MANAGING POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION AFTER MULTIPARTY ELECTIONS: REGIME TRAJECTORIES IN BURKINA FASO, CHAD, AND SENEGAL

By

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UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA

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To my parents, Kris and Jeff
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It is not an understatement to say that it is very much thanks to Leo that I have found success. I established a network of friends and colleagues through the Sahel, Europe and the United States, largely thanks to his inherent ability to bring people together. His friendliness towards and respect for others has opened up doors for me in at least six foreign countries and the knowledge that his door will always be open is a constant comfort. No one else has influenced my thinking on and understanding of the Sahel to the same extent. In addition to the many academic, bureaucratic, cultural and historical lessons I have taken from Leo, I would like to mention three important life lessons which stand out and served me extraordinarily well during my fieldwork: 1) talk to anyone who will talk you; 2) eat anything other people eat; and 3) sleep anywhere you can. Finally, I should also note that his inveterate editing skills significantly improved my dissertation and that his theoretical creativity over the years fundamentally shaped my trajectory to receiving a Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science.
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In 2011, Dan Smith became the only political science faculty member at UF, besides Leo Villalón, to have traveled and conducted research in all six Sahelian countries through the Trans-Saharan Elections Project. I continue to be grateful for his willingness to let me tag along for the project’s first round of US-based trips to Tallahassee and Washington D.C. I learned more about American Politics and the management of elections during this time than any other. Dan has had several excellent pieces of advice during my time at the University of Florida. I would like to note one in particular: while I was navigating the failed 2015 RSP-led coup in Ouagadougou, Dan advised me not worry about my dissertation research design and soak up the military coup experience. That advice turned out to be highly influential as I hope many of the episodes discussed in this dissertation attest.

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<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>ADF/RDA</td>
<td>Alliance pour la Démocratie et la Fédération/Rassemblement Démocratique Africain (Alliance for Democracy and the Federation/African Democratic Assembly)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AEF</td>
<td>Afrique Équatoriale Française (French Equatorial Africa)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANP</td>
<td>Actual Number of Parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANS</td>
<td>Agence Nationale de Sécurité (National Security Agency)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AOF</td>
<td>Afrique Occidentale Française (French West Africa)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APEM</td>
<td>Appui au Processus Electoral au Mali (Support for the Electoral Process in Mali)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>Collectif Anti Référendum (Anti-Referendum Group)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCVC</td>
<td>Coalition Contre la Vie Chère (Coalition against the High Cost of Living)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDP</td>
<td>Congrès pour la Démocratie et le Progrès (Congress for Democracy and Progress)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDR</td>
<td>Comités de Défense de la Révolution (Committees for the Defense of the Revolution)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEFOD</td>
<td>Centre d’Etudes et de Formation pour le Développement (Center for Development Studies and Training)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CENI</td>
<td>Commission Electorale Nationale Indépendante (Independent National Election Commission)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CND</td>
<td>Conseil National de la Démocratie (National Council of Democracy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNDP</td>
<td>Cadre National de Dialogue Politique (National Team for Political Dialogue)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNS</td>
<td>Conférence Nationale Souveraine (Sovereign National Conference)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNT</td>
<td>Conseil National de Transition (National Council of the Transition)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Name</td>
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<tr>
<td>CODMPP</td>
<td>Collectif d'Organisations Démocratiques de Masse et de Partis Politiques (Collective of Democratic Organizations for the Masses and Political Parties)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPDC</td>
<td>Coalition des Partis Politiques Pour la Défense de la Constitution (Coalition of Political Parties for the Defense of the Constitution)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CST</td>
<td>Conseil Supérieur de Transition (Superior Council of the Transition)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DDS</td>
<td>la Direction de la Documentation et de la Sécurité (Office of Security and Documentation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENP</td>
<td>Effective Number of Parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAP</td>
<td>Forces Armées Populaires (Popular Armed Forces)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAN</td>
<td>Forces Armées du Nord (Armed Forces of the North)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAR</td>
<td>Front des Forces d’Action pour la République (Action Forces Front for the Republic)</td>
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<td>FLAS</td>
<td>Foreign Language Area Studies</td>
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<td>FLN</td>
<td>Front de Libération Nationale (National Liberation Front)</td>
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<td>Frolinat</td>
<td>Front de Libération Nationale du Tchad (National Liberation Front for Chad)</td>
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<td>LASDEL</td>
<td>Laboratoire des Etudes et de Recherche sur les Dynamiques Sociales et le Développement Local (Laboratory for Studies and Research on Social Dynamics and Local Development)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MPP</td>
<td>Mouvement du Peuple pour le Progrès (People’s Movement for Progress)</td>
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<td>MPS</td>
<td>Mouvement Patriotique de Salut (Patriotic Movement for Salvation)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MRS</td>
<td>Mouvement Républicain Sénégalais (Senegalese Republican Movement)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAFA</td>
<td>Nouvelle Alliance du Faso (New Alliance for Faso)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODP/MT</td>
<td>Organisation pour la Démocratie Populaire – Mouvement du Travail (Organization for Popular Democracy – Labor Movement)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAI</td>
<td>Parti Africain de l’Indépendance (the African Party for Independence)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAP-JS</td>
<td>Parti Africain pour la Paix et le Justice Social (African Parti for Peace and Social Justice)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Name and Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>PDS</td>
<td>Parti Démocratique Sénégalais (Senegalese Democratic Party)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PLD</td>
<td>Parti pour les Libertés et le Développement (Party for Freedom and Development)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PPT</td>
<td>Parti Progressiste Tchadienne (Chadian Progressive Party)</td>
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<td>PS</td>
<td>Parti Socialiste (Socialist Party)</td>
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<td>RDA</td>
<td>Rassemblement Democratique Africain (African Democratic Assembly)</td>
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<tr>
<td>RDP</td>
<td>Rassemblement pour la Démocratie et le Progrès (Assembly for Democracy and Progress)</td>
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<tr>
<td>RSP</td>
<td>Régiment de Sécurité Présidentielle (Presidential Security Regiment)</td>
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<td>TSEP</td>
<td>Trans-Saharan Elections Project</td>
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<tr>
<td>UDIHV</td>
<td>Union pour la Défense des Intérêts de Haute-Volta (Union for the Defense of Upper Volta’s Interests)</td>
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<tr>
<td>UDT</td>
<td>Union Démocratique Tchadienne (Chadian Democratic Union)</td>
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<tr>
<td>UDV</td>
<td>Union Démocratique Voltaïque (Voltaic Democratic Union)</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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MANAGING POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION AFTER MULTIPARTY ELECTIONS: REGIME TRAJECTORIES IN BURKINA FASO, CHAD, AND SENEGAL

By

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Why, after the inauguration of multiparty elections, do regimes in some countries undergo further processes of political liberalization, while in others, regimes effectively curtail political liberalization or even slide into authoritarianism? Typically, studies addressing this question focus on the characteristics of democracy’s formal institutions, particularly the free and fair organization of elections. This perspective fails to take sufficient account of other important institutions outside of the formal structures of government that shape the prospects for continued liberalization. After winning elections, ruling parties inevitably seek to remain in power and are thus always tempted to limit or even erode liberalization. In newly electoral regimes, militaries, neo-traditional institutions, civil society and the opposition can at times reinforce and at other times provide a check on the illiberal tendencies of governments by shaping the ways in which regimes manage pressures for greater political liberalization.

In this dissertation, I investigate the role of these institutions in the divergent regime trajectories of Burkina Faso, Chad and Senegal before and after the inauguration of multiparty elections. Burkina Faso exhibits moments of limited liberalization followed by illiberal recalibrations through which the regime long maintained stable electoral authoritarianism. Senegal experienced processes of liberalization that produced a trajectory towards gradual
democratization. In contrast, the Chadian regime has followed a trajectory towards the restoration of authoritarian rule. Relying on over eighteen months of fieldwork in these three countries, I examine the factors shaping the coercive power of the military, the symbolic power of neo-traditional institutions, and the mobilizing power of civil society and the opposition. I find that where the military is cohesive and maintains a norm of republican civil-military relations, it may improve the prospects for political liberalization; where neo-traditional institutions are socially and politically integrated they promote stability, thereby improving the prospects for political liberalization; and where civil society and the opposition exhibit high organizational capacities and remain unified they may successfully pressure regimes for greater political liberalization. When these characteristics are in place, these non-governing institutions may function as a vital check on the illiberal tendencies of newly electoral regimes, improving the prospects for democracy over time.
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION: MULTIPARTY ELECTIONS AND THE EMERGENCE OF ELECTORAL REGIMES IN AFRICA

Introduction

This is Burkina. God didn’t give us the sea. He didn’t give us fields of cocoa. God gave us Blaise Compaoré. When Blaise was in power at least life was stable enough, even if you were poor you knew it’d be alright. With Blaise you always had some Tô

—Burkinabè Garage Manager

Field Notes

Burkina Faso held regular presidential and legislative elections from 1991 until 2012: five legislative and four presidential contests. In each election over this period, Blaise Compaoré won the presidency and his party, the Congrès pour la Démocratie et le Progrès (CDP), secured a majority in the legislature. Yet the dominance of Compaoré and the CDP over the Burkinabè political system came to an abrupt end in 2014 when hundreds of thousands of protesters flooded the streets of the capital city of Ouagadougou as well as many other urban areas. They sought to prevent the National Assembly from voting on a law, which would have modified presidential term limits, enabling Compaoré to seek his fifth term in office.²

The protests led to the dismissal of the government, a state of emergency, and—at the demand of the protesters—the resignation of President Blaise Compaoré. Leaders of the movement, including civil society activists and political opposition members, joined with military leaders to quickly assemble a civilian-led transitional government. Recognizing that the

1 From a conversation with neighbors on the future of Burkina Faso in Ouagadougou, October 22, 2015, shortly after the failed coup d’état attempt. This and all subsequent translations from interviews in French are my own. Tô is a commonly served ground millet dish.

2 While technically this term would have been a third term, following his 2005 and 2010 terms, under the 2014 constitutional provisions guiding presidential term limits, Compaoré had in fact already served two terms under previous constitutional provisions in 1991 and 1998. For a more in-depth discussion of the reforms which allowed for these terms constitutionally see: Eizenga and Villalón (forthcoming).
protests had been driven by popular demands to maintain and uphold the constitutional order, rather than to undermine or overthrow it, the transitional government quickly committed to organizing elections within twelve months.

The return to elected civilian rule proved to be tenuous, and its survival far from guaranteed. In September 2015, a coup d’état led by the former presidential guard—the Régiment de Sécurité Présidentielle (RSP)—temporarily took the interim president, prime minister, and two government ministers hostage and threatened to derail the entire transition process. Although the coup was met with significant nation-wide mobilization demanding a return of power to the transitional government, the RSP brutally repressed the protesters, killing dozens in the capital. The RSP’s attempt to seize power ultimately failed, however, when the chief of staff of the national military led an operation against the coup leaders and reinstated the interim president and other transitional authorities. The national military thus successfully restored constitutional order under the transitional government, and despite the RSP interruption, presidential and legislative elections successfully took place on November 30, 2015.

For the first time in the history of the country, Burkinabè citizens elected a civilian head of state who had never taken power militarily. The 2015 elections also marked the first time that an incumbent president did not run for reelection. Similarly, the legislative elections produced groundbreaking results. The president-elect’s party, the Mouvement du Peuple pour le Progrès (MPP), won only a plurality of the seats—55 of 127—in the National Assembly. Thirteen other parties received seats, including the well-established opposition party, the Union pour le Progrès et le Changement (UPC), which received 33 seats. The former ruling party, the CDP, won the third-largest number of seats (18).
It is notable that the CDP won any seats at all, since forty-two members from the former ruling party had been barred from contesting the elections. In fact, many leaders from the former ruling party had their assets frozen during the campaign period, or were even imprisoned for their alleged involvement in orchestrating the failed RSP coup and/or because of their support for a third term under Compaoré’s rule. These features of the election were not widely recognized by observers, and cast some doubt over the accuracy of the characterization of these elections as Burkina Faso’s freest, fairest, and most competitive, electoral contests (Bertrand 2015, and Eizenga and Villalón 2016). While this characterization may be true, that is largely the case because the elections certainly highlighted important improvements in Burkina Faso’s electoral process, and not say that the elections were without deficiencies.

Previously, Burkina Faso had been considered one of West Africa’s most stable regimes during Compaoré’s rule. At least superficially, Compaoré appeared to have shaped the electoral process in Burkina Faso in such a way that it allowed for limited political competition on a regular basis, while simultaneously guaranteeing that he and his party remained in power (Eizenga 2015). As such, many scholars classified the Burkinabè regime as a hybrid type of authoritarian regime, which used and benefited from holding regular multiparty elections, but still engaged in patently authoritarian practices. The elections in 2015 yielded new electoral victors, but it was far from clear that there had been a significant change in the trajectory of the regime. Perhaps, more importantly, this sequence of events raises a number of central questions regarding the prospects for political liberalization in Burkina Faso: Why, for instance, did it take

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3 For examples see: Hilgers and Loada (2014) who refer to the Compaoré regime as Semi-Autoritaire (Semi-Authoritarian); Eizenga (2015) who applies Levitsky and Way’s Competitive Authoritarianism to Compaoré’s time in power; and Harsch (2017, 118) who describes Compaoré’s rule as “‘Democracy’ with a Heavy hand.” Compaoré’s regime also meets all of the necessary criteria of an electoral authoritarian regime described in Schedler (2006 and 2013).
a popular insurrection, with the participation of hundreds of thousands of citizens, to remove Compaoré from power only to uphold the constitution and the political institutions that were established during his tenure as president? Why did the military, the sole remaining vestige of Compaoré’s rule, split in two over this process? And why, following the protests, their repression, and the clear determination of the people to maintain the constitutional process, did the CDP still win the third-largest number of seats? How do we make sense of these seemingly paradoxical aspects of Burkina’s move towards democratization?

Any one of these questions might serve as a fascinating basis for a dissertation project. Rather than focus on these case-specific questions, however, I attempt in this dissertation to situate them in a broader, comparative framework. Analyzing Burkina Faso in comparison with two of its neighbors, Senegal and Chad, the central research question which drives this dissertation is as follows: Why, after the inauguration and routinization of multiparty elections, do regimes in some countries undergo further processes of political liberalization, while in others, regimes effectively curtail political liberalization or even slide into authoritarianism?

This and related questions have piqued the attention of political scientists for decades, and volumes of work form an immense body of literature on regime types and political order. In more recent years, these questions have received particular attention due to mounting evidence that several of the world’s newer democracies have fallen short of full democratic governance despite holding relatively free and fair multiparty elections. In some cases, countries have increasingly reverted to authoritarian forms of governance, despite avoiding complete regime

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4Indeed, entire academic journals address this subject. For example, *Democratization* defines itself as “devoted to the study of the broad phenomenon of democratization – defined as the way democratic norms, institutions and practices evolve and are disseminated or retracted both within and across national and cultural boundaries. In particular, the journal aims to promote a better understanding of distinct phenomena, such as: transition to democracy and democratic installation, democratic consolidation and crisis, and deepening or weakening of democratic qualities.”
breakdown and still organizing semi-regular elections. Indeed, events around the world in the 2010s led scholars and policymakers to question whether the world is experiencing a “democratic recession” (Diamond 2015) or perhaps witnessing what Plattner (2017) terms “liberal democracy’s fading allure.” In 2018, prominent scholars of democratization Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt, even authored a work intended for popular consumption entitled, “How Democracies Die,” sounding an alarm against rising authoritarianism in the United States and abroad.

Illustrative of this trend toward authoritarianism, Burkina Faso is one example among many wherein the establishment of multiparty elections did little to promote democratic rule. Instead, a new form of politics has emerged in these hybrid regimes, in which political elites use seemingly democratic political and social institutions to accumulate power and maintain a political order characterized by persistent authoritarian traits (Schedler 2013). Political development following the inauguration of multiparty elections is far from uniform, and that variation presents an important puzzle. Typically, studies addressing this question focus on the characteristics of liberal democracy’s formal institutions, particularly the free and fair organization of elections. This perspective fails to take sufficient account of other important institutions outside of the formal structures of government that shape the prospects for continued liberalization. I refer to these institutions as non-governing institutions, by which I mean to emphasize that while each of these institutions shapes electoral politics in specific ways, they remain institutions that lie outside the formal structures of government in civilian multiparty regimes. These non-governing institutions are important because, after winning elections, ruling parties inevitably seek to remain in power and are thus always tempted to limit or even erode liberalization. In newly electoral regimes, non-governing institutions, such as militaries, neo-
traditional institutions, civil society and the opposition can at times reinforce and at other times provide a check on the illiberal tendencies of governments by shaping the ways in which regimes manage pressures for greater political liberalization.

In this dissertation, I investigate the role of these institutions in the divergent regime trajectories of Burkina Faso, Chad and Senegal before and after the inauguration of multiparty elections. Building on a body of data gathered by extensive fieldwork in these three comparable cases, I develop a theoretical framework which posits that variations in the characteristics of the military and neo-traditional institutions, shape the ability of regimes to manage pressures for greater political liberalization. These pressures themselves vary depending on the nature and organization of the two other non-governing institutions, civil society groups and the political opposition. I use this theoretical framework to explore the different ways in which contemporary multiparty regimes evolve in distinct and divergent regime trajectories, with important consequences for political order and stability. Empirically, the work offers explanations for cases of three distinct trajectories: gradual democratization (Senegal), stable electoral authoritarianism (Burkina Faso), and the restoration of authoritarian rule (Chad).

Before embarking further along the trajectory of this project it is worth highlighting a particular point about the structure and approach and I have developed for this dissertation. I begin several of the subsequent chapters with episodes from the 2014-2015 events in Burkina Faso that took place during my fieldwork in the country. As I discuss below, the purpose of this dissertation project was to engage in a theory building exercise to better understand processes of political liberalization in African electoral regimes. To accomplish this goal, I build on conceptual innovations within an historical institutionalist approach that examines a series of proposed causal processes over time through comparative historical analysis. Within historical
institutionalism there has been a tendency in retrospect to regard outcomes as inevitable, but in fact when observing the processes involved in arriving at a particular outcome as those processes take place, their highly contingent nature is revealed.

My fieldwork in Burkina Faso afforded me precisely this type of opportunity. As briefly discussed above, the events of the popular insurrection in 2014 that ousted Blaise Compaoré from power and the subsequent political transition of 2015 that took place during my fieldwork offered an unprecedented opportunity for me to observe the complicated and highly contingent processes at work between different institutions as the regime recalibrated. These processes and events demonstrated the crucially important roles of political, but non-governing, institutions that shape the prospects for political liberalization over time. For the moment, the future regime trajectory of Burkina Faso remains shrouded in uncertainty. However, the dramatic events which occurred in 2014-2015 help to illuminate the various ways in which non-governing institutions shape the ability of regimes to manage pressures for political liberalization. Consequently, as I develop my theoretical argument throughout this dissertation, I attempt to highlight episodes from these events in Burkina Faso to demonstrate how they have shaped my intellectual trajectory.

**Multiparty Elections and Democratization**

The fall of the dictatorships in Spain and Portugal and the collapse of the Soviet Union, followed by the subsequent political transitions to multiparty electoral systems across the world, encompass the so-called “Third Wave of Democracy” (Huntington 1991). These events reverberated around the world, leading to the birth of multiparty electoral systems which aimed to lay the institutional foundations for new democracies. These initial moments of institution-building often arose from temporary compromises to impassioned debates over new electoral systems and power distributions between political elites (Bodian 2016, 17). The resultant
institutional frameworks inevitably underwent periodic revisions, depending on the tools available to political elites during negotiations over processes of political liberalization. The result of these negotiations set countries on different regime trajectories, variously in the direction of further political liberalization and eventual democratization, stable electoral authoritarianism, the erosion of political liberalization lead to restored authoritarianism, or in some cases, regime breakdown and collapse.

Sub-Saharan Africa as a region captures all of these experiences. African countries experienced an explosion of multiparty political systems during the 1990s as virtually all countries undertook formal political transitions to democracy. Initially, many of these developments were greeted with optimism. Many observers suggested that this moment marked the “second wave of liberation in Africa” (Kpundeh 1992, Osaghae 2005 and Cheeseman 2015, 86). These transitions were seen as a renewed invigoration of and experimentation with democratic institutions across the continent. Bratton and van de Walle (1997) argued that the spread of multiparty elections across Africa in the 1990s was due to the after-effects of regional economic stagnation, international pressure, and popular protests, all of which local populations hoped multiparty elections would address. This initial optimism for democratization efforts that swept Africa in the early 1990s shortly passed, however, as it became apparent that most countries on the continent remained undemocratic. Explanations for this lack of democratization range from the absence of a capable African state (Linz and Stepan 1996, 18 and Joseph 1999) and legacies of endemic conflict and instability (Cheeseman 2015 and Debois 2016), to entrenched neopatrimonial relations (Bratton and van de Walle 1994 and 1997) and a lack of

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5 Henceforth and throughout this document, sub-Saharan Africa and Africa are used interchangeably and do not include the North African countries or territories: Morocco, Western Sahara, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, or Egypt.
modernization, a ‘civic culture’ or ‘social capital’—components several scholars understand as crucial for democracy (Almond and Verba 1963, Putnam 1993, Diamond 1999 and Inglehart and Welzel 2005). Yet, these accounts fail to address a particular puzzle: why did some African countries democratize, despite these deficits, and why did many of the ‘flawed’ and ‘blocked’ transitions result in dramatically different regime trajectories? Indeed, even those cases labeled as ‘successful’ transitions experienced significant variation in their subsequent regimes trajectories; a point which Villalón and VonDoepp (2005) raise in a volume which follow the political development of each ‘successful’ case.

Beyond the analyses of failed democratization efforts in Africa, there is significant variation in the ways that such ‘electoral’—but not fully democratic—regimes continue to evolve. While some regimes allow a ruling elite to embed themselves with little threat to their power, others exhibit significant political liberalization and increasingly competitive elections; while still others, such as Burkina Faso, exemplify the ways in which elites continue to renegotiate regime stability even in moments of potential breakdown, allowing and simultaneously limiting political competition. Africa is the region of the world with the highest absolute number of electoral regimes, and increasingly these regimes reflect a wide diversity in their form and nature.

Today, virtually every African country organizes elections which are contested by multiple political parties (Diamond and Plattner 2010). According to Morse (2017, 115), by 2013, only four African countries did not hold regular elections to national office. Lindberg

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6 The terms flawed and blocked refer to Bratton and van de Walle’s distinctions (1997, 120).

7 Here I rely on Roessler and Howard’s (2009) regime typology which distinguishes between ‘closed,’ ‘hegemonic,’ and ‘competitive’ authoritarian regimes, and ‘electoral’ and ‘liberal’ democratic regimes based on their elections and their quality. Africa as a world region presents the highest absolute number of regimes, but it is the diversity amongst these regimes that I wish to highlight here.
(2006) has argued that this explosion of electoral activity across the continent represented a new form of regime transition, which he termed “democratization by elections.” He maintains that through repeated electoral experiences, voters and electoral systems improve, leading not only to freer and fairer elections, but also eventually to consolidated democracy through mutually reinforcing processes of political learning and accountability (2006, 143-161). However, some have warned against the risk of falling into the “fallacy of electoralism” (Schmitter and Karl 1991), or have noted that authoritarian regimes may simply imitate democratic procedures to bolster their claim to power. Thus as Linz and Stepan (1996) demonstrated across South America and Europe, it is essential that scholars do not mistake the necessity of elections for democracy with sufficiency for democracy.

Nevertheless, the inauguration of elections leads to a transformation of politics and thus, deserves to be analyzed as a moment in which political transformations such as regime change may indeed be possible. For instance and Edgell et al. (2018, 423) point out, when opposition parties openly contest elections over several iterations this process may fundamentally alter the nature of the regime. Indeed, a burgeoning body of research suggests that elections may be self-reinforcing, producing positive feedback loops that expedite and potentially enhance the democratic quality of electoral regimes (Edgell et al. 2018). Yet, for some, this “electoral mode of transition” has not been observed in other parts of the world, and further analysis of the evidence for Africa suggests that uninterrupted electoral cycles and repeated elections do not necessarily lead to more democratic regimes (Bogaards 2013 and 2014). Indeed, in cases from other regions of the world, evidence suggests that regular elections may result in stronger and more stable authoritarian regimes (Magaloni 2008). Certainly, the routinization of multiparty
elections in authoritarian contexts has generated significant debate over its effects on regimes and their rulers.

Incumbent presidents and ruling parties across much of Africa have proven themselves to be stubbornly entrenched, avoiding turnovers at the ballot box in many cases and solidifying electoral authoritarianism as a modal regime type in the region. This resembles the global trend toward electoral authoritarianism elsewhere in the world during the post-Cold War period (Levitsky and Way 2010 and Schedler 2013). Applying the criteria outlined by Roessler and Howard (2009), by 2017 nearly 45% of African countries were electorally authoritarian, while fewer than 30% were democratic. Africa presents a rich terrain in which to study political order and regime trajectories comparatively. Yet, surprisingly, few scholars have undertaken this endeavor.

This dissertation project seeks to fill this gap with a comparative examination of the origins, trajectories, and development of political order in sub-Saharan African multiparty regimes. It aims to do this by addressing a central question: Why do increasingly democratic institutions develop in some African regimes following the adoption of multiparty elections, while in others, authoritarian institutions persist or even resurface despite the adoption of multiparty elections? That is: How do politics and the prospects for democracy evolve following

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8 Using Roessler and Howard’s (2009) regime typology, I identified 21 electoral authoritarian regimes (counting those classified as ‘hegemonic’ or ‘competitive’) out of 48 total regimes.

9 Here again, I am relying on Roessler and Howard’s (2009) regime classifications. I have simplified their typology in this instance so that democratic regimes meet their criteria for electoral democracies as a threshold, thus capturing what the authors term both ‘electoral’ and ‘liberal’ democracies. Meanwhile, what I refer to as electoral authoritarian regimes hold elections, but do not meet any additional criteria, thus combining Roessler and Howards’ sub-categories of ‘hegemonic,’ and ‘competitive’ authoritarian regimes.

10 For a select few studies which attempt to study the diversity of regimes comparatively in sub-Saharan Africa primarily with regard to whether or not regimes democratize see: Lebas (2011), Riedl (2014), and Cheeseman (2015); and for comparative studies on electoral authoritarianism see: Morse (2015 and 2017).
multiparty elections in Africa? In order to gain more insight into the political processes which result in different regime trajectories and to better understand the institutional mechanisms which guide these trajectories, I focus on countries within a particular sub-region of Africa: the Francophone Sahel. The six countries of the Sahel—Senegal, Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, and Chad—collectively reflect the many different trajectories that have led to the diversity of electoral regimes in Africa.

Research Design and Methodology

Why look to the Sahel?

The Francophone Sahel sub-region of Africa is uniquely suited to address these theoretical questions. Following independence, some Sahelian regimes quickly transformed themselves into single party systems lasting for decades (Zolberg 1966); while in others, regimes survived for less than two years after independence. The Sahel presents instances of new leaders coming to power by a multiplicity of means: military coup, popular uprising, rebellion, and, of course, elections. Authoritarian regimes in the Sahel have been replaced by different authoritarian as well as by democratic configurations, and in some cases have vacillated between the two regime types. Virtually all regime types and trajectories have occurred in this region during the post-colonial period. This study sets out to analyze three Sahelian countries—Burkina Faso, Senegal, and Chad—which display significant variation in their regime trajectories before their respective adoptions of multiparty elections, but which are each characterized by the establishment of stable regimes following the implementation of regular elections.\textsuperscript{11} That

\textsuperscript{11} These features separate these three countries from Mali, Niger, and Mauritania. As I discuss in more detail below and in Chapter 2, I apply Mill’s method of agreement to select Burkina Faso, Chad, and Senegal for their contextual similarities and variation on the dependent variable, \textit{Regime Trajectory}. Doing so improves the ability of this dissertation to develop an internally valid theory. Mali, Niger and Mauritania each share many contextual similarities with Burkina Faso, Chad, and Senegal, but following the establishment of multiparty elections in the former three countries, each experienced at least one regime breakdown. Mali experienced a regime breakdown in 2012, and arguably since then, it has failed to oust an occupation and on-going insurgency in its northern territory.
common stability, however, has been achieved via very different trajectories in terms of movement towards democracy. Specifically, I analyze three different regime trajectories following the inauguration of multiparty elections: 1) gradual democratization in Senegal, 2) stable electoral authoritarianism in Burkina Faso, and 3) the restoration of authoritarian rule in Chad. In addition to this variation, these cases help to demonstrate how different institutional configurations of non-governing institutions shape the ways in which regimes manage pressures for greater political liberalization in Africa.

Senegal, Burkina Faso and Chad share many structural characteristics, yet each has followed a different path since independence and through the era of political liberalization. Despite four decades of rule by the same party, Senegal represents one of the few African countries that has not experienced prolonged single party or military rule. Instead, Senegal exemplifies the regime trajectory of gradual democratization through incremental reforms and an increasingly open political system. It is the only Sahelian country (and one of the very few in Africa) to experience peaceful turnovers following incumbent losses at the ballot box in both 2000 and 2012, which effectively solidified its standing as a democratic regime. Burkina Faso and Chad endured significant regime instability for the first two decades after independence, but both stabilized under presidents who took power by force shortly before the democratic openings of the 1990s, who then convened transitions to multiparty electoral systems in their early years in office, and who subsequently won presidential elections throughout the 1990s and 2000s. These similarities, however, mask important differences between the two cases.

Niger has experienced repeated regime breakdowns in 1996, 1999, and 2010. Mauritania experienced a breakdown in 2008 and had only limited multiparty elections before 2006. I explore these cases in comparison to Senegal, Burkina Faso and Chad in Chapter 2 when evaluating alternative theoretical explanations for regime divergences in each case.
In Burkina Faso, the authoritarian characteristics of the regime gave way to gradual controlled liberalization and increased electoral competition following episodes of social unrest. Civil society and the media thus gained important freedoms during the 2000s, and political reforms produced opportunities for the opposition to gain greater representation in the legislature (Eizenga 2015). These features suggest that under the long presidency of Blaise Compaoré, Burkina Faso should be considered a stable electoral authoritarian regime. Over a comparable timeframe the ruling party in Chad, on the other hand, became increasingly entrenched and authoritarian, gradually eroding rather than expanding its liberal components. The only substantive challenges to the ruling party in Chad have come from threats of destabilization in the region and unsuccessful rebel attacks on the capital city. Presidential term limits were abolished in 2005, and legislative elections were indefinitely postponed in 2015. These characteristics suggest that Chad has experienced a restoration of authoritarian rule, despite organizing multiparty elections semi-regularly since 1996.

These brief descriptions of the different regime trajectories experienced in these three countries lay out the specific theoretical puzzle for this project: Why, despite their similar characteristics, have these three Francophone Sahelian countries experienced different degrees of authoritarian resilience, and what are the consequent implications for the prospects for democratization in the region? In Chapter 2, I address various possible explanations for this puzzle—including economic development and crises, and party types, institutionalization, and systems. While of some utility, following a comparative examination of my three cases in

\[\text{12 As we will see throughout this work, the Burkina regime presents interesting and sometimes contradictory characteristics over time. There thus exists some debate over the appropriate regime classification of Burkina Faso among the few studies which attempt to do so at all. For the purposes of this dissertation, I chose to classify it as an electoral authoritarian regime, a type for which I put forward explicit parameters in Chapter 2. For an argument as to why Burkina Faso under Compaoré might best be considered a hegemonic authoritarian regime in 1990s and a competitive authoritarian regime since the 2000s, see Eizenga (2015).}\]
regional context I find each of these explanations ultimately inadequate for explaining the observed variation. I propose, instead an alternative theoretical framework which we be developed in the following chapters.

Small-N Comparative Historical Analysis

I employ comparative historical analysis (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003) and process tracing techniques (Hall 2008) to investigate the varying progress of political liberalization within the stable multiparty electoral regimes of the Francophone Sahel. Comparative historical analysis hinges on the logic of Millian methods of comparison. More precisely, I employ Mill’s “method of indirect difference” and a “most similar systems design” which aims to compare cases which differ in outcome (regime trajectory) in order to identify more easily its cause(s) or independent variable(s) (Ragin 1987, 39-42 and 47-48).\[13\] This method employs comparisons between cases which exhibit highly similar characteristics, but also divergent outcomes to approximate control variables across various contextual factors and to identify what theoretically relevant factor(s) varied prior to the outcome of interest (Slater and Ziblatt 2013, 1303). As alluded to above, this dissertation uses this approach to compare the historical differences and similarities between Burkina Faso, Chad and Senegal in an effort to develop a theory of political liberalization in African electoral regimes.

When employed effectively, Millian methods produce high levels of internal validity and are thus particularly valuable for building theory. However, these methods are unable to adequately evaluate the external validity of the results without extending the analysis to a broader set of cases in which to test the portability of the theory. In other words, Mill’s methods

\[13\] Mill’s method of difference can be contrasted with Mill’s method of agreement, which compares highly dissimilar cases exhibiting the same outcome, in an effort to identify what other factors are similar and may explain the outcome. For a more in depth discussion of Mill’s methods see Ragin (1987, 34-52)
of comparison help to substantiate a theory within a set of cases, but fail to evaluate how well that theory travels to other cases. Furthermore, high levels of internal validity require a very strict interpretation of similar and different cases to rule out all plausibly relevant and alternative explanatory factors essentially reflecting experimental logic (George and Bennett 2005, 152). This is rarely, if ever, feasible in the comparative studies of regimes. Since Mill’s methods cannot provide the complete internal validity of an experiment, they are frequently employed alongside within-case process tracing techniques. Process tracing techniques attempt to examine and elaborate the causal links—the causal chains and causal mechanisms—between the variable(s) theorized to produce an outcome of interest (George and Bennett 2005, 206). Process tracing is particularly useful for research employing a theory-oriented approach which “construes the task of explanation as one of elucidating and testing a theory” by investigating its causal mechanisms (Hall 2008, 306). When investigating the cases in a given study, this method can be employed to verify that evidence exists in support of the expected causal mechanisms, or alternatively, to rule out particular causal processes.

In a similar fashion, process tracing is an extremely useful way to inductively build theory. The value of process tracing resides in its ability to develop and explore the causal mechanisms helping to substantiate the internal validity of its results. As such, it is particularly useful in case studies which seek to closely analyze the causal mechanisms suspected of being at work in a given theory, as well as those which seek to elaborate or refine theory in deviant cases. By integrating process tracing with comparative methods, studies gain inferential leverage over internal validity which is essential for developing theory. In doing so, however, a necessary tradeoff is often external validity and further analysis and theory testing to a larger more representative sample is necessary to establish the external validity of the theory and to
determine the exact boundaries of a theory’s scope. I return to a discussion of the approach I employ to develop the theoretical framework of this dissertation in Chapter 3.

I use these methods to analyze the cases of Burkina Faso, Senegal, and Chad in an effort to build and preliminarily substantiate a theoretical framework that demonstrates the institutional origins and trajectories of political regimes in these countries. I developed the theoretical framework for this dissertation inductively from the data gathered during field research. It relies on historical comparisons of processes between the three cases over time to minimize the risk of over-reaching generalizations, and to evaluate the influence of political institutions through control and variation, in order to build a theoretical framework which helps explain political order in different multiparty electoral regimes in Africa. I pay close attention to the historical contexts and antecedent conditions at work prior to multiparty elections to fully develop the causal processes at work in each case’s regime trajectory (Mahoney 2001, 6-8). I then more closely analyze the institutional configurations of the military, neo-traditional institutions, civil society and the opposition through process tracing and comparison to evaluate the roles each institution plays in shaping the ability of regimes to manage pressures for greater political liberalization. The purpose of this analysis is to explain how different configurations of these institutions shaped the repertoire of options available to regimes that continued to face pressures for greater political liberalization following the start of multiparty politics. The historical moments addressed in this project cover the different antecedent conditions created by colonial rule, the subsequent conditions during the post-colonial period, and the variation across the regime trajectories in each country following the adoption of regular multiparty elections.

Relying on over eighteen months of fieldwork in Chad, Senegal and Burkina Faso, I examine the factors shaping the coercive power of the military, the symbolic power of neo-
traditional institutions, and the mobilizing power of civil society and the opposition. I find that
where the military is cohesive and maintains a norm of republican civil-military relations, it may
improve the prospects for political liberalization; where neo-traditional institutions are socially
and politically integrated they promote stability, thereby improving the prospects for political
liberalization; and where civil society and the opposition exhibit high organizational capacities
and remain unified they may successfully pressure regimes for greater political liberalization.
When these characteristics are in place, these non-governing institutions may function as a vital
check on the illiberal tendencies of newly electoral regimes, improving the prospects for
democracy over time. When these characteristics are not in place, however, regimes are more
likely to experience a steady erosion of political liberalism resulting in a return to
authoritarianism as ruling parties face limited barriers to holding on to power. Finally, when
these characteristics are partially in place, the prospects for greater or reduced political
liberalization vacillate creating an uneasy balance generally exemplified by electoral
authoritarianism.

Senegal underwent a gradual democratization, incrementally enacting liberalizing
reforms until the democratic process institutionalized so successfully that two incumbent
presidents lost elections and allowed for peaceful turnovers of power. Unlike Senegal, Burkina
Faso exhibits moments of limited liberalization followed by illiberal recalibrations through
which the regime long maintained stable electoral authoritarianism. Burkina Faso adopted
multiparty elections only to have its leaders develop a large repertoire of tactics through which
the regime periodically offered liberalizing reforms only to later recalibrate to maintain a
trajectory as an electoral authoritarian regime. As the introduction of this chapter highlights, non-
governing institutions engaged in the recalibration of the regime during the 2015 political
transition. Chad, on the other hand, experimented with multiparty elections only to slowly erode any semblance of their democratic character, first by manipulating the electoral process, then by abolishing presidential term limits and ignoring the legislative electoral calendar. The Chadian regime has systematically removed checks on executive power and the fairness of the electoral process and has thus charted a trajectory toward the restoration of authoritarian rule.

In sum, this dissertation focuses on four non-governing institutions: the military, neo-traditional institutions, civil society and the political opposition, and argues that variations in the characteristics of these institutions either pressure multiparty regimes for greater political liberalization or enable multiparty regimes to maintain or deepen authoritarian politics. The specific characteristics of these institutions are themselves shaped by important historical antecedent conditions. I will argue that one set of particularly influential antecedent conditions pertains to the extent and form of colonial administration and its effects on these institutions in each of the three countries. Elites seeking to maintain their power over political processes at the moment of establishing multiparty elections relied on these sets of institutions to do so, with varying degrees of success depending on the nature of the institutions.

The analysis of my three cases suggests that when these institutions produce high levels of extractive power and coercive capacity, regimes are more likely to follow trajectories that restore authoritarian rule. By contrast, when these institutions are unable to fully provide these tools to elites seeking to maintain power, liberalizing concessions are likely to be made, although these will be dependent on the capacity of civil society and opposition groups to mobilize liberalizing pressures. In contexts where these are limited, electoral authoritarian regimes are likely to develop and persist. Finally, when liberalizing pressures grow beyond the ability of
these institutions to function as a bulwark against them, the military and neo-traditional institutions are more likely to support and facilitate gradual processes of democratization.

**Field Word and Data Collection**

This dissertation builds on nearly eight years of research on the prospects for democracy in Africa, and more specifically in the Sahel. This interest first emerged in 2011, when I participated in the Trans-Saharan Elections Project at the University of Florida. This project exposed me to the diversity of electoral systems in the Sahel, as I was introduced to several elections officials from each of the six countries. The extensive discussions I witnessed between the American and Sahelian delegations reinforced my suspicion that while their electoral systems exhibited variations, these could not sufficiently explain the diversity of regime trajectories in the region.

In addition to these insights, the Trans-Saharan Elections Project confirmed my need to strengthen my French and Arabic language skills for fieldwork. Funding provided by the US Department of Education through a Foreign Language and Area Studies (FLAS) Fellowship from the Center for African Studies at the University of Florida allowed me to undertake

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14 Over a three year period, the Trans-Saharan Elections Project (TSEP) organized exchanges between elections officials and specialists in the United States and the six countries of the Francophone Sahel. It was made possible by a grant to the University of Florida from the United States Department of State Bureau of Education and Cultural Affairs. For more on this project see the TSEP website at: [http://tsep.africa.ufl.edu/](http://tsep.africa.ufl.edu/).

15 On a personal level, one of the most fascinating insights from this project related to the extent to which Sahelian electoral processes were in many ways more advanced than their American counterparts. I witnessed this during my fieldwork as well. The amount of money spent on improving the administration and organization of African elections, alongside funds spent on protecting these elections from fraud, is impressive. In many ways Sahelian elections appear superior and more secure than American elections.

16 Throughout the Sahel, French is an official language, although in each country only a minority of the population is fluent in French. Nevertheless, it is the language of the vast majority of official documents. Chad and Mauritania have two official languages: French and Arabic. This has led to a number of debates across political and socio-religious spheres in each country, and some ambiguity of the relative status of the two languages in Mauritania. On Chad see: Eizenga and Hoinathy forthcoming.
significant Arabic language study.\textsuperscript{17} During the same period, I studied French at the University of Florida, followed by a nine-week intensive one-on-one course at the West African Research Center in Dakar, Senegal.\textsuperscript{18} From Senegal, I was able to travel to Ouagadougou and N’Djamena to conduct initial interviews in Burkina Faso and Chad, allowing me to begin to plan the parameters of this project.\textsuperscript{19}

The second and major phase of research and the beginning of data collection for this dissertation began with the support of a Minerva Initiative grant to the University of Florida entitled “Political Reform, Socio-Religious Change, and Stability in the African Sahel.”\textsuperscript{20} The project sought to analyze the socio-political factors affecting stability and instability in the Sahel. Noting that these six countries comprised some of the least-studied countries in Africa, and that each of these countries faced significant contemporary challenges to stability, the purpose of the project was to comparatively assess the factors influencing the capacity of Sahelian states to manage pressures for socio-political change and to maintain stability, political order and effective governance. The project provided significant funding for the fieldwork research.

\textsuperscript{17} In total, I completed four semesters of Arabic study, the fourth taking place at the Arabic Language Institute in Fez, Morocco.

\textsuperscript{18} This course met five days a week for four hours in the summer of 2013, and consisted of face to face exchanges between myself and the instructor.

\textsuperscript{19} My pre-dissertation fieldwork was made possible by generous funding from the Department of Political Science and Center for African Studies at the University of Florida. I planned this fieldwork to coincide with the APSA Africa Workshop on Religion and Politics held in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso during 2013 for which I was selected as a fellow.

\textsuperscript{20} This grant was awarded from the Minerva Initiative, a basic social science research program of the US Department of Defense as grant FA9550-12-1-0433. The Principal Investigator of the grant was Leonardo A. Villalón who selected three PhD students, including myself, as co-investigators. This grant also led to the establishment of the Sahel Research Group at the University of Florida. We obtained IRB approval from the University of Florida Institutional Review Board 02 under the protocol #2014-U-0338 and subsequent renewals as well as approval from the Human Research Protection Official Review process from the Research Oversight and Compliance Division of the Department of the United States Air Force under protocol number FOS20140014H.
conducted for this dissertation, as well as two others, each of which compares different sets of three Sahelian countries.

In the case of this dissertation, the primary fieldwork research took place over the course of eighteen months from June 2014 to December 2015. This time was split between Senegal, Burkina Faso, and Chad almost evenly. In each setting, I conducted formal interviews with elites, gathered material at national archives, discussed politics on the street in numerous informal interviews, and worked closely with local research and civil society organizations concerned with politics. I immersed myself in the contemporary politics of each place by deploying the techniques and strategies of ethnographic research and participant observation, by volunteering with local organizations, attending events at universities and, in Chad, by teaching English as a second language to adults.

I collected data while conducting 117 semi-structured interviews with political elites, state officials, civil society activists, religious and traditional leaders, and media representatives. I also took contemporaneous notes after countless discussions, debates, and conversations during this time. Generally, I took “jottings” down on paper during interviews and throughout the day. I would write a detailed transcription of these notes, following the standard practices outlined in Bernard’s (2011) “Research Methods in Anthropology,” as soon as possible following the events of that day. I used these interviews to guide my historical research, and throughout the dissertation I rely on this body of evidence to help support my argument.

Finally, I collected and analyzed hundreds of documents in each country, including official state documents, political party documents, civil society organizations’ materials, and

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21 To maintain anonymity, I have not identified my interviewees by name in this work. Instead, when citing these interviews I have noted only the location and general profession of the interviewee.
archival records. These records vary dramatically, both between countries and within country, with regard to their accessibility, content, and quality. In many cases, historical documents at the archives did not receive needed attention or care, were completely disorganized, or were simply missing. Nevertheless, I obtained significant primary sources of information from these archives and other organizations during my fieldwork. Following fieldwork, I also collected and compiled all available elections data for each multiparty election that has been held in the Sahel through 2016.

This research has resulted in a great amount of information upon which I have based the comparison of regime trajectories between countries and institutions from the colonial period through the adoption of multiparty elections in Burkina Faso, Chad, and Senegal. A core insight from this research was that multiparty regimes in Africa rely on multiple sources of authority for the maintenance of political order, and that these sources of authority are constantly adapting to their own political contexts. Thus, while each of these regimes have remained stable following the commencement of multiparty elections, their institutions are continuing to evolve and shape contemporary political processes, leading to diverging outcomes in terms of democratization.

The prospects for democracy ebb and flow with the ability of these institutions to adapt.

**Structure of the Dissertation**

This dissertation is organized into nine chapters. This introductory chapter has introduced questions about the regime origins, trajectories, and institutions in Francophone Sahelian African countries. I have suggested that different sets of institutions and their characteristics function as tools for regime elites to manage pressures for political liberalization following the adoption of

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22 In Chad two organizations proved to be particularly helpful: Centre d’Etudes et de Formation pour le Développement (Center for Development Studies and Training) and Centre Al-Mouna, both established by the Catholic Church in N’Djamena.
multiparty elections. I have noted that following the widespread adoption of multiparty regimes across the African continent, many regimes remained persistently authoritarian, while other underwent processes of democratization and argued that the variation in the trajectories of African regimes warrants closer examination. The remainder of the dissertation develops this argument via close empirical analysis of the cases of Burkina Faso, Chad, and Senegal, each of which followed a different regime trajectory following in the inauguration of multiparty elections.

Chapter 2, “Regime Types and Political Order in Africa,” discusses the conceptualization and measurement of regime types and examines various existing explanations for divergent regime trajectories. It pays particular attention to those explanations based on economic and political party-based factors. I use an original data set from thirty-five legislative elections, and apply Elischer’s (2013) typology of African political parties to demonstrate that the types of parties, their level of institutionalization, and the party system within which they operate in the Sahelian context are not sufficient explanations for the divergent regimes trajectories of Senegal, Burkina Faso and Chad. To the contrary, these factors are remarkably similar when compared across these three different countries. The chapter concludes by offering an alternative approach to explaining Sahelian regime trajectories.

Chapter 3, “Non-Governing Institutions and Political Liberalization,” elaborates the theoretical and conceptual framework for the dissertation. Building on the discussion developed in Chapter two, this chapter presents a theoretical framework based on different institutional configurations in Senegal, Burkina Faso and Chad to explain how these configurations limited the possible options available to regime elites seeking to remain in power. Specifically, I address how different configurations of militaries, neo-traditional institutions, civil society and the
opposition can at times reinforce and at other times provide a check on the illiberal tendencies of governments by shaping the ways in which regimes manage pressures for greater political liberalization. Ultimately, these differences lead to three potential outcomes: gradual democratization, electoral authoritarianism, and the restoration of authoritarian rule.

Chapter 4, “Regime Antecedents: Colonialism in Sahelian Africa,” investigates differences in the colonial experiences of Burkina Faso, Chad, and Senegal. It attempts to demonstrate that the extent and form of French colonial administration of the three territories varied dramatically. These differences not only shaped political order at the moment of independence, but also had significant impact on the military, political parties, neo-traditional institutions, and on each country’s civil society, resulting in different post-colonial experiences. The remainder of the chapter offers a brief overview of each country’s decolonization.

Chapter 5, “Political Liberalization and Regime Trajectories,” discusses in detail the different political dynamics of each country following the colonial period leading up to their respective inaugurations of multiparty elections. It then explores the trajectories that each regime followed subsequent to these transitions. I maintain that in addition to political parties, three other institutions—the military, neo-traditional institutions, and civil society—played critical roles in shaping the institutional frameworks which would go on to operate after their respective political transitions in each case.

Chapter 6, “The Role of the Military in Liberalizing Regimes,” argues that levels of military cohesion and the character of civil-military relations shape the prospects and types of political interventions that are likely to occur in a newly electoral regime. Where the military remains more cohesive, is used for social development purposes, and is characterized by republican civil-military relations, regimes will attempt to constrain political liberalization, but
are more likely to abide by constitutionally guaranteed civil liberties and electoral processes. Interestingly, in these liberalizing regimes, the military may operate as a guarantor of the political institutions that oversee democratic processes, which may ultimately result in gradual democratization. Conversely, where the military is composed of competing factions, or has experienced years of rebellion and civil conflict, abuses and repression of civil liberties are more common and liberalization is more likely to be impeded, preventing the consolidation of democracy and indeed increasing the likelihood of a restoration of authoritarian rule. Where the military is cohesive, but characterized by civil-military relations predisposed to intervention, political liberalization is likely to advance and regress, making stable electoral authoritarianism the most likely outcome.

In Chapter 7, “Neo-Traditional Institutions and Symbolic Power in Sahelian Africa,” I develop the argument that the degree to which neo-traditional institutions are socially and politically integrated in a given regime may provide the necessary social stability for nascent liberal institutions to take root and, over time, allow for gradual democratization to occur. However, where neo-traditional institutions are disparate, and do not command authority over large overlapping sections of society, they are unable to provide assurances of social stability and may, in fact, be counterproductive to liberalization. In such cases, neo-traditional institutions and their leaders are less likely to be useful allies for political parties or regimes. Instead, disparate neo-traditional institutions are more likely to be pitted against one another in competition over state resources. This may lead to the oppression of certain groups over others, may exacerbate socio-political tensions, and may make democratic institutions malfunction along neo-patrimonial lines.
Chapter 8, “Mobilizing Power and the Roles of Civil Society and the Opposition,” investigates the roles of these institutions in shaping regime trajectories by examining two factors: the degree to which civil society and the opposition present a united front for political liberalization, and the organizational capability of these groups to mobilize large cross-sections of society so as to pressure regimes for political liberalization. When pressures for liberalization are coordinated, widespread and sufficiently targeted, leaders of the military or neo-traditional institutions are likely to make calculated decisions not to support the regime in their efforts to consolidate power. Alternatively, when such pressures appear to be disparate or limited, the military and neo-traditional leaders are more likely to gamble on the regime, and in turn increase the regime’s chances of resisting or significantly controlling pressures for liberalization. The ability of the opposition and civil society to pressure regimes for political liberalization thus depends in part on the extent to which they are fragmented or unified.

In Chapter 9, “Conclusion: Political Liberalization in Africa,” I situate the broad contributions of the dissertation within the subfields of comparative politics and African politics. The argument that I develop in this dissertation underscores the importance of understanding the roles of the military, neo-traditional institutions, civil society and the opposition both for scholars and for those invested in the advancement of political liberalization. I also elaborate on future areas of research on these subjects, by discussing the possibilities for testing the theoretical framework developed in the dissertation, address its potential scope conditions, and elaborate on the implications of this theoretical framework for cases of regime instability following multiparty elections. Finally, I conclude the dissertation by examining the potential future for political liberalization in Burkina Faso.
CHAPTER 2
REGIME TYPES AND POLITICAL ORDER IN AFRICA

Introduction

People in the street are calling them [the political leaders of the MPP] the ‘Mouvement des Postes Perdus’ (Movement of Lost Positions) because they used to run the CDP. Their political platform might as well be a carbon copy of the last ten years. But sure, things are moving here.

—Burkinabè Bureaucrat

Field Notes

Political parties are constantly multiplying in the Sahel, but the people who lead them rarely change. The Mouvement de Peuple pour le Progrès (MPP), the political party which ultimately won the 2015 presidential elections and a plurality of the legislative seats in Burkina Faso, illustrates this fact well. It was created by three prominent politicians—Roch Marc Christian Kaboré, Salifou Diallo, and Simon Compaoré—each of whom had previously held leadership positions under the Compaoré regime and in former ruling party, the Congrès pour la Démocratie et le Progrès (CDP). Voters are not unaware of these trends. As highlighted in the quote which opens this chapter, some ironically referred to the MPP as the ‘Mouvement des Postes Perdus’ leading up to the 2015 electoral campaign because the MPP was established by the CDP members who had just resigned en masse in January 2014. The extent to which the same political players continue to dominate the field is impressive. During the 2015 political transition and in an attempt to distance himself from the CDP, Compaoré’s former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Djibrill Bassolé, established his own political party—the Nouvelle Alliance du

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1 Interview with a Burkinabè bureaucrat. Ouagadougou, February 27, 2015.

2 Table 2-2 below provides data on the effective, relevant and actual number of parties to participate in legislative elections in each Sahelian country. For specific reference to Senegal on this phenomena see Kelly (2014).

3 A literal translation for this might be, Movement of Lost Positions. The intended interpretation and joke is that this is a political party created from several politician who lost their influence within the ruling party.
Faso (NAFA)—to run for the presidency. Even Zéphirin Diabré, the leader of the opposition and the Union pour le Progrès et le Changement (UPC) since the 2010 legislative elections, began his professional debut as a member of Compaoré’s government in the 1990s.

During the transition in 2015, opposition parties recognized that the CDP continued to pose a viable electoral threat even after its overthrow, simply because of its historical political dominance and the name recognition which many of its representatives enjoyed. Consequently, members of the transitional legislature—in which the MPP and other opposition parties held a majority—reformed the electoral code, barring all those who had supported Compaoré’s attempt to modify presidential term limits from standing for elections.4 This reform crippled the CDP after the Constitutional Court ruled that its presidential candidate, Eddie Komboigo, and several of its legislative candidates were prohibited from contesting elections.5 In response to these prohibitions, members of the former presidential guard who were still loyal to Compaoré attempted to derail the political transition by staging a coup and taking the interim president and prime minister hostage. Notably, Fatou Diendéré, a former CDP parliamentarian, was one of the individuals barred from contesting the legislative elections by the Constitutional Court. She also happened to be the spouse of the leader of the coup, Gen. Gilbert Diendéré.6 The coup eventually

4 These events and the formal structure of the transitional legislature are discussed in greater detail in subsequent chapters.

5 Businessman and prominent political fundraiser Eddie Komboigo was selected by the CDP to lead the party in 2015. It was a highly contested decision within the party, which fractured multiple times over the decision. Ultimately, the faction which argued for a public change of face won the debate. Of course, Komboigo’s financing of several political campaigns and continued support for the party at this challenging time also contributed to the decision. These insights were presented to me in multiple interviews with former (and at the time, current) CDP members during the months from August 2015 through December 2015.

6 Gilbert Diendéré was widely suspected of executing the assassination of Thomas Sankara at the order of Blaise Compaoré in 1987. He continued to work closely with Compaoré as the leader of his presidential guard until the 2014 popular insurrection.
failed when the national military intervened to reverse it and reinstalled the transitional government.

Burkina Faso is not alone in the continued dominance of a political elite. Indeed, Senegal is also subject to this phenomenon. For several electoral cycles, Senegal’s political parties, the *Parti Socialiste* (PS) and the *Parti Démocratique Sénégalais* (PDS) were led by the same political figures. After Léopold Sédar Senghor’s retirement as president in 1981, Abdou Diouf, who had risen through the ranks of the PS to become Prime Minister, was appointed Senghor’s successor. Diouf then faced Abdoulaye Wade, leader of the PDS, in four successive presidential contests, winning each time until the 2000 presidential elections. Ousmane Tanor Dieng replaced Diouf as the leader of the PS after the electoral defeat of 2000, and has continued to lead the party through 2018. Abdoulaye Wade continued to lead the PDS until he lost the presidential election in 2012, after which he took a brief hiatus only to return as the party’s Secretary General prior to the 2017 legislative elections.7

In Chad, President Idriss Déby Itno represents yet another manifestation of political dominance. In 2005, he successfully eliminated presidential term limits by popular referendum. On April 10, 2016, the most recent presidential elections in Chad took place and Déby obtained a majority of the votes in the first round. However, the election suffered from numerous credible accusations of fraud, leading the opposition leader, Saleh Kebzabo, to characterize the election as a “coup d’état électoral” (Eizenga 2018). Kebzabo had been Déby’s principal opponent since 2008, after Ibni Oumar Mahamet Saleh, the former opposition leader, went missing.

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7 In 2017, Abdoulaye Wade was 90 years old, but this did not prevent him from playing an important role in the legislative campaign. Accordingly to one analyst, his announcement that he would retake the mantle as the Secretary General of the party “completely disrupted the ruling party” and “enable the PDS to take the second largest number for seats at the National Assembly.” Interview with Senegalese political scientist and analyst 15 August 2017.
Déby has been in power since 1990 after having ousted Hissène Habré. Déby’s political party, the Mouvement Patriotique du Salut (MPS), has held a majority in the legislature since its inaugural elections in 1997, despite the fact that more than one hundred political parties are registered in Chad (Munan, Angsthelm, and Djiraibe 2014). Unlike other Sahelian countries, one of the primary paths to power in Chad has been through political violence, which remains endemic throughout the country (Debos 2016). Consequently, a number of notable political leaders have perished, gone into exile, or negotiated their own transformation from rebel group to political party during Déby’s tenure in power. This has facilitated some changing of the political guard in Chad, but similar to other countries in the region, the vast majority of elites who occupied the political scene in the 1990s continued to dominate the political scene in the 2010s.

These forms of political dominance in Burkina Faso, Senegal and Chad more broadly demonstrate a distinctive feature of Sahelian politics: the existence of a persistent political elite, or as one Burkinabè political analyst described, an “élite infatigable” (inexhaustible elite). The presence of such elites can be noted in all six Sahelian countries, regardless of their ranking by various measures of political freedom, democracy, or autocracy (Eizenga forthcoming). Clearly, even though multiparty elections across much of sub-Saharan Africa brought optimism to those hoping for democratic consolidation, incumbent politicians and their parties quickly learned how to survive democratization, maintaining their political power through a variety of tactics.

Given these observations, and the similarly persistent dominant elite in Burkina Faso, Chad, and Senegal, this chapter situates these three countries comparatively within the Sahel to address potential explanations for their surprisingly divergent regime trajectories. By

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8 Interview with a Burkinabè political analyst, September 8, 2015. Ouagadougou.
“trajectories” I refer to processes of political reform that result in the historical evolution of a regime. More precisely in this work I use the term to refer specifically to the transformation over time of new multiparty regimes, following a political “transition,” into seemingly stable regimes of varying types or natures. That is, variations across regime trajectories refers to variations in the direction in which a regime might evolve following the inauguration of multiparty elections and the regime’s subsequently ability to manage pressures for greater political liberalization.

In the following sections, this chapter first discusses regimes, their conceptualization in political science, and their operationalization in this dissertation. The chapter then turns to a discussion of existing explanations for different regime trajectories by: 1) evaluating Sahelian economies, 2) engaging with literature on political parties in African politics, and 3) offering a first look at a compilation and analysis of legislative elections data for each of the six Sahelian countries since their respective adoptions of multiparty elections. This analysis engages with many different scholars who have investigated the role political parties and party systems play in shaping regimes across sub-Saharan Africa. I argue that the emphasis on the role of parties provides an incomplete picture when it comes to the Sahel, where political parties, party systems and other political institutions fail to explain the divergent regimes trajectories of Sahelian countries. As we shall see throughout the dissertation, other important variables must be taken into account in an explanation of this variation. The chapter concludes with a brief discussion of the approach taken in this dissertation, so that the reader can better understand the regime trajectories of Burkina Faso, Chad, and Senegal.

Concepts and Approaches to Regime Trajectories

Regime Types and the Conceptualization of Democracy

An important first step for any study seeking to better understand regimes, their trajectories, and the evolution of their politics is establishing how to distinguish one regime from
another. In other words, how do we conceptualize democracy versus authoritarianism? Then, how do we measure it? Disputes over conceptualization and measurement of regimes have filled libraries of books; rather than attempt to provide a new concepts or measures, I build on the previous work to establish a starting point from which to build the argument of this dissertation. In this section, then, I will briefly review some of the common approaches and debates, before settling on definitions of regimes appropriate for this study. I then provide some initial evidence to demonstrate that each of my three cases exhibit different regime trajectories, both as they are defined in this dissertation, and also by a number of other approaches. These are the differences I seek to explain. Finally, I consider existing explanations for democratization and regime stability, and argue that these are insufficient to explain the variation I have described.

Regardless of the methodological approach, all research designed to assess differences in regimes must address how democracy is conceptualized. One of the most longstanding and influential concepts of democracy dates back to the early 1970s. Using a Weberian “ideal type” strategy, Dahl (1971) defines democracy using two basic components. First, democracy is characterized by “permissible opposition, public contestation, or political competition,” and secondly by "the right to participate in public contestation" or the "inclusiveness" of a regime (Dahl 1971, 4). When these two components are fully realized it results in a democratic regime (Dahl 1971, 3). Based on this conceptualization, Dahl offers four regime types which exhibit high and low combinations of political competition and participation. He defines regimes with

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9 Dahl presents eight institutional guarantees that must be met in order for a regime to be considered a democracy. They are: 1. Freedom to form and join organizations; 2. Freedom of expression; 3. Right to vote; 4. Eligibility for public office; 5. Right of political leaders to compete for support (and implied the right of political leaders to compete for votes); 6. Alternative sources of information; 7. Free and fair elections; and 8. Institutions for making government policies depend on votes and other expressions of preference (1971, 3). These are further elaborated throughout the book.
high levels of both competition and participation—those closest to approximating democracy—as 'polyarchies' (Dahl 1971, 7).

Dahl’s institutional requirements for democracy generated a number of important advancements in the conceptualization of democracy for political science and social science inquiry more generally. Many students of democracy have continued to point out that democracy captures much more than just elections and their outcomes, which at best, serve as proxies for actual democratic governance. Schmitter and Karl (1991, 4) maintain that “democracy does not consist of a single unique set of institutions [like multiparty elections]. There are many types of democracy, and their diverse practices produce a similarly varied set of effects.” Clearly, this poses a number of problems for the accumulation of knowledge and theory about democracy, as well as the processes which lead to or conversely away from it.

Coppedge argues that these problems often arise because we understand democracy to be a ‘thick’ multi-dimensional concept, which is problematic for theory testing designs unless we are able to ‘unpack’ the various dimensions into measurable indicators (1999, 469-470). Democracy is a patently multi-dimensional concept and consequently, there is a need to collect rich data across all countries to develop better measures capable of reflecting all dimensions proposed to be theoretically relevant (Coppedge 2012, 47). In Coppedge’s view, there is no reason why democracy cannot be quantified. He suggests that quantifying democracy is analogous to reducing Beethoven’s compositions to ones and zeroes for digital recordings.

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10 Karl (1995) refers to the tendency of looking solely at elections to evaluate democracy as the “fallacy of electoralism”

11 Numerous different regime sub-types and hybrid regimes have been conceptualized in an attempt to capture variation along the multitude of characteristics which define different forms of democracy. Collier and Levitsky (1997) highlight a number of them in their article, “Democracy with Adjectives.” As I elaborate below, literature on authoritarianism has also found itself in this position, as scholars struggle with the fact that not all authoritarian regimes are equal.
(Coppedge 2012, 45). However, other scholars disagree with this, arguing that this represents an overly ‘natural science based’ approach to conceptualizing democracy, since it is based on assumptions that there are unchanging law-like principles operating in processes of democratization.

One dominant measure which attempts to quantify democracy, or at least that scholars have frequently used to approximate democracy, is Freedom House scores. This measure uses scores ranging from 1 (most free) to 7 (least free), in an attempt to capture civil liberties and political rights in its ordinal scale. Freedom House is commonly employed in quantitative analyses of democratization, among other ordinal measures of democratic quality such as the Polity IV database. However, these measures and their calculated scores inevitably result in some ambiguity. For instance, how should researchers theorize the difference between a score of 4 and 5 on Freedom House scales? Or, how should research account for the fact that there are many different combinations of scores which may average a 4 on Freedom House scales? The same kinds of questions can be posed to the Polity IV dataset to highlight problematic issues in identifying regime type thresholds or cutoffs as well as equifinality.

Attempting to avoid these issues, some scholars maintain that dichotomous measures of democracy are preferable to graded or ordinal scales of democracy (Huntington 1991, 11-12; Przeworski et al. 1996, and Przeworski and Limongi 1997, 178-179). Proponents of this perspective argue that democracy is not capable of being measured by degree across different ‘kinds’ of regimes; a regime is either a democracy or it is not (Alvarez et al. 1996, 21-22).

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12 I have served as the Freedom House analyst for Burkina Faso and Chad since 2015. Consequently, the scores for Burkina Faso and Chad have been directly influenced by my own evaluations.

13 Equifinality refers to idea that many different paths can lead to the same destination. In this particular case, it refers to the fact that several different score combinations across the various civil liberties and political rights indicators used by Freedom House may lead to the same final score.
Additionally, dichotomous measures are expected to be more reliable, with some claiming that they include less measurement error (Alvarez et al. 1996, 31). Perhaps one of the most infamous (and consequently, longest lasting) examples of this approach is the so-called ‘two-turnovers test,’ which maintains that to be considered a stable democracy, governments must undergo two peaceful transfers of power following elections.\(^\text{14}\)

Collier and Adcock (1999) address this debate and many others in their seminal piece “Democracy and Dichotomies.” The authors provide an extensive discussion of the debates surrounding the appropriate conceptualization and measurement of democracy and non-democracy. In the process they review numerous methodological arguments and general justifications marshaled by prominent scholars of democracy. Ultimately, the authors reject the idea that there exists a single “correct” meaning for the concept for all research and thus, they maintain that scholars should adopt a pragmatic approach paying close attention to the theory and research design they employ. Specifically, the authors write:

\[\text{…we adopt a pragmatic position…we hold that specific methodological choices are often best understood and justified in light of the theoretical framework, analytic goals, and context of research involved in any particular study. As theory, goals, and context evolve, choices about concepts likewise may evolve (Collier and Adcock 1999, 539).}\]

More recently, others have continued to build on this pragmatic approach by linking it to qualitative research design which pay particularly close attention to theory and within-case analysis. It is this form of approach which I endeavor to develop below.

A growing number of works measure and evaluate democracy through the use of process tracing which pays careful attention to the within-case interaction of theory, concepts, and

\(^{14}\) Huntington 1991, 267: “The party or group that takes power in the initial election at the time of transition loses a subsequent election and turns over power to those election winners, and if those election winners then peacefully turn over power to the winners of a later election.”
evidence to capture causal complexity and generate more creative theorizing (Bernhard 2009, 513). I attempt to adopt such an approach in this dissertation. Brady, Collier and their co-authors discuss the benefits of this type of qualitative research for concept formation by demonstrating the advantages of using within-case observations that are sensitive to causal process (2010, 184). Such an approach, however, should still take seriously the need to demonstrate variation, especially for comparative purposes. In order for causal processes to be adequately examined, research designs must be crafted in such a way as to observe differences over time both within cases and between cases.

As I briefly introduced in Chapter 1 of this dissertation, my aim is to evaluate the theorized causal mechanisms at work by comparing the different regime trajectories between Burkina Faso, Chad and Senegal, and it seeks to substantiate these mechanisms with detailed within-case accounts. First, I seek to confirm that these three cases do, in fact, present some variation across their regime trajectories. I have already suggested that the two peaceful electoral turnovers (2000 and 2012) experienced in Senegal, the continued uneven electoral playing field in Burkina Faso, and the elimination of presidential term limits and indefinite postponement of legislative elections in Chad, capture at least some qualitative evidence of divergent trajectories.

Below, I have prepared two graphs that present measures from the Varieties of Democracy (V-DEM) project. These graphs demonstrate that by these measures Burkina Faso, Senegal and Chad each display some variation after their respective adoptions of multiparty elections. Figure 2-1 below uses data from the V-DEM project to compare levels of electoral

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15 I have collected data from V-DEM to produce graphs of their values for five different indices which measure different forms of democracy: electoral democracy, liberal democracy, deliberative democracy, egalitarian democracy, and participatory democracy. Each of these graphs reveal similar trends and consequently, only those for electoral and liberal democracy are produced here.
democracy in each of the three countries from 1960 to 2016. This data is arguably superior to other available measures for several reasons: it is anchored in Dahl’s (1971) framework discussed above, it follows the minimalist and maximalist version of electoral democracy (Munch and Verkuilen 2002), the data are fully transparent and are not overly predicated upon the country experts who code the data, and finally, confidence intervals are provided to help reveal levels of uncertainty present in the data (Teorell et al. 2016). Unsurprisingly, Senegal consistently holds the highest value through 2015. Chad maintains the lowest value through the era of multiparty elections, and Burkina Faso falls between the two, though its score increases following 2010. Figure 2-2 displays the values for each country based on V-DEM’s liberal democracy index. The trends for each country based on this measure roughly mirror those presented in Figure 2-1.

![Electoral Democracy Index](https://www.v-dem.net/en/analysis/VariableGraph/)

Figure 2-1. Electoral Democracy from 1960 to 2016

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16 Figure 2-1 was generated using the V-DEM project’s online analysis tool available to the public here: [https://www.v-dem.net/en/analysis/VariableGraph/](https://www.v-dem.net/en/analysis/VariableGraph/). The Electoral Democracy Index attempts to reflect the extent to which the ideal
Three important observations can be made from these figures. First, the figures help to substantiate the argument that these three regimes have followed divergent regime trajectories. Second, Figure 2-1 demonstrates that after adopting multiparty elections, each regime indeed experienced an improvement in its overall score. However, Figure 2-2 calls into question how significant these improvements should be considered, particularly in the case of Chad. Finally, both Figures 2-1 and 2-2 suggest that Burkina Faso has undergone significant improvements to the quality of its electoral and liberal democracy in the wake of 2014. I would argue, however that this should at best be taken with caution—and may even be a temporary illusion—given the

Figure 2-2. Liberal Democracy from 1960 to 2016

of electoral democracy is achieved, which the project defines as “making rulers responsive to citizens, achieved through electoral competition for the electorate’s approval under circumstances when suffrage is extensive; political and civil society organizations can operate freely; elections are clean and not marred by fraud or systematic irregularities; and elections affect the composition of the chief executive of the country. In between elections, there is freedom of expression and an independent media capable of presenting alternative views on matters of political relevance.” More information about the measure is available at https://www.v-dem.net.
ongoing dynamics still in play. As I have already suggested in Chapter 1, while the popular insurrection in Burkina Faso should be viewed as an important moment for turnover in power, it does not (yet) represent regime change. To the contrary, the majority of the institutions and the ways in which power continues to be accumulated and organized in Burkina Faso remain very similar to what they were under the Compaoré administration.

**Regime Types in Burkina Faso, Chad and Senegal**

A vast body of literature exists on classifying regime types and sub-types of hybrid, democratic and authoritarian regimes.\(^{17}\) The regime distinctions put forth by Roessler and Howard (2009), and mentioned in Chapter 1, build on three classic works that distinguish regimes by levels of contestation and participation (Schumpeter 1942, Dahl 1971, and Diamond 1999). Using these fundamental texts as a starting point, they distinguish between five different types of regimes: closed authoritarian, hegemonic authoritarian, competitive authoritarian, electoral democracy, and liberal democracy (Roessler and Howard 2009, 107-109). The authors develop these types primarily through an electoral lens, although they recognize that the deepening of democracy also requires a “robust civil society, effective and independent legislatures and judiciaries, and a civilianized military” (Roessler and Howard 2009, 106).

Assuming that elections are a necessary component of democratic governance, however, the types described by Roessler and Howard support the argument that Senegal, Burkina Faso and Chad have followed distinct regime trajectories after adopting multiparty electoral systems.

Senegal, Burkina Faso and Chad have each allowed “regular national elections, where there is a choice in candidates” following their respective adoptions of multiparty elections; they

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\(^{17}\) For a useful overview of new trends in comparative politics related to forms and dynamics of authoritarian rule see: Diamond (2015) Chapter 8, “Hybrid Regimes.”
thus do not fit the criterion for *closed authoritarian regimes* (Roessler and Howard 2009, 107).\(^{18}\)

This dissertation will show that Chad might have been considered a *competitive authoritarian regime* following multiparty elections in 1996 and 1997, but that subsequently, those in power systematically moved the regime on a trajectory toward a *hegemonic authoritarian regime*.\(^{19}\) Conversely, following the inauguration of multiparty elections the Burkinabè regime experienced slight improvements to the level of political contestation allowed in elections and the electoral process, but the transitional government still relied on illiberal tactics to limit competition and participation. This created “an uneven playing field,” situating Burkina Faso as a stable *competitive authoritarian regime* (Roessler and Howard 2009, 108, and Levitsky and Way 2002, 53 and 2010, 9-12).\(^{20}\) Senegal, on the other hand, incrementally adopted increasingly liberal political reforms. This resulted in a trajectory from competitive authoritarianism to *electoral democracy* under which legislative and executive elections became generally free and fair and were characterized by a competitive process on a largely even playing field, despite irregular infringements of civil liberties (Roessler and Howard 2009, 109).

