AT THE LIMITS OF EMPIRE: INCAS, SPANIARDS, AND THE AVA-GUARANÍ (CHIRIGUANAES) ON THE CHARCAS-CHIRIGUANA FRONTIER, SOUTHEASTERN ANDES (1450s-1620s)

By

JONATHAN SCHOLL

A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA

2015
To K (for making it possible) & M (for putting it in perspective)
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to express my gratitude to the members of my committee for remaining with me during this long process. My advisor and mentor Ida Altman, above all, has provided guidance in my work while allowing me to develop an identity as a historian and to branch out as a scholar. The late Bruce Chappell introduced me and so many others to Spanish colonial paleography, which allowed me to begin to make sense of the sixteenth-century scripts that made up much of my research base. Thank you also to the staff of the Latin American Collection at the University of Florida library. Others who have helped my academic research include the University of Florida Graduate School, the Center for Latin American Studies, and the Gary and Eleanor Simons family, which each funded trips to Bolivia so I could conduct portions of my primary research. While in Bolivia, I had the invaluable support of the administration and staff at Archivo Nacional de Bolivia in Sucre, the Archivo Histórico de Cochabamba, the Archivo Histórico de Tarija, and the Archivo Histórico de la Universidad Autónoma Gabriel René Moreno (in Santa Cruz). The University of Florida History Department and Writing Center provided me opportunities to teach throughout my coursework and research. For those opportunities I have many people to thank, including but not limited to Andrea Sterk, Elizabeth Dale, and Alison Reynolds. In more practical matters, I would like to recognize my parents, Bob and Elaine, for their support and assistance, particularly over the past year. My parents-in-law, Erika and Friedrich-Wilhelm Schaeper, also provided me assistance at some key times, including by ordering and paying for a much-needed collection of microfilmed documents from the Spanish Archivo General de Indias. Madison Warren deserves recognition for easing my workload, and my mind, by providing exceptional childcare over much of the past year. Finally, and above all, I want to thank my wife, Katharina, for her help and support in so many areas throughout this process. To say I could not have done it without her is a gross understatement.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

page

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS</th>
<th>4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF FIGURES</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 CHIRIGUANA HISTORICAL ETHNOGRAPHY</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Origins &amp; Migrations: In Search of the Land without Evil</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnicity, Culture, and Worldview: Men without Masters</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The People of the Documents: The “Chiriguanas” in Context</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 VERTICAL POLITICS ON THE SOUTHEASTERN INCA FRONTIER</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inca Expansion into Charcas: Historiographic &amp; Anthropological Models</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Charcas,” its Inhabitants, and the Inca “Conquest,” 1450s-1480s</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Cost-Benefit Analysis of Charcas</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Confederation in Pre-Incaic Charcas</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Conquest of Charcas in the Documentary Record</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Imposition of a New Arrangement</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Oroncota Siege in Focus</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion: Applying the Models</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 CHARCAS AND THE INCA FRONTIER SYSTEM</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Inca Construction of Charcas, 1480s-1520s</td>
<td>152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Political Confederation</td>
<td>152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Porco &amp; Cochabamba Production Enclaves (and Ideological Centers?)</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Upper Pilcomayo Basin &amp; and the Central Valleys</td>
<td>173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tarija &amp; the Pilaya Basin</td>
<td>181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samaipata &amp; the Lowland East</td>
<td>187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inca Frontier Defensive Strategy: From Defense-in-Depth to Zones of Acculturation, and Back</td>
<td>198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion: The Establishment of the Charcas-Chiriguana Frontier</td>
<td>203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 POPULATING THE CHARCAS-CHIRIGUANA FRONTIER</td>
<td>223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Settlement in Charcas and in the Chiriguana Cordillera, 1530s-1550s</td>
<td>223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish Exploration from the Río de la Plata (Asunción), 1520s-1550s</td>
<td>232</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A Spanish Dispute amidst the Chiriguanas, 1559-1565 ........................................ 251
Chávez’ Intervention & Death among “the Chiriguanas,” 1565-1568 .................... 262
Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 266

6 FRANCISCO DE TOLEDO, THE CHARCAS REFORMS, AND THE FIRST
CHIRIGUANA WAR................................................................. 270

Toledo’s Royal Mission, 1568-1571 .................................................................. 270
Investigating the Chirigua Question, 1571-1573 ............................................. 279
Detente and Negotiation, 1573-February 1574 ................................................ 290
The Toledo Entrada, Preparation and Execution, 1574 ................................ 302
Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 311

7 BUILDING AND BREACHING THE CHARCAS-CHIRIGUANA FRONTIER ...... 313

Establishing the Tarija, Tomina, & Santa Cruz Frontiers, 1574-1582 .......... 316
An Attack and the Prelude to War, 1582 ......................................................... 328
The Return to a State of War, 1583-1584 ........................................................ 343
Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 361

8 WAGING WAR & BUILDING PEACE AT THE LIMITS OF EMPIRE .......... 363

The Audiencia-Led Offensive, 1584-1585 ....................................................... 364
Autonomy No More, 1586-1588 ...................................................................... 375
The Affirmation of Local Interests, 1588-1595 .............................................. 384
Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 395

9 OFFICIAL POLICY AND FRONTIER REALITY ........................................ 399

The Tomina Frontier, 1595-1604 ..................................................................... 400
The San Lorenzo Frontier, 1594-1604 ............................................................. 415
Conclusion: Velasco’s Legacy ........................................................................... 420

10 GRADUAL REENGAGEMENT & RENEWAL OF CONFLICT ............. 424

An Opportunity in the South, 1605-1606 ....................................................... 425
Inter-Factional Politics and the Almendras Holguín Entrada, 1606-1608 ........ 427
Towards a Missions System, 1609-1611 ......................................................... 439
Poblar y (no) Conquistar, 1612-1615 ............................................................... 450
The Final Entradas, 1616-1620s ..................................................................... 458
Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 467

11 SUMMARY REMARKS .................................................................................. 471

LIST OF REFERENCES ......................................................................................... 476

Archival Sources .................................................................................................. 476
Published Primary Sources ................................................................................. 476
Secondary Sources........................................................................................................479

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH .........................................................................................497
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-1</td>
<td>Map showing Andean regional topographies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-2</td>
<td>Hydrographic map of Bolivia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-1</td>
<td>Approximate map of Charcas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-2</td>
<td>Major features of Inca-controlled Charcas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-3</td>
<td>Evidence related to Inca expansion into Charcas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-4</td>
<td>Views of the Oroncota Plateau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-1</td>
<td>The three frontier zones</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-2</td>
<td>An Inca orejón</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-3</td>
<td>Porco site plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-4</td>
<td>Incallajta site plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-5</td>
<td>A kallanka in Huánuco Pampa, Peru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-6</td>
<td>Hypothetical reconstruction of the kallanka at Incallajta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-7</td>
<td>Ushnu platforms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-8</td>
<td>Oroncota</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-9</td>
<td>The Greater-Cuzcotoro Defensive Chain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-10</td>
<td>Cuzcotoro/Manchachi site plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-11</td>
<td>Incahuasi site plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-12</td>
<td>Iñao site plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-13</td>
<td>Incapirca site plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-14</td>
<td>The Pilcomayo and Pilaya basins of southern Bolivia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-15</td>
<td>Bermejo River basin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-16</td>
<td>The capac ñan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-17</td>
<td>Condorhuasi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Page</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-18</td>
<td>Samaipata site plan ..........................................................220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-19</td>
<td>Samaipata ...............................................................................221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-20</td>
<td>Map with the approximate relative locations of Incallajta, Samaipata, and La Fortaleza ..................221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-21</td>
<td>La Fortaleza site plan ..........................................................222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-22</td>
<td>“Guaraní-Chiriguano” pottery samples from Cuzcotoro .................................................................222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-1</td>
<td>Locations referenced in Chapter 5 ........................................268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-2</td>
<td>Paraguay-La Plata River basin .................................................269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-1</td>
<td>Locations referenced in Chapter 7 ........................................362</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-1</td>
<td>Locations referenced in Chapter 8 ........................................397</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-2</td>
<td>Illustration of the Charcas Chiriguana frontier from 1588 ..........................................................398</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-1</td>
<td>Locations referenced in Chapter 9 ........................................423</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-1</td>
<td>Locations referenced in Chapter 10 .......................................470</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Inca and Spanish control in the province of Charcas stretched eastward only as far as the easternmost foothills of the Andes for a period of nearly two centuries. From the 1520s to the 1620s, these two empires faced resistance in their attempts to push back the eastern frontier from the Guaraní-speaking Chiriguana peoples who occupied the region. This dissertation analyzes the establishment and persistence of the Charcas-Chiriguana frontier in the eastern Andes. It argues against the theory that incursions by the Chiriguanaes were responsible for the political structure of Inca (and pre-Inca) Charcas by demonstrating the influence of the Inca state on the political and economic structures of Charcas. It also suggests that the proto-Chiriguana peoples had a cooperative relationship with the Inca state until the 1520s. The conflict that occurred at this point in time altered Inca strategy toward the imperial frontier system during the final years of Inca rule. From the time when the Spanish established a significant presence in Charcas in the late 1530s-50s, their official relationship with the Chiriguanaes was characterized primarily by conflict. This dissertation demonstrates how periods of conflict and peace often grew out of important unofficial and usually illicit cooperative interactions facilitated by inter-factional Chiriguana struggles or the provisioning of native labor to the Spanish frontiers. It argues that
peace between frontier Spanish and Chiriguana populations revolved around a mutual interest in a market based exchange of native captives for European products. This form of trade typically carried on in contravention of Spanish law, though enforcement of prohibitions against it was incomplete. The limitation of such exchanges—without achieving their elimination—was key to prolonged periods of peace along the frontier, though the violence inherent in the captive trade promoted conflict in other senses. The relationship between Spaniards and Chiriguanaes was additionally shaped by matters that affected the Spanish empire and its administration as a whole but occurred far from the region under study. Longer-term factors included the evolutions of both Spanish imperial philosophy and Chiriguana culture.
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

The easternmost cordillera of the central Andes marked the effective frontier of settlement for two successive Andean imperial states, Inca Tawantinsuyu and Spanish Peru, for more than two centuries (Figure 1-1). Beginning around 1520, the Guaraní-speaking “Chiriguana” peoples began conducting raids upon Inca and, later, Spanish positions in the eastern Andean province of Charcas. The Chiriguanaes managed to resist subsequent attempts to conquer, expel, or eliminate them during much of the century that followed. Instead, they held onto the majority of their territory in the cordillera and remained free from direct imperial control. This project aims to explain the processes that led to the establishment of the Charcas-Chiriguana frontier, as well as its persistence over time.

Lying to the east of the frontier was a geographically unique liminal zone that the Spanish commonly called the “Chiriguana cordillera.” It marks the point at which several different South American geographic and climatic regions converge. Not only do the highlands of the altiplano and Eastern Cordillera drop precipitously over a relatively short span, the humid

---

1 Throughout this work, I employ a mix of the traditional and modern orthographies of Quechua and Aymara terms, as is consistent with recent English-language secondary literature in the field of history. I thus use “Inca” and “yanacona” rather than “Inka” and “yanakuna,” but also “Tawantinsuyu” rather than “Tahuantinsuyo,” “mallku” rather than “mayco,” and “kallanka” rather than “cayanca.” The names of the Aymara kingdoms of Charcas also appear according to their more recently used variants.

2 The use of the term “Chiriguana” and its variants to refer to the ancestors of the Ava-Guaraní peoples of Bolivia and northern Argentina is something of an anachronism. As I discuss in more detail below and in the coming chapters, the term is of Quechua origin, and it was originally meant to denigrate lowland-origin peoples. The Spanish eventually applied it more specifically to Guarani speakers, and later to Guarani speakers within a specific geographical area. Nevertheless, for the sake of clarity I will use the most common forms of the term as they appeared in the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Spanish documents that make up most of my primary source base. These documents most often discuss the “Chiriguana people,” a single “Chiriguana” (whether male or female), or “the Chiriguanaes.” In the late-seventeenth century, the term shifted to the more Hispanized “Chiriguano” (singular) and “Chiriguanos” (plural). Most existing secondary scholarship focuses on the later era and thus uses “Chiriguanos.” For the switch from “Chiriguanaes” to “Chiriguanos,” see Isabelle Combès, Diccionario étnico: Santa Cruz la Vieja y su entorno en el siglo XVI (Cochabamba: Instituto de Misionología, 2010), 129ff.

3 References throughout this work to the “Chiriguana cordillera” or simply “the cordillera” indicate this region.
northern Mojos (or Beni) forests meet the Chaco scrubland plains to the east and south. Significant tributaries of the two major continental river systems run through the cordillera as well. A third river bisecting the cordillera provides the most significant source of fresh water to the Chaco (Figure 1-2). These topographic features facilitated migration from distinct parts of the continent and made the cordillera region a venue for cross-cultural interactions. Oftentimes, these interactions involved peoples belonging to cultures that varied significantly from one another.

Abutting the cordillera to the west, on the other side of the frontier, was the province of Charcas. Under both the Incas and the Spanish, Charcas encompassed the eastern Andean highlands as well as much of the subandean territory that slopes downward towards the heart of the continent.  

By the late 1400s, Charcas was beginning to play a key role in the functioning of the larger Inca empire. By the 1530s, the Spanish had replaced the Incas as the rulers of Charcas. Both valued the province highly, in part due to the presence of abundant silver mines in the highlands. Soon, Charcas became intertwined with the Spanish empire’s pursuits halfway across the globe. Charcas was crucial in supporting the defense of the Habsburg system in Europe, and the policies implemented within Charcas often reflected factors such as the results of battles in Germany and philosophies from the halls of Salamanca. This was the case even along the Charcas-Chiriguana frontier, where, in the tradition of Andean complementarity, Spanish settlers increasingly developed lower-altitude agricultural and pastoral lands in order to provision the

---

4 The effective limits of Charcas fluctuated over time, in as far as they were ever really defined, and differed during the Inca and Spanish periods. Inca Charcas, for instance, began somewhat farther east than Spanish Charcas, which went all the way to Lake Titicaca. The Spanish also claimed a great deal more territory as part of Charcas than they really controlled at this early stage.
growing urban highlands. These activities brought them and the natives under their control into contact—and often conflict—with the Chiriguanaes.

Chapter 2 is a study of the Chiriguanaes. It consists primarily of an analysis of secondary ethnographic literature that seeks to explain their culture and genesis as a people. Despite more than a century of periodic scholarly attention to these topics, little consensus has formed regarding a number of seemingly basic questions. Others have only recently been answered with any degree of confidence. My analysis focuses specifically on the debates over three fundamental issues. The first relates to the Chiriguanaes’ positioning with respect to their closest cultural relatives. The Chiriguanaes formed a western enclave of Guaraní-speaking peoples that was largely cutoff from the rest of the language family. In the contact era, most Guaraní speakers resided many hundreds of kilometers to the east, in the Paraguay basin or along the Atlantic coast. Scholars have long speculated about what brought the Chiriguanaes’ Guaraní ancestors to travel such a long distance and settle in the Andean foothills. The second issue of interest relates to the apparently “savage” Chiriguana culture observed by colonial Europeans. Early descriptions of the Chiriguanaes and culturally similar peoples often emphasized their cannibalism, penchant for war, nomadism, and lack of religion and political organization. While these descriptions clearly played upon familiar tropes, they also reveal coded truths that modern ethnographers have used, along with other research, to approximate the early Chiriguana ethos. The third issue relates to the origins of the term “Chiriguana” and its use in early colonial documents. While it eventually came to indicate the Guaraní-speaking peoples who lived in and around the cordillera, variants of the term Chiriguana appear in a variety of contexts in documents dating to the 1530s-1570s (and occasionally thereafter). Establishing whom the
author meant to indicate by the term, in different scenarios, is important to research related to the early Chiriguana peoples and their settlement on the Charcas-Chiriguana frontier.

Chapters 3 & 4 relate to the pre-Hispanic era in Charcas and the frontier region, spanning from the beginnings of Inca rule in Charcas in roughly 1450 through the 1520s, when the Inca empire fell into a dynastic struggle and civil war that lasted until the arrival of the Spanish in 1532. Because traditional documents from this time do not exist, research into this era necessitates a fuller reliance on well-grounded theoretical models and informed, contextual readings of different types of sources. Chapter 3 begins with an introduction that frames the remainder of the chapter and the next. It also explains my theoretical approach to the question of Inca imperial expansion in Charcas. Sections of Chapters 3 & 4 further address methodology in order to explain how I interpret the documentary and archaeological sources that inform this period. Chapter 3 focuses primarily, however, on the Inca annexation of Charcas (ca. 1450-ca. 1485). I argue that existing scholarly explanations of this process mischaracterize it by overemphasizing certain sources and improperly reading others backwards in time. This leads the literature to suggest that the kingdoms or chiefdoms that made up Charcas shared a high degree of political integration prior to the province’s incorporation into the Inca state. I present evidence to the contrary and suggest a description of the Inca “conquest” of Charcas that better fits the available evidence. In Chapter 4, I look deeper into the Inca state’s strategy as it transformed the province of Charcas during the 1490s-1520s. Of particular interest is the eastern frontier system developed during this era. The Inca installations in and around the cordillera initially served a role in the further eastward expansion of the empire. Clashes with Chiriguana peoples along this frontier on at least two occasions changed Inca strategy pertaining to the
region around 1525. These new Inca frontier policies were crucial in establishing the Charcas-Chiriguana frontier.

The process by which the Incas exerted control over Charcas and subsequently transformed the province sheds light on the issue of the Chiriguanaes and their presence in the eastern Andes. Literature that addresses the Inca annexation of Charcas tends to downplay the empire’s role in transforming the political structure of the province. These works suggest instead that the principal Aymara kingdoms of Charcas (and even some non-Aymara peoples) were unified into a political confederation that the Incas later incorporated, unchanged, into their imperial bureaucracy. This theory holds that the impetus for their confederation was the threat of incursion from Chiriguana peoples on the eastern frontier. I find that such an explanation not only mischaracterizes the formation of the Charcas confederation and the Inca annexation of the province, it rests upon misleading assumptions regarding the interaction between highland and lowland peoples at this time. Most critically, it presumes that interactions between the peoples of Charcas and the Chiriguanaes were hostile *ab initio*. While there is evidence of a certain degree of inter-ethnic conflict at the Charcas frontiers in the pre-Inca period, other evidence suggests more cooperative interactions between these groups prior to the 1520s. By demonstrating the active role that the Inca state, rather than Chiriguana hostility, played in the political unification of Charcas, I hope to help dispel the notion that these conflicts were the principal factor that defined the political structure of pre-Hispanic Charcas.

The remainder of the dissertation pertains to the Charcas-Chiriguana frontier during the Spanish colonial period. It begins with the establishment of a Spanish presence in Charcas in the late 1530s and ends in the 1620s with the failure of the final large-scale attempts to colonize the
Chiriguana cordillera for more than a century. The existing literature on this topic during this era is often superficial and somewhat perfunctory, given that it tends to serve as a small part of larger works on the Chiriguanaes in later periods. These works typically catalogue, in varying degrees of detail, the significant conflicts of the 1560s, 1570s, 1580s, 1600s, and 1610-20s. My work also revolves around these conflicts, but it goes into far more detail about other aspects of the era and uses some sources that have not been incorporated into any published work. Where my work differs most significantly from the existing literature about this topic is that I seek to go beyond the primary sources in several ways. First, I put Spanish policy towards the Chiriguanaes and the frontier region in a wider imperial context. I explain the development of frontier strategy as a collaborative effort among colonial officials at many different levels who often took into account developments happening some distance from Charcas. The glacially slow pace of communication between Peru and the metropole further affected the administration of the region. One result was that significant changes in policy typically came when officials at the local and regional levels managed to monopolize the power of government. This occurred in certain isolated incidents, such as the death of a viceroy. A second way that my work addresses the primary sources is to seek, where possible, to explain the actions of the Chiriguanaes who appear in the primary sources either collectively or as individuals. This entails attempting to strip away the veneer of prejudice and self-interest that often overlays descriptions of Chiriguana peoples.

---

5 The Chiriguanaes were only “pacified,” and the cordillera colonized, beginning in the 1730s after a long and gradual process of missionary work among the Chiriguanaes, which itself dates primarily to the 1690s and later. Their “acculturation” into the primarily Franciscan missions system helped quell their resistance, but it was never really complete. Rebellions and instances of long-term resistance persisted well past the independence of Bolivia. The last significant uprising took place in the 1890s. For this process, see Lorenzo-Giuseppe Calzavarini, Nación chiriguana: grandeza y ocaso (Cochabamba: Editorial los Amigos del Libro, 1980), chaps. 10-16; Francisco Pifarré, Historia de un pueblo (La Paz: Centro de Investigación y Promoción del Campesinado, 1989), chaps. 11-25; Saignes, Ava y Karai: Ensayos sobre la frontera chiriguano (siglos XVI-XX) (La Paz: Hisbol, 1990), chaps. 3-5; and Erick D. Langer, Expecting Pears from an Elm Tree: Franciscan Missions on the Chiriguano Frontier in the Heart of South America, 1830-1949 (Durham, NC: Duke Univ. Press, 2009).
and their behavior in the documents from this era. It also entails understanding them as rational actors responding to incentives and operating according to the dictates of a culture in flux. I have also tried to establish conclusions regarding issues that do not emerge directly from the documents. For example, some evidence suggests that Spaniards and Chiriguanaes operated in collaboration with one another during periods that were relatively free of conflict. These collaborations were usually unofficial and illegal under Spanish law, so they tended not to result in official documentation, yet a preponderance of small clues help build a convincing case for persistent cooperation across the Charcas-Chiriguana frontier.

Chapters 5 & 6 cover the era that begins with the establishment of a Spanish presence in Charcas in the late 1530s and ends with the first major Spanish war against the Chiriguanaes, a disastrous 1574 attempt to oust them from the cordillera. The period is a unique one because it corresponds to the era in which the Spanish and the Chiriguanaes came into contact with each other for the first time. Two periods of significant conflict (dating to 1564 and 1574) set the tone for their official interactions in the decades that followed.

Chapter 5 begins with a short description of Spanish Charcas in its earliest days. This discussion of the Spanish administration in the province is far briefer than the earlier study of Inca administration in Charcas for several reasons. The first is that Spanish Charcas is far better understood in the existing literature. It is also likely more familiar to the reader. Describing it requires far less foundational research and general explanation. Another factor is the fact that both the Spanish imperial philosophy and Charcas’ role within the Spanish empire changed rapidly in the coming decades. Both the initial silver boom of the late 1540s and 1550s and a period of reform in the Spanish empire during the 1540s-60s had significant impacts on how Charcas was run. Throughout the remainder of the dissertation, I will repeatedly address
changing Spanish administrative directives as they pertain to the Chiriguanaes and the development of strategy toward the frontier region. The bulk of Chapter 5, however, describes the peculiar circumstances behind the first Spanish attempts to colonize the cordillera in 1559-68. These efforts involved not only Spaniards from Peru and Charcas but also Spaniards from the Río de la Plata colony. The latter’s decades-long experience among some of the Chiriguanaes’ closest Guaraní relatives, which I describe at some length, would greatly affect the shape of these settlement efforts. Following an initial period of apparent peace, violent Chiriguana-led attacks wiped out the two Spanish settlements founded nearest the cordillera. I argue that the attacks sprung from Chiriguana resistance to Spanish attempts to implement control over native labor, a cycle that repeated itself often in Spaniards’ relations with Guaraní peoples. The Spaniards’ strategies in this regard, meanwhile, were the results of their attempts to conform to Spanish law during the course of a unique dispute between Spanish claimants to the region.

Chapter 6 covers the majority of the administration of Francisco de Toledo, who served as viceroy of Peru from 1568-1581. It begins by placing Toledo and his royal mandate to serve in an imperial context. He came to power during an era of significant administrative reforms in the Spanish empire that would greatly shape his influence in Charcas, as well as his approach to the Chiriguanaes. One major aspect of his legacy in Charcas was his reorganization of the mining industry and the system of native labor in Charcas. His legislation in these areas led to even greater labor shortages in the frontier region and inspired additional support for eastward expansion into the lowlands. The chapter proceeds by examining Toledo’s legal case for war with the Chiriguanaes, again in the context of the wider issues facing the Spanish empire, and culminates with the failed 1574 invasion of the cordillera that Toledo personally led. The war came about only after a curious period of negotiations with Chiriguana leaders. I argue that the
failure of these negotiations, much like the failure of the invasion, was due in large part to Toledo and his advisors’ profound inability to understand the world beyond the frontier.

Chapters 7, 8, 9, & 10 focus on Spanish frontier strategy following Toledo’s departure from Charcas in 1574 and continuing until the 1620s. A recurrent theme that emerges in these chapters is the dissention between many of the Spanish residents of Charcas, particularly the frontier settlers, and the officials at the highest levels of the colonial state, usually the viceroy in charge at any particular time. The Spanish residents of the frontier almost constantly advocated for the eastward expansion of settlement into the cordillera and the lowlands beyond. They argued that seizing the cordillera would achieve two goals. First, it would eliminate the frontier security threat posed by the Chiriguanaes’ periodic incursions. Second, it would ease chronic labor shortages in the region by granting access to the native populations in the eastern lowlands. The viceroys in charge of Peru during this era tended to urge caution in this regard. They hesitated to commit to the costs of an unsuccessful invasion, as Toledo had done in 1574. The official result, for most of this time, was a policy of separation between Spaniards and the residents of the Chiriguana cordillera. Spaniards were prohibited from entering the cordillera without specific permission. The aim of the prohibition was twofold. It would prevent the Spanish from inciting the antagonism of the Chiriguanaes while also preventing the illegal commercial exchange of native captives for Spanish goods that had developed along the frontier. These exchanges dated back as far as the 1550s, but they had become more common as the Spanish side of the frontier developed in the 1570s and beyond.

I argue that this policy of separation was successful in maintaining relative peace along the Charcas-Chiriguana frontier, but only because of the rather unique incentives it created for both Spaniards and Chiriguanaes. It worked not because it functioned exactly as intended, but
precisely because there was a degree of circumvention of the prohibition. On one hand, the policy largely prevented direct competition between Spaniards and Chiriguanaes. It successfully prevented the Spanish from establishing a long-term presence in the cordillera or satisfying their labor shortages by tapping directly into the native populations beyond the cordillera. On the other hand, the lack of effective enforcement meant that the trade continued at varying levels. This market-based interaction provided both sides with a mutually beneficial reason to cooperate peacefully, as well as a supply of “merchandise” they might otherwise have sought through war.6

The central event around which Chapters 7 & 8 revolve is the prolonged 1583-90 Chiriguana war, which consisted of numerous Spanish invasions of the Chiriguana cordillera and, finally, the re-foundation of a Spanish settlement near the Guapay River (the eventual basis for modern Santa Cruz, Bolivia). The lead-up to this second war is perhaps the most misunderstood period in the history of Spanish-Chiriguana relations, especially when one considers the relatively rich source base available. The secondary literature mischaracterizes both the years since Toledo’s invasion and the causes that led to the outbreak of war. Chapter 7 begins with a discussion of the Spanish frontier system that developed in response to the Chiriguana presence during the 1570s. One aspect of the frontier system was an increased demand for native captive laborers in certain Spanish frontier towns, a demand partially satisfied by the Chiriguanaes. Officials prohibited the trade in 1582. I argue, as Chapter 7 proceeds, that the prohibition of the captive trade was a trigger that escalated hostilities along the frontier later that year. It removed the impetus for peaceful cooperation between Spaniards and Chiriguanaes.

---

6 I take pains within the chapters to highlight the plights of the victims of these “peaceful” exchanges. Lest that point fail to come across here, please understand that the exchange of native captives across frontier was far from universally beneficial. It entailed nothing short of violent enslavement and human trafficking. I argue simply that these exchanges prevented greater levels of conflict along the frontier between the Spanish and Chiriguana beneficiaries of the trade.
Spanish efforts to reassert control and security served instead to escalate matters further by uniting a number of Chiriguana factions in additional offensives against the Spanish frontier. The most devastating of these attacks resulted in the destruction of the Spanish town of San Miguel.

The Spanish offensives of 1584-90 and the immediate aftermath are the focus of Chapter 8. The Audiencia of Charcas, empowered as a result of a vacancy in the position of viceroy, authorized a large-scale invasion aimed at eliminating the Chiriguanaes from the frontier region once and for all. These efforts were initially successful, but faltered over time due to lukewarm support in the urban highlands, diminishing resources, and the sheer difficulty of the task. The arrival of a new viceroy further complicated the war effort because he sought to divert resources to matters he deemed more vital to the king’s interests. The entire episode illustrates the challenges of waging war at the territorial limits of the empire. In the end, local officials began to assert more control over particular sectors of the frontier. The result was the limited resurgence of the captive trade.

Chapter 9 covers much of the 1590s and the first few years of the seventeenth century. Most of this period coincides with the administration of Luis de Velasco, who served as viceroy of Peru from 1596-1604. The chapter begins by describing the origins and inspiration for the strategy of frontier segregation that Velasco imposed from above. The strategy drew in large part from the success of similar policies in northern Mexico. The chapter then describes the effects of his policies in the context of different sections of the frontier during the relatively peaceful period that coincided with Velasco’s administration.

Chapter 10 describes the gradual unraveling of Velasco’s policies and a resumption of hostilities along the frontier. It begins with the gradual renewal of official attempts to reengage with the Chiriguanaes in 1605. That year, Spanish officials began to entertain the possibility of
sending missionaries into certain Chiriguana communities in the southern cordillera. Shortly thereafter, officials in Santa Cruz intervened in an inter-factional dispute that had threatened to spill across the frontier. Neither instance turned out exactly as Spanish officials hoped, but continual pressure to expand Charcas eastward into the lowlands inspired additional attempts to pacify the Chiriguanaes through religious instruction. By the 1610s, these efforts also failed, but the incentive to link Charcas with the Spanish Atlantic provinces drove still more bids to populate Chiriguana territory. Chiriguana resistance to these attempts led to their failures as well. The frontier would remain intact for another century.
Figure 1-1. Map showing Andean regional topographies. The blue line in the subandean zone provides a general idea of the frontier in question, though it was in no sense fixed over time. Adapted from Bryan P. Murray et al., “Oligocene-Miocene Basin Evolution in the Northern Altiplano, Bolivia: Implications for Evolution of the Central Andean Backthrust Belt and High Plateau,” Geological Society of America Bulletin 122, no. 9-10 (2010): 1444.
Figure 1-2. Hydrographic map of Bolivia. The Guapay or Grande River (known by both names, both now and in colonial times) runs eastward through the northern section of the cordillera, then turns north and empties into the Amazon via the Mamoré. The Pilcomayo River, which passes through the southern part of the cordillera, runs to the Paraguay. The Parapetí River (known to colonial Spaniards as the Sauces) bisecting the cordillera empties into the Isoso wetlands of the Chaco. From Fundación Amigos de la Naturaleza, Noel Kempff.
CHAPTER 2
CHIRIGUANA HISTORICAL ETHNOGRAPHY

Modern scholarship on the Chiriguanaes has been a long time in gestation. Chroniclers, jurists, and evangelists posed compelling questions relating to the Chiriguanaes’ origins and culture when they began to appear in the historical record in the mid-1500s. Yet only recently have ethnographers been able to address many of these same fundamental questions from a scholarly perspective. They have done so by taking into account a wide variety of evidence, including early written observations of the Chiriguanaes and their closest cultural relatives, oral histories and cosmologies recorded among their descendants, archaeological investigation, and linguistic analysis. This research has established some degree of scholarly consensus regarding certain aspects of contact- and colonial-era Chiriguana society and culture. There is far less agreement about other aspects.

There are a number of reasons why quality ethnographic work on the early Chiriguanaes has been so hard to produce. One relates to the earliest written descriptions of them and similar peoples native to lowland South America. These documents prominently feature cannibalism, nomadism, nudity, and other characteristics associated in Europeans’ minds with the basest savagery. Europeans of the era had difficulty conceiving of a civilization that lacked certain markers of technological advancement, as the Chiriguanaes’ and others’ did. The documents from the colonial era readily demonstrate this difficulty and the persistent prejudices that resulted from it. Modern ethnographers have struggled to strip away the subjectivity and preconceptions
that went into these early descriptions in hopes of demystifying “savage” behaviors and understanding them within the cultural contexts in which they were practiced.¹

Another problem that has hindered research on the colonial Chiriguanaes is more specific to the Chiriguanaes themselves. It relates to the unclear origins of the term “Chiriguana” and its derivations. Rarely, if ever, did the people most commonly described as Chiriguanaes self-identify in that way. The use of the term dates back to the earliest chronicles of Inca history written by the first generations of Spaniards in Peru. The Chiriguanaes reportedly resisted incorporation into the Inca empire and clashed with the peoples of the pre-Hispanic Andean highlands on several occasions. Reports of conflict with peoples described as Chiriguanaes resumed after the Spanish took control of Peru. Only in the 1570s, as the Spanish began to define and categorize the “nations” of people in Peru did the term “Chiriguana” reliably come to indicate the people to whom it has typically applied since then—the Guaraní-speaking populations living just beyond the frontiers of settlement of the eastern Andean province of Charcas. Even afterward, there are instances when it appears in other contexts.

Advances in modern ethnographic research on the early Chiriguanaes represents a convergence of a number of disciplines and area studies. Thierry Saignes, the pioneer of Eastern Andean regional studies in the 1970s and 80s, recognizes three distinct approaches that contributed to the important breakthroughs made during the twentieth century: that of the traveler-ethnographer, the Catholic evangelist, and the expert in Tupí-Guaraní studies (usually by way of Paraguay or Brazil).² The work conducted by the scholars from these disciplines, as well

---


² Saignes, Ava y Karai, 11.
as the combined approach that Saînes helped to bring about, has established a richer picture of the genesis and ethos of the Chiriguana peoples as they came into existence and during the Spanish colonial period. This chapter traces those developments and points to areas where new research is emerging. It consists of three sections.

The first section discusses the body of scholarship that deals with the origins and migrations of the Chiriguanaes. It begins with a summary of the earliest, seventeenth-century explanations for the presence of Guarani speakers in the eastern Andes. It then discusses a number of turn-of-the-twentieth-century work that attempts to put Spanish colonial documents and missionary experiences relating to the Chiriguana into context, according to the historical and social scientific standards of the day. Throughout the twentieth century and into the twenty-first, scholars have gradually come to understand more fully the tradition of migration within Guarani culture and how that tradition inspired Chiriguana settlement on the eastern-Andean frontier. Still, there is little consensus regarding the motives behind the Guarani migrations that led to Chiriguana ethnogenesis. Key figures in the advancement of the understanding of this phenomenon include Erland Nordenskiöld, Curt Nimuendajú, Alfred Métraux, Hélène Clastres, Bartomeu Melià, and Catherine Julien.

In the subsequent section, I discuss the secondary works that seek to explain how the collective experiences of the Guarani migrants brought about the genesis of a Chiriguana ethnic identity. The major figures who have advanced the scholarship in these ways are Branislava Susnik, Thierry Saînes, and Isabelle Combès. Their writings help establish basic ethnographic concepts such as Chiriguana socio-political organization and residency patterns, but they also seek to explain how and why the Chiriguanaes demonstrated the traits that distinguished them from other indigenous peoples encountered by the Spanish. These traits include their apparent
warrior ethos, unique interactions with other indigenous peoples, and reported cannibalism. The overarching theme of this section is scholars’ attempts to contextualize an apparent contradiction inherent in Chiriguana ethnogenesis—the society came into existence and defined itself on the basis of not only inter-ethnic conflict, but intra-ethnic conflict as well.

This discussion leads into a final section of analysis that is particularly pertinent for historical research on the topic of the colonial Chiriguana. It centers on the use of the term “Chiriguana” and its variants in early colonial-era documents. This research is primarily associated with Catherine Julien and Isabelle Combès, anthropologists whose work seeks to characterize the multiple and changing contexts in which Spaniards wrote about their encounters with peoples who fell into the category. These contexts often differed greatly even across short spans of time and distance. They were particularly fluid because of the potential for miscommunications and misperceptions related to native peoples’ languages, ethnicities, and political affiliations. The work discussed in this section is crucial in contextualizing the documents that make up the principal source base on which much of this dissertation are built. This section additionally incorporates some primary research that serves to extend the available published work in this area and shape it to the project that follows.

**Origins & Migrations: In Search of the Land without Evil**

The question of the origins of the Chiriguana people is part of a larger challenge to scholars seeking to explain the distribution of South American peoples at the time of European contact. But the Chiriguana people represent a case that affords unique insights about this topic for a number of reasons: they came into existence relatively late in time; there are multiple surviving historical perspectives regarding their contact-era migrations; several non-Europeanized populations from the same language family continued to exist into the modern era; and they were positioned at the convergence point of several dominant linguistic and cultural
groups of pre-Columbian South America. The scholarly consensus is that the contact-era Chiriguana settled where they did due in part to their Guaraní ancestors’ quest for a “Land without Evil.” The nature of that land and the means by which they sought it are topics of continued debate.

The first written account of the origins of the Chiriguana, by Ruy Díaz de Guzmán, appeared already in 1612. Díaz de Guzmán was a Spanish-Guaraní mestizo from Asunción. His account explains that the primary populations from which the Chiriguana drew were Guaraní speakers in the Paraguay basin. Their first interactions with Europeans sparked a series of mass migrations that brought them to the eastern foothills of the Andes. According to Díaz de Guzmán, in the early 1520s, some years prior to Francisco Pizarro’s encounter with Atahualpa at Cajamarca, a small retinue of Europeans shipwrecked on the island of Santa Caterina (off the coast of modern Brazil) while searching for a passage between the Atlantic and Pacific. The Portuguese captain Alejo García learned the local Guaraní language and decided to investigate the interior of the continent where, local lore held, he would find magnificent luxuries of all sorts. He and a small entourage traveled inland to the Paraguay River, where they participated in a native expedition, 2,000-strong, headed across the continent to the eastern frontiers of the Inca empire. Together, they ransacked the locals and made off with as much plunder as they could carry. Their cargo consisted chiefly of metal objects and captives. According to Díaz de Guzmán’s account, Garcia and company returned to the Paraguay basin where the natives killed him and his European companions, sparing only the mestizo child that García had fathered. The same fate awaited the 60 Portuguese sailors who had remained on the coast. Fearing the reprisals of additional Portuguese soldiers, thousands of natives fled westward and established themselves in the foothills of the eastern Andes where they remained generations later. The tale was a
product of oral histories passed down in Díaz de Guzmán’s native Asunción. The chronicler even reportedly knew García’s son.³

For centuries, writers reiterated versions of this story. It appears most prominently in the work of the seventeenth-century historian Nicolás del Techo and the eighteenth-century ethnographer Pedro Lozano, both Jesuits. Spanish historian Manuel Serrano y Sanz cites del Techo’s version in his 1898 article on the Chiriguana. In many ways, this article is reflective of the European prejudices that carried over all the way from the sixteenth century. Serrano y Sanz describes the Chiriguana people as the most barbarous in South America, and he holds that they posed an obstacle to the advance of civilization and order, not only during the period of Spanish rule, but before as well. Yet Serrano y Sanz’ work also represents an important watershed. It not only brings to light much of the archival material that would shape the developing scholarly interpretation of the Chiriguana in the century to come, it subjects the story of their origin and migration to the scrutiny of other sources.⁴

One important question that Serrano y Sanz raises involves the incompatibility of Díaz de Guzmán’s story with another well-known seventeenth-century source, the writings of Garcilaso de la Vega. Garcilaso’s chronicle claims that the Chiriguanaes occupied the borders of the Inca empire already in the mid-fifteenth century, well before the Alejo García saga in the 1520s. According to Garcilaso, the Inca launched an attempted invasion of the Chiriguana territory, but it failed to dislodge them from their strongholds in the mountains. Serrano y Sanz ultimately

---

³ Ruy Díaz de Guzmán, Anales del descubrimiento, población y conquista del Río de la Plata (Asunción: Ediciones Comuneros, 1980 [1612]), 94-98. The Portuguese spelling of the name is Aleixo Garcia. I use the Spanish spelling throughout because it more commonly appears this way in the Spanish and English language literature I have consulted.

⁴ Manuel Serrano y Sanz, “Los indios chiriguanaes,” Revista de archivos, bibliotecas y museos (Spain) 2, no. 3 (1898): 322-23.
determines that Garcilaso’s account disproves the theory that García played a role in the origins of the Chiriguana. He does remark on the linguistic similarities between the Paraguayan Guaraní and the Chiriguana, claiming that “the Chiriguanaes were of the Guaraní race,” but he also suggests that they were more than the products of a simple relocation.⁵

Franciscan missionary Fr. Bernardino de Nino’s *Etnografía chiriguana* is another early attempt to bring together multiple sources relating to Chiriguana origins, but it also bears more resemblance to the Jesuit histories of the eighteenth century than to the pioneering ethnographic work on South American native peoples that began in the years that followed. The concept of history that he advances—and that the Franciscan order and archbishopric approved prior to its publication in 1912—is one that privileges the empirical truth of biblical versions of population dynamics, including the Tower of Babel and the flood. The *Etnografía* is further marked by Bolivian nationalism, a bias that leads him to view the Chiriguana people with a certain esteem.⁶ Nevertheless, De Nino had spent 18 years living among the Chiriguanaes when he published his work, and he recorded Chiriguana oral histories relating to the origins of the people. According to the oral histories, the ancestors of the Chiriguana left Paraguay and Brazil after fighting a war with whites from distant lands. The whites defeated them due to their superior weapons and skill at arms and pursued the Chiriguana westward to the Andean foothills. The story appears to reflect Díaz de Guzmán’s account and the Jesuit histories that borrow from it rather than


⁶ Bernardino de Nino, *Etnografia chiriguana* (La Paz: Tipografía Comercial de Ismael Argote, 1912), iii, ix-xiv, 65, 69. Interestingly enough, De Nino seems to place in the Chiriguanaes the genesis of the earliest Bolivian nationhood. Their resistance against “Inca Yupanqui with his numerous armies from Cuzco” and the vain attempt by the Viceroy in Lima to “humble the pride of this race,” led only to show that the “Bolivian Nation exercises clear authority” over the territory. The Franciscan missions system, which he defended in his time against liberals seeking to dismantle it, took over after the war of independence and “progresses in the shadow of the Bolivian flag that has always flown over these far-flung lands.” Simmering discord between Bolivia and Paraguay over these lands in de Nino’s day would boil over into the Chaco War during the 1930s.
authentically sourced oral histories passed from generation to generation back to the sixteenth century. It makes sense that the Chiriguana who lived within the mission system would have been exposed at some point in the recent past to these Spanish-sourced versions of their history, but de Nino does not draw the connection.\(^7\)

In their migrations westward, the Chiriguana did not settle closer to their place of origin, de Nino claims, because the dry Chaco scrublands were unfit for their way of life. Though he describes the Chiriguana as uncivilized, he grants that they were not entirely without any refinement, as were the residents of those areas in de Nino’s day. De Nino recognizes that the Chiriguana were and are an agricultural people. They were, as a result, a step above the hunter gatherers of the Chaco scrublands. In this way, De Nino argues, they gained the esteem of their neighbors:

> What is certain is that the Chiriguana race has distinguished itself from the others that remain still in a savage state … [These other peoples] consider the Chiriguanos noble lords, serving them with maize and other things, and furthermore approve of inter-marriage with [Chiriguanaes of both sexes].

De Nino’s hardly-altered concept of the Enlightenment-era civilizational hierarchy requires little comment. As far as the relationship he seems to have observed between the natives of the Bolivian lowlands and the Chiriguana, de Nino hints at a much deeper cultural exchange that had not yet been decoded by scholars in his day.\(^8\)

---

\(^7\) Nino, *Etnografía chiriguana*, 72-73, 73 n. 1. Though he appears not to recognize the influence of these accounts, De Nino is not completely ignorant of the story of Alejo García and his purported role in the Guaraní migrations. He mentions the flight of four thousand natives from Paraguay “due to the ongoing relations they had had with the Portuguese” and claims that they augmented the existing Chiriguana population, but his reticence to attribute the origin of the Chiriguana to this account stems from his belief that these refugees were not originally Guaraní. This misinterpretation seems to be based on the appellation “Carius” applied to them, see page 73 n. 1. This term, or, more commonly “Cario,” was a synonym for Guaraní in early colonial-era documents produced in the Asunción context. See Alfred Métraux, “The Guarani,” in *Handbook of South American Indians*, 7 vols., ed. Julien H. Steward (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution, 1948), vol. 1, 69.

\(^8\) Nino, *Etnografía chiriguana*, 70-71. Pierre Clastres is the most vocal critique of incorporating the biases of Western civilization into the study of lowland South American natives. See Pierre Clastres, *Society Against the State: The Leader as Servant and the Humane Uses of Power Among the Indians of the Americas*, trans. Robert
The work done by Fulgencio Moreno on the Chiriguana is also characterized by strong nationalist leanings regarding the Bolivia-Paraguay border dispute. Indeed, his interest in the migrations of the proto-Chiriguanaes stems from his responsibilities as the Paraguayan representative at a series of diplomatic talks between the countries in 1915. His argument that Paraguay should control territory that, at the time, fell within the borders of Bolivia rests in part on the Paraguayan origins of the Guaraní-speaking residents of the region. Moreno presents documentary evidence that demonstrates that Spaniards operating out of Asunción in the mid-sixteenth century settled parts of the disputed territory. They brought 1,500 Guaraní-speaking natives from the Asunción area with them on their mission, the goal of which was “to go and populate” the land in question. Moreno argues that these 1,500 natives remained in the disputed territory and constituted the nucleus of the Chiriguana peoples in the Chiquitos and Santa Cruz regions of Bolivia. Moreno does concede, however, that a population of Chiriguana predated the arrival of the Guaraní speakers he references. They lived in the area between Santa Cruz and La Plata—the location of the Chiriguana cordillera of Spanish colonial times.9

Neither Moreno nor others who may have read his argument at the time were aware of it, but he seems to have stumbled on some issues relevant to the Chiriguana that later scholars spent decades parsing out. First, he notes that there were multiple instances of migration, even on the historical record, that brought significant numbers of Guaraní speakers to the greater eastern-Andean region. Second, his work hints that the Chiriguanaes who were already established in the

---

eastern Andes may have been distinct from the Guaraní speakers who established themselves in the Santa Cruz region.

Swedish ethnographer Erland Nordenskiöld’s work revisits the Díaz de Guzmán narrative and the Alejo García story. His thesis, characteristically for the time of publication, 1917, focuses narrowly on whether the Portuguese explorer entered Inca territory prior to Pizarro, but it represents a step forward in modern historical research. Nordenskiöld’s work tests Díaz de Guzmán’s explanation for westward Guaraní migration from the Paraguay basin against the writings of contemporary Inca-sourced chronicles in more depth than others before him. He argues, ultimately, that Díaz de Guzmán’s explanation of the Paraguayan origins of the Chiriguana is accurate in all crucial aspects. It not only offers a plausible motive for the Guaraní migration to the eastern Andes, it also stands up to Nordenskiöld’s scrutiny of the source.10

He argues that the inconsistency between Díaz de Guzmán’s account and that of Garcilaso de la Vega, which dates the arrival of the Chiriguana to the Andean foothills to the prior century, is an error on Garcilaso’s part. According to Nordenskiöld, the other major chronicles of the Incas contain no mention of the Chiriguanaes or other Guaraní-speakers threatening Inca territory prior to the reign of Huayna Capac, whose reign coincided with García’s arrival. All of these sources, on the other hand, discuss Huayna Capac’s ill-fated attempt to pursue and defeat the Chiriguanaes. Regarding this encounter, however, Garcilaso is silent. Nordenskiöld concludes on the basis of this evidence that Garcilaso was mistaken and likely “assigned an event that happened under [Huayna Capac] to the reign of his grandfather.”11

---


11 Ibid., 106-09, 116-21. The only error Nordenskiöld found in Díaz de Guzmán’s account is a technical one. He determines based on a letter relating to a 1521 Portuguese mission to South America, which he believes included
By discounting Garcilaso’s mention of Guaraní-Chiriguana contact with the Inca empire prior to the 1520s, Nordenskiöld has removed all impediment to his belief that Guaraní westward migration was set off by the European presence in Paraguay and Brazil.

Yet Nordenskiöld’s work is still in many ways a product of an earlier time. His assertion that García’s presence set off Guaraní westward migration, which he makes largely in ignorance of Guaraní culture, perpetuates false notions of native submissiveness and European initiative. It also suggests that a clash between the Guaraní and the Incas was inevitable upon their meeting. Nordenskiöld’s lack of familiarity with the Guaraní culture is understandable given the sources with which he worked. Colonial-era commentators had a great deal of difficulty attempting to explain Guaraní cultures. Ethnographers prior to Nordenskiöld’s generation also fared poorly in demystifying Guaraní beliefs and behaviors. Given the wide dispersal of Tupí-Guaraní peoples along the Brazilian coast at the time of European contact and their relative cultural homogeneity, colonial documents tell us surprisingly little. Their authors often asserted that the Tupí-Guaraní were ignorant of even the most basic elements of all religion. This was, of course, because the colonial commentators were looking only for culturally relevant parallels to Christian concepts. Those who were able to parse elements of Tupí-Guaraní belief from their experiences with the

García, that García’s exploration dates more accurately to 1522 than 1526. In a later publication, Nordenskiöld offers the additional possibility that Garcilaso was referring to the “tribes of the Chaco in general, and not any particular tribe.” See Erland Nordenskiöld, Changes in the Material Culture of Two Indian Tribes under the Influence of New Surroundings (New York: AMS Press, 1979 [1920]), XIII n. 2.

12 Tupí-Guaraní is a linguistic group whose dialects are mostly mutually intelligible. The name Tupí was used by the Portuguese, Guaraní by the Spanish. Whether the people who spoke these languages were culturally uniform at the time of European contact is a matter of debate. Métraux and H. Clastres do ascribe a large degree of pre-conquest cultural uniformity in the widely dispersed members of the language group. Lorenzo Calzavarini and Catherine Julien are among those that call that uniformity into question. See Alfred Métraux, La civilisation matérielle des tribus Tupi-Guarani (Paris: P. Geuthner, 1928); Hélène Clastres, The Land-without-Evil: Tupí-Guarani Prophetism, trans. Jacqueline Grenez Brovender (Urbana: Univ. of Illinois Press, 1995), esp. 5-6; Calzavarini, Nación chiriguana, 37-38; and Catherine Julien, “Kandire in Real Time and Space: Sixteenth-Century Expeditions from the Pantanal to the Andes,” Ethnohistory 54, no. 2 (2007): 247-49, 265.
natives were almost exclusively clergymen undertaking to convert their charges. It is not surprising that they failed to record much about native ideologies beyond that which helped them do away with those ideologies.\footnote{13}

The linguistic work undertaken by missionaries, however, helped stimulate research contemporary to Nordenskiöld regarding the Guaraní and related native peoples. The most notable example of this groundbreaking research is that of German linguist and ethnographer Curt Unkel. Though he made no direct contribution to scholarship on the Chiriguana, his research on the Guaraní has greatly enhanced scholars’ abilities to understand the Chiriguana and their origins. Unkel came to be known under the name given to him by the Guaraní among whom he lived: Nimuendajú, which means “the one who made himself a home.” Though he lacked formal education on the subject, Nimuendajú was the first ethnographer to attempt to record and analyze Guaraní mythology from a scientific point of view. He did so by interviewing members of the Apapokúva-Guarani, among whom he lived from 1905-13. According to fellow anthropologist of the Guarani, Bartomeu Melià, Nimuendajú’s work recording and analyzing the creation and destruction mythologies central to Guaraní religion “sheds more light on the authentic Guarani religion than everything that has been written ever since.”\footnote{14}

Nimuendajú’s most influential finding relating to Chiriguana ethnography is the importance of physical migration in search of the “Land without Evil” to the religious culture of the Guarani. Subsequent research shows that basic elements of the creation myth that Nimuendajú documented were common to all Guarani peoples dating back some 2,000 years. Its


heroes are twin brothers. Their birth coincided exactly with the death of their mother, who was devoured by the Blue Tiger. Their journeys ever-onward in search for the home of their mother, where they will live in abundance, represent a sort of scripture to the Guaraní. It recounts their encounters with people and situations unique to the Guaraní experience. Their actions and behaviors in response to their experiences are the template for Guaraní cultural practice. Their guide during their journey is their father, transformed into the god-like Tupa, who communicates with them in meteorological phenomena like thunder and during the performance of ritual dances. When Tupa permits it, the prophecy goes, the Blue Tiger will devour all mankind.¹⁵

In or around 1910, Nimuendajú witnessed and recorded an instance of the Guaraní migratory ideology in action. His residence among the Apapokúva overlapped with one of the last-known instances of ritual relocation by a Guaraní community. Spurred by the visions of a shaman—visions sent by Tupa—they moved eastward from the Amazonian forests toward the Atlantic. But, the unlikely participant writes …

the march of the Guaraní to the east was not spurred by pressure from enemy tribes, even less by the hope of finding better conditions for life on the other side of the Paraná, nor the desire to get closer to civilization; only by the fear of the destruction of the earth and the hope of finding the “Land without Evil” before the destruction would occur.¹⁶

At the close of his account, Nimuendajú poses a question “for those more competent [than he]:” were the Guaraní resettlements of the recent past and attested to in the historical

---


record the “death rattles of earlier [migrations] that brought the Tupí-Guaraní to their settlements along the [South American] coast at the age of discovery?” If so, can these migrations be attributed to similar religious causes? Nimuendajú’s work argues that their positioning on the coast during the sixteenth century only makes sense if one takes into account religious motives. According to him, they made no apparent uses of the sea in the way of resources or trade.17

Alfred Métraux, a Swiss ethnographer and student of Nordenskiöld, finds in Nimuendajú’s migratory hypothesis a concept that could hold together a grand theory about the wide dispersion of the Tupí-Guaraní in lowland South America. He agrees that the religious motive was an element in spurring on the Tupí-Guaraní migrations. At a more practical level, he argues, these “politico-mystical uprisings” were inspired by messages received by the shamans “aim[ed] at slowing up social and cultural disorganization” within the participatory populations. They became particularly acute upon the culturally disruptive arrival of the Europeans but existed beforehand as well.18 He also recognizes the material aspects inherent in the westward migrations in which Alejo García took part and suggests that the gold, silver, and copper purported to exist among the peoples of the eastern Andean slope sparked plundering raids that then led to more permanent settlements.19 Because he recognizes the centrality of migration to Guaraní culture and sees in the practice the mechanism by which the Tupí-Guaraní came to occupy so much territory already prior to European contact, Métraux discounts Alejo García’s

17 Ibid., 127-28.


supposed leadership role in the migration described by Díaz de Guzmán. He argues that there was an ongoing tradition of migration that predates the contact period. The implication for the study of the Chiriguanaes is that García’s trek was only one in a series of journeys that led to the settlement of Guaraní-speakers in the eastern Andes. Métraux’s position on this issue frees him to reevaluate the veracity of Garcilaso’s claim relating to Guaraní contacts with the Inca during the reign of Inca Yupanqui (the mid-1400s). He believes that the Guaraní had indeed begun to threaten the security of the Inca territory by this early date. Furthermore, it was these westward migrations from the upper Paraguay River to the frontiers of the Inca empire dating from 1471 to 1526 that created the cultural basis for the Chiriguanaes whom the Spanish would encounter. Métraux argues that the miscegenation of these migrants and their descendants with the Arawak Chané provided their genetic stock. He explains that Guaraní migrants enslaved Chané women and produced offspring with them (more on this in the next section). As a result, most Chiriguanaes were a genetic mixture of Arawak and Guaraní. An infusion of Guaraní blood came in the form of fresh migrants who arrived in the retinues of Spanish settlers from Paraguay (as described above by Moreno), and it is likely that migration between Asunción and the eastern Andes continued into the later-sixteenth century both in the company of and independent of Spanish-led expeditions.20

Métraux is reluctant to describe the Guaraní migrations that would brought about the Chiriguanaes as primarily a religious phenomenon. He believes that metal trinkets and copper tools originating from within the Inca empire reached the lowlands through trading networks, of which the Guaraní occupied (or plundered) the most distant branches. He writes, “the prospect of rich loot was certainly the predominant cause of their invasions.” He grants, however, that the

religious aspect that Nimuendajú emphasized in his take on the twentieth-century migrations, “also may have played some part in determining” the sixteenth-century Guaraní westward movements.  

Hélène Clastres turns on their heads Métraux’s explanations for both the socio-cultural role of Tupí-Guaraní migrations and the inspirations for the particular westward journeys that set in motion Chiriguana ethnogenesis. Rather than serving as forces for social and cultural cohesion, as Métraux’s work argues, Clastres argues that they were the results of the disruptive aims of a particular class of shaman who sought to cast aside the social order. She claims that the Guaraní associated the Inca-controlled Andes with the Land without Evil described in their origin myths due to the material wealth of the Inca empire. Guaraní westward migrations may have netted little more than material plunder, but their goal, Clastres suggests, went further. It was precisely the type of religious-focused migration that Nimuendajú witnessed dozens of generations later in Brazil.  

Clastres distinguishes a hierarchy of shamans among the colonial-era Tupí-Guaraní based on the descriptions left by the missionaries and travelers of the era. At its peak were the karai, who held a special status that transcended the bounds of the community. They appear in the earliest documents as “false prophets,” or figures “believed to be saints” and “revered as gods.” On occasion, a karai would address a particular community in the course of a ritual cloaked in elaborate ceremony. Clastres argues that the underlying message of each oration was that the community must embark on a voyage in search of the Land without Evil, the quest to which

21 Ibid., 466.
“Tupí-Guaraní religious practice has always been bound.” Two sixteenth-century descriptions of these rituals exist. In both cases, the karai highlights the imminent destruction of the earth and calls upon the people to avoid the catastrophe by searching out the Land without Evil. The search, Clastres argues, involved not only a physical abandonment of the ancestral land in order to go “beyond the high mountains,” the karai urged the people to abandon the very principles upon which Guaraní society was based: their subsistence activities and social interactions. Instead, they were to dedicate themselves to intra-ethnic warfare and out-migration, pursuits that represented “the negation of rules of alliance.” Rather than uniting the Guaraní in their traditional cultural values, the karai exerted a centrifugal force that nullified the possibility of strong social bonds within the community.

The suggestion that proto-Chiriguana migrants associated the Land without Evil with a physical place (and the Incas in particular) hinges to a great extent upon the meaning of a Guaraní term: kandire. Clastres’ work holds that the Guaraní Land without Evil was a physical place with otherworldly qualities. The ancestors dwelled there in everlasting abundance, and most only accessed it upon death, but she argues that Guaraní cosmology held that the worlds of the humans and that of the gods were permeable; humans could cross over body and soul to become god-men. If they did so, they achieved immortality. The argument stems from the work of anthropologist León Cadogan, who worked among the Paraguayan Mbyá-Guaraní in the 1950s. According to the myths he recorded, one could transfer to the Land without Evil “without going through the ordeal of death,” or “oñemokandire” (my emboldening) in their Guaraní

23 Ibid., 23, 27-36.

24 Ibid., 37-40, 55-56. Clastres’ apparent paradox of a society that contains at its heart strong anti-social forces owes much (and probably contributes much) to an influential theoretical framework developed in P. Clastres, Society Against the State, a book I discuss in more depth below.
tongue. Cadogan translates *kandire* as “resurrection” in his Mbyá-Guaraní vocabulary. If indeed the *kandire* were related to a resurrective process necessary in achieving immortality—one that lay just beyond the mountains in physical space—it was conceivable that searching it out was the primary impetus that drove the Guaraní to migrate westward as the proto-Chiriguanaes did.\(^{25}\)

Subsequent theories regarding the cultures and migrations of the Tupí-Guaraní have necessarily been in direct dialogue with Clastres’ hypothesis. Some are critical of Clastres for what they deem a too-expansive approach to the Tupí-Guaraní peoples across time and space. Catherine Julien finds that Clastres relies on overly simplistic linguistic categories when they likely had little social and political meaning in local context. This leads Clastres to be too willing to read back in time and across great distance social and cultural characteristics that did not necessarily apply to the historical Guaraní: for instance the application of finer points of Nimuendajú’s and Cadogan’s research to the fifteenth- or sixteenth-century proto-Chiriguana.\(^{26}\) Nor is Clastres the first to do so in haste, according to Melià. He argues that Nimuendajú’s work presupposes the existence of “a ‘continuum’ that linked the ancient and modern Guaraní and would justify a retrospective ethnology and general theory of migration extending to all Tupí-

\(^{25}\) Clastres, *The Land-without-Evil*, 23-24, 76-79. Clastres was not the first to associate *kandire* with the Incas. Métraux speculated years earlier regarding the possible association between the “Land without Evil” and the Incas. See Alfred Métraux, “Études sur la civilización des indiens Chiriguano,” *Revista del Instituto de Etnología de la Universidad Nacional de Tucumán* 1, no. 2 (1930): 303-08. Even earlier, Nordenskiöld highlighted the appearance of the term in a 1557 document produced in the course of a Spanish expedition from Paraguay. The document notes the “struggle between the ‘Chiriguanos’ and the ‘Candires.’” He suggested that the latter term referred to the “Indians of the hills,” possibly the Incas. He also used it in discussing the dispersion of metal goods into the lowlands—“who in their turn had got these metals from the Chanes, Chimenos, Carcaras, Candires, and others”—and regarding certain structures, “which are presumably of Candire origin.” See Nordenskiöld, “The Guarani Invasion of the Inca Empire,” 111, 114, 114 n. 39. Clastres fails to cite him or the 1557 document, though Cadogan is apparently familiar with Nordenskiöld’s attribution of Candire to the Incas, for he calls attention to it: “It is significant that a non-Guaraní nation was designated … at the time of the conquest with the name Kandire. Could they have been considered to be immortal because of their superior culture?” See León Cadogan, *Ayvu Rapyta: Textos míticos de los mbyá-guaraní del Guairá* (São Paulo: Universidade de São Paulo, 1959), 59, 198. I borrow the translation of this quote from Julien, “Kandire in Real Time and Space,” 258.

\(^{26}\) Julien, “Kandire in Real Time and Space,” 247-50, 265.
Guaraní throughout time, based on the ethnography of certain migratory movements by modern Guaraní.”

According to Julien and Melià, Nimuendajú provided the theory; Métraux provided the source work to prove it; but the theory fits a bit too neatly.

Julien’s and Melià’s skepticism about Guaraní cultural continuity through time and space is an extension of a hypothesis advanced by Lorenzo Calzavarini. He suggests that the apparent vastness of Tupí-Guaraní dispersion was due more to the linguistic (and partial-cultural) “Guaranization” of non-Tupí-Guaraní populations. The linguistic homogeneity of the peoples encountered by Europeans across great distances gave them the impression of similar ethnic and cultural uniformity. Scholars have long-since recognized this phenomenon on the frontiers of Spanish settlement. The Chané—who adopted the Guaraní language during the sixteenth century—are the readiest example. But Calzavarini speculates that the phenomenon of Guaranization, forced or otherwise, extended beyond the gaze of the Spanish both in distance and time. In other words, Tupí-Guaraní linguistic and cultural domination over many non-Tupí-Guaraní populations may appear in the archaeological and linguistic records as Tupí-Guaraní migration and the expulsion of those peoples they encountered.

Melià looks more closely at the concept of the term Land without Evil, “yvy imarää” in Guaraní, from the perspective of the Guaraní themselves. As a Jesuit priest and a student of Cadogan, his academic specialty is the language and culture of the Guaraní. He notes that Guaraní dependence on maize and other temperate crops made their way of life possible only in a limited environmental area. The ritual feast and the consumption of the fermented maize drink cangui were both crucial to Guaraní cultural existence, and both necessitated the production of

---


28 Calzavarini, Nación chiriguana, 37-38.
agricultural surpluses. As such, they depended on a climate that produced consistently warm temperatures and persistent rainfall, as well as access to major waterways. The archeological record provides evidence of their pre-contact settlement only in areas that satisfied these prerequisites. These rather strict boundaries made the idea of “land” a constant aspect of concern for the Guaraní. But one cannot count on the immutability of land: “nothing is more unstable that the land of the Guaraní, which is born, lives, and dies.” The Guaraní relationship with the land, Melià continues, has always involved “cycles that are not just economic but socio-political and religious.” When climatic or other changes threw the environment outside of the equilibrium necessary for the Guaraní, they responded, if necessary, by relocating.29

Melià explains that the Guaraní identify their land with the term “tekoha.” Its meaning spans the boundaries of the economic and the cultural. Some synonyms from a 1639 Guaraní vocabulary translate to “mode of being, system …, behavior …, custom.” It is the “conditions that make possible the Guaraní way of life.” The measure of quality that the Guaraní applied to any particular land depended, in the description of a seventeenth-century Jesuit, on the soil, vegetation, and other geographical features. Quality land also needed to be habitable by the community, as social life was and remains a crucial element of being Guaraní. Poor land, or, more to-the-point, “evil” land, is that which is prone to the natural and manmade disasters to which virtually all agricultural peoples are susceptible: drought, flood, fire, and enemy attack, among others. As Nimuendajú and Clastres both show, the destruction of the earth was a core aspect of Guaraní religion. But Melià argues that the slash and burn techniques that the pre-contact and early colonial-era Guaraní used almost exclusively to prepare their fields also led to

another marker of evil in the land, soil exhaustion. This method of agriculture led to the continual need to relocate as the earth lost its productive capacity over a short span of time.30

The original Guaraní quests for the Land without Evil, from this perspective, were rather mundane. They were movements in search of virgin agricultural territory. But particularly puzzling is the fact that the proto-Chiriguana Guaraní settled primarily in an environment outside of their traditional ecological niche. Much of the cordillera where the Spanish encountered the greatest concentration of Chiriguanaes is too dry and lies at too high an altitude to fit the expected Guaraní parameters. Melià theorizes that the migratory concept took on a much more politico-mystical quality as a result of the arrival of Europeans, their agriculture, and their notions of civilized space. Their appropriation of the land capable of supporting their ways of life made the possibilities of finding a Land without Evil ever more remote. He argues that it is only through increasing reliance on the shamans—particularly the karai—and their abilities to “recreate ecological ‘spaces’ similar to the traditional ones that they [remained able to] achieve true tekoha.”31

Julien’s doubts about H. Clastres’ conceptual model have led her to reconsider the written source material in greater depth and breadth. Her article “Kandire in Real Time and Space” focuses on the sixteenth-century documentary references to kandire, in all its variations, in order to determine its meaning to the Guaraní speakers of the era. These sources also lead her to consider a number of more subtle clues that suggest the nature of Guaraní migrations toward the eastern Inca frontier in the sixteenth century. A number of references she has uncovered refer to

30 Ibid., 296-303.
the “Canire” or “Candire” as a group of people rather than a physical place. They were particularly important to Guaraní speakers because they controlled the sources from which much-sought-after metal flowed into the lowlands. These Candire lived in the high mountains near a big lake, controlled the territory all the way to the Guapay (Grande) River, and used the hair of deer-like creatures to spin yarn. In retrospect, these descriptions clearly seem to reference the Incas.32

If the Candire were the Incas, just how did this appellation evolve among the Guaraní and the other informants? Julien attempts to answer the question by locating the origin of the word Candire. Though scattered evidence suggests it may have had Guaraní roots, the prevalence of witnesses identified as Chané (rather than Guaraní-speaking) among the informants to the expeditions of the 1540s and ‘50s leads her to look elsewhere. There is presently a Bolivian city called Camiri in the Andean foothills. It sits just to the east of where the Qaraqara people (an Aymara social and political unit that operated under Inca rule in the generations prior to the Spanish conquest) lived. The Porco mine from which the Inca obtained much of their silver lay in Qaraqara territory, so the idea that Kandire-Canire-Camiri, with its connotations of metal, wealth, and power, might refer to the Qaraqara is plausible. The Aymara linguistic evidence supports Julien. A sixteenth-century Aymara vocabulary defines camiri as both of the following: “creator, in the same manner as God” and “rich person.”33 The implication of these linguistic and geographical confluences, though speculative, is that “Candire” came to certain Guarani-speaking populations as a derivation of an Aymara term that certain peoples living on the Inca frontier associated with wealth and power. It came to serve as a semi-ethnic indicator for one or a

33 Ibid., 257-62.
number of peoples associated with the Inca empire, but certain subsets of Guaraní seem to have linked it with mystical concepts that already existed in their cosmology.

Julien’s investigation both underlines and recasts certain elements of Clastres’ hypothesis on Guaraní prophetism and migration. In a sense, she creates a synthesis of Métraux’s primarily material thesis and Clastres’ exclusively religious thesis for the impetus behind Guaraní migrations, if perhaps closer to the former. But Julien points out that the migrations evident in her sources do not support the kind of permanent settlement migration that Nimuendajú apparently witnessed and Métraux and Clastres assign backwards as the defining element of Tupí-Guaraní dispersion. The wide distribution of communities that spoke versions of the language upon European arrival in South America may owe instead to unplanned settlement by members of raiding parties, the use of Guaraní as a lingua franca on these multi-ethnic expeditions aimed at taking captives and metal (following Calzavarini), or the short-distance relocation of Tupí-Guaraní populations to virgin forest territory suited to slash-and-burn agriculture (following Melià).34

Franz Michel, the head of a foundation working in support of the Bolivian Ava-Guaraní (the descendants of the Chiriguanaes), also rejects the conflation of Candire and the Land without Evil. He argues that the latter is a concept of preeminent importance among the Guaraní, but it refers more accurately to the harmonious interaction of human beings with their environment and the spirit world. When humans properly manage their behavior and operate within the spheres into which the earth is divided, one need not worry about providing for oneself. Therein humans can live in a Land without Evil, but also a land in which one can shed one’s burdens. This lightening of the load may indeed be the central aspect of the Land without

34 Ibid., 263-65.
Evil and the Guaraní origin of the concept of “Candire.” Michel notes that José Domingo Velis proposes in his recent dictionary of Guaraní that Candire has its etymology in the phrase “ka-
ndicueri,” or, “we are tired.”

No truly definitive explanation for the migration and settlement of the Guaraní-speaking ancestors of the Chiriguana has emerged around which any scholarly consensus has formed. No single overarching factor seems to have brought about the large-scale movements that were crucial to Chiriguana ethnogenesis. Nor can scholars isolate a precise recipe of practical economic and political concerns synthesized with more abstract religious concepts to explain Guaraní population migrations. The keys to understanding the concepts of kandire and the Land without Evil are the contexts in which people deployed them. Michel is cognizant of the conflicting explanations for Guaraní migrations, but he insists that they might all be correct in their own ways. Myth, he argues, is remade according to the social system rather than the other way around. Just as earlier Guaraní-speaking peoples might have clung to an ethos of migration precisely in opposition to the reducción or the missions system, today many assert that harmony with the land is the key to their concept of Land without Evil. In this way they seek to protect their agricultural ways of life under the threat of an expanding urban sector.

Mutability in this sense is the one concept that can safely be projected backwards in time. Individuals and groups within Chiriguana communities frequently recast concepts such as the “Land without Evil” and “kandire” according to particular circumstances. They sought to shape community norms of behavior to coincide with their own interests. According to the context, this

---


36 Ibid., 240, 251.
might have meant reinforcing traditions and bonds that held the community together, but the anomaly in the case of the Chiriguana seems to have been the inordinate tendency toward dis-integration and fragmentation relative to other communities. The following section addresses this.

**Ethnicity, Culture, and Worldview: Men without Masters**

Early European observers typically associated the Chiriguana people with war, pillaging, nudity, anarchy, nomadism, brutality, and sexual and alcoholic licentiousness. They noted that these frontier people had no interest in and little capacity for Christianity, and they wantonly consumed human flesh, the greatest single indicator of their uncivilized state. These observations were based on scant empirical evidence, but the conclusions that colonial jurists, commentators, and Spanish frontier settlers drew were the results of their cultural biases and political objectives. The ethnohistorical work that scholars have undertaken in order to peel back the colonial distortions tells us that the Chiriguana were a people whose history of migration and interaction with a variety of other cultures highlighted their capacity for ethnic-distinction and were desirous above all for freedom as they uniquely defined it.

Serrano y Sanz, the late nineteenth-century Spanish historian, builds his image of the colonial Chiriguanaes based on legal opinions written in reference to the failed sixteenth-century conquests by the Spanish as well as later missionary accounts, and his work reflects them largely uncritically. The characterization is stark in almost all cases: they knew nothing of politics, and in peace they recognized only the authority of the familial father. In war they chose the most vicious and exuberant man among them as a leader. They were equally ignorant of religion. They failed even to possess idols and had only a faint notion of the divine or the soul. The missionaries tended to ascribe the attitude of general indifference to Christianity shown by the Chiriguana to their apparent lack of a capacity to understand the theological. They were, on the other hand,
extremely superstitious and reverential toward magical powers and those capable of summoning them.37

Serrano y Sanz dwells upon the ferocious nature that the early Chiriguana displayed toward European witnesses and native informants. They terrorized their neighbors and celebrated their violent exploits in song during immodest, drunken ceremonies. But despite their apparent bravery and resilience, they had no concept of honor as Serrano y Sanz defines it, and they would flee when convenient. They also consumed their captured enemies. Indeed, “from their earliest days, they were dedicated to cannibalism and continued devouring human flesh until long after the [Spanish] conquest of Peru.” Only as they benefitted from contact with the Spanish and “civilized Indians” did they begin to sell their captives rather than eating them. From that point, they made war in order to take captives and also “raided ranches, killed as many Spaniards as they could, snatched livestock, and oppressed neighboring Indians, especially the peaceful Chané.” The sexual habits of the Chiriguana were equally contemptible. They were not only polygamous but prone to divorce and the exchange of sexual partners among the 80 to 100 residents of the same dwelling. Their living situation was an improvement over the caves in which Serrano y Sanz reports that they had lived in pre-Hispanic times. They were also accustomed to nudity, though over the course of the colonial period they learned to cover themselves: “some even dressed in the European style and lived in luxury thanks to the fruit of their raids and robberies.”38

38 Ibid., 329-31. The reference to caves is almost certainly taken from Garcilaso, who was probably using the word “Chiriguana” in its generic sense—meaning savage or barbarian—rather than describing the Chiriguana. See below for a discussion of the generic and ethnic meanings of the term.
Serrano y Sanz’ allusion to the Chané as the chief victim of Chiriguana aggression foreshadows an insight about the unique relationship between the two peoples that ethnographic research continues to clarify. Nordenskiöld, familiar with the Chané due to his study of the material culture of the Bolivian lowlands, helps move forward the discussion. He recognizes that the Chané are Arawak peoples who have adopted the Guaraní language and culture, but he also writes under the misconception that the Guaraní migrations that followed Alejo García’s death were the first instances of Guaraní settlement in the eastern Andes. The sources from which his work draws indicate that the García and his Guaraní companions took Chané captives when they traveled to the Inca frontier. This confluence of evidence leads Nordenskiöld to conclude that the Chané, who “give the impression of being a tribe that has been pushed aside,” were displaced from the eastern Andes by the Guaraní in the early sixteenth century.  

Later research finds that the Chané populations settled sparsely across the Chaco between the Andean foothills and the Paraguay River were the southwestern-most extensions of Amazonian-origin Arawak speakers. Prior to the arrival of significant Guaraní settlement, they lived in apparent peace with the Aymara highland kingdoms to their west, which also made use of the lowland climate zones in order to diversify their agricultural yields. The Chané adopted many of the cultural markers of the highland groups, including clothing and technologies, above all from the Qaraqara and Chicha peoples with whom they came into contact most commonly. They carried on trade with the western highlands, where they obtained metal goods in exchange

---

39 Nordenskiöld, “The Guarani Invasion of the Inca Empire,” 120-21. He became more certain of this hypothesis in the coming years. See Nordenskiöld, Changes in the Material Culture, XII-XIII, 206. Much of Saignes’ and Combès’ work, both together and separate, has focused on the Chané-Guaraní-Chiriguana dynamic (discussed below).

40 Métraux, “Tribes of the Eastern Slopes of the Bolivian Andes,” 466-67. The Chicha were not originally a highland-origin people but came outwardly to resemble the Aymara in some ways by the early-sixteenth century. For more detail about these peoples, see Chapter 3.
in most cases for slaves and women. Though they are generally described as peaceful, they fought wars with other Arawak populations in the eastern lowlands, during the course of which they obtained their captive trade goods. The Inca state extended its territorial control over the Aymara kingdoms around 1500 and began to oversee the trade network. Branislava Susnik, the preeminent ethnographer of the Paraguayan Guaraní writing during the mid-twentieth century, finds that the Chané received a special status akin to visiting tradespeople that allowed them to control the flow of metal to the east.\textsuperscript{41}

Their role in the metal trade between the eastern Andes and the Paraguay basin is presumably among the reasons that the arriving Guaraní focused so fixedly upon the Chané and why “they made slaves of [the Chané] and ravished a great number of their women.”\textsuperscript{42} But their focus on the Chané as a people worthy of enslavement reflects a widely recognized Tupí-Guaraní cultural mindset. It is a central component of the warrior ethos—born of generations of competition and migration—that the Guaraní brought to the eastern Andes. The name by which the Guaraní knew the Chané is tapuy, the meaning of which approximates “slave.” The Guaraní of the early colonial period found that those who belonged to the tapuy, in the ethnic and cultural sense, were fit only for servitude. Other sixteenth- and seventeenth-century examples of this relationship between Tupí-Guaraní and their various tapuya (plural) are abundant. Along the coast, the most common tapuy populations consisted of Arawak or Gê speakers.\textsuperscript{43}

\textsuperscript{41} Branislava Susnik, \textit{Chiriguanos: dimensiones etnosociales} (Asunción: Museo Etnográfico Andres Barbero, 1968), 165-66. Like many of the assertions in this book, it is unclear what evidence Susnik uses to draw this conclusion.

\textsuperscript{42} Nordenskiöld, \textit{Changes in the Material Culture}, XIII.

Métraux analyzes one of the earliest recorded clashes between *ava*, the Tupí-Guaraní self-appellation that means “men,” and their designated *tapuy* people. It appears in the chronicles of the sixteenth-century Portuguese explorer and naturalist, Gabriel Soares de Souza. Soares de Souza’s account relates a tale he heard and recorded the 1570s or ‘80s. According to Tupí elders, their people came from the west and attacked a wealthy, coastal-dwelling population of *tapuy*. The Tupí displaced the *tapuya* and established themselves in their settlements while the *tapuya* fled inland to the less-productive lands of the forests. Eventually, a more powerful Tupí community displaced Soares de Souza’s informants, whose community retreated back inland. There, they clashed a second time with their *tapuya* rivals and displaced them once again. Métraux concludes based on this account that the Tupí-Guaraní were in the process of exterminating or displacing other peoples to the margins of the continent in the sixteenth century. In those areas where populations of non-Tupí-Guaraní speakers remained scattered amongst Tupí-Guaraní communities, he argues that the bellicose interlopers had “not yet had time to exterminate or assimilate vanquished populations.”

The struggle between the Guaraní and the Chané was a similar conflict in a different setting. In both cases, the struggles between the peoples in question remained unfinished in the sense that the *tapuy* population remained in existence. Their Tupí-Guaraní rivals had not eliminated them, though in Métraux’s view, this may have been because of the interruption caused by the arrival of Europeans. In the case of the Chané people, the majority eventually became slaves, and even those communities that remained free adopted Guaraní language and customs—an example of elimination through assimilation.

---


Chiriguana religion, as characterized in colonial-era documents, also sheds light on the apparent thirst for conflict that drove their collective behavior along the eastern Andean frontier. Polo de Ondegardo, the prominent sixteenth-century Spanish jurist, claimed that the Chiriguana “have vengeance as their religion, and they call it exchange.”46 Their particular version of the creation story reinforced and justified the idea of life in this pursuit. Like the Apapokúva-Guaraní cosmology recorded by Nimuendajú, it involves the violent birth of twin brothers as their mother is consumed by tigers. Their father abandoned them and transformed into the divinity associated with celestial bodies and natural phenomena such as thunder. The story follows their wandering in search of their father and their interaction with the natural environment. Examples include their theft of fire from the vultures, a vignette symbolizing the passage from a state of nature to culture, or their defeat of the evil spirits from whom they receive maize. Whereas the Apapokúva version ends with the twins’ discovery of ritual song and dance through which they can communicate with their father, the Chiriguana story climaxes in their destruction of the tigers that ate their mother. Their reward for visiting this vengeance upon the tigers is deification as the sun and moon. Polo de Ondegardo associated Chiriguana vengeance with the concept of “exchange” or “trade” because it represented the apparent means by which they interacted with those outside their own cultural group.47 In other words, the mythical twins’ quest to destroy the tigers established an ideological model for Chiriguana behavior that privileged confrontation through violence along ethnic and cultural lines.

Susnik theorizes that the competition for resources between proto-Guaraní populations and against other migratory peoples, especially over arable land, is the basis for many of the

46 Cited in Melià, Ñande reko, 51-52. The word yeepi, translates as both venganza and trueque. See the discussion of this and other dual meanings in the Guaraní language in the context of Combès and Saignes, “Chiriguana,” below.

47 Melià, Ñande reko, 54-57.
combative ethno-social traits the Chiriguana exhibited in early colonial times. These populations often followed the same riverine routes throughout the continent as they sought new territory for settlement. A population that found productive terrain needed to protect it from others who would displace them. In this competitive environment, some communities or people within communities allocated more of their energies to raiding others’ resources than they did to production by more typical means such as agriculture, husbandry, or hunting. This type of predation required the development of an identity based on alterity vis-à-vis those they victimized.  

Despite the generally hostile character of inter-group interactions in this type of environment, exposure to others also sparked the evolution of cultures and generated new cultural fusions. In this sense, Susnik’s take on the conflict between Tupí-Guaraní populations and others is more complex than Métraux’s view. Susnik finds that the results of such mutual influence were important factors in socio-tribal individualization and that new hybrid ethnicities emerged as a result of this conflict. It was not simply a matter of the wholesale displacement or destruction of the weaker in battle. The subjugation of the Chané by the Guaraní to create the Chiriguana is the most notable example of the genesis of a hybrid society because it took place in historical time, but Susnik argues that such interactions were commonplace in lithic South America.  


49 Susnik, *Dispersión tupí-guaraní prehistórica*, 58-59. In “Tribes of the Eastern Slopes of the Bolivian Andes,” (from 1946) Métraux recognizes more fully the dual influences of the Chané and Guaraní on the Chiriguana to an extent not reflected in his earlier statement from *Migrations historiques* (1927) about the extermination or assimilation of *tapuy* populations. He does maintain, however, that the remaining Chané populations “cannot be distinguished from their conquerors” (see page 467), indicating that their culture has all but disappeared.
Susnik’s work has been particularly important in helping scholars understand the socio-cultural role of warfare for the Chiriguana. While their apparent penchant for armed conflict led scholars and commentators to dismiss the Chiriguana as uncivilized or without culture, Susnik explains that Neolithic expansionist societies, of which the Guaraní-Chiriguana were an exemplar, required war against others in order to claim resources, express ethnic self-affirmation, and exact revenge on behalf of the population. The Chiriguana thus developed an exclusionary ethnocentric or even ethnophilic identity (from which the complementary tapuy concept arises); a professional warrior class and an associated ethos; sacred rituals surrounding warfare; and a non-rigid concept of political union.

