CERTAINE BOUNDES: INDIAN PEOPLES, NATIONS AND VIOLENCE IN THE
SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY CHESAPEAKE

By

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To Mimi, you are worth so much
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This dissertation examines the Native perspective on development of boundaries, and communication and connection across boundaries, in the seventeenth-century Chesapeake. Many Native places were gradually appropriated, and as a consequence Indians’ knowledge of the Virginian landscape maintained political relevance, and their intelligence regarding English movements provided new means of exerting power. Archaeology, land and court records, and official correspondence demonstrates that both official and illicit English movement across the Chesapeake depended on Natives for support. This project explores how some Indians, Africans, and Englishmen pursued trade, war, freedom, and diplomacy beyond Virginia’s borders by following long-established Native lines of communication and travel. In so doing, they undermined colonial attempts to establish boundaries of all types—between Indians and Englishmen, between colonies, between property owners—and delegitimized colonial authority.
CHAPTER 1
BACKGROUND

In 1690, Stafford County officials in the northwestern reaches of the Virginia colony captured and interrogated a group of Indians over the deaths of a cow and a mare. “The chiefest of the Prisoners” was the “king of the Doegs,” though he might have preferred the Algonquian language term for a leader, “werowance,” over “king.” The county official began with the simple question, “by what means he being a stranger came here?”¹ No Englishmen in the courtroom had seen him before, raising suspicion that he might be a foreign raider. The king began his story fourteen years before, when Virginia’s war against a neighboring group called the Susquehannocks became doubly complicated for the Chesapeake’s Algonquians when Nathaniel Bacon led an indiscriminate and frightening rampage against any nearby Indians.² “Senecar” Indians—probably the Iroquois or the Susquehannocks among them—captured the king from his home among the Doegs’ neighbors, the Nanzaticos, near the Potomac River. He remained an adopted kinsman of that foreign nation for thirteen years, during which the Iroquois made war on Native and European groups from Virginia to New France. Then, “about fourteen months agone” he had left the Iroquois and planted corn among the Nottoway Indians, a hundred miles to the south of Stafford County. He left “in this summer before corn was Ripe,” and arrived back home intending to live among the Nanzaticos “with whom he had lived and conversed before.” Having established his identity and his well-traveled past prior to capture by the English, the Doeg leader

¹ “Notes from the Records of Stafford County, Virginia, Order Books (Continued),” Virginia Magazine of History and Biography 44, no. 1 (October 1937): 277-78.

turned the conversation to diplomacy, insisting his Virginian captors negotiate with him about the cow and the mare.³

For Englishmen in the room who might never leave Stafford County, let alone Virginia, the king provided a glimpse into broad swaths of eastern North America, and how Indian alliances and wars had the power to link together disparate places over great distances. How, in a world full of competing Native and European sovereignties, did the King of the Doegs cross so many borders successfully, and why did he return? English reliance upon his answers, his diplomatic finesse, and leadership among the Doegs suggests that Algonquian proximity and movement were both threatening and unknowable to his English neighbors. Most textbooks would tell us that English claim and rule in Virginia was unimpeachable in 1690, having stood the test of Bacon’s Rebellion. By the middle of the seventeenth century, the explosion of tobacco cultivation and expansion of African slavery defined the colony’s political economy, erasing from the story not only Native land tenure but a Native presence altogether.⁴

This project explores how Natives still held ground, literally and politically, seeking to show the terms by which they held it before 1607 and the changing but persistent Native-defined terms by which they still did in 1690. Their continued ability to leverage influence and power rested not only on residence and sovereignty prior to English arrival but also on the knowledge and experience they had gained over the seventeenth century in their dealings with Englishmen. Native people retained influence and power disproportionate to their numbers – numbers that had steadily shrunk over the century.

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³ “Notes from the Records of Stafford County, Virginia, Order Books (Continued),” 278.
Nevertheless, study of that century—through county and patent office records, literary works, and archaeological reports from across the seventeenth-century Chesapeake—shows that the English, not Natives, were the ones still navigating on the fringes of a much larger web of Algonquian connections.

In seventeenth-century Virginia, Algonquians maintained power through their knowledge of the Chesapeake, contouring how Indian neighbors, English elites and servants, enslaved African peoples, and Native outsiders experienced and interacted with their surroundings. The King of the Doegs was one in a long line of werowances from many petty chiefdoms who proved resilient through multiple battles, diplomatic summits, and captivities. Most critically, he had survived by gathering his bearings: in the Iroquois north, the Nottoway south, and the Virginia courtroom. His journey speaks to the connectedness and mobility within the Indian world at the end of the seventeenth century, and the extensive knowledge about politics and languages on the Eastern Seaboard and the interior still held by Indians and only coveted by the English. Although the king’s immediate concerns were provincial—the cow and the mare—he nonetheless took his Virginian captors seriously, understanding that small conflicts over space crossed permeable property, county, and colony lines. It was the failure of such borders that, after all, drew him away from home in the first place.

Algonquians, English elites and servants, Africans, and Native peoples from farther afield who entered Chesapeake Indian landscapes flouted or even took advantage of colonial Virginia’s permeable borders. Borders for the English defined land tenure, legitimacy, and safety from outsiders on paper and in custom. Yet borders—of English and Native making—were constantly in flux, constantly negotiated through
trade, alliance, diplomacy, and warfare. And the power of Indians to set, move or cross those borders shaped and defined the early English agricultural landscapes traditionally seen to be at the core of the Virginian economy by the mid seventeenth century. In short, because of their understandings of the landscape and disregard for English authority, Indians were a part of every seventeenth-century story of expansion and resistance. In historian Richard White’s words, “Chronology will always remain at the heart of a discipline that seeks to explain change over time, but this has left historians open to the charge from geographers that they write history as if it took place on the head of a pin.” Because the Chesapeake’s economic and social transformation relied on both conflicts over Native territory and the spread of slavery and tobacco production across the landscape and its physical connectivity to the Atlantic, space is as crucial as time in the study of Anglo-Indian relations. The landscapes often serving as backdrops for our historical actors are themselves multidimensional, not only occupying physical space but the perceptions and representations of those spaces—making the complicated successes and failures of Virginian expansion visible and measurable in fields full of tobacco, or in houses burnt by Indians at war. Just as leaders the King of the Doegs and Anglo-Indian conflicts changed, landscapes and their particular significances change over time and meaningfully shape surrounding people and events in ways we have only begun to explore.

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5 Richard White, “What is Spatial History?” (Spatial History Lab, Working paper; Stanford University, February 1, 2010).

Seeking to bring together multiple historiographical threads, this dissertation draws on ideas from lines of inquiry into African-American, Chesapeake, and Native history, exploring a complex Native world involving diverse Indian nations and individuals. Their world included feuding English elites and their desperate servants, as well as indentured and enslaved Africans plotting escape. The question of landscapes and boundaries that depend for their definition on perspective, whether oppressive or porous, ordered or contested, is central to Stephanie Camp's concept of a “rival geography” in Closer to Freedom: Enslaved Women and Everyday Resistance in the Plantation South. Camp argues that through flight and resistance against the oppressive spatial structures of the plantation, enslaved people created rival geographies as “alternative ways of knowing and using plantation and southern space” in conflict with the world created by owners. African-American communities developed a rival geography close to the plantation, using understandings of the surroundings from quarters to swamps to resist where force is manifested; events like balls held in the woods provided entertainment but also a means to share knowledge and reinforce group identity crucial to resistance in the future. In seventeenth-century Virginia, newly arriving groups of Englishmen and Africans found rival geographies already surrounding them in the form of Indian roads and towns and waterways, all impossible to control.

Multiple Indian and English understandings and uses of these landscapes coexisted in the same places. Even when colonial officials drew upon their legal authority to set the colony’s boundaries--of settlements, fields, and the roads between

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them--those boundaries constantly moved and were habitually, violently, and publicly contested and delegitimized not only by Indians, but also by indentured English and African servants, licensed and illicit traders, land speculators and still others. Much like the planters of Camp’s world, colonial officials fought a battle to contain and control an boundary-breaking world full of constantly developing connections. Colonial officials and plantation owners worked to reinforce racial, geographic, and physical boundaries alongside one another, in this case often bringing together property boundaries, surveying customs, traveling passes, and discriminatory laws to contain servants and keep Indians out. But through rival geographies and their own critical knowledge and diplomacy, Indians maintained a home field advantage and power across the Chesapeake disproportionate to their numbers.

Historians of colonial Virginia have long worked towards an understanding of the origins of southern plantation systems and longstanding, uniquely American racial categories. Indians, but more so English interest in Indian land, play a key role. Edmund Morgan’s classic *American Slavery, American Freedom* charted the slow shift towards African slavery through planters’ efforts to exterminate Algonquian Indians and usurp their land, then to be worked by English servants and African slaves. Morgan pointed to the aftermath of one particularly seminal event in seventeenth-century Chesapeake history—Bacon’s Rebellion and his marches against the Indians—as the moment that elite “engrossers” of Indian land, fearing an underclass united against them, worked “to separate dangerous free whites from dangerous slave blacks by a screen of racial
contempt." Kathleen Brown added in *Good Wives, Nasty Wenches, and Anxious Patriarchs* that lack of traditional markers of English manhood like landholding, wives, and legal freedom led to unrest. “Bacon's Rebellion became a veritable cacophony of voices competing to define honor, manhood, and authority in a colonial society” which, like Morgan argued about race, “produced an Anglo-Virginian masculinity in which class rifts were lessened by the new importance of race and gender hierarchies.” More recent work integrates the Chesapeake and its Native, English, and African populations into the broader Atlantic world, looking at rebellion and hardening ideas about slavery within the context of England’s other colonies. April Hatfield’s *Atlantic Virginia* illuminates how Englishmen grafted their Atlantic orientation onto Indian geographies, concluding that at midcentury, “Virginia no longer represented an invasion within Tsenacommacah but, rather, an effective supplanting of the now-defunct Powhatan polity.” In Morgan’s and Hatfield’s work, colony-level conflicts like Bacon’s Rebellion and the following ascendency of the plantation system often crowd out ongoing Native

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9 Kathleen M. Brown, *Good Wives, Nasty Wenches, and Anxious Patriarchs: Gender, Race, and Power in Colonial Virginia* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996), 139-40. Additionally, Anthony Parent’s work *Foul Means* asserts that an elite group of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century planters consciously grabbed Indian land and substituted African slaves for white servants, particularly through the headright system that gave them fifty acres of land for every African imported. I heartily agree that a small group of men acted anti-socially and in their own interest—and we even discuss some of those same men, like William Claiborne, Edward Hill, and John Washington. However, I emphasize that, as they ratchet up bills for the forts on the fall line and militia gatherings against the Indians they displace—these men often do not act in the interest of the colony even as they force it to expand. I also focus more on how land transformed from Indian fields to plantations contoured resistance as well as elite wealth. Anthony Parent, *Foul Means: The Formation of a Slave Society in Virginia, 1690-1740* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003).

politics and histories. Although each of these works acknowledges the centrality of Indian history—and in Hatfield’s case, Indian geographies—to the development of Virginia’s colonial history, few works examined these developments from a Native perspective until James Rice’s work *Tales from a Revolution: Bacon’s Rebellion and the Transformation of Virginia* showcased multiple Native perspectives alongside the actions of Englishmen. The actions of Indians, not just their presence on the periphery and in Bacon’s rallying cry, were integral to Rice’s explanation of the events of 1676. From a Native point of view, the turbulence and drama was no historical turning point, and did little to resolve preexisting tensions over land and violence.¹¹

Rice’s work represents part of a growing scholarship on Native Virginia that tells the complex and rich story of the Chesapeake’s political geographies. Archaeologists like Martin Gallivan and Stephen Potter, and anthropologist Helen Rountree, examine pre-colonial Native landscapes and how diverse Algonquian groups harnessed them to trade, influenced one another, spread news, and incorporated newcomers. These and other archaeologists’ interpretations of material culture are essential to this dissertation as it seeks to chart how Indians might have used their own histories and prior political and economic relationships to respond to English misbehavior.¹² A crucial guide to this study has been James Rice’s environmental history, *Nature and History in Potomac*

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Country. Rice writes a long history of human occupation along the Potomac River, arguing when it came to Anglo-Indian relations that the “ecological imaginations” of the two sides were irreconcilable. Simultaneously, he demonstrates that “the Indians in effect governed the timing, extent, and character of colonization,” since Englishmen were forced to adapt to landscapes left behind by their predecessors. Rice handily navigates the dizzying number of Native groups that inhabited or moved through the Potomac basin to create alliances or battle for sovereignty. His portrait of the Potomac as a boundary between polities past and present leads the reader beyond the more traditional historical and geographical shape of the Virginia colony to see the space as contested by Englishmen and Indians throughout the seventeenth century.

Rice’s argument fulfills the promise of “facing East” from an Indian perspective, a term first coined by Daniel Richter in his seminal work Facing East from Indian Country, inviting us to see Chesapeake politics and squabbles over space with diverse Algonquian worldviews in mind. Work like Nature and History in the Potomac Country shifts attention away from singular, “turning points” like Bacon’s Rebellion, and instead emphasizes continuity. Building upon Rice’s notion of contouring colonization, this dissertation explores how Indian nations and individuals also contoured resistance to colonization, from all-out Anglo-Indian wars over land to abetting English and African servant runaways—and how internal English divisions and lack of commitment to the colony also served to undermine would-be colonial borders. Focusing on individual


Algonquians’ shifting personal ambitions and allegiances, this story decenters polities—be they from the Virginia colony to the Powhatan Chiefdom—and highlights instead how questions of territorial borders and sovereignty played out in the lives of everyday people. Following Indians and some of the other individuals whose movements were influenced by them in the Chesapeake region as they transgressed boundaries to involve themselves in local commerce, violence and diplomacy, this dissertation emphasizes the mobility that the riverine Chesapeake environment offered to Indian, English, and African peoples. It also seeks to look beyond questions of sovereignty at the level of polity or nation or colony, to see lives, actions, and power exerted at the level of the individual and the local.

Instead of occupying a single landscape divided among Native polities, Algonquians engaged in an ongoing back-and-forth with elites over the use of familiar landscapes—beginning long before the first English arrivals on Jamestown Island. Chapter 1 discusses how the Chesapeake’s riverine environment facilitated widespread connections between Algonquians, trading and warring with non-Algonquian neighbors, and the rise of an Algonquian chiefdom’s expansion under a Pamunkey chief named Powhatan only decades before English incursions. This chapter demonstrates that the Powhatan elites’ use of boundaries enforced through war kept out invaders and dispossessed neighboring threats, but ultimately relied on preexisting local and intraregional trade to survive. The pursuit of a seemingly impossible goal—to control who crossed into Powhatan territory while relying on luxury goods from beyond new boundaries—left everyday life in local control and kept people on the fringes of Powhatan’s Chesapeake only loosely in his orbit. This history would uniquely position
Algonquians to deal with European newcomers who sought settlement on their borders, and ultimately in their lands.

When English ships made landfall, English commanders and colonial officials faced similar balancing acts to those of Powhatan. Chapter 2 explores in the early years of English-Powhatan relations, seeking a clearer picture of how elites on both sides sought and failed to contain their constituencies as contact and conflict erupted. Unwilling to be incorporated into the Powhatan Chiefdom themselves, Englishmen were nonetheless reliant on Indian knowledge and goodwill to move down Indian paths and along the rivers. Once dependent, they could do nothing to patrol their own boundaries around forts and fields. Because of the very existence of the Powhatans nearby, they lost control of the movements of their servants while relying on their labor, and failed to stem the tide of Indian people and goods into the fort and surrounding plantations. English runaways and interlocutors fit easily into the Algonquians’ networks of communication, and they became a source of intelligence for the Powhatans while they delegitimized any appearance of English control over their own. Powhatan leadership did not exert overarching control over the flow of goods, people, and information either; too many individuals and localities had sway over trade and communication routes. Powhatan chief Opechancanough’s devastating 1622 attack on the English would have been even more devastating had not some of the Powhatans’ fringe tributaries broken away and formed an English alliance that favored their locality over the paramount chiefdom.

Chapter 3 follows these balancing acts from the aftermath of the 1622 conflagration to the outbreak of war again in 1644, showing how Englishmen and
Algonquians both sought to harness the connectivity provided by the Chesapeake’s riverine environment to pursue political and financial gain, often at the advantage of larger polities and alliances. The Powhatans’ superior knowledge of the landscape resulted in a stalemate during the Anglo-Powhatan War, but also encouraged the English to seek profit and alliance beyond Opechancanough’s influence. Even as the Powhatan Chiefdom’s power over Algonquians and English in the Chesapeake diminished during this period, petty Algonquian elites gained greater standing and influence. They led their tribes through a decade of violence and into local agreements with Englishmen, central in English pursuit of trade and land to the north. When Maryland’s first settlers curbed Virginian expansion north with an assertion of new boundaries, men from the two colonies fought over the Indian trade and threatened one another with rumors of incoming Indian massacres, thus weakening both Virginia and Maryland colonial governments’ claims to sovereignty. Werowances obviously continued communication and trade across this new and arbitrary border. They found that the divisions among Englishmen understandably increased tensions, but that they also multiplied their choices in trading and political partners. Failed efforts to solve intercolonial misunderstandings, fence in servants, farm and build English landscapes, and create coherent Indian policies only further delegitimized the divided English in Indian eyes and created greater openings into which Native leaders could assert their own needs and ends.

Undermining the authority of the colonial governments and Indian leaders to decide boundaries, English and African men and women used long-established Indian landscapes to transgress boundaries between Maryland and Virginia, and between
Indians and Englishmen. At the same time, Chapter 4 documents equally the English officials and planters who learned that harnessing Indian networks could win wars, open new markets to English goods, and increasingly, win them choice Indian land. As English claimants moved west and south, werowances met them in county court to assert their own understandings of land use and to challenge the legitimacy of their property claims. Simultaneously, English and enslaved African runaways used Indian canoes to reach Indian towns, and Indians who killed swine wandering into their fields, both challenged the sanctity of English property and the line between Indian and English landscapes. Increasing numbers of Africans also found sanctuaries within this land from which they could develop long-term resistance to slavery, co-opting places like the Great Dismal Swamp for maroon settlements—while colonial officials found that tithes on Africans helped pay for long-term wars against the Indians. At the same time, the obvious porousness and shifting nature of colonial and property borders proved that English-created boundaries could themselves be adjusted to accommodate certain planters’ interests. Elites like Eastern Shore planter Edmund Scarborough harnessed fear of Indians, mistrust of Marylanders, and extensive colony resources to push against both Maryland and Indian property that he himself desired. Actions like these prove that Virginian expansion would not be accompanied by secured borders and safe settlements, and that force instead of law would decide the legitimacy of geographic boundaries.

Along a lengthening border made unsafe by illegitimate settlement, English elites relied more than ever on the knowledge of the Indians they worked to dispossess and enslave. Chapter 5 charts the ways in which Algonquian elites’ customs that governed
everyday interaction with the English gave way to violence and chaos over the course of the 1660s. The fight over land on the borders grew increasingly deadly and expensive for the English, for whom conflicts with nearby werowances bubbled over into colony affairs while non-Algonquian groups like the Iroquois might raid at will. Planters also grew anxious at the proximity of growing numbers of Africans and servants to Indians, even as they required their labor to erect forts and ship tobacco. And even as they anticipated Indian violence, they harnessed fear of Indians to enact vigilante violence and move borders for their own gain. Violence against and enslavement of Indians on the part of a few planters became a key way to control mobility and the permeability of borders—qualities of the Indian landscape Algonquians had upheld for generations. Nevertheless, many Indian leaders deflected attempts to destroy their place in the Chesapeake, supplying critical information about Native outsiders and taking their disputes with local elites to Governor Berkeley himself.

This project comes to a close with the outbreak of Bacon’s Rebellion not because it was a new kind of eruption that displaced the society before it and set a new path for English colonization, but because it represented just another in a series of conflicts reflective of the tension between Englishmen’s efforts to maintain Virginia’s borders and Native connectivity across those borders. For Algonquians across the Chesapeake well familiar with the doings of Englishmen like Edmund Scarborough over the previous decades, the attacks of Bacon’s rebels were nothing new or surprising. Instead, they responded creatively to the melee by falling back on the same swamps that had sheltered them in the pre-colonial period, and on diplomacy with the English under the leadership of Pamunkey werowansqua (female chief) Coackoeske. Conflicts with
neighboring Indian groups, alliances, and trade moved on as before, and so did crossing into Maryland and passing through English plantations on established paths. Though reduced in numbers, Algonquians found new ways to the familiar, regrouped into new nations on established lands and roads. Learning about and adapting with creativity to growing threats, Algonquians strengthened their resiliency for future battles. Virginia’s instability and violence had pulled the King of the Doegs away, but after all he returned home—and with irreplaceable knowledge of the connected world beyond Virginia’s bounds.
CHAPTER 2
THE ALGONQUIAN MARITIME WORLD

Introduction

On the banks of every Chesapeake tributary, Algonquian peoples began the early summer mornings running into the water to bathe together before light. By sunrise, anyone who could swim against the currents engaged in the ritual that reaffirmed their ties to the resource that tied them together. They “Strew tobacco on the water or Land,” maybe silent, maybe their splashing and chatter heard across the inlets and marshes by families in villages within sight. For at least some of these—the people on the south portion of the Chesapeake Bay—rivers were the origins of people and the day, since “First they say were made waters, out of which by the gods was made all diversitie of creatures that are visible or invisible.” They clambered out to prepare the first meal of the day, which again was a reminder of the rivers: tuckahoe and fish, heated in pots tempered with shell from the banks. If men stayed nearby for the day, they and women began work “comonly upon the Rise of a hill, that they maie overlooke the River and take every smale thing into view which sturrs upon the same” to watch for family and visitors. In canoes to trade, fish, or forage, men and women both labored against currents and in shallows. They could expect that work and the day ended like it began, immersed in the river with offerings of tobacco: “likewise they doe at the setting of the Sunne.”

For Algonquians, the river served as a conduit rather than a barrier, connecting them to other people, towns, and nations sharing the same waterways. The major four rivers that flowed into the bay created the three peninsulas of the Chesapeake and tied together the Coastal Plain, Piedmont, and mountains. When a visiting Englishmen
“enquired how nigh the Rivers of Carolina, Virginia and Maryland arose out of the Mountains,” one Algonquian emphasized the unity of the four and their connection to the west: “he clapt the Fingers of one Hand 'twixt those of the other, crying, they meet thus.” And within the Coastal Plain—from the Atlantic Ocean to the falls of the four rivers—the Algonquians built complex relationships from incredibly diverse peoples. The riverine environment of the Chesapeake supported somewhere around thirteen thousand people divided into around thirty-four diverse districts, some densely populated, some relatively sparse, perhaps hit affected by early encounters with European disease. They maintained combinations of alliances, enmities, trading partnerships, dialects, and kinship specific to only their petty chiefdom. But together, they enabled the sudden and meteoric rise of the Powhatan paramount chiefdom among the Algonquians at the end of the sixteenth century.

From every town, news and trade emanated and reinforced the lines connecting sixteenth-century Algonquian peoples. This chapter outlines the key shift towards a centralized chiefdom in the Chesapeake in the sixteenth century, and how it grew from but ultimately could not control or change established communication patterns between Algonquians and their Native neighbors. Just like they shared a language and culture, Algonquians also shared a riverine landscape. Although overland routes linked the Powhatans to a continental trade network, water routes and paths that ran parallel were the channels of everyday life. The Powhatan Chiefdom maintained formal diplomatic ties with outsiders and the paramount chieftain Powhatan himself orchestrated a complex tribute system from his capital at Werowocomoco. But these ties were built upon, and complimented, smaller-scale and preexisting economic and social exchanges
between the towns inside of each district. As Powhatan brought groups further afield into orbit during the expansion of his empire, each petty chiefdom, and each town inside of those petty chiefdoms, adjusted these smaller networks of exchange to accommodate tribute and alliance. Joshua Piker writes of early American Indians, “alliance and affiliation connoted fluid structures, frameworks that influenced belief and behavior but that were themselves subject to manipulation…the process of restructuring and reshaping the world often centered on the local, on the individual.” While broader Chesapeake politics and diplomacy shifted, individual communication and boundaries on a local level even as politics and trade changed radically around them.

Understanding Algonquian landscapes during English attempts at colonization first necessitates a look at resiliency in the face of political change before Europeans came to stay. Englishmen settling in Carolina or Virginia, in Alan Taylor’s words, walked (and floated) upon Indian landscapes they had difficulty acknowledging as “a complex network of diverse peoples.” April Hatfield points out that we should follow the English around with a critical eye to understand established communication patterns that came before. Whether European explorers understood it or not, “Powhatans’ interaction patterns with one another and with other Native American groups also provided the network of paths and exchange relationships that literally plotted English movements.” But diplomatic visits witnessed by the English were largely formal and theatrical, meant to intimidate and impress. In addition to their obvious ethnocentrism, written sources reflected English interest in supplanting the Powhatan Chiefdom’s authority with their own. An important question thus remains: what didn’t the English see? English colonial leaders like Walter Raleigh and John Smith sought to find and understand local Indian
relationships to a centralized power structure to “suppresse the Salvages insolencies,” instead of how individuals, families, or villages related to one another. Using archaeology and ethnohistory to reconstruct relationships between individuals and localities instead decentralizes the English fixation on the Powhatan Chiefdom and reveals that control of the Chesapeake remained elusive even for the Algonquians’ most dynamic leader.

**Establishing Networks**

For Chesapeake Algonquians, small-scale agriculture and political hierarchy revolved around a constant flow of people through a riverine landscape. Between 1200 and 1500 AD, diverse, prospering Chesapeake communities implemented military defense, agriculture, and a prestige economy all based on long-distance interactions with outside peoples. By participating in the flow of goods and policing boundaries against outsiders, Chesapeake people shared much common material culture and understandings of the landscape even as control remained local.

Similar political structure, culture, and language bound Chesapeake Algonquians to the Chesapeake’s changing landscape and the people who ruled it. While archaeologists agree that no one single factor drove the shift to agriculture and the communities’ support of elites, they also noticed a decline in long-distance trade. Simultaneously, an increase in short-distance, intensive communication reflected a less mobile society, and Natives built progressively larger storage pits inside of progressively larger homes to store their successful harvests.¹ As other indigenous leaders to the

west and along the Chesapeake began to direct military campaigns and the flow of goods, Algonquian chiefs, called werowances, did the same. They retained power at least in part through defense and controlling the movement of copper, puccoon, and foodstuffs in a prestige goods economy, in which werowances and werowansquas accumulated valuable goods and redistributed them through reciprocal exchanges founded in alliance and kinship.\(^2\) Whatever the cause, the result was that long before Powhatan rose to power in the 1590s, “through their association with palisade construction, elite mortuary ritual, and communal feasting, certain villages in the Chesapeake became places of chiefly authority.”\(^3\)

In the 1500s Algonquian towns still maintained noticeable variations in government and everyday life based on their proximity to friendly neighbors and hostile outsiders. No two towns were built alike: some groups maintained palisades, some built above-ground storage of food, and some celebrated different burial practices which coexisted and changed over time. Men and women lived among a few other families or, more often in the interior, among dozens of people surrounding a palisade.\(^4\) Women in fertile areas farmed more than foraged. The Appamattucks were ruled by a werowansqua, a female werowance, while a circle of Chickahomininy men governed their people autonomously. Women in important towns like the Pamunkey capitol at Werowocomoco cooked for important visitors more regularly than others, and perhaps


\(^4\) Turner, ”A Re-Examination of Powhatan Territorial Boundaries and Population, CA AD 1607,” 59.
spoke more languages. These differences were the products of place: ecology, resources, and proximity to threat encouraged diversity across the Chesapeake.

This short-distance, intensive communication heavily depended on waterways and Indian means to turn them from obstacles into highways. The shallow waters of the Chesapeake were dangerous and capricious; Virginia's first historian Robert Beverley wrote that “when [Virginia Indians] cross any great Water, or violent Fresh, or Torrent, they throw...valuable things, that they happen to have about them, to intreat the Spirit presiding there, to grant them safe passage.”

Using canoes, Natives habitually traversed creeks, rivers, and the bay to make trade, alliances, and war. Dugout canoes were relatively simple if time-consuming to build and use, adaptable to a variety of needs from transport to trade, and ideal for a spectrum of waterways from tributary waters to estuaries. Constructed of a single log burned and scraped hollow, these vessels required relatively few tools and only a patient hand to fan the flames. Unlike trees used for ships’ masts, canoe logs need not be especially straight or tall, and the Indians “burne downe some great tree, or take such as are winde fallen,” adapting techniques for burning away green wood as needed.

Explorer John Smith noted their superior speed and ease of movement relative to “our barges” and also remarked on their enormous size, “fortie or fiftie foote in length, and some will beare 40 men, but the

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most ordinary are smaller, and will beare 10, 20, or 30 according to their bignesse.”

With no keel or ballast, dugout canoes were prone to capsize or flip, yet men and women, elites and nonelites, learned to handle them with ease. The relatively large numbers a single canoe could carry also made them a valuable asset in transporting warriors towards battle or in pursuit, and equally important in taking goods and people away from conflict. Water transportation canoes, carrying men and women fishing and visiting, were a common sight.

The overland routes, on the other hand, tied the Algonquians to both long-distance trade and short-distance communication. On each peninsula, a set of paths probably ran parallel to the larger rivers, joining each town in each petty chiefdom and skirting swampy or impassible areas, intersecting at the tip and the falls to make a circuitous path. Daily traffic made at least some broad, sunny, public paths stretching miles between villages obvious to outsiders like the English, “the ground all flowing over with faire flowers of sundry colours and kindes.” Thus, even unfamiliar inland groups visiting the tidewater could expect an amphibious approach, floating down one of the major Chesapeake rivers east, leaving canoes on a bank or secreted in marsh grass, and walking their way to a village. With the help of stone axes and saplings, Indians

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manufactured and maintained bridges over minor waterways “made of a few cratches [X-shaped struts], thrust in the ose [ooze], and three or foure poles laid on them, and at the end of them the like, tyed together onely with barkes of tree.”

Overland routes, maintained through their use, moved people across a variety of terrains.

Overland and by water, men traveled to faraway places, where they were accommodated by women. The experience of travel and distance therefore depended partially upon gender. Adult men hunted, traded, and warred seasonally using paths that took them unknown distances—if invaders came and plundered, it’s likely that Chesapeake residents reciprocated—and they took with them goods made by women such as shell beads or roanoke, bread, and processed hides.

The long paths ran from the Great Lakes to the Gulf of Mexico, comingling regional powers, goods, and languages. Werowances and werowansquas traveled on diplomatic missions to other towns, and villagers along the paths were expected to entertain and feed visitors. Women played host to traders and guests. In this and their everyday work foraging and gathering material for mats, rope, and house construction, women developed an exceptional grasp of the landscapes and peoples surrounding their villages, offering them a different perspective than their male counterparts.

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For Algonquians keyed into continental trade routes, barriers to mobility were an equally important resource, particularly during seasons of conflict. Natural barriers like the fall line, a primary route for travelers along the Eastern seaboard and boundary line between Algonquians and the culturally distinct Monacans, was virtually uninhabited at the turn of the seventeenth century. The line kept these mutual enemies out of a single day’s reach of one another, while allowing both to seasonally hunt the deer that flourished there thanks to lack of human intrusion. On home turf, Chesapeake Indians used bogs, wetlands, marshes, and swamps on the interiors of the peninsulas and mainland to disappear. Powhatan himself described this method of self-defense and its accompanying foraging skills, according to John Smith: “forced to flie from all, to lie cold in the woods, feede vpon Acornes, rootes, and such trash, and be so hunted…that I can neither rest, eate, nor sleepe; but my tyred men must watch.” Children, women, and food stores, in historian Jill Lepore’s words, “were entirely invisible in swamps, disembodied, indistinguishable from the vegetation around them.” Moves or retreats to the swamps did not lack planning or organization. Henry Spelman, later a captive to the Patawomecks, witnessed an attack by the northern raiders called the Massawomecks in which the Algonquians sheltered “behind trees takinge ther opportunitie to shoot at their enemies.” Contrasting the English experience of warfare in “open fields,” he referred to the battleground as “ther place,” perhaps a reference to consciously-chosen or familiar


16 Smith, *Generall Historie*, 76.

“marish ground full of Reede.”\textsuperscript{18} Men and women both had extensive knowledge of the uninhabited grounds and waters around them for this purpose, even as they changed seasonally or shifted with nearby watercourses. Some also reinforced their villages with constructed defenses. Archaeologists discovered Algonquian palisaded villages near the Potomac River fall line, Piscataway palisades on the north shore of the Potomac, and on the northern end of the Eastern Shore, suggesting a variety of attempts to stop raids and control interactions with wide-ranging and indiscriminate northern neighbors.\textsuperscript{19}

During war and peacetime, trading paths, and therefore the towns they led to, remained under local control because individuals and districts maintained a distinct “home turf” advantage keeping neighbors and enemies in check. Constantly developing knowledge and solutions to overcome or create barriers, men and women in Algonquian towns on the coast decided the nature of their connections to other Algonquians and the people beyond.

**Negotiating with Outsiders**

Together, conflicts and relationships across Algonquian chiefdoms brought new goods and knowledge into the region. Because local leaders remained in control of relationships with non-Algonquian people, proximity to outsiders’ trading routes and geography-specific resources determined a werowance’s status within the Chesapeake

\textsuperscript{18} Henry Spelman, *Relation of Virginia* (London: Chiswick Press, 1872), 54-55. Albert and Shirley Small Special Collections Library, University of Virginia.

\textsuperscript{19} Potter, *Commoners, Tribute, and Chiefs*, 178. MacCord also suggests that the palisades were too small to support the large number of Patawomecks, so the palisade was probably a rendezvous point for hamlet populations distributed along nearby creeks. Howard A. MacCord, “The Indian Point Site, Stafford County, Virginia,” *Archaeological Society of Virginia Quarterly Bulletin* 46, no. 3 (1991), 119. According to Merrell, the Piscataway fort, called Moyaone, appeared between 1550 and 1600. James Merrell, “Cultural Continuity among the Piscataway Indians of Colonial Maryland,” *William and Mary Quarterly* 36, no. 4 (October, 1979), 550. See also Rountree and Davidson, *Eastern Shore Indians in Virginia and Maryland*, 24, 32.
Algonquian world. Conversely, the trade and territorial rivalries of local leaders also brought long-range Native threats into the region, like the Massawomecks and Susquehannocks, precipitating the desire for defense from the Powhatan Chiefdom and introducing Algonquians to the interior trade in European goods.

Each werowance developed unique relationships with their non-Algonquian and Algonquian neighbors based on local landscape. In 1608, John Smith captured a Siouan-speaking Mannahoac man from the western portions of the Rappahannock River. Smith asked the captive “how many worlds he did know,” and he responded, “he knew no more but that which was under the sky that covered him, which were the Powhatans, with the Monacans, and the Massawomecks, that were higher up in the mountains.”20 His answer echoed the riverine system’s unity and connection—all the worlds were covered by the same sky—but it was also a very local answer, unlikely to be replicated by peoples to the south or east. To the south, the Weyanoke had probably heard of the Massawomecks but were much more familiar with the Iroquoian-speaking Meherrins and Nottoways to the immediate south of their own villages. Meanwhile, the Pamunkeys and the Monacans harassed one another, but the Accawmacks on the Eastern Shore were separated from this conflict by the bay. They never mentioned the Monacans because they had more reason to fear Massawomeck canoes.21 Although all of these groups became part of a single chiefdom, proximity decided daily interaction.

20 John Smith quoted in Ethan A. Schmidt, “Cockacoeske, Weroansqua of the Pamunkeys, and Indian Resistance in Seventeenth-Century Virginia,” *American Indian Quarterly* 36, no. 3 (Summer 2012), 289.

with non-Algonquians and placed certain groups in either vulnerable or lucrative positions.

Trade and communication routes developed between nearby neighbors despite geographical and linguistic barriers, for some Algonquian elites a promising entrée to rare goods. Archaeologists track these exchanges through ceramic types: women made pottery in most Native societies, and Algonquian women moved into their husbands’ new homes when married, suggesting that in part intermarriage spread pottery forms across boundaries. Other forms came to a site when someone exchanged the contents of a pot far away from their point of origin. The southern portion of the Chesapeake is a perfect example of this exchange. To the south and west of the Algonquians, the linguistically distinct Nottoway and Meherrin peoples lived along rivers that emptied into the Outer Banks area rather than into the Chesapeake Bay. Even further west lay the powerful Tuscaroras and the impenetrable Great Dismal Swamp, in which the Tuscaroras hunted and mounted a natural defense in the event of warfare. Around the time of English contact, Iroquoian-speaking people in the Piedmont eschewed Algonquian pottery traditions and began creating pottery more reminiscent of people to the south, who they were probably connected to through the rivers flowing southeast. Meanwhile, the wares of the Nottoway and Meherrin peoples made it to the Weyanokes and then into core Algonquian territory along the Powhatan (now James)

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River. These Iroquoian and Algonquian peoples maintained a “fluid” collection of pottery traditions, pointing to frequent exchange moving from north to south. To the far north of the Chesapeake, on the other hand, the abrupt appearance of foreign wares at the Potomac Creek archaeological sites revealed immigration to the Potomac River from more northerly climes around 1300 AD. Alongside vessels made by migrants to the Potomac River are ceramics from Piedmont, Appalachian, and coastal Algonquian groups that show trade with these newcomers ran from west to east. Every group from the Potomac Creek peoples to the Nottoways formed their own histories and patterns of movement and exchange.

Prestige goods provided the Algonquians with economic reason to interact with their neighbors and fueled the rise of Algonquian elites. For example, the nearest source of puccoon, a red skin dye valuable to Algonquians, was in Nottoway territory, a three days’ journey away from the Pamunkey River, and south beyond that were otter skins to trade for shell beads, or roanoke, manufactured by Powhatan women. Yet they did not challenge the middleman status of their smaller neighbors, perhaps because of their close geographic—and, it appears, cultural—ties to the powerful


Tuscarora.\textsuperscript{29} According to archaeologist Lewis Binford, communication was swift nearby along the main fall line path running north-south; the rocky shoals allowed for relatively dry and quick river crossings useful to war or trade parties of the Powhatans.\textsuperscript{30} Desirable resources and nearby roads made these two distinct peoples long-term acquaintances, if not friends. While not necessary to sustain everyday life, prestige goods shipped north via river buttressed Algonquian elites’ displays of wealth and influence.

Overland travel routes also brought neighboring enemies like the Monacans, who the Powhatans told the English were “very barbarous” and came “Downe at the fall of the leafe and invaded his Countrye.”\textsuperscript{31} But the constant flow of goods complicated the relationship between enemies. The Powhatans appeared to the English to suggest that these Siouan-speakers followed established traditions of cyclical warfare, in which warriors surprised and raided villages annually. That much is probably true, but the term “barbarous” is misleading. Little was written about the Monacans by early seventeenth-century observers since the Monacans refused to be observed by the English, but archaeologists and historians now agree that the Monacans’ trajectory to chiefdom-led societies and government mirrored that of the Powhatans across the fall line. They

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{29} Ethan A. Schmidt, “The Right to Violence: Customary Rights, Moral Economy, and Ethnic Conflict in Seventeenth-Century Virginia” (PhD diss, University of Kansas, 2007), 97.
\item \textsuperscript{30} Lewis R. Binford, “An Ethnohistory of the Nottoway, Meherrin and Weanock Indians of Southeastern Virginia,” \textit{Ethnohistory} 14, no. 3-4 (Summer-Autumn, 1967), 137. Helen Rountree evaluated and agreed with his conclusions about the early period in Helen C. Rountree, “The Termination and Dispersal of the Nottoway Indians of Virginia,” \textit{The Virginia Magazine of History and Biography} 95, no. 2 (April 1987), 193-214.
\item \textsuperscript{31} Smith, \textit{Generall Historie}, 33. Smith does not remark in his general history who exactly told him of the Monacans’ lifestyle and government structure. The quote about invasion is from Navirans’ interview in Gabriel Archer, ”A Relatyon of the Discovery of Our River,” in Horn, \textit{Captain John Smith}, 940.
\end{itemize}
maintained a common language family and “a centralized and hierarchical sociopolitical system,” and as ossuary-builders, they shared at least one key component of their spirituality and mortuary rituals. They also habitually traded goods, or at least allowed goods to pass through their territories: pots and clay pipes from the Shenandoah Valley were exchanged for shell beads and pendants from Potomac Creek peoples in the Tidewater. The Algonquians may have told a lie about their neighbors to protect their access to Monacan copper, the most important prestige good and the key to the Powhatan Chiefdom’s power. Werowances controlled the flow of this all-important prestige good found nowhere on the Coastal Plain, and Powhatan himself was aware of the very distant Great Lakes supply as an alternative source. An alliance between the Monacans and any of his other neighbors might ratchet up the military threat, but it could also cut off access to important wealth. Maintaining control over the movement of goods and people across territories was thus increasingly important to leaders who lived adjacent.

While other threats came from overland, the Massawomecks and the Susquehannocks from the north side of the bay excelled at amphibious raids on


33 Stephen Potter, Commoners, Tribute, and Chiefs: The Development of Algongquian Culture in the Potomac Valley (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1993), 158.

34 Gallivan, James River Chiefdoms. See Appendix A for site summaries.

Algonquian peoples along the Potomac and on the Eastern Shore. John Smith said the Massawomecks brought war “upon all the world,” their seasonal raiding threatening the safety of all in the densely-populated northern Chesapeake. Smith’s 1612 map suggests that they came from a large body of water, leading historians to postulate that they arrived annually from the Great Lakes region. If that is the case, the Massawomecks were proof of the extraordinarily distant contacts created by riverine routes and Native technologies. After 1575, both groups began raiding and trading with increased frequency, but only the Susquehannocks placed trading outposts and remained a long-term influence on the Chesapeake. Through the Susquehannocks’ engagement in the French and Dutch trade, they gained European tools and brought the people in the northern part of the Eastern Shore into their sphere of influence around the time of English contact. In doing so, they made enemies: the numerous and independent Piscataway Algonquian peoples on the northern banks of the Potomac with whom they warred frequently; the Massawomecks, who targeted their goods; and the Algonquian peoples on the Eastern Shore who resented the intrusion. Though the Susquehannocks told John Smith that they were "scarce known to Powhatan…and he as little of them," Smith had no doubt heard from Algonquians of the Susquehannocks’ recent settlement, their harassment of Eastern Shore peoples, and their European goods. When a Pamunkey werowance named Powhatan brought regional military

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36 Pendergast, 6.


resources to bear on localized conflicts along the Chesapeake’s fringes, he also gained wider access to the movement of goods across those same fringes.

**The Rise of Powhatan**

The leadership of Powhatan addressed outsider threats and harnessed both local and outsider exchange networks to create a polity that thrived on trade and military force. Powhatan also used new tactics based in networks of local exchange, like forced migrations and marriage to high-ranking women, to solidify control and assure tribute. The goods sent to the paramount chiefdom from the tributary districts vested Powhatan and his Pamunkey capital at Werowocomoco with central authority over most Algonquians in the Chesapeake. The centralization of power on the James River, a tribute system based on maize, and a prestige goods economy, interconnected previously independent Algonquian groups in new ways. It caused an acceleration in local travel and migration, and gave that travel new meaning.

Powhatan’s emphasis on interconnectedness was at the root of this transformation, and his answer to internal threats was to redistribute and replace them. He inherited leadership of “the Countryes Powhatan, Arrohateck, Appamatuck, Pamunky, Youghtamond, and Mattapnient,” all in the fertile areas north of the James River, but the other two dozen territories he claimed “which are all adjoyning to that River…have bene either by force subdued unto him, or through feare yielded.”

The English arrived to stories that Powhatan wiped out a tribe called the Chesapeakes to the south and gave their territory to a newly acquired group, the Nansemonds. In the case

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of the Kecoughtans, whose recalcitrant chief died in 1597, Powhatan “conquered the People killing the [new] Chief and most of them, and the reserved he transported over the River, craftely chaunging their seat, and quartering them amongst his owne people.” He moved survivors closer to his loyal groups and replaced the chief with his own son, Pochins.41 In 1608, he rehomed the remaining Kecoughtans at Piankatank on the tip of the Middle Peninsula, a place that he had previously, as William Strachey ominously put it, “dispeopled.”42 It may be that “most” Kecoughtans means “most men,” since Powhatan could not have torn down homes, forced a journey of several days, and set up a new district without the labor of women. However, his actions against some left noticeable, armed dissent: “the Weroances of Nandsamund Warraskoyack and Weanock are now at peace with him, howbeit they maie peradventure be drawne from him for some rownd Rewardes and a plentifull promise of Copper.”43 Ironically, through the same mix of exchange and threat that characterized Algonquian contact with outsiders, Powhatan fenced the mobility of his Algonquian neighbors.

Powhatan also redistributed power across the Chesapeake through marriage. He and other leading men, like his younger brother Opechancanough, arranged matches between leading female kin and leaders of other groups. This strategy worked exceptionally well in Algonquian society, given that leadership devolved matrilineally—guaranteeing Powhatan’s offspring a place among unrelated local elite—and women facilitated diplomatic ritual and could inherit leadership roles themselves. Powhatan also

42 Strachey, "The Historie of Travell into Virginia Britania," 1053.
43 Ibid., 1089.
sent for elite-born young women to come to Werowocomoco, joining with him in marriage to strengthen the relationship between their families and his. Women might also produce a potential heir to a particular district born with all the kinship obligations of a son or daughter. Dozens of children and a group of well-traveled and diplomatically-trained mothers who literally kept political alliances alive were the result of only a few decades. It also, however, left holes: the independent Chickahominies, a powerful group at the population core north of the James, were ruled by a group of elders and “will not admitt of any Weroance from him to governe over them.” There was no one Powhatan could marry off or in who could change the regime, leaving an obvious exception in an otherwise unified landscape.

One facet of Powhatan’s and other chiefs’ control in the larger chiefdom included regulating how that landscape was used. He established boundaries—“Every Weroance knowes his owne Meeres and lymitts to fish fowle or hunt in”—and gave the land inside each district a new, obligatory meaning—“but they [owed] all of their great Weroance Powhatan.” At least symbolically given the gift of land, werowances under Powhatan had a clear-cut obligation to maintain order and peace inside of their districts. English captive Henry Spelman witnessed a series of five executions in his time among the Patawomecks in 1609, four for the murder of a child and one for robbery. Significantly, one of the men who was put to death for murder had no part in the actual crime but was complicit in “consealing it as he passed by, beinge bribed to hould his pease.” The man

44 Rountree, Pocahontas, Powhatan, Opechancanough, 15-35.


46 Ibid., 1069.
had traveled—maybe even from one side of the village to another—but had withheld knowledge of wrongdoing. The robber, for his part, was knocked on the head and thrown into the fire not only for stealing from a traveler, but specifically for taking his copper and beads. Spelman notes that to steal a neighbor’s corn is also a capital offense, but the man had taken advantage of necessary communication lines to steal another’s prestige trade goods, items vested with cultural power and controlled by werowances. His transgression carried extra weight. To maintain authority over goods and people, the leader of the Patawomecks understood the need to reassert his tenuous hold over those goods and people in transit.\textsuperscript{47}

Communication lines inside the Powhatan Chiefdom and beyond were also harnessed to uphold the tribute system and boundaries between districts, taking advantage of what each district’s adaptations to the landscape had to offer. Anthropologist Helen Rountree mentions just a few examples: “The Appamattucks were a conduit to luxury goods like puccoon…The Pamunkeys were the guardians of the holiest place in the region, Uttamussak…And they, the Youghtanunds, and the Mattaponis could be a breakbasket of the organization.”\textsuperscript{48} Recent acquisitions on the fringes with their own political relationships beyond, like the Weyanoke to the south, would also serve to bring outside trade goods to the core, and the populous Patawomecks to the north could reinforce a counterattack on the Massawomecks with Powhatan’s help. The Accawmacks on the Eastern Shore farmed more corn on the interior’s workable soils than did some people on the western shore, a valuable asset to

\textsuperscript{47} Spelman, \textit{Relation of Virginia}, 43-46. The werowance of the Patawomecks is never named in this account.