To insure that my distinctions between these regime trajectories are sufficiently robust, I have also followed the recent guidelines for classifying political regimes presented by

\(^{18}\) This distinction is also the fundamental criteria for electoral authoritarianism as presented by Schedler (2006 and 2013). Schedler distinguishes electoral authoritarian regimes from electoral democracies by evaluating the freedom, fairness, inclusiveness, and meaningfulness of elections (2013). Such distinctions place all three countries addressed in this dissertation squarely in the category of electoral authoritarian regimes immediately following their respective adoptions of multiparty elections. Chad then remains in that category until legislative elections become routinely postponed, at which point it should be classified as authoritarian. Burkina Faso remains in the electoral authoritarian category with the possibility that after the 2015 political transition, it became an electoral democracy. Senegal became an electoral democracy in 1993 following reforms to the electoral system.

\(^{19}\) Taking inspiration from Munck (2006, 33), Roessler and Howard define hegemonic authoritarian regimes as those in which “restrictions on opposition parties and their political activities, bias in state-owned media coverage, and other forms of repression so severely circumscribe contestation that the incumbent candidate or party does not face the possibility of losing, often leading to a de facto one-party state” (2009, 108).

\(^{20}\) See also Eizenga 2015 for a case study of competitive authoritarianism in Burkina Faso under Blaise Compaoré.
Lührmann, Tannenberg and Lindberg (2018). These authors follow the guidance laid out by Collier and Adcock (1999) and aim to provide scholars with a “robust and comprehensive regime type measure for research requiring and ordinal or dichotomous measure” (Lührmann, Tannenberg and Lindberg 2018, 2). The authors develop four regime types: 1) closed autocracies, 2) electoral autocracies, 3) electoral democracies, and 4) liberal democracies. Pulling from Dahl’s (1971) theory of polyarchy, they begin by distinguishing regimes by those which are autocracies and those which are democracies. Lührmann, Tannenberg and Lindberg (2018, 4) make this distinction by distinguishing those regimes in which “rulers are de-facto accountable to citizens through periodic elections…and [those in which] they are not.” They then further distinguish between the two types of democracies and the two types of autocracies. Closed autocracies do not exhibit multiparty elections for the chief executive or the legislature. Electoral autocracies hold de-jure multiparty elections for the chief executive and the legislature. In addition to de-facto multiparty, free and fair elections, electoral democracies meet the minimal institutional prerequisites outlined by Dahl (1971, 8) for democracy, but fail to exhibit the rule of law or other liberal principles set out by the authors. Liberal democracies, then, meet all these perquisites and the rule of law and liberal principles are satisfied.\textsuperscript{21}

In the future, I hope to obtain and analyze the Lührmann, Tannenberg and Linberg’s data and regime type classifications in closer detail with regard to the three cases focused on in this dissertation. For the time being however, I have applied the distinctions between these four regime types as presented by the authors. Chad is arguably the most clear cut case. After the inauguration of multiparty elections in 1996 the regime falls within the category of an electoral democracy.

\textsuperscript{21} The detailed discussion and subsequent measurement justification employed by the authors to delineate these regimes types are laid out in Lührmann, Tannenberg, and Lindberg (2018, 3-6).
autocracy. After the elimination of presidential term limits in 2005 and the subsequent indefinite postponements of legislative elections (first in 2006; then again in 2015) Chad may now be a closed autocracy given its lack of legislative elections. Burkina Faso, is best identified as an electoral democracy based on this typology. It fulfills the electoral requirements and the meets Dahl’s institutional prerequisites, beginning in the 1990s according to the V-Dem data presented by Lührmann, Tannenberg, and Lindberg (2018). However, as will become clear throughout this dissertation and particularly in Chapter 5, the extent to which Burkina Faso maintains de facto accountability through free and fair multiparty elections varies as the regime actively works to undermine those institutions. This may partially explain why Burkina Faso is one of the cases which most frequently diverges from the other regime type datasets that Lührmann, Tannenberg, and Lindberg compare to their own (2018, 11-12). Senegal, clearly distinguishes itself as electoral democracy as well, but much earlier after the adoption of full multiparty elections in 1983. Senegal, does not meet the authors’ requirements for being considered a full liberal democracy, but in their appendix Senegal is distinguished from other electoral democracies as receiving a high score. For my purpose this provides at least initial evidence to suggest that over time processes of political liberalization may be accumulating in Senegal.

For simplicity, throughout this dissertation I will refer to Burkina Faso as a stable electoral authoritarian regime, Senegal as an electoral authoritarian regime which gradually democratized, and Chad as an electoral authoritarian regime which experienced a restoration of authoritarian rule. I develop detailed qualitative accounts to further justify these distinctions in

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22 Following the guidelines in Lührmann, Tannenberg, and Lindberg (2018, 5), Chad does not meet the Electoral Democracy Index cut-off value of greater than .5. Figure 2-1 displays the values for this variable and Chad clearly remains below the .5 threshold.
Chapter 5. This variation in trajectories, representing the dependent variable to be explained, will be discussed in much more detail in the chapters that follow.

As a point of departure for the explanation, I now turn in this chapter to a discussion of some of the dominant existing explanations for why regimes might diverge following multiparty elections. I begin by considering arguments which maintain that economic factors—such as level of economic development, crises, and relative inequality—can explain why some regimes democratize and others do not. I then turn to a relatively new and growing body of literature in African politics which investigates the roles of political parties and party systems in explaining differences in regime types and the organization of political power. I follow this with a discussion based on data that I collected and organized on politically relevant parties and thirty-five multiparty legislative elections held in all six of the Sahelian countries to compare differences and similarities between these countries. Ultimately, I draw the conclusion that differences in economic development, party institutionalization, party type, and party system do not adequately explain why Senegal, Burkina Faso, and Chad differ with regard to their regime trajectories in the post-multiparty elections period. Other explanations are necessary to explain their divergence.

**Existing Explanations of Democratization and Authoritarian Rule**

The strong correlation between development and democracy and between poverty and authoritarianism remains one of political science’s most perplexing puzzles. Przeworski and Limongi (1997, 156-157) set forth two explanations as to why democracy is strongly correlated with economic development (operationalized as per capita income): “either democracies may be more likely to emerge as countries develop economically, or they may be established independently of economic development but may be more likely to survive in developed countries.” After testing these two explanations, the authors find that the latter explanation holds
(Przeworski and Limongi 1997, 177). Furthermore, they argue that the level of development is not as important as whether countries produce economic growth (ibid.).

Responding to this argument, Boix and Stokes (2003, 545) theorize a process of “endogenous democratization” through which “economic development both causes democracy and sustains it.” To make this argument, they note that the number of transitions to democracy at high levels of development is attenuated, but that this does not necessarily invalidate their theory if countries at low income levels undergo transitions when they begin to develop. By adjust their model specification and the sample of countries the authors demonstrate that economic growth does make transitions to democracy more likely (Boix and Stokes 2003, 519). This argument has been widely criticized. Acemoglu et al. (2008, 836) have calculated “regressions that include country fixed effects and/or instrumental variable regressions” which “show no evidence of a causal effect of income on democracy over the post-war era or the past 100 years.” These findings obscure the relationship between democracy and development leaving the field with little consensus other than ceteris paribus the poorer the country the more likely it is to be authoritarian.

Other authors have established links between democracy and its breakdown with economic crisis. Gasiorowski (1995) maintains that an economic crisis increases the likelihood of democratic breakdown, but also affects the likelihood of democratic transition depending upon the historical moment in which it takes place. Substantiating the arguments of Remmer (1990) and Huntington (1991), Gasiorowski shows that the impact of inflationary and recessionary crises on regime breakdowns and democratic transitions change over time (1995, 892). This finding confirms that different moments in history cause independent variables, such as recessionary crises, to have different effects on the likelihood of democratic breakdown or
transition. In a similar study, Svolik (2010, 116) attempts to determine the likelihood of democratic stability. He argues that states “with low levels of economic development, a presidential executive and a military authoritarian past are less likely to consolidate.” However, for Svolik, the only factor which increases the likelihood of authoritarian reversals from transitional democracies is economic recessions (ibid.).

Another group of scholars has attempted to unearth the impact of various configurations and distributions of economic resources on democratization. In “Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy,” Acemoglu and Robinson argue that the level of inequality in society is a crucial determinant of democratization (2006). The authors assert that democratization is most likely to occur at moderate levels of inequality and that it is least likely to occur at the lowest and highest levels of income inequality. On the other hand, Boix (2003) claims that democracy is more likely to occur when income inequality is low and that it becomes less likely as inequality increases. Ansell and Samuels point out that both arguments hinge upon the idea that elites fear democratization most during moments in which they believe the median voter will demand the highest levels of redistribution, and thus elites will seek alternatives to democratization in such moments (2010, 1544). Alternatively, Ansell and Samuels maintain that rather than simply being a function of income inequality, democracy is a function of development, land-holding equality and income equality.

These various works are evidence of the hotly contested positions offered by scholars on the role of economic development as a determinant of democratization. If economic development were actually a clear determinant, we would expect that where countries experience economic growth, avoid economic crises, and maintain relatively minimal levels of economic inequality of both the income and land-holding varieties, democratic regimes would be more likely to emerge.
Conversely, we would expect that countries with lower levels of development which experience economic crises, or which have high levels of income and land inequality, would more likely be authoritarian. By focusing Senegal, Burkina Faso, and Chad through a most similar systems design, my goal has been to investigate non-economic factors which play a role in processes of political liberalization.

To confirm their economic similarities, Figures 2-3 through 2-6 below display commonly used economic indicators in cross-national studies of democratization with values for Burkina, Chad, and Senegal (the cases examined in this dissertation), as well as for Mali, Niger, and Mauritania (the neighboring remaining Sahelian countries) alongside the sub-Saharan Africa average (excluding high income countries), for a regional comparison. It should be noted that all of these countries are objectively poor. Mauritania, which has population of between 4 and 5 million people and a population density of just over 4 people per square kilometer, and Senegal, which also has a coastline and more significant infrastructural development, fair only slightly better than the other four countries, which routinely fall in the bottom ten percent in commonly used development indices such as the Human Development Index. Indeed, as the figures indicate, the Sahelian countries are collectively some of the poorest found in Africa, much less the world, and as such existing theories might lead us to expect that they would all be unstable authoritarian regimes. Instead, as I have argued, there is remarkable regime variation across these economically similarly countries.

While Senegal performs marginally better with regard to GDP and growth per capita than Burkina Faso or Chad, these differences hardly seem significant enough to account for the

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23 Figure 2-3 presents data collection from the World Bank Database for GDP per capita at purchasing power parity from 1990 through 2016 (all the data for which the data are available).
gradual democratization of Senegal. Additionally, these factors do not explain why Mauritania did not also follow this trajectory given the improvements to its GPD per capita during the same timeframe, or why Mali for a time in the 1990s and early 2000s appeared to represent the most established democracy in the region despite being economically poor. It also does not help explain why Burkina Faso did not experience a restoration of authoritarian rule when its economy suffered, or why the general volatility of economic growth in Chad has not resulting in greater regime instability. Instead, Burkina Faso remained a stable electoral authoritarian regime which became more politically liberal since multiparty elections and Chad slowly reverted to authoritarian rule, despite the turbulent economic growth displayed in Figures 2-4 and 2-5.

Finally, Figure 2-6 displays the World Bank’s Gini Index estimate for these six countries from 1987 to 2016. In sum, it would appear that economic factors do not contribute much to a

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24 Indeed the comparison of these six countries belie their similarly desperate economic status. To confirm this feature one only need to compare Senegal to countries in other regions of the world or even with other African countries many of which display superior economic performance.

25 Figure 2-4 presents data collection from the World Bank Database for GDP growth per capita as an annual percentage for the years 1960 – 2016. Figure 2-5 presents identical data, but only for Senegal, Burkina Faso, Chad and the sub-Saharan Africa average.

26 The Gini index measures the extent to which the distribution of income (or, in some cases, consumption expenditure) among individuals or households within an economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. A Lorenz curve plots the cumulative percentages of total income received against the cumulative number of recipients, starting with the poorest individual or household. The Gini index measures the area between the Lorenz curve and a hypothetical line of absolute equality, expressed as a percentage of the maximum area under the line. Thus a Gini index of 0 represents perfect equality, while an index of 100 implies perfect inequality.

27 Note: The data presented in this table are extremely limited and sporadically recorded by the World Bank. To generate Figure 2-6, values for the Gini Index were duplicated for the years in which data were missing. For example, if a country recorded a Gini coefficient of 50 for the year 1988, but then was missing data until 1999, then a Gini coefficient of 50 would be recorded during the years between 1988 and 1999. This tactic, while imperfect, allows for the graph to more clearly highlight change without assuming gradual shifts where no data were recorded.
Figure 2-3. GDP per capita, PPP
Figure 2-4. GDP per capita growth
Figure 2-5. GDP per capita growth (select countries)
Figure 2-6. GINI index (World Bank Estimate)
broader understanding of the divergent trajectories of Sahelian regimes, other than to suggest that they do not conform to the existing theories that rely on economic explanations.

A different explanation for the low levels of economic development in the Sahel may relate to differences between political parties and their internal organization or strength. Bizzaro et al. (2018, 2) find that while parties play differing roles under democratic and authoritarian regimes, their internal organization, nonetheless, contributes to the prospects for long-term development in both regime contexts. Given that Sahelian countries all exhibit low levels of development, we would expect to find that parties in the Sahel lack internal organization and institutionalization. If this were the case, perhaps it would be indicative of other characteristics related to Sahelian political parties, such as strong affiliation to ethnic identity, which may in turn help to explain their divergent regimes trajectories. In the following section, I investigate these other possible explanations more closely by analyzing the characteristics and institutionalization of political parties in the Sahel.

**Types of Political Parties in Sahelian Politics**

Before virtually all sub-Saharan African regimes had adopted multiparty elections, the study of political parties often overlapped with the study of political regimes and their leaders; indeed, most African regimes were single-party regimes (Zolberg 1966). The inextricable and often highly personal linkages between political leaders and their parties made it difficult to study political parties as institutions. Instead, scholars of African politics tended to conceptualize political power and its origins from various sociological sources of authority. These include: the personalistic ‘Big Man’ rule (Hyden 2014, 97-116), ethnicity and/or political clientelism (Lemarchand 1972), or neo-patrimonialism (van de Walle 2001), as well as Weberian-inspired ideal types of authority (Jackson Rosberg 1982). This left a gap in the conceptualization of political parties in Africa, leading many to focus heavily on the ethnic origins of political parties.
even after the widespread adoption of multiparty elections.50 To date, relatively few comprehensive studies of African political parties as institutions exist and, as this dissertation attempts to address, a relative gap in the study of institutions and the ways in which they structure power in African politics persists. However, a growing body of research, focused on variations in political party types and party systems in Africa, appears poised to begin to fill this gap.

Several recent works have begun to lay the foundation for the systematic study of political parties and party systems across sub-Saharan Africa following the adoption of multiparty electoral systems, and they frequently do so in an effort to better understand the role of parties in democratization. LeBas (2011) compares the emergence of opposition parties in Kenya, Zimbabwe and Zambia, arguing that authoritarian legacies persisted through the construction of institutions which proved consequential to the development of opposition parties following multiparty elections. Her work focuses specifically on the relationship between authoritarian leaders and organized labor, demonstrating alliances between the two which initially bolstered authoritarian rule, but eventually brought about the authoritarian leaders’ demise.

LeBas further argues that in the era of multiparty elections, opposition parties may use unions as starting points for inclusive national outreach campaigns to bridge ethnic cleavages. Relying on union networks to establish cross-cutting civil society movements, newly formed opposition parties are able to generate sufficient electoral support to overturn authoritarian incumbents. Unions may then serve as the institutional foundations for political parties, seeking to position themselves in opposition to former authoritarian ruling parties at the introduction of

50 See Posner 2005 as an exemplar of the primacy given to ethnicity in the study of African politics.
multiparty elections, thus challenging the notion that ethnicity or other socio-cultural attributes serve as the primary source of organization for new political parties. Unions have been important sources of popular organization in both Senegal and Burkina Faso; however, unions face stark challenges to cross-cutting national organization in Chad. More importantly, Senegal and Burkina Faso do not exhibit the same types of ethnic cleavage explored in LeBas’s work, and thus potentially fall outside of the scope conditions of her theory.51

Riedl (2014) also challenges the prevailing view of political parties as simple tools of personalized clientelism. Her work demonstrates variation across party system institutionalization by examining the regularity of party competition, the stable roots of political parties in society, the legitimacy of the electoral process, and degree of party organization prior to multiparty elections (2014, 35-56). She argues that variation across these four components during the political transitions to multiparty elections helps to explain the varying levels of party system institutionalization following democratization, suggesting that authoritarian legacies continue to influence the party systems of African democracies (Riedl 2014).52 Similarly, Sanches (2018), explores differences in ‘adequately’ ‘inadequately,’ and ‘over-institutionalized’ party systems across thirty sub-Saharan African countries with case studies examining Cape Verde, Zambia, and Mozambique. Sanches explores and refines the defining properties of party system institutionalization and under which conditions it varies. Riedl and Sanches each

51 I explore the role of unions and other civil society organization more closely in Chapter 8 of this dissertation. Below, I elaborate on the point that ethnicity does not play a significant role in the party institutions of Senegal, Burkina Faso and Chad.

maintain that the influence of former authoritarian institutions persists beyond the adoption of multiparty systems, and shapes the level of party competition that follows founding elections.\textsuperscript{53}

In an effort to evaluate the similarity and/or difference between levels of party institutionalization I have turned again to the invaluable data collected by the Varieties of Democracy project. Figure 2-7 displays V-DEM’s party institutionalization index for Burkina Faso, Chad and Senegal.\textsuperscript{54} It clearly demonstrates that after 1990, Chad, Burkina Faso, and Senegal each had relatively similar levels of party institutionalization. Indeed, from 1992 through 2016, the confidence intervals for these countries on this measure overlap with one another suggesting that it is difficult to established clear differences between these three cases. Below, I discuss in more detail differences in the party systems of these three cases, as well as in Mali, Niger and Mauritania, through an analysis of multiparty legislative elections in all six countries. Both Figure 2-7 and the analysis of Sahelian party systems suggest that party institutionalization does not adequately explain why Senegal, Burkina Faso and Chad follow different regime trajectories.

This recent body of work in African politics signals a transition away from conceptualizing political power as highly personalized, and toward an attempt to understand the institutional frameworks by which power is consolidated in African regimes. Scholars of African

\textsuperscript{53} Two recent dissertations also seek to expand on this growing body of research. Kelly (2014) and Choi (2018) treat political parties in Africa as political institutions by providing studies of party proliferation in Senegal and a comparison of party strongholds and legislative turnover in Kenya and Zambia respectively.

\textsuperscript{54} Figure 2-7 was generated using the V-DEM project’s online analysis tool available to the public here: https://www.v-dem.net/en/analysis/VariableGraph/. According to the project, “Party institutionalization refers to various attributes of the political parties in a country, e.g., level and depth of organization, links to civil society, cadres of party activists, party supporters within the electorate, coherence of party platforms and ideologies, party-line voting among representatives within the legislature. A high score on these attributes generally indicates a more institutionalized party system. This index considers the attributes of all parties with an emphasis on larger parties, i.e., those that may be said to dominate and define the party system.” More information about the index is available at https://www.v-dem.net
Figure 2-7. V-DEM’S Party Institutionalization Index
politics have begun to recognize that the transition to multiparty systems has elevated the importance of political parties in contemporary politics. Studies have also begun to employ systematic analysis of legislative elections to evaluate the ways in which African party systems conform to and diverge from patterns of party system development in other areas of the globe (Weghorst and Bernhard 2014). However, there remains significant debate over how best to approach African political parties as institutions.

For example, Elischer (2013, 5) breaks with the past assumption that ethnicity is the principal organizing mechanism for African political parties, noting that relatively few studies treat political parties systematically, and even fewer apply a generalizable framework with which to do so. By drawing on studies of political parties found in other world regions, Elischer seeks to fill this gap with an operationalized and amended form of Diamond and Gunther’s (2001) political party typology. This framework accounts for political parties’ goals, social base, electoral strategy, and organizational structure (Elischer 2013, 30-37).55 The application of this typology to the cases discussed in Elischer 2013 reveals that not all political parties in sub-Saharan Africa form along ethnic cleavages; rather, certain demographic conditions increase or decrease the likelihood that ethnic parties will prosper.56 The typology also presents several additional avenues through which one might compare political parties.

55 The typology used in Elischer 2013a is presented in detail on page 39. Here, the various subcategories (Party Goals: Motive of Formation and Rhetoric; Electoral Strategy: Electoral Rhetoric and Contention of Election Manifesto; Organizational Structure: National Coverage, Party Factions and Party Apparatus; Social Base: Leadership Composition, Cabinet Composition and Party Nationalization and Divergence Scores) are broken down along with their various measures and then applied to several African cases.

56 Elischer applies his typology to three detailed case studies: Kenya, Namibia, and Ghana. He also analyzes several preliminary case studies of politically significant parties in Tanzania, Botswana, Malawi, Senegal, Burkina Faso, Zambia and Benin as a robustness check on the finding that ethnic parties are not the norm, but are more likely to occur in those cases where the demography of country does not have an ethnic core group.
For instance, comparisons across the various categories would serve to indicate whether any particular trends exist with regard to the characteristics of political parties in the Sahel. In an effort to take a first step towards such an analysis, I gathered data on the politically relevant parties in each of the six Sahelian countries. This research reviewed each party’s purported goals, electoral strategies, organizational structure, and social base to the extent that data were available using the same guidelines established in Elischer (2013, 30-37). Table 2-1 below displays the results of this research and applies Elischer’s typology to politically significant parties in the Sahel. Parties were determined to be politically significant if they served as the ruling party, held a plurality of seats in the legislature, or officially led the opposition in the legislature during the last two electoral cycles.57 I do not differentiate between motives of formation and rhetoric on party goals because in each case the motives were determined to be national. Similarly, in each case the electoral rhetoric and the content of election manifestos were determined to be catch-all. Table 2-1 represents a first attempt at applying Elischer’s typology to the Sahelian sub-region.58

Several points can be drawn from this analysis. First, Elischer’s finding that ethnicity is not a principal driver for party formation in African politics is substantiated by the non-ethnic character of the politically significant parties operating in Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Senegal. The similarities between party types regardless of country are perhaps the most striking feature of this analysis. Nearly every politically relevant party in the Sahel region falls under Elischer’s category of a catch-all type basing their goals on attracting the largest

57 An exception to this was made for Mauritania, where the two parties holding the most number of seats were selected; and Senegal, where the two parties selected represent longstanding parties in the country’s political history and maintain significant representation in the ruling coalition and opposition coalition. I compiled all of the data presented in Table 2-1 myself.

58 Data limitations prevented the subcategories of party nationalization and divergence from being recorded, but there were no implications that these score would have dramatically affected the types of the parties.
cross-cutting pool of supporters possible.\textsuperscript{59} The self-proclaimed Islamist party founded in Mauritania, Tawassol, is the one notable exception from the other parties in the region in that its goal is to bring together those religious believers of a specific doctrine of Islam.\textsuperscript{60} Second, the fact that these Sahelian countries exhibit such significant party type similarities and yet still experience very different regime trajectories indicates that party type has only a limited—if any—effect on regime trajectory.

Chad is the only case which presents a slight deviation from this trend. Chadian parties initially held strong ethno-regional bases, but these distinctions have largely diminished over time and with repeated electoral contests. Chad does not have a distinguishable ethnic core group, and yet due to the sheer number of different ethnic groups in Chad, political organization has often required multi-ethnic alliances. It is also worth noting that unlike the other countries, Chad has far fewer “ethnic cores.” Elischer (2013) argues that ethnic cores make ethnically-based parties more likely in general. To a lesser degree, the ethno-regional dynamics in Chad present a variation from the other Sahelian countries and may have contributed to the fact that political parties began as multi-ethnic alliances only later to develop into catch-all parties. This thus both partially conforms to and deviates from Elischer’s findings.

\textsuperscript{59} Elischer writes that the catch-all party “aims to form a long-lasting political force in which two conditions are fulfilled: It bridges its country’s dominant ethnic cleavages (past or present) by incorporating influential community leaders from both sides of the cleavage into its leadership structure. Furthermore, the ethnic catch-all party is formed long before election day and survives electoral defeats as well as leadership contests without major changes (splits and merges) in the groups that make up the party. By staying together as a united political force, it demonstrates that it has overcome the divisive logic of ethnic arithmetic” (2013a, 29).

\textsuperscript{60} Although, given that Mauritania’s population is officially 100 percent Muslim, Tawassol’s designation as a religious/programmatic party does not necessarily exclude any particular identity. Group and indeed, the party draws members across many of the other relevant social cleavages in Mauritania included ethnicity and race For a detailed account of Islamism as a political movement in Mauritania, including the emergence of the contemporary political party Tawassoul, see: Ould Ahmed Salem 2013.
Table 2-1 demonstrates that ethnicity is not a primary political mobilizer in the Sahel, but the preponderance of catch-all parties suggests that another factor may be shaping parties in this fashion. For instance, political parties in the region may simply be attempting to capture as many votes from as many communities as possible. This might strengthen political debate in the region by engaging with multiple communities and developing cross-cutting political platforms. Parties could thus develop more representative and inclusive institutions, resulting in higher degrees of accountability. For instance, as parties vie for the support of as many voters as possible, their platforms could begin to develop different policy prescriptions aimed at mobilizing large cross-sections of the voting population. One might predict that over time that this would strengthen the prospects for political liberalization and perhaps lead regimes down trajectories of gradual democratization.

However, this prediction is likely to manifest only if political parties, even catch-all parties, are not simply personalized vehicles for extending patronage to voters. If political parties rise and fall with the fate of specific political elites, this suggests that policies and political debate matter very little, and instead that it is the generosity and wealth of particular party leaders which guide voters’ decisions at the ballot box. Clearly, more research and analysis of party strategy and debate are needed to make substantiated claims regarding Sahelian political parties. As evidenced by the dominance of the political elite in Senegal, Burkina Faso, and Chad discussed at the beginning of this chapter, however, it is difficult to rule out the idea of parties as vehicles of political patronage. If parties are, in fact, merely vehicles of political patronage, this would be unlikely to improve the prospects for political liberalization. Instead, it would suggest that party politics in each case is somewhat irrelevant to the regimes under which they operate, and rather what matters is the depth and affluence of party members.
Alternatively, catch-all parties might be related to the shared colonial history of these countries. Inspiration for the multiparty electoral systems in the Sahel was primarily derived from the French Fifth Republic. Consequently, the constitutions and the laws which regulate party formation share many similarities, with the exception of Mauritania, which is officially an Islamic Republic (Trans-Saharan Elections Project). Thus, the essential structures of Sahelian multiparty political systems appear quite similar to the political parties which operate within them.

Ultimately, what is particularly interesting for the purposes of this dissertation, is that the Chadian parties became more like Senegalese and Burkinabè parties, even though Chad’s regime trajectory diverged from the other two cases. Indeed, the remarkable similarities between all of the Sahelian parties strongly suggests that party type is not driving their regime trajectories. The fact that the politically relevant parties in each of these countries are catch-all parties suggests that Elischer’s typology, and the many party characteristics it brings together, are not particularly useful for understanding why regimes follow differing trajectories after installing multiparty elections. Nevertheless, as pointed out by Bodian (2016), the details of each system vary internally and are susceptible to constant debates, revisions and tinkering. In addition to these various internal debates over the content of their respective electoral codes and other institutional reforms following the adoption of multiparty elections, political parties remain to be assessed by their electoral performance. As a step in this direction, I thus now turn to an analysis of the thirty-five legislative elections which have been held in these six countries subsequent to their adoption of multiparty systems, and through the end of 2016.

61 For more on the differences and similarities between each country with regard to their electoral systems and laws see the results of the Trans-Saharan Elections Project conducted by the Sahel Research Group at the University of Florida: http://tsep.africa.ufl.edu/
Table 2-1. Typology of politically relevant parties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Electoral Strategy</th>
<th>Organizational Structure</th>
<th>Social Base</th>
<th>Cabinet Composition</th>
<th>Party Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Goals</td>
<td>National Coverage</td>
<td>Party Factions</td>
<td>Party Apparatus</td>
<td>Leadership Composition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDP</td>
<td>national</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>individual</td>
<td>leader/civil society</td>
<td>mixed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPP</td>
<td>national</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>individual</td>
<td>youth/civil society</td>
<td>mixed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPC</td>
<td>national</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>individual</td>
<td>youth/civil society</td>
<td>mixed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPS</td>
<td>national</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>individual/none</td>
<td>youth/military</td>
<td>mixed/regional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDR</td>
<td>national</td>
<td>med</td>
<td>individual</td>
<td>youth/women</td>
<td>mixed/regional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>URD</td>
<td>national</td>
<td>med</td>
<td>individual</td>
<td>youth/women</td>
<td>mixed/ regional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADEMA</td>
<td>national</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>individual</td>
<td>youth/women</td>
<td>mixed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPM</td>
<td>national</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>individual</td>
<td>youth/women</td>
<td>mixed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>URD</td>
<td>national</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>individual</td>
<td>youth/women</td>
<td>mixed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPR</td>
<td>national</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>individual/none</td>
<td>leader-centric</td>
<td>mixed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tawassol</td>
<td>religious</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>ideological</td>
<td>intellectuals</td>
<td>mixed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNSD</td>
<td>national</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>individual</td>
<td>youth</td>
<td>mixed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNDS</td>
<td>national</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>individual</td>
<td>youth</td>
<td>mixed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDS</td>
<td>national</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>individual</td>
<td>youth/women</td>
<td>mixed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PS</td>
<td>national</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>individual</td>
<td>youth/women</td>
<td>mixed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I would like to express my gratitude to Sebastian Elischer for his very helpful comments on Table 2-1 and the discussion of it in this dissertation. His feedback and advice on the work presented here play a significant role in its success. As always, any errors or discrepancies belong to me.
Legislative Elections and their Implications in the Sahel

Very few attempts to systematically analyze African legislative elections data have been done to date. This is in part due to the challenges of persistent data limitations. However, recent innovations in electoral systems and the electoral management bodies—bodies which administer the electoral process in many of Africa’s multiparty political systems—have improved the transparency and access that researchers and voters have regarding elections data. Table 2-2 below displays the results of a preliminary analysis of election data from each legislative election held in the six Sahelian countries since their respective adoptions of multiparty systems through 2016.

The data reveal a number of interesting comparisons, many of which have been mentioned already above. For example, with the exception of Senegal, all turnovers in power have taken place following some type of extra-constitutional regime breakdown. This has been most common in Niger, where a military coup in 1996 created the first instance of post-transition regime breakdown, then again in 1999, and again in 2010. Niger is also the only case where the party system is routinely classified as non-dominant. The 2014 popular insurrection in Burkina Faso and the transitional government which then organized the subsequent 2015 elections also highlight a moment of extra-constitutional regime breakdown. However, unlike Niger, this breakdown and the resulting turnover in power arguably boosted Burkina Faso’s democratic standing, as suggested by the data generated by the V-DEM project and displayed in Figures 2-1.

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63 There are some exceptions such as Mozaffar and Scarritt (2005), Bogaards (2008) and Weghorst and Bernhard (2014). However, to my knowledge no study to date compiles data for all six Sahelian countries through 2016.

64 I compiled this data relying on a number of different sources, including Nohlen, Krennerich, and Thibaut (1999), country records from the Inter-Parliamentary Union, country-specific Electoral Commission official results, and country specific reports. For each election, efforts were made to confirm the electoral results from multiple sources. The compiled data are available upon request.
and 2-2 above. (As noted above, I remain unconvinced that it is yet possible to reach this conclusion and I develop evidence to the contrary in subsequent chapters).

Based on the V-DEM data, as well as other commonly used measures for democracy such as the Polity IV database and Freedom House scores, I have offered a classification of regimes at the moment of each legislative election, reported in Table 2-2 under “Regime Type.” Table 2-2 reaffirms that Sahelian regimes present a wide spectrum of types: from full democracy in Senegal, and arguably for a time in Mali, to hegemonic authoritarian regimes in Chad and at times Niger and Mauritania. It merits noting, however, that there have been no closed authoritarian regimes in the Sahel since the 1990s.

Most Sahelian political regimes exhibit traits of both authoritarian and democratic regimes, fitting the various hybrid regime types discussed above. For Table 2-2, regimes which hold regular national multiparty elections for presidential and legislative offices are qualified as either electoral authoritarian regimes or electoral democracies. Electoral democracies are distinguished from electoral authoritarian regimes when the ruling party and president were initially elected to office under a constitutional multiparty system and did not take power by an extraconstitutional mechanism prior to organizing elections. For instance, President Abdou Diouf first became president of Senegal when Leopold Senghor resigned from office. He was, thus, not elected to his first term in office, and until he lost the 2000 presidential election, Senegal—for the purposes of this comparison—was an electoral authoritarian regime. However, following his 2000 loss, Diouf peacefully handed over power, concretizing the “fairness, freedom, inclusivity and meaningfulness” of the electoral process and thereby vaulting Senegal to the designation of democracy (Schedler 2013). In an effort to offer some descriptive data on the legislative election results, Table 2-2 also provides the largest vote shares obtained by political parties in each
Table 2-2. Legislative Elections and Party Systems

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Election Year</th>
<th>Vote Share Winner</th>
<th>Seat Share Winner</th>
<th>Incumbent Seat Change</th>
<th>Turnover</th>
<th>Breakdown</th>
<th>ENP</th>
<th>ANP</th>
<th>Relevant Parties</th>
<th>Regime Type</th>
<th>Party System</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Electoral Authoritarian</td>
<td>Dominant Authoritarian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>+18</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Electoral Authoritarian</td>
<td>Dominant Authoritarian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>-40</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Electoral Authoritarian</td>
<td>Dominant Authoritarian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>+15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Electoral Authoritarian</td>
<td>Dominant Authoritarian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>-11</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>Dominant Authoritarian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Electoral Democracy</td>
<td>Non-dominant Authoritarian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>44</td>
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<td>Dominant Authoritarian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2002*</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>+21</td>
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<td>1.8</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>Dominant Authoritarian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2011*</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>-11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>30</td>
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<td>Authoritarian</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1978 (tri-party system)</td>
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<td>83</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>1.4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>Authoritarian</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>+10</td>
<td></td>
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<td>1.2</td>
<td>8</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>-7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>Dominant Authoritarian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>-16</td>
<td></td>
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<td>1.8</td>
<td>6</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>-4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Electoral Authoritarian</td>
<td>Dominant Authoritarian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>-33</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>Dominant Authoritarian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>+13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>Dominant Authoritarian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>-78</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>Dominant Authoritarian</td>
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<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Election Year</td>
<td>Vote Share Winner</td>
<td>Seat Share Winner</td>
<td>Incumbent Seat Change</td>
<td>Turnover</td>
<td>Breakdown</td>
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<td>ANP</td>
<td>Relevant Parties</td>
<td>Regime Type</td>
<td>Party System</td>
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<tr>
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<td>-------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td></td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>22</td>
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<td>75</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>+21</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>10</td>
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<td>Electoral Democracy</td>
<td>Dominant</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2002*</td>
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<td>45</td>
<td>-42</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2007*</td>
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<td>5.2</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>Democracy</td>
<td>Non-dominant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2013*</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>-34</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Electoral Authoritarian</td>
<td>Non-dominant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>85</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>1.4</td>
<td>20</td>
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<td>Authoritarian</td>
<td>Dominant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>+4</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>Authoritarian</td>
<td>Dominant</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>2001*</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>-10</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>7</td>
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<td>Authoritarian</td>
<td>Authoritarian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2006*</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td></td>
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*Refers to elections where the number of votes received by a party remained unavailable. In these cases the number of seats obtained by a party was used for determining the values for the effective number of parties.
election as well as the percentage of seats that the winning party received within the National Assembly. Table 2-2 then presents the percentage seat change from the previous elections for the incumbent ruling party.\textsuperscript{65}

Finally, Table 2-2 reports the data on the number of parties and the type of party system in each country, as well as data pertinent to levels of party proliferation. Here the data reported are analyzed using the same framework which is presented in Bogaards (2008), which builds on Mozaffar and Scarritt (2005). However, due to data limitations, Table 2-2 is unable to report data for party volatility and instead reports statistics for the effective, actual, and relevant parties. The effective number of parties (ENPs) was determined using the theorem introduced by Laakso and Taagepera (1979), which functions as a concentration index measuring the relative size of parties in the legislature.\textsuperscript{66} The number of relevant parties is based on Sartori’s (1976, 122–123) counting rules which attempt to identify the number of relevant actors in competition and government formation; or in other words, those parties with the potential ability to form a coalition or thwart the attempts of other parties from doing so. The “actual” number of parties (ANP) refers to the number of parties which received votes during the legislative elections, or which received seats following the election, depending on the data available.\textsuperscript{67}

\textsuperscript{65} These data demonstrate which countries provide detailed elections results allowing the public to tabulate the votes themselves. Only Senegal and Burkina Faso offer complete data for each multiparty election covered here. Chad and Mauritania offer the least data.

\textsuperscript{66} These measures take each party’s share of the vote or seats as a decimal fraction, squares it, then sums these squared fractions and divides one by this sum to yield the effective number of parties. Where available, the ENP was calculated using the vote share won by each party. However, where this data was unavailable, the ENP was calculated using the number of seats held in the legislature. Different equations for ENP were used as robustness checks. The statistics reported were derived from the classic Laakso and Taagepera (1979) equation. The others—see Taagepera and Grofman (2003) as well as Golosov (2010) for alternative equations which calculate the effective number of parties—are not reported as they did not offer any additional analytical leverage.

\textsuperscript{67} Two things must be noted here. First, the number of extant parties far exceeds the number of parties which received votes or seats in practically each country. However, the data available in each case makes this difficult to report and the figure is constantly changing. Second, in many cases, parties run as part of a coalition and voters then cast their ballot in favor of a coalition of parties. In these cases coalitions are counted as one party since the
Several interesting points emerge from the data. First, party systems in the Sahel tend to be dominant much like across most of the continent (Bogaards 2008, 126). Once again, Senegal emerges as an outlier in the Sahel because even though its party systems remains dominant, it is the only case where a peaceful transfer of power following legislative elections occurs. According to Basedau (2007, 117), this should be observed as an indication of non-dominance. However, I evaluate this characteristic to be an indicator of regime type rather than party system dominance, particularly since in both instances of peaceful transfers of power, the Senegalese electorate also provided large legislative victories to the new ruling party. Indeed, it is notable that despite turnover, the Senegalese system retains its dominance. This feature has been observed elsewhere in Africa, where Bogaards notes that “Africa is exceptional because of the dominance of dominant party systems on the continent” (2008, 126). Senegal may be somewhat of an outlier in the Sahel, but its party system dominance suggests that it is less exceptional when examined within the universe of African cases.

This dominance is largely driven by the rules which guide the electoral system in Senegal and which for more than a decade following the inauguration of multiparty elections provide clear benefits to the winner of electoral outcomes. Bodian (2016) has provided an extensive study of how electoral systems have been debated and designed, debated again and redesigned to create a constant process of electoral system tinkering by politicians. His study compares the different electoral systems of Senegal, Mali and Niger, and finds that in times of quotidian politics, incumbent politicians will change the rules of the electoral game if faced with an disaggregated data are unavailable. For example, in the 2012 legislative elections in Senegal, Benno Bokk Yakar, the winning coalition, is listed as one party despite consisting of several.

68 Basedau does not include Senegal in his analysis because of its short experience with democracy at the time (2007, 114).
electoral threat and when extra-institutional threats are minimal. However, in times “extraordinary politics,” notably during periods of political transition when extra-institutional threats are high, politicians are more likely to negotiate with their counterparts finding an agreeable process of electoral reform in an effort to maintain their tenure in power. This study highlights important differences between Senegal, Mali and Niger, but it also provides at least partial evidence that explains the party dominance of Senegal, Burkina Faso, and Chad. Each country is characterized by an electoral system that provides significant advantages to the parties that obtain the most votes regardless of proportion of the vote received. Indeed, in Senegal the ruling party frequently obtained a majority of the seats in the legislature without obtaining a majority of the vote due to the electoral system’s design.

Cases of non-dominance are observed in Niger and Mali prior to democratic reversals in both countries; democratic breakdown occurs repeatedly in Niger. This offers initial evidence that dominant party systems may lead to better prospects for democratization in the immediate future, and indeed, to the extent that dominant party systems provide political stability and in turn foster the institutionalization of an electoral system, perhaps also in the long term. On the other hand, it is equally likely that dominant party systems enable ruling parties to escape accountability and engage in authoritarian tactics, since there are fewer parties to provide viable electoral alternatives. Given these observations, the most recent electoral outcome in Burkina Faso and the resultant non-dominant system might be viewed with cautious optimism, suggesting

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69 There is not sufficient space here to go into detail about the Malian case, but unlike the 2014 popular insurrection in Burkina Faso, the military coup which put an end to Mali’s democratic regime in 2012 did not follow a restoration of political order or authority over its full territory. Thus, while a political transition did follow the 2012 coup and elections organized in 2013, these events do not represent a continuation of the same regime in Mali as they do in Burkina Faso. Instead, a low grade civil conflict continued to plague the Malian government as a UN peacekeeping mission and flawed peace accord process sought (unsuccessfully to date) to reestablish order across the country.
that the newly elected ruling party will need to be accountable to the electorate if it wishes to maintain power. Conversely, the increasingly autocratic governance in Chad and to a lesser degree in Niger suggest that these regimes may remain stable in the immediate future, but at the cost of developing democratic institutions (Elischer 2018).

However, what stands out as particularly interesting for the purposes of this dissertation is that in the cases of Senegal, Burkina Faso, and Chad each country exhibits dominant party systems. There appear to be slight variances between the levels of competition faced by legislators during elections, but this is indicative of the different regime trajectories followed by each case. Importantly, then, party systems do not appear to help explain why Burkina Faso, Senegal and Chad each follow different regime trajectories.

Conclusion

This chapter began with a review of several of the different ways that democracy and other regime types are conceptualized. In doing so, I argued that regardless of which classification or data are used to measure regimes in the Sahel, the trajectories of Burkina Faso, Senegal and Chad diverge after their respective transition to multiparty systems. The core of the chapter presented data on the economies, political parties and party systems of the Sahel in the context of a discussion of the existing theoretical literature which attempts to explain regime variation according to these factors. I conclude that these existing approaches fail to explain why Burkina Faso, Chad and Senegal followed different regime trajectories after adopting multiparty elections.

Because all three countries present extremely low levels of economic development and growth as well as similar levels of inequality, most economic explanations of regime type, breakdown, and what I refer to as trajectories would suggest that these regimes are likely to be unstable and authoritarian. However, as I have shown, each case in fact presents a stable regime,
but ones which followed a different trajectory after the adoption of multiparty elections. Senegal followed a trajectory of gradual democratization. Burkina Faso implemented multiparty elections but maintained a stable electoral authoritarian regime. And Chad incrementally restored authoritarian rule. Noting that economic explanations offer relatively little explanatory purchase for this puzzle, this chapter then moved to analyzed some of the political institutions at work in each case.

An in-depth comparison of political parties across Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Senegal, reveals that these Sahelian political systems are characterized by extremely similar types of political parties. Using Elischer’s (2013) political party typology to investigate the characteristics of politically relevant parties in the Sahel systematically, I find that nearly every one meets his criteria for a catch-all party type. This finding suggests first, that unlike numerous accounts and studies of African politics, ethnicity is not a defining political cleavage in the Sahel. Second, this strongly suggests that differences in the types of political parties do not help explain the different trajectories of Sahelian regimes.

Similarly, through an analysis of the thirty five multiparty legislative elections held in the Sahel from 1978 to 2016, I argued that differences in the party systems of the Sahel also fail to explain their divergent regimes. Senegal, Burkina Faso and Chad each present cases of dominant party systems. In the Senegalese case, this occurs even following the two peaceful turnovers of power in 2000 and 2012. We also observe from these analyses that while the actual number of parties which received votes or seats in legislative elections is quite high, the effective number of parties (or relevant number of parties) remains quite low. Importantly, these feature appear to be unrelated to the regime trajectories observed in Senegal, Burkina Faso and Chad since their adoptions of multiparty elections.
These findings suggest that an alternative approach needs to be employed in order to explain the different regime trajectories exhibit by these cases. I offer such an alternative in this dissertation, applying an historical institutionalist approach to analyze these three regime trajectories. I propose a theoretical framework that posits non-governing institutions play a core role in the accumulation and organization of power, and thus in producing different regime trajectories. These institutions include neo-traditional authorities, the military, civil society and opposition groups. In Chapter 3, I develop the theoretical framework that takes account of these institutions, and I describe in detail the causal mechanisms which shape African multiparty regime trajectories. My broad aim in this dissertation is to provide a theoretical framework to better understand how politics evolves over time in Africa’s diverse multiparty regimes.
CHAPTER 3
NON-GOVERNING INSTITUTIONS AND POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION

Introduction

Whenever strong institutions arise to transcend the quotidian politics of factions and cliques, and to organize elite collective action on a national scale, there is a fundamental political puzzle to be explained.

—Dan Slater
Ordering Power

Chad, Burkina Faso, and Senegal each maintained stable regimes following the adoption of multiparty elections and their component political institutions. Each resisted the inertia of factional disputes over power—or at least found institutional solutions for the destabilizing potential of such disputes. Yet each case also followed a different regime trajectory in the years after the inauguration of regular multiparty elections: 1) gradual democratization in Senegal, 2) stable electoral authoritarianism in Burkina Faso, and 3) the restoration of authoritarian rule in Chad. These cases and their variation present a striking example of the “fundamental political puzzle” Slater (2010, 11) points to in the quote above. In this dissertation, I seek to offer an explanation for this puzzle. My core argument is that in each case different characteristics across a set of key political institutions outside of the formal regime structures shaped the evolution of political order in these regimes, and help to explain their divergent trajectories. Four institutions in particular are central to my argument: the military, neo-traditional institutions, and civil society and the opposition. Throughout this dissertation, I refer to these collectively as non-governing institutions, meaning that while each of these institutions shapes electoral politics in specific ways, they remain institutions that lie outside the formal structures of government in civilian multiparty regimes. The impact of each of these very different institutions of course
varies widely. I explore these variations in detail in the chapters that follow, in light of the theoretical framework that I develop below.

In this chapter, I use an historical institutionalist approach to regime development and trajectories to develop a causal argument that employs the concepts of antecedent conditions and institutional junctures. In the process, I raise a number of important considerations concerning the importance of time and institutional change for understanding the causal processes at work in the trajectories of Africa’s multiparty regimes. I engage with a broader literature within comparative politics and sociology, as well as public policy, to demonstrate that certain effects of institutional configurations may shift over time through processes which shape regime trajectories and reshape the relations between regimes and these non-governing institutions. These shifts result in gradual and divergent regime trajectories.

After discussing this conceptual framework, I discuss my theoretical contributions to the literature on multiparty regimes in sub-Saharan Africa by introducing and elaborating the different institutional mechanisms that shape the divergent trajectories of Burkina Faso, Senegal and Chad. Differences in each case’s colonial and immediate post-colonial experiences shaped the development of the non-governing institutions inherited by each post-colonial regime, producing the antecedent conditions for subsequent regime evolution. The different characteristics of these institutions then in turn shaped each regime’s trajectory following the introduction of multiparty elections. The military, neo-traditional institutions, civil society and the opposition each play key roles in the constraining or reinforcing the exercise of power by post-transition incumbents, hence shaping the resultant regime trajectories under multiparty electoral rule. To begin this discussion, I again turn to a particular episode from the 2014-2015 events which took place during my fieldwork in Burkina Faso, to highlight and illustrate the
contingent and fluid nature of political outcomes in the critical moments that collectively shape processes of political liberalization and regime trajectories.

**Non-Governing Institutions in Burkina Faso’s 2015 Transition**

In 2014, a popular insurrection in Burkina Faso forced Blaise Compaoré to resign from the presidency, bringing about a rapid extra-constitutional political turnover in the country.¹ Immediately following Compaoré’s resignation different key individuals began vying for power. Numerous other actors—most importantly Burkina Faso’s non-governing institutions—became quickly engaged in shaping the transitional government that would ultimately be responsible for returning the country to elected civilian rule. Unlike the 2010 military intervention and subsequent transition that some characterize as a “Praetorian Regulation of Politics” in Niger (Baudais and Chauzal 2011, 295),² hundreds of thousands of Burkinabè citizens—mobilized by civil society groups and the opposition across the country—led the popular insurrection against Compaoré, obscuring the role of the military in the ensuing transitional process. This put the military in a complicated position vis-à-vis civil society and other leaders of the popular insurrection, leaving them all with a fundamental question: Who was in charge?

Leaders of the popular insurrection and the military had negotiated Compaoré’s resignation from the military headquarters in downtown Ouagadougou on October 31, 2014.³

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¹ These events are described in greater detail in Chapters 2 and 8 of this dissertation. My fieldwork took place during the political transition which began following Compaoré’s resignation.

² The 2010 coup in Niger took place after Mamadou Tandja, the president at the time, decided he would run for reelection despite the Constitutional Court having ruled that it would be unconstitutional. Tandja dissolved the government, legislature and courts in a defiant attempt to hang on to power. Ultimately, the military stepped in to remove him from office, but in doing so, the military also made it clear that it would lead a political transition to reestablish constitutional order. The political transitional successfully accomplished this by organizing elections in 2011.

³ Leaders of the Citizen’s Resistance Front (Front de Resistance Citoyen) Professors Augustin Loada and Luc Marius Ibriga, attorney Hervé Ouattara, leader of the Anti-Referendum Collective (Collectif Anti-Referendum), popular musicians and activists Sams’K la Jah and Smockey alongside attorney Guy Hervé Kam from Citizen’s Broom, (Balai Citoyen) and Casimir Sawadogo of the Action Network for Democracy (Réseau d’Action pour la
However, before his resignation, Compaoré had dismissed the government, and protesters had burned down and looted the National Assembly—literally dismantling the legislature.\(^4\) Although the military had played a minimal role in the insurrection, immediately following Compaoré’s resignation two different military leaders claimed to be the interim head of state.\(^5\) Gen. Honoré Traoré declared himself interim president to the international and Burkinabè press; only hours later, Lt. Colonel Isaac Zida—second in command of the presidential guard (RSP)—pronounced himself interim head of state and suspended the constitution, after he had confirmed that the RSP had safely escorted Compaoré into exile.\(^6\) In effect, two different factions of the military sought to guide the country to subsequent elections using the “good coup” model employed in neighboring Niger.\(^7\) Supporters of the popular insurrection refused this attempt to hijack their “revolution.”\(^8\)

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\(^4\) The President of the National Assembly and close Compaoré ally, Soungalo Ouattara, disappeared following the popular insurrection, even though some argued that the constitution stipulated that he was to become the interim president. Col. Zida put an end to this line of argument when he suspended the constitution.

\(^5\) The military’s role in the insurrection involved protecting Compaoré from demonstrators, negotiating his resignation, and allowing protesters to gain access to the National Assembly and other buildings. At least seven protesters were killed by security forces during the insurrection. However, during many interviews in Ouagadougou, interviewees suspected that the military had been complicit in, or at least tacitly supportive of, the insurrection, citing previous protests during which the military had opened fire on demonstrators to quickly disperse them. In the case of the popular insurrection the military opted not to violently repress the mobilization.

\(^6\) Compaoré was later awarded Ivoirian citizenship and continues to live in exile in neighboring Côte d’Ivoire.

\(^7\) Elischer (2017) has demonstrated that in the post-1989 era, African military coups rarely lead to military regimes. However, he argues that it is equally rare that military coups improve the prospects for democracy. The so-called ‘good coup’ refers to military interventions which unseat authoritarians, organize transitions to multiparty elections, a return to the barracks afterward. Elischer argues that military juntas use political transitions after leading a coup to control the organization of elections in an attempt to ensure that their chosen candidates are elected. This depends on the ability of the military to oversee the transition and to install an elected civilian regime which it supports.

\(^8\) The term “revolution” was used by many charismatic leaders to mobilize people to the streets during this time. It carries extra significance in Burkina Faso because it harkens back to the revolutionary regime of Thomas Sankara who was assassinated in 1987. Sankara’s assassination is largely believed to have been organized by Compaoré to facilitate his rise to power.
On November 1, 2014, a letter signed by Gen. Traoré declared Zida the interim president, but this was quickly met with protests organized by civil society leaders and the opposition who demanded that the transition be led by a civilian.\textsuperscript{9} Demonstrations continued into the next day, and by November 3, Zida began consultations with the opposition, civil society leaders, former members of the ruling party, trade unions, business associations, and religious leaders to discuss how the transition would be organized. Civil society and the political opposition used the military’s internal divisions to their advantage. As one activist later explained to me, “During that time, there was a lot of confusion, but we knew that after everything that had happened the military could not keep us off the streets. It was the birth of \textit{ruecratie}\textsuperscript{10} and we wanted to show that the military could not take that power away from us.”\textsuperscript{11} Activists and opposition leaders remained steadfast and unified in their demand that the military turn power over to a civilian leader, fearing that the military might attempt to slow their momentum and take charge of the transitional process. Protests continued in the streets.

Then, in an effort to curry favor for his tenure as interim president, Zida met with the Mogho Naaba, Burkina Faso’s most important traditional leader, on November 4, 2014.\textsuperscript{12} Shortly

\textsuperscript{9} Former opposition leader Zephirin Diabré was one of the strongest voices against the possibility of a military-led transition. He feared that if the military controlled the process, a member of the CDP could essentially be selected to replace Blaise Compaoré and minimal change would take place. Interview with a youth leader of Diabré’s political party the \textit{Union pour le Progrès et Changement} (Union for Progress and Change, \textit{UPC}) Ouagadougou December 12, 2015.

\textsuperscript{10} A loose translation of this term might be “politics of the street” or more literally “street rule.” It indicates that protesters had the power to effect political change, rather than the military, politicians, or parties. This term became popular in the Burkinabè press and amongst civil society activists following the popular insurrection.

\textsuperscript{11} Interview on 19 November 2015 in Ouagadougou with a youth leader of Balai Citoyen – one of the largest activist groups to take part in the popular insurrection of 2014. Interview conducted in French; all errors of translation are my own.

\textsuperscript{12} The Mogho Naaba is the leader of the Mossi people who represent the largest ethnic group in Burkina Faso. Figures vary and debates continue, but by most estimates the Mossi comprise a slight majority of the Burkinabè population. The Mogho Naaba is a revered traditional leader throughout the country, and regardless of one’s ethnicity, the Mogho Naaba is well respected.
after the meeting, Zida announced he had no intention of remaining in power. One can only speculate as to what the Mogho Naaba said to interim president Zida, but given the turn of events, it seems reasonable to assume that the Mogho Naaba advised that the popular demand for a civilian transitional leader would outweigh the ability of the military to maintain order. The next day, on 5 November, Zida and the military came to an agreement with members of the opposition, civil society, and the former ruling party over the broad aims and organization of a transition. One colleague who took part in the process believed that at this moment, the ‘insurrectionists’ had gained the advantage:

> We went into that meeting knowing that we had the upper hand. Not only was support for Zida waning within the military, he had lost the support of traditional leaders and the CDP was destroyed… [Meanwhile,] we had spent the last several days drafting the outline of the Transitional Charter. It caught them by complete surprise. We arrived at the negotiation prepared and laid out the foundation for the Transition to the military [leadership]. We, the insurrectionists, proved to be more organized than the military.

The charter stipulated that the transition would be led by an interim civilian president unanimously selected by members of the military, political parties, and civil society, each of which would receive the same number of electors. The interim president would name a prime minister and select a transitional cabinet of twenty-five members. A ninety-member transitional legislature—the *Conseil National de Transition* (CNT)—would be convened with thirty seats to the former opposition parties, twenty-five seats to the military, twenty-five seats to civil society, and ten seats to the former ruling party and its allies. The members of the transitional

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13 News media accounts quote the Mogho Naaba saying, “They [Col. Zida and his aides] came to tell me that they would hand back power to civilians…The country should regain peace and quiet.”

14 The specific details guiding the transitions were elaborated over the next several days and finalized on 13 November.

15 Interview with political scientist and leader of the popular insurrection. March 2, 2015 in Ouagadougou.

16 National Transitional Council
government and legislature were not allowed to participate in the upcoming elections and would be selected by their representative bodies; these members were responsible for making necessary reforms and organizing elections before November 2015.\textsuperscript{17}

Among these reforms were a series of one-time modifications to the electoral code. The CNT undertook these revisions, barring any individual found to have supported the attempt to modify presidential term limits—the issue which ignited the 2014 popular insurrection—from contesting the 2015 presidential and legislative elections. Clearly, this reform targeted the former supporters of Blaise Compaoré and his party. In early September 2015, slightly more than a month before elections were scheduled to take place, applications for candidacy were heavily scrutinized. The Constitutional Court—the judicial body responsible for validating all applications for candidacy—upheld the reform and annulled several applications for candidacy from the CDP itself as well as several former members of the CDP who had applied under the banner of a new or different party.\textsuperscript{18} The playing field remained uneven, but now tilted dramatically in the opposite direction.\textsuperscript{19}

Having crafted a legislative body wherein the former opposition and civil society together held a majority of the seats, it became relatively straightforward for these groups to minimize the potential threat that the former ruling party would pose in the electoral process. However, rather

\textsuperscript{17} The charter for the transition was written and revised by leaders of civil society and professors of law from the University of Ouagadougou during the days when Zida claimed to be interim president. In an interview on September 4, 2015, a member of the opposition and a government official explained to me that the charter had been written as quickly as possible so that during negotiations with the military, they would have the upper hand. He said, “to [the military leadership’s] surprise we already had a document outlining the structure of the transition under civilian leadership. Once we had the essential structure we only needed to negotiate to what extent and in what fashion the military would play a role in the transition.”

\textsuperscript{18} Many speculate that it was this decision which motivated the failed RSP coup of September 2015. I return to this event in Chapter 5 of this dissertation, which analyzes the role of the military in electoral regimes.

\textsuperscript{19} The idea of an “uneven playing field” is one of the defining characteristics of Levitsky and Way’s (2010) Competitive Authoritarianism. I borrow only their terminology here.
than embrace completely free and fair elections, the former opposition sought to maintain an ‘uneven playing field,’ only this time in their favor. Essentially, the regime’s trajectory remained intact, despite the removal of Blaise Compaoré from power.

These processes do not indicate a regime change in Burkina Faso. On the contrary, the goal of the popular insurrection was not regime breakdown, but rather to defend the limited liberal gains that had been made in reforming the regime over time through the maintenance of certain checks on the regime’s power, such as term limits for the president. Burkina Faso’s non-governing institutions enabled the popular insurrection to accomplish precisely that goal and ensured that the regime continued on a remarkably unchanged trajectory after the 2015 political transition. The 2015 elections were perhaps characterized by enhanced levels of competition due to the absence of incumbent candidates, though, many remained skeptical of how much change the elections represented, given the continuity of key actors who had once been part of the former government.

One Burkinabè captured the general sentiment of those hoping for the advancement of democracy following the November 2015 elections, “Salif [Diallo, one of the leaders of the winning political party,] is as vindictive as they come. You see, they have taken everything they learned under Compaoré and turned it against them! They don’t care about democracy. They want revenge.”20 The popular insurrection toppled the party in power and an incumbent president who sought to remain in power against the will of many citizens; it did not bring down the

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20 Interview with retired Burkinabè business woman, Ouagadougou, November 12, 2015. This sentiment was expressed to me routinely in several interviews and discussions with those who had protested for Compaoré’s resignation.
regime. Burkina Faso remained, at least for the time, a consistently electoral authoritarian regime.\footnote{Donno (2013, 702-703) observes and argues that, “many electoral authoritarian regimes remain durably authoritarian even after power changes hands [a fact which] attests to the importance of treating turnover and democratization as distinct phenomena.”}

If Burkina Faso presents a case where regime stability continues in the form of an electoral authoritarian regime, Chad and Senegal represent divergent cases. All three share many similar formal political institutions, but their non-governing institutions present a number of differences. As highlighted in Chapter 2, the relevant political parties in each case look remarkably similar and the party systems within which these political parties operate are all dominant systems characterized by ruling party majority-led legislatures. Other political institutions share several similarities as well. For instance, each case is a semi-presidential regime modeled after the French Fifth Republic, with a strong executive branch; each relies on a \textit{Commission Électorale National Indépendant} (CENI) to organize and administer the electoral process, offering at least a semblance of free and fair elections.\footnote{The CENI refers to the National Independent Electoral Commission; in Senegal this institution is referred to as the \textit{Commission Électorale Nationale Autonome} (Autonomous National Electoral Commission, CENA). It should also be noted here that during the time of writing this dissertation in 2018, the Chadian National Assembly at the behest of President Idriss Déby modified their constitution to establish the Fourth Republic of Chad. The Fourth Republic is now a presidential republic and the modifications to the constitution eliminated the office of Prime Minister. The President of Chad is now both head of State and Head of Government and is the sole chief executive of the country.} Yet, when observed over time, these political institutions—and the regimes which they comprise—begin to diverge.

Senegal underwent a gradual democratization, incrementally enacting liberalizing reforms until the democratic process institutionalized so successfully that two incumbent presidents lost elections and allowed for peaceful turnovers of power.\footnote{President Abdou Diouf lost and conceded presidential elections to Abdoulaye Wade in 2000. President Wade lost and conceded presidential elections to Macky Sall in 2012.} Unlike Senegal, Burkina Faso adopted multiparty elections only to have its leaders develop a large repertoire of tactics
through which the regime periodically offered limited liberalizing reforms only to later recalibrate to maintain a trajectory as an electoral authoritarian regime. As the above narrative highlights, the military, civil society, neo-traditional institutions, and the opposition all engaged in the recalibration of the regime during the 2015 political transition.

Chad, on the other hand, experimented with multiparty elections only to slowly erode any semblance of their democratic character, first by manipulating the electoral process, then by abolishing presidential term limits and ignoring the legislative electoral calendar. The Chadian regime systematically removed the ‘freedom, fairness, inclusivity and meaningfulness’ of its electoral process and thereby restored authoritarian rule (Schedler 2013). Twenty-four I discuss each of these trajectory in much greater detail in Chapter 5.

All three of these regimes established lasting institutional configurations and experienced regime stability for decades, but why and how did politics evolve differently in each case to result in these three different regime trajectories? In this dissertation, I offer an answer to this empirical puzzle by examining differences in each countries’ non-governing institutions over time, and in relation to the regime. In so doing, I craft a theory addressing how political power is shaped in African electoral regimes in interaction with non-governing institutions. After winning elections, ruling parties seek to accumulate and organize power within regimes in ways which limit or even erode political liberalization. Militaries, neo-traditional institutions, civil society and the opposition can provide a check on the illiberal tendencies of the government by shaping the ways in which regimes are able to manage pressures for greater political liberalization. Differences across these non-governing institutions constrain the options available to electoral

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24 Chad routinely ranks at the bottom of indices such as Freedom House which attempts to measure levels of civil liberties and political rights to capture the level of democratic governance in the world’s regimes.
regimes to accumulate and organize power and thereby constrain their possible regime trajectories.

To explore the theoretical implications of this argument, the following section presents the historical institutionalist approach that I deploy to analyze institutional junctures and their antecedent conditions as tools for understanding how the powers of non-governing institutions shape regime trajectories over time. The subsequent sections conceptualize each non-governing institution and develop a clear theoretical framework for the different trajectories of African electoral regimes. After discussing the conceptual components of the historical institutionalist perspective adopted in this dissertation, the chapter introduces the non-governing institutions which, I argue, have shaped the different regime trajectories of Burkina Faso, Chad and Senegal. By exploring the different strategies and mechanisms multiparty regimes use to organize power through their interactions with non-governing institutions, and how differences across these institutions shape their different regime trajectories, this dissertation embarks on a new theoretical trajectory of its own.

**An Historical Institutionalist Approach to Understanding Regime Trajectories in Africa**

Certain types of research questions, and the theories advanced to explain them, are best addressed by particular types of research designs. Crucially important to any research design is the conceptualization of causality inherent to the theory under investigation (Mahoney 1999 and Hall 2003). Only after considering the theoretical implications of particular causes can research go about identifying the appropriate methods for discovering their effects. Indeed, the use of cross-panel statistical analysis, which assumes unit homogeneity, or experimental methods, may miss important ways in which contextual effects structure politics over time as a process (Hall 2016). To explain the divergent regime trajectories of Senegal, Burkina Faso, and Chad we need to observe regimes over long periods of time, sometimes decades, examining the interplay of
power among a multiplicity of actors as these shape institutional configurations and processes of political liberalization (or not) during those periods.

The significance of time in a given theory plays a vitally important role in research design since some methods are not useful for examining certain causal processes. Pierson illustrates the importance of time with a two-by-two chart, describing combinations of short and long causes and outcomes (2003, 192). Before determining the appropriate research methods, it is necessary to think critically about the proposed time horizon in which the cause(s) and outcome(s) are expected to take place. This dissertation analyzes long-term outcomes by looking at regime trajectories. The theoretical assumption made in this dissertation is that there are a number of key factors certain causes that condition the ability of regimes to accumulate and organize power. The ways in which regimes accumulate and organize their power have important effects on how they are able to manage pressures, over time, for greater political liberalization. These processes then shape the trajectories of these regimes.

I theorize that different non-governing institutions are the most important of these key factors. For simplicity and for purposes of developing an internally valid inductive theoretical framework, this dissertation posits three regime trajectories following the establishment of multiparty elections: 1) gradual democratization, 2) stable electoral authoritarianism, and 3) the restoration of authoritarian rule. In doing so, this dissertation attempts to analyze three distinct outcomes, two on extreme ends of the spectrum (democratization, and a restoration of authoritarian rule), and one intermediate outcome (stable electoral authoritarianism).25

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25 Another potential set of outcomes which is not analyzed in this dissertation is the universe of cases in which regime breakdowns occur. For example, following multiparty elections, a regime may begin to gradually democratize, but that regime may later break down, which would place it outside the immediate scope conditions of the theoretical framework developed in this dissertation. Similarly, the restoration of authoritarian rule is not conceptualized here as a regime breakdown, but rather as a gradual erosion of the institutional characteristics which
In the parsimonious language of dependent and independent variables, the central research question of this dissertation considers regime trajectories as the dependent variable, and posits that the different configurations of certain non-governing institutions—the military, neo-traditional institutions, civil society and the political opposition—function as independent variables which partially explain the divergent regime trajectories observed over time in Burkina Faso, Chad and Senegal. But dependent and independent variables are not equivalent to theory. They cannot on their own tell us why these three regimes followed different trajectories. To do that, this dissertation develops a theoretical framework which builds on conceptual innovations in the approaches of historical institutionalism and comparative historical analysis, which address the proposed causal processes at work within each regime trajectory over time.26

Comparative historical analysis aims to identify particular moments in history at which the institutions that structure actors’ behavior become more susceptible to change. These junctures are often conceptualized as ‘critical’ junctures, or moments during which actors have higher levels of volition (Cappaccio and Keleman 2007, Soifer 2012, and Cappoccia 2015). For example, the episode from Burkina Faso’s 2015 transition, discussed at the beginning of this chapter, demonstrates the roles actors played in establishing the institutional framework of the country’s post-Compaoré regime. These specific historical events allow for the possibility of large scale structural change to take place, ‘lock-in,’ and begin a causal process of path dependence (Cappaccia 2015, 147). Such processes are frequently referred to as feedback loops, and highlight a reciprocal logic of mutually reinforcing interests, beliefs, and/or resources.

make electoral regimes distinct from their fully authoritarian counterparts, namely: the regular organization of at least nominally free and fair multiparty elections to national executive and legislative offices.

26 Impressive surveys of these two overlapping approaches which bring together social science scholars from the fields of sociology, political science, international relations, and economics can be found in Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003; Mahoney and Thelen 2015; and Fioretos, Lynch and Steinhouse 2016.
This dissertation’s argument is in line with this institutional logic, and views the implementation of multiparty elections as a juncture of institutional change within African regimes. However, as the three divergent regime trajectories demonstrate in Senegal, Burkina Faso, and Chad, multipartism may have locked-in at their respective junctures, but the inauguration and continuation of multiparty elections did not lock-in specific regime trajectories. Rather, and as I develop in greater detail below, the characteristics and configuration of each regime’s non-governing institutions shape regime trajectories.

The junctures at which point regimes implement multiparty elections resulted in a variety of changes to African political systems, and enabled certain actors to reconfigure their access to, accumulation of and organization of political power. This reconfiguration of political order following the significant changes experienced by regimes occurred through repeated interactions between non-governing institutions and the newly multiparty regimes. The decisions of actors at these junctures represent proximate causes which intersect with long-term causes (the structural characteristics of non-governing institutions) to result in long-term outcomes: the regime’s trajectory. Due to the long-term nature of the outcome, regime trajectories may only become clear over an extended period of time, but the institutional processes that lead to the evolution, erosion, and/or stability of political liberalization are shaped by the reconfiguration of institutional mechanisms after the inauguration of multiparty party elections.

At least initially, these reconfigurations, often inspired by former configurations between regimes, the military, neo-traditional institutions, civil society and the opposition, shaped the likelihood that a particular regime trajectory would then follow. In the cases used to develop this theory, institutional change over time unveils the continued evolution of political liberalization in Senegal resulting in its trajectory of gradual democratization, the erosion of political
liberalization in Chad resulting in the restoration of authoritarian rule, and the stable, but limited political liberalization in Burkina Faso, resulting in electoral authoritarianism.

By theorizing that regime trajectories are not ‘locked in’ following the adoption of multiparty elections, I diverge from a standard historical institutionalist approach and build upon recent innovations that attempt to capture processes of institutional change over time. An investigation of the different regime trajectories of Senegal, Chad and Burkina Faso presents an opportunity for a novel theoretical contribution within this framework. They demonstrate that over time, and through long-term processes of institutional change, multiparty electoral regimes may follow very different trajectories. While the political institutions of multiparty elections may become ‘locked in’ as cycles of multiparty elections become routine, this alone does not determine the trajectory of the regime or its degree of political liberalization. Unlike the growing literature that focuses primarily on the institutions within (especially authoritarian) regimes, this dissertation attempts to look at how new multiparty electoral regimes interact with sources of power outside of the regime—what I here call non-governing institutions. By doing so, this dissertation attempts to address the theoretical gap left behind by work that simply identifies a list of variables that might result in an outcome, and instead heeds the call of Hall (2016, 44) to examine the dynamic processes of how regimes follow divergent trajectories over extended periods of time. The institutional interactions within the specific contexts of Burkina Faso, Chad

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27 See Magaloni (2006); Greene (2007); Brownlee (2007); and Gandhi (2008) for a selection of significant and recent contributions to the literature on authoritarian political institutions.

28 Pepinsky (2014) raises two important critiques from the rationalist and social conflict theory perspectives which suggest that authoritarian institutions are epiphenomenal on more fundamental political, social and economic conditions. He maintains that authoritarian institutions cannot effectively constrain political actors because by their very authoritarian nature, those institutions can be discarded or rebuilt to meet the needs of the authoritarians. This dissertation attempts to address these concerns at least partially by identifying the mechanism outside of political institutions which interact with (electoral) authoritarian regimes to shape their trajectories over time.
and Senegal demonstrate how a regime’s ability to manage pressures for greater liberalization
shapes the evolutionary pathways of its trajectory.

This approach fuses together the commonly held view among historical institutionalists
that institutions are capable of structuring politics, but it also recognizes that institutions change
and evolve over time, what Hall (2016, 39) refers to as a “paradox of plasticity” faced by
historical institutionalists. Addressing, at least partially, this paradox is one of the central
theoretical contributions that I offer through this dissertation. I argue that configurations of the
non-governing institutions shape processes of political liberalization within multiparty electoral
regimes over time, resulting in institutional change as these non-governing institutions are in turn
shaped by the introduction of multiparty electoral politics. By illuminating the different and
reciprocal relationships between multiparty regimes and non-governing institutions, I seek to
explain the different ways in which these relationships shape regime trajectories.

