ETHNIC WAR AND PEACE IN POST-SOVIET EURASIA

By

SCOTT GRANT FEINSTEIN

A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA

2016
To my Mom and Dad
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

In the course of completing this monograph I benefited enormously from the generosity of others. To my committee chair, Benjamin B. Smith, I express my sincere appreciation for his encouragement and guidance. Ben not only taught me to systematically research political phenomena, but also the importance of pursuing a complete and parsimonious explanation. Throughout my doctoral studies Ben remained dedicated to me and my research, and with his incredible patience he tolerated and motivated my winding intellectual path. I thank my committee co-chair, Michael Bernhard, for his hours spent reading early manuscript drafts, support in pursuing a multi-country project, and detailed attention to clear writing. Michael’s appreciation of my dissertation vision and capacity gave this research project its legs. Ben and Michael provided me exceptionally valuable advice. I am also indebted to the help provided by my other committee members – Conor O’Dwyer, Ingrid Kleespies and Beth Rosenson – who inspired creativity and scientific rigor, always provided thoughtful and useful comments, and kept me searching for the big picture.

Among institutions, I wish to gratefully acknowledge the support of the Center of European Studies at the University of Florida, IIE Fulbright Foundation, the American Council of Learned Societies, the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, IREX, the American Councils, and the Department of Political Science at the University of Florida. The research and writing of this monograph has been accomplished due to their financial assistance and support.

I have learned from more scholars than I can name here, without which this monograph would have taken much longer. In particular, I wish to express my gratitude to Bryon Moraski, Amy Kreppel, Shinasi Rhama, Stephen Holmes, Russell Hardin, John
Flaspohler, Galina Wladyka, and Lawrence Dodd. Each of these people positively shaped this project in ways too numerous to enumerate. I wish to also thank my colleagues - Keith Weghorst, Christopher Manick, Ruchan Kaya, Kyle Marquardte, Jenny Boylan, and Bruno Broll-Barone. Among many things, these dear friends provided hours of wonderful and useful conversation.

While conducting field research, several scholars, archivists, and librarians facilitated my access to primary source materials. They include Professor Veronica Neagu of the Institute of International Relations in Moldova, Professor Olga Karmazina of Tavrida National University, and Professor Ruslan Tsiunchuk from Kazan State University. I would also like to thank the librarians at the Franco National Library of Ukraine, the Tatar National Library, the National Library of Moldova, the Moldovan Transnistrian Republic Library, the Library of the Autonomous Gagauzia, Kazan State University Library, the Tatarstan national Republic Library, and the Russian State Library in Moscow. I wish to also thank Maia Morari for her tireless devotion to my Romanian language studies and sincere compassion, as well as the Morari family and Saratenii Vechi for giving me friendship and a home for so many years.

Finally, I wish to express my deepest gratitude to my friends and family for their unwavering encouragement and support. I dedicate this dissertation to my mother who taught me the value of hard work and to my father who taught me the importance of detailed reasoning. Together they raised me to serve honestly. I thank my sister Jennifer for her passionate politics and quick logic, my sister Rachel for her unending insight and hours on the phone discussing this project and its struggles, and my brother James for his global perspective and penetrating questions. To my daughter Alexandra,
you inspire me with your power and curiosity. Și cel mai mult, I thank Cristina Poleacovschi, my life partner, for her courage and generosity, her demand for clarity and poetry. Through her love and empathy I find joy.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF TABLES</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF FIGURES</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 INTRODUCTION</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perspectives on Secessionist Violence in the Former Soviet Union</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychological Explanations</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External Actors</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional Explanations</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elite Mobilization</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modernization Explanations</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motivations and Capacity</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theory</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research Design</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Approach, Sources of Data, and Goals</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structural and Narrative Method</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outline of Chapters</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 IDENTITY COHERENCE AND HYPOTHESES OF SECESSION</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part I. Conceptualizing Group Politics</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part II. Forming Group Coherence</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modernity and Group Formation</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identity Building: Intellectuals and Diffusion</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hardening and Transforming Identities</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encounters with other groups</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political opportunities</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group innovation</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary: Intellectuals, Dispersion, and Hardening</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resources and Building Coherence</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part III. The Power of Coherent Groups: State Stability and Group Mobilization</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theories of Group Mobilization</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group Coherence and Group Mobilization</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part IV: Pre-Communist Groups, the Soviet Experience, and the Rise of a Post-Communist National Political Order</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-Communist Groups and Soviet Ethno-Federal State Formation</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet communism and nation building</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Pre-communist groups and future group coherence ........................................ 101
Pre-communist groups and future group incoherence ................................ 108
Section summary .......................................................................................... 109
Rise of National Politics ............................................................................... 115
National State Stability ................................................................................ 122
Part V: Hypotheses ....................................................................................... 125

3 STRUCTURAL ORIGINS OF PRE-COMMUNIST GROUP COHERENCE .......... 131

Pre-Communist Coherence .......................................................................... 134
Russians ........................................................................................................ 135
The Stirrings of a Nation: Early Russian History .......................................... 135
State Penetration: Industrialization and Modernization ............................... 139
State centralized education: military conscription, primary schooling, and printed texts ................................................................. 140
Infrastructure: railways, factories, and urbanization .................................... 147
Encounters and hardening a Russian identity through Russification .......... 149
Summary ..................................................................................................... 159
Moldovans .................................................................................................... 160
Limited State Centralized Education: Military Conscription, Primary Schooling, and Printed Texts .......................................................... 161
Limited Infrastructure: Rail and Cities ......................................................... 163
Limited Opportunities in Bessarabia ............................................................. 167
Summary ..................................................................................................... 169
Ukrainians ..................................................................................................... 170
Hardening the Ukrainian Identity after the First World War .................... 177
Summary ..................................................................................................... 179
Additional Groups ....................................................................................... 180
The Crimean Tatars ...................................................................................... 180
The Gagauz .................................................................................................. 182
Tatars along the Volga .................................................................................. 184
Summary ..................................................................................................... 185
Chapter Summary ....................................................................................... 185

4 PRE-COMMUNIST GROUP MOBILIZATION AND SHAPING THE SOVIET EXPERIENCE .................................................................................................. 191

Explanations of National Movements ......................................................... 192
Theorizing the Pre-Communist Origins of Post-Communist National Movements 195
Mobilized Groups and Communism: an Overview of Factors related to Building Coherence and a Soviet Ethno-National Policy ........................................... 197
Mobilized National Groups and Ethno-Federal Design ............................... 197
Soviet Features of Nation Building .............................................................. 202
Pre-communist groups and coherence ......................................................... 202
Pre-communist groups and incoherence ...................................................... 203
The paradox of ethnocide and ethnic deportation ....................................... 204
Summary ..................................................................................................... 205
Cases: Moldova, Ukraine, Russia .......................................................... 207
Moldova .............................................................................................. 207
Moldovans and Communism: a Romanian Intellectual cohort and a Russian promoted Moldovan mass identity .................................................. 209
Gagauz and Communism: Soviet neglect and a dispersed intellectual community .................................................................................. 226
Ukraine ................................................................................................ 228
Ukrainians in Ukraine ........................................................................... 229
The Crimean Tatars: Exile and Increased Coherence ....................... 235
Russia .................................................................................................. 238
Russians: The Collapse of Empire and Construction of Communism .... 239
Tatars .................................................................................................... 242
Chapter Summary .............................................................................. 244

5 POST-SOVIET SECESSION AND STABILITY .................................. 247

The 1980s and Early 1990s: Increased Political Organization, Developing National Unity, and Independence ........................................ 250
Mid-1980s: Increased Opportunities and Political Organization ....... 250
Late 1980s: Developing National Unity across Organizations .......... 255
Early 1990s: Nationalism and Independence ..................................... 262
Post-Independence: The National Order, Elite Consensus, Minority Mobilization, Coherence, and Stability and Violence in the 1990s .... 266
Ukraine and Support for Hypothesis 1: Ukrainians-Crimean Tatars and Ukrainians-Russians in Crimea ....................................................... 271
Ukrainian Elite Consensus ................................................................. 273
Post-Independence Secessionists ....................................................... 275
Minority mobilization ........................................................................ 276
Coherence and managing conflict .................................................... 278
Russia and Hypothesis 2 and 3: Russians-Tatars along the Volga River and Russians-Chechens .............................................................. 293
A Divided Russian Elite .................................................................... 296
Post-Independence Secessionists ....................................................... 300
Minority mobilization ........................................................................ 300
Managing conflict and generating violence ..................................... 303
Moldova and Hypothesis 4 and 5: Moldovan-Russians in Transnistria and Moldovan-Gagauz ................................................................. 311
Incoherence and a Divided Moldovan Elite ....................................... 314
Elite Divisions .................................................................................... 325
Post-Independence Secessionists ....................................................... 329
Minority mobilization ........................................................................ 329
Incoherence and ethnic violence ...................................................... 331
Chapter Summary: Ukraine, Russia, and Moldova .......................... 337

6 FUZZY SET QUALITATIVE COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS .................. 341

Finding a New Approach to Examining Secessionist Civil War ......... 342
## CONCLUSION

Why did Post-Soviet Ethnic Group Coherence Vary Across Groups? .................. 375
Explaining Soviet Imperial Modernization’s Influence on Group Coherence ........ 379
Summary ........................................................................................................... 386

### APPENDIX

#### A THE DATA: FUZZY SETS .............................................................................. 391

Concentrated Territory .................................................................................... 391
  Majority in a Regional Base ((Fearon and Laitin 2000; Duffy Toft 2003). 391
  A Territorially Concentrated Group ................................................................. 392
Regional Base .................................................................................................... 392
  Urbanized Minority Group ............................................................................. 392
Indivisible Territory ........................................................................................ 393
  Indivisible Territory ....................................................................................... 393
  Tradition of Habitation .................................................................................. 393
Resources ........................................................................................................ 394
  Nationalized (political and cultural borders become congruent) .................. 394
  Formal Administrative Autonomy ................................................................ 394
  Nationalized .................................................................................................. 394
Resource Rich Territory ................................................................................... 395
  Contiguous Homeland .................................................................................. 395
  ‘Recruitable’ Population ............................................................................... 396
Advantaged initial state conditions ................................................................. 396
Weak State Capacity ....................................................................................... 397
Grievances ........................................................................................................ 397
  Highly Declined in Political Status ............................................................... 397
  Highly Politically Discriminated Groups .................................................... 398
  Highly Economically Discriminated Groups ............................................ 398
  Highly Declined in Economic Status ........................................................ 398
Economically Beneficial to Secede/High Status region in a low status country ........................................................................................................... 399
Security Dilemma ................................................................................................................. 399
Modernization Effects ........................................................................................................ 399
Pre-Communist Literate Majority ....................................................................................... 399
Unequal Development ........................................................................................................ 400
International Factors ......................................................................................................... 400
Country’s Desire for Close Ties with Europe ................................................................. 400
Russian Economic Dependence ......................................................................................... 401
Language Different from the Center .................................................................................. 401
Majority Group Elite consensus ......................................................................................... 401
Coherence ............................................................................................................................ 402
Coherent Majority Group ................................................................................................. 402
Coherent Minority Group ................................................................................................. 402
Theory of Group Coherence and Secessionist Civil War .............................................. 402
Theory of Group Coherence and Chaotic Violence ......................................................... 403
Theory of Group Coherence and Stability ........................................................................ 403

B  TRUTH TABLE ANALYSES ............................................................................................................. 404

C  FULL TRUTH TABLE......................................................................................................................... 419

LIST OF REFERENCES ............................................................................................................. 428

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH .......................................................................................................... 453
LIST OF TABLES

Table | Description                                                                 | Page
---|---|---
1-1 | Motivation predictions for secession.                                       | 59
1-2 | Capacity predictions for secession.                                         | 60
1-3 | Tripartite method of analysis.                                               | 61
3-1 | Summarized claims of structural forces that facilitated group formation.     | 187
3-2 | Population of eleven cities in European Russia, 1800-1910.                   | 188
3-3 | Largest town populations in Moldova, 19th century                           | 189
5-1 | Regression of a country's average 1990s military spending.                   | 338
6-1 | Mathematical translations of verbal labels.                                  | 362
6-2 | List of necessary but not sufficient conditions for early secessionist civil war. | 363
6-3 | List of necessary and sufficient conditions for early secessionist civil war. | 364
6-4 | Fuzzy truth table analysis for chaotic violence, theory of group coherence, regional base. | 365
6-5 | Necessary and sufficient causal conditions for stability.                    | 366
6-6 | Theory of group coherence and stability outcome.                             | 368
7-1 | Early post-soviet violent secession, stability, and chaotic violence: majority group coherence and intra-group elite consensus, minority group coherence, territorial concentration. | 390
B-1 | Identifying initial necessary conditions for early post-communist secessionist civil war, chaotic violence, and stability. | 404
B-2 | Truth table analysis for secessionist civil war: relative deprivation theory and institutional autonomy. | 407
B-3 | Fuzzy truth table analysis of initial necessary conditions for secessionist civil war. | 408
B-4 | Truth table analysis for secessionist civil war: state strength, recruitable population, and resources. | 409
B-5 | Truth table analysis for secessionist civil war: indivisible territory theory, institutional (segment states thesis) theory, security dilemma. | 410
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Analysis Title</th>
<th>References</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B-6</td>
<td>Truth table analysis for secessionist civil war: indivisible territory theory</td>
<td>410</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-7</td>
<td>Truth table analysis for secessionist civil war: theory of European integration desires, security dilemma, institutions, coherence</td>
<td>411</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-8</td>
<td>Truth table analysis for secessionist civil war: theory of group coherence, security dilemma and concentrated territory</td>
<td>411</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-9</td>
<td>Truth table analysis for secessionist civil war: theory of group coherence, institutional autonomy, security dilemma, concentrated territory</td>
<td>412</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-10</td>
<td>Truth table analysis for secessionist civil war: coherence and elite theory, security dilemma, concentrated territory</td>
<td>412</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-11</td>
<td>Truth table analysis secessionist civil war: security dilemma, ties with Europe, tradition of habitation, administrative autonomy, language differentiation</td>
<td>413</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-12</td>
<td>Truth table analysis for security dilemma: group coherence and concentrated territory</td>
<td>413</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-13</td>
<td>Fuzzy truth table analysis for chaotic violence: indivisible territory, coherence, European Union desires, language differentiation, economic dependence on Russia</td>
<td>414</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-14</td>
<td>Fuzzy truth table analysis for chaotic violence: theory of group coherence, regional base</td>
<td>414</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-15</td>
<td>Truth table analysis for stability: initial necessary sets</td>
<td>415</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-16</td>
<td>Truth table analysis for stability: theory of group coherence</td>
<td>416</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-17</td>
<td>Truth table analysis for stability: absence of grievances, economically advantaged territory</td>
<td>416</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-18</td>
<td>Truth table analysis for stability: absence of grievances, absence of security dilemma</td>
<td>417</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-19</td>
<td>Truth table analysis for stability: absence of security dilemma</td>
<td>417</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-20</td>
<td>Truth table analysis for stability: theory of group coherence</td>
<td>418</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-21</td>
<td>Truth table analysis for absence of security dilemma outcome, theory of group coherence</td>
<td>418</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-1</td>
<td>Fully specified truth table for forty-one cases</td>
<td>419</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# LIST OF FIGURES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-1</td>
<td>Following state collapse, flow chart for early post-communist secessionist civil war, stability, and chaotic violence</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-1</td>
<td>Group Coherence</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-2</td>
<td>Following state collapse and high minority group territorial concentration levels, the power relationships of post-communist secessionist civil war, stability, and chaotic violence</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-1</td>
<td>Majority group coherence levels and intra-majority-group elite consensus levels: shaping group organizational capacity and national unity.</td>
<td>339</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-2</td>
<td>Military and public health expenditures as a percentage of gross domestic product.</td>
<td>340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-1</td>
<td>Outcome Secessionist Civil War: Decline in economic status and Relative Deprivation</td>
<td>370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-2</td>
<td>Outcome Secessionist Civil War with causal combinations: Coherent Minority; Incoherent Majority and Coherent Minority; Incoherent Majority, Coherent Minority and Territorial Concentrated (RB); Fully Specified Theory of Group Coherence, Territorial Concentration (RB), and Intra-Group Elite Consensus (EC)</td>
<td>371</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-3</td>
<td>Outcome Chaotic Violence: Group Coherence Theory and Concentrated Territory Theory (RB)</td>
<td>372</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-4</td>
<td>Outcome Stability: Group Coherence Theory, Concentrated Territory Theory (RB), Intra-Group Elite Consensus (EC) Causal Combo</td>
<td>373</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Abstract of Dissertation Presented to the Graduate School of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

ETHNIC WAR AND PEACE IN POST-SOVIET EURASIA

By
Scott Grant Feinstein

May 2016

Chair: Benjamin B. Smith
Cochair: Michael Bernhard
Major: Political Science

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, ethnic minorities in ten countries called for secession, but only five resorted to civil war in pursuit of separatist goals. While scholars allude to necessary factors for secession and unique ways groups may calculate the advantages of loyalty or exit, these approaches fail to completely explain how rebellious ethnic minorities formed, why they coordinated and collectively acted, and why only some seceded. To fully answer this question, this dissertation demonstrates the key role of group formation in shaping the Soviet Union’s ethno-federal institutions and post-Soviet conflict.

To explore the political foundations of secession I utilize a two-tiered analytic framework that assesses the utility of twenty-one existing secessionist theories through a fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis of necessary and sufficient conditions for secessionist violence on the full sample of Soviet successor states and comparative historical analysis of three countries (Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine). I argue that the variations in emergent group coherence helped shape the state’s and groups’ organizational capacities, which largely determined whether each new country would stabilize with or without secessionist violence.
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Numbers, weapons, and strategy all count in war, but major deficiencies in any one of those may still be counter balanced by superior coherence and discipline.

–Samuel Huntington
Political Order in Changing Societies

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, ethnic minorities in ten countries called for secession, but only five resorted to civil war in pursuit of separatist goals (Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia, Nagornyi-Karabakh in Azerbaijan, Transdnistria in Moldova, and Chechnya in Russia). Why did some Soviet successor states experience secessionist civil wars following independence in 1991 while others experienced minimal resistance? Scholars of post-Soviet secession attempt to answer the question by focusing on institutional factors (Bunce 1999; Laitin 2001; Toft 2005; Roeder 2007; Zürcher 2007; Hale 2008), psychological explanations (Kaufmann 1996; 1998; Hale 2008), external actors (Brubaker 1996; Fearon 1998; Laitin 2001; Beissinger 2002), elite theories (Zürcher 2007), and modernization theory (Suny 1993, 1994). While they allude to necessary factors for secession and unique ways groups may calculate the advantages of loyalty or exit, these approaches fail to fully explain how rebellious ethnic minorities formed, why they coordinated and collectively acted, and why only some seceded. This dissertation seeks to understand the formation of ethnic group solidarity and salience and a group’s influence on communist ethnic policies and early post-soviet conflicts. I argue that the development of group coherence, along with intra-group elite consensus and territorial concentration, helped shape the state’s and opposition’s organizational capacities and ability to end intra-group struggle, which largely
determined whether each new country would stabilize with or without secessionist violence.

I illustrate how the configuration of majority and minority groups in successor states led to different capacities and opportunities to maintain or contest the state. States controlled by ethnic groups with coherent identities and intra-group elite consensus ended their internal struggles and effectively coped with early secessionists, but when a state was controlled by a weak ethnic group – incoherent group or a coherent group without intra-group elite consensus – internal struggles persisted and a country’s stability became dependent upon the opposition’s coherence and territorial concentration. A territorially dispersed secessionist opposition (coherent or not) struggled to mobilize and all states were able to end these conflicts without violence, but territorially concentrated coherent oppositions that contested a weak group managing the state, could not be contained and the country experienced secessionist civil war. In the case of two relatively incoherent groups, such as the Uzbeks in Tajikistan, the opposition failed to develop a powerful secessionist direction, the state struggled to restore order, and chaotic violence resulted. However, states controlled by coherent groups without intra-group elite consensus easily had enough state resources to effectively compromise or repress, without physical violence, a territorially concentrated incoherent opposition, resulting in early post-Soviet stability. In other words, territorial concentration, intra-group elite consensus, and the relative coherence of groups largely determines their initial capacity for secession and a state’s ability to manage or avoid, through compromise or repression, violent secessionist conflicts.¹

¹Throughout the dissertation I use the terms ‘majority’ and ‘those controlling the state’ interchangeably and ‘minority’ and ‘those in the opposition’ interchangeably, because in all post-Soviet cases, aside from
I examine this theory and discuss early secession from successor states through five procedures. First, I critically discuss the extant research on separatist violence. While many scholars focus on institutional explanations or individual agency, they ignore the group politics of separatism (i.e. how groups come to conceive of themselves, creating qualitatively different entities that may be mobilized more or less well for impeding secession (for those dominating the state) or contesting territorial authority (for those attempting to secede)), and the power relationship between the state and opposition that generates compromise, repression, and the opportunities and motivations for secession.

Second, this dissertation not only explains why group politics and the power relationships between the state and opposition became important to post-Soviet secession and stability, but also why group politics and power relationships varied across the Soviet Union. Essential elements of this story are the collapse of the Russian Empire and Soviet system, which increased the opportunities for nations and national elites to contest the state through capture, secession, or rights demands. The pre-communist group formation and intra-group elite consensus that helped build Soviet ethno-federalism, which defined many ethnic cleavages and continued to shape and vary future levels of group coherence. The role modernity, group intellectuals and the dispersion of ideas as well as encounters groups have with others that helped define and harden mass identities. International agenda setters, like the European Union, and material resources that often polarized or influenced intra-group elite consensus in the newly independent states, which determined whether group elites would use the same

Kazakhstan and Armenia, ethnic majority groups controlled the state and minority groups composed the secessionist oppositions.
symbols to mobilize their groups for different and potentially non-cooperative purposes (leading those without consensus to often tolerate or sponsor violence and those with consensus having fewer motives and opportunities to utilize or tolerate violence to solve ethnic conflict). Settlement patterns that created highly populated minority territories that helped secessionist groups access local resources and increase their potential to claim the territory as a homeland and sovereignty. And group coherence levels that decreased potential lines of internal group conflict, facilitating cooperation, an end to intra-group struggles, helping groups through increased organization impose state control over violent entrepreneurs and secessionists (in the case of the majority) or contest state authority (in the case of minority groups).

Third, to test the theory of coherence and trace causal mechanisms, I conducted a structured comparison of five ethnic-group-pairings within the former Soviet Union that present wide variation on these outcomes in the 1990s: Slavs-Moldovans (secession), Gagauz-Moldovans (chaotic violence), Russians-Ukrainians (autonomous republic), Crimean Tatars-Ukrainians/Russians (limited autonomy), and Tatars-Russians (constitutional autonomy). All cases experienced at least one secessionist movement, but only one seceded.

The comparison benefits from both structural and cultural analysis. This paragraph highlights the objectives of each, and the Research Design section elaborates on the process and method. The structural analysis uses process tracing to illustrate the formation of group coherence and defines baseline group coherence levels prior to communism and in 1985. I find that when group formation preceded imperial
modernization the group was coherent prior to communist collapse. Additionally, the structural comparison highlights the role of group coherence over time illustrating how it helped end internal group struggle and factors, such as European Union conditionality and material resources, that led to intra-group elite consensus. The cultural analysis achieves three objectives. First, the analysis determines what particular symbols, artifacts, values, and assumptions constituted coherence within and across cases. Second, it examines whether variance in these features was related to similar historical conditions. Third, the cultural analysis traced patterns and built case studies to develop historically contextualized descriptions of group coherence and assessed coherence’s relationship to stability and movement. Through these goals the analysis illustrated the political discourse and movement cultures that helped shape the groups and their actions.

Fourth, to demonstrate the theory’s generalizability I assessed the role of coherence across forty-one post-Soviet cases through a fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis (a comparative approach that uses set theory to specify necessary and sufficient conditions for certain outcomes). The analysis helps demonstrate the theory’s explanatory power and agreement with Hypotheses 1 through 5, and the analysis also helps investigate whether the theory is generalizable across a narrow context.

Finally, the project contributes to the separatist literature by identifying the resources and communal relationships necessary for secession. Where previous

---

2 In addition to tracing historically contingent opportunities for intellectuals to disperse a mass identity and encounters groups had with ‘others’ including the state that helped harden an identity (and how imperial modernization limited these opportunities and encounters for groups without a prior formed identity), I discuss how post-imperial modernization group formation lent itself to coherent groups when accompanied by exclusive, mass ethnic repression.
studies portray interests in material resources as determinate of mobilization, this project identifies the political foundations of group coherence and theorizes its connection to resources.

In the following section I provide a brief history of the violence that erupted after the collapse of Soviet power and situate the events within the extant literature on separatism. Next I provide definitions for several terms used throughout the dissertation. I then summarize my theory of ethnic power relationships and the historical and relational underpinnings that led to early post-communist violence. (In Chapter 2 I discuss in detail the factors that hardened various coherence levels and how they shaped organizational capacity and secession in the 1990s across the former Soviet Union Republics.) Subsequently, I describe the case selection and multi-method analysis used to examine the theory. I conclude by presenting a brief outline of future chapters.

**Perspectives on Secessionist Violence in the Former Soviet Union**

The Soviet Union utilized a variety of methods to organize ethnic groups, but during and after the collapse of central state control in the 1980s and 1990s there was substantial variation in how minority groups responded. In several countries (Moldova, Georgia, Russia, and Azerbaijan) minority movements violently seceded, and the country experienced secessionist civil war. Other groups sought secession but settled for concessions (Tatars in Tatarstan, Russia and Russians in Crimea, Ukraine). While some countries did not experience secessionist mobilization, they experienced local ethnic violence (Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan). Others who were exiled returned to their homeland, some rebelled (Chechens) and others cultivated an indigenous-like status
(Tatars in Crimea). The remaining eight republics experienced the 1990s without violence or minority upheaval. Why did these areas experience such divergent outcomes after the fall of the Soviet bloc?

In this section I discuss several prominent individual works that may be used or directly attempt to explain post-Soviet secession: Horowitz’s (1985) psychological theory, Brubaker’s (1996) and Laitin’s (2001) triadic theory, Beissinger’s (2002) theory of transnational learning, Hale’s (2008) ethno-federalism theory, Bunce’s (1999) theories of institutional design, Roeder’s (2007) segment states theory, Zürcher’s (2007) elite theory, Suny’s (1993; 1994) extension of modernization theory, and the full range of capacity and motivation theories. I demonstrate how each provides insight into understanding secession and their limitations regarding the internal group structures necessary to act collectively.

**Psychological Explanations**

A number of psychological theories focus on individual attachments to groups or territory (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Peterson 2002; Kaufman 1996; Cornel 2002; Horowitz 1985). Individuals feel compelled to divide themselves into groups, act cooperatively with the group, and compete with non-group members. Furthermore, as they associate with group symbols they are more likely motivated to defend them. In particular, Donald Horowitz’s (1985) psychological theory has been used to understand secession in the former fifteen republics (for examples see: Emizet and Hesli 1995; Laitin 2001; Hechter and Okamoto 2001; Murinson 2004, Hagendoorn et al. 2013).
Horowitz asserts that a group’s status and the status of the region will determine the likelihood and timing of secessionist movements (Horowitz 1985, 257-9). Status is viewed in terms of group status in symbolic narratives as well as economic power. A country’s inhabitants define a high status group with particular symbolic positive attributes, such as intelligent and hardworking. A low status group is often negatively characterized by members of higher status groups, and may labeled as stupid or lazy, regardless of intelligence and work ethic. Group behavior is then based on a calculus of anxiety and economic costs. A high status group in a high status region is unlikely to secede (late and rare) and will only do so if the costs are low. A low status group in a high status region is also unlikely to secede (early and rare) because they typically compose only a small portion of the advanced region. A high status group in a low status economic region is only slightly more likely to secede (late and somewhat frequently) than the previous two because the group will easily benefit if they send their labor to other parts of the country and remain loyal. However, a low status group in a low status region will have little reason to remain in the state. Despite the economic costs the group will cope with anxiety primarily through secession, early and often. While Horowitz’s theory demonstrates the importance of status and economic costs, it does not address the organizational capacity of groups and their ability to overcome collective action problems. In other words, while groups may evaluate their economic costs and anxieties, it does not mean they can sufficiently organize to secede.

3 When there is a structural “downgraded” change (i.e. when the group on top goes to the political or economic bottom) conflict is more likely to result (Horowitz 1985; Olzak 1992). This is the case for Russians and other Russophones across many former Soviet Union Republics. However, Slavic or Russian secession only happened in a few cases.
Consequently, Horowitz’s theory struggles to explain four prominent cases of post-Soviet secession and stability. The first case is the attempted secession of Transnistria from Moldova. Russians were the region’s high status group and led a secessionist movement. Being primarily urban, Russians had access to the material resources and education the vibrant cities provided, and Transnistria’s heavy industry made it a valuable region. Thus, the Russians were a high status group in a high status region. Horowitz’s theory would predict a rare and late likelihood of secession for Russians in Moldova as the costs of secession would be too high. However, in contravention of Horowitz’s theory, Transnistria engaged in separatist war soon after Moldovan independence.

The second case also conflicts with Horowitz’s theory of status and secession. Located in southern Moldova, the Gagauz were a high status group in a low status region. In the Horowitzian model, the group’s high status and rural region, Gagauzia, should have prompted the group to seek territorial control through late and frequent

---

4 Laitin (2001) similarly tests Horowitz’s theory, but does not provide support for his classification of groups and regions. Here I provide supportive evidence for the status claims and illustrate the Horowitzian model’s challenges.

5 While David Laitin (2001) identifies the Gagauz as low status, he does not provide evidence or justification for the classification. Conversely, I argue that the Gagauz should be considered a high status group because their majority claims Russian as their first language. In Moldova, issues of status are typically divided upon linguistic lines, and then upon ethno-linguistic or ethnic lines. Two languages primarily divide this status: Russian and Romanian. Those who speak Russian are highly regarded and those that speak the Romanian language are often treated with negative prejudices. Many Romanian speakers struggle to find employment compared to their Russian speaking counterparts. For example, the best orator in both languages will typically win national elections even though the Moldovans make up the vast majority of the population. Consequently, as Russian speakers the Gagauz have a higher status than Romanian speakers.
secession. However, the Gagauz attempted secession early but did not gain independence.\textsuperscript{6}

The third case examines the Russians in Estonia.\textsuperscript{7} According to Horowitz’s model, the low status Russians in the low status north-east of Estonia, which is relatively rural and underdeveloped, have nothing to gain by staying in Estonia. Accordingly, they should seek secession early and frequently. Nevertheless, the Russians in Estonia did not secede, contradicting Horowitz’s theory again.

Finally, Armenians in Azerbaijan were a high status group in a low status region. Whereas the Soviets suppressed all religions, Christians still received preferential treatment to Muslims. When the USSR collapsed the Christians were accorded greater status, and Muslims continued to be subject to negative discrimination. This holds true in Azerbaijan where the titular nationality was primarily Muslim and held a lower status than Armenians. Thus, Armenians in Nagorny-Karabakh are a high status group in an underdeveloped, low status region. Horowitz’s theory predicts late and frequent secession, but the region seceded early. Once more, Horowitz’s theory is not borne out by the evidence. Following state collapse in former Soviet Union republics, something more than comparison and competition is influencing group actions.

\textsuperscript{6} Members of the Gagauz did declare independence from Moldova, but through compromise the Moldovan state and the Gagauz did not erupt into violent secession. Rather, the two sides settled for relative autonomy within Moldova.

\textsuperscript{7} Russians typically had a high level of status throughout the former republics, but in Estonia the Russians lived alongside urban Estonians. Estonian city dwellers are educated and many hold high skill jobs. Whether the Estonians had a higher status compared to the Russians prior to 1990 is irrelevant to Horowitz’s theory. After independence the Estonians controlled the economy and the political apparatus, elevating them to a higher status level.
External Actors

The inability of Horowitz’s theory to fully explain secessionist behavior in former Soviet countries led to the study of international influences (Brubaker 1996; Laitin 2001; Beissinger 2002). Additionally, many scholars (Noutcheva et al. 2004; Vachudova 2005; Way 2008, 60; Kelley 2006) explore the role of the European Union (EU) in dictating majority and minority relationships after the collapse. However, the former theories only tacitly discuss group capacity differences and provide minimal variation of explanatory variables, and Judith Kelley (2006) illustrates the EU’s minimal role in affecting early secession.

Brubaker’s (1996) triadic configuration theory explains that a minority opposition group will choose separatist violence if their external homeland state credibly commits to cover the costs. The theory takes into account three important actors (i.e. the domestic minority, the homeland, and the majority) and addresses where legitimacy arises for movements, but it relies heavily on international elements and pays less attention to organizational capacity and why domestic tensions formed along ethnic lines.

For instance, Laitin argues that Moscow’s lack of control over the 14th army in Transnistria was a signal to the population that the army would fight on behalf of the Transnistrrians. He asserts that Moscow gave autonomy to the local military so it could support local secessionists. However, Laitin’s evidence highlights two problems with the triadic argument. First, his narrative does not include the signaling of protection by the Russian homeland, which is central to triadic configuration theory. Rather, the lack of Moscow’s control over the military likely signaled Russia’s neglect of the Transnistrian-Moldovan situation. Second, and more importantly, regardless of whether the Russian
homeland signaled a credible commitment by deliberately neglecting, or even utilizing, the 14th army in Transnistria, the question remains, why were Transnistrian authorities able to gain control over it, while Russophones were not able to organize control over the Russian military in Estonia or Ukraine? International influences, security alliances, and military units are resources that may help coordinate and affect the potential trajectories of a group, but they do not clearly determine why some groups may use them better than others or why a group is motivated to secede. The theory assumes that if a group can secede it will. However, as the example demonstrates, the presence of resources sufficient to secede is often available but not all groups do so.

Mark Beissinger (2002) utilizes trans-national learning to effectively explain initial Soviet secession, but his argument runs into analytical and methodological problems when it is extended to explain secession from Soviet successor states. Beissinger (2002) argues that the structural arrangements of pre-Soviet national identity in Baltic countries helped catapult the devolution of the USSR. While particular events (e.g. protests in Tallinn, glasnost, perestroika, demonstrations in Moscow) influenced the structure and eventual direction of the Baltic movements, strong Baltic national identities saw the Soviet Union as an occupation regime and this made it easier for the Baltics to organize secessionist movements. In a tide of nationalism the events in the region brought legitimacy and a newly imagined capacity to groups throughout the Soviet

While Beissinger (2002) addresses the collapse of an empire, I explore his theory of transnational learning in an international context. The following paragraphs discuss whether the theory effectively explains continued secession after the emergence of fifteen new states, or whether the theory is only applicable within a single state and applicable to the collapse of empire. Because transnational learning is at the heart of Beissinger’s theory, it makes sense to explore its application in multiple context, including across international borders. Even when independent countries separate nations, learning across nations may still be possible and relevant for future mobilization. For detailed research on transnational learning across international borders see Beissinger’s (2007) and Wilson’s (2007) study of Eastern Europe’s ‘colored revolutions’.
Union. In sum, he argues that structurally coherent groups influenced the national revival of others and the eventual secession of fifteen republics. Throughout the book Beissinger lucidly illustrates the mechanics that spread legitimacy and learned actions from one group to the next and cogently explains how the fifteen republics became states. Nevertheless, the book struggles to explain why the Union became fifteen states and not more or less, and its theory also struggles to adequately extend to explain variation in secession from these successor states.

First, while he succinctly traces how legitimacy was transmitted from uprising to uprising, these individual events are potentially less relevant to secession from successor states. The collapse and independence of fifteen states generated a new playing field distinctly different than what brought the collapse of the Soviet Union; it created an event large enough to mobilize all minority groups. Thus, how groups continued to learn mobilization strategies and imagine potential group achievements, was often overshadowed by the collapse of the Soviet Union. The emergence of fifteen new republics created a powerful symbol for all groups to imagine mobilization and sovereignty, which puts into doubt the deterministic effect of transnational learning of secession from successor states in the 1990s.

To account for the fact that every group was exposed to the tide of nationalism, either by the collapse of the USSR or learning from local uprisings, Beissinger argues that the structural conditions favorable for secession can be subverted by institutional constraints and prevent secession (2002, 233). “In the Soviet case certain features of target groups – their level within the ethnofederal hierarchy, their size, their patterns of linguistic usage, their degree of urbanization – facilitated the making of such linkages
[‘forge connections between actors of mobilization across time and space’] (2002, 450), either allowing groups to take advantage of the tide and mobilize or preventing them from doing so (2002, 450-451). However, the structural factors alone do not sufficiently explain post-collapse movements. For example, they incorrectly predict that Volga Tatars would secede and that Chechens and Gagauz would not mobilize (2002, 243-246). Beissinger offers a reasonable ad hoc account for each, but each account does not generalize to other cases. For instance, he asserts that despite substantial structural constraints to Chechen mobilization, Stalinist deportations helped the group overcome these constraints. However, this does not account for Crimean Tatars who were also deported but did not violently secede nor does it describe why the Gagauz would mobilize despite their substantial constraints and avoidance of Stalinist deportation. The structural constraints and ad hoc variables leave the reader wondering if a more general explanation may describe these cases.

Second, Beissinger’s (2002) empirical regressions do not control for his other explanatory variables. For example, when analyzing structural factors Beissinger focuses on “population size, ethnofederal status, urbanization, linguistic assimilation, prior state independence, and previous levels of nationalist conflict with the state” (2002, 269) but does not include his primary variables (i.e. institutional constraints and the tide of nationalism). If he believes that institutional constraints affect the structure, the regression analyses (e.g. Beissinger 2002, see page 244 and 213) should include these variables. Without their inclusion it becomes difficult to empirically support through regression that the variation in structural forces played a determinant role in secession.⁹

⁹ Beissinger’s (2002) theory is perhaps more applicable within each successor state, but I explored it here to investigate whether it offers insight into international transnational learning.
EU effects are also often attributed to stability and coping with minority issues (Noutcheva et al. 2004; Vachudova 2005; Way 2008, 60), but as Judith Kelley (2006) illustrates, prior to conditionality EU agenda setting had little influence on the Baltics.\(^\text{10}\) Similarly, prior to conditionality, Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians had successfully coped with secessionists.

Nevertheless, EU conditionality likely influenced the means of settling group conflict and oriented intra-group elite consensus. As I argue in Chapter 2 and 5, instead of utilizing repression to solve ethnic issues, the EU encouraged many groups to develop democratic institutions and promote minority rights, processes that often necessitated intra-group elite consensus. Similarly, external homelands often influenced the means of settling conflict.

**Institutional Explanations**

The institutional understanding of post-Soviet secession was identified early on by many scholars due to the Soviet Union’s unique state arrangements. Not only were socialist rules intimately tied to the state (Bunce 1999), but an ethno-federal structure separated the republics and material resources (Hale 2008; Roeder 2007; Zürcher 2007; Bunce 1999; Suny 1993) and became the initial dividing lines of the Soviet Union. While these theories help explain why the Soviet Socialist Republics seceded, often using material calculations and examining the role of state resources, they do not fully explain why other groups seceded after the collapse. In this section, I demonstrate that

\(^{10}\) While I have not found scholarly work that argues the European Union and group desires to join the EU tempered secession in Baltic countries, readers frequently wonder about Europe’s influence on successor state secession in the Baltics.
while institutions likely primed ethnicity’s greater coherence during the collapse, they do not adequately explain why some ethnic groups sought or achieved secession.

For instance, Valerie Bunce (1999) provides a powerful institutional explanation of post-Soviet secession. She argues that the high degree of centralization in the Soviet Union created a centrifugal force during the collapse. In other words, the structure directed competition toward the republics and not a grab for the center. While Bunce offers a wonderful institutional perspective on the collapse of the USSR, as well as Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, she does not offer a full explanation of related violence.\(^{11}\)

Henry Hale (2008) and Philip Roeder (2007) also offer two prominent institutional theories of secession in the Soviet Union. Exploring their theories demonstrates the importance of institutional explanations and its limitations. I discuss both below.

Henry Hale (2008) argues that the Soviet ethno-federal design led to a unique set of interests that produced secession. He starts his book by tracing the utility of ethnicity. He explains that ethnic bonds are an outgrowth of familial bonds, and members use them as a heuristic tool to guide their actions and reduce uncertainty. Hale goes on to explain that ethnic politics are interest driven and that Soviet institutions both made ethnic identities important to life chances and administrative units important to economic interests. While this section of the book provides an intriguing ideal type for ethnic groups and behavior, Hale relies on a relatively ambiguous dependent variable, \textit{timing of secession}, to illustrate his theory.

\(^{11}\) Successor state violence in the USSR is outside the scope of Bunce’s (1999) work, but as Mark Beissinger (2002) discusses, it is intimately connected to the collapse of federal systems.
Hale argues that groups in the Soviet Union were primed by the ethno-federal system to utilize ethnicity as a primary tool to reduce uncertainty, and during the collapse of the central state groups sought to preserve their material interest. He asserts that richer republics needed the Soviet Union less and were more likely to secede, those that were poorer and received benefits from unification were more likely to stay loyal.

However, as Benjamin Smith (2013) notes Hale’s dependent variable becomes the timing of secession and not secession itself. All the fifteen republics seceded, which offers no differentiation on the latter dependent variable. To examine whether his theory of economic calculations agree with reality, the timing of secession becomes important. Those who may economically benefit the greatest from secession, like Ukraine, should secede early, and those who benefit more with loyalty, like Uzbekistan, should secede late. However, as Smith (2013, 361) asks, “how do we justify the classification of Ukraine as an early seceder and Uzbekistan as a unionist, given that their respective declarations of independence came only three weeks apart, and that out of a period of more than one hundred weeks?”

Philip Roeder’s (2007) theory of Soviet secession also utilizes an institutional perspective. He argues that administrative apparatuses and previous state-like institutions can create a ‘segment-state’ and when combined with territorial claims secession will occur. Individuals are easily mobilized as those in charge can use the tools of the ‘segment state’ to overcome collective action problems. For instance, leaders can use the state apparatuses to become master of an identity and prevent others from contesting their ambitions (e.g. secession) and use other state-like tools
and symbols to entice followers. However, Roeder’s theory is primarily identifying *resources* that can be used for secession and motivations for secession are again attributed to elite economic calculations. While administrative resources and state-like tools are important elements that dictate a group’s capacity, they are less helpful in explaining secession if a group does not unify or desire secession. For example, both Crimea and Tatarstan had elites trying to organize independence movements and Roeder classifies both as second order ‘segment-states’. Furthermore, the oil in Tatarstan and black sea access and heavy industry in Crimea make both locations economically attractive to potential elite mobilizers; but neither seceded. Again, these observations demonstrate that institutional resources and economic calculations are likely not the central factors driving post-Soviet secession. First, both a state and the mobilizing group define secessionist capacity. It is a relative concept that goes beyond how resources frame interests and defines what each collection is capable to do with respect to the other. It is easy to secede from a disorganized and collapsing state and much harder to secede from one with substantial powers. Second, a group must also work together and unify toward secessionist goals.Attributing this unity to institutions ignores not only what created these institutions, but also treats secessionist mobilization as categorically and theoretically distinct from all other social movements. In other words, Roeder takes institutions as given rather than considering them potentially endogenous to mobilization and coherent identity.

Most importantly, these theories cite institutions as primarily causal and ignore their endogenous potential. These scholars assert that the ethnic identity and the reason members follow elite desires is because ethno-federal institutions have helped
identity monopolize the game. However, this not only ignores many ethnic secessionist movements that operate outside ethno-federal systems (Smith 2013, 363), but also the ethno-federal design offers little explanation for why Leninist-Stalinist policy would establish an ethno-federal system despite explicit and deep opposition to such measures (Stalin 1912-1913, IV). As I discuss extensively in Chapter 4, mobilized ethnic groups unmistakably played a large role in convincing Lenin to change communist national policy. Conversely, I argue groups were a central feature to generating institutions. In other words, communist institutions emerge as an intervening variable rather than a primary determinant of secession. 12

**Elite Mobilization**

Many scholars focus on the ability of elites to energize and mobilize their followers (Englebert and Hummel 2005; Hechter 2000; Smith 1998; Chinn and Roper 1995; Anderson 1983; Gellner 1983). Elite driven theory explains that those in power will seek out their own interests and will utilize their resources to motivate others. While there are a number of elite mobilization theories of secession, I focus on Christoph Zürcher’s (2007) explanation as it directly focuses on successor state secession and the context in which elites operate.

Christoph Zürcher (2007) makes a complex argument that utilizes institutions, the weakness of emerging states, and the collapse of the Soviet system as the backdrop to understanding post-Soviet secession. However, the thrust of the argument relies on the ability of elites to work out disagreements and maintain continuity between the old and new order; elites must prevent the rise of factions. He offers compelling insight into elite

---

12 This is not to say that institutions had no role prior to communism, rather group mobilization was essential to the shape communist institutions developed.
action but ignores much of the language that built and defined the politics and the means through which people were mobilized. For instance, the rise of political factions does not necessitate violence, and it often takes more than elite inability to control a population to compel individuals to fight and die for a cause. While Zürcher effectively and usefully illustrates elite actions during the period, he leaves the reader wondering why divisions become violent, why people followed some elites and not others, and does not really address the potential role of identity in elite behavior.

Additionally, Zürcher’s (2007) research design does not address the role of other secessionist theories and leaves the reader questioning whether his theory of elite agreements sufficiently explains secession and stability. Zürcher utilizes five cases; three that experienced secessionist violence (wars over Chechnya, Georgia, and Nagorno-Karabakh) and two that did not (Dagestan and Ajaria). The problem with the case selection is that those with similar independent variables share the same dependent variable and those with different dependent variables varied widely. While this is not inherently problematic, it does not isolate elite actions as determinant, and leads to several unanswered questions about the pre-existing social and political relationships within these regions.

First, Chechnya, Georgia, and Nagorno-Karabakh have minimal variation on factors often associated with secession, including settlement patterns, status changes for minorities and majorities, repression of minorities, entrenched hatreds, segment like states, a similar sub-region, elite mobilizers, and incongruence between the new and old order. However, Zürcher’s research design does not eliminate these factors as explanatory, but he still argues elite actions drove secession and stability. Without
variation we cannot clearly determine whether elites or other factors were most important. In all three regions numerous factors, and not just elite bargaining failures, were associated with the same outcome – violence and war.

Zürcher attempts to deal with his cases’ lack of variation by including two benign cases (no secession) and presumably use Mill’s method of difference (the independent variables are held constant and variation is on the dependent variable - secession). However, Dagestan and Ajaria have a set of initial conditions very different from the three secessionist cases and do not lucidly eliminate other explanations of secession. Whereas the groups within all of Zürcher’s violent secessionist cases have different languages, ethnicities, and previous violent conflicts, the Ajarias and Georgians who did not experience violence, speak the same language, most have the same religion, and their historical tensions primarily involve identifying different outsiders as the enemy, not each other. Additionally, the Ajaria autonomous soviet region was not given many of the bureaucratic features and resources like other ‘segment-states’ because no one has ever identified the group as ethnically different from Georgians (Zürcher 2007, 202). Similarly, in Dagestan many initial conditions were also very different than those in Chechnya, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. Dagestan has well over a dozen ethno-linguistic groups, is underdeveloped, receives significant benefits from its Russian association, and the region is unified by the Russian language. While we could imagine violence in both areas, and there was some in Dagestan, there are few theoretical reason to presume these groups would collectively act to create a new nation. It seems that Zürcher’s explanation of elite driven peace and violence cannot be clearly separated from other potentially important variables.
As it appears, the above variation in potential independent variables is too great to assume the method of difference would isolate important variables. The uneven comparison is potentially why Zürcher observes elites holding the Georgians and Ajarias together. However, we cannot know from his story and design whether it was the elites’ ability to keep the group together, or the historical arrangement that kept Ajaria from exiting. The same follows for Dagestan. While the region does have multiple languages and the Soviet administration was relatively weak and poor, those in the region shared a common religion (Sunni Islam), a working common language (Russian), no change in relative status (the Russians stayed in power), a small territory, and few industrial developments or significant resources to fight over. It then seems to follow that the historical conditions were favorable to Russian elites working together and maintaining order, and particular elite’s skills were less relevant. In other words, the Dagestan population had little capacity to organize outside of the Russian language and resources, and the people had little reason to rebel. While Zürcher attributes the secessionist variation to elite and administrative agreements, the research design is unable to effectively isolate his primary causal variable. Therefore, we are left wondering whether elite actions merely indicate a type of preexisting anti-secessionist or secessionist structural arrangements. Instead of assessing elite agreements, this dissertation focuses on their possible antecedents and how group coherence shaped administrative and elite agreement.

Modernization Explanations

Most notably Ernest Gellner (1983), Benedict Anderson (1983), and Eric Hobsbawm (1990) describe the effects of industrialization and modern society on the development of homogenous identities and nationalism. They illustrate that increased
industrialization and the need for mobile laborers influences the development of national identities through uniform education. Hitherto, Ronald Suny (1994; 1993) is the only author to extend modernization theory to the post-Soviet secessions.

In two different books, Suny (1994; 1993) takes a modernization view of nationalism that explores the Soviet Union’s construction of identity and movements. While the books insightfully couch secessionist movements within the unique post-industrial historical moments, Suny (1994) only discusses the variations of intra-group formation of titular groups and we are left wondering whether weak and strong groups may facilitate different post-soviet quests for power. In both books he describes nations as derivatives of nationalism and that they are contingent upon social, economic, and political processes. Suny (1994) carefully assesses the policy tensions and events that produced numerous sets of potential symbols and identity arrangements underlying future ethnic mobilization. However, the imagined boundaries and capacities that created European nationalism and the breakup of the Soviet Union into fifteen republics are primarily discussed in general terms as they apply to successor state secession; they do not clearly illustrate why some new states continued to violently break apart and others did not.

Motivations and Capacity

I now consider whether other theories of secessionist violence applied to five regions help elucidate post-Soviet secession. The majority of separatist studies attempt

---

13 The first, *Making the Georgians* (1988; 1994), begins with the growth of Georgian tribes and their trajectories from 1100 B.C until Russian imperial annexation in 1801. Next, he discusses the social and ethnic dynamics that shaped the Georgian identity from 1801 to 1917. Finally, the third period covers the Caucasian Revolutions, Soviet history and the complexity of politics up until independence in 1991. Each section demonstrates the presence of ‘Georgian-ness’ within the caucuses and its lack of coherence and continual construction until the 1990s (180, 296). In the second book, *Revenge from the Past* (1993), Suny widens his scope of cases and narrows the time frame to assess the policy contradictions and institutional arrangements that shaped the division of the Soviet Union.
to answer two fundamental questions. Why are groups motivated to separate? And why do some groups succeed at separation? From these questions I divide the relevant theories into two types: motivation and capacity. While there are many different ways one could divide the literature, this framework avoids throwing out theories that combine their concepts of motivation and capacity, which makes more theory available to help understand secession and prevents us from overlooking valuable insights within theories. The five cases are chosen based upon their diversity in outcome and public fears that arose in the 1990s describing their secessionist potential.

First, there are four broad approaches to secessionist ethnic group motivations: elite mobilization (Englebert and Hummel 2005; Hechter 2000; Smith 1998; Chinn and Roper 1995; Anderson 1983; Gellner 1983), psychological mechanisms (Roeder 2007; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Peterson 2002; Kaufman 1996; Cornel 2002; Horowitz 1985), economic motivations (Hale 2008; Roeder 2007; Toft 2005; Peterson 2002; Laitin 2001), and indivisible territory (Toft 2005). Nevertheless, a summary assessment of five cases (Transdnistria/Moldova, Nagornyi-Karabakh/Georgia, Lake Peipus/Estonia, Crimea/Ukraine, and Gagauzia/Moldova) coded utilizing secondary and primary sources provides initial evidence that none are sufficient for a thorough explanation of secession. Table 1-1 indicates whether these theories correctly predicted secession across the five cases (two that experienced secessionist violence and three that had no secession). When a motivational theory predicts secession in a given region it is labeled “yes”; when it predicts no secession it is labeled “no.” For example, the Russian

---

14 The four general theories of motivation are broken up into sub-theories in an attempt to examine theoretical variants. Psychological Mechanisms include Horowitz’s theory of ethnic status as well as the effect of historical legacies (Smith 2010; Roeder 2007). Material mechanisms include unequal development (Toft 2005), decline in economic and political conditions, and the theory of an economically or strategically valuable territory.
leader Yuriy Meshkov mobilized Russians in Crimea to secede and at other times to join the Russian Federation. Consequently, Table 1-1 stipulates a ‘yes’ for elite mobilization, as they had a charismatic and active leader, but also illustrates that the theory incorrectly predicted secession as the group did not violently secede. Table 1-1 is then analyzed down each column. If a theory is correct it will have a “yes” for both regions that experienced secession, and a “no” for all three regions that had no secession. The final row notes whether a motivational theory correctly predicted secessionist outcomes across the cases.

Table 1-1 illustrates that across five cases motivational theories do not completely determine secession. For instance, Slavs in both Moldova and Estonia experienced unequal development, but only Moldova had a secessionist movement, which indicates that inequality is not a sufficient factor for secession. However, elite mobilization and indivisible territory are identified as important. While only two cases experienced secession, these two theories predict secession in all five cases. This over-prediction demonstrates that elite mobilization and the idea of an indivisible territory are likely necessary elements for secession.

Second, a successful separatist movement, like any structured, large group action, must solve both the collective action and the coordination problems. The incentives to solve these problems do not necessarily stem from a desire to separate, but must be present for separatist mobilization to occur. The literature outlines several ways groups solve these two problems. Smith (2010) argues that a history of resistance against the state and traditional hierarchies make relevant ties for future mobilization. Toft (2005) stipulates that settlement patterns are essential to forming concentrated
groups, and with high concentration a group may share similar life experiences, feel attachment to the land, and lessen the need for technologies that would otherwise be essential to coordinating people across an expansive territory. Autonomy over a territory is also believed to provide several organizational tools, and as it establishes an alignment between culture and politics within the territory the groups are likely to pursue greater autonomy (Hale 2008; Roeder 2007; Toft 2005; Cornel 2002). Finally, modern tools and propaganda are frequently cited as ways groups solve coordination problems (Hobsbawm 1990; Anderson 1983; Gellner 1983). I evaluate these theories across the five cases and present results in Table 1-2. When a theory predicts secession in a given region it is labeled “yes”; when it predicts no secession it is labeled “no.” A correct theory must be consistent across all cases with respect to their outcomes. If a theory holds true it will receive a “yes” for both regions that experienced separatism (above the bold line) and “no” for all three regions that avoided separatism (below the bold line). The final row, as in Table 1-1, marks “true” or “false” based upon whether a theory correctly predicted secessionist outcomes across the cases.16

Table 1-2 illustrates, like Table 1-1, that across the five cases capacity theories fail to alone determine secession. However, an ethnically concentrated territory and modernization effects, like elite mobilization and indivisible territory, appear as necessary conditions for secession.

15 I do not analyze “security dilemma” theories because the collapse of the Soviet Union did not develop complete anarchy as the republics maintained state and military powers. Without anarchy the dilemma does not arise (Posen 1993; Hardin 1995). Additionally, if a region experienced a security dilemma and a collapse of the state it would have happened after the outbreak of war. Nevertheless, such a breakdown of the state is treated as exogenous to the security dilemma (Fearon and Laitin 2000). In other words, wide scale violence and state breakdown occurred and then a security dilemma arose.

16 Interpreting from the table, an ethnically concentrated territory and modernization effects are necessary but insufficient conditions for secession.
Several theories of separatist violence do not completely explain outcomes in Soviet successor states. Throughout this section I have demonstrated the inconsistencies of seven major theories by examining their explanatory ability across cases - Laitin’s (2001) and Burbaker’s (1996) triadic configuration theory, Horowitz’s (1985) theory of status and secession, institutional explanations (Hale 2008; Roeder 2007), elite driven theories (Zurcher 2007), modernization theories (Suny 1993; 1994), theories of motivation, and theories of capacity. Nevertheless, while these theories did not correctly predict secessionist violence, there are elements of each that remain relevant to consideration of the question. As noted above, an ethnically concentrated territory, modernization effects, elite mobilization, and a perceived idea of an indivisible territory are necessary but insufficient conditions for separatist violence.

**Theory**

I argue here and in Chapters 2 through 7 that national group coherence levels of groups holding the state and those in the opposition varied each country’s fate. Coherent ethnic group majorities managing the state effectively dealt with secessionist ethnic minorities effectively.\(^{17}\) However, incoherent group majorities managing the state could not effectively deal with secessionists because their own internal struggles prevented cooperation and the efficient use of available material resources that could have helped settle conflict. In the latter, depending upon the minority group’s coherence level the country experienced an early secessionist civil war (coherent minority group).

\(^{17}\) What is ethnic? What is a nation? Across the former Soviet Union ethnicity and nation are synonymously used to identify cultural groups that believe they share common descent. I utilize this conception and include those groups whose “indicium of group identity is color, appearance, language, religion, some other indicator of common origin, or a combination thereof” (Horowitz 1985, 17-18). (This definition does not suggest that ethnic and national groups are unique beyond a belief in descent or deterministic in behavior. As I argue, coherence and opportunities make identity groups unique and influential.)
or chaotic violence (incoherent minority group). In this section I briefly discuss why and when coherence matters to organizational capacity and power, how groups become coherent, and how coherence influenced early post-communist secession and stability.

Why does coherence matter? High levels of group coherence, solidarity (common understanding) and salience, facilitate greater organizational capacity. First, when given the opportunity, group coherence provides links that facilitate cooperation between members and nascent connections that may be used to build organization upon. Solidarity will help the group more clearly understand with whom, what, and why they want to organize, and salience will illustrate the importance of organizing particular spheres. Second, group coherence reduces the number of potentially divisive features and makes cooperation and ending internal struggles more likely. Third, as the group organizes, hierarchies and authority relationships naturally develop, which need justification. High levels of solidarity help legitimate the authority within these internal hierarchies. Fourth, organized, cooperating, and with legitimate authority, the group may utilize fewer material resources to incentivize its internal relationships and allocate more

\[^{13}\text{What is Secessionist Civil War? Violent Secession? Chaotic Violence?}\] First, for this dissertation I use Daniel Treisman’s (1997, 224-225) eleven indicators for secessionist activity. A region’s secessionist activism score is then created by adding up the positive indicators, with a max score of 11. Second, civil war refers to civil conflicts that resulted in more than 500 battle related casualties (Fearon and Laitin 2002, 30) (While Fearon and Laitin (2002) use 1000 battle deaths as the minimum number needed for a civil war, this excludes several events across Eurasia, including Transnistria’s conflict with Moldova, that is widely understood as a Civil war. Furthermore, because violent secession is the primary focus of this dissertation, and not civil war itself, the degree of violence is less essential to understanding the phenomenon.) Finally, secessionist civil war is a combination of the two above: a degree of secessionist activity combined with civil conflicts that resulted in more than 500 battle casualties (I commonly refer to secessionist civil war as ‘secession’ or ‘effective secessionist movement’)

Consequently, violent secession is a secessionist civil war that resulted in the formation of two or more states. Chaotic violence is sustained unpredictable physical violence for group goals that results in deaths, but not de facto or de jure independence – directed, unpredictable, domestic killing that did not lead to an additional state. And stability is observed when secessionist civil war and chaotic violence are absent. Where independence movements arose, but did not become violent a country is considered stable. Stability is observed when secessionist civil war and chaotic violence are absent. Where independence movements arose, but did not become violent a country is considered stable.
resources to coping with inter-group conflicts. Finally, efficiently utilizing resources, a highly coherent group can effectively end intra-group struggle and coordinate behaviors.

So, when does group coherence matter to secession and stability? State collapse creates opportunities for groups to exercise their coherence, territorial concentration allows the oppositional minority group access to resources to contest the state and make use of its coherence and capacity, and intra-majority-group elite consensus helps utilize the group to its full capacity by preventing national rhetoric and symbols being mobilize for competing interests. First, coherence matters when political opportunities arise, like when “institutional access opens, rifts appear within elites, allies become available, and state capacity for repression declines…” (Tarrow 1998, 71). While constraints prevent an exchange of information and assembly, opportunities encourage contentious politics and permit organization. In general, state collapse provides a unique political opportunity that all groups may use to organize.

Second, if following state collapse the new state includes a territorially concentrated minority, group coherence is likely to influence the emergence of post-collapse violent secession and stability. Minority group territorial concentration not only assists coordination and cooperation but also helps these groups access local resources (Duffy Toft 2003, 22; Roeder 2007) and increases their potential to claim the territory as a homeland (Duffy Toft 2003, 22) and contest the state. As Monica Duffy Toft explains, “For ethnic groups, territory is often a defining attribute of their identity,

---

19 In chapter two I also discuss the role modernity and the Soviet experience played in making group coherence important to mobilization.

20 For Philip Roeder (2007) administrative autonomy provides hegemonic identity tools that amplify the potential to mobilize groups. Consequently, in the Soviet Union, administrative autonomy was more often given to concentrated groups than not.
inseparable from their past and vital to their continued existence as a distinct group” (Duffy Toft 2003, 19). Without a concentrated territory, a minority group has little capacity or legitimacy to mobilize for secession and violently claim territorial authority. Consequently: no territorially concentrated ethnic minority, no early post-state-collapse ethnic violence. Nevertheless, territorial concentration is not a sufficient condition for secession across the former Soviet Union cases, only a necessary condition. When there is a territorially concentrated minority group, group coherence levels will shape early secessionist and stability outcomes.

Third, intra-group elite consensus determines whether a coherent group may be used effectively to manage or engage conflict or whether the national rhetoric will be pulled in multiple competing directions by elites, negating group coherence’s ability to aid group cooperation and organization. While group coherence may influence intra-group elite consensus, elite consensus may vary independent of coherence levels (this is further discussed in Chapter 2).

How do groups become coherent? First, I illustrate the emergence of mass identity as a function of intellectual identity building and then of mass diffusion of that identity to group members, and, second, the hardening and transformation of that identity as a function of interaction with other groups and the state.21 I argue that these processes shaped groups prior to communism, which in turn varied groups’ interactive processes during communism and influenced coherence levels in the 1990s. In essence, those groups that experience group formation prior to imperial modernization were coherent in the 1990s (exceptions are discussed in Chapters 2, 3, and 4).

21 Group Intellectuals: For this dissertation I assert that group intellectuals are people that articulate or generate ideas about a bounded community and their own position within that community. (Group intellectuals are further elaborated on in the following chapter).
How did group coherence affect post-communist secession? Highly variant historic and contingent factors during the 19th and early 20th centuries helped shape pre-communist groups, and as each pre-communist group developed it began to shape both itself and the broader ethnofederal system that predefined post-collapse ethnic cleavages. When the Russian Empire collapsed better formed groups with some intra-group elite consensus limited internal struggle, organized, engaged in conflict, and eventually helped build Soviet institutions that entrenched intellectual opportunities and group encounters for some and not others, factors that would help shape and vary future coherence levels across the republics. During the Soviet Union’s collapse, titular majority groups inherited the successor states and minority groups potentially had the opportunity to either strive for rights or organize to secede from the new state. Consequently, with a national order established but not institutionalized and territorially concentrated minorities pursuing further independence, majority and minority group coherence and elite consensus determined the power relationships that would shape stability and secession in the 1990s.

The flow chart represented in Figure 1 illustrates these relationships and how they related to different outcomes. Following state collapse there were three pathways to stability (two if there was a territorially concentrated minority group), two pathways to secession, and one pathway to chaotic violence.

Consequently, when a territorially concentrated minority group attempted to secede five basic patterns emerged. First, buttressed by majority group coherence and intra-group elite consensus, state actors were able effectively use repression and compromise to manage conflicts with coherent minority oppositions, such as Russians
in Ukraine, and avoided violence. Second, where coherent majority’s encountered incoherent minorities, like the Tatars in Russia, stability arose out of compromise and repression, despite the lack of intra-majority-group elite consensus. In this case the state and group provided sufficient resources to deter secessionists, despite intra-group

Figure 1-1. Following state collapse, flow chart for early post-communist secessionist civil war, stability, and chaotic violence

elite divisions. Third, where the majority lacked elite consensus (coherent or not) and encountered a coherent minority, like Chechens in Russia or Abkhaz in Georgia, secessionist civil war emerged. Fourth, where state actors lacked a coherent ethnic identity, as in Azerbaijan, the relatively coherent Armenian minority seceded through violent struggle. Finally, in the case of two relatively incoherent groups, such as the Gagauz in Moldova, the opposition failed to develop a powerful secessionist direction, the state struggled to restore order, and chaotic violence resulted.

Research Design

Why the Soviet Republics? First, the case studies of various groups and their interactive relationships provide insight into people and countries that continue to shape
the post-communist world. Understanding their political histories illustrates how they built post-communist institutions and gives perspective to both future coherence levels and how ethnic groups may play different roles in conflict. Second, the former Soviet Union is fertile ground to explore variation and similarity related to groups, stability, and secession. The Soviet Union’s non-violent collapse offers a common timing and phenomenon that launched each group’s post-communist existence. Furthermore, in ten republics minority groups declared independence, but not all countries experienced secession. Consequently, the regional study lends insight into contemporary struggles, holds numerous independent variables constant, and varies the dependent variable.

To provide contextualized understanding I use structural and cultural analyses to assess groups in Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine through case studies and case comparison. Additionally, the fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) explores variation across all former Soviet republics, and identified necessary and sufficient conditions for secession and stability through set theory.

The comparison of Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine facilitates the use of two of Mill’s (1843) methods: method of agreement and difference. First, the cases naturally control for several independent variables, and vary on the dependent variable. When an independent variable is present across different outcomes, it is identified as insufficiently explanatory. For instance, the concentrated minority groups’ population percentages are similar across their respective sub-regions. The territorially concentrated Slavs in Transdnistria (53.8%) and Russians in Crimea (65.6%) make up a similar percentage of their sub-region’s respective populations; concentrated Tatars and Gagauz are respectively similarly composed in Crimea, Ukraine (0.5%), the Volga
region of Russia (3.7%), and Gagauzia, Moldova (3.5%). Consequently, a territorially concentrated minority population and their relative size appear across all cases regardless of outcome, and indicate that these factors were not sufficient for secession or stability. However, because they occurred in all cases they potentially remain necessary for secession. Similarly, a concentrated group and relative size are not necessary for stability as other cases, like Bulgarians in Moldova and Ukraine, or Uzbeks in Turkmenistan, were widely dispersed and the relationship between the majority and minority groups remained stable. The presence of a Russian army in a territory that seeks independence is also ruled out as causally sufficient. There was a standing Russian army in Crimea, Transdnistria, and the Volga region that had the potential to be used to enhance the minority's power and opposition, but only Transdnistria and the local 14th army engaged in secessionist civil war. Furthermore, because the titular population percentage is similar across all countries (Moldovans 64.5%, Ukrainians 72.7%, Russians 81.5%), it is not likely a determinant factor for secession or stability. The case comparison also controls for several economic factors, as several regions were similar in the early 1990s. Transdnistria, Gagauzia, and Crimea had vast rural populations, underdeveloped industry, and similar levels of moderate development and urbanization (Laitin 2000). Additionally, because of the style of Soviet rule, the regions were left with similar state administrations. All regions had lightly armed republican guards, and a similar, fairly developed centralized state

---

22 1989 USSR Census, Crimean Tatar data based upon 1991 Ukrainian state calculations.

apparatus. Development of schools, roads, and hospitals were fairly equal across all regions, as well (Kaufman and Hardt 1993).

Additionally, Soviet rule left similar communist legacies in all three countries, but obviously not all legacies were associated with secession. As such, Soviet Communism helps control for several theories of secession. All groups experienced similar decimation of civil society under Soviet rule (Bernhard 1993; Howard 2003), but only a few groups experienced secession. Consequently, low levels of civil society are not sufficiently explanatory. Across most republics, policies of ethno-federalism gave power to the titular republic groups and disenfranchised other ethnic groups (Hale 2008; Roeder 2007; Cornel 2002; Hollinger 2000, 138-39), which eliminates grievances regarding the destruction of past political rights as a purely sufficient reason for secession. Furthermore, ethnic Russians were primarily in control of state institutions during Soviet rule, but leading up to independence, the ethnic Russians in Ukraine and Moldova lost status and power as they were removed from responsible positions in governance and politics. Consequently, a group’s loss of political power also does not appear sufficiently causal. Additionally, all groups except the Crimean Tatars had similar access to resources and experienced the political opportunities provided by the Soviet Union’s collapse.24

Second, several case pairings vary the independent variable and hold the dependent variable constant. This also helps eliminate some independent variables, like contemporary literacy rates and state socialism. When different independent variables

---

24 The last point is important to the proposed theory, which stipulates that coherence levels, political opportunities, and resources may all influence organizational capacity. However, with resources and opportunities consistent across most groups and coherence levels allowed to vary, the primary independent variables is isolated from other theoretical factors and its relationship with secession and stability may be effectively examined.
are associated with the same outcome across cases, we can conclude that they are not sufficiently explaining the phenomenon. For instance, economic development varies across the Soviet cases and does not consistently align with secession. The fairly rural Crimean Tatars and the more urban and industrial developed Volga Tatars and Crimean Russians all experienced stability. Similarly, while not the primary cases, Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Transnistria all varied in development levels but experienced secession.

While methods of agreement and difference help identify potentially important independent variables and eliminate others, the fsQCA helped decipher whether various combinations of variables were associated with different outcomes. The comparison of groups across all fifteen republics utilizes the diversity of variables and unique configurations to identify necessary conditions for secession. It also examines whether the theoretical predictions work on a more general level.

Overall, comparison across the former Soviet Republics as well as a small-N comparison across Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine is useful for studying secessionist violence because most groups had historical and institutional similarities from 1940 to 1989, minority oppositions that sought independence in the 1990s, similar ethnic compositions, yet different secessionist outcomes. By holding several key rival explanations constant it becomes easier to identify the appropriate historical elements and transformations both countries and their respective identity groups experienced in order to make them unique.

To conduct the analysis I historically trace the interrelationship between social and political cultures and structures. Through this method I test theory, trace patterns,
and demonstrate the causal processes that led these countries to drastically different outcomes with respect to their minority oppositions. Specifically, the following approach and methods seek to comprehensively demonstrate the role of group identities, their historical legacies, their relationship to others groups, and how these elements relate to the emergence of secessionist violence.

**General Approach, Sources of Data, and Goals**

To conduct the study and test Hypotheses 1 through 5 I conducted a three-tiered analysis – structural, cultural, and fuzzy set qualitative comparative, which focused on three levels of analysis and three sources of information. The tripartite analysis helps counterbalance each method’s limitation as they each assessed theory and history through different data. In this section I outline the research design’s general approach, sources of data, and goals. I then discuss the methods of investigation.

The project examined and identified how the interplay of structure (the forces and rules that guide, unite, and separate people) and group cultures (the agents’ descriptions, critiques, understandings, and reactions to events and structural forces) shaped the likelihood of secession. To do so, I identified three sources of information: local narratives and discourses that defined groups and their others (e.g. texts: newspapers, educational books, policy statements), structures that unified and split groups (e.g. economy, industry, urbanization, state institutions, migration, and settlement patterns), and demographic characteristics (e.g. population size, contiguous homeland, military presences, economic status, leaders actively mobilizing, etc.) that distinguished groups with secessionist and nationalist potential from others. I then used three methods with three kinds of evidence to confirm or disconfirm theory. Each method allowed me to make inferences using different sources of information, and their
combination allowed me to confirm those of the other two. See Table 1-3 for a comparison.

The historical structural analysis utilizes comparative method and case studies to demonstrate and understand group formation and identify patterns of coherence, stability, and secession. The analysis first investigated six ethno-linguistic groups (Moldovans, Russians, Ukrainians, Gagauz, Crimean Tatars, and Tatars in Russia’s Volga River region). Using secondary academic sources, this analysis explored whether each group identified as a community prior to their communist experience (either before 1917 or before 1945), during the Soviet era, and during the transition out of the Soviet Union until 1994. These three periods mark differences in structure and the analysis assessed whether the periods affected group narratives and coherence. Two related goals also motivate the structural analysis. First, it establishes a baseline coherence level for each group prior to 1985. Second, it evaluates whether the narrative analysis correctly assessed group coherence levels from 1985-1994.

The cultural analysis seeks to understand coherence, stability, and secession in the 1990s. Through primary texts (three newspapers in each country, academic texts, high school civic texts, and policies) the analysis brings to light the history from 1985 to 1994 that helped define each group in relation to the ‘other’ and identify features that led to different post-communist outcomes.

To develop insights within and across each case the analysis employs case studies, discursive analysis, the comparative method, and pattern tracing. The case studies had two primary goals. First, they illustrated the political discourse and group interactions that emerged and that helped shape groups and violence. Second, the
studies tested the theory of group coherence by directly observing how groups constituted their identity in relation to their ‘other’ and whether a coherent identity and movement cultures emerged and helped explain early post-communist outcomes.

The discursive analysis critically explored the general language used to label each group as well as the stories that consistently described each group and their actions in different arenas. The analysis allowed me to trace how each group became largely defined by intellectual ideas and the dispersion of these ideas as well as group encounters with ‘others’. Essentially, as each group’s intellectuals had opportunities to gather and disperse content that described the group, and as group members encountered other groups and the state, a group identity began to harden; it began to take on a more similar understanding and mark life chances in an increasing number of spheres.

The comparative method and pattern tracing historically contextualized descriptions of groups and events. The analyses illuminated how each group became constituted in narrative and the expansion of a group’s politics into multiple arenas created the coherence essential for secession or stability. By comparing cases I was also able to assess whether certain types of narratives consistently correlated with various outcomes.

The fsQCA has two goals. First, it analyzes the extant literature on separatism to establish baseline conditions for post-Soviet secession. To do so it uses twenty-six causal sets developed from existing theory addressed in the literature review section, including elite mobilization, a historical legacy of violence, an indivisible territory, unequal development, systematic group decline in economic resources or political
rights, disputed rights over a strategic or resource rich territory, autonomous status or administrative rights in a territory, group population density in a territory, industrialization levels, urbanization levels, and the presence of a contiguous homeland. Additionally, it assesses European Union conditionality, agenda setting by external homelands, and the theory of coherence.

Qualitative comparative analysis is particularly useful as it utilizes set theory to identify necessary and sufficient conditions for certain outcomes (Ragin 1987; Mahoney 2004). All minority groups living in the former Soviet Union that compose 10% or more of a republic's population or have a concentrated territory are assessed.\(^{25}\) I identified whether the conditions for all the above listed theories were met in each region/country, to what degree they were met, and whether a theory or combination correctly predicted a secessionist movement. The data was coded by examining secondary research and regional case studies.

Second, the fsQCA helps analyze whether the theory of coherence is generalizable. I assess its application across multiple cases in combination with other potential secessionist factors, and evaluate its influence on stability and secession. (In Chapter 6 I elaborate on the fsQCA.)

**Structural and Narrative Method**

The structured comparison starts with a history of the eight ethnic groups’ identities before Soviet rule and traces their development through 1994, when the secessionist struggles under consideration had come to an end. Data regarding groups

---

\(^{25}\) Population percentages are taken from the 1989 All Soviet Union Census. As discussed in the definitions section, a territorially concentrated groups is defined by the Minorities at Risk (MAR) data category ‘Regional base’ (GC2), “A spatially contiguous region larger than an urban area that is part of the country, in which 25% or more of the minority resides and in which the minority constitutes the predominant proportion of the population” (MAR 2009, 18).
prior to Soviet rule through 1985 concentrated on existing structures of power and was obtained through secondary sources. Group data from 1985 through 1994 (the years leading up to and just after the violence) concentrated on contemporary agents’ and institutional descriptions of culture, events, and politics and was predominantly obtained from primary archival resources. The methods helped assess the data, refine causal mechanisms, and test alternative theories of coherence and secession.

I conducted archival research in three locations. In Simferopol, I worked with Tavrida National University and conducted research at the Franco National Library of Ukraine and the Tatar National Library, both in Simferopol. In Chisinau, Moldova I worked with the Institute of International Relations in Moldova and conducted research at the National Library of Moldova, the Moldovan Transnistrian Republic Library, and Library of the Autonomous Gagauzia. Finally, in Kazan, Russia I worked with Kazan State University, and conducted research at the Kazan State University Library, the Tatarstan National Republic Library, and The Russian State Library in Moscow.

Field research allowed me to trace patterns and layers of institutional narratives from 1985 (the year Mikhail Gorbachev took power and began ‘Perestroika’ and ‘Glasnost’ reforms) to 1994 in a method similar to Orren and Skowronek (1994), Gee (1992), Reisman (1993), and Weber (1990). To uncover these narratives I focused on academic texts, government ethnic and linguistic policies, three major newspapers at each site (Ukraine: Pravda, Zorya Halytska, Silski Wisti; Moldova: Pravda, Literatura și Arta, Basarabia; Russia: Pravda, Moskovskij Komsomolets, Vechernyaya Kazan, Kommersant, and Izvestia)26, and high school civic text books.27 The narratives

26 Pravda will be useful for all identity groups as it was a major Soviet Newspaper throughout the Union.
embedded in these materials were often the primary sources defining group identity. While other national narratives were typically limited to few people and were unimportant in framing the group and its encompassing characteristics, the materials under investigation were state supported and had the greatest prominence and furthest distribution. The discourse between these texts produced many principal stories that defined each group, and by tracing them I put together an understanding of each identity. Furthermore, I focused on how each group became defined with respect to the other at its conceptual border. While group members may lack a complete collective identity in some settings, at the borders (e.g. where a narrative discusses or compares the groups) the stories are more likely to function as a site of contentious politics. This historicist narrative approach helped identify common themes within and across these countries and develop an understanding of each group’s coherence. Additionally, it illustrated particular elements and institutional tensions that led to six different constructions of identity in the 1990s (Moldovans, Ukrainians, Russians, Gagauz, Crimean Tatars, and Volga Tatars), and why some groups adopted a narrative that promoted violence and others did not.

**Outline of Chapters**

Chapter 2 describes the theory of group coherence and power relationships.

Chapter 3 delves into the modern origins of pre-communist coherence, and explores the

---

27 Darden and Grzymała-Busse (2006) demonstrate that the timing of mass-literacy is important to generating ties and legitimacy to particular national identities. Exploring the specific contents of educational texts that explain history and current social tensions to students will help illuminate the specific narratives that define identities and unveil the internal logic that often rationalizes an identity’s legitimacy.

