To Lia and Koralia
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STATE EMERGENCE AND INTERSTATE CONFLICT: DETERMINANTS AND EFFECTS OF NEW STATE BEHAVIOR

By

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Chair: Laura Sjoberg
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This work focuses on the behavior of new states by developing theoretical and empirical links between state formation processes and conflict propensity. More specifically, I claim that different processes of state emergence will have a resonating and empirically distinct effect on the future behavior of new states. Drawing insights from the territorial change and democratization literature I develop a novel theoretical framework that links pre- and post-independence domestic and interstate dynamics, ultimately leading to an explanation of new state demeanor. Methodologically the dissertation relies on a systemic analysis of relevant data covering all years and all inhabited regions from 1816 to 2001. The primary empirical tests utilize epidemiological methods of inference, while the results are validated via matching techniques for robustness purposes. In essence, I show that new states behave quite differently than their older counterparts and that their behavior can be attributed to their birth legacies. One of the most significant implications of my study is that for the past two decades the conflict and democratization literature has erroneously promoted a number of spurious empirical relationships by ignoring the inherent heterogeneity in the international system as an indirect consequence of state formation processes.
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Overview, Puzzle, and Question

On June 26, 1991, after two years of heightened ethnic tensions, the first of the independence wars marking the beginning of the Yugoslavian disintegration was initiated between the federal republics of Serbia and Slovenia following the latter’s official declaration of secession the day before. By the end of the following year four new states had emerged (Slovenia, Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and Macedonia), two of which – Slovenia and Macedonia – managed to escape the ongoing conflict relatively unscathed. In 1996 the Yugoslav wars seemed to be over after an additional state gained its independence (Bosnia). Two years later, however, violence erupted in Kosovo between the Serbs and ethnic Albanians, an indication that the process of the Yugoslavian breakup was not complete and that ethnic self-determination movements had not yet been fully satisfied. As of this day two more states have seceded from Serbia (Montenegro and Kosovo) bringing the total count of new countries emerging by the dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) to seven (Allcock 2000; Trbovich 2008; Lampe 1996).

At about the same time the Yugoslav conflict was taking place Czech and Slovak elites were contemplating the partition of Czechoslovakia. In what later became known as the “Velvet Divorce” the parliaments of the Czech Republic and Slovakia declared their independence from the federation in 1992. In contrast to the cases of Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Montenegro – but very much alike Macedonia and Slovenia – the two successor states came into existence (i.e. gained international recognition) the following year without experiencing pre-partition violence, ethnic and territorial contestations, or boundary disputes (Innes 2001).

Although the secessions of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia were roughly concurrent and
in close geographical proximity, the new states that were created did not share similar experiences in regards to their interactions with neighboring nations. More specifically, the Czech Republic and Slovakia did not engage in any militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) with politically relevant states since their independence in 1993. Contrastingly, five ex-Yugoslavian states (all but Kosovo and Montenegro) experienced numerous MIDs involving neighboring countries, spanning from three (Slovenia) to twenty-three (Serbia), including several spells of violence that barely came short of an interstate war. The above observations, then, posit the following question: why did some of these new states experience (or express) interstate aggression from (or towards) their neighbors so soon after their independence?

The cases of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia are neither idiosyncratic nor unique in the history of the modern nation-state. In about two hundred years, system membership has exploded from a mere 23 states in 1816 to 195 states in 2011.¹ During the 20th century alone 181 new states were formed,² while 32 political entities lost their statehood, as a result of partition, termination of colonial rule, unification, annexation, conquest, and liberation from military occupation.³ This influx of states in the system meant that new boundaries had to be drawn and new interstate relationships had to be established, often affecting the security and threat calculi of neighboring nations. Some new nations were integrated peacefully in the community of states forming strong ties with their neighbors shortly after their emergence. Others merely managed to avoid interstate disputes. Yet others became either aggressors or targets of revisionary actions.

¹ Correlates of War (COW) System Membership data (v2011).
² Some states did so multiple times. Cuba, for example, gained its independence from the United States in 1902, then lost it to the US in 1906, only to regain it again in 1909.
³ It should be noted that new states can only be formed by partition, decolonization, unification, or liberation from military occupation.
The empirical puzzle this study attempts to address, therefore, has to do with observing a great variation on the demeanor of new states towards their neighbors and vice versa. Hence, the research question could be formalized as follows: what are the dynamics that influence the behavior of new states in the system and how do they affect the prospects of interstate conflict?

In this project, I attempt to answer this question by investigating the hypothetical link between the process by which a state was created and militarized interstate disputes. More specifically, echoing Goertz and Diehl (1995), I argue that state emergence is a sub-systemic political shock that bears significant ramifications for the study of international relations, thus justifying our scholarly attention. What is unique about state creation, as opposed to other “shocks” (e.g. global wars), is that this kind of a political shock can be conceptualized as the direct outcome of a fixed range of mutually exclusive processes. As such, building a theoretical and empirical bridge between the immediate antecedent conditions and the aftermath of this shock should be both feasible and desirable. Overall, this study seeks to complement traditional approaches on conflict processes that have ignored this link inadvertently “[imposing] a massive *ceteris paribus* assumption” (Lemke 2011: 1; italics in original).

At the core of this study lies an implicit attempt to theoretically connect prestate-level\(^4\) processes and interstate behavior. The challenges inherent to such a proposition are considerable. Identifying when the birth and death of a state occurred can be a relatively simple task. Most scholars concur that the birth of a state is denoted by international recognition. The death of a state, although slightly more challenging, is generally presumed to occur either when a state

\(^4\) With this term I refer to the state (e.g. Yugoslavia) that existed prior to the emergence of the new states (e.g. Serbia, Croatia etc.), not the environment before the creation of the concept of “modern nation-state.” I prefer the term “prestate” to “substate” as it relates to specific conditions of a state about to be created rather than the internal dynamics of any state in the system.
officially dissolves and is substituted by one or more political entities or when it loses its territorial or political sovereignty. Numerous data repositories (e.g. the Correlates of War project) have this information readily available.

However, this is not the case regarding prestate processes. For instance, a state partition ends with new political entities emerging but the origins of the process are usually unknown or highly contested. Did the process begin when an ethnic group officially submitted a request for self-determination? Was it initiated when the dissolved state was itself originally created by attempting to unite populations of different ethnic identities? Does the temporal length of such a process play any role to its outcome and/or the subsequent behavior of new states? How far back in time should one go in order to identify the origins of state-creation processes? Ultimately, is there a reason to expect that the internal dynamics of these processes are relevant to our understanding of new state behavior? Similar questions may be raised concerning the source of agency when transitioning from the prestate to the interstate level. For the latter traditional IR approaches have settled on the state as the primary actor. The former, however, requires a much more detailed approach in order to identify the primary agents and to assess their impact on both the process and the behavior of the new state, if any.

To that effect I argue that any answer to the above questions fundamentally promotes a specific set of arbitrary, untestable, assumptions. These assumptions will in turn dictate the temporal, spatial, and analytical scope of the study. To put it into perspective, the claim that the aftermath of the Yugoslavian dissolution has its roots in the post-WWII policies of Josip Tito, while it carries merit, it imposes the assumption that both Tito and his policies are still conducive to the interstate behavior of the post-Yugoslav states more so that the process of state-creation (violent secession) itself. What is more, such an argument rests on the underlying axiom of
idiosyncrasy, prohibiting an across case comparison. Since I am more interested on the post-independence interstate behavior, for the purposes of this study I will focus on the nature of state-formation processes rather than their idiosyncratic characteristics. In other terms, I assume that the origins and impact of said processes can be comparable across cases and time. Additionally, as the phenomenon under investigation happens to be new state demeanor, the causes that lead towards each of the four state emergence processes are theoretically irrelevant. Violent secessions, for instance, regardless of their antecedent conditions are expected to affect new state behavior in similarly identifiable ways.

**Why Focus on New States**

New states neither emerge in a vacuum nor are created by accident; their independence is a result of a series of intentional domestic and/or external actions that are likely to inform the behavior of a new state and of its neighbors for the foreseeable future. Even without discussing the precise consequences of specific state formation processes, the demeanor of a new state’s should be expected to be qualitatively different from that of an old state, especially if conceptualized as the cumulative vector of a quint-dimensional pull. First, all else equal, the domestic environment of a new state encompasses certain particularities not present in older states. Politically, the new nation needs to lay the foundations for its preferred political structure, admittedly a time consuming affair. Leaders of contesting elites are expected to compete in order to fill the power gap that appears after independence. New constitutions have to be written and political powers to be consolidated. The new government will be expected to maintain internal stability while attempting to retain its legitimacy both domestically and internationally. Economically, the new state will have to establish a new currency, build its industrial sector, attract investment, and establish trade relations. Societally, it will need to instill to its citizens notions of a shared, common, identity that will serve as the national point of reference. Such an
identity will effectively distinguish the in-group from the out-groups, acting as the underlying adhesive for the citizens of the new entity. Notwithstanding the above, perhaps the first priority of every new state is to build a security apparatus that will allow it to survive against domestic and external threats. A strong military reduces the chances that further internal decomposition of the nation will occur and curbs potential revisionary intentions from other states. However, apart from a handful of exceptions, new states rarely emerge militarily powerful. Most have to endure long periods of vulnerability and insecurity before achieving what they consider to be “acceptable” levels of military power. It is during these transformative periods that they are expected to attract aggression as they lack the necessary means to deter or thwart aggressive actions.

Second, a new state faces a different set of challenges when it comes to its interactions with other states; these challenges are usually absent when only old states are concerned. The birth of a new state – a de facto territorial change (Tir 2006) – always results to territorial gainers and losers. Territory is perceived to be a highly valued commodity since no state can exist without sovereign rights over a specific spatial domain. Additionally, territory is irreplaceable, non-substitutable, and of a finite quantity, which suggests that territorial acquisitions correspond to a zero-sum game. Territorial gainers are those new states now occupying territories that were previously integral or extrinsic parts of other nations. Territorial losers, on the other hand, can be both new and old states depending on the process of emergence. For those new states that emerge as territorial losers (e.g. Serbia) state creation denotes an unwilling cession of much of what they perceive as their territory to their new neighbors. As such, state creation results in a special, often friction-laden, subset of interstate relationships that occur between said gainers and losers. These pairs of states are more prone to experience disputes over land as an expression of
dissatisfaction over territorial distributions. This effect becomes even more accentuated if one considers that new international boundaries require time to become institutionalized. The territorial dimension associated with state creation, therefore, indicates that new states, when compared to old states, emerge with a greater inherent tendency to express (if losers) or become the recipients of (if gainers) territorial claims and revisionary actions.

Third, the reaction of an old state to the emergence of a new nation in close proximity leads to different behavioral expectations in new-old when compared to old-old state dyads. State creation signifies change in the regional status quo. It has been well documented that status quo revisions provoke negative sentiments and reactions, especially when achieved via violence (Tir 2005; 2006). Established members of the international community are less likely to accommodate or accept amidst their ranks a new state that achieved its independence with the use of force, severely hindering the prospects of dyadic cooperation and harmonious coexistence. From the old state’s perspective, a violent uprising in an adjacent territory that results in the emergence of an independent political entity is perceived as extremely threatening. The fear of a contagion of intrastate violence over interstate boundaries may lead to a range of possible outcomes, not the least likely of which may be a preemptive military mobilization or a political intervention. The elevated levels of threat and the proximity to its source, in turn, are conducive to an environment of distrust, which is likely to be reciprocated by the new state. A peaceful emergence will be met with less resistance from neighboring old states, although sentiments of hesitation and reservation are expected to persist in the short-term until those new states effectively signal their amicable intentions and stabilize their domestic environments. A possible exception to the above could be found in those cases where old states have strong pre-independence ethnic or cultural ties with new states.
Fourth, new state’s demeanor will be dependent on the stance of the international community, not only the reactions of neighboring nations. An international condemnation of a political entity’s emergence, much like in the case of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, is going to be detrimental for its future and its statehood acquisition aspirations. In extreme instances a refusal of recognition from at least the prominent actors of the international system bears severe consequences. The new entity officially resides in a grey area outside the confines of international law; as a “self-declared” state its sovereign rights over its territory are not recognized, therefore not protected, with the potential exception of a very small minority of interested parties. For all intents and purposes, an international refusal of recognition denotes a de facto illegitimate territorial occupation. As a result, the new entity is denied membership to intergovernmental organizations, such as the United Nations, and is unable to form trade partnerships or alliances with any state outside the small circle of its patrons. Less extreme and more frequently observed instances of the international community’s reaction to the birth of an entity have to do with a delay in granting the latter with statehood or a partial recognition (e.g. Palestine). In these occasions the community may want to signal its initial opposition or reservations insofar as the legitimacy of the process by which independence was achieved is concerned. In these cases, the new entity faces a prolonged period of uncertainty during which it is more likely to become a recipient of revisionary actions as a particularly vulnerable target. In addition, temporary international isolation may feed hardliner elites and, in turn, extreme sentiments of nationalism as the only means to maximize the chances of survival at these early statehood stages. On the other hand, an immediate positive systemic reaction to the birth of a state signals international approval and is more likely to be correlated with prosperity and peace (Coggins 2014).
Fifth, a new state should be expected to behave differently than an old state due to maturation and generational effects. Maturation refers to the psychological, albeit observable, development of distinct behavioral traits that affect one’s character, personality, and demeanor. Although a fuzzy concept, maturation can offer us certain insights if applied to states as on individuals. The behavior of states is greatly affected by past events; historicity guides the creation of heuristics, which in turn informs actions and reactions. A new state usually emerges devoid of experiences associated with navigating interstate affairs. As an immature entity, therefore, its reactions to external stimuli are expected to be distinctive and, to some extent, unpredictable. An operational definition of maturation escapes the focus of this study since it would be an almost impossible task to define precise criteria by which a state can be categorized as mature as opposed to immature. That being said, the adoption of the theoretical construct of maturation suggests that behavior is temporally dependent, an implication that has been largely ignored by contemporary approaches to international relations. In other words, states are born, they familiarize themselves with their environments, they learn how to behave based on past experiences that accumulate over time, while constantly adapting to an ever-changing system; on average, one might argue that the more mature a state is, the greater the chances of survival. In addition, maturation also suggests that the impact of external stimuli in the formation of behavioral traits can best be described as a logarithmic function, meaning that the experiences amassed during the first years following the creation of a state have a disproportionate effect on demeanor when compared to the diminishing return of experiences that occur after long periods of time. When applied to the citizenry of the new state, maturation refers to generational effects associated with the memories of independence maintained by those individuals who witnessed the state’s birth. A violent ethnic conflict, for instance, that resulted in a partition will be
remembered by those involved and attempts to be transferred to the younger generations will be undertaken. As time passes by, however, the collective influence of those memories and past experiences on people’s attitudes is expected to decay. Put simply, the impact of a violent past will not last forever. For the above reasons maturation implies that the process of emergence will not have a temporally persistent effect on state behavior, although that effect is expected to be rather significant during the infantile stages of the new entity.

The international community of states could not be further away from a homogenous group of actors, which is precisely how they have been treated by the literature so far. The five dimensions outlined above provide us with a logical justification for evaluating the claim that new and old states may exhibit distinguishable behavioral patterns. If we accept the notion that state age is relevant to the study of interstate interactions the logical next step should be to disaggregate the sample and focus primarily on comparing the new members of the international system to their older counterparts, which implies a de facto rejection of the blanket ceteris paribus assumption that has dominated empirical conflict analyses to date. Even new states, however, should not be considered to be a uniform group. A simple historical overview of a limited pool of cases would indicate that their behavior varies significantly, even among cases that exhibit similar post-independence characteristics. This leads us to hypothesize that state age alone cannot account for this variation. The only viable alternative, therefore, would be to create a new approach that incorporates state-birth arguments as central to analyzing state behavior.

It should be noted at this point that this study attempts to build on traditional conflict processes approaches already in existence, not substitute them. The task undertaken herein is to be viewed as an effort to improve on the literature on the basis first of additive and then of integrative knowledge cumulation, rather than substitution. Moreover, the exclusive focus on
new states in this study does not aim in identifying the root cause of all wars and conflicts; rather, the goal is to explore whether the process of state emergence itself accentuates or dampens the baseline likelihood of interstate violence.

The outline of this project has as follows. Chapter 2 summarizes the research relevant to new states and their formation processes. Arguments pertaining to territorial change, violent territorial transfer, border institutionalization, and the impact of political shocks are also included therein. This theoretical and empirical review highlights not only what we know about new states, but – more importantly – what we have opted to ignore. The purpose of this chapter is to lay the foundation for the theoretical arguments that follow by focusing mostly on the shortcomings of the conflict processes literature. Chapter 3 presents an integrated theoretical model that ties pre-independence processes and new state behavior. Although the primary goal is to explain interstate violence expressed or experienced by new states, the theory also incorporates arguments that deal with expectations of democratization and harmonious neighboring relations, thus tapping into the territorial peace thesis as well as the positive peace literature. The research design is presented in detail in Chapter 4. A discussion of relevant variables, operationalizations, measurements, and concerns over validity issues ensues. The chapter concludes with an analysis and selection of the appropriate methodological tools for answering the question at hand. The presentation of the findings and their substantive, comprehensive, interpretation takes place in Chapter 5. In Chapter 6 I present a model linking birth legacies and intrastate behavior, in order to holistically understand how and why new states are different. Finally, the seventh chapter offers an overall assessment of the study, including suggestions for the improvement of future conflict approaches along with policymaking implications and avenues for future research.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

Overview

Contemporary conflict literature has by and large ignored the potential effects of state emergence and state age on new state behavior. In Lemke’s (2011: 1) words: “[w]hen making predictions about wars, alliances, trade levels, etc., IR researchers assume that Great Britain and the Democratic Republic of the Congo are directly comparable entities. Given comparable stimuli, Britain’s and the DRC’s empirical behaviors are expected to be very similar.” This blanket assumption is not only problematic in explaining interstate interactions. In its core lies an even more flawed ontological axiom. By ignoring the pre-state conditions that led to a state’s birth, International Relations researchers treat the theoretical construct of the “state” as “exogenous or prior,” rendering state formation processes irrelevant and inconsequential (Coggins 2014: 19). As such, with very few notable exceptions, engagement with state-creation and its aftermath has been sporadic and fragmented, mostly revolving around either specific case studies or three types of conceptually distinguishable research objectives: a) pre-independence state-formation mechanisms; b) post-independence domestic processes and effects; and c) long-term determinants of domestic stability and sustainability of new states (e.g. Mahoney 2010; Roeder 2007; Coggins 2014; Tilly 1975; Rokkan 1975; Cooper 2005; Prakash 1995).

A comprehensive understanding of new state behavior requires a theoretical and empirical link between pre-state dynamics and post-independence effects. Such an endeavor is laden with several challenges for state birth is the end result of a number of different processes. Within the international relations scholarship different research agendas have produced arguments and findings that may be relevant to new state behavior. The most promising and insightful of these arguments can be found within the territorial conflict and interstate rivalry
literatures. In the following section I attempt a historiography of the discipline’s engagement with new state demeanor, either implicit or explicit, in order to set the ground for a new model linking state birth and interstate conflict.

**Early Attempts**

One of the earliest attempts to bridge (either directly or indirectly) the gap between the dynamics of state-creation and their impact on the subsequent behavior of new states within the confines of the IR discipline can be attributed to Maoz (1989). The core aim of this research was to comprehensively investigate the existence of empirical and theoretical links between the process of state formation and international conflict, as it relates to the conflict linkage and conflict contagion research agendas. The former is concerned with the linkages between domestic and international conflict while the latter examines the spread of violence through time and space. Maoz (1989) finds that new and old states behave differently, although after a period of time new states adjust and adopt similar behavioral patterns to those of older states. That is to say, new states gradually adapt to the challenges they face and learn to align their behavior to that of their older counterparts according to systemic expectations.

If that is indeed the case, according to Maoz (1989), the factors that may adequately account for that discrepancy can only be found in a state’s pre-independence phase. To that effect, Maoz (1989) develops a taxonomy of new states based on their formation processes. New states are either “evolutionary” if they emerge through a slow, organic, process where they gradually assume autonomy and sovereignty (e.g. “Liberia, Ethiopia, and Nepal”) or “revolutionary” if they emerge rapidly and through the use of force (e.g. “the modern Middle Eastern subsystem”) (Maoz 1989: 203-204). Although the above conceptual distinction encompasses temporal (slow versus rapid emergence) and procedural (organic versus non-
organic) elements, Maoz (1989: 209) opts to operationally separate the two processes based on the presence or absence of “political violence.” In essence, Maoz (1989) argues that political violence as a process of state formation seems to play a significant role on subsequent behavior. His findings support his claims. New evolutionary states are expected to experience less conflict when compared to new revolutionary states. The implications that follow his research are important for two reasons. The first is that a difference in the behavior of old and new states can be established empirically. The second is that this difference seems to be attributed to pre-independence dynamics rather than post-independence conditions. In doing so, Maoz (1989) has therefore effectively paved the way for a deeper investigation of new state behavior.

Maoz (1996) advances this argument further by elaborating on the logic first presented in Maoz (1989), although the restrictions of the evolutionary-revolutionary dichotomy persist. Maoz (1996) confirms that state-creation legacies have a significant impact on the domestic environment of a new state, which in turn affects its conflict proneness in two ways. First, a new state may potentially become the aggressor since its revolutionary state-creation process and its subsequent internal structure have been developed specifically to support and propagate a violent demeanor. Second, a new state may attract aggression since its revolutionary political structure can be perceived as unstable and threatening by members of the international community. Alternatively, evolutionary state “births” develop conflict-dampening mechanisms very early on given the peaceful nature of their transition from sub-state to state entities. Interestingly enough, Maoz (1996) also finds that new state behavior approximates old state behavior when the latter undergoes political change. More specifically, the post-independence behavior of new states approximates that of old states experiencing increased levels of political instability due to regime change and/or regime transition. During periods of political transition states have been shown to
be more war-prone, until they become politically “mature” and assume a stable regime, although some empirical analyses contend that such a relationship is not as robust as first thought to be (Mansfield and Snyder 1995, 2002; cf. Starr and Lindborg 2003; Ward and Gleditsch 1998).

The new ground broken by Maoz (1989; also, Maoz 1996) was indicative of a scholarly turn in the mid-1990s towards process-driven explanations to the puzzle of war. As with all new approaches, however, these early steps raised more questions than they answered. For instance, the two works mentioned above ignore several potentially important determinants of new state behavior. The taxonomy employed by Maoz (1989; 1996) oversimplifies and at the same time aggregates the effects of pre-independence dynamics. Particularly, the evolutionary-revolutionary distinction seems theoretically redundant as it hinges on the mere presence or absence of “political violence.” Convincing an explanation as it may be, it axiomatically imposes an additional blanket assumption regarding state formation processes themselves (i.e. secession, decolonization, liberation, and unification) in that they are assumed to be altogether inconsequential as their individual effects are deemed to be theoretically indistinguishable. Maoz (1989; 1996) anticipates violent secessions to have the same effect on new state behavior as violent liberations. On the other hand, the territorial distributions that result from a peaceful decolonization – where the metropolis willingly cedes remote land to the indigenous population – are expected to affect demeanor in exactly the same manner that peaceful secessions – where the new states will share common boundaries as neighbors – do. In other words, the solitary focus on “political violence” fails to account for the potentially significant territorial aftermath of new state emergence, which might be important to our understanding of new state behavior. Moreover, although an important first step, Maoz’s (1996) focal analytical point seems to be “change,” not state creation per se, since his project aspired in comparing the outcomes of state
emergence to the consequences of political transformations of already established (i.e. “old”) states. The problem here is that an exclusive focus on “political change” entirely ignores the logically significant territorial ramifications every state birth entails.

Several other theoretical and conceptual issues arise. The first has to do with the duration of the self-determination process. Arguably, lengthy independence struggles, violent or not, may affect the structural characteristics of the new state and its subsequent behavior. The second relates to the intensity and duration of pre-independence violence. The claim that the presence of “political violence” has a flat positive effect on the bellicose tendencies of new states can be countered both logically and empirically. Simply put, intensely violent and lengthy struggles should be expected to have a far greater effect than an isolated act of political violence that occurred two decades before the creation of the new state. Third, persistence and consistency in regards to time and means employed by the self-determination effort are entirely ignored as influencing factors of new state behavior. Persistent, uninterrupted, independence attempts – where each of the opposing sides employs the same set of strategies and tactics during the entire pre-emergence period – should lead to substantially different outcomes than attempts where inconsistency in regards to the means and goals was exhibited. Fourth, the exact meaning of “political violence” and its precise substantive impact on the process of “political change” is never really explained or operationalized. “Political violence” and “violence” are not conceptually identical, yet their meaning is frequently confounded leaving the reader often perplexed on the true nature of the primary explanatory factor Maoz (1989; 1996) employs. Fifth, for analyses aiming in explaining political change both these two works ignore significant temporal considerations since they treat the aftermath of new state births as constant. Under this frame of mind, revolutionary new states are expected to express or be the recipients of bellicose
intentions ad infinitum, unless a new instance of political violence occurs. As such, new states are essentially assumed to be resistant to behavioral changes while political violence becomes the only medium of change in both the domestic and the international system, a fundamentally erroneous suggestion. Sixth and - to my mind - most importantly, no explanation is offered as to why some state experience evolutionary and others revolutionary births. Until this question is answered this dichotomous distinction serves only as an indication of potential spuriousness in the relationship between political violence and political change; the reasons behind the decision to inflict the former could account for the latter as well.

**The Territorial Conflict Approach**

After Maoz (1996) the discipline’s interest in new states, their emergence, and subsequent behavior faded into obscurity for the better part of the next decade. Only as the literature begun to uncover the effects of territoriality on the likelihood of interstate conflict did focus on new states attract some degree of scholarly attention again. The reason behind this development is simple: the birth of a new political entity is by default associated with territorial change. Naturally, therefore, research on new state demeanor was implicitly subsumed under wider territoriality-related questions, although establishing a direct link between territoriality and new state behavior was never the primary goal.

Understanding how relationships are impacted by the occupation of established spaces by new political entities is crucial to answering the question at hand. The territorial conflict literature adopts a different perspective in explaining interstate behavior that indirectly bears significant ramifications for the study of post-independence demeanor. Territory is conceptualized as the most important resource for states, since their very existence is contingent upon the occupation of land (Goertz and Diehl 1992). As such, states are assumed to be very
sensitive to territorial changes that affect them and extremely reluctant to cede land that belongs to them (Hensel 2012). In Diehl’s (1991) view, territory serves as both a facilitating condition for conflict and as a source of conflict, implying that geography offers states both the opportunity and the willingness to fight. More specifically, the close proximity between neighboring states may “at least create structure of risks and opportunities in which conflictual behavior is apparently more likely to occur” (Starr and Most 1978: 444). On the other hand, the salience of territory due to its value (tangible or intangible) solidifies the determination of states to fight in order to defend it or acquire it (Hensel 1996; Huth 2000; Kocs 1995; Vasquez and Henehan 2001; Vasquez 1995).

Empirical research on territory and conflict consistently points out five major findings. The first is that contiguous states fight each other more and with higher intensity than non-contiguous ones, although contiguity seems to serve more of a facilitating - rather than causal - role due to the increased opportunity for violence proximity conveys (Bremer 1992; Gleditsch and Ward 2001; Lemke 2002; Senese and Vasquez 2008; Senese 1996, 2005). Second, contiguity significantly affects the threat perceptions of neighbors leading to excessive reactions that may include bellicose behavior (Diehl 1985; Reed and Chiba 2010). Third, neighboring states tend to experience a greater number of territorial disputes than non-neighbors as shared spaces are more likely to be contested than spaces located far away from the homeland (Hensel 2000). Fourth, territorial disputes greatly increase the hazard of conflict initiation and escalation (Hensel 1999; Huth and Allee 2002; Senese and Vasquez 2008; Tir and Diehl 2002; Vasquez and Henehan 2001). Finally, confrontations over territory make conflict recurrence more likely than disputes over any other contentious issue (Colaresi, Rasler, and Thompson 2007; Senese 2005; Tir and Diehl 2002; Vasquez and Valeriano 2009). The relevance of geography, therefore,
to this study becomes apparent: state-creation is intimately tied to notions of territorial change, which implies an increased baseline hazard of violence (Tir 2006). In other words, the literature on territorial conflict implicitly suggests that new states have an inherent proclivity to experience a high volume of frequent and severe militarized interstate disputes, particularly if the newly established boundaries are situated on a disputed territorial space and/or the territory they find themselves occupying is perceived as an integral part to the survival and cohesion of another state.

Territorial change and territorial claims are not only correlated with conflict, however. Hensel and Mitchell (2005) - in a study that disaggregates types of geographical salience - find that territorial disputes over geographical spaces with high intangible value are more likely to lead to peaceful settlement attempts when compared to disputes over tangibly valued territories. Using an additive scale of three binary indicators to measure intangible value (homeland, cultural ties, and past ownership) Hensel and Mitchell (2005) conclude that states are, surprisingly, inclined to negotiate claims over psychologically invaluable territories with their foes, although the precise selection process by which a state will choose the peaceful path of negotiations over violence was left unspecified. Concerning new state behavior, Hensel and Mitchell’s (2005) findings imply that the process of state creation greatly influences the psychological value of the territory that changes ownership, therefore it affects state reactions. If their scale accurately captures the intangible dimension of “value” then secessions should render ceded territories more valuable than decolonizations, ceteris paribus. The peaceful or violent resolution of territorial claims involving one or more new states, therefore, hinges on their process of emergence by default.

Following a different set of arguments, Gibler (2012) claims that peacefully resolved
territorial disputes result in both democracy and peace. According to the territorial peace thesis, territory is considered to be extremely salient to individuals and states. Threats stemming from territorial claims are expected to receive the utmost attention of the actors engaged. States that resolve to violence in order to respond to these threats experience higher degrees of power concentration and militarization. Power concentration in combination with large standing armies necessary for safeguarding the homeland may, in turn, be used for domestic suppression and the curtailing of individual freedoms. As such, nondemocratic practices and institutions eventually prevail. Most importantly, states that go down this path are found to be more likely to escalate already existent or respond aggressively to new territorial threats, thus becoming seemingly locked in a spiral of violence and autocracy (Gibler 2012).

Conversely, peacefully settled territorial disputes allow states to turn their focus away from security concerns. Having resolved their territorial differences affected states concentrate their efforts to improving their well-being, free of external and/or existential threats. A peaceful resolution of a dispute over the most salient of issues (i.e. territory) indicates that, should a new dispute over another issue arise, states will be more likely to respond in a similar way. As a result, said states develop institutions that adopt and foster nonviolent norms of dispute resolution. In other words, they slowly begin to democratize or, if they are already robust democracies, they strengthen their established normative practices when dealing with external threats. The spiral now becomes one of democracy and peace.

An added dimension to the territorial peace thesis has to do with settled borders as a result of peaceful territorial transfers (Gibler and Tir 2010). Their work demonstrates how peacefully exchanged territories generate stable, robust, and institutionalized international boundaries. Settled borders are less likely to be disputed in the future, thus reducing the “level of
threat to the territorial integrity of states” (Gibler and Tir 2010: 965; also Owsiak 2012). Agreements over boundaries also reduce the likelihood of rivalry development or continuation as they indicate the willingness of the adversaries to overcome the commitment problems that are associated with border disputes (Owsiak and Rider 2013; Rider and Owsiak 2015). The outcome is more internal liberalization and democratization driven by the absence of territorial aggression. These findings confirm the primary theoretical mechanism of the wider territorial peace thesis, while the policy implications of Gibler and Tir’s (2010: 966) work are straightforward: states should “proactively” seek solutions to disputed boundaries - even if that includes a willing cession of part of their territory to their neighbors - in order to avoid deliberalization, militarization, and interstate conflict in the future.

The territorial peace literature suggests that the democratization pace and conflict prospects of new states depends heavily on the means employed to achieve independence. Under this frame of mind, violent state births are expected to hinder democratization as they are an indication of disagreement over existing territorial distributions. These disagreements are bound to give rise to territorial claims following independence, which in turn are expected to accentuate perceptions of external threat. Additionally, violent births propagate the necessity and value of violence as a policymaking tool, indirectly rewarding militarization. Hence, power concentration and deliberalization are to be observed after a state emerges through the use of force.