\textsuperscript{48} Rountree, \textit{Pocahontas, Powhatan, Opechancanough}, 43.
the Powhatan Chiefdom. Their consistent supply of cultivated and gathered foodstuffs, and valuable purple beads made from clam shell, tied them into the Powhatans across the bay despite distance. By strengthening Powhatan elite at the core, the periphery received protection and access to goods brought in from a different corner of the chiefdom.

Prestige goods, tribute corn, and people were funneled to old places granted new meaning. Previously, sacred places were profoundly localized; anthropologists note that unlike practitioners of universal religions like Christianity, Algonquian spirits and histories “would have provided them instead with holy places close to home, as well as given them rituals aimed at propitiating and then thanking the superhuman forces that affected their well-being year after year within their territory.” The previous generation of Pamunkey people no doubt revered both their temple at Uttamussack and their capital town Werowocomoco as important places, but the addition of the resources of new petty chiefdoms transformed their meaning as symbols to outsiders of a successful, large-scale polity. At the enormous temple at Uttamussack, “The Salvadges dare not goe up the river in boates by yt, but that they solmnely Cast, some piece of Copper, white beades or Pocones into the River, for feare their Okeus should be offended and revenged of them,” a ritual that Weyanokes or Patawomecks might not have performed a generation before. As with common people and common objects, extraordinary

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49 Rountree and Davidson, 9-14. John Pory wrote in 1621 that the Eastern Shore Indians farmed more intensely than did Western Shore Indians, and held a store of about six months’ worth of corn. (Quoted in Rountree and Davidson, 16).

50 Rountree and Turner, 34.

51 Strachey, "The Historie of Travell into Virginia Britania," 1076.
objects were also funneled along the water to places of chiefly power. Priests stuffed the temple at Uttamussack full of copper, beads, European metal goods, and pearls, all of which were necessarily sourced through the extensive trade networks Powhatan worked to strengthen. The objects that the Powhatans traded with the English and others, the routes those objects took, were thus imbued with the power of Powhatan himself as the charismatic center of the prestige goods economy.

**Conclusion**

The few seventeenth and early eighteenth-century Indian maps in existence underscore the importance of social, political, and familial relationships and spheres of influence rather than formal geographical boundaries and cartographic science. Maps are foremost material manifestations of group identity, formed relationships to external identities and interdependencies, and the makers of Powhatan’s only extant map distilled the Chesapeake’s countless identities and political relationships into a single object. “Powhatan’s mantle” is a conceptualization of the Powhatan Chiefdom sewn of Powhatan trade goods, featuring four deerskins and thousands of shell beads. An enormous figure flanked by animals is surrounded by thirty-four circles created through concentric rings of beading, according to John Smith the precise number of districts Powhatan claimed under his control at the time of English contact. Each circle is also near identical in size and shape: rather than map rivalries or relationships between

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52 Smith, *Generall Historie*, 35.


54 Historians and archaeologists disagree about the importance of the animals and the significance of the number of circles, since Strachey only listed twenty-four greater and lesser werowances in his description of the Powhatan Chiefdom. Waselkov, “Indian Maps,” 457.
diverse Algonquian peoples, they are homogenized in their orbit around a single individual. The designer chose white beads rather than the rarer and more valuable purple color. Anthropologists postulate that the color white was associated at the time with civil peace, perhaps a reference to the alliance between each district, and the safety guaranteed by a powerful new leader. Whether all thirty-four lesser chiefs truly orbited Powhatan and his heirs, much like other conquerors’ assertions, his “mantle” was a claim that they did. His influence crossed rivers, gathered together and directed diverse channels of resources and goods, and halted the invading influence of outsiders.

At the turn of the sixteenth century, Powhatan was no stranger to threats from outside the borders of his domain. Spanish exploration, pressures from the north and west, and his own attempts to subjugate northern and western groups taught him and other Powhatan leadership the delicate balance between the opportunity and threat posed by outsiders beyond the Powhatan sphere of influence. When the Jamestown colonists began to build and trade in the heart of the Chesapeake in 1607, Powhatan aimed to control the flow of goods and people in and out of the English fort. In the resulting battle over boundaries, district werowances and non-elite Algonquians across the Chesapeake cultivated opportunity in pursuit of their own goals.

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CHAPTER 3
INCORPORATING AND SURVEILLING THE ENGLISH, 1607-1622

Introduction

Among the “worlds” connected to the expanding Powhatan Chiefdom was England, as English peoples made intermittent landfall, war, and trade beyond the long-established seasonal patterns of the Chesapeake. Considering the failed 1570s Spanish missions in the Piedmont, the Powhatans were aware of the European maritime and military technology for more than a generation—and neither had made a lasting change for surrounding peoples. This chapter will demonstrate how Algonquian and English Chesapeake residents undermined official attempts at imposing physical and legal boundaries between them. Algonquians maintained the upper hand in the initial decades of Jamestown’s settlement, orchestrating the experiences of English emissaries and interpreters along the Chesapeake’s waterways. In traveling waterways and Indian trails, Natives, early English captives, and military leaders learning about a broad swath of the Chesapeake influenced the fates of peoples locked inside of James Fort or farming nascent plantations beyond. On Powhatan’s own fringes, leaders of Eastern Shore, Potomac, and peoples south of the James watched these going-ons with great interest.

Virginia’s “Company Period” from 1607 to 1624 provides an important prelude to a century of Anglo-Indian relations and understandings of the landscape in a number of ways. First, the stunning fumbles in Anglo-Powhatan relationships between 1607 and 1622 seared into both Indian and English memories a sense of what worked and what did not. Complex relationships developed with local Algonquian leadership surrounding the fort, plantations, and in the Indian towns themselves, and helped the colonists
survive hunger and the wrath of other Native leaders. But these relationships gave way, as historians have noted, to English policy and settlement pattern that excluded non-Christian Indian people and residents, creating a new geographic line between English and non-English. Accompanying this policy was the 1619 implementation of the “great charter” and its privatization of real estate, an incentive for property owners to secure boundaries at the exclusion of Indians and non-Indians alike.¹ These changes in perspective and policy supported the movement of servants and masters beyond the fort to plant, who in turn formed new relationships with neighboring Algonquians.

There was no single Indian response to English colonization, even within the Powhatan Chiefdom. At the time of the English landing in 1607, the core Powhatans themselves—the Pamunkeys and Appamattucks for instance, concentrated on the James River—maintained a vested interest in cornering the trade in luxury goods while maintaining power over their Algonquian-speaking neighbors on the fringes of their sphere of influence. Some of those recently-subjugated neighbors, like the Accawmacks and the Weyanokes, saw a potential ally in the English as they attempted to wrest power back from the chiefdom. Still other independent groups—the Susquehannocks and the Massawomecks—saw opportunities for trading and raiding that would increase their own economic and political power.

Context for Contact

English and Algonquian preconceptions of one another were based only on glimpses of each other’s peoples, oftentimes gathered secondhand. Contemporary English sources about the Chesapeake were written against the background of violent campaigns against the Irish and changing ideas about landholding. English elites who sought through their published works to encourage investment in the Virginia Company, entertain English readers, and justify colonialism in Ireland and elsewhere. These authors paint the decline of the Powhatan Chiefdom as cataclysmic for Chesapeake Algonquian people, but ethnography and archaeology show us how they thrived and even flourished during the initial decades of the Virginia colony.

Chesapeake Algonquians made previous contact with English explorers at Roanoke in the 1580s long before the settlement of Jamestown in 1607. Indeed, they were otherwise accustomed to foreign, linguistically diverse traders and raiders who came into the bay via unfamiliar watercraft—and brought with them European goods. The Massawomecks, after all, harassed the Susquehannocks and Algonquians along the Potomac on the north part of the bay in their lightweight birch bark canoes. The Massawomecks and Iroquoian-speaking Susquehannocks themselves were already trading furs to the French to the north by the time of Smith’s exploration of the bay. Smith saw among people in the north Chesapeake tools and objects more familiar to him than to their owners, “Many hatchets, knives and pieces of iron and brass,”

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2 For the most recent and comprehensive work on English diplomatic failure at Roanoke, see Michael Leroy Oberg, The Head in Edward Nugent’s Hand: Roanoke’s Forgotten Indians (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010).

purportedly from Canada delivered through the Susquehannocks and used by Algonquian women in their cornfields.⁴ Smith and the company of gentlemen were not the only hostile force, trade competition, Christians, or Europeans to reckon with.

Algonquians might have recognized in the original all-male crews of Englishmen a similarly well-traveled people, whose lives also revolved around travel by water. With a well-established seafaring tradition by the turn of the seventeenth-century, the English first moved across the Atlantic to Virginia following the strong example of the successful Spanish project. England’s elite and middling private investors considered and pursued a dizzying number of ventures and ideas. Planners, called “projectors,” argued to royals and investors that their scheme had implications for very security and happiness of England’s subjects and society.⁵ Young men and women of a variety of European nations found themselves bought from masters in England, signed up on ships or for the army and spirited off to the Netherlands, Turkey, Newfoundland, or the Americas. As of 1607, however, the English record of military and colonial expeditions had been mixed: success with great bloodshed in Ireland, uneasy peace with Spain in the Netherlands, and ominous silence from Sir Walter Raleigh’s expedition left behind on Roanoke Island. Servants of the company had cause to fear for their futures abroad.⁶

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Assembled piecemeal, the story of complex English and Indian ambitions and alliances relies on London’s seventeenth-century publishing houses and their adventuring authors, all with a variety of questionable ambitions. Staples of early modern English literature, they explain widespread expectations surrounding exploration and emigration that shaped the English reality in the Chesapeake. In the decade surrounding settlement at Roanoke, Richard Hakluyt promoted exploration and settler colonialism, in which he had a vested financial interest as a member of the Virginia Company, by pointing to exaggerated English successes in the Irish wars and exaggerated summaries of Virginia’s natural resources. “By little and little,” he wrote in *The Principall Navigations, Voiages, and Discoveries of the English Nation*, English ships and soldiers would draw savages like the Irish “to more civilitie,” and as a bonus contain Spain’s Catholic influence on the New World. More pious writers picked up and plagiarized promotional literature like Hakluyt’s works in their own histories and collections chronicling the spread of Anglicanism worldwide. Samuel Purchas’s twenty-volume *Purchas his Pilgrimes*, released in full in 1625, contains interlocking and triumphant narratives of Christianity across the globe and with it, the spread of English influence. He assured his readers of Virginia’s future: “Almightie God that had thus farre tried the patience of the English, would not suffer them to be tempted above that they were able.” Even the self-serving had a place in the greater spiritual and national plan for expansion, summarized as, “Glorious to God in the furtherance of his Truth, and

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beneficial to the Common-wealth, and to the private purses of the Adventurers, if the blooming of our hopes be not blasted with our negligence.\(^9\)

At the beginning of the seventeenth century, English surveyors were transforming the meaning of landscape and boundaries in England. At the time English lawmakers challenged the diverse landholding practices of the Middle Ages, most farmers were landholders “renting” interminably from wealthier tenants; the place and occupation of landholding farmers were protected not by the explicit word of law, but “customary law,” the fact that their land was normally farmed and so their right as farmers to remain was considered law. The crown ultimately bestowed the right to tenure land onto both the landholder and the elites who rented to them.\(^10\) The farm or manor’s landscape had a meaningful legal history that might vary from locality to locality, from which the landholder drew his right to the land. Early surveying and mapping reflected this emphasis on the local, determining value through the time a piece of land takes to plow (determined by a knowledgeable local steward) over measurable acreage.\(^11\) The rise of scientific surveys in the early seventeenth century, completed experts of math rather than a locality, placed value on mathematical distances over history or knowledge of a particular place. This benefited landowners

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9 Purchas, *Purchas his Pilgrimes*, vol. 5, 831-33.


and buyers by promising to unburden them of the social aspects of a landscape: local, customary rights of the landholder.¹²

In a colonial context, surveying would delegitimize Native customary uses of land and the social meanings applied to them by erasing the long histories of Native occupation and use of particular landscapes, that the English initially sought to document. However, the shift from a centuries-old practice to an early modern mathematical standard did not occur overnight. Surveying challenged core values and ideas about what the relationships ought to look like between the classes and between people and the land. Some Englishmen—those who had benefited from customary rights, or those who simply did not change their habits—did not buy into these new ideas, and followers of the old and new coexisted uneasily into the seventeenth century.

The accounts of the adventurers, nonetheless, propped up promotional literature with harrowing exploits of witty Englishmen triumphing over the Chesapeake peoples and landscape. Past and contemporary historians alike share an opinion that, in the words of early eighteenth-century chronicler John Oldmixon, adventuring storyteller John Smith “never dropt his main Design to make himself the Hero of his History.” The temptation of Smith’s storytelling, his recounting of “Incidents equally agreeable and surprizing, but pretty romantick and suspicious” plagues readers who struggle to see through his bias to an ethnographic account of Chesapeake Algonquians.¹³ Beyond

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their Anglocentrism and their interest in supplanting the Powhatan Chiefdom with their own tribute system, the earliest Englishmen who walked the Chesapeake and wrote about it gave a militaristic perspective both on their own colonists (whose “slothfull carelesnesse” proved “the necessity of martiall power”) and Indian populations (counted by “bowmen” per town).14

Like Hakluyt’s work, Smith’s thoughts were clouded by the 1601 violent success of the campaigns against the Irish, and the threats of Spanish, French, or Dutch war.15 By Irish land with precision and attempting to terrorize the Irish into English habits, elite Englishmen pursued measurable progress and both the spoils and justification of military conquest. Simultaneously, fears of Spanish domination in the Americas forced schemers north to Virginia to avoid a boundary dispute with the more established colonizers.16 Contradictory messages—assurances of Protestant superiority against English geopolitical insecurities and constant confusion and distrust of potential Indian enemies—leave readers looking elsewhere for an accurate accounting of the history of English and Indian lives that featured in these early accounts.

To better understand Indian lives, we can turn to the work of archaeologists and ethnographers who have contributed revealing data and alternative narratives which underscore the importance of landscape and long-term cultural change. Their work on the contact period, particularly around the Powhatan’s capitol at Werowocomoco,


15 For the Irish wars in an American context, see Eric Hinderaker and Peter C. Mancall, At the Edge of Empire: The Backcountry in British North America (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003). Hinderaker and Mancall consider the forcible Irish occupation in the sixteenth century to be the first Western fringe and colony for the English.

16Hinderaker and Mancall, 2-4.
highlights the Powhatan consolidation of power well before 1607, as well as Algonquian cultural continuities after. Contextualizing the establishment of Jamestown within the Native past and the centuries that came before serves to reframe the 1607 English arrival as far less cataclysmic and fateful in the history of Chesapeake Indians. In turn, it allows us to see that, as archaeologist Martin Gallivan notes, “native strategies of the colonial period were rooted in precontact social landscapes.”

**Settling In**

The Jamestown project needed Indian assistance to survive, making it difficult for colonial leaders to police the physical boundaries between Englishmen and Indians on their own terms. Interactions that aided the English also gave the Powhatans intelligence of English movements, and Powhatan himself initially attempted to control English movement through the pre-contact strategy of containing tributary peoples to districts. Initially, Powhatan used English prestige goods to increase his authority as paramount werowance and his place as a middleman along eastern seaboard trade routes, strengthening his diplomatic and economic position among other Native peoples. Simultaneously, he opened the Chesapeake to the spread of English goods and explorers who were eager to see what Native people and places could offer them.

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17 Martin Gallivan, *James River Chiefdoms: The Rise of Social Inequality in the Chesapeake* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2003). Working with both archaeologists and historians, anthropologist Helen Rountree engages living history and comparative ethnography as well as more traditional ethnohistorical approaches to reconstruct the lives of Powhatan women. Rountree, “Powhatan Indian Women,” 1-29. Increasingly other archaeologists have undertaken the pursuit of peoples marginalized by even the archaeological record, including those defined by long-distance migrations like the Susquehannock and the Shawnee. See, Stephen Warren, *The Worlds the Shawnees Made: Migration and Violence in Early America* by (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2014.)

The English choice of military post at an island on the Powhatan—renamed James—River guaranteed their dependence on and intimacy with the Powhatans. The location of the 134 who settled Jamestown Island helped shape initial power relations and knowledge about the Powhatans, and the Powhatans about them. Surrounding the peninsula upon which James Fort sat gave the Powhatans an upper hand in their relations with the English, allowing them to choose between aiding and isolating the strangers. Meanwhile, English ambitions were further undermined by a myriad of self-inflicted problems. Literature discussing the dismal water quality of Jamestown, the revolving door of ambitious leaders, the obsession with precious commodities, the endemic starvation, disease, and death, the violent and erratic behavior of the English towards Powhatan and nearby Algonquians, just in the first two or three years, have made clear Jamestown’s dismal lack of “success.” In recent decades, archaeology at Jamestown Fort has shown the most disparaging rumors were actually true, and the colonists more divided than recorded in writing. Proof positive of cannibalism, as practiced on a fourteen year-old girl, and evidence of Catholic relics secretly buried with leader Gabriel Archer in the Protestant churchyard, are recent archaeological evidences of divisions within the wooden palisades of the fort unrecorded in contemporary texts.19

The Powhatans were perplexed by the apparent absence of leadership and lack of

19For historical perspectives on mortality and failure in the first few years of Jamestown, see Carville Earle’s original environmental history, “Environment, Disease, and Mortality in Early Virginia,” in The Chesapeake in the Seventeenth Century: Essays on Anglo-American Society eds. Thad W. Tate and David L. Ammerman (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1979), 95-125. Kupperman, The Jamestown Project and James Horn, A Land as God Made It: Jamestown and the Birth of America (New York: Basic Books, 2007), provide complimentary accounts of the social, intellectual, and religious trends undergirding English expansion and the play-by-play of politics inside the Company, respectively. Archaeologists of the Jamestown Rediscovery project, who wrote many of the field reports referenced in this chapter, have also released their findings about the consumption of fellow colonists during the Starving Time in William Kelso, et. al., Jane: Starvation, Cannibalism, and Endurance at Jamestown (Williamsburg, Va: Colonial Williamsburg Foundation, 2013).
knowledge about food procurement; John Rolfe later wrote that, "we are constrayned yearely to go to the Indians and intreate them to sell us corne, which made them esteeme verie basely of us."20

Following Powhatan’s rules of trade for the moment, however, paid enormous dividends towards Smith’s education as a Chesapeake inhabitant, and for his place in English society as an explorer of the New World. Two Indian guides, his passport through the chiefdom, took him to the falls of the Potomac, through a myriad of Indian villages where he was hospitably treated. These visits, which occurred several times over the course of Smith’s time in Virginia, impressed Smith and the English with the size and power of Powhatan’s domain and, by extension, with what they hoped such power and prosperity could offer the starving colonists in the present moment. In his ominous words to his men, “there is as much danger to returne as to proceede.”21

Primary accounts also demonstrate that this movement may have been a Powhatan attempt, that would fail in the long term, to incorporate the English into the chiefdom as tributaries. Historians have commented extensively on Smith’s terrifying “adoption ceremony” at Powhatan’s and Pocahontas’s hands in late 1607, wherein Pocahontas appeared to save him from certain death. Mirroring his previous conquests through marriage and kinship on other Algonquian chiefdoms, Powhatan renamed Smith as Nantaquoud, claimed him as his son, and gave him a territory to govern.22 For Powhatan, this adoption ceremony functioned in lieu of a marriage, one of the more

22 For more on this episode and its results, see the chapter “Living with Europeans,” in Daniel Richter’s Facing East from Indian County, pp. 69-109.
conventional ways to create alliances between distant groups.\textsuperscript{23} The Jamestown colonists did not marry off to Indian men the very few Englishwomen to come to Virginia. At any rate, they also would not have immediately understood nor respected that Powhatan’s offspring would then rule as a petty werowance of Jamestown, according to the rules of this matrilineal society. Powhatan had dealt with this cultural difference before with his neighbors the Chickahominies—who governed by a council rather than by a single werowance—but just like with Smith, these cross-cultural compromises created ambiguously-defined hierarchies and foreshadowed future conflicts.

Archaeology demonstrates that a large component of informal, social incorporation involved leveraging food, a persistent English problem. The “supply” ships brought people from England necessary to settle—in 1609, for example, over three hundred men, women, and children—but few provisions for them. In ways the Virginia Company’s leaders would never admit, the very survival of the colony’s residents depended upon the hospitality of Indian women. Despite intermittent warfare, context dating between 1610 and 1620 inside James Fort show a high proportion of Native ceramics likely used to store food, outstripping the number of European-produced ceramics in the same contexts. Unfinished shell beads, bone tools for processing hides, and stones for grinding corn also point to the constant and industrious presence of Native women.\textsuperscript{24} Just beyond James Fort where the English attempted to farm, like at


the former Indian site of Paspahegh, the ratio reflected the assemblages inside of the fort deposited at the same time. Algonquian women brought these pots that they made and possibly cooked by fire for the English on-site, supporting both soldiers and laborers.\(^{25}\) The presence of pottery made by contemporary Indian women inside the fort and on the earliest plantations demonstrates English reliance on Indian networks of hospitality and travel. Archaeological evidence also suggests that Englishmen and particularly Algonquian women sustained selective contact for almost a generation. Simple-stamped pottery, made and carried by Algonquian women, was not only found in James Fort features dating to the earliest years of settlement, but also on outlying plantations as late as the second quarter of the seventeenth century.\(^{26}\) The web of communication used by Algonquian men and women benefited hosts and guides as well as guests. Reciprocity that cemented new relationships and provided new knowledge was gained through travel between Algonquian and English spaces, transforming both.

Many Englishmen embraced the constant contact with Indian women, and their presence redefined the interior spaces of the fort. In the formal exchange of food and the looting of Indian villages in war, William Strachey noted that Jamestown’s soldiers stopped to pick up Indian mats made by Algonquian women, “to dress their chambers and inward rooms, which make their houses so much more handsome.”\(^{27}\) What seems

\(^{25}\) Pecoraro and Givens, “‘Like to Perish from Want of Succor or Reliefe,’” 4.


an unequal exchange proved useful for some Indian leaders. For groups on the periphery like the Patawomecks, providing the English with food simultaneously cultivated a separate alliance with the English, while undercutting Powhatan’s control over the English food supply.\(^{28}\) In 1611, Lord de le Warr reported that Argall made a peace and trade for corn with the Patawomecks whom Francis West had so recently plundered, and referred to their werowance as “a King as great as Powhatan.”\(^{29}\) Indian tobacco pipes typical of those crafted along the Potomac River were found in James Fort, suggesting that at least the goods of women far from the English traversed great distances in the name of diplomacy.\(^{30}\) The diversity of materials from Native peoples around the bay proved the fort’s walls porous, subjecting the people inside to the complex diplomatic incorporation occurring outside.

The English necessity to trade for subsistence products (which colonists initially refused to grow) gave Indians knowledge of English whereabouts and strategy and forged relationships that made Anglo-Indian violence personal. Seasoned military leaders proved unable to police the interactions between Indians, each other, and their lessers, a far cry from accounts of legal and cultural domination in Ireland. Rather than an anonymous Indian or European threat lobbing projectiles from a distance, combatants often knew each other from their time trading and treating, and were dedicated to keeping lines of communication open in the future even if they sought to slay each other in the present. When food was scarce for both the Powhatans and


\(^{29}\) Lord de la Warre, “A Short Relation,” 1611, in *Captain John Smith*, ed. Horn, 1171.

English in 1610, the same few Paspahegh men guarded their borders from trespass by the colonists who had dined and treated with them in the years before. It probably appeared maddeningly slow and simple to the English, who watched for Paspaheghs waiting outside the fort to pick off Englishmen attempting to walk beyond the palisade. By the middle of 1610, only sixty colonists remained alive. Ensign Powell caught sight of the werowance Wowinchapuncke of Paspahegh, a face he recognized, and against orders chased him down and stabbed him until he was sure he died, resulting in an all-out deadly fight between the two sides.  

Indian leaders inside and outside of Powhatan’s chiefdom saw the English as potential military allies and trading partners as well as a possible threat. The English did their best to hide their weakness, burying the dead inside the fort and retrieving bodies from without so that the Indians would not see the tolls of war and disease. Nevertheless, Powhatan and other Algonquian elites understood English inadequacies lay not only in food procurement but in a lack of understanding of the new place, and he reminded English leaders of that fact. When Smith threatened violence against Powhatan in 1608 after bargaining extensively over corn, he replied, "What can you get by warre, when we can hide our provisions and fly to the woods? Whereby you must famish by wronging us your friends."  

Aware they were being watched, the English understood that their Powhatan guides beyond the fort were perpetually only as helpful in acquainting them with the Chesapeake as would serve their own interests, but the English, isolated in a landscape

modified for amphibious travel and hospitality, were powerless to travel and learn without them. Within weeks of his arrival, Gabriel Archer hailed the nearest occupied canoe along the James, piloted by an Arahatec man who upon learning the use of a pen, "layd out the whole River from the Shesseian bay to the end of it so far as passadg was for boates."\textsuperscript{34} The man went home to grab provisions, then followed Archer’s group six miles with dried oysters, alerting the other Indian groups of their arrival. Archer saw him three times that day, each time more amazed. Perhaps the English were outstandingly slow in their journey upriver, since by the time they reached the home of the werowance of Arahetec, Powhatan himself was on his way to appoint his own set of guides. He did not leave their wanderings to chance, appointing a high-ranking Arahatec named Navirans and posts along the way to supply them. In hindsight it seems possible that if they missed a post someone would alert Powhatan that they had strayed off course, but Archer did not notice and was delighted by the hospitality (and jewelry) of his hosts. He named one of their stops “Kynd Womans Care” since there women had supplied “bread new made, sodden wheate and beanes, mullberyes, and some fish undressed more then all we could eate.”\textsuperscript{35}

\textbf{The Price of Dependence}

As soon as Englishmen sashayed out of the fort, the battle over intelligence about the Chesapeake and English worlds began. As the English traveled, they sought to document and exploit the cultural and political differences between Powhatans while Powhatan sought to quell and hide those differences. The English discovered that

\textsuperscript{34} Gabriel Archer, “A Relatyon of the Discovery of Our River,” in \textit{Captain John Smith}, ed. Horn, 936.

\textsuperscript{35} Ibid., 943.
people like the Accawmacks on the Eastern Shore and the Patawomecks on the Potomac were uneasy with Powhatan’s influence over their polities, and sought trade that circumnavigated Powhatan’s control over goods.

Through surveillance and a tactical upper hand, Powhatan sought to control the newcomers and their threats as he had in the past, confining the offending party to a particular area. After Sir Thomas Gates sacked nearby Kecoughtan in 1611, Powhatan gave the leaders at Jamestown an ultimatum: “either we should depart his Country, or confine our selves to James Towne only, without searching further up into his Land, or Rivers, or otherwise, hee would give in command to his people to kill us, and doe unto us all the mischiefe, which they at this pleasure could and we feared.” He added to the English sense of foreboding with surveillance of their movements and in particular, the ships which brought people and goods to the island. “Watchful he is over us, and keeps good espial upon our proceedings…at what tyme soever any of our boates, pinnaces or shippes, come in, fall downe, or make up the river, [sentinels] give the Alarum.” English writer William Strachey suspected that Powhatan waited for an opportunity “to offer us a tast of the same Cuppe which he made our poore Countrymen drinck off at Roanoak.”

As paramount chief, Powhatan maintained power during the contact period in part because of his ability to control the ways that prestige goods, including those metallurgic and glass goods made by Europeans, moved. As he had before the

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38 Daniel K. Richter comments extensively on the decline of the trade in prestige goods, and the increase of dependence on European materials over time, in Facing East from Indian Country: A Native History of
English came, Powhatan collected and distributed items valuable for their rarity, and the trade enhanced his own political and spiritual clout. Ralph Hamor noticed that Powhatan used wine given to him by Christopher Newport years before to lubricate a diplomatic discussion; Patawomeck men and women tossed glass beads at funerals attended by Henry Spelman; Englishmen recognized elements from an English bedstead and an English crown at a temple to Okeus at Powhatan’s second capital, Orapax. European goods were everywhere, but in ways now controlled by Powhatan. In the valley of Virginia, where copper was processed by Natives, white glass beads appeared no later than 1615 perhaps traded west by the Powhatans for copper. The trade in European goods filtered through the Powhatans was made easier and more adaptable by trading paths established almost a century before the paramount chiefdom was constructed. As middleman inside and outside of the chiefdom, control over the movement of goods and people complemented one another, predicated upon distances that Powhatan’s people could cross.

But confining the English—and other Algonquian elites—was a difficult mission, only intermittently successful as Englishmen and Algonquians continued to trade. When Indians traded (illegally) with docked English ships beyond the fort at night, they gathered intelligence, while others took pot shots from the bank at Englishmen aboard

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small boats traveling upriver. At the same time, Powhatan also sharply cut off illicit movement even inside of his own kinship network, including a wife’s brother, “Amarice, who had his braynes knock’t out for selling but a baskett of Corne, and lying in the English fort 2. or 3. daies without Powahtans leave.” Probably a high-ranking member of a tributary group if his sister married Powhatan, Amarice’s travel to Jamestown posed as much a threat as Smith’s travel out of the fort, both potentially providing intelligence and trade beyond Powhatan’s control. Even as the English remained dependent on Indian corn, the visible gap between Powhatan’s policy of containing the English and his inability to consistently enforce it proved useful to Englishmen looking for weaknesses in the chiefdom.

By satisfying the English curiosity only to a certain point, the Algonquians revealed to the English their differences with outsiders and enfolded these strangers into their preexisting alliances and enmities. Navirans halted the English at the fall line, demurring about proceeding farther: “he began to tell us of the tedyous travell we should have if wee proceeded any further…we should get no victualls and be tyred.” Then he revealed that the people to the west, “the Monanacah was his Enimye.” Archer noticed that the Weyanokes were at odds with the nearby Paspaheghs, on whose land the English were just then clearing trees to erect a fort. Navirans refused to enter their district, and then suddenly turned and left them. Captain Christopher Newport, with Archer at the time, suspected danger, and he sped back to Jamestown where two hundred men—probably Weyanokes or Paspaheghs—under their werowance made an

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assault at the palisade gate, for days shooting at them whenever they left the fort to relieve themselves. The very first helpful Arahatec man returned to lay out the situation for Newport: the Pamunkey, Arahatec, Mattapony, and Youghtamong would help them make peace with “Contracted Enemyes” of the English: the Weyanoke, Tappahanock, Appomattucks, and Kiskiaks. In the meantime, the English should “Cutt Downe the long weedes rounde about our Forte,” helpful advice in a landscape rife with palisaded towns.43

The English carefully catalogued the dizzying political and social differences between Algonquians, and this knowledge proved critical for future diplomatic overtures. Explorers as early as Thomas Hariott carefully noted each group’s different military strength, raw materials, and political borders. Diplomacy, they quickly learned, would be difficult because “The language of every government is different from any other, and the farther they are [apart] the greater is the difference.”44 After spending time with both Powhatans on the James and the Patawomecks to the North, Henry Spelman noticed that the Patawomecks worshipped “an another god whom they call Quioquascacke,” rather than or in addition to the Powhatans’ Okeus.45 The Accawmacks on the Eastern Shore disdained “that devillish custome in making black Boyes,” a Powhatan rite of passage called huskanaw which transformed pubescent boys into men ready for war through a physically punishing spiritual journey.46

43 Ibid., 948.
44 Thomas Hariott, Narrative of the First Plantation of Virginia (London: Bernard Quaritch, 1893), 36.
45 Spelman, Relation of Virginia, 26.
46 Smith, The Generall Historie of Virginia, 143.
of the bay, only adult men who had undergone this rite of passage contributed to
decision-making in councils.\textsuperscript{47} Smith also probably noticed another difference confirmed
by archaeologists, that some of Powhatan towns were semi-palisaded, with family
homes surrounding a circular fort for protection from northern groups.\textsuperscript{48} Meanwhile to
the south, the Weyanokes maintained a double-walled palisade and “a place called the
great market,” a feature that no doubt interested Englishmen looking to trade just as
Algonquians had been interested in southern goods for decades.\textsuperscript{49} Despite regular
contact rebounding across the bay, Algonquians developed distinct population and
social patterns which lasted long past their induction as a tributary nation into Powhatan
society, and the English noticed.

Part of making sense of such a diverse landscape relied on mapping, a task
which Smith and other colony leaders took seriously as part of promoting the Virginia
Company. Smith’s “Map of Virginia,” engraved and published in London by professional
mapmakers, is the most famous of the early English maps of Virginia, and the most
digestible for contemporary Englishmen. In the decades before the map’s publication,
atlases of counties in the British Isles by Christopher Saxton and John Speed set a
precedent for illustrated and uniform maps depicting major towns, parklands, and
county boundaries accompanied by a description and history of the county. The
mammoth effort to map all Great Britain had served the colonial project in Ireland, and

\textsuperscript{47} Gallivan, \textit{James River Chieftdoms}, 24.

\textsuperscript{48} Howard A. MacCord, Sr., “The Indian Point Site, Stafford County, Virginia,” \textit{Archaeological Society of

\textsuperscript{49} Leverette B. Gregory, “The Hatch Site: A Preliminary Report (Prince George County, Virginia)”
viewers of Speed’s 1610 map of Cork saw illustrations of a well-ordered town at the center of British occupation and read about “the wild Irish” and “Christianitie in Ireland how it decaied.”\textsuperscript{50} Smith’s map looked quite similar. Instead of steeples, loaf-shaped Indian dwellings, yahakan Algonquian homes mark the large towns with a residing werowances, and surrounding minor settlements appear as smaller bullseyes like on Speed’s maps. But unlike on many of Speed’s map, there are no obvious population centers profiled in illustration, only a part of a single boundary—between the Powhatans and their Monacan neighbors—and no mention of paths or roads to suggest how one town relates to another.\textsuperscript{51} These features and the letters, “POWHATAN” across the whole Chesapeake create the illusion of a uniform landscape ruled by a single man.

On the other hand, an unknown Englishman’s (maybe even Smith’s) sketch of the Chesapeake terrain acknowledged the differences between Powhatan’s tributaries and in so doing, reflected the colonist’s actual experience of the Algonquian landscape. The 1608 Zuniga Map shows the path taken through the Powhatan Chiefdom by an Englishman, who counted the numbers of homes in each village and took note of the sequence of the towns he passed through. Because he was presumably guided by Algonquians, he demonstrates firsthand the relationships between each town, and where river crossings and potential hospitality awaits. Illustrations of towns includes nearby earthworks like palisades and ditches surrounding Werowocomoco, using the differences between them as potential identifiers. Reflecting earlier English

\textsuperscript{50} John Speed, “The theatre of the empire of Great Britaine : Presenting an Exact Geography of the Kingdomes of England, Scotland, Ireland” (London: William Hall, 1611), University of Michigan Libraries, 139-140.

\textsuperscript{51} John Smith, “A Map of Virginia : with a Description of the Countrey, the Commodities, People, Government and Religion” (Oxford: Barnes, 1612)
understandings of land, rather than measuring distance and direction by a compass
rose, he shows that the Monacans lay “two dayes Journey” away, and marked historical
locations where Captain Smith was taken captive along the James River and where
colonists from Roanoke were last seen by Algonquians.52 The Algonquian landscape’s
history and diversity was necessary for Englishmen to understand in order to subvert it.

Other autonomous groups with openly hostile or ambivalent relationships to the
Powhatans were interested in the military and trade offerings of the English. Strachey
noted in 1612 that northern-dwelling Indians frequently attacked people on both the
Eastern and Western shores, who “are contynually harrowed and frighted by them of
whose cruelty the said people generally complayned.”53 The Susquehannocks and the
Piscataways both courted Smith as a potential ally against the Massawomecks and as
an outlet for their furs, which they had been trading to Europeans for some time. He
found them palisaded at the north end of the bay, ready with tobacco pipes and
provisions. Pushed by Company leaders, voyagers like Samuel Argall followed after
Smith to make contact with “those Northern people,” but worried Powhatan “seeing o[u]r
access theither againe…might forestall o[ur] Trucking.”54 The rewards might outweigh
the risks, though, and Argall had heard “the French have cleered eight thousand pounds
of trade with the Indians, for furs, which benefit wil be as easily by us procured” and

52 Copy of a ms. map of a portion of S.E. Virginia repersenenting the James, York, and Rappahannock
Rivers and part of Chesapeake Bay: entitled “Memorandum sent from London, England, 10th Sept. 1608
by Zuniga to the King of Spain”] (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1890).


54 Sir Thomas Dale, Report from Virginia, May 25, 1611, Earl of Warwick Papers, Albert and Shirley Small
Special Collections Library, University of Virginia.
received an invitation from the Susquehannocks to return the following season.\textsuperscript{55} In 1611, Thomas Dale suggested hiring mariners to trade for corn with the Patawomecks or the Susquehannocks, in place and in spite of Powhatan.\textsuperscript{56} Trying to circumnavigate Powhatan’s influence, English attempted clumsily to keep their options for alliance varied by distributing goods and bridging the language gap. Smith summoned Peter Wynne in 1608 to go west with him since "the people of Monacan speak a farr differing language from the subjectes of Powaton, theyr pronunciation being very like welsh so that the gentlemen in our Company desired me to be theyr Interpreter."\textsuperscript{57} They hoped moving beyond Monacan-Powhatan diplomatic borders would bring them freedom from Powhatan attempts to orchestrate English movement and trade.

**Creating and Controlling Interlocutors**

Captives and interpreters like Peter Wynne facilitated understanding between the Powhatans and newcomers, adding permanence to diplomatic relations. Through formal adoption ceremonies performed across the Chesapeake and informal interaction with Algonquian women inside of the fort, Jamestown became an Indian space fully incorporated into the Chiefdom through a ranger of people who served as interlocutors. Both English and Powhatan elites hoped these men and women would provide them an advantage in their attempts to understand the other side, but over time this new class of people developed their own ambitions and often undermined the goals of their countrymen.

\textsuperscript{55} Hamor, “A True Discourse of the Present State of Virginia,” 1146.

\textsuperscript{56} Sir Thomas Dale, Report from Virginia, May 25, 1611, Earl of Warwick Papers.

People like Peter Wynne and many more unknown Algonquin and English people served an increasingly vital role in communication and diplomacy. Presented as Captain Christopher Newport’s son, Thomas Savage was traded as an adopted child for an aide to Powhatan named Namontack, “one of a shrewd, subtile capacitie.”58 The next year, Namontack left for England with his adoptive father Sir Christopher Newport on a reconnaissance mission for Powhatan.59 In addition to gathering intelligence about the English, Namontack helped the English trade for corn and avoid combat when the English “found the Salvages more readie to fight then trade.”60 Savage, a child in 1607, would serve as an interpreter and guide for Smith and other colonial leaders in the following decades. To navigate these complex relationships, interpreters crossed borders to provide a crucial component of knowledge about the other for both Powhatan and the English. This initial interaction demonstrated a promising ideal: two individuals, in isolation, devote their lives to jump across wide physical and cultural chasms, advancing the knowledge and security of their respective nations.

The ideal was far from a reality where each side faced deep divisions, and the English in particular saw short-term gains to bed had in the young men’s skills, at the expense of those young men. Leaders in these two deeply divided empires used interpreters thrown into enemy territory as leverage against speakers of their own


60 Smith, *The Generall Historie of Virginia*, 70.
languages. Two years after Thomas Savage’s adoption, Smith took the nobleman’s son Henry Spelman to the Algonquians where “unknowne to me he sould me,” leaving him there in exchange for the rights to “a [Native] towne caled Powhatan.” While Smith obviously differed with Spelman and said the move bettered relations with the Powhatans, Spelman reported that Smith only traded Spelman for land to undermine a claim Deputy Governor Francis West made at a different town. This episode caused further friction inside of the Company council, in part because Spelman—ostensibly a tool of the English—served as his own vocal advocate.

A similar exchange demonstrated that internal Powhatan alliances frayed when petty werowances divulged information about Powhatan movements in exchange for their own diplomatic gains. As a token of goodwill, Smith later bequeathed his literate young page Samuel Collier to a werowance at Warraskoyack “to learne the Language.” He only did that after the werowance told him not put his guard or guns down, since Powhatan had reached Smith by messenger earlier but, according to the Warraskoyack werowance, “sent for you onely to cut your throats.” If it was indeed true (and the same advantage could be gained from a lie), it was, like Amarice’s visit to Jamestown, another betrayal of Powhatan, another separate relationship cultivated. Both Powhatan and Smith realized an understanding of language, custom, and weakness was crucial in attempts to incorporate the other—and interpreters were necessary in the race for intelligence.

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61 Spelman, Relation of Virginia, 16. Spelman also claimed that Smith was returned to England over this conflict, because he had conspired with Powhatan to kill West, an idea which closely correlates in timing to an attempt on West’s men as they upriver to trade in Smith’s own account. Smith, The Generall Historie of Virginia, 105.

Products of deeply divided political environments themselves, these interpreters were their own men and could not be counted on to serve new or old masters. The Patawomecks, who treated Spelman well on a visit to Powhatan, agreed to smuggle Spelman away from Powhatan to safety in one of their towns on the Potomac River. He and a Dutch boy named Samuel, who often accompanied Spelman from town to town, escaped in secret. Such a move would obviously serve the Patowomecks in creating separate long-distance trade alliances with the English. Powhatan himself responded by sending men to order Spelman and Samuel back to the village. Spelman refused, unsure if he could trust these men, and turned to continue walking north. Unwilling to lose control of the interpreters or let those on the fringe like the Patawomecks have access to the interpreters' knowledge, the Powhatan emissaries suddenly cleaved through Samuel's head with an axe. Running for the woods, Spelman made it to “the Patomeckes cuntry” on his own, a feat of orienteering in a riverine environment that spoke to his time amongst the Powhatans. Smith reports that Spelman was the only survivor of the attack. Among the Patawomecks he lived in security for a year until he was ransomed back to the English by Captain Samuel Argall with copper. But the trauma and Samuel’s death would have been avoided, Spelman later claimed, had not fellow adoptee and interpreter Thomas Savage “fayne sum excuss of stay & unknowne to us went backe to the Powetan and acquaynte him wt our departing wt ye Patowomeck.” Savage’s intentions are unclear, if he was in fact responsible, but

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Spelman’s distrust for one of the few Englishmen in the same precarious position demonstrates his discomfort with contested loyalties.

Flare-ups in violence and the first all-out war between the Powhatans and English in 1609 convinced these captives and adoptees living with the Natives that, even if the presence of boys like Spelman and Savage facilitated alliances, the English leadership could not be trusted to value their lives or to broker a peace. The other colonists remained trapped inside of the fort with the Powhatans waiting to attack outside, and food became a scarce commodity while paranoia and restlessness abounded. With Smith gone (according to Smith), colony leaders lacked unity, strength, and a plan. In desperation and crisis, colonist Hugh Price stalked into the exact center of the fort, “exlameinge and Creyinge outt thatt there was noe god, alledgeinge thatt if there were a god he wolde nott Suffer his Creatures whome he ha
nd framed to induce thse miseries.” Onlooker George Percy considered it an act of God that when Price left the fort the same day he was killed by the Indians and his body abandoned and torn apart by wild animals.66

While their countrymen suffered in the fort, self-interested merchants drew resources from the alliances set up by the captive system and created new problems. Captain Francis West, for example, not only devastated the Indian communities on the Potomac from whom he took corn to feed his sailors and endangered interpreter Spelman thereby, but upon collecting the spoils abandoned the starving colony and sailed away.67 Death was the consequence not for Smith or West, but for people inside

of Jamestown Fort, at West’s settlement, and for the Patawomecks. He also left Spelman, as a representative of the colony’s leadership, in a precarious position. People locked out of leadership positions in the colony, interpreters and laborers both, learned quickly that they were expendable.

Self-interested laborers, necessary in the pursuit of economic success beyond the fort, also undermined Virginia’s precarious position. Despite conflicts and contracts that might urge them to stay, company servants—children, artisans, young laborers—to the disgust of Company leaders seemed to have little loyalty to England or investment in the success of the colony, and crossed cultural borders to move in with nearby Indian neighbors. Young indentured servants and laborers, of which there were few at first, were transported to Virginia as an extension of caring for “our poore children apprentices, which have their trades taught them freely, and their meate and drinke they duly receive at the houses of the better sort from day to day by turns.” Through the early seventeenth century, the apprenticeship system devolved into a predatory system headed by “Spirits, who take up all the idle, lazie, simple people they can intice.” Spirits and colonial promotions promised poor men and women that “they shall goe into a place where food shall drop into their mouthes: and being thus deluded, they take courage, and are transported.” By 1618, the cash-poor Virginia Company paid colonists

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69 John Smith was most annoyed by Polish and Dutch or German carpenters, who left the English to live full-time with the Indians instead of building structures for Jamestown. Smith, The Generall Historie of Virginia, 94.

70 Thomas Scott, “The Belgicke Pismire: Stinging the slothfull Sleeper, and Awaking the Diligent to Fast, Watch, Pray; and Worke out their Owne Temporall and Eternall Salvation with Fear and Trembling,” (London: J. Dawson, 1623), 76-7.
in land by the number of people they brought across the Atlantic. Servants were among those who arrived in rising numbers, “But not finding what was promised, their courage abates, & their minds being dejected.” Whatever their misconceptions or willingness, indentured servants perhaps left a community behind to cross the Atlantic – an enormous and dangerous barrier – with their own ambitions. But once in Virginia, they were confined on plantations or in forts with other servants, in the words of one historian, “to particular plots of an immeasurable expanse, and…to the drudging routine of cultivating those enclosures” for social betters. And that was noticeably rougher than customary farming in England. In the words of deposed leader Edward Wingfield, “Wear this whipping, lawing, beating, and hanging in Virginia knowne in England I feare it would drive many well affected myndes from this honorable action of Virginia.” Servants had little interest, other than for their own survival, in enforcing rules or shoring up boundaries to assist in the colonial project, and had already survived one boundary crossing.

Like interpreters, runaways also proved themselves interlocutors. While their stories are largely unrecorded, runaways offered Indians knowledge, labor (even Spelman worked among Patawomeck women), and leverage in diplomatic discussions with colonial leadership. Where gentlemen and Smith sought riverine passages west,

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71 William Bullock, “Virginia Impartially examined, and left to publick view, to be considered by all Judicious and honest men” (London: John Hammond, 1649), 14.


runaways became experts on their immediate options for survival surrounding James Fort. As border crossers, runaway children, artisans, and servants became an endemic sign of English weakness and leverage for nearby Powhatans. Wingfield chuckled that as a sign of goodwill "the wyroances doe likewise send our men runnagates to us home againe, using them well during their beeing with them; so as now they being well rewarded at home at their retorne, they take litle joye to travell abroad without Pasportes." Spelman's friend Samuel may have been one of the Dutch artisans who were sent to build a house for Powhatan but then stayed with the Indians afterwards. Once commanders built settlements beyond Jamestown, the problem compounded; men mining for iron attempted to steal a small boat and break for it, and in 1610 Lord de la Warre sentenced one of those caught to death as an example. The farther the English extended their claims beyond Jamestown, the more diverse the strategies to escape English control; servants forced into the work of claiming ownership of the landscape by altering it on behalf of their masters were also given new opportunities to "Runn away unto the Salvages whome we never heard of after." If the colony were to permanently expand beyond the triangular acre of James Fort, more control over the movement of servants, and internal policing of boundaries, would be necessary.

Reining in Boundary Crossers

To do so, veteran English commanders drew on the rigid military models they implemented in continental Europe to upend the Anglo-Indian relationships that

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75 Ibid., 1106.
76 Percy, "Trewe Relation," 1100.
interlocutors had created in only the previous few years. Their plan was to create exclusively English spaces by destroying the Algonquian networks leading to them, using English military rules and strategies. Trade, expansion, and diplomacy would be conducted the English way—and desertion and illicit trade would have to stop.