When there were no text books re-written for the period under investigation, the old texts sufficed as they remained the primary narrative provided by educational institutions in each country and have been essential in defining the perceptions of potential warriors and leaders.
contingent and historical factors that led to different levels of coherence across six groups. Chapter 4 illustrates the interaction between group coherence and communism. In particular, it focuses on how groups shaped communist national policy and helped develop post-communist group coherence. In combination, Chapters 3 and 4 illustrate how the timing of group formation and imperial modernization shaped group coherence. Chapter 5 discusses how post-communist groups organized and settled conflict. Utilizing fsQCA, Chapter 6 examines the theory of group coherence in context and combination with other potential causal factors. Finally, the conclusion summarizes this dissertation’s main variables and findings, and illustrates how the theory applies to other separatist situations outside the region.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Region/country</th>
<th>Elite mobilization</th>
<th>Historical legacies of violence</th>
<th>Horowitz prediction regarding ethnic status</th>
<th>Indivisible territory</th>
<th>Unequal development (GDP)</th>
<th>Decline in economic and political conditions</th>
<th>Valuable territory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Violent secession</td>
<td>Transdnistria/Moldova</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nagornyi-Karabakh/Azerbaijan</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Violent secession</td>
<td>Lake Peipus/Estonia</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Crimea/Ukraine</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gagauzia/Moldova</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theory correctly predicts secession across cases</td>
<td>False</td>
<td>False</td>
<td>False</td>
<td>False</td>
<td>False</td>
<td>False</td>
<td>False</td>
<td>False</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: “Yes” indicates that theory predicts separatist violence; “no” indicates that the theory does not predict separatist violence for the region. “True” indicates if the theory correctly predicted separatism across the cases; “false” indicates if the theory incorrectly predicted separatism across the cases. Sources: Laitin (2001); Raun (2001); King (2000).
Table 1-2. Capacity predictions for secession.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Region/country</th>
<th>Feudal legacies</th>
<th>Autonomy over a territory</th>
<th>Ethnically concentrated territory</th>
<th>Modernization effects</th>
<th>Contiguous homeland</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Violent secession</td>
<td>Transdnistria/Moldova</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nagorny-Karabakh/Azerbaijan</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No secession</td>
<td>Lake Peipus/Estonia</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Crimea/Ukraine</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gagauzia/Moldova</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Theory correctly predicts secession across cases: FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE

Notes: “Yes” indicates that theory predicts separatist violence; “no” indicates that the theory does not predict separatist violence for the region. “True” indicates if the theory correctly predicted separatism across the cases; “false” indicates if the theory incorrectly predicted separatism across the cases. Sources: Laitin (2001); Raun (2001); King (2000);
Table 1-3. Tripartite method of analysis.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Observational unit/data</th>
<th>Historical structural analysis</th>
<th>Cultural analysis</th>
<th>tsQCA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Formal institutions, conflicts, events, changes in authority and governance, industrialization, urbanization, class formation, state formation</td>
<td>Symbolic orders, rules and regularities, policy, civil society, behavior, organizations and clubs, elite actions and agreements, individuals, events</td>
<td>Socio-demographic characteristics, individuals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sources</td>
<td>Secondary texts/ case studies</td>
<td>Primary texts (newspapers, high school civic textbooks, academic texts, policy statements), interviews, social narratives and discourse</td>
<td>Censuses/ secondary texts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inferential strategy</td>
<td>Comparative method: (method of agreement and difference) compare and hold constant numerous variables in their case specific context.</td>
<td>Pattern tracing: process verification and induction to analyze and identify causal mechanisms</td>
<td>Fuzzy set qualitative comparison: logical comparison of causal combinations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Case Studies: develop historically contextualized and holistic descriptions of variables, countries, and group dyads.</td>
<td>Critical discursive analysis: assessing discourse within socio-political context and relations of power</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goals</td>
<td>I. Developed an understanding about group formation and how group coherence happens, II. Established a baseline of each group's level of coherence, III. Identified patterns of violence, stability, and coherence</td>
<td>I. Assessed what particular features constituted coherence. II. Traced patterns and built case studies to develop historically contextualized and holistic descriptions of group coherence, stability, and movement. III. Examined whether the baseline coherencies established from the structured comparison correlated with different or similar types of narratives. 1. Do groups collectively act and coordinate similarly based upon their coherence levels? 2. Do different power relationships form (are the defined differently)? 3. Do different desired and professed outcomes of actions arise? IV. Illustrated the political discourse and movement cultures (the norms, and not just the economic and defense alliances) that helped shape the groups and their actions.</td>
<td>I. Evaluated whether the theory of coherence is generalizable across cases. II. Examined whether Hypotheses 1 through 5 agree with the observed history. III. Analyzed existing theories and set baseline conditions for post-Soviet secession. IV. Demonstrated the theory's confluence or contradiction with other theories.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER 2
IDENTITY COHERENCE AND HYPOTHESES OF SECESSION

If the purpose of history is the description of the flux of humanity and of peoples, the first question to be answered, unless all the rest is to remain unintelligible, will be: What is the power that moves nations?

–Lev Tolstoy
*War and Peace*

The Soviet Union’s collapse was both a political opportunity and symbolic event, through which every minority group had a potential opportunity to mobilize. Despite this potential, not all mobilized, seceded, or became violent. I argue in Chapter 2 that the early separatist violence that came to define successor state secession across the former Soviet Union was due to the way groups came to self-identify much earlier. In short, a group’s capacity for secession requires more than just elites, concentrated ethnic settlements, and timing: at its root the prospect of secession depends on a configuration of the majority group’s and minority group’s coherence.

Chapter 2 is divided into five major sections that theorize and define group coherence, and its role along with elites and territory in mobilization, stability and secession. It concludes with five hypotheses that Chapters 3 through 7 test. To define group coherence in Part One, I begin by briefly arguing against utility maximization theories of group politics and propose a theory of groups based upon their quality of coherence, solidarity and salience.

Part Two describes the formation of group coherence in four sections. First, it discusses nations and group coherence as modern phenomena. Second, it describes group formation as a function of identity building by intellectuals and mass dispersion of that identity. It explains how identity building by group intellectuals is necessary for
clarifying what constitutes a group and how through the reinterpretation of ideas group members become connected to various spheres. Third, the section argues how an identity becomes more concrete and transforms as people encounter other groups and the state. Finally, the section discusses material resources multiple effects on group formation.

In Part Three I discuss how group coherence influences organizational capacity and mobilization, and outline under what circumstances groups are likely to become mobilized. First, I review several theories of group mobilization and discuss how these theories typically offer institutional and elite explanations for mobilization while assuming most groups are the same. Second, I explain how group coherence provides an internal resource from which cooperation is more likely to emerge. Additionally, I argue that with greater organization and cooperation, resources may be more efficiently used and the group better mobilized.

Third, I highlight the role of state reach, elites, territory, and political order in illustrating a national group as political and mobilizable. In doing so, I discuss how state reach helps national groups become important to politics and more compatible with mobilization than in the past. Essentially, state reach helps people envision a national group by changing conceptions of time (e.g. simultaneity), reducing vertical loyalty relationships like those to local lords, and promoting social obligation that extends horizontally beyond local networks (Anderson 1982; Gellner 1983; Taylor 1989; Taylor 1997). Under these new conditions national groups become possible, and their quality, coherence, helps culturally shift who can work together and how they can mobilize. The ‘modern’ Western European discourse also encourages group mobilization as it
privileges nation-states and often describes them as natural and good. Next, as intra-group elite consensus forms, they are more likely to facilitate group mobilization. Intra-group elite consensus limits the potential ways national symbols may be utilized and prevents elites from using the same symbols to mobilize the group for different and potentially non-cooperative purposes. Territory is also essential to politics and mobilization as it defines the modern state and contestation for state power. In particular, an ethnic group’s population density in a territory is central to national secessionist movements as higher population density beyond urban areas helps legitimate territorial claims and distribute resources (Duffy Toft 2003).

Finally, I argue that when a group has high levels of intra-group elite consensus, group coherence, and territorial concentration they are better able to resolve internal struggles during dynamic social or political change (e.g. state collapse). With consensus achieved and internal struggles resolved, group organization and mobilization require fewer resources that may be used more efficiently to maintain the state or contest its authority.

Part Four draws on group mobilization and group formation theory in combination with an historical structural argument to theorize why majority and minority group coherence levels varied in each republic and why nations became politically mobilized and influenced early post-communist stability and secession. First, I contend that Soviet institutions together with mass movements helped make national identities important to post-communist politics. As the Soviets attempted to stabilize the state and temper nationalist mobilization following the 1917 Russian Revolution they made cultural concessions that institutionalized the importance of national identity. Next, I argue that
the timing of group formation and imperial-era modernization, along with ethnic deportations, helped harden group identities and post-communist group coherence levels. A group that formed prior to 1917 was more likely to effectively persuade the Soviet Union to make specific cultural concessions, allowing the group to have state support and access to modern technologies that could help disperse its identity. This privileged cultural status also helped harden these group identities and marked life chances. However, groups that struggled to form prior to 1917 obtained few cultural concessions from the Soviets, and mass identity formation was left to conceptions developed by both the Russian center and contentious shadow intellectual communities.¹ While both claimed to represent all potential group members, the different conceptions reached different populations; at minimum, two different, and often incompatible, national understandings developed within a group. Additionally, without an identified community group around which members could mobilize and gain access to opportunities, communism became more appealing and the identity became less salient still. Nevertheless, under some conditions weakly formed pre-communist groups – especially those that experienced forceful deportation – developed cohesion in successive decades. In the simplest sense, a common trauma helped people envision a community’s borders and systematic difficulties during repatriation following the trauma further illustrated the community but also permitted increased communication between group members and dispersion of group conceptions.

¹ Groups that formed prior to the Soviet Union had resolved more intra-group struggles and could more readily put pressure on the Soviets to achieve concessions than weaker pre-communist groups. A degree of intra-group elite consensus was also necessary to achieve Soviet concessions, like national institutions.
Part Four also briefly discusses the collapse of Soviet communism and the rise of post-communist nations. Across the fifteen republics nine titular groups successfully mobilized (Beissinger 2002, 210-211), and in many cases national elites replaced the old Russian political guard. Regardless whether the movements were from the ground up, instigated by elites mobilizing the population, or elites dressed in the garb of nationalism, nations became a primary marker of the post-communist political order and in fourteen republics, national majority groups dominated the state.

Part Five concludes by hypothesizing the power relations between a group dominating the state and its territorially concentrated ethnic minorities. Coherent group majorities with intra-group elite consensus managing the state effectively dealt with all secessionist minorities. However, incoherent group majorities managing the state struggled to deal with secessionists. In the latter, depending upon the minority group’s coherence level the country experienced an early secessionist civil war (coherent minority group) or sporadic violence (incoherent minority group). Furthermore, if a coherent majority lacked elite consensus a coherent minority would violently secede, but an incoherent minority’s relationship with the state would remain stable. I postulate these as Hypotheses 1 through 5 and provide a matrix representation of the potential for violent secession after the collapse of central state power. Chapters 3 through 7 then utilize the theory and comparative historical analysis to empirically test Hypotheses 1 through 5.

Part I. Conceptualizing Group Politics

After the collapse of central state power in the Soviet Republics, titular ethnic groups gained control of the state (Hale 2008; Roeder 2007), first-language Russians were removed from power (with a few exceptions including the Russian Federation,
Ukraine, and Belarus), and other minorities encountered new governing languages. With their new authority, the groups that controlled the state faced several decisions when encountering minority opposition. They could pursue four basic strategies: 1) compromise with the opposition, 2) repress the opposition, 3) develop a strategy that combine compromise and repression, or 4) ignore the minority altogether. Compromise could include devolving greater autonomy to the opposition, patronage, or allowing access to policy-making decisions directly or indirectly through institutions (Gandhi 2008). Repression can take many forms, including physical coercion (e.g. violent repression) or formal and informal exclusion (e.g. language discrimination and limiting voting rights). Both may lend themselves to legitimate forms of domination (internalized obedience to authority). The state’s choice of action depended upon constraints on its power and its motivations.

To understand the group’s power to manage conflict (the dominant group) or rebel (the non-dominant group), we must not only understand the material resources a group can assemble and use to legitimate its claims, but we must also understand what allows the group to come together, act collectively, and utilize material resources effectively. In Chapter 1 I argued that economic and security alliances exist in many forms, but they do not have the same quality as ethnic, religious, national, or other social bonds. For instance, the international community is primarily a series of economic and security alliances. However, the relationships between individual members is limited and defined through the state and international organizations. Furthermore, economic and security alliances are typically defined by these actors as instruments to achieve a common good (e.g. peace, liberty, equality), and not as inherently ‘good’
themselves. On the other hand, the national narratives that define a nation’s bonds have value embedded within, and, are arguably, viewed as inherently good (e.g. America the beautiful; Moldova the slice of heaven; Russia the motherland – adjectives defining the group itself as a good).

As it appears, not all groups and bonds are the same. To evaluate their relationship to secession I utilize the term group coherence and define it in the next section.

**Group coherence.** Group coherence is composed of two dimensions: solidarity and salience in a given territory. Solidarity is the shared understanding of the group and the ability to maintain the group. Salience reflects how the group defines life chances in different spheres. As an identity takes on more similar understandings and becomes more important the greater the group identity coherence will be. See Figure 2-1.

More specifically, a coherent group is composed of individuals who share a commonly understood identity and who identify with that community across a variety of spheres. Particularly, salience is the relevance of an identity in different spheres, and an identity is relevant when it marks (determines, is an identifier of) life chances. For example, the Moldovan identity and accent, versus the Romanian identity and accent, has become salient to Moldovan city politics and business as it signals who is ‘educated’ and potentially ‘right’ for public office or a high status job. Past experience and political outcomes primed the identity to mark life chances in such spheres. As the identity’s association with more spheres increases (e.g. the Moldovan identity may come to additionally mark life chances in sharing public and private goods, NGOs, or civil society organization), the salience level also increases. Conversations and events
may be related to many narratives and identities, but the more salient an identity the more the group is related to a diverse range of contexts. Nevertheless, a coherent group must also have a similar understanding of the identity. No two people or collection of individuals will ever have the same understanding of an identity (much less would we be able to adequately demonstrate it if they did), but two people or the collection may more closely understand one identity relative to another. The more shared this belief the more solidarity the group possesses. Sharing a similar understanding of symbols is also important. As individuals increasingly associate the same symbols with the identity, solidarity increases. Additionally, when members believe maintaining the group is good, solidarity is also higher. The more shared these beliefs, the more solidarity within the group. When both identity salience and solidarity are high the identity is relevant to many issues and similarly understood. Highly coherent, group members share numerous links that provide an established structure to build an organization upon that assist coordination and cooperation.

In sum, group coherence is solidarity and salience – common understanding of an identity that marks life chances across many spheres. Group politics is when an identity becomes mobilized for political actions.

**Part II. Forming Group Coherence**

With coherence defined, I discuss first the emergence of mass identity as a function of intellectual identity building and then of mass diffusion of that identity to group members, and, second, the hardening and transformation of that identity as a function of interaction with other groups and the state. I argue that group coherence is modern, always an on-going process, and historically in different ways. Before jumping into my argument I briefly address several modern components of group formation. (I do
not discuss the development of each sphere individually, but describe a generalizable process attributable to interests, institutions, and culture).

**Modernity and Group Formation**

Most generally, modernity’s cultural-industrial shift was essential to group formation. Many scholars from Max Weber (1958, 140, 228; Sadri 1985; Oruu 1989; Islam 2013) and Émile Durkheim (1897; 2013) to Ernest Gellner (1983) and Benedict Anderson (1983; 2006) note that modernity fundamentally changed group relationships. In particular, Weber and Durkheim discuss how modernity generated anomie and disenchantment for new urbanites, which stimulated a need for new justifications of power and meaning, or vice-versa. Maintaining a materialist explanation, Gellner continued to describe the industrial economy’s effect on increased labor mobility. He asserts that to maintain stability, and build a skilled class that can navigate changes, states objectively homogenized culture through bureaucracy and education. Anderson similarly illustrates how materials helped people conceptualize distant communities. For instance, newspapers and museums conveyed simultaneity and spread particular stories to a limited population, which produced common understanding within geographic borders that differed from those who did not receive the material. While other, often non-materialist, explanations for modernity and its effects remain in healthy debate,² wider consensus holds that modernity’s cultural-industrial shift helped foster mass identities.

---

² Such non-materialist explanations, include the links between Protestantism, commercial policy, or early modern art and industrial activity. In later chapters I apply Charles Taylors (1989; 1997) insights on the modern shift in moral frameworks to this dissertation’s cases and discuss how Soviet modernity in particular facilitated an importance and power in national groups and group coherence in the post-communist world.
Several scholars have begun to apply this modernist perspective to the formation of groups in the Soviet Union (Suny 1994; Suny 1993; Darden and Grzymala-Busse 2006; and Beissinger 2002). Their work typically identifies specifically modern features and patterns that allow, promote, and maintain national groups. While some theories concentrate on specific elements of modernity, like literacy and major events, others focus on the historic agents and structure that shaped discursively different groups. Building on these works, this dissertation embraces modernity’s unique relationship to groups, and focuses on how two variables influenced mass identity and its hardening: intellectual dispersion of group concepts and a group’s encounters with ‘others’.

Darden and Grzymala-Busse (2006) attentively argue that the timing of literacy and its combination with nationalist content illustrate with whom loyalties rest, particularly in the Soviet context. Groups that became literate and taught nationalist sentiments prior to communism developed and maintained a cultural context that negatively envisioned the Soviets as occupiers of their national territory. It is robustly shown that these variables, and potentially these visions, after independence translated into greater rejection of communist leaders in their first post-communist elections. On the other hand, groups that became highly literate under communism were taught positive communist sentiments and after independence remained more loyal to the communist party, as also witnessed in their first post-communist elections. The theory gives insight into the formation of cultural orientations, attachments, and signals where one could begin to look for the creation of a cultural identity and its values, but the theory struggles to illustrate the depth of these group attachments and values. For instance, loyalty to a pre-communist nation or to the Soviet Union does not directly explain loyalty to a successor state, but these loyalties, represented by groups not making secessionist claims after the collapse, existed in many new countries (e.g. minorities in Russia, Belarus, Lithuania, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan). Consequently, while the timing of literacy and nationalist rhetoric may help explain particular group loyalties and animosities, alone the thesis struggles to explain the quality and depth of group attachments beyond party choice.

Keeping with the modernist perspective, Mark Beissinger (2002) stipulates that modern states assert through education, force, and money a national order within a border that marginalizes other national visions. State institutions then maintain the identity’s reality and quality as it illustrates people’s possibilities. Usually the nation is constrained by normal social ties and order, but changes of “order alter the context within which the politics of identity plays itself out” (25). When opportunities arise the national identity can be used to challenge order, which creates three new group collections: challengers, the challenged, and observers. From these three new collections new nations may arise. Expanding on Beissinger’s perspective, I argue that while challenging order may produce national groups, more general process that are often not political can also help shape them. Beissinger’s (2002) work also focuses on major social events that shaped groups and group movement.
Identity Building: Intellectuals and Diffusion

There is a mass of evidence for the primary role of intellectuals, both in generating cultural nationalism and in providing the ideology, if not the early leadership, of political nationalism.

—Anthony Smith
National Identity

Anthony Smith’s (1991, 94) reference to intellectuals reflects on their pivotal and fairly well known role in developing group understanding and nationalism. Within their role, intellectuals historicized groups and provided to fundamental collective questions, grounding various group identities. As Smith (1991, 96) states, effective intellectuals’ “[Historicism] presents as comprehensive a picture of the universe as the old religious world-views without appealing to an external principle of creation, while at the same time integrating the past (tradition), the present (reason) and the future (perfectibility)”

Furthermore, ethnic intellectuals provide collective answers to questions like: “Who am I? Who are we? What is our/[my] purpose and role in life and society?” Their articulation and reinterpretation of group ideas generated common conceptions that had the potential to resonate widely with a population in various spheres and develop over time.

4 Intellectuals do not necessarily envision groups or society more factually, as they are often enraptured with myths.

5 To ensure the concept of the intellectual remains useful and that their role is effectively illustrated, I narrow Weber’s definition of the intellectual – idea makers (Sadri 1985, 88) – to convey ‘literate idea makers’ with institutionally approved positions and skills; such as those approved by schools, theatres, and museums. In the Soviet and pre-Soviet context, poets, musicians, writers, journalists, and educators primarily represented the most widely accepted intellectuals, and compose the most general form of the concept. In particular, group intellectuals, are those with similar positions as those previously mentioned, who used ideas to describe a community, their position within it, and then to connect a group to similar interests. In these positions group intellectuals had the potential to produce common understanding and group salience.
To develop a mass identity, intellectuals must be allowed to communicate and disperse their ideas to group members, and they must also engage and connect member’s existing disparate values to the collective identity. The former is seemingly obvious, but identifying where and why communication is hampered or possible helps shed light on why group coherence varies. While the process is highly contingent, politics tend to shape the variation, intentionally or not.

For instance, in Moldova the intellectual community was censored under communism, and while intellectuals developed a particular Moldovan ethnic vision amongst themselves, they could not openly share it with the majority of Moldovans. On the other hand, partly due to their group’s mobilized pressure on the Bolsheviks before and during communist rule, Ukrainian intellectuals received greater autonomy and positions within the party that helped them build a common understanding. Consequently, while the Moldovan intellectual community envisioned a Romanian ethnic perspective, out-group intellectuals – often ethnic Russians from Moscow, such as “The All-Union ‘Get the Hands of the Romanian Invaders Off Bessarabia!’ Society of Bessarabians” (Vsesoiuznoe obshchestvo bessarabtsev “Proch’ ruki rumynskikh zakhvatnikov ot bessarabii!”) – determined much of the mass Moldovan ethnic view. Accordingly, the majority of Moldovans learned that a substantial historic, ethnic, and linguistic distinction existed between Romanians and Moldovans – key concepts that invaded the republic’s institutions and differed from the intellectual community. In this Moldovan case, intellectual repression limited information exchange under communism and consensus did not build between those that received identity conceptions from the group’s intellectual leaders and the wider population these same intellectuals claimed to
represent. However, in the Ukrainian case, intellectual leaders were given substantial autonomy at various periods and able to help develop and design educational programs and cultural institutions, which promoted a more homogenous group conception with regard to intellectual and mass orientations.

Similarly, effective intellectuals need to begin with a set of symbols and markers that are salient to group members. Individual moral frameworks prime people for numerous actions and values, and intellectuals must tap into these frameworks in order to change or extend them to a common group perception (Taylor 1989; Smith 1991; Sadri 1985). For example, for many groups, intellectuals articulated their group vision by extending people’s unique, valued kin networks and affections to non-local people and events (Hale 2008). ‘Brothers’ and ‘sisters’ began to include those in the extended ethnos; founders and historical protectors of the group became described as ‘fathers’ and ‘mothers’. Familial relationships, whether through blood or unique social relations (e.g. Melanesian, Nuer, Yapese; well discussed anthropological examples that illustrate non-western ideas of familial groupings), often come with a familiar conception, and the industrial age’s fairly centralized educational intuitions often built off kinship’s familiar stories in order to include those beyond a village (Gellner 1983; Anderson 1982).

Finally, while a number of modern factors helped facilitate the intellectual’s role in group formation, two factors were particularly important. First, communication technology gave intellectuals the opportunity to distribute their concepts widely and uniformly (Anderson 1982). Second, as religious, local, and vertical hierarchies that often bonded people at other points in history withered, intellectuals and the people they
claimed to represent became less bounded and open to a new perspective of association across space and time (Anderson 1982; Taylor 1989; Gellner 1983).

In sum, group intellectuals are necessary for building identity and to do so they must utilize salient symbols of those they claim to represent as well as modern tools and circumstances to help distribute their ideas. Without modernity and engaged intellectuals, groups become fractured by multiple understandings: different understandings within the intellectual community, between intellectuals and group members, between group members, or throughout the group.

**Hardening and Transforming Identities**

**Encounters with other groups**

The borders and meaning of an identity are continually constructed and negotiated. Various encounters between groups will help define these lines and over time can harden identities. As Ernest Gellner (1983, 61) argues,

> In the old days it made no sense to ask whether the peasants loved their own culture: they took it for granted, like the air they breathed, and were not conscious of either. But when labor migration and bureaucratic employment became prominent features within their social horizon, they soon learned the difference between dealing with a co-national, one understanding and sympathizing with their culture, and some hostile to it.

Similarly, as inter-group encounters continue to mark culture and national identities as important, group borders and features harden. Individuals bring forward a vision of their identity and as they encounter others who also bring along a vision of that identity a discourse develops. As society, politics, and economics consistently influence these encounters’ discourse by marking life chances, eliciting emotions, or determining transaction costs the identity will either harden or wither. However, without inter-group
encounters, these identity-building common features fade to the background and other elements become important to the community and affection.\(^6\)

**Political opportunities**

Political opportunities help associate a group with new spheres and build solidarity as they encourage contentious politics (Tarrow 1998, 19-20), and as intellectuals and members become involved in politics they associate the group with new spheres. (In Part III I discuss how opportunities also allow groups to organize.) When a state is weak or elites change positions, opportunities arise which allow agents to act. These actions may include opportunities for intellectuals to gather and define ethnic groups or expand their relevance into new spheres. For instance, opportunities often allow intellectuals to describe relationships between the group and society previously barred or made illegal, or provide them greater opportunities to interact with members. In a similar vein, as the monarchy’s authority waned amidst the 1905 Russian Revolution many previously illegal intellectual communities became public and actively associated their community with politics across the Empire’s numerous cities and towns. With more opportunities to communicate and interact, intellectuals developed links between their conceptions and the daily lives of people. The same happened at different

---

\(^6\) Only meaningful group contact will illustrate a group value. As contact theory (Rothbart and John 1985) illustrates, if group members’ behavior is not consistent with their stereotype, the interaction occurs often and in numerous social contexts, and members are believed to be typical of their cultural group, prejudices will decrease. When interactions take place without these the inter-group interaction is more likely to illustrate value. Consequently, to assess whether an inter-group interaction spurred cultural value, necessitates an understanding of the contact. For example, in Chapter Four I discuss the relationship between communist ideology and incoherent groups, and argue that despite increased inter-group contact, notions of equality tempered a valued group understanding in various republics.
times throughout Soviet rule, most recently with Gorbachev’s reforms, Perestroika and Glasnost, in the mid 1980s.  

Broadly speaking, group intellectuals also shape group understanding over time. As social and political contexts shift (e.g. new elected officials, migrant workers move into cities) and values shift (e.g. agrarian production to modern capital, democracy to group rights) intellectuals help articulate the group’s relevance to these new situations and values. For instance, Soviet authorities that needed to mobilize people to fight in World War II heavily promoted the previously muted Russian identity. Prior to the war, the Bolsheviks tempered the Russian Empire’s Russian culture and called for an Eastern Slavic unity (Weeks 2010; Hosking 1997; Guroff and Guroff 1994; Jahn 2004; Subtelny 2009) (many Russians had not only opposed the Bolsheviks, but also appeared as a threat to other nations who previously suffered under Russian nationalism). However, facing another European war the Soviets needed to mobilize soldiers and turned to the Russian population. The Russian identity was an inherent good for millions of Soviet citizens, and intellectual authorities became essential to redefining the Russian image and relating it to Soviet survival and a new European war.

---

7 Political opportunities that allow another group to mobilize not only transmit a repertoire of contention to another group, but also affiliate the group with new ideas about what is important. For instance, Monica Duffy Toft (2003, 2-3, 28) discusses how one group’s secession in a multi-national territory lends credibility to another’s through precedent. I have discussed in other works that it also happens internationally, when Kosovo declared independence in 2008 it reinvigorated Transnistrian, Abkhaz, and South Ossetia’s secessionists. Similarly, Mark Beissinger discusses the contagion effect and how the wave of nationalism and social repertoires swept across the FSU. It is my contention that contagion, precedent, and ‘waves’ acted through coherence as they not only provided new contentious repertoires, but also associated the group with several new spheres.

77
Group innovation

Innovation also encourages group coherence. As members invent and incorporate new practices and events they expand the group’s repertoires and inter-group dynamics. Again, these may be intentional or unintentional. For instance, a peace march that becomes a widely publicized event may only include a portion of group members, but draw the attention of others. Depending upon responses to the march, group members may develop new ways to act together and understand their relationship to other groups. If the group encounters a harsh state crackdown they may find themselves associated with a new enemy. They may also view themselves as linked to passivism or new social repertoires, or perhaps the march helps associate the group with weakness and fear of activism. While what catches on is not always clear from the start, innovation can often spontaneously connect the group with new spheres and actions.

Summary: Intellectuals, Dispersion, and Hardening

Through historic processes group members began to similarly understand and find relevance in their group identity. High levels of interaction and information exchange between group intellectuals and group members, as well as group intellectuals and the state, facilitated a highly salient, accepted, and mass dispersed group conception. Meaningful inter-group interactions helped group members develop a valued cultural-based identity, and opportunities and innovation increased the group’s cultural understanding and association with many spheres. With these processes
combined, groups became coherent or maintained coherence. Without these processes a group was incoherent.⁸

**Resources and Building Coherence**

Material resources have multiple influences on building group coherence. First, while resources are necessary for industrialization, often facilitating meaningful inter-group interactions,⁹ industrialization under particular conditions can also encourage

---

⁸Henry Hale (2007) argues that ethnicity is initially independent of institutions and naturally forms to reduce uncertainty, the “opportunity individuals have to pursue whatever it is that they desire” (62). To make this argument Hale moves through a multi-step process. First, he (2008, 34) convincingly substantiates a proposition of identity by referencing George Mead (1934), Sigmund Freud (1960), and Erik Erikson (1967). Here he stipulates that “Identity is the set of points of personal reference on which people rely to navigate the social world they inhabit…” and taking from Freud and Erikson he stipulates, “identity cannot be understood apart from the social world” (34). However, Hale’s theory becomes more tenuous as he begins to apply his proposition of identity to group formation. He asserts that the complexity of the world and humans’ minimal cognitive capacity makes doing simple tasks difficult but identity and groups decrease the unknown and provide a heuristic tool for understanding and behavior. In other words, identities orient and help navigate the world in order to reduce uncertainty, and by the same logic he explains that group identities also help reduce uncertainty. Nevertheless, the theory fails to answer a number of questions about group formation. First, it supposes, akin to Hobbes, that the state of nature is chaotic and social groups help manage that world, but as Locke later showed the state of nature is in question and possibly more social and certain than Hale or Hobbes would have us believe. As such, the claim that uncertainty reduction is motive for social groups could easily be replaced by a Lockean liberal account; people possibly come together because of their framework of values, a desire for an objective arbiter or ancestral connections. The counter argument to Hale’s thesis would be that, humans have always had some semblance of understanding and capacity to make sense of the world, arguably prior to conscious identity building and modern group formation, and only when this breaks down does uncertainty and often paralysis arise (Heidegger; Taylor 1989). Second, the results from Tajfel’s experiments put into question the uncertainty reduction thesis. When people were told they over estimated or under estimated the dots on a page they began to form and reinforce groups accordingly. While Hale believes that these groups formed due to a belief in common fate and a residual need to reduce uncertainty (35-36), the experiment reveals only connections to a common past (e.g. whether you over-estimated or under-estimated the dots on a page). The dot estimations cannot reveal greater certainty about the different individuals in the room nor immediately illustrate their future. The primary variable influencing groupness is the authority figure (someone conducting the experiment) that stipulated the most salient value, over or under dot estimators.

⁹Modernity’s industrialization impacted groups as it increased urbanization, interactions, literacy, and allowed people to re-conceptualization communities. For instance, industrial changes allowed homogeneity to form, and forced valued group interactions (In part, material allocation creates advantages and disadvantages that not only create distinctions, but also often need justification. Inequality may then stimulate who intellectuals interact with and which homogeneities are valued.). Labor’s mobility drove a national education, and when new urbanites faced distinctions between old city dwellers and themselves they understood a value in homogeneity. In these cases, the way people interacted with material resources fundamentally changed people’s relationship to the land, survival, and each other. Gellner (1983), Anderson (1982), and Hobsbawm (1990) all provide essential discussions on these changes.
interactions that limit a homogenous cultural value. For instance, contact theory suggests that prejudice decreases when group members who are believed to be typical of their cultural group behave inconsistently with their stereotype frequently and in numerous social contexts (Rothbart and John 1985). If industrialization combines with a political regime or social factors that encourage less prejudiced contact, it does not create a valued group.

Second, while material resources may help fund intellectual opportunities and interactions, they are not necessary nor do resources guarantee funds will be allocated to group coherence. On one hand, financial resources may help fund intellectual opportunities and interactions. Better-financed intellectuals can disperse a common understanding by eliminating competing narratives and protecting their organizational endeavors. One example is the Ukrainian intellectuals in the late 19th century, who found backing among landed elites in Eastern Galacia (Western Ukraine). The elites helped finance the Ukrainian literacy campaigns and with their landed authority helped insulate intellectual activities from Austro-Hungarian and Polish adversaries. On the other hand, if group members with financial power do not wish to fund a group, whether it is because they do not value the group or the group lacks relevance, their finances are not used to facilitate coherence. For instance, Russian Soviets actively hindered Russian cultural ventures in the 1920s to likely prevent nationalist backlash from other groups. In this case, Russian members had the resources to support group intellectuals, 10

10 While Russians replaced most landed elites in Eastern Ukraine, the West were able to hold their grounds because they had common religious bonds with the ruling Austro-Hungarians and little rural competition with Polish urbanites (I discuss this at greater length in chapter 3). However, as I also discuss in chapter 3, landed elites in Moldova withered under Ottoman rule and subsequently were rotated in and out by the ruling Russians and Romanians. Consequently, Moldovan intellectuals could not turn to the countryside for protection when facing an opposing state authority.
but state stability necessitated that they direct their efforts to non-Russian cultural endeavors. As it appears, resources alone do not guarantee greater intellectual support or a more common understanding.

Nevertheless, well financed group intellectuals have more opportunities to exchange information and develop common conceptions about the group. Resources open access to technologies and insolate group members from rival conceptions, which allows group members to develop a more singular understanding. While group wealth will not correlate with greater common understanding, when group members target resources to intellectuals there is a greater likelihood that the group’s common understanding will increase.

Third, while resources may help set interests or act as a motive, it may increase or decrease coherence levels. First, as previously mentioned, those with material wealth can easily advertise their claims and convince or compel others to hold a particular interest. For instance, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) dominated the Union’s media outlets, which helped connect various groups to various ideas. In part, Moldovans became associated with a folk culture, and Ukrainians as central to the communist revolution. At the same time, the CPSU’s material wealth allowed authorities to restrict many connections between group members and prevented group associations outside of Party sanctioned spheres. In this case, Moldovans had few opportunities to develop their cultural identity beyond their folk culture associations. However, repression, facilitated by material wealth, often spurred backlashes and increased coherence for other groups. In Estonia Soviet repression reinforced a valued
interaction between Russians and Estonians, and connected the group to attitudes about a Russian occupation.

Finally, material resources may become an interest, and the pursuit to own or wield them can associate the group with an additional sphere. An object of interest for a few can be expanded to highlight a secondary interest for many. For example, elite financial interests in land may become transcribed into a group interest in sacred or indivisible land (Toft 2010). Specifically, leaders motivated to control oil fields may find it advantageous to describe a piece of land as sacred to the group’s identity. In this case, elite material interests generate a new story that associates the group with the concept of sacred land. Material interests generate a new sphere of association. Conversely, resource interests may decrease salience. As groups co-opt materials, the “zero-sum” battle for resources becomes less significant and leaders no longer need to generate material interest inspired stories. Without the stories, material interests fail to associate the identity with new spheres.

Part III. The Power of Coherent Groups: State Stability and Group Mobilization

As the previous sections discussed, groups are contingently built collections of people that hold some degree of common understandings and salience over time, and in this section I assess why they matter. To do so, I first explicitly discuss three theories of why groups mobilize, including fears of exploitation (Hale 2008), hegemonic identities and material calculation (Roeder 2007), and transnational learning (Beissinger 2002). While these three theories suggest important mechanisms for mobilization, they attribute group politics to elite material interests and context but give less attention to the group as a collective unit, particularly as they varied in cohesion and importance across the former Soviet Union’s emerging successor states. I argue that while politics
and history shape varying group coherence levels within territories that establish group power relationships and influence whether nationality will become political, group coherence intimately shapes organizational capacities (often ending intra-group struggle), the quality of political mobilization, and ability to utilize material resources. After discussing the three theories of group mobilization and group coherence’s relationship to organizational capacity and mobilization, I discuss the circumstances necessary for group mobilization and discuss how group coherence, territory, and elite consensus influence stability and secession.

**Theories of Group Mobilization**

Henry Hale (2008) argues that when there were questions about the state’s efficacy, ethnicity provided a divisive distinction that weakened collective action at the Soviet Union’s center (Moscow’s ability to rule).

“Where people are not conscious of an ethnic divide distinguishing them from the central government or when such perceived divides do not involve significant indicators of danger, a region’s representatives are less likely to perceive much risk of exploitation associated with the collective action problem...Where people are conscious of an ethnic divide with the central government, past and future central state actions will be crucial in shaping whether a given region sees the union as too likely to be exploitive.” (138-139).

As the uncertainty of the state increased, those more ethnically similar to the center had fewer fears of exploitation and remained loyal subjects of the state. Those with greater ethnic distinctions had increasing fears of exploitation and began to mobilize in opposition, which weakened the federal state’s ability to work together. However, the theory runs into empirical issues. For instance, it does not adequately explain why Russians throughout several republics supported independence from the Soviet Union. In both western Moldova (excluding Transnistria a region that boycotted elections) and
Ukraine, Russian majority regions overwhelmingly voted for independence, despite Hale’s predictions that their close ethnic resemblance to those managing the Soviet central government would make them more loyal and less mobilized. The thesis additionally struggles to illustrate secession from the Soviet successor states, as many groups dissimilar from their new center did not secede in the 1990s despite uncertain federal states (e.g. Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, Russia; Crimea, Ukraine; Grodno, Belarus; North Kazakhstan, Kazakhstan).¹¹

Conversely, Roeder (2007) claims elites used the group’s symbolic framework to mobilize a singular identity, one created by a segment-state’s institutional domination, for personal goals.¹² Specifically, he argues that mobilization in a nation-state project is primarily only meaningful when it operates in the context of institutional domination, which allows elites to utilize an identity’s symbols to mobilize the population and seek material interests. However, his argument ignores the numerous groups that formed and mobilized for a nation-state project without experiencing institutional domination (e.g. the Ukrainian nation that facilitated the formation of a Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and independent Ukraine; Part IV discusses this in more detail) as well as those that experienced institutional domination and elite material interests for secession that did not mobilize and form a new state (e.g. Tatars in Russia along the Volga River).

Mark Beissinger (2002) offers a compelling look at why groups take particular actions and why we witness similar mobilization patterns. He stipulates that modern

¹¹ The ethno-national groups in each region, respectively: Tatars, Bashkirs, Russians, Crimean Tatars, Poles, Russians.

¹² To reiterate, for Roeder a segment-state is an existing institution that marks territorial and human boundaries. He then clarifies that different levels of institutional boundaries are more dominating over people’s lives than others, and the most dominating institutions help sideline competing identity claims, generating a singular identity more able to be mobilized by elites.
states assert through education, force, and money a national order within a border that marginalizes other national visions and generates a more singular mass identity. State institutions then maintain the identity’s reality and quality as it illustrates people’s possibilities under normal conditions. As such, usually the nation is constrained by ordered, normal social ties, but changes of “order alter the context within which the politics of identity plays itself out” (2002, 25). When opportunities arise a national identity may challenge existing arrangements, which at minimum creates challengers, the challenged, and observers. Observers may then learn from others how to generate support and mobilize their population. There are numerous tactics available and many ways group symbols can be used for mobilization, but not all are readily visible or well known until it is observed. For instance, post-Soviet secession in the 1990s was, in part, imaginable because groups observed what the initial fifteen republics had done. Nevertheless, while trans-national learning is an important feature of mobilization that influenced how secessionists acted in the 1990s, it does not clearly explain the variation – i.e. why some effectively used what they learned to secede, and others did not.

Essentially Hale’s (2008), Roeder’s (2007), and Beissinger’s (2002) books assume that under certain specified conditions all nations generally have similar capacity to mobilize and secede. However, several examples illustrate both that despite their specified conditions being met no mobilization occurred and mobilization occurred when their conditions were not met, particularly after the Soviet Union’s collapse. In other words, these scholars account for context, but do not consider the actual qualities

---

13 While this may seem similar to Roeder’s (2007) explanation of leaders using institutions to develop an identity, it is more akin to Gellner (1983) who does not find identity building as necessarily an intentional process from above.

14 The latter, false negatives predicing no secession, applies only to Roeder (2007) and Hale (2008).
that compose a group, its imagined and real characteristics and how these influence and respond to context.

To address the assumption that all groups will act similarly under the same conditions, I not only highlight modern and Soviet conditions and context that enabled national group power, but also emphasize coherence’s role in shaping organization, group consensus, and the quality of mobilization that define a group’s ability to operate in various conditions and contexts. The former illustrates the uniquely modern feature of national groups, coherence, and how they behave. The latter illustrates how groups vary in their capacity to organize, build consensus, and mobilize (a feature either ignored by other theories or often attributed to material resources and institutional effects) and lends insight into institutional formation, variation in transnational learning, and why some groups coped with exploitative fears differently.

**Group Coherence and Group Mobilization**

Group coherence is widely identified as helpful for group mobilization and organizational capacity (Huntington 1968, 25; Oberschall 1973; Tilly 1977, 3-45; Gurr 1993, 9; Hechter 2000). In particular, I argue that in a moment of dynamic state and social change, like state collapse, high group coherence – solidarity and salience – provides strong links that may help build larger organizational connections and skills. In periods of dynamic change, mass protest heightens and increases the opportunity and necessity for collective action (Durkheim 1951, 253; Weber 1972, 657; Huntington 1968, 5; Johnson 1966). Whether it is the inability of institutions to adapt and keep up

---

15 For Hechter (2000; 1987), solidarity and salience are important issues for organization and collective action.

16 Examples of links and tools, include symbols for a common belief system and similar informal rules to integrate individual interests.
with society, the anomie that follows urbanization, or collapse of authority, dynamic change of social relationships and disequilibrium tend to be followed by an anxiety and chaos that encourage people to collectively act and restore order. Within such tumult people turn to toward social groups as they provide links (e.g. symbols, rules, leaders, and affections) – an existing structure – that can be cultivated into an operating organization (Somers and Gibson 1994, 67; Morris 1984; Johnston 1998; Taylor and Whittier 1992, 104; Tilly 1978; Marwell and Oliver 1993; Oberschall 1973; Hale 2008) and help restore order. The group’s common understanding is its internal structure and its salience the external ties. As common understanding and salience increase, the group is linked by more shared symbols and beliefs. While these links facilitate organization and an ability to restore order in a number of ways, I discuss how they facilitate communication and justifications for organization.\footnote{I focus on communication because it is commonly identified as essential to organizational development and it relies centrally on shared symbols, a core feature of coherence. Justification for order is also discussed as it emphasizes the non-material and survival based interests that lead to organization.}

As common symbols and understandings make communication clearer and facilitate expressing a common objective, like maintaining the group, individuals will ‘tune in’ to each other and develop interdependent activity, forming an organization’s ‘building block’ (Kuhn 2008, 1233; Taylor and Cooren 1997; Taylor 2000). Additionally, high levels of contact between individuals with a common understanding is shown to increase network density and organization over time (Mropherson and Smith-Lovin 1987; Mropherson and Smith-Lovin 2001; Tarrow 1998; Powell et al. 2005; Poleacovschi and
Javernick-Will 2016),\textsuperscript{18} this is often because similarities and similar symbols may breed attachment (Powell et al. 2005).

Furthermore, clearly communicated historical narratives of social repertories often help a group imagine contemporary unity and mobilization (Tarrow 1998). Most modern national groups tend to be associated with dynamic histories often full of past mobilization and triumph, but those that are more coherent articulate a clearer history and are more successful at utilizing the historic repertoire. For instance, many coherent groups’ historicized narratives and repertoires of the pre-Soviet period that remained relevant in their struggles for state power in the 1990s. Histories of mass protest or successful wars allowed group members to believe in shared experiences and past actions. They could envision themselves acting together in the present because they believed they were connected to past actors with whom they shared similar properties for mobilization. Additionally, because the present narratives and struggles were similar to stories members learned or experienced regarding the Russian Empire’s collapse or World War II, group members could easily incorporate the past symbols into contemporary unity and action. For example, they shared a common perception that ethnic control of the state was valuable, which made messages to seek state control reasonable and effective.

A more common belief system generated by group coherence also facilitates organization through justification. Because coherent groups share more similar conceptions regarding interests, institutions, and culture, leaders can both readily identify justifications for developing the organization that will resonate with the

\textsuperscript{18} Furthermore, as coherence increases the clarity of group goals and symbols, communication and identifying who and what members should obligate themselves toward can become simplified.
population and communicate these justifications effectively to their members. For instance, with greater coherence, ‘who’ and ‘what’ constitutes the group becomes clearer, and the group as a virtue often becomes a consistent justification for cooperation and authority. ‘Why should I/we?’ ‘For the party!’ ‘For the nation!’ ‘For the weak!’ ‘For society!’

Nevertheless, for group members to efficiently work together they must end internal group struggles which is facilitated by group coherence through organizations and more directly. Organization facilitates consensus among group members through communication and beliefs, but ending group struggle may also occur prior to or alongside organization. Prior to organization or alongside it, group coherence helps end internal struggles as members agree and cooperate as they have fewer points of conflict, often fewer opportunities for dissent among elites, and the organizational capacity enabled by group coherence provides a powerful and operational structure that reduced the costs of collective action and coordination, discouraging dissent and more costly oppositional intra-group organization.

However, because each group has a different level of coherence at the time of dynamic social or political change, they will initially develop different levels of organizational capacity and ability to end internal group struggles. In essence, more coherent group structures lessen intra-group conflict and increase the potential for cooperation and organization.

19 Each law may be rationalized as good for the group. Each tradition may give reverence to the group. And charisma, embedded in the group or leader, may illustrate the group’s ‘ability’ to transcend constraints and ‘magically’ transform things for the group. For all subordinate relationships coherence may facilitate legitimacy as it focuses the group as the primary value.
A better organized group with fewer internal struggles may then more easily: increase coordination, decrease elite defection (Ordeshook 1996, Tarrow 1977, and Treisman 2001, 13),\textsuperscript{20} efficiently use resources for organization (Barney 1991; Grant 1996; Kogut and Zander 1992), mobilize available resources (Barney 1991; Grant 1996; Kogut and Zander 1992), orient people to common goals, and communicate (Fairhurst and Putnam 2004; Kuhn and Ashcraft 2003; McPhee and Zaug 2000; Kuhn 2008). Together the group is more able to collectively act and mobilize for political action, whether in opposition to the state or managing state affairs.

Conversely, with limited coherence – less solidarity and salience – a group has weaker links (e.g. fewer common symbols to build a belief system and less developed norms to integrate individual interests), than more coherent groups, for building larger organizational connections, skills, and ending internal struggles. A less organized group will then find it more difficult to: maintain elite loyalty, efficiently use resources for organization, mobilize available resources, orient people to common goals, communicate, and morally internalize authority (dominating individuals). With less coherence and subsequent organization, the group struggles to collectively act and mobilize for political action.

These preceding paragraphs are not to suggest that preexisting coherent groups are always important for mobilization. For instance, there are many times when new groups, mobilization organizations (Minkoff 1997), ideas (Jasper and Poulsen 1995; Jasper 1997), and framing (Tarrow 1998; Snow et al. 1986; Gamson 1988; Benford 1993) may arise prior to identity formation to help people mobilize and challenge

\textsuperscript{20} This is not to suggest that elite defection is not possibly, rather defection is constrained.
authority. However, when groups (coherent or not) are present, following dynamic state and social change, they may only become important entities for organization and mobilization in specific political environments: modern conditions, group is territorially concentrated, intra-group elites have consensus, and when state power is not equally distributed.

Following the work of several scholars, I assume that mass groups, like nations, are in part important because of modernity (Anderson 1982; Gellner 1983; Taylor 1989; Hobsbawm 1990; Suny 1993; Taylor 1997). At the very least, as Ronald Suny (1993) explains, modernity is an essential aspect to making group identities, specifically national ones, important to politics and mobilization. “Nationality is the modern, secular form of ethnicity with a degree of coherence and consciousness that enables its members to be mobilized for national political goals” (Suny 1993, 12). For instance, the modern secularization and industry that helped sideline religion and foster urbanization weakened church and local community bonds, and modern states that removed lords and Tsars from power increased the potential for heterogeneous leadership and stimulated non-traditional forms of hierarchy. These changes then combined with a moral shift away from piety and venerating lords toward notions of egalitarianism and an obligation to a wider scope of people. As these modern material conditions facilitated new groups and new moral frameworks encouraged people to contribute to a wider populace, mass populations (e.g. national groups) had the means to develop organizations and challenge justifications of power, often changing the means of political action (Anderson 1982; Gellner 1983; Taylor 1989; Hobsbawm 1990).

---

21 This ideology and its spread, as well as a new perception of time and simultaneity, was also aided by technology and material changes, as was discussed in part II.
Modernity also makes territory central to group mobilization. As territory defines the modern state it determines the boundaries of political contestation and where groups may politically mobilize.

Furthermore, territory also influences to what degree groups may access local resources and coordinate (Duffy Toft 2003, 22; Roeder 2007). Greater group density and the higher the proportion of the group in a specific territory allows the group to potentially have access to more local resources and better justify group claims to state power than a more dispersed group. Conversely, a highly dispersed group has proportionally less access to fewer resources across a larger area, and with a smaller population they may have a more difficult time claiming rights within the region or state.

Intra-group elite consensus is also essential to utilizing a national group's connections and organization. While coherence helps a group organize and end internal struggles, powerful elites may still use the national group and its links to organize portions of the population in different directions that are potentially not cooperative. Thus, intra-group elite consensus helps prevent divides in how national rhetoric and organization are used and helps maintain links between varying national interests and organized spheres. With consensus, elites are less likely to mobilize sub-group populations and the nation in ways that could undermine the national group, which prevents splintering between national organizations.

---

22 For Philip Roeder (2007) administrative autonomy provides hegemonic identity tools that amplify the potential to mobilize groups. Consequently, in the Soviet Union, administrative autonomy was more often given to concentrated groups than not.

23 Additionally, the ‘modern’ Western European discourse also encourages group mobilization as it privileges nation-states and often describes them as natural and good.
Elite consensus occurs when defection and mobilizing sub-groups-supra-groups (smaller or large than the national group) or organizations are not in the interest of the leaders, not possible (insurmountable hurdles), or not imagined. While a number of idiosyncratic factors will help bring elites to agreement or division (Zurcher 2007, 9), to illustrate the contingent nature, I focus on four factors. First, group coherence levels should influence intra-group elite agreement and division. A more coherent and organized group is more likely to credibly illustrate that loyalty to the group center over regional or diverse interests is better rewarded (to see how this is illustrated in parties and state bureaucracies see Ordeshook 1996, Tarrow 1977, and Treisman 2001, 13). Beyond coherence, three factors consistently appear to influence elite consensus, including narratives, the distribution of power, and interests (these are each discussed in detail in Chapter 5)_{24}

Briefly, narratives may structure elite opportunities and constraints by posing group perspectives as contentious or compatible, as well as imagined and unimagined. For instance, in Ukraine the two dominant national narratives in the early 1990s – aversion to Russian rule and Ukrainian cultural revival – did not undermine each other and allowed for common ground and unity in Ukraine’s historicized independence prior to the Russian ‘betrayal’ of the Treaty of Pereiaslav of 1654. On the other hand, in the Russian Federation, Russian national narratives of independence and Soviet revival

---

_{24} Conflict and consensus theory also suggest that the more specialized elite occupations the greater likelihood of elite consensus (Searing 1971, 443; Mills 1956; Keller 1963). This is valuable territory to investigate in further studies. Finding allies can also help elites converge or divide and mass protests can allow elites to find opportunities for divergence (Tarrow 1998, 79). However, high coherence generally prevented mass movements from arising within the group outside elites, which limited the potential for elite divergence across coherent group cases. Early risers contest authority they can reinforce or create instability in the elite (Tarrow 1998, 144). Brokerage, identity shift, radicalization, convergence (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001, 162) Nevertheless, a number of other factors contributed to coherent group elite divisions and cohesion.
contradicted one another and facilitated two elite factions. While these narratives are not isolated from social conditions, and with framing techniques elites may quickly alter the discourse, narratives often set an opportunity structure (Barnett and Duvall 2005; Sjöstedt 2007).

Second, the distribution of power may determine opportunities for elites to contest authority or remain loyal to the state or national groups. As Skocpol (1979) and Moore (1966) illustrate, concentrated wealth allows less opportunity for contestation but a bourgeois class, with its distribution of financial power, not only allows more elites the opportunity to contest central authority, but also it is proposed to lead to unique institutional arrangements, like democracy. In the national group context, more concentrated power, as occurred in Ukraine versus Russia, allowed a particular collection of titular group elites to dominant the national narrative and sideline competing national visions.

Third, elite interests, often set by material rewards and international factors, help shape elite consensus and division. For instance, in the Baltic states, most elites desired to become part of the European Union (EU) (EU integration appeared, among many things, financially beneficial and a desire widely held in the population), which provided a common interest, and, with EU agenda setting, the common interest helped constrain elite behavior (Kelley 2010). To become part of the EU, the country had to accomplish specific goals, often only achievable through elite consensus (Kelley 2010). Conversely, in Georgia material interests and international factors divided the titular group’s elite. Prior to independence some Georgian elites attempted to use national rhetoric to quell secessionist activity in Abkhazia while other elites sought independence.
from the Soviet Union. This national division grew as each side rallied their national support by often diminishing the work of the other, and after independence, these factions continued to divide the elites as they helped secure their personal status in parliament. Additionally, after independence Russian/CIS and European/NATO poles pulled Georgian elites in different directions as the most financially sound and secure path remained unclear.

Finally, following modern dynamic social and political change, the state’s distribution of authority across groups will set the political environment for group coherence, elite consensus, and territory to influence state stability or secession. Each group’s level of coherence prior to the formation of the new state, with respect to other groups, will establish their potential capacity to organize and maintain or contest this initial distribution of power. The degree of elite consensus will determine whether the group’s coherence will be cooperatively organized to contest or maintain power. And ethnic group territorial concentration will temper the intra-group allocation of resources and justifications for nation-state claims.

Under particular modern circumstances that highlight a group’s importance to elites and masses, like the collapse of the Soviet Union and the rise of post-communist national order in fourteen of the fifteen republics, groups can become the essential feature for contestation and order. As the next section illustrates, a political history – based upon pre-communist group organization that helped define Soviet structures, future group coherence levels, and post-communist national order across most of the

---

25 Eurobarometer surveys in 1994 and 1996 show Georgia as experiencing the largest increase in positive opinions regarding the CIS and the highest population proportion among CIS countries to positively view the EU (16%).
republics – helped shape the power relationships between titular majority groups and minority secessionists that would determine regional violence and separatism in the early 1990s.

Part IV: Pre-Communist Groups, the Soviet Experience, and the Rise of a Post-Communist National Political Order

When central state Soviet control disintegrated in 1991, titular ethnic groups gained power over their respective republic’s state apparatuses and many minorities in these republics lost political power or became alienated from politics. Large Russian populations most often experienced role reversals, while other groups, such as the Crimean Tartars, were marginal both during and after the Soviet Union. These groups not only faced different conditions, as addressed in Chapter 1’s case examples, but their levels of group coherence also varied, likely contributing to early post-Soviet stability outcomes. In other words, in the 1980s the republics differed in both material conditions and group conceptions. In this section I describe how pre-Communist group formation and Soviet Communism helped vary these future levels of group coherence.

Pre-Communist Groups and Soviet Ethno-Federal State Formation

Consensus holds that national mobilization helped influence early post-Soviet secession (Beissinger 2002; Suny 1993; Roeder 2007; Hale 2008; Zürcher 2007), but two competing perspectives dispute the origins of these group movements. On the one hand, Soviet institutions are discussed as setting the foundation for national group mobilization (Roeder 2007; Hale 2008; Zürcher 2007). These scholars often claim that Lenin’s personal decisions, based on a belief of a quick world-wide proletariat revolution, set up institutional boundaries that enhanced the importance of ethnic identity and made groups central to politics and elite mobilization strategies. However,
institutions did not operate uniformly under communism nor did the boundaries dictate the same early post-communist secessionist outcomes. Accordingly, it is difficult to identify elite decision-making and communist institutional design as the cause of post-communist variation. On the other hand, scholars argue that early 20th century national mobilization played a role in shaping Soviet ethnic institutions, group movements, and post-communist political variations (Suny 1993; Suny 1994; Beissinger 2002). In addition to the qualities of Soviet modernity that helped make groups relevant to post-communist politics, this dissertation supports the latter contention and illustrates that groups themselves helped shape much of their coherence through intellectual activities and encounters with other groups and the state. I argue that there was not a unidirectional relationship of Soviet authority and institutions affecting group formation. Instead groups and ethnic institutions influenced each other.

As noted, this group-institutional thesis is in contrast to several scholars. I discuss a number of these arguments in Chapters 3 and 4, but first I focus on Phillip Roeder’s (2007) contention. Roeder (2007) claims that Soviet institutions promoted a singular identity and marginalized alternatives by providing a focal point, incentivizing coordination around an identity, allocating coercive resources, and producing common attachments. However, his institutional design thesis is historically questionable, as several groups likely helped shape the institutions.

For instance, Roeder argues that the Soviet Union’s ethno-federal institutional design was Lenin’s choice. He asserts that while the design was not related to a priori national groups, it facilitated the development of several groups, including the

---

26 Lenin built ethno-federal institutions to limit Stalin’s power by directly opposing Stalin’s plans for consolidation.
Ukrainians. To support the notion, he paraphrases Sullivant (1962, 45-65) and states that “Where the red army was in control...the non-Bolshevik governments had disappeared, and the leaders of the states that joined Russia in the USSR were dependent on the Red Army and had little leverage to press for a different type of constitutional order” (Roeder 2007, 58). However, the absence of a non-Bolshevik government and active party leaders does not illustrate the absence of mobilized national groups, nor that these groups could not influence Bolshevik concessions in exchange for order. Moreover, Sullivant (1962, 47-49) discusses Ukrainian nationalists as a primary reason the Soviets granted Ukrainians federal independence. “The struggle for the Ukraine was in part a national struggle, and Ukrainian nationalist and peasant bands fought against Russians and their allies...” (Sullivant 1962, 63).

Furthermore, after losing control of Kiev for the second time, the Bolshevik’s third military attempt to control the city and Ukraine came with a new policy.

By the end of 1919 it was apparent to Russian leaders that a re-evaluation of policy was necessary. Plainly they had achieved no successes in Ukraine either in forcefully suppressing opposition elements or in winning over non-Communist Ukrainians....Yet again there was the immediate need to establish some form of political authority over the republic...A comprehensive resolution was adopted, reformulating Soviet policy...The second proposition was the recognition that the importance of Ukrainian nationalism had been completely missed by Ukrainian Bolsheviks and that in the future it was the solemn obligation of all Communists to remove every obstacle to the free development of the Ukrainian language and culture and to oppose every attempt to reduce Ukrainian institutions to a secondary plane (Sullivant 1962, 52-53).

In other words, the more likely scenario appears that while those in control and supported by the Red Army could not challenge constitutional order, the countryside

---

27 Proposition one stipulated the “right of the Ukraine to self-determination” and independence (Sullivant 1962, 53).
and exiled governments (those that had overthrown the Red Army twice before in Ukraine) threatened sustained stability and influenced Soviet ethno-federal concessions. (The topic of Ukrainian nationalism's influence on Bolshevik concessions is further discussed in Chapter 4.)

Nevertheless, even if Lenin chose to establish federalism without having national concerns, groups inherently influenced each republic’s federal institutions in two ways. First, each republic’s institutions were designed to match the cultural diversity within and across the republics. Because these institutions were always in some way a reaction to an existing identity group, it does not correspond that groups were mere products of institutions. Consequently, groups and their diversity across republics ensured the content of the institutional design remained explicitly different. Second, each republic’s identity groups differed in quality, including their capacity to press for different rights under communism (Suny 1993). In other words, on the chance that groups were not the impetus for institutional designs, the group influenced how ethnic institutions operated.

In Chapter 3 and 4 I elaborate on this argument and illustrate how pre-communist groups helped shape future coherence levels and many future social repertoires. Specifically, I discuss how pre-communist groups that mobilized mass movements encouraged Soviets to develop ethnic institutional divisions that helped harden the identities of some of the region’s national groups.

---

28 Chapter Three discusses the pre-communist formation of groups and Chapter Four empirically elaborates upon how groups influence Soviet institutional design and how the Soviet experience influenced future group coherence levels.
Soviet communism and nation building

As national groups and Soviet leaders compromised and built ethnic based institutions and established national structures, they began to indirectly and directly build national groups. Early on ethno-national republics, regions, schools, language programs, censuses and passports all helped institutionalize and illustrate the role of national identities in several aspects of social and political life (Beissinger 2002, 50; Hale 2008; Roeder 2007; Suny 1993). Titular ethnic republics and regions centralized local political power around ideas of national culture. Schools and museums taught history and future goals in terms of cultural similarities and differences. As people encountered other ethnic groups, indicated or promoted by many of these institutions and programs, they could understand their own identity and that of another in terms of a mass population and its relationship to territory. Similarly, institutions helped homogenize and distribute ethnic symbols that helped further orient life chances around national groups (Hale 2008; Roeder 2007).

These practices, which would have made little sense in the absence of mobilized groups (as mentioned, these practices acted against communist ideological interests), reiterated and distributed the importance of national groups and made them more central to Soviet political activities. As Ronald Suny (1993, 126) notes “Nation-making in the USSR occurred within a unique context: a state that had set out to overcome nationalism and the differences between nations had in fact created a set of institutions and initiated processes that fostered the development of conscious, secular, politically mobilizable nationalities.”

Reforms, like national cultural autonomy and ethno-federal institutions, however, did not operate in the same ways across republics and groups. While they increased the
opportunities for some intellectuals to define their groups, and generated hierarchies that helped spread the importance of a group, these same features also stymied identity coherence for others.

I argue that the timing of group formation and Soviet imperial modernization largely influenced the different way these institutions operated and a group’s level of coherence in the 1980s. Groups that formed prior to the Soviet experience lacked fewer internal struggles and could more readily exert influence on the Soviet state in ways that allowed their group intellectuals to disperse identity conceptions and their group members to encounter others in a manner that hardened their identity. Conversely, groups that did not form a national identity prior to imperial modernization had more internal group struggles, could not obtain similar Soviet concessions, and experienced Moscow directed national development, which generated obscure and competing opportunities for intellectuals to disperse an identity and decreased the potential encounters that could have hardened a group’s identity. However, I also discuss the exception to these two trajectories and argue that mass movements and mass ethnic repression often helped harden group identities during the Soviet experience, even when the group had not formed prior to communism.

**Pre-communist groups and future group coherence**

Many of the groups that formed prior to communism lacked internal struggles, mobilized, and solidified a unique position within the Soviet Union. Specific group rights and autonomy provided opportunities for group intellectuals to build and disperse a common understanding; the ideological regime helped embed these groups’ identities and symbols into Soviet concepts (e.g. Ukrainian and Russian ‘founders of
communism’), which kept the groups’ salient;\textsuperscript{29} authoritarian control and threats often prevented non-group-members from having the same group privileges, which entrenched hierarchies that illustrated a group’s value within a republic; and Stalinist repression hardened identities.

First, prior group formation and mobilization allowed group intellectuals to continue to disperse a more singular identity conception. Many intellectuals from mobilized groups dropped their nationalist agenda (i.e. developing a sovereign nation-state) in exchange for political positions and the opportunity to continue many cultural practices, such as making their national tongue an official language in government institutions and exchanging information through school curricula and literature (For example, Ukrainian intellectual incorporation into the Party is thoroughly discussed by Radziejowski 1983, 110-113; Subtelny 2009; Magosci 1996; Mace 1983; 375-400; Borys 1960. While it is unclear whether this was a strategy of Ukrainian national elites to obtain power in the Party or a product of group desires, these groups that formed prior to communism and their group intellectuals influenced a Soviet compromise that made the future dispersion of their identity more likely to be wide-spread and homogenous.).\textsuperscript{30}

\textsuperscript{29}Other discussions of group ideas and symbols becoming embedded in communist institutions include Michael Bernhard’s (1993) discussion of the church in Poland, Jan Kubik’s (1994) assessment of communist institutions that “partially [remodeled] the existing cultures,” which helped keep symbols relevant (1994, 3), Keith Darden’s and Anna Grzymala-Busse’s (2006) exploration of mass education and literacy, and Philip Roeder’s (2007) and Henry Hale’s (2008) assessment of the Soviet’s ethno-federal system.

\textsuperscript{30}The compromises that had brought group intellectuals and concerns into the party, ultimately severed the group’s orientation and eased the Soviet’s victory over many national oppositionists. Naturally, while national armies and followers did not immediately or completely dissolve nor give up on desires to establish a national Ukrainian state, many followed their group leaders, and began to accept the rule of the new communist authority. Furthermore, these leaders’ new positions helped eliminate nationalist actions (attempts to align cultural and political borders) because any nationalism expressed by group intellectuals undermined their new authority. As Ken Jowitt (1992) extensively argues, Leninism’s near total claim on subordination supported the party, and when group leaders made nationalist claims they hampered the legitimacy that supported their new positions. Consequently, integration into the party...
Furthermore, the centralization of power brought many of these mobilized group leaders to top party positions. As power became increasingly concentrated but also nationally distributed, mobilized group leaders naturally gained higher positions within the party. The result of this centralization is that the total number of top communist authority positions decreased, but mobilized group leaders had the necessary group backing to obtain many meaningful spots. For example, while Ukrainian leaders, such as Mykola Khvylovy and Oleksander Shumsky, openly opposed Bolshevik authority and Russian nationalism in the 1920s, and quickly moved up the hierarchy, leaders of less mobilized groups were more often punished as illustrated by Mirza Sultan-Galiev, the Tatar communist, who was arrested for ‘national deviance’ in 1923 despite arguably much less contentious activity.\(^{31}\) Integrated into the state hierarchy and granted autonomy to develop cultural policy, group intellectuals from mobilized groups could interact with each other and their members, and build a more common group understanding. Additionally, as mobilized groups encountered changes in lifestyle and politics, under a weak centralized state their intellectuals had the authority and opportunity to organically develop their group’s cultural understanding and awareness in cooperation with other group members. Those groups that became part of the communist order helped undermine their opposition to communist rule and align their personal group interests with the forming state’s interests.

\(^{31}\) While Stalinist terror and purges in the 1930s came with the most dramatic crack down on coherent group autonomy and the death and execution of estimated millions (including the execution of both Khvylovy and Shumsky), centralization had established coherent group connections and a national policy. When the 1930s increased centralization over coherent groups, the identity and policy could not completely disappear (this is discussed in more detail in the section below “Coherent Groups and Communist Russification and Stalinist Terror”. The majority of books and newspapers in republics with coherent majorities remained in the titular language. Intellectuals who escaped the purges went underground or hid in rural areas, and waited for a new opportunity to arise.
continued to interact with the population and eventually developed a highly salient and
more common group understanding that both group intellectuals and the majority of
group members identified with and appreciated.

Second, interactions with different groups and the state varied. For example,
ideology embedded group ideas for mobilized groups. To co-opt many group interests
and meanings the Soviets embedded group symbols into communist practices and
institutions. Mobilized groups had many established symbols and organizations that
could be utilized to orient people in opposition and by incorporating their symbols into
the CPSU and its agenda the Soviets minimized the potential for contention. Instead,
group traditions and customs often became recognized as foundational to the
communist agenda and Soviet rituals. For instance, religious Christmas Trees became
secular New Year’s Trees (Новогодняя ёлка), Ukrainians became brothers and
partners of an Eastern Slavic Communist revolution, Russian Kremlins (in architecture
and name) represented authority’s seat, and Baltic bureaucracy gave way to the
region’s communist ‘national-accommodative’ ruling structure (Kitschelt et al. 1999). As
similar symbols supported both the group and the party, they no longer provided a
useful contradiction or source of opposition. For instance, the easily recognizable
symbolic tree could not represent religious repression because it was permitted and
legal under Soviet rule. Additionally, the symbolic tree was now also linked to Soviet
support and did not clearly represent the old perceptions or opposing views. Having a
tree or being Ukrainian, things people valued, became both acceptable and communist,
which helped minimize their role in ethnic-state contentions. Additionally, incorporation
of symbols helped square communist ideology with the national policy. The Bolsheviks
had originally described national groups as problematic to their ideals, but claiming various mobilized groups as foundational to the ‘Soviet Communist experience’ the Bolsheviks linked socialism and national groups and ended worries about compromising the ideology. They were now necessary to communist socialism. Nevertheless, as the Soviets applied and used a group’s symbols, they also kept the symbols active and possible for future reinterpretation and mobilization, should the opportunity arise. In other words, the integration of these group symbols helped mediate confrontation between communist authorities and ethnic groups, and it helped keep many group symbols active and embedded in state institutions.

Third, compromise and authoritarianism combined to entrench group hierarchies in a mobilized titular group’s republic or autonomous region by deterring both challenges to a titular group’s status and assimilation into their group.\textsuperscript{32} Specifically, when previously mobilized groups made their claims on autonomy, Soviet authorities agreed upon a general notion of ‘what’ and ‘who’ constituted each group, stipulated the identity in passports and official documents, and declared that it was part of a person’s official identity. With limited movement across groups and an inability to challenge hierarchies within these republics, the group rankings and privileges mobilized groups initially established remained intact. At the very least, these group members had an unmatched and uncontested ethnic privilege, which allowed them to devise their own group understanding and maintain many original apolitical cultural organizations despite heavy-handed authoritarian rule. Consequently, advantages for mobilized groups

\textsuperscript{32} Moscow’s heavy hand in entrenching these groups was likely due to a combination of reacting to demands by mobilized groups and attempts to limit the number of mobilized groups with which it had to compromise.
served as ethnic barricades, which ensured that they continued to demark the identity as important and kept their historical memories largely uncontested.\textsuperscript{33}

While communism did not remain uniform and Stalinist terror of the 1930s dramatically centralized authority and increased totalitarian rule over everyone, including mobilized group members, it did not decrease coherence levels for all groups.\textsuperscript{34} In many cases Stalinism reified the value and salience of previously formed and mobilized groups.

Totalitarianism under Stalin came with mass killings of many national groups, but instead of eliminating particular groups and their identities, the terror aided in the establishment of a cultural memory often around the atrocities and very meaningful interactions, particularly for previously mobilized groups who had become increasingly coherent during the 1920s. As Stalin (1912-1913) noted early on, repression ‘agitates a national minority.’

A minority is discontented not because there is no national union but because it does not enjoy the right to use its native language. Permit it to use its native language and the discontent will pass of itself.

A minority is discontented not because there is no artificial union but because it does not possess its own schools. Give it its own schools and all grounds for discontent will disappear.

\textsuperscript{33} While there were some unintentional exceptions that encouraged assimilation (further discussed in the case studies), titular groups that established their hierarchy in a republic or autonomous region could rarely be contested.

\textsuperscript{34} In fact, even as Stalinist terror attempted to dismantle all local nationalities, it did so by providing a Russian nation and denied the value of others, The Russian language is studied by the toilers of the whole world. In his time Marx paid tribute to the mighty Russian language, studying it and utilizing in his work primary sources in the Russian language... In our situation the Russian language is the language of the international community of people's of the USSR. Knowledge of the Russian language enables the peoples of the USSR to acquire the highest cultural values. [Also cited in Subtelny 2009, 422, and R. Sullivant, Soviet Politics and the Ukraine, 1917-1957 New York, Columbia University Press, 1962, 229-30]}
A minority is discontented not because there is no national union, but because it does not enjoy liberty of conscience (religious liberty), liberty of movement, etc. Give it these liberties and it will cease to be discontented.

Thus, equal rights of nations in all forms (language, schools, etc.) is an essential element in the solution of the national question (VII).

With extreme repression under Stalin’s 1930s terror, these groups’ national values did not disappear. While the party became more powerful and could repress these increasingly coherent groups more than in the 1920s, the repression primarily agitated these groups and fueled their discontent. For instance, as Ukrainian cultural displays were persecuted, it actively highlighted a meaningful difference in identities and connected the group to state and party politics. Subsequently, when opportunities arose during the Second World War and after Stalin’s death, previously mobilized groups, like the Ukrainians and the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, again pushed for rights and further transformed their identities.

Accordingly, mobilized groups’ early voices, both in the 1920s and following World War II, locked leaders and the identity into authority positions, which helped most hold cultural policy positions, allowing them to disperse a more united group conception and reinforce inter-group encounters that illustrated the group’s demarcation of life chances. With a mobilized population and political opportunities these groups more easily cultivated and monopolized territorial history, which facilitated greater salience and associations with more historical movements and perceptions that group mobilization was possible. Furthermore, it generated a national discourse and policy that would also impact groups that had not mobilized.
Pre-communist groups and future group incoherence

Similar features that had promoted coherent group formation – national autonomy, Soviet ideology, and authoritarianism – hindered coherence for others. First, in several republics where group formation remained weak prior to communism, Soviet ideological equality helped temper ethnicity as a determinant factor in social and political life by softening the distinction between groups and preventing the group from becoming a frequent marker of life chances. Without an identified community group around which members could mobilize and gain access to opportunities, communism became more appealing than the group. Second, national autonomy gave some groups the right to their identity, but centralized authoritarianism easily permitted outsiders, typically bureaucrats in Moscow, to dictate how these rights operated. With few organizational opportunities and facing heavy coercion, these groups could not effectively protest, and the Soviets either dictated who and what constituted the group or they attempted to eliminate the group (e.g. Ingush, Chechens, and Crimean Tatars). When Soviet authority dictated a group’s constitution it limited a groups’ opportunities to exchange information, organize, and associate in politics. Accordingly, their group intellectuals’ ideas were not incorporated into the Soviet descriptions and had limited range to disperse the identity, often through underground, non-officially sanctioned means. Consequently, at minimum, two group conceptions became dispersed to two different populations, each claiming representation of the whole nation.

35 In the case of group elimination, members were often forcibly removed from their homes, experienced stigmas, and underwent extensive repression and genocide. The attempted destruction was thought to remove the national group and any issues associated with it. However, while these groups did not always become highly coherent, their survivors often achieved increased group solidarity.
Finally, Stalinist totalitarianism often prevented the hardening of identities for weak pre-communist groups. Without prior group formation, Stalinist assimilation strategies faced less organized opposition and lacking self-directed cultural autonomy the groups loss of institutional cultural privileges generated less outrage (compared to groups who had previously ran their own cultural institutions).

First, ideology, specifically represented on beliefs in equal rights for all loyal laborers, limited valued inter-group interactions for many groups that did not mobilize. While mobilized groups received unique rights that entrenched their status and value, a republic or autonomous region with titular groups that did not mobilize more uniformly experienced access to the state. Additionally, communist ambitions for equality limited cultural prejudices and inequity within groups that did not mobilize. For instance, in many locations, such as Azerbaijan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan, Russian culture – the primary coherent ‘other’, due to planned migration efforts and their dominance in political and economic spheres, that could potentially act as a source for meaningful national differentiation – was tempered throughout the 1920s and after the Second World War. Those that urbanized during the decade were given fairly equal social and economic opportunities (i.e. minimal ethnic discrimination), and because these groups had few previous inter-group interactions, and their cultural homogeneity did not define their personal affections and life chances, many people shrugged off their national identity in favor of assimilating to the more dominant Russian culture. Low urbanization rates in many non-mass-mobilized groups’ republics also helped keep titular groups separated from urban cultures, which decreased the potential for
interactions with others that could illustrate the identity’s importance. Consequently, contact between groups was often limited, and when it occurred it did not cause considerable exclusion and repression nor did it provide a source of adoration and utility.

Second, centralized authoritarianism hampered the construction of groups that did not form prior to communism as it allowed different group descriptions to develop and be dispersed to different people. Despite the fact that national policy, like cultural programs and language promotion, helped form national groups, intellectuals from weak pre-communist groups, as well as those that lacked intra-group consensus and prior power, could not leverage the group to obtain party positions and were more often barred from authority and the opportunity to build group coherence. Even those intellectuals that occasionally held conversations, and established small underground networks with like-minded individuals, struggled to discuss their conceptions with party leaders and the community at large, which hampered an alignment between intellectual group conceptions and what the CPSU taught to other group members. Consequently, group intellectuals’ exclusion from authority positions in the party and national policy cultivated a shadow group understanding that differed widely from the mass public.

Finally, Russification and Stalinist terror in the 1930s further encouraged less mobilized groups to assimilate. Unlike mobilized groups who experienced repression of their valued traditions under Russification and intolerance toward their cultural autonomy, non-mass mobilized groups experienced repression of a less established

---

36 In Georgia, the Georgians were the urbanites and few other cultures had an opportunity to urbanize. The exception was Abkhazia and South Ossetia, where two mobilized groups interacted frequently with Georgians.
identity. The latter group members did not tend to readily identify with their group, which made them less likely to choose cultural maintenance at the expense of assimilation into the Russian community and the rewards that came with following Soviet policy. Additionally, during the 1930s the primary force that determined life chances and shaped politics was not Russian. Rather, in many areas all peoples, regardless of group, were repressed through Stalinist terror. In republics with non-mass-mobilized titular groups, people from all ethnic backgrounds were purged and groups did not offer a substantial differentiation. In other words, in the 1930s these groups did not systematically provide opportunities, pain, or affections, and without differentiation a group’s cultural homogeneity became minimally important.

Additionally, groups that formed prior to communism and the party’s hold on history limited the potential historical narratives that could be associated with weaker pre-communist groups. The latter could not call themselves another group or link themselves to narratives attributed to others, claim a different history, or discuss a history separated from dominant group conceptions. Instead, they were taught a particular historical narrative handed down and approved by Moscow (Suny 1993, 112-113; King 2000), which often represented Russians and other mobilized groups as successful actors, and those that did not mobilize as disjointed and full of internal dissent.