A peaceful state birth, on the other hand, denotes a de facto mutually agreeable, if not amicable, territorial transfer whereby the parties involved have achieved a nonviolent settlement over the most salient of issues. Consequently, the probability of future territorial claims between them drops significantly. Responding to a minimal need to protect its territorial integrity from immediate aggression, the new state does not need a large standing army. Instead, since
bargaining and compromise have resulted in “success” (i.e. the acquisition of statehood), the new state is expected to internalize said principles in its domestic structure and externalize them when dealing with its counterparts. In short, peaceful state births provide new state with the opportunity to initiate their democratization process.

That being said, Gibler and Tir’s (2010) findings suggest that territorial transfers may be quite independent from border institutionalization. The mid-1950s decolonization wave in sub-Saharan Africa, for example, was mostly nonviolent, but the new boundaries that were drawn lacked the salience of stable borders elsewhere for three reasons: a) decolonization borders are arbitrary and - in most cases - inherited, meaning that they are devoid of any historical significance; b) said borders came into existence suddenly upon the departure of the metropolis; their creation potentially ignored the whims of the new emerging states; c) their original purpose was one of administrative efficiency rather than setting the foundations for future self-confined national units. For those reasons, even nonviolent state creations are often followed by unstable interstate boundaries, which in many cases separate instead of uniting cohesive ethnic populations. Gibler and Tir’s (2010) work implies that the procedural dimension is as important to new state demeanor as the means (violent-peaceful) by which independence was achieved given the temporal element of border institutionalization along with the inevitable predicament of inherited boundaries some states face.

**Rivalries and Political Shocks**

The literature on rivalry development and enduring rivalries also adds to the puzzle by introducing the element of past experiences and reciprocal behavior. According to Diehl and Goertz (2012), states maintain a memory of what has happened, which has a great impact on what will happen. States that have fought in the past are more likely to fight in the future, no
matter if the issue of contention is the same or not (Colaresi, Rasler, and Thompson 2007; Goertz and Diehl 1993; Rasler and Thompson 2006; Vasquez and Leskiw 2001). Exposure to violence in the past cultivates a mentality of fear and mistrust; rivals are suspicious of each other and tend to overreact even to non-threatening bargaining or conflict resolution signals. Especially in cases of ongoing disputes, memories of previous altercations between enduring rivals may provoke immediate and violent responses making armed conflict initiation more probable than in any other setting (Valeriano 2012). Under this frame of mind, pre-independence memories of a new state may become a determining factor of its behavior, although this link has been left unexplored by the conflict processes literature.

Rivalries are important to our understanding of interstate processes as they tend to produce high caliber, durable, militarized behaviors in a dyad (Tir and Diehl 2002). Rivalries have been shown to account for the greatest frequency of interstate disputes and fatal conflicts (Valeriano 2012), although this could be a by-product of the case selection tactics employed by rivalry scholars. The likelihood of conflict escalation in a rivalry by far exceeds that of a non-rivalry, ceteris paribus, rendering rivalry development a necessary step to war (Vasquez 2009). However, rivalries are conceptualized as the context within which international violence occurs with high frequency, not a cause of war per se. Hence, their study usually explores and investigates auxiliary assumptions as they relate to the intermediary outcome of choice (i.e. rivalry) instead of the direct effects of rivalry on violence.

Rivalry and geography are interrelated. Research has shown that contentious issues increase the probability of two states getting locked in a rivalry setting (Hensel 1999; Vasquez 2009). Most interstate disputes occur due to territorial contestations. If left unresolved, these territorial claims are likely to recur and intensify (Vasquez and Leskiw 2001). Dispute recurrence
is likely to be accompanied by power politics practices from all involved parties, thus
propagating behaviors that may evolve into rivalry relationships (Vasquez 2009). Disputes over
intangible territories, in particular, tend to produce long-lasting enmity between two states,
leading them to adopt policies that increase the net amount of threat in a dyad. As states sink
further into this spiral of mutual aggression and intransigent rhetoric, a rivalry is only expected to
escalate to future violent confrontations.

The conflict scholarship, therefore, has long established an empirical association between
territory and rivalry, although few studies have attempted to explore the issue in depth. For
instance, the fundamental unanswered questions remained in place for much of the literature’s
involvement with rivalries, regardless of the consistence of emerged empirical patterns: how do
rivalries form in the first place since not all unresolved territorial disputes lock states in a rivalry
setting? Is it indeed territory that causes rivalries or is it that existing, albeit latent, animosity and
competition is manifested through territorial contestations? If rivalries are assumed to be a
locked system of escalating aggression, why and how do some of them end?

Some answers to the above questions are provided by Rider and Owsiak (2015: 511) who
claim that “rivalry forms as the result of a commitment problem” or, in other words, a deliberate
failure to honor an agreement due to anticipated future power shifts. States base their decision to
honor or renege on an agreement based on their individual utility calculus. If this agreement is
expected to significantly strengthen their potential adversaries, states choose to fall back on their
promises, thus setting the foundations for an environment of mistrust. Rider and Owsiak (2015)
argue that this is especially the case when territory is at stake for its value has long term effects
on a dyadic power equilibrium. For this reason they argue that the cause of most rivalries can be
traced back to commitment problems regarding boundaries. According to this view, unsettled
borders, as indicators of commitment problems, fester disputes that eventually lead to rivalries. On the other hand, settled interstate boundaries signal the satisfaction with both the present and future status quo, hence minimizing the probability of potential revisionary behavior closely tied to rivalry settings.

If agreement over boundaries sets the foundations for the appearance of commitment problems, then new states should experience such predicaments with a very higher frequency when compared to old states. The reasoning behind such a claim is straightforward. Echoing the discussion on territory above, the emergence of a new state by default generates new unsettled boundaries. These borders have to be agreed on by neighboring states. If those neighbors determine that by recognizing the new borders the new state will experience a relative power surge in the future, neighbors will be either reluctant to accept them in the first place or likely to dispute them soon thereafter, this way paving the path toward the emergence of rivalry. Rider and Owsiak (2015) suggest that the prospect of reneging on a previous recognition of contiguous international boundaries hinges on the evaluation of the land they divide. If the latter is perceived to be valuable then the former is to be expected with a high degree of certainty. This applies to our discussion of new states, as many of them form on territories that were previously occupied by neighboring nations, thus resulting in a de facto net loss for them. All things equal, the literature on rivalries suggests that state formation processes are relevant in regards to the relationship of new and old states.

The above discussion is supported by perhaps the most comprehensive research on the initiation and termination of rivalries. Diehl and Goertz (2000) introduce the element of “political shocks” to explain the seemingly abrupt onset, or termination, of rivalry. Political shock denotes “a dramatic change in the international system or its subsystems that
fundamentally alters the processes, relationships, and expectations that drive nation-state interactions” (Diehl and Goertz 2000: 221). There are two types of political shocks. The first, systemic shocks, refers to system-defining events such as global wars or events that result in significant changes to the global distribution of interests and power (e.g. the collapse of the USSR). The second, domestic shocks, refers to state-level events that disturb the established territorial and power equilibria between neighbors in a region. Diehl and Goertz (2000: 226) assert that in domestic politics, along civil wars and regime change, state formation constitutes a de facto political shock. The unexpected emergence of a new political entity usurps the status quo of a region, leading neighboring states to react with reservation or animosity towards the new member. This shock and its immediate aftermath presumably pushes states to adopt a defensive stance that may be interpreted as an indication of hostile intentions, prompting a security dilemma. For these reasons, according to Goetz and Diehl (2000), new states and their older neighbors should be more likely to engage in competitive behaviors, thus laying the foundations for rival dyads. In short, state emergence is perceived to be a precursor of rivalry, although Diehl and Goertz (2000) admit that in rare cases this type of a political shock may end a rivalry in cases where the new state is formed with the purpose of serving as a quasi buffer zone, in effect distancing existing rivals.

The review of the territorial conflict and rivalry literatures suggests that new states and future violence may be interrelated, although neither new state behavior nor the process by which they came into existence were put under the analytical microscope. In other words, the formation of new states, in those rare occasions that was explicitly mentioned, was treated as a latent intervening condition between a hypothesized cause and effect. Particularly in regards to the scholarly works on international boundaries, the lack of an explanation that establishes a link
between how boundaries are formed in the first place vis a vis how they are settled or consolidated reveals that the conflict literature is content with ignoring antecedent conditions if they do not comfortably fit within the conventional narrative of interstate conflict processes. Rejecting the axiom that all states belong in a homogenous pool of agents, who are assumed to act and react uniformly ceteris paribus, would essentially require a paradigm shift. The issue here is that the introduction of arguments relying on pre-state conditions (i.e. state formation processes) would open Pandora’s box for the traditional approaches. It could be that the vast majority of empirical patterns uncovered about interstate conflict are spurious since the conditions that led to the mere presence of the population we examine - conditions that are informing their actions and decisions both domestically and internationally - were completely disregarded from our analyses.

**Notable Exceptions**

The four most prominent studies in recent years with an exclusive focus on new state emergence and its aftermath that attempt to combine a variety of contributing dynamics that could, plausibly, be of interest in explaining their future interstate demeanor are Tir (2005), Tir (2006), Lemke (2011), and Lemke and Carter (2016). Tir (2005) examines states that emerged via secession and aims in identifying the determinants of their post-independence interstate interactions insofar militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) are concerned. He shows that disputes involving ethnic territory (i.e. territory considered to be invaluable to the survival of ethnic kin) and violent breakups (as opposed to mutually agreeable or peaceful secessions) greatly increase the hazard of MID initiation and involvement. Other potentially relevant covariates, such as domestic politics and economic/strategic territorial disputes, are found to have inconsistent effects.
However, Tir (2005) is concerned only with secession, as a process of territorial change relevant to state-creation, and with post-secession states, as the sub-sample under investigation. As such, the politically relevant dyads in Tir’s (2005) analysis exclude “new” (e.g. Slovakia) and “old” (e.g. Austria) state combinations. This selective sub-sample raises important questions as to how generalizable Tir’s (2005) results may be (at best) or as to the appropriateness of the case selection procedure (at worst). If the theory is purported to capture a link between secession and aggression, then the probability of the latter’s appearance should logically be evenly distributed along the entire spectrum of the new state’s territorial boundaries. In other words, if a new seceded state is expected to behave aggressively - or be the recipient of revisionary behavior - then all of its neighbors should be considered potential targets or threats. At the very least, the case selection process could have been checked or controlled via a number of auxiliary modeling specifications. By ignoring this aspect, Tir (2005) introduced severe selection bias in his arguments and results. Moreover, by intentionally censoring the potential spectrum of new state interactions, Tir (2005) effectively argues that new seceded states may fight other new seceded states, without explaining what role old neighboring states (or new non-seceded state) might play in this relationship.

The scope of Tir’s (2005) analysis is expanded in Tir (2006), where unification is added to the existing territorial change framework, yet the dyad selection restrictions persist since both studies are primarily interested in “the boundary alterations that affect territories that are considered homeland (i.e. non-colonial) by all the participant countries.” (Tir 2006: 7). Violent secession (or unification) is confirmed to be a precursor of future violent behavior, albeit only towards other states that emerge through the same secession (e.g. Serbia-Kosovo, but not Kosovo-Albania or Kosovo-Macedonia). The theory presented hinges on the territorial change
framework put forth in the territorial conflict literature: violent territorial transfers (i.e. violent secessions) increase the probability that territorial losers will seek to revision the new status quo on their favor, thus resorting to armed confrontations.

Lemke (2011), on the other hand, offers a more comprehensive study of what he terms “birth legacies” on interstate conflict. Lemke’s (2011) core argument revolves around the notion of “birth type,” which is a collapsed trichotomous indicator (“good birth,” “neutral birth,” and “bad birth”) of a seven-point scale, ranging from “indigenous generation” to “derelict decolonization.” His data include all new states and their politically relevant counterparts, while the actual analysis incorporates a variety of temporal controls and modeling procedures. The main finding is that “birth type” has a resonating effect on conflict onset, conflict outcomes, wealth accumulation, material capabilities, democratization, and state failure. Building on Lemke (2011), Lemke and Carter (2016: 30) develop a more comprehensive model to test for the effects of birth legacies on interstate and intrastate war participation and outcome, showing that “good birth states […] are both more willing to wage war and more likely to win those wars they fight.”

The aforementioned two studies are ultimately based on the binary organic/non-organic distinction when it comes to differentiating between certain birth types (cf. Maoz 1989). This theoretical construct suggests that distinct state-emergence processes (secession, decolonization, liberation, and unification) may lead to both “good” and “bad” state births alike. Similarly, violence, as the means through which independence was achieved, can be an ingredient of both birth types. Two questions, then, may arise from the above observations: a) what, if any, is the independent effect of state-creation processes on their future demeanor?; b) is there a distinct impact of pre-independence violence on the life cycle of new states?
These two studies pave the road for further investigation. First, the attempted theoretical link does not explain how exactly birth types and future behavior are linked apart from the assertion that good births somehow result in peaceable interstate relations due to them being temporally protracted, thus providing all involved parties with time to adapt and come to terms with the new reality; however, the temporal dimension is neither explicitly discussed or altogether tested for. Second, the good versus bad birth taxonomy is extremely vulnerable to subjective interpretations, since a series of operational criteria for these conceptual classifications is absent from both studies. Third, all tests for the above arguments rely on bivariate specifications, leaving ample room for error, underlying conditions, and statistical noise to appear in the results.

Departing from Lemke’s (2011) and Lemke and Carter’s (2016) theoretical foundations, in Chapter 3 I develop an explanation of new states’ behavior that hinges on the non-controversial assumption that the four different state-emergence processes (i.e. secession, decolonization, liberation, and unification) have independent and empirically distinguishable effects. In simple terms, state emergence through decolonization is assumed to be associated with dynamics that are different from those associated with secession, liberation, or unification, thus affecting the future behavior of (or towards) decolonized states in comparable and identifiable ways, justifying their conceptual separation. Additionally, a peaceful emergence is assumed to be conducive to specific types of demeanor that are quite dissimilar from those expressed after a state gains its independence through the use of force. In essence, therefore, this is an attempt to complement previous “birth legacies” studies, by adopting an approach of disaggregation that attempts to assess the multiplicative, albeit distinguishable, impact of state-creation processes and means on the behavior of new states.
CHAPTER 3
NEW STATES AND INTERSTATE CONFLICT

Self-Determination and Group Dynamics

The Notion of Self-Determination

State formation is inextricably tied to the principle of self-determination, the right of a population to form a representative governing authority. Self-determination allows cohesive groups of individuals to reject what they perceive as unjust governance and replace it with a new political contract founded on the basis of common goals and shared expectations. As such, the newly formed contract is considered to be morally superior to the one it replaces as it eradicates societal dissatisfaction and disenfranchisement while at the same time it is assumed to ensure stability as it rests on popular consent (Anderson 1996: 37). The notion of self-determination technically applies to both polity replacement attempts (e.g. changing the governing system within the state) and political independence efforts (e.g. new state emergence). However, after the post-WWII decolonization wave in SE Asia and sub-Saharan Africa “self-determination” has been consistently, and almost exclusively, associated with the creation of new states or the concerted efforts of ethnic groups to establish autonomous political entities.

Without delving deep into the normative assumptions surrounding it, self-determination is considered to be a fundamental tenet of international law. In 1960 the UN General Assembly pronounced that self-determination is a “human right” and that its denial violates the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Although the UN specifically referenced decolonization as the primary aim behind the original language of Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the right to self-determination has been reaffirmed numerous times during postcolonial periods (most recently in 2013), thus it has been de facto extended to non-colonial cases of independence (Brilmayer 1991). In such cases the right to self-
determination can be justifiably evoked if and only if: a) there is a well-defined group of people seeking statehood; b) their human rights are violated; and c) domestic or international law cannot remedy the situation (Borgen 2008).

In practice, however, the international community has reacted in a widely inconsistent fashion when dealing with self-determination movements. The world’s major powers where quick to recognize the two new states that emerged after the Czechoslovakian partition, for instance, but they are still deliberating the legality of a potential Palestinian state. Similarly, the UN accepted South Sudan as a member relatively soon after its declaration of independence in 2011, but has yet to validate Northern Cyprus’ existence as an independent entity. Such erratic responses to certain peoples’ independence claims have been attributed by some to the inherent conflict of two opposing principles of international law: the right to self-determination and the respect for the territorial integrity of existing states (Thornberry 1989). The former allows groups of people to form their own state - which requires some sort of territorial cession - while the latter guarantees the right of an existing state to deny such a demand. Perhaps no case encapsulates how different segments of the international community have selectively used each of these two principles to advance the primacy of one over the other in order to promote their own agendas better than Kosovo.

The UN-supervised, albeit autonomous, provisional government of Kosovo declared its independence from Serbia in 2008 following years of tensions between ethnic Serbians and Albanians. The new entity was formally recognized by the US and several EU-member states including Germany, France, and the UK almost immediately thereafter on the basis of the Kosovars’ inalienable right to self-determination. Russia, Cyprus, and Serbia promptly challenged this recognition claiming that Kosovo’s independence constituted a blatant breach of
international law as it violated the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Serbia. The dispute revolved around the unwillingness of Serbia to allow a distinct group of mostly ethnic Albanians establish a new state over what is considered to be the birthplace of Serbian identity and culture, as Kosovo was both the original seat of the Serbian empire and the hub of Serbian christianity. Put simply, Kosovo’s perceived historical and religious importance along with its revered position within the Serbian folklore and mythology render it an invaluable, indivisible, and unsubstitutable territory to Serbs.

Pure territorial calculations also factored into Belgrade’s denial of the Kosovars’ request. In 1992 the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had already lost about 60% of its territory to Croatia, Macedonia, Slovenia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. By 2006 and the emergence of Montenegro its size was further reduced by 14%. Kosovo’s independence would result in an additional 12.5% of the Serbian territory being ceded away, an unacceptable predicament for Belgrade. Moreover, a potential Serbian concession to Kosovo’s demands would set a dangerous precedent given the active separatist movements in Vojvodina and Preševo Valley. For Serbia’s patrons, setting a formal precedent of the primacy of the right to self-determination over that of territorial integrity was equally alarming. Russia still tries to suppress independence claims in some of its provinces, most notably in Chechnya, Dagestan, and North Ossetia, while Cyprus still refuses to recognize the right of ethnic Turks to create their own state.

The dispute about the international status of Kosovo remains unresolved to this day. Although the majority of the international community has officially recognized it (108 UN member states), Kosovo is not itself a member of the UN, which places its statehood in peril under international law. Paradoxically, in 2014 Russia recognized the independence of the Republic of Crimea before annexing it; at the same time Moscow continued to tout the primacy
of territorial integrity over self-determination and refused to reconsider its position against Kosovo. Equally perplexing was the reaction of those states who had recognized Kosovo but were now refusing to extend the same right to Crimea given the geopolitical importance of Ukraine for the West and the manner by which Russia aggressively pursued its territorial aspirations. Overall, based on the recent practices of major international actors, it seems that self-determination can be safely assumed to be a second tier human right frequently trumped by states’ aversion to any change that may usurp the territorial status quo.

To that effect one may blame the ambiguity of the legal and theoretical context surrounding the notion of self-determination. More specifically, exactly who is entitled to - or bears the agency of - self-determination remains unspecified. A well-defined group of people (Borgen 2008) may sound intuitive enough, but who gets to decide what constitutes a “well-defined group” in the first place? The lack of a concrete set of characteristics delineating the minimum preconditions of what is considered to be a well-defined group of people, therefore entitled to determining its political status, effectively means that the right to self-determination is open to subjective interpretation. For Jennings (1956: 56) the entire concept is “ridiculous” since no group of people may decide for themselves until “someone decides who are the people.” Jennings’ (1956) observation is particularly astute since, paradoxically, the right to self-determination is always determined by someone other than one’s (or a collective group’s) self. Anderson (1996) claims that the ambiguity of the term itself is intentional for it provides the international community with the opportunity to impose arbitrary, case-specific, limitations. An unlimited version of self-determination would, in theory, allow any disaffected individual to dispute or reject the legitimacy of political authority, or even form a new political entity.
altogether. Hence, if left unchecked, self-determination would pose an existential threat to the very notion of the modern territorial nation state.

**Linking Territoriality and Self-Determination**

In more practical terms, the right to statehood has been traditionally extended to groups of people that satisfy three key requirements: a) they share a common identity; b) they self-identify as members of distinct group; and c) they have a historically established territorial association (Toft 2012; also Smith 1986). Although these requirements do not solve the problem of ambiguity, they set the foundation for a more precise understanding of what a “well-defined” group is supposed to look like. The identity requirement pertains to the ethnic and cultural characteristics individuals perceive they have in common. Members of the same ethnic group share similar subjectively constructed, albeit objectified, traits associated with their common ancestry. They share a relatively similar appearance as a visual indication of group affiliation. They speak the same language and usually share the same religion. Members possess a communal understanding of their history, to which they assign an almost teleological purpose. It is this “perception of cultural uniqueness and individuality which differentiates populations from each other and which endows a given population with a definite identity, both in their own eyes and in those of outsiders” (Smith 1986: 22).

Individuals that share these characteristics are not entitled to self-determination by default, however. They have to deliberately separate themselves from others by erecting ethnocultural demarcation lines that highlight the distinctiveness of the ingroup as compared to all outgroups. In simple terms, they *have to want* to be different from everyone else and they need to self-identify as such; a group’s existence is dependent on self-recognition. Group cohesion and, to some degree, insulation can only be achieved by adopting a group identity, thus manifesting imaginary intergroup differences into reality. This self-identification with a specific
group provides it with both membership and political power. Ethnic and cultural similarities within a certain population may arguably persist through time, yet group formation or decay is dependent on the willingness of its members to continue their selective affiliation with the unit.

The third and most important requirement for a “well-defined” group has to do with its association with a territory, conceptualized as “a symbolic geographical center, a sacred habitat, a ‘homeland’” (Smith 1986: 28). The homeland is what essentially provides the group with a collective identity by establishing a place of origin and a demonstrable genealogy, thus endowing its inhabitants with a sense of “ownership.” Populations lacking this vital tie to territory are denied the right to autonomy or independence - even if the previous two conditions are satisfied - as they have no legitimate claims over a particular piece of land (e.g. Roma). The psychological importance of territory to ethnic groups cannot be overstated. Ethnic and religious memories, historical events, ancestral legends about the origins of the group, perceptions of exceptionalism, even expectations of perpetual survival, are all encompassed by an inanimate “object.” Consequently, the greater the potency of a group’s territorial link the greater its chances of achieving independence.

The territorial dimension, then, is arguably what transforms a group into a well-defined group, therefore entitled to self-determination under the auspices of international law. Yet, ironically, it also happens to be a group’s major obstacle for achieving independence. Territory is considered to be the most valuable resource for a state both in terms of economic prosperity and security from external threats. As such, states consistently express an aversion towards their own territorial dismemberment, which is a necessary prerequisite for the success of any self-determination movement. States are expected to oppose self-determination bids, through violence if necessary, simply because territorial cessions undermine the fabric of their own
existence. In an effort to curb potential or latent self-determination attempts states are faced with two options, both equally undesirable for different reasons. The first is to deny or ignore any and all claims by an independence seeking group, peacefully or through the use of force. The short-term outcome is undoubtedly beneficial to the state. It maintains its territorial integrity and sends a clear signal to any group that may attempt to undermine the status quo. In the long term, however, the state is faced with a great risk of this policy backfiring. Years of accumulated grievances against an authority that chooses to ignore or punish, rather than accommodate, a minority group combined with a policy of selective exclusion of group members from political processes will eventually solidify the resolve of the disaffected and trigger some sort of resistance (e.g. Cyprus and ethnic Turks; Spain and the Basques etc.). Depending on the relative demographic and military strength of the separatist group, resorting to violence to achieve its goals is not to be unexpected.

The second option for the state is to offer a degree of recognition to the group accompanied by concessions ranging from an official tolerance of its cultural distinctiveness (e.g. Kurds in Turkey), to limited local autonomy (e.g. Corsica), to a federated system of equal powers and protections (e.g. Switzerland), or in rare occasions to statehood (e.g. Czechoslovakia). Such compromises aim in maintaining the internal cohesion of the state by alleviating the grievances expressed by the group(s). The risk this choice entails for the state has to do with the generosity of the concessions as compared to the demands of the group. Meeting or exceeding self-determination demands can be counterproductive since a group may perceive such a deal as a sign of weakness, prompting it to up the ante and ask for more. The end result is a further erosion of the state’s authority, thus an indirect increase of the likelihood of an eventual armed confrontation. Concessions that do not adequately address the group’s concerns, on the
other hand, may result in locking the two sides in a downward spiral of latent distrust and hostility, similar to the one described in the first option.

Research on states’ reactions to self-determination claims has shown that the first option is preferable in multiethnic settings.¹ According to the reputational theory of separatist conflict states become less likely to accommodate independence bids as the number of ethnic groups within a country increases (Walter 2006). Governments are wary of granting concessions to a separatist group as this would encourage other groups to follow suit. Faced with the possibility of a separatist “domino effect,” multiethnic states are therefore inclined to reject all self-determination attempts, through violence if necessary, in order to build a reputation of toughness that would disincentivize future challenges to the domestic status quo (Walter 2006: 313). Given that 82 percent of states in the system are categorized as multiethnic pre-independence is expected to be a relatively common precursor of successful self-determination attempts (Toft 2012: 585).

**Causes of Self-Determination Claims**

From the perspective of the group itself the mere decision to seek independence is indicative of unaddressed grievances caused by the state’s economic and political structure (Toft 2012). Parity in resource accessibility and distribution ensures a measure of domestic harmony in that groups have no incentive to challenge a state that provides goods and services to all its citizens. By contrast, unequal economic development amongst ethnic populations creates tensions between those benefiting and those feeling exploited, especially when poverty tends to disproportionately affect members of a specific ethnic group by intentional structural design. Economic grievances are only one side of the coin, however. Seeking self-determination is a de

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¹ States are multiethnic when there is more than one internationally recognized minority ethnic group present, bringing the total number of ethnic group in the country to three or more.
facto political manifestation of disaffection against an institutional structure that propagates preferential access to the upper echelons of political power. Quasi-exclusive political structures, in which groups are treated differently solely on the basis of their ethnic identities, are found to be associated with a greater number of separatist claims. The asymmetry in power-sharing leads to a loss of confidence in the state itself, not only the governing authority. Disaffected citizens tend to withdraw in their ethnic microcosm and seek protections and representation by their respective groups, thus reinforcing the barriers between them and the political elites and rendering domestic conflict or a territorial split more likely. To the extent that the structure is inflexible, the only solution to this perceived injustice is to replace the state in its entirety by forming a new political entity.

Yet, Toft (2003) and Walter (2009) contend that political and economic grievances aside an important aspect of the decision to seek statehood has to do with mere geographical constraints. Group location and concentration influences both its socioeconomic status and its political accessibility. For geographically isolated populations in the periphery (e.g. surrounded by mountain ranges or residing in islands) the costs of participating in the political and economic activities of the center are prohibitive. As a result, these populations are expected to develop a self-preservation mentality rooted in regionalism, which indirectly enhances elements of group exclusivity and cultural distinctiveness. Topography therefore facilitates group cohesion and relative homogeneity. Geographical barriers ensure the region is inaccessible to non-members and act as a natural firewall against external influence. This disconnect between the center and the periphery is often materialized through separatist claims. The more profound geographical features surrounding an isolated group, the more likely it is for it to gain a domestic and international recognition of its right to self-determination.
Conceptualizing State Emergence

Differentiating Processes and Means

The most important conclusion derived from the above discussion is that: a) territoriality is central in explaining and understanding state birth; and b) the emergence of a new state is always preceded by some degree of substate acrimony – although this does not always result to violence – with only one potential exception that will be analyzed in detail in the next segment.\textsuperscript{2} Self-determination groups and associated claims do not appear without there being factors that promote tension between groups or a segment of the population and the ruling authority. The mere expression of complaints from aspiring separatists - be it due to disenfranchisement, disaffection, or structural oppression - indicates the presence of underlying and ongoing antagonism. Even before reaching this stage, the selection effect associated with individuals adopting sub-national identities in lieu of, not along with, national ones reveals that an irreversible domestic schism has already been manifested. This volatile environment of disassociation and animosity, if left unaddressed, paves the way for formal statehood demands and lengthy self-determination struggles.

The origins of practically all modern states can be traced in conditions as such. What differs are the processes and means through which each state actually came into existence. By process I refer to the mechanism by which statehood was achieved, whereas by means I refer to the prevalent degree of hostility experienced during the independence effort. New states can only emerge through one of four distinct processes (secession, decolonization, liberation, and unification), while each one of these processes can be either violent or peaceful. The conceptual difference between processes and means is simple, yet significant. The former is the outcome of

\textsuperscript{2} Unification is assumed to be more of an inclusive, rather than exclusive, process of state emergence.
a nexus of systemic conditions on which neither a self-determination group nor the parent state has any influence. The latter, however, entails the element of choice thus introducing agency into the state-emergence equation. Both are expected to affect the behavior of new states and their neighbors in predictable ways. While processes impose limitations on the range of post-independence preferences and opportunities, the choice between violence or peace prioritizes certain preferences over others, thus shaping the nature of future actions towards the domestic and international environments.

**What is a New State?**

Modifying Tir’s (2005: 714) definition of secession, I refer to the emergence of a new state as the formation of a new territorially bounded political entity with international recognition and full sovereign rights over both the land it occupies and the population that inhabits said land. This formation, in turn, implies the dissolution (or the dismantlement) of a state, of which the new political entity was previously an integral (or extrinsic) part. As a consequence, the new state finds itself occupying a spatial domain contiguous to either already established neighbors (i.e. “old” states) or other new states that emerged during similar state-formation processes, or surrounded by both old and new states alike (e.g. Macedonia). This recently independent political entity is called upon to create and maintain relations with its adjacent neighbors amidst an environment of insecurity, instability, and uncertainty the process of state-formation itself has created. What is more, the new state is suddenly put in a position where it has to interact with its neighbors at the same time that the institutionalization of the new boundaries, the crystallization of its political structure, and the reorganization of its defensive capabilities are taking place. An apparent exception to the above conceptualization applies to cases classified as “temporary

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3 Unless the state under consideration is geographically isolated (e.g. Tuvalu).
military occupations” (e.g. the US occupation of Haiti, 1915-34). Given that in these instances the occupying power(s) never intended to annex or institutionalize permanent control over the occupied territories, these countries lost their statehood temporarily only to emerge again without the prior dissolution or dismantlement of the occupying entity (Edelstein 2004). Temporary occupations are regarded as special cases of state emergence for the reason that the emerging states are “new” only in regards to their reentry into the international system, although in reality they have retained relatively adequate levels of political, economic, and military autonomy throughout their occupation periods.

**Secession, Decolonization, Liberation, Unification, and Violent Emergence**

Secession signifies the territorial partition of a state’s homeland leading to the loss of statehood of the previously unified political entity and the subsequent emergence of two or more successor states (e.g. Czechoslovakia; Tir 2006: 46). The partition itself can be the outcome of several dynamics. In cases such as Yugoslavia, secession occurs due to deep ethnic and religious divisions. By contrast, the ex-USSR serves as an example of a quasi-federated country breaking up because of the unwillingness or inability of the parent state to withstand the political and economic costs associated with maintaining the union. Although the underlying causes differed, both Yugoslavia and the USSR dissolved due to an internally initiated process. Still, in the case of the final dissolution of the Ottoman Empire in the early 1900s, the birth of Bulgaria was expedited under external (i.e. Russian) military and political pressure. Either side of the border, then, may set the course for this purely domestic territorial change.

Decolonization, on the other hand, denotes the termination of colonial rule over a dependency, usually due to the inability of the metropolis to hold on to its colonies, resulting in the creation of states located far from the metropolitan homeland (Strang 1991). Contrary to secession, decolonization significantly inflates the total number of states in the system as it does
not presuppose a loss of statehood on the part of the colonial power. After the conclusion of this process of territorial change the ceding authority (i.e. the metropolis) and the receiving entity (i.e. the ex-colony) rarely end up sharing boundaries, unless the former continues to either occupy areas of strategic or economic importance that would normally be part of the new state’s territory (e.g. the Suez Canal) or still retains colonial presence in areas adjacent to the new state (e.g. Tanzania and British Nyasaland). As with secession, decolonization can be both internally and externally motivated.