Steeck and Thelen (2005, 15) as well as Fligstein and McAdam (2012) suggest that in
any society there are an array of institutions layered on top of each other shaping political order,
and that regimes employ those institutions that best suit their interests at any given time. I point
to the different characteristics of non-governing institutions in Senegal, Burkina Faso and Chad,
to demonstrate how regimes employ or react to non-governing institutions in an effort to manage
pressures for greater political liberalization. These interactions produce reciprocal relationships
between regimes and non-governing institutions that over time and through the “temporal
syncopation” of political reform result in different regime trajectories (Hall 2016, 45). While this
dissertation uses comparative historical analysis to evaluate this theoretical framework, it also
seeks to innovate this approach by viewing institutions less as rigid structures and more as relational spaces that guide actors’ behaviors.\textsuperscript{29}

To develop a theoretical framework that accounts for this requires a conceptualization of gradual or unanticipated change within our understanding of institutions and their effects. Hacker, Pierson and Thelen (2015, 180) present two ways in which institutions change over time—through processes of ‘drift’ and ‘conversion.’\textsuperscript{30} They define ‘drift’ as the type of change experienced when institutional effects are altered as a function of change(s) in their original contexts. Put differently, the effects of a particular institution may change, because the context in which that institution originally developed has changed, rendering the original effect irrelevant, but resulting in a new unintended effect. ‘Conversion’ refers to change that occurs when actors redirect institutions for purposes beyond their original intent. In these instances, institutions are adapted by actors to effect change differently from how the institution was initially envisioned.

In this dissertation I argue that the multiparty regimes which emerged in Burkina Faso, Chad and Senegal followed different regime trajectories due to differences in their configuration of non-governing institutions, which conditioned the ability of the regimes to manage pressures for greater political liberalization. However, these non-governing institutions also adapted to the onset of multiparty elections as a contextual change. In some cases, this further precipitated a particular regime trajectory.

\textsuperscript{29} Below I outline a number of conceptual innovations which help to provide some traction on this idea. The theoretical framework I develop in this chapter recognizes that non-governing institutions are mostly-rigid structures, but that they also adapt over time, and this has made me more amenable to the nuanced perspective advanced by Peter Hall (2016) in his piece “Politics as a Process Structured in Space and Time.”

\textsuperscript{30} Streek and Thelen (2005, 13) also outline three other processes—displacement, layering, and exhaustion—which result in gradual, but transformative, institutional change.
This is not to say that particular moments, such as the adoption and implementation of
multiparty elections, do not have long-lasting or transformative effects. To the contrary, specific
historical moments or junctures often have a wide variety of effects. However, as Pepinsky
(2014, 636) points out, “even dramatic and unanticipated institutional changes such as
democratization, are unlikely themselves [emphasis in the original] to upset existing socio-
economic orders. Absent a shock to a society’s social structure, elites are likely to harness new
political institutions in order to adjust their earlier strategies of domination and accumulation.”
The theory advanced in this dissertation supports Pepinsky’s assertion, and suggests that elites
interact across institutions to formulate strategies of managing pressures for greater political
liberalization, and that these strategies vary depending on different configurations of non-
governing institutions. Thus, I contend that institutions matter to the extent that they constrain, or
potentially liberate, elites to adjust their strategies, but those adjustments take place over long
periods of time and through institutionally shaped processes.

To borrow the language of Pierson (2003), ‘short causes’ may still be highly relevant for
‘long outcomes,’ or ‘short causes’ may result in ‘short outcomes,’ which have cumulative effects
over time to become ‘long causes’ for ‘long outcomes.’ For example, Howard and Roessler
(2006) demonstrate that in some authoritarian contexts elections may lead to liberalization
without resulting immediately in democratization, but these ‘liberalizing electoral outcomes’
function as primers for democratization and thus have long term causes. My approach recognizes
that politics continues to evolve after specific junctures, such as the establishment of multiparty
elections, and posits that it is crucially important that theories of political liberalization take into
account a causal analysis that understands processes over time, and rests on a systematic
comparison of contextualized concepts between and within cases (Bernhard 2009, 11). By
evaluating the different regime trajectories of Burkina Faso, Chad, and Senegal following their adoption of multiparty elections, I have attempted to build a theory that accounts for long-term processes of political liberalization or the lack thereof through a causal analysis of variation in non-governing institutions.

Two caveats are in order here. First, the macro-social structures present across much of Sahelian Africa are not conducive to stability. As shown in Chapter 2, Sahelian countries are among the poorest on the planet and experience a high degree of economic volatility. In some ways, this makes the cases of Burkina Faso, Senegal and Chad that much more interesting. The propensity of each to experience economic crises over the last several decades suggests that political stability would be more difficult to establish. However, it also suggests that the possibility of an exogenous (or endogenous) shock resulting in political instability is comparatively higher in this region.31

Second, this dissertation situates itself squarely within the tradition of the “eclectic messy center” of comparative politics. By this I refer to Evans’ (1995, 4) discussion of “work that draws on general theories whenever it can but also cares deeply about particular historical outcomes,” relying on specific cases to craft innovative theory and “theories as lenses” to unveil the particular fascinating aspects of cases. As such, I draw on the theoretical frameworks advanced in other works of comparative politics, but remain committed to the empirical

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31 While Burkina Faso, Chad and Senegal each represent cases of regime stability following multiparty elections, this is by no means guaranteed and to some degree the comparability of stability experienced in each case might be up for debate. While the different institutional configurations elaborated below helped to maintain stable regime trajectories, they are not conceptualized here to be sufficient causes of stability. Rather, as long as the regimes remain stable, these different institutional configurations condition the prospects for greater political liberalization and thus the trajectory of each regime. The surprising breakdown of democracy and political order in neighboring Mali serves as a cautionary example of a case where an exogenous shock began a series of destabilizing events that ultimately ended democratic governance and undermined the regime’s claims of authority over much of Malian society.
exposition of each case and its institutions. The goal of this inductive theory-building approach is both to provide a compelling explanation for the different regime trajectories in Senegal, Burkina Faso and Chad and to contribute a potentially generalizable theoretical framework for the study of democratization and comparative authoritarianism. To borrow the words of Peter Hall (2016, 45):

[My] perspective [advanced above] does not mean political scientists have to become historians. The search is still for fruitful generalization, notably about the factors conditioning the formation of coalitions and institutional or ideological development. However, the result [and my hope is to be able to contribute to] deeper and more realistic models of politics.

The theoretical framework developed in this dissertation examines particular configurations of non-governing institutions before and after the juncture represented by the adoption of multiparty elections. However, it maintains that this juncture does not represent a complete restructuring of institutional order in these three political regimes. Rather this juncture represents a moment during which large scale political transformation occurred (the ‘lock-in’ of multiparty electoral systems), and subsequently reconfigured relations with existing non-governing institutions—the military, neo-traditional institutions, civil society and the opposition—presenting new strategies to manage pressures for greater political liberalization. This process proceeded differently in each case as the institutional configurations provided different sources of power to the regime, and in turn shaped each regime’s trajectory.

Institutions do not emerge from ahistorical contexts. Quite the opposite, institutions develop, evolve and change in relation to particular historical contexts structuring politics across time (Hall 2016, 39). Non-governing institutions are shaped by their own histories of interaction with previous regimes and social coalitions that result in their different institutional characteristics. These histories represent important antecedent conditions—common practices or experiences—that shape relations between the regime and non-governing institutions. In the
cases of Burkina Faso, Senegal and Chad, the extent and form of colonial rule represents a central antecedent condition.

Colonial policies and administration in each former French colony shaped the relational structures between the regime and its non-governing institutions long before the advent of multiparty elections. In the case of the military, civil society and the opposition, colonial rule is directly linked to the establishment of each of these institutions. In the case of neo-traditional institutions, colonial rule represents a juncture during which the existing institutional order was refashioned by colonial authorities’ interactions with already existing African institutions. This reshaping of socio-political order resulted in the different characteristics of contemporary neo-traditional institutions. The extent and form of colonial rule left an important impact on the characteristics of each non-governing institution prior to the introduction of multiparty elections, and these characteristics remain relevant for understanding how and why non-governing institutions shape the ability of the regime to manage pressures for greater liberalization.

Consequently, the overall theoretical framework proposes that an examination of this process must begin with a consideration of the characteristics of these non-governing institutions prior to the introduction of multiparty elections. Critical antecedent conditions are factors which precede a juncture during which institutions undergo a reconfiguration, and which affect how that reconfiguration occurs (Slater and Simmons 2010). In this case, the extent and form of colonial rule had already shaped the realm of possible regime trajectories by affecting the institutional development of non-governing institutions prior to the introduction of multiparty regimes. In other words, colonial rule laid the foundation for Africa’s contemporary multiparty regimes by shaping the characteristics of non-governing institutions and the regimes themselves as well as the relationships between the two.
Figure 3-1 below presents a stylized causal diagram of the place of non-governing institutions within the conceptual framework I propose. The extent and form of colonial rule function as antecedent conditions that shape the military, neo-traditional institutions, civil society and opposition in crucial ways before, during and after the inauguration of multiparty elections, resulting in a reconfiguration of political order under the new regime. These non-governing institutions create structured processes through which actors interact and condition the ways in which power is accumulated and organized under the new regime. Through these processes non-governing institutions shape the abilities of regimes to manage pressures for greater political liberalization that leads to distinct regime trajectories over extended periods of time. The role of time is important for regime trajectories since regimes and their institutions function as relational spaces wherein actors induce gradual change through adaptation. Pierson (2015, 124) suggests that “power is like an iceberg; at any moment in time most of it lies below the waterline, built into core institutional and organizational structures of societies.” It is precisely these core institutional and organizational structures of society that I aim to reveal and analyze through this theoretical framework.

Below I outline the different forms of power wielded by the military, neo-traditional institutions, civil society and the opposition. In the same sections, I elaborate how different characteristics of these institutions help to explain the ways in which they are able (or not) to constrain the ability of regimes to manage pressures for greater political liberalization. Specifically, I outline the factors shaping the coercive power of the military, the symbolic power of neo-traditional institutions, and the mobilizing power of civil society and the opposition. The onset of multiparty electoral regimes in Senegal, Burkina Faso and Chad changed the configuration of existing political institutions and forced the core institutional and organizational
structures of society to adapt to a new political context. Within these new contexts, the varying characteristics of non-governing institutions forged a new set of prospects for greater political liberalization. In the following section, I develop this argument in more detail by introducing how and why this was the case for each non-governing institution, and briefly discussing differences in each institution’s characteristics in Burkina Faso, Chad and Senegal. I then summarize these differences in an analytical framework and conclude with a brief summary.

Figure 3-1. Causal Diagram

**Managing Political Liberalization in Electoral Regimes**

The framework discussed above attempts to provide an approach for understanding how different configurations of institutions structure political processes over time, and how those institutions change themselves as a result of those same processes. For the purposes of this dissertation, and the theory it advances, I first examine the colonial period during which the antecedent conditions for contemporary regimes shaped the characteristics of non-governing institutions. Secondly, I examine the moment at which the introduction of multiparty electoral...
politics reconfigured those institutions and hence politics in contemporary African regimes. The theory formulated in this dissertation contends that differences in the colonial rule experienced by each of the cases serve as important antecedent conditions because they shaped the non-governing institutions in each regime prior to the adoption of multiparty elections. These different characteristics then shaped the reconfiguration of interactions between these non-governing institutions and the regime following the adoption of multiparty elections. Below, I theorize that these interactions are best understood as different types of power that are wielded by non-governing institutions. Depending on the characteristics of the reconfigured institutional combinations, the regimes accumulate and organize power differently following multiparty elections and this in turn conditions their ability to manage pressures for greater political liberalization. Over time, and through the “syncopation” of political processes, the management of pressures for greater political liberalization results in distinct regime trajectories. Below, I delve deeper into the particular factors that undergird this theory by exploring how and why each non-governing institution contributes to this process.

Antecedent Conditions and Colonial Rule

The form and extent of colonial rule had important consequences for the ways in which non-governing institutions would subsequently structure political processes. The “form” of colonial rule is understood primarily as the purpose(s) of the colony during colonial rule: for instance, did the colony serve primarily as a source from which to extract goods and labor? Or, was the colony also used for larger administrative practices, thereby resulting in some (perhaps limited) forms of administrative investment? The “extent” of colonial rule is understood as both

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32 I owe some credit for this particular insight to Pukuma’s (2017) work on the different forms of British colonialism and their impact on the prospects for post-colonial democratic survival.
the duration and geographical expansion of the colonial presence. Depending on its form and extent, I postulate that the impact of colonial rule will have left different impressions on the institutional and organizational social structures in each colony, and that this will have shaped the characteristics of the structures.

Each of the cases focused on in this study experienced French colonial rule, but the form and extent of that rule varied dramatically within each case, creating differing conditions at the moment of independence. French colonial rule began much later in Chad and lasted for a much shorter duration than elsewhere on the continent: early 1900s-1960.\textsuperscript{33} The French colonial presence also varied dramatically across the territory, and the form of colonial rule was almost entirely extractive. In Senegal, on the other hand, a European presence was established much earlier along the coastline—the French trading post of St. Louis was established in 1659—and beginning in the 1850s the French presence extended into the interior of the territory. Consequently, the French developed a more extensive presence throughout the territory, and Senegal became the colonial center from which the French administered the territories of French West Africa. Meanwhile, the territory comprising modern day Burkina Faso fell under the administrative jurisdiction of several colonial territories at different times, until the Mossi kingdom successfully pressured French authorities for their own territorial status following the Second World War. Crucially, the interaction of the colonial regime with the Mossi kingdom established important institutional ties with neo-traditional institutions in Burkina Faso that did not take place in Chad. Still, the territory was colonized relatively late, experienced minimal

\textsuperscript{33} As I discuss in detail in Chapter 4, the French colonial conquest of Chad began in the late 1890s and continued until roughly 1920. Thus, portions of contemporary Chadian territory did not experience even French military administration until the late 1910s, while certain communities, primarily in the south, experienced a French colonial presence as early as 1897.
French presence, and was used primarily for extractive purposes. As a result, the extent and form of French colonial rule in Burkina Faso was somewhat mixed, but still primarily short and extractive. Figure 3-2 displays these differences across four different quadrants.

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Senegal
Burkina Faso
Chad

Figure 3-2. Colonial Rule: Extent & Penetration

These conditions shaped the role of the military in politics differently during the post-colonial era. The longer exposure to colonial rule, and deeper integration and investment by the French in the Senegalese military resulted in a cohesive military corps that more closely resembled the French military apparatus. To the contrary, the Chadian military was not cohesive at independence. Rather it was comprised almost entirely of Chadians from the south of the country, leading the French to retain a strong military presence to maintain law and order in Chad’s northern territories even after independence.

French colonial rule also shaped the relations between neo-traditional institutions and political institutions in their colonies, as colonial administrators sought out and supported certain traditional partners to enhance their authority over each former colony. These relationships
between the French colonial apparatus and neo-traditional authorities were later integrated to varying degrees within the post-colonial political systems of each country.

Finally, colonial rule also shaped the origins of civil society and the opposition in these countries. French politics exposed African elites to unionized labor, one of the first and most powerful forms of social activism in post-colonial Africa, and African political elites were introduced to the French political system and specifically to political parties through their exposure to its institutions as part of French colonial rule.

In each of these ways, the colonial experiences of Senegal, Burkina Faso and Chad shaped their contemporary political processes by their effects on each country’s non-governing institutions, as explored further in Chapter 4. The remainder of this chapter provides an overview of the roles each non-governing institution plays in the shaping the trajectories of Africa’s electoral regimes.

**The Military and Coercive Power**

The military is a state institution that is used by the regime or government for the enforcement of order, but it is also an institution that interfaces with and is composed of members from society. These two characteristics imbue the military with a particular kind of power, which I refer to as **coercive power**, and which I define as the ability to use force or the threat of force as a means of accomplishing particular ends. The coercive power of the military also forms the crux of the principal-agent paradox in civil-military relations. In a liberal democracy, ideal civil-military relations are characterized by complete civilian oversight of the military. This poses a principal-agent paradox because civilians lack coercive power over the military.

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34 In sub-Saharan Africa, the military is frequently understood as the security force which may also comprise the police and in Francophone countries, the gendarmerie. Additionally, the military regularly plays a role in law enforcement and the administration of law and order in African countries.
military, meaning civilians have limited options for preventing the military from interfering in politics.\textsuperscript{35}

In the context of regimes which recently adopted multiparty elections the coercive power of the military may be used as a resource with which to manage pressures for greater liberalization. However, not all militaries are created equal. Two characteristics of the military structure the ways in which the coercive power of the military may be employed by the regime.

First, the \textit{normative understanding} of civil-military relations within the military creates an institutional mechanism which political intervention more or less likely. Where the military is characterized by a culture of adherence to a republican norm of civil-military relations, meaning that the military guarantees the stability of the state while remaining out of political processes, regimes may employ the coercive power of the military to uphold political institutions.\textsuperscript{36} Indeed, in such cases the military may even function as a credible horizontal accountability check on the regime itself. These regimes rarely employ the coercive power of the military to repress pressures for political liberalization violently. Alternatively, where the military is characterized by an interventionist norm of civil-military relations, regimes can more readily pull the coercive power of the military into the political process to repress pressures for greater political liberalization. This poses a dilemma to regimes, however, since the military may also pose a threat to the regime itself. If the regime has exacerbated socio-political crises to the detriment of the country in the military’s perception, and if the military understands civil-military relations to

\textsuperscript{35} For more on the principal-agent conundrum of civil-military relations see: Feaver (2003)

\textsuperscript{36} Students and scholars of civil-military relations will notice here and below that I borrow on some of the foundation logic discussed in Finer’s (1962) classic work, \textit{The Man on Horseback}, as well as the idea of Professionalism developed in Huntington’s (1957) similarly influential work on civil-military relations, \textit{The Soldier and the State}. 

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allow for political intervention, the military may intervene in the political process to oust the regime.

Secondly, military *cohesion* also affects the coercive power of the military and functions in conjunction with the military's norms of civil-military relations.37 A cohesive military may keep the regime in check, but it presents a double-edged sword because a cohesive military has greater coercive power that may be used to heavily suppress pressures for liberalization. Here, civil-military relations become crucially important. Republican civil-military relations dictate that there is civilian oversight of the military and that the military will not intervene in the political process. Consequently, the military will not exceed its mandate of providing security for the citizens of the country by violently repressing pressures for greater political liberalization if such pressures are regulated within the political system. Interventionist civil-military relations, on the other hand, is characterized by a willingness of the military to intervene in the political process, and thus, may lead to the violent repression of such pressures, to the point that they produce a socio-political crisis. At such a point the military then becomes more likely to oust the regime.

Where the military is not cohesive but is instead fragmented or divided by multiple factions, its degree of coercive power will be diminished and maintaining a republican norm of civil-military relations becomes less likely. In such contexts, a regime may give preference to certain factions within the military over others, and in turn use these military factions to suppress pressures for political liberalization. By limited the overall cohesion of the military, the regime

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37 I have undoubtedly been influenced by Slater’s (2010, 4-12) work on authoritarian regime resilience and state building in Southeast Asia with regard to military cohesion here as well as coercive and symbolic power. However, I depart significantly from Slater’s work, hoping both to build on it and to expand the horizon of political processes which Slater discusses.
also protects itself from the potential threat of military intervention against the regime. In this case, regimes are more likely to use the military as a tool of extraction and repression to combat pressures against political liberalization. This also prevents the military from becoming cohesive, and thus reduces the potential threat that a cohesive interventionist military might pose to the regime.

However, this strategy does not fully eliminate the threat of a military intervention. Particularly at times of crisis moments of social unrest, factions within the military may overthrow the regime, seeing such moments as an opportunity to take power. As I will argue, however, when other non-governing institutions—neo-traditional institutions, civil society and the opposition—exhibit high degrees of symbolic and/or mobilizing power, these institutions may be able to hold the military in check following the ouster of the regime by taking advantage of the military’s lack of cohesion. Such was the case following the 2014 popular insurrection in Burkina Faso discussed in the introduction to this chapter.

![Figure 3-3. Military: Civil-Military Relations & Cohesion](image-url)
Figure 3-3 displays the differences in each case across these two characteristics of the military. The Senegalese military is both cohesive and characterized by republican civil-military relations in the sense of a strong tradition of a non-interventionist norm in the political process. The Chadian military, on the other hand, is characterized by numerous factions and a history of civil conflict which I understand to be a violent form of interventionist civil-military relations. The Burkinabè military presents a more complex case in which the institution is more cohesive than that of Chad, yet prior to the adoption multiparty elections suffered from a number of ideological factions which after elections diminished. The Burkinabè military also regularly intervened in the political development of the country exhibiting an interventionist norm of civil-military relations. Chapter 6 examines the role of the military in more depth.

**Neo-Traditional Institutions and Symbolic Power**

By neo-traditional institutions I refer to social sources of authority within African societies, including religious orders, chieftaincies or other forms of authority rooted in social traditions. I use the prefix ‘neo’ here to indicate that while these sources of social authority are rooted in historical structures, they adapt to their contemporary contexts with remarkable ingenuity. Thus, while these institutions derive relevance from their traditional roots, they must

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38 Some might point to the separatist conflict in the Casamance region of southern Senegal as evidence of a lack of cohesion. On the contrary, the limited conflict in the Casamance helps to underscore that the national military is itself quite cohesive and, even when faced with a low-level insurgency, has upheld republican norms of civil-military relations.

39 It must be noted that such social sources of authority can be found throughout the world and history, but they arguably play a unique role in African society in the structuring of political order, primarily because of the relative newness with which African societies have become organized into contemporary nation states. This insight is outside of the purview of this dissertation, but aims to build on arguments advanced in Herbst (2000).

40 Here again, I owe some credit to the influence of Slater (2010) and his discussions of communal elites, but the works of Villalón, (notably 1995, 2010, and 2015) have advanced my thinking on neo-traditional institutions in significantly different directions, helping me to better capture the peculiarities of these institutions in the African socio-political context.
also adapt to their new contexts in order for that relevance to continue. Where they successfully accomplish this balancing act, neo-traditional institutions exhibit what I term symbolic power.

I define symbolic power as the ability to use status and reverence as a means for directing the actions of others. Such power is often tenuous at best, and those institutions that wield it must effectively and cleverly adapt to their changing political and sociological contexts over time to maintain their symbolic power. Thus, neo-traditional institutions must interact with regimes to negotiate the ways in which they can maintain their social relevance and symbolic power. This often results in a symbiotic relationship between neo-traditional institutions and political regimes, where regimes provide preference to certain neo-traditional institutions, and those institutions support aspects and agendas of political regimes in return. The degree of symbolic power wielded by neo-traditional institutions and the ways in which it is put to use are determined by two factors: the level of their social integration, and the level of their political integration.

When neo-traditional institutions are politically integrated into a regime, they are likely to structure political processes such that they maintain the status quo, thereby working to mitigate pressures for greater political liberalization. Where neo-traditional institutions are not politically integrated, they are likely to either work against the regime by attempting to carve out their own areas of authority, or to seek integration into the regime to benefit from the collaboration.

Secondly, the degree of symbolic power inherent in neo-traditional institutions is affected by the degree of their social integration. Where neo-traditional institutions have ties to a large cross section of the population, they wield a greater degree of symbolic power by representing a larger portion of society. Conversely, where numerous neo-traditional institutions overlap or
capture disparate groups of the population, that symbolic power is less concentrated and less influential. Social integration may be also understood more qualitatively as varying in accordance with the adherence and penetration of social customs into the quotidian politics of local communities. Where such traditions are more centralized, pervasive, and consequential in the lives of citizens, neo-traditional institutions should be understood as more deeply integrated socially.

Political elites are more likely to view neo-traditional institutions as partners in their goal to influence popular support, and thus seek to co-opt them, when they wield large degrees of symbolic power. Whether neo-traditional institutions are able to wield such power depends on whether they are socially integrated, i.e. where they are not diverse, fragmented, or irrelevant in the view of the population. Where they are not socially integrated they are more likely to be pitted against one another as they compete for recognition and resources from the regime and society. In this scenario, it is unlikely that they will be able to effectively mobilize large sections of society for political liberalization. On the other hand, it is the very threat which socially integrated neo-traditional institutions pose to the perceived legitimacy of the regime that makes them desirable for cooptation by the regime itself. And insofar as neo-traditional institutions are able to function as a bulwark against pressures for increased political liberalization, regimes will be tempted to attempt to put them to this use.

Figure 3-4 places Burkina Faso, Chad and Senegal in quadrants based on the degree of political and social integration of their neo-traditional institutions. In Burkina Faso, neo-traditional institutions are highly integrated into the political system. Leaders of neo-traditional institutions routinely weigh in on political issues and are used to maintain order in times of socio-political crises. However, there are many forms of neo-traditional institutions in Burkina
Faso, meaning that there is no one set of institutions with which the regime can engage. Instead, there are several, and certain neo-traditional institutions are given greater preference over others due to their perceived degrees of symbolic power. In Chad, neo-traditional institutions are neither politically nor socially integrated to any significant degree. There are simply too many different neo-traditional institutions for these institutions to lay claim to any degree of symbolic power. Consequently, they are unable to credibly check the regime, and instead vie amongst each other for access to the resources and recognition of the regime. In Senegal, neo-traditional institutions are highly integrated into the political and social realities of Senegalese society. This creates a mutually reinforcing dynamic whereby politicians and leaders of the neo-traditional institutions provide checks and balances on each other’s ability to accumulate and organize power. I explore the details of neo-traditional institutions in each case in Chapter 7.

**Mobilizing Power in Civil Society and the Opposition**

Under certain configurations, the military and neo-traditional institutions may provide regimes with the needed coercive and symbolic power to check pressures for greater

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**Figure 3-4. Neo-Traditional Institutions: Social & Political integration**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>High Integration</th>
<th>Low Integration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High Social</td>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Social</td>
<td>Chad</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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liberalization. However, popular pressure, particularly when effectively organized by civil society and the political opposition, may exceed the range of influence wielded by neo-traditional institutions and the military, and result in liberalizing concessions from the regime. The ability of civil society and the opposition to present a unified front and mobilize the populace is what I refer to as *mobilizing power*. Central to the idea of mobilizing power is the idea that civil society and the opposition both foment and channel popular discontent in an attempt to leverage the regime for greater political liberalization.

Two factors, the unity and the organizational capacity of civil society and the opposition, are crucial in their abilities to pressure regimes for greater liberalization. When civil society and the opposition have a high degree of mobilizing power, the likelihood of political liberalization is also much higher. Yet, civil society and the opposition in African electoral regimes rarely wield a high degree of mobilizing power. Instead, they are often fragmented or coopted by the regime. They may suffer from a limited base and thus pose only a minimal threat. It is imperative to recognize here that civil society in the African context often means something quite different from the forms of civil society or associational life discussed in Putnam (1993) or Bernhard (2005). Civil society in the African context refers broadly to what has most frequently included: human rights groups, women’s groups, journalists, jurists, business associations, and other mostly elite-driven groups. These institutions tend to be urban-based, elite-led, culturally westernized, and hence inherently limited in their ability to mobilize large sections of African society.

Early attention given to the democratization efforts in Africa focused on the reputedly important role of such groups in promoting democracy by supporting limited use of state power
and the expansion of individual rights. Historically speaking, the institutions of civil society in the Sahel have been neither mass-based nor popular organizations. In fact, liberalization brought about by multiparty elections has historically opened doors more broadly to societal forces such as neo-traditional institutions and other religious institutions. Indeed, this process has partially eroded the popular appeal of civil society institutions as leaders of neo-traditional institutions shift their strategies to cater to a larger audience. This, in turn, forced civil society groups to gradually adapt their own strategies diminishing their relevance outside of elite circles.

Figure 3-5. Civil Society: Organizational Capacity & Unity

Still, the mobilizations around the 2014 popular insurrection in Burkina Faso and the controversial 2012 campaign of Abdoulaye Wade in Senegal suggest that civil society groups can at times exert high degrees of mobilizing power to channel popular discontent with regimes that attempt to make illiberal reforms (Chouli 2015 and Resnick 2013). Conversely, attempts by civil society groups in Chad to mobilize large sections of society have largely failed or have been

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41 For an example of such works see: Harbeson, Rothchild and Chazan (1994).
countered with coercive power, effectively extinguishing them. Based on these initial observations, Figure 3-5 above represents civil society based on its unity and organizational capacity in these three countries.

Figure 3-6. Political Opposition: Organizational Capacity & Unity

Similarly, the political opposition can vary according to the same two dimensions. In Chad, the political opposition is neither unified nor capable of organizing large cross-sections of society. Opposition parties in Chad tend to be fragmented and easily coopted or pitted against each other by the regime. They also tend to rely on regional strongholds for support, with limited followings in other parts of the country. When opposition parties have posed a potential challenge to the regime, their leadership has become a target of repression and suppression by the regime. In contrast, the opposition in Senegal has presented a unified front and has built up its organizational capacity over time and has therefore been able to extract liberalizing concessions from the regime. Burkina Faso’s opposition has exhibited characteristics of both the opposition in Chad and Senegal, but at different times in its history. Prior to 2013 and the debates over presidential term limits, the opposition struggled to present a unified front or
mobilize large followings of supporters. However, the political controversy surrounding the modification of presidential term limits galvanized the opposition and even fragmented the ruling party. These events strengthened the mobilizing power of the opposition in Burkina Faso, although it remains to be seen if that will be maintained in the wake of the events of 2014-2015. Figure 3-6 above displays the level of unity and organizational capacity that characterizes the opposition in Burkina Faso, Senegal and Chad.

**Organizing Power and Regime Trajectories**

Table 3-1 provides an overview of the different characteristics of the non-governing institutions found in Senegal, Burkina Faso and Chad. In each case, the varying forms and extent of colonial rule shaped these non-governing institutions and contributed to the differing characteristics exhibited respectively by the military, neo-traditional institutions, civil society and the opposition. These differing characteristics shaped the ways in which regimes accumulated and organized power following the adoption of multiparty elections, affecting in turn how these regimes then managed pressures for greater liberalization. These processes ultimately sent each country down a different regime trajectory. Senegal represents a case where the coercive power of the military is high, the symbolic power of neo-traditional institutions is high, and the mobilizing power of civil society and the opposition are high; the resultant regime trajectory is one of gradual democratization. Burkina Faso shows that where the degrees of transformative, symbolic, and coercive power are mixed, stable electoral authoritarianism is a likely result. Chad exhibits low levels of transformative, symbolic and coercive power, which allows the regime to pursue political processes characterized by the suppression of pressures for greater political liberalization, and leading to the restoration of authoritarian rule.

The gradual democratization exemplified by Senegal following its adoption and implementation of multiparty elections occurred as the electoral regime in Senegal made a series
of incremental but liberalizing concessions to civil society and the opposition. These concessions took place at an incremental pace because the regime could rely on the coercive power of the military to ensure that the political institutions of the regime would remain stable and the military would not intercede in the political process. This was perhaps most evident when, after the electoral loss of president Abdou Diouf in 2000, the military remained out of the political process, guaranteeing the stable and peaceful turnover of power to opposition leader Abdoulaye Wade. The republican norms of civil-military relations, combined with the cohesion of the military, created a process of institutional drift that facilitated the gradual democratization of the Senegalese regime. Similarly, faced with a unified civil society and opposition with growing public appeal, the symbolic power of the Sufi orders went through a process of conversion as the orders adapted to the context of increased liberalization in Senegal. Notably, they renegotiated or adjusted the nature of their political integration following the 1993 electoral process, and further facilitating Senegal’s gradual democratization.

In Burkina Faso, as my description in introduction of this chapter has highlighted, the military, neo-traditional institutions, and civil society and the opposition each played specific roles in the 2014 insurrection and subsequent political transition. As we shall discuss later, they also played key roles following the adoption and implementation of multiparty elections in the 1990s. Prior to that process, the military’s level of cohesion was quite low, and it had intervened multiple times in Burkinabè politics. Blaise Compaoré implemented reforms to change these dynamics after he came to power. Under his leadership the new electoral regime in Burkina Faso elevated a select unit within the military as the coercive arm of the institution, while simultaneously hollowing out the resources available to the rest of the military. This strategy
centralized political power in one faction of the military, which the regime used to violently suppress pressures for greater liberalization.

However, on multiple occasions, this repression sparked social crises, gradually providing civil society and the opposition with opportunities to increase pressure on the regime through their mobilizing power, to which the regime then responded by prevailing on neo-traditional institutions to call on demonstrators to return to calm. These moments resulted in some liberalizing reforms to the political process in Burkina Faso, but, through the regime’s ability to recalibrate, have so far failed to produce the same extent of political liberalization observed in Senegal and, as I have argued above, allowed Burkina Faso to continue as an electoral authoritarian regime. The syncopation of processes of liberalization in Burkina Faso rests balanced upon an uneven political playing field, but through the combination of coercive and symbolic power the regime has successful managed challenges which have emerged as result of the mobilizing power of civil society and the opposition.

In Chad, a fragmented and interventionist military presented the regime with multiple opportunities to extract from and repress the population, raising the potential cost of pressuring the regime for greater liberalization. Disparate neo-traditional institutions left the regime with several options for co-opting symbolic power, while the lack of one institution capable of mobilizing a large section of society that could potentially threaten the legitimacy of the regime’s authority limited the need to integrate neo-traditional institutions politically. Without these checks the electoral regime in Chad was able to successfully use the military as coercive force to undermine any potential of an already fragmented and weak civil society and opposition gaining mobilizing power. Consequently, over time the Chadian regime faced less and less pressure for
increased political liberalization and, to the contrary, enable the regime to evolve in the direction of the restoration of authoritarian rule.

Table 3-1. Analytical Framework

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Senegal</th>
<th>Burkina Faso</th>
<th>Chad</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Colonial Rule</td>
<td>High/High</td>
<td>Intermediate</td>
<td>Low/Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>High/High</td>
<td>High/Low</td>
<td>Low/Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neo-Traditional Institutions</td>
<td>High/High</td>
<td>High/Low</td>
<td>Low/Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Society &amp; Opposition</td>
<td>High/High</td>
<td>High/Low (Low*/Low)</td>
<td>Low/Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime Trajectory</td>
<td>Gradual Democratization</td>
<td>Stable Electoral Authoritarianism</td>
<td>Restoration of Authoritarian Rule</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Opposition in Burkina Faso shifts over time from Low/Low to High/High. Under Compaoré the opposition does not unify until 2010 and even then only moderately. Its organizational capacity also remains limited – only high during times of social crisis; the 2014 constitutional crisis created the tipping point, perhaps best captured by the January mass resignation of ruling party members see: Eizenga and Villalón (forthcoming).

**Conclusion**

Regimes engage with non-governing institutions in attempts to capture power from sources outside of the regime’s authority and in an effort to manage pressure for greater political liberalization. Their ability to manage these pressures then shapes the trajectories of these regimes. Like an iceberg floating mostly beneath the surface of the water, power shapes political processes going on within regimes, conditioning the prospects for greater liberalization over time, but often out of sight (Pierson 2015). This chapter has laid out three forms of power that interact with African electoral regimes: coercive power; symbolic power; and mobilizing power. Wielded by non-governing institutions, each new electoral regime must engage with these forms of power to varying degrees in an effort, to accumulate and organize their own power to manage pressures for greater political liberalization.
To understand these iterative processes over time, I have argued that a research design should employ comparative historical methods and concepts grounded in theory, to examine these institutions as relational spaces structured by time and space (Hall 2016). Based on this logic, I maintain that colonial rule in each country left different legacies, which function as antecedent conditions shaping the characteristics of non-governing institutions. At repeated institutional junctures, when regimes reconfigure and tinker with their institutional frameworks that undergird the processes of multiparty elections, the powers of non-governing institutions may pose a check on the illiberal tendencies of these regimes to curtail or erode political liberalization. Based on these reconfigurations, regimes engage with non-governing institutions to accumulate and organize their power to manage pressures for greater liberalization. The result of these processes and the ability of these electoral regimes to manage pressures leads to different regime trajectories over time.

Specifically, the extent and form of colonial rule shaped the non-governing institutions of the military, neo-traditional institutions, civil society and the opposition, affecting their abilities to generate coercive, symbolic and mobilizing power respectively. Coercive power is at its highest where the military is highly cohesive and characterized by republican norms of civil-military relations. Symbolic power is at its strongest where neo-traditional institutions are both politically and socially integrated. Mobilizing power, wielded by civil society and the opposition, is at its most effective where these institutions are unified and capable of organizing large mobilizations of supporters. Non-governing institutions lacking these characteristics will have low levels of corresponding power. The degree of power wielded by these institutions shapes their respective interactions with the regime as well as the regime’s strategic capabilities for
managing pressures for greater liberalization. Over time, these interactions and strategic capabilities result in different regime trajectories.

The research for this dissertation was designed to allow an historical institutionalist analysis of Senegal, Burkina Faso, and Chad over periods of time, following their adoptions of multiparty elections. The non-governing institutions of each case exhibit differing levels of these three types of power. The three trajectories of each case are explored in greater detail as I now turn to the empirical evidence that supports my theoretical claims, through a comparative historical analysis of each institution during the proposed period of time and across these different spaces. Chapter 4 will examine in particular the period of colonial rule in each case, to evaluate how the extent and form colonial rule shaped the subsequent characteristics of their non-governing institutions. Through an examination of the histories of colonial rule, it becomes apparent that differences in the French colonial administration of these three cases left a lasting impact on their non-governing institutions and, consequently on the prospects for political liberalization in each case.
CHAPTER 4
REGIME ANTECEDENTS: COLONIALISM IN SAHELIAN AFRICA

Introduction

“[Authoritarian leaders] inherit an economy, a system of property rights, a class of wealth holders, and a range of pre-existing organizations and institutions—not the least of which are constitutions, legislatures, political parties, opposition political movements, trade unions, police forces, and militaries.”

——Stephen Haber

Authoritarian Government

The epigraph above underscores a crucial and sometimes overlooked point about institutions: they have a history. Institutions develop over time, within specific contexts, and frequently in response to specific problems faced by sets of actors. The institutions inherited by African leaders at the moment of decolonization and independence were, in many cases, the same institutions established during colonial rule in Africa. However, even before colonial rule and subsequent independence, a number of existing African institutions were shaping politics and society across the continent. Colonial authorities seeking to expand their empire had to contend with existing economies, African rulers, their states and various African systems of governance. The different ways in which colonial rulers incorporated these existing African institutions into the colonial empire, and the concomitant differences across the institutions introduced by colonialism, laid the foundations for the immediate set of post-colonial institutions inherited by newly independent African regimes. The specific objective of this chapter is to explore these dynamics during French colonial rule in Senegal, Burkina Faso and Chad, and in

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1 This epigraph is drawn from Haber (2006, 696).

2 For detailed accounts of African history, states and societies before the advent of European colonialism see: Ki-Zerbo 1972; and Niane and Ki-Zerbo 1997
doing so, to discuss the differences in antecedent conditions for the various characteristics of each country’s non-governing institutions.³

The principal goal of this dissertation is to demonstrate how non-governing institutions—the military, neo-traditional institutions, civil society and the opposition—shape the trajectories of multiparty electoral regimes in Africa. This chapter more specifically provides an account of the antecedent conditions which shaped how the characteristics of these institutions developed during colonial rule. The chapter embarks on an investigation of the colonial attributes of these institutions while examining the role of colonial rule in the development of political parties, civil society and the military, as well as the relationships between colonial authorities and already-existing African institutions.⁴ I will argue that differences in the extent and form of colonial rule in Burkina Faso, Senegal and Chad have significantly shaped the course of each country’s post-colonial political and institutional development.

The Extent and Form of Colonial Rule

The extent of colonial rule played a central role in the development of non-governing institutions and it varied significantly both within colonies and from colony to colony. I understand the “extent” of colonial rule to refer to both the duration and the geographic expanse of the colonial administrative presence. Some scholars argue that colonial rule transformed and penetrated the very cultural and social structures of African populations, suggesting that colonialism affected African spaces pervasively. Young (1994), for example, argues that colonial

³ Until 1984, Burkina Faso was known by its colonial title, Haute Volta (Upper Volta). Throughout this chapter and this dissertation, I refer to Burkina Faso as Burkina Faso except where this poses problems of clarity.

⁴ Where these already existing institutions continue to play a role in the politics of post-colonial regimes, I refer to them as neo-traditional institutions. However, it is important to note that other institutions which do not derive their origins from these already existing African institutions also fall within the concepts of neo-traditional institutions such as the Catholic Church.
rule was expansive and penetrating, destroying precolonial African states and societies as Europeans conquered the continent.\(^5\) Once a territory was conquered, colonial powers were able to erect regional administrative infrastructure to further project their authority over these territories, leading to highly coercive and extractive tactics across the continent (Acemoglu and Robinson 2010 and 2012, 245-273). Additionally, colonial rule introduced new economic systems based on trade in cash crops, new boundaries which set the stage for today’s African states, new infrastructure systems which continue to dictate patterns of trade, and it imparted European languages, religions, and cultural patterns to colonized populations (Herbst 2000, 58). These accounts suggest that the extent of colonial rule dramatically refashioned the institutional configurations of African politics, economics, and society, integrating African states, for better or for worse, into a global state system and market economy through European colonization.\(^6\)

However, the extent of colonial rule varied dramatically from colony to colony and within each colony. As Herbst (2000, 94) notes, European colonial rule, like the African states before it, faced many of the same costs to extending power over geographic space. Vast, sparsely populated and difficult terrains prevented power from being easily or evenly imposed across colonial territories. Instead, colonial authority remained rooted in administrative centers, while colonial presence in rural areas varied significantly—a fact acknowledged by colonial authorities.

\(^5\) At the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885, European powers began demarcating the boundaries of their colonial possessions in Africa. In an effort to avoid conflict of territory amongst themselves, Europeans needed to demonstrate their hegemony over African geographical space. Young (1994, 100) maintains that to accomplish this, European powers needed to provide evidence of having already established basic order over a territory resulting in the ability to generate revenue from that territory.

\(^6\) Indeed, Burkinabé historian Joseph Ki-Zerbo (2003, 8-9) highlights the persistence of colonial systems even today in what he refers to as the continued degradation of African culture through an unbalanced system of cultural exchange and trade; one in which African culture has the least chance to spread and participate on the global stage.
themselves. The demography and geography of the African continent presented numerous challenges to European colonizers, limiting the extent of their presence and functional authority over the interior of the continent. Due to the challenges of extending colonial authority over these territories, colonial authorities frequently incorporated existing institutional frameworks for governance and political order. Generally speaking, the rules and organizations which comprise formal institutions provide a framework for how power is organized in a given society and, as discussed in previous chapters, these frameworks are difficult to change; African institutions are in this respect no different today and were no different at the time of colonial rule. Accordingly, in an effort to establish their authority with minimal costs, colonial authorities regularly sought to integrate already-existing African institutions into their colonial administrative structures, thereby transforming them to serve colonial ends. The degree to which colonial authorities incorporated these institutions varied from colony to colony and depended upon the existing institutions available within the colony.

Existing African states had their own sets of rules, trade relations, and organizations at the advent of European colonization. While colonial rule dramatically refashioned many of these traditional African institutions to serve colonial purposes, colonial authorities also had to adapt to the traditional institutions which were present and accessible in these societies. Many have argued that traditional institutions continued to shape politics, economics, and societies in African countries after colonial rule, acknowledging that precolonial conditions persisted after colonial rule even if precolonial traditional institutions had changed under colonial rule (Englebert 2000, Nunn 2008, Michalopoulous and Papaioannou 2013, Villalón 1995 and

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7 For various detailed accounts of the limits to French colonial authority, see: Barrows 1974; Faidherbe 1889; Gellar 1976; Lanne 1996 and 1998; Massa and Madiéga 1995; and Robinson 1951.
In some cases, African states were completely destroyed and new, more compliant or complicit, ‘traditional’ institutions were supported by colonial authorities. Frequently, however, existing socio-political institutions were retained, as colonial authorities adapted these institutions to meet their objectives, resulting in socio-political change. The extent of colonial rule varied in conjunction with the ability of colonial authorities to incorporate existing African institutions and had a direct impact on the characteristics of these institutions in the post-colonial period.

Colonial authorities routinely incorporated existing African institutions as a means of projecting colonial authority and thereby extending the authority of the colonizer through society with only minimal colonial investment (Herbst 2000, 58-96 and Mamadani 1996). However, the political integration of these institutions into the colonial project also changed the ways in which they related to their populations. For this reason, in the post-colonial period I refer to these institutions as “neo-traditional institutions.” In Africa, colonial authorities had learned from their experiences in India and Indochina, leading them to shift the foundations of colonial rule by incorporating local traditional institutions to further penetrate society (Mamdani 1996, 286). This shift had important repercussions for the local traditional institutions regarding their degree of

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8 A significant body of literature exists which discusses the relationship between precolonial institutions, contemporary economic growth, as well as the extent to which the colonial origins of certain institutions affect economic development. Englebert (2000) and Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2016) maintain that the compatibility of precolonial with colonial institutions has important implications for contemporary outcomes such as economic development. Indeed, the extent to which the colonial origins of institutions affect economic development continues to be a hotly debated subject. Some point to self-reinforcing cycles of extraction or “vicious circles” resulting in long-term underdevelopment (Acemoglu and Robison 2013). Others argue that the persistence of historically rooted effects wanes over time as institutional development becomes less and less determined by their origins (Young 2004 and Maseland 2018). Seeking to identify how growth-promoting institutions develop, several scholars have focused their attention on different patterns of colonization, the identity of the colonizer and colonial policies (Acemoglu et al. 2001 and 2005, Bertocchi and Canova, 2002, La Porta et al. 1998, Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2016 and Sokoloff and Engerman, 2000). Generally, this literature suggests that the colonial origins of contemporary domestic institutions continue to have contemporary effects on the economic performance of their countries through mechanisms of path dependence whereby the effects of colonial era institutions ‘lock-in’ to create growth-promoting or poverty-entrenching processes (Spolaore and Wacziarg 2013).
political and social integration during decolonization and the post-colonial period. However, and as I develop below, the degree to which colonial powers were able to integrate existing African institutions varied from territory to territory, depending on both the extent and form of colonial rule.

Colonial rulers also introduced a number of new European institutions to their colonial territories. The extent of colonial rule also played a role in this process. Contemporary political parties, civil society in the form of trade associations, and the military all trace their historical origins back to the period of colonial rule. Young African elites received colonial educations and were subsequently integrated into colonial institutions to meet the demand for low-level, or “auxiliary,” colonial administrators (Gellar 1976, 31-33). Africans who received their education in Europe were exposed to European trade union activism, to political activism, and to notions of national identity. European powers also relied on Africans as soldiers in the first and second World Wars, during which African troops fought in the imperial military. The degree to which African colonial citizens and subjects were exposed to these institutions varied significantly depending on the duration and the geographic expansion of colonial rule. It also varied based on the form of colonial rule, which I understand primarily as the purpose(s) of the colony as evidenced by colonial policies.

The form of colonial rule mattered for determining the ways in which existing African institutions would be incorporated into the larger colonial enterprise. Existing institutions either adapted to colonial rule or were supplanted by competing colonial-sponsored institutions within

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9 Indeed, following the First World War, Blaise Diagne, a Senegalese parliamentarian and the first African to hold elected office in French West Africa, introduced a law which granted French citizenship for imperial military service. This law was passed in 1916 and became one of the first pathways available to African colonial subjects to French citizenship (Bodian 2016, 72). In practice, though, French citizens of African descent continued to face significant discrimination (Johnson 1971).
which African subjects were incorporated. In this way, many traditional institutions of African politics and society were repurposed and transformed by colonial rule, but this depended in part on the needs of colonial authorities in any given colony. Existing African institutions continued to play important roles for organizing power within African society, but their roles shifted to meet the needs of colonial authorities, depending on the objectives of the colonizer in the specific colony.

Much ink has been spilled on the effects of differing forms of British, French, Portuguese and Belgian rule in Africa (Conteh-Morgan 1997, Morgenthau 1964, Zolberg 1966). That being said, perhaps no assumption has become more pervasive than the association of British colonialism with indirect rule, and French colonialism with direct rule or assimilation.10 This assumption suggests that British colonialism tended to employ a method of administration which either incorporated local governing institutions without much transformation of those institutions, or appointed local leaders as colonial representatives; whereas the French relied on importing their own institutional frameworks and assimilating locals within them. While there is some truth in this distinction, the cases focused on in this dissertation, all of which are former French colonies, suggest that Herbst (2000, 81-82) is right to criticize it as exaggerated, and to note that in practice British and French colonial rule actually had much more in common. British colonial administrator K.E. Robinson (1951) acknowledged this fact following a visit to French West Africa, during which he observed colonial institutions that had largely been constructed based the specific constraints and circumstances present in both British and French colonial

10 Conteh-Morgan (1997, 39-44) discusses these forms of colonial rule and refers to the Belgian and Portugese models as an economically driven “paternalism” and intensely oppressive “assimilation” respectively.
Recently, this and other observations have led scholars to question the assumption of colonial policy variation between the colonial powers and instead explore other more pertinent areas of policy variation within the colonial empires themselves.

Thus, the form of colonial rule is better explored through differences in colonial policy which reveals that colonial authorities pursued different objectives from colony to colony than through differences between colonizer countries. For example, Pukuma (2017) observes that internal variations in British colonial policy may be responsible for more post-colonial variation than the actual effect of the colonizers’ national identity. She develops a typology of different British colonies and evaluates how the different colonial types’ prospects for democratic survival fare in the post-colonial era. Students of French colonialism will notice similar disparities—the French, like the British, did not apply a uniform colonial policy to each of their territories, and the variations in French colonial policy resulted in important post-colonial differences. Further, this was the case even within their colonial territories on the African continent where both the form and extent of French colonial rule varied from colony to colony.

In sum, differences in the extent and form of French colonial rule shaped the role of the military and neo-traditional institutions in politics during the post-colonial era. These differences also shaped the origins of civil society and the opposition in the former colonies. French politics exposed African elites to unionized labor, one of the first and most powerful forms of social activism in post-colonial Africa. Additionally, African political elites were introduced to the

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11 Robinson (1951, 128) notes that French and British colonial policy often shared more in common than was commonly acknowledged, particularly policies of indirect rule and association. He writes, “Similarly, association was often contrasted with our policy of indirect rule, but both are really to be regarded as national variations of the policy of differentiation…In French West Africa we have one instance of the policy of identity in the special case of the Senegal towns, not perhaps taken very far but possibly quite as far as the little seed left by the Legislative Council in Lagos. We have also one instance of the policy of differentiation in this particular form of association, and in this light we notice its general similarity to indirect rule.”
French political system through their exposure to its institutions as part of French colonial rule. Some colonies in French colonial Africa also received greater administrative and infrastructural investments as a result of the extent of colonial rule in those colonies, but also because of differences in colonial policies which designated certain colonial possessions as more productive than others.

This chapter aims to build on these observations by exploring the differences in colonial administration in three former French colonies, Senegal and Burkina Faso formerly part of French West Africa (Afrique Occidentale Française, AOF), and Chad formerly part of French Equatorial Africa (Afrique Équatoriale Française, AEF). The AOF and AEF both exhibited differences in French colonial rule, perhaps most notably in the timing of their establishment. The French long held trading and military outposts along the West African coast, but a French presence developed in Central Africa much later, only in the late 1800s. Furthermore, internal variations within the AOF and AEF regarding the extent and form of French colonial administration also had effects on the institutional origins and development of post-colonial non-governing institutions in each territory.

The difference in the extent and form of French colonial rule function as critical antecedent conditions (Slater and Simmons 2010). These differences shaped the ways in which non-governing institutions would develop in the post-colonial period and go on to shape regime trajectories following the adoption of multiparty elections. The comparatively longer, more organized, and more penetrating extent and form of French colonial rule left Senegal with non-governing institutions and administrators more readily adapted to the post-colonial political, social and economic systems that its leaders inherited at independence. This in turn primed those institutions for a multiparty electoral regime. Conversely, in Chad and Burkina Faso, colonial
experiences left those territories with significant challenges to establishing and maintaining political order following decolonization. Other important differences between Chad and Burkina Faso, such as the differences between existing African institutions during colonial rule, resulted in different French colonial policies in each case. Thus, the extent and form of colonial rule conditioned non-governing institutions in Burkina Faso and Chad differently. Ultimately, geography, demographics and the existing African institutions in each colonial territory required the implementation of different colonial policies which then resulted in different institutional developments in each case. Specifically, differences in the colonial experience of each case shaped post-colonial non-governing institutions in ways that would tangibly contributed to different regime trajectories after the introduction of multiparty elections.

The remaining sections of this chapter are organized as follows: in the subsequent section, I briefly describe the beginnings of the French colonial presence in Africa. This section describes the broad and essential differences between the AOF and AEF while also reviewing the unique colonial history of the ‘Four Communes’ along the Senegalese coastline. The chapter then discusses the individual cases of Senegal, Burkina Faso, and Chad in an effort to highlight specific differences in the extent and form of colonial rule in each case, underscoring the relationship of the colonial authorities with the existing African institutions, as well as the development of political parties and the military during French colonial rule. Finally, the chapter concludes with a brief discussion of the decolonization process in French West and Equatorial Africa.

**The Colonial Origins of Francophone Africa**

There is little debate over whether or not colonialism changed the institutional frameworks in Africa, and yet colonial rule over much of the African continent was relatively short-lived. Europeans began exploring the African coastline as early as the fifteenth century.
Portuguese, Dutch, Spanish, British and French explorers established military and trading outposts at strategic points along the African coastline, but the exploration of the interior of the continent did not truly begin until the middle of the nineteenth century. In the case of French colonial Africa, trading posts along the contemporary Senegalese coast were established in the seventeenth century. Four sites are notable in early French colonial history: the Fort of Saint Louis—established in 1659 on an uninhabited island near the mouth of the Senegal River; the island of Gorée located just off the Cap-Vert peninsula—first settled by Portuguese circa 1450 and taken by the French from the British in 1677; the town of Rufisque, an important port for trade; and the fourth site, Dakar, which would become the most influential colonial site by the end of the nineteenth century. These four colonial towns—Saint Louis, Gorée, Rufisque and Dakar—became known as the ‘Four Communes’ of Senegal and their residents were accorded French citizenship following the French Revolution of 1848.12

The rise of Louis Napoléon Bonaparte and the Second French Empire marked the beginnings of French military campaigns into the interior of West Africa in earnest.13 Under the direction of Governor Louis Faidherbe, French colonial campaigns began to move up the Senegal River in 1854. Their goal was to increase their commercial exploitation of the territory by eventually integrating populations along the Niger River (Barrows 1974, 279 and Joly 2009, 85-95). These campaigns to extend France’s trading network into the African continent mark the beginning of French colonial rule, but actual administration—including the Four Communes—would not truly begin until the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries. French colonial authorities only began attempting to establish control over contemporary Burkina Faso

12 For a brief time, the policy of according citizenship to residents of these towns was revoked during the Second French Empire. For an extensive account of Senegal during the time of the Second Empire see: Saint-Martin (1989).
13 For an excellent summary of French military engagement prior to this moment see: Joly (2009, 75-85).
in 1895 and rebellions throughout this territory continued well into the twentieth century (Balima 1996, 209-210 and Harsch 2017, 9-21). It was not until 1900 that the French could make even limited claims of colonial authority over the Chadian territory, where violent French colonial military expeditions continued well into the twentieth century. Indeed, the vast desert hinterland known as Borkou-Ennedi-Tibesti never fully came under complete colonial control, requiring a French military presence even after Chadian independence in 1960.

In historical terms, French colonial rule in most of Africa was remarkably brief. By one calculation, “the year 2030 marks the approximate tipping point when the post-colonial history of [Mali, Niger, Mauritania, Burkina Faso and Chad] surpasses the duration of their colonial history; in the Sahara, that tipping point was roughly the year 2000” (Mann forthcoming, 3). One might argue that for Chad and Burkina Faso, the year 2020 would be more appropriate, considering that most of the individuals in those areas who would encounter French colonizers did not do so until the early 1900s. Mann (forthcoming, 2-3) also argues that aside from Senegal, the French colonial experience in the AOF and AEF lasted for roughly a lifespan, and that the French colonial policy of assimilation had a relatively limited impact on African societies in the Sahel and even less on the societies of the Sahara.

Chad—the only AEF colony to include portions of the Sahara—represents the final frontier of the AEF, connecting the AEF to the AOF. French military expeditions reached southern Chad by mapping the rivers north of the Congo and traversing contemporary Central African Republic. After moving beyond these areas and entering Sahelian Chad, the French encountered strong resistance from the leader of the Borno Empire, Rabah. His forces posed a significant challenge to establishing French rule in contemporary Chad, resulting in a particularly violent French conquest of the territory. Consequently, Chad did not become a separate colony
distinguished from the Central African Republic until 1920. The French would continue to fight a resistance in northern Chad until after independence in 1960.14

The establishment of Burkina Faso was slightly less violent. The AOF developed in fits and starts as the French followed the Niger River across the Sahara, the territory north of Côte d’Ivoire, and the territory north of Dahomey, which comprises contemporary Benin. As the French followed the “Niger loop” (known in French as the Boucle du Niger) north toward Timbuktu and then south toward Niamey, the French learned of an allegedly large population south of the Boucle du Niger. In all likelihood, the rumored population was the Mossi Kingdom. By 1888, the French had sent an envoy seeking to establish trade and an alliance with the King of the Mossi, the Mogho Naba, in Ouagadougou. However, rather than agree to make the Mossi a protectorate of the French, the envoy was expelled from the city (Harsch 2017, 12). The French found a more willing ally in the leader of Yatenga, a rebellious Mossi province, with whose help the French were able to conquer Ouagadougou and establish control of the territory. The Mogho Naba fled into exile in the British-controlled territory of the Gold Coast (Izard 1985, 135-144). Subsequently, after settling boundary questions with the Germans and British, this territory officially fell under the administration of Haute Sénégal et Niger (Upper Senegal and Niger) until 1919, when Burkina Faso was officially designated the French colony of Haute Volta (Upper Volta). However, in 1937, Haute Volta was divided three ways, falling under the administration of Côte d’Ivoire, French Soudan, and Niger. The colony of Haute Volta was only reincorporated in 1947 as its own separate colony (Massa and Madiéga 1995, 17-20). Today, the boundaries of Burkina Faso remain remarkably intact.

14 This chapter reviews these events in more detail below.
Senegal’s unique colonial history represents the beginning of a French presence on the continent, while Chad and Burkina Faso represent the final stages of demarcating the AEF and AOF respectively. These differences in the amount of time that each territory spent under French colonial rule had significant effects on the administrative attention each colony received during colonial rule. The Four Senegalese Communes received significantly more representation in French government and investment from the French Empire (Lanne 1998, Manning 1998, 24-54 and 110-123, Saint-Martin 1989 and Thompson and Adloff 1958). Meanwhile, Chad became known as a territory where one might advance a military career, but little else (Largeau 2001). Burkina Faso became an important labor source for cash crop production in Côte d’Ivoire’s cocoa fields, and, for cotton in French Soudan (Mali) as well as for colonial public works projects around French West Africa (Bodian 2016). Cotton production in Burkina Faso and Chad failed to develop lucrative exports during colonial times, leaving both colonies with a somewhat diminished status in the colonial empire (Harsch 2017, 16, Manning 1998, 31, 49, and 114-115).

Geography also played a significant role in the colonial development of Senegal, Chad and Burkina Faso. Senegal’s geographic location on the West African coastline meant that populations there had been exposed, for better or worse, to European trade and inputs for centuries. Beginning with the Atlantic slave trade and continuing through the Industrial Revolution in Europe, this had important consequences. One such consequence was that investment in infrastructure projects in Senegal began much earlier than in other areas of the AOF or AEF.

The efforts to develop railways in each colony presents an illustrative example. In Senegal, the purpose of the principal railway developed by the French was to eventually connect Dakar to the Niger River, and thereby create a direct route from the river to the sea while
bypassing British colonial territory in Nigeria. Colonial authorities began this ambitious project in the 1880s. The railroad connecting Bamako, on the Niger River, to Dakar incurred some delays as a result of changes in French politics and economics as well as the First World War, but the railroad was nevertheless completed in 1923 (Lambert 1993 and Roberts 2011). The economic incentives of connecting the Niger River to Dakar served to expand the economic exploitation of French Soudan, particularly in the development of peanut exploitation in Senegal (McLane 1992). Migrant workers would travel to Senegal to work in the peanut fields, coming from villages in contemporary Mali along the Senegal River as well as the Niger River (Peterson 2011, 141-145). These infrastructural investments made during colonial rule improved the trade relations between Senegal and Mali and improved market access for many of the peanut farmers.

Prior to colonial rule in Chad, trade occurred primarily through trans-Saharan routes over land. Chad’s location at the extreme interior of the continent meant that for much of its colonial history, transporting materials to the colony required months. This discouraged colonial authorities from investing much in terms of colonial administration, infrastructure or economic development, and it remained that way until the Second World War (Lanne 1998, 19). After the Second World War, some attempts were made to connect southern Chad to ports in French Congo. However, these attempts to better connect Chad to the AEF through infrastructure projects failed. Indeed, during the 1950s, efforts to connect cotton-producing southern Chad by a railway to Bangui and eventually to a route for export along the Congo-Océan Railway collapsed.

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15 At the same time, another project in Senegal aimed to connect Saint Louis to Dakar. This project began in 1883 and was completed in 1885.

16 One reason that the project was delayed resulted from the connection of Kayes to Bamako in 1904. Located on the Senegal River, Kayes functioned as important connecting station. The Kayes-Bamako line effectively connected the Niger River to the Senegal River. However, the increasing importance of Dakar to colonial trade continued to provide a strong incentive for the French to construct the railway from Dakar to Kayes.
due to political and economic concerns (Sautter 2000 [1958], 29-30). As of 2018, Chad still does not have a railroad and lacks a direct route to the sea.

Similarly, Burkina Faso’s location in the interior of the continent resulted in limited exposure to European trade prior to colonialization. After Burkina Faso was incorporated into the AOF, it was eventually connected by rail to ports in Côte d’Ivoire, but it took nearly the entire colonial period for the railway to finally reach Ouagadougou. Work began on the railway in 1903, and did not reach Ouagadougou until 1954 (Gregory, Cordell and Piché 1989, 89). Certainly, there were numerous challenges to overcome which impeded the project, including WWI and WWII; however, the length of time necessary to complete the project underscore the perception of lower economic importance attributed to Burkina Faso by the colonial administrators, just as a complete failure of efforts in Chad was indicative of the same perception.

Evidently, geography resulted in different levels of accessibility and economic viability among Senegal, Burkina Faso, and Chad. This in turn had an effect on the extent of colonial presence in these territories in terms of time and socio-political penetration. The differences in the extent of colonial presence, subsequently, had an impact on the colonial policies which were deployed over these territories and resulted in different relationships between colonial institutions and existing African institutions, as well as levels of infrastructure investment in each colony and the economic developments in each colony. I explore this in more detail in the subsequent sections which highlight the central political developments during the establishment and administration of colonial rule in each case. Table 4-1 below summarizes and displays the different antecedent conditions that shaped the characteristics of non-governing institutions in Burkina Faso, Senegal and Chad during colonial rule.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Extent and Form</th>
<th>Military</th>
<th>Neo-Traditional Institutions</th>
<th>Civil Society</th>
<th>Political Parties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Form: low infrastructure, AOF labor source, cotton introduced as cash crop. Temporarily split among three colonies.</td>
<td>After WWII: Some future officers held military experience from colonial era conflicts in Indochina and Algeria.</td>
<td>Chiefs integrated into colonial system. French colonial administration that most closely resembled indirect rule. Mossi Chiefs became political actors.</td>
<td>Trade unions early and active. Migrant labor for cocoa plantations in Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>Extent: virtually no presence in some areas other than military admin. Duration very short: est. late 1890s-1920.</td>
<td>Before WWII: soldiers almost exclusively conscripted from south. First colony to declare for the Free French in WWII.</td>
<td>Disparate groups and kingdoms prior to colonization. Existing institutions violently resisted French rule in central and northern regions</td>
<td>Colonial exploitation heavier in southern regions. Limited to no colonial education outside of south.</td>
<td>Political parties emerged post-WWII. Very few Chadian elites. First leaders non-Chadian French supported southerners. Others sidelined from political process.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>Extent: comparatively higher penetration. Sufi order linked rural communities to colonial authorities. Duration longer: Four Communes (1600s) interior expansion mid-1800s.</td>
<td>Before WWII: First African colonial soldiers conscripted into colonial forces. Many served in WWI and formed new class of subjects. Dakar supported Vichy</td>
<td>Longer history of colonial interaction. Short-lived resistance and ‘jihads’ gave way to incorporation.</td>
<td>Young Senegalese civil society group established before WWI.</td>
<td>Four Communes experienced local governance well before WWI. Parties linked to French parties. Some participation, competition and political debate institutionalized.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Colonial Rule in Burkina Faso, Senegal and Chad

Burkina Faso: Francophone Indirect Rule

In Burkina Faso, the existing institutions of the Mossi kingdom or empire played a key role in the colonial administration of the territory and in the development of political activism in the country. Prior to colonial rule, contemporary Burkina Faso could be broken down into several different groups including: the Mossi in Central Burkina Faso, the Peul (also referred to as Fulani) and the Gourmantche in the northeastern region known as Liptako-Gourma, the Dioula in the western regions of Burkina Faso, and a number of decentralized groups known as the Lobi, Dagara, Gourounsi and Oulé (or Wili) across the southern areas of the country. Each of these groups had various levels of organization. Liptako-Gourma refers to a former Peul state, organized by a caste system, which was established following the conquest of the Gourmantche by the Peul in a region overlapping the modern borders of Mali and Niger (Irwin 1981). Conversely, the Oulé and Lobi groups did not have chiefs or defined territorial organizations and have sometimes been described as acephalous communities (Savonnet-Guyot 1986). Meanwhile, the Dioula were composed of itinerate traders connected through their shared Islamic faith and commercial ties throughout the larger West African region (Harsch 2017, 11). By far the most centralized and organized group, however, was the Mossi.¹

As noted in the previous section, Europeans only began to engage with the Mossi in the late 1800s, with the first envoy arriving in Ouagadougou in 1888. After the French conquered Ouagadougou and Mogho Naba Woghbo fled into exile, the French hesitated before integrating the Mossi state system into their colonial structure. However, the limited French colonial presence throughout the territory made it difficult for colonial authorities to establish law and

¹ For extensive and excellent account of the Mossi see: Izard 1985 and Skinner 1964 and 1989.
order and the decentralized communities in the west staged periodic rebellions and revolts. The comparatively late arrival of French administrative personnel to the territory and the consequent lack of colonial order postponed the actual designation of Burkina Faso as a colony until 1919.

Yet, despite not being designated as its own colonial entity, the peoples of Burkina Faso in particular were exploited as a large labor source. Additionally, their comparatively late designation as a colony resulted in low levels of education, by some accounts the lowest school enrollment in the entire AOF, and in turn, fewer auxiliary-level administrators (Massa and Madiéga 1995, 357-395). This posed a number of challenges to administering the colony, especially prior to 1919, when the French deliberately limited the power of chieftaincies in the region.

However, faced with these challenges, colonial administrators began to recognize the advantages of integrating the local Mossi chieftaincy institutions into their colonial apparatus. Noting the challenges of administering the territory, one colonial administrator advocated for the increased involvement and recognition of the chiefs:

The high population density of this region would render all administration impossible if we were not to have indigenous groups possessing strong authority. For example: Ouagadougou, where sometimes there are only three European civil servants for 500,000 inhabitants. The chiefs [Mossi leaders], whose dedication and loyalty to us are absolute, provide us in every circumstance and domain a great service. It is astonishing, especially when compared to those from Senegal, to see how much the chiefs of this country have been disadvantaged from the point of view of honorary distinctions and rewards. It appears to be quite important that we repair this mistake. They merit it and it is in our interests (Louveau [1910] cited in Balima 1969, 75).

One particularly large revolt in the west resulted in thousands of insurgent deaths at the hands of colonial authorities (Balima 1996, 209-210; and Gnimien 2016).

My translation. The original French reads: “La grande densité de population de cette region rendrait toute administration impossible si nous n’avions pas de cadres indigènes possédant une forte autorité. Exemple : Ouagadougou, où ne sont parfois en service que trois fonctionnaires européens d’autorité pour 500.000 habitants. Les chefs, dont le dévouement et le loyalisme à notre égard sont absolus, nous rendent en toutes circonstances et en tous domaines de très grands services. Il est étonnant, surtout lorsqu’on les compare à ceux du Sénégal, de voir
The French quickly started to heavily rely on the Mossi chiefs for the administration of the colony, and French presence across Burkina Faso remained remarkably limited.

Once Burkina Faso was officially designated a colony in 1920, the French in effect implemented indirect rule through the existing Mossi institutions to collect head-taxes (*impôt de capitation*), forced labor participation in public works ventures such as the Côte d’Ivoire-Niger and Senegal-Niger railways, and to implement *corvée* (unpaid) labor for local administration and private interests such as Catholic missions (Gervais and Mandé 2000). Pre-existing labor migration patterns of Burkinabè society from Burkina Faso to modern Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire posed several problems for meeting the desires of colonial authorities to establish cotton as a cash crop in Burkina Faso. Further complicating this endeavor was the need for labor in Côte d’Ivoire’s cocoa plantations, where planters actively sought to employ Burkinabè migrant workers (Gervais 1990). The economic opportunities presented by the planter in Côte d’Ivoire led many Burkinabè to migrate to the cocoa fields, reducing the men available for cultivating cotton in Burkina Faso. Ultimately, Burkina Faso’s inability to maintain fiscal self-sufficiency following the world economic crisis of 1928, coupled with the need for a larger labor pool in Côte d’Ivoire, led to the dissolution of the colony in 1932 (Fréchou 1955). The colony would be reestablished in 1947 following World War II, due to a strategy advanced by the Mossi chiefs to reclaim authority over their traditional territory.

The ambiguous administrative status of Burkina Faso resulted in a stronger alliance between the Mossi Kingdom and French colonial authorities. Faced with a large population and limited colonial presence, colonial administrators opted to reinstate and reinforce much of the
authority attributed to the pre-existing Mossi institutional structure prior to colonial rule to help establish and maintain order (Skinner 1964, 162 and Massa and Madiéga 1995, 21). These decisions had an impact on the breadth of the colonial administration in the colony, which ultimately remained quite limited. For example, in 1929, there were only fifty French colonial administrators, and in 1948—twelve years before independence—a single head of a subdivision was responsible for administrative units which encompassed 400,000 to 450,000 subjects (Massa and Madiéga 1995, 21 and 90). Indeed, as Harsch (2017, 15) notes, “in the most populous territory in French West Africa [AOF] there were few educated Africans to serve the state and the number of French administers was tiny.” The Mossi Kingdom’s strong institutions, and the territory’s relatively high population density resulted in colonial policies that led Burkina Faso to become one of the main sources of corvée labor in the AOF and arguably the territory, within which indirect rule was most aggressively employed by French colonial authorities.

The relationship between French authorities and the Mossi chiefs persisted during the 1930s and the 1940s following the division of the territory. Indeed, the need for labor and the ability of the Mossi chiefs to supply it became one of the central political battles for the peoples of Burkina Faso, ultimately resulting in the onset of political activism in the territory. Popular opposition to forced labor grew significantly in the post-war period. Gervais and Mandé (2000, 75) note, “the fear of possible unrest resulting from continued labor recruitment by the administration spurred the AOF central administration to abolish forced labor as early as February 1946..before its adoption for all colonies in the law of April 11, 1946.” Traditional chiefs and elected MPs then joined together and formed a coalition to reinstate Burkina Faso to its former status as a separate overseas territory. At the same time, colonial authorities started to worry about political events in Côte d’Ivoire. A growing radical nationalist political group
known as the *Rassemblement Democratique Africain* (African Democratic Assembly RDA) had emerged in Côte d’Ivoire and was aligned with the French communist party.

Recognizing fears about the growing influence of the RDA, the Mossi chiefs began working on a strategy to regain their status as a separate colony by aiding colonial authorities to counter the leftist political movement (Harsch 2017, 17-18). This strategy proved to be fairly simple, and colonial authorities quickly returned to their reliance on the Mossi chiefs, who were seen as the conservative elements of Burkinabè society, to confront the radical aims of the RDA and the *Syndicat Agricole Africain* (African Agriculture Union).

Ultimately, this alliance between French colonial authorities and the Mossi chieftaincy led to the rebirth of Burkina Faso. Ahead of the 1945 election of the First Assembly (*premiere constituant*), the Mogho Naba sought to establish his own political organization by calling intellectuals together in the *Union pour la Défense des Intérêts de Haute-Volta* (Union for the Defense of Upper Volta’s Interests, UDIHV) which eventually became known as the *Union Voltaïque* (Ouedraogo 1995, 449-458). The Union functioned as an instrument for the Mogho Naba to maintain Mossi dominance in the political representation of Burkina Faso, which was also viewed by some as a denunciation of the RDA’s vision of African nationalism (Gervais and Mandé 2000, 75). Supporters of the RDA, such as African planters in Côte d’Ivoire, relied on Burkinabè labor in their cocoa fields. Fear that the effects of separating Burkina Faso and Côte d’Ivoire would return centralized power to the Mossi chiefs led Ivoirians and western Burkinabè groups like the Lobi and Oulé to support the RDA, in opposition to the reconstitution of Upper Volta (Madiéga 1986, 85-99). Ultimately, the Mossi chiefs won the political battle and became increasingly involved in the political system and the representation of Burkina Faso in France. Skinner (1957, 131), speculated that the Mossi chiefs might even seek to represent the colony.
themselves by standing for election to executive office. Eventually, the Mossi chiefs held a number of elected offices during the 1950s, including being elected as part of the RDA.