Not only were less mobilized groups built in relationship to the mobilized, most of the former groups’ symbols remained in local cultural spheres and did not become part of the CPSU’s image. The Soviets had little need to co-opt the interests and symbols of

37 Conversely, republics with mobilized majority groups lost their cultural autonomy, and often experienced substantial pain for their loses and affections toward their culture.
these groups. For example, as Romanians annexed Bessarabia with national claims after the First World War the Soviets articulated a Moldovan history, folklore, and language, but had no need to incorporate many Moldovan ideas into the Soviet structure. The Soviets easily dominated the Moldovan population and sought to purely articulate a group identity different from Romanians. Furthermore, as the CPSU began to build the Moldovan identity it determined the group’s associations. Typically Moscow, and at times Kharkov, used communist symbols to describe the Moldovans and primarily connected the people to local agrarian folklores and traditions. The group’s relationship with politics and authority was limited to Soviet or communist adjectives (e.g. the Republic of Moldova Communist Party of the Soviet Union) or local activities. In a sense, under communism the Moldovan identity became associated with very few spheres, and institutionally limited in its ability to describe and be described.\footnote{38}

**The paradox of ethnocide and deportation**

The Soviet focus on nationality also combined with the totalitarian dictator’s idiosyncratic actions to stimulate group coherence in rare cases. The Soviets implemented a variety of seemingly personally motivated, specifically targeted (e.g. Volga-Tatars, Crimean Tatars, Chechens, Georgians, Romanians) anti-ethnic policies, including deportation and systematic ethnocide. These repressive experiences then helped create a common national understanding and hardened the identities of both groups that did and did not form prior to communism.

\footnote{38 Nevertheless, groups that did not mobilize or develop national issues did not cultivate coherence under communism. While numerous minority groups spread perspectives about their group through party organs and newspapers, some groups never reached the attention of communist authorities. These groups that lacked a particular level of pre-communist salience, lived outside Soviet territories, or avoided national issues crept under the radar and did not develop widely under Soviet communism.}
The shared trauma of deportation and genocide anchored members of different groups with similar experiences and in their new locations, previously heterogeneous peoples became settled in close proximity. The relocated community now shared an experience and understanding of injustice, and living close together many began to develop a common language to communicate and describe their exile, homeland, and Russian persecutors. Once they repatriated, these groups had a fairly developed identity that they continued to build upon, underground and in direct contest to Soviet led identity conceptions. However, those groups that returned to their homelands prior to Soviet collapse had more opportunities to disperse a common understanding of their identity and have it mark life chances.

The longer a group lived in its homeland after repatriation and before the Soviet collapse, the more opportunities they had to disperse a common group understanding and undergo local discrimination. Once returned, groups lived in a smaller territory, compared to their previous dispersion throughout Eastern Russia and central Asian republics, and could readily interact with the entire community and distribute identity information (while in exile group members typically could not travel to visit their families or other group members outside their home in exile). Furthermore, these groups and their later generations of children could develop a sense of attachment to their homeland through conceptual descriptions and physical interactions with the territory. This was unlike groups who were only allowed to return closer to the Soviet Union’s collapse, or following it. Groups that returned later remained more dispersed for a longer period of time, and while in exile the distance and repressive Soviet regime increased the costs of communicating to the whole group, decreasing the potential to
develop a common understanding. Additionally, these group’s children had less potential to develop a physical relationship with their homeland territory, weakening its importance to the new generation, prior to Soviet collapse.

Finally, while during exile groups often experienced tolerant surrounding communities, when they repatriated to their homelands they encountered severe discrimination, including finding their homes occupied by Russians and others that would not return their property and many were systematically barred from jobs and political positions. These encounters illustrated the importance of each group and hardened their identities. Nevertheless, those unable to return until close to the Soviet Union’s collapse had a delayed relationship with everyday discrimination causing their identities to remain less salient.

For instance, when communists faced various national challenges during the 1940s, such as Stalinist paranoia of national movements and the incorporation of several new nations, the party attempted to eliminate the Crimean Tatars through deportation and denial of their existence. In the 1920s the CPSU made strong efforts to illustrate a unique Crimean Tatar nation, but after World War II the party sought to reestablish authority by attempting to make some groups disappear; largely through deportation and propagandizing terror. Nevertheless, the deportation systematically chose a particular collection of people, which illustrated the group’s difference from Russians and neighbors, and as a diverse population of Crimean Tatars were relocated in similar areas it allowed the group’s intellectuals to interact with the population, and the experience inspired many to speak out, regardless of Soviet retribution, which helped stimulate the group’s association with politics (Uehling 2004; Williams 2001). For
example, prior to deportation the Crimean Tatars had three distinct languages that later merged into a singular language. However, because the group remained exiled and dispersed longer than the Chechens (Crimean Tatars were exiled from 1944 to the late 1980s, and most returned after the Soviet Union’s collapse; Chechens were exiled from 1944 to 1957), the former had fewer opportunities to consolidate its identity, build a physical relationship with the territory, and encounter hostile Russians on a daily basis that would illustrate the identity’s importance.

Section summary

Groups that formed prior to communism were more likely to have fewer intra-group struggles and increase their group coherence under communism than those that did not form prior. The former obtained advantages within their republics that illustrated their group’s importance and increased the identity’s salience, but, within their respective republics and autonomous regions, titular groups that did not form rarely experienced advantages or disadvantages by way of their national identity, which limited their group salience. Intellectual opportunities to define the group and build solidarity also differed for both types of groups.

Rise of National Politics

As communism withered, in part due to the rise of national competition for political authority, national groups became the primary form of order across the former Soviet Union republics (Kitschelt et al. 1999; Suny 1993; Beissinger 2002; Roeder 2007; Zucher 2007; Hale 2008). As discussed in Chapter 1, several scholars explain the rise of this post-communist national political order through institutional factors (Bunce 1999; Laitin 2001; Toft 2005; Roeder 2007; Zürcher 2007; Hale 2008), psychological explanations (Kaufmann 1996; 1998; Hale 2008), elite theories (Zürcher 2007), and
modernization theory (Suny 1993; 1994). To offer further insight into these explanations, the section on “Soviet Communism and Nation Building,” along with Chapters 3 and 4 of this dissertation, illustrate the group influence behind Soviet institutional formation and how both groups and Soviet communism together engendered nation building and national identities that could be politically mobilized. Informed by this framework, in this section I briefly summarize the work of several scholars who discuss the timing and processes that helped elites and national identity produce new nation-states.

The timing of the Soviet Union’s collapse is most often associated with the decline in Soviet authority that opened opportunities for legal organization and mobilization outside the Party. For instance, Ken Jowit (1993) explains that the decline of Leninist charismatic and rational authority opened an opportunity for non-Party entities to claim to represent populations within the Soviet Union, and Gorbachev’s reforms continued the assault against Leninist charisma, which opened a public sphere to voice concerns (glasnost) and loosened central state control (perestroika) to a breaking point (Jowit 1993). Conversely, Andrew Janos (2000) has described a West-

---

39 First, how do we explain the timing of national mobilization in the 1980s and independence in the 1990s? After all, communist authority began to decline with post-Stalinist reforms (Jowit 1993), so why did it take nearly forty years for the national opposition to claim a monopoly on coercive authority? Second, why did national elites work together? And why did they oppose Soviet authority? Third, why did national republics secede? Finally, why did nationality continue to stratify politics after independence?

40 Utilizing the framework of Ken Jowit and decline of communist authority, one may stipulate that as the CPSU’s charismatic domination began to wither various ethnic groups became the locus of independent action and a source to legitimate changes in power and routinized authority. Communism’s charismatic Leninist party (Jowit 1993) and the Union’s patrimonial domination (Kitschelt et al. 1999) subordinated most of the former Soviet republics, and ordered individual’s lives until the early 1950s. Arguably, the mystic power of Leninist change dissipated as Khrushchev abolished Stalinism and declared communism. Khrushchev’s proclamation eliminated a clear bourgeois enemy, and the party could no longer completely subordinate the citizenry. Without class warfare others could ‘appear to stand for the individual against the domination of the group’ (Jowit 1999), and the most salient and organized alternative – nationalities – increasingly represented a source of legitimate power. Leninist charisma
East cycle of liberalism and conservatism that led to periods of relative deprivation, authoritarianism in Eastern Central European countries, and a breakdown in state authority. While Janos (1993) does not directly discuss the cycle in relationship to the Soviet Union, his explanation offers insight into the collapse. Essentially, the theory explains that eastern countries have attempted to deal with western material advances and eastern people’s desire for similar materials by developing conservative authoritarian practices. Authoritarianism acted as a means to forcibly generate the desired changes, often without sacrificing immediate political authority. However, as conservative authoritarianism in the east failed to keep up with western material advances, liberal reforms were taken (like those following Stalinism and later glasnost and perestroika), which hampered the regime’s authority, as happened in 1917 in Imperial Russia and the late 1980s in the USSR. Still others have described increasing international influences and challenges the Soviet Union faced as key sparks for the
changes witnessed in the 1980s and 1990s. Between military conflict in Afghanistan, a struggling economy, the collapse of the European communist bloc, the country’s general focus on military defense, and increasing foreign information, the Soviet system experienced extensive external pressure that pushed its structural arrangements (i.e. nationalism and a centralized state) to their limit. Consequently, with too much pressure and too much centralized authority, the state struggled to reform and maintain itself. Valarie Bunce (1999) has given an authoritative institutional account that stipulates the decline began as economic incentives replaced physical coercion, which removed resources from the center thereby weakening the regime, divided elites along utilitarian lines, and empowered society. What unites all these explanations is their emphasis on the decline of Soviet domestic authority. Whether the decline came from waning Leninist domination (Jowit 1993), materialist desire and relative deprivation (Janos 2000), external pressure on encumbered authority, or institutional design, these and other Soviet struggles likely combined with 1980s’ succession challenges, glasnost and perestroika, and a changing international landscape to weaken the Party’s monopoly on authority, enabling people to speak out against the regime.

These changes in opportunity structure allowed nations to organize as the primary opposition because national identities not only socialized people to internalize a group self and were composed of symbols communicable to a majority audience, but also due to institutional configurations, prompted by previous national mobilization, ethnic groups were the most developed large communities, outside the Soviet state.

---

41 Additional explanations for the timing of Soviet collapse are offered by the increased uncertainty about the communist regime (Kietschelt et al. 1999; Hale 2008), economic decline in general…. However, the debate of timing of communist collapse is beyond the scope of this dissertation.
Nationality had been the primary permitted form of non-state led rhetoric and organization throughout soviet communism, and, using nationality as the public motive, political and ethnic leaders effectively united during communism without facing significant threats from above, giving them an advantage over all other potential oppositional groups. Nearly all other non-state mass collectives had been repressed and did not exist independent of Soviet authority until the late 1980s (Il'ina 2000 66, 68, 133; Ziegler 1987, 62-63). While Pravda estimated over sixty thousand social organizations had become active across the Soviet Union by 1988 (Butterfield and Sedaitis 1991, 1), the newness of these groups and their previous limited social activity weakened their capacity and helped make national rhetoric a source of commonality and unity for their initiatives (Kietschelt et al. 1999). As the Empire liberalized in the 1980s, in terms of a policy that directly opened a public sphere to voice social and political concerns (glasnost) and a policy that indirectly loosened central state control (perestroika), national organizations and symbols continued to be the primary form of organization to express something other than the Party’s claims. With many people wanting to air grievances or challenge authority, nationality served as the accepted and most organized tool to do so.

While in the beginning glasnost only allowed groups to examine their national histories, such examinations often went on to reveal, within extensive public articles, atrocities in communist history, and particularly grievances against Stalinism (Wanner 1998). These early deviations from Party controlled information signaled both a wide scale decrease in the level of Soviet violent threat and illustrated a possible approach

42 The number is likely exaggerated and more in the thousands (White 1995; 1999, 12).
others could use to air grievances or gain more power (Beissinger 2002). United in
resentment to the Soviet Union, limited to national rhetoric and organization, and cross-
national learning that highlighted the effectiveness of national unity, national elites
typically reached a basic level of consensus within their respective republics.

Basic intra-group elite consensus and solidarity was also encouraged by
nationality-based prejudices. Informal Soviet restrictions on national identity often
hindered a leader’s opportunities within the Party, but actions toward national rights
actively elevated the political potential of national elites. While all elites would not obtain
equal privileges and positions, in the face of Soviet authority and prejudice, national
solidarity offered more rights and power than most nationals had had before.
Additionally, national elites and intellectuals offered a source of legitimacy that enticed
agreement between elites. Intellectual leaders often held trusted positions within a
national community, and their endorsements helped incumbent challengers gain wider
support and greater legitimacy through association (Cialdini 1999; 2001). Similarly,
nationality provided greater certainty for elite relationships as communism’s certainty
decreased (Hale 2008).

Beyond what nationality offered as an identity, it was politically and economically
of interest to elites. For instance, nationalism facilitated Yeltsin’s attack on Gorbachev
and helped elites across all republics unite against Soviet power (Bunce 1999, 107-
109). Additionally, within each republic material interests often helped elites unite
toward a common goal of national independence (Roeder 2007; Hale 2008).

While other forms of organization arose, the region’s social-political history
primarily limited organization to anti-Soviet nationalism. Labor and class movements
were heavily co-opted by the state, gender collectives lacked salience, multiple parties were not permitted, and most other collectives had not developed in the past nor were they allowed to organize throughout much of the early 1980s. Whether national mobilization occurred due to a decline of Leninist domination (Jowit 1992), economic decline, or increased uncertainty about the communist regime (Kitschelt et al. 1999; Hale 2008), the struggles the Soviets faced combined with glasnost and perestroika and enabled nations to become the primary opposition. The exact mechanisms of why national oppositions mobilized are also debated, but not necessarily contradictory. The expected payoffs of state loyalty decreased compared to switching to national loyalties (Roeder 2007, 111), and with increased opportunity elites could use the latter’s hegemonic symbols to organize (Roeder 2007; Zurcher 2007). Increasing uncertainty in the late 1980s and early 1990s pushed people toward nations, a collective they could better rely upon (Hale 2008). Nationalists sought popular mandates, something Gorbachev was not interested in, which allowed them to obtain mass support (Suny 1993, 145). Furthermore, nationalist rhetoric easily “transposed the idea of closure against economic competition and universalistic norms of individualism into the sphere of socio-cultural conduct and collective identities” (Kitschelt et al. 1999, 75).

Subsequently, the fifteen republics developed a level of elite consensus and national organization greater than the Soviet’s and most successfully mobilized against the Soviet state. As each republic seceded new nation-states emerged with majorities comprising the primary state-society relationship. While institutionalization of national

---

43 “The likelihood of success of the second-best project [national unity] must be so much greater that elites and intellectuals will calculate that their expected payoff – that is, the probability of success times their payoff f from a second-best outcome- exceeds their expected payoff from the first-best project [party loyalty].”
culture became a primary project, it is still underway in all of these countries (Suny 1993, Wanner 1998). However, prior to institutionalization of nationality, these new states needed to confront nationalist minority conflicts.

**National State Stability**

As Charles Tilly remarked, “The presence of a coherent revolutionary organization makes a great difference at exactly this point ["the moment at which some people belonging to members of the alternative coalition seize control over some portion of the government, and other people not previously attached to the coalition honor their directives, marks the beginning of a revolutionary situation"]. An organization facilitates the initial seizure of control, spreads the news, and activates the commitments already made by specific men.” (Tilly 1978, 208). Likewise, I argue that majority national group coherence, the revolutionary group that gained state power, was also essential to helping legitimate the post-communist nation-state. In particular, I discuss how majority group coherence and elite consensus prior to taking over the state, as well as political opportunities influenced internal group struggles, state stability, and minority group mobilization.

When majority groups take control of a new state, whether they become the only entity for organization, their salience makes them inescapably relevant, political, and potentially polarizing. For instance, partially founded by successful titular majority mobilization in ten states (Beissinger 2002, 210-211; Suny 1993)\(^4^4\) and ruled by a titular

---

\(^4^4\) While national mobilization was likely important to the Soviet Union’s collapse and subsequent nationally led states, the collapse itself and theorizing why national groups took initial power is beyond the scope of this dissertation. For more information on national and non-national causes of the collapse and subsequent national rule see developed discussions by Jowitt (1992), Hale (2008), Beissinger (2002), Roeder, Bunce (1999), and Suny (1993). The important point I attempt to make here is that where national groups came to power, the successor state clearly organized dynamically around national politics. Potentially, as modern intellectual ideas and interactions with other groups increased national
majority in executive and parliamentary institutions, national titular elites and titular majorities took power across fourteen of the former fifteen Soviet Republics. Composing the majority of society and government leadership, majority national groups constituted the primary state-society relationship. Consequently, those groups that resolved their intra-group struggles prior to taking power could readily bring co-nationals, previously unassociated with the movement, to support the new order. With a likely legitimate authority over half the population, obedience to commands were often morally justified and accepted, lowering the material costs of stability and, by definition, constituting a stable relationship within the group and allowing more resources to be used to resolve conflicts with minority groups (Bernhard 1993, 26, 27).

45 Kazakhstan is the one country without a titular majority, and consequently national identity was much less relevant and commonly understood entities in the region, and following the collapse they defined each successor state’s initial boundaries of political organization.

46 While stability is not impossible with overwhelming material resources (Bernhard 1993, 27), several of this dissertation’s cases had similar resources and levels of state capacity but varied in terms of group coherence and state stability.

Similarly, international influences are often discussed as shifting the power of groups. However, as I discuss in Chapter Five, international agendas and norms often defined the processes of conflict settlement, but played a minimal role in stability and violent secession. For instance, as Judith Kelley (2006) illustrates, the EU had little influence on the Baltics before the three states were offered conditional entry into the Union. Similarly, prior to conditional entry, Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians (all coherent groups) had successfully coped with secessionists. Instead, I argue a majority group’s ability to manage state affairs came from its coherence.
I argue that group coherence and elite consensus played a major role in helping resolve intra-group struggles prior to taking over the state. Coherence helped group members agree and cooperate as it reduced the realm of potential conflict, decreased opportunities for intra-group elite dissent, and organizational capacity enabled by group coherence provided an operational structure that reduced the costs of collective action and coordination, mitigating interest in other organizations (e.g. the costs were lower than developing an organization from scratch or joining one with less capacity).

Consequently, under these national majority group regimes, the end of intra-group struggle directly related to state stability. By definition, majority groups that legitimate their authority over group members have a stable state-society relationship with a majority of the population. With an obedient majority, the state then allocated more material resources to cope with minority conflicts. Conversely, titular majorities that did not eliminate their internal struggles prior to taking over the state lacked legitimate national authority and did not have an obedient majority. Instead the state split limited resources between coercing stability in the majority of society and coping with rebelling minorities, or, in some cases, they attempted to alter the state’s political organization. Similarly, minority groups that resolved intra-group struggles by the time of state collapse had more material resources to contest the state than those that continued to be divided, making more materials available to contest the state.

However, the minority’s opportunity to secede remained tempered by the coherence and elite consensus within the majority and the minority’s territorial density. As coherence and elite consensus helped resolve a majority group’s internal conflicts prior to gaining state control minorities had less opportunity to secede as their
grievances and demands were either effectively repressed or compensated by the majority. Conversely, without coherence and/or elite consensus to help resolve a majority group’s internal conflicts prior to gaining state control, minority’s had more opportunity to organize and secede.

Finally, only densely settled ethnic minorities could pursue an independence movement. Minimal density tempered the legitimacy of territorial claims and the allocation of resources to secessionist causes, making it easier for even weak majority groups to compromise and repress the movements. However, a more territorially dense group had greater legitimacy when challenging territorial authority and posed a challenge to all new nation-states.

Part V: Hypotheses

To examine why the outcome of Soviet collapse was different across states, resulting in violence in some and peaceful shifts of power in others, it is necessary to understand the tensions and relationship between more and less coherent ethnic groups that controlled the state and those that comprised the opposition or secessionist groups. When a new country has a territorially concentrated minority group, I propose five hypotheses and illustrate them in Figure 2-2.47

---

47Intra-group elite divisions were not deterministic for minority group mobilization and organization. Even when minority elites united immediately after state collapse, without a coherent national identity they lacked an organizational structure that would help successfully mobilize their populations. Lacking state and administrative tools and a developed pre-Soviet-independence group structure to help organize, incoherent minority groups struggled to collectively act. Similarly, coherent minority groups always had an incentive for intra-group elite consensus. First, if nationality systematically segregated minority group elites from political and economic opportunities, they all had an interest in working together to fight national biases. Second, if some national minority elites gained political opportunities within the new government and others did not, the group’s coherence would determine the potential for unity. A coherent group with only some national elites gaining from the post-communist arrangements faced minimal national opposition because those who sufficiently gained typically received sufficient resources to dominate their group’s national narrative/politics and a combined interest to not undermine their new positions (Hechter 2000, 49).
**H1**: A country with a coherent ethnic group managing the state and intra-group elite consensus will experience secessionist violence

A majority group with a coherent ethnic identity that controls the state and intra-group elite consensus will be forced to deal with a strong coherent minority opposition. The minority will effectively mobilize its members and form an organized opposition to the state, which will force the state to respond to the opposition’s demands either through repression or compromise. Because the majority is relatively powerful due to its coherent ethnic organization, limited internal struggles, elite consensus, and access to state resources, it is likely to have sufficient capacity to deter the opposition from violent secession.

**H2**: A country with a coherent ethnic group managing the state (with or without intra-group elite consensus) and an incoherent minority opposition will experience secessionist violence

A group with a coherent ethnic identity that controls the state will likely ignore a minority opposition that has an unclear identity. A minority group with an incoherent identity is not likely to articulate separation and, even if elements within the group do articulate separation, the state will have more than enough capacity to suppress them.48

**H3**: A country with a coherent ethnic group managing the state without elite consensus and a coherent ethnic minority opposition will result in secessionist violence

Where coherent titular majorities did not maintain intra-group elite consensus, factions (often some violent) within the majority emerged and in protectionist reaction to high levels of uncertainty, and often violence, coherent minority groups sought and

---

48 When coherent majorities encountered incoherent secessionist minority groups, only minimal elite consensus – national territorial integrity – was necessary to resolve the conflicts. These minorities observed a coherent majority that could easily impose its will upon them if elite consensus arose. With the majority able to attack with overwhelming force, incoherent minorities were not willing to violently oppose the majority’s will and national order.
achieved independence through secessionist civil war. Unlike incoherent minorities, coherent minority secessionists posed a threat to the majority’s territorial power and with majority group elites divided in their response to this threat, some in the majority were more likely to take violent action against the secessionists (often to gain national political support). However, coherent minorities did not see a violent rebuke as futile. Thus, when coherent majorities without intra-group elite consensus threatened or violently offended coherent minorities (as they often did in order to cope with minority demands), these minorities effectively used anti-majority nationalist rhetoric to mobilize and defend themselves through secession and, if need be, violence.

**H4:** A country with an incoherent ethnic group managing the state and a coherent ethnic minority opposition will result in secessionist violence.

An incoherent group that controls the state will struggle to collectively act and utilize the state’s resources. They will have minimal capacity to satisfy the demands of its constituents or bring order to unrest. However, a coherent minority opposition will easily act collectively and can effectively utilize their available resources. On the state side, elites mobilizing an incoherent group are likely to disagree and will be unable to take effective action. On the opposition side, the elites will be able to successfully organize resistance to the state and the group stands a good chance of successful rebellion.

**H5:** A country with an incoherent ethnic group managing the state and an incoherent ethnic minority opposition will likely result in violence, but not secession.

Again, an incoherent group that controls the state will struggle to act collectively and utilize the state’s resources. An incoherent minority opposition will utilize a catastrophic event, like the Soviet Union’s collapse, to legitimate their actions and
increase their coherence. Many in the opposition will mobilize and may even fight. However, the opposition will fail to efficiently collectively act and will be unable to mount a powerful rebellion. The group managing the state will struggle to bring order. As groups battle for power and no group brings order, chaotic violence will ensue.

Figure 2-2 summarizes the five hypotheses in a matrix. To examine Hypotheses 1 through 5, Chapter 3 establishes baseline, pre-communist coherence levels for six groups, Chapter 4 illustrates their interaction with communism, and Chapter 5 discusses how their coherence levels shaped post-communist order.
Figure 2-1. Group Coherence
Majority Group Elites

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Consensus</th>
<th>No Consensus</th>
<th>Consensus or No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>High Coherence</strong></td>
<td>Stability</td>
<td>Secessionist Civil War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Low Coherence</strong></td>
<td>Secessionist Civil War</td>
<td>Secessionist Civil War</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Minority Group Coherence

Figure 2-2. Following state collapse and high minority group territorial concentration levels, the power relationships of post-communist secessionist civil war, stability, and chaotic violence
CHAPTER 3
STRUCTURAL ORIGINS OF PRE-COMMUNIST GROUP COHERENCE

Wide consensus holds that national mobilization was essential to early post-
Soviet secession (Beissinger 2002; Suny 1993; Roeder 2007; Hale 2008; Zürcher
2007), but debate remains regarding the origins of these movements. Several scholars
assert that Soviet institutions were a precursor for national groups and later group
mobilization (Roeder 2007; Hale 2008; Zürcher). In general, they argue that institutional
boundaries enhanced the importance of ethnic identity and made groups central to
politics and elite mobilization strategies. While institutionalized borders, like Soviet
republics and autonomous regions, often followed ethnic lines, they did not form
independent of ethnic groups, lead to homogenous operation, or associate uniformly
with early post-communist ethnic mobilization. As other scholars have argued, pre-
communist and early communist national mobilization played a role in influencing Soviet
institutions, later group movements, and post-communist political variations (Pipes
1954; Suny 1993; Suny 1994; Beissinger 2002).\(^1\) To illustrate that institutions alone
cannot account for the post-collapse mobilization, in Chapter 3 I conduct a structural-
cultural analysis of six groups that illustrate variations in pre-communist group identity
formation. In doing so, I highlight those groups that formed a shared sense of identity
prior to communism, explaining their pre-communist organizational potential and
capacity to influence Soviet institutions. In the following pages I argue that some
groups, like the Ukrainians and Russians, became coherent prior to communism and
that others, like the Moldovans and Crimean Tatars, remained relatively incoherent. To

---

\(^1\) Pipes (1954) describes how groups influenced institutional variation, but obviously does not discuss
post-communism.
do so, I conduct case studies of Russians, Ukrainians, Moldovans, Crimean Tatars, Gagauz, and Volga Tatars. Each case examines how state penetration and its fluctuation facilitated group coherence, and its relative absence did not. These pre-communist legacies had important implications for post-communist conflict.

To do so, I conduct case studies of Russians, Ukrainians, Moldovans, Crimean Tatars, Gagauz, and Volga Tatars. Each case examines how state penetration and its fluctuation facilitated group coherence, and its relative absence did not.

First, state penetration in the Russian Empire increased in many areas as centralized educational and judicial systems, military conscription, industrialization, and roads and railways reached previously isolated peasant communities. These new systems and greater mobility between locations instituted both more uniform experiences among the state’s peasantry and meanings describing their experiences. For instance, centralized obligatory schooling organized student life along similar daily routines and using a formal Russian language taught common curricula and concepts. As common state features reached more people more frequently, people’s lives increasingly revolved around shared experiences.

Second, without complete state penetration, a task rarely achieved long-term (Binder et al. 1971), more than one identity formed, often creating cross-group encounters that hardened identities. While extensive state penetration could impede minority group formation by encouraging assimilation or by preventing the dispersion of a new mass identity through repression, the state’s incomplete reach created opportunities for people to support and disperse concepts not officially backed by the
state. For instance, the Hungarian and Russian imperial states did not completely foster assimilation or penetrate rural communities in Eastern Galicia (Western Ukraine), providing opportunities for Ukrainians to build non-Russian schools and circulate non-Russian newspapers.

Additionally, as Sydney Tarrow (1998, 19-20) argues, increased opportunities facilitate contentious politics. As state breakdown generated opportunities for mobilization, these groups tended to encounter one another or the state with some degree of conflict. For example, during the 1848 Hungarian revolution, the limited state control in Galicia allowed urban Poles and Ukrainians to encounter each other in various spheres. For instance, as universities in Lviv became more locally run in the late 1840s and early 1850s, Ukrainian and Polish professors could compete for positions teaching history and language. State breakdown created opportunities for non-state backed (e.g. Russian) identities to become dispersed and increasingly mark life-chances and affections (Darden 2014).

Finally, a lack of state penetration prevented people from dispersing a mass identity and developing systematic encounters that could harden an identity. Untouched by the state and with few technological and social changes, these regions lacked features that could facilitate a common sense of mass identity.

---

2 However, in some areas non-Russian identities became muted through effective policies. For example, Russification policies that deeply penetrated Belarus resulted in few salient distinctions between Russians and Belarusians (Hale 2008, 108). Additionally, Russian and Romanian state repression combined with extensive urban and rural imperial reach in Bessarabia to keep people from developing mass identities different from the rulers. Many scholars argue that wars and coercion help cleanout discontent and minority populations, helping homogenize the population and leave only the loyal. While this is often the case, the Russian Empires meager penetration left substantial opportunities for many minority ideas to continue to circulate and develop.
Table 3-1 summarizes the primary claims made for each case by listing the presence, fluctuation, or absence of state penetration over time. Without increasing state reach, a region’s population had minimal opportunities to disperse an identity or harden one through encounters with Others; these groups did not form before communism. However, with increased and imperfect state penetration, a region’s population had opportunities and encounters that stimulated some sense of collective identity, these populations formed a shared sense of identity. The Russians and Ukrainians experienced necessary processes to form, but Moldovans, Crimean Tatars, Gagauz, and Tatars along the Volga lacked many necessary processes, and remained fairly incoherent prior to communism. I expand on each group’s experience in their respective subsections.

**Pre-Communist Coherence**

In the Russian Empire during the 19th century, industry and Russian culture increasingly provided access to a new political and social life (in other areas of the “near abroad” the Poles, Austrians, Hungarians, and Prussians often offered a modern cultural distinction). Where the Russian state reached with schools, military, and transportation, it socialized people with state values and facilitated group integration, but, where it failed to, people avoided state socialization and in some cases built non-Russian identity conceptions. Despite some multicultural policies, imperial authority favored socialized Russians and differently treated those that did not assimilate. In its most intense form, the unequal treatment evolved to look down up non-Russian art and history and the state banned many non-Russian groups from owning businesses and holding political positions. Where Russianness and non-Russianness marked people’s
life chances, a border between groups began to harden. As Valerie Bunce asserts, empires were breeding grounds for nations.

Empires as subjective constructs generate constantly evolving judgments about equality and dignity, whether expressed in political, economic, social, or cultural ways. They create a powerful sense of insecurity, which is precisely why they, even more than states, it can be suggested, make the nation, with its promises of long-term equality, unity, and belonging, so appealing (2005, 420).

While the Russian Empire did not affect all groups in the same way, it fostered the creation of many pre-communist groups.

To illustrate why some groups shared a sense of identify and others did not, I first discusses early struggles in Russian identity building and then the increase in Russian Imperial state reach and its influence on Russian identity. Next, I examine how the state and Russian identity helped promote cultural distinctions that increased the value and salience of other groups.

Russians

Our common obligation consists in this that the education of the people be conducted, according to the Supreme intention of our August Monarch, in the joint spirit of Orthodoxy, autocracy, and nationality.

—S.S. Uvarov
Zhurnal Ministerstva Narodnogo Prosvescheniia

The Stirrings of a Nation: Early Russian History

At its height, the Russian Empire spanned from East Asia to Europe, encapsulating diverse religion, ethnicity, law, economics, and culture (Mendras 2012; Hosking 2001, 4, 17; Franklin and Widdis 2004; Goruff and Goruff 1994;; Riasanovsky 2005). Uneven state reach over the 19th century then helped harden much of the diversity by fostering a sense of Russian and many non-Russian identities.
During the 19th century, the Russian Imperial state increasingly backed industrial
development and nation building primarily in its western regions, including Moscow, St.
Petersburg, Kazan, Kiev, Donetsk, and Crimea. In these cities and surrounding rural
communities industry necessitated and encouraged literacy and urbanization (literacy
increased from less than 10% at the beginning of the 19th century to more than 40% by
1900 and the percentage of the population living in urban areas increased from 4% at
the end of the 18th century to 18% by 1917) (Szymańska 2004, 77-78). With more
people working in similar settings and receiving similar schooling, experiences and
interpretations of life and politics homogenized. In particular, Russian high culture and
peasant culture permeated the new working urban classes and formal education
system, solidifying a more singular perception of who lived in the Tsar's Empire. By the
late 19th century and early 20th century, the Russian identity began to harden within
these regions as old and new urbanites, as well as those politically opposed to the
Russian Monarchy, gained opportunities to develop a separate and often unacceptable
culture, equipped with a different language, customs, and political goals and loyalties.
Revolution and incomplete governance furthered these groups’ divides and the
formation of identities as non-Russian cultures were increasingly allowed to disperse an
identity and encounter Russians in ways that illustrated their cultural differences as
central to affection and life-chances.

**Encounters with a burgeoning imperial state and Europe.** Despite the
emergence of a more modern state, early encounters with a cultural Other, nation
building attempts, and intellectual movements, a mass Russian national identity did not
begin to harden until the late 19th and early 20th century. With limited state reach, most
of the Russian population remained isolated and without common experiences or means to receive common interpretations of life and politics.

The Russian state emerged with a Senate, Holy Synod, and colleges in the late 18th and early 19th century. In particular, a universal education program began in 1803, regulated by *The Charter of the Universities of the Russian Empire*, circulated common cultural characteristics. However, resources limited school expansion beyond major cities and the emerging modern state failed to reach the masses or bring isolated Russians together (Hosking 2001, 213, Ch. 5).

Following the Russian and French War of 1812, political movements began to use national rhetoric, helping draw a wider distinction within the Russian Empire and encouraging both the Tsar and intellectuals to more actively pursue nation-building projects.\(^3\) For instance, several Russian generals and nobles returned from Europe and the war to form an underground society, the Union of Salvation (later referred to as the Decemberist), which sought to transform the Empire into a constitutional monarchy. Upon Alexander I’s death in 1825, the Union used the opportunity to mobilize a December coup against the new Tsar, Nicholas I, with a goal to establish a free citizenry and rule of law. While united by a sense of patriotism and recognition of the importance of Russia as both multinational and an ethnically Russian state, their overthrow failed. Most participants were immediately killed, and others sent to Siberia. However, their actions called wide attention to their literary works, which included

\(^3\)Napoleon Bonaparte’s 1812 invasion of the Russian Empire illustrated differences in two monarchies, but was not culturally defined at the time. It is widely asserted that Napoleon’s harsh treatment of Russian peasants and lack of desire to free the serfs, as he had done in several other countries, helped mobilize the countryside’s support of the Russian army. Generals, soldiers, peasants, and serfs, at their peak of 910,000, had come together against a political and imperial “other,” but most did not characterize the distinction as cultural (Hosking 2001, 260-265; Garb 2003).
constitutions, poems, goals, and notions of ‘everyday Russian people’, the peasantry (Jahn 2004, 60). These events and works provided a focused, romantic view of a potential Russian population, and in its wake the Tsar’s nation building program, the doctrine of Official Nationality or “The Triad,” began, a program that various intellectuals would eventually harness to help cultivate a national identity.

In 1833, following the revolts and increased romantic nationalism in Western Europe (Hoskings 1998, 144-150; Pipes 2005), Nicholas I reconsolidated authority and implemented the universal education program, Official Nationality – Orthodoxy, Autocracy, Nationality (Правосла́вие, самодержа́вие, наро́дность).4 In addition to devotion to religion and Tsar, the program specifically highlighted the ‘people’, the *narod*, but did not clarify ‘who’ and ‘what’ it constituted. Petr Chaadaev (1794-1856) echoed the *narod’s* vagueness, when he stated in 1836 that Russians lacked history, morality, and contribution to the world (Jahn 2004, 61; Hosking 2001, 274). Nevertheless, the vagueness in concept opened an opportunity for intellectuals to define the *narod* and disperse their ideas through the developing Russian state. Early on, two prominent Russian visions emerged – Slavophiles and Westernisers – that helped establish a dynamic discourse across intellectuals, the nobility, and a mass population.

There were competing visions of who the Russian people were and two groups competed over the loyalty of the peasantry. The Slavophiles largely asserted that peasants represented the *narod*, and that they stood in opposition to a repressive westernizing monarchy. They believed the peasant culture should dominate, with the

---

4 Sergei Uvarov (1785-1855) is typically acknowledged as a primary advocate and designer of the program.
nobility acting and behaving more like peasants. While the westerners also believed the narod included the peasant masses, they claimed that noble culture should educate and enlighten the peasants (Jahn 2004, 61-62; Hosking 2001, 275-279; Hutchinson 2000, 654). Whether the narod would reflect the nobility's behavior and culture or the peasants', the two sides helped focus the early intellectual debate about Russian identity. While the Empire entered the 19th century with only vague notions of a national state, the national identity would not remain undefined and minimally distributed for long.

**State Penetration: Industrialization and Modernization**

Following substantial emotional and physical losses in the Crimean War (1853-1856) and fears of western romantic nationalism spreading into Russia, the state began a radical industrial development program. As Nikolai Chernyshevskii wrote in the late 1850s,

> It is clear to everyone that since the conclusion of our last war Russia has begun to take a more active part in the general European economic evolution. Everyone can see the rapid intensification of our industrial activity. Our private capital, moral and material, is emerging from its lethargically idleness; foreign capital is beginning to find profitable and secure investments here. A part of it has already been transferred to our country in large sums; another part is ready to migrate to us shortly in yet more significant amount. There can be no doubt about the consequences of such developments. (Chernyshevskii 1948, 303)

Partially in reaction to the west and in an attempt to conceive a modern Russia, industrialization projects became more prevalent (Shevyrev 1941, Miliukov 1978, 150), and as they increased the state's reach, industry helped disperse a Russian identity and

---

5As S. Shevyrev (1967, 219), a Moscow University Professor wrote in 1841, "The West and Russia, Russia and the West -- here is the result that follows from the entire past; here is the last word of history; here are the two facts for the future." Also quoted by Suny (1997, 36).
encouraged cultural encounters that increasingly shaped life-chances and affections (Suny 1997, 28).\textsuperscript{6} In particular, the emergence of centralized education, developed infrastructure, and exclusionary policies helped disperse and harden a Russian ethnic identity.

**State centralized education: military conscription, primary schooling, and printed texts**

State directed industrialization came with increased state reach that helped disperse common cultural characteristics through the military, schools, and print media. As Eugene Weber (1970) notes in France, universal military service forces the use of a common language and illustrates a connected, alternate way of life, and state directed education provides more homogenized "suggestions of alternative values and hierarchies; and of commitments to other bodies than the local group" (338). Furthermore, Benedict Anderson (1983) illustrates that as common literature reached the countryside through print media it helped shape a sense of simultaneity that allowed people to imagine those beyond their local towns. Common literature also provided a shared reference point for encounters with non-locals and inspired a culture the dispersed masses could similarly reflect. Consequently, as the Russian state reached more peasants and people through the military, centralized education, and print media a common Russian identity became dispersed.

Compulsory military conscription helped bring many in the population into direct contact with the state and formal education. During the early 19\textsuperscript{th} century peasants experienced extremely hard conditions in the military, including twenty-five years of

\textsuperscript{6}A number of scholars discuss the Russian defeat during the Crimean War and how it instigated imperial reforms (e.g. Confino 1972, 132 Skocpol 1979, 84-85; Hosking 2001; Ch. 7)
active duty and savage corporal punishment, causing many to take any measure to avoid service, but military reforms in the 1860s and 1870s quickly increased the number serving (Miliukov 1978, 46). By 1874, nearly all males aged 20 served six years and received elementary education, helping increase literacy among military recruits to around forty percent in 1900 and sixty-six percent by 1913 (Arnove and Graff 2013, 127; Rashin 1951, 37). While participation in higher education augmented one's time in the military, non-military education programs also developed literacy and increasingly utilized a centralized curriculum.

Regional government centers, zemstva, connected locals to the centralized bureaucracy and an increasingly common educational curriculum. The ministry of education facilitated central control through inspectors (inspektora narodnykh uchilishch) that oversaw each school and school district, about one inspector for every fifty schools (Folge 1999, 164). While Russian oversight did not achieve the same levels of conformity and power that arose in Germany and England, inspection of schools is widely cited as a source of state penetration and nation building (see Folge 1999). Even when strained by limited finances and physical barriers (inspectors often had many schools to observe with limited ability to travel to provincial areas, preventing complete monitoring and enforcement), Russian inspectors and the centralizing education system spouted national ideas and facilitated substantial increases in literacy and national education. In effect, the Zemstva provided crucial elementary schooling (Eklof 1986, 72-83, 128-154). As the academic philosopher, Daniel Bell Leary wrote in 1919, “Autocratic Russia, like Germany, had a highly centralized national system of

---

7 уезд, some translate as county.
education, with very definite national ideals, and a highly specialized conception of mass and class..."(10). According to a number of surveys, by 1890 the majority of children (those under 16 years of age) in the empire attended, finished, or had not yet attended school. Regional studies illustrate that upwards of 90 of percent children in some regions attended school during the 19th century’s last decade and developed similarly high literacy rates with substantial retention. For instance, modest estimates indicate that by 1914, 60% of children eight to eleven years old were in primary schools and the adult literacy rate had improved to 40% across the Empire (Arnove and Graff 2013, 128-130).

Increasing access to books and newspapers also helped spread national ideas and a common culture. From 1881 to 1895 the number of books and periodicals published each year in Russia increased from 6,508 to 13,247, and the number of libraries and bookstores also increased. By the end of the century provinces in European Russian averaged 17 libraries a piece and the region had over 1,325 bookstores in total, excluding St. Petersburg and Moscow (the latter cities increased their bookstores from 54 and 76 in 1867 to 153 and 181 in the mid-1890s, respectively) (Yukiko 1981, 163). With greater access to print materials, newspaper circulation increased. While the total circulation of newspapers is difficult to estimate, Russkoe Slovo alone had over 1 million readers before the end of the century. The importance of mass distribution of print materials is well discussed by Benedict Anderson (1983). As Anderson (1983) illustrates, novels and newspapers help shape a sense of simultaneity that allows people to imagine those beyond their local towns. Newspapers have multiple

---

8 Eklof, Ben, "Myth of the Zemstvo School", pp. 576-579; Also cited by Arnove and Graff (2013, 130)
events juxtaposed with a singular date and novels piece back and forth between different scenes happening at the same moment in time, helping people picture a mass population concurrently acting. The distribution of common literature also provides a shared reference point for encounters with non-locals and inspires similar cultural characteristics a dispersed population can reflect. Consequently, the state’s increasing reach and homogenized literature further provided common cultural notions.

Within the Russian identity’s many contours, Russian literature and history developed. In particular Under the Tsar’s direction, education programs through the military, schools, and print media incorporated the Russian intelligentsia’s literary language and many notions of Russian writers and artists, often incorporating the currently deemed “Golden Age” of Russian literature into its curriculum, which together helped describe the Russian identity more deeply, universally, and made it available to a wider population. As Darden and Grzymala-Busse (2006) and Darden (2014) illustrate, early nationalist mass education that gave way to a literate population helped national groups form allegiance and durable ties. “Once initially established through the schools, national identities are preserved and reproduced over time within families and reinforced by local communities in a way that makes these constructed identities virtually highly resistant to significant change or substitution over time” (Darden 2014, 1). Consequently, as Russian education and literature combined it began to develop a united Russian community. Many writers and historians are well known for profoundly contributing to this period and a more developed Russian identity, including Ivan Turgenev, Fedor Dostoevsky, Leo Tolstoy, Anton Chekhov, and Maxim Gorky (Alexei Peshkov).
In *War and Peace*, Tolstoy (1869, 1978) challenged common notions that leaders’ calculations or mass cultures drove nations, and illustrated that the solidarity of the entire collective, “the activity of all the people who participate in the event” produce the movement of nations (1869,1978, 1425). The concept further bridged cultural notions of the *narod*, and helped culture appear unrelated to class origins. Dostoevsky, Gorky, and Belinskii are often noted for their descriptions of the ‘Russian Soul’, which embodied many features, such as the suffering and hope of the Russian *narod*. These writers exemplified romantic notions of the peasant, which exemplified the soul’s plight and optimism (Riasanovsky 2011, 341-349). Nikolay Nekrasov’s poem, ‘Who is Happy in Russia?’ (Кому на Руси жить хорошо?) illustrates the peasants emerging role in the Russian identity and connection to suffering and hope:

The heart of each peasant/ Is black as a storm-cloud,/ Its thunder should peal/ And its blood rain in torrents;/ But all ends in drink--/ For after one cupful/ The soul of the peasant/ Is kindly and smiling;/ But don’t let that hurt you!/ Look round and be joyful!/ Hey, fellows! Hey, maidens!/ You know how to foot it!/ Their bones may be aching,/ Their limbs have grown weary,/ But youth’s joy and daring/ Is not quite extinguished,/ It lives in them yet!

Dostoevsky’s conceptualization of Russians resonated well with an increasingly literate public (52% literate in urban areas by 1897 and 32.6% literacy throughout urban and rural European Russia), as it likely illustrated a reason for hope amidst suffering. In his final book, *The Brothers Karamazov*, he connects hope to Russian faith and an existing structure of society, the Church.

---

9 The difference between young and old literacy in 1897 census illustrates a likely increasing literacy rate for the surrounding years. Thirteen percent of those over 60 years of age were literate compared to those aged 50-60 years who had a 19% literate rate; those aged between 40-50 years, 23%; 30-40 years, 27%; 20-30 years, 32%; and 10-20 years, 34% (Timasheff 1942, 82). Furthermore, 40% of military recruits reported to be literate (Arnove and Graff 2013, 127).
For it is by her people that Russia will be saved….The people will rise up against the atheist and subdue him, and a unified Christian Russia will appear under the Russian Orthodox Church…The Russian people are a God-bearing people (1880, 2003, 421).

In theater, Anton Chekhov and Maksim Gorkii illustrated the lives of ordinary Russians from the lowest classes to nobles (Jahn 2004).

Historians also began to define the Russian narod, and the growing educational system helped distribute their works widely. Sergei Soloviev (1820-1879) and his student Vasili Alichevsky produced the *History of Russia*, a volume updated yearly and taught throughout Russian schools. Vladimir Solovyov became arguably the era’s most important Russian historian when he most famously wrote *The Justification of the Good*, which detailed shame, pity, and reverence as central to a moral and Christian public and private life. These writers and artists articulated a vision of Russians, their situation, and their future. While no complete consensus developed or ensured that these authors and their works would continue to contribute to the Russian identity, their discourse articulated a Russian culture and its importance to a wide Russian audience. At the very least, as Benedict Anderson (1982) notes, novels and history books alone helped conceptualize time in a way that allowed people to view those beyond their towns as simultaneously acting.

---

10 Hosking (2001, 351) also partially quotes this text.

11 These writers often continue to represent a ‘golden age’ within the collective memory of Russians, and help characterize the Russian narod and language as essential to literature and art throughout the world. However, the period and works, like all things historical are fashioned to meet the expectations and needs of the present. For instance, the literary “Golden Age” filled with suffering and hope that intended for a more socially beneficial world, is often used today to describe literature and art as the greatest hope amongst the suffering. Such a narrative, while potentially reasonable, is particularly advantageous to those who wish to keep people at rest.
Furthermore, these works found their way into local newspapers and school curriculum, stimulating a national vision and conversation with the masses. For instance, Tolstoy’s *War and Peace* was a serial released in the magazine *The Russian Messenger*, and during its time and forward it became widely discussed in newspapers from *Golos* to *Vsemirnu Trud*. Local *zemstva* helped direct and coordinate the educational curriculum, teaching literacy and integrating Russian literature and history into daily life, such as Sergei Soloviev’s and Vasili Alichevsky’s (1820-1879) the *History of Russia*, which was increasingly taught throughout the Empire’s schools.

In addition to national writings published in ‘thick’ journals, illustrated journals, called ‘thin’ publications, or *lubki*, also helped increase the reach of news and spread of common culture. As Hubertus Jahn (2004, 67-69) discusses, *lubki* (the illustrated images distributed like newspapers) increasingly depicted Russian people with particular clothes, houses, and dances juxtaposed in the foreground to common national symbols, like the Moscow Kremlin, basilicas, or palaces in St. Petersburg (67-69). The pictures helped link common national symbols to people throughout the countryside.

Increasing state reach helped disperse a centralized, common notion of Russian culture. Through military conscription and primary school education the Russian language was taught, increasing literacy rates and the distribution of common notions of Russian history and future. With increased literacy and means to print and distribute writings, newspapers and novels also spread national ideas, including conceptions of the Russian nation and soul. As John Slocum (1993, 59) argues, by the 20th century,

---

12 Thick Journals, tolstye zhurnaly; Thin Journals, tonky zhurnaly; Illustrated Journals, lubki
“nationality had become a politically salient category - and nationality politics, an anachronistic term when applied to Russia prior to the mid-nineteenth century, had become a central feature of the political landscape.”

**Infrastructure: railways, factories, and urbanization**

Railways and factories further expanded the state’s reach. Together, these new industrial technologies decreased the costs of travel and urban living, bringing people previously geographically and economically isolated into contact with one another. With increased contact, these people were more likely to meet diverse members of their common community, envision simultaneity across vast spaces, experience similar encounters with ‘others’, easily disperse identity conceptions and literature, and begin to develop a common culture.

The Empire’s railroad expansion from 1838 to 1905, in particular, (the Empire’s railroad tracks increased from virtually zero to covering over 37,000 miles) stimulated the potential for identity development (Ascher 1988, 19). First, the rails increased the transportation of foodstuffs from the countryside to urban areas, allowing population density to increase. Second, serving as a common means of transport for all classes, railroads forced peasants and nobles to interact. Similarly, as people from cities, towns, and villages had increased means to travel in between their locations and interact with different classes, the Empire’s geographic and economic divides weakened. Third, transportation brought new tariffs to the countryside that put in place government regulators and tax collectors that uniformly guided people’s behavior with the state (Hamburg 1984, 164-190).

State directed industrial growth also came with factories that facilitated urbanization, theoretically bridging geographic and economic class isolation. New
industrial factories both lowered the value of rural goods, encouraging peasants to seek work in cities and helped sustain a highly concentrated city population by labor commoditization. Increasingly, the formally isolated rural peasants and elites began to inhabit the same geographical area (Hobsbawm 1990 120). By 1910, fifteen percent of the Russian Empire lived in urban areas, approximately the same proportion of urban France and Germany in 1850, respectively (Bairoch and Goertz 1986, 288). Table 3-2 illustrates the growth of European Russian cities from 1800 to 1910; over the century, the population in these cities alone increased from roughly 750,000 people to 5,759,000 people.

By 1914 the Russian Empire had the fifth greatest industrial production in the world (Ascher 1988, 20; Jeffires 2013, 1; Aganbegyan 1988: 45-47). As industrialization expanded the state’s reach, by providing increased means of transportation and growing cities, it also helped the country’s potpourri of classes increasingly interact with one another. In the next section I discuss how increasing state reach and political development helped shape and harden the Russian identity. As Katkov wrote before the end of the 19th century, “there is in Russia one dominant nationality, one dominant language, which was developed by centuries of historical life.” Despite the empire’s diversity, they all felt a sense of unity with “the Great Russian world…” “in the unity of the state, in the unity of the supreme authority in the Tsar” (Katkov 1887, 100-101).13

Encounters and hardening a Russian identity through Russification

While state reach and the spread of national ideas helped bridge geographic and class divides, they also created political encounters that helped harden the Russian identity. During, and following, the Turkish War (1877-1878) Russian leaders embarked on developing a unified ethnic community. As Hoskins (2001, 334) remarks, a common Russian culture increasingly became promoted:

Alexander II and Nicholas II ...tried to draw the non-Russian regions and people more securely into the framework of the empire, first by administrative integration, then by inculcating in each of them as far as possible the language, religion, and culture of Russia, leaving their own traditions as subsidiary, colorful ethnographic remnants rather than active social forces.

The prominent newspaper editor Mihal Katkov echoed the march to Russify the masses in the Tchaikovsky Gazette, “It must be one thing or the other...either Poland or Russia...In the ethnographic sense there is no antagonism between Russians and Poles...But Poland as a political term is Russia's natural and irreconcilable enemy.”

However, harsh treatment of non-Russians, justifications of this unequal treatment, and uneven implementation of Russian cultural policies solidified differences between groups.

Harsh treatment of non-Russians allocated rights and privileges to those with Russian cultural characteristics and limited those of non-Russians. As Hans Rogger remarks:

The search for legal-administrative uniformity and order and the principle that the empire was a unitary Russian rather than a multi-national (and

---

14 Kappler (2014, ch 6) extensively discusses the rise of nationalist Russification policy.

15 V.A. Tvardovskaia, Ideologiia poreformennogo samoderzhaviia (Moscow: Nauka, 1978, 26); Martin Katz, Mikhail Katkov: A political Biography, 1818-1887 ( The Hague: Mouton, 1966, 83); M.N. Katkov, Sobranie peredovykh statei Moskovskikh Vedomostei 1867g (Moscow, 1897), 265; Hosking 2001, 333
much less a federal) state was never abandoned. Indeed, the more the principle was challenged by facts and by demands for autonomy, the more vigorously it was asserted. (Rogger 1983, 182)\textsuperscript{16}

In particular, the unequal distribution of power and access to education, as well as the denial of non-Russian ethno-linguistic groups and banishment of non-Russian literature and education, stipulated through various mediums and every day advantages who was Russian.

The unequal distribution of Zemstvo illustrates a growing awareness of national distinctions, and it also helped entrench national political advantages. At the same time Zemstva and Russian schools expanded into new rural areas, they avoided regions dominated by other nationalities, such as Poles and Lithuanians (Eklof 1986, 72-83, 128-154). Slocum (1993, 88) argues that the avoidance of non-Russian areas illustrates the states early distrust of non-Russians. “Self-government, even in the limited form represented by the zemstva, was not to be placed in the hands of local elites whose loyalties might run counter to the interests of the Russian state” (1993, 88). By devolving state power and financing schools in only Russian dominated areas, Russian nationals gained political advantage across the Empire.

Furthermore, Russian nationals received substantial political and educational advantages within their region and zemstva. The zemstva actively barred Jews and allowed only delegates to be those “not belonging to the number of persons of Polish descent [ne prinadlezhashchie k chislu lits pol'skogog proiskhozhdeniia].”\textsuperscript{17} The Ministry of National Education (MNP) also ruled on February 22, 1869 that “on measures for

\textsuperscript{16} Cited in Slocum (1993, 52)

\textsuperscript{17} Cited in Weeks (1996, 148).
ensuring the teaching of Holy Scriptures in Russian language by Roman Catholic priests,” that Russian language exams, history, and geography be necessary for enrolment, advancing in grade levels, and graduation (Ministerstvo Narodnago Prosveshcheniia 1871, 1070-71). In other words, the Russian language became mandated as the primary language in educational and religious affairs (religion being the previously most salient line of cultural distinction in the Empire). The state also actively closed non-Russian schools. As Education Minister D. A. Tolstoi notes,

In consequence of this I ordered the Curator to present me with considerations of the closing of those Gymnasiums and Progimnazii of the Circuit where the number of Orthodox students is insignificant, and on the conversion of the sums assigned to these schools to the organization in that Circuit of women’s education in the spirit of Russian nationality [narodnost’]. (Tolstoi 1871, 926)

The paragraph illustrates two important facts. First, the distinction being made by the MNP regarding school policies was Polishness not Catholicism – national and not religious. Second, the State Council began to provide greater school access to Russian children and limit access to Polish Catholics (Slocum 1993, 105).

As elites denied the difference between Russians and Others they ascribed group differences and reified borders, stimulating a cultural divide. Statements like those from the Minister of the Interior P.A. Valuev, perhaps illustrate how the denial of a Ukrainian culture, fostered both a Russian and a Ukrainian identity. In 1876 Valuev explained, that the Ukrainian language “never existed, does not exist and shall never exist” (Subtelny 2008, 282), and claimed,

Permitting the creation of a special literature for the common people in the Ukrainian dialect would signify collaborating in the alienation of Ukraine

---

18 Cited in Slocum (1993 103-104)
19 Cited in Slocum (1993, 105)
from the rest of Russia...to permit the separation of thirteen million Little Russians would be the utmost political irresponsibility, especially in view of the unifying movement which is proceeding alongside us among the German tribe. (Hosking 2001, 336)

Valuev’s refusal to permit Ukrainian culture inherently acknowledged the group’s existence and highlighted political, acultural motivations for unity and division. As the two groups became politically differentiated, more cultural characteristics, like clothing and songs, became associated with the two groups as well as a particular politics, monarchy versus rebellion.  

The ban on non-Russian literature and education further reified differences in groups. For instance, despite the renunciations of Ukrainian culture, the continued critical and popular success of Ukrainian writings led the Tsar to ban the language from all publications in 1863 (Shkandrij 2001, 130-133). However, underground and rural movements continued to advocate for the Ukrainian language, particularly focusing on cultural features missed by the Tsar’s ban. Intellectuals avoided the Tsar’s 1863 law by circulating previously written historic Ukrainian works, writing in the Russian language to advocate for Ukrainian language rights, and producing Ukrainian language plays. In response, the Tsar signed additional laws in 1876 and 1881 that banned Ukrainian historical documents and Ukrainian theater (Solchanyk 1985, 60-62). Through each ban the Russian state implicitly recognized differences in Russian and Ukrainian languages,

20 The encounters also highlighted the Russian identity from the perspective of Ukrainians. For instance, Mykhailo Drahermanov described, Ukrainians as a ‘plebian nation’ of oppressed and toiling masses and Russians as increasingly cruel, monarchic rulers (Subtelny 2008, 285). (Specific encounters between Russians and Ukrainians are discussed more in the Ukrainian section).

21 Minister of the Interior, Petr Valuev largely designed the plan (Shkandrij 2001). Roman Solchany in "Language Politics in Ukraine discusses the changes in policy.  
http://shron.chtyvo.org.ua/Solchanyk_Roman/Language_Politics_in_the_Ukraine_anhl.pdf
history, and theater/performance, reifying a growing divide between the two groups. Eventually Ukrainian intellectual efforts for recognition achieved success within several universities, including the Russian Academy of Science, The Universities of Kyiv, and the University of Kharkiv, where each acknowledged Ukrainian as a separate language and put pressure on the Tsar to repeal the ban on Ukrainian publications. The Council of Ministers and Tsar refused to lift the ban, but eventually and briefly changed their position during the social upheaval preceding the 1905 Russian Revolution.

Education that favored Russian culture also hardened the Russian identity and made Russian culture more salient. For instance, in the Baltic regions students witnessed their parents’ languages receiving more or less privilege and prominence. Early in the 19th century, elementary schools taught local languages for two years and Russian for three years (Suny 1997, 46).22 By the end of the 19th century many schools could no longer teach in non-Russian languages (Slocum 1993, Ch. 3 and Ch. 4). The growing ethnic divide and its penetration into schools is also illustrated by the state organized conference on education and inorodtsy (non-people or foreigners). The conference concluded that,

The ideal school from the point of view of state unity would be a unified school for all the narodnosti [peoples] of the Empire, with the state language of instruction, not striving for the repression of individual nationalities (natsional'nosti), but cultivating in them, as in native Russians, love of Russia and consciousness of her unity, wholeness [tselost] and indivisibility. Heuman (1998, 216) 23

---

22 Suny notes that religion and church singers were exempt.

23 Also cited by Suny (1997, 47-48)
As Susan Heuman points out, the state sought assimilation but realized that “the majority of the empire’s population was not and never would be truly Russian” (1998, 256).

Discriminatory policy came with an ethnic justification and a political response that further defined group identities. Russian culture and language represented high social status in contrast to ‘inferior’ non-Russians and thickened over time. For instance, in the early 19th century, Russians viewed Ukrainians, ‘little Russians’, primarily as immature urbanites or peasants undeserving of equal treatment until they learned Russian, but soon Russians represented the preservers of prosperity and Ukrainians or Estonians as subversive and a symbol of opposition to the monarchy. In particular, the divide between Russians and Ukrainians grew, Russians supported the monarch and Ukrainians romanticized combinations of populism, volunteerism, and Ukrainian ethnicity (Subtelny 2008, 281).

Justification extended beyond general social cues and stratifications into descriptions of language and performance. Nikolai Polevoi, a Russian historian and journalist, argued,

> Even we Russians read Kotliarevsky’s *Aeneid* (Eneida) as a witty prank. But the imitators and followers [of Kotliarevsky] then discovered their mistake of [trying to create] the so-called Little Russian literature, which is simply an anachronism in our contemporary life… Those who followed Kotliarevsky and Gogol showed how ridiculous was the idea of artificially creating an autonomous Little Russian poetry, and of making Little Russia the subject of epics, lyrics, novels, stories that are autonomous, that could form a separate literature. All this constitutes only part of a common Russian poetry and literature.\(^{25}\)

---

\(^24\) Cited in Suny (1997, 47-48)

\(^25\) Also cited by Shkandrij (2001, 156).
While such denunciations provoked Ukrainian intellectuals to further argue for their own culture and history (e.g. Kvitka’s "Holovaty: Materials for a History of Little Russia" and “Witch of Konotop”), the critical and popular success of these Ukrainian works, as well as their increasing distribution, forced Russian intellectuals to further define the difference between ‘Great Russians’ and ‘Little Russians.’ In particular, it seems Russians increasingly felt a need to justify Ukrainian ‘inferiority’. As Shkandrij (2001, 159) notes, Russian intellectuals typically defined the difference between groups through dominant and non-dominant characteristics. For instance, in P. Belokha’s (1860) textbook on geography, the author explains, “Little Russians are Orthodox. Their main occupation is agriculture and animal husbandry, but other trades are also spread among them fairly successfully.” However, he goes on to explain, “All Russians are Orthodox and speak one language’ they are distinguished by their physical strength, enterprising character, industriousness’ besides agriculture they work in other occupations, and in manufacturing, trade and education they surpass all other national inhabitants of the Empire.”

In many urbanizing areas, culture conflicts even became violent, with many describing Russians as “ferociously nationalist” (Suny 1997, 46; Slocum 1993, 10). In one instance, Hubertus Jahn (2004, 65) relates the story of an attack by Russian men on Turks and Tatars in St. Petersburg in 1897, in which the attackers explained their actions, “Your Honor, the Turks didn’t spare our guys, so we now want to cut the throats of the Tatars.”

While we cannot be sure that ethnicity or nationalism motivated the

outbreak of violence, it was clearly the excuse. At minimum encounters like the one in St. Petersburg, justified violence through nationalist rhetoric, furthering nationalist sentiment and reflecting the growing separation between Russians and non-Russians, including the privileges and intra-group affections people experienced.

Nevertheless, the uneven implementation of Russification programs created reactions from non-Russians and opportunities for them to combat the policies, further forging the borders of a Russian identity. As Suny (1997, 50-51) states, “Both the programs of discrimination and inequity between metropole and periphery and the resistant cultures and counter-discourses of nationalism of non-Russians prevented the kind of homogenization and incorporation of the population into a single “imagined community” of a Russian nation.” Instead, Russians and non-Russian ethnic groups emerged creating encounters that hardened multiple identities.

The reaction to harsh treatment is well described more generally by the former prime minister Sergei Witte,27 “The borderlands ... began to avenge very real discrimination that had gone on for years, as well as measures which were entirely justified but unreconciled with the national feelings (natsional’noe chuvstvo) of conquered ethnic groups (inorodtsy)” (Wcislo 1995, 176). While Russification was not uniform or intended to be uniform across regions, the state’s harsh policies repressed people along national lines, increasing the salience of Russian and non-Russian identities. As Suny (1997, 50) goes on to state,

While Muscovy and imperial Russia were successful in integrating the core regions of its empire, often referred to as the vnutrennie guberniia,

27 Also cited by Suny (1997, 49).
into a single nationality, diverse administrative practices, as well as the compactness of the local ethnicities and the effects of settlement policies, maintained and intensified differences between the Russian core and the non-Russian peripheries.

Pan-Slavic programs and often brutal governance encouraged Russian and non-Russian cultural distinctions to become more valued (Jahn 2004, 63; Hoskings 2001, 333-344; Peterson 2007).

For instance, the 1830s began a period of Russian language instruction in schools and abolition of formal Ukrainian language training, pushing many Ukrainian teachers and writers underground. However, the Russian Empire’s incomplete governance of urban life and rural Galicia allowed intellectuals to continue to pursue national language rights (in the section on Ukraine, I further discuss the development of Ukrainian identity outside Russian Imperial power). Without complete imperial governance, Ukrainians developed a space to hold meetings away from state authority, like the Brotherhood of Cyrillo and Methodius in Kiev. As Ukrainian literature, often through underground publications, became more widely printed before 1864, many Russian intellectuals began to publicly define the difference between Russian and Ukrainian writings, with most only accepting Ukrainian as a peasant language and subset of Russian literature.

Approximately one month before the 1905 revolution, the Council lifted the ban on Ukrainian publications and acknowledged that the prohibition had “severed the fraternal link between Russian and Ukrainian writing.”28 While the Tsar reinstated anti-

---

28Also cited by Shkandrij (2001, 158).
Ukrainian languages laws in 1906, after the revolution was thwarted, repeated state breakdown had given Ukrainian intellectuals the opportunity to disperse their identity and extend their language into the state, finally receiving an official public decree that Russian and Ukrainian were different.

Consequently, when and where the imperial state struggled to exercise its full repressive power, enclaves tended to emerge oriented around non-Russian identities because intellectuals had greater opportunities to disperse identity conceptions that described their group and Russians. Each time non-Russians pressed forward a concept it contradicted the Russian notion of a singular Slavic nation, producing reactions that continuously deepened the difference between groups. For instance, as non-Russians formalized and dispersed their languages, their newspapers conveyed a unique history and depiction of contemporary events in relationship, and often contention, to the monarchy’s official stance, provoking a reaction that politicized each identity and their differences. By 1910 the Russian narod became solidified as who represented non-Russians – inorodtsy (alien) – became more clearly defined:

The term inorodtsy is understood in the language of the government and the nationalist press in a double sense – a political one and technical-juridical one. In the political and most important meaning of this word, the basic indication of non-Russianness [inorodschestvo] is language. Only the population which speaks the Great-Russian dialect has privilege to the title of the Russian people [russkii narod]. Not race, not even religion nor political loyalty plays and essential role. Poles, being of Slavic blood, speaking in a Slavic dialect, are nonetheless considered inordotsy. Georgians, although Orthodox, nevertheless remain inorodtsy. Even Ukrainians, native blood brothers of the Great Russians, similarly Orthodox like the latter, but having the audacity to speak in their own Little Russian dialect, although they are so close the Great Russians, do not cease from being regarded in many respects as [having] the status of inordtsy. Baltic Germans, renowned for their loyalty, similarly remain inorodtsy, just like the “rebel” Poles. But the Russian sectarians, even the most furious enemies of Orthodoxy, even the most suspicious in the eyes
of the government for their social doctrines, but preserving the Russian speech, remain immutably in the rolls of the real Russian people [narod]. An t is well known to all that a serious political reality, a whole complex of political relations of enormous importance, lies behind this classification. (Shtenberg 1910, 531).

Summary

Before the collapse of the Russian Empire, the Russian identity became increasingly inclusive of peasants, nobles, and the monarchy. By 1913, 45% of the population throughout the Empire identified as Russian, including the Tsar and Christian Orthodox religious authorities (Moss 2004, 160, 171; Mendras 2012, 27). Through uneven state reach alongside with industrialization, increased literacy, and urbanization, an identity became dispersed and hardened, increasingly connecting people to a community across space and time. As John Slocum argues, by 1910,

Nationality had become a politically salient category within imperial Russia...Language-based nationality achieved the status of the primary criterion for distinguishing Russians from non-Russians (and one group of non-Russians from another) by overturning an earlier official definition of the situations, according to which religion was the primary criterion for determining Russianess and no-Russianness.

As I discuss in Chapter 4, when the empire collapsed and the Bolsheviks mounted a powerful organization and rebellion against the Russian state in 1917, the Russians did not disappear. With its coherence and organization the group instead became an influential entity shaping Soviet communism and the party.

---

29 Cited in Slocum (1993, 195)

30 It is important to understand that as the Russian national identity grew, it organized within many state institutions, but the monarchy remained the state. While Imperial Russia had some modern nation-state features, like its dictation of culture and group status, the primary value and legitimate order was based upon the Monarch's traditions, and not necessarily national ones.
Moldovans

Several own up to a nationality different from what might be expected. This man with a broad and beardless face, typical of the Little Russian, calls himself a Gagaoutze. The other styles himself a Bulgarian, but his kindly face with grizzled mustaches, his fur cap as well as his racy Roumanian speech, remind me of the Oltean type of the Valachian Carpathians. That Jew might be a genuine Aryan, that Russian looks like a Bulgarian....One of them, who claims to be Russian, calmly admits that his father is Moldovan and his mother Bulgarian.

—Emmanuel de Martonne
1919 description of Bessarabia inhabitants

To summarize this analysis, under communism, the Moldovans developed a literary language, clear borders, and a cultural description, but did not become coherent. Without coherence prior to communism the group’s organizational capacity remained limited, could not withstand Bolshevik repression, and, in part, could not efficiently cultivate and disperse the identity under communism to establish coherence. To illustrate why a local identity never formed in Moldova prior to communism as it did in Ukraine and Russia, I discuss the lack of state reach in the region.

First, without centralized education and developed infrastructure in Bessarabia, no state identity spread, which limited opportunities to express and observe cultural differences and inequalities. Furthermore, because cultural differences marked few life chances, those in power had minimal need to justify their culture’s dominance and oppositional politics had minimal reason to harness cultural claims. Finally, weak landed gentry ensured that most elites in the region followed the ruling government’s cultural policies, restricting opportunities for non-Russian and non-Romanian intellectuals to disperse a shared identity.

31 Also an epigraph in King (2000).
Limited State Centralized Education: Military Conscription, Primary Schooling, and Printed Texts

Minimal state reach in Bessarabia prevented centralized education from spreading national identities and making cultural differences salient. In particular, during Russian and Romanian rule, the state struggled to both enforce military conscription and establish national state schools. The lack of state education through these institutions combined with the dearth of printed texts to keep the vast majority of Bessarabia’s inhabitants isolated and culturally-linguistically diverse.

Military conscription did not efficiently stimulate nation building in Bessarabia because neither the Russian nor Romanian state could maintain constant authority in the region or enforce universal military service when they ruled. First, over the 19th and early 20th century parts of Bessarabia fluctuated between different rulers, limiting the number of local inhabitants joining the military. Following the Crimean War of 1856 Russia lost three of Bessarabia’s southern regions (Bolgrad, Cahul, and Ismail) to the Ottoman Empire (under Romanian authority), after the Russo-Turkish War (1877-1878) the Ottoman Empire and newly established Kingdom of Romania lost control of the southern regions to Russia, and during the years between the First and Second World Wars the Romanian Kingdom ruled all of Bessarabia between the Prut and Nistru rivers. Without constant rule, neither Romanian military service nor Russian universal military conscription successfully indoctrinated people in the region. Those under Ottoman/Romanian rule not only avoided Dmitry Milyutin’s 1860s and 1870s universal Russian military conscription (Stone 2006), but also the absence of universal Ottoman military conscription prevented the three southern regions from developing a mass Romanian identity or backlash to it (International Review 1998). Second, limited state
capacity throughout Bessarabia likely contributed to fewer means to force conscription under Russian and Romanian rule, allowing many rural Moldovans to avoid service. Joshua Sanborn (1998, Appendix A) estimates that Moldovans composed less than 1% of the Russian Imperial Army and during interbellum years many avoided conscription. Charles King (2001) similarly finds that the Romanian military primarily consisted of people from Wallachia and Transylvania and not Bessarabia. In essence, many in Bessarabia avoided military service and the potential to receive national state education.

While centralized school curricula became mandated in Bessarabia, just as occurred throughout both the Russian Empire and Kingdom of Romania, in practice the limited number of schools and minimal ability to enforce curricula restricted the expansion of a common curriculum. Consequently, under Russian rule and by 1918 the Moldovan’s literacy rate remained around 8%, a slight rise from 4.5% in 1812 (Nistor 1991, 249-55; King 2000) and consisted primarily of a urban, fairly Russified, Russian speaking Moldovan population.

While 20th century Romanian interbellum rule increased the region’s literacy to nearly 30% (King 2001), there remained a lack of printed texts in Bessarabia. For instance, by 1930 (10 years after Romanian rule began), Chisinau published only seven newspapers, five Russian language dailies and two Romanian language weeklies, which did not venture far beyond the cities borders (King 2001, 46-47). Without modern opportunities to disperse a common identity, local inhabitants remained without a mass identity. The lack of mass identity in Bessarabia was clear, as noted by the activist C. Stan who served the Romanian Minister of Education:
That Bessarabia has remained culturally backward is our greatest advantage. If there had been any culture at all in Bessarabia, it would have been Russian...[but] Russian books could not erase the clean and unaltered soul of the Moldovan...We are working in an environment in which we have to create everything but destroy very little.32

**Limited Infrastructure: Rail and Cities**

Without consistent encounters with others, the Moldovan countryside remained an assortment of language dialects and customs. While Russians dominated the region, they rarely encountered rural areas, and only a small number of urban Moldovans engaged with a potential ‘other’.

Transportation remained limited throughout Bessarabia, preventing potential opportunities for locals to encounter cultural differences. Only three primary railroads ran across the region during the 19th century, all of which extended to cities in Russia and Ukraine (none stopped at multiple locations within Bessarabia), and paved roads covered only 90 miles (King 2001, 42). In part, without mass transportation the region itself could not become less rural and instead the population remained high isolated. 33

The region’s lack of urbanization and highly rural population further limited pre-1920s opportunities to encounter a cultural ‘other’, preventing mass group features from becoming more homogenous and valued. Table 3-2 illustrates the minimal growth of major urban areas in Bessarabia. Russian and Romanian immigrants largely fueled the

---


33 Geography and historic divides limited the region’s infrastructure, and, subsequently, Russification to small urban areas. The empire faced industrial challenges and choices. First, the relatively distant Bessarabia was a less geostrategic position for industrial advancement than those along the Dnieper River or Carpathian Mountains. Protection and development of the latter prevented military advancement to a wider region and left the territory directly exposed, without mountains, seas, or armies, to Bucharest. Furthermore, Bessarabia’s distance from Moscow stretched limited resources across an even larger terrain. As many scholars noted, the empire’s inability to keep up with international industrialization pressures spread its capacity thin (Moore 1967; Skocpol 1979), and industrial competition in the north likely limited 19th century infrastructural development in the more southern Bessarabia.
region’s 19th century urbanization, and only a small portion of Moldovans lived in urban areas and could thereby encounter Russian or Romanian populations. By 1926, less than 4% of Moldovans lived in urban areas ("Vsesoiuznaia perepis’ naseleniia 1926 goda" 1929), leaving the vast majority of Moldovans in rural settings avoiding national encounters.

Despite increased Romanian literacy and moderately developed infrastructure in the region, a mass identity remained elusive. Under Romanian rule, urbanization decreased facilitating fewer urban encounters and the high diversity of those who did urbanize limited common cultural features to help unify new urbanites.

Limited Ethnic Politics in Bessarabia. Lacking political development in the form of increased state reach and urbanization in the region, the indigenous inhabitants’ ethnic identities did not harden. Instead, religion and local differences largely defined politics (Mirasca 2002, 29). As Marcel Mirasca notes,

During the Russification process, the most powerful ally of the administration was the community (or identity) of religion, which was fully exploited...At the local level, among the peasants (the majority of the population), there had been no interest – at least before 1917 – in political or national matters and whatever came from the official propaganda, including that from the church, was accepted as true. (Mirasca 2002, 29)

Consequently, ethnic inequality and national justifications of inequality remained irrelevant, even at times of regional state independence.

Despite Moldova’s brief independence during World War I, a national identity remained relatively irrelevant. Instead, evidence supports the notion that external pressures and fears stimulated a need for internal political consensus within a body and collection of elites that faced a one sided option: they had the opportunity to work
together and govern or let someone else govern their lives and region. Likely believing they understood the good life, there was little desire to capitulate to external forces.

The collapse of the Russian Empire opened an opportunity for Moldovans to increase their salience and begin to organize. During the Bolshevik Revolution the formerly underground Moldovan intellectuals who had previously failed to organize, combined with the Tsar’s disbanded military units to organize and, albeit briefly, gain independence. The Tsar’s army had mobilized roughly 300,000 Moldovans, primarily from rural areas, towards the very end of the war. Amongst the unrest that followed the Tsars’ March 1917 abdication, the soldiers dismantled the army and united with urban Moldovan intellectuals to form the first organizations led by Moldovans. Together they created the Society for Moldovan National Culture that soon became the Moldovan National Party. Several other unions organized, but across most was a common demand for self-determination and equal rights (King 2000, 32-33; Vitu 2003, 13).34 Similarly motivated by a desire for better treatment, Moldovan organizations worked together to declare regional autonomy on October 21, 1917, and two months later, on November 21, 1917, formed the Sfatul Tarii (National Council). The council held elections in several rural communities, but despite increased engagement with the villages, two urban-led factions dominated the assembly: those who composed the Moldovan Bloc and those who were Socialist Revolutionaries.

However, both groups lacked a mass literate population and, therefore, struggled to spread the national identity. Instead, vestigial and emerging imperial authorities

---

34 In part, a Slavic-repressed Romanian culture was also difficult for the rural countryside to identify with, as the regions rural areas were highly diverse (various Slavic, Turkic, Uralic, Romance, and Germanic tongues composed the Bessarabian countryside). I discuss this more below.
shaped the factions, and ultimately determined their direction. To avoid internal anarchy both groups gravitated toward established authority. Ion Inculeț, the council’s President and leader of the socialist faction, had helped officiate Kerensky’s Provisional Government, which gave him substantial access to the region’s administrative networks. He used this position to push liberal reforms and gained substantial influence through urban Moldovans. Pantelimon Halippa, Inculeț deputy in the council, also pushed liberal reform, but was interested in a pan-Romanian movement. Both Inculet and Halippa had worked for the 1906-1907 newspaper Revista Bessarabia, but after it was shut down, Inculet remained in Moldova and formed relationships with Russian Imperial authorities. Halippa on the other hand, was exiled to Romania where he continued to work for the paper in Iasi, and while there, began to develop an identity around a democratizing Romania. The socialist faction and Bessarabia’s close relationship to Russian governance made liberal Russian unity a logical decision, particularly being faced by reform as well as external and internal threats. Within the 1917 vacuum the two were natural leaders among a small community, but after an initial agreement, their institutional relationships took them in different directions.

Before the factions could completely divide they faced external and internal challenges that helped them compromise and embrace the Bolsheviks in December of 1917. Internally, neither urban faction dominated the rural areas, because they both had similar strengths (i.e. a similar language as the peasantry - Romanian) and challenges (i.e. limited resources for organizing the peasantry). Externally, Ukraine declared sovereignty over Bessarabia, and a potential invasion threatened the regions new autonomy. Pressured by potential internal chaos and the need for a Kiev delegation, the
council found common ground in the Bolsheviks as the desire for equal rights resonated with both sides.