Liberation from military occupation captures the emergence of a new state after being militarily occupied following its defeat during an armed confrontation. The temporary character of a military occupation is what renders it conceptually distinguishable from both conquests and annexations that denote permanent territorial acquisitions. (Edelstein 2004; Tir et al. 1998).4 Liberation may take one of the following two forms: a) the occupying state retracts its forces unilaterally when it decides the goals of the occupation have been fulfilled (e.g. West Germany, 1952); or b) the liberation is a direct or indirect consequence of external military intervention in support of the occupied state (e.g. Belgium, 1945). With very few exceptions, the emerging entity was an internationally recognized country before the occupation, lost its statehood briefly, and reemerged again by establishing sovereignty over a territorial space largely approximating the one owned before. Much like decolonization, liberation usually produces new states without eradicating old states with rare notable exceptions associated with overwhelming military victories against the occupying power (e.g. Germany at the end of WWII). In regards to

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4 The intent of the occupying force plays a major role in assessing whether an emergence is conceptualized as liberation or secession. For example, if the victor originally aimed in annexing and exercising ownership of the territory of the occupied state, then the re-emergence of that state can be conceptualized as a secession rather than liberation.
territorial configurations, liberated states can be either contiguous to - or distanced from - their occupier depending on the scale and intent of the military campaign that led to their dissolution.

Finally, unification is the process by which two or more states decide to merge their territories and to seek international recognition as a single sovereign political entity (e.g. United Arab Republic). The old states’ decision to form a union is an outcome of mutual internal motivation and can therefore be viewed as a self-correction process, in which the purpose of the new state is to rectify an externally imposed division of populations that feel as sharing a common ethnic or cultural background. Procedurally speaking, unification results in a net decrease of the total number of states as the output is always smaller than the input. As such, the territorial rearrangement leaves behind a new state that is only surrounded by older counterparts.

Violence, on the other hand, pertains to a group’s conscious decision to use force during the independence struggle. As an agent-driven, nonstructural, set of actions, violence in the context of the present study denotes the deliberate use of force by the self-determination group with a clearly formed political objective, namely statehood. While a precise operational definition of violence is laid out in Chapter 4, the conceptual distinction between violent and nonviolent emergence hinges on the presence of conflict between the state and any nonstate actors seeking independence. Moreover, to be classified as violent birth, the group’s leadership and members should be explicitly targeting agents of political authority or institutions opposing their bid for independence.

**New States and Interstate Disputes**

The behavior of new states towards their neighbors is largely dependent on how each state emergence process affects four fundamental aspects of modern-day statehood. The first relates to the intrinsic and psychological value of the territory for the involved parties (i.e. territoriality). The second has to do with the introduction of new international boundaries and their subsequent
institutionalization efforts. The third pertains to the ethnic composition of the new state as opposed to that of its neighbors or predecessor. Finally, the fourth concerns the proximity and spatial clustering of the new states emerging by each process. It is important to note that the above factors are not independent from each other; rather, they should be conceptualized as multiplicative and interactive, meaning that they operate as intertwined vectors of new state demeanor. In this section I attempt to expound a certain range of testable hypotheses about the interstate behavior of new states based on the interaction of the above conditions combined with the presence or absence of pre-emergence violence.

The nexus of competing relationships between new states and their neighbors in a dyadic setting can be divided into three groups that will be analyzed separately. To begin with, new states interact with neighbors emerging through the same process (e.g. Czech Republic and Slovakia). Next they interact with other new states that emerged contemporaneously but via a different event (e.g. Slovakia and Ukraine). Then, they form relations with neighbors that have been established members of the international community for decades before the new state became independent (e.g. Slovakia and Austria). All these dyadic configurations are multifaceted and multi-directional, meaning that they produce significant and occasionally asymmetric effects on both sides of the dyadic equation. For that reason, in setting the foundations for my theoretical presuppositions below I will be examining how specific dyadic compositions may affect the behavior of a new state and its propensity for conflict.

The following analysis is predicated upon theoretically consistent and logically plausible inferences given the structural peculiarities of each process of state emergence. Historical

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5 The conceptualization of international boundaries as jurisdictional institutions follows the logic and arguments of Simmons (2005).
examples in support of my arguments and expectations will be provided when necessary. While there will be outliers, or exemptions, that do not conform to the expounded expectations, recall that the purpose of this section is to contrive a general theory of new state behavior that is dependent on several pre-independence conditions. To suggest otherwise would imply that every instance of state creation has been idiosyncratic and irrelevant to understanding interstate interactions.

**Secession**

**Territoriality**

Secession as a process has structural particularities that coalesce in affecting states’ conflict proclivity. States do not always emerge from secession on equal footing. In most cases there is a single new nation (i.e. rump state; Tir 2005) that is perceived to be the historical and cultural, or “legitimate,” successor of the now defunct polity (e.g. USSR and Russia, Yugoslavia and Serbia). For rump states the territorial dismantlement of the preceding entity is profoundly consequential as it affects preexisting notions of a unified homeland, conceptualized by some as the “secular functional analogue to sacred ground” (Shelef 2016: 37). Given that the latter is psychologically invaluable, thus effectively indivisible (Hensel and Mitchell 2005), secession implies that a rump state emerges as the de facto territorial loser. This predicament places the rump state in a “losses frame” rendering its future behavior dependent on recuperating relative losses by expressing a “risk-acceptant” mode of conduct (Berejikian 1997). In other words, the perceived incurred cost of territorial loss for the rump state is expected to spark sentiments of irredentism that persist through time. This effect is exacerbated in cases of multiple states emerging from a single event as large swaths of the homeland are distributed among multiple recipients. While a single territorial claim between two new states can be managed or settled peacefully due to the attention it attracts from the opposing sides as well as from the international
community, the diffusion of territorial claims across numerous interested parties should increase the conditional probability of escalation as multiple dissensions are unlikely to be settled at once, thus allowing for potential underlying disputes to fester. Russia’s recent behavior towards Ukraine regarding Crimea can be considered as a typical example of the territorial dynamics that shape the relationship between rump and non-rump states.

Territorial claims do not originate only on the side of the rump state, however. The directionality of revisionism is occasionally reversed as instances of territorial aggression by seceded states against rump states or fellow seceded states have occurred. Moldova, for instance, raised a claim in 1994 regarding the territory around the Ukrainian village of Kopanka under the justification that Kopanka has historically been an integral part of the Moldovan homeland - Ukraine responded by claiming ownership of the Palanca region. Moreover, seceded states have also been involved in territorial disputes with old adjacent states that were not partial to the partition event. Macedonia has laid claims over much of Northern Greece following the name dispute of 1993, while Bulgaria is formally disputing the Macedonian sovereignty over the Strumica area since 1998.

Disputes such as the above are essentially indications of dissatisfaction of the incurred territorial change for both new and old states in a region. For new states, territorial revisionism serves as an indication that their new homeland does not match their preconceptions and expectations. Underneath the territorial tensions between new states and their neighbors, however, lie legitimate concerns about the immediate survival of the new state as they relate to both territory and identity. First, during the volatile period immediately after independence – where a state is at its most vulnerable position – new states seek to consolidate their territorial

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6 Territorial Claims data, Issue Correlates of War (ICOW): http://www.paulhensel.org/icowterr.html
sovereignty as fast as possible in order to avoid territorial contestations and fend off potential challengers. Fear of having its new homeland constricted by its new neighbors may push a partitioned state towards a preemptive strategy of territorial expansion, thus signaling intentions of territorial aggression. In turn, these signals will be received by all neighbors and are expected to be reciprocated in kind, leading to a vicious cycle of bilateral claims. Although it is not uncommon for such claims to be diffused peacefully over the years, one may argue that they impose undue pressure on the new state and some of its neighbors to engage in “often protracted, difficult, increasingly antagonistic, marked by mutual distrust” negotiations (Druckman 1980: 38). As Valeriano (2012) demonstrates, the persistent nature of unresolved territorial claims lays the foundation for the formation of rivalrous relationships that, in turn, amplify dyadic competitions and the chances of conflict escalation between any two states.

Second, one of the priorities of elites in states emerging after a secession is to maintain internal cohesion by establishing a new national identity that is anchored on the newly acquired territory. The new identity is required to be unique and substantially different than that of their neighbors – at the same time grounded on plausible historical notions of a linear ethnic genealogy (Tajfel and Turner 1979). This leads to the transfer of internal ethnic cleavages during the pre-secession era onto the international arena, much like in the case of Serbia and Croatia (Dyrstad 2012). The fixation with identity politics in the first post-independence years combined with the promotion of ethnic distinctiveness in the hopes of sustaining internal conformity requires a certain kind of political rhetoric that is likely to be perceived as threatening by the leaders of adjacent states, especially other new states in the region.

From the perspective of old states, major territorial changes in close proximity are expected to evoke foreign policy shifts geared towards an aggressive territorial posture.
Preemptive claims against a new state are not uncommon as old states try to both capitalize on the inability of the former to adequately defend itself and to signal their intolerance to any further destabilization of the regional status quo. Fear of a spillover effect stemming from events that are beyond their control may also lead old states to condemn partitions, thus jeopardizing future neighboring relations. Old states place immense value on maintaining their territorial sovereignty which puts them at odds with new states born out of a process that undermines it. Particularly in cases where an old state faces internal divisions and ethno-territorial cleavages, its relationship with a newly partitioned entity seems all but certain to begin on contentious grounds. In all, the reserved and/or hostile stance of old states against seceded ones can be only assumed to accentuate the dyadic security dilemma.

**Boundaries**

The introduction of new international boundaries, an immediate byproduct of the new territorial configurations, further adds to expectations of interstate competition. The difference between these new borders and the ones resulting from any other process lies in their pre-independence intended purpose. Contrary to mere administrative and provincial concerns, pre-secession internal demarcation lines - such as in the case of Czechoslovakia - typically convey ethnic considerations by acknowledging the coexistence of distinct populations within the same country. In that sense, international borders do not get entirely redrawn, they are just transposed from the domestic to the interstate realm. This does not mean they remain undisputed, however. Due to the salience of the territory affected, a mutual recognition of the homeland’s division via the signing of a post-partition boundary settlement agreement can be challenging for two reasons. First, new borders are a constant reminder of a permanent territorial loss for the rump state (Tir 2006; Owsiak 2012). As such, the latter is unlikely to accept a settlement unless the immediate benefits of a boundary agreement exceed the expected costs of a protracted legal and
political dispute. In the case of the Soviet Union, the threat of domestic political and economic disintegration, combined with external pressure and the tidal wave of western liberalization, forced Russia to rapidly settle new boundaries with all ex-USSR partners. Russian elites, in their efforts to avoid a complete state breakdown, focused their attention on the domestic environment which led them to sign border agreements on sub-optimal terms. Such hastily agreed-upon boundary settlements, however, are highly susceptible to future challenges. After a rump state achieves a certain degree of domestic stability, it may revisit the issue of territorial losses and attempt to undermine or delegitimize established border regimes (Hughes and Sasse 2002).

Second, the new demarcation lines between the seceded states suffer from institutionalization asymmetries when compared to the portion of international boundaries that remained unaffected by the event (Zacher 2001). Boundaries between seceded states and old adjacent neighbors, for instance, retain their capacity as institutions that clearly delineate the limits of states’ territorial sovereignty (e.g. the border between Slovenia and Austria). In contrast, boundaries between new states themselves are devoid of any institutional value immediately after the birth of a political entity. This lack of perceived legitimacy, whose acquisition is gradual and largely dependent on time, results in the attraction of perhaps unwanted attention by the newly seceded nations. Even under the assumptions of territorial satisfaction and absence of revisionary intentions, new states will expend resources – diplomatic, military, and political - to ensure that the new boundary will acquire intangible value in order to minimize the chances of a potential boundary dispute in the future. Ironically, the more attention a boundary attracts the more likely it is to be delegitimized and eventually disputed (Rider and Owsiak 2015; Carter and Goemans 2014).
Ethnic composition

Ideally, the purpose of all secessions is to create ethnically homogenous states where distinct populations can finally afford the opportunity to determine their fate (Tir 2005). In practice, however, such an outcome is rarely achieved. More often than not, seceded states remain heterogeneous, albeit with a radically different ethnic composition. Populations that were previously ethnic minorities, such as Croats in Yugoslavia, are now the dominant majority; conversely, the dominant ethnic group during the unified years finds itself ostracized and marginalized in the new state. As the proposed solution to tensions due to ethnic fractionalization then, secession fails to deliver. The usual outcome is the emergence of states that struggle to achieve domestic conformity and end up being consumed by ethnic disputes between them and adjacent nations. What is more, the ethnicity aspect interacts heavily with perceptions about territoriality. Since ethnic minorities have historical ties to certain geographic enclaves, one may argue that all ethnic claims are latent and thinly veiled territorial disputes in the making (Tir 2006).

The creation of ethnic diasporas is a thorny issue on the side of every post-partition state. As Kolstø (1993) demonstrates, diasporas are frequently invoked by territorial revisionists under the pretext of ethnic unification as they are likely to experience sociopolitical discrimination by their inadvertent host state, thus bound to request assistance from their ethnic counterparts. This situation fuels interstate volatility as the “parent” state of an ethnic diaspora may intervene politically to assist its kin and use the “ethnic reunification” argument as a justification for undermining the territorial integrity of its neighbors. Moreover, the mere existence of diasporas raises the already elevated sentiments of nationalism within “parent” states, which plays squarely onto the hands of populist or extremist politics and would-be authoritarian elites. Illustrative of the effects of diasporas on new state behavior is the case of the former Soviet Union, where its
dissolution resulted in “25 million ethnic Russians [...] residing outside their ‘own’ successor state” (Kolstø 1993: 199-200). Because a large portion of this population was situated in eastern Ukraine, Moscow aggressively pushed for a semi-autonomy status to be granted to specific territories populated by self-proclaimed Russians. This not only led to friction in the relationship between the two states, it also undermined the early efforts of the Ukrainian government to establish an inclusive national identity under which the nation was to be united. Fast forward twenty years, the dispute over the status of the Russian diaspora spilled over other contentious issues, such as trade, economy and, most importantly, territory. The friction culminated in what we observed as the forceful cession of Crimea and the ongoing de facto Ukrainian civil war.

It should be noted that disputes over the potential reunification with ethnic brethren are not only limited between post-secession states. Old states and new states often raise claims against each other under the pretext of safeguarding the rights of ethnic minorities with secession itself becoming the structural catalyst behind such intentions. Established neighbors feel empowered about attempting to absorb their ethnic kin following the birth of an undoubtedly weaker neighbor. On the other hand, new states respond to such demands by further suppressing the rights of minorities, thus inviting international condemnation and intervention.

**Proximity and spatial clustering**

Proximity has traditionally played a major role in the conflict processes literature. As discussed in Chapter 2, geographic distance has been promoted as the second most important explanatory factor of interstate conflict, after territoriality. The logic behind such a claim is straightforward: the ability of states to project their military power is finite; hence, states are
assumed to bear minimum projection costs when engaging adjacent entities. For many, proximity conveys opportunity, rather than willingness, for conflict. In other words, if willingness is present due to territorial, ethnic, political, or other reasons, proximity makes conflict probable rather than possible. The impact of proximity arguments on conflict scholarship is so profound that the primary proto-sampling method of researchers relies on the selection of “politically relevant dyads,” denoting pairs of states that share a common border and are assumed to have constant opportunity for violence. Indeed, empirical findings suggest that adjacent states are more likely to engage in war than non-adjacent ones by a wide margin.

Secession is the only process of state creation where new states always emerge in close proximity to one another. Just because of their relative distance we should expect post-secession states to experience an increased frequency of militarized disputes, ceteris paribus. However, their relationships are largely shaped by factors that increase their willingness to compete in addition to the presence of constant opportunity. When present, issues such as the extreme salience of territorial cessions, boundary disputes, and ethnic considerations render the interaction between opportunity and willingness a necessary and sufficient condition for conflict onset (Brochman, Rod, and Gleditsch 2012).

Regional clustering refers to the emergence of multiple new states in the same geographic area. In this context adjacency promotes certain behavioral patterns over others given that new states are now put in a position where they have to interact and coexist with neighbors with whom disagreements and incompatibilities led to their partition in the first place. More

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7 Boulding (1962) first captured the essence of decaying military projection capacity as a function of distance and capability, coining the term “loss of strength gradient.” The only exceptions to this assumption are military superpowers.

8 For an exhaustive review of findings on contiguity and conflict see Bremer (2000).
specifically, a post-secession new state dyad is expected to experience a degradation of the quality of interstate interactions - be that trade, capital flows, cultural exchanges, or mere political communications - when compared to the pre-secession substate environment simply because partitions are essentially designed to bring forth such changes. The rate of decay is expected to be more profound in such dyads than in old-new state pairs which should maintain a relatively similar volume of interstate interactions, ceteris paribus.

Clusters of contemporaneously emerging entities with salient grievances elevate the regional likelihood of disputes for three reasons. First, seceded states may receive challenges to their sovereignty from multiple fronts as they are surrounded by latent competitors. Second, their inexperience in peaceful dispute resolution combined with an ineffective signaling of their intentions – since there is no prior baseline on which they can be judged on – can set a region on alert and may trigger preemptive aggression. Third, territorial envelopment by potential competitors in a k-adic⁹ configuration exponentially increases the number of territorial hotspots with a high concentration of unresolved claims, thus increasing the likelihood that one of these claims will escalate to a dispute. From the perspective of old states the situation becomes particularly alarming. Instead of one established neighbor with a long history of documented intentions, diplomatic practices, and political particularities, old states now must live next to a group of new states that are diplomatically immature and politically underdeveloped.

Of course, the impact of clustering on the likelihood of conflict in post-secession instances is a function of the number of new states, the number of old neighbors, and the relative distance within new-new and new-old dyads. This means that the effect of clustering can be less profound when secession takes place in geographically remote nations. The Sweden-Norway

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⁹ The notion of the “k-ad” refers to groups of more than two actors (k>2) and was first introduced by Poast (2010) as a more appropriate statistical alternative to the dyad.
breakup of 1905, for instance introduced just one additional politically-relevant dyad to the system, resulting in a total of three new pairs of states substituting two pre-existing ones.\textsuperscript{10} In contrast, the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 resulted in 44 new dyads replacing the original 13. For the 15 new states and their old neighbors, this event was followed by a total recalibration of foreign and domestic policy that severely shocked not only the regional balance, but the entire system. Apart from unresolved territorial and boundary disputes, the mere volume of dyadic interactions that had to be recalibrated was conducive for regional destabilization, intense competition, and eventually interstate disputes.

**Hypotheses**

Based on the above discussion we can expound several hypotheses concerning the behavior and experiences of seceded new states. The following theoretical suppositions summarize the cumulative impact of the aforementioned structural conditions, both in a monadic and a dyadic setting. In short, I have argued that new states and the actions of their political leadership are bounded by these external factors and modified accordingly. The birth legacies of partitioned states attract and, at the same time promote, certain behavioral patterns over others, mostly due to the procedural factors associated with secession itself. Formally then:

\textbf{H-1a}: New states emerging from secession are more likely to initiate militarized interstate disputes and territorial disputes than old states.

\textbf{H-1b}: Seceded states face an increased hazard of conflict involvement.

\textbf{H-1c}: Dyads comprised of two seceded states are more likely to experience militarized, territorial, and boundary disputes than those comprised of both new and old states.

\textbf{H-1d}: The greater the number of contiguous states emerging from a secession the more likely it is for them to experience interstate violence.

\textsuperscript{10} Sweden-Denmark, Norway-Sweden, Sweden-Russia in place of Sweden-Denmark, Sweden-Russia.
Decolonization

Territoriality

Contrary to secession, decolonization affects territories far away from the homeland, therefore less salient for the ceding state. Colonial powers have historically occupied territories central to their commercial interests. As empires expanded and intercontinental trade flourished dependencies obtained an additional layer of strategical importance. Military footholds on distant areas conveyed not only the might and reputation of the colonial state, but served as a deterrent to the expansion of competing powers (Young 2001). The advancements of technology regarding travel during the mid-20th century, however, combined with the post-WWII economic exhaustion of colonial powers and the revolution of ideas surrounding the ethics and morals of western imperialism, raised the costs of colonial presence exponentially. The reputational and material cost of maintaining colonies now exceeded the benefits of easy access to raw resources and trade routes, resulting in a proportional reduction of the economic and strategic value of colonial territories. Absent of intangible or psychological value for the metropolises, the cession of territories to the statehood-seeking movements was deemed largely acceptable as long as a certain degree of colonial influence persisted within the new polities. Apart from a rather small number of certain territorial enclaves with immense strategic importance that were retained by some colonial states (e.g. Suez Canal), decolonized states and their metropolises were no longer adjacent, thus possessed limited opportunity for territorial contestations.

Specifically regarding the territorial value of the lost lands, decolonization does not suffer from the same zero-sum mindset secession does. Hensel and Mitchell (2005) devised a taxonomy of territorial value, where a score is assigned to each disputed territory based on three tangible and three intangible value categories for each side up to a maximum of twelve. The three intangible salience categories award value to territories that are considered homelands, have
significant co-ethnic presence, and had been previously occupied by either side (Hensel and Mitchell 2005: 278). Although seceded territories always obtain the maximum salience score (i.e. 6 for both states) in these categories, former colonial territories are by definition limited to half of the maximum value. While one may object the linear and additive nature of this measure, Hensel and Mitchell’s (2005) arguments emphasize one major difference between the two processes when territoriality is concerned. For partitioned states a territorial gain for one side denotes a loss of equal value for another in absolute terms. Decolonized states, on the other hand, enjoy gains that far exceed the value of colonial losses. Since colonial losses do not concern indivisible and unsubstitutable territories, any attempts to challenge the new territorial status quo are deemed “high risk-low reward,” thus highly unlikely. For that reason, we should observe fewer disputes between former metropolises and their dominions, on average.

This does not mean the life-cycle of new states is free from immediate geographic competition, however. Much like post-secession outcomes, territories abandoned by colonial powers typically yield more than one new state. These states are now sovereign neighbors and subject to similar kinds of territoriality considerations as seceded states. Their newly acquired independence is contingent upon maintaining control over a territory that has suddenly been assigned the role and intrinsic value of the “homeland.” For that reason, former dominions are incentivized to aggressively protect their territorial integrity during the first vulnerable years of their existence by expanding their military capabilities to offset the vacuum of power caused by the abrupt exit of the colonial power, resulting in actions and policies that can be interpreted as revisionist. The absence of a balancing presence and a traditional arbitrator of intracolonial disputes may lead decolonized states to engage each other in lengthy confrontations over the legitimacy of occupied lands, particularly in cases where the new “homeland” does not spatially
match established and historical preconceptions of ancestral origins. In simple terms, new states may perceive the arbitrary geographic carving of their spatial domains by exiting metropolises as illegitimate and may try to remedy this perceived injustice by raising claims against their colonial counterparts.

The tangible value of decolonized territories is also an important factor of their post-independence behavior in stark contrast to post-secession cases. Recall that most were colonized by imperial states due to their trade significance and high concentration of natural resources. Colonial powers, intending to facilitate resource extraction, established numerous economic exploitation spheres which then became independent polities. This created an imbalance in resource accessibility for decolonized states. Those emerging resource-rich invited the envy of their poorer neighbors. As such, territorial disputes on the basis of economic value, particularly when natural resources are located near contestable spaces, are not uncommon in the decolonized world. At the same time, they seem to disproportionately occur between states that share common colonial legacies. Spolaore and Wacziarg (2016) develop an economic model of relatedness and demonstrate that their increased conflict proclivity can be attributed to their common preferences over rival goods, cultivated by the presence of a common colonial ancestry. Put simply, former British dominions experiencing resource asymmetries are more likely to fight over tangible territorial endowments for they share similar preferences over what is considered a “valuable resource.” In addition, the same study demonstrates how ethnic, linguistic, and cultural relatedness may incentivize confrontations as it eradicates future costs associated with ethnic heterogeneity and national assimilation if an occupation takes place.

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11 This includes both mineral (e.g. oil, gold, diamonds) and non-mineral resources (e.g. water, soil quality, agricultural capacity).
Findings such as these suggest instances of conflict are only restricted to intra-colonial interactions. However, Spolaore and Wacziarg’s (2016) logic of colonial legacies, insofar as they relate to informing state preferences and war-making choices, can be expanded to explain intercolonial competition. One would expect territorial disputes between colonial powers, for example, to influence the relations of new states separated by imperial fault lines. The territory now occupied by South Sudan, for instance, was considered tangibly and strategically important by both the British – who wanted to connect their southern dominions with Egypt to the north and Kenya to the east – and the French – who aimed in expanding their sub-Saharan presence. Their departure from the area in the late 1950s led to the emergence of two contiguous new states: Sudan and the Central African Republic. Per Spolaore and Wacziarg (2016), these states should not experience interstate confrontations due to their different colonial past, as it affects their structure of preferences over competing resources. However, the Sudan-CAR pair has been one of the most conflict prone dyads in Africa according to the COW and ICOW projects. It seems then that historical animosity between two colonial powers can poison the relationship of new states, which inherit the territorial grievances of their colonial masters in addition to any cultural and socioeconomic traits.

In sum, territorial competition should increase the conflict proclivity of dyads comprised only of decolonized states, regardless of their colonial backgrounds. This tendency can be attributed to both psychologically invaluable land as it relates to ethnic fragmentation (detailed below) and to exogenously imposed resource asymmetries. The presence of a relatively small number of old adjacent states (e.g. Ethiopia) is anticipated to have minimal effect in mitigating regional instability, since they lack the capabilities to keep aggressive behavior in check. To the contrary, recent history has indicated that established states often turn territorial revisionists in
attempts to capitalize on the exit of colonial powers and the subsequent military vulnerability of new states (e.g. Ethiopia-Somalia).

**Boundaries**

As with post-secession outcomes, boundary disputes between decolonized states have been frequent and mostly violent (Carter and Goemans 2014). The underlying dynamics associated with post-colonial border claims, however, are quite different. To begin with, colonial powers did not consider overseas frontiers to be more than a rough demarcation of their zones of influence. The first mention of intercolonial boundaries as quasi-institutions occurred during the Berlin Conference of 1884-85, when European metropolises agreed on broad rules governing Africa’s dismemberment (Griffiths 1986). Disagreements over the cartography of Africa, coupled with apathy for its ethnopolitical geography, resulted in these boundaries being drawn as straight lines connecting known physical features (Boggs 1940).\(^\text{12}\) Apart from unintentionally creating “grey zones,” comprised of large unexplored regions that were left unclaimed, this practice left boundaries devoid of any substantive institutional value since they were never meant to be “state borders” in the first place (Herbst 1989). It wasn’t until the late 1930s – as Europe was preparing for war – that these borders obtained international recognition following hasted attempts to collectively settle overseas territorial claims (Nugent and Asiwaju 1996).

The literature on colonialism points to three distinct characteristics of new borders that should logically increase the likelihood of conflict between (and within) decolonized states (Wucherpfennig, Hunziker, and Cederman 2016; Silberfein and Conte 2006; Englebert, Tarango, and Carter 2002). First, the arbitrary delineation of colonial boundaries was primarily aimed in maximizing administrative efficiency and resource extraction rather than to satisfy preconceived

\(^{12}\) The same practice was later applied to all overseas European colonies.
ethnic or territorial sensitivities. As such, the spatial cohesion of new states was undermined as they emerged with inherited borders devoid of psychological value and historical significance. Tribal areas were exogenously divided and assigned new national identities, while in several instances rival ethnic groups were forced to cohabitate by being placed in the same homeland (e.g. Sudan, British Raj). Second, colonial indifference regarding their future legal standing impeded the gradual maturation of colonial boundaries to international institutions. A delayed acquisition of their jurisdictional importance promoted policy ambiguity and regional uncertainty, which then provoked revisionist actions (Simmons 2005). Third, the decision to arbitrary demarcate overseas dominions on an industrial scale, combined with imperfect information on morphological particularities and cartographical imprecision, created spaces so immense that future local sovereign governance became largely unattainable (Carter and Goemans 2011). Boundary monitoring and control still remains a challenge for many resource-limited decolonized states due to their sheer length; as they remain porous and unprotected, borderland regions are susceptible to experience interstate violence and/or criminal activity in addition to becoming incubators for tribal strife and civil unrest.

Absent a process of indigenous demarcation and institutional maturation, decolonized states are expected to engage in protracted boundary claims that remain largely unsettled. Indeed, according to the Issue Correlates of War, 41% of ongoing border disputes involve decolonized states. While not all disputes escalate to full blown interstate wars, these data serve as an indication of the impact colonial inheritance has on the positive peace prospects of a new state. What is more, the number of peacefully resolved claims as a proportion of the total in this subgroup of states is substantially lower than the global average (17% to 68%). This discrepancy could be attributed to a lack of trust decolonized states express towards traditional Western
arbitration and settlement mechanisms. In other words, although the departure of colonial rule created an opportunity for new entities to remedy any perceived injustices pertaining to their territorial configurations, it also instilled a perpetual distrust of third-party arbitration efforts carried by former imperial states as they stir memories of external control and manipulation.

**Ethnic composition**

An unintended side-effect of colonial boundaries was the partitioning of tribal areas and ethnic homelands. With the exception of the South American colonies, decolonized states are typically among the most ethnically heterogeneous in the system. To put it in perspective, Miles (2015) asserts that there are more than 62 partitioned ethnic groups between only nine states in sub-Saharan Africa.\(^{13}\) Of these, the Hausa people are spread over a territory that spans from Côte d’Ivoire in the West to Sudan in the East. Others have made similar observations: Asiwaju (1985) counts 177 ethnic groups separated by new interstate borders, while Griffiths (1986: 205) claims that “[e]very land boundary in Africa cuts through at least one.” In many cases, ethnic partitioning becomes particularly egregious; Burkina Faso’s boundaries, for instance, divide 21 “culture areas” while just the Nigeria-Cameroon border divides 14.

Heterogeneity of such a magnitude becomes problematic both domestically (“suffocation”) and internationally (“dismemberment”).\(^{14}\) Domestically, effective and ethnically impartial governance is largely unattainable. Calls for equal representation of minority ethnic groups are routinely ignored, as are their demands and grievances. Majority dominated regimes intentionally suppress the rights of minorities, which in turn engage in efforts that challenge the legitimacy of the state itself. National identities have yet to supplant local ones due to the

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\(^{13}\) These states are: Niger, Chad, the CAR, Cameroon, Sudan, Nigeria, Togo, Ghana, and Benin.

\(^{14}\) These two concepts are explained in detail by Englebert et al. (2005).
magnitude of cultural diversity, thus promulgating deeply rooted ethnic divisions. As a result, decolonized states frequently experience political instability, civil discord, and/or ethnic violence.

When it comes to interstate interactions, ethnic “dismemberment” is bound to promote irredentism and calls for reunification (Englebert et al. 2005: 1097). Contrary to secession-related reunification claims, decolonized states are not driven by a desire to repatriate diasporas. In fact, the concept of “ethnic diaspora” does not apply to decolonized states as it requires alignment of the national and sub-national identities in the revisionist state. Since the arbitrary imposition of the construct of “national identity” has yet to percolate into the heterogeneous populations of decolonized states as to substitute local and tribal identities, ethnic reunification efforts are primarily driven and orchestrated on the substate level. The decision of a state to aggressively pursue or facilitate reunification attempts brought forth by a partitioned ethnic group partially depends on the latter’s domestic social standing and influence. Most importantly, it depends on the value of the territory an ethnic group has historical ties to, as well as the relative military/political power of the potential adversary.

Official demands aside, the presence of co-ethnics on the other side of the border, combined with limited border enforcement capabilities, provides opportunities for revisionist states to subversively destabilize their neighbors. It is not uncommon for authorities to supply material support to coethnic rebels or intervene militarily to protect coethnics from intrastate conflicts in adjacent territories. Such actions exacerbate existing territorial anxieties among new states and further undermine the function of the de facto permeated boundaries. As ethnic-driven irredentist claims and profound disrespect for territorial integrity remain prevalent in their
interstate relations, decolonized states should face a significantly elevated conflict propensity when compared to new states emerging by other processes on average.

**Proximity and spatial clustering**

State creation via decolonization is theoretically agnostic of proximity considerations. The conceptual definition of state birth via decolonization mandates that the metropolis and the former colony are non-contiguous, but offers no assumptions about the position of the new state relative to other new or old states.\(^\text{15}\) Historically, however, decolonization waves have occurred roughly concurrently and resulted in a flurry of new states emerging within well-defined geographical regions. The vast majority of African states, for example, was granted independence from European colonial rule in the two decades following WWII. Similar in fashion was the decolonization process of the Middle East, the Indian subcontinent, and Southeast Asia, although a few established states with long traditions of sovereign authority were already present in the region (e.g. China, Japan). South America decolonized during the first half of the 19\(^{th}\) century, while the emergence of Caribbean nations occurred in the 1970s. In all these four regions decolonization resulted in a significant inflation of the total number of states in the system – all these new states emerged in tight geographic clusters.\(^\text{16}\)

With secession, clustering accentuates interstate competition primarily due to tensions arising from the partition of the motherland. Unlike secession, the element of a dismembered motherland is not applicable to decolonized states. What is also different is the absence of older neighbors that may help counterbalance the behavioral immaturity of their newly emerged

\(^\text{15}\) This is not the cases with secession, where we a priori know new states will be situated in close proximity, if not adjacent, to each other.