The RDA recovered from its initial defeats after tempering its rhetoric and preying upon factions which emerged within the Union Voltaïque. Mogho Naba Sagha became president of the local RDA chapter, the Parti Démocratique Unifié (the United Democratic Party) and held the position until his death in 1957. Under his leadership and as part of a coalition with the Burkinabè leader of RDA, Ouezzine Coulibaly, who had been politically active in Côte d’Ivoire before returning to Burkina Faso, the RDA was able to produce a substantial political following throughout the territory (Englebert 1986). By 1956, the party held a majority of the territorial assembly and established a government.

Coulibaly was elected by the Assembly as the Prime Minister in 1957. Sadly, Coulibaly died in 1958. The politician who emerged to replace him, Maurice Yaméogo, represented the auxiliary elites who had participated in the colonial administration of Burkina Faso as clerks, interpreters, and canton chiefs. Yaméogo made little effort to maintain relations with the institutions of the traditional chieftaincy. In fact, at the moment of independence, he praised French President de Gaulle and the Ivorian leader of the RDA, Houphouët-Boigny, without acknowledging the Mogho Naba (Skinner 1964, 202). In 1966, faced with economic crisis and mobilized trade unions, this oversight by Yaméogo, and the policies of his administration to undermine the role of the chiefs, led to his undoing when union activists called on the military to remove him from power.

**Senegal: Collaboration and Social Integration**

Senegal’s colonial experience is unique within French colonial Africa because of the already existing Four Communes on the Senegalese coast. The Four Communes—Gorée, Saint Louis, Dakar and Rufisque—were considered part of France, and residents had been accorded
the rights of French citizens since the mid-nineteenth century. The decline of the Atlantic slave trade, in conjunction with the socioeconomic transformations brought about by the Industrial Revolution in Europe, produced new conditions which dramatically altered the nature of Europe’s political and economic relationships with West Africa. This eventually led to European colonization of the interior of the continent (Hopkins 1973, 124-166), and had particularly important consequences for existing African institutions and states in the interior of Senegal.

Seeking to expand their economic exploitation of Senegalese territory, specifically Gum Arabic from acacia trees and peanut production, the French began to engage in establishing protectorates over existing states along the Senegal River Basin. They established a military base on the Cap Vert Peninsula in 1859; effectively annexing the territory and providing additional security for three of the four communes. From the Cap-Vert military base, the French led campaigns against the Wolof kingdoms of Baol, Cayor and Djolof. Together the kingdoms fought against French rule until 1886 when the leader of the resistance to French colonial rule, Lat Dior, was killed (O’Brien 1971, 31-35 and Sy 1969, 72-103). However, even before Dior’s death, French economic exploitation of the Senegal River Valley was significant. By 1885, colonial authorities were exporting more than 40,000 tons of peanuts annually from Saint Louis (Guiraud 1937, 37). The fall of the Wolof kingdoms resulted in even greater economic exploitation across the territory and had significant ramifications for social order in Senegalese society.

After defeating the Wolof kingdoms, the French, seeking to limit organized resistance to their rule, disbanded the ceddo caste which represented the noble warrior class in Wolof social order. This effectively eliminated much of the power, influence, and prestige of traditional authorities in Wolof society (Gellar 1976, 16). The subordination of the chiefs in the new
colonial administrative system created an authority vacuum which was to be eventually filled by religious leaders (M’Bayo 2016, 161-168). The Wolof could no longer rely upon their former patrons for support and security, and turned for guidance to religious leaders such as Amadou Bamba, founder of the Senegalese Mouride Sufi order, as well as Malick Sy and El Hajj Abdoulaye Niasse, founders of prominent Senegalese branches of the Tijaniyya Sufi order. While maintaining their religious roles, the religious authorities also eventually assumed several of the functions which were previously performed by the Wolof chiefs and rulers (Gellar 1976, 17). One of the most striking developments that took place after the French conquest was the rapid spread of Islam and the rise of new Muslim religious leaders who became the predominant indigenous colonial authorities in many areas (Foster 2013, 43-68, M’Bayo 2016, 115-142, Cruise O’Brien 1971, Robinson 2000 and Sy 1969).

Thus unintentionally, the French colonial conquest of Senegal strengthened the importance of the Senegalese Sufi orders in their ability to provide social stability. The characteristics and socio-political function of the Sufi orders would ultimately have a long term impact on political structures in Senegal. More currently, their ability to aggregate interests, organize and mobilize society, and effectively cooperate with the post-colonial state enables the Sufi orders to function both as a tool and a check on post-colonial Senegalese governance (Villalón 1995, 259). The Senegal Sufi orders comprehensively captured virtually all communities in Senegalese society, unlike their Mossi counterparts in Burkina Faso which only aggregated the interests of the Mossi communities. The Sufi orders provided French colonial administrators with an instrument to help project their authority both broadly and deeply into Senegalese society and politics. Thus, the colonial policies which led to the transformation of the Sufi orders in Senegal, from completely socially-integrated institution to both socially and
politically integrated, present an important distinction between the cases of Burkina Faso and Senegal.

Another important consequence of the disbanding of the ceddo class pertained to the integration of Senegalese subjects into the colonial army. In 1857, French colonial authorities officially established the *Tirailleurs Sénégalais* (Senegalese Riflemen). In order to expand its colonial presence, the French needed manpower and the most readily available force presented itself from Senegalese subjects. Although Senegalese subjects comprised the initial force, African troops from across the continent were referred to as *Tirailleurs Sénégalais* regardless of their origins throughout French colonial rule (Joly 2009). These troops were used throughout imperial France in Madagascar, Mali, Benin, Indochina, Morocco and Europe during the First and Second World Wars.

During the early stages of French colonial expansion, these forces were comprised primarily of volunteers who came from the north and east of Senegal (Michel 2009). During the World Wars, however, a significant number of troops was forcibly conscripted into the colonial army. During World War I, French West Africa contributed more than 100,000 new recruits primarily from Mali, Guinea and Burkina Faso, and by some counts, upwards of 40,000 recruits per year (Ba 2015 and Sarraut 1923, 41). By the end of the war, more than 156,000 West Africans had served in France, North Africa and the Middle East and approximately 30,000 were killed in action (Crocker 1974, 275). The forced recruitment and the extraction of young West African men from society had a devastating impact. (Buell 1928, Crowder 1968, Schacter-Morgenthau 1964 and Suret Canale 1964). They were frequently chosen by village and canton chiefs who designated former slaves and other “undesirables” to serve in the army for three years or to work stints in public works projects (Gellar 1976, 36). While the number of troops recruited
from the federation declined sharply during the interwar period, the French simultaneously increased their demand for *corvée* labor (Delavignete 1946, 183). Residents of Four Communes benefited from their unique status and were exempted from *corvée* labor. This exemption gradually began to be extended to a handful of others outside of the Four Communes who had received a colonial education and been granted the rights of citizenship.

Prior to the war, the development of a growing colonial bureaucracy required an increased number of low level colonial administrators. To accomplish this, the French began training an auxiliary elite of so-called ‘*évolues*’ subjects who were French educated and considered ‘assimilated’ into French culture. Together with the *originaires* of the Four Communes, this group formed a body politic which participated in three separate political institutions: the municipal government of the Four Communes established between 1872 and 1887; the *Conseil General* (General Council) founded in 1879 and which functioned as a territorial assembly charged with the colony’s budgetary affairs; and representation at the Assembly in Paris. These political institutions witnessed the birth of the Senegalese colony’s first African political group, the Young Senegalese. Founded in 1912 in Saint Louis, the Young Senegalese consisted of clerks, school teachers, interpreters, and the letter-writers who met regularly to discuss the political issues of the day. From within this group emerged the first elected African parliamentarians to the French National Assembly, including Blaise Diagne (Johnson 1971, 149-153).

Political activism rose during the interwar period. Galandou Diouf had formerly been a follower of Diagne but in the 1920s he created his own political group, becoming Diagne’s chief political rival. Gellar (1976, 41) notes, “The polarization of Senegalese politics into two camps, one revolving around the person of the deputy [Diagne] and the other around the person of the
leading challenger [Diouf], became a constant feature of Senegalese political life during the interwar period.” In addition to the political battle between Diagne and Diouf, the Young Senegalese group was also responsible for motivating many other Senegalese politicians, such as Lamine Gueye who led the Senegalese section of the French Socialists during the brief Popular Front era from 1936-1938. Gueye would go on to be elected to the National Assembly alongside Léopold Sedar Senghor in 1944 when he championed the law that would officially grant French citizenship to all colonial subjects. Senghor went on to become Senegal’s first President.

During the expansion of French colonial rule, and until the constitution of the Fourth French Republic introduced universal suffrage and accorded all colonial subjects the status of citizens, the originaires of the Four Communes enjoyed an exceptional political status within the French colonial system. Senegalese parliamentarians like Lamine Gueye and Senghor helped to define and establish the French democratic system as well as the meaning and content of French citizenship (Mann forthcoming, 8). Indeed, the future Senegalese president Léopold Sedar Senghor contributed to the very text of the constitution of the Fifth Republic which continues to enshrine French law today. The comparatively long history of French political institutions in Senegal resulted in a cadre of experienced Senegalese politicians and statesmen from which newly independent Senegal could rely on at decolonization and from which other colonies did not benefit. This unique and exceptional history left Senegal with a set of institutions and actors more readily prepared to govern and enact political order over Senegal’s territory. As Mann (forthcoming, 8) notes, “Senegal’s relatively robust institutions of governance, like those of France, were a kind of colonial co-production, developed in the Communes before being more broadly shared as they gradually lost their particularity in the post-war period.” The experience and “co-production” of these political institutions and the relationships that they established for
advancing political order in Senegal were comparatively stronger than in the other colonies of French West and Equatorial Africa. This had important ramifications for the future prospects of democracy in Senegal and contributed to the development of Senegalese non-governing institutions in ways which shaped its regime trajectory following the adoption of a multiparty electoral system.

**Chad: Colonial Conquerors and Social Transformations**

Chadian society is composed of hundreds of distinct communities and peoples, making it challenging to discuss it as a singular society today, much less prior to those communities’ encounters with French colonial officials. The boundaries of contemporary Chad were determined by French colonial expansion, but this did little to establish Chad as a nation. The challenge of erecting a Chadian nation-state precipitated decades of civil strife following independence and contributed to internal rebellion and instability during the colonial period. This was largely due to ethno-regional conflict as well as resistance to French colonization. Writing about these conflicts and colonial history in Chad, Lemarchand (1980, 449) contends, “the fractional forces that led to the near disintegration of the Chadian polity should not obscure the significance of the opposite phenomenon, not the fission but the fusion of ethnic identities into a wider field of interaction.” To understand the ‘fusion’ of ethnicities in Chadian political history, one needs to examine the different colonial policies which shaped the contours of identity in the French colonial territory. The French drew these contours primarily along geography, religion, and briefly, ideology, but the contours invariably fell along the lines of the violent and enduring resistance to French rule in Chad.

Despite the diversity of groups in Chad, a few generalities can be drawn about different political communities before the onset of colonial rule. First, communities in the extreme north, which is characterized by the arid desert climate of the Sahara and its Tibesti and Ennedi
mountain ranges, tended to be more engaged with communities found in North Africa and modern Sudan. Here, nomadic peoples have historically dominated the region and have long established traditions of crossing the desert along ancient trade routes. These routes continue to be used and those who travel them pay little attention to contemporary international boundaries (Arditi 2003a, 188-189 and Scheele 2016). In the western regions of Chad, African kingdoms had emerged which also covered territory in parts of contemporary northern Nigeria and eastern Niger. These included the Kanem-Borno Empire and later, slightly further to the south, the Baguirmi Empire. These kingdoms established centralized political authority, covered an expansive territory, and as result of their trade relations across the Sahara with Berber and Arab communities, were highly influenced by Islam from North Africa (Lovejoy 1974). They were centuries old with well-documented histories of trade and travel to North Africa and the Middle East. Beginning as early as the twelfth century, the sultans of Kanem-Bornu routinely traveled to Mecca for the Hajj to reinforce the legitimacy of their kingdom and its trade connections across the Sahara (Montclos 2017, 279). Other Muslim kingdoms existed to the east closer to the border with contemporary Sudan.

In eastern Chad, Arabs migrated from Sudan to settle the Ouaddai kingdom centered in modern Abéché. These Arabs did not seek to convert the inhabitants of this region to Islam in massive numbers; they were more interested in commerce (Arditi 2003, 190). For a long time, Ouaddai elites followed the Sudanese influenced traditions of Qaddiri Islam, despite attempts by the Sanusiyyas from Libya to develop a following there. Prior to the arrival of the French, the Sanusiyya supported the military initiatives of the final Emperor of Borno, Rabah, to spread their influence over most of contemporary Chad. By the end of the nineteenth century, face with

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4 For an excellent reference sources on the Borno Empire see: Barkindo (1992, 492-514)
pressures from the French and Rabah, Ouaddai allied itself with the Sanusiyya. Rabah was an accomplished military leader who successfully wielded violence to force numerous existing political entities to pay tribute. Rabah was the last of many military leaders from these kingdoms to wage war on the neighboring kingdoms in this region. Conflicts between the Muslim kingdoms of Borno, Kanem, Baguirmi, Ouaddai and Darfur occurred frequently during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Reyna, 1990). By the late nineteenth century, Kanem, Baguirmi and many other communities to the south had fallen under Rabah’s dominion. Consequently, the leadership of Baguirmi gladly agreed to become a protectorate of France in 1897 in the hopes that it would put an end to Rabah’s tyranny (Gondeau 2013, 36). The French and Rabah’s forces would engage in multiple skirmishes across southern Chad before 1900.

Communities in southern Chad initially welcomed the first French military expeditions. The French sought to establish trade and enter into alliances with the local populations, while simultaneously attempting to connect the AEF from Brazzaville to the AOF. At that time, the southern region of Chad was characterized by political fragmentation with numerous clans organized in disparate village communities under the authority of a chief (mbang), but lacking in any real concentration of political power (Lemarchand 1980, 451). The communities comprised the Sara regions of southern Chad and represented some of the most densely populated areas of the territory. At the moment of independence, this area accounted for roughly one-third of the Chadian population (Cabot and Boquet 1974). The arrival of the French which was initially welcomed by the Sara and the group’s large population, led colonial authorities to develop policies which sought to exploit the labor of the Sara.

Prior to the arrival of colonial forces, the Sara remained on the periphery of the more centralized kingdoms of Baguirmi to the north and Ouaddai to the east. Yet violence in this part
of modern day Chad had a long history (Azevedo 1982). In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the loosely-connected Sara communities in southern Chad suffered from raids launched by the Muslim empire-states of Kanem-Borno, Baguirmi, Ouaddai and Darfur (today in Sudan) seeking to capture slaves (Azevedo 2003, 21-46). During French colonial rule, policies integrated the Sara into the colonial administrative apparatus and coerced labor. This began with the French military expeditions into contemporary northern and central Chad during the end of the nineteenth century in which Sara were recruited and used as laptots (locally sourced colonial militia) porters, and as laborers. The exact number of those conscripted remain unknown, but scholars point to Sara dominance in the indigenous forces of the colonial army in Chad (Azevedo 2003, 65-73). The Sara, unlike the Mossi who exhibited a centralized political structure with strong existing institutions, became the people most integrated into the Chadian colonial administration.

The colonial expansion over Chadian territory can be summarized by a few key moments. In October 1897, Émile Gentil signed a protectorate treaty with Aberramane Gaourang II, Sultan of Baguirmi, who sought French protection from Rabah’s troops. Numerous clashes occurred over the next three years between French colonial troops and Rabah’s soldiers. The most deadly occurred in Kouno where the French colonial naval officer Henri Bretonnet aimed to reinforce Gaourang II against Rabah. Instead, Rabah and his men massacred Bretonnet’s troops on July 17, 1899.5 The second mission of Émile Gentil pushed Rabah’s forces back on October 28, 1899 to Kouno, but the massacre of Bretonnet’s men made war between the French and Rabah unavoidable (Roche 2011, 85-92). In 1900, the military conquest of Chad began in earnest

5 Bretonnet was killed by Rabah’s soldiers at Niellim-Togbao where he and some of his forces had retreated from Kouno. The Sultan of Baguirmi escaped the battle.
following the defeat of Rabah. French troops from Algiers as part of the Fourneau-Lamy expedition met a second mission which had left from Niger and was led by commanders Joalland and Meynier. These two columns met Émile Gentil and his forces who had simultaneously traveled down the Chari River toward Lake Chad. These forces engaged Rabah and his men in battle at Kousseri on April 22, 1900. Both Rabah and Commander Lamy were killed during the battle. This site, first named Fort Lamy and renamed N'Djamena in 1973, served as the center of French colonial authority and would eventually become the contemporary capital of Chad.

The Military Territory of the Country and Protectorates of Chad was signed on September 5, 1900. This was the official beginning of French colonial rule over Chad, but it did not mark the establishment of a consistent colonial presence in the territory. For the next seventeen years, French colonial forces would continue their military efforts. These battles would take place between the French and the Sanusiyya who had allied with the Ouaddai kingdom in the east. Unlike Senegal and Burkina Faso, the complete conquest of Chadian territory required decades of battles against several hostile groups. Lemarchand (1992, 225) writes:

“The conquest of the Islamic north…proved extraordinarily difficult and costly, confronting the French with the toughest resistance. Epitomized by the defeat of Rabah in 1900, the battles against the Senussiya in 1901 and 1913, and the storming of the capital of Waddai in 1917, the conquest of northern Chad remained engraved in French memory as a singularly bloody affair.”

Even following this conquest of the territory and the establishment of a colonial presence in the extreme north of Chad, the actual colonial presence across the entire territory remained virtually nonexistent. Although Chad did not have the same population density as Burkina Faso, the number of French colonial officials present after the military expeditions were among the lowest in the AEF. This resulted in the greater isolation of Chad and guaranteed that it received the least amount of colonial investment in infrastructure (Freed 2010, 212).
Consequently, colonial officials attempted to bolster their ranks through local education, but this proved to be a difficult task. Chadians comprised the smallest contingent of colonial educated individuals within the AEF, from which fewer colonial subjects received an education when compared to the AOF. To erect the colonial administration, a workforce was needed including auxiliary staff, interpreters, customs officers, writers and guards, but the violence and resistance to colonial rule made it challenging to derive this administrative force locally.

Colonial attempts to provide local education faced numerous challenges and the limited extent of colonial rule made education in Chad a laborious endeavor in and of itself (Gardinier 1989). The first education certificates to be conferred on Chadians were not until 1932 and the graduates had been educated outside of the colony (Lanne 1998, 49). By 1939, there were nine such certificates awarded, 57 in 1945. However, education in the colony remained practically non-existent; in the 1945-1946 academic year there were only 2,500 students locally enrolled in primary school and none enrolled in secondary school (Gardinier 1989, 65). Despite efforts to establish an educated base of local officials, in 1943 there were a total of nineteen Chadians who had a higher rank than clerks of the administration, out of 305 for the whole of the AEF (Lane 1998, 49). To the extent that there existed a support staff for colonial authorities in Chad, many of them came from the AEF, or even the AOF. Of the Chadians who were selected for colonial education, almost all originated from the southern regions of the territory. This was also the case for those Chadian who were recruited into the Tirailleurs Sénégalais (Lemarchand 1980, 454-455 and 1992, 223).

Herein lies the first colonial-reinforced socio-political identity concerning Chad: the north-south division of colonial integration and resulting elite status conferred on southerners.

The Sara and to a lesser degree other southern populations comprised the dominant group to be integrated into the colonial administration. Unlike the Mossi, the Sara did not comprise in
and of themselves a coherent political centralized society. The “fusion of Sara identity” was, at least initially, the result and repercussion of French colonial rule (Lemarchand 1980). Another factor which contributed to this fusion was the development of cotton agriculture in the region beginning in the 1930s (Arditi 2004). The climate and agronomy of southern Chad allowed for the agricultural production of cotton, whereas the northern and central regions of the territory remained too arid and sparsely populated in most cases for this cash crop production. Consequently, the French invested in the development of new towns and introduced compulsory cotton production to the largely Sara-populated regions (Gondeu 2013, 35). This led to a greater French colonial presence in the south.

The cash crop economy in the south exacerbated the already extremely extractive labor policies which had been established during the military conquest and administration of the colony. Lacking a central local authority to incorporate, the French military authorities relied on heavily oppressive tactics, including violence against uncooperative villages. Gervais (1982, 112) argues that these coercive policies and the concomitant threat of violence may have resulted in some temporary moments of economic surplus, but this simultaneously produced a fundamental cycle of underdevelopment: over-exploitation and under-investment. These policies resulted in a series of economic crises which only further entrenched Chad’s lowly status within the AEF, reproducing the vicious cycle of economic underdevelopment and a lack of colonial investment. The shared experience of exploitation as a result of the development of cotton agriculture served to create a collective identity among the Sara in ways which previously had not been the case. It also divided Chadian society between those integrated into the colonial system and those separated from the colonial system. The more politically, socially and
economically integrated southerners developed stronger relationships with French colonial authorities creating the first division between the communities of northern and southern Chad.

The second division, made more concrete as a result of the colonial conquest of Chad and which overlapped with the colonial crafted north-south division, falls along religious lines. The conflicts among the French, African Muslim kingdoms, and the Senussiya produced a significantly different relationship between the French and Muslim communities in Chad than the relationships found between the colonial state and the Sufi order in Senegal. The conflicts left an indelible impact on the French colonial rhetoric regarding Islam in Chad—a relationship that led colonial officials to describe the Senussiya as engaged in a holy war against the French with the goal of establishing a pan-Islamic empire in sub-Saharan Africa (Meynier 1946, 132-134). It also left a lasting impact on the Muslim communities of Ouaddai. Throughout the colonial period, these communities refused to send their children to colonial schools, preferring to send them to neighboring Sudan and other Arabic-speaking countries (Arditi 2003b and Khayer 1976). These decisions further exacerbated the divisions between the northern and southern groups, worsening already tense ethno-regional divisions by assuring that the southern groups became more integrated into the colonial administration.

Following the development of political parties and activism in the post-World War II period, these ethno-regional divisions became heavily politicized and took on an ideological distinction. The rise of the RDA as discussed briefly in the case of Burkina Faso was also active in Chad. The RDA in Chad developed primarily under the banner of the Parti Progressiste Tchadienne (PPT). Educated Chadians, though few in number, became engaged in the nationalist
political platforms extolled by the RDA.6 Naturally, these educated Chadians sought to garner support from their communities which happened to be primarily in the Sara-dominated regions of the south (Lemarchand 1980, 458-462). French colonial authorities, seeking to undercut support for the communist-leaning PPT, arrested and dismissed several Chadian PPT members from their posts within the colonial administration to prevent them from contesting elections (Lisette 1977, 52). The French colonial authorities threw their support behind Muslim Chadians from the west and north of the colony who supported the conservative pro-metropole Union Démocratique Tchadienne (Chadian Democratic Union UDT) political party.

The clearly ethnic breakdown of political parties at this moment in Chadian history eventually erupted into violent clashes, with riots in the southern city of Fort Archambault, contemporary Sarh, between members of the PPT and UDT. As Lemarchand (1980, 459) notes, “ethnicity, in short, derived its own reductionist logic from mutually reinforcing interactions between cultural and social identities, with political discrimination serving to further accentuate the trend towards polarization.” The French colonial preference for the Sara communities had resulted in a return to violent confrontation between different groups and the introduction of electoral politics only aggravated this. These tensions remained high until the RDA broke ties with the French communist party in 1951. The tide of French support shifted back to the PPT following the onset of the Algerian war and the emergence of the National Liberation Front (Front de Libération Nationale, FLN) which rekindled French fears of pan-Islamism. This final swing of the pendulum of political support would see the French commit to the installation of a Sara, François Tombalbaye, and the leader of the PPT as prime minister ahead of independence.

6 Indeed, the first leader of the PPT, Gabriel Lisette, originated from the French Antilles. He would also become the first Prime Minister of Chad.
Tombalbaye would later become the first president of Chad after independence. However, the division entrenched between the different ethno-regional, and to a lesser degree, religious communities in Chad would continue to threaten the county’s stability for decades to come. In many ways, colonial rule in Chad institutionalized violence and division amongst Chadian groups. The colony’s non-governing institutions were shaped along these violent divisions and persist in Chadian politics today.

**Decolonization and Independence**

This chapter demonstrates some of the ways that different colonial policies deployed in Senegal, Chad and Burkina Faso had important consequences for institutional development prior to the end of colonial rule. The decolonization period of the late 1950s occurred rapidly and produced a variety of different outcomes across the former AOF and AEF. In the late 1950s, tensions in Algeria threatened to descend into civil war precipitating a political crisis in France. The leaders of the French government called on General Charles de Gaulle—who unexpectedly resigned from the presidency in January 1946—to assume again the position of Head of State, reform the Republic and stave off further threats of civil war in May 1958. De Gaulle proposed a new constitution which inaugurated the French Fifth Republic, after a referendum across the French Union—France and all of it overseas territories including the former AOF and AEF colonies—was held and approved the constitution on September 28, 1958. Through the referendum, colonial member states of the French Union also voted to continue as part of what was renamed the “French Community” in a vote for “yes” to the referendum, whereas a vote for “no” would result in immediate independence. Though hotly debated by the African political parties at the time, all of the AOF and AEF colonies voted to remain part of the French Community, with the sole exception of Guinea which became independent on October 2, 1958. By 1960, however, it became clear that the French Community was unsustainable. The different
constellations of political parties, politicians and neo-traditional institutions played important roles in this decolonization process, role that frequently had important consequence for non-governing institutions in the immediate post-colonial period.

In Senegal, the more integrated and developed political institutions of the ‘Four Communes,’ coupled with a larger number of local individuals who had been acculturated within this system, ensured French support and a steady transfer of power at independence. Furthermore, the Sufi orders—the neo-traditional institutions which colonial rule further integrated political and socially in Senegal—ensured that political stability would be maintained through social stability. After decades of cooperation with French colonial authorities, the Sufi orders had developed strong commercial ties to the Senegalese states, thereby intertwining their economic interests with the political status quo (Boone 1992, 88-95). Although Senegal’s first president, Léopold Sedar Senghor, was Catholic, he understood the importance of the relationship between the marabouts and the state, and his administration invested in this during his tenure. In return, the Sufi orders continue to play a central role in the political stability of the Senegalese regime.

In contrast, Chad lacked the institutional development and economic investment experienced in Senegal. Electoral politics had only begun in the post-World War II era and quickly erupted into ethnic violence in Chad. Threats to Chad’s internal composition from rebellious movements in the north of the country required that the French maintain a heavy military presence there even after independence. Unlike Senegal, the existing African institutions are

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7 It needs to be noted here that at independence, Senegal and French Soudan formed a union under the name of the Mali Federation. The federation broke down shortly after independence due to disagreements between Modibo Keïta and Léopold Sedar Senghor. Keïta lost significant support from the French as a result, while Senghor remained closely tied to the French Fifth Republic and benefitted from maintaining much of the colonial system, at least in the first years of his rule. For an in-depth discussion of these events see: Foltz (1965)
in Chad revolved around recurring conflict between existing African states prior to colonial rule. The French colonial conquest of the territory perpetuated these violence-based divisions. These seemingly endless conflicts resulted in a set of institutions which remained too disparate for the French to systematically integrate into the centralized colonial political system. While, the previously fragmented Sara clans became the most integrated populations in colonial Chad, which helped to build a collective Sara identity, this also increased conflict and opposition between the Sara and other groups from the northern and central regions of the country. This ultimately institutionalized violence in Chadian politics and society. These tensions continued to threaten Chadian stability for decades after independence.

The higher population density and more centralized African institutions of the Mossi kingdom in Burkina Faso provided a more developed political system with which colonial authorities were able to cooperate. The initial resistance of the Mossi kingdom led colonial authorities to be wary of pursuing indirect rule through the chiefs, but over time and with the clear need of an already established set of institutions from which to project colonial authority, French colonial administrators quickly began to rely on the pragmatic Mossi chiefs. Alliances with the Mossi Kingdom provided distinct advantages to colonial authorities seeking to assert their authority over Burkina Faso while it was colonized and during the decolonization process. The Mossi chiefs emerged as an important political force and several held elected offices in the years before independence. Indeed, Mogho Naba Saghla led a local chapter of the RDA until his death in 1957. His replacement, Mogho Naba Kougri, was much younger and inexperienced. He proposed to establish a constitutional monarchy in 1958 on the eve of decolonization which legislators portrayed as an attempt to reestablish a feudal society and overwhelming rejected
The move temporarily sidelined the Mossi chieftaincy from electoral politics. The French, however, maintained a strong connection to the Mossi chiefs.

Following the death of Ouezzin Coulibaly, Maurice Yaméogo became the leader of the RDA and head of government in 1958. After independence, Yaméogo consigned the chiefs to a lower status. As a former colonial clerk, Yaméogo sought to maintain the colonial administration, but having been threatened by the chiefs, he sought to limit their influence in politics (Balima 1996, 280-284). These events and the resultant political tensions left Yaméogo with few allies after independence, including the French due to their continued support of the Mossi chiefs, who Yaméogo viewed as political rivals. The Mossi chiefs continued to play an important socio-political role in Burkinabè culture, society, and politics. The centrality of the Mossi chiefs in post-colonial Burkinabè politics and society is explored in greater detail as a neo-traditional institution in Chapter 7.

Another particularity of the decolonization process concerned establishing national militaries. During colonial rule, there existed a metropolitan army and the troupes coloniales of which the Tirailleurs Sénégalais were part. However, African soldiers were stationed sporadically throughout the empire and no efforts were made to establish national forces. In September 1956, France established six écoles militaires préparatoires (military academies) in Africa to begin training a pool of young men for officer cadet courses. The goal was to increase the number of African soldiers who held higher ranks or non-commissioned officer status in the Troupes d’Outre-Mer (Overseas Troops) which replaced the Troupes Colonials following World War II. By 1960, ahead of independence, the Troupes d’Outre-Mer had 415 African officers and cadets, plus 85 in training and some 2,500 NCOs (Crocker 1968, 19). Since the French territories, unlike the British, had no national military institutions until after independence,
African officers and men of the colonial army had to be ‘territorialized’ while local institutions had to be built from the ground up as part of the decolonization process.

This occurred through a series of agreements between France and the colonies before independence. The key points of these defense accords can be broken down into three areas: 1) transfer by France of men and units in addition to a basic grant of munitions, vehicles, and fixed installations to the new national authorities; 2) French assistance in the development of military forces through training in Africa and France and the continued supply of military equipment; and 3) direct French military aid in the external and internal defense of the African territories, at their request (Ligot 1963 and Crocker 1968). Burkina Faso declined to participate in these accords or to allow the French to station troops within Burkinabè territory. Burkina Faso’s reluctance to enter fully into the French military system stemmed from France’s support of President Maurice Yamèogo’s political opponents in 1959-1960, as well as the political pressure exerted by disgruntled, underemployed veterans of the Troupes d’Outre Mer (Crocker 1968, 21). Chad and Senegal completely accepted the defense accords and the French established military bases in both countries.

In Chad, the French were even more involved than merely establishing a military presence. In fact, the French intervened directly to ensure internal stability throughout the 1960s. French intelligence also offered strategic advice to President Tombalbaye regarding particular militias in the north which could be used to maintain order over rebellious groups (République du Tchad No. 681/MRA). French efforts to reinforce the Chadian military, while simultaneously intervening to maintain stability in Chad during and following decolonization, virtually

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8 La coopération militaire dans les accords, passés entre la France et les états africains et malgache d'expression française
guaranteed that military cohesion in Chad would not be accomplished. In Senegal, the military quickly developed, in part due to investments made by the newly independent government under Senghor and in part due to a more cohesive officer corps at independence (Crocker 1974). As I discuss in further detail in Chapter 6, President Senghor clearly used the military to cultivate civil-military relations built upon the Republican ideals of French democracy and to promote development around newly independent Senegal.

The differences in the relationships between colonial authorities and the existing African institutions during the time of colonial rule set the stage for important political developments following decolonization. In Senegal, the newly independent regime led by Senghor worked to maintain its close ties with the marabouts and stamped out political opposition, trade union agitation, and leftist movements (Boone 1992, 94, Cruise O’Brien 1979, 216, Schumacher 1975). In Burkina Faso, Maurice Yaméogo’s reluctance to provide the Mossi Chiefs with any deference alienated the Mossi leaders and left him without their support during times of crisis, ultimately resulting in his ouster (Harsch 2017, 24-25). In Chad, the Sara-dominated political class took control of the political system and systematically consolidated power under the leadership of Tombalbaye (Haggar 2007). This would eventually lead to decades of civil war between the Sara-dominated Chadian state and rebel groups largely comprised of northerners.

Chapter 5 discusses the post-colonial developments of each of these countries in more detail. It gives attention to the roles of non-governing institutions from independence through to each country’s transition to multiparty electoral systems. The discussion of these transitions highlights the roles that non-governing institutions play in shaping the subsequent regime trajectories in each case. The extent and form of colonial rule discussed above function as critical antecedent conditions that shaped the ways in which the military, neo-traditional institutions,
civil society and the opposition influenced regime trajectories in the post-colonial era and after the adoption of multiparty elections.
CHAPTER 5
POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION AND REGIME TRAJECTORIES

Introduction

Now, make no mistake: History is on the side of these brave Africans [who resist calls to wield power in unfair ways], not with those who use coups or change constitutions to stay in power. (Applause.) Africa doesn't need strongmen, it needs strong institutions. (Applause.)

—President Barack Obama
Ghanaian National Assembly

Barack Obama nous parle de l’histoire de l’Amérique. Nous, nous avons notre histoire du Burkina. L’histoire de chaque pays africain, c’est différent. Il n’y a pas d’institution forte s’il n’y a pas, bien sûr, d’homme fort.

—Président Blaise Compaoré
Radio France International

In Chapter 4, I discussed how the extent and form of colonial rule serve as antecedent conditions that refashioned existing institutional frameworks and reconfigured political order in Burkina Faso, Chad and Senegal. Colonial rule introduced many of the roles that contemporary non-governing institutions—the military, neo-traditional institutions, civil society and the opposition—play in politics, and laid the institutional foundations from which post-colonial regimes inherited their political systems. These antecedent conditions shaped the characteristics of non-governing institutions in ways which have in turn shaped the abilities of regimes to

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1 The above epigraph is taken from President Barack Obama’s speech to the Ghanaian Parliament made on July 11, 2009 in Accra, Ghana as part of his first official trip to sub-Saharan Africa. Accessed May 20, 2018: https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-ghanaiian-parliament

2 This epigraph is drawn from an interview given by President Blaise Compaoré to Radio France International on August 7, 2014. “Barack Obama is speaking to us about American History. We have our history of Burkina. The history of each African country is different. There is no strong institution if, of course, there is no strongman.” Accessed May 20, 2018: http://www.rfi.fr/emission/20140807-blaise-compaore-histoire-usa-pas-celle-afrique.
manage pressures for greater political liberalization, resulting in different regime trajectories after the inauguration of multiparty elections.

Below, I examine the different political dynamics in Senegal, Burkina Faso and Chad, beginning with the immediate post-colonial period leading up to their respective inaugurations of multiparty elections. I then explore each country’s transition to multiparty elections and subsequent regime trajectories. In doing so, it becomes clear that, as the quotes above suggest, African regimes have their own histories, and thus present a wide variety of institutions with their own sets of characteristics. I introduced these characteristics in Chapter 3, and will discuss each non-governing institution in detail in subsequent chapters. Non-governing institutions shape the prospects for greater political liberalization, after the installation of multiparty elections, by providing a repertoire of tactics to regimes to manage pressures for political liberalization. These tactics and the ability of regimes to stifle pressures for greater political liberalization without conceding liberalizing reforms propel each regime down its own unique trajectory. The purpose of this chapter is to examine each country’s political developments after decolonization, in order to demonstrate how each country can be characterized as following one of three particular regime trajectories.

In some contexts, non-governing institutions severely constrain the ability of regimes to avoid greater liberalization, and as a result, regimes concede incremental liberalizing reforms in their efforts to maintain power and stability. This results in a trajectory of gradual democratization, as evidenced by Senegal. In other contexts, such as Burkina Faso, the characteristics of non-governing institutions enable the regime to concede only limited liberalizing concessions, after which the regime may be able to recalibrate to maintain an uneasy status quo or a trajectory of stable electoral authoritarianism. Finally, in certain other cases, the
characteristics of non-governing institutions are such that they provide no real check against efforts of the regime to systematically erode political liberalization, leading to a trajectory that over time results in the restoration of authoritarian rule, as exemplified by Chad.

In the sections that follow, I develop each of these trajectories by discussing the processes of liberalization that each case experienced, and by underscoring how their configurations of non-governing institutions shaped these processes. First, I present accounts of the political events following independence in each country to provide a history of political change prior to the implementation of multiparty elections. These accounts demonstrate the importance of the antecedent conditions in each case, and highlight differences across each country’s non-governing institutions prior to the introduction of multiparty electoral regimes. Already at these moments, non-governing institutions began to display important institutional characteristics that carried on into the era of multiparty politics with the regime and shaped the regime’s ability to manage pressures for greater political liberalization. In the second section, I discuss the political transitions that took place in each case and which inaugurated multiparty elections, paying close attention to the roles of the military, neo-traditional institutions, civil society and the opposition. In this section, I also discuss the regime trajectories that each case followed after the establishment of multiparty politics, to highlight the differences across each regime’s non-governing institutions and to substantiate their different regime trajectories. The chapter concludes with a summary of these trajectories and the roles of non-governing institutions in their perpetuation.

Post-Colonial Experiences

Table 5-1 present short summaries of the antecedent conditions which shaped the characteristics of non-governing institutions before the establishment of multiparty elections in each case. From Table 5-1, it becomes clear that non-governing institutions held different
characteristics already at this juncture. Differences in the extent and form of colonial rule in Senegal, Burkina Faso and Chad had already begun to shape the characteristics of non-governing institutions before independence. Senegal’s longer history with local governance, even if limited, allowed for the emergence of a more dynamic civil society and opposition. This, in turn, made implementation of single party rule more challenging for the regime, due to the mobilizing power of these institutions. Senghor’s close defense cooperation with the French and his policies to instill republican norms cultivated a high degree of coercive power in the military, and the Sufi orders also maintained their high symbolic power in the post-colonial period. In Burkina Faso, the Mossi chiefs’ political integration waxed and waned with the various regimes, depending on the perceived threat they posed and resulting in moderate levels of symbolic power. Similarly, the opposition and civil society remained limited in their development following independence and during various military regimes, despite moments of social unrest led by trade unions and multiple efforts at installing civilian government. For its part the military developed norms of intervention and a loss of cohesion, limiting its coercive power. In Chad, the single party rule of the first regime imploded into civil war, which dramatically shaped all non-governing institutions. Neo-traditional institutions lost their symbolic power over society as they became increasing disparate and divided. Civil society and the opposition were virtually non-existent as they were officially banned, and all political dissent was harshly persecuted. Finally the military grew increasingly fragmented from years of violent conflict, and this served to develop a norm of violent interventionist civil-military relations, leaving the military with low levels of coercive power. In the following section, I develop the events which shaped each country’s neo-traditional institutions and explain how the development of these characteristics came to be prior to multiparty elections in each regime.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Military</th>
<th>Neo-Traditional Institutions</th>
<th>Civil Society</th>
<th>Opposition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>Limited support from French. Military developed interventionist norm to resolve social and political crises</td>
<td>Moderate social heterogeneity with centralized hierarchical structures offered intermediate degree of social integration</td>
<td>Unified and active trade unions, limited number of groups</td>
<td>Banned by first regime; failed attempts to reintroduce</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Initially cohesive, loss of cohesion after multiple ideologically driven military regimes</td>
<td></td>
<td>Limited organizational capacity due largely to agrarian society. No mass-based groups</td>
<td>Kept in check or banned by military regimes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>Lacked cohesion: comprised primarily of one segment of society. Multiple armed groups claimed equal legitimacy.</td>
<td>Extraordinarily disparate. No efforts by first regime to integrate politically. Civil war precluded further efforts at political integration</td>
<td>Extremely limited at independence.</td>
<td>Banned by first regime.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>After French military reduced its support, the country quickly devolved into norms of intervention through violent conflict.</td>
<td>Limited social integration due to disparate institutions across ‘Chadian’ society. Civil war exacerbated social divisions</td>
<td>Practically non-existent within the country during civil war</td>
<td>Linked to armed groups during civil war.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>Cohesive and strong support from French military. Socially cross-cutting</td>
<td>Long history of relations between colonial regime and the Sufi orders maintained by first regime; high degree of political integration.</td>
<td>Unified and active in urban centers. History of political activism.</td>
<td>Initially lacked official recognition. Unified successfully for recognition.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Developed norm of republicanism through initial policies such as Armée Nation</td>
<td>Sufi orders capture virtually all of post-colonial society through centralized and hierarchical structures</td>
<td>Strong organizational capacity. Student and labor protests of 1960s nearly destabilized regime.</td>
<td>Won limited representation in tri-party system.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Burkina Faso: Politicized Military Regimes and Revolution

Like many of the newly independent Francophone African states, Burkina Faso’s first post-colonial government quickly set about consolidating power in a single party regime under the leadership of president Maurice Yaméogo and the UDV—the Burkinabè branch of the RDA. As a former colonial administrator, Yaméogo represented the auxiliary elite class of évolutés. However, in the years preceding independence, Yaméogo lost the support of the French who backed the traditional Mossi chiefs in elections; the French had viewed the chiefs as conservative pro-France political representatives. Consequently, Yaméogo maintained a distant relationship with the French after independence, perhaps most notably in his refusal to allow the French to establish a military base or to allow them to intervene militarily in the event of crisis (Crowder 1968). These decisions had major ramifications for Yaméogo in 1966, when trade union strikes paralyzed the public sector after there were a series of repressive efforts by the Yaméogo regime to stifle political dissent and calls for political change.

Yaméogo had badly mismanaged the country, bringing it to the point of a socio-economic collapse. Threatened by the French support of the Mossi chiefs, Yaméogo established single party rule by banning all forms of political opposition outside of the UDV. He also took steps to remove many of the privileges the chiefs had received under the colonial administration, effectively removing their formal authority in the name of modernization. In addition to banning political opposition, Yaméogo sought to decertify public sector unions which was an overt attempt to cut their international affiliations (Harsch 2017, 24). The unions, however, had

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137 This term, literally meaning evolved, refers to the class of colonized subjects who received French education and served as clerks or other lower level administrators throughout the French colonies.

138 The UDV also maintained the strongest degree of institutionalization thanks to its regional connections to the RDA.
maintained a strong connection to the labor movement in France following independence, which allowed for the cultivation of a nascent civil society in the urban Burkinabè politic (Muase 1989). Still, with no political parties to challenge the UDV or Yaméogo in elections, he claimed to win presidential elections in 1965 with 99.98 percent of the vote, while estimates put turnout at a dismal 20 percent of registered voters. Disenchanted with the political process, the trade unions called for strikes and began to mobilize their supporters in opposition to Yaméogo and the UDV. Recognizing the potential threat, Yaméogo jailed potential challengers on charges of corruption and dispersed union meetings with tear gas.

These efforts to stifle his opposition only served to exacerbate the popular discontent with the regime. The growing social unrest throughout the country’s urban centers caused the leaders of neo-traditional institutions to seek a compromise. The Catholic Church and the Mogho Naba—the traditional leader of the Mossi chiefs—attempted to reason with Yaméogo calling on him to meet and negotiate a compromise with the unions, but the president refused their counsel and their offers to mediate (Harsch 2017, 25). Finally, after these attempts failed and several of the lower Mossi chiefs announced their support of the strikes, the military stepped in and removed Yaméogo from power at the behest of the unions. It then established the country’s first military regime under general Sangoulé Lamizana, who in addition to ousting Yaméogo, dissolved the National Assembly.

The unions continued to pressure the regime for social and political reform, but Lamizana, with the full weight of the military behind him, first decided to target the public corruption that had flourished during Yaméogo’s rule. The military regime enacted harsh austerity policies that embittered the trade unions to the government, but Lamizana succeeded in gaining the support of neo-traditional institutions by re-engaging the chiefs. Lamizana invited the
Mogho Naaba to a public ceremony held at the presidential palace, and restored the privileges the previous regime had revoked from traditional chiefs (Harsch 2017, 27). Additionally, Lamizana conferred one of the country’s highest honors on the ‘Emperor of the Mossi,’ and in turn, the Mogho declared at the 1968 National Congress of Traditional Chiefs that the chieftaincy and its representatives would do nothing to undermine government authority (Balima 1996, 315). The partnerships that Lamizana formed with the Burkinabè chiefs helped the military regime maintain stability during the famines that ravaged the Sahelian countryside in the 1970s. It also provided some assurance to the military regime that it could control a political transition, reinstate civilian rule and a new republic. A new constitution was drafted in 1969, and in December 1970 multiparty legislative elections were held. Although this marked the reestablishment of a multiparty legislature, the new constitution stipulated that the executive branch of government would continue to be staffed by the military, and that the head of state’s offices would be held by the highest ranking military officer, who of course was Lamizana.

This mixed civilian-military regime, known as the Second Republic, only lasted until 1974, when Lamizana used public outcry over political corruption and factional disputes within the political parties to justify a new intervention of the military, the dismantling of the National Assembly, the banning of political parties, and the suspension of the constitution (Harsch 2017, 31). Lamizana then moved to reinstate civilian rule entirely by 1978 when voters elected him as a civilian president in a second round run-off election, after Lamizana secured the support of the Mogho Naba and Mossi chieftaincy (Harsch 2017, 33). This civilian government was short-lived due to public discontent over corrupt elites and the government’s inability to hold them accountable. Ultimately, a faction of the military led by Colonel Saye Zerbo staged a military coup, removing Lamizana from power and disbanding the government. The population largely
supported the coup, which received praise from the leaders of neo-traditional institutions as well as from the ever-disruptive trade unions (Harsch 2017, 35 and Zagré 1994, 109). However, in addition to highlighting the shifting alliances of neo-traditional institutions with Lamizana’s regime, this coup represented the beginning of growing factional disputes based on ideological differences within the military’s officer corps.

Another military coup in 1982 ousted Zerbo from power, when internal dissent rose to such a point within the military that it threatened the outbreak of civil war. The 1982 coup eventually placed Jean Baptiste Ouédraogo in power, with Captain Thomas Sankara as prime minister in a power-sharing government, which Ouédraogo promised would last no longer than two years. Ouédraogo, a military doctor and conservative Catholic, sought to align Burkina Faso more closely with France, while Sankara, a leftist, worked to keep the country officially non-aligned, albeit while developing ties with Qaddafi in Libya. The pair held widely different political views and Sankara received significant popular support from the unions and leftist contingents within the military. However, the neo-traditional institutions—historically forces of conservatism in the country—remained wary of these politics and supported Ouédraogo, despite his status as a political novice.

Ultimately, tensions between the two kept the military divided, even if they managed to remain in power during the 1980s. After a failed coup attempted to reinstall Zerbo as president, Sankara was jailed by Ouédraogo. This provoked a military mutiny in the town of Pô, and popular protests demanding Sankara’s immediate release. Eventually, facing mounting popular pressure, Ouédraogo relented and released the charismatic leftist. Sankara later organized a number of other leftist junior officers and staged yet another bloodless coup in 1983, marking the beginning of Burkina Faso’s leftist revolution.
The revolutionary regime of Sankara sought to capitalize and co-opt the unions’ ability to mobilize people by creating a widespread national network of *Comités de Défense de la Révolution* (Committees for the Defense of the Revolution, CDRs) which operated as satellite offices under the central command of the National Revolutionary Council (Muase 1989, 213-4). The CDRs diffused party ideology throughout the country, while simultaneously engendering a high level of public participation in state affairs. Sankara quickly emerged as a widely popular figure not only in Burkina Faso, but also across the continent and for leftists around the world.139 Sankara stripped neo-traditional institutions of their mostly symbolic authority, and maintained the ban on political parties during his time in power. Through Sankara’s regime, the military and the revolutionary council held complete control over the government. There is insufficient space to delve into the intricacies of Sankara’s rule, but it dramatically restructured the Burkinabè state. Sankara’s political legacy and revolutionary ideology continue to leave their mark on Burkinabè politics. The revolutionary regime met a quick end, however, when Captain Blaise Compaoré, one of Sankara’s closest collaborators, organized his own coup, leading to the assassination of Sankara and twelve of his compatriots on 15 October 1987. Compaoré would go on to orchestrate the political transition that returned Burkina Faso to civilian rule and multiparty elections, ultimately establishing the most stable regime in the country’s post-colonial history. I further elaborate this transition and Burkina Faso’s subsequent regime trajectory in the following section.

In sum, Burkina Faso’s regime trajectory began from a set of antecedent conditions following colonial rule, and in which: 1) the military lacked cohesion, suffered from internal divisions and intervened in politics to avert growing social unrest; 2) neo-traditional institutions

139 For an excellent introduction to Sankara and the 1983 leftist revolution in Burkina Faso see Harsch (2014).
were intermittently integrated into the political system and wielded intermediate degrees of social authority; and 3) the political opposition was virtually non-existent, and civil society’s mobilizing power often prompted a series of political and institutional crises, resulting in military intervention. From this starting point, the configuration of non-governing institutions in Burkina Faso was to enable the regime to allow limited liberalizing concessions only to periodically recalibrate its trajectory afterward to maintain electoral authoritarianism.

**Chad: Civil Conflict and Disorder**

In the immediate post-colonial period, non-governing institutions in Chad failed to contribute to the overall stability of the country. Instead, the French military provided essential support to the nascent and fragmented national military and political regime led by president François Tombalbaye. During colonial rule, southern communities had been much more integrated into the political system than those in eastern or northern Chad, and very little was done to integrate neo-traditional institutions politically. This was in part due to the highly diverse composition of Chadian society, and the already-existing deep divisions between the communities within this society.

The rise to power of François Tombalbaye as the leader of the PPT—the Chadian arm of the RDA—did not improve this situation, but rather it exacerbated divisions within Chadian society. Tombalbaye actively favored his own Sara communities, excluding others from access to power. When Tombalbaye banned all other political activity in Chad, there were strong ethnic and regional demarcations between those included in the PPT and those who were not, setting the stage for the decades of civil conflict that would follow (Haggar 2007, 115). Numerous rebel groups, especially in the northern and eastern regions, challenged Tombalbaye’s political
authority and threatened to break into outright rebellion. In 1964, the French military left northern Chad, and the government assumed the full administration of its entire territory. By the fall of 1965, rebellion broke out in Mangalmé (a town in central Chad) which eventually spread to the eastern regions of Batha, Ouaddaï and Salamat. Although initially unrelated, revolts led by the northern nomadic communities, which had been marginalized under French colonial rule, broke out shortly thereafter across the Sahara in the Borkou, Ennedi and Tibesti regions.

These uprisings stemmed from a combination of local issues and more general grievances which were shared across regions, namely: the repressive governance of Tombalbaye, the systematic preference of southern Chadians in the civil service, and the resultant grievances against southern civil servants (Buijtenhuis 2001, 150). The rebellions also stemmed from the fact that the national military remained almost entirely comprised of troops from the south of the country. The eruption of armed rebellion would only further drive a wedge between the country’s different ethno-regional communities, pitting them against one another in conflict. The rebellions of the 1960s sparked a civil war between the government and many rebel groups that would last for decades.

The first largescale attempts to take power in N’Djamena came from Front de Libération Nationale du Tchad (National Liberation Front for Chad, FROLINAT). Founded in June 1966 in Sudan, FROLINAT functioned as an umbrella organization that aimed to coordinate a diverse set of rebel troops throughout the Chadian countryside. While some semblance of unity was maintained at first, FROLINAT eventually broke into a dozen or so different movements, each

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140 The northern Saharan regions of Borkou, Ennedi and Tibesti remained under French military administration for four years following independence, and the French established and maintained a military base in N’Djamena to support Tombalbaye’s regime.
led by different leaders and often operating in geographically and ethnically distinct areas. Consequently, FROLINAT made little progress during the initial phases of its rebellion against the Tombalbaye regime. The Chadian state responded to the rebel movements by investing heavily in the security apparatus of the state. Military spending increased from 18 percent of the state budget in 1968 and 1969 to more than 40 percent from 1973 to 1977 (Buijtenhuis 1987, 52).

Simultaneously, Tombalbaye continued to consolidate political power in the PPT and sought to raise the political dominance of the Sara through the requirement of the yondo initiation rites—a Sara traditional custom—for all communities in the south (Haggar 2007, 346). This act turned many of the non-Sara southern communities against the president, but did not guarantee unwavering loyalty by the Sara’s neo-traditional institutions either. As Tombalbaye’s regime grew increasingly personalist, characterized by brutal repression, paranoia, and excessive corruption, dissent grew from within his own ranks (Haggar 2007, 332-337). Tombalbaye’s political miscalculations during the 1970s turned the military and Sara neo-traditional institutions against his regime, while civil war engulfed the country and civil society and the political opposition either took up arms or remained on the fringes of the socio-political spheres. Unsurprisingly, the Chadian national military ousted Tombalbaye in 1975, installing General Félix Malloum as head of state. Malloum continued to fight FROLINAT, but relieved many of the harsh repressive policies implemented by Tombalbaye.

FROLINAT’s armed struggle against the Chadian government gained success when Colonel Muammar Qaddafi offered substantial military aid to the Forces Armées Populaires

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141 These different movements were and continue to be referred to as des tendances, trends or factions. (Debos 2013a, 73).
(Popular Armed Forces, FAP) led by Goukouni Oueddei. Subsequently, the FAP overran all of the Chadian military’s garrisons in the BET region in 1977 and 1978. This prompted President Malloum to begin holding negotiations with the Forces Armées du Nord (Armed Forces of the North, FAN), another tendance (or faction) of the FROLINAT led by Hissène Habré. The negotiations commenced in 1977 and were held in Khartoum. They concluded with an agreement signed in N’Djamena in 1978 that named Habré as Prime Minister and Malloum as President. However, internal conflict between the two leaders and continued revolt in the northern and eastern regions led by the other tendances prevented the establishment of a lasting peace. In 1979, war broke out in N’Djamena between the Chadian national military, FAN, and FAP. Oueddei’s FAP joined with Habré and the FAN to force the Chadian national military to retreat from the capital and ultimately disband. The expulsion of the national military—dominated by soldiers from the south—also saw the abandonment of N’Djamena by virtually all southern inhabitants (Buijtenhuis 2001, 151). These events effectively split the country in two. In the south, a de facto government called the Comité Permanent functioned autonomously, both politically and economically, for more than two years under the leadership of Colonel Wadal Abdelkader Kamougué and remnants of the national army.

In August 1979, peace negotiations took place in Lagos, in which a transitional government was established in N’Djamena. Nine factions of FROLINAT, including both FAN and FAP, a political party close to FROLINAT, l’Union Nationale Démocratique, and the national military, attended the negotiations. The Lagos Accord put in place the Gouvernement d’Union Nationale de Transition (National Union Government of the Transition, GUNT) which was presided over first by Lol Mahamat Choua and then by Goukouni Oueddei. However, infighting between FROLINAT leaders led to renewed conflict in N’Djamena, principally
between Habré’s FAN and Oueddei’s FAP. Oueddei once again received the support of Libyan forces, which were able to push Habré and his forces back to Sudan. However, once the Libyan forces returned home, the GUNT, led by Oueddei as president, was too weak and divided to resist a second wave of attacks launched by Habré in 1982 (Debos 2013a, 81). With French military support, Habré was able to wrest control of N’Djamena from Oueddei and retake control of the south, which offered very little resistance. Habré’s FAN was comprised of several northern, central, and eastern ethnic groups, and quickly established a transitional council, le Conseil d’État, which became the new political elite of the once again unified country (Buijtenhuis 2001, 152). This transition ended with the dissolution of the council by the Conseil des Forces Armées de Nord (Council of the Armed Forces of the North) which designated Habré as President and head of government, and enacted Chad’s 1982 constitution. This marked the beginning of Habré’s dictatorial rule, which would last until 1990.142

Repression under the Habré regime was unfettered and severe. Habré exerted control through a variety of security apparatuses, the most notorious being the secret political police, or la Direction de la Documentation et de la Sécurité (DDS), created in 1983. The DDS routinely arrested, imprisoned, and tortured individuals who were suspected of being part of the opposition. The National Investigation Commission on the crimes of Habré’s regime ultimately attributed the death of more than 40,000 individuals to these acts of political violence.143 By 1984, single party rule was consolidated under l’Union Nationale pour l’Indépendance et la Révolution (UNIR) and its satellite organizations for youth, women, and business owners.

142 For detailed accounts of the FROLINAT rebellions and the various changes to the government, see Buijtenhuijs (1978) and (1987).

143 In 2015, Habré faced charges of war crimes and was tried by a Special Tribunal in Senegal where Habré had lived in exile since 1990. He was found guilty of crimes against humanity by the Tribunal. For a full account of the trial and the efforts of Habré’s victims to hold him accountable, see Hicks (2018).
Despite the repression, rebellions continued to mount against the UNIR regime. Southern rebels led by former soldiers of the national military under Malloum were brutally massacred during September 1984—remembered today as the events of Black September. Following the assassination of Idriss Miskine, the former minister of Foreign Affairs, groups of his kinsmen, the Hadjaraï, revolted in Central Chad, ultimately fleeing to Sudan. Consequently, young Hadjaraï men were increasingly targeted by the DDS. In the north of the country, Habré’s forces fought against Goukouni Oueddei and other remnants of the former GUNT, which fought with the support of Libyan forces, occupying the northernmost territory of Chad in the Aouzou Strip conflict. The Libyans were defeated in 1987 by the Chadian army and the GUNT forces quickly fragmented and dispersed throughout the region, with Oueddei eventually seeking asylum in Algeria.

The end of Habré’s regime began with a failed coup led by Ibrahima Mahamat Itno, Hassan Djamous, and Idriss Déby, the leaders of l’Action du 1er Avril (The Act of April 1st) who were each highly decorated military officers in Habré’s armed forces. In response, Habré and the DDS unleashed yet another round of arrests and disappearances. Idriss Déby was the only leader to escape, fleeing to Sudan where he recruited fighters from his ethnic group, the Zaghawa, in both Chad and Sudan. The Zaghawa, consequently, became the next ethnic group to be targeted by Habré’s security forces. In Bamina, a town in the Darfur region of Sudan, Déby met with other rebel leaders opposed to Habré’s continued rule who represented the Haderjaï, Chadian Arabs, and a small group of southerners. In March 1990, these groups formed the MPS, and in December they launched a successful attack on N’Djamena, finally ousting Habré with the support of Sudan, France, and Libya. The military offered little resistance, and Habré fled to
Cameroon, eventually taking exile in Dakar, Senegal. The MPS, led by Déby, took up residence in the capital and transformed itself from an armed movement into a political party. Déby and the MPS quickly adapted to the political exigencies of the times: they dissolved the former political organizations of Habré, set up a commission of investigation to illuminate Habré’s crimes, and by 1991, they began the political transition to a multiparty electoral system.

The decades of conflict and extremely repressive dictatorial rule of Hissène Habré left Chadian non-governing institutions in worse condition than at independence, resulting in poor antecedent conditions for the prospects of political liberalization. The military remained extremely fractured. In fact, at the beginning of the 1990s, the military might have been better described as a band of rebel groups temporarily united against the Habré regime. Neo-traditional institutions continued to function in their own localities, but had limited to no connection to the political system, and found themselves with limited to no social integration. Civil society and the opposition had existed only in the shadows and under threat of persecution during Habré’s rule, leaving their organizations and leadership to return from exile after Déby took power. These institutions provided little to no foundation for political liberalization in Chad prior to the establishment of multiparty elections. In the following section, I elaborate how, with these antecedent conditions, Déby maintained an unrivaled degree of control over the political transition in exchange for the semblance of political peace, and over time, how this slowly eroded political liberalization launched in the 1990s to produce a restoration of authoritarian rule.

144 Habré would eventually go to trial for war crimes and crimes against humanity at a special tribunal in Senegal that would find him guilty. These events played out over years between authorities and victims in Chad, the internal law community and International Court of Justice, and Senegalese officials. For an in depth account of these events see: Hicks (2018).
Senegal: from Single Party to the Beginning of Gradual Democratization

Unlike Chad and Burkina Faso, Senegal entered the post-colonial period with a longer history of political pluralism, thanks to the unique colonial experience of the ‘Four Communes’ and the growth of political activism even before World War II. The colonial administration also cultivated relationships with the Sufi orders in Senegal to promote political and social stability, resulting in highly integrated neo-traditional institutions. Finally, on the eve of independence, the French invested significantly in the training and development of a national Senegalese military, establishing a military academy in Senegal and developing an officer corps from virtually a complete cross-section of Senegalese society. These differences provided the post-colonial regime with distinct advantages toward institutionalizing stability, even if the post-colonial context also presented significant challenges to the establishment of political authority.

Two events tested Léopold Senghor’s leadership shortly after independence. First, Senegal and Mali had originally jointly received independence as a federated state known as the Mali Federation. The federation only lasted two months. A number of internal disagreements intensified between the political leaderships of Mali and Senegal regarding the administration of the armed forces, development of an indigenous bureaucracy, the strength of the federal government, and the precise relationship of the Federation with France (Foltz 1965, 169-172). These disagreements remained manageable until Senghor learned that the political leadership in Mali was actively seeking to replace him, a Catholic, with a Muslim as president of the Federation. As tensions heightened between the two political groups, Malian political leaders called on the national military to move against Senghor, but he and Mamadou Dia, the vice premier of the federation, mobilized the gendarmerie to remove the Malian political leadership from Dakar without conflict and declared Senegal independent from the Mali Federation (Foltz 1965, 180). The separation occurred without any conflict, though relations soured between Mali
and Senegal and during Senghor’s tenure, while Senegal maintained a very close relationship with France.

The second event took place in 1962, when Senghor began to establish *de facto* single party rule against the desire of several other politicians, including the more leftist Mamadou Dia, Senghor’s prime minister (N’Diaye 2008, 208). Senghor’s machinations sparked an attempted military coup d’état which he attributed to Dia, and used as a pretext to imprison his prime minister for many years. It also served as an important lesson about the military and political stability for Senghor.

These events led the first president of Senegal to quickly recognize the threats the army presented to his rule. In fact, the clear and early threats of military intervention have been credited with influencing Senghor’s thoughts on civil-military relations (Diop and Paye 1999, 322). Senghor maneuvered to ward off such perils by co-opting the military leadership, and through the development of a civil-military relations policy known as ‘*armée-nation*’ (N’Diaye 2008, 205). Through this policy, the army implemented nation-building and economic development projects, such as vaccination campaigns and other public works initiatives. *Armée-nation* served the dual purpose of forging strong bonds between the military and the people, as well as cultivating an institutional norm under which the military understood its role to be the defense of and service to the Republic. Perhaps, more ingeniously, this policy occupied the military and its soldiers with projects and tasks of national importance, keeping them out of politics. The policy of *armée-nation* stayed in place well after Senghor’s tenure as president and helped concretize the role of the military as a republican institution in the regime early on, something I explore in more detail in Chapter 6.
In addition to the military’s support, Senghor had long cultivated the support of neo-traditional institutions through strong relationships with the Sufi orders. Himself a Catholic, Senghor fully embraced the strong form of French secularism known as laïcité, but this did not keep him from building what would become the political base of his newly independent regime (Villalón 2015, 310). By maintaining close ties with the Sufi religious elite, Senghor secured the social stability necessary for him to consolidate and accumulate power in his party (the PS) during the 1960s. The strong support of a cohesive military with a growing republican ethic, and an increasingly integrated set of neo-traditional institutions provided Senghor with the political and social support necessary to maintain stability while he ran unopposed in the 1968 and 1973 elections.

These strong institutional relationships between Senghor’s regime, the military and neo-traditional institutions allowed him to successfully weather crises, and to out-maneuver rivals without significant repression or violence and without fundamentally altering the relations between the post-colonial regime and Senegalese society (N’Diaye 2008, 208). However, the establishment of a de facto single party regime did not eliminate the tradition and history of political activism which developed during colonial rule in the ‘Four Communes,’ and of which Senghor himself had been a part. These groups questioned the legitimacy of Senghor’s regime and its policies, eventually posing a serious challenge to the supremacy of the PS, perhaps most notably during the labor and student-led movements of 1968 (Bathily 1992 and Blum 2012). The commitment of Senegal’s elite to political contestation through their continued opposition and civil society mobilization pressured Senghor during the years of single party rule (N’Diaye 2008,

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145 For a more detailed account of Senghor’s engagement with the Maraboutic leadership see Villalón (1995, 207-212) and Coulon (1981).
Consequently, after solidifying his relations with the Sufi orders and reforming the military as a republican rather than an intervening institution, Senghor introduced a series of political reforms aimed at compromising with the opposition and unions.

Unlike many of his contemporaries, Senghor publically embraced political liberalization and actively sought to portray Senegal as a liberal democracy. He began implementing political reforms following the 1973 elections that revived the multiparty electoral contests through an official three-party system (Villalón 1994b, 167). Participation in subsequent elections was constrained to three officially approved parties each representing a distinct political ideology, yet the elections did produce some degree of competition (Jackson and Rosberg 1982, 96). Senghor also garnered international recognition for respecting the political and civil rights of Senegalese citizens, enabling the PS to be the first African political party admitted to the Socialist International (Africa Confidential 1978). These reforms hardly represented full multiparty elections, but they stood in stark contrast to the surrounding neighborhood of military and single party regimes.

Senghor resigned from office at the end of 1980, allowing his hand-picked successor and prime minister, Abdou Diouf to become president on January 1, 1981. Diouf sought to follow the same strategy laid out by Senghor and continued to maintain strong relationships with the Sufi orders, and continued the policy of armée-nation. Diouf also sought to bolster the status of Senegal as a liberal democracy in West Africa, and to counter detractors who had been calling his legitimacy into question since he had become president without being elected. Diouf accomplished this feat by pursuing a set of additional liberalizing reforms, opening up the electoral process to completely open multiparty elections. This reform worked to Diouf’s and the PS’s advantage. Initially it appeared as a concession to the energized opposition which
demanded fully open elections, but it quickly weakened the opposition as it inevitably resulted in the fragmentation of political parties, complicating efforts to form an anti-PS coalition (N’Diaye 2008, 209-210). These reforms mark the beginning of the gradual transition which resulted in the democratization of Senegal.

The elections of 1983 returned Diouf to the presidency, with renewed electoral legitimacy, and gave the PS a majority of the seats in the National Assembly, strengthening its political dominance. Fourteen parties competed during the electoral process, but the Sufi orders continued to support the PS and Diouf. The marabouts—religious leaders of the Sufi orders—remained pillars of the regime’s stability following Diouf’s ascension to the presidency (Villalón 2015, 312). However, as discussed in the following section, the continued and growing economic challenges faced by Africa served as a catalyst for increased popular dissatisfaction. This was especially the case in the urban centers, where the political opposition and civil society found a cause célèbre in socio-economic grievances and a base to pressure the regime to implement additional liberalizing reforms during the 1980s. These reforms, continuing to the 1993 elections, serve as a “long political transition” in Senegal. However, it is clear that the antecedent conditions discussed above provide improved prospects for greater political liberalization in Senegal, given the different characteristics of its non-governing institutions following the end of colonial rule.

As I have discussed in detail above, differences in these characteristics often developed from the foundations laid by colonial rule and the subsequent processes of decolonization. However, in each case these characteristics also had important ramifications for the prospects of greater political liberalization. I now turn to an in-depth discussion of the inauguration of multiparty elections in each case and each case’s subsequent regime trajectory.
Regime Trajectories after the Inauguration of Multiparty Elections

Table 5-2 presents a summary version of each country’s regime trajectory and the relationships between the regime and non-governing institutions. In Burkina Faso, an intermediate configuration of non-governing institutions limited the prospects for further political liberalization after multiparty elections, resulting in stable electoral authoritarianism. Burkina Faso’s antecedent conditions resulted in a military with an intermediate degree of coercive power, neo-traditional institutions with an intermediate degree of symbolic power, and a civil society and opposition with fluctuating levels of mobilizing power. In this context, the inauguration of multiparty elections under the regime led by Blaise Compaoré produced an electoral authoritarian regime. The case of Burkina Faso demonstrates how electoral authoritarian regimes may collaborate with the military and neo-traditional institutions to navigate pressures for greater political liberalization from civil society and the opposition. This produces a cycle of limited compromise and recalibration that keeps the political playing field tilted to the advantage of the ruling party, but also occasionally allows for limited oppositional gains.

In Chad, antecedent conditions initially provided non-governing institutions with low coercive, symbolic and mobilizing powers. The Chadian state quickly devolved into civil war along ethno-regional divisions, as it became clear that its initial post-colonial regime worked to exclude segments of society from political processes. This conflict served as yet another antecedent condition that reduced the coercive power of the military, the symbolic power of neo-traditional institutions, and the mobilizing powers of civil society and the opposition.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Military</th>
<th>Neo-Traditional Institutions</th>
<th>Civil Society</th>
<th>Opposition</th>
<th>Trajectory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>Low degree of coercive power. Violent and interventionist civil-military relations; lack of cohesion. Military used to repress and eliminate anti-regime forces. Rebels integrated into national military as a form of co-optation</td>
<td>Low degree of symbolic power. Transformed into state institutions. Controlled by the regime and used to further fragment already disparate sets of NTIs. Limited to no check on erosion of political liberalization.</td>
<td>Low degree of mobilizing power. Lack of unity due to years of targeted repression. Organizational capacity restrained by regime’s indifference to demands.</td>
<td>Low degree of mobilizing power. Fragmented and co-opted by regime. Limited organizational capacity due to limited base.</td>
<td>Illiberal reforms erode the degree of political liberalization and lead to the Restoration of Authoritarian Rule.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>High degree of coercive power. Cohesive military; long history of republican norms of civil-military relations. Military as guarantor of the Republic’s institutions. Perceived as independent of politics.</td>
<td>High degree of symbolic power. Supported regime closely through use of electoral proclamations of support. High level of social integration produced ability to stabilize unrest. Political integration ‘drifted’ as regime gradually democratized.</td>
<td>High degree of mobilizing power. Unified through growing educated, urban middle and elite classes. Growing organizational capability channeled popular discontent during social unrest for liberalizing reforms.</td>
<td>High degree of mobilizing power. Unified for greater political liberalization through reforms. High organizational capability over time due to social frustration with regime.</td>
<td>Incremental liberal reforms over time produces Gradual Democratization</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Consequently, the rise of Idriss Déby and the MPS to power and the subsequent adoption of multiparty elections set the stage for a political transformation of the Chadian regime, but it did little to improve the prospects of longer term political liberalization. Without non-governing institutions to provide stability and function as a check on the authoritarian tendencies of the new regime, those in power actively impeded the ability of civil society and the opposition to mobilize for greater political liberalization. Over time, without empowered non-governing institutions, these actions produced a cycle of erosion that reduced the regime’s level of political liberalization through a series of illiberal reforms. This restoration of authoritarian rule is exemplified by legislative elections that are routinely postponed for indefinite amounts of time and a lack of presidential term limits to provide a check on executive power. More recently, in 2018, the regime organized a national forum, which the opposition boycotted, to construct and adopt a new constitution, establish a presidential republic and eliminate the position of prime minister. This further eroded any checks to executive control of the regime.

In Senegal, where colonial rule resulted in comparatively stronger relationships across the regime and non-governing institutions, further strengthened by the post-colonial regime, the antecedent conditions promoted stability and incremental liberalization. Following the adoption of full multiparty elections, the high degrees of coercive power from the military and symbolic power from neo-traditional institutions helped to assure the continued stability of the regime when faced with high levels of mobilization from civil society and the opposition. However, once the military guaranteed the independence of the electoral process, and neo-traditional institutions faced pressures to their own symbolic power from social change, greater liberalization began an institutionalized cycle by which non-governing institutions promoted the gradual democratization of the regime, and eventually allowed for a turnover in power from the
ballot box. That peaceful turnover helped to further institutionalize democratic processes in Senegal.