Nevertheless, in mid-January Romanian military forces crossed the border and removed the Red Army. Without Bolshevik-Russian protection, increasing threats from Ukraine, and facing an occupying army, the urban council declared independence on January 24, 1918. Two months later, on March 27, 1918, the occupying Romanians, combined with returned exiles and Romanians who were formerly underground, helped influence a vote, which incorporated Bessarabia into the Romanian Kingdom.

Throughout these events, the Moldovan intellectual community never reached consensus on the fundamental questions about who they were, nor did their messages reach beyond the limits of the intelligentsia to the population at large. Along the Nistru River’s eastern bank, the Bolsheviks took hold, and the indigenous community that lacked a coherent identity entered communism with minimal resistance.

**Limited Opportunities in Bessarabia**

The ruling state, whether it was the Russian or Romanian Monarchy, governed throughout Bessarabia and provided little autonomy for non-state supported groups to organize in towns or rural areas. In part, the region’s landed elite could not provide a layer of autonomy for group development. Late 18th century and early 19th century Ottoman rule separated Moldova’s landed elite from the Christian Orthodox Church. While Ottoman rule did not have religious dictums, interest in Christian Orthodoxy lessened as communication and encounters with the church decreased. Orthodoxy slowly faded as a source of power and substantial value in Bessarabia. With less connection to the church, the landed elite had no substantial focal point that united them, and easily accepted or were replaced by new religious authorities and state rule.
as they emerged. In essence, there was a weak or nonexistent alliance of gentry and clergy, and a weak sense of unity among the gentry themselves. Consequently, the weak religious gentry throughout the countryside both changed with new empires and prevented intellectual movements from organizing and developing group conceptions.

For example, when the Russian Empire annexed Bessarabia in 1812, the Tsar replaced local clerics with Russian Orthodox Priests. The Romanians did the same in Bessarabia’s southern districts from 1856 to 1878, and again throughout Bessarabia during the 20th century interbellum years. Romanian Orthodox Priests with allegiance to Bucharest supplanted the Russian Orthodox rural positions. Without strong landed ties, empires easily replaced nobles, and maintained local power over peasant communities. With the 1905 revolution, Bessarabian intellectual circles developed and began to publically organize. Underground student organizations, mostly educated at the University of Dorpat (Tartu) in Estonia, now had an opportunity to organize after several years of underground gatherings (King 2000). Several intellectual communities arose, including pan-Romanianists, Bessarabians, and social democrats. However, after the Tsar stemmed the revolutionaries and restored order, authorities repressed the urban indigenous intellectual communities. With Russian urban domination, and rural religious gentry allied with Moscow, the intellectuals had no domestic opportunity to continue their projects or spread their group and ideological conceptions. Consequently, the intellectual movements went dormant until 1917, and only a few continued to privately organize underground or in the Kingdom of Romania.

Following the Second World War, Romanian rule between the Prut and Nistru rivers also remained repressive and banned most minority organizations, which limited
Moldovan intellectual activities and all but forced urban Moldovans to assimilate. By 1926 there were no Moldovan schools in the region: only one Russian and one Ukrainian public school remained. Non-Romanian newspapers also closed, and other minority museums and public schools were destroyed. As a result, Moldovans did not develop local intellectual communities or have an opportunity to disperse and discuss an identity different than Romanians.

Summary

Most inhabitants of Bessarabia did not form a mass political identity prior to Soviet communism. The region’s low political and economic development meant that immigrated Russians and Jewish people largely occupied urban areas and the indigenous population remained without access to national descriptions and political encounters along cultural lines. Furthermore, the agrarian and imperial history in Bessarabia established a traditional political structure with weak land-owning elites and foreign rulers. While the clergy and church remained the primary authority in rural areas, unlike in Western Ukraine, their rule across the countryside depended upon who was the central power, Moscow or Bucharest. Changes between Romanian and Russian rule positioned different clergy to govern the countryside, which prevented locals from organizing a culture distinct from their rulers. The Russian Orthodox Church demanded that local churches and schools teach in the Russian language, and under Romanian rule the Russian clergy was removed and many Western Moldavian priests came to teach in the Romanian language and traditions. These changes kept the countryside from becoming a place where group cultures, different from those in cities, could develop and organize. Consequently, urban Russians and Romanians composed the most coherent groups, and the vast rural population, whether they be Moldovan,
Romanian, anti-Russian, or Bulgarian, struggled to develop and harden a homogenous cultural identity.

**Ukrainians**

Ukraine will become one day a new Greece; the beautiful climate of this country, the gay disposition of the people, their musical inclination, and the fertile soil will all awaken. From so many small tribes which in the past were Greeks there will rise a great and cultured nation whose boundaries will extend to the Black Sea, and thence into the far-flung world.

—Johann Gottfried Herder\textsuperscript{35}

*Journal meiner Reise im Jahre*

Pre-communist political development and uneven state reach within the borders of contemporary Ukraine helped form a Ukrainian nation. Increased state reach encouraged Ukrainian encounters with Russians and Poles and places the state failed to reach created opportunities to disperse a non-Russian mass identity.

As discussed in the section on Russians, many Ukrainian regions became penetrated by the Russian Imperial state and experienced increased infrastructure, causing many Ukrainians to develop a salient identity in contrast to Russians and Poles. Simply, ethno-language differences gave way to social inequality and ethnic based justifications of these inequalities, helping shape the Ukrainian identity. To avoid reiterating the role of state penetration and infrastructure in Ukrainian identity formation, in this section I primarily discuss the uneven state reach that opened opportunities for Ukrainians to conceptualize their identity and disperse its content.

**Uneven State Reach: Opportunities to Conceptualize a Nation and Disperse its content through schools**

Without complete state penetration, Ukrainians had several opportunities to develop and disperse their identity. Early business ownership helped Ukrainian speakers develop collective grievances and resources to organize in the early 19th century, political unrest in the Austro-Hungarian Empire and lack of Austro-Hungarian and Russian Imperial reach into the Western Ukrainian countryside allowed Ukrainians to develop schools that helped disperse a mass identity.

Despite 19th century Russification in Eastern Ukraine, Ukrainians remained with economic opportunities in cities. Until 1834, urban areas remained fairly autonomous, in part because Magdeburg Law, established in several Ukrainian towns toward the end of the 18th century, granted local self-government (Kohut 1988, 35). Under the law, cities run by burghers (typically the wealth bourgeoisie) had substantial independence, including their own bodies of self-government and substantial oversight of taxes and judiciary. This statute continued to impact individuals in urban communities throughout many locations until 1831, and officially ended in Kyiv in 1834 (Kohut 1988, 287). Until this point, artisan guilds and businesses slowly became integrated into the Russian administration, but only after an embezzlement scandal racked Kiev’s elite did the guilds and merchants become completely replaced by Russians (Kohut 1988, 290). These years of autonomy helped Ukrainian speaking business owners gain skills and the capacity to organize.

Once they were banned from owning businesses and despite the harsh treatment and minimal initial group understanding, various business owners and intellectuals began to gather in university settings, across the countryside, and in urban

---

36 I. Kamanin, “Poslednie gody samoupravleniia Kiev po magdeburgskomu pravu,” KS, 1888, no. 5, p 140-68; no. 8 p 157-95; no. 9, p 597-622 Discusses the scandal.
enclaves to describe an ethnic distinction. In Kharkiv and Zaparozia, intellectuals embraced Herder’s romantic description of Ukrainians. For example, two journals, the *Ukrainian Herald* and the *Ukrainian Journal* discussed the group’s language and folklores. Historians connected the locals’ distinction to the Cossak Hetmanate and the Kieven Rus. Most notably in Ukrainian history was Taras Shevchenko, a poet and painter, who began to shape a literary language that also helped explain the serfs’ predicament and relationship to Russian authority. In contrast to Alexander Pushkin’s reverence for Peter I and Catherine the great, Shevchenko wrote,

> Now I understand/ It was the First who/ Crucified our Ukraine/ And the Second finished/ off the widowed orphan./ Murderers! Murderers! Cannibals! \(^{37}\)

Additionally, Shevchenko, and roughly a several dozen others, formed a secret society called the Brotherhood of Cyrillo and Methodius in Kiev. Additionally inspired by European romanticism, the members continued to describe the distinction between themselves and Russians. Mykola Kostomarov’s, the group’s primary leader, *Dve russkie narodnosti (The two Peoples of Rus’)*, explained two different cultures and histories for Russians and Ukrainians (Wilson 1997, 28). \(^{38}\) “The nature of the Ukrainian people is dominated by the personal will, but for the Russian the whole community prevails.” “Watching the Russian people in all walks of life we often encounter truly morally Christians,…but they have little inner piety. The Ukrainian people have a strong sense of God’s omnipresence, spiritual emotion, internal appeal to God in secret reflection on him, heartfelt desire for the spiritual, the unknown, the mysterious, but

---

\(^{37}\) Also described in Subtelny (2009, 235) Rich, Song of Darkness, 36

\(^{38}\) Pritsak and Reshetar, ‘Ukraine and the Dialectics of Nation-Building’, n. 64
gratifying world.”³⁹ The brotherhood also highlighted the different histories and futures between the two groups. For instance, in contrast to the Tsar’s government they proposed that,

Ukraine will rise from her grave and will call upon her brother Slavs; they will hear her call and all Slavs will arise… and Ukraine will be a self-governing republic in the Slavic union. Then all the peoples will point to that spot on the map where Ukraine is situated and they will say, ‘Behold, the stone which the builders rejected has become the cornerstone.’ (Luciani 1956)⁴⁰

To better articulate their social predicament, they further developed a literary language as well as political and historical concepts that emphasized Slavic cultural independence, historical autonomy, religious freedoms, and American-style democratic institutions and constitutionalism (Rudnytsky 1986, 17; Subtelny 2009, 236). The Brotherhood encountered few outside the group and remained relatively small, but in describing their predicament they began to establish a more common Ukrainian ethnic understanding that highlighted the Kieven Rus and Cossacks as their ancestors and Russians as a distinct historical ‘other’. In 1847, after two years of underground work, the group was discovered by Russian authorities, harshly punished and banished. Its discovery, coupled with fears stirred by the growing nationalism in Europe, inspired further repressive policies against Ukrainian nationals and threatened Ukrainian

³⁹ В характере украинского народа преобладает личная воля, а в российском преобладает всеобщность.


intellectuals throughout the rest of the century. Nevertheless, the crackdowns pushed many of the intellectuals west where new opportunities arose.\textsuperscript{41}

Eastern Ukrainian intellectuals had also inspired clergymen in Eastern Galicia to form the Ruthenian Triad in the 1830s (Subtelny 2001), and despite some differences, both eastern and western intellectuals had a common situation relative to urbanites. A growing Polish culture dominated towns in the west, which differentiated new urbanites from the old, much like the Russians in the east. Both eastern and western Ukrainian intellectuals had common inspirational origins in Kharkiv, and a language more similar to each other than to Poles or Russians. Consequently, when Ukrainian intellectuals could no longer gather in Russian-dominated Ukraine, many eastern intellectuals moved west and began to more directly discuss Ukrainian traditions and language with a new peasant population and a developing western Ukrainian intellectual community.

In particular, the Austro-Hungarian Empire’s 1848 revolutions and uprisings provided several opportunities for eastern intellectuals now living in Eastern Galicia and Transcarpathia (modern day Western Ukraine) to commune and continue to develop a formal Ukrainian understanding. As eastern and western intellectuals had increasing opportunities to interact they grew closer in their group explanations. In a sense, Russian repression in the East stimulated increased intellectual identity dispersion between Ukrainians by pushing those from the east to the west, which helped the group develop a more common and valued understanding of their identity.\textsuperscript{42}

\textsuperscript{41} In contrast Russian intellectuals explained the, “‘Ukrainian idea’ – as a giant step backwards.”

\textsuperscript{42} While potentially 20\% to 40\% of the population became Russified, the traditions continued and spread in Eastern Galicia under the Austro-Hungarian rule that allowed substantial local autonomy.
The 1848 revolutions in the Austro-Hungarian Empire’s territories also helped Ukrainian identity salience increase and a modern Ukrainian organization to develop. As the empire faced revolts in Vienna and throughout its territories, central authority decreased and many elites fought for power. In the midst of opportunities opened by the revolutions and chaos, and partly supported by the Austro-Hungarian Count Franz Stadion, the Ukrainian intellectuals continued to commune. By May 1848 the Supreme Ruthenian Council (Holovna ruska rada, or HRR) had formed in Lviv, which quickly established fifty local branches throughout several regions. With their new organization, these intellectuals extended their interests regarding cultural independence and unique histories to many new spheres, including more formalized education. The events of 1848 were clearly providing opportunities for intellectuals to increasingly shape an identity, disperse it, and organize the population.

With these new opportunities, Ukrainian intellectuals gradually structured their group ideas, interacted with the community, and organized various spheres. Local autonomy aided by unrest throughout the empire gave people the opportunity to develop their own cultural agenda, Polish nationalism inspired a national opposition, and Russian centralization pushed a developing eastern Ukrainian narrative to meet with counterparts in western Ukraine. Nevertheless, in 1851 many Ukrainian opportunities in urban western Ukraine (Eastern Galicia) came to a halt.

As the Austro-Hungarian Empire restored Polish regional order they closed the council and exiled many Ukrainophiles; however, unlike the Moldovans, the Ukrainians continued to widen the dispersion of their identity. First, Transcarpathia remained fairly autonomous until 1867, and incorporated the council’s work into
local projects, such as schools and theatrical troupes (Subtelny 2009, 449). Intellectuals continued to commune, and this de-urbanization made sustained direct contact between nationalist elites and the rural population possible, speeding up identity formation. Second, limited rural infrastructure and a developed landed gentry prevented Polish cultural penetration into the countryside. This forced separation generated relative independence for Ukrainians in Eastern Galicia who began to disperse their identity and organize. Supported by the landed gentry, the new rural community built and maintained schools, and continued to cultivate and disperse a Ukrainian identity.

With independence amongst the landed gentry intellectuals continued to work together and with those they claimed to represent, including Ivan Franko, Nicholas Kostomarov, historian Mykola Kostomarov, author Panteleimon Kulish, and Michael Hrushevs'kyi. Their wider dissemination of identity over the last half of the 19th century and early 20th century helped shape a formal Ukrainian language, and developed schools and organizations to disperse and develop stories that identified Ukrainians as an independent and suppressed nation with distinct enemies:

[First], demonstrate that their ethnic and spiritual ancestors were the people of Kiev and to deny that the Russians were descended from the medieval state of Kiev. Two, the Cossacks of the Zaporozhian Sich struggled with Poland and Russia to create an independent Ukraine. (Efimenko 1906, 4)

While the content was not perfectly uniform, it reflected three common features: a formal language, Cossack and Kyiven Rus origin stories, and were powerfully couched in the rhetoric of Taras Shevchenko and his contemporary literary colleagues.
Hardening the Ukrainian Identity after the First World War

The opening provided by the First World War and the collapse of both the Austro-Hungarian and Russian Empires helped harden the Ukrainian identity and opened opportunities for increased group organization. With the Ukrainian population divided by several ruling authorities but without a state of their own (eastern Ukraine was usurped by Soviet communism, and western Ukraine was divided between Poland, Romania, and Czechoslovakia), the group continued to encounter ‘others’ that often harshly illustrated their ethnic difference, and their freedoms across various regions allowed intellectuals to develop the group’s understanding. For instance, while Poles and Romanians attempted to nationalize their new holdings and exile Ukrainians, which helped further illustrate the group’s importance and uniqueness, local autonomy in Transcarpathia and Soviet authority in eastern and central Ukraine helped provide intellectuals with opportunities to shape and disperse the identity. Furthermore, limited infrastructure prevented Polish authority from powerful rural influence, which created an opportunity for continued rural organization by Ukrainians who had previously organized

---

43 The Paris Peace Conference confirmed Transcarpathia’s status as an Autonomous Territory within Czechoslovakia, and the Council of ambassadors and Treaty of Riga established Polish rule throughout Eastern Galicia. Finally, the Treaty of St. Germain ceded Bucovina to the Kingdom of Romania.

44 Local authorities argued that Ukrainian/Ruthenians were a polish sub-group, and began to dismantle many Ukrainian institutions and features: Ukrainian schools became Polish-Ukrainian (Ukrainian schools dropped from 2,426 in 1922 to 352 in 1938, and Polish-Ukrainian schools rose from 1635 in 1928 to 2438 in 1938); In Kholm and Podtachia only Polish schools were permitted; Ukrainian Language chairs were dismissed from universities and schools in Lviv; In Polisia Authorities renamed Ukrainians as ‘Tuteishi’ (“people who live here”); Polish authorities also argued Ukrainians were composed of two sub-groups, Lemkos and Huntsuls. In response Ukrainians founded an illegal Underground University from 1921-1925, and upon its closure many students continued to study in Czechoslovakia at the Ukrainian Free University and the Charles University in Prague (Magocsi 1998, 588). While the semblance of Ukrainian government eventually began to dissipate, political parties formed (Magocsi 1998, 592-596), social organizations remained, and even an armed resistance partially continued in Galacia (Magocsi 1998, 589).
under the Empire in western Ukraine. Despite their different regional experiences with authority and groups, they all continued to foster Ukrainian coherence, through building educational infrastructure, organizing the peasantry with township governments and cultural clubs, and teaching a history of the Cossack golden age and the future of a free intellectual and political Ukrainian culture.

Ukrainian intellectuals persistently worked with their rural organizations and continued to organize and stimulate coherence in three specific regions. Many Ukrainians migrated and developed cultural programs within the newly autonomous Transcarpathia located in the also new Czechoslovakia. There they formed the Central Ruthenian People’s Council in Yjgorod on May 8, 1919, and chose autonomy within Czechoslovakia (Magocsi 1996, 519). Directed by the council, the region’s schools nearly doubled from 495 in 1920 to 879 in 1938 (Magocsi 1998, 606). The Czech government further supported Ukrainian culture by building Ukrainian national theaters, like the subcarpathian Rusyn National Theater, and cultural societies, like the Prosvita Society (1920, similar name to the Ukrainian society in Eastern Galicia) and the Dukhnovych Society (1923). Others moved and built cultural content in the nationally liberal Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (UkSSR), and still others continued to move into rural communities and disperse content throughout western Ukraine.

The interbellum years helped further harden the Ukrainian identity through literacy and mass education. As Ukrainian language literacy increased, across vast distances the group could more effectively communicate to its members. By 1939 Ukrainian literacy in all three regions doubled (despite several narratives that attempted
to define Ukrainians as ethnically diverse),\textsuperscript{45} which allowed intellectuals to more precisely decipher with whom and how they constructed their identity. Additionally, Ukrainian organization prior to 1919 in Eastern Galicia helped root cultural curriculum and language in schools (450 Ukrainian schools remained in the region) and state institutions, including the autonomous features of the neighboring UkSSR and Transcarpathia. In essence, from 1920 to 1938 the majority of Ukrainians in Transcarpathia, UkSSR, and Eastern Galicia received similar ethnic stories from schools, definitions of enemies, encounters that illustrated intra-group affections, and senses of Ukraine’s national borders. While each region and its inhabitants underwent different experiences, the Ukrainian population received a standardized narrative about the experience through schooling and various publications: “The great Cossack decedents are repressed by Poles and Russians and will again one day become free.”

**Summary**

Ukrainian coherence emerged, in part, through a cycle of encounters with other national groups, opportunities often created by state collapse and war, and repression by Polish and Russian authorities. These factors eventually brought intellectuals to a receptive countryside in the 1850s and opened an opportunity for Ukrainian literature, schools, and organizations to help increase group solidarity and salience at a mass level. The community’s increasingly shared cultural values developed with increased urban encounters with Russians in the east and south, as well as through encounters

with Poles in the west. The revolutions in 1848 further opened an opportunity for the group’s intellectuals in the west to unify and begin to develop a literary language and the foundations of a cultural understanding. Following the return of centralized authority by the Austro-Hungarian rulers and their closing of Ukrainian intellectual organizations, rural religious nobles provided a space and opportunity for Ukrainian intellectuals to disperse the identity to the population they claimed to represent, rural regional peasants, and continue to develop the group’s relationship to politics and coherence.

Additional Groups

While many pre-communist groups organized after the Soviet Union’s collapse, those without sufficient pre-communist coherence could not widen the dissemination of their identity with communist centralized authoritarianism and ideology in a way that worked to build coherence and effectively organize. Without power to pressure the Bolsheviks and the party these groups’ identity formation, like the Moldovans, became cultivated through the party’s top-down reactionary approaches, and struggled to develop their own group understanding and cultural value. Those, such as the Crimean Tatars, Gagauz, and Volga Tatars, that did not encounter other groups along cultural lines or have an opportunity to intellectually or politically act remained relatively incoherent prior to communism.

The Crimean Tatars

I argue that the local rural population’s mass emigration away from Crimea over the 19th century helped the Crimean Tatars avoid Russian state reach, hindering their group’s ability to become coherent prior to communism. Prior to Russian Imperial rule in Crimea, the Islamic population had remained firmly rooted in traditional village and tribal values and without a strong national identity. Three distinct populations with different
languages lived in the region, the Steppe, Mountain, and Southern Tatars. These populations were further divided by their class roles as nobles and peasants. When the Russian Empire under Catherine the Great in 1783 annexed the peninsula she extended Russian noble status to the local elites and took a supportive interest in their Islamic religion. She also ensured that Bahcesaray and Karasubazar towns remained Crimean Tatar enclaves, and appointed Prince Michael Vorontsov (1782-1856; retired in 1853) as Governor-General of the southern province, New Russia, who also took a supportive interest in the indigenous population. However, as the Crimean War (1853-1856) ravaged the peninsula and terrorized many who practiced Islam, a mass emigration of Crimean Tatars took place to the Ottoman Empire. Estimates suggest this decreased the population from hundreds of thousands, and ultimately, to around one hundred thousand (Williams 2001; Sasse 2007). While the Russian Empire took on industrial projects and began to urbanize the peninsula shortly after the war, before Crimean Tatars could encounter Russian culture in mass they again left for the Ottoman Empire. Instead of remaining urban or urbanizing to face cultural discrimination, many chose, intentionally or not, a geographic location with greater religious tolerance. Ottoman Sultan Abdulaziz, who ruled from 1861-1876, was the first to promote the empire as a Muslim and religious haven, which may have helped attract many from the peninsula (Williams 2001, 129). The Crimean Muslims largely avoided the Russian culture. Instead, many moved to the Ottoman’s Islamic and multi-national empire, and continued to avoid repression or prejudice based upon culture. Without such encounters, their cultural identity remained relatively irrelevant to social and political life.
Intellectual communities began to form in the early 20th century, but remained limited in their activity and exchange of information due to a dearth of domestic political opportunities. Bey Gaspirali and others began to organize a Crimean Tatar national movement, and in 1905 these intellectual communities expanded to develop a language and create religious schools which initiated a dynamic student and teacher exchange with Istanbul. While the Tsar cracked down on Crimean Tatar organizations after he restored power, the 1908 Ottoman revolution allowed the Fatherland Society (Vatan Cemiyeti) to develop in Istanbul in 1909. The founding members of the Fatherland Society (i.e. Noman Çelebi Cihan, Cafer Seydahmet [Kinmer], Yakup Seytabdullah Kerçi, and Ahmed Şukrii) resuscitated their exchange program and brought students to Istanbul, which helped develop various pockets of Crimean Tatar group thought through the peninsula. During the 1917 revolution many in the Fatherland Society returned and actively mobilized a brief Crimean Tatar independence from December 1917 to January 1918. The Bolshevik invasion ended their reign, and the Crimean Tatar militants moved into the mountains. The region continued to exchange hands until the Bolsheviks secured power in November 1920.

Despite their brief intellectual growth, the Crimean Tatar community remained limited by political opportunities and inter-group encounters. Without opportunities to develop salience, intellectual opportunities to disseminate the identity, and inter-group encounters, the Crimean Tatars never developed a high level of pre-communist coherence.

The Gagauz

Minimal modernization and a strong imperial state ensured that the Christian Orthodox Gagauz in Bessarabia remained fairly rural and disconnected from urban
areas and other ethnic groups, which limited their ability to interact along cultural lines and develop group solidarity and salience. Consequently, the group’s early 19th century settlement in Bessarabia resulted in a trajectory more similar to the Moldovans than Russians and Ukrainians.

Likely a combination of persecution under the Ottoman Empire and resettlement incentives from the Russian Empire encouraged the Gagauz from Bulgaria to settle in southern Bessarabia. After their early 19th century settlement in what is present day Gagauzia, an autonomous republic in southern Moldova, the group struggled to build a salient identity and common cultural understanding.

Contributing to the group’s struggle for coherence, industry and infrastructure did not develop throughout the 19th century, which restricted their opportunity to encounter other groups and the state. Therefore, the Gagauz remained primarily rural and untouched by Russian and Romanian culture. Low infrastructure and primarily rural concerns prevented intra-group communication as well as the development of intellectual community that could systematically discuss changing symbols and meanings. Instead, most villages developed their own rituals, language dialects, and attributes (Vladimirovici 2009; Kvilinkova 2011). Many spoke Russian and observed the Russian orthodox religion, but some called themselves Turks or Gagauz, and others Bulgarian, Bessarabian, or Russian. By 1909 a Bulgarian anthropologist, G. Dimitrov (1909), reported that self-identifying Gagauz described nineteen different group origin stories, indicating an incoherent group history and cultural understanding.

Various rulers in the region ascribed the Gagauz different attributes and names, and it was not until after the First World War that a ruler recognized a distinct Gagauz
population. Interested by a peasant uprising that declared a sovereign Gagauz Halkı (Gagauz People) for two weeks in the wake of the 1905 Russian Revolution, the Kingdom of Romania began the first systematic historical analyses of the Christian Orthodox Turks (Minahan 2002). And for the first time an outside authority differentiated the people from other Bulgarians, and called the Gagauz “Gagauz”. While the distinction helped validate their developing identity, its post-war arrival illustrates the identity’s minimal relevance in the early 20th century. Consequently, without substantial coherence, and minimal Romanian industrialization in the area, the Gagauz struggled to develop a coherent identity and were largely ignored by the Soviets in 1939 and following the Second World War.

**Tatars along the Volga**

Despite some pre-communist modernization in what is now Tatarstan, strong connections between Tatar and Russian nobles helped maintain the state’s regional governance, stimulating unwavering state penetration and preventing an opportunity and incentive for Tatar nobles to fuse with other classes. The Tatars’ integration into the Russian empire began with Ivan the Terrible’s 1552 invasion. While the developing repressive Russian empire harshly treated Tatars, as the empire developed over several centuries the religious and regional based repression lessened. Russian and Tatar nobles held high and fairly equal status and the region’s peasant populations freely intermingled, preventing a dynamic cultural distinction. In particular, Russian and Tatar historiography stipulates that Tatar nobles in Kazan helped elect the first Romanov Tsar in 1613, legitimating Tatar nobles’ status until the empire’s end (Zerev 2002, 78). With a fairly consistent status of privilege, noble Tatars often innocuously differed from Russians by religion, and within their group by local churches and class.
While the Tatar nobility developed an intellectual culture, their connection to the Russian state stemmed their desire to disseminate it to the masses or substantially interact with peasants. National salience and organization did arise with opportunities in 1905 and 1917, but the noble’s connections to the Russian state kept most group development interested in social reforms and political parties rather than national movements. Furthermore, as a highly rural region, many potential Tatar communities remained disconnected and each celebrated their unique local features and not a broader Tatar culture.

**Summary**

Russian imperial policy prevented intellectual dissemination of identity for both Crimean and Volga Tatars, as neither group was allowed to substantially organize outside the nobility. Furthermore, mass emigration during the 19th century limited Crimean Tatars’ intellectual aspirations and encounters with other groups, and Volga Tatars’ inter-group encounters were based upon class and religion, which impeded culture as a valued distinction. The Gagauz rural population in Bessarabia limited the people’s encounters with one another as well as a meaningful engagement with Russian culture. Without consistent encounters with Russian culture, and due to the lack of opportunities for intellectuals to interact to build connections to politics, these groups were unable to develop a wider dissemination of identity, preventing an increase in salience and solidarity.

**Chapter Summary**

Before the Soviet Union emerged, history had already begun to shape ethnic identity and determine which groups had the capacity to influence politics as nations
conscious of themselves and Others. Minimal inter-group encounters with a homogenizing Russian culture and a meager opportunity structure for group intellectual and political interactions prevented Moldovans, Gagauz, Crimean Tatars, and Tatars along the Volga from developing salience and solidarity. These communities struggled to build a meaningful common understanding of their group identity and lacked a common group expression, political relevance, and feelings of a valued culture. In contrast, inter-group encounters, opportunities to build intellectual communities, and agency to associate in political spheres helped develop coherent Ukrainian and Russian identities.

As history shaped various coherence levels it determined which groups could better organize and politically influence a changing society. Facing political opportunities, incoherent groups struggled to organize and politically act, but coherent groups became an organized political entity for change. In future research I intend to explore how these differences influenced Soviet institutions and future group cohesion. It is imaginable that, when the Russian Empire collapsed highly coherent groups, like Russians and Ukrainians organized, engaged in conflict, and eventually helped build Soviet institutions that would shape group coherence levels.

Consequently, despite the 1917 Russian Revolution that shifted many state and society relations, not all former power relationships were restructured or destroyed. The state continued to rule over a similar territory, a distinctly Russian capital remained the center of power, and it appears that several national groups had the capacity to continue to organize, influence politics, and shape Soviet institutional features often attributed to late communist national mobilization.
Table 3-1. Summarized claims of structural forces that facilitated group formation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>1991 country</th>
<th>1991 national sub-region</th>
<th>Regional modernization (empire/state)</th>
<th>Revolution (empire)(^c)</th>
<th>Imperial governance incomplete in region (why)</th>
<th>Pre-Communist group formation in country/sub-region</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russians</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td></td>
<td>Some (Russian)</td>
<td>Yes (Russian 1905, 1917)</td>
<td>No (state backed)(^b)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tatars</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Tatarstan</td>
<td>Some (Russian)</td>
<td>Yes (Russian 1905, 1917)</td>
<td>No (strong noble relations)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldovans</td>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td></td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Some (Russian 1905; Crimean War)</td>
<td>No (weak landed gentry)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gagauz</td>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>Gagauzia</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Some (Russian 1905, 1917)</td>
<td>No (weak landed gentry)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainians</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td></td>
<td>Some (Hungarian and Russian)</td>
<td>Yes (Hungarian 1848; Russian 1905)</td>
<td>Yes (independent countryside in western Ukraine b/c of strong landed gentry, mandenburg law in Eastern towns)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainians</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Western Ukraine</td>
<td>Some (Russian and Hungarian)</td>
<td>Yes (Hungarian 1848)</td>
<td>Yes (independent countryside b/c of strong landed gentry)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainians</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Eastern Ukraine</td>
<td>Some (Russian)</td>
<td>Yes (Russian 1905, 1917)</td>
<td>Some (dependent countryside but Mandenburg law delaying dependent towns)</td>
<td>Some</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crimean Tatars</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Crimea</td>
<td>Some (Russian) (did not effect the rural population)(^a)</td>
<td>Some (Russian 1905, 1917; Crimean War)</td>
<td>No (weak landed gentry)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: \(^a\)While the Russian Empire did modernize Crimea, the vast majority of the non-Russian rural population migrated to parts of the Ottoman Empire instead of urbanizing, \(^b\)State directly facilitated Russian identity dispersion, \(^c\)Yes = region's ruling empire experienced revolution and the region participated in it, Some = region did not always participate in the revolution, but region's ruling empire experienced revolution.
Table 3-2. Population of eleven cities in European Russia, 1800-1910.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>1800</th>
<th>1850</th>
<th>1870</th>
<th>1890</th>
<th>1910</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ekaterinoslav</td>
<td>9,000</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>24,000</td>
<td>47,000</td>
<td>196,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazan</td>
<td>54,000</td>
<td>45,000</td>
<td>79,000</td>
<td>134,000</td>
<td>188,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kharkov</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>60,000</td>
<td>188,000</td>
<td>236,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiev</td>
<td>23,000</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>71,000</td>
<td>184,000</td>
<td>505,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minsk</td>
<td>11,000</td>
<td>24,000</td>
<td>36,000</td>
<td>71,000</td>
<td>101,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moscow</td>
<td>250,000</td>
<td>365,000</td>
<td>612,000</td>
<td>799,000</td>
<td>1,533,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nizhny</td>
<td>14,000</td>
<td>31,000</td>
<td>41,000</td>
<td>73,000</td>
<td>109,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Novgorod</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Odessa</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>90,000</td>
<td>121,000</td>
<td>314,000</td>
<td>506,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rostov (Don)</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>13,000</td>
<td>39,000</td>
<td>67,000</td>
<td>121,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sankt Petersburg</td>
<td>336,000</td>
<td>485,000</td>
<td>667,000</td>
<td>1,003,000</td>
<td>1,962,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samara</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>24,000</td>
<td>34,000</td>
<td>95,000</td>
<td>96,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saratov</td>
<td>27,000</td>
<td>64,000</td>
<td>93,000</td>
<td>123,000</td>
<td>206,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>748,000</td>
<td>1,228,000</td>
<td>1,877,000</td>
<td>3,098,000</td>
<td>5,759,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3-3. Largest town populations in Moldova, 19th century

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Town</th>
<th>1818</th>
<th>1828</th>
<th>1835</th>
<th>1849</th>
<th>1897</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chisinău</td>
<td>10,966</td>
<td>31,351</td>
<td>34,079</td>
<td>42,613</td>
<td>108,483</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balti</td>
<td>1,925</td>
<td>3,657</td>
<td>5,239</td>
<td>5,531</td>
<td>18,478</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cahul(^e)</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>528(^d)</td>
<td>2741</td>
<td>7077</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orhei</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>3934(^c)</td>
<td>4174</td>
<td>12,336</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tiraspol</td>
<td>4863</td>
<td>6327</td>
<td>9457</td>
<td>14820</td>
<td>31,616</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipal(^f)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soroca</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>2170(^c)</td>
<td>3545</td>
<td>15,351</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Akkerman</td>
<td>4645</td>
<td>12576</td>
<td>24113</td>
<td>16076</td>
<td>28,258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Izmail(^b)</td>
<td>6795(^a)</td>
<td>11798</td>
<td>14418(^c)</td>
<td>26243</td>
<td>2,295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khotin</td>
<td>2803</td>
<td>6780</td>
<td>6945</td>
<td>12100</td>
<td>18398</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolgrad(^e)</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
<td></td>
<td>12,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kilia</td>
<td>4020</td>
<td>3671(^b)</td>
<td>4149(^c)</td>
<td>6412</td>
<td>11618</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reni</td>
<td>1539</td>
<td>3671(^b)</td>
<td>3655(^c)</td>
<td>7314</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>37,556</td>
<td>3671(^b)</td>
<td>112,252</td>
<td>141,569</td>
<td>259,314</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: \(^a\)1816, \(^b\)1827, \(^c\)1836, \(^d\)1838, \(^e\)under Kingdom of Romanian from 1856-1888, \(^f\)includes Bender


Chisinău: ANRM, F. 2, inv. 1, d. 554, f. 13; Ф.Ф. Вигель, op. cit., p. 25; ANRM, F. 2, inv. 1, d. 1199, f. 64; А. Защук, Материалы для географии и статистики России, собранные офицерами Генерального Штаба. Бессарабская область, С.-Петербург, 1862, часть II, p. 106; ANRM, F. 2, inv. 1, d. 2593, f. 98; ANRM, F. 2, inv. 1, d. 2815, f. 65; ANRM, F. 2, inv. 1, d. 3267, f. 34; ANRM, F. 2, inv. 1, d. 4948, f. 44; ANRM, F. 2, inv. 1, d. 4683, f. 221; Я.С. Гросул, И.Г. Будак, Очерки истории народного хозяйства Бессарабии (1812-1861), Кишинев, 1967, p. 56-57; ANRM, F. 2, inv. 1, d. 5461, f. 35.

Balti: ANRM, F. 5, inv. 2, d. 743, f. 96; ANRM, F. 2, inv. 1, d. 1199, f. 64; ANRM, F. 2, inv. 1, d. 1484, f. 9; ANRM, F. 2, inv. 1, d. 2139, f. 5; ANRM, F. 2, inv. 1, d. 2589, f. 50; ANRM, F. 2, inv. 1, d. 3797, f. 7; ANRM, F. 2, inv. 1, d. 4948, f. 67; ANRM, F. 2, inv. 1, d. 4693, f. 27; А. Скальковский, Опыт статистического описания, p. 356; Я.С. Гросул, И.Г. Будак, op. cit., 1967, p. 56-57.

Khotin: ANRM, F. 5, inv. 2, d. 743, f. 41; ANRM, F. 2, inv. 1, d. 1199, f. 64; ANRM, F. 2, inv. 1, d. 2138, f. 1; ANRM, F. 2, inv. 1, d. 2596, f. 49; ANRM, F. 2, inv. 1, d. 4948, f. 86; ANRM, F. 2, inv. 1, d. 4683, f. 63; ANRM, F. 2, inv. 1, d. 4693, f. 233; В.М. Кабузан, Народонаселение Бессарабской области и левобережных районов Приднестровья, Кишинев, 1974, p. 104; Я.С. Гросул, И.Г. Будак, op. cit., 1967, p. 56-57.

Tiraspol: ANRM, F. 3, inv. 5, d. 25, f. 108; ANRM, F. 5, inv. 2, d. 440; ANRM, F. 2, inv. 1, d. 1199, f. 64; ANRM, F. 2, inv. 1, d. 1484, f. 49; ANRM, F. 2, inv. 1, d. 2139, f. 44; ANRM, F. 2, inv. 1, d. 2330, f. 6; ANRM, F. 2, inv. 1, d. 2596, f. 68; ANRM, F. 2, inv. 1, d. 2815, f. 23; ANRM, F. 2, inv. 1, d. 4948, f. 45; ANRM, F. 2, inv. 1, d. 4683, f. 102; ANRM, F. 2, inv. 1, d. 4693, f. 225; Я.С. Гросул, И.Г. Будак, op. cit., 1967, p. 56-57.

Akkerman: П. Свицын, op. cit., p. 300; ANRM, F. 5, inv. 2, d. 743, f. 46; ANRM, F. 2, inv. 1, d. 1199, f. 64; ANRM, F. 2, inv. 1, d. 1484, f. 65, 167; ANRM, F. 2, inv. 1, d. 2134, f. 189; ANRM, F. 2, inv. 1, d. 2138, f. 52; ANRM, F. 2, inv. 1, d. 2589, f. 83; ANRM, F. 2, inv. 1, d. 2596, f. 77; ANRM, F. 2, inv. 1, d. 2815, f. 80; ANRM, F. 2, inv. 1, d. 4948, f. 89, 171; ANRM, F. 2, inv. 1, d. 5683, f. 246; ANRM, F. 2, inv. 1, d. 4693, f. 239; Я.С. Гросул, И.Г. Будак, op. cit., 1967, p. 56-57; В.М. Кабузан, op. cit., p. 92.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Town</th>
<th>1818</th>
<th>1828</th>
<th>1835</th>
<th>1849</th>
<th>1861</th>
<th>1897</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Izmail</td>
<td>1818</td>
<td>1828</td>
<td>1835</td>
<td>1849</td>
<td>1861</td>
<td>1897</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Св. н., op. cit., p. 312; ANRM, F. 2, inv. 1, d. 1199, f. 64; ANRM, F. 2, inv. 1, d. 1484, f. 35; ANRM, F. 2, inv. 1, d. 2138, f. 37; ANRM, F. 2, inv. 1, d. 2589, f. 61; ANRM, F. 2, inv. 1, d. 4948, f. 50; ANRM, F. 2, inv. 1, d. 5464, f. 10; ANRM, F. 2, inv. 1, d. 4683, f. 31-34; ANRM, F. 2, inv. 1, d. 4693, f. 247; В.М. Кабузан, op. cit., p. 96; Я.С. Гросул, И.Г. Будак, op. cit., 1967, p. 56-57.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(In 1849, Ismail also had a Military garrison, and when included raised the population to 30 900. (А. Скальковский, Торговые рынки Новороссийского края, in „Журнал Министерства Внутренних Дел“, С.-Петербург, 1851, часть 33, p. 57))

Kilia & Reni: ANRM, F. 3, inv. 5, d. 25, f. 103; ANRM, F. 5, inv. 2, d. 743, f. 86, 90; ANRM, F. 2, inv. 1, d. 1484, f. 27, 88; ANRM, F. 2, inv. 1, d. 2138, f. 30, 63; ANRM, F. 2, inv. 1, d. 2589, f. 2, 73; ANRM, F. 2, inv. 1, d. 4948, f. 50-51; ANRM, F. 2, inv. 1, d. 4141, f. 119, 146; ANRM, F. 2, inv. 1, d. 4683, f. 6, 177; ANRM, F. 2, inv. 1, d. 4693, f. 248-249; В.М. Кабузан, op. cit., p. 92, 96; Я.С. Гросул, И.Г. Будак, op. cit., p. 56-57.

Cahul, Orhei, Soroca: ANRM, F. 2, inv. 1, d. 2138, f. 43; ANRM, F. 2, inv. 1, d. 2589, f. 8, 66; ANRM, F. 2, inv. 1, d. 2330, f. 37; ANRM, F. 2, inv. 1, d. 2593, f. 15; ANRM, F. 2, inv. 1, d. 2815, f. 49, 92; ANRM, F. 2, inv. 1, d. 4948, f. 49, 65, 75, 78, 95; ANRM, F. 2, inv. 1, d. 4683, f. 84, 155, 201; ANRM, F. 2, inv. 1, d. 4693, f. 229, 235, 237; Я.С. Гросул, И.Г. Будак, op. cit., p. 56-57.
CHAPTER 4
PRE-COMMUNIST GROUP MOBILIZATION AND SHAPING THE SOVIET EXPERIENCE

In the course of the nineteenth and early twentieth century, national groups varied in their cultural coherence. For as we have seen, Russians and Ukrainians developed a heightened cultural understanding and political salience compared to Moldovans and Crimean Tatars. While these groups had little effect on the fall of their respective dynastic rulers (i.e. Romanovs and Habsburgs), the First World War and the 1917 Russian Revolution ended dynastic reign and ushered in a short period of mass-level national and class mobilization. In some regions socialist class movements dominated, in other regions nationalist groups mostly organized, other regions had a mixture of class and nation, and still other regions lacked a mass political movement. As the Bolsheviks eventually took power, they sought to bring order to these class and national movements. Some scholars argue brute force and Leninism ended the mass movements (Roeder 2007; Hale 2008), and others assert compromises with some national groups became necessary (Suny 1993; Beissinger 2002). Continuing with Chapter 3’s framework, I argue that when the Russian Empire collapsed more coherent national groups mobilized the peasantry, engaged in conflict and then constrained Soviet institutions in ways that helped ethnicity become central to politics and varied future group coherence levels.

Chapter 4 begins with a general discussion of scholarly works that explore the rise of nations across the Soviet Union and then outlines a general theory of group mobilization that affected institution building and coherence. First, I argue that Soviet institutions together with mass movements helped make national identities important to post-communist politics. As the Soviets attempted to stabilize the state and temper
nationalist mobilization following the 1917 Russian Revolution they made cultural concessions that institutionalized the importance of national identity. I then discuss how Soviet communism shaped different coherence levels. In general, nationally mobilized groups carved out sufficient autonomy to increase their coherence, but groups that did not mobilize in mass had much more contingent changes in coherence levels. In the second section, I utilize Moldovan, Ukrainian, and Russian case studies to demonstrate six groups’ intellectual activities, their unique relationships with ‘others’ during communism, including national groups and the state, and establish their 1985 baseline coherence levels. Like Chapter 3, the case data are primarily based upon secondary sources and utilize a historical structural analysis.

**Explanations of National Movements**

Over the past two decades scholars developed insight into why in the late 1980s and early 1990s nationalism appeared across the Soviet Union. Ethno-federal institutions, increased state reach and technology, and a shift in ideology are often noted for making nations politically relevant to post-Soviet politics, but the role groups themselves played in the process is less discussed.

As mentioned in Chapter 3, many illustrate how the Soviet Union’s federal structure used ethnic territories to divide the union’s people and material resources, which helped center national groups as essential to one’s life chances and interests (Hale 2008; Roeder 2007; Zürcher 2007; Bunce 1999; Suny 1993). By 1936 the party named all current and future Soviet republics after ethno-national groups and generated various corresponding national schools and language programs. At the very least, titular groups (the republic’s namesakes) taught and practiced their respective cultures, and printed texts (newspapers, literature, science, and politics) in their own languages, and
well over 100 other minority groups also had the opportunity to develop schools, newspapers, and cultural clubs. Similarly, to examine and keep track of these groups, Soviet leaders gathered ethnic data through censuses and marked nationalities in passports, which in the process also ascribed group identities. Furthermore, an early (1920-1933) affirmative action policy, *korenizatsiia* (*indigenization, nativeization*), was designed to cultivate groups and integrate them into communist practices. *Korenizatsiia* is more extensively discussed in the case sections as it varied across groups and republics, but in general it was part of strategy to address national issues through cultural and language programs, which often connected groups to state politics and made them relevant to public issues.

In addition to the federal structure, Soviet modernization shaped why national groups could exercise regional power in the 1990s. Soviet policies that eliminated religion and fostered urbanization helped weaken church and many local community bonds; the removal of lords and Tsars came with an increase in heterogeneous leadership that stimulated non-traditional forms of hierarchy. Finally, these changes combined with ideology to shift moral concerns from piety and venerating lords to notions of social progress and an obligation to a wider scope of people, which often helped empower nations.¹

However, there is less agreement whether Soviet intuitions independently created groups (Roeder 2007; Hale 2008) or whether these institutions were more endogenous (Suny 1993; Beissinger 2002). First, given all the constraints the Bolsheviks inherited, coherent national groups were able to exert leverage they might

¹ This ideology and its spread, as well as a new perception of time and simultaneity, was aided by technology and material changes.
not have had otherwise and took advantage of young institutions to extract ones that protected their interests.

Second, regardless of a group’s initial impact on institutions, groups inherently influenced each republic’s federal institutions in two ways. Principally, each republic’s institutions were designed to match the cultural diversity within and across the republics. Because these institutions were always in some way a reaction to an existing identity group or groups, it does not correspond that groups were mere products of institutions. Accordingly, groups and their diversity across republics ensured the content of the institutional design remained explicitly different. Second, each republic’s identity groups differed in quality (Suny 1993), including their capacity to press for different rights under communism. In other words, on the chance that groups were not the impetus for institutional designs, at the very least groups influenced how the institution operated. Consequently, reducing institutional design to a blank slate potentially lends itself to truncated answers to why groups became important.

Additionally, these broad institutional and modern factors that quashed class, civic, and religious affiliations and heightened the importance of national identity do not sufficiently illustrate the differences in early post-soviet outcomes. Nearly all regions experienced some degree of modernity, ethnic institutions, and post-Soviet national movements. Additionally, many regions had European desires, Russian occupying armies, and similar economic development levels, but not all experienced secessionist civil war. Consequently, while the USSR helped shape mobilizable national groups (Suny 1993, 102-126, 126), increased nationalism in general does not explain the observed phenomena (nor do the other features mentioned). To address this variation, I
explore how a group’s relationship with Soviet communism often led to different group capacities and organization.

Thus, to better understand how both history and Soviet communism influenced national group formation, the quality of group coherence, and later secession, I continue the group focus begun in Chapter 3. I discuss how groups influenced Soviet institutional formation and variations within these institutions affected group intellectuals, the dispersion of mass identity, and group interactions with others.

**Theorizing the Pre-Communist Origins of Post-Communist National Movements**

I argue that prior to communism many national groups formed and mobilized mass populations that then put pressure on Bolshevik and later Soviet reforms. As discussed, several groups had begun to develop national identities by the end of 19th and early 20th centuries. These burgeoning groups then combined with opportunities provided by the 1917 Russian Revolution to harden their identities through mobilization and statehood. The cultures and communities that had developed would not disappear under a new structural order or a repressive regime. Consequently, order necessitated that the Bolsheviks and post World War Two Soviets compromise with these groups, which encouraged group development and varied group coherence across the republics.

In particular, the revolution’s chaotic environment unfettered the peasantry (the vast majority of the population) from landed and state institutions, creating opportunities for emerging political groups, like nationalists and socialists, to organize a larger

---

2 There were two points when groups interacted with Soviet communism, some in 1917, and others pre-communist experience extended until 1945.
population. Peasants mobilized by national groups increasingly developed solidarity and salience that helped later challenge Bolshevik dominance. Their mobilization typically either manifested in complete independence as was seen after the First World War in the Baltic states and Finland, which provided a state apparatus to further develop their national identities, or helped push for national cultural rights within the Soviet Union, as occurred in Ukraine and Georgia. When the latter took place, it helped promote numerous national identities and developed the coherence of mobilized groups through ethno-federal institutions and cultural privileges. Even where foreign states are credited as responsible for encouraging local national movements, like in Lithuania and Belarus, the dispersion and hardening of identity occurred and the Bolshevik’s were challenged. However, while many non-mass-mobilized groups still developed their identities during communism, largely due to the institutional arrangements encouraged by mobilized groups and communists, they struggled to build coherence. Non-mass-mobilized groups, like the Moldovans and Crimean Tatars, did not threaten Bolshevik order and received minimal cultural compromises that would contribute to intellectual opportunities and the hardening of an identity.

Consequently, Soviet concessions to mobilized groups brought reforms and policies that helped make national groups central to politics, but they operated differently in different republics. A group that formed prior to 1917 was more likely to effectively persuade the Soviet Union to make specific cultural concessions, allowing the group to have state support and access to modern technologies that could help disperse its identity. This privileged cultural status also helped harden these group identities and marked life chances. However, groups that struggled to form prior to 1917
obtained few cultural concessions from the Soviets, and mass identity formation was left to conceptions developed by both the Russian center and contentious shadow intellectual communities.\(^3\) While both claimed to represent all potential group members, the different conceptions reached different populations; at minimum, two different, and often incompatible, national understandings developed within a group. Additionally, without an identified community group around which members could mobilize and gain access to opportunities, communism became more appealing and the identity became less salient still. Nevertheless, under some conditions weakly formed pre-communist groups – especially those that experienced forceful deportation – developed cohesion in successive decades. In the simplest sense, a common trauma helped people envision a community’s borders and systematic difficulties during repatriation following the trauma further illustrated the community but also permitted increased communication between group members and dispersion of group conceptions.\(^4\)

**Mobilized Groups and Communism: an Overview of Factors related to Building Coherence and a Soviet Ethno-National Policy**

**Mobilized National Groups and Ethno-Federal Design**

In 1917, many of the more developed national groups had united with peasants to form civically and militarily mobilized factions across the former Russian empire, and

---

\(^3\) Groups that formed prior to the Soviet Union had resolved more intra-group struggles and could more readily put pressure on the Soviets to achieve concessions than weaker pre-communist groups. A degree of intra-group elite consensus was also necessary to achieve Soviet concessions, like national institutions.

\(^4\) In Georgia the peasantry mobilized with the Mensheviks, in Ukraine with the Bolsheviks or the Ukrainians, in Russia with the national monarchy, Mensheviks, and primarily the Bolsheviks, in Lithuania a German led Lithuanian population, in Estonia and Latvia their respective national groups, Armenian peasants aligned with a national movement, peasants in Belarus united with the Bolsheviks and some with an internationally (Russians, Germans, and Poles) promoted nationalist movement, and the remaining future republics had no mass political movement (Suny 1993, ch. 2).
by actively competing for power and independence they posed a threat to communist order (Raleigh 2006, 149, 151; Smith 2006, 496). Rather than continuing to fight each national movement and their army, Bolshevik leaders partially managed these groups’ dissent by making compromises and co-opting ethnic interests (Raleigh 2006, 151, Martin 2001; Smith 2006, 498; Sullivant 1962, 49). Bolshevik compromise is illustrated by the leadership’s ideological retreats and the malleability of nations that helped utilize and simplify traditional cliental practices.

For instance, in December 1917 the Bolsheviks continued to war with the Ukrainians and Finns, and faced nationalist dissent throughout the Baltic states. Despite Lenin’s enthusiasm against nations and for the right of national self-determination, the fact that his faction struggled to rule Kiev, Kazakhstan, and other areas in the former Russian Empire, led to a shift in national policy (Subtelny 2009, ch. 18; Hosking 2001, ch. 10; Suny 1993, 88; Pipes 1954). As discussed in the case studies, the Red Army repeatedly struggled to control both Ukraine and the periphery. Local forces, often nationally mobilized contested and overthrew the Bolsheviks until the Fifth Congress of the Soviet changed policy.

The Fifth Congress of the Soviet, on July 10, 1918, compromised with mobilized national groups and declared that nations had the right to cultural autonomy (Xenia Joukoff Eudin. “Soviet National Minority Policies 1918-1921”; The Slavonic and Eastern

---

5 However Martin does note that Korenizatsia and other policies were not concessions. Rather he emphasizes that they were more likely a way to undermine anti-Soviet nationalism by promoting national identity in a soviet form. (2001, 2-9)

6 “up to and including secession and the formation of an independent state.” Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets October and November 1917

7 Trotsky also notes, “the policy of Bolshevism on the national questions, having ensured the victory of the October revolution, also helped the Soviet Union to hold out afterward notwithstanding inner centrifugal forces and hostile environment.” (The Revolution betrayed (New York, 1977), 170
Paragraph eleven of Chapter V of the constitution describes the Bolshevik concession:

The Soviets of the regions which are characterized by special customs and national composition, can form autonomous oblast unions at the head of which, as in the case of every other oblast association that may be formed, there should be an oblast congress of Soviets and its respective executive organ. (Sobranie Uzakoneni I Rasporjazeni Raboceo I Kresljanskogo Pravitelstva (Moscow, 1917-1918), No. 51, p. 601)

The policy differed dramatically from what both Lenin and Stalin initially desired and believed would be helpful to address national group interests and issues. They had argued that self-determination and democratization would end questions of nationhood, and autonomy would only increase national challenges ("Marxism and the National Question" 1912-1913; "Theses on the National Question" 1913). Nevertheless, the Party made the compromise and granted groups’ national autonomy (Martin 2001; Smith 2006; Pipes 1954; Carr 1976, 311; Smith 1999; Sullivant 1962, 49).

While Philip Roeder (2007, 58), citing Moshe Lewin (1968, 62-62, 86-89), claims that Lenin’s change of heart was an attempt to keep Stalin from consolidating power and that he battled Stalin and many in the party to implement the reform, Jeremy Smith’s (1999) more recent archival work illustrates that the rift between Lenin and Stalin regarding the national question was exaggerated. In fact, both Lenin and Stalin frequently switched their positions, blurring the divide on the issue. To both leaders, nationalism was an economic problem that should be addressed through Marxism.

Lenin stated in early 1917 that

While recognizing equality and equal rights to the national state [the proletariat] values above all and places foremost the alliance of the proletarians of all nations, and assesses any national demand, any national separation, from the angle of the workers’ class struggle. (Smith 1999, 16)
And Stalin stated in October 1920 that, “self-determination was outmoded and ‘should be subordinated to the principles of socialism” (Smith 1999, 22). However, to bring order, both believed the new state needed to compromise on the issue, and national autonomy was that compromise. In April 1917 Lenin remarked at the Seventh Congress,

The Party demands broad regional autonomy, the abolition of supervision from above, the abolition of a compulsory official language, and the fixing of the boundaries of the self-governing and autonomous regions in accordance with the economic and social conditions, the national composition of the population, and so forth, as assessed by the local population itself. (V. I. Lenin The Seventh (April) All-Russia Conference of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) APRIL 24–29, 1917)

Similarly, in November 1920 Stalin stated,

The Government of Russia considers it necessary to tell you that Dagestan must be autonomous, that it will enjoy the right to natural self-administration, while retaining its fraternal ties with the peoples of Russia. Dagestan must be governed in accordance with its specific features, its manner of life and customs. (Smith 1999, 24)

As Smith (1999, ch1) notes, the national question was answered by granting national autonomy, a position supported by both Lenin and Stalin at different times.  

While multiple types of groups competed with the Bolsheviks for power, nationalism directly threatened communism. A number of scholars stress that the Bolsheviks had two choices to cope with mobilized nationalists: incorporate them into the Union or give them federal autonomy. In part, fears of continued Russian

---

8 For example, as many scholars note, including the one cited by Roeder (2007, 58), Ukrainian nationalists are believed to be the reason for Soviets granting Ukrainians federal autonomy (Sullivant 1962, 49; Carr 1976, 311).

9 Furthermore, Stalin is credited as creating the idea of national autonomy as a solution to “breaking down the barriers between nations.” (Smith 1999, 19).
chauvinism made the latter the only feasible option (Carr 1976, 311; Martin 2001; Smith 2006; Smith 1999; Smith 2006, 137). As Nikolai Bukharin stated,

\begin{quote}
As the former Great Power nation, we should indulge the nationalist aspirations [of the non-Russians] and place ourselves in an unequal position, in the sense of making still greater concessions to the national current. Only by such a policy, when we place ourselves artificially in a position lower in comparisons with others, only by such a price can we purchase for ourselves the trust of the formerly oppressed nations.
\end{quote}

Even as the Soviets established power and their militarized opponents dissipated, nationalists continued to organize and at the very least needed some concessions to make Soviet order sustainable and palatable (Ball 2006, 176).

Beyond the posed threat by mobilized national groups, compromises with national groups seemed less damning to the communist project than monarchy, religion, or class. Ethnicity’s increasingly accessible and malleable nature made it potentially suitable to party goals as they could orient ethnic groups more easily than other contentious entities, such as those mobilized by ideologies, other charismatic figures, rights, or rational-legal claims. The latter necessitated numerous immediate Soviet concessions and compromises to Leninism because tolerance toward a completely different ideological concept, rights, a charismatic leader, or laws contradicted the party’s ideological basis and its method of order.

On the other hand, ethnic nations, while anti-Marxist, did not undermine the project’s short-term authority and logic, and their existing networks often helped orient people toward Leninism and traditional hierarchies. Nationalism was believed to disappear as communism developed and traditions developed under Tsarist order served as tools for communist authorities to establish order (Weeks 1999). Consequently, the party developed many cliental relationships, and national groups
offered communist leaders another way to systematically extend their patronage to further manage society. By cultivating the elite leaders of large ethnic groups, leaders reduced their patronage networks from thousands to a little over a hundred, and through these networks the party expressed ideological goals and kept order without substantial costs (Hosking 2001, 416). The church could have been another useful network, and was utilized at different points under communism, but, ultimately, mobilized national groups oriented the traditional ties.  

While pre-communist groups were not fully formed modern nations, those that mobilized encouraged future national group formation. Mobilization itself illustrated a national community that helped unite distant members, and pressure on the Bolsheviks helped shape ethno-federal institutions and independent states – the features commonly attributed to making national groups politically relevant in the 1980s and 1990s.

**Soviet Features of Nation Building**

**Pre-communist groups and coherence**

Many of the groups that formed prior to communism lacked internal struggles, mobilized, and solidified a unique position within the Soviet Union. Specific group rights and autonomy provided opportunities for group intellectuals to build and disperse a common understanding; the ideological regime helped embed these groups’ identities and symbols into Soviet concepts (e.g. Ukrainian and Russian ‘founders of

---

10 Additionally, the Orthodox Church’s historic dependence and deep connection to the Russian state prevented it from organizing an opposition. Instead, the church adapted to communism, as it had to changing Tsarist regimes.
communism’), which kept the groups’ salient;\textsuperscript{11} authoritarian control and threats often prevented non-group-members from having the same group privileges, which entrenched hierarchies that illustrated a group’s value within a republic; and Stalinist repression hardened identities.

**Pre-communist groups and incoherence**

Similar features that had promoted coherent group formation – national autonomy, Soviet ideology, and authoritarianism – hindered coherence for others. First, in several republics where group formation remained weak prior to communism, Soviet ideological equality helped temper ethnicity as a determinant factor in social and political life by softening the distinction between groups and preventing the group from becoming a frequent marker of life chances. Without an identified community group around which members could mobilize and gain access to opportunities, communism became more appealing than the group. Second, national autonomy gave some groups the right to their identity, but centralized authoritarianism easily permitted outsiders, typically bureaucrats in Moscow, to dictate how these rights operated. With few organizational opportunities and facing heavy coercion, these groups could not effectively protest, and the Soviets either dictated who and what constituted the group, or they attempted to eliminate the group (e.g. Ingush, Chechens, and Crimean Tatars).\textsuperscript{12} When Soviet authority dictated a group’s constitution it limited a groups’

\textsuperscript{11}Other discussions of group ideas and symbols becoming embedded in communist institutions include Michael Bernhard’s (1993) discussion of the church in Poland, Jan Kubik’s (1994) assessment of communist institutions that “partially [remodeled] the existing cultures,” which helped keep symbols relevant (1994, 3), Keith Darden’s and Anna Grzymala-Busse’s (2006) exploration of mass education and literacy, and Philip Roeder’s (2007) and Henry Hale’s (2008) assessment of the Soviet’s ethno-federal system.

\textsuperscript{12}In the case of group elimination, members were often forcibly removed from their homes, experienced stigmas, and underwent extensive repression and genocide. The attempted destruction was thought to
opportunities to exchange information, organize, and associate in politics. Accordingly, their group intellectuals’ ideas were not incorporated into the Soviet descriptions and had limited range to disperse the identity, often through underground, non-officially sanctioned means. Consequently, at minimum, two group conceptions became dispersed to two different populations, each claiming representation of the whole nation. Finally, Stalinist totalitarianism often prevented the hardening of identities for weak pre-communist groups. Without prior group formation, Stalinist assimilation strategies faced less organized opposition and lacking self-directed cultural autonomy the groups loss of institutional cultural privileges generated less outrage (compared to groups who had previously ran their own cultural institutions).

**The paradox of ethnocide and ethnic deportation**

Non-mass-mobilized and mobilized groups also experienced extensive repression that stimulated some group coherence. The Soviets implemented a variety of specifically targeted (e.g. Volga-Tatars, Crimean Tatars, Chechens, Georgians, Romanians) anti-ethnic policies, including deportation, reframing histories, and systematic ethnocide. Some anti-ethnic policies, such as deportation of the Chechens or Crimean Tatars, helped create a shared understanding of injustice and experience within their respective groups as illustrated by their development of a common language and descriptions of their exile, homeland, and Russian persecutors. Simply, through the shared trauma of deportation and genocide, members of different groups were often able to recognize similarities between themselves and historically “othered” peoples.

remove the national group and any issues associated with it. However, while these groups did not always become highly coherent, their survivors often achieved increased group solidarity.
For instance, when communists faced various national challenges after 1946, such as Stalinist paranoia and the incorporation of several new nations, the party attempted to eliminate the Crimean Tatars through deportation and denial of their existence. In the 1920s the CPSU made strong efforts to illustrate a unique Crimean Tatar nation, but after World War II the party sought to reestablish authority by attempting to make some groups disappear; largely through deportation and propagandizing terror. Nevertheless, the deportation systematically chose a particular collection of people, which stimulated a valued inter-group interaction, and as many Crimean Tatars were relocated in similar areas it allowed the group’s intellectuals to interact with the population, and the experience inspired many to speak out, regardless of Soviet retribution, which helped stimulate the group’s association with politics (Uehling 2004; Williams 2001).

Summary

Groups that mobilized mass movements prior to communism were more likely to increase their group coherence under communism than those that did not mobilize. The former had advantages within their republics that illustrated their group’s importance and increased the identity’s salience, but, within their respective republics and autonomous regions, titular groups that did not mobilize rarely experienced advantages or disadvantage by way of their national identity, which limited their group salience. Intellectual opportunities to define the group and build solidarity also differed for both types of groups.

In particular, communism’s relationship with groups generated a unique historical discourse for each group. Under a relatively weak centralized state, mobilized groups had the opportunity to monopolize portions of history, and gain a connection to its
gravitas, social memory, grievances, repertoires of action, and cultures of mobilization. On the other hand, national policy often prevented assimilation that could have allowed non-mass-mobilized group members to identify with groups that had mobilized, and authoritarianism often prevented the former from building their own identity and competing with others for historical claims. For instance, in 1953 few had consciously experienced the turn of the century and the social actions that created empires, rebellions, industrialization, or nations. None experienced the Cossack’s Henmenete democracy and fall, or Ivan Groznies conquest of Kazan and the east frontier, but, ultimately, some people could identify with these histories while others were systematically barred.  

Each person’s passport and textbook explained who was ethnically connected and who was not. Even with de-Stalinization these historical group records minimally changed. Simply, previously mobilized groups had more opportunities to write their preferred history and highlight what they wanted to emphasize, but those who did not developed under a purposeful top-down approach that often utilized historical remnants (i.e. events and tails not applied to the mobilized) to detail a distinct identity and had little ability to assimilate or collect provocative and malleable stories about their heritage. Consequently, as mobilized groups continued to build an elaborate, formal history, their leaders could more easily explain that their ‘ethnic nature’ was composed of dynamic social repertoires, including attributes and practices of protest, mobilization, and independence; these group members could then more easily imagine collective group acts as real possibilities.

13 Additionally, not all groups could claim what constituted a valuable feature of history.
Cases: Moldova, Ukraine, Russia

This section seeks to illustrate why Moldovans, Gagauz, Russians, Ukrainians, Crimean Tatars, and Tatars along the Volga developed different levels of coherence under communism; despite nearly all having cultural distinctions, intellectual particularities, developed literary languages, and other aspects of identity that are typically associated with coherence. To do so, the cases below illustrate how the independent variable – pre-communist group coherence – interacted with communism and shaped post-communist group salience and solidarity. Simply, different levels of pre-communist group coherence influenced how the Soviet’s maintained authority and ways in which group coherence fluctuated under communism. Each case first discusses whether a group mobilized a mass movement and threatened Soviet order, and how it affected their relationship with communism. I then describe how each group’s interaction with other groups, group intellectuals, and the state affected group changes and coherence under communism.

Moldova

The Moldova case looks specifically at the interaction between communism and a non-mass-mobilized majority group and minority group, as well as communism’s relationship with two mobilized groups within the republic. Most simply, Moldovans and Gagauz lacked substantial coherence and did not mobilize prior to communism, and while they both became more developed due to communist national policies, by the late 1980s neither group’s leadership and people they claimed to represent developed a common understanding and coherent identity. Mainly, the intelligentsia from within the Moldovan community and the non-intelligentsia majority vastly differed in how they
understood and articulated their own identities. Moscow largely dictated what and who constituted the Moldovans, and as the Moldovan intellectual community grew but lacked the right of public expression, a chasm formed between what the majority of Moldovans learned and those who privately spent time reflecting upon and articulating the identity. The Gagauz, however, began marginal and remained largely neglected throughout communism. The group had few opportunities to express itself or communicate its identity publicly. While Gagauz coherence increased largely due to brief periods when regional cultural clubs became legalized, the identity remained poorly understood by its members and minimally relevant. Additionally, the rural structure of Moldova and communist equality kept the Gagauz and Moldovans isolated and with few meaningful inter-group interactions. On the other hand, Ukrainians and Russians began with coherent identities, and the CPSU integrated many of these groups’ intellectual leaders into national policy positions and their symbols into communist institutions. Consistent cultural development and expression across their respective group members increased the salience and solidarity of Ukrainians and Russians, as well as Eastern Slavs under the rubric of the Russian language and the Soviet flag (Kaufman 1996, 1; Roper 2010, 106).

Specifically, this section illustrates how pre-communist groups interacted with communism in Moldova. The aftermath of the First and Second World Wars created two different periods of Moldovan-communist interaction. The first came when Bolsheviks annexed the Eastern bank territory along the Nistru River (mostly present day Transnistria), and the second when Soviets annexed the rest of Bessarabia after World War II. While each annexation occurred because of mobilized groups, Romanians and
Slavs (Romanians removed the Bolsheviks from Bessarabia after the First World War, and the Russian and Ukrainian dominant Slavs removed the Romanians and Germans after the second), incoherent communities of Moldovans and Gagauz’s interaction with communism did not generate high post-communist coherence levels for the latter two groups.

**Moldovans and Communism: a Romanian Intellectual cohort and a Russian promoted Moldovan mass identity**

Latinism...[is] a sharp wedge...driven into the heart of the Slavonic world.

--Iurri Samarin
“Sovremennyi ob'em Pol'skogo voprosa”\textsuperscript{14}

The Bolshevik’s 1919 annexation of the Nistru River’s Eastern bank (at the time part of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic (UkSSR))\textsuperscript{15} came with minimal Moldovan resistance, and without a coherent Moldovan identity the Bolsheviks did not need to cultivate the group or incorporate its leaders into the party of the government. As Chapter 3 illustrated, the region’s agrarian features and unconnected communities governed by weak landed gentry prevented inter-group and intellectual interactions, which left the territory with various languages and an awareness of isolated local histories. Consequently, without coherence the Moldovans did not organize a threat nor represent a source of potential Soviet order. The Bolsheviks dominated the Moldovans without compromise, and did not integrate Moldovan intellectuals and symbols into communism.

\textsuperscript{14} Samarin (1877, 333)

\textsuperscript{15} In the December 1936 Soviet Congress the names changed to Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, which I will also represent with the abbreviation, UkSSR.
Nevertheless, the loss of Bessarabia, west of the Nistru River, to the Kingdom of Romania along with threats from coherent Ukrainian and Russian groups challenged Bolshevik dominance in the region. To maintain order and increase their regional power the new rulers began to make claims on Bessarabia, further centralize authority, and cultivate a Moldovan identity. Bureaucrats from the center began to govern and organize the region. First, after several peasant uprisings, and the Bolshevik’s failed coups in Bessarabia, which directed the area’s peasant anger over famine toward the Kingdom of Romania (the Tatarbunary Uprising), the region became ruled under an official administrative territory within the UkSSR called the Moldovan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (MASSR). With official status, the state developed the territory’s administrative networks (Kolstø 2002, 202), and began to build a Moldovan identity in terms of historical narratives, language, and the group’s future affiliations. However, due to the dominant influence of communism, the group never became coherent. During the 1920s and 1930s the Moldovan identity offered little value and increasing Stalinist terror repressed the few intellectuals that began to organize and interact with the population. Similarly, after the Second World War, the group’s formal identity cultivation continued from above, but repression of intellectual interactions, low value, and limited political opportunities kept the identity’s salience and solidarity low.

Even amongst industrialization and education that lifted Moldovan’s literacy from 10% in 1910 to 74% by 1939, people in the MASSR could easily assimilate to the Russian or Ukrainian cultures. While the authorities actively attempted to cultivate the Moldovan culture and encouraged their integration into communism, Moldovans had little reason to appreciate the identity as they found more economic success and high
acceptance when they assimilated to more Slavic and Russian practices. Many positions, including work, education, and politics, necessitated that people express either the Ukrainian or Russian culture, at least linguistically. However, unlike the rest of Ukraine, where these cultures determined political opportunities, the MASSR specifically targeted the minority Moldovan population, and used the party’s ideology and central authority to guard against Moldovan prejudices, which provided fairly unhindered access to Ukrainian and Russian schools, party positions, and other urban jobs. In this case, the Moldovan identity offered very little advantage, and one’s inheritance of the identity did not distinguish them with substantial problems or advantages.\footnote{Despite growing industry that would typically put new urbanites at a disadvantage and instigate a meaningful inter-group interaction, the Moldovans were protected against discrimination and many incentives encouraged assimilation. Shortly after the Russian Civil War Soviets began several industrial projects that greatly advanced the MASSR’s infrastructure. Factories and migration increased the urban population and roads and railways increasingly linked the countryside. City populations rose from 82,283 in 1926 to 124,012 in 1939, and the number of schools and students doubled from 22,000 in 1927-1928 to 48,000 in 1937-1938 (\textit{Narodnoye Obrazovaniye Nauka i Kultura v SSSR} 1977). In addition, there were over 116 collective farms each with youth attending school. Consequently, when moving, taking on a new job, or encountering new politics, people encountered new hierarchies, but were not systematically barred from them and the rules allowed them to adapt to the change. Furthermore, Slavic identities more than others offered a path to power, status, and a \textit{better} life. With over 80\% of the region’s school children coming from the countryside (“Report on ‘School children by Social Class, 1926-1927 Academic Year,’ Arhiva Organizatiilor Social-Politice a Republicii Moldova”) (Also discussed in (Brysiakin 1974, 249; King 2000, 76), rural communities gained for the first time opportunities to become educated and incentives to adopt a group identity. Educational connections and collective farms created new values and statuses, which necessitated and emphasized urbanization, material advantages, and ‘better’ lives, and Slavic culture offered a path to ‘advance’. By 1939 the region was 80\% literate (up from roughly 18\%) in the Russian language (Скурути и Апмау 2001, 225), and most understood, or at least learned about, their Slavic connections and ‘tragic’ exile from Bessarabia. In other words, the Slavic cultures and languages provided meaning as well as material and social advantages relative to Romanians.}

Even with early affirmative action policies in the Moldovan ASSR, korenizatsiia (\textit{indigenization, nativization}), few Moldovans became part of the communist order (King 1998). Instead, those who urbanized were more likely to celebrate Russian and Slavic practices, including Ukrainians and Russians. Russian and Slavic dominance in the
region offered the best paths to political and economic success and did not come with substantial prejudices. The region was urbanizing for the first time and most people from rural areas were readily accepted into the Russian and Ukrainian education programs, which further encouraged those in the region to assimilate to these cultures rather than learn a less relevant formal Moldovan language and culture.

While bureaucrats and intellectuals outside the territory made the majority of policy and cultural decisions, Moscow and Kharkov¹⁷ split early authority in the MASSR (Surilov 1963), and along the way, Ukrainian and Russian group coherence was in a mutually beneficial manner. The Bolsheviks and Ukrainians disputed several eastern territories, and Moscow likely feared the Moldovan territory’s autonomy would further encourage Ukrainian mobilization.¹⁸ To prevent growing unrest they granted substantial authority to Kharkov. The split in decision-making formed a mutually desirable Slavic narrative in the territory that emphasized common roots and encouraged a sentiment amongst community members to avoid undermining both Russians and Ukrainians.

In part, the coherent groups and Soviets helped build a Slavic identity, as well as a Moldovan identity, through emphasis on commonalities and that grew out of reaction to Romanian animosity. First, the content celebrated an eastern Slavic label composed of Ukrainian and Russian attributes. For instance, the region taught both groups’ languages and did not substantially alter their unique vocabularies and grammar. However, many narratives also identified and highlighted their attributes as Slavic. Stories described the Russians and Ukrainians as important leaders in the revolution,

¹⁷ The Ukrainian SSR capital from 1919 to 1939
¹⁸ This is further discussed in the Ukraine case.
and reversed the empire’s Russian centric history and highlighted Ukrainian’s connection to the Kiev-Rus and central role in Slavic origins (Wilson 2002, 142). The curriculum of urban education taught and embraced a fairly homogenizing Slavic perspective. Even Moldovan national writers embraced the Slavs. The poem Moldova by Alexander Robot (1913-1941) highlights an ethnic Russian Soviet, Grigory Kotovsky, as a great leader who took Moldova out of the ‘dark forest’ and into a new century:

Rights and Luck are not in the Forest / When Kotovsky jumped in the fire / He lit large fields and / Moldova’s new century.¹⁹

The Moldovan poet not only underemphasizes the Moldovan country’s and identity’s cultural specifics but does not attribute the country’s and identity’s triumph to the group. Instead, the poet heralds a Russian, Kostovsky, as the group’s historic leader and national awakener. At the very least, the poem is an example that the ethnic distinction seemed unimportant to even some who deeply embraced a Moldovan identity.

Additionally, having a common Romanian ‘enemy’ helped bridge the region’s Slavic community and further weaken the Moldovan identity. The Soviets never officially recognized Romania’s annexation of Bessarabia, and through maps and books the Soviets continued to describe Slavic heritage as fundamental to the Moldovan’s origins. People learned how Slavs had helped Stefan the Great defeat the Poles, and how Slavic literature and high culture had defined the territory. Most importantly for the region, the content blamed the MASSR’s difficulties on ‘bourgeois Romanian oppression’ (Guzun 2013). In particular, the MASSR’s famines in the 1920s were attributed to Romanians (Okhotnikov and Batchinsky 1927): ‘the kingdom barred people

¹⁹ Молдов «Дар ку прик пзбуцра ста дретатя, норокул, Молдова ун яак ното ынчепе, Атучынд Котовский се арунка ын фокул, Апринс пе ынтинселе степе.» (нистру 9).
from Bessarabia’s fertile lands, they starved them, and now they should rise up against Romanian oppressors.20 The official Soviet word on the region further highlights the Romanian enemy (Akgün and Baltag 2013, 17):

“After the invasion of imperial Romania in Soviet Bessarabia, the Moldovan nation was dismembered. Its largest share, living on the territory of Bessarabia, which remains under the occupation of the invaders, endures a harsh social and national yoke. But its smaller part, living in the Soviet State, constitutes a socialist nation.”

Rather than stimulate interest in the development of a Moldovan identity, the controversy with Romanians pushed many Moldovans away from the Romance culture and toward an appreciation of Slavs.21

While one may guess that Moldovan group compliance or bottom up aspirations to be different than Romanians rooted these notions (I discuss more of the narratives in the post-World War II section below), the group and enemy cultivation clearly began at the top. As Charles King (King 2000, 52) notes much of the anti-Romanian agenda came from the Moscow based Society of Bessarbians, or its full name (mentioned in Chapter 2), “The All-Union ‘Get the Hands of the Romanian Invaders Off Bessarabia!’ Society of Bessarbians” (Vsesoiuznoe obshchestvo bessarabtsev “Proch’ ruki rumynskikh zakhvatnikov ot bessarabii!”). Furthermore, minimal Moldovan inclusion in the party and non-agrarian positions illustrate a lack of involvement in cultural policy on behalf of Moldovan people. Soviet content, largely originating in Moscow and Kharkov,

20 While these are the general sentiments, Kopanskii (1978) offers a detailed discussion of the anti-Romanian descriptions and actions.

21 This is not to say that all Moldovans, Ukrainians, or Russians in the MASSR accepted the party line. In fact there was substantial disagreement about governance, not particularly nationalistic, that encouraged hundreds to illegally migrate (from the USSR’s opinion) into the Kingdom of Romania.
spread a common Slavic conception through newspapers and schools, and
strengthened it by assigning grievances to a common enemy.

Russian and Ukrainian languages remained the primary tool for official business
and secondary schools, which stimulated interest in their cultures and language, but did
not do the same for Moldovan group formation. While some studied Moldovan in the
Cyrillic alphabet and kept the language,\textsuperscript{22} this was principally limited to a handful of
Moldovans; few Ukrainians, Russians, and Moldovans learned the language. The
interwar reforms did not substantially stimulate interest in the Moldovan identity, but did
encourage some Slavophilia.