Susnik’s analysis of the Chiriguana ritual feast illustrates a number of these concepts in full bloom. The arete (Spanish, convite; English, banquet) is a deeply-rooted Guaraní ritual that continued into the late nineteenth century among the Bolivian Guaraní even as they resided in missions. Because of the long duration of the period in which these banquets took place, a great many accounts describing them survive. Erik Langer uses these accounts to describe the general way in which the festivals tended to occur. According to his analysis, the chief would begin preparations by setting out a large empty container meant to hold the fermented corn beer cangui, thus challenging his people to produce a sufficient quantity of the beverage. The female members of all households produced and displayed amounts of cangui proportional to their households’ prestige, while men hunted game and provided firewood. Surrounding Chiriguana communities were also invited, and on the arranged day, all entered the village and began

---


51 Ibid., 9-10. The priests overseeing the missions avoided outlawing the practice because they recognized its importance to their charges. Forbidding it would likely have driven many of the neophytes away, so the priests accepted the “‘place of the infidels’ alongside ‘the place of the neophytes.’”
drinking, dancing, and singing for the duration of the celebration. The *cangui*, and therefore the festival, often lasted a week or more. The *arete* was followed by a reciprocal invitation from another community, whose goal was to surpass the extravagance of the just-concluded festival.52

Langer’s and Susnik’s sources mostly chronicle nineteenth-century *arete*, which were certain to have differed in ways from their sixteenth-century equivalents, but they demonstrate particular elements of the Chiriguana society that Susnik claims date from much earlier. In the sense that the *arete* served as a mechanism to display and disperse wealth (in the form of surplus corn not necessary for basic nutrition) among community members and beyond, they were demonstrative of a certain inclusiveness that both undermined and affirmed social status. Its communal aspects cemented a certain sense of solidarity that was necessary to carry out attack and defense maneuvers or migrations within the smallest political units. At the same time, all households faced expectations according to their social status, the chief or *tuvicha* above all. But social class was more flexible or open to negotiation at the time of the *arete*, up to a point. Economic abundance was the key to social prestige, and, Susnik claims, the Guaraní concept of poverty was tied intimately with the inability to provide sufficient corn to produce the *cangui* necessary for a proper feast. One might elevate or lower one’s household prestige by providing more or less than expected during the preparations for an *arete*.53

Considering the celebrations of *arete* as they relate to warfare provides additional insights about the Chiriguana worldview. The sixteenth-century Chiriguana were particularly aggressive in their attacks along the frontier of Spanish settlement. At this time Europeans and natives living

---

52 Langer, *Expecting Pears from an Elm Tree*, 133-36.

along the frontier reported instances of what seem to have been large, interregional *arete* preceding attacks on their settlements. These gatherings consisted of the recitation of speeches that affirmed Chiriguana ethnic superiority vis-à-vis the *tapuya* and promised vengeance towards the Spanish. Members of the elite corps of soldiers, the *queremba*, often took the lead in these recitations alongside the shamans, the *tuvicha* of the constituent communities, and the *tuvicha rubicha* or overall leader among the allied groups. The shamans’ speeches often focused on the paradise awaiting those who might perish in battle. They also verbally instilled invincibility upon the warriors who would participate. Others’ speeches concerned a “collective ‘ava’ revenge,” a feeling of inter-community solidarity that heightened as a result of warfare against a powerful common enemy. The initial era of conflict between Europeans and the Chiriguana resulted in an unusually prolonged phase of this type of mobilization. It may have strengthened further the ethnic dualism that the Chiriguana core population had already developed in the era leading up to the mid-sixteenth century.  

The concept of *ava* exclusivity persisted even in times of peace. A sixteenth-century chronicler described this ethos as the subjugation of “those other peoples who do not share your language.” In practice, the Chiriguanaes did not consider all non-Tupí-Guaraní speakers to be fit necessarily for subjugation, at least not in the way the Chané were. Susnik posits that the Chané appealed to the Chiriguanaes as their particular *tapuy* because the Chané were agricultural people who were capable with the bow and arrow, similar to the Chiriguanaes. These characteristics made them serviceable slaves to the Chiriguana, who sought labor for their fields

---

54 Susnik, *Chiriguanos*, 16-19. The *queremba* filled the role of military scouts, elite archers, and, in *arete*, inspirational figures. Their role in the government of a community is not clear. See Saignes, *Ava y Karai*, 27. Susnik notes based on a document from this era that they were among “the people whose word was listened to” by the Chiriguana. See Susnik, *Chiriguanos*, 125-27.

55 Cited in Susnik, *Chiriguanos*, 16.
and warriors in battle. Other factors contributing to their particular victimhood were their demographic strength and propensity to mix with people of other ethnicities. Susnik points out that factions of other native peoples with similar characteristics to the Chané also succumbed to the dominance of the Chiriguana, but their relationships better fit the model of lord and tributary community than master and slave, as described the majority of Chiriguana-Chané interactions. These populations consisted of plains people, *llaneros*, like the Chané who also came to speak Guaraní in the generations after the arrival after the Spanish.  

In their raids upon Chané and other *llanero* communities, the Chiriguana aimed to capture alive as many of their rivals as possible. Of these captives, most of the women and children became slaves. Reports from the era indicate that some men were ceremonially slain and consumed, primarily during the earliest times for which documentary evidence exists. Susnik argues that the ceremony of cannibalism served the purpose of terrorizing the inhabitants of the region and reaffirming Chiriguana ethnic superiority. They benefitted from their reputation for fierceness in that the Chané seem to have resigned themselves to servile status despite their overwhelming numerical superiority. Susnik finds that anthropophagic rituals also marked a rite of acceptance into the community for certain male Chané who had been captured in boyhood. At this point, they might even enter the ranks of the elite *queremba* warrior class. Susnik also suggests based on reports correlating to eras of deer and tapir meat shortages, foods imbued with symbolic value to Chiriguana warriors, that they may have eaten human flesh as a nutritional substitute.  

---

56 Susnik, *Chiriguanos*, 32-42.  
Reports of ritual cannibalism gave way to reports of the sale of captives by the Chiriguana as markets developed in Spanish frontier settlements over the course of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. These markets facilitated the exchange of prisoners of war for metal goods and weapons. Saignes explains this shift in practical, materialist terms. The acquisition of Spanish weapons and other technologies was an increasingly important aspect of the Chiriguana quest to exert dominance over other native peoples they encountered. It was also essential in order to define their *ava* identity as it related to the growing European presence in the eastern Andes. The Chiriguanaes distinguished their European rivals for control of the region from native peoples of all ethnic and cultural groups who occupied the same area. To the Chiriguana, white skin and the use of unfamiliar technologies and techniques (including riding horses) marked the *karai*. As discussed above, this is the same term applied to the most prestigious Chiriguana prophets.\(^\text{58}\)

The association is curious, since the Chiriguana fiercely resisted the European *karai*. Perhaps the term simply connoted power of an apparently supernatural origin. That the Spanish wielded firearms, blades, and armor from atop great beasts might have convinced the early Chiriguanaes that the newcomers were somehow extraordinary. The Chiriguanaes nevertheless demanded that the *karai* also recognize the *ava* as a group exalted above others. As a result, the basis of their interaction with the *karai* in the earliest years after contact centered on demonstrating the strength of their grip over the eastern Andes and their determination to remain free from the slavery to which the *karai* sought to subject them. Francisco Pifarré puts it in more

social scientific terms: “The Chiriguana mode of social organization, based on autonomy and alliance between groups, conflicted with the vertical and centralist mode of the colony.”

The Chiriguana understanding of the concept of slavery in this context encompassed any form of social control, including the strictures of mission life, the payment of tax or tribute, or personal service. Pifarré argues that the Chiriguanae not only refused to pay tribute to the Spanish, but they reversed the relationship of colonizer and colonized and considered their raids on Spanish territories to be a form of tax or tribute collection on the karai. At the same time, the Chiriguana were skeptical of the motives of European missionaries, whom they rejected most commonly out of suspicion that the priests aimed to enslave them. Even within Chiriguana society, submission to authority was not the norm. Some documentary sources insist upon characterizing Chiriguana leaders as implacable tyrants towards their own people. In certain circumstances, such as in times of war, the relationship may have held true. But more commonly, the tuvicha had very little capacity to compel his followers to act. Susnik describes the role of the tuvicha as vertical, in that he needed to build sufficient prestige to attain the admiration of his peers, and horizontal, in that he had to demonstrate the capacity to coordinate communal activity toward the common good. He worked to come to decisions by building consensus among the eldest and most prestigious residents of the village. Evidence shows that the tuvicha needed to maintain the support of his people in both his horizontal and vertical duties to avoid being replaced or abandoned. Two areas in which a tuvicha might grievously overreach his authority were economic matters and spiritual matters. The office did not extend into either sphere.

---

59 Susnik, Chiriguanos, 23-25; Pifarré, Historia de un pueblo, 56-57.

60 Susnik, Chiriguanos, 24-25, 51-52, 74, 78-82; Pifarré, Historia de un pueblo, 56-57.

61 Susnik, Chiriguanos, 127-33. Such limits on a chief’s political power are not uncommon among American native peoples. See the discussion, below, of Clastres, Society Against the State. Though there are certain instances of
The lack of a strong top-down authority structure during peacetime among the colonial-era Chiriguanaes leads to the question of how they nucleated and maintained a social system. Susnik finds what she deems the “basic principles of group identification among the Chiriguanos” in the familial categories hií and tutì, as described in a nineteenth-century dictionary of the Chiriguana dialect written by a Franciscan missionary. The former term refers to the male sons of a man’s sisters, female cousins, and female relatives in general. The latter is the reciprocal term that the hií uses for his mother’s brothers and other male relatives of previous generations. By elevating the hií-tutì relationship to importance, the community widens the net of intergenerational social bonds between males and reinforces the Chiriguana social identity. This relationship manifested itself in the rhetoric of Chiriguana rebellions, during which leaders invoked their “‘nephews’ to maintain unity of action.” At the same time, men considered the daughters of their sisters, female relatives, and indeed all Chiriguana women of marriageable age to be tipe or itipe. Avuncular marriage (between niece and uncle) was desirable in Chiriguana communities. Susnik speculates that it made possible the protection of a pure Guaraní lineage amidst the environment of miscegenation with the Chané and others.  

62 Combès and Saignes theorize that because ethnically endogamous marriage among the early Chiriguana was uxorilocal (the couple would live with the wife’s extended family), a man marrying his niece would remain within his own household and retain his productive capacity for his own blood relatives.  

63

---

female political leaders and important elders in more recent Chiriguana history, it is unlikely that any women directly wielded political power during the era under study.

62 Susnik, Chiriguanos, 100-02. Susnik’s source regarding the use of the term nephew, “sobrino,” in rebellion is unclear.

Jesuit missionary sources provide the best insight into the socio-residential practices of the sixteenth-century Chiriguana. A 1594 *carta annua* analyzed by Susnik shows that the norm on the frontier was a village or *tende* consisting of five to six structures (*maloca*) that each held twenty to thirty families (*teyy*). The inhabitants of one of these communal houses together made up one *tecua*, the most fundamental unit of Chiriguana nucleation at this point in time. The *tecua* functioned as an economic unit judged upon its ability to produce agriculture and captives, and the status of the *tende* depended on this accumulative power as well as the prestige of its *tuvicha*. The *tecua* often broke off into smaller units, particularly after the Chiriguana reached their territorial apex at the end of the seventeenth century. At this point, dwellings consisting of around five *teyy* became more common. An important correlate of how faithfully Chiriguana populations kept to their traditional social units was the degree of European incursion. Where *karai* settlement was persistent and successful, Chiriguana ethnic identity was more fractured, and internecine struggles broke the unity that the Chiriguana showed toward Europeans in earlier times. This parallel supports Susnik’s overall hypothesis that the “real conqueror” of the Chiriguana people was the loss of their fierce character as a result of interactions with Hispanic society over the long term.64

The political anthropology of Pierre Clastres, who worked primarily among the Mbya-Guaraní in Paraguay, has greatly influenced subsequent study of the Chiriguanaes. His book *Society Against the State* questions many of the preconceived normative notions about so-called primitive cultures that his predecessors and contemporaries brought to the study of indigenous peoples in Paraguay and elsewhere. His work particularly calls into question the idea that cultures evolve toward statehood as the pinnacle of existence. Instead, he claims, the movement

64 Susnik, *Chiriguanos*, 57, 102-03.
toward statehood was not coequal with the development of politics or culture. Indigenous Americans who lived outside state organizations also possessed politics and culture. The state as it evolved in Europe rather epitomized the development of coercive power and the technologies necessary to implement it. In societies such as those of the early Guaraní, political power existed, but it did not carry with it the violent implications and recognizable hierarchies that Western observers expected. No such command and obedience relationship existed among them. Instead, they were societies against the state.\(^{65}\)

The role of the chief is crucial in demonstrating how a society against the state functions. Clastres compares the behaviors of chiefs from accounts about the most so-called uncivilized peoples of America and finds that they performed their duties not by resorting to force, but by building consensus. This often involved giving of their personal wealth for the good of the wider group. These chiefs were cognizant of the fact that “the society itself, and not the chief, [was] the real locus of power,” and charity rather than greed was the responsibility of the leader. A chief who was ineffective or unwilling to operate under these norms would lose all power and prestige associated with chiefdom, and another would seize it and occupy the position. The lack of coercive power concentrated in the person of the chief or anyone else is precisely the aim of the structure of a society against the state. Clastres claims that indigenous Americans considered the development of an institution akin to a state to be antithetical to the perpetuation of their culture. The architects of this system had “a very early premonition that power’s transcendence conceals a mortal risk for the group, that the principle of an authority which is external and the creator of its own legality is a challenge to culture itself.”\(^{66}\)

---

\(^{65}\) Clastres, *Society Against the State*, 1-18.

There are many parallels between the Chiriguana society described by Susnik and the society against the state: the relative weakness of the chief during times of peace, the importance of generosity (especially within the *arete*), and particularly the destruction of indigenous culture due to association with Europeans and their culture and technologies. Saignes’ portrait of a colonial Chiriguana chief draws further parallels between Chiriguana society and the society against the state. It is based on a wide variety of references to Chiriguana political organization dating to the early colonial era. According to Saignes, the *tuvicha*’s duties consisted of overseeing the well-being of the community, especially insofar as it concerned assuring a favorable balance with the natural and supernatural forces that affected it. The shamans assisted the chief in interpreting supernatural signs to this end. The chief was responsible for arbitrating internal grievances and decision-making assemblies, gauging the opinion of the group, and directing the organization of collective action, whether productive, celebratory, or combative. The chief had to demonstrate generosity, warmth, and personal liberty—the ideal of freedom from slavery. But the chief was forbidden from profiting personally from the office under the threat of losing the title. If the *tuvicha* carried out his responsibilities to the satisfaction of the village, he typically passed the title to his oldest son, but only if the community considered him fit to assume the position.67 This typical succession pattern privileged a *tuvicha* who faithfully carried out the responsibilities of the role but prevented the development of a dynasty for its own sake.

---

Calzavarini applies Clastres’ model of a society against the state in reference to the Chiriguana. But where Clastres stops short of explaining the genesis of the culture, Calzavarini incorporates the concept of the “ethos of the jungle” developed by Betty Meggers with Amazonian peoples in mind. The theory holds that virtually all aspects of culture are responses to the natural environment in which people live. In the case of the early Tupí-Guaraní migrants, Calzavarini claims, the open and undefined spaces of lowland South America led to a desire to migrate, which, in turn, led to the development of a strong group dynamic. The group dynamic came about as the result of the compulsion to fix upon an identity “among the great possibilities of dispersion brought about by the illusion of the infinite.” This group identity manifested itself in warfare, which serves as an act of union and, in the capture of women and children, a means to perpetuate the culture. This group-identity ethos also influenced the socio-demographic residential patterns of the Chiriguana as they began to settle in the eastern Andes. The nuclei that they formed were, ideally, economically and socio-biologically self-sufficient, according to Calzavarini. But due to their desire to maintain independence from an all-encompassing community dynamic, the settlements were insufficient for many necessary collective actions, such as defense. Calzavarini argues that in response to this deficiency the Chiriguana developed dual concepts of integration: the narrowly exclusionary oréva and the inclusionary ñandéva. Both terms translate to “our,” but the “our” of oréva encompasses only the tende or village. The ñandéva “our” reaches beyond the tende to the guára, which was made up of other communities that share cultural identity but not political unity under typical circumstances. But these alliances made possible the dominance over geographical spaces that the Chiriguana achieved in the eastern Andes. Within the tende and the shared concept of oréva, there exists a further struggle between affiliation with one’s smallest family unit, the teyy, and the extended-family tecua, the
traditional unit of residence among the Chiriguana.\textsuperscript{68} This conflict may be the basis of the movement over time toward residence in structures shared by fewer families noted by Susnik and Serrano y Sanz, as discussed above.

Much of Saignes’ work on the Chiriguana expands upon the concept of warfare as an integral foundational aspect of ethnic identity and one that distinguished them even from other peoples who successfully resisted Spanish conquest for a significant period, such as the Jívaro or Araucanian people. Saignes finds that their ethos of warfare was the result of the confluence of ethnic, political, and religious factors. The strength of these factors allowed the Chiriguana to resist conquest despite continuing intra-ethnic conflict that precluded any negotiated unity of purpose among the Chiriguana.\textsuperscript{69}

Saignes argues that the ethnic aspect of war is crucial to the very basis of Chiriguana identity. According to a governor of the province of Santa Cruz in the late sixteenth century, the Guaraní term \textit{chiriones} referred to the offspring produced by the males of one’s own ethnicity and the females of another ethnicity. Saignes explains that the Chané, with whom the Guaraní-Chiriguana most commonly produced \textit{chiriones}, were known among the Guaraní of the Paraguay basin as the Guana. The combination of the two terms, he argues, gives us Chiri-guana—both the ethnic designation and the basis for Chiriguana existence. “Chiriguana,” as the term appears in many sixteenth-century sources, thus implies \textit{mestizaje} with a chosen \textit{tapuy} ethnic group. Warfare was the means by which the Guaraní migrants to the eastern Andes obtained sufficient numbers of women to establish and perpetuate the resultant Chiriguana population. Warfare also served to elevate the \textit{ava} ethnic group, not only as a result of their victories, but especially by

\textsuperscript{68} Calzavarini, \textit{Nación chiriguana}, 22-24, 38-40.

\textsuperscript{69} Saignes, \textit{Ava y karai}, 10, 21-22.
denigrating the tapuy in defeat, enslaving them, and in its most extreme form, consuming them in cannibalistic ritual.\footnote{Ibid., 22-26.}

But warfare also paradoxically served integrationist ends. In one sense, Saïgnes explains, war was the only activity for which the Chiriguanaes organized themselves above the community level. Otherwise, their alliances did not reach outside the tende. In another sense, warfare even served to integrate enemies into Chiriguana society. Service in the elite queremba corps functioned as a mechanism of becoming ava, even for the male tapuy children captured in warfare and reared in Chiriguana society. This practice of incorporating outsiders further served the Chiriguana in that it provided a channel by which captives could express violence outward rather than toward subversive ends. That these “assimilated” Chiriguanaes were by orders of magnitude greater in number than “natural” Chiriguanaes, claims Saïgnes, shows the capability of the Chiriguana to inculcate others into their bellicose ava culture. This was the only means by which they could expand at the rate necessary to dominate the eastern Andes as they did.\footnote{Saïgnes, Ava y karai, 22-27; Combès and Saïgnes, “Chiri-guana,” 73.}

Saïgnes describes the political aspects of war, as practiced by the Chiriguana, as expressions of resistance to the state, in keeping with Pierre Clastres’ model. Based on late sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century descriptions of Chiriguana intra-ethnic conflict, Saïgnes determines that the cycles of festival and warfare governed relations between and even within Chiriguana tenda. The rupturing of a village or an alliance between two communities was a mechanism that ensured that no tuvicha gained excessive coercive power. At the same time, both offensive and defensive warfare made cooperation between tenda necessary because of their small individual populations. In this sense, Saïgnes argues, internecine warfare functioned as
both a centripetal force and a centrifugal force among Chiriguana populations. It assured them a balance between autonomy and uniformity.\textsuperscript{72}

Saignes finds that the religious aspect of Chiriguana warfare hinges on the role of the shaman as prophet. His stance reflects the concepts put forth by Hélène Clastres and Nimuendajú, which aver that Guaraní religious leaders urged action in order to avoid death and the destruction of the world. Instead, the shaman implored his people to pass into the Land without Evil, as discussed above. Saignes disagrees with Melià’s more materialist understanding of the Guaraní paradise. Like Hélène Clastres, he argues that the shamans’ speeches were challenges to the authority of their chiefs. While the chief endeavored to keep peace and maintain respect for tradition, it was the shaman who represented the voice of conflict and disorder, urging the people to cast off their traditional social and economic duties. The appearance of European technology swung the balance toward the shamans and a greater penchant towards warfare, says Saignes. For if the gods could place just outside their grasp the potential for the power the Chiriguana sought to dominate their neighbors, “what could the civil leaders propose to maintain traditional organization?”\textsuperscript{73} In coming to this conclusion, Saignes echoes Pierre Clastres, who has also argued that the seeds of coercion and conflict that destroyed traditional Guaraní social organization came in the form of European technologies. But where Clastres finds that these technologies led to more social stratification and the emergence of production-based socioeconomic classes, Saignes sees the triumph of the traditional Guaraní religious and military elite over Western notions of socioeconomic organization.

\textsuperscript{72} Saignes, \textit{Ava y karai}, 28-33.

\textsuperscript{73} Ibid., 33-38.
France Marie Renard-Casevitz, Anne Christine Taylor, and Saignes jointly probe more deeply into the Chiriguana concepts of *ava* and *tapuy* by examining their relationships with the Chané and other frontier peoples during the colonial era. The scholars highlight the role of the Spanish colonists settled around the frontier in providing incentive for the Chiriguana to wage captive-driven warfare against the indigenous populations in the area. These settlers were often eager to exchange metal tools and weapons, including firearms, for native slaves. Spanish law prohibited such exchanges, but the insatiable demand for labor provided ample motive to circumvent these orders. Some Spanish or mestizo settlers even reportedly specialized as brokers in the sale of captives provided by the Chiriguanaes to Spaniards throughout Peru.74

Saignes and colleagues have further analyzed colonial inquests into such wars waged for the purpose of taking captives. These documents suggest that Chiriguana warriors targeted populations to the south of Santa Cruz where unsubjugated Chané and other peoples lived. Colonial officials blamed the slave raids for the virtual extinction of many smaller ethnic groups, but a series of epidemics, droughts, and famines that occurred between 1590 and the 1620s probably did more to ravage these populations. Farther northeast, beyond Santa Cruz and the Guapay River, the Chiriguanaes held three Amazonian-origin ethnic groups in a relationship of tributary allies for a time beginning in the mid-to-late-sixteenth century. The Tamacoci, the Yurakare, and the Xore provided children, bows and arrows, herbs used to poison arrows, game, and military assistance against Spanish incursion.75


75 Population estimates for an area between the Chiriguana stronghold of the cordillera and the city of Santa Cruz in 1560 range up to 60,000 native inhabitants. By 1678, fewer than two hundred reportedly remained. See Renard-Casevitz, Saignes, and Taylor, *Al este de los Andes*, vol. 1, 265-67; and Combès and Saignes, “Chiri-guana,” 52-56, 90-92.
The Chiriguana attitude at this time toward indigenous Andean highland peoples, including Quechua and Aymara speakers, is less clear. The Spanish gravely feared that the Chiriguanaes might ally themselves with other native resistance movements. These fears appeared most realistic in 1566 when the taki onqoy rebellion threatened the central Andean highlands. Such an alliance never occurred, but there is evidence of certain limited partnerships between Chiriguana factions and communities of eastern Andeans who had been Inca subjects in prior generations. These peoples’ partial orientation towards the highlands, and their cooperation, at one level, with the Spanish settlements in the region gave them greater access to products that were valuable to the Chiriguanaes. Certain Chiriguana communities apparently entered into exchange-based alliances with other native peoples in order to supply themselves above all with metal implements that they used as tools and weapons.76

More instances of informal cooperation between certain Chiriguana factions and particular indigenous communities in the eastern Andes—but for which there exists little or no evidence—were likely. Certain documentary sources hint that individuals abandoned their service to the Spanish or tributary villages in order to join the Chiriguana, and more instances almost certainly occurred off the record. Combès and Saignes categorize the early interactions between the Chiriguana and the majority of native eastern-Andean frontier peoples as “oscillating between collaboration and rejection.” The Chiriguanaes also satisfied their demands for scarce resources—including metal implements, livestock, horses, and slaves—by raiding Spanish and indigenous settlements in the eastern Andes. In other cases, they may have

76 Renard-Casevitz, Saignes, and Taylor, Al este de los Andes, vol. 1, 248-49, 268-70; Combès and Saignes, “Chiriguana,”58-60. The Chui and Yampara were among their occasional partners. Both were lowland-origin people indigenous to the eastern Andes, and both were closely aligned with Inca aims in the region during the early 1500s. See Chapters 3 & 4.
demanded a steady supply of goods from native communities in exchange for foregoing such raids. In this sense, native residents of the frontier beyond just the Chané also suffered the consequences of the Chiriguana ethos of vengeance.\textsuperscript{77}

The Chicha, like the Chané and indeed due to the apparent similarities between the ethnic groups, found themselves in the role of “preferred partner” (\textit{socio preferencial}) to the Chiriguana. Combés and Saignes borrow this concept from Simone Dreyfus-Gamelon’s idea of “favourite enemies and formal partners” among the Caribs of the Caribbean islands. This designation differentiated the Chané and Chicha from the highland indigenous peoples, such as the Aymaras, as well as the Spanish and the hunter-gatherer Toba or Diaguita peoples of the Chaco. Chiriguana society depended on the definition and prioritization, not only between \textit{ava} and other, but also among the various others. Combés and Saignes argue that the Chané and Chicha represented a minimal alterity or “alter-ego” relative to the Chiriguana.\textsuperscript{78} As a result, they became the most frequent targets of Chiriguana frontier raids, especially when the objective of the raids was to capture slaves.

The concept of enslaving those who resemble oneself most closely may initially appear counterintuitive. After all, Europeans in the Americas during this very same period of time settled on Africans as their preferred victims of slavery in part due to their superficial \textit{dissimilarities}. Combés and Saignes’ linguistic analysis of the Chiriguana dialect of the Guaraní

\begin{footnotesize}
\footnote{Combès and Saignes, “Chiri-guana,” 60; Renard-Casevitz, Saignes, and Taylor, \textit{Al este de los Andes}, vol. 1, 263-64, 270.}
\end{footnotesize}

\begin{footnotesize}
\footnote{Combès and Saignes, “Chiri-guana,” 90-92, 99. The original French title of this work was \textit{Alter Ego: Naissance de l’identité chiriguano}. The quote from Dreyfus-Gamelon appears in English in the Spanish text that I use. Regarding the similarities between the Chicha and Chané, see Métraux, “Tribes of the Eastern Slopes of the Bolivian Andes,” 467. Métraux categorizes the Chicha as highland Aymara in origin and the Chané of Amazonian Arawak origin. The former is incorrect (Chapter 3), though they had taken on many elements of highland culture by the time the Spanish arrived. Métraux’s larger point, that the Chicha and Chané cultures had begun to resemble each other a great deal by the colonial period despite their distinct origins, is well-founded. Both adopted the dress, technology, and many other elements of material culture from their western neighbors.}
\end{footnotesize}
language helps bring the Chiriguana relationship with their alter-ego into sharper focus. A number of terms associated with warfare and slavery also refer to other types of interactions with exogamous groups: as Polo de Ondegardo hinted in drawing parallels between Chiriguana vengeance and trade, yeepi can refer to “exchange” (trueque) or to “revenge” (venganza); tovaja signifies “enemy” (enemigo) but also the blood relatives of one’s spouse—“in-law” (cuñado, suegro, or yerno). These dualities reflect the Tupí-Guaraní roots of the Chiriguana concept of slavery. Early Tupí-Guaraní communities tended to be in constant conflict with a fluctuating variety of other mostly-Tupí-Guaraní communities. These wars provided men with exogamous reproductive partners whom they captured during attacks on rival villages. At the same time, male warriors from other communities took women from the first community for the same purpose. In this way, early Tupí-Guaraní communities minimized the practice of incestuous reproduction and widened the genetic pool from which they drew. The cultural or ideological mechanism that perpetuated this “exchange” of captives privileged the practice of visiting “vengeance” upon one’s enemy. In other words, a Tupí-Guaraní ethos of vengeance developed that the warriors of the community might satisfy by taking captive wives from other communities. These bilateral, exogamous “marriages” between enemy communities—though misogynist and violent at their core—resulted in familial links. They made “in-laws” of one’s enemies. Slavery, under these circumstances, was not directed at creating an entirely separate class within the society, as was the dynamic of African slavery in the Americas. Instead, slaves were typically incorporated into the community as an integral part of that community’s perpetuation.79

---

79 Combes and Saignes, “Chiri-guana,” 43-44, 75-76, 92-93, 101-04, 144. Similar paradoxical categories resulting from the overlap of kin and enemies were the norm in the northern Mexican/southwestern US borderlands during the
The other likely fate of slaves captured during the Tupí-Guaraní wars of the early-formative period was sacrifice and cannibalistic consumption by one’s captors. Like the provision of exogamous females for reproduction, this byproduct of warfare was also important to Tupí-Guaraní existence. Combés and Saignes point out that the two meanings of the Guaraní term u—“eat” and “copulate”—reflect this parallelism. Ritual cannibalism likely initially developed among the early Tupí-Guaraní as a means to free the spirit of one who had died from his body, thus allowing him passage into the afterlife. It was an honor bestowed upon warriors from one’s own community who had fallen in battle. Among the early Tupinambá, the person chosen to so honor the fallen was apparently the deceased’s sister’s husband—his brother-in-law or tovaja. As Tupí-Guaraní marriage became more and more associated with warfare and the capture of exogamous females, the practice of eating one’s tovaja—both in the sense of in-law and enemy—evolved. Cannibalism became a means to rid a community of captives that could not be integrated. At the same time, eating one’s tovaja feminized him and his fellow warriors because of the homonymic relationship between eating and copulating. This process elevated one’s own ferocity vis-à-vis a lessened opponent.80

The Chiriguanæas differed from the Tupinambá and the other early Tupí-Guaraní in that their primary targets for yeepi were not other ava. Combés and Saignes argue that, for the earliest Guaraní migrants to the eastern Andes, there were no other populations of ava within reach. It became necessary to choose and develop a preferred alter-ego ethnicity, instead, in order to

80 Combés and Saignes, “Chiriguana,” 103-05, 144. Terms with the dual meanings “eat” and “copulate” are surprisingly common. Not only do they crop up in Yoruba and other languages developed among so-called tribal peoples, the French verb “consommer” provides an example. See Claude Lévi-Strauss, The Savage Mind, trans. George Weidenfeld and Nicholson Ltd. (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1966), 104-05.
continue the two practices which they had developed to interact with those outside their own communities: exogamous biological reproduction and the consumption of human flesh. These two practices both necessitated perpetual warfare, which the Chiriguana fought with a variety of enemies. But evidence suggests that their armed struggles with the Spanish, other Chiriguana factions, or native peoples besides the Chané and Chicha were geared toward more conventional ends such as security, plunder, or captive-taking for ransom. The Chiriguana did not apparently eat their Spanish or rival ava captives, and they did not typically take wives from among the Spanish, highland-origin native peoples, or the natives of the Chaco. By the time that a Chiriguana culture separate from that of the Paraguay-basin-origin Guaraní had developed in the eastern Andes, the Chané tapuy representing their alter-ego had displaced the Tupí-Guaraní tovaja as the preferred partners. This distinction appears to have been a key one in the process of Chiriguana ethnogenesis.

Combès and Saignes argue that, despite their importance to Chiriguana perpetuation, the tapuy would never achieve the status of ava as a group. Individuals captured in youth might do so, but the epitome of existence that most Chané could achieve in Chiriguana social terms was a status analogous to females vis-à-vis Chiriguana males. As one would expect within a society built upon the capture of women in warfare, distinct lines separated sex roles among the Chiriguanaes. The male was superior to the female, and men were responsible for pursuits considered with more esteem, including hunting and warfare. The spheres of agriculture, basket- and pottery-making, and the production of cangui belonged to women. Among the Chané, the sexes shared in the tasks of agriculture, and the males were relatively less inclined toward warfare. This behavior feminized them, from the Chiriguana perspective. Evidence shows that

---

81 Combès and Saignes, “Chiri-guana,” 92-93, 99, 102-03.
the Chiriguana employed male Chané captives at so-called female tasks and treated them in other ways like women. It was the ability of the Chiriguanaes to devise a category for the Chané as the feminine alter-ego that made possible Chiriguana existence, based as it was on the simultaneous biological integration of the two groups while maintaining for the Chané an insuperable principal of otherness. To put them in modern terms, the hierarchies that governed the Chiriguana interpretation of the world were certainly both misogynistic and xenophobic. But at the same time, the Chiriguanaes relied on both women and the Chané tapuya for their continued existence.82

While the work of Combès and Saignes does well to incorporate and expand upon the scholarship that preceded it, it perhaps too conveniently casts the relationships between Chiriguana and Chané in stark terms suitable for classification: aggression and passivity, violence and victimhood, masculinity and femininity. Combès’ more recent participatory anthropological work among the modern Guaraní in Bolivia, some published in conjunction with Kathleen Lowrey, has caused her to reconsider the relationship between ava and tapuya and to explore the shades of gray that characterize it. Scholarship on this topic, including Combès’ own, had always considered the Chané culture all but extinct under the pressure of the Chiriguanaes’ all-encompassing Guaraní identity. Even those Chané who escaped direct and forcible integration had become, over time, Guaranized in both language and other aspects of culture. They even came to use the name ava to refer to themselves. But among certain modern ava populations, Combès has noted the persistence of Chané identity and culture among the Chiriguanaes’ descendants. It is evident in material elements such as basket weaving and pottery styles, religious celebrations, and sociopolitical organization. This new evidence has led Combès

82 Ibid., 128-41, 148, 158-60, 167-68, 188.
and Lowrey to argue that Chiriguanaes existence represented not the domination and elimination of one culture by another, but rather an oscillation between “Guaraní and Chané poles.” One aspect of the Guaraní culture, however, has taken firm hold of even those modern *ava* peoples who identify most with their Chané ancestors. They are proud, above all, of their status as *iyambae*, “men without masters.”

**The People of the Documents: The “Chiriguanaes” in Context**

Recognition of the shifting nature of the Chiriguana peoples, especially during their earliest period of nucleation in the eastern Andes, has led some of the most prominent recent scholars of Chiriguana historical ethnography to focus more directly on the earliest written sources with an eye toward a foundational question: what, exactly, did the authors of the documents mean when they used the term “Chiriguana” in any of its variants? The scholarly understanding of the early Chiriguanaes has developed largely based on descriptions from the seventeenth century or later written from the perspective Spaniards in the western highlands, where the primary Spanish institutions and population centers were. The residents of this region were familiar with only one type of “Chiriguanaes.” Those classified in this way consisted of a number of aggregations of Guaraní speakers living in and around the Chiriguana cordillera. By the end of the sixteenth century, the term “Chiriguanaes” quite definitively referred to this relatively circumscribed group—one based on perceived ethnicity and culture, primarily language. The Spanish associations with the term were not necessarily accurate, and the term carried with it a number of clear normative biases against non-European cultures and particularly lowland native. Nevertheless, one can understand with reasonable precision what a document

---

83 Isabelle Combès, *Etnohistórias del Isoso: Chané y chiriguanos en el Chaco boliviano (siglos XVI a XX)* (La Paz: IFEA, 2005), 19-20, 32-33, 57-58, 67; Combès and Lowrey, “Slaves without Masters?,” 691-705.
dating from circa 1600 and beyond was meant to indicate when it refers to “the Chiriguanaes.”

Documents from other perspectives conform less-readily to the expected connotations of the term.

Catherine Julien’s article “Colonial Perspectives on the Chiriguaná” argues that Spanish officials in Charcas applied the term “Chiriguana” beyond its proper ethnic boundaries in the process of making the case for war against the Guaraní-speaking peoples of the eastern Andes during the early 1570s. In doing so, they created what Julien deems a “heuristic category” that made the enemy familiar under the practices of Spanish jurisprudence. The category rested almost exclusively on the population’s use of the Guaraní language. Expanding the term “Chiriguanaes” to encompass all Guaraní-speaking communities allowed colonial officials to include in their case for war a longer list of perceived misdeeds and crimes collected from across the continent. It also spread collective guilt for crimes committed by “the Chiriguanaes” over a much larger population. All Guaraní speakers identified as such were effectively guilty under Spanish law. By the time of the first official war against them in 1574, the term “Chiriguana” in all of its variations assumed a meaning that was constructed to demonize a wide swath of native peoples, and thereby justify their enslavement. As Julien describes it, the Spanish officials in Charcas hoped to eliminate the category of people they had only just created.

Recent work by Isabelle Combès has gone back even further in time to reconsider the very origins of the term “Chiriguana” and its variants. Her article “Chiri-guana,” co-authored with Saignes, uses Saignes’ earlier proposed etymology of the term (discussed above in more

---


detail): miscegenation (chiri-) with the Chané (also known as the Guana). The Combès and Saignes article also dismisses as apocryphal an explanation of the term “Chiriguana” offered in an early-seventeenth-century Spanish chronicle of eastern Andean history written by Diego de Alcaya.\(^{86}\) Alcaya’s chronicle explains that Inca forces captured a number of lowland warriors after they attacked an Inca frontier installation. Their punishment consisted of being left under guard, bound, and naked on a high-altitude peak until they died of exposure. This was a torture designed to highlight the highland people’s own masculinity and virility towards the climate vis-à-vis the lowland Guaraní. As the story goes, the Inca greeted the news of their deaths mockingly, proclaiming “in a loud voice, ‘Halla, halla Chiripiguñuchini,’ which is to say, ‘In this way I have given them a lesson with the cold.’”\(^{87}\) If a version of this etymology is indeed true, it would mean that “Chiriguana” and its various permutations derived from a Quechua term meant to denigrate the peoples along the eastern frontier of the Inca empire. The term essentially translates to, “he who is punished by the cold.”

Combès’ stance towards this proposed account of the appellation “Chiriguana” has become more favorable in recent years. Though she urges the reader “not to take Alcaya’s explanations literally” as they regard the story of the prisoners and certain other vignettes, Combès now concludes that “the etymologies [of the term Chiriguana] based in Quechua have greater probability of being correct.” She argues that the term most likely evolved among Quechua speakers in the immediate pre-Hispanic period as a means to describe a variety of peoples whose appearance and culture seemed most foreign to the core Inca ethnic group and

\(^{86}\) Combès and Saignes, “Chiri-guana,” 84-88.

\(^{87}\) Diego Felipe de Alcaya, “Relación cierta … a su Excelencia el señor Marqués de Montes Claros,” in Cronistas cruceños del alto perú virreinal, ed. Hernando Sanabria Fernández (Santa Cruz, Bolivia: Publicaciones de la Universidad Gabriel René Moreno, 1961 [ca. 1610]), 55-56.
other central Andean highland cultures. It served as a generic term indicating otherness. Much like the closest parallel term from the Western world—barbarian—it also connoted savagery or a lower class of being.\textsuperscript{88}

A number of factors influenced the evolution of Combès’ view toward the origins of the term Chiriguana. In addition to her more receptive reading of Alcaya, she points to the fact that the term “Guana” does not appear in reference to the easternmost Chané populations in any documentary records prior to the seventeenth century. The earliest Spanish explorers of the Paraguay basin used variations of the term Chané to describe some peoples in the region, but nothing that might be read as a variation of “Guana” appears in their reports. In other words, the association between the Chané and the term Guana may have resulted from the use of the term Chiriguana rather than the other way around. Evidence that the term chiriones connoted mestizaje in the language of the Chiriguana dates back to at least 1586, but this leaves a significant period of time for the word Chiri- to make its way into certain Guaraní dialects from Quechua. That time period—one characterized in the eastern Andes by civil war, conquest, and migration—was one that opened the door for new ethnic and cultural interaction, including the adoption of new vocabulary to describe such interactions. The evidence that has been most influential on Combès’ revision of her view is the appearance of the term “Chiriguana” a number of sixteenth-century sources wholly out of the Guaraní context. The term appears as a synonym

\textsuperscript{88} The term “Chunchos” served a similar purpose for Quechua speakers. It initially connoted “savages” but came to serve as an ethnic designation for the forest peoples indigenous to the region east of Cuzco. Combès, \textit{Diccionario étnico}, 130-33. A similar term originating among the Aymara or Chicha of the Tarija region, “Macaros,” may also have referred to local Guaraní-speaking populations in a less-than-positive way. It translates to “interior” (dentro), but it disappears after the mid-1500s. Curiously, the term Chunchos remains even today in the Tarija region as a means of describing certain groups of presumably Guaraní descent. See Mario E. Barragán Vargas, \textit{La historia temprana de Tarija} (Tarija: Gráfica Offset KOKITO, 2001), 52-53, 93-94; and Mario E. Barragán Vargas, \textit{Poblaciones originarias de Tarija I: Moyos Moyos y Churumatas} (Tarija: Sociedad de Etnografía e Historia de Tarija, 2011), 36-37. Regarding Combès’ reconsideration of the Alcaya chronicle, see “Saypurú: el misterio de la mina perdida, del Inca chiriguano y del dios mestizo,” \textit{Revista Andina} (Cuzco) 48 (2009): 189-90.
for Chile—literally “‘Chile or Chiriguana’” in several instances—when describing the destination of the Diego de Almagro expedition from 1535. The inhabitants of the region that Almagro and company visited during that expedition were known to the Incas as ferocious and without cultural refinement, much as the Incas categorized the Guaraní of the eastern lowlands, but they were undoubtedly not Guaraní speakers. The terms “Chile” and “Chiriguana” seem to have gradually evolved from non-geographically specific idioms for barbarian into more precise geographic and ethnic appellations in the years to come.

Additional evidence further supports the suggestion that “Chiriguana” and its variants originally indicated nothing more than the vast swath of peoples beyond the frontiers of the Inca empire. Garcilaso de la Vega’s 1609 Royal Commentaries perhaps best reflects the terminology of the pre-conquest Inca elite. On two occasions, the work geographically locates the Chiriguanaes at the extreme southeastern edge of the Inca realms. But a different portion of the work describes the province of the Chiriguanaes located “in the Antis”—the multi-ethnic northeastern quadrant of Tawantinsuyu, which sloped downward from Cuzco toward the Amazon basin. Garcilaso’s writings associate the peoples of Antisuyu with the lowland symbols of the bow and arrow, the tiger, the monkey, the giant snake, tropical bird feathers, tropical fruits, and the coca leaf. These people “had been ferocious in the past,” to the point that the Incas erected fortresses north of Cuzco aimed at preventing incursions. Other early histories recorded among the post-conquest Inca elite support the presence of peoples described with variations of

---


the term “Chiriguanaes” in both areas mentioned by Garcilaso. Cabello de Balboa’s chronicle describes an instance in which Huayna Capac passed through the “land possessed by the invincible Chiliguananea people” during a journey between Quito and Cochabamba.91 Similarly, Sarmiento de Gamboa’s writings describe the Inca-constructed fortress in Pocona near Cochabamba, “on the frontier against the Chirihuanas.”92 Both references put the people, geographically, in Antisuyu. Meanwhile, Betanzos’ 1551 chronicle and the testimonies of the Incas nietos describe encounters between Tupac Yupanqui and the Chiriguanaes during the Inca’s journeys to the distant southeast. In the former text, Tupac Yupanqui subdues “the great people” before moving on to “a great river that they say is that of La Plata,” an apparent reference to the distant lowlands. The latter describes the Chiriguanaes as the people who mark out the boundaries of the known world to the southeast, in the province of Tucumán.93

While some of the geographical markers associated with the Chiriguanaes in these sources were associated with Guaraní speakers at the time of their writings (the great river of La Plata, for instance), others were not. There is no reason to believe that Guaraní peoples occupied Inca Antisuyu. Even the so-called Chiriguanaes of Tucumán from these sources were not Guaraní. Guaraní populations would eventually occupy the Tucumán region, but reports of Chiriguana attacks on Spanish settlements in Tucumán dating to as late as the 1570s were references to the Tonocoté-speaking Lule and Calchaquí peoples.94 Likewise, a document from

---


92 Pedro Sarmiento de Gamboa, Historia de los Incas (Madrid: Miraguano Ediciones, 1988 [1572]), 141.


94 There are a number of instances of Spanish royal officials speaking of the Chiriguanaes (or related terms) threatening Tucumán in Gobernantes del Perú, cartas y papeles, siglo XVI; documentos del Archivo de Indias, 14 vols., ed. Roberto Levillier (Madrid: Sucesores de Rivadeneyra, 1921). See “Carta del Licenciado La Gasca al
the 1560s blamed the “yndios chiriguanaes” for attacks on Spanish frontier properties near Tarija. The culprits for the attacks were later identified as “Omaguacas” and “Apatamas,” references to non-Guaraní-speaking peoples from the south. The only overarching commonality that united the peoples indicated by the earliest uses of the term Chiriguana was the persistence of their cultures. These cultures, which had developed in lowland tropical or semi-tropical regions to the north and east of the Andean highlands, were held in collective low esteem by both the natives of the Andean highlands and the Spanish in Peru. The refinement of the category to the point that it indicated a single (though itself internally differentiated) group or “nation” occurred only during the early colonial period.

95 Both documents relate to attacks on Juan Ortiz de Zárate’s estates in the Tarija valleys. See “1564.47 (9 Sept. 1564),” and “1564.52 (5 Oct. 1564),” both in Acuerdos de la Real Audiencia de La Plata de los Charcas, 10 vols., ed. José Miguel López Villalba (Sucre: Corte Suprema de Justicia, 2007), vol. 1, 110-12, 117.

96 Julien argues that this narrowing of the category had occurred by the mid-1570s, which is generally true. The broad term persisted, however, in certain circumstances. In 1586, for instance, officials in Tucumán described “the Indians of war called Chiriguanaes” as cannibals who live in the land still poorer and drier than that of Tucumán—land the Spanish could not colonize. See “Carta á S.M., del cabildo de la ciudad de Santiago del Estero … (Santiago del Estero, 1585-1589),” in Gobernación del Tucumán. Correspondencia de los cabildos en el siglo XVI, ed. Roberto Levillier and Antonio Rodríguez del Busto (Madrid: Sucesores de Rivadeneyra, 1918), 145, 154, 173; Manuel Lizondo Borda, Historia de la Gobernación del Tucumán (Siglo XVI) (Buenos Aires: Imprenta y Casa Editora Coni, 1928), 43-54; Manuel Lizondo Borda, Tucumán indígena: diaguitas, lules, y tonocotés, pueblos y lenguas (siglo XVI) (Tucumán, Argentina: Talleres Gráficos Miguel Violeto, 1938), 33-54; and María Cristina Scattolin, “Los ancestros de Calchaquí: una visión de la colección Zavaleta,” Cuadernos FHyCS-Universidad Nacional de Jujuy (Jujuy, Argentina) 20 (2003): 51-79.
The implications of these conclusions regarding the construction and evolution of the term “Chiriguana” are far reaching. Together they show that there likely never was a Chiriguana people, as defined from within. The term and its variants represent impositions from two successive imperial powers upon a variety of peoples who occupied their frontiers. Scholars must carefully weigh the histories of the term as they continue to wrestle with and understand the contexts in which these categories were constructed and deployed.

**Conclusion**

Anthropologist David Maybury-Lewis describes lowland South America and particularly Brazil as “a country that was explored early and settled late.” Although explorers pushed forth into the wilderness right to the heart of the continent via the major rivers and land routes already in the first decades after their arrival, some peoples of the remote interior remained secluded from direct and prolonged contact with Western civilization to at least the nineteenth century. Ethnographic understanding of the lowland South Americans and the Chiriguanaes in particular followed a similar trajectory. Despite explorations aimed at understanding and explaining their histories and cultures dating to their earliest European contacts, only with the development of modern ethnography can scholars begin to understand and depict them in a way that approaches accuracy. And even as scholars piece together the scant clues that the historical documents provide, the challenges of contextualizing the environments in which they were created remain difficult.

---

CHAPTER 3
VERTICAL POLITICS ON THE SOUTHEASTERN INCA FRONTIER

The most direct account of the establishment of Inca rule in the southeastern Andean region of Charcas comes from the Jesuit chronicler Bernabé Cobo. His version suggests that Inca forces faced a unified, inter-ethnic resistance when they attempted to subdue the primarily Aymara peoples of the southeastern highlands and temperate valleys beyond. According to his history, “the Inca [Tupac Yupanqui] made a campaign through the provinces of Carangas [Karanqa], Paria, Cochabamba, and Amparaes [Yampara], along with the other provinces that fall within the borders of Charcas” (Figure 3-1). Over 20,000 fled from the Inca as he entered these provinces, and “by common agreement they entered through the valleys of Oroncota, where they found a natural fortress formed by the lay of the land.” This fortress was a naturally fortified, sheer-walled mountain that contained the elements necessary to withstand a long siege. Only one point offered access, and the presence of guards at that point made direct attack impossible. Tupac Yupanqui ordered the construction of a base of operations at the bottom of the plateau that the people atop could plainly see. He then organized a series of festivals to take place there, during which the participants could “freely give themselves over to their carnal delights without anybody bothering them.” Eventually, the guards succumbed to the invitations offered by the women of the Inca camp and abandoned their posts. The army stormed the undefended plateau and quickly subdued and imprisoned the refugees. Tupac Yupanqui went on to incorporate and govern the territory he had won as part of Inca Collasuyu.¹

Approximately 50 years later, in 1538, the peoples of Charcas demonstrated exemplary unity and devotion to the Inca state. The members of a confederation of seven chiefdoms held out longest against the Pizarro brothers when they invaded Collasuyu. They surrendered only at the behest of the Inca Paullu, a Spanish puppet leader but nevertheless the possessor of the royal tassel. A petition to King Philip II on behalf of those seven allied indigenous chiefdoms in Charcas dating to 1582 sheds light on the methods by which Inca officials governed the province of Charcas and engendered such dedication to the empire. The petition, known as the “Memorial of Charcas,” requests that the tribute and state labor obligations of those seven communities, or “nations” as the petition puts it, be reduced on the grounds that they enjoyed privileged status under the Incas. They wished to strike a similar arrangement with their new king.

Under Inca rule, the obligations, privileges, and alliances that defined the Charcas confederation were manifold. They dictated the means of interaction both between the constituent nations and the imperial state and among the constituent nations themselves. But scholars have been reluctant to credit the Inca state for the existence of the confederation or its structure. The existing secondary literature suggests, instead, that the ethnic and sub-ethnic members of the Charcas confederation were already united in a similar (or identical) alliance prior to their incorporation into Inca Tawantinsuyu. Though such a natural inter-ethnic alliance

---


3 This document is familiar to specialists due to its publication with an introductory essay in 1969 by Waldemar Espinoza Soriano. See “El Memorial de Charcas: ‘Crónica’ inédita de 1582,” ed. Waldemar Espinoza Soriano. *Cantuta, Revista de la Universidad Nacional de Educación* (Lima) 4 (1969): 117-27. I use a more recently published version of the text, “El memorial de los Mallku y principales de la provincia de los Charcas,” in Platt, Bouysse-Cassagne, and Harris, *Qaraqara-Charka*, 828-57. I refer to the document in the text as the “Memorial of Charcas” or simply the “Memorial.” The term “nación” to describe the ethnic and political units by which the peoples of Charcas organized themselves came into use during the Toledan reforms of 1569-75. Chiefdom or kingdom is a more accurate term dating to earlier eras. See Platt, Bouysse-Cassagne, and Harris, “‘Charka rojo, Charka blanco,’” 52.
would have been out of the norm, particularly for the Aymara peoples who represented the
greatest share of the population of Charcas, scholars argue that the peoples of Charcas united
precisely due to the threat of the Chiriguana peoples. They argue, in other words, that the
Chiriguana presence on the frontier was responsible for the political structure of Charcas.

The “Memorial of Charcas” itself is silent on this point. It describes a relatively brief
point in time when Inca power was at its peak under Huayna Capac (the 1510s-20s). It does not
address how Inca officials imposed the terms of the confederation (I will argue in this chapter
that this occurred gradually during the 1450s-80s) or whether it was an imposition at all. This
chapter seeks to explain how the Inca state came to rule over Charcas as a means of assessing
how the Chiriguana presence affected political relations and frontier strategy in the region. The
questions are related. If the peoples of Charcas were not united before their incorporation into the
Inca empire, the notion of the Chiriguana threat as a driver of significant political change is in
doubt. The broader implications of this notion—the assumption that Chiriguana hordes were
flooding the Andean perimeter in the fifteenth century—are also called into question.

I argue instead in this chapter that the peoples of Charcas were minimally unified prior to
coming under the influence of the Inca state, and that Inca officials dealt with them at the level of
their kingdoms or chiefdoms rather than as a confederation. Furthermore, the more coercive
phase of the Inca incorporation of Charcas (after 1571) failed to incite the type of unified
resistance that would be expected of a true confederation. This argument necessitates analyzing
in depth the accounts of the Inca “conquest” of Charcas, including Cobo’s (related above), which
characterizes the annexation of Charcas as the military conquest of a unified interethnic
resistance. Cobo’s account serves as one basis for the argument that the peoples of Charcas were
indeed a confederation prior to their incorporation into Tawantinsuyu. I argue that Cobo and his
sources conflate and mischaracterize a single incident in the course of a long process with the entirety of that process.

In Chapter 4 I provide an evidence-based narrative that describes the active Inca transformation of Charcas into the province described in the “Memorial of Charcas.” Of particular importance for this project is the southeastern frontier system that the Incas instituted over the course of the 1480s-1520s. I argue that it originally served both a military-security function by protecting the primary Inca state pursuits in the region as well as a political and ideological function, as the Inca state sought to increase its control of territory and populations to the east. Groups of Chiriguanaes (or their Guaraní ancestors) radically altered Inca frontier strategy in the 1520s when they attacked Inca-controlled installations along this frontier on at least two occasions. These attacks and the Inca responses to them effectively established the Charcas-Chiriguana frontier that would persist in similar forms for the following two centuries.

The coming section of this chapter reviews the body of literature dealing with the expansion of the Inca empire in general during its latter stages and its expansion into Charcas in particular. It discusses the difficulties of identifying reliable historical information in these circumstances, as well as the theoretical models that are most appropriate to analyze the nature of Inca rule in Charcas. Portions of the remainder of this chapter and the next also consider methodological questions related to the types of evidence available when researching these types of questions.

Inca Expansion into Charcas: Historiographic & Anthropological Models

Piecing together the history of Inca expansion into the frontier region southeast of Lake Titicaca is an exercise in contextualizing apparent contradiction. Evidence is scattered throughout a variety of documentary sources compiled mostly from oral histories, and the sources regularly refute each other. John Rowe’s canonical account of Inca expansion places the
conquest of the area a mere 50 years or so prior to the arrival of the Spanish in Peru. According to his contextualized reading of the chronicles of Inca history written after the Spanish conquest, the lands and people of the region nominally came under the rule of the empire during the reign of Tupac Yupanqui (1471-93). The empire fully incorporated the diverse human and natural resources of the eastern slopes and valleys into state service, however, during the reign of Huayna Capac (1493-1527).

John Murra has shown that the swiftness of Inca expansion was due to the application of methods of conquest and governance tailored to the Andean ethnic, cultural, and geographical realities they faced. The broad corpus of literature on the functioning of the Inca empire holds generally that the state’s experience in governing an often-hostile multi-ethnic populace stretched across thousands of kilometers of difficult-to-traverse territory led to the refinement of techniques that maximized state utility relative to investment of state resources. Inca officials tailored culturally-appropriate means of legitimizing and perpetuating a relationship between ruler and subject that was inherently hierarchical and unequal but managed to appear only minimally so. Reciprocal redistributive arrangements, decimal organization, the construction of an inclusive but regimented state religion, and the fostering of kinship ties were among the methods they employed that were deeply rooted in Peruvian coastal and central-highland Andean cultures. Many of these and other strategies emulated institutional or cultural practices that dated from the Middle Horizon Tiwanaku or Wari civilizations, or even earlier.

---


6 The Horizon model for Andean prehistorical chronology reflects the work of a great many scholars. It holds that relatively complex cultures gained broad influence at particular epochs and in particular regions of the Andes: the Early or Chavín (ca. 850-ca. 200 BCE), Middle or Wari-Tiwanaku (ca. 600-ca. 1000 CE), and Late or Inca (ca.
These administrative strategies arose from the circumstances that the Incas typically confronted during their expansion and consolidation. Of course the precise regional and local considerations that state administrators encountered varied greatly over the enormous expanses of the empire they came to rule. These circumstances often differed more radically at the frontiers, where the cultural practices upon which Inca political strategy commonly relied, such as reciprocity or verticality, were understood differently or unknown. In these areas, state functionaries had to modify their approaches in order to maximize state benefit relative to cost. Indeed a great deal of the strength and durability of Inca rule owes to the state’s ability to adapt to a variety of circumstances.7


Frank Salomon’s article to which this chapter’s title alludes, “Vertical Politics on the Inka Frontier,” proposes an ideal-type model of Inca conquest in precisely the type of distant frontier area under consideration here. According to his research on the final Inca expansions in the extreme north of Chinchasuyu (in modern-day Ecuador) the Inca state asserted itself in a phased annexation plan that accounted for the differences that distinguished this area from regions closer to the imperial center. Essential to the northern frontier strategy was the Incas’ imposition of a political authority structure operating above the local lordships in existence there. State functionaries had to implement it without divesting local lords of their traditional authority so as to maintain the productive capacities of these regions with minimal expenditure of imperial resources. In the first phase, the Inca state sought to extend its authority over the complementary economic zones on which Andean societies depended for their economic diversification, thus “closing … the economic circuit on which each given level of political authority depended” in order to “minimiz[e] points of external dependency.” This step was particularly necessary absent strong cultural tendencies toward verticality strategies in frontier regions. Highland Andean societies typically diversified their economic yields and lessened the risk of catastrophic loss by relocating segments of the community to distinct non-contiguous ecological zones.

8 Though I discuss extensively the factors that shaped the policies pursued by the Inca state in the section that follows, I do not attempt to break down the internal processes of strategy and decision making step-by-step. The Inca himself had the power of final approval or denial, but scholars know that he consulted the ancestors and gods via religious officials who performed of rituals designed to determine their will. See Sabine G. MacCormack, Children of the Sun and Reason of State: Myths, Ceremonies and Conflicts in Inca Peru (College Park: Dept. of Spanish and Portuguese, Univ. of Maryland, 1990), 10-22. Scholars also know that administrative and military officials, the so-called orejones of Cuzco, had a degree of influence. See Waldemar Espinoza Soriano, Los orejones del Cuzco o La clase ociosa en el imperio inca: Siglo XV y XVII (Lima: Universidad Nac. del Perú, 1977). I therefore use variations on the terms “officials” and “functionaries” interchangeably with “state” or “empire” when discussing actions taken on behalf of the Inca state.

relocated *mitima* (Quechua) or *maluri* (Aymara) population maintained its full social and political ties to the core population and thus remained within the political control of its local lord, whether a *kuraka* (Quechua) or *mallku* (Aymara). Once the Incas imposed this more contained structure at the frontier, imperial officials would seek to impose their preferred, official modes of governance at the local level as well. They thus removed the traditional personalist elements from local rule—effectively achieving the transition within the local regimes from chiefdoms to imperial provinces. This involved exerting closer control over the political elite and organizing ethnic authorities at multiple levels. This top-down imposition of authority was at the same time designed to stimulate the creation, from the original chiefdoms, of a hierarchy of political institutions that connected constituent societies to the Inca state.11

The twin outbursts of civil war and epidemic disease in Tawantinsuyu, followed by the encounter with the Spanish force at Cajamarca, were variables that together proved overwhelming to the strategic mechanisms of the Inca empire. They ultimately cut short the development of northern Chinchasuyu as an Inca province even before the completion of phase two of Salomon’s model. Officials never had a chance to implement longer-term strategies for the development and consolidation of the province, nor did they manage to extract from it much in the way of resources.12 Charcas, the Inca province roughly corresponding to modern central Bolivia, provides a better case by which to observe the continuing development and

---


12 There is no evidence of Inca architecture dating to Huayna Capac’s reign north of Tomebamba. His successors failed to carry out significant construction indicative of governance strategies anywhere. See Susan A. Niles, *The Shape of Inca History: Narrative and Architecture in an Andean Empire* (Iowa City: Univ. of Iowa Press, 1999), 271-73.
consolidation of Inca rule in the provincial setting. The processes leading to the Inca incorporation of Charcas began earlier than they did in Chinchasuyu. Though it collapsed at the same time and for the same reasons, Inca rule spanned a greater time period in the region.

The “Territorial-Hegemonic” model of imperial rule applied by Terence D’Altroy to the Inca state provides a useful analytical schema by which to examine the imperial development of Charcas. It is a fitting complement to Salomon’s model of incorporation in that it helps make sense of the strategies by which an imperial state like the Inca might establish and carry out the types of objectives that Salomon proposes. The model posits a continuum along which an empire exerts its military, political, and economic power. At one extreme end is hegemonic control, which “entails a core polity (usually a state) and client polities that are responsible, with varying degrees of autonomy, for implementing imperial policy, extracting resources for imperial consumption, and providing security out of their own resources.” This approach corresponds with indirect strategies. At the other end of the spectrum is territorial control, which involves “more-direct occupation and governing of subject territories, with the central state being responsible for underwriting security and administration.”

According to the model, spatial elements help determine the degree to which empires make use of hegemonic and territorial strategies of control. Larger empires tend to employ a greater proportion of hegemonic strategies. Doing so helps limit investment in the governance of their territories, especially in those distant territories where the cost of territorial administration strategies are higher (due chiefly to the costs of transportation). Of course, empires also operate

---

at a number of points on the territorial-hegemonic continuum at any one time in different parts of the empire. The general trend is of policies toward the hegemonic end of the spectrum at the fringes of the empire and territorial policies in the heartland, again due primarily to the greater cost of territorial administration far from the imperial core.\footnote{D’Altroy, \textit{Provincial Power in the Inka Empire}, 19-24; Sonia Alconini, “Dis-embedded Centers and Architecture of Power in the Fringes of the Inka Empire: New Perspectives on Territorial and Hegemonic Strategies of Domination,” \textit{Journal of Anthropological Archaeology} 27 (2008): 64-65.}

Tendencies toward territorial or hegemonic strategies may also shift over time or space for other reasons. In the northern region on which Salomon’s study focuses, the movement from the hegemonic toward the territorial end of the spectrum—as the empire began to shape the political and economic relationships with and between the subject peoples—was a function of the multistage implementation of a plan. The plan took shape as it did because Inca officials recognized the regional variants with which they were dealing. The territorial-hegemonic model is capable of accounting for such variants because one of its characteristic elements is a focus on cost-benefit analyses by the involved parties. It treats the exertion of imperial power “less as a dichotomized system composed of core elites and exploited, dominated polities than as a series of interrelated strategies.”\footnote{D’Altroy, \textit{Provincial Power in the Inka Empire}, 24.} State policy will generally reflect the expected maximization of net imperial power—that is, the sum of political, economic, military, and ideological power. Meanwhile, the subject peoples will support or resist imperial mandates to a degree in accordance with their own expected outcomes. As a result, the empire and its subjects need not always act in opposition to one another. Their interaction is not typically zero-sum, and it may frequently be mutually beneficial. The approaches of both parties will also necessarily change.
over time not only according to the actions of the other party or parties, but to accommodate changing external variables as well.

Before proceeding to discuss the actual implementation of Inca imperialism in Charcas, consider more closely the cost-benefit analyses that Inca officials faced as they determined where along the territorial-hegemonic spectrum their policies should fall as the state exerted political, economic, and military power. And because a shortcoming of D’Altroy’s model is its failure to include nonmaterial elements, a brief discussion of ideological power is also warranted.

D’Altroy defines political power as that deriving “from one entity’s ability to dominate the processes of managing consent, judging, and decision making.” To maximize its capabilities in this realm, an empire might take a territorial approach: the dismantling of a conquered client state and the installation of an imperial bureaucracy staffed with administrators. Inca imperial officials, rather, tended to opt to achieve these ends hegemonically, particularly in the distant provinces. They aimed to ensure the continued allegiance and functioning of a client polity while often initiating changes in it over a long period of time, as in Salomon’s example.16 Given the long view that the Incas applied to expansion strategy, one must understand the conquest and political governance of a client state as different phases of the same plan. The idea of a hegemonic or indirect conquest might sound counterintuitive because one typically envisions conquest as the ultimate expression of territorial power. But the Inca conquest phase rarely took the shape of a simple military confrontation. It was a more commonly a dynamic process whereby the representatives of the imperial state came to position themselves and the resources at their disposal in such a way that they became indispensable for the maintenance of local leaders’ positions of authority. But the Inca state was rarely able to achieve a sufficient level of

16 Ibid., 11, 22-24.
political power using hegemonic strategies alone. The alliances that came about from this hegemonic process often crumbled over time, and the result was usually some sort of armed rebellion. When this occurred, the state was well equipped to respond militarily. After restoring order, officials might implement more-territorial methods of political control to prevent further rebellion. Cycles of rebellion and the reassertion of Inca control were common elements in the integration of a province.¹⁷

Economic power, according to D’Altroy, “derives from control over access to natural resources, materially productive labor, goods, and services.” An empire can typically exert economic power either through low-cost, low-extraction strategies associated with hegemonic control, or it can employ more-territorial methods associated with higher costs and yields. The former is typically reflected in tributary models of extraction, minimal infrastructural investment, and minimal transformation of the organization of labor. The latter involves a high degree of infrastructural investment and the likely transformation or extension of local labor structures. It also often involves the development of state-directed production enclaves in the provinces.¹⁸

As discussed above, the ability of the Inca state to wield economic power was essential to achieving political power without risking a direct confrontation. Obtaining the particular objects necessary to create and sustain a veneer of prestige—both for the empire itself and for its clients—required a great degree of coordination and access to resources that were necessarily difficult to obtain in any quantity. The Incas’ capabilities in the arena of “wealth finance,” as D’Altroy and Timothy Earle describe the management and delivery of the high-value prestige


¹⁸ D’Altroy, Provincial Power in the Inka Empire, 11-12, 21-22.
items that were crucial to maintaining satisfied clients, were highly refined. In its imperial maturity, the state controlled territory that included mines, herds, and agricultural lands conducive to the production of a wide variety of non-staple resources. The state also maintained skilled artisans capable of fashioning those resources into finished items. It supplemented the ability to obtain and produce goods within the empire with a capacity to trade for exotic goods only available elsewhere, such as deep in the Amazon basin.19

“Staple finance,” D’Altroy and Earle’s term for the production of excess staple foodstuffs and other quotidian resources, also undergirded the ability of the Inca state to exert political power in the long run. The redistributive capacity of the empire, which literally and symbolically included imperial subjects in the consumption of the surpluses amassed by the state, was crucial in minimizing the perception of inequality in the imperial relationship. Redistribution required the collection of excess staple goods that state functionaries would exchange, in a way, for political compliance. It was also necessary that the state amass sufficient staple goods to allocate labor toward administrative and military tasks. In other words, the state had to provide for its officials and soldiers in order to maintain its political and military capacities.20

The ability to assemble and control a sufficient supply of labor is one of the primary challenges that pre-modern empires faced in implementing their economic programs. The Inca


state did so in part by modifying Andean cultural practices that had functioned to help organize community production tasks on smaller scales for centuries. The *mita* system required most populations subject to Inca control to provide a particular number of individuals during rotating periods of state service. *Mitayos* (laborers providing *mita* service) maintained their affiliation with their communities of origin and typically returned to them upon the completion of their allotted service. The *mita* system functioned essentially as a means to spread state labor demands throughout the imperial subject population according to communities’ relative ability to provide labor. State *mitima* (a practice distinct from the *mita*) populations also fulfilled the labor demands of the empire, but over longer periods of service. This practice involved the relocation of a portion of a population to an area far from the point of origin, typically for permanent resettlement. The *mitmaqkuna* (literally “*mitima* people,” those who lived in *mitima* populations) lived and worked as a community in their newly assigned regions at state-appointed tasks. The Inca state also removed certain people from their communities of origin and severed their ethnic ties. These individuals worked full time on behalf of the state, often in specialized and/or high-prestige positions. *Yanaconas* and some *camayos* both fell into this category. The former acted as personal attendants to the ruling classes and might provide a variety of services. The latter were specialists at a certain task, such as construction or herding.\(^{21}\)

These primarily economic categories also had political aspects to them. Officials carefully considered which populations to select for relocation and the sites of their relocations according to the benefit of the empire. Their calculations took into account a number of factors. Inca functionaries might place peoples they perceived as less-civilized alongside others considered more-civilized in order to inculcate the former with cultural practices more acceptable to the imperial elite. One aspect of this approach on the northern frontier, as is clear from Salomon, was the attempt to instruct newly incorporated subjects in the methods of traditional Andean complementarity. The exact ethnicities of all the mitmaqkuna sent to work in Charcas have not been established, but the area was likely a tapestry of languages and cultures originating in the highlands, the Pacific coast, and perhaps the eastern lowland regions.  

D’Altroy defines military power as “the capacity to elicit a desired response through a combination of force and diplomatic persuasion.” The primary distinction between the exertion of military force at the territorial end of the spectrum and that at the more hegemonic end is that in the first case, the empire uses military power directly to achieve its aims. Ultimately, all coercion under an extreme form of territorial control is military in nature, and there is a strict proportionality between the capacity of the empire to exert military force and its overall military power. In the second case, the empire attempts to economize the exertion of military force and relies primarily on the threat of force to achieve its economic and political goals. Hegemonic control thus results in the achievement of military power “defined by the range within which

---

others see the central state as being capable of compelling obedience,” a range out of proportion to the state’s actual overall capacity for military force.23

The primary drawback of more hegemonic arrangements is that they sacrifice security, especially at the peripheries of the empire. Clients, rather than imperial military forces, must fulfill the typical minimum security functions required by the imperial state at the frontier. In a situation in which the empire’s economic strategies fall at the hegemonic end of the continuum, these minimum security functions are extremely low. Preventing the occasional breach of the perimeter by outsiders in such circumstances may not be worth the costs of fully securing the frontier. But in cases in which the empire has invested a great deal to develop the economic infrastructure of the provinces (as would be the case in Inca Charcas), officials might avoid the costs of tightly securing the border by expanding politically—establishing new client polities abutting any exposed areas of the developed province. This strategy essentially equates to the establishment of buffer client states surrounding zones key to imperial production. Within such a buffer zone, officials might choose to delegate security to the local populations (hegemonic military strategy) while acculturating those populations to imperial rule (territorial political and economic strategies). Archaeologists describe this type of frontier as a “zone of acculturation.” In many ways, this strategy fits precisely the Salomon model of frontier expansion described above. Another possible approach to the buffer zone involves the empire establishing a territorial military presence at key sites of potential incursion and stationing mobile defensive units well behind the outer perimeter. In the Late-Horizon Andes, these strategic sites would most typically

---

take the form of mountain passes, rivers, and areas on the Inca *capac ñan* infrastructure network. This intermediately-territorial military strategy is known as “defense-in-depth.”  

As will be clear in regards to Charcas, the Inca state did develop economic enclaves and infrastructure, and the creation of buffer clients to protect economic investment was a practice in which both the Inca and pre-Inca rulers of the region seemingly engaged. It is difficult, however, to pinpoint the security aspect as the prime motive for acquiring new clients and territories. The drivers behind state expansion in the Andes were multifaceted and included many military, economic, and ideological aspects. During the period of Inca rule, Inca officials employed various tactics designed to increase the perception of the state’s military capacity and, by extension, its overall (hegemonic) military power. These involved ensuring that news of their successful campaigns was widely known. They also marched armies through particular subject territories in order to display military might. Under more extreme circumstances, soldiers might also engage in terror tactics, like the complete annihilation of a city or mass public executions.

Demonstrations of Inca power commonly went beyond strategies involving just military resources. Representatives of the Inca empire undertook activities and enacted policies that seemed to do little besides demonstrating state control of labor and other resources. These activities and policies themselves expended resources and therefore appear outwardly irrational.

---


Dennis Ogburn argues that Inca officials expended these resources toward such projects as monumental architecture, elaborate royal processions, and the transport of certain goods out of proportion to their relative utility, in order “to instill a psychology of submission in provincial subjects.” This mindset changed the political cost-benefit analyses of provincial subjects, “the majority of [whom] resented foreign rule and … must have been continually reassessing opportunities for rebellion and the chances for success.”

At the same time, aspects of some of these same Inca strategies sought to transform subject peoples at a deeper level. They aimed to instill in them an ideology that legitimized the position of the state and instructed them in proper behaviors designed to promote state ends. At the very least, one must recognize that Inca officials expended a great deal of resources toward ideological ends. They acted out elaborate ceremonies—many of which were not directly associated to political strategies such as redistribution—often in venues intricately constructed for the occasion. They saw utility in supporting and emphasizing certain beliefs, which might influence the behavior of those for whom such rituals were designed to appeal, including the Incas themselves. Anthropologist Paul Friedrich defines ideology as “a system, or at least an amalgam, of ideas, strategies, tactics, and practical symbols for promoting, perpetuating, or changing a social and cultural order.” The capacity to implant such a system equates to ideological power. Those who are able to exert ideological power create systems designed to confront “practical problems and [systems that] necessarily reflect or express the will and interests for control or change of some social group or class.” In other words, these ideological

---

systems are essentially the means by which elites put “political ideas in action.” Geoffrey Conrad’s concept of ideology extends Friedrich’s definition in order to demonstrate how ideological power might influence economic and military power as well. He finds that ideology “provides the members of a group with a rationale for their existence.” In doing so, it provides a template for “ideologically proper action.” The behaviors appropriate to the templates developed by Inca officials were helpful in mobilizing subjects at their basic organizational levels, and they particularly emphasized conduct that expanded state economic and military power. The result was that subjects had additional impetus to fulfill their labor and military duties.

According to these definitions, then, ideological power functioned in the Inca empire in much the same fashion as political, economic, and military power. It represented a means by which officials could seek to augment the sum power of the state through coercion or the exchange of one type of power for another. One may also place the exertion of ideological power along the territorial-hegemonic spectrum. At the territorial end, officials might seek entirely to strip a subject polity of its ideological system and impose its own. This could entail the destruction of ideologically significant objects and areas and the elimination of any existing priestly class. The empire could put into place its own sacred objects and religious officials while reshaping appropriate areas into ceremonial venues. At the hegemonic end of the continuum, imperial officials might seek to reinforce existing ideologies that governed behavior within client

---


polities while syphoning off the surplus resources facilitated by the client’s own ideological system.

In practice, Inca ideological strategy included elements of all of the above. The myths on which Inca imperial ideology was based described a privileged relationship between the creator god, Viracocha, and the Inca dynastic ruler who initiated the imperial expansion, Pachacuti. Viracocha declared the Inca and his successors to be sons of the sun, Inti. Both the sun and the Incas were to act on behalf of Viracocha in the earthly realm. The chief task entrusted to Pachacuti and his successors, according to the tale, was the reorganization of the pan-Andean pantheon. This imbued the conquests of new peoples by the Incas with the duty of religious reform and otherwise undergirded political acts with divine significance. Inca officials allowed subjects to maintain local religious traditions, and even incorporated them into state religion, in as far as they fit within the guidelines of the official ideology. This included honoring sacred objects associated with local religions by positioning them in the Temple of the Sun in Cuzco. The objects remained there as ideological hostages meant to guarantee the pliability of those who subscribed to the cults they represented. Imperial agents outlawed those beliefs and practices that did not fit within the imperial ideology. They also replaced or supplemented the rituals of subject communities by including local populations in state ceremonies. These celebrations symbolically incorporated subjects into the imperial ideology. At a more local level, the provision of prestige also represented the use of ideological power. Much of the appeal of the unique objects or titles provided by the empire was their exclusivity. Those who received them enjoyed an elevated level of ideological power over local subjects merely because of their association with the ideologically powerful Inca state.29

29 MacCormack, Children of the Sun and Reason of State, 8-12; Rowe, “Inca Policies and Institutions Relating to the Cultural Unification of the Empire,” 97, 108-10; Gary Urton, Inca Myths (Austin: Univ. of Texas Press, 1999), esp.
“Charcas,” its Inhabitants, and the Inca “Conquest,” 1450s-1480s

The deterioration of the Tiwanaku civilization’s political influence over its former territories in the tenth to the twelfth centuries led to a period of intense competition for resources in the lands to the south of Lake Titicaca. Native Andean chronicler Guaman Poma designated this period the auka runa pacha, or age of warriors. During the following centuries, groups of Aymara-speaking pastoralists established themselves in the easily defensible altiplano pastureland. Over time, the Aymaras nucleated into social and political units, each under the leadership of a mallku (king or chief). The most powerful mallku (plural) consolidated rivals under their leadership and developed larger, more complex socio-political units. Four of these Aymara chiefdoms or kingdoms—the Qaraqara-Charka, the Sura, the Killaka, and the Karanqa—eventually became the primary components of the Charcas confederation.

62; Justin Jennings, “The Fragility of Imperialist Ideology and the End of Local Traditions, an Inca Example,” Cambridge Archaeological Journal 13, no. 1 (2003): 107-20. Jennings also describes an example in which Inca officials appear to have brought about the end of a local religious custom for reasons of incompatibility with state ideology. The inclusion of the already abandoned ruins of Tiwanaku in Inca state rituals is an example of the incorporation of sacred concepts from outside Inca tradition. The capac hucha ritual, which involved the sacrifice of children at locations deemed sacred by the Incas, is an example of a ceremony designed to incorporate local elites into the ideology of the empire. Elements of the practice were reflective of the spatial and temporal order established by state ideology. The children chosen for the honor of sacrifice—thereby entrusting them to the spiritual realm of the most honored ancestors—consisted primarily of the offspring of local leaders. See Colin McEwan and Maarten Van de Guchte, “Ancestral Time and Sacred Space in Inca State Ritual,” in The Ancient Americas: Art from Sacred Landscapes, ed. Richard F. Townsend (Chicago: Art Institute of Chicago, 1992), 359-71; and Jennifer L. Faux, “Hail the Conquering Gods: Ritual Sacrifice of Children in Inca Society,” Journal of Contemporary Anthropology 3, no. 1 (2012): 1-15, esp. 11-12.


31 Platt, Bouysse-Cassagne, and Harris, “‘Charka rojo, Charka blanco,’” 36-37, 58; Roger Neil Rasnake, Domination and CulturalResistance: Authority and Power among an Andean People (Durham, NC: Duke Univ. Press, 1988), 97-98; Claudia Rivera Casanovas, “Forms of Imperial Control and the Negotiation of Local Autonomy in the Cinti Valley of Bolivia,” in Malpass and Alconini, Distant Provinces in the Inka Empire, 151-72. The Qaraqara and Charka kingdoms would later be separated into two units. See “La probanza de los incas nietos de conquistadores,” ed. John Howland Rowe, Histórica (Lima) 9, no. 2 (1985): 214. The document, analyzed in more depth below, mentions the entry of Inca forces “into the province of the Charcas; both provinces, which are uila charca [Red Charka] and hanco charca [White Charka].” Another early document indicates that the name “Caracara” dates only
The territory these kingdoms occupied is marked approximately on the south and east by a line connecting sites known to archaeologists as Incallajta in the north, Samaipata to the east-southeast, and Incahuasi and Condorhuasi, respectively, to the southwest (Figure 3-2). These points essentially mark out the eastern limits that the Inca empire would reach at its territorial peak, as well as the Charcas-Chiriguana frontier. To the west of Charcas lay lands at extreme altitudes—above the conditions capable of producing viable agricultural yields—and barren salt flats. To the northwest, toward Lake Titicaca, the northern Aymara kingdoms of the Lupaqa, Pakasa, and Qulla occupied a separate socio-political sphere that began to the immediate northwest of Paria, the chief Sura community. Inca administrators maintained the territorial distinction of Charcas by recognizing the region and its inhabitants as distinct within the southeastern quarter of the empire, Collasuyu.

Traditional Aymara sentiments toward other ethnic groups were a product of their starkly binary system of organization, which pertained to all spatial and temporal aspects of existence. This type of dualism is common in Andean cultures, but the Aymara especially subscribed to a worldview delineated into the categories urco and uma (often translated as “upper” and “lower,” respectively). At the highest levels, the Aymaras saw themselves and other peoples adapted to

from the reign of “the Inca Guayna Capax.” See “La probanza de don Fernando Ayra de Ariutu,” in Platt, Bouysse-Cassagne, and Harris, Qaraqara-Charca, 730.

32 Rodolfo Raffino and Rubén Stehberg, “Tawantinsuyu: The Frontiers of the Inca Empire,” trans. Tom Dillehay, in Archaeology in Latin America, ed. Gustavo G. Politis and Benjamin Alberti (London: Routledge, 1999), 171-73. “Limits” must be understood in context. I wish to give a general idea of the geographical area under consideration, but Inca representatives operated in certain capacities outside this region, and nothing resembling a hardened frontier existed at this point.

33 Platt, Bouysse-Cassagne, and Harris, “‘Charka rojo, Charka blanco,’” 33-36. The eventual name of the Spanish Audiencia of Charcas is a remnant of the division of Inca Collasuyu into two separate administrative units. Their borders of each were not coterminous in any sense. Spanish Charcas reached farther west to the approximate modern borders between Bolivia and Peru. In Inca times, the Lake Titicaca area inhabited by the northern Aymaras consisted of another such sub-suyu, Collao. See Pärssinen, Tawantinsuyu, 261-63.
the high-altitude altiplano setting as urco. Uma, on the other hand, implied otherness—non-Aymara existence. All Aymara peoples were urco relative to the uma eastern lowland populations with whom they came into contact at the frontiers of Charcas. These peoples belonged primarily to cultures that had developed on the plains to the southeast and forests regions to the north. The Aymaras additionally distinguished themselves from non-Aymaras by self-identifying as marcanie, a term meaning “‘those who live settled in villages’ … [and] signaling a certain level of … ‘civilized order.’”

The Qaraqara-Charka was the most powerful and populous of the Aymara kingdoms as a result of certain economic and ideological advantages. One advantage was their control over a highland region that encompassed five sacred hills, Porco chief among them. These hills contained rich silver and lead deposits. It is not clear the degree to which the Aymaras made use of these metals in pre-Incaic times, but the region was nevertheless ideologically and economically significant. The cult of sacred objects (huaca) associated with the hills drew pilgrims from throughout Charcas. Over time, the Qaraqara-Charka also came to employ Andean complementarity strategies that drove them increasingly to occupy lower-altitude ecological niches. These strategies provided them reliable supplies of lower-altitude staple products such as coca and maize. The Qaraqara-Charka’s more traditional Aymara peers, the Killaka and Karanqa peoples, maintained less diversified economies oriented toward camelid


herding, while the Sura maintained an intermediate status. The Qaraqara-Charka and Sura’s increasing occupation of lowland ecological zones brought them into frequent contact with non-marcanie, uma peoples to the east, whom they described as peoples “of the bow and arrow.”

The Aymara used the term “bow-and-arrow people” with a certain degree of disdain that set apart the non-marcanie outsiders, but it had its basis in the fact that the bow and arrow was foreign to the cultures of the Andean highlands. The Aymaras hunted and went to war armed with wooden clubs and slings. Nevertheless they apparently came to recognize the utility of the lowland, uma technology. The Aymara did not widely adopt it themselves, but they strategically allied themselves with certain bow-and-arrow peoples when it benefitted them. One result of these contacts was that the line between marcanie and non-marcanie began to blur in some ways by the second half of the 1400s. The uma peoples adopted certain Aymara cultural markers and highland organizational traits. The Chicha and Chui were among the bow and arrow peoples who most came to resemble their Aymara neighbors. Leaders from both were also party to the “Memorial of Charcas.” Their inclusion in this document long suggested to scholars a false ethnic homogeneity between them and the Aymara nations.

---

36 María de las Mercedes del Río, *Etnicidad, territorialidad y colonialismo en los Andes: tradición y cambio entre los Soras de los siglos XVI y XVII (Bolivia)* (La Paz: Instituto de Estudios Bolivianos, 2005), 38–49; Platt, Bouysse-Cassagne, and Harris, “Charka rojo, Charka blanco,” 50–51, 64-65; Rossana Barragán Romano, “¿Indios de arco y flecha?“ *Entre la historia y la arqueología de las poblaciones del norte de Chuquisaca (siglos xv-xvi)* (Sucre: Antropólogos del Surandino, 1994), esp. 28ff.


38 See, for example, Bouysse-Cassagne, *La identidad aymara*, 210-11. Despite her high-level understanding of the Aymara, Bouysse-Cassagne initially erroneously believed that the Charcas confederation consisted entirely of Aymara lordships. Certain lists of mitayos at Potosí seem to indicate this as well, but other documents demonstrate that the Spanish exempted the “indios de arco y flecha” from mining duties in recognition of their inexperience and their difficulties dealing with the high-altitude climate. Further oblique documentary references to the Charcas confederation vary from two to seven in their accounts of the number of participating nations. See Platt, Bouysse-Cassagne, and Harris, “Charka rojo, Charka blanco,” 61-64, 71-72; and Barragán Romano, “¿Indios de arco y flecha?”, 145, 153.
The Chicha seem to have hailed from the south-southeast of the territory they occupied in Charcas in the fifteenth century. Their original language(s) is (are) not known, nor is their precise reason for migrating to Charcas. They apparently used Quechua and Aymara exclusively by the time of the Spaniards’ arrival, an indication of more than fleeting residence in the region. Some scholars believe that the term “Chicha” may represent a broad category of related peoples rather than an ethnic or political label of any innate importance. The term may have served to conflate many groups of loosely related peoples living between the highlands south of Potosí to the Atacama Desert and the boreal plains of northern Argentina. Even less is clear about the Chui prior to Inca rule. Certain evidence places them in the Cochabamba valleys already before the arrival of Inca forces to the area.