Ironically, to implement this strategy, they would first need to use the knowledge and skills gained through captives and interpreters, and the cooperation of Algonquian groups on the Powhatan fringe. Indians uncomfortable with Powhatan’s authority used the chaos to ally with the English, breaking off chunks of the Powhatan chiefdom from the inside and outside.

With an understanding that both English and Indian interlocutors were also useful to Natives, new leadership used military violence to enforce Virginia’s boundaries by controlling movement to and from the fort. Building on the earlier laws established by Lord de la Warre, Thomas Gates and Thomas Dale imposed martial law upon their arrival in 1611, and their rules made radical changes to the way that colonists interacted every day with the Indians. They banned all Indian trade, and saved the severest punishment for runaways. At the new city of Henricus on the falls of the James, a group of men ran away and Dale, the fort’s commander, retaliated: “Some he apointed to be hanged some burned some to be broken upon wheles others to be Staked and some to be shott to deathe all theis extreme and crewell tortures he used and inflicted upon them To terrefy the reste for attempteinge the Lyke.”

Inside Jamestown, Gates also abruptly and violently halted the presence of Indians in the fort: “Dyvers Indyans used to come to our foarte at James Towne bringeinge victewalls with them Butt indede did

77 Ibid., 1112.
Rather come as Spyes then any good affectyon they did beare unto us. Some of them
Sir Thomas Gates Cawsed to be apprehended and executed for a Terrour to the
Reste.” They even policed the border by altering the architecture of the fort’s interior,
constructing a building with limited access around a newly-dug well and “a block howse
to be raised…to prevent the Indians (whoe use ordinarily to swimme over unto our Isle
at a certaine Creek) from killing o[ur] Cattell.”78 Since war also cut off trade, however,
Gates and Dale were also powerless to demand food and command the return of goods
and people beyond the forts.

Restricting movement but insisting on expanding English territory, Gates and
Dale meshed the fight for land, food, and the creation of exclusively English spaces.
They oversaw the reorganization of the fort system which thwarted Powhatan’s wish
that incorporated communities stay within assigned territories.79 In search of corn and
with plenty of English death to “revenge” on the Indians, Gates cleared out neighboring
Algonquian groups. When Humphrey Blunt’s canoe was blown to the enemy’s shore
where he was retrieved and executed, Gates took the village of Kecoughtan and turned
it over to English plowmen “so much grownd is there Cleered and open, ynough with
little Labour alreddy prepared, to receave Corne…of 2. or 3000. Acres.”80 Meanwhile,
Dale marched south against the Nansemonds; both groups were among Powhatan’s
recent acquisitions, sacked by him before the English settled Jamestown and under

78 Sir Thomas Dale, Report from Virginia, May 25, 1611. Warwick Papers. See also William Kelso, Beverly
Straube, and Daniel Shmidt, eds., 2007-2010 Interim Report on the Preservation Virginia Excavations at
Jamestown, Virginia, (Preservation Virginia, 2012), 41.

79 Frederic Gleach, Powhatan’s World and Colonial Virginia: a Conflict of Cultures, (Lincoln: University of
Nebraska Press, 1997), 128.

obligation to stand by him in war.\textsuperscript{81} Gates and Dale—whether they understood this or not—rearranged the complex geopolitical stage Powhatan engineered to surveil allies and enemies, and to distribute goods and food.

Gates and Dale fused their militarization and border expansion to the connections made by interpreters and captives like Namontack and Spelman. To the north, Patawomeck petty werowance Iopassus was instrumental in taking perhaps the most famous captive of all, Pocahontas. He and Pocahontas probably developed a diplomatic relationship previously when she had protected Spelman from her father, Powhatan, allowing Spelman to live along the Potomac after his capture. Captain Argall called on his kinship with Iopassus, “an old friend, and adopted brother” to convince him to lure Pocahontas into English hands. By trickery, Iopassus delivered her aboard Captain Argall’s ship in 1613, alongside a cargo of corn.\textsuperscript{82} The following year, Dale rode up the Pamunkey River with Pocahontas on board and waited to be noticed by people from Powhatan’s village. He shouted to emissaries that, “I came to bring him his daughter, conditionall he would…render all the armes, tooles, swords, and men that had runne away, and give me a ship full of corne, for the wrong he had done unto us.” Pocahontas encouraged her kinsmen to treat with Dale, who continued, “If not burne all.”\textsuperscript{83} The Indians attempted to negotiate, offering to return an Englishman named Simons, “who had thrice plaid the runnagate, whose lies and villany much hindred our


\textsuperscript{82} James D. Rice, \textit{Nature and History in the Potomac Country from Hunter-Gatherers to the Age of Jefferson} (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009), 84.

\textsuperscript{83} Letter from Sir Thomas Dale, June 18, 1614 in Hamor, “A True Discourse of the Present State of Virginia,” 1157.
trade for corne” but told a lie that another runaway actually staying with them was beyond reach because he was dead. The situation devolved and the English burned the Indians’ homes, forcing Powhatan’s brother Opechancanough to sue for peace through emissaries to the fort. Powhatan later returned seven English people, some guns, and promised corn to follow. In so doing, he publicly forfeited a degree of control over the flow of goods and people in his chiefdom.

Soon the other Indian groups were handed another golden opportunity to chip away at Powhatan’s control of movement. The Chickahominies, who paid tribute to Powhatan but maintained a separate governing structure, sought a separate peace at James Fort a dozen miles from where they lived. The English noticed that “these people presuming upon their owne strength and number (in no one place In those parts, which we know, so many togeather)…a long time neglected Powhatan,” either not paying tribute or disengaging from military pursuits. During the previous war, Powhatan actively worked to keep these neighbors from coming to agreement, telling the English the Chickahominies were not to be trusted and urging the Chickahominies “to betray such of our [English] men as should come at any tyme to trade with them for corne.” But at peace, they had cause to worry at the marriage of Pocahontas to John Rolfe, which sealed an alliance between the Powhatans and the very destructive English. They had also no doubt noticed elderly Powhatan’s retreat from public life after the conclusion of hostilities, and were perhaps troubled that his brother Opechancanough

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85 Ibid., 1129.
took his place. Opechancanough had previously fought with the English, opening the possibility of a new war that could draw in the Chickahominies. With presents of deer they approached Sir Thomas Dale and proposed a similar relationship to the one they had with Powhatan previously, to fight and pay tribute for a leader if they could govern themselves. Samuel Argall, the same man who convinced Iopassus to break with Powhatan over Pocahontas’s capture, promised them protection, trade goods, and an engraved copper image of King James if they would help fight the enemies of the English and call themselves “Tassantasses,” the Algonquian word for strangers that Powhatan had for the English.\textsuperscript{87} They consulted among each other and “requested further, that if their boats should happen to meet with our boats, and that they said they were the Chikahominy Englishmen [in their language, Chickahominy strangers], and King James his men, we would let them passe; we agreed unto it, so that the pronounced themselves English men.” Proudly, Sir Thomas Dale added, “This people never acknowledged any King, before; no nor ever would acknowledge Powhatan for his King, a stout people they be.” As an afterthought, he added, “and a fine seat they have.”\textsuperscript{88} At the perfect moment, the Chickahominies gained mobility and an alliance for a portion of their identities and an acknowledgment of English control over the landscape. With the Chickahominies’ request of free passage along the rivers, King James was perhaps becoming, in John Smith’s words to Powhatan, “king of all the waters.”\textsuperscript{89}

\textsuperscript{87}Hamor, “A True Discourse of the Present State of Virginia,” 1128.


Interpreters also now played a critical role in this new arrangement in ways Powhatan had not intended. Upon seeing Thomas Savage for the first time since the beginning of the war, Powhatan gently scolded him, “my childe you are welcome, you have bin a straunger to me these foure yeeres, at what time I gave you leave to goe to Paspahae...to see your friends, and till now you never returned.” He reminded Savage of his symbolic placement inside the bounds of the chiefdom as well, established “by the donative of Captaine Newport, in liew of one of my subjects Namontacke, who I purposely sent to King James his land, to see him and his country.” Savage’s behavior was outside the bounds of the acceptable role as an interpreter, and of a son, and English behavior beyond the bounds acceptable in a petty chiefdom.

Pocahontas’s abduction, and her subsequent marriage to John Rolfe in 1614, set a precedent for English transgression upon the very extensive kinship network Powhatan used to facilitate incorporation of the English and tributary groups. During his reunion with Powhatan, Savage visited not to reunite with his adopted father, but with a message from the English to procure Powhatan’s “exquisite” eleven-year-old daughter as a “bedfellow” for Sir Thomas Dale, and as security for the Powhatans’ good behavior. Even though “many times [Powhatan] would have interrupted my [Dale’s] speech, which I intreated him to heare out” and the child was married to a werowance three days’ distance away (which might have been a lie), through Savage the English insisted that the child was too young to consummate a marriage anyway and that Powhatan could have it annulled. Their reasoning fell on deaf ears. Powhatan angrily replied that, “When [Pocahontas] dieth he [Dale] shall have another childe of mine, but she yet liveth: I

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holde it not a brotherly part of your King, to desire to bereave me of two of my children at once.” The marriage of the chieftain’s daughter, after all, was a promise of future diplomatic ties; the marriage of two daughters seemed coercive instead. To add insult to the injury, on the same mission an Englishman recognized and demanded the return of William Parker, a man captured at one of the forts during the war and whom the Indians had said was dead. Powhatan replied, “you can no sooner see or know of any English mans being with me, but you must have him away…I will send no guides along with you, so as if any ill befall you by the way, thanke your selves.” 91 The English refusal to cooperate with Powhatan’s placement of people, one of the strategies at the core of his rise to power, led to Powhatan’s own bitter withdrawal.

**English Expanding Outward**

In co-opting Powhatan fields, trade, laborers, interpreters, and kinship networks, Englishmen and their new Indian allies chipped away at Powhatan authority. Although a small presence—in 1616 only 350 colonists dispersed among six settlements—the English had already annihilated entire towns, redistributing populations in their wars against the Powhatans. 92 In the pursuit of profit through furs and tobacco, Englishmen needed Indian guides, Indian paths and networks, and Indian fields. Colonial leaders found new plantations and ships difficult to surveil, however, and Englishmen, now Africans, and Indians evolved localized relationships with one another—a pre-colonial pattern comfortable for many Algonquians.

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After “a firme peace” was established in 1614, the English rearrangement of people and things demonstrated a shift to a unilateral flow of people and goods between Indians and English worlds. Dale enforced English, rather than Indian, ideas about staking permanent property bounds on the landscape and “did compound with Powhatan the Indian Kinge or cheife of that place and bounded the same out with markeable Trees and other Marks of perpetuall knowledge and remembrance with a solemn procession.” Forest-fed “Wild Swine” competed with deer for food and ate Indian women’s crops. Archaeologically, the presence of a large amount of Native women’s wares and butchered wild game but fewer English-made trade goods probably means that trade only continued one way, a trend persisting into the 1630s. People only moved one way, too: Ralph Hamor wrote that the Indians were working for the English under Dale, perhaps to plant corn and cook at the surrounding forts. But on the other hand, the return of Simons demonstrated that the Powhatans could no longer reliably shelter runaways, weakening a key Powhatan threat to martial law. Perhaps because they were unwilling to be held liable for illegitimate English movements, Indians as well as Englishmen began to at least make a show of enforcing Dale’s requirement that traveling Englishmen carry a passport, the string of pearls given to Dale by Powhatan.


95 Ibid., 1148.
Peace also gave the English a chance to revisit potential profits from agriculture with new energy. In 1614, the first Virginia Company servants were released from indenture, John Rolfe exported four barrels of sweet-scented tobacco, and the company shifted from collective farming to private garden plots. Those men, left to shift for themselves, could expect a two hundred to three hundred percent return on their investment in tobacco if they survived.  

96 John Pory reported one man who cleared 200 pounds sterling worth of tobacco; another with six servants who cleared 1000 pounds.  

This made the land adjacent to English forts and homes, in addition to the trade passages through them, profitable for the first time to Englishmen. Even as they justified “plant[ing] ourselves in their Places” since Indians keep “only a generall recidencie there, as wild beasts have in the forrest,” Company servants knew the labor behind clearing fallow fields “rough weeded and overgrowne wth Shrubbes and bushes” and working “many grounds clear’d here by the Indians to our hands, which being much worn out, will bear no more of their corn.”

97 Interest in controlling the movement of laborers shifted with the meaning of land. As Karen Kupperman writes, “whatever commodities the country might offer would be produced by English labor, not acquired through trade with the Indians,” and to survive the colony required “large-scale migration rather than maintenance of a small military

96 Pecoraro and Givens, “‘Like to Perish from Want of Succor or Reliefe,’” 5. David Hackett Fischer and James C. Kelly, Bound Away: Virginia and the Westward Movement (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2000) 27.  


When settlers farmed tobacco and diversified their crops for subsistence, they began a brisk exchange with supply ships; taking advantage of sporadic English shipping, the Dutch were more than willing to trade with the early tobacco farmers and especially in the post-Company period. In 1619, they found a market for over twenty Africans of unknown legal status, distributed through the colony as servants. Servants continued to pour in to the colony, and continued their own separate exchange with their Algonquian neighbors regardless of the policies of their masters. George Sandys wrote, “I like not this stragelinge” or fanning out of English settlement west, one reason being “two of those [hands] a little after ran away (I am afraid to ye Indians) & no doubt the other two would have consorted with their companions, if sickness had not fettered them.”

Interest in keeping servants on plantations also altered the meaning of the movements of Indians. Masters recognized the necessity of controlling and surveilling Indian whereabouts, both as part of the labor pool themselves and to avoid enticing English and African servants to run off to Indian towns. Englishmen negotiated with Indian parents to take Algonquian children into their households to instill in them a Christian education; they were placed at outlying plantations where the Indian families were supposedly well acquainted with particular colonists. But then it was up to the colonists “to after keep them that they runn not to theire parents or frends, and their said Parrents or frends steale them not away wch naturall affecon may inforce in the one


100 Copy of Letter of George Sandys to John Ferrar, March 5, 1623, Earl of Warwick Papers.
and the other.”101 Planter William Capps made, he thought, a humorous argument for importing slaves to solve the endemic runaway problem: “by hap bring you in 3 or 4 score slaves to work about a ffort or other servile worke, but before I deliver them up I will make them sing new Toes, old Toes, no Toes at all, because they shall not outrun me.”102

Pointed explorations meanwhile followed the possibilities of expanding trade networks, which were followed by Algonquians and English explorers pointing the way to Indian nations beyond. In July 1621, after “settinge out of a Voyadge to trade with the Indians in Virginia for Furrs,” the Company resolved to venture north to take a slice of the French and Dutch trade, no doubt with the Susquehannocks. Their rivals “yearly made in Lawarr and Hudsons River some 20 or 30 Leagues in distance from the Sotherne Plantacon…their incredible gaine and wealth.” A few months later, the distance from Jamestown was modified to the more accurate 50 leagues according to additional exploration and discussion; adventurers signed the “rolls” to invest and appointed an agent.103 New maps and the corresponding reports that “certainely enformed” government officials who could not see it themselves, gave economic adventures abroad the appearances of sound investment.104 In the fur trade and in tobacco exploration, exploration made economic expansion viable, commodifying Indian networks.

102 Copy of Letter of William Capps to John Ferrar, March 31, 1623, Earl of Warwick Papers.
104 Ibid., 515.
The Algonquian Response

In the wake of a rapidly evolving threat, new Powhatan leaders challenged English expansion even as others welcomed certain settlers as a buffer against them. The Second Anglo-Powhatan War erupted along the lines established in the first fifteen years of contact: taking advantage of localized relationships with Englishmen, the Indians used their thorough knowledge of individual plantations and English agriculture to take captives, wreak starvation, and cause the breakdown of English settlements beyond Jamestown. Although the death toll itself seems small, the emphasis on forced servitude, trade, and monocultural planting caused the destruction of Virginia’s tenuous hold on Indian places beyond the fort.

For the Algonquians, English expansion also brought a shift in values and strategy. English shop scraps glutted the market for copper as a prestige item, and the English themselves had displaced hundreds if not thousands of people by 1614 in defiance of Powhatan’s carefully orchestrated district system. Rolfe reported that “now the case is altered, they sue from us, come to our Townes, sell the skins from their shoudiers which are their best garments to buy corne.”¹⁰⁵ A previous strategy for maintaining allegiance and making new alliances—accruing and distributing goods—was falling apart. In response, new leaders leaned on defense and military tactics to gain power among Powhatan tributaries. Their strategies also leaned on local, accrued knowledge of the English, a product of English expansion into Algonquian landscapes.

The Powhatan leaders who fought for control of the region had in common an emphasis on military aggression. Powhatan himself removed away from

Werowocomoco to the head of the Chickahominy River at a village called Orapax in 1616; he died soon after, and his successor Opitchapam appears infrequently in the Virginia Company records. A spiritual figure, Pamunkey warrior Nemattanew, or Jack of the Feather to the English, distinguished himself against the English in battle and gained a following. In one bemused English chronicler’s words, “There was at this time a tall handsome well-made Indian, called Nemattanow, who had gain’d such Esteem amongst his own People in War, that they believ’d him to be invulnerable; for he had hitherto escaped without Hurt, from all the Battles he had ever been engaged in.”\textsuperscript{106} The phenomenon went beyond superstition: a decade of endemic conflict with one particular group of Europeans bred, in historian Alfred Cave’s terms, “an aggressive, flamboyant, and provocative symbol of resistance” to English expansion.\textsuperscript{107}

Powhatan’s brother Opechancanough emerged as the next leader and dominant threat to non-Powhatan Indians and Englishmen exactly because he worked throughout his career to police the movements of neighboring Indian groups in ways that benefited the Powhatan Chiefdom.\textsuperscript{108} While Powhatan still ruled, for example, the original chief of the Tappahannocks, Pipsco, had stolen a wife from Opechancanough and was in retaliation deposed, replaced by Powhatan’s young son Tatacoope (though the woman remained with Pipsco as his wife).\textsuperscript{109} Decades later, the Nottoways and Meherrins remembered that Opechancanough visited the populous Chowans to the south bearing


\textsuperscript{107} Cave, \textit{Lethal Encounters}, 113.

\textsuperscript{108} Kupperman, \textit{The Jamestown Project}, 272.

gifts, a petty werowance “went to salute and embrace the King of Chawan, and stroaking of him after their usuall manner, he whipt a bow string about the King of Chawans neck, and strangled him.” The reason given, “a young woman that the King of Chawan had detayned of the King of Pawhatan,” perhaps righting a wrong in the flow of captives. Almost a century later in 1710, Weyanoke women and a Nansemond chief cited not the English, nor the Pamunkey or Powhatans, but Opechancanough by name and his war against the English as the reason for their migration away from their earlier village sites. He had pushed aside, intimidated or redistributed entire Indian nations over decades; it follows he would attempt to shepherd the English inside of boundaries defined by the Powhatans.

Shifts towards combativeness in leaders on both sides had largely negative impacts on the interpreters and other cultural emissaries. During this period of tentative peace, neither Opechancanough nor the English trusted them. Two prominent Indian women, upon complaint by their English hosts that they were too expensive to keep with English families, were sent to Bermuda to find suitable husbands. Several of the ambassadors sent by Powhatan to England during this period of peace, including Pocahontas and Nemontack, never saw Virginia again. In 1619, interpreter Henry Spelman was tried for treason at Jamestown for confiding in “Opochankino, of a great

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111 Nathaniel Harrison and Phillip Ludwell, “Deposition of Betty (Indian) 1710 September 22, Mary (Indian), Jenny Pearce (Indian),” and “The Examination of Great Peter,” Lee Family Papers, 1638-1867, Section 66. Virginia Historical Society, Richmond, VA.


113 Powhatan told Ralph Hamor that Nemontack had not returned from London as of 1614, in Horn, Captain John Smith, 1147.
man yt should com and putt [the governor] out of his place...but being mercifull in sparinge his life have degraded him from his Capt: Ship and made him a servnnt to the Collony for Seaven years in qualitie of an Interpriter."¹¹⁴ That Spelman was valuable to the Company officials as an interpreter, but disgraced and worthless to the military hierarchy demonstrates an ironic values schism among leaders between control over boundaries and the profitable possibilities inherent in crossing them.

Interlocutors continued to look out for themselves and forged relationships with local werowances on their own. At least one captive turned interpreter found sanctuary with geographical distance from both Jamestown and Opechancanough. Thomas Savage used the linguistic and political skills honed during his captivity on the western shore to embed himself into formal diplomacy and everyday politics between the Indians and the English. At the invitation of the Laughing King, werowance of the Accawmacks, he chose the Eastern Shore as his base for a plantation and for fur trading. In 1619, the English established their first permanent settlement in the east along Old Plantation Creek near the Laughing King’s district capitol. Savage himself probably consciously chose an advantageous setting for trade, with access to Susquehannock furs by boat and to the Nanticoke or other northern groups by land, but still far south, safe from raids within the Accawmack network of towns. During John Pory’s stay with Savage in the 1620s, Opechancanough sent someone to murder Savage, among other reasons, “because he brought the trade from him to the Easterne shore”—or at least, that is what the Laughing King told him. Because the Laughing King shared the news, the

assassination attempt was unsuccessful.\textsuperscript{115} Pory also wrote of climbing hostilities facing the Accawmacks, “they on the West would invade them, but that they want Boats to crosse the Bay, and so would divers other Nations, were they not protected by us.”\textsuperscript{116}

The Laughing King allowed Englishmen like Savage to carve niches for themselves in the heart of their communities along preexisting communication lines, thus benefiting from trade and avoiding hostility through a friendly English presence. Simultaneously, Savage’s privileged position further undermined Powhatan control over goods and tributary werowances.

The tensions between the Eastern Shore and the core of the Powhatan chiefdom were emblematic of many pressures pushing Opechancanough to plan a massive attack on the English. His most obvious concern was the rapidly growing English population, men and women walking off ships and into tobacco storage houses and cornfields at an accelerated rate. They also attacked Algonquian elites without seeking justice through the chiefdom. Suspected of the murder of a Mr. Morgan when he was seen wearing corresponding to a deceased Englishman, for example, Jack of the Feather was shot to death by angry colonists, who did not ask for the Powhatans’ approval of their punishment. Other Englishmen raided the Patawomecks for corn when they were too slow in supplying it, breaking established trade norms and perhaps pushing others to agree to Opechancanough’s plan.\textsuperscript{117} Further, the Company leaders’

\textsuperscript{115} Smith, \textit{The Generall Historie of Virginia}, 142.


\textsuperscript{117} Helen C. Rountree and Rebecca Seib, \textit{Indians of Southern Maryland} (Baltimore: Maryland Historical Society, 2014), 63.
continued insistence on trading to the north and west of the Powhatans threatened the controlled flow of European goods through the Powhatans while strengthening their enemies.\textsuperscript{118} The Powhatans occupied more of the Chesapeake than the English, but the flow of people, goods, and military encounters were not in Opechancanough’s control. The escalation of violence preceding the 1622 attack should add dimension to colonists’ descriptions of all-out war as a “surprise.”\textsuperscript{119}

Opechancanough brought together an extraordinary number of Powhatan’s tributaries to devise a devastating attack plan. Indians living near western plantations coordinated for weeks but still continued to trade, sleep, and eat amongst Englishmen. However, some events leading up to its execution revealed cracks along Powhatan’s periphery, and based on the same types of relationships that allowed the attack to succeed. Opechancanough failed to convince the Accawmacks to join in the developing plot and instead, the Accawmacks warned the English, strengthening their relationship with Jamestown and the traders on the Eastern Shore at the expense of Opechancanough’s. Individual Indians approached the Englishmen they lived with or visited in an effort to save them. One of Reverend George Thorpe’s English servants, perhaps told by Thorpe’s Indian students living at Berkeley Hundred, warned him of the impending attack and then ran away so as not to die since “his Master out of his good meaning was so void of suspition and full of confidence, they had slaine him, or he


\textsuperscript{119} Helen C. Rountree, \textit{Pocahontas’s People: The Powhatan Indians of Virginia Through Four Centuries} (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1989), 70. Opechancanough was probably already in the final stages of organizing at this juncture, since he pretended to reconcile himself to Jack of the Feathers’s death and moved forward without him.
could or would beleeeue they would hurt him." An Indian of unknown origin named Chauco, who had converted to Christianity, gave a warning that was believed (perhaps because he was a fellow Christian?) but came too late to save the outlying plantations. Tribal, religious, even perhaps familial identities developed through English expansion ran counter to Opechancanough’s goals of Powhatan unity.

In preparation for an all-out war, the Powhatans had little use for their distrusted English emissaries. After fighting broke out on the banks of the Potomac, an Indian recognized Spelman aboard an English boat and told him of an imminent attack, which his villagers had chosen to avoid.120 In perhaps the same episode, Spelman took an informant and a small armed force to a nearby werowance—possibly to the Patawomecks themselves—to verify the story. It was an unfortunate move: "ye kinge in his presence caused the fellowes head to bee cut of & cast into the fire before the said captain, his face (a bad reward to betray him that had given him so faigthfull a warninge)" and according to this account, Spelman was among those killed next day.121

Opechancanough’s attack was foremost a triumph of Algonquians’ localized knowledge and familiarity with the English. On a morning in late March of 1622, otherwise unarmed men bearing meat to trade picked up the nearest farming implements to kill the English—families inside of their homes and servants in the fields, “they well knowing in what places and quarters each of our men were, in regard to their

120 Ibid., 145.

121 Copy of Letter of Peter Arundell to William Canning, April 1623, Earl of Warwick Papers. There is more than one account of the death of Henry Spelman.
daily familiarity, and resort to us for trading and other negotiations.”

At midday “they fell to Work all at once every where, knocking the English unawares on the Head, some with their Hatchets, which they call Tommahuaks, others with the Hows and Axes of the English themselves, shooting at those who escap'd the Reach of their Hands.”

Reverend Thorpe and nine others were killed at his plantation. In addition to murdering 347 Englishmen, the warriors killed farm animals, cut down tobacco and corn, and mutilated the deceased, horrifying the English as “a fresh murder, defacing, dragging, and mangling the dead carkasses into many pieces, and carrying some parts away in derision.”

Opechancanough clearly planned for the long-term by taking some captives, killing men but keeping women alive to bargain with Governor George Sandys for a ceasefire in time to plant the year’s corn.

Governor Sandys bided his time, and perhaps also held hope of retrieving servants who continued to run to Indians regardless of the war. He was also outnumbered, a situation that worsened during the first year of the war as planters ran to the Eastern Shore for safety and many more died of disease. Plus, through their time spent in the forts and on plantations, the Powhatans accumulated “manie peeces besides, with Powder and Shott, and knowing too well how to use them.” The point was, Sandys wrote to England, “how would their weakenes have indured the want of their

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124 Smith, The Generall Historie of Virginia, 151.

125 Copy of Letter of Peter Arundell to William Canning, April 1623, Earl of Warwick Papers.

126 Copy of Letter of Christopher Bishop to Peter Woodal, 1623, "Notes taken out of the Ires, wch came from Virginia in the Abigail and were del. The Comrs. In June 1623," Earl of Warwick Papers.
ablest to have gonne upon the Indians, when out of the whole Collonie wee Could not raise 180 (whereof 80 were onelie fit to carrie buthens) to incounter 1000?"\textsuperscript{127}

Beyond wiping out a quarter of the colony’s population in days, the beginning of this second Anglo-Powhatan War contracted English movement and thereby the English economy. The Indians and the confined English in many ways relived the days of the Starving Time. Trade with the Powhatans was abruptly severed, Opechancanough anticipating and waiting for the desperate movements of the colonists. In letters copied for Company investors in London, one after another the colonists asked for help or rescue. “We are all undone,” moaned Lady Wyatt; William Rowlshy tried to buy his wife a single hen and could not afford one because of inflated prices; Christopher Davison’s servants and crop of corn on the Eastern Shore was spared by the Indians but he had no way to get there. Colonists watched from their windows as Indians slaughtered their cattle in untended fields. Pigs permitted to propagate in the woods remained there, since “we dare scarce stepp out of dores neither for wood nor water.”\textsuperscript{128}

The following death and disorder descended directly from the abrupt population shifts caused by Indian warfare. \textit{The Abigail}, bearing English servants, brought sudden sickness and hunger to a colony already clustered in the familiar environs of James Fort. George Sandys wrote that “the lyveing [are] hardlie able to bury the dead” and continued, “Extreme hath beene the mortalitie of this yeare, wch I am afraid hath double

\textsuperscript{127} Copy of Letter of George Sandys to Sir Samuel Wrote, 28 March 1623, Earl of Warwick Papers.

\textsuperscript{128} “An Abstract of the Ires receaved from Virginia conducing to the discovery of the state of the Colony in or about April 1623,” Earl of Warwick Papers. Kingsbury, ed., \textit{The Virginia Company of London}, vol. 4, 115.
the Number of these wch were massacred.” One contemporary estimated that five hundred to six hundred people succumbed to disease by 1623. Sickness faced colonists inside of the forts and war faced people without, and everyone slowly starved “so that out of nessesitie they must have perished either by the Enemye, or famyne.” Caribbean sailors stopping in to port were stunned by the bizarre combination of anarchy and inaction greeting them: the goods on *The Abigail* were still aboard two weeks after docking, “everie tide being overflowed with water and the trunks readie to bee swallowed.” Sick or healthy, no one could take on a servant and the seamen watched as “passengers out of the Abigaill have died in the streets at James Towne, and so little cared for that they have lien untill the hogs have eaten theyr Corps.”

English servants, like English interpreters, learned that colonial officials and elites had little concern for their welfare, and that they had little control over their location or fate in wartime. English servants bore starvation and abandonment disproportionately. “A pinte of meal must serve 3 dayes,” wrote home Richard Frethorne, who asked for cheese, clothes, and voyage home from his parents and clergyman. He needed clothes since a fellow servant, engaged in a trade for foodstuffs that masters could not supply, stole Frethorne’s cloak and “to his dying hower would not tell mee” where he sold it. These servants also shared meager provisions with captured Indians who were enslaved according to the English traditions of just war—“it was by policie,” says Frethorne—and defended themselves and crops from attack knowing full well any all to

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129 Letter from George Sandys to Sir Miles Sandys, 30 March 1623, Earl of Warwick Papers.

130 Letter from George Sandys to Sir Samuel Sandys, 30 March 1623, Earl of Warwick Papers.

131 John Harvey, "From the Attestations of Divers sufficient and understanding sea men," Earl of Warwick Papers.
“the nighest helpe that Wee have” ten miles away would come too late. Unable to afford care and starving themselves, masters sold their starving servants “like a damme Slave,” said Thomas Atkins of his Master Atkins, who bartered him for a shirt and treated him “so basely.” Henry Briggs wrote, “My master hath sould me & ye rest of my ffellowes” and packed to leave Virginia. Servants were aware they paid the price of English expansion into Indian territory.

The economic effects were devastating on the vast majority of planters who had few to no servants, or who were unfortunate enough to live where Opechancanough’s confederates attacked. William Capps, himself owner of several indentures, pitied the planter without laborers and land to fend off such catastrophe: “Plants gone, that’s 500 waight of Tobacco, yea and what shall this man doe, runne after the Indians? …how will they doe that are fewer? Let them first be Crusht alittle, and then perhaps they will themselves make up the Nomber of their owne safetie.” During the war in 1625, half of the colonists were servants, and half of the servants were owned by ten men. The Second Anglo-Powhatan War, and the dissolution of the economy which followed, transformed the traditional apprenticeship system into a privilege for a few planters, and made Indian, English, and African creole servants liquefiable and moveable assets within English-occupied territory.

132 Copy of Richard Frethorne to parents, Copy of Richard Frethorne to Robert Bateleman, 5 March 1622, Earl of Warwick Papers.

133 “An Abstract of the Ires receaved from Virginia conducing to the discovery of the state of the Colony in or about April 1623,” Earl of Warwick Papers.


The public commentators on the Second Anglo-Powhatan War published long lists of the people and places attacked by Opechancanough’s forces, but did not recognize the conflict as a war between nations. Instead, they dwelled on the relationships between the attackers and the attacked, manifested in the moments and days before spent together at the breakfast table and on the road. They pointed out the “brutish” betrayal of the Indians against their “Benefactors” which would justify a scorched-earth English military campaign, but they also condemned the dead. “Yet were the hearts of the English ever stupid,” said Edward Waterhouse in hindsight.\textsuperscript{136} In William Bullock’s judgment years later, “the English, by reporting trust and confidence in the Indian, gave the opportunity, for it was not the strength of millions could injure them…there is no danger in them, except you give them weapons, and stand still whilst they destroy you.”\textsuperscript{137} In particular, Reverend George Thorpe’s seemingly willful ignorance of the Natives’ ability to make war, the risks of familiarity, and his accommodation of his Indian students, served as a warning to the colonists who came to replace the massacred. “He thought nothing too deare for them, he never denied them any thing” in his efforts to convert them to Christianity, John Smith said.\textsuperscript{138} The obvious solution was a physical separation, an end to Indian children in English households, Indian hunters at English tables, English traders in Indian villages.

Although English leaders in London and at Jamestown called for the extirpation of Indian military strength, traders, interpreters, petty werowances, and runaways still

\textsuperscript{136} Waterhouse, \textit{A declaration of the state of the colony and affaires in Virginia}, 18.

\textsuperscript{137} William Bullock, \textit{Virginia Impartially examined} (London: John Hammond, 1649), 12.

\textsuperscript{138} Smith, \textit{The Generall Historie of Virginia}, 145.
had much to gain from the maintenance of the connections between them. The accounts bemoaning Opechancanough’s attack said little about political and class-based differences between Englishmen that drove them across the borders set up by leadership. Simultaneously, they also downplayed the differences between Indians – except the ones that warned the English of the oncoming massacre. In rejection of diplomacy and a peace that had never existed, they posited that the Indians and the land together were the problem, and expanding English territory meant neutralizing both Indians and the land. “The Countrey is not so good,” Waterhouse confessed, “as the Natives are bad, whose barbrous Savagenesse needs more cultivation then the ground it selfe, being more overspread with incivilitie and treachery, then that with Bryers.” Runaways and interpreters, and Indians who benefited from or welcomed their presence, transgressed borders before and after Opechancanough’s massacre.

Opechancanough experienced success, harnessing tributaries and their relationships with Englishmen to push the Englishmen back to where they first landed. It was proof that Powhatan’s military policy that originally empowered him could succeed in new and challenging times. For the English, George Sandys noted the significance of the “Murders” as a “reformacon.” Many colonists were quick to blame Sandys’s mismanagement of Indian diplomacy and yearned for the time when the Chickahominies and Powhatans paid tribute after the previous Anglo-Powhatan War. But instead of looking to English intimacy with the Indians as the primary cause, Sandys saw the ironies inherent in expanding boundaries while patrolling them: “how is it

139 Waterhouse, A declaration of the state of the colony and affaires in Virginia, 11.

140 George Sandys to Sir Miles Sandys, 30 March 1623, Earl of Warwick Papers.
possible to govern [English] people so dispersed; especially such as for the most part sent over?” On the positive side of the early war, he saw “more Comfort and Securitie, publique Charges more easilie defraied, forces raised with lesse…hazard to the Remaynder” when the survivors of the initial attack returned to the mouth of the James. The Virginia Company’s charter was revoked in 1624, a consequence of an investigation after the initial Indian attack. Although now formally under Whitehall, the elites who engineered the English defense chose to move west again in patterns unchanged by their losses. Their goals instead crystallized by the first two decades of settlement: accumulation of labor and private property, and distance from the Indians whose trade routes and fields they appropriated. Powhatan’s former allies and descendants, on the other hand, worked as they had before to secure their borders and craft alliances for a more secure future.
CHAPTER 4
A SHIFT IN POWER AND BOUNDARIES, 1622-1644

Introduction

Within the first year of war after Opechancanough’s 1622 attack on the English, Potomac River Algonquians took to the water where the English sailors lay sleeping in the presumed safety of their ships. The Indians “woke Mr. Pountis his shallop [small boat] & hewed her too pieces.” Perhaps coming up the river from the bay, they regrouped and “came with 60 canouse to take the unlucky ship the Tyger,” an English transport vessel that had earlier unloaded its second cargo of indentured servants and women intended for Virginia. In 1622, Ralph Hamor was commissioned with the same ship to gather corn by any means necessary—which justified kidnapping the Patawomeck werowance or his son—and the Indians may have recognized the same watercraft months later.¹ The Tyger’s skeleton crew of “4 saylers & some few land men” awoke to somewhere between ten and forty warriors in each of sixty long log dugout canoes, intent on capturing the Englishmen’s vessel by surprise attack. Acting fast and catching a lucky wind, the sailors “whipped up sayles & went faster [than] theyr Canowes & so left her.”² The Englishmen of the Tyger might have been horrified by the swarm of watercraft, but Indian leaders across the Chesapeake had long stockpiled canoes in inlets and marshes, ready to orchestrate offensives like this one.

¹ Wyatt Mss., Virginia Colonial Records Project (hereafter cited as VCRP), Library of Virginia, 40.
² Peter Arundell to William Canning, 15 April, 1623, Earl of Warwick Papers, Albert and Shirley Small Special Collections, University of Virginia (hereafter cited as Earl of Warwick Papers); and John Smith, The Generall Historie of Virginia, New-England, and the Summer Isles (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006), 32. If the warriors were the same who killed Spelman, whose death is referenced in the same letter but not explicitly connected to this event, they may be Piscataways, according to anthropologist Helen Rountree, or Anacostians according to interpreter Henry Fleet quoted in Rebecca Seib and Helen C. Rountree, Indians of Southern Maryland (Baltimore: Maryland Historical Society, 2014), 64.
Such maritime interactions between Indians and transgressive Englishmen highlight the ways in which the boundary claims asserted by the royal governments in Virginia and Maryland proved all too often to benefit boundary transgressors and undermine colonial authority. Although the power of the Powhatan Chiefdom undeniably diminished during the period between 1624 and 1644, individual Algonquians and other Indians found new paths towards advancement and shaped English and Indian migrations in the Chesapeake. Turning our gaze outward to the edges of the Powhatan Chiefdom provides a different Native perspective to shifting borders and power relations of this era.

In the chaos following the 1622 attack and preceding a new war in 1644, communication lines around the Chesapeake Bay and its tributaries were held open by war and trade. Some Algonquians and Englishmen personally profited by harnessing pre-colonial established communication networks, recognizing and turning new borders between peoples to their advantage, and breaking from their roles in their respective governments in doing so. New profits were up for grabs for anyone who would risk navigating greater distances by water, and groups like the English-allied Algonquian Indians on the northern fringe of the Powhatan Chiefdom used the advantages of geography and good diplomacy to provide intelligence and safe escort to outsiders. Historians following the voyages of intrepid English explorers forget, in Andrew Lipman’s words, “that Indians met Europeans as fellow mariners.”

Individual Algonquians and petty chiefs gained influence through an intimate knowledge of the

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Chesapeake’s environs and delicately balanced local political and social connections. In English workboats or Algonquian canoes, these traders, raiders, and diplomats dexterously navigated complicated waters, their presence shaping the Englishman’s view of the world beyond Virginia.

Historians traditionally point to the Second Anglo-Powhatan War, fought from 1622 to 1632, as the beginning of the end for the Powhatan Chiefdom’s hold on the Chesapeake. As Natives lost their grasp on copper exchange and English communication and exploration, English tobacco farmers claimed an important toe-hold in the James River basin, foreshadowing Virginia’s embrace of slavery-driven “tobacco culture” that pushed Native communities farther and farther west.\(^4\) Englishmen also began enslaving Indian men and women for export as punishment after 1622, among many shifts towards a more aggressive and violent approach to pushing Indian populations off of potential farmland.\(^5\) Though the initial 1622 attack destroyed a quarter of the English population and most settlement beyond Jamestown, the English colony survived and even thrived during the resulting decade of war.\(^6\) In 1625, the English settlements held 1300 people; by 1629 there were two thousand settlers and by 1640 there were eight thousand.\(^7\) Meanwhile, Algonquians on the geographical fringes of the Powhatan Chiefdom already flirting with defection found little incentive to openly side

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with the Pamunkey leaders of the assault, and developed separate tactics in response to surrounding violence.

But while the Powhatan Chiefdom waned, some indigenous peoples also gained a foothold in trade and politics in spite or because of these changes after the war ended in the 1630s. The chiefdom certainly unraveled at the edges as the destructive war dragged on and European settlers indeed settled on both sides of the James River between the 1620s and the early 1640s, but Indians maintained power at the local level over travel, trade, and communication before and after the paramountcy of the Powhatans. While Opechancanough’s attempt to curtail English expansion initially succeeded, the Powhatans were unable to fend off continued English raids on the nearest available Powhatan tributaries and their corn supplies into the 1630s. The war also encouraged the English to seek new Indian friends for sustenance and profit, and thus the Patawomecks, their neighbors the Piscataways, and non-Algonquian groups like the Susquehannocks played an increasingly central role in defining boundaries between Englishmen and Indians than did the Powhatans as a group.

In their efforts to make the “wilderness” into familiar English gardens and farms, from the 1630s into the 1640s Virginia government officials erected all sorts of new borders alongside palisades and centralized tobacco storehouses. Echoing these architectural impositions of order, the Assembly constructed a body of law around control of labor and contact with Indians.\(^8\) Indians and nonelite Englishmen flouted these borders easily in the Chesapeake environment. Illegal traders, Indians, and runaways

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\(^8\) William Waller Hening, *The statutes at large; being a collection of all the laws in Virginia, from the session of the legislature, in the year 1619*, vol. 1, (New York: R & W & G Bartow, 1819), 219 (hereafter cited as *Statutes at Large*).
unsurprisingly took to the water, and their adventures in the bay on the ambiguous border between Virginia and the new colony of Maryland are at the center of this chapter. Preexisting Indian politics and connections comprised the foundation upon which these men and women placed their ambitions, drawing together aspirations of freedom from servitude in the Dutch colonies, ascendancy to tribal leadership, or a monopoly on the beaver trade, all acquired illegally and by boat. These Native connections created an intercolonial, shared history of the southern Atlantic coast.

**Transforming Algonquian Warfare, 1622-1632**

English efforts to defeat the Powhatans ran against superior Indian understandings of Chesapeake climate, alternative food sources, and escape routes. The English adapted to Algonquian warfare, but the true reason for their successes was the supply of corn and protection from Algonquians like the Patawomecks who had defected from the Powhatans. Even these alliances were undermined by opportunism on the part of Englishmen, who attacked allied and enemy Indians alike for booty, causing the war to drag on. Englishmen transformed traditional Algonquian seasonal raids into seasonal raids on corn harvests, and traditional captive-taking into a method of coercing allies. Adapting to constantly evolving understandings of Algonquian diplomacy and war began to pay dividends for the English army, which continued to fight within an Indian framework.

Opechancanough’s war against the English forced military officials to think of new strategies while struggling between safeguarding people and property on English-held land, and chasing the enemy into unfamiliar territory. At the beginning of the Anglo-Powhatan War in 1622, the Virginia Company sat on the verge of collapse, and colonists redrew plans to tear the Company away from their dependence upon
Powhatan trade and society. Opechancanough’s forces demolished the outlying settlements, creating a crisis for the Englishmen. “The infinite trade that had in this 4 years of securitie,” said colonial Thomas Martin, “enabled Opukanhanoe to hyer many auxiliaries wch in former times I knowe for want thereof Pohatan was never able to act the Like.” The final governor before the Company’s dissolution in 1624, Sir Francis Wyatt, implemented radical shifts in policy towards consolidating and fortifying the English population to prevent future attack and illicit trade. While he found provisions for refugees, his father advised building palisades and stationing watchdogs to guard (relatively) fireproofed homes with cellars and second-story windows. While others proposed burning Indians’ canoes and boats, one colonist proposed cutting supplies to cripple Powhatan alliances and then subjecting survivors to labor on English plantations. In this iteration, the English strategy required both an army dedicated to “contynuallie harassinge and burneinge all their Townes in winter” and “90 shallopps, that in May, June, July and August may Scoure the Baye and…the Rivers yt are belonginge to Opekankano” to intercept trade and fishing, and avoid “a Tedium Warr.”

The English correctly identified Opechancanough’s amphibious surprise attacks as a weak point, and moved closer to scorched earth policy and slavery as a way to break the Algonquians’ hold on the land.

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9 Thomas Martin, “The manner howe to bringe in the Indians into subjection wthout making an utter extirpation of them together wth the reasons,” 1622, Papers of Sir Julius Caesar, British Museum, VCRP.


11 Martin, VCRP.
English military schemes proved overly ambitious, partly because elite military leaders failed to account for how the Chesapeake environment accelerated the movements of people on both sides. “In Somer time when the corne and weeds are growne high” —up to eight or ten feet tall, according to one estimate—“heer will be much mischief done, as the Attempts of the Indians in these two months of march and Aprill,” future governor John Harvey warned in 1624. Thicker foliage in summer forests provided camouflage, and Indians simply killed people and cattle that spent their days beyond the palisades in clearings for crops and pasture. On the other side, while English destruction of Indian homes and corn was devastating to the Powhatan tribute system, especially for women who produced these goods in the frequently-targeted areas along the James, supplies of tuckahoe in the shallow waters meant that their families would never starve.\footnote{Helen C. Rountree, 
*Pocahontas, Powhatan, Opechancanough: Three Indian Lives Changed by Jamestown* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2005), 217-221.} Indeed, their families, and entire “towns”—in the English experience, stationary and earthbound rather than mobile—proved difficult to find when the Indians dispersed inland in late autumn and early spring to forage. Unable to gain the desired decisive victory by 1624, two years after initial the attack, a bleak Governor John Harvey guessed that the war would drag on for two or three years more.

In fact, the war would continue for eight more years because the Powhatans mitigated damage even as the English adapted to Algonquian patterns of surprise attacks, exchange of captives, and periodic truce-making. With their understanding of the complicated terrain of the Chesapeake, the Algonquians certainly maintained an upper hand over traditional English tactics emphasizing conquering battlefields and
uninhabited areas, executing stealthy attacks and retreats with minimal casualties. Using that same emphasis to gauge their losses, colonists marveled at how Powhatan raiders “utterlie demolished” the two riverside forts of Charles and Henrico, which like many English castles “stood upon high ground their Cliffs being Steepe.”13 When colonists ran for the palisades, Indians promptly burned vacated English homes, literally shrinking the English presence on the landscape to an area primarily on the north side of the James—almost to the original land Powhatan granted them.14 Providing shelter against enemies and undesirable to English farmers, marshes and pocosons also slowed the progress of English expeditions. In perpetual pursuit during the war, the English were perplexed and frustrated at what they viewed as cowardice on the part of the retreating Powhatans, who “flye as so many Hares; much faster then from their tormenting Devill” into the woods.15 Not just Indian knowledge, but English ignorance and demoralization made possible the Algonquians’ low-risk military strategies.

The violence and dearth of trade pushed Algonquians on the Powhatans’ fringes to shift alliances and location. For example, the Appamattucks, a core Powhatan group, moved to the falls of the James after the English destroyed their villages. Accawmack

13 Anonymous, "Answere to the propositions made by the Right Honorable the Lord Chichester for the better selling of the plantation of Virginia," August/September 1623, Earl of Warwick Papers.