\textit{Post World War Two}

After the Second World War the Soviet Union annexed Bessarabia, exiled and
repressed those who claimed a Romanian identity, and only tolerated a majority
Moldovan nation within the newly minted Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republics
(MSSR).\textsuperscript{23} At the time of annexation, an estimated 40,000 to 120,000 Romanians were
forcibly deported, killed, or migrated to areas within Romania, which left a small urban
Romance speaking population (<7\% of the total Romance language speakers). The
majority of those Romanians who survived, were a rural illiterate and unconnected
population (68\% of the total population were Moldovans, of which over 93\% lived in
rural communities, a fraction of whom were literate). Faced with Romania’s continued
claim to Bessarabia the CPSU persisted to label all Romance speakers Moldovan and
cultivate the Moldovan identity, but without valued inter-group and political interactions,

\textsuperscript{22} Usage of the Cyrillic alphabet briefly changed to the Latin alphabet during the 1930s.

\textsuperscript{23} Official annexation came in 1939 with the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, but sustained Soviet authority did
not occur in the region until after the war.
as well as Moldovan intellectual support and involvement, the group remained incoherent.

For the majority, the Moldovan identity came from legitimate institutions that explained who they were. Schools, censuses, and newspapers helped describe the group, and the general narrative to an extent, accurately portrayed their folk life. However, the characteristics, like before the war in the MASSR, seemed unimportant to many Moldovans. Even those who agreed with certain characteristics could not typically observe how the Moldovan group affected them and operated in their world. Their passport designated identity, but it rarely determined potential employment opportunities, social status, or on the street rights. Most Moldovans remained rural laborers who were sufficiently supported on the land and did not need to urbanize.\(^{24}\) Similarly, village positions within the Kolkhoz were available for all, regardless of group, and those who desired to could attend universities and colleges without problem. The Moldovan identity rarely signaled status and directed how many were treated in the republic during communism.\(^{25}\)

Despite post-war infrastructural development that helped Moscow build a slightly more coherent Moldovan group, the identity lacked many political features. Rural communities became connected with schools, roadways, and literature, and urban populations more than quadrupled. For instance, the number of urban schools nearly doubled from 1950 (166 schools) to 1975 (304 schools) with a similar doubling in total

\(^{24}\)Obviously the famines in Moldova illustrate a period when people were not sufficiently supported by village community, but urbanization was also not an option. Consequently, it did not encourage cultural interactions.

\(^{25}\)While under communism the Moldovan identity singled minimal prejudices, after communism ethnic prejudices against Moldovans notably increased.
school enrollment from the 1950-1951 academic year (736,000 students) to the 1975-1976 academic year (1,483,000 students). New roads linked the north and south of Moldova, and several communities in between. Bridge projects lined many rivers, which helped foster regular contact between previously isolated neighbors. Additionally, rail systems connected the population and allowed government policy to effectively reach most communities, which helped more Moldovans experience similar state features and have these features relate to their ascribed identity. By the 1980s book and journal circulation increased from 31,000 in 1940 to 33 million. Roads, radio, and television connected many village communities, and by the 1970s the population became nearly 97% literate. The Russian language dominated most official spheres, but as the republic’s official second language Moldovan also spread. Overall, development ensured connections between rural and urban communities, and people throughout the territory were taught similar stories about their Moldovan heritage and Soviet future. However, because the center dictated who and what constituted the group, they limited the group’s opportunities and associations. The CPSU did not need to afford the Moldovans special rights or opportunities, and kept the group from politics and nationalist ideas.

Instead, cultural programs associated Moldovans with Soviets within apolitical spheres. Moscow used the adjective, “Soviet” throughout all republics, but it became a significant attribute for Moldovans. The rural populations had not previously received standardized content that helped people systematically communicate and conceptualize their relationships. However, ‘Soviet Moldovan’ described the first common articulation of identity across the entire rural Bessarabia landscape. One is hard pressed to find a
book, newspaper, or policy written between 1945 and 1990 that does not mention Moldova or Moldovan next to its descriptive ‘Soviet’. Additional descriptions, often included ‘socialist’, ‘comunist’, ‘pionier’, ‘lucrător’, ‘slavă’, and ‘națiune în curs de dezvoltare’ which similarly portrayed underlying Soviet values and attributed them to the Moldovan identity. The connection between the Moldovan identity and the Soviet socialism is also found throughout texts; including academic research. The party’s scientific description consistently stated that ethnicities had two social relationships; an external and an internal one. While the latter tends to sound primordialist, a position supported widely and openly by Stalin, the distinction provided the Soviets an opportunity to describe themselves as the external factor: as the Soviets engaged in the class struggle they openly argued that they fostered natural groups. In this case, Soviet socialism made the natural Moldovan entity ‘better’. In other words, descriptions consistently illustrated that Moldovans were socially dependent and naturally bounded to the Soviets as subjects. G. N. Zaharova (1985) iterates the Soviet connection as he describes in a lengthy academic book, *Modern Ukrainian/Moldovan Ethnic Relations*, why the Moldovans and Ukrainians have similarities, even though the Moldovans started off with “agricultural traditions” and the “importance they saw in livestock.”

In more difficult working groups of managers and specialists of middle and higher echelons the percent of Moldovan is [today] more prevalent. The fact is that before Bessarabia entered the USSR its social class structure was fundamentally different from the other Soviet republics. It consisted of poor peasants, kulaks, lone craftsmen, and others. After World War II workers in the Moldavian SSR had ample opportunities for comprehensive social and cultural development, education and professional skills. As a

---

result of Lenin's national policy and equalization of socio-economics, and political and cultural development of the peoples of the USSR, an evolution of the social structure of Soviet Moldavia took an accelerated tempo.  

The Moldovan success is commonly accredited to their access to prestigious schools and cultural 'levels', and the Soviet Social Structure that helped bring people together and allow the Moldovans to succeed (Zaharov 1985, 25-26). Fundamentally, the Soviets argued that class differences were more different than ethnic, and that the Moldovans became a group because of the Soviets help in the class struggle. Consequently, the repeated Soviet description described Moldovans' historic and future bonds, as well as their primary association to government and political organization as almost purely Soviet.  

Numerous apolitical folk spheres and anti-Romanian Bourgeoisie were the primary exception to the Soviet attribute. The Soviet Ministry of Culture actively cultivated several programs that nurtured Moldovan music and dance, the academic community emphasized language and historic differences between Moldovans and Romanians, and industry highlighted the people's and regions wine and chocolate

---

27 “В более сложных по характеру труда группах руководителей и специалистов среднего и высшего звеньев процент молдаван несколько преобладает. Дело в том, что до вхождения Бессарабии в СССР ее социально-классовая структура принципиально отличалась от структуры других советских республик. В нее входили крестьяне-бедняки, крестьяне-кулаки, кустари-одиночки и др. После Великой Отечественной войны трудящиеся Молдавской ССР получили широкие возможности для всестороннего социального и культурного развития, повышения образовательного и профессионального уровней. В результате осуществления ленинской национальной политики и выравнивания уровней социально-экономического, политического и культурного развития народов СССР эволюция социальной структуры Советской Молдавии проходила ускоренными темпами.” (Захарова 1985, 23)

28 Nevertheless, as discussed later, when the Soviet Union collapsed the adjectives' values dissipated, and with it a substantial meaning of the Moldovan identity.
production. The Moldovan identity influenced these spheres – language, music, dance, chocolate, and wine – but did not have much impact in many political areas. Poems and literature about the Moldovan people described rural life, and connected people through a widely disseminated folk culture. The famous Moldovan poet Dumitri Matkovski’s poem “We have a Country, like a Peace” illustrates the folk centered Moldovan ideal,

We have country like a flower, / like a sunflower, / like a sunflower / like a star / The most sweet, most chosen, / The most proud, most beautiful / Between all other countries / Mine is the princess

The poem, and many like it, positively attributes the country’s and people’s greatness to agricultural features and general qualities. Additionally, its two political features work in ambiguous contradiction. First, the poet asserts Moldova’s superiority by stating that it is the most ‘sweet’, ‘chosen’, ‘proud’, and ‘beautiful’ country, but he then diminishes its potential relevance by comparing the country to a princess; compared to a queen, king, or tsar, the princess is typically an apolitical lesser elite. While the poem likely reflects the Moldovan SSR’s diminutive position at the time (the Union’s primary power was in Moscow), the poem reflects a popular narrative that informed people’s ‘rightful’ apolitical and subjugated position in life. In fact, up until late 1989 published poetry almost exclusively discusses how the Soviets liberated Moldova from the Great War (and occasionally how Moldovan’s helped out in the Great War) or the Moldovan’s agriculture.

29 However, Gorbachev briefly ended wine production for nearly two years between 1985-1987, which attacked a Moldovan value and stimulated some greater meaning in the identity.

30 Ам о Царэ ка о паче «Ам о царе ка о флоре, ка ун рэсэрит де соаре, ка ун рэсэрит де соаре, ка о стя. Чя май булче, май алясэ, Чя май мыйндра, мау фрумоасэ, Ыйнтрэ алте цэрь крэясэ Цара мя.» (Нистру 4)
lifestyle and connection to the land. With other identity options, the Moldovan one associated with few political spheres.

Furthermore, the MASSR argument that Moldovans and Romanians constituted unique groups with different histories, languages, and a past full of animosity between them, continued to be a major aspect of the Moldovan identity. This particular narrative also highlighted the Romanian fascist past and potential for future harm to Moldovan people. Speeches and texts frequently reflected anti-Romanian sentiments found in the following statement, “We must increase the fight against Bourgeois propaganda that inaccurately describes the Moldovan nation’s history and false unity with our neighbor” (CP of the MSSR Policy, Fund 31.259 Statement 1985). Not only were the Moldovans, not Romanians, but they were also not Ukrainians and Russians, and the history the party described was shaped from what these groups did not claim as their own.

Despite a concerted Soviet effort to build a Moldovan identity, centralized authority and the Soviet dictatorship prevented group intellectual interactions and a common understanding from developing between Moldovan intellectuals and the majority of Moldovans. Consequently, an isolated Moldovan intellectual community formed with very different feelings about the group’s identity. The intellectual community grew from many latent early 20th century Romanian Kingdom’s cultural concepts, and increasingly viewed the Moscow led Moldovan conception as farce. By the 1970s most

---

31 These attributes remain some of the strongest unifying points in Moldova today (documentary interviews 2010, 2012). See the weekly Soviet published magazine, Nistru or Literatura si Arta for examples. Like other Soviet materials, the magazine printed the Moldovan language in Cyrillic letters until 1990. However, with increasing autonomy it switched its title to Bessarabia, and through an arguably pluralist framework debated many Moldovan conceptions.
Moldovan intellectuals embraced and privately communicated a similar understanding that Moldovans extended from Romanian origins (King 2001, 112-114).

While Moldovan intellectuals’ conceptions did not spread or develop with the majority, it became widely popular amongst non-Russian educated urbanites for several reasons. First, the Romanian based Moldovan identity provided a new status for educated urbanites that differentiated them from rural Moldovans and less educated urbanites. Highly educated people could take solace in the conception as it explained any inferior opportunities in terms of ‘repression’, rather than a weak and new ethnos. They had similar skills to other urbanites, but at times faced challenges because of their ethnic association. The more Romanian based identity illustrated the challenging situations as unjust, and offered a clear explanation for it. Much like the aforementioned, the intellectual narrative more accurately described their experiences and offered more developed explanations for the situation in society and politics. While the Moscow led identity, with its folk focus, offered a slightly more adequate understanding for those in rural areas, it did not provide an insightful account or meaning for many highly educated urban Moldovans. The latter experienced rapid changes that needed explanations, as well as some power, pain, and opportunities based upon their ethnic identity. The Moldovans needed to adapt and confront these experiences, but Soviet policy domination prevented their interactions and the identities growth.

32 While Moldovans experienced substantial national equality, at some positions within society, including intellectual worth, Moldovan culture was looked as second to the quality produced by Russian intellectuals.
As urbanization and higher education increased throughout the region a Moldovan intellectual community developed, and began to conceptualize the identity with numerous ‘Romanian’ features, which starkly differed from the party promoted version. By the 1970s most group intellectuals similarly understood all indigenous Moldovans as having Romanian origins, and from 1969 to 1972 the intellectual orientation and organization reached its pre-1980s peak with the National Patriotic Front. Three Moldovan professors, Alexandru Usatiuc-Bulgăr, Alexandru Şoltoianu, Gheorghe Ghimpu, headed the group composed of roughly 100 other local literary and artistic figures. The KGB uncovered the movement in 1971, and sent its leaders to prison and then into forced exile. The movement brought attention and organization to the Romanian intellectual conception and widened the underground community, but awareness of the perspective remained largely urban and ineffective at communicating with the majority of the population who now accepted the communist promoted Slavic view.

Many group intellectuals privately wrote in the Latin alphabet and continued to learn the literary Romanian language. This common language not only eased communication with writers in Romania, but also historicized the group and linked them to ancient Dacia tribes and the Roman Empire. The narrative followed that Dacia tribes settled the Romanian territory and later Romans conquered it. In doing so, the Romans gave locals their contemporary Romance tongues. The narrative sidelined other attributes and marked language as an important distinction of people and territory. Furthermore, language explained a historic and geographic distinction from their Slavic language neighbors. While borders did not contain singular language groups and
people shared many characteristics across different languages, the narrative illustrated the historic other against a contemporary conception that highlighted difference.

Intellectuals also historicized the Moldovans with symbolic Romanian personalities. Michael the Brave, the first authority to reign over all three Romanian principalities in the 17th century, highlighted a common leader and became the pan-Romanianist’s foundational symbol. Specifically Moldavian and Moldovan figures were also used to show and argue commonalities. For instance, Moldavia’s princes, Alexander the Good and Stefan the Great, who won several wars against foreign invaders in the 15th and 16th centuries, were discussed as Romanian protectors. This is despite their vassal rule in a distinct Moldovan principality as well as physical battles and political conflicts with Wallachia and Transylvania (well over two thirds of modern Romania). Furthermore, the intellectuals dismissed other figures like Ivan III who Russians argued helped Stefan the Great win the 1497 war against Poles. Past leaders and historical understandings either represented everyone Romanian, or were rejected as irrelevant.33 Together these and other well-known symbols standardized the narrative of the region’s history amongst intellectuals. The Moldovan intellectuals came up with the same standardized answers to critical questions about the group’s history and
identity. The content’s historical focus drew modern links across the intellectuals and associated them with dispersed people.

Accordingly, the majority and intellectual conceptual division splintered the Moldovans. Different stories divided people’s perceptions and values. For example, the intellectual community described their Roman origins and idea of Stefan the Great as a Romanian hero, but the majority learned a Slavic based origin story and Stefan the Great’s Moldovan history. The two narratives mismatched symbols and meaning, and questions gave rise to differing answers and explanations. Slavic influenced Moldovans viewed Stefan the Great as a Moldovan hero and the Romanian influenced Moldovans viewed him as a protector of larger Romania. The populations could have potentially communicated their ideas to one another, but the perception was not necessarily accepted. With differing understandings, agreement was less likely and the idea of what group constituted a proper origin and future became less apparent. Each national story undermined the others sovereignty.

In 1985 Gorbachev’s liberalizing reforms permitted the Moldovan Mateevici organization to form, which brought together numerous professors, artists, and journalists in Chisinau. While the organization increasingly introduced the intellectuals’ more Romanian cultural perspective, generally, it publicly expressed the Soviet Moldovan conception. Soviet authority allowed the group to only write in Cyrillic, and adhere to communist ascribed folk traditions. Not until 1988 did several changes occur as leaders, including Mircea Snegur, Mircea Druc, Lucihnschi, and Oazo Nantoi, contested top officials, such as Semion Grossu (First Secretary of the Moldovan Communist Party until November 1989) and Aleksandr Mosanu (President of
Parliament). This became the turning point when the intellectual community re-asserted an identity and organized with state powers. However, the majority population and the intellectual community that combined with the leadership now held two different conceptions of identities. In particular, the new leaders’ justifications of power did not resonate with the population and opened opportunities for administrative dissent.\(^{34}\)

**Gagauz and Communism: Soviet neglect and a dispersed intellectual community**

Prior to communism the Gagauz lacked coherence and posed little threat to Soviet stability. In fact, by 1909 a Bulgarian anthropologist, G. Dimitrov (1909), reported nineteen different Gagauz origin stories. Many common identity markers in Moldova, like religion, language, and ethnic labels, also did not correspond with the Gagauz. While the people spoke Russian and observed the Russian orthodox religion, some were called Turks or Gagauz, and others Bulgarian, Bessarbian, or Russian. With minimal coherence the Gagauz did not become a nationalist threat to the Soviets. The Soviets, at that time largely ignored the group. After the Second World War, Soviets did recognize the Gagauz in censuses, a distinct Gagauz culture was only briefly permitted twice throughout communism, in the 1950s and the 1980s. Instead, the region primarily learned the Russian language and Soviet cultural perspectives. Throughout Soviet rule few differentiated the Gagauz from Bulgarians, Russians, and others.

While the region received new schools and some urban development, until 1957 the Gagauz language essentially lacked a formal written script (Chinn and Roper 1998, 89) and most of the group remained rural. From 1956-1961, and again in the late 1980s, Gagauz schools opened and taught the language and culture. However, while the brief

\(^{34}\)In the following chapter I elaborate on how the incoherence combined with leadership, and then produced a weak post-communist administration.
opportunity allowed some intellectuals to gather and historicize the group’s Turkish-Bulgarian historical origins, the opportunity was brief and many group features, such as a literary language never developed. These periods helped raise the group’s salience and the Russian language helped the group overcome communication challenges, but the community struggled to organize their intellectuals and rarely had opportunities to interact.

Without a well developed written Gagauz language and people’s limited Gagauz literacy, the language was minimally used in letters and other communications; a practice that not only helped other groups buttress their underground networks, but also contest authority and build group awareness. The use of three different alphabets (Cyrillic, Latin, and ‘Turkic-Latin’) further confused later written communications. For instance, when the Gagauz newspaper Ana-Sozu (Mother Language) went to print in the 1980s and used the Latin alphabet, the few who understood the Gagauz language could read the paper. Such decisions, illustrate that the intellectual community lacked cooperation and common understanding of many group features.35

Toward the end of the 1980s the Gagauz identity helped frame the region and peoples’ politics, economics, and geography – Gagauz readily identified with the group. Many argued for Gagauz rights, and books and journals began to frequently mention Gagauz connections to social issues. However, the Soviet’s repression of a Gagauz intellectual community and Gagauz education prevented a common understanding. While the Gagauz valued their group and in the 1980s and 1990s many worked to

---

35Gagauz high literacy rates and fluency in Russian made confusion about the Gagauz language a lesser obstacle in the 1980s. Members used the Russian language to effectively communicate, which helped them overcome many communication barriers and increasingly generate Gagauz salience. However, their opportunities to collectively build a coherent group still remained limited. Furthermore, the language lessened the differentiation between urban Russians and urbanizing Gagauz.
protect it and increase its power, there were numerous debates and facts that competed and undermined one another. There was little agreement regarding historical debates, contemporary language structure, or future relationships with Moldovans, Russians, and Soviets. Some members asserted that their primary historical connection was with Turks or Bulgarians, and others argued that relevant origins began with the Russian language or Eastern Orthodoxy. Furthermore, there was minimal consensus regarding what passed as the correct formal Gagauz language. Each of these differences translated directly into lower levels of understanding and solidarity. Today, many outsiders struggle to distinguish cultural and physical differences between Gagauz, Ukrainians, Russians, and Bulgarians in Gagauzia (Chinn and Roper 1998, 90).

**Ukraine**

The Ukrainian case explores the interaction between communism and a pre-communist mass mobilized eventual majority and a pre-communist minority that did not mobilize in mass. Mobilized Ukrainians fought for cultural rights and obtained high levels of autonomy throughout communism, but Crimean Tatars did not mobilize prior to communism and struggled to substantially increase their coherence. While the Crimean Tatars did increase in coherence due to their deportation in the 1940s, they struggled to develop high levels of political salience and solidarity. Repressive uniform treatment by Soviet authorities motivated Crimean Tatars to actively describe their common experiences and illustrated their common group identity. However, Moscow prevented the group’s cultural displays and harshly repressed the Crimean Tatars intellectual community when it spoke out against the deportation. Like many who were deported after the war, the Crimean Tatars were accused of being Nazi sympathizers, and gained
little support in their new communities, which were often undeveloped and poor quality lands. Nevertheless, their harsh treatment based upon the population’s cultural and physical features demonstrated the group as a value.

Conversely, Ukrainians began with more coherent identities, and the CPSU integrated many of these groups’ intellectual leaders into national policy positions and their symbols into communist institutions. Consistent cultural development and expression across their respective group members increased the salience and solidarity of Ukrainians and Russians, as well as Eastern Slavs.

**Ukrainians in Ukraine**

We are witnessing a national unification of the Ukraine, and we say: we are absolutely for the complete and unlimited freedom of the Ukrainian people. We must do away with the old, bloody, and filthy past, when a Russia of capitalists and oppressors played the role of a executioner among other peoples. We shall wipe away this past, and we shall leave no stone unturned in doing it. We shall tell the Ukrainians; as Ukrainians your life is your own to organize as you wish. But stretching hands of brotherhood to the Ukrainian workers, we shall tell them: together with you we shall struggle against your bourgeoisie just as we struggle against ours. Only the Socialist union of the toilers of all countries will abolish every reason for insane nationalism and quarreling.

—Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, *Socinenija*

Chapter 3 illustrates how Ukrainians developed an increasingly coherent group prior to communism. I now discuss how the group threatened Bolshevik authority, which led to various compromises that aided in the integration and institutionalization of Ukrainian intellectuals, associations, and value into communism. Like the Moldovans, Ukraine entered Leninist communism at two different points: Eastern and Southern Ukraine after the First World War, and Western Ukraine, Galicia, Transcarpathia, and
Bucovina after the second. Unlike the Moldovans, Ukrainian’s high coherence challenged the Soviets after both annexations, and facilitated Ukrainian group interactions.

As the historian Orest Subtelny (2009) remarks, “Ukraine was a land easy to conquer but almost impossible to rule” (360), and from 1919-1921 this declaration remained true. Kiev changed ruling authority five times in one year, and six different armies occupied the territory: the Bolsheviks, the Ukrainians, the Whites, the Entente, the Poles, and the anarchists. Amidst the Russian Civil War and following both the ousted Central Rada and the first removal of Bolsheviks from Kiev, Pavlo Skoropadsky on April 29, 1918 established himself as an autocratic Hetman in Kiev. His reign lasted until November 21 when the Directory of Ukraine formed the Ukrainian National Republic (UNR). The Directory, formed by two Ukrainian intellectuals, Volodymyr Vynnychenko (playwright, writer, artist, and activist) and Symon Petliura (writer, journalist, and statesmen), and supported by over 40,000 soldiers established a Ukrainian national authority.

The Bolshevik’s second invasion of Ukraine in December of the same year removed the UNR, and the Polish offensive in Galicia pushed the West Ukrainian National Republic (ZUNR) out of the west. While Ukrainian intellectuals had cultivated the group identity, and empires and organizations had kept them separate for generations, Ukrainians in the east and west now had an opportunity to unite with their claimed brati. On January 22, 1919 the UNR and ZUNR commemorated their unity.36

---
36 Major organizational differences and ideological features separated the two western and eastern Ukrainians, but common enemies and national notions combined well with the west’s organized bureaucracy and large army.
By February 5, 1919 the Bolsheviks had gained power in Kharkiv and Kiev, but their governance stimulated numerous grievances and Ukrainian leftist intellectuals organized peasants around Kiev in opposition. With weakened local support the White Army's attack from the Dnieper's left bank, and the united national Ukrainians', UNR-ZUNR, attack from the west easily ousted the Bolsheviks whose continued struggle to rule Ukraine stimulated a change in national policy.

Upon the Bolshevik's third Ukrainian invasion in December 1919, they not only arrived with a much larger military, but they came with new national policies and rhetoric to stabilize power. The military had doubled to 3 million soldiers, and its leaders emphasized Ukrainian Soviet independence: “the free and independent Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic again arises from the dead” (Borys 1980, 256). Overwhelming military power decisively removed anti-Bolsheviks and defeated the Ukrainian army, but subsequent order in Ukraine became possible only with national cultural concessions (Subtelny 2009; Magosci 1996; Mace 1983; 375-400; Borys 1960). As noted in the Fifth CP(B)U Conference in Kharkiv (17-22 November 1920), “The national question in Ukraine is a most important and tumescent problem. Without a proper solution to this problem the victory of the proletarian revolution Ukraine would be impossible.”

While the solutions took time to become implemented and accepted, many prominent Ukrainians immediately received positions within the party, and until 1923 the Ukrainian Soviet government acted as a fairly independent entity (Subtelny 2009, 380-383). As national challenges continued, the party implemented Ukrainization. Many changes came with the Korenizatsiia policy, in Ukraine called Ukrainization. One

---

37 Kommunisticheskaiia partiiia Ukrainyi v rezoliutsiiakh i resheniiakh sezdov i konferentsii (Kiev, 1959), 73 (also cited by Radziejowski (1983)
change was that through new policies introduced under Ukrainization, people were taught the Ukrainian language, and the learning of this language, encouraged the development and spread of other cultural features. However, after initial efforts by bureaucratic Russians to cultivate the identity, several more Ukrainian leaders and intellectuals fought to lead the cultural program. In particular, Vlas Chubar became head of the Ukrainian Soviet government, Oleksander Shumsky headed the department of agitation and propaganda, and Mykola Skrupnyk led the justice department.

The program, headed by group intellectuals, ensured Ukrainian language and cultural rights, and by 1927 70% of government business was conducted in the Ukrainian language, up from 20% five years earlier. Additionally, Ukrainian literacy and party membership quickly rose. Over ten years Ukrainian literacy increased from 15% to 50% in rural areas and from 40% to 70% in urban settings, and Ukrainians became the majority in the UkSSR’s party by 1927, up from 23% in 1923. By comparison, Ukrainians were far more integrated into communism than Moldovans, whose membership rate in the Communist Party of Moldova by 1940 was 17.5%. The Ukrainian language spread easily through books and newspapers; the vast majority of the republics texts were in Ukrainian. The language even became part of officer-training schools, and because the Ukrainian language was the primary path to receive education and urbanize, the vast majority of potential Ukrainians took part in the national identity (Subtelny 2009, 390).

Post World War Two

\[38\] In fact, under communism, Moldovans never gained a majority membership in the republic’s communist party.
During the inter-bellum years, the Poles gained power in the west, but as discussed in Chapter 3, the Western Ukrainians continued to develop their identity and received substantial support from Soviet Ukrainians in the east. After the Second World War the Soviets annexed western Ukraine, and created two additional features that helped the Ukrainian identity grow in coherence. First, the events reunited all Ukrainian people under a single political border, the UkSSR. Second, while Stalin's annexation campaign exiled many western Ukrainian intellectuals, liquidated the Greek Catholic hierarchy, and killed hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians in both Western and Soviet Ukraine, the party still needed to make numerous national cultural compromises. The party again brought western Ukrainians into government positions and for a brief period granted Ukraine the right to conduct foreign relations. Consequently, the Stalinist terror and totalitarianism that cracked down on Ukrainian nationalists and harshly purged its sentiments also stimulated the Ukrainian identity to increase in solidarity and salience.

In addition to the way the harsh treatment directly stimulated coherence, subsequent reforms further rejuvenated the group. Nikita Khrushchev, former Premier of Ukraine, remained loyal to Stalin and active in the Ukrainian purges. However, upon Stalin’s death he rose in party leadership largely backed by the Ukrainian Communist Party. His well-known de-Stalinization speech and policies not only turned the party’s direction, but also made numerous concessions to Ukraine. As General Secretary, Khrushchev replaced numerous Russian leaders in Ukraine with ethnic Ukrainians, and by 1959 Ukrainian party membership grew to over 60% (Subtelny 2009, 497).

The fairly organized Ukrainian intellectual community continued to push for cultural representation and reforms. Amidst the struggle to reestablish authority after the
war, numerous Moscow propagandists had taken control of Ukrainian education, but in reaction to the usurped authority the Ukrainian intelligentsia became inspired to organize for more rights, which they successfully did. By 1957 a Ukrainian history journal was published (*Ukrainskyi Istoryshnyi Zhurnal*), as well as Ukrainian intellectual led encyclopedias, volumes about the Ukrainian people’s art, language, towns and villages, and dictionaries. However, potentially the most important reform came when the 1958 national language policy, effective across the Soviet Union, particularly increased Ukrainian coherence, and the coherence of all previously coherent groups. Prior to the reform Ukrainians, like all others throughout the country, had to learn Russian, but could choose whether they wanted to learn a second language. With minimal practical post-war advantages to learning Ukrainian, many passionate Ukrainians chose to only learn Russian. However, the new language policy capitalized on the highly salient Ukrainian identity. Many people associated themselves with the Ukrainian group and, accordingly, had to learn the language. The policy allowed those who identified as Ukrainians to not only learn a common language, but communicate about contemporary interpretations of life through Ukrainian sources and intellectuals. Consequently, Ukrainians increasingly established and observed common notions of their history, language, and future. A new generation of Ukrainian writers and poets arose, and were granted some expressive flexibility, including denunciations of Stalin and communist infractions against the Ukrainian people.

Under Leonid Brezhnev Ukrainian cultural rights began to diminish, but did not disappear. Russification, pushed largely through Russian migration and the ‘gifting’ of Crimea by Khrushchev in 1954 (a Southern peninsula contiguous with the UkSSR that
had approximately one million self-identifying Russians and only a couple hundred thousand Ukrainians) to the Ukrainian Republic, dramatically change the country’s population demographics. In fact, from 1926 to 1979 the Russian population more than tripled in Ukraine, rising from 3 million to 10 million. Russian language publications also increased. From 1959 to 1979 the number of Ukrainians who declared Ukrainian their first language fell from 93.4% to 89.1% (Subtelny 2009, 524). Nevertheless, Ukrainian intellectuals continued to describe and interact with the Ukrainian community, and they developed a common understanding without dynamic disturbances or contentious debates regarding content. As Gorbachev’s reforms increased opportunities to organize, Ukrainian expression mixed with grievances against the Soviets and ushered in a reorganization and mobilization of the coherent Ukrainians.

The rapid social changes that accompanied industrialization oriented many people, including Ukrainians, toward large national identities. In particular, the Ukrainian language and culture gave meaning to its members in these new environments. As collectivization, a new factory hierarchy, and anti-religious rhetoric changed people’s lives, these new areas became meaningful and legitimate partially because Ukrainian conceptions mediated the change. Additionally, in the republic group status remained consistent with Russians on top followed by Ukrainians, and then others, which helped illustrate the identity’s value. Grievances also had similar group explanations; Ukrainians’ history of repression under others would lead to freedom.

**The Crimean Tatars: Exile and Increased Coherence**

The Crimean Tatars’ burgeoning modern coherence did not particularly threaten Soviet order, but Turkish nationalism and potential claims on Crimea from the Ottoman Empire, similar to the way Romanian nationalism spurred fears and oppositionist claims
to Bessarabian authority, became a primary concern throughout communism. Despite an intellectual awakening and underground networks in Crimea, the group identity had minimal opportunities to develop among potential members. Various Crimean Tatars intellectual communities popped up in St. Petersburg, Moscow, Istanbul, Kiev, and throughout Crimea, but many of them lacked organization and opportunities to distribute the cultural content to those they claimed to represent (Kirimli 1996, 169-196). Once the Bolsheviks gained control of the Crimea in 1921, and in the absence of a coherent Crimean Tatar group, Moscow easily guided regional policy.

Nevertheless, the Bolsheviks feared the Ottomans and later, the Republic of Turkey, as they made Turkish national claims on the peninsula. In reaction to these often very real claims to rule the peninsula, in manners similar to cultivating the Moldovan identity in MASSR, the Bolsheviks briefly implemented a Crimean Tatar group cultivation project. For instance, in October 1921, the Council of Peoples Commissariats (SNK) of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR) formed the Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (Crimean ASSR), and Crimean Tatar and Russian became the official state languages. Over one hundred villages used Crimean Tatar as the primary administrative language (Bugai et al. 1995, 142.), and numerous Crimean Tatar cultural institutions covered the territory, including teachers’ colleges, journals, newspapers, museums, libraries, theaters, and a Crimean Tatar language and literature institute at Tavrida University in Simferopol (Pohl 2000). However, during the 1930s Stalin’s ‘Bourgeoisie cleansing’ removed roughly 30,000 Crimean Tatars from Crimea, and after the Second World War Stalin used the Soviet’s increased capacity to exile the remaining population. The harsh treatment and many deaths in exile
decimated the Crimean Tatar population and its communal life, but also, along with their continued strife during communism, the events became central to the Crimean Tatar identity and helped further unite the group.

The Crimean Tatars’ common experience of repression in exile aided in the development of an intellectual community that recognized the group’s common position in history and, thus, served as a foundation for bonds between victims and motivations for group maintenance. Nearly 45% of the Crimean Tatar population died over their first five years. Difficult living conditions deprived the group of material conditions that could help them survive or help them organize and rebel. However, Soviet attempts to completely erase the group from memory changed how many throughout the USSR perceived the Crimean Tatars, and became an opportunity for increased group coherence.

In exile the Crimean Tatars narrowed their language from three dialects to a singular standard, which helped the group build a literary language and more effectively communicate their common history and future. Previously, the middle steppe, mountain, and the south served to geographically divide the Crimeans in culture and language, but as they experienced repression and many interacted in exile the mountain ‘middle language’ became a tool for communication and unity. Furthermore, their history of independence, historicized in modern terms by Soviets and over the inter-revolution period, became refined and provided hope and reason. Soviet attempts to dilute the group’s understanding and describe the Crimean Tatars as part of the Volga Tatar community stimulated reactions and statements in opposition, which helped clarify the group among its members. Despite harsh retaliation, many Crimean Tatars continued to
fight against the repression and voiced opposition to their treatment. Without political, economic, and social rights, they had nothing to lose.

While the Chechens, Ingushens, and others deported under Stalinism eventually returned in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the Crimean Tatars did not have the same opportunity. ‘The return’ became an important symbol for the Crimean Tatars, as it represented their native land as Crimea and helped identified the community. Consequently, deportation and negative propaganda stimulated in-group understanding, particularly regarding their perceived aggressors, Russians and Soviets, and their common homeland. Nevertheless, without access to schools or a highly concentrated population until after 1991, the Crimean Tatars lacked substantial coherence and organizational capacity.

Russia

The Russia case looks at the interaction between communism and a mobilized Russian majority and non-mass-mobilized Tatar minority. With numerous Russians in the CPSU the intellectual community had continual advantage to interact with the community and politics. Additionally, periods of Russification kept Russian culture in meaningful contact with other coherent groups, which facilitated group solidarity. Conversely, Tatars lacked a more coherent identity prior to communism, did not mass mobilize, and were granted fewer rights that protected their cultural practices. Moscow dictated much of the group’s history and features, and barred the group’s intellectual perspective. Furthermore, the group’s official autonomy status within the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist republic ensured the population did not experience substantial inequity, like the Moldovans, which limited the culture’s value.
Russians: The Collapse of Empire and Construction of Communism

Nationalism is for small peoples who fear extinction. The Russians are a great people [. . .] Russia speaks like Christ used to speak: come to me and share my spirit.

—Kunaev
(in Neumann 1996, 197)

The Russian group extended into numerous institutions and organizations on the eve of the First World War, but when the state could no longer support itself political factions grew and the group’s organizations, closely tied to the state, also collapsed. While Russians held a dominant status and controlled the gates to state politics, the imperial system’s traditions ruled the empire and the national population did not. The Russian people were not the heart of the foundations, organizations, and nor were they a source of social power that supported the state and order; it was a traditional monarchy that collapsed under international pressures and the weakening of the landed gentry (Skocpol 1969).

Despite having a more coherent nation, when the state collapsed many of the group’s organizations fell apart, and for the first time, the Russian nation had political opportunities to organize widely outside the state and nobility. The Russian’s identity salience in socialism and monarchy (peasant culture or nobility) remained high, and amidst the opportunities people re-organized in these salient spheres. The Whites and the Reds became the primary organized factions dominated by Russian group members. The Whites, many of whom desired the restoration of the Romanov dynasty and the empire, were loosely allied anti-Bolshevists. The Reds grew from the Russian socialist’s two primary parties, the minority (Mensheviks) and the majority (Bolsheviks). To achieve their goals both Reds and Whites worked to organize the
Russian nation, and while both were highly repressive, the leaning restorationist Whites were arguably less tolerant toward the lower classes, which encouraged many peasants to join the Reds (Hosking 2001, 394-395). In other words, while civil war provoked chaos that disrupted loyalties and group organization, the Russian population had coherent features, mobilized, and continued to develop coherence under Soviet rule.

The Struggle for Power and to Organize Salient Spheres: Bolsheviks immediately co-opted symbols into the ideology and government structure

Russians were a large, salient group associated with the monarchy, religion, ending suffering, and many rural features. While the Tsar limited intellectuals to nobles and organization to mostly state spheres, under the collapse many more could describe and organize the nation. In the process to obtain power and order, the Bolsheviks relied heavily on Russian culture and imperial traditions, which incorporated into the movement Russians, their symbols, descriptions, and cliental relationships of the monarchy.

The Bolsheviks easily consolidated authority as people quickly resorted to old habits within a chaotic new world. As Hosking (2001) notes,

It became clear that Russia’s social memory had not perished with the institutions of the old society, that the habits of personal dependence through patron-client networks revived readily, to be given a new form by the now dominant Communists (416).

Similarly, while the Bolsheviks killed and exiled many Russians, many of the group’s intellectuals and symbols became incorporated into the party (Guroff and Guroff 1994). Russian imperial apparatuses and its national connections aided Bolshevik domination throughout the former Russian empire. In fact, the early Russian importance to power was so prominent that Stalin wanted to name the new Soviet state, the
“Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic.” However, tempered by the multi-national society and the desire for a global international communism, Lenin’s preference, the “Union of Soviet Socialist Republics”, emerged as the official state title.

The Russian community remained closely connected to the state party and remained salient throughout communism. Even during periods that attempted to temper the Russian culture, the Russian community remained an influential force. Soviet and Russian symbols intimately meshed, and in times of international isolation, Russians served as the dominant source of behavior, culture, and ritual. First language Russian speakers were the vast plurality in the 1898 Russian Imperial Census, and ethnic Russians remained the majority from 1920 to 1989 in the Soviet Union. By pure numbers, no other ethnic culture could have the same influence under Soviet communism, and with closed international borders the culture permeated Soviet life. Furthermore, World War II and the need for mobilization stimulated a resurgent Russian nationalism. The large Russian population became a major source of action as the party claimed the war was to fight for Russian’s survival. The cinema also played up Russian symbols, including many films by Aleksandr Nevskii. As Goruff and Goruff (1994) illustrate, “For Russians… the Soviet state had adopted many Russian traditions. [And] the maintenance of these traditions in many ways contributed to the authority of the Soviet system” (84). Closely related to Soviet communism, Russian symbols and culture continued to serve as a prominent fixture in politics and throughout the Russian people’s lives.

Russian intellectual interactions were sustained throughout communism. The party not only compromised with Russian intellectuals and brought their thoughts into
the party, but also Russians and Russian intellectuals composed the party’s majority. With greater rights and privileges allocated to many Russian, the group had substantial opportunities to interact and cultivate a Russian understanding. While group members did not necessarily look at the party as theirs, most believed it was their group who brought the people of the Soviet Union the communist party and a better life.

In addition to intellectual and political interactions, the Russian culture continued to valuably interact with other cultures. Russian cultural domination varied throughout communism and at times was underemphasized in republics, but aside from the autonomous oblasts it was always dominant in the RSFSR. Furthermore, Russification in the 1930s and around the Second World War also put the group in meaningful contact with coherent group majorities in other republics. The 1930 Russification policies raised Russian culture as a vanguard, which allowed even greater autonomy to the Russian intellectual as well as the group’s privilege over others.

While Russians did not receive cultural autonomy from the Bolsheviks, they dominated the party and ran the house with imperial institutions. Even without a nation-state arrangement communism stimulated their interactive processes and helped the group maintain coherence.

**Tatars**

Tatars in the Volga-Ural region developed various intellectual elites, but never formed a coherent national group prior to communism. The primary pre-communist Tatar community had also supported liberal-communism, and worked alongside the Bolsheviks. Consequently, the Bolsheviks incorporated communist Tatars, like socialist Georgians, into a political administration, but did not grant
substantial cultural autonomy. Nevertheless, like other national groups, the Tatars became elevated under communism, and a Moscow-led national identity was cultivated. A historicized relationship that emphasized the closeness between Russians and Tatars helped manage animosities, and fueled multiple understandings among the majority and intellectuals.

Like the Moldovans, intellectuals’ descriptions of the Tatars were highly regulated by Moscow. They focused on a specific origin story, and a constructivist conception of nations. The Soviets primarily pushed a Bulgharo-Tatar conception. Other primary Tatar origin stories developed underground, including the Mongol-Tatar and the Turko-Tatar narratives, but they were not publicly permitted or understood by the group’s majority. Furthermore, Moscow limited investigations into the group’s history to the Soviet’s Tatarstan Autonomous Republic. Tatars are the Russian federation’s largest minority and live much wider than the Tatarstan area, but investigations into the group’s history were limited to within the ASSR’s borders. Additionally, while books in Moldova tended to emphasize the primordial and constructivist aspects of groups, in Tatarstan they downplayed differences and the academics focused more on how all nations could work together and the social aspect of these groups. The following description in the 1989 book by L. I. Rosenberg, is a representative example of the historicism,

In the 15th century until the beginning of the 19th century the tendency of kind tolerant relationships among different nationalities and religious groups was a barrier against mistrust and mutual opposition, and meanness. These two features have had a deep influence on the psychology and community consciousness of the people living, especially Russians and Tatars. (Rosenberg 41).\(^{39}\)

\(^{39}\) [Розенбург Л. И. Этнические контакты в верхнем и среднем Поволжье в ХВ до начала ХИХ в // Эгонканккны зоны в европейской части СССР. М.: Типография Министерства культуры СССР, 1989]
Differences between Russians and Tatars are tempered in the book as the author emphasizes these group’s common kindness and harmony. Finally, the various Tatar communities throughout the TASSR were taught individual group conceptions, which further differentiated the potential Tatar group (e.g. Kazan, Astrakhan, Kasimov, Mishar, Siberian, Volgo-Ural, and Kryashen Tatars (Christian Tatars)).

While the Tatars could not actively participate in developing a historic framework or connecting their population to politics, the regions autonomy elevated the group’s status and helped the group avoid cultural discrimination. Consequently, the identity often provided little distinction and the region had some of the highest Russian-‘other’ marriage rates in the Soviet Union, over one-third throughout communism. With an identity being constructed by a Moscow-led majority, as well as limited discrimination, the group did not become coherent.

**Chapter Summary**

Once the Russian Empire collapsed, socialist and nationalist values dominated hearts and minds and often became the values that groups mobilized around. While various socialist factions slowly became consolidated or destroyed, coherent nationalist factions remained distinct and immutable. As the new state formed, centralized socialist authoritarianism and nations shaped many fundamental and lasting features of communism.

Mobilized national groups’ autonomy as well as their intellectual and symbolic participation in the CPSU, ensured that their encounters would help maintain coherence and that they could continue to historicize their identity and movement cultures. Additionally, their actions and autonomy shaped Soviet Communism’s national policy,
and entrenched nations, incoherent or not, as essential to social and political life. However, the repressive nature of the party limited most cultural autonomy and rights to groups that had mobilized, those they could not completely dominate, and used the idea of national autonomy as a motive to develop and dominate incoherent groups when national issues arose. Consequently, Soviet leaders often used top-down approaches to construct non-mass-mobilized groups and kept these group’s intellectuals from helping transform their cultural identities, which often combined with communism’s ideology of equality to prevent the formation of coherence.

Fundamentally, a group identity may become coherent when identifiers share a common understanding and the identity is associated with many spheres. Under ideal-type conditions the process of industrial modernization likely shapes which groups will come to value their cultural homogeneity and become highly coherent. Consistently, the Soviet Union presents a unique history of nation building that facilitated different levels of national group coherence. Those less coherent prior to communism often combined with policies of equality and Stalinist indiscriminate terror that typically limited their valued experiences to non-cultural affiliations. Even as totalitarianism struggled to provide adequate solutions and Leninism failed to charismatically subordinate individuals, many new familial and friendship bonds, not national groups, bridged the anomie and helped people confront social and survival challenges. Conversely, many other groups experienced high levels of cultural autonomy and privilege/discrimination that helped them develop their cultural understanding, distribute it, and illustrate its importance in numerous settings. Regardless of these difference in coherence, the collapse of the socialist state left individuals within artificial, geographic, and national
borders – the most general meaning and orientation beyond kin and friendship networks – to politically mobilize. As each titular group inherited their republic and formed an independent state, their coherence determined whether they could use the opportunity to organize and cope with emerging conflict.

Finally, this discussion regarding whether institutions or groups are exogenous highlights a larger theoretical premise regarding why some nations move and have power. In essence, the institutional perspective asserts that groups are more of an after effect and that a containment of nationalism or fostering of it is possible through institutional design, at the very least in the Soviet context. The group theory approach illustrates a more dynamic history that influences group movements, and argues institutional design is not separable from the people acting within and around the institutions; that the institutions are group products and not simply a top down structure imposed by elites without a priori meaning or social cause. Accepting the latter encourages a more dynamic look into not only what works to solve ethnic violence in an ideal setting, but how ethnic violence operates, institutions form to address ethnic issues, and how we may begin to critically address these issues.
CHAPTER 5
POST-SOVIET SECESSION AND STABILITY

Ties of blood, speech, custom and so on have an ineffable, and at times overpowering, coerciveness in and of themselves.

—Clifford Geertz
Old Societies and new States

And this sentiment of loyalty to members of one's kinship, language, and cultural groups strengthens the political fabric of administrative units that have borders more or less congruent with these divisions.

—Daniel Treisman
After the Deluge

(commenting on Clifford Geertz's above quote)

When Nations have led a long and glorious existence they cannot break with their past, no matter what they do; they are subject to its influence at the very moment when they work to destroy it; in the midst of the most flaring transformations, they remain in character and destiny fundamentally as their history has shaped them. No revolution, no matter how daring and powerful, can abolish national traditions of long standing.

—Francois Guizot
Essai sur l'histoire de France

During the 1980s the Soviet Union economically struggled (Colton 1986; Aaslund 2007, 15; Stoner-Weiss and McFaul 2009, 5,6), its Eastern European bloc broke from the communist mold, and in several republics nationalist rhetoric pitted citizens against one another. Despite few predictions that the Soviet Union would end, by 1991, the imperial state divided into fifteen new nation-states and immediately some appeared more stable than others.

In Chapter 5 I illustrate, that with a national order established but not institutionalized (and minority secessionists mobilizing throughout a number of republics) how varying levels of pre-independence majority and minority group coherence and elite consensus shaped the power relationships that would determine
stability and secession in the 1990s. First, I discuss how liberalization in the late 1980s and early 1990s led to increased opportunities and political organization for Ukrainians, Russians, and Moldovans in their respective titular republics. Next, I illustrate how national unity helped bind these organizations and their role in mobilizing independence from the Soviet Union.

In part, the variance in stability can be traced back to pre-communist and communist legacies. First, as I discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, the timing of modernization and group formation contributed to Soviet ethno-federalism and the formation of modern national identities that could be politically mobilized in the late 20th century. As state reach increased over the 19th century, several national groups, like Ukrainians and Russians, garnered a shared sense of identity and contested emerging Soviet authorities. To cope with this contestation, state leaders engaged these and other national groups through often ad hoc combinations of repression and compromise that institutionalized, in varying ways, a group’s ability to disperse a common identity and its encounters with ‘others’. These institutionalized relationships reflected, constrained, and built each national group’s size, coherence, and independence from the Communist Party, often highlighting national issues and making nations natural sites of mobilization. Conditioned to mobilize, national groups combined with a number of factors, including elite material interests (Roeder 2007; Hale 2008), relative status (Emizet and Hesli 1995; Laitin 2001; Hechter and Okamoto 2001; Murinson 2004, Hagendoorn et al. 2013), ancient hatreds (Kaufman 2001), centrifugal institutions (Bunce 1999), international factors (Brubaker 1996), and transnational learning.
(Beissinger 2002), to increase pressure on the Soviet state and facilitate national republic independence in 1991.

Across the fifteen republics nine titular groups successfully mobilized (Beissinger 2002, 210-211), and in most cases national elites replaced the old political guard. Even in republics where national movements struggled to completely displace the old guard, or national movements did not occur, elites “cover[ed] themselves with the mantel of nationalism” (Suny 1993, 128; Beissinger 2002; Roeder 2007; Zürcher 2007; Hale 2008). As Hoskings (2001, 589) notes, after the coup and Boris Yeltsin’s suspension of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), “all the nomenklatura leaders at republican level had understood by now that they could no longer rely on Moscow to back them up, and that they must create a new power base at home in alliance with nationalist intellectuals and their own elites.” When the Soviet Union collapsed, in part due to this group mobilization, national titular majority group leaders remained in power and illustrated that the political order was based upon national stratification.¹

However, as I argued in Chapter 2, before national stratification could be institutionalized or reformed, the Union’s collapse created an opportunity for minority groups to further mobilize within their new successor states (Wanner 1998; Zurcher 2007, 4-9; Crowther 1991). In fact, in twelve countries – Ukraine, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Belarus, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Moldova, Georgia, and Azerbaijan – these minorities immediately mobilized for national independence.

¹At the very least, Brubaker (1994, 49) notes, that the battle for post-communist authority was between “national elites…” and “aspiring counter-elites.” National elites took power, but faced counter elites and that challenged their national rule. Additionally as Wanner (1998) notes, elites felt bound to national promises because they had been central to articulating the republics independence and their personal authority. National rule was also likely compelling to elites due to its salience, productive work in developing statehood in Europe and seemingly beneficial contribution to order in the Baltics.
I examine six ethnic groups across Ukraine, Russia, and Moldova (two in each country) to illustrate their support for the arguments I put forward in Chapter 2. I show that the Ukrainian-Russians in Crimea and Ukrainian-Crimean Tatar cases support Hypothesis 1 (cases with majority group coherence and intra-group elite consensus encountering minority secessionists experienced stability). The Russian-Tatar case supports Hypothesis 2 (cases with majority group coherence but without elite consensus encountering incoherent minority secessionists also experienced stability) and the Russian-Chechen case supports Hypothesis 3 (cases with majority group coherence but without elite consensus encountering coherent minority secessionists experienced violent secession). The Moldovan-Russians in Transnistria case supports Hypothesis 4 (cases with majority incoherence and minority coherence experienced violent secession) and the Moldovan-Gagauz case supports Hypothesis 5 (cases with majority incoherence and minority incoherence experienced chaotic violence).

The 1980s and Early 1990s: Increased Political Organization, Developing National Unity, and Independence

Mid-1980s: Increased Opportunities and Political Organization

In the mid-1980s, Gorbachev’s reforms, particularly glasnost and perestroika, produced a new set of rules that changed the political opportunity structure, which many leaders utilized to organize and challenge existing authority (Tarrow 1996, 54; Beissinger 1991). In a very general sense, perestroika helped decentralize the government and altered hierarchical control, and glasnost permitted leaders to voice problems in new ways. While all Soviet leaders implemented reforms after their inauguration in order to distinguish themselves from past leaders and contemporary
challengers (Mendras 2012), the timing of Gorbachev’s reforms came with new technologies that facilitated increased cross-national learning (Beissinger 2002), economic decline (oil prices plunged throughout the 1980s), state stagnation and its incompatibility with economic reform (Hosking 1999, 578), Gorbachev’s unique decisions to not use the full force of the state (Suny 1993, 159; Hosking 2001, 588), elite agency more generally (King 2001), extended conflict in foreign wars, relative deprivation (Janos 2000), and a decline in Leninist charismatic authority (Jowit 1991), which contingently culminated in greater civic organization and safer oppositional encounters with Soviet authority.

Overall, these reforms, contemporary state challenges, and a history that consolidated national identity came together to allow independent organizations to materialize across the Soviet Union (Suny 1993). Below I discuss the emergence of several organizations in Ukraine, Russia, and Moldova and then go on to illustrate their role in establishing a post-Soviet national political order.

In Ukraine, the Writer’s Union and environmentalists emerged as two of the first independent organizations. In particular, the union focused on Ukrainian cultural projects that sought a “rebirth” of the Ukrainian nation and language (Abdelal 2001, 108-109). As their projects delved into more controversial subjects, like language and cultural rights, and did not experience state repression, the Writer’s Union tested the limits of glasnost by discussing the 1932-1933 famine and the 1917-1920 Ukrainian independence movement. Shortly after the union’s foundation environmentalists,

---

2 Stalin had even established a glasnost policy that encouraged people to turn in those who obstructed the communism and state command.

3 In particular, the decline in job payments and goods influenced by perestroika’s changes were coupled with glasnost’s increasing permission to dissent.
responding to the 1986 Chernobyl disaster, formed the Green World (Zelenyi Svit) organization. Specifically, the timing of Chernobyl and glasnost helped publically reveal the Soviet system’s problems and illustrated the need for reform. As Gorbachev later explained, “[Chernobyl] shed light on many of the sicknesses of our system as a whole. Everything that had built up over the years converged in this drama: the concealing or hushing up of accidents and other bad news, irresponsibility and carelessness, slipshod work, wholesale drunkenness.” (Gorbachev 1996, 193). As the Writer’s Union, environmental groups, and other organizations continued to gather outside officially state sanctioned spheres, protest, and engage in controversy without state repression, independent organizations increased into the thousands (Butterfield and Sedaitis 1991, 1; White 1999, 12).

Like in Ukraine, political organization and contestation to the CPSU also began to increase during the 1980s in the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR). New journals like Ekspress-khronika and Glasnost openly stipulated an independent perspective on Soviet life and often discussed controversial positions toward the Union without noticeable reprisal. For instance, Ekspress-khronika discussed protests throughout the union, including those held by Latvians that chose to celebrate their 1917 independence and memorialize Latvian’s deportation to Siberia (as reported on Ekspress-khronika, no 15, 1987; Ekspress-khronika special issue, 16.11.1987; Ekspress-khronika, nos. 10, 12, 1988). They also reported on the activities of social groups that investigated official misuses of authority and public officials involved in crimes (Ekspress-khronika, no 9, 1987, A No. 6109, 44/87). These papers illustrated,

---

4 Also quoted in Hosking (577)
both directly and indirectly, people’s emerging possibility to engage in non-state sanctioned actions without significant punishment.

Additionally, academic institutions provided a source of intellectual leaders and independent organization. In particular, the Central Economic-Mathematical Institute in Moscow became the Club Perestroika and focused largely on a number of widely popular interests, including protecting historic buildings, the environment, and opposing nuclear power (Hoskins 2001, 580-582). By 1989 the club formed Russia’s most organized opposition, Memorial, which included many Russian intellectuals, such as literary scholar Dmitrii Likhachev, writers Evgenii Evtushenko and Bulat Okudzhava, and journalist Vitalii Kortich. The historian and Memorial leader, Iurii Afanasiev, related the organization’s objectives, “The most important task of Memorial is to restore to the country its past. But the past is alive in the present. Therefore Memorial is a political movement, for today has not settled accounts with yesterday.” As well-known figures that attempted to reassess history in order to shape the future (actions previously prohibited outside the state), these intellectuals helped attract the attention of urbanites and students and helped lead civic participation in social and political issues.

Like in Ukraine and Russia, groups began to organize in Moldova in the mid-1980s that explored their national history and then challenged Soviet authority. The primary organization for independence grew out of the Alexe Mateevici Literary-Musical

---

5 Among others, people protested against the destruction of the Hotel Angleterre in Leningrad, where the poet Sergei Yesenin committed suicide in 1925. As the New York Times reported in May 1987, “Moscovites say its membership “came from fringe elements of a more loosely organized coalition of Russophiles that in the 1970’s called itself Rodina, or Motherland, and was championed by a popular Soviet artist, Ilya Glazunov…whose canvasses glorify” old Russian churches saints and cultural figures like Dostoyevsky and Tchaikovsky.

Club,\(^7\) to become the Democratic Movement of Moldova and then the Moldovan Popular Front (MPF).\(^8\) The club first used the opportunities in the 1980s to examine its Romanian origins and then question the Soviet argument, that the Moldovan language was distinct from Romanian. Additionally, Gagauz, Bulgarians, and Russians attended the Alexe Mateevici club meetings as they found it a useful place to voice problems with Soviet authority (King 2001, 124-125). Collectives interested in perestroika and analytical history also began to organize. The Moldovan Democratic Movement in support of Restructuring formed in 1988 and sought to protect Moldovan and minority cultures through education and language rights, condemned Stalinist deportations, and promoted democracy, autonomy, market reforms, and ecological protection (Horowitz 2005, 113). The Association of Historians also increasingly challenged the Soviet academic establishment and at their first congress announced,

> Rooting out these evils [of historiographical distortion] demands the liquidation of a clan of functionaries in science and in the sphere of official ideology who have arrogated to themselves the right to formulate scientific task, to give opinions, to interpret historical events, and to pronounce verdicts that exclude the right of appeal. This highly influential group has long been a parasite [on the academic community] (*Literatura si arta* 1989).\(^9\)

The mid-1980s provided an opportunity for independent organization and a level of political contestation the Soviets had not previously permitted. While great distance often existed between a republic’s organizations, the late 1980s and early 1990s offered

---

\(^7\) A Soviet permitted cultural organization. Mateevici inspired Moldovan writing and poetry in the early 20th century until his death in 1917.

\(^8\) The MPF became the primary organizational leader for Moldovan independence in 1991.

a period of consolidation, independence, and then, as I argue, a test of each republic’s
national cohesion.

**Late 1980s: Developing National Unity across Organizations**

Nationality helped consolidate and co-opt numerous political interests and
organizations that gained a voice in the mid-1980s because it remained a primary link
between society and the state. For five to seven decades the nation educated,
activated, and integrated citizens into the political system (Brubaker 1994, 52). At the
same time, other organizations, such as parties became less important, in part, due to
their negative association with the Communist Party (Mishler and Rose 1997; Subtelny
2009, 615). For instance, by 1999 there were 71 political parties in Ukraine, but only
350,000 to 400,000 people (of 50 million) were party members. Furthermore, only 31.2
percent of those in Ukraine believed “in the necessity of a multiparty system and only
8.8 percent were willing to grant power to any single party” (Subtelny 2009, 615).

Mistrust in political parties remained high across most of the FSU (Kulik and Pshizova
2005; Reshetova 2012). Similarly, mass labor organizations remained tainted by
communist style unions (Kubicek 2002; Mandel 2001), their internal divisions (Kubicek
2004, 103-135, 158-183) and bureaucratized strong-men-like networks also prevented
labor from unifying more widely. However, nationality became central to consolidating
organizations and legitimating independence and post-communist authority.

---

10 Mishler and Rose (1997) use survey data to illustrate a general skepticism toward state institutions
across the former Soviet Republics.

11 The reasons of a low trust in political parties in Ukraine and how does it influence satisfaction with
democracy in this state.

12 At the very least, nationality was useful for political organization (Roeder 2007; Hale 2008; Beissinger
2002; Suny 1993).
In Ukraine, the Writer’s Union that formed in the mid-1980s became the Rukh (Ukrainian Popular Movement in Support of Perestroika) and quickly gained support from many Ukrainian organizations and demographics. Labor unions, environmentalists, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church and the Ukrainian Catholic Church all became united under the Rukh, whose message utilized historical terms to emphasize national unity and antagonism to the Soviet state (Wanner 1998, xxiii).

With greater opportunities to discuss the national history, the Rukh began to first question Soviet historical interpretations. For instance, many began to discuss the Kieven-Rus and challenge Russian depictions of their origin story (Furtado and Hechter 1992, 183-184, 200). Next came a critique of Soviet origins and Stalinist excess that quickly extended into a critique of Marxist-Leninism and the 1917 revolution (Wanner 35). As Wanner (1998, 35) notes, the Rukh began to “reform the present system by engaging the past and using rational for independence through nationalist historiography.”

Nevertheless, the Rukh was not only nationalistic, and it gained broad multi-national support, from Russians, Jews and other groups on civic, anti-Soviet terms. While the Rukh “committed itself to upholding the sovereignty of the Ukrainian republic, to promoting the Ukrainian language and culture, to voicing ecological concerns, and to supporting the democratization of the political, social, and economic systems”, it also strived to incorporate all ethnic groups (Subtelny 2009, 576):

The actualization of the full amplitude of the national rights of the various ethnic groups that inhabit Ukraine is inseparable from their acknowledgment that the Ukrainian nation in the republic has the status of historical owner. Ukraine is the only territory in the world on which fully valid existence and development of the Ukrainian ethnos is possible. (Program of Rukh, Kiev. 1989)
Claiming a national right to the territory and protection of other nationalities, the Rukh managed to generate a powerful national and multi-national movement.

Despite general national and civic unity that eventually culminated in 90 percent of voters casting their ballot for Ukrainian independence, including a majority in all regions, the Ukrainian independence movement was neither linear nor unchallenged by various cleavages. Most notably, Ukraine’s regional divisions both influenced and stalled the nationalist movements. For instance, Soviet control in Eastern Ukraine withered more slowly than it did in the west (not until 1990 did larger labor protests in the east begin) and conservative hardliners utilized the east-west differences to cut through the Ukrainian nationalist drive for independence.\textsuperscript{13} As Subtelny (2009, 589) argues, “[In the west] the attitude was a reflection of nationalism’s deep roots in the region, a tradition of anti-Soviet resistance, and the relative brevity of communist rule in the region. In eastern and southern Ukraine, where national consciousness was much weaker and soviet rule had existed considerably longer, pro-Communist sentiment was widespread.” While the vast majority across all these regions considered themselves Ukrainian (aside from Crimea), it remained more acceptable in the east to support non-national endeavors as well as communism. For the older generations in the east, communism was the regime they grew to appreciate, which often made it easier to support than alternative foreign concepts; in the west the older generation had

\textsuperscript{13} After independence, the east-west divide continued to have political ramifications. The west supported the democratic movements and the east the communist conservatives, ‘socialists’. As Subtelny argues, “the attitude was a reflection of nationalism’s deep roots in the region, a tradition of anti-Soviet resistance, and the relative brevity of communist rule in the region. In eastern and southern Ukraine, where national consciousness was much weaker and soviet rule had existed considerably longer, pro-Communist sentiment was widespread” It was more acceptable in the east to support something that wasn’t nationality and also to support the communists. For the older generations in the east, communism was what they primarily knew and they could easily support this.
experienced Soviet, Polish, and Romanian rule that conflicted with their rural, and later urban, cultures, which sustained a disdain for non-Ukrainian national authorities and further highlighted the importance of the Ukrainian identity. With national politics highly salient in the west, elites easily garnered support for Ukrainian nationalism, but those in the east saw other opportunities as similarly important and some elites struggling within the nationalist framework capitalized on these other political perspectives.

Furthermore, cultural authority differed across the east and west. As scholars note (Kietschelt et al. 1999, 40, 42; Darden and Grzymala-Busse 2006, 91) notes, prior to Soviet rule western Ukraine developed a bureaucratized, more legal-rational, form of authority that continued to develop throughout communism and the east remained less modern, in the Weberian sense, and more traditional. In particular, the west’s established rules of authority helped govern people’s lives throughout the region, and those who gained power through these rules could lead the vast, integrated bureaucratic system. As Ukrainian national elites rose to power they then used the bureaucracy to connect to and mobilize a wide collective. However, in the east, traditional authority dominated hierarchies and allowed local strong-men to control various local networks. These strong-men then co-opted emerging forms of rhetoric – communist, nationalist, Russian or Ukrainian linguistic preferences, international wedges, labor, or environment – to often retain their localized power and keep the population split. However, as I discuss later, the national movements combined with a collapsing Soviet state to eventually help bridge these divides.

14 Similarly, a social democratic past in western Ukraine also inspired democratic organizations and development. Facing elections, western elites utilized nationality to gain votes, but in the east democratic campaigning did not help the choice, rather it was the informal traditional networks that often brought people to power and influenced their vote.
In Moldova, groups continued to use nationality to unite behind the MPF. As the Alexe Mateevici Literary-Musical Club developed into the MPF, the organization included several smaller collectives and helped organize gatherings and protests against Soviet authority. One of its most significant events during communism included organizing the “Grand National Assembly” in 1989, which involved an estimated 80,000 to 300,000 people congregating in the center of Chisinau to condemn the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, the Soviet annexation of Bessarabia, and the Soviet influenced decline of Moldovan culture.\(^\text{15}\)

Several intellectual collectives also began to organize and support a more Romanian based vision of language, history, and future. The organizations supporting these views included the Writers’ Union, the Institute of Linguistics, the Institute of History, and Chisinau State University. However, due to a lack of popular and elite interest in joining Romania in 1990, 3.9 percent of Moldovans and fewer minorities desired unification (Solonari and Brutne 1994), unity remained a relatively small issue compared to others, but as I discuss later, it played a major role, along with a controversy over official state languages, in the rhetoric that would divide the country’s post-communist nations.

However, as language and other issues arose, the Moldovans struggled to completely unite for anything beyond independence. For instance, the emerging politics over language illustrated the impending deterioration of a multi-national MPF and a united and organized Moldovan nation. Toward the end of the 1980s leaders in Moldova began to utilize the new cultural and political organizations to mobilize people for

personal influence and national power, and in January 1989 the Supreme Soviet of
Moldova, largely pressured by the intellectual movements, declared Romanian the state
language. Nevertheless, by August the Supreme Soviet witnessed the law’s
divisiveness. Russians and Gagauz believed their first language, Russian, was being
demoted and discriminated against, and political elites feared that the law both
advantaged powerful elites from Romania and would allow these foreign elites to more
forcefully dictate republic politics. Subsequently, the Supreme Soviet attempted to curb
ethno-linguistic splintering through a series of amendments and clarifications, including
the protection of minority languages and a new declaration that Moldovan written in
Latin script was in fact the state language. However, the latter declaration prevented
unity between Moldovan intellectual elites and political elites, and splintered Moldovans
who debated about the borders of their identity. Consequently, different elite messages
emerged and different voices resonated with different portions of the Moldovan
population. The group then began to divide upon issues of historical origin (their ‘true’
ethnic history) and future (i.e. abolition of the Soviet empire and pan-Romanian union
versus a newly structured Soviet Union with more local control) (King 2001, 142; Way
2002, 137; Katchanovski 2006, 108), which decreased cross-organizational
coordination and the group’s organizational capacity more generally (Way 2002, 137-
138, 129). With numerous understandings of their identity, the various organizations
struggled to correspond to one another.

16As I discuss later, in 1991 the Moldovan Declaration of Independence reinstated Romanian as the
official language and set off numerous conflicts with the country’s minorities. In the 1994 constitution, the
official language remained without a designated a name (not Romanian or Moldovan) and is tacitly
described as “the State Language.”

17Lucan Way (2002, 129, 137-138) also points out that in Moldova there exists a lack of cross-
organizational coordination and collaboration in civil society and political organizations, which he
Nevertheless, until independence, a divide between and within the Moldovans did not widely develop as they shared a foe – Soviets – and a common 'other' that often embodied greater social and political privileges – first language Russian speakers. Consequently, the Moldovan nation continued to unite behind the MPF and mobilize for independence (Crowther 1998, 149).

In Russia, Memorial, the Orthodox Church, and many other intellectual and cultural organizations began to take on more exclusionary Russian nationalist rhetoric that began to uniquely shape the politics in the CPSU and the RSFSR. However, unlike in Ukraine and Moldova, co-ethnics dominated both the established apparat and the reformers, which generated three primary national divides: those who supported Gorbachev, conservatives who tried to stop or turn back reforms, and liberals who sought greater reforms. All three camps harkened similar conceptions of the same national identity.

Gorbachev utilized nationalist rhetoric to combat his growing competition. Most directly he made nationalist concessions to the Russian Orthodox church, allowing them to again become a public organization and reopen monasteries and churches. He also brought several nationalist leaders into his Presidential Council, including nationalist and environmentalist, Valentine Rasputin, and the leader of the United Workers’ Front, Veniamin Yarin.

The conservatives became exclusionary nationalist. In 1989 they proposed a “Bolshevik platform” and a faction within them, the Patriotic Bloc, exhorted the election slogan, “We don’t need a great shock. We need a great Soviet Russia! Russia has

attributes to, in part, Moldova’s deep historical divides regarding ethnicity that prevent a single group from monopolizing political power.
always been and remains a world power! She will do everything so that the Soviet Union remains." These Russian nationalists and hardliners deepened their unity in 1990 when they formed the Russian Communist Party, a de-facto party within the CPSU, that opposed Gorbachev, sought Russian independence, and desired Russian domination over the Soviet Union (Hosking 2001, 585).

At the same time, Russian reformers utilized Russian civic nationalism to mobilize support. Specifically, Yeltsin led this faction by carefully utilizing the civic rossiskie over the ethnic russkie (O’Connor 2005 173-176; Hosking 2001, 587). He emphasized the importance of the republic’s borders and mobilized the multi-national Russian nation within (rossiskie). With this support, Yeltsin managed to beat the Soviet apparat in 1989 by obtaining over 90 percent of the vote in an election that, after years of antagonism to Gorbachev and the Soviet regime, allowed him to represent the Moscow district in the Congress of People’s Deputies of the Soviet Union.

Early 1990s: Nationalism and Independence

While a number of intra-group divides continued to exist throughout the republics, the failed 1991 coup helped end much of the Soviet regime’s remaining certainty and legitimacy (Mandelbaum 1991/1992; Hale 2008, 7; Suny 1993, 152). Among several problems, the coup illustrated Moscow’s unwillingness or incapacity to exert violent force against republics that seized Soviet power. Additionally, it highlighted the uncertainty associated with remaining loyal to the Soviet state and the greater certainty provided by national republics (Hale 2008). Consequently, Soviet hardliners in Ukraine and Moldova embraced their respective titular nationalists’ agendas and declared

---

18 Also quoted by O’Connor (2008, 165)
independence. In Russia, Yeltsin and reformers effectively mobilized the Russian civic nation against the Russian-led Soviet Union and nationalist conservatives, and usurped all RSFSR power (e.g. the military and the KGB) under Yeltsin and the Russian Congress (Hosking 2001, 587). By this time any action to restore the union, violently or peacefully, was likely impotent and would have confronted several mobilized republics and local armies (Mendras 2012, 50-51).

In Ukraine, despite regional culture divides that would continue to be important in Ukrainian politics, the 1990 elections and failed putsch helped move Ukraine toward independence. In March, the Rukh combined with 39 other organizations to form the Democratic Bloc and received 90 of the 450 seats in Ukraine’s parliament (Verkhovna Rada)\(^\text{19}\) with the remainder going to the CPSU.\(^\text{20}\) Ukrainian intellectuals composed sixty-five percent of the Democratic Bloc candidates and apparat hardliners represented 85 percent of CPSU candidates. While the elections were not entirely free,\(^\text{21}\) the divide illustrated the dichotomy among the population and within the elites. It also provided the republic’s first multi-party parliament, which kept pressure on hardliners and created a new legal challenge to communist authority.

However, the failed coup helped end much of Soviet regime’s remaining certainty and legitimacy. The Democratic Bloc used the event to rally support, and following suit,
the Communist Bloc embraced the national agenda and helped obtain near unanimous parliamentary support for independence.

Four months later – with Ukrainian national communists, Ukrainian Democratic Bloc nationalists, and minorities all in support of independence – Ukraine held a public referendum and authoritatively seceded.\textsuperscript{22} Holding the independence referendum on the same day as the Ukrainian presidential elections, December 1 1991, 90 percent of voters chose independence and 62 percent voted for Leonid Kravchuk, the former leader of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet.\textsuperscript{23}

In Moldova, the MPF followed the moves by national popular fronts in the Baltics (Beissinger 2002; King 1994, 109; Crowther 1998, 148) and pushed for sovereignty, pluralism, and national revival. Mircea Snegur, a prominent communist leader joined the movement, and supported by MPF delegate victories in the 1990 elections he became President of the Supreme Soviet (Crowther 1998, 149).\textsuperscript{24} While the MPF triggered different identities and disseminated different understandings of the Moldovan identity, most outside of Gagauzia and Transnistria rallied in support of national independence. After the coup illustrated that republics and elites would not experience violent retaliation, the national movement’s desire for sovereignty helped pressure leaders to declare independence.

\textsuperscript{22} Several issues are widely noted to have helped encourage a majority of Ukrainians to seek sovereignty, including a fear of Russian President Yeltsin’s retaliation against communists, the Chernobyl disaster, and a general belief that Ukrainian lands would allow greater prosperity (Subtelny 2009, 582-583; Wilson 1997, 200).

\textsuperscript{23} All presidential candidates ran on a platform that supported a “yes” vote for Ukrainian independence.

\textsuperscript{24} In the 1990 elections, the Communist Party was the only permitted party, but individuals could compete independently. Nevertheless, the MPF won 27 percent of the seats outright, and working with rural nationalist communists they handily controlled the majority.
In Russia, the 1990s saw the three Russian nationalist camps dwindle into two: nationalist conservatives and civic nationalist liberals. Headed by Boris Yeltsin the liberals mobilized on populist principles, in the name of democracy, and for a more independent RSFSR Supreme Soviet and Russian Communist Party. On these platforms, Yeltsin and the political movement, Democratic Russia, obtained electoral victories in March 1990 that established Yeltsin as the chairman of the reformatted Russian Supreme Soviet. Furthermore, their wins allowed Yeltsin to bring all power in the RSFSR under the Russian Congress of People’s Deputies (Dunlap 1993, 92-95; Hosking 2001, 587). In the opposition, hardline communists and conservative nationalists continued to oppose both Yeltsin and Gorbachev. They used exclusionary nationalism to oppose Yeltsin in RSFSR institutions, like the Russian Congress of People’s Deputies and the Russian Supreme Soviet, and opposed Gorbachev by supporting and acting through the RSFSR institutions (institutions that undermined Soviet authority). In essence, Yeltsin and the liberals used a civic nation to proclaim the republic’s sovereignty and usurp Soviet power, the conservatives used an exclusionary Russian nation to proclaim a Soviet Russia (one of fifteen “independent socialist republic[s] belonging to the USSR”) and preserve Soviet unity, often in the name of protecting Russian nationals in other republics.

Gorbachev and the Soviet Union’s central authority continued to decline as the republics gained more institutional authority and his nationalist base became co-opted.

_____25 The RSFSR never had its own communist party or completely independent Supreme Soviet for a number of reasons, including that most believed the Soviet central government served the RSFSR’s interests.

_____26 John B. Dunlop, The Rise of Russia and the Fall of the Soviet Empire (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993). In June 1991 Yeltsin was elected president of the RSFSR and his popular mandate usurped nearly all control from Gorbachev.
by the conservatives and liberals. Finally, with waning authority, Gorbachev agreed (March 1991) to devolve nearly all power to the republics, aside from military, foreign policy, and currency (Hosking 2001 588; Suny 1993, 150-152). However, in an attempt to prevent further devolution, Gorbachev’s appointees staged a failed coup on August 19, 1991.

The coup (which involved the kidnapping of Gorbachev by his own Soviet establishment who then ordered military tanks to surround the parliament, Yeltsin – a republic president – climbing upon these tanks to deliver a speech describing the coup as a crime and an act against Russian sovereignty, and the military not attacking the crowd or those in parliament) illustrated either Moscow’s unwillingness to act violently against the devolution of the Soviet Union or its inability to do so. Either way, the Soviet republics saw no threat in taking more power and quickly began to formally declare their independence.

Post-Independence: The National Order, Elite Consensus, Minority Mobilization, Coherence, and Stability and Violence in the 1990s

In the age of the nation state, a state’s ability to craft a nation out of a diverse population and cultivate allegiance is perhaps more likely to ensure its survival than a monopoly on violence.

—Catherine Wanner 1998
*Burden of Dreams*

Following the August coup, each republic seceded and a new national order developed with titular majorities comprising the primary state-society relationship that
now needed justification (Suny 1993, 160; Wilson 1997, ch. 6; Wanner 1998).\textsuperscript{27} As Charles Tilly (1978, 7-31, 208) argues,\textsuperscript{27}

The presence of a coherent revolutionary organization makes a great difference at exactly this point ["the moment at which some people belonging to members of the alternative coalition seize control over some portion of the government, and other people not previously attached to the coalition honor their directives…"] An organization facilitates the initial seizure of control, spreads the news, activates the commitments already made by specific men.

Consequently, national coalitions needed to organize support for their nation-state and confront nationalist minority conflicts.

When the Soviet Union collapsed, in part due to national mobilization, national titular majority group leaders remained in power and illustrated that the political order was based upon national stratification. While Soviet successor countries lacked powerful anti-communist parties and bureaucratic institutions, they needed to legitimate the new state, its national order, and cope with challenges to authority. To do so, leaders turned to the most salient justifications of power and most organized groups that could simultaneously maintain the legitimacy that internally ordered each republic and assuage rival factions – the titular nation.\textsuperscript{28}

At the same time, political and social changes in 1985 and later independence led to increased mobilization of minority groups, including Russians in Transnistria and Crimea, Crimean-Tatars, Tatars along the Volga, Chechens, and Gagauz. Each of

\textsuperscript{27} At the very least, nationality determined who composed the majority of a country’s institutional political elites (those who held public office) (Brubaker 1994). Kazakhstan did not have a titular majority.

\textsuperscript{28} Similar to the pre-communist transition to communism, ethnic intellectual leaders became integrated into current state needs and authority structures. 
these groups attempted to secede from their respective successor state and each successor state attempted to deal with these minority conflicts.

However, pre-independence group coherence levels and the degree of intra-group elite consensus determined a group’s potential organizational capacity and whether its organizations and national rhetoric would form a united entity or fractionalize. A group’s level of common understanding and salience shaped the quality of existing links – symbols and historic connections – and to what degree these links provided an existing structure to help groups organize – facilitated communication and coordination, helped justify group relationships, and encouraged the imagination for collective organization and action. Elite consensus determined whether a nation’s strong organization and national rhetoric, built on coherence, would become divisive or united.