The lack of clear data from this early period about either the Chicha or the Chui makes it very difficult to speculate about the degree of political and social complexity that characterized either people before the organizing influence of the Inca state. In the case of the Chicha especially, it is likely that different communities that fell into this pseudo-ethnic category organized themselves in different ways. Populations settled farther to the north, in the Tarija


41 Raimund Schramm, “Fronteras y territorialidad. Repartición étnica y política colonizadora en los Charcas (Valles de Ayopaya y Mizque),” in Presta, Espacio, Emías, Frontera, 182-84; Geraldine Byrne de Caballero, “Introducción al documento,” in “Repartimiento de tierras por el Inca Huayna Capac” (Testimonio de un Documento de 1556), ed. Adolfo de Morales (Cochabamba: Universidad Mayor de San Simón, 1977), 1-14; Wachtel, “The Mitimas of the Cochabamba Valley,” 223 n. 9. Querejazu Lewis places them in the southern portion of Charcas prior to the reorganization undertaken by the Incas, but his claim is based solely on Sarmiento’s indication that the refugees from a purported Inca invasion “retreated to the Chichas and Chuyes” in likely reference to Oroncota—an association I call into question below—as evidence that the Chui traditionally occupied land near the southern frontier of Charcas. See Roy Querejazu Lewis, Bolivia prehispanica (La Paz: Librería editorial Juventud, 1989), 171-73, 303-04. The Incas nietos testimony contains a similar reference, but it is also dubious. See below.
valleys and southeastern Andean foothills, seem to have demonstrated a reasonably high degree of socio-political structure. Much of the so-called Inca road in the region is almost certainly the product of Chicha labor that occurred prior to Inca control over the region. Inca officials also found the Chicha suitable to serve as *mitima* imperial administrators among peoples farther to the south whose cultures had very little socioeconomic gradation.\(^\text{42}\)

Scholars have been able to determine more precise information about the social and political organization of the Yampara, a related people who also occupied the liminal zones east of the Charcas highlands. They do not appear in the “Memorial,” though they occupied a significant role in the functioning of the Inca empire in their particular region. Their name may not appear in the document because of their outward cultural similarity to the Chui and Chicha. Colonial sources may have conflated the Yampara into one or both of these other ethnic categories.\(^\text{43}\) The Yampara are of unclear origin but seem to have migrated to the eastern Andes from the east prior to the era of Inca control. They culturally assimilated to their highland neighbors in a number of ways, including by organizing themselves into upper and lower moieties centered at distinct locations.\(^\text{44}\) Archaeological work at a Yampara population center

---


\(^\text{43}\) Barragán Romano, “¿Indios de arco y flecha?”, 141-42.

shows that processes resulting in lasting social stratification based on the abilities of elites to extract surplus resources were underway before the influence of Inca dominion.\textsuperscript{45} Additional ethnic clusters of Churumata, Jurie, Tomata, Lacaxa, and Moyo Moyo peoples dotted the map of Charcas in early colonial times, primarily in the eastern and southeastern valleys. Their dispersion into small communities at fairly great distances from one another suggests their relocation by Inca functionaries as frontier \textit{mitima} populations, but the question of where they resided prior to the era of Inca rule is not entirely resolved. Scattered documentary, linguistic, and archaeological evidence suggests that most if not all were eastern Chaco-dwellers who came west in the mid-to-late sixteenth century. Some might also represent subgroupings of the Chicha.\textsuperscript{46} The Uru and Lipe peoples occupied border regions to the west and southwest, respectively, of Charcas. They may have represented the remnants of pre-Aymara populations in the altiplano pushed to less desirable environments in the extreme highlands.\textsuperscript{47}


A Cost-Benefit Analysis of Charcas

From the perspective of the expansionist Inca empire in the mid-fifteenth century, Charcas promised a number of challenges and opportunities. Control of the natural and human resources of the region might augment the power of the state in a variety of ways, but at what cost? The logistical challenges to any reasonable conquest and extraction strategy were daunting. Not only was it far from the Inca heartland, the terrain was difficult to maneuver, and the local leaders represented potentially powerful adversaries.

Hegemonic strategies offered one option. Aymara ideology and the relative political unity in the larger kingdoms fostered production surpluses sufficient to maintain local elites. The empire might leverage its own powers in such a way so as to skim a portion of these surpluses at intervals—essentially the construction of a tributary system. If organized correctly, such a system would provide a reliable return on investment for the Inca state over time, but any gains would be minimal. Exacting higher revenues via increased tribute levies would be difficult because it would involve the challenge of displacing classes of elites in the principal Aymara kingdoms. These Aymara leaders had established themselves precisely because of their abilities to fend off political rivals. Demanding too much of their surpluses was a sure path to resistance and costly military expenditures. Some of the less-formidable groups in Charcas, on the other hand, lacked the socioeconomic complexity necessary to produce large-scale surpluses. In either case, Inca officials would need a high degree of political influence to reap significant rewards. Hegemonic strategies are poorly compatible with such influence.

Conversely, Inca officials could have attempted to impose more territorial strategies in gaining control over Charcas. The region was capable of producing additional surpluses if given the benefit of larger-scale organizational principals and additional investment. The theretofore underutilized Cochabamba valleys, particularly, offered the potential to provide the Inca state
with a surge in staple goods such as maize, coca, and camelid products, as well as secondary crops that promoted wider dietary diversity. These products might, in turn, feed workers in the highland mines of Charcas. Control of the human resources in Charcas also meant the opportunity to coopt skilled and battle-tested Aymara soldiers and lowland bowmen into the imperial armies. The geographical position of Charcas further provided Inca traders the prospect of obtaining exotic goods by tapping more directly into long-distance exchange networks connected to the Amazon and Paraguay River basins.

The potential economic and military benefits were sufficient to outweigh the overarching problem of distance, but implementing such a grand scheme was costly. The economic costs could be offset by expected returns in the long run. The larger challenge was cultivating the necessary political power to make such changes. Winning political influence by sheer force was out of the question. The military capacity of each of the principal Charcas kingdoms was formidable on its own. If they united in resistance, they would prove a collective adversary too powerful to fight for anything but a pyrrhic victory. Instead, Inca officials would strategically deploy the state’s economic, military, and ideological power over multiple generations in order to develop sufficient political influence in Charcas.

**Political Confederation in Pre-Incaic Charcas**

Scholars who have looked into the degree of integration of the nations of Charcas have tended to agree that they functioned as a political unit already prior to the Inca annexation of Charcas. Their belief is that the threat of advancing Chiriguana peoples from the east precipitated alliances between the Aymara kingdoms of Charcas and the Chicha, Chui, and Yampara peoples. These alliances grew into a confederation that the Inca state incorporated largely without
transformation. These findings are logical, but they lack evidence. The truth is that the exact
degree of integration of the various nations into one political unit is not immediately clear. Nor is
the exact impetus behind the confederation. The Charcas confederation operated at its highest
levels of coordination as a single entity under the organizing force of Huayna Capac’s rulership
(1493-1527), as discussed below in Chapter 4. Whether it originated as a result of intervention
from Cuzco or prior to any such intervention is a matter of debate. The “Memorial of Charcas”
itself offers little insight in this respect because it emphasizes the privileges that the petitioners’
ancestors enjoyed under the Incas rather than the origins of the confederation.

One collection of documents does provide a bit of insight into the pre-Inca relationships
between the Aymara and the bow-and-arrow people who eventually became parties to the
“Memorial.” These documents consist of testimonies collected by the Spanish in 1638 and
relating to the histories of the Aymara peoples in the region. The testimonies suggest the
establishment of a political relationship between at least one Aymara kingdom and two groups of
bow-and-arrow peoples. The Qaraqara leaders who testified before Spanish authorities credited

---

48 Platt, Bouysse-Cassagne, and Harris, the authors of the most thorough and recent treatment of the confederation, assert that the expansion of the Aymara kingdoms to the east “had to do with defensive policy, not just against local bow-and-arrow warriors, but also against the Chiriwana, policies that the Inca and the King would later take up.” See Platt, Bouysse-Cassagne, and Harris, “Charka rojo, Charka blanco,” 72, 80. Rivera Casanovas, states that “it is broadly accepted that [the Charcas confederation under the Incas] was constituted over an existing political structure.” See Rivera Casanovas, “Forms of Imperial Control and the Negotiation of Local Autonomy in the Cinti Valley of Bolivia,” 153-54. Rasnake indicates that the constituent groups’ “inclusion in the Inka Empire did not seem to change in fundamental ways their forms, organization, or economy.” See Domination and Cultural Resistance, 96-98. On this second point, Platt, Bouysse-Cassagne, and Harris are less certain. They write, “it is possible that the ‘four nations that were soldiers of the Inka’ (the Charka, Qaraqara, Chicha, and Chui) had already united in a military alliance before being incorporated into Tawantinsuyu.” See page 80. Emphasis mine.

49 The testimony focuses on the pre-Inca era only to affirm that their control over the territory extended backwards in time to that period. They likely made this point in order to distinguish themselves from populations of laborers brought to the area by the state during the era of Inca rule. See “El memorial de los Mallku y principales de la provincia de los Charcas.” Examples appear on 847, “My ancestors and forefathers have been lords of this land for more than two hundred years, before and after the Incas”; and 851, “I am the principal cacique of the said repartimiento since the time of the Incas and before…. [My ancestors,] likewise, were caciques and lords and captains, in the time of all the Incas and before them.”
their ancestor Ayra Canchi, a contemporary of Inca Pachacuti (r. 1438-71), with the subjugation of the Chui people, as well as the construction of fortresses in territory occupied by the Chicha and other lowland peoples along the Pilaya and Pilcomayo Rivers, “[to which] his lands ran” (Figures 3-1 & 3-2). The testimony is clear that Ayra Canchi undertook the conquests prior to any official association with the Inca state.50

Ayra Canchi’s motive for expanding his territories to the south toward the Pilaya and Pilcomayo Rivers likely stemmed from his people’s intensive cultivation of the temperate, low-lying Cinti Valley, which lies just to the north of the Pilaya.51 The fortresses along the Pilaya and Pilcomayo Rivers indicate a perceived security threat towards the region originating from the lowlands south and east of the fortified passes.52 By conquering or allying with the Chicha and the other peoples of the Pilcomayo and Paspaya River basins, Ayra Canchi was presumably cultivating partners whose presence would act as a buffer for his own security interests. The testimonies suggest that he helped fortify strategic points on his allies’ more distant perimeter, in keeping with a defense-in-depth model. This strategy would not necessarily eliminate the

50 “La probanza de don Fernando Ayra de Ariutu,” 721-55, esp. 724, 737. The testimony calls the Pilcomayo the Paspaya. For the association of the Pilcomayo with the Paspaya, see Ana María Presta, “Hacienda y comunidad. Un estudio en la provincia de Pilaya y Paspaya. Siglos XVI-XVIII,” in Presta, Espacio, Etnías, Frontera, 79.

51 Rivera Casanovas, “Forms of Imperial Control and the Negotiation of Local Autonomy,” 151-72.

52 There are a number of structures in the indicated region that date to the immediate pre-Inca era. It is unclear if any were built in coordination with the Qaraqara. I discuss those structures for which there is evidence in the following chapter. The Chicha gained special notoriety for their prowess at cutting stone and constructing infrastructure projects during the Inca period. Some belonging to the group clearly had experience in these pursuits. See Raffino, Vitry, and Gobb, “Inkas y Chichas,” 248-49. The Incas later responded to continued threats of invasion of the region by outsiders by placing “a garrison of soldiers … on lands in the province of the Chichas,” according to a late-sixteenth-century description of the area. See Reginaldo de Lizárraga, Descripción breve de toda la tierra del Perú, Tucumán, Río de la Plata y Chile (Buenos Aires: Union Académique Internationale, 1999 [ca. 1600]), 196. This particular garrison was likely stationed at Condorhuasi, which I also analyze in the following chapter.
likelihood of attack, but it would give him time to respond and defend *his* territories in the event of a security breach at the outer frontier.⁵³

Platt, Bouysse-Cassagne, and Harris argue that the Qaraqara and Chicha peoples’ mutual interest in defending the region against the threatening outsiders provided Aymaras and the Indians of the bow and arrow with “the capacity to forge alliances.”⁵⁴ While the relationship put into place by Ayra Canchi does indicate a degree of alliance between the Aymaras and the Chicha, whether the relationship was a basis for the Charcas confederation is another matter. It does not necessarily hold that the two were partners in a confederation. If anything, the wording of the testimony suggests that they were not. While it is silent about how Ayra Canchi established his alliance with the Chicha, the witnesses claimed that he “subjugated” (*sujetó*) the Chui and “put [them] in his obedience” (*puso en su obediencia*).⁵⁵

The wording describes a relationship reflective of the Aymara dualistic hierarchical schema rather than the much more cooperative and equal partnership described in the “Memorial of Charcas.” If the alliances between Ayra Canchi and the Chicha and Chui were indeed the inter-ethnic bases for the Charcas confederation, their relationships underwent a radical change at some point in the interim. The Inca state may have built the Charcas confederation upon certain unilateral or bilateral political relationships, but it would seem that the empire actively altered the political relationships between the peoples of Charcas rather than simply incorporating a functioning confederation into the empire. This remaking of the inter-ethnic

---

⁵³ This type of strategic security planning bears a great deal of resemblance to that of imperial officials who take on contiguous client states in order to institute hegemonic military practices over valuable provinces. See D’Altroy, *Provincial Power in the Inka Empire*, 12-13, 20, 71-73; and Alconini, “The Southeastern Inka Frontier against the Chiriguanos,” 391.

⁵⁴ Platt, Bouysse-Cassagne, and Harris, “*Charka rojo, Charka blanco,*” 80.

⁵⁵ “La probanza de don Fernando Ayra de Ariutu,” 724, 737.
relationships in Charcas is consistent with the process discussed in more detail, below, following a discussion of the Charcas peoples’ relations with the Inca state.

A section of similar colonial-era testimonies from the Killaka perspective provides insight into how the Inca state worked with certain Charcas peoples prior to the actual integration of the region into the empire. This 1575 document also suggests that, despite the evidence of overlapping alliances between certain groups (e.g. the Charka/Qaraqara and Chicha discussed above), there was no functional Charcas confederation prior to the incorporation of the region into Tawantinsuyu. The testimony indicates that Colque, the mallku of the Killaka kingdom, assisted Pachacuti (r. 1438-71) in the conquest of the Chicha and the Diaguita, the latter a lowland plains and desert people who lived to the south-southeast of Charcas. Colque’s role was not simply a matter of diplomacy. He reportedly led his own people into battle as part of the Inca forces.56

This evidence of Killaka participation in a war against the Chicha indicates one or both of two possibilities. First, the Chicha who came under attack were a people distinct from those represented later in the Charcas confederation. This is a reasonable possibility since it is unlikely that “Chicha” represented any monolithic ethnic, much less political, group. Furthermore, the Chicha who appear in this testimony are always paired with the more distant Diaguita peoples. This may suggest that the Chicha people in question were oriented more to the south and were distinct from the group allied with the Qaraqara during the same era. The second possibility is that the Killaka did not share the Qaraqara alliance with the Chicha because their interests did

56 “Primera información hecha por Don Juan Colque Guarache, cerca de sus predecesores y subcesión en el cacicazgo mayor … Año 1575,” ed. Waldemar Espinoza Soriano, Revista del museo nacional (Lima) 45 (1981): 237, 242, 245. For the Diaguita, see Ana María Lorandi, “Los Diaguitas y el Tawantinsuyu,” 235-59; and Raffino and Stehberg, “Tawantinsuyu,” 171-72. Archaeological evidence at sites such as Aconquija and Quilmes suggests cooperation between the Diaguita and Inca, but the former were never truly incorporated into the empire.
not align in the same ways. The Killaka had an almost exclusively highland orientation and were therefore far removed from the lowland security threats that may have concerned the Qaraqara and the Chicha. Either scenario is supportive of the belief that there was no functional Charcas confederation at this time.

Perhaps more importantly in regards to the degree of political integration in Charcas, this document shows that Inca state representatives interacted with the peoples of Charcas at the level of their sub-ethnic chiefdoms. Inca officials did not seek to negotiate with representatives of a confederation but rather with Colque, the *mallku* of a constituent group. If there had been an existing political structure upon which the Incas arranged the Charcas confederation, it would be counterintuitive for Inca officials to neglect to interact with the elite at this higher level. Interacting with the constituent *mallku* meant investing far greater economic and ideological power to absorb piecemeal the component parts of Charcas. Additional documents analyzed in the next section, which relates to the Inca incorporation of Charcas, also support the tendency of Inca officials to interact with the Aymara *mallku* and other representatives of the individual kingdoms in lieu of a representative of an overarching alliance. Despite evidence of coordinated inter-ethnic endeavors and the high likelihood that similar collective interests drove cooperation between the Aymara kingdoms, evidence for a true Charcas confederation prior to consolidation under Inca control is lacking.

**The Conquest of Charcas in the Documentary Record**

The story of how the Incas incorporated Charcas and transformed it into a pliant and beneficial province is also a difficult one to establish. The most direct and commonly examined sources relating to the pre-Hispanic Andes are the chronicles of Inca history written by the first generations of Spanish residents in Peru, including the Bernabé Cobo chronicle referenced above. Though they are invaluable resources, their content requires skepticism on a number of
fronts. First and foremost, the authors had agendas, both conscious and subconscious. Secondly, the dual filters of language and culture obscured the transmissions between native informants and the almost-exclusively Spanish authors. The problem of inter-cultural communication, especially during the first generations after the Spanish conquest, raises the question of whether the chroniclers were capable of understanding their informants, much less describing what they learned within the limits of a language ill-suited for the circumstances.57

But even if the chronicles were perfect translations of the pre-Hispanic histories passed from generation to generation, additional issues complicate the use of the chronicles as historical documents. One factor relates to the empirical veracity of the tales on which the chronicles were based. The lack of a fully articulated system of writing in the pre-Hispanic Andes meant that orally transmitted histories served as the chroniclers’ primary sources. The recitation of events of the past is a product of both the historical moment being portrayed and the historical moment at which it is constructed. Oral histories, therefore, are more prone to modification over time than written texts due to the tendency to reinterpret them at each telling.58 The chronicles also draw on other types of sources less susceptible to intergenerational slippage: the painted panel, which depicted scenes of events and particular achievements; songs and poems, which were composed and recited by court lyricists to commemorate events; and the quipu, the knotted-cords prominent


in the Andes. These types of sources were nevertheless subject to a variety of interpretations. Scholars know little about how the intended audience might have read any of these artifacts.\footnote{No examples of the panels have survived. Artists may have incorporated some of their motifs into pictorial histories developed for King Philip II. See Catherine J. Julien, “History and Art in Translation: The Paños and Other Objects Collected by Francisco de Toledo,” Colonial Latin American Review 8, no. 1 (1999): 61-89, esp. 80-81. The duties of the amautas and harauicus, who narrated Inca deeds in a ritualized fashion, come primarily from the chronicles themselves. These means of transmission are oral, of course, but the lyrical arrangement of the “texts” would tend to make the histories relatively less-mutable over time. See Niles, The Shape of Inca History, 7-13. The scholarly corpus on the quipu is vast and varied. For a scholarly work relating to the use of the quipu to recover pre-colonial history, see Gary Urton, “De nudos a narraciones: reconstrucción del arte de llevar registros historicos en los Andes a partir de transcripciones en español de los khipus incaicos,” in Bouysse-Cassagne, Saberes y memorias en los Andes, 303-23.}

The empirical accuracy of any of these histories may, in any case, have been less relevant than other aspects of the telling. One prominent scholarly interpretation holds that the histories that informed the chronicles contain, above all, myths encoded with particular knowledge that served to justify the sociopolitical system that the Incas put into place or other aspects of Andean culture. At other times, members of certain Inca factions intentionally altered the particulars of a historical tradition for the benefit of that faction—a means of creating a non-empirical but nonetheless heightened contextual truth.\footnote{Franklin Pease and R. Tom Zuidema are the most notable scholars who have proposed a less literal interpretation of the chronicles on these grounds. See R. Tom Zuidema, The Ceque System of Cuzco: the Social Organization of the Capital of the Inca, trans. Eva M. Hooykaas (Leiden, Netherlands: E.J. Brill, 1962), esp. 12-17; and Franklin Pease G.Y., Las crónicas y los Andes (Lima: Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, Instituto Riva-Agüero, 1995), esp. 71-78. Rostworowski de Diez Canseco advocates for a more literal, though still careful, reading of Inca chronicles and attributes many inconsistencies and impossibilities in them to this phenomenon. See Rostworowski de Diez Canseco, History of the Inca Realm, viii-ix, 33-34.}

Their contradictions, confusions, and mythical qualities, however, should not lead scholars to dismiss the chronicles. Instead, one must understand them in terms of the milieu of both source and author, where possible. It is also necessary to reference them against other sources. Colonial testimonies taken from non-Cuzco populations that look back to the Inca period can add reference points to our understanding. And finally, archaeological data can help clarify confusions and contradictions. This multidisciplinary approach is the only way, as Craig
Morris has put it, “[to] diminish the enigma that has so long enveloped the Inkas.” So while no one chronicle account of the Inca conquest and governance of Charcas offers the whole story, by piecing them together with other evidence, a fairly full picture appears.

Garcilaso de la Vega’s unique status as an early mestizo cultural intermediary frees his history from some of the problematic issues that affect his contemporary’s chronicles, but his work is subject to many of the same pitfalls. According to his account, the extension of Inca rule into Charcas dates to Capac Yupanqui (r. ca. 1320-ca.1350), whom he credits with the resolution of a long-standing war between two kings or chiefs in the region who solicited his mediation. The Inca reportedly appealed to the warring factions on the logic of natural law and the duties of political leadership, at which time the leaders “determined to submit themselves to the Inca and become his vassals” in recognition of his justice and fairness. The Inca thus incorporated virtually all of the Qaraqara territories. After a time in Cuzco, Capac Yupanqui returned to these new territories and from there approached Chanyanta, a Charka highland population. The inhabitants debated whether to receive the Inca as their lord or stand against him in defense of their freedom. In the end they struck a compromise and negotiated a qualified surrender that recognized their right to reject the Inca’s instruction if they found him unjust. This suited the Inca because he wished “to keep to the example of his ancestors, which was to win vassals by love and not by force.” Garcilaso explains that the good government they experienced gave them cause only to celebrate their fortune of coming under Inca rule. They did so by promising to

---


“renounce all the idols, rites, and customs they had” in favor of worshipping the Inca and “his father the Sun.”

These passages are emblematic of a number of themes in Garcilaso’s *Royal Commentaries* that affect the author’s credibility. Garcilaso was the son of a Spanish captain and an Andean woman of noble birth. He sought to depict indigenous peoples, and particularly the Incas, in a positive light. Like Capac Yupanqui in the passages above, the Inca characters who appear in Garcilaso’s histories consistently act according to the dictates of Renaissance humanism, the European cultural paragon at the time. Garcilaso’s work also emphasizes the long period of the Incas’ imperial reign and their civilizing influence on the peoples they ruled.

Garcilaso’s description of the continued conquest of Charcas under the next Inca, Inca Roca (r. ca. 1350-ca. 1380), resumes the trend of non-violent expansion undertaken by his ancestors. Inca Roca brought into his realms the provinces of “Chuncuri, Pucuna [Pocona], and Muyumuyu, which were nearest his kingdoms,” and “Misqui, Sacaca, Machaca, Caracara [Qaraqara], and others as far as Chuquisaca.” What is unique about these additions to Tawantinsuyu, though Garcilaso does not explicitly mention it, is that many refer to areas associated most with bow-and-arrow peoples, namely the Chui and Yampara.

---

63 Ibid., vol. 1, 151-54.


65 Garcilaso de la Vega, *Comentarios reales de los Incas*, vol. 1, 200-03.

66 It is possible that these associations date to the end of the Inca era and may reflect state-induced population movements undertaken in later generations, and therefore the conquests that Garcilaso credits to Inca Roca were confined only to highland-oriented populations and their lowland *maluri* offshoots, not bow-and-arrow peoples. The meaning of a particular phrase is important to this question. According to an English translation of the *Royal Commentaries*, Garcilaso describes the people referred to above as “of the Charca race, though they are of different tribes and tongues.” See El Inca Garcilaso de la Vega, *Royal Commentaries of the Incas*, trans. H.V. Livermore (Austin: Univ. of Texas Press, 1989 [1609]), 225. The use of the word “race” seems to support the interpretation that all were Aymara populations. But when Garcilaso was writing, “Charca” could have referred to aggregations of people at any of several levels (the Aymara kingdom, the region, the confederation, etc.), only some of which excluded peoples of the bow and arrow. Furthermore, the Spanish word that Garcilaso’s translator depicts as “race”
that the task of overseeing the more forceful incorporation of the last of the peoples of Charcas fell to Inca Viracocha (r. ca. 1410-1438). He had to conquer the Karanqa, Killaka, Chicha, and Yambara when they failed to recognize the benefits of Inca civilization. He did so “with more ease and with less danger and deaths than he had initially feared” over a period of three years.67

Garcilaso’s account diverges wildly in its timetable for the expansion of Tawantinsuyu and the conquest of Charcas from chronicles written by his approximate contemporaries and, by extension, the accepted chronology of Inca expansion developed initially by Rowe in the 1940s.68 The other chronicles’ general agreement on their timetables has led Rowe to “reject [Garcilaso’s chronology] unconditionally.” Rowe instead credits the expansion of the Inca state beyond the immediate surroundings of Cuzco to Pachacuti and his successors beginning in 1438. He finds that they carried out the expansion almost entirely between 1463 and 1493. In other words, by the time that Garcilaso claims that all of Charcas was conquered, Rowe concludes that

in English is apellido. A better translation for apellido in this case is “muster,” based on the English equivalent of the archaic meaning of apellido, referencing a military force brought in defense of something. For this definition, see James F. Powers, “Life on the Cutting Edge: The Besieged Town on the Luso-Hispanic Frontier in the Twelfth Century,” in The Medieval City under Siege, ed. Ivy A. Corfis and Michael Wolfe (Woodbridge, Suffolk, UK: Boydell Press, 1995), 26-28. From the perspective of Garcilaso and his Cuzco-centric informants, members of the Chui, Chicha, Qaraqara, and Charka nations, if not all the peoples of Charcas, would have borne a military connotation of due to their eventual status as soldiers for the Inca state. This interpretation also better fits the second element of the statement, the reference to “different tribes and tongues.” The term “tribes,” naciones in the original, is subjective and may refer to a number of different socio-political or ethnic categories, but “tongues” suggests the inclusion of non-Aymara, non-marcanie populations.


68 By extending the period of Inca rule in the provinces of the empire Garcilaso may have hoped to provide a legal basis by which to restore the Inca dynasty. The justification for its dissolution rested in part on the fact that the Incas had only recently come to rule so vast an empire. Garcilaso’s history was, in a sense, a rebuttal of the account written by Sarmiento for the opposite purpose. See D.A. Brading, “The Incas and the Renaissance: The Royal Commentaries of Inca Garcilaso de la Vega,” Journal of Latin American Studies 18, no. 1 (1986): 1-3, 14-15, 20. Garcilaso might also have been criticizing the Spanish conquest by emphasizing the Incas’ subjugation of subject peoples by persuasion rather than by force. See Sara Castro-Klarén, “Writing Sub-Alterity: Guaman Poma and Garcilaso, Inca,” in Borders and Margins: Post-Colonialism and Post-Modernism, ed. Fernando de Toro and Alfonso de Toro (Frankfurt, Germany: Vervuert Verlag, 1995), 53-55.
the Inca state was in its imperial infancy. The chronicles on which Rowe’s thesis primarily relies are less detailed than Garcilaso in their descriptions of the conquest of Charcas. Pedro de Cieza de León, for instance, explains only that while passing through Collasuyu, Tupac Yupanqui “sent messengers to all the nations of the Charcas … Of them, some came to serve him and others to make war against him.”

Recall from above that Cobo’s *History of the Inca Empire* provides probably the best known account of the supposed conquest of Charcas by the Incas. Cobo’s account is a seventeenth-century product of earlier manuscripts and thus a level removed from the informants, but his chief source is most likely the account of Polo de Ondegardo, whose original has not survived. Cobo’s manuscript describes the siege of over 20,000 people at the mountaintop fortress of Oroncota. The besieged apparently consisted of a variety of Aymara and non-Aymara peoples from Charcas. The confrontation appears in the chronicle immediately after Tupac Yupanqui’s brutal campaign against the northern Aymara kingdoms, which rebelled upon receiving word of the death of Pachacuti. There, Tupac Yupanqui “played havoc with those towns, punishing those who were guilty of starting the rebellion with unusual rigor.” In Charcas, however, Tupac Yupanqui reportedly beguiled the guards with women and drink before storming the fortress and imprisoning his rivals.

---

69 Rowe, “Absolute Chronology in the Andean Area,” 265-84; Rowe, “[Analytical Article] La probanza de los incas nietos de conquistadores,” 193. The chronicles that he privileges as most independent and trustworthy are Cabello Balboa, Cieza de León, Betanzos, Sarmiento, and Cobo. Cabello Balboa is important in that he provides the dates for Inca successions after 1438, but he is silent on the conquest of Charcas.


Because this incident of the siege in Oroncota is one of the few pieces of evidence that suggests a functional inter-ethnic defensive Charcas confederation prior to the influence of the Inca state, it bears more scrutiny. Two other Spanish-penned chronicles have apparent references to the same siege. One is Juan de Betanzos’ *Narrative of the Incas*, though Betanzos’ account varies in the details (Figure 3-3, which aims to organize and compare the various sources discussed herein). He dates the siege to the reign of Pachacuti, who had already died in Cobo’s version. In Betanzos’ account, Pachacuti’s sons Amaru Túpac and Paucar Usnu set off for Collasuyu under orders from their father to “go and discover and conquer as seems fit.” They proceeded “until arriving at the province of the Chichas[;] when they arrived, the lords of the Chichas had made a type of fort. And in that fort all of them were waiting for the Inca’s sons.” The Inca’s sons came upon a deep ditch that the Chicha had dug around their position. The ditch was full of firewood. Once Inca forces set their siege, the Chicha set the ditch ablaze. Paucar Usnu, erroneously thinking that he could jump over the ditch, fell into the flames, and, “his people unable to rescue him, he burned in the fire.” In the end, Amaru Túpac patiently waited out the Chicha, and due to their “lack of management, they gave themselves up.”72

Another description of a siege in Charcas is Sarmiento de Gamboa’s. His account is briefer and more conventional. Like Betanzos’, it also dates to the reign of Pachacuti and involves his two sons: “As [Amaru Túpac and Paucar Usnu] approached the Charcas, the natives of the province of Paria, Tapacari, Cotabambas [Cochabamba], Poconas, and Charcas retreated to the Chichas and Chuyes … so all could fight against the Incas together.” The chronicle describes their position as “a strong place” but elaborates no further about it. Faced with a strong,

---

united opponent fighting from a positional advantage, the Incas divided their forces into three. Each attacked from a different angle. Together they scored a victory. Both Amaru Túpac and Paucar Usnu survived. 73

The prevailing belief among the few who have examined these three accounts in detail is that they refer to a single event, and the inconsistences they demonstrate are products of the less-than-empirical Andean construction of memory. The most prevalent explanation for the discrepancy over who was Inca at the time has been the sourcing of the chronicles. Betanzos and Sarmiento both relied primarily on the accounts of the royal line associated with Pachacuti in investigating the history of his conquests, and might, as a result, have assigned the accomplishments of others to him. 74 The fact that the two successive Incas shared power during a period akin to a coregency during the final 15 or 16 years of Pachacuti’s life further complicates attributing events to one reign or another. 75 Another inconsistency between the three siege narratives entails the descriptions of the participants. Betanzos lists only the Chicha as the Incas’ opponents while Sarmiento and Cobo describe large multi-ethnic forces assembled from throughout Charcas. Finally, the three accounts of the battle itself differ from each other, as described above, with Betanzos’ and Cobo’s accounts both appearing fantastical alongside Sarmiento’s. One possibility is that the first two accounts are embellished and mystified versions of the last one.

73 Sarmiento de Gamboa, Historia de los Incas, 114-15.

74 Querejazu Lewis, Bolivia prehispanica, 300-15; Pärssinen and Siiriäinen, Andes orientales y Amazonía occidental, 193-96; Platt, Bouyssse-Cassagne, and Harris, “‘Charka rojo, Charka blanco,’” 80; Barragán Romano, “¿Indios de arco y flecha?”, 115; Pärssinen, Tawantinsuyu, 120-21.

75 María Rostworowski, Pachacutec (Lima: IEP Ediciones, 2001 [1953]), esp. 124, 256-74. The map on page 167 reflects this period in that it attributes the conquests southeast of Lake Titicaca to “Pachacutec and Túpac Yupanqui” rather than trying to parse out the territorial gains.
A more fitting interpretation is that Betanzos and Cobo (via Polo de Ondegardo) wrote of two separate events: the first involved the siege of a Chicha position that occurred during the reign of Pachacuti; the second was the siege at Oroncota during the reign of Tupac Yupanqui. Sarmiento’s account, then, conflates elements of both accounts into a single event. It is reasonable that he heard about both events from the same oral sources that Betanzos and Polo de Ondegardo did. Or even more plausibly, he may have read Betanzos’ and Polo de Ondegardo’s chronicles while writing his own. Sarmiento’s incorporation of elements of both events (Pachacuti’s sons from Betanzos, the interethnic resistance from Polo) has caused his account to serve as a bridge between them. As a result, scholars conflate them erroneously.

The clearest evidence in favor of this view comes from comparing a later section of Betanzos’ account with a lesser-known description of Tupac Yupanqui’s accomplishments, as related by his descendants with the aid of quipus before a Spanish notary in 1569. It is known as the Incas nietos (grandsons of the Incas) account. Both Betanzos and the Incas nietos describe Tupac Yupanqui marching into Charcas with his armies after having subdued the rebellion of the northern Aymara kingdoms. It is clear that this incident occurred during Tupac Yupanqui’s own reign and thus after 1471 because these rebellions were sparked by news of Pachacuti’s death. Both accounts describe the Inca’s reluctance to commit himself to conquests in Chile and his

---

76 Recall that Cobo’s version, though written well after Sarmiento’s, was likely a facsimile of Polo de Ondegardo’s lost work, which is tentatively dated to 1559-60. See Julien, Reading Inca History, 55; and Julien, “Oroncota entre dos mundos,” 97 n. 1. Sarmiento also seems to have incorporated certain elements from the Incas nietos account, which I examine below.

77 For the context of this account, see Rowe, “[Analytical Article] La probanza de los incas nietos de conquistadores,” 193-201.

78 Tupac Yupanqui’s ruthless campaign against the Qulla, Lupaqa, and Pakasa after Pachacuti’s death is prominent in all the chronicles that cover this era of transition between Pachacuti and Tupac Yupanqui. Among them, Betanzos, Sarmiento, Cieza de León, Murúa, Cobo, and the Incas nietos all relate this event. See Pärssinen, Tawantinsuyu, 121; Martín de Murúa, Historia general del Perú, ed. Manuel Ballesteros (Madrid: Historia 16, 1987 [ca. 1600]), 88-90; Cobo, History of the Inca Empire, 143; and “La probanza de los incas nietos,” 225.
subsequent return through Charcas. At this point, Betanzos mentions that Tupac Yupanqui visited the site of his brother Paucar Usnu’s death among the “Chjchas.” This passage additionally provides a clue regarding the approximate location of the Chicha stronghold where his brother had died. It lay between “Caxa Vindo” and “Llipi.” Casabindo is a municipality in the modern province of Jujuy, Argentina, that lies just to the east of the border with Chile and Bolivia. The Lipi or Lipe people lived southeast of the highland salt flats (Figure 3-1). These clues indicate that Tupac Yupanqui memorialized his brother at a place that likely corresponds today to a location at the border of Argentina and Bolivia. Not only does Oroncota lie well outside this area, the *Incas nietos* account explains that only after Tupac Yupanqui honored his brother did he “[lay] waste to Huruncota,” an almost certain reference to Oroncota.79

A later section of this chapter returns to the Oroncota siege and the context surrounding it. First, it revisits the Aymara local sources, some of which are examined above for their clues into the pre-Inca functioning of the Charcas confederation, this time with an eye toward their depiction of the so-called Inca conquest. Recall that the testimony in these sources typically aims to secure recognition of a status or benefits by the colonial government. As such, the accounts demonstrate a high degree of advocacy as well as many of the other problems associated with the more familiar Inca chronicles.80 They do, however, offer a point of view that is wholly distinct from the almost entirely Cuzco-sourced works discussed above.

These documents show that the Aymara *mallku* had no official relationship with Inca state prior to the reign of Pachacuti (1438-71), at which time they entered into clientelist


agreements under which they pledged obedience to the Inca. In exchange for their fealty, the state granted them prestigious objects and titles (Figure 3-3). The first set of documents revisits the lineage of a colonial Qaraqara leader going back five generations, to the time of Pachacuti. The leader’s ancestors included Ayra Canchi, who was the “chief and absolute lord” of more than 20,000 people, and Localarama, who held a status one level below Ayra Canchi’s. Ayra Canchi sent Localarama as “the first ambassador who gave obedience to the Inca.” From Pachacuti, Localarama received the use of the title capac, which signifies wealth and power. He also provided him with “a map woven from camelid cloth” in exchange for the “news he brought to the Inca from the four provinces” of Tawantinsuyu. Pachacuti also took the step of sending an ambassador to Ayra Canchi, on whom the Inca official bestowed the honorific sobriquet “Anco Tutumpi,” which means “blooming white flower.” Ayra Canchi also benefitted from his association with the Inca in that he received the privilege of “going from town to town in a golden litter.”81 The second set of documents, from the perspective of the colonial Charka people, holds that Copacatiaraca pledged obedience to the Inca. In exchange, he and his successors received “honors and privileges that they managed to maintain for themselves due to their quality, nobility, and gentility.” These honors included traveling in a type of litter affixed with a sunshade made of feathers.82 Third, the colonial Killaka testimony (discussed from a different perspective above) claims that Colque pledged obedience to the Inca and subsequently lent his efforts and those of his people to the conquest of the Chicha and Diaguita. In return,


82 “Probanzas de los Uno Malco de Sacaca, don Juan Ayavire Cuysara y don Fernando Ayavire Cuysara,” in Platt, Bouysse-Cassagne, and Harris, Qaraqara-Charka, 858-1001, esp. 884, 898-99, 928, 932, 938.
Pachacuti granted him the right to ride in a litter and to call himself “Inca” Colque, a mark of extremely high status and close association with the Cuzco elite.\(^{83}\)

These three accounts all aver that leaders of Aymara kingdoms of Charcas pledged allegiance to the Inca empire during the reign of Pachacuti (1438-71), prior to the conquest described by Cobo and which scholars have typically considered to mark the beginning of Inca rule in Charcas. The Killaka testimony may also lend some support to Betanzos’ account of the siege in Chicha territory during the same time period.\(^{84}\) Further testimony of Pachacuti’s military venture into the Chicha and Diaguita territories comes in the form of a separate document recorded based on the readings of the Inca knotted-cord *quipus*, and thus from the Inca perspective as the *quipucamayos* (cord keepers) recreated it in the late sixteenth century. The document states that Pachacuti “conquered up to the end of the Charcas, until the Chichas and Diaguitas.”\(^{85}\)

The gifts pledged by the Inca to the Aymara *mallku* represented a certain level of economic investment by the state. The economic cost was not insignificant, considering the scarcity of gold, high quality cloths, and the like, as well as the costs associated with the labor of producing the gifts. It was, however, relatively fixed, given the small circle of Aymara leaders honored in these ways. The more difficult aspect to quantify in this exchange is the cost of

---

\(^{83}\) “Primera información hecha por Don Juan Colque Guarache,” 237-68, esp. 237, 241-42, 245-46, 249.

\(^{84}\) Ibid., 237, 242, 245. Espinoza Soriano confuses Pachacuti and Tupac Yupanqui in his introductory essay that appears prior to the document. See Espinoza Soriano, “El reino Aymara de Quillaca-Asanaque, siglos xv-xvi,” 197.

\(^{85}\) The word “Charcas” in this reference seems to indicate the region rather than the kingdom (Charka) given the other evidence, which all points to the fact that the Inca state under Pachacuti did not make war on the Aymara kingdoms of Charcas. *Relación de la descendencia, gobierno y conquista de los incas*, ed. Juan José Vega, (Lima: Editorial Juridical, 1974 [mid-to-late 1500s]), 38-39. The document has been traditionally attributed to the pen of Vaca de Castro due to the appearance of his name on a surviving copy. His direct participation in its production is unlikely. Julien theorizes that it represents another part of the lost history of Polo de Ondegardo. See Catherine Julien, “Polo de Ondegardo y el «Discurso sobre la descendencia y gobierno de los ingas»,” *Histórica* (Lima) 33, no. 2 (2009): 7-28.
extending prestige to them. Access to these objects, and especially the titles that the *mallku* came to enjoy, represented an expenditure of ideological power on the part of the Inca state. By this relatively late stage in Inca imperial expansion, the state had amassed a degree of esteem among the peoples of the Andes. The Incas’ capacity in this regard helped induce the Aymara elite to welcome an association with the empire. Extending such access and associations more widely, however, meant they became incrementally less-exclusive—and less valuable in ideological terms—at each instance. Providing rare gifts and prestige thus represented an expenditure of the overall ideological power of the empire.

The “Memorial of Charcas” suggests that, at least during the later Spanish colonial period, the leaders of Charcas valued these expenditures of prestige more highly than the gifts that accompanied them. Alongside the grievances that these seventeenth-century *mallku* articulated regarding tribute demands and other material aspects of the Spanish colonial system, they paid significant heed to the disparities between the markers of their statuses and those of prominent Spaniards. The centrality of symbolic rights—such as “participat[ing] in the bull feasts and jousting alongside the other gentlemen and noblemen”; “wear[ing] silk and gold and silver and Spanish clothing” (not gifts in this case, merely the right to display their own wealth); freedom from remand “to the public criminal or civil jails, but instead to the houses of the city government, as is done to the other gentlemen from Spain, since we are no less”—demonstrates the degree to which the *mallku* come to regard the symbolic elements of their positions. Even those privileges the *mallku* sought that had both practical and symbolic importance—such as the rights to *yanaconas* or to own African slaves; to own mines; to carry swords, muskets, and other Spanish weaponry; or to ride horses and mules affixed with harnesses—were couched in the
presupposition of their status as nobility of a “quality” on par with Spanish nobility and far more refined than the masses.86

The greatest ideological honorific that the representatives of the Qaraqara, Charka, Chicha, and Chui held during the Inca period, however, was their designation as “soldiers since the time of the Incas called Pachacuti, Tupac Yupanqui, Huayna Capac, and Huascar Inca.” This status exempted them from certain duties to the state, but it also meant that “no nation was so esteemed by the lord Incas in all the kingdom of Peru like these four nations.”87 The esteem that representatives of the Inca state showed at least four nations of Charcas was apparently crucial in winning their allegiance and services.

The Imposition of a New Arrangement

If an attitude of friendly patronage and clientage characterized relations between the Aymara kingdoms of Charcas and the Inca empire all the way back to the reign of Pachacuti, why did his son Tupac Yupanqui march into Charcas and lay siege to Oroncota, as Cobo’s account describes? A separate series of sources suggests that friction between the Aymara kingdoms and the Inca state emerged during Tupac Yupanqui’s reign. This friction was a product of a top-down transformation of Charcas. The Inca state was beginning to convert the obedience that its investments had cultivated among the Aymara mallku into substantive political power—power that might help the state implement advantageous structural changes in Charcas.

The Incas nietos’ account best describes Tupac Yupanqui’s involvement in the subjugation of Charcas during this period. In their version, Tupac Yupanqui entered into Charcas and “put both provinces of Charca [the Qaraqara and Charka] in order and passed onward.”

---

86 “El memorial de los Mallku y principales de la provincia de los Charcas,” 833, 835-36, 847-48.
87 Ibid., 841-43.
that point, “he entered the province of the Chicha and Moyomoyo and Yampara and [Di]aguitas” and others. Following a sojourn to the distant south, Tupac Yupanqui and his retinue set up a number of additional frontier fortresses. Then, “they came upon a fortress in the province of the Chui and Chicha called Huruncuta. Laying waste to that province, [Tupac Yupanqui] populated it with orejones,” a class of Inca administrators. This version of the Inca subjugation of Charcas paints a seemingly different picture than the local sources. It attributes their obedience—being “put in order”—to Tupac Yupanqui rather than Pachacuti. It also describes a more coercive relationship punctuated by the Oroncota siege.88 Betanzos’ account helps fill in some of the missing details. It suggests that the Inca forces’ objective for this journey revolved around locating new sources of metals. After returning from the distant south, it explains that Tupac Yupanqui advanced to “a province called Chuquisaca”—the Spanish colonial name for the region within Charcas that included included La Plata, Porco, and Potosí—where “there were bellicose people who called themselves Charcas, and he subdued them briefly.” This correlates with the Incas nietos version, which holds that Tupac Yupanqui “put [the Qaraqara-Charka] in order and passed onward.”89

Considering the substantial evidence indicating that their leaders had already pledged obedience to Pachacuti years earlier, Betanzos’ and the Incas nietos’ references to “subjugat[ing]” or “put[ting] in order” the Qaraqara and Charka may appear to be misattributions to the wrong Inca. But the Tupac Yupanqui was ushering in a new type of relationship with the


89 Betanzos, Suma y narración de los Incas, 163-64; “La probanza de los incas nietos,” 225-26. The orders of events in the two accounts are slightly different. The Incas nietos put the subjugation of the Qaraqara and Charka before the journey through the southern borderlands. Betanzos reverses them. An explanation for possible confusion on the part of the Incas nietos involves the difficulty in accurately reproducing quipu accounts that travel across both time and space. See Rowe, “[Analytical Article] La probanza de los incas nietos de conquistadores,” 197-98.
leaders of Charcas. Obedience to the new Inca would require the Aymara elite to surrender a much greater degree of their autonomy. The chronicles do not explain in any detail how this confrontation proceeded—including whether a physical battle took place or not—but Betanzos does offer a hint about how their relationship would change:

As [Tupac Yupanqui] had them under his control and was advised by his retinue that the [Qaraqara/Charka] were lords who possessed a great deal of silver, he asked them where they got it. They told him they took it from a mountain called Porco. He wished to see it and thus ordered that his people walk there. When they arrived where the mines were, he gave the order that he receive in tribute all that [the mines] give. Gathering all the silver they could, he left the province of Charcas.90

From the perspective of the Inca state, the succession of a new Inca offered the opportunity to renegotiate the terms of obedience. The stipulations that Tupac Yupanqui imposed upon the Qaraqara and Charka were much more onerous than those they enjoyed under his father. The Aymara mallku had been esteemed clients, but they became tributaries when Tupac Yupanqui came to rule alone. Instead of abstract obedience, they now had to surrender a place of great economic and sacred significance, the Porco mine.

Additional evidence also bears this out. Martín de Murúa, a Spanish friar and chronicler writing around 1600, wrote that the Inca “gave the order to discover mines” following the “war of blood and fire” against the northern Aymara kingdoms in revolt. Immediately afterward, “those [mines] of Porco appeared and were discovered.”91 Even though the Aymaras took silver ore and lead from Porco well before the rebellion of the northern Aymaras, the mines “appeared,” from the perspective of Murúa’s informants, only when the empire came to control them.

90 Betanzos, Suma y narración de los Incas, 164-65.
91 Murúa, Historia general del Perú, 89-90.
Colonial testimony from the Charka and Qaraqara perspectives also indicates that a change occurred between those peoples and the Inca state when Tupac Yupanqui came to power. In a section of the Charka local history, Joan Ayavire Cuysara sought to convey the overall harmony that had existed between the Incas and his people. It is clear from elsewhere in his testimony that his ancestors had an amicable relationship with Pachacuti. Yet he only described an unbroken spirit of good will going back to a point “after Tupac Yupanqui came to subdue this province.”92 That he did not extend it the extra generation to Pachacuti suggests that there was a rupture in that good will. The Qaraqara local history hints at a similar rupture, but in a different way. The most telling element of the testimony in regards to this issue is the absence of any mention of Tupac Yupanqui whatsoever. Ayra de Ariutu described his ancestors who lived during Tupac Yupanqui’s reign as contemporaries and clients of Huayna Capac instead. References to the Inca succession—e.g., “they have been esteemed … [as] leaders of the nation of the Qaraqaras … since the time of the Incas Pachacuti and Guayna Capac”93—also exclude Tupac Yupanqui without explanation. This seems to be an example of the Andean penchant for adaptive historical memory. His exclusion from their history is suggestive of a Qaraqara reaction to a perceived affront.94

---

92 “Probanzas de los Uno Malco de Sacaca,” 862.

93 “La probanza de don Fernando Ayra de Ariutu,” 722-23. Pachacuti is referred to in this document by variations of his presuccession name, Yupanqui. It is not a reference to Tupac Yupanqui, the references to whom always include Tupac or, more commonly, Topa.

94 Platt, Bouysse-Cassagne, and Harris, call this phenomenon “telescoping” (the term appears in English), but they view the exclusion of Tupac Yupanqui a bit differently than I do. They consider it to be a product of the colonial context—an attempt to demonstrate an unbroken track record of cooperation with authorities such as the king, to whom they are appealing for favor. See Platt, Bouysse-Cassagne, and Harris, “‘Charka rojo, Charka blanco,’” 75. While loyalty is an important part of the image the Qaraqara are attempting to display and a valid reason for their avoidance of the whole truth, it does not fully explain the conspicuous absence of his entire existence. This instance bears too much resemblance to other examples in the Andes in which individuals are stricken from memory entirely due to their perceived misdeeds. See Rostworowski de Diez Canseco, History of the Inca Realm, 33-34.
The Oroncota Siege in Focus

If the imposition of a more hierarchical and exploitative affiliation with the empire was enough to cause a rupture of good will between the Incas and the chief Aymara peoples of Charcas, was it enough to incite a rebellion? In other words, is it reasonable that they went atop Oroncota in flight from Tupac Yupanqui’s forces as Cobo’s account indicates? As is clear from the *Incas nietos* version of events, the Inca siege of Oroncota occurred after Tupac Yupanqui’s sojourn through Qaraqara-Charka territories. The Inca claimed the mines of Porco for himself at this point in time, according to Murúa and Betanzos. But these accounts do not suggest that the resentment of the Qaraqara-Charka actually reached the level of rebellion, and they are entirely silent about the Oroncota siege.\(^{95}\) Recall that Cobo’s chronicle indicates that the defenders of Oroncota consisted of a multiethnic force composed of peoples from throughout Charcas. The specific provinces mentioned indicate participation by both highland Aymaras and lowland bow-and-arrow peoples, and scholars have accepted it without a lot of skepticism.\(^{96}\) But is Cobo’s account reasonable? Who were the besieged atop Oroncota? Did the Aymara peoples participate in the resistance? Furthermore, could 20,000 people gathered in a fortress—even if they had

---

95 Julien, “Oroncota entre dos mundos,” 98 n. 2; Pärssinen and Siiriäinen, *Andes orientales y Amazonía occidental*, 196. Both point to Betanzos’ mention of a confrontation between Tupac Yupanqui’s forces and the northern Aymara Colla at the fortress “Suruco” or “Urocota” in Betanzos, *Suma y narración de los Incas*, 157-58, as another reference to Oroncota (though Julien does not make this connection in a later work, *Reading Inca History*, 143, 154, 159). John Hemming claims that “Urocoto” represents a lost fortress built by Tupac Yupanqui located in “the forests of the Chuis, east of Lake Titicaca.” See John Hemming, *The Conquest of the Incas* (New York: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1973), 231. Hemming apparently derives this odd description of where the Chui lived on the basis of a passage in Murúa that describes an attempt by Manco Inca to take refuge in the fort while fighting the Spanish. Murúa places “Uro Coto” in “the province of the Chuis.” See Murúa, *Historia general del Perú*, 245. I disagree with Hemming. Murúa seems to have conflated two fortresses with similar names. The fortress in which Manco Inca likely hoped to take refuge is the one to which Betanzos refers on 157-58. It was the site of a battle that took place in “the Province of Chuquipa” as a last gasp of the northern Aymara rebellion prior to the Inca sortie into Charcas. Pärssinen and Siiriäinen claim that Chuquipa refers the colonial era province encompassing La Plata. They have certainly confused Chuquipa with Chuquisaca (or miswritten “La Plata, Sucre” when they meant La Paz). Chuquipa was the pre-Hispanic name for La Paz.

96 Pärssinen and Siiriäinen, *Andes orientales y Amazonía occidental*, 195; Platt, Bouysse-Cassagne, and Harris, “‘Charka rojo, Charka blanco,’” 80.
access to “much farmland, water, and a wood”—really have “the intention of spending their lives there and never coming down from those cliffs”? Archaeological investigations regarding the site offer some telling insights. The pucara, or fortress, is not a walled structure as the English term indicates. It consists rather of a mostly flat section measuring approximately 8 km by 4 km atop a mountain that rises abruptly above the confluences of the Pilcomayo and several of its tributaries (Figure 3-5). Streams containing fish run across the mountain. The rivers below lie at approximately 2,020 m above sea level whereas most of the fortress area falls between 2,800-2,900 m, and certain peaks rise to near 3,300 m. These peaks offer unobstructed views of the surrounding countryside in all directions. 97

Ceramic evidence of the occupation of the surrounding valley by the Yampara dates back to 400 CE. The primarily Yampara character of the occupation up to the time of the siege is further evidenced by testimony from Yampara mitima populations originally from Oroncota but settled elsewhere in Charcas. 98 The presence of remnants of an additional ceramic style of unknown provenance dating to the late 1400s, however, indicates the presence of at least one cultural group other than Yampara. 99 Given the fluidity of territorial and ethnic distinctions in

---


98 Alconini, “The Southeastern Inka Frontier against the Chiriguanos,” 396-403; Julien, “Oroncota entre dos mundos,” 106-08; Del Río and Ana María Presta, “Un estudio etnohistórico en los corregimientos de Tomina Yampaaraes: Casos de multietnicidad,” in Presta, Espacio, Étnicas, Frontera, 189-218, esp. 198-200. Pärssinen and Siiriäinen interpret references placing Oroncota in the “province of the Chicha and Chui” from the Incas nietos and Sarmiento’s chronic as telling evidence that these two peoples jointly occupied the valley and the plateau prior to the arrival of the Incas. See Pärssinen and Siiriäinen, Andes orientales y Amazonía occidental, 192-96. But it is equally possible that the Incas nietos reference—“and later they found a fortress in the province of the Chui and Chicha called Huruncuta”—is rather an indication of where the pucara stood at the time when the testimony occurred rather than an indication of who lived there when Tupac Yupanqui’s forces besieged it. In other words, the reference to the Chicha and Chui may reflect population movements undertaken by the Inca and Spanish colonial states in later periods. See “La probanza de los incas nietos de conquistadores,” 226.

99 Pärssinen and Siiriäinen, Andes orientales y Amazonía occidental, 203-04; Sonia Alconini, “The Southeastern Inka Frontier against the Chiriguanos,” 418 n. 2.
both documentary and archaeological evidence, it is entirely possible that peoples belonging to multiple ethnicities cohabited in the valleys or occupied them in successive periods.

In this light, most of Cobo’s description is plausible, if exaggerated. The size of the site indicates that a great number of people, though based on Alconini’s application of models relating to pre-Hispanic agricultural yields, far fewer than 20,000, might have sought refuge atop Oroncota with the intent of remaining for a long period of time.100

Excavations at Oroncota have uncovered a small number of examples of Inca style ceramics. Carbon methods date these potsherds to “close to the year 1450—or a little earlier.” This leads Pärssinen & Siiriäinen and Pärssinen & Korpisaari to conclude that the Inca occupation of the site began at this time and that the siege took place in the first half of the fifteenth century.101 This date conflicts with the documentary evidence that the siege occurred during the reign of Tupac Yupanqui and thus after 1471. But Pärssinen & Siiriäinen’s own reasoning undermines their interpretation of the Inca ceramic evidence suggesting the early date. A different article of theirs argues:

Only rarely can a one-to-one relationship between the archaeological and historical evidence be demonstrated. Historically recorded social, political, religious, or economic change does not immediately affect all material culture; or vice versa …. In other words, it is not self-evident that the spread of a certain ceramic style would accompany significant political changes or, in our case, that the appearance of so-called Inka ceramics would necessarily indicate contemporary conquest by an imperial state.


101 Pärssinen and Siiriäinen, *Andes orientales y Amazonía occidental*, 174-92; Pärssinen and Korpisaari, *Western Amazonia = Amazônia ocidental*, 44. For the distribution of Inca-style ceramics, see Alconini, “The Southeastern Inka Frontier against the Chiriguanos,” 405-08.
Based on this reasoning, Pärssinen & Siiriäinen reconcile radiocarbon data that assigned an Inca material presence at a site near Lake Titicaca to an era when all historical evidence concurs that “redistribution and exchange [in the area] were [not yet] controlled by an Inka authority.” They determine that the artifacts arrived instead due to exchange relationships that existed prior to the period of imperial dominance.  

The Inca artifacts at Oroncota should be viewed in the same light. Especially considering the scarcity of Inca ceramic evidence here, it is all the more likely that the arrival of these Inca artifacts preceded the onset of Inca political dominance in this region. The presence of these Inca artifacts seems to hint, rather, at otherwise-undocumented attempts by Inca representatives to establish a relationship with the residents of the site around 1450. Scholarship on the Yampara concludes that this group had begun to develop a nascent political elite class by this time. It would follow that Inca representatives attempted to coopt this group in much the same way that they did with the highland Aymara elite. The Incas were making these contacts with Qaraqara-Charka and Killaka leaders at essentially the same time that Pärssinen and his colleagues suggests the ceramics arrived at Oroncota (around 1450). The fact that Tupac Yupanqui eventually chose to subdue the peoples near Oroncota by force of arms suggests either that these attempts to court their obedience were unsuccessful, or they resisted the imposition of the new terms of obedience that he wished to impose. In either case, the ceramic evidence is not necessarily indicative that the siege occurred prior to 1471. More likely, it took place after 1471, as the overwhelming majority of documentary evidence suggests, during Tupac Yupanqui’s imposition of a new arrangement with the peoples of Charcas.

Given all of this evidence, it is ultimately improbable that the Aymara kingdoms participated in the Oroncota resistance in any significant numbers. Though they seem to have had motive to resent Tupac Yupanqui, there is no evidence corroborating Cobo’s account that would suggest they rebelled as a group or took to the plateau in defiance of the Inca. In much the same way that Cobo’s account exaggerates the number of combatants atop the plateau, it is more likely that the oral histories that informed his version of events aimed to convey the general state of hostility between the Incas and the people of Charcas at the time. If their relationship with the Inca empire was characterized by “multiple oscillations between alliance and divorce, submission and war or rebellion,” as Renard-Casevitz, Saignes, and Taylor describe relations between the Inca state and many of its subject peoples, it seems most likely that this oscillation stopped short of the latter extreme for the Aymaras of Charcas. More likely, the resistance consisted of Yampara and other bow-and-arrow peoples living closer to the plateau. Their more active opposition to the terms imposed by Tupac Yupanqui further demonstrates the assertion that the strategies of governance typically employed by the Inca empire were less effective at the frontiers, among peoples whose cultures differed more significantly from their own.

**Conclusion: Applying the Models**

Before moving to the analysis of Inca rule in Charcas after the annexation of the province, reconsider the models for Inca expansion and apply them to Charcas. First, consider Salomon’s model. It holds that the first phase of expansion involved gaining control of complementary ecological zones according to the ideals of Andean verticality strategy. Imperial officials achieved a great deal toward this end in Charcas through relatively simple and inexpensive means. They cultivated relationships with Charka, Qaraqara, and Killaka leaders

---

103 Renard-Casevitz, Saignes, and Taylor, *Al este de los Andes*, vol. 1, 64.
through a program of gift exchanges and honorifics. The joint Qaraqara-Charka kingdom(s) already controlled populations residing in multiple resource zones because their peoples applied Andean verticality strategies. The presence of the bow-and-arrow peoples, however, prevented them from making full use of the lowland complementary zones that they had begun to occupy. The bow-and-arrow peoples, meanwhile, did not respond as reliably to the Inca strategies of peaceful incorporation developed for highland cultures. In Salomon’s terms, their presence left the economic circuit partially open. In order to close it fully, Pachacuti’s armies brought certain lowland peoples beyond Charcas—the Chicha and Diaguita, among them—under Inca control, in at least one case employing Killaka assistance.

Pachacuti’s death and the subsequent rebellion of the northern Aymara provinces derailed Inca aims in Charcas for a time, but Tupac Yupanqui returned to Charcas after brutally resubjugating the peoples of the Lake Titicaca region. Shortly thereafter, he journeyed through Charcas and reestablished relationships with the highland peoples, though his actions represented a shift to phase two of Salomon’s model. This is the phase in which the empire began to exert more direct control over its client populations—the beginning of their transformation into imperial provinces. Tupac Yupanqui sought to take greater direct advantage of their resources, particularly the silver they possessed in great quantities. He continued his military campaigns along the frontier (an extension of phase one), including another visit to Chicha territories beyond Charcas. In Yampara territory, he and his forces overcame resistance at Oroncota and left the territory under a degree of Inca control. This victory brought about the completion of stage one in Charcas. The empire had come to exert control over the resources of the Aymara highlands as well as a number of temperate zones in the eastern valleys. A period of infrastructural development, intensive resource extraction, and political reorganization followed.
Now consider Garcilaso de la Vega’s account of the Inca incorporation of Charcas with an eye toward the larger narrative strokes and metaphorical elements it contains. As discussed above, his strict timeline of events is of little practical use since it is clear that he had motive for distorting the record. But in the context of the other sources analyzed, Garcilaso’s version offers certain insights. It delineates three clear phases of expansion into Charcas during the reigns of three successive Incas. In the first phase, Inca representatives approached the most powerful highland Aymara chieftaincy in Charcas—the Qaraqara-Charka kingdom—and won its obedience. In the second, the empire came to encompass even some of the bow-and-arrow peoples in the frontier lands of Charcas. Finally, the Inca set his sights on the remaining peoples of Charcas, including the Killaka and Chichas, and subdued them at least partially through military means.

Rather than understanding these phases as victories during distinct reigns dating to the distant past, imagine them as stages during the reign of Pachacuti. The first stage is well attested in the testimonies of the colonial Qaraqara and Charka. The ties that these new clients had already developed with certain factions of the bow-and-arrow peoples, as evidenced by those same testimonies, helped facilitate the incorporation of these lowland peoples into the Inca orbit as well in the second stage. The third stage includes the conquest through clientelism of the Killaka and the military subjugation of a certain faction of Chicha and Diaguita, both evident in the Killaka testimony about the mallku Colque, the latter also in the quipucamayos’ version.

Characteristically, Garcilaso is less inclined to dwell on the more exploitative aspects of Inca expansion into the region. He does not describe the shift that seems to have taken place when Tupac Yupanqui came to reign as Inca—a shift best described as one that leveraged the state’s economic and ideological investments in the highland mallku of Charcas into more direct,
territorial forms of political, economic, and ideological power. By the time he seized the mines at Porco, members of the Aymara elite had likely come to rely on their ideological associations with the Inca empire in order to maintain their own positions. At the same time, they were also less inclined to rebel because Inca officials had managed to cultivate a psychology of submission through hegemonic military strategies. Tupac Yupanqui’s brutal destruction of the northern Aymara kingdoms, his victories over the frontier populations of Charcas, and the multiple armies that he marched through the region all boosted the perceived military capabilities of the empire. He and his successor would continue to use a variety of political, economic, military, and ideological strategies in the ongoing transformation of Charcas, the subject of the following chapter.
Figure 3-1. Approximate map of Charcas. Primary ethnic and sub-ethnic core territories shown. From Platt, Bouysse-Cassagne, and Harris, Qaraqara-Charka, 45.
Figure 3-2. Major features of Inca-controlled Charcas. From Platt, Bouysse-Cassagne, and Harris, *Qaraqara-Charca*, 82.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INCA REIGN</th>
<th>SOURCE</th>
<th>Pachacuti (sole ruler 1438-ca. 1456; “Coregency” ca. 1456-71)</th>
<th>Tupac Yupanqui (1471-93)</th>
<th>Huayna Capac (1493-1527)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bernabé Cobo (1653) [following Polo de Ondegardo (ca. 1560)]</td>
<td>Siege of the Chicha by Ica’s sons at a fort. Pucar Ussau dies leaping ditch of fire.</td>
<td>Inca forces besiege a multi-ethnic resistance at Oroncota.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Juan de Betanzos (1551)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Inca visits the site of his brother’s death among the Chicha, then proceeds to Chiquisaca and subdues the Charcas. Claims Porco mines.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pedro Sarmiento de Gamboa (1572)</td>
<td>Siege of Chicha and Chia by Inca’s sons at a “strong place.”</td>
<td>Porco mines “discovered” by Inca representatives.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martín de Murúa (1580s-1616)</td>
<td>Quisquecanes in “Relación de la descendencia…” (mid-to-late 1500s)</td>
<td>Inca “conquered up to the end of Charcas, until the Chichas and Diaguitas.”</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incas nietos, descendants of Tupac Yupanqui (1569)</td>
<td>Inca puts Qaraqara and Charka in order, travels to the Chicha, Yampa, Diaguita, etc. “Lay[s] waste to” Oroncota in the province of the Chui and Chicha and stations funcionaries in it.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qaraqara mallku Fernando Ayra de Ariuta (1638)</td>
<td>Qaraqara leaders give obedience to the Inca, receive gifts, titles, and honorifics.</td>
<td>Reign conspicuously excluded.</td>
<td>Maliku Ochatoma receives gifts including a shirt adorned with gold and is granted Huayna Capac’s daughter in marriage. She bears the next maliku, known as “Inca” Moroco. Tata Pala becomes governor over the Killaka, Sura, Karama, and Chui in his province.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charka mallku Juan Ayavare Cuyara &amp; Fernando Ayavare Cuyara (1580s &amp; 90s)</td>
<td>Charka leader pledges obedience to the Inca and aids in the conquest of the Chichas and Diaguitas, receives gifts, titles, and honorifics.</td>
<td>Tupac Yupanqui subdues the province and begins a period of alliance and chancery.</td>
<td>Maliku Cohcoco receives many gifts befitting high status including shirts of fine cloth and others decorated in precious metals.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Killaka mallku Juan Colque Guarauche (1575)</td>
<td>Killaka leader pledges obedience to the Inca.</td>
<td>Tupac Yupanqui subdues the province and begins a period of alliance and chancery.</td>
<td>Maliku Juan Colque Guarauche called “Inca” and provided with insignias of royalty and three shirts of precious metals and jewels.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Memorial of Charcas” (1582)</td>
<td>Leaders of the Killaka, Karama, Sura, Charca, Qaraqara, Chicha, and Chui granted privileges by the Incas, dating from Pachacuti through Huayna Capac. The last four nations were especially esteemed and exempted from taxes and tributes due to their status as soldiers.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pedro de Cieza de León (1556)</td>
<td>Messengers sent to the peoples of Charcas. Some submitted peacefully, others resisted.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Archaeological Record</td>
<td>Inca-style ceramics discovered at Oroncota dating to ca. 1450.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3-3. Evidence related to Inca expansion into Charcas.
Figure 3-4. Views of the Oroncota Plateau, (a) from directly overhead; (b) from the southwest demonstrating the scalable approach (both from Google Earth); (c) and from the northeastern side, from across the Pilcomayo River at ground level (taken by author, June 2013).
CHAPTER 4
CHARCAS AND THE INCA FRONTIER SYSTEM

Scholars know little about the degree to which the Inca state made effective use of the political power that Tupac Yupanqui cultivated and seized in Charcas in the years immediately following his so-called discovery of the silver mines at Porco. Officials took steps to consolidate the new province militarily, and they presumably intensified silver extraction. These policies, in turn, necessitated certain changes in the labor force and greater agricultural production in order to provision these additional non-staple workers.¹ The state’s newfound political power over Charcas manifested itself to a greater degree under his successor, Huayna Capac. During Huayna Capac’s reign, officials implemented a political reorganization of the region. They also instituted more intensive ideological mechanisms to coincide with more territorial economic transformations, as well as offensive and defensive military strategies involving the peoples of the region. In other areas of Charcas, Inca officials maintained much more hegemonic policies of control.

Some of the most radical changes carried out in Charcas under Inca supervision took place at or near the frontiers of imperial control. The distribution of certain natural resources within Charcas—namely silver ores in the highlands near Porco and temperate agricultural lands in the Cochabamba valleys—compelled officials to develop economic enclaves within the distant territory. They implemented certain strategies designed to overcome the disincentives to territorial economic extraction at such a distance from the imperial heartland (most significantly, the costs of transport and security). The influx of labor necessitated by the enclave style of

¹ I include “presumably” only because scholars do not know with precision when the Inca state-directed intensification of production began, whether during Tupac Yupanqui’s or Huayna Capac’s reign. Research shows that Inca control of the mines and the surrounding region did bring about whole-scale changes of settlement patterns consistent with territorial policies of control. See Van Buren and Presta, “The Organization of Inka Silver Production in Porco, Bolivia,” 173ff.
resource extraction in Charcas also required the development of new political bonds within the region.

The sources that best demonstrate the political reorganization of the region are the “Memorial of Charcas” and the local histories of the individual nations or kingdoms. The ways in which the confederation members interacted with one another and with the imperial state represented precisely the hierarchy of political institutions that Salomon describes as the goal of phase two of the incorporation of an imperial province. The state effectively achieved the organization of an efficient administrative structure while also augmenting the military capacity of the empire. Imperial officials had only to make continued modest expenditures of economic and ideological power in exchange. Many of these documents also help describe the economic and infrastructural changes that the Incas engendered in Charcas.

Also testament to the era of Inca rule in the region are the physical remains of structures dating to this period. The Incas nietos’ testimony refers to the construction of fortresses along the eastern frontier of Charcas (and beyond) under the direction of Tupac Yupanqui. It specifically mentions “Pocona” (the approximate site of Incallajta), “Sabaypata” (Samaipata), “Cuzcotuiro” (Cuzcotoro), and “Huruncuta” (Oroncota). The testimony follows: “He put in all the fortresses many Indians from diverse places in order to guard the said frontier, where he left many orejones. At present, their sons and descendants are living in the said fortresses and on the frontiers.” This list of Inca installations along this stretch of frontier is incomplete, though the construction of other sites may not have coincided with Tupac Yupanqui’s reign. At least eight additional sites of similar nature existed, and more lie outside Charcas to the north of Paria and to the south of Tupiza. Of the additional complexes, those of most interest are a chain of

\[\text{2 “Probanza de los incas nietos de conquistadores,” 226.}\]
installations in the vicinity of Cuzcotoro (located in the Pilcomayo basin), Condorhuasi (a military fortification in the southern highlands), La Fortaleza (east of Samaipata), and a number of outposts in the vicinity of where the Pilaya River branches from the Pilcomayo.

These structures are invaluable to the understanding of the evolution of Inca rule in the frontier zone during the final days of the unified Inca empire. A corpus of literature focused on Inca architecture allows scholars to interpret the purposes, both practical and symbolic, of a number of elements common to Inca-occupied sites. Along with documentary evidence, archaeological study of these structures allows scholars to approximate the mechanisms of Inca imperial power on display in particular regions. In other words, the structures help demonstrate how Inca officials chose to represent the state and deploy state resources in provincial areas.

It is no surprise that the frontier structures of Charcas demonstrate widely differing characteristics. Not only did the Incas apply different strategies in different areas of Charcas, those strategies were at different stages of implementation when civil war and the Spanish conquest halted their development. This chapter identifies three zones of the Charcas frontier, distinguished by the architecture of their structures, the positioning of those structures relative one another, and the principal opportunities and challenges that confronted Inca officials in the areas. Those zones correspond to the Upper Pilcomayo Basin & and the Central Valleys, the Pilaya Basin & Tarija Valleys, and Samaipata & the Lowland East (Figure 4-1). Additional areas of interest include two enclaves in which the Inca state centered intensive, state-directed economic production: the Cochabamba valleys and the Porco mining highlands.

This chapter traces the development of Charcas into an economically productive province, from the perspective of Inca imperial officials. It begins by examining how Inca functionaries reshaped the political landscape of Charcas, primarily in their formation of the
Charcas confederation. This section is important for the discussion of the Charcas frontier because it establishes how and imperial functionaries cooperated with the local elite in administering the province. The arrangements that the Incas made to guard and advance the frontier similarly divided responsibilities between local officials and those from the Cuzco heartland. The next section focuses on the development of the two economic enclaves within Charcas and how the presence of these imperial interests affected Inca policies along the eastern frontier. Discussions of the three frontier zones follow, each in terms of its Inca-era archaeological structures and available documentary sources. The chapter concludes by examining one particularly vexing challenge that threatened the interests of the Inca empire in Charcas during the final days of its existence: advancing Guaraní/Chiriguana populations from the east. As discussed in previous chapters, various lowland peoples represented greater or lesser degrees of threat at different sectors of the Charcas frontier. Their presence compelled Ayra Canchi to fortify areas in the south, and Inca forces faced off against eastern lowland populations during both Pachacuti’s and Tupac Yupanqui’s reigns. During Huayna Capac’s reign, however, the Inca state attempted to extend control over lowland peoples in different ways. These peoples included some of the Guaraní ancestors of the colonial-era Chiriguanaes. Their attacks on Charcas frontier eventually confounded Inca officials’ approach to the distant region and necessitated new strategies of frontier security and development. The result was the establishment of the Charcas-Chiriguana frontier.

**The Inca Construction of Charcas, 1480s-1520s**

**The Political Confederation**

The rupture of good will between the Aymara elite of Charcas and the Inca state under Tupac Yupanqui was short-lived. As the following documents demonstrate, Inca officials reinstituted the strategy by which they had initially gained a political foothold in Charcas—the
dissemination of luxury goods and ideological prestige—in order to regain and consolidate their political control over the local leaders. By the end of Huayna Capac’s reign, and earlier in most cases, the elite from each of the Aymara kingdoms and several bow-and-arrow peoples in Charcas essentially served in the capacity of Inca state officials, both in the region and elsewhere in the empire. They came together in a confederation that facilitated the administration of Charcas as a stable and productive province within Collasuyu.

The organization of the confederation reflected in many ways the traditional concepts of Aymara categorization that provided all Aymara marcanie peoples with a degree of prestige. But at the same time, it diverged from the urco-uma schema in elevating the status of the Chicha and Chui approximately to match that of the esteemed Qaraqara-Charka, which the Inca state divided into two separate kingdoms. The “Memorial of Charcas” explains that the duties owed to the state by these four kingdoms consisted of service in the Inca armies. When called upon by the Inca to go to war, “the Qaraqara and Chicha gathered together in Macha, the capital of the Qaraqara; and the same with the Charkas and Chui [who] gathered together in the town of Sacaca, the Charka capital.” Note the pairing of each Aymara group with one group of bow-and-arrow people. Members of the four nations fought on the northern frontier “and won victory against [the peoples of] Guayaquil and Popayán,” and also manned “the frontiers and garrisons in the fortresses against the Chiriguanaes.”

Rather than serving in rank-and-file battalions, the soldiers of these four nations enjoyed the distinction of appointment to elite corps within the Inca forces. An honor that accompanied this exalted status was the permission to distinguish their appearance with “feathers, clothing,

3 “El memorial de los Mallku y principales de la provincia de los Charcas,” 842-43. More on the security of the Chiriguana frontier below.
and some weapons and other things that were for [them] exclusively, dedicated and granted by the Inca lords.” The testimonies of the mallku in the “Memorial” further claim that the four nations were “exempted from tributes and excises, and all other taxes and personal services.” Their leaders, meanwhile, enjoyed privileges denied to almost all others outside the Cuzco elite, including the use of yanacona servants and certain status markers.4

From the perspective of the Inca empire, the inclusion of the four nations in these military corps served two principal purposes: first, it boosted the overall military power of the empire by harnessing their unique weapons and style of fighting and deploying them to state ends; second, and more pertinently for the development of Inca control over Charcas, it provided the military elite of each nation with vested stake in the Inca patronage system, thus strengthening the political control that the empire had achieved. Though the mallku do not use the term, their ancestors might be described as a class of camayoc who specialized in warfare. They went where Inca officials wished to make use of their expertise but maintained their ethnic affinities. At the conclusion of their duty, they returned home and took up their own labor until the next call for their services. Their military expertise was the factor that raised the status of the leaders of these nations above others within the empire.

A secondary aim of the state—one accomplished by pairing the Chicha and Chui bowmen with Qaraqara and Charka soldiers, respectively—relates to engendering certain transformations in the lowlanders’ cultures. Aymara culture fairly closely resembled that of the Inca heartland. This cultural similarity benefitted the Inca state in the sense that the Aymara elite responded positively to the benefits of Inca patronage. They were more susceptible to control than those who had no real cultural template for this brand of patronage. Pairing the Chui and

4 Ibid., 842.
Charka with Aymara counterparts during wartimes may have driven the bow-and-arrow peoples to value Inca patronage similarly. It is certainly the case that the Chicha and Chui began to resemble their highland neighbors more closely over time in the areas of language, political organization, and social organization. So while Inca officials took advantage of aspects that distinguished these subject populations, they sought to change other aspects. This duality of top-down transformation on one hand and adaptability to circumstance on the other is a hallmark of Inca imperial rule over the peoples of Charcas.

The framework of the Charcas confederation and the specialization of certain members’ duties provided them with opportunities to distinguish themselves through exceptional service. The local sources describe how the Inca empire used economic and ideological rewards to motivate the Charcas elite to remain loyal and productive for Huayna Capac (Figure 3-3). Among the Qaraqara, the Inca rewarded the mallku Ochatoma for his people’s military service and their construction of a fortress in Tomebamba (to the south of Quito) with a marriage alliance at the highest levels of the Cuzco elite. The Inca’s own daughter married Ochatoma and bore the next mallku of the Qaraqara, a son named Moroco. Because of his blood connection to the Cuzco royalty, he came to use the high-status moniker “Inca” Moroco. Ochatoma also received elite-level material gifts from Huayna Capac, including “a shirt of bezants of gold.”

Inca representatives also provided the Charka mallku Cohocoho with “insignias of royalty,” shirts emblazoned in gold and silver, other clothing made of fine cloth, and gold and silver objects for his service. Like his father, he rode in a litter carried by one hundred servants. The Killaka mallku Colque Guarache, another contemporary of Huayna Capac, already bore the

---

5 “La probanza de don Fernando Ayra de Ariutu,” 724, 731, 737.
6 “Probanzas de los Uno Malco de Sacaca,” 884.
honorific title “Inca” due to his grandfather’s service to Pachacuti in the conquest of the Chichas and Diaguitas. He additionally received insignias of royalty and the gift of three luxurious shirts from Huayna Capac. One shirt was ornamented with silver, one with gold, the third with jewels. Meanwhile, a Sura mallku named Achacata won the right to use the title “Inca” based on his fidelity and obedience.

These so-called gifts were economic and ideological investments on the part of the empire aimed at ensuring dependent local elites. The titles of prestige achieved the same ends, but they additionally represented the reorganization of the political relationships in the region. Within a generation, Inca functionaries were transforming the administrative structure of Charcas. On one hand, these reforms were designed to accommodate an influx of mitmaqkuna and mitayos necessary for imperial economic projects in Charcas and the displacement of soldiers from the four nations. On the other hand, the reforms corresponded better to the imperial aims in the region.

One facet of this transformation involved Inca officials extending the jurisdictions of certain favored mallku—to encompass the state mitmaqkuna of a given region, for instance—while they reduced or deemphasized those of others. The highest-level aspect of imperial reorganization of political roles within Charcas included the division of the Qaraqara and Charka, organized beforehand as complementary moieties, red and white, of a single nation into two separate nations. As a part of this redrawing of jurisdictions, Inca policy makers extended the role of Tata Paria, a Qaraqara official at the time of Huayna Capac (though his relationship to

---

7 “Primera información hecha por Don Juan Colque Guarache,” 237, 241-42, 245-46, 249.
8 Pärsinnen, Tawantinsuyu, 267; Platt, Bouysse-Cassagne, and Harris, “Charka rojo, Charka blanco,” 94.
9 “La probanza de los incas nietos de conquistadores,” 214.
the mallku Inca Moroco is not clear). He apparently saw his power expanded to the governorship or lordship not only of the newly-designated Qaraqara people, but of the Killaka, Sura, Karanqa, and Chui in the province as well.\textsuperscript{10} His son Gualca later inherited his positions of authority. Both enjoyed a collegial relationship with their counterpart among the Charka, named Cuysara (son of Cohocoho) who meanwhile saw his responsibilities and rank similarly heightened. A witness described Cuysara as the “lord of the nation of the umasuyos and Charka.”\textsuperscript{11} This position effectively made him the leader of the uma moiety of the old Charka kingdom, as well as all members of the uma moiety in the Killaka, Sura, and Karanqa kingdoms.

The new positions of responsibility that Tata Paria (and later Gualca) and Cuysara enjoyed essentially made them mallku above all other mallku in Charcas. These positions had not existed prior to the Inca incorporation of Charcas. Nor had the two complementary administrative realms—inter-“national” urcosuyu and umasuyu units of Charcas—over which the new leaders presided. Their appointments to these positions thus marked the creation of a new organizational level by the Inca state. They had effectively become the urcosuyu and umasuyu co-rulers of the new Charcas confederation. Tata Paria and Cuysara were to preside over the various mallku and chiefs assigned to them, though they also served these roles in their own provinces. They would answer, in turn, to the governor of all of Collasuyu, who had to deal only with whomever occupied these new positions in Charcas and their approximate counterparts in the other jurisdictions of Collasuyu.

This arrangement reflects Inca administrative hierarchies in other regions: the Apu position corresponded to the governorship of one of the four quarters; below him, several

\textsuperscript{10} “Probanzas de los señores y principales de Macha,” in Platt, Bouysse-Cassagne, and Harris, \textit{Qaraqara-Charka}, 764-807, esp. 772-73.

\textsuperscript{11} Ibid., 778.
suyuyuc governed provinces within the quarter; multiple tocricoc, who oversaw their lesser geographical or population units, served below each suyuyuc. Tata Paria and Cuysara seem to have been the first individuals elevated to positions corresponding to suyuyuc in Charcas. The remaining mallku and the leaders of the Chui and Chicha likely maintained positions akin to tocricoc. It bears mention, however, that these positions and jurisdictions were not defined as clearly as in modern bureaucracies. A degree of organizational flexibility led to the overlap of certain duties and affiliations.

The state-driven importation of mitayos and mitmaqkuna into Charcas led to just such a confusion of affiliations. As discussed above, these workers maintained their ties to their communities of origin. At the same time, they were subject to the oversight of the empire as represented by local officials. The economic enclave of Cochabamba was especially fraught with complex political allegiances and intertwined responsibilities, but other regions within Charcas were also subject to the rearrangement of the population by the Inca state. Witnesses during the early Spanish colonial period claimed that the Yampara leader Francisco Aymoro was responsible for dividing the land among the mitmaqkuna and “foreigners” settled by the Incas in a defined Yampara province near Oroncota.

The testimony indicates that Francisco Aymoro and his father, named simply Aymoro, both occupied the post of “governor of this province and cacique of the Yampara” under the Incas. The term that the witnesses used to describe their position in the imperial hierarchy is ambiguous, of course, since there is no perfect Inca administrative equivalent to “gobernador.” Aymoro and Francisco Aymoro may have served in a role similar to a tocricoc, like most of the

---

12 For the typical administrative structure of Inca provinces, see Pärrssinen, Tawantinsuyu, 263-93; and Platt, Bouysse-Cassagne, and Harris, “Charka rojo, Charka blanco,” 91-96.

13 Julien, “Oroncota entre dos mundos,” 105-06; Barragán Romano, “¿Indios de arco y flecha?”, 116-18.
Aymara *mallku* and the Chicha and Chui leaders. If so, it would seem to follow that the Yampara cacique would have answered to either Tata Paria or Cuysara following the organization of the Charcas confederation under Huayna Capac. But one factor distinguishes the Yampara, under Inca rule, from their neighbors. The Inca state maintained a permanent presence of officials from Cuzco within Yampara territory. As the *Incas nietos* account indicates, a class of ethnic-Inca officials (called *orejones* by the Spanish, Figure 4-2) occupied Oroncota and Cuzcotoro. Both of these complexes fell within Aymoro’s territory, and colonial documents corroborate the presence of individuals living in the Yampara provinces a century later who claimed to have descended from Inca royalty. No such structures *orejones*-in-residence existed within the core population zones of the Aymara kingdoms.