**Burkina Faso: Stable Electoral Authoritarianism**

Burkina Faso’s transition to multiparty electoral politics and subsequent regime trajectory took place under the leadership of Blaise Compaoré and his party, the CDP. After taking power in a military coup, Compaoré organized and guided the political transition to multiparty elections, insuring through the process that his political party would emerge as the dominant force in Burkina Faso’s new multiparty system. To accomplish this, Compaoré eliminated potential rivals and detractors in the military, reconnected the regime with the neo-traditional leaders of the Mossi chieftaincy and Catholic Church (and later Protestant and Muslim leaders), and worked to co-opt and/or fragment the opposition and civil society. Ultimately, Compaoré’s success in these endeavors led to regular presidential and legislative elections which were dominated by the ruling party, and which maintained a strong relationship with neo-traditional institutions. However, as is frequently the case for electoral authoritarian regimes, growing internal discord over the question of succession weakened the CDP’s hold on the regime, and led to Compaoré’s and its own removal from power, when civil society and opposition groups channeled popular discontent to mobilize hundreds of thousands in the 2014 popular insurrection.

Throughout Compaoré’s rule, when socio-political crises demanded concessions to civil society and the opposition, Compaoré engaged in strategic reforms, conceding immediate, but limited liberalization that he often recalibrated to his advantage over the following years. By doing so, the regime in Burkina Faso maintained an uneasy balance of multiparty elections characterized by limited levels of liberalization. The inherent tensions of electoral authoritarian rule produced moments of crisis and instability. These often appeared to give way to
liberalization and even democratization, but in the end Compaoré relied on the military’s coercive power and the symbolic power of neo-traditional institutions to outlast short-term gains made by a temporarily unified opposition and civil society. The regime consistently recalibrated under Compaoré’s rule to reproduce the continued dominance of the CDP as the ruling party and its leadership. While the popular insurrection ousted Compaoré from power, it remains too early to tell if these events will lead to a dramatically changed institutional configuration of the regime constructed during Compaoré’s tenure in power. Thus, to understand the regime trajectory of Burkina Faso, I now turn to a closer look at the political transition to multiparty elections and the ways in which the regime subsequently managed pressures for political liberalization.

Compaoré accession to power in 1987 following the assassination of Sankara marked the fourth military coup d’état in less than a decade, and the military remained highly politicized following the putsch. After having eliminated Sankara’s remaining supporters, Compaoré sought to bring the different ideological factions of the military in line by creating the Front Populaire, a politico-military organization to lead the country out of the crisis and “rectify” the revolution. The Front’s leadership claimed that Sankara had misdirected the revolution through the use of political violence and a lack of the people’s voice. Compaoré used this justification to actively reach out to the Mossi chiefs and Catholic Church as representatives of the people, seeking their help to return the country to stability.

Initially, due to Sankara’s assassination, the Front Populaire suffered from a lack of legitimacy. Compaoré served as the president and appointed his close allies, Jean-Baptiste Boukary Lengali and Henri Zongo, to the positions of first and second vice-president. The implication of all three in the assassination of Sankara made it difficult for Compaoré to consolidate popular support and political power. During his first years as president, Compaoré
faced several attempted coups which he used as a pretext to execute political rivals. In fact, on 18 September 1989, both Lengali and Zongo were accused of plotting a coup against Compaoré, and were summarily executed. This political violence became commonplace under the initial years of Compaoré’s rule, despite his claims that he would “rectify” the revolution by putting it back on the democratic road from which Sankara had deviated. Compaoré’s search for legitimacy left him little choice but to undertake processes of political reform and in so doing, he inaugurated Burkina Faso’s contemporary multiparty electoral regime.

The official goal of the Rectification was to end the chaos that had been caused by the risky and erratic central leadership of the CNR, which had been implemented locally by the CDRs (Jaffré 1989, 209). Rectification was marked by a political transition from the leftist political orientation of Sankara’s regime to a political system that embraced the liberal democratic institutions, a transition which seemed inevitable after the fall of the Soviet Union. In fact, the political exigencies of the late 1980s and early 1990s provided Blaise Compaoré with an opportunity to secure his tenure and to provide a veneer of legitimacy to his rule. Attempting to avoid the fate of Moussa Traoré in neighboring Mali—where resistance to democratic reform had led to his downfall—as well as that of Ali Saïbou in Niger—whose concession to negotiating changes brought his marginalization—Compaoré opted for pre-emptive “democratization” as a strategy for survival.¹ Despite this “democratizing” strategy, Compaoré rejected calls for an inclusive National Conference that would bring together all political and social factions in the drafting of a constitution and for decisions regarding the country’s future. He instead established a commission providing representation for the unions, other civil society representatives, the political opposition, and neo-traditional leaders; however, the commission, provided far more

representation for Compaoré’s allies in the *Front Populaire* (Ouattara 2013, 80-83). The commission outlined a new constitution for the Fourth Republic of Burkina Faso and it solidified the political dominance of the *Front Populaire*. More than a dozen political parties accepted the proposed constitution, largely modeled on the French Fifth Republic. The constitution was adopted by referendum on 11 June 1991 with 93 percent of the vote in favor.

While the constitution allowed for the free creation of political parties, unions, and other civil society organizations, Compaoré kept tight control over the first elections and his political party, the *Organisation pour la Démocratie Populaire – Mouvement du Travail* (ODP/MT). The ODP/MT maintained a hegemony over the *Front Populaire* which now consisted of other political parties, making it practically impossible for any oppositional voice to be heard (Ouattara 2013, 62). In protest, the political opposition chose to boycott the elections. Compaoré was thus the sole presidential candidate in the inaugural elections of 1991, which also recorded the lowest participation rate in the country’s history, some 18 percent of registered voters—remarkably, even lower than voter turnout during the single party rule of Yaméogo (Otayek 1996, 54-8). In the 1992 legislative elections, the ODP/MT won a majority of the seats in the National Assembly, solidifying the political dominance of Compaoré and his political party.

In 1996, ahead of legislative elections scheduled for 1997, the ODP/MT formed a political alliance with several smaller parties in the political opposition, including one of its main rivals, the *Convention Nationale des Patriots Progressistes* (CNPP), to create the CDP. The newly formed party won a majority of the seats at the National Assembly in each of the following legislative elections until 2015 (Eizenga 2015, 67-69). The legislative elections of 1997 gave the CDP more than two thirds of the seats at the National Assembly, allowing Compaoré to use the party’s legislative dominance to eliminate presidential term limits.
However, large-scale opposition against the increasingly authoritarian nature of the regime began to emerge in the wake of these reforms. A series of repressive and politically violent events at the end of the 1990s triggered massive anti-regime demonstrations. These protests against the regime became known as the ‘Zongo Affair,’ referring to the alleged political assassination of investigative journalist Norbert Zongo in December 1998 (Hagberg 2002). The protest movement represented the first time during Compaoré’s rule that civil society and the opposition unified, mobilizing massive demonstrations in order to extract political concessions from the regime. This political crisis and the increased opposition to the regime led Compaoré to call on neo-traditional leaders to mediate negotiations between the regime, civil society and the opposition. Compaoré appointed a Collège des Sages (Council of the Wise)—an advisory council charged with proposing recommendations—to restore social order. The negotiations and recommendations produced a series of political, institutional and electoral reforms from the regime that it adopted in July 2001.

At first, many criticized the Collège des Sages, believing that those leading it would ignore the opposition and civil society’s demands because of their close relationships with the regime. Yet, the recommendations of the council called for significant reforms. One of the reforms recommended by the council was a key demand of the opposition: the reinstatement of presidential term limits, to which Compaoré conceded. The constitution prescribed that henceforth, the president could serve a maximum of two five-year terms in office. In a blow to the opposition, however, and before the presidential elections in 2005, the constitutional court ruled that the modification was non-retroactive, effectively treating Compaoré’s 2005 bid for the presidency as if it were his first election, and after his electoral victory, his first term. At this

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2 This same decision thus enabled Compaoré to run for re-election to a “second” constitutionally-allowed term in 2010. Despite much dissatisfaction at the time, Compaoré in fact ran and won elections in those years. Importantly,
point in Burkina Faso’s trajectory, a distinguishable pattern emerged: 1) political dominance by the ruling party, 2) limited elite dissent, 3) social unrest and mobilization generated by heavy repression or popular grievance, 4) forced concessions, and finally, 5) recalibration and a return to political dominance. The inability of the opposition and civil society to mobilize consistent pressure through a unified front allowed for the intermediate levels of support from neo-traditional institutions and the military to forego lasting political liberalization. The second stage of Compaoré’s rule only further substantiated this trend.

Legislative elections held in 2002, shortly after the implementation of the recommended reforms, resulted in large opposition party gains. However, the CDP maintained a slight majority in the National Assembly, and the dominance of the executive continued to pose an obstacle to further political liberalization (Santiso and Loada 2003). Acknowledging the increased difficulty he would face if the opposition rallied behind a presidential candidate in 2005, Compaoré and the CDP returned to their playbook from 1996 and negotiated the co-optation of the Alliance pour la Démocratie et la Fédération/Rassemblement Démocratique Africain (ADF/RDA), the largest opposition party.³ The ADF/RDA’s promised support of Compaoré for the presidency in the 2005 elections all but guaranteed his victory, and in the wake of the ADF/RDA’s coalition with the CDP, the opposition fragmented.

However, under Article 37 of the constitution, adopted as part of the reforms of 2001, Compaoré could not seek re-election in 2015. It is in this context that the most recent attempt, and ultimate failure, of the Compaoré regime to modify presidential term limits emerged.

³ Interview, Ouagadougou, March 2015 with retired government official and CDP party boss. In this interview our conversation focused on the internal deliberations of the CDP leadership at the time. Specifically, I was told that “many of the younger members of the party felt that to reach out to Noël [leader of the ADF/RDA] would be a sign of weakness, but those of us who remembered the early elections in the 90s and the incorporation of the CNPP offered a different opinion. We told them that having a larger party was never a problem and we did not need to fully incorporate the party, we could instead create a presidential coalition that would provide our members the largest benefit, but offer opportunities to those parties who supported our goals as well. It was a strategy to both bring Noël in line with the party and divide that which [the opposition] he was leaving behind.”

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Following Compaoré’s re-election in 2005 and the subsequent announcement that he would once again plan to run in 2010, factions of the CDP began to voice concerns over the lack of democratic procedures in the party and the longer-term question of succession. These concerns led to a gradual loss of political support from many of Compaoré’s closest allies in the party. Even before his re-election in 2010, CDP party members started laying the groundwork for their own 2015 presidential campaigns, evoking presidential term limits as a central pillar of the democratic system. These small internal cracks in the party edifice grew, eventually providing an opening for much broader, external mobilizations to limit the regime’s hold on power.

In 2009, as the 2010 presidential elections approached, prominent figures including Professor Augustin Loada, Human Rights lawyer Prosper Farama, and former government minister and deputy director of the United Nations Development Program Zéphirin Diabré, established the Forum des Citoyens de l’Alternance (Citizens Forum for Turnover). The forum brought together some 250 participants to work against the continued rule of Blaise Compaoré. It also marked the beginning of Diabré’s political ambitions and his clear break with the CDP. Indeed, some speculated that Diabré might contest the 2010 presidential elections himself. Instead, Diabré, also a leader of the Coalition Contre la Révision de l’Article 37 (Coalition against the Revision of Article 37—the constitutional article stipulating presidential term limits) created a new political party, the Union pour le Progrès et le Changement (UPC). Although Diabré did not contest the presidential elections of 2010, his party set up a national network with their eyes fixed on the upcoming legislative elections. These elections were to solidify Diabré and the UPC as important actors within the political opposition. The party won nineteen seats in the National Assembly, second to the CDP’s seventy, and tied with the ADF/RDA.
As internal divisions grew in the CDP and political leaders began to stake their claim on what was assumed to be the last five years before succession, public tensions grew over socio-economic grievances. The death of a high school student, Justin Zongo, who had been detained by police as part of an investigation and died in police custody, triggered widespread protest and demonstrations by students. These protests were met by soldiers who were ordered to disperse the crowds and suppress the demonstrations, but the regime’s credibility began to wane in the wake of Justin Zongo’s death. By March 2011, mismanagement of the security forces and preferential treatment for certain regiments of the military over others caused soldiers to mutiny. Contingents of the military openly revolted around the country, demanding better pay and working conditions, while other contingents were tasked with bringing the mutineers to order (Dwyer 2017). These mutinies displayed a troubling lack of cohesion within the military and threatened the political stability of the regime; some even speculated that it might have been the beginning of the end for the Compaoré regime (Chouli 2012). However, Compaoré and the military leadership were able to negotiate an end to the mutinies and discharged several of the mutineers. Nevertheless, the clear dissension within the military’s ranks inspired the opposition and organization of civil society to join in the mobilizations.

Aware of the brooding internal debates in the CDP, and encouraged by signs that the military also held grievances against the regime, the political opposition and civil society organizations seized the opportunity to reignite their fight against the authoritarian nature of Compaoré’s regime. As the leader of the political opposition, Diabré joined with other

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4 For an excellent examination of why soldiers mutiny, including observations from cases studies of Burkinabé mutinies, see Dwyer (2018).

5 Numerous interviews with those involved in the organization of the popular insurrection noted the importance of the 2011 protests and mutinies. In an interview in Ouagadougou, on August 22 2015 with civil society activists who
opposition parties and civil society organizations, such as the *Coalition Contre le Vie Chère* (CCVC), in a critical campaign against the creation of a Senate, which the CDP had hoped to establish as part of ploy to modify presidential term limits (Villalón and Eizenga forthcoming). CCVC capitalized on public disenchantment with the economic situation of country, enabling the campaign to mobilize tens of thousands of demonstrators in marches across Ouagadougou. Much of the debate against the Senate denounced the institution as an unnecessary budgetary expense.

Others, notably Compaoré’s political opponents, argued that the Senate might be manipulated by Compaoré to modify Article 37, thus allowing the president to run for re-election in 2015. The tense political context of popular mobilization again fed the birth of new civil society organizations such as Le Balai Citoyen (The Citizen’s Broom). Launched by well-known and wildly popular young local musicians, Smockey and Sams K Le Jah, the movement protested the autocratic practices of the regime. These new forces, adept at mobilizing youth, joined with civil society groups to successfully mobilize crowds during the ‘Zongo Affair,’ presented a well-organized and highly mobilized socio-political threat to the regime (Chouli 2015). In light of this rapidly changing social context and rising opposition from civil society and popular demonstrations in the streets, members of the CDP began to reevaluate their own political futures.

The growing tensions surrounding the debates over the possibility of introducing a Senate as well as to changes to presidential term limits alienated neo-traditional institutions. Neo-traditional leaders had come to the regime’s defense in the death of Justin Zongo and lost popular credibility in the process. The attempts of traditional and religious leaders to mediate on

explained, “The events of 2011 and temporary exile of the president to his hometown of Zinairé showed us that the CDP had problems and the army was not under the full control of Compaoré.”
behalf of the government with the student protesters following Justin Zongo’s death were completely rejected by the youth (Chouli 2012, 138). That rejection made the leaders of these neo-traditional institutions approach the politically-charged issues of the Senate and presidential term limits more cautiously. Leaders of the Catholic Church and the Mogho Naba took ambiguous stances on these issues, attempting to distance themselves from the regime, while leaders of the Pentecostal churches and Muslim leaders expressed tacit support for Compaoré and the machinations of the CDP (Hagberg et al 2018, 43-44). Ultimately, it became clear that efforts to establish a Senate and to modify presidential term limits were far too unpopular for neo-traditional institutions to support openly, causing the regime to lose important allies in the suppression of pressure for greater political liberalization.

The most significant blow to the CDP’s strength occurred at the beginning of 2014, when seventy-five members of the party resigned together. The resignation letter listed a variety of grievances, but chief among them were the authoritarian-style leadership of the party and the President’s desire to modify presidential term limits to remain in power. Amongst those who resigned were three very influential members who had recently begun to distance themselves from the party in the wake of the Senate debacle and the ongoing protests against any attempt to modify presidential term limits. Roch Marc Christian Kaboré, former president of the National Assembly and former president of the CDP, led the mass resignation. He was joined by Salifou Diallo, the former minister and party leader, and by Simon Compaoré (no relation to the president), who served as mayor of Ouagadougou for seventeen years until he gave up his post at the end of 2013.

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6 In one interview in Ouagadougou on September 10, 2015, a journalist explained to me that the letter was simultaneously an airing of internal party grievances and a “declaration of war” against Compaoré and his entourage.
The move of Kaboré, Diallo, and Simon Compaoré to break with the CDP highlighted the growing divisions that existed within the party, especially amongst the leadership. The disagreements over succession in the party created an unresolvable elite conflict, prompting these leaders’ defection which threatened the durability of the party.\(^7\) Two weeks after their resignation from the party, these three leaders and their supporters joined Diabré, president of the UPC and formal leader of the opposition, in a demonstration in Ouagadougou. The demonstration drew tens of thousands of protesters, whose principal demand was to maintain presidential term limits.\(^8\) Following this countrywide campaign against the modification of term limits, those who had resigned from the CDP created a new political party, the *Mouvement du Peuple pour le Progrès* (MPP). At its founding congress, the party was comprised of 117 members, all of whom had previously belonged to the CDP. The MPP joined the political opposition, which, along with civil society organizations against the modification of presidential terms, would launch the largest campaign against the regime that Burkina Faso has ever witnessed. This culminated in the popular insurrection that forced Compaoré to resign from office on October 31, 2014.

The ousting of Compaoré from power resulted in a year-long transitional government, but this political transition did very little to transform the political system. Rather, the institutional framework, established in the 1990s and reformed during Compaoré’s tenure in power, remained largely intact. Following the 2015 legislative elections, the MPP won a plurality of the seats, the UPC won the second largest number of seats, and the CDP won the third largest number at the

\(^7\) For analyses of electoral authoritarian regime dynamics which predict these types of defections and their harm to regime durability see: Morse (2015, 131) and Pepinsky (2014, 642).

\(^8\) Other demonstrations organized by the political opposition took place in the cities of Bobo Dioulasso, Koudougou, Fada N’Gourma, Dédougou, Kaya and other regional capitals.
National Assembly. This marked a change in the opposition which officially was led by the UPC, but the CDP struck out as an alternative opposition bloc within the legislature. The relationships built between the regime and neo-traditional institutions continued to function in ways that produced mutual support in response to social crises throughout the transition and after. The military also continued to support the regime, though the removal of Compaoré from power unveiled a fault line between two different camps within the military. The efforts by Compaoré and the CDP to use the party’s dominance to push through illiberal reforms galvanized civil society and the opposition in such a way that they were able to channel popular discontent and mobilize sufficient pressure to prevent the modification of presidential term limits.

It remains to be seen if the removal of Compaoré from power by popular forces will result in further liberalization or if it simply represents a change of power under a stable electoral authoritarian regime. While Compaoré may have lost power, the political regime that he helped to establish built lasting and stable relationships with non-governing institutions, which allowed the regime to manage pressures for greater political liberalization through limited concession and subsequent regime recalibrations. The configuration of these institutions helped the regime address pressures for greater political liberalization strategically, without ceding incremental liberalization. Ultimately, while the CDP lost power and Compaoré fled into exile, the prospects for democratization in Burkina Faso remain messy.

**Chad: the Restoration of Authoritarian Rule**

Chad’s political development since Déby rose to power in 1990 can be broken down into three distinct periods: first, the political transition that inaugurated multiparty elections; second, a wave of illiberal reforms including the elimination of presidential term limits in 2005 and subsequent renewal of violence; and third, the end of rebellion and the signing of peace accords.
in 2010, followed by several political reforms that entrenched Déby as president and the MPS as the ruling party, moving the already-hegemonic regime in the direction of complete authoritarianism. In this section, I explore the political events leading up to the 2016 re-election of Déby that signify the erosion of political liberalization and the restoration of authoritarian rule.

Chad’s non-governing institutions offer virtually no check on the regime’s ability to contravene pressures for greater political liberalization. These institutions wield a limited degree of influence over the authority of Déby’s political regime and are much more likely to be co-opted by the regime to prevent and sometimes erode political liberalization in the country. In the years following Déby’s 2016 re-election, after which fieldwork for this dissertation was completed, Déby has indefinitely postponed legislative and municipal elections and has adopted an entirely new constitution, embracing a presidential republic and eliminating several other checks on executive power in Chad’s authoritarian regime. In the paragraphs below, I develop this trajectory, pointing to the roles of the military, neo-traditional institutions, civil society and the opposition.

After taking control of N’Djamena on 2 December 1990, the MPS transformed itself into a political party with Déby as its leader. These types of transformations, in name only, were common within the new regime. The security apparatus of the former regime, la Direction de la Documentation et de la Sécurité (DDS), for example, became l’Agence Nationale de Sécurité (ANS) and shifted its surveillance to the newly recognized opposition parties (Debos 2013a, 88). Indeed, in some ways the work of the ANS became easier with the official adoption of a multi-party system in 1991. By allowing political parties to form openly, the political opposition became much easier to follow. The same can be said of the reforms that allowed for increased
press and association liberties, but even in light of these reforms, Chadians continued to live under the tense, often violent, repression of the regime. In 1992, Joseph Behidi, the vice president of the *Ligue Tchadienne des Droits de l’Homme* (Chadian Human Rights League), was assassinated, resulting in a demonstration led by other civil society leaders. Similarly, union leader Samuel Mbaïguedem, an outspoken critic of the MPS, was killed in 1993 during the national conference, the *Conférence Nationale Souveraine* (CNS). The Déby regime may have been less brutal and slightly more open than the dictatorship of Hissène Habré, but Déby’s rule did not put an immediate end to the arbitrary arrests and assassinations that had also characterized the previous decade and had kept civil society and the opposition from developing their organizational capacities.

Despite these atrocities and political violence, the official recognition of political parties and civil society groups allowed Chad to follow the example of many African countries that had organized national conferences to organize their own transitions to multiparty elections. The CNS in Chad allowed many political leaders—even former rebel leader and president Goukoni Oueddei—attend and debate the political future of the country. For the first time, Chadians were allowed the opportunity to deliberate on the political system best suited to the country and a transitional charter was accepted that marked the beginning of political pluralism in Chad (Ngarédjimti 2011, 15). However, the CNS suffered from a number of limitations—in addition to the violent repression of some civil society leaders—such as the dominance of the presidential movement, a divided opposition, and the inability to follow-up on its own recommendations. Despite these weaknesses, there are many who believe that the CNS remains “the largest step
forward for democracy in Chad”\textsuperscript{9} or the single “best hope democracy has had [in Chad].”\textsuperscript{10} Indeed, the improvement in civil liberties, however lacking, which accompanied the CNS are unparalleled in Chadian political history. Had the CNS been able to fully implement its vision, democracy might have taken root in the Chadian political system.

Déby and the MPS undermined many aspects of the CNS leading up to the presidential elections of 1996. The conference marks the beginning of a political transition which lasted for three years with Déby serving as president. The prime minister elected by the CNS, Fidel Moungar, was relieved of his duties a few months into his role by the Conseil Supérieur de Transition (High Council of the Transition, CST), the transitional governing body, leaving Déby with unchecked executive powers (Houzibé 2016, 161-63). Other ministers of the government were also replaced, as Déby doled out patronage to those from whom he required support. At this time, Déby also began to reach out to neo-traditional institutions, but not for support of the regime. Rather, he offered recognition from the state and appointed neo-traditional leaders to post as governors, \textit{prefets}, and \textit{sous-prefets}, as well as other administrative positions (Debos 2013b). In doing so, Déby primed the upcoming electoral contest in his favor and entered into a variety of local political battles through the appointment of certain neo-traditional leaders over others.\textsuperscript{11} The CNS, which ended in April 1993, called for a constitutional referendum to be organized and take place within one year of its culmination, yet the election did not take place until 1996 as the MPS gathered the necessary support and modified the proposed constitution.

\textsuperscript{9} Interview in N’Djamena 17 January 2015 with a civil society leader.

\textsuperscript{10} Interview in N’Djamena 15 March 2015 with prominent activist and human rights lawyer.

\textsuperscript{11} In one interview in N’Djamena on November 11, 2014 this strategy was described as “one of the most cunning political moves made by a northerner in the South; it did not always win Déby support, but it forced his political opponents to choose sides sometime costing them important local support.”
In 1995, the CST took the decisions of CNS that attempted to limit the powers of the president and essentially emptied them of their substance through a formal modification of the transition’s national charter (Debos 2013a, 89). Subsequently in March 1996, the CST drafted a constitution based on the modified charter and put it to referendum. Voters approved the constitution with nearly one hundred percent of the vote—at the time, several opposition leaders naively believed that a multiparty electoral system might present opportunities for them to regain some control over the regime. Rallying a number of small political parties to his cause in a second round runoff elections, and thus dividing the opposition, Déby was elected president in the country’s first multiparty presidential election in July 1996, and his party, the MPS, went on to win a majority of the seats in 1997. These results were repeated in 2001 and 2002, despite the fact that in both instances the opposition strongly contested the results with some candidates boycotting the elections altogether.

This period demonstrates two strategies implemented by Déby. After obtaining power, he allowed for political pluralism at a level which was previously unthinkable in the country. However, political pluralism also accomplished two things that enabled Déby to further entrench his regime into the Chadian political system. It brought opposition actors out in the open, making them easier to manipulate, bargain with, or surveil. Déby proved to be highly skilled at exacerbating the internal tensions present in the political opposition causing parties which would have otherwise been unified against him to fight amongst themselves. The opposition instead

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12 Several interviewees suggested that even though the recommendations of the CNS had been largely ignored, a general feeling of hope persisted during this time of political change.

13 Indeed, one can still find a number of publications produced in the years following the CNS which aimed to educate citizens on their roles in multiparty elections, human rights, decentralization, and associational life.

14 Interview in N’Djamena 18 October 2014 with the leader of one of the political parties belonging to the opposition.
demonstrated a propensity for fragmentation and an overall lack of organization, both of which Déby used to his advantage. This also allowed for the development of a sophisticated patronage system in which Déby could build alliances through the appointment of ministerial positions in the government. By co-opting a number of smaller political parties, Déby could use political pluralism to his advantage, ultimately promulgating a modified constitution with fewer constraints to his presidential powers.

Relatively few reforms took place during Déby’s first two presidential mandates. The political opposition continued to exhibit problems of fragmentation and co-optation, failing to offer a serious challenge to the MPS. However in 2006, a chance for political turnover emerged as Déby faced constitutional term limits. Instead of accepting such a turnover, Déby called for a constitutional referendum to eliminate presidential term limits and other minor checks to executive power that had been elaborated in the 1996 constitution.

In response, the opposition mounted a largescale campaign against the referendum. Twenty opposition parties formed the Coalition des Partis Politiques Pour la Défense de la Constitution (CPDC) and campaigned for their supporters to boycott or vote no at the referendum. The opposition actively campaigned for a boycott of the referendum because it was assumed that if voters did not turn out, they would be far less susceptible to coercion from the regime, and low turnout would hurt the legitimacy of the referendum. This decision also highlighted the fact that many, even within the CPDC, realized there was little to nothing that they could do to stop the referendum from taking place. They broadcasted campaign slogans throughout the country with messages such as:

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15 Interview in N’Djamena 22 January 2015 with leader of a party belonging to the CPDC.
Nevertheless, other political parties continued to suffer from internal disagreements, remaining divided over how to vote on the referendum. The referendum also angered some members of the MPS who supported the maintenance of presidential term limits, but they quickly fell into line when it became clear that defection would be dealt with harshly.

Despite this and media coverage of voter intimidation, the boycott failed and the CENI reported provisional results, with a participation rate of 71.6 percent, of which 77.8 percent voted yes. The official results published by the Constitutional Council recorded a participation rate of 57.8 percent with 65 percent of the vote supporting the modification of the constitution. Both the opposition and the media launched several accusations of fraud and corruption against the governmental institutions responsible for the results. However, even regime-critical newspapers, like N’Djamena Bi-Hebdo, acknowledged that the results were undoubtedly for a yes to the reform of the constitution and the elimination of presidential term limits, citing the MPS’s superior ability to campaign effectively and mobilize its supporters throughout the country.

With the successful elimination of presidential term limits, Déby was free to run for re-election in 2006 and the political regime in Chad began to erode away some of the political

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16 Quotes taken from the Chadian newspaper, N’Djamena Bi-Hebdo no. 834. Pp.4-5 published 3 February 2005. They read: “The referendum campaign and vote don’t concern you.” and “Refuse to vote on June 6 2005. Refuse to legitimize this forfeiture, this dismal masquerade. Just as the entire international community (UN, European Union, USA, France, Germany…) who refuses to give their support.” and “Don’t give into the mirage, or the blackmail, or the intimidations. Stay home on June 6, 2005.”
liberalization that the CNS attempted to install. Before Déby’s re-election, Chad once again fell into a period of political violence, as armed rebellion broke out in the eastern regions of the country. The Chadian military remained incoherent as bands of rebels periodically broke away from the military or were reintegrated into it. In April 2006, a coalition of rebel groups attacked N’Djamena, less than one month before presidential elections. The Chadian military successfully repelled them with significant French military support, but it was clear that Déby risked falling victim to the same form of rebellion he had led sixteen years before.

Consequently, many civil society organizations, with the support of key figures in the political opposition, campaigned for the postponement of presidential elections. As one civil society actor noted, “[Before the 2006 presidential elections] we called for no elections without peace.”17 Undeterred, elections took place on 3 May 2006, and voters re-elected President Déby. The main actors in the opposition boycotted the elections, leaving little competition against the incumbent president, but his re-election exacerbated criticism from both the civilian and armed currents of the opposition.18

Legislative elections which were scheduled to take place shortly after the presidential elections, but they were delayed due to the increased criticisms from civil society and the political opposition, ongoing rebellion, as well as pressure from the European Union. In response, the MPS agreed to meet with the political opposition to discuss liberalizing reforms. An agreement was signed on 13 August 2007 after nearly four months of dialogue among more than eighty different political parties from both the presidential majority and the opposition. The

17 Interview in N’Djamena 23 January 2015
18 The CPDC, Front des Forces d’Action pour la République (FAR), and Parti Africain pour la Paix et le Justice Social (PAP-JS) all boycotted the elections.
agreement called for various reforms to the electoral code, such as: a CENI with equal representation of both the opposition and the presidential majority, a biometric census, modifications to the number of seats at the national assembly, the accreditation of electoral observers, and equal representation of the majority and opposition at polling stations. A number of other generally liberal and democratic principles were also reinforced in the agreements, such as: freedom of the press, political neutrality of the armed forces and local/traditional authorities, civic education led by political parties, increased civic participation, and the judicial independence of the Constitutional Council and Supreme Court. Finally, the agreement called for peace negotiations between the state and rebel groups.

Negotiations did take place and the Chadian government and the Conseil Démocratique et Révolutionnaire Tchadien (Chadian Revolutionary and Democratic Council) reached an agreement in Tripoli on 8 October 2007. The agreements also received the official support of Libya and Sudan both which had previously offered support to the rebel groups. However, the signatories of this agreement had little faith in the agreement. As one rebel leader feared, “Le mépris avec lequel la délégation gouvernementale menait les débats était si inacceptable que nous ne pensions alors qu’à revenir vers nos bases arrière et à en découdre en terrain militaire” (Koulamallah 2014, 23).19 That is precisely what took place, and the peace treaty fell apart in 2008 when the new allied rebels of the UFDD, the RFC, and the Union des Forces pour le Changement et la Démocratie (Union of Forces for Change and Democracy) attacked N’Djamena and laid siege to the presidential palace for three days. However, internal

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19 “The contempt with which the governmental delegation was threatening the debates was so unacceptable that at that point we were only thinking about going back to our bases and fighting in the military field.”
disagreements between the rebels and assistance provided by the French military to the Chadian government put an end to the siege and forced the rebels to retreat back to Sudan.

Déby did not fail to take advantage of these events. He arrested several political actors immediately following the attack on N’Djamena, perhaps most notably, Ibni Oumar Mahamat Saleh, one of the signatories of the 2007 Political Agreement and prominent opposition leader of the PLD from eastern Chad. Saleh would have presented a tangible electoral threat to Déby and the MPS if he could have succeeded in building an opposition coalition. However, Saleh disappeared after his arrest in 2008. By 2009, very few of the agreements outlined in the 2007 accord had been implemented and legislative elections continued to be postponed. The US Embassy’s 2009 annual report describes the state of human rights in Chad as deplorable, noting the continued disappearances of political actors, unwarranted arrests and detentions of political actors, the use of excessive force, restrictions on freedom of expression, discrimination on the basis of ethnicity and sex, and the exploitation of children. These human rights abuses continued until international condemnation of both Chad and Sudan surrounding the Darfur crisis grew to the point of action. Finally, in January 2010, representatives of the Chadian and Sudanese governments signed an agreement essentially pledging to suspend support to rebel groups based in both countries, putting an end to this period of armed rebellion against Déby’s regime. Virtually all of the former rebels were integrated into the national military, which did little to help make the military a cohesive or non-interventionist institution, but it did serve to put an end to the active rebellions. Déby strategically deployed the different military regiments, giving specific leaders and their troops coveted posts under the supervision of the Chadian Customs and
Border Control, or over particular regions, or on high profile missions. In this way, Déby kept the military appeased despite its lack of cohesion.

This period of reform and repression demonstrates a clear erosion of liberal political processes and the restoration of authoritarianism, justified by increased political violence and instability. The strongest single piece of evidence of an ‘authoritarian restoration’ is the elimination of presidential term limits, which provides one of the strongest, if not the strongest check on executive powers. However, the ability of Déby to control the political transition, and the relative inability of non-governing institutions to curtail the regime’s authoritarian tendencies after the fact, further underscore the erosion of political liberalization under Déby (Buijtenhuijs 1993, 1998 and 2001). The non-governing institutions in Chad lack any form of centralized authority, which allows the regime to accumulate and organize power along wholly self-serving lines, regardless of multiparty elections.

The renewed armed rebellions as a form of political dissent emboldened Déby to rely on his arsenal of repression to target both the armed and civilian oppositions. Armed conflict between government and rebel troops further enabled the regime to completely ignore the 2007 civilian agreement between the political parties of the presidential majority and opposition, even if international pressure forced the presidential majority to hold the political dialogue and accept the agreement with a previously unacknowledged opposition. Thus, despite the recognition

20 Several interviews pointed to this strategic organization of the military, suggesting that the military followed Déby, but remained based heavily on patronage. Specific leaders of the military were, in the words of one interviewee, provided “fiefdoms” and other leaders received promotions and high-profile missions where the spoils of the mission, such as goods obtained by disrupted smugglers might be left unaccounted for or deals with smugglers might result in steady profit streams for the soldiers and their commanders. In virtually, every interview I conducted which discussed the military it was clear that while the Chadian military had a high degree of wartime experience, they were far from a cohesive institution. Frequently, different units of the military clash with one another due to the ethno-regional background of their soldiers. Allegedly, the president’s ethnic group—the Zaghawa—comprise a majority of the military’s leadership and the elite presidential guard, despite that the comprise less the two percent of the country’s population.
received by the civilian opposition during this period, democratic processes either recoiled or stagnated during this period of renewed political violence and rebellion, as Déby and the MPS further consolidated their power.

With peace finally established in 2010, an electoral census was used to create an electoral list, and legislative as well as presidential elections were organized by the CENI and held in 2011. Unsurprisingly, the results of both elections mirrored those of the past. Political opposition leaders boycotted the presidential elections allowing Déby to win handedly and the MPS and other parties making up the presidential majority won a majority of seats in the National Assembly. After securing the MPS victory in the 2011 elections, the government began to address many of the previously agreed upon reforms that had originally been outlined in the 2007 political agreement to quell the complaints of civil society and the political opposition.

Meetings between the presidential majority, the political opposition, and civil society leaders culminated in the political agreement of 2 April 2013. The agreement outlined reforms to be made to the political system and electoral process and elaborated three primary actions. First, the composition of the CENI would be modified once again, creating equal representation between the presidential majority and opposition, as well as allocating seats for members of civil society. Secondly, parties agreed that a biometric census would take place by the end of 2013 in order to update the electoral list. Third, the agreement called for the establishment of the Cadre National de Dialogue Politique (CNDP), an additional institutional body charged with the oversight of the biometric census and the organization of upcoming elections alongside the CENI. The CNDP provided equal representation to the political majority and opposition, representation to civil society actors on its steering committee, and representation to every political party which signed the agreement of 2 April 2013 in its general assembly. The
implementation of these reforms, the establishment of the CNDP, and the apparent willingness of the regime to engage in forms of political liberalization encouraged many political activists at the time.\textsuperscript{21} However, the subsequent machinations of the regime demonstrated that these reforms would produce limited political liberalization. Instead, the regime continued to employ strategies to fragment civil society and the opposition; relied on the military to suppress and violently repress any attempts at massive political dissent; and continued to use neo-traditional institutions in ways that kept them from accumulating symbolic power outside of their local bases.

By the end of 2015, the state conducted a biometric census, but the nearly three-year delay in its implementation caused the electoral calendar to increasingly resemble the delays which took place during the 2000s. The government postponed municipal and legislative elections originally scheduled for 2014 and 2015, until after presidential elections could be organized in 2016. Many regime supporters blamed the CNDP for the delays, arguing that disagreement between parties of the political opposition had complicated the electoral process. The CNDP quickly became an arena wherein internal opposition disagreements were on display and two political groupings emerged within the opposition. To paraphrase one source:

Déby gave the opposition what it wanted by creating an institution with representation for all political parties and now the CNDP…is allowing [Déby] to accomplish the same strategy he employed in 2006 by delaying legislative elections until after the presidential [elections].\textsuperscript{22}

\textsuperscript{21} In several interviews with civil society activists and members of the opposition, they recalled that during these years and especially following the initial establishment of the CNDP, many believed that the regime was open to reform. There was a certain optimism about the fact that most of the country’s rebel groups had disbanded or made peace with the government and that there was a “genuine feeling that we would now make some real political progress for our country.”

\textsuperscript{22} Interview in N’Djamena 15 March 2015
Presidential elections took place in April 2016, and shortly after his re-election, Déby announced that municipal and legislative elections would be indefinitely postponed. The implementation of a more representative CENI and the creation of the CNDP served to further fragment the opposition and delay the electoral process, giving more credibility to the presidential party and helping to entrench Déby’s authoritarian rule. In this period of reform, Déby was able to manipulate ostensibly representative institutions to his advantage discrediting the political opposition and avoiding challenges to his political authority.

In sum, since Déby has come to power, his regime has demonstrated three different strategies, all of which incorporate non-governing institutions in ways that further erode any semblance of political liberalization in Chad. When faced with violent contestation, the regime employs the military’s limited coercive power through violent repression to eliminate political threats, regardless of whether they are civilian or armed. The regime also relies on a dual strategy of co-optation and fragmentation to discredit and sideline the opposition and civil society. At the beginning of his rule, this took place by his strategy of making democratic concessions in the guise of political reforms. In the last five years, however, the regime began manipulating the political debate by creating and exploiting representative institutions, such as the CNDP, to further fragment the opposition. By allowing all political parties to have representation on the CNDP, the political debate surrounding the electoral process became increasingly complicated, making it more difficult for the political opposition to coordinate internally.

Finally, neo-traditional institutions remain disparate in Chad after years of conflict that go back to the colonial conquest of the territory. Déby’s rise to power marked the beginning of a

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23 For a very public example of fragmentation within the opposition at the level of the CENI and CNDP see: Fahtta, Raymond D.T. 2014. “Djimet Bagaou – Saleh Kebzabo : La guerre est déclarée !” La Voix, no. 0270 15 to 22 September : 1, and 5.
transformation in the relations between neo-traditional institutions and the regime. The regime has pursued a strategy of integrating these institutions as tools of state administration through officially recognized positions such as the *chef du canton*. However, the political authority of these institutions is wholly dependent on their official recognition by the regime. By doling out this form of patronage, the regime has strategically pitted opposition politicians and other neo-traditional institutions against one another, insuring the continued local support for his rule amongst newly empowered neo-traditional leaders. Under the MPS regime, strategies of repression, the manipulation of reforms, and illiberal abuses of power continue to keep the MPS and Déby in power as the sole guarantors of political stability, even as this leads to the restoration of authoritarian rule.

**Senegal: Gradual Democratization**

Abdou Diouf came to power following the resignation of Senegal’s first president, Léopold Sedar Senghor, and quickly spearheaded a number of significant reforms which culminated in greater political liberalization. These reforms included the inauguration of fully open multiparty elections and other liberalizing reforms to the political system over an extended period of time. Unlike Burkina Faso and Chad, there was no specific political event or singular moment demarcating the political transition to a multiparty ‘democratic’ regime. Rather, Senegal exhibits a regime trajectory of gradual democratization which began during the 1980s and reached its culmination after electoral reforms in the mid-1990s. These reforms were ultimately put to the test in the 2000 elections, in which the majority of voters opted to cast their ballots in support of a turnover in power.

Non-governing institutions—the military, neo-traditional institutions, civil society and the opposition—played central roles in this process. Neo-traditional institutions provided a stabilizing role through their high degrees of social and political integration. The military
guaranteed the independence of the electoral process acting as a horizontal accountability check on the regime, remaining out of politics, and helping the regime to maintain stable and institutionalized processes of liberalization. Civil society and the opposition routinely channeled popular dissatisfaction in a unified effort to promote liberalization and successfully organized large-scale mobilizations to extract liberalizing concessions, which opened up the electoral process over time. After the turnover of power in 2000, these institutions helped to prevent the new ruling party from eroding the liberal gains that had been made during the 1990s. Democratic rule was again put to the test in 2012, when President Abdoulaye Wade decided to run for a controversial third term in office. His electoral bid nevertheless failed, as voters denied him the electoral victory, and Senegal continued its pathway toward gradual democratization when Wade conceded the election. In the following paragraphs, I develop this trajectory in detail, starting from the full opening of the electoral process with the elections of 1983.

Diouf eliminated the tri-party system established under Senghor and opened the electoral contest to all officially registered political parties ahead of the 1983 elections. This served to quiet opposition demands for political reforms. However, it simultaneously divided the opposition parties, limiting the prospect of a united opposition to PS while helping Diouf and the PS obtain an easy electoral victory (Vengroff and Creevy 1996, 207). However, economic stagnation and other challenges nurtured popular grievances against the regime and Diouf’s rule, presenting the new president with several challenges to maintaining power and political stability in Senegal. This, in turn, put pressure on the leaders of the Sufi orders to distance themselves from the regime, while increased the pressures for further liberalization from civil society and the opposition simultaneously increased (Villalón 2015, 310). Diouf understood the value in trying to garner support from the Sufi orders. Ultimately, his efforts to maintain the support of
the Sufi orders paid off in terms of their continued support and in terms of their ability to mobilize the rural vote for his presidential bid in the 1988 elections. Despite the growing popular discontent in urban settings where the opposition, notably the PDS led by Abdoulaye Wade, maintained a growing following, Diouf won reelection.

The official declaration of Diouf’s victory over Wade in the 1988 elections sparked the most significant political protests Senegal had ever known. Numerous riots led largely by unemployed youth—who used the word sopi ‘change’ in Wolof as their rallying cry, which had also been one of the campaign slogans of Wade—rocked Dakar and other urban centers (Gomez-Perez et al. 2009, 187; Villalón 1994b, 173). The results had been announced almost immediately following the election, and the speed at which they were announced triggered a wave of violence and destruction from those who accused the regime of fraud and corruption. Diouf’s government declared a curfew and state of emergency, which lasted three months, in an effort to reclaim a hold over society, but the election badly damaged the regime’s legitimacy (Young and Kanté 1992). The significant protests in response to Diouf’s claim of his electoral victory made the 1988 elections the last major foray of neo-traditional institutions into Senegal’s elections (Villalón 2015). These groups of mobilized, unemployed youth were not fully incorporated into the system of the Sufi orders. Demographic changes and urbanization had caused Sufi orders to lose some degree of their social integration, but these neo-traditional institutions remained important pillars in Senegalese society.

In response to these uprisings, the government commenced a series of new initiatives to deepen democracy in Senegal, starting with unprecedented negotiations with the opposition in 1991. The most significant of these initiatives related to the electoral code, which had been the

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24 I discuss this shift in symbolic power of Senegal’s neo-traditional institutions in greater detail in Chapter 7.
chief focus of the opposition’s critiques of the political system and which had been widely
decreed as the symbol of the regime’s undemocratic foundations (Villalón 1994b, 165). The new
electoral code was adopted in February 1992 before the elections scheduled for 1993. It was the
first electoral code to be accepted by all political parties and marked a profound change in the
degree of liberalization in the political system (Villalón 2015, 313). Given the massive protests,
the opposition leaders convinced themselves that only the unfairness of the previous illiberal
electoral system prevented them from taking power; thus, they had proclaimed the new system
perfect predicting the inevitability of an opposition victory in the next elections (Villalón 1994b).
Unexpectedly, Diouf and the PS won the elections in 1993, again with the support of their mostly
rural base, and this time, the result appeared to be free of fraud or manipulation. Diouf’s victory
confused the urban, mostly educated body politic and outraged the youth and opposition, sowing
seeds of public disillusionment and cynicism. However, the opposition could not point to a
flawed system because of its involvement in the adoption of the new electoral code and its
proclamation of a supposedly “perfect” electoral system.

The political ambiguity which emerged during the mid–1990s led religious authorities to
completely refrain from publicly giving political advice to their followers (Clark 1999, 162). It
also proved to be an important moment for the military. The executive branch continued to
control the administration of the military without much oversight from the legislature, and during
the 1980s, a series of regional crises were completely dealt with by the executive (N’Diaye
2008).25 However, the growing protest and discontent with the regime, coupled with moments of
very low levels of political legitimacy, posed opportunities for the military to break with the

25 These crises consisted of an armed separatist movement in the southern Casamance region, and increasing
tensions with neighboring Mauritania and Guinea Bissau. Diop and Paye (1999) provide a useful overview of these
crises and the military’s role in addressing them.
regime. Instead, the military, which had been charged with maintaining social and political order, continued to quell destructive riots and protest, and maintained its status as a republican institution. Owing to the independence of the military, as observed by all political actors, the government selected a retired general to administer the electoral process following the 1991 negotiations, in an effort to guarantee electoral independence.

In the 2000 elections, Senegalese politics dramatically changed. For the first time, the historically dominant opposition party, the PDS, was able to oust the former ruling party, the PS, at the polls by forming a strong coalition and a highly mobilized and unified civil society (Lo 2006, 94). This unified opposition and civil society were themselves made up of a small Francophone and educated elite consisting of students, teachers, lawyers, and journalists who sought democratization (Villalón 2009, 45). The opposition also benefitted from a change to the configuration of its backers by gaining the support of several former cadres of the PS who shifted their alignment behind the PDS and Abdoulaye Wade (N’Diaye 2008, 211). Wade won the electoral contest, and after learning of the result from the military, Diouf conceded the election. This act marks a crucial moment in the gradual democratization of Senegal; one in which a unified and well-organized civil society and opposition both successfully mobilized voters to the polls, and the military and neo-traditional institutions remained independent of the electoral process, helping to insure a legitimate outcome.

The gradual democratization of Senegal’s political regime is evident from the electoral outcomes, as well as the liberalizing reforms implemented under Diouf, but it is also telling that the relationships between the regime and non-governing institutions shifted as the regime evolved over time. As the regime democratized, neo-traditional institutions could no longer guarantee their political support to the regime out of fear that they would lose their own disciples
due to their politics. With the gradual democratization of the Senegalese regime, elections represented the will of the people and thus needed to reflect that outcome; this required gradual, but noticeable institutional change. Paradoxically, the relationship between the regime and the Sufi orders had guaranteed the regime’s stability over a long enough period of time that the support of the orders ‘drifted’ from its intended purpose (Hacker, Pierson and Thelen 2015).

As the theoretical framework I develop in this dissertation suggests, the high levels of political and social integration of the Sufi orders resulted in a supportive role for the regime during the 1970s and 1980s that allowed for incremental liberalizing reforms. Over time, these reforms resulted in the gradual democratization of the regime that coincided with a form of ‘institutional drift,’ whereby their public pronouncements of support resulted in unintended consequences (Hacker, Pierson and Thelen 2015). Similarly, the role of the military shifted in Senegal. Building on its republican norms of civil-military relations and cohesion, the military contributed to the independence and stability of the electoral process by providing a check on the regime’s ability to manipulate electoral outcomes. Finally, civil society and the opposition successfully channeled the popular discontent of the growing body of disenchanted urban and educated elite to produce a consistent pressure for greater political liberalization. This pressure produced steady and incremental reforms which resulted in Senegal’s first democratic turnover in power (Villalón 1994b, 165).

Neo-traditional institutions, the military, civil society and the opposition, remain central to the political calculations of Senegalese elites. Interestingly, Wade—like Diouf—made constitutional reforms upon becoming president, which he claimed would enhance democracy in Senegal. He changed the term limits of the presidency from seven-year terms to five-year terms with a limit of two terms. However, he opted to contest the 2012 presidential elections when the
constitutional court ruled that, if elected, the term would constitute his second term in office under the new presidential mandates. This decision by the constitutional court was deplored by large sections of civil society as undemocratic and resulted in a number of protests, not unlike those following Diouf’s electoral victory in 1993. Also similar to Diouf’s experience, Wade lost the election in the second round to his former prime minister, Macky Sall, who had garnered the support of several civil society movements after breaking with Wade. Sall had formed a coalition of political parties originating from the opposition. The united coalition propelled Sall to the presidency and Wade accepted the electoral outcome; the regime in Senegal continued its gradual democratization.

**Conclusion**

Non-governing institutions are central to the ways in which political regimes accumulate and organize power over society. When presented with a cohesive military that holds a republican norm in civil-military relations, the military can help maintain the independence of the electoral process and the stability of the regime’s political institutions through its coercive power. This, coupled with support from neo-traditional institutions which are highly integrated politically and socially, may result in long-term socio-political stability, thanks to their high degree of symbolic power. This, in turn, increases the chance that the demands of a unified and capable civil society and opposition will be taken seriously by the regime, which then increases the likelihood that reforms will be implemented to address pressures for greater liberalization. This is the case in Senegal, where these three non-governing institutions shaped the regime’s trajectory toward gradual democratization.

Alternatively, such pressures might be completely ignored, even at the risk of stability, if the military is not cohesive or prone to intervention and/or neo-traditional institutions are too disparate to be socially integrated, rendering them with limited coercive and symbolic power.
respectively. Indeed, in this scenario, if civil society and the opposition are fragmented and lack the organizational capacity necessary to produce a high degree of mobilizing power, they will be unable to extract liberalizing reforms from the regime. Under these circumstances, the regime’s power is more likely to be consolidated in ways which resemble authoritarian rule. Over time, this may result in a cycle of erosion of liberalization that might eliminate the significance of elections altogether.

Finally, regimes may remain more or less stable when these non-governing institutions fall along more intermediate configurations of these characteristics. In such instances, regimes may occasionally concede to liberalizing reforms only to employ illiberal strategies to recalibrate their power when pressures for liberalization diminish. This results in a stable regime with a limited level of political liberalization. Without the coercive power necessary to check the regime, the military functions primarily as a stabilizer, as do neo-traditional institutions in moments of social unrest. Civil society and the opposition experience moments when their mobilizing power is amplified, enabling them to extract limited or temporary liberalizing reforms. However, as social dissatisfaction wanes their mobilizing power diminishes and they are unable to maintain their liberal gains.

The cases focused on in this dissertation, and discussed in detail above, exhibit these three different regime trajectories and these three different configurations of non-governing institutions. These configurations emerged from inherited relationships built between colonial administrators and these non-governing institutions, but they also evolved under the post-colonial regimes which arose following independence. The adoption of multiparty elections in each case marks an important juncture, after which these different configurations shaped each country’s regime trajectory.
In Senegal, where colonial rule resulted in comparatively stronger relationships across the regime and non-governing institutions, the post-colonial government cultivated a non-interventionist and cohesive military, averting potential military rule, while simultaneously, relying on the deeply integrated neo-traditional institutions to maintain social stability in times of potential crisis. With this configuration of institutions, the government had little choice but to make concessions to civil society and the opposition over time and at moments of popular discontent. This resulted in greater political liberalization and a regime trajectory of gradual democratization, notwithstanding the decades in which the ruling party did not lose power. During this time, the military helped to guarantee the independence of the electoral process, and the influence of neo-traditional institutions ‘drifted,’ as they risked losing their followers if they became increasingly politicized. Political liberalization took place incrementally, as the ability of civil society and the opposition to mobilize voters eventually produced a turnover in power at the ballot box. This was in part due the high mobilizing power of both civil society and the opposition that forced the ruling party to make a series of political reforms during the 1990s. The peaceful turnover in 2000 helped to further institutionalize the democratic process in Senegal and repeated itself in 2012.

In Burkina Faso, an intermediate configuration of non-governing institutions limited the prospects of further political liberalization, after multiparty elections resulted in stable electoral authoritarianism. Burkina Faso’s colonial antecedents did not provide the post-colonial government with politically integrated neo-traditional institutions, despite the fact that neo-traditional institutions in the country remained integrated socially. The initial post-colonial government’s attempts to consolidate power, coupled with corruption, led to the intervention by the military. This politicized the military with different political ideologies that served to
fragment different groups of officers, ultimately leading to five military coups d’état (1966, 1980, 1982, 1983 and 1987). The fifth and final coup in 1987 brought Blaise Compaoré to power. Under his leadership the regime eliminated divisive political currents within the military, and established multiparty elections. Compaoré also repaired the regime’s relations with the neo-traditional institutions, by restoring many of the privileges of the traditional chiefs and by actively engaging religious leaders to mediate socio-political crises frequently caused by the repressive authoritarian policies of his regime. Compaoré’s efforts stabilized Burkina Faso’s politics by temporarily stifling pressures for increased political liberalization from civil society and the opposition. However, political miscalculations, notably the attempt to modify presidential term limits in the face of clear and strong popular opposition against such modifications, cost Compaoré the presidency and the CDP its hold on political power, as massive popular protest forced Compaoré to resign. The future of political liberalization in Burkina Faso remains unclear, since these events may or may not result in a lasting reconfiguration of the regime and non-governing institutions.

In Chad, colonial antecedents initially provided the post-colonial government with the assurance of political stability from the French defense and cooperation accords. However, lacking strong political and neo-traditional institutions, coupled with a military heavily drawn from one segment of society, the Chadian state quickly devolved into civil conflict. These conflicts continued for much of Chad’s post-colonial history, serving to further divide its socio-political foundations. The successful rebellion of Idriss Déby and the MPS set the stage for a political transformation in Chad, but did little to improve the overall integration of neo-traditional institutions. Rather, Déby strategically incorporated certain neo-traditional leaders while excluding others by involving the regime in local disputes of authority and appointing
certain leaders as state administrators. The military also continued to lack cohesion as many rebel groups opportunistically surrendered to become integrated into the national military. Finally, the ability of civil society and the opposition to mobilize the population for greater political liberalization in Chad remained fragmented and disorganized, as Déby relied on violent and repressive means to stifle any mobilized opposition, and simply ignored calls for political reform. This enabled Déby to eliminate presidential term limits as well as other checks on the power of the executive completely, indefinitely postpone legislative and local elections, and continue the cycle of erosion of liberalization that is leading the country toward a restoration of authoritarian rule.

Having discussed the regime trajectories of each case, highlighting the key moments when non-governing institutions shaped these trajectories, I turn to a closer analysis of determinants of the varying roles of non-governing institution in each case. In Chapter 6, I argue that the varying characteristics of the military as a non-governing institutions shape its role in politics and in turn, the prospects for continued political liberalization in newly electoral regimes. As an institution charged with the coercive powers of the state, the military can easily become an illiberal institution, but this is not always the case. Where the military is cohesive and abides by republican norms of civil-military relations, it can just as easily contribute to the political liberalization of a regime by functioning as a horizontal accountability check on the regime itself. As the quotes at the beginning of this chapter suggest, non-governing institutions play important roles in the prospects for greater political liberalization, thereby shaping regime trajectories following the inauguration of multiparty elections, but the different histories experienced by institutions and their development shape their characteristics over time, and in turn greatly influence the ways in which regime trajectories are shaped.
CHAPTER 6
THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN LIBERALIZING REGIMES

Introduction

African attitudes toward the military coup d’état have always been ambivalent—resenting it as undemocratic and its perpetrators as generally ill equipped to govern, yet willing to applaud it, on occasion, as the only means to put a swift end to an obnoxious regime or to find a shortcut to progressive political development.

—Samuel Nolutshungu
Limits of Anarchy

When evaluating the prospects for greater political liberalization in African electoral regimes, the military matters. Militaries have frequently intervened in politics across the African continent. Arguably, no other institution exhibits the same potential to derail processes of political liberalization. Consequently, the study of African militaries focuses primarily on their ability to disrupt electoral politics through military coups, on the forms of military rule, and on the processes for their disengagement from the political arena. Less commonly asserted is the idea that the military may also at times enhance the prospects for greater political liberalization. Militaries can provide a check on the regime’s ability to contravene pressures for greater political liberalization.

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1 The epigraph to this chapter is drawn from Nolutshungu (1996, 92).

2 For examples of works which have addressed these subjects see: Baynham (1986), Decalo (1990), Edgerton (2002), Foltz and Bienen (1985) and Howe (2001). There are also significant literatures that indirectly deal with the military in Africa through a focus on security, conflict and peacekeeping. Here, and throughout this dissertation, I am concerned with the military as a political institution, specifically in its role in shaping the prospects for greater political liberalization.

3 Some have argued that military interventions, specifically coups which restore constitutional rule, may serve as a form of democratic course correction, or a so-called ‘good coup’ (Baudais and Chauzal 2011 and Varol 2012). Thyne and Powell (2014) theorize ways in which coup potentially open pathways toward democratization through the incentives to coup leaders to turnover power for political legitimacy and economic development. Geddes (1999) also marshals evidence suggesting that military regimes are the shortest lived forms of authoritarianism indirectly suggesting they may be more likely to lead to democratization. However, recent evidence suggests that such coups rarely, if ever, usher in political reforms that are beneficial to democracy in the long-run (Bermeo 2016, Derpanopoulos et al. 2015, Tansey 2016).
liberalization by playing the role of institutional guarantor, thereby checking the ability of regimes to manipulate institutions. Where formal institutions—such as the judiciary—remain inchoate checks on ruling parties, they may fail to prevent the regime from eroding or blocking efforts for greater political liberalization. In such cases, the military may play an arbitrating role in politics. However, as I develop further below, the history and characteristics of most African militaries render this an unusual phenomenon.

In this chapter, I discuss the role of the military in shaping the different regime trajectories of Burkina Faso, Chad, and Senegal, considering it as an institution that structures the relations between political actors. My interest is thus different from most discussions of African militaries in that I focus on the role of the military in politics under electoral regimes, and not on the causes or effects of coups, or on military interventions that claim to restore democratic governance. Similar to the other institutions analyzed throughout this dissertation—neo-traditional institutions, civil society and the opposition—I view the military under civilian electoral regimes as a non-governing institution, meaning that it does not play a formalized role in governance. However, as discussed in Chapter 3, this does not mean that the military is apolitical or uninvolved in the political processes. To the contrary, the military and other non-governing institutions play central roles in politics and, accordingly, shape the prospects for greater political liberalization in Africa’s electoral regimes.

To be sure, the military differs from other non-governing institutions given that in the recent history of many countries, the military did in fact govern for some period of time. In such a

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4 This is the case following colonial rule in many African countries and in two of the cases—Chad and Burkina Faso—focused on this dissertation. However, as I discussed at length in Chapter 4 and as I revisit briefly in Chapter 7, neo-traditional institutions often emerged from former pre-colonial African states and governing institutions. Neo-traditional institutions, then, from a *longue durée* historical perspective also share this past experience with political rule.
cases, the military’s history involves experience with direct rule and/or governance; such was the case under the military regimes of Burkina Faso in the 1970s and 1980s. Militaries with this experience may develop internal bureaucracies for public administration, making it difficult for the military to withdraw from governance. Especially in the African context, where formal institutions remain weak, poorly funded, and lack capacity, the military has at times filled these gaps. In electoral regimes, however, voters bestow upon civilian leaders the authority to govern through elections, excluding the military from formal governance, though not necessarily from politics. The role of the military in politics following the adoption of multiparty elections becomes a crucial point of examination because of the military’s potential to provide newly electoral regimes with administrative capacities. The military is also important for understanding regime trajectories following transitions to multiparty elections because of its role in providing security.

In an electoral regime, the military serves as the state institution charged with the defense and security of the country, and in principle remains outside of politics and policymaking. Furthermore, as the primary institution responsible for safeguarding the state from external threats and—perhaps more frequently—the regime from internal threats, African militaries wield significant powers (Warner and Thaler 2016). Indeed, following colonial rule, newly independent African states invested heavily in their militaries to protect their regimes from external and internal threats, as well as to maintain law and order through generalized policing (Branch and Mampilly 2015). These roles afforded the military with significant coercive

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5 In sub-Saharan Africa, the military is frequently understood to include other security forces including the police, and in Francophone countries, the gendarmerie. The military frequently operates as an institution responsible for law and order in African countries. Additionally, inter-state conflicts, which provided an impetus for the development of national militaries elsewhere in the world, are infrequent in Africa due to mutual interests in maintaining state sovereignty and borders (Herbst 2000). Lemke (2002) finds, in an analysis of African state dyads, that African states are one-tenth as likely to fight as state pairs in other regions.
power—the ability to use force as a means of accomplishing a particular ends—immediately following independence. Two characteristics of the military—the nature of civil-military relations and the extent of cohesion—shape the military’s coercive power, and provide regimes with a repertoire of strategies that may be employed to address pressures for greater liberalization. These strategies in turn shape regime trajectories over time as the regime either concedes to greater political liberalization, mitigates efforts at liberalization, or undoes political liberalization.

In the sections below, I examine these characteristics and the role of the military in the regime trajectories of Burkina Faso, Chad and Senegal. Differences across the civil-military relations and the level of cohesion of the military help to underscore the various roles the military has played in the political liberalization—or lack thereof—in each case’s regime trajectory. These differences initially emerged following the creation of national militaries at the end of colonial rule. The subsequent post-colonial histories experienced in each country further shaped each national military’s role in post-colonial politics. The advent of electoral politics transformed the political systems of the regimes such that the historical and political role of the military and its coercive power had a significant influence on the development of each regime’s subsequent trajectory.

In Burkina Faso, the initially tense relations between France and the ruling regime following independence led the regime to decline French aid and military support in the event of political instability. Consequently, following widespread disapproval of the first Burkinabè government, the national military intervened and established military rule. Military rule itself proved to be unstable, and ideological factions in the military eventually produced a series of military coups before the 1987 putsch brought Blaise Compaoré to power. Compaoré eventually
oversaw the political transition from military rule to electoral politics. During this transition, Compaoré attempted to improve military cohesion, but simultaneously personalized particular units of the military in the process—notably the presidential guard (RSP)—to insulate the new regime from the threat of another military intervention. This led to moments of tension between the regime and the military and, over time, the divisions within the military shifted such that when the final standoff was to come in 2014 the RSP supported Compaoré while the national military supported popular demands to uphold the constitution. While Burkina Faso may have entered a new phase in its regime evolution since 2014, the analytic framework I propose sheds much light on the quarter century following the era of liberalization. In Burkina, a moderately cohesive military, characterized by interventionist civil-military relations, provided sufficient coercive power to maintain stability and limit political liberalization, resulting in a long-lasting stable electoral authoritarian regime. In the end, attempts by Compaoré and his ruling party to remain in power unveiled the fault line that had gradually deepened within the military, and that contributed to the popular insurrection that overthrew Compaoré’s regime.

Chad represents an unambiguous case in which conflict and violence have significantly fractured the military over time and in a cyclical fashion. In Chad, colonial rule established a national military composed primarily of certain groups from the south, providing for a cohesive, but not representative military. Decolonization provided the Chadian state with political assurances through the defense accords between France and the first independent government of the country. These accords established a French military presence in the territory to support the newly independent regime in the event of instability. However, as the first president’s rule shifted towards dictatorship and the French withdrew their forces from the northern territories of the country, rebellion broke out led by armed groups who had been excluded from the military.
This marked the beginning of decades of civil war and political conflict. These conflicts and cycles of political violence shaped the military as an institution, resulting in a high degree of fragmentation, which led to a rebellious and interventionist form of civil-military relations. Consequently, the coercive power of the military is comparatively low, a fact which helps to explain, in part, why Chad has suffered from violent repression, rebellion, and the erosion of political liberalization following the adoption of multiparty elections. These factors contribute to the on-going restoration of authoritarian rule in Chad.

Senegal represents an entirely different case on the other end of the spectrum of military cohesion and civil-military relations. In Senegal, the newly independent regime led by President Senghor maintained close relations with France, which established a military academy in the country and helped to train a cohesive military institution. Senghor also adopted a policy known as Armée-Nation that aimed to develop strong ties between the military and society. This starting point resulted in a cohesive military, characterized by a high degree of republican civil-military relations, which ultimately contributed to a high level of coercive power over society and, over time, influence on the regime. Consequently, the military directly contributed to Senegal’s stability in times of crisis while also maintaining its distance, even independence, from politics.

Since the Senegalese military as an institution had thus developed a reputation for political independence, in the era of multiparty competition both the ruling party and the opposition agreed to the appointment of retired generals to oversee the organization and administration of elections. Thus, when elections produced political turnover through the ballot box, the ruling party accepted the results in part due to the unimpeachable impartiality of the military. In Senegal, the military, through its coercive power, functioned as a partial check on the
regime, and helped to ensure that the steps taken towards the regime’s gradual democratization were upheld over time.

This chapter will analyze the factors contributing to these varied roles for the military in each case, I begin, however, with a discussion of the complex and central role of the military in the unprecedented political events of Burkina Faso’s 2014-2015 political transition. These events represent the most significant direct intervention of the military in the political life of the three cases since the advent of multiparty competition.

**Burkina Faso’s ‘Coup d’État le plus Bête du Monde’**

The popular insurrection that ousted Blaise Compaoré from power after his political party attempted to modify presidential term limits on October 30, 2014, might not have occurred had the military intervened to keep Compaoré in power. However, in the days preceding 31 October, divisions within the military began to publicly emerge. Hundreds of thousands of protesters took to the streets against the proposed constitutional reform beginning on 27 October, and in the days leading up to the scheduled 30 October vote in the National Assembly. As the demonstrators began to mass in public areas, information circulated about various military posts where soldiers were sympathetic to anti-regime mobilizations. Then, as parliamentarians arrived to cast their votes for the bill to modify presidential term limits, protesters were allowed to pass as they

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6 As I discussed in the introduction of Chapter 1 to this dissertation, my fieldwork coincided with the 2014-2015 events in Burkina Faso. In this chapter as well as Chapter 7 and Chapter 8, I return to episodes from these events in an attempt to achieve three goals: 1) Use the discussion of the events to demonstrate how the fieldwork experience and observations significantly shaped my thinking and theoretical argument. These episodes are intended to underscore the overarching research question of my dissertation, while also illuminating the important--though often overlooked--roles that non-governing institutions play in politics and the shaping of regime trajectories after multiparty elections; 2) That these events took place during my fieldwork in Burkina Faso has provided me several insights regarding the process of inductive theory building which I wish capture through the stylistic use of these moment to introduce my research; and 3) these events have received relatively little scholarly attention and thus, their exposition represents a valuable empirical contribution on a little known case.

7 Interview with protest leader Ouagadougou, November 23, 2015.
pushed past the security forces who were supposed to keep the protesters at bay. Once inside, the demonstrators looted the National Assembly, and set the building on fire.

During the insurrection, the military continued to protect the presidential palace, but looters and protesters destroyed several other buildings including the residence of the president’s brother, the ruling party headquarters, the Ministry of Communication, and other residences belonging to former ruling party members.\(^8\) The military then convened the leaders of various civil society groups at the military headquarters in downtown Ouagadougou to negotiate an end to the insurrection. During these negotiations, the leaders of the insurrection made it clear to the military leadership that President Compaoré’s resignation was non-negotiable, and when the military leaders themselves presented Compaoré with the demands for his resignation, he reportedly accepted the terms. After his resignation, a contingent of the RSP led a convoy of soldiers protecting Compaoré as he fled into exile to Cote d’Ivoire, where he was granted naturalized citizenship shortly after his arrival.

Compaoré’s exit from Burkina Faso left a power vacuum in his wake, posing a potential problem: the people had removed the president from power, but not the military. The president had dissolved all other governing institutions before his resignation. Who then held the legitimate claim to political power? Two leaders from within the military simultaneously claimed to be interim head of state, Lieutenant Colonel of the RSP Isaac Zida, and Chief of Staff of the National Military Honoré Traore. Their dual claims to power further revealed the divisions in the military and lack of coordination between the RSP and the national military’s leadership. These events foreshadowed an important fault line for debate and negotiations with the civilian leaders.

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\(^8\) Similar protest occurred throughout Burkina Faso’s urban centers, but those in Ouagadougou resulted in the most significant damage. The events resulted in at least six casualties.
of the popular insurrection. In the words of one leader of civil society, it showed “first and foremost that the military was not monolithic.” Zida emerged from the initial dispute as the interim president, but his tenure was short-lived as leaders of the popular insurrection demanded that a civilian-led transitional government be established to organize elections within one year.

In a matter of days, civil society leaders drafted the *Charte de la Transition* (Transitional Charter) which outlined an institutional power-sharing agreement and established a transitional legislative body, the *Conseil National de Transition* (CNT). Importantly, the charter stipulated that a special selection committee composed of members of the political parties, civil society, traditional and religious leaders, and the military would unanimously select a civilian as interim president. The military would also maintain a role in the CNT, holding 25 seats within the legislative body—the same number of seats as civil society. Since the president had to be selected by consensus, the military negotiated with the other groups belonging to the special committee to protect its own interests during the transition. Thus after the committee selected Michel Kafando as president on November 17, 2014, he immediately named Lt. Col. Isaac Zida as his Prime Minister.

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9 Interview with transitional government official on March 2, 2015, Ouagadougou.

10 There is insufficient space to go into detail concerning this process here, but it is important to note that the military maintained its voice in the process despite conceding some control over to civil society. Notably, however, the Transitional Charter, which outlined the process by which a transitional government would be established, was drafted by political and legal experts from civil society. The selection of a president is outlined closely in the Charter pgs. 3–6.

11 The CNT was composed of 90 seats; 30 seats for the former political opposition; 25 for civil society; 25 for security forces; and, strikingly, 10 for the former “parties of the presidential majority,” that is the parties which had supported Compaoré. These stipulations are outlined in the Charter as well pgs. 6–7.

12 Several of those present during the deliberations noted that Zida’s selection was part of the negotiations between civil society and security forces, which had failed to establish consensus on an interim president three previous times. One of the reasons they failed to establish consensus related to internal disputes between members of the security forces. Notably, the RSP sought to maintain its influence over the executive. According to some, the military agreed on a path forward when Zida would be named PM, and members of the national military (not the
the Transitional Charter stipulated that the majority of the cabinet had to be composed of civilians.13

In sum, the military agreed to give up significant governing power to a civilian leadership while maintaining some influence in the transitional process. This was far from a guaranteed outcome following the popular insurrection, and highlights a fundamental question in civil-military relations: Why, when, and under what conditions does the military decide to disengage from governance? In the case of the popular insurrection, the military did not intervene until the insurrectionists had already ousted the government and yet, with no other mutually agreeable and legitimate entity to take over power, the military maintained its complicated role in the political transition. The military’s internal problems of cohesion become clearer during the transition itself.

To be sure, the possibility of a military intervention could not be completely ruled out during the transition; in fact, the transition was nearly derailed by what would become known as the “stupidest coup d’état in the world.”14 On September 16, 2015, General Gilbert Diendéré, leader of the RSP, took Interim President Kafando, Prime Minister Zida, and two transitional ministers hostage during a meeting at the Presidential Palace.15 The next day, the spokesperson for the RSP, Lt. Col. Mamadou Bamba, declared on national television that the RSP had

13 Charte de la Transition pg. 8.

14 ‘Le coup d’état le plus bête du monde’ became a popular nickname for Diendéré’s September 2015 coup—a coup which nearly derailed the political transition in Burkina Faso. This nickname became widely used in much of the Francophone media at the time.

15 A series of other near-interventions staged by the RSP had earlier threatened the transition in February, June, and July. One of the most actively discussed speculations ahead of the September coup amongst Burkinabè in daily conversation related to the expected longevity of the Transitional Government, if the RSP decided to overthrow Kafando.
dissolved the Transitional Government and had begun wide-ranging talks to establish a new government. Shortly thereafter, Gen. Diendéré emerged to proclaim himself the acting head of state as the leader of the *Conseil National de la Démocratie* (National Council of Democracy) which he claimed would redirect the efforts of the transition and would organize truly free and fair elections. Observers would later learn that Diendéré aimed to overturn the rulings of the Constitutional Court that excluded former members of the government—who had supported Compaoré’s efforts to modify presidential term limits—from contesting the elections. It is also widely believed that a report on the reform of the RSP, which recommended the unit be disbanded and was published shortly before the coup, motivated many of the soldiers to participate in the attempt to take power.\(^{16}\)

The coup was met with social outrage, popular protests, and international condemnation (Zeilig 2017).\(^{17}\) Within days, leaders of the regional institution ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) flew to Ouagadougou to attempt to mediate the crisis. A special meeting of ECOWAS was organized in Abuja, Nigeria after the mediations. When it became clear that Diendéré had no intention to stand down and sought to negotiate some form of power-sharing agreement, and that ECOWAS intended to support this, the national military mobilized. Contingents of the national military from around the country deployed towards Ouagadougou as crowds of protesters in urban centers around the country expressed their discontent with the RSP coup.