Figure 5-1 illustrates how titular majority group coherence and degrees of intra-majority-group elite consensus combined to shape a group’s organizational strength and unity. Specifically, titular majority group coherence offered an existing structure the state could utilize to better organize and justify the national order, and elite consensus helped prevent divides in how national rhetoric and organization could be used. Cell one illustrates that with high group coherence and intra-group elite consensus the group became well organized and the organization and national rhetoric had few political divides; this greater unity decreased uncertainty and anxieties among minority groups. Conversely, highly coherent groups with elite divisions provided strong national organizations pulled in multiple directions (cell two). These titular majority states deterred incoherent minority groups from violent protest and exit as the majority’s
potential unity posed a threat to the group’s existence. However, these groups generated uncertainty and anxiety for coherent minority groups because violent nationalist sects within the majority were difficult to prevent and coherent secessionists were highly visible targets. Finally, with a national majority dominating the state, low titular majority group coherence limited group organization, and elites politicizing the nation’s intricacies further divided the developing organizations (cell three). These groups posed a minimal potential threat to coherent and incoherent minorities that protested, did not assuage anxieties and uncertainty for minorities who remained loyal to the state, remained prone to uninhibited violent nationalist sects amongst majority group members, and struggled to bring order.  

An incoherent group with intra-group elite consensus was highly unlikely under a nationally ordered state. In such a situation, the national group provides the primary means to power, and if the group is not coherent, politicizing its nuances and debates provides greater opportunities than loyalty to a united group.

Incoherent groups created more opportunities for internal leadership challenges, which directly undermined the state administration’s national legitimacy. After independence intellectual elites and leaders continued to describe goals for their country’s future, which did not resonate with the people and often caused grievances. Concentrated minorities then expressed opposition that resonated with some of the majority’s sub-national communities as well as other minorities. As these titular sub-groups became more organized and prominent, state leaders attempted to address their issues. However, support for one agenda meant another became neglected, such as the national rhetoric that justified the administration. Other leaders witnessed the neglect and mobilized additional sub-groups and issues to challenge seated power. The national founding oriented the struggle for power toward ethnicity, but low coherence levels directed the conflict toward intra-ethnic divides instead of outward toward the ‘other’. Different intra-ethnic claims developed within the administration, and each attempt to solve a minority issue undermined traditions that ordered the state. With conflicting claims on authority the administration could not organize to address minority issues. As the state withered, coherent secessionists mobilized. For example, when Russians in Moldova complained about language rights, many Moldovans also became concerned and organized. While Tatar language rights spurred Russian nationalism in Russia, in Moldova it raised concerns for Russian speaking Moldovans and others with whom Romanian identity conceptions did not resonate. Leaders reacted by reversing Romanian language laws and renaming the state language Moldovan. The administration – whose legitimacy built upon a Moldovan national identity that resembled Romanianism – now had leaders that addressed an organizing sub-group of Moldovans at the expense of their initial justifications for power. While many joined the Moldovan language movement, others in the administration continued to rally around the Romanian language policy, and still others mobilized different sub-group concerns. Moldovan national justifications for state power remained the focal point, but multiple conceptions of what that meant allowed for continuous challenges. The administration became divided at the essence of its legitimacy. As leaders found support in society, new national administrative justifications arose, and the original Romanianized Moldovan justification of power supported only one faction. No supra-group traditions or group charisma resonated that could immediately restore a united
However, elite divisions were not deterministic for minority group mobilization and organization. Even when minority elites united immediately after state collapse, without a coherent national identity they lacked an organizational structure that would help successfully mobilize their populations. Lacking state and administrative tools and a developed pre-Soviet-independence group structure to help organize, incoherent minority groups struggled to collectively act. Similarly, coherent minority groups always had an incentive for intra-group elite consensus. First, if nationality systematically segregated minority group elites from political and economic opportunities, they all had an interest in working together to fight national biases. Second, if some national minority elites gained political opportunities within the new government and others did not, the group’s coherence would determine the potential for unity. A coherent group with only some national elites gaining from the post-communist arrangements faced minimal national opposition because those who sufficiently gained typically received sufficient resources to dominate their group’s national narrative/politics and a combined interest to not undermine their new positions (Hechter 2000, 49).

In the case study sections I separately focus on each country – Ukraine, Russian, and Moldova – to discuss how nationalist independence generated a national order in each new country. I then illustrate how narratives, the division of power, international factors, and interests led to elite divisions and consensus. Following this, I explain how minority mobilization challenged state authority (i.e. Crimean Tatars, Russians in Crimea, Tatars along the Volga, Chechen, Russians in Transnistria, and

---

nation. Essentially, attempts to compromise or repress Russian secessionists produced more administrative divisions, decreased state legitimacy, and caused state actors to work against one another in their solutions.
Gagauz). Finally, I discuss how coherence influenced organizational capacity and combined with varying levels of elite consensus to shape the state’s ability to manage these minority conflicts.

**Ukraine and Support for Hypothesis 1: Ukrainians-Crimean Tatars and Ukrainians-Russians in Crimea**

In this section I focus on two cases in Ukraine that support Hypothesis 1 - A country with a coherent ethnic group managing the state and intra-group elite consensus is less likely to experience secessionist violence - Ukrainian-Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian-Russians in Crimea. I illustrate that Ukrainian coherence and elite consensus within the group helped a newly independent Ukraine avoid early Russian and Crimean Tatar secession.

As Chapters 3 and 4 illustrated, Ukrainians developed and hardened a coherent national identity through intellectual activities and encounters with other groups (including the state). Mobilization prior to the Soviet Union pressured the communist authority to provide Ukrainians with a privileged status within the republic, which permitted group intellectuals’ the opportunity to continue to cultivate and disperse the Ukrainian identity to a mass population. Additionally, the special status and advantages in the republic increased the Ukrainian people’s contentious encounters with the republic’s minority groups, the RSFSR, and Russian ruling authority in Moscow. Keeping the identity salient and well understood the Ukrainians became increasingly coherent throughout the Soviet experience.

In 1991, Ukrainians represented 75 percent of the population and substantively supported the national movement that helped generate independence, indicating that the Ukrainian nation represented the country’s most powerful electoral faction and the
primary cleavage for mass politics. While the leadership immediately attempted to institutionalize Ukrainian rule and national identity through education and cultural institutions, the process was slow (Wanner 1998; Sasse 2007). For instance, the constitution was not ratified until June 28, 1996 and many reforms were dogged by political cleavages (e.g. regional, environmental, and cultural). Consequently, until a potential Ukrainian order could become institutionalized, to maintain stability leaders needed to actively justify in the present the national based order and manage ethnic separatist movements.30

While resistance to these justifications arose among several concentrated minority groups – for instance, both Russians and Crimean Tatars used the national order and collapse as an opportunity to politically mobilize their respective populations – Ukrainians generally accepted the new order. Ukrainian elite consensus helped prevent divides in how national rhetoric and organization could be used and group coherence helped elites justify the order to the Ukrainian majority and offered an already organized existing structure the state could utilize. With elite consensus and Ukrainian unity and organization behind the national order, the state needed fewer resources to maintain its majority support and could easily communicate and coordinate action, which meant more resources were available and could be effectively used to combat minority conflict. Additionally, the often singular national voice helped signal credible commitments to coherent minorities, enticing them to remain less rebellious.

30 Justifying national rule was the obvious choice compared to generating a non national order. As Molchanov (2000, 279-280) notes, Ukrainian nationalism provided significant power to the ruling elites. First, nationalism allowed local oligarchy to reclaim power, capital, and resources. As the Soviet Union collapsed, nationalist terms allowed elites to regain the lost power. Second, it allowed Ukrainian elites to protect and insulate themselves from the more powerful Russian sharks. Third, the Ukrainian diasporas offered substantial financial support to the Ukrainian agendas. Finally, Western Ukraine had a grassroots movement that would support that national agenda. These factors helped nationalism rise as an important form of authority in Ukraine and remain so.
Ukrainian Elite Consensus

Several factors helped maintain Ukrainian elite consensus, including a constrained narrative, continuation of Ukrainian Soviet apparatuses, institutional arrangements, and international pressures. First, the two primary Ukrainian nationalist narratives that emerged in the 1980s and continued through the 1990s did not provide a natural division among elites. The first narrative proposed a revival of Ukrainian national culture and language, features that had been fostered throughout the Soviet experience but tempered by Soviet centralism ('the revival of Ukraine and social role of Ukrainian language' (Pikulicka-Wilczewska and Sakwa 2015; Bhabha, 1990, 1-7). The second narrative, which has become dominant but compliments the first, states an aversion to 'horrific' Russian rule, including reference to enslavement and genocide (Wilson 1997, 157-161). Not only did these two perspectives not undermine or contradict the other, but also they found common ground in Ukraine’s historicized independence prior to the Russian ‘betrayal’ of the Treaty of Pereiaslav of 1654. These national narratives constrained potential elite divisions to two primary sides and allowed substantial room for compromise.

Second, because the communist government was never completely replaced in Ukraine (rather communist elites became nationalists), Kravchuk and other elites had Soviet state networks and apparatuses at their disposal to encourage elite consensus and provide a singular and dominate Ukrainian narrative. For instance, those in the executive branch and the Cabinet of Ministers retained access to state-controlled media and numerous resources to most vocally articulate an “official” narrative (Wolczuk 2001, 136). Other elites existed with differing views but lacked the state apparatus to spread
them. Essentially nobody beyond the state had the capacity to utilize the narrative to effectively mobilize Ukrainians in different directions.\(^\text{31}\)

Third, institutional arrangements in Ukraine also encouraged a unified national elite. While the growing civil society and democratic bodies were weaker than those in some Eastern European countries, they allowed the nationalist party to face some competition, and in order to combat non-nationalist issues national elites became more united. While civil societies and democratic bodies were similar in other former republics whose elites divided, like Georgia and Russia (I talk about this more later, essentially they had other pre-independence issues that divided elites and fostered nationally divisive democratic arenas), the Ukrainian civil society and democratic bodies came with fewer pre-independence divides and helped stimulate a more united post-Soviet elite. In other words, the focused national, anti-Soviet movement for independence that did not need to deal with pre-independence secessionists helped Ukrainian elite consensus remain and democratic bodies facilitate national unity rather than dissent.

Conversely, when national movements took numerous directions prior to independence it often confused people’s perception of rightful leaders and national narratives, which provided a source of continued contention in democratic spaces. For instance, in Georgia, national factions arose when some mobilized for independence and others mobilized the masses to cope with secessionists in Abkhazia (1994, 332). This national division grew as each side rallied their national support by often

\(^{31}\) Additionally, Kravchuk and his government needed the national support to maintain power. The ruling elites had tied themselves to national politics and as they faced domestic party factions, their individual and party prosperity rested upon national unity and the ability to utilize nationalizing concepts (Kuzio and Wilson 1994, Ch. 9). They then used state resources to do so.
diminishing the work of the other, and after independence, these factions continued to
divide the elites as they helped them secure their status in parliament. Additionally,
Georgia’s lack of ethnic diversity beyond its separatist regions meant that once the
separatist factions vacated parliament, the singular nationality had minimal
parliamentary ethnic opposition that national elites could unite against.

Finally, international factors facilitated Ukrainian elite consensus. Russian power
and the fear of being usurped by the Russian state made a common foe for Ukrainian
elites and encouraged their unity. United and sovereign they had their own country and
were the most powerful people in it; divided, Russia could take more domestic influence
or even annex the country making Ukrainian leaders small fish in a sea of ‘sharks’
(Subtelny 2009, 582-583; Wilson 1997, 200). Additionally, a drive for European like
prosperity helped unite many early Ukrainian elites. Relative deprivation has long been
believed to drive mass movements and elite decisions in Eastern Europe (Janos 2000).
Consequently, the west’s comparative prosperity and its association with nation-states
made Europe and Ukrainian national unity a common interest for many elites (Morrison,
1993, 691).

As it appears, narratives, the distribution of power, and interests helped
encourage Ukrainian elite consensus. As the next section discuss, a united Ukrainian
elite prevented national factions from forming, allowing majority group coherence to help
organize the population, legitimate the national order, and deal with the rise of minority
nationalists.

**Post-Independence Secessionists**

Glasnost and perestroika, as well as the Soviet Union’s collapse, provided
opportunities for Russians and Crimean Tatars, like other groups previously discussed,
to organize and mobilize in Ukraine. In particular, the Russian population in eastern Ukraine (over 44 percent of the population in Donetsk and Luhansk were Russian) and Crimea (64 percent of the Crimean population in 1989) organized secessionist movements in 1991 (Kuzio and Wilson 1994, 207, 202) and Crimean Tatars, while still scattered throughout the former Soviet republics, began a national movement to return to Crimea and establish sovereignty on the peninsula. However, with Ukrainian coherence facilitating majority social support behind a united Ukrainian elite, the state could not only allocate more resources to these conflicts, but also they could more effectively mobilize their population to cope with them.

**Minority mobilization**

Both Russians in Crimea and Crimean Tatars sought unique rights and sovereignty in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In reaction to Ukrainian independence, the communist party in Crimea declared sovereignty on September 2, 1991 and soon after Iurii Meshkov’s Republican Movement of Crimea (Respulikanskaia partiia Kruma-Repulikanskoe dcizhenie Kruma’ RPK-RDK) united with several other Russian organizations behind goals of Crimean separatism, Russian nationalism, and reintegration with Russia. Despite the fact that factions within the Russian organization

---

32 Non-Russian minority national movements occurred in other concentrated territories in Ukraine. Ruysn in Transcarpathia mobilized for independence from Ukraine and national Romanian and Moldovan movements occurred in Chernivitsi (prior to 1939 the region was part of Romania).

33 For the sake of brevity, I primarily discuss early mobilization by Russians in Crimea and Crimean Tatars.

34 Increasing unrest in Uzbekistan further encouraged Crimean Tatars to mobilize. Uzbek slogans in 1989 should “Russkii doloi, Tatarskii domoi, Koreetsii Hanoi!” (Down with the Russians, home with the Tatars, and to Hanoi with the Koreans!) (Williams 2001, 439).

35 The primary Russian organizations that came together were the Russian Party of Crimea (Russkaia partiia Kruma), the Russian Community of Crimea (Russkaia obshchina Kruma), the Russian Society of
varied in their support for each goal, a number of sources at the time believed the tensions were headed to a Yugoslavia-like violent exchange (Kuzio 1994a, 1994b; Meek 1994; Economist 17 July 1993). Furthermore, while a majority of the Crimean population voted for independence from the Soviet Union during the country wide referendum on December 1, 1991, 44 percent of those in Crimea rejected it, which left a substantial portion unsatisfied with Ukrainian rule and an opportunity for local elites to continue to organize and mobilize for secession.

The peninsula's other major national movement involved the dispersed and exiled Crimean Tatars who since 1987 vociferously advocated for a return to Crimea. The National Movement of the Crimean Tatars primarily headed the group's early mobilization and successfully campaigned to the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet who in 1989 exonerated the group of Stalin's denunciations and permitted their return. But the Russian national movement, ethnic discrimination, and Crimean parliament hindered resettlement. The Russian national movement in Crimea and ethnic discrimination systematically prevented a redistribution of property to Crimean Tatars and barred the group from equitable treatment throughout most social, economic, and political interactions on the peninsula (Uehling 2004, 210; Chervonnaia and Guboglo 1992, 187). Furthermore, the Crimean parliament banned Crimean Tatar resettlement in Simferopol and Bachchysarai, two regions where Crimean Tatars were a near majority.

---

Crimea (Russkoe obshchestvo Kryma), and the Russian-language Movement of Crimea (Russkoiazychnoe dvizhenie Kruma) (Sasse 2007, 155; Kuzio and Wilson 1994, 203).

36 The Economist feared “a long-running, acrimonious, possibly bloody, and conceivably nuclear dispute” over Crimea.

37 As early as 1987 Crimean Tatars began serious protests for their right to return to Crimea. In April 1987, 2,000 Crimean Tatars marched in Moscow’s Red Square with signs that read “Motherland or Death” (Williams 2001, 436). It was the largest protest in the Moscow since the Russian Revolution.
in 1939 (Kuzio and Wilson 1994, 192; Radians’ka Ukraiha, 18 September 1991). Likely frustrated by the slow progress, another major Crimean Tatar organization in 1991 – the Organization of the Crimean-Tatar National Movement (OKND) – became the movement’s primary voice (Kuzio and Wilson 1994, 202) and continued to campaign for Crimean Tatar sovereignty on the peninsula.

In reaction, Ukrainian authorities attempted to assuage these national movements. While Crimea did not offer substantial financial gains, Ukrainian leaders found it in their interest to keep Crimea within Ukraine as it provided a strategic water way and a military base along the Black Sea. But unlike national confrontations over other useful territories in other republics, the Ukrainian state did not seek to violently prevent ethnic Russian or Crimean Tatar state claims on the peninsula. I argue that to do so effectively, Ukrainians needed intra-group elite consensus to keep national actions focused and group coherence to provide organized mass support to these elite led actions.

**Coherence and managing conflict**

Despite many post-independence challenges that threatened to divide the Ukrainian nation and the national order, Ukrainians remained fairly united. Leaders largely worked together to utilize the group’s identity, and they used coherence to

---

38 In this paragraph I discuss the political factions within the Ukrainian nation, but it is worth noting several other issues that emerged and posed a challenge to national unity. For instance, the well-known hyperinflation rates from December 1992 to September 1994, which for several months hit highs of 10,000 percent (ten thousand percent), generated mass, and not just ethnic, protest. The new post-communist rules lacked institutionalization and served as a lightning rod for challenging the state. The election of Soviet apparat to the presidency and parliament gave the impression that nothing had truly changed with independence and illustrated to many that more protests and reforms were necessary. Furthermore, minority secessionist encouraged Ukrainians to advocate for different and contradicting solutions.
organize and justify the national order and state actions, which then helped the state avoid violent minority secession.

Following independence the previously united Ukrainian nation, supported by the National Democratic Bloc and the national communists, formed several political factions. On the right, many organizations emerged, including the Ukrainian National Assembly-Ukrainian Self-Defense Force (UNA-UNSO) that advocated for Ukrainian regional super-power status under a more authoritarian like system. Also on the right, the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists (KUN), developed out of the former 1940s party OUN and attempted to reclaim their mission, “Ukraine for the Ukrainians!” and avow that the “Ukrainian state would be a national dictatorship (natsiokratiia).” In the center, the Party of Democratic Rebirth of Ukraine (PDRU) sought to build ties between national democrats and russophiles. The organization that fostered early Ukrainian national movement, the Rukh, itself divided into liberal and right parties (i.e. the Rukh and the Congress of National-Democratic Forces (CNDF), respectively). Civil society organizations and religious factions also independently gathered to influence the new government (Wilson 1997, 75-92). Furthermore, regional divides threatened compromise. For instance, in Galicia, Kravchuk obtained only 13.3 percent of the 1991 presidential electoral vote and in other parts of the west and south he received only a slim majority, which created an organized and underrepresented population, potentially ready to contest the democratic ruling (Kuzio 1994, 197).

---

These diverse, and often radically active factions proclaimed desires for very different outcomes and had the potential to pull apart the young state. If left to their own devises, at the very least they could individually challenge state rules or clamor for rights and privileges that stretched the state’s limited resources. In a more unsettling sense, these organizations could independently and violently influence Ukrainians and minorities, potentially creating perceptions of an ethnically violent Ukrainian state that no coherent minority would peacefully tolerate.

To manage intra-group factions and stem violent rogue activities, as well as cope with the vacuum created by communism’s collapse, the state utilized national ideology and ‘promoted it with a vengeance’ (Kuzio 1994, 199, ch. 4). To help stimulate national unity, immediately after independence the government adopted several official Ukrainian state symbols, including the trident, the yellow and blue flag, and the hymn used from 1917-1920, ‘Ukraine has not yet died’.40 Additionally, while Kravchuk attempted to remain more moderate and inclusive of minorities in rhetoric, by 1992 he used increasing nationalism to gain support across the Ukrainian factions. He moved away from civic-national statements like,

Ukrainian and Russians have lived together for centuries, have shared grief and joy in equal proportions and have spilt blood together for this land. As President I envisage Ukraine as a state of Ukrainians, Russians and all the nationalities who inhabit it. It simply cannot be any other way.41

And moved on to more nationalist ideas like,

---

40 It should be noted that while the addition of new symbols to the state came easily (not that there was not some backlash), the removal of Soviet symbols, as decreed by Kravchuk only took place in the west (Wilson 1997, 162).

We have only looked at the negative features in nationalism, rather than [seeing it as] some sort of creative force. A national-liberation movement, if we do not attempt to blacken it, can be a creative force in building the state.\textsuperscript{42}

As Wilson (1997, 111) notes, Kravchuk wholly endorsed the national view and made “constant references to Russian ‘chauvinists’, Russian ‘territorial pretensions’ and [their] ‘crude interference in our affairs’, and statements such as ‘Russians are psychologically used to thinking of everything else as a part of Russia’….” These sentiments framed politics in nationalist terms and helped bring the various Ukrainian factions behind Kravchuk’s government and the new state (Wanner 1998; Wilson 1997; Kuzio 1994).

Other narratives and symbols also helped unite the Ukrainian people and illustrate the legitimacy of the national order. For instance, historicized pre-modern Kievn-Rus and Cossack independent states illustrated a common origin and likened Ukrainians to a fiercely independent and democratic people (Wanner 1998, 131). Taras Shevchenko, held up as the father of Ukraine and its greatest poet, justified Ukrainian rule by illustrating that the nation had a common struggle and goal of nation-statehood. By highlighting a glorious past and illustrating its contemporary relevance, many people could then imagine their unity in the present and their ability, when united, to ‘re-obtain’ prosperity in the future.

Ukrainian coherence helped these narratives and symbols become important to bringing people together and justifying the national order. First, Ukrainian coherence ensured that the group’s history and symbols were readily available to the population, which increased the likelihood that elites and the masses could reach a common vision

\textsuperscript{42} Kravchuk June 1992b; An interview with Kravchuk in the most prominent western Ukrainian newspaper. Cited in Wilson (1997, 110-111).
and support for the new nation-state. As Levko Luk’ianenko (1994, 57)\textsuperscript{43} stipulated, [Ukrainian symbols are our] national riches, dearer than life for any given member of our tribe or citizen of the state.”

In particular, the common, salient symbols and vocabulary shaped policies and state visions that made sense to the people better than others, which allowed many interests to become co-opted by national rhetoric. For instance, despite a developing civil society and widespread democratic desires, a lack of modern Ukrainian independence and fears of anti-nationalist regionalism were used to justify centralized power (Wilson 1997, 164; Vasyl’ Osviienko, ‘Chomu my protu federalizatsii?’, Samostiina Ukraina, no. 15 (October), 1991; Yevhen Boltarovuch, ‘Federatuvna Ukraina nikoly ne poduduie odes’kyi terminal’, Demoz, no. 4, 1994; Ukhvala pershoi konferentsii DemPU: pro zahrozu suverenitetovi I teritorial’nii tsilisnosti Ukrainy (Kiev, party material, 12 April 1992)). As Mykhailo Horyn, the Ukrainian nationalist and prominent leader within the Ukrainian parliament, remarked,

There is a paradoxical situation in Ukraine, when it is not the nation which is building the state, but the state which, having established itself on Ukrainians ethnic territory at the same time as the nation’s emergence, is now assisting the latter’s consolidation. Federalism would only strengthen regional consciousness and obstruct the process of creating a single national organism.\textsuperscript{44}

Similarly, several state structural problems hampered Ukraine’s economy and its ability to solve environmentalist and energy issues, but rather than delineate particular causes most became ethnically framed as Russian’s putting Ukrainians in harm’s way (Wilson


\textsuperscript{44} Mykhailo Horyn’, ‘National’na yednist’ – garant ukrains’koi derzhavnosti’, speech at the first congress of the CNDF, Samostiina Ukraina, no. 31 (August), 1992. Also quoted by Wilson (1997, 164)
1997, 168-170). For instance, while poor fiscal policies likely contributed to high inflation, Mykhailo Horyn’ (1993)\textsuperscript{45} and others discussed Russia’s economic ‘war against Ukraine’ (Wilson 1998, 170).

Furthermore, many Ukrainian symbols and figures were heavily integrated into people’s lives through education, festivals, calendars, and the urban landscape (Wanner 1998). For example, Ukrainians commonly recited Taras Shevchenko poems or performed Cossack dances at various holidays and events, and as the state utilized these symbols to justify support, people understood them, actively performed them, and increasingly viewed their everyday actions as part of a positive mass entity.

Finally, coherence meant that the lines between ethnic groups were important throughout the country and that maintaining a national political order for Ukrainians came with immediate rewards for all co-nationals. Throughout communism Russians experienced the greatest economic and political advantages in the UkrSSR and Ukrainians witnessed their own advantage over other minority groups. With the new national order, Ukrainians, especially first-language Ukrainian speakers, observed their national advantage and had salient and understood reasons to support it.

Consequently, the united Ukrainian nation and its strong social support for the Ukrainian order provided the state with substantial backing to manage secessionist conflicts. First, strong national support meant that Ukrainian perceptions of secessionists and their territories could be used to facilitate negotiation. Most Ukrainians agreed on the state’s borders and stood by its integrity (Katchanovski 2006,

\textsuperscript{45} IV zizd Ukrains’koi respublikans’koi partii (kiev: URP, 1993)
This is unlike in Moldova where many people differently viewed Transnistria and Bessarabia territories, leading the population to question decisions regarding sovereignty from Romania and compromise with seceding territories. Instead, in Ukraine the border was understood and people supported it.

Related to a well-understood border, coherence directly helped negotiations with Russians in Crimea seem an acceptable approach to resolving secessionist demands. Most Ukrainian elites and group members similarly viewed Ukraine and Crimea as different territorial units, openly recognized Crimea as a recent addition to the Ukrainian territory, and believed Crimea was a Russian populated location (Sasse 2007, ch. 2; Drohobysky 1995, 137). When movements in Crimea sought autonomy and secession, it was not viewed as absurd. Instead, negotiation with a Crimean authority, an authority that often appeared naturally different than those in Kiev, seemed a reasonable solution. Furthermore, the coherent Ukrainian identity helped leaders emphasize this historic view of Crimea and Crimean authority, which helped justify negotiations in ways that it made sense to most. At the same time, national coherence and elite consensus helped the government demonize federalism as historically problematic and as Russian attempts to weaken the Ukrainian state (Drohobysky 1995, 144; Defense and Aerospace 1993). Consequently, as polls in the early 1990s illustrated, Ukrainians largely agreed: no notable Ukrainian factions opposed negotiation with Crimea, and the

---

46 Katchanovski (2006, 100-121) reports on several public opinion polls conducted in Ukraine and Moldova.

47 “Degisen Dunya Kosullarinda Turk Deniz Kuvvetleri’nin Yeni Gorevleri ve Kuvvet Yapisi,” (New tasks and the new force structure f the Turkish naval forces in the context of changing world conditions), Savunma ve Havacilik (Defense and Aerospace) 7, no. 3 (May-June 1993): 14
vast majority opposed Crimean federal autonomy (Katchanovski 2006, 117).\textsuperscript{48} Radical right parties and those on the left mounted nearly no opposition to how authorities handled Crimea. Even President Leonid Kuchma, whose platform during the 1994 presidential elections emphasized a turn toward federalism, largely ignored the issue once in office (Drohobysky 1995, 148-149).

Had they been less coherent, selling compromise with Crimea would likely have been a struggle. For instance, separatist Russian forces in Crimea attempted to gain momentum by framing their movement as seeking protection from Ukrainization (Sasse 2007, 156), but amendable to Crimean difference and an understanding of the region’s Russian traditions, the Ukrainian parliament remained flexible to Russian demands, including approval that the Republic of Crimea may have a president and hold parliamentary elections (Sasse 2007, 157). For example, the majority of Ukrainians supported Russian as a second state language (even 20 percent in Western Ukraine supported it) (Katchanovski 2006, 117), indicating their acceptance of Russian national and Russian-linguistic demands. Furthermore, permitting Russians in Crimea and Crimean Tatars to obtain various rights increased competition amongst secessionists and elites, and it began a process that helped institutionalize relationships between Kyiv and Simferopol (Sasse 2007, 158-159).\textsuperscript{49} Counterfactually, had Ukrainians been less coherent, Ukrainian sub-groups less amendable to Russian desires would have likely arisen and protested or blocked Crimea’s increased institutional autonomy, causing tensions to rise and the Ukrainization narrative to gain traction; this is precisely what

\textsuperscript{48} As Drohobysky (1995, 145, 149) notes, advocates of federalism in Kyiv weakly framed their arguments and had a relatively muted narrative.

\textsuperscript{49} Simferopol became the undisputed capital of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea in 1991 and remained so until March 2014.
happened in Moldova with Russians in Transnistria. At the very least, Kyiv’s commitments to Crimea would have appeared less credible.

Additionally, coherence added to Ukrainian organization and its ability organize helpful political thought, such as a more general understanding of ethnicity’s constructed nature and relationship to laws. Ukrainian intellectuals widely discussed ethnicity’s construction and often relationship with laws, and many, like Lartzev (1993) described how perceived differences and stereotypes between communities affected one’s ability to arrive at political and economic solutions. Reading these and other similarly framed perspectives likely helped frame negotiation as a necessity for stable inter-ethnic relations.

Furthermore, Ukrainian unity and support for the state freed up material resources that could be used for taming disagreements with secessionists. In particular, Ukraine increased military spending throughout the 1990s, indicating that more resources were available for managing minority conflicts. In fact, while Ukrainian military expenditures in 1993 were one of the lowest in all republics, by 1997 they were second to only Russia in the percentage of GDP spent on the military. Table 5-1 illustrates the association between coherence and resources allocated to military funds across the fifteen republics. Military expenditures as a percentage of GDP are based on each country’s 1991-1999 average and taken from the Quality of Government data set.


51 Ларцев, В. С. 1993. Какую идеологию должно "исповедовать" Украинское государство и его армия. Киев: Ларцев, В. С.

52 While the new state attempted to institutionalize Ukrainian nationality (Wanner 1998), in the meantime it needed to maintain order.
Oil exporting countries are measured with a dummy variable. A 1 is assigned to countries where oil exports constitute “one third of its total merchandise exports”, 0 is for countries with less than one third. There are 123 country observations (Dietrich and Bernhard 2009). When controlling for oil wealth, levels of development (a dummy variable and GDP per capita in 1993), and the presence of concentrated coherent minority groups (a dummy variable where 1 indicates the country has a concentrated minority, 0 where a country does not have a concentrated minority)(Gurr 1993, 328), coherence correlates with greater military spending. This makes sense, as a less coherent group would need to keep its national population satisfied through greater social goods, even during times of war, as happened in 1993 and 1994 in Moldova. However, a more coherent group can allocate more resources to military expenditures, particularly when they need to address secessionist conflict.

Finally, as Gwendolyn Sasse (2007) argues, the negotiation process, and its drawn out nature, between the Ukrainian state and separatists helped assuage ethnic conflict. “For what appears to be a feeble and symbolic institutionalized solution –

---

53 As Henry Hale (2008, 169) notes, economic development across the republics is helpfully done by their relative comparison. Utilizing retail commodity turnover (Hale 2008, 169-170), I divide half of the Soviet republics into more developed republics – coded as a 1 – and half into less developed – coded as 0. (1=Ukraine, Russia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Belarus, Georgia, and Armenia. 0 = Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Azerbaijan.)

54 Concentrated highly coherent minority groups negatively correlate with military spending, which makes sense according to the theories proposed in this dissertation. When a coherent national group attempts to solve secessionist conflict it should be able to do so without only coercive means, more effectively negotiate with a coherent minority nation, and need to spend more resources to likely accommodate the coherent minority group.

55 When controlling for regime type (dummy variable: 1= polity iv score higher than five, 0= polity iv score five or lower), coherence remains significant. Autocracies are believed to spend more on physically coercive control than democracies to avoid civil violence (Hegre et al. 2001; Muller and Weede 1990).
Crimean autonomy – cloaks the deeper causality of conflict prevent arising from a process of compromise and consensus building” (Sasse 2007, 8).

In part, the drawn out negotiation process was due to Ukrainian coherence. First, the united Ukrainian nation helped encourage Russian and Crimean Tatar secessionists to engage in talks with Kyiv even if ‘progress’ occurred slowly. While four different factions laid claim to the Crimean Peninsula – the Russian Federation, Russian led Crimean Separatists, The Ukrainian State, and the Crimean Tatars – the Ukrainian state made the most coherent claim to the territory and it was clear that all others needed to negotiate with, or combat, Kyiv. The Russian Federation, and its divisive elites, could not commit, to or against, Crimean irredentism and sovereignty. In November 1990 and again in November 1991, Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk agreed that both states “recognize and respect the territorial integrity….within the presently existing borders within the USSR.”56 However, in January of 1992 the Supreme Soviet of Russia denounced the 1954 transfer of Crimea to Ukraine and deemed it illegal, but during the first Crimean War, Russia and Yeltsin generally ignored cries for sovereignty in Crimea (Wydra 2003, 118). In part, continual struggles within Russia generated the Federation’s ambiguity and made it a poor location for negotiation or future incorporation.57 On the other hand, while Russian and Crimean Tatar separatists organized, they both lacked the Ukrainian state’s institutional

56 Also cited in Prazauskas (1994, 174). The 1991 agreement does not mention the “USSR.”

57 The Russian Federation’s policy toward Crimea remained vague until February-March 2014 when Russian military forces stationed in Sevastopol occupied major cities, the State Council of Crimea (Crimean Parliament), declared Crimean independence, and the peninsula’s unification with the Russian Federation.
power and its fairly united elites. Consequently, Kyiv remained the focal point for secessionists concerns.

Second, the organized Ukrainians could efficiently negotiate with their Crimean counterparts. While numerous countries tried to similarly bargain with secessionists, what they did not have was a coherent nation that organized and united majority-group-elites who similarly viewed the Crimean peninsula’s politics and agreed how to utilize nationality to solve ethnic tensions (see above). The government communicated with separatists and Crimea’s emerging governments, and it frequently used the Russian language to make appeals to the Crimean public at large (several actions that did not happen in Moldova). These public appeals came from numerous sources and through various media, including Commander of the Odessa military District Vitaly G. Radetzky, who asserted a united Ukrainian air of confidence that illustrated the state’s commitment to uniting all of Ukraine and not just Ukrainian nationals. In Crimean Izvestini (DECEMBER 9 1992) a front-page article was headlined by the commander’s remark, “We have one pain, one dream of revival of sovereign power within the proud Ukraine.”

The Ukrainian Parliament also actively negotiated with Crimean separatists. As the Russian led secessionist movement, in the name of “the multiethnic people of Crimea” (mnogonatsional’nyu nardo Kruma), declared on May 5-6, 1992 a vague

---

58 Where Moldova and Georgia frequently refused to communicate in the separatist’s titular language through TV or radio, to recognize and negotiate with separatist ‘governments’, and lacked information regarding separatist activities, Ukraine made these concessions early on.

59 “У нас одна обся боль , одна мечта возрождене суверенной державы с гордым именем Украина.”
independence (samostoiatel’nost)\textsuperscript{60} and called for an independence referendum, six days later the Ukrainian Parliament (who previously put together several special committees to negotiate with the separatists) declared the acts illegal, held a special session of parliament with the Crimean separatist leader, Bahrov, and ordered Crimea to amend its constitution (Sasse 2007, 145-147). Strategically, the parliament did not disavow Crimea’s constitution, only what it said. The swift action and compromise helped calm the situation and keep secessionists involved in negotiations (Sasse 2007). Conversely, in Moldova the first official post-independence negotiation with separatists on August 29, 1991, a meeting that also took place in Kyiv, involved the kidnaping and arrest of separatist leaders, Igor Smirnov and Andrei Cheban. These events, poorly organized and inadequately conceived, decreased the Moldovan state’s ability to signal credible commitments.\textsuperscript{61} Furthermore, Ukraine utilized top negotiators and political parties to help broker deals on behalf of the government, which helped arrange economic zones that would protect Crimean elite businesses and finances (Sasse 2007, ch. 7, 168).

Additionally, to generate stability, in part, minorities must believe that state authorities will not renege on their agreements (Fearon 1995, 2). Without vocal intra-group elite opposition, Ukrainian commitments to territorial integrity and concessions appeared fairly credible. Minorities believed Ukraine would not tolerate secession but that they would likely follow through with their compromises, such as allowing a Crimean Parliament, president, constitution, and independent elections. Juxtaposed to

\textsuperscript{60} They did not use the term, nezavisimost (full legal and political independence), the word Ukraine used in its referendum to secede from the USSR (Sasse 2007, 145).

\textsuperscript{61} The Moldovan government arrested and imprisoned them, but a rail blockade within Transnistria eventually helped the separatists negotiate their leaders’ release.
the Russian Federation, who remained ambiguous about Crimea, the Ukrainian state position did not vary and several short-term actions, like allowing Russian to remain an official language in the peninsula, proved to assuage fears of potential Ukrainian hostilities to minorities.

Ukrainian organization assuaged Crimean Tatar secession as well. Despite occasional poor treatment of Crimean Tatars by Ukrainian authorities, like when they largely prevented the return of the population from 1991 to 1998 until a citizenship for displaced people was negotiated, the Crimean Tatar OKND chose to work with the Ukrainian government. The Crimean Tatars had not only come to view Russia as their primary enemy, a ‘people and state that had committed genocide’, but also they viewed Ukraine as a stable unit with whom they could work. As Algimantas Prazauskas (1994, 175) notes, “the Tatar leaders do not support the irredentist and secessionist aspirations of local Russians and pledge their allegiance to Ukraine.”

The coherence within Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar communities facilitated negotiations and helped both sides compromise. At first Ukrainians fought against the notion that Crimean Tatars were indigenous and opposed the Mejlis, the official body of the Crimean Tatar government. However, by early 1992 the Ukrainian state recognized and negotiated with the Mejlis, and by 2000, the state stipulated, that “…it is necessary to understand that the historical homeland of the Crimean Tatars, where they as an ethnos were formed, is under the jurisdiction of Ukraine, which first of all, is obliged to

---

62 After independence, Ukrainian law only granted citizenship to those living in Ukraine (Williams 2001, 451). While subsequent treaties developed between Uzbekistan and Ukraine in 1998 to allow special permission for Crimean Tatars to gain citizenship, those in Russia (as of January 2014) faced many obstacles to repatriation in Crimea.
draw up a set of political-legal measures guaranteeing the preservation and
development of the Crimean Tatar ethnos in Ukraine" (Beluha 2000).

Within the spectrum of choices to form a new country, Crimean Tatars could have attempt to form a Crimean Republic, Tatar republic, joined with Turkey, bridged its Sunni Islamic or Bessarabian connections, or advocated for non-identity affiliated associations. For instance, from 1989 to 1990 the KGB and GRU (Military Intelligence) attempted to persuade Crimean Tatar leaders to form a pro-Russian stance in exchange for financial and legal support (Williams 2001, 440). However, Crimean Tatar leaders continued a pro-Ukrainian position often citing their historic alliances and mutually beneficial organization. For instance, Kurultay (1999), leader of the Ukrainian nationalist party Reform and Order stated, “when, during the 17th century the Ukrainian and Tatar divisions stood shoulder to shoulder they were unbeaten. Now it happens that we are again in one country. It is our country, together we will live and we will build her.” In the end, the coherence of Ukrainians and their ability to communicate a mutually beneficial history helped the Crimean Tatars appreciate Ukrainian authority, and their own coherence helped the nation negotiate, build institutions, and achieve independence.

A united Ukrainian majority lessened minority anxieties, and through strong organizational structures and efficiently utilized resources, the state mitigated early secessionist movements and helped prevent secessionist violence in the 1990s. Today nationality continues to play a role in Ukrainian politics, but it has largely become a tired


64 Also quoted by Williams (2001, 441, footnote)
divide with little resonance in the mass population. In part, massive elite corruption that
enveloped nearly all state institutions, Russian oil and gas that helped shape political
elections, and isolated regional political cultures combined with a vibrant civil society
and increased civic nationalism to generate a very active and united population with
minimal constraints on state power and politicians. For instance, while linguistic politics
dominated parliament from 2003-2013, the population remained fairly uninterested in
the issue and most felt unrepresented by their elected officials (Euroborameter).

Nevertheless, following Russia’s annexation of Crimea, ethnic national ties on
the peninsula will undoubtedly shape early confrontation and politics. This study
suggests that under a fairly united Russian elite, little violence is expected in the region.
However, the more challenges President Vladimir Putin faces to his domestic political
power may encourage nationalist violence against Crimean Tatars and other minorities
(various forms of hooliganism are already permitted and increasing). This scenario is
even more likely as Putin has dismantled his state institutions at the expense of his own
personal appeal (Mendras 2012), making it increasingly harder for the president to
maintain control over the population and oppositional elites, which increases the ‘need’
to drum up support through exclusivist, and sometimes violent, nationalism. While the
ever increasingly coherent Crimean Tatars would likely not let the violence happen
without a fight, the massive Russian army and discernible Crimean geography would
likely culminate in a horrific event.

**Russia and Hypothesis 2 and 3: Russians-Tatars along the Volga River and
Russians-Chechens**

Cases in Russia support Hypothesis 2 - A country with a coherent ethnic group
managing the state and an incoherent minority opposition is less likely to experience
secessionist violence - and Hypothesis 3 - A country with a coherent ethnic group managing the state without elite consensus and a coherent ethnic minority opposition will likely result in secessionist violence. The Russian-Tatar case supports Hypothesis 2: even with minimal elite consensus within the Russian majority, the group’s coherence helped the country avoid secessionist violence with an incoherent minority group. Coherence illustrated a massive collective capable of violent action and the Russian nation’s interest in territorial integrity, causing the group to cautiously avoid provoking violent Russian state force. The Russian-Chechen case supports Hypothesis 3: without elite consensus within the Russian majority, factions within the majority emerged and increased anxieties within the Chechen population, who consequently continued to pursue independence. However, as factions within the Russian population became violent and mobilized against the highly visible Chechen movement, Chechens defended themselves and continued to seek independence through secessionist civil war.

Similar to Ukraine, Russians developed and hardened national identity through intellectual activities and encounters with other groups. Dominating the Soviet Union and various nationalist movements provided Russians with a privileged status throughout the republics, and in this position group intellectuals continued to cultivate and disperse the Russian identity to a mass population. Additionally, their special status and advantages increased the Russian people’s contentious encounters with minority groups, republics outside the RSFSR, and foreign nations. With a salient and understood identity, the Russians became increasingly coherent throughout the Soviet experience.
After independence, Russian nationals remained in power and while a civic national order helped declare independence, Russians and Russian nationalist continued to run and dominate state affairs. Since 1989, ethnic Russians composed more than 80 percent of the Russian population and the vast majority of territories and oblasts had Russian majorities. De-facto, Russians represented the most powerful cleavage for mass politics, but they needed to stabilize the state and justify Russian rule.\textsuperscript{65} This was particularly difficult because the RSFSR institutions left a set of rules in the Russian Federation less developed than in other republics (other republic administrations had been more independent of the Soviet system and allowed them to maintain greater central state authority after the Soviet collapse (Treisman 2001, 12-14; Mendras 2012, 130-146)) and local elites dominated regions and remained fairly insulated from the center. To regain central state authority and support for Russian national rule, leaders sought to actively justify the national based order. While resistance to these justifications arose among several concentrated minority groups – for instance, Tatars and Chechens used the national order and collapse as an opportunity to politically mobilize their respective populations – most Russians generally accepted Russian authority.

However, Russian elite conflict divided how the national rhetoric and organizations were used. Regional elites developed their own zones of governance, nationality, currency, and policing (Mendras 2012; 130-146; Treisman 2001, 12-14). For instance, it was not uncommon to have local mayors and governors becoming elected and battling for autocratic regional power, such as happened in Bryansk, in 1999, when

\textsuperscript{65} G. L. Kertman illustrates through survey data that nearly forty percent of all Russian respondents favor limiting non-Russians from political office and governmental administrations (Kertman 2001, 138).
the Governor removed the town’s popularly elected mayor and administrative chiefs (Mendras 2012, 134-135). National elites also remained divided along what the Russian nation stood for: communism, Soviet Union, empire, democracy. Without elite unity the full force of the coherent Russian nation, and its various organizations, could not be used to manage conflicts and Russian nationals, like Boris Yeltsin in 1994, became more likely to partake in violent action to garner nationalist political support.

Despite a divided elite, Russian group coherence served as a deterrent to incoherent minority groups as it provided an adequate base to negotiate and illustrated a potential population that could squelch dissent. Furthermore, Russian coherence helped leverage mass social support for Russian rule. However, lacking elite consensus, elite actions lacked mass support, increasing coherent minority group anxieties and generating potential for nationalist violence. Subsequently, Yeltsin utilized exclusivist violent nationalism against Chechens to mobilize national support, but the coherent Chechens, who never stopped working for independence, defended themselves and violent secessionist war ensued.

A Divided Russian Elite

Like in Ukraine, the division of power among national elites, elite interests, and national narratives helped shape the degree of elite consensus in Russia, but unlike in Ukraine, the division of power and interests divided the Russian elite. I primarily focus on how the division of power: competition between hardline leaders and reformers, within democratic bodies, and regional divisions posed Russian elites against each other.

First, prior to and following the Soviet collapse a large divide developed between Russian elites. The new Russian national state and the Soviet Union were both Russian
led projects, and supporters of each politicized the nation in different directions. Hardliners sought to preserve the Soviet Union and utilized national rhetoric to do so, and reformers pushed to dismantle Soviet traditions and also utilized national rhetoric for their cause.

On the one side, as Kevin O’Connor (2006) notes, those attempting to preserve the Union rallied their support around vague nationalism that saw the Russian nation’s unique mission in the Soviet Union. These notions replaced the ideas of Marxism-Leninism with Russian nationalism as the motivation for unity. Several organizations untied behind the hardline elites and attempted to hold the Soviet Union together, including the RSFSR’s Writers’ Union, the Leningrad Party District, and the Russian Communist Party. The Communist Party and vestigial Marxism-Leninism provided a developed network to mobilize support, often through nationalist rhetoric, for hardliner elites.

After the union collapsed conservative hardliners continued their march against Gorbachev and modernizers who had, in their opinion, destroyed the empire (Berelowitch (1992, 35-41). They helped generate several extremist entities like the Pamiat (memory) association, the newspapers Den (the day) and Zavtra (tomorrow). Several of these organizations often held positions that were “racist, anti-Semitic and proposed a strong central government at the expense of democratic processes” (Mendras 2012, 74).

On the other side, while reformers often tempered their nationalist rhetoric and Yeltsin utilized the civic rossiskie over the ethnic russkie that illustrated the government’s support for the new country’s diversity, he invoked nationality generally –
speaking directly to republic leaders, “take as much sovereignty as you can swallow” – and the Russian identity particularly to undermine Gorbachev (Khazanov 1997, 138-139; Mendras 2012; 73; Drobizheva et al. 1994, 189). They used phrases like “national interests,” “national grandeur,” a “special role,” and “derzhavnost” (‘a strong and mighty statehood), accompanied with “Slavonic unity” to substitute Russian interests for more general citizen interests (Khazanov 1997, 138). The RSFSR institutions and the co-opting of the Soviet Union’s military and central administration powerfully supported the reformers nationalist agenda.

Second, with major pre-existing divides among the national community and proportional minority representation, democratic bodies helped further divide Russian elites. The genuinely democratic and liberalizing state agenda (Mendras 2012) helped restrain the power of the state until late 1993 (September 21-October 4) when Yeltsin forcibly dissolved parliament. Until the dissolution, Yeltsin allowed competition and did not use the full force of the state to dominate the Russian narrative, allowing the two powerful Russian nationalist voices an institutional space to consolidate their respective agendas and collectives. Additionally, Russian dominance in parliamentary institutions meant minorities had minimal affect on legislation and did not create a powerful opposition that could help focus Russian elites on a similar conflict and help them unite.


67 Additionally, others, like Alexander Solzhenitsyn, promoted a Slavic union with Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians (Mendras 2012, 74). In the end, Solzhenitsyn and the Slavic union movement ended up supporting Vladimir Putin along with the Orthodox clergy.

68 Russian nationals composed 69 percent of the Supreme Soviet and 78 percent of the Congress of People’s Deputies from 1990 to 1993 and over 80 percent of the Duma (the lower house of the Federal Assembly of Russia) from 1994 to 2007 (Protsyk and Harzl 2013, 244-247).
Instead, Russian elites remained divided and utilized national rhetoric to mobilize Russians in different directions.

Third, administrative divisions (I discuss this in greater detail when illustrating the variance in national mobilization and violence in Russia) throughout Russia also separated many elites and began to establish small isolated enclaves of governance. With local authority, and unable to keep regional elites interested in adherence to the federal state, regional divides developed with unique national visions and policing forces to establish local rule and often monetary systems, including regions with their own currencies, barter systems, and tax initiatives (Piketty 1995; Gelman and Senatova 1995; Treisman 2001, 12-14; Mendras 2012, 127-133).

While the communist government was not replaced in Russia, similar to Ukraine, the infrastructural divides and division over the past and future of the state kept Russian elites divided. The Communist Party remained a powerful and active voice, and Russian nationalism and Yeltsin’s government provided alternative Russian nationalist voices. The two elite entities directly competed for the same nation and used national symbols to powerfully advocate for competing entities and actions.69

---

69 Additionally, international factors heightened elite divisions. While Russian citizens and leaders were not widely interested in joining the EU and the country’s substantial domestic resources provided for citizens without the trappings of EU conditionality (Russia was the polarizing force to the EU and often acted in reactionary ways (D’Aniere 2011)), Soviet separatism itself pushed Russian leaders to take different positions regarding Union and secession that divided elites and the population.
Post-Independence Secessionists

The 1980s and early 1990s provided opportunities for Tatars and Crimean Tatars, like other groups previously discussed, to organize and mobilize in Russia.\(^7\) In particular, Tatars in Tatarstan (48.5 percent of the population in the region in 1989, Russians composed 43.3 percent) and Chechens in Chechnya (66 percent of the population in 1989) organized secessionist movements, respectively, in 1991 (All Soviet Census 1989).

While Russian coherence facilitated majority social support to the Russian government and provided adequate threat to Tatar secessionists, without Russian elite consensus violent nationalism became a solution to cope with waning national support and limited resources. Violent Russian nationalism then encountered coherent Chechens who could violently retaliate.

Minority mobilization

The All-Tatar Public Center (VTOT) (Все татарский общественный центр (ВТОЦ)) became the largest and most significant Tatar organization and would eventually go on to form many of the region’s parties. Twelve doctoral students from the institute of language, literature, and history, primarily from Kazan State University (KGU) held a meeting in June 1988 to discuss problems associated with Tatar national development and the necessity to organize a Tatar civil movement. Soon they formed a committee headed by M. A. Mulyukov (М. А. Мулюков) (a history professor), and in February 1989 (17\(^{th}\)-18\(^{th}\)) the forming collective held a Tatar national movement congress in Kazan with 586 delegates, including 150 representatives from communities

---

\(^7\)Non-Russian minority national movements occurred in other concentrated territories in Russia. For instance, Bashkir in Bashkortostan mobilized for independence from Russia.
outside Tatarstan. During the congress they founded the Tatar Public Center (ТОТ)
(“Народного движения в поддержку перестройки, татарский общественный центр”
(ТОЦ)) with its primary eight leaders, being М. А. Мулюков (М. А. Мулюков) (primary
coordinator), Ф. А. Байрамова (Ф. А. Байрамова), Д. М. Исхаков (Д. М. Исхаков), Ю. Г.
Камалутдинов (Ю. Г. Камалутдинов), И. Г. Садыков (И. Г. Садыков), Р. Г. Сафин (Р. Г.
Сафин), Г. Л. Фаизрахманов (Г. Л. Фаизрахманов), Р. С. Хакимов (Р. С. Хакимов). At
that time, TOT’s early platform remained supportive of Soviet communism and its
perestroika goals but emphasized national rights and “returning to Leninist norms of
international relations”.

Shortly after its founding, TOT began to develop a national agenda committed to
‘national rebirth’ through Tatar political rights. The national rebirth centered around three
aspects: “Tatarism” which represents the identification/realization of the Tatar nation,
“Turkism” which represents the identification/realization of the wide ethno-language
community of the Turkish world, and “Islamism” which represents the
identification/realization of the Muslim religious communities. It is argued that the
combination of these three elements was reflected in the programs of the entire
organization.71 Eventually these concepts became interpreted differently and divided
TOT into three political wings: The most radical goal of TOT, held by a small minority,
sought to increase Tatarstan’s status to the level of a Union Republic, a political
moderate center that sought Tatar rights within the RSFSR and then the Russian
Federation, and those with a democratic opposition and pro-Russian orientation.

---

71 Nevertheless, the ideology of the TOT program, the priority was given to Tatarism and Islamism, and
Turkism relegated to a secondary initiative (13).
The second Tatar congress in 1991 renamed the group to All-Tatar Public Center (VTOT) and neglected the more moderate positions and instead proposed that Tatarstan leave the RSFSR to become an equal rights participant in the Soviet Union. The idea of independence embraced the group’s historic background and committed itself to restoring the historic justice to the violent acts of Ivan the Terrible in 1552 (13).\(^72\)

VTOT, along with the Tatar local government led by Tatarstan President Mintimer Shaimiev, soon helped organize a referendum regarding Tatarstan’s status and its new constitution. The majority of the population (62 percent) supported independence and the constitution; the latter also specified Tatarstan as a Sovereign State.

However, broad social support for the group and complete independence did not exist for long. At its max in 1991, only 6 percent of the Tatarstan population supported VTOT and by 1997 only 3 percent of Tatars continued to support it (26). Furthermore, by 1992 support for independence among surveyed Tatars varied across Tatarstan’s region with a republic average of 20 percent.\(^73\) As Monica Toft-Duffy (2010, 50) notes, while independence was not completely based in ethnic terms (noted by the official languages of Tatarstan remaining Tatar and Russian), a weak Tatar national identity and fear of a strong Russian state encroaching on local political freedoms motivated the region toward both sovereignty and later compromise.

In the late 1980s protests for cultural, religious, and language rights also increased in Chechnya and eventually lead to the formation of a Popular Front that

\(^{72}\) Nevertheless, only with the fall of the Soviet Union did VTOT openly proclaim support for Tatarstan’s independence.

\(^{73}\) At times regional support for independence was much higher. For instance, in the republic’s second largest city, Naberezhnye Chelny, 61 percent of Tatars surveyed supported independence from the newly sovereign Russian Federation (Gorenburg 2006, 150).
advocated for a Chechen to head the local Communist Party. By 1989, the pressure effectively helped Doku Zavgayev become head of the Communist Party of the Chechen-Ingush Republic, and in 1990 the front helped place a vast majority of Zavgayev’s Chechen supporters into local Supreme Soviet seats.

In November 1990 (23-25th) the first All National Congress of the Chechen People (ANCCP) was held with over 1,000 participants, including Zavgayev and Chechens who opposed his leadership. The congress elected Dzhokhar Dudayev, a Major General in the Soviet military, as president of the organization. Similar to TOT, the ANCCP initially sought republic status for Chechnya within a united Soviet Union, and on November 27th the local Supreme Soviet declared its republic status, expressing itself as equivalent to other republics like Moldova or Georgia.

However, following the August coup and independence movements across the Soviet Union, on September 7th 1991, ANCCP military units seized several government buildings, including radio and television centers and took control of the Chechen-Ingush Supreme Soviet. The region held elections on October 27th and on November 1, 1991, the ANCCP came to power under president Dzhokhar Dudayev and declared the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria independent.

Managing conflict and generating violence

As the Tatars and Chechens mobilized for independence, the Russian nation’s coherence deterred the less coherent Tatars, but without elite consensus the state’s relationship with the coherent Chechens became increasingly tenuous and eventually

74 Environmental issues, such as building a biochemical plant in Gudermes, also helped spearhead Chechen mobilization.

75 Ichkeria references the non-Russian name for Chechnya, dating back to at least the 18th century.
violent. For coherent majorities and incoherent minorities the logic of minority mobilization tended to follow the inverted U-shaped relationship with state repression, identified by Ted Gurr (1970, 237) – at high and low levels of repression there is less likelihood of minorities to become violent (Gurr 1970, 237; Muller 1985; Dudley and Miller 1998). The idea is consistent with Hypothesis 2. As the Tatars encountered increased sticks, and carrots, their rebellious secessionist activities decreased. However, as Hypothesis 3 proposes, in the FSU cases, coherent minorities did not tolerate high intensity repression and rebelled against it.

First, amongst growing unrest and the Russian Federation’s regional division, Russian coherence helped legitimate the state and Russian national order. Few completely accepted the new state, including elites and regional administrations that expanded their own authority and challenged the state’s. In particular, Russia’s eighty-nine regional administrations independently developed in the early 1990s, and with minimal communication and contact with the central state they became isolated (Mendras 2012, 127-133; Treisman 2001). While mobilization in the isolated regions appeared to make regional secession highly likely (Mendras 2012, 127; Codagnone and Filippov 2000), Russian ethnic bonds and rhetoric helped (not evidently secondary) prevent this non-ethnic based secession. As Peter Rutland (1994) explained,

---

76 Regional leaders even gained control of military units and had their own police forces (Piketty 1995; Gelman and Senatova 1995).

The old soviet system and its decay weakened the central state’s bureaucracy and support for national leaders (Treisman 2001, 12-14). Instead, local leaders found political and economic advancement by succumbing to local pressures, and they became increasingly uninterested in a singular Russian state.

77 Treisman (2001,) argues that fiscal policies used subsidies and tax breaks to accommodate the regions prone to rebellion and that this helped national identity and central administrative resources interact in ways that helped preserve the union. Valdimir Popov (2004) also makes a similar claim (“Fiscal Federalism in Russia: Rules Versus Electoral Politics," Comparative Economic Studies, v. 46, 2004, p 515-541) However, material incentives could not maintain the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, or
“Russians share a strong sense of cultural homogeneity, and have four centuries’ experience of life in a common state.” These cultural attachments, utilized by elites, leveraged the Russian nation to illustrate and legitimate a common community and future (Tuminez 2000, ch. 5). For instance, harnessing the group’s history to reconstitute the Russian future, the nationalist intellectual, Iurie Kagramanov (1994) stated, “We have our own, independent religious-philosophical tradition and within it a sufficiently rich assortment for the natural continuation of the great Russian culture and for the Self-Development of the Russian genius…” The Soviet and later Russian Federation politician Natalia Narochnitskaia (1993) exhorted, “Russia must become a great power because it is good for her, and good for the world.” Even the originally civic Russian nationalist, Boris Yeltsin, increasingly utilized nationalist rhetoric to support the state and blame economic and political problems on the west (Tuminez 2000, 174; Smith 1999, 47; Brudny and Brudny 2009, 260).

Despite claims for different Russian borders, neo-imperialist and Russian Federalists supported, at minimum, territorial integrity of the Russian Federation. The Russian nation defined itself by its territory and state (Smith 1999, 44), and its question of greater devolution was not acceptable, only the possibility of maintenance or gain.

---

78 Also cited by Treisman (2001)
80 Neo-imperialism increased among nationalists, exemplified by Vice-President Alexander Rutskoy’s proclamation in 1992, “The historical consciousness of the Russians does not allow anyone to mechanically equate the borders of Russia with those of the Russian Federation.” (“Vlasti namereny naniat’ sudebnykh pristavov,” Segonia, August 8, 1996, p. 2; Cited in Smith (1999, 48))
Yeltsin and his primary opposition, the Communist Party, firmly vowed to not allow the disintegration of Russia (Office of Soviet Analysis CIA 1991, 13).

Three powerful entities also brought the Orthodox Church back into the state, levering mass support for Russian state rule. The Yeltsin led reformers returned church properties and monasteries, which provided locations for national and religious organization, and also they formed the Council of Cooperation with Religious Organizations that helped institutionally reunite the church and state. 81 At the same time, Gennady Zyuganov, the Communist Party leader, used the church to lever nationalist support for the state, “At the basis of the Russian idea lie two fundamental values – Russian spirituality, which is unthinkable without the Orthodox world view, and awareness of our true purpose on earth, and Russian power and statehood.” 82 On his own, the church patriarch, Aleksy II, further helped rally national support for the state with contentions like, “The Russian Orthodox Church has always come to the assistance of the military in defending the Hoy Borders of our Fatherland.” 83 These three major political institutions – the reformist led government under Yeltsin, the communist party, and the church itself – dominated the political discourse with Russian nationalism, and, with few other loud political voices present, they effectively promoted an ethnic Russian state.


82 Cited in Knox (2004, 147)

This is not to say that he utilized nationalism and the church only for the state, he obviously benefited from the relationship. However, his actions and statements, in the process of supporting his party, advocated a Russian nation-state.

83 Patriarch Aleksey II, at the official signing of the accord between the ROC and the Russian military, March 2, 1994.
Like in Ukraine, Russian coherence helped these messages resonate with the population and helped leaders frame nationalist politics. A common understanding among the population facilitated communication as it helped individuals identify the history and people that contemporarily illustrated “Russian Greatness,” such as the literary language, writers like Tolstoy and Dostoevsky, Olympic athletes, Yuri Gregarine, and acknowledged under unfavorable light other characters like Joseph Stalin, Peter the Great, and. For instance, the nationalist and religious artist, supported publically by Yeltsin, famously painted a scene of well-known Russian figures with half marked by red blood and the other half embraced in glowing light. Leaders and masses understood the lineage of the Russian people that connected back to the Tsars, the literary “Golden Age” of Tolstoy and extended through the Soviet Union. The exclusionary Russian nation clearly represented a specific people and helped communicate particular symbols that evoked contemporary Russian national and state greatness.

The national rhetoric became a clear tool Moscow could use to obtain social and regional elite support. Principally, it helped mobilize a vocal portion of the population and when it appeared physically aggressive it kept oppositional voices at home (Tuminez 2000, 182-186). Additionally, nationality helped the Russian state organize, which likely helped efficiently deliver funds that could entice regional elite loyalty.

Second, group coherence helped produce organizational capacity more generally. Most strikingly, the Communist Party and the ruling government used Russian common understanding to organize their respective populations.

In particular, nationality proved a useful tool for organizing civil society. As Bahry et al. (2005, 525) illustrate through survey data in two sub-regions of Russia, intra-
ethnic trust among Russians was substantially higher than that among Tatars and Yakuts (72.8 percent, 54.5 percent, and 58.2 percent, respectively), which theoretically should have led to greater “civic engagement” (Putnam, 1993, 173). In practice, local Russian social organizations became larger, more mobilized, and better funded, despite their minority representation in the region within Tatar and Yakuts dominated governments. While one may expect that Russian coherence should then relate to a vibrant civil society in Russia today, Henry Hale (2008) illustrates that continued state constraints on civil society prevented its development, and the components and potential for mass led civil organization had been present in the Russian population.

Furthermore, organizational research illustrates that the Russian identity facilitated more knowledge sharing in organizations compared to inter-ethnic knowledge sharing in the same organizations (Michailov and Hutchings 2006). With knowledge sharing acting as an essential component driving more efficient organization and action (Grant 1996), Russian’s ability to share knowledge should inherently correlate with better organization. Nationality helped these collectives effectively communicate and organize, and coherence improved their quality.

Additionally, Organized crime networks developed around Russian ethnic boundaries (Twigg and Schectern 2003, 63), and political parties (like Russia’s Choice and Liberal-Democrats), regional oblasts, businesses, and many social organizations also used nationality’s links to organize. However, less coherent nationalities, like Moldovans and Azeri, crime networks, parties, businesses began as more multicultural endeavors.
Third, while nationality helped generate organizational capacity, elite divisions used these organizations in multiple directions and preventing intra-organizational and inter-group coordination and collaboration. “Nationalism is an ideology with powerful legitimating effects; by anchoring political power in the “nation”, nationalism confers legitimacy on elites who successfully claim to represent the nation’s interests and project a credible commitment to defending and fulfilling the national mission” (Tuminez 2000, 187). Divided and powerful, elites used the same nation for different goals. While I mentioned two primary directions in the ‘Elite Divisions” section, Astrid Tuminez (2000, 175) illustrates five variants: aggressive nationalism as illustrated by Yeltsin beginning in 1992 and reaching violent heights in Chechnya in 1994, westernizing Russian nationalism that emphasized a “healthy, wealthy future” when allied with the West, nativism, moderate statism, and national patriotism. Elites utilized the nation to mobilize for different nationalist purposes and to support their own interests, which prevented the integration of national groups. Without elite consensus, the two primary elite factions, the Communist Party and reformers, did not cooperate or allow their organizational networks to collaborate. Instead they pulled in different directions.

Fourth, Russian coherence helped deter Tatar secession. Russian group coherence served as a deterrent to incoherent minority groups as it provided an adequate base to negotiate and illustrated a potential population that could squelch dissent. The Russian state asserted its desire for territorial integrity and coherence helped the assertion appear credible to Tatars, which signaled to the Tatars that Tatarstan could not peacefully gain independence.
The Tatars observed a coherent Russian population that supported a national order dominated by Russians that could easily impose their will, especially if elite consensus increased. Russians dominated the military chain of command, political, and economic establishments, and had a united interest to preserve both their domination in society and the federation’s territorial integrity. Believing the majority could attack with overwhelming violence, the Tatars were not willing to violently oppose majority and national order. Furthermore, elite consensus remained in basic terms as they generally agreed to preserve the Russian territory’s integrity.

Finally, Russian elite divisions helped spur secessionist civil war in Chechnya. While Russian made their desires for territorial integrity clear, they did not dissuade Chechnya’s pursuit for independence. First, Russian elite divisions made Chechens wary about negotiations and their commitment to not harm ethnic minorities. Second, Chechens believed that if Russia violently impeded their independence a violent rebuke would be effective, due to Chechen coherence and organization. Consequently, Chechens kept organizing for independence.

Unable to obtain wide support for his agendas, elite division pushed Yeltsin to gain support through nationalist violence, which triggered secessionist civil war in Chechnya. For a while Yeltsin and the ruling coalition continued their multinational approach to state affairs but soon shifted to more exclusionary and often violent nationalism to help unite the various factions and maintain support. As Yeltsin began to face increasing challenges from communist party nationalists he engaged far right nationalism to gain support after and to help alter the constitution in 1993, dissolve parliament and violently attack Chechnya (1994).
The Russian state and mass population did not view the incoherent Tatars the same as the more coherent Chechens. Instead, the state and people more easily looked at the Chechen secessionists as a greater threat to territorial power and with elites divided in their response to this threat and divisive authorities clamoring for Russian national support they rabble-roused through intensely repressive actions. However, the more coherent Chechens did not see a violent rebuke as futile. Thus, when the Russian state, without intra-group elite consensus, threatened and then violently offended the Chechen minorities in 1994, these minorities easily used anti-majority nationalist rhetoric to mobilize and defend themselves through secession and war.

Moldova and Hypothesis 4 and 5: Moldovan-Russians in Transnistria and Moldovan-Gagauz

The Moldovan-Russian (Russians in Transnistria) case and the Moldovan-Gagauz case support Hypothesis 4 - A country with an incoherent ethnic group managing the state and a coherent ethnic minority opposition will likely result in secessionist violence - and Hypothesis 5 - A country with an incoherent ethnic group managing the state and an incoherent ethnic minority opposition will likely result in violence, but not secession - respectively. Low group coherence left the Moldovan majority with weak links to nationally organize, generating uncertainty regarding the state’s future relationships with the concentrated Russian secessionists in Transnistria and Gagauz secessionists in southern Moldova. Uncertain about their future in the new country and feeling under threat, Russians in Transnistria continued to mobilize for

---

84 Azeri-Armenian case also supports hypothesis 4; Kyrgyz-Uzbeks support Hypothesis 5
independence. As Moldova lost de facto authority over the region, portions of the elite used violent force – one of the final tactics – to attempt to preserve territorial integrity, but these Russians had the capacity and motivation to retaliate and secede.85 Conversely, when the Moldovan state attempted to dissuade the less coherent Gagauz secessionists from exit, both sides lacked the capacity to bring inter-group and intra-group stability. Without coherence, political entrepreneurs mobilized violent sects within their national populations and with both sides unable to bring order, chaotic violence ensued.86

As Chapters 3 and 4 illustrated, Moldovans struggled to become highly coherent before the collapse of the Soviet Union. Elite repression limited national narratives and identity cultivation to frameworks that failed to resonate with the entire population and Soviet institutions largely defined the identity’s political associations. Furthermore, more equal political and economic opportunities, as well as agrarian lifestyles reduced Moldovan’s contentious encounters with ‘other’ groups and often allowed for Moldovan de jure assimilation into the Russian culture. Infrastructural design also limited Moldovan encounters (with one another and other national groups) within the republic, reducing the possibility to solidify national differences and contentious politics. Consequently, without intellectuals free to disperse an identity that resonated with the

85 Unlike in Russia, when the Moldovan state acted violently, nationalist support for the ruling elites did not grow. Low group coherence both hindered the framing of nationalist violence and provided weak links for organizing and mobilizing the nation.

86 As with all post-Soviet national mobilization, these minority groups’ high population density in a specific area, charismatic elites, and message that their territory was indivisible helped overcome collective action problems and make their concentrated territory an aspect of state contention. Nevertheless, it was each group’s pre-independence level of coherence that translated into different levels of post-communist organizational capacity and their intra-group potential to contest the state’s territorial authority.
community and contentious encounters with others, the Moldovan identity developed multiple understandings and remained poorly salient.

Despite the weak identity, the dissolution of the Soviet Union helped Moldovans become the dominant faction in the country, one that needed to legitimate its authority and manage several growing ethnic conflicts. In 1989 Moldovans composed nearly 65 percent of the population and held the vast majority of official political positions (majority of the parliamentary and executive branches of government). While Ukrainians in Ukraine and Russians in Russia easily legitimated their national authority to their respective co-ethnics, Moldovan leaders struggled to organize the population and justify Moldovan rule. The group’s low solidarity and salience limited associational and communal links that could help organize the nation, making it difficult to coordinate action, constrain elite opportunities to defy the group, efficiently use resources for organization, mobilize available resources, orient people to common goals, communicate, and morally internalize authority (dominating individuals).

With low coherence and its affect on organizational quality, the Moldovans struggled to collectively act and mobilize for political action, which impeded support for the state and the state’s ability to manage ethnic conflict. In particular, the national majority could not effectively express its will nor could national elites legitimately dominate or organize their national members, which meant limited resources became divided to both maintain national support and resolve minority conflict, providing Russians in Transnistria greater opportunity and motivation to organize and minimal state support to bring order to chaotic violence with Gagauz in southern Moldova.
Incoherence and a Divided Moldovan Elite

The Moldovan identity’s limited coherence provided weak links for building an efficient organization. Instead of being connected to one another by links of common understanding and through common associations to numerous political spheres, Moldovan group members differently viewed who and what constituted their nation and did not associate it with many political concepts. Some believed those living in rural communities composed the Moldova population, others viewed Moldovans as those who now inhabited the historic Moldavian principality, others believed romance language speakers within the Moldovan republic were Moldovan, and some did not believe a Moldovan nation existed (that Moldovans were in fact Romanians, communists, or Slavs). Additionally, symbolic figures illustrated different social connections and propagated different reactions. For instance, in literature, many Moldovan’s expressed close attachment to the poet, Alexander Pushkin, who briefly lived in the republic (while exiled from Moscow). For many people, Pushkin illustrated the group’s glorious connection to Slavs and Russians. On the other hand, the beloved Romanian poet, Mihai Eminescu, pleasingly illustrated the groups association with Romania, and Alexei Mateevici, the famed early 20th century Bessarabian poet, exemplified a uniquely Moldovan character. While most Moldovans appreciated all three poets in the early 1990s, they did not agree who represented their nation. These examples illustrate the tensions within the Moldovan identity’s understanding. Similarly, the identity remained relevant to rural folk culture and lacked political salience. Consequently, without a common understanding and salience the group lacked symbolic and historicized connections that could help its members communicate, develop a common belief system, and envision collective movement.
The group’s limited common symbolic and historicized connections prevented communication and its potential to help build affinities between group members and between the elites and masses. Without a common understanding, people lacked the means to communicate their various perspectives, and because many symbols and histories did not cross class and status lines, intra-group cooperation struggled.

First, different identity conceptions prevented Moldovans from communicating and organizing in ways to overcome class and status divides. As mentioned, different symbolic meanings and identity borders between urban elites and rural Moldovans developed over the 20th century. As various ruling authorities and educational systems accompanied the expansion of national identity making in Moldova (Romanians and then Soviets) they prevented a clear border from forming around the Moldovan identity. Romanian rule largely reached urbanites and encouraged people to view Russian-Soviets as ‘others’ and as Soviet rule reached rural communities with mass education they emphasized Romanians as the ‘other’. 87 Consequently, Moldovans living in rural and urban communities tended to reflect the different beliefs about their national identity’s borders. While early on, the two perspectives had a common anti-communist agenda, following independence the potential Moldovan nation divided between the two perspectives and struggled to provide cross-cutting links through other interests and divides.

87 Most agreed that Poles and Turks represented a clear ‘other’ because they represented outsiders under both modernizing Romanian and Russian states.
As these national perspectives increasingly marked status and class divides within the Moldovan group, they entrenched divisions and limited the potential for national cooperation. For example, urban Moldovans continued to tout their Romanian-leading national perspective without reform because it likely illustrated their higher status and incorporating rural Moldovan national perspectives into the narrative would wash away the marker and dilute urban social privilege. This is most notably witnessed by the fact that despite less than 3 percent of rural Moldovans desiring unification with Romania in 1990, the leading bloc, MPF (headed by urban intellectuals) continued to seek unification. As both sides developed different opinions regarding social welfare, privatization, and future of the state (Crowther 1998), the ruling party remained unwilling to amend its agenda, despite running itself into the ground; at the very least, this was a sign of poor rural-urban cooperation and communication, and illustrates that many urbane leaders had a systematic and national aversion to rural perspectives and interests. Beyond, these points, urban Moldovan perspectives tended to objectify rural Moldovans and by framing the rural community without agency and diminutive urban

---

A status and class divide also formed along urban and rural lines. Different views on speaking and identity followed urban and rural class lines and highlighted different statuses within the Moldovan nation. For many educated urbanites the Moldovan identity promoted by the Soviets, largely based upon agrarian folk traditions, seemed artificial and unrepresentative of their experiences. Instead, the Romanian narrative often captured a better sense of these urbanites' identity and their social position: they were often not treated as equally as Russians nor agrarian Moldovans. However, the Romanian identity made little sense to others who rarely heard the perspective; in general, the Soviets more easily prevented less educated urbanites and people living in rural areas from the Romanian perspective. Interviews with K-12 teachers from 2005-2007 highlight the urban-rural divide: "Villagers don't know about the world; they are ignorant." “They [Romanian/Moldovan villagers] incorrectly speak." “We will be put down and treated badly by people from the cities; for decades they discriminate against people who come from the village.” (Response by several teachers working in Moldovan villages regarding how their students will be perceived in town. They explained that the treatment was nothing new and existed for decades. Taken from interviews with the author conducted in summer 2005.)

agenda setters became less receptive to rural interests. Additionally, urbanites, with elevated status and class opportunities, had the means to dominate the national conversation, but because the narrative conflicted with rural national visions it did not provide a link within the population. Instead, as urbanities touted their national perspective, and provided the primary, early Moldovan political voice, it alienated rural Moldovans and discouraged intra-group cooperation. Consequently, rural Moldovans in the early 1990s, unable to express their national perspective, were less likely to support national movements in general and express confidence in the MPF (the ruling coalition represented by urban elites), in particular (Crowther 1998, 155).

Counterfactually, had the rural and urban Moldovans enjoyed a similar set of notions about their group and identity’s borders, like Ukrainians, leaders could have better communicated their similarities and unity. For instance, even if urbanites, with their class privileges, dominated the national conversation, both sides would have been more likely to similarly envision the nation and rural folks would not have found the urban perspective contentious. Additionally, national conceptions would not have been closely related to illustrating the intra-group class and status divides, allowing both the incorporation of rural perspectives and intra-group class and statuses to remain.

Second, the titular national identity’s wide variety of perspectives inherently made communication and agreement difficult. Debate surrounded the nation’s language, in terms of its name, written script, science (grammar, vocabulary, and history), and origin. Additionally, the nation’s history, international relationships, territory, name, and origin came under debate. Essentially, people did not agree on who and what constituted the

---

90 Interviews taken with non-elites and elites twenty years after the collapse.
Moldova nation. Without fundamental agreement on who they were, more immediate issues like privatization of businesses, minority conflicts, and whether they wanted to unify with Romania became confused, ignored, or often wrapped up in the national identity debates, which slowed down solutions and intra-group organization. For instance, naming the state language Romanian did not inherently deny the existence of a Moldovan nation or mean that Moldovans desired unification with Romania. However, for many people, including both Russian and non-Russian speakers, such policies connoted the aforementioned and obfuscated nuanced desires. This then led to newer Moldovan factions that further pulled the nation apart as they tried to circumvent the naming debate in order to get other nationalist interests achieved. For example, a three page opinion article that appeared in Bessarabia in 1992 calls for a number of changes regarding the language and how it is represented in public, but never refers to the language by name, instead referring to it as ‘our language.’ Other articles referred to ‘our language’ specifically as Romanian, others Moldovan, and still others Romanian with a specific accent and vocabulary.91

As Cararus (2000-2002, 46) notes, the name of a language means a lot and is inherently political. For instance, it helps people decide which newspapers they will read and televisions shows they watch. “Thus, an element that had been considered primordial and natural acquires non-natural values, that is, political values that suppose assumption and awareness” (Cararus 2000-2002, 48). As people followed different forms of media and held different political values, they had fewer common interest to

---

91 The numerous national questions meant that national issues did not neatly align. National territory, unification with Romania, the science and history of the national language, the language’s name, ethnic origins, Latin versus Cyrillic scripts, international relationships, economics, and security often appeared as part of the same issue, in unique combinations, and separate.
encourage cooperation and were often more likely to develop contentious relationships. Furthermore, emotions people held toward the Romanian and Moldovan concepts were real and motivating. As Clifford Geertz (2000, 120) argues, cultural givens motivate people “for virtually every person, in every society, at almost all times, some attachments seem to flow more from a sense of natural – some would say spiritual – affinity than from social interaction.” Had the language and history not had two salient labels, at the very least, it would have been more difficult to mark political borders within a singular national identity.

The Moldovan’s multiple perspectives and disunity are also well illustrated by Moldova Suverana’s (Sovereign Moldova) August 31, 1991 front-page articles. The newspaper was arguably the county’s most pro-‘Moldovan’ outlet, yet its own articles seemed to lack certainty about the nation’s direction. Celebrating the republic’s newly constituted Language Day and four days of independence, the front-page headlines read: “National Celebration of ‘Our Language’,” “Wakeup you Romanian,” “What did you do?” (an article that discusses the country’s future, as well as a potential autonomous or independent Gagauzia and Transnistria). President Snegur’s column in this paper’s edition also discussed languages’ importance, but never referred to a Moldovan one (or Romanian). Each article offered a contradictory perspective on the Moldovan group, country, and language. In general, numerous perspectives about the group circulated and despite attempts by certain sources, like this newspaper, to juxtapose the issues, these articles largely ignored the other’s perspective and nuance.