The relationship between the roles of the *orejones* and those of the Yampara caciques is not fully clear. It may seem self-evident that the *orejones*’ authority outranked Aymoro’s, but Catherine Julien has identified documents relating to similarly overlapped political authorities in which “all the Inca *orejones* … [in the area were] subject to” a local leader on the northern frontier of Tawantinsuyu. Furthermore, one witness claimed that Aymoro “was obeyed by all” within his jurisdiction. Archaeological evidence from the region suggests the single category of official implied by the term *orejones* was in fact made up of a variety of categories sorted by rank and responsibility. Only their use of ear spools, which usually reflected affiliation with the

---

14 Cited in Julien, “Oroncota entre dos mundos,” 105. Both Aymoro and Francisco Aymoro reportedly interacted with Huayna Capac. Conceivably, the elder Aymoro’s time as cacique and governor also spanned to the reign of Tupac Yupanqui.

15 Incallajta and Samaipata fell outside these areas, and Porco was not an administrative center despite its importance (see below).

Inca ethnic group, united all orejones. Some orejones seem to have been subject to Aymoro and Francisco Aymoro, while others were not.\(^{17}\)

In addition to orejones-in-residence, the Inca also occasionally sent officials from his inner circle to assist or direct provincial political leaders. Spanish observers often rendered the position of these tokoyrikoq as visitador or proveedor, terms that best translate to “inspector.” In one example from Charcas, Huayna Capac sent a royal official named Yasca from Cuzco to the eastern frontier in order to help establish stronger defenses on the upper Pilcomayo. He returned to Cuzco after completing his task. These inspections facilitated the connection between the local elite or orejones-in-residence and the imperial hierarchy. The tokoyrikoq (plural) also habitually made detailed reports before the Inca upon returning from their appointments, a vital function that provided imperial officials in Cuzco the information necessary to form effective strategies.\(^{18}\)

Huayna Capac’s rule over Charcas falls at various places along the territorial-hegemonic spectrum discussed in Chapter 3. The implementation of an imperial administrative structure in the form of the Charcas confederation, including the creation of a new bureaucratic level foreign to the region, reflects a high degree of territorial political control. At the same time, the evidence suggests that Inca officials directly reorganized the military resources of the region by adopting potential rival military elites into the state forces and deploying them, in some cases, across great distances. They seized direct control of certain aspects of the province by appointing royal

\(^{17}\) The archaeological evidence from the Inca complexes at Oroncota and Cuzcotoro, examined in detail later in the chapter, suggests that the orejones at Oroncota were higher-level officials than those at Cuzcotoro. See Alconini, “The Southeastern Inka Frontier against the Chiriguanos,” 403-04, 410-13; and Alconini, “Dis-embedded Centers and Architecture of Power in the Fringes of the Inka Empire,” 72-79. The former were almost certainly outside of the Yampara caciques’ jurisdiction. The latter seem to have been subject to the authority of their position as “governor.” This indicates that the Incas applied strategies at varying points on the territorial-hegemonic spectrum within even small regions, but the overall approach to the Yampara provinces seems to have been more territorial than in the lands of the Aymaras, Chui, or Chicha within Charcas.

\(^{18}\) Pärssinen, Tawantinsuyu, 287-89. For the example of Yasca, see the discussion of Cuzcotoro, below.
officials in residence and inspectors in the Yampara districts. Certain elements of the political changes undertaken by the empire in Charcas, however, were far closer to the hegemonic end of the spectrum. Officials appointed local leaders to most positions typically apportioned to the Cuzco elite. Even in Yampara territory where the Inca state did send orejones, some may have served under the authority of the local leader. An additional hegemonic aspect of Inca political control is the fact that the newly-elevated leaders of the Charcas confederation—Tata Paria and Cuysara—wielded political powers that reflected the classificatory system established within local Aymara political culture. For the majority of the native Charcas population, the result was that individuals and household units interacted with the state through their traditional local leaders and operated according to categories within the familiar urco-uma hierarchy.

**The Porco & Cochabamba Production Enclaves (and Ideological Centers?)**

The capacity of the highland silver mines of Charcas was the economic resource most immediately appealing to the Inca imperial state. The high value and relatively low bulk of refined silver made it worth the effort to transport it to the imperial core. The silver that ornamented the sacred Coricancha in Cuzco and the Inca’s royal litter reportedly originated in Porco. Porco was only one of the silver mines in the region overseen by Inca officials, but its ores were the most systematically extracted during the Inca Horizon. It was also the most sacred to the local residents at that time. One colonial-era document suggests that the ores taken from the other mines remained the property of (or were symbolically returned to) the local communities. The silver ores mined from Porco, on the other hand, were “for the Inka.”¹⁹

¹⁹ Platt, Bouyssse-Cassagne, and Harris, “La plata sagrada,” 135-39, 150-65. Document cited in Jean Berthelot, “The Extraction of Precious Metals at the Time of the Inca,” in Murra, Wachtel, and Revel, *Anthropological History of Andean Polities*, 72. Translation by Berthelot. Emphasis appears in his quotation. Though the prevailing belief had been that the cerro rico of Potosí was left un-exploited prior to its discovery by the Spanish, increasing evidence shows that mining activities at Potosí date to as far back as the Middle Horizon. The exact degree of Inca-era extraction is not clear. It may have been one of the community mines. See Mark B. Abbott and Alexander P. Wolfe,
The climate and soil in the extremely high-altitude region near Porco made all but the slimmest agricultural yields impossible. Seasonal camelid pasturing likely supplemented the diets of residents, but the region was itself incapable of sustaining the large-scale labor force necessary for intensive mining operations. Ceramic evidence dating to the pre-Inca period at Porco suggests that the region was a site of contact among a variety of altiplano peoples, but the resident population was very small. Those who did live there likely sustained themselves in part using resources produced in the lower-altitude and more agriculturally productive valleys to the south and east. After the Inca takeover of Porco, the resident population multiplied. Structures dating to this period include administrative and residential quarters, small mineshafts, ore grinding and smelting facilities, and storage complexes. The lack of certain elements in the Inca-era architecture surrounding Porco—such as fine masonry, a large ceremonial plaza, or artisanal workshops—suggests a narrow dedication on the part of the administrators of the site to silver extraction and refinement (Figure 4-3). In other words, Porco was not associated with a prestigious administrative posting. This does not necessarily mean, however, that Inca officials left the administrative tasks to local leaders embedded in the Charcas confederation. In the closest corollary situation for which there is significant evidence—the Inca-controlled gold and silver mines north of Lake Titicaca—the state implemented an administrative and supervisory apparatus staffed by officials from Cuzco. In the case of Porco, either scenario or a mixture of the two might hold.20


20 Van Buren and Presta conclude based on the absence of archaeological evidence of mining activity in any of the pre-Inca structures around Porco that “the Inka occupation of Porco was constructed entirely de novo by the empire, rather than embedded in a previously established settlement.” See Van Buren and Presta, “The Organization of Inka Silver Production in Porco, Bolivia,” 173-85. I am less convinced that this absence of mining evidence is evidence of the absence of mining. Their larger argument, however—that Inca control substantively transformed the social
The influx of residents to Porco following the Inca takeover of the site included seasonal workers providing *mita* labor to the Inca state. Colonial documents demonstrate that individuals who identified as members of the northern-Aymara Lupaqa and Charcas-Aymara Karanqa peoples were among them. Despite their presumed lack of specialized training, *mitayos* likely provided the bulk of the labor force at Porco. The high quality of the ores available during the pre-Hispanic period made it relatively simple to identify productive veins. What remained was a process of digging the ores from the surrounding rock, followed by the equally labor-intensive but unskilled step of crushing them to remove the largest impurities. Once sorted, the final phase of ore refinement required more specific skills. It involved melting impurities from the ores over high-temperature flames. Specialized workers accomplished this step using llama dung-fired furnaces called *huayras*. The design, placement, and tending of these furnaces required specific knowledge. If managed correctly, the product was near-pure silver.²¹

It is unlikely that the skills necessary to purify silver ore in this way were available in a typical tributary population. Inca representatives seem to have drafted skilled smelters from nearby populations. They also likely trained workers in the specialization. The Spanish later encountered workers at Porco who specialized in smelting. They identified themselves as *yanaconas*. Their status indicates that the state maximized the outputs of workers with these skills by employing them year round, or nearly so, in their trades.²² The social and economic

---


²² Van Buren and Presta, “The Organization of Inka Silver Production in Porco, Bolivia,” 190-92. Recall that a *yanacona* was typically de-tethered from his community of origin.
reorganizations overseen by Inca officials at Porco are reflective of primarily direct, territorial control of the mining enterprise there.

The Inca approach to the ideological significance of Porco is more difficult to gauge, and the historical and archaeological evidence is misaligned in some ways. A number of documents describe the veneration of sacred objects associated with Porco and several neighboring mines dating to the pre-Inca period. Spanish officials discovered and destroyed these so-called idols over a period spanning the 1570s to 1625. Miners took great pains to hide them from their priests and other Spaniards in the meantime. Based on the testimonials about the religious practices at Porco during the pre-Inca and Inca periods recorded during these extirpations, Platt, Bouysse-Cassagne, and Harris theorize that Inca officials performed a “complex ritual of reinvestment” over the sacred objects after transporting them to Cuzco. This process effectively integrated them into the Inca solar cosmology. Officials then returned them to their original sites.  

If true, the effect was that the objects retained their original ideological powers, now channeled toward imperial ends. This interpretation reflects ideological control by the Incas toward the hegemonic end of the spectrum. The problem with such an interpretation is that no clear archaeological evidence of religious pilgrimage or ritual practice from the pre-Inca period has emerged at Porco. In light of this lacuna, Van Buren and Presta put forth the possibility that Porco’s pre-Inca ritual significance was exaggerated. The sacred characters of the mountains were, according to their interpretation, purely the invention of Inca functionaries. This explanation puts Inca ideological control methods closer to the territorial end of the spectrum. But a weakness of Van Buren and Presta’s explanation is that there is a similar lack of architecture reflecting clear ritual or

---

23 Platt, Bouysse-Cassagne, and Harris, “La plata sagrada,” 152-53.

pilgrimage practices dating to the Inca era. Porco had clearly gained ideological significance by this time. The miners’ efforts to hide the sacred objects associated with Porco and the other mines are clear evidence in this regard. In all likelihood, the associated structures that would suggest pre-Inca ritual practice at Porco have been hidden by continuing mining activity or Spanish efforts to do away with non-Christian religious practices.

As in Porco, the Inca reorganization of the Cochabamba region began during the reign of Tupac Yupanqui and escalated under Huayna Capac. The ongoing transfer of laborers to and from the region was among the most significant population movements in the pre-Hispanic Andes. The first phase initiated under Tupac Yupanqui had primarily military ends. It was marked by the transfer of the Chui and Cota peoples from the valley to the frontier area in the east. A certain section of the vacated lands became the exclusive personal property of the Inca. The other native autochthonous group, the Sipe Sipe (a subgroup associated with the Sura Aymara kingdom), remained as a core agricultural labor population.25

The Inca assumption of political control over Charcas during Tupac Yupanqui’s reign corresponded with the addition of a long and largely undefended eastern frontier to Tawantinsuyu. Considering Inca actions in terms of the territorial-hegemonic model, the initial security measures that imperial officials took in regards to this frontier—sending soldiers to guard it actively—suggests that they were planning for the further economic development of Charcas. That development was likely already underway in Porco, as discussed above. It accelerated in the Cochabamba region to previously unprecedented levels during the reign of Huayna Capac. During that second phase, an additional 14,000 individuals from the entirety of

---

25 Wachtel, “The Mitimas of the Cochabamba Valley,” 199-204. It is not clear who exactly the Cota were. They may have been bow-and-arrow peoples similar to the Chui or subgroupings of another ethnicity like the Sipe Sipe. Regarding the Sura-Sipe Sipe connection, see Río, Etnicidad, territorialidad y colonialismo, 50ff.
Tawantinsuyu were reportedly sent to Cochabamba. This force included members of the *marcanie* Sura, Karanqa, and Killaka peoples as well as some from as distant as the Cuzco region and Chile. Officials designated some of these communities for specialized labor, such as a certain aspect of agricultural production or, in the case of the Sipe Sipe, the tending of the royal camelid herds and agricultural transport procedures. State functionaries divided arable land in the valleys with a high degree of specialization. Certain plots were reserved for state political or religious uses. Other plots were set aside for particular *mitima* or *mita* populations in order to permit the laborers to sustain themselves.²⁶

The territorial-hegemonic model dictates that investment in infrastructural projects and territorial economic control in an area so close to the frontier is typically counterintuitive. Not only does development in such a region extend the distance that resources must travel to reach the imperial heartland, it also increases the importance of rigid frontier security. The empire that develops areas near the frontier generally must resort to costly territorial military tactics to prevent attacks on frontier economic zones by hostile outsiders.²⁷ Certain infrastructural investments and other adaptations on the part of the Inca empire, however, alleviated the distance issue. The presence of a labor force unable to produce its own staple goods—such as that at Porco, for instance—represented an opportunity for symbiosis with the relatively nearby Cochabamba enclave. The complementarity of the highland and temperate valley zones allowed the state to avoid, in part, the necessity of transporting the low-value, high-bulk resources produced in Cochabamba all the way to the imperial core. Some of the maize and coca produced

²⁶ Wachtel, “The Mitimas of the Cochabamba Valley,” 199-226. The Qaraqara and Charka also received plots of land in Cochabamba for their ethnic *maluri* populations, see “El memorial de los Mallku y principales de la provincia de los Charcas,” 837.

there could remain within Charcas where they sustained workers who provided services to the state such as local administration, frontier security, or mining. Yet the majority of the agricultural surpluses of Cochabamba went north to the immense purpose-built state storehouses at Paria. Highways built and maintained to keep down transport costs connected the regions. From there, the products of the Cochabamba enclave went to provision soldiers, administrators, artisans, and religious officials elsewhere in the empire. At the same time, Inca officials under Huayna Capac largely avoided the expenditures associated with territorial military control at the Charcas frontier by using strategies discussed below, later in the chapter.

The transition from Tupac Yupanqui to Huayna Capac was approximately coincident with a major shift relating to state production in Cochabamba. Both leaders enacted primarily territorial policies of political and economic control in the enclave, but while the policies established during Tupac Yupanqui’s reign focused most on strengthening his military capabilities in the region, Huayna Capac’s policies sought to reach those same ends through economic means. It is unclear whether this shift in relative emphasis in Charcas was the direct result of the change of leadership. An evolution of policy toward the region also makes sense if one considers the overall long-term strategy of Inca officials according to Salomon’s model. During Tupac Yupanqui’s reign the state had to exert a degree of pressure on the peoples of Charcas in order to forge a favorable relationship with them or to reshape the terms of a relationship from an earlier era. The focus of policies that came later was to develop those relationships toward ultimately more fundamental ends. The agricultural enclave at Cochabamba represented precisely this type of beneficial long-term project. Not only did it provide the empire with significant economic power, it undergirded Inca imperial power of all types. The surplus products from Cochabamba supported the Inca military, administrative classes, and ceremonial
activities, and the reorganization of Cochabamba bolstered the military, political, and ideological powers of the empire. It may have been simply a coincidence that Huayna Capac came to rule at approximately the time when this shift was imminent or already underway.

The principal Inca complex in the Cochabamba vicinity also bears out the transition from a military focus to an economic one. Of course, economic production required a certain marriage of military, political, and ideological authority as well. Incallajta, as the structure is known, demonstrates this balance well (Figure 4-4). It sits at the convergence of two small rivers at approximately 3,000 m of elevation in the rolling hills 130 km east of the modern city of Cochabamba. It was located just to the north of the primary Inca-era highway that connected the agricultural populations in the region’s valleys to the Inca heartland. To the north and northeast of Incallajta, the land quickly descends toward the Amazonian forests. Thick defensive walls surround the complex.28

The name Incallajta, a Quechua term roughly equivalent to “place,” “town,” or “village” of the Incas, is almost certainly a generic term applied after the Inca period. It does not appear in any chronicles. The Incas nietos account refers only to Pocona, the name of the modern city closest to Incallajta, when it lists the fortresses constructed on the eastern frontier by Tupac Yupanqui. A number of chroniclers describe a tour of Collasuyu by Huayna Capac during which he stopped at Pocona and, in the words of Cabello Balboa, “a fortress that his father had built there.” In Sarmiento de Gamboa’s version, Huayna Capac went to Pocona in order to “give order to that frontier … and to rebuild a fortress that his father had made.”29


29 Cabello Balboa, Miscelánea antártica, 362; Sarmiento de Gamboa, Historia de los Incas, 141. For a long time, most scholarship equated Incallajta with a fortress called Cuzcotoro mentioned in multiple chronicle reports as the site of a reported attack by the Chiriguanas, among them are Hyslop, Inka Settlement Planning, 176-82; José de Mesa and Teresa Gisbert, “Los Incas en Bolivia,” Historia y Cultura (La Paz) 1 (1973): 26-29; and Rowe,
The structures within the walls also bear witness to the military character of the site. The ruins of several *kallanka* sit at the heart of Incallajta. A *kallanka* is a representative Inca-style building consisting of stone walls arranged in a long rectangular shape, typically at proportions of four- or five-to-one. During Inca times, a *kallanka* featured a steeply-pitched roof supported by wooden poles extending to the interior floor. The shorter, end walls of the building rose to triangular gables in accordance with the pitch of the roof. The roof probably consisted of thatched straw. The entirety of the interior made up a single room, though certain examples of the *kallanka* may have contained additional loft space above ground level (Figure 4-5). In general, archaeologists associate the *kallanka* with the quartering of soldiers. The seven most typical examples found at Incallajta were most likely dedicated to this end. The site thus clearly had a role in guarding important zones of production and transportation infrastructure against potential incursions.30

At the same time, Incallajta demonstrates a number of non-military features. The largest *kallanka* at the site is an example (“1” in Figure 4-4). This *kallanka* was built on a scale unlike almost all others for which there is evidence. It measures 80 m by 25 m, and the gables, which

---

30 Hyslop, *Inka Settlement Planning*, 82-85, 176-82. For a discussion of Inca occupation of the immediate vicinity of Incallajta, see Coben, “Theaters of Power,” 69-75. Colonial Spaniards referred to most *kallanka* as “*galpones,*” a word that can refer to “sheds” and other similar storage buildings, but also indicates “dormitories” used for laborers. Archaeologists associate them in most cases with housing for transient low-level operatives, usually soldiers. Sites otherwise indicative of military significance often feature multiple *kallanka* arranged alongside each other. For general literature on the *kallanka*, see Graziano Gasparini and Luise Margolies, *Inca Architecture*, trans. Patricia J. Lyon (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1980), 196-98; and María de los Angeles Muñoz, “The Kallanka at Samaipata, Bolivia: An Example of Inka Monumental Architecture,” in Burger, Morris, and Matos Medieta, *Variations in the Expression of Inka Power*, 257-64.
are no longer intact, likely reached to a height of 18 m (Figure 4-6). It is the largest *kallanka* that remains standing anywhere today. Like a similarly-scaled version that reportedly sat in Cuzco before the arrival of the Spanish, it almost certainly did not serve as a military barracks. It was more likely the setting for feasts and other public ceremonies. During such gatherings, representatives of the empire conceivably performed rituals that redistributed resources and affirmed the ideological and political roles of the state and local institutions. Colonial documents typically refer to these larger *kallanka* as “great hall[s].”

There is also evidence of at least one example of an *ushnu* in the primary plaza at Incallajta. This signature Inca-style structure (also written *usnu* or *usñu*) consisted of a platform, the scale and shape of which could vary greatly. Colonial commentators described examples of these structures variously as thrones, shrines, altars, or even fortresses. Some consisted of nothing more than a stone dais in a plaza (Figure 4-7a). Others more closely resembled pyramids and featured elaborate terracing built into the structure or carved from rock (Figure 4-7b). It is clear that they had great ceremonial and political importance for the Inca state. Officials might have displayed a sacred object atop an *ushnu* so viewers could venerate it. At other times, they, or perhaps the Inca himself (Figure 4-7c), presided over ceremonies or addressed subjects from the *ushnu*. Archaeologists associate the structure particularly with conquered territories because of the frequency with which they appear there. They may have served as symbols of state power in far-flung parts of the empire or as a means of connecting distant areas with associated

---

structures in the Cuzco heartland. In these senses, they were integral to mechanisms of political and ideological control.\textsuperscript{32}

The archaeological remains at Incallajta suggest that the \textit{ushnu} played a part in the public ceremonies for which the great \textit{kallanka} was likely designed. One platform abuts the large \textit{kallanka}, and was probably accessible from inside the great hall (“2” in Figure 4-4). It measures approximately 6 m by 5 m. In the center of the platform sits a large boulder that occupies the majority of the platform. Another boulder with a flattened top surface sits in the center of the plaza. The flattened surface of this rock has a diameter of around 2.5 m. It is known popularly as the “sacrificial stone,” though there is no significant evidence that it served such a purpose. It more likely served as an \textit{ushnu} platform itself. The remains of a third possible \textit{ushnu} sit in the lower plaza. The presence of these \textit{ushnu} at Incallajta, particularly in concert with the immense \textit{kallanka}, further indicates the political and ideological character of the site.\textsuperscript{33} Perhaps the most unique feature of the Incallajta complex also relates to the ceremonial character of the site. The \textit{torreón} (“6” in Figure 4-4) is a tower consisting of nine angled faces that sits across a narrow gorge from the main complex. The faces indicate the time of year based on which face is illuminated at sunset. In this way the Incas could likely determine the appropriate date according to the ritual calendar.\textsuperscript{34}

\textsuperscript{32} Hyslop, \textit{Inka Settlement Planning}, 69-74; Gasparini and Margolies, \textit{Inca Architecture}, 264-80. Certain examples of \textit{ushnu} may also have projected military power because it served in some instances as a viewing stand from which officials could oversee military reviews.

\textsuperscript{33} Hyslop, \textit{Inka Settlement Planning}, 83-85; Coben, “Theaters of Power,” 91, 198-202, 281. Coben suggests that the \textit{ushnu} platform may also have featured water troughs or basins for ceremonial use, as the descriptions of the Cuzco \textit{ushnu} suggest that it had.

Lawrence Coben, the archaeologist who oversaw the most recent large-scale excavations at Incallajta, argues that the re-building of Incallajta by Huayna Capac was for the primary purpose of better incorporating ideological aspects into the complex. It was fully functional as a military fortress prior to the re-building process, but Coben finds that afterward, it additionally served as an “Other Cuzco.” By the phrase “Other Cuzco,” he alludes to the seventeenth-century native chronicler Guaman Poma, who wrote that there were six additional versions of the Inca capital city located throughout the empire, including one in Charcas. These cities shared certain design similarities with Cuzco, but more importantly, they held a degree of ritual significance for the empire. According to Coben, Incallajta was among those that “replicated the capital’s role as a sacred theater, the venue for the calendar of state-sponsored performances.” Much like aspects of the Inca imperial architecture itself, these performances included elements designed to make clear the power of the state even in its distant provinces.\(^\text{35}\)

This creation of a venue designed for the celebration of sacred imperial ritual reflects a high degree of territorial ideological control in the Cochabamba region. It is not entirely clear what the rituals consisted of, and the inclusion of elements from the native or mitima populations’ religious traditions may have tempered the territorial nature of Inca ideological strategy here. But if Coben is correct that Incallajta was an “Other Cuzco,” the implication is that state officials imported an ideological program designed to regulate the political and economic activities of the Cochabamba enclave. This ideological control pattern supplemented the highly territorial economic strategies deployed by the empire in the Cochabamba region. The military control mechanisms were similarly territorial, considering the military aspects of the site. As for the political mechanisms of control, the verdict is mixed. The orejones who occupied the

---

\(^{\text{35}}\) Coben, “Theaters of Power,” 228–45.
Incallajta site conceivably exercised a degree of political power over the enclave. Most mitayos and state mitmaqkuna also found themselves under the thumbs of political leaders to whom they had previously owed no allegiance. At the same time, other laborers in Cochabamba answered to their traditional leaders, and the Charka and Qaraqara maintained their access to the area as part of their long-practiced verticality strategies.

**The Upper Pilcomayo Basin & and the Central Valleys**

Several hundred kilometers to the south-southeast of Cochabamba, across the eastern Andean valleys, lay the ruins of an Inca site atop the Oroncota plateau (Figure 4-8a). The plateau rises nearly 1,000 m above the Pilcomayo and Inkapampa Rivers. It was the same plateau upon which the peoples of Charcas supposedly fled from Tupac Yupanqui and his army. After Inca officials took control of the area, they oversaw the construction of two separate complexes atop the plateau. The main complex features a dominant monumental structure known as Rey Inca, which consisted of a large plaza, bounded by a wall on the east, two kallanka on the north, and a line of rectangular rooms to the west and south. The complex also includes a number of smaller residential or administrative enclosures, including a third kallanka, and a great many storage facilities (Figure 4-8b). Rey Inca contains a number of high-prestige architectural components that are without equal outside the core of the empire. The smooth-surface, “pillowed face” rock walls and large interior niches are unusual for structures on the imperial frontier. The other structures atop and around the Oroncota plateau demonstrate less architectural investment, but they nevertheless show a high quality of workmanship. El Pedregal consisted of a small defensive outpost strategically hidden in cliffs and seemingly designed to control access to the plateau. The purpose of Inkarry Moqo, located near the valley floor, was seemingly related to the collection and storage of surpluses from the surrounding valleys. These structures collectively imply that Oroncota’s primary intended purpose under the Incas was as an administrative center.
Pottery distribution in the complex itself tells a similar story. Examples of styles from the Inca heartland and the distant highlands appear in the context of Rey Inca. This suggests that orejones, supported by yanaconas or a small mitima population, occupied the primary Inca complex at Oroncota rather than local laborers.  

Craig Morris argues that Inca administrative centers like this one were generally designed to connect distant provinces to the imperial core. They served as staging grounds for the redistributive rituals that linked imperial representatives to local populations through their local elites. In this way they functioned similarly to, though at a more political and less ideological level than the “Other Cuzcos” discussed above in terms of Incallajta. But Inca administrative centers played both ideological and political functions rather than simply bureaucratic functions. As such, they are apparent in the archaeological record due to their locations (in the provinces), large plazas (the venue of ceremonies), administrative buildings (where bureaucratic duties and preparations for redistributive ceremonies occurred), and large storage capacities. Agricultural storage capacity is fundamental to an administrative center’s functioning because maize, and particularly the chicha beer brewed from it, played such an important role in Andean redistributive rituals.  

Despite the presence of the administrative center at Oroncota, Inca control of the region apparently did not bring about significant changes in the local political economy, at least not of those communities in the immediate vicinity of the plateau. The state extracted little economic benefit from the populations there, and local elites largely maintained their independence from

---


imperial control. These local elites likely even benefitted from certain aspects of their interaction with the state, such as better access to prestige items. This relationship may have brought about greater socio-economic stratification and labor specialization in the local Yampara society. It also may have facilitated the strengthening of religious cults controlled by the local elite. None of these changes came about, however, through direct implementation by the state.38

The seeming disconnect between the high level of Inca investment in architecture and the minimal economic returns the state reaped in the area leads Sonia Alconini, the archaeologist who has led the most extensive excavations at the site, to describe the Oroncota complex as a “dis-embedded imperial center.” In other words, it was a venue in which the Inca officials sought to demonstrate the power of the state in a contested landscape. This involved the construction of buildings designed primarily to exhibit the empire’s potential to exert force.39 Such construction styles therefore theoretically reaped political and even military returns through extremely hegemonic strategies. Like other architecture-of-power complexes, Inca Oroncota was designed to cultivate political allegiance while preventing local populations from challenging state power.

But according to historical evidence relating to the wider region surrounding Oroncota, territorial elements of control were also part of the Inca strategy in the central valleys. As discussed above, Inca officials sent mitima populations to the Yampara territories near Oroncota. The highest-level Yampara officials during the reign of Huayna Capac, Aymoro and his son Francisco Aymoro, oversaw the functioning of these foreign laborers. These workers most likely provisioned the Oroncota complex, chiefly to fill the storage silos with the maize necessary to


preform redistributive rituals within Rey Inca. Julien shows that in other similar scenarios in which *mitmaqkuna* tended to the provisioning of an Inca fortress or other state installation, the workers assumed the title *pucaracamayoc*. This title does not appear in reference to Oroncota, but it is reasonable that such a class of “fortress-tenders” came into existence in order to satisfy the needs of the state complexes here as well.\(^{40}\)

Aymoro’s jurisdiction also included sites located farther down the Pilcomayo to the east, where the ruins of a chain of Inca structures now lies (Figure 4-9). The best-known is Cuzcotoro, because of references to it in multiple chronicles. Pärssinen and Siiriäinen convincingly place Cuzcotoro atop a mountain ridge that runs north-and-south approximately 50 km east of Oroncota. The locals know the ridge as the *serranía* Khosko-Toro. The primary Inca ruins on this ridge, known to locals as Manchachi (Quechua for “place of terror”), are at an elevation of approximately 2,250 m. A defensive wall stretching 1.7 km guards the peak of the ridge from the east. It is attached to small stone enclosures built at intervals that likely served as storage facilities or resting places for soldiers on patrol (Figure 4-10). The enclosures reflect Inca style architecture, though of a low masonry quality. The likely remnants of watch posts providing a view to the east sit to the south of the wall. Approximately 300 m west of the wall, one encounters the so-called main complex consisting of eleven rooms built in Inca style. The site also featured a number of storage silos and a *kallanka* used as military barracks. Pärssinen and Siiriäinen argue that boulders in the vicinity of the *kallanka* “are the remains of a similar walled construction” that preceded this one. The earlier incarnation was an “even larger and more solid

\(^{40}\) Julien, “Oroncota entre dos mundos,” 100-04.
structure.” The archaeologists additionally found a number of round stones that did not originate at the site and seem to typify sling stones.\textsuperscript{41}

The evidence of a destroyed structure next to the *kallanka* at Cuzcotoro is consistent with historical evidence in a number of written accounts. According to the chronicles, the fortress at Cuzcotoro was the location of one of the most calamitous attacks on eastern Inca positions. It occurred late in the reign of Huayna Capac, probably around 1520-25. Chiriguana warriors killed all the troops stationed there and, according to some versions of the story, proceeded all the way to the highlands before imperial forces could respond and turn them back. After the immediate threat had passed, Huayna Capac sent an Inca official named Yasca to rebuild the fortress and reorganize border defense.\textsuperscript{42}

Ceramic inventories from the site provide some insight into the question of who resided at Cuzcotoro. The pottery discovered within the main complex represents local “Manchachi” styles prior to the period of Inca occupation (beginning ca. 1480s) and thereafter demonstrates an increase in Inca-related styles and eastern lowland styles. Unlike at Oroncota, no ceramics associated with the Cuzco elite or the distant highlands have been located. Nor has any Yampara pottery surfaced.\textsuperscript{43} This evidence implies two conclusions. First, that Inca officials built their


\textsuperscript{42} Pärssinen and Siiriänen, “Cuzcotoro and the Inka Fortification System,” 137-40. Descriptions of this attack appear in Sarmiento de Gamboa, *Historia de los Incas*, 146-47; Cabello Balboa, *Miscelánea antártica*, 383-84; and Murúa, *Historia general de Perú*, 130-31. Sarmiento uses the term “Chirihuana”; Murúa uses “Chiriguana”; and Cabello Balboa, “Chiliguanes.” The location of Cuzcotoro in the heart of the Chiriguana cordillera, as well as the evidence of Guaraní migrations to the Andes during the 1520s (the Alejo García tales as well as other evidence analyzed in Chapter 5), indicate that these Chiriguana invaders were indeed Guaraní and not simply Chiriguanaes in the broad sense of the term.

\textsuperscript{43} Alconini, “The Southeastern Inka Frontier against the Chiriguanos,” 410-13.
complex upon a preexisting site that had been home to a community of non-Yampara locals in the pre-Incaic period. Second, the staff of Cuzcotoro included locals as well as ethnic Incas from the heartland, but the latter used more-provincial ceramics, so they were likely of a lower class and rank than the *orejones* at Oroncota.

Both conclusions largely square with the historical evidence regarding the Yampara cacique Aymoro’s role at Cuzcotoro. The testimony discussed above in regards to his political role in the imperial hierarchy also tells us that, “in his capacity and role as governor of the province and cacique of the Yampara, [Aymoro] had some fortresses at Dilava and Conima and in Cuzcotoro. And in order to fortify them, the Inca Huayna Capac sent Indians to him” and later to his son and successor Francisco Aymoro.\(^\text{44}\) In the context of the lack of Yampara ceramics at Cuzcotoro, it becomes fairly clear that Aymoro’s control over Cuzcotoro related to his role as “governor,” not to his role as leader of the Yampara. In other words, Cuzcotoro was not historically a Yampara site; Aymoro was assigned responsibility over it by Inca officials. Secondly, the wording—“he had some fortresses”—seems to imply that the “Indians” sent to Aymoro were under his jurisdiction and not vice versa.

Pärssinen and Siiriäinen have located the ruins of two additional Inca-era military installations in the immediate vicinity of Cuzcotoro that seem to match with the “Dilava” and “Conima” fortresses mentioned in coordination with Cuzcotoro. Each lies atop a mountain ridge at approximately 15-25 km distance from at least one other site. Together they form a crescent shape that stretches to the north and east of Cuzcotoro (Figure 4-9). Their positioning relative to

\(^{44}\) Cited in Julien, “Oroncota entre dos mundos,” 105.
one another made possible visual contact and thus immediate rudimentary communication between all of the sites.\textsuperscript{45}

The easternmost of these sites is known as Incahuasi. The name is a generic one applied by locals well after the end of its Inca occupation. It simply means “Inca house.” Incahuasi sits atop the serranía Inka Huasi, a north-south ridge, at around 1,900 m of elevation. The site is in poor condition because of construction work there dating to the 1930s. What remains are a few terraces that contain the foundations of houses separated from the main complex. Erland Nordenskiöld’s 1913 map and description provide a bit more of an idea of the original structures and layout (Figure 4-11). He describes a stone building measuring approximately 15 m by 30 m overlooking a steep cliff to the east. Smaller buildings surrounded it and also dotted the crest to the north and south. A wall rings the complex on the west, but it enclosed livestock and was in all likelihood not defensive in nature. No wall appears to have protected the site from the east, but the steepness of the eastern slope was sufficiently daunting for would-be invaders. Later scholars agree with Nordenskiöld’s classification of Incahuasi as a military fort. It featured several non-military aspects because its residents were required to be partially self-sufficient at the extreme frontier of Inca settlement in the area, but surveillance and the communication of any threat from the east was likely their primary responsibility.\textsuperscript{46}

Pärssinen and Siiriäinen argue that the third site corresponds to a complex that lies between Cuzcotoro and Incahuasi. Both the ridge and the site upon it are known to locals as Iñao. The site consists of three terraced platforms at around 1,500 m above sea level on which

\textsuperscript{45} Pärssinen and Siiriänen, “Cuzcotoro and the Inka Fortification System,” 139, 158-60; Saignes, Los Andes orientales, 12-13.

the foundations of a number of buildings remain. They include the remnants of a *kallanka* (24.5 m by 9 m) and several residential and storage facilities. The feature that sets Iñao apart from the other sites in the area is an *ushnu* platform measuring 2.2 meters in height (Figure 4-12).\(^{47}\)

A fourth military installation sits atop the Khosko-Toro mountain ridge approximately 20 km to the north of Cuzcotoro: a hilltop enclosure called Incapirca. The Quechua meaning of the name, “Inca walls,” is descriptive of the site, as it consists entirely of a 1.5 km-long, 3 m-high stone wall encircling a peak at approximately 3,000 m of elevation (Figure 4-13). There is no evidence of any structure inside the wall, nor are any ceramics evident there. Its purpose appears to have been security alone. The wall features gated entrances and bastions, both consistent with military installations. The walls are also backfilled to an interior height of around 1 m to allow those inside to survey and fire sling stones in all directions. Vincent Lee concludes that Incapirca was built as a refuge in which the surrounding population could take cover in the event of an attack. Pärssinen and Siiriäinen suggest that Incapirca “probably was never finished, or it was a refuge built to complement a pre-existing defence system.”\(^{48}\)

No extensive archaeological work has focused on Incahuasi, Iñao, or Incapirca. As such, valuable data such as ceramic evidence indicating the inhabitants of the structures is unavailable. It is also unclear if the sites came under attack at the time when Cuzcotoro was apparently destroyed. The initial surveys and descriptions indicate only that all three were either constructed or refitted under Inca supervision. If one can trust the testimony that describes Aymoro’s role in the region, and also extrapolate the ceramic evidence available at Cuzcotoro, the most likely scenario is that *orejones* and locals worked together to staff the complexes under Yampara.

---

\(^{47}\) Pärssinen and Siiriäinen, “Cuzcotoro and the Inka Fortification System,” 156-58.

oversight. This would imply that, unlike at Oroncota, the Inca empire implemented largely
hegemonic political control of the eastern sites on the Upper Pilcomayo. The state supplemented
the power of the local leaders, however, by lending them resources in the form of labor that
included orejones from the Inca heartland. Economic extraction was seemingly low, if there was
any at all. The primary role of these structures seems to have been to provide the people living
under Inca rule, particularly at Oroncota and the nearby valleys, as much advanced notice as
possible of the approach of hostile forces from the east. Their role in these attacks is discussed in
more detail below.

Tarija & the Pilaya Basin

The region surrounding the modern city of Tarija was the site of the southernmost Inca
installations within Charcas. This zone represented another potential area of inroads by which
lowland populations might breach the highlands. The Pilaya tributary of the Pilcomayo led
directly to the Chicha heartland, the Cinti Valley populated by the Qaraqara, and potentially
Porco (Figure 4-14). Alternatively, the Bermejo River might lead populations from the Paraná
and Paraguay basins into the Tarija valleys (Figure 4-15) and into contact with the southern
portions of the capac ñan, the Andean road and infrastructure system (Figure 4-16). A lack of
chronicles relating to the pre-Hispanic period in this area, along with the rudimentary nature of
archaeological work on the structures there, makes it difficult to speak with much precision as to
the Inca strategies for the incorporation and defense of the area. Data relating to Inca control of
the area just to the south of Charcas, however, helps suggest some strategies that the Incas might
have taken within Charcas as well.

The largest frontier installation overseen by the Incas in the Pilaya basin was
Condorhuasi, located to the west and at higher elevation than the modern city of Tarija.
Lizárraga’s description of the area from around 1600 references “a garrison of soldiers” located
“on lands in the province of the Chichas … when [the Inca] was lord of these lands.” According to him, these soldiers were specifically tasked with guarding the territory “against the Chiriguana.” The likely ruins of that garrison complex overlook the strategic valleys of the San Juan de Oro River, a tributary of the Pilaya and secondary tributary of the Pilcomayo. Condorhuasi consists of a pair of gated perimeter defensive walls running along the exposed southwestern face of the mountain (Figures 4-17a & 4-17b). The other approaches to the mountain are far too pendulous to scale without specialized equipment (Figure 4-17c). The walls surround approximately 100 small, stone-walled enclosures that likely served as residences and storage houses. Some of the better-preserved buildings feature doorways and interior niches suggestive of Inca design, but other aspects, such as the flat, stone roofs that partially cover others, are almost certainly non-Inca. The pottery found there is also suggestive of both Inca and local styles, but in-depth analysis of it is lacking. Like other sites in the region, Condorhuasi has been subject to very little archaeological study. Those who have analyzed it in any professional sense are in agreement that it represents a combination of Chicha and Inca architectural styles, probably the result of the Inca occupation and refitting of a preexisting defensive complex. Its position along the Inca road connecting the eastern lowlands with the altiplano was strategic in the sense that it offered protection and surveillance of the most likely potential points of incursion into the southern highlands. At the same time, the location made possible the rapid movement of soldiers to and from Condorhuasi when needed.


Autochthonous Juríe, Moyomoyo, and Churumata populations inhabited the valleys to the south and east of Condorhuasi. Scattered documentary evidence suggests that the Incas came to rule over a number of installations in this area, and they placed mitima communities including Karanqa and Chicha peoples there to staff them. Most of the sites have not been located with any certainty, and archaeological work on them is lacking. Some may have represented outposts on the capac ñan. Others, such as Aquilcha and Esquile, were reportedly larger military structures similar to Condorhuasi in their scale and purpose. The roles and functions of the mitima communities that operated in and around the Inca structures are not clear. Nor is their relationship with the local populations. Documentary evidence relating to areas farther to the south, however, demonstrates that Inca officials also transferred Chicha mitmaqkuna beyond Charcas, at least as far as the Quebrada de Humahuaca in modern-day Argentina (Figure 4-15). Their duties and responsibilities in these installations may offer insight into how the occupation of nearby southern Charcas functioned under the Incas as well.

The structures located to the south of Charcas demonstrate Inca political, military, economic, and ideological influence over the local populations in varying forms. The Chicha mitmaqkuna sent to the area likely served in roles relating to all of these aspects of control. There is particular evidence, however, relating to their capacity to instruct the natives of this region in social and cultural practices deemed appropriate by Inca officials. Carlos Zanolli has identified multiple instances in which Spaniards relied on the Chicha, specifically, to help them make

---

51 Aquilcha was reportedly the home of 100 households of Karanqa mitmaqkuna. See Raffino, Vitry, and Gobbo, “Inkas y Chichas,” 258-60; and Presta, “La población de los valles de Tarija,” 235-45.


53 For the most comprehensive brief summary of some key sites in this area, see Félix A. Acuto, “Experiencing Inca Domination in Northwest Argentina and the Southern Andes,” in Silverman and Isbell, Handbook of South American Archaeology, 845-61.
contact with and acculturate other native peoples in this area, a testament to their similar service during the Inca period. In the same way that Inca officials paired the Chicha with the Qaraqara in order to modify Chicha culture, Inca officials seem to have used Chicha *mitmaqkuna* in hopes of “civilizing” even more culturally distinct peoples. A particular documentary reference from the seventeenth century even mentions certain “Chichas-**Orejones**” living in the area. They were the descendants of “Indians who occupied the Inca empires in the mines and the conquest of the cordillera.” This provocative reference seems to suggest that Chicha *mitmaqkuna* in the far south served as imperial *orejones.*

Zanolli argues that the conflation of the Chicha residents of the area and the *orejones* was the result of local histories confusing two classes of administrators sent from the exterior. He finds that they were indeed separate groups. This interpretation, however, is based on an overly generalized interpretation of the *orejones* class. Not only did *orejones* vary from each other in rank and purpose, as was the case with the *orejones* stationed in the Upper Pilcomayo region, their affiliation with the Inca ethnic group was not necessarily entirely a matter of ethnicity as one might understand it. The Inca state granted the status of “Inca by privilege” to certain favored clients. Multiple chronicle accounts specifically demonstrate that some Incas-by-privilege modified their ears with spools. Many of the Aymara *mallku* in Charcas gained this status, as represented by their use of the title “Inca.” It is perfectly reasonable that at least some of the Chicha *mitmaqkuna* in the Quebrada de Humahuaca were similarly honored. If so, the

---

56 For more on the “**Inca de privilegio,**” see Bauer and Covey, “Processes of State Formation in the Inca Heartland,” 850; Rowe, “Absolute Chronology in the Andean Area,” 260-61; and Hidefuji Someda, “Aproximación a la imagen real de «los incas de privilegio»,” *Boletín de Arqueología PUCP* (Lima) 8 (2004): 31-42. See esp. 34, where Someda identifies multiple chronicle accounts that describe overlap between the two categories.
staffing of Inca complexes in the far south was reflective of the Incas’ handling of the Cuzcotoro Defensive Chain on the Upper Pilcomayo. The Chichas-\textit{Orejones} likely served in much the same fashion as the \textit{orejones} sent to help Aymoro fortify the frontier.

It would be presumptuous to say definitively that the Inca structures in the Tarija area worked in precisely the same way. More evidence relating directly to them is necessary first. It is reasonable to suggest, however, that the Karanqa and Chicha \textit{mitmaka} sent just south of the Pilaya River occupied similar roles as equivalent foreign labor populations in similar structures in the immediate northern (the Upper Pilcomayo) and southern (the Quebrada de Humahuaca) regions. If so, they would have answered to a small class of Inca \textit{orejones} and likely interacted with local \textit{mitima} populations that helped support them and the resource needs of the complex.

The effect of the Inca and associated \textit{mitima} presence on the locals in the Tarija region is a more complex issue to resolve. If one looks again to the immediate north and south for corollaries, one finds differing evidence. Félix Acuto argues that the Inca presence in Northwestern Argentina was extremely significant in shaping the local societies there, and Zanolli agrees. Alconini argues largely the opposite in certain communities in the vicinity of key Inca structures on the Upper Pilcomayo. One reason for this divergence of Inca strategy might relate to the differences between the natives in each area. Those who lived farther to the south exhibited social and cultural norms that differed more radically from Inca ideals. The Yampara, in Alconini’s study, were organized in ways that much more closely reflected highland Andean practices.\textsuperscript{57} From the perspective of the Salomon model, the empire needed to exert more transformative pressure in the distant South than on the Yampara. If this were the case, one

might hypothesize a middle ground in this respect for the Tarija valleys. But again, evidence for a fuller conclusion here is lacking.

It is safe to conclude that Inca control over the region near the Pilaya and Tarija valleys concentrated on control of access to the highlands via the rivers that flowed to the southeastern lowlands, as well as the imperial road system. There is no evidence suggesting intensive economic interests in the area. Nor is there evidence of a territorial ideological program. Both ideologically and politically, the empire was more intently focused on the more distant South, where it seemed to be cultivating political allegiance and transforming local cultures during Huayna Capac’s reign. One might point to the success of the Qaraqara mallku, Ayra Canchi, in inadvertently preparing the ground for Inca rule when he reportedly exerted control over the Pilaya basin during the prior generation.\(^{58}\) His rule over the natives of this region may have begun the process of acculturation toward more “appropriate” highland ways of life. As such, Inca political strategies in this region were also largely hegemonic. Only in the military sense might one classify Inca control of this region as territorial. The empire maintained one large military structure, Condorhuasi, in the highlands, and evidence suggests that others existed at lower altitudes closer to the Pilcomayo tributaries near the modern city of Tarija. But other than a single reference to a staff of 100 families at Aquilcha, there is nothing to indicate the degree to which these complexes were occupied by soldiers or who these soldiers were. The structures may have been entrusted entirely to locals or designed merely to project the capacity for military coercion. Either scenario would reflect hegemonic military strategies.

---

\(^{58}\) See Chapter 3; and “La probanza de don Fernando Ayra de Ariutu,” 724, 737.
The most distant of the fortresses that the Incas nietos highlighted as Tupac Yupanqui’s legacy of expansion was Samaipata (Figure 4-18). The area where this complex stands was largely outside of the zone of control of the peoples of the Charcas confederation. It is located atop one of the easternmost peaks of the Andean mountain range and above one of the southernmost tributaries of the Amazon. Its location at the convergence of three ecological systems—the highland valleys to the west, the humid Mojos plains to the northeast, and the dry Chaco scrubland to the southeast—made it a point of convergence among many culturally distinct peoples.

A lesser-known chronicle written by Diego Felipe de Alcaya in the early 1600s describes the incorporation of Samaipata and the peoples of the surrounding area into the Inca realm in much greater detail than is available relating to other areas of Inca frontier expansion. Alcaya’s chronicle is the product of his father’s interactions with the natives of the original Santa Cruz region (modern San José de Chiquitos) in the 1560s. Alcaya’s father, Martín Sánchez Alcayaga, appears on the list of encomenderos from 1561. Alcayaga was also privy to the oral histories of the Inca royal line continued through Pallau to his son Carlos Inca, Alcayaga’s principal informant.59

Alcaya’s text claims that the Inca60 sent a relative of his named Guacane to the “plains of Grigotá” with the intent of incorporating the territory into the Inca realm. Grigotá, Alcaya’s text


60 Alcaya places the events of his chronicle during the reign of “Mango Inga.” The name seems to correspond with that of the Inca installed by Pizarro in 1533, Manco Inca, but cannot be the same because the events described by Alcaya occurred during the period of Inca expansion and “before the Spanish arrived in these parts.” See Alcaya, “Relación cierta,” 47, 55ff. Pärssinen posits that the name may rather have been a generic term used in the region for the position of Inca. See Pärssinen, Tawantinsuyu, 131. The claim by the Incas nietos suggests that the construction
explains, was the name used by the foremost political leader of the lowland plains to the east of Samaipata. All community leaders owed allegiance to him. Through these other kings and chiefs, Grigotá ruled over 50,000 people. During Guacane’s march to the eastern lowlands, Inca scouts happened upon a series of valleys with abundant access to fresh water. On one peak in the area, Guacane ordered the construction of a “magnificent fortress” capable of quartering his soldiers and decorated with stone carvings. He populated the valleys surrounding the site, called “Sabaypata,” or more commonly Samaipata, meaning “the heights of rest” (*la altura de descanso*) in Quechua and Aymara.\(^1\)

Guacane proceeded further to put the stamp of the Inca empire on the region by constructing an additional fort at Guanacopampa and organizing extensive agricultural and mining operations in the new territory using “new populations” that he placed in the region. He brought his brother Condori from Cuzco to take charge of operations in the gold and silver mines he and his retainers discovered at nearby Saypurú. He then extended his control over the plains ruled by Grigotá. Grigotá and the principal political leaders submitted to Guacane in exchange for gifts of both symbolic and practical importance: fine clothing, metal adornments, and metal axes and chisels. Over time, he further “attracted [the local elite] to his service [and] occupied them little by little in working fields of maize and things of the land, [meanwhile] fattening them with deer hunts and fishing in abundant rivers, … and accompanying them ostrich racing and turkey and rabbit hunting, as they were inclined to do.” Guacane did this in order “so they would

---

not see that he thrust work and labor upon them.” The Inca was so pleased with Guacane’s success in developing the region that he granted him a measure of autonomous rule over it. Guacane made his headquarters at Samaipata complete with the trappings of his own royal court.

Archaeological analysis of the so-called “magnificent fortress” at Samaipata helps put Alcaya’s description into context. The term “fort,” applied to it traditionally by locals, is in many ways ill-suited to the site. Its most striking feature is a rock outcrop measuring approximately 250 m by 60 m and sitting at around 1,950 m emerging from the surrounding hill (Figures 4-19a & 4-19b). The surfaces of the outcrop feature carvings of various types and intricacies, including geometric shapes, niches, seats, drainage channels, basins, and animal forms. There are no caverns or hollowed-out areas of the structure that would allow one to enter it as one would enter a building. It does, however, include apparent ritual spaces set apart from the rest of the outcrop. The remnants of stone walls as well as postholes suggest only the partial enclosure of certain areas atop and alongside the carved structure. The seeming disconnect between the name “fort” and the evidence available in the early 1900s led Erland Nordenskiöld, one of the first modern academics to describe the complex, to conclude that Samaipata was not a fortress at all in pre-Columbian times. It was rather a ceremonial outpost at the extreme edge of Inca territory.

---

62 Alcaya, “Relación cierta,” 47-50. Alcaya writes that Guacane was able to use the title “king” (rey). Pärssinen interprets this as a likely translation of the term “apo or capac apo,” both more equivalent to viceroy or royal governor. See Pärssinen, *Tawantinsuyu*, 130. The existence of the Saypurú mine has never been confirmed. Most modern scholars conclude that it was a product of myth. Combès has greater faith that it did exist in some form. See Combès, “Saypurú,” 189-90; Enrique Finot, *Historia de la conquista del oriente boliviano* (La Paz: Juventud, 1978 [1939]), 294-95; José María García Recio, *Análisis de una sociedad de frontera. Santa Cruz de la Sierra en los siglos XVI y XVII* (Seville: Excm. Diputación Provincial de Sevilla, 1988), 76.

Though the massive carved rock dominates the site and the scholarship about it, a large plaza flanked by exposed building foundations just below the outcrop offers additional information about the purpose of Samaipata during the Inca period (Figure 4-18). French travel writer Alcide d'Orbigny indicated a “village des Incas” on his map of the site from the mid-nineteenth century, but the remains of the village were hidden under thick vegetation until very recently. In the early 1990s, archaeologists uncovered evidence of a number of buildings that together were a prime example of the Inca monumental architectural style consistent with a provincial administrative center. They found the remains of a large number of storehouses and an acllahuasi—which scholars now consider to have been a residence for high-status Inca women. The site also seems to contain the ruins of certain military features dating to the Inca era, including a kallanka measuring 68 m long, 16 m wide, and 12 m high, and two concentric defensive walls surrounding the entire complex. More recent archaeological work has also uncovered evidence of storehouses on nearby mountain peaks and other traces of Inca infrastructure suggestive of an extension of the capac ñan in the area. The whole of the evidence suggests that Samaipata served not only ceremonial functions but as an important Inca administrative center.64

There is no surviving site associated to the Guanacopampa fort that Alcaya’s text references, but Guanacopampa was not the only additional Inca controlled fortress in the vicinity of Samaipata. Albert Meyers and Cornelius Ulbert reason that if Samaipata did serve as an imperial administrative center, “strategically it is logical that the imperial frontier must have

been located further east.” The same pattern is evident in Oroncota, where Cuzcotoro and the related structures mark out a frontier of sorts at a distance to the east of the administrative center. Meyers and Ulbert have carried out small-scale excavations on an apparent Inca site located some 50-60 km east of Samaipata (Figure 4-20). La Fortaleza, as it is known, consists of two complementary complexes, each sitting atop hills at around 800 m above sea level and separated from each other by a deep ravine (Figure 4-21). The hills represent the easternmost heights of the Andes before the plains of Grigotá, on which modern-day Santa Cruz, Bolivia, stands. The ruins of perimeter defensive walls surround both complexes. The walls feature bastion-like protrusions designed for surveillance and defense. Inside the walls is evidence of a number of buildings, the use of which is still mostly undetermined due to the lack of in-depth excavations at the site. The southern complex contains the ruins of a kallanka, a further indication of La Fortaleza’s military character, but the northern complex suggests an additional purpose. It features a stepped-platform that likely served as an ushnu. Meyers and Ulbert determine on the basis of the ushnu that La Fortaleza was designed to project Inca state power to the nearby populations of the nearby lowlands.65

Returning to the Samaipata complex itself, there is no consensus among archaeologists about whether Alcaya’s chronicle is correct in attributing the construction of site solely to the Incas. Archaeologist Oswaldo Rivera Sundt, among others, describes periods of occupation of Samaipata by the Chané and Mojocoya peoples from the northeast dating to 800 CE. This version relies upon the existence at Samaipata of two or more clearly differentiated pre-

---

65 Meyers and Ulbert, “Inka Archaeology in Eastern Bolivia,” 82-84; Albert Meyers, “Incas, Españoles y el Paytiti: la perspectiva desde el ‘Fuerte de Sabaypata,’ Oriente de Bolivia,” Archivio per l’Antropologia e la Etnologia (Florence) 135 (2005): 167-170. La Fortaleza cannot correspond to Guanacopampa because its location does not fit the description from the chronicle.
Columbian periods of carvings in the outcrop. The earlier, pre-Inca phase(s), according to this theory, reflect(s) an era of residency and pilgrimage by primarily lowland peoples from the north and east. The representations of animals native to the northeastern lowlands, such as the jaguar and boa constrictor, are indicative of this interpretation. The later Inca phase of carvings focused more intently on geometric shapes and included the type of the trapezoidal niches in which the religious elite placed portable objects of veneration. The products of this later phase represent, according to Meyers, a lack of respect for, and even an explicit rejection of, the earlier phase. Those favoring the multi-cultural provenance of Samaipata also point to pottery found at the site and in the vicinity attributed stylistically to several peoples from the eastern and northern lowlands. Others attribute the “two stylistically and stratigraphically separate complexes”—the animal motifs and the niched temples—to two distinct Inca styles from sequential eras. Those favoring this explanation point to areas within the Inca heartland that resemble either of the two clearly recognizable phases as well as other examples of the superposition of one Inca construction style upon another. The new phase, they argue, may well have marked a transition within the Inca state or its strategies for the frontier zone, of which Samaipata apparently was the administrative capital.

This debate is important in terms of the nature of Inca ideological control in the Samaipata region. The former interpretation—that the Incas took control of a long-occupied ritual site and imposed a radically different state-sanctioned ideological program—suggests an exceptionally territorial approach to ideological control of the region. If the latter interpretation is

---

66 Rivera Sundt, “El complejo arqueológico de Samaipata,” 66-71; Meyers, “Toward a Reconceptualization,” 237-44. Meyers and his colleagues “interpret the two systems as opposed to each other, with the later one not respecting and perhaps even explicitly rejecting the earlier one.”

67 Meyers, “Toward a Reconceptualization,” 237-44.
correct, and all elements are of Inca origin, it suggests that imperial officials implemented two distinct phases of ideological policy. During the first, artisans under Inca control apparently imprinted the ideological symbols familiar to the peoples native to the wider region. They then changed course from this hegemonic policy and carved symbols more common to Inca symbolic architecture in other areas. Regardless of the precise course of events, the change in approach in their policy represents a movement from hegemonic to more territorial forms of ideological control. This shift might have reflected a reversal of course, perhaps coinciding with the ascension of a new Inca to the throne. Alternatively, it may have represented a two-phased plan of ideological incorporation and transformation similar to Salomon’s political and socio-economic model.

The Alcaya chronicle, meanwhile, provides insight into the political and economic workings of the Samaipata province under Inca control. The brothers Guacane and Condori were almost certainly high-ranking Inca orejones sent from Cuzco to govern the new province. Guacane reportedly occupied the more administrative roles of governance while Condori directly handled the state’s economic extractive interests. Alcaya’s text explains that after subduing the people of the plains of Grigotá, Guacane “put some Indian workers from the plains” in the Guanacopampa fortress. Meanwhile, he staffed the gold mine with “one thousand Indians from this kingdom”—that is to say, from the Charcas highlands where Alcaya wrote his chronicle. Guacane also “left the necessary people to work the silver,” though the account elaborates no further about these workers.68

What Alcaya’s chronicle does provide indicates that Guacane brought mitima populations from the highlands. These workers labored both in the mines, as the chronicle states directly, and

68 Alcaya, “Relación cierta,” 49.
in the fields around Samaipata, because he “populated the upper valleys” before coming to
control the plains of Grigotá. The chronicle makes no mention of it, but mita laborers may well
have supplemented these mitmaqkuna populations. The common pattern from Cochabamba and
elsewhere where the Incas imported significant labor forces was to pair mitayos with more
permanent labor populations. The latter assumed specialized positions and managed the former,
who performed more menial tasks.69

After “the first years,” Guacane won political power over the plains of Grigotá. His
strategy greatly resembled the methods by which Inca officials won allegiance in the Charcas
highlands—investing gifts and objects of prestige—though the more utilitarian nature of some of
these gifts (axes and chisels) may reflect the lesser socio-economic gradation among the people
of this region. In other words, the elite here had use for axes, when Aymara mallku probably did
not. Guacane also incorporated the local populations in some aspects of Inca administrative,
military, and/or economic activities from the point when he began to exercise political power.
Their exact labor function is not clear from the wording—“there [at Guanacopampa] he put some
Indian workers from the plains.” They may have provisioned the complex as pucaracamayoc, as
local populations frequently did elsewhere, but they may also have served as guards or servants
within the structure itself. Presumably they also provided assistance at La Fortaleza and other as-
yet-undiscovered Inca sites. Local laborers also likely aided in the mining operations as some of
“the necessary people [who] work[ed] the silver.”70

Within the Samaipata complex itself, the residents probably consisted of a number of
Inca orejones in addition to Guacane, some of whom were likely religious officials tending to the

69 For the organization of mitayo and mitima labor relative one another, see Wachtel, “The Mitimas of the
Cochabamba Valley,” 213-17.

ideological rituals centered on the sacred outcrop. Other functionaries, possibly yanaconas, likely served the orejones class and helped with elements of the redistributive rituals associated with such an administrative center. The presence of the acllahuasi at Samaipata indicates that a population of Inca “chosen women” also lived there. They helped brew chicha beer and weave cloth, both of which played important roles in Inca political and religious ceremony.\footnote{Morris, “The Infrastructure of Inka Control in the Peruvian Central Highlands,” 165-68.}

All of this evidence indicates that Inca policies toward the peoples of the plains of Grigotá initially skewed toward the hegemonic end of the spectrum. Guacane exerted economic and ideological power, both in the gifts he gave and in the construction or transformation of the Samaipata site. Depending on one’s interpretation of the stratigraphy of the carvings on the rock outcrop, he may have exerted more territorial ideological control from the beginning. His political and ideological exertions won him political power over Grigotá and his followers, whose labor he began to exploit as he continued courting the local elite. This interaction certainly reveals some social, political, and economic changes in the area, but again, the impact is hard to gauge without more evidence. Conceivably it imposed sharper socio-economic stratification in the local populations. As was the case in the Yampara community analyzed by Alconini, access to luxuries and, at least in this case, class-specific activities, likely enhanced the power of the existing elites over their followers. The average plains resident, however, most likely saw his or her workload increase due to the demands on these communities made by the empire. Closer to Samaipata and Saypurú, assuming the latter indeed existed, Guacane exerted more territorial forms of political and economic power. He imported laborers from elsewhere in the empire to work in the fields and the mines, as well as members of the administrative and religious classes.
to run the Samaipata complex, though it is unclear who occupied these regions when Guacane first arrived.

The question of the military methods of control over the region is a bit more difficult. María de los Angeles Muñoz suggests that the kallanka at Samaipata served as a military barracks on the basis of its position near the Chiriguana frontier. The presence of the rock outcrop, furthermore, rules out the possibility that the kallanka was the primary religious center in the complex. Her excavations focusing on the kallanka have turned up both Inca and surrounding lowland styles of ceramics. If the structure had served as housing for soldiers or other itinerant laborers at the site, this would seem to indicate that the plains people occupied positions associated with the servicing or protection of Samaipata. But the excavation of the kallanka also revealed other clues that are valuable when understood in the context of Alcaya’s chronicle. Although the kallanka at Samaipata dates originally to the second phase of the rock carving sequence and was certainly of Inca origin, its ruins demonstrate two distinct phases of occupation. Angeles Muñoz has found that the wooden posts that originally supported the roof of the building were both broken and burned, likely during an attack by outsiders. In the aftermath of the destruction, the postholes were covered with gravel during a second period of occupation. The identity of these later residents is not entirely clear; nor is the era in which they occupied it, with any degree of precision.\footnote{Angeles Muñoz, “The Kallanka at Samaipata,” 257-64.}

This evidence of the destruction of at least one of the Inca structures at Samaipata correlates to an incident described in Alcaya’s chronicle. According to his version of events, news of the wealth of the Incas, and that of the brothers Guacane and Condori particularly, attracted the attention of the Guaraní peoples who lived well-beyond the plains of Grigotá. Up to
8,000 bowmen set forth from the east with the intention of seizing for themselves the dominion of the Incas. The chronicle explains that the Guaraní warriors brought with them their wives and children with the understanding that they would “not return again to their places of origin.”

The majority of the invaders prepared to attack the newly-incorporated Inca province under the direction of Guacane and Condori. Alcaya’s chronicle explains that the brothers had lost their vigilance and failed to guard against the possibility of any threat because the peoples of the eastern lowlands appeared to be “brutish people, naked and submissive.” The Guaraní took advantage of the brothers’ complacency. They attacked the primary population center of the plains of Grigotá at the moment when Guacane had descended from Samaipata to meet with the local leaders. Guacane was killed in the attack; Grigotá was among the wounded. Countless others were taken prisoner. The Guaraní learned the location of the Saypurú mines from their captives and soon attacked the mines as well. They captured Condori in the process before proceeding to the fortress of Guanacopampa and then Samaipata itself. Residents of both complexes almost entirely abandoned the sites in anticipation of the arrival of the marauding Guaraní.

Alcaya’s chronicle goes on to explain that when the Inca received news of the attacks, the death and capture of his highest officials, and the loss of Saypurú, he sent a high-ranking official named Turumayo with an army to dislodge the invaders from Inca territory. The Guaraní had meanwhile begun to make homes and plant crops in the Andean foothills. Grigotá organized his bowmen alongside the soldiers sent by the Inca. Together they faced off against the newcomers. The battle that followed was devastating to both sides. Turumayo was among the thousands

---

73 Alcaya, “Relación cierta,” 51-52.
74 Ibid., 50-54.
reportedly killed in the battle. Alcaya’s chronicle indicates, however, that the surviving Guarani remained in the region and “populated the cordillera that is theirs today.” In other words, the Guarani migrants who attacked Samaipata and fought Turumayo’s armies managed to carve out a foothold in the eastern Andes. They served, according to this source, as the nucleus of the population known to the Spanish several generations onward as the Chiriguanaes.

According to this version of events, the kallanka might indeed have been constructed as a military barracks. Guacane likely had little notion of how exactly the peoples of the Grigotá plains would react to his imposition of authority. He was certainly sufficiently wary at the outset that he constructed at least one (La Fortaleza) and probably two (Guanacopampa) or more military installations to protect Samaipata. Alcaya’s chronicle explains that the process of winning over the plains peoples went so smoothly, from Guacane’s perspective, that he lost his sense of vigilance. It might even follow that Guacane’s reported placement of locals at Guanacopampa is symbolic of a transition to an indirect strategy of military management. If Alcaya’s version holds true, it is difficult to believe that the kallanka at Samaipata remained primarily a military barracks at the time of its destruction. It is possible that while the rock outcrop increasingly served more purely religious functions, the kallanka began to serve as the venue of the more secular redistributive rituals common to an Inca administrative center.

**Inca Frontier Defensive Strategy: From Defense-in-Depth to Zones of Acculturation, and Back**

Consider for a moment the frontier models discussed in the context of military strategy in the introduction to Chapter 3, the acculturative and the defense-in-depth. Both represent imperial responses to the protection of a distant frontier zone that abuts an area of importance to the

---

75 Ibid., 54-56.
empire, such as an economic enclave. The acculturative model involves attempting to shape clients’ political and economic organization toward acceptable standards. Rather than focusing on military resources, per se, the aim is to neutralize the likelihood that the peoples of the frontier zone will become a threat. It is similar to Roman strategies in certain situations, where the empire sought to protect its interests from dangerous “outer barbarians” by selectively incorporating less-threatening “inner barbarians.” The defense-in-depth strategy involves the investment of territorial military control at limited key “hard points” along the frontier and the establishment of mobile military units in the interior that are capable of rapid response if any of those points is breached.

The evidence for periods favoring both the defense-in-depth and acculturative models in the case of Samaipata is clear. Guacane’s approach to the peoples of the plains of Grigotá was initially guarded. He therefore erected highly territorial defensive structures at key points as he pushed the frontier of Inca control eastward. La Fortaleza and Guanacopampa protected not only the Samaipata complex and the Saypurú mines from attack, but also Cochabamba, the economic enclave located relatively near Samaipata on the capac ñan road system to the west (Figure 4-20). In other words, the presence of these Inca facilities provided the frontier with a degree of depth. In the case of attack, messengers might be able to bring additional military resources from their stations elsewhere in the empire to help defend the most important imperial investments. This is reflective of classic defense-in-depth strategies. Over time, Guacane’s strategy placed less emphasis on military control of the particular frontier points and more on ideological, political, and economic methods of control in the area as he incorporated the plains peoples as Inca clients. Doing so all but insulated Guacane from danger that might come at the hands of these “inner barbarians.” The transformation of Incallajta from a military installation to an ideological and
political complex may well have coincided with the successful addition of this extra layer between the site and the danger of the eastern frontier.

Eventually, Guacane and his frontier defenses fell instead to the “outer barbarians” in the form of the Guaraní/Chiriguanaes. Despite the destruction of Samaipata, one should be hesitant to consider the acculturative strategy a failure in this case. It was at least partially effective when considered from the perspective of the imperial state as a whole. Because the Incas had forged a firm alliance with Grigotá, the Guaraní could not reasonably manage a sneak attack on any Inca fortifications themselves. Instead they attacked the plains of Grigotá, which held little inherent value for the empire. The Guaraní forces managed to advance on and attack higher value targets in Saypurú and Samaipata, but they failed to advance as far as Incallajta and the Cochabamba valleys. The value of these areas was far higher than the eastern frontier positions. Insulating the Cochabamba production enclave likely played a key part in Inca officials’ decision to expand toward Samaipata and beyond in the first place. Despite the shift away from defense-in-depth, the empire managed to protect its more significant investments through the acculturative model in effectively the same way. Because the invaders could not advance undetected beyond the plains of Grigotá, the Incas had the necessary time to reallocate military resources the empire’s most crucial resources.

Evidence is sparser for the Pilaya and Tarija valleys in southern Charcas, but there was at least one large military garrison structure, Condorhuasi, that was set back from the outer frontier of Inca control. The existence of others closer to the frontier, including Aquilcha and Esquile, is likely. These structures’ locations near major imperial roadways suggest they would have served well as complementary sites for a defense-in-depth military strategy. Condorhuasi, particularly, might have housed a mobile battalion that could respond with relative speed to multiple frontier
“hard points” while simultaneously defending a valuable route to the highlands. It is not entirely clear if the Incas supplemented their military strategies in this region with ideological and political ones in the way they did near Samaipata, but the scenario is reasonable. They seem to have deployed such an acculturative model in the far South near the Quebrada de Humahuaca, where the state relied on Chichas-orejones to serve a function akin to that overseen by Guacane and Condori in the lowland East.

The Upper Pilcomayo region is a bit more of a puzzle. The lack of sufficient archaeological data from the complexes east of Cuzcotoro leaves out some key information. One resulting problem is that it is difficult to gauge what structures date to the period before the Chiriguana attack on Cuzcotoro and what complexes may have been built as part of the Inca response to it. The chronicle accounts only describe an attack on Cuzcotoro, but the attack may also have targeted the other military complexes in the region—today known as Iñaö, Incahuasi, and Incapirca—as well. It is also possible, however, Cuzcotoro was the only Inca complex in the region at the time of the attack and Yasca, the Inca official dispatched to the area to reorganize and strengthen the frontier, built the others in order to add additional depth to the frontier.

Both of these interpretations have evidence in their support. Pärssinen and Siiriäinen’s interpretation of the archaeological evidence at Cuzcotoro seemingly validates the view that dates the construction of Incahuasi, Iñaö, and Incapirca to after the Chiriguana attack. They conclude that a larger kallanka once stood next to the kallanka currently evident at the site (Figure 4-10). It would have been counterintuitive for Yasca to attempt to strengthen the frontier by stationing fewer troops at the breach point. But if Yasca intended to extend the frontier to the east and station forces in new complexes closer to hostile territory, a smaller contingent at Cuzcotoro would have made sense. The problem with this interpretation is that it leaves a very
small window in which Yasca could have planned, built, and entrusted the new fortresses to the Yampara leaders in the area.\textsuperscript{76}

The most reasonable explanation is that Cuzcotoro, Iñao, and Incahuasi were initially designed by the Incas as components of a defense-in-depth strategy aimed at the protection of the Oroncota region and possibly the Porco enclave. Like at Samaipata, and as the \textit{Incas nietos} testimony implies, the initial stages of implementation probably occurred during Tupac Yupanqui’s reign. With the help of the orejones entrusted to him, Aymoro (the Yampara leader) began to adopt a strategy of acculturation towards the local populations. The presence of the otherwise peculiarly located ushnu at Iñao seems to indicate a degree of political and ideological strategy deployed in the region. The Chiriguana attack interrupted the acculturative stage, much as a similar one did in Samaipata. Yasca arrived in response and reverted to the earlier defense-in-depth model, most markedly by ordering the construction of a new fortress in which to garrison a local military unit capable of quick response to threats in the area. Incapirca was the resulting structure, but it remained unfinished and largely unused when Tawantinsuyu erupted in its long period of civil wars upon the death of Huayna Capac. For that reason Incapirca lacks any apparent development as a functioning site, and it also fails to appear in the historical record.

This scenario is particularly plausible in that it mirrors the more fully evidenced account from the Samaipata region. It also resembles elements of the contemporary situation in the Quebrada de Humahuaca, where the Incas deployed bow-and-arrow peoples and orejones to bring about the acculturation of frontier peoples. Further archaeological research at Iñao,

\textsuperscript{76} The documentary references to Aymoro’s jurisdiction mention that he ruled over the trio of Cuzcotoro, Dilava, and Conima during the reign of Huayna Capac. His son Francisco Aymoro also served as governor and cacique during the reign of the same Inca. If the attack occurred around 1520 or after (as evidence suggests), all of these changes would have had to fit into the period of the seven or fewer years preceding Huayna Capac’s death in 1527.
Incapirca, and Incahuasi is necessary to make any definitive conclusions about the precise chronology of development of the Upper Pilcomayo Basin defensive structures.

**Conclusion: The Establishment of the Charcas-Chiriguana Frontier**

The image of Inca state power in Charcas that emerges from the territorial-hegemonic analysis is a complex and nuanced one, as one might expect. Over a period equivalent to fewer than three generations, the Inca empire incorporated and transformed Charcas by strategically deploying power in its various forms. Those investments provided returns that imperial officials invested in the further development of the Charcas province as well as additional expansion toward the east, a pattern mirrored elsewhere on the other frontiers of Tawantinsuyu. As they approached peoples who differed radically from the coastal and highland Andean peoples of the Inca heartland, they implemented increasingly creative strategies designed to minimize the risk of security breaches relative to security costs. In at least two similar areas on the Charcas frontier (the Incallajta-Samaipata corridor & the Oroncota-Cuzcotoro corridor), this took the form of a defense-in-depth model that eased over time into a more acculturative model. The strategy was seemingly successful in both areas up until attacks from lowland Guaraní/Chiriguana populations reversed the eastward advance of the Inca empire.

The southeastern Inca or Charcas-Chiriguana frontier that took shape at the end of Huayna Capac’s reign was the result of the interplay of the Incas’ strategic deployment of resources in the region and the reactions of local and not-so-local populations to the Inca presence. Alcaya is the most explicit in stating that the Incas’ wealth inspired the westward migrations of the Guaraní, but additional evidence supports the same general idea. These peoples then clashed with the Incas and those under Inca control, who halted their westward

---

77 Julien, “Kandire in Real Time and Space,” 245-72. See also Chapter 5.
advance. Instead of returning to their homelands, the Guaraní populated the cordillera that coincides with the easternmost Inca installations in the region. These peoples made up the core of the populations living in and around the Chiriguana cordillera decades later when the Spanish began to establish a presence in the same region.

The chronicle accounts of interactions along and across this frontier in Inca times emphasize the dissimilarities that differentiated the highland and “Chiriguana” cultures, as well as the conflict between them. Sarmiento, for instance, tells his readership that Yasca sent Chiriguana prisoners who had been captured after the sack of Cuzcotoro to Huayna Capac “so that he might see the peculiarity of that people.” And it was after the attack on Samaipata that the Inca devised the method of torture by mountaintop exposure that gave rise to the term “Chiriguana.” Both accounts echo Garcilaso de la Vega’s own characterization of the Chiriguanaes as the antithesis of the high civilization of the Incas. This corpus of evidence seems to suggest that the first and only contacts between the two peoples were violent encounters—a belief bolstered by the often-violent nature of interactions across the frontier during the Spanish colonial period. Stretched to the extreme, one might read a certain sense of inevitability into the clashes that pitted them against one another.

A few pieces of scattered evidence turn this notion on its head. None are themselves definitive, but together, they suggest that the cultural and geographical space across which Guaraní peoples and the Inca state operated before their clashes was much wider and more permeable. Two distinct references in the Alcaya chronicle offer starting points. The first arises in the context of Guacane’s offer of state patronage to Grigotá in exchange for the allegiance of

---

his peoples. It follows: “There the caciques who were subject to the great Grigotá met together, Goligoli, Tendi, and Vitupué, all chiefs with their factions that came to 50,000 Indians, and gave obedience to the new king Guacane.”\textsuperscript{79} The inclusion of Tendi and Vitupué in this passage calls for more inspection. The names both refer to powerful Chiriguana leaders who came into contact with the Spanish in the same region in the 1560s, 1580s, and 1600s. The distance in time makes it all-but-impossible that the names referenced the same individuals in each case. The names were likely inheritable titles (much like Grigotá) that designated the leaders of certain Guaraní communities. In any case, the indication is that a significant portion of a reported 50,000 inhabitants in the plains of Grigotá who lent their obedience to the Inca state were Guaraní, or at least lived under Guaraní leadership.\textsuperscript{80}

The second provocative reference from Alcaya springs from his mention of the Xarayes peoples. This group of people was native to the upper Paraguay River in the modern Brazilian Pantanal. They reportedly helped guide and encourage the Guaraní on their voyage to seize the wealth of the Inca empire.\textsuperscript{81} Pärssinen suggests that the Xarayes learned about the Incas not based on trade routes or travelers who passed through their lands but instead due to the presence of an Inca settlement in their midst. He bases his argument on an anonymous map of the Río de la Plata from around 1600, which places “towns of orejones” (pueblos de orexones) along the Upper Paraguay. A 1638 document corroborates this assertion, describing a “province of orejones” located in the same region. Pärssinen suggests that this orejones settlement may have

\textsuperscript{79} Alcaya, “Relación cierta,” 49.
\textsuperscript{80} Combés, “Grigotá y Vitupue,” 67-72.
\textsuperscript{81} Alcaya, “Relación cierta,” 51-52. For more on the Xarayes in this era, see Paulo Pitaluga Costa e Silva, \textit{Índios Xarayés} (Cuiabá, Brazil: Instituto Homem Brasileiro, 2009), 100-08.
represented a “guard station in Jarayes [Xarayes] against the Guaraní Indians of Paraguay.” 82 I am inclined to interpret it differently. Alcaya’s account explains that Guacane’s expansion into the Samaipata region produced the unexpected coup of discovering the productive Saypurú mines. Inca settlements undertaken in the east after this point most likely represented attempts to insulate Saypurú after it took on importance to the empire. This necessitated either adding depth to the frontier under a defense-in-depth strategy or attempting to incorporate and acculturate yet another contiguous population. Elsewhere along the frontier, orejones were deployed especially for the latter purpose. The suggestion is that the Incas were extending their reach to incorporate and acculturate populations native to the Paraguay basin, including Guaraní peoples.

The references to the orejones along the Paraguay are not the only evidence of Inca efforts to acculturate Guaraní populations. Archaeological data from the Cuzcotoro complex, the site of the more southerly attack by the Chiriguana on Inca interests, suggests similar efforts here, as well. Sonia Alconini has uncovered examples of ceramics that she identifies as “Guaraní-Chiriguano” styles in the plazas of the Manchachi/Cuzcotoro main complex (Figure 4-22). The distribution of the artifacts suggests that “these were the product of public feasting activities sponsored by the Inka.” The incorporation of Guaraní ceramics in these feasts leads Alconini to argue that “the Inka included [Guaraní cultural] factions in their celebrations as a strategy of political incorporation.” 83 The indication of this conclusion is not only that some Guaraní communities coexisted with other populations on the Upper Pilcomayo, but also that


provincial state officials attempted to include at least some Guaraní peoples into the empire, likely as a *protective* measure. Under this scenario, they represented the “inner barbarians” guarding against potentially more-dangerous “outer barbarians.”

The evidence that the Inca state actively courted the Guaraní with its acculturative ritual and ideological program is enough to call for reconsideration of the presumed relationship between the two. It also calls for more excavations, particularly at Iñao, where the presence of the *ushnu* suggests that state political and ideological rituals might have been focused. Finally, it calls for the reconsideration of ceramic evidence from Samaipata. Angeles Muñoz mentions the presence of ceramic pieces that bore textile impressions fitting with Guaraní pottery styles. These artifacts, she argues, “are credited to intrusions by the Chiriguano.” A more plausible argument, in light of the full body of evidence, is that these potsherds represented an attempted incorporation of Guaraní populations by the Inca state at Samaipata.

Whatever the condition of the Inca structures and methods in effect along the Charcas frontier in the mid-1520s, it is very likely they no longer operated in the same fashion as the decade wore on. Huayna Capac died in 1527, and a dispute between factions supporting different heirs to the Inca throne quickly devolved into civil war. The war was reaching its end just as the Spanish encountered the victor, Atahualpa, on the north coast of Peru in 1532. The Spanish would not exercise any real control over Charcas until at least 1539. During the interval, it is likely that additional Chiriguana peoples established themselves in the cordillera stretching from near Samaipata in the north to near Tarija in the south. The history of the Charcas-Chiriguana frontier had only just begun.

---

84 Angeles Muñoz, “The Kallanka at Samaipata,” 263.
Figure 4-1. The three frontier zones, (a) the Upper Pilcomayo Basin & Central Valleys; (b) the Pilaya Basin & Tarija Valleys; and (c) Samaipata & the Lowland East. Adapted from Platt, Bouysse-Cassagne, and Harris, *Qaraqara-Charka*, 82.

Figure 4-3. Porco site plan. Pre-Hispanic elements shown. From Van Buren and Presta, “The Organization of Inka Silver Production in Porco, Bolivia,” 184.
Figure 4-4. Incallajta site plan. From Coben, “Theaters of Power,” 278.
Figure 4-5. A *kallanka* in Huánuco Pampa, Peru. Photos of ruins above hypothetical renderings of the (a) interior and (b) exterior. From Gasparini and Margolies, *Inca Architecture*, 202-03.

Figure 4-6. Hypothetical reconstruction of the *kallanka* at Incallajta. Cross-section view from a narrow, gabled end. From Lee, “Reconstructing the Great Hall at Inkallacta,” 63.
Figure 4-7. *Ushnu* platforms, (a) in Pumpu, Peru (from Hyslop, *Inka Settlement Planning*, 88); (b) Vilcashuamán, Peru (from Wikimedia Commons, commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Ushnu_o_Piramide_Inca_-_Vilcashuaman._Ayacucho.jpg); and (c) Guaman Poma (from Guaman Poma, *El primer nueva crónica y buen gobierno*, 398).
Figure 4-8. Oroncota, (a) distribution of Inca sites; (b) main “Oroncota” site plan. From Alconini, “The Southeastern Inka Frontier against the Chiriguanos,” 400, 404.

Figure 4-9. The Greater-Cuzcotoro Defensive Chain. From Pärssinen and Siiriänen, “Cuzcotoro and the Inka Fortification System,” 141.
Figure 4-10. Cuzcotoro/Manchachi site plan. Theorized position of the destroyed larger *kallanka* highlighted with dark outline. From Alconini, “The Southeastern Inka Frontier against the Chiriguanos,” 411.

Figure 4-11. Incahuasi site plan. From Hyslop, *Inka Settlement Planning*, 158.
Figure 4-12. Iñao site plan. From Pärssinen and Siiriänen, “Cuzcotoro and the Inka Fortification System,” 158.

Figure 4-13. Incapirca site plan. From Lee, “Cuzco-Tuyo,” 17.
Figure 4-14. The Pilcomayo and Pilaya basins of southern Bolivia. Squares indicate Inca complexes analyzed in the text; see Figure 4-9 for more detail on the Greater-Cuzcotoro Defensive Chain. Adapted from J.R. Miller et al., “Heavy Metal Contamination of Water Soil and Produce within Riverine Communities of the Río Pilcomayo Basin, Bolivia,” *Science of the Total Environment* 320, no. 2-3 (2004): 190.
Figure 4-15. Bermejo River basin. The Quebrada de Humahuaca is indicated approximately by the outlined rectangle. From Strategic Action Program for the Binational Basin of the Bermejo River.
Figure 4-16. The *capac űnan*, (a) a general map (from Hyslop, *The Inka Road System*, rear cover); (b) a section of road connecting an area near Condorhuasi to the Tarija Valleys (taken by author, May 2013).
Figure 4-17. Condorhuasi, (a) site plan (from Lee, “Seven ‘Inca Pucaras’ on the Bolivian Frontier,” 39); (b) view to the west-southwest from inside the defensive walls; (c) the southern face of the fortress (both taken by author, May 2013).
Figure 4-18. Samaipata site plan. From Meyers, “Toward a Reconceptualization of the Late Horizon and the Inka Period,” 232.
Figure 4-19. Samaipata, (a) and (b) views of the carved rock outcrop; (c) the foundations of the *kallanka*. Taken by author, June 2013.

Figure 4-20. Map with the approximate relative locations of Incallajta (a), Samaipata (b), and La Fortaleza (c) relative to the modern cities of Cochabamba and Santa Cruz, Bolivia. Major modern roads, departmental boundaries, and major rivers also indicated; the Plains of Grigotá correspond approximately to the area between the two rivers where Santa Cruz now stands. Adapted from “United Nations Map of Bolivia,” available at commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Un-bolivia.png.
Figure 4-21. La Fortaleza site plan. From and Ulbert, “Inka Archaeology in Eastern Bolivia,” 83.