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\(^{16}\) Interview with Burkinabè official, Ouagadougou, December 11, 2015. This was also widely reported in local media.

\(^{17}\) Similar to the popular insurrections, upon learning of the coup, thousands of protesters flooded the streets of Ouagadougou. However, this time the RSP had prepared for the mobilization and quickly fired on protesters from strategic positions to disperse the crowds. Eleven people were killed and 271 others were wounded during the events.
After several tense days, Diendéré was forced to back down, publically apologized for the coup, and the majority of the RSP surrendered to the National Military led by Army Chief of State Pingrenoma Zagré. The Mogho Naba, the country’s most important traditional authority, played an influential role in mediating this surrender, which I discuss in more detail in Chapter 7. However, some members of the RSP, undoubtedly concerned about their fate once the coup was overturned, decided to ignore the agreement and refused to disarm. The decision of these RSP members not to disarm raised panic in Ouagadougou about the possibility of conflict breaking out in the capital’s streets between the national military and the RSP. In response, Zagré led a battalion of the national military in a siege of the RSP’s barracks, shelling the soldiers until they ultimately surrendered. The national military thus in the end supported the transitional authorities and intervened to maintain the political transition which the RSP had sought to derail. It remains to be seen what role the national military will play in the future of Burkinabé politics, but these events provide for the possibility of an optimistic outlook.

The coup resulted in some delay in the electoral calendar, but successful and widely acclaimed elections took place at the end of November 2015, and popularly elected executive and legislative branches of government were inaugurated before the end of 2015, completing the promised transition.

As this summary suggests, in Burkina Faso’s post-Compaoré political transition, the military played a variety of different, yet consequential, roles in the maintenance of the regime. First, when faced with a surge of popular discontent over the attempts to modify presidential term limits stipulated in the constitution, the military did not violently repress or intervene to

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18 My observations from the field during the time of the coup and eventual counter coup based on several conversations with other resident of Ouagadougou at the time.
prevent the popular insurrection and defend the government. Second, in the weeks following the popular insurrection—during which the make-up of the transitional government was negotiated—the military actively sought to insure that it remained part of the political process. Third, divisions within the military, which had developed during Compaoré’s time in power, eventually led to the RSP-led coup with the aim of re-installing Compaoré loyalists to power. The coup ultimately failed when the national military’s cohesion outweighed the RSP’s efforts and helped to restore the transitional authorities to power.

The national military in Burkina Faso proved to be a largely cohesive institution in the face of the one major fault line between the RSP elite presidential guard and the rest of the military. Following the ouster of Compaoré in 2014, this fault line grew increasingly significant as it became clear that the transitional government—of which several members of the national military were part—would seek to reform the presidential guard, with the tacit support of the national military. Had the national military—which formally excluded the RSP—been less cohesive or had the military’s interventionist norm of civil-military relations been more interventionist, it is entirely possible that Burkina Faso would have experienced a full regime breakdown in 2015. Instead, transitional authorities successfully organized elections, restored civilian rule, and arguably maintained the continuity of Burkina Faso’s regime. Though, with the overthrow of Compaoré and the subsequent transition, many initially suspected that in time these developments might result in improved prospects for greater political liberalization. It has remained an open question in the first few years following this “transition” what trajectory Burkina Faso’s regime may now follow, a debate for which I provide some initial ruminations in Chapter 9.
Developments within the military itself and its evolving role suggested the possibility of either outcome. The ambiguous and complicated role of the military in recent Burkinabe history points to the multiple ways it might influence the trajectories of electoral regimes. In the remainder of this chapter, I turn first to a review of the role of the military in regime trajectories through a brief discussion of coercive power, civil-military relations and military cohesion. I then examine the military’s role and development over time in Burkina Faso, Chad and Senegal.

The Military and Coercive Power

Two initial points need to be underlined before returning to the characteristics of the military as an institution and how these characteristics shape regime trajectories. First, African militaries are diverse. Despite the prevailing rhetoric that conflict, instability, and constant military coups plague the African continent, a closer look reveals that, in fact, African militaries developed in a variety of contexts, some more stable and peaceful than others. In the three cases I focus on in this dissertation, Senegal has never experienced a military intervention, coup, or major conflict; Burkina Faso has had four explicitly military regimes, but virtually no experience with conflict or rebellion; and Chad has experienced years of civil war followed by intermittent rebellion as well as conflict with Libya over its northern boundary. Similarly, accounts of Africa’s ‘unprofessional’ militaries abound, but despite these many examples of unprofessionalism, military experts and scholars consider several African militaries to be professional, including South Africa, Botswana, Senegal, and Ghana (Howe 2001, Ouédraogo 2014, and Warner and Thaler 2016). This variation across African militaries suggests that as a non-governing institution, the military may indeed offer some explanatory power for divergent regime trajectories.

Secondly, I treat the military as an institution, but it is of course composed of many actors. As such, I am chiefly concerned with the political processes that the military shapes,
rather than with the grievances or perceptions of soldiers. African militaries face extensive material and logistical impediments to their tasks of providing security and maintaining order (Chuter and Gaub 2016, 12). In addition to limiting their operational capacity, this reality frequently produces poor morale, perceptions of nepotism, and other grievances amongst military ranks. In some instances, this may have some effect on the overall cohesion of the military. However, I focus on military cohesion as an institutional characteristic, rather than as a function of actors’ perceptions or values. Similarly, I do not attempt to analyze whether certain military leaders are more or less supportive of democratic governance than others as a means of understanding civil-military relations. Rather, my aim is to understand what institutional characteristics shape the military’s role in regime trajectories following the introduction of multiparty elections.

As a non-governing institution, the military shapes political processes through its coercive power. I define coercive power as the ability to use force as a means of accomplishing particular ends. Generally, the military is the institution responsible for maintaining internal security and external defenses, even at times taking a policing role to maintain law and order (Warner and Thaler 2016). This occurs, for example, when the regime deploys the military to disperse crowds of protesters, when the military disrupts smuggling routes through the hinterland of a given country, or when the military intervenes to restore peace following local conflicts between different groups, such as the intermittent farmer-herder conflicts common throughout the Sahel. These activities and capacity provide the military with its coercive power vis-à-vis society.

However, the coercive power of the military also presents a fundamental principal-agent problem for civilian regimes: how to empower the military without threatening the regime’s
authority in the process? Recognizing the potential threat that the military poses to regime stability, many regimes invest in the military strategically to protect the regime, sometimes limiting the capacity of the military or only providing resources, training and opportunities to specific units.\textsuperscript{19} Such strategies often result in militaries that suffer from a lack of resources, training, nepotism, and co-ethnic dominance in elite units such as the presidential guard (Ouédraogo 2014, Warner and Thaler 2016). In these ways, the military in some cases evolved with a primary goal of insulating the regime from social unrest, rebellion and even military intervention at the expense of its overall operational capacity. These strategies and attempts by the regime to develop a military institution capable of protecting the regime shape the characteristics of the regime over time, resulting in different degrees and forms of military cohesion and civil-military relations. These institutional characteristics in turn shape the military’s role in politics, and the regime’s trajectory.

**Civil-Military Relations**

The military is the non-governing institution used by the regime for the enforcement of order, but it is also an institution that interacts with and is composed of members from society.\textsuperscript{20} The military’s ability to wield its coercive power over society, despite being subject to society’s oversight, forms the crux of the principal-agent paradox in civil-military relations (Feaver 2003). In an ideal liberal democracy, civil-military relations are characterized by complete civilian oversight of the military. However, this is rarely, if ever, truly achieved. Because civilians lack

\textsuperscript{19} In their excellent overview of “The State of Knowledge” on African Militaries, Warner and Thaler (2016) treat this dynamic through an examination of regime interests and the military as protecting the regime or threatening the regime.

\textsuperscript{20} Dwyer (2016, 72-73) points out explicitly that for many soldiers, military careers commence at similar times as those who begin their university studies, and generational connections between the military and communities often remain intact following soldiers’ enlistment in military service. As a result, Dwyer (2018, 175) argues, soldiers often share the similar grievances and perceptions of those in power as their civilian peers.
coercive power over the military, the military’s norm of civil-military relations is crucial for understanding how the military shapes a particular regime’s trajectory.\footnote{Even in some of the most ‘developed’ and stable democracies in the world, the military remains engaged in politics. Indeed, civilian oversight over the military remains a contentious issue even in the United States (Feaver 2003 and Kohn 2002). A lengthy literature exists on civil-military relations in democracies. For a useful review of many of the principal debates see: Feaver (1999). For an excellent discussion of “how democracies control the military,” one of the “oldest problems of human governance,” see: Kohn (1997).}

The norm of civil-military relations creates an institutional mechanism, making political intervention more or less likely. As a non-governing institution, the military is removed from formal governance, but that does not necessarily mean that the military remains completely apolitical. The study of civil-military relations focuses specifically on the ability of a civilian government to control and oversee the military; in other words, to keep the military out of politics. The norms of civil-military relations is the first characteristic of the military that shapes its coercive power and in turn, the ways in which the regime relies on this non-governing institution to accumulate and organize power.

Where republicanism—a history of non-intervention and strong social collaboration—characterizes civil-military relations through political processes, the military may help to guarantee the authority of formal institutions such as the constitution. In this way, the military provides a horizontal accountability check on the regime. In such cases, the military can play a role in upholding the independence of electoral processes and the observation of citizens’ civil liberties, thereby improving the prospects for greater political liberalization. Conversely, where histories of intervention or political violence characterize civil-military relations, regimes are more likely to employ militaries against increased liberalization. This commonly results in attempts to limit civil liberties and violate the electoral process. In these different ways, regimes manage pressures for greater political liberalization, contributing to divergent regime trajectories.
Different civil-military relations result from a variety of historical and structural factors including: the initial development and training of the military following independence; the regime’s military policies; the experience of the military in politics and conflict; and the social composition of the military. The initial development of the military lays the foundation for its establishment as an institution and sets the preliminary boundaries of civil-military relations. The regime’s military policy determines the capacity of the military and how it is employed. The experience of the military in politics and conflict shapes the military as an institution. Finally, the social composition of the military has implications for how broadly or narrowly the military’s interests align with the various components of society. These features also contribute indirectly to the second characteristic of the military that shapes its overall degree of coercive power: military cohesion.

**Military Cohesion**

The second characteristic of the military that influences its degree of coercive power is the military’s cohesion. Where the military is representative of society, with a clearly established hierarchy, and is not characterized by intra-institutional disputes or fragmentation, the military’s overall operational capacity is likely to be enhanced (Ouédraogo 2014). This serves to improve the ability of the regime to use the military either as a check on greater pressures for political liberalization or as a guarantor of the regime’s institutions. However, where the military is not cohesive, its ability to maintain stability through its operational capacity diminishes, and its coercive power becomes limited. In such cases, electoral regimes are less likely to maintain stability without an erosion of political liberalization and may face mutinies, rebellions or military interventions as factions of the military attempt to capture state power or resolve internal grievances.
Additionally, military cohesion affects the coercive power of the military in conjunction with the military’s civil-military relations. A cohesive military may keep the regime in check, but it presents a double-edged sword. A cohesive military also has greater coercive power that the regime can use to suppress pressures for liberalization. Here, the military’s norm of civil-military relations becomes crucially important. Republican civil-military relations dictate that there is civilian oversight of the military and that the military will not intervene in political processes. Consequently, the military’s mandate of providing security for the citizens of the country supersedes the regime’s efforts to violently repress pressures for greater political liberalization. Interventionist civil-military relations, on the other hand, is characterized by a willingness of the military to intervene in political processes. Thus, interventionist and cohesive militaries may engage in the violent suppression of such pressures until they produce a socio-political crisis, at which point, the military is likely to oust the regime.

Where the military is not cohesive and is instead fragmented or divided by multiple factions, its degree of coercive power will be diminished, and republican civil-military relations becomes less likely. Consequently, a regime may give preference to certain factions within the military over others, and in turn use these military factions to suppress pressures for political liberalization. This also prevents the military from becoming cohesive and reduces the potential threat that a cohesive interventionist military might pose to the regime. However, this strategy does not fully eliminate the threat of a military intervention. Particularly at times of social unrest or crisis, factions within the military may overthrow the regime, seeing such moments as an opportunity to take power.
Figure 6-1. Military’s Characteristics

Figure 6-1 attempts to display roughly where each case from this dissertation fell with regard to these two characteristics of the military at the point when each regime adopted multiparty elections. As the case studies below elaborate in much more detail, Burkina Faso’s military is characterized by an intermediate degree of military cohesion. The leaders of the political regime who inaugurated multiparty elections in Burkina Faso reformed the military to eliminate internal dissent, but simultaneously created the presidential guard as an elite, and separate, unit to protect the ruling party and president. The distinction of the RSP from the rest of the national military worked against military cohesion over time in Burkina Faso. Meanwhile, the history of the military involvement in politics, however, clearly designates the civil-military relations of the country as interventionist. The degree to which the military remained engaged in the political processes of the 2014-2015 political transition provides ample evidence of the military’s willingness to intervene. This has given the military an intermediate degree of coercive
power resulting in a tense, but stable, management of pressures for greater political liberalization and a stable electoral authoritarian regime.

Chad also exhibits an interventionist civil-military relations, but one propelled by years of conflict and a violent history in which military intervention, especially rebellion, has been the modus operandi for capturing power. Chad’s violent history, however, has also left it with an extremely fragmented military into which the current regime has integrated several former rebel groups. Thus, while the Chadian military’s experience with conflict affords it a comparatively high degree of operational capacity, this does not translate into a high degree of coercive power over society, since the military is not viewed as legitimate by a variety of groups within the Chadian state. Consequently, the Chadian regime relies on the military to suppress pressures for greater political liberalization and works to eliminate any potential internal threats to the regime. In these ways, the military has contributed to the regime’s trajectory, restoring authoritarian rule.

Finally, Senegal displays a high degree of military cohesion and a long history of republican civil-military relations. Both are evidenced through the military’s activities under the policy of Armée-Nation, its independence and impartiality in politics, and in its limited but effective deployments. This has led to a high degree of coercive power, allowing the military to aid the regime in maintaining a stable institutional framework. However, over time the military’s commitment to the institutions of the republic also resulted in its role as a guarantor of processes of political liberalization that shaped the regime’s trajectory of gradual democratization. In the following sections, I further develop these claims through a closer examination of events in each country.
Coercive Power and Managing Political Liberalization

Burkina Faso: from Ideology to Patronage

Following independence, the creation of the national military in Burkina Faso differed from Senegal and Chad. Burkina Faso accepted only some of the military accords established between France and its former African colonies. In Burkina Faso, the French provided military training, organization and arms to the national military as in other former colonies. However, Maurice Yaméogo—Burkina Faso’s first president—did not agree to the full body of *Accords de Coopération*, which included a number of mutual defense agreements between France and its former African colonies. Specifically, Burkina Faso did not agree to allow France to intervene in the event of a socio-political crisis, and did not allow for a French base to be established on Burkina Faso’s territory (Crocker 1968, 21 and Ligot 83-91). This meant that the French would not guarantee the regime’s stability as was the case in Chad and Senegal. This also meant that during decolonization a military training base was not established by the French before independence in Burkina Faso and those Burkinabè troops trained by the French received their training outside of Burkinabè territory. Following independence, the threat of a military intervention increased since France did not guarantee the newly independent regime’s stability.

Another important difference between Burkina Faso and the other cases relates to the level of military cohesion in Burkina Faso. As a colony, conscription into the colonial armed forces came from virtually all segments of society in Burkina Faso. Thus, unlike Chad, the initial composition of the national military was not divided by social cleavages. However, the colonial military selected few Burkinabè soldiers for the military officer corps and those that had been selected for the upper echelons of the armed forces tended to be connected to the Mossi chieftaincy (Gallais 1982, 110). Of those few Burkinabè soldiers who became officers ahead of independence, many had been deployed as colonial forces to Indochina and other colonial
territories where they had seen combat (Balima 1995, 492 and Skinner 1989, 214). This relative lack of military officers, in conjunction with the lack of a French regime stability guarantee, had important consequences for Burkina Faso after independence. When the first independent regime faced an economic crisis, provoking a general strike staged by the trade unions, it led to Burkina Faso’s first military coup d’état in 1966. Colonial Sangoulé Lamizana, a former colonial soldier with experience in Indochina, had the support of the national military, the unions and the French, as he became the second head of state in Burkina Faso (Welch 1968, 7-8).

From 1966 to 1978, the national military controlled the executive branch of government, became heavily politicized, and expanded its forces and capability, despite the fact that limited multiparty legislative elections were organized and, in theory, performed a military oversight role. Coinciding with this expansion and the incorporation of a new younger officer corps was the emergence of different political ideologies (Harsch 2014, 20-36). Lamizana actually aimed to remove the military from politics at the end of the 1970s. In 1978, he won presidential elections that fully restored an elected civilian government. However, conservative groups within the military feared that this might eventually lead to a turnover in power as a leftist wing of the military began to amass a large political following (Martin 1986). Sayé Zerbo—another Indochina veteran with close ties to the Catholic Church—led another military coup in 1980. He returned the country to military rule and preemptively attempted to keep the leftist contingents from taking control as the military became an increasingly politicized institution (Englebert 1986, 90).

In the end, Zerbo’s efforts failed. The military, now extremely politicized and fragmented along ideological lines, threatened to implode under Zerbo’s government, the Comité Militaire de Redressement pour le Progrès National (Military Recovery Committee for National
Progress). To stave off what appeared to be an inevitable conflict—both within the military and with leftist oriented civil society groups—conservative wings of the military acted to remove Zerbo in 1982 and agreed to form a unity government with increasingly popular ‘radical’ young officers of the leftist wing in the military. These were led by Captain Thomas Sankara (Harsch 2017, 39-41). The conservative military elites agreed to appoint an unpolitical military doctor, Jean-Baptiste Ouédraogo, as president and accepted Sankara as the Prime Minister in 1982. Sankara’s popularity, however, threatened the regime, which made efforts to sideline him as Premier. 22 These dynamics eventually led to the 1983 military coup, marking the beginning of Sankara’s revolution (discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5).

Two fundamental observations should be noted regarding the military in Burkinabè politics at this point, both of which serve as the antecedent conditions shaping the military prior to multiparty elections. First, the post-colonial structure of the military at independence led to a relatively high degree of cohesion, but the disagreements with the former colonial power over the role of the French military allowed for an interventionist civil-military relations. Secondly, and over time, the military became fragmented along the lines of different political ideologies, in large part as a consequence of its intervention in politics. This left the military in Burkina Faso divided internally, and with an interventionist form of civil-military relations for much of its post-colonial history—as evidenced by the four military coups experienced leading up to its fifth coup in 1987. Both military and political elites viewed the military as a governing institution during this time, and consequently, it developed into a highly politicized institution. The military

22 The unity government actually detained Sankara at one point in 1983, resulting in a mutiny of the soldiers in Pô where many of Sankara’s comrades in arms were stationed. The soldiers effectively took control of the city and succeeded in negotiating Sankara’s release after a sustained two-month mutiny (Dwyer 2017, 221). Students also took to the streets to protest Sankara’s arrest during this time (Brittain 1985, 45). These events marked the beginning of the end for Ouédraogo’s presidency.
also developed a comparatively higher degree of administrative and bureaucratic experience. These events set the stage for Blaise Compaoré’s military coup in 1987, and shaped the role of the military in Compaoré’s subsequent electoral regime.

Compaoré and the group of soldiers who led the coup with him immediately began eliminating other officers who they believed might attempt a counter-coup.\textsuperscript{23} This began with Compaoré quickly establishing control over the military, which was accomplished by assassinating military leaders who remained loyal to Sankara. Compaoré’s goal was to prevent any form of counter military mobilization (Harsch 2017, 106-108). Compaoré then began the period of “rectifying” the revolution under his politico-military institution, the \textit{Front Populaire}. Given the international context of the Third Wave, the rectification eventually culminated in a political transition to multiparty elections, as discussed in Chapter 5. The military, however, remained an important institution for Compaoré to exercise his control over this process. He established the \textit{Front Populaire} as the political organization responsible for leading the transition, and the military under his leadership remained its coercive arm. In practice, there was little distinction between the two. While Compaoré’s violent repression of ideological dissension in the military helped to improve its overall level of cohesion, those military leaders closest to Compaoré profited politically by being included in the decision-making bodies of the \textit{Front}

\textsuperscript{23} Perhaps the most famous example is the last stand of Captain Boukary “the Lion” Kaboré in Koudougou. Kaboré led a contingent of men who defied the orders to surrender to the new leaders in Ouagadougou. Kaboré eventually fled to neighboring Ghana after it became clear that other bases of troops, formerly loyal to Sankara, had accepted the new military leadership. Over a dozen of the troops who remained in Koudougou were summarily executed, a fate which many soldiers met in the days following Sankara’s assassination. Compaoré’s loyalist also fell victim to his violent machinations, perhaps most notably with the execution of Jean-Baptiste Boukary Lingani and Henri Zongo, who were both arrested and killed after being accused of plotting against Compaoré, despite having helped him orchestrate the coup that brought him to power.
This marks an important strategy of the emerging electoral regime for administering the military and placating its leadership: patronage.

With the return to civilian rule and the inauguration of multiparty elections, Compaoré’s government imposed a number of important reforms upon the military. Perhaps most important was the creation of the RSP as a separate unit under the direct authority of the presidency. The rest of the national military fell under the authority of the Chief of Staff of the Military and in principle remained outside of politics. The RSP on the other hand benefited immensely through special trainings and equipment designated to the elite unit directly from the presidency. The RSP was also responsible for executing the president’s coercive power over society in violently repressive ways. The various social crises, which led to large-scale protest against the corruption and violent repression of the regime, were almost always inextricably linked to the violent repression and perceived impunity of the RSP. In response to such protests, the government regularly deployed the RSP to disperse the crowds, sometimes resulting in causalities.

The special designation of the RSP as a sort of praetorian guard exempt from the rule of law created divisions within the military. In 2011, the grievances held by many soldiers boiled

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24 Interview Ouagadougou, November 16, 2015 with retired politician and academic. “In many ways, the Front Populaire resembles the CNT (the Transitional legislature) today…[The Front Populaire] comprised all of the political parties that had come around to Compaoré by that time, the military played a dominant role, traditional leaders happily reengaged the political scene, and anyone truly linked to Sankara’s ideology remained discretely sidelined. When you think about it, not much has really changed.” I should note that I was accompanied during this interview with a member of a political party that had been in the opposition under Compaoré. Immediately following the interview, my colleague expressed his disagreement with the view that the Front Populaire and the CNT were similar. He argued that the events of the popular insurrection and 2015 were dramatically different because “the people forced Blaise Compaoré to leave; his own military did not have him killed.”

25 Harsch (2017, 115-140) discusses the repressive nature of Compaoré’s rule in a chapter entitled “‘Democracy’ with a Heavy Hand.” Political assassination, torture, arbitrary detention, and other forms of harassment were common during Compaoré’s rule. I have discussed a few notable events in Chapter 5 that incited public protest, particularly the deaths of Dabo Boukary, Norbert Zongo, and Justin Zongo, but the list of victims is sadly much longer.
over into months of military mutinies. These mutinies coincided with massive civilian demonstrations against the regime’s repression, triggered by the death of Justin Zongo in police custody. As demonstrators protested Zongo’s death, the list of grievances against the regime grew, and after nearly a month of sustained civilian demonstrations, members of the military began their own demonstrations. The initial military mutinies among enlisted ranks had been sparked by shared outrage over a court ruling that sentenced a group of soldiers to more than a year of jail time (Dwyer 2017, 225). This initial mutiny spread, and contingents of enlisted soldiers revolted in different parts of the country over the course of nearly four months. The mutinies did not have central leadership and remained uncoordinated between the mutineers, but generally the mutineers shared grievances related to, or at least perceptions of, pervasive corruption and favoritism in the military, particularly related to selective promotion within the officer corps (Dwyer 2017, 227). In slightly different terminology, the mutineers were angry by the fact that the regime did not include them in its patronage system.

Interestingly, some members of the RSP, perhaps opportunistically, also mutinied during these events—the first time the RSP engaged in revolts (Chouli 2012, 139). The RSP demanded increased wages, higher housing stipends, better benefits, and other financial improvements. Compaoré quickly conceded to the RSP’s demands, and further responded to the mutinies by dissolving the government, appointing a new army chief of staff and prime minister. Compaoré also took over the portfolio of the defense minister himself. Like the RSP, the other mutineers called for better wages, living conditions, and other improvements to the terms of service such as more opportunities for promotion and career advancement. Compaoré attempted to negotiate minimal concessions with the remaining mutineers, but many continued their revolts. Ultimately,

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For a full account of these mutinies and an analysis of the mutineers motivations see: Dwyer (2017).
when mutinies broke out in Bobo Dioulasso—Burkina Faso’s second largest city—Compaoré responded by sending the RSP and other special forces to “forcibly disarm” the remaining mutineers. The results were bloody, with some military sources reporting dozens of casualties (Dwyer 2017, 226).

The mutinies displayed and deepened an important cleavage within the military. Certain groups of the military belonged to the patronage-based system and stood to profit from protecting the regime, while other groups remained excluded. This internal division showed that the military elite, many within the RSP, aimed to stifle the general sentiment of economic grievance—both among society and the junior soldiers—to maintain their special privileges and the political status quo. However, another section of the military’s leadership, outside of the RSP, wished to integrate the RSP under the national military’s chief of staff to address these grievances. The pseudo-autonomous status and the perceived impunity given to the RSP by the presidency upset many of the national military officers who wished to reform the military as an institution.  

As debates over the Senate and presidential term limits began to spark public mobilizations, many speculated that large sections of the military leadership wished to embrace a more liberalized and less personalized administration of the military. This had important implications leading up to the popular insurrection in 2014. Indeed, one well-placed interviewee

27 Interview with retired military officer, Ouagadougou, October 23, 2015.

28 This opinion was raised in several of my interviews with military and political officials in Ouagadougou during 2015. My interview with a retired military officer, Ouagadougou, October 23, 2015, provided the strongest confirmation of this sentiment. However, I should note that these interviews took place after Compaoré had been ousted and I cannot discount some level of revisionist history among those I interviewed on this subject. During the 2015 transition there was a strong desire to present the national military as supportive of the people’s will.
speculated on the different implications of these divisions between the self-interested RSP and the supporters of the people within the rest of the military’s leadership:

Someone told us where the RSP were going to be stationed through the internet. Only military officials would have had this information. It was also clear that General [Djibril] Bassolé had relieved some gendarmes of their commands ahead of the insurrection and in turn replaced them with soldiers who supported the insurrection. Thanks to them, we learned where soldiers and barricades would be, and when. This information allowed protesters to organize and march. Those internal military forces who worked with the people made a big contribution to the fall of the regime. If the military had not played that role, it would have been a blood bath because Blaise was ready to fire on the demonstrators.29

These internal divisions clearly increased the prospects for political turnover in Burkina Faso; had the military intervened on behalf of the regime, it is entirely plausible that the popular insurrection may have failed.

The role of the military in Burkina Faso contributed to its stable electoral authoritarian regime trajectory for the first two decades after multiparty elections beginning in 1991. Intermediate levels of military cohesion coupled with an interventionist form of civil-military relations enabled the electoral regime, under Compaoré’s leadership, to wield the coercive power of the military to mitigate pressures for greater political liberalization. When these pressures eventually spread to include the military itself, however, they split the military along the fault line of patronage that had heretofore been used by the regime to insulate itself. When the regime attempted to deflect pressures for greater liberalization and impose illiberal reforms to keep Compaoré in power, the key fault line that had developed within the military enabled the massive mobilization of the population and forced a turnover in power.

In the wake of the popular insurrection, in 2014, Burkina Faso’s future regime trajectory remains unclear, but the weight of history in Burkina Faso suggests that the role of the military in

29 Interview 2 March 2015 with a senior leader of the popular insurrection.
politics will continue. There is still the very real possibility of military intervention. And as I
highlighted above in the discussion of the ‘Coup d’état le plus bête du monde,’ the military coup
led by the RSP during the transition underscores how difficult it can be to lock-in civil-military
relations built on the principle of non-interventionism. As I develop below, the Senegalese case
suggests that the enactment of direct policies aimed at building the legitimacy of the military in
the eyes of the people is an essential step toward republican civil-military relations. If the future
role of the military in politics in Burkina Faso looks similar to that of the role of the military in
Senegal, then there is reason to hope that the prospects for greater liberalization may increase.
Unfortunately, as I develop below, the case of Chad demonstrates how challenging this process
can be when the military’s characteristics are not conducive to cohesion or non-intervention.

**Chad: Foreign Intervention, Rebellion and Repression**

Colonial administration in Chad played two fundamentally important roles in shaping the
military’s role in politics. First, the French conscripted virtually all Chadian colonial soldiers
from the south of the country, excluding men from the northern groups that the colonial
authorities had battled during the conquest of early 1900s. Second, because the Chadian
governor supported the Free French forces from the beginning of World War II, the post-war
French military held an extremely strong commitment to the maintenance of the regime in Chad
(Lemarchand 1992).30 The French and the newly independent Chadian government, led by
François Tombalbaye, formalized this agreement militarily through “Accords de Coopération”
(Cooperation Agreements) which allowed for the establishment of a French military base in
N’Djamena, and for continued French military administration of the northern territories of the

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30 The Free French refer to those French citizens which resisted the Nazi occupation of France during World War II
and led troops in combat against the Axis powers.
country after independence (Ligot 1964). With these joint French-Chadian military agreements, the new government tapped into the coercive capacity of French military and the French continued to invest heavily in the Chadian national military after independence. However, the Chadian military continued to be formed primarily of soldiers from southern and central Chad, as Tombalbaye worked to surround himself with co-ethnics.

French support propped up Tombalbaye for more than a decade as he consolidated power under a dictatorship (Haggar 2007). However, in 1964, when the French began to reduce their military presence from the northern and eastern regions of the country due to French and Chadian domestic pressures to do so, numerous armed groups rebelled against Tombalbaye, precipitating a cycle of violent conflicts known as the FROLINAT wars, that would continue for decades (Buijtenhuijs 1978 and 1987). These conflicts resulted in a national military that failed to establish any form of cohesion. At one point, the Chadian state was de facto split into three different territories, each controlled by different military or rebel forces. When Tombalbaye’s own men organized a military coup against him, the cohesion of the military further deteriorated and a series of unity governments failed to effectively restore order or governance over the country. Finally in 1982, Hissène Habré claimed power and used his forces to stamp out most forms of armed resistance, forcing many rebel groups to flee into neighboring countries.

Habré’s rule limited armed resistance through extremely harsh and violent repression of any form of opposition. These tactics ultimately turned three of his military leaders against him, but their attempt to stage a coup d’état was foiled and two of them, Hassan Djamous and Mahamat Itno, were executed. The third, Idriss Déby escaped, fled to Sudan, and from there organized the Mouvement Patriotique de Salut (MPS) as a rebel force to take power from Habré. When Déby led the MPS rebellion against the rule of Hissène Habré in 1990, he led forces that
had fought both for and against Habré in the FROLINAT wars, as well as rebel groups he had himself fought against as a military leader in Habré’s military. The MPS was hardly a cohesive military institution, but rather an opportunistic alliance between several rebel groups, many of which previously fought against one another. Thus following Déby’s assuming power, the military consisted of an assortment of different rebel factions. Some of these factions transformed themselves into political parties. Others integrated with many of Habré’s former security forces to comprise a new national military, and some broke away from the MPS to continue a rebellion, but now against Déby’s rule.\(^{31}\) For my purposes, two crucial points emerge from this history and help to explain the role of the military in Chadian politics. First, the military has never been cohesive. At times, different armed groups overlap with different ethno-regional identities that were themselves forged during colonial rule and which make each of these groups relatively cohesive, but the national military has failed to build cohesion amongst its disparate ranks (Lemarchand 1980 and Chapter 4).\(^{32}\) Secondly, the seemingly endless conflicts which punctuate Chadian politics and history have shaped the military into a combat-hardened institution ready to intervene in politics.

Chad’s military history before the introduction of multiparty elections presents a case where the military displays virtually no cohesion, and violent interventions characterize civil-military relations. These characteristics have their roots in the colonial history of the country and its military development. The antecedent situation of the Chadian military before the

\(^{31}\) These paragraphs attempt to summarize a significant portion of Chad’s complicated military history. The conflicts that took place during the first thirty years of Chadian independence and the actors involved in those conflicts are complex and cannot be covered in complete detail here.

\(^{32}\) For some of the excellent historical and political science work on these complex conflict dynamics see: Buijtenhuijs (1978) and (1987) on the ever shifting FROLINAT wars, Debos (2013a) and (2016) on Déby’s rise to power and the cycle of conflict in Chadian society and politics, and Powell (2017) on the role French military interventions in stabilizing Chad.
introduction of multiparty politics presents a case where the coercive power of the military is fragmented between several factions. It also demonstrates a norm of civil-military relations that is heavily politicized due to the military’s history of conflict and violence. Armed groups have been used repeatedly to suppress and violently repress any forms of political dissent or opposition in Chad. These characteristics provide very little support for the prospects of political liberalization. Indeed, following the adoption of multiparty elections, the regime continued to employ the military as a tool to stifle and eliminate pressures for greater liberalization, contributing to its gradual restoration of authoritarian rule.

After taking power in 1990, Déby organized multiparty elections and returned Chad to civilian rule, but he also integrated many rebellious factions of the military as a way of eliminating potential rebellious threats. Déby was able to reintegrate the south with the guarantee of multiparty elections, but this did not lead to cohesion within the military. Several former rebel groups were also integrated into the political system by transforming themselves into political parties, and thus partaking in the political patronage that accompanied supporting the ruling party. Under Déby’s rule, the military used these strategies of incorporation and integration repeatedly, and at each reintegration the military became less cohesive as it included an assortment of different groups. These groups typically maintained their identity even once integrated into the military, and the regime assigned them to specific tasks, some more lucrative than others. This produced a system within the military based on patronage, but unlike the Burkinabè case, in Chad only those groups that posed a significant threat to the regime were

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33 Many people I interviewed pointed to this tactic, highlighting how it both served to protect the regime and to provide an incentive to rebels.

34 Interview with a Chadian exporter, N’Djamena, November 9, 2015.
integrated. Thus, the military not only lacked cohesion, but civil-military relations were characterized by conflict and violent intervention.

Two instances are instructive for understanding these processes of integration and incorporation into the military and politics: the rebellions of 2006 and 2008. In both cases, rebel groups nearly captured N’Djamena and narrowly missed removing Déby from power. In 2006, the Chadian military forces successfully pushed the rebels back, after which the regime enticed several of the rebels to disarm, and integrated them into the national military.35 However, the leaders of three rebel groups—one group headed by two of Déby’s nephews, the Erdimi twins—remained opposed to Déby rule. These groups joined forces with tacit support from Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir. In 2008, they laid siege to the presidential palace in N’Djamena for three days, but ultimately failed to agree on who would replace Déby if they succeeded in removing him from power (Koulamallah 2014). In the end, because the rebels proved to be no more cohesive than the national military, the French military intervened to support Déby and pushed the rebels out of the city and back to Sudan.

The regime then entered into a series of peace agreements with the rebels, which stipulated that many of them would receive amnesty and be integrated into the security forces. Others, including the spokesperson for the rebel groups, created their own political parties, aligned with the ruling party, and subsequently entered the government. In sum, rebellion and intervention insured that the military continued to lack cohesion, preventing it from wielding coercive power beyond the violent repression of social forces and contributing to the outbreak of cyclical internal conflicts.

35 Interview with Chadian civil society activist, N’Djamena, February 12, 2015.
These internal conflicts have diminished somewhat in recent years, as Déby has deployed the military in trans-regional counter-terrorism activities.\(^3\) In the new regional context, Déby’s aim is to portray Chad as a bastion of stability in the region by demonstrating the effectiveness of Chadian soldiers in combat, both to keep potentially rebellious soldiers occupied and to improve relations with Western countries, particularly France and the United States (see Eizenga 2018). However, the improved relations have not translated into reforms of the political system in a more liberal direction. By deploying Chadian troops to combat terrorism in Mali and Nigeria, the regime in Chad is able to provide lucrative patronage to those contingents of the military that are deployed, while simultaneously occupying their time. A similar strategy has been deployed around Lake Chad, which is infamous for its smuggling routes and virtually unregulated commerce (International Crisis Group 2017). Indeed, many Chadian soldiers are now engaged as part-time security for shipments of goods across the lake, and as private security for those looking to do business in the area.\(^3\)

These activities also help the Chadian regime to entrench its hold on power through connections with the international community, namely France and the United States, which now overlook the erosion of political liberalization in Chad in exchange for its military support in countering terrorism throughout the region (Debos 2016, 178). This simultaneously allows for the military and security forces more generally to be used as a means of violent repression to stifle attempts to pressure the regime for greater political liberalization. As discussed in more detail in Chapter 5 and Chapter 8, security forces routinely harass the opposition and dissenting

\(^3\) The Chadian military is currently involved in counter-terrorism operations against Boko Haram in neighboring northeastern Nigeria and against Al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations in northern Mali. Chad is also a troop contributor and country-partner of the G5 Sahel—a multi-country joint military taskforce with counter terrorism objectives.

\(^3\) Interview with Chadian researcher, N’Djamena February 18, 2018.
civil society organizations to decrease efforts at widespread mobilization. The employment of the security forces in this manner, and the constant threat of violent conflict in Chadian politics, significantly impede efforts to promote political liberalization in the country. The regime has displayed its ability to shift its own trajectory toward the consolidation of power and the erosion political liberalization through its ability to integrate rebel groups into the political system and military, only to redeploy them as agents of an increasingly authoritarian regime.

The deep divisions between the units of the Chadian military prevent the institution from developing cohesion. This is in part due to a strategy of the regime to protect itself from internal challenges by incorporating rebel groups. Former rebels have been integrated into the military and as a result, it is not uncommon to find soldiers serving together who previously fought each other. These divisions make it difficult to rid the military of interventionist impulses. Indeed, by incorporating those groups that took up arms against the current regime, intervention is in some ways rewarded. These qualities allow the regime to employ the military for repressive purposes without fear of the military attempting to act as a check on the regime. The military thus functions primarily to repress Chadian citizens, stifling all efforts to promote greater liberalization. This situation has worsened over time as the current regime has strategically doled out patronage to particular contingents of the military to maintain its control over the military. In these ways, that low degree of military cohesion and the violent interventionist tendency of the Chadian military have contributed to the regime trajectory of a restoration of authoritarian rule. Senegal presents a contrasting example where the military, shortly after independence, established high degree of cohesion and a republican form of civil-military relations.

**Senegal: Development, Regulation and Institutionalization**

The colonial antecedent conditions in Senegal for the establishment of a national military are in stark contrast to those in Chad and Burkina Faso. First, at independence the military was
largely a cohesive institution with soldiers and officers from various social backgrounds. This level of cohesion was enhanced by the fact that the French had begun training African troops from all of its overseas territories in Senegal—for which the Senegalese were a dominant force—by the end of the 1950s, just ahead of independence (Crocker 1968, 19). As a result, the Senegalese military started from a position of high cohesion, with a more developed officer corps and with a commitment from the French to invest in the establishment and a continued partnership with the Senegalese military.\footnote{Interview with Senegalese academic, Dakar, June 12, 2015.} The relations between the French and Senegal grew closer following the split of Senegal and Mali shortly after independence.\footnote{The two countries had initially come to independence together as the short-lived Mali Federation.} Like Chad but unlike Burkina Faso, the Senegalese regime led by Senghor fully embraced the French defense accords, helping to guarantee the political stability of the country and allowing the military to develop with French training and investment. In return, the French established a military base (and officer academy) in Senegal and committed to joint action, including direct French intervention in the event of external threat or internal disorder (Crocker 1974, 284).\footnote{Direct French intervention was indeed called upon by the Senegalese government on 30 May 1968, in response to widespread student protests. The first demonstrations began in March of 1968, but by the end of May, the students’ agitation escalated to the point of threatening the stability of the country. Senghor imposed a curfew and formally appealed to the French for military aid (Blum 2012, 152).}

The French remained committed to many of their former African colonies for decades after independence and arguably more so than other former colonial powers (Luckman 1982). The relationship between France and Senegal remained particularly close due to a variety of factors, among which is undoubtedly the longer colonial history of the “Four Communes” discussed in Chapter 4. This close relationship between the Senegalese and French militaries had
two effects. First, it laid the foundation for a republican understanding of the military in politics. Unlike Chad, Senegal had already established political institutions that had exercised significant local authority and public administration during colonial rule, in contrast to the national military that colonial and Senegalese authorities established in the final two years before independence. Given the more developed public administration, the political leadership asserted their control over the security forces in Senegal somewhat more easily, and promoted the clear objective of consolidating the newly independent Senegalese state (Sady 2011, 32). Second, the general cohesion of the Senegalese military limited internal disputes and attempts to politicize the already non-governing military institution. This was put to the test when Senghor’s prime minister, Mamadou Dia, allegedly plotted to orchestrate a military coup against Senghor just two years after independence. Dia was arrested upon discovery of the plot, but it served as a useful lesson to Senghor who increasingly recognized the potential threat that the military might pose to continued civilian rule.41

After this alleged foiled coup plot, Senghor made a significant policy decision that fundamentally shaped the future of the military’s cohesion, and fostered a deep republican form of civil-military relations in this non-governing institution. Senghor’s policy, known as Armée-Nation, served two functions. First, it promoted social and economic development through public works initiatives around the country. The government deployed the military to accomplish tasks for which it had lacked a full technical staff. Soldiers were engaged in the very public improvement of the country through various infrastructure projects, vaccination programs,

41 There are many theories regarding whether or not Dia actually conspired against Senghor. What is clear is that the relationship between the president and his prime minister was strained. As Senghor moved to consolidate more power in the executive, Dia posed a potential problem to his efforts. Given that Dia’s politics aligned more closely with Leftist sympathizers in neighboring governments, Senghor moved against him knowing he would continue to have full French support. I am indebted to countless lengthy conversations with my Senegalese colleagues about Senghor’s politics for these insights that I am only able to summarize here.
agricultural development, and even the adoption and care of orphans by military spouses (Diop 2009, 4). Secondly, these activities demonstrated the military’s ability to improve the daily lives of citizens without necessarily subjecting them to the use of force. Through Armée-Nation, the military became associated with a positive connection between society and the state, but it also remained out of politics. By keeping the military engaged in development work, soldiers acquired transferable skills and knowledge during their military service, all while remaining too occupied by their work to devote much attention to politics (N’Diaye 2008, 205).

Senghor also took direct steps to remove the military from politics. For instance, active duty soldiers were not allowed to vote in elections, nor were military officials allowed to participate in any electoral processes (Howe 2001, 279). Political reforms during Wade’s presidency in the 2000s eventually changed this policy, but military impartiality and independence from politics remain a central feature of military culture in Senegal. As one professor of constitutional law noted, “the military has a long and remarkable history of being committed to a Republican ethic. There has been almost no debate over the military’s role in politics, because as our constitution makes perfectly clear, the military is not a political institution.” This professor’s comments may seem somewhat self-assured, but the Senegalese military’s record confirms his assertions. Senegal remains one of the few West African countries never to have experienced a military intervention in politics.

Senegal’s military, following independence, was characterized by a high level of cohesion thanks to its colonial experience. It also entered the post-colonial periods with more established political institutions and a somewhat greater degree of republicanism in its civil-military relations. Senghor’s policies to keep the military out of politics and engaged in the

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42 Interview Dakar, July 8, 2015.
country’s development further improved military cohesion and promoted republican civil-military relations. These characteristics also gave the military a high degree of coercive power over both society and the regime following the adoption of elections, and over time, this contributed to the gradual democratization of the Senegalese regime.

Abdou Diouf, Senegal’s second president, maintained these policies throughout his presidency. As the Senegalese political system gradually embraced greater liberalization, the administration of elections also developed as an important bureaucratic task. This task fell under the Ministry of Territorial Administration which a retired general had been named to head, precisely because of the military’s perceived impartiality in the political process (Niang 2012, 283). This was hardly the case in Burkina Faso, much less Chad, where the military was not only seen as the coercive wing of the regime, but was at times viewed as the personal guard to the ruling party and president. In Senegal, the military functioned as a vehicle to insure the stability of electoral institutions during the regime’s gradual transition to democracy. The republican impartiality of civil-military relations helped insure that the military as an institution could be held responsible for the fair administration of elections through the Ministry of Territorial Administration. Since soldiers were not allowed to vote, the public viewed them as apolitical. It also limited the opportunity for political gain from military service. Consequently, the military was viewed as a legitimate arbiter of electoral process and an indifferent state institution.

The 1992 “consensual” electoral code, discussed in Chapter 5, marked a significant step for political liberalization in Senegal, but from the perspective of the political opposition—following their losses in the 1993 elections—further steps needed to be taken. The opposition wished to see the organization and administration of elections delegated to an independent institution, outside of the administration’s authority. In 1997, Diouf partially conceded and
established the *Observatoire National des Élections* (National Elections Observatory, ONEL) to supervise and oversee the administration of elections by the Ministry of Territorial Administration, and the verification of the electoral results by the judiciary (Niang 2012, 285). Diouf appointed retired general Mamadou Niang as president of ONEL, continuing the tradition of appointing impartial apolitical actors to positions that required independence from the government to uphold the non-partisan electoral process.

In his memoir, Niang (2012, 286) recounts President Diouf’s remarks to the first appointees to the ONEL, “*Ne craignez personne en dehors de Dieu. Soyez neutres. Ne venez pas me demander des instructions et je ne vous en donnerai pas.*”43 Niang presents Diouf as fiercely partisan, working as his party’s leader to advance the interests of the PS, but also as a President staunchly committed to the Republic and the advancement of democracy. He notes, for example, that each of the eight members appointed to ONEL knew ahead of their meeting with the president that the new oversight organization represented a political loss for Diouf and the PS. However, each member also felt encouraged and empowered to perform the task of ONEL after meeting with the president. For Niang, the commitment of the president to democratic governance and elections is indisputable, despite the “impenetrable ever changing jungle that politics” appeared to be to the retired general (Niang 2012, 285).

By appointing retired generals to ministerial and other administrative positions responsible for the organization and administration of elections, Diouf appeased the opposition’s concerns of overly partisan manipulations of the electoral process. This was possible because of the republican civil-military relations that had existed in Senegal since independence, and had been cultivated through the policy of *Armée-Nation*. The cohesion and republican cultures that

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43 “Fear no one except God. Be neutral. Do not come to me asking for instructions, and I will not give you any.”
characterize Senegal’s military provide it with a form of coercive power that helps to guarantee the institutional framework of Senegalese politics. The military is widely understood to be separate from politics. This widely held perception contributed to its ability to uphold the fairness of the electoral process and the democratic and republican character of elections. Unlike the military in Chad or in Burkina Faso, the military in Senegal is not political.

The 2000 electoral turnover from Diouf to Wade served as an ultimate proof of Senegal’s liberalization. Having never previously faced an electoral outcome where the ruling party or an incumbent president had lost, this election verified the integrity of both the electoral process and the military’s commitment to remaining out of the political process. Those charged with the organization, supervision, and verification of the elections confirmed the results. Faced with his electoral loss, and the acknowledgement of Senegal’s republican military of this fact, Diouf conceded the elections. This outcome and the role of the military in Senegal’s politics beginning with independence demonstrate a path for the military that contributes to enhanced prospects for greater political liberalization. The military proved to be a republican institution during this electoral period and, at least partially, enabled Wade to peacefully attain power. To be sure, political tensions surrounding elections and the ONEL continued to spark public controversy throughout the 2000s, but in the end the cohesive and republican characteristics of the military helped to provide the overall institutional stability necessary for the regime to follow its trajectory of gradual democratization.

**Conclusion**

Throughout West and Central Africa, militaries regularly intervene in politics and, arguably, the military poses the single greatest threat to African regimes. The military’s potential to derail processes of political liberalization is particularly high in contexts where it suffers from a lack of cohesion or when civil-military relations are characterized by a history of intervention.
Consequently, the study of African militaries tends to focus on their politically disruptive roles, and analyzes military coups and military rule in Africa. In this chapter, I have argued that the military plays many roles in politics and in some cases these roles may actually improve the prospects for greater liberalization. Two factors, the military’s cohesion and the nature of civil-military relations, shape the different roles that the military may play in political regimes following the adoption of multiparty elections. I theorize that cohesion and republican norms within the civil-military relations contribute to the military’s ability to accomplish its goals through coercive power. In each of the three cases I discussed in this chapter, different forms of the military’s coercive power contributed to each regime’s trajectory.

In Burkina Faso, after years of being synonymous with the regime the military was reformed to become the coercive arm of the regime under Blaise Compaoré, himself a former military officer. This left the military divided internally, as those closest to the presidency profited from their proximity to power. It also posed a problem for the regime more generally as grievances began to emerge among a younger officer corps. Following the 2011 mutinies, some changes were made to the military’s administration and structure, but ultimately the divisions between the RSP and the national military created different political wings within the military as an institution. When confronted with protests demanding political change and the resignation of the president, these divisions grew deeper and the national military sided with the people. However, the military remained a central player during the political transition that followed, and a failed coup during the transition displayed the fault line between the national military—itself mostly cohesive—and the former presidential guard (the RSP). The military’s historical lack of cohesion and civil-military relations characterized by political intervention hindered its ability to use its coercive power to keep the regime accountable. Consequently, the military facilitates the
uneven playing field that for some time tilted Burkina Faso’s electoral authoritarian regime in favor of the ruling party. These characteristics contributed to the regime’s ability to limit political liberalization.

In Chad, the military suffers from deep divisions, which are visible in its units and their deployments. This is in part due to a strategy of the regime to keep groups from challenging its power. However, the lack of cohesion in the military limits its coercive power over society, and feeds the on-going cycle of political violence. While the regime pursues strategies to integrate former rebels, the military continues to suffer from its lack of cohesion. These divisions make it difficult to rid the military of an interventionist ethic. Indeed, the strategy of incorporating groups that took up arms against the current regime rewards those groups for their actions. For this reason, the military lacks independence and functions primarily to repress Chadian citizens who are pressuring the regime for greater political liberalization. This situation has worsened under the current regime, as constitutional rights such as the freedom of assembly and speech are routinely blocked through the use of security forces. Additionally, with limited checks on the regime’s power, legislative elections have been postponed indefinitely. The military in Chad lacks cohesion, and displays a form of violent interventionist civil-military relations. These characteristic of the military fail to promote the needed coercive power to prevent rebellion from armed groups in society and fails to check the regime’s illiberal reforms. In these ways the role of the military in Chad’s politics has allowed for the erosion of political liberalization and supports a trajectory toward the restoration of authoritarian rule.

Senegal presents a starkly contrasting situation. While the military is at times used to disperse crowds and protesters, this is rare and typically done through much less repressive means. Instead, the military holds an independent and republican position in Senegal’s politics.
The long history of remaining out of politics and working closely with communities and development projects through the military policy of *Armée-Nation* cultivated a republican non-interventionist military culture that is not evident in Burkina Faso or Chad. Senegal also entered the post-colonial era with a comparably cohesive military which, when joined with its republican culture, produced a high degree of coercive power. As the regime undertook reforms which promoted political liberalization, the military’s coercive power began to serve as a horizontal check holding the regime accountable. These processes contributed to increased prospects for greater political liberalization, and ultimately to Senegal’s regime trajectory toward gradual democratization.

In sum, where historical conditions have favored the emergence of a national military that is highly cohesive and exhibits republican attitudes towards civilian authorities, the military’s coercive power is not only able to check disruptive or destabilizing social forces, but also the regime itself. In such cases, authoritarian impulses in new electoral regimes may be constrained by the military and, in conjunction with other non-governing institutions, this ability to function as a horizontal accountability check on the regime may improve the prospects for greater political liberalization. Where the military is not cohesive and has a history of violent and interventionist civil-military relations, its coercive power is likely to be low, resulting in continued cycles of violence. Finally, where the military has an intermediate degree of coercive power due to intermediate levels of cohesion and the country has a history of interventionist civil-military relations, as was the case in Burkina Faso, the military’s role in politics is likely to be mixed and more politicized. In these cases, the prospects for greater political liberalization are also likely to be mixed. Each of the three cases discussed above display the dynamics of these relationships. In short, the military matters for shaping the trajectories of regimes following the
adoption of multiparty elections; different characteristics of the military are likely to facilitate
different trajectories. Of course, and as we shall see in Chapters 7 and 8, the military is not the
only non-governing institution which matters. Neo-traditional institutions, civil society and the
opposition also play important roles in shaping regime trajectories following the adoption of
multiparty elections.
CHAPTER 7
NEO-TRADITIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND SYMBOLIC POWER IN SAHELIAN AFRICA

Introduction

Crozat [a French naval physician sent to establish relations with the Mossi], looking at the Mogho Naba through European eyes, did not find the ‘great king’ he had expected. Yet he and later European visitors to the Mossi capital [Ouagadougou] did affirm that all Mossi officials and district chiefs prostrated themselves in obeisance to their sovereign, even if they did not subsequently follow his instructions.

—Elliot Skinner

The Mossi of Upper Volta

In this chapter, I discuss the neo-traditional institutions that shaped the regime trajectories of Burkina Faso, Chad and Senegal following their respective adoptions of multiparty elections. By neo-traditional institutions, I am referring to those institutions that draw their significance from social sources of authority such as religious orders, chieftaincies or other forms of authority rooted in social traditions. Typically, neo-traditional institutions are outside of government, formal politics, and the state’s administration and thus, I define them as non-governing institutions. Designating them neo-traditional underscores that these institutions are dynamic and change over time. Indeed, as discussed in Chapter 4, colonial rule dramatically reshaped the landscape of existing African institutions from which most neo-traditional institutions originated. Colonial authorities frequently refashioned these existing institutional frameworks by working with those traditional leaders who were willing to adapt to colonial objectives. This process of refashioning institutions to meet colonial objectives, such as maintaining order and extracting labor and resources, changed the ways in which already existing institutions functioned in society. This, in turn, restructured socio-political relations, resulting in new forms of political order under which neo-traditional institutions frequently play influential roles.

1 The epigraph to this chapter is drawn from Skinner (1964, 32).
Today, neo-traditional institutions continue to wield substantial power over local populations in sub-Saharan Africa, making them important tools for the organization and accumulation of power under electoral regimes. Traditional institutions play important roles in the provisions of public goods, access and decisions regarding funds for development, and in many cases, local governance (Baldwin 2016 and Wilfahrt 2015). Moreover, public opinion research across the continent shows that rather than viewing chiefs as antithetical to democracy, Africans instead embrace the dual systems of authority as an integrated institutional framework (Logan 2009). Neo-traditional institutions also provide electoral regimes with potential sources of socially based authority and legitimacy. However, it is crucial to note that just as regimes follow divergent trajectories over time, neo-traditional institutions and their socially-based sources of authority also shift over time and often as a result of their configuration and relationship with the regime.

Consequently, while the sources of neo-traditional institutions’ authority are rooted in long social traditions, these traditions have been adapted to contemporary contexts often with remarkable ingenuity. Neo-traditional institutions derive relevance from their traditional roots and social following, and they engage with contemporary issues to sustain their continued relevance. This creates a reciprocal relationship where the social context, within which neo-traditional institutions operate and which neo-traditional institutions themselves shape, also shapes the interests of neo-traditional institutions for maintaining authority and relevance. Through this cycle the actions neo-traditional institutions shape the trajectory of social and political developments and respond to those developments. I understand this reciprocal process by which institutions both shape and then are shaped by their contexts as a form of institutional change over time, sometimes referred to as “institutional drift” (Hacker Pierson and Thelen
2015, 180). These changes or adaptations are gradual, sometimes difficult to notice, but through a process-based analysis that captures the influences of and on these institutions, the forms of institutional change become clearer. Where neo-traditional institutions successfully accomplish the balancing act of stably adapting to and structuring their socio-political context, they in turn become socially and politically integrated, following a similar logic to path-dependence. In such cases, neo-traditional institutions exhibit a high degree of what I term symbolic power, and are likely to collaborate with electoral regimes.

I define symbolic power as the ability to use status and reverence as a means for directing the actions of others. Such power is often tenuous at best, and the institutions that wield it must adapt to their changing political and sociological contexts in order to maintain it. This was true during the establishment of colonial rule when these institutions faced the invasion and conquest of the French, but it has also remained true during the time of electoral politics. Neo-traditional institutions routinely cooperate with regimes to identify the ways in which they can maintain their social authority through their symbolic power. In some cases, this produces a form of symbiotic relationship between neo-traditional institutions and regimes, where regimes profit from the recognition and support of neo-traditional institutions, and those institutions benefit from political integration within the regime. The degree of symbolic power wielded by neo-traditional institutions, and the ways in which it is used, are determined by two factors: 1) the level of their political integration; and 2) the level of their social integration.

By political integration, I am referring to those neo-traditional institutions that openly collaborate with the regime, and yet, maintain their own independent source of authority outside of the regime’s control. When neo-traditional institutions are politically integrated within a regime, they are likely to structure political processes such that they maintain the status quo,
thereby working to mitigate pressures for greater political liberalization. Where neo-traditional institutions are not integrated politically, they are likely to either work against the regime by attempting to carve out their own areas of authority, or to seek integration into the regime to benefit from potential collaboration. I understand socially integrated neo-traditional institutions as those which have broad effective ties to the population, including that large numbers of people owe allegiance to these institutions, and that this allegiance in fact matters in terms of shaping people’s behavior. As such, they wield a greater degree of symbolic power by holding sway over a larger portion of society. Conversely, where numerous neo-traditional institutions overlap or capture disparate groups of the population, that symbolic power is less concentrated and less influential. From this perspective, social integration varies across quantitative demographic measures, but crucially it also has a qualitative dimension that varies in accordance with the adherence and penetration of social customs into the quotidian politics of local communities. Where such traditions are more centralized, pervasive, and consequential in the lives of citizens, neo-traditional institutions should be understood as more deeply integrated socially.

Perhaps most importantly, the different histories of neo-traditional institutions produce different outcomes regarding the presence of neo-traditional institutions with a high degree of symbolic power. For instance, where a particular neo-traditional institution captures the support of virtually the entire population, the prospects for a high level of social integration are increased. When considering the roles of neo-traditional institutions, then, one must pay close attention to historical context and social dynamics which over time may lead to social change. Similar hypothetical scenarios can be envisioned regarding the degrees of political integration, and perhaps most intriguing are those cases where an intermediate degree of social integration
results in increased political integration that serves in turn to reinforce the importance of a given neo-traditional institution socially.

In the sections that follow, I examine how neo-traditional institutions in Senegal, Chad and Burkina Faso vary in their degree of political and social integration. Senegal presents a case of high political as well as social integration, that most closely resembles the ideal reciprocal relationship that promotes and enhances symbolic power. Senegal also demonstrates the ways in which neo-traditional institutions adapt to changing political contexts through institutional drift. The institutional organization and infrastructure of Sufi orders in Senegal provided French colonial authorities with an already socially integrated system of traditional institutions with which to collaborate during colonial rule. The high degree of social integration and the organized hierarchical structure of the Sufi order caused the French to be initially wary of these traditional institutions. However, in time it became clear that the collaboration between the French and the Sufi orders would benefit both parties. During the post-colonial period, Senegalese political leaders continued to invest and develop their political collaborations with the Sufi orders, which significantly contributed to political stability and the gradual democratization of the Senegalese regime.

Chad displays essentially the complete opposite form of interactions. The neo-traditional institutions in Chad remain disparate and at times opposed to one another, resulting in a low degree of social integration. The violence that characterized the societies of contemporary Chad prior to colonial rule and then during colonial rule left neo-traditional institutions with limited social authority for Chadians. Since neo-traditional institutions in Chad exhibit a low degree of social integration, they only wield symbolic power over small and disparate communities, and rarely in a coordinated manner. Consequently, post-colonial regimes in Chad have rarely sought
to use these institutions to bolster their own stability. The Chadian electoral regime has approached neo-traditional institutions opportunistically through forms of neo-patrimonialism and strategically by instigating fragmentation or through cooptation. One insightful Chadian analyst likened the regime’s strategy of manipulating neo-traditional institutions to “a game of multi-dimensional chess.” These strategies offer little opportunity for neo-traditional institutions to cultivate symbolic power and simultaneously prevent neo-traditional institutions from developing a high degree of political or social integration.

Burkina Faso again represents an intermediate case. The centralized and hierarchical structure of the Mossi kingdom with its large population provides this neo-traditional institution a relatively high degree of social integration. Recognizing this, the French initially tried to sideline the Mossi, but its colonial administrators quickly realized the chiefs could help to organize and implement colonial rule. This led to the political integration of the Mossi chieftaincy and other neo-traditional institutions in ways which helped maintain colonial order. However, as the quote at the beginning of this chapter highlights, the Mossi chiefs’ power prior to colonial rule, and certainly after, only extended so far. The majority of Burkinabè are not Mossi, though they may view the Mogho Naba, and other Mossi chiefs, with great respect. This respect, even for those Burkinabè who are Mossi, may not result in complete or total obedience. Neo-traditional institutions in Burkina Faso are characterized by a higher degree of ambiguity because of this intermediate level of social integration—there are multiple sources of symbolic power in Burkinabè society, and consequently, Burkinabè people are more selective in their personal sources of authority. Nevertheless, as I discuss in more detail below, the Mossi kingdom as a neo-traditional institution maintains a high degree of symbolic power and the

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2 Interview N’Djamena with Chadian researcher and professor at the University of N’Djamena.
traditional chiefs frequently play important roles alongside religious leaders in Burkinabè affairs. The Mossi chieftaincy’s central location and long history of political integration continues to lead political leaders to frequently seek support from the Mogho Naba’s symbolic power. Historically, this has resulted in a relatively close collaboration between neo-traditional institutions in Burkina Faso, particularly during moments of political or social unrest. The electoral regime of Burkina Faso worked closely with the institutions of the Mossi Empire in the 1990s and 2000s, and each continues to play important roles in the organization and accumulation of power in Burkina Faso. As a point of departure, a brief account of the Mogho Naba’s various roles during the events surrounding the 2015 insurrection and political transition highlight the ambiguous role of symbolic power exhibited by the Mossi Chief.

The Mogho Naba in the 2015 Political Transition: Symbolic Ambiguity

The reverence ascribed to the Mogho Naba, and the Mossi chieftaincy as an institution, played a central role in the efforts of numerous actors to establish and maintain peace during the turbulent political events of 2014 and 2015. In Chapter 3, I discussed the 2014 meeting between the Mogho Naba and Lt. Colonel Isaac Zida who, despite significant pressure and calls for a civilian-led transitional regime, claimed to be the interim head of state following Blaise Compaoré’s resignation.3 As citizens urged the military to hand over power to a civilian, influential figures such as the Mogho Naba helped mediate this crisis and restore political order through the establishment of the transitional government. The public meeting between Zida and the Mogho Naba helped to calm the protesters demanding that Zida step down, but this was not

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3 Prior to the establishment of the Transitional Government many called on Kouamé Lougué, a retired general, who had led many of the popular insurrection’s marches, to be installed as the interim head of state. Lougué actually sought refuge at the Mogho Naba’s compound during this time as the RSP, and following Zida’s order, searched for Lougué. Some speculated that Zida might have met Lougué at the Mogho Naba’s compound in a secret meeting.
the last time that transitional authorities consulted the Mogho Naba during the political transition.

Unsurprisingly, a few months into the transitional government’s rule, the Mogho Naba led a delegation of traditional leaders to the presidential palace as a courtesy visit to the president of the transition, Michel Kafando.\(^4\) Such a public and symbolic demonstration was viewed by critics as an ostentatious ploy by the Mogho Naba and the other traditional leaders to maintain the appearance of their social authority, but this ignores the larger political context.\(^5\) The visit occurred on 13 February 2015, at the same time that trade union leaders were instigating protests against policies of the new transitional government. The visit also occurred shortly after transitional authorities decided to take steps towards the dissolution of the RSP (Commission 2015). The decision to disband the RSP led Prime Minister Zida to seek refuge from his own men at the Mogho Naba’s compound on 4 February 2015. In light of these events, it seems likely that the transitional government aimed through this visit to publicly demonstrate that it continued to have the support of the neo-traditional institutions.

In a similar event, Prime Minister Zida visited the Mogho Naba to bolster his legitimacy after presidential guards stormed a cabinet meeting demanding he resign in July 2015. In each of these public showings, political leaders demonstrated at least some reliance on the Mogho Naba to confer his symbolic power over their positions in efforts to maintain their legitimacy. By

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\(^4\) The delegation included the Naba Kiba from Yatenga, Naba Bassouma, the King of the Gourmantché, and Naba from Pô referred to as the Pô-Pê.

\(^5\) Indeed, one particularly cynical respondent spent nearly half of an interview developing the argument that traditional leaders have no place in a Republic. Referring to the times of the Revolution during which Sankara sidelined traditional authorities as ideal, this respondent argued that the decades of collaboration between the Compaoré governments had tainted the role of traditional institutions in politics. It should be noted that this is the only instance in my research where it was suggested that traditional authorities should be abolished. Overwhelmingly, those I met and spoke with held traditional authorities in great esteem, and even a source of national pride.
accepting their visits and meeting with these leaders, the Mogho Naba sent a signal to all Burkinabè that they had the support of the Mossi kingdom.\textsuperscript{6}

During each of the tense political moments in the Burkinabè transition of 2015 in neo-traditional institutions, and particularly the Mogho Naba, emerged as important sources for mediation and for the maintenance of political stability. Perhaps none was quite as important as the role of mediator which the Mogho Naba assumed during the military coup that took place in September 2015. As discussed in Chapter 6, seeking to avoid its dissolution and to reinstate a government that was favorable to former president Compaoré, the RSP took the President and Prime Minister of the Transition hostage at the presidential palace.\textsuperscript{7} The coup temporarily derailed the political transition and officials postponed elections. Subsequently, the Mogho Naba played a central role in the negotiations that resulted in the deal to restore the transitional administration to power.

The leader of the RSP coup, Gilbert Diendéré, visited the Mogho Naba in an attempt to generate support for his coup only a few days after declaring himself head of the Conseil National de la Démocratie (National Council of Democracy, CND). Instead of garnering support, people gradually lined the streets surrounding the Mogho Naba’s compound to protest the CND and Diendéré’s coup. Aware of the public dissatisfaction with the coup, the Mogho Naba reportedly suggested to Diendéré that the country needed to return to peace and stability. Shortly after the meeting, the media reported that the National Military had deployed to Ouagadougou to negotiate an end to this crisis.

\textsuperscript{6} Interview with retired politician, Ouagadougou, October 12, 2015.

\textsuperscript{7} Two government ministers were also taken hostage at this time: Augustin Loada, Minister of Public Works, and René Bagoro, Minister of Housing and Urban Development.
Meetings and negotiations between representatives of the CND and National Military took place at the Mogho Naba’s residence. When the two military parties agreed to an accord stipulating that the RSP would surrender and disarm, they did so in front of the Mogho Naba as a sign of good faith. The successful negotiations and the key role of the Mogho Naba led international media outlets to proclaim the Mossi King as Burkina Faso’s “mediator monarch” (BBC 2015). However, as I explained in Chapter 6, some members of the RSP chose not to surrender, ignoring the Mogho Naba and the agreement. Instead they either fled into exile or temporarily appeared willing to fight from their barracks, reactions that highlight the fact that there are also limits to the symbolic power of the Mogho Naba. As the quote at the beginning of this chapter suggests, neo-traditional institutions matter in Burkina Faso, and yet, they cannot control all Burkinabè. Not all Burkinabè are Mossi and thus may not feel particularly compelled to follow the Mogho Naba. Furthermore, Burkinabè culture demands respect for traditional authorities, but not blind obedience.⁸

During times of peace in Burkina Faso, political leaders, ambassadors, ministers and elected officials visit the Mogho Naba to receive symbolic approval by showing their respect for the traditions of the Mossi kingdom, and for the continued importance of neo-traditional institutions in the country. In times of crisis, the role of these institutions is even more important—they can serve as a bulwark against instability and when strategically employed by the regime, they can bolster the regime’s legitimacy. The events of the 2015 transition and coup demonstrate that leaders of the transition—and different parties involved in the failed coup—at

⁸ One particularly interesting feature of the Mogho Naba is his reliance on a spokesperson. Traditionally the spokesperson issues the decrees of the Mogho Naba, who does not speak to others directly in an official capacity. This insulated the Mogho Naba from those directives that are not followed, providing him the ability to avoid criticism and redirect orders as necessary. Interview Ouagadougou, August 16, 2015.
least wished to maintain this relationship with the neo-traditional institution. Both coup leaders and transitional authorities sought to gain legitimacy through visits to the Mogho Naba.

To be sure, in Burkina Faso at least, the symbolic power of neo-traditional institutions extends only so far. Once again, the events of the 2015 political transition in Burkina Faso demonstrate the intermediate status and messy center occupied by the Burkinabè case. The Mogho Naba, and more generally the neo-traditional institutions of Burkina Faso, provide an important source of political authority through the symbolic power they wield in Burkinabè society, but that power has its limits in Burkina Faso where society and traditions vary and neo-traditional institutions are incompletely integrated into society.

In the following section, I discuss the ways in which neo-traditional institutions are socially and politically integrated, and the different strategies that are employed by electoral regimes seeking to benefit from the symbolic power of neo-traditional institutions. Neo-traditional institutions play a central role in many African societies, but African societies are extremely diverse as are the neo-traditional institutions that help to structure them. Colonial experiences, social demographics, and history have shaped the integration of neo-traditional institutions in different ways across the continent and resulted in a variety of institutional frameworks with which electoral regimes must contend to organize and accumulate power.

**Neo-Traditional Institutions and Symbolic Power**

Neo-traditional institutions occupy an ambiguous area between the political and the social spheres. Throughout much of the world, religious institutions exemplify them. With the exception of theocracies, religious institutions are considered separate from political institutions, yet their importance in the lives of ordinary citizens, and the symbolic power which they wield, make them important players in politics. Even in Western democracies, such as the United States, religious institutions shape policy debates, despite institutional norms like secularism that
aim to keep religious entities removed from public life. Religious institutions are centrally important—arguably even more so—throughout Africa. They share this importance with a number of other institutions that existed prior to colonial rule and the establishment of contemporary state borders, and which are frequently referred to as traditional or customary institutions. Even the so-called ‘acephalous’ communities, which lack hierarchical or centralized political organization, exhibit forms of institutions that shape social and political order through customs such as initiation cohorts.

Generally, neo-traditional institutions are seen as an authority distinct from national politics and the government. These institutions represent specific communities—those may be ethnic communities, like the Mossi through the Mogho Naba, or they may be religious communities such as the disciples of a particular Sufi order. Nevertheless, these institutions hold a significant sway over politics as a by-product of their position as social power brokers. For example, in a village where a chief involves himself or herself in politics, this involvement will likely have a significant impact on the political decisions of the people living in that village (Hagberg et al. 2018, 43). This is particularly the case in electoral regimes because chiefs—or religious

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9 For evidence of the importance of religious institutions in Africa, see the results of survey research conducted by the Pew Research Center that provides data demonstrating the exceptionally high importance that Africans give to religion in their lives. Indeed, in Senegal 98 percent of respondents to the survey responded, “very important” to the question: “How important is religion in your life - very important, somewhat important, not too important, or not at all important?” Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life. 2010. “Tolerance and Tension: Islam and Christianity in Sub-Saharan Africa.” Accessed on June 2, 2018 http://features.pewforum.org/africa/.

10 The Sara of southern Chad are an excellent example of this. The different communities comprising the Sara did not have hierarchical or centralized political leadership, but they were bound together through initiation rites, known as yondo, which connected age peers between villages and ordered society. These initiation ceremonies continue today in the Sara communities and at times have been politicized such as toward the end of Tombalbaye’s rule (Haggar 2007, 345-52). Interview N’Djamena October 11, 2014. See also: Azevdeo (2005, 94-95).
leaders—may become so-called ‘big electors’ through whom politicians seek support and the votes of an entire village.

In these cases, neo-traditional institutions become politically integrated within the regime. This begins a path dependent relationship, structuring politics such that neo-traditional institutions collaborate with electoral regimes to maintain the status quo, and thereby work to mitigate pressures for greater political liberalization or political change. This relationship is most likely to last in the cases where neo-traditional institutions are also deeply integrated socially. Where neo-traditional institutions capture a large cross-section of the population, they wield a greater degree of symbolic power because neo-traditional institutions are concentrated in a particular group over society. However, where numerous neo-traditional institutions capture disparate groups of the population, that symbolic power is less concentrated, and therefore less influential on the regime. Thus, the degree to which neo-traditional institutions are socially integrated has ramifications for whether these institutions are likely to become politically integrated. At a certain point, if neo-traditional institutions are unable to capture a large enough cross-section of society, then they no longer present viable or valuable institutions with which to collaborate.