\(^\text{16}\) Canada, Australia, and New Zealand are examples of decolonized states which emerged by the same event, but not in the same region.
counterparts, given that states tend to emulate their neighbor’s behavior (Lake and Rothchild 1998). Inherited resource asymmetries, ethnic partitions, and porous boundaries would influence the behavior of any state; when these factors are present region-wide, however, the conditional likelihood of dyadic competition is rising.

Finally, clustering also affects the probability of civil conflict contagion. Buhaug and Gleditsch (2008), addressing the phenomenon of intrastate wars spilling over interstate boundaries, identify spatial distribution patterns that point to a neighborhood effect. In short, they argue that as the number of states experiencing high probabilities of domestic violence increases in a region, so does the propensity for dyadic wars. These findings are directly relevant to decolonization; as discussed in Chapter 6, post-colonial state birth is positively correlated with civil conflict initiation and involvement, therefore we should anticipate their geographic clustering to correspond to an elevated baseline hazard of conflict contagion on the interstate level.

**Hypotheses**

In summarizing the arguments above, I expect decolonization to result in a significant increase of conflict proclivity in a region. Although both new and old states are expected to face an overall greater propensity for conflict, the impact of decolonization should be especially profound for dyads of decolonized states in particular. In comparison to secession, decolonization should yield a relatively greater hazard for conflict onset and involvement primarily due to ethnic concerns and clustering effects. This leads us to the generation of the following testable propositions:

- **H-2a**: Decolonized states are more likely to engage in militarized interstate disputes than old states or any other type of new state.

- **H-2b**: Dyads comprised of at least one decolonized state face a greater likelihood of conflict when compared to any other dyadic combination.
\textit{H-2c:} The neighborhood effect on dyadic conflict propensity is more profound in regions affected by decolonization.

\textbf{Liberation}

\textbf{Territoriality}

Liberation is a rather peculiar state emergence process in that it denotes a lagged territorial exchange rather than permanent territorial change. The territoriality dimension of state creation via liberation is not as complicated as in the cases of secession and decolonization. States temporarily occupy other sovereign nations through the threat or use of military force, engaging in what Edelstein (2004: 53) calls “security” or “comprehensive” occupations.\textsuperscript{17} These span over brief periods and are usually terminated by the forced or voluntary departure of the occupying power, which results in the restoration of the former state’s territorial integrity and authority. As such, liberation is conceptualized as a process of reversion to the antecedent territorial status quo that existed prior to the occupation. Importantly, occupations in the context of this study are conditioned on the \textit{a priori} intention of the aggressor to exert a temporally constrained rule over foreign territory. Since the invading power is expected to leave within a few years, the occupied territory does not obtain symbolic meaning or value for the occupier. In fact, the longer an occupation lasts the costlier it becomes due to the amount of resources devoted on maintaining order and security. A prolonged foreign presence can cause “occupation fatigue” for both the occupiers and the people under their rule, positively affecting the probability of armed insurrection. When an occupation is terminated, liberated states recuperate existential losses by gaining control of the psychologically invaluable and indivisible

\textsuperscript{17} Security occupations aim in preventing the collapse of the target state and a subsequent regional destabilization. Comprehensive occupations secure the interests of the occupying force and involve nation-building endeavors (Edelstein 2004: 53-54).
motherland, while occupiers cede territory that has little salience beyond its temporally limited, and now de facto negligible, strategic value.

A simple analysis of the territorial gains-losses frame offers limited insights regarding the future behavior of new states and their neighbors. Liberation by definition confers military weakness on the part of the new state. The mere fact that it was occupied in the first place suggests a material inability to defend itself against aggression. The re-emergence of the new state, therefore, is expected to convey territorial satisfaction and temper territorial aspirations against its neighbors given the very recent memories of military defeat. Prior victimization is also expected to elevate the importance of peaceful resolutions to contentious issues in fear of provoking interstate intervention anew. Liberated states usually switch their focus inwards, indicating a marked preference for stabilizing the domestic environment, consolidating political authority, and rebuilding their economic and societal structures.

Notable exceptions to such behavioral patterns occur when liberations result in geographically contiguous dyads comprised of the aggressor and the victim. Particularly in cases where the occupation was violent and terminated by the intervention of third parties, liberated states have sought reparations in the form of territorial concessions. Although such requests are rarely granted by third parties, territorial demands of this sort may be perceived as indications of territorial dissatisfaction and revisionism by weary neighbors, in addition to temporarily poisoning the prospects of peaceful coexistence between the former occupier and the liberated state. As time passes by, however, we should observe a marked decline of interstate animosity that can be partially attributed to the de facto resolution of the dispute that caused the occupation in the first place, as well as the pacifying presence of older states in the region actively seeking
stability through peace. Taking all the above factors into account, liberation should be one of the least conflict-prone processes of state emergence insofar territoriality is concerned.

**Boundaries**

Liberated states are “new” only in the sense of regaining their system membership. Given that they were never entirely absorbed as territorial entities, their boundaries never lost their interstate demarcation purpose; rather, they were preserved and managed by the occupying force.\(^{18}\) The emergence of a liberated state should therefore be accompanied by a gradual re-institutionalization of its interstate boundaries without significant objections since, in theory, the territorial change that occurred during liberation is tantamount to a change of administration as opposed to a new geographic configuration. One may argue, however, that the occupation itself denotes a violation of territorial integrity, thus a denigration of those boundaries as territorial regimes. In other words, these boundaries may remain unaltered, yet their institutional value has been negatively affected by the invasion. Relatively longer occupations severely undermine the institutional purpose of interstate borders and by extension increase the time they require to reach their pre-occupation status.

For that reason, liberated states are assumed to be deeply incentivized to actively pursue policies aimed in strengthening the norm of territorial integrity, whose violation led to them losing system membership in the first place. Such diplomatic initiatives may include engagement with international partners or transnational actors, bilateral agreements, or membership in defensive alliances. The threat of future territorial cessions due to the presence of porous boundaries should lead liberated states to promote norms and behavioral patterns that are conducive to a paradoxical vision of the territorially bounded nation-state: encouraging tight

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\(^{18}\) The opposite would denote annexation rather than occupation.
interstate cooperation without compromising the intended function of borders. To that extent, the attitudes of old neighboring states towards the essential purpose of boundaries may as catalysts in consolidating their institutional value by recalibrating the regional focus towards inviting greater volumes of interstate interactions. More cooperation reduces the institutional stress on boundaries and the need to militarily protect them, thus allowing them to mature organically over time. Mature and settled borders, in turn, should act as the cornerstones of positive peace between neighboring states, new or old.

**Ethnic composition**

The ethnic makeup of liberated states is left unaffected by both the occupation event and the birth of the new state. The presence of the occupying force, whose mission has a specific administrative and security scope, offers limited opportunity for ethnic rearrangements. The disinterest of occupiers to implement ethnic rearrangement policies results in reduced internal tension during the post-emergence rebuilding process. Unlike secession and decolonization, liberation does not give rise to factors associated with ethnic strife. To the contrary, the shared memory of collective defeat is expected to provide elites with a unique opportunity to develop a new, unifying, national identity. The substitution of local or ethnic identities with a national one should increase the distance between the constituents of the new entity and coethnic populations residing across the border. At the same time, any preexisting ethnic tensions should subside, resulting in a reduced likelihood of external intervention on behalf of oppressed minorities.

**Spatial clustering**

Liberation does not offer concrete theoretical expectations in regards to the relevant positioning of the new states. Traditionally, military campaigns and subsequent occupations tend to happen along spatial contiguity lines, where the invading force conquers adjacent states first before proceeding to challenge initially remote targets, which implies geographic adjacency.
between new states. Given that very few military campaigns have resulted in the occupation of numerous states, liberations usually result in the emergence of a small number of new states amongst established neighbors.

Recall that state emergence is logically tied to destabilization, primarily due to upsetting the territorial status quo. However, there are two reasons behind this process of state emergence being perceived more positively by neighboring nations, as opposed to decolonization and secession. First, the new state was an equal partner not so long ago. Its loss of statehood and the territorial change that signifies is considered to be a relatively bigger geopolitical shock when compared to state birth via liberation. Second, liberation requires prior occupation, which in turn requires a successful military campaign. Regional militarization and the evident success of violence as a political mode of conduct (i.e. invasion resulting in occupation) is arguably more disconcerting as compared to liberation, violent or not. Viewed as alternatives, the latter should help subside the level of insecurity caused by the former. For these reasons, the spatial clustering and contemporaneous emergence of liberated states should produce quite opposite outcomes that those of other processes; their birth is tied to the defeat or departure of the aggressor who attempted territorial revisionism. The more states regain independence the lesser the threat of further interstate violence. As such, the birth of liberated states should be met with regional enthusiasm, while the presence of older counterparts should minimize the threat of regional instability originating in the shock of state creation itself. In short, the termination of a military campaign denoted by the liberation of a nearby state should provide old states with an opportunity to exert their pacifying presence, thus establishing itself as a stabilizing factor in the neighborhood
**Hypotheses**

All in all, liberated states have both limited opportunity for conflict, due to their hamstrung military capacity, and limited willingness as prior victims of aggression. Their recent loss of system membership and its associated ramifications for the perils of military defeat should positively inform their attitudes towards peace and prosperity as well as teach them the value of cooperation. Formally then:

- **H-3a:** Liberated states should experience a decreased proclivity for interstate conflict when compared to seceded and decolonized states.
- **H-3b:** Dyads comprised of liberated states are less likely to engage in militarized disputes.
- **H-3c:** The conflict prospects of liberated states should closely approximate those of older adjacent states.

**Unification**

**Territoriality and boundaries**

The emergence of a unified state refers to an internally motivated and consensual territorial change, resulting from an a priori willingness to rectify what is perceived as an externally imposed territorial division (e.g. Germany 1990). The outcome is the creation of a new state in possession of a significantly larger homeland without the acquisition of territory from its older neighbors. Unifications are uniquely distinguishable events in that they yield only territorial gainers and reduce the overall number of states in the system. The de facto absence of a territorial loser implies a lack of exogenous grievances associated with loss of land and its intrinsic value, which suggests that disputes over this specific territorial change will rarely arise.

Territoriality, however, comes into consideration when one accounts for its impact on the regional balance of power following a new state’s emergence. Unified states are not only spatially larger; they are significantly more powerful. Their territorial expansion means that they
now have access to more resources and manpower, which indicates a marked increase of their military capabilities. Since the primary reason behind relinquishing sovereignty on the part of the pre-unified states was to form a politically, economically, and militarily stronger entity, unification should in principle be a cause for concern for older neighbors. The entire basis on which prior relations were founded has now changed and with it the balance of power has been usurped. Established adjacent states have now valid reasons to perceive the new state as a potential threat and a future aggressor, particularly when there were unsettled territorial disputes between the formerly independent states and their neighbors prior to unification. This positive effect on dyadic conflict propensity depends on the severity of pre-emergence territorial competition. In general, we would expect the territorial expansion occurring by unification to at least temporarily offset bellicose intentions.

The external boundaries of unified states remain unaffected by this process of state-making, thus they retain their institutional capacity. The only change occurs to the common boundary between the pre-unified states, which is now relegated to an administrative, internally managed, border. Since the interstate boundaries of the new state experience no alterations whatsoever, the impact of state creation on boundary associated territorial considerations should be minimal. As such, unified states are expected to avoid engaging in boundary disputes or conflicts. Echoing Tir’s (2006) arguments, unification should in fact increase the new state’s willingness for cooperation as its size and access to resources now renders it an attractive trading partner for its neighbors.

**Ethnic composition and clustering**

Unification occurs primarily due to ethnic similarities between distinct political entities. Viewed as a self-correction process, the goal achieved by unification is to bring together coethnics separated by externally imposed events. The populations are not ethnically distinct and
consider their identity similarities to be more important than their political divisions. They share a common history and cultural background, speak the same language, and they follow similar religious practices. In most cases, unified states were sharing the same territory in the past, rendering their symbolic ties to the unified homeland “unbreakable.” Given that it achieves ethnic homogeneity, unification is unlikely to lead to ethnic tensions in a dyadic setting. As a state creation process, unification manages to deliver conformity. At the same time, the lack of suppressed ethnic minorities reduces the chances of disaffection and political marginalization, which is instrumental for the viability of the new state. Its peers are more likely to accept it in their midst if the new state avoids ethnic tensions, as those are an indication of domestic instability that may spill over common borders. Lastly, when peaceful, the process and character of unification implies a mentality of “ethnic respect” that can be easily externalized. Unified states, therefore, are anticipated to conform and promote norms of regional integration. Their supportive stance on normative attempts in favor of tighter cooperative international regimes by default presupposes an absence of bellicose intentions.

When it comes to spatial clustering any discussion about the effects of unification would be abstract as it is an admittedly rare event in the history of the modern nation state. In fact, to date we have not experienced a politically relevant dyad comprised of two unified states. In theory however, the aversion to conflict exhibited by unified states should render their regional clustering a force for good. Given their adherence to positive norms of interstate behavior, one may argue that a region with many unified states would experience a relatively greater likelihood for harmonious coexistence.

**Hypotheses**

The above discussion logically leads us to the following formal presuppositions:
**H-4a**: As a process of state emergence, unification reduces the hazard of militarized interstate disputes for a new state.

**H-4b**: Dyads containing a unified state should be less conflict prone than dyads containing seceded, decolonized, or liberated states.

**H-4c**: Unified states should experience a lesser likelihood of territorial disputes

**Violence**

Contrary to conventional thinking, I do not conceptualize pre-emergence violence as an “interaction” factor of mere procedural importance as others have suggested (e.g. Lemke and Carter 2016). To the contrary, I argue that violence has a consistent, albeit compounding, effect on that of each of the four processes. In other words, no matter what the impact of a process is on interstate conflict propensity, I contend that violent emergence will always make the latter more likely. In that respect, violence should have a statistically independent and empirically distinguishable effect that is separate from procedural expectations. My claims revolve around conceptualizing violence as an indication of agency rather than structure, thus warranting a separate discussion as a distinct theoretical dimension.

In formal terms, I argue that pre-independence violence is the most significant indicator of post-independence state behavior regardless of the specific process. The reasons behind this theoretical expectation are simple. From a macro-behavioral standpoint, a violent state birth suggests that the sociopolitical foundations of the new state were built on aggression and bellicosity. Essentially the byproduct of substate conflict, violence is perceived as the medium of success and a legitimate practice of resolving grievances. Its transposition from the prestate to the substate environment is only natural following the reward it provided to the self-determination struggle, namely statehood. Abandoning the mentality of force would be counterintuitive, as violence now has an established track record of delivering desirable outcomes. The efficacy of violence during independence should suppress pacifying tendencies.
and conflict resolution approaches both domestically and internationally. Internationally, state birth through armed confrontation signals to neighboring nations that resorting to the use of force is permissible; at the same time, it sets a precedent for other active self-determination groups to follow.

At its microfoundations, a violent emergence denotes an armed insurgence or rebellion against the out-group representing the state’s authority. Manifested as actions that fall within a wide spectrum, ranging from organized combat to political assassinations, pre-independence violence victimizes civilians and military personnel alike. In certain cases, such as former Yugoslavia, it begins as a guerilla-type warfare and may evolve into systematic genocide or a traditional military campaign emulating the characteristics of interstate wars. Regardless of the degree of escalation, violence and its impact on human life and property informs the attitudes of those involved and affected. Individuals that lost family members during the course of independence are less likely to forget and forgive; at the same time, the intragroup animosity prevalent prior to state birth will be accentuated due to the impact of violence and will be propagated through societal contact, affecting everyday decisions, perceptions, stereotypes, and ultimately behavior. Such attitudes will be reflected in the new state’s elites and its new government, as they represent the mentality of the average constituent.

Specifically in regards to the effects of violence on personality traits, there is a wide body of literature dealing with trauma and its consequences on human behavior. The findings suggest that children who experienced violence in the past tend to normalize and internalize it as a mode of conduct. Particularly when war is concerned, the psychological trauma caused on

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19 For a summary of findings on this topic see Jensen and Shaw (1993), Murthy and Lakshminarayana (2006), and Moffitt (2013).
children and young adults by inflicted non-domestic violence and by being exposed to images of death seems to persist for several years after the event. Their behavior is altered in such a way as to accommodate and normalize violence in order to cope with loss and post-traumatic stress. Aggression and mistrust defines interpersonal relationships, especially towards those with ethnic or political ties to the perpetrators of violent acts. In the context of state emergence, this suggests that pre-independence violence leads to a generation of individuals – some of which will become statesmen and policymakers – whose decision-making calculus is deeply affected by their past experiences as children growing up during a civil conflict. This normalization of violent behavior is expected to escape the confines of private life and seep into the realm of interstate demeanor.

The domestic political consequences of pre-independence violence can be far-reaching. The leaders of the successful armed campaign that led the group to the acquisition of statehood are expected to experience a massive popularity boost and eventually be rewarded with post-independence positions of power. Placing former militants, such as Radovan Karadzic, Milan Babic, and Slobodan Milosevic, into the upper echelons of political order allows them to manipulate the formation of the political structure and institutions during the first formative years of the new entity. As celebrated victors, they are viewed as the saviors of the nation and enjoy practically unlimited power, which they may use to oppress minorities and quell dissent. Power sharing mechanisms and democratization attempts are actively suppressed as violence becomes an institutional policy tool promoted by those whom it benefited immensely. In the eyes of the elites the success attributed to violence serves as proof of the inadequacy of reconciliatory practices, which are a necessary ingredient of democracy. The overall outcome is a consolidation of political authority and a rejection of democratic values, leading the new state towards a path of militant autocracy.
In a strictly dyadic context, a violent emergence signals to neighbors the proven ability of the new state to mount and sustain military operations. The success of the campaign also indicates that the new state is capable of waging and, most importantly, winning wars. Since the primordial instinct of the new state’s elites is to ensure its survival, they are expected to retain a high degree of military preparedness and organization, which may be misinterpreted as a sign of bellicose intentions by older states in the region, leading them to respond in kind. Such actions and reactions increase the chances of adversarial relationships and the overall likelihood of dyadic disputes due to the inevitability of miscalculations and mutual provocations. Particularly when a dyad of new states emerging from the same violent event is concerned, recent memories of violent pre-state confrontations are expected to profoundly affect their now interstate interactions in a profoundly negative way. Studies on substate conflict outcomes offer empirical support to the above claim. Intrastate conflicts attributed to ethnic divisions with a particularly strong territorial component have been found to have a rather high probability of recurrence (Thies 2004; Quinn, Mason, and Gurses 2007; Daxecker 2011; and Gurses 2014). Conceptualized as quasi-intestate disputes, since are followed by the immediate creation of a new state, such substate conflicts denote de facto violent territorial cessions. Unsettled interstate territorial contestations, in turn, create an environment of mutual distrust and animosity which can expand to other policy areas beyond territoriality. This predicament causes competitors to “lock” into a relationship defined by repeated and lasting disputes that face a higher than average likelihood of conflict onset and escalation (Valeriano 2012).

In formal terms:

\[ H-5a: \] Violent emergence increases the likelihood of conflict for new states.

\[ H-5b: \] A dyad comprised of two violently born new states should face a significantly greater hazard of interstate disputes when compared to any other dyad.
**H-5c: Violent births are expected to increase the likelihood of interstate wars.**

**A Note on State Age and Maturation**

The impact of state age on interstate behavior has so far evaded scholarly attention. As discussed in Chapter 1, until very recently the conflict processes literature had ignored the fact that that new states comprise only a subset of the entire population of states in the system that exhibits its own unique behavioral patterns (the only notable exception is Lemke and Carter 2016). The prevailing practice imposes two fundamentally flawed assumptions. The first is that of behavioral homogeneity, in that all states are expected to react similarly given the same external stimuli; in other terms, their internal dispositions towards certain community members are irrelevant. This does not bode well with my analysis of state emergence. The arguments presented here, if shown to withstand empirical scrutiny, suggest that the process and means of state birth restrict, and most importantly drive, the gamut of interactions between new states and their neighbors. Two seceded states, for instance, will experience a qualitatively different relationship immediately after a secession when compared to the relationship two older states have. The second assumption is that of temporal inconsequentialism, meaning that states’ past does not affect their future demeanor. Although numerous studies have attempted to capture the effects past events may have on conflict propensity, their implementation practices have been less than nuanced. When testing for militarized interstate disputes, to offer an example, the traditional approach has been to control for the number of peace years or of past disputes. Unfortunately, these abstract measures have little to say about what matters most in the context of this study, namely how states will behave given how they came to be in the first place. To this point, I argue that the legacy of state creation has a substantively different impact on new state behavior than an additive and linear measure of past interstate conflicts, which in this context would be zero by default. If my theoretical expectations are correct, the conflict literature has so
far relied on two axiomatic assumptions that are likely to yield spurious empirical relationships by failing to capture the heterogeneous origins and nature of states in the system.

An important implication of considering state age as relevant to understanding behavior relates to the notion of “maturation.” Although state age can be controlled by a simple measure that counts years after independence, I argue that such a simplistic approach is inadequate in capturing changes in behavior due to socialization. Instead, I claim that states, as made by individuals, follow a non-linear maturation process that can be attributed to the pervasiveness of memories and reflected by state actions both domestically and internationally. As such, states learn from their actions and their consequences, and they adapt to external stimuli according to the outcome of their behavior. All states go through this maturation process, but, given that time has a diminishing effect on learning, new states are particularly susceptible to behavioral adaptation and realignment. Most importantly, generational replacement suggests that birth legacies have a profound but temporally limited effect that has been comfortably ignored by all conflict analyses to date. Although time per se is theoretically agnostic, the research design I introduce in Chapter 4 incorporates these concerns and attempts to expound empirical links between maturation and state demeanor based on the following hypotheses:

\( H-6a \): The effects of processes and means are not constant over time; instead they fluctuate due to maturation effects.

\( H-6b \): The impact of violent emergence in specific is expected to decay as time passes by.

\( H-6c \): Given enough time new state behavior should approximate that of old states.
CHAPTER 4
RESEARCH DESIGN

Overview

Chapter 3 presented a succinct and logically consistent theoretical model of new state behavior that links pre-state conditions and post-state outcomes. In the following five sections of the present chapter I lay out the exact parameters of my empirical analysis. The first section focuses on the operational definitions of state emergence, processes, and means. Next, I discuss the data collection process and the issues associated with compiling an original data set of state birth. Section 3 details the units of analysis and offers precise descriptions and measurements of the dependent, independent, and control variables. An overall assessment of the sample selection process, temporal and spatial restrictions, and data limitations follows suit. Lastly, the final section explains the precise methodological tools that I employ in performing the empirical tests, as well as addresses certain epistemological concerns that arise from the exclusive reliance on probabilistic approaches in assessing causal relationships.

Operational Definitions

Operationalizing States, New and Old

The operational definition of a state utilized in this work abides by the traditional parameters set by the Correlates of War project (Small and Singer 1982). This particular definition of a “state” hinges on the satisfaction of three prerequisites. First, a state needs to be occupied by a sizeable amount of individuals. The population requirement enforces a minimum standard of political power, by conceptualizing people as a resource, as to capture only those states with an opportunity to become active participants of the international system. Second, a state should be able to exercise sovereign authority over its allocated territory. This “stateness” criterion ensures that political entities which have been afforded autonomous or semi-
autonomous status (e.g. colonial dependencies) can be comfortably excluded as they are neither the arbitrators of political power over their territories nor the primary agents of their domestic and international actions. Third, a state needs to be recognized as such by a significant number of its peers, which should include several major powers. Diplomatic recognition in this case serves as a proxy for international standing and legitimacy. The establishment of diplomatic missions or relationships serves as a fundamental validation of a state’s existence; conversely, entities that violate the norm of territorial integrity by unilaterally declaring independence are routinely punished by being denied recognition and system membership. For all the above reasons, and in accordance to Small and Singer (1982: 40-46), I define a state as a territorially bounded political entity with a population of more than 500,000 permanent inhabitants and a record of established formal relations with at least two major powers (before 1920). After 1920, the recognition criterion is conditioned upon membership to the League of Nations or the United Nations. Instances of entities that meet some but not all the above criteria include, but are not restricted to, micro-states (e.g. Monaco, Lichtenstein), quasi-states (e.g. Northern Cyprus), and pseudo-states (e.g. the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant).

As with all operational definitions, there are certain reasonable criticisms one may raise regarding arbitrariness, temporal inflexibility, and restrictiveness. In this particular case, the primary anticipated concerns hinge on the ambiguity of “territorialness,” the strictness of the population criterion, and the ambiguity of diplomatic recognition. To begin with, the auxiliary, albeit necessary, condition of a “territorially bounded entity” is not properly operationalized by the Correlates of War project (Small and Singer 1982). Although the authors mention the importance of settled boundaries to the definition of a state, in practice they do not strictly enforce it when compiling their system membership data. The issue here lies on the volume of
boundary disputes present in the system, especially during periods immediately prior or after major/global conflicts, which would result in a slew of states dropping out of the sample. To remedy this unintended consequence, the effective solution to the boundary issue practiced by the COW project is to approximate the “settled boundaries” criterion with a “reasonably settled boundaries” one, which then becomes open to subjective interpretation.

Similarly, the population threshold of half a million for an entity to qualify for membership seems rather arbitrary and inelastic considering that the period it is applied to spans over two centuries. Small and Singer’s (1982: 41) justification for the adoption of this threshold as one that conforms with their prior notions of a “state,” further undermines its validity; according to their account, an investigation of the data revealed that raising the population limit to one million would exclude states such as Baden (1816-1820) and Greece (1830-1845) among others. While I understand the importance of “measure sensitivity,” in that small changes to component operators may alter the output significantly, such ex post facto thresholds are susceptible to criticism, especially when considering that the world population has grown by more than seven times since 1800 (Clarke 1996: 250). In other words, the population criterion could have been better conceptualized as a proportion of total population rather than a fixed amount of a state’s inhabitants to ensure its validity across time.

In terms of recognition, the split sample approach (prior to 1920 – after 1920), which could have been applied to the population criterion as well, suggests that an entity qualified for system membership in the 1800s if and only if it had established formal relations with France and Britain, as they were the only major powers in the world at the time (Singer and Small 1972: 21). This condition imposes an extremely Eurocentric idea of statehood, which results in the exclusion of entities located in the edges of the globe, or those that were deemed unimportant for
the geopolitical interests of the two major powers of that time. Although the rationale provided by Singer and Small (1972) relates to ensuring the key status of an entity and its global standing, a perhaps more appropriate approximation of system membership during the industrial revolution era would be a state’s recognition by the majority of its immediate neighbors. That being said, the above drawbacks of this Correlates of War definition are overshadowed by one major advantage: its almost universal usage ensures the familiarity of the audience with the definition and allows for an external validation of the data collection process. These reasons alone compel me to operationalize system entry in my study as per Small and Singer’s (1982) suggestions.

Having defined what a state is, the next step is to set the parameters for the distinction between new and old states, which has been central to this study. It should be noted that such a definition has not yet been attempted due to the discipline’s lack of interest in new state emergence and behavior, therefore it will be accompanied by a set of arbitrary assumptions, whose selection I attempt to justify below. The major axiomatic standard I impose relates to transforming a continuous measure (i.e. time since independence) to a dichotomous indicator of state age (new/old). Theoretical and empirical support for this binary distinction originates in Maoz (1989), who shows that new states exhibit qualitatively and quantitatively different behavioral patterns when compared to older states in the system. Following his suggestions, I argue that “new” states cannot retain this characterization ad infinitum, meaning that at some point during their existence their amassed experiences on the world stage and the mere volume of interstate interactions would qualify them for membership into the group of “old” states.

1 Maoz (1989) never fully operationalizes the distinction between the two beyond the abstract notion of “new” versus “old.”
Unfortunately, an effort to quantify experiences, memories, and interactions would present us with more problems than those it would solve; thus, the most straightforward – and replicable – way to proceed is to come up with a cutoff criterion of “years after independence” beyond which a state is considered to be old.

The conventional procedure in identifying the appropriate cutoff point of an operational sub-component, as evident by the process followed by Singer and Small (1982) regarding the population limit, would have been to thoroughly investigate the data and choose a number based on its empirical consequences. However, such practices imbue the outcome with a researcher’s motivational and/or confirmation bias; in other terms, the selection and interpretation of patterns is contingent on a researcher’s a priori goal-motivated reasoning. I depart from this established path by choosing the age threshold based on a theoretical justification, rather than its empirical effect. More specifically, I assert that states cease to be “new” after 30 years, or 1.5 generations, for two important reasons. First, the literature on collective memory retention and generational effects suggests that 30 years is the average threshold beyond which past experiences cease to affect character and behavior formation as they fade into obscurity (see the seminal work by Manheim [1928]1952; also, Schuman and Scott 1989; Schuman and Rodgers 2004). Although participants of major events generally happen to retain memories for longer periods of time, their ability to transmit the latter to future cohorts has been determined to be greatly reduced after three decades. Since the behavior of a new state is essentially a vector of the collective attitudes and behavior of its citizens, I claim that a state “matures” when their collective recollection and impact of state emergence stops influencing their decisions. Second, I argue that a state’s transition from one category to the other also occurs due to the diminishing participation of event observers in public life due to the natural progression of life. The leaders of a successful
statehood bid, for instance, who may be rewarded with positions of power for their contributions, are bound to be replaced as they become older. At maximum, their direct influence on state affairs and policy outcomes ends when they die. Given that the global, population-weighted, average life expectancy during the period under investigation is 47.8 years (Riley 2005), the thirty years threshold captures a life’s worth of public service for a typical adult, ceteris paribus.

**Processes**

I operationalize secession as the process of territorial change that occurs within the fully recognized and permanent homeland of a state, resulting in its replacement by at least two new political entities that meet the system membership criteria. By territorial change I refer to the introduction of new international boundaries that delineate the territories of the new entities, while homeland – as opposed to a dependent territory – denotes the well-defined spatial domain in which the seat of the government is situated. Conversely, decolonization is defined as the process by which an entity located in a dependent territory (i.e. a territory that is non-contiguous to the homeland) gains system entry. There are two fundamental differences between secession and decolonization. The first relates to spatiality, in that the operational determination hinges on the location of the new state relevant to the location of the ceding entity; seceded states *always* occupy a segment of the partitioned ex-homeland. The second is procedural, meaning that secession requires the system exit and replacement of the affected entity by new states, while decolonization requires the homeland of the metropolis and, by extension its system membership, to remain unaffected.

Liberation, on the other hand, is a special type of state emergence process as it is conditioned on the prior occurrence of a theoretically and empirically distinct event, namely conquest. The latter captures cases where an entity lost its system membership, usually following the implied or actual use of force by another state, but retained a functioning degree of political
autonomy. Conquests also denote an explicitly temporary extension of sovereignty of the occupying entity over the homeland of the now defunct state; an intend to permanently claim ownership rights would classify it as annexation instead of conquest (Edelstein 2004). As such, liberation is defined as an entity’s re-entry into the system of states following the termination of a conquest event. Importantly, for liberation to be coded as such the new state needs to reenter the system with its former official name or an unambiguous variant thereof. Finally, I operationalize unification as the territorial integration of two or more system members into a new entity that manages to acquire international recognition. Unification mandates that the merge results in the loss of statehood for all involved entities before the new state gets recognized with its own, distinct, name; otherwise the event signifies territorial annexation rather than unification.

Means

Processes of state formation aside, in Chapter 3 I theorized that the emergence of a new state can be achieved by either violent or peaceful means. Determining the prevalent mode of a successful self-determination attempt can admittedly be problematic for two important reasons. First, the vast majority of statehood campaigns involves a combination of peaceful approaches and bellicose actions. Peaceful self-determination efforts include negotiations, demonstrations, even political aggression such as the forceful exclusion of specific populations from political processes. Violence, on the other hand, ranges from threats to use force to full-blown military insurgencies and civil wars. Given that both violent and peaceful means may be employed at the same time during the process of state birth, the task of distinguishing which of the two actually led to statehood can be overwhelming. Second, it is next to impossible to assess the time-dependency of certain actions. Cases such as the Greek independence of 1821-1830 demonstrate
the extent of the challenge. In more recent years the cases of Kenya, Eritrea, and Ireland are illustrative of the temporal complexities associated with the variety of the means self-determination groups typically employ during the years prior to independence. The questions that logically flow from the above are essentially the following: do temporally distant acts of violence exert a substantive effect on future negotiations? If yes, should the outcome be attributed to the use of force or the peaceful agreement? Is the temporal effect quantifiable? What about contemporaneous events that involve both peace and violence?