Figure 4-22. “Guarani-Chiriguano” pottery samples from Cuzcotoro. From Alconini, “The Southeastern Inka Frontier against the Chiriguanos,” 412.
CHAPTER 5
POPULATING THE CHARCAS-CHIRIGUANA FRONTIER

Settlement in Charcas and in the Chiriguana Cordillera, 1530s-1550s

The initial stages of the Spanish conquest of the Inca empire likely had little direct effect on the peoples of Charcas, particularly along the eastern frontier in question. The Charcas confederation remained at least partially intact throughout the chaos and upheaval of the Inca dynastic civil war (1527-32) and the subsequent Spanish conquest of Peru (1532-33, and sporadically afterward). Representatives of the confederation met with the Spanish soldiers who came to the eastern highlands in 1539 and revealed the location of the Porco silver mines. The same year, the Spanish established a lasting presence in the region by founding the Villa de la Plata (commonly known as La Plata [modern Sucre, Bolivia]) on the site of a Yampara community called Chuquisaca. Many of the highest ranking Spaniards in Peru established themselves in the region in order to take advantage of the mining sector.¹ In the decades to come, Spanish authorities built upon and reshaped the political, economic, and social structures that were in place when they arrived.

Little evidence has survived that might help establish with any precision the nature of Chiriguana settlement in the frontier region at the time of the Spanish conquest. Certain chronicles indicate—and archaeological research generally corroborates—that Chiriguana communities settled in the region following the attacks on Cuzcotoro and Samaipata in the

¹ “El memorial de los Mallku y principales de la provincia de los Charcas,” 843-44; Roberto Querejazu Calvo, Chuquisaca, 1539-1825 (Sucre: Impr. Universitaria, 1987), 19-27; Brooke Larson, Cochabamba, 1550-1900 (Durham, NC: Duke Univ. Press, 1998 [1988]), 32-33; Ana María Presta, “Encomienda, Family, and Business in Colonial Charcas (Modern Bolivia): The Encomenderos of La Plata, 1550-1600” (Ph.D. diss., The Ohio State University, 1997), 42-53. The economic activities coordinated by the confederation, including those in Porco and Cochabamba, had not persisted on the same scale as prior to 1527. The more traditional, smaller-scale economic verticality strategies pursued by the peoples in the region presumably continued—persisting even during the initial years of Spanish control, in many cases.
1520s. These migrants probably joined existing Guaraní-speaking peoples already living in the
general region. Additional evidence discussed below suggests that similar westward migrations
of Guaraní peoples continued in subsequent years. Others waves of migration occurred in the
company of Spanish explorers during the 1540s and ‘50s.

There is also little evidence of contact between the Spanish residents of Peru and the
Chiriguanaes through most of the 1540s. The pace of Spanish expansion towards the eastern
lowlands slowed after the foundation of La Plata. A major factor in its cessation during this
period was the persistent armed conflict that pitted Spanish factions in Peru against each other
throughout much of the decade. These civil wars occupied much of the manpower and resources
that might have gone towards the development of the eastern foothills or expeditions aimed
toward the heart of the continent. A brief period of peace in 1543 allowed for the organization of
an expedition under the leadership of Diego de Rojas. Rojas and company may have passed
through territories occupied by Chiriguana peoples during their march to the Río de la Plata, but
the surviving documents related to the expedition are vague in their descriptions of the native
peoples they encountered.3

Despite a lack of significant direct interaction with the Spanish in Charcas, a variety of
documentary evidence indicates the presence of Chiriguana populations active on the frontiers of
Spanish Charcas during the 1540s. One series of testimonies collected in 1560 relates to a

---

2 See Chapter 4. The chronicles in question are Alcaya’s, which describes the attack on Grigotá and Samaipata, and
Díaz de Guzmán’s, which describes the tale of Alejo García.

3 For a summary of the civil wars of the era, see Querjazu Calvo, Chuquisaca, 29-55. For the most pertinent
elements of the Diego de Rojas expedition, see Díaz de Guzmán, Anales del descubrimiento, 173-77; Manuel
Lizondo Borda, Descubrimiento del Tucumán: el pasaje de Almagro, la entrada de Rojas, el itinerario de Matienzo
(Tucumán, Argentina: Talleres Gráficos Miguel Violetto, 1943), 62-63; Francisco de Aparicio, “Descubrimiento del
territorio argentino: La ‘Entrada’ de Diego Rojas,” Revista de Historia de América (Mexico City) 34 (1952): 323-
36; Stella Maris Molina Carlotti de Muñoz, “Los padecimientos en la gran entrada de Diego de Rojas,” Quinto
community of Moyomoyo people living near La Plata. Before the Spanish arrived, they resided in the lower-altitude Tomina and Sopachuy Valleys immediately to the east of La Plata (Figure 5-1), where “the Inca had put them … in order to resist against the Chiriguanaes.” They fled westward to the highlands out of “fear of the Chiriguanaes” following an attack that killed their leader in 1541 or 1542. In another document from the early 1560s, the Spanish adventurer Ñuflo de Chávez testified to having found that “the Chiriguana people from the cordillera had eaten up the frontiers and the repartimientos [belonging to three citizens of La Plata] and the Chichas and their frontiers.” Chávez passed through the region in 1548-49 after traveling across the continent from Asunción, where he was based at the time. These belated claims of Chiriguana conflict with native populations during the 1540s are further bolstered by a 1549 letter written by the chief royal official in Peru, Pedro de la Gasca, to the Spanish Council of the Indies. La Gasca’s letter references his plan to “defend the Indians of Charcas from the Chiriguanaes” by advancing the frontiers of Spanish settlement “little by little” into the lowlands and pacifying the hostile natives along the way. The letter does not indicate with any specificity where the conflicts in question were taking place, but the Tomina Valley and the surrounding region is a likely possibility. A 1608 description of Tomina and its surroundings suggests that the Spanish began

---

4 “Informaciones de oficio y parte; Cristóbal Barba, capitán, vecino de La Plata,” Archivo General de Indias (hereafter cited as AGI), Charcas, 78 N8, 3r-15v. The Tomina and Sopachuy Valleys both lie just north of Cuzcotoro. Both also played significant roles in later Spanish-Chiriguana conflicts. The dating of the attack on the Moyomoyos comes from a reference to it taking place “at the time when the Spanish left [La Plata] to unite with Governor Vaca de Castro.” This places it during war that followed the assassination of Francisco Pizarro and thus during 1541-42.

5 “Información de los méritos y servicios del capitán Nuño de Chaves,” AGI, Patronato, 105 R19, 19. Chávez’ testimony dates his encounter with the Chiriguanaes of the cordillera to 1546, but other accounts of his journey reliably date it to 1548-49. See “Memoria y resolución de los casos y cosas sucedidas en la tierra desde la gobernación de Juan de Ayolas que sea en gloria (Lima, a principios de 1560)” in Desde el Oriente. Documentos para la historia del Oriente Boliviano y Santa Cruz la Vieja (1542-1597), ed. Catherine Julien (Santa Cruz, Bolivia: Gobierno Municipal Autónomo, 2008), 50-51; and Barnadas, Charcas, 58-59.

6 “Carta del Licenciado La Gasca al consejo de Indias sobre diversos asuntos de gobierno … (Los Reyes 17 de julio de 1549),” in Levillier, Gobernantes del Perú, vol. 1, 204-06.
to develop the region in 1548, when the native population abandoned it due to the persistent threat of Chiriguana incursions.\textsuperscript{7}

La Gasca and the royalists’ victory over Gonzalo Pizarro and his followers in 1548 restored a modicum of order in Peru and freed up resources to pursue a strategy of eastward expansion. Far more significant to the future of Charcas, however, was the discovery of the Cerro Rico of Potosí in the extreme highlands between Porco and La Plata during the course of the war, in 1545. The silver ores of the “rich mountain” quickly gained renown for their purity and abundance. The rapid expansion of the silver mining sector in the late 1540s and 1550s greatly increased the economic and political importance of eastern Charcas. Spanish imperial authorities recognized this shift by elevating La Plata to the status of "ciudad" in 1555.\textsuperscript{8} The rapid growth of the urban population in the Charcas highlands that resulted from the first Potosí silver boom helped spur the (re)development of the temperate agricultural lands within a moderate range of the highlands. Growing demand for basic foodstuffs, coca, timber, beasts of burden, and other necessities helped established a market that took advantage of the symbiosis between the highlands and lowlands. Spaniards and natives responded by intensifying agricultural production and husbandry in the subandean geographies they could access.\textsuperscript{9}

\textsuperscript{7} “Descripción de la villa de Santiago de la Frontera de Tomina y su distrito,” in Colección de documentos inéditos, relativos al descubrimiento, conquista y organización de las antiguas posesiones españolas de América y Oceanía, sacados de los archivos del reino, y muy especialmente del de Indias, 24 vols., ed. Joaquín F. Pacheco, Francisco de Cárdenas y Espejo, and Luis Torres de Mendoza (Madrid: Impr. de Frías y Compañía, 1864-84), vol. 9, 338-39.

\textsuperscript{8} Barnadas, Charcas, 35-38; Querejazu Calvo, Chuquisaca, 69-72.

Many of the native laborers engaged in mining and related economic endeavors during this early period owed labor or tribute to prominent Spaniards, to whom they had been pledged in *encomienda*. The arrangement was an Old-World mechanism that effectively siphoned off the productive capacity of native communities and redistributed resources among the colonial elite. In exchange, the grantee (an *encomendero*) owed the communities entrusted to him religious instruction and basic protections. Native *encomienda* workers remained tied to their communities of origin, and *encomenderos* were limited in both the amounts and types of services they could demand, though abuses were often rampant. An *encomendero* was further required to reside in the jurisdiction to which his grant corresponded and to offer military service in defense of the kingdom, should the need arise.¹⁰

Other native workers operated independently of their communities of origin under a version of the traditional Andean concept of personal service, *yanaconaje*. These workers were known in Charcas during the colonial period as *yanaconas*, as well as by Castilian terms such as *personas de servicio* or *naborías*. They served as the chief source of labor in areas where there were few autochthonous native communities, including the mining centers of Porco and Potosí during the 1540s through the early 1570s. *Yanaconas* were typically attached to Spanish masters by bonds that resulted, in some ways, from pre-Hispanic socio-cultural constructions, as *yanaconas* enjoyed elevated status in Andean native society. Natives left their traditional communities and became *yanaconas* in large numbers during this period. The elevated social

---

status of the *yanacona* was one reason. Others were overtly coerced to serve Spanish masters. Most, however, were reacting to the decimation of the traditional Andean community structure as a result of disease and war. The reorganization of native communities and the development of the labor draft (*mita*) system in the 1570s diminished the role of *yanaconas* in the highland mining economy, but they remained especially crucial to the labor force in some of the subandean zones near the Charcas-Chiriguana frontier, where the Spanish residents did not directly benefit as much from the *mita*. In this context, personal servants performed a variety of services on Spanish *chácaras* (the local term for the large ranches that were common in the region), including but not limited to agricultural labor, skilled trades, and the transport of goods to the highland markets. Personal servants often performed these tasks alongside African slaves, who also made up a significant part of the labor force near the frontier. Though personal servitude was legally and technically distinct from slavery, the categories often bled into one another. The similarity between the systems, as well as the abuses of personal servitude, led the Spanish crown to mandate a prohibition on *yanaconaje* already in the 1540s. Persistent resistance to the prohibition led to its suspension. Other similar reforms during the era in question were also suspended, delayed, or ignored.\(^1\) Despite many changes in the labor structure in Charcas in the decades to come, the price of labor remained artificially low as a result of the coercive mechanisms in place. As a result, Spaniards continued to struggle throughout the period under consideration to secure sufficient supplies of labor. Those living along the frontiers remained especially dependent upon, and hungry for, personal servants.

---

It is unclear how often Chiriguana forces came into conflict with the native residents of the subandean valleys nearest Potosí and La Plata during the 1530s or early 1540s. It is likely, however, that the frequency and severity of the Chiriguanaes’ attacks increased as a result of the (re)introduction of large-scale agriculture and husbandry resulting from the Potosí silver boom during the late 1540s and 1550s. Not only did these pursuits bring native laborers operating within the Spanish system into increased contact with the Chiriguanaes, they also entailed the introduction of new and valuable commodities such as horses, cattle, and metal tools.

Two Spanish expeditions that set out for the east in 1555 may have been early responses to Chiriguana hostilities toward Spanish-controlled native laborers. Only a few oblique documentary references survive in regards to either, however, so any assertions about their specific intentions, routes, and contacts with native peoples are speculative. One expedition was led by Juan Núñez de Prado, who had founded a Spanish settlement in Tucumán in 1549. According to the later recollection of one of his captains, the expedition passed through a part of the Chaco near the Parapetí River. This sector of the Chaco would come to be associated with Chiriguana settlement in the years to come. The other expedition was apparently led by Diego de Sanabria. A 1590 testimony claims that he “gathered people for the journey to and population of the Mojos and Chiriguanaes.” When the testimony was collected, the reference indicated a slightly more northern region also associated with Chiriguana peoples. Sanabria’s expedition lasted until 1557 but produced no tangible results.¹² Neither expedition led to lasting settlements.

¹² Finot, Historia de la conquista del oriente boliviano, 104-11; “ Expediente de los servicios prestados por el capitán Pedro de Valencia,” Archivo Nacional de Bolivia (hereafter cited as ANB), Expedientes coloniales (hereafter cited as EC), 1590.2, Ir. The testimony regarding the Núñez de Prado expedition claimed that it traveled through the “plains where they killed Andrés Manso” a decade later.
It is unclear if these missions had any significant effects on the Chiriguanaes and their settlement near the cordillera.

It was not until 1559 that Spanish officials determined with any certainty to try to tame the Chiriguanaes who lived in and beyond the cordillera. A Spanish soldier named Andrés Manso set off that year to found a permanent Spanish settlement in the eastern lowlands. He received his commission from the viceroy of Peru, Andrés Hurtado de Mendoza (Marqués of Cañete). Cañete had sent Manso, along with 50 or 60 men, “in order to populate a town on the other side of the cordillera and plant food.” He wrote the Council of the Indies in January of 1560 about “news of a piece of land that is at the back of the Villa de La Plata, on the other side of the cordillera, populated by some Indians called Chiriguanaes.” These Indians, the viceroy had learned, “have caused a lot of damage to the natives who are next to the cordillera, to the encomiendas of the citizens of the village of La Plata, and to those who are on the other side.”

One reason for this more concerted effort to secure and push back the frontiers of settlement in eastern Charcas was the increased importance of La Plata. In 1559, the recently ascended King Philip II created the Audiencia of Charcas (also called the Audiencia of La Plata) as an administrative jurisdiction within the Viceroyalty of Peru that might better oversee royal interests that lay at some distance from Lima, the capital of the viceroyalty. The capital of the new Audiencia, the city of La Plata, was chosen in large part due to its proximity to Potosí. The officials that served on the Audiencia court, typically one president and four additional judges, came to exercise control over civil and criminal matters in the immediate vicinity of the city. They were also responsible for carrying out decrees issued by the king or viceroy, overseeing

---

13 I follow the typical convention in the secondary literature of indicating Spanish noblemen by their titles. Most of the viceroys discussed throughout this project fall within this category.

14 Cited in Finot, *Historia de la conquista del oriente boliviano*, 111.
local officials, and safeguarding royal privilege, among other duties, within the entire province of Charcas.\textsuperscript{15}

The Audiencia began to exercise jurisdiction from La Plata in 1561. At that point, the officials serving on the Audiencia had already identified the Chiriguanaes as a threat. Not only did they impinge upon natives within the Spanish colonial system, they also preyed upon the native peoples who resided east of the cordillera, outside of Spanish control. A 1561 letter from Licenciado Juan de Matienzo, one of the first Audiencia officials, describes the Chiriguanaes as “cruel people and untamed in war.” Matienzo observed that it was common for them to capture large numbers of natives during raids on the lowland plains. They were said to eat some of their captives immediately, “others they fatten to that effect; others they sell, and others serve as [their] slaves.”\textsuperscript{16}

Matienzo had also learned that Spaniards were among the customers for the Chiriguanaes’ captives, who served as servants and laborers on frontier \textit{chácaras}. This document is the first definitive evidence of such commercial arrangements. The purchase of captives by Spaniards fell, at best, into a legal gray area. It was certainly in violation of the spirit of the Spanish prohibition on native slavery, especially because the lowland natives to whom it applied lacked the cultural context of \textit{yanaconaje}. Still, the practice would continue for much of the coming century despite more-specific prohibitions against it. Like Viceroy Cañete and La Gasca,\textsuperscript{15,16}

\textsuperscript{15}José Luis Baptista Morales, “Introducción: Acuerdos de la Real Audiencia de La Plata,” in López Villalba, \textit{Acuerdos de la Real Audiencia de La Plata}, vol. 1, xxviii-xxix; Querejazu Calvo, \textit{Chuquisaca}, 72-81. The term Audiencia refers both to the judicial and administrative body and the province over which it held jurisdiction. I often use variations on the phrases “members of the Audiencia” and “Audiencia officials” to discuss the men who occupied the roles of president and judge.

\textsuperscript{16}“Carta a S.M. del licenciado Matienzo, con larga noticia de los indios chiriguanaes, sus desmanes y atrevimientos … (La Plata 20 de Octubre de 1561),” in \textit{La Audiencia de Charcas: Correspondencia de presidentes y oidores, documentos del Archivo de Indias}, 3 vols., ed. Roberto Levillier (Madrid: Impr. de J. Pueyo, 1918), vol. 1, 54-56.
Matienzo’s proposed solution to the problems posed by the Chiriguanaes was establishing a Spanish presence beyond the frontier. He argued that the inhabitants of the lowland plains to the east stood to gain from Spanish protection as well as “the right teaching of the evangelical doctrine.” The Spanish, meanwhile, would benefit by bringing them into the legitimate labor market. Matienzo felt that the natives living beyond the cordillera could “work the mines” in highland Charcas, many of which were presently “left unworked for lack of Indians.”

Matienzo was aware when he wrote his letter that Andrés Manso was already on his way to found a Spanish settlement beyond the cordillera. If the scant information about the Núñez de Prado expedition is accurate, it was not his first journey to the eastern lowlands. He had served as a captain on the 1555 mission that traversed the Chaco plains. Now four years later, he returned to the region with the intention to remain. When he arrived there, however, he found the natural environment of the Chaco inhospitable to agriculture and settlement. His chief complaint was the lack of a reliable source of fresh water. Instead of founding a town, he turned to the north and continued to explore. Before Manso could carry out his orders to found a permanent settlement, his men heard rumors about a strange group of travelers from the east. The encounter (covered later in the chapter) would be an important event in the history of the Charcas-Chiriguana frontier.

**Spanish Exploration from the Río de la Plata (Asunción), 1520s-1550s**

The rumors that Manso had heard referred to an expedition led by Ñuflo de Chávez. Chávez and company had set out from the Spanish city of Asunción on the Paraguay River over a year earlier. The journey was only the most recent of Chávez’ attempts to explore the interior

---

17 Ibid., 55-56.

of the continent in search of the Great Mojo or the Paitití, two of the more common iterations of the semi-mythical tales that circulated in the South American lowlands during the era in question. A group of approximately 40 Spanish soldiers and 1,000 native auxiliaries accompanied Chávez at this point. The latter consisted primarily of Guaraní speakers from the vicinity of Asunción.¹⁹

Evidence of official cooperation between Spaniards and Guaraní peoples on the Atlantic coast dates back to the 1520s, only a few years after Alejo García’s travels across the continent. In 1526, King Charles sent a fleet under the leadership of Sebastian Cabot to the south Atlantic in order to strengthen his claims in the vicinity of the line of Tordesillas. Cabot planned to sail onward and establish a settlement in the Spice Islands of Asia, but his objectives changed when he landed on the Brazilian coast. The crew encountered a shipwrecked Spaniard there who described tales of a wealthy king to the west. Cabot was further intrigued by silver objects in the possession of the indigenous peoples that he encountered farther to the south, along the Río de la Plata. He presumed the metal was from a nearby source. Cabot’s false hope in this regard led him to christen the estuary with the misleading name that translates to “River of Silver.” The Spanish pushed inland and established a fortress called Sancti Spiritu near the confluence of the Paraná and Carcarañá Rivers (Figure 5-2).²⁰

¹⁹ These myths were similar, in many ways, to the fabled El Dorado that may be more familiar to readers. The coming pages will establish the context of Chávez’ mission and describe it in more detail.

²⁰ Gott, Land Without Evil, 16, 77; Finot, Historia de la conquista del oriente boliviano, 81-82; Julien, “Colonial Perspectives,” 23-25; Diego Abad de Santillán, Historia argentina (Buenos Aires: Tip. Editora Argentina, 1965), 104-07. In all likelihood the silver had traveled to the Atlantic coast from a great distance. It may have come as a result of the raid in which Alejo García participated a few years prior. It might also have come via another similar raid or a combination of trade and assaults on exchange networks extending into those same regions. For the tale of Alejo García, see Chapter 2.
The natives in the Río de la Plata region included several of the southeastern-most communities of the Tupí-Guaraní language family. The earliest Spanish reference to the natives of the region, from 1528, describes the natives in the vicinity of Sancti Spiritu as “Guaranís also called Chandules.” In its most basic sense, the word Guaraní simply means “warrior.” It came to represent an ethno-cultural and linguistic category of people because many who spoke the language during the contact period apparently self-identified in this way. They more commonly used the word “ava,” or variations such as “abá”—“men” in most Tupí and Guaraní dialects—to indicate concepts of ethnic affiliation. Guaraní peoples further organized themselves into socially and politically distinct communities called guáras. “Chandules,” or a derivation of the term, likely referenced the guára affiliation of the natives nearest Sancti Spiritu. In all likelihood, scores of distinct Tupí-Guaraní guáras existed at the time of European contact.  

The Spanish abandoned the Río de la Plata in 1529. By that point, they had become frustrated by their failure to locate silver mines in the region, and their attempts to locate the great king to the west were also fruitless. The final straw was a native attack on Sancti Spiritu. The Spanish had initially established an alliance with the Chandules, but it crumbled due to the Europeans’ ongoing exploitation of the local communities. The natives set fire to Sancti Spiritu and killed most who were inside. The survivors quickly returned to Spain. Six years later, the Spanish sought to reestablish a presence in the region. The discovery and initial conquest of Peru in 1532 spurred imperial officials to seek new routes that could ease transportation between the Andean highlands and the Atlantic. Cabot’s experiences sailing up the Paraná River suggested

---

the possibility of a navigable waterway across the continent. King Charles granted the rights of a
new colony in the Río de la Plata to a wealthy nobleman named Pedro de Mendoza. He and his
crew arrived in 1535 before Mendoza’s ill health prompted him to return to Spain. Leadership of
the colony fell to Juan de Ayolas. Among the soldiers under his command was Ulrich Schmidel, a
German whose written account provides a detailed record of many events in the years to
come.22

By 1537, Ayolas and his crew established what would become a permanent presence in
the region. Ayolas’ ships advanced upriver well beyond the ruins of Sancti Spiritu and anchored
at a Guaraní settlement on the banks of the Paraguay. Documents from the years to come often
refer to the population as “Carios,” a derivation of the guára name. The Spanish bombarded the
palisades surrounding the principal Cario town for three days before the natives surrendered. The
terms of the surrender gave the Spanish dominion over the Carios, who constructed a fortress for
the Spanish on the site of the town in the weeks following the battle. It formally became the city
of Asunció during a ceremony of foundation later the same year.23

Unlike elsewhere in the contemporary Spanish Indies, where settlers typically distributed
native communities in encomienda, the Spanish residents of Asunció exclusively relied on
personal servants. Native women cultivated crops and performed household tasks, while Cario
men assisted the Spanish in their ongoing explorations for wealthy civilizations or gold and


silver mines. Large numbers of native auxiliaries were integral in the undertaking of these often-long-distance explorations. Their knowledge of the region and the peoples they might encounter, though often the product of hearsay and myth, oriented the Spanish in the unfamiliar landscape. The Carios were also capable soldiers, and they were often better equipped than the Spaniards to communicate with the new peoples they might encounter. Their willingness to accompany Spanish expeditions likely sprang less from overt coercion by the Spanish than from their own cultural conditioning. Exploration connoted warfare and thus the opportunity to take captives from among their rivals. In general, captives served a number of social and cultural roles within Cario-Guaraní society, and a warrior’s status was dependent to a degree upon his ability to capture his rivals.24

Ayolas remained in the settlement that would become Asunción only a short time after his victory there. He continued upriver in search of the great, wealthy civilization that had eluded Cabot’s men. The Payaguá, a Guaycurú-speaking people who resided on the west bank of the upper Paraguay, confirmed the existence of the “Carchkareisso” people, who lived far away and possessed gold and silver.25 Ayolas’ informants included a “slave” living among the Payaguá who claimed to have accompanied “Garcia, [the] Christian” on the eastward portion of his

24 Julien, “Colonial Perspectives,” 29-36; Gott, Land Without Evil, 92. In 1556 the governor of Spanish Paraguay boasted of sufficient native female servants for more than 3,000 Spaniards. See “Carta y relación y testimonios q. vinieron con ella del Río de la Plata y otros memoriales de leguas q. ay por la costa de la mar del norte y por partes de la tierra de las Yndias y otras peticiones sobre la perpetuación de los yndios de Perú (1556),” in Colección de documentos relativos à la historia de América y particularmente à la historia del Paraguay, ed. Blas Garay (Asunción: H. Kraus, 1899), 224-32. Bringing natives entrusted in encomienda on expeditions of discovery was explicitly prohibited by Spanish law. See Zavala, El servicio personal de los indios en el Perú, vol. 1, 8. For more on the roles of warfare and captives in Guaraní societies, see Chapter 2.

25 This is likely a reference based on the Qaraqara-Charka of the eastern Andean highlands; see Chapter 3. The notes for the Hakluyt Society translation of Schmiedel inexplicably associate the Carchkareisso with the “Guaycurús.” See Schmiedel, Voyage of Ulrich Schmidt, 25 n. 1. He more accurately associates a later reference to the “Carchkareos” with the “Charcas.” See page 40 n. 5. What the Payaguá actually said is a mystery since Schmiedel is often badly mistaken in transcribing names, both native and Spanish. For more on the Payaguá, see Combès, Diccionario étnico, 30-31.
journey some 15 years earlier. The slave, a Chané from the interior, offered to guide the Spanish on a quest in the footsteps of García. They had no idea, of course, that the wealthy settlements from which García had taken “a certain quantity of metal” in the 1520s were coming under Spanish control at that very moment. Ayolas set off in February of 1537 in the company of 130 Spaniards, 30 (or 300) Payaguá retainers, and the Chané as their guide.26 The Spaniards never returned. The ranking soldier in Ayolas’ absence was Domingo de Irala, who began search efforts when the expedition failed to return in a timely manner. Rumors circulating among the peoples to the west suggested that the Spaniards had been killed by their native companions. The Spanish at Asunción soon captured two Payaguá and wrenched a confession from them under torture before Irala ordered them burned.27

The crown sought to assert greater control over Asunción beginning in the early 1540s. Alvar Núñez Cabeza de Vaca had returned to Spain in 1537 following his famous eight-year adventure through North America. He was appointed to the post of royal adelantado (frontier governor) of Río de la Plata in 1540. Upon his arrival in Asunción two years later, he attempted to reform the colony along the lines of the Spanish legal ideal by prohibiting native slavery, encouraging active evangelization of the natives, and enforcing strict discipline. By 1544, Irala managed to reassert control. He and a number of other prominent individuals arrested Cabeza de

26 “Carta de Domingo de Irala a Su Magestad, Asunción, 1 marzo 1545;” in Julien, Desde el Oriente, 20-21. Schmidel’s version claims that 300 Payaguá attended the expedition. See Schmidel, Voyage of Ulrich Schmidt, 25-26. Schmidel’s number is more in keeping with the typical ratios of subsequent Spanish/native expeditions, but the number appears in Roman numerals (“XXX”) in the letter, so a transcription error is not likely.

27 It is not clear how far the Ayolas mission advanced to the west. Certain testimonies from the investigation into his disappearance seem to suggest that he may have reached the outskirts of the former Inca empire and attacked it, but this detail may be a misplaced reference to the Alejo García journey. The anonymous “Relación del Río de la Plata” and Irala’s report are very similar, but the former claims that Ayolas arrived among the Chané who agreed to accompany him, and a confrontation with the “caracaraes” caused their retreat. See Schmidel, Voyage of Ulrich Schmidt, 25-28; “Carta de Domingo de Irala a Su Magestad,” 22; and “Relación del Río de la Plata (Asunción, 9 marzo 1545),” in Julien, Desde el Oriente, 34-36.
Vaca on the charge of poor governance and sent him back to Spain. His crime, more accurately, was upsetting the status quo in Asunción. The order he wished to impose clashed not only with the interests of Europeans, but also with the Cario elite. Both benefitted from the ad hoc arrangements under which they lived. Those arrangements dictated that women, both Cario and captives from other native peoples, serve as tokens of kinship alliance and perform a disproportionate share of labor. Though Asunción seemed a veritable “paradise of Muhammad” according to traditional Spanish values, it had become a socio-cultural hybrid of European and Cario-Guarani. Cabeza de Vaca’s leadership threatened the system that had evolved.28

The Spaniards in Asunción persisted in organizing exploratory expeditions throughout Cabeza de Vaca’s brief stint in charge of the colony. Despite the violence that befell García and Ayolas, the fantastic tales of the lands to the west continued to stir their interest. The records from these voyages provide a great deal more detail about them than exists for earlier expeditions. The native testimonies that make up a large component of these records served to reinforce Spanish expectations of a land only just out of reach to the west, the wealth of which would surpass even their wildest imaginations. The documentation from Irala’s 1542-43 expedition northward up the Paraguay consists of brief interviews with the natives he and his men encountered. Irala and his translators sought knowledge of the ethnic and cultural composition of the Pantanal region (the tropical wetlands from which the Paraguay River flows) with particular attention to the movement of metal to the area. The answers they recorded

---

express the political complexity that characterized the region at the time. It was an intricate tapestry of native political and ethnic groups.\textsuperscript{29}

The effects of large-scale, long-distance journeys across the interior of the continent had begun to shape the ethnic composition of the region. While conducting interviews near the port he established on the Paraguay River, dubbed Puerto de los Reyes, Irala learned of multiple nearby settlements of Chané. The Chané homeland lay a good deal to the west of the Paraguay basin, in the lowlands near the Andean foothills. The Chané that Irala interviewed described their place of origin as “\textit{tierra adentro}” or “the interior.” They had come to the area as captives on the eastward leg of transcontinental voyages undertaken by peoples from the Paraguay basin. One Chané man claimed that he “had lived with and been a slave of García,” the Portuguese castaway. When Irala’s interpreter asked how he and his people had come to live in the region, he explained that the tradition of migration across the continent predated García’s involvement: “The Guarani” had often “met together in mass at the port called Ytatyn [Itatín] in order to go and search out metal.” Their journey took them through the lands of the Chané, where the Guarani “murdered many of them in their houses and captured their women and children.” Additional testimonies collected farther upriver confirmed these tales. They also indicated that Itatín was not simply a port at which the cross-continental expeditions amassed, but a Guarani sub-ethnic group who organized and led these journeys. Irala and his crew returned to Asunción.

\textsuperscript{29} “Relacion de la jornada al norte,” in Julien, \textit{Desde el Oriente}, 1-11. There is no addition information available about many of the groups mentioned in the document. Presumably, many of the names reflected categories significant to the informants rather than proper ethnic designations. They may also have referenced geographical features or the names of political leaders. As a result, it is difficult to contextualize the references in any definite way. Some of the groups mentioned, including the Xarayes and Guaxarapos, would figure in the expeditions and settlements of the immediate future but did not remain in existence under those names or any obvious successors into the modern era. The Guachí were the apparent descendants of the Guaxarapo. They remained in small numbers into the nineteenth century but ceased to exist prior to any significant study of the culture. The Xarayes disappeared much sooner. See Alfred Métraux, “Ethnography of the Chaco,” and “Tribes of Eastern Bolivia and the Madeira Headwaters,” both in Steward, \textit{Handbook of South American Indians}, vol. 1, 225, 246; vol. 3, 383-84; and Pitaluga Costa e Silva, \textit{Índios Xarayés}, 104-06, 153ff.
in 1543 with the hope that they would find the passage to the west and untold riches if they could just make contact with the Itatín, whose presence had eluded them during the expedition.  

Later in 1543, Cabeza de Vaca personally led an expedition aimed at making contact with the Itatín. A number of accounts of the journey survive, and they differ greatly because it ended in controversy with his arrest and deportation. The reports agree, however, that the expedition failed in its aims. The Spanish did not locate the Itatín. Instead, they clashed with the Guaxarapo people near Puerto de los Reyes, and most fell ill due to malaria or a water-borne parasite. Meanwhile, as part of the expedition, Hernando de Rivera led scouting mission westward from Puerto de los Reyes. He returned to the main detachment on the river with fantastical accounts of peoples in the distance who were wealthy in both metal and agriculture. He had not personally made contact with them, but the informants that he interviewed described seemingly incredible tales of a race of warrior women, a race of very small men, and wealthy, well-dressed people who “care for a great deal of livestock that are very large sheep with which they tend to their fields and to which they attach freight.”

Each of Rivera’s tales appears to contain shreds of empirical evidence filtered through the lenses of culture—both European culture and that of his informants—unfamiliar with what

30 “Relacion de la jornada al norte,” 7-10.

31 The reason for the tension with the Guaxarapos was likely multifold. In addition to their almost-certain resentment of Spanish demands that they deliver supplies, Schmidel’s account raises the possibility that they were targeting the Asunción Carios who accompanied the expedition. See Schmidel, Voyage of Ulrich Schmidt, 38-52; and Julien, “Colonial Perspectives,” 36-38. Julien’s summary relies mostly on Cabeza de Vaca’s own account and that of Schmidel. For negative perspectives on Cabeza de Vaca’s leadership during the expedition, see “Carta de Domingo de Irala a Su Magestad,” 25; and “Relación del Río de la Plata,” 37. Irala reported that Cabeza de Vaca “ordered [his men] to make war on some nearby Indians” after stressing how peacefully the natives had behaved toward the Spanish. The author of the anonymous “Relación del Río de la Plata” claimed that “the [indigenous] people were disinclined to come [to the Spanish] due to the poor treatment that the governor again visited upon all of them,” and that, “in payment for the good works [Cabeza de Vaca] received, he never called [his crew] anything but scoundrels (vellacos), and he tyrannized the land and mistreated everyone, in word and in deed.”

32 “Razon sumaria de la jornada que hizo Hernando de Ribera por los xarayes (Puerto de los Reyes, febrero 1544),” and “Relacion de Hernando de Ribera (Asuncion, 3 marzo 1545),” both in Julien, Desde el Oriente, 18-19, 27-32.
the evidence described. The first story likely has its origins in the Amazon warriors of Greek legend. Only a couple years prior, Francisco de Orellana’s men reported clashing with a band of female warriors while exploring the heart of the continent. The name of the Amazon River is a reflection of their experiences. Reports from Orellana’s journey might have colored the perceptions of Rivera or his retinue as they explored the new landscape trained on finding evidence of the *amazones*. The origin of the stories of the very small men is a different matter. These tales likely stemmed from a mis-observation codified in the Guaraní language.

“Tapuymiri” is a Guaraní term that translates to “little slaves.” It served as a broad, denigrating category referring to an eclectic group of peoples occupying the plains east of the Guapay (Grande) River. The term likely comes from the fact that they lived in low-roofed houses with very small doors. Guaraní-speaking outsiders who saw these houses assumed that the inhabitants were proportionally small. The last of Rivera’s tales appears to refer to highland peoples of the eastern Andes. The Aymaras and others relied on camelids, which colonial Spaniards often called rams or sheep, for a number of purposes. These camelids would have left an impression upon people native to the eastern lowlands, where no similarly large herd animals lived. Rivera’s information, vague as it was, validated the efforts the Asunción Spanish had expended thus far in trying to push westward.

A momentary disintegration of the Spanish-Cario alliance followed Cabeza de Vaca’s arrest and deportation and put a hold on any plans for further exploration. Schmidel’s account blames the disunity that the Christians displayed, “the sending away of Cabessa de Bacha being

---

33 For the meaning of Tapuymiri, see Combès, *Diccionario étnico*, 289. The Spanish would later describe the region and its inhabitants as “Chiquitos,” or “little ones.” Chávez already described this area as the “Provincia de los chiquiytos” in 1561. See “Información de los méritos y servicios del capitán Nuflo de Chaves,” 21-22. The term Chiquitanía refers to the region today.
the occasion of it,” for the natives’ decision to turn on them.34 This political division may have been an element in the Cario revolt, but the real cause likely lay deeper. The natives’ perspective is absent in the evidence that remains, but increasing abuse by the Spanish of the terms of their alliance with various native peoples was the pattern in the Río de la Plata colony. Cabeza de Vaca’s leadership may have served as a brake on certain abuses for a time. The atmosphere after his departure was more permissive of abusive conduct toward the Carios. While the “custom” had been that the natives “give their daughters or sisters” to the Spanish, over time the Spanish became bolder in “tak[ing the Carios’] wives and daughters” without permission.35

Irala’s second in command, Ñuflo de Chávez, reportedly quelled the native uprising when he led a small army “to the pacification of the province, where with the best methods and modes possible, he attracted all to peace and to the obedience of your majesty although they were bellicose people.”36 The wording of the reference leaves little to glean about what actually transpired. Furthermore, the context of the quote, a petition by Chávez for royal recognition of his services years later, indicates it requires a good deal of skepticism. The only clear conclusion to be drawn from the incident is that the Spanish-Cario alliance was subject to periods of conflict. The rebellion was one in a series of instances in which Guaraní-speaking populations fought against the imposition of different or increasingly demanding mechanisms of control by the Spanish. The pattern dates at least as far back as the destruction of Cabot’s Sanctí Spiritu, and it would continue as a defining pattern of Spanish-Guaraní relations in the years to come.

34 Schmidel, Voyage of Ulrich Schmidt, 54.

35 Multiple accounts suggest this scenario. See “Relación de las cosas que han pasado en la provincia del Río de la Plata, desde que prendieron al governador Cabeça de Vaca,” and “Memorial de las cosas que han sucedido despues que Caveça de Vaca fue traido de las provincias del Río de la Plata,” both in Garay, Colección de documentos relativos á la historia de América, 260-81.

By 1547, the state of affairs in Asunción was sufficiently stable that Irala and Chávez led another exploratory expedition. It consisted of 250 Europeans and a similar number of Cario retainers. They sailed up the Paraguay to the port from which the Itatín reportedly set off on their westward journeys. In the months to come, they endured a dangerous and difficult overland voyage punctuated by violent confrontations with a number of different native peoples. As they finally crossed the Guapay (Grande) River awaiting the emergence of mountains of silver and gold on the horizon, they unexpectedly encountered natives who conversed with them in Spanish. These natives were entrusted in encomienda to Pedro Anzures, an attendant to Pizarro and the founder of the city of La Plata.37

With hindsight and a sense of irony, one might say that they succeeded in their most immediate goals. They followed largely in the footsteps of García and the Itatín (if perhaps along a route lying a bit to the south), who had encountered the outlying provinces of the Inca empire in full flourish. When Irala and company reached the same location, it was the humble outskirts of Spanish Peru. Irala and his companions’ far-outsized expectations contributed to their disappointment. The reports they had heard of encounters with Andean highlanders were distortions that had grown to mythical proportions over time. The continued retellings and translations of these tales, both linguistic and cultural, twisted the original encounters and repeatedly couched them in terms familiar to the storyteller and/or audience. By the time the stories reached and took hold of the men of Asunción, they had passed through a number of

cultural filters. Their beliefs bore the mark of a broadly-shared Guarani cultural belief in a “land without evil.”

Irala’s assessment of the situation was different, though. He and his men felt surely that they had somehow followed the wrong path. In the years to come, they would continue to seek out lands more in fitting with their expectations. In the meantime, they made camp among the local Tamacoci people. Chávez traveled to the Spanish capital of Peru in Lima in order to clarify the legal status of the expedition. Irala hoped to secure the rights of settlement in the area so he might create a base of operations for future missions. He wished to continue the search for the mythical lands of gold and silver, this time turning to the north. But the bulk of the men on the expedition, both native and European, refused Irala’s orders. They wanted to secure more immediate rewards. They stripped Irala of his authority before attacking the Gorgotoqui people, a populous nation who lived in the vicinity of their encampment. Schmidel’s account explains that they took 12,000 prisoners in all and returned to Asunción without waiting for Chávez.

Chávez arrived in Lima at the end of 1548 and spoke with President La Gasca, the chief royal official in Peru at the time. La Gasca had only just reasserted royal control over the Spanish residents of Peru after the protracted Gonzalo Pizarro rebellion. He did not positively regard the

---

38 For this phenomenon of cultural and linguistic distortion in other contexts, see Stuart Schwartz, ed., Implicit Understandings: Observing, Reporting, and Reflecting on the Encounters Between Europeans and Other Peoples in the Early Modern Era (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1994). Especially applicable from this volume are Peter Hulme, “Tales of Distinction: European Ethnography and the Caribbean,” 157-97; and James Lockhart, “Sightings: Initial Nahua Reactions to Spanish Culture,” 218-48. For a fuller discussion of scholarship on Guaraní culture and the role of the “Land without Evil” in those cultures, Chapter 2. For the most direct work on how Guaraní speakers likely understood and acted upon these same tales during this period, see Julien, “Kandire in Real Time and Space.”

39 “Memoria y resolución de los casos y cosas sucedidas,” in Julien, Desde el Oriente, 51; Barnadas, Charcas, 58-59; Julien, “Colonial Perspectives,” 39-40; Schmidel, Voyage of Ulrich Schmidt, 77-78. A 1556 document written in Asunción discusses the sale of “muchos yndios orocotoquies” in the city. See “Carta y relación y testimonios … de los yndios de Perú (1556),” 229. The Gorgotoqui were an agricultural people who lived near the site of San José de Chiquitos today. The term Tamacoci refers imprecisely to a population, possibly Chané, living near the Guapay (Grande) River in the sixteenth century. See Combès, Diccionario étnico, 271-79.
ample power that Irala seemed to wield from Asunción. He was all the less pleased that, as far as
he knew, Irala was waiting with an army on the outskirts of Charcas. He refused any requests
from Chávez to found a settlement and sent him away.40 By the time Chávez made his way back
to Asunción, Irala had reestablished his authority as governor. The two planned another
westward expedition in 1553, but excessive rainfall made it impossible to proceed far enough
upriver to set off to the west. During the brief expedition one of the Spanish captains reportedly
managed to make contact with the Itatín. Hernando de Salazar led a scouting mission that, as he
claimed in a 1562 description of his services, “crossed into the provinces of the Itatín, Cario
people, where they were received in peace.” Salazar contacted Irala, who “sent up thirty men and
pacified the land and took possession of the land.”41 Information about this 1553 contact with the
Itatín is sparse, and it was recorded well after the fact. Considering the lack of immediacy
displayed by the residents of Asunción in the years after 1553, it stands to reason that they no
longer had faith that the Itatín could guide them where they wished to go. No expeditions
departed Asunción in the four years to follow. Irala’s death and the implementation of the
encomienda system in Asunción, both in 1556, marked the close of the period of large-scale
exploration from the city.

Salazar’s description of the Itatín-Guaraní as “Cario people” demonstrates the use of the
term “Cario” by the residents of Asunción to describe the wide-ranging ethnic category defined

40 In fact, La Gasca arranged to replace Irala as governor of the colony with a more trusted ally. In the end, La
Gasca’s choice to succeed him demurred at leaving his rich encomienda at Potosí and died in 1549 without
attempting to take on the position. See “Carta del licenciado Gasca al Consejo de Indias acerca de la conveniencia …
(28 de enero de 1549),” and “Carta del Licenciado La Gasca al Consejo de Indias. Refiere lo hecho por Centeno …
(2 de mayo de 1549),” both in Levillier, Gobernantes del Perú, vol. 1, 136-48, 168-73; Finot, Historia de la
conquista del oriente boliviano, 104, 138; Barnadas, Charcas, 58-60; R.B. Cunninghame Graham, A Vanished

41 “Información de servicios de Hernando de Salazar,” in Julien, Desde el Oriente, 121; Finot, Historia de la
conquista del oriente boliviano, 140; “Memoria y resolución de los casos y cosas sucedidas,” 52.
primarily by the use of the Guaraní language. Spanish settlers in the Río de la Plata began inaccurately to apply guára monikers to all Guaraní-speaking peoples all the way back in the 1520s, when a document described the Cario-Guaraní—who lived upriver from Sancti Spiritu—as “Chandules from above.” In later years, the close relationship between the Cario-Guaraní and the Spanish residents of Asunción led the latter to apply the term Cario to anyone who spoke the language.

Soon, the Spanish in Asunción were beginning to apply a new term to the Guaraní speakers they encountered. A Spaniard named Jaime Rasquín wrote to the king in 1557 or ’58 in order to petition for the governorship of Asunción. His letter refers to “some Indians that in the province of Peru they call Chiriguanaes and in our province they call Guaranís.” Rasquín meant to convey that he was optimistic that the Spanish in Peru could cultivate a beneficial relationship with the Guaraní-speaking peoples on the Charcas frontier despite appearances to the contrary, most notably their supposed penchant for cannibalism. The Spanish at Asunción had become allies with the similarly bestial Carios, and Rasquín believed that the two groups of native peoples were all but identical. He even indicated that the Chiriguanaes “are outsiders in those parts [and] that they long ago left the province of Paraguay where we reside.” The only distinction he recognized, aside from their regions of residence, was that the Carios in Asunción had accepted Christianity and therefore ceased to eat human flesh or make unprovoked war on their neighbors. He claimed that the Chiriguanaes also wished to adopt the faith: “we have word

---

42 For the early example, see “Carta de Luis Ramírez á su padre,” 452-53. A reference dating to 1542-43 provides a good example of the latter. The document describes three people approaching in a canoe: “According to how they appeared by the tongue in which they were speaking, they were Cario.” See “Relacion de la jornada al norte,” 1-2. For more on the equivalence between Cario and Guaraní, see Métraux, “The Guarani,” 69.
from them that, knowing as they do how their kin have received the faith of our lord Jesus Christ, they wish also to receive it.”

Rasquín’s letter offers no explanation of how the Spaniards in Asunción became aware of the term Chiriguana, nor does it clarify when or why it began to evolve from its earlier generic use to take on the ethnic and, later, legal significance it did by the 1570s. The most likely explanation points to Ñuflo de Chávez and his journeys to and from Lima nearly a decade earlier. Recall that Chávez crossed the Andes from the plains of the Tamacocies in 1548 in order to plead for settlement rights before returning to Paraguay in 1549. Rasquín’s knowledge of both the term Chiriguana and the Guaraní-speaking communities in the Andean foothills near Charcas likely stems from these journeys. Chávez’ later claimed to have encountered and “pacified” the Guaraní communities on the Charcas frontier in 1548. Though there are a number of reasons to treat elements of his claims with skepticism, it is reasonable to conclude that Chávez at least became aware of the Chiriguanaes on the frontiers of Spanish settlement in 1548-49. He likely would have heard the term, in its generic sense, applied to “savage” populations of Guaraní speakers. Judging by Rasquín’s—and later his own—use of the term as a synonym interchangeable with language-based ethnic designations for Guaraní speakers, Chávez seems to have misunderstood the boundaries of the category.

At the time when Rasquín wrote of the equivalence between the Chiriguanaes and the Guaraní, Chávez was preparing for a voyage that would bring him into contact with a network of populations he would describe consistently as Chiriguanaes. It would be the first exploratory

43 “Petición de Jayme Rasquin,” in Julien, Desde el Oriente, 43. Julien and Garay tentatively date the document to 1557 because it references the death of Irala, which occurred in 1556. See the editor’s note in Desde el Oriente, 41. The document also appears to predate the 1559 “Relación sobre el viaje de Jaime Rasquín,” AGI, Patronato, 29 R12.

44 “Memoria y resolución de los casos y cosas sucedidas,” 56; “Información de los méritos y servicios del capitán Nuflo de Chaves,” 19. As discussed above in regards to this source, Chávez erroneously dates his journey to 1546.
expedition to depart Asunción since the brief contact with the Itatín in 1553. After Irala’s death in 1556, Chávez was passed over to succeed him as governor. Chávez left the city in 1557 or ‘58 with plans to found a New Asunción that would recreate the spirit of exploration that had characterized Asunción in its infancy. Chávez, accompanied by several hundred Spaniards and more than a thousand Cario auxiliaries, initially planned to settle among the Xarayes peoples to the north, but he sailed onward after noting their apparent poverty. His subsequent encounter with the Itatín left him similarly unimpressed, so he chose to travel as far up the Paraguay as his boats could take him. Four days beyond the territory of the Itatín, they encountered “a town of Chiriguanaes” who described the landscape and peoples of the area. These “chiriguanas amigos” claimed to know a great deal about the rich lands the Spanish were seeking. They offered to direct Chávez through the treacherous territories that lay between. One account of this portion of the journey uses the designation “Candires” to refer to the “true lord[s] of metal and of other things” that lay beyond the western horizon. The descriptions of the Candires, like the references to the lands of very large sheep recounted by Rivera on a previous expedition, indicate distorted representations of the Incas or those living on the Inca frontiers. Other informants made reference to the “caracaras” who inhabited the region immediately preceding that of the Candires.45

As Chávez and his men increasingly penetrated westward, they continued to encounter settlements of friendly Guaraní-speaking peoples they called Chiriguanaes. The leaders of two such settlements confirmed the stories of wealth in metals and other resources in the lands to the

45 “Memoria y resolución de los casos y cosas sucedidas,” 53-54; “La relación general de todo lo susodho,” 57-59. For more about the possible meanings and etymologies of “Candire” in this context, see Chapter 2, and Julien, “Kandire in Real Time and Space,” 254-57. References to the “caracaras” almost certainly indicated highland Andeans, including the Qaraqara of Charcas.
west. Many residents of both villages had reportedly made the voyage in the past, and some were willing to accompany the Spanish to “the land … in which god had given us all good things.” Their point of entry on these previous journeys was a crossing on the Guapay (Grande) River from which it was possible to see the mountains beyond. But before they reached that point, they would encounter the Tapuymiri led by the powerful Jaguagua. The Chiriguana communities and the Tapuymiri had a history of conflict and warfare.46

The testimonies of these so-called “Chiriguanaes” paints an image of a series of settlements of Guaraní speakers interspersed between the Pantanal region of the upper Paraguay River and the plains east of the Guapay (Grande) River.47 These settlements were the byproducts of westward expeditions that likely dated back at least as far back as the 1510s. In Chávez’ time, they occasionally cooperated with each other to undertake missions aimed at pillaging the natives of the Andean highlands and taking captives from among the primarily Arawak-origin peoples who lived around the Guapay (Grande) River. Some Chiriguanaes even indicated that they wished to resettle their families farther to the west.48 Chávez was not cognizant of the fact that he had passed into the land of the Candires a decade earlier. Instead, he continued to

46 “La relaçion general de todo lo susodho,” 57-63.

47 The network of interspersed “Chiriguana” villages does not appear to have extended past the Guapay River passage, to which Jaguagua’s people controlled access. The testimony of one Chiriguana leader makes a curious reference to the “chiriguana de la sierra,” whom the Spanish might seek for guidance during the penultimate portion of their journey. See “La relaçion general de todo lo susodho,” 63. It is unlikely, however, that this referred to the same sierra or cordillera of the eastern Andean foothills associated with the Chiriguanaes, which lay west and south of the Guapay River. This is not to indicate that no Guarani speakers occupied the cordillera at this time—only that those who did were not part of the same interconnected network of Guaraní-speaking communities that operated to the east of the Guapay. Jaguagua and his so-called “Tapuymiri” appear to have acted for a time as an effective filter of east-west migrations, at least at this latitude.

48 “La relaçion general de todo lo susodho,” 59-63. One witness volunteered to accompany the Spanish because “he wished to trade for his relatives … and wanted to bring back metal.” Others reportedly indicated that “they wanted to go with [the Spanish] and bring their women and children.”
envision lands of untold wealth described in myths that resulted from translation and irrational expectations.

Chávez’ expedition acted on the advice of the “chiriguanas amigos” and eventually made its way toward the Tapuymiri people. Chávez’ testimony from 1560 describes the Tapuymiri as “a bellicose and populous people and lords of the herb,” the last phrase a reference to their use of a poisonous substance on the tips of their arrows. Chávez’ attempts to make peaceful contact with the Tapuymiri were reportedly rebuffed in violent fashion. Still, he and his men attempted to push onward toward the Candires. The Tapuymiri blocked their progress and besieged the Spanish camp with a force reportedly estimated at “twenty thousand men of war, well supplied with weapons and well trained.” The Spanish broke the siege on Trinity Sunday of 1559, but at the cost of more than a dozen Spanish fatalities, the loss of twice as many horses, and more wounded. The poisoned arrows worked to great effect in spite of Spanish armor. Hundreds of their native allies also perished in the fighting.

After the battle, when they were safely beyond the Tapuymiri, Chávez decided to construct a secure location in which his people could nurse their injuries and regroup. He found himself once again in the lands of the Tamacoci, where Irala had set up and then abandoned camp in 1548. Like Irala, Chávez faced a mutiny among his men. They feared continued attacks from the surrounding native populations. Most of the Spanish deserted camp and took with them 1,500 native allies back to Asunción. Only 40 Spaniards and around 1,000 auxiliaries remained with Chávez, who was steadfast in his determination to maintain a more permanent presence in the area. He founded the town of Nueva Asunción on the banks of the Guapay (Grande) River in
the territory of the Tamacoci in August of 1559. The town came more commonly to be called La Barranca, the ravine, in the years to come.49

Chávez’ intention at the outset of his expedition had been to populate, and the establishment of La Barranca entailed the distribution of land among the remaining Spaniards, now the town’s founding citizens. But La Barranca was also to serve as a base for further exploration. To that end, Chávez sent out a scout to the west tasked with searching for the next step on the road toward the Candires. He unexpectedly came across a group of Spaniards only about a day’s journey from La Barranca.50 They were members of Andrés Manso’s expedition, which had set out from the Charcas highlands months earlier.

A Spanish Dispute amidst the Chiriguanaes, 1559-1565

When they came face to face near La Barranca in late 1559, Manso and Chávez viewed each other as rivals. Both had a claim from a Spanish authority to oversee the settlement of the region. In their estimations, those claims contradicted each other. The clash between them and their supporters would play out over the coming years in territory effectively beyond the frontiers of Spanish colonial settlement. A variety of native populations were active in that geographical space, including several Chiriguana communities. All parties engaged in political maneuverings in order to gain a foothold in their mutually occupied territory. The struggle resulted in the formation of certain cooperative arrangements between the various Spanish and Chiriguana factions. But ultimately, the arrangements between the Spanish and Chiriguanaes collapsed.

The legal aspects of the dispute between Chávez and Manso resulted in the production and survival of documentary evidence that otherwise would not exist. The dispute served to

49 “Memoria y resolución de los casos y cosas sucedidas,” 54-55; “Información de servicios de Hernando de Salazar,” 122; Julien, “Colonial Perspectives,” 42; Gott, Land Without Evil, 156-57.

50 “Memoria y resolución de los casos y cosas sucedidas,” 55-56.
catalogue interactions with the Chiriguanaes during this period, but not, of course, in any balanced sense. The interests and assertions of the Chávez camp also tend to overshadow Manso’s for reasons that will become obvious. Native voices occasionally emerge in the documents, but only through the filters of the Spanish participants and their agendas. The actions taken by the various Chiriguanaes in response to the situations they faced provide a much clearer indication of their thinking, even if the factional nature of the Chiriguana peoples prevents drawing any definitive conclusions about the people as the whole. The trend that continues over the course of the 1560s—a trend taking shape already in 1520s Río de la Plata—is that Guaraní-speaking communities were willing to maintain alliances with Spanish factions so long as their interests were aligned. They would operate alongside the Spanish as soldiers, explorers, and interpreters, among other roles. They were unwilling, however, to alter elements of their ways of life to conform to the acceptable standards for native behavior upheld by colonial officials such as Viceroy Cañete or Licenciado Matienzo. The Spanish pursued settlement strategies that impinged on their ways of life. The result was the rupturing of Spanish-Chiriguana alliances in the eastern Andes.

Rather than come to blows, Manso and Chávez agreed upon their initial confrontation to appeal to the authority of the viceroy. A party quickly set off for Lima. Chávez decided to present his case for leadership of the region in person. Manso remained behind, perhaps too confident that Viceroy Cañete—the same viceroy who commissioned him to populate the very land in dispute—would settle the matter in his favor. Chávez’ claim was based upon his authorization from the governor of Río de la Plata to found a settlement among the Xarayes. La Barranca was half a continent away. But Viceroy Cañete’s chief objective in the matter was the expansion of the Spanish presence into the interior. Chávez’ experiences in crossing the
continent suggested the immensity of the still-unknown territory and potential riches. It also brought into focus the elusive possibility of a navigable waterway between Charcas and the Atlantic. In early 1560 Cañete made the decision to divide the territory in question into separate jurisdictions. He classified the area of initial dispute surrounding La Barranca and the land to the north as part of a new territory called the Province of Mojos. Chávez was to exercise control over it. Manso would retain his rights of settlement, but his jurisdiction would be the Province of the Plains of the Chaco to the south. The resolution was a victory for Chávez. He remained hopeful that Mojos was home to the wealth and wonders he had sought throughout his explorations. It was a defeat for Manso. Not only was the scope of his authority cut in half, the half he retained consisted precisely of the inhospitable land he had chosen not to colonize months earlier.\(^5\)

Manso was furious. Word of the verdict preceded Chávez and company on their return from Lima, and Manso reportedly took steps to prevent its implementation. According to an account written by Chávez’ chief ally Hernando de Salazar, Manso planned to disarm all of Chávez’ partisans, kill the highest ranking among them, and block Chávez from entering the region. His ally in the endeavor was the Chiriguana leader Vitupué and a band of warriors loyal to him. On two occasions, Manso reportedly initiated his plan, then called it off before firing a shot. Only after Chávez arrived in La Barranca did the matter came to a head. Manso allegedly set fire to Chávez’ estate. The act was enough, “in addition to that described above and [his]

\(^5\)“Memoria y resolución de los casos y cosas sucedidas,” 56; “Información de los méritos y servicios del capitán Nuflo de Chaves,” 22; “Provisión Real del Marques de Cañete nombrando a Nuflo de Chavez como teniente general de la Provincia de Mojos (Lima, 15 febrero 1560),” in Julien, *Desde el Oriente*, 64-65; Gott, *Land Without Evil*, 158; Finot, *Historia de la conquista del oriente boliviano*, 112-14, 169-71. Chávez was not properly “governor” of the new province. Viceroy Cañete appointed his own son to preside over it, but Chávez remained “lieutenant general” (lugar teniente general) in charge until Cañete’s son, who was serving as governor of Chile, could exercise control in person. He remained in Chile, and Chávez continued to operate as the de facto governor of the province until his death. The younger Cañete would play an important role in the ongoing struggle with the Chiriguana people in the 1590s when he served as viceroy of Peru. See Chapter 8.
other crimes,” to warrant Manso’s arrest. Chávez imprisoned him and disarmed his most loyal followers in July of 1560. Manso departed the city in chains and under guard. He was meant to stand trial before the Audiencia in La Plata.  

Following Manso’s departure, Chávez’ inclination was to widen the scope of settlement. He left La Barranca in the hands Hernando de Salazar and set off to the east in the subsequent months. In early 1561, he founded a new town called Santa Cruz de la Sierra. It lay more than 200 km east of La Barranca in the area known as Chiquitos (The original site of Santa Cruz lies on the current site of San José de Chiquitos, Bolivia; La Barranca’s site was closer to the modern city of Santa Cruz, Bolivia; Figure 5-1). The vicinity was home to a variety of native groups, among them Chané and the Gorgotoqui. Chávez assigned encomiendas to the first Spanish citizens of Santa Cruz in April. At around the same time, he wrote a list of requests for the viceroy on behalf of the council of Santa Cruz. Most of Chávez’ requests were standard. They involved pleas to extend privileges to and suspend obligations for the citizens. A few, however, provide a glimpse into the type of settlement that Chávez expected to oversee. Chávez felt that there was little hope he would find mines or other sources of metal in the area because “the natives drink from their hands during the rainy season [because] there is neither gold nor silver nor other metals.” Neither was the land fit for intensive cultivation. He claimed that the only hope the Spanish encomenderos had to thrive was if the viceroy were to grant them the right to demand service from their native charges “in the mines of Potosí.” Binding their fortunes to Potosí in this way would be beneficial for the “pacification, development, and growth of the land, and the citizens and residents of [Santa Cruz]” while the natives would become “more

52 “Información de servicios de Hernando de Salazar,” 123; “Resolución de los casos ofrecidos al capitán Nuñio de Chaues desde el año de cincuenta y siete,” and “Testimonio del escribano Francisco Gallego,” both in Julien, Desde el Oriente, 109-12, 113-15.
cultivated and would come more quickly to the knowledge of the holy Catholic faith.” In order to overcome the difficulty of the distance between Santa Cruz and the mines, Chávez requested that the city of La Plata organize the improvement of the road system and provide local labor to aid in the transport of supplies.\textsuperscript{53}

Chávez had not yet abandoned his quest to find the elusive source of wealth in the interior of the continent, but he recognized that more immediate benefits would come from tying the inhabitants of Santa Cruz to the fortunes of the Charcas highlands. In a way, this was what his position as interim governor of Mojos demanded. The provision granted by Viceroy Cañete tasked him with peopling the \textit{tierra adentro} for the benefit of the king and spreading the Christian faith.\textsuperscript{54} Employing the local natives in the mines of Potosí would accomplish both, according to his logic.

Manso did not remain out of the fray for long. Chavez’ chief ally, Salazar, reported that Manso managed to escape his imprisonment \textit{en route} to La Plata and proceeded to sow unrest among the natives near La Barranca by burning their towns and crops. Salazar requested that the viceroy prohibit anyone in Charcas from joining forces with Manso under penalty of death. The officials serving on the Audiencia in La Plata were unsure of how to intercede in such a divisive issue. Manso’s arrest had inflamed passions in La Plata to the point that factions coalesced behind each party, and they were near blows. Nor did the officials in La Plata see events exactly from Salazar’s point of view. Their description of Manso’s “escape” raises the question of whether he might rather have been cleared of wrongdoing. As they summarized the matter,

\textsuperscript{53} “\textit{Ynstruzion del cabildo de la çibdad de Santa Cruz de la Sierra de la gouernaçion de los Mojos},” in Julien, \textit{Desde el Oriente}, 96-99; Finot, \textit{Historia de la conquista del oriente boliviano}, 178-79.

\textsuperscript{54} “Provisión Real del Marques de Cañete,” 64. Regarding Chávez’ intentions to continue his search for the wealthy civilization that eluded him, see García Recio, \textit{Análisis de una sociedad de frontera}, 36-38.
“Chávez arrested Manso and sent him to [La Plata]—once loose he returned to his population and is there now, and Chávez in his.” The officials further characterized Manso as “very content and happy” to have the opportunity to do the king’s bidding “more peacefully.”

The members of the Audiencia hoped that passions would subside and that the viceroy’s will be done.

Following his detention, Manso travelled to the Chaco plains, where a handful of his remaining confederates were waiting. He established a settlement called Santo Domingo de la Nueva Rioja in the eastern part of the cordillera (on the Parapetí River), commonly known as Nueva Rioja. Very little evidence survives regarding Manso’s activities during this period. Instead, there is a rare instance of a Chiriguana voice, distorted though it may be, appearing in the documents to fill the gaps. Matarapa appeared in Santa Cruz in May of 1561. Elsewhere he is described as the “ambassador of the [Chiriguana] caciques.” He had come from “the province of Vitupué” in order to clarify a point that baffled the Chiriguana leaders. Matarapa reminded Chávez that he (Chávez) had ordered the Chiriguana peoples not to attack the peoples of the plains, “because it angers God and the leader of the Spanish.” Manso, however, had directly contradicted the order by putting out the call to go to war in the plains, and several caciques had joined him. Chávez responded by instructing him to send Vitupué to Salazar in La Barranca so that he might address the situation.

The passage suggests that both Manso and Chávez were maneuvering to establish alliances with the Chiriguana peoples in their midst. Chávez’ recommendation that Vitupué visit

55 “Resolución de los casos ofresçidos al capitan Nuflo de Chaues desde el año cinquenta y siete,” 112-13; “Carta á S.M. del presidente y oidores de la audiencia de los Charcas … (La Plata 22 Octubre 1561),” in Levillier, La Audiencia de Charcas, vol. 1, 23-35.

56 “Testimonio del escribano Francisco Gallego,” 113-16. For the reference to Matarapa’s position, see “Resolución de los casos ofresçidos al capitan Nuflo de Chaues desde el año cinquenta y siete,” 113. Though the term originates in the Caribbean and has no real connection to the region, “cacique” is the most common term used to indicate native leaders of all ethnicities throughout the colonial period in Charcas. I follow the sources in using it.
Salazar implies that he was hoping to draw the powerful cacique into a partnership with the settlers of La Barranca. As is clear from his exploits, Chávez was comfortable allying his interests with Guaraní-speaking populations, and the strategy makes particular sense if one considers Chávez’ wish to connect Santa Cruz to the highlands. The route between Santa Cruz and Potosí passed through territory controlled by Vitupué. Manso’s call to war, as well as Salazar’s accusations against him, meanwhile, suggests that he was adopting precisely the type of “Chiriguana” behavior he had been sent to the region to stamp out. By encouraging the Chiriguana peoples to capture and enslave the natives of the plains, Manso may have been hoping to reward his allies with the labor and service that in other circumstances a captain general might entrust to his Spanish allies in the form of the encomienda. Waging war for captives was the more culturally significant version of the institution for the Chiriguanaes. It had been the basis of the partnership between the Spanish and the Carios in Asunción decades earlier, and it was clearly an important pursuit among Guaraní speakers in the eastern Andes as well. In putting out the call for war, Manso managed to harness that pursuit toward his own ends, at least for a time.

In contrast, Chávez boasted of the positive effect he had had on the Chiriguana peoples on the Charcas frontier. He claimed to have “reformed them of many evil rights and customs that they had,” not by violence and coercion, but “by means of his kindness and by means of the friendship that the Chiriguana Indians have forged with him.” The testimony was meant to

---

57 “Información de los méritos y servicios del capitán Nuflo de Chaves,” 20. Chávez’ intended use of the term “yndios chiriguanas” in this case falls into a bit of a gray area. Elsewhere in the document he used the same terminology in its broad sense to refer to the Carios who rose against Asunción in 1544, the people he supposedly conquered on the Charcas frontier in 1548-49, and a Guaraní group in the upper Paraguay that he defended from Portuguese slave raiders in 1555. This particular context, however, immediately follows the second instance and seems to indicate a much narrower usage indicating the Guaraní speakers on the Charcas frontier. See pages 17, 19, 21 for the other uses. For additional testimony that characterizes Chávez’ leadership as in accordance with Spanish law, see “Información de Santa Cruz de la Sierra (Cuzco, 17 septiembre 1571),” in Julien, Desde el Oriente, 218-21.
show that he was achieving the goals set out for him by the viceroy—extending the frontiers of Spanish settlement, taming the wild savages, promoting Christianity, and protecting the natives under Spanish control. While certainly exaggerated, it demonstrates that Chávez sought to model his relationship with the Chiriguana peoples along the Spanish legal ideal.

There exists very little direct evidence from Manso’s Nueva Rioja during its existence, but one series of documents seems to indicate that Manso also attempted to change the form of control he exerted over the Chiriguana peoples in his midst to one more consistent with the traditions of Spanish law. Manso granted *encomiendas* to several of the Spanish inhabitants of his settlement in April and May of 1563. In addition to several other groups of natives in the Chaco, mostly Chané, he entrusted to a Spanish ally “the town of Zaype, Chiriguanaes, which is in the cordillera with the cacique Curaybi, with all his Indians, caciques, and prominent individuals subject to him.” Zaype (or Çaype) was a Chiriguana cacique who had heeded Manso’s call to arms against the natives of the Chaco. Now, his people were subject to “the things of our holy Catholic faith and good policy, [including] providing occasional tribute.” The language pursuant to many of the *encomiendas* Manso granted during the period includes the right of *encomenderos* to receive service from their charges “by whatever means, part, or place that may be [part of their] haciendas and to their benefits.”

The control that Manso wielded over the natives living in the Province of the Chaco began quickly to slip away. Audiencia records from November of 1563 vaguely reference the receipt of a report from Manso that described “the death of eleven Spaniards, which only he survived.” A letter written two months later by a member of the Audiencia provides a bit more

---

58 “Encomiendas hechas por Andres Manso (La Plata, 27 abril – 5 mayo 1563),” in Julien, *Desde el Oriente*, 160-64. The language in *encomienda* grants was, in many ways, legal boilerplate, but it was still a reasonable representation of what the grantee might expect to receive from his native charges.
detail. On a particular night when Manso had left Nueva Rioja on a mission, he and eleven soldiers with him fell victim to a coordinated attack. Nowhere does either document specifically name the perpetrators beyond saying they were “the Indians around him.”59 The attack on Manso and his traveling party portended more strife with the natives in the area. The town of Nueva Rioja suffered an attack sometime in mid-1564 that wiped it off the map. Manso and all the other Spanish residents were reportedly killed. The full details of the destruction of the settlement are murky and come most directly in the form of a letter written by Licenciado Matienzo several years later. Manso seems to have attempted to punish those responsible for the deaths of his eleven companions by availing himself of a faction of Chiriguana warriors. His army of Spaniards and Chiriguanaes rode out from Nueva Rioja and captured a reported 2,000 prisoners in the Chaco. According to the letter, Manso divided the captives between himself and his Chiriguana allies. That night, “the same Chiriguanaes that had helped him perpetrate such a great cruelty” turned on Manso’s settlement and its 80 Spanish residents. They burned Nueva Rioja to the ground as they waited outside, bows trained on anyone who emerged from the flames.60

Either the same group of Chiriguanaes or a coordinated ally attacked and destroyed La Barranca within a period of a few days. Only a few of the Spanish residents of the town managed to escape to the relative safety of Santa Cruz. Later testimony suggests that Santa Cruz was the target of similar attempts to destroy it at around the same time, but the population managed to

59 “1563.26 (8 Nov. 1563),” in López Villalba, Acuerdos de la Real Audiencia de La Plata, vol. 1, 46-47; “Carta á S. M. del Licenciado Antonio López de Haro, oidor de la Audiencia de los Charcas … y de lo ocurrido al capitan Andrés Manso con unos indios (La Plata 4 de Enero de 1564),” in Levillier, La Audiencia de Charcas, vol. 1, 126-27.

60 “Carta a S. M. del licenciado Matienzo, oidor de Charcas, describiendo una parte de la tierra del distrito de la Audiencia … y á éste mismo se le dé la gobernación del Río de la Plata (La Plata 2 Enero 1566),” in Levillier, La Audiencia de Charcas, vol. 1, 169; “Copia de una información de servicios de Hernando de Salazar (Santa Cruz de la Sierra, 2 – 16 octubre 1568),” in Julien, Desde el Oriente, 174-75, 183-84, 193, 199; Julien suggests that Manso may have allied himself with Vitupué to fight against the Chiriguana peoples who controlled the area closer to Nueva Rioja. See Julien, “Colonial Perspectives,” 47-48.
fend off the attack. The residents of Santa Cruz blamed Vitupué, specifically, for having coordinated the attacks. A group of Spanish soldiers retaliated against him late in the year and recovered a cache of Spanish weapons and other property allegedly taken from the two destroyed Spanish settlements.\footnote{“Copia de una información de servicios de Hernando de Salazar,” 174-75, 183-84, 193, 199. Some explanations held that the same group of Chirigu anaes travelled from Nueva Rioja to La Barranca and attacked both settlements in succession. See “Carta a S. M. del licenciado Matienzo … (La Plata 2 Enero 1566),” 169.}

The most plausible explanation for the violent collapse of Spanish-Chiriguana alliances in 1564 were the attempts by the Spanish to exert new and different forms of control onto the Chiriguana peoples in their midst. Though the available evidence leaves a number of gaps in the narrative, this explanation best fits the pattern of Spanish-Guaraní relations going back decades. The long tradition of cooperation between the two groups, primarily in the Paraguay basin had been organized around pursuits that tended to benefit the elite in both groups. In the Provinces of the Chaco and Mojos, the Spanish had begun to orient themselves toward settlement patterns that conflicted with Guaraní ethno-cultural practices. In at least one case, a group of Chiriguanaes was awarded in \textit{encomienda}, a departure from the ways the Spanish had used Guaraní labor in the past. Guaraní men were accepting of roles on Spanish-led expeditions, in their military retinues, as hunters and fishermen, and as dealers in the products of these activities, most notably their captives. Agriculture was the work of women, and Guaraní-speaking men generally considered it beneath them. It was Manso’s stated duty, however, to plant crops in the plains, and the \textit{encomenderos} would have expected agricultural service from the natives entrusted to them.

A similar antagonism toward the \textit{encomienda} contributed to a widespread rebellion of Cario-Guaraní in Asunción at around the same time. It was not the first native uprising in the region, but it was among the most widespread and terrifying for the Spanish residents of the city.
Not much is known about the rebellion. The eighteenth-century Jesuit historian Pierre-François-Xavier Charlevoix described the indigenous participants’ thinking as “probably with a view of being able to shake off a yoke, the weight of which grew from day to day more intolerable.” The Asunción revolt collapsed, and in the following decades the antagonism in Asunción waned as the Guaraní culture gave way more and more to one of mestizaje. But in the regions surrounding the Spanish settlements of La Barranca and Nueva Rioja, there were two key differences. First, the balance of power was tipped more in favor of the natives. The small, newly constructed Spanish towns were far less capable than Asunción of mounting defenses against much larger native attacking forces. Second, Asunción had only very gradually evolved into a Spanish settlement characterized by *encomienda* labor. In Nueva Rioja, at least, the movement towards entrusting Chiriguanas in *encomienda* was rapid and far more disruptive.

But the awarding of Chiriguanas in *encomienda* was not the only disruptive element of the institution, from the Chiriguanas point of view. Their mode of surplus agricultural production called for the capture of members of rival communities. It was this aspect of their behavior that made them particularly objectionable from the perspective of the Spanish colonial establishment in the first place. But beginning with the founding of the Spanish settlements in their midst in 1559, the Spanish began to lay direct claim to a much greater portion of the native populations from which the Chiriguanas drew their captives, among them the Chané and Tamacoci. The competing claims put the two groups (Spanish and Chiriguanas) in opposition to one another for the labor of these native groups. By 1565, the Chiriguanas had eliminated their

---

rivals in Nueva Rioja and La Barranca. The residents of Santa Cruz remained, but they could no longer claim that their presence had a wholly beneficial effect in civilizing the Chiriguanaes. They observed, rather, that “the Chiriguanaes of the sierra … were the enemies of those who served the Spanish.”63 In other words, the Chiriguana populations living in and around the Chiriguana cordillera preyed upon the peoples of the plains that the Spanish had entrusted in encomienda. This rivalry over native laborers would be a recurring feature in Spanish-Chiriguana relations in the years to come, though not always in the ways one might expect.

**Chávez’ Intervention & Death among “the Chiriguanaes,” 1565-1568**

Chávez had been absent from the Province of Mojos during the time of the attacks on Nueva Rioja, La Barranca, and Santa Cruz. He had returned to Asunción to bring his wife and children, as well as other settlers, to Santa Cruz. Over 100 Spaniards agreed to make the move, and a party including a reported 1,000 natives departed Asunción in October of 1564. As the expedition turned west from the Paraguay River and passed through the territory of the Itatín, Chávez recruited a reported 3,000 additional natives to accompany him and settle in the vicinity of Santa Cruz. In an ironic twist, it was now Chávez who led them along the westward road that he had navigated a decade earlier thanks to help from the Itatín and their Chiriguana kin. And just like a decade earlier, the journey to the west was plagued by hardships, this time as a result of swollen swamps and rivers, supply shortages, and sporadic hostility from local populations. The journey took its greatest toll on the natives in the party. Many died, and most of the native survivors abandoned Chávez before reaching Santa Cruz. They formed a number of new communities approximately 150 km to the east of the city.64

63 “Copia de una información de servicios de Hernando de Salazar” 175.

Chávez and the remainder of the party he led from Asunción arrived in Santa Cruz sometime in the beginning of 1566. They found the city in a state of alert and its defenses in disrepair due to the ongoing threat of attack. Chávez and Salazar personally led soldiers out of the city in order “to achieve the pacification and punishment of the Chiriguanaes of the cordillera and to populate the land that was entrusted to the Captain Andrés Manso.” The Audiencia, meanwhile, raised funds and recruited soldiers to support their mission.65

The Spanish cavalries reportedly succeeded in scattering the hostile Chiriguanaes and alleviating the threat to Santa Cruz. No contemporary report detailing the expedition survives, and the few later testimonies that seem to relate to this period tend to be vague. Several witnesses testifying on behalf of Chávez’ legacy two decades later made reference to a standoff between Chávez and Vitupué, and a 1571 document calls Vitupué the “captain and head of all the damage the Christians have received.” According to certain testimonies, Chávez and his soldiers faced off with Vitupué in his village. Vitupué’s forces “fought at this time with muskets” taken from Nueva Rioja and La Barranca “and not with arrows” and managed to wound several Spanish soldiers. The Spanish side gained the upper hand when soldiers captured a wounded Chiriguana cacique. They freed him in exchange for his promise to end the rebellion. He also arranged to free “two mestiza women, daughters of Spaniards, whom [Chiriguana forces] had captured” from Nueva Rioja. According to other testimonies, Chávez and his soldiers won a far less satisfying victory. They were unable to catch up to the fleeing residents of Vitupué’s territory. Instead, the Christians burned his village and the surrounding crops as the residents escaped into the

65 “Copia de una información de servicios de Hernando de Salazar,” 176, 185, 194; “1566.23 (20 Mar. 1566),” in López Villalba, Acuerdos de la Real Audiencia de La Plata, vol. 1, 216-18.

66 The Audiencia officials pledged to Chávez several sums they had collected as fines for various reasons. They also ordered Spaniards in La Plata to serve with Chávez as their punishment for misdeeds. See “1566.31-35 (9-27 May 1566),” in López Villalba, Acuerdos de la Real Audiencia de La Plata, vol. 1, 226-31.
mountains. Meanwhile, Salazar’s cavalry chased a Chiriguana band of warriors until they escaped to the west. 67 Whichever version is correct, the victory resulted in the opening of the roads immediately to the west of Santa Cruz and the pacification of the region, at least for a time.

Chávez’ mission was less successful in ensuring safe passage to the highlands or alleviating the threats nearer to La Plata. The Audiencia had been most critically concerned in March of 1566 about Chiriguana forces advancing to the northwest from the area near Nueva Rioja via the temperate eastern valleys, including Tomina, and threatening the “Spaniards and Indians from whom the Imperial village of Potosí maintains itself.” Yet there is little evidence to suggest that Chávez did anything to repopulate Nueva Rioja or prevent incursions on the part of these particular Chiriguana populations. In October of 1567, the Audiencia again expressed concern about the Tomina valleys, “for the damage that the Chiriguanaes have done [there].” 68

Effectively cut off from La Plata and Charcas by the hostile Chiriguana communities in the distant west, Chávez’ strategy for the development of Santa Cruz turned eastward instead. He had received word of silver mines among the Guaraní-speaking communities to the east, near the newly settled Itatín. In mid-1568, Chávez set off from Santa Cruz to investigate the mines and bring the Itatín into the service of the Spanish. The more detailed witness testimonies of his journey maintain that Chávez gathered together the foremost Itatín leaders when he arrived in

67 “Relación uerdadera del asiento de Santa Cruz de la Sierra (Cuzco, 1571),” and “Relación de los servicios de Nuflo de Chávez y Alvaro de Chávez (La Plata 1588-89),” both in Julien, Desde el Oriente, 213, 253, 256, 263-64, 266, 270. Salazar claimed to have “followed the Indians on horseback until the Chinguri River.” See “Copia de una información de servicios de Hernando de Salazar,” 176, 185. “Chinguri” served as an alternate name for the Guapay. Matienzo described the settlement of La Barranca as having been on the “Chunguri River.” See “Carta a S. M. del licenciado Matienzo … (La Plata 2 Enero 1566),” 169.

68 “1566.23 (20 Mar. 1566),” and “1567.60 (16 Oct. 1567),” both in López Villalba, Acuerdos de la Real Audiencia de La Plata, vol. 1, 216-17, 396. There is a suggestion in two 1571 documents that Chávez reassigned the encomiendas left vacant in Nueva Rioja, but no evidence suggests any actual attempts to resettle the region in a permanent way at this time. See “Información de Santa Cruz de la Sierra, (Cuzco, 17 septiembre 1571),” 219; and “Relación uerdadera del asiento de Santa Cruz de la Sierra (Cuzco, 1571),” 215.
their settlements. He explained to the assembled caciques that he wished not “to treat the Indians cruelly, but by the best Christian methods attract them to peace and knowledge of evangelical law.” He wanted “to do well by them, to indoctrinate them and have them as children, because that is what the king had ordered.”

These testimonies were part of an effort to secure royal recognition for Chávez’ services, so their characterization of Chávez’ behavior certainly exaggerate his fidelity to Spanish law. But at the same time, they show that Chávez was attempting to extend Spanish forms of institutional control over the Itatín populations east of Santa Cruz. He planned to evangelize them, settle them, and, no doubt, entrust their labor to the Spanish residents in what remained of the province. But Chávez never got to the point of dividing up and granting the Itatín in encomienda. While addressing the assembly of caciques, one of them approached Chávez from behind and struck him on the head with a club. Chávez collapsed under the force of the blow. The soldiers accompanying him scattered the natives and managed to fight their way free, but the assault proved fatal. Chávez died in September of 1568, between one and three days after the assault. By some accounts, the existence of the mines had been a ruse all along, but at least one witness maintained years later that “he was present and did the assessments of the mines, and if they were worked today they [would be] very rich and of great benefit.” They remained an object of speculation and exploration among the residents of Santa Cruz for decades to come.

Given the available evidence available, it is impossible to declare with any certainty why the Itatín killed Chávez. It may have been the result of a personal dispute or animosity resulting

---

69 “Relación de los servicios de Nuflo de Chávez y Alvaro de Chávez (La Plata 1588-89),” 247, 252, 256, 264, 266; Díaz de Guzmán, Anales del descubrimiento, 250-51.

70 “Relación de los servicios de Nuflo de Chávez y Alvaro de Chávez (La Plata 1588-89),” 247, 252, 266; Díaz de Guzmán, Anales del descubrimiento, 150-51.
from the difficult journey they had shared two years earlier. But in the light of the other breakdowns in Spanish-Guaraní relations—most notably in the attacks on Nueva Rioja and La Barranca in 1564, but also Sancti Spiritu in 1529 and Asunción in 1544 and 1560—the most likely scenario is that the Itatín rejected Chávez’ attempts to define their interaction on Spanish terms. Years later, as the Spanish built a legal case for war against the Chiriguanaes of the cordillera, the similarity between them and the Itatín served once again to link the two Guaraní-speaking peoples in Spanish minds and jurisprudence. An official account of Chávez’ death from 1577 describes him as having died while “making war on the Chiriguanaes Indians.”

Conclusion

Over the course of the 1540s and 1550s, Spanish pursuits in eastern Charcas came to rely upon the development of the subandean valleys near the highland urban centers of La Plata and Potosí. Settlement in these areas brought Spaniards and natives working within the colonial system into conflict with the Chiriguanaes. Spanish officials sought to put an end to these conflicts, and bring new populations into the labor force, by increasing the Spanish presence beyond the frontier. By the early 1560s, two competing groups of Spanish settlers in the newly founded lowland settlements of La Barranca, Nueva Rioja, and Santa Cruz allied, in various ways, with Chiriguanaes and other native peoples in order to maintain and strengthen their claims to the region. A period of peace and apparent cooperation quickly collapsed into widespread violence. This brief harmonic era mirrored the coming together of Spaniards and Guaraní speakers in Asunción decades before. There, the relationships between the Spanish and their native allies evolved gradually away from agreements based on forms of cooperation congenial with native values and towards those favored by Spanish colonial legal authorities.

The Spanish successfully imposed that evolution despite resistance from their native allies at a number of steps. The movement to impose these latter forms of interaction, most notably the *encomienda*, came about far more rapidly in the eastern Andean lowland Spanish settlements of Nueva Rioja, La Barranca, and Santa Cruz. The response was correspondingly swifter and stronger. European colonization and the institutions that accompanied it affected the Chiriguanaes differently and to different degrees in each case, but by 1564, the most powerful native groups fully opposed the Spanish presence and sought to eliminate all three settlements. Their violent opposition to the Spanish presence greatly diminished the ability of the Spanish to control the region and reduced it to one section, near Santa Cruz. The Spanish only managed to maintain that foothold by waging war against the Chiriguanaes of the cordillera to the west, thus isolating those in Santa Cruz from the growing urban highland colonial centers of La Plata and Potosí. Chávez responded by seeking out a means of economic development suited to the city’s new circumstances. It involved expanding the sphere of Spanish influence over a different Guaraní-speaking population located to the east. The Itatín likewise reacted with hostility, and the death of Ñuflo de Chávez marked the end of any official, large-scale cooperation between Europeans and people labeled Chiriguanaes until 1607.