In these cases, regimes are more likely to pit neo-traditional institutions against one another as a means of keeping these institutions in check and limiting their symbolic power over constituents. Where neo-traditional institutions are not politically integrated, they are likely to either work against the regime by attempting to carve out their own areas of authority, or to seek integration into the regime to benefit from neopatrimonial relationships. Political elites are more likely to view neo-traditional institutions as partners in their goal to influence popular support, and thus seek to co-opt them where they wield large degrees of symbolic power. Whether neo-
traditional institutions are able to wield such power depends on whether they are socially integrated or socially irrelevant in the view of the communities. Where several neo-traditional institutions exist and hold authority over a population, the degree of social integration is lower and as a result, their ability to sway popular opinion or command populations with any social authority is limited. In this scenario, it is unlikely that they will be able to effectively mobilize large sections of society for political liberalization or vice versa to support the status quo of an electoral authoritarian regime.

Insofar as neo-traditional institutions are able to function as a bulwark against pressures for increased political liberalization, regimes may put them to this use. This is most likely to take place during times of political or social unrest, when electoral regimes are facing challenges to their own power. In such moments, neo-traditional institutions can sometimes provide stabilizing forces to return calm to social or political unrest. As the previous episode from Burkina Faso’s recent political transition highlights above, at moments of heightened pressure or increased instability, political leaders sought out the Mogho Naba for his symbolic power and the social legitimacy he could confer as the leader of the Mossi. The reverence with which Burkinabè people hold the Mogho Naba supplied different political actors with much needed legitimacy at times of crisis. However, the Mogho Naba’s influence was also not absolute. The decisions of some RSP members not to surrender despite the Mogho Naba’s role in the negotiations suggests the symbolic power is limited.

Figure 7-1 places Burkina Faso, Chad and Senegal in quadrants based on the degree to which their neo-traditional institutions are integrated politically and socially. In Burkina Faso, neo-traditional institutions are highly integrated into the political system. Leaders of neo-traditional institutions routinely weigh in on political issues, and regimes use their support to
maintain order in times of socio-political crises. However, there are many forms of neo-traditional institutions in Burkina Faso, meaning that there is not one set of institutions with which the regime can engage. As I develop below, religious institutions in Burkina Faso are also gaining influence over the population, though they remain less politically integrated. This has resulted in the electoral regime giving certain neo-traditional institutions greater preference over others, due to their perceived degrees of symbolic power.

![Figure 7-1. Neo-Traditional Institutions](image)

In Chad, neo-traditional institutions are neither politically nor socially integrated. There are simply too many different neo-traditional institutions for these institutions to present a threatening—or useful—degree of symbolic power. Consequently, they are unable to credibly check the regime, and instead vie amongst each other for access to the resources and recognition of the regime. Given that this is the case, the regime in Chad has strategically engaged neo-traditional institutions to dole out patronage to allies or to deepen local political conflicts in efforts to weaken any potential opposition. In Senegal, neo-traditional institutions are highly integrated into the political and social realities of Senegalese society. This creates a mutually
reinforcing dynamic whereby politicians and leaders of the neo-traditional institutions provide checks and balances on each other’s ability to accumulate and organize power.

The following sections discuss neo-traditional institutions in the specific contexts of each country focused on in this dissertation. In Senegal, neo-traditional institutions may exemplify the ways in which institutional drift can reshape the roles of neo-traditional institutions in politics and society as both undergo structural change. The neo-traditional institutional framework in Senegal provided its electoral regime with a source of political stability during its gradual democratization (Villalón 1995). As the regime in Senegal gradually democratized, the roles of neo-traditional institutions in the country gradually shifted as well. Villalón (2010 and 2015) terms this development the “democratization of the religious sphere.”

Burkina Faso demonstrates that a high degree of political integration has limits, and without a corresponding degree of social integration, electoral regimes may face occasional challenges from social forces seeking political change. The strategic collaboration between the electoral authoritarian regime under Compaoré in Burkina Faso relied on neo-traditional institutions at various moments; but ultimately, political miscalculations made support for Compaoré’s government untenable, even for neo-traditional leaders. The ambiguous relationship between neo-traditional institutions and political regimes in Burkina Faso is both the result of the country’s history and the intermediate degree of social integration—the Mossi are not a majority of the Burkinabè population and thus do not capture the same degree of social integration as the Sufi orders in Senegal, despite that their centralized and hierarchical chieftaincy structures are analogous. In Chad, the disparate types and forms of neo-traditional institutions limit their ability to provide symbolic power to the regime, but also fail to pose any real coordinated threat to the regime’s authority. Consequently, the increasingly authoritarian regime in Chad engages with
neo-traditional institutions to pit them against one another and/or supports certain neo-traditional regimes to undercut potential rivals.

**Three Different Frameworks of Neo-Traditional Institutions**

**Senegal and the Gradual Democratization of the Religious Sphere**

Senegal’s neo-traditional institutions have historically been a stabilizing force in politics. The Sufi orders in Senegal function as a check on an arbitrary exercise of state power, and thus these institutions are key to explaining the country’s political development and regime trajectory (Villalón 1995 and 2015). The Sufi orders are also pervasive with virtually all Senegalese who follow a *marabout* (Sufi religious leader) and a particular branch of a Sufi order. This is not to say that other forms of social authority, culture, or customs do not matter to Senegalese people, or that Sufi orders are the exclusive source of symbolic power in Senegal. To the contrary, Senegal maintains a small minority—approximately five percent of the population—who identify as Catholics, and the Sufi orders of course have very limited symbolic power over this community. However, other neo-traditional institutions are simply not as integrated in Senegalese society and politics. The Sufi orders are socially and politically integrated to such a high degree that they influence the lives of practically all Senegalese, regardless of an individual’s personal faith.

The Sufi orders engage with state power while maintaining some distance from it through their powerful and cohesive forms of social organization. Their well-developed institutional hierarchies introduce a measure of balance in state-society relations that has underpinned the country’s regime stability during and following the colonial period (Villalón 2015, 306). As the center of the French colonial administration in the AOF, colonial administrators in Senegal established a heavily institutionalized system which relied on the incorporation of the Sufi orders to bolster and extend colonial authority (Robinson 2000). In return, the Sufi orders used their
position within the French colonial system to their benefit. The French required obedient subjects, while the Sufi orders sought faithful disciples, and these dueling ambitions to cultivate authority over society quickly found overlapping interests and incentives for collaboration (Villalón 1995, 201). The strong relationship between colonial authorities and the Sufi orders in Senegal developed into a symbiotic relationship unlike any other in the AOF or AEF (Villalón 2009, 44).

The colonial policies of collaboration and integration laid the foundation for post-colonial relationships between these neo-traditional institutions and the state. This symbiotic relationship crafted a mutually beneficial framework for political stability, but it also contributed to the ability of the Senegalese regime to follow a trajectory of gradual democratization in the post-colonial period. In many ways, the relationship between the regime and Senegal’s Sufi orders represents a path dependence par excellence where both benefitted as long as they collaborated to maintain stability and negotiate reform. As Senegal followed this trajectory, its socio-political context evolved in ways which shifted the effects and aims of Sufi orders through a process of institutional drift.

The two most dominant Sufi orders in Senegal: 1) the Tijaniyya which captures a larger cross-section of society and is divided among several branches based on different familial lineages; and 2) the Mouride order, which originated in Senegal during the colonial period and under the leadership of Cheikh Amadou Bamba Mbacké. Today, these Sufi orders are still led

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11 In depth accounts of the Mouride order’s origins can be found in Cruise O’Brien (1971) and Babou (2007). Other Sufi orders are also present in Senegal society such as the: Qadriyya and the significantly smaller Layene order. The Layene order, comprised primarily of disciples from the costal Lebou ethnic group, is an indigenous order, while the Qadiriyya is a much older order, founded in Baghdad and spread to Senegal and across much of West Africa from Mauritania. For an account of the Layene association during the presidency of Aboudoulaye Wade, see Diagne (2013). A particularly detailed account of the relationships between marabouts and their disciples and the different orders can be found in Villalón (1995, 115-199).
by families and religious leaders—known throughout West Africa as marabouts—who trace their lineage back to the founders of their respective orders. Marabouts are held in the utmost esteem throughout society and Sufi orders are considered “the single most important feature of the contours of Senegalese society which the state confronts in its efforts to elaborate a basis for the exercise of power” (Villalón 1994a, 434). The ability of the Sufi orders to adapt to changing political circumstances under French rule, and to subsequently carve out their own space within post-colonial electoral politics, solidifies these neo-traditional institutions as a crucial and entrenched feature of the Senegalese socio-political environment. Indeed, due to their expansive social integration and the early institutionalization of their political integration, Sufi orders in Senegal contributed directly to the gradual democratization of the country’s regime.

As discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, French decolonization in 1960 initiated a transfer of authority to an African elite trained by colonial authorities, and in Senegal this transfer took place within the existing model of collaboration and integration between the regime and neo-traditional institutions. Sufi leaders continued to collaborate with the state, seeking to ensure their own interests and relevance in the future (Villalón 2009). Even during moments of social unrest shortly after independence, the regime was able to remain stable, in part thanks to the staunch support of the marabouts. Indeed, particularly tense moments in the elections of 1963 and 1968 saw large-scale protests based on economic grievances, yet despite these protests Senghor ran unopposed, having consolidated power under a de facto single-party regime. During this period, religious leaders, who continued to collaborate closely with Senghor’s regime, actively urged their followers to vote for Senghor (Clark 1999, 161). The cohesiveness that the Sufi orders maintained throughout this period directly influenced the durability of Senegal’s first regime and its further developments (Back 2008, 439). The symbiotic relationship that existed
between marabouts and the state during colonial times had clearly survived the initial changes following independence.

Following Senghor’s decision to reestablish a multi-party system, he continued to actively court the support of neo-traditional institutions, while also maintaining the officially laïque (secular) nature of the state (Clark 1999, 161). The Sufi orders provided to the Senegalese regime under Senghor, and the leadership of his party the PS, the promise of popular support and political stability. Most famously, this took place through religious injunctions known as ndigals in Wolof (Senegal’s lingua franca), which the Sufi orders invoked at election time as a type of voting instruction to their disciples in favor of the ruling party (Villalón 2015, 310). After Senghor resigned in 1980, handing the presidency over to Diouf, a number of reforms were undertaken, opening the political system to more competition (Villalón 1994b, 170). However, the marabouts continued to support the PS with Diouf as president. Even during times of economic hardship, increased political opposition and social discontent, the leaders of the Sufi orders urged their disciples to support the PS in elections to varying degrees.

The mutually beneficial relations based on state concessions to religious authorities in exchange for their political support of the PS and of Diouf undoubtedly reassured the ruling party that an expansion of political liberalization through the inauguration of completely multiparty, though incompletely democratic, elections would not be detrimental to the PS

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12 I use the French laïque here to signify the fact that secularism in Senegal and throughout most of the Francophone world is modeled much more closely on the form of institutionalized secularism observed in France. This form of secularism enforces the strict separation of religious and public spheres, such that all religion and religious symbolism is equally excluded from public discourse and space. In the era of democratization this French conception has come under significant fire and in many ways has been untenable given the deeply religious societies of West Africa. This might be best contrasted with the American version of secularism which focuses instead on equal inclusion, at least in principle, of all religions.

13 See also Villalón (1995, 138-39, 197-98, and 263-64) for more on the use of ndigals during elections.
political future. As I have developed in more detail in Chapter 5, the electoral system began to evolve during the late 1980s facing pressures for further democratization, and that evolution in combination with other social changes shifted the role and interests of religious actors (Villalón 2015, 310).

Diouf’s victory in the 1988 presidential elections resulted in riots led largely by unemployed youth who used the word sopi (‘change’ in Wolof) as their rallying cry (Gomez-Perez, LeBlanc and Savadogo 2009, 187 and Villalón 1994b, 173). Though the PS continued to dominate the political scene, the 1988 elections highlighted the potential for a political crisis. These groups of mobilized protesters were comprised primarily of unemployed youth, which the Sufi orders had not fully incorporated. These youth represented a generation that grew up outside of the colonial experience, and in a time of increased economic pressures due to a growing population and the adoption of structural adjustment reforms (Villalón 2015, 312). These social changes resulted in individuals who felt less tied to the practice of ndigals, in conjunction with economic dissatisfaction. These changes somewhat reduced the ability of the Sufi orders to manage social demands for political change. However, while the 1988 elections resulted in large-scale protest and accusations of fraud, the PS regime continued to rely on the Sufi orders to help restore social stability. The Sufi orders helped to accomplish this without incurring significant harm to their religious authority or symbolic power, but their followers began to increasingly insist that the Sufi order remain out of politics (Villalón 2015, 313). This put the regime in a weakened position vis-à-vis the demands of the opposition which resulted in additional concessions—notably concerning electoral reform—such as the new electoral code passed before the 1993 elections.
The generation of dissatisfied youth entering the political scene in Senegal coincided largely with an exponential growth in numbers of descendants of the founders of the Sufi orders. The increased number of Sufi leaders’ descendants put increasing pressures on the marabouts themselves to develop their own followings to maintain their socio-religious authority. With increasing pressures to stay out of politics and the growing possibility of fragmentation within the Sufi orders due to the increasing number of marabouts, the Sufi orders did not issue an ndigal ahead of the 1993 presidential election. Nevertheless, even without the direct pronouncement of maraboutic support, Diouf again won the elections in 1993. The opposition’s loss, despite the new electoral code and lack of an ndigal issued to support the regime, frayed the political will of the urban educated elite who supported the opposition (Villalón, 1994).

Outraged, youth and the opposition contributed to a tense political climate following the 1993 elections, and sensing the deep dissatisfaction with the regime, the Sufi orders consequently further distanced themselves from the political sphere by the mid–1990s. In fact, they completely refrained from publicly giving political advice to their disciples both in terms of the vote and in terms of political activism (Clark 1999, 162).

These changes culminated in the breakthrough 2000 elections which brought the opposition Parti Démocratique Sénégalais (PDS) to power. The process leading up to the 2000 turnover in power was gradual and incremental. The agreements struck during the years of the 1990s, were marked by intense negotiations between the PS and the PDS regarding further democratic and liberalizing reforms. These agreements ultimately led to the democratization of

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14 This lack of religious edicts supporting the PS was particularly notable for the Mourides who had routinely issued ndigals in favor of the PS ahead of past elections. One slight exception, came from the Moustarchidine movement within the Tijaniyya Sufi order. This movement issued a major anti-regime, essentially anti-PS, political statement that was also uncharacteristic of the Sufi orders past actions (Villalón 1998).
the political system (Villalón 2009, 45). These political changes also spurred further socio-religious change.

Evidently, the neo-traditional structures of the Sufi orders faced significant strains on their ability to manage social dissent against the PS-led regime during the 1990s. Nevertheless, the relationship between the state and the Sufi orders helped to guarantee the stability that was necessary for political reforms to take place to begin with, and ultimately to ensure that a gradual process of democratization followed the adoption of multiparty elections in the 1980s (Villalón 1994b, 165). The rules of the political game shifted incrementally during the 1990s, ultimately giving in to increased mobilization, led by civil society and the opposition (the subject of Chapter 8) and culminating in the democratic turnover of political power in 2000 and again in 2012. The elections and peaceful turnover of power from Abdou Diouf and the PS to Abdoulaye Wade and the PDS marked an important political change, helping to strengthen democracy in Senegal. It also coincided with significant changes in the ability of the Sufi orders to insure and maintain their political influence. This change represents a moment of institutional drift for Senegalese neo-traditional institutions; as the political system democratized, the religious orders adapted.

As president, Abdoulaye Wade also sought out the support and the help of the Sufi orders. Indeed, as he personally had done immediately following his election in 2000, Wade and his entire cabinet paid a controversial visit to the leader of the Mouride order on the eve of the legislative elections in 2001. Senegalese newspapers circulated images of Wade—the President of the Republic—prostrating himself to his marabout, raising questions about both the secular nature of the state and the preferential treatment of one Sufi order over the others. The controversy surrounding Wade’s relationship with the Mouride order persisted throughout his
presidency (Babou 2013 and Diouf 2013). While the *marabouts* refrained from the very public pronouncements or religious edicts on public affairs, their influence over the population continued (and continues) to render the Sufi orders politically important. However, the socio-economic changes that led to growing demands for political change also resulted in socio-religious change when the Sufi orders began to adapt themselves to democratic politics. Through the reciprocal processes of political and social change, Sufi orders adjusted their *political positions* to adapt to a changing social context and persisting in their *social role* as forces of stabilization.

Large-scale political changes, such as democratization, imply significant changes in the way that interests are aggregated and expressed publicly. In deeply religious societies, such as Senegal, democracy may provide an effective tool for promoting religious goals and policies as it serves to express the will of the majority (Villalón 2015, 328). The efforts of religious leaders in Senegal to promote their interests, values and agendas has led some to question the democratic nature of this system, but the fact that religious leaders have pursued these goals within the democratic system suggests that democratization is on a path toward consolidation in Senegalese politics. Indeed, as Senegal’s gradual democratization proceeds, the effects of neo-traditional institutions have drifted from support for a less than democratic regime to support for democratic rule that represents the majority.

**Burkina Faso and Ambiguous but “Wise” Chiefs**

In Burkina Faso, electoral politics has been typified by an ambiguous relationship with neo-traditional institutions like the Mossi and other chieftaincies. Generally, neo-traditional institutions have supported the regime and political leaders in an effort to maintain social peace and the political status quo. In many ways, these efforts appear similar to those of the Sufi orders in Senegal, which collaborated with the regime directly to maintain stability. In Burkina Faso,
the Catholic Church and the Mossi chiefs similarly supported the electoral regime at times of social unrest, but the more diverse backdrop of neo-traditional institutions in Burkina Faso and the smaller population captured by these institutions resulted in a less socially integrated status. The lower degree of social integration in turn meant that these institutions wielded less symbolic power over the population. Consequently, neo-traditional institutions in Burkina Faso have navigated a more ambiguous path, frequently calling for calm only after political violence and repression have been exercised by the regime (Hagberg 2007). This has exposed neo-traditional institutions to significant criticism at times of intense socio-political debate. They maintain an uncertain relationship with the current regime; at times neo-traditional institutions have called for reforms in the name of ‘the people,’ while at other times they clearly support the regime and counsel their followers to stay out of the streets. In this section, I focus on the different relationships neo-traditional institutions, particularly the Mossi chiefs, have had with regimes in Burkina Faso. Then I highlight a few key events from the Compaoré era to demonstrate their ambiguous relationship with the current regime.

As I have discussed above the Mossi chieftaincy, particularly during and since colonization, has closely collaborated with those in power in Burkina Faso. However, in the immediate post-colonial period the chiefs were sidelined by the country’s first president, Maurice Yaméogo. Indeed, Yaméogo made public displays of his authority over the chiefs, and took steps to limit their power (Skinner 1964, 202-3). During times of economic hardship, Yaméogo’s corruption and increasingly ostentatious lifestyle angered trade unions and other workers who began calling for his removal from office. The Mogho Naba, along with the Catholic Cardinal in Ouagadougou, called on Yaméogo to make concessions, but he refused. That decision precipitated his removal from power and Burkina Faso’s first military regime
(Harsch 2017, 25). Relations between the military regimes of the 1970s and 1980s and neo-traditional institutions in Burkina Faso remained at ease until the leftist revolutionary regime of Thomas Sankara came to power in 1983.

Sankara embraced an egalitarian and leftist view of politics that had little room for hierarchical or religious institutions, and his regime marks a contentious moment for neo-traditional institutions in Burkinabè politics. Depicting them as feudal structures, Sankara’s government named traditional chiefs the “enemies of the people” and attempted to formally remove them of their status by expanding the government’s presence throughout the country (Harsch 2017, 85). The regime pursued these goals by establishing Comités de Défense de la Révolution (Committees for the Defense of the Revolution, CDRs) which aimed to shift local authority from the chieftaincies to commoners through participatory democracy. The tactics of indirect rule through the chiefs in local communities came to a quick, albeit temporary, end in this period.

However, this dramatic change particularly for the Mossi was met with various degrees of acceptance. In many cases, villages appropriated the process by appointing chiefs themselves to the CDRs, and frequently the implementation of Sankara’s policies depended heavily on the degree to which local chiefs remained integrated into politics.¹⁵ Sankara, recognized that the neo-traditional institutions of Burkina Faso wielded a certain amount of power, but he also believed that collaboration with them only served to keep the state weak.¹⁶ Consequently, the solution for his revolutionary regime was to divest neo-traditional institutions of their power.

¹⁵ Interview with a civil servant, Ouagadougou, August 27, 2015: “The idea that one could come to power and declare that centuries of tradition were to be forgotten and chiefs were now on equal footing with slaves was truly revolutionary. It was also a terrible joke. In the countryside chiefs would never give up their status so easily.”

¹⁶ Interview with political party leader claiming to follow the ideology of Sankara’s revolution, Ouagadougou, August 18, 2015.
Today, one can still find remnants of this tense battle for symbolic power in Burkina Faso. Hundreds of thousands of people recall Sankara with esteem and respect; he has inspired generations. But for some, his defiance of the chieftaincy in Burkina was a mistake:

Sankara viewed the chiefs as a relic of the past standing in the way of his desire to advance the country. He wished to remove them from their status because he truly believed that they were holding us back. I have often thought that if Sankara himself had not been Silma-Mossi [of mixed Mossi and Peulh origins] that this would not have been a problem. Then he might have better understood the place of the chieftaincy in our culture.¹⁷

Ultimately, Sankara failed to completely abolish the status of the traditional chiefs and other neo-traditional institutions in Burkina Faso. During Sankara’s regime, chiefs lost their positions as indirect rulers, coordinating between the central government and local communities (Harsch 2017, 85). However, these neo-traditional institutions maintained important social positions in many of Burkina Faso’s diverse communities; they continued to wield significant symbolic power.

While Sankara viewed the chiefs as outdated and backward-looking forces, Compaoré’s regime quietly, reinstated their positions as social power brokers for the regime. Under Compaoré neo-traditional institutions were seen as important potential tools for manipulating society. Traditional chiefs received material and financial benefits in exchange for their support of the CDP (Somé 2003, 242). During Compaoré’s regime, religious authorities, notably from the Catholic clergy (Kolesnore 2016), but also Pentecostals (Laurent 2009), became more and more involved in public and political affairs.¹⁸ Muslim leaders have historically had lower

¹⁷ Interview with retired businesswoman, Ouagadougou, October 12, 2015. See also footnote 13.

¹⁸ Several interviews substantiated the role of Christian religious authorities in political life. Notably, during a church visit, one source pointed out that certain well-known politicians attended multiple church services on Sunday and during each, the pastors would highlight their presence in the congregation. Frequently, contributions to the church would be collected shortly after such an announcement – the implication being that the politician would then leave a large contribution. Church visit, Ouagadougou October 18, 2015.
visibility, but that has started to change in recent years (Madore 2016 and Saint Lary 2009). These neo-traditional leaders—chiefs and religious authorities—held important positions as commissioners and other cultural liaisons during Compaoré’s regime. They also played central roles in maintaining support for the regime and at times actively worked to elect themselves of close (but subordinate) relatives or supporters to the National Assembly.19 Yet, as discussed with the Sufi orders in Senegal, these leaders also have their own interests to which to attend.

Two events in particular, the establishment of the Collège des Sages (Council of the Wise) and the debate surrounding the Senate and the reform of presidential term limits, highlight these interests. However, as I develop below, unlike Senegal the ambiguous stance of neo-traditional institutions in Burkina Faso is unrelated to larger processes of social change. Instead, these institutions attempted to counter the political miscalculations of the Compaoré regime without losing their own positions of social authority. Given their intermediate degrees of symbolic power, neo-traditional institutions abandoned the regime, and Compaoré and the CDP lost power when their mistakes let to the popular insurrection in 2014.

In 1999, Compaoré created the Collège des Sages as a special commission composed of religious, traditional and former political leaders, in response to the wide-scale protests led by the ‘Trop C’est Trop’ (Enough is Enough) campaign. This campaign was a reaction to the Zongo Affair, previously discussed in Chapter 5. Leaders of the movement viewed the commission with skepticism because those appointed to the commission were seen as regime sycophants or ideologically conservative.20 However, the commission produced a report for the government

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19 Personal communication with the author from scholar who trained legislators in Burkina Faso’s National Assembly during 1999.

20 Interview with long-time leader of civil society, Ouagadougou March 2, 2015.
that recommended significant institutional reforms, including the reestablishment of presidential term limits, intended to help reestablish stability in the country. Amongst the leaders’ recommendations were reforms to the electoral code, the constitution and the administration of elections. In 2001, the government adopted many of these reforms, the most significant of which was the reinstatement of presidential term limits at a maximum of two five-year consecutive terms, and the adoption of an electoral system based fully on proportional representation in the legislature.\textsuperscript{21} Initially, these reforms satisfied some within the opposition and civil society movement. They also lessened popular pressure on the regime and restored social calm to the country.

Additionally, the reforms marked a formal incorporation of neo-traditional institutions in political affairs. One of the reforms called for the establishment of an independent electoral commission (\textit{Commission Electoral National Independent}, CENI). The CENI would be comprised of fifteen members, five from the ruling party coalition parties, five from the opposition, and five for ‘civil society’ which included a Muslim delegate, a Catholic delegate, a Protestant delegate, a delegate from traditional institutions (chieftaincies), and a delegate from the human rights organizations. The fifteen-member commission also elected a member from the five civil society delegates to serve as the president of the commission. With the exception of the human rights delegate—and occasionally the Catholic delegate—the civil society members almost exclusively voted with the ruling party representatives.\textsuperscript{22} In the words of one interviewee

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item[\textsuperscript{21}] Previously, the legislative elections utilized a mixed system where the party which won the largest proportion of the votes also won a majority of the seats up for election in that constituency. This effectively placed certain constituencies under a winner takes all first past the post electoral system. For more on the electoral system in Burkina Faso visit the Trans-Saharan Elections Project (TSEP) run by the University of Florida’s Sahel Research Group: \url{https://tsep.africa.ufl.edu/}.
\item[\textsuperscript{22}] Interview with former member of the CENI, Ouagadougou, December 11, 2015.
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discussing the CENI under Compaoré, “the independence of the CENI was a farce. The opposition fought to insure the fairness of elections, but the CDP is too close with the traditional and religious leaders…They support each other to maintain the status quo.”23 However, this view of the CENI, and those representing neo-traditional institutions, as complicit with the ruling party began to change following the 2010 elections.

Following the low turnout and discrepancies that plagued elections of 2010, the CENI came under fire from many different activists. This prompted a slight reshuffling of the CENI, but little else until the government proposed to create a second chamber in the legislature, a Senate. This rather obvious ploy to create a legislative path to reform of presidential elections sparked public outcry strong enough to shift the stance of the Catholic Church and traditional leaders from supporting the regime to being a bit more critical. In 2013, the Catholic bishops diagnosed the democratic society as “sick,” subject to social infections like impunity, corruption, and growing inequality (Kolesnore 2016, 33). Officially, the Catholic clergy stated that if the Senate were established they would not take their seats, even though the proposed Senate provided for a number of seats to represent the Catholic, Protestant, Muslim, and traditional leaders. Ultimately, the Senate proposal met strong resistance—in the form of rallies and protests—from the political opposition and civil society. These demonstrations against the Senate served as a primer to the October 2014 popular insurrection as the protests shifted from the proposed Senate, to rejecting a referendum on presidential term limits, to rejecting a proposed law to reform term limits.

During these protest movements against the state, traditional and religious authorities became very involved in Burkina Faso’s socio-political events, mainly on the side of ‘the

23 Interview with a government official, Ouagadougou, December 5, 2015.
people,’ but always with the goal of restoring social order. Having long been associated with the ruling power, this shift represents a type of semi-renaissance for neo-traditional institutions in Burkina Faso (Hagberg et al. 2018, 44). Alternatively, it may simply highlight the ambiguous positions of traditional and religious authorities, particularly of the Mogho Naaba and the Catholic clergy. Their positions became extremely clear during the political miscalculations of the CDP which resulted in the popular insurrection. When the regime took steps which these neo-traditional leaders deigned as potentially disruptive, they drew on their symbolic power in withdrawing support from the regime to avoid being targets of popular discontent and to preserve their social stature. However, it remains to be seen, following the end of Compaoré’s rule, whether their positions have dramatically changed or will simply recalibrate back to the previous configuration (Hagberg et al. 2018, 46). Neo-traditional institutions in Burkina Faso have historically been politically integrated, but the intermediate demographic coverage of the Mossi chieftaincies and the plurality of other potential leaders suggest a need to follow the will of the people. In the case of the popular insurrection, most leaders of neo-traditional institutions recognized their inability to prevent the unrest; unfortunately for Compaoré and his government, his political advisors did not.

**Chad and its “Useful” and “Useless” Communities**

Neo-traditional institutions in Chad are numerous and disparate. The end of the Borno Empire hastened by the advent of French colonialism only made this situation worse. As the French systematically conquered contemporary Chadian territory, the existing African

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24 I do not intend to suggest that other more socially integrated neo-traditional institutions do not need to follow the will of the people. As the case of Senegal presents. The Sufi orders remained keenly aware of their political actions and took care not to act in ways that would cause them to lose disciples. I rather intend to imply here that the Mossi chieftaincies could never claim to have the same demographic following as the Sufi orders and as a result the degree to which they could persuade or influence the behavior of Burkinabè, their symbolic power, was more intermediate.
institutions broke down under colonial rule. As discussed in Chapter 4, the French invested more heavily in the South, ‘le Tchad utile,’ (useful Chad) than in the central or northern regions. Most of Chad’s Muslims at that time lived in “le Tchad inutile” (Useless Chad) where the colonizers did not invest. These were areas where the previous kingdoms of Baguirmi and Ouaddai had long established institutions, as well as the nomadic Arab, Toubou and Gorane herders who moved their herds through these kingdoms and north into the desert. Once conquered, these groups were primarily neglected by colonial authorities and comparatively few gained an education. During colonial rule, their lands remained poor and underdeveloped even by the standards of the desert’s edge (Arditi 2003a and De Waal 2006, 58).

In the South, French colonial rule provided some organization and order to the Sara clans, helping to solidify their different communities into a singular identity (Lemarchand 1980). These populations received more colonial education in comparison to the northern groups, further complicating divisions between the utile and inutile regions of Chad. Importantly, the northern, primarily Muslim, groups had previously maintained socially and political integrated institutions for political order. However, these institutions were largely excluded from French colonial rule and were left in various states of disarray after the French conquered their former political organizations. The integration of the Sara clans into the French colonial apparatus drove the wedge of identity politics deeply and divisively into Chad’s political culture, producing the North-South divide to which many students of conflict in Chad still frequently point.

As I mentioned briefly in Chapter 5, ethno-regional divisions and political asymmetries led to continued conflict between the different identity-based groups during the years of civil war, beginning in 1960s and continuing until Déby’s rule. By that time, Chadian communities were deeply divided and neo-traditional institutions frequently overlapped with para-military or
rebels, especially in the northern and central eastern regions.\textsuperscript{25} Alternatively, some neo-traditional institutions were removed from the political processes as civil conflict continued during the dictatorship of Hissène Habré. The deeply entrenched ethno-regional divisions in the country present a central difference between the experiences of neo-traditional institutions in Chad and those of Senegal and Burkina Faso. The on-going civil conflict in the post-colonial period and the disparate and divided sociological sources of authority made the political and social integrations of neo-traditional institutions highly unlikely. This contrasts greatly with the experiences of neo-traditional institutions in Senegal and Burkina Faso, which both capture a much larger cross-section of society and have benefited from long-term political integration.

Déby’s rise to power and the subsequent implementation of multiparty elections kept these socio-political divisions mostly in place. However, one aspect that emerged with Déby’s rise to power was a renewed interest in collaborating with neo-traditional authorities for the strategic purposes of undermining his rivals.\textsuperscript{26} While drafting a new constitution, the regime sought to directly incorporate neo-traditional authorities, recasting them as state authorities. This effectively took place as a formalization of neo-traditional institutions in Chad, via a process of identifying and incorporating different ‘traditional’ authorities as Canton Chiefs and other official state administrators. One retired opposition leader described this strategy as “one of the most cunning political moves…it did not always win Déby support, but it forced his political opponents to choose sides, sometimes costing them important local support.”\textsuperscript{27} According to the 1996 constitution, ‘traditional authorities’ became guarantors of government administration and

\textsuperscript{25} Interview with civil society peace activist, N’Djamena September 19, 2014.

\textsuperscript{26} Multiple interviews with political party leaders mentioned this tactic.

\textsuperscript{27} Interview in N’Djamena on November 11, 2014
hold the power to preside over domestic and civil disputes, conflicts between herders and farmers, land disputes, and the collection of rural taxes. In effect, they are state actors, and at the very least they are thus collaborators with the regime (Debos 2013b). However, by formalizing these institutions into a state controlled by the regime, Déby also divested many of these institutions from their symbolic power over the population and transformed them into regime institutions. The regime effectively took control of the symbolic power of those neo-traditional institutions.

This left a number of tricky questions for the regime regarding who can be appointed a ‘traditional authority.’ Legislators at the Chadian National Assembly decided to address this and other questions raised by this paradox in 2007. They opened a parliamentary commission to investigate the process by which the state recognizes and supports traditional authorities and their institutions. As part of this investigation the commission published a report on the management of the territorial administration which found that the regime had gone about haphazardly appointing and sometimes simply creating ‘traditional’ authorities which it then vested with the power to exercise authority over rural areas and populations (National Assembly 2007, 27). Predictably, this strategy of establishing specifically state-sponsored traditional authorities that exercise the power of the state has led to many different types of reactions. In some cases, where traditional authority has not historically been centralized, the newly appointed ‘traditional authorities’ are viewed as nothing more than an appendage of the regime itself.

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28 See Debos 2013b for an excellent account of the Chadian state’s role in appoint government administrators throughout the country, and particularly in the eastern region of Chad known as Dar Tama.
In other cases, it has led to the routinization of regime cooptation, creating rifts within communities as the state selects certain leaders over others. Debos (2013b, 50) demonstrates how this has taken place among the leaders of the Tama in eastern Chad, where she writes:

Dans le Dar Tama, les normes routinisées à propos de la cooptation dans l’administration et la chefferie traditionnelle sont remises en cause par une politique visant à diviser et à faire taire les proches des rebelles, tandis que les cooptés bénéficient d’une impunité octroyée par l’État. Le cas de ce département est singulier, mais non exceptionnel. Il met en évidence la manière dont le bras armé de l’État et son appareil administratif organisent un désordre politiquement efficace et entretiennent un entre-guerres permanent.29

This strategy of dividing and dominating symbolic power in communities is one employed by the state to prevent the organization of rebellion against the state and regime. Debos (2013a, 2013b, and 2016) argues that this creates an on-going cycle where rebels may not necessarily be engaged in war with the state, but tensions remain so persistently high that they are not at peace either. The regime employs a strategy of keeping neo-traditional authorities in check by pitting them against one another for access to benefits from the state. This contributes to a form of restless peace or entre-guerre (inter-war) status, whereby social groups remain primed for conflict even in times of no conflict (Debos 2016). Unable to keep their independence from the state because of their lack of social integration, the Chadian regime completely dominants neo-traditional institutions controlling their access to power.

The case of the Tama and their internal divisions are not unique across the Chadian communities. Déby maintains his control of the different traditional chieftaincies through several different mechanisms. In some cases, the regime has simply increased the number of

29 My translation: “In Dar Tama [the area where the Tama live], there are routinized norms regarding cooptation by the administration and traditional chieftaincy by a policy which splits and silences co-opted rebels who benefit from state granted impunity. The case of this department [administrative region] is singular, but not exceptional. It provides evidence for the ways in which the armed wing of the state and it administrative apparatus organizes a politically useful disorder to maintain a permanent state of inter-war.”
‘cantons’ to which it can then appoint chiefs. Since 1990, the number of cantons—and consequently appointed canton chiefs—has more than doubled (Territorial Administration 2013). This process allows the regime to distribute new positions, frequently inciting internal conflicts along the way, and insuring that those local leaders are more concerned with their intra-community strife than they are with criticizing or challenging Déby (Debos 2013b). In other contexts, where neo-traditional institutions are more centralized and socially integrated, the regime has sought to cement strategic alliances, but this has occurred with varying degrees of success. In various ways, the disparate neo-traditional institutions, some newer than others, have become utile for maintain the Chadian regime’s stability.

However, in a few areas, the multiparty regime led by Déby has encountered well-established neo-traditional institutions that have refused to comply with the regime and ignores this form of state patronage. The Gong of the Mundang are one example. This relatively small, but centralized kingdom is located in Léré near Lake Léré on the border with Cameroon, into which Mundang society extends.\(^{30}\) Perhaps unsurprisingly, one of the main sources of political opposition to president Déby’s party is also from this region and receives the support of this neo-traditional institution.\(^{31}\) Yet, because the Mundang are only one group in a country with hundreds, it is difficult to organize any effective opposition to the regime. Indeed, the incentives for the regime to integrate the Gong of Lake Léré are few when viewed from its position of power. The neo-traditional institution of the Gong, at least for the contemporary Chadian regime, remains inutile.

\(^{30}\) See Djondang 2004 for a more detailed description of the Gong of the Mundang and the traditional institutions found in this community.

\(^{31}\) Interview with the son of an opposition party member, N’Djamena January 24, 2015.
Conclusion

In this chapter, I have demonstrated that the differences in the social and political integration of neo-traditional institutions in Senegal, Burkina Faso, and Chad have resulted in varying levels of the symbolic power they exert. Consequently, each plays important but very different roles in shaping the regime trajectories of each country. These differences are rooted in the various ways in which the regimes attempt to manage the different forms of symbolic power available to them to manage pressures for greater political liberalization. Neo-traditional institutions have worked closely with different political regimes since the colonial period, which produced different types of antecedent conditions in each case. In Senegal, the virtually all-encompassing Sufi orders became reliable and effective collaborators with colonial authorities, who eagerly cemented strong political relationships with the orders. In Burkina Faso, the Mossi chieftaincy’s intermediate social integration, but eager political ambition, produced moderate levels of symbolic power that left it with an ambiguous role in Burkinabè politics. In Chad, the existing centralized traditional institutions that had been present and challenged colonial authorities were left in disarray following colonial rule, resulting in a disparate set of institutions with which to collaborate. These antecedent conditions forged under colonial rule then led to three very different trajectories in the post-colonial and post-electoral periods.

In Senegal, the extensive social and political integration of the Sufi orders allowed the political regime to rely on those neo-traditional institutions to maintain political stability in times of social and economic crises. The integration of the Sufi orders also helped to insure that the political opposition received limited support from voters, at least initially. Taking the consistent support of the Sufi orders for granted, over time the PS-led regime conceded politically liberalizing reforms under Diouf’s leadership to quell popular protest and opposition demands. These reforms led to the gradual democratization of the Senegalese regime. This gradual process
may not have occurred had it not been for the stabilizing social role played by the Sufi orders throughout the process. Maintaining that social role, paradoxically caused the Sufi orders to shift their political positions as they could no longer continue their open and public support for the regime, without risking the loss of their own followings (Villalón 2015). Ultimately, this shift contributed to the on-going political liberalization of the country as politicians and neo-traditional leaders adjusted their tactics and strategies for managing political liberalization.

In Burkina Faso, the ambiguous relationships of the Mossi chieftaincy and the Catholic Church with the regime display the limits of symbolic power over the people when neo-traditional institutions are only partially integrated socially. Successfully employed in moments of socio-political crisis, these institutions were able to help maintain political stability and stave off the ouster of the ruling party. However, this was only possible with the acceptance of some liberalizing concessions from the regime. Without strong and consistent resistance from the political opposition or civil society, these concessions appeared only temporary, and the recalibrated political integration of neo-traditional institutions enabled the ruling party to maintain a less-than democratic electoral regime. Ultimately, however, because neo-traditional institutions in Burkina Faso were less socially integrated, they exhibited a lower degree of symbolic power. When finally confronted with demands for greater liberalization from a unified and organized opposition and civil society, neo-traditional institutions took up the mantle of the people rather than the regime. This ambiguous relationship demonstrates the limits of symbolic power for electoral regimes that attempt to erode political liberalization.

Chad’s neo-traditional institutions have the lowest degree of symbolic power. Indeed, neo-traditional institutions are effectively consumed by the state, or even in some cases fabricated by the state, losing their independence from the regime entirely. While this is a form
of political integration, it differs significantly from the ways in which neo-traditional institutions are integrated within the political regimes of Senegal or Burkina Faso. Rather than coordinating alongside the regime, many Chadian neo-traditional institutions are virtually part of the regime. At times, government authorities go to great lengths to remind them of their position of power by removing and appointing new leaders, or creating new chieftaincies altogether, triggering local conflict and rivalry. By donning these regime-sponsored neo-traditional institutions with authority and responsibility, the regime ensures that virtually no alternative sources of authority will block the steady erosion of political liberalization in Chad. These strategies employed by the multiparty regime in Chad result in a constant pool of loyal applicants competing amongst themselves for a seat at the table, rather than organizing amongst themselves to take over the table (as had been the case during the civil conflicts experienced during the 1960s through the 1980s). The divided and disparate neo-traditional institutions in Chad create a situation in which none are truly integrated socially or politically at the national level, and the regime determines those that are useful and useless. This results in certain pockets of independence from the regime, but those pockets also have insufficient symbolic power to compete with the regime and have thus far been unable to prevent a restoration of authoritarian rule. Consequently, political liberalization continues to be eroded in Chad, despite the adoption of multiparty elections.

Neo-traditional institutions, as non-governing institutions, can bestow upon newly electoral regimes their symbolic power rooted in their sociological traditions and history. When these institutions are integrated socially and politically, they can produce stabilizing relationships between the regime and society that help to improve the prospects for greater political liberalization. However, for the prospects of greater political liberalization to advance, there must be a source generating and channeling popular pressure for greater political liberalization.
In Chapter 8, I turn to the non-governing institutions that apply this pressure on newly electoral regimes: civil society and the political opposition.
CHAPTER 8
MOBILIZING POWER AND THE ROLES OF CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE OPPOSITION

Introduction

When I called, my guys answered. We took to the streets day and night to protest. We did not engage in the looting. We were Balai Citoyen. We walked all the way to Koysam that day chanting ‘down with Blaise!’ and ‘Blaise get out!’ During that march, we felt that we were in power and we still are; Burkina Faso is a ruecratie now. Not even the RSP can stop us.

—Balai Citoyen Youth Leader¹

Having inaugurated multiparty elections, regimes inevitably face pressures for greater political liberalization; civil society and the political opposition are central sources of these pressures in Africa’s electoral regimes. These two non-governing institutions—political institutions in electoral regimes that are not involved in governing—differ from the military and neo-traditional institutions in that they represent the chief antagonists of African electoral regimes. In Chapters 6 and 7, I theorize that under certain conditions, the military and neo-traditional institutions serve as non-governing institutions that help the regime to manage pressures for greater political liberalization and maintain the status quo, while in other circumstances they may shift their support towards a trajectory of democratization. In this chapter, I theorize that civil society and the opposition are the primary non-governing institutions that channel, impose and at time stoke those pressures against the regime. The relative success or failure of these institutions to pressure the regime, along with the regime’s relative ability to manage those pressures, shapes the trajectory that the regime follows after it has adopted multiparty elections.

¹ Interview Ouagadougou, November 18, 2015. A rough interpretation of the neologism ruecratie might be “Street-aucracy” or the “rule of the street.” The intended point, as I interpreted during the interview, was that the people of the street had taken power through their mobilizations of the 2014 popular insurrection.
In this chapter, I discuss the roles that civil society and the opposition play in processes of political liberalization in the electoral regimes of Burkina Faso, Chad and Senegal. I argue that two variable characteristics, their unity and their organizational capacity, contribute to civil society and the opposition’s ability to mobilize large swaths of society for greater political liberalization. I refer to this ability as the \textit{mobilizing power} of civil society and the opposition. When civil society and the opposition are able to present a unified front and mobilize the populace in large cross-cutting numbers, this results in a high degree of mobilizing power that can be wielded by civil society and opposition leaders to win liberalizing reforms from the regime. Conversely, where civil society and the opposition are not unified, or lack the capacity to organize large mobilizations, the regime is able to ignore these \textit{non-governing} institutions’ demands. The degree of mobilizing power wielded collectively by these two non-governing institutions, along with the relative capacity of the regime to use the military and/or neo-traditional institutions in response, shapes the regime’s trajectory following the establishment of multiparty elections, by either successfully pressuring for greater liberalization or by failing to do so.

While conceptually civil society and the opposition might be considered as distinct institutions, in the reality of African politics they are most often interrelated, and I thus treat them here as one category. In African contexts, elites who share sets of interests and remain excluded from political power regularly comprise and lead \textit{both} civil society groups and opposition parties, and move frequently between them. Civil society under African electoral regimes is primarily composed of urban elites who share a set of political interests and who routinely pressure regimes regarding socio-political and economic grievances. These elites, trained in Western institutions and literate in the colonial languages, form groups with agendas
for advancing a number of interests that are typically associated with Western liberal democracy, including: human rights groups, women’s groups, students associations, journalists, jurists, trade unions, and business associations. While this list of groups may appear representative of society as a whole, the vast majority of citizens in Sahelian countries remain poor, agrarian, and non-literate in the official languages, and they are thus largely excluded from participation in these groups.

During the 1990s, scholars of democratization in Africa paid significant attention to the importance of “civil society” groups in promoting democracy, arguing that they might “fix” or support state bureaucracies gone wrong (Harbeson, Rothchild and Chazan 1994). This idealistic view of civil society, quickly became the subject of various critiques. For instance, some questioned the democratic commitments of such groups, pointing to their opportunistic spread as symptomatic of elite and middle classes attempting to stake their claim in the budding electoral political order (Fatton 1995). These civil society groups often held important international connections, many of which were also sources of funding, that called into question the representative and democratic nature of their objectives (Lewis 2002, 578 and Uvin 1998).

Related to this, and perhaps more significantly, was the observation that even collectively these civil society groups represented only a small minority of the population, composed of the more educated, and urbanized elements of society (Lewis 2002, 576).

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2 Harbeson, Rothchild and Chazan (1994) bring together a number of contributions that address the interactions between civil society and the state in democratizing Africa. A central assumption throughout their edited volume is that Africa suffered from weak states and broken bureaucracies that blocked efforts to improve state capacity. Civil society groups presented themselves as a convenient solution since they existed outside of the state. Rather than funneling aid into corrupt governments and malfunctioning bureaucracies, civil society groups could use the aid money to take over some services typically provided by the state and thereby improve the prospect for better democratic governance. Others have described this as the ‘good governance’ agenda, which suggests that a reciprocal and virtuous cycle connecting the state, economy and civil society might emerge through the promotion of civil society and eventually lead to balanced growth, equity and stability in developing countries (Archer 1994).
In light of this literature and these critiques, I follow Ferguson and Gupta (2002, 994), in conceptualizing civil society groups as “horizontal contemporaries” of the regime, exemplified by the fact that civil society in Burkina Faso, Chad and Senegal has been neither mass-based nor popular in its composition, but rather composed of parallel but non-governing elites. These non-governing institutions sometimes pressure the regime for change, at other times are coopted by the regime, and at yet still other times perform the role of watchdogs; but these institutions always play these various roles from the same level and in the same space as other non-governing institutions and the regime.

Clearly, such groups have played important, and at times central, roles in shaping political processes in the 1990s, especially in drafting the constitutions that enacted multiparty electoral politics. However, as I discussed in more detail in Chapter 5, the political transitions to multiparty elections took place under very different sets of circumstances, which in turn, provided different opportunities for civil society groups to influence the particular regime’s subsequent trajectory.

I conceptualize the opposition as those recognized political parties comprising the official opposition, with or without representation in the legislature, and which are not part of a ruling party coalition or legislative bloc in any capacity. These parties pressure the regime for greater liberalization in an effort to increase their access to power and potentially governance. In the dominant party systems of Burkina Faso, Senegal and Chad, the opposition has rarely had the ability to pressure electoral regimes for greater liberalization effectively. Indeed, the continued

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3 As I develop in more detail below, Burkina Faso once again presents a more complicated case in that during the rule of Thomas Sankara, efforts to implement participatory governance resulted in partial success and might have been considered a form of popular organization. However, this was most certainly not civil society or an opposition. It was instead a form of leftist popular governance under a single revolutionary party.
dominance of ruling parties in each case demonstrates the challenge the opposition faces in its efforts to pressure the regime for greater political liberalization. Yet the implementation of multiparty elections, in each case, represented a major victory for the political opposition. However, the implementation of multiparty elections poses a challenge to the opposition’s unity and capability to organize large sections of society, since party proliferation also increases intra-opposition competition. At times, the opposition may join forces with a mobilized civil society to generate sufficient pressure on the regime to extract liberalizing reforms as concessions, but the continued unity and organizational capacity of both civil society and the opposition is crucial for understanding the trajectory that each regime follows.

In this chapter, I argue that the power of civil society and the political opposition to mobilize citizens in demonstrations of support against illiberal policies or acts by the regime improves the prospects of greater liberalization. However, generally in Burkina Faso, Chad and Senegal, the political opposition is still nascent and easily fragmented, and civil society groups capture only a narrow cross-section of elites and their interests. While these institutions may at times be able to channel popular discontent with the regime, the prospects for greater liberalization generally remain poor. However, when civil society and the opposition have the organizational capacity to channel popular pressure for greater political liberalization in a unified manner, the prospect for greater political liberalization improve. In each case, the role of colonial rule shaped the prospects of these countries differently, leading to a more or less unified civil society and opposition, and to differences in their respective capacities to organize popular mobilization. These different antecedent conditions shaped the ways in which civil society and the opposition developed over time, leading to the implementation of multiparty elections and subsequently their different regime trajectories.
Among the three countries that I compare, Senegal demonstrates most clearly how civil society and the opposition may gradually advance efforts towards political liberalization. Over time, a unified opposition and civil society have extracted significant reforms from the Senegalese regime, at key moment of high popular dissatisfaction with the regime. These reforms have spurred the ultimate democratization of the Senegalese electoral regime and have resulted in two peaceful turnovers of power. Chad by contrast demonstrates a different and particularly illiberal outcome in which the political opposition and civil society both lack the capacity to organize large groups of mobilized citizens and fail to remain unified as checks against the regime. Thus, Chadian civil society and the Chadian political opposition have lacked the mobilizing power necessary to prevent the regime’s trajectory toward a restoration of authoritarian rule. Burkina Faso presents an intriguing case, where particular events serve to unify civil society and the opposition against the illiberal actions of the regime and amplify their organizational capacity. However, in times of social stability, opposition parties are easily coopted by the regime and civil society’s organizational capacity suffers from an unmotivated social base. Still, Burkina Faso has a long history of public protest, and this recurring form of expression has ousted more than one regime. As I have done throughout this dissertation, I now turn to the protests of the 2014 popular insurrection and the 2015 political transition in Burkina Faso and the roles of civil society and the opposition during this episode, in an effort to evaluate the future prospects of political liberalization in Burkina Faso.

**Mobilizing a Popular Insurrection**

Compared to other aspects of the 2014 popular insurrection, the roles of civil society and the opposition in organizing ordinary citizens to protest have received greater attention.\(^4\) *Balai*

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\(^4\) This includes attention from the international media, but also from several academic accounts. See, for example, Chouli (2015), Frère and Englebert (2015), (Hagberg et. al. 2018, 19–46), Harsch (2017, 202–22) and Zeilig (2017).
Citoyen (Citizen’s Broom), and other youth movements created ahead of the popular insurrection, have received significant international media attention for their roles in mobilizing the insurrection—though some have cautioned that this attention may be a bit exaggerated (Chouli 2015, 326). Regardless, the popularity of these organizations both profited from and continued to stoke the tense social climate and general hostility toward the modification of presidential term limits leading up to the popular insurrection. Importantly, such youth-based movements helped to create momentum for other civil society groups with a longer history in Burkina Faso. Together, these groups began to channel popular discontent with the regime into pressure to effectively negotiate with the regime. Indeed, many other civil society organizations and opposition parties organized, participated in, and joined the demonstrations leading up to the popular insurrection.

Beginning as early as 2013, debates over the establishment of a Senate became a central focus of critiques of the regime by civil society and opposition parties. Then, after the regime abandoned its efforts to install the second chamber of the legislature, civil society groups such as Balai Citoyenne, Ça Suffit, and Collectif Anti Référendum (CAR), turned their attention to protesting the organization of a popular referendum. The regime-sponsored referendum aimed to obtain a popular vote approving the modification of Article 37 of the constitution to reform presidential terms limits and thus enable Compaoré to run for another term in office. This

Harsch (2017) which provide a full account of the events and investigate several actors in detail outside of civil society groups as well.

5 Among the groups involved in organizing demonstrations were those with long histories in Burkina Faso’s civil society sphere such as, Mouvement Burkinabè des Droits de l’Homme et des Peuples (Burkinabè Movement for Human and People’s Rights, MBDHP), Coalition Contre le Vie Chère (Coalition against the High Cost of Living, CCVC), several trade unions, and student associations. Other groups emerged in response to popular discontent with the CDP’s moves to modify presidential term limits through a referendum. These groups included: the Collectif des Femmes pour la Défense de la Constitution (Women’s Group for the Defense of the Constitution, COFEDEC), the Front de Résistance Citoyenne (Citizen’s Resistance Front), and youth movements such as the Collectif Anti Référendum (Anti-Referendum Group, CAR), and Ça Suffit (That’s Enough).
objective provided a clear target against which anti-regime civil society groups and the opposition mobilized demonstrations. The opposition and civil society remain particularly unified against any modification to the constitution. As the popular insurrection demonstrates, civil society and the opposition wielded a significant degree of organizational capacity to mobilize citizens opposed to the referendum.

The heightened public disapproval over efforts to reform the constitution amplified the organizational capacity of civil society and opposition parties as well. Since the proposed reform of Article 37 remained so unpopular, civil society groups and the opposition could marshal significant segments of the population to demonstrate against the regime and any perceived illiberal attempts to change the constitution. This was in part due to widespread and popular dissatisfaction with the CDP and the Compaoré regime at this time. The debates over the Senate and referendum took place shortly after the demonstrations and the mutinies of 2011 discussed in Chapter 6. With a unified civil society and opposition wielding a high capacity to organize repeated and large demonstrations (often with tens of thousands of protesters) against the regime, the foundation for the popular insurrection began to fall into place (Harsch 2017, 199-202).

As civil society groups and the political opposition coalesced to mobilize larger and larger groups against the referendum, the pressure of unpopularity chipped away at the normally unified ruling party. In fact, the ruling party fragmented as a result of the push to reform the

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6 “Each week that I gathered my soldiers we gained new members. No one wanted the referendum and no one wanted Blaise to stay. Getting people out in the streets was easy.” Interview Ouagadougou, November 18, 2015, member of Balai Citoyen who served as a neighborhood youth leader. As a neighborhood youth leader, this interviewee was responsible for communicating with the leadership of the organization and getting members of the neighborhood organized for demonstrations and meetings. In a fundamental sense, the position served as the mobilizer of the group.

7 Civil society groups, specifically MBDHP, had collaborated with opposition parties at other moments of social crisis in Burkina Faso, but the ruling party had previously maintained a united front in support of Compaoré.
term limits. In early January 2014, dozens of party members, many of them leaders, signed a letter of resignation from the CDP. The mass resignation cited the undemocratic nature of the party’s internal decision-making processes, as well as the desire and intentions of party leaders to move forward with a plan to reform Article 37 to allow Blaise Compaoré to run for another term.

Two weeks after their resignation from the party, the leaders of the collective resignation and their supporters joined with Zéphirin Diabré, the UPC president and *Chef de File de l’Opposition* (official leader of the opposition), at a demonstration in Ouagadougou.⁸ The demonstration drew tens of thousands of protesters, with the principal demand that Article 37 not be modified. Other demonstrations organized by the political opposition took place in the cities of Bobo Dioulasso, Koudougou, Fada N’Gourma, Dédougou, Kaya and other regional capitals. Following the countrywide campaign against the modification of term limits, those who had resigned from the CDP created a new political party, the *Mouvement du Peuple pour le Progrès* (MPP). At its founding congress, the party comprised 117 members all of whom previously belonged to the CDP.⁹ The MPP joined the political opposition, which along with civil society organizations against the modification of presidential term limits, would launch the largest campaign against the regime that Burkina Faso has ever witnessed. The informal coalition between the MPP and other opposition parties marked an important shift in the Burkinabè political landscape.

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⁸ In Burkina Faso—as well as Chad, but still being debated in Senegal—the political opposition is a formally recognized coalition of parties which holds seats in the National Assembly and who elects from their representatives a leader known as the *Chef de File de l’Opposition*, and who then plays a formal and institutionalized role in the legislative process. In the parlance of American politics, this would be analogous to the minority leader, if Congress only had one chamber.

⁹ Interview with a member of the MPP, Ouagadougou, September 8, 2015.
In the following months, the political opposition, notably including the UPC and the MPP, held a series of protests, conventions, marches, and rallies. The opposition also often joined with civil society organizations like the *Balai Citoyen* and CAR, to coordinate amongst their supporters. The message was simple. These organizations, parties, and their supporters opposed any attempt by the government to modify Article 37, even by popular referendum. There was fear of a referendum because the CDP had a large amount of support throughout the countryside, driven by patronage networks. Therefore, the goal of the opposition and civil society groups was to cast doubt on the potential legitimacy of the referendum. In the words of one activist, “Our first goal was to prevent the referendum so no modification of presidential term limits could be made. We had the support in the cities, but we worried about fraud in the rural areas. We had to show the regime that they did not have the people’s support for a referendum.”  

Civil society groups and the opposition organized a nation-wide campaign to raise awareness of the constitution and advocate against the referendum. Their actions produced results. Demonstrations against the referendum drew large crowds around urban centers throughout the country, leading some within the CDP itself to argue against the referendum, over fears that their party might in fact lose. This line of argumentation led to the proposal of “the legislative strategy,” which would ultimately prove to be “Compaoré’s folly.” As internal divisions within the ruling party bloc continued to grow, secret negotiations took place between the CDP and the ADF-RDA, a party that belonged to the ruling party coalition, but had previously refused to back the modification of Article 37. In the end the CDP secured the ADF-RDA’s support for a bill modifying presidential term limits that would sidestep

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10 Interview with civil society activist and journalist, Ouagadougou, September 11, 2015.

11 Interview with a former CDP party member, Ouagadougou, December 7, 2015.
the need for a popular referendum (Harsch 2017, 203). The ADF-RDA held 19 seats in the National Assembly, which along with the CDP’s seats provided the ruling party coalition with a super majority. Thus, if the ADF-RDA and the CDA voted together, they could modify the constitution without holding a popular referendum (Eizenga 2015). As this news broke, the opposition and civil society groups immediately called on their supporters to protest the decision. In the end, the CDP’s decision to pursue this “legislative strategy” proved to be a massive miscalculation, resulting in the siege and burning of the National Assembly on the day that the Parliamentarians were schedule to vote on the bill.\(^\text{12}\)

The fragmentation of the ruling party and the unity of civil society and the opposition in the face of the regime’s efforts to modify the constitution demonstrate the heightened pressures for greater (or at least maintained) liberalization faced by the regime at this moment in Burkina Faso’s history. Additionally, the organizational capacity of civil society groups and the opposition was amplified as a result of the public outcry over the regime’s illiberal machinations. These events would repeat themselves, on a smaller but similarly consequential scale, when the RSP led the 2015 coup attempting to install a pro-CDP transitional government. Immediately following the coup, many of the same civil society groups led and organized demonstrators into the streets to protest the coup, while opposition leaders denounced the RSP’s actions calling for a restoration of the transitional government. When it became clear that the RSP was willing to open fire and kill protesters, these groups called on their supporters to take disruptive but covert actions. For instance, the groups told their followers to stay out of the streets when the RSP was present, but to barricade roads to disrupt their patrols in Ouagadougou. Meanwhile, groups

\(^\text{12}\) I have discussed these events in more detail in Chapter 1 and Chapter 9. Harsch (2017, 203-207) also provides an excellent account.
around the country protested the events in other urban areas where the RSP did not maintain a presence (Zeilig 2017).

The protests and demonstrations successfully sent a clear message to all observers domestic and international: the RSP-led coup had no support from Burkinabè citizens. That message mattered, and leaders of Burkina Faso’s neo-traditional institutions and the national military took note of it, just as they had during the popular insurrection. As I discussed in Chapter 6, elements of the armed forces chose not to disperse protesters violently in the popular insurrection and thus played a key role in undoing the 2015 RSP coup. And as we have seen in Chapter 7, the support of neo-traditional leaders for the Compaoré regime, and of the RSP and its leadership following the coup, waned significantly ahead of the popular insurrections. These groups had historically supported the regime’s political projects, and could be counted on by the regime to help bring social movements, like those galvanized by civil society and the opposition, back into line. That neo-traditional institutions and the military did not, and perhaps could not, return society to calm during the events of the popular insurrection and RSP-led coup, should be attributed, at least in part, to the large-scale organization of unified pressures for greater political liberalization by civil society and the opposition.

When civil society and the opposition are able to demonstrate a high degree of mobilizing power in such contexts, they are able to more effectively pressure the regime for liberalization. The ability of neo-traditional institutions and the military to support regimes seeking to implement illiberal change depends on the degree of pressure the regime faces for greater political liberalization. Where civil society and the opposition hold a high degree of mobilizing power, there are steep costs associated with pursuing illiberal policies, which in some cases may lead to outcomes like the popular insurrection in Burkina Faso. However, whether this kind of
pressure results in persistent liberalization and potentially long-term gradual change depends on the configurations of non-governing institutions. In the case of Burkina Faso, it remains to be seen if civil society and the opposition can maintain their high degrees of mobilizing power in conjunction with support from the symbolic power of neo-traditional institutions and the coercive power of the military. If the dynamics of the 2014 popular insurrection and subsequent political transition are maintained, a trajectory toward gradual democratization may begin to take shape. However, given the degrees of symbolic power held by neo-traditional institutions, the interventionist form of civil-military relations, and the tendency of civil society and the opposition to wield mobilizing power only in times of crisis, a return and maintenance of electoral authoritarianism may be as, if not more, likely.

**Mobilizing Power**

Under certain configurations, the military and neo-traditional institutions may provide regimes with the needed coercive and symbolic power to check pressures for greater liberalization and maintain the political status quo. However, popular pressure, particularly when effectively organized by a unified civil society and the political opposition, may exceed the range of influence wielded by neo-traditional institutions and the military, and result in liberalizing concessions from the regime. When this occurs, civil society and the opposition hold a high degree of mobilizing power—the ability to channel popular discontent and/or desire for greater political liberalization—into large scale mobilization as exhibited by demonstrations, protests, and other peaceful forms of public opposition.

In the early 1990s, many African states experienced protests mobilized in this manner, and these movements frequently captured large segments of society pressuring regimes for greater liberalization. This wave of protests resulted in the adoption of multiparty elections and the end of single party rule in many African countries. Scholars conceptualized these protests...
and other forms of popular pressure as democratization from below, and in direct confrontation with the state or regime (Wood 2000 and Mueller 2018, 43-47). For arguably the first time since independence, civil society groups effectively overpowered regimes and successfully won liberalizing political reforms. Fatton (1992, 105-6) describes this as a process he termed “débordement” by which he aims to capture civil society’s ability to defy and overwhelm the state’s attempts to order power through massive demonstrations of political defiance and protest. As Fatton (1995, 71) observes “civil society is thus a potentially liberating factor in any political calculus; and yet it is not always civil.” This view of civil society imbricates nicely with the events of the popular insurrection in Burkina Faso discussed above, but leaves behind the question of how to conceptualize civil society outside of such momentous events.

As noted above, and underscored in my discussion of the popular insurrection, I conceive of civil society somewhat differently throughout this dissertation. Rather than focusing on the potential for an civil society to oust an illiberal regime in a moment of unprecedented political change, I view civil society as those organizations which have the potential to channel forms of mobilization for greater political liberalization consistently over time. These groups pursue a wide range of goals and activities, but when mobilizing supporters, demonstrators, and protesters, they coordinate their efforts through the language of democracy, and typically pressure regimes for greater political liberalization (Mueller 2018, 46). These groups vary in their capacity to organize mobilizations and in the degree to which they pressure the regime from a united position. In this respect, and within the contexts of newly electoral regimes, I view these civil society groups as sharing certain commonalities with the political opposition. Both engage and negotiate political power with the regime, seeking to extract concessions, partnerships, and other governing policies that are in line with their interests.
Some might point to similarities between this conceptualization of civil society and that of neo-traditional institutions. Where they are similar, from my perspective, is in the fact that both institutions fall within the category of non-governing institutions. However, where they differ is in the form of power they wield. The symbolic power of neo-traditional institutions is rooted in the sociological traditions of different communities. The mobilizing power of civil society (and the opposition as I develop below) is rooted in the ability of civil society channel, organize, and focus popular discontent against or away from the regime. The unity of civil society and of the opposition coupled with their respective organizational capacities determines the mobilizing power that each wields to pressure and negotiate with the regime.

Civil society and the opposition as play similar roles, as non-governing institutions that channel popular pressures for greater liberalization through their mobilizing power. However, their interactions and engagements with the regime are different. The opposition officially engages in direct electoral competition with the regime, seeking to replace the ruling party and/or seeking other politically derived benefits in those cases where electoral victory is unlikely if not impossible. In the event that an opposition party wins elections and becomes the ruling party (or coalition of parties), the former ruling party then becomes the new opposition. Thus, it is important to note that the individual political parties that occupy the institution of the opposition are not the focus of my analysis; it is rather the non-governing institution of the opposition. The role of the opposition is to rival the government and to pressure the government on policy decisions. Building off Bodian’s (2016) demonstration that the opposition regularly pressures the regime for liberalizing electoral reforms, I assume that in electoral, but illiberal or at least less

\[13\] For an in depth discussion of the dynamics which shape party behavior amongst those ‘opposition’ parties that do not stand a chance of winning power see Kelly (2014).
democratic contexts, the opposition will thus be constantly pressuring the regime for greater political liberalization.

The ability of civil society and the opposition to present a unified front and to organize the mass mobilization of citizens for political liberalization or other demands is what I refer to as their mobilizing power. This is particularly important in electoral regimes because the freedoms of assembly, of speech and expression, and thus the freedom to oppose, are all rights associated with increased political liberalization and democratic governance. Indeed, the act of voting is one such form of the freedom of expression. Thus, in regimes where liberalization has yet to occur, or where the regime aims to thwart further liberalization, one would expect that the ability of opposing political organizations to be a crucial factor in determining the prospects for liberalization or for the institutionalization of liberalization.

As I noted above, two factors play central roles in the mobilizing power of civil society and the opposition; their unity and organizational capacity. When civil society and the opposition are characterized by a high degree of both unity and organizational capacity, their abilities to pressure regimes effectively for greater liberalization are likely to be increased. Yet, in African electoral regimes, this situation is rare. In most contexts, civil society and the opposition tend to suffer from fragmentation or cooptation by the regime and from lack of organizational capacity outside of urban centers. Since civil society and the opposition have historically drawn their interests in accordance with their elite members, they suffer from a limited base. Thus, they lack the ability to mobilize their supporters sufficiently or consistently to pressure the regime. Since civil society and the opposition generally lack a high degree of mobilizing power, they have had to adapt their strategies in an attempt to appeal to a wider social base. The mobilizations around the 2014 popular insurrection in Burkina Faso and the controversial 2012 campaign of
Abdoulaye Wade in Senegal may signal that in these two countries, the mobilizing power of civil society and the opposition has increased (Chouli 2015 and Resnick 2013). However, attempts by civil society and the opposition in Chad to mobilize large sections of society have largely failed or have been repressed by the regime and effectively extinguished.

**The Political Opposition**

![Political Opposition Diagram]

Figure 8-1. Political Opposition

Figure 8-1 above displays the level of unity and organizational capacity that characterize the opposition in Burkina Faso, Senegal and Chad. In Chad, the political opposition is neither unified nor capable of organizing large cross-sections of society. The regime works to keep the opposition fragmented, by coopting and pitting opposition parties against each other. With a few exceptions, opposition parties rely on regional strongholds for support, but these fail to develop into national followings. When opposition parties have posed a potential challenge to the regime, their leadership has become a target of violent repression and suppression by the regime, often suffering from imprisonment, harassment, and in extreme cases assassination.
In contrast, the opposition in Senegal has generally presented a unified front and has gradually built up its organizational capacity over time. The opposition developed a high degree of mobilizing power and this eventually translated into the ability to mobilize voters to vote for a change in power at the ballot box. The gradual democratization of Senegal’s regime took place in part because the opposition used its mobilizing power to pressure the regime for further reforms to the system, and notably electoral laws, after the adoption of multiparty elections. Over time, this enabled the opposition to successfully extract liberalizing concessions.

Burkina Faso’s opposition has exhibited characteristics of both the opposition in Chad and Senegal, but at different times in its history. Prior to 2013 and the debates over presidential term limits, the opposition struggled to present a unified front or to mobilize large followings of supporters. However, the political controversy surrounding the modification of presidential term limits galvanized the opposition and fragmented the ruling party. As I noted above, the debate over term limits led many ruling party members to break with the party, join the opposition and create their own party. The popular unrest and outrage over the regime’s attempts to modify the constitution strengthened the mobilizing power of the opposition in Burkina Faso by amplifying its organizational capacity. Early moments of social unrest had failed to produce the same degree of unification among opposition parties, and the regime easily coopted opposition parties following minor political concessions. During the 2013-2016 period, however, when the regime attempted to erode the level of political liberalization, the opposition remained highly unified. With its amplified organizational capacity, the opposition helped lead masses of demonstrators against the regime’s efforts. In the following sections, I develop each case in more detail to examine the case-specific characteristics of the political opposition.
Chad: from Rebellion to Repression

The political opposition in Chad faces enormous challenges. The regime actively works to undercut the organizational capacity of the opposition, and pursues policies aimed at fragmenting opposition parties. The regime often employs violent repression to stifle the opposition’s attempts to mobilize supporters and, in the worst cases, these efforts have resulted in the persecution and disappearance of opposition party leaders. This political violence can be traced back to the politics of colonial rule and the exclusion of certain populations from electoral representation, followed by civil war. However, these strategies continued to penetrate Chadian politics even after the adoption of multiparty elections. Many of the political parties which represent the opposition struggle to develop bases outside of their local strongholds due to manipulations of the ruling party (Munan, Angsthelm and Djiraibe 2014, 26). Consequently, the opposition lacks mobilizing power and fails to channel popular pressure for greater liberalization in Chad. Instead, the regime under the rule of Idriss Déby and the MPS has been able to keep the opposition from presenting a challenge, as the regime pursues reforms that slowly restore authoritarian rule.

As I discussed in more detail in Chapters 4 and 5, the political violence that characterized much of Chad’s colonial and post-colonial history continues to shape the dynamics of

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14 In their comprehensive study of Chadian political parties, Munan, Angsthelm and Djiraibe (2014, 26) point out that “the ease [of identifying party strongholds] could lead one to speak of regional or ethnic parties. According to an observer of Chadian political life: “Mr. Kebzabo has his fief in Mayo-Kebbi. Mr. Lol Choua, in the whole Lake region and among Kanembou, There’s Mr. Yorongar, his influence goes from Moundou to Koumra. There is also Mr. Kamougué, who is a Sara M’Baye and whose fief goes from Koumra to Sarh passing by Moïssala (Moyen-Chari, Logone Oriental). Even the MPS posses a stronghold in Ouaddaï, BET, Mongo, Aï just to Abéché.” Original text: “La facilité pourrait nous conduire à parler de partis « régionaux » voire « ethniques ». Selon un observateur de la vie politique tchadienne : « M. Kebzabo a son fief au Mayo-Kebi. M. Lol CHOUA, dans tout le Lac et le Kanembou. Quant à M. Yorongar, son influence va de Moundou à Koumra. Il y a aussi M. Kamougué, qui est un Sara M’Baye et dont le fief va de Koumra à Sarh, en passant par Moïssala (Moyen-Chari, Logone Oriental). Même le MPS possède un fief au Ouaddaï, au BET, de Mongo, à Aï jusqu’à Abéché ».”
contemporary Chadian politics. Debos (2013a, 92) captures these dynamics clearly in her research on cycles of violence in Chad:

*Au Tchad, la guerre est au centre de la profession politique. Une grande partie du politique a été formée par l’expérience du maquis. Un ancien journaliste tchadien me disait en 2006 : “Au Sénégal, pour faire de la politique, il faut passer par la prison ; au Tchad, il faut passer par la lutte armée.” Entretien fait avec Dieudonné Djonabayé, dit “Bendjo”, ancien rédacteur en chef de N’Djamena Hebdo, N’Djamena, septembre 2006.*

I view these formational cycles of political violence as a set of antecedent conditions that continue to shape the roles available to the opposition in multiparty politics.