My approach in addressing these concerns lies in adopting a “primacy” criterion. By that I effectively argue that when violent acts and peaceful tactics overlap during the pre-independence stage, violence supersedes peace as the primary medium of success. Militarized domestic disputes have been found to disproportionately affect the decision-making calculus of the opposing sides as violence is more likely to be reciprocated in kind; at the same time it informs future bargaining attempts regarding the military capacity and resolve of the participants (Morey 2009; DeRouen and Bercovitch 2008; Quinn, Mason, and Gurses 2007; Thies 2004). In other words, the use of force may eventually bring the opposing sides to the bargaining table, however the discussions will bear the implicit threat of further violence if negotiations fail. As such, I argue that violent independence struggles retain this characteristic even if they are promptly followed by peacefully brokered state birth agreements. Since the vast majority of civil conflicts tend to recur within three years (Morey 2009), I set this as the temporal restriction in

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2 Greece acquired independence from the Ottoman Empire following a lengthy war of secession that ended in 1826. The new state lacked international recognition by the major powers (UK, France, and Russia) and was treated as a de facto territorial occupation by a rebellious movement. Negotiations were initiated between the involved parties, the Ottoman Empire and the Greek rebels, in 1827 with the former offering a greater degree of autonomy and the latter demanding independence. After three years, during which hostilities had ceased, and under the pressure of Britain and France the Sultan Mahmud II conceded to the Greek demands. The agreement was accompanied by Ottoman territorial concessions that far exceeded the Greek expectations. As such the new Greek state seemingly emerged from a peaceful secession rather than a violent one. Most historians, however, attribute the outcome of the negotiations to the convincing military victories of the Greek rebellion three years before the official acquisition of statehood (Dakin 1973; Brewer 2011).
assessing whether a state emergence was violent or peaceful. Moreover, a self-determination effort is considered to be violent if and only if: a) the state deploys its official military resources to suppress it; and b) there is a clear distinction between combatants and noncombatants on the side of the self-determination group (i.e. there is an openly declared militant arm that engages government forces). Random acts of political violence (e.g. assassinations, covert operations, or “lone-wolf” terrorist acts) are therefore excluded from this categorization. Thus, given the above discussion I summarily refer to pre-independence violence as concerted bellicose acts involving a self-determination group and the ruling authority that take place no more than three years before the acquisition of statehood.

Data Collection

To answer the main questions surrounding my study (i.e. what are the determinants of new state behavior) I had to create an original data set of state emergence processes and means, since, to my knowledge, no dedicated procedural state creation data set existed prior to this attempt. As the time period under investigation extends back to 1816, I had to rely exclusively on secondary and tertiary data due to the apparent unavailability of primary sources. My starting point was the Correlates of War Territorial Change data, Version 5 (henceforth TC; see Tir et al. 1998), which codes all territorial changes involving at least a member of the international system from 1816 to 2014. These data include types of territorial transfers, cases of colonial independence and secessions, whether there was violence involved, as well as system entry/exit dates. The next step was to validate the accuracy of TC against the CoW System Membership (v2016; henceforth SM)4 data for potential mismatches on the dates new states gained

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3 In order to correspond with readily available data on interstate and intrastate disputes.

independence. Unfortunately, it quickly became evident that in several cases the TC and SM data were in stark disagreement. Not only they dissented on the system entry and exit dates, there existed spatial mismatches between coded territorial transfers and their outcomes. To offer just one example, the disintegration of the Turkish Empire that started in 1821 and lasted for about a century, and which created most states in the modern Balkan region, was coded significantly different in these two data sets, raising questions about which of the two was more accurate than the other. In addition, the coding parameters for violence and territorial change in the TC data, as they relate to state creation and the separate processes of state emergence, were different to the ones I developed and described above.

To remedy these issues, my coding relied heavily on secondary historical sources such as the Atlas of World History (O’Brien 2010), Encyclopedia Britannica, and the Statesman’s Yearbook, the last two of which are included in the list of sources used in the development of the TC data set. My first attempt resulted in the creation of the first version of my data set, termed State Emergence Processes (or SEP) v1, which was completed in late 2013 and contained all cases of new states from 1816 to 2001. The release of new data on conflict, system entry, and territorial changes by the Correlates of War project, in addition to the publication of Lemke and Carter (2016) study on birth legacies, allowed me to expand my own data set up to 2015. Thus, by June 2016 I had finalized SEP v2, which is the version I ultimately use here.

The biggest challenge I encountered during the data collection process had to do with coding liberation cases, which are conditioned on conquest as opposed to annexation, in the

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5 Another, more recent, example concerns Belgium after, and France during, WWII. In the SM data Belgium is coded as reentering the system in 1945, while the TC data completely ignores this fact, coding Belgium as a “non-exit” case. France is coded as entering in 1942 in the SM data versus 1944 in the TC data.

6 Tir et al. (1998), for instance, classify conquest as an exclusively violent event that is either permanent or temporary; such a definition would be inadequate for the purposes of this study.
aftermath of WWII. Specifically, it was almost impossible for me to assess the true intent behind the occupation of European states by Germany in the period 1938-1945. Historical texts recounting the events that took place frequently assign different ex ante intentions in each case (c.f. Keegan 1989; Douglas, Hugget, and Robinson 1996; Mawdsley 2009; Weinberg 2005; Dear and Foot 2001; and Madison 2009); the fact that the signaling of Nazi authorities regarding the long term plans for the occupied territories was changing over time further complicated the issue. Although certain cases, such as Austria and Greece, are universally considered to be clear cut examples of annexations and conquests respectively, opinions about the cases of Belgium, Netherlands, and Czechoslovakia are contested.

My solution was to use the formation of puppet governments comprised of occupied nationals as a proxy for the long-term plans of the occupiers. Poland, for example, was territorially dismembered by Germany on the west and Russia on the east in 1939. Soon thereafter, Germany established the “General Government” for the territories in between, which was manned exclusively by German citizens. One of its first directives was to declare any notion of Polish citizenship and nationality illegal, effectively rendering the former Polish territories annexed (Majer 2003). Conversely, the occupation of Czechoslovakia was promptly followed by the establishment of the German Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, a quasi-autonomous entity with a Czech government under German oversight (Crowhurst 2013). To my mind, the presence of a national – albeit de facto externally controlled – government suggests that the long term intentions of Germany were to use the occupied territory of former Czechoslovakia as a buffer space between the homeland and its neighbors. In the Polish example, however, the immediate declaration of the newly acquired lands as German indicates permanent, as opposed to
temporary, territorial acquisition. Following this logic, all controversial occupation cases, WWII-related and otherwise, were submitted to this litmus test before being coded as liberations.

The second major obstacle in compiling the SEP data relates to coding violent and peaceful state births for the simple reason that the practical application of the “primacy criterion” discussed above was less straightforward than expected. The assessment of certain secession cases of the 1800s (e.g. Greece, Serbia) was particularly challenging as detailed written accounts of the sequence of pre-independence events were either sparse or conflicting. Even more well researched and relatively recent cases proved to be problematic due to their convoluted history. The independence of Cameroon in 1960, which is coded as peaceful decolonization in the TC data set, serves as the case in point (see Sharp 2013; DeLancey et al. 2010). In 1919, the entity now known as Cameroon was split under two mandates, one administered by France and the other by the UK. During the next 25 years these two dependencies mounted separate statehood bids that were outright rejected by the colonial powers. The British and French intransigence markedly changed after the end of WWII. Seeing as how the two empires were militarily weak, Cameroonian self-determination movements mobilized on both sides of the border and managed to acquire semi-autonomy. However, the two campaigns employed different means to achieving this end; French Cameroonians engaged in organized violence largely under the banner of the Union des Populations du Cameroun (UPC), while the largely unorganized British Cameroonians chose the peaceful reconciliation route. By 1960, UPC’s strategy bore fruit as the territories under French control became officially independent; a year later their conational neighbors chose

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7 Serbia became de facto, although not de juris, independent in 1867 when the Ottoman Empire withdrew all its military personnel from Serbian territories. In 1876, during the Russo-Turkish war, Serbia initiated an expansionary conflict against the Ottomans. The treaty ending the Russo-Turkish war, signed during the Congress of Berlin in 1878, contained a provision regarding the international recognition of the Kingdom of Serbia. Thus, although the Serbo-Turkish conflict may be considered by some as interstate, rather than intrastate, Serbia’s lack of system membership technically renders this episode a violent secession (Harris [1936]1969).
to unite with the new state instead of merging with Nigeria. Given the sequence of facts presented above and contrary to its classification in the TC data, it is quite obvious that Cameroon emerged via violence, although its territorial expansion was peaceful (i.e. the integration of the formerly British territories).

Cases such as the above are illustrative of the effort and detail that went into creating and validating the SEP data set. The final stage involved the latter’s submission to a “trust” test by inviting reviews and comments from conflict processes scholars such as Doug Gibler, Jaroslav Tir, Jeff Carter, Mark Souva, and Gary Goertz among others, both in-person and online. In these discussions the major concerns raised had to do with the statistical impact of European liberation cases, which are clustered in time and space, the potential endogenous effect of WWII on perceptions surrounding the norms of self-determination and territorial integrity that may have influenced future statehood bids, and the impact of global alliance patterns (e.g. NATO, Warsaw Pact) during the second half of the 20th century on both independence and conflict patterns. In accordance to their suggestions, therefore, I decided to censor the militarized interstate disputes associated with the two world wars and control for defense pacts in my empirical analyses in order to address such concerns.

Units of Analysis and Variables

Units of Analysis

The first of my two series of statistical tests presented in Chapter 5 is concerned with identifying the monadic determinants of new state behavior, insofar as their post-emergence conflict propensity is concerned. My initial goal is to establish that behavioral patterns between new and old states are indeed distinguishable and that this difference can be statistically attributed to state emergence processes. An additional reason behind the adoption of the monadic approach relates to addressing the generic “maturation” hypothesis by showing how temporal
dynamics affect experiences and demeanor. In sum, the first modeling stage is devoted in justifying my claims regarding the inherent heterogeneity of the international system, which has so far been ignored by the conflict processes literature. As such, the unit of analysis format for these tests is the state-per-year.

This monadic approach, however, is restrictive when it comes to assessing new states’ behavior relative to the characteristics of their neighbors. New states do not emerge in a spatial vacuum. The behavior of a newly independent state may take one form when facing a new neighbor and another when facing an established (i.e. old) contiguous nation. The case of Sudan serves as an appropriate example to elaborate on the above. Sudan was peacefully decolonized from the UK in 1956. Excluding the presence of colonial powers in the region, the new state found itself adjacent to three states (Egypt, Libya, and Ethiopia). Upon its independence, Sudan had to develop relations with: a) an established (“old”) neighbor (Egypt) that had been independent for about 34 years; b) an adolescent neighbor (Ethiopia), which emerged in 1941; and c) a relatively newly independent neighbor (Libya), which joined the system only in 1951. During its thirty year maturation period, Sudan will have to react to the emergence of six new neighboring countries (Uganda, Kenya, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Chad), some of which came into existence through the use of force. A focus on the state as the unit of analysis will average out and essentially dampen the individual effects these events had on the behavior of Sudan, prohibiting us from discerning the convoluted vector of environmental influences, within which new states operate. For these reasons the second series of tests utilizes a dyadic framework (i.e. dyad-per-year), both in a non-directed and a directed format as to extrapolate conflict initiation and involvement patterns respectively.
Dependent Variables

The primary outcome of interest in the present study is interstate conflict, which I formally define as an incident of organized military action that occurs between two or more members of the international system of states. Based on this definition I have created two groups of binary dependent variables (DV$s), one capturing the onset of conflict and the other conflict involvement. The difference between the two is that the first marks only the year in which an interstate conflict was initiated for a participant (in the monadic version of the data set) or a dyad (in the dyadic version); subsequent conflict years are coded as missing. Involvement, on the other hand, marks all years in which a conflict was ongoing for a state or a dyad. The rationale behind the adoption of these two different formats is that I wanted to address conflict behavior in a holistic manner. Methodologically speaking, an exclusive focus on onset is accompanied by data censoring, which implies that the duration of an event is irrelevant. Conversely, conflict involvement introduces a repeated failure sequence, which may have significant statistical ramifications. In practice, the former assigns weight to “trigger-happy” states that may be frequent initiators, but tend to settle their disputes shortly thereafter. The latter, on the other hand, elevates the importance of states that engage in few but lengthy conflicts. In trying to avoid the theoretical predispositions associated with each of these two groups, I decided to test my theory against both as their side-by-side comparison allows us to assess the effect of state formation processes on conflict proclivity and conflict experience together.

The source of these two DV$s can be found in the Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) version 4.1 data of the Correlates of War project (Palmer et al. 2015). MID$s are defined as “united historical cases of conflict in which the threat, display, or use of military force short of war by one member state is explicitly directed towards the government, official representatives, official forces, property, or territory of another state” (Jones, Bremer, and Singer 1996: 168). In
those data MIDs are coded on a 4-point ordinal scale (1-4), with each point reflecting an incident’s severity. According to this categorization, the first level marks a non-militarized dispute, the next two levels capture incidents where use of force was either threatened or displayed respectively, while the fourth level denotes the initiation of actual interstate violence.⁸ MIDs that exceeded the threshold of 1000 battle-related fatalities per calendar year are separately coded as interstate wars (Small and Singer 1982). Each group of dependent variables contains the same 3 binary indicators. The first (MIDs) assigns the absence of conflict to non-militarized disputes. The second (Violent MIDs or VMIDs) captures cases where force was used (level 4 of the MID scale), but no combatants died. The third (Fatal MIDs or FMIDs) denotes instances of interstate violence that resulted in fatalities.

To evaluate hypotheses concerning territorial disputes and alliance formation I constructed two secondary DVs, both of which are binary and apply only to the dyadic data format due to the nature of the relationships they capture.⁹ The first codes the presence of militarized territorial disputes (either in terms of involvement or initiation) and was created using the Territorial Claim (v1.10) data of the Issue Correlates of War (ICOW) project (Frederick, Hensel, and Macaulay 2017).

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⁸ According to Jones, Bremer, and Singer (1996: 171-173), the “threat to use force” classification applies to incidents where a state issues an explicit threat to blockade, occupy territory, declare war, or use nuclear weapons targeting another member of the international system. Similarly, “display of force” refers to an escalation of militarized activities, such as alerts and mobilizations. Finally, the “use of force” signals escalation in the sense that a blockade, a declaration of war, the use of nuclear weapons, or any other type of organized interstate hostility has taken place.

⁹ These two indicators contain the component of interaction and, to some degree, reciprocity. Integrating them into the monadic dataset would violate the intentions behind their original construction.
Independent and Control Variables

The main independent variables are the processes of independence and the presence or absence of pre-emergence violence. The processes are coded as a series of four binary variables (“Secession,” “Decolonization,” “Liberation,” and “Unification”) given the operational criteria defined above. In the monadic version of the data, old states have been chosen to serve as the baseline category. In the dyadic data, no baseline can be selected as dyads may be comprised of two new states that emerged through the same or different processes, as well as any new-old state combination. In other words, the total number of dyadic combinations between the four processes (including “old” states) that are present in my data is 14.10

My control variables include indicators traditionally associated with the onset, involvement, escalation, or duration of interstate conflict in the literature. The first is a dichotomous measure of democracy based on the Polity IV project (Marshall, Gurr, and Jagers 2016).11 In its conception, this measure applies only to states; for dyads I have simply multiplied the indicators for both states at a given year to denote dyadic democracy. The second is a quantitative measure of relative material capabilities based on v5.0 of the National Material Capabilities data (Singer 1988). The source of this variable is the Composite Index of Material Capabilities (CINC), which is essentially an aggregate measure of a state’s power relative to the total systemic capabilities (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 1972). The six subcomponent indicators for CINC capture the unweighted average of military expenditures, military personnel, iron and steel production, energy consumption, total population, and urban population as a share of the

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10 In specific, for secession (S), decolonization (D), liberation (L), unification (U), and old states (O) these combinations are: SS, SD, SL, SU, SO, DD, DL, DU, DO, LL, LU, LO, UU, and UO.

11 Although Polity has its flaws, it is the only dataset that goes back to 1816.
global average. For my purposes, I created four quantile categories in my monadic data; for the dyadic version, I simply calculated the stronger-to-weaker CINC ratio in a dyad, which means that it now relays power preponderance. My next two control variables consist of dichotomous indicators for: a) the presence of defense pacts (dyadic version only); and b) the former Soviet Socialist Republics, since the dissolution of the USSR introduced a high number of states in the system. Finally, given that I intended to examine whether pairs of new states behave differently exclusively towards each other, I have also included a variable denoting such dyads.

**Sample Selection and Data Limitations**

For the past three decades the prevailing sample selection strategy adopted by international processes researchers has been that of “politically relevant dyads” (PRDs), defined as pairs of contiguous states or dyads in which at least one state is a major power (Lemke and Reed 2001). In practice, PRDs are the widely used alternative to random sampling in international relations research because they constitute a tiny subsample of state-to-state per year observations; in fact, they reduce the population of all possible dyadic combinations by more than 90% (Lemke and Reed 2001: 128). Despite their statistical usefulness (i.e. the reduction of noise in the sample), the PRD concept is based on a theoretically justifiable assumption: international conflict happens only when both the opportunity and the willingness for aggression is present (Most and Starr 1989). Since the opportunity for conflict is considered to be independent of actors’ intentions, largely invariant, and time-inelastic – parameterized as a function of distance and military capabilities – it was integrated in the sampling process as to maximize the focus assigned on willingness. For conflict researchers, there was no reason to analyze the interactions of distant states, such as Spain and Singapore, that possessed no opportunity for war since they would not be able to engage each other even if they really wanted to.
For all the above reasons, therefore, my protosampling approach for my dyadic data abides by the rules established in mainstream conflict processes literature. In specific, I include only dyads that: a) are territorially adjacent, meaning they share common boundaries (i.e. strict contiguity); or b) are separated by up to 150 miles of water (i.e. relaxed contiguity); or c) include at least one major power as their power projection capabilities are assumed to be global (i.e. maximum opportunity; Boulding 1962). My monadic sample, on the other hand, has been left untreated since the conveyance of opportunity is theoretically irrelevant. The only added case selection constraints relate to the presence of new states and the maturation threshold. Specifically, states (or dyads) enter the sample only if they are new (or contain at least one new state) and exit after 30 years. I have imposed such restrictions as my goal is to examine new state behavior; allowing old-old state dyads to be present or states to exceed the maturation period would unnecessarily clutter the data and obscure the hypothesized empirical patterns. Regarding the temporal and spatial coverage, my monadic data cover the period 1816-2010 and my dyadic data 1816-200112 without any “blackouts” and include all inhabited regions of the planet. The only exception to the monadic data applies to models containing territorial disputes as a dependent variable, for which the period ends in 2001 due to the limitations of the source data (i.e. Territorial Claims). The complete population of relevant observations is 14019 and 54468 for the monadic and the dyadic samples respectively.

**Methodology and Concerns**

For my empirical tests I utilize event history analysis in order to assess the effects of temporal dependence on my dependent variables. In plain terms, the dependent variable is technically *the time to event* rather than the event per se. Survival techniques allow researchers to

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12 The dyadic MID data has not been updated yet for the 2002-2010 period as of March 5, 2017.
examine how independent predictors influence the likelihood (termed “hazard”) of an occurrence as time passes by. Ordinary maximum likelihood estimations ignore time and past experiences altogether; thus, they are inappropriate in evaluating the evolution of conflict behavior. Given that my theoretical framework is agnostic on the shape and form of temporal dependence I rely on the Cox semi-parametric proportional hazards model (see Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004). This estimation technique leaves the hazard function unspecified and is advantageous over other EHA models (e.g. Gompertz, log-logistic, Weibull etc.) because it does not require the analyst to provide a theoretical justification for an a priori specification of the cumulative effect of the estimators on time, allowing for a non-monotonic fluctuation of the duration dependency. Overdetermination of the covariates’ effects and systematic bias will, therefore, be avoided.

A fundamental assumption of Cox is that of proportionality of the multiplicative hazards. The proportional hazards assumption (PHA) simply refers to the following: the hazard ratio (i.e. the hazard rate for the ith individual divided by the baseline hazard) should be independent of time and expressed as a fixed proportion (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004: 48). Essentially, the PHA expects the impact of an estimator on the hazard rate to be expressed as a constant factor of proportionality (Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn 2001: 973). Thus, a violation of the assumption of proportionality greatly affects the estimation process since it unintentionally parameterizes the baseline hazard function for a variable k and a case i, resulting in biased estimations. For those models that a violation of the PHA was detected I have applied the Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn (2001) correction, in which an interaction term of any offending variable(s) and the natural log of time is inserted in the model. The interpretation of the constitutive effects is performed in accordance to Licht (2011).
The methodological discussion could not be complete without addressing an important difference between survival models and any other traditional statistical method, namely the issue of collinearity. Survival models such as Cox require the analyst to set up the data in a specific way before any estimations are attempted. The set up relies on four parameters: a) a time variable, common for all subjects; b) the event of interest, or “failure”; c) the temporal restrictions, if any; and d) an “id” variable that groups – and at the same time separates – observations belonging to a subject from others. In my case, the four binary emergence processes are by definition mutually exclusive. A new state cannot emerge by both, say, secession and decolonization. However, due to the latter survival setup parameter (“id”) collinearity is avoided and the models are allowed to run with all four processes present. This is a result of clustering, since the model assesses each dichotomous process individually within the range of observations “id” specifies, and happens for two reasons. First, the model assumes the reference category to be the absence of a state emergence process (i.e. old states). Second, the parametric function of the covariates is factored into a nonparametric hazard rate that is different for each subject and each delta (i.e. time unit) (Box-Steffensmeir and Jones 2004). As such, certain monadic models in Chapter 5 include all four processes together.
CHAPTER 5
EMPIRICAL PATTERNS OF STATE EMERGENCE AND INTERSTATE CONFLICT

Overview

In this chapter I present my empirical findings on the relationship between birth legacies and interstate conflict. The first section offers a description of the data, including a preliminary evaluation of the dependent and key independent variables. The next section is devoted on the monadic analysis of new state behavior as compared to that of old states. The fifteen models of the third section uncover the dyadic patterns of conflict involvement and initiation. Finally, the last section discusses the substantive effects of the preceding analyses and sets the foundation for Chapter 6, which focuses on intrastate behavior.

Descriptive Statistics

In 1816 the international system was comprised of 23 states. Of those, only one, the United States, was situated outside the continental Europe. Another two were occupying territories that expanded beyond Europe, Russia and the Ottoman Empire. Of the remaining 21, eleven would lose their statehood within fifty years due to the unification of the German and Italian states. Despite the initial system membership decline tendencies, by 1900 the total number of states would almost double to 42, primarily as a result of the decolonization of the Americas. The territorial rearrangements following the end of WWI and the interwar period would bring this number up to 66, a 57% increase from the beginning of the century and a 187% increase since 1816. This expanding trend in system membership accelerated with the decolonization of Africa, when the number of states more than doubled to 134 in 1970. The last major wave of state emergence took place over the next 23 years; by the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the USSR in 1993, the system included 186 members. Since then only 9
more entities gained their independence, bringing the grand total to 195 states as of 2016 (Figure 5-1).

Table 5-1 summarizes new states by process and the means of their emergence. As indicated, slightly less than a quarter of all new states, 44 out of 186, were created via the use of force. Decolonization is by far the process that granted independence to most entities; 109 total former dependencies were admitted into the system. Of these, about 10% experienced violence during their statehood bid. At first glance this attests to the complete collapse of colonial powers and their inability or unwillingness to launch military campaigns as to hold on to their overseas territorial possessions. It also indicates the scale of spatial and temporal clustering new decolonized states are dealing with and alludes to the extent of their security concerns following their independence. In absolute terms, the most violent and second most prolific state emergence process is secession, with 44% of its cases being births by fire. This suggests that territorial cessions involving swaths of the homeland face violent resistance by the ceding entities. In about half of these cases self-determination movements had to fight before they gained statehood. Still, liberation is shown to be relatively more violent than all four process; of only 19 liberated states more than half were created through the use of force (58%). This is most likely an effect of liberation’s antecedent condition, namely conquest, which at minimum is conditioned upon an implicit threat to resort to violence. The last process of state emergence, unification, created only 7 new states, 6 of which emerged peacefully. The single exception was the United Arab Republic in 1958, the union between Egypt and Syria that lasted for just three years. Finally, twenty states emerged more than one time via more than one process with 14 of them doing so violently at least once. Examples include the two secessions that created Austria (1919 and 1955), the
secession and liberation of Albania (1914 and 1944), and the decolonization and secession of South Africa (1920 and 1990).

Figure 5-2 depicts regional patterns of state formation over time.¹ The number of new states in Europe and the Americas follows a relatively smooth linear ascending trend with very few noticeable peaks in the aftermath of major events, such as the exit of Portugal and Spain from South America, the two world wars, and the Soviet secession. The Middle East region exhibits a similar pattern after the 1930s when countries like Yemen and Iraq gained independence. The thin sliver in the middle represents Oceania and the South Pacific (OSP), the only region without an official system member until Australia and New Zealand gained entry in 1920.² 12 more states will emerge in OSP by 2016, of which only will 3 meet the criteria of statehood described in the previous chapter.³

The two major exceptions to the normality of this systemic pattern are Asia and Africa, both of which experienced a relatively high rate of temporally concentrated state births due to decolonization. Southeast Asia, in specific, accounts for the creation of 13 new states in the ten-year period following the end of WWII, while sub-Saharan Africa witnessed a massive wave of state emergence with 43 new states gaining independence in a single twenty-year period (1956-1976). Once again, this highlights the environmental pressure imposed on these new states given the particularities of their contemporaneous emergence. To put it in perspective, if we consider

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¹ The total number of states in Figure 5-2 is 217 as it includes entities that lost their statehood over time.

² Both countries were considered autonomous, but not independent, since 1901 and the formation of the Commonwealth of Australia under the British Crown. It was not until the Treaty of Versailles in 1919 that Australia, New Zealand, and Canada were allowed to participate and become official signatories in an international agreement. This effectively meant they gained complete control over their foreign policy, which until then was determined by Great Britain.

³ These are: Fiji, Papua New Guinea, and Solomon Islands.
Africa to be a simple, undirected, network with a set number of nodes communicating with each other, the introduction of 43 new states on top of the original 8 would increase the number of interaction knots from 28 to 903.\textsuperscript{4} Even if we disregard the structural particularities of decolonization as they relate to boundaries and ethnic heterogeneity, the introduction of so many new states in such a small amount of time is bound to increase the risk of regional conflict due to the opportunity offered by mere territorial contiguity.

Turning our attention to the means by which state emergence was achieved, Figure 5-3 shows the number of additional new states created via violence or peace in 20-year increments. Much like in Table 5-1, the preponderance of peaceful state births is immediately apparent, as are its temporal characteristics. The two periods where violent births overtake the number of peaceful state creations are 1876-1896 and 1936-1956. The first can be attributed to the Balkan wars of independence during the Russo-Turkish conflict, while the second is a direct result of the violent liberation cases that occurred after the defeat of Nazi Germany. The peak in the 1956-1976 period is marked primarily by peaceful statehood bids that naturally correspond to the plethora of former colonies acquiring statehood.

Since on the surface it seems like major conflicts may trigger or follow state emergence, Figures 5-4 and 5-5 attempt to shed some light on the relationship between militarized interstate disputes and new state creation.\textsuperscript{5} The former plots the frequency of MIDs and system entries per year while the latter is a time-series cross-correlogram with lagged point estimates. As we can see, Figure 5-4 indicates a progressive increase in global conflict activity that has particularly

\textsuperscript{4} The formula for calculating the number of asymptotic node connections is: \( \sum_{k=1}^{n-1} k = \frac{n(n-1)}{2} \)

\textsuperscript{5} Note that the MID v4.1 data cover the period 1816-2010, not 1816-2016.
intensified in the second half of the 20th century. However, these spikes do not necessarily follow the pattern of new state births, which remains relatively stable. To offer more clarity, Figure 5-5 suggests that a substantive relationship between conflict and general system entry is entirely absent. Specifically, the pattern of the correlogram is highly inconsistent whereas the magnitude of the relationship never manages to exceed the minimum threshold of a marginally weak association (.35). In contrast, when system size is factored in against MIDs the correlation becomes extremely potent, reaching covariance levels beyond .75. We can therefore establish based on Figures 5-4 and 5-5 that no covariance between new state emergence and conflict appears to exist in the data.

**Monadic Analyses**

This section examines the monadic behavior of new states as affected by the process and means of their emergence. These tests are divided into two empirical steps. The first step is to establish that new state demeanor is indeed different than that of their older peers as hypothesized. Since the fundamental premise of this work is grounded on the presupposition that the system of states is inherently heterogeneous, it is of outmost importance to empirically show how and why that is the case. The next step focuses on dissecting the impact of pre-independence condition on the hazard of MID involvement and initiation. The goal is to identify whether different processes are associated with different behaviors on the state-year level. All monadic analyses contain both restricted and unrestricted models, starting with simple estimations, to identify the effects of different predictors in a piecewise manner. The entire population of cases is comprised of 14019 state-per-year observations; it includes both old and new states with at least one neighbor separated by 150 miles of water or less, covering the period 1816-2010. Of these, 7864 observations represent old states while the remaining 6155 represent
new states. 9431 observations denote peace-years (i.e. no ongoing MIDs) and 4588 violence-years (i.e. ongoing MIDs). The number of observations for more restrictive thresholds of international conflict has as follows: 2320 violent MIDs (VMIDs), and 1247 fatal MIDs (FMIDs).

Although in many cases states experience more than a mid in a given year, the monadic format on this data set allows only for “participation in conflict” to be coded; for that reason I have included the most serious MID in instances of concurrent disputes. Lastly, regarding the distribution of MIDs it should be noted that no matter the operationalization criterion of choice (MID, VMID, or FMID), conflict episodes are evenly distributed across time when conditioned on system size.

Table 5-2 reports the Cox regression estimates of militarized interstate dispute involvement, while Figures 5-6 and 5-7 report the Kaplan-Meier survivor function and the Nelson-Aalen cumulative hazard function respectively. Model 1 shows that new states are much more likely to be involved in MIDs when compared to old states. Specifically, state birth increases the hazard of MIDs by approximately 119% for the first three decades in an equiproportional fashion (i.e. the PHA is not violated). This confirms my initial assertions about the difference in behavioral patterns exhibited by new vs. old states. The substantive importance of this hazard ratio can not be overstated; state emergence in the system is accompanied by more than twice the risk of conflict involvement for new members only. In the context of recent events, such as the secessions of Kosovo and South Sudan, the finding implies that on average these countries are more than 90% likely to experience interstate conflict before the end of the

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6 Recall that states are operationalized as “new” for 30 years following their system entry.

7 The transformation of estimates to percentages is done using the formula: \((e^b) - 1\), where \(b\) is the obtained coefficient.
first decade following their independence. Although the result is preliminary as it accounts for just one covariate, a trend is undeniably present. New states are much less likely to avoid conflict during their formative years and are consequently more likely to form contentious relationships with their neighbors, which could adversely affect their economic development and democratization prospects.

An additional important finding, as evident from Figure 5-6, is the appropriateness of the selected maturation threshold. Specifically, the survival functions of new and old states converge after about three decades, meaning that state emergence as a determinant of conflict behavior becomes irrelevant after this period. Moreover, the above figure indicates that the chances of a new state “surviving” (i.e. avoiding MIDsin) are significantly lower than those of old states. Within just five years after their independence new states face an 80% chance of becoming participants in a dispute versus a 20% chance for old states. The Nelson-Aalen estimates (Figure 5-7) shows the exponential increase of the MID hazard new states face, estimated to reach 300% by year 20. In other words, for each additional delta (1 year) a new state manages to avoid interstate confrontations, the likelihood of “failure” increases by a factor of 2.09. Two conclusions can be derived from the above: a) state birth profoundly affects conflict propensity; and b) new and old states should be compartmentalized when analyzing systemic conflict tendencies given their differences.