The Spanish in the Charcas highlands, meanwhile, felt increasing pressure from Chiriguana peoples on their eastern frontiers. The booming mining industry increasingly demanded resources drawn from greater distances, and colonial officials were ever more interested in the east as the source of labor and the means to support it. The events of the 1560s suggested to Spanish officials that pacification through contact was not the answer. But how to carry out the larger pursuits in Spanish Charcas—economic and ideological—while the Chiriguanaes remained a presence on the frontier?
Figure 5-1. Locations referenced in Chapter 5. Adapted from Fundación Amigos de la Naturaleza, Noel Kempff.
Figure 5-2. Paraguay-La Plata River basin. Modern cities shown, including Santa Cruz at its current site just west of La Barranca. Sancti Spiritus was located between Santa Fe and Rosario. Puerto de los Reyes was along or near the section of the Paraguay River that divides Paraguay from Brazil. Note that the Guapay (Grande) River does not appear because it empties into the Amazon basin. From Wikimedia Commons, commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Riodelaplatabasinmap.png.
CHAPTER 6
FRANCISCO DE TOLEDO, THE CHARCAS REFORMS, AND THE FIRST CHIRIGUANA WAR

The events of the 1560s dealt a significant blow to the belief that Spanish settlement would push steadily eastward from Charcas through the heart of the continent toward Paraguay, the Río de la Plata, and the Atlantic Ocean. The failure of Spanish efforts to colonize in and around the Chiriguana cordillera coincided with a movement toward reform of the Spanish empire that was driven from the highest levels of power. The crown, under pressure from the church, sought to impose wide-ranging changes to the colonial state that would improve the plight of the natives, safeguard royal privilege, and bureaucratize political administration. The ever-growing importance of Charcas to the larger strategic pursuits of the empire made it a focal point of the reform. The implementation of these reforms in Spanish Peru was tasked to the new Viceroy of Peru, Francisco de Toledo. Among his many important duties was securing the frontier from the predations of the Chiriguanaes, but the climate of reform in the Spanish empire made his task of justifying war against them—from both a juridical and economic perspective—a far more complicated matter. He also showed himself to be far more open than most local officials to the possibility that the Spanish and Chiriguanaes might reach a peaceful solution. He set his mind on a military solution only after negotiations, of sorts, failed. These failures sprang from fundamental differences between the parties’ understandings of acceptable peace along the Charcas-Chiriguana frontier.

Toledo’s Royal Mission, 1568-1571

King Philip II appointed Francisco de Toledo viceroy of Peru in 1568 during a period of transition for the Spanish empire. Toledo would take up his office the following year. The king was involved in a series of wars being waged with greater or lesser
intensity, both in his Iberian kingdoms and throughout Europe and the Mediterranean World. At the same time, Toledo’s future jurisdiction faced a number of issues that required the attention of a strong bureaucratic leader with a track record for loyalty. In short, the crown feared that its grasp on the important territory was tenuous, and Peru was crucial in King Philip’s grand strategy for restoring Catholic Europe. The basis for Toledo’s mission was the reassertion of royal control over the land, its inhabitants, and its resources. ¹

One major issue of concern to the Spanish crown at the time leading up to the Viceroy’s appointment was philosophical and juridical—the ongoing problem of justifying Spanish dominion over the Americas and the native peoples there. The legal and moral underpinnings of the Treaty of Tordesillas and the papal bulls of donation (1494) were the subject of intense debate by European jurists and philosophers by midcentury. Chief among their criticisms was the gulf between the ideal of a Catholic, Spanish overseas empire, in which the new subjects of Castile pledged their service in exchange for Christian tutelage and eternal salvation, and the prevailing reality, in which the Spanish colonial ruling classes violently exploited native peoples for their personal

¹ In 1564, Toledo’s predecessor as the Viceroy of Peru, Diego López de Zúñiga y Velasco, the Conde de Nieva (served 1561-64), was recalled due to his perceived inability to carry out the duties of the position. He died before the news reached him. His contemporary in New Spain was recalled in 1567. For the most direct characterization of the period as one of crisis for Spain, see Demetrio Ramos, “La crisis india y la Junta Magna de 1568,” Jahrbuch für Geschichte Lateinamerikas (Hamburg) 23 (1986): 1-61. Others characterize the period more in terms of the crown’s changing needs regarding the Indies. See Manfredi Merluzzi, “Religion and State Policies in the Age of Philip II: the 1568 Junta Magna of the Indies and the New Political Guidelines for the Spanish American Colonies,” in Religion and Power in Europe: Conflict and Convergence, ed. Joaquim Carvalho (Pisa: Pisa Univ. Press, 2007), 184-88; and Patrick Williams, Philip II (Houndmills, UK: Palgrave, 2001), chap. 4. See also Hanke, “Viceroy Francisco de Toledo and the Just Titles of Spain to the Inca Empire,” 3-19; Arthur Franklin Zimmerman, Francisco de Toledo: Fifth Viceroy of Peru, 1569-1581 (Caldwell, ID: Caxton Printers, Ltd., 1938), chap. 1, 107-09; Estela Cristina Salles and Héctor Omar Noejovich, “Las lecciones de la historia: repensando la política económica del virrey Toledo,” Economia (Lima) 31, no. 61 (2008): 29-32. For the establishment of Toledo’s and his ancestors’ track record of loyalty and service to the crown, see León Gómez Rivas, El Virrey del Perú don Francisco de Toledo (Toledo, Spain: Instituto Provincial de Investigaciones y Estudios Toledanos, Diputación Provincial, 1994), chaps. 1-3, 5.
enrichment. By the 1550s, two principal opposing views on the issue had emerged. Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda represented a widespread school of thought that maintained that the peoples of the Americas were naturally inferior to Europeans. Subjecting them to Spanish rule, by force if necessary, was beneficial for all parties because they were incapable of forming legitimate instruments of self-government. Bartolomé de Las Casas opposed Sepúlveda on both counts. Throughout his time in the Americas he doggedly documented the moral failings of so-called Christian rule over the natives. By the end of his life, he increasingly recognized the legitimacy of pre-Hispanic American cultures and institutions. He had begun to believe that the Spanish governance violently foisted upon the peoples of the Americas was illegitimate. An extensive debate pitted the two against one another before King Charles in Valladolid in 1550-51. No consensus emerged from it.²

Francisco de Vitoria and the philosophers who subscribed to the school of Salamanca occupied an important middle ground between Sepúlveda and Las Casas’ later positions. Vitoria’s philosophical arguments regarding the legitimacy of Spanish overseas empire, which he began to promulgate in the 1530s, informed Las Casas’ more moderate

² Toledo’s most radical opinions appear in the rare Confesionario: Avisos y reglas para confesores from 1564, which includes the clear argument that Spain was and had always been in violation of natural law by forcing its rule upon Native Americans. See Hanke, “Viceroy Francisco de Toledo and the Just Titles of Spain to the Inca Empire,” 4-5. For the evolution of Spanish concepts of empire during this period, see above all Anthony Pagden’s work, including, The Fall of Natural Man: The American Indian and the Origins of Comparative Ethnology (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1982); Spanish Imperialism and the Political Imagination: Studies in European and Spanish-American Social and Political Theory, 1513-1830 (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1990), esp. chap. 1; “Jus et Factum: Text and Experience in the Writings of Bartolomé de Las Casas,” Representations 33 (1991): 147-162; Lords of All the World: Ideologies of Empire in Spain, Britain and France c. 1500-c.1800 (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1995), chaps. 1-2. See also Colin MacLachlan, Spain’s Empire in the New World: The Role of Ideas in Institutional and Social Change (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1988); Patricia Seed, “‘Are These Not Also Men?’: The Indians’ Humanity and Capacity for Spanish Civilisation,” Journal of Latin American Studies 25, no. 3 (1993): 629-52, esp. 629-31, 634-6; and Javier Tantaleán Arbulú, El virrey Francisco de Toledo y su tiempo: Proyecto de gobernabilidad, el imperio hispano, la plata peruana en la economía-mundo y el mercado colonial, 2 vols. (Lima: Universidad San Martín de Porres, Fondo Editorial, 2011), vol. 1, chap. 4.
earlier views and provided his critiques with a juridical basis. The crux of Vitoria’s reasoning dealt with the idea that American peoples, on the whole, were akin to children in need of European guidance as they developed their rational faculties over a series of generations. In order to apply his philosophy to the politics of the day, Vitoria developed scenarios under which the Spanish king and his representatives might justly assert control over foreign peoples as well as those in which he had no right to do so.3

Other threats to the crown’s control of Peru revolved around the implementation of imperial policy at the local level. The Europeans who officially and unofficially oversaw Spanish policy in Peru had become accustomed to operating with a great deal of latitude. They were effectively free to pursue their own interests alongside their duties as citizens, *encomenderos*, local officials, or clergymen. The dictates of long-held Iberian traditions and explicit royal decrees were meant to prescribe their behaviors and keep them in check. But in practice, individuals and the legal bodies they formed often elevated personal interests above their official responsibilities. Many were emboldened by their distance from the potential for metropolitan interference and by the sympathy of local authorities. The royal representatives surrounding Philip II in the 1560s framed the issue in terms of the lack of a formal code of laws governing Peru and the Indies in general. They observed that Spaniards in the Americas often conducted themselves according to local customs based on ad hoc solutions to a variety of situations. The procedures they developed had begun to comprise new traditions of acceptable behavior.

---

Those traditions often clashed with crown interests in a number of situations, including those relating to native peoples, their tribute, and their labor.4

The so-called Indian question lay at the nexus of the political and philosophical problems confronting Spain and its American colonies in the 1560s. In 1568, Spanish and papal delegates met to discuss how best to reform the empire’s approach to its native subjects. The meeting is known in the literature as the \textit{Junta Magna}. Among its participants were the newly appointed viceroys of New Spain and Peru. The most pressing issue that faced the delegates concerned the failures of the Spanish evangelization mission in the Indies. Las Casas had died in 1566, but his work remained influential, particularly among the Catholic theologians who struggled with questions relating to the treatment of the natives and their souls. There was general recognition among the participants in the \textit{Junta} that corruption and incompetence pervaded the American clergy. They settled on certain recommendations for the reform of the American church and its methods. But the findings of the \textit{Junta} represented a brake on any momentum gained by Las Casas’ more radical positions. They declared Spanish claims over the American territories to be legitimate. The \textit{Junta} also urged priests to remove themselves from the workings of the colonial government in order to maintain their evangelical purity. Any future interference in the mode of Las Casas would be considered detrimental to the conversion of the natives.5

4 The wars between the Spanish factions in Peru most readily illustrated the lack of royal control over the European population there. The Gonzalo Pizarro rebellion came about as a result of the attempted introduction of royal reforms over settlers’ rights to native labor. Pedro de la Gasca, one of Toledo’s more capable predecessors, only managed to quell the rebellion by suspending many of the key provisions of the reforms. See Teodoro Hampe Martínez, \textit{Don Pedro de la Gasca (1493-1567). Su obra política en España y América} (Lima: Fondo Editorial de la Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, 1989), esp. 82-83, 98-105. Regarding the focus on the lack of a legal code in Peru, see Gómez Rivas, \textit{El Virrey del Perú don Francisco de Toledo}, 125-28; and Zimmerman, \textit{Francisco de Toledo}, 146ff.

5 Merluzzi, “Religion and State Policies in the Age of Philip II,” 183-201; Gómez Rivas, \textit{El Virrey del Perú don Francisco de Toledo}, 128-42; Ramos, “La crisis indiana y la Junta Magna de 1568,” 6-26; Williams,
The Junta Magna also addressed temporal issues relating to the Spanish Indies, including mining revenues, tribute collection, and the encomienda. The participants’ discussion balanced the moral and philosophical issues raised by Las Casas and others against the necessities of the state. Among those participants representing the latter position were three members of the king’s financial council. The bankruptcy of the Spanish crown in 1557 complicated fiscal matters for King Philip, and the flow of American silver was increasingly important for him to pursue state aims in Europe. Maximizing resource output in Peru would involve, above all, introducing new mining techniques and regulating the supply of labor. The details of what the Junta expected of Toledo in regard to these matters are not entirely clear; the set of “secret” financial instructions provided to him before he departed for Peru has not survived.  

Toledo arrived in Lima in 1569. After a period of residence there, he took it upon himself to make a tour of inspection throughout the Viceroyalty. He was determined to examine firsthand the land he intended to reform. His visita lasted five years, and for much of it he resided within Charcas. The changes he instituted in the province greatly affected the history of the region, both during his tenure and in the decades to come.

Philip II, 94-95; Isacio Pérez Fernández, Bartolomé de las Casas en el Perú: el espíritu lascasiano en la primera evangelización del Imperio Incaico (1531-1573) (Cuzco: Centro de Estudios Rurales Andinos Bartolomé de las Casas, 1988), 380ff. As Merluzzi describes, the Junta Magna was above all an attempt to clarify the roles of the Roman Church and the Spanish state as they pertained to the souls of American natives. But Pérez Fernández argues that the persistent inability of the crown to oversee an effective program of evangelization for American natives—free of the abuses described by Las Casas and others—was at the heart of the pope’s aspirations to take on a greater role in Spanish America.

One of the first matters Toledo investigated during his visita was the question of Inca imperial legitimacy. In some senses, Spanish claims in Peru hinged on whether the prior rulers exercised just title to their empire. The prevailing belief in Las Casas’ writings, as well as in the earliest chronicles of Inca history, was that Inca rule had been legitimate. They emphasized the long tenure of Inca control in the Andes and the positive effects of their rule, including the imposition of a civilized and rational code of law. The stance developed during Toledo’s initial tenure in Peru reversed this sentiment. In 1571, an anonymous treatise surfaced in Peru. Its author was a friar residing near Cuzco. His firsthand experience in Peru led him to conclude that the Incas had been tyrants who ruled illegitimately. Rather than bringing peace and order to the Andes, they oppressed and exploited their subjects. Furthermore, Inca state expansion was a recent phenomenon. Only under the final three rulers had the empire expanded to exercise dominion over non-Inca peoples. After overseeing his own investigation, Toledo came to agree. He wrote in 1572 that the Incas had usurped power from legitimate local rulers. The Spanish king was well within his rights to make use of the resources of the land or pledge them to other Spaniards. These rights extended to the yields of the Peruvian mines and any valuables dedicated to pagan worship. The king might also exercise jurisdiction over the peoples of

---


8 Hanke, “Viceroy Francisco de Toledo and the Just Titles of Spain to the Inca Empire,” 5-7; Covey, “Chronology, Succession, and Sovereignty,” 182; Gómez Rivas, El Virrey del Perú don Francisco de Toledo, 137.
Peru, including imposing upon them a system of law and a mechanism to encourage their productivity.⁹

One of the primary legacies of Toledo’s visita was the reorganization of the native population, both in Charcas and elsewhere in Peru. Among the viceroy’s chief duties was arranging the native peoples of the viceroyalty into communities so that they might be more inclined to accept Christianity and “civilized” life. Living according to organizing principles recognized by the Spanish also facilitated the collection of tribute and tithes, as well as the implementation of state labor demands. Toledo made his first efforts to create reducciones or pueblos de indios (Indian towns) on the coast prior to embarking on his royal visita. As he and his retinue traveled through Spanish Peru, they gathered information about the local peoples and attempted to compel them to live according to royal dictates.¹⁰

---

⁹ Pedro Sarmiento de Gamboa’s Historia Indica was also a product of research undertaken at this time under Toledo’s sponsorship. It represented a more public refutation of Las Casas’ arguments by describing the Inca period in Peru as one of excessive cruelty and degradation. Toledo’s official establishment of Spanish legitimacy on the basis of Inca illegitimacy did not entirely put the matter to rest. For one thing, it does not follow logically that the Spanish can rightfully occupy a role simply because another wrongfully did so. The Jesuit José de Acosta, for one, called attention to this failure, saying that “it is not lawful to rob a thief.” Translation by Hanke. Other dissenting opinions continued to circulate, particularly outside of the Spanish-ruled kingdoms and territories. But Toledo’s pronouncement was largely effective within Peru, especially paired with the prohibition of the circulation of Las Casas’ works and the establishment of the inquisition. See Hanke, “Viceroy Francisco de Toledo and the Just Titles of Spain to the Inca Empire,” 7-17; Zimmerman, Francisco de Toledo, 104-09; Covey, “Chronology, Succession, and Sovereignty,” 183-86; and Gómez Rivas, El Virrey del Perú don Francisco de Toledo, 134-36. The degree to which the results of Toledo’s investigation were predetermined is a matter of longstanding debate. Hanke summarizes the early arguments over this question. See esp. pages 8-9. See also MacCormack, “History, Historical Record, and Ceremonial Action,” esp. 346-47, which stresses the changing nature of Cuzco in the years between the 1550s (when the testimonies for the first chronicles were collected) and the 1570s (when Toledo’s investigation occurred). She argues that the Incas were much more able “to control the content of historical memory” in the earlier period.

¹⁰ Toledo’s predecessors had undertaken small-scale reducciones in the past, but Toledo’s efforts represented a major shift in emphasis. One additional benefit of the new reducciones (in their ideal form), from the perspective of the crown, was that native tribute labor came to be funneled through legal institutions (usually town councils) rather than provided directly to encomenderos. It bears mention that these reforms were significant in the destruction of age-old Andean traditions of residence and communal life. See Tantaleán Arbulú, El virrey Francisco de Toledo y su tiempo, vol. 1, 215-22; and Alejandro Málaga Medina, “Las reducciones toledanas en el Perú,” in Pueblos de indios: Otro urbanismo en la región andina, ed. Ramón Gutiérrez (Quito: Ediciones Abya-Yala, 1993), 263-316.
Throughout Peru, the mandate to create *reducciones* was intertwined with the economic pursuits of the particular region. The relationship between native peoples’ residence and their labor was all the more important in parts of Charcas, where silver mining was of particular interest to the crown. Toledo had been specifically charged with ensuring the productive functioning of the mines in his jurisdiction. His introduction of the technique of mercury amalgamation to mining ventures at Potosí and Porco greatly increased the potential yields from silver ores. The new methods also increased the demand for mining labor to extract ore. In this sense, the introduction of amalgamation shaped Toledo’s further-reaching transformation of the region, the development of a system that supplied the Charcas silver mines with a reliable supply of native labor.\(^ {11}\)

Toledo resided in Potosí for more than a year, a period spanning 1572-73. The *mita* draft labor system that Toledo instituted during this time was an outgrowth of native institutions employed toward similar aims. Under the *mita*, each indigenous town was assigned a number of laborers that typically equated to one-seventh of their populations of adult males capable of work. Their labor might go toward any activity that was in the public interest. In and near highland Charcas at this time, this most often meant silver mining and the pursuits directly related to it. Toledo also drew up a code of law meant to govern the extraction of ore and the refinement of silver. As a result of his reforms, silver yields rose exponentially throughout the 1570s and peaked shortly after Toledo’s tenure as viceroy.\(^ {12}\) One result of Toledo’s labor reforms and their emphasis on highland mining


\(^{12}\) Nearly 10,000 natives reported to Potosí, a single mining town, to fulfill their demands for labor in the inaugural draft of 1573. By 1578, more than 14,000 *mitayos* worked in the mines of Potosí. Tantaleán
would be a shift of native workers away from the subandean valleys near the Charcas-Chiriguana frontier and towards the highlands. At the same time, the growing urban highland population would demand greater and greater quantities of the goods produced in those same frontier areas. The combination would lead Spaniards living along the frontier to seek new sources of labor for their chácaras.

**Investigating the Chiriguana Question, 1571-1573**

Already prior to his residence in Charcas, Toledo had turned his attentions to the Chiriguanaes and the host of crimes they were alleged to have committed. King Philip had written a declaration of war against the “Chiriguanaes Indians” in December of 1568 that gave Toledo “permission to make war to the point of subduing them.” The primary bases for the declaration of war were their attacks on Nueva Rioja and La Barranca and specifically the murder of Andrés Manso. The document also mentions the Chiriguanaes’ “many assaults on our Indian subjects” as well as their destruction of the “many populations in those plains” to the east. The king further had learned of their capturing and bartering the Chicha, “our vassals,” who as a result of the attacks on their communities, “will become anxious and abandon the mines at Porco.” The Chiriguanaes’ resistance, to that point, against “every possible human method to bring these Indians to the service of God and our own,” left the king no choice but to approve methods of violent conquest.13

---

The declaration of war was written preemptively. It was Toledo’s responsibility to determine how to subdue the Chiriguanaes. In early 1570, while Toledo resided near Cuzco, he expressed hope that it might be possible to avoid war. His opinion was that alternative methods—those that would not necessitate the expenditure of the royal purse—might yet prove effective in pacifying the Chiriguanaes. By March of 1571, Toledo had been informed of ongoing attacks attributed to the Chiriguanaes at a number of points along the eastern and southern frontiers of Charcas. The attacks particularly threatened native communities and Spanish estates that lay at a distance from major settlements. At that point Toledo did not fear for the principal population centers themselves. He wrote confidently, “I believe that the city of La Plata and the mines of Potosí and Porco will remain secure.”

Toledo’s initial in-depth inquiries about the Chiriguanaes date to later in the same year. The viceroy was still residing in Cuzco when his secretary interviewed a series of witnesses who represented distinct perspectives regarding the Chiriguanaes. Two of them were residents of Santa Cruz and knew a great deal about the destruction of the Spanish settlements founded by Manso and Chávez. Four others represented the point of view of the Spanish residents of La Plata. The testimony of the latter group provides greater insight into the feelings about Chiriguana incursions nearer the Audiencia capital and in the south, where certain prominent residents of the city had estates. Though Toledo already had legal authority to wage war against the Chiriguanaes, the questions posed to

---

14 “Carta del virrey del Perú Don Francisco de Toledo de 3 de febrero de 1570,” and “Relación de una carta del virrey … (8 de febrero de 1570),” both in Garay, Colección de documentos relativos á la historia de América, 572.

15 “Carta del virrey del Perú sobre materia de guerra (Marzo 1571),” in Garay, Colección de documentos relativos á la historia de América, 573-75. Later in the same letter he affirmed, “at present there is no danger to the mines nor to the city.”
each witness demonstrate a legalistic approach to the matter. Because the Chiriguanaes had never fallen under “illegitimate” Inca dominion, Toledo felt he needed to construct the case for war from the ground up. He wished to establish beyond dispute that the Chiriguanaes were deserving of legitimate subjugation by force. His questions, therefore, guided witnesses to comment on such damning behavior as apostasy, cannibalism, and the refusal to allow safe passage through neutral territory. Each of these crimes was either an explicit or implicit reference to the ongoing debate over the legitimacy of Spanish conquest.

Toledo’s secretary opened the questioning of each of the witnesses by asking them to confirm that “the Chiriguanaes of the cordillera between Santa Cruz de la Sierra and the province of Charcas had been largely under the obedience and in the service of His Majesty” before rebelling and “leaving the doctrine.” This prompt was aimed at characterizing the Chiriguanaes as willful deniers of the faith and traitors against the king rather than simply as a people deprived of the Christian message. Cristóbal de Saavedra, one of the witnesses from Santa Cruz, answered based on his own experience that “the greater part of them were peaceful and served the Christians as they were ordered.” They served even though they were not “entrusted [in encomienda or repartimiento] to anyone.” The implication was that they had chosen the Spanish as their leaders. Only after “seven or eight years” did they “congregate with the others of the cordillera and rise up.” The prompt and Saavedra’s response reflect differing conceptions of the category indicated by the term “Chiriguanaes.” While the former clearly indicated the Chiriguanaes of the cordillera, the service that Saavedra had witnessed the Chiriguanaes render to the king had taken place while he was “in the land of Paraguay,” not on the frontiers of Charcas. Some of the auxiliaries who accompanied Chávez and Irala across
the continent had likely left the Spaniards and settled in the cordillera, but they did not make up the core of the Chiriguana population. The confusion mattered little as far as the case Toledo was building against them. Other witnesses confirmed that it was public knowledge “in the entire kingdom that the Chiriguanaes, or the better part of them, were peaceful and under the obedience of His Majesty and served the Spanish, and many of them were baptized.” Their rebellion was a rejection of their bonds with the Spanish and with the faith.16

The second prompt by Toledo’s secretary related to the ongoing threat that the Chiriguanaes posed along the frontier. Witnesses were asked to address the reports that the Chiriguanaes persistently blocked the roads between Charcas and Santa Cruz. This was, of course, a practical matter, but it also hearkens back to the philosophy of Francisco de Vitoria, who proposed seven scenarios in which Europeans were justified in exercising dominion over foreign peoples. The first of his “legitimate titles” rested on the concept of shared public resources. He argued that a nation that prevented others from exercising their rights to peaceful passage, trade, or the exploitation of common resources was in violation of self-evident natural law. They were therefore subject to attack and conquest by those to whom they refused passage. According to the testimony, the Chiriguanaes’ behavior clearly violated natural law.17

16 “Ynformaçion de los Chiriguanaes (Yucay y Cuzco, 24-29 de octubre 1571),” in Julien, Desde el Oriente, 222-24, 227. The document is a transcription of a portion of “Informaciones hechas de orden del virrey del Perú, Francisco de Toledo, sobre la conducta y malos procedimientos de los indios llamados Chiriguanaes,” AGI, Patronato, 235 R1.

17 “Yinformacion de los Chiriguanaes,” 223. Vitoria’s seven “títulos legítimos” appear in “De indis recender inventis relectio prior,” 122-36. Carro explains them in detail in “Los postulados teológico-jurídicos de Bartolomé de Las Casas,” 126-39. It bears mention that the application of such a standard toward the Spanish would have undermined the exclusivity to their colonies that they so-jealously guarded.
The second part of the second prompt addresses how the Chiriguanaes affected the functioning of daily life in Charcas. It calls attention to the proximity of Chiriguana settlements to the chief Spanish settlements in the region, La Plata and Potosí. The testimony in response to this prompt affirms not only that the Chiriguanaes resided fewer than 30 leagues (~150 km) from the city of La Plata, it details how and where the Chiriguanaes most acutely threatened Spanish interests throughout the region. The responses touch upon the damages done to the commercial and agricultural interests of the Spanish in “the jurisdiction of the said city of La Plata and the imperial town of Potosí.” They included cattle raids upon ranches in the Tomina Valley. A witness claimed that as a result of one such Chiriguana incursion, the residents in Tomina “live in caution and suspicion, having fortresses where they gather at night so they are not taken by surprise.” He went on to explain that “one or two Spaniards and many Indians from the said valley have died” as victims of the Chiriguanaes. According to the testimony of a different witness, even the fortresses that the frontier dwellers built for their protection were not enough to ensure their safety. He claimed that “the Indians have set fire to the forts that the Spanish have for their protection.” In the specific instance he referenced, the Chiriguanaes reportedly used “for kindling the crosses that [the Spanish] had in their courtyards in order to mock them.”

The consensus among the witnesses was that the Chiriguana threat was much more acute in an area of more-recent Spanish settlement to the south, the Tarija Valley and its environs. Spaniards controlled native populations in encomienda in the region as early as the 1540s, but the development of the region had accelerated in recent years. By

---

18 “Información de los Chiriguanaes,” 224-33.
one reasonable estimate, the Chiriguanaes had begun to threaten native populations near Tarija in the mid-1550s. In the 1570s, as Toledo undertook his investigation, the Chiriguanaes not only attacked Spanish properties and killed and kidnapped a number of native workers in the region, they began to ally themselves with the native peoples from the south—the same peoples from the desert frontier region of “Omaguaca [Humahuaca] …, Jujuy, Salta, and Casab[n]do” who had threatened Spanish estates in the region in years past. The distinction that the witness made between “the Chiriguanaes Indians” and those from the desert south near Humahuaca demonstrates that the category “Chiriguanaes,” as the Spanish used it, was beginning to evolve and become more specific. Gradually, the latter peoples were falling outside of the “Chiriguana” category. Together the Chiriguanaes and their allies proceeded to harass the local Chicha populations. In the words of one witness, they were routinely “killing the [Chicha] Indians and carrying off their property, wives, and children, and kidnapping all the Indians that they can, whom they make their slaves.” The Chicha so feared the encroaching Chiriguanaes that they “do not dare resist.” Instead, “it has happened that only six Chiriguanaes arrive at a town in the province and [the residents] give them whatever they have … without interfering.”

This testimony likely contains some hyperbole, but if the descriptions of Chicha resignation at the arrival of Chirigua warrior were reasonably truthful, they help explain some of the more extreme behaviors reported among the Chiriguanaes. Just as the

---

19 Ibid., 224-33. The Lizárraga chronicle posits that the Chiriguanaes arrived in the Tarija region during “the civil wars against the tyrant Francisco Hernández [Girón],” a conflict that dates to 1553-54. See Lizárraga, Descripción breve de toda la tierra, 195. For the initial Spanish settlement of the region and the awarding of encomiendas, see Avila, Don Luis de Fuentes y Vargas y la fundación de Tarija, 63-75; Barragán Vargas, La historia temprana de Tarija, 44-60; and Barragán Vargas, Poblaciones originarias de Tarija, 36-75.
Incas demonstrated power by marching their armies through conquered territories, building monumental structures in distant regions, and circulating tales of their victories, the Chiriguanaes cultivated an attitude of fatalism among their rivals. The Chicha communities’ belief that the Chiriguanaes could—and more importantly would—burn entire villages and kill scores at a time was an important advantage for the Chiriguanaes. Instilling such terror in their victims allowed them to accumulate resources without risking losses in battle. They could also divide their forces and plunder more communities using fewer soldiers.

According to the testimony, the Chiriguanaes parlayed the fear they instilled in other native peoples into an arrangement that the Spanish described as a tributary relationship. This was the subject of the third prompt from Toledo’s secretary: whether the “Chiriguanaes have made the peaceful Indians … pay tribute.” According to one of the witnesses from Santa Cruz, the natives of the Chaco to the east of the cordillera did so. The same was true, according to another witness, of “the Chichas and others nearby [who live under] the royal crown [but] give [the Chiriguanaes] tribute and service, [because] they are so fearful of the damage they could do and so they will not be eaten.”

In prevailing Spanish legal opinion, the Chiriguanaes’ extortion of resources by force or by terror was a violation of universal law. Though the peoples of the Chaco were all presumably outside of official Spanish control, the behavior of the Chiriguanaes denied them their rights to choose their leaders. The Chiriguanaes’ treatment of the

---

20 Susnik has recognized the utility of the terror instilled by the Chiriguanaes, particularly in the Chichas. See Susnik, Chiriguanos, 19-20.

21 “Ynformacion de los Chiriguanaes,” 224-34.

22 Toledo had declared Inca rule illegitimate on the grounds that it was forged by conquest rather than election. Chiriguana “rule” was all the more so. If a legal opinion were necessary, one might have invoked Vitoria’s writings that American native peoples were free to choose their rulers, without interference. See
Chicha peoples was all the more egregious. As the Spanish understood it, the Chichas had already chosen their ruler: the Spanish king. The Chiriguanaes were imposing on His Majesty’s vassals. But the witnesses also recognized that their king was failing to live up to his end of the bargain. It was his duty to protect his subjects. According to one witness, the Chichas “came many times to beg [the witness] that he plead before the Audiencia [on the Chichas’ behalf] so that they favor [the Chichas] and protect them from the injuries” they repeatedly suffered. The Audiencia officials, to that point, had chosen to demur given the sensitivity of the issue. They claimed it was outside of their authority to order intervention. Only the viceroy could do so.23

The fourth prompt from Toledo’s secretary references the practice of cannibalism by the Chiriguanaes. It asks the witnesses to comment regarding whether the Chiriguanaes’ “principal food and source of meat are the peaceful Indians.” The wording is important because it seeks to establish an ongoing pattern of capture and anthropophagy by the Chiriguanaes, not simply instances of cannibalism.24 Vitoria and other jurists who questioned the basis of Spain’s titles to its colonies regularly took up the topic of cannibalism and other sins against nature. Vitoria directly refuted the claim that such practices justified the violent subjugation of the perpetrator. To him, the apparent similarity between appropriate meat and human flesh led peoples with imperfectly developed reason to confuse the two. Cannibalism was an error of perception in most cases. It did not result in the surrender of all the perpetrators’ freedoms. But Vitoria did

23 “Ynformacion de los Chiriguanaes,” 226. The Audiencia’s inability to approve military intervention against the Chiriguanaes without approval from the viceroy would be a repeated issue in the future. See Chapter 7 for a discussion of this division of powers.

24 “Ynformacion de los Chiriguanaes,” 223.
grant that Christian kingdoms could take up arms in order to free those souls destined for human sacrifice or to prevent the unnecessary loss of life stemming from the continuation of an unjust war.\textsuperscript{25} The prompt’s wording helps differentiate between these two types of cannibalism, and the testimony provided Toledo with a great deal of evidence that the Chiriguanaes’ reported cannibalism was not simply an error of perception. According to one witness, “they have as their principal custom and joy the consumption of the flesh of the Indians they capture … whom they fatten … [and] kill when they wish.” According to another—and refrains commonly repeated in the investigations during the era—the captives whom the Chiriguanaes seized, especially among the Chichas, were “slaves [destined to be] killed and eaten” because “the chief delicacy among the Chiriguanaes is to eat human flesh.” Furthermore, their consumption of human flesh was not “a matter of necessity, but of vice.” Though they had “quantities of pigs, chickens, and ducks, they set them aside in order to eat human flesh.”\textsuperscript{26}

The testimonies in response to these prompts collectively show that the efforts taken against the Chiriguanaes to that point had not alleviated the threat they were perceived to have posed. They remained a significant impediment to further Spanish expansion into the lowlands to the south and east of La Plata. The Chiriguanaes had additionally continued to hamper Spanish economic interests throughout the frontier region. The damage inflicted by the Chiriguanaes, to that point, had involved mostly the theft and destruction of livestock and property at the outer reaches of Spanish settlement in the region. In certain instances, native workers, African slaves, and even a few


\textsuperscript{26} “Ynformaçion de los Chiriguanaes,” 224-34.
Spaniards had died during the course of Chiriguana attacks. And their proximity to La Plata and Potosí meant that the Chiriguanaes represented a looming danger to far greater Spanish interests.\textsuperscript{27}

In answer to the fifth and final prompt offered by Toledo’s secretary, the witnesses described the measures taken so far to contend with the Chiriguanaes. Audiencia officials had reportedly traveled to the frontier on at least three occasions and “sent them messengers [requesting that] they come in peace, offering them good treatment.” They responded by fleeing. More than one witness suggested that any additional attempts to make peaceful contact with the Chiriguanaes were likely to be not only fruitless, but disastrous. They were known to be the perpetrators of tricks and ambushes that drew in unsuspecting individuals before slaughtering them. Such behavior had become part of the accepted narrative regarding the end of Ñufllo de Chávez, and the same reportedly befell a Mercedarian friar.\textsuperscript{28}

Previous armed missions had reportedly fared better. In 1570, Hernando Díaz led a mission credited with saving the lives of all the Spaniards in the Tomina Valley and the surrounding area. A detachment of fifty Spaniards rode out from La Plata when they heard of a plan by the Chiriguanaes to unite and attack the Spanish estates there. Díaz and company successfully trapped the conspirators in “two large storehouses.” These buildings were presumably \textit{malocas}, the housing structure common among the Chiriguanaes. Díaz told them that “he had come in the name of His Majesty to plead with them peacefully [and] that … [the Spanish] did not want war.” The Chiriguanaes...

\begin{footnotes}
\item[27] Ibid., 225-32.
\item[28] Ibid., 225-34. The details of the death of the friar are lacking. The witness, himself a Mercedarian, claimed that the Chiriguanaes killed one of his order who had been evangelizing for 30 years.
\end{footnotes}
responded that “they only wanted to fight, and that [the Spanish] had not defeated them and would not ever do so.” The testimonies do not describe with any clarity how the confrontation proceeded, but a letter written by Toledo around the time of the investigation provides the conclusion: “Hernando Díaz, who I assigned to the frontier . . . , killed and burned a good part of those who caused harm there.” The witnesses only attested to the results of Díaz’ mission: “the defeat hindered the Chiriguanaes because they had been coming to [the region] repeatedly to kill Spaniards.” Presumably, slaughtering a number of them as they took refuge within their homes had forestalled attacks in the ensuing year. Other similar missions reportedly occurred in response to Chiriguana attacks in the Tarija region during the same period.29

The testimonies of the witnesses consulted during the investigation largely cemented the legal grounds for war. They doubly confirmed that the viceroy would be justified under Spanish jurisprudence in violently subjugating the Chiriguanaes. Perhaps more importantly, the evidence would assuage the conscience of the king. Nevertheless, it is not clear that Toledo had yet determined his course of action. As ironclad as his right to assert military force may have been, the prudence of going to war was another matter. Toledo’s writings show that throughout the period, the Chiriguana question was a multifaceted one that balanced the costs and benefits of action and inaction. Díaz’ success

---

29 Ibid., 226, 231-33; “Carta a S.M. del Virrey D. Francisco de Toledo, sobre materias de guerra . . . (Del Cuzco, 1.º de Marzo de 1572),” 292, 298. Regarding the maloca, typically a 20-to-30-family structure, see Susnik, Chiriguanos, 100-02. One witness described his participation in an armed mission to Tarija “where some of the Chiriguanaes Indians had risen up, and they were killed. To serve as examples, the prisoners were sent throughout the provinces of Charcas, especially to Potosí.” The Spanish stopped “the punishment” when a number of Chica communities and their neighbors rebelled. For a few reasons, it seems to me that the Chiriguanaes about whom this witness was speaking were not the Guarani speakers about whom this project is concerned. He was rather using the term in the generic sense. First, the parading of the prisoners throughout Charcas and “especially to Potosi,” seems to have been aimed at the prevention of rebellion against the Spanish in general. There were presumably no Chiriguanaes at Potosí upon whom to impress the message. Furthermore, the Chica who lived within Charcas seemingly would have been in favor of Spanish action against the Chiriguanaes—not in rebellion as a result of it.
aside, he recognized that sending out cavalry forces from the Audiencia capital to pursue roving Chiriguana bands across the difficult terrain had proven both costly and ineffective. Yet Toledo also called attention to the duty that he and the king shared toward “the Indians of the region and the ranches that are under [the king’s] obedience and royal protection.” Neither would it serve God or the king if “those [on the frontier] who your majesty has already won as vassals … lose the faith that they received and risk the church that God has planted [in Peru].”30

**Detente and Negotiation, 1573-February 1574**

After arriving in La Plata in 1573 to take up the matters of governance there, Toledo remained reluctant to commit the resources for a coordinated offensive attack on the Chiriguanaes. His primary immediate goal was securing safe passage between Spanish settlements throughout eastern Charcas. He remained hopeful that he could devise a peaceful solution that balanced the duties of the royal government and the mandate to avoid unnecessary expenditures. He planned to continue his investigations into their ways of life, now consulting “the particular individuals who best understand the Chiriguanaes.”31

Shortly after his arrival in the city and before he could arrange a fuller inquiry into the Chiriguana question, the possibility of a peaceful solution seemed to present itself to Toledo. A party of Chiriguanaes entered La Plata in search of the viceroy. Their

---

30 “Carta a S.M. del Virrey D. Francisco de Toledo, sobre materias de guerra … (Del Cuzco, 1.º de Marzo de 1572),” 292-94; “Carta del virrey Toledo á S.M. sobre materia de guerra (1572),” in Garay, *Colección de documentos relativos á la historia de América*, 580-81; “Carta a S.M. del virrey D. Francisco de Toledo, sobre materias tocantes a guerra y conquistas (Potosí, 20 Marzo 1573),” 32.

message was that “they were tired of doing evil, and they lacked food during the previous
years.” Small Spanish entradas (armed expeditions) into the cordillera, such as the one
overseen by Díaz, had presumably resulted in the destruction of Chiriguana crops, and
evidence suggests that famine had affected their harvests in recent years. Perhaps this
very shortage of agricultural goods had contributed to the reported uptick in Chiriguana
raids upon native villages during the same period. In the words of Reginaldo de
Lizárraga, a priest and chronicler who was at Toledo’s side throughout this period, the
Chiriguanaes who had come to the city claimed that they “no longer wanted war or
enmity with the Christians, nor to do them ill on their ranches …, but only peace and
concord.” But neither Lizárraga nor Toledo was convinced of the group’s sincerity.
Toledo himself attributed their peaceful gesture to their “terror [resulting from] the
punishment that the Vilcabamba Incas had gotten,” a reference to his recent forceful
subjugation of native rebels headquartered in the Vilcabamba Valley north of Cuzco.32

Toledo arranged for García de Mosquera, a Guaraní-speaking mestizo “soldier”
originally from the Río de la Plata, to venture into the cordillera. He was to bring the
Chiriguana caciques to La Plata in order to discuss peace. Toledo wished to determine if
the Chiriguanaes were “trying to distract [him] with peaceful methods until [he] left the
province” or if they were sincere. In the meantime, several members of the Chiriguana

32 “Copia de algunos capítulos … fecha en la ciudad de la Plata, Junio 3 de 1573,” 138-40; Lizárraga,
Descripción de toda la tierra, 282-83. For the recent increase in raiding activity and the Vilcabamba
connection, see “Carta a S.M. del virrey D. Francisco de Toledo acerca de los asuntos de guerra de que de
nuevo se le ofrece dar cuenta … (La Plata, 30 Noviembre 1573),” in Levillier, Gobernantes del Perú, vol.
5, 198-99. The “Vilcabamba Incas,” also known as the Neo-Inca state, was a movement that advocated at
one time for the expulsion of the Spanish from Peru and the reestablishment of Inca rule. By 1570, it more
moderately hoped to carve out an autonomous region in Antisuyu. Its leaders were members of the Inca
royal line. Toledo ordered an invasion of Vilcabamba in 1572. Spanish forces captured the leader, Tupac
Amaru, who was executed in Cuzco later that year. The incident brought an end to Spanish recognition of
the Inca royal line. See George Kubler, “The Neo-Inca State (1537-1572),” Hispanic American Historical
Review 27, no. 2 (1947): 189-203; and Kim MacQuarrie, The Last Days of the Incas (London: Piatkus,
2007), chaps. 7-9.
delegation remained in La Plata as guarantors of Mosquera’s life. Toledo hoped for the Chiriguanaes’ reform in the future under structured Spanish tutelage, but he was cautious in his approach. He wrote at the time that “they have neither faith nor honor; one cannot trust of them what he cannot see. Until now a worse people has not been discovered, nor a population that causes more harm and damage.” No written instructions for Mosquera’s duties on this trip survive, but a later document suggests that he was additionally tasked with reconnaissance of the land so as to determine where Spanish forces might enter the rugged terrain, should it become necessary.33

Mosquera returned with between 30 and 50 natives from the cordillera. Among them were two Chiriguana tuwichas or “caciques principales”: Marucare and “Inca” (ynga) Condori.34 Toledo wrote that they brought with them macaws and monkeys, an indication that they came from a significant distance. In all likelihood they did not reside in the vicinity of La Plata. Two additional members of the travelling party were their Chané servants. Another was a Chicha by birth who had grown up in a wealthy Spanish household. He was known by the Christian name Baltasarillo. Lizárraga wrote that, “not wishing to live as a Christian, [Baltasarillo had become one of] the Chiriguanaes and

33 “Copia de algunos capítulos … fecha en la ciudad de la Plata, Junio 3 de 1573,” 139-40; “Relación de la jornada que hizo el Virrey del Perú Don Francisco de Toledo á la Provincia de Santa Cruz de la Sierra contra los Indios Chiriguanaes,” in Mujía, Bolivia-Paraguay, vol. 2, 170-71.

34 The documents make no suggestion that the Spanish questioned Condori’s use of the title “Inca”—much less the Quechua origin of the name Condori—though it bears some attention here. Recall that Condori was the Inca official in charge of the Saypurú mines near Samaipata, circa 1520. See Chapter 4. Recall also that a Chiriguana tuvicha named Condori or Condorillo was briefly an ally of Andrés Manso. Combés examines the origin of the name Condorillo in this context and suggests some possibilities. Most likely, the Chiriguana Condori took the name of the Inca official after defeating (capturing/killing/consuming?) him. See Combés, “Saypurú,” 200-01.
taken up their customs, leading them [into battle] against [the Spanish] and against his
own race and blood.”

The leaders of the delegation told Toledo that a factor in their decision to
approach the Spanish and make peace was the appearance among them of a mysterious
young man who had shaken up Chiriguana society. He had instructed “all the caciques to
unite together and come before [Toledo].” The young man had the appearance of a
native, but he brandished crosses, performed miracles, and urged the Chiriguanaes to
abandon some of their fundamental sociocultural practices. Only a few days later, three
more Chiriguanaes appeared in the city with more information about the mysterious
young man. Each of the three carried a cross with him. They indicated that they were
there to check on how the Christians had received the first group of Chiriguanaes and
their companions. Seeing that “they were well and had been well treated,” the cross
bearers requested an audience with the Apo—the approximate Quechua equivalent of
governor. They told Toledo and the others present about a young native man named
Santiago who appeared two years prior in a Chiriguana village called Saypurú. He carried
with him two crosses, a small one that he kept in his hand and another that he erected in
the village plaza for all to see. He preached that the Chiriguanaes should no longer “kill
nor eat human flesh; neither should they make war on those of the plains nor with other
peoples … [and] they should not have more than one wife.” Instead, they should live
according to “that founded on the law of reason.” Santiago claimed to have been sent by

---

35 “Carta a S.M. del virrey D. Francisco de Toledo acerca de los asuntos de guerra de que de nuevo se le
ofrece dar cuenta … (La Plata, 30 Noviembre 1573),” 198- 200; “Información hecha … sobre averiguar la
aparición de un joven entre los indios chiriguanaes que se dijo ser Santiago Apostol,” AGI, Patronato, 235
R3, 6; Lizárraga, Descripción breve de toda la tierra, 283-84. The presence of a baptized Chicha warrior
among the Chiriguanaes—one who had chosen to live among them—suggests that the Chiriguanaes, like
the Incas of Vilcabamba, attracted a variety of disaffected social elements at this time.
“his lord who was called Jesus.” The cross bearers had come in order to request “men from the house of God … to baptize them and instruct them in the things of the faith.”

Toledo was intrigued. Though he could hardly have expected in his best possible scenarios that the Chiriguanaes would take such a spontaneous turn towards Spanish Christian ideals, Lizárraga’s chronicle suggests that those who were present when Toledo received the cross bearers “cried tears of joy giving thanks to our Lord.” They believed that “God had sent an angel” to the Chiriguanaes and worked a miracle among them. Toledo arranged for their three crosses to be placed on the main altar of the cathedral in La Plata. But at a meeting called to discuss the situation, the secular and religious officials of the city were divided. Lizárraga’s account reports that he (the author) was among those who looked upon the story of Santiago with great skepticism. Toledo determined that he would appoint representatives to travel with the three cross bearers into the cordillera and investigate the situation closely.

During the months of September to December 1573, the mestizo, García de Mosquera, again visited the Chiriguana cordillera, this time to gather testimony and determine the veracity of claims regarding the mysterious Santiago and his purported miracles. The larger intention of his mission, however, was to determine the true

36 “Información hecha … sobre averiguar la aparición de un joven entre los indios chiriguanaes que se dijo ser Santiago Apostol,” 19; “Carta a S.M. del virrey D. Francisco de Toledo acerca de los asuntos de guerra de que de nuevo se le ofrece dar cuenta … (La Plata, 30 Noviembre 1573),” 201-02; “Informaciones hechas … de los indios llamados Chiriguanaes,” 3-6; Lizárraga, Descripción breve de toda la tierra, 282-85. A 1953 article references this incident, but it provides a version of events that consists almost entirely of translations of parts of “Informaciones hechas … de los indios llamados Chiriguanaes.” It contains virtually no analysis, argument, or context. See Jack Autrey Dabbs, “A Messiah among the Chiriguanos,” Southwestern Journal of Anthropology 9, no. 1 (1953): 45-58.

37 Lizárraga, Descripción breve de toda la tierra, 285-91. “Carta a S.M. del virrey D. Francisco de Toledo acerca de los asuntos de guerra de que de nuevo se le ofrece dar cuenta … (La Plata, 30 Noviembre 1573),” 200-03; “Informaciones hechas … de los indios llamados Chiriguanaes,” 4-6; “Información hecha … sobre averiguar la aparición de un joven entre los indios chiriguanaes que se dijo ser Santiago Apostol,” 1-4.
intentions of the Chiriguanaes with regard to making peace on Spanish terms. To that end, Mosquera was to determine if Santiago’s supposed message of submission to Christianity and its ideals had taken hold. He was to interview the witnesses to Santiago’s miracles as well as the Chiriguana caciques, the latter in order to gauge their likely reactions to receiving clergymen in their communities. Mosquera was also to assure the Chiriguanaes that the Spanish were disposed to treat them well if they would submit to God and king.38

The testimonies collected by Mosquera largely align with the stories told by the Chiriguana visitors in La Plata and the three cross bearers. They agree that Santiago had arrived without warning in the vicinity of the Chiriguana village of Saypurú around two years before. He claimed to be a saint sent from heaven by his father Jesus, and he carried with him two crosses—one in his hand and a large one on his back. According to some witnesses, the large cross followed behind him, even though no one carried it. The saint was long-haired, beardless, and dressed in the style of a native. Most witnesses remarked specifically on his beauty. Santiago consistently astounded the Chiriguanaes with his healing powers. In one specific instance, he was known to have revived a Chané slave who had died, or almost died, as a result of a snakebite. In other cases, he placed his small cross upon the chests or lips of the sick and healed them. Santiago was also known to have performed a miracle that conjures the feeding of the multitudes, as well as other biblical miracles. During a famine, he gave a boy two pumpkin seeds to plant. Two days later the seeds had brought forth entire groves full of pumpkins. The people could take and eat as many as they wanted, but the fruit was never exhausted. At the same time,

---

38 “Informaciones hechas … de los indios llamados Chiriguanaes,” 5-9.
Santiago’s presence portended ill for those who did not heed his message of repentance from cannibalism, polygamy, and incest. He had explained that his father, Jesus, had taken from the Chiriguanaes “their food and drink because they do not take note of nor observe [his] words … For that reason the fields had been dried on four occasions.” In a specific instance, a cacique named Marucar defied Santiago by killing and eating a slave after hearing his message. Marucar fell dead immediately afterward. Similarly, a cacique named Moroczan, to whom Santiago gave a cross so he could venerate it, tossed the item away because he considered it valueless. He fell sick and died soon after.\(^{39}\)

Santiago’s reputation for healing and meting out justice helped build his standing as a truly holy person. So did his improbable appearances and disappearances and the perception that he never ate. An oft-repeated tale among the testimonies was one that saw Santiago, in a general display of frustration at the Chiriguanaes’ refusal to heed his calls for repentance, warning them that they “will be destroyed by [his] father.” He punctuated his warnings by striking the ground with a large cross. Warm, salty water came forth from the place where the blow had landed.\(^{40}\)

Mosquera’s presence in the cordillera also served as an opportunity for the Chiriguanaes to learn information about the Spanish. Mosquera reported that one man he encountered in the home of a cacique inquired directly about the viceroy. He wished to know how tall he was, how old he was, and whether a large retinue accompanied him. Above all, he wanted to know how Toledo planned to make war against them. The caciques that Mosquera interviewed were also interested in the details of their potential

\(^{39}\) Ibid., 9-19; “Información hecha … sobre averiguar la aparición de un joven entre los indios chiriguanaes que se dijo ser Santiago Apostol,” 4-41.

\(^{40}\) Informaciones hechas … de los indios llamados Chiriguanaes,” 15.
subjection to Spanish rule. One group of five caciques gave statements that suggested they were entertaining a negotiated peace. They claimed that they were willing to pledge themselves to the viceroy and, “in cases of war, to serve in it and to provide other personal services [such as] transport or the clearing of land, planting and cultivating, and construction … which are the offices of men.” They would not, however, agree to other conditions. They would not allow the Spanish to live in or near their towns. If the Spanish had to populate the frontier, they might do so in “the Tarija valley and the [eastern] plains in which Manso had been.” The caciques were not willing to give up other particular locations they considered their own. Furthermore, the Chiriguanaes would not “serve in the stables nor bring water nor perform other services that are the work of women.”

As Mosquera finished his interviews and departed for La Plata, a Chiriguana cacique named Chimbuy attempted to give him his niece. Mosquera refused “because he did not know [Toledo’s] feelings” about such an exchange. Exchanging women with another party was a culturally appropriate means of sealing a pact between rivals among the Guaraní. Chimbuy may have sought to build goodwill in this way particularly because he and his fellow caciques feared that Toledo was planning an ambush—that he was going to kill them and those who were already in the city when they came to visit La Plata. According to Mosquera, “because they are gullible Indians … [they believe] what some Spanish-speaking Indians told them, that [Toledo] does not want to allow [the first group of Chiriguanaes who had visited him in La Plata] to go … to their lands.” But they were not gullible. Toledo had, in fact, been holding the delegation of 30 to 50 against its will in the city. And when the Spanish learned that the prisoners wished to return to their

41 Ibid., 20-22.
homes, Toledo moved them to a place where the Spanish could better keep track of them and prevent their escape. There is no evidence to suggest that Toledo actually planned to lure the other Chiriguana caciques to La Plata so he could “do them great harm when they [were] all gathered together,” as Chimbuy and company feared. Rather, he seems to have hoped to convince them to remain in the city indefinitely, and “to bring their children so that here they would be indoctrinated and educated [in the faith].”

Nevertheless, the imprisonment of the Chiriguana delegation in La Plata became a significant point of contention that ultimately sunk any hopes for a negotiated peace. The Chiriguanaes who remained in La Plata during Mosquera’s visit to the cordillera managed to escape from their de facto imprisonment in February of 1574. Mosquera had returned during the previous December. According to multiple reports, a particularly strong storm facilitated the flight of the prisoners. Toledo ordered a full mobilization of Spanish resources for a thorough manhunt. His forces managed to capture four escapees, whom they brought before the viceroy, though there is no evidence of what befell them from there. Others, including Inca Condori, disappeared completely, but only after reportedly attacking a number of native communities and traveling parties as they fled.

Among the Spaniards, the escape of the Chiriguanaes from La Plata represented definitive proof that their suggestion of a detente had been a “fiction.” They had been perpetrating a ploy designed to trick the viceroy and distract him from preparing for a war against them. According to Lizárraga, Toledo determined to go to war only a matter

---

42 Ibid., 21-22; “Relación de la jornada que hizo el Virrey del Perú Don Francisco de Toledo á la Provincia de Santa Cruz de la Sierra contra los Indios Chiriguanaes,” 172; Lizárraga, Descripción breve de toda la tierra, 292-93.

43 Lizárraga, Descripción breve de toda la tierra, 292-93; “Relación de la jornada que hizo el Virrey del Perú Don Francisco de Toledo á la Provincia de Santa Cruz de la Sierra contra los Indios Chiriguanaes,” 172-73.
of days after the incident. His letter to the king dated the following month makes it clear that there was no longer any alternative: “I do not know what more the king or his subjects should do to defend the breaches of his kingdoms and frontiers and protect his vassals and subjects, and they to defend their houses and estates that are burned and robbed daily.” In the same letter from March of 1574, Toledo revealed that he had determined to place more significant Spanish populations in the Tarija and Tomina Valleys. These populations might prevent Chiriguana inroads in the future. They might also serve as bases from which Spanish forces might enter into Chiriguana territory during the upcoming war.44

The character of Santiago vanishes from the Spanish documents along with any real chance for peace with the Chiriguanaes at the beginning of 1574. Santiago is not mentioned in Toledo’s secretaries’ official account of the Chiriguana war, written at the end of that year. It is therefore unclear whether the Spanish believed that he was real or if he was simply an element of the “fiction” sold to them by the Chiriguanaes. Regardless, the situation bears consideration from the other side. What might Santiago have represented from the Chiriguana perspective?

Mosquera’s report and the testimony of the Chiriguanaes who visited La Plata provide fairly certain evidence that a native, or perhaps mestizo, pseudo-religious figure was active in the Chiriguana cordillera circa 1570-72. On the surface, it appears that the young man incorporated Christian iconography and language to accompany a similarly

44 Lizárraga, Descripción breve de toda la tierra, 294; “Relación de la jornada que hizo el Virrey del Perú Don Francisco de Toledo á la Provincia de Santa Cruz de la Sierra contra los Indios Chiriguanaes,” 172-73; “Carta a S.M. del Virrey D. Francisco de Toledo, acerca de los distintos negocios de guerra de las provincias del Perú y Chile … de seguridad que para ello tiene (20 Marzo 1574),” and “Carta del virrey D. Francisco de Toledo a S.M. exponiendo cuanto había hecho para traer de paz a los indios Chiriguanaes … por la guerra (10 Mayo 1574),” both in Levillier, Gobernantes del Perú, vol. 5, 413-15, 430-31.
Christian message of repentance and submission. He not only used the cross, he invoked the name of Jesus and mimicked Christ’s behavior in a number of ways. Santiago had clearly been exposed at some level to Spanish missionaries in the years before. Perhaps he had traveled from Paraguay; perhaps he had been within the orbit of the Spanish settlements of the 1560s; perhaps, as Lizárraga suggested, he had observed a particular Carmelite friar reported to have traveled among the Chiriguanaes ransoming their captives; perhaps there were other evangelists active in the area about whom there is no surviving evidence.45

It is entirely possible that a Chiriguana did take to the Christian faith during this period. It is certain, however, that a man in Santiago’s likely situation viewed the elements of Christianity to which he had been exposed through a Guaraní cultural lens. One should therefore attempt to understand it in the same way. This requires recognition that the itinerant holy man was not foreign to Guaraní culture. Hélène Clastres’ work has highlighted the role of such individuals in contact-era Tupí-Guaraní societies. Her analysis of the behavior of the most-revered among them, the karai, mirrors in many ways the reports that survive regarding Santiago. The karai were also known to live outside of a community, perform miracles, and exhort the population to change its ways. Their messages, like Santiago’s, struck at the very heart of Guaraní socio-cultural practices. They urged the people to abandon their socially prescribed activities and follow the karai. But the typical message of the karai did differ from Santiago’s in a few key senses. The karai were often instrumental in encouraging war and cannibalism. It was the path by which the community could reach the land without evil beyond the high

45 Lizárraga, Descripción breve de toda la tierra, 287. There are no other surviving references to this friar.
mountains. Santiago, on the other hand, was a new kind of karai. Like the others, he represented a centrifugal force in opposition to the typical, more-secular tuvichas. His message urging the abandonment of cannibalism, polygamy, and war provided an alternative route to a different land without evil.

Examine other aspects of the entire incident from the Chiriguana point-of-view helps bring other elements into focus as well. It is clear from the documents that the Chiriguanaes’ escape from La Plata in February of 1574 convinced the Spanish that they had been acting in bad faith throughout. While the notion cannot be dismissed, neither can it be assumed that they were insincere. The Spanish were operating under a number of misconceptions regarding the Chiriguanaes that prevented them from analyzing the situation from their counterparts’ point of view. They believed that the Chiriguanaes who approached Toledo understood the process of making peace in the same way that the Spanish did. For the Spanish, peace connoted their submission to God and king, settlement in reducciones, and forced labor or tribute. The Chiriguana representatives rather sought to negotiate an armistice, not a surrender. Only the three cross bearers sent by Santiago had specifically requested instruction in the Christian faith. The Chicha-turne-Chiriguana named Baltasarillo, for one, had explicitly rejected a life as a Christian. The group of caciques interviewed by Mosquera also explicitly rejected allowing Spaniards, and presumably priests, to settle among them. As the weeks of their imprisonment dragged on, the Chiriguanaes in La Plata began to understand more and more clearly what an agreement with the Spanish would have entailed, especially as the Spanish instructed them to send for their children.

---

46 Clastres, The Land-without-Evil, 23-56.
The Spanish officials also seem to have believed initially that these Chiriguanaes were somehow representative of the entirety of the Chiriguana people. Toledo had taken pains to instruct Mosquera to confirm the envoys’ message of submission and peace as he contacted the caciques in and around the cordillera, but he couched those instructions in his supposition that the delegation may have been deceptive. What he did not seem to grasp yet was the political heterogeneity of the Chiriguana people—that the envoys may have been sincere, but that their feelings regarding peace were not widely shared. In truth, there is little chance that these men understood themselves as ambassadors for the Chiriguana nation. To them, such a rigid category did not exist—certainly not in a political sense. Like Santiago, it makes the most sense to understand their actions in terms of their own culture. And like Santiago, it is likely that they were seeking some sort of advantage or status within their own societies. The Christians, their doctrine, their technology, and their beasts had all proven powerful, and in certain circumstances (the Chávez-Manso dispute, for one), beneficial within the Chiriguana orbit. In the uncertain times in which the Chiriguanaes found themselves, some presumably considered adapting rather than resisting the change on the western horizon. But ultimately, they were not willing to subject themselves to the lives of subservience—worst of all, performing women’s work—that they saw other native peoples living. They were *ava*—men—and they would by no means submit to being the *tapuy*—slaves—of the Spanish.47

**The Toledo Entrada, Preparation and Execution, 1574**

As the colonial government’s official stance shifted toward war in March and April of 1574, Toledo received an in-depth report on the customs and history of the

---

47 See Chapter 2 for a discussion of *ava* and *tapuy* from the Chiriguana perspective.
Chiriguanaes written by Juan Polo de Ondegardo, a respected Spanish jurist of the era. Licenciado Polo’s report begins with a recognition that Toledo had already determined to go to war. Polo was supportive of the viceroy’s decision, as his conception of the Chiriguanaes was inextricably linked to warfare and ritual cannibalism. Though he characterized them as “many nations”—a likely remnant of the broader Inca-era conception of the Chiriguanaes—his report describes cannibalism as “their principal religion…. All their festivals, whether in joy or sadness, involve the death of slaves.” Another defining characteristic of the Chiriguanaes was that “each in its own way makes war habitually and, [they] eat each other and hold the others as property and make ransom among themselves.” Those that had settled on the Charcas frontiers in the cordillera did so, Polo claimed, precisely because “they have found those who live here in this area … to be meek and fit [for attack and enslavement].”48 In other words, they had settled upon their source of slaves and meat.

Polo’s report additionally raises the question of whether the Chiriguanaes taken captive during the war could be justly subjected to slavery. He felt that the Spanish prohibition on indigenous slavery was not intended to extend to circumstances such as these, and he pointed out that the King of Portugal allowed the enslavement of the same peoples within his colonies.49 The issue had been on Toledo’s mind for some time. Just before he arrived in La Plata, Toledo requested guidance from the king regarding whether the extraordinary crimes reportedly perpetrated by the Chiriguanaes necessitated extraordinary measures—in other words, “whether those captured in war might be given as slaves.” Up to that point, Toledo had abided by the royal prohibition on native slavery

48 “Informaciones hechas … de los indios llamados Chiriguanaes,” 53-57.
49 Ibid., 57-61.
and forbidden the Spanish to enslave the Chiriguanaes, even those captured during military ventures (what did become of them is not clear). This was more than just a philosophical issue. It also had implications for the resources available to Toledo if he were to go forward with a war. In the early years of conquest in Peru, soldiers pledged themselves and their resources to the crown in hopes of winning reward in the form of an encomienda grant. Part of Toledo’s reforms to the labor system entailed deemphasizing the encomienda as an instrument of royal patronage. But while he was disinclined to grant new encomiendas, the Spaniards in La Plata, at least, were reluctant to put themselves at risk without the expectation of reward. Toledo specifically complained about their unwillingness to assist with the Chiriguana problem unless they were guaranteed excessive compensation. As Toledo’s secretaries once wrote, they demanded so much in exchange for their cooperation, one would have thought the viceroy was demanding “they go and conquer Algiers.”

There was no agreement regarding the extent of the Spanish population’s obligations toward the protection of the frontiers. Could the Spanish residents of the region be obligated to serve in a war against the Chiriguanaes? Would their service merit additional honors and grants from the crown, or did it fall within their normal duties? In posing these questions Toledo sought to balance the practical demands of war with the challenge of paying for it. But perhaps the point was moot. If the viceroy were to permit the Spanish to keep their Chiriguana prisoners as slaves, he might attract enough cooperation from the labor-hungry residents to carry out his plans. An influx of labor into

---

50 “Carta a S.M. del virrey D. Francisco de Toledo, sobre materias tocantes a guerra y conquistas (Potosí, 20 Marzo 1573),” 33-39; “Relación de la jornada que hizo el Virrey del Perú Don Francisco de Toledo á la Provincia de Santa Cruz de la Sierra contra los Indios Chiriguanaes,” 174; “Carta a S.M. del virrey D. Francisco de Toledo acerca de los asuntos de guerra de que de nuevo se le ofrece dar cuenta … (La Plata, 30 Noviembre 1573),” 199.
the market would also benefit the ever-important output of silver. Toledo brought the
issues before the Audiencia. He requested that each official put down in writing his
opinion on three points: whether a war against the Chiriguanaes was licit, whether Toledo
could call upon the residents of the region to aid him in carrying out such a war, and
whether it was just to enslave the prisoners that would result from such a war. Their
opinions were unanimously positive on all points. And regarding the question of the
duties and obligations of the encomenderos and other Spanish residents of La Plata and
Potosí, it was determined that Toledo might call upon them in cases of both defensive and
offensive warfare.51 In April-May of 1574, Toledo consulted the religious officials of the
region on the matter of the enslavement of prisoners of war and received the blessing of
the Church: “it was resolved that, in the matter of the war it was very just … that the
Chiriguanaes Indians be given as slaves to those who capture them.”52

Soon after meeting with the religious officials, Toledo wrote a letter to the king
detailing his decision to proceed with war. He expressed his arguments in terms of the
persistent heinous crimes committed by the Chiriguanaes, their conduct towards peaceful
communities of natives both within and outside of Spanish control, their repeated
rejection of peaceful forms of interaction, the dangers they represented to the distant
Spanish settlements like Santa Cruz, and their advance towards the central Spanish
interests at La Plata and Potosí. He explained that the religious and secular officials were

51 “Parecer del presidente y oidores de las Audiencias de los charcas y La Plata, sobre el modo de hacer la
guerra a los indios chiriguanaes y castigo que debía imponérseles,” AGI, Patronato, 235 R2, Block 1, 1-12;
Block 2, 1-8; Block 3, 1-8; Block 4, 1-12. Among the finer points of the issue of service was whether one’s
fealty to the crown required his participation only when under attack or whether it also required serving the
king’s interests (namely, protecting his native vassals) on the offensive.

in agreement that war was “the one and only remedy that was humanly possible.”

Toledo wrote his official statement of condemnation in the middle of May. In it he touched upon many of the same points as in his letter to the king, but he also freed up the necessary resources from the royal treasury and officially called upon the Spanish population to provide their support for the impending war.

Toledo planned to lead the effort personally in order to ensure its success and the wise expenditure of any royal funds that went into it. He would assemble 300 to 400 Spanish soldiers and move towards the sites of the “final Inca fortresses that [the Chiriguanaes] captured in the region,” before turning northward to the Guapay (Grande) River, where Chávez’ settlement of La Barranca had stood. At the same time, Don Gabriel Paniagua would lead a smaller force of 120 soldiers eastward from the Cochabamba region toward Santa Cruz and engage the population led by the powerful Chiriguana leader Vitupué. It was important to Toledo’s strategy that these two Chiriguana forces not join in defense against Toledo’s column. Both Spanish armies would also include a number of native auxiliaries that consisted of both indios de servicio and Chicha’s. The latter had been chosen for their facility with the bow and arrow.

---

53 “Carta del virrey D. Francisco de Toledo a S.M. exponiendo cuanto habia hecho para traer de paz a los indios Chiriguanaes … por la guerra (10 Mayo 1574),” 428-33.

54 “Provisión de la Audiencia de los Charcas, sobre condenaciones impuestas a los indios chiriguanaes,” AGI, Patronato, 235 R6, 1-2; “Relación de la jornada que hizo el Virrey del Perú Don Francisco de Toledo á la Provincia de Santa Cruz de la Sierra contra los Indios Chiriguanaes,” 170-74. The refrain regarding the threat posed by the Chiriguanaes was, by this time, that they had come within five leagues (~25 km) of Potosí.

55 Presumably, the Inca fortresses to which Toledo was referring consisted of Oroncota and/or those of the Greater-Cuzcotoro defensive chain. See Chapter 4. “Carta del virrey D. Francisco de Toledo a S.M. exponiendo cuanto habia hecho para traer de paz a los indios Chiriguanaes … por la guerra (10 Mayo 1574),” 433-35; Lizárraga, Descripción breve de toda la tierra, 296-98. Also included among the Spanish forces, according to Lizárraga, were “Chiriguana Indians whom they brought as guides.” The text mentions them in the course of a vignette that demonstrates the strength of the Chiriguana bow relative the Chicha’s. A Chicha auxiliary and a Chiriguana guide each fire an arrow at a coat of mail stuffed with straw. The Chicha arrow bounces off harmlessly. The Chiriguana arrow easily penetrates the armor. I am inclined to interpret this event either as apocryphal or from an earlier era. Lizárraga seems to have placed it at this
Lizárraga’s chronicle reports that when it came time to gather the forces, the Spanish, “in keeping with their obligations, offered to serve and did so without personal interest or payment of any kind.” Toledo was similarly positive about the Spanish response to his call to arms. Neither mentioned how much the enticement of capturing slaves during the course of the war played into the spirit of service and cooperation. Presumably the concession helped significantly in this regard. Toledo might easily have remanded all potential captives to service of the crown instead. Doing so would have been more in keeping with his overarching royal directive to increase the flow of income into the royal purse and to limit the prerogatives of the Spanish *encomendero* class. Apparently his more immediate concern was ensuring the cooperation of his forces as they set out together in battle, which they did at the beginning of June of 1574.

What followed was a series of disasters that reveal how little the Spanish understood the nature of the war they had committed to fight. Toledo and his captains were ill-prepared for the terrain and climate, and despite their investigations, they were still poorly informed about their enemies and their tactics. The series of misfortunes began as Toledo’s column descended into the Pilcomayo basin. According to Toledo’s secretaries’ report, Mosquera had lied to the viceroy about the flow and course of the Pilcomayo and its tributaries. As a result, he and his soldiers had to cross repeatedly a number of flowing rivers, in the process losing much of their food, livestock, and other

---

point in the narrative to demonstrate the potency of the enemy. It seems too farfetched that the Spanish would have trusted anyone they classified as “Chiriguana” to guide them at this point in time. Furthermore, there is no reference in Toledo’s official report about Chiriguanà collaborators. I suspect he would have blamed them for the problems that eventually befall the mission.

56 Lizárraga, *Descripción breve de toda la tierra*, 297; “Carta del virrey D. Francisco de Toledo a S.M. exponiendo cuanto había hecho para traer de paz a los indios Chiriguanàes … por la guerra (10 Mayo 1574),” 434; “Relación de la jornada que hizo el Virrey del Perú Don Francisco de Toledo á la Provincia de Santa Cruz de la Sierra contra los Indios Chiriguanàes,” 175-76.
supplies. Toledo’s writings give no indication as to why he felt Mosquera had lied. More likely, the Spanish failed to understand the seasonal climatic variations of the land. Mosquera had visited the region at the beginning of the rainy season the year before, likely before the rivers gathered any strength. Toledo and his armies seem to have timed their attack to coincide with the dry season, but they did not wait until the river levels began to fall. The dry scrubland terrain in which the Spanish found themselves did little to ease their supply losses. And soon, heat, toil, and thirst began to take their toll. Toledo fell extremely ill with a stomach ailment that greatly inhibited his column’s movements. Meanwhile, a group of soldiers that split off from Toledo’s company fell victim to attacks on their camp that resulted in the deaths of a few soldiers, dozens of injuries, and in one case the theft of 50 horses. On other occasions, the Spanish found Chiriguana villages deserted but for a few women and children. The men had retreated eastward after destroying any supplies they could not carry. The Spaniards also continually found themselves unable to overtake Chiriguana bands that had fled just ahead of their arrival. The same was true of Paniagua’s forces. They avoided the illness and supply losses experienced by Toledo’s soldiers, but the Chiriguanaes evaded all encounters with them. 

By mid-August, the Spanish had not yet had one successful engagement with the Chiriguanaes, whom they had expected to be able to kill and capture by the multitude. Toledo made the decision to abort the mission, and his forces retreated to the west carrying the viceroy upon their shoulders on a litter. Paniagua learned of Toledo’s retreat

57 “Relación de la jornada que hizo el Virrey del Perú Don Francisco de Toledo á la Provincia de Santa Cruz de la Sierra contra los Indios Chiriguanaes,” 177-81.

58 Ibid., 180-92; Lizárraga, Descripción breve de toda la tierra, 301-06.
while still in fruitless pursuit of Vitupué, and determined to return home immediately, before the rainy season began.⁵⁹ Hunger and illness had played significant roles in turning back the Spanish armies, but the Chiriguanaes had essentially fought a successful guerrilla war. They made use of the terrain, carefully chose their confrontations, and ceded territory to the more powerful enemy. The Spanish had no tactical strategy with which to counter. Nevertheless, Toledo’s secretaries’ report puts it in the most favorable terms. The invasion had been successful in liberating the frontier populations and the roads from the Chiriguana threat.⁶⁰

This was partially true in the immediate sense—the Chiriguanaes had ceded ground—but Lizárraga’s chronicle puts to rest any talk of Spanish victory. His account benefitted from years of hindsight (during which the Chiriguanaes remained a presence on the frontier) and the freedom to describe the returning expeditionaries as they actually appeared. Lizárraga wrote of the great suffering experienced chiefly by the natives who accompanied Toledo. Many reportedly died of hunger and illness, while others who deserted eventually fell into the hands of the Chiriguanaes or fell prey to the wildlife in the region. Those who did survive and returned to their homes were little more than skin and bones, and they had lost faith in the king. To Lizárraga, all the costs and suffering had been in total vain. As the soldiers reentered La Plata, the residents asked “how many Chiriguanaes [had] they brought back in chains?” Their honest answer was, “not even a fingernail.” In Lizárraga’s estimation, “God had delivered the Chiriguanaes into the hands [of the Spanish],” but Toledo and company entered into battle with “great pride,”

⁵⁹ Lizárraga, Descripción breve de toda la tierra, 303-06.

⁶⁰ “Relación de la jornada que hizo el Virrey del Perú Don Francisco de Toledo á la Provincia de Santa Cruz de la Sierra contra los Indios Chiriguanaes,” 193-96.
and instead delivered themselves into the hands of the Chiriguanaes. The Spanish were spared through the mercy of God, who “blinded” the Chiriguanaes to their opportunities to slaughter the Spanish forces wholesale. Instead, the Spanish escaped, just in time, back to the safety of the highlands.\footnote{Lizárraga, Descripción breve de toda la tierra, 302-07.}

Accounts written to inform the king about the entrada in the immediate aftermath are still more pointed in their criticism of Toledo’s leadership. An account by the president of the Audiencia of Charcas from 1576 accuses the viceroy of willfully ignoring advice about the territory he was about to enter. Instead, he outfitted himself and his company with the trappings of luxury and neglected the practical elements of war. They entered into the harsh land dressed in silk adorned with opulent ornaments, “as is the custom in wars of cowardice.” They brought with them litters, and “other things of great hindrance” ill-chosen for the opponent and territory. The only beneficiaries were the Chiriguana enemies, who managed to enrich themselves out of the stock of abandoned supplies, including horses, camelids, and mules. The officials in the Audiencia of Los Reyes (Lima) captured popular opinion against Toledo when they summarized the series of events: “a great sum of gold was spent from your majesty’s purse … [and in the end] all left [the war] lost, destroyed, and walking barefoot without having accomplished anything except having killed a great number of Indians that they brought in their service.”\footnote{“Carta a S. M. de D. Lope Diez de Armendariz, Presidente de la Audiencia de Charcas … (La Plata 25 Septiembre 1576),” in Levillier, La Audiencia de Charcas, vol. 1, 371-72; “Carta de la Audiencia de Los Reyes, dando cuenta a S. M. de la pobreza y descontento de la tierra … y otros agravios contra él (Lima 15 Marzo 1575),” in Levillier, Gobernantes del Perú, vol. 7, 244-45.}

The disaster that was the Toledo entrada had become a
common point of reference in later discussions of the struggle over the Charcas-Chiriguana frontier. It would dominate perceptions for generations to come.

**Conclusion**

The era of Spanish imperial reform in the 1560s greatly altered aspects of governance in colonial Charcas. By 1574, Viceroy Toledo had introduced reforms to the region that more-closely guarded royal privilege; altered the scope and shape of the labor system; and reflected the new legal philosophy to Spanish imperial claims. His approach to the Chiriguanaes and the threat they were perceived to pose at the Charcas frontier reflected each of these types of reform. I have argued, particularly, that the legal case he built against them came out of the philosophical debates of 1560s Spain. However his decision to proceed with the invasion was a rational calculation based on the costs and benefits before him. No example better illustrates this point than Toledo’s vacillation towards war after his firsthand experience with the Chiriguanaes in La Plata. The Chiriguanaes he encountered did not resemble those constructed in the course of his investigations. But over time, it became equally clear that neither were they a pliant native populace resigned to serve the Spanish. Toledo decided upon war, then made another practical determination to subject the Chiriguanaes captured during the war to slavery.

Toledo’s failure in this regard did not prevent future Spanish efforts to expand eastwards from Charcas, but they complicated them in a number of ways. Future efforts to tame the Chiriguanaes would have to contend with the legacy of Toledo’s ill-fated invasion. The more immediate effect was that the Chiriguana cordillera remained the effective boundary of eastward Spanish settlement. Only small, isolated Santa Cruz represented an island of Spanish control in the vast heart of the continent. In some ways,
this was a return to an earlier era before Irala, Chávez, and others blazed trails, of sorts, across the continent. But the situation was new in other ways. Among the Spaniards of Charcas, the east was no longer simply *terra incognita*. It had come to represent a triumph of barbarians over civilization and paganism over Christianity.
CHAPTER 7
BUILDING AND BREACHING THE CHARCAS-CHIRIGUANA FRONTIER

The second Spanish “war of blood and fire” against the Chiriguanaes took place in the wake of the destruction of a Spanish frontier town called San Miguel de la Laguna in January of 1584. Only weeks after that attack by the Chiriguanaes, the Audiencia of Charcas sent a letter to the king describing the disaster and the impending military response. As Audiencia officials put it, “the town had been founded and populated in accordance with the advice of [respected individuals] in order to suppress, to some degree, the raids by these Indians [the Chiriguanaes, which] do great harm along these frontiers.” It was only the latest and most egregious offense by a people whose “tricks and cunning” had plagued the eastern frontier for decades.1 By July, Spanish armies coordinated their attacks along multiple fronts in order to eliminate the hostile Chiriguana nation.

The period of conflict that followed appears as little more than a footnote in most discussions of Spanish-Chiriguana relations. It is perhaps best known in the literature as the impetus behind the foundation of San Lorenzo el Real de la Frontera (in 1590 [officially 1592]) following years of intermittent Spanish offensives.2 The few secondary works that address the impetus for the 1584 war reflect a narrow body of evidence. They draw almost exclusively on the Spanish-penned condemnations of the Chiriguanaes written in and after 1584, including the letter from the Audiencia to the king cited above. These documents predictably focus on the destruction of San Miguel in making the case

1 “Carta a S. M. de la Audiencia de Charcas … (La Plata 17 Febrero de 1584),” in Levillier, Audiencia de Charcas, vol. 2, 95-98.

2 Finot, La Conquista del Oriente Boliviano, 301-02; García Recio, Análisis de una sociedad de frontera, 102-03. San Lorenzo would become the basis for the modern Santa Cruz de la Sierra following the relocation of the original population during the 1590s-1620s.
for war against the Chiriguana “nation.” The testimonies put the attack in the context of the attacks on Nueva Rioja and La Barranca and the murders of Andrés Manso and Ñuflo de Chávez in an attempt to compile a comprehensive record. Another such document is a manuscript written by Ruy Díaz de Guzmán in 1617 and published under the title “Los Chiriguanos.” Though it is one of Díaz de Guzmán’s lesser-known works, it represents the closest approximation of a contemporary chronicle of eastern Charcas during the 1580s. It seamlessly (and misleadingly) blends the 1574 and 1584 Spanish offensives with a list of provocations on the part of the Chiriguanaes, punctuated by the destruction of San Miguel and the Spanish military response.\(^3\) These overly simplified accounts have prevented scholars from taking into consideration the context of the intervening decade. Instead, the existing literature characterizes the 1584 war as a continuation of the conflict that had prompted Toledo’s entrada ten years earlier. In their explanation, Toledo’s failure had served only to “double the aggression of the Indian enemy.” The Spanish and natives under Spanish control continued to live under the constant threat of Chiriguana incursions throughout the period. These works find that the destruction of San Miguel was the tipping point at which Chiriguana aggression had gone too far.\(^4\)

This view is a profound oversimplification of relations between Spanish and Spanish-controlled native populations, on one hand, and the many varied Chiriguana frontier populations, on the other. I argue throughout the coming chapters that Chiriguana

---

3 Ruy Díaz de Guzmán, “Los chiriguanos – Manuscrito No. 1,” in Relación de la entrada a los chiriguanos: edición crítica de los manuscritos existentes en la Biblioteca Nacional de París, ed. Ch. de Crozefon and Hernando Sanabria Fernández (Santa Cruz, Bolivia: Fundación cultural Ramón Darío Gutiérrez, 1979 [1617]), 75-78.

factions were becoming increasingly heterogeneous in their approaches to the Charcas frontier populations following Toledo’s 1574 invasion. Many interacted with the Spanish through primarily peaceful means characterized by market exchange. This was particularly true along the Tomina frontier where San Miguel was located (Figure 7-1). This is not to say that the Chiriguanaes living here had abandoned war as a culturally and economically significant practice. In some ways, war facilitated the cooperation between Chiriguana and Spaniard. The populations of the Chiriguana cordillera participated in violent assaults on native communities living in the plains to the east. They also occasionally targeted Spanish farmsteads or native communities under Spanish control. But here more than elsewhere, these wars facilitated peaceful market exchange with the frontier Spanish communities. As a result, Chiriguanaes were able to satisfy their demand for metal and other European goods without conducting raids.

This chapter thus focuses on the decade between Toledo’s failed 1574 invasion and the Spanish offensives that began in 1584. It begins by explaining in further detail the nature of Spanish-Chiriguana relations during this era in terms of three important frontier areas: Tarija, Tomina, and Santa Cruz. It then goes on to describe the deterioration of relations between the sides, beginning near the end of 1582 when a Chiriguana leader coordinated a particularly devastating assault on the Charcas frontier north of Tomina. It was the first in a confluence of events on both sides of the frontier that led to the full-scale war that followed. I demonstrate that the war began over a year prior to destruction of the town of San Miguel. In fact, the establishment of the town was itself a response to the wartime crisis. Its destruction represented an escalation of the conflict rather than its root cause. I argue that the root of the conflict more accurately lay in the colonial state’s prohibition of the captive economy in which the Spanish residents of Tomina and the
Chiriguanaes participated. The ban on trading for native captives took away the incentive for cooperation between the frontier Spanish and Chiriguana populations. It also deprived Spaniards along the frontier of a key labor source. Many advocated all the more emphatically to access new populations of native peoples beyond the cordillera by extending the eastward reach of the colonial state. The Chiriguanaes were an obstacle to this type of expansion. In short, the Chiriguanaes, who served at one time as a conduit for native laborers from beyond the frontier, had begun to hinder the Spanish capacity to incorporate additional native workers. I argue that the conflict escalated to the point of war for two primary reasons. First, the Spanish failed to understand fully the dynamics of inter-factional Chiriguana relations. Their actions facilitated the unification of the Chiriguana factions against them rather than exploiting their divisions. The second reason—the vacancy in the post of viceroy during the lead-up to the war—allowed the Spaniards in Charcas to approach the frontier crisis far more aggressively than they otherwise would have. The approach that was implemented incorporated significant input from individuals who stood to benefit most from taking an aggressive stance against the Chiriguanaes.