Because the distinction between political elites and the mass population in Moldova is difficult to discern, due to the permeable constraints on becoming an elite, it
is not possible to completely distinguish elite division from mass national incoherence (Way 2002).\(^92\) In general, both elites and masses lacked coherence regarding the Moldovan identity and because of it they struggled to communicate.

Nevertheless, with only one presidential candidate, the elites were likely not the solitary force dividing the people’s desires. In fact, this lone presidential candidate, Mircea Snegur, often appeared to follow, rather than lead, national opinion regarding the nation’s historic and linguistic relationships.\(^93\) As Presidium of the Supreme Soviet in 1989, largely with the support of the MPF, Snegur publicly discussed a Romanian-Moldovan historic and language connection, and the importance of a sovereign and multi-national Moldova.\(^94\) As the similar origins sentiment generated greater unrest – rural Moldovans began to organize and claim their unique identity, and Slavs in Transnistria and Gagauz in southern Moldova began to protest the sentiments – \(^95\) Snegur severed ties with the MPF and denounced a Romanian connection and exhorted ‘Moldovanism’.\(^96\)

Limited symbolic and historicized connections also prevented the development of a common belief system among Moldovans that could help justify vertical and horizontal

\(^92\) The state is too fragmented and leaders “lack the authority and coordination to prevent today’s allies from becoming tomorrow’s challengers…” (Way 2002, 127).

\(^93\) Snegur began his political career with the communist party in Edineti, a Northern region of Moldova. He gradually worked his way up the party ranks and eventually became the chairman of the Supreme Soviet. However, the future president was trapped within identity issues.

\(^94\) “Republica Moldova nu poate reuşi ca patrie a unui singur neam, ci ca patrie a Moldovenilor Români, Rusi, Ucraineni, Găgăuzi, Bulgarì ş. a., toţi cetăţeni egali în drepturi şi toţi deopotrivă Moldoveni, fie că aparţin limbii, istoriei şi culturii poporului Român, Rus, Ucrainean, Găgăuz sau Bulgar” (1991, Bessarabia Literatura)

\(^95\) “Today we rely on closing a intra-governmental treaty between Romania and Moldova. No need for me to explain…We are two sovereign states, which speak the same language, have the same roots, a common history” (22 May 1991, Moldova Suverana)

\(^96\) With less than 50% of the population voting, Snegur ran unopposed and received 98% of the vote.
relationships. First, traditional belief systems varied across villages and rarely helped people feel connected to an important and singular Moldovan identity. While the Soviet’s discussed local agrarian life, like “the rich Moldovan soil” and “great Moldovan work ethnic,” they did not discuss the population’s relationship to central government. Instead, Kolkhoz heads ran local politics with unique local traditions. Similarly, local and familial networks often provided more important relationships throughout communism than the Moldovan identity; the latter of which primarily functioned as Soviet state tool and an entity that, after the collapse, no longer remained widely relevant. Consequently, “Among the peoples of the Soviet south, loyalty is given first to kinship groups or intimate friends; a sense of personal worth therefore stems more from the honor or shame one brings on one’s circle than from a successful career or great accumulation of wealth” (Suny 1993, 120). Beholden to kinship and local networks, each with unique belief systems of what constituted ‘loyalty’, further distanced people from national beliefs. In particular, Moldovan incoherence prevented elites from identifying and mobilizing common ground between these familial belief systems.

Second, national leaders, lacking prominence in Moldova’s Soviet historicism (see Chapter 4), were not habituated as highly important and many people could not agree on what constituted a good traditional or charismatic leader. Romanian, Russian, Moldovan, those supported by the Orthodox church, Russian and Romanian speaking, ideologically, and westernizing all appeared to represent a relevant leader for some but not all. Finally, nation-state territorial integrity was trumped by economic and security concerns (Crowther 2007). Nationalism appeared relatively unimportant, making it difficult to charismatically organize the nation based upon its transcendent qualities. If
the nation held little importance and had few common symbols to represent its ‘magic’, people remained unmoved.

Limited symbolic and historicized connections also hindered Moldovan’s from envisioning a united movement and the desire to work together. Potentially unifying historical moments promoted by the Soviets did not involve the Moldovans. For instance, the peasantry revolution of 1917 did not happen in Moldova, and the great patriotic war included Moldovans working with Germans and Romanians, as well as the Soviets. Moldovans had few historicized interdependent experiences upon which unifying narratives could gain traction.

The historic figures used to found national movements also provided little guidance in who represented the united Moldovans and how they should act. For instance, the push toward Sovereignty included a hearkening to two historic Moldavian leaders, Alexandru cel Bun and Stefan cel Mare. These princes unequivocally represented authority, military associations, and the church, but their relevance and understanding provided minimal guidance and coherence for Moldovans in the 1990s. First, while the princes represented autonomy, they struggled to symbolize independence and define sovereign borders. Both Stefan cel Mare and Alexadru cel Bun were not independent of higher authority and often paid tribute to the King of Poland and other rulers. Furthermore, half of their former territory was located in present day Romania. While symbols may be molded to represent many ideas and features, the more contestation about their meaning and lack of relevance in particular spheres translates to a less coherent symbol (Smith 2003, 39, 45). During the 1990s people utilized these figures to argue pan-Romanian connections and an independent
Moldova. Both arguments were reasonable, but incompatible. A group actively debating its sovereign history and figures may make for a progressive society, but it impedes coherence and potential associations for unity.

Second, Stephan cel Mare and Alexandru cel Bun’s historic governance does not describe sufficiently relevant relationships for modern mobilization. They primarily organized mercenary soldiers from multiple language and ethnic backgrounds, and varying foreign alliances, to fend off invading armies, including the Ottomans, Poles, and Hungarians.\(^{97}\) While the expectation may be that enthusiasm around warrior princes would stimulate a strong army in the 1990s, it did not happen. The enemy and the goals had changed. The Transnistrian territory they intended to defend was not part of the historic principality, and the opposition was secessionist and not invaders. Additionally, while Stefan cel Mare’s other primary contribution was his work with the church and the construction of many basilicas, he did not actively organize or represent other social communities and connections. Consequently, his church work remains a powerful association for people and helps guide religious relationships, but it is often unclear to people how he contemporarily represents the country beyond religion.\(^{98}\) Stefen cel Mare and Alexander cel Bun remain highly regarded in both Moldova and Romania’s Moldavia province, but outside of military might their representation is highly debatable and does not translate into or buttress a comprehensive coherence. In essence, they do not describe and inspire clear social, ethnic, or state relationships.

---

\(^{97}\) They also fought against the Poles and Hungarians.

\(^{98}\) Probably the most coherent sphere of the Moldovan identity is its religious relationships, which was also not a contentious line for Russian and Gagauz who also mostly identify as Eastern orthodox Christians.
Rather these figures further stimulated the Moldovan-Slavic-Romanian debate, and continued to divide the Moldovan community in the early 1990s.

Finally, Moldovan national independence during the 1917 Russian Revolution, a major and more modern movement, is shrouded in debate. Soviets, Romanians, and the emerging independent Moldovan community argued over the intent of independence and its relationship to foreign adversaries and allies (see Chapter 4 for more details regarding how early 20th century Moldovan independence became framed).

The imagination of Moldovan unity also remained muted. As Johann Gottfried Herder (1773) wrote, "A poet is the creator of the nation around him, he gives them a world to see and has their souls in his hand to lead them to that world." While intellectual figures divide the Moldovan identity in multiple directions, the Moldovan writers often lacked the opportunity to make their work political, and without a poetic national, historic Moldovan voice, Moldovanism went unheard until after independence. There were Moldovan, Russian, and Romanian literary figures. Each triggered the respective identity and argued a particular conception of the Moldovan group. For example, prominent figures supporting the Romanian identity conception were Ion and Doina Aldea Teodorovici, Grigore Vieru, Eugen Doga, Constantin Tanase. These people passionately engaged the Romanian features of the Moldovan identity and politics through music, art, and literature, and promoted a Romanian history and anti-Soviet and anti-Russian grievances. On the other hand, intellectuals, such as Andrei Lupan, who supported Moldovanism primarily discussed rural life and traditional customs, which did not engage political spheres. The Moldovan identity had minimal
political orientations and images beyond Soviet and nascent creations, and most traditional artists with Moldovanism tendencies were engaged with different, often apolitical spheres.

These remarks are not intended to suggest that Moldovan incoherence was inherently bad or problematic; the titular group’s incoherence created opportunities for many intellectuals and national group members to push for openness and pluralism in Moldova. While this push generated even less common understanding in the short-term, it may help build an intellectually tolerant nation in the future. After all, incoherence is often a state of significant intellectual and passionate achievement, and it is coherent groups that often enter and effectively repress pluralism (Russell 1945, Mouffe).

Elite Divisions

The weak Moldovan identity also combined with competing national narratives, divisive interests, and the dispersion of power to generate elite divisions. However, where Russian elites used the same national identity and symbols to pull the nation in different directions and co-opt non-national based issues, Moldova’s numerous national identity conceptions got pulled in many directions and few non-national issues came into political play. First, as illustrated, the two primary Moldovan narratives questioned the titular majority’s origins. Political leaders working with the Moldovan Popular Front (MPF)\(^99\) largely supported a conception that those living in Moldova were Romanians. For example, political leaders in the MPF, such as its top official and Prime Minister from May 1990 to May 1991, Mircea Druc, frequently referenced Romanian rule during the 1920s and 1930s, and the brief historical periods in the 17\(^{th}\) century as examples of

\(^99\) Its origins and actions are discussed more in the following section.
the populations’ Romanian roots (Dailey 1993; King 2000; ) (later Druc move to Bucharest and became a Romanian presidential candidate, running on the platform of reuniting Romania and Moldova). Iurie Rosca, a Front leader, also worked for pan-Romanianism and openly proclaimed in a Bucharest newspaper, “We want to unite with Romania.” On the other side, those who supported a sovereign Moldova, like Mircea Snegur and Ion Druta organized the Agrarian Democrats. The party and its leaders openly rejected unification. Snegur proclaimed unification as “betrayal” and those who thought otherwise as actively denying, “the legitimacy and historical foundation of our right to be a state, to call ourselves the Moldovan people.” Furthermore, Oazu Nantoi, former vice president of the MPF, and founder and leader of the Social Democratic Party explained, “[we] never considered unification with Romania. Not me, not the Social Democratic Party, not Mircea Snegur.” The two perspectives came from Bessarabia’s divided history, resonated with different parts of the population, and provided little room for reconciliation and effective national organization.

The division of power among Moldovan elites combined with the two narratives to further drive elites apart. During the 1980s and early 1990s the most powerful political elites gained power from two independent sources: intellectual (historians and those

100 Obiective prioritare ale Frontului Popular din RSS Moldoveneasca, Adevarul, March 27, 1990, p.6. Also quoted by King 2000, 151


102 Mircea Snegur, “ Republica Moldova este tara tuturor cetatenilor sai,” Pamint si oameni, February 12, 1994, p.3. Also quoted by King 2000, 155.

103 Personal interviews with the author, June 2010.
devoted to the literary-arts) and the former Soviet state apparatus. On the one hand, former political leaders in the Soviet state primarily gained power through party networks and bureaucracy, which positioned them in control of many state resources in the late 1980s and early 1990s. On the other hand, literature and art, often one’s ability to create and recite poetry, was an innocuous, soviet approved form of social power and notoriety that helped intellectuals effectively communicate and rise to power in Moldova (CTIE). Intellectuals’ social capital and communication skills, illustrated in their ability to mobilize the country’s largest mass assembly in 1989 (80,000-300,000 people), offered a powerful counter to many established Moldovan political leaders. Furthermore, the weakness of the country’s institutions is said to have offered minimal power to any source and kept a more equal playing field between elites (Way 2002, 129, 137-138).

International interests, including whether to remain close with Russia or develop a closer relationship with the west also pitted elites against one another. History – repression under the Romanian Kingdom, Kingdom of Poland, Hungarian Empire, Russians, and Soviets – illustrated both the east and west as dubious and often dangerous options.

Finally, the weak Moldovan identity created more opportunities for internal leadership challenges, which directly undermined the state administration’s national legitimacy. After independence intellectual elites and leaders continued to describe goals for Moldova’s future, which did not resonate with the people and often caused

---

104 Economic leaders followed the political leadership until independence, and then began a more pan-Romanian vision. They attempted to distance themselves from the old system and found western and European visions as a more lucrative venture and perspective (King 1994). Additionally, many of these leaders were dealing with collapsing businesses, and were preoccupied with their own business and avoided much of the public political action.
grievances. Russian minorities then expressed opposition that resonated with some Moldovan sub-national communities as well as the Gagauz and other Slavs. As Moldovan sub-groups became more organized and prominent, state leaders attempted to address their issues. However, support for one agenda meant another became neglected, such as the national rhetoric that justified the administration. Other Moldovan leaders witnessed the neglect and mobilized additional sub-groups and issues to challenge seated power. The national founding oriented the struggle for power toward ethnicity, but low coherence levels directed the conflict toward intra-ethnic divides instead of outward toward the ‘other’. Different intra-ethnic claims developed within the Moldovan administration, and each attempt to solve a minority issue undermined traditions that ordered the state. With conflicting claims on authority the administration could not organize to address minority issues. As the state withered, coherent secessionists mobilized.

For example, when Russians in Moldova complained about language rights, many Moldovans also became concerned and organized. While Tatar language rights spurred Russian nationalism in Russia, in Moldova it raised concerns for Russian speaking Moldovans and others with whom Romanian identity conceptions did not resonate. Leaders reacted by reversing Romanian language laws and renaming the state language Moldovan. The administration – whose legitimacy built upon a Moldovan national identity that resembled Romanianism – now had leaders that addressed an organizing sub-group of Moldovans at the expense of their initial justifications for power. While many joined the Moldovan language movement, others in the administration continued to rally around the Romanian language policy, and still others mobilized
different sub-group concerns. Moldovan national justifications for state power remained the focal point, but multiple conceptions of what that meant allowed for continuous challenges. The administration became divided at the essence of its legitimacy. As leaders found support in society, new national administrative justifications arose, and the original Romanianized Moldovan justification of power supported only one faction. No supra-group traditions or group charisma resonated that could immediately restore a united nation. Essentially, attempts to compromise or repress Russian secessionists produced more administrative divisions, decreased state legitimacy, and caused state actors to work against one another in their solutions.

**Post-Independence Secessionists**

**Minority mobilization**

Russian and Gagauz mobilization also increased throughout the 1980s and 1990s. The primary Russian movement, Yedinstivo (The International Movement for Unity) began in 1988 as the cultural and language organization, Interclub. Soon the organization connected with the United Council of Work Collectives in Tiraspol and began to organize Russian speaking laborers, engineers, and factory managers east of the Nistru River (Roper 2010, 105). In reaction to Moldovan policies and weakening of the Soviet Union, the organization helped establish the Transnistrian Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic in 1990 (Chinn and Roper 1995). The group held Russian linguistic protectionist sentiments and stood as loyalists to the Soviet Union. By early 1991 non-ethnic Moldovans in the region began to support the group and several Russian dominated cities in Transnistria (e.g. Tiraspol, Ribnita, Dubasari, and Bender) formed paramilitary organizations (Nedelciuc, 1992, 70). While the group’s character looked multi-national (often supported by adversity to supposedly strict Moldovan language
laws) and Soviet communism appeared its primary agenda, a Russian national faction dominated the group and its organization (King 2001; Kaufman 1995). The demarcations of national identity took on many names, but clearly divided the populations based upon a sense of competing ethnic characteristics – Eastern/Slavic/Russophone/Russian/Communist versus Western/Romance/Moldovan/Romanian/anti-communist (Kaufman 1995, 11).

Tiraspol editorials frequently discussed the Russian group’s importance and the tragic effects of potential infringement, such as “imagine we are one land, speaking a common language, sharing the same beliefs and history, and all of a sudden someone tells you speak another language and accept different traditions. How would you feel?” (Nestrovski Maridian 1992). As the identity, one people respected and wanted to preserve, became highly politicized it began to organize. The group’s shared understanding of symbols, such as Soviet leaders, Flags, history, and communist desires also helped people find common links and motivations to unite.

In Gagauzia the Gagauz Halki (Gagauz People) political party organized. It too began as a cultural club and developed into a political movement that declared autonomy in 1990. The population increasingly mobilized, as language laws appeared to threaten the population. Not only did a switch to an official Romanian language signal their potential alienation from politics and economics as the Gagauz are primarily Russian-language speakers, but also it roused fears of Romanian occupation. The actions increased the group’s inter-ethnic tension, including a clash with 40,000 Moldovans loaded on buses attempting to repress any Gagauz elections for independence.
Nevertheless, low Gagauz coherence hindered the group’s coordination and ability to collectively act. The group was largely rural and forgotten about before and after the Soviets, despite a five-day period of independence in 1906. In the wake of the 1905 Russian Revolution, a peasant uprising declared a sovereign Gagauz Halki (Gagauz People) (Minihan 2002). The event helped generate a Gagauz interdependent experience, and future secessionist enthusiasm. However, the group lacked significant domestic and external narratives and collective cultural experiences until 1980. The Soviets rarely engaged the community and Gagauzia, the groups settlement region with its capital in Comrat, remained rural, isolated, and one of the most underdeveloped regions in Eurasia. The region had few schools, low literacy rates, and the Gagauz alphabet was the last to be changed to Cyrillic (King 2000, page; Minahan 2002). It was a relatively forgotten group.

**Incoherence and ethnic violence**

As discussed, political and social changes in 1985 led to increased national organization throughout Moldova, including secessionist movements by both Russians in the East and Gagauz in the South. However, with the Moldovan population divergent in their state support, struggling to organize, and divisive elites generating divergent agendas the coherent Russian population violently seceded and the Gagauz experienced sporadic and chaotic violence before attaining national autonomy.

First, low group coherence affected the state’s ability to legitimate the Moldovan national order, causing the state to spend material resources to obtain loyalty from the majority population and limiting those available for manage minority conflicts. As discussed in the section “Incoherence and a Divided Moldovan Elite,” the potential ethnic Moldovan population held different perspectives on whom the national ruler
should be and where the state boundaries should reside. In the most general characterization, some Moldovans used the nation to advocate for Romanian nation-state rule, others sought to organize a Moldovan populous embedded with more Romanian characteristics for a sovereign Moldova, and still others used a specifically Moldovan national identity for a sovereign Moldova. Each perspective stipulated different national rulers and some different state borders, putting justifications for a Moldovan national order into question. For instance, justifications for a Moldovan state, like claiming a Moldovan history and ethnic right to the land, encountered catastrophic criticism by a substantial portion of potential Moldovans who either believed Soviets constructed the nation or that the nation was distinctly Romanian. Similarly, justifications for Romanian rule, like the group’s linguistic connection and history, also met devastating criticism. In essence, each national perspective claimed to represent ethnic Moldovans but by advocating for different rulers and justifications of rule they actively undermined Moldovan rule in general. At the very least, three competing justifications for a national state withered the integrity of each justification leaving few hearts and minds devoted and obligated to the state’s particular power arrangements.

With depleting state legitimacy, resources became spread thin in order to obtain social support. Funds went to producing street signs with Latin characters to please various constituencies, new history books, mass conferences designed to debate the content of books, community gatherings designed to organize the population, parliamentary hours spent on bridging the different national perspectives, social welfare, and public health. The primary organizations went into developing state needs and
obtaining Moldovan support for sovereignty, which limited the funds and people available to peacefully and violently resolve conflict.

In general, the more constituents a leader must satisfy to maintain power, “the greater that leader's commitment to public goods provision” (Bell 2011, 627). In line with this argument, public goods provisions (as illustrated by Public Health Provisions) as a percentage of GDP appeared higher in Moldova than in both Ukraine and Russia, likely due to the group’s unconsolidated nature. With less coherence, the state needed to use more resources to maintain public support than in Russia and Ukraine. Conversely, the latter two experienced a decline in public health spending throughout the 1990s. The relationship is illustrated in Figure 5-2.

Consequently, the state had fewer potential resources to spend on resolving conflicts with ethnic minority groups. Figure 5-2 also provides supporting evidence to this relationship, illustrating that compared to Russia and Ukraine, military spending as a percentage of GDP remained the lowest in Moldova. Additionally, Moldova experienced minimal increases in military spending, despite internal military engagements with Russians and Gagauz and a relatively new military arsenal that needed funding. Correspondingly, Ukraine’s military received more funds throughout the 1990s.

---

105 This is supported by data that looks at public education (Brown and Hunter 2004; Avelino, Brown, and Hunter 2005; Stasavage 2005), public health (Filmer and Prichett 1999; Zweifel and Navia 2000; Navia and Zweifel 2003; Ghobarah, Huth and Russett 2005), welfare expenditures (Niskanen 1997; Brown and Hunter 1999; Boix 2001; Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo 2001), and general public goods (Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, and Limongi 2000; Lake and Baum 2001; Mulligan, Gil, and Sala-I Martin 2004; Ross 2006; Morrow, Bueno de Mesquita, Siverson, and Smith 2008; Bell 2011). A similar Breakdown is also referenced by Bell (2011).

106 Russia’s decrease in military spending is likely due to the USSR’s end and a decreased need for military presence in Eurasia, the Caucasus, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia.
Second, as I also discussed in the section, “Incoherence and a Divided Moldovan Elite,” low Moldovan group coherence hindered organizational capacity more generally. For instance, ‘Who are we?’ (the Moldovans) became a primary political division that prevented national organization. The MPF and its successors, like the Christian-Democratic People’s Party, claimed that Moldovans were simply Romanian and advocated a specific state border and population. Prominent scholars and center-right parties asserted that Moldovans were Romanians but that Soviet rule generated a unique experience for Moldovans and had a ‘deleterious’ affect on ‘Moldovan Consciousness’. Finally, many like the Agrarian Democratic Party, the Movement for a Democratic and Prosperous Moldova, the Socialist-Unity Bloc, and the Party of Communists of Moldova all claim that Moldovans were a unique nation, formed from a distinct history as any other ‘true’ nation (King 2000, 63). Each national perspective, derived from the low clarity regarding who and what constituted the Moldovans, had its own organizations that mobilized Moldovans in competing directions, such as desires for different state borders, national ruling authorities, international policies, cultural reforms, and solving minority conflicts. Without common understanding the group struggled to overcome other social divides, like class, or provide social links that could help build organizational structures. Similarly, low coherence and elite divisions meant sub-national and divergent national ideas mobilized organizations in multiple directions and further prevented intra-organizational and intra-group coordination and collaboration.

107 King (2000) describes these three Moldovan perspectives as the most dominant from 1990 to 1994.
Lacking organization the Moldovans struggled to signal credible commitments to minorities, and, compared to the uncertainty of remaining in the state, potential Moldovan state violence against secessionists appeared less threatening. The Moldovans offered differing opinions about the future of the state and how they would treat minorities. Changing language laws and debated positions regarding the country’s unification with Romania and sovereignty signaled an inconclusive future for Russians and Gagauz who spoke little of the titular language and feared the Romanian population.\textsuperscript{108} Losing jobs and political rights appeared as major political threats to the separatists…. Furthermore, violent threats against Gagauz and Russians (40,000 volunteer Moldovans appeared in Comrat to oppose local elections, incarcerations of activists, and killings in Bender) further illustrated loyalty as a threat. At the very least, the possibility of staying seemed less dangerous than departure. If staying in the state appeared to come with extinction, than pursuing independence at the cost of a state violent crackdown seemed similarly reasonable – “When you ain’t got nothing, you got nothing to lose.”\textsuperscript{109}

Additionally, to gain national support, many Moldovan leaders implemented and utilized nationalist policies that not only further alienated Russians and Gagauz, but also limited their communication with these separatist populations. For instance, national policy discouraged the use of the Russian language, preventing state leaders from using the Russian language on television, radio, and in newspapers. Consequently,\textsuperscript{108} Harsh but brief interbellum Romanian rule and Soviet education often illustrated Romanians as an oppressor and enemy.\textsuperscript{109} Weak Moldovan organization also illustrated the Moldovan state’s low capacity and its potential inability to effectively repress the movements, further lowering the costs of rebellion.
those who could not fluently understand Romanian, (88.3% of Russians and 95.6% of Gagauz (King 2001, 118)) only heard the Russian language message, which allowed separatists and not the Moldovan state to dominate regional narratives in Transnistria and southern Moldova. Consequently, the state’s disorganized attempts to influence separatist populations were ineffective. Instead, Russian and Gagauz leaders controlled their respective population’s conflict discourse and continued to mobilize for secession.

However, as the Moldovan state attempted to prevent the secessionist movements with compromises, violent threats, and finally violence, minority group coherence levels stimulated different reactions. The poorly organized Gagauz had some in the population act out violently and others accept negotiations. Some Gagauz leaders, like Stepan Topal utilized radical nationalism to obtain Gagauz support and others used violence to defend themselves against Moldovan national violence. Both Moldovans and Gagauz then struggled to find wide support both sides lacked the capacity to bring stability, but also both sides lacked the capacity to bring order within their respective groups. Without coherence, political entrepreneurs mobilized violent sects within their national populations and with both sides unable to bring order, chaotic violence ensued.

The Gagauz minority opposition utilized the Soviet Union’s collapse to question the new rules, legitimate their actions, and increase power. Many mobilized and fought for independence, but the Gagauz failed to efficiently collectively act and were unable to mount a powerful rebellion. Moldovans struggled to bring order. As the two battled for power, and no group brought order, chaotic violence ensued.
Chapter Summary: Ukraine, Russia, and Moldova

The collapse and national mobilization helped produce fifteen national states in need of legitimacy. With national leaders aligned (caused by national group formation and the decline of communist authority, often represented by national mobilization) and a national character ordering the state, coherence determined whether group unity was sufficient to aid group organization and achieve stability. Coherence helped group members signal their preferences to leaders and leaders the symbolic framework and social unity necessary to communicate and organize action. Among many things, coherence permitted political judgments and character to align between social activists and government.

While coherent majorities were able to cope with incoherent minority secessionists through compromise and repression, and coherent minority secessionists through compromise and non-violent repression, when coherent majorities lacked elite consensus they often violently repressed coherent minority secessionists and further violence ensued. Additionally, incoherent majorities struggled to compromise with or repress the opposition, and their opponents had opportunity to organize and secede. Where state actors lacked a coherent ethnic identity, as in Moldova, the relatively coherent and resource rich Slavic minority seceded through violent struggle. In the case of two relatively weak groups, such as the Uzbeks in Tajikistan, the opposition failed to develop a powerful secessionist direction, the state struggled to restore order, and chaotic violence resulted.
Table 5-1. Regression of a country's average 1990s military spending.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
<th>Model 6</th>
<th>Model 7</th>
<th>Model 8</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High coherence</td>
<td>1.354</td>
<td>1.619</td>
<td>1.74</td>
<td>1.896</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>titular group</td>
<td>1.579</td>
<td>1.803</td>
<td>2.192</td>
<td>2.754</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil</td>
<td>1.354 (0.565)*</td>
<td>1.619 (0.7086)*</td>
<td>1.74 (0.768)*</td>
<td>1.896 (0.647)*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coherent minority in a</td>
<td>1.619 (0.565)*</td>
<td>1.74  (0.768)*</td>
<td>2.029</td>
<td>2.02</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>concentrated territory</td>
<td>1.74 (0.768)*</td>
<td>2.02 (0.716)*</td>
<td>1.786</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secessionist claims</td>
<td>1.579 (0.461)*</td>
<td>1.803 (0.652)*</td>
<td>2.327 (0.716)*</td>
<td>2.754 (0.655)*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elite unity</td>
<td>1.74 (0.768)*</td>
<td>2.02 (0.716)*</td>
<td>1.786</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita in 1993</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[constant 2000 USD]</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High development</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R^2</td>
<td>0.0256</td>
<td>0.0016</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: *p<0.050
Coefficient (standard error)
### Figure 5-1. Majority group coherence levels and intra-majority-group elite consensus levels: shaping group organizational capacity and national unity.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>High Intra-Group Elite Consensus</th>
<th>Low Intra-Group Elite Consensus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>High Coherence</strong></td>
<td><strong>Low Coherence</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1) Well organized and minimal division of national rhetoric and organizations; decreases uncertainty and anxieties among minority groups</td>
<td>3) Weak national organizations; poses a minimal potential threat to protesting coherent and incoherent minorities; does not assuage anxieties and uncertainty for minorities who remain loyal to the state; violent nationalist sects within the majority are difficult to prevent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Strong national organizations but national rhetoric and organizations do not cooperate; deters incoherent minority groups from violent protest and exit; generates uncertainty and anxiety for coherent minority secessionists due to their high visibility; violent nationalist sects within the majority are difficult to prevent</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*aSee footnote 31*
Figure 5-2. Military and public health expenditures as a percentage of gross domestic product.
CHAPTER 6
FUZZY SET QUALITATIVE COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

To illustrate the role of group coherence in the context of other necessary conditions I utilize fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA). The fsQCA testing discussed in Chapter 6 has two goals. First, it analyzes the extant literature on separatism to identify necessary and sufficient conditions for post-Soviet secession. To do so it uses twenty-six potential causal sets developed from nineteen existing or proposed theories addressed in Chapter 1: elite mobilization for economic interests (Roeder 2007; Hale 2008), an indivisible territory (Duffy Toft 2003), unequal development (Buhaug et al. 2011; Roeder 2007; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Peterson 2002; Kaufman 1996; Cornel 2002; Collier and Hoeffler 2002), systematic minority group decline in economic status (Cederman et al. 2009), minority group decline in political rights (Cederman et al. 2009), disputed rights over a resource rich territory (Duffy Toft 2003), previous formal titular autonomous status in a territory (Roeder 2007; Hale 2008), minority group territorial concentration (Duffy Toft 2003), population size (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Hegre and Sambanis, 2005), advantaged initial state conditions/weak state (Fearon and Laitin 2003), minority group urbanization levels (Duffy Toft 2003), security dilemma (Posen 1993), majority group pre-communist literacy rates (Darden 2014), desires to have closer ties with Europe, economic dependence upon Russia, language different from the center (Hale 2008), elite consensus (Zürcher 2007), the presence of a contiguous homeland, and group coherence.

Second, the fsQCA helps analyze the theory of group coherence and intra-group elite consensus in context. I assess its application across multiple cases in combination
with other potential secessionist factors, and evaluate its set relationship to stability and secession.

Utilizing set theory to identify necessary and sufficient conditions for certain outcomes (Ragin 1987; Mahoney 2004), I examine all minority groups living in the former Soviet Union that compose 10% or more of a republic's population or have a regional base.¹ I identified whether the conditions for all the above listed theories were met in each region/country, to what degree they were met, and whether a theory or combination correctly coincided with secessionist civil war. The data was coded by examining secondary research and regional case studies.

Prior to the formal analysis I undertake three tasks. First, I discuss some of the challenges large-N quantitative research and case studies encounter when assessing secessionist theory. Next, I discuss how fsQCA helps assuage some traditional methodological difficulties by integrating quantitative precision and qualitative complexity. Following this, I outline the fuzzy calibration method and fsQCA analysis. I then conduct the analysis and discuss the results.

**Finding a New Approach to Examining Secessionist Civil War**

Previous examinations of the mentioned secessionist theories are often inhibited by a number of factors, including how each variable within a theory is measured, evaluated, and treated in its relationship with other variables and theories. In particular, the dominant approaches to social science research – large quantitative analyses and elucidate

¹ Population percentages are taken from the 1989 All Soviet Union Census. A regional base is defined by the Minorities at Risk (MAR) data category ‘Regional base’ (GC2), "A spatially contiguous region larger than an urban area that is part of the country, in which 25% or more of the minority resides and in which the minority constitutes the predominant proportion of the population" (MAR 2009, 18)
case studies – often ignore relevant and irrelevant distinctions and complex causal factors or struggle to be clearly generalizable and precise in measurement.

Each of the discussed secessionist theories is proposed and often evaluated as a more singular causal factor for secession but rarely do qualitative understandings inform its quantitative measurement, researchers systematically consider it in combination, or context. For instance, population size is frequently regressed over the set of countries with minority populations of 1% or more, and identifies general trends regarding the role of population size: larger minority populations and country populations are associated with greater rates of rebellion (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Hegre and Sambanis, 2005). However, the regression treats all increases in population size as the same, even when we may observe qualitative distinctions. In the set of large populations, the two groups at the very top both have a “large population,” but the difference that separates them indicates that one has a more “large population” than another. “This difference is usually taken at face value, meaning that there is usually no attempt to look at the cases and ask whether this difference – any other difference, regardless of magnitude – is a relevant or meaningful difference with respect to the underlying concept” (Ragin 2007, 6). Consequently, the typical continuous variable loses the specificity of helpful qualitative categories.

Additionally, large-N analysis makes it difficult to calculate the effect of a cause in combination with other factors, like confrontations over homelands, state collapse, or group cohesion. Rarely does a social scientist identify a singular necessary and sufficient causal variable. Instead combinations of variables in different contexts produce the outcome. For instance, some countries with large populations experience
rebellion and some do not, but the generalized level analysis does not shed light on when population size matters. It ignores the causal complexity and how population size’s potential combination with other variables may lead to rebellious outcomes. The approach ignores the specificity of individual cases.

Conversely, the case oriented approach uses individual cases to avoid misrepresentation but struggles to directly illustrate general patterns. For instance, Gwendolyn Sasse’s (2007) case study of 1990s violent conflict avoidance in Crimea, Ukraine sheds light on how the process of institution building, and not the institutions themselves, prevented violent rebellion. However, the case less clearly illustrates why institution building may, or may not, produce violence in other settings.

Furthermore, Sasse (2007) makes a number of qualitative measurements. To do so, she attaches and imposes meaning as to what constitutes negotiations, stability, weak institutions, and violent rebellion. Implicitly, she likely interprets indicators like “number of violent altercations” with respect to her knowledge about cases and her interests, such as using civil war theory to help define “stability” or “rebellion.” Generally, such qualitative measurements are made implicitly and without systematic modeling.

---

2 The control variable in a typical linear regression does not provide for causal complexity, rather it illustrates that, ‘despite the fact’ that B is present, the outcome variable Y is associated with X. The control variable does not clearly highlight when X matters. Interaction models may be used to add to context, but they are often limited by the available data. For instance, as Ragin (1987, 65) notes, “statistical tests for interaction work well only when all empirically plausible interactions are known in advance (that is, can be hypothesized), when there is a relatively small number of such interactions, when hypothesized interactions are not excessively collinear with each other, when a simple additive model is an empirically plausible representation of other causes of the phenomenon of interest, and when the number of cases is large enough to allow the investigator to assess the strength of the interaction effect relative to linear approximations.” These conditions are rarely met because of the limited number of cases and collinear issues. For instance, “six different causal conditions…would require an equation with sixty-four terms, many of which would be highly collinear” (Ragin 1987, 66).
(Ragin 2009, 180). Despite necessary and common use of case studies to explore social phenomena, some may argue that we lose precision in this approach.

Conversely, fuzzy sets offer “the precision that is prized by quantitative researchers and the use of substantive knowledge to calibrate measures that is central to qualitative research” (Ragin 2007, 9). Consequently, to better understand the complex relationship between causes, and bridge the divide between precision and in-depth knowledge, I utilize fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) to evaluate the discussed theories across the full set of former Soviet countries.³

**The Method: Fuzzy Set Comparative Qualitative Analysis**

Fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA), developed by Charles Ragin (1987), is a relatively new approach to formally assessing small-N data through set-theoretical descriptions of cases (Jordan 2012, 145). The method helps systematically compare cases and determine combinations of conditions that lead to an outcome while still allowing for in-depth case complexity (Ragin, 1987; Rihoux and Ragin 2009). I use fsQCA to identify conditions proposed to affect violent secession. I collected both qualitative and quantitative data to code forty-one cases across thirteen former Soviet republics for each variable developed from the literature review section.⁴ Next, I calibrated these according to their set definitions and then identified patterns in the data to illustrate combinations of factors that led to violent secession and those that led to early post-communist stability or chaotic violence.

---

³ Additionally, fuzzy set allows a distinction between relevant and irrelevant distinctions (Ragin 2007).

⁴ Kazakhstan did not have a titular majority group and Armenia does not have any substantial minority populations, putting both outside the scope of this project.
Using fsQCA

Much social science research already utilizes set theory. For instance, many studies evaluate cases with a similar outcome to determine their shared causal conditions or examine cases with similar conditions to determine whether they lead to varying outcomes. fsQCA formalizes these processes to describe outcomes. A 1 represents full membership in a set and a 0 score represents full non-membership, 0.5 illustrates the point of maximum ambiguity of set membership, and the values between represent varying degrees of membership and non-membership. Column 1 and 2 of Table 6-1 illustrate this relationship between the mathematical and qualitative categories.

To calibrate a case’s membership in each set I use the direct and indirect process outlined by Ragin (2007). Each set utilizes substantive qualitative knowledge and often, but not always, a quantitative indicator to assign a numeric value between 1 and 0 that represents a cases membership in the set. Ragin's (2007) direct calibration method then utilizes the upper threshold for complete membership, the cross-over point, and threshold for nonmembership to systematically, but not mechanistically, regulate the degree of a cases inclusion within the set. The indirect method, utilized when the

---

5 “They reflect the imposition of external criteria via the three qualitative anchors” (Ragin 2007, 15). “A key difference between a fuzzy set and a conventional variable is how they are conceptualized and labeled. For example, while it is possible to construct a generic variable years of education, it is impossible to transform this variable directly into a fuzzy set without first designating and defining a target set of cases. In this instance, the researcher might be interested in the set of individuals with at least a high school education or perhaps the set of individuals who are college educated. This example makes it clear that the designation of different target sets dictates different calibration schemes. A person who has one year of college education, for example, will have full membership (1.0) in the set of people who are at least high school educated, but this same person clearly has less than full membership in the set of people who are college educated. In a parallel fashion, it is clear that level of economic development makes sense as a generic variable, but in order to calibrate it as a fuzzy set, it is necessary to specify a target set, for example, the set of developed countries. Notice that this requirement—that the researcher designate a target set—not only structures the calibration of the set, it also provides a direct connection between theoretical discourse and empirical analysis. After all, it is more common for theoretical
“three qualitative anchors” are less distinct, uses broad groupings to sort “cases into different levels of membership, assign three different levels preliminary memberships scores, and then refines these membership scores using the interval scale data” (Ragin 2007, 17). Appendix B describes the calibration procedures for each causal condition.

After the causal conditions are calibrated, I build a truth table that includes all cases and calibrated sets. The truth table was examined for inconsistency issues (e.g. the same conditions had different outcomes)\(^6\) and completeness (Rihoux and Ragin 2009). Appendix D includes a fully specified truth table.

Utilizing the fsQCA software and algorithm developed by Charles Ragin, I then begin the analysis. First, to get an idea of necessary conditions for the causal outcomes (secession, stability, chaotic violence), I calculate whether the outcome is a subset of the causal condition. “If all (or nearly all) instances of the outcome show the condition, we would consider the condition necessary” (Jordan 2012, 158). Equation 6-1 illustrates the relationship (\(X =\) causal condition and \(Y =\) outcome) (Ragin 2007, 20).

\[
Necessity = \frac{\sum(\min(x_i, y_i))}{\sum y_i} \quad (6-1)
\]

I then assess various combinations and their set relationship to the outcome, including a direct analysis of each proposed theory as well as additional causal combinations based upon theory and knowledge. Through logic and, logic or, and fuzzy subset operations the software identifies sufficient and necessary conditions for the specified outcome (Ragin 2007, ch. 5). If cases sharing several outcomes uniformly discourse to be organized around designated sets of cases (e.g., the “developed countries”) than it is for it to be organized around generic variables (e.g., “level of economic development”) (Ragin 2007, 10).

\(^6\) For instance, if the same causal conditions lead to different outcomes, there is either a mistake or a missing causal condition the researcher must identify, calibrate, and then include.
exhibit the same causal combination, the outcome is a subset of these combinations. To identify this set relationship, a consistency calculation is made the same way as the one previously discussed but in its causal combination instead of as a single cause.

“Consistency, like significance, signals whether an empirical connection merits the close attention of the investigator. If a hypothesized subset relation is not consistent, then the researcher’s theory or conjecture is not supported” (Ragin 2008, 45). If a combination has a consistency score greater than 0.75 it is generally considered to be a necessary condition for the outcome.

Similarly, cases that share several causally relevant conditions and the same outcome illustrate a subset of combinations that lead to the outcome. To identify this set relationship, a coverage score is calculated, as in equation 6-2 (Ragin 2006, 11).

Convergence helps assess relevance and how important the combination is for accounting for the outcome. Consequently, a causal combination with a high consistency score is said to be sufficient for the outcome.

\[
Sufficiency = \frac{\Sigma (\min(x_i, y_i))}{\Sigma x_i} \quad (6-2)
\]

The categories are not mutually exclusive. First, a sufficient combination may not be necessary. For instance, two democracies may be sufficient for avoiding war, but they are not necessary as many other regime types exist as non-warring dyads. Similarly, a necessary combination may not be sufficient. Elite consensus may be necessary for democracy, but we may not witness democracy every time there is elite consensus. Additionally, the analysis may illustrate that different causal combinations may be necessary and/or sufficient. Appendix B provides critical tables used in the analysis of the truth table.
Data and Analysis

Examined Outcomes

Early Secessionist Civil War is defined by a secessionist (Treisman 1997, 244-245) civil conflicts that resulted in more than 500 battle related casualties. Chaotic Violence is physical violence for group goals that results in deaths, but not de facto or de jure independence – directed, unpredictable, domestic killing that did not lead to an additional state. Stability is the absence of secessionist civil war and chaotic violence. Each is indicated by data found in the Minorities at Risk (MAR 2009) dataset and the Ethnic Armed Conflict dataset. I use a crisp (1,0) calibration to assign set membership for these outcomes. Those in the set (e.g. experienced secessionist civil war) receive a 1, those out of the set (e.g. did not experience secessionist civil war) receive a 0.

Analysis

Charles Ragin’s fsQCA software is used to analyze the data for necessary and/or sufficient conditions for the three outcomes: secessionist civil war, chaotic violence, and stability. Calibrations for all causal conditions are located in Appendix A. I describe the data sources used to indicate a qualitative category (i.e. set membership), the division of qualitative categories, and assignment of quantitative values.

Results and Discussion

The initial identification of necessary conditions illustrated (Appendix B-1) several potential causes of the three outcomes. Cases with early post-communist secessionist civil war appeared an important initial subset (consistency 0.75<) of several casual conditions: theories of group coherence, concentrated territory (regional base and percentage of population in regional base), indivisible territory (long habitation and indivisible territory), institutional segmentation, language differentiation, security
dilemma, popular minority desires to not build closer ties with Europe, and elite disagreement. Cases with early post-communist chaotic violence appeared an important initial subset (consistency 0.75<) of several causal conditions: theories of group coherence, concentrated territory (regional base and percentage of population in regional base), indivisible territory, language differentiation, popular minority desires to not build closer ties with Europe, economic dependence upon Russia (CIS membership). Cases with early post-communist stability appeared an important initial subset (consistency 0.75<) of several causal conditions: theories of group coherence (majority group coherence), the absence of grievances (absence of political discrimination, decline in political status, economic discrimination, decline in economic status, and relative deprivation), valuable land (absence of high material status region in low status state), absence of a security dilemma. However, further examination of several conditions withered away their explanatory value and helped identify other causally pathways and ‘relevant’ conditions.

**Secessionist Civil War**

One theory provided a necessary pathway to secessionist civil war without additional causal factors (however, it was minimally relevant), but the analysis supports several causal combinations as necessary for the outcome and one combination as necessary and sufficient. The theory of group coherence, concentrated territory, and intra-group elite consensus are both necessary and sufficient for secessionist civil war. I first discuss the necessary conditions that lacked sufficiency and then move on to the latter.

Only one isolated causal theory, economic grievances (a decline in economic status and relative deprivation), remained a necessary condition for secessionist civil
war, but it was not sufficient (see Table B-2 in Appendix B). For instance, a 0.802 consistency score indicates that the secessionist civil war outcome was a subset of a decline in economic status and relative deprivation (economically disadvantaged compared to the center) (i.e. the causal combination only occurs where there are instances of early secessionist civil war), but, with a coverage of only 0.268, the fuzzy causal combination is only a partial subset of the outcome cases (at the very least, when secessionist civil war happened it often occurred without economic grievances, roughly only 26.8% of the time did it accurately coincide with the outcome). Figure 6-1 illustrates in a Venn diagram the consistency and coverage of the combination. In fact, the Armenian-Azeri and the Chechen-Russian dyads are the only case with a secessionist outcome and in the set of minority's with economic decline and relative deprivation.

Additionally, Table 6-2 illustrates several necessary, highly complex but insufficient combinations for secessionist civil war. Consistency is high because these combinations, like the economic grievances combination, only occurred in the Armenia/Azerbaijan case. They do not over predict secession. Rather they predict it consistently in one case. Sorting through these combinations we can generate a more

---

7 Six different causal combinations were unique to Armenian/Azeri secessionist civil war: 1) The absence of regional resources, previous formal administrative autonomy and absence of a weak state combined for secessionist civil war; 2) The absence of a recruitable population, absence of a weak state, and presence of security dilemma combined for secession; 3) Absence of resources, absence of a weak state, and a security dilemma combined for secession; 4) Previous administrative autonomy, absence of a strong state, and a security dilemma combined for secession; 5) Security dilemma, minimal minority desires to become closer with Europe, elite agreement, indivisible territory, security dilemma and elite agreement combined for secession. Long habitation, security dilemma, elite agreements; and 6) Administrative autonomy, a security dilemma, and elite agreement combined for secession. We could say that, in essence, despite majority elites working together, the absence of a large recruitable population, the absence of a weak state, and few regional resources, the economically aggrieved Armenians and the Azeri dominated state went to war over the Nagorno-Karabakh territory. Likely the Armenian long habitation, formal administrative autonomy for 68 years, the region’s indivisible nature, the country’s low desires to become closer to Europe, and a security dilemma, in part, helped spur secessionist civil war.
parsimonious solution. For instance, a security dilemma and a strong state may have combined with a low population, few resources in the minority region, or previous administrative autonomy to instigate secession. Additionally, Armenian/Azeri civil war fits fully in the set of cases where majority intra-group elite agreement and a security dilemma uniquely combined with the country’s minimal desires to join the EU, the fight over an indivisible territory, the long habitation of Armenians in the territory, or Nagorno-Karabakh’s previous administrative autonomy.

However, by further exploring the necessary combinations in the general solution, I reduced the number of factors and identified a more necessary and sufficient causal combination. A security dilemma, minimal desires to join the European Union, long habitation in the territory, previous administrative autonomy, and language differences between the minority group and the majority combined consistently with Armenian/Azeri, Abkaz/Georgian, Russian/Moldovan, and Chechen/Russian civil war cases, but over predicted the Ingush/Russian case (non-violent), and failed to identify the Ossetian/Georgian case (see Table 6-3 for consistency and convergence details).

Additional analysis also identified two necessary and ‘more not-sufficient conditions than sufficient conditions’ for early secessionist civil war (the same coverage and consistency occurs if we reduce the first set of combinations listed in Table 6-3 to the second). In various combinations, theories of indivisible territory, institutional segmentation, modernity, and security dilemmas consistently identified several cases of secessionist civil war. High urban minority group populations, beliefs that the territory was indivisible, and a security dilemma accompanied civil war in the Armenian/Azeri and Ossetian/Georgian cases. Previous titular minority group administrative autonomy,
a security dilemma, and high urbanization amongst the minority group coincided with Russian/Moldovan, Armenian/Azeri, and Ossetian/Georgian cases. Neither identifies completely sufficient conditions for civil war, but instead several potential necessary combinations are identified, helping confirm the theories of indivisible territory, security dilemma, and previous administrative autonomy as important.

Finally, the analysis identified two primary necessary and sufficient conditions for secessionist civil war. A security dilemma, a coherent minority group, and either minimal desires to become closer with Europe or previous administrative autonomy coincide with secession in all five cases (Appendix B Table B-7). Similarly, two combinations of group coherence coincide with secessionist civil war. A coherent minority group and either an incoherent majority group or a coherent majority without intra-group elite agreement are necessary and sufficient conditions for secessionist civil war when there is also either a security dilemma, the minority lived in a regional base, or the minority previously had titular administrative autonomy (Appendix B Table B-8). In all cases a coherent minority group was a necessary condition.

Figure 6-2 illustrates through a series of Venn diagrams and a stepwise process how the fully specified theory of group coherence, territorial concentration, and intra-group elite consensus identifies necessary and sufficient conditions for secessionist civil war. It first illustrates a coherent minority groups set consistency and coverage, then

---

I do not do the same for the first causal combination – security dilemma, minority coherence, desire to be closer with Europe, or previous administrative autonomy – because it potentially only reiterates the theory of group coherence, territorial concentration, and intra-group elite consensus because observing violent state acts indicates the security dilemma calibration. As such, it is difficult to parse out whether a security dilemma was the effect of other factors or the cause of the type of violence that ensued. A quick analysis of the security dilemma illustrates that it coincides with the theory of group coherence, intra-group elite consensus, and a concentrated minority regional base in all five cases (see Appendix B table B-12, note that when intra-group elite disagreement is removed from the first causal combination it coincides with Armenian/Azeri case to include all five within the theory, as illustrated in the full truth table,
adds an incoherent majority to the causal combination set. As discussed throughout the dissertation, an incoherent group should be unable to prevent secessionist civil war in the presence of a coherent minority opposition. However, this alone is not necessary or sufficient for secessionist civil war, in part because a minority group must also be fairly concentrated in order obtain material resources to compensate for its relatively fewer resources compared to those available to the state. Without territorial concentration no minorities rebelled and coherence did not matter. However, when the minority is also territorial concentrated the theory of group coherence consistently explains two cases of secessionist civil war but cannot identify the three remaining cases (it does not over predict secessionist civil war). Nevertheless, when the theory of group coherence and minority territorial concentration are combined with intra-group elite consensus all cases of secessionist civil war are identified. The causal combination is necessary and sufficient.

This identified combination of necessary and sufficient conditions for early post-communist secessionist civil war is theoretically appealing. First, the analysis illustrates that previous minority titular administrative territorial autonomy or a concentrated minority territory only matter for secession when the inhabitants, or former inhabitants, share a common understanding and their identity is relevant to life chances (i.e. when the minority group is coherent). Second, attachment to a specific territory, either through

Appendix D). We may then assume, because group coherence, elite agreements, and regional bases are calculated by observations and a causal story that precede the observation of the security dilemma, that group coherence, in part, may have shaped a security dilemma in each secessionist case. Similarly, a necessary and sufficient causal combination for secessionist violence appears when an incoherent majority or a coherent majority that lacks intra-group elite consensus encounters a coherent minority group inhabiting a regional base or one that previously had titular administrative territorial autonomy. These combinations consistently arise only when there is secessionist civil war and together they include all cases of secessionist civil war.

354
having a regional base or previous titular autonomy, is necessary for coherent minority
groups to engage in a war of independence. Third, when these conditions are in place,
either an incoherent majority or a coherent majority without intra-group elite consensus
managing the state will fail to bring order. Likely, as these majorities either disagree
regarding who and what they are or elites mobilize the group in different directions, the
group struggles to organize and coordinate action that may assuage the established
coherent minority, leading to a possible security dilemma, further minority mobilization,
and early post-communist secessionist civil war.

Chaotic Violence

Reduction of the fuzzy set analysis identified one necessary and sufficient causal
combination. The initial analysis provided a complex causal combination (having a
regional base, an incoherent majority, minority tradition of habitation, indivisible territory,
urban minority, minimal desires for closer ties with Europe, language differences
between the majority and minority, and the country was economically dependent upon
Russia) that successfully reduced to the most parsimonious identified combination –
incoherent majority, incoherent minority, and the minority has regional base within the
country – while at the same time increasing both the coverage (0.432 to 0.881) and
consistency (0.932 to 1.000). In Appendix B Table B-13 illustrates the initial analysis,
Table B-14 is a display of the reduction, and Table 6-4 (not in the appendix) illustrates

---

9 While the initial analysis of necessary conditions for early chaotic violence identified a country’s
economic dependence upon Russia, desires for a closer relationship with Europe, a minority’s language
being different than the majorities, an urbanized minority group, a minority’s long tradition of habitation in
a region, and indivisible territory, none remained consistent in the fuzzy set analysis.
the final reduced truth table analysis in its individual sets and Figure 6-3 displays the subset consistency and coverage relationships in a Venn diagram.

The identified causal combination supports and adds to this dissertation’s Hypothesis 2. After the Soviet Union’s collapse chaotic violence occurred where an incoherent minority group lived in a regional base and an incoherent majority dominated the state. A regional base was likely necessary to the causal chain because it provided the minority with a close network of people to mobilize (Duffy Toft 2003; Fearon and Laitin 2003), helped reduce the costs of mobilization (Duffy Toft 2003), and increased the potential for group members to feel an attachment to a specific place and take up arms there. An incoherent majority is likely necessary, at the very least, because it provides the minority an opportunity to rebel. However, as both groups lacked coherence they both struggled to bring order, either toward a secessionist civil war or stability. Furthermore, the analysis illustrates that in particular combinations a weak state, desires to become closer with Europe, economic and political grievances, economic and political status, an indivisible territory, and administrative autonomy were necessary conditions for chaotic violence but not sufficient. This makes sense, as these conditions, like many other political narratives, typically become relevant in a context that successfully frames them as important, often dependent upon whether a group is able to communicate them as such. While coherence and affinity to a group, as well as regional affiliations are also contextual and will vary over time as their image and importance are communicated, they had a more sticky quality, particularly across the former Soviet Union cases just following the collapse.
Stability

A number of theoretical causal combinations appeared as necessary and relatively sufficient conditions for stability. The confluence of proposed theories and stability is likely due to stability’s substantially higher frequency than violence and secessionist civil war. Of the forty-one cases examined, twelve experienced violence and twenty-nine did not. Consequently, at least nearly one aspect of every existing theory coincides with stability: the absence of political grievances; the absence of relative deprivation and the absence of security dilemma; the absence of indivisible territory, absence of a tradition of habitation in the territory, and an urbanized minority all were necessary conditions and relatively sufficient for stability; the absence of administrative autonomy and relative deprivation; a resource rich area with relative deprivation also avoided violence; those without security dilemmas; all countries that desired closer ties with Europe experienced stability (the Baltics); those that lacked a literate majority prior to communism and were not economically dependent upon Russia experienced stability; those with a literate majority prior to communism and did not have a different language than the minority group experienced stability (mostly cases in Ukraine); and those without language difference between the majority and minority, as well as having no economic dependence on Russia avoided violence. See Appendix B, Table B-15 for a full list.

Nevertheless, four reduced combinations had the highest consistency and coverage scores: 1) the theories of group coherence and concentrated territory; 2) the absence of relative deprivation and the absence of a security dilemma; 3) the absence of a security dilemma; and 4) the absence of political discrimination. Table 6-5 illustrates the four set combinations. The stability outcome is a subset of each combination,
respectively, in more than 80% of the cases. The combinations, respectively, are a subset of stability over 70% of the time. Three primary conclusions may be drawn. First, the absence of political discrimination appeared to be a necessary and sufficient condition for early post-communist stability. Second, the absence of relative deprivation and the absence of a security dilemma also are necessary and sufficient conditions for early post-communist stability.

Finally, group coherence theory, a concentrated territory, and intra-group elite consensus are necessary and sufficient for early post-communist stability. While the theory initially appears as having similar coverage and consistency as the other explanations when not combined with the concentrated territory condition, together the three theories have complete coverage. All cases without a concentrated territory remained stable, and all cases with a concentrated territory, defined by having a regional base (MAR 2009), were stable when either a coherent majority group encountered an incoherent minority group or when a coherent minority group encountered a coherent majority group with intra-group elite consensus. Additionally, when the coherence causal conditions are combined with a concentrated territory and analyzed for the outcome stability, the combination is necessary and sufficient (solution coverage 0.8917 and 0.967 consistency); this is the greatest level of coverage and consistency for all sets and set combinations with the outcome stability (see Table 6-6).

10 Group coherence theory and intra-group elite consensus are combined into a single causal set (1 or 0) that, according to the hypotheses described in chapter 2, should specific early post-communist stability.

11 Additionally, as mentioned in the section regarding secessionist civil war, a security dilemma occurred either when incoherent majority groups dominated the state or a coherent majority lacked intra-group elite consensus. Similarly, the theory of coherence and a concentrated territory tracks the absence of a security dilemma, and only “under predicted” the Talysh/Azeri and Lezgin/Azeri cases, which that lacked
Violence occurred only where minority groups had regional bases, if they did not, the dyad remained without violence. Thirteen dyads lacked a regional base and all thirteen did not experience early post-Soviet violence. Countries that had minority groups with regional bases avoided violence when either a coherent majority group encountered an incoherent minority group or a coherent majority group had high intra-group elite consensus. A group needed a regional base to secede, but when those in power could work together, aided by coherence, they effectively managed the secessionists and remained stable.

Chapter Summary

This fsQCA helps illustrate several causal combinations potentially necessary and/or sufficient for early post-communist secessionist civil war, chaotic violence, and stability. First, the study supports a number of existing theories and combinations of theories as being necessary for secession, including theories of indivisible territory and economic grievances. Additionally, a security dilemma, a coherent minority group, and either minimal desires to become closer with Europe or previous administrative autonomy coincide with all five cases of secessionist civil war and almost always only combine in cases of civil war. Similarly, two combinations of group coherence with other factors are exhibited as necessary and sufficient conditions for secessionist civil war: A coherent minority group, and either an incoherent majority

---

a security dilemma. Appendix B, Table B-21 lustrates security dilemma as a subset of group coherence and concentrated territory combination and the combination as a subset of a security dilemma. As discussed, with observations of coherence and a concentrated territory prior to those of a security dilemma, the notion is supported that either coherence is related to generating security dilemmas or that they hold other common factors. Nevertheless, the former makes theoretical sense, as a majority maintained stability a security dilemma did not arise. This is confirmed by the set of cases that the theory of group coherence predicted to be stable (coverage 0.724 and consistency 0.840) (see appendix B, Table B-20).
group or a coherent majority without intra-group elite consensus, are necessary and sufficient conditions for secessionist civil war when there is also either a security dilemma, the minority lived in a regional base, or the minority previously had titular administrative autonomy. Second, chaotic violence appeared when an incoherent majority encountered an incoherent minority that lived in a regional base.

Finally, stability was a subset of several casual sets or causal combinations, including: the absence of political grievances; the absence of relative deprivation and the absence of security dilemma; the absence of indivisible territory, absence of a tradition of habitation in the territory, and an urbanized minority. These and several other combinations also exhibited themselves as necessary conditions and relatively sufficient for stability. However, four theoretical causal set combinations had the highest levels of coverage and consistency: the theories of group coherence, intra-group elite consensus, and concentrated territory; the absence of relative deprivation and the absence of a security dilemma; the absence of a security dilemma; and the absence of political discrimination.

While several existing theories allude to important factors for secession and unique ways groups may calculate the advantages of loyalty or exit, these approaches fail to consider the relevance of how the group that becomes mobilized conceives their mass entity and how that mass entity’s pre-existing importance influences mobilization. For instance, while the theory of an indivisible territory considers how minority groups and the state imagine their relationship to land, it does not consider the qualities that constitute the group as potentially influencing a group’s ability to act on territorial, and other, beliefs. In other words, many minority group-state relationships may involve an
indivisible territory that do not involve violence, such as those in Russia’s contemporary ethnic federation, those that make up the United Kingdom, or Poles and Russians in Belarus. As a number of these scholars allude to but admittedly do not systematically examine, including Duffy Toft (2003) and Posen (1993), this analysis suggests that how members conceive their group creates a qualitatively different entity, one that may cooperate more or less well. As the “whole exceeds the sum of its parts, creating a unit stronger relative to those groups with a weaker identity” (Posen 1993, 31), motivations and capacities for secession are, in part, likely dependent upon the qualities and cohesion that define the group.
Table 6-1. Mathematical translations of verbal labels.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Verbal label</th>
<th>Degree of membership</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fully Member</td>
<td>0.993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threshold for Full Membership</td>
<td>0.953</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mostly In</td>
<td>0.810</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More In than Out</td>
<td>0.622</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crossover Point</td>
<td>0.500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More Out than In</td>
<td>0.378</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mostly Out</td>
<td>0.119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threshold for Full Nonmembership</td>
<td>0.047</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full Nonmembership</td>
<td>0.007</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ragin (2007)
Table 6-2. List of necessary but not sufficient conditions for early secessionist civil war.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Causal combination</th>
<th>Raw coverage</th>
<th>Consistency</th>
<th>Corresponding truth table analysis</th>
<th>Cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(^b)resource<em>adminautonomy1</em> (^b)weakstatecapaci</td>
<td>0.247</td>
<td>(^a)0.886</td>
<td>Table B-4</td>
<td>Armenian/Azeri</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(^b)recpop<em>weakstatecapaci</em> secdil</td>
<td>0.333</td>
<td>(^a)0.960</td>
<td>Table B-4</td>
<td>Armenian/Azeri</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(^b)resource<em>weakstatecapaci</em> secdil</td>
<td>0.247</td>
<td>(^a)0.966</td>
<td>Table B-4</td>
<td>Armenian/Azeri</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>adminautonomy1* weakstatecapaci* secdil</td>
<td>0.335</td>
<td>(^a)0.983</td>
<td>Table B-4</td>
<td>Armenian/Azeri</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>declineecon*relativedepr</td>
<td>0.268</td>
<td>(^a)0.802</td>
<td>Table B-2</td>
<td>Armenian/Azeri</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secdil<em>noEU</em>ElitAgree</td>
<td>0.200</td>
<td>(^a)1.000</td>
<td>Table B-3</td>
<td>Armenian/Azeri</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>inditerritory<em>secdil</em>eliteagree</td>
<td>0.200</td>
<td>(^a)1.000</td>
<td>Table B-3</td>
<td>Armenian/Azeri</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>longhabit<em>secdil</em>eliteagree</td>
<td>0.200</td>
<td>(^a)1.000</td>
<td>Table B-3</td>
<td>Armenian/Azeri</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>adminauto<em>secdil</em>eliteagree</td>
<td>0.200</td>
<td>(^a)1.000</td>
<td>Table B-3</td>
<td>Armenian/Azeri</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: \(^a\)Necessity = \(\sum (\min (X1 Y1))/\sum Y1 = 0.75<, \(^b\)Inverse of set = 1 - subset (e.g. \(^b\)Long habitation = absence of long habitation)
Table 6-3. List of necessary and sufficient conditions for early secessionist civil war.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Causal combination</th>
<th>Raw coverage</th>
<th>Consistency</th>
<th>Corresponding truth table analysis</th>
<th>Cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>secdil\textsuperscript{w}wanteu*mincoh</td>
<td>0.991 \textsuperscript{a}0.871</td>
<td>Table B-7</td>
<td>Armenian/Azeri (1,1), Abkaz/Georgian (1,1), Ossetian/Georgian (1,1), Russian/Moldovan (1,1), Chechen/Russian (0.953,1)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>adminautonomy1<em>secdil</em>mincoh</td>
<td>0.991 \textsuperscript{a}0.909</td>
<td>Table B-7</td>
<td>Armenian/Azeri (1,1), Abkaz/Georgian (1,1), Ossetian/Georgian (1,1), Russian/Moldovan (1,1), Chechen/Russian (0.953,1)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>regionalbase<em>adminautonomy1</em>secdil*mincoh</td>
<td>0.991 \textsuperscript{a}0.991</td>
<td>Table B-9</td>
<td>Armenian/Azeri (1,1), Abkaz/Georgian (1,1), Ossetian/Georgian (1,1), Russian/Moldovan (1,1), Chechen/Russian (0.953,1)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>secdil*cohelipathsec</td>
<td>1.000 \textsuperscript{a}1.000</td>
<td>Table B-10</td>
<td>Armenian/Azeri (1,1), Abkaz/Georgian (1,1), Ossetian/Georgian (1,1), Russian/Moldovan (1,1), Chechen/Russian (1,1)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>adminautonomy1*cohelipathsec</td>
<td>1.000 \textsuperscript{a}1.000</td>
<td>Table B-10</td>
<td>Armenian/Azeri (1,1), Abkaz/Georgian (1,1), Ossetian/Georgian (1,1), Russian/Moldovan (1,1), Chechen/Russian (1,1)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>regionalbase*cohelipathsec</td>
<td>1.000 \textsuperscript{a}1.000</td>
<td>Table B-10</td>
<td>Armenian/Azeri (1,1), Abkaz/Georgian (1,1), Ossetian/Georgian (1,1), Russian/Moldovan (1,1), Chechen/Russian (1,1)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>regionalbase<em>adminautonomy1</em>secdil<em>mincoh</em>eledisag</td>
<td>0.790 \textsuperscript{a}0.888</td>
<td>Table B-8</td>
<td>Abkaz/Georgian (1,1), Ossetian/Georgian (1,1), Russian/Moldovan (1,1), Chechen/Russian .953,1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>secdil<em>wanteu</em>longhabitation<em>adminautonomy1</em>langdif</td>
<td>0.900 \textsuperscript{a}0.750</td>
<td>Table B-11</td>
<td>Armenian/Azeri (1,1), Abkaz/Georgian (1,1), Ossetian/Georgian (1,1), Chechen/Russian (1,1), Ingush/Russian (1,0)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: \textsuperscript{a}Necessity = \( \sum (\min (X1 \ Y1))/\sum Y1 = 0.75< \), \textsuperscript{b}Inverse of set = 1 - subset (e.g. \textsuperscript{b}Long habitation = absence of long habitation)
Table 6-4. Fuzzy truth table analysis for chaotic violence, theory of group coherence, regional base.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Causal combination</th>
<th>Raw coverage</th>
<th>Unique coverage</th>
<th>Consistency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>regionalbase*</td>
<td>0.881</td>
<td>0.881</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>minincoh*majinco</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: solution coverage: 0.881000, solution consistency: 1.000000, frequency cutoff: 1.000000, consistency cutoff: 1.000000, "Necessity = \( \frac{\sum (\min (X1 \ Y1))}{\sum Y1} = 0.75 \)<
Table 6-5. Necessary and sufficient causal conditions for stability.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Causal combination</th>
<th>Raw coverage</th>
<th>Consistency</th>
<th>Corresponding truth table analysis</th>
<th>Cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>bsecdil</td>
<td>0.931</td>
<td>a0.871</td>
<td>Table B-19</td>
<td>Russian/Uzbek (1,1), Tajik/Uzbek (1,1), Crimean Tatar/Ukrainian (1,1), Crimean Russian/Ukrainian (1,1), Transcarpathian/Ukrainian (1,1), Russian (Donbass)/Ukrainian (1,1), Kazakh/Turkmen (1,1), Russian/Turkmen (1,1), Uzbek/Turkmen (1,1), Russian/Tajik (1,1), Pamiris (Badakhsha)/Tajik (1,0), Avars/Russian (1,1), Yakut/Russian (1,1), Tuvinian/Russian (1,1), Roma/Russian (1,1), Lezgins/Russian (1,1), Kumeys/Russian (1,1), Karachay/Russian (1,1), Buryat/Russian (1,1), Bashkir/Russian (1,1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>brelativedepr*</td>
<td>0.758</td>
<td>a0.868</td>
<td>Table B-18</td>
<td>Russian/Uzbek (1,1), Tajik/Uzbek (1,1), Crimean Russian/Ukrainian (1,1), Transcarpathian/Ukrainian (1,1), Russian (Donbass)/Ukrainian (1,1), Kazakh/Turkmen (1,1), Russian/Turkmen (1,1), Uzbek/Turkmen (1,1), Russian/Tajik (1,1), Pamiris (Badakhsha)/Tajik (1,0), Avars/Russian (1,1), Yakut/Russian (1,1), Tuvinian/Russian (1,1), Roma/Russian (1,1), Lezgins/Russian (1,1), Kumeys/Russian (1,1), Karachay/Russian (1,1), Buryat/Russian (1,1), Bashkir/Russian (1,1), Russian/Lithuanian (1,1), Polish/Lithuanian (1,1), Russian/Latvian (1,1), Russian/Kyrgyz (1,1), Russian/Georgian (1,0)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: aNecessity = \( \sum (\min (X_1 Y_1))/\sum Y_1 = 0.75< \), bInverse of set = 1 - subset (e.g. bLong habitation = absence of long habitation)
### Table 6-5. Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Causal combination</th>
<th>Raw coverage</th>
<th>Consistency</th>
<th>Corresponding truth table analysis</th>
<th>Cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>cohpredstabil</td>
<td>0.724</td>
<td>0.840</td>
<td>Table B-16</td>
<td>Crimean Tatar/Ukrainian (1,1), Crimea Russian/Ukrainian (1,1), Transcarpathian/Ukrainian (1,1), Russian (Donbass)/Ukrainian (1,1), Avars/Russian (1,1), Yakut/Russian (1,1), Tuvinian/Russian (1,1), Roma/Russian (1,1), Lezgins/Russian (1,1), Kумых/Russian (1,1), Karachay/Russian (1,1), Buryat/Russian (1,1), Bashkir/Russian (1,1), Tatar/Russian (1,1), Ingush/Russian (1,1), Chechen/Russian (1,0), Russian/Lithuanian (1,1), Polish/Lithuanian (1,1), Russian/Latvian (1,1), Russian/Georgian (1,0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bpolidisc</td>
<td>0.736</td>
<td>0.831</td>
<td>Table B-17</td>
<td>Crimean Russian/Ukrainian (1,1), Transcarpathian/Ukrainian (1,1), Russian (Donbass)/Ukrainian (1,1), Kazakh/Turkmen (1,1), Uzbek/Turkmen (1,1), Russian/Tajik (1,1), Avars/Russian (1,1), Yakut/Russian (1,1), Tuvinian/Russian (1,1), Karachay/Russian (1,1), Buryat/Russian (1,1), Bashkir/Russian (1,1), Tatar/Russian (1,1), Ingush/Russian (1,1), Russian/Moldovan (1,0), Russian/Lithuanian (1,1), Polish/Lithuanian (1,1), Russian/Kyrgyz (1,1), Russian/Georgian (1,0), Russian/Belorussian (1,1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**

- Necessity = \(\sum (\min (X1 Y1))/\sum Y1 = 0.75<

- Inverse of set = 1 - subset (e.g. Long habitation = absence of long habitation)
Table 6-6. Theory of group coherence and stability outcome.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Combo</th>
<th>Causal combination</th>
<th>Raw coverage</th>
<th>Unique coverage</th>
<th>Consistency</th>
<th>Cases</th>
<th>Unique cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>&quot;majcoh&quot;<em>eliteagre</em></td>
<td>0.213</td>
<td>0.079</td>
<td>&quot;1.000</td>
<td>Russian/Kyrgyz (0.881,1), Russian/Tajik (0.881,1), Uzbek/Tajik (0.881,1), Russian/Turkmen (0.881,1), Kazakh/Turkmen (0.881,1), Tajik/Uzbek (0.881,1), Russian/Uzbek (0.881,1)</td>
<td>Uzbek/Turkmen, Kazakh/Turkmen, Tajik/Uzbek</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>majcoh<em>eliteagre</em></td>
<td>0.338</td>
<td>0.325</td>
<td>0.949</td>
<td>Russian/Azeri (0.881,1), Russian/Kyrgyz (0.881,1), Russian/Tajik (0.881,1), Russian/Turkmen (0.881,1), Russian/Uzbek (0.881,1)</td>
<td>Russian/Azeri</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>majcoh<em>mincoh</em></td>
<td>0.168</td>
<td>0.026</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>Tatar/Russian (0.881,1), Bashkir/Russian (0.881,1), Buryat/Russian (0.881,1), Karachay/Russian (0.881,1), Kumyks/Russian (0.881,1), Lezgins/Russian (0.881,1), Roma/Russian (0.881,1), Tuvinian/Russian (0.881,1), Yakut/Russian (0.881,1), Avars/Russian (0.881,1), Ingush/Russian (0.622,1)</td>
<td>Tatar/Russian, Bashkir/Russian, Buryat/Russian, Karachay/Russian, Kumyks/Russian, Lezgins/Russian, Roma/Russian, Tuvinian/Russian, Yakut/Russian, Avars/Russian, Ingush/Russian</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: solution coverage: 0.891793, solution consistency: 0.967093, frequency cutoff: 1.000000, consistency cutoff: 0.942363. Complex Solution combination 1 and 3 illustrate without a regional base the number that did not experience violence combination 2 illustrates cases with a coherent majority and incoherent minority that did not experience violence combination 4 illustrates that a coherent majority, elite agreement and minority coherence did not experience secession. ^Necessity = \( \sum (\min(X1 Y1))/\sum Y1 = 0.75<, ~^bInverse of set  = 1 - subset (e.g. ^bLong habitation = absence of long habitation)
Table 6-6. Continued.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Combo</th>
<th>Causal combination</th>
<th>Raw coverage</th>
<th>Unique coverage</th>
<th>Consistency</th>
<th>Cases</th>
<th>Unique cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>majcoh<em>eliteagre</em>mincoh</td>
<td>0.328</td>
<td>0.319</td>
<td>0.964</td>
<td>New Russians/Estonian (1,1), Russian/Latvian (1,1), Polish/Lithuanian (1,1), Russian/Lithuanian (1,1), Russian (Donbass)/Ukrainian (1,1), Crimean Russian/Ukrainian (1,1), Polish/Belarussian (0.881,1), Russian/Belarussian (0.881,1), Transcarpathian/Ukrainian (0.81,1), Crimean Tatar/Ukrainian (0.81,1)</td>
<td>All</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: solution coverage: 0.891793, solution consistency: 0.967093, frequency cutoff: 1.000000, consistency cutoff: 0.942363. Complex Solution combination 1 and 3 illustrate without a regional base the number that did not experience violence combination 2 illustrates cases with a coherent majority and incoherent minority that did not experience violence combination 4 illustrates that a coherent majority, elite agreement and minority coherence did not experience secession. aNecessity = \( \sum \frac{(\min (X_1, Y_1))}{\sum Y_1} = 0.75 < \), bInverse of set = 1 - subset (e.g. bLong habitation = absence of long habitation)
Figure 6-1. Outcome Secessionist Civil War: Decline in economic status and Relative Deprivation
Figure 6-2. Outcome Secessionist Civil War with causal combinations: Coherent Minority; Incoherent Majority and Coherent Minority; Incoherent Majority, Coherent Minority and Territorial Concentrated (RB); Fully Specified Theory of Group Coherence, Territorial Concentration (RB), and Intra-Group Elite Consensus (EC)
Figure 6-3. Outcome Chaotic Violence: Group Coherence Theory and Concentrated Territory Theory (RB)
Figure 6-4. Outcome Stability: Group Coherence Theory, Concentrated Territory Theory (RB), Intra-Group Elite Consensus (EC) Causal Combo
CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION

Despite the depth and originality of his major theses, Marx failed to give an adequate account of the sources and nature of nationalism, and underestimated it…

—Isaiah Berlin
Against the Current

The great mass of the French nation is formed by the simple addition of homologous magnitudes, much as potatoes in a sack form a sack of potatoes.

—Karl Marx
Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte

Following the Soviet Union’s collapse, its fifteen successor states faced enormous – and in many cases insurmountable – obstacles to stability. As majority ethnic groups consolidated power within the new state, territorially concentrated ethnic minority groups contested the majority’s and state’s authority. Ethnic minorities in ten countries called for secession and in five countries secessionist civil wars broke out. This dissertation explains the variation: why some states experienced violent secession following Soviet state collapse and others did not.

I argued that the configuration between majority and minority ethnic groups following communism shaped the ethnic majority-dominated-state’s capacity to manage conflicts and minority secessionists’ relative capacity to contest the state. In particular, each group’s post-Soviet coherence levels determined their ability to organize. When a coherent majority group dominated the state they had substantial capacity to organize and deter minority secession and violent rebellion. However, when the majority group lacked coherence they struggled to organize and manage conflicts, and the minority’s level of group
coherence determined the type of violence – secessionist civil war (coherent minority group) or chaotic violence (incoherent minority group). Additionally, when a coherent majority lacked elite consensus and faced a coherent minority, secessionist civil war ensued. This dissertation illustrates why post-Soviet ethnic group coherence varied across groups, why and when intra-group elite consensus influenced group mobilization and violence, and how relative group coherence and the configuration of ethnic majority and minority groups determined post-Soviet secession and stability outcomes.

**Why did Post-Soviet Ethnic Group Coherence Vary Across Groups?**

Groups with coherent ethnic identities that antedated the Soviet Union were able to reconstitute their identities into a useful, coherent formation after the fall of Soviet power. These identities not only made sense in the 1991 context, but even as these ethnic groups changed over time their relationship with Soviet communism maintained group understandings and salience after communism. I illustrate that uneven state reach ensured that not all people would have identical experiences or embrace a state promoted mass identity. While some would come to identify with the state backed identity (e.g. Russian), others had opportunities and technologies to develop and disperse alternative identity conceptions, which often helped both the state and non-state backed identities solidify. Additionally, where the modernizing state minimally reached and state backed mass identity conceptions were not dispersed, locals had minimal opportunities to assimilate and few motivations to develop and disperse a non-state mass identity.
First, prior to the Soviet Union, imperial state reach increased through centralized education, military conscription, industrialization, and transportation infrastructure. These features provided more uniform experiences among the state’s peasantry and helped disperse a uniform conception of mass identity. For example, Russia’s centralized schooling distributed national materials to millions, increasing the literate population and national patriotism (Darden 2014).