Similar results are obtained from Model 2, focusing on violent emergence, albeit with an important caveat: the predictor here captures only a violent state creation against either

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8 The X axis has been truncated for clarity.
9 The Y-axis reports cumulative hazard ratios – to transform it to percentages the numbers need to be exponentiated. Thus, this linear trend is, in fact, exponential.
nonviolent independence or the presence of an old state. The findings add credence to the hypotheses surrounding the role of pre-independence conflict on new state behavior. In specific, the baseline hazard of MID involvement increases by about 50% for entities that fought to gain statehood. The picture becomes much clearer if we disentangle the substantive effects of violent births and compare it to the experiences of old states (Figure 5-8). The probability of avoiding interstate disputes drops to zero at 11 years for the former as opposed to 30 years for the latter, on average. Still, the two survival curves of new states (violent and nonviolent emergence) seem to be close and following a similar trajectory as further evidence of system entry effects. The combined model (Model 3) confirms the statistical relationship of both covariates with conflict; while they marginally lose substantive impact, they retain their predictive significance.

Delving deeper into the impact of state creation legacies, Table 5-3 offers a series of more detailed estimations linking emergence processes and means with interstate behavior. The first model should be viewed as a baseline assessment of new state conflict proclivities. Based on the results of Table 5-2 (Models 1 and 3), the expected effect of the four processes on the hazard of militarized interstate disputes should have been overall positive, given that their combined presence (i.e. a new state) was shown to raise the likelihood of conflict exponentially. Model 1 clearly indicates this is not the case for two reasons. First, only three of the four processes influence dispute propensity, the exception being liberation. Second, two of the remaining three processes have a positive effect on dispute involvement, with unification being the only process that results in peace rather than violence. Confirming my theoretical expectations, both secession and decolonization seem to increase the hazard of MIDs, by 262% and 95% respectively, at the first post-entry year. However, both processes are in violations of the proportional hazards

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10 Violence is always coded 0 for old states.
assumption with their time varying covariates (TVCs) being negative, thus suggesting a decaying trend of the initial effect. To interpret their over-time performance a graphic representation of their constituent impact is offered in Figures 5-9 and 5-10. Figure 5-9 clearly shows a declining trend of the initial hazard, accompanied by a sharp decrease during the first 5 years and a relative stabilization over the next 25. Although secession manages to retain its statistical significance and positive effect through the entire time span – albeit marginally towards the end – the trajectory is important as it implies behavioral adaptation while highlighting the temporal dependency of memories and past experiences. Specifically, the hazard of MIDs for seceded states drops from 262% to 65% during the first decade, then to 46% after twenty years and to 28% after thirty years. The model predicts a similar trend for decolonization (Figure 5-10), although it is much more uncertain about the precise starting hazard. In substantive terms, however, when compared to secession former colonies seem to be rather less inclined to compete with their neighbors, at least immediately after acquiring statehood; the MID hazard drops from 95% to 49% and 34% per each passing decade. Both processes are tied to revisionist behaviors; the difference is that seceded states seem to start off significantly more conflict prone, but manage to discard their birth legacies faster than their decolonized peers. In contrast, unification in the restricted Model 1 appears to reduce the baseline dispute risk by almost half with its effect being proportional and consistent over time. Liberation is perplexingly irrelevant to our understanding of state behavior for the entire duration, although its primary and interacted coefficients are quite similar to those of unification (Figure 5-11).

Model 2 introduces violent emergence in the mix of independent predictors. Its presence, however, leaves the statistical performance or substantive impact of emergence processes unaffected. The introduction of an additional statistically significant estimator and the
subsequent improved performance of the overall model without major changes in directionality or magnitude of standard errors can only mean two things: a) it suggests that violence improves model specification significantly; b) it confirms the predictive robustness of emergence processes and their statistical independence from violence, justifying both their theoretical and methodological differentiation. The impact of violent emergence remains positive as anticipated, boosting the chances of MID involvement by a factor of 1.43 per post-entry year, ceteris paribus. This equiproportional increase contradicts my expectations of a diminishing trend due to maturation, which is still present in secession and decolonization. In fact, the nonproportional constituent effect completely disappears with the introduction of control variables, suggesting that its detection was an artefact due to unspecified statistical noise.

Following Tir’s (2006) train of thought and model-building rationale, I have controlled for the dissolution of the USSR in Model 3 to account for the creation of 15 new states within a two-year span, marking the single most important state emergence event. The combined results remain stable with secession being the most relatively affected variable as anticipated given that the “USSR” dummy should drain from its predictive capacity. That said, the change is marginal; secession’s initial effect is reduced by about 15%. Former Soviet states, however, are found to have a markedly increased conflict involvement rate of 42.7%. This finding is preliminary in that these states exit the investigation less than two decades after their entry (1991-2010). Model 4 is the unrestricted monadic estimation by replacing the USSR control with two variables proposed as highly important in the conflict literature, namely democracy and material capabilities. Democracy is supposed to dampen conflict propensity for states with liberal regimes are less likely to fight according to the monadic version of the democratic peace theory (see Rosato 2004). In contrast, states with an abundance of material capabilities are expected to be involved
in more conflicts as military power, much like contiguity, is equated with opportunity in a system where willingness for violence is assumed to be constant (Hegre 2008). Both point to the right direction in my estimations. Democratic states are about 18% less likely to fight, while moving from one CINC quantile to the next increases the chance of interstate violence by almost 40%. In perspective, the United States are estimated to be four times as conflict prone as Greece, facing a relative hazard of 160% when compared to smaller entities.

The last two models (Models 5 and 6) replace MIDs with VMIDs and FMIDs respectively. As a reminder of their operational criteria, the former captures only instances where hostility levels between two states reached the point of actual use of force. The latter denotes incidents where the use of force resulted in combatant fatalities. Both mark a significant escalation in conflict behavior and comprise a much smaller subset of the MID sample. Still, certain predictors remain surprisingly consistent in their directionality and statistical performance, if not in terms of substance. What can immediately be noticed is that moving from one hostility level to the next liberation becomes an important predictor of interstate behavior, while unification and democracy fall off. Moreover, while secession and decolonization retain their signs and significance, the first loses half of its substantive effect and the second gains just about that. Specifically, Model 6 reveals a pattern by which seceded states are 2.5 times less likely to be engaged in revisionist behavior as decolonized states, whose hazard tops at 190%. Liberated states, on the other hand appear to avoid fatal confrontations by almost 90% when compared to their peers. Finally, pre-independence and material capabilities retain their association with post-independence violence as theoretically hypothesized.

11 Although the decolonization coefficient is double the one of secession, remember that to obtain hazard rates one needs to exponentiate them.
Notwithstanding the above, conflict involvement and the findings of Table 5-3 capture one side of the story that is monadic new state behavior. The other important aspect relates to conflict initiation. The difference of the two is technical, but at the same time profoundly important. Conflict involvement speaks directly to the preference of new states for confrontation over peaceful settlements and their erratic reactions to external provocations. In this context, new states can be either the initiators or the recipients of aggression; they are shown to be prone to get involved in prolonged disputes, dependent how they were structurally created.

Conflict initiation, on the other hand, looks at whether new states are likely to become the originators of interstate disputes and how processes influence such behavioral tendencies. As such, Table 5-4 offers the same set of six models with initiation as the outcome of choice, rather than involvement. The entire population of MIDz are dichotomously coded once just for the initiating party with ongoing conflict years being censored. Dispute participants are also ignored as they are recipients of revisionist behavior. Immediately obvious in the estimations above are the pattern similarities between involvement and initiation. Generally speaking, processes and means remain relevant to predicting initiation, perhaps even more so than predicting involvement. Some of the differences between the models in Tables 5-3 and 5-4 relate to the size of coefficients as well as their statistical performance regarding the PHA.

Beginning with Model 1, we can observe that all four processes become more potent when we move from involvement to initiation. This suggests that state emergence processes are not only likely to influence reactive behavior and conflict experience, but that they are indeed causing states to pursue confrontation as a valid policymaking tool. In simple terms, new states not only engage in interstate violence, they tend to start such episodes. Seceded states are almost 5 times as likely (473%) more likely to target their neighbors immediately after their
independence, followed by decolonized entities with a positive hazard of 136%. Similar to Table 5-3 both variables are PHA violators with negative interactive terms, meaning that their initial effect diminishes rapidly as time passes by, retaining however their positive sign until year 30. Although liberation seems to be slightly significant (at the .1 confidence level) and positive at t1, its combined effect renders it irrelevant for the duration of time under risk. Unification still appears to be conducive for regional peace as it is shown to reduce the likelihood of dispute onset by 47%.

No major changes occur with violence and the USSR dummy in the picture (Models 2 and 3). Both exert a positive effect on the dependent variable; when compared to findings of Table 5-3 the substantive impact of these two covariates fluctuates by no more than a couple percentage points. The unrestricted MID models of involvement and initiation retain their similarities except for violent emergence, which surprisingly becomes insignificant. Given that Model 4 introduces material capabilities into the estimation and based on a comparison with the following models, it is safe to assume that when it comes to MIDs the effect of pre-independence violence is dampened by the fact that new states tend to emerge militarily weak. In other terms, violence and CINC seem to interact offering evidence for the relationship between pre-state and post-state military capacity vis a vis behavior.

That said, the findings become increasingly interesting as we move upwards in episode severity. In Models 5 and 6 we see a significant uptick in the impact of processes and means on VMID and FMID initiation versus involvement. Despite their decaying trends, as evident by their negative constituent effects, in Model 5 secession and decolonization increase the initial hazard of violent dispute initiation by an astounding 1,300% and 1,100% respectively. According to Figure 5-12, the effect of the former drops to 232% within just ten years and to
92% after thirty years, eventually disappearing completely in the 34th post-emergence year in the .95 confidence level. Decolonization remains somewhat steadier in decline with its effect reduced to just 172% in three decades. Still, evidence suggests that both partitioned states and former dependencies are far more likely than states emerging through other processes to challenge their neighbors during the very first decade, after which their behavior becomes less aggressive, all things average.

In contrast to the previous estimations of Table 5-4, in Model 5 liberation’s combined effect is statistically insignificant, although it starts out with an extreme hazard rate, in testament to the value of a graphic representation of the equiproportionality corrective procedure (Figure 5-13). Unification, the only pacifying process when it comes to dispute onset, exerts a negative impact for just 12 years, after which it too loses its significance. It is important to mention that during their first decade unified states are found to be conflict initiation averse, reducing their baseline hazard by an additional 45 to 94 percent, depending on the year we look at. Regarding the control variables, the only notable observation relates to material capabilities; CINC and the initiation of escalated incidents are not associated in the sample. Model 6, concerned with the onset of fatal MIDs, serves as a confirmation of the aforementioned patterns. The structural legacies of secession and decolonization trigger widespread aggression all the while liberation remains irrelevant and unification a process that at least initially promotes regional conformity.

The final set of estimations on the monadic level concerns the onset and escalation of territorial disputes as a quasi-theoretical robustness test. In Chapter 3 I claimed that state creation is a de facto territorial change event and, as such, it is anticipated to inform territorial dissatisfaction tendencies for states emerging by certain processes. Specifically, I argued that

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12 Given the similarities of Models 5 and 6 I have decided to omit the combined effect figures for brevity.
seceded states are expected to initiate territorial disputes because of the type of territory affected by the process, the homeland. Furthermore, decolonized states will behave similarly due to disputed boundaries and ethnic divisions. I hypothesized that liberation and unification can be conceptualized as processes of territorial correction, thus are unlikely to lead to such disputes. To that effect, in Table 5-5 I consider whether state creation processes and means affect the likelihood of the very small subset of MID s that captures disputes strictly over contiguous territories (TDs; 655 observations in total). I also include escalation measures (VTDs and FTDs) that mark only those TDs that were escalated to the point of a VMID (N=226) or a FMID (N=114).

The results of all three models confirm my hypotheses and serve as validation of my previous findings as they remain remarkably consistent. Both decolonized and partitioned states start their lives with a very high proneness to revision the territorial status quo. These tendencies dissipate rather quickly, reaching zero by year 15. The only time where secession and liberation have persistent positive hazard effects is when the escalation of territorial disputes to fatal interstate incidents is concerned. Liberation’s impact is inconclusive throughout, although there is a slight indication of a negative effect in Model 2 if we stretch the threshold of statistical significance. Unification still remains the only process that reduces the baseline hazard by quite an amount in the first two models (97.5%), alas its trend shifts upwards and escapes significance within 11 years. Violent emergence, as a non-violating PHA predictor, increases the chances of territorial dispute initiation and escalation by 71% in the entire period under investigation. Democracy has an accentuating negative effect, suggesting that new states with liberal regimes learn to embrace the democratic norms of peaceful conflict resolution as time progresses.
Finally, CINC’s coefficient is proof of the warmongering attitudes expressed by more powerful states that utilize their capabilities to inflict changes in the territorial status quo.

**Dyadic Analyses**

The monadic tests above examined whether state birth processes and means can be considered precursors of interstate violence with the new state being the focal center of international activity. The state-per-year data setup allowed us to adopt a perspective that is isolated from bilateral interactions, within which all received stimuli are collapsed to a single vector. In that respect, new state behavior in monadic analyses is nothing more than a nondirectional output that completely ignores the distinctiveness of each individual neighbor. For instance, according to the findings of the previous section, the Czech Republic and Uzbekistan were very likely to initiate militarized disputes against their neighbors shortly after their independence since they both emerged through secessions. However, over the next 20 years the Czech Republic neither expressed nor received aggressive behavior, unlike Uzbekistan who initiated 7 disputes and was targeted an additional 3 times. Undeniably, there are several idiosyncratic differences between these two countries that may account for the behavioral discrepancies. Yet, the particular characteristics of the entities that surround them may also be of explanatory value. The Czech Republic was born on the outskirts of the EU and was mostly surrounded by older democratic states with long traditions of peaceful resolution practices. Uzbekistan, on the other hand, emerged in a conflict prone region, surrounded by four new states – created by the same secession – and Afghanistan. Its tendency to resort to violence, then, can plausibly be a product of both the emergence process and the environment within which it is situated. Monadic analyses are inappropriate to answer such questions. That is why this section is

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13 Slovakia gained entry in 1993 and Uzbekistan in 1991; both secessions were peaceful.
devoted to dyadic explanations of new state behavior by integrating the dimension of partner characteristics. It is important to note that from over six dozen models and an equal number of figures I decided to focus on and present estimations predicting violent and territorial MIDs only, as well as 5 indicative figures that pertain to the first model only to conserve space.

Table 5-6 is comprised of six estimations, the first of which is considered the baseline model of dyadic VMID involvement. The processes, as well as “violence,” capture dyads were at least one of the two states emerged as such. “Democracy” denotes the presence of a jointly democratic dyad and “alliance” the presence of a formal pact. “CINC” is operationalizes as the quantile ratio of the strongest dyad member to the weakest, thus higher numbers denote power preponderance rather than balance. In Model 1 secession is found to have an initially positive and decaying effect on the risk of violent conflict involvement, increasing the baseline hazard by a relatively small amount (37%). Despite its negative interaction term, secession retains an almost flat temporal trend that never drops below traditional significance levels, exiting at 27% (Figure 5-14). When decolonization is present the baseline hazard of violent disputes is raised by a factor of 1.61; its positive effect rapidly declines, however, exiting our consideration at $t_{13}$ (Figure 5-15). Liberation follows the exact opposite trend that secession does, although it gains significance after three post-independence years, thereafter imposing a persistent negative effect of about 35% (Figure 5-16). Lastly, unification is the only state creation process that lacks predictive value in this model, seemingly rejecting my theoretical claims about its pacifying nature (Figure 5-17). The trajectory of violent emergence once again appears to confirm expectations about the temporal inconsistency of past experiences surrounding traumatic events. While it starts as the single most important predictor of aggression between new states and their
neighbors, raising the risk of interstate confrontation by more than 129%, its effect lasts for only 14 years losing more than 80% of its potency within the first decade (Figure 5-18).

The statistical performance of the control variables justifies their inclusion in these estimations and consideration in our discussion of new states and conflict. Specifically, in a nod to the democratic peace theory, dyadic democracy appears to dampen the likelihood of violent MIDs by 95%, albeit only temporarily. This can be attributed to bilateral maturation; the more time two democratic neighbors interact with each other the less important their respective regimes become in decisions about war and peace. Power preponderance also appears to be associated with a negative tendency to engage in conflict. Put simply, weaker states avoid challenging stronger ones, while stronger states are quite likely able to exert their influence and obtain concessions just through the implied threat of military intervention. Finally, formal alliances between the two members of a dyad are naturally, and equiproportionally, reducing the hazard of dyadic competition, echoing all major conflict studies to date.

The second model substitutes pre-independence violence with a dummy capturing cases where both new states were born via fighting (“Both Violence”). The obtained coefficients for processes and control variables are mostly similar to the ones in Model 1 with an important difference: the indicator for dyadic violent emergence is not a PHA violator, meaning that its substantively positive impact (63%) remains surprisingly constant over time. This finding suggests that two neighbors born through a process that legitimized conflict as a policy-making practice will be mutually incentivized to challenge each other. When states with a violent past cohabitate the same space, their interactions seem to be informed by a volatile mix of suspicion and distrust. Possessing first-hand experience of the success brought on by violence, and knowing that their neighbors are privy to the same information and experience, may cause
aggressive posturing, which is likely to increase the dyadic threat levels. Unfortunately, such activity is bi-directional and retaliatory, meaning that both sides are likely to think and act similarly at the same time, thus creating a potentially explosive environment. The remaining primary predictors assume their familiar trajectories. Secession and decolonization are positive and significant for about a decade, while liberation remains the only persistent negative process. Yet, unification is still insignificant in this estimation much like in Model 1.

Model 3 introduces the added control of “new state dyad” that denotes pairs of new states only, as opposed to mixed dyads or dyads comprised of two old states. The rationale behind this predictor is to further test claims about the uniqueness of new state behavior. During the monadic analyses, I showed how all new states exhibit different conflict propensity patterns than their older neighbors. It is, therefore, important to confirm these trends by isolating such dyads from the statistical noise produced when the nature of the peers is averaged out. The “new state dyad” indicator is significant, positive, and consistent, almost doubling the average baseline risk of interstate conflict involvement. To put it in perspective, two newly emerged entities that share a common boundary are found to be twice as likely to fight each other as any other type of dyadic combination. The magnitude of this effect approximates the results we obtained from the monadic analyses, proving that there is a qualitative difference in behavior that depends on state age, a conclusion that had evaded detection to date.

The parameterization of recent births in dyads produced an important unintended consequence: the coefficients of processes experience changes in their conditional impact. All four, combined with their constituent terms, point to the right direction, but their substantive effect has been altered considerably. In the cases of secession and decolonization the initial hazard increase and, subsequently, the time to escape consideration have been halved as
compared to the previous two estimations. With liberation the effect has been doubled and it now appears to accentuate over time. Finally, unification for the first time acquires predictive capacity for a brief period (4.5 years), during which it is shown to reduce the likelihood of violent militarized interstate disputes. All the above lead me to conclude that much of the impact of different processes can be attributed to dyadic similarity, or the “neighborhood effect”. Given that states often emerge through multi-birth events (i.e. USSR), each process is likely to capture much of that peer-to-peer interaction.

The following model attempts to shed more light on the qualitative behavioral differences of dyads whose members were created by the same event. In Chapter 3 I theorized that the partition of the intangibly valuable homeland may give rise to territorial aspirations and lead seceded states to try and recuperate perceived losses, thus rendering them more likely to target their former co-nationals with future revisionary actions. Similarly, I argued that the ineffective colonial boundary drawing is bound to be challenged by decolonized states in an effort to remedy perceived ethnic and territorial injustices. I hypothesized that liberated may actively try to avoid confrontations given the very recent memories of military defeat and/or occupation, while I was atheoretical about unifications given their very infrequent historical occurrence. In short, by isolating event similarity in this model I effectively claim that common legacies, territorial ambitions, and process clustering may inhibit interstate cohabitation.

The results confirm such expectations. Pairs of states created by the same partition or decolonization incident (e.g. Serbia-Croatia, Kenya-Tanzania) are noticeably more likely to target each other as opposed to states originating in different events or processes. For secession, the hazard increases by 60% and for decolonization by 157%; at the same time, liberated states, such as Belgium-Netherlands after WWII, are found to be half as likely to challenge each other.
compared to any other dyadic combination. Note that unification is excluded from the model as no two unified states have ever been contiguous within the 30-year window of the “new state” operational criterion. The remaining estimators retain their signs and impact, meaning that controlling for democracies, material capabilities, and alliances does not alter the effects of event similarity.

The fifth model restricts the sample to mixed (new-old state) dyads only in order to assess their conditional conflict propensity. In this context, and contrary to my expectations, dyads where the new state has seceded are shown to experience a hazard rate that is 3.3 times larger than the average. To put it differently, seceded states and their established neighbors will almost certainly engage in at least one violent MID, unless they are both democratic. Although the interaction term is negative, the original effect is so potent that its combined impact never drops below 71%. Another interesting finding is that of decolonization. The initial negative conflict propensity of 61.4% disappears within 4.5 years and reappears positive and ascending at \( t_{12} \). Unified states also face an increased MID hazard when paired with their older neighbors, perhaps understandably so as they happen to be new (i.e. they have a higher monadic conflict propensity) and are mostly surrounded by established entities (i.e. the monadic propensity has just one outlet, old states). The indicators for violent emergence, dyadic democracy, and material capabilities emulate their trajectories from previous estimations, while liberation and alliances are statistically irrelevant. In Model 6 the previous dyadic restrictions are reset and the dependent variable changes to that of violent territorial dispute involvement. Secession and decolonization exert a positive effect on the hazard, contrasting that of liberation and unification. That said, for secession and unification their immediate impact is temporary and is eventually reversed within the first post-independence decade.
The six models of Table 5-7 are comprised of the same set of independent variables and dyadic restriction as in Table 5-6, albeit the focus now is onset rather than involvement. As a result, the trends of the independent variables show some important deviations from prior estimations. The base model, Model 1, finds decolonization, liberation, and unification to perform in accordance to the proportional hazards assumption in predicting initiation. Secession, the only violating variable, is shown to have a positive initial effect of about 50% that intensifies with time, multiplying the baseline hazard rate by a factor of 2.27 at year thirty. Decolonization, the only other conflict inducing process, consistently raises the hazard by a relatively moderate amount when compared to secession (40%). The two remaining processes, liberation and unification, are both reducing the baseline hazard of conflict onset by more than a quarter per year, while a violent birth follows its, by now well-documented, decomposing pattern that starts positive and ends insignificant within the second post-independence decade.

In Model 2, dyadic violent emergence forces the parameterization of time dependence to be normalized for the entire set of predictors, thus offering systemic and proportional consistency of the obtained estimates in a manner rarely encountered in this project. According to these results, the impact of processes is marginal, although statistically significant and pointing to the hypothesized direction. In this estimation, much like in Table 5-6, a dyad with two new violently created states faces grave danger of future confrontation, no matter what the structural particularities of each process are. When controlling for new state dyads (Model 3) the estimation experience uncertainty regarding the initial impact of secession and decolonization that rapidly turns to positive within 5 years. At the same time, the conflict aversion expressed by unified and liberated states is slightly dampened. Put together, Models 2 and 3 suggest that much
of the initial effect of these processes is absorbed by the conflict proneness attributed to new states in general and mutual violent emergence in specific.

Models 4 and 5 serve as auxiliary robustness checks of the findings in Table 5-6. Event similarity is confirmed to be a driving force behind the onset of aggressive behavior when it comes to partitioned and decolonized states, in contrast to liberated states where the effect is exactly the opposite. The mixed dyad sample restriction (Model 5) yet again affirms the overall conflict-prone behavior associated with secession and decolonization, although the effect of the latter is latent and surfaces delayed in this case. Unified states emerge as revisionary actors against old neighbors whereas the behavior of liberated states is mixed, ergo inconclusive. Finally, pattern similarities between conflict involvement and initiation persist when shifting the focus to strict territoriality (Model 6); the four processes and pre-independence violence closely match the trends unveiled in Table 5-6.

The last set of estimations (Table 5-8) contains three separate modelling procedures that address the issue of conflict selection effects (VMID onset), in that they clearly identify the initiators and targets in a dyad. In the first two models, the aggressors are exclusively new states and the victims are old (Model 1) and new (Model 2) neighbors. The processes and means in these models denote the birth legacies of just the initiator, thereby completely ignoring the characteristics of the target. The third model reverses conflict origination, with old states targeting new ones and with the main predictors denoting the birth legacies of the dispute claim recipients. This table is a more detailed version of the dyadic restriction models above in an attempt to assess with precision whether processes affect whom states target. The three controls remain dyadic in nature as in previous estimations.
Per the results, seceded entities are highly likely to indiscriminately target all states in close proximity – regardless of their age or classification – immediately after they emerge (Models 1 and 2). The constituent effects of secession, however, suggest that such new states become more reserved in their interactions with old neighbors with time, reversing their initial aggressive tendencies in less than 4 years (Model 1). As time progresses, new states born by partitions shift their focus on their newer neighbors (Model 2), an indication of target preference that appears to factor in the age of neighbors. A similar pattern can be observed in regards to decolonized states. Former dependencies are 86% more likely to attack old rather than new neighbors during the first year. However, the two trends follow different directions with that of Model 1 reversing after 10 years and that of Model 2 exponentially intensifying.

Liberated states in both models are found to be less inclined to provoke disputes as they grow older, despite their initial indecisiveness. Unified states, on the other hand, are exactly the opposite. Their aggressive tendencies crystallize given enough time and towards old and new states alike, although they show a stronger initial preference for victimizing older neighbors. This is to be expected as unified states are likely to carry over their arguments with contiguous states to their post-unification lives, during which they are territorially bigger and materially stronger by definition. As such, they tend to revisit unfavorable past settlements or rekindle latent territorial aspirations given their relatively advantageous position.

The findings of Model 1 also demonstrate a complicated interaction, in which the four processes assume predictive primacy over violent emergence when the victim is a new state. That being said, the role of violent past re-emerges as progressively positive and significant in Model 2. Taken together, the results of both estimations allude to the catastrophic effects of new state clustering and to the role of pre-independence violence as a catalytic behavioral factor. To
elaborate, the chances a new state will attack a neighbor depends on two factors: the former’s state creation process and the latter’s age. If both states are young then the process is all that matters. If the dyad is mixed, violent emergence acquires predictive capacity and asserts a potent impact on the baseline hazard. In that respect and without considering processes, the recipe to dyadic peace appears to be a nonviolent emergence amongst old neighbors.

In the final model we see that old states select themselves out of confrontations with any type of new state apart from decolonized ones (statistically insignificant), as further proof of how maturation promotes norms of nonviolent conflict resolution and conflict aversion attitudes. Most importantly, old states actively try to avoid those neighbors that experienced prestate violence as they tend to be not only combat-ready, but eager to initiate new disputes (see Model 2). It is important to note that the cumulative hazard of this estimation is particularly low given the overall conflict aversion old states exhibit relative to that of new states, a finding that was detected in the monadic analyses as well. That is the reason for the counterintuitive impact of the controls. In isolation, showing that imbalanced (i.e. comprised of a strong and a weak state) democratic dyads are more likely to fight would be controversial; in context, it shows that the presence of these variables acts as a statistical counterweight to the combined negative effect of the remaining predictors.

**Discussion**

Three major conclusions can be drawn from the preceding detailed interpretation of coefficients, hazard rates, constituent effects, and confidence intervals produced by the more than two dozen models and figures. First, new states belong to a unique subgroup of system members that accounts for the great majority of interstate conflict behavior. Second, their behavior can be traced back and attributed to the processes and means that fueled their emergence. Third, state age – and the behavioral maturation it brings about – influences conflict
tendencies and interaction patterns. The conflict processes literature has been oblivious to these conditions and by ignoring them it has inadvertently promoted spurious relationships and fallacious policymaking suggestions that have clouded the way we understand and study global violence.

The first indication of a heterogeneous international system appeared in the monadic tests where the likelihood of interstate conflict was found to be linked to how political entities acquire statehood. Partitioned and decolonized states generally tend to get involved in more conflicts and are highly susceptible to dispute escalation. Compared to them, liberated and unified states seem to be relatively conflict averse, whereas pre-independence violence appears to promote belligerency. Yet, to make matters complicated, state age and the characteristics of potential competitors in dyadic tests alter such effects significantly. How, then, are we to make practical and theoretical sense of such findings? The answer is simple: by returning to the origins of state creation and the structural connotations of each process.

For secession, the story is relatively straightforward. Two or more seceded states emerge after each partition event. Their newly occupied territory is just a portion of the bifurcated homeland. Their neighbors are both new and old, their number depending on regional dynamics and the magnitude of the event. Militarily they are relatively weaker and, at least, initially, left off to fend for themselves. Domestically, their political system is a blank canvas; ethnic elites tend to capitalize on the perceived success of secession to consolidate power and extend their leadership tenure. Their first priorities are to organize a defense apparatus, minimize external threats, and establish domestic conformity based on the acquisition of a new national identity. Secondary priorities may include economic growth, democratizing, forming trade partnerships, joining alliances and regional blocs, and generally being a positive influence within their new
neighborhood. Unfortunately, this is not what happens. The data shows that their instinctive reaction immediately after their birth is to aggressively position themselves against their neighbors. Seceded states appear to perceive and internalize the territorial change occurred by partition as territorial loss, followed by an externalization of their dissatisfaction with the outcome. Their irredentism sparks efforts to recuperate “lost” lands and reunite with distant coethnics which, combined with their inexperience in managing interstate tensions, lead them to contest the status quo. In some respects, seceded states’ behavior imitates that of a new inmate: despite their relatively disadvantageous position (i.e. their limited military capacity) they conduct themselves as if they feel compelled to challenge every entity that surrounds them to prove themselves.

Seceded states are highly likely to both involve and initiate interstate disputes. The different trends associated with each behavior can be attributed to their inexperience. While initiation is self-explanatory, involvement essentially refers to the protraction of an ongoing conflict; the increased duration, in turn, provides participants with information on their opponents’ capabilities and the potential outcome. Seceded states are eager to initiate a dispute, violent or not, but relatively hesitant to prolong it. Such behavior is indicative of information asymmetry due to their limited exposure to interstate signaling flows, as well as of their inability to process and react to external stimuli. Additional symptoms of inexperience are their proclivity to conflict escalation and their lack of target preferences. Seceded states challenge all their neighbors, although they show a marked predilection for other new states, suggesting a lack of concise aims and feasible goals. They are also found to be partial to violence escalation or at least unable to prevent it. Their increased tendency to compete over territory combined with their particular interest on their former substate partners implies that territorial changes and
territoriality (i.e. the psychological attachment to land) are the causes behind their erratic behavior.

The aftershock of partition, however, does not last forever. The new states adapt to their territorial reality and learn to curb their revisionist tendencies. The majority of models showed a sharp decline in their conflict risk during the first post-independence decade that is consistent with the maturation hypothesis. In certain cases, such as the initiation of violent disputes against older neighbors, their behavior was modified to approximate that of their targets. The dissipation of aggression within mixed dyads suggests seceded states develop a robust security and threat evaluation mechanism that leads them to reevaluate their interactions with old neighbors, slowly building relationships based on mutual trust. To that effect, the behavior of old states, who happen to avoid confrontations with the products of partition as they are fully aware of the costs of conflict, may by playing an important role.

In many respects the effects of secession match those of decolonization. Former colonies emerge into an environment characterized by uncertainty given the departure of metropolises and the contemporaneous creation of several new entities. The resulting power vacuum and the absence of an ultimate arbitrator of territorial and ethnic differences lead them to attempt to resolve those differences in a rather primordial manner: through the use of force. Compared to seceded states, decolonized entities initiate, are involved in, and escalate disputes more frequently. They, too, are affected by a learning curve, however that is not as sharp as with secession and excludes the most significant contentious issue. Decolonized states tend to become more aggressive regarding territoriality as time progresses. Although they are not products of homeland dismemberment, their practically nonexistent boundaries and the suboptimal ethnic carving they are associated with seem to be the sources of their aggression; their mere presence
invites disputes and territorial claims. Decolonized borders were not designed to serve an interstate purpose. They were never institutionalized as such, nor were they drawn to accommodate the regional tribal, cultural, and ethnic heterogeneity. Colonial powers artificially drew lines on a map, often without complete knowledge of morphological elements, encompassing huge areas that overlapped in regards to colonial ownership. As such, decolonized states emerged with unsettled borders and attempted to remedy the situation using force.