15 Edward Waterhouse, A declaration of the state of the colony and affaires in Virginia. : With a relation of the barbarous massacre in the time of peace and league, treacherously executed by the natie infidels upon the English, the 22 of March last. Together with the names of those that were then massacred ; that their lawfull heyres, by this notice given, may take order for the inheriting of their lands and estates in Virginia. And a treatise annexed, written by that learned mathematician Mr. Henry Briggs, of the Northwest passage to the South Sea through the continent of Virginia, and by Fretum Hudson. Also a commemoration of such worthy benefactors as haue contributed their Christian charitie towards the advancement of the colony. And a note of the charges of necessary provisions fit for every man that intends to goe to Virginia (London: G. Eld, 1622), 22.
Indians and their English neighbors on the Eastern Shore shipped corn to English combatants via traders on the Western Shore while avoiding the action themselves. The Patawomecks especially experienced the push and pull of violence and profit during the war. At the start of the conflict, Thomas Martin listed the Patawomecks on the Potomac River as enemies of Powhatan, but soon their towns became fortified English footholds on the Potomac at the northern reaches of Powhatan influence. To gain their alliance in 1622, the English helped the Patawomecks destroy nearby enemies, a raid from which they gained valuable corn supplies for the colony. At the same time, English communication with new Indian suppliers threatened these alliances: acting on a rumor of betrayal and upon no higher authority, Captain Isaac Maddison killed between thirty or forty allied Patawomecks, destroying all the buildup of goodwill. By the next year, the Patawomecks had forgiven the English and took part in their own surprise attack against the core Powhatan group, the Pamunkeys: in the summer of 1623, the Patawomecks invited Pamunkey leadership to a parley at their “neutral” capital, and poisoned them according to an Englishman’s plan. The Patawomecks, like the English, understood that periodic truces and surprise attacks stretched thin the line between a nominal ally and an enemy, and maintaining even frayed relationships with both Powhatans and Englishmen meant surviving and regrouping for the next season of warfare.

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For English elites, war and profit connected on the Chesapeake’s fringes. In 1626, income-starved George Sandys paid an interpreter to seek furs from the Patuxents to the north, never mind that they were enemies of English-allied Patawomecks. He bemoaned Jamestown’s location so near the Powhatans in the wake of the desolation, arguing that the capitol of Virginia should have been built in a more defensible position—against both Native and foreign enemies—across the bay and nearer friendly, trading Natives. English raiders on the Western Shore fought battles for food and booty, which they then sold for inflated prices, using the money from raids to buy land and servants. As historian James Rice writes, “Not coincidentally, every councilor who led a military expedition between 1622 and 1625 ranked among the fifteen colonists controlling the greatest number of servants.” By the time the English destroyed the Pamunkeys’ central corn supply in 1624, (“sufficient to have sustained four thousand men for a twelvemonth”), a new pattern of attack was developing that would further prolong the war. Englishmen and Indians now fought seasonally based on the harvest of corn (once planted, unmovable), a pattern elite Englishmen reinforced as part of the long-term strategy to benefit from Indian agricultural labor.

Interlocutors, captives and captive-taking provided continuity during shifting patterns of war, making parleys and periodic truces necessary for ransoming prisoners.

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20 Copy of Letter from George Sandys to Sir Samuel Sandys, 30 March 1623, Earl of Warwick Papers.


Sandys promised the destruction of the Powhatans to Englishmen at home, but only “after the restitution of their prisoners.” During the initial surprise attack, Algonquians took over a dozen people, including several women, from the plantations, but only a year later “There are none but women in Captivitie with the Indians for the men that they took they put to death.” The Patawomecks captured Henry Fleet, the single survivor who witnessed interpreter Henry Spelman’s death, and he learned the Algonquian language quickly enough to become a translator. Anne Jackson was taken captive in 1622, repatriated, and transported back to England in 1629; others were forced to sell their labor to other colonists to pay off ransoms made to the Powhatans. Some willingly left the English, like a group of Carib Indians from the West Indies who escaped a slave ship in 1627 and made for Native towns. On the other hand, the English effort to take captives was far more opportunistic than diplomatic, facilitating short-term and reactive gains. In 1622 two captured Powhatans provided the whereabouts of missing English prisoners before they were sold into slavery. After the incident when he slayed friendly Patawomecks for booty, Captain Maddison caught the werowance “and his sonne, taken prisoners brought to James Towne, brought home agayne, ransomed,” effectively terrorizing one of only a few allies. During a temporary truce in 1629, the governor sent an Indian man, “who not withstanding wee forebore to kill or punishe,” to

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23 Christopher Bishop to John Woodall, "Notes taken out of the Ires, wch came from Virginia in the Abigail and were del. The Comrs. In June 1623," June 1623, Earl of Warwick Papers.


25 Rountree, Pocahontas, Powhatan, Opechancanough, 223.

26 Richard Frethorne to Robert Bateman, 5 March 1622; Richard Frethorne to parents, March 20, April 2 & 3, 1623, Earl of Warwick Papers.

27 Arundell to Canning, Earl of Warwick Papers.
Opechancanough to negotiate for an end to depredations of livestock.\textsuperscript{28} As the war transformed and lengthened, captive-taking ensured that enemies and temporary allies would come back to the treaty table.

The long war between the Powhatans and the English changed English strategies towards their Algonquian neighbors in many key ways, the most crucial being the individualistic pursuit of profit from war. Simultaneously, people on the fringes who were threatened and enticed by the English developed distinct new strategies, from collaboration to accommodation, and created distinct local relationships between werowances and traders or militia captains. The English were still dependent on maritime networks and Native intelligence for profit and survival even as military leaders sought to sever those connections.

\textbf{Transforming an Algonquian Landscape}

In the English military mind, the permanent destruction of the Powhatans was tied to the transformation and regulation of Powhatan landscapes—but disagreements over English access to Powhatan landscapes caused infighting and inefficiency. The new colonial governor, John Harvey, attempted to create a recognizably English landscape via palisades and orderly settlement, and to stop the war that precipitated fast-paced interactions between English and Indians difficult for colonial government to control. Because wealthy colonists hoped to continue the war for booty, they sought to undermine the new governor and formed alliances based on their antagonism towards him. While Englishmen were barred from interacting with Indians, servants and Indians

\textsuperscript{28} Henry Read McIlwaine, ed., \textit{Minutes of the Council and General Court of Colonial Virginia, 2\textsuperscript{nd} ed.} (Richmond: Virginia State Library, 1979), 198.
transformed new plantations on the periphery into places of subversion through continued interaction and trade.

Harvey, who had reported on the chaos after the initial assault a decade before, worked to harden boundaries between Indians and Englishmen and sought to redirect the flow of goods and people to benefit English combatants. Elected in 1628, the former sea captain ordered thrice-yearly marches, a halt to all peace talks, and corn cultivation undertaken by the colonists themselves.\(^{29}\) The Assembly banned all Indian trade in 1631, and the following year the governor issued a direct order that all merchants "saile directlie to the port of James Citty; and that you unlade no goods nor breake any bulke until you shall come to an anchor there" to halt smuggling.\(^{30}\) All of these changes eroded enterprising colonists’ goodwill towards Harvey, which dissipated altogether after his parley with the Chickahominies and the Pamunkeys to negotiate a stop to the very popular war by 1632.\(^{31}\)

Traders and raiders both developed alliances based on their antagonism towards the new regime. An Indian interpreter, perhaps Patawomeck captive Henry Fleet, started a rumor that Harvey himself benefited from compensation offered by the Indians for over five hundred destroyed hogs.\(^{32}\) Already stretching resources because of an influx of new English immigrants and a crop blight, colonists resented the “dangerous

\(^{29}\) Hening, *Statutes of Virginia*, vol. 1, 141, 152-3.

\(^{30}\) Ibid., 191.


peace” prohibiting them from taking Indian corn and retaliating against property and livestock damage inflicted by Powhatan raiders. Meanwhile, the marches south, wiping Indians settlements from both sides of the James River enabled burgeoning numbers of “inhabitants to cleare the grounds and lands” and plant their own crops.33 For traders looking to make a profit from inflated prices on food, the population rise and the delicate peace justified that the trade should continue despite Harvey’s attempts to shut it down. After all, there were “no meanes left to relieve their wants without transgressing his Commands.”34

While elites profited from the war, their servants developed a separate, miserable experience. Their strategies for survival ran counter to the boundary-making ambitions of their masters. The people building and rebuilding plantations were disproportionately servants, comprising fifty percent of the population by 1625, and life on the periphery was short and hard.35 Out of nine burials at a plantation called Neck-of-Land, no men were older than thirty-five and several were children, with a total average age of 12.5.36 Evidence points to continuing interaction and dependence on Indians to survive, in spite of the law. At Neck-of-Land, primarily occupied by low-status people, evidence of the consumption of deer meat was ubiquitous—but not evidence of processing and butchering, suggesting that these functions were performed off the plantation by

33 Hening, *Statutes of Virginia*, vol. 1, 141. David Hackett Fischer estimates that one thousand people joined the preexisting colonists in 1628, two thousand in 1634-5, and by 1642 there were eight thousand people total in the colony. David Hackett Fischer and James C. Kelly, *Bound Away: Virginia and the Westward Movement* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2000), 41.

34 Captain Mathews to Sir John Wolstenholme, 34.

35 Fischer and Kelly, 26.

someone else.\textsuperscript{37} A palisaded complex owned by Councilman Sandys revealed that the bones of wild game, and especially fish, comprised 78\% of faunal remains—but no fishing gear was found on-site, signifying that perhaps vital proteins were traded in. Copper and glass beads also found on site dated to the Second Anglo-Powhatan War and after, supporting the idea that someone on the plantation hoped to trade with nearby Indians.\textsuperscript{38} Although cattle and tobacco dominated the English Chesapeake landscape, on a local level some people—and perhaps especially servants—persisted in a trade with Indians to survive while they transformed the James River.

The end of the war also allowed Harvey to consolidate a recognizably English landscape very different from Virginia before 1622. He put in place Governor Wyatt’s plans for a much longer palisade, a wall to stretch the length of the lower peninsula. The wall did little for defense since it stopped at the river and rotted in place, but the colony, it seemed, “began to bee of more plenty and Security…the planters then first began to fence their ground, and plant Corne; the few Cattell they had encreased to such numbers that they were able to help their neighbour plantations.”\textsuperscript{39} He and the Council also encouraged settlement to buffer the burgeoning James River plantations against the Powhatans, providing an incentive from 1630 onward “for securing a tract of land called the Forest, bordering on the chief residence of the Pamunkey King, the most dangerous head of the Indian enemy” of “50 acres to all persons the first year and 25

\textsuperscript{37} Ibid., 62. Cow and pig remains, in contrast, showed evidence of on-site processing.

\textsuperscript{38} Seth Mallios, \textit{At the Edge of the Precipice: Frontier Ventures, Jamestown’s Hinterland, and the Archaeology of 44JC802}, (Richmond: Association for the Preservation of Virginia Antiquities, 2000), 58.

the second year, who should venture to seat on south side of the Pamunkey River." In 1634, the General Assembly divided land by the rivers into "shires" with names that mirrored county seats in England; a military lieutenant in each remained responsible for the inhabitants' safety "to take care of the warr against Indians." Archaeology at some plantations also reflects this increasing separation between peoples: a decline in remains from consumed game and Native wares at some outlying tobacco plantations indicates that Powhatans no longer traded foodstuffs in the second quarter of the seventeenth century; instead, the English relied on Dutch shipping for continental goods they could buy on credit when the tobacco economy flourished. Dutch goods, from common tobacco pipes to precious Chinese export porcelain, found in archaeological digs on Virginia plantations demonstrated the growing influence of the Dutch trade.

Meanwhile, across the bay an entirely different set of Anglo-Powhatan exchanges developed. On the Eastern Shore, where the Accawmacks maintained an alliance with the English during the Anglo-Powhatan War, and even sheltered Western Shore Englishmen and interpreters, Algonquians who lived among the English shaped English experience and movements through long-term relationships rather than captive-taking and plundering. Fewer palisades and a bay between the Shore and the conflicts meant more opportunity for interaction. Accawmacks and their English neighbors found themselves as the exceptions to the laws that governed the mainland. In 1629,

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41 Hening, Statutes of Virginia, vol. 1, 224.

Englishmen living in Accawmack territory were called to patrol the western shore for Pamunkey incursions, but not to protect their own plantations, and in 1631, the Assembly prohibited speaking with Indians except on the Eastern Shore. The Accawmacks spread apart rather than clustered their land grants to the English, and the only recorded palisaded Indian town was Tockwogh to the north, a group friendly with but probably not part of the Powhatan chiefdom. Archaeological evidence along Old Plantation Creek indicates that settlers tore down or built atop the place where English palisades once stood only decades before. Unlike their counterparts to the west, Eastern Shore Indians had more to gain from friendly than hostile interaction and constructed their environments accordingly.

The developing landscape on the Eastern Shore affected everyday life much like on the James River, and small, mundane hints also point to the benefits of interaction

43 Hening, Statutes of Virginia, vol. 1, 167. As April Hatfield suggests in Atlantic Virginia, the Accawmacks as a Powhatan people may have played roles as go-betweens on established Indian trade routes for fur traders trading with larger groups, in this case the Susquehannock. April Hatfield, Atlantic Virginia: Intercolonial Relations in the Seventeenth Century (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 24.) Although the Accawmacks may have traded furs to the English as well, anthropologists argue that consistently, larger and more hierarchical groups like the Susquehannock tend to dominate over smaller and more egalitarian groups like the Accawmacks in the European fur trade. For the Accawmacks’ part, the presence of mats, pots, and Indian cabins in English homes suggests a trade in food as well as in land. Stephen Potter, Commoners, Tribute, and Chiefs: the Development of Algonquian Culture in the Potomac Valley (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1993), 198-9.

44 Although the Tockwoghs are proximate to the Accawmacks, Smith recorded in his conversations at Tockwogh that they were close allies with the Susquehannocks in their wars with the Massawomecks, who were conducting destructive raids from the far north. The Susquehannocks then told him that their own nation was "scarce known to Powhatan…and he as little of them," suggesting that the Tockwogh and the Powhatan (or at least the Powhatan of the Western Shore) are unrelated groups. See James F. Pendergast "The Massawomeck: Raiders and Traders into the Chesapeake Bay in the Seventeenth Century," Transactions of the American Philosophical Society 81, no. 2 (1991), 11.

45 Nicholas M. Luccketti, Beverly Straube, and Edward A. Chappell, Archaeology at Arlington: Excavations at the Ancestral Custis Plantation, Northampton County, Virginia (Richmond: Association for the Preservation of Virginia Antiquities, 1999), 14. Luccketti also reports that artifacts associated with martial occupation, namely gun flints, were contained in early-period deposits associated with a slot trench.
between Englishmen and Indians at peace. Edward Bestwick’s probate inventory at the
time of his death, for instance, listed three “Indian bowles,” and his accounts noted that
two other settlers owed him Indian bowls. Anthony Linny, if his house follows the typical
hall-and-parlor style of the seventeenth century, kept four Indian-made reed mats in the
semi-public hall space and one by his bed, some Indian baskets with his tools—outside,
perhaps—and seven Indian bowls near the hearth. Thomas Jolly drowned in a creek
with green beads and peake in his pocket.46 Cooked meals, salted meats, and aid in
travel or in emergencies probably also accompanied Indians to English plantations,
though the convenience and permanency of reusable materials like pots and baskets is
the only remaining evidence of the food and exchange that also took place. The Eastern
Shore Englishmen’s frequent and varied use of the products of Algonquian women like
ceramics and mats, and of their own trade goods valuable to the Accawmacks,
demonstrates continued and easy communication across cultural lines. Without
palisades or pales around either English or Indian towns on the Eastern Shore
Accawmacks contoured settlement patterns and modes of interaction through land
grants and trade. Their interactions demonstrate that as warfare and Powhatan control
diminished, Indian groups and individual Englishmen developed localized relationships
with potential to thwart the intentions behind an English-Indian boundary.

Taking advantage of these intimate relationships and the captive-taking and
border-crossing caused by a decade of war to the west, a new generation of interlopers
carved niches in the fur trade for themselves on the bay. Foremost among them was

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46 Susie M. Ames, ed., County Court Records of Accomack-Northampton, Virginia 1640-1645,
Abstracts Accomack County 1637-1640 (Baltimore: Genealogical Publishing Company, 1961), 100.
Henry Fleet, who by the end of the war owned boats and had the language skills to make partnerships on Native terms. In 1626, a wealthy merchant with New England connections named William Claiborne grabbed an unnamed Native trespasser at a nearby plantation as part of a plan to enslave Native men as guides and interpreters. These men, uninterested in maintaining Indian or English political stability, pitted themselves against each other, their governments, and all but their closest Indian allies in their travels up the bay.

Claiborne, Fleet, and Rumors, 1631-1640

New interlopers interested in the fur trade sought connections via water with Natives on the northern Chesapeake, and many Native people reciprocated their advances while in search of political allies to aid them in their pre-contact disputes. However, the presence of Maryland soldiers and Dutch and Swedish goods gave the Virginians competition. The conflict between Maryland and Virginia centered on an island sold to Virginian William Claiborne by the Susquehannocks, which fell inside of Maryland’s chartered territory. Groups like the Patuxents and Susquehannocks fought one another over Maryland’s presence in the Chesapeake through traders Henry Fleet and Claiborne through both violence and rumor. Ultimately, however, the real winners of the Maryland-Virginia dispute are the Indians, translators, and runaways who took advantage of the fragmented nature of English colonial authority to get better prices, make a power play, or obtain freedom.

Looking to the water instead of lost territories demonstrates how a myriad of Algonquians and Native newcomers maintained power. People on the water absorbed

Indian understandings of Chesapeake rivers as facilitators of connection rather than as natural boundaries, manufacturing more interlocutors from Indian and English contexts. Indians traveling via canoe or pinnace, as historian Joshua Reid states in his study of the Makah people, were empowered “to participate in global networks of exchange, to resist assimilation, and to retain greater autonomy.”\(^48\) New and old connections on the water maintained by Indians contrasted sharply with increasing segmentation and supervision imposed by English colonial borders on land.

Interpreters like Fleet, upon whom the Company depended, and elite adventurers like Claiborne were among the first to sail abroad in search of new connections. Sailing up the bay, Virginian adventurer William Claiborne and interpreter Henry Fleet each maneuvered between Indian and English landscapes through Indian points of contact, pulling on diplomatic ties to gain financial advantage over the other. Just as they had for the colonists inside Jamestown Fort, interpreters’ travels and relationships continued to define the outer bounds of early Virginian society for the English by providing intelligence to the governor and Assembly, and opening new lines of trade for colonists. Carrying the developing English hierarchy along, their servants and guides who traveled with traders and experienced Indian politics alongside them probably gathered intelligence and skills on their own. As mobile merchants who worked between two cultures, interpreters and traders often brought first news from non-English people to Jamestown and collected information on where to settle, what goods were desired by Indians, and where to look for furs. Their intimate knowledge of the Chesapeake’s

periphery helped them strategically establish points of contact hosted by friendly Indian werowances and safe from raiders.

Everyday Indian life was not demonstrably altered by men such as Claiborne and Fleet. The fur trade accounts for only a component of mostly anonymous border-crossings that brought food home, families together, and raids from northern enemies. But the traders’ and Indians’ travels highlight the range of benefits and perils Englishmen presented to elite and nonelite Indians who had ambitions to legitimize their own power, to profit as middlemen and messengers, to gather prestige goods and weapons, and to keep them out of the hands of their enemies.

Indians and traders sustained their relationships by transgressing boundaries, but saw their relationships and transgressions very differently. The work of trading was inseparable from other social and political experiences for Natives. "[T]he exchange of goods is not so easily fenced off into an economic realm," notes Richard White in his history, *The Middle Ground*, "…the fur trade proper is merely an arbitrary selection from a fuller and quite coherent spectrum of exchange that was embedded in particular social relations."49 Although Indians and fur traders fought for control of those social relations and the landscapes that brought them together, the fur trade was grafted atop, rather than disruptive of, these experiences.

While trade goods themselves could be exciting, many peoples along the bay were interested in using the fur trade to shore up defenses against marauding northern

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groups and in gaining diplomatic power over surrounding groups or internal rivals. The fur trade expanded north of the Rappahannock River in the 1630s, encouraging consistent communication between groups like the Massawomecks who were hostile to Algonquians, and enterprising Englishmen like Claiborne and Fleet through Indian middlemen along the Eastern Shore and Potomac Rivers. Fleet estimated in 1631 that five thousand people lived along the Potomac, a large market for European goods. However, archaeology suggests that as English exploration and contact increased north and west of Jamestown, not everyone materially benefitted or chose to engage. Evidence of trade goods is diverse, including folded copper, beads, gun flints, wine, and serving wares from Europe, but is found in smaller amounts along the Potomac and Rappahannock Rivers. While they began to trade beaver pelts and wolves' heads, mats and baskets to the English, much of day-to-day life in the 1630s and 1640s for Algonquians was still conducted with unglazed earthenwares and flint-knapped projectile points. Many of the Algonquians evidently were interested in the political and geographic gain to be had from trade with the English. Chesapeake Algonquians maintained longstanding connections and enmities with fur trading peoples farther afield. Beyond the Anglo-Powhatan Wars, the diplomatic

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52 Stephen Potter, *Commoners, Tribute, and Chiefs*, 165. Disputing James Axtell’s claims in *After Columbus: Essays in the Ethnohistory of Colonial North America* (1988) that European trade goods were relatively unimportant during the early contact period, Potter argues that due to preexisting social hierarchies, European goods were probably buried with high-ranking Indians and are thus hard to find. I would quantify both and add that gifts and payment to Indians like livestock and matchcoats are made of organic material and are unlikely to be glaringly apparent in the archaeological record. James Axtell, *After Columbus: Essays in the Ethnohistory of Colonial North America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).
landscape radically shifted with Massawomeck, Dutch, and Susquehannock migrations nearby. The Massawomecks traveled south by birch bark canoe to raid their Indian enemies and trade with the English, enriching their chosen Indian middlemen who held their furs and escorted the English. After 1624, the Dutch established a series of permanent tiny forts between the Connecticut and Delaware Rivers far to the north of Virginia, but their goods and ships nonetheless flooded the Chesapeake during this period. Dutch merchants settled on the Eastern Shore and connected to shipping interests in New Netherlands; English traders shipped goods from New Netherlands to trade with Indians and colonists; still other lone Dutch traders traveled by river south. New Amsterdam and short-lived New Sweden supplied the Susquehannocks and other Indians with guns in exchange for pelts, empowering them to conduct devastating raids on their traditional southern enemies like the Piscataways and displace Algonquians on the Eastern Shore. Even though many Algonquian werowances on the fringes remained friendly with the English, they still remained vulnerable to outsiders, especially attacks by water.

Virginian traders sailed directly into these complicated geopolitics. By 1631, Claiborne set up his business along a network of islands off the Eastern Shore he intended for trading, defense, and self-sufficiency. Hoping to trade with the Susquehannocks to the north, Claiborne set up “in the Territorie of the

54 Pieter Hovens, “The Netherlands,” *American Indian Quarterly* 17, no.1 (Spring, 1993), 242-4.
Susquehanoughs which Island with other lands adjoining the King of the
Susquehanoughs had given to the said Clayborne." He found the distinct geography of
the island as useful as the Susquehannocks had, for some overlapping and some
distinct reasons. "Not above a league and halfe distant from each other," the islands
had safe docking points, and at least one of island nearby had reliable fresh water.
Servants stocked smaller but habitable Claiborne and Poplar Islands with hogs free to
forage without becoming a nuisance to Claiborne or his crew. At the center of this web
lay Kent Island, the largest patch of land at over thirty square miles. Shaped like a
fishhook and covered in discouraging marshland and shallows, defense-minded settlers
throughout the seventeenth-century built forts and homes to the southeast where "all
along this necke there is not above 3 roode of water betwixt it and the maine land [the
Eastern Shore], and at either end thereof about 3 foote deep when they tyde is out."
Although potential invaders would worry about miring their watercraft in the sand, the
proximity to the Eastern Shore was conducive to trade. The waters were deepest at the
southern tip of the island, good information for captains of English and Dutch vessels.
The Susquehannocks could reach Kent Island in half a day from their main town at the
head of the bay, and make it back home in two days. From Kent Fort, Englishmen
looked over the waters of the Kent Narrows and could see the vegetation and
occasional Algonquian peoples of the Eastern Shore.


58 Cyprian Thorowgood, "A Relation of a Voyage Made by Mr. Cyprian Thorowgood to the Head of the Baye," reproduced in George E. Gifford, Jr., and Marion Tinling, "A Relation of a Voyage to the Head of the Bay," The Historian 20, no. 3 (May 1958), 349.

59 Thorowgood, 349.
Claiborne bought the labor of servants and slaves and took Indian captives. He hoped to make them into interlocutors beholden to him, useful for interpretation, security, and seamanship. They worked in dangerous and isolated conditions even for Virginia, in larger ships where “there wilbe sometimes att least 3 or 400 Indians about the Shallopp…with Axes, Tomahawkes and Bowes and Arrowes with them,” or on smaller “boates to be well maned with at least 6 or 7 men in each of them, else they are in danger to be cutt of by the Indians…the Indians have served others soe.”

In welcoming Claiborne, the Susquehannocks worked side by side with servants, helping the servants clear the ground of brush so that they could construct homes and plant corn as a token of friendship. In at least one case Claiborne sent a servant up the Delaware River with his trading partners to become an interpreter, presumably for the Susquehannocks. Visiting Claiborne’s fort at Kent Island, a Marylander learned of Susquehannock war traditions "from a Negroe which lived among them for to learne the language."

The geography and surrounds of Kent Island literally trapped servants in an Indian landscape, caught in the middle of preexisting Native feuds while far more vulnerable than Claiborne himself. The neighboring Algonquians on the northern Eastern Shore and at the head of the bay no doubt resented that Claiborne and his men enriched the Susquehannocks and brought them south so frequently, and they made their displeasure obvious. Claiborne also complicated matters by withholding weapons.

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60 Ibid., 192-194.
61 Ibid., 234.
62 Thorowgood, 349.
and ammunition from servants, perhaps because he did not trust them but certainly because he did not want Indians to take their munitions. At one point confronted by several dozen Indians at the gates of the fort and trapped inside, the men “cut severall Loope hooles on every side and end of the houses on the said Plantation…to shoot out att” and destroyed the element of surprise for the attackers. An ally Native group had given Claiborne’s people advance notice, a crucial upside to maintaining labor with language skills.63 Ironically, servants with little control over their surroundings made pivotal decisions and gained unprecedented Indian knowledge that upheld the elite English presence on the bay.

Meanwhile, the Anacostian Indians and Henry Fleet built an entirely different beaver trade around the Massawomecks to the north. Fleet understood from his time along the Potomac that the Massawomecks raided seasonally and traded fur for European goods from the French. The Anacostians and the Yeocomocos were willing to provide direction and diplomatic help, leading Fleet to temporary Massawomeck towns, storing skins and carrying English goods upriver.64 Although Fleet had London backers, New England connections, and—unlike Claiborne—the affection and financial backing of Governor Harvey, he lacked human capital. The servants whose labor he rented from planters ran away once off their masters’ plantations, he apparently did not keep Indian captives, and his business partner told Indian middlemen that Fleet was dead so that he could grab the furs for himself.65 His competitive edge was also the source of his

63 Ibid., 200.
64 Rice, Nature and History, 92-96.
problems: Algonquian communication lines along the river, using the water as a route rather than a barrier like Claiborne used the bay. It worked, before the Massawomecks disappeared from the Chesapeake without known cause in 1634. Without them, the exchange broke down. Even with Fleet’s intimate knowledge of the northern Chesapeake and a great European demand for furs, he could not control Native use of the roads that brought the desired products to them.

Each trader harnessed English resources and Indian landscapes in ways that played to their different advantages, but their movements and profits were ultimately circumscribed by much more powerful peoples. Even with wealth like Claiborne’s and knowledge like Fleet’s, no Englishmen could avoid making new enemies with a new alliance, or becoming dependent on new allies for profit.

**Marylanders Enter the Bay**

The foundation of Catholic-friendly Maryland in 1634 north of the Potomac River permanently altered relationships between traders, the Indians, and colonial governments by inaugurating a slow-burning border war that lasted over a century. Their war over space initially focused on rights to the Indian trade, which Virginia traders already understood ignored English borders or legalities. Already, Claiborne and Fleet competed with each other’s and Dutch, French, and Swedish goods for northern furs, and the new colony would no doubt include men eager to make a living like themselves. They and Algonquians saw that the new power on the bay could provide leverage in controlling the flow of outsiders like the Susquehannocks to Kent Island. But Virginia’s Englishmen also came ready to fight people within Maryland’s new borders, having learned that there was often profit in conflict with Indians.
Fears of Indians and religious enemies, and very real Virginian ill will, caused the Marylanders complications and confusion. With his finger on the pulse of investors in the fur trade and news from the colonies, founder Lord Baltimore was deeply suspicious of the Virginians, particularly Claiborne. He also understood that his Catholic sympathies virtually guaranteed a degree of mistrust and hostility from Anglican Virginia towards Maryland colonists. Lord Baltimore commanded the Maryland colonists to skirt English lookouts at Jamestown and Point Comfort in order to avoid trouble with the Virginian government, and instead they were to pick a place to settle that "healthfull and fruitfull, next that it may be easily fortified, and thirdly that it may be convenient for trade both wth the English and savages." 66

The Virginians welcomed them by inducting them into the rumor mill to stoke fear among the Marylanders and Algonquians. The Marylanders stopped in Jamestown against Lord Baltimore’s orders, a mistake that caused the eruption of rumors among the Indians on the Potomac that “6 Spanish ships were a comeing t o destroy them all.” An unknown person told the Piscataways specifically, the most populous group on the Potomac, to prepare for war and spread the word: “the king of Pascatoway had drawne together 500 bowmen, great fires were made by night over all the Country.” 67

Maryland’s Jesuit priest Father Andrew White blamed Claiborne—despite the fact that he had actually tipped them off to the waiting situation. Because it was rumor, he could never be certain.


On the journey up the bay the Marylanders’ much larger ship scooped up “Henrie fleet, and his 3 barkes, who had beene a firebrand to inflame the Indians against us.” Fleet had arrived, he said, to trade, but he negotiated the new home of St. Mary’s City from the Algonquian Yeocomocos, in exchange for Maryland reinforcements against outsider Indian raids (the Yeocomocos were beyond the Powhatan periphery), a deal that an elite like Claiborne would never have had the connections to negotiate. The new alliance pitted the Marylanders against Claiborne, who traded with the Yeocomoco’s enemies the Susquehannocks. Fleet then violated the Marylanders’ newborn sovereignty by trading “with out leave, and got that time above 200 skins” before disappearing within days. Governor Calvert was annoyed but shrugged it off in view of the positive result, “as noble a seat as could be wished, and as good ground as I suppose is in all Europe.” Fleet had gotten away with profiting in Maryland territory and demonstrated the power and utility of his long-lived Indian connections.

For their part, nearby Algonquians treated Maryland and Virginia as two governments under the same king, mirroring their own chiefdoms like those under Powhatan in revealing similar fault lines. As they had during the Anglo-Powhatan Wars, petty chiefs and commoners used these vague boundaries and diplomatic relationships to their advantage at the local level. When an Accawmack man felt in some way responsible for a Marylander’s death, for example, the werowance traveled to the home of Eastern Shore magistrate Obedience Robins to offer a hundred arms’ length of roanoke to right the wrong, a customary negotiation tactic between leaders hoping to avoid violent retribution. Robins refused to take it—he had only heard rumors of a death

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to the north and murders were punished, not paid off—but in storming out he left the Accawmacks’ Laughing King in the same room with a Virginian named Daniel Cugely who accepted the roanoke and kept it for himself. Considering the situation neutralized, the Laughing King returned home and Obedience Robins was left to not only locate a corpse, but reopen an issue considered already resolved by the Indians. It probably bothered the Laughing King very little.

Not just the result of miscommunications, other border encounters furthered communication breakdowns exactly because they occurred at the border. In a similar case on the opposite side of the Maryland-Virginia line, men from enemy Wicomiss and Susquehannock nations came to trade with Virginians at Kent Island at the same time when “one of the Susquehanocks did an Injury to a Wicomesse, whereat some [English] that saw it, did laugh.” The Wicomiss escalated the situation, killing five Susquehannocks, three Englishmen, and some cattle and absconding with trade goods belonging to both groups. The Wicomiss werowance sent messengers from Wicomiss and Patuxent to the governor of Maryland, instead of Virginia, to offer restitution. Pouncing on a chance to assert authority over Claiborne’s trading post, Lord Calvert demanded that the werowance deliver the men responsible, though no Marylanders would know who those men were. The messenger refused on grounds that, “you are heere strangers, and come into our Countrey, you should rather conforme your selves to the Customes of our Countrey, then impose yours upon us,” causing Calvert’s power

69 Ames, *County Court Records of Accomack-Northampton, Virginia, 1632-1640*, 57.

70 “A Relation of Maryland,” in Hall, 88.
Whether accidental or intentional, in both cases the Indians enacted justice, non-elite Algonquian transgressors survived their violent encounters, and the English denied themselves an effective response through insufficient communication across the Potomac River boundary.

Algonquians near St. Mary’s City intentionally used the rumor mill to turn the Marylanders against their new friend Henry Fleet, who had brought old enemies more frequently into the Chesapeake to trade. In their search for reliable allies, Marylanders hoped their Algonquian neighbors would speak honestly about which Virginian to trust. Wannis, tayac or leader of the Piscataways, indeed pointed out in a conference with the Marylanders that “this gentleman of Yawacomico [which the Marylanders now called St. Mary’s] did not knowe Captaine Fleete soe well as wee of Virginia becaus they were lately come.” Wannis, with assent and cajoling from other gathered werowances and great men (“Let it alone.” “Doe you tell it?” “I care not if you tell it.”) finally relented to share a rumor in the presence of Claiborne himself. One of Wannis’s great men revealed that Fleet said Paspahegh men were coming to kill Claiborne, that “that it would bee in vaine for him to runne away any where, for that if hee goe to the Isle of Kent the greate men can fetch him there.” The Paspaheghs, once the closest neighbors of James Fort, had been significantly weakened in the first Anglo-Powhatan War over twenty years before; it seemed more likely that Fleet manufactured a threat to keep Claiborne away from his trading post and Indians. Wannis also revealed to the assembled Marylanders and Claiborne that he was warned to not board Claiborne’s ship because Claiborne would take him captive. Significantly, the great men heard Fleet

\[71\] Ibid., 90.
say these things—maybe—in one of the Piscataway’s villages, demonstrating their people’s centrality in politics and intelligence. Wannis’s trading ally, the werowance of Patuxent, angrily corroborated his account, “when they [the Marylanders] came to speake with Captaine Fleete, all the lyes would redound uppon him and lye uppon him as high as his necke, and at last breake his necke.”72 The great men used consensus amongst themselves to share information and drive a wedge between Fleet and the Marylanders, and to shore up their usefulness to Claiborne and the newcomers.

The assembled Algonquian elites had plenty of reason to hate Fleet for seeking out the Massawomeck raiders as trading partners, but others had reason to hate Claiborne for enriching himself from Susquehannock raiders. Claiborne was also the victim of Indian rumor. When Marylanders first met Claiborne’s servants, they interrogated them about whether Claiborne “had ever practized wth the Indians against them,” since “it had ben very briefe in the Mouthes of the Indians all wayes.”73 The Marylanders remained worried that the Susquehannocks would use their trading routes to stop by St. Mary’s City “to make warre upon us” and they further worried that the Virginians would supply the guns to enable such an attack.74 Algonquians and their new neighbors had cause to fear the same things, and the collective effect of rumors about Claiborne and Fleet was mutual mistrust between the two fledgling colonies.


Although the traders played a central role in how goods shifted power dynamics between Indian groups, non-Algonquians like the Susquehannocks also used the intra-English competition for furs to stoke enmity between Marylanders and Virginians, and to perpetuate the flow of goods across multiple borders. Virginians, Marylanders, and the Dutch brought goods to Indians along the bay, who could then choose with whom they wanted to trade. For example, Claiborne learned when his goods remained unsold that the Susquehannocks desired Dutch cloth rather than finished coats and blankets, and axes rather than hoes, and so he sought to supply the Susquehannocks with Dutch goods.\textsuperscript{75} The edge went to whichever trader could coordinate with backers and merchants from across the Atlantic to get products Indians desired, with very real and personal results. Traders observed Dutch cloth and farming tools among Susquehannock Indians, and Virginians blamed Marylanders because under their noses the Dutch and Swedes “furnished the Indians with powder, shot, and guns, to the great damage and danger of those plantations and of his highness’s subjects.”\textsuperscript{76} When a Maryland fur trader boasted to a Virginian that he had saved him from an Indian attack, the Virginian shot back, “not soe, And againe the Indians told me that it was by means of Capt Claybornes Cloth…it beinge better liked” than the Marylanders’ goods.\textsuperscript{77} The exchange demonstrates the Virginian advantage, but also places Indians, who did the telling and the buying, in control of knowledge and exchange as well as life and death.

\textsuperscript{75} Archives of Maryland, vol. 5, 207.

\textsuperscript{76} “Mr. R.[ichard] Bennet and Mr. S.[amuel] Mathew to secretary Thurloe,” A Collection of the State Papers of John Thurloe, vol. 5 (London: Fletcher Gyles, 1742), 487, Albert and Shirley Small Special Collections Library, University of Virginia.

\textsuperscript{77} “Henry Ewbank’s Account of his Capture,” The Calvert Papers, vol. 1, 148.
For Lord Calvert and Lord Baltimore, borders were central to maintaining authority and order, and Claiborne’s presence on Kent Island—well within the bounds of Maryland provided by the charter—was the central irritation for the fledgling colony. Claiborne, after all, would not suffer in the event of a Susquehannock attack on Maryland soil. At first, they realized they could profit from the Susquehannock trade, and extended the olive branch to Claiborne and his men by offering them continued residence at Kent Island in exchange for acknowledgment of the Marylanders’ authority. Claiborne remained unresponsive. Governor Harvey of Virginia sailed to Maryland’s seat of government at St. Mary’s to mediate an agreement, while rumors swirled again that Claiborne encouraged the Indians to “supplant” Maryland before they “take their Country from them.” Perhaps Claiborne was a provocateur, since “he himself publikely protested that if my lords plantation should surprize or take any of his boates, he would be revenged though he joined with the Indians in a canoa.” But this time, unknown Indians “confessed” this rumor—did they make it up themselves?—and said “the Indians had a purpose to have attempted it, had they not bene dissuaded by one Captayne Fleet [who] is now in good credit wth them.” Although perhaps even the Marylanders and Claiborne were unsure of which Indians they were, these men portrayed Fleet as a valuable ally who diffused a perhaps dangerous, perhaps fictional situation. The Indians, whoever they were, made clear that Claiborne (and by extension, the Susquehannock raider) was the real threat.

78 “Instructions to the Colonists from Lord Baltimore,” in Hall, 19-20.

79 “Extract from a letter of Captain Thomas Yong to Sir Toby Matthew,” in Hall, 54-6.
In an escalating situation on the water, Indian rumor allowed the Marylanders’ scrappy but well-connected outfit to finally outmaneuver Claiborne. In 1635, with the aid of Indians the Marylanders confiscated Claiborne’s ship the Long Taile and everyone on it, in one (Virginian) account “bound his men and cast them into the hold besides beating and hurting them.”\textsuperscript{80} They stranded Claiborne’s crew “without any armes to defend themselves from the natives.” One commander told the crew that Claiborne’s commission “did not any way license the said Capt Clayborn to trade any further than the Ile of Kent” and another said that the commission “was a false Coppie and grounded upon false information.”\textsuperscript{81} Claiborne’s friends “understood with indignation” that the Marylanders “made prize and shared the goods amongst them.” Meanwhile, new rumors began that in retaliation, Claiborne sought out the Marylanders at Claiborne’s old trading posts and did battle while Indians watched. After his own eviction from office, Governor Harvey wrote that Claiborne encouraged the Marylanders to abandon Kent Island and “if those of Maryland condescend not, they intend to supplant them, and to send them home as they have done mee.”\textsuperscript{82}

The Marylanders dealt the death blow to Claiborne’s operation on the basis of another Indian rumor. Two years later in 1637, a dangerous story made its way to St. Mary’s City that the Susquehannocks “intended in the spring following to make warre upon us at St. Maries pretending revenge for our assisting of our neighbors Indians

\textsuperscript{80} Letter to Captain John South, 4 May 1635, VCRP.

\textsuperscript{81} “Thomas Smith’s Account of his Capture,” \textit{The Calvert Papers}, vol. 1, 148.

against them two yeares before (wch we never did though they will needs thinck so).”

Perhaps the Susquehannocks considered the attack on Claiborne an attack on them, or maybe the rumor had dubious origins. Maryland’s governor blamed Thomas Smith, Claiborne’s agent who maintained the Virginians’ presence on Palmer Island at the head of the bay, as the progenitor of the attack. Under the cover of night, a group of thirty or forty men with Maryland’s governor and interpreter Robert Evelyn landed on the south side of Kent Island and approached the fort. A defected Virginian servant from Claiborne’s group let them in: “findeing the gate towa-rds the sea at my comeing fast barred in the inside one of my company beeing acquainted wth the place quickly fouind passage in at an other gate and commeing to the gate wch I was at opened unto me.”

Soon, over a hundred men on Kent Island were declared subjects of Maryland, and Claiborne’s agent Thomas Smith and Claiborne’s brother-in-law John Butler were taken aboard the pinnace as prisoners, charged with treason. To make an example to other interlopers, Smith was drawn and hanged as a pirate—at least in part over a rumor.

Rumors that gained credibility when they came across the border from enemy territory ironically served to strengthen and harden boundaries as Maryland tightened its control on the northern Chesapeake. The beneficiaries of the Virginians’ loss of Kent Island were Catholic traders like newly arrived Kent Island resident Giles Brent, who maintained strong connections to groups like the Piscataways on the Western Shore.


86 Ibid., 88.
Claiborne’s financial backers in England replaced him with the Maryland-friendly Robert Evelyn, who followed Claiborne’s model by sending his son, Mount Joy, to live with the Patawomecks and learn Algonquian to become an interpreter like Fleet had before.\textsuperscript{87} The same year, Calvert lent Fleet a servant and invested in his trade in furs, at least temporarily affirming Fleet’s allegiance to Maryland.\textsuperscript{88} Finally, Claiborne’s former servants benefitted from the exchange in the ownership of their indentures. William Williamson, Philip West, and John Hopson served Robert Evelyn “as they had formerly done the said Claiborne” and were legally released after an additional year of service helping the Marylanders and long before their indentures held by Claiborne would have expired.\textsuperscript{89} The violent end to Virginia’s dominant place in the fur trade taught this spectrum of elites and non-elites that crossing boundaries, particularly from Virginia to Maryland, led to profit and freedom.

Marylanders rushed into Indian politics in the same clumsy way that the Virginians had decades before. They soon found themselves subjected to the same dependence and uncertainty, the same concerns about violence from neighbors and outsiders, that the Virginians had also experienced before. However, their identities as Englishmen at odds with their fellow Englishmen created new possibilities for surrounding Native peoples, and for non-elite Virginians as well.

\textsuperscript{87} Ames, ed., \textit{County Court Records of Accomack-Northampton, Virginia, 1640-1645}, 180.


Appropriating Indian Power on the Border, 1635-1644

For Algonquians and Englishmen learning about their new neighbors, the Marylanders’ growing long-term estrangement from Virginians, created by Indians and the Indian trade, presented opportunities born from miscommunication. With new perceptions of the physical proximity of the border, Englishmen crossed to the opposite side to escape the law or pursue wealth, and Algonquians sought alliances with the English or used the lack of communication between Virginia and Maryland to reassert their own authority. However, what seem like provincial ambitions and local conflicts did not stay at the border. Poor enforcement of colonial boundaries challenged the image and authority of the highest levels of Virginia and Maryland colonial governments and encouraged subversive actions on the part of runaways and Indians. Because of these threats to legitimacy, masters and officials far removed from the Potomac and Kent Island began to worry about how to close the border.

The Marylanders proved to Algonquians that they saw the line between Indians and English differently than did Virginians, and opened new lines of communication through Catholicism. Possession of Kent Island also helped the Marylanders amplify a diplomatic strategy relatively unused by the Virginians: English-Indian relationships founded on religious conversion. Members of the Society of Jesus, beginning with Father Andrew White on the first Maryland voyage, took pains to live with Indians in unfortified villages, learn the diverse Algonquian dialects, and make contact with potential converts on both sides of the Virginia-Maryland border. Beginning in 1639, the Jesuits built missions on the Patuxent River, at the Piscataways’ capital, and perhaps most significantly, on Claiborne’s Kent Island for a combined congregation of Indians
and Englishmen.\textsuperscript{90} The Piscataways and the Patuxents saw the Jesuits primarily as vessels of diplomacy and trade goods and happily met with them as allies. The Patuxent chief Maquacomen built the Jesuits a storehouse in his capitol in 1639 as an incentive to keep the Jesuits in town. By 1642, the Patuxent “queen”—maybe a werowansqua or perhaps a wife of the werowance—and her mother, and the Portobaccos to the west of the Patuxents converted to Catholicism, strengthening alliances with the Marylanders as Susquehannock incursions became more deadly. In return, the Portobaccos provided the Jesuits a safe place from which to proselytize, on the central Portobacco River with access to peoples to the west. It would also be a welcome relief for priests concerned about the Piscataway mission’s safety against Susquehannock aggression from the north.\textsuperscript{91}

The chief of the Piscataway developed the longest and most mutually beneficial relationship with the Jesuits, folding together an emphasis on language, captives, and the importance of space in maintaining alliances. Kittamaquund assassinated his elder brother Wannis to become tayac, creating considerable internal strife.\textsuperscript{92} As leader of the largest group of Algonquians near St. Mary’s City, the Piscataway capital became an obvious place for a mission. Conversing with the priests long enough to become proficient in English, Kittamaquund placated them by paring down to a single wife and announcing he would convert eventually. Perhaps in exchange for the priests’ presence

\textsuperscript{90} Seib and Rountree, 75.

\textsuperscript{91} Ibid., 77-79.

\textsuperscript{92} Ibid., 43.
in his town, he offered the Jesuits his young daughter for a period of seven years to learn English and English customs, a traditional diplomatic exchange.93

The Jesuits also created a radically different environment than the one experienced by Indians at Jamestown, constructing borders between the sacred and profane rather than between Indians and Englishmen. The Jesuits recounted in 1639 that Kittamaquund traveled to St. Mary’s City and accidentally interrupted the execution of an Indian from an unknown Algonquian nation, convicted of murder. The man spoke no English, the execution scene was foreign, and the Jesuits were in the process of making a last-ditch attempt to convert him before his death. Kittamaquund stepped in and explained to the man what the priests tried to communicate, and then in their common language reassured him. Their conversation centered on the appropriate way to die in the execution ritual—the condemned man asked if he should sing, as he would if he were captured by the Susquehannocks in war—and was told by the priests to repeat the names of Jesus and Mary and to make the sign of the cross while he fell, in lieu of something more familiar. Seizing an unexpected opportunity, the Catholics buried his body on consecrated ground and with great care in front of the chief, demonstrating their spiritual alliance by physical closeness.94

The Jesuits believed that because of this incident Kittamaquund finally converted, and his baptism created new opportunities for Englishmen and Indians far beyond St. Mary’s. He took the name Charles—also the name of the English king—and his child in English care, baptized Mary, was around the same age as the Charles I’s


own daughter Mary. Mary went to live with the Brents, a Catholic family then living on Kent Island after the Maryland takeover; a son in the family, Giles Brent, eventually took Mary as his wife. Upon the death of her father around the time of their wedding, Brent made claims to Mary as a leader of the Piscataways and as a property owner on behalf of the nation. His marriage to Mary gave him two unusual opportunities: to take control of Indian land inside of Maryland borders without a proprietary grant, and to negotiate with other Indian groups from the standing of both the Piscataways and the English. Due to the former, the Brents fell from grace in Maryland and relocated to the Virginian side of the Potomac. From there, Giles Brent continued to refer his claim to the “scepter” of the Piscataway. In Mary and Giles Brent’s marriage, Catholicism, Kent Island wealth, and the Maryland-Virginia line on the Potomac came together into an amalgamation of English ideas about inheritance and Native power structures. Traders like the Brents, Claiborne, and Fleet would use interlocutors like Mary and pivot towards Indian land over Indian trade by water as a way to wealth.