**Establishing the Tarija, Tomina, & Santa Cruz Frontiers, 1574-1582**

Following the failure of his 1574 invasion, Viceroy Toledo sought to secure the eastern frontier of Charcas by establishing Spanish towns in Tarija (San Bernardo de la Frontera de Tarija, 1574) and Tomina (Santiago de la Frontera de Tomina, 1575). He chose both locations because of their locations in temperate regions near Potosí and La Plata with growing Spanish presences, but also because of their positions vis-à-vis nearby Chiriguana populations. The citizens of both new towns were tasked with fortifying defenses and establishing more robust surveillance in these principal areas subject to
Chiriguana incursions. Under Spanish law, the legal foundation of a town invested the local officials with certain powers. The terms of a town’s foundation also regularly provided incentives for residents with certain qualities to live there. Along the Chiriguana frontiers of sixteenth-century Charcas, officials were given the responsibility of dividing up and granting agricultural and pastoral lands, as well as assigning rights to native labor owed to the colonial state. The beneficiaries of these resources were the men deemed most deserving on the basis of their service during the initial establishment of the new municipality and their continuing residence in it. Officials had some leeway in executing their offices and providing benefits to those “for whom it is most agreeable for the service of God and His Majesty.” Service in this regard meant, above all, being prepared and willing to defend the town and its jurisdiction against external threats.

There is considerable evidence that points to the Chiriguanaes as the impetus behind the foundation of both towns. The most direct documentary reference to both towns in this regard comes from “Carta del Licenciado Cepeda a S. M. en contestación de … (La Plata 10 de Febrero de 1590),” in Levillier, La Audiencia de Charcas, vol. 3, 2-4. The document describes “santigias de tomina” as a “town of Spaniards founded by Francisco de Toledo to resist these Indians [the Chiriguanaes].” San Bernardo de Tarija was responsible from its beginnings for the “repair and defense of the Province of the Chichas,” the nearby native population that had long been subject to Chiriguana incursions. Toledo also wrote that “the reason and causes that have moved and move me to make this population [in Tarija] … is to be on the frontier of the Chiriguanaes Indians and the defense of the Chichas on that frontier.” See “Comisión del virrey Francisco de Toledo a Luis de Fuentes (Potosí, 8 marzo 1575),” in Historia de Tarija: corpus documental, ed. Catherine J. Julien, Kristina Angelis, and Zulema Bass Werner de Ruíz (Tarija: Editora Guadalquivir, 1997), 49-51. See also “Carta del Licenciado Matienzo, Presidente interino de la Audiencia de Charcas, a S. M. … (4 de Enero de 1579), in Levillier, La Audiencia de Charcas, vol. 1, 483; “Relación de los corregimientos y otros officios que se proveen en los reynos e provncias del Piru, en el distrito e gobernación del visorrey dellos (1583),” in Levillier, Gobernantes del Perú, vol. 9, 134-35; Lizárraga, Descripción breve de toda la tierra, 178-79; Querejazu Lewis, Impacto hispano-indígena en Charcas, 324-25; Barnadas, Charcas, 45-49.

“Comisión del virrey Francisco de Toledo a Luis de Fuentes (La Plata, 22 enero 1574),” in Julien, Angelis, and Bass Werner de Ruíz, Historia de Tarija, 35; “Títulos de Luis de Fuentes (Tarija, 16 Oct. 1595),” Archivo Histórico de Tarija (hereafter cited as AHT), Caja 2, 618v-623r. One might also prove oneself deserving of land rights by serving with merit during a crisis after the initial foundation of a town. See examples of lands granted by Luis de Fuentes following a period of conflict with the Chiriguanaes for, in one example, “all haste to the business of the war with the Chiriguanaes Indians each time it is demanded of you,” in a number of documents from the AHT. See “Mercedes de Luis de Fuentes (Tarija, 22 June 1583),” AHT, Caja 3; and “Juicio ordinario n. 42, Juan García Calderon contra Xpobal Camargo sobre unas casas (Tarija, 21 June 1583),” AHT, Caja 5. More examples exist in the titles reprinted in Julien, Angelis, and Bass Werner de Ruíz, Historia de Tarija. Documentation for the earliest days of Tomina is far sparser. A 1618 copy of testimony from 1584 describes the first corregidor of the town’s success in attracting residents and “mak[ing] a force for the defense against the Chiriguanaes Indians.” See “Probanza
As discussed in preceding chapters, the valleys of Tarija were an important agricultural and pastoral region for the functioning of the late-Inca empire. The region had increasingly come to serve a similar role in Spanish Charcas since the 1540s. Like the Incas, the Spanish faced the challenge of guarding their interests against attacks precipitated by communities living to the east and south. By the 1570s and likely earlier, many of these attacks were perpetrated by Chiriguana populations living in the southern cordillera.7

The situation was similar in the Spanish-occupied valleys closest to the center of the Chiriguana cordillera, near the community of Tomina to the east of La Plata. Far less information is available regarding the development of the Tomina valleys prior to the foundation of a Spanish town there. No local or regional history of Tomina has been written, in part because the town founded there has remained small and provincial. It is clear that there was a Spanish presence in the region in the 1560s. Documents from the period make frequent mention of Chiriguana attacks in the location. It is also established that there were Spaniards settled in the Tomina valleys in 1574. It was in their community (not yet a town) that Toledo took refuge after falling ill during his entrada. A 1608 description of the region explains that the Spanish began to develop Tomina and the surrounding valleys in the 1540s. Under the protection and cultivation of the Spanish, the

---

7 Regarding Spanish interests in the valleys of Tarija prior to the foundation of a town there, see Ávila, Don Luis de Fuentes y Vargas y la fundación de Tarija, 63-75; Catherine J. Julien, “Introducción,” in Julien, Angelis, and Bass Werner de Ruíz, Historia de Tarija, xiii-xviii; Barragán Vargas, La historia temprana de Tarija, 85-115; Presta, “Encomienda, Family, and Business in Colonial Charcas,” 179-80.

---
valleys had become vital agricultural and pastoral lands on which the urban centers of Charcas depended.  

The surviving documentation offers few specifics about any Chiriguana threats that the residents of the Tarija frontier faced in the earliest days after the town’s foundation. A number of witnesses appearing in legal proceedings related to the founder of Tarija, Luis de Fuentes y Vargas, testified to his successful neutralization of the Chiriguana menace and protection of the town. Fuentes himself testified that the presence of the “evil and bellicose nation” required him to undertake great expenses, efforts, and personal risks in these initial years. A late eighteenth-century missionary chronicle claims that Fuentes and the other town founders suffered an attack almost immediately after their arrival in the region in April of 1574. Chiriguana warriors reportedly encircled their encampment, set fire to it, and killed several as they attempted to flee. The attack prompted Fuentes to relocate the town to a more secure location. In July, he re-founded San Bernardo (where Tarija, Bolivia stands) at a site “fifteen leagues [~75 km] from [the closest Chiriguana] towns and five or six [~25-30 km] from their lands.”

During the apparently tense initial years, the founders of San Bernardo oversaw the construction of buildings designed to withstand raids originating from across the frontier. The most significant was a large fortress on the main plaza in which all Spanish residents could take shelter when the need arose. The natives in the region, many of

---

8 “Descripción de la villa de Santiago de la Frontera de Tomina y su distrito,” 331-39; Lizárraga, Descripción breve de toda la tierra, 178-79.

9 “Relación de servicios de Luis de Fuentes (La Plata, 2 febrero – 3 marzo 1598),” in Julien, Angelis, and Bass Werner de Ruiz, Historia de Tarija, 357-58; Manuel Mingo de la Concepción, Historia de las misiones franciscanas de Tarija entre Chiriguanos, 2 vols. (Tarija: Universidad Boliviana Juan Misael Saracho, 1981 [1794]), vol. 1, 59-61; Ávila, Don Luis de Fuentes y Vargas y la fundación de Tarija, 107-09, 124-29. The initial site on which Tarija briefly stood is now the town of San Lorenzo, Bolivia.
whom had been Inca-era *mitimaes*, also relied on structures that the Spanish described as fortresses to protect themselves from frontier raids. Inca officials almost certainly supervised the construction of some of these structures. An early resident named Juan Rodríguez Durán described a particular incident from the earliest days of Tarija in which Chiriguanaes targeted “a fort where the friendly Indians and all the laborers in the town had collected.” Chiriguana forces managed to capture more than 40 natives and made their escape back eastward along the Santa Ana River. Twelve Spaniards set off on horseback the following day and caught up to the Chiriguanaes and their captives 15 km from town. In the ensuing confrontation, the Spanish managed to recover the captives without suffering any fatalities, though a soldier was struck in the chest by an arrow.10

According to Rodríguez Durán’s testimony, the Chiriguanaes returned to Tarija in 1577 and inflicted far greater damage. Their attack focused this time on an area near the town that was home to more than 300 natives. A report from the Audiencia written in 1579 explains that more than 20 died in the attack, and the Chiriguanaes took a great many additional captives. Among the dead was the *alcalde* of San Bernardo. Rodríguez Durán testified that the Spanish only managed to avoid far more casualties by securing themselves inside the plaza fortress built for just such an occasion. After the attackers fled, Fuentes led a reprisal that wiped out the Chiriguana community responsible for the attacks. Rodríguez Durán claimed personally to have killed the offending “*caçique principal*.”11


It is likely that the type of *entradas* described by Rodríguez Durán occurred more frequently than they appear in the available documentary record during this era. Two 1576 documents, both written in order to assign lands near Tarija to early residents, make reference to a road that connected the town to Chiriguana territory. The first document describes it as “the royal road that was now made toward the Chiriguanas,” an indication that it was not a preexisting road, but rather one that was built by the Spanish. The effort put into such an endeavor implies that the Spanish more regularly traveled beyond the frontier. But by 1598, when much of the testimony relating to Fuentes’ deeds was recorded, the Chiriguanas no longer posed a significant danger to the Spanish population or their interests in the immediate region of Tarija. The last attack on the town itself had occurred in 1577. The last instance of military resources being expended on the defense of the Tarija frontier against the Chiriguanas dates to 1589. The experiences of these early years seem to have conditioned the residents of the Tarija frontier to view the Chiriguanas strictly as the enemy. There is no evidence of peaceful interaction or attempts to differentiate the Guaraní-speaking factions to the east from one another. San Bernardo largely achieved the purposes for which Toledo had ordered its foundation. It served effectively as a bulwark against incursions from the east.

The Audiencia’s 1579 letter describing the attack on Tarija expresses concern that similar attacks might threaten the population of Santiago de Tomina, but the little

---

12 “Merced de tierras de Luis de Fuentes a Domingo Hernández (Tarija, 8 agosto 1576),” and “Merced de tierras de Luis de Fuentes a Juan Vicente Morón (Tarija, 27 octubre 1576),” both in Julien, Angelis, and Bass Werner de Ruíz, *Historia de Tarija*, 117, 126.

13 “Relación de servicios de Luis de Fuentes (La Plata, 2 febrero – 3 marzo 1598),” 357-58. Regarding the end of the Chiriguan threat to the town, see Julien, “Introducción,” xxiii. Julien attributes “acts of aggression” toward the Spanish after the 1580s (the war described in this chapter) to natives living within the colonial system. The final request for powder and munitions to guard the frontier appears in “Acuerdo para enviar pólvora a las fronteras de Tarija y Paspaya (Potosí, 17-19 agosto 1589),” in Julien, Angelis, and Bass Werner de Ruíz, *Historia de Tarija*, 263-65.
available evidence suggests that no large-scale attacks ever took place in the town. Instead, the Spanish in Tomina and the Chiriguanaes in the vicinity developed a cautious coexistence. The founder and first corregidor of the town, Melchor de Rodas, claimed that he managed to negotiate peace with the local Chiriguana populations not by defeating them in battle, but by peaceful means: “through the messengers he sent to them.” A wide variety of testimonies dating to the early 1580s show that the Spanish living on the Tomina frontier carried on regular commercial interactions with a number of Chiriguana factions. Their visits to Tomina sometimes lasted multiple days, during which time they were treated as guests in the town.14

These Chiriguana trading parties brought “trifles” from the forest—including “antlers, fish, honey, and ostrich bones”—that they exchanged for Spanish-made products. But at least prior to 1582, Chiriguana merchants and the Spaniards in Tomina dealt more commonly in natives captured from the lowlands to the east of the cordillera. At least two of the most prominent citizens of Tomina even went so far as to provide Spanish weaponry and other supplies—including gunpowder, metal blades, and horses—to certain Chiriguana factions so that they might be able to maximize their supply of these captives. The market for non-Christian slaves in Tomina was accepted in at least a de facto sense until at least 1580. That year, Viceroy Toledo wrote to the Audiencia suggesting the purchase of Chané captives in Charcas be outlawed. In 1582 the Audiencia

14 “Carta del Licenciado Matienzo, Presidente interino de la Audiencia de Charcas, a S. M., … (La Plata 4 de Enero de 1579),” 483; “Probanza de méritos y servicios de Don Melchor de Olmedo y Rodas,” 1r; “Información cerca de los indios chiriguanaes (Santiago de Tomina, 17 Nov. – 30 Dec. 1582),” AGI, Patronato, 235 R7, 17-18, 24-25, 32-33, 50, 69, 74.
officially forbade “the trade of Indians that was done in Tomina” and set a price of 500 pesos per violation.\textsuperscript{15}

Chiriguanaes were also known to have engaged peacefully with natives living within the colonial state structure, though these types of relationships were likely the exception rather than the norm. In the instance that appears in the historical record, the native community in question was made up of Chui people living in the repartimiento of Mizque, in the northern part of the jurisdiction of the corregimiento of Tomina. At the time, Mizque was an agricultural region populated almost exclusively by natives. It was a particularly strategic area because the primary road connecting Santa Cruz to the Charcas highlands ran through it. The Chui reportedly used their connections within colonial society to provide their Chiriguana allies with information about events in Charcas as well as sought-after European technologies, including metal goods and gunpowder. According to the testimony of an escaped African slave who lived in a Chiriguana community for several years, the relationship dated back a long time and involved near-monthly meetings. A significant factor in the forging of the alliance had been the marriage between the Chui cacique and the sister of his Chiriguana counterpart, Marande.\textsuperscript{16} Looking a bit more deeply, it becomes clear that this relationship was the product of Spanish intervention. Ñuflo de Chávez engaged with a cacique named Marande when he passed through the region during his 1548 journey to Lima. He

\textsuperscript{15} “Información cerca de los indios chiriguanaes,” 32-33; “Viceroy Toledo to the Audiencia of La Plata (12 Jan. 1580),” ANB, Correspondencia (hereafter cited as Corr.), Ficha 12, 2r-2v; “1582.65 (8 Oct. 1582),” in López Villalba, *Acuerdos de la Real Audiencia de La Plata*, vol. 3, 382; “Relación con documentos que Lorenzo Suarez de Figueroa … sobre el estado de la guerra de los Chiriguanaes,” in Mujía, *Bolivia-Paraguay*, vol. 2, 676-77. For more regarding general Chiriguana/Spanish cooperation in capturing/purchasing native slaves, see Renard-Casevitz, Saignes, and Taylor, *Al este de los Andes*, vol. 1, 264-68.

\textsuperscript{16} “Relación con documentos que Lorenzo Suarez de Figueroa … sobre el estado de la guerra de los Chiriguanaes,” 685-92. Two captive Chiriguanaes confirmed the escaped slave’s testimony in this regard.
brokered the marriage pact between the groups in order to curtail conflict between his Guaraní-speaking allies and the natives in Charcas. According to one witness testifying in 1583, Marande’s sister—as well as the alliance between the two peoples—was still alive.\footnote{Consultas a autos y diligencias … indios chiriguanaes … (9 Oct. 1583 – 29 Jan. 1584),” AGI, Patronato, 235 R9, Block 1, 11-12, 23. See Chapter 5 above for more on Chávez’ 1548 journey.}

But neither were the interactions between the residents of the Tomina frontier and the Chiriguanaes entirely peaceful. The Spanish regularly suffered small-scale Chiriguana raids on their estates along the Tomina frontier throughout the 1575-82 period. Most commonly, the Chiriguanaes targeted livestock, horses, foodstuffs, textiles, and metal objects. Less often, the raids resulted in the capture of native laborers from Spanish estates. Given the fragmented nature of Chiriguana political society, it is likely that the perpetrators of many of these raids belonged to factions that were antagonistic towards the Spanish. But even those factions that interacted peacefully with the Spanish occasionally turned violent. One example involved a 1582 attack on Bartolomé García’s \textit{chácaras}, located a league and a half from Tomina. Several Spanish witnesses alleged that the perpetrators were the same Chiriguanaes who often came into town in order to trade. According to one witness, “they took all the laborers [García] had there” as well as 450 pesos in coinage, his entire herd of livestock, six horses, and a variety of supplies in the house, “even taking the bolts in the doors.” According to another, they would have taken García’s wife and children if they had been there during the attack.\footnote{Información cerca de los indios chiriguanaes,” 15, 22-23, 89.} Certain sections of testimony further suggest that some of the captives purchased by the Spanish had been
captured during the course of these types of attacks along the Spanish frontier. In other words, the Spanish were paying to ransom laborers from their own properties.\textsuperscript{19}

One sequence of interactions between the Chiriguanaes and the Spanish residents of Toma and Tarija is particularly illustrative of the different ways the Spanish living near different sections of the frontier approached the Chiriguanaes. The sequence also illustrates the complexity that characterized the relationships between the Spanish of the Toma frontier and the Chiriguanaes in their orbit. In 1579, a Chiriguana cacique sent a messenger to the officials in Toma. The messenger informed them that a large faction of Chiriguanaes, “the better part of the cordillera,” had set off to attack two locations along the Tarija frontier in the south. Another flank of the offensive was set to target the Mizque frontier in the far-northern section of the jurisdiction of Toma. The Spanish used the advance warning to distribute crucial military supplies—muskets, powder, lead, and wicks—and to position soldiers at the necessary positions.

There is no evidence that the attacks ever actually occurred. Perhaps they failed to come together because the Spanish had fortified the frontiers. Regardless, officials in Tarija made certain to remain vigilant if such an attack were to occur in the future. They built up and replenished their powder stock nearly annually in the years to come in their attempts to construct an impenetrable defense against threats of this type. The corregidor of Toma, however, highlighted the fact that his Chiriguana ally acted in the Spanish interest. He described the cacique who sent the message to the Spanish as “the best friend that we have,” and the parties maintained their peaceful commercial relationship. But only a year later, the very same group of Chiriguanaes reportedly perpetrated a raid in

\textsuperscript{19} Ibid., 24, 79, 124.
Sopachuy, a populated valley to the south of Santiago de Tomina. The results included three kidnapped native workers and a great deal of property damage to a frontier estate.\(^{20}\)

For the Spanish on the Tomina frontier, these vacillations between conflict and cooperation left them in a unique situation. It was difficult for them to understand or predict the complex and fluid nature of Chiriguana alliances. Nor could they control the captive-taking economy in which they participated. On the whole, however, they tended to benefit from their interactions with most of the Chiriguanaes in their vicinity during the 1575-82 era. Their interactions also helped them develop a capacity, albeit imperfect, to differentiate between Chiriguana factions.

The state of affairs in Santa Cruz was a bit different than in Tarija or Tomina. The city had always existed between two “Chiriguana” populations, the Itatín to the east and those of the cordillera to the west. There is no direct evidence to suggest that either population represented a direct threat to the Spanish inhabitants of Santa Cruz in the era spanning from the late 1560s to 1582. The reprisals taken in the wake of Ñuflo de Chávez’ death in 1568 represented the last recorded major conflict between the Spanish and the Itatín. The residents of Santa Cruz (*cruceños*) maintained their desire to find and exploit the mines that Chávez had been seeking in Itatín territory, and Governor Lorenzo Suárez de Figueroa led a mission aimed at locating them in 1582. Few details from the journey have survived, but it seems that relations between the parties were largely cooperative. Suárez de Figueroa managed to enlist the cooperation of Itatín soldiers only two years later when he marched into battle against the other population of Chiriguanaes.

\(^{20}\) “Relación de servicios de Luis de Fuentes (La Plata, 2 febrero – 3 marzo 1598),” 360; “Acuerdo de los oficiales reales de la Hacienda Real para entregar pólvora y mecha a la frontera de Tarija (Potosí, 20 febrero 1579),” “Entregas de pólvora y mecha a las fronteras de Tarija y Tomina (Potosí, 6-13 junio 1580),” and “Entrega de pólvora a la frontera de Tarija (Potosí, 3 febrero 1582),” all in Julien, Angelis, and Bass Werner de Ruiz, *Historia de Tarija*, 226-30.
By the end of the 1580s, a contingent of Jesuit priests had success evangelizing among the Itatín.  

Despite the lack of evidence of any direct confrontations between the Chiriguanaes of the cordillera and the residents of Santa Cruz between 1574 and 1582, the presence of the Chiriguanaes made life difficult for the cruceños in two ways. Their presence hindered travel and communication between Santa Cruz and the highlands. There was no viable way for travelers to navigate between the two Spanish-controlled sectors without passing through Chiriguana territory. The Chiriguanaes also limited the Spaniards’ access to native laborers in the vicinity of Santa Cruz. The two groups, Spanish and Chiriguana, each sought to establish its own version of dominion over the native peoples of the region. The Chiriguanaes reportedly went out to the plains south of Santa Cruz “where there [were] many Chané Indians and those of other nations in order to make war on them.” Their attacks yielded captives and caused “great destruction” to the native populations that the Spanish intended to bring into the colonial system. Even more egregiously, the Chiriguanaes of the cordillera waged war against Spanish tributary

---

21 García Recio, *Análisis de una sociedad de frontera*, 72-74. The Chiriguanaes and their predations figure prominently in a 1586 description of the city and its environs, but it was written during the course of the war against the Chiriguanaes that had begun in 1584. See “Relación de la ciudad de Santa Cruz de la Sierra por su gobernador don Lorenzo Suárez de Figueroa (1586),” in *Relaciones geográficas de Indias*, 4 vols., ed. Marcos Jiménez de la Espada (Madrid: Tip. de M. G. Hernández, 1881), vol. 2, 162-69. Based on the testimonies of cruceños taken in 1583 regarding the crimes committed by the Chiriguanaes (see “Consultas a autos y diligencias … indios chiriguanaes”) no specific notable incidents occurred between the death of Ñuflo de Chávez and the 1583 attacks described below. Suárez de Figueroa reported to the Audiencia that 150 “indios itatines chiriguanaes” accompanied him in his *entrada* against the Chiriguanaes of the cordillera in May of 1584. See “Cartas del Gobernador Suarez de Figueroa, dando cuenta de la campaña, á la Audiencia,” in Mujía, *Bolivia-Paraguay*, vol. 2, 408-09. For the Jesuit evangelization of the Itatín, see Alexandre Coello de la Rosa, “Los jesuitas y las misiones de frontera del alto Perú: Santa Cruz de la Sierra (1587-1603),” *Revista Complutense de Historia de América* (Madrid) 33 (2007): 156, 161-66.
populations—“[the] peaceful Indians who serve the Christians in the provinces of Santa Cruz.”

Officials at the Audiencia and viceregal levels considered the population of the distant Spanish outpost a vital brake on Chiriguana expansion during the 1570s. The role of Santa Cruz was to protect the natives of the interior from Chiriguana predations. To that end, officials attempted to limit the residents’ propensity to continue their town founder’s legacy of fortune-seeking in the Mojos region to the north. Following the failure of the 1574 entrada, Toledo wished to reallocate the population of Santa Cruz so that they might better protect the Charcas frontiers. He advocated for the westward relocation of the town to the site where La Barranca had stood. This location was more defensively strategic from the perspective of Charcas, Peru, and the empire. Furthermore, moving the population of Santa Cruz westward would shorten the dangerous trip between Santa Cruz and Charcas. Toledo’s reasoning was sound, but uprooting the population would have undermined the cruceños’ ongoing exploratory pursuits in Mojos and Chiquitos. Established interests within Santa Cruz won out in this regard, at least until the reconsideration of the matter after the war of the 1580s.

An Attack and the Prelude to War, 1582

October or November of 1582 marked the beginning of a reversal in Spanish-Chiriguana relations in the corregimiento of Tomina. Word reached Santiago de Tomina that Chiriguana forces had conducted raids into several valleys along the northern section

---

22 “Información cerca de los indios chiriguanaes,” 90-96, 129-34. These testimonies came from natives who had been captured and held in Chiriguana communities.

of the frontier. They destroyed several native communities and Spanish farmsteads in the course of abducting or killing hundreds of native laborers under Spanish control. It was the single most destructive Chiriguana offensive against Spanish interests in at least 10 years. The ways in which both sides responded to the situation would escalate the conflict to full-scale war. The descriptions of these attacks, the Spanish response, and, to a lesser degree, the sentiments of the Chiriguana actors involved survive in a series of investigations conducted by the Spanish in the wake of the attacks.

The collection of testimonies among the residents of Tomina began in November of 1582, several weeks after the attacks in the north. The perpetrators had eluded detection by entering from the northeast via the “rio grande,” a term that referred in this context to the primarily east-west section of the river known elsewhere as the Guaypay (today officially the Grande River, which forms the border between the departments of Cochabamba and Chuquisaca). From there, they traveled down the Zudáñez River and targeted native villages and Spanish farmsteads that fell within the repartimientos of Presto and Mojocoya. One witness referred to their penetration to the Seripona valley, located only 60 km from La Plata.24 Reginaldo Lizárraga’s roughly contemporary description of this region between Mizque and La Plata characterizes it as largely wild and untamed but for several fertile enclosed valleys. The Moyos communities who lived

---

24 These testimonies regarding these attacks and the immediate Spanish responses to them comprise “Información cerca de los indios chiriguanaes,” 1-85. Descriptions of the attacks specifically appear on 12-13, 21-23, 31-32, 39-40, 47-48, 55, 67-68, 76-77. References to attacks in Mojocoya, on 101-02, 108, 114, come from testimonies regarding the nature and lives of the Chiriguanaes and opinions regarding the best ways to respond to them. Two other valleys indicated, Sopopo and Torco Torco, likely correspond to modern communities of the same names located slightly farther south along the Zudáñez.
there grew maize and wheat, and Spaniards who had access to land and native labor transported those foodstuffs to the Potosí market.25

The witnesses interviewed about the matter knew little about the specifics of the attacks. They had initially received word of the Chiriguana incursions via a messenger sent by a priest who was in Presto during the chaos. The message reported that the Chiriguanaes encircled several native villages and “carried off all of the laborers they found in the valleys.” The attackers burned or otherwise destroyed anything they could not take with them. A witness who owned land in the area in question claimed that 10 native laborers, seven male, three female, had been taken captive from his farm alone. The Chiriguanaes had also killed two small children who represented low-value captives, particularly because they slowed the pace of retreat. In total, the series of attacks led to the deaths and capture of a reported 300 Christian natives.26

When word of the incursions reached Santiago de Tomina, the corregidor of the region, Pedro de Segura, set off on horseback in pursuit of the Chiriguana perpetrators with a contingent from the town. Their plan was to intercept the marauding Chiriguanaes and their captives as they retreated back eastwards along the Río Grande into the “tierra adentro.” If they managed to reach the river before the Chiriguanaes escaped into the interior, they intended to “tie up the pass and take away their prey.” The Chiriguanaes

---

25 Lizárraga, Descripción breve de toda la tierra, 170-71. The apparent lack of large-scale livestock projects in these areas comes as a bit of a surprise. The witnesses note the theft of horses and mares in these attacks but only once mention “other livestock,” in “Información cerca de los indios chiriguanaes,” 114. Cattle ranching was becoming widespread in Mizque at this time, so neither distance from the market nor the threat of Chiriguana attacks seems to have been prohibitive in this regard. See Gutierrez-Brockington, Blacks, Indians, and Spaniards in the Eastern Andes, 48-51. Perhaps the isolation and enclosure of the fertile valleys or the many wild animals mentioned by Lizárraga played a factor in the inhibition of this industry. Testimony taken regarding a later proposal to develop Mojocoya describes certain difficulties with the watering and pasturing of significant herds in the area. See “Consultas a autos y diligencias … indios chiriguanaes,” 170, 200.

26 “Información cerca de los indios chiriguanaes,” 68, 76, 102.
managed to elude Segura’s cavalry. The Spaniards found themselves unable to continue their pursuit when the Chiriguanaes’ trail led them to a pass so narrow they could not maneuver it. Segura and company remained for a few days in the vicinity of the Río Grande frontier in order to protect the inhabitants of the area, then returned to Tomina. During their travels, the residents they encountered made it known just how extensive a problem the Chiriguanaes posed along this section of northern frontier. They had recently become bolder and more shameless, and the frontier settlers had had to undertake great efforts and expenditures to repair and run their properties.²⁷

The perpetrators of the attacks along the section of Río Grande were reportedly from a faction (parcialidad) of Chiriguanaes led by a cacique named Candio. The path of the attackers’ retreat suggests that they made their homes to the northeast of Spanish-controlled territory, somewhere in the general direction of where La Barranca had briefly stood in the 1560s. Candio’s name does not appear in documents referencing the 1574 entrada or the lead-up thereto. He had likely established his leadership in the years just prior to these attacks.

Segura was unsure of how to deploy his resources in protection of the northern section of frontier. He and the residents of Tomina were equipped and prepared to respond to Chiriguana raids, but an attack on this scale had come as a surprise. The circumstances forced Segura to rethink his approach to the Chiriguana populations in the region. One potential option involved stationing Spanish soldiers in greater numbers at vulnerable points along the northern section of frontier. The problem was that soldiers were a limited resource, and shifting the Spanish defenses to the more distant frontier

²⁷ Ibid., 12-13, 21-22, 32, 40, 47-48, 55, 61, 67-68, 77.
along the Río Grande would have necessitated removing them from the immediate vicinity of Santiago de Tomina. Segura’s superiors, including Toledo’s successor Viceroy Martín Enríquez, feared that this would weaken the defenses designed to protect La Plata and its environs. Instructions from the viceroy and the Audiencia of Charcas gave Segura authorization to use force against the Chiriguanaes, but they also ordered the residents of Santiago de Tomina not to abandon the town. They were to “punish [the perpetrators of any incursions] in as far as it [was] possible,” but following them into their territories required more forces than could be safely spared.28

Upon consulting with the leaders of the community, Segura determined a new course of action that sought to turn the alliances he had with the Chiriguanaes in the region to his advantage. The next time a group approached Tomina in order to trade, the Spanish would imprison and hold them for ransom. He believed that he could leverage these prisoners for the release of the Christian natives taken captive during the recent raids in the north. If the strategy worked, he might also manage to bring about the return of escaped African slaves who had taken refuge among the Chiriguanaes. In other circumstances, the tactic that Segura advocated would have been considered cowardly. But those who favored the plan justified it. Their experiences with the Chiriguanaes taught them that they often conducted acts of aggression under the auspices of friendship. Turning the tables in this way was not only wise, it was perfectly just.29

28 Ibid., 14-15. It is not clear whether the letters from Viceroy Enríquez and the Audiencia referred to these specific attacks or to a general strategy toward the Chiriguanaes. The context in which they come up in the testimony suggests that Segura received the instructions only after returning from his pursuit.

29 Ibid., 13, 23, 40, 49, 61-62, 78-79. Slaves ran away from Tomina and joined the Chiriguanaes at rates sufficient to bear specific mention in at least two separate documents in 1580 alone. See “Entregas de pólvora … (6-13 junio 1580),” 229; and “Viceroy Toledo to the Audiencia of La Plata (8 July 1580),” ANB, Corr., Ficha 15, 3.
Segura’s premise was weak in at least one crucial sense. It presumed that the perpetrators of the attacks in the north would be willing to trade their captives in exchange for members of a different Chiriguana faction. The presumption is surprising because Segura and company certainly understood that “the Chiriguanaes” was not a monolithic entity. It was only three years prior that a friendly cacique helped save the Spanish from a multi-pronged attack on Mizque and Tarija. Furthermore, Segura had come to Tomina from the Río de la Plata. He was even married to a mestiza daughter of Domingo de Irala and a Guaraní woman.\(^{30}\) For him to have settled upon this course of action, Segura must have suspected that the local Chiriguana populations had somehow been party to the recent attacks. At the very least, he must have expected that he could play an alliance between the factions to his benefit.

An opportunity for Segura to carry out his plan came quickly. A delegation made up of almost 50 Chiriguanaes and their Chané “slaves” visited Tomina in November of 1582. Two caciques identified as Mapae and Areya led the group. One witness mentioned that Mapae and Areya were responsible for the recent attack on Bartolomé García’s property, but the relationship between the Spanish and this Chiriguana faction was mostly cooperative. None of the Spaniards who testified feared that the group had come with violent intentions. They arrived at midday, and they dispersed into groups as they reached the town. According to one witness, they visited people they had come to know in Tomina over the course of previous commercial exchanges. The only difference was that,

in this instance, the Chiriguanaes had not brought with them any captives to trade. They were there instead to peddle forest products of little apparent value.  

At some point during their stay, Segura confronted Mapae and Areya regarding the recent attacks by Candio’s people. Their responses established that the two factions of Chiriguanaes were indeed allies, but that they were unable or unwilling to arrange for the release of the Christian captives. Mapae and Areya further admitted that they were “friends” with Candio and that “they were aware [beforehand] that the Indians from Candio’s faction were coming to do damage.” No doubt remembering the warning he had received before the planned 1579 assault, Segura wanted to know why he had not been alerted “long enough beforehand to be able to thwart them.” The caciques had no satisfactory explanation. And when the Spanish urged Mapae and Areya to facilitate the release of the captives taken during these attacks, one of them responded that “his friends would not agree to bring the [captured] laborers.” Though Segura and the two Chiriguana leaders had been committed to at least the illusion of friendship between their populations, the caciques’ inaction when it came to Candio led Segura to declare that Mapae and Areya shared “much of the blame” in the matter.

On this basis, Segura determined to go forward with his plan to imprison Mapae, Areya, and their followers. He and several other Spaniards sprang into action. Segura went about luring many of the Chiriguanaes into his home by offering them food and

---

31 “Información cerca de los indios chiriguanaes,” 13-14, 24, 32-33, 37, 41, 50, 56-57, 62-63, 68-69, 74, 79-80. Areya’s name appears as “Area” throughout this document. It is spelled “Areya” in future documents. The number of Chiriguanaes armed with bows and arrows fluctuates between accounts. Diego de Medina declared that “the majority of” a group of 20 he had seen were armed. Alvís de Mesa claimed that there were more than 20 bows in all. Alonso Rodríguez only saw two armed bowmen, but these may have been in a small group.

32 Ibid., 13-14, 25-26, 33, 41, 50, 56, 80.
chicha (a fermented maize drink common in the Andes) as they prepared to leave town in the late afternoon. When most were assembled there, Spanish soldiers seized the last few Chiriguanaes who remained in the street and forcibly pushed them inside. Tensions rose as the Spanish commenced disarming those still in possession of their longbows. The majority had left them outside, an indication that they did not perceive the threat they faced until it was too late. But even for those who had them, the crowded interior scene rendered the formidable weapon useless. Spanish soldiers wrenched the bows from of their hands as the Chiriguanaes came to recognize that they were trapped. A number of the Chiriguanaes, including at least one of the caciques, began to move for the door amid a cacophony of shouting in Guaraní.

Several Spaniards held the door shut from the outside as the Chiriguanaes pushed from within. One or two Spaniards seized Mapae by the hair to ensure he could not escape, and another felled Areya by striking him on the head with the handle of his sword. Despite the best efforts of the Spanish, five or six Chiriguanaes managed to escape onto Segura’s enclosed patio. Some of them began to climb the walls while others pushed toward the street exit. In the chaos, several Spaniards drew their swords, and two or three of the Chiriguanaes suffered blade wounds on their arms and about their heads. Another allegedly brandished a knife and lunged toward Segura. The corregidor’s son-in-law ran his sword through the man’s belly. According to the witnesses, he saved Segura’s life. The wounded Chiriguana died the following day, but only after receiving baptism. He allegedly “died a Christian.” ³³

In total, the Spaniards of Tomina imprisoned 48 or 49 Chiriguanaes on that day. Around 20 were captured in Segura’s house, and the same scenario was apparently playing out simultaneously just east of town at Miguel Martín’s estate, where another part of the delegation had gone in order to trade. There is no direct testimony regarding how the latter detention took place. In the most specific reference to it, a witness simply stated that “the captain [Segura] alerted some soldiers that they should go capture others that were still in Miguel Martín’s house, and the witness saw some people go … [and] they bought back some of the other Chiriguanaes.” The prisoners were restrained—“tied up” or “put in restraints”—and gathered together in a room as Segura’s plan played out.34

The testimony is clear that the Spanish had had no intention of harming the prisoners. Several witnesses made special mention that the Spanish carefully tended to the injuries resulting from the scuffle on Segura’s patio. The Spanish tried to convey this message to the Chiriguanaes as well. In the words of the translator between Segura and the prisoners, Segura explained to them that “they should not fear …; no harm would come to them. Instead, they would be treated like sons.” But underlying that promise was an implicit threat that only one witness verbalized. Their “good treatment” depended on the Chiriguanaes’ willingness to “do their duty in this case.” That duty consisted of “freeing all of the [captive] laborers that were in their lands.” The following day, the Spanish instructed the prisoners to choose two from among them to deliver the ultimatum

---

34 Ibid., 29, 37, 45, 53, 58-59, 71-72. It is not clear where they were kept. In 1608, the town had a “very good” complex that contained the city hall, counting office, and a jail. It is unlikely that this structure was there in 1582, because it had been built “from its foundations” by the corregidor in 1608, Julio Ferrufino, whose name does not appear in any documents from this period. See, “Descripción de la villa de Santiago de la Frontera de Tomina,” 324.
back to their communities. “One Chiriguana and the other a slave” (Chané) set off for the cordillera with the message.\textsuperscript{35}

As the first testimonies took place in the days following the ordeal (November 28, 1582), word had just reached Tomina that a delegation of Chiriguana women, including “some of the wives of the chiefs who are imprisoned,” were approaching the town along with “some of the captives [taken] from the Spanish.”\textsuperscript{36} The news seemed to justify Segura’s hardline tactics. The Chiriguanaes appeared to be caving to his demands. It soon became clear, however, that Segura’s plan had not worked quite as anticipated. The Chiriguana delegation that arrived in Tomina consisted in its entirety of exactly one Christian native and a small group of women and boys captured by the Chiriguanaes in the eastern plains. Even the recently freed Christian, Agustín, had not been captured by Candio’s people in the preceding weeks. Agustín had lived on a Spanish chácara in the immediate vicinity of Tomina before his capture five years earlier. He lived among the Chiriguanaes ever since. The women in the delegation, including the “wives” announced earlier, claimed that Agustín was the only Christian captive living among them. They explained that “those who were just recently taken” in the north “did not come to their lands.” In other words, Candio’s people’s captives were not in their possession, and just as Mapae and Areya had suggested, “their masters [did] not want to give them up.”\textsuperscript{37}

Segura retained the hard line. He dismissed the delegation of women and boys after explaining to them that his original proposal remained intact. He would not release


\textsuperscript{36} Ibid., 30, 46, 53-54, 59-60, 66.

\textsuperscript{37} Ibid., 72, 82-83.
the Chiriguana captives until “they returned all that they had taken.” Segura’s stance suggests that he did not fully believe the women’s claims—that he still felt that Mapae and Areya could arrange the release of the recently captured native laborers if given sufficient incentive to do so. But doubt had begun to creep in as Segura wondered how to proceed. The possibility of holding nearly 50 prisoners indefinitely was not only legally questionable, it required expenditures and effort on the part of the townspeople. The situation required the development of a new strategy that might extricate Segura and company from the hostage plan and explain their actions before the Spanish authorities.

To these ends, officials in Tomina began a new investigation focused on the Chiriguanaes themselves, their ways of life, tendencies, and lands. A portion central to nearly every testimony focuses on the degree of coordination between different Chiriguana factions. This line of questioning shows that the Spanish sought to establish whether the terms they set for the prisoners’ release were just or reasonable. They wanted to establish whether they could hold Mapae and Areya and their followers responsible for Candio’s people’s crimes. Could they reasonably expect Candio to respond to the terms Segura had established? How, ultimately, should they proceed?

Most of the witnesses in the general investigation consisted of prominent Spaniards who had had a presence on the frontier for years. Three claimed to have served with Andrés Manso during his initial attempts to colonize the eastern plains. At least two of them had accompanied Hernando Díaz on his 1570 entrada against the Chiriguanaes, the last Chiriguana confrontation generally considered a success from the Spanish

38 Ibid., 83.
perspective. Díaz himself was chosen to oversee the questioning, and he provided his own opinions in a written conclusion. Another of the witnesses was García de Mosquera, the mestizo who twice traveled to the cordillera prior to Toledo’s abortive 1574 offensive. Mosquera and Miguel Martín, another witness, were precisely the men reported to have been supplying weapons to certain Chiriguana factions in order to increase the supply of slaves to Tomina in recent years.

The testimonies collected during the general investigation largely reiterate many of the damning tropes about the Chiriguanaes that appeared a decade earlier during Toledo’s own investigation. They describe the Chiriguana people in broad terms as naked savages who occupy themselves only by making war. Their primary targets were the peoples living to the east of the cordillera, the Chané among them. One witness averred that the damage inflicted by the Chiriguanaes on those peoples was so great that their numbers had fallen from 80,000 to 3,000 in the time since Manso had founded his settlement there. The witnesses further confirmed that many of the Chiriguanaes were Christian apostates. This had been another common assertion in testimonies condemning the Chiriguanaes in years and decades past, but these testimonies demonstrate a more sophisticated understanding of the composition and motives of the Chiriguana communities. Rather than presuming that all Guaraní speakers had served the Spanish in Paraguay before turning on their masters and the Christian faith (as was the prevailing legal truth in Toledo’s time), they noted that “some who go about the cordillera had been in the Río de la Plata and had stayed” in the frontier region after accompanying Irala and

39 For a fond memorialization of Díaz’ efforts during this mission, see “Relaciones para su excelencia de la guerra de los chiriguanaes (7 Apr. 1583 – 4 May 1586),” AGI, Patronato, 235 R9, Block 3, 23.

40 “Relación con documentos que Lorenzo Suarez de Figueroa … sobre el estado de la guerra de los Chiriguanaes,” 676-77.
Chávez. Others had been baptized during Chávez’ period of alliance with local Chiriguana communities or by a priest who had been with Manso in Nueva Rioja. Those who bore Christian names fell into these categories. The witnesses admitted that others—including Mapae, Areya, Candio, and the other caciques—could not properly be called apostates.\(^{41}\)

Yet all three caciques were still guilty, in the eyes of the witnesses. They expressed their belief that Mapae and Areya shared culpability for the attacks carried out by Candio’s people. The witnesses asserted that Chiriguana communities typically knew about and coordinated their actions. One cited the attacks on Nueva Rioja and La Barranca—the coordination of which was a “public and well-known” matter—as evidence that all Chiriguana military actions were organized in similar fashion. Two others noted that the caciques were known to divide among them whatever they manage to steal from the frontier, including captives, once they had carried out their attacks.\(^{42}\) The implication of this finding was that Mapae, Areya, and their wives were lying in claiming that none of the captives taken from the Río Grande frontier were in their service. As one might expect, the witnesses neglected to focus on the largely cooperative nature of the relationships between the Spaniards of Tomina and many of the local Chiriguana populations. Nor did they mention the role of the Spanish in encouraging some factions to go to war in order to gain captives. Instead, Díaz determined on the basis

---

\(^{41}\)“Información cerca de los indios chiriguanaes,” 98-125, esp. 99-100, 106, 112-13, 119-23. The population decline numbers come from the testimony of Andrés de Cañizares on page 99. Miguel Martín cites a more conservative baseline population figure of 30,000 on page 113.

\(^{42}\)Ibid., 102-03, 115, 124. The phrase “public and well-known” (público y notorio) is one seen consistently in Spanish testimonies of the era. It satisfies a legal standard by which the witness need not cite his source because the information in question is so well established. Mosquera was a bit more equivocal in his testimony. He claimed that the communities worked together as well as alone in their assaults. See page 109.
of these testimonies that “the time will come … [when neither] the native nor Spanish vassals of his majesty will be able to live” along the frontier “without great unrest and personal risk.” He suggested that the Spanish could only avoid such a scenario with a proper military solution. He proposed organizing a force that would “enter by way of the Tomina frontier to make war upon and punish [the Chiriguanaes] in line with their sins and to dislodge them from the cordillera.” Corresponding armies sent out from Tarija and Santa Cruz would ensure that the Chiriguanaes would respond either by falling into line and obeying the Spanish or fleeing back to Paraguay. Díaz reasoned that in either case, the native populations in the eastern lowlands would be able to recover, and the Spanish would be able to make use of the lands and laborers beyond the cordillera. The Chané and others in the plains would serve well to support any Spanish populations that might be founded in the vacated territory.43

The recommendation to go to war against the Chiriguanaes and colonize the vacated region comes as little surprise. It was in the interests of the leading residents of Tomina to advocate for war. This was true not so much because of the Chiriguanaes’ penchant for occasional frontier incursions near Tomina but for the larger issue of securing inexpensive labor. Prior to the Audiencia’s prohibition on trading for native captives, the Chiriguanaes had served as a conduit between the Spanish in Tomina and the natives in the eastern lowlands. Since the prohibition, the only way to access the labor of these populations was to push the frontier eastwards and bring them into the Spanish colonial system. The presence of the Chiriguanaes stood in the way of that plan.

43 Ibid., 125-28.
The documentation regarding the imprisonment of the Chiriguanaes in Tomina comes to an end at a point in time when it appears that Pedro de Segura’s strategy had backfired. The Chiriguanaes he had imprisoned turned out to be poor bargaining chips in his bid to win back the captives taken from the valleys to the north near the Río Grande. Agustín was the only captive who returned as a result of Segura’s bold strategy, and there was little hope that many more might follow. Officials in Tomina suggested organizing a war but there seems to have been little support at the upper levels of colonial government.\textsuperscript{44}

As becomes clear in the next section, Mapae and Areya and their communities remained a significant presence on the Tomina frontier in the years to come, but it is only because of a chance reference in a later document that there is indication of how their captivity ended and they returned to the cordillera. In testimony dating to 1584, Melchor de Rodas, Segura’s predecessor as corregidor, makes reference to the incident, saying that Segura “imprisoned the chief caciques of the said Chiriguanaes and harmed them and mistreated them so that they fled.” The wording suggests that the captives managed somehow to break free from their imprisonment. More importantly, Rodas pinpointed the imprisonment as the “reason that they returned [to their earlier ways]”—the ways by which they lived before Rodas had pacified them during his tenure as corregidor in 1575-77—“and rebelled and … returned to war.”\textsuperscript{45}

\textsuperscript{44} There is no surviving reply from the Audiencia officials, and the notes that typically record the business they discussed in their meetings “do not detail the business discussed” during substantial periods of time during this era. See López Villalba, Acuerdos de la Real Audiencia de La Plata, vol. 3, 383 n. 1117.

\textsuperscript{45} “Probanza de méritos y servicios de Don Melchor de Olmedo y Rodas,” 1v. In a different section of testimony from 1590, Rodas again referred to the events surrounding Mapae, Areya, and Segura. He claimed that the region was in a state of peace “until a corregidor of Tomina did [the people of the cordillera] great harm.” See “Actuados sobre el reclamo de Melchor de Rodas contra Pedro Ozores de Ulloa (25 Mar. – 9 Aug. 1590),” ANB, EC, 1590.9, 2r. Rodas’ attribution of blame to Segura alone deserves a bit of skepticism. Rodas had been forced from the corregidor position and banished from Tomina for four years in 1577 for unknown reasons. Rodas may have been eager to heap blame upon his
The Return to a State of War, 1583-1584

The state of war along the Tomina frontier truly commenced in April of 1583 with an attack on Miguel Martín’s chacara in the Mojotorillo Valley, some 25 km southeast of Santiago de Tomina. This was the site at which two dozen of Mapae and Areya’s followers had been imprisoned the prior November. A reported 200 Chiriguana warriors managed to take seven native workers, a number of horses, and other supplies from the property. These particular Chiriguanaes were reportedly under the command of a cacique named Coyagua. Neither he nor the force he led “had ever before been seen on this frontier.” At the same time, Mapae, free once again, led 70 warriors into the Sopachuy Valley lying just to the south, and there was word that similar attacks were occurring in the far north near Mojocoya. The Spaniards along the frontier scrambled to allocate resources and strengthen their defenses while they pleaded for help from the Audiencia. The coordinated force they faced was reportedly 2,000 strong and assembled from among many factions spread throughout the cordillera.46

The Spanish had not been taken entirely by surprise. Officials in Tomina must have recognized the ill will that the imprisonment of Mapae and Areya had created, and there is suggestion that Segura had ordered the abandonment of certain outlying properties (such as Martin’s) in order to tighten the defenses around key areas before the attacks occurred. These countermeasures may have limited the damage done during this initial Chiriguana offensive. Segura also alluded to a network of native spies working on

---

46 “Relaciones para su excelencia de la guerra de los chiriguanaes,” 11-13. Future brushes with Coyagua makes it clear that his faction was centered near the Guapay (Grande) River southwest of the site of La Barranca.
behalf of the Spanish. Presumably, they monitored the Chiriguanaes’ movements and warned of impending attacks.\footnote{Ibid., 12, 14-15, 17. It seems that the spies also carried occasional messages between the two groups.}

By August, the residents of Tomina were spread thinly throughout the region in their vain hope of maintaining a semblance of frontier defense. The raids continued despite their presence, and they were helpless to respond effectively in the numbers in which they found themselves (five or fewer in some locations). Meanwhile, a priest in Mojocoya received a message from two Chané “slaves” that an “infinite” force was gathering to attack the whole frontier at the coming of the next full moon. The councilmen of Santiago de Tomina responded to the ongoing chaos by recalling all men of fighting age to the town in order to protect it. In a clear indication that they considered themselves to be at war, they also sent their wives and children away from the frontier.\footnote{Ibid., 15-20.}

The Chané messengers seem to have been bluffing. No large scale assaults were reported during the next months. The message was more likely a method of intimidation—a means to force the Spanish into retreat. It worked. As a result, the Chiriguanaes effectively controlled the entire Tomina frontier and managed to make deeper inroads into lands with significant native populations nominally under Spanish protection. By October of 1583, native leaders speaking on behalf of the communities of Tarabuco and Presto reported “being so cornered and scared that we do not dare leave our houses to tend to our animals and fields nor to take advantage of the land that we have.” Small-scale assaults continued along the Grande River and penetrated as far southwest as the Charobamba Valley, approximately 50 km northeast of La Plata.\footnote{Ibid., 20-23. The assault on Charobamba reportedly involved 42 Chiriguanaes.}
As the Chiriguanaes’ assaults reached deeper into Spanish territory, Spanish officials found themselves in a unique situation. The laws of the Spanish Habsburg kingdoms typically separated the powers of justicia and gobierno in a jurisdiction like the province of Charcas. The Audiencia exercised the powers of justicia, which related primarily to the resolution of disputes and ensuring the functioning of the province. The powers of gobierno, however, were reserved for the king or his appointed representative. These powers included waging war and founding new settlements. The viceroy typically held the power of gobierno in overseas kingdoms like Peru. Viceroy Enríquez died unexpectedly of natural causes in March of 1583. It would be nearly two full years before a proper successor took up the post. The question of who held the power of gobierno in the interim was a topic of ongoing political debate. One undetermined issue was whether the president of the Audiencia of Lima, in some senses the acting viceroy, became invested with the full powers of the viceroy during the vacancy of that office. But there was no official hierarchical arrangement between the two Audiencias, and officials in La Plata had advocated for more autonomy for many years. They seized the opportunity to exercise it—at least de facto—in this case. The Audiencia of Lima had little recourse to disagree, and it faced several more immediate threats to its own jurisdiction at this time.\(^50\)

The Chiriguana situation was among the first issues the Audiencia tackled following the assumption of its new powers. Officials argued on the basis of two cédulas signed by the king in 1568 (copies of which were discovered in the royal hacienda

records from 1574) that they had authority to act with wide discretion in response to the Chiriguanaes. One document allowed Viceroy Toledo to spend what he deemed necessary for the pacification and administration of the provinces in times of uprising and war. The other condemned the Chiriguanaes for their crimes and called for their settlement into communities.\textsuperscript{51} The goals set out in the cédulas remained incomplete, so, now invested in the interim with the powers of the viceroy, the officials of the Audiencia set out toward accomplishing them. By invoking these cédulas, the Audiencia had revived the decade-old war declaration of war against the Chiriguanaes.

But not everything was as it had been a decade earlier. For one thing, there was no explicit royal backing for an invasion. There was also a sense, especially in Potosí where the royal accounts were tabulated, that the king’s poverty precluded the funding of a proper war effort. Several officials with knowledge of the king’s finances suggested that the more immediate and realistic way to reverse the Chiriguanaes’ inroads was to establish additional Spanish populations at key points on the frontier. Importantly, the official in charge of the royal purse in Potosí (the factor) agreed to release limited funds to be put towards establishing new settlements along the frontier.\textsuperscript{52}

In July of 1583, the Audiencia began to entertain specific proposals for new Spanish settlements aimed at retaking control of the frontier and combatting future Chiriguana incursions. A small element, represented chiefly by García de Mosquera and Miguel Martín, advocated for an aggressive approach to frontier settlement. They hoped to license a population “in the middle of the land of the Chiriguanaes from which to make

\textsuperscript{51} “Consultas a autos y diligencias … indios chiriguanaes,” 177-80.

\textsuperscript{52} “Acuerdo de los oficiales de la Hacienda Real sobre las fronteras de Tarija y Tomina (Potosí, 12 julio 1583),” in Julien, Angelis, and Bass Werner de Ruiz, Historia de Tarija, 231-34.
war upon them and remove them from where they are populated.” Mosquera drew up a proposal for a town foundation on the Sauces River (now the Parapetí), near the ruins of Manso’s Nueva Rioja. Recall that Spanish officials had wished to reestablish a Spanish presence in the area ever since the destruction of Nueva Rioja in 1561, but Chiriguana resistance to a Spanish presence in the area, as well as a chronic shortage of resources, had delayed any such plans. Meanwhile, Miguel Martín proposed an approach that involved seeking out the fabled mines of Saypurú in Chiriguana territory and establishing a population based around exploiting them.53

The Audiencia favored more modest proposals focused on areas that related more closely to the defense of the established frontier. The native leaders of Presto and Tarabuco pledged their support for a new Spanish settlement in the northern Mojocoya Valley. And in lieu of his other proposal, Miguel Martín suggested populating an expanse of acreage abutting a lake just beyond his own frontier property southeast of Santiago de Tomina. The area would be known as La Laguna. Both areas were strategically important. As one witness put it, “the Chiriguanaes make most frequent use of two points of access [to Spanish-controlled territory]. One is the Pescado River,” which ran near the proposed La Laguna site. The other was the Río Grande, just north of Mojocoya. From both points, Chiriguana forces had recently been able to penetrate westward as far as the more populous native communities of Presto and Tarabuco.54

53 “Consultas a autos y diligencias … indios chiriguanaes,” 163-66, 176-77. Martín’s interest in the mines may have come about due their mention in the testimony of the returned captive Agustín. See “Información cerca de los indios chiriguanaes,” 96-97. For officials’ desire to reestablish a presence on the Sauces River, see García Recio, Análisis de una sociedad de frontera, 95 n. 35, 99.

54 “Consultas a autos y diligencias … indios chiriguanaes,” 166-67, 175-77, 181-84, 199-200; “Relaciones para su excelencia de la guerra de los chiriguanaes,” 13, 19, 21-23. La Laguna sat only a league from the valley of Cuzcotoro, where the Inca defensive installation of the same name suffered a Chiriguana attack. See Chapter 4.
Both locations also had other benefits that their supporters touted relative to the other’s drawbacks. As mentioned above, the Mojocoya site had the full support of the local native communities, who saw the Río Grande as the more immediately dangerous area. They offered to lend their labor to build the necessary fortresses. Those who supported the Mojocoya site also claimed that the valley would support 100 Spanish households once developed and secured. But Martín and his supporters argued that shoring up the frontier southeast of Tomina would be far more beneficial in terms of the overall agricultural production of the region. The lands near La Laguna were ready for planting, and improving security in the area would also allow for the greater development of the agricultural lands to the west. Many natives had left this area out of fear of the Chiriguanaes and had been working in the coca fields to the north. If given a chance, they might return to their places of origin and resume farming. The problem was that, until they did return, La Laguna lacked a significant local tributary population. It would be difficult to find the labor necessary to construct a defensive infrastructure there.\(^{55}\)

The Audiencia determined in September of 1583 to award the foundation of a town at La Laguna under the leadership of Miguel Martín as captain and justicia mayor. In this role Martín had the responsibility to protect the frontier from the Grande River in the north to the Cuzcotoro Valley in the south. The town would come into existence under the name San Miguel de la Laguna on Saint Michael’s feast day, September 29 on the modern calendar. The officials noted that the name was appropriate given the archangel’s association with protecting the weak and fighting evil. The foundation of San Miguel came with a variety of important stipulations. Because the town was to serve as a

\(^{55}\) The debate of the relative merits on both locations plays out over “Consultas a autos y diligencias … indios chiriguanaes,” 166-77, and sporadically from 181-205. See esp. 183, 190, 199-200.
deterrent to frontier incursions, it was important to populate it quickly. The plan was to send eight Spaniards to the site immediately to construct a fortress and begin to plot out the lands. Within four months, Martín had to assure that 30 men resided there; eight months after that, it would become necessary to have a full population of 40 men. It was also important not to weaken the frontier defenses in other areas by drawing that population from elsewhere on the frontier. No resident, other than Martín himself, could come from Santiago de Tomina. To attract these residents and establish the town, Martín had the right to grant land rights within a certain jurisdiction. Because there were no nearby native communities, Martín also received the use of two contingents of native laborers. Twenty-three would work as spies in the service of the town and frontier; another of 25—whose labor was loaned from Santiago de Tomina—would work for a six-month period on construction and farming.  

As the first residents laid the foundations of San Miguel, the Chiriguana offensive expanded into additional sections of the frontier. Officials began an inquiry in October into reports of an attack upon the community of Pototaca. The targets included a ranch that was home to a reported 5,000-6,000 head of cattle and camelids. The area was particularly strategic because it was located only 15 leagues (~75 km) southeast of Potosí and represented a significant food, transport, and timber source for the mining center. The attack directly resulted in the deaths of 11 natives, the capture of 16 others, and the loss of a great deal of property. The ancillary costs were also tremendous. The remaining native residents evacuated the area in the wake of the attack, leaving behind the animals.

56 Debate over the terms of foundation, including official positions, salaries, and details of land arrangements, play out in “Consultas a autos y diligencias … indios chiriguanaes,” 181-205. The terms themselves appear on pages 206-18. The documents do not include any arrangements for a population in Mojocoya, though there is suggestion that a presidio would be constructed there to respond to specific threats in the north.
and crops they had been tending. The evacuation of the teams of lumbermen additionally left the mills of Potosí without their all-important supplies of wood and charcoal.

The attack on Pototaca represented a new cooperative effort involving the Chiriguanaes and at least one community of Lacaxas. The latter were a frontier group about which scholars know little. They appear in early colonial encomienda rolls from multiple locations along the eastern frontier, suggesting they served as Inca mitimaes. The Lacaxas living near Pototaca had apparently been in conflict for some time with the natives under Spanish control in the region. Witnesses referenced at least two raids the group had perpetrated in the three years prior, but in this instance, the feeling was that the Lacaxas had served primarily as “guides” or “spies” for the Chiriguanaes.57

At the same time, reports out of Mizque confirmed that Chiriguana factions were active in that region and along the road that connected it to Santa Cruz. These attacks were different, however. Nearly all of the previous Chiriguana frontier raids targeted native communities and Spanish property. In these most recent instances, the perpetrators did not hesitate to harm Spaniards directly. One attack resulted in the death of a Franciscan friar while he administered the sacraments to a native community in the Turkue Valley. The offensive penetrated all the way to the Chari Chari Valley and the

---

57 “Consultas a autos y diligencias … indios chiriguanaes,” 5-6, 29-30, 103, 107, 109-49. The Lacaxas also carried out a simultaneous peripheral attack on a small native community, from which they carried off approximately five captives. It is alleged by the witnesses that the smaller attack was meant to draw attention away from the primary Chiriguana force, the estimated size of which ranged from 160 to 300. The most specific account of the aftermath of the attack comes from Juan Miguel, the native in charge of the great ranch. See pages 113-16. For the location of Pototaca and the Supas Valley, see Antonio de Alcedo, Diccionario geográfico-histórico de la Indias Occidentales ó América, 5 vols. (Madrid: Imp. de Manuel González, 1788), vol. 4, 212-13, 292; and Ann Zulawski, They Eat from Their Labor: Work and Social Change in Colonial Bolivia (Pittsburgh: Univ. of Pittsburgh Press, 1995), 170-74. For more about the importance of the area to the Potosí economy, see “Testimonio de Luis de Fuentes en la relación de servicios de Juan Ladrón de Leyba (La Plata, 20 noviembre 1596),” in Julien, Angelis, and Bass Werner de Ruíz, Historia de Tarija, 352-55. For more on the Lacaxas, see Barragán Romano, “¿Indios de arco y flecha?”, 97-102.
In two other instances, Chiriguanaes set upon traveling parties of Spaniards as they made their way east from Mizque to Santa Cruz. In the first case, a Mercedarian and his two or three native companions were all killed. In another, Chiriguana warriors allegedly ambushed a group of nearly 40 Spanish travelers. They killed 10 of them and carried off a two-year-old boy. Ñuflo de Chávez’ mother-in-law was among the dead. Chávez’ daughter was also in the party, and she suffered an arrow wound to the thigh. The Chiriguanaes additionally made off with two dozen horses and destroyed religious art bound for the church in Santa Cruz. One piece was a statue of the baby Jesus. The attackers allegedly went out of their way to damage it on the head, hands, and feet.

The testimony of a Chané messenger sheds some light on the Chiriguana perspective during this period. He appeared in Sopachuy (near Tomina) during this series of attacks. He claimed to have carried messages between several Chiriguana caciques in the prior months. According to his testimony, a wide variety of Chiriguana caciques were coordinating their attacks against the Spanish. The powerful Vitupué, against whom Chávez and the cruceños did battle in the 1560s, was among the leaders who set aside their traditional rivalries in order to cooperate against their common enemy. Vitupué had been behind the assault on the Spanish travelers. He reportedly relished the opportunity “to fill his hands” with their cargo, but even more enticing was the chance to “take revenge for what Ñuflo de Chávez and the other captains had done to [his people].”

---

58 “Consultas a autos y diligencias … indios chiriguanaes,” 6, 67, 70, 91; “Relaciónes para su excelencia de la guerra de los chiriguanaes,” 23.


60 “Relaciónes para su excelencia de la guerra de los chiriguanaes,” 23-25.
Despite the widespread participation in the Chiriguana offensive, it was not a completely united front. Some Chiriguana leaders did not consider themselves to be at war with the Spanish, and they hoped to deescalate the tensions. The Chané messenger in Sopachuy had come with a message from his own Chiriguana cacique. He wished to warn the Spanish of impending attacks on the valley. The cacique, Yaguei, had reportedly attempted to restrain his fellow Chiriguana leaders in the prior weeks and months, but the others had not heeded his message of peacemaking. Another delegation consisting of two Chiriguanaes arrived in La Plata around the same time. They asked to speak to the president of the Audiencia and claimed before the council that their cacique, Yrare, wanted only friendship with the Spanish. He had gone to the length of freeing all of his Christian captives in order to gain Spanish favor.61

Others decidedly favored war. Vitupué had made clear his desire for revenge, and a cacique named Rapa expressed a similar sentiment in pledging “to come and take with him the head of Captain Pedro de Segura [in order] to drink from it.” But Candio was reportedly the central figure behind the unification of the Chiriguana factions. In November of 1583, Candio arranged an arete (the ritual Guaraní festival) in an attempt to convince Mapae and Areya, among others, to join forces with him. In the course of the arete, Candio spoke with disdain for the Spanish and called upon a collective ava identity. According to witnesses, he claimed that “he was not afraid of [the Spanish] or of the witch [feminine] who ruled over them.” After all, the Spanish were nothing but “men, just like [the Chiriguanaes].” Candio also made mocking use of the vestments taken from

---

one of the priests who had recently fallen victim to the Chiriguanaes. He tore them and dressed his wives in the remnants.62

Candio’s behavior suggests that he was attempting to prove that the Spanish were not necessarily the superhuman *karai* that many Chiriguanaes may have believed. They could be defeated if confronted by a united *ava* resistance. Candio’s speech shows that he believed the leader of the Spanish was endowed with certain powers associated with witchcraft, but tellingly, Candio feminized him as a way of showing his unfitness for battle. The offensives that Candio had begun a year earlier had proven both the leader’s ineffectiveness and the inability of the Spanish to protect themselves and their territory. Even their holy men and the symbols of their powerful religion had been rendered impotent, as Vitupué’s men had also shown in desecrating the figure of the baby Jesus. Now it seemed that Candio might unify the Chiriguana factions and overrun the shoddy frontier defenses. This scenario represented the worst case scenario for the Spaniards on the frontier.

Audiencia officials recognized the escalation of the Chiriguana war following the attack on Pototaca and the Spanish travelers. Not since the 1560s had the Chiriguanaes presented such an explicit and prolonged threat to the safety of the Spanish themselves or interests so near and vital to Potosí. The Audiencia officials had come to recognize that “each day the audacity of the said Indians increase[d].” The council convened in October of 1583 to investigate and determine a proper solution. The position of viceroy was still vacant, so it fell to the Audiencia to plot a strategy. The documents are clear that the

62 “Consultas a autos y diligencias … indios chiriguanaes,” 106; “Relaciones para su excelencia de la guerra de los chiriguanaes,” 25-28. It is not clear to whom, exactly, the witch reference was meant to refer. It may have been Segura, Toledo, or another Spanish authority figure who had been active within the frontier region. It conceivably may also have referred to the king, pope, or Christian god.
councilmembers had already decided upon a widespread military action. The question that remained was how to carry it out.63

The witnesses consulted by the Audiencia suggested a number of means by which they might avoid the strategic failures that doomed Toledo’s entrada. Some suggested building self-sustaining presidios beyond Spanish-controlled territory. These outposts would allow for the provisioning of Spanish forces and the organization of later offensives, should they become necessary. Many advocated varying versions of a three- or four-column approach discussed earlier by Díaz and designed to ensure that the Chiriguanaes could not simply retreat into the interior or coordinate their defenses on a single front. Armies could organize their departures from Tomina, Santa Cruz, and Tarija, and some witnesses even advocated for the involvement of an army approaching from the Río de la Plata region. Segura’s testimony on the matter came via a letter. He suggested recruiting not only Spanish captains from Paraguay, where he once lived, but also three to four thousand Guarani soldiers, “well-trained in war and feared by [the Chiriguanaes].”64

The testimonies also dwell on the matter of the appropriate legal status for any resulting Chiriguana captives. The question of whether it was just to enslave them or merely condemn them to servitude for a period of time was a revisitation of the same issue a decade earlier. The officials ultimately came to a similar judgment in 1583 as their counterparts had in 1574. All adult male Chiriguanaes would be subject to perpetual slavery in condemnation for the crimes described throughout the testimonies. Any Chané

63 The proceedings and testimonies appear in “Consultas a autos y diligencias … indios chiriguanaes,” 5-109. A letter from the Audiencia to the king written in August of 1583 expresses similar sentiments. See “Carta de la Audiencia de los Charcas, dando noticia … (La Plata 3 de Agosto de 1583),” in Levillier, Audiencia de Charcas, vol. 2, 60-63.

slaves or other natives determined to have taken up arms in the course of the Chiriguanaes’ crimes were to serve as *naborías*—a type of personal servant who was not free, but he was not subject to sale by his master—for a period of 10 years. Afterward, they would become *yanaconas*. All women and children living among the Chiriguanaes, as well as adult male slaves adjudged not to have participated in the Chiriguanaes’ crimes, were to become *yanaconas* immediately.\(^{65}\)

In some senses, the debate around the question of enslavement focused on the same points as it did during the prior decade. Much of the testimonies highlight the depravity of the Chiriguanaes and their crimes, earlier failed means of attracting them to peace, and their supposed apostasy. The Audiencia’s report to Lima on the issue is similarly superficial. But an especially interesting aspect of the debate over this issue was a line of questioning that focused on similar scenarios in other frontier areas of the Spanish Indies. A number of Spanish residents of Charcas had spent time in New Granada and Quito, where, according to their testimonies, the Spanish openly and legally bought and sold Páez and Pijao captives at public auction. Another had spent many years in Mexico, where he claimed the Chichimecas were subject to *de facto* legal enslavement. Like the Chiriguanaes, these native groups were alleged cannibals who were known to raid the frontiers. Granting their captors rights of enslavement “has stopped the many evils that they did, and companies of soldiers assemble in the interest of … bringing back many of them as prisoners.”\(^ {66}\)

---

\(^ {65}\) Official judgments to this effect appear in “Consultas a autos y diligencias … indios chiriguaanes,” 65-68, 150-52. One witness proposed “cutting off the right index finger” of captive Chiriguanaes as a “signal and punishment for what they have done,” but also as “an important security measure to ensure that they do not flee, and if they do, they cannot do damage with a bow.” See page 25.

\(^ {66}\) “Carta de la Audiencia de los Charcas, dando noticia … (La Plata 3 de Agosto de 1583),” 60-63; “Consultas a autos y diligencias … indios chiriguaanes,” 46-65. The quote refers specifically to Popayán,
The testimonies collected in October and November only galvanized the Audiencia’s determination to go to war. Officials began to make the necessary arrangements for an invasion to begin in early 1584. They also took immediate steps to construct and staff a fortress in the Supas Valley southeast of Pototaca and approved a proposal to found two settlements bordering on the jurisdictions of Tarija and Potosí: San Juan de la Frontera de Paspaya (modern Camargo, Bolivia) and Cinti (within the modern Bolivian provinces of Nor Cinti or Sud Cinti). The hope was that these populations might prevent the Chiriguanaes from “dar[ing] to climb to the highlands” of Potosí. The council further prohibited all frontier residents from interacting with the Chiriguanaes under any circumstances. Officials considered themselves already to be operating under a state of warfare, and they presumed that the Chiriguanaes would mask their violent intentions under the guise of peace. They warned that even peaceful encounters were acts of “treachery in order to spy and get to know the land and … the comings and goings [of the Spanish].”

Miguel Martín, now several months after the foundation of San Miguel, acknowledged the prohibition on contact with the Chiriguanaes in a letter to the Audiencia. He pledged to “do what [the officials] command of him,” but he and his fellow residents of La Laguna did not sense any acute danger. They continued to interact but other witnesses expressed similar sentiments that allowing the legal enslavement of the natives in a particular area effectively reduced their crimes by motivating Spanish soldiers to pursue them.

67 “Consultas a autos y diligencias … indios chiriguanaes,” 106-09, 147-49, 154-56. A 1586 report written by the Audiencia is the first reference to these towns being formed. See “Carta del Licenciado Cepeda a S. M. tocante al beneficio … (La Plata 9 Diciembre 1586),” in Levillier, Audiencia de Charcas, vol. 2, 255-56. The former was founded by Juan Ladrón de Leyba “at his cost.” It was particularly important because animals laden with metals from Potosí reportedly traveled through the pass in which the town was located. See “Testimonio de Luis de Fuentes en la relación de servicios de Juan Ladrón de Leyba (La Plata, 20 noviembre 1596),” 354-55; “Relación de los pareceres sobre atajar la guerra de los chiriguana,” BN, Manuscript 3044, Papeles varios tocantes al gobeirno de Yndias, 304r. No other references to the Pueblo de Cinti are available.
with and attempt to win over local populations of Chiriguanaes who, by all appearances, were receptive to the new Spanish frontier settlement. Some had even assisted with the construction of the town and the fortress. According to one founding citizen of San Miguel, the Spanish residents eventually felt it unnecessary to deploy the spies allotted to them because they “trusted in the friendship that the [local populations of] Chiriguanaes had shown in coming to help build the town and the fort.” Martín wrote in mid-December that the Chiriguanaes nearest San Miguel were aware of the impending Spanish entrada. He had informed them that they would have to uproot their families and “live as vassals of his majesty where the Royal Audiencia demands.” Their response seemed to validate his continued contact with them. They wished “to be our friends and the adversaries of our enemies.”

Martín’s belief that he had managed to make an alliance with a faction of a population infamous for its “treachery” in such matters appears a bit surprising, but it is not entirely out of character for one who had had extensive experience on the Tomina frontier. Men like Martín tended to characterize the Chiriguanaes in broad terms and absolutes in their official testimonies, but the context of those testimonies is important. Their testimonies typically served to justify actions they favored, such as a declaration of war, the foundation of a frontier town, or the justification of enslavement. Categorizing “the Chiriguanaes” as a single “nation” and attributing their alleged criminal behavior across the wide category better served their interests. Their actions, however, show that Martín and others with similar exposure to the Chiriguanaes were capable of a degree of differentiation between “Chiriguanu” populations and factions under the right

---

circumstances. When the net incentives were positive, the Spanish on the Charcas frontier ultimately had no problem differentiating between factions of Chiriguanaes and cooperating with them, even during times of war.

Martín’s positive assessment of the Chiriguana factions near San Miguel led him to pull back and reallocate many of the resources meant for the defense of the town. The residents had limited access to native labor—23 natives provided by the Audiencia to serve as spies and 25 from Tomina for other labor including the construction of a fort during a six-month period—because there was no local tributary population. The residents of San Miguel directed both groups to tend to their crops and herds rather than serving their security needs precisely because Martín trusted the Chiriguanaes living in the area not to endanger the safety of the town. Meanwhile, the fortress remained incomplete, and no one was taking the pulse of the Chiriguanaes beyond the frontier.\(^69\)

Martín’s trust proved foolish. On the night of January 14, 1584, a large force of Chiriguanaes attacked San Miguel de la Laguna and killed all of the Spaniards who were there. The casualties included Miguel Martín, the town priest, an additional 13 Spaniards, three African slaves, and a mulato child. Twenty-four natives, two slaves, and two mulatos were taken captive. The Chiriguanaes also made off with 50 horses and a cache of weapons and armor. Estimates of the size of the Chiriguana force range from 1,500 to over 2,000. Piecemeal reports indicate that the attack occurred just after nightfall. The Spanish were in their “straw houses” located a distance of two musket shots away from the unfinished fortress. Two sentinels standing guard in the town fired a musket to alert the residents to the impending danger. Some managed to reach the fortress, but the

---

\(^{69}\) Accusations to this effect appear in “Consultas a autos y diligencias … indios chiriguanaes,” 223-24, 230-31, 237-39, 249. Most blame Martín for his lack of care and leadership. One blames the other residents for failing to heed Martín’s advice about security.
Chiriguanaes “bore through [the walls of] the fort in many places.” Because it lacked a solid roof, a number of the attackers commenced “climbing the walls and firing down upon [those inside] like bulls in an arena.” Those who attempted to flee were seized and beaten to death with clubs.70

One resident, Mateo de Olarte, had been away from the town on an errand when the attack occurred. He alerted the residents of Santiago de Tomina and other nearby sections of the frontier. Segura was among those who arrived in San Miguel the following day to assess the damage. He described the scene as “the greatest shame describable by human tongue or pen.” Bodies littered the ground amidst charred shells of buildings. The Spaniards who had responded rounded up any livestock that remained and buried most of the bodies in a mass grave. Many of the natives taken captive in the attack had come from Santiago, and Segura was not shy in expressing his frustration over the loss. Less than a week after the attack, he indicated that Martín deserved to be beheaded, had he not already perished, because he showed so little care with Tomina’s tributary laborers.71

The attack on San Miguel was reportedly a cooperative effort led by five caciques. One—Candio—had been adversarial toward the Spanish in all of their previously recorded interactions. Another—Coyabaca—likely refers to Coyagua, who had led the earlier attack on Martín’s property. Another—Tendi—appears in the Alcaya chronicle as an ally of Vitupué. The other two were the erstwhile allies of the Spanish on

70 Reports from the first Spaniards to respond to the attack and testimony from the natives who witnessed it appear in “Consultas a autos y diligencias … indios chiriguanaes,” 219-31, 237-39, 242-49, 262-64.

71 Ibid., 219-31, 237-39, 242-49. Only Martín, the priest, and one other prominent Spaniard escaped the indignity of a mass burial—their bodies were brought back to Santiago—but burying the others in a single grave was necessary due to the fear of another attack.
the Tomina frontier, Mapae and Areya. Their alliance had collapsed, it seems, due to Pedro de Segura’s ill-advised response to Candio’s provocations a year-and-a-half earlier. The incident certainly played a part in the antipathy between the two sides, but Segura’s actions were as much an indicator that the relationship was no longer valuable to the Spaniards in Tomina. The colonial state’s prohibition of the captive trade had already changed the relationship on a more fundamental level. From that point onward, they no longer had a common interest to sustain the partnership.

Upon news of the destruction of San Miguel, the Audiencia delayed the impending *entrada* in order to fortify the frontier. Among the first orders of business was reestablishing a presence at La Laguna (where San Miguel had stood). Officials wanted to ensure that adequate defenses lay between the Chiriguanaes and any Spanish frontier properties. They chose Melchor de Rodas to oversee the reestablishment of a town in La Laguna, this time with the proper care and security. He set off at the end of January and established a town called San Juan de Rodas on the ruins of San Miguel.72 Furnishing soldiers to secure other areas of the frontier proved more difficult. Despite the danger to the frontier region, the Spaniards living in La Plata, Potosí, and elsewhere in highland Charcas were largely ambivalent about the Chiriguana threat. It seems they did not find the threat sufficiently acute to support the war effort in any material way. The 19 *encomenderos* of La Plata balked at the Audiencia’s demand that they each provide three or four soldiers to secure the frontier. They claimed that their obligations did not extend to the *corregimiento* of Tomina. The matter seemingly ended in a compromise whereby they each provided a single soldier. Tomina would have to make up the rest. Segura

---

72 Ibid., 249-62. Some officials favored uprooting and relocating Santiago de Tomina to La Laguna to this end, but they concluded that the two towns were both necessary in the long term.
bitterly noted that even the new increased efforts to secure the frontier were paltry in regard to the challenges he faced: “In the time of the Incas there were four thousand Indians stationed to guard against this wicked people.” Now the residents of Tomina had to beg the Audiencia to grant a tenth of that total to rebuild and staff certain key areas.73

**Conclusion**

The destruction of San Miguel de la Laguna was several years in the making, but it was not simply another example of a long line of confrontations between Spaniards and Chiriguanaes dating back decades. Common interests had spurred Spaniards near Tomina and certain Chiriguana factions to forge mutually beneficial relationships during the late 1570s and early 1580s. The basis of their collaborations largely ceased in 1582 when their main means of trade was outlawed. The Spanish foolishly attempted to repurpose their alliance with one faction (Mapae and Areya’s) when another Chiriguana leader (Candio) began to assert himself at the end of the same year. The miscalculation only helped Candio unite the cordillera against the Spanish. By the beginning of 1584, the costs of the poor strategy were mounting. The Spanish had all but lost the capacity to secure major sections of the Chiriguana frontier. The only positive, from the Spanish frontier perspective, was that the attack on San Miguel had been so heinous that it helped galvanize support for an entrada later in the year. That support, however, would come chiefly from other areas of the Chiriguana frontier, including Santa Cruz, and not from the Spanish population centers in the Charcas highlands or the higher levels of colonial government.

---

Figure 7-1. Locations referenced in Chapter 7. Adapted from Wikimedia Commons, http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Bolivia_Topography.png.
CHAPTER 8
WAGING WAR & BUILDING PEACE AT THE LIMITS OF EMPIRE

In the weeks and months following the January 1584 destruction of San Miguel de la Laguna, the members of the Audiencia revisited the matter of the invasion of the Chiriguana cordillera. For officials in Charcas, the atrocity inflicted upon the Spanish frontier town only proved more conclusively the need to secure the eastern frontier once and for all. They reasoned that the only way to do so was by dislodging the Chiriguanaes from the cordillera and populating the vacated land with Spanish towns. Not only would the new towns prevent the Chiriguanaes from reestablishing themselves, expanding the effective reach of Spanish governance would benefit both the church and king: the church because it might evangelize to the natives upon whom the Chiriguanaes habitually preyed; and the king because the new territories might help provision the Charcas mining sector with laborers and much-needed supplies. It was, in other words, a matter of the highest priority for the Spanish kingdoms, and officials hoped that citizens from across Charcas and Peru would support their fight in opposition to the Chiriguanaes. They would also come to count on their superiors within the colonial state apparatus to support their ambitious plans.

The officials in charge of the war effort found, however, that substantial support for the cause came almost exclusively from actors on other sections of the Chiriguana frontier. The citizens of La Plata, Potosí, and elsewhere throughout highland Charcas were reluctant to join the fight or to provide money and supplies. And when the Spanish colonial hierarchy once again took control over the powers of gobierno in Charcas, local and regional officials found that their superiors were more focused on other matters considered more central to the wellbeing of the empire. The outbreak of war with England (beginning 1585), the threat of piracy in Spain and the Spanish Indies, and the preparation of the famous Spanish Armada took precedence over matters
in the eastern Andes. Though the Audiencia’s idealistic pleas to church and state supremacy in the cordillera eventually struck a chord with the king, the difficulties of executing policies at the edge of the empire significantly complicated the implementation of any grand strategy toward the Chiriguanaes. Instead, local officials and unofficial actors began to negotiate arrangements that served their own circumstances and interests.

**The Audiencia-Led Offensive, 1584-1585**

By June of 1584, the Audiencia had consulted with a number of respected citizens and determined a strategy for the invasion and occupation of the cordillera. The plan was a modified version of the three-column approach proposed prior to the attack on San Miguel. In its final form, it called for four Spanish armies to set out from four locations: Tarija, Santa Cruz, Mizque, and the Charcas highlands (La Plata and Potosí) (Figure 8-1). Juan Lozano Machuca volunteered to organize this last army, the largest and most crucial to the plan. His force was to consist of between 200 and 250 Spaniards plus native auxiliaries. Lozano Machuca pledged to enter the cordillera via Tomina and push the frontier eastwards. After overrunning the Chiriguanaes in battle, he would oversee the establishment of settlements in the vacated territory in order to prevent the possibility of their return. As he put it, he would “not leave the cordillera until conquering, flattening, and ruining” the Chiriguanaes. Meanwhile, the three other Spanish armies would engage the Chiriguanaes from other directions in order to prevent the enemy from concentrating its forces against Lozano Machuca. The plan called for the Mizque force to link up with the army advancing from Santa Cruz. Together they were to secure the northern plains while the Tarija army advanced through the cordillera from the south.¹

¹ “Declaration of Arias de Herrer (5 June 1584),” ANB, Corr., Ficha 38, 1r-2v.
The surviving documentation relating to the army assembled in Tarija gives the clearest picture of the earliest phases of the offensive. The founder of Tarija, Luis de Fuentes, led the effort, and he sent several dispatches to the Audiencia during the months that followed his and his men’s departure in July of 1584. Fuentes made it clear in these documents that his objective was to advance through the cordillera towards the Guapay (Grande) River, a journey that would lead him through “the core and strength of all the Chiriguanaes.” He and the 70 soldiers that accompanied him were to destroy the Chiriguana towns they encountered while killing or capturing as many as possible. Fuentes’ army also included native auxiliaries—his dispatches refer to “our Indians”—but there is little mention of them, their numbers, or the roles they played. Fuentes’ reports describe the terrain through which he and his men trudged as “hell,” and they recount lingering difficulties with illness as they pushed onward. Absent, however, is any mention of resistance from the Chiriguanaes, who seem to have retreated ahead of the danger. The Spanish burned several mostly abandoned villages and any maize surpluses they could not use for themselves. By early August they had advanced to within a few leagues of the banks of the Río Grande, where they constructed a fort on the ruins of a village they destroyed.²

Fuentes and company encamped in the immediate vicinity of a major Chiriguana population center. Their daily activities began to bring them into frequent contact with locals as they foraged and gathered water. In short order, the Spanish stumbled upon a major cache of agricultural stores that the Chiriguanaes were keen to defend. The two sides skirmished on several occasions during the first weeks of August, during which Fuentes claimed that his men killed a handful of Chiriguanaes, among them at least two caciques. Fuentes’ army also managed

² “Carta del capitán Luis de Fuentes al licenciado Cepeda, presidente de la Audiencia de Charcas (Pueblo de Marachiui, 31 agosto 1584),” and “Relación de todo lo que ha sucedido desde el 17 del mes de julio (Pueblo de Marachiui, 8 septiembre 1584),” both in Julien, Angelis, and Bass Werner de Ruíz, Historia de Tarija, 240-43.
to destroy four local villages and burn 35 silos (*piruas*) full of maize, the equivalent of more than a thousand *cargas* (one *carga* = the amount a freight animal could carry). In mid-August 1584, two Chiriguana messengers approached the Spanish camp. They requested an end to hostilities and a chance to trade with the Spanish in peace. Fuentes noted that the damage he and his men had inflicted was so great that the Chiriguanaes were “compelled by necessity” to beg for peace. The devastated communities had to “go about the mountains without homes, food, or other refreshment.” Fuentes agreed and negotiated the terms of the encounter, but he feared that the Chiriguanaes were being disingenuous. They had earned a reputation for treachery, so Fuentes decided to seize the opportunity to “proceed like them, … coming proclaiming peace [but] bringing [the faith] of Judas.” The Spanish forces approached their opposite numbers under the guise of peace on the day of the meeting. Upon the prearranged signal, they opened fire. A great many Chiriguanaes died, including eight caciques. A week later, Fuentes’ men advanced on the main Chiriguana settlement in the vicinity and burned it to the ground after a full day of fighting.3

As Fuentes dictated his final dispatch from Chiriguana territory in early September 1584, he and his men were still patrolling the land and doing battle with small, roving Chiriguana forces. By October they had returned to Tarija. The timing of their retreat likely coincided with

---

3 The documentation lacks clarity about the planning and execution of the ambush. The Spanish seem to have arranged code words to coordinate the timing of their attack from several possibly hidden locations. “Relación de todo lo que ha sucedido desde el 17 del mes de julio (Pueblo de Marachiui, 8 septiembre 1584),” 243-46; “Carta del licenciado Cepeda a Luis de Fuentes (La Plata 18 septiembre 1584),” 248-49. The Judas reference is not Fuentes’ own. It comes from Audiencia president Cepeda, who showed no qualms with Fuentes’ use of a tactic associated with the enemy. It is difficult to analyze the encounter from the Chiriguana perspective, particularly because so little information is available regarding the factions involved. It seems more likely than not that those who sought peace with Fuentes were indeed acting in good faith. Scholars have argued that the Chiriguanaes rightfully earned their reputation for refusing to surrender even when they faced long odds, and their desire to avenge defeat led them to engage in war under the banner of peace. But the destruction of their food stores may well have changed their calculations. Susnik has theorized that, in the case of inter-factional Guaraní wars, the destruction of maize surpluses tended to signal an end to a conflict. Fighting could begin again in these circumstances only after the next harvest. See Susnik, *Chiriguanos*, 202-03. 