The bellicosity of former colonies is particularly acute against their peers, an indication of clustering effects, both geographic and temporal. Seceded states usually emerge with at least one old neighbor that serves as a pacifying influence. This rarely happens with decolonization. New states and their territoriality concerns are congregated in well-defined subregions. What is more, the legacies of colonial intervention, intercolonial conflict experiences, and the manner by which colonial powers conducted themselves in respect to treating their subjects imply a history of institutional and systemic violence, as well as a tradition founded on its legitimization. It was expected, therefore, that former colonies would behave aggressively when resolving their territorial concerns. The issues relating ethnic fragmentation only seem to compound the salience and impact of territoriality. Still, there are indications that decolonization states learn from their past actions and adjust their behaviors accordingly, especially when dealing with other mature decolonized states. It just seems to take more time for their aggression to be checked. This delay seems to be a product of the volume and intensity of dyadic disputes; for decolonized states, it is very difficult to escape and environment of distrust once that has been established.

With liberation and unification we obtain an entirely different set of implications. Analyzing liberated states first, they are exhibiting peculiar behavioral changes between the monadic and dyadic tests. Liberation reduces the likelihood of monadic MID involvement, but
increases that of initiation. It is also found to have a largely negative effect regarding dispute escalation. In the dyadic setting, liberated states are consistently expressing an accentuating aversion to initiating and being involved in conflicts. This discrepancy between onset and involvement or different levels of dispute intensity should not be alarming. The former can be attributed to the baseline category, namely old states. Liberated states do engage in less serious disputes more than old states, in accordance to the systemic behavior of all new states. Their reluctance to escalate, however, is a potent reminder of their fear to relive the actions that led them to lose statehood in the first place. In other words, liberated states exhibit sensible conflict-selection behavior. They tend to participate in disputes less frequently than seceded and decolonized states and will actively attempt to diffuse a situation that is about to escalate.

In the dyadic setting, it becomes abundantly clear that liberated states shy away from any and all conflicts possible, including those concerning territory. They do not initiate or get involved in competition with neighboring states, particularly those of the same process. In most situations their conciliatory attitudes continue to strengthen and their conflict resolution mechanisms appear to improve through time. Apart from the prior occupation, central to their behavior is the return to the ex ante status quo, which results in immense territorial satisfaction. Not only do liberated states gain their entire homeland back when they emerge, they inherit their prior boundaries, which happen to retain much of their pre-occupation institutionalized value. Their population enjoys a robust national identity, which not only was already present but was strengthened during the occupation; thus, domestic conformity is most easily attainable. Moreover, a less discussed aspect of liberation relates to how the rest of the community perceives their re-entry. The fact that occupation usually occurs in violation of international norms, liberated states are treated quite differently than other state births. Older states celebrate
their emergence and are eager to provide support, or at least establish relations. With other processes this does not happen as old states seem to monitor and react to adjacent birth events with caution, if not reservation.

The last process tackled happens to be by far the less populous and, thus, more obscure in disentangling its effects. I hypothesized that unified states should be conflict averse primarily as a result of their territorial expansion. They are stronger, bigger, and have united with their coethnics. As such, they should be satisfied, thus unwilling to challenge the new status quo and jeopardize their advantageous position. Indeed, that is exactly what was uncovered, with an important caveat. Unified states are likely to victimize old neighbors. A potential explanation for this behavior could be found on inherited disputes and claims that could not potentially be captured in this study. By that, I refer to latent or ongoing conflicts the pre-unification states were involved in. Their territorial enlargement and increased military capacity affords them with the opportunity to aggressively settle contentious issues once and for all, in some ways getting revenge for the past transgressions of the now relatively weaker neighbors. Their reluctance to target other new states suggests their intentions are not to territorially expand through war. This is also confirmed by findings negatively linking unification and territorial disputes. Their arguments are centered around policy, regime, or cultural differences.

Processes aside, perhaps the most important conclusion relates to the impact of pre-independence violence. The use of force as a medium of independence seems to result in devastating outcomes for systemic peace. As anticipated, pre-state violence is the most consistent predictor of interstate acrimony, always raising the risk of conflict onset, involvement, and escalation. As exhaustively discussed in Chapter 3, violence serves a dual role in promoting such behaviors. First, states with a violent past legitimize aggression as a policy-making tool because
of the successful outcome. Their new leaders, likely to have participated in the pre-independence conflict, have emerged as victors and are rewarded with political positions of power. Since violence is ultimately what brought them there, they will be unwilling to discard its use both domestically and internationally. Second, pre-independence violence denotes high-intensity intrastate conflict. As such, it will always be accompanied by perceptions of victors and losers, which do not necessarily happen to be mutually exclusive (i.e. both new states may perceive themselves as losers). The transposition of intrastate differences to the interstate system is bound to be expressed as MIDs between the newly emerged entities. These disputes, in turn, are likely to breed enduring rivalries and protracted animosity. Time is found to ameliorate such effects, however. Most results indicate that the effects of pre-independence violence decay in little more than a decade. Again, this suggests the presence of an elusive maturation process, by which new states change their behaviors and gradually forget past violent experiences. This is not to say that the impact of violence disappears; it just becomes less detrimental in governing interstate relationships.

Lastly, democratization and power preponderance were found to be necessary conditions for peace. Democratic states are less likely to engage their neighbors, more so if they happen to be democratic as well. This explains why the outcomes of certain recent secessions, such as Czechoslovakia vis a vis Yugoslavia, have been so different. That being said, it is unclear whether the democratization of new states happens concurrently to their emergence or is a product of the absence of territorial claims. The territorial peace theory (Gibler 2012) contends it is the latter. If that is indeed the case, the territorial change that leads to state emergence should account for both the occurrence of territorial claims and affect the subsequent democratization prospects. In Chapter 6 I elaborate these claims and argue that processes can be conceptualized
as the missing link that ties territory and democratization together. Regarding material capabilities, the results confirm their monadic positive effect on conflict with a simultaneous inverse effect within the dyad. In the words of Hegre (2008: 566) I find that “preponderance may pacify, but power kills.” To clarify, more powerful states tend fight more, but imbalanced dyads tend to fight less. This is logically tied to the opportunity/willingness framework. Military capacity exponentially increases the opportunity to fight and dyadic parity creates uncertainty about the potential outcome, thus producing a positive expected utility of conflict for both sides due to imperfect information (i.e. when two sides are equal they both think they can win). Power preponderance, however, results in accurate utility calculations; the greater the gap between two states the more certain the outcome.

In the next chapter, I conclude this project with a thorough discussion of the policymaking implications of birth legacies, as well as the new avenues for research offered by acknowledging the temporal effects of maturation of conflict processes.
Table 5-1. New States by Process.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Process</th>
<th>Peaceful</th>
<th>Violent</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Secession</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decolonization</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberation</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unification</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi-Process</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Unique New States</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>186</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5-2. Preliminary Cox Regression Estimates of Conflict Involvement.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New State</td>
<td>.785*** (.106)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>.688*** (.107)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence</td>
<td>--- (.048)</td>
<td>.404*** (.049)</td>
<td>.341*** (.049)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\chi^2$</td>
<td>69.86*** (1)</td>
<td>66.36*** (1)</td>
<td>116.62*** (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>14019</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Cell entries report coefficients and robust standard errors (in parentheses). *p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01
### Table 5-3. Comprehensive Cox Regression Estimates of Conflict Involvement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1: Processes Only (MIDs)</th>
<th>Model 2: Violence (MIDs)</th>
<th>Model 3: USSR (MIDs)</th>
<th>Model 4: Unrestricted (MIDs)</th>
<th>Model 5: Unrestricted (VMIDs)</th>
<th>Model 6: Unrestricted (FMIDs)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Secession</td>
<td>1.286*** (.259)</td>
<td>1.133*** (.260)</td>
<td>1.024*** (.261)</td>
<td>.786*** (.097)</td>
<td>.419*** (.139)</td>
<td>.576*** (.184)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decolonization</td>
<td>.666** (.267)</td>
<td>.607** (.267)</td>
<td>.599** (.266)</td>
<td>.892*** (.098)</td>
<td>1.000*** (.136)</td>
<td>1.065*** (.181)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberation</td>
<td>.755 (.355)</td>
<td>.523 (.357)</td>
<td>.482 (.356)</td>
<td>.330*** (.125)</td>
<td>-1.841*** (.343)</td>
<td>-2.219*** (.531)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unification</td>
<td>-.723*** (.149)</td>
<td>-.647*** (.149)</td>
<td>-.634*** (.150)</td>
<td>-.643*** (.152)</td>
<td>-.186 (.283)</td>
<td>-.495 (.436)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence</td>
<td>--- (.055)</td>
<td>.357*** (.057)</td>
<td>.412*** (.057)</td>
<td>.520*** (.061)</td>
<td>.172** (.086)</td>
<td>.212** (.101)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>--- ---</td>
<td>--- ---</td>
<td>--- ---</td>
<td>-.197*** (.024)</td>
<td>-.262*** (.087)</td>
<td>-.055 (.109)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINC</td>
<td>--- ---</td>
<td>--- ---</td>
<td>--- ---</td>
<td>.349** (.024)</td>
<td>.262*** (.034)</td>
<td>.360*** (.046)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR dummy</td>
<td>--- ---</td>
<td>--- ---</td>
<td>--- ---</td>
<td>.356*** (.024)</td>
<td>--- ---</td>
<td>--- ---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TVCs Secession</td>
<td>-.252*** (.098)</td>
<td>-.255*** (.098)</td>
<td>-.239** (.098)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decolonization</td>
<td>-.101 (.100)</td>
<td>-.092 (.100)</td>
<td>-.091 (.099)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberation</td>
<td>-.183 (.135)</td>
<td>-.178 (.135)</td>
<td>-.179 (.134)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ \chi^2 \] 94.52*** (7) 136.27*** (8) 147.45*** (9) 289.23*** (7) 263.50*** (7) 187.28*** (7)

\[ N \] 6808 5979

Note: Cell entries report coefficients and robust standard errors (in parentheses). *p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01
Table 5-4. Cox Regression Estimates of Conflict Initiation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1: Processes Only (MIDs)</th>
<th>Model 2: Violence (MIDs)</th>
<th>Model 3: USSR (MIDs)</th>
<th>Model 4: Unrestricted (MIDs)</th>
<th>Model 5: Unrestricted (VMIDs)</th>
<th>Model 6: Unrestricted (FMIDs)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Secession</td>
<td>1.554*** (.311)</td>
<td>1.391*** (.312)</td>
<td>1.310*** (.314)</td>
<td>.784*** (.113)</td>
<td>2.658*** (.669)</td>
<td>2.839*** (.1473)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decolonization</td>
<td>.860*** (.321)</td>
<td>.800** (.321)</td>
<td>.791*** (.320)</td>
<td>.760*** (.116)</td>
<td>2.226*** (.691)</td>
<td>2.473*** (.1201)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberation</td>
<td>.737* (.427)</td>
<td>.489 (.429)</td>
<td>.457 (.428)</td>
<td>.285*** (.145)</td>
<td>1.625** (.782)</td>
<td>1.744</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unification</td>
<td>-.628*** (.182)</td>
<td>-.546*** (.183)</td>
<td>-.536*** (.183)</td>
<td>-.486*** (.186)</td>
<td>-2.821*** (.863)</td>
<td>-2.876* (.1500)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence</td>
<td>--- .379*** (.064)</td>
<td>.421*** (.122)</td>
<td>.094 (.067)</td>
<td>.343*** (.084)</td>
<td>.642*** (.128)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>--- ---</td>
<td>--- -.170** (.067)</td>
<td>-.392*** (.091)</td>
<td>-.252* (.135)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINC</td>
<td>--- ---</td>
<td>--- .301*** (.169)</td>
<td>-.252* (.136)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR dummy</td>
<td>--- ---</td>
<td>--- .273** (.028)</td>
<td>--- (.122)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TVCs</td>
<td>--- -.344*** (.117)</td>
<td>-.347*** (.117)</td>
<td>-.336*** (.117)</td>
<td>--- -.618*** (.244)</td>
<td>-.653 (.426)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secession</td>
<td>-.193 (.120)</td>
<td>-.184 (.120)</td>
<td>-.182 (.119)</td>
<td>--- -.375 (.252)</td>
<td>-.393 (.436)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decolonization</td>
<td>-.156 (.161)</td>
<td>-.153 (.161)</td>
<td>-.152 (.160)</td>
<td>--- -.460 (.288)</td>
<td>-.505 (.485)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberation</td>
<td>--- ---</td>
<td>--- ---</td>
<td>--- -.904*** (.343)</td>
<td>--- .075* (.041)</td>
<td>.109* (.063)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unification</td>
<td>--- ---</td>
<td>--- ---</td>
<td>--- -.904*** (.343)</td>
<td>--- .075* (.041)</td>
<td>.109* (.063)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINC</td>
<td>--- ---</td>
<td>--- ---</td>
<td>--- -.904*** (.343)</td>
<td>--- .075* (.041)</td>
<td>.109* (.063)</td>
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<tr>
<td>$\chi^2$</td>
<td>84.75*** (7)</td>
<td>119.45*** (8)</td>
<td>124.23*** (9)</td>
<td>179.66*** (7)</td>
<td>228.58*** (12)</td>
<td>146.01*** (12)</td>
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Note: Cell entries report coefficients and robust standard errors (in parentheses). *p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01.
Table 5. Cox Regression Estimates of Territorial Dispute Initiation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Model 2: VTDs</th>
<th>Model 3: FTDs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Secession</td>
<td>2.926***</td>
<td>3.022***</td>
<td>2.097***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.917)</td>
<td>(1.054)</td>
<td>(.741)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decolonization</td>
<td>2.945***</td>
<td>2.552**</td>
<td>2.400***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.929)</td>
<td>(1.070)</td>
<td>(.742)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberation</td>
<td>-.583</td>
<td>-1.081*</td>
<td>.017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.449)</td>
<td>(.597)</td>
<td>(1.021)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unification</td>
<td>-3.655***</td>
<td>-3.957***</td>
<td>-2.133**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.136)</td>
<td>(1.269)</td>
<td>(.871)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence</td>
<td>.539***</td>
<td>.685***</td>
<td>.708***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.144)</td>
<td>(.159)</td>
<td>(.220)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>-.181</td>
<td>-.940***</td>
<td>-.639**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.437)</td>
<td>(.211)</td>
<td>(.266)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINC</td>
<td>.284***</td>
<td>.236***</td>
<td>.339***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.062)</td>
<td>(.070)</td>
<td>(.098)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TVCs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secession</td>
<td>-.791**</td>
<td>-.849**</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.335)</td>
<td>(.393)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decolonization</td>
<td>-.789**</td>
<td>-.627</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.338)</td>
<td>(.397)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unification</td>
<td>1.173**</td>
<td>1.453***</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.464)</td>
<td>(.559)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>-.343*</td>
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</table>

\[ \chi^2 \]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>123.59*** (11)</th>
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<th>67.27*** (7)</th>
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<tr>
<td>N</td>
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</table>

Note: Cell entries report coefficients and robust standard errors (in parentheses). *p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01.
Table 5-6. Cox Regression Estimates of Dyadic Violent MID (and TD) Involvement.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Secession</td>
<td>.313*** (.152)</td>
<td>.647*** (.134)</td>
<td>.230*** (.087)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>1.190*** (.209)</td>
<td>.426*** (.201)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decolonization</td>
<td>-.075 (.131)</td>
<td>.417** (.168)</td>
<td>.252*** (.126)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>-.488** (.198)</td>
<td>.374*** (.085)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberation</td>
<td>-.421** (.175)</td>
<td>-.240 (.168)</td>
<td>-.512*** (.169)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>.051 (.216)</td>
<td>-1.120*** (.327)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unification</td>
<td>-.263 (.168)</td>
<td>-.212 (.169)</td>
<td>-.324* (.167)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>.410** (.071)</td>
<td>-1.140*** (.310)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence</td>
<td>.827*** (.133)</td>
<td>--- (.119)</td>
<td>.791*** (.167)</td>
<td>.896*** (.107)</td>
<td>4.16** (.166)</td>
<td>1.207*** (.225)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New State Dyad</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>--- (.116)</td>
<td>--- (.166)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both Secession</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>--- (.046)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both Decolonization</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>--- (.053)</td>
<td>.474*** (.064)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both Liberation</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>.942*** (.211)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both Violence</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>.487*** (.058)</td>
<td>--- (.119)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>-.298*** (.417)</td>
<td>-2.922*** (.415)</td>
<td>-2.930*** (.414)</td>
<td>-2.937*** (.413)</td>
<td>-3.778*** (.578)</td>
<td>-2.802*** (.689)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINC</td>
<td>-.013*** (.091)</td>
<td>-.983*** (.091)</td>
<td>-1.003*** (.091)</td>
<td>-1.013*** (.089)</td>
<td>-.786*** (.041)</td>
<td>-1.064*** (.070)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allied</td>
<td>-.135* (.077)</td>
<td>-.134* (.077)</td>
<td>-.188*** (.072)</td>
<td>-.287*** (.078)</td>
<td>.021 (.097)</td>
<td>-.089</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TVCs</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>.487*** (.058)</td>
<td>--- (.089)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secession</td>
<td>-.020 (.062)</td>
<td>-.159*** (.054)</td>
<td>-.087** (.039)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>-.202** (.081)</td>
<td>-.179*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decolonization</td>
<td>.144*** (.054)</td>
<td>-.130** (.053)</td>
<td>-.164*** (.051)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>.304*** (.075)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberation</td>
<td>.013 (.075)</td>
<td>-.111 (.071)</td>
<td>-.144** (.072)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>-.059 (.089)</td>
<td>.096</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unification</td>
<td>.107 (.070)</td>
<td>.103 (.071)</td>
<td>.133* (.070)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>.588*** (.123)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence</td>
<td>-.270*** (.057)</td>
<td>--- (.049)</td>
<td>-.250*** (.047)</td>
<td>-.263*** (.036)</td>
<td>-.236*** (.068)</td>
<td>-.210**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>.684*** (.165)</td>
<td>.668*** (.164)</td>
<td>.672*** (.164)</td>
<td>.656*** (.164)</td>
<td>.967*** (.217)</td>
<td>.697**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINC</td>
<td>.111** (.037)</td>
<td>.111*** (.037)</td>
<td>.118*** (.036)</td>
<td>.135*** (.036)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Cell entries report coefficients and robust standard errors (in parentheses). *p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01.
Table 5-7. Cox Regression Estimates of Dyadic Violent MID (and TD) Initiation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Secession</td>
<td>.421***</td>
<td>.194***</td>
<td>-.143</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>.706***</td>
<td>.769***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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Note: Cell entries report coefficients and robust standard errors (in parentheses). *p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01.
Table 5-8. Cox Regression Estimates of Dyadic Violent MID Targeting.

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Note: Cell entries report coefficients and robust standard errors (in parentheses). *p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01.
Figure 5-1. System Membership, 1816-2016.

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Figure 5-4. State Creation and Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1816-2010.
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CHAPTER 6
DOMESTIC EFFECTS OF STATE EMERGENCE

Overview

State creation does not only impact the international system. New states reform their
domestic environment in fairly predictable ways given the process by which they emerged. In
this chapter I formulate several presuppositions on the theoretical link between birth legacies and
intrastate conflict or democratization. The structure has as follows. The first section offers a brief
overview of the civil conflict literature and highlights its relevance to the question at hand. Next,
I present a set of arguments that logically tie state emergence and domestic behavior. The
following two sections presents the research design and the empirical findings. I conclude with a
evaluation of the obtained patterns and a discussion of the implications for the literature.

Understanding Intrastate Conflict

The vast majority of conflict studies have been devoted to analyzing the causes and
effects of interstate disputes, yet, over the last fifty years, civil conflict has become a far more
prevalent phenomenon both in terms of frequency and consequences (Thenmer and Wallensteen
2013). The realization of the magnitude of the problem, combined with the recent availability of
reliable data, prompted a sharp scholarly turn towards the study of domestic violence in the mid-
1990s, a trend that has accentuated over the past decade. Still, despite the attention it has
attracted, the body of knowledge pertaining to civil conflict is plagued by empirical
inconsistencies and contradicting findings (Salehyan and Thyne 2012). This lack of scholarly
consensus can be attributed to the complex innate nature of domestic unrest and the difficulty in
obtaining precise information on motivations, causes, or outcomes. To begin with, as Salehyan
and Thyne (2012: 191-192) explain, the absence of a commonly agreed-upon definition of civil
war has resulted in numerous arbitrary conceptual and operational definitions of the
phenomenon, undermining the replicability and reliability of findings in addition to preventing their accumulation. Within this strand of criticism fall scholarly disputes over the coding of conflict spells, as it heavily depends on the preferred operationalization of civil war. Related concerns have been raised regarding the distinction between warring sides, the number of combat-related and civilian fatalities, and the indirect or long-term psychological impact on civilian populations. Other minor scholarly disagreements pertain to the conceptual separation of genocide and politicide, and to the exclusion on non-ethnic conflicts from the traditional civil conflict research (see Goldsmith et al. 2013; Uzonyi 2016; Sambanis 2001).

What do we know about civil war, then? The literature has attempted to explain intrastate violence through several, often intertwined, theoretical perspectives. The theoretical origins of much of the current state of the discipline can be traced back to Gurr (1970), who argued that societies where stark economic inequalities are present are more likely to experience civil discord. Groups with limited access to resources perceive themselves to be “relatively deprived” and develop grievances they then express towards the dominant groups (also Buhaug et al. 2011). Such confrontations may result in either rare policy changes or most often in further repression and eventual conflict (Collier and Sambanis 2005; Koubi and Böhmelt 2013; Thomson 2016). Along the same theoretical lines, others claim that ethnocultural identity differences are the primary causes behind the appearance of socioeconomic inequality (Gurr and Moore 1997; Frye 1992; Kauffman 2001; Denny and Walter 2014). These asymmetries in intergroup dynamics promote horizontal cleavages in multiethnic societies that promulgate divisions and ethnic competition. Particularly in cases where access to power is conditioned upon group membership, these divisions are bound to result in armed insurrections (Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010; Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug 2013).
Ethnic composition, group concentration, and war are also found to be intimately tied to notions of territoriality (Toft 2003). A group’s psychological attachment to land may elevate the risk of intrastate animosity, especially in cases where territories possess symbolic elements central to ethnic and religious identities (Toft 2006). Kelle (2017) contends that territoriality informs ethnic identities and can be considered the motivating factor behind self-governance and self-determination movements, although such an effect seems to be contingent on group size and geographic isolation (Jenne, Saideman, and Lowe 2007). However, self-determination movements tend to appear more frequently in less developed countries, suggesting a multidirectional link between a state’s economic performance, territorial sentiments, ethnicity, and statehood bids (De la Calle and Sanchez-Cuenca 2012).

Another theoretical perspective emphasizes the role of “greed” as it relates to informing preferences and decisions. According to this train of thought, the motivation behind challenges to authority is greed for power or access to resources, combined with underlying conditions that allow for the manifestation of such behavior. This set of arguments, grounded on economic theories of utility maximization, has found mixed empirical support, particularly in regards to the impact of lootable and natural resources in ethnically fractionalized states (Ross 2004). Resource wealth offers opportunistic benefits to greedy elites, who may utilize identity and sociopolitical issues to their benefit in mobilizing the masses (Collier and Hoeffler 1998; Wimmer 2012; cf. Young 2016). Some scholars contend that an abundance of extractable minerals, measured as the ratio of a country’s GDP, increases the likelihood of civil war and its potential duration (Collier and Hoeffler 2002; Collier, Hoeffler, and Söderbom 2004; Lujala, Gleditsch, and Gilmore 2005). Others, however, report that these findings are statistical artefacts due to the underlying relationship between resource rents and weak state capacity (de Soysa 2002). Weak states are
both unable to maintain a robust security apparatus that will help them keep internal threats in check and lack the mechanisms that allow them to effectively acquire, manage, and distribute rents (for an overview of related findings see DeRouen and Sobek 2016).

A yet fourth approach draws attention to structural dimensions by adopting Most and Starr’s (1989) “opportunity and willingness” framework that has been the foundation of interstate conflict processes research. Assuming willingness to rebel against authority under conditions that promote relative deprivation, the likelihood of civil war depends on whether the opportunity to wage war exists. These works combine arguments from several distinct perspectives in order to better understand the phenomenon of domestic violence, with particular focus on ethnic fragmentation, geographic dispersion, and morphological details (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Buhaug and Rod 2006; Wiedmann 2009; Gubler and Selway 2012; Butcher 2015). Their findings are consistent and uniform: states with numerous well-established and geographically separated ethnic groups are more likely to experience internal conflict. The distance between the capital and centers of distinct ethnic activity also affects the organizational capability of rebels as compared to the ability of the government to mount an effective military response. Both the morphology and infrastructure affect the probability of war, as well as the strategies available to the insurgents; mountain ranges and jungles are found to be conducive to the opportunity for internal conflict due to the protection they offer.

The presence of democratic institutions is also important to the amelioration of inequalities and preservation of domestic conformity even in ethnically fragmented states, as they provide groups with access to power and affords them the opportunity to channel their grievances (Feng 1997; Reynal-Querol 2002; Cederman, Gleditsch, and Hug 2013). Open and
competitive systems are less likely to be violently challenged, leading some to claim their findings constitute evidence of a “civil democratic peace” effect (Hegre et al. 2001; Cederman, Hug, and Krebs 2010). However, these results have been disputed by those who argue that strong state capacity is endogenous to democratization, thus ultimately responsible for the absence of civil wars (Hegre 2014). What is more, consolidated regimes on both sides of the spectrum (i.e. democracies and autocracies) are routinely found to be associated with longer domestic peace spells, suggesting the existence of a curvilinear relationship between the type of political institutions and civil strife (Gleditsch and Ruggeri 2010). Both consolidated democracies and autocracies are assumed to have the ability to maintain order, although they exert it through different mechanisms (Fjelde 2010). This leaves out one regime type that is consistently found to be associated with more conflict: anocracies (Sambanis 2001). However, as Vreeland (2008) explains, anocracies are defined based on the Polity scale, whose conceptual subcomponents include measures of domestic acrimony. In other words, anocracies are partly defined on them experiencing political or ethnic violence, which renders the entire anocracy-war relationship spurious (Vreeland 2008). More theoretically consistent and empirically sound is the body of evidence linking transition and civil conflict (Cederman, Hug, and Krebs 2010; Regan and Bell 2010). Still, Cook and Savun (2016) find that past experience with democratic institutions helps mitigate the chances of war during transition periods and demonstrate that the instability new democracies experience accounts for much of the transition effect.

A number of recent attempts to explain civil wars have focused exclusively on the impact of the environment and the related expression of human aggression (Hendrix, Gates, and Buhaug 2016). These approaches hypothesize that climate change and variability disproportionately affect agriculture-based economies, which is used as a proxy for economic development and state
capacity. According to these theories, human populations lacking food security due to prolonged droughts are more likely to rebel against a government that fails to meet their needs (Nordas and Gleditsch 2007). Theisen, Holtermann, and Buhaug (2012) discuss how food scarcity and resource competition cause confrontations between individuals and groups, which can be accurately predicted by rainfall patterns in agrarian societies. Schleussner et al. (2016) report that natural or environmental disasters enhances the risk of armed conflict outbreak in territorially large and highly fractionalized countries as the economic impact of such calamities tends to affect territorially concentrated populations. This line of reasoning is not without its caveats, however. Wiscnath and Buhaug (2014: 709) question the reliability of both micro-climate data and related results by arguing that “the direction and magnitude of the climate effects are inconsistent and sensitive to research design.” One might argue, for instance, that the temporal effects of climate change are assessed in decades-long windows, meaning that they are largely invariable on a year-to-year basis. Another criticism arises if one considers that populations residing in colder climates face similar food security concerns. If limited accessibility to crops is what triggers domestic strife, then Northern Russia, Canada, and the Scandinavian countries should be hotbeds of violence. These inconsistencies prompted Hendrix’s (2017) work, who demonstrates how the bulk of climate-conflict research examines just the sub-Saharan African region, rendering the findings susceptible to the presence of latent conditions and confounding factors associated with the already volatile ethnopolitical situation of those states.

Finally, attempts to link intrastate conflict to interstate dynamics have produced a hybrid subfield of conflict processes devoted to third-party interventions. This group of studies is mostly interested on the duration and termination of civil wars, as the vast majority of foreign meddling happens after the onset of conflict. The body of findings, once again, shares little to no empirical
consensus given the variability of methods, aims, intentions, and capabilities third-parties bring to the arena of domestic strife (see Enterline and Linebarger 2016). What all studies agree on is that interventions tend to tilt the scales of victory towards the receiving side, either that is the rebels or the government (Gent 2008; Sullivan and Karreth 2015). Intervening states can be neighbors afraid of conflict diffusion, non-neighbors concerned with humanitarian disasters, or states seeking reciprocal rents by the side they support, or international organizations (Finnemore 2004; Gleditsch 2007; Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006). Despite the nature of the intervener, several analyses find that civil wars tend to be extended as a result of intervention, although the final settlements are found to be less likely to be disputed if monitored by foreign powers (Kim 2017; Balch-Lindsay, Enterline, and Joyce 2008; Regan 2002).

To summarize, the common themes of this literature highlight a number of potentially interrelating factors. According to those, the states that face a great risk of experiencing domestic unrest are usually ethnically fragmented, culturally diverse, with deep economic cleavages. Moreover, they tend to be institutionally underdeveloped and politically in flux. The presence of natural resources, impassable terrains, vast territorial distances between the center and the periphery, and proximity to unstable neighbors only seem to amplify intrastate divisions. That being said, confounding factors and endogenous effects relevant to methodological decisions and theoretical approaches cloud a definitive set of correlates of intrastate war that approximates that of interstate conflict scholarship (e.g. territoriality, material capabilities, dyadic democracy, alliances etc.). The relatively recent turn towards domestic processes has also ignored, much like on the interstate level, issues arising from the birth of new states, such as their age, maturation, and the impact of emergence processes. In the next section, I address these concerns under the theoretical prism of state creation and its aftermath.
New States And Ethnic Conflict

In Chapter 3 I expounded specific theoretical linkages between birth legacies and interstate behavior. Territoriality, boundaries, ethnic composition, and clustering were the lenses through which I interpreted the distinct effects each state emergence process had on the life cycle of new states. I adopt the same framework regarding the domestic effect of independence in this chapter. I argue that the conditional impact of emergence processes and means, as it relates to their structural particularities, confines the spectrum of domestic political outcomes, which then affects the likelihood of domestic violence. Specifically, I claim that state creation is as much of an international political shock as it is domestic, in that the acquisition of statehood and the sudden territorial sovereignty they are granted present new states with a blank canvas on which that are afforded the unique opportunity to create their own political, cultural, identity, and economic structures. The process through which a substate entity really becomes an organized state unavoidably requires a realignment of intra- and inter- group dynamics that will define domestic life for decades. In this context, the following paragraphs examine how each process influences factors associated with conformity, such as ethniterritorial configurations, identity issues, economic development, and democratization. I largely exclude, but not entirely ignore, discussions surrounding the impact of nature (i.e. morphology and climate) as they are neither relevant nor directly related to the mechanics of state creation per se, not to mention they are theoretically unconvincing (see Wiscnath and Buhaug 2014; Hendrix 2017). In short, I assume that nature-driven variables are randomly assigned, thus independent of procedural effects. Thus, I focus my discussion on the major factors contributing to civil wars as identified by the literature: ethnic cleavages, identity, economic development, natural resources, political stability, and democratization.
Out of all four processes of state emergence decolonization and secession are the ones that are expected to result in a deterioration of interethnic relations. Since secession is the result of a successful self-determination movement, it requires both sides to possess a distinct identity on the basis of which group membership is assessed and granted. Regardless of the means (violent or peaceful) partition was achieved, the process itself solidifies group identities in order to justify the statehood bid, thus widening the already present intergroup gap. This ethnicity-based differentiation persists after the partition and is considered a stepping stone to the creation of a new national identity that is necessary to maintain domestic conformity and, most importantly, unity. However, as explained in Chapter 3, secession rarely produces the intended outcome of ethnically homogenous states. The newly introduced territorial boundaries often encapsulate populations of a different ethnic background (i.e. diasporas) who become pariahs in their own countries and are routinely excluded from sociopolitical consideration. Especially during the first post-independence years, populations of different ethnic background are viewed as pawns of potentially aggressive neighbors, especially when their presence is used as the justification for territorial revisionist claims. These people are casted as undesirables and are pushed to isolation, a practice which ironically undermines the domestic stability of the new state.