Meanwhile, the servants and troublemakers who witnessed (or fell victim to) the shenanigans of men like Claiborne and Fleet also hoped to appropriate Indian networks

95 Ibid., 129-31.

96 Lois Green Carr, “Margaret Brent: A Brief History,” electronic publication by the Maryland State Archives, 1998, msa.maryland.gov, accessed 19 April 2017. Note that Giles Brent’s sister, who remained unmarried, was also named Mary Brent. Here I have tracked Mary from Piscataway references markers of Indian identity i.e., “Indian Brent” or “Mary Kitomaquund Brent.”

97 Rice, Nature and History, 134.

98 “Proceedings of the Council of Maryland, 1671-1681,” Archives of Maryland, vol. 15, ed. William Hand Browne (Baltimore: Maryland Historical Society, 1896), 124. Lois Green Carr, “Margaret Brent: A Brief History,” electronic publication by the Maryland State Archives, 1998. Msa.maryland.gov. Note that Giles Brent’s sister, who remained unmarried, was also named Mary Brent. Here I have tracked Mary from Piscataway references markers of Indian identity i.e., “Indian Brent” or “Mary Kitomaquund Brent.”
and knowledge to find a way out of legal bondage. Runaways, often Chesapeake travelers themselves, found a destination, friends, and a mode of transportation in the multiple cracks between English factions and Indian allies. Additionally, their destinations and modes of transport suggested shared knowledge about trade, transportation, and the periphery of the colony. In 1640, for example, African and English servants working in the southern fringe of the colony across the river from Jamestown grabbed guns and a ship and attempted an escape.99 The man from whom they stole the ship and guns, appointed cape merchant William Pierce, monitored all shipping interests in the bay including the Indian and tobacco trades with the Dutch, to whom the servants hoped to run. That same year, merchant Hugh Gwynn of the Middle Peninsula personally retrieved three of his servants from Maryland, and the Virginia General Court sentenced Gwynn’s “Dutchman,” “Scotsman,” and “a negro named John Punch” to a dangerous thirty lashes apiece to set an example.100 Maryland’s and New Netherland’s perceived proximity also encouraged increasing numbers of men to abscond, leading to drastic efforts to plug the leak. Those not on the northern border were becoming increasingly aware of its proximity.

Fugitives also played on political differences caused in part by the trading rifts, trusting that Maryland and Dutch competitors in the trade would shelter them. While Maryland runaways—even the governor’s own servant, in one case—fled to Virginia, the Jesuits reported that several Virginian servants sold themselves out of Virginia and became good Catholics to the chagrin of Virginian masters. For their part, the Jesuits

99 “Decisions of the General Court,” Virginia Magazine of History and Biography 5, no. 3 (1898), 237.
100 Ibid., 237-8.
were pleased to purchase four more of these and brought them into the Church as well.

Charged with treason for carrying such servants out of the colony to sell, Virginian Daniel Duffield had familiarized himself with the comings and goings of Maryland traders in his earlier work grinding corn for them on Virginia’s Eastern Shore. Hiding out from Virginia authorities, he stole an Indian canoe and disembarked at the nearest Accawmack town, but not quickly enough to avoid detection. Richard Hudson’s dog tracked Duffield to the Marylanders’ ships:

the said Duffeild told [Hudson] that hee would knock him in the head with his Axe, And this deponent seeing Duffield soe desperate told him that hee would shoote him, And the said Duffeild Asked this deponent saying wherefore will you hinder mee, And further [Hudson] saith That Lewis White did carry the said Duffeild on board the Maryland Vessell.101

Entries in Maryland’s archives about Duffield’s treason stop thereafter, suggesting that perhaps another ship carried him to New England or the Caribbean. Such opportunities would come more frequently as the trade in foodstuffs and people between colonies gained speed. Servants, upon whom Duffield’s scheme depended, watched strategies of escape with intensity, and took note of nearby Indians as a potential resource.

As with traders, Indians proved useful middlemen for English servants, and their presence defined the bounds of possibility for escape. William Abram, an enterprising servant in 1638, saw all of that in Eastern Shore Algonquians. Armed with a bolt of cloth and “a booke to learne to speake the Indyan tongue” that he offered to pay for in homemade tobacco pipes, he asked his fellow servants, “wherefore should wee stay here and bee slaves [when we] may goe to another place and live like gentlemen?”

101 Ames, County Court Records of Accomack-Northampton, Virginia 1640-1645, 354.
invited fellow servants “within twoe myles of his Masters house” to seek sanctuary in New Netherland, “for hee speake very good dutch.” Abram’s possessions—cloth and a language dictionary—were the tools of trade and communication in the Algonquian world. He not only assumed that his fellow servants would join him, but also that the Indians would help him in his efforts to escape. Abram’s attempts to escape his condition revealed, and probably solidified, an early class consciousness among servants, who would rather be Dutch than poor Englishmen. Abram also rebuked the darkening line between Englishmen and Indians—surely in part influenced by the intimate local connections with Accawmack Indians nearby and a peaceful lull in Opechancanough’s war against the English. Perhaps nearby Indians had helped others, like Abram’s friend John Neale, who had escaped earlier and returned to convince others to come back with him. Or maybe Abram considered Virginia’s colonial government a shared enemy with the Indians in the moment. Whatever his line of thinking, it required him to imagine himself outside of his cultural identity, beyond his legal status in fragmented Virginian society and the potential dangers of seeking Indian alliances.

In the wake of the Second Anglo-Powhatan War, the conflicts and alliances along the Potomac and the northern Chesapeake challenged the skills and authority of Pamunkey leadership, and of colonial officeholders like John Harvey and Lord Baltimore. While these officials sought to exert authority, the nature of the borders was instead decided by those facing marginalization by elites on all sides: conspirators like

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102 Ames, County Court Records of Accomack-Northampton, Virginia 1632-1640, 120. The Dutch were not obligated to return runaways from Virginia until the “Articles of Amity” were passed in 1660. See Warren Billings, Sir William Berkeley and the Forging of Colonial Virginia (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2004), 121.
Fleet, runaways like Duffield, pretenders like Kittamaquud. They formed no cohesive society but their attempts to cross boundaries for profit or power represented a refutation, rather than a fringe, of the tobacco plantations spreading along the James. Interactions like these brought elite attention to borders as loci of problems caused by Englishmen as well as Indians. While the Maryland-Virginia border hardened along a series of localized conflicts, the Virginian elites, next led by energetic Governor William Berkeley, sought to fend off a second attack from the Powhatan werowance Opechancanough. Afterwards, Virginian elites reached south and west along Algonquian communication lines, negotiating local relationships to trade and patent land as a means to consolidate power, bringing increasingly farther-afield Indians and English non-elites into contact with one another, creating lengthening borders with greater opportunities for transgression.
CHAPTER 5
EXPLORATION, SURVEYING, TRANSFORMATION, 1640-1660

Introduction

In the woods along the Virginia-Carolina border at Brewsters River, the path parted at a pair of enormous trees and split into two semicircles, bowing away from itself symmetrically. Pyancha, an Appamattuck arrived at the parting and waited for a moment before clearing brush away to walk along the west side of the path. A Nottoway man known as Oyeocker arrived next and mirrored him along the path's east side. Virginian planters Edward Bland and Abraham Wood stalled behind them and watched in mystification and imperiously asked for explanation of their actions, "demanding the meaning of it." Pyancha refused to reply and left them behind, but Oyeocker “prepared himselfe in a most serious manner to require our attentions,” according to Bland. He told a story Algonquians knew about a person also familiar to the English. Years before, when Powhatan chief Opechancanough visited the Chowans to the south bearing gifts, a petty werowance “went to salute and embrace the King of Chawan, and stroaking of him after their usuall manner, he whipt a bow string about the King of Chawans neck, and strangled him.” He continued, “in memorial of this,” the friends of the Powhatans—in this case an Appamattuck man—follow the western trail, and the friends of the Chowans—here, a Nottoway—follow the east.\(^1\) Even though in 1650, when Wood accompanied the two Native guides into the hinterlands, the Chowans and Powhatans were no longer the same political units they had been a generation before, and Opechancanough was dead, ritual performed on the landscape

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memorialized shifts in power and place. When Englishmen walked along older paths and through Indian towns in efforts to appropriate them for their own narrative of empire, paths and towns also physically guided and therefore shaped the experiences and actions of Englishmen passing through. For the English, their performance was required, too. But no matter the shifts of power, the Englishmen’s decision to follow Oyeocker clockwise around the tree indicated that Native knowledge and tradition still commanded European obeisance, and they were thus folded into Indian history as friends of these Carolina Indians—albeit with their own interpretations.\(^2\)

Charting the paths of Native and English western migrations and settlements indicates how Native controls over the landscape still engineered the ways in which Englishmen experienced the Chesapeake after 1640. Small and large Anglo-Indian conflicts between 1640 and 1660 continued to change the overland routes and Indian landscapes and to shift more power away from large-scale polities to local werowances and landholders. Although the English fur trade declined during this period, the earlier mariners’ fluid exchanges in the Chesapeake’s riverine environment continued to define relationships between Indians and increasing numbers of newcomers on the coast. As Europeans moved upriver in search of land rights, former Powhatan werowances made temporary alliances with planters, and Algonquian middlemen and guides profited as they used their diplomatic skills to reinforce preexisting relationships and histories. Even as they depended on Indian mobility, Englishmen sought to constrict Indian movement and intelligence to lessen the costs of prolonged Indian wars, runaway servants, and demands for land. Indian leaders were increasingly pushed to fight English fear tactics

and violence along the borders in order to assert control in their territories. Local tensions, questionable English claims to land, and bouts of violence came to characterize relationships on Virginia’s borders.

**The Third Anglo-Powhatan War, 1644-1646**

The first major conflict of this era began when Opechancanough took advantage of religious and political divisions between Englishmen to orchestrate a well-organized attack on peripheral settlements in 1644. In dire financial straits from the war, Virginian planters relied on the new county elites and laborers to provide soldiers and supplies while commanders enslaved Powhatan combatants and sold them abroad for the first time. As the war waged on, opportunists like William Claiborne took advantage of the chaos to restart his military campaign against Maryland for the Indian trade. From these two years of conflict, Englishmen learned that enslavement could defray the cost of Indian removal and that Indian wars provided cover and justification for boundary transgressions. Algonquians, several of whom detribalized, learned to interpret English land laws and treaties in order to maintain autonomy.

Powhatans and English military commanders, and the myriad of people caught between them, adopted new strategies to mitigate the costs of yet another long conflict. Buoyed by knowledge and experience with the Chesapeake maritime network, Natives and Englishmen who started and ended this brief bout of violence recognized that it was larger than the Virginia colony and allowed it to spill over colonial borders and beyond the reach of Virginia’s authorities. The final war between the southern Chesapeake’s two largest powers, the English and the Powhatans, resulted in large-scale demographic and political movement west following the ultimate defeat of Opechancanough’s forces. Although most Englishmen did not profit from the war, some
found the war itself a useful distraction while they took advantage of the growing instability on the border between Maryland and Virginia.

Like his assault twenty years before against Virginia’s nascent settlements beyond James Fort, Opechancanough’s coordinated 1644 attack was a surprise to the English inhabitants. Native population dynamics, carefully catalogued by English writers, seemed to support claims that the colony was prospering. While Opechancanough was planning, William Castell wrote, all of the Chesapeake would yield only three thousand Algonquian warriors total, and only a few hundred of these on the James River where the colonists lived and planted. However, traders and Indians both saw rising tensions on the northern fringe of the Chesapeake and noted the Powhatans’ perfect timing. The English got word that in New Netherland, governor William Kieft’s 1643 massacre of Lenape Natives backfired when neighboring Algonquian peoples united to invade the tiny colony, permanently slowing its growth. From prosecuting hog stealing to murdering the Yeocomocos’ werowance, the relative English newcomers in Maryland proved paranoid and well-armed against the Algonquians they had tried so hard to befriend before. Maryland settlers further tested the limits of friendly relationships with their own Algonquian neighbors by declaring war on their now mutual enemy, the Susquehannocks, in 1642. With tensions high, both English colonial governments attempted to halt the gun trade, punishing colonists who

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sold ammunition, weapons, or any other trade items and entitling colonists to confiscate and keep guns found with an Indian. However, English law did little to stop movement of new weapons from the Dutch and Swedish colonies, and the people attached to them. When in 1643 Virginia planter John Nuttall testified about the death of Maryland sailor Roger Oliver at the hands of an Indian wielding a Dutch knife, he demonstrated how maritime communications irreparably entangled people and goods from far-flung places through escalating violence.

Public conflicts between Englishmen compounded weaknesses obvious to their Indian neighbors. Miscellaneous rumors resurrected fear that profit-minded Virginians would “doe mischife” with the Susquehannocks against the Marylanders. On the plantations, the governor blamed on “too much leniety” shown to previous runaways that inspired new ones, “imbeasling the goods of theire said Maisters in hopes mistaken of the like favors showen to them as to others in theire cases.” When servants continued to seek sanctuary with Indians or in a neighboring colony, even English elites refused to respect English geographical boundaries. Planter Edmund Plowden lost five servants to St. Mary’s City in 1644, and when his call for Governor Calvert’s assistance went unanswered, he took three Marylanders and their boat and goods for himself. These incidents went unpunished on the opposite side of the line and continued to

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6 William Waller Hening, *The statutes at large; being a collection of all the laws in Virginia, from the session of the legislature, in the year 1619*, vol. 1, (New York: R & W & G Bartow, 1819), 255. William Hand Browne, ed., *Archives of Maryland*, vol. 3, (Baltimore: Maryland Historical Society, 1885), 144.

7 *Archives of Maryland*, vol. 4, 210.


weaken the relationships between European governments. Miscommunication and division among Englishmen made the specter of pan-Indian alliances so frightening. However, foremost on every colonist's mind sat the English Civil War, a struggle between loyalists to the crown and the new parliament with Protestant sectarian overtones. Opechancanough “was by some English Informed, that all was under the Sword in England, in their Native Countrey, and such divisions in our Land; That now was his time or never, to roote out all the English.”

Intelligence of events from different corners of the English Atlantic, and their relation with one another, provided Opechancanough with a distinct advantage.

Opechancanough probably did not hope to root out all of the English, but instead “correct the colonists' inappropriate behavior and stay their ceaseless expansion.”

Settlement near the core of the remaining Powhatan Chiefdom groups on the Pamunkey River, “Incroachments made on their Lands by some of [previous governor] Sir John Harvey's Grants,” became the Powhatans’ specific geographic target. On these lands, English settlement increasingly meant restructuring how people traveled and organized local governance. Young and well-educated William Berkeley's new, energetic governance heralded further transformation of the Indian landscape through gentry-governed counties that erased Powhatan districts (“Accomack” renamed


“Northampton”), and matched with newly-constructed prisons and parish churches. More subtle changes, like ordering the construction of bridges and fining Englishmen who borrowed canoes from one another, promised to change the way people and goods had moved across the riverine landscape for centuries. Finally, William Berkeley’s pet project was the diversification of Virginia’s monocultural tobacco economy. He attempted to turn the English gaze towards potential investments in mining under the Powhatans’ feet and to the west past the Appomattox River.

Opechancanough’s 1644 tactics initially mirrored his 1622 strategy, beginning with an attack “which was executed so suddenly on all the Out-settlements, that they cut off almost five hundred Souls.” Like before, his forces consisted of a coalition of core Powhatans like the Pamunkeys and temporarily allied groups like the Chickahominies; once again, many Indian groups on the fringes, the Eastern Shore and Potomac, declined to participate. The Powhatans initially attacked settlements at “the greatest Distance from the Seat of Government [Jamestown], but especially about the Head of York River, where Opochancanough himself lived.” Recognizing that “’twas impossible for him to destroy them at once, without an entire Conquest,” the Powhatans again depended on the isolation of the English plantations to harass inhabitants with little

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14 Hening, *Statutes at Large*, 1: 249, 269.


16 Ibid., 144.
risk.\textsuperscript{17} By “killing all their Cattell [and] destroying in the nights, all their Corne Fields,” the Powhatans drew on the experience of the previous conflict and began another war of attrition with potential assistance from the political troubles in England. The lack of foodstuffs compelled the Assembly to pass a 1645 law “against hoarding and ingrossing” corn to sell for extortionate prices. The Assembly passed all of these measures in an effort to avoid the suffering and division which occurred after the 1622 attack.\textsuperscript{18} Seeing an opportunity to take advantage of hostilities, servants and enslaved Indians and Africans once again ran to the Powhatans.\textsuperscript{19} Since the colonists received all of their weapons and labor from abroad, Opechancanough had reason to hope that “having no supplyes from their own Countrey which could not helpe them” the colonists would be “suddenly Consumed and Famished.”\textsuperscript{20}

The short supply of arms, alongside the destruction of property and the destruction of “divers of our men who travelled negligently,” created tension between colonial authorities and frustrated planters. Planters wanted to destroy the Powhatans and get on with the business of planting, but the war proved costly and highlighted English vulnerabilities. While the 1622 attack led to ten years of sporadic raids and violence, the new governor and his council hoped to quickly end the conflict rather than profit from plunder. But the Powhatans were correct in their assumption that the


\textsuperscript{18} Hening, \textit{Statutes at Large}. 1: 347.


\textsuperscript{20} “Perfect Description of Virginia,” in Force, \textit{Tracts and Other Papers}, 11.
Virginians ran low on ammunition and predictable shipments of supplies, and with few Virginian exports during the war, merchant vessels happily took their wares north to Maryland instead. Berkeley’s secretary Richard Kemp wrote to the governor while campaigning against the Chickahominies in 1645 that his troops came down to a single barrel of powder. If not for a last-minute delivery of shot, “wee must have againe disbanded,” implying that at least some commanders were marching until a lack of powder and ammunition forced them to retire. “The people cryed oute loud for marches,” Kemp said, and the shortage of shot “was not by them considered.”21 Fear, economic concerns, and a dearth of supplies put planters and officials at odds with each other.

Seeing the need to contain the conflict, Berkeley and the Assembly took advantage of the colony’s new county structure to draw the soldiers, money, and supplies for the war from the colonists themselves. After the initial attack, commanders from the counties on the south side of the James were authorized to take supplies from colonial inhabitants and go after the Indians beyond their own counties and on the “frontiers.” Wounded men and horses, lost property, and stolen vessels (and officers’ salaries) were accounted for by the county courts, which levied taxes on householders in whatever amount “they conceive reasonable.”22 To support expanding this militia, all black men and women were deemed tithable, and servants and others could be impressed to fight by the county councils of war.23 Property owners and slaveholders


22 Hening, Statutes at Large, 1: 245, 292.

23 Hening, Statutes at Large, 1: 292.
from the new counties on the south side of the James thus invested labor as well as financial resources into the transformation of Indian landscapes to the south and west.

Yet the English needed to rely on Native peoples in order to win the war. To put plans into action and destroy the Powhatans’ Pamunkey leadership, the English relied upon Indian intelligence of enemy movement through relationships built in the previous decades. After the initial assault in 1644, Opechancanough had strategized for defense rather than attack, and retreated to his seat on the Pamunkey River that he had occupied for two decades. Surrounded by wooded swamps and streams atop low-lying land on the winding river, the Powhatans had picked a prime spot for defense, one of many later coopted by the English. In 1645, Fort Royal’s carpenters set to work nearby when Virginia’s military leaders realized the Native site’s strategic value in drawing the line between Indian and English forces.  

24 English forces also took aim at the “kings owne house” in 1645, sacking Powhatan temples and burning Opechancanough’s fortifications. Captain Ralph Wormeley “brought in one prisoner by the locke to the great joy of the Armye, and was of great Consequence to them in guiding them to their townes and Corne feildes.”

25 By 1646, recognizing “the almost impossibility of a further revenge” against an enemy “lurking up & downe the woods in small numbers,” the General Assembly and governor agreed to send interpreter Henry Fleet by boat to

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24 Based on modern USGS maps and Anthony Langford’s c. 1650 map of the Pamunkey River, I believe this spot to be near the Horseshoe on the Pamunkey River. See, Martha W. McCartney, “The Draft of York River in Virginia: An Artifact of the Seventeenth Century,” *Southeastern Archaeology* 3, no. 2 (Winter 1984); 97-110.

Opechancanough for talks of peace.\textsuperscript{26} Receiving intelligence, perhaps from Fleet, that the werowance had left his island on the Pamunkey, Governor Berkeley himself marched to the falls of the James with mounted troops from the county militias—a tactical advantage the English lacked in their previous conflicts with the Powhatans—and “surprized and took him Prisoner.”\textsuperscript{27} Opechancanough was shot in the back by an Englishman at Jamestown, overcome by Englishmen who harnessed the Indian communication networks which he had helped build and master.

Using intelligence of Powhatan movements, the English series of forts planned in 1645 became the engines of displacement of Natives and at exorbitant cost to county taxpayers. Fort Royal, atop Opechancanough’s seat, was the first costly fort. In exchange for land, Thomas Rolfe, son of John Rolfe and Pocahontas, built Fort James on the Chickahominy River to cut off Native access to plantations on the lower peninsula and to displace Native towns.\textsuperscript{28} To halt Indian fishing and agriculture on the Appomattox River in 1646, the General Assembly ordered Fort Henry built and manned with forty-five paid soldiers.\textsuperscript{29} Active for only four or five years, the earthworks were vital to temporarily disrupting Powhatan networks of food gathering, defense, and communication, but remained part of the public levy for the war for years afterward and a centerpiece of political conflict.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{26} Hening, \textit{Statutes at Large}, 1; 318.
\item \textsuperscript{27} Oldmixon, \textit{British Empire in the Americas}, 374.
\item \textsuperscript{28} Helen C. Rountree, \textit{Pocahontas, Powhatan, Opechancanough: Three Indian Lives Changed by Jamestown} (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2005), 233.
\item \textsuperscript{29} Hening, \textit{Statutes at Large}, 1; 315.
\end{itemize}
Although this final Anglo-Powhatan War financially burdened the average planter, men with preexisting connections to Indian allies—or the fortune to sit at the shifting geographical border between Indian and English at the right time—used the colony’s stretched resources to advance their own positions. In wartime, Henry Fleet found himself once again at the center of diplomatic negotiations and at the head of company of troops, first to treat in Maryland between the Susquehannocks and the Piscataways in 1644, and then with Opechancanough in 1646. Moving between a myriad of different polities and languages, Fleet also negotiated handsome levy-funded salaries, land grants, and trade avenues for himself on both sides of the Potomac. Roger Marshall, a county militia captain who led a charge against the Pamunkey, was rewarded for his service with control of Fort Royal in Opechancanough’s former domain. Other householders no doubt saw that county and colony-level appointees both directed and benefited from the war.

Meanwhile, Virginian traders continued their attack on the northern border with Maryland, taking advantage of diverted attentions during Virginia’s war, Berkeley’s financing of the war, and Maryland’s separate conflict with the Susquehannocks. Pseudo-pirate and Parliamentarian Richard Ingle, an opportunistic tobacco merchant, proved the border between Virginia and Maryland was dangerously unstable. He had previously resisted arrest on the Eastern Shore in 1643 because Captain Francis Yeardley had tried to take him into custody under the king’s name; he “facht’t a Powle Axe and Cuttles or a sworde…saying if you had arrested mee in the King and

30 Browne, Archives of Maryland, 3: 147.
31 Hening, Statutes at Large, 1; 327. "A Description of the Province of New Albion (1648)" in Force, Tracts and Other Papers, 2:6.
Parliaments name I would have obeyed it for so it is now.” He demonstrated how easy it was for elites to avoid punishment so near the border when “in a dominereing way florished his sworde and Comaunded all the Virginians saying gett you all out of my shipp soe weighed Anchor and went upp to Maryland.”32 During the war, Ingle returned to (Catholic) Maryland in 1645 on a craft splendidly named the *Reformation*. His invasion was joined by “some revolters, protestants, assisted by 50 plunder[ing] Virginians” who opportunistically stole cattle and booty from burning Catholic homes and plantations.33 Soon after, William Claiborne, accompanied by paid Virginian troops, allied with Ingle to retake the Susquehannock trading post at Kent Island he had lost a decade before, against Governor Berkeley’s wishes.34 Ingle’s politically- and religiously-motivated attack against the Catholic Marylanders triggered a rush of colonists who saw opportunity in Indian war and border instability.

The invasion brought the two colonial governments together to restore order. With the blessing of both Maryland governor Calvert—who had fled to Virginia—and Berkeley, Captain Edward Hill left for Maryland to retrieve the Virginians and restore order.35 Hailed by plundering Virginians and Maryland’s Protestants as a potential new leader, Hill instead declared himself governor of Maryland. He attempted to intimidate Maryland leadership, “menacing us wth dangers & feares” until he left for Virginia to sue

32 Ames, *County Court Records of Accomack-Northampton*, 301.
for his governor’s salary from afar.\textsuperscript{36} For years, the Marylanders lived with the possibility that Hill would come back with reinforcements from Chicacoan, a nearby Virginian settlement recently settled by many angry Marylanders from both sides of the conflict. Restored governor Thomas Greene called the bluff of the “disturbers” in a letter to Hill: “And for yor good therefore, what ever wee heare to the contrary, wee wish you shall be none of them.”\textsuperscript{37} Using the Indians and religious conflict as justifications, these men further confused the lines between the colonies, undermined the already tenuous authority of both governments, and left a lasting legacy of mutual mistrust.

Few Native peoples benefited from the final Anglo-Powhatan war. For people on the southern rim of the Chesapeake most affected by the county militia campaigns and English settlement, the war caused unprecedented migrations that pulled Algonquians into other trading and political realms. The migrations made it ultimately difficult to construct and reconstruct alliances and chiefdoms in the central Chesapeake. The Nansemonds, who went to war with the Virginians in 1646, split in two, one group leaving for Blackwater Swamp south of the colony and another converting to Christianity and staying within the Virginia colony’s orbit.\textsuperscript{38} These Christian Nansemonds ultimately retreated to the impenetrable Great Dismal Swamp south of the colony, where after around 1660 archaeology shows they were joined by escaped servants and slaves

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{36}Browne, \textit{Archives of Maryland}, 4: 324.

\textsuperscript{37}Ibid, 315.

\end{footnotes}
The Nansemonds of the Blackwater were joined by their old enemies the Weyanokes, formerly at the epicenter of the Powhatan Chiefdom along the James River. The Weyanokes moved south to the Roanoke River during the war “for fear of ye Resentment of ye English,” and killed messengers from the Powhatans who came to retrieve them. Instead, they allied with the nearby Tuscarora, who allowed them to live near their large trading towns. Far more difficult to track than groups who split or moved as a unit, new bonds formed among groups that faced land loss, like the Wicomocos and Chicacoans forced onto a reservation together in the 1650s. Finally, Indians with no tribal affiliations or titles listed in records applied for and received land grants, suggesting that a number of Indians lived apart from their kinship networks after the war.

A second, more ominous migration of Indians helped the English ultimately defray the cost of the war. English slavers sent Indians over the age of eleven to an unknown “Western Island”; elites like Edward Hill used shipping connections to sell Indians in Maryland, while ordinary planters like Thomas Smallcomb, stationed at Fort Royall, sold Indians overland to James River planters like Governor Berkeley. Though


40 Philip Ludwell, “The Examination of Nick Majr. & Sevll other of ye old men of ye Meherrin Indians,” Lee Family Papers, 1638-1867, Section 66, Virginia Historical Society, Richmond, VA.


never large nor dependable, the trade in Indian slaves made future costly wars seem tenable in Virginia. In historian Michael Guasco’s words, “Indian slavery may have been valued less at this time for its ability to provide laborers and more for its ability to facilitate Anglo-American colonialism.” Their sale could help pay for wars after the fact, and hasten the depopulation and destabilization of Native towns and polities. Englishmen and Indians both continued the practice after the war; in 1652, the Assembly put in place laws to restrict Englishmen from selling Indian children entrusted to their care and to stop Indians from buying or stealing the children of other families or nations. Planters and soldiers ultimately profited from scattering their enemies into the wind through violence, labor, and land grabs.

Concluding the war, the Treaty of 1646 between the English and Powhatans put in place barriers between English plantations and Indian villages that acknowledged the ways they were illicitly intertwined. The agreement positioned the English to control communication and expansion in the future. Opechancanough’s successor Necotowance was to return “all such negroes and guns as are yet remaining” with him and any that might come his way in the future, emphasizing the English designation of Africans as property. The English also realized how mobile that property had become. Stipulations about the return of any Indian prisoners and servants that “shall hereafter run away” anticipated that Indians and servants would escape from the English in the coming years. However, the nature of more formal communication had turned to the

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advantage of the English. In lieu of using Powhatan’s necklace as a passport for the English coming into Powhatan places, Necotowance’s men would use an English object, a matchcoat or badge of “striped stuff,” to deliver messages into English territory. Necotowance agreed to travel to Jamestown to pay tribute and promised that his messengers would repair to Fort Henry on the Appomattox River to trade or communicate with the English. Most importantly, the treaty established that the area between the York and James Rivers through the falls belonged to the English. Unlike the palisades marking an end to the previous war, the new line would unofficially move with the English as they broke the treaty’s terms and settled beyond these boundaries.  

The treaty was also unenforceable on the Powhatans’ side since Necotowance’s power over Indian districts, goods, and intelligence was diluted by the scattering of tribes. Necotowance found it difficult to control Algonquian movement as a weakened head of state. Berkeley was even forced to hire bodyguards to protect against assassination attempts perpetrated by Indians who continued the resistance. In terms of more mundane trespasses, Necotowance complained, “My countrymen tell me I am a liar when I tell them the English will kill you if you goe into their bounds.” One of the same militia captains who invaded Kent Island during the war “made him no liar when lately he killed three Indians without badge encroaching.” Runaway servants, enslaved peoples, and Indians, however, could expect consequences for illegal activity from petty werowances rather than from the primary Native leader who had signed the treaty. With


Opechancanough, the hope that the English might be (even violently) incorporated into the Powhatans’ landscape died.

But without him, werowances and Indian men and women had independent bargaining power. Necotowance relayed to Governor Berkeley information about non-Powhatan peoples to the south and west: his knowledge and diplomatic skills—and those of Indian traders’ servants—proved necessary for the development of a second and hopefully more lucrative fur trade. Simultaneously, the English population patterns began to shift: from eight thousand colonists in 1640, their number swelled to fourteen thousand by 1653. Growth after 1653 intensified in the north Chesapeake, and especially near the Potomac River, which travelers noted was “on either side, in regard of the commodiousnesse, and pleasantnesse of the soyle much inhabited” by Native peoples. To the north on the Potomac and across the bay on the Eastern Shore, Indian leaders worked to develop localized and personal networks with growing numbers of Englishmen, gathering useful intelligence of their own.

**New Trades**

The Native groups who migrated to the south and west of Jamestown after the final Anglo-Powhatan War were then in an opportune position to curate the English experience of trade and discovery along long-established overland routes. In the southern Chesapeake in particular, parties of Appamattucks and English planters from the falls of the James traveled west to infiltrate the Tuscarora and Occaneechee trade, impossible without pre-contact Appamattucks routes to non-Algonquian towns.

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Native interlocutors were intentionally selective with the intelligence that they offered to Virginian traders, who the Indians understood sought trade, military alliance, and land. These early relationships and travels cultivated the alliance between Virginia’s tributary Indians and the colony through Virginians’ incorporation into the Indian landscape. Abraham Wood’s 1650 expedition south demonstrates how Indian movements facilitated or thwarted the English presence in the trade, and how Indians and Englishmen in the trade reinterpreted and reconfigured the landscape and its history together.

Abraham Wood was one of several planters enriched through proximity to Indians during the Anglo-Powhatan Wars before taking the helm of early exploration south and west of the James River. In 1653, the General Assembly gave Henry Fleet, William Claiborne, and Abraham Wood the exclusive privilege of both trading and patenting land “in places where no English ever have bin and discovered.”50 These three landowners and traders were chosen because of their extensive contact with Indian peoples. Henry Fleet, lifelong interpreter and trader, proved himself—if sometimes untrustworthy—capable in a myriad of delicate situations involving Natives and Englishmen. Established elite William Claiborne had since lost the outpost at Kent Island once again, and like Fleet played a critical and lucrative role in the campaigns against the Powhatans that had opened these new lands to settlement. Abraham Wood bought and controlled Virginia’s outpost at Fort Henry on the Appomattox River, the treaty-defined point of contact between Englishmen and Algonquians. Although he began life in Virginia as an indentured servant, after the war with Opechancanough

50 Hening, Statutes at Large, 1: 377.
caused the establishment of the fort system, Wood capitalized on the flow of Indian goods and communications rerouted through his plantation.\textsuperscript{51} Wood was like Fleet and Claiborne: both a planter and trader, he invested in expeditions beyond the colony as a means to patent land and establish trade connections to the west.

Indian middlemen were also in search of trade and gain, enabling Englishmen to habitually plunge themselves southwest into a diverse cultural landscape and an outright hostile Native environment. Coalescing preexisting alliances and what James Merrell refers to as the “principle of least effort,” the Iroquoian-speaking Nottoways and Meherrins, and newcomers like the Nansemonds and Weyanokes bordering the Iroquois-allied Tuscarora to the west maintained a tense balance of power that could shift with a new English trade.

On the most basic level, the English needed assistance navigating new geography. Unlike in the parklike environs to the north, the southern Chesapeake and hillier areas west proved a physical and navigational challenge. Anglican minister James Blair later wrote that a guide was necessary to enter the nebulous area between Carolina and Virginia because “there is no possibility for a stranger to find his road in that country, for if he once goes astray (it being such a desert country) it is a great hazard if he ever finds his road again.”\textsuperscript{52} The southern Chesapeake’s riverine environment proved an inconvenience, but colonists were even more concerned with the disorienting, impassible swamps and pocosons. Their very proximity made


to Agues, as those who are so seated in England." The settlements grafted atop these challenges promised to be equally difficult to navigate. Most rivers were fordable only at hubs controlled by Indians, and those few settlers who ran boats across often refused to take visitors with them. These early guides and their travels shaped English overtures to western groups like the Tuscaroras as well as English observations of the life on the interior.

The routes to promising trading connections with populous and powerful groups like the Occaneechees and the Tuscaroras were complicated by pre- and post-contact migrations and shifts in power. Fleet and Claiborne indeed patented huge swaths of land on the modern-day Carolina-Virginia border, but Wood used his connections to neighboring Indians, the Appamattucks, to plan expeditions south. A core district of the Powhatan Chiefdom before contact, the Appamattucks had provided access to distant and valuable goods for Powhatan via preexisting trade routes that ran through their towns. After they began appropriating Appamattuck land by 1619, the English decimated most of their villages in 1623 during the Second Anglo-Powhatan War. Remaining residents moved west of Fort Henry sometime after 1623, and gained Wood as a new neighbor when the fort was sold to him in 1646. They took their trade connections with them as they moved, and in 1650 a Nottoway guide named Pyancha

55 Rountree, Pocahontas, Powhatan, Opechancanough, 43, 199, 221.
agreed to lead Wood’s men along these old routes. Wood’s local relationships granted him a leg up in exploration into the distant south.

Guides Oyeocker and Pyancha were uniquely suited for the work because trade routes and diplomacy connected them personally among these far-flung groups even before regional instability accelerated Indian movement. Pyancha took the travelers through the major Indian towns to the south belonging to the Nottoway and Meherrin, a polite and diplomatic effort to make the Englishmen’s presence known to the headmen in these territories. There, a Nottoway king named Chounterounte discouraged the Englishmen, warning them that the weather and path on the way to the Tuscaroras would be rough. The Nottoways probably hoped to avoid an alliance between the marauding and populous Tuscaroras and the English. Pynacha himself facilitated meetings in the language and customs of the Meherrin and Nottoway tribes almost a hundred miles south of where his group lived at Fort Henry. He received intelligence about a forthcoming Meherrin attack from “a woman that was his Sweet-heart” living in Meherrin town, and when a Meherrin man claiming to be a werowance presented himself to the Englishmen, Pyancha turned him away and using his knowledge of alternative travel routes steered the group towards safety.57

Migration of formerly allied groups also caused conflict and reconfigurations of old relationships. Pyancha may have intentionally missed a visit to the Appamattucks’ former allies the Weyanokes, who had settled temporarily between the Meherrin and Chowan Rivers with the permission of the Tuscaroras. The Weyanoke took over the fallow fields of previous Indian occupants, but relationships with neighbors appeared to

wilt over only a few short years: the Weyanokes built fortifications, relied on tuckahoe in nearby swamps for subsistence rather than agriculture, and quickly depleted their stocks of even wild plants.\(^5\) They had little to gain from trade as residents of the Nottoway-Meherrin sphere of influence and much land to lose from contact with English surveyors. The Weyanokes therefore attempted to sabotage Wood’s mission by sending runners along the route ahead of the English to spread a rumor that the English had come to kill them. Wood sent his own runners, but ominously found again and again that “our Runner had not beene where we had sent him.”\(^5\) The Weyanokes’ actions, certainly altering their relationship with the visiting Appamattuck guide, were themselves guided by previous English displacement of Native peoples.

In anticipation of expansion, the Virginia colony had no southern border—but without an enforceable boundary, Wood’s exclusive license to explore and trade meant little. At every turn, he saw European movement along Indian routes that potentially subverted his own ambitions. Though he told potential Indian trading partners that he only visited to track down a long-lost English woman, the Nottoway insisted that an Englishman from near Fort Henry had come among them to trade “Bells, and other petty truck,” a challenge to Wood’s ownership of the trade originating at his back door. Meanwhile, the Indians reported another non-Indian trading among the Tuscarora; someone had beaten Wood to his potential untapped market. He wrote a note in

\(^5\) Virginia archaeologist Lewis Binford writes that the Weyanokes, more so than their neighbors the Nottoways and Meherrins, appreciated English material culture, trade, and farming practices, going as far as to plant orchards and build English homes despite their frequent moves. Lewis R. Binford, “An Ethnohistory of the Nottoway, Meherrin and Weanock Indians of Southeastern Virginia,” *Ethnohistory* 14, no. 3/4 (1967): 157.

"English, Latine, Spanish, French, and Dutch" to deliver to the Tuscarora town where the European man was reported, and asked the Tuscarora headman to visit his party at the Meherrin Town. The Tuscarora headman never came, and almost certainly no European received his letter. Wood and his party faced more disappointment and limitation in exploration, diplomacy, and trade than discovery in the west.

Traveling from a fort symbolizing English ascendancy into a diverse and indecipherable landscape, the English explorers depended on Indian knowledge to interpret and claim ownership of these foreign places. The Englishmen's attempts to understand the Indian landscape created effects on English understandings outlasting the expedition. For example, Wood expedition member Edward Bland renamed the Nottoway River and Nottoway Indians “Blandina” after himself, but in naming both “Blandina,” he inadvertently tied the name of the people to the name of their home like the Algonquians would. The English did find places where English and Indian understandings seemed to overlap. For example, “the old fields of Manks Nassoneicks” named for a group that had since moved west along the James, were a suitable day's distance from the Appamattucks' territory and Fort Henry, making them an important named camping site for traders in 1650 and into the eighteenth century. “Manks Nassoneicks” was gradually bastardized to “Moncks' Neck,” a reference to a neck of land and Carolina Proprietor George Monck; both names implied possession in Algonquian and English languages. Bland named a patch of woods “Farmers Chase”

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when his servant Robert Farmer chased Nottoway women and children into the woods, his “hallow” misinterpreted as a sign of aggression. Only knowledge of Indian history and behavior made possible the transformation of the landscape and a linguistic transfer of ownership from Indian to English, at least to the English explorers.

Understanding often went beyond linguistics and into Native history. While guiding the Englishmen, Oyeocker paused to reflect at “a place of severall great heapes of bones” and told Wood and his companions “that at this place Appachancano one morning with 400. men treacherously slew 240. of the Blandina [read: Nottoway] River Indians in revenge of three great men slaine by them.” Intrigued by the story, together the Englishmen named the ossuary Golgotha. It was a reference to the place in Jerusalem where Christ was crucified, but more generally a name for a site of suffering, sacrifice, and burial. Christianizing a Nottoway landmark is, of course, colonization at work. Bland neither remembered whatever Siouan or Algonquian phrase now lost to history referred to this place, nor replaced it with another dislocating “Blandina” marker of colonization. Bland found his bearings through a fundamentally foreign, non-Christian landmark and in doing so acknowledged his surroundings as imbued with history and gravity. Both the Englishmen and Nottoways, after all, had lost great numbers to the same foe.

English explorers in the mid-seventeenth century not only sought knowledge of where Indians and Europeans then lived, but where they had traveled and resided before. Excursions like Wood’s were crucial to the expansion and legitimacy of the

colony: claiming new territory, gathering intelligence on rival European powers, and developing new land and new markets for English goods among Indians. Ironically, during this period the trade routes and alliances desired by Englishmen only produced threats and rumors which worked to heighten English insecurities about their tenuous claims to the region. As long as Algonquians controlled such knowledge and travel, English traders moved through this uncharted territory unsure of their place and dependent on their hosts and guides for survival. Western exploration further demonstrates the extent of Virginia’s dependence on Indian knowledge and the integral part that Indians played in the English remaking of the Chesapeake landscape.

**Trading for Land**

In the northern Chesapeake, werowances and commoners made individual alliances to avoid conflict and gather intelligence on English goings-ons. Like Pyancha and the Appamattucks to the south, for a brief time these Algonquians created localized relationships with Englishmen and channeled English migrations along Indian routes through pre-contact patterns of hospitality, land use, and trade. Individual werowances developed strong relationships with nearby planters and traders that avoided violent encounters and provided Indians intelligence on English goings-on and movement. Simultaneously, they showed up in court to secure land rights through litigation and legal documents like wills. Surveyors threatened this system by forcing conflicts in which Indians were displaced and then benefiting from surveying Indian land for themselves and political allies. Indians not only understood the surveyors’ ambitions but went through English channels to safeguard possessions and enforce their own boundaries against encroaching Englishmen. Finally, Indian proximity played a key role in orchestrating the servant’s experience and movement across the landscape as well,
albeit in different ways. Virginia’s servant class respected the boundaries of neither Englishmen nor Indians, and escape attempts and other illicit activities threatened the profits planters hoped for on their new land claims. As familiar presences and as outsiders, Indians habitually undercut the ability of household mistresses and masters to control their labor and police the boundaries of their plantations.

The incredible travels of Colonel Henry Norwood, a member of English parliament shipwrecked in America, perfectly demonstrates how Indian communication networks incorporated newcomers and established English friends on the Eastern Shore.64 The crew of the Virginia Merchant had abandoned Norwood among other sick passengers during the night, and the survivors had no idea on which beach they lay stranded—on Assateague, an island off the coast of Maryland. They had already resorted to cannibalizing four passengers too sick to last through the January nights, and they fired weapons into the air hoping to attract attention. Native Assateague fishermen visited the island in their canoes—perhaps just by chance, since in 1650 musket fire aimed at waterfowl was not unusual in daylight—and found the survivors. Armed with knowledge from “Mr. [John] Smith’s travels,” Norwood instructed his fellow surviving castaways to “please them with such trivial presents as they love to deal in,” to meet them “unarm’d,” and to smile; they “hate to see a melancholy face.”65

As they did for many immigrants to Virginia in the seventeenth century, these Eastern Shore Indians arrived prepared to orient Colonel Norwood to the Chesapeake


through a long series of symbolic exchanges. After returning to town to discuss the
discovery and an appropriate response (the wait was long; “we thought our selves
forgotten by them”), the next afternoon the same fishermen returned with dozens of
people, entire families who wasted little time settling into familiar roles with the
Englishmen. In Algonquian, Norwood and the Indians exchanged “many salutations and
Ny Tops” all around and Indian women dispensed generous portions of Indian food, a
time-tested welcome as well as a necessity. Male Indian authorities addressed Norwood
as the party’s leader, “being of largest dimensions, and equip’d in a camlet coat.”
Chesapeake Indians had routinely exchanged fur and food for English and Dutch cloth;
they likely recognized the silver and gold lace on Norwood’s chest as a prestige item
unavailable to most Englishmen and Indians alike.\textsuperscript{66} The trade of food and clothing,
objects so intimately tied to survival, accentuated the interdependency that Eastern
Shore Algonquians carefully cultivated.

The Indians on Assateague happily drew English gratitude with food, but
maintained careful control over where they went and what they saw. With enough to eat
already, the Indians were far more interested in information about the English situation
than in English stuffs. Which was their “country?” How did they reach shore without a
boat? And, would they come to meet the werowansqua and werowance, in Norwood’s
words the “queen” and “king”? Friendly but suspicious, the families hid an extra canoe in
the marsh and agreed to take the English to their town, Kickotank, only after the English
supplied satisfactory answers over several days. Norwood was delivered to Dutch
native and Indian trader Jenkin Price minus a pair of tweezers and his coat (“he was the

\textsuperscript{66} Norwood, “A Voyage to Virginia,” 29.
first king I could call to mind that had ever shew'd any inclinations to wear my old cloaths"). Price’s hope in communicating with the Algonquians that day was “to trade for furs, and no more,” but he found Norwood unexpectedly shoved upon him, heralded by an Indian courier dispatched to his home. The Algonquians expected Price to translate to the werowance the circumstances of Norwood’s visit, and to take the exhausted Norwood back with him. Despite the unusual conditions surrounding Norwood’s visit, the Algonquians from Assateague conducted diplomacy developed over decades, replete with impressive food offerings and constant control over the visitors’ experience. Perhaps they were too accommodating and friendly for the Englishmen to notice that they were, to a degree, prisoners.

Even on the way to Price’s house, the “angel” Indians guided the way and took charge of Norwood’s first impressions of the Eastern Shore beyond Kickotank. Jack, an English-speaking pilot for Price, was determined to deal Norwood a guided tour of the chiefdom. Despite his place as neighbor and a trader of European goods, Price evidently had little choice, either. Demonstrating the expanse and largess of “a mighty nation we were in that country,” against Norwood’s wishes Jack stopped for the night at the Gingaskin village, the next large Indian settlement, so that the party could meet with the werowance and trade with villagers. He next planned to “call at his aunt’s town, the queen of Pomumkin.” It would have been a convenient place for Jack to overawe his visitor with Indian political power and his consanguine ties to it, a scene Norwood might recognize from Smith’s travels among Algonquians forty years before. 

Fortunately for

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67Because the Pamunkey lived on the Western Shore, his “aunt” may have been a wife of Totopotomoi, the reigning werowance of the Pamunkeys that had, within living memory, led the Powhatan Empire. Before the Anglo-Powhatan War of 1644, paramount chiefs like Powhatan himself often kept wives at
the Englishmen, the Indian town of Nandua was also right across Nandua Creek from
Price’s home. For his part, desperate Norwood sought an English home and
“resolved, by God’s help, that night to sleep at Jenkin’s house.” Norwood may have
been unaware, but all of the involved Assateague Indians played an expert role in
conducting him safely to a pre-selected English plantation where they shared a
language and a degree of mutual trust. Had they not been as friendly with the
castaways, had they left Norwood to starve, or had they taken him to the wrong
Virginian planter, a miscommunication might have devolved into violence. When
Englishmen unexpectedly came into Indian spaces, a knowledge of the surrounding
English landscapes and politics was vital to Native diplomacy and future safety.

Privileging an economically beneficial relationship that began decades before,
Eastern Shore Indians were pointedly friendly. They refused to participate in the
Powhatans’ final large attack in 1644, and the Accawmacks even served as spies
during the war, as they had in 1622. Not only did their villages remain unscathed by
the conflict, but their friendship secured their relationship with Governor Berkeley.
During the peace, he ordered no land removed from the Accawmacks, citing their
alliance with the English, the intelligence they shared in the previous wars with the
Powhatans, and the certainty of future conflict: “That wee cannot reasonably hope for
the like effecte of their freindship in case wee should againe need it (which god Knows

satellite villages to ensure fealty of lesser chiefs, and to establish kinship with their leaders. Rountree,
Pocahontas, Powhatan, Opechancanough, 33-35.