366
the onset of the rainy season. Fuentes had opined in one of his letters that it would take a year-long campaign to eliminate the enemy completely from the cordillera, but the same letter made plain Fuentes’ apprehension about the coming rains and the illnesses they brought.4

From the Spanish perspective, the Tarija offensive was a success, even though Fuentes did not spend the full year assumed necessary to drive the Chiriguanaes completely out of the region. The Spanish had suffered no deaths and few serious injuries. They had inflicted, on the other hand, a great deal of damage to the enemy.5 Above and beyond the confirmed casualties, they had cleared a section of the cordillera and an area along the Guapay (Grande) of nearly all trace of Chiriguana domestic life, including dwellings and crops and the maize surpluses that were crucial to so many aspects of Chiriguana society and culture.

The Spanish offensive that launched from Santa Cruz under the leadership of Governor Lorenzo Suárez de Figueroa achieved similar successes against the enemy, though over a wider swath of territory and during a longer period of time. The cruceño force had set out in May of 1584. Figueroa’s objective was to remove the Chiriguanaes from the plains west of Santa Cruz, an area populated by a variety of native peoples but largely under the control of the Chiriguana cacique Vitupué. Figueroa’s force of 75 Spanish or mestizo soldiers and 1,500 native allies met up in short order with Fernando de Cazorla and his Spanish army advancing from Mizque, around 100 strong. Together, they burned several towns and punished the individuals purportedly

---

4 “Carta del capitán Luis de Fuentes al licenciado Cepeda, presidente de la Audiencia de Charcas (Pueblo de Marachiui, 31 agosto 1584),” 240-42; “Relación de todo lo que ha sucedido desde el 17 del mes de julio (Pueblo de Marachiui, 8 septiembre 1584),” 246-47; “Constatación del fin de la campaña (Tarija, 17 octubre 1584),” in Julien, Angelis, and Bass Werner de Ruiz, Historia de Tarija, 250-51.

responsible for the attacks along the Mizque-Santa Cruz road during the preceding year. They also “captured and killed a large quantity of Indians, and confiscated or burned a large quantity of food, horses, weapons, clothes, and many other things and prizes.” As had occurred in Fuentes’ experience, the great majority of the Chiriguanaes fled before the advancing Spanish armies rather than fighting in open battle. Small Chiriguana bands engaged with the Spanish only in the course of guerrilla-style ambushes. The Chiriguanaes’ tactics proved increasingly effective after the rains set in and made travel difficult for the Spanish. As the wet season wore on, the Spanish found themselves increasingly bogged down and beset with illness and supply shortages.

Suárez de Figueroa and company decided after much deliberation to make camp along the Piray River (Figure 8-1) while they waited out the season.6

Suárez de Figueroa relaunched his campaign against the Chiriguanaes under better skies in early 1585. His army also had the benefit of additional soldiers and supplies that arrived from Santa Cruz. The fort that he and his men had constructed in the plains now served them as a base from which to organize and headquarter their operations. The productive land and friendly native populations in the vicinity of the base suited the interests of the Spanish. Soon the residents oversaw sufficient agricultural interests to sustain themselves, and they saw the possibility for the economic diversification necessary to maintain a permanent presidio, if not a flourishing town.

---

6 “Carta del licenciado Cepeda a Luis de Fuentes (La Plata 18 septiembre 1584),” 249; “Cartas del Gobernador Suárez de Figueroa, dando cuenta de la campaña, á la Audiencia,” 408-20; “Relación con documentos que Lorenzo Suarez de Figueroa … sobre el estado de la guerra de los Chiriguanaes,” 648-73. The size of the Mizque force comes from testimony on page 662. A report written by Cazorla just before his army departed lists 99 soldiers among its participants. See “Campamento del Maese Hernando de Cazorla … para la entrada á los Chiriganos,” and “Resolución del Gobernador Suarez de Figueroa dando cuenta á la Real Audiencia de Charcas,” both in Mujía, Bolivia-Paraguay, vol. 2, 406-08, 460-61; “Relación de los servicios de Nuflo de Chávez y Alvaro de Chávez, La Plata 1588-89,” esp. 260-61.
The *cruceños* argued that the presence of a Spanish population between Santa Cruz and the Charcas frontier was necessary if their mission were to succeed in the long run. As one soldier put it, pushing the Chiriguanaes out of the “province of Vitupué would be easy,” but without a permanent Spanish presence in the region, “they would return in a few years and reassemble and rebuild what we have taken from them, and they would commit even greater crimes … [against] the Christians and vassals of His Majesty.” Suárez de Figueroa reiterated that similar strategies were also necessary elsewhere, namely beyond the Tomina and Tarija frontiers. Cazorla, meanwhile, took steps to settle a population in Samaipata that might serve as protection for the Spaniards and native communities to the west in the vicinity of Cochabamba. He noted specifically that the Incas had nurtured a settlement in the same location for much the same purpose.7

During both the 1584 and 1585 portions of the campaign, Suárez de Figueroa divided his forces. Some pursued the Chiriguanaes who had fled the plains into the cordillera to the south and west. Others went north to fight the Tamacocies and other “allies” of the Chiriguanaes. The testimony of one witness in particular gives some credence to the belief that the Chiriguanaes often cooperated with a number of other native peoples, including some from the northern Mojos region. The witness was an African slave named Blas who had been a captive in a Chiriguana village. According to his testimony, Blas had escaped from his Spanish owner near Cochabamba four years prior. He attempted to flee to Santa Cruz, but a Chiriguana faction captured him and employed him as a metalworker and tanner. He escaped his Chiriguana masters in the chaos of

---

the Spanish invasion and approached Suárez de Figueroa’s men. Blas explained that the Tamacocies and others native to parts of the northern plains and Mojos regions provided the Chiriguanaes with supplies, including the raw materials for their bows and arrows and the poisoned herb they applied to their arrow points.8

Based on what is known about the Chiriguanaes, the relationships they had with their so-called allies more likely took the shape of a tributary model than a cooperative one, but Suárez de Figueroa and company were eager nevertheless to engage the peoples to the north. Part of the motivation for this northward-facing strategy almost certainly stemmed from the cruceños’ ongoing desire to explore the region in search of the elusive, wealthy Mojos people. The campaigns that set out to the north from Santa Cruz since the 1560s had failed to bring them any closer to contact with the civilization and its leader, the Great Mojo. More than one witness testifying about the state of the war in the northern plains brought up the possibility that the Spanish might use their recently gained foothold in the area as another point from which to explore to the north.9

As Fuentes’ and Suárez de Figueroa’s armies engaged the Chiriguanaes on their flanks, the force being organized in La Plata and Potosí under the leadership of Lozano Machuca was supposed to roll back the frontier from the west and take control of the heart of the cordillera.

---

8 “Relación con documentos que Lorenzo Suarez de Figueroa … sobre el estado de la guerra de los Chiriguanaes,” 652-55, 680-92. Blas also informed the Spanish about the relationship between the Chiriguana cacique Marande and the Chui community in Mizque.

9 “Relación con documentos que Lorenzo Suarez de Figueroa … sobre el estado de la guerra de los Chiriguanaes,” 652-55, 663-66; “Cartas del Gobernador Suarez de Figueroa, dando cuenta de la campaña, á la Audiencia,” 411-14. A year later, Suárez de Figueroa described the discovery of the “Moxones” as one of the hopes sustaining the people of Santa Cruz. See “Relación de la ciudad de Santa Cruz de la Sierra por su gobernador don Lorenzo Suarez de Figueroa,” 163. The campaign against the Chiriguanaes’ allies explains the appearance of Tamacosi slaves for sale alongside Chiriguana slaves in Cochabamba in 1585. See “Cartas de venta de esclavos (24 Sept. – 3 Oct. 1585),” Archivo Histórico de Cochabamba, Expedientes Coloniales de Cochabamba, 43, 570r-71v, 580v-83r, 605v-08r, 611r-12v.
Lozano Machuca had been scheduled to lead his army into the field in May, June, or July of 1584 in coordination with the other Spanish campaigns, but Fuentes noted in a letter to the Audiencia at the end of August that Lozano Machuca, “does not seem to have arrived at his station.” The Audiencia confirmed his assessment: “the other [army] of Juan Lozano Machuca … until now has not departed … [despite] the great importance [it has] in the cordillera to squeeze the evil people on all sides.”10

Lozano Machuca was seemingly an odd choice to lead the primary invasion force of the Spanish entrada. He was a royal bureaucrat rather than a military man, and the Audiencia wrote at one point that he had come to fill his military role “because there was no other who would go for it.”11 But the true reasons for his unexpected selection may point to a difficulty that would significantly hamper the Spanish war effort in the years to come: a chronic lack of funding.

Raising the resources necessary to undertake the war was an issue that pressed heavily upon the officials of the Audiencia from the time they decided to undertake an offensive against the Chiriguanaes. The armies of Tarija, Mizque, and Santa Cruz had managed to organize and operate during the course of their 1584 and 1585 campaigns without any expenditure on the part of the colonial state. Soldiers in those regions seem to have responded to the enticement of legally enslaving Chiriguana captives. They also had a vested interest in ridding the region of the Chiriguanaes and the threat they posed. Many of those who enlisted provided their own weapons and supplies during the campaign, while prominent citizens footed the bill for others. Scattered

10 “Carta del capitán Luis de Fuentes al licenciado Cepeda, presidente de la Audiencia de Charcas (Pueblo de Marachiui, 31 agosto 1584),” 242; “Carta del licenciado Cepeda a Luis de Fuentes (La Plata 18 septiembre 1584),” 249.

11 “Carta de la Audiencia de Charcas a S. M. con largo informe … (La Plata 14 Febrero 1585),” 153.
documentary references suggest that extra demands on native communities contributed to the effort as well.\textsuperscript{12}

Fostering similar cooperation in La Plata and Potosí, however, would prove difficult. The scenario had been similar in recent similar circumstances. Viceroy Toledo had had difficulty gaining support and cooperation for his 1574 \textit{entrada} from the citizens of the region (Chapter 6), and the \textit{encomenderos} had fought the Audiencia’s demands that they provide soldiers to secure the frontier only months earlier in the wake of the attack on San Miguel (Chapter 7). The latter situation clearly demonstrates just how little effective power the Audiencia wielded over the \textit{encomenderos}. More importantly, the Audiencia was ill-equipped to recruit and supply an army using state funds. The power of \textit{gobierno} that the Audiencia of Charcas exercised in the absence of the viceroy technically encompassed fiscal matters, but it was neither official nor complete in the practical sense. The Audiencia remained hesitant to requisition royal funds for expenditures related to the \textit{entrada} without royal approval. And as one official put it, the Audiencia “[did] not have permission or license from His Majesty to spend what was necessary for such a just war.”\textsuperscript{13}

\textsuperscript{12} The army advancing from Mizque, under the leadership of Fernando de Cazorla, had been provisioned “at his cost.” See “Declaration of Arias de Herrer (5 June 1584),” 1v. The royal \textit{hacienda} officials of Santa Cruz swore in April of 1585 that “no part of His Majesty’s royal accounts in this city had been spent” on Figueroa’s campaign to that point. See “Relación con documentos que Lorenzo Suarez de Figueroa … sobre el estado de la guerra de los Chiriguanas,” 673. Ñuflo de Chávez’s son Álvaro was among those who outfitted not only himself but several additional soldiers (12 in his case). See “Relación de los servicios de Ñuflo de Chávez y Alvaro de Chávez (La Plata 1588-89),” 242-43. And Fuentes claimed to have funded personally those members of his own force who could not afford to outfit themselves for the \textit{entrada}. See “Carta de la Audiencia de Charcas a S. M. con largo informe … (La Plata 14 Febrero 1585),” 152; and “Memoria de los gastos hechos para la campaña contra los chiriguanas (Tarija, 1584),” in Julien, Angelis, and Bass Werner de Ruíz, \textit{Historia de Tarija}, 251-54.” Native communities in the Mizque region were forced to provide additional transport service and sentinel duty. See “Suplica de Alonso Guarayo y Miguel Cevita, Pueblo de Mizque (28 Nov. 1586),” ANB, EC, 1586.9, 20r-21r. Several native communities had livestock and other resources confiscated in order to supply soldiers. See “Lorenzo Lapaca, Lorenzo Chuquiundo y Juan Condo … sobre ciertos carreros de la tierra que les tomó (1585-1587),” ANB, EC, 1587.2, 6r, 14r-16v. Demands on native communities almost certainly extended beyond these few examples, which survive in the documentary record only because the communities formally fought the requisitions with legal action.

\textsuperscript{13} Bridikhina, \textit{Theatrum mundi}, 37-52; “Carta a S. M. de la Audiencia de Charcas … (La Plata 17 de Febrero de 1584),” 96.
The one royal official who did wield some power over the royal purse strings, in this case, was the royal *factor* at Potosí. His job was to manage the king’s exchequer, including the payment of bills authorized by royal order. Recall that a year earlier, the *factor* had released a sum of silver for expenses related to the foundation of San Miguel on the basis of a creative reading of a royal order written for Viceroy Toledo over a decade before. The man who served as *factor*, both prior to the foundation of San Miguel and as the Audiencia planned the invasion of the cordillera, was none other than Juan Lozano Machuca.¹⁴

The evidence does not prove definitively that the Audiencia empowered Lozano Machuca to lead the main thrust of the *entrada* on the basis of his office and the financial support it might leverage, but it suggests that it may have had some effect. The question of whether Lozano Machuca actually used his position to divert royal funds to the war effort is equally difficult to determine with any certainty. One available document suggests that he did, at least on a limited basis. The document in question references an investigation into a sum of 14,000 pesos. Despite a lack of specific royal approval, the funds seem to have gone to supply the men under Lozano Machuca’s command.¹⁵ Ultimately, the amount was a pittance compared to what would have been necessary to carry out Lozano Machuca’s offensive as planned.

Perhaps the best evidence of Lozano Machuca’s innocence in the matter of diverting royal funds was his failure to organize the *entrada* with which he was tasked. Sometime in late 1584, half a year after he had been scheduled to lead 250 soldiers into the cordillera, he and a

---

¹⁴ “Lozano Machuca, Juan,” in *Diccionario histórico de Bolivia*, 2 vol., ed. Josep M. Barnadas (Sucre: Grupo de estudios históricos, 2002), vol. 2, 118. For the requisitioning of funds for San Miguel with the cooperation of Lozano Machuca, see Chapter 7, and “Acuerdo de los oficiales de la Hacienda Real sobre las fronteras de Tarija y Tomina (Potosí, 12 julio 1583),” 231-34.

¹⁵ “Viceroy Conde del Villar to the Audiencia of La Plata (28 Aug. 1586),” ANB, Corr., Ficha 51, 1r-1v. Determining with any clarity whether he availed himself of more would require far more focused research on the *hacienda real* records at Potosí.
few dozen soldiers set off to populate a section of territory along the Parapetí (known to the Spanish as the Sauces) River (a site on or near modern Monteagudo, Bolivia). The settlement that they formed was known during its brief existence as Concepción de Torremocha. Details about the city—records refer to it as a “ciudad”—are sparse. Already by February of 1585, the fledgling outpost was under great pressure. Violent local resistance to the Spanish presence, combined with the miserable condition of the surrounding lands, had left the settlers in great need. Lozano Machuca had died at the hands of the Chiriguanaes. The Audiencia arranged an emergency shipment of supplies, soldiers, and munitions, but these measures did little to ease the remaining frontier settlers’ misery. The surviving soldiers remained in the fort, “naked, shoeless, and dying of hunger,” under the leadership of Lozano Machuca’s lieutenant, Pedro de Cuellar. They had lost “the spirit for the cause for which they had set out” and were convinced that, without immediate help, “the Chiriguanaes would come and skin all of them alive just like they had done … to Captain Miguel Martín in La Laguna.”

In July of 1585, the Audiencia acknowledged that Lozano Machuca had been a poor choice to lead the entrada: “the experience with Juan Lozano Machuca and Captain Pedro de Cuellar has shown us that the matters of war, and especially those that relate to the cordillera and the Chiriguanaes, are not for everyone.” These men, in the judgment of the Audiencia officials,

---

16 “Carta de la Audiencia de Charcas a S. M. con largo informe … (La Plata 14 Febrero 1585),” 153; “Carta de la audiencia de Charcas a S. M. sobre la provisión del oficio de factor … (La Plata 26 Febrero 1585), in Levillier, Audiencia de Charcas, vol. 2, 200-01; “Viceroy Conde del Villar to the Audiencia of La Plata (19 Sept. 1585),” ANB, Corr., Ficha 43, 1r-2v. It seems that a portion of the population was relocated westward from Concepción de Torremocha during this rescue mission. The relocation of the settlement is alluded to in “Carta del Licenciado Cepeda a S. M. tocante al beneficio … (La Plata 9 Diciembre 1586),” 256. Luis de Fuentes also noted the abandonment of the original site in July-Aug. of 1586. See “Auto constatando la campaña contra los chiriguanaes (Tarija, 3 septiembre 1586),” in Julien, Angelis, and Bass Werner de Ruiz, Historia de Tarija, 256. But a small population remained in, or returned to, the location until its final abandonment in early 1588. None of the contemporary documents (or his biographical entry) indicates the cause of Lozano Machuca’s death, but a transcription of a 1596 document blames the Chiriguanaes for the deaths of “Pedro [sic.] Loçano Machuca” and Pedro de Cuellar. See “Ofrecimiento que hizo Don Pedro Ozores de Vlloa … Decreto de la Audiencia,” in Mujía, Bolivia-Paraguay, vol. 3, 28.
“did not have the necessary skill” to do the job. The Audiencia decided to entrust Lozano Machuca’s responsibilities to Suárez de Figueroa instead. The governor of Santa Cruz came to be in charge of the entirety of the cordillera and proposed efforts to populate it. Finding resources to empower him to carry out his orders, however, remained a difficult task.

Despite the difficulties facing the Spanish war effort at the time, the Audiencia’s January 1586 report to the king and his advisors paints a positive picture. It describes the great destruction visited upon the enemy by Fuentes’ and Suárez de Figueroa’s forces: many Chiriguanaes had been killed and captured; others had fled far from the frontiers of Spanish settlement. The report claims that the initial phases of the entrada had made it so “populations all around the cordillera are free and can take advantage of the fertility [of the region], which beforehand they were not able to do.” And in the meantime, the new populations founded along the frontier—San Juan de Rodas, San Juan de Paspaya, and Cinti—had served well to prevent counteroffensives.  

Autonomy No More, 1586-1588

Almost a year later, in December of 1586, the Audiencia’s reports to the king demonstrate a shift in tone. The elation of easy victories had given way to the challenges of holding the newly won territories, but the officials in charge of the war effort never wavered. They believed that the only way for the Spanish to prevail and eliminate the Chiriguana threat in any lasting sense was to build proper military installations and found new Spanish settlements beyond the frontier. No area was more important to hold than La Barranca in the northern plains,

---

17 “Traslado de una carta de la Real Audiencia … ofreciendo ampliar su jurisdiccion,” in Mujía, Bolivia-Paraguay, vol. 2, 643-47.

the site of Ñuflo de Chávez’ original settlement in 1559. The ravine that gave La Barranca its name (barranca = ravine) was a strategic point through which Chiriguana and allied forces passed when they advanced on the Spanish frontier north of Tomina. Suárez de Figueroa’s forces had occupied an area near the region in 1584-85, and officials believed that it would not be difficult to defend it with a small permanent settlement. Furthermore, a population in La Barranca would satisfy Suárez de Figueroa’s calls for a Spanish presence between Santa Cruz and Mizque that could protect the road connecting Santa Cruz and the Charcas highlands.

Also of import were the proposed foundations of several Spanish settlements “within the cordillera, in the middle of the enemies’ territory.” Concepción de Torremocha represented one such effort. And though the Audiencia’s report acknowledges the difficulties that the settlement faced, officials were undeterred. They simply stressed that the lands of the cordillera would have to be won with special effort and attention. Establishing a lasting, productive presence in the cordillera was simply going to require “oxen and plows [in addition to] muskets and other weapons.”

Suárez de Figueroa’s report on his jurisdiction, written in June of 1586, underlines many of the same issues and reaffirms the notion that the strategy of conquest and occupation was the only possible solution. “Once started,” as the offensive had been two years earlier, it was important that Spanish forces “not let up until they finish punishing and rooting out [the Chiriguanaes] from the cordillera.” He believed that this required the establishment of Spanish towns at La Barranca and on the Sauces (Parapetí) River. The latter region was where

---

19 “Carta del Licenciado Cepeda a S. M. tocante al beneficio … (La Plata 9 Diciembre 1586),” 256-57; “Carta a S. M. de los licenciados Cepeda y Lopidana, contestando a varias reales cédulas. (La Plata 31 Diciembre de 1586),” in Levillier, Audiencia de Charcas, vol. 2, 279-83; “Relación con documentos que Lorenzo Suarez de Figueroa … sobre el estado de la guerra de los Chiriguanaes,” 648-49.
Concepción de Torremocha stood, but Suárez de Figueroa warned that it would require a great deal more effort to ensure its survival. He suggested that the king commit to recruiting 100 musketeers from Asunción to come and fight alongside soldiers from Tomina and Tarija. Together they might engage the Chiriguana factions in that region while the town took root. Failing to prioritize the war, Suárez de Figueroa warned, would put the city of Santa Cruz itself in jeopardy. His own capacities to fight the Chiriguanaes were diminishing each day while the Chiriguanaes regrouped and reestablished themselves.\(^{20}\)

The problem was that all of these plans required much more substantial resources. The Audiencia proudly reported that no royal funds had been used for the war effort up to that point, but permission to tap into the king’s exchequer had become vital to achieving lasting success against the Chiriguanaes. The sources of funding that had sustained the *entradas* over the previous years were reaching exhaustion. Suárez de Figueroa and his *cruceño* soldiers had been lamenting for some time their poverty and inability to contribute further to the war effort. The shortages they faced were exacerbated by a fire that destroyed their fortress in the plains in 1585. The fire wiped out not only their shelter but their supply reserves as well. To make matters worse, Suárez de Figueroa’s salary as governor of Santa Cruz had gone unpaid for many years. Native communities in the highlands, meanwhile, had begun to resist the extraordinary demands made upon them to fund and service the offensives. Officials began to fear that the demands upon some natives within the colonial system would impel them to ally themselves with the Chiriguanaes.\(^{21}\)

\(^{20}\) “Relación de la ciudad de Santa Cruz de la Sierra por su gobernador don Lorenzo Suárez de Figueroa,” 167-69.

\(^{21}\) As explained above, it was probably untrue to claim that *no* royal funds had been used, but they remained minimal. “Relación con documentos que Lorenzo Suarez de Figueroa … sobre el estado de la guerra de los Chiriguanaes,” 655-57, 669-71; “Relación de los servicios de Nuflo de Chávez y Alvaro de Chávez (La Plata 1588-89),” 258-59; “Carta del Licenciado Cepeda a S. M. tocante al beneficio … (La Plata 9 Diciembre 1586),” 257-58. For suits brought by natives against extraordinary requisitions for the war, see “Suplica de Alonso Guarayo y
These difficulties forced the Spanish to reduce the scale of their efforts during the 1586 campaigning season. Suárez de Figueroa’s force returned home at the end of 1585 and did not return to the field the following year. Audiencia officials called upon others to prevent, as much as possible, the reestablishment of Chiriguana factions in those areas won since 1584. Pedro de Segura hoped to mount an offensive from Tomina, but, for unclear reasons, “he could not put it into effect.” Instead, Luis de Fuentes set out again from Tarija with 50 soldiers in July of 1586. The campaign lasted only 24 days in total. Fuentes’ men managed to burn three Chiriguana towns and run off their populations, but the report about the campaign stresses that they would have stayed much longer and “destroy[ed] the Chiriguana caciques” had sufficient manpower and resources been available to them.22

A second issue undermining the continuation of the war effort was the inattention of the Spanish official nominally in charge of it during this time. The sputtering and stalling of Spanish momentum coincided with what amounted to the first days in office for new viceroy of Peru, Fernando de Torres y Portugal, known as the Conde del Villar. Villar had arrived in Lima in November of 1585. His installation in office greatly diminished the Audiencia’s capacity to govern freely. The Audiencia retained its powers of justicia, but by nature of his office the viceroy exercised authority over such matters as making war and founding towns and cities, the powers of gobierno.

In April of 1586, Viceroy Conde del Villar took steps toward taking charge of the war effort. He dispatched an advisor to Charcas in order to gather information, and he commissioned

Miguel Cevita, Pueblo de Mizque (28 Nov. 1586),” 20r-21r; “Lorenzo Lapaca, Lorenzo Chuquicondo y Juan Condo … sobre ciertos carneros de la tierra que les tomó (1585-1587),” 1r-16v; and “1588.44 (16 June 1588),” in López Villalba, Acuerdos de la Real Audiencia de La Plata, vol. 4, 63-64. The last document specifically raises the fear of collaboration between the Chiriguanaes and natives within the Spanish system.

22 “Auto constatando la campaña contra los chiriguanaes (Tarija, 3 septiembre 1586),” 256-57.
Suárez de Figueroa to write a report about his jurisdiction. Soon, other matters soon took precedence. English corsairs were threatening Spanish possessions far and wide. Francis Drake had sacked Santo Domingo in January of 1586, and Thomas Cavendish’s fleet was active on the Pacific coast in the months that followed. These fears of a potential English attack coincided with a devastating earthquake that struck near Lima in July. The resulting tsunami battered the port city of Callao and defensive installations along the coast. The viceroy remained nearly silent on the Chiriguana war while he concentrated his attention and all available resources on matters he found more pressing. He recalled his representative to Charcas in September. Soon after, he demanded that the *encomenderos* of Charcas report to Lima for service in the defense of the kingdom.\(^23\)

The members of the Audiencia appealed the viceroy’s orders to the crown on behalf of the *encomenderos* of Charcas. They argued that removing men and resources from their jurisdiction undermined their own efforts to protect the eastern frontier of the kingdom. Similar disputes between officials at different levels of colonial governance were common under Spanish Habsburg rule, especially during this particular period. The king’s European ambitions were costing more than ever, and the state sought to extract more from, and spend less on, its overseas dominions. Appeals to higher levels of governance delayed and often prevented the implementation of orders from above while allowing local governing bodies some effective autonomy.\(^24\)


\(^{24}\) “Carta a S. M. de los licenciados Cepeda y Lopidana, contestando a varias reales cédulas. (La Plata 31 Diciembre de 1586),” 282-83. For discussion of jurisdictional disputes and appeals to higher authorities in colonial Spanish
system meant that communications often lagged for more than a full year in each direction. The Audiencia wrote its appeal in December of 1586. The king’s ruling on the matter did not reach Charcas for nearly three years. While the matter was pending, the viceroy had little capacity to enforce his directives.\textsuperscript{25}

This type of dissimulation on the part of the Audiencia allowed local officials some autonomy from the viceroy’s directives, but the tactic was limited in its effect. Officials in Charcas remained helpless to take charge of the war effort in any substantive way without the viceroy’s sanction. In other words, dissimulation was not effective as a proactive measure. They could not simply ignore his presence and operate in regards to the war as they had before he took office. Officials in Charcas needed the viceroy’s cooperation in order to initiate an offensive or found a town. The Audiencia knew well that acting without permission on these matters went far beyond mere non-compliance. It was potentially an act of treason.\textsuperscript{26} While the viceroy focused elsewhere, officials in Charcas could do little beyond continuing to voice their appeals to the viceroy and king. Meanwhile, no significant Spanish offensives took place, and Chiriguana factions used the time to regroup and strike back in mid-1587. Travelers on the road between

---

\textsuperscript{25} The king ruled on this matter in February of 1589. See “Para que los encomenderos residan en sus vecindades … (8 de febrero de 1589),” in Cedulario de la Audiencia de La Plata de Los Charcas (Siglo XVI), ed. José Enciso Contreras (Sucre: ABNB, 2005), 487. The Audiencia first noted receiving the ruling at the end of 1589. See “Carta del Licenciado Cepeda a S. M. en contestación de … (La Plata 10 de Febrero de 1590),” 1, 17. The king ultimately sided with the Audiencia. But even if he had not, the appeal would have delayed the undesirable order for a significant period.

\textsuperscript{26} The clearest example of the Audiencia’s recognition of its subservience to the viceroy in such matters of state comes from a 1590 letter, “Carta del Licenciado Cepeda a S. M. en contestación de … (La Plata 10 de Febrero de 1590),” 2. It explains that the Audiencia did not respond to a particular Chiriguana threat (explained in more detail below) because “request[ing] Spanish soldiers for [such an] emergency and making war is a matter of gobierno [a power reserved for the viceroy], and the Conde [del Villar] has not been pleased with me for not going along with him on matters that do not appear to be in your royal interest.”
Mizque and Santa Cruz reportedly fell victim to attacks, and rumors about mobilized Chiriguana factions sent frontier towns scrambling to amass munitions and other defensive supplies.27

The reemergence of hostilities along the frontier in late 1587 drove Viceroy Conde del Villar finally to address matters in eastern Charcas. In his letter from December of that year, he appears supportive of efforts taken against the Chiriguanaes to that point, writing, “it has seemed good to me what you have done to pursue and punish [the Chiriguanaes].” He also informed the Audiencia that Pedro de Ulloa, his lieutenant and the new corregidor of Potosí, would be investigating and advising him on the matter.28 Ulloa’s subsequent investigation into the potential costs of continuing the war effort confirmed the Audiencia’s commitment to the project of populating the cordillera with Spaniards. According to his report, “all [the witnesses he interviewed] were unanimous in the opinion that the best way to be able to pacify these enemies or expel them from the land was to build fortresses and start populations” in the cordillera. They were adamant that “there [was] no other way to suppress them and finish them but this.”29

The cost that Ulloa’s informants estimated would be necessary to found populations and ensure their security—150,000 pesos—greatly tempered the viceroy’s support. He wrote in January of 1588 that the sum far surpassed what the king could spare in a time of “such great need for his exchequer.” The war with the English and the construction of the Grande y Felícísimas Armadas (the famed Spanish Armada) were matters of much higher priority. Instead,

27 “Carta a S. M. del Licenciado Cepeda con sucinta relación de las cosas que tocan a su gobierno (La Plata 25 Julio 1587),” and “Carta a S. M. en su Real Consejo del Licenciado Cepeda, acerca de las cosas convenientes al real servicio y dignas de remedio (La Plata 13 Enero 1588),” both in Levillier, Audiencia de Charcas, vol. 2, 310-11, 314-18; “Acuerdo de los oficiales de la Hacienda Real sobre pólvora y arcabuces (Potosí, 6 mayo 1587),” and “Acuerdos para enviar pólvora a las fronteras de Tarija, Paspaya y Tomina (Potosí, 1-14 octubre 1587),” both in Julien, Angelis, and Bass Werner de Ruíz, Historia de Tarija, 258-63.

28 “Viceroy Conde del Villar to the Audiencia of La Plata (14 Dec. 1587),” ANB, Corr., Ficha 64, 1r-1v.

29 “Relación de los pareceres sobre atajar la guerra de los chiriguanaes,” 304r-08r.
he recommended that officials in Charcas “look at what else can be done that would achieve the same desired effect, always having before their eyes the goal of avoiding costs for the kingdom, at least for now.” To these ends, the viceroy proposed mandating those living in potentially dangerous areas to construct fortresses in which they could sleep each night and watchtowers from which to monitor their surroundings. They might also be expected to post sentinels to warn them of attacks and to take up arms in defense of native communities. The viceroy explained that it may additionally be necessary during this time of care and vigilance to abandon certain lands that could not easily be defended.30

Villar’s plan was essentially the antithesis of the strategy favored by local officials and pursued in recent years. Rather than pushing forward the Spanish presence into the cordillera, he was advocating the consolidation—and in certain cases the abandonment—of the frontier. Nowhere was the distinction clearer than in the case of Concepción de Torremocha. Despite the great efforts that had gone into establishing and protecting the population in recent years, the viceroy ordered it abandoned against even the apparent wishes of the few soldiers who remained there. It was far more crucial, in his estimation, that all available resources and manpower be put towards matters of greater value to the king. He closed the letter with a summary of his assessment of imperial matters: “At this time, one cannot do greater service for His Majesty than to send him your financial support, nor can one cause him greater problems and harm than failing to send it.”31

Predictably, Audiencia officials responded with an appeal to the king. The viceroy’s instructions amounted, in their opinion, to defeat and retreat, and their letter sought to undermine

30 “Viceroy Conde del Villar to the Audiencia of La Plata (2 Jan. 1588),” ANB, Corr., Ficha 65, 1r-2v.
31 Ibid., 1r-4r.
the viceroy’s leadership by blaming him for the recent reversals on the frontier: “Since the Conde del Villar has governed, the Chiriguanaes have recovered so much of their spirit and vigor that they returned … to their bloody and perverse customs.” By contrast, the Chiriguanaes “did not even dare lift their heads” to commit such atrocities when the matter had been under their own authority. Audiencia officials also renewed their calls for a settlement in La Barranca, arguing that it was the only way to ensure safe passage in the region and continued communication with Santa Cruz. They also proposed founding another frontier town between San Juan de Rodas and San Juan de Paspaya. The area was reportedly still vulnerable to Chiriguana incursions, and Francisco Vasquez, “a captain of the old guard,” had volunteered to establish a population in the Pomabamba Valley “at his cost.” The Audiencia saw no downside, but, as the letter explained, the viceroy had ignored all suggestions to the detriment of those who lived in the area.32

The Audiencia’s attack on the viceroy’s leadership was an oversimplification of matters. It was true that the Chiriguanaes were largely in retreat prior to his tenure, and they had begun to recover since he arrived, but this was primarily a factor of the Audiencia’s own outsized expectations. The experience of Juan Lozano Machuca and Concepción de Torremocha demonstrates just how difficult it would have been to occupy and develop the cordillera. The viceroy’s reluctance to issue a blank check for expenses related to the war was simply a function of the larger fiscal reality of Philip II’s imperial Spain. The Audiencia officials maintained their idealistic viewpoint regardless. They continued to argue that pushing the frontiers of Charcas eastward was to God’s and the king’s own utmost benefit. Defeating the Chiriguanaes would not

only allow the church to flourish in newly won territories, new populations beyond the frontier would help ease the flow of silver by supplying Potosí with agricultural goods and laborers.33

**The Affirmation of Local Interests, 1588-1595**

The Audiencia’s many supplications to the crown eventually merited royal attention, and the king’s response would be central to resolving the impasse between viceroy and Audiencia. Philip II and his advisors took time from their preparations for the invasion of England in March of 1588 to address matters in eastern Charcas. The most recent news from Charcas to reach the peninsula was the Audiencia’s December 1586 report. This letter (described in detail above) described the military achievements to that point and outlined plans for additional settlements in the cordillera. It also contained the Audiencia’s first expressions of exasperation with the new viceroy’s apparent lack of enthusiasm for the project. The far more exasperated 1588 reports, of course, had not yet reached Europe.

The instructions written on the king’s behalf in March 1588—one addressed to the Audiencia, the other to the viceroy—were neither critical nor overtly supportive of the Audiencia’s plans, but they validated the efforts made against the Chiriguanaes in two important ways. First, they recognized Suárez de Figueroa as an indispensable figure in maintaining control over the region and authorized the payment of his salary as governor of Santa Cruz and the cordillera. The payment would be crucial to Suárez de Figueroa’s and his fellow cruzeños’ involvement in future Spanish projects in the vicinity of La Barranca. Second, the king elevated the Audiencia’s position relative to the viceroy in the matter of the Chiriguana war. The king’s instructions to the viceroy contain language that demands the Conde del Villar “to supply that

which is most suitable pertaining to the war and the [new] populations, according to the opinion of the Audiencia."\textsuperscript{34} The wording of the king’s response suggests that he and his advisors valued the expertise afforded by the more local perspective, but the Audiencia’s idealistic and hopeful vision for the frontier likely played a part in his instructions. The Audiencia’s reports had promised Spanish expansion into new lands and the triumph of Christianity and civilization over paganism and barbarity. The viceroy’s more practical concerns paled in comparison.\textsuperscript{35}

Before the king’s March 1588 instructions began the ocean crossing for Peru, King Philip and his advisors made an additional determination that also affected Spanish policy toward the Chiriguanaes. They decided to relieve Viceroy Conde del Villar of his duties. A number of factors brought about the change, including the viceroy’s advanced age and allegations of corruption in his inner circle. His successor as viceroy of Peru was García Hurtado de Mendoza, better known as the Marqués de Cañete. He sailed from Spain in March of 1589. Cañete had previously served as governor of Chile, and his firsthand experience with the Araucanians along the frontier in southern Chile made him sympathetic toward the officials in Charcas in their fight against the Chiriguanaes. He arrived in Peru and took office in January of 1590.\textsuperscript{36}

The king’s instructions from March 1588 traveled on the same fleet of ships as the new viceroy, and they arrived in Peru only shortly before he did. Officials in Charcas responded to

\textsuperscript{34} “Sobre los chiriguanaes y otras cosas … (1 de marzo de 1588),” in Enciso Contreras, Cedulario de la Audiencia de la Plata, 460-62; “Real Cédula al conde del Villar (1 Mar. 1588),” AGI, Charcas, 415 L. 2, 47r-48r. Emphasis mine.

\textsuperscript{35} The king’s 1590 instructions, written in response to the Audiencia’s 1588 reports, suggest the same. The king recommended that the viceroy allow his vassals who are most familiar with the Chiriguanaes, especially those from Santa Cruz, to do what was necessary to rid the cordillera of their “bloody and perverse customs.” See “Real Cédula al licenciado Cepeda (20 Mar. 1590),” AGI, Charcas, 415 L. 2, 63r-64v; “Real Cédula a don García de Mendoza (20 Mar. 1590),” AGI, Charcas, 415 L 2, 65r-66v.

\textsuperscript{36} Vargas Ugarte, Historia general del Perú, vol. 2, 305-13. García Hurtado de Mendoza’s father, Andrés Hurtado de Mendoza (also a Marqués de Cañete) served as viceroy of Peru from 1556 to 1561. Andrés was the viceroy who resolved the dispute between Ñuflo de Chávez and Andrés Manso by creating the province of Mojos. He appointed his son García, then in Chile, the nominal leader of Mojos province. Chávez ruled Mojos in his stead. See Chapter 5.
the king’s letter and the appointment of the new viceroy in early 1590 with “new spirit and strength to serve [the king].” Their stance in regards to the Chiriguana frontier, however, had evolved over the intervening years. Rather than pursuing the complete elimination of all Chiriguanaes from the frontier zone and a subsequent occupation of the cordillera, the Audiencia had begun to advocate a more measured and incremental development and advancement of the frontier over time. With the exception of La Barranca, the Audiencia’s 1590 report makes no mention of establishing a Spanish presence in Chiriguana territory. Instead, it focuses on the foundations of new Spanish towns along the frontier—in Pomabamba and Mojocoya—and the further development of the frontier towns founded in recent years—particularly San Juan de Rodas and San Juan de Paspaya. Audiencia reports from subsequent years echo the same themes. The Chiriguanaes were still a presence in the cordillera, but they had ceased to be an imminent threat that compelled their conquest and removal by all necessary means.37

The explicit reason for the Audiencia’s change in approach was the successful war waged against the Chiriguanaes in the years before Viceroy Conde del Villar arrived. The Audiencia claimed that Spanish efforts during that time had led to the deaths of the “most warlike” Chiriguanaes, and the others had been driven “farther into the interior” than they were beforehand. Additionally, the Spanish towns and military installations on the frontier had

37 “Carta del Licenciado Cepeda a S. M. en contestación de … (La Plata 10 de Febrero de 1590),” 1, 3-4, 14-17; “Carta a S. M. del Licenciado Cepeda, dando noticia de … (La Plata 1.º Octubre 1592),” “Carta a S. M. del Licenciado Cepeda, presidente de Charcas, con larga relación … (La Plata 12 Marzo 1593),” “Carta a S. M. del Licenciado Cepeda, sobre la cobranza del donativo gracioso … (La Plata 20 Marzo 1593),” all in Levillier, Audiencia de Charcas, vol. 3, 153-55, 162-68, 187. The Pomabama community did not achieve official municipality status at this time. It remained under the jurisdiction of San Juan de Paspaya. Nevertheless, later testimonies would affirm the population’s immense importance in “the protection of the frontiers against the Chiriguanaes Indians.” See “Méritos a favor de don Alonso Martines del Villar (1 Apr. 1650),” ANB, EC 1650.9, 1r-44v, esp. 1r-1v, 3r, 6r, 12v-13r, 18v, 20r, 21v, 24r, 25r-29v, 31r-32v, 35v, 37v, 39r-39v, 41v.
prevented them from gaining access to Spanish estates and tributary native communities.\textsuperscript{38} There is some truth in these explanations, but the documents show that the real reasons for the change in approach toward the Chiriguanaes were more complex. The challenges of governing the far-reaching and diverse territory of Charcas while struggling to incorporate and tame new territory was simply too great a task.

For one, the growth of the urban centers of Charcas had begun to require bringing new lands under cultivation. The mining sector, particularly, was in great need of resources, and shortages in commodities such as camelids (used to carry freight to and from the highland mining towns) and European beasts of burden (used in and around the mines and mills themselves) were hindering silver output. The best way to remedy the shortages in the immediate sense was to encourage the further development of fields and pasturelands in the still largely unpopulated frontier areas abutting the cordillera to the west. The Audiencia recognized that the development of the territory along the frontier would be a much better investment of the limited resources available. In part, this was due to the developing realization that the growing Spanish population in Charcas was not easily enticed to populate and develop the lands of the cordillera. The Audiencia’s 1590 report notes that the new, American-born generation of Spaniards wished only to establish estates with easy access to the La Plata and Potosí markets. They scoffed at the prospect of developing an estate in the cordillera, which would require a constant struggle against the difficult-to-tame lands, a lack of infrastructure, and pockets of Chiriguana resistance. For them, the cordillera offered “neither gold nor silver, but only arrows.”\textsuperscript{39}

\textsuperscript{38} “Carta a S. M. del Licenciado Cepeda, dando noticia de … (La Plata 1.\textsuperscript{o} Octubre 1592),” 153; “Carta a S. M. del Licenciado Cepeda, presidente de Charcas, con larga relación … (La Plata 12 Marzo 1593),” 162-63.

\textsuperscript{39} “Carta del Licenciado Cepeda a S. M. en contestación de … (La Plata 10 de Febrero de 1590),” 14; “Carta a S. M. del Licenciado Cepeda, presidente de Charcas, con larga relación … (La Plata 12 Marzo 1593),” 162-68; “Carta a S. M. del Licenciado Cepeda, sobre la cobranza del donativo gracioso … (La Plata 20 Marzo 1593),” 187. The excess of Spanish vagabonds in Charcas who were not easily put to work on worthwhile projects was a recurring theme in
The other aspect that led the Audiencia officials to focus on the development of the frontier towns was their greater confidence in the security of most of the immediate frontier region. The cordillera had been relatively quiet in the years since the most recent offensives. Between 1588 and 1593, Chiriguana caciques at different points along the frontier—Tarija, Santa Cruz, and near La Plata—reportedly contacted the Spanish in order to “seek peace.” Some even showed interest in accepting clergymen in their communities. Unfortunately, firsthand reports of these meetings do not exist. The only evidence of their taking place are references in correspondence by the Audiencia and viceroy. These sources suggest, however, that Spanish officials remained wary of the Chiriguanaes’ true aims. Audiencia reports consistently warn that the Chiriguanaes dialogued with the Spanish only in order to gain information that might be used in the course of a future attack.40

The Audiencia was confident, however, about the frontier populations’ collective ability to manage most threats. The Audiencia’s reports from the early 1590s focus on only one location that remained critical for the security of the frontier: La Barranca. The war of the 1580s had
cleared most of the Chiriguana populations out of the northern cordillera west of La Barranca. But as the Audiencia had consistently argued throughout the 1580s, a Spanish population there would prevent others from moving into the region, carrying out incursions into Mizque, or preying upon travelers going to and from Santa Cruz. In February of 1590—mere weeks after Cañete had replaced Villar as viceroy—the task of populating La Barranca was already underway. Soldiers recruited from Santa Cruz had begun to build a fortress on the banks of the Guapay River. The tacit royal permission to found a town in the king’s 1588 instructions had been enough to put plans into motion, and Viceroy Marqués de Cañete would officially sanction the foundation of a city, San Lorenzo el Real de la Frontera, in 1592. The site fell under the jurisdiction of Suárez de Figueroa as governor of Santa Cruz, and the payment of his salary helped cover expenses related to the establishment of the population there. He empowered his lieutenant, Gonzalo de Solís Holguín, to oversee the partitioning of land and labor rights to the first residents. Suárez de Figueroa’s and his fellow cruceños’ enthusiasm for the project, however, was largely tangential to the task of stifling Chiriguana activity in the area. Their experience in the northern plains during 1584 and 1585 had spurred them to believe that the region was better positioned than Santa Cruz for further expeditions into the province of Mojos. This belief helped align the interests of the Spanish officials at the Audiencia level, who had long advocated for the repopulation of the area for security purposes, with those of the residents of Santa Cruz, who remained more interested in the continued exploration of the lands to the north.41

41 García Recio, Análisis de una sociedad de frontera, 44-48, 57-58, 105-07; Finot, Historia de la conquista del oriente boliviano, 237-40. Further evidence of Suárez de Figueroa’s primarily northern focus at this time was his foundation of the short-lived Santiago del Puerto, some 50 leagues north of San Lorenzo, in 1592. It was abandoned in 1594. The Audiencia also highlighted the suitability of La Barranca for the conquest of the Mojos in “Carta a S. M. del Licenciado Cepeda, tratando del bien temporal … y mestizos que la mandan (La Plata 15 Marzo 1591),” in Levillier, Audiencia de Charcas, vol. 3, 113. Cristóbal Samaniego, a prominent cruceño, also contributed toward the
The only significant Chiriguana incursion mentioned in any of the Audiencia’s reports from 1590 to 1595 references an instance that occurred in 1589. It provides a rare partial glimpse into the complex and evolving web of interactions along the Tomina frontier that had been taking place off the official written record. The document reports that sometime in 1589, a Chiriguana cacique named Coyagua gathered a force of 400 warriors to strike a massive blow against the Spanish at San Juan de Rodas. This was presumably the same Coyagua who had led two attacks in the same area six years earlier, including the destruction of San Miguel. According to the Audiencia’s letter, the Viceroy Conde del Villar’s inattention to the matter had left the defenses along that section of frontier ill-equipped to handle such a large offensive. The town only managed to escape the fate of San Miguel due to some seemingly unexpected assistance; a second Chiriguana force intervened before the first could reach the town. The leaders of the second force were Mapae and Areya, the caciques taken prisoner by Pedro de Segura in Tomina in 1582. Mapae and Areya had been Coyagua’s allies leading up to the attack on San Miguel in 1584, but when the two Chiriguana factions met in 1589, they were enemies. They squared off during the course of a major battle that resulted in many casualties on both sides. Afterword, the new corregidor of the Tomina frontier, Melchor de Rodas, led 30 soldiers into the cordillera in support of Mapae and Areya.42

The incident is informative, particularly because it runs so contrary to expectations built solely from the written record. It illustrates unofficial developments, including those taking place

42 “Carta del Licenciado Cepeda a S. M. en contestación de … (La Plata 10 de Febrero de 1590),” 2. The Audiencia officials’ criticism of Villar for the poor state of the frontier defenses is, admittedly, a contradiction of their own recently stated confidence in the security of the frontier. The actual capacity of the frontier defenses at the time is not clear, as they were not directly tested. The chance to criticize Villar one last time was apparently too much to pass up.
beyond the frontier and those that may otherwise have remained clandestine. The first and most obvious example of these unofficial developments is the strife between the two (or more) Chiriguana factions represented by Coyagua, on one side, and Mapae and Areya, on the other. The conflict between them belied the Spanish legal opinions written in justification of the recent war, which nurtured a persistent and misguided characterization of the Chiriguanaes as a unified nation that operated as one entity. The two factions had indeed cooperated in 1583-84, but the alliance had clearly collapsed by 1589. The lack of the Chiriguana perspective makes it difficult to provide a full picture as to why. The most likely scenario is that Coyagua’s faction had been a long-time rival and adversary to that of Mapae and Areya, and they had only found common ground years earlier in their mutual enemy, the Spanish.

The second unofficial development that this incident seems to expose revolves around the question of why Mapae and Areya seemingly endured so much effort and risk in 1589 in order to help their former enemies in San Juan de Rodas. It is another question that cannot be entirely resolved using the available resources, but Melchor de Rodas’ brief testimony about the incident offers some additional insight. Recall that Rodas founded Tomina in 1575, and he claimed to have pacified the local Chiriguana communities during his first tenure as corregidor of the frontier region in 1575-77. Rodas’ account of the 1589 confrontation between the Chiriguana factions largely mirrors the Audiencia’s own, but his testimony indicates that he had developed a relationship with Mapae and Areya over the preceding years. He claimed that he had opened up a dialogue with the caciques during the course of “the fierce war with those who had populated the Sauces [River],” an apparent reference to the 1585 foundation of Concepción de Torremocha. He communicated with them by posting letters in a roadside hut built for the purpose. And later, because of the “love they had for [Rodas]” stemming from his first tenure as corregidor, they
began more direct communications with the Spanish. When Rodas took up the post of corregidor a second time in 1587 or 1588, Mapae and Areya began to send “messengers” directly to the Spanish frontier.43

It seems likely that these messengers engaged in more than just the exchange of information, at least as the relationship evolved. Rodas’ testimony references an occurrence immediately following the confrontation with Coyagua in which Mapae and Areya’s representatives met with several prominent Spaniards along the frontier. They brought with them a group of captives that included, according to Rodas, “some Christian people, … among them an African slave.” Others consisted of native “servants” (personas de serviçio). That these servants were not included among the “Christian people” suggests that they were captives from the cordillera or the eastern lowlands. The Spanish purchased the captives with objects prized by the Chiriguanaes: “taffeta fabric, clothing, scissors, knives, hats, and other things that they made [the Spanish] understand [they should bring].”44

Rodas’ testimony does not necessarily show that the exchange of captives had become a habitual practice, but the most likely scenario suggests that the instance he described was not the first such exchange in the recent past. Trading captives was, in all likelihood, the basis upon which Rodas had managed to renew the alliance between the Spanish on the Tomina frontier and Mapae and Areya in the years prior to 1589. This type of commerce had been integral in maintaining ongoing peaceful cooperation between the two groups prior to 1582 (including when

43 “Actuados sobre el reclamo de Melchor de Rodas contra Pedro Ozores de Ulloa (25 Mar.-9 Aug. 1590),” 1r-3r. The first available documentary reference to Rodas’ second stint as corregidor of Tomina comes from May 1588. See “1588.34 (16 May 1588),” in López Villalba, Acuerdos de la Real Audiencia de La Plata, vol. 4, 50-51.

44 “Actuados sobre el reclamo de Melchor de Rodas contra Pedro Ozores de Ulloa (25 Mar.-9 Aug. 1590),” 2r. The distinction between a personal servant and a slave had legal importance—and this is likely why Rodas used the former term in his testimony—but the categories often bled into one another.

392
Rodas was corregidor of Tomina), and it was the prohibition of the trade in 1582 that contributed to the unraveling of the alliance and the beginning of the Chiriguana war of the 1580s (Chapter 7). Furthermore, the growth of the mining sector exacerbated labor shortages in the region. As the Audiencia’s 1593 report puts it, “all are lacking in laborers because Potosí swallows up and consumes all that there is for one hundred leagues around, and it is not sufficient nor does it satisfy the hunger and need that there is for more Indians.”45 The insatiable demand for mining laborers—a demand that spilled over into related labor markets as well—would have raised the incentive for the Spanish to circumvent the prohibition on purchasing captives from the Chiriguanaes.

In short, the renewal of the trade in captives just prior to 1589 had a number of benefits for the Spaniards along the Tomina frontier as well as their Chiriguana trading partners. For the Spanish, it helped ease labor shortages within Potosí’s strong orbit. For the Chiriguana elite, it provided a reliable supply of products that were largely unavailable to them from any other reliable sources. But perhaps more importantly, the trade provided a security function for those on both sides. While engaged in mutually beneficial commerce, both sides had an incentive not to wage war against the other. In the extreme case of the 1589 battle, it seems that Mapae and Areya went so far as to come to the aid of the Spanish in order to protect their commercial interests and partners, and Rodas repaid the favor by riding out in support of their cause against Coyagua.

The Audiencia officials were apparently ignorant about the arrangements between the Spaniards on the Tomina frontier and their Chiriguana allies, at least in 1590. They responded to

45 “Carta a S. M. del Licenciado Cepeda, presidente de Charcas, con larga relación … (La Plata 12 Marzo 1593),” 165.
the battle between Coyagua and Mapae and Areya by suggesting that Rodas should not involve
himself in the conflict in any way. Both groups of Chiriguanaes were enemies, as far as they
were concerned, and the Audiencia officials “hoped that the war between these Indians would
diminish and exhaust their forces fighting one another” rather than fighting the Spanish.46

There is no evidence to suggest that the Audiencia was any more aware of the interaction
between the first inhabitants of San Lorenzo and the Chiriguana communities in their vicinity.
Here the evolution of the trade in captives seems to have followed a similar path as near Tomina,
though the details are less clear. The first Spanish residents of the new frontier population found
the region sparsely inhabited by natives when they arrived in 1590. The recent war and the 1584-
85 Spanish occupation of the region had taken its toll on the local native peoples, many of whom
likely fled. In 1590-91, just after Solís Holguín assigned a number of local native communities to
serve the Spanish population, a wave of epidemic disease struck the area and killed a significant
portion of the labor force. In the years to come, many communities of natives from Chiquitos
(where Santa Cruz stood at the time) migrated to San Lorenzo with their encomenderos, but
epidemic disease, flight, and the insatiable highland labor market left San Lorenzo chronically
short of laborers. The residents sought other sources of native labor in a variety of ways
throughout the 1590s and beyond, including the capture of Chiriguanaes and their purported
allies during the course of short entradas and the purchase of captives from certain Chiriguana
factions.47

46 “Carta del Licenciado Cepeda a S. M. en contestación de … (La Plata 10 de Febrero de 1590),” 2.

47 García Recio, Análisis de una sociedad de frontera, 155-60, 168-94, 250-75. This movement of natives pledged in
encomienda was squarely against Spanish law, but laws pertaining to native labor were habitually breached in both
Santa Cruz and San Lorenzo during the era under consideration. In earlier and later periods, outright slave
expeditions were also a common (though also illegal) means of procuring native labor in both municipalities. See
The fact that the interactions between Spaniards and Chiriguanaes remained local and unofficial—at least as the documentation portrayed it—was important, and not simply so the Spaniards who participated could avoid punishment. The unofficial nature of these arrangements allowed the members of the Audiencia and their superiors in colonial government to derive the benefits of the illicit activity that bound the two sides together while they retained clean hands and consciences. They could continue to maintain that their approach to frontier rule served the interests of both the church and the king when in fact it varied greatly from the ideal. The ultimate arbiter of the situation, the king, was additionally insulated from local policies and arrangements by the two-year delay in communications.

**Conclusion**

The Spanish offensives against the Chiriguanaes in 1584 began with the premise that Spanish forces could clear their enemies out of the cordillera and northern plains and establish a network of thriving Spanish towns in their stead. The earliest signs were encouraging in this regard. Chiriguana populations offered little resistance as Spanish armies managed to push their ways through the cordillera and clear the region of Chiriguana communities. But as the war drew on, the sheer scale of their endeavor became evident. Those who had devised the entrada had underestimated the problems that terrain and weather would play. The enemy, too, was more persistent than the Spanish had anticipated when it came to defending the cordillera against lasting Spanish settlements.

The reversals suffered by the Spanish drew down the resources available for the war. They also coincided with the Audiencia’s loss of autonomous rule over Charcas, a correlation that local and regional officials blamed on Viceroy Conde del Villar’s reluctance to commit to the security of the eastern frontier. His replacement, driven in part by the king’s own instructions, proved more willing to defer to officials in Charcas. But from the time Viceroy...
Marqués de Cañete took office, local frontier interests were becoming more and more responsible for shaping day-to-day Spanish policy toward the Chiriguanaes. In most aspects, these local interests fit well with the larger concerns that were of import to officials at the Audiencia level and above, but they violated Spanish law and compromised the philosophy behind Spanish rule in the Indies.

This was the case in Santa Cruz and the new settlement of San Lorenzo, where the locals’ desire to found a town in La Barranca, primarily for the purposes of exploration, coincided with the Audiencia’s frontier security concerns. It was also the case along the Tomina frontier, where the security and prosperity of the region united local and higher-level imperial interests. In both locations, local arrangements resulted in the illegal use of native labor and the bartering of captives with the Chiriguanaes despite prohibitions against doing so. The fact that the illicit aspects of the evolving local, frontier policies remained unofficial and (mostly) hidden from higher-level officials allowed them to continue. As the following chapter demonstrates, the illicit trade between Spaniards on both the Tomina and San Lorenzo frontiers and certain factions in both locations would continue and evolve to fit the legal, economic, and political realities of the times.
Figure 8-1. Locations referenced in Chapter 8. Adapted from Wikimedia Commons, http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Bolivia_Topography.png.
Figure 8-2. Illustration of the Charcas Chiriguana frontier from 1588. “Mapa de la cordillera en que habita la nación Chiriguana que por la parte del Este confina con la provincia de los Charcas … (1588),” AGI, Mapas y Planos, Buenos Aires, 12. The orientation is such that north is to the left.
As the Marqués de Cañete’s tenure as viceroy of Peru continued into the mid-1590s, Spanish policy toward the Chiriguanaes remained static. Officially, Spaniards and mestizos were prohibited from any form of trade or other interaction with the peoples of the cordillera. Unofficially, local frontier interests took advantage of arrangements with certain Chiriguana leaders to trade Spanish goods for captive laborers. Cañete’s successor as viceroy, Luis de Velasco, would be far more vocal in his opposition to the flouting of Spanish law in favor of frontier interests. Velasco’s prior experience as viceroy of New Spain provided a model by which he might reduce the levels of conflict on the Charcas-Chiriguana frontier. It necessitated, above all, the closure of the frontier and the prohibition of contact between Spaniards and Chiriguanaes. Velasco stood by his policy despite opposition from officials and residents of the frontier who wished to take fuller advantage of the resources beyond the frontiers of Spanish settlement.

The policy coincided with a relatively long period of peace along the frontier. I argue that Velasco’s policy of strict segregation was conducive to this peace because it effectively limited the interactions across the frontier and prevented Spaniards from attempting settlement in the cordillera. But the policy also functioned precisely because it failed to eliminate interactions between the two groups. The viceroy’s limited ability to enforce his policy allowed frontier Spaniards and Chiriguanaes to continue to engage in the type of mutually beneficial interactions that contributed to peace in the previous decades. This chapter begins by describing the inspiration for Velasco’s Chiriguana policy and its (partial) implementation on the Tomina frontier. The discussion touches upon the circumvention of the policy as well as resistance to it. The chapter then addresses the state of the San Lorenzo frontier during the same era.
As the Marqués de Cañete’s tenure came to a close, the Audiencia of Charcas was forced to address the illegal trade in native captives that was occurring within its jurisdiction. The practice had become more visible since the end of the war. Multiple reports from 1595 make reference to the ongoing exchange of Chané along the Tomina and Mizque frontiers. In some cases the flouting of the prohibition on this type of trade was blatant. Not only did “some Spaniards and mestizos [go] to the Chiriguanaes to trade for Chané Indians,” a significant secondary market had developed in the urban centers of Charcas. Specialist merchants sold their captives “publically and freely in … Potosí and this city [La Plata] as if they were slaves.” The Audiencia responded by setting out new, harsh penalties for anyone found to be carrying on unauthorized interactions with the peoples of the cordillera. Officials hoped that their new emphasis would serve to prevent such behavior in the future.¹

The Audiencia’s new emphasis on preventing and punishing unauthorized interaction with the peoples of the cordillera fit well with the Chiriguana policy mandated by the new viceroy of Peru, Luis de Velasco, who replaced Cañete in 1596. Velasco emphasized from early on in his tenure that the Spanish must seek by all necessary means to prolong the peace along the frontier. He feared that any interaction between Spaniards and Chiriguanaes might destabilize the region and begin a costly war that could also threaten the highland mining industry. The goal,

¹“Carta a S. M. de la Audiencia de Charcas sobre multiples asuntos de hacienda y gobierno … (La Plata 17 de Febrero de 1595),” and “Carta a S. M. del Dr. D. Jerónimo Tovar y Montalvo, fiscal de la Audiencia … (La Plata 20 de Febrero 1595),” both in Levillier, Audiencia de Charcas, vol. 3, 240-41, 256-57. The term Chané, in this case, was more likely a general indication of captive, pseudo-slave status rather than a proper ethnic descriptor. The Chiriguanaes called the Chané tapuya, which translates to slave. See Chapter 2.
therefore, was total separation. As he put it, “the surest way forward is to defend our house and not provoke the enemy or go to his [house] to look for him.”

Velasco’s caution stemmed in large part from his mandate to minimize costs and maximize revenues within his jurisdiction. King Philip II’s kingdoms remained at war with England, the Dutch United Provinces, and the advance of Protestantism throughout Europe. The silver originating in highland Charcas accounted for no small part of the revenues upon which these efforts—and the servicing of debts related to them—depended. But his approach also owed to his experiences in Mexico, where he had spent most of his adult life. He arrived in Mexico in the late 1550s during his father’s tenure as viceroy of New Spain. The elder Velasco’s time in office coincided with the beginnings of the Chichimeca War, a long and costly series of conflicts with loosely confederated native peoples in north central Mexico. Conflict with the Chichimeca peoples would continue largely unabated through the 1580s. Major conflicts on the Chichimeca frontier came to an end during the younger Velasco’s first stint as viceroy of New Spain, 1590-95.

The end of the Chichimeca War was the result of a reimagined approach to the northern Mexican frontier implemented by Velasco’s predecessor, Álvaro Manrique de Zúñiga, Marqués of Villamanrique and viceroy of New Spain from 1585 to 1590. Villamanrique had come to recognize the ways in which Spanish soldiers contributed to the persistent native unrest in the region. He wrote in 1590 that the soldiers stationed in the northern presidios nearest the Chichimecas “were the ones making the war, irritating the Indians and provoking them to

---

2 “Viceroy Luis de Velasco to the Audiencia of La Plata (4 Oct. 1596),” ANB, Corr., Ficha 227, 1r-2r.

3 Vargas Ugarte, Historia general del Perú, vol. 3, 11-18. For discussion of the role played by silver from Upper Peru in the ongoing financing of the Habsburg European wars, especially during the tenure of Philip II, see Stein and Stein, Silver, Trade, and War, 21-34, 40-56.
hostility.” He removed the great majority of the soldiers and began two programs designed to achieve peace without war. The first was a plan often called “peace by purchase.” It involved making strategic gifts or payments to native communities that had been deemed threatening. The program was designed to limit the incentive to attack Spanish interests and instead create bonds of friendship. The second was a program of instruction in “civilized life” for the frontier native peoples. It included training in sedentary land use by missionaries or other Spanish advisors as well as the resettlement of whole communities of pacified native peoples from central Mexico to serve as behavioral models. Velasco continued both programs while he also worked to eliminate Spanish slave raids that preyed upon the natives beyond the frontiers of Spanish control. Already by 1591, the great majority of the gran chichimeca frontier territory was said to be pacified.⁴

Preventing unauthorized interactions between Spaniards and the natives beyond the settled frontier would prove to be more difficult in the southeastern Andes than it was in New Spain. The Audiencia of Charcas’ new emphasis on the prohibition of such contacts in 1595 seems to have put an end to the most egregious violations of the law, but noncompliance remained a nagging problem. Viceroy Velasco felt the need to highlight the prohibition in much of his correspondence with the Audiencia throughout the 1590s. By 1601, he went so far as to call for the appointment of a special judge dedicated to the matter.⁵ But despite his emphasis, there exist references to only two occasions in which Spaniards were taken to task for entering

---


⁵ “Viceroy Luis de Velasco to the Audiencia of La Plata (2 Jan. 1597),” ANB, Corr., Ficha 234, 1r-1v; “Viceroy Luis de Velasco to the Audiencia of La Plata (1 Feb. 1599),” ANB, Corr., Ficha 288, 1r; “Viceroy Luis de Velasco to the Audiencia of La Plata (no date indicated; 1600 or 1601),” ANB, Corr., Ficha 316, 1r-1v. It is not clear whether a judge was ever appointed in this role.
the cordillera without permission. One involved a “foreigner in a monk’s habit,” who was arrested in 1596. The other involved a group of Spaniards who were fined in 1599 for trading with the Chiriguanaes.6

It is extremely likely that the vast majority of illegal contact went unpunished, though the true measure of the frequency and volume of trade (the most common type of contact) between the two groups is impossible to measure with any precision. Those involved had incentive to avoid documenting their behavior, particularly in the types of sources that have tended to survive. Some evidence that dates to just prior to and just after Velasco’s time in office, however, suggests a bit about the nature of the interactions during the period in question.

The first piece of documentation references a small-scale entrada into the cordillera undertaken by the residents of San Lorenzo in 1595. They had entered the region after an apparent attempt to attack the fledgling town (more detail on this incident below). After burning a Chiriguana village in the northern part of the cordillera, the small Spanish force stumbled upon “four Spaniards and mestizos who went about among these Indians and had entered from Tomina in order to trade.” Based on the location of the encounter, they had traveled a significant distance from Tomina.7

More informative yet is testimony relating to an instance dating to 1606 in which the corregidor of Tomina sent a party into the cordillera to undertake an official investigation. His instructions to the leader specifically state that, “under no circumstances [should he] attempt to

6 “Viceroy Luis de Velasco to the Audiencia of La Plata (20 Nov. 1596),” ANB, Corr., Ficha 230, 1r-1v; “Viceroy Luis de Velasco to the Audiencia of La Plata (1 Aug. 1599),” ANB, Corr., Ficha 288, 1r. Virtually no details are available regarding the crimes and punishments to which Velasco alluded in these letters. The evidence, of course, may not be complete. The Libros de acuerdos from the Audiencia of Charcas relating to the years 1590-1621 have been lost.

7 “Información de oficio de los servicios del Governador Gonzalo Solis Holguin … (1603),” in Mujía, Bolivia-Paraguay, vol. 3, 85-86.
trade for any captives from the Chiriguanaes.” Their sole purpose was to be the “service of our Lord,” rather than the pursuit of any commercial interests. Despite the instructions, the leader of the investigation admitted upon his return to having carried out trade on his own behalf and for a number of Spanish residents of the frontier. He had carried with him on his trip merchandise ranging from metal goods to fabric and clothing and a horse. The document does not describe what he brought back to Tomina except for one piece of “merchandise”: an African slave who had escaped from his property. He exchanged four pieces of iron and a suit of clothing (with whom is not clear) for the return of the slave.

The testimony from the investigative party further makes it clear that they were not the only ones undertaking this type of commerce in the cordillera. They ran into a “mulato sambo,” (an individual of African, Amerindian, and possibly European racial makeup) laden with trade goods who was attempting to barter beads, high-prestige clothing, and metal blades for captives and other “prizes.” He claimed to be doing business on behalf of a high-ranking frontier official, the lieutenant corregidor of Tomina and alcalde ordinario of San Juan de Rodas. Moreover, the mulato sambo trader reported to the investigators that he had encountered two natives on a similar errand for a different Spanish resident of the frontier. These men—one an Itatín, the other “from the plains”—were seeking to trade high-prestige clothing provided by their client for “ten Christian Indian captives that belonged to” the Spaniard.8

These two surviving references suggest that, despite Velasco’s efforts to stamp out the ongoing trade, there was little risk of punishment for violating the prohibitions in place. The

---

8 “Memoria y instrucción de lo que ha de hacer Diego Antón en la Cordillera de los Chiriguanaes … (6 Dec. 1606-4 Apr. 1607),” ANB, Corr., Ficha 606, 6r-6v. The document does not offer clues to the identities of the 10, nor does it explain how they came to be in the cordillera. The Itatín merchant is described as a “Guarayo.” For the association of the term with the Itatín, see Combés, Diccionario étnico, 163.
involvement of the high-ranking royal official—someone who was responsible for applying viceregal orders—points to one reason why. The personal benefit that he derived from the trade was at odds with his official duties.

The emphasis on the prohibition on the captive trade may, however, have contributed to changes in the ways it was carried out. In both of the cases described above, the time and resources put into the journeys suggests that the trade had become the domain of specialists who catered to particular Spanish and Chiriguana customers. What differed between the two cases, however, were the identities of the individuals who occupied this intermediary position. In the first case from 1595, the merchants were Spaniards and mestizos coming from Tomina. This matches how the trade had functioned in the 1570s and early 1580s when men like Melchor de Rodas, García Mosquera, and Miguel Martín facilitated the exchanges. In the second from 1606, the specialist merchants described in the document were figures who had come of age in and around the cordillera during a now-decades-long history of interactions between the groups. They were emblematic of a growing group of non-Spaniards who could operate comfortably on the margins of both Spanish and Chiriguana society. The arrangements formed between the Spanish and these intermediaries allowed Spaniards to continue to derive the benefit of trade with the Chiriguanaes while maintaining at-least-partial compliance with the legal prohibition against it. 9

Trade between the two groups was also difficult to root out for the fundamental reason that it was a mutually beneficial exercise. Like other instances of free trade, the exchange of

---

9 One of the primary themes of Saïgnes’ work on the Chiriguanaes during this era involves highlighting the emergence of the Hispano-Guaraní mestizo. For his clearest work on this theme, see Saïgnes, “Entre ‘bárbaros’ y ‘cristianos,’” 13-51. His work is focused, however, on those figures who primarily lived within the Spanish orbit, such as Mosquera, rather than the primarily native figures about whom there is very little information.
captive laborers for European products satisfied relative scarcities on both sides of the frontier. This mutual benefit came in this case, however, at the detriment of the victims of the captive taking economy: the Chané and other native peoples living in the cordillera and the eastern lowlands. But the wellbeing of those who were regularly subject to Chiriguana captive raids and de facto enslavement by both the Chiriguanaes and the Spanish was something that the Spanish tended to consider selectively and for their own benefit. They most often characterized these peoples simultaneously as victims in need of Spanish protection and as the means to remedy labor shortages in the highland mines and related supporting industries.

Lowland natives taken from beyond the frontiers of Spanish settlement and delivered to Spanish masters by barter or capture fell into the Spanish legal category of “personal servants” (*personas*/*indios de servicio* or *naborías*). Spaniards in Charcas and elsewhere in highland Peru used the term interchangeably with the term for the similar Inca-era category, “*yanacona,*” even when applied to natives for whom it lacked the cultural context of the Inca past. *Yanaconas* and personal servants were technically distinct from slaves, but in practice the categories often bled into one another. The eastern lowlanders in the service of the Spaniards on the Charcas-Chiriguana frontier are often described as slaves, and, especially in distant frontier regions poorly controlled by royal representatives, personal servants were sold in a manner legally applicable only for slaves. Similar widespread abuse led King Charles to outlaw the use of personal servants in Peru in 1542, but the provision was widely ignored, and the practice remained common into the seventeenth century. King Philip III reaffirmed his grandfather’s

---

10 To his credit, Velasco would prove to be an exception to this rule. See below, and “Fragmentos pertinientes de una carta del Virrey Don Luis de Velasco … (Mayo 5, 1602),” in Mujía, *Bolivia-Paraguay*, vol. 3, 52-56.
prohibition on personal servitude in a 1601 royal order, but the Audiencia suspended the implementation of the ban.\textsuperscript{11}

The subject of the non-Chiriguana residents of the cordillera and the lands to the east came up most often in the written record, during this period, when the officials in Charcas lobbied the viceroy and king to pursue a far more interventionist policy towards the Chiriguanaes. On a number of occasions between 1595 and 1604, the members of the Audiencia and others in prominent positions proposed large-scale \textit{entradas} aimed at expelling the Chiriguanaes and incorporating the cordillera and its inhabitants directly into the Spanish dominions. One aspect of their arguments in favor of the plan was that it would save a great many natives from ongoing Chiriguana predations. Instead, the Spanish might “bring [the peoples there] the knowledge of the holy Catholic faith.” Incorporating the region would also allow them finally to stamp out the illicit sale of “slaves … brought from the eastern plains.”\textsuperscript{12} Both were benefits that highlighted the idealized aspects of Spanish imperialism.

The proposals also highlighted the potential economic benefits for Charcas and, particularly, the highland mining sector. Proponents did not wish to lose the labor provided by the captive trade without a ready replacement. The replacement labor, under the proposed scenarios, would come from essentially the same groups of people, only by other legal and quasi-legal mechanisms. If anything, extending Spanish dominion over the cordillera and the lands

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{11} Barnadas, \textit{Charcas}, 289-98; García Recio, \textit{Análisis de una sociedad de frontera}, 185-90, 231-36; Renard-Casevitz, Saignes, and Taylor, \textit{Al este de los Andes}, vol. 1, 264-68; Vargas Ugarte, \textit{Historia general del Perú}, vol. 3, 45-74. For the Audiencia’s suspension of the 1601 ban on personal servitude, see “Audiencia of La Plata to the King (1 Mar. 1606),” AGI, Charcas, 18 R. 3, N. 10, 1r-1v. During the wars of the 1570s and 1580s, there were additional semi-legal measures by which Chané and other lowland natives living among the Chiriguanaes were subject to terms of personal service. See Chapters 6 & 7.

\textsuperscript{12} “Carta a S. M. del Licenciado Cepeda, con particular relación del estado … (La Plata 28 Marzo de 1595),” in Levilier, \textit{Audiencia de Charcas}, vol. 3, 259-65.
\end{flushright}
beyond would have provided even more direct access to native laborers to work in the silver mines and related industries. The Audiencia concluded that once the Spanish were in control of the eastern lowlands, the natives “could comfortably be taken out [of the region], and half of them put in Potosí,” while the other half served on the farms and ranches of the Spanish frontier communities.13

Another potential benefit of taking action against the Chiriguanaes was that it might represent a productive outlet for the many idle Spaniards in Charcas. The Audiencia had noted the excess of American-born vagabonds in the region in the preceding years, but the immigration of unskilled, low-born people from Spain and elsewhere in the Americas had exacerbated the problem. Officials complained that these so-called vagabonds were not only unproductive, their idleness and moral failings set a poor example for the native peoples with whom they interacted. Officials envisioned a scenario in which they would fight for land in the cordillera, then develop ranches and farms in the region, thereby becoming productive subjects.14 The crux of this proposal—employing the idle Spaniards of Charcas in the conquest and development of the cordillera—was nearly identical to a plan dismissed by the Audiencia five years earlier in 1590. Officials determined then that not enough men would be willing to undertake the project. The

13 “Carta a S. M. del Licenciado Cepeda, con particular relación del estado … (La Plata 28 Marzo de 1595),” 259-65. The 1595 letter from the president of the Audiencia most clearly states the motivations for an entrada, but others employ similar logic. See also “Ofrecimiento que hizo Don Pedro Ozores de Vlloa … Decreto de la Audiencia,” 23-47; “Capitulación de Pedro Lopez de Zavala en que ofrece poblar en los Chiriguanos … (1602),” in Mujía, Bolivia-Paraguay, vol. 3, 57-64; “Carta de la Audiencia de Charcas acerca de cuanto consideraba … (La Plata 10 Abril 1597),” and “Carta a S. M. de la Audiencia de Charcas en la cual después de dar cuenta del … (La Plata 6 Marzo 1600),” both in Levillier, Audiencia de Charcas, vol. 3, 315-16, 433-34. For more on the shortages in Potosí at this time, see “Carta a S. M. del Licenciado Cepeda, presidente de Charcas, con larga relación … (La Plata 12 Marzo 1593),” 165-68.

14 “Carta a S. M. del Licenciado Cepeda, con particular relación del estado … (La Plata 28 Marzo de 1595),” 260-62.
landless were only willing to develop territory with more direct access to the Potosí and La Plata markets, and they did not want to contend with the Chiriguanaes.15

Certain new factors appear to have influenced the Audiencia’s renewed interest in the plan five years later. The first was the Audiencia’s estimate of just how many native peoples the Chiriguanaes controlled. According to a letter addressed to the king, “only three or four factions … have gathered together 20,000 Chané Indians.” Among the other “ten or twelve factions that there are, there are at least 30,000 [additional enslaved] Indians, in addition to the very savage and bestial [peoples] who live in the plains that fall on the other side of the cordillera.”

Furthermore, the lands of the cordillera and the eastern plains represented the only remaining land areas that the Spanish might develop within reasonable reach of the eastern highlands. By this time, other territories along the frontier had already been “given, sold, and pledged,” largely to native groups that depended upon them for their survival.16 In short, the frontier areas abutting the cordillera to the west had been largely put into production, yet the demand for resources in Charcas was outstripping the supply. The solution advanced by the Audiencia and others in Charcas was to boost the supply of a number of scarce resources by looking to the lands and native peoples beyond the reach of Spanish dominion in the east.

Another factor influencing the Audiencia’s interest in a new entrada was the involvement of the prominent former corregidor of Potosí and lieutenant to Viceroy Conde del Villar and Marqués de Cañete, Pedro de Ulloa. He proposed a plan to carry out an invasion in 1596. His proposal was a factor leading the Audiencia to believe that the development of the cordillera

15 See Chapter 8; and “Carta del Licenciado Cepeda a S. M. en contestación de … (La Plata 10 de Febrero de 1590),” 14.

16 “Carta a S. M. del Licenciado Cepeda, con particular relación del estado … (La Plata 28 Marzo de 1595),” 262-63. There is no indication how the Audiencia came to these numbers.
could be undertaken “at moderate cost and [with] little work.” Unlike Juan Lozano Machuca, the choice to lead the 1583 invasion, Ulloa was a man with significant Old-World military credentials. He also pledged to provide the majority of the costs of the mission from his own personal fortune. In exchange, he requested a number of honors and dispensations, including the perpetual governorship of the Santa Cruz region and the cordillera, as well as any newly discovered provinces.¹⁷

Ulloa’s plan called for the founding of two new Spanish towns of 80 to 100 inhabitants each, complete with military installations, in territory occupied by the Chiriguanaes. He argued that he could achieve his goal with an invasion force of no more than 250 or 300 Spanish soldiers. The key was the cooperation of two Chiriguana caciques, whom Ulloa claimed would welcome and support the Spanish in pursuit of their mutual enemies. Ulloa described one, Pedro Mangurei, as “one of the foremost caciques of the cordillera.” Manguri pledged “to subject himself to your royal crown and, in order [to serve the king] better, requested a priest to indoctrinate and teach [his people].” The other, Yambatuig, also offered fealty to the Spanish crown as well as the 1,200 warriors under his command. His primary goal, according to Ulloa, was “to avenge himself against the caciques and Indians who … killed his father and brothers four years earlier.”¹⁸

---

¹⁷ “Ofrecimiento que hizo Don Pedro Ozores de Ulloa … Decreto de la Audiencia,” 23-47. The governorship Ulloa sought included a salary and the rights to assign native labor and land throughout the jurisdiction. Ulloa also requested the leadership of the corregimientos of Tomina and Mizque for his lieutenants, four Jesuit priests, 150 native auxiliaries, military supplies, and a loan of 50,000 pesos. The loan would be repaid, according to the proposal, following the successful establishment of the new towns and upon the delivery of the other awards demanded above. For more on Ulloa’s military service in Europe and North Africa, see “Actuados sobre el reclamo de Melchor de Rodas contra Pedro Ozores de Ulloa (25 Mar.–9 Aug. 1590),” 11r-11v.

¹⁸ “Carta a S. M. del Licenciado Cepeda, con particular relación del estado … (La Plata 28 Marzo de 1595),” 262; “Ofrecimiento que hizo Don Pedro Ozores de Ulloa … Decreto de la Audiencia,” 23-47.
Mangurei and Yambatuhig were not the only Chiriguana caciques in recent times to propose an alliance with the Spanish of Charcas in order to fight against other Chiriguana factions. In 1592 or 1593, several Chiriguana leaders approached Tomina with the same strategy in mind. At that time, Viceroy Marqués de Cañete recommended refusing any negotiations with the Chiriguanaes, “because their cunning and malice is great, and there is little security in agreeing to anything with them because they do not know how to keep their word.” In February of 1596, the members of the Audiencia also reported having received multiple requests “during the past months” to enter the cordillera in support of one Chiriguana faction against another. They explained that they chose not to act due to “the treachery and cunning that [the Chiriguanaes] typically show.”

Viceroy Velasco’s response to Ulloa’s proposal reflected similar caution, but his primary concern was the potential cost of the invasion. In October of 1596, he wrote that Philip II was in such dire financial straits that “there is no place here to spend his finances on new conquests.” Velasco did not oppose a war of conquest on principle. His opposition stemmed from the same spirit of pragmatism that led to his policy of separation between Spaniards and Chiriguanaes. His approached called upon those near the frontier to “take advantage of the best peace available and not raise [the banner of] war until a time that there is no safer road” but to do so.

Audiencia officials in La Plata refused to let the matter drop. They appealed to the king in 1600 in order to urge action against the Chiriguanaes. They cited the constant pressure the Chiriguanaes exerted on San Lorenzo while noting that only the relentless vigilance of the

---

19 “Viceroy Marqués de Cañete to the Audiencia of La Plata (10 Mar. 1593),” ANB, Corr., Ficha 156, 1r; “Carta de la Audiencia de Charcas a S. M. sobre materias de hacienda … (La Plata 23 de Febrero de 1596),” in Levillier, Audiencia de Charcas, vol. 3, 305. The identities and affiliations of these other “curacas y principales” are not clear. These contacts may have led to Ulloa’s tentative agreements with Mangurei and Yambatuhi.

20 “Viceroy Luis de Velasco to the Audiencia of La Plata (4 Oct. 1596),” 1r-2r.
frontier settlers prevented them from attacking elsewhere as well. Both claims read as exaggerations in light of the other evidence from the time.\textsuperscript{21} But more pertinently, they claimed that finally conquering the Chiriguanaes “will bring to peace a great number of tame and docile people who live on the other part of the Chiriguana cordillera who would supply all the labor necessary for the mines and for the benefit of the [extraction of] silver ores from Potosí.”\textsuperscript{22}

The Audiencia’s case for mounting an invasion of the cordillera struck a chord with the new king, Philip III, who had ruled since his father’s death in 1598. A royal communique sent in the king’s name in 1601 openly challenged Velasco for his inaction. It asked why the viceroy had failed to “subdue that nation” even after the Audiencia had pointed out to him on numerous occasions that he could do it “at little or no cost to [the royal] treasury.” The new king and his advisors had little context or perspective on the matter of the Chiriguanaes or the previous failed attempts to subdue them. As a result, even the wording of the 1601 royal \textit{cédula} reflected the Audiencia’s letter from the prior year. It, too, pointed to