Diasporas tend to congregate in well-specified territorial enclaves situated close to their coethnic patrons (e.g. ethnic Albanians in Kosovo, Croats in north Serbia, Russians in Moldova etc.), close to the new borders and far from the capital. Their distance from the symbolic center of the new state and the behavior of their current co-nationals is bound to result in grievances quite rapidly as their isolation is just a reflection of historically acute ethnic cleavages that led to the breakup of the former entity. The situation is reminiscent of a destabilization spiral:
diasporas’ dissatisfaction with the present situation is expected to incentivize them towards requesting external assistance or express autonomy claims, which the new government will push back against, causing said groups to express further grievances. The outright rejection of self-determination requests is by itself problematic, as the mere existence of the new state de facto legitimizes secession on the basis of ethnicity. That being said, the ethnic fragmentation of seceded states is not as profound as in decolonized states since it heavily depends on the magnitude of the event. A partition that results in just two new states is expected to generate two minorities, one in each entity (e.g. Sweden-Norway). Multi-state partitions, on the other hand, should procure multiple ethnic diasporas (e.g. USSR and successor states), but such events are rarely encountered. On the positive side, the heterogeneity secession results in appears to be asymmetric, meaning that there is always a dominant ethnic majority and usually one or two much weaker ethnic minorities. This power imbalance would suggest that the likelihood on the weak side resorting to violence is small. The presence of an adjacent ethnic patron, however, should create rational expectations of defiance, expressed as organized insurrection attempts.

Decolonization results in a similar ethnically fragmented domestic environment, albeit for different reasons that I will briefly address here as they were thoroughly discussed in Chapter 3. Decolonized states are de facto multiethnic as their boundaries are inherited, therefore not delineated based on ethnicity nor are the outcome of internal negotiations. Since they were drawn by the metropolises to maximize administrative efficiency, the new boundaries failed to match ethnic faultlines; the end result is the emergence of territorially large new entities that incorporated several distinct tribal or ethnic groups. Such multiethnic environments have important ramifications for the study of civil conflict. First, as the literature suggests, states with high degrees of ethnic fractionalization are found to be prone to instances of domestic violence.
Second, the lack of a prior identity seems to be negatively correlated to the creation of a new one. In British colonies, for instance, indigenous populations were never considered to equal partners; they were always referred to as imperial subjects and were treated as inferior to British citizens. This practice prevented those populations from adopting their assigned identity as it carried negative connotations of personhood. When decolonization occurred, the former subjects immediately shed off any remnants of colonial legacies from their new identities. The initial lack and the subsequent abolition of a common reference point relevant to their legacy and struggles against the colonial powers, however, meant that ultimate post-independence identity reference point regressed back to localized and primordial notions of tribal ancestry. This, in turn, undermined the creation and fast adoption of a common multiethnic national identity that would serve as the adhesive and would hold the new state and society together.

Moreover, the size of most decolonized states, combined with the presence of a large number of distinct ethnic populations, meant that central governments are unable to address the needs of distant populations or influence their behaviors. With self-governance becoming a necessity in remote areas, it is only a matter of time until self-determination bids spring out given the natural evolution of communal interdependence that ignores traditional state boundaries. A fragmented domestic environment also implies the absence of a preponderant ethnicity around which a national identity can be structured. Given the number of ethnic dyads in decolonized states the probability of interethnic animosity should be much higher compared to those in partitioned ones. In summarizing the above discussion, I anticipate both seceded and decolonized states to experience higher amounts of domestic violence, particularly during the first post-independence years.
This is not the case with the remaining processes of state emergence. Liberation should, in principle, reduce the chances of the new state experiencing civil discord, at least one that is sparked through unresolved identity issues. The reason is rather simple. Occupations usually happen to strengthen national identities, rather than ethnic ones (e.g. Belgium in WWII). The occupier automatically becomes the dominant outgroup, prompting the elevation of nationality over ethnicity even in fragmented countries. In other words, ethnic competitors unite in tandem against the common enemy, sidelining their ethnic differences. Following the exit of the occupier, the reacquisition of statehood and territorial integrity should satisfy all different sects inside the liberated state equally. I expect this effect to persist for several years, although it should decay as common memories of resistance to occupation decompose. Unification, on the other hand, occurs on the basis of a common ethnocultural identity (e.g. Germany in 1989). This prerequisite ensures the presence of an underlying identity around which the two (or more) populations decide to unify. Irreconcilable differences may arise later in time (e.g. United Arab Republic); however, I expect domestic conformity to manifest in the absence of civil conflicts through the first formative years of the new state.

In terms of economic development and its relation to state emergence, the four processes are theoretically associated with significantly different outcomes. To begin with, unified states find themselves in an economically advantageous position relative to their pre-unification ones for two reasons. First, contrary to decolonization and liberation, the decision to forgo their statehood in favor of a union is exclusively internal, implying that the initial costs associated with state birth are minimized due to possessing perfect information about expectations and outcomes. Second, unification denotes an expanded economic structure that subsumes the resources of the participants, resulting in an economy much larger than the ones it replaced.
Although secession is also associated with internal motivations, partitioned states are de facto smaller, meaning that the possess reserves of human and physical capital than their predecessors. What is more, secessions differ from unifications in that the economic structures of the new states must be designed anew instead of becoming the product of a planned merge, resulting in prolonged periods of relative economic uncertainty that may exacerbated existing ethnic divisions.

Liberated and decolonized states face qualitatively distinct conditions. As in both processes statehood is acquired externally and abruptly, either via intervention or voluntary departure, the timing and consequences of birth are not evaluated beforehand. As such, planning for the post-emergence economies rarely takes place.¹ To complicate matters further, colonial powers and occupiers tend to control and redirect the economic output of their dominions towards serving their interests. Particularly regarding former colonies, they experience extensive and prolonged pillaging of their natural and human resources, as the primary goal of the metropolises has been economic exploitation rather than territorial expansion. Moreover, when colonial powers exit they usually leave behind structures of continued influence that aim in retaining the beneficial to them extraction of resources and manipulation of economic performance in decolonized states. This does not happen in liberated states, where independence finds their economic infrastructure relatively intact, thus prompting relatively higher rates of growth than those exhibited in former colonies.

All the aforementioned factors – ethnicity, identities, and economic development – are intimately related to democratization, although the latter is not directly or theoretically linked to the structural impositions of state emergence processes, but rather to the behaviors these

¹ An exception could be considered the case of Japan following its occupation by the United States.
promote. In other terms, one cannot compellingly argue that democratization is more likely in secessions as opposed to liberations, or vice versa. However, democratic transitions have been found to be taking place more frequently and with higher likelihood of success in states that are not mired by territorial disputes (see Gibler 2012). Since birth legacies are influencing territorial revisionist behaviors, as evident by the previous chapter’s empirical findings, I do expect them to be indirectly affecting the democratization prospects of new states.

The central argument of territorial peace theory is that the presence of territorial claims causes states to shift their attention from internal issues to external threats (Gibler 2009; 2012). By doing so, they create standing armies and structure their domestic and foreign policies around security and survival, which become the state’s top priorities. Leaders are empowered by the domestic convergence and the absence of meaningful political opposition in the face of those threats. As such, they are incentivized to consolidate their powers and extend their tenure, promoting their image as “defenders” of the state. The large armies under their command only serve to promote their political agendas and are routinely used as tools of domestic oppression. All these dynamics are found to severely hinder democratization. In the case of new states I modify Gibler’s (2012) framework and argue that territorial threats do not appear out of nowhere, but are rather the outcome of state emergence processes. Since secession and decolonization increase the hazard of territorial disputes, I hypothesize that these new states will be much slower in adopting democratic institutions than liberated and unified states. In contrast, liberation and unification should be associated with higher rates of democratization given their inverse relationship to the onset and prolongation of territorial disputes.

I have intentionally left the discussion on the means of emergence last, as I believe pre-independence violence negatively affects all aspects of domestic life much like it does for
interstate relations. To begin with, regardless of the emergence process, violence cements identities to such a degree that future reconciliation attempts are largely untenable. If we compare the dissolutions of Yugoslavia and USSR, for example, we can see that while ethnic tensions have appeared within former Soviet states, they are much less intense than those within Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia. Memories of violent clashes between different ethnic factions are expected to persist well after the creation of new states, as different groups perceive each other not only as distinct, but as essential enemies. This expectation is consistent with the literature on ethnic conflict recurrence that finds the number and intensity of prior episodes to be robust predictors of future ones (Quinn, Mason, and Gurses 2007). Given that pre-independence violence by definition denotes instances of civil conflict, it can be conceptualized as a precursor of civil strife within the newly established entities.

In addition, wars of independence tend to have lasting negative effects on economic development and state capacity. The unconventional nature of domestic conflict relies on the destruction of soft targets. Self-determination movements try to hamper the military and financial ability of the state to suppress statehood bids by targeting vital infrastructure and sources of physical capital, thus hindering the government’s rent collection and income generation structures. Unfortunately, by doing so rebels undermine the prospects of their own economic growth and development should they manage to become independent. Combined with any latent and unresolved identity issues, the limited state capacity may increase the chances of economic grievances appearing, thus negatively affecting the intrastate conflict outlook.

Finally, as discussed in Chapter 3, pre-independence violence is synonymous to success as it leads to new state creation. Group leaders obtain the symbolic status of the nation’s “father” and are rewarded with post-independence positions of power. As such, they are unwilling to
forego the practices that elevated them within the new state’s institutions and are expected to continue their reliance on violent practices when it comes to retaining their tenure and eradicating opposition. What is more, the legitimization of violence allows for its utilization against potential domestic threats, such as sidelined ethnic groups requesting self-governance or self-determination movements. Prestate violence, then, has a dual function in increasing the likelihood of civil wars. First, it delays democratization by promoting state-sponsored suppression of civil rights. Second, it reduces reliance on domestic settlement approaches rendering organized rebellion the only viable response on the part of deprived minorities.

To recap, the above compilation of arguments points to the following empirical expectations. Secessions and decolonizations should result in higher civil conflict and lower democratization rates when compared to liberations and unifications, or to old states for that matter. Decolonization, in particular, should exhibit the most potent impact on the likelihood of civil wars for new states. Violence is expected to have a similarly positive and persistent effect, albeit for different reasons. Processes and means aside, I do expect these effects to decompose given enough time as states mature and adapt their domestic behaviors to better accommodate the resolution of grievances and curb domestic aggression.

**Research Design**

**General Approach**

To evaluate hypotheses on the impact of state emergence on the likelihood of civil wars I have merged SEP v2.0 with economic and resource wealth indicators in order to approximate the traditional research design approaches of intrastate conflict literature. The modeling procedure mimics the one in Chapter 5; restricted models appear before the integrated, unrestricted, ones. Although my main interest is on determinants of domestic violence, I have expanded the scope
of my analysis to include estimations on the likelihood of democratization as an indirect robustness check for the territorial peace findings.

**Variables, Data, and Methodology**

For the dependent variable denoting civil conflict I rely on the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict data set, which defines it as an “instance of contested incompatibilities between a government and at least one nonstate actor that operates within the territorial confines the government controls” (Gleditsch et al. 2002: 168-169). This data set is similar in aims, range, and scope to the Correlates of War data on interstate disputes, but for three major exceptions. The first and obvious one is that exclusively interstate conflict instances are excluded as they are irrelevant. The second is that the time frame of these data only extend back to 1946 instead of 1816. The justification provided for this data collection decision is that reliable information on civil wars is sporadically available for incidents that took place before WWII. Third, the data capture events that resulted in at least 25 battle-related fatalities. Although UCDP/PRIO’s data contain observations on interstate disputes caused by an ongoing civil conflict (i.e. interventions) and extrasystemic confrontations (i.e. conflicts that have been expanded beyond the original state’s territory), I have excluded them from consideration as I am interested in intrastate conflicts only. For my purposes, I have dichotomized the civil conflict indicator, with 1 denoting the onset of an event.

My indicators for economic performance are drawn from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project data, version 6.2 (Coppedge et al. 2016). Specifically, I use quantitative measures for GDP per capita and GDP growth, with the former being transformed by the natural logarithm. For the measure on resource wealth I rely on Haber and Menaldo’s (2011) data of per capita income of a state’s production of minerals, including oil, gas, coal, and precious metals. Regarding democratization, I used the Polity IV data (Marshall, Gurr, and Jagers 2016) to
develop an ordinal measure of transition that ranges from -1 to 1 that captures a state’s movement on the Polity scale relative to the previous year, which I use as a control variable in the civil conflict tests (termed “Political Transition”). For the state emergence-democratization models, where democracy appears as a dependent variable, I use a binary indicator of democracy based on Polity IV, with 1 capturing states a score over 6 on the Polity scale only for the first year a state transitions to a full democracy. The remaining variables regarding processes and means of state emergence remain as described in Chapter 4.

Overall, my data contains all new state observations from 1950-2006, without any temporal and geographical blackouts. The selected timeframe is not a research design decision, but a result of the Haber and Menaldo (2011) data coverage restrictions. My sampling scope is strictly monadic and my unit of analysis is the state-per-year. For my empirical tests, I once again rely on the Cox semi-proportional hazard model, with repeat failures and robust standard errors. The total number of observations in my sample is 2925, including 98 instances of civil conflict onset and 834 democratic state-years.

**Results**

The three models of Table 6-1 report the Cox regression coefficients of state emergence effects on the hazard of intrastate conflict onset. Model 1 offers a restrictive set of covariates that include just the four processes. As anticipated, both secession and decolonization are positively affecting the likelihood of event occurrence. Secession, in specific, increase the baseline hazard by about 142%, while decolonization more than quadruples it. Liberation and unification, on the other hand, have the exact opposite effect in that the both reduce the hazard of conflict onset by 95 and 75 percent respectively. In substantive terms, seceded states are twice as likely to experience violent domestic unrest relative to older, mature, states. At the same time, decolonized states exhibit double the conflict onset proneness of partitioned entities. Since all
covariates exhibit equiproportional trends, this particular effect of decolonization is expected to reduce the cumulative survivor function to zero within the first 10 years. To put it differently, the model predicts that on average it takes less than a decade for the decolonization effect to manifest itself as civil conflict.

Model 2 introduces the covariate for violent births in order to disentangle the means of state creation from the processes. Not surprisingly, the coefficients for all four processes retain their signs and significance, although they suffer minor alterations in their magnitude due to the inclusion of violence, which also happens to improve the overall performance of the model. Regarding the means of state birth, this estimation shows violence has a positive and statistically significant effect on the hazard of civil conflict onset, elevating it by 107% in the first post-independence year.

However, consistent with its performance during the interstate conflict estimations, this indicator is once again violating the proportional hazards assumption. Since its time-varying covariate is negative, we can ascertain that the impact of violent state births decays over time and eventually disappears after about 8 years. In substantive terms, Model 2 demonstrates that while the impact of each process is consistent over time, the effect of pre-independence violence is not.

The narrative uncovered by the first two estimations is a novel one within the context of the civil conflict literature. Both seceded and decolonized states appear to experience domestic turmoil and disarray in a situation that progressively deteriorates over time when compared to older states. The question here is not whether these states will face civil war, but when, as in both cases the findings suggest that a violent incident is imminent. That being said, this methodological procedure is agnostic regarding the likelihood of conflict recurrence. To put it differently, although we can assert that a single conflict spell is unavoidable post-birth, we do not
possess information on its duration, escalation, termination, and diffusion. In stark contrast to secession and decolonization, the other two processes seem to promote a domestic environment of relative stability that allows them to divert resources away from responding to domestic threats and towards their economic and political advancement.

The remaining estimation presents the unrestricted model that includes traditional correlates of intrastate conflict in order to evaluate whether the state emergence effects identified in the previous iterations were a product of model misspecification. Once again, we observe changes relevant to the substantive impact of the key covariates, but not in terms of their overall statistical performance. Secession and decolonization positively affect the immediate post-independence domestic conflict hazard by 95 and 132 percent. At the same time, liberation and unification exert a mitigating effect, albeit 7 and 13 percent smaller than previously estimated at \( t_1 \). The coefficient for violent independence is almost identical to the one reported in Model 2, as is its constitutive effect. A major change is the widespread presence of proportionality violations that now extends to all processes in addition to violence. The combined trends appear to be logically consistent to expectations of new state behavior. Specifically, the initial effects of secession and liberation appear to decay with time. Secession creates a volatile domestic environment for about 7 years, after which its link to conflict ceases to exist. Similarly, the pacifying effect of unification lasts for a little more than a decade. However, in the cases of both decolonization and liberation time serves as an accelerating catalyst to their initial impact. The effect of decolonization, in particular, accentuates exponentially, increasing the baseline hazard of civil conflict by more than 8 times at \( t_{30} \).

The control variables contain some surprises as well. The effects of political transition and resource wealth point to the expected direction, with only the former reaching traditional
levels of statistical significance. To elaborate, the coefficient of transition suggests that democratization suppresses domestic competitions and prevents it from escalating to full-blown conflict. In the case of extractable resources, there appears to be a faint and positive association between wealth generated by rents and intrastate violence. However, the absence of conclusive evidence of a robust relationship between the two lends credence to those who claim that resource wealth is not a cause, but a symptom of civil unrest (see Smith 2016). What is more, the two proxies for economic development that almost always find a place in this literature, GDP per capita and GDP growth, are found to be irrelevant. This suggests the existence of an underlying, and previously underreported, link between birth and development.

In Table 6-2, I assess whether new state democratization is influenced by birth legacies given the former’s prominence within the civil and interstate conflict traditions. Democracy is argued to be the cornerstone of peace in both contexts, promoting both external and internal harmonious relationships. In this case however, it seems that antecedent conditions, namely those associated with state birth, influence the presence of democracy, thus rendering its relationship with domestic peace spurious. To elaborate, the restricted first estimation establishes an apparent link between processes and democratization, except for unification which is irrelevant in the entire set of regressions. In the case of partitions, they seem to decrease the hazard of a state becoming a democracy by about a quarter; former colonies, on the other hand, experience an almost 70% reduction in their chances of adopting liberal institutions. In contrast, for liberated states the respective relationship is positive and exerts a substantial impact (~73%).

The introduction of pre-independence violence confirms its independent effect on the future life of new states, leaving the conditional impact of processes relatively unaltered. As hypothesized, the acquisition of statehood via the use of force repels liberal values by a factor of
1.7 as compared to peaceful births. However, its downwards trajectory reveals a harmonization trend, by which its transposition and legitimization in the domestic realm is slowly but steadily rejected. In fact, the findings suggest that the impact of a violent birth on political institutions completely dissipate within a decade.

The third iteration complicates the overall picture. The controls for economic performance do not pass the significance threshold and resource wealth is shown to be inhibiting democratization. However, the performance of key indicators changes quite significantly. First of all, processes and means are violators of the proportionality assumption. Second, the set of their interactive terms has the opposite direction of the main coefficient. Given their relative size it becomes obvious that their effects are brief and their statistical relevance temporary. Secession, in particular, negatively affects democratization for about four years, after which its effect remains dormant for a decade, only to reappear as a catalyst for liberalization towards the latter half of the second post-emergence decade. Holistically, the model suggests that there might be an unobserved relationship between economic performance and processes of state birth that has not yet been captured.

**Discussion and Concerns**

Birth legacies exert a demonstrable influence on all aspects of a new state’s life. In this chapter I examined I showed evidence of a link between state emergence, civil conflict, and democratization. Secession and decolonization seem to hinder both domestic conformity and democratization, although the latter appears to have a much more potent effect than the former. When combined with a violent self-determination struggle, the prospects of a “normal” state life are especially dire. Combined with the findings of the previous chapter, we can assert that states created through either process are highly susceptible to both international and intrastate crises, and authoritarianism. In contrast, liberation and unification are confirmed as the more pacifying
processes of state birth, curbing any aggressive tendencies towards the entire spectrum of state and substate activity. Liberation is also shown to be conducive to the adoption of democratic institutional practices, which are also found to serve as inhibitors of violent behavior.

Still, the unrestricted estimations indicate that the effects of processes are not perpetual. In the context of ethnic conflict, most new states temper the initial shock of emergence by learning how to deal with the structural conditions it imposes. Regarding partitions, the gradual adoption of a national identity helps as it assumes ethnic identifiers, thus bridging the gap created by the a priori ethnic competitions that led to the request for independence. Similar, albeit in the opposite direction, mechanisms emerge in the cases of liberated and unified states, where the initial jubilation triggered by independence decays into obscurity. The exception to this rule of temporal decomposition are decolonized state, which are found to be unable to set their ethnic differences aside. This is not counterintuitive, as the degree of ethnic heterogeneity that was imposed by the territorial delineation of colonies by the imperial powers – combined with their abrupt exit, the degree of economic exploitation, and the total absence of any notion of a unique and superseding national identity – becomes an almost unsurmountable barrier in the path towards domestic prosperity.

This chapter also brings forth a subtle challenge to the tenets of territorial peace theory. If indeed democratization and the onset of territorial disputes (see Chapter 6) are affected by state birth legacies, then the territorial peace suffers from theoretical and empirical misspecification. To put it differently, my findings suggest that the absence of territorial disputes and the prospects of future democratization hinge on, and can be traced back to, the processes and means of state emergence. It would seem problematic to suggest that territorial transfers and the settlement of such changes is directly related to the adoption of democratic institutions without examining the
structural conditions and consequences of the original territorial cession, pertaining to how a state was created.
Table 6-1. Cox Regression Estimates of State Emergence and Intrastate Conflict

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1: Only Processes</th>
<th>Model 2: Violence Included</th>
<th>Model 3: Unrestricted</th>
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<td>Standard Error</td>
<td>Coefficient</td>
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<tr>
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<td>---</td>
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Note: Cell entries report coefficients and robust standard errors (in parentheses). *p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01.
Table 6-2. Cox Regression Estimates of State Emergence and Democratization.

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<td>89.10*** (4)</td>
<td>103.92*** (6)</td>
<td>118.04*** (15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>2925</td>
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Note: Cell entries report coefficients and robust standard errors (in parentheses). *p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01
CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION

Project Summary

The established practice of modern IR scholarship is to implicitly censor the pre-state background when examining state behavior. States enter the analytical microscope free of pre-independence historical legacies and experiences, which are in essence deemed irrelevant and inconsequential. If this approach is indeed valid, then all new states should exhibit perfectly similar behavioral patterns immediately after their emergence. This project, then, addresses a simple, albeit to date ignored, empirical puzzle: if that is the case, why do we observe such great variation in the behavior of new states? To put it differently, why do some new states manage to avoid conflict, while others express, or become the recipients of, bellicose intentions?

I traced the answer to the above questions to the conditions immediately preceding the formation of a state. I argued that the process and means of emergence will have a resonating impact on how a new state will behave towards its neighbors during the first stages of its existence. My theory was structured around a logical mechanism that links pre-state with post-independence domestic dynamics, ultimately leading to an explanation of new state demeanor. More specifically, throughout this project I claimed that each of the four state emergence processes (secession, decolonization, liberation, and unification) has an independent and empirically distinguishable effect on the future behavior of new states. My theory was structured around four distinct pillars: the value of territory affected, the introduction of new international boundaries and their subsequent institutionalization efforts, the proximity and spatial clustering of the new states emerging by each process, and the ethnic makeup and identity of the new state as opposed to that of its neighbors or predecessor.
In succinctly discussing the hypothetical causal links, I argued that the division of a psychologically invaluable territory during a secession (i.e. the homeland), combined with the close proximity of the new post-secession states, is expected to positively affect the hazard of territorial claims and, consequently, the likelihood of conflict. Unresolved territorial issues are expected to exacerbate revisionist behaviors and incentivize confrontations. Domestically, partitioned states struggle to create a unifying national identity given their ethnic heterogeneity that is ironically promoted by secession, the process that is supposedly designed to produce ethnically homogenous entities. The ethnic cleavages that triggered self-determination bids are expected to cut deep into the new state’s societal divisions given the presence of diasporas, unsettling attempts to unite the new populace under a single banner. I argued that due to these conditions seceded states will face challenges in promoting democratic institutions and may even find themselves in a precarious and volatile domestic environment that may be conducive to ethnic competition.

Decolonization, on the other hand, posits a different set of structural conditions that affects new state demeanor. Although the value of the territory affected is strategic and economic, thus divisible as opposed to a psychologically invaluable piece of land, decolonized states should experience a greater hazard of territorial claims onset and escalation. The reason lies in the inherited colonial boundaries that were designed to maximize administrative efficiency rather than satisfy ethnic homogenization concerns. As a result, the new boundaries are devoid of any intangible or institutional value rendering them more likely to be contested. The ethnic heterogeneity of the decolonized states - as well as their contemporaneous emergence and tight spatial clustering - also provides them with an incentive to usurp the territorial status quo in an attempt to presumably unite ethnic groups separated by new state borders. Domestically, the
abrupt exit of a colonial ruler that enforces stability and security is expected to be followed by widespread unrest as the different ethnic groups are fighting to consolidate access to political power. As such the likelihood of rapid democratization is severely diminished and with it the chances of internal conflict increase exponentially.

For the two remaining processes of state emergence, liberation and unification, I argued that they should reduce the risk of both intrastate and interstate conflict. Liberation from a temporary military occupation carries persistent memories of past defeats. Thus, satisfied by the acquisition of statehood, a new liberated state is expected to avoid actions that may jeopardize its newly found independence. Similarly, unification can be conceptualized as an internal correction process, after which the new state is expected to externalize and signal its satisfaction with the overall outcome, thus increasing its positive peace interactions. For both types of state emergence process, the minimization of external threat combined with a strong overarching identity, should allow new states to devote their attention and resources to their domestic environments. Free from the need to militarize and respond to aggressive actions, liberated and unified states should experience greater chances of domestic conformity and democratization.

Notwithstanding the above, perhaps the most important determinant of new state behavior concerns the use of violence during the pre-emergence period. Violent state formations should disproportionately influence both the domestic and the international environment. Since the emergence of a new state signifies a de facto territorial change, a violent emergence can be considered a territorial grab by force. Such state formations should bring forth latent irredentism claims, therefore increasing the hazard of both conflict initiation and escalation. Moreover, as the primary means of success, violence and militarism are now acceptable policymaking tools. Leaders of new states are justified in employing violence and threats both internally and towards
neighboring states. Established neighbors are also expected to react aggressively in fear of conflict contagion. In short, pre-independence violence should negatively affect both the interstate and intrastate likelihood of violent competition.

To test these theoretical propositions, I collected new data on territorial transfers and state emergence dating back to 1816. I then employed epidemiological methods of inference to evaluate the temporal dependence of the covariates against the phenomena of interest. Put simply, I was not only interested in the presence of an association between birth legacies and state behavior, I was curious to see whether these effects fluctuated through time. My findings strongly support my claims. Violence, as the means by which a state achieved independence, is the most consistent predictor of new state behavior. States emerging through the use of force are bound to experience interstate disputes and territorial contestations, while domestically they are more likely to maintain undemocratic institutions. The four processes of state formation are also revealed to be influential regarding the future behavior of new states in an empirical verification of the hypothetically expounded behavioral patterns. Most importantly, the impact of processes and means is shown to fluctuate non-monotonically through time, suggesting the presence of a “maturation” effect that has so far eluded our attention. This temporal dependence of birth legacies, along with the confirmation of a wildly heterogeneous international system, bear important ramifications for systemic conflict analyses that I discuss below.

**Implications and Avenues for Future Research**

The first major implication of this work concerns the protosampling tradition followed by scholars of conflict processes. Specifically, I refer to the unquestioned primacy of the construct of political relevance. As I explained in Chapter 4, political relevance allows us to restrict the sample of subject to a bare minimum by assuming that power projection capabilities – and, by extension, physical distance – are the most important determinants of interstate behavior. In
doing so, we exclude states and dyads that we have determined are impossible to fight against each other. Support for political relevance has been widespread and robust, with proximity being identified as the most important correlate, albeit not cause, of war. However, as my findings demonstrate, even within the politically relevant sample, certain subgroups (i.e. new states) account for the vast majority of interstate conflict instances and are exhibiting different behavioral trends than their older peers. In other words, the international system is undeniably multilayered and by promoting certain protosampling restrictions over others undermines the validity of the obtained empirical patterns. My suggestion, then, would be to disaggregate the system of states even further if we really want to identify the primary causes and correlates of war. To that end, I propose developing a new sampling construct similar to the “political relevance” one that separates the population of states in the system on the basis of state age. To the very least, state age should become a permanent statistical control akin to the male/female dichotomy used in almost every study on electoral behavior.

Second, the process of active learning and behavioral adjustment has been so far ignored in this scholarship. Although most recent conflict studies have employed epidemiological methodologies and survival models, few have been concerned with exploring their statistical assumptions or taking advantage of their capabilities insofar as the impact time has on actions and reactions. In my case, I found that new state behavior changes over time and that new states seem to “mature” in how they socialize and react to external or internal stimuli. Although I focused exclusively on conflict, maturation could explain many aspects of state behavior, including trade patterns, regional integration efforts, diplomatic relations, signaling, and the formation of alliances to name just a few. It could also help us understand why we observe certain reputational effects or why states tend to imitate each other’s actions.
Last but not least, if state emergence processes and means are indeed such robust predictors of international and domestic conflict, maybe we should shift our focus towards determining exactly why that is the case by moving our analytical attention even further back in time. In short, I argue in favor of a turn towards prestate conditions and the construction of theoretical bridges between comparative politics and international relations. What is more, since the primary agents of substate change are groups of individuals rather than states themselves as they lack agency, we should pay more scholarly attention to micro-interactions, meaning the interactions between humans and the societies they construe instead of the abstract notions of states we tend to personify.

This project may have achieved its primary goal, namely to investigate why new state behavior is different, but in doing so several pertinent questions emerged that will have to be addressed in the future. To start with, we know little about the factors that lead to the success or failure of state formation struggles or how past failures affect future success. A group that seeks to acquire sovereignty is faced with a choice between one or more strategies and tactics out of a wide spectrum of potential alternatives, some of which are: uprisings, attacks, rebellions, demonstrations, or international mediation/interference requests. Given the variety of choice it would be interesting to see how certain actions are associated with the desired outcome and how the legacies of such actions influence policymaking decisions.

Moreover, success or failure are not only dependent on the selected self-determination strategy or the simple decision to employ violence. The outcome would also seem to be a function of consistency, intensity, and resolve that includes both temporal and spatial considerations. For instance, isolated acts of violence scattered over large periods of time presumably have different effects on success than persistent and coordinated attacks taking place
within well specified temporal windows, ceteris paribus. Similarly, self-determination attempts relying on several contradictory strategies (i.e. both violent and peaceful) will arguably lead to dissimilar outcomes when compared to consistent efforts. Yet, these outcomes should be contingent on the willingness and capability of the oppressing authority to resist or facilitate a change in the status-quo.

Another theoretical puzzle concerns the authoritarian dimensions of domestic conformity and institutional violence in new states. Since the success of a self-determination effort (i.e. the acquisition of statehood) is usually exploited by the new state’s elites, along political, ideological, and economic lines it would be interesting to investigate what are the exact mechanisms through which such intentions are manifested. If the leadership of a new state indeed experiences leeway in determining the shape and form of institutional structures, how exactly does it amass such great political capital? And how are these mechanisms different from more traditional vehicles of political power? While the literature has offered insights on the expression of institutional violence, generally speaking, it has completely ignored the link between the unique circumstances surrounding state emergence and its political ramifications.

Finally, an important missing link in the entire discussion of state creation pertains to our inability to measure territorial value and assess the costs associated with territorial changes. Although we, as a discipline, are aware of the importance and role of territoriality regarding all aspects of human behavior, we still do not possess a reliable theoretical and empirical framework through which we can evaluate propositions about the psychological importance of territory. We know, for instance, that claims over intangibly valuable lands are more likely to result in confrontations than those over territories with tangible value, but we still are unable to precisely define what the distinction between the two is and how to measure the difference in relative
worth. What is more, the literature has yet to develop and test arguments about the size and relative location of territorial claims or the progressive acquisition of psychological attributes. In all, there is still work to be only to complete the picture that concerns new state behavior. My hope is that this work can be just the beginning towards creating a research agenda that will incrementally increase our understanding of war.
LIST OF REFERENCES


BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Ioannis Ziogas holds a MA and a PhD in Political Science from the University of Florida. He previously obtained a BA in International and European Studies from the University of Macedonia, Greece and a MA in International Studies from the University of Sheffield, UK. His research focuses on international conflict and political methodology.