68 Helen C. Rountree and Thomas Davidson, Eastern Shore Indians of Virginia and Maryland
(Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1997), 58.

69 Norwood, “A Voyage to Virginia,” 47.

70 Rountree and Davidson, Eastern Shore Indians of Virginia and Maryland, 58.
howe soone it may bee).”

Instead of contending with Berkeley’s forces and new boundaries, the people on the north rim of the Chesapeake struck a brief and delicate balance with nearby traders and planters who were at times neighborly and at others violent. They were able to do so because so many other Native groups had turned against the colony, and English fear of new Indian alliances pushed them to placate and reward their few allies.

At the local level, however, long-term and delicate relationships developed through proximity as neighbors and as opponents in the courtroom. With developing understandings of English boundaries and law, Indians took responsibility for appropriate behavior and land use. In 1650, for example, colonist Richard Hill evicted headman Wachawamp from his land on the Eastern Shore; the werowance then complained to the court that “hee was disturbed in his hunting” and the justices ordered that he not be disturbed in the future. The same man borrowed an “English” boat without asking from a headman named Andiaman and refused to give it back, threatening Andiaman with violence. The court forced Hill to return the canoe and pay court costs, enforcing the preexisting Chesapeake Indian practice of borrowing watercraft as needed. Andiaman and Richard Hill met again in court in 1655 when Andiaman complained that Hill had seated on his land without paying for it, and for the


third time the court ruled against Hill and ordered him to pay costs. At least temporarily, werowances and the courts came together to police planter behavior that might otherwise devolve into violence.

Some Indian leaders turned to English property documents, usually a tool of dispossession, to ward off conflict and intrusion. Headman Wachawamp's 1656 will is one of only a few Indian-authored wills from seventeenth-century Virginia. Wachawamp brought with him to Occahannock many elites, from his daughter to her "great men" guardians, to participate in the process. The will also required that English officials attest to its legitimacy. Several Englishmen signed their names on behalf of the validity of the legal document, and George Truett testified that he understood through both the interpreter and through "knowledge of the Indian tongue" that the great man was in his right mind when he signed the will. Interestingly, the will is redundant, bequeathing unto his daughter his kingdom already hers (and then his brother’s son’s) by Algonquian matrilineal practices. Formalizing his wishes with an English document reflected his belief that the English respected the written word more than the Accawmacks’ political conventions.

The final grants of Wachawamp also demonstrated his commitment to the language and legal systems which gave English property rights—and through his participation, Indian property rights—their weight, but still with Algonquian terms. Out of “Love and affection I always did bear to the Anglish,” Wachawamp included a final

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75 Wachawamp is certainly a contemporary of Debedeavon, one of the successors to the Laughing King, and the two may be one and the same.

land grant in an effort to contour English expansion, willing that when they expanded north “they live at Ockahannock or Wachapreague but that I leave to their choice.” Occahannock is on the eastern side of the peninsula, Wachapreague on the west; Wachawamp asked the English to pick one, but not both. He also made his preference clear: “But in case they make choice of Wachapreague wch I think most convenient then my desire is that the English will procure a patent for their land.” Settlers who sought a patent and Indians who lived on the west side of the peninsula would maintain access to the familiar navigable and fishable waterways near the Indians’ central village. By making the signing of the will in court a serious ceremony attended by Algonquian and English elites, Wachawamp also avoided setting a dangerous precedent of English expansion without written consent and a patent. Wachawamp’s will married his understandings of English and Indian desires for land use, even to the point of leaving a paper trail.

As their spaces became blurred with those of the English on the local level, keeping the peace became more difficult for Indians. Between grantees and their tenants, dense settlement led to common offenses of overcrowding by those who most thoroughly ignored property lines: a man’s dogs attacked a neighbor’s cow, hogs trampled through a just-green cornfield, one planter shot another’s dog when he wandered off his owner’s property. The response from those disinvested in the survival of English livestock was just as predictable. Ill-fed indentured servants took advantage of free-ranging livestock, slaughtering hogs and feasting together creekside, away from

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77 Ibid., 589-90.
their masters. Servants continued to run away to Indians who harbored them, demonstrated by repeated clauses in colony and county-level treaties in which Indians agreed to desist. Much like Necotowance insisted, few headmen and werowances could “control” the people they led. Instead, they relied on persuading men and women of appropriate behavior, and then making reparations on behalf of the tribe to other Indians and Englishmen after an incident occurred. On the Potomac, for example, Indians on the Virginia side of the river routinely crossed over to chase more abundant game, much to the chagrin of Marylanders. Indians in Maryland, Virginia, and contested spaces like Kent Island stole and killed huge numbers of hogs, and allowed their dogs to kill cattle, then compensated owners with woven mats or armslengths of shell bead roanoke. Marylanders prepared to battle Eastern Shore Indians over repeated harassment and depredations in December 1652, but they had to call off their plans when they discovered that the Indians knew about them already—and besides, few Englishmen wanted to march in midwinter. Without fences, people and property proved difficult to hem in and enforcement of borders proved even more complicated.

Once they had claimed their tracts, militia captains and surveyors sought labor to work their vacant land. Elites who claimed lands to the north and west increasingly imported Africans and then claimed fifty acres per head, fueling the rush for Native land. The wealthiest of the men mentioned above—Edward Hill, Edmund Scarborough,

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78 Ames, *County Court Records of Accomack-Northampton*, 205.


William Berkeley, William Claiborne, Giles Brent—owned the labor of Indians, Africans, and English servants at some point over the course of their lives. Archaeologists examining tobacco pipe use and manufacture notice common forms and designs among free and unfree Indians and bound laborers until midcentury, suggesting shared social as well as work settings.\textsuperscript{82} Meant to shore up the power of colony elites, massive properties occupied by a diverse servant class created the backdrop for shared resistance.

Indians inside and outside of agricultural landscapes shaped the makeup and experience of the servant class. Alongside European men and women, Algonquian youths came to work daily in Virginian households, other children herded Maryland cattle, and Indian men and women hunted or worked on an informal basis. Some traded at great distances for their masters, like trader Giles Brent’s servant Thomas, gone for months until he was reported as a runaway.\textsuperscript{83} Although increasing numbers of Indians from nations to the southeast, traded in as slaves, stood alongside them as laborers, local Algonquians drew on local connections to family and tribe to keep them safe or from being sold too far away. Their knowledge of the Chesapeake was useful to traders and planters alike, but foremost advantaged the Indian herself in procuring resources or absconding from service.


\textsuperscript{83}John Frederick Dorman, ed., Westmoreland County Records, 1658-1661 (1970), 75.
Simultaneously, the number of Africans in Virginia and Maryland rose to around 1700 by 1660.84 Those who were sold as slaves cost between two and four times an indentured servant, making their labor not particularly advantageous and accessible only to elites.85 Even before 1660, however, Africans overcame the foreignness of the Chesapeake landscape to travel in pursuit of control over their labor and environment. Planter Francis Pott sold a woman named Marchant to Stephen Charlton, one of the wealthiest men on the Eastern Shore. Marchant repeatedly ran back to the Pott family until a frustrated Charlton said, “it was indifferent to him (or words to that purpose) whether he had the Negro woman (or tobacco presently).” Marchant “answered she would not go with [Charlton]. She would stay where she was,” and Charlton sued for his money back.86 Some masters attempted to coerce the actions of fellow freedmen rather than attempt to surveil the movements of their African slaves. In 1652, Indian trader William Andrews requested in court that no one trade with his African servant John, presumably since Andrews could not control the type of goods that came John’s way.87 Illegal trade built networks of acquaintances: when a set of white servants stole liquor, “hid it in hollow trees about the plantation,” and sold it to sailors at port in York County, an African named Emmanuel Anvil bought a case.88 While there is little written evidence

87 Ames, *County Court Records of Accomack-Northampton*, 330.
of communication and subversion of masters between Indian and African servants, both ranged across the Chesapeake in pursuit of a life apart from agricultural labor.

Masters struggled to keep servants within the bounds of their plantations, and they oftentimes considered the issue tied to Indian proximity. At least two of the county-level treaties signed in Rappahannock County with Indian nations contained articles addressing the return of servants who “usually thro[w] themselves amongst us the Indians for harbour or to be pillotted unto remote parts with intent to defraud their masters of their time & Service.”\(^9\) In 1649 the Assembly noted that “Divers Loytering Runaways in the Collonye, whose verye often absent themselves from their masters service, and some times in two or three monthes Cannott be found” could cost planters an entire crop due to a long-term stay elsewhere. In the same breath they used to complain about lost labor, they condemned servants to death who “Carrye Either piece, powder, or shott, and leave Either all or one of them with the Indians.”\(^10\) A petitioner to Cromwell wrote that decline in tobacco sales would disproportionately hurt “the poorer sort (three parts of four of the whole) and reduce them to a necessity of becoming slaves to the rest, who being merchants as well as planters, will be better able to subject, or else provoke them to conspire with the natives to cut their neighbors throats.”\(^11\) Exchanges and temporary alliances between servants and Indians terrified planters who needed both.

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91 “A Paper Concerning the Advancement of Trade (1656).” A Collection of the State Papers of John Thurloe: Containing Authentic Memorials of the English Affairs from the Year 1638, to the Restoration of King Charles II. ed. Thomas Birch, vol. 5 (London: Printed for the executor of F. Gyles, 1742), 80-83.
For servants, Indian villages were a beacon rather than a threat. Maryland servant Henry Billsbury put it bluntly: “they would rather live with the Pagans than Come home to be Starved for want of food, Cloathing and have their Brains beaten out.” Indians offered hospitality, respite, and relief in often unexpected ways. Unlike English servants and tenants, historian Edmund Morgan points out, all Indians living in their own villages controlled their own labor. Servants oftentimes used spare hours on Sundays to visit the nearest Algonquians—to the extent that some Algonquians complained—and no doubt found that everyday village work paralleled English ideals of freedom and self-determination. Probably not coincidentally, Virginians were prohibited from sailing boats and firing guns on Sundays. John Little’s Indian and English servants, including Henry Billsbury, ran repeatedly to unnamed Indians, who also protected them from a cruel master by taking the blame in court for stealing from Little. In 1654, the “King of Machepungo” was summoned to a local tavern to answer charges that he “led away an Indian woman” belonging to planter William Whittington. Either the dispute was settled at the tavern without the clerk present, or the werowance failed to appear in court—probably the latter, since he “refuseth any warrant.” One overseer complained of a very young Dutch boy that he “was not fit to do any work in the ground” and would


93 Morgan, American Slavery, American Freedom, 50.


95 Browne, Archives of Maryland, 10: 434.

96 Walczyk, Northampton County, VA Orders, Deeds, & Wills, 1651-1654, 187.
frequently “runaway to the Indians.”97 Servant John Devorax ran away twice in the span of a decade, learning the Accawmacks’ language by his second attempt, demonstrating that the art of escape might evolve with the presence of Indians inside and outside of colonial society.98 It was also oftentimes to Indians’ benefit to harbor servants—especially Indian servants whom they might know—not least since this engineered a market in illicit trade goods: in 1654, Thomas Alligood, William Harrington, and Samuel Shoole, all servants to Armstrong Foster, stole a boat and disappeared for two weeks. They developed scurvy and came back on their own accord, but they left behind “a match coat to the Indians and several goods.”99 A repeating pattern of resistance, an exchange of time and distance for goods, encouraged servants to look beyond English boundaries in ways that would have seemed familiar to servants of Claiborne and Fleet twenty years before.

As conflicts over land in the north Chesapeake intensified, Indians leaned on court documents and law to legitimize their claims and avoid all-out war. The General Assembly ordered a land allotment set aside for the Rappahannocks south of the Potomac, but this did not prevent violence. The Assembly charged the men of Northumberland, Westmoreland, and Lancaster Counties with raising men for war in 1655.100 The marchers demanded “such satisfaction as [they] thinke fit for the several

97 Ibid., 80-81.
98 Rountree and Davidson, Eastern Shore Indians of Virginia and Maryland, 79.
99 Walczyk, Northampton County, VA Orders, Deeds, & Wills, 1651-1654, 40.
100 Hening, Statutes at Large, 1: 389.
injuries done," and the leader of the Rappahannocks was killed in the scuffle.¹⁰¹ In 1658, Henry Fleet saw a chance to stir hostilities with the Rappahannocks that might displace them from their remaining land. The Rappahannocks’ complaint about Fleet suggests that he gathered men to covertly invade Rappahannock land. It seems he intended to harass them under the pretense that the Rappahannocks threatened elite Moore Fauntleroy’s plantation, a former Indian town named Mangorick granted to Fauntleroy by a past chief.¹⁰² Fleet was no doubt influenced by his own grant of 750 acres “upon the Southwest side of great Rappahannock Town where the Indians are at present.”¹⁰³ The response from the current chief, Naeheoopa, was decidedly personal, accusing Fleet in court of exploiting those “fearing us the Indians” while affirming their own “integrity.” Simultaneously, Naeheoopa called Moore Fauntleroy “a friend and Brother” of “the Great Men,” but also reminded him of English boundaries in terms of an English document: the patent. Fauntleroy’s land was “not to stretch further into [beyond the] bounds in the said Pattent.” Not only that, the land was Fauntleroy’s and he should not “suffer any other person…but only himself” to inhabit the land or punish trespassers.¹⁰⁴

By placing Fauntleroy and the great men as familial equals, the Rappahannock diplomats acknowledged the power of English institutions like the patent—and the court

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¹⁰² The town is listed on John Smith’s 1612 map as “Mangoraco,” located south of Pissaseck on the east side of the Rappahannock River.


¹⁰⁴Sparacio and Sparacio, Old Rappahannock County Records, Deeds and Wills, 1656-1662, 26-27.
system that enforced patent boundaries—but like Wachawamp’s will, only in terms of traditional Algonquian power relationships. If Moore Fauntleroy was given land as a “brother” of the great men, Fauntleroy’s land was his to rule, but not to give away. In this sense, Naheoopa promoted regional stability by formally treating with the occupant of neighboring lands. That Naheoopa chose to deal with Fauntleroy, instead of directly confronting the aggressive Fleet, demonstrates that he saw that his own wishes and English hopes for control over fear and violence in the region might be mutually reinforcing.

Other Rappahannock Indians found creative ways to maintain and bolster traditional diplomatic ties based on English conceptions of property. One of the Rappahannock elites present when Naheoopa came to court had two names, John and Caskemino. Shortly before troubles began over Fauntleroy’s plantation, Caskemino visited Moore Fauntleroy, leading behind him a young female pig. He presented it to Fauntleroy’s daughter, Eliza, and Fauntleroy had the gift recorded at the courthouse. A year later, Eliza’s father exchanged the sow’s offspring for an ewe, relatively rare livestock in early Virginia. Caskemino’s choice of gift was incredibly astute. While some pigs resided in hog houses on plantations, allowing them free rein in the woods to fend for themselves was also a cheaper and common English practice. Caskemino understood not only that an unmarked pig was unclaimed and therefore claimable, but that young and female livestock held more value to the English than male or mature animals because their offspring could be sold. Further, in gifting the pig to Eliza Fauntleroy, he paid respect to the family with a traditional Algonquian (and English)

105 Ibid., 106.
gift—food—without appearing to pay tribute to Moore Fauntleroy himself. Through a conceptual understanding of English chattel and its appreciative value, Caskemino forged a relationship with Fauntleroy but also reiterated his political autonomy.

Even in the face of growing conflict, Indians found creative ways to fit English people and institutions into their diplomatic and political worlds. They defied illicit attempts to create fear of Indians, illegal attempts to grab property, and English hierarchies between master and servant. Their employment of the courts legitimized their fight in English eyes to preserve Algonquian ideas about land rights, but these moments only complemented the personal and local relationships that had long characterized Algonquian relationships with outsiders. Leading to the formal recording of Wachawamp’s will or Andiaman’s suit, however, were countless informal moments of visits to men like Price or Hill that that made the Indians’ entrée into the legal world possible.

**Surveyors and Violence**

Yet outside the courthouse negotiations, the 1650s were roiled by a rash of small but violent and expensive conflicts between county-level surveyors and nearby Indians over the borders between them. Once again, Virginian traders used the Indian wars as a cover to consider an invasion of Maryland. Often instigated by unfounded rumors of Indian attack, many of the campaigns were later condemned by colony-level officials even as surveyors patented new land and military leaders sold Indian slaves. Long aware that the Indian presence undermined forced servitude, elites learned from a decade of local skirmishes that the threat of Indian attack covered boundary transgressions and harnessed military resources for private gain.
Through their deceptively objective task of recording the dimensions of patents and resolving land disputes, surveyors threatened Native attempts to keep the peace and negotiate land exchanges, engineering conflicts during which they displaced Algonquians before benefiting from surveying of Indian land for themselves and elite political allies. In the preceding centuries of English law, surveyors determined the ownership and rights of individuals to land through bounding it, either legitimizing or overwriting its customary use. In the north Chesapeake, Indians not only understood this dynamic and surveyors’ personal ambitions but went through English channels to safeguard possessions and enforce their own boundaries against encroaching Englishmen. Native leaders then faced down frustrated planters and surveyors, who used violence and colonial resources to attempt to supplant Native landscapes.

In the years after Opechancanough’s death the English intentionally co-opted the landscape of indigenous peoples exactly because they had belonged to Indians, planting settlements atop Indian fields and village sites. Part of this was expediency: Indian settlements had tended to coalesce along the tributary channels to the major rivers, simultaneously providing shelter from and access to European watercraft for the defense- and trade-minded Englishman. Major overland trade routes in this riverine environment passed through towns located on the fords of the river, highly visible to Englishmen traveling by land. Englishmen were also attracted to fields already cleared, and with “habitason selected and made Choise of, Those plases partlie received or procured from the Savages, and partlie by infinite labour (being generallie overspread with woods),” they chose to build homes, even churches, in fields where Indian women
had labored. Surveyors also used Indian paths and homes as property boundaries with an understood meaning—for example, “the Indian Path” or “Indian Ned’s Fields”—that marked these landscapes as recently and formerly Indian. In pursuit of the best land, Englishmen hired Indians with knowledge about the landscape and agriculture—a pursuit they also had in common—to point them in the right direction. In 1650, for example, three planters surveying together stopped and noticed, “three Indian Cabbins upon the sd land” next to a tributary of the Potomac, the only remarkable feature on the land other than its proximity to other planters’ lands. When one man said with disdain he thought the land would flood, another replied “if you wil not, I wil have it my selfe,” and “took a book out of his pocket & did set down the bounds of the sd land.” In Lancaster County, an agent for a wealthy planter looking to buy on the Potomac River “hire[d] an Indian to show me the sd land,” but found it already in demand with another Englishman who beat him to the punch and “contrary to Law & equity did Survey the sd land for himselfe.” These planters hoped not just for land or fertile land but Indian land, and relied on Indian knowledge and the markers of an Indian presence to best their English competition and push Indians further inland.

Surveying might indeed appear a key engine of exclusion of Indians from Indian landscapes, yet hidden behind claims of technological innovation and scientific objectivity was a chaotic process. Survey boundaries were marked by shifting

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106 “A brief declaration of Th’ estate of the Plantacon in Virginia during the first twelve yeares when Sir Thomas Smith was Governor of the Company,” Earl of Warwick Papers, University of Virginia.


108 Ibid., 86.
landscape features like trees, stones, and waterways which fell, moved, or were renamed. But without even these shaky bounds neighbors benefited from the use of unbounded or disputed land. Early chroniclers of Virginia’s history remembered how surveyors invoked vague “natural Bounds” to at best, “allow large Measure, that so the Persons for whom they survey’d might enjoy larger Tracts of Land, then they were to pay quit Rent for.” At worst, surveyors “often gave out Draughts of Surveys, without ever actually surveying it, or coming on to the Land.” Particularly insidious was the practice of presenting a survey in court before or in lieu of presenting a title, a custom outlawed only in the 1660s. Landowners and surveyors, sometimes the same person, bounded out land to preclude others from claiming a title, and they could survey any land not currently inhabited by other Englishmen, effectively deciding the size and boundaries of a new property without payment or any other official corroboration. When elite planter Gerrard Fowke sought to take Patawomeck Indian lands, for example, he bounded his own property next to the “King,” werowance Wahunganoche, and at some point his family simply usurped about six hundred acres of the Patawomecks’ territory along their shared border. At midcentury, surveyors themselves stood to gain land, money, and even additional offices through their position by using their position to overcharge landowners, act as brokers for land sales, and refuse a particular survey if it did not seem fiscally worthwhile. Colonial politicians and surveyors themselves could add weight to one side or the other in court cases where, “upon a new surveigh the least variation of a compasse alters the situation of a whole neighborhood and deprives many


persons of houses [and] orchards,” which then belonged to neighbors.\textsuperscript{111} Surveyors literally altered property lines at their pleasure, showing supposedly immutable boundaries to be anything but.

Grasping surveyors’ conflict of interests, the Assembly attempted to stem the flow of court cases and re-surveys over boundaries between Englishmen and between Englishmen and Indians. They sought to balance the power of “fraudulent and underhandealing surveyghors” with the power of the landholders, now including Indians, who depended on them. To structure agreed-upon boundaries, however, the Assembly also mandated that “all the inhabitants of every neck and tract of land adjoining shall goe in procession” to come to consensus.\textsuperscript{112} Needless to say, their procession, which was authorized by the parish, did not include Indian (or non-Anglican) inhabitants. Instead, community policing and the guidance of a surveyor served to make the chaotic and corrupt process of Anglicizing Indian landscapes appear orderly and transparent.

Indian elites fully understood this process and used their histories of migration in court to seek redress in creative ways. One Indian group, faced with incursions from a nearby fur trader and planter on the Eastern Shore, employed their knowledge of their former home and a mutual understanding of waterways as boundaries to reason that the “plantation of Phillipp Taylor cannot be impaired thereby he being seated on the one side of A Creeke, and they on the other, and not hitherto have either built or cleared on that side the Indians are appointed to dwell on.”\textsuperscript{113} The Indians’ argument might have

\textsuperscript{111} William Waller Hening, \textit{The Statutes at Large; Being a Collection of all the Laws in Virginia, from the Session of the Legislature, in the Year 1619}, vol. 2, (New York: R & W & G Bartow, 1823), 101.

\textsuperscript{112} Hening, \textit{Statutes at Large}, 2: 100.

\textsuperscript{113} Ames, \textit{County Court Records of Accomack-Northampton}, 56.
resonated with local magistrates familiar with customary rights of landholders. Algonquians near Onancock noticed men with surveyors’ instruments in the woods where they hunted, and appealed in county court as people who had moved previously for English “friends,” perhaps intentionally in language similar an English will, to save “inheritance of themselves and of their prosperities.” To create a reservation on the Eastern Shore for the Gingaskins, the General Assembly authorized the governor to specifically commission “two or three gentlemen with a surveyor living on this side of the bay (that have no relation to Accomack),” a recognition of the self-interested nature of surveying which caused the complaints. That negotiations of Indian land sales were first justified by Indian tie to place, however, is one of the central ironies of English pursuit of Chesapeake land.

In pursuit of their own gain, some surveyors promised their fellow Englishmen relief from both Indian proximity and therefore, colonists’ fear of it. Where other Englishmen felt cramped, surveyors like the wealthiest trader and planter on the Eastern Shore, Edmund Scarborough, searched for opportunity beyond the reach of the county courts. Scarborough accrued headrights like all other elites, and by the 1650s at the latest, some of his came from the importation of African slaves. Since Governor Berkeley had declared Accawmack land at Gingaskin off-limits to the English, Scarborough gathered others frustrated with limitations on land purchases—including defendant Richard Hill and Maryland’s pretend governor Edward Hill—and went after a

114 Walczyk, Northampton County, VA Orders, Deeds, & Wills 1651-1654, 74.


116 Walczyk, Northampton County, VA Orders, Deeds, & Wills 1651-1654, 15.
small group to the north called the Pocomoke in 1651, near where Scarborough would claim land on the Maryland border. He assured fifty already-fearful colonists that in their violence they were preempting a planned attack. “And what you shall there agree for the good & safety of the County, I do willingly condescend to,” a fellow justice wrote Scarborough before his march, “I pray you bee careful not to ingage us in a warr but upon good grounds not elce but god directing you.”117 Such weak dissenting voices were ignored, or crushed: trader William Andrews spoke against attacks on Indians on the Eastern Shore, and the same year his license to trade was revoked.118 Within Pocomoke lands where the Indians gathered to watch the invasion, colonists shot and killed at least one Pocomoke man, and captured and hogtied several more. By starting a rumor that stoked colonists’ fears only five years after the final Anglo-Indian War ended, Scarborough harnessed the violent response of his neighbors towards a narrow gain.

As they did when surveyors usurped land illicitly, the colonial government would have to quell future conflicts if Scarborough’s scheme went awry. Fearing that real, angry Indians might replace Scarborough’s manufactured Indian problem, James City officials tried Scarborough for “going in a hostile manner among the Indians and doing them outrages contrary to the known laws of Virginia.”119 Pleading that the gathered

117 Deal, Race and Class in Colonial Virginia, 34-35.
118 Deal, Race and Class in Colonial Virginia, 34.
119 Jennings C. Wise, Ye Kingdome of Accawmack or the Eastern Shore of Virginia in the Seventeenth Century (Richmond, VA: Virginia Historical Society, 1911), 119. Why Scarborough chose that exact moment is unknown, but Berkeley’s influence was weakening on the colony as royal rule was attacked in England. He was recalled in 1652 and returned in 1660. Scarborough may also have seized a moment of temporary weakness and confusion to the north: the Susquehannock and the government of Maryland also fought for a consecutive decade, causing the disruption and displacement of several Maryland-allied or neutral Algonquian peoples who sought refuge with the Nanticokes, probably swelling the number of Indians living north of the Virginia line. The Susquehannock and the Marylanders made peace in 1652,
Pocomokes—who watched the English approach from their side of the line—provided visible proof of insurrection and reason enough to preempt an attack, Scarborough slipped away from a guilty verdict. Instead, using influence at the county court level, Scarborough was given sole trading rights to William Claiborne’s old haunts at Palmer’s Island at the mouth of the Susquehanna River, one of the outposts of Susquehannock territory and now firmly within Maryland’s bounds. Like Fleet and Claiborne before him, Scarborough subverted both the governor’s authority and established boundaries between Indians and Englishmen, and faced no consequences.

Marrying trading, surveying, and military might, Scarborough exemplified the growing power of local elites and county-level officials. Like Claiborne and Fleet before him, he also benefited from Virginian hostilities against Maryland—only his reach narrowed the path for other Englishmen like Andrews to promote his own relationships with Indians, achieve social mobility through trade, or to hide from agents of either government. That he harnessed the fear of what waited beyond Virginia’s borders and returned to the Eastern Shore rewarded set an ominous precedent for decades of localized violence.

**Escalation and Failure**

Developments in the southern Chesapeake soon demonstrated that the ability of elites to harness resources and labor and to stomp into local Indian politics could prove catastrophic and expensive for the colony. Scarborough’s 1651 transgressions, though terrible, were contained to the county, and the threat he claimed to address proved

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one year after Scarborough’s episode. See, Rountree and Davidson, *Eastern Shore Indians of Virginia and Maryland*, 87-92.

120 Deal, *Race and Class in Colonial Virginia*, 34.
fabricated. The question then was how would the English respond to a real threat that created a real need to patrol and uphold their boundaries? Long-term power shifts that started as local conflicts grew into large-scale embarrassments undermining the legitimacy of Virginia’s borders and the value of its Indian diplomacy. Edward Hill, who like trader Abraham Wood before him, depended on Algonquian alliances to enter safely into the interior, cost the colony and Indian allies deeply through a failed military expedition. Additionally, Scarborough’s second attempt at pushing Virginia’s northern border demonstrated that powerful men disposed of colony resources towards their own gain and in so doing, demonstrated the limits of formal diplomacy between the colony and Native peoples.

The increasing number and size of elites’ land grants, and Virginia’s involvement in Indian politics to the west, caused local decisions to reverberate across the colony. Located at the split between the James and the Appomattox River, Edward Hill’s plantation Shirley became a rendezvous point for traders and Indians moving downriver from the south and west, and for Pamunkey Indians sent by Necotowance and his successor, Totopotomoi, to relay messages to the governor. In the decade since his invasion of Maryland, Hill had accrued even more local and colony-level status by gaining four thousand acres of land, the title of colonel, and a seat among the Burgesses—even serving as speaker. Nearby to Hill’s plantation, the Pamunkey also shored up their status: due north on the York River sat Totopotomoi’s new capitol at Pamawomeck, on five thousand acres affirmed by the Assembly as a token of goodwill.

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121 Hening, *Statutes at Large*, 1: 348.

in 1653.\textsuperscript{123} The site was crucial for Totopotomoi not only because of its proximity to generations-old trade routes and Opechancanough’s “ancient” seat just upriver, but also because if he vacated the property for any reason, the whole would default to Councilman William Claiborne.\textsuperscript{124} The colony gave Pamunkey leadership a measurable incentive to stay put and police their boundaries against outsiders, both English and Indian.

Totopotomoi and Hill’s proximity to the southern Virginian periphery, however, proved dangerous. Between Hill and the Pamunkey capitol, an outside group from the south called the “Rickahockians” settled at the fall line on the Virginia peninsula. Although their identity is uncertain, they were enemies of multiple Algonquian groups during the second half of the seventeenth century; archaeologists suggest they shared language with and were allied with the Algonquians’ enemies the Susquehannocks to the north.\textsuperscript{125} Most importantly for the Pamunkey, the Rickahockians’ forces were enormous—between six or seven hundred people—most certainly larger than the entire Pamunkey settlement at that time.\textsuperscript{126} Most importantly for Hill and the English, those huge forces were perfectly situated, as the Powhatan had been, “to invade us.”\textsuperscript{127} Both

\textsuperscript{123}Henry Read McIlwaine, ed., \textit{Minutes of the Council and General Court of Colonial Virginia} (Richmond, VA: Virginia State Library, 1979), 90.


\textsuperscript{126} The 1669 census, taken less than fifteen years later, lists fifty Pamunkey bowmen, or less than two hundred people total. James Mooney, “The Powhatan Confederacy, Past and Present,” \textit{American Anthropologist} 9, no.1 (1907): 134.

\textsuperscript{127} Hening, \textit{Statutes at Large}, 1: 402.
the Pamunkey Indians and Hill had a vested interest in removing the Rickahockians to secure the nebulous southern border of English Virginia and protect control over their respective dominions.

Faced with mounting tensions at several points of contact—the conflict with the Rappahannocks and the border dispute with Maryland—Virginia’s officials chose a restrained approach.128 As a high-ranking military officer, Hill was tasked by the Assembly with leading a coalition of men taken from surrounding county militias to meet with “the said new come Indians without makeing any warr if it may be, only in a case of their own defence.”129 Hill was also licensed to require all tributary Indians to assist in military operations. Although the Assembly also specifically volunteered the Chickahominy for service (and the Chickahominy also had new land grants to defend), a hundred of Totopotomoi’s Pamunkey warriors were the only Indians specifically mentioned who joined Hill.130 If all hundred men were in fact Pamunkey, Totopotomoi had made a serious investment in a show of strength on behalf of the few hundred remaining Pamunkeys under his rule—or Hill coerced Indian tributary forces into the English force’s central task of policing English boundaries.

The result of this alliance was a catastrophe for the Pamunkeys, and proof for onlooking colonists and Indians that elites like Hill had few qualms about wasting Indian lives and English resources. In a confrontation with the Rickahockians (which the English maintained after the fact was started by the Pamunkeys), Totopotomoi was

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killed, his forces were destroyed, and the English retreated without engaging. Unlike most Algonquian warfare predicated on strategy and captive-taking, the “Battle of Bloody Run” became so jarringly violent that in legends repeated afterwards the tributaries of the James turned red.\(^\text{131}\) The loss left the Pamunkeys leaderless, no doubt seriously undermined male labor including hunting and defense, and placed those remaining within sight across the river from the Rickahockians.

Adding to the Pamunkeys’ bitterness, neither Governor Berkeley nor Hill offered restitution for the devastating number of men lost, contrary to the Pamunkeys’ understandings of their alliance.\(^\text{132}\) When Hill returned to Jamestown, the Assembly stripped him of his offices for life and ordered him to pay the costs of suing for peace with the Rickahockians. Meanwhile, the taxpayers of the affected counties paid for lost horses, damaged boats, and provisioned militias.\(^\text{133}\) Appomattox River trader Abraham Wood replaced Hill as the head of Charles City and Henrico County militias, strengthening his place in the trade and in local government.\(^\text{134}\) However, Hill rebounded quickly: although he was prohibited from holding office in 1656, he was somehow reinstated to the Assembly by 1658 amid protests from members like Moore Fauntleroy, who sat uncomfortably close to Rickahockian depredations against his own Indian neighbors over fifty miles to the north.\(^\text{135}\) What had begun as a local conflict over space defied county borders and established patterns of warfare to become a lasting

\(^{131}\) Meyers, “From Refugees to Slave Traders,” 89.


\(^{133}\) Mcllwaine, Minutes of the Council and General Court, 103.

\(^{134}\) Hening, Statutes at Large, 1: 426.

\(^{135}\) Catlett to Catlett. Mcllwaine, Minutes of the Council and General Court, 114.
regional issue. The border problem also produced lasting divisions among the colony’s political leaders. Although once again the English lost face while surveilling “those lymitts which in a just warr were formerly conquered by us,” elites like Hill suffered little long-term through their reckless behavior, and the consequences were borne by tributary Indians.\textsuperscript{136}

Elites increasingly learned from spectacles like Hill’s that branding nearby Indians as threatening to Virginian plantations unified colonists. In 1659 Edmund Scarborough planned a larger attack, hoping to manufacture new alliances once again through shared fear. This time, his targets were the Assateagues, probably the same Eastern Shore Indians who rescued Colonel Norwood a decade before. Scarborough sought an alliance with Maryland—which had recently contested his claim to the Susquehannock trade with threats of imprisonment—against “the common enemy who soe long triumphed in the ruines of Christian bloud.”\textsuperscript{137} He asked Virginia’s then-governor Samuel Mathews to coordinate a dual assault: Maryland’s forces against the “Nanticoke and Confederats,” while three hundred men under Scarborough took out the Assateagues to “sufficiently subject the insolencies of those Indians who now despise the English honour.” Scarborough’s goal was to find the Assateagues (“harder to find than conquer,” he claimed), then destroy their ability to “plant corne, hunt, or fish, soe make him poor and famish him.” The Nanticokes would be eliminated “to prevent other Indians from receiving those with whom we warr,” a methodical attempt to destroy Indian networks as an investment in future conflicts. Hoping to grab land on Virginia’s

\textsuperscript{136} Hening, \textit{Statutes at Large}, 2: 403.

\textsuperscript{137} Browne, \textit{Archives of Maryland}, 3: 379.
and Maryland’s Eastern Shore border for himself, Scarborough harped on their common identities as Christian and English while ignoring their mutual distrust, and collapsed discrete Indian groups into a single bloodthirsty and insolent mass.

The exorbitant cost and the silence surrounding the march are testimony to his failure. The Marylanders declined to make war on the Nanticokes without cause, and perhaps the Assateaguges did indeed elude Scarborough and escape to the shelter of their neighbors. In 1660 the Virginia Assembly paid 71,500 pounds of tobacco “for the full charge of all the late war” after the burden on the Eastern Shore’s taxpayers spawned unrest, since their particular locality needed no protection or defense from nearby Indians.138 Many of the men compensated for their part in the conflict were familiar characters, uniquely suited to build on knowledge and relationships they accrued over decades among the Indians: interpreter Henry Fleet was compensated for powder and two guns, trader Jenkin Price was granted five thousand pounds of tobacco for “preservation of severall persons among the Indians.”139 For others, however, the march was an annoyance and a burden. Returned from the march, York County militiamen were out a pair of shoes, an axe, a French rapier, liquor, and "mostly guns."140 A Captain Fox not only owned a cannon personally, but somehow lost it. Additionally, every militiaman was ordered to be compensated for his time, which totaled ten weeks apiece, to be paid in civilian work on militia officers’ plantations and

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138 This account is found in both Deal, Race and Class in Colonial Virginia, 40, and Wise, Ye Kingdom of Accawmack, 161.


140 “Resolution of York County Court, 1660,” in Weisinger, York County, Virginia Records, 1659-1662, 48.
enforced by those same militia officers. \textsuperscript{141} In Lancaster County, the “delinquents,” presumably men who avoided service, were ordered by the court to make up the difference. \textsuperscript{142} The absence of multiple delinquents from the western shore, however, also suggests that while the war was state-supported, it was an unpopular move to meddle in a distant and potentially dangerous conflict, especially with other conflicts closer to home.

Scarborough’s failures to rally Virginians, unite the Marylanders, or get taxpayers to shoulder the cost of his foray across the border demonstrates that Indian lines of alliance and communication into the English world had protected them. As a county surveyor and justice, Scarborough’s powers were limited and his desires provincial. Neither the Marylanders nor residents across the colony believed that Scarborough’s raid would be cost-free or worthwhile. Scarborough did succeed in demonstrating, however, that in running amuck across Maryland and into Indian territory, Englishmen could achieve semi-legal autonomy and free reign across the Chesapeake and Maryland at the expense of the colony, and escape once again from punishment.

In a Chesapeake landscape no longer contoured by the Powhatans, Algonquians turned inward towards local relationships and networks. Their new relationships with Englishmen and other Indians led them into Maryland and to Tuscarora towns, to court and battle, and into English homes, fields, and forts. Werowances navigated colonial and county-level politics expertly and with a sustainable future in mind. Indian politics

\textsuperscript{141} Weisinger, \textit{York County, Virginia Records}, 49.

\textsuperscript{142} Sparacio and Sparacio, \textit{Lancaster County, Virginia Orders 4 February 1656-12 March 1661 from Order Book 1656-1666}, 77. In Lancaster County, several planters died owing Edmund Scarborough money in the 1650s, which may have strengthened his claim to the militia’s time and resources.
and places directly guided how English plantations grew, even as surveyors and county officials turn violent. Yet once planters like Scarborough grabbed control of fear and boundaries, exchange and communication networks became truncated for Indians, land and speculation opportunities became more difficult to find for other free men, and running away became dangerous for laborers. Virginia’s borders proved consistently porous, but only for some individuals; for others border-crossing came at great cost. Violence and politics outside of formal wars and treaties meant that politics, even in Jamestown, remained local and personal. English Virginians like Hill and Claiborne discovered and sought to understand Chesapeake landscapes only for their individual ends and profits, in the process subverting Indian and English political authority alike. Native leaders suffered losses at their hands but so too did officials in Jamestown seeking to maintain peace with their neighbors, and order within their own settlements.
CHAPTER 6
VIOLENCE AND FRACTURE, 1660-1676

Introduction

On a hot September day in 1661, officials from Rappahannock County met a gruesome scene at Richard White's tobacco plantation, “opposite to Nansemond Towne,” near where the conglomerated tribe called the Nanzaticos had settled in 1654. They were joined by "a grat man" named George of the Nanzaticos.\(^1\) George was a potential witness to the death of:


Two Englishmen lately murthered at the house of Richard White in the freshes of Rappahanock County. We went to the said plantacon and viewed the bodies & found the body of Jof[?] cruelly massacred in the house of the aforesaid White...his scull splitt on the forehead...his Skull beaten in the side of his head over the eye. Moreover neer the door of the said house we found the body of Thomas White Sonn of the aforesaid Richard...striped naket with his skull beaten in over the Eye. Also we found the skull of Daniel Pignell Servant to the said Richard White beaten in the side of the head with an ax as we conceive by the bigness of the hole in the skull. Also we found that part of the body of the said Pignell was carried away with Varment but the hind quarters from the towes we found dragged in a Swamp...\(^2\)

The three men—according to the report, two of them English—had clearly been surprised by multiple assailants wielding axes and clubs. The members of the White household were all in or near the house rather than dispersed across the plantation working. Such attacks, perpetuated during mealtimes or at night when people congregated predictably, evoked English vulnerability during the Anglo-Powhatan Wars.
decades before. All signs pointed to Indian perpetrators and luckily for the officials, there was a fourth man present who could confirm their fears:

…by which sad consequences of the action and by the examination of an English Servant of the said Whites named John Evens that esapted out of the house at that time when the murther was committed we do all agree in our Verdict that it was the Indians…

But which Indians? Unlike during Opechancanough’s 1644 attack, the neighbors of the victims were unsure of who to blame, even with Indians like George in much closer daily proximity. The evidence pointed to a local conflict rather than a random killing since it seemed one man was targeted, at least symbolically; Thomas White, the son of Richard and the only man with direct ties of ownership to the plantation, was disrobed after death, a marker of humiliation in Algonquian warfare. Although Englishmen complained about "the Northern Indians" and specifically Doegs and Rappahannocks, the Nanzaticos were most proximate and therefore almost certainly knew the White family well enough to differentiate Thomas, a freeman, from his servants. And with increasing numbers of land patents and scuffles over livestock and boundaries with men like Moore Fauntleroy and Gerard Fowke, Natives certainly had reason enough to lash out. However, the suspicious Englishmen were forced to rely upon the Nanzaticos for intelligence about who the attackers were and where they had gone. For his part, George was quick to place the blame elsewhere when "he told us that the same day that the murther was committed he found the footing of divers Indians

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4 Sparacio and Sparacio, Old Rappahannock County, Virginia Deed & Will Book, 1656-1662, 111.
going from the said Plantacon."\(^5\) Evidence only George could see convinced officials to look down the road instead of across the street.

Despite the uncertainty about who to blame, Governor William Berkeley had all but predicted the massacre at the White plantation. Earlier in 1661, he acknowledged frequent and insistent complaints from "Indians of Rappahannock River" concerning vague and "unnecessary injurys," but threw responsibility at the very county authorities and landholders responsible, writing "I know not at this distance what judgment to make…I beseech you to be careful of this."\(^6\) Only after the murders did the governor's council focus their attention on the dealings of local elites with neighboring Indians. It seems Berkeley saw the two as connected; immediately after his commission barred from office men who had harassed nearby Rappahannocks and Patawomecks, he paid Richard White ten thousand pounds of tobacco from the public levy for the loss of his son.

Such unresolved incidents were oftentimes the result of regional conflicts and political shifts beyond the control of Algonquians and English alike, and were mediated by local leaders like George, who understood the environs and politics better than his English neighbors. The attack on the White plantation demonstrates key shifts in colonial-Indian relationships and in the flow of people through the Chesapeake during the third quarter of the seventeenth century. First, the earlier destabilizing trends increasingly undermined communication across Native-English boundaries at the level of colonial officials and Native werowances. Defiance of treaties between Indian groups

\(^5\) Ibid., 111.

and the county governments had led to increasing numbers of land disputes fought in courtrooms, while failures of the Anglo-Indian military alliances were bringing former enemies like the Susquehannocks and Rickehockians closer and closer to Chesapeake borders.

Yet, in other ways, the outcomes of past violence and border transgressions had created unexpectedly mixed local landscapes of Native-English co-existence. Some of this intermixture was the byproduct of Indian-created solutions to the loss of power—efforts to bargain in county courts or to join trading parties—meaning that Native people constantly traveled in and out of English towns and settlements. Individual Indians further defied the boundaries of Virginia and landholders’ properties indirectly, by guiding, selling, and treating along shared borders. For their part, Virginia’s traders continued ever more frequently to bring Indian goods into English towns, and to sell captive Indian children as servants and slaves on English plantations. Simply put, the English could envision and map on paper a divide between “English” and “Indian” land, but they could not fully understand or control where and how Indians and Englishmen moved on the ground. Thus a Native presence never stopped mitigating imagined English borders.

The problem for English and Indian leaders—that would lead again to the outbreak of warfare—ultimately proved to be the Algonquian world’s interconnectedness: local conflicts and bargains never stayed local, and no one Indian or Englishman could halt the uneven, rippling effects of a dispute or curb increasingly frenetic movement across hard-won boundaries. Openly and subversively, planters, servants, and traders were drawn into the lucrative and lawless process of border-crossing into Indian territory
or through Indian channels. Both Native and colony-level attempts to monitor border-crossing, contain county elites’ power, and stymy the rising tide of violence were useless when routes and ties became appropriated by elites in their attempts to eradicate perceived threats to planters’ authority over labor and land.

**Geographic Coexistence in the 1660s**

To understand how patterns of violence shifted in the 1660s, we must first look at how Indians and Englishmen were intermixing and coexisting in local settings—primarily at various spots along the shared Maryland-Virginia border—that officials in Jamestown could not have anticipated. Although the population dynamics and changes in the landscape undeniably point to a shift towards a Chesapeake controlled by the English, their authority was unproven on the fringes and on the local level. The boundaries of elite land patents in the west overreached their abilities to actually “hold” and settle the land, while their Algonquian neighbors continued to use it as before. In fact, local werowances adapted to the English court system to maintain their own authority and ability to broker peace with their neighbors. Still other Algonquians benefited from living so near the English to broker their own creative social and legal agreements.

George’s Chesapeake world looked very different than it had a generation or two before. English land claims, demographic stabilization, and the tobacco economy left a visual mark on the landscape. By the early 1660s, between eighty and ninety percent of the available land in some western counties was claimed by Englishmen, leaving few opportunities for detribalized Indians, newly-freed and formerly-indentured servants both
African and Anglo, and newly arriving European immigrants. The English population in 1662 reached 25,000, and an increasing number of people lived long enough to see freedom from indentured servitude and begin their own households. By the middle of the decade, fewer Europeans crossed the Atlantic as indentured servants, coinciding with an economic depression that pushed planters to plant maximum amounts of tobacco in response to low prices. Increasingly, Africans enslaved for life worked alongside indentured servants in the fields of men wealthy enough to afford to purchase them. By the 1670s, Africans comprised the majority of the labor force on the plantations of elites, numbering 2600 individuals by 1680. Further, Indian laborers, some from nearby Algonquian villages and others from as far afield as Spanish Florida, joined a diverse labor force. The population and number of surrounding towns, however, demonstrated marked decline and consolidation. The 1669 census counted 605 fighting men on the western shore (compared to an estimate of 2600 on the eve of Opechancanough’s 1644 attack). Although most continued to live in longstanding towns—even as the towns accepted outsiders or relocated—the majority of Powhatan’s districts listed on John Smith’s map were transformed into English plantations, moved

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farther from the colony, or were annihilated by the English. Around a quarter of the fighting men lived with people like the Nanzaticos, in towns created since the English first settled at Jamestown Island three generations before. These warriors and their families drawn to newer settlements primarily lived on tributaries in the northern Chesapeake, an area relatively sparsely settled by the English. Even though modern estimates place the total Algonquian population at 2900 in 1685, Indians in a variety of political and geographical positions adapted to these changes and exerted a disproportionate influence over the colony.

That is because, as the Algonquians understood, English dominance over the landscape was far from complete. A 1662 “act for building a towne” attempted to bring permanence, planning, and urban living to James City, but almost all people beyond Jamestown’s taverns and apartments lived in modest and temporary vernacular housing replaced every twenty years that betrayed an image of permanence city planners hoped to convey.12 Connecting people on plantations, “horse paths” built atop the Indian network of paths increasingly also served as the connectors between small communities like Middle Plantation and Gloucester Town and surrounding agricultural landscapes.13 To save expensive labor costs, servants turned already-cleared “Indian fields” into English tobacco fields rather than cut through forest. In 1668, for example, Thomas Cooper deeded a thousand acres to Thomas Goodrich that “formerly & lately

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the Matapony Indians did Inhabite.”14 Farther downriver on the Totuskey Creek on the south side of the freshes, the Totuskeys and Morraticos moved again when John Hull bought not “land” but “both…Townes” for payment in matchcoats sometime before 1667.15 Christ Church Parish built their “Mother Church” in the middle of the “Small Indian Field next to ye head of Capt. Brocas his ground.”16 Indians exhibited the same tendency towards reusing landscapes: archaeological evidence suggests that the town of Nansemond was grafted either nearby or atop a late prehistoric settlement that probably belonged to the Piscataways at contact.17 The key for most Indians and English settlers was not stability or transformation but access to mobility—to move tobacco and furs downriver for sale, and to maintain connections with allies and trade partners to the west. Because Englishmen took the (literal) paths of least resistance, Anglo-Virginian society would have looked more familiar to George than laws and patents suggested.