Many of the current political parties and politicians participated in rebellions before and after the political transition to multiparty elections that took place from 1990 to 1996. The political parties that contributed to the CNS, discussed in Chapter 5, were in fact rebel groups that transformed themselves into political parties in order to compete in elections. As one academic noted, “While I was conducting a training on legislative processes in Chad during the late 1990s, many of the parliamentarians, who we were there to train, told me that only a few years ago they had been in the bush engaged in rebellion.”16 While many of the rebels disarmed and entered electoral politics during the transition in the 1990s and ahead of multiparty elections in 1996, others would break away to lead armed rebellion again (Buijtenhuis 1998, 93-105 and Haggar 2014). Perhaps unsurprisingly, then, the opposition in Chad has remained fractured and its capacity to organize has remained stifled as it has been faced with severe and violent repression.

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15 In Chad, war is at the center of the political profession. The experience of rural guerrilla war has shaped a large part of politics. A former Chadian journalist told me in 2006: “In Senegal, to do politics, you have to go to prison; in Chad, you have to go through armed struggle.” Interview done with Dieudonné Djonabayé, called “Bendjo,” former editor in chief of N’Djamena Hebdo, N’Djamena, September 2006.

16 Interview with scholar of democratization in Francophone Africa, Dakar, July 2015.
The transitional government led by Déby remained in power for nearly six years after he assumed power by force in 1990. The transition culminated in presidential elections during 1996, when voters elected Déby as president. Legislative elections took place in 1997, during which the MPS won a majority of the seats at the National Assembly. Despite the transition to multiparty elections, rebel groups have continued to challenge the government, creating areas of insecurity and instability throughout the country (Van Dijk 2007, 700). Armed rebellion peaked following the 2005 popular referendum that reformed the constitution and eliminated presidential term limits. As I discussed in more detail in Chapter 5, the opposition boycotted the referendum and subsequent elections. Other political leaders, both from the opposition and in the ruling party coalition, decided to take up arms and lead rebel groups against the regime (Haggar 2014). As a civil society activist explained, “After the referendum, it appeared that war had returned to our country. That’s when we began our call for ‘No elections without peace!’ At that time, many ambitious men became rebels because our history is one of conflict; it is the pathway to power.”

For a significant part of Chad’s multiparty electoral history, political opposition has overlapped with armed rebellion. However, in 2008, this shifted somewhat following the last major rebellion.

In 2008, rebel fighters were able to besiege the presidential palace in N’Djamena for three days, after which the Chadian military finally secured French military support and repelled the rebels (Hansen 2011b, 3 and Koulamallah 2014). During the siege, the presidential guard arrested three popular opposition figures: the leader of the Parti pour les Libertés et le Développement (PLD), Ibni Oumar Mahamat Saleh, the leader of the party Fédération Action pour la République (Federation Action for the Republic, FAR) Ngarlejy Yorongar, and Lol

17 Interview, N’Djamena, February 23, 2015.
Mahamat Choua, leader of the *Rassemblement pour la Démocratie et le Progrès* (Assembly for Democracy and Progress, RDP). While under arrest, security forces tortured and severely beat the opposition leaders, who authorities alleged had helped the rebels plan their attack.\(^{18}\) Saleh disappeared following the 2008 attack on N’Djamena. It is widely believed that he died while in custody, though his remains have never been found.

These events created the impetus for a United Nations and European Union peacekeeping force in Chad and instigated the beginning of negotiations between the government and rebels for a peace agreement. Eventually, the former rebel leaders agreed to be integrated into the Chadian military, and rebel activity calmed significantly. Some rebel leaders opted to transform themselves back into politicians and joined the ranks of the ruling party coalition, while others fled into exile (Koulamallah 2014). Considered successful, the peacekeeping forces finished their mission at the end of 2010. Multiparty presidential and legislative elections were scheduled and organized in 2011, but with mixed results: The opposition boycotted the presidential elections and the MPS won 117 of 188 seats in the National Assembly. The party to win the second most seats, the UNDR, won only 10, and of the remaining seats, 23 parties won only one or two seats. This degree of fragmentation at the National Assembly assures that the MPS continues to maintain its hegemony over the legislature.

Since the legislative elections in 2011, the regime has developed several strategies to further entrench its power and erode political liberalization. Even parties that have historically been allies of the MPS suffer from its increasingly hegemonic character. At the ruling party’s National Congress, convened following the legislative elections of 2011, it was decided that

\(^{18}\) For a full account of these events from the perspective of one of the arrested politicians, see Yorongar (2010, 135-163).
support for parties in the ruling coalition was no longer necessary. Instead, senior party members demanded that they receive greater recognition in the government. Several government reshuffles subsequently placed long-time members of the MPS into ministerial positions throughout the government at the expense of former party allies.

In 2013, the regime organized several meetings between the ruling party, the political opposition, and civil society leaders, culminating in the political agreement of 2 April 2013. It appeared that this agreement might improve the political stature of the opposition through three changes. First, the composition of the electoral commission (the CENI) was modified to create equal representation between the presidential majority and the opposition, and seats for members of civil society were added. Second, it was agreed that a biometric census would take place by the end of 2013 in order to update the electoral list to resolve a longstanding complaint of opposition leaders. Third, the agreement called for the establishment of the *Cadre National de Dialogue Politique* (CNDP).

Despite this political agreement, the opposition’s fragmentation led to numerous public debates over the composition of the CENI and the CNDP, and by the middle of 2015 plans for a biometric census continued to stall. The electoral calendar increasingly resembled the delays that took place during the 2000s at the time of the popular referendum. First, the administration postponed municipal elections originally scheduled for 2014, and then the government postponed

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19 Interview with MPS party member, N’Djamena November 12, 2014.

20 The initial reform to the composition of the CENI called for twelve members from each the political opposition and the presidential majority, as well as six members from civil society. However, in August 2013, the electoral code was modified again to add an additional ten seats to the CENI, adding five seats to both the political majority and opposition. Nevertheless, equal representation was finally established by the end of 2013. The CNDP is composed of a steering committee that gives equal representation to the political majority and opposition as well as representation to civil society actors, and a general assembly that gives representation to every political party that signed the agreement of 2 April 2013.
the 2015 legislative elections. Many blamed the CNDP for the delays, arguing that it served only to further fragment the political opposition and complicate the electoral process.21

The analysis of one opposition party leader suggested that the decision to create the CNDP appeared to be a victory for the opposition, but actually worked against it. “Déby gave the opposition what it wanted by creating an institution with representation for all political parties and now the CNDP…is allowing him to accomplish the same strategy he employed in 2006 by delaying the legislative elections until after the presidential elections.”22 Another source described the addition of seats to the CENI and the creation of the CNDP as an irrelevant form of only symbolic inclusion: “That’s politics in our country. The cake is always growing. Everyone eats and then makes a lot of noise, but those in power never actually listen. They do what they want.”23 Despite a corruption scandal, a much delayed biometric census, and internal disputes between the different wings of the opposition represented in the CENI and the CNDP, the CENI managed to organize presidential elections in 2016, but municipal and legislative elections remained indefinitely postponed.24

Unsurprisingly, Déby won re-election amidst claims that the electoral process suffered from serious inconsistencies and irregularities. Election observers and the opposition claimed to have witnessed polling staff stuffing ballot boxes and removing ballots cast as well as polling

21 In many of the interviews I conducted with members of political parties and the CNDP, complaints about the lack of coordination in the opposition were central. Additionally, the ruling party used the opposition’s internal divisions to avoid blame over the delays.

22 Interview with opposition party leader, N’Djamena, March 15, 2015.

23 Interview with civil society activist, N’Djamena, 14 November 2014.

stations that lacked properly trained staff (Eizenga 2016). Some in the opposition even declared that the provisional results announced by the CENI could not be accurate based on their own tabulations. Regardless, after the election the regime again ignored the opposition’s claims and returned to its tactics of violent repression. Chadian authorities have targeted, harassed and arrested opposition leaders, such as Saleh Kebzabo and Laokein Médard, multiple times since the 2016 election, and the government has banned scheduled opposition meetings (Eizenga 2018). These crackdowns have taken place in the context of increased social unrest due to a set of austerity policies enacted by the government, which I discuss in more detail below. Strikingly, even with increased social tensions, the opposition has failed to channel popular discontent with the government into pressure capable of extracting concessions from the regime. This is in part because the opposition remains fragmented and the regime’s repression curtails the opposition’s organizational capacity.

Despite the liberalizing gains—the inauguration of a multiparty political system—made in the 1990s, Déby and the MPS have been extremely successful in further entrenching their own power. This has occurred through the manipulation of political institutions, violent repression and to a lesser degree, cooptation, to keep the opposition fragmented and unable to organize popular pressure against the regime. By the summer of 2018, legislative elections had still not taken place. With no clear indication of when they might be organized, the opposition had largely given up on calling for legislative and municipal elections and instead focused on the unpopular austerity policies. The implementation of a more representative CENI, and the creation of the CNDP, only served to further fragment the opposition and delay the electoral process, giving more credibility to the presidential party and helping to entrench Déby’s authoritarian rule. In this period of reform, the Chadian regime manipulated ostensibly
representative institutions to its advantage by fragmenting the political opposition and avoiding challenges to its political authority. In the process, the regime continued its trajectory toward a restoration of authoritarian rule.

**Senegal: Growing pressure to Cohabitation**

In sharp contrast to Chad, Senegal arguably exhibits the most developed political opposition. The political system developed during Senghor’s rule resulted in an opposition consistently unified in its desire for greater political liberalization that over time developed a comparatively stronger degree of organizational capacity. Immediately following independence, Senghor consolidated power in his party, the *Union Progressiste Sénégalaise* (Senegalese Progressive Union, UPS) and only UPS candidates contested the first elections after Senegalese independence. However, growing social tensions in the 1960s and into the early 1970s led Senghor to implement electoral reforms to allow for at least some electoral competition (Casswell 1983). A constitutional revision actually prescribed a multiparty system that allowed contestation between three ideologically distinct parties. The official reform of the electoral system took place only after Senghor faced mounting pressures from his rural base, internal division within his own party, and a desire to achieve international recognition as a democratic state (Vengroff and Creevey 1996, 206). In 1974, following liberalizing reforms that allowed for the official registration of other political parties, Abdoulaye Wade formed the PDS, in opposition to Senghor’s PS. These two parties dominated Senegalese politics over the next several decades—some might argue that they continue to dominate Senegalese politics today.

In 1976, Senghor inaugurated the tri-party electoral system in which multiparty elections were organized, and three parties, each representing a different ideological platform, competed. The PS occupied the center (democratic-socialist) ground, the PDS held the liberal democratic position, and the *Parti Africain de l’Independence* (the African Party for Independence, PAI)
was designated the leftist party (Vengroff and Creevey 1996, 206-7). Senghor secured more than 80% of the vote in the tri-party 1978 elections and the PS obtained 82 of 100 seats in the National Assembly. Senghor and the PS enjoyed significant incumbency advantages against the newly formed opposition, and the only presidential opponent, Abdoulaye Wade. Senghor, however, remained cautious and limited the power of the PDS as an opposition through the official recognition of a fourth political party, the Mouvement Républicain Sénégalais (Senegalese Republican Movement, MRS) aimed in part to fragment the opposition (Bodian 2016, 103-104). Other ‘associations’ emerged during the 1970s, but with the official ideological space filled by these four parties, no additional parties were officially recognized until after Senghor’s resignation at the beginning of 1981.

The organizational capacity of the opposition at this point remained relatively low, but the growing number of associations prompted Senghor’s successor and former prime minister, Abdou Diouf, to allow unlimited registration of parties after he became president in 1981. This decision marks the beginning of what would become an increasingly proliferated field of political parties in Senegal (Kelly 2018). In 1983, the PS dominated the electoral outcomes, in part thanks to the support of the Sufi orders—as discussed in Chapter 7—and also in part thanks to the advantages of incumbency. However, the initial opening also led to a proliferation of parties that, at least partially, weakened the opposition through fragmentation. Gradually Senegalese political parties developed a surprising degree of maturity from their comparatively longer participation in the multiparty electoral process (Vengroff and Creevy 1996, 204). Still, the PDS remained the strongest opposition party and emerged as the principal competitor with the PS.
Diouf and Wade thus faced off in four different presidential contests (1983, 1988, 1993 and 2000) as the leaders of essentially the only two relevant political parties over these decades. While the PDS routinely failed to capture a majority of the vote or to build an opposition coalition strong enough to contest the power of the PS during this time, it did begin to more effectively channel popular pressure for political change. Following the opposition’s loss in 1988, Villalón (1994b, 173) notes that “what distinguished the 1988 elections from the previous ones, however, was the willingness and the capability of the opposition in a situation of economic hardship and urban discontent to challenge the official results on the streets.” After the elections, the opposition remained unified and proved itself capable of organizing largescale, potentially destabilizing, protests in Dakar which threatened the regime seriously enough to extract some concessions.

In fact, even though the elections suffered from credible accusations of fraud, the opposition eventually proved willing in this context of popular grievance to collaborate with the PS, in exchange for reforms and/or inclusion in the government. Following the 1988 elections, the opposition negotiated and successfully extracted massive reforms from the ruling party, the most notable of which related to the electoral code. The 1992 consensual agreement over the new electoral code was an unprecedented change in Senegalese politics, and the opposition believed it would emerge victorious in the 1993 elections as a result (Villalón 1994b). However, that was not to be the case as the support of the rural population continued to ensure PS dominance.

Nevertheless, the proven capability of the opposition to mobilize popular pressure against the

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25 As part of the reforms implemented by Diouf’s government in consultation with the opposition in the early 1990s, the government changed presidential terms from periods of five years to seven years. Hence, the seven year gap between elections in 1993 and 2000.

26 For an exposition of the 1988 elections see Young and Kanté 1992.
regime and the reforms it received in response improved the prospects for greater liberalization in Senegal.

During the period following the 1993 elections, the PS faced significant and ongoing social unrest, especially after the assassination of Babacar Sèye—vice president of the Constitutional Commission—and following the January 1994 devaluation of the West African CFA Franc. Despite the major threat the regime faced due to this unrest, the opposition opted not to mobilize followers seeking to oust the regime (Bodian 2016, 107). Instead, the opposition decided to pursue inclusion in the government under Diouf, in a bid to gain access to state power and governance. Abdoulaye Wade and other influential figures of the opposition joined Diouf’s government in 1995. While this gave them some access to state resources, the decision to join the government risked undermining the credibility of the opposition (Vengroff and Creevey 1996, 208). Ultimately, the political gamble paid off, as PDS members, including Wade, resigned from government ahead of the next presidential elections in 2000.

Although the defeat of the incumbent President Diouf in the 2000 election was partially due to defections from the ruling PS due to internal divisions, the organizational capacity of the PDS was also an important factor. Following both the electoral losses in 1988 and 1993, the PDS mobilized supporters to pressure the ruling party for concessions. Following the 1988 elections this pressure resulted in significant and liberalizing reforms, which although they failed to produce a PDS victory nevertheless improved the fairness of the electoral process. Then, following the 1993 elections, the opposition pressured the regime to gain access to the government. As a result, the PS faced increasingly difficult internal disputes and fractured, only

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27 This currency, shared by most of the former French colonies in West Africa, had remained pegged to the French Franc at a fixed rate even after independence, and remained pegged to the Euro after France adopted the Euro as its currency.
to become the new opposition party following Wade’s electoral victory and assumption of the presidency.

In 2012, Wade faced a similar dilemma. After months of social unrest and discontent over Wade’s decision to run for what would have been effectively his third term as president, he lost the election to his former prime minister, Macky Sall, who had split from the PDS and formed a new coalition in opposition. Today, Macky Sall faces challengers from within his own loose coalition of political parties as well as challengers from the historically dominant PS and PDS. Future electoral cycles will demonstrate the degree of strength these parties exhibit, but certainly, it appears to be the case that regardless of the victor, all the parties will respect the result. Democracy is, for the time being, alive and well in Senegal.

**Burkina Faso: Cooptation and Electoral Manipulation**

Historically, the regime in Burkina Faso has easily coopted the political opposition. Efforts to eliminate any political opposition, for fear of French or Mossi influence, led the country’s first president to quickly consolidate power in a single party regime. As discussed in Chapter 6, the country’s subsequent military regimes became the ideological bastions in the political sphere. Consequently, the different political parties of contemporary Burkina Faso display limited variance with regard to their political ideology. This makes them vulnerable to the regime’s efforts to coopt them and dominate the political system, since their policy platforms are unaffected by coalitional shifts. Indeed, as discussed in Chapter 5, the experience of leftist

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28 During Wade’s first term in power, his government reformed presidential term limits restoring the five-year duration in office. This was later reformed again back to a seven year term. Given the changes made to the term limits, the Constitutional Court ruled that each reform represented a new set of presidential terms for which Wade was eligible to run for a subsequent term. Thus, even though presidential term limits stipulated that no president could hold office for more than two consecutive terms and Wade won the presidency in the 2000 and 2007 elections, the courts ruled he was eligible to run for office in 2012 for his second term under the second reform of presidential term limits.
rule under Sankara, followed by the political transition led by Compaoré in the late 1980s through 1991, ensured that Burkinabè political parties appeared nearly identical in terms of policy.

This gave those in control of the transition, namely those party leaders belonging to the *Front Populaire*, significant advantages ahead of the first multiparty legislative elections. These founding legislative elections gave Compaoré’s party the *Organisation pour la Démocratie Populaire – Mouvement du Travail* (ODP/MT) a majority of the seats in the national assembly. Meanwhile, the opposition suffered from disorganization, a lack of resources, and the inability to establish a unified platform against the ruling party (Eizenga 2015).

The regime utilized a strategy of fragmentation to maintain this status quo, by encouraging political party formation and periodically increasing the number of seats in the National Assembly.29 The ruling party profited from the proportional electoral system’s design that allowed many political parties to compete for few seats in the legislature.30 One former opposition party leader explained, “[the ruling party] was guaranteed at least one seat in almost every electoral district because even in opposition strongholds, the party in power would win the second largest proportion of the vote. All the other smaller parties split the rest of the vote, so no one else could win.”31 In other words, opposition parties competed over and divided the

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29 Interview with retired CDP party leader, Ouagadougou, November 24, 2015. During the interview, the former party member described a strategy by which the CDP aimed to increase the number of seats to promote the proliferation of small opposition parties with whom the ruling party could more easily negotiate.

30 It is worth noting here that in each case the ruling party coalition actively sought to manipulate the electoral system to its electoral benefit. The success of the ruling party to accomplish this, and what I attempt to highlight here, is in part dependent upon the (in)ability of the opposition to counter such attempts with effective pressure for greater political liberalization. It is along these lines that the opposition in Burkina Faso differs significantly from the opposition in Senegal, for example.

31 Interview with former member of the political opposition, Ouagadougou, August 22, 2015.
proportion of seats, which in turn benefitted the ruling party. In later elections, the CDP further gained political sway by gerrymandering the administrative units where elections were held to ensure that opposition parties competed against one another in a given election.\textsuperscript{32} Similarly, by increasing the number of seats in the National Assembly, smaller opposition parties were encouraged to compete against larger ones, rather than join the larger parties, because by joining they perversely increased their odds of winning seats. While it is possible that the results of these reforms – implemented by the CDP-dominated legislature – were incidental, it seems unlikely that reforms made under the pretense of a more representative government would result in a repeatedly one-sided National Assembly.

In addition to keeping the opposition fragmented, the CDP successfully coopted the strongest opposition parties. Indeed, the CDP itself was a product of cooptation in 1996, following the merger of the ODP/MT and several smaller opposition parties. Most importantly, the largest opposition party, the \textit{Convention Nationale des Patriotes Progressistes – Parti Social-Démocratie} (CNPP/PSD) joined with the ODP/MT, and in subsequent legislative elections, the new CDP won a super majority of the seats. The CDP pursued cooptation again following the legislative elections of 2002, after which it almost lost its legislative majority. As part of the recommendations issued by the \textit{Collège des Sages}, discussed in Chapter 7, the electoral system was reformed ahead of legislative elections in 2002. The reforms, which implemented the full proportional system, actually caused the CDP to lose seats, although it maintained a slight majority in the National Assembly (Santiso and Loada 2003). Fearing that presidential elections in 2005 might go to a second round run-off, the CDP reached out to the ADF–RDA, which held seventeen seats after the 2002 elections, second only to the CDP’s fifty-seven. The ADF–RDA

\textsuperscript{32} Interview with former government minister, Ouagadougou, March 3, 2015.
agreed to support Compaoré in the presidential election in exchange for representation in the government. Subsequently, the ADF–RDA regularly joined with the ruling party coalition, even to its detriment in 2014, when its decision to support the modification of presidential term limits triggered the popular insurrection.

The ability of the CDP to form alliances with opposition parties weakened the credibility of the political opposition, which ultimately diminished the opposition’s organizational capacity. From the perspective of Burkinabè voters, there was no credible alternative to the CDP; not only did the opposition fail to present a unified critique of the ruling party, but they quickly entered into the ruling coalition after becoming a potential threat.33 This was partly because many in the opposition believed strategies of allegiance and submission to the CDP offered the best opportunities to develop the political capital necessary to truly compete against the incumbent regime (Hilgers 2006). Indeed, the list of presidential candidates ahead of the 2015 elections made it clear how difficult it was to find a candidate who had not at some point been close with the former ruling party. Of the ten most discussed candidates, eight had held positions in one of the Compaoré governments. Of the two front runners, Zephirine Diabré left the CDP to work in the private sector in the early 2000s after serving as a presidential advisor to Compaoré, and Roch Kaboré had served as prime minister and president of the CDP under Compaoré’s rule.

Indeed, politics during the Compaoré regime were at times characterized by the absence of political alternatives (Hilgers and Mazzocchetti 2006). However, growing dissent within the

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33 In several discussions and interviews, Burkinabè voters expressed this to me. Most often, their sentiments were formulated along the lines of the words of a Burkinabè youth in Ouagadougou on November 22, 2015: “things have changed, but it’s no thanks to the opposition, it was the people who changed our political situation.” One of the unintended consequences of conducting research after the popular insurrection was that those events framed the thoughts of most voters. Nevertheless, indirect remarks about the irrelevance or inability of the opposition to challenge the former ruling party were routinely made when I discussed politics under Compaoré with my Burkinabè contacts.
CDP and the resignation of several of its members over the proposed modification of presidential term limits demonstrated that the possibility of political change existed. As I developed in much more detail above, internal disputes over who would lead the party if Compaoré was no longer president divided CDP members seeking to enhance their own political fortunes. When it became clear that the debates surrounding the Senate and the modification of presidential term limits provided the opposition with amplified organizational capacity and a political issue with which to unify their supporters, the CDP split. These events led to a change in Burkina Faso, and at least temporarily elevated the ability of the opposition to work toward greater political liberalization.

In the wake of the popular insurrection and the political transition that brought a new party to power, how much has actually changed for the opposition? A few key points stand out after the legislative results of the 2015 elections. First, no party won a majority of the seats in the National Assembly. The MPP, the party created by the former members of the CDP who resigned in 2014 ahead of the popular insurrection, won a plurality of the seats. This was the first time in Burkina Faso’s multiparty electoral history that no party won a majority. Second, the vast majority of parliamentarians elected to the National Assembly in 2015 did not hold office before the popular insurrection. To be precise, out of the 127 members elected to the National Assembly in 2015, only 27 had also been elected in the previous legislative elections. This represents a significant change in the composition of the National Assembly. In fact, roughly 82 percent of the legislators elected in 2015 had not been legislators in 2014 before the popular insurrection. These two major changes—the compositions of the parliamentarians and the lack of party with a majority—undoubtedly changed the political dynamics of the opposition in Burkina Faso as the ruling party coalition by necessity became more representative. Over time, if the opposition is
able to remain unified while it develops its organizational capacity, this may bode well for the prospects of greater political liberalization and perhaps mark the beginning of a new regime trajectory.

### Civil Society

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<th>Unity</th>
<th>Organizational Capacity</th>
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<td>High</td>
<td>High: Senegal</td>
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<td>Low: Burkina Faso</td>
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Figure 8-2. Civil Society

Figure 8-2 displays the approximate positions of civil society in each country based on their degrees of unity and organizational capacity. In Senegal, civil society has played an important role since before independence. Political activism and associations have a long history in Senegal, and even prior to the adoption of multiparty elections these groups pressured the regime for greater political liberalization. In the era of multiparty elections, these groups shifted from creating the pressure on the regime for change and began to channel the discontent of society for liberalizing reforms. In moments of social unrest, often resulting from socio-economic grievances, civil society in Senegal proved capable of organizing unified pressures against the regime for incremental political change that over time resulted in the gradual democratization of regime. This took place most recently following the widespread mobilizations.
against a third presidential term for Abdoulaye Wade in 2012. While civil society cannot be attributed with all of the credit for Wade’s decision to abandon his proposed reforms and his subsequent electoral loss, civil society unity and organizational capacity certainly contributed to this outcome.

In Burkina Faso, civil society has had a long and mixed history. Trade unions in urban center have been particularly disruptive, demonstrating their unity and organizational capacity soon after the country’s independence. However, the revolutionary regime of Thomas Sankara, limited the political activism of civil society group and aimed to shift all of their organizational capacity to the state, to be directed by the CNR. When Sankara’s regime’s fell, Compaoré implemented reforms that opened up space for civil society groups and for political activism, but many of these groups remained allies with the regime. In short, civil society did not remain wholly unified. Over time, as it became clear that the regime under Compaoré was severely repressive of any political dissent, civil society began to unify and organize large mobilizations to pressure the regime following its repressive acts. These moment of social unrest, coupled with civil society’s waxing and waning organizational capacity, produced cycles of reform and recalibration under Compaoré. Eventually, however, this cycle culminated in the popular insurrection which ousted Compaoré from power. Burkina Faso represents a case where civil society has experienced many difficulties, but its long history of activism and protests contributed to its ability to pressure the regime for limited liberalizing reforms, particularly at moments of social unrest.

In Chad, civil society remains weak. After independence and during the thirty years of civil war, civil society experienced few opportunities to organize or develop into an institution capable of channeling popular pressure for political change. The regime has relied on violent
repression to stifle attempts by civil society to build up organizational capacity or to form a
united front in opposition to the regime. The active and violent repression used by the regime to
limit the mobilizing power of civil society has been effective so far. Without facing significant
pressure from civil society or the opposition, the regime remains indifferent to popular
dissatisfaction or socio-economic grievances held by the public. As a consequence, the regime
has eroded the political liberalization experienced during the 1990s. Despite the semi-routinized
multiparty electoral politics of the 1990s, Chad’s regime trajectory clearly follows a pathway
toward the restoration of authoritarian rule. In the following sections, I discuss these cases in
more detail, highlighting specific episodes that underscore the characteristics of civil society in
each country.

**Senegal: Agitators for Democratization**

Civil society—groups and associations led by elites actors seeking to advance sets of
interests that are typically associated with Western liberal democracy—in Senegal began to
emerge even before World War I. Prior to the war, colonial expansion across West Africa placed
bureaucratic and administrative strain on France, requiring the training of so-called ‘évolues,’
colonial subjects who were French educated and considered ‘assimilated’ into French culture.
Along with the originaires of the Four Communes of Senegal, these two groups comprised those
‘African Frenchmen’ who participated in the first political institutions responsible for local
governance in the Senegalese colony. They also comprised the first African political group, the
“Young Senegalese.” This group—founded in 1912 in Saint Louis by low-level colonial
administrators such as, clerks, schoolteachers, interpreters, and the letter-writers—were
precursors to the French educated African elites who continue to dominate much of civil society
throughout West Africa. The Young Senegalese also inspired and shaped many of Senegal’s first
politicians, including Blaise Diagne, Galandou Diouf, Lamine Gueye, and even Senegal’s first
president, Léopold Sedar Senghor. The Young Senegalese groups marks the beginning of civil society in Senegal, and civil society groups, particularly through student unions and public sector unions, continued to develop before and after independence.34

Protest and demonstrations by students and unions have disrupted politics many times in Senegal’s political history. As early as 1968, students and unions proved to be a challenging force for the regime (Bathily 1992). Indeed, the general strike and demonstrations led by students against Senghor’s regime in May 1968 forced Senghor to implement a curfew, deploy the National Army, and call on the French military for support. When the regime arrested hundreds of demonstrators and many of the unions’ leaders even larger demonstrations broke out throughout Dakar (Blum 2012, 152). The mobilizations effectively forced the regime to negotiate with the demonstrators. Bathily (1992) presents these events as a successful strategy designed to win more student rights and to pressure the Senghor government for greater political liberalization, notably multiparty elections.

The efforts of this nascent civil society proved successful. In the early 1970s, a series of reforms implemented by Senghor signaled concessions to civil society’s political activism. Rather than attempting to suppress opponents of the regime, as was the case in many other African countries at the time, Senghor opted to allow limited amounts of political liberalization (Beck 1997, 11). This successful strategy helped to unify workers in solidarity with students in Dakar. Through their mutually reinforcing organizational capacities, the unions and student association successfully pressured the regime toward limited liberalization, even when faced

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34 It is worth noting here that in addition to the presence of student associations and the unions, the independence and freedom of the media have a long and established history going back to the immediate post-colonial period (Pasquier 1962). Today, the media in Senegal is vibrant. Opposition and media critical of the regime are published widely in local languages as well as in French. Indeed, it is common to find opinion editorials authored by many of the politicians in the opposition and in the ruling party as way of disseminating their political views and arguments.
with arrest and repression. Other demonstrations and protests led by students and unions erupted at various moments of popular discontent throughout the 1970s and 1980s and regularly joined forces with the political opposition to pressure the regime for liberalizing reforms.\textsuperscript{35}

These demonstrations and their ability to extract limited concessions set the antecedent conditions for Senegal ahead of the adoption of the 1992 ‘consensual’ Electoral Code. The 1992 Electoral Code arguably represents the liberalizing reform that most evened the electoral playing field in the country and perhaps most closely aligns with other countries’ political transitions to multiparty electoral system at the time (Villalón 1994b, 175). As I have discussed above, these reforms did not result in an immediate change in power, but the new electoral code and other agreed upon reforms between the opposition and ruling party marked a transitional moment in Senegal’s regime trajectory. It also opened the Senegalese political arena to greater liberalization that enhanced the unity and organizational capacity of civil society.

During the 1990s, civil society activism grew to become common and highly political in Senegal, and student associations and trade unions continue to shape the politics of the country. Frequently, those who hold leadership positions in these organizations find themselves involved in politics later in their careers. Indeed, many argue that by becoming active in the leadership of student movements or unions they are on the fast track to a political career.\textsuperscript{36} Many leaders of Senegalese student groups hold ambitions of one day obtaining political office, and they attempt to make themselves known through their activism by pressuring the regime for change and in the process demonstrating their mobilizing power.\textsuperscript{37} Strikes and other forms of public dissent are

\textsuperscript{35} For an excellent account of the various reforms and the politics behind those reforms see Bodian (2016, 104-114 and 202-212)

\textsuperscript{36} Interview with Senegalese student activist, Dakar, June 27, 2015.

\textsuperscript{37} Interview with Senegalese student activist, Dakar, June 27, 2015.
common and generally respected by the government, although sometimes protesters are dispersed if demonstrations become violent or destructive.

Finally, contemporary Senegal exhibits a robust civil society due to its comparatively developed urban centers and the growing number of professional workers. In 2010, when Wade proposed a constitutional amendment to lower the percentage of the vote required to forego a second round runoff election and to create the position of vice-president, it incited massive demonstration against the regime (Bodian 2016, 111). Almost immediately, these classes of Senegalese citizens responded by establishing civil society movements against the proposed reforms. By June 2011, a coalition of civil society groups and political parties known as the Mouvement M23, along with other popular youth movements such as Y’en a Marre, organized mass demonstrations that threatened to destabilize the country. Wade did not move forward with the proposal, but instead he decided to run for a controversial third term in office under the existing rules.³⁸ Popular discontent with the decision produced demonstrations that approached the scale of those that characterized the popular insurrection in Burkina Faso in 2014. However, unlike the events in Burkina Faso, Wade’s concession allowed the 2012 elections to take place without significant irregularities and the outcome to strengthen the country’s democratic institutions. Popular mobilizations against Wade translated into political support and as the elections went to a second round, Macky Sall obtained a majority of the ballots cast. Wade conceded the elections and stepped down from office, choosing to respect the result. Clearly, civil society possessed the ability to pressure the regime for further liberalization, but, more

³⁸ In 2001, during Wade’s first term in office, presidential term limits were reformed from two seven-year terms to two five-year terms and back to two seven-year terms in 2008. The Supreme Court ruled that Wade was eligible to contest the presidential elections organized in 2012 because the term limits had been modified during his terms in office and did not stipulate that they would be retroactive.
importantly, after obtaining liberalizing reforms civil society has been able to develop as a check on the ability of the regime to erode the democratic nature of its political institutions. This process has led to an institutionalization of liberal democratic politics in Senegal that guarantees civil liberties of all citizens.

**Burkina Faso: Protests and Amplified Mobilizing Power**

In Burkina Faso, the trade unions have always played an important and influential role in politics, pressuring several post-colonial regimes at certain inflection points during the country’s history. Union activism emerged quickly in Burkinabè political life, beginning with the introduction of unionized civil servants under colonial rule and growing during the post-colonial regimes (Muase 1989). Shortly after independence, trade unions discovered their ability to effectively shut down the government and commerce through generalized strikes that severely disrupted the first regime. The “founding moment” that marks the Burkinabè tradition of protest was the overthrow of Maurice Yaméogo and the end of the First Republic. The military led the actually ouster of Yaméogo and subsequently took over the regime, but it was made possible by the trade union-instigated popular movement in January 1966, which was a reaction to the blatant enrichment of the former regime, despite its introduction of austerity plans (Chouli 2012). This movement set the tone for the subsequent military regimes and the attempts to return to civilian rule. In fact, unions played a role in pressuring, even weakening, each of the military regimes which took and lost power ahead of Sankara’s revolution in 1983.39

Sankara came to power on the wings of real popular support. In addition to the mutiny led by Blaise Compaoré and soldiers loyal to Sankara in Pô, popular protest in support of the

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39 For useful summaries of these events see Chouli (2012, 5-6) and Harsch (2017, 22-49). For an excellent account of the various roles that trade unions played in Burkinabè politics during this time see Muase (1989).
charismatic prime minister and army captain broke out following news of his arrest by the
government (Dwyer 2017 and Chouli 2012, 6). However, Sankara’s approach to governance
failed to cultivate popular support through the top-down application of his policies, and by 1985
the trade unions once again began organizing to denounce the diminished freedoms they
experienced under Sankara’s CNR. During the revolution, the government cracked down on the
unions and other forms of popular mobilization; organizing outside of the government’s purview
was deemed “subversive” and subject to “military sanctions” (Chouli 2012, 7). When Compaoré
came to power following Sankara’s assassination, trade unions and other forms of civil society
regained freedoms of assembly and speech. Indeed, the creation of the *Front Populaire* by
Compaoré initially provided space for several different civil society groups including the trade
union bloc, *Confédération Générale du Travail du Burkina*, the student association, *Union
générale des étudiants burkinabè* and an umbrella organization focused on human rights, the
*Movuvement Burkinabè des Droits de l’Homme et des Peuples*. These organizations continued to
play important roles in pressuring the government during Compaoré’s rule, pressuring the regime
at moments of social unrest.

However, following Sankara’s downfall, civil society lost important elements of its
organizational capacity. The ability of civil society to consistently pressure the regime for
liberalizing reforms over time wavered. Instead, civil society groups relied on heightened
moments of popular dissatisfaction or outrage with the regime’s repressive acts to amplify its
ability to organize and extract liberalizing reforms, and frequently the reforms did not fully
address the lack of democratic governance in the regime. As I develop below, Burkina Faso’s
civil society did pressure the regime at certain inflection points when it unified and profited from
an amplified organizational power, but post-colonial experiences under the different military
regimes of the 1970s and 1980s kept civil society from being able to consistently pressure the regime, until a wave of popular dissatisfaction ousted Compaoré in the popular insurrection of 2014.

Shortly following the first multiparty elections organized in 1990s, student unions waged the most openly critical demonstrations of the regime. Protest and forms of public demonstrations grew more common throughout Burkina Faso during this time, even taking place at the municipal level. Harsch (2009) has arguably done the most systematic analysis of public protests in Burkina Faso and has found that the national political context shapes protest and local government response. The organizational capability of civil society to mobilize citizens in protest is at least in part a function of the regime’s popularity and local government’s performance. Similar to Fatton’s (1992) concept of débordement, popular mobilizations spurred on by the repressive acts of the regime put the regime under significant pressure, but only temporarily. Below I discuss some key episodes.

When a student union leader, Dabo Boukary, died while in police custody in 1990, the student unions were outraged. Their grievances grew in the subsequent years and the unions regularly held protests against the repressive nature of the regime (Wise 1998). As student protests erupted on campuses all over the country, a broader movement against the repression of the Compaoré regime gradually emerged and reinforced the student movements after the deaths of investigative journalist Norbert Zongo and three of his colleagues in 1998 (Harsch 1999). These politically motivated killings sparked a socially diverse movement against the regime under the umbrella organization of Collectif d’Organisations Démocratiques de Masse et de Partis Politiques (Collective of Democratic Organizations of the Masses and Political Parties, CODMPP) which included the student unions, university professors, opposition parties, media
actors, labor unions, and women’s associations (Ouédraogo 2006, 16-17). The CODMPP spearheaded a countrywide anti-regime movement often referred to as the ‘Trop C’est Trop’ or ‘Enough is Enough’ movement, and placed an enormous amount of pressure on the Compaoré regime to dramatically reform the political system.\textsuperscript{40} The movement attacked key leaders in the Compaoré regime publicly, calling on President Compaoré to account for the death of Zongo and his colleagues (Hagberg 2002, 221-22). This unprecedented assault against Compaoré’s regime forced the regime to react to the public outcry.

In response to the wide scale protests and demonstrations led by the ‘Trop C’est Trop’ campaign, a special commission of religious, traditional and former political leaders was created. The commission generated a report to the government with a series of institutional reforms and recommendations to the government to reestablish stability in the country. Amongst the various recommendation listed in the report were reforms to the electoral code, the constitution—notably, reinstatement of presidential term limits—and in the administration of elections. In 2001, the government adopted a series of these reform—most importantly changing presidential term limits to a maximum of two five-year consecutive terms, and the adoption of proportional representation for legislative elections. The adoption of the reform largely returned the country to a context of calm.

The government attempted to follow similar strategies ahead of the popular insurrection, but greatly miscalculated the desire of demonstrators to avoid a reform of presidential term limits. The ouster of the CDP and Compaoré reveal an important point about the nature of the

\textsuperscript{40} These events are sometimes referred to as the ‘Zongo Affair’ that references the murder of investigative journalist Norbert Zongo and three of his colleagues. Zongo had been investigating the death of driver David Ouédraogo in which members of Compaoré’s family, specifically his younger brother François, and the RSP had been implicated. For more detail accounts of the ‘Zongo Affair’ and related events see: Loada (1999), Hagberg (2002), and Harsch (1999).
regime in Burkina Faso. On paper, the political institutions enshrined by the constitution pointed to democratic and electoral process, thus the potential for political change. However, the prospects for political change were being manipulated by the regime, and required the extra-constitutional actions of the people to insure that the desired changes take effect. This was not the case in Senegal, where the opposition’s unity and organizational capacity coupled with similar degrees of organizational capacity and unity from civil society pressured the regime for gradual political liberalization over time that ultimately allowed for political change to occur through the electoral process. The ability of Burkina Faso’s civil society to channel popular discontent into pressures for greater liberalization suggests that the prospects for greater political liberalization may improve over time. Civil society in Chad is another story.

**Chad: Repression and Regime Indifference**

As was the case with the factors that shaped the political opposition in Chad, political violence stemming from the colonial and post-colonial periods sets the stage for civil society’s role in politics. The political transition leading up to the first multiparty presidential elections in 1996 ushered in a new era for civil society, which began to pursue an increasingly public role during and following the *Conférence Nationale Souveraine* (CNS). Many civil society groups flourished during the political transition and worked tirelessly to educate Chadian citizens about their new rights. However, political violence had not been completely eliminated. In 1992, Joseph Behidi, the vice president of the *Ligue Tchadienne des Droits de l’Homme* (Chadian League for Human Rights), was assassinated, resulting in massive demonstrations led by other civil society leaders. Similarly, a union leader, Samuel Mbaïguedem, was killed in 1993 during

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41 One can still find a number of publications produced in the years following the CNS that aimed to educate citizens on their roles in multiparty elections, human rights, decentralization, and associational life.
the CNS. Indeed, the Deby regime may have been less brutal than that of Habré’s, but it did not put an immediate end to the arbitrary arrests and assassinations that characterized previous regimes, nor would it following elections (Debos 2013a, 89).

As I developed in Chapter 5, it is undeniable that initial political liberalization occurred after Déby came to power, but civil society’s organizational capacity has been insufficient to check the erosion of that liberalization by the regime through repression. During and after the 1990s, student associations and unions became more active in Chad by organizing public sector workers and occasionally going on strike. However, unions never reached the same level of organizational capacity in Chad as they did in Burkina Faso or Senegal. Student movements also emerged during the 1990s and began to disrupt the educational sector more frequently, although the regime did (does) not hesitate to disperse student protests with tear gas, and at times soldiers use live ammunition against student demonstrators resulting in causalities.

Unlike the Senegalese or Burkinabè cases, union activists and student leaders rarely become involved in politics. The media and professionalized civil society also suffers from the regime’s repression. Journalists and editors who take a critical stance on the regime frequently become targets of harassment. They suffer arbitrary detainments, seizure of property, and some have had to flee into exile. Two highly critical journalists and prominent figures in the Chadian media, Eric Topona and Jean-Etiene Laokolé, were imprisoned on 6 May, 2013 for allegedly

42 Many of the interviews I conducted with civil society activists and political party leaders pointed to the transition as a success for democracy in Chad, noting that it was one of the most important political developments for the country. In some cases, interviewees even suggested that what Chad needed now was another political transition that could affect similar change.

43 While living in N’Djamena for eight months, I resided in a neighborhood roughly 2 kilometers from the main campus of the University of N’Djamena—the country’s largest public university. On five occasions, tear gas flooded my neighborhood after security forces used it to disperse student protest on campus. For five of the eight months during which I lived their either the students or the faculty were on strike.
supporting a plot to destabilize the regime. This is also true for civil society organizations that are overly critical of the regime. Civil society leaders face harsh repression in the form of arrests and jail time. According to Amnesty International (2017), 65 associations have been refused authorization for peaceful protests, as the government increases its use of repressive laws, arrests of human rights activists, and the intelligence service in attempts to thwart the work of government critics.

Recent events before and after the 2016 presidential elections capture the degree to which civil society in Chad suffers from a lack of the civil liberties typically expected in multiparty regimes. The socio-economic climate in Chad eroded dramatically during 2016 due to a budgetary crisis.\(^4\) Lacking the necessary funds to support public services and faced with a deficit of roughly $US 550 million, the government of Chad increased the deficit of the national budget multiple times. This forced the government to adopt sixteen austerity measures, resulting in an increasingly tense social environment that had already been plagued by strikes, protests, and demonstrations prior to the presidential election earlier in the year.

Beginning in February 2016, two months of social protest and turmoil preceded Déby’s reelection. The emergence of a video on social media of an opposition leader’s teenage daughter being gang-raped by the sons of high-level Chadian officials triggered social outcry throughout the country.\(^5\) The protests, led by several prominent civil society leaders, aimed to address problems of violence against women and the impunity of members of the ruling party.

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\(^4\) The crisis was brought on by a fall in oil prices beginning in 2014 and the simultaneous increase in public expenditure generated by the fight against Boko Haram. The drop in oil prices split the country’s largest source of revenue in half between 2014 and 2016, while the military expenditure forced the government to more than double its national debt, accordingly to the Minister of Budget and Finance.

\(^5\) The protest movement became known as the Zouhoura Affair, named after the victim. After weeks of protests, the police arrested the seven accused rapists who were tried and convicted by the courts. However, two of the convicts later escaped from prison under highly dubious circumstances.
Importantly, these protests and demonstrations highlight a moment of strong public dissatisfaction with the regime, and offer an example of civil society’s attempt to use its mobilizing power to channel that dissatisfaction to produce reform. The demonstrations catalyzed a widespread movement against the continued rule of Déby on the eve of presidential elections, but ultimately did little to effect political change.

In response to these movements, the regime cracked down heavily on civil society, arresting four of its leaders. Each of the leaders represented a different anti-regime movement and each received a four-month prison sentence for organizing an unauthorized unarmed assembly, disturbing the peace, and resisting the exercise of legitimate authority. This high profile crackdown on civil society leaders exemplifies the challenges faced by civil society in Chad. It also demonstrates the willingness of the regime to censor those who oppose their authority or criticize its politics and policies. Similar crackdowns took place throughout the country prior to presidential elections, casting a shadow over Déby’s victory and subsequent legitimacy. The threat of censorship and repression against civil society from the current Chadian government remains constant. This lack of protection for the freedoms of assembly and speech prevents civil society from enhancing its mobilizing power.

Following Déby’s reelection, the social climate in Chad temporarily calmed, despite the fact that the political opposition refused to acknowledge the results and demanded that Déby step

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46 The four leaders and their movements were: Younous Mahadjir, Secretary General of l’Union des Syndicats du Tchad; Céline Narmadji, spokeswoman for the movement Trop c’est Trop; Nadjo Kaina, Spokesman for the movement IYINA; and Mahamat Nour Ahmed Ibedou, Spokesman for the movement Ça Suffit.

47 During my fieldwork, I participated in nearly daily discussions with civil society members as an intern at a local civil society organization focused on peace building and politics in Chad. Virtually everyday jokes were made about government surveillance. It became clear to me that these were not entirely jokes, but rather one form of coping with the fact that many of them faced serious threats to their livelihoods as a result of their work and commitment to improving the political situation in the country.
down from power. Numerous attempts by civil society to mobilize youth and others around the country against Déby failed. Civil society and the opposition even joined forces to call for several general strikes, asking everyone from taxi drivers to shop owners to stay home and out of the streets, causing the country to appear as if it were a “Ville Morte” or ‘Ghost Town.’ But these efforts largely failed.

Even so, in the months following the 2016 presidential election, authorities jailed prominent civil society and opposition leaders for attempting to organize demonstrations against Déby’s continued rule. The youth and student leader of a group known as IYINA, a word meaning ‘We’re tired,’ in local Arabic was arrested and imprisoned by authorities multiple times after the 2016 election for disturbing the peace and planning demonstrations. It is clear that these associations and organizations lack the forms of mobilizing power needed to effectively pressure the regime for political liberalization. Only a very limited number of protesters are willing to endure the potentially violent and ongoing repression of the regime. This allows the regime to follow a strategy of authoritarian indifference.

In a piece critical of the regime, satirical Chadian poet and author, Nimrod (2005, 292), describes the state of relations between democracy, civil society and the Chadian regime in the following fashion:

Le Tchad n’est pas une démocratie, c’est une parlocratie. Et le Président, toujours fier de filer la métaphore, répond, presque en s’excusant: « Le chien aboie, la caravane passe ». Le Tchad, en effet, est la patrie des chiens, et celle des caravanes esclavagistes.48

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48 Interpretation: Chad is not a democracy, it is a parlocratie [representing the ability to speak and be heard from the French verb to speak parler]. And the president, always proud to spin the metaphor, responds, almost apologetically: “The dog barks, the caravan passes.” Chad, in effect, is the homeland of dogs, and that of slave caravans.
regime-critical journalists and activists commonly reference Déby’s use of the familiar saying, “when the dog barks the caravan passes” much in the same way that Nimrod does above. The saying captures the regime’s indifference toward demonstrations and the perceived futility of these demonstrations. However, when such disturbances garner enough of the regime’s attention, detachments of the security forces heavily and violent repress them, or, as was the case for IYINA after it began to receive international attention, its leadership was arrested and meetings were banned. Those who decide to challenge the regime suffer the consequences. In short, the political liberalization that occurred in Chad in the 1990s allowed a nascent civil society to emerge, however continued repression has kept Chadian civil society from developing the organizational capacity necessary to pressure for greater liberalization. Instead, this repression has eroded the limited protections in place for freedom of assembly and speech over time and has resulted in an increasingly authoritarian regime under which civil society’s watchdog role is blatantly ignored.

**Conclusion**

In this chapter, I have argued that the differences in the unity and organizational capacities of civil society and the political opposition in Senegal, Burkina Faso, and Chad each play important roles in shaping the regime trajectories of each country. Civil society and the opposition play important roles in channeling popular discontent into pressure imposed upon the regime to extract greater liberalization. The ability of civil society and the opposition to do this depends on the strategies available to the regime to resist these pressures, and that is in turn partially a function of its relations with the other non-governing institutions such as the military and neo-traditional institutions. However, where civil society and the opposition are unified, and wield a high degree of organization capacity, they obtain a high degree of mobilizing power and
become more likely to be able to effect gradual political liberalization. Senegal most closely captures this dynamic.

In Senegal, a highly unified opposition and civil society were able to produce enough mobilizing power to extract political concessions from the regime, resulting in political liberalization. Political liberalization occurred incrementally and over time in the Senegalese political regime, as civil society and the opposition consistently pressured the regime. In doing so, Senegal has followed a regime trajectory of gradual democratization. When former president Wade decided to run for a third term, civil society was able to mobilized massive protests and opposition, and in the end the political institutions produced the electoral victory of Macky Sall to replace Wade. The strength of civil society has thus been a significant check on the inherent tendency of electoral regimes to attempt to ensure their hold on power. Adding further evidence to the trajectory of Senegal’s gradual democratization, Wade conceded the election. Senegal’s second election that produced a peaceful turnover in power in 2012 confirms that political liberalization has occurred gradually, but effectively in that case.

In Burkina Faso, protests and demonstrations are common throughout the country in both major urban centers and in small municipalities, suggesting that a relatively high degree of organizational capacity exists in certain areas. However, civil society and the opposition have lacked the level of unity needed to function as a consistent pressure for political liberalization. At times of intense socio-political crisis, generally triggered by dramatic events, these groups do unify and are able to extract political concessions. This dynamic, however, means that whether a trajectory of gradual democratization results or not is overly dependent on the powers of civil society in times of crisis. When crisis hits, Burkina Faso’s regime has historically conceded to liberalizing reforms and waited for the crisis to pass, after which time the regime recalibrates the
political playing field to maintain the regime’s dominance. The mobilizing power of civil society and the opposition in Burkina Faso has hit intermittent highs, making it difficult to assess the most recent popular insurrection in 2014 which ousted Compaoré from power, only to result in the election of a party composed of those former CDP members who worked under Compaoré for years. However, the fragmentation of the CDP and the gains made by the opposition in the wake of the popular insurrection may also indicate that the prospects for greater political liberalization in Burkina Faso have improved. In time, and after relations between the regime and non-governing institutions stabilize, the future regime trajectory of Burkina Faso will become clearer.

In Chad, civil society and the opposition have been incapable of organizing to ensure sufficient strength, and they thus endure heavy and violent repression from the regime, which targets them with harassment, arbitrary arrests, property seizure, and in the worst cases assassination. The incapacity of civil society and the opposition to counter these tactics of managing pressures for liberalization have predictably led to a restoration of authoritarian rule in Chad. This regime trajectory towards the restoration of authoritarian rule has been precipitated by the configuration of Chad’s military and neo-traditional institutions as well which both fail to provide a check on the regime’s authoritarian tendencies. Ultimately, the prospect for greater liberalization in Chad seem dim at best. Civil society and the opposition suffer from limited and perhaps diminishing mobilizing power. At the time of writing (March 2018), opposition parties splintered from their coalition, further fragmenting its legislative bloc into three “oppositions.” Then, in April 2018, President Déby modified the constitution without holding a popular referendum. Completely ignoring the opposition parties which refused to accept the constitutional reform, the MPS led a coalition of supporting parties in the National
Assembly to approve a new constitution that established a ‘Presidential’ Republic, giving Déby enhanced powers. In many ways, these moves suggested that the limited political liberalization experienced in the 1990s in Chad have been almost completely reversed or checked. It is difficult to argue that the regime trajectory experienced in Chad since the adoption of multiparty elections exhibits anything other than the full restoration of authoritarian rule.
CHAPTER 9
CONCLUSION: POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION IN AFRICA

Introduction

As a guardian against depredation, as a guide to decent politics, as a source of political imagination, as a progenitor of institutional design, as an organization of power, as a leading way to organize political life across much of the globe, and as the target of challenges from a wide variety of intellectual, religious, and political movements, liberalism presents historical and conceptual, normative and empirical challenges of the highest order.

—Ira Katznelson
*Strong Theory, Complex History*

The epigraph above is drawn from an essay in which Katznelson (2009, 111) calls on comparativists employing an historical institutionalist approach to embrace a more encompassing research program. His concern is that such historically oriented work might lose its significance if scholars fail to produce a larger “concatenation” of research embedded in strong theory. To avoid this potential outcome, Katznelson offers (2009, 97) an “exhortation,” proposing “a close focus on the history, character, and conundrums of political liberalism.” Reading that essay for the first time during the Fall of 2011 in the “Introduction to Comparative Political Analysis” graduate seminar, it struck me as precisely the type of academic hubris and, at times, moralizing that I wanted to avoid. Put differently, I did not fully appreciate Katznelson’s aspiration as novice student of comparative politics.

Yet, his discussion of works—brought together by a “wish to understand how institutional contexts and processes establish situations within which social action takes place [or not]”—captured my attention (Katznelson 2010, 100). In future re-readings, the essay introduced me to a significant body of work in comparative politics and revealed subjects that I felt deserved further exploration in contemporary African politics. I began to pay more careful attention to the “historical turn” in comparative politics and, more specifically, the study of democratization (Capoccia and Ziblatt 2010). I learned that Evans’ (1995) “eclectic messy center” of comparative
politics continued to be a strong, even admirable, force within the sub-field. Finally, through works that employed theories with mechanism-centered logics, and that approached historical processes as “sequences of mechanisms,” I found examples that aligned with my own epistemological preferences (Tilly and Goodin 2006, 16). Eventually, my aspirations of contributing to this literature grew and Katzenelson’s call for a focus on political liberalism re-emerged.

As such, in this dissertation, I have focused primarily on how multiparty electoral regimes in Africa organize power. In this endeavor, I treated the process of political liberalization empirically with the broad aim of contributing to a better understanding of liberalization’s “character, content, deficits, vulnerabilities, and causal capacities” within the diverse contexts and experiences of contemporary African politics (Katzenelson 2009, 112). My argument diverges from an analysis of liberal democracy’s formal institutions and refocuses attention on how regimes interact with non-governing institutions that shape the prospects for continued liberalization. In the liberal democracies of the West, where contemporary liberalism arguably traces its origins, important institutional checks on executive power developed alongside multiparty elections and serve to limit attempts by illiberal actors to reorder politics and to entrench themselves in power. Newly electoral African regimes present an altogether different context, in which the formal political institutions of Western liberalism exhibit shorter histories and exogenous origins. As such, these contexts offer new sites from which to observe how governments manage pressures for greater political liberalization, how social and political coalitions form and act, and how the intrinsic features of liberalization interact with political reform (Katzenelson 2009, 115). My central claim is that non-governing institutions—militaries, neo-traditional institutions, civil society and the opposition—are crucial to understanding these
processes in Africa. Ruling parties around the globe inevitably seek to maintain themselves in power and are thus always tempted to limit or even erode political liberalization; in African electoral regimes, the characteristics of non-governing institutions may at times reinforce and at other times provide a check on these illiberal government tendencies, by shaping the ways in which regimes manage pressures for greater political liberalization.

In this dissertation, I investigated the roles of these institutions in the divergent regime trajectories of Burkina Faso, Chad and Senegal before and after the inauguration of multiparty elections. Burkina Faso displays moments of limited liberalization followed by illiberal recalibrations, through which the regime maintains electoral authoritarianism. Senegal experiences processes of liberalization that produce a trajectory towards gradual democratization. Chad continues to follow a trajectory towards the restoration of authoritarian rule. Through a comparative historical analysis of these three distinct regime trajectories, I examined how the coercive power of the military, the symbolic power of neo-traditional institutions, and the mobilizing power of civil society and the opposition shaped processes of political liberalization differently in each case. In the remainder of this conclusion, I return briefly to this analysis to discuss its contribution for understanding processes of liberalization across the African continent and in comparative politics. I then turn to areas of future research, where the theoretical framework might be further refined and/or expanded. Finally, I conclude with a brief discussion of the future of political liberalization in Burkina Faso following the 2015 political transition.

**Non-Governing Institutions in Africa’s Electoral Regimes**

In recent years, political scientists have observed that in several sub-Saharan African countries, democratic institutions have begun to consolidate despite the initial deficiencies that characterized their early multiparty elections. Meanwhile, in other African countries, a
restoration of authoritarian politics has occurred even where multiparty elections had become routine. This dissertation explores several research questions related to these developments, all of which center on the primary inquiry: Why, after the inauguration of multiparty elections, do regimes in some countries undergo further processes of political liberalization, while in others, regimes effectively curtail political liberalization or even slide into authoritarianism? In this dissertation, I address this puzzling variation through an original theoretical framework based on different institutional configurations of the military, neo-traditional institutions, civil society and the opposition. The purpose of this framework is to elucidate the roles played by these non-governing institutions in shaping the possibilities by which electoral regimes manage pressures for greater liberalization.

Thus, the four institutions central to my argument are the military, neo-traditional institutions, civil society and the opposition. Throughout this dissertation, I refer to these collectively as non-governing institutions, meaning that while each of these institutions shapes electoral politics in specific ways, they remain institutions that lie outside of the formal structures of government in civilian regimes. In treating these institutions as distinct from the regime, my goal is to take into account the “layered nature of authorities and the roles of social institutions” and to illuminate the ways in which these institutions engage with African multiparty regimes to shape the prospects for greater liberalization (Lust 2018, 336). Of course, the impact of each of these different institutions varies widely from case to case and over time, as each regime follows its own trajectory.

Thelen (2004) observes that works based on path-dependent trajectories have been more focused on persistence than change, and in doing so, may ignore important questions regarding how institutions evolve and develop over time. In this dissertation, I closely adhere to, and offer
two contributions in line with this observation. First, by employing Hacker, Pierson and Thelen’s (2015, 180) concept of “institutional drift,” whereby institutions undergo processes of change as a result of evolutions to their original contexts, I examine the ways in which the configurations and effects of non-governing institutions gradually shift within the post-electoral contexts of Burkina Faso, Chad and Senegal. These shifts shape and are shaped by reciprocal relationships between multiparty regimes and non-governing institutions, that over time and through political reform result in different regime trajectores.

The second contribution relates to the focus on persistence rather than change, through attention to the “temporal syncopation,” which characterizes the reiterative political reforms that signal institutional junctures along the pathway of each regime trajectory (Hall 2016, 45). In this dissertation, I have elaborated the causal processes at work within each regime trajectory over time that are the product of a series of inter-connected, but contingent outcomes. Whereas there may be a tendency to view each outcome as inevitable, in fact when observing the processes involved in arriving at that outcome, its highly contingent nature is unveiled. My fieldwork in Burkina Faso afforded me the opportunity for precisely this type of observation. The events of the popular insurrection in 2014 that ousted Blaise Compaoré from power, and the subsequent political transition of 2015 that concluded during my fieldwork in the country, provided me with the unprecedented opportunity to observe the complicated and highly contingent processes unfolding as the regime attempted to recalibrate. I have tried to capture this by discussing various episodes from my fieldwork at the beginning of several chapters throughout this dissertation. These episodes underscore both the contingent nature of those processes as well as the roles of non-governing institutions in those processes, and ultimately form the foundations from which I have crafted my theoretical framework.
Ultimately, my research finds that where the military is cohesive and maintains a norm of republican civil-military relations, it is characterized by a high degree of coercive power which may improve the prospects for political liberalization; where neo-traditional institutions are socially and politically integrated, they promote stability through a high degree of symbolic power which in turn improves the prospects for political liberalization; and where civil society and the opposition exhibit high organizational capacities and remain unified, they wield a high degree of mobilizing power that may successfully pressure regimes for greater political liberalization. When these characteristics are in place, the powers of these non-governing institutions function as an important check on the illiberal propensities of newly electoral regimes, and thus, encourage democratization over time. When these characteristics are not in place, the risk of regimes experiencing a steady erosion of political liberalism and a subsequent return to authoritarianism is increased. Finally, when these characteristics are partially in place, as is perhaps the case most commonly across the continent, the prospects for greater or reduced political liberalization vacillate, creating an uneasy balance as exhibited by the electoral authoritarianism experienced in Burkina Faso. Understanding the ways in which non-governing institutions shape the organization of power, through their impact on the ability of Africa’s electoral regimes to manage pressures for greater political liberalization, is the chief contribution of this work. However, there remains much work to be done.

Areas of Future Research

The theoretical framework developed in this dissertation for understanding this puzzle relies on the comparison of stable regimes following their inauguration of multiparty elections. This comparison has been important for developing the internal validity of the theory behind the framework, but may unnecessarily limit the scope conditions of the theory. Thus, one area of future research might expand the comparative analysis to two new and important cases within the
same sub-region: Mali and Niger. The addition of Mali and Niger would incorporate a case of regime breakdown (Mali post-2012) and recurring instability (Niger) following the implementation of multiparty elections. By analyzing cases of regime instability through this framework, I hope to more closely evaluate the connections between regimes and non-governing institutions, by investigating where differences in characteristics of non-governing institutions may have failed to produce sustainable frameworks for regime trajectories.

In the 1990s, Mali and Niger both experienced moments of political liberalization and institutional reform which resulted in the adoption of multiparty elections. In Mali, it initially appeared that democratization was well underway toward consolidation (Wing 2008). However, weak political coalitions began to dissolve when the military failed to put an end to an ethnic-separatist rebellion in 2012 and sent the country into years of instability and conflict (Ibrahim and Zapata 2018). This rebellion seized on the absence of legitimate authority in the country’s sparsely populated north and revealed that the ostensibly democratic foundations of Mali’s regime represented little more than a house of cards.

Over the last three decades, Niger has experienced four regime restorations following military coups, which in each case eventually returned the country to civilian rule and multiparty elections (Elischer 2018). These iterations suggest that there exist impediments to the production of stable political institutions in Niger and, consequently, institutions fail to ‘lock-in’ and create the types of institutional feed-back loops observed elsewhere. Instead, Niger’s institutional configurations have resulted in forms of “chronic instability” (Bernhard 2015). Bernhard (2015, 987) proposes three sets of causal mechanisms which explicate the failure of configurations of institutions to produce stability: 1) “exogenous shocks,” 2) “the mutability of coalitional politics” and 3) the “disjuncture between mechanisms of change and institutional reproduction.”
the addition of the above two cases, and an analysis of their non-governing institutional configurations, future research might help to confirm the roles of these “chronic instability” mechanisms or reveal additional causal mechanisms in the destabilization of regimes.

Another area for future research that would serve to further refine the theoretical framework employed is the addition of cases from outside of the Sahelian context. Four cases that immediately come to mind are Ghana, Mozambique, Zambia, and Uganda. These cases share a set of important similarities with Senegal, Burkina Faso and Chad while at the same time display intriguing differences that might serve to further test the scope conditions of my theory.

With regard to similarities, each represents, at least at first glance, stable regime trajectories that overlap nicely with gradual democratization (Ghana), a restoration of authoritarian rule (Uganda), and the ebb a flow of electoral authoritarianism (Mozambique and Zambia). The similar outcomes regarding their regime trajectories makes for a logical pairing with Senegal, Chad, and Burkina Faso through structured comparison.

Ghana, Mozambique, Zambia, and Uganda also provide several differences that would help to refine, strengthen and/or confirm the theory I have developed in this dissertation. First, none of the four countries are Francophone and all represent cases from separate sub-regions on the continent, and thus present very different colonial antecedent conditions. Ghana, like Senegal, is coastal and maintains some of the earliest sites of Afro-European exchange; however, it played a somewhat less central role in British colonialism than Senegal in the French colonial empire. Uganda, like Chad, is situated deep in the interior of the continent and was one of the last territories to be integrated into the British colonial empire in Africa, but unlike Chad, neo-traditional institutions represented by the chieftaincy of the Buganda more closely resemble the centralized political structures of the Mossi in Burkina Faso. Zambia presents an altogether
different scenario, as it was one of the territories brought under the influence of the British crown through the expansion of the British South Africa Company led by Cecil Rhodes, who obtained mineral rights from local communities through dubious treaties. Finally, Mozambique is a former Portuguese colony which experienced a liberation struggle in order to establish independence from Portuguese rule, even though Portuguese investment in Mozambique dramatically decreased during in the 1900s. Thus Zambia and Mozambique present two cases in which the form and extent of colonial rule at least on initial inspection may have differed greatly from colonial experienced in the Sahel.

In addition to divergent colonial antecedent conditions, these cases also point to many other intriguing differences that could be explored with further research, regarding military intervention, or lack thereof, in politics. Ghana, for example, experienced multiple military regimes and coups d’états, but after its transition to multiparty elections, its one-time military leader, Jerry Rawlings, abided by presidential term limits and retired from politics following his second term in office. Conversely, Zambia has never experienced a military regime or even a successful military intervention its political development, while both Uganda and Mozambique endured periods of civil war following independence. These superficial assessments of the role of each country’s military in politics warrants, at the very least, a closer examination of each country’s non-governing institutions, given the initial differences that are observable based on the framework developed in this dissertation. Additional comparisons of neo-traditional institutions, civil society and the opposition across these diverse cases may also add significant inferential leverage and scope to my analysis and theoretical framework.

Finally, another area for future research is the degree of importance of international and regional factors. Perhaps no work gives more weight to the power of international factors for
improving the prospects for democratization than Levitsky and Way (2010). The authors focus
on two principal features for the promotion of democratization: Western linkage and leverage.
The authors maintain that for democratization to occur successfully in competitive authoritarian
regimes, a high degree of Western linkage is essential. The authors also point to a domestic
factor, organizational power, which more closely aligns with the theoretical framework I have
developed in this study, but also differs in important ways. The focus of Levitsky and Way on
international explanatory factors for democratization has led to the criticism that they fail to
adequately entertain other plausible pathways to democratization, particularly those related to
domestic conditions (Slater 2011, 387). For the cases that I have discussed in this dissertation,
Levitsky and Way’s theory would not predict a democratic outcome, given that all three lack a
high degree of Western linkage and yet, the case of Senegal—and perhaps the future for Burkina
Faso—display an alternative trajectory.

Levitsky and Way also discuss one other international factor: international leverage, or
the credible threat of international donors to withhold aid, and how this may produce pressures
on poorer authoritarian regimes to embrace democratic reform (Levitsky and Way 2010). In
cases that have low organizational power, but experience high leverage, the authors predict
unstable authoritarianism; whereas when coupled with high organizational power, the authors
predict stable authoritarianism. However, in the case of Chad, the direction of the leverage is
reversed, due to regional dynamics and the desire of the international community to contain
threats of growing terrorism across the Sahel (Eizenga 2018). This reverse leverage allows the
Chadian regime to pressure Western countries to commit aid in exchange for Chad’s continued

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1 See Bogaards and Elischer (2016) for a much more in-depth treatment of Levitsky and Way’s (2010) theoretical
framework in Africa.
commitment to maintain stability in the region; it also simultaneously enables the Chadian regime to use repression to silence domestic dissent and withstand pressures for greater political liberalization. Furthermore, the increasingly destabilizing aspects of regional terrorism in the Sahel pose another threat, in that they may elicit and justify a “law and order” crackdown from regimes, which may have deleterious effects for both processes of political liberalization and political stability. With this in mind, I return once again to Burkina Faso in a discussion of the future for political liberalization following the 2015 political transition.

**What Future for Political Liberalization in Burkina Faso?**

After the 2015 political transition in Burkina Faso, one phenomenon appears to have remained constant: the ambiguous status of Burkinabè politics. Several post-transition political features continue to support the theories developed in this dissertation. First, the results of the 2015 election were consistent with past trends, demonstrating that political parties are multiplying but the elites who lead them rarely change and the dominant parties of the past continue to dominate (Chapter 2). The victory of Roch Kaboré in presidential elections verified the continued allegiance of many voters to the same political elites of the past. Further, the three parties to obtain the largest number of seats in the legislative elections represent the most dominant parties from past elections. Although, many of the individual parliamentarians changed—indeed more than 80 percent of the legislators obtained seats for the first time—and for the first time no political party obtained a majority of the seats in the National Assembly. This indicates that the popular insurrection and subsequent political transition may have resulted in some increased electoral competition.

Second, the important stabilizing role of neo-traditional institutions persists, but remained fluid (Chapter 7). Shortly after the elections, the Mogho Naba proclaimed that it was time for the country to return to calm—a statement viewed as tacit support for the new regime. However, the
extent to which the regime will openly collaborate with the Mogho Naba in the wake of the popular insurrection remains unclear (Hagberg et al. 2018). Perhaps in time, and when faced with social unrest, the relations between the regime and neo-traditional institutions will be clarified.

Third, without the controversy of the former ruling party’s attempt to modify presidential term limits, civil society and the opposition lost the amplified organizational capacity they each exhibited during the popular insurrection (Chapter 8). With a new ruling party elected to power, the opposition needed to adjust its coalition of parties which now included the former ruling party. It quickly became clear that unity would be a challenge, as the CDP proclaimed that it would lead its own oppositional bloc within the National Assembly. Civil society, still active and engaged in protests, continued its attempts to pressure the new regime for political liberalization, but displayed diminished organizational capacity, and in some cases, a willingness to align closely with specific political parties.²

Finally, the military appeared increasingly cohesive as an institution, and its actions to uphold the political transition in 2015 suggested the possibility that norms of civil-military relations might shift in a republican direction (Chapter 6). The RSP had been disbanded by the end of the 2015 political transition. Many of those accused of organizing the failed RSP coup d’état in 2015 surrendered to the authorities and awaited trial by military tribunal. More troubling, however, has been the deteriorating security situation in light of the growing threats from terrorist activities in the broader Sahel. Prior to the 2015 elections, Burkina Faso had not suffered from the insurgency brewing across the border in northern Mali. By the summer of 2018, three major terrorist bombings and attacks had taken place in downtown Ouagadougou

² See Harsch (2018) for examples of on-going protests and efforts to continue pressuring the regime.
targeting foreigners and security forces and hundreds of smaller scale attacks had occurred in the north of the country. The response from the military was initially disorganized and then heavy handed, resembling, at least in some areas, the forms of repressive crackdowns that might easily evolve into the rollback of political liberalization for certain communities. These actions cast doubt on the potential for developing republican norms of civil-military relations.

Just as I observed first-hand the contingent processes gradually unfolding during my fieldwork in Burkina Faso, it remains difficult to accurately predict the future regime trajectory of Burkina Faso at this moment in time. It is tempting to argue that insufficient change has occurred and thus a trajectory other than continued electoral authoritarianism remains unlikely. The experience of those in power suggests that the current ruling party understands the institutional configuration necessary to propel the country down a trajectory of stable electoral authoritarianism. It remains to be seen whether the possibility of an exogenous shock—perhaps in the form of increased civil conflict as the government seeks to maintain law and order following another terrorist attack—will destabilize the regime or provide a pretext for the regime to further roll back political liberalization in the country. Alternatively, one might also point to the emboldened Burkinabè populace that declared the country a ruecratie and mobilized throughout the streets of Ouagadougou in 2014 to protect their constitution, to argue that the liberalism enshrined in Burkina Faso’s constitution is more likely to grow than contract.

Only as the highly contingent outcomes of political reform take place, coalesce and interlock to form a series of historical processes that will represent Burkina Faso’s currently unfolding regime trajectory, will we be able to evaluate how its non-governing institutions shape the new regime’s ability to manage pressures for greater political liberalization. For now, Burkina Faso’s regime trajectory remains too ambiguous to predict. Only over time can we
examine the causes of effects. In the meantime, this dissertation represents the inter-locking processes that have joined to form my trajectory towards becoming a scholar of comparative politics, political liberalization, and African politics.
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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Daniel Eizenga earned a Bachelor of Arts in International Development Studies with a focus on Africa from Calvin College in Grand Rapids, Michigan in 2008. He received a Master of Arts in Political Science in 2013 from the University of Florida. He earned his Ph.D. in Political Science with a Graduate Certificate in African Studies from the University of Florida in the 2018. His research focuses on African politics, democratization, Islam and politics, and civil-military relations. He is a Research Associate with the Sahel Research Group at the University of Florida and has conducted extensive research in Sahelian Africa. He has published several works on politics and democratization in Burkina Faso and Chad.