Second, while state reach promoted the spread of the state backed mass identity, state reach also created opportunities for non-state backed identities to develop and be dispersed. Because complete state penetration is rare and often short-lived, under nationalizing and modernizing conditions people will typically have both the opportunities and technologies to disperse multiple mass identities. For instance, the Hungarian and Russian imperial states did not completely foster assimilation or penetrate communities in Eastern Galicia (Western Ukraine), providing opportunities for Ukrainians to build non-Russian schools and circulate non-Russian newspapers.¹

Third, state reach increased the likelihood of inter-group encounters and the potential for political and economic inequalities to develop between ethnic groups. In tandem, state reach backed and developed an identity and allowed opportunities for other groups to develop an identity in the same geographic region, allowing people from both groups to encounter one another. However, the treatment by the state was not always equal. Because one group was affiliated with the state and the others not, members across groups often systematically

¹ State reach was typically highest near the imperial capital, constraining opportunities to oppose the state backed mass identity and stimulating high levels of ethnic homogeneity in these regions.
experienced different political, economic, and social advantages and affections. For instance, in Kiev during the late 19th century those who spoke the imperial language, Russian, could own businesses but Ukrainian language speakers or those identifying with a mass identity other than Russian could not. Consequently, one’s mass identity marked their entitlement to certain rights and property, increasingly structuring everyday life. Similarly, political opportunities facilitated contentious politics among mass identity groups (Tarrow 1998, 19-20), which further hardened these identities. People used opportunities, like elite division and regional unrest, to separately and politically mobilize both the state and non-state backed identity groups, bringing people from both groups into direct competition. For example, during the 1848 Hungarian revolution, the weakened imperial state in Galicia provided opportunities for locals, like Poles and Ukrainians, to exercise greater autonomy. With imperial rules and authority in question, urban Ukrainians challenged the status quo that privileged Poles in education and formed their own primary schools and opened Ukrainian history faculties in universities. Each new school and faculty position was an ethnic competition. Schools competed for students and professors competed for a limited number of jobs along ethnic lines.

Finally, people untouched by the state could not disperse a mass identity or systematically encounter others. Untouched by the state and with few technological and social changes, these regions lacked features, like transportation infrastructure and print capitalism, that could facilitate a common sense of mass identity. For instance, while the Russian state helped develop
urban areas and print media technology in Ukrainian territories, the vast majority of Moldovans remained rural and without access to centralized schooling, news media, cities, and industrial technology. Furthermore, most people living in Moldova did not encounter a mass Russian culture or those outside their village. Remaining relatively untouched by the state, people lacked modern technologies and infrastructure that could have helped them spread and imagine a mass identity.

As Chapter 3 illustrates, Russians and Ukrainians became coherent and Moldovans, Gagauz, Crimean Tatars, and Tatars along the Volga remained incoherent prior to Soviet Communism. The Russians successfully spread a national identity and encountered groups like the Ukrainians and Poles, hardening a sense of Russianness. Finding opportunities within the Russian and Hungarian Empires to disperse their identity, Ukrainians developed a nation in opposition to encounters with Russians and Poles, often by developing schools and cultural clubs in western Ukraine and its countryside. Conversely, the state minimally reached the Moldovans, Gagauz, Crimean Tatars, and Tatars along the Volga, limiting potential interest in mass identities and hindering peoples’ ability to develop and disperse one. For instance, as the Russian Imperial state expanded into Crimea, Crimean Tatars migrated to Ottoman Imperial territories and avoided contact with Russians, modern capacities to distribute an identity, and ethnic politics. Related to this, the state did not reach deeply into Bessarabia, keeping the population, including most Moldovans and Gagauz, isolated in rural areas and without modern state contact.
Explaining Soviet Imperial Modernization’s Influence on Group Coherence

The timing of group coherence and imperial modernization then determined future group coherence levels. Groups that became coherent prior to Soviet imperial modernity remained coherent and groups that did not become coherent generally remained incoherent through Soviet rule to the early 1990s. While Soviet institutions together with mass national movements helped make national identities important to post-communist politics – the post-revolutionary Soviet state quelled nationalist mobilization through cultural concessions that institutionalized national identities – not all groups had the same opportunities to cultivate and disperse their identities. Coherent groups, like Ukrainians and Russians, gained privileges to disperse their identity and a cultural status that helped solidify their identity as a marker of life chances. Conversely, the state and underground (non-state approved) intellectual communities defined incoherent groups, like Moldovans and Tatars, keeping multiple competing ethnic identity conceptions in play for a single population. Additionally, with a poorly defined community to mobilize around, these pre-communist incoherent groups became less appealing than communism, further preventing the identity from defining life chances and hardening.

When the Russian Empire collapsed, coherent groups successfully mobilized and obtained concessions from the emerging Soviet state, such as national language rights and top political positions, that helped entrench the distribution of their identity and identity group based encounters. With these

---

2 I also discuss how some incoherent groups became coherent through deportation and repatriation.
cultural concessions coherent groups could disperse and consolidate their identity. For instance, Ukrainian leaders like, Vlas Chubar (head of the Ukrainian Soviet government) and Oleksander Shumsky (head of department of agitation and propaganda), received powerful positions within the government and the nation obtained cultural rights, ensuring that new ideas regarding what constituted the Ukrainian identity could emerge within the population and not be completely censored by Moscow or only originate in Moscow. Instead, as identity perceptions changed, the population had the autonomy to incorporate new and old ideas about what constituted the Ukrainians. Relatedly, the Ukrainian authorities had the right to distribute a Ukrainian language and culture through schools, ensuring that most students received mass identity content.

At the same time, Ukrainians and other coherent groups obtained a privileged cultural status that marked them as having different life chances within the Soviet state. At the very least, with their unique cultural rights, Ukrainians in the Ukrainian Republic had greater autonomy over describing their identity than other groups, like Bulgarians and Tatars, further marking the identity’s role in daily life.

Conversely, incoherent groups could not contest the Soviet state and instead Moscow described their identity and prevented alternative identity conceptions from public spaces. With few cultural concessions bureaucrats from the center developed and dispersed identity conceptions, but without incorporation or continuous totalitarian rule, shadow intellectual communities formed with unique conceptions that claimed to represent the same ethnic
community that the Soviets described. For example, Moldovans did not receive the same concessions as Ukrainians; this is illustrated by the fact that few non-
Russians in the Moldovan republic obtained prominent party positions early on and that bureaucrats from the center reconfigured the local literary language and cultural history. In contrast to Ukraine, only Soviet approved histories and cultural materials about Moldovans were publically dispersed and celebrated in Moldova. For instance, while figures like Taras Shevchenko (the so called father of Ukrainian language) continued to be taught in public schools and incorporated into general Ukrainian history, describing Mihai Eminescu (the so called father of the Romanian language) and Stefan cel Mare (pre-modern leader of the Moldovan principality) as part of Moldovan history were outlawed and labeled Romanian propaganda. Unable to publically distribute non-Soviet conceptions of the local identity, local intellectuals in Moldova limitedly and quietly discussed and distributed notions of their language, history, and symbolic persons. Similarly, as conceptions of the Moldovan identity changed over time, centralized control in Moscow and little local cultural autonomy, meant that Moscow systematically controlled, with little variance, what the identity constituted. At minimum, pre-Soviet incoherent group populations, like the Moldovans, received two different identity conceptions, often with each conception reaching and influencing different parts of the population. For instance, in Moldovan the Soviets used public schools and government organizations to disperse a Slavic based Moldovan national identity on the Romance speaking population and
underground intellectuals used underground networks and gatherings to often describe the same Romance speaking population as Romanian.

Furthermore, without an identified community group around which members could mobilize and gain access to opportunities, communism became more appealing and important than an ethnic identity. For example, the Moldovan identity was not privileged in Moldova and communist policies of economic equality helped temper the Russian identity’s authority in the region, minimizing the role ethnicity played in life chances. Instead, people became more likely to utilize non-national identities for organization.

Paradoxically, deportation and repatriation helped increase the coherence of some groups. Because only some ethnic groups, like Chechens and Crimean Tatars, had their entire population deported, forcing them to experience and witness a horrific, ethnically based injustice. Group coherence also continued to increase upon a group’s return. Upon repatriation to their former land, groups typically encountered systematic hardships compared to those who now inhabited their homes, towns, and cities. Additionally, upon repatriation groups often lived in closer quarters (their ‘homeland’) than when they lived in exile (spread throughout the republics), making it easier to distribute common descriptions of their experiences and conceptions of their identity. In particular, the Crimean Tatars and Chechens highlighted the importance of repatriation.

While the Chechens returned from exile after 1956 and developed an increasingly coherent identity, the Crimean Tatars remained exiled and distributed throughout Central Asian Republics until the 1990s and struggled to
become coherent. In sum, mass ethnic deportation systematically determined one’s life chances and, along with hardships, repatriation came with advantages to communicating and dispersing a mass identity.

**Post-Soviet Stability And Secession: How Did The Relative Group Coherence Of Ethnic Majority And Minority Groups Determine Outcomes?**

After the Soviet Union’s collapse national groups remained a powerful source of organized and mobilized people that would determine early post-Soviet conflicts. As decentralized authority in the late 1980s and early 1990s increased opportunities for political organization, elites harnessed national identities to challenge Soviet authority and national majority identities to establish fourteen new nation states.³ Other elites used national minority identities to oppose the new nation states and further rebelled. While a territorially concentrated minority was necessary for violent rebellion, the outcome of these challenges to state authority depended upon the relative coherence between the ethnic majority group dominating the state and the ethnic minority group rebelling.⁴

First, where coherent titular majority groups, maintained intra-group elite consensus, like Ukrainians in Ukraine, or where coherent titular majorities encountered incoherent secessionist minorities, like Russians in Russia with respect to Tatars, the country avoided violent ethnic conflict. In the former, elite consensus kept factions from forming within the Ukrainian nation and allowed Ukrainian coherence to help end intra-group conflict and legitimate the national

³ Kazakhstan did not have a majority nation.

⁴ In addition to each group’s level of coherence, one configuration’s – coherent ethnic majority and coherent ethnic minority – outcome also depends upon the degree of intra-group elite consensus. The role of intra-group elite consensus is discussed in the Postcommunist section, Chapter Two, and Chapter Five.
order. With majority social support behind a united Ukrainian elite, the state could not only allocate more resources to secessionist issues, but also they could more effectively mobilize their population and unite organizations under a national cause that sought to cope with secessionists. Additionally, a united Ukrainian elite meant that minority groups like Russians and Crimean Tatars in Crimea faced greater certainty regarding their status and futures living in the new Ukrainian state. In essence, the united Ukrainian elite decreased the possibility of factions forming within the national group, increasing, in the minds of many Russian and Crimean Tatar secessionists, the credibility of majority group’s commitments. Thus, a united Ukrainian elite lessened Russian and Crimean Tatar anxieties that otherwise could have further encouraged exit. Nevertheless, only minimal elite consensus – national territorial integrity – was necessary for coherent Russians to non-violently resolve conflict with Tatars in Russia. After the collapse, Tatars observed a coherent majority that could easily impose its will if elite consensus arose. Observing that the Russian majority could attack with overwhelming violence, the Tatars were not willing to violently oppose the majority’s desire to maintain territorial integrity and national order.

Second, where coherent titular majorities did not maintain intra-group elite consensus, factions (often some violent) within the majority emerged and in protectionist reaction to high levels of uncertainty and often violence, coherent minority groups sought independence through secessionist civil war, like occurred between Russians and Chechens in Russia (Georgians, Abkhaz, and Ossetians in Georgia are another example of this configuration). Unlike
incoherent minorities, the coherent Russians found that the coherent Chechen secessionists posed a higher threat to territorial integrity than other less coherent nations, and with Russian elites divided in their response to this threat, many Russian authorities were more likely to take violent action against the Chechens. However, the coherent Chechens did not see futility in a violent rebuke nor did a divided Russian elite help provide credible commitments regarding a bright future for Chechens within the new Russian state. Thus, when the coherent Russian majority, without intra-group elite consensus threatened Chechens with troop invasions and later violently attacked, the Chechens easily used anti-majority nationalist rhetoric to mobilize and defend themselves by engaging in a secessionist civil war and achieving early de facto independence.5

Third, where incoherent ethnic majorities became the dominant faction, ethnic violence emerged, such as arose between Moldovans, Russians, and Gagauz in Moldova. The incoherent Moldovan majority could not effectively express its will nor could Moldovan elites legitimately dominate their co-nationals, meaning limited resources became divided to both maintain national support and resolve conflicts with Russians in Transnistria and Gagauz in Gagauzia. As the Moldovans struggled to organize and mobilize their own nation through policies that often threatened the future status of Russians and Gagauz, they fostered

5 Specifically, elite consensus determines whether the majority group’s potential capacity may be used in a unitary direction to cope with conflict (i.e. under elite consensus) or whether the majority national identity is more likely to be used to mobilize the group in multiple directions and decrease the state’s capacity to deter the coherent minority’s secessionist mobilization (i.e. minimal elite consensus). Specifically, if state formation following state collapse includes a territorially concentrated coherent minority group and a coherent majority group, intra-majority-group elite consensus will also help define early secessionist and stability outcomes.
high levels of uncertainty within both populations. Seemingly under threat, the Russian minority in Transnistria continued to mobilize for independence and as the Moldovan state succumbed to violent repression to maintain territorial authority, the coherent Russian minority had the capacity and motivation to defend itself and secede. As the incoherent Moldovan nation encountered the incoherent Gagauz secessionist minority, both sides lacked the capacity to bring stability as well as the capacity to bring order within their respective groups. Without coherence, political entrepreneurs mobilized violent sects within their national populations and with both sides unable to bring order, chaotic violence ensued.

Summary

When a minority group was territorially concentrated, the relative coherence between the ethnic majority group and minority group largely determined whether a nation would violently secede or stability would arise without violence. Coherent Ukrainians with elite consensus successfully managed Russian and Crimean Tatar mobilization in Crimea without violence (support for Hypothesis 1). Coherent Russians in the Russian Federation, despite elite division, successfully managed the incoherent Tatar group’s mobilization along the Volga River without violence (support for Hypothesis 2) but engaged in secessionist civil war with coherent Chechens (support for Hypothesis 3). Incoherent Moldovans struggled to manage coherent Russians in Transnistria, resulting in secessionist civil war (support for Hypothesis 4) and incoherent Gagauz, resulting in chaotic violence (support for Hypothesis 5). As
Table 7-1 illustrates, all early post-Soviet secessionist movement outcomes support Hypotheses 1 through 5.

This project contributes to the study of ethnic politics and post-state-collapse violence, secession, and stability through its incorporation of existing political theories and its own unique theoretical contribution. First, by incorporating existing theories, I identified a necessary condition for secessionist and chaotic violence following the Soviet state collapse – a territorially concentrated ethnic minority group. Second, I find that when given the opportunity coherent identity groups will influence their relationship with state institutions, often securing cultural rights, like ethno-linguistic autonomy in regional schools, that ensure the group’s continued coherence. In other words, the project supports other findings that groups are not purely endogenous or exogenous to state institutions. Finally, and most prominently, I show how ethnic politics is more than a single group’s dynamics but how the configuration of dynamics between dominant and minority groups explains not only whether there is mobilization but the form it takes. Consequently, I suggest that any thorough explanation of ethnic mobilization and its forms must include an assessment of the configuration between dominant and non-dominant ethnic groups.

In fact, state collapse and subsequent rebellion within successor states is not isolated to the post-Soviet cases. This dissertation’s findings have the potential to lend insight into other past and contemporary ethnic political issues, including the dearth of postcolonial secessionist movements in sub-Saharan Africa and the paradox between weakening national identities under
supranational systems and the fate of peoples if a supranational system
collapsed. For instance, a lack of colonial state reach in sub-Saharan African
countries may have led to low majority and minority group coherence levels and,
following the end of imperial states, the inability for majority and minority groups
to bring order, leaving chaotic violence and non-secessionist civil wars as a more
likely means of political contestation. Relatedly, as the European Union (EU)
attempts to create both a supranational system and identity, the potential for
stability and violence following an unforeseen and unfortunate end to the
European supranational system may depend upon the transformation and
configuration of Europe’s majority and minority national identities.

The European case is particularly interesting because this dissertation’s
findings complicate and complement the current thinking about EU nationality
policies. It is often argued that as long as majority nations remain strong and
coherent, they pose a threat to European integration (Carey 2002; Deflem &
Pampel 1996). At the same time, this dissertation suggests that if majority
national identities become incoherent, a collapse of the European supranational
system may lead to early, violent conditions. However, this dissertation also
reveals nationality as a modern phenomenon that works in relationship with state
institutions, meaning that a postmodern horizon, while highly uncertain in form
and inevitability, may decrease the relevance of nationality in
Europe and developed nations will seek to secure their continued coherence. In
effect, while many look at the development of both European postmodern values
and sustained nationalism as a contradiction that needs to be resolved,
maintaining the agenda of both may not only be inevitable, but in the event of collapse it may also serve as a safeguard against early violence.

This dissertation’s focus on the historic development of mass ethnic groups and their early post-collapse conflict in Eurasia provides insight into the nations and tensions shaping conflict in the region contemporarily. National movements in the 1990s not only established state borders that are contested today, but also put into place ethno-cultural policies that are already beginning to reshape group coherence in the region and majority and minority ethnic groups’ abilities to organize, manage conflict, and contest state authority.

In this manuscript I illustrated that it is not just institutions, ideas (e.g. grievance, security dilemma), and individuals (leaders and micro explanations) that influence politics, but also a modern identity group’s importance to member’s life chances and the group’s bonding cultural content that facilitates both the dominant group’s capacity to effectively use the state to manage external group demands and the external group’s relative capacity to mobilize and pursue demands. In essence, a population’s cultural coherence and its capacity to organize with respect to another organized group of people drive politics and change over time.
Table 7-1. Early post-soviet violent secession, stability, and chaotic violence: majority group coherence and intra-group elite consensus, minority group coherence, territorial concentration.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Majority group</th>
<th>No elite consensus &amp; coherent (majority-minority)</th>
<th>Incoherent (majority-minority)</th>
<th>No Majority (titular-minority)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not territorially concentrated</td>
<td>Stability: Tajik-Russian, Russian-Roma, Lithuanian-Russian, Georgian-Russian, Azeri-Russian, Belarussian-Russian, Turkmen-Uzbek, Turkmen-Russian, Turkmen-Kazakh, Uzbek-Russian, Uzbek-Tajik, Kyrgyz-Russian, Armenia</td>
<td>Stability: Kazakh-Russian</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Territorially Concentrated - “A spatially contiguous region larger than an urban area that is part of the country, in which 25% or more of the minority resides and in which the minority constitutes the predominant proportion of the population” (MAR 2009, 18).
The various sets are identified and calibrated according to theory. Their quantitative values are calibrated using several datasets, including the Minorities at Risk dataset (MAR 2009), Quality of Governance dataset (Dahlberg et al. 2015), European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (2009), Ethnic Power Relations dataset (Wimmer et al. 2009), Duffy Toft (2003) resource wealth and duration data, the 1989 All Soviet Union Census, and numerous qualitative tools and secondary sources. (See Appendix D for the completed truth table.)

**Concentrated Territory**

A group that lives in a concentrated territory is considered important for secession (Fearon and Laitin 2000; Duffy Toft 2003). Located in a similar area a group has greater potential to communicate, share resources, experience similar grievances, and develop similar symbols and attitudes that may be used for mobilization. There are several ways to classify a concentrated territory.

**Majority in a Regional Base ((Fearon and Laitin 2000; Duffy Toft 2003)).**

This crisp set includes minority groups that constitute the majority in a specified regional base, 1, and those that do not, 0. All Soviet Union Census (1989) data is used for population percentages and regional bases are identified using MAR (2009) variable GC2 coding procedures.\(^1\) The condition is labeled: majregbase.

---

\(^1\) "A spatially contiguous region larger than an urban area that is part of the country, in which 25% or more of the minority resides and in which the minority constitutes the predominant proportion of the population.” (MAR 2009, 18).
A Territorially Concentrated Group

Territorial concentration is calibrated into a fuzzy set. I begin with a group’s population percentage in its regional base (MAR 2009), or if it lacks a regional base, the highest percentage of the population it constitutes in a region the size of an urban area or larger. The data is then calibrated. Those that compose 50% of the specified region are at the threshold of being full members in the set of territorially concentrated groups. The cross-over point is 15%, the most ambiguous position whether the group is territorially concentrated. Finally, groups that compose 10% or less population percentage in a specified region are fully not members of the set of territorially concentrated groups. All Soviet Union Census 1989 data is used to calculate population percentages. The condition is labeled: concentration.

Regional Base

A regional base is defined by the Minorities at Risk (MAR) data category ‘Regional base’ (GC2), “A spatially contiguous region larger than an urban area that is part of the country, in which 25% or more of the minority resides and in which the minority constitutes the predominant proportion of the population” (MAR 2009, 18). If the preceding statement is true the case receives a 1. If the statement is false it is calibrated as 0. (MAR (2009) data is used for the calibration.) The condition is labeled: regionalbase.

Urbanized Minority Group

In a given republic, the percentage of a group’s population that lives in urban areas is the calibrated into a fuzzy set. Those groups with 80% of their population living in urban areas are at the threshold of being full members in the set of urbanized minority groups. The cross-over point is 50% of the group’s population, the most
ambiguous position whether the group is in the set of urbanized minority groups. Finally, minority groups that compose 30% population percentage in a specified region are fully not members of the set of urbanized minority groups. All Soviet Union Census 1989 data is used to calculate population percentages. The condition is labeled: urbanmingroup

**Indivisible Territory**

Monica Duffy Toft (2003) argues that when a minority group believes that it occupies a homeland and there are two or more concentrated territories in a state the territory becomes indivisible. The minority group believes that have rights to the land that they will not give up. The state views the territory as indivisible because if they allow it to secede they will set a precedent for the country’s other concentrated group/s. In addition to the theory of indivisibility, Duff Toft (2003) argues that traditions of group habitation group in their homeland and higher levels of rural concentrated groups will also lend themselves to secessionist rebellion.

**Indivisible Territory**

This crisp set includes those groups that reside in their homeland (GC8 (MAR 2009)) and in a country with 2 or more concentrated groups (Duffy Toft 2003, appendix 1), 1. Those that lack one of the conditional features are not in the subset of groups residing in indivisible territory, 0. The condition is labeled: inditerritory.

**Tradition of Habitation**

The tradition of habitation is indicated by three levels of duration (Duffy Toft 2003, 41, appendix 2). Residence beginning prior to 1800 indicates that a group is a full member in the set of groups with a tradition of habitation, 1. Group residence beginning between 1800 and 1945 is most ambiguous whether the group is within the set of those
with a tradition of habitation, 0.5. Finally, residence since only 1945 indicates being a fully nonmember of the set, 0. (Tradition of habitation is also calibrated as those in residence before 1945 as a 1 and those since as 0, but such calibrations did not provide additional insight in the fuzzy analysis.) The condition is labeled: longhabitation.

Resources

**Nationalized (political and cultural borders become congruent)**

Administrative autonomy is considered an institutional form that made identities important to politics within specified regions (Hale 2008) and identity mobilizable by elites (Roeder 2007).

**Formal Administrative Autonomy**

This crisp set calibrates a 1 for groups who experienced formal autonomy and a 0 for all those that did not. Formal autonomy is assigned to groups that resided in their formally autonomous titular region (state, republic, oblast, okrug, or city) during the 20th century. The condition is labeled: adminautonomy1.

**Nationalized**

I utilize duration of residence in a group’s formally autonomous titular region (state, republic, oblast, okrug, or city) during the 20th century to indicate a group’s membership in the fuzzy set of nationalized groups. I utilize the indirect calibration method (Ragin 2007). Groups with 50 or more years residing in their formally autonomous region (over two generations) are full members within the set of nationalized groups, 1. Groups between 30 to 49 years are at the threshold of full membership.

---

2 Few of the groups analyzed lived in autonomous titular okrugs (district) or cities (only the Poles in Belarus had an autonomous okrug from 1932 to 1935). Furthermore, oblasts and republics rarely featured distinctive differences in their relationship to the central Soviet state. Consequently, all cases of formal titular autonomy are calibrated as a 1, and there is no distinction made between an autonomous SSR, oblast, okrug, or gorod.
membership in the set, 0.953. Groups between 25 and 29 years are mostly in the set of nationalized groups, 0.81. Groups with 15 to 24 years residing in their formally autonomous titular region are more in than out of the set of nationalized groups, .622. Groups with 6 to 14 years residence are at the cross-over point, as it is most unclear whether they are more in than out of the set of groups that nationalized (unclear whether they had time to actually make the political and cultural borders congruent), 0.5. Groups with any stint of formal autonomy during the 20th century to 5 years of autonomy are mostly out of the set of nationalized groups, 0.119. Those that never experienced formal titular autonomy in the 20th are full nonmembers, 0. The condition is labeled: adminautonyrs.

**Resource Rich Territory**

It is believed that when a territory is highly valued by two or more entities it increases the likelihood of contention. Waterways, natural resources, industrial development and strategic borders help make a territory more valuable, and incentivize elites to gain control over the territory through group mobilization. Territorial exit is also likely to increase conflict with the state if the territory is rich in material resources.

I calibrate this utilizing the existing crisp set created by Duffy Toft (2003, appendix 2). 1 indicates that the region where the group resides contains natural and human made resources, 0 indicates that the region where the group resides contains no natural or human-made resources. The condition is labeled: resource.

**Contiguous Homeland**

Homelands are often believed to inspire irredentist claims as well as offer unique protection or strategic help from abroad. 1 = Contiguous External Homeland to regional
base, 0 = No Contiguous External Homeland to regional base. The condition is labeled: contighome. ³

‘Recruitable’ Population

Membership in the recruitable population is indicated by a minority group’s population proportion within a given state (Fearon and Laitin 2003). I use the direct calibration method with three anchor points, 20% population percentage for the threshold of full members, 8% population percentage for the cross-over point (Fearon and Laitin (2003) utilize the 8% value as definitive turning point between having a recruitable population, those with more than 8% are recruitable those with less are not), and a group that composes 3% of the population is fully a nonmember of the recruitable population set theory. The condition is labeled: recpop.

Advantaged initial state conditions

I utilize the initial conditions used by ERBD (1999, 21, ch 2). The values are derived from a factor analysis with weighted averages that measure level of development, trade dependence on CMEA, macroeconomic disequilibria, distance to the EU, natural resource endowments, market memory and state capacity. GDP per capita, geographical location (proximity the EU), distortions in the allocation of employment, extent of macroeconomic imbalance and length of time under central planning. Those with an ERBD index score of 0.4 are at the threshold of full membership, an index score of 2.2 indicates the cross-over point of membership, and an ERBD score of 3 indicates

³ Variable also examined but illustrated minimal insight: Resides in Homeland 1 = fully (Homeland’s imagined boundaries do not exceed those of the state or the group’s regional base within the state = MAR 1 (GC8)), 0.67 = resides in the homeland more than not (homeland’s imagined boundaries exceed those of its regional base, but not the state’s boundaries = MAR 2 (GC8)), 0.5 = the greatest ambiguity exists when homeland’s imagined boundaries exceed those of the state ( MAR 3 (GC8)), 0 = no imagined homeland (MAR 4 (GC8)), Homeland’s imagined boundaries lie entirely outside the state in which the group currently resides (MAR 0 (GC8))
the threshold for full nonmembership in the set of states with advantaged initial conditions. The condition is labeled: advaninitialsta.

**Weak State Capacity**

I utilize Hamm, Stuckler and King’s (2010) index for 1990s state capacity to indicate membership within the weak state capacity countries. I take the average of the five scores (barter, bribe, government inefficiency, insecure contracts and property rights, and unofficial payments to public officials) that indicate the likelihood of having a weak state (World Bank/EBRD Business Environment and the Enterprise Performance Survey, 1999/2000). Those on the threshold of full membership are indicated by a 0.6 average on the scale, 0.5 indicates the cross-over point, and 0.4 indicates the threshold point for full nonmembership in the set of weak states. The condition is labeled: weakstatecapacity.

**Grievances**

Political and economic grievances are cited as motivating, instigating, or sustaining rebellion.

**Highly Declined in Political Status**

A drop in political status can lead to grievances that instigate mobilization. 1 = Fully in the set of groups that highly declined in political status (Change in MAR score (POLDIS) from 0 to 3 or 4), 0.67 = Moderately high decline in Political Status (Change in MAR score (POLDIS) from 1 to 3, 1 to 4, 2 to 3, or 2 to 4), 0.5 = Most ambiguous whether they experienced a high decline in political status (Change in MAR score (POLDIS) from 1 to 2 or 3 to 4), 0.33 = more out than in the set (Change in MAR score (POLDIS) from 0 to 1, 0 to 2), 0 = no change or improved. The condition is labeled: declinpol.
**Highly Politically Discriminated Groups**

The variable is based upon Minorities at Risk (MAR) data and categories (POLDIS). MAR scores of 4 or 3 are coded as a 1, fully in the set of highly politically discriminated groups. A MAR score of 2 is coded as 0.67, mostly in the set of politically discriminated groups. A MAR score of 1 is coded as 0.33, more out of the set of highly politically discriminated groups. A MAR score of 0 is coded as 0, fully out of the set of politically discriminated groups – no discrimination. The condition is labeled: polidisc.

**Highly Economically Discriminated Groups**

The variable is based upon Minorities at Risk (MAR) data and categories (ECDIS). MAR scores of 4 or 3 are coded as a 1, fully in the set of highly economically discriminated groups. A MAR score of 2 is coded as 0.67, mostly in the set of economically discriminated groups. A MAR score of 1 is coded as 0.33, more out of the set of highly economically discriminated groups. A MAR score of 0 is coded as 0, fully out of the set of economically discriminated groups – no discrimination.\(^4\) The condition is labeled: econdiscrim.

**Highly Declined in Economic Status**

A drop in economic status can lead to grievances that instigate mobilization. 1 = Fully in the set of groups that highly declined in economic status (Change in MAR score

\(^4\) MAR scores are represented in fuzzy sets: 1 = Exclusion/repressive policy “Public policies (formal exclusion and/or recurring repression) substantially restrict the group’s economic opportunities by contrast with other groups” and “Social exclusion/neutral policy. Significant poverty and under-representation due to prevailing social practice by dominant groups. Formal public policies toward the group are neutral or, if positive, inadequate to offset active and widespread discrimination” (Minorities at Risk Project 2009, 11). 0.67 = “Neglect/no remedial policies. Significant poverty and under-representation due to historical marginality, neglect, or restrictions. No social practice of deliberate exclusion. Few or no public policies aim to improving the group’s material well-being” (Minorities at Risk Project 2009, 11). 0.33 = Neglect/remedial policies. Significant poverty and under-representation in desirable occupations due to historical marginality, neglect, or restrictions. Public policies are designed to improve the group’s material well being” (Minorities at Risk Project 2009, 11). 0 = No discrimination. A similar representation exists for political discrimination.
(ECDIS) from 0 to 3 or 4), 0.67 = Moderately high decline in economic status (Change in MAR score (ECDIS) from 1 to 3, 1 to 4, 2 to 3, or 2 to 4), 0.5 = Most ambiguous whether they experienced a high decline in economic status (Change in MAR score (ECDIS) from 1 to 2 or 3 to 4), 0.33 = Change in MAR score (ECDIS) from 0 to 1 or 0 to 2), 0 = no change or improved. The condition is labeled: declineecon.

**Economically Beneficial to Secede/High Status region in a low status country**

Calculated using whether the region inhabited by the minority group was a resource rich territory (see calibration for resource) and the state was initially advantaged (see calibration for advaninitialsta). When resource = 1 and state initial advantage <0.3 I assign a 1 for it being economically beneficial to secede. All other values receive a 0. (Future iterations will measure the economic benefits of secession with Henry Hale’s (2008, 169) retail commodity turnover index.) The condition is labeled: econtoseced.

**Security Dilemma**

I use Barry Posen’s (1993) definition of a security dilemma to evaluate the cases and assign a crisp set. Full membership in the set, 1. Full nonmembership in the set of cases that experienced a security dilemma, 0. The condition is labeled: secdil.

**Modernization Effects**

**Pre-Communist Literate Majority**

Literacy is believed to create loyalty when it is accompanied by nationalist rhetoric that may help then support more pro-national affiliations or pro-communist affiliations depending upon its timing (Darden and Grzymala-Busse 2006). High literacy rates prior to communism are proposed to increase loyalty to national groups than Soviet entities and ease post-communist collaboration. Consequently, it is proposed
that majority groups with high pre-communist literacy will be more able to cooperate to end conflict, and minority groups with high pre-communist literacy will be more able to unite to secede. I utilize Darden’s and Grzymala-Busse’s (2006) data and figures to indicate cutoff points that help calibrate the set of pre-communist literate national titular majority groups. Groups with pre-communist literacy rates of 83% are used to indicate the threshold of full membership. Groups with literacy rates of 45% indicate the cross-over point of membership. Finally, majority groups with literacy rates of 20% indicate the threshold for full nonmembership in the set of pre-communist literate titular majorities. The condition is labeled: litmaj.

Unequal Development

Many scholars argue that unequal patterns of development across ethnic groups will instigate ethnic violence. 1 = Fully very seriously economically disadvantaged (MAR 3 (ECPOV)), 0.67 substantially disadvantaged (MAR 2 (ECPOV)), 0.3 slightly economically disadvantaged (MAR 1 (ECPOV)), 0 = no economic disadvantages (MAR 0 (ECPOV)) (MAR 2009, 161-162). The condition is labeled: relativdepr.

International Factors

Country’s Desire for Close Ties with Europe

This crisp set utilizes euroborometer data to indicate those country’s with 40% or more who felt favorable to the EU as fully in the set of minority groups that desired close ties with Europe, 1. Groups with 39% or less minority respondents who felt favorable are calibrated as fully nonmembers of the set. The condition is labeled: wanteu.

---

A secondary calibration was also examined for the set of minority groups that wanted to join the EU: 50% indicated full membership, 40% indicated the cross-over point, 20% full nonmembership.
**Russian Economic Dependence**

Current state membership in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) is used a proxy for Russian economic dependence. This crisp set is defined by whether a group is a current member, 1, or not, 0. (Current membership better illustrates economic independence than 1990s membership, as early post-communist international power arrangements, confusion, and negotiations likely led to some nations becoming members, despite their lack of need.) The condition is labeled: cis.

**Language Different from the Center**

It is proposed that groups with vast differences in their first language from the state center were more likely to oppose loyalty because the difference in language would hamper their life chances (Hale 2008; Marquardt 2014). I use the indirect calibration method to determine membership in the set of case that have a minority group with a different language from the majority group. A different language family indicates full membership in set of cases that have a different language from the center, 1. Different languages indicate the threshold of full membership, 0.953. Different dialects indicate more out than in, 0.378. Finally, no notable difference indicates full nonmembership, 0. The condition is labeled: langdif.

**Majority Group Elite consensus**

The indirect calibration method – indicated by notable political factions, government collapse, the number of elections, and the number of ‘major’ policies overturned within the titular majority – is used to illustrate negative set membership (e.g.

---

6 To be added, elite mobilization, 1 = full (widely considered charismatic and active), 0.67 = more in than out (active but not highly charismatic), 0.33 = more out than in (mostly a grassroots movement with some charismatic leaders), 0 = no elite involvement,
Coherence

Group Coherence is informed and calibrated through case studies. In essence, group coherence is composed of solidarity (common understanding as established by cultural artifacts and interviews) and salience (indicated when a group identity marks life chances in numerous spheres). Following state collapse, I propose that high group coherence provides links to build organizational capacity, which determines whether the group dominating the state will successfully manage minority conflicts (assuming elite majority consensus) and the minority group’s ability to rebel.

Coherent Majority Group

Table 6.1 illustrates the general relationship between mathematical categories and qualitative membership in a set. I use the same values and qualitative scores to define membership in a coherent majority group. The indicators for calibration are illustrated in Chapter 2. The condition is labeled: majcoh.

Coherent Minority Group

Table 6.1 illustrates the general relationship between mathematical categories and qualitative membership in a set. I use the same values and qualitative scores to define membership in a coherent minority group. The indicators for calibration are illustrated in Chapter 2. The condition is labeled: mincoh.

Theory of Group Coherence and Secessionist Civil War

This is a crisp set where a case receives a 1 when it includes an incoherent majority group and a coherent minority group, and a 0 when it does not. The condition is labeled: cohpredictcw.
Theory of Group Coherence and Chaotic Violence

This is a crisp set where a case receives a 1 when it includes an incoherent majority group and an incoherent minority group, and a 0 when it does not. The condition is labeled: cohpredicchao.

Theory of Group Coherence and Stability

This is a crisp set where a case receives a 1 when it includes a coherent majority group, and a 0 when it does not. The condition is labeled: cohpredstabil.
### APPENDIX B

**TRUTH TABLE ANALYSES**

Table B-1. Identifying initial necessary conditions for early post-communist secessionist civil war, chaotic violence, and stability.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theory</th>
<th>Theory of coherence</th>
<th>Theory of concentrated territories</th>
<th>Theory of indivisible territory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>cohpredictcw</td>
<td>Necessary conditions for secessionist civil war</td>
<td>Necessary conditions for chaotic violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.400</td>
<td>Consistency</td>
<td>Coverage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>a1.000</td>
<td>0.286</td>
<td>0.455</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>cohpredichao</td>
<td>a1.000</td>
<td>Consistency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>a1.000</td>
<td>0.667</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>cohpredstabil</td>
<td></td>
<td>Consistency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regionalbase</td>
<td>a1.000</td>
<td>Consistency</td>
<td>Coverage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concentrated</td>
<td>a0.848</td>
<td>Consistency</td>
<td>Coverage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majregbase</td>
<td>0.600</td>
<td>Consistency</td>
<td>Coverage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urbanmingroup</td>
<td>0.633</td>
<td>Consistency</td>
<td>Coverage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urbanmingroup*</td>
<td>0.367</td>
<td>Consistency</td>
<td>Coverage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indterritory*</td>
<td>0.900</td>
<td>Consistency</td>
<td>Coverage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Longhabitation</td>
<td>0.367</td>
<td>Consistency</td>
<td>Coverage</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*aNecessity = \( \sum (\min (X1 Y1))/\sum Y1 = 0.75 <\), binverse of set = 1 - subset (e.g. bLong habitation = absence of long habitation)
### Table B-1. Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theory</th>
<th>Fuzzy sets</th>
<th>Necessary conditions for secessionist civil war</th>
<th>Necessary conditions for chaotic violence</th>
<th>Necessary conditions for stability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Consistency</td>
<td>Coverage</td>
<td>Consistency</td>
<td>Coverage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theory of indivisible territory</td>
<td>urbanmingroup*</td>
<td>0.995</td>
<td>0.126</td>
<td>0.916</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>longhabitation</td>
<td>0.900</td>
<td>0.155</td>
<td>0.750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>inditterritory</td>
<td>0.800</td>
<td>0.143</td>
<td>0.750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>a*: coverage = 0.75 &lt;, inverse of set = 1 - subset (e.g. Long habitation = absence of long habitation)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theory of pre-communist Literacy theory</td>
<td>blitmaj</td>
<td>0.472</td>
<td>0.100</td>
<td>0.042</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>theory of institutions (administrative</td>
<td>adminautonomy1</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>0.227</td>
<td>0.330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>segmentation)</td>
<td>adminautonyrs</td>
<td>0.860</td>
<td>0.251</td>
<td>0.167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative deprivation theory</td>
<td>relativdepr</td>
<td>0.402</td>
<td>0.240</td>
<td>0.112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population size theory (Recruitable</td>
<td>recpop</td>
<td>0.209</td>
<td>0.092</td>
<td>0.317</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population)</td>
<td>langdif</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>0.137</td>
<td>0.813</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language differentiation theory</td>
<td>polidisc</td>
<td>0.612</td>
<td>0.239</td>
<td>0.885</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grievance theory</td>
<td>declinpol</td>
<td>0.305</td>
<td>0.174</td>
<td>0.747</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>econdiscrim</td>
<td>0.333</td>
<td>0.176</td>
<td>0.816</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>declineecon</td>
<td>0.112</td>
<td>0.118</td>
<td>0.736</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table B-1. Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theory</th>
<th>Fuzzy sets</th>
<th>Necessary conditions for secessionist civil war</th>
<th>Necessary conditions for chaotic violence</th>
<th>Necessary conditions for stability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Consistency</td>
<td>Coverage</td>
<td>Consistency</td>
<td>Coverage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State capacity theory</td>
<td>weakstatecapaci</td>
<td>0.665</td>
<td>0.111</td>
<td>0.705</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>advaninitialsta</td>
<td>0.599</td>
<td>0.112</td>
<td>0.423</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External homeland theory</td>
<td>Contiguous</td>
<td>0.400</td>
<td>0.133</td>
<td>0.500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valuable land theory/elite interests in secession</td>
<td>resource</td>
<td>0.600</td>
<td>0.176</td>
<td>0.330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>econtoseced</td>
<td>0.200</td>
<td>0.142</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Dilemma</td>
<td>secdil</td>
<td>a&lt;sup&gt;1.000&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0.500</td>
<td>0.500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Desires/Conditionality</td>
<td>WANTEU</td>
<td>a&lt;sup&gt;1.000&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0.135</td>
<td>a&lt;sup&gt;1.000&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>WANTEU</td>
<td>a&lt;sup&gt;1.000&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0.135</td>
<td>a&lt;sup&gt;1.000&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic dependence on Russian Federation</td>
<td>cis</td>
<td>0.600</td>
<td>0.107</td>
<td>a&lt;sup&gt;1.000&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elite agreement theory</td>
<td>eliteagre</td>
<td>a&lt;sup&gt;0.800&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0.148</td>
<td>0.667</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup>Necessity = Σ (min (X<sub>1</sub>, Y<sub>1</sub>))/ Σ Y<sub>1</sub> = 0.75<sub>a</sub>, <sup>b</sup>inverse of set = 1 - subset (e.g. <sup>b</sup>Long habitation = absence of long habitation)
Table B-2. Truth table analysis for secessionist civil war: relative deprivation theory and institutional autonomy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Causal combination</th>
<th>Raw coverage</th>
<th>Unique coverage</th>
<th>Consistency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>declineecon*relativedepr</td>
<td>0.268</td>
<td>0.034</td>
<td>a0.802</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>adminautonomy1<em>relativedepr</em>litmaj</td>
<td>0.243</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>0.327</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

solution coverage: 0.277485
solution consistency: 0.356595
frequency cutoff: 1.000000
consistency cutoff: 0.780000

Parsimonious Solution

*Necessity = Σ (min (X1 Y1))/Σ Y1 = 0.75<

*inverse of set = 1 - subset (e.g. *Long habitation = absence of long habitation*)
Table B-3. Fuzzy truth table analysis of initial necessary conditions for secessionist civil war.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conditions</th>
<th>Coverage</th>
<th>Consistency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Secdil<em>noEU</em>ElitAgree</td>
<td>0.200</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>inditerritory<em>secdil</em>eliteagree</td>
<td>0.200</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>longhabit<em>secdil</em>eliteagree</td>
<td>0.200</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>adminauto<em>secdil</em>eliteagree</td>
<td>0.200</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>urban<em>longhabit</em>noEU*elite agree</td>
<td>0.186</td>
<td>0.205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>urban<em>langdif</em>noEU*eliteagree</td>
<td>0.186</td>
<td>0.166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>urban<em>longhabit</em>adminauto*eliteagree</td>
<td>0.186</td>
<td>0.439</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>urban<em>adminauto</em>langdif*eliteagree</td>
<td>0.186</td>
<td>0.391</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Solution consistency: 0.169  
solution coverage: 0.2  

\[ \text{Necessity} = \frac{\sum (\min (X1 \ Y1))}{\sum Y1} = 0.75 <  

\text{Inverse of set = 1 - subset (e.g. Long habitation = absence of long habitation)}
Table B-4. Truth table analysis for secessionist civil war: state strength, recruitable population, and resources.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Causal combination</th>
<th>Raw coverage</th>
<th>Unique coverage</th>
<th>Consistency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>adminautonomy1*recpop</td>
<td>0.209</td>
<td>0.154</td>
<td>0.658</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$^b$ resource<em>adminautonomy1</em>$^h$ weakstatecapaci</td>
<td>0.247</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>$^a$0.886</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$^b$ recpop*$^h$ weakstatecapaci*secdil</td>
<td>0.333</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>$^a$0.960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$^b$ resource*$^h$ weakstatecapaci*secdil</td>
<td>0.247</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>$^a$0.966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>adminautonomy1*$^h$ weakstatecapaci*secdil</td>
<td>0.335</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>$^a$0.983</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Solution coverage: 0.489854

Solution consistency: 0.788533

Frequency cutoff: 1.000000

Consistency cutoff: 0.926426

Parsimonious Solution

**Necessity = $\sum (\min (X_1 Y_1))/\sum Y_1 = 0.75<$

$^b$ inverse of set = 1 - subset (e.g. $^b$ Long habitation = absence of long habitation)
Table B-5. Truth table analysis for secessionist civil war: indivisible territory theory, institutional (segment states thesis) theory, security dilemma.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Causal combination</th>
<th>Raw coverage</th>
<th>Unique coverage</th>
<th>Consistency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>urbanmingroup<em>longhabitation</em>inditerritory<em>secdil</em>adminautonomy1</td>
<td>0.438</td>
<td>0.438</td>
<td>a 0.779</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

solution coverage: 0.437800
solution consistency: 0.778726

Parsimonious Solution

*aNecessity = \( \sum ( \min (X_1 Y_1)) / \sum Y_1 = 0.75 < \)

*inverse of set = 1 - subset (e.g. Long habitation = absence of long habitation)

Table B-6. Truth table analysis for secessionist civil war: indivisible territory theory.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Causal combination</th>
<th>Raw coverage</th>
<th>Unique coverage</th>
<th>Consistency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>adminautonomy1<em>secdil</em>urbanmingroup</td>
<td>0.633</td>
<td>0.095</td>
<td>a 0.836</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>secdil<em>inditerritory</em>urbanmingroup</td>
<td>0.438</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>a 0.755</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>secdil<em>longhabitation</em>urbanmingroup</td>
<td>0.538</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.731</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

solution coverage: 0.632600
solution consistency: 0.761252

Frequency cutoff: 1.000000
consistency cutoff: 0.778726

Parsimonious Solution

**Necessity = \( \sum (\min (X_1 Y_1)) / \sum Y_1 = 0.75 < \)

*inverse of set = 1 - subset (e.g. Long habitation = absence of long habitation)
Table B-7. Truth table analysis for secessionist civil war: theory of European integration desires, security dilemma, institutions, coherence.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Causal combination</th>
<th>Raw coverage</th>
<th>Unique coverage</th>
<th>Consistency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>secdl<em>~wanteu</em>mincoh</td>
<td>0.991</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>^0.871</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>adminautonomy1<em>secdl</em>mincoh</td>
<td>0.991</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>^0.909</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

solution coverage: 0.990600
solution consistency: 0.870781
frequency cutoff: 1.000000
consistency cutoff: 0.835493

Parsimonious Solution
^Necessity = \sum (\min (X1 \ Y1))/\sum Y1 = 0.75<
^inverse of set = 1 - subset (e.g. ^Long habitation = absence of long habitation)

Table B-8. Truth table analysis for secessionist civil war: theory of group coherence, security dilemma and concentrated territory.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Causal combination</th>
<th>Raw coverage</th>
<th>Unique coverage</th>
<th>Consistency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>regionalbase<em>adminautonomy1</em>secdl<em>~majcoh</em>mincoh</td>
<td>0.352</td>
<td>0.176</td>
<td>^0.936</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>regionalbase<em>adminautonomy1</em>secdl<em>mincoh</em>elitedisag</td>
<td>0.790</td>
<td>0.610</td>
<td>^0.888</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

solution coverage: 0.966800
solution consistency: 0.906772
frequency cutoff: 1.000000
consistency cutoff: 0.860745

Complex Solution
^Necessity = \sum (\min (X1 \ Y1))/\sum Y1 = 0.75<
^inverse of set = 1 - subset (e.g. ^Long habitation = absence of long habitation)
Table B-9. Truth table analysis for secessionist civil war: theory of group coherence, institutional autonomy, security dilemma, concentrated territory.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Causal combination</th>
<th>Raw coverage</th>
<th>Unique coverage</th>
<th>Consistency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>regionalbase<em>adminautonomy1</em>secdil*mincoh</td>
<td>0.991</td>
<td>0.991</td>
<td>a0.991</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

solution coverage: 0.990600
solution consistency: 0.908807
frequency cutoff: 1.000000
consistency cutoff: 0.865239

Complex Solution

aNecessity = ∑ (min (X1 Y1))/∑ Y1 = 0.75<
biinverse of set = 1 - subset (e.g. bLong habitation = absence of long habitation)

Table B-10. Truth table analysis for secessionist civil war: coherence and elite theory, security dilemma, concentrated territory.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Causal combination</th>
<th>Raw coverage</th>
<th>Unique coverage</th>
<th>Consistency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>secdil*cohelipathsec</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>a1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>adminautonomy1*cohelipathsec</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>a1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>regionalbase*cohelipathsec</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>a1.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

solution coverage: 1.000000
solution consistency: 1.000000
frequency cutoff: 2.000000
consistency cutoff: 1.000000

Parsimonoius Solution

aNecessity = ∑ (min (X1 Y1))/∑ Y1 = 0.75<
biinverse of set = 1 - subset (e.g. bLong habitation = absence of long habitation)
Table B-11. Truth table analysis secessionist civil war: security dilemma, ties with Europe, tradition of habitation, administrative autonomy, language differentiation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Causal combination</th>
<th>Raw coverage</th>
<th>Consistency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>secdil<em>wanteu</em>longhabitation<em>adminautonomy1</em>langdif</td>
<td>0.900</td>
<td>0.750</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

solution coverage: 0.900000  
solution consistency: 0.750000  
frequency cutoff: 1.000000  
consistency cutoff: 0.750000  

Complex Solution  
\[^aNecessity = \sum (\min (X_1 Y_1))/\sum Y_1 = 0.75<\]  
\[^b\text{inverse of set} = 1 - \text{subset (e.g. } ^b\text{Long habitation = absence of long habitation)}\]

Table B-12. Truth table analysis for security dilemma: group coherence and concentrated territory.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Causal combination</th>
<th>Raw coverage</th>
<th>Consistency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>regionalbase<em>majinco</em>~majcoh*elitedisag</td>
<td>0.352</td>
<td>0.800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>regionalbase<em>mincoh</em>majcoh*elitedisag</td>
<td>0.381</td>
<td>0.762</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

solution coverage: 0.685500  
solution consistency: 0.778358  
frequency cutoff: 1.000000  
consistency cutoff: 0.750000  

Intermediate Solution  
\[^aNecessity = \sum (\min (X_1 Y_1))/\sum Y_1 = 0.75<\]  
\[^b\text{inverse of set} = 1 - \text{subset (e.g. } ^b\text{Long habitation = absence of long habitation)}\]
Table B-13. Fuzzy truth table analysis for chaotic violence: indivisible territory, coherence, European Union desires, language differentiation, economic dependence on Russia.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Causal combination</th>
<th>Raw coverage</th>
<th>Unique coverage</th>
<th>Consistency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>majinco</td>
<td>majcoh</td>
<td>longhabitation</td>
<td>inditerritory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>wanteu</td>
<td>langdif</td>
<td>cis</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

solution coverage: 0.431833
solution consistency: 0.932014
frequency cutoff: 1.000000
consistency cutoff: 0.932014

Intermediate Solution

Necessity = \( \sum (\min (X1 \ Y1))/\sum Y1 = 0.75 <\)

inverse of set = 1 - subset (e.g. Long habitation = absence of long habitation)

Table B-14. Fuzzy truth table analysis for chaotic violence: theory of group coherence, regional base.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Causal combination</th>
<th>Raw coverage</th>
<th>Unique coverage</th>
<th>Consistency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>cohpredictchao</td>
<td>regionalbase</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

solution coverage: 1.000000
solution consistency: 1.000000
frequency cutoff: 2.000000
consistency cutoff: 0.967325

Parsimonious Solution

Necessity = \( \sum (\min (X1 \ Y1))/\sum Y1 = 0.75 <\)

inverse of set = 1 - subset (e.g. Long habitation = absence of long habitation)
### Table B-15. Truth table analysis for stability: initial necessary sets.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Causal combination</th>
<th>Raw coverage</th>
<th>Unique coverage</th>
<th>Consistency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(^{b})relative depr(^{b})polidisc(^{b})declinpol(^{b})econdiscrim(^{b})declineecon(^{b})secdil</td>
<td>0.586</td>
<td>0.506</td>
<td>(^{a})0.864</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(^{b})relative depr(^{b})declinpol(^{b})econdiscrim(^{a})declineecon(^{a})econtoseced(^{d})resource(^{a})secdil</td>
<td>0.080</td>
<td>0.023</td>
<td>(^{a})1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(^{b})relative depr(^{b})polidisc(^{b})declinpol(^{d})econdiscrim(^{b})declineecon(^{b})econtoseced(^{b})secdil</td>
<td>0.103</td>
<td>0.023</td>
<td>(^{a})1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(^{b})relative depr(^{b})polidisc(^{b})declinpol(^{b})econdiscrim(^{b})declineecon(^{b})econtoseced(^{b})secdil</td>
<td>0.069</td>
<td>0.058</td>
<td>(^{a})1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(^{b})relative depr(^{b})polidisc(^{b})declinpol(^{b})econdiscrim(^{b})declineecon(^{b})econtoseced(^{b})secdil</td>
<td>0.080</td>
<td>0.069</td>
<td>(^{a})0.876</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(^{b})relative depr(^{b})polidisc(^{b})declinpol(^{b})econdiscrim(^{b})declineecon(^{b})econtoseced(^{b})resource(^{b})secdil</td>
<td>0.023</td>
<td>0.023</td>
<td>(^{a})1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(^{b})polidisc(^{b})declinpol(^{b})econdiscrim(^{b})declineecon(^{b})econtoseced(^{b})resource(^{b})secdil</td>
<td>0.092</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>(^{a})1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(^{b})relative depr(^{b})polidisc(^{b})declinpol(^{b})declineecon(^{b})econtoseced(^{b})resource(^{b})secdil</td>
<td>0.092</td>
<td>0.023</td>
<td>(^{a})1.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

solution coverage: 0.862414  
solution consistency: 0.903540  
frequency cutoff: 1.000000  
consistency cutoff: 0.783455  
Complex Solution  
\(^{a}\)Necessity = \(\sum (\min (X_1, Y_1))/\sum Y_1 = 0.75<\)  
\(^{b}\)inverse of set = 1 - subset (e.g. \(^{b}\)Long habitation = absence of long habitation)
Table B-16. Truth table analysis for stability: theory of group coherence.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Causal combination</th>
<th>Raw coverage</th>
<th>Unique coverage</th>
<th>Consistency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>cohpredstabil</td>
<td>0.724</td>
<td>0.724</td>
<td>a0.840</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Solution coverage: 0.724138  
Solution consistency: 0.840000  
Frequency cutoff: 4.000000  
Consistency cutoff: 0.809524  
Complex Solution

\[ \text{Necessity} = \sum (\text{min}(X1 \ Y1))/\sum Y1 = 0.75< \]
\[ \text{inverse of set} = 1 - \text{subset (e.g. } \text{Long habitation} = \text{absence of long habitation)} \]

Table B-17. Truth table analysis for stability: absence of grievances, economically advantaged territory.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Causal combination</th>
<th>Raw coverage</th>
<th>Unique coverage</th>
<th>Consistency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>bpolidisc</td>
<td>0.736</td>
<td>0.713</td>
<td>a0.831</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>brelativedepr<em>econdiscrim</em>resource</td>
<td>0.057</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>a0.716</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>brelativedepr<em>declineecon</em>resource</td>
<td>0.046</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>a0.801</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Solution coverage: 0.770000  
Solution consistency: 0.817350  
Frequency cutoff: 1.000000  
Consistency cutoff: 0.769053  
Parsimonious Solution

\[ \text{Necessity} = \sum (\text{min}(X1 \ Y1))/\sum Y1 = 0.75< \]
\[ \text{inverse of set} = 1 - \text{subset (e.g. } \text{Long habitation} = \text{absence of long habitation)} \]
Table B-18. Truth table analysis for stability: absence of grievances, absence of security dilemma.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Causal combination</th>
<th>Raw coverage</th>
<th>Unique coverage</th>
<th>Consistency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>bpolidisc*bcontoseced</td>
<td>0.540</td>
<td>0.149</td>
<td>a0.825</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>brelativedepr*secdil</td>
<td>0.758</td>
<td>0.368</td>
<td>a0.868</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

solution coverage: 0.907931
solution consistency: 0.868404
frequency cutoff: 1.000000
consistency cutoff: 0.783455

Parsimonious

aNecessity = Σ (min (X1 Y1))/Σ Y1 = 0.75<
binverse of set = 1 - subset (e.g. bLon habitation = absence of long habitation)


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Causal combination</th>
<th>Raw coverage</th>
<th>Unique coverage</th>
<th>Consistency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>bsecdil</td>
<td>0.931</td>
<td>0.931</td>
<td>a0.871</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

solution coverage: 0.931035
solution consistency: 0.870968
frequency cutoff: 10.000000
consistency cutoff: 0.870968

Complex Solution

aNecessity = Σ (min (X1 Y1))/Σ Y1 = 0.75<
binverse of set = 1 - subset (e.g. bLong habitation = absence of long habitation)
Table B-20. Truth table analysis for stability: theory of group coherence.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Causal combination</th>
<th>Raw coverage</th>
<th>Unique coverage</th>
<th>Consistency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>cohpredstabil</td>
<td>0.724</td>
<td>0.724</td>
<td>0.840</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

solution coverage: 0.724138  
solution consistency: 0.840000  
frequency cutoff: 4.000000  
consistency cutoff: 0.809524  
complex solution  
\[ \text{Necessity} = \sum \frac{\min (X1 Y1)}{\sum Y1} = 0.75 < \]

\( ^{b} \)inverse of set = 1 - subset (e.g. Long habitation = absence of long habitation)

Table B-21. Truth table analysis for absence of security dilemma outcome, theory of group coherence.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Causal combination</th>
<th>Raw coverage</th>
<th>Unique coverage</th>
<th>Consistency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( ^{b} )regionalbase</td>
<td>0.419</td>
<td>0.258</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( ^{b} )secdil</td>
<td>0.651</td>
<td>0.484</td>
<td>0.800</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

solution coverage: 0.903226  
solution consistency: 0.848485  
complex solution  
\[ \text{Necessity} = \sum \frac{\min (X1 Y1)}{\sum Y1} = 0.75 < \]

\( ^{b} \)inverse of set = 1 - subset (e.g. Long habitation = absence of long habitation)
## APPENDIX C
### FULL TRUTH TABLE

Table C-1. Fully specified truth table for forty-one cases.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Dyad</th>
<th>majregbase</th>
<th>concentration</th>
<th>regionalbase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>Armenian/Azeri</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.995</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>Talysh-Murgan/Azeri</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.880</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>Lezgin/Azeri</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.998</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>Russian/Azeri</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.659</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>Polish/Belarussian</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.996</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>Russian/Belarussian</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.047</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>New Russians/Estonian</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.907</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>Abkaz/Georgian</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.560</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>Ossetian/Georgian</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.989</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>Russian/Georgian</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.354</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>Uzbek/Kyrgyzyz</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.231</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>Russian/Kyrgyzyz</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.969</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>Russian/Latvian</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.940</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>Polish/Lithuan</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.984</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>Russian/Lithuanan</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.970</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>Russian/Moldovan</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.711</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>Gagauz/Moldovan</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.702</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Chechen/Russian</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.986</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Ingush/Russian</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.995</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Tatar/Russian</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.946</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Bashkir/Russian</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.644</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Buryat/Russian</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.684</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Karachay/Russian</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.800</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Kuma/Russian</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.606</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Lezgins/Russian</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.998</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Roma/Russian</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Tuvinian/Russian</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.989</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Yakut/Russian</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.829</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Avsars/Russian</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.745</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>Pamiris (Badakhsha)/Tajik</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.997</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>Russian/Tajik</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.996</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>Uzbek/Tajik</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.798</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>Uzbek/Turkmense</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>Russian/Turkmense</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.254</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>Kazakh/Turkmense</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Russian (Donbass)/Ukrainian</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.929</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Transcarpathian/Ukrainian</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Crimean Russian/Ukrainian</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.989</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Crimean Tatar/Ukrainian</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.027</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>Tajik/Uzbek</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.182</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>Russian/Uzbek</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.832</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Dyad</td>
<td>urban mingroup</td>
<td>indi territory</td>
<td>long habitation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>Armenian/Azeri</td>
<td>0.930</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>Talysh-Murgan/Azeri</td>
<td>0.500</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>Lezgin/Azeri</td>
<td>0.409</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>Russian/Azeri</td>
<td>0.989</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>Polish/Belarussian</td>
<td>0.463</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>Russian/Belarussian</td>
<td>0.975</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>New Russians/Estonian</td>
<td>0.985</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>Abkaz/Georgian</td>
<td>0.397</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>Ossetian/Georgian</td>
<td>0.713</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>Russian/Georgian</td>
<td>0.974</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>Uzbek/Kyrgyz</td>
<td>0.282</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>Russian/Kyrgyz</td>
<td>0.880</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>Russian/Latvian</td>
<td>0.971</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>Polish/Lithuanian</td>
<td>0.684</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>Russian/Lithuanian</td>
<td>0.981</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>Russian/Moldovan</td>
<td>0.974</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>Gagauz/Moldovan</td>
<td>0.339</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Chechen/Russian</td>
<td>0.149</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Ingush/Russian</td>
<td>0.283</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Tatar/Russian</td>
<td>0.829</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Bashkir/Russian</td>
<td>0.470</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Buryat/Russian</td>
<td>0.354</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Karachay/Russian</td>
<td>0.213</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Kumyks/Russian</td>
<td>0.414</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Lezgins/Russian</td>
<td>0.390</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Roma/Russian</td>
<td>0.696</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Tuvinian/Russian</td>
<td>0.204</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Yakut/Russian</td>
<td>0.158</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Avars/Russian</td>
<td>0.210</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>Pamiris (Badakhsha)/Tajik</td>
<td>0.158</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>Russian/Tajik</td>
<td>0.988</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>Uzbek/Tajik</td>
<td>0.088</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>Uzbek/Turkmen</td>
<td>0.540</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>Russian/Turkmen</td>
<td>0.991</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>Kazakh/Turkmen</td>
<td>0.687</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Russian (Donbass)/Ukrainian</td>
<td>0.977</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Transcarpathian/Ukrainian</td>
<td>0.880</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Crimean Russian/Ukrainian</td>
<td>0.880</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Crimean Tatar/Ukrainian</td>
<td>0.224</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>Tajik/Uzbek</td>
<td>0.209</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>Russian/Uzbek</td>
<td>0.989</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Dyad</td>
<td>admin autonys</td>
<td>resource</td>
<td>contig</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>Armenian/Azери</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>Talysh-Murgan/Azери</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>Lezgin/Azери</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>Russian/Azери</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>Polish/Belorussian</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>Russian/Belorussian</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>New Russians/Estonian</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>Abkaz/Georgian</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>Ossetian/Georgian</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>Russian/Georgian</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>Uzbek/Kyrgyz</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>Russian/Kyrgyz</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>Russian/Latvian</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>Polish/Lithuanian</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>Russian/Lithuanian</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>Russian/Moldovan</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>Gagauz/Moldovan</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Chechen/Russian</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Ingush/Russian</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Tatar/Russian</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Bashkir/Russian</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Buryat/Russian</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Karachay/Russian</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Kumyks/Russian</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Lezghins/Russian</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Roma/Russian</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Tuvinian/Russian</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Yakut/Russian</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Avars/Russian</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>Pamiris (Badakhsha)/Tajik</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>Russian/Tajik</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>Uzbek/Tajik</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>Uzbek/Turkmen</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>Russian/Turkmen</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>Kazakh/Turkmen</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Russian (Donbass)/Ukrainian</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Transcarpathian/Ukrainian</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Crimean Russian/Ukrainian</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Crimean Tatar/Ukrainian</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>Tajik/Uzbek</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>Russian/Uzbek</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Dyad</td>
<td>weakstate capaci</td>
<td>polidisc</td>
<td>declinpol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>Armenian/Azeri</td>
<td>0.174</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>Talysh-Murgan/Azeri</td>
<td>0.174</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>Lezgin/Azeri</td>
<td>0.174</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>Russian/Belarussian</td>
<td>0.165</td>
<td>0.330</td>
<td>0.330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>New Russians/Estonian</td>
<td>0.032</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>Abkaz/Georgian</td>
<td>0.589</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>0.670</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>Ossetian/Georgian</td>
<td>0.589</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>0.670</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>Russian/Georgian</td>
<td>0.589</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>Uzbek/Kyrgyzy</td>
<td>0.981</td>
<td>0.670</td>
<td>0.330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>Russian/Kyrgyzy</td>
<td>0.981</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>Russian/Latvian</td>
<td>0.440</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>Polish/Lithuan</td>
<td>0.603</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>Russian/Lithuan</td>
<td>0.603</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>Russian/Moldovan</td>
<td>0.996</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>Gagauz/Moldovan</td>
<td>0.996</td>
<td>0.670</td>
<td>0.500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Chechen/Russian</td>
<td>0.975</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>0.670</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Ingush/Russian</td>
<td>0.975</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Tatar/Russian</td>
<td>0.975</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Bashkir/Russian</td>
<td>0.975</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Buryat/Russian</td>
<td>0.975</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Karachay/Russian</td>
<td>0.975</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Kumyks/Russian</td>
<td>0.975</td>
<td>0.670</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Lezgins/Russian</td>
<td>0.975</td>
<td>0.670</td>
<td>0.330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Roma/Russian</td>
<td>0.975</td>
<td>0.670</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Tuvinian/Russian</td>
<td>0.975</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Yakut/Russian</td>
<td>0.975</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Avars/Russian</td>
<td>0.975</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>Pamiris (Badakhsha)/Tajik</td>
<td>0.953</td>
<td>0.330</td>
<td>0.330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>Russian/Tajik</td>
<td>0.953</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>Kazakh/Tajik</td>
<td>0.953</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>0.670</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>Uzbek/Turkmen</td>
<td>0.953</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>Russian/Turkmen</td>
<td>0.953</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>Kazakh/Turkmen</td>
<td>0.953</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Russian (Donbass)/Ukrainian</td>
<td>0.994</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Transcarpathian/Ukrainian</td>
<td>0.994</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Crimean Russian/Ukrainian</td>
<td>0.994</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Crimean Tatar/Ukrainian</td>
<td>0.994</td>
<td>0.330</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>Tajik/Uzbek</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>0.670</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>Russian/Uzbek</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Dyad</td>
<td>relative depr</td>
<td>secdil</td>
<td>econ tosecd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>Armenian/Azeri</td>
<td>0.670</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>Talysh-Murgan/Azeri</td>
<td>0.670</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>Lezgin/Azeri</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>Russian/Azeri</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>Polish/Belarussian</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>Russian/Belarussian</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>New Russians/Estonian</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>Abkaz/Georgian</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>Ossetian/Georgian</td>
<td>0.670</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>Russian/Georgian</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>Uzbek/Kyrgyz</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>Russian/Kyrgyz</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>Russian/Latvian</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>Polish/Lithuanian</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>Russian/Lithuanian</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>Russian/Moldovan</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>Gagauz/Moldovan</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Chechen/Russian</td>
<td>0.670</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Ingush/Russian</td>
<td>0.670</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Tatar/Russian</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Bashkir/Russian</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Buryat/Russian</td>
<td>0.670</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Karachay/Russian</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Kumyks/Russian</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Lezgins/Russian</td>
<td>0.670</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Roma/Russian</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Tuvinian/Russian</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Yakut/Russian</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Avars/Russian</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>Pamiris (Badakhsha)/Tajik</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>Russian/Tajik</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>Uzbek/Tajik</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>Uzbek/Turkmen</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>Russian/Turkmen</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>Kazakh/Turkmen</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Russian (Donbass)/Ukrainian</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Transcarpathian/Ukrainian</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Crimean Russian/Ukrainian</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Crimean Tatar/Ukrainian</td>
<td>0.670</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>Tajik/Uzbek</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>Russian/Uzbek</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Dyad</td>
<td>langdif</td>
<td>eliteagre</td>
<td>elitedisag</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>Armenian/Azeri</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>Talysh-Murgan/Azeri</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>Lezgin/Azeri</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>Russian/Azeri</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>Polish/Belorussian</td>
<td>0.953</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>Russian/Belorussian</td>
<td>0.953</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>New Russians/Estonian</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>Abkaz/Georgian</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>Ossetian/Georgian</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>Russian/Georgian</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>Uzbek/Kyrgyz</td>
<td>0.378</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>Russian/Kyrgyz</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>Russian/Latvian</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>Polish/Lithuanian</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>Russian/Lithuanian</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>Russian/Moldovan</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>Gagauz/Moldovan</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Chechen/Russian</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Ingush/Russian</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Tatar/Russian</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Bashkir/Russian</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Buryat/Russian</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Karachay/Russian</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Kumyks/Russian</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Lezgins/Russian</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Roma/Russian</td>
<td>0.953</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Tuvinian/Russian</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Yakut/Russian</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Avars/Russian</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>Pamiris (Badakhsha)/Tajik</td>
<td>0.500</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>Russian/Tajik</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>Uzbek/Tajik</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>Uzbek/Turkmen</td>
<td>0.378</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>Russian/Turkmen</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>Kazakh/Turkmen</td>
<td>0.378</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Russian (Donbass)/Ukrainian</td>
<td>0.378</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Transcarpathian/Ukrainian</td>
<td>0.378</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Crimean Russian/Ukrainian</td>
<td>0.378</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Crimean Tatar/Ukrainian</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>Tajik/Uzbek</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>Russian/Uzbek</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Dyad</td>
<td>mincoh</td>
<td>minincoh</td>
<td>cohpredict cw</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>Armenian/Azeri</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>Talysh-Murgan/Azeri</td>
<td>0.119</td>
<td>0.881</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>Lezgin/Azeri</td>
<td>0.119</td>
<td>0.881</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>Russian/Azeri</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>Polish/Belarussian</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>Russian/Belarussian</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>New Russians/Estonian</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>Abkaz/Georgian</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>Ossetian/Georgian</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>Russian/Georgian</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>Uzbek/Kyrgyz</td>
<td>0.119</td>
<td>0.881</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>Russian/Kyrgyz</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>Russian/Latvian</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>Polish/Lithuanian</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>Russian/Lithuanian</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>Russian/Moldovan</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>Gagauz/Moldovan</td>
<td>0.119</td>
<td>0.881</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Chechen/Russian</td>
<td>0.953</td>
<td>0.047</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Ingush/Russian</td>
<td>0.378</td>
<td>0.622</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Tatar/Russian</td>
<td>0.119</td>
<td>0.622</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Bashkir/Russian</td>
<td>0.119</td>
<td>0.881</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Buryat/Russian</td>
<td>0.119</td>
<td>0.881</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Karachay/Russian</td>
<td>0.119</td>
<td>0.881</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Kumyks/Russian</td>
<td>0.119</td>
<td>0.881</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Lezgins/Russian</td>
<td>0.119</td>
<td>0.881</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Roma/Russian</td>
<td>0.119</td>
<td>0.881</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Tuvinian/Russian</td>
<td>0.119</td>
<td>0.881</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Yakut/Russian</td>
<td>0.119</td>
<td>0.881</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Avars/Russian</td>
<td>0.119</td>
<td>0.881</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>Pamiris (Badakhsha)/Tajik</td>
<td>0.119</td>
<td>0.881</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>Russian/Tajik</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>Uzbek/Tajik</td>
<td>0.119</td>
<td>0.881</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>Uzbek/Turkmen</td>
<td>0.119</td>
<td>0.881</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>Russian/Turkmen</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>Kazakh/Turkmen</td>
<td>0.119</td>
<td>0.881</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Russian (Donbass)/Ukrainian</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Transcarpathian/Ukrainian</td>
<td>0.810</td>
<td>0.190</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Crimean Russian/Ukrainian</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Crimean Tatar/Ukrainian</td>
<td>0.810</td>
<td>0.190</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>Tajik/Uzbek</td>
<td>0.119</td>
<td>0.881</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>Russian/Uzbek</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table C-1. Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Dyad</th>
<th>cohpred stabil</th>
<th>cohelipathsec</th>
<th>secessviol</th>
<th>violnosecess</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>Armenian/Azeri</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>Talysh-Murgan/Azeri</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>Lezgin/Azeri</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>Russian/Azeri</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>Polish/Belorussian</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>Russian/Belorussian</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>New Russians/Estonian</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>Abkaz/Georgian</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>Ossetian/Georgian</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>Russian/Georgian</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>Uzbek/Kyrgyz</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>Russian/Kyrgyz</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>Russian/Latvian</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>Polish/Lithuanian</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>Russian/Lithuanian</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>Russian/Moldovan</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>Gagauz/Moldovan</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Chechen/Russian</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Ingush/Russian</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Tatar/Russian</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Bashkir/Russian</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Buryat/Russian</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Karachay/Russian</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Kumyks/Russian</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Lezgins/Russian</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Roma/Russian</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Tuvinian/Russian</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Yakut/Russian</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Avars/Russian</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>Pamiris (Badakhsha)/Tajik</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>Russian/Tajik</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>Uzbek/Tajik</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>Uzbek/Turkmen</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>Russian/Turkmen</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>Kazakh/Turkmen</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Russian (Donbass)/Ukrainian</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Transcarpathian/Ukrainian</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Crimean Russian/Ukrainian</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Crimean Tatar/Ukrainian</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>Tajik/Uzbek</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>Russian/Uzbek</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Dyad</td>
<td>violence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>Armenian/Azeri</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>Talysh-Murgan/Azeri</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>Lezgin/Azeri</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>Russian/Azeri</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>Polish/Belarussian</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>Russian/Belarussian</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>New Russians/Estonian</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>Abkaz/Georgian</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>Ossetian/Georgian</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>Russian/Georgian</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>Uzbek/Kyrgyz</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>Russian/Kyrgyz</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>Russian/Latvian</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>Polish/Lithuanian</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>Russian/Lithuanian</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>Russian/Moldovan</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>Gagauz/Moldovan</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Chechen/Russian</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Ingush/Russian</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Tatar/Russian</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Bashkir/Russian</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Buryat/Russian</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Karachay/Russian</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Kumyks/Russian</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Lezgins/Russian</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Roma/Russian</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Tuvinian/Russian</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Yakut/Russian</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Avars/Russian</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>Pamiris (Badakhsha)/Tajik</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>Russian/Tajik</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>Uzbek/Tajik</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>Uzbek/Turkmen</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>Russian/Turkmen</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>Kazakh/Turkmen</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Russian (Donbass)/Ukrainian</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Transcarpathian/Ukrainian</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Crimean Russian/Ukrainian</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Crimean Tatar/Ukrainian</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>Tajik/Uzbek</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>Russian/Uzbek</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LIST OF REFERENCES


Berelowitch, Alexis. 1864. ‘Le nationalism russe,’ politque etrangere.


Bessarabia Literatura. 1991. “Republica Moldova nu poate reuşi ca patrie a unui singur neam, ci ca patrie a Moldovenilor Români, Ruşi, Ucraineni, Găgăuzi, Bulgară şi a., toţi cetăţenii egali în drepturi şi toţi deopotrivă Moldoveni, fie că aparţin limbii, istoriei şi culturii poporului Român, Rus, Ucrainean, Găgăuz sau Bulgar.”


Bukharin, Nikolai. 1933. Dvenadtsatyil s’ezd RKP/b/. Protokoly. Moscow: 613


Chernyshevskii, N. G. 1948. Polnoe Sobranie sochinenii vol. IV, Moscow.


Ekspress-khronika. 1987. no 9, A No. 6109, 44/87


Ekspress-khronika. 1988. no. 10, 12.


Katkov, M. N. 1897. Sobranie peredovykh statei Moskovskikh Vedomostei 1867god. Moscow


Kiev. 1983. Kommunisticheskaya partiya Ukrainy v rezoluciyakh i resheniyakh i решениях и съездов конференций и пленумов. Политиздат Украины.


Lartzev, V. C. 1993. Какую идеологию должно "исповедовать" Украинское государство и его армия. Киев: Ларцев, В. С.

Leary, Daniel Bell. 1919. Education and Autocracy in Russia from the Origins to the Bolsheviks [by] Daniel Bell Leary. University of Buffalo.

Lenin, V. I. 1913. “Theses on the National Question.”


and Stalin: Empire and Nation-Making in the Age of Lenin and Stalin. Oxford
University Press, USA.

Martonne, Emmanuel. 1919. “Travaux Du Comite D’etudes, Tome II, Questions


McAdam, Doug, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly. 2001. Dynamics of Contention.
Cambridge University Press.

Organizations: Status Distance and the Composition of Face-to-Face Groups.”

Meek, J. 1994. “Moscow Draws up Plans for Huge Migration of Russians.” Guardian,
June 2.

Publishers Ltd.

divisions of labour in the Soviet Republic of Estonia.” Nations and Nationalism 4
(March):363-88.

population migration in Soviet Estonia.” Journal of Ethnic and Migration
Studies 27 (August):133-150.

Mihailescu, Dan. 2007. De La Coroana Regala La Cercul Polar - Antologie. București:
Editura Curtea Veche.

Mikhnos’kyi. 1942. Hunchak and Solchany, Ukrains’ka suspil’no-politychna dumka,


System of Logic Ratiocinative and Inductive, Being a Connected View of the
Principles of Evidence and the Methods of Scientific Investigation (Books I-
III), ed. John M. Robson, Toronto: University of Toronto Press.


Rihoux, Benoît, and Charles C. Ragin. 2009. Configurational Comparative Methods: Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) and Related Techniques. SAGE.


Rozenburg, L. 1989. Этнические контакты в верхнем и среднем Поволжье в ХV до начале ХIХ в // Этноконтактные зоны в европейской части СССР. Типография Министерства культуры СССР.


Skocpol, Theda. 1979. States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.


Stalin, J. V. 1912-1913. “Marxism and the National Question”

Stan, C. Letter from Propagandist C. Stan to Minister of Education, April 26, 1920, ANR-DAIC, f. Ministerul INstructiunii, d. 118/1920 f.53


Storojenko, A. n.d. “Украинская идея, это гигантский шаг назад.”


Tilly, Charles, and Sidney Tarrow. 2006. Contentious Politics. OUP USA.


USSR. 1928. Itogi vsesoiuznoi perepisi naseleniia 1926 goda (Results of the all-union census of population of 1926). Moscow: Statistika.


Visti prestsentrut 1991. UMA, no. 8 (July).


BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Scott Grant Feinstein earned a Bachelor of Arts degree in chemistry and biology from Concordia College – Moorhead in 2004 and Master of Arts degree in politics from New York University in 2008. He received his PhD in political science from the University of Florida in May 2016 with concentrations in Comparative Politics, American Politics, and Political Methodology. During graduate school he also studied and conducted research at the University of California – Berkeley, Lomonosov Moscow State University, and several regions in Ukraine, Russia, and Moldova.

Dr. Feinstein’s research and teaching interests broadly focus on how humans establish order and change to adapt to and create new social conditions. This broad interest brought him to investigate how it is that states, institutions, and nations, particularly in Europe and former Soviet countries, respond to collective identities while adapting to societal changes, and the role that citizens, history, and culture play in this process. He also served as a United States Peace Corps Volunteer to Moldova.