English landholders simultaneously desired control over mobility, both over their own laborers and the Indians whose paths and roads they had appropriated, but they occupied and surveilled their supposed territory unevenly. English claims of property ownership were not synonymous with control. The lands owned or rented by Englishmen were farmed unevenly; elite landowners who bought tens of thousands of acres on Virginia’s colonial borders repeatedly filed for extensions to settle them, while

15 Ibid., 87.
16 C. G. Chamberlayne, ed., The Vestry Book of Christ Church Parish, Middlesex County, Virginia, 1663-1767 (Richmond: Old Dominion Press, 1927), 5.
17 “Nanzattico Archaeological Site, King George County,” Notes on Virginia 47 (2003), 22.
less wealthy settlers concentrated in Southside Virginia fought to make smaller parcels productive every year.\(^{18}\) Some men, like George Nicholls and Matthew Wilcox with their four thousand acres, simply acquired more than they could ever hope to deforest in a lifetime.\(^{19}\) In 1668 one mariner from Plymouth, Thomas Shepheard, requested 119 head rights for settlers brought from Britain on three of his ships. Shepheard lived in England, and almost certainly never saw his six thousand acres even if they were patented.\(^{20}\)

Although the General Assembly made provisions to reassign “Deserted Lands” after three years of inactivity, the law only applied if anyone noticed.\(^{21}\) In 1671, a thousand-acre plat on Moratico Creek was given away after its previous two owners never settled there; the original grant date was January 1, 1660.\(^{22}\) Nonetheless, Indians who used or traversed untilled land clashed with elites who claimed property rights; archaeology demonstrates that elites on the Northern Neck palisaded their homes by the 1670s.\(^{23}\)

Representatives from Rappahannock County and the Mattaponi nation met and decided that “our Indians may have Freed & Liberty…without Englishmens Clear fenced

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\(^{20}\) Ibid., 62. It is also worth noting that a ship with the same name as Shepheard’s, the *Exchange*, entered the service of the Royal African Company in 1676, suggesting that the large number of headrights may have resulted from his share in a ship involved in the slave trade. “Ships Entertained by ye Royall Affrican Company since Xtmas 1674,” Virginia Colonial Records Project, Library of Virginia, Richmond, VA. (hereafter referred to as VCRP)

\(^{21}\) William Waller Hening, ed., *The Statutes at Large; Being a Collection of all the Laws of Virginia, from the First Session of the Legislature, in the Year 1619*, vol. 1 (New York: R & W & G Bartow, 1819), 468.


ground...providing our Indians not committing any Trespass agt their Stocks.” The Assembly also instructed men in Gloucester and Lancaster Counties to “assigne...sch places and bounds to hunt in as may be convenient, both for the inhabitants and the Indians” exactly because Indians were hunting, fishing, and traveling wherever they wanted regardless of law.

In an environment where Englishmen were insecure in their authority, the mix of Indian and English land claims and haphazard land and resource use nullified the potential of reactive laws to separate Algonquians and Englishmen, and created surprising venues for reciprocity and communication at the level of local, personal relations. Changes and continuities in the Chesapeake landscape affected the ways Algonquians lived and interacted with landowners, servants, and other Indians even on their own lands. Some must have felt themselves surrounded. In southern Maryland and northern Virginia, the reserved Native lands below the falls were isolated on peninsulas and between English neighbors, forming a “checkerboard pattern” with English parcels. Clement Herbert, for instance, knowingly patented four hundred acres on the Rappahannock squarely between “Nansemond & Nanzatiquou Town,” taking land the two groups probably shared and guaranteeing that communication between them would run by or through his land.

Census records demonstrate that Indian neighbors often merged governments, either as commanded by the English or voluntarily to pool

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resources.27 Meanwhile, Indians living west of the falls sat in a dangerous position between the Susquehannocks, the Iroquois, and other potentially hostile people who moved swiftly up and down the same fall line path from one hundred years before. Patents suggest that nearby inland Algonquians moved frequently, seeking fortifiable marshes and riverine peninsulas and islands from which to safely conduct trade and diplomacy.

Englishmen who stretched past their bounds or broke the peace often met retribution at the hands of their Algonquian neighbors. Werowances and male Indian elites were frequent visitors to county courts. In Stafford County in 1687, for instance, an unnamed Indian man was hunting game for an Englishman named John Simpson when he was shot in the back near a hunting cabin. After he had been missing for over a week, it was another Indian who found him, recognized him, and reported his death directly to Simpson. Like George, this Indian bounded the crime scene, showing Simpson “horse or Mare footings” and “a small twigg about ye thickness of a mans fingure…that the shott yt killed the Indian did cutt” after the ball had exited his chest. Another Englishman, August Knighton, came forward the same day with a piece of circumstantial evidence: that Thomas Norman, a carpenter and landholder, stopped by Knighton’s house after a suspiciously fruitful hunting trip, four deer slung over the back of his horse. But it was the nearby werowance, “the Kinge of Mattawioman,” Chequeton who had the final word. Not only had Thomas Norman been “angry wth them” in the past, but Norman was the only English person who hunted game on horseback.

27 Rebecca Seib and Helen C. Rountree, Indians of Southern Maryland (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2015), 82.
Chequeton’s war captain chimed in that “it was an Englishman that killed him for if it had
been an Indian hee would have Tommahawked him & Cutt a Lock of Hayre & flesh
together from his head.” The court reached a compromise verdict; Norman was found
innocent, but compensation of some kind—which apparently was what the
Mattawomans sought—was paid out, an acceptable and traditional form of Algonquian
justice. The Mattawomans not only knew where and how their neighbors hunted, lived,
and travelled daily, but watched out for their own when they came into contact with the
English. That Chequeton said Norman had been angry with “them” meant that the
unknown murder victim was probably a Mattawoman. Although their party did not bring
their dead to English justice, by insisting the killer was not one of them they protected
their living from accusations. Finally, entrance into English political machinations would
not be possible if the English had not adopted the same hunting grounds as the
Mattawomans and other groups in the first place. The English who co-opted Indian
travel routes now encountered Indian surveillance, and accountability.

The county courts did not replace Algonquian ideas about justice; they simply
became another possible route for Indians seeking justice in boundary disputes.
Simultaneously, werowances unhesitatingly demonstrated their displeasure at late
payments and broken deals. During one spectacular incident in 1664, the werowance
and great men of the town Great Matomkin on the Eastern Shore visited their neighbor,
John Die, who may have occupied the land he purchased from the Indians before it was
patented—or may have not yet paid for it. One tried to take his ax, some held him on

28 Ruth Sparacio and Sam Sparacio, eds., Stafford County, Virginia Deed & Will Abstracts 1686-1689
the ground “by the haire of the head, and put Durt in his mouth & eares,” while the rest disarticulated his house. Once the structure lay in pieces, at the werowance’s cue they left with no further violence to person or property. The tactile symbolism of the suffocating dirt and the fallen house indicate the Matomkins’ anger that Die claimed the ground and presumed to settle upon it without meeting an agreement. The issue was resolved by Die’s sudden death only two years later, but the terrifying incident was first relayed and the statement made to other Englishmen in court by John Die. Controlling the type and extent of punishment empowered headmen to take English ideas about property into their own hands.

Indians without formal claims to power in their own groups also created and maintained niches and networks all their own on the fringes of colonial society, using the proximity of the English to their advantage. In 1665, Edward Gunstocker, also known as “Ned the Indian,” received an order of protection, head rights, and a living inside county bounds from county courts—and all probably on the land he had inhabited before colonists settled nearby. “The said Ned” was, like George, a Nanzatico who lived in or near Nansemond. Also like George, he had “mightily conduced to the peace and quiett of the Country,” although the precise aid he offered officials in Rappahannock County is lost; his protection order only stated that he was “like to run into great Dangers from other Indians for his Service don to the County.” So while George probably walked back home to Nansemond after Richard White’s murder, perhaps

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along the “Chicacoan path,” Gunstocker had committed some act which made that impossible. Instead, he trusted that English arms and Rappahannock County officials would safeguard his newly patented land. Although Edward Gunstocker’s precise origin in English records is lost, Indian “traytors” like him found support in the county courts and a niche among landowners.

A map of Virginia’s English settlements or a planter’s property survey might provide quantifiable evidence of Virginia’s growth and success. However, Indians who attended court were aware of the gap between ownership as declared by local justices and surveyors and how the landscape remained the same beyond. These empty claims only undermined the authority of Virginian elites and their legal system, even as some Algonquians sought their protection. English pretensions to power presented an opening to all Algonquians, making it possible to simultaneously flout English authority and invest in it. As settlers replaced Algonquian women’s fallow fields with rows of tobacco, Indian knowledge of Native landscapes and Englishmen remained central to daily life.

**Economic Connectivity**

Indians gathered knowledge about Virginia’s agricultural landscapes through ongoing efforts in diplomacy, trade, and hospitality. Algonquians watched as planters pursued control over the northern Chesapeake, working to limit the mobility of Indians and servants while maintaining their own connectivity to one another and tobacco merchants. Large-scale plantation agriculture deepened this contradictory need, as servants and increasing numbers of enslaved Africans strayed from the plantation along the same Indian paths and roads upon which news and hogsheads of tobacco travelled. Englishmen relied on Indian knowledge and trade as their own attempts at infrastructure
development fell short of their needs, ironically using Native landscapes and material culture in attempts to enforce new boundaries.

As they would with Indian visitors, Indian men and women accommodated exchanges of all types with the English as part of diplomacy. At least some Indians simultaneously maintained tribal identity and lived on land patented by Englishmen. The Indians of the town of Portobacco, an area legally claimed by landowner and Councilman Ralph Wormeley, lived autonomously across the Rappahannock from the residences of Wormeley and his servants. Wormeley used the water as a natural barrier between his crops and his hogs, which he left on the Indian side of the river. Hogs had long been a point of contention for Englishmen and Indian women, who had little time to keep these basically feral animals from trampling and rooting through Indian crops. When Durand de Dauphine visited Wormeley at his plantation, however, three Indians brought food in greeting, with tobacco pipes and pots full of corn supplied by the Indian women who hung back. Wormeley himself received a separate gift of deerskins. When Wormeley and his visitor later left for the next county over, the same men reappeared to see them off. Whether the Portobacco residents realized or not, the Frenchman’s visit had implications for them: Wormeley tried to sell Durand five hundred acres of the estate upon which they were settled. Although the Indians had no written claim to the farms across the river, their hospitality kept them diplomatically connected to its current residents and the movement atop it, and gave them important visual information about the comings and goings of outsiders.³¹

Intimate day-to-day customs that brought Indians and Englishmen together provided Indians with cultural knowledge of their neighbors as well as of the English language. Indian towns continued to host Englishmen, particularly servants, on the day of rest “to the disquiet of the Heathen, but certainly to the great Scandal of the Christian Religion.” In a conversation from the eighteenth century, William Byrd II exchanged barbs with a Virginia Indian hunting on a Sunday, who “laught at the English for losing one day in Seven; tho the Joke may be turned upon them for losing the whole Seaven, if Idleness and doing nothing to the purpose may be called loss of time.” A visiting scholar of the Royal Society reported that plantation masters habitually visited Indians towns in search of priests and conjurers, seeking medical treatment for valuable enslaved Africans (services provided, for a price). Anglican officials in England were probably correct that Indians saw, English “Families disordered, their Children untaught, the publick Worship and Service of the great God they own, neglected,” particularly since Indians insisted on laboring on Sundays in contrast to Englishmen. A 1629 law that prohibited Englishmen from journeying on the Sabbath was replaced by a 1663 law that prohibited only servants from so doing without a pass. Compulsory visits to county courts and Jamestown also gave Indians – elites, at least – the language they needed.

35 William Sherwood, “Virginia’s Deplor’d Condition,” Microfilm 228, Albert and Shirley Small Special Collections Library, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA.
to converse. Francis Louis Michel of Switzerland met an emissary from an unknown Algonquian nation at a celebration in Jamestown.

A Frenchman and I were astonished... that two of them could speak English. One of them looked at us and said in poor English, whether we thought that if they had been taught like we, they could not learn a thing just as well as we. I asked him, where he had learned to speak English, he answered, they were not so stupid, because they had to come every year, they could hear us speak and learnt it that way.  

Certainly no one familiar with the Chesapeake would have made the same mistake. The Europeans’ inadvertent insult to the Indians’ intelligence also underscores that Indians used gatherings to observe. Their growing body of knowledge, and growing ability to communicate in both Indian and English places, forced Englishmen to contend with them as potential adversaries who could “learn a thing just as well as we.”

Algonquians on both sides of the falls habitually traveled in and out of their localities and engaged in the colonial economy and society for guns, powder, shot, cloth, and money. Indian men’s outstanding marksmanship with both bows and firearms meant that they found a market for their hunting skills in middling and elite Anglo households, while Indian women’s cuisine found a place in English hearths. Refuting claims that masters starved their Chesapeake servants with a meatless diet, former Maryland servant George Alsop wrote for a promotional tract that he ate plenty of meat as a servant because the Indians brought it right to their table. He wrote venison “so nauseated our appetites and stomachs, that plain bread as rather courted and desired than it.”

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innumerable sortes of choyce fish, (if they will take the paines to make wyers or hier the Natives, who for a small matter will undertake it).”  

39 One visiting clergyman in Virginia noted that the English who had fresh meat beyond the slaughtering season sold and distributed it to those who did not, a display of excess as well as magnanimity.  

40 The meager reality for many servants, however, also revolved around Indian proximity. Traveler Thomas Reade journaled that the planters “live well themselves but keep their Servts. To hard dyet to Homine…made of the Indian Corn is their great food, and water their drink, wch they Call up in the Sabbath day Succhanna, wch is the Indian name for wa.tr.”  

41 Other writers confirm the servants they met did not eat bread at all, and that hominy—an Algonquian corn cake made by women for meals or for travel—was a food relegated to servants.  

42 In 1661, servant William Clutton was arrested for suggesting that “the servant ought to have pone, hominy, and meat two times a week.”  

43 Indian cuisine demonstrates that Indians continued to interact with and affect the everyday lives of Englishmen differently according to class and circumstance. Exported to plantations, Indian material culture served to deepen the class lines, and their labor


41 Thomas Reade, “Life of Thomas Reade, Rector of Moreton, in the County of Dorcet, Written by His Own Hand, and Design’d to be Continued by Him, so Long as God Shall Prolong It,” Albert and Shirley Small Special Collections Library, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA, 27.


expended in gathering food reaffirmed mutual benefit between Indian men and English elites.

Engagement with the English economy in skins and meat also altered the ways that Native communities left their mark on the natural landscape. Besides their efficiency at killing wolves for bounty monies and taking down groups of deer rather than a single animal for the fur trade, Indians also elicited the marvel of European visitors for their housing. Their “cabins were very artfully made of withes, mere pieces of bark” that “keeps out the rain very well.” Rather than the loaf-shaped homes of previous generations, Algonquians built temporary housing near prime spots to hunt and fish apart from their villages.\textsuperscript{44} Listed in English records sitting alongside small creeks and in clusters, “Indian cabins” serviced trades so seasonal and uncertain that their impermanency made them poor landmarks for the English. One land patent referenced a place where there were, simultaneously, “formerly and usually” Indian cabins.\textsuperscript{45} The bark-sided lodgings may reflect that men traveled with one another for safety and eschewed the female labor mat-making required, an idea supported by the discovery of nails at one cabin site that would replace the cordage women also made.\textsuperscript{46} Siding was made from bark similar to Native homes in the Piedmont, and the cabins took a rectangular shape like the tiny English homes belonging to lower-class Virginians. But at least for some groups, the bark houses became acceptable, even expected, housing in

\textsuperscript{44} Edward Alexander Porter, ed., \textit{The Journal of John Fontaine: An Irish Huguenot Son in Spain and Virginia, 1710-1719} (Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press, 1972), 85.

\textsuperscript{45} Sparacio and Sparacio, \textit{Stafford County, Virginia Deed & Will Abstracts 1686-1689}, 83.

villages. In 1677, Coackoeske, werowansqua of the Pamunkey, “pray[ed] libertye to
gather barque from trees from any mans land to build Cabins.”47 Just like the presence
of Indian women and men in the plantation economy changed what was cooked on an
English fire, the English demand for meat and fish literally shaped the making of Indian
homes.

Englishmen and Indians came into contact via a hybrid of roads and trails,
changing cultural landscapes themselves that connected neighbors and distant places.
Law regulated the Indian trails and roads, which now connected English plantations, for
the sake of the “dispatch of business,” but authorities found the boundaries of those
same plantations obstructed connectivity. Planters fenced their boundaries with little
concern over whether someone could reach their house, or had no discernible overland
route to their plantation at all.48 The care of roads funded by public levies was left to
respective county officials, who did little to coordinate improvement of overland travel
through other counties. Legal efforts to remediate the “King’s Roads” and ferries were
met with apathy on the part of property owners, especially the wealthiest whose
plantations and boats sat on navigable waters. Northampton County planter William
Greening complained that he could not visit the other side of Hungars Creek because,
despite the county court’s payment to “certain undertakers” to remedy the situation,
“there is but a rotten stick or 2 left for a bridge, the same being a high road way, and
necessary passage for travelers, so that either the passenger must be constrained to go

47 Henry Read McIlwaine, ed., Minutes of the Council and General Court of Colonial Virginia 1622-1632,
1670-1676, with Notes and Excerpts from Original Council and General Court Records (Richmond, VA:
Virginia State Library, 1924), 90.

48 Hening, Statutes at Large, 2: 261.
3 or 4 miles about, or adventure both health and life in going over.” Pleas for aid like this one were shot down by fellow Englishmen, not only through apathy but also through outright hostility at perceived violations against private property. Planter Thomas Gregg built a fence across a freshly-cleared road in Stafford County presumably to mark his property line and discourage trespassers; his neighbor Robert Alexander helpfully placed a different fence blocking “the old way so that it is not passable for strangers in the night,” so there was no obvious way forward at all.

Natural as well as manmade obstacles impeded English attempts to establish an orderly landscape. The dense vegetation and waterlogged ground that marked unfarmable “wastelands” indiscriminately crossed the boundary between Indians and English, who had in common their disinterest in making the “pocoson” and other problem areas productive for the common good. For all of their plats and claims, the English elite were forced to halt formal landscapes and work spaces abruptly at the pocoson’s edge, a demonstrable limit to their domain. Even in the name, for the English the pocoson was totally foreign, both physically and culturally impenetrable. While surveyors’ lines snapped the Indian landscape into smaller and smaller pieces, pocosons, often miles wide, remained indomitable. An Englishman could turn “the Indian Road” into “the Ferry Road” by altering its use, but a pocoson was unusable and so it would always be a pocoson. Ironically, the pocoson’s stationary cultural and geographical qualities made it a perfect boundary. No one wanted their property line to run directly through a pocoson, and fathers most often gifted pocosons unto a lucky heir.


50 Sparacio and Sparacio, *Stafford County, Virginia Deed & Will Abstracts 1686-1689*, 82.
as a single unit, keeping them intact legally as well as physically. “The Pocoson” simply became “Hoskins Pocoson” or remained anonymous but especially horrible: “a terrible myery Pocoson” or “my Great Pocoson.” Wastelands became boundaries in more ways than one, a natural landmark for separating private property but also a barrier cutting communication between Englishmen on the riverine landscape that otherwise promoted connection.

Therefore, one of the most reliable ways to move overland continued to be Indian paths. Even when the English developed a somewhat dubious ferry system, complete with fares and a schedule, the way down to the dock was, in Middlesex County’s case, “by the Indian Road now called the Ferry Road.” As Jamestown officials placed huge demands on time and labor to create centralized infrastructure, at the local level planters were content to use what came before. That “Indian paths” were consistently used as reference points speaks to the permanency of Indian landscape features in English life. As they continued to provide transportation and direction to Indians, so they did for Englishmen along the same boundaries and paths. The path to and away from Richard White’s land, for example, was also probably the path that hemmed in the plantations of Thomas Bryant and Thomas Maddison, his nearest neighbors, but it was first and continued to be “the path that leadeth to Chickasony” for Native peoples. The roads created boundaries while infringing upon them, allowing

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53 Ruth Sparacio and Sam Sparacio, eds., *Old Rappahannock County, Virginia Deed & Will Book Abstracts 1672-1676 Part I* (Arlington, VA: Antient Press, 1989), 79. In this land sale from Richard White to Bartholomew Wood in 1672, the destination of the path is also called “Chicacus.” This path may have
anyone to move away from Virginian colonial surveillance and control, and almost certainly into Maryland and up to Iroquois country.

Entangled life in Indian towns and English plantations shaped daily life for Englishmen. Visits back and forth contributed to the success of the developing tobacco economy, while simultaneously contributing to the mobility of Indians, non-elites, traders and servants beyond the plantation.

**Local Roads Under Colonial Law**

According to the law, Indians traveled these same roads as foreigners once they entered Virginia’s domain. The English put in place legal boundaries in attempts to establish the physical boundary between Indian land and English territory, however, these rules did little to halt trade and communication. When the aggregate effects of war and population instability inspired official attempts to clamp down mobility using objects like badges in the third quarter of the seventeenth century, free Indians and Africans, Englishmen, and Natives in various positions of legal servitude and slavery found (or made) cracks in laws regulating trade, weapons, and communication to order to take back control of the roads that ran between English and Native lands.

The initial English system of borders and badges only worked to separate English and Indians on paper and not in fact. The treaty signed by Necotowance in 1646 commanded all people under Pamunkey rule to travel within English bounds with a badge of “striped stuff,” a material only accessible to them at forts like Abraham

been a different one than the one George took ten years before to reach Richard White’s plantation house.
Wood's on the falls. This practice reinforced the border between Indian and English by, first, creating a checkpoint for legitimate travel and physically marking outsiders when in English territory and second, collapsing all identities beyond English-occupied territory as "Indian." English control of passports and checkpoints facilitated their attempts to control the physical line between insiders and outsiders. Algonquians and Englishmen ceased using this system at the latest in 1661, if it had ever actually worked at all. Plenty of Indians—entire nations of Indians—lived or habitually worked within English bounds, and plenty more did not answer to Necotowance's authority or the term "tributary Indian." The system also required the English to turn on Indians who ignored the law. Edmund Scarborough complained in 1663, "the law prohibiting the Indians to come within the English bounds without badges doth only inflict a punishment upon the Indians so coming but not much upon the English for not taking such Indians as come in without badges." Ever the fearmonger, he prophesized a potential boundary-crossing conspiracy: "so by reason of their sinister ends the law is seldom put into execution for prevention of which mischief or peradventure a greater if not timely prevention put a stop to it." The colonial response to boundary crossing was an attempt to exploit the leadership struggles and caste distinctions of Algonquian neighbors. In 1661, badges with more permanency, poured and finished in silver or hammered into copper,

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55 Hening, Statutes at Large, 2: 138-143.

56 Henry Read McIlwaine, ed., Minutes of the Council and General Court of Colonial Virginia (Richmond: Virginia State Library, 1924), 23.
accompanied the Assembly’s decision to revisit the 1646 treaty. The four extant today—three found by archaeologists in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries—belonged to Algonquian allies like the Pamunkey, Appomattucks, Machoticks, and Patawomecks, differentiated by these badges from non-tributaries like the Susquehannock and Doeg. The English also assigned significance to the metals comprising the badges themselves, silver for “kings” and copper for warriors, then later pewter for non-tributary Indians, differentiations which probably resonated with Chesapeake peoples. The medal for the Machoticks and Patawomecks, for instance, reads “Ye King of” on one side to exclude others from using it.57 Even if an Englishman never laid eyes on it after it was struck by a smith, such objects still served a purpose for werowances by using an understood medium to reify preexisting distinctions between neighbors and strangers, and between warriors and superiors. But unlike preexisting hierarchy, metal badges had the power to affect how Algonquians moved across the Chesapeake, with only elites holding explicit power to walk into English territory. The wear on the gorgets, almost completely through the silver in the case of the Pamunkey badge, demonstrates that some were part of the werowance’s uniform.58

However, physical markers of exchange and relationship like these also reinforced long-held Algonquian ideas about reciprocal giving between allies and the power of Indian elites to broker these exchanges. Silver Indian badges and colorful matchcoats are rightly discussed by historians and anthropologists as ugly legal


markers of racial difference imposed by the English. Written land deals and agreements were an extension of settler colonialism, “under procedural formalities cast in the language of voluntary contract and value-for-value, [concealing] a drastic and absolutist ambition to clear Indians from the field of property.” But, at the same time, contemporary Algonquian leaders more than likely interpreted and used them on their own terms. Unlike the badges of “striped stuff,” the silver, copper, and pewter metals held both economic and cultural significance to Algonquians, for whom the inter-Indian copper trade was still within living memory in 1662. As archaeologists have come to expect, buried with Algonquians who died before and after English settlement were copper and metal grave goods in the form of jewelry, clothing elements, and tools. When in the colonial period Algonquian leaders died frequently, their governments were consolidated with neighbors, and families and tribes moved away from familiar fields, the badges connoted a personal relationship between Algonquian leader and Virginia governor. It gave the user legitimacy in the English world, and had the potential to strengthen a leader in the Algonquian world.

Most Algonquians probably did not use badges and traveled among the English all the same, a reflection of understood, local use of shared spaces like roads. Factors unanticipated by the architects of the badge system made it obsolete, including the constant stream of English into Indian territory, the constant movement of the line between Indian and English people due to English settlement over the border, and the absence of a visible, physical boundary between Englishmen and Indians. Most

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colonists, after all, did not have maps that demonstrated an aerial distinction between empire and its fringe. According to Rutman and Rutman, colonists were also probably most comfortable in surroundings within a few miles of home; their example of Benjamin Davis never left an area of ten square miles on the Middle Peninsula where he was born. For Indians and colonists going about daily business, a vernacular developed around notched trees, local landmarks (like Oyeocker’s tree), and nonvisual cues that emphasized continuity, keeping travelers on the path. One shared piece of material culture, the firearm, bridged the geographic gap between plantations and towns with an auditory signal understood by both Indians and Englishmen. Despite occasional laws that prohibited Indians from owning firearms, they were necessary for Indian inclusion in the markets for meat and furs. Englishmen and Indians within a radius of several miles heard the discharge of a weapon in solitary shots, volleys and patterns, or calls and responses, and the residents of Indian towns and English plantations were aware of each other’s going-ons because everyone integrated the report of musket fire into their lives. One trader who witnessed the funeral of a Waxhaw child remembered, “When they began to throw in the Earth an Indian fired five Gunns over him.” In comparison, this was a practice so common among the English that the Assembly specifically excepted “marriages and funeralls” from their ban on recreational shooting in 1656. Both English and Algonquians stalked small animals—deer, geese, raccoons, even

60 Rutman and Rutman, A Place in Time, 32, 121.


62 Hening, Statutes at Large, 1: 401-2.
grackles—in the woods with firearms, or found company in barking dogs on seasonal or extended hunting trips.\(^{63}\) Englishmen and Indians both understood that these sounds and sights were constant signs of the presence of both peoples.

This vernacular became useful as Virginian traders moved beyond the localized Algonquian world and into unfamiliar land occupied by different peoples, appropriating signals left by previous people to make the regional landscape intelligible to the English. Surry County planter Francis Toms, for instance, remembered that on a 1661 expedition to move the Wyanoke Indians to safety after Nansemonds assassinated their werowance, he saw “the[ir] murdered King was laid on a Scaffold & covered with Skins & mats” and “an English built house where the King had been shot.”\(^{64}\) Some traders notched trees with the number in their party, others with the names of an expedition’s leaders so that they could find the same route again without Indian guides—to the delight of later generations of traders who rediscovered them: in the 1730s, William Byrd II “found a Large Beech Tree, with the following Inscription cut upon the Bark of it, "J.H. H.H. B.B., lay here he 24th of May 1673" …Joseph Hatcher, Henry Hatcher, and Benjamin Bullington, 3 Indian Traders, had lodged near that Place 60 Years before”.\(^{65}\) That Byrd stopped for rest at the same place as the Hatchers, and his contemporaries

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\(^{63}\) Archaeology at sites occupied for extended periods has shown that wild game and fish, popular in the seventeenth century, decreased in importance as a good source of food over time, replaced by domestic stock. The faunal remains at Clifts Plantation, a domestic site on the Potomac River occupied between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries, demonstrate that 14% of animal proteins came from wild game during the mid-seventeenth century, and this proportion was even greater at other sites. Fraser D. Neiman, *Field Archaeology of the Clifts Plantation Site, Westmoreland County, Virginia* (Robert E. Lee Memorial Association, 1980), 199.

\(^{64}\) “The Indians of Southern Virginia, 1650-1711. Depositions in the Virginia and North Carolina Boundary Case (Concluded),” *Virginia Magazine of History and Biography* 8, no. 1 (1900): 3

passed by the same places as Pyancha on the Wood expedition, showed the continued centrality of Indian sites and patterns of communication. The mundanity and frequency of funeral rites or fallow fields underscored the point that the woods were not in fact “wild” as the English claimed, but thoroughly settled and cultivated by Native hands.

Virginia’s Indian traders were comfortable masters of the most Anglicized Tidewater landscapes—William Byrd at Westover, William Berkeley at Green Spring—but in the Piedmont region were forced to talk, travel, and act on Indian terms. They learned communication customs quickly in a linguistically complicated place, and much of the cross-cultural communication might have seemed familiar. Just like Appamattuck allies living near traders fired a greeting volley in 1671, when other traders approached the Indian trading town of the Occaneechees, they waited until they were within hearing of a musket shot to announce their presence.66 Then “Wee discharged severall Pistolls, which is a Custome that the English always use when they come to an Indian Town, Hearing the noise of our Arms a great many of the Indians that were in the Town came running up the Hill towards us.”67 Because firing pistols created noise at a great distance, Indians could leave their families in presumed safety, meet with the English at the point of discharge, and invite those they trusted back with them (in this case, the narrator, an Indian guide, and no one else). Such customs and communications, founded on mutual dependency and mistrust, would be impossible without the unique


67 Traunter, Travels of Richard Traunter, 18-19.
sensory experience offered by the firearm and its earlier use as a communication tool to the east.\textsuperscript{68}

However, some Anglo and Indian traders in pursuit of profit appropriated established communication lines to turn the diverse labor Indian market towards slavery. The evolving market for Indian labor connected the local and regional and the origins and fates of Indian hired workers, indentured servants, and slaves were remarkably varied. Englishmen with access to the west began to appropriate Native trade and communication lines to tap into the developing slave trade in Indians, particularly Indian children. Unlike the African labor monopolized by elites, English families in every county, middling or elite, benefited from Indian labor. Local Algonquian men might hunt for upper-class plantations, and their children might take an apprenticeship in a middling household. But Indian men might also join an expedition to retrieve war captives from afar, might sell a child from another tribe to repay a debt, or might plummet into slavery themselves as punishment for some crime. Historians often focus on South Carolina’s destructive Indian slave trade, but Virginians also willingly bought war captives and colonial officials rewrote laws to bring them into the colony as slaves.\textsuperscript{69} In fact, in the 1650s before Carolina’s founding, Indian slaves and Indians agents in the slave trade were known to the colonies immediately to the north; Jane


Fenwick died before 1660 with Indian slaves in her possession, and in 1654 Francis Yeardley observed seven Africans and a Spaniard he assumed were slaves at a Tuscarora town. Indian slave traders from numerous tribes operated in an enormous geographical area independently of traders from English colonies. One captive Virginian even witnessed a raid on a South Carolina plantation and a Spanish mission by the same group of raiders. By the 1660s, a long-distance trade in slaves from the Ohio Valley and Spanish missions emptied into South Carolina ports for export, and by 1670 Virginian traders began actively seeking Indians not just as guides but also as commodities.

In the Chesapeake, the growing long-range channels that funneled enslaved Indians east grafted onto the preexisting market in short-term Indian labor. Michael Guasco argues that beyond simply satisfying a need for labor, planters may have seen value in Indian slavery “for its ability to facilitate Anglo-American colonialism.” Not only did the commodification of Indian labor destabilize politics in the continent’s interior, it implied in Kristalyn Shefveland’s words, “the threat of enslavement to keep disobedient tributaries and hostile foreign Indians at bay.” Finally, Indian servitude also serviced

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the long-held English belief in acculturation as an answer to Indian resistance. On the most local level, for example, Accawmack parents sent their youth into the English-occupied Eastern Shore to work at tanneries, plantations, and inside households. During the 1660s and the 1670s the number of Indian laborers increased, and according to Joseph Deal, “Indian youths served as apprentices on English farms and plantations.”

In 1670, the Assembly passed a distinction between non-Christian brought by sea—which “shalbe slaves for their lives”—and non-Christians brought overland, who were to serve until thirty years of age. But by the 1680s, increasing numbers of Indians, probably victims of the slave trade in the Carolinas, served “as slaves for life.” Although they worked next to Indians whose cultures they did not share, perhaps from the Accawmacks’ perspectives, their children were part of traditional exchange—much like English boys had been only a generation before—facilitating peace with the English. In formal exchanges rather than piecemeal, parents and headmen brought groups of children to court to be “bound out” according to English documents, mirroring Wachawamp’s will. The first group of half a dozen or so children brought into service formally traveled with the Occahannock headmen to the


76 Hening, Statutes at Large, 2: 283.

77 Deal, “Race and Class in Colonial Virginia,”61. In The Indian Slave Trade, Alan Gallay notes that the Westo and Savannah groups to the South trades captives to the Virginians, before the Virginians were uprooted as primary trading partners by the Carolini ans (40-45).
Northampton County court in 1660, demonstrating the political gravity of the exchange.\textsuperscript{78}

However, these provincial, personal exchanges could quickly outgrow local relationships with just a county court decision. A merchant named John Beauchamp told the Charles City County court that he had the consent of an Indian servant's parents to take the boy to England, and received permission from the court to take him across the Atlantic.\textsuperscript{79} In an effort to resolve his debts to the English, the werowance of the Weyanokes sold "Mettapin a Powhatan Indian" as a slave for life to Elizabeth Short. The courts ruled he "had no power to sell him being of another nation" and ordered that Short free Mettapin who spoke "perfectly the English tongue and desir[ed] baptism."\textsuperscript{80} An Occahannock man who went by the English name Pickpocket was punished in 1664 with transportation to the West Indies for repeat instances of breaking and entering. Anthropologist Helen Rountree notes that Pickpocket was "the only Eastern Shore Indian from Virginia to be so treated." Pickpocket's case recalled a precedent set by war—Governor Berkeley exported Powhatan Indians to the West Indies on his own ship after the defeat of Opechancanough—but applied to peacetime and Indian people of an allied nation.\textsuperscript{81} Certainly, no English servant was so treated. English justices who

\textsuperscript{78} Earlier estate inventories indicate that teenage Indians lived as servants with English families in the 1640s and 1650s, but their origin and fate is unknown. See, for example, the inventory of William Pinley, 5 October 1650, in Walczyk, \textit{Northampton County, VA Orders, Deeds, & Wills 1651-1654}, 7.

\textsuperscript{79} McIlwaine, \textit{Minutes of the Council and General Court of Colonial Virginia}, 4.

\textsuperscript{80} Ibid., 16.

\textsuperscript{81} Rountree and Davidson, \textit{Eastern Shore Indians of Virginia and Maryland}, 73. It is also possible that Accawmack or other Indians on the Eastern Shore were exported without comment by the courts. For a broad discussion on early Virginian Indian slavery, see C.S. Everett, "They Shalbe Slaves for Their Lives," in Alan Gallay, ed. \textit{Indian Slavery in Colonial America} (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2009), 67-108.
punished Indians by separating them from their family bonds and familiar landscapes changed the definition of Indian residence on English plantations for both the Accawmacks and the English.

Within a decade, the same county elites and Algonquians used their local relationships to intentionally enter the regional slave trade. In 1670, Accomack County citizens employed John the Indian to “procure” fatherless children—from no particular nation—for a bounty of roanoke. Instead of apprenticeship through the consent of great men, the English simply retrieved Indian children when they needed them. The emphasis on “fatherless” children is significant: Algonquian and many contemporary Native societies were matrilineal and children lived with their mothers’ families regardless of the status or situation of their fathers. But under Virginia law, fatherless English children without sufficient estates to sustain their housing or education could be bound out by the court to avoid a burden on the local parish. Though they redefined the legal bond between Indian mothers and children in English terms, English officials stopped short of breaking the formal diplomatic relationship with neighboring Algonquian and forcibly enslaving their children.

That would not last, and neither would the communication lines which originally gave slavers an opening. Nonelite Englishmen saw freedom and profit to be had from violating the legal boundaries between Indians and English, demonstrating to Virginian officials the threatening allure of Indian proximity and communication lines. In their disputes over land, labor, and trade with Indians and planters of other colonies,

82 Rountree and Davidson, Eastern Shore Indians in Virginia and Maryland, 78.
83 Hening, Statutes at Large, 2: 93.
Virginia’s elites simultaneously tore through boundaries and turned local conflicts into intercolonial disasters. The governor and Assembly were forced to rethink and redraw boundaries in order to save them.

**Communication Falls Apart**

The 1661 incident on Richard White’s plantation in Rappahannock County was an early contribution to a reign of rumors and confusion in Virginia’s northern border counties. For the English elites, fear of the bursting tobacco bubble, unknown Indian assailants, a lack of fresh servants, too many servant revolt plots, and potential Dutch invasion encouraged policing of borders. Meanwhile, Algonquians rightly feared capture and harassment from outsiders like the Iroquois, Susquehannocks, and the Rickehockians, and increasingly, their English neighbors. Tensions over land use and ownership agreements made between planters and werowances in county courts quickly spilled over county lines and reached Jamestown. The resulting conflicts, which started as small-scale disputes between neighbors, broke through the customary methods of problem-solving in local courts, on paper, and through everyday interaction that reinforced mutual dependency. Ultimately, expensive wars justified on the grounds of profitable Indian enslavement and imperative colonial security cleared the landscape of Native residents and made way for plantation agriculture.

Colonists long feared Native threats that entered Virginia from beyond its borders. When the Susquehannocks to the north sucked Maryland Englishmen into their war with Iroquois rivals, no badges or checkpoints could stop them from raiding south of the Potomac and then returning to safety in Maryland—where Marylanders habitually
defied the law and sold them weapons.\textsuperscript{84} English pamphlets discussed at length the Susquehannocks’ (real or exaggerated) executions of their war captives and (real or exaggerated) subjection by force of other Indian groups, resurrecting the specter of an intertribal alliance against Virginians that had so terrified them during the Second Anglo-Powhatan War.\textsuperscript{85} The Susquehannocks’ Iroquois enemies also ventured south from the Great Lakes region in search of new territory for the fur trade, presenting another factor beyond English control or surveillance. Less than six months after the attack on the White plantation, Governor Berkeley’s committee on Indian affairs recommended closing the border to “Marylanders, English and Indian” to halt the flow of “Susquehannock and other northern Indians, in considerable numbers frequently com[ing] to the heads of our rivers, whereby plain paths will soone be made which may prove of dangerous consequence.”\textsuperscript{86} To make matters worse, planters with African slaves raised concerns “about theyr negros being commanded to work att ye fortificacons,” either because of the proximity of escape or because of labor lost in the field.\textsuperscript{87} Instead, those with a vested interest in shutting down illicit trade stepped forward: trader Abraham Wood, who would benefit from cutting out Maryland trader competition, was empowered to police the border.

Wealthy Virginian landowners exploited English fears, made sharper by the absence of Indian culprits to bring to court. Moore Fauntleroy decided to resolve long-


\textsuperscript{85} Alsop, \textit{A Character of the Province of Maryland}, 73.

\textsuperscript{86} McIlwaine, \textit{Minutes of the Council and General Court of Colonial Virginia}, 15.

\textsuperscript{87} Letter from Thomas Lynch to Dr. Worsly, July 8, 1673, VCRP.
standing tensions with his Rappahannock neighbors by arresting the great men and Wachiopa, the new werowance of the Rappahannocks, for refusing to pay tribute to Governor Berkeley. Such a breach of etiquette was a dangerous and seemingly foolhardy threat to authority when Englishmen were on the lookout for Indian raiders. The Rappahannocks insisted that not only had they paid the tribute, they had paid Fauntleroy a ransom for the return of their werowance and great men. It was Fauntleroy who had not paid, for land he bought from the Rappahannocks. Fauntleroy was barred from holding office and his other land claims made void. The Rappahannocks also used their trip to Jamestown to complain about Fauntleroy’s hogs, and Fauntleroy was then ordered to hire a hog-keeper until his servants would erect a fence. That Fauntleroy was ordered to pay Wachiopa half the payment owed for land demonstrates that colonial officials doubted that he would follow through once back in Rappahannock County. County-level officials were in a unique position to deliberately miscommunicate with officials at Jamestown, misconstruing threats, making false charges against Native leaders to discredit claims of mistreatment, and making arrests that advertised their usefulness in restoring order.

The illusion of restored order had the opposite to expected effect, breeding suspicion and mistrust of county officials. The same month that Wachiopa was arrested, Gerrard Fowke former Kent Island trader Giles Brent issued a warrant for the arrest of Patawomeck werowance Wahunganoche, presumably for the murders at the nearby White plantation. Like Wachiopa, Wahunganoche turned the tables and convinced officials at Jamestown that Brent and Fowke repeatedly harassed the Patawomecks in

88 Hening, Statutes at Large, 2: 152-53.
the past. Most damning of all, Wahunganoche testified that he had delivered one of the culprits (of unknown origins) to Fowke personally, and that Fowke had allowed him to escape. Brent and Fowke, as well as others accused by Wahunganoche of harassment, were ordered to pay the Patawomecks in roanoke and matchoats, Brent was forced to pay court costs, and Fowke was hit with fines amounting to twenty-five thousand pounds of tobacco. Fowke’s punishment reflected the real danger he unleashed on his neighbors while manufacturing a fictional one.

For the seriousness of Fowke and Brent’s crimes, the governor and council also escalated from barring individuals from office to dissolving Westmoreland County, from which Brent and Fowke had issued their illegal warrants. Dissolving the border between Westmoreland and Northumberland was a clear display of colonial over county authority, since patent and county boundaries both bore the governor’s signature. The move had serious implications for Englishmen using local office to climb the social ladder, but especially for those also using the office to broker land deals. Westmoreland’s elites fought back, determining with allied members on the commission that “the countyes shall bee two distinct countyes and their bounds to remaine as they were.” They appointed as justices elites like John Washington, Isaac Allerton, and incredibly, Gerrard Fowke. The following year, Fowke represented Westmoreland County in the General Assembly. Fowke was the latest in a line of Englishmen who

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90 John Frederick Dorman, ed., *Westmoreland County, Virginia Records, 1661-1664* (Washington, D.C.: 1972), 10-13. One of these commissioners, John Carter, patented 4,000 acres on the north side of the Rappahannock River in 1664, suggesting he may have had a personal investment in keeping these justices in place.

transgressed and helped redefine boundaries without permanent retribution, encouraging neither respect nor faith for colonial authority and the bounds they set out.

At the same time, the werowances on the Northern Neck were successful in calling out blatant corruption and receiving restitution in Jamestown. But as tensions rose, the General Assembly became concerned that the Patawomecks might drift away from their relationship with the colony to the east and towards groups hostile to the English to the west, like the Doegs. The English offered very little protection, and alliances with nearby groups also facing possible depredations from the Rickahockians and Iroquois made sense. In 1663, the Assembly imposed new laws governing only Indians on the Northern Neck, ordering that they turn over the children of werowances as security for good behavior and pursue “foreign” Indian raiders who commit crimes against the English. The law also singled out Wahunganoche specifically, prohibiting him from holding council with the Doegs or any other groups without consent from the officers of the militia. He was also to pursue the Doegs to punish murders that traders among the Occaneechee insisted they had committed. In justifying and proposing enforcement for these laws, the English pulled from the Algonquian communication networks that ran through these borders. Pushing tributary werowances to police English boundaries for them only increased the dependence and suspicion that beleaguered colonists already felt.92

Pragmatism may have driven the Assembly’s plans to turn the Algonquians into a buffer: policing the border was becoming increasingly expensive during an economic downturn and sustained outside pressure from hostile Indian groups. Commitment to

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tobacco cultivation and increasing dependence on African labor also deepened costs and consternations. In Berkeley’s words, “wee leave at our backs as Many Servants besides Negroes as there are freemen to defend the Shoare and on all our Fronteirs, the Indians, Both which gives men fearfull apprehentions of the dainger they Leave their Estates and Famelies in” while on the march.93 Early chronicler John Oldmixon wrote that in the 1660s, the Virginians could muster a force of six thousand or seven thousand men—and would leave twice as many at home to guard the plantations and servants.94 The 1663 Assembly session determined that “the unnecessary feares of the Indians by Some perticular persons hath put the Country to an excessive charge,” and ordered each of the four major rivers to pool financial resources for their own defense.95 Berkeley saw the expenses of stopping runaways from leaving and Indians from coming into the country as interrelated, writing, “wee begin to make provisions for these our people fly to Maryland, and by this meanses heighten our publik charges; and weaken our defence against our perpetuall Enemies the Indians.”96 Perhaps not by accident the 1663 Assembly reconfigured their “ineffectual” laws concerning retrieving runaways.97

These tensions negatively affected the already strained relationship with the Patawomecks particularly. In 1664, not only did crops fail and servants plot “to arme

97 Hening, Statutes at Large, 2: 187.
them selves with their masters armes,” but according to surveyor (and Richard White’s coroner) John Catlett, “the King of Potomeck” was hatching a plot to “extirpate” all the Englishmen from the northern Chesapeake.98 Perhaps unlike Brent and Fowke, Catlett truly believed the Virginian colony was at stake. He and other settlers from Rappahannock and Westmoreland counties petitioned for Governor Berkeley’s aid in suppressing attacks from “the Northern Indians,” but not receiving an immediate response, pretended ignorance of any “plot” and agreed to aid the Patawomecks in destroying the Rickehockians, who the Patawomecks insisted were the real murderers.99 Catlett suspected that the Patawomecks had guessed their plan, but remained cool because “they had so cunningly wrought their business.” In other words, Catlett claimed he knew that the Patawomecks knew an attack was imminent, but that the Patawomecks did not know Catlett knew about their own impending attack. Through an orchestrated effort across Patawomeck territory, Catlett and others captured nine “chief conplotters as wee supposed,” stole weapons from others, and brought the Patawomecks to Jamestown to be tried for murder.100

98 John Catlett to Thomas Catlett, April 1, 1664, Misc. Manuscripts, John D. Rockefeller Library, Colonial Williamsburg Foundation, Williamsburg, VA.

99 “Petition of planters from Rappahannock and Westmoreland Counties,” in Billings and Kimberly, Papers of Sir William Berkeley, 209. Original source not found. In response to their remonstrance, the Assembly passed a law ordering that the Patawomeck turn over Indian children hostages as insurance for good will, and that the werowance of the Patawomeck pursue the unknown Indian murderers of English families, who the Assembly suspected were Doegs. Hening, Statutes at Large, 2: 193-94. Because the letter mentioned “pursuit of the Arickehockians” rather than Arickehockian villages or people, it is likely that this group is an Iroquoian-speaking people, perhaps the Susquehannock, who were frequenting the area on the Maryland-Virginia border at this time, or Iroquois raiders, who came south seasonally. See James D. Rice, “Bacon’s Rebellion in Indian Country,” Journal of American History 101, no. 3, (December 2014).

100 Catlett to Catlett.
“But to ye astonishment of all that knew any thing of the certainty of this affaire,” all nine men were dismissed and sent home with a reward, surely a slap in the face to the elites who had risked life and reputation on that certainty. Why had the Patawomecks not met English justice, this time? In a tangled ball of lies, it is difficult to tell politics from paranoia, and no Patawomeck “plot of extirpation” was mentioned beyond Catlett’s account. John Catlett was quick to blame “private Interest,” but the debacle only a few years before was a breach of trust between the colonial and county governments on the Rappahannock, and officials at Jamestown knew what to expect.¹⁰¹ Further, according to Catlett’s own account, the Patawomecks were a human barrier between much more hostile groups, like the Doegs, and much larger groups, like the Iroquois—and their mutual amity was much more consistent.

Promising profit through the policing of borders temporarily brought county and colonial officials together. In response to supposed Doeg raids in 1666, Catlett and three other planters wrote a missive to Jamestown proposing to pool the military resources of the northwestern counties as an investment: “wee doubt not wth assistance of Almighty God by the strength of our Northerne parts utterly to destroy and eradicate wth out Further Incouragment then the spoyles of our Enymies.”¹⁰² Berkeley agreed that rather than another law or court decision, the wholesale destruction of the Doegs was necessary for fear of an alliance with “these other Indians,” probably the Susquehannocks. “It may be done without Charge” he wrote, “for the Women and

¹⁰¹ Catlett to Catlett.

Children will Defray itt.” Berkeley hoped to convince young men, some of whom had sat out the Accomack march only five years before, to fight “for their share of the booty.”

On his way home from Governor Berkeley’s acquittal in 1664, Wahunganoche died. The English declared war on and enslaved many of the remaining Patawomecks during their war on the Doegs in 1666; that same year, descriptions of Fowkes’s property mentioned no Indians and interestingly, no specific western boundaries at all. “All the land comonly called by the name of Machapungo formerly enjoyed by the King of Potomack” remained in Fowke family hands, the exact boundaries disputed for decades. Proximity to Indian settlement facilitated elite land grabs, even as friendship and exchange made for years of neighborliness. The migration and violence of other Indian groups, probably Susquehannocks who had also come south to take Patawomeck captives that same year, provided further justification for the removal. Finally, despite pursuing livestock husbandry, the English badge system, redress through the court system, and diplomatic relationships with English officials, the Patawomecks were not immune to English warfare, enslavement, and removal.

However, encounters like these had unforeseen and long-term results. On the surface, Governor Berkeley’s plan for the “Northern Indians” seemed chillingly pragmatic, but he failed to foresee that shutting men like Catlett out of their justice

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104 Catlett to Catlett.

105 “The Case of the Deft., Fitzhugh vs. Fowke,” Fowke/Fowlke Family Papers, Shirley and Albert Small Special Collections Library.
system, and opening the door for slavery wars for profit, would turn Englishmen away from both local compromise verdicts and colony-wide diplomacy. As Catlett angrily wrote, “should the like occasion happen I believe wee of the northern parts fronters to the Indians shall not be so forward as wee have been for publique redress of o[u]r wrongs.” The schism between county and colonial redress meant that Englishmen sought to neutralize individual Indians, particularly leaders, they blamed for violence and land disputes. But another, more insidious tendency to fear “that there was a combination of all the Indians in these parts” justified a war for enslavement on “all the Indians,” within and without English boundaries.  

**A Different Strategy on the Eastern Shore**

The situation differed markedly on the Eastern Shore, where a denser population of Englishmen and isolation from Anglo-Indian western warfare created a less distrusting relationship between Indians and Englishmen. Eastern Shore Algonquians, like the Patawomecks longtime allies of the English, had been more successful in fending off extralegal attacks from Englishmen. Perhaps in response to Scarborough’s aggression against their northern neighbors like the Assateagues and Nanticokes, Algonquians on Virginia’s side of the border asked Berkeley directly for protection against encroachment in 1660. “The English seat so neare them, that they receive much damage in their corne,” probably again from wandering livestock. The governor authorized a reservation be surveyed to exist in perpetuity, “that they may have no

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106 Catlett to Catlett.

107 Catlett to Catlett.
power to alienate it.”

Lacking legal, economic, or social justification, Edmund Scarborough yoked English fear and outright vigilantism to remove the Indian presence in a personal pursuit of land.

Rather than collapse boundaries, Edmund Scarborough used his power and office to create new ones. In 1663, Scarborough divided Accomack and Northampton Counties along their present bounds, giving two-thirds of Virginia’s Eastern Shore to Accomack County despite its tiny English population and appointing himself sheriff. With his appointment as Accomack’s chief magistrate and Surveyor-General of the colony in 1663, he grew bolder in establishing new boundaries of all kinds. Without the idea of movement into a “frontier” like on the western shore, the possibility of expansion of any kind was cut off for Northampton County planters on the tip of the peninsula like it once was for Scarborough. That he erected a fort at his plantation of Gargaphia sometime in between his copious conflicts with Algonquians demonstrates that he anticipated conflict with Indian neighbors where there had not been any before.

Like Berkeley and Catlett, Scarborough saw economic downturn, servant plots, political infighting, and fear of Indian attack as interrelated threats to elite control. He faced fire on his plantations from servants who threatened him with death, burned down a barn, assaulted him with words or farm implements, and attempted escape to the Dutch. He was present during the 1663 Assembly that reconfigured runaway recapture laws, placed increased burdens on the Patawomecks, and cracked down on


109 Rountree and Davidson, Eastern Shore Indians of Virginia and Maryland, 70.

110 These incidences are discussed in Deal, “Race and Class in Colonial Virginia,” 147-150.
Quaker meetings. Given an order from the Assembly (alongside John Catlett) to redraw the border with Maryland, he chose to exploit growing fear by choosing an enemy he shared with the governor: Quakers and the runaway servants and dissenters they harbored. Following a familiar script, in October 1663 Scarborough travelled with forty horsemen, some again from the western shore, to disputed territory between Maryland and Virginia with the intention of claiming land for Virginia and Accomack County.

The battle was one-sided because it was fought not between Maryland and Virginia, but between the most powerful and the most marginalized of Virginians over formalized boundaries. As it concerned the settlers who lived there, the boundary was a given: everyone with whom Scarborough spoke knew himself to be in Maryland. According to a proclamation issued by Charles Calvert, Scarborough was indeed “many miles into this province to the Terror of the people…there by him long before seated by vertue of a Comission from this governmt.”¹¹¹ Moreover, the settlers had no other reason to be in Maryland but to be elsewhere besides Virginia. The first man Scarborough encountered was Stephen Horsey, an official who probably knew Scarborough’s high-handedness from his earlier time as a Virginian. According to his official report to the governor, Scarborough promised to arrest Horsey, who continued to claim his home sat in Maryland, for “Contempt & Rebellion.” Horsey shrugged, “The Governor of Maryland will Come soe soone as you are gone and Hang me & them at our doares.” Scarborough arrested the Maryland official anyway and “sett the broad

¹¹¹ Calvert also noted that Scarborough traveled without his fellow surveyors into Maryland territory, and that Governor Berkeley disclaimed any knowledge of his actions. Charles Calvert, “Proclamation,” in Archives of Maryland, ed. William Hand Browne, vol. 3 (Baltimore: Maryland Historical Society, 1885), 497.
arrow on the doore" to claim Horsey’s home for the king. Scarborough then stopped in to check on some Quakers and other former Virginians, Thomas Price and George Johnson, the latter whom Scarborough called a “proteus of heresy.” More indignant and verbose than Horsey, they refused to assist Scarborough. The Virginians arrested them, carved arrows on their doors and moved on to the next house. (The owner of this house, Henry Boston, asked that Scarborough come back another day.) Amazingly, Scarborough held a "Court of sirvey" and coerced the Maryland commissioners into recording the land of the new Marylanders as part of Virginia. Finally, he “agreed to” appoint new officials. His justification to Berkeley:

“That if a report of Col. Scarboroughs coming from troopes of horse had not prevented together with a slooape of his full of armed men, seeking Runawaies had not hapned their in that juncture of time to the terror of the Indians, they had undoubtedly bin cutt of[f], therefore desired course to be taken therein which accordingly was done.”

Scarborough once again thwarted an imaginary enemy, this one a bizarre combination of laboring-class runaways, dissenter, and the monolithic Indian threat (probably with reference to Maryland’s unending disputes with Algonquians on the north side of the line). For Scarborough, all personified the threat to elite control: “very insolent robbers,” Indians and “the English their residing and other vagrant & ingaged persons…without law and government.” Scarborough did not name a specific Indian group or individual as a potential robber or murderer. But their very identity as a wild card, used by

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Scarborough to strike desperation into Jamestown officials and to call landholders to arms, identified diverse threats as a cohesive political unit. More importantly, Algonquians did not ally one colony over another or one class over another, like Horsey and his Quaker neighbors seeking settlement where autonomy remained possible. In this case, the Indians’ geographical liminality, associated to the gentry with “Runawaies” and even a “proteus of heresy,” served as justification for their demise.

While Scarborough’s campaigns to move Virginia’s border seem like conflicts apart from day-to-day life for Indians, the unmediated violence precipitated breakdowns of Anglo-Indian customs and gave Eastern Shore Algonquians reason to fear. The need for labor and land fueled his final and most violent attack on the northern fringes of Virginia’s Eastern Shore in 1670; when in April the General Court forbade him from altering the line between Maryland and Virginia once more, there was nowhere left to go.115 Berkeley’s arrest warrant, issued twenty years too late, speaks for itself:

Col. Edmund Scarburgh hath contrary to my order and the Peace long since established between us & the Indians unjustly & most Treacherously oppressed them by Murthering Whipping & burning them, By taking their children by forcing from them who are their Parents & many other waies to the apparent hazard of the said Peace established.116

The struggle to defeat Indians with excessive, brutal military force and to take their children revealed the tie between Indian war and English thirst for land and labor. It was one thing to absorb Indian neighbors’ children as servants and Indian slaves from


faraway nations; it was another to enslave a neighbor’s children despite formal diplomatic and legal ties that protected them.

Knowing Scarborough would not face justice in the county he had created, Berkeley ordered him remanded without bail and brought to Jamestown. Somehow, Scarborough simply refused to be arrested—he stiffly informed the marshal he was headed that way anyway—and escorted himself to James City to take his seat in the House of Burgesses. Only then was he stripped of his office. What followed was a political coup of sorts following the strategy of Westmoreland County’s dissolution: the Assembly reunified the counties and Northampton residents dominated the new administration. But the wealthy planters and traders of the next decade, some already sitting among the Burgesses with Scarborough, saw what wealth might be gained, and social problems eliminated, by challenging the permanence of colonial borders and enacting vigilantism against Virginia’s closest Indian allies. Simultaneously, Indians on both sides of the English colonial border observed how malleable and selective English law and English-Indian diplomatic relations were.

**Crossing Borders for Freedom**

While formal relationships broke down in court between planters and headmen and marches on the borders rushed and receded, ties at the individual level stretched but did not break in many localities where co-existence previously prevailed. English servants, African slaves, and Algonquians employed their own strategies for coping with servitude. Between them, they sustained a very different cross-cultural exchange, geared towards an exit strategy. Where those connections formerly afforded Virginia elites their alliances, inside of rival geographies their charges appropriated their connections to escape or better their own lives. Between households, servants of
disparate backgrounds watched elites move to suffocate the exchange across borders, and they ran while referencing past and contemporary Indian geographies.

Indian servants originating in the Chesapeake, already part of the communication networks that ran between Indian towns and plantations, depended on by their masters for their geographical knowledge, were especially efficient runaways. There were more Indian servants every year, and they were more difficult to retrieve. Planter Giles Brent’s own Indian servant, Thomas, went to Maryland in 1660 to trade on behalf of his master and “returned nott.” Edmund Scarborough’s Indian servant Humphrey confessed in court that he “absented himself” for six months, an exceptional feat for any servant attempting to run away alone. In one incredible odyssey, Wincewack escaped to Maryland twice over the course of three years, gone for a total of twenty-two months between 1667 and 1670. He was only returned when the werowance of Metomkin, Amongos, was locked in prison for harboring so many runaways. Still others fought: Indians John the Bowlmaker and Jack of Morocco grabbed the constable “by the hair of the head and drew blood from him” when the constable attempted their arrest.

Following the generation before, Africans continued to travel across the Chesapeake in pursuit of trade and control over their own labor. A sailor invited two Africans in York County aboard a ship, but before long they were caught by a constable and jailed in his home. The constable woke to find his clothes, his canoe, and the


119 McKey, Accomack County, Virginia Court Order Abstracts, 3: 31.
Africans missing—this time for good. An indeterminate number of Africans, led by a woman named Pendall carrying her son, left Accomack County in a stolen boat and navigated across the entire bay, finally stopping at Thomas Goodrich’s plantation in Rappahannock County and working there for a year. Lancaster County’s court committed small planter Thomas Naylor to a month in jail because “hee did trade wth: a Negroe belonginge to Coll. Edward Carter” in goods amounting to 240 pounds of tobacco. Thomas Phillips traveled to court to sue his master for freedom in Middlesex County; irritated that he was kept in slavery, he pursued his own buyer who agreed to free him after twenty-one years. Looking beyond the plantation to escape or at least soften the impact of slavery, Africans built far-reaching networks of advocates and partners in illegal activity mirroring those of Algonquians.

Indian and African runaways often ran away with fellow servants, raising the expense of retrieving them. A man named John joined English servants at a different plantation—Governor Berkeley’s plantation—in an escape that lasted two months. Planter William Jones’s Indian and English servants both ran away frequently, and in 1665 he accused his tanner of encouraging his Indian servants to run away under threat that Jones wanted “to send them to the Barbadoes,” a threat that probably carried

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weight after Indian servant Pickpocket’s fate.\textsuperscript{125} Since it was difficult to punish a werowance or great man for harboring a runaway, the onus fell on overseers and masters to retrieve them and then to pay any requisite court costs. Such was the case for Hugh Baker, an overseer for a widow named Mary Drew. Not only was he ordered to the nearby Indian towns to recover another man’s Indian servant beaten by Drew’s white servant, but he was also smacked with court charges.\textsuperscript{126} Andrew Price emptied his master’s house of arms, powder and shot, and fishing implements—but no food—and ran away. When he was caught and returned, “there was one gun brought back again.”\textsuperscript{127} A pattern of resistance, an exchange of time and distance for goods, encouraged servants to look beyond Virginia much like elites.

Proximity and intelligence about the movements of others informed oftentimes ambitious plans for escape. Over the course of a year, at least thirteen servants along Nandua Creek, regardless of sex, race, and master, planned a voyage to New England. Perhaps Isaac Medcalfe began calculating shortly after he first arrived with his master Ambrose White in Virginia and remarked that “he never saw any people kept so in the country before, and if he had so long to serve here as some of us had, he would hang himself before he would serve it.”\textsuperscript{128} Medcalfe and White had come south from

\textsuperscript{125} In Deal, “Race and Class in Colonial Virginia,” 63.

\textsuperscript{126} Walczyk, \textit{Northampton County, VA Orders, Deeds, \& Wills 1651-1654}, 77.

\textsuperscript{127} McKee, \textit{Accomack County, Virginia Court Order Abstracts}, 3: 9.

\textsuperscript{128} The deposition of Renny Sadler, one of the servants caught with Medcalfe, mentioned Medcalfe was inspired by four men from Pocomoke escaped via boat. In 1669, three male servants belonging to three masters successfully escaped Somerset County; one of them had previously been employed in Long Island so their masters assumed they were headed north. Atwood S. Barwick, ed., \textit{Archives of Maryland}, vol. 86 (Baltimore: Maryland State Archives, 1999) URL: http://aomol.msa.maryland.gov. Although the escape was planned and almost executed in 1670/1671, the depositions were not taken until mid-1672.
Maryland’s Eastern Shore, where Medcalfe heard that four servants had escaped together in a boat headed for Long Island. He relayed their success to other servants who feverishly spread his story. It rolled from chatter to plot when two other Virginia Eastern Shore servants, Renny Sadler and Laurence Gary, ran plantation to plantation along Deep Creek and the Nandua and reported back that, if they would plan an escape, most servants at each plantation would come with them. An agreement “to knock the person on the head who should first reveal it” added gravity and certainty.

The conspirators relied on news from across the colony, and across class boundaries, to pick the perfect moment. First they settled on April of 1670, with the onset of spring and their masters’ preoccupation with reunifying Northampton and Accomack Counties, but let the date pass unremarked.\(^{129}\) Meanwhile, they noticed changes afoot “at the Assembly,” which increased the bounties for runaways to a thousand pounds of tobacco and encouraged masters to seek redress against their servants in court, even if they inflicted corporal punishment at home.\(^{130}\) Finally an opportune moment came when planter Captain Richard Hill, one of the masters of several involved servants, was otherwise occupied in James City. Coordinating the perfect time to strike required intimate knowledge of the Virginia elite working calendar along with the weather.

Women also played a vital role that remained invisible in previous runaway attempts. Once a rare sight on the Eastern Shore and across Virginia, “maids” and “wenches” like Mary Warren worked double duty for their masters and the other

\(^{129}\) Deal suggests that the logistical trials of reunification helped Indian servants run away. Deal, “Race and Class in Colonial Virginia,” 68.

servants. Although John West’s servant woman Francis was on the verbal ship’s manifest, Mary herself had no intention to sail; regardless little by little she made extra cheese and butter, stashed sails and flour, made linen and stole storehouse keys from her master’s bedchambers. What Mary Warren could not do herself, she delegated to male servants to fetch or hide. All these women kept the plot a secret, including Lawrence Gary’s own wife, who also chose to stay ashore. The foodstuffs and clothing these servant women provided were dangerous to their masters’ hopes for recapture, making possible longer journeys. That they worked for no obvious benefit demonstrates that the comradery among servants crossed gender lines, even if the work performed is conventionally prescribed to Englishwomen. That they were caught hoarding an enormous amount of food—including fourteen or fifteen cheeses—suggests that the work of helping men escape was often communal or even female to begin with.

Also apparently required was an extensive, unwritten inventory of each household’s resources comparable to those of other households. In the window of time planter Richard Hill was gone, the runaways and their compatriots stole goods valued at an astounding 13,260 pounds of tobacco. At various moments, they planned to take Captain West’s gun and Jenkin Price’s son’s boat; John Carter stole sails and Thomas Watts promised to procure a compass. Robert Milner knew that Tabitha Smart’s petticoat was red and big enough for a sailing flag. All the while Medcalfe methodically set aside time away from his master’s home, whittling away planks into oars. The greater value in goods they stole, the greater the stakes; lost goods directly translated to time added to an indenture by the court.
The youngest of the conspirators, seventeen-year-old Alexander Swann, squeezed through a crack in the earthen walls of his master's storehouse the night of the escape. While he groped for bottles of brandy in the pitch black, he heard a gunflint hit the hammer of a pistol fractions of a second before it discharged in his face. The plot had been betrayed, and Alexander Swann was among the last to know. Receiving news that two men were captured loading stolen goods into a boat and had plans to tie up their master and mistress for lead time, it seems Swann's master sat awake in the dark waiting with powder but evidently no shot. Swann ran for his bed and lay still while others discretely mitigated the damage. Medcalfe chopped his new oars to pieces. Mary Warren hastened to replace the stolen goods before her master would find them missing "and said that she never saw such fools in her life to loose such an opportunity as that, for there was in the milk house a great deal…that she ordered for our voyage."

John Carter laid the stolen sails, now torn, in the creek for his master to find. When interrogated, he blamed unknown thieves from somewhere beyond the plantation. To his co-conspirators he joked, "Was it not well turned? Let [me] alone for a scurvy trick any time."¹³¹

Despite the seriousness of their theft and conspiracy, they hid evidence rather than turn on one another. Escape still seemed within their reach. The two men taken prisoner in a storehouse yelled ominously through the walls that "We shall be loose again" and a new plan was hatched for Christmas. Thomas Watts suggested they sail to Venice "and there they would live." Their hopes hung on the focal point of any escape plan: a pilot. With a pilot, they could get to Maryland or New England or Venice; without

¹³¹ McKey, Accomack County, Virginia Court Order Abstracts, 3: 64-67.
one, no amount of planning mattered. The pilot who agreed to take them was a “Black James that came down with Cornelius a Dutchman’s wife.”132 “Black James” is difficult to identify, but the lack of last name suggests he was a non-English person. Medcalfe protested his innocence and blamed the influence of the fellow servants who had turned on him in their testimonies. He lived past the trial but probably stayed a servant for longer as punishment: his master, Robert Pitt, died before Medcalfe was freed.133

Such coordinated and large escape attempts and a clear sense of vision rarely appear in records, but Medcalfe and his fellow servants correctly sensed the walls closing in on illicit attempts at freedom; the Assembly attempted to crush the cross-racial alliances that made possible elaborate escape attempts, and made special provisions for the “neighboring Indians” who independently negotiated with the miserable servant class. Just months after the servants’ trial in September 1672, the General Assembly passed “An act for the apprehension and suppression of runaways, negroes and slaves,” which added a distinctly racial component to the earlier laws against runaways. Because “many negroes have lately beene, and now are out in rebellion in sundry parts of this country” and “Indians or servants shoul
d Andy chance to fly forth and joyne with them,” the Assembly legalized the wounding or murder of “Runaways either negro, mulatto, Indian slave or servants, resisting.” Promising

132 Ibid., 64-67.
133 McKey, Accomack County, Virginia Court Order Abstracts, 3: 64-67, 111. While only he could have known about the success of Pocomoke runaways in Maryland as a Marylander, indicating his intimate involvement in planning the revolt, Medcalfe may have been truthful when he said he was framed by his fellow servants. Of the many servants mentioned as conspirators, the majority (nine) came together to the Eastern Shore from the same boat, all claimed as headrights by Devereux Browne. Medcalfe was one of the few not on that boat. When they missed their chance with Black James, two servants from the original plot went to searching for another pilot and found two more men at the home of a nearby yeoman.
rewards, the Assembly also required “neighboring Indians…to seize and apprehend all runaways whatsoever that shall happen to come amongst them.”\textsuperscript{134} The planters’ fear of rebellion and lost property, built on their violent accumulation of servants and land, combined to raze the open landscape the Indians and English built together on the Eastern Shore.

**The Rebellion**

For Chesapeake Algonquians, Bacon’s Rebellion was the result of a long series of simmering tensions: between Algonquians and outside Native foes, between Indian traders and planters, county and colonial governments, and ultimately between competing visions of how geographical and social borders might unite or divide disparate groups. The conglomerate of people who took part in the rebellion undermined the authority of Berkeley’s colonial government in part by defying borders that Berkeley had helped raise around personal property and English plantations. The central irony of their rebellion—that it was fueled by the food, plunder, knowledge, and now fear of Indians—also describes the irony of the seventeenth-century battle over boundaries. On a landscape interconnected by Indians, in Bacon’s words, “I ventured to cutt ye knott.”\textsuperscript{135}

Ironically, key moments in the conflict demonstrate that Nathaniel Bacon’s rebels relied on fear of Indians, Indian loot, Indian labor, and Indian intelligence to maintain their hold over the Chesapeake. Bacon led 211 men to the river surrounding the Occaneechees’ fort deep in the Piedmont in May 1676. Their number was half of what it

\textsuperscript{134} Hening, *Statutes at Large*, 2: 299-300.

\textsuperscript{135} “Mr. Bacon’s acct of their troubles in Virginia by ye Indians, June ye 18th, 1676,” *William and Mary Quarterly*, 9, no. 1 (July 1900): 9.
had been days before, and they ran low on provisions after their last stop among the Nottoways and Meherrins. The Occaneechees’ fort was a nerve center for Native intelligence and goods, another in a long line of fortified bastions Englishmen had used and later targeted with only their own ends in mind. Bacon had traveled days to reach the sustenance and intel promised by such a site. The Occaneechee chief Persecles, an ally of the English traders, agreed to replenish English provisions and, equally critically, informed Bacon that the enemy he was after—the Susquehannocks—were camped nearby. Would the English like to venture after them?  

English accounts of what occurred afterwards differ—either as evidence of Persecles’ or Bacon’s betrayal. The Occaneechees brought the Susquehannocks into the fort and put them to death, but soon a disagreement erupted between the Englishmen and their allies over either prisoners or provisions. It ended with the fort aflame, with men, women, and children—Occaneechees and Susquehannocks alike, inside. Forty or fifty Indian allies lay dead, including Persecles, and his daughter was among the women and children Bacon and his men “disposed of” as slaves.  

With plunder and victory won by harnessing and then betraying Indian alliances and communication lines, Bacon turned back to Jamestown to face Governor Berkeley.

After the slaughter of the Occaneechees, Bacon’s ranks swelled as he moved eastward towards another confrontation with the governor. In the coming months, his army of five hundred men demanded Bacon be given a commission to pursue Indians,

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supported his “Declaration of the People” labelling the existing government corrupt, and demanded fealty from the county governments. Although Bacon died of disease in October 1676, bitter fighting continued between Loyalists and multiple small armies comprised of Africans, servants, middling farmers, and several elites—a nightmare scenario for Jamestown’s reeling government. Edmund Morgan in *American Slavery, American Freedom* points to the rebellion as a turning point towards racialized slavery and the consolidation of elite power:

> If freemen with disappointed hopes should make common cause with slaves of desperate hope, the results might be worse than anything Bacon had done. The answer to the problem, obvious if unspoken and only gradually recognized, was racism, to separate dangerous free whites from dangerous slave blacks by a screen of racial contempt.\(^{138}\)

For many, Bacon’s call to arms against the Indians had little to do with Indians or Bacon himself. Some were frustrated by the decline in tobacco prices. Rebel leader Richard Lawrence threatened to burn the tobacco crop to the ruin of merchants sitting in ships nearby, “And that the Burning of the present Crop, would heighten the Value of the next.”\(^{139}\) Public levies also grated on the average planter, who saw “the building of forts back in the woods upon severall great mens Lands, under pretence of securitie for us against the Indians which we perceiving and verrie well knowing that ther pretence was noe securitie for us.”\(^{140}\) Besides, depredations on English plantations continued unabated since “the Indians quickly found out where about these Mouse traps were


\(^{140}\) Henry Read McIlwaine, *Minutes of the Council and General Court of Colonial Virginia 1622-1632, 1670-1676, with notes and excerpts from original Council and General Court records, into 1683, now lost* (Richmond, VA: Virginia State Library, 1924), 101.
sett, and for what purpose, and so resalved to keepe out of there danger.” After Berkeley temporarily banned the Indian trade, some probably recognized the potential for loot, like wealthy and recently licensed Indian trader William Byrd, who purportedly stole a thousand pounds worth of goods traveling through Gloucester County. Perhaps the Meherrin and Nottoway, who joined the campaign to the Occaneechee fort, had a raid in mind from the beginning. “Many evill disposed servants” and slaves “did depart” and led a separate fight for freedom, some holding a strategic point up the York River until the very end of the rebellion. They only surrendered when told they could have freedom at the governor’s discretion—only to be returned to their masters downriver. Contrary to allusions to the “rabble,” however, elites and middling farmers, not just the desperate and uneducated poor, were well-represented in looting and violence against Indians.

Bacon emigrated to Virginia only a few years prior to the rebellion, but for some followers his campaign was about the long and personal histories of violence they shared with Indians. In petitions to England, a young man recalled the parents he lost in Opechancanough’s 1644 attack, while an older Englishmen referenced his loyalty to the colony through his service “under Sir William Berkeley against the Great Indian Emperor

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141 History of Bacon’s and Ingram’s Rebellion (Cambridge: Press of John Wilson and Son, 1867), 50-51.
Appochaukonaugh, when he received several wounds."^{145} For those who remembered the Anglo-Powhatan Wars, some scenes would look familiar: families waiting behind “Pallisadoes and redoubts,” where “no Man Stirrd out of Door unarm’d.”^{146} The language of the just war against non-Christians returned: John Godfrey of Rappahannock County on Virginia’s fringe wrote in his 1676 will, “wee have a faire Election to be destroyed by ye HEATHEN, & no more then our deserts for it is Just with God to cutt us of[f] for our Sinns & Wickedness that is daily enacted among us.”^{147} And many of the players were the same. In 1677 Charles II received a packet from “Coll: Wm: Claiborne a Poor Old servant of your Majesty's father & Grandfather,” who at eighty-nine years old rallied Loyalists against rebel forces. He then mentioned the rebellion and his illustrious career leading wars against Indians in his final petition to grant compensation for the loss of Kent Island in the 1630s.^{148} Giles Brent, who married into Kittamaquud’s Christian family and had occupied William Claiborne’s former post on Kent Island, crossed the Maryland border to pursue the Pamunkeys with the rebels.^{149}

Among those who left a will behind was Edward Gunstocker, the former Nanzatico tribesman who found safety among the English in previous years. “Now

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^{145}Petition of William Howard and Petition of Henry West, quoted in “America and West Indies: November 1677,” in Sainesbury and Fortescue, Calendar of State Papers Colonial, America and West Indies, 10:174-86.


^{147}Sparacio and Sparacio, Old Rappahannock County, Virginia Deed & Will Book Abstracts 1677-1682, 26.


^{149} “A True Narrative of the Late Rebellion of Virginia, by the Royal Commissioners, 1677,” in Andrews, Narratives of the Insurrections, 1675-1690, 123.
designed upon an Expedition with the English against my Countrymen the Indians,”
Gunstocker joined the rebellion after news of Jamestown’s destruction spread and only
days before Bacon’s death. At the time, Bacon’s forces cruised along Indian paths
through woods surrounding English settlements with Indian scouts, looking for Indians
to capture and destroy. Perhaps it was not by accident that among “the first that was
taken was a young woman belonging to the Nanjaticoe Indians, half starved, and so not
able to escape. The main of them fled and upon search made after them they
discovered and killed two or three Indian men and as many women.”

Chesapeake Algonquians were the victims of Bacon’s forces because of their
proximity. Their intimacy with the English, Bacon’s allies argued, made them a danger.
During the rebellion, Indians came down the paths from inland where settlers caught
glimpses of them; others looked at their Indian neighbors with new suspicion. In
Gloucester County, Bacon’s forces took all available guns and horses from English
residents, leaving them vulnerable to unfamiliar Indians they now saw daily. Perhaps
not incidentally all of Gloucester refused to join Bacon’s army. From the first, Bacon
attempted to drive apart Algonquians, settlers, and the governor’s forces. After he
“seized two Indians, a man & a Boy, who then did & always had lived in peace &
friendship amongst the English, these he bound to trees, & wth much Horror & cruelty
put to Death, without examining their crime,” loyalist Phillip Ludwell wrote nervously that

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151 “A True Narrative of the Late Rebellion of Virginia, by the Royal Commissioners, 1677,” 125.
152 William Sherwood, “Virginia’s Deplor’d Condition,” Microfilm 228, Albert and Shirley Small Special Collections Library, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA.
former Indian friends “are now our worst enemies, having had a frequent and free intercourse amongst us these 20 odd years, & well knowing our Plantacons and manner of Living.” Bacon upended a delicate balance and bred more insecurity and fear.

The pursued Algonquians mitigated risks and resisted, recognizing that the rebels simultaneously depended on Indian knowledge even as they actively sought to destroy it. They moved to temporary locations in pocosons and subsisted on wild foods, as Powhatan himself had promised John Smith they would: “What can you get by warre, when we can hide our provisions and fly to the woods? Whereby you must famish by wronging us your friends.” The Pamunkey werowansqua, Cockacoeske, stayed in a camp on a pocoson that eluded Bacon’s Indian scouts and mired Bacon’s soldiers in swampy ground. A fellow Pamunkey was captured beyond the camp, withheld knowledge of Cockacoeske’s hideout, and led the men off course instead, for which Bacon ordered her execution. Finally discovered and forced to leave her temporary village to the pillagers, the werowansqua avoided capture for two weeks living in the woods with a child from her tribe. Dozens of other Pamunkeys were captured to be sold into slavery.

At the end of the rebellion, when vulnerable to both Susquehannock and settler attacks, some western tribes sought sanctuary in English homes and the intercession of English leaders, leaning on the relationships they had developed with nearby landholders with some success. The president of the Assembly, Nicholas Spencer,

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helped his neighbors the Nanzaticos who “notwithstanding their strong desire to peace, and endeavours for it, had bin destroyed by our wild headed rabble, if I had not interposed, and restrained them, to their dissatisfaction.”

Local relationships could not stop looting and enslaving elsewhere, however; the engagement of Wahunganoche and Naeheoopa with county leadership was no protection against a colony-wide and profitable purge.

Very aware of Native mobility through the interior of the continent, English governors from New England to Virginia passed frantic letters back and forth about the curious timing of their respective wars and skirmishes with the Indians. They were particularly concerned about the possibilities that the Susquehannock War, Virginia’s war against its Indian allies, or King Philip’s War in New England might reach past colonial bounds. Governor Berkeley decided in February of 1676, before the rebellion began, that “The infection of the Indians in New-England has dilated it selfe to the Merilanders and the Northern parts of Virginia.”

Rumors swirled that Bacon rushed messengers to Carolina and Maryland, and even New England to persuade colonists “with large remonstrances and reasons for his taking arms.” Some Maryland blamed “The French (who is believed hath a great hand in the late New England Indian warr and burning Boston).” Virginia’s Assembly blamed the governments of Carolina and

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156 Nicholas Spencer to Thomas Notley, VCRP.
158 Governor Lord Vaughan to Secretary Coventry, January 4, 1677,” in Sainsbury and Fortescue, Calendar of State Papers, 2-13.
159 “Complaint from Heaven with a Huy and crye and a petition out of Virginia and Maryland,” in Browne, Archives of Maryland, 5: 134.
Maryland for such a long rebellion, since they had failed to send reinforcements to Berkeley. In addition to letting traitors through, Maryland and Carolina long habitually failed to police their borders: “Our Servants and Slaves Runn away thither upon any fault Committed, Sullen humo' r & disgust of theires…Indians that are soe mortally enimyes to us, are in peace and amity with them, and upon all injuries offer’d us retreate." Although they only meant to pass blame, the Assembly was correct: shared borders meant that crumbling colonial authority in one colony could soon affect its neighbor’s authority. They justly feared a future of constantly contested boundaries.

After the fact, though, middling landholders at the local level revealed longstanding dissatisfaction with how county leaders dealt with Indians and land use. Sent to the English military commissioners restoring order, the collection of county grievances often mentioned high levies and corruption, but contradicted one another based on their location when it came to Indian relations. Although their Indian neighbors had little to do with the rebellion, Isle of Wight County landholders on the southern Virginia border were exposed to Indian raids and the taxes that came with forts and asked that “ther may be a continuall warr with the Indians that we may have once have done with them.” In an effort to avoid levies altogether eastern neighbors in Nansemond made the unreasonable request that, “no Pson bee paid or allowed for any reall or prtended services.” To the immediate north, men from James City County

160 McIlwaine, *Minutes of the Council and General Court*, 98.


162 McIlwaine, *Minutes of the Council and General Court*, 102.

163 Ibid., 88.
suggested a peace be reached with all neighboring Indians and a return to mapped
“bounds...between us and them.”164 Meanwhile in the northwest, Rappahannock County
men asked for immediate peace with the Indians, and in strong words that every county
pitch in to cover the costs of the past and future wars: “o[u]r neighbor Counties are soe
narrow hearted & close fisted as to think it none of their duty to assist us in destroying
the blood thirsty Indians, but would willingly leave us to fight the battles of the
Republique.”165 Westmoreland County authors agreed with their Rappahannock
neighbors, but asked that a specific tribe, the Doegs, be eliminated for revenge killings
which occurred before the rebellion.166 Lancaster County also asked that the Indian
trade be completely halted and that the colony declare war on a small group of Indians
living next door in Northumberland County.167 Each set of men had in mind not Indians
in general, but those nearby with whom they dealt every day, and with geography in
mind they wrote in support of preserving their livelihoods instead of the colony. There
was no one Anglo-Indian relationship, but many different relationships and negotiations
developed over generations, and multiple visions for the future of the Chesapeake.

Regardless of location, many county grievances and petitions highlighted the
self-interested nature of elite participation in Indian conflicts and its costs to landholders;
in the Lower Norfolk County men’s words, “wee humbly desire to know what is done wth
our money.” Northampton County’s landholders reminded the commissioners that “our

164 Ibid., 107-8.
165 Ibid., 105.
166 Ibid., 107.
167 Ibid., 89.
county som yeares since was contrary to our expectation divided into two Counties to our great Detriment and Loss notwithstanding ye great advantage of Colonel Scarborough," and they asked for their land back from Accomack County.  

Rappahannock County men examined the very beginning of the rebellion, in which Virginian militia leaders chased Susquehannock hunters over the border and into Maryland where they were killed by Maryland’s militia. They politely suggested the officials, “would be pleased to examine & Know by what Authority Coll George Mason & Major George Brent went over into Maryland & Killed severall of the Indians there wch wee suppose was the Originall cause of the murthers Comitted in o[u]r Country.”  

The Charles City County grievances and several testimonies and petitions skewered Edward Hill, probably the son of the man who went into battle with Totopotomoi twenty years earlier. “A most notorious coward and insolent turbulent fellow,” Hill was accused by tenants and fellow elites alike of calling the militia for a week out to plunder rather than protect the county, and of attempting to sell governor’s pardons to men who fought Indians under Bacon. In one spectacular case, Hill purportedly imprisoned a man as a rebel at the Hill plantation at Westover, where the man then saw Hill’s servants walking around in the prisoner’s new stockings he had left at home.  

Hill issued a grievance of his own against the Charles City County grievances. But the rebellion eroded the authority of local elites, and demonstrated to other Englishmen that planters with

168 Ibid., 99.

169 Ibid., 106.

170 Andrews, Narratives of Insurrections, 26. Charles City County Complaints against Edward Hill, June 12, 1677, VCRP.
enormous tracts of land like Hill were willing to take advantage of westward expansion, boundary transgressions, and the chaos that resulted.

Scholars of the early Chesapeake blame Nathaniel Bacon, a newcomer, and his rebellion for crushing Indian autonomy from the Piedmont east, yet the traders and planters who preceded him, were the ones who, having once sought Indian partners in exchange, then chose to use those longstanding Indian networks in order to destroy them. If we put Bacon in the context of Scarborough and his peers, his rebellion seems old hat. As Virginia transitioned towards social stratification and large-scale tobacco planting, from an open, shared geography to a battleground of rival geographies, structural and military violence became crucial to expansion. As Alan Taylor writes, “More than minor aberrations, Indian deaths and the African slaves were fundamental to the success of colonization and the prosperity of the free.”¹⁷¹ Men like Scarborough taught the next generation of elites to ask for neither permission nor forgiveness, to take advantage of gaps in the fence, and to redefine boundaries, particularly Indian boundaries, for profit from land and labor. Only through brutality at the fringes could planters consolidate power on their own plantations. In sum, successful planters demanded not just land but uniformity of landscape; control of labor was predicated upon control of land. But the battle was far from over, and Native efforts in defense of their polities, lands, and families would continue in both new and old ways.

CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION

The flow of people and goods through the Chesapeake irrefutably and irreversibly changed over the seventeenth century, bringing in former enemies like the Susquehannocks and Rickehockians by mistake or by trade, pushing Algonquians towards said former enemies, and increasingly pulling Native children indentured and enslaved onto English plantations. All of these movements were the byproducts of Indian ambition or creative solutions to the diminution of power. Throughout it all, the English could map but not control where these Indians moved as Indian leaders and English elites bargained and fought at a local level for land.

In the aftermath of Bacon’s Rebellion, Cockacoeske went to the colony level to undo some of the damage of the conflict to both people and place. Her dealings as werowansqua with the Virginian government began when in 1656 "Tatapatamoi her Husband had Led a Hundred of his Indians in help to th' English against our former Enemy Indians, and was there Slaine with most of men; for which no Compensation (at all) had been to that day Rendered."\(^1\) Unsurprisingly, she chose to keep Pamunkey men out of this conflict twenty years later, and was proud to say only eight warriors died during the rebellion.\(^2\) But when the colony seized traitors’ estates and redistributed their goods to Loyalists, that included enslaved Indians. The Weyanoke werowansqua’s brother, for instance, was captured by Bacon but resurfaced in London as a servant to

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\(^1\) T.M. “The Beginning, Progress, and Conclusion of Bacon’s Rebellion,” 26.

the Culpeper family.\textsuperscript{3} Petitioning the commissioners who replaced Berkeley’s
government, Cockacoeske extricated all but five captives from English homes and
plantations, and an Indian woman was even returned at the colony’s expense from
Bermuda in 1682.\textsuperscript{4} She then secured the return of land appropriated when the
Pamunkey originally headed for the pocosons to escape Bacon’s men, as well as
fishing and hunting rights in western lands. Her translator, Cornelius Dabney, wrote to
one of the commissioners that it “very much rejoice her heart that she had such
instruments as yr Honr to make her favorable at ye Court.”\textsuperscript{5} The restoration of means of
subsistence as well as family through a relationship with the new Virginia government
gave Cockacoeske new bargaining power.

Cockacoeske then began the process of pulling other Indians into this
relationship and into the Pamunkey orbit, to make them “of the same mind and affection
to His Majesty as herself.”\textsuperscript{6} She complained to the colonial government that former
Powhatan tributaries who had long been independent, like the Rappahannocks,
disregarded her authority. At the treaty signing at Jamestown which formally ended the
conflict with the Algonquians, the werowansqua signed “on behalf of herself and those

\textsuperscript{3} Henry Read McIlwaine, \textit{Minutes of the Council and General Court of Colonial Virginia 1622-1632, 1670-
1676, with notes and excerpts from original Council and General Court records, into 1683, now lost}
(Richmond, VA: Virginia State Library, 1924), 83.

\textsuperscript{4} Ibid., 83, 151.

\textsuperscript{5} Cornelius Dabney to Francis Moryson, June 29, 1678, VCRP.

\textsuperscript{6} Cockacoeske to Francis Moryson, June 1678, in Sainsbury and Fortescue, \textit{Calendar of State Papers},
256-268. For more on Cockacoeske’s consolidation of power over Chesapeake Algonquians, see Martha
W. McCartney, “Cockacoeske, Queen of Pamunkey: Diplomat and Suzeraine,” in \textit{Powhatan’s Mantle:}
\textit{Indians in the Colonial Southeast}, ed., Gregory A. Waselkov, el al., (Lincoln: University of Nebraska
scattered remnants of Nations, anciently and now again united under her Subjection.”

In the few years following, Cockacoeske set out to bring the Chickahominies, always an independent people, under her subjection and in doing so, settle long disputes that repeatedly flared since the sixteenth century. By attempting to control Pamunkey and Chickahominy movements between Indian towns, she followed the mode of Opechancanough and Powhatan in generations before. When, for example, the Chickahominies would not return Pamunkey women and children helping to shuck corn, her translator wrote to London about it. She also employed Native rumors to her advantage, reporting on suspected poisonings and supposed plans of attack. Crucially, she also pointed out to the English ways her interest in controlling Native mobility intersected with theirs, like when the Chickahominy promised but failed to mobilize warriors on behalf of the English, or in one case, refused to return an Englishman’s Indian servant’s runaway wife. As enslavement of Indians and Africans grew in Virginia, a new, harder boundary between Indians and Englishmen required enforcement from somewhere inside the Native-dominated West. None of these tactics were new to a werowansqua, but they were now backed by consolidated English authority also vested in restraining Indian mobility.

For Indians, Bacon’s Rebellion was not a transformative moment and their situation changed little in the ensuing years. In fact, the Algonquians’ knowledge of the interior proved crucial in the dire times that followed. The Susquehannocks came back to raid Virginian plantations and surrounding Indian towns tributary to the colony; these

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7 John Berry, unknown letter, VCRP.

8 “Grievances against the Chickahominies,” VCRP.
raids pulled the King of the Doegs away from home in 1677 and brought him back again in 1690, providing the stage for the diplomatic negotiations with which this dissertation began. The situation only worsened for Algonquians when the Susquehannocks joined the Iroquois, and the movements of these “Northern Indians” proved difficult to track or predict. Ironically, Nicholas Spencer asked the Susquehannocks’ enemies the Mattawomans, who lived in Maryland, “to goe out with them after those Indians, wch have committed the Murthers [against the English].”9 And like before, Chesapeake Algonquians were not above using English fear and the rumor mill to their own advantage: in 1704, a Chickahominy great man complained that a fellow Chickahominy named Tom Perry “broke down his Cabbin beat his woman & threatened his life.”10 In reprisal the following week, Indians Coscotrunk and James Mush burned down Perry’s house. When it seemed that the blame would shift back to him, Perry added that Musk and Coscotrunk planned to join the Iroquois to destroy the English.11 Lacking proof, Perry’s accusation came to naught. But he proved that Indian intelligence about comings and goings across the Chesapeake provided Algonquian individuals with special access to colonial officials and the court system.

As the Chesapeake landscape changed, Algonquians remained at the center of the politics and violence surrounding expansion, and their geopolitical knowledge bought them the continued power to limit and adjudicate border transgressions well into the eighteenth century. In 1699, werowansqua Betty Queen brought her great men to

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9 Letter from Thomas Notley, January 1677, VCRP.
11 Ibid., 367.
Virginian officials and accused one of the wealthiest men in Virginia, Ralph Wormeley, of violating the 1677 Articles of Peace signed by her aunt and predecessor, Cockacoeske. A committee formed to examine land claims—and to gather a case to push Virginia’s southern border into North Carolina—met with the Pamunkey delegation that demanded a patent to their land and refuted Wormeley’s claim on at least five thousand acres that a surveyor “did enter, survey, and lay out…to their great prejudice and breach of the said Articles of Peace.”¹² The Wormeley family had claimed no fewer than three Indian towns in previous patents, and now the Pamunkeys claimed they saw Wormeley and the surveyor laying out new tracts within a mile of their town.¹³ The committee made many decisions that damaged the long-term future of Virginian Indian sovereignty over their land: the Pamunkeys were no longer allowed to sell land to non-Indians, the Crown absorbed much of the unclaimed land, and many English claims to their lands were upheld. However, elites like Wormeley were at least temporarily shut out from claims to the Pamunkey Neck. Instead, the Indians’ English neighbors now permanently seated “Indian leases,” usually less than a thousand acres originally rented to them by the Pamunkey themselves. In this way, the Pamunkey leadership contoured the character of settlement in the English community surrounding them. By 1701, the Pamunkeys’ lands had been surveyed at the colony’s expense, strengthening the case of other groups, like the Chickahominies, that their lands should be “laid out” and

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protected as well. Betty Queen and her great men used the power of diplomacy and their understanding of the legal system to guarantee the Pamunkey a tangible and inviolable stake in the Chesapeake landscape.

The continuity of the Algonquian presence in the legal system ironically guaranteed the continuity of the rival geographies and resistance to the growth of plantation culture. Into the eighteenth century, Algonquians maintained power and authority over Native land—and through intelligence and communication, lands claimed by Englishmen—even as colonial ideas about property boundaries and colonial borders evolved and hardened. Algonquian leaders and even troublemakers like Perry alternately employed the legal system and illegal behavior to exercise their own ideas about how the shared Chesapeake landscape ought to be used.

As Indians continued to shape the landscape beyond Virginian plantations, they partially shaped the central conflict between African-Americans and Englishmen on the plantation. Anglo-Indian border disputes and Indian communication with Virginia’s diverse enslaved and indentured laborers informed English laws and customs concerning tithes, runaways, travel, and militia patrols. Simultaneously, the routes to freedom, to the Great Dismal Swamp maroon settlements or beyond the colony, were first and continued to be Indian. The Chesapeake’s English landscapes and rival geographies of the eighteenth century were connected to one another by roads and paths Indians of the seventeenth century could navigate.

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14 McIlwaine, Minutes of the Council and General Court, 169, 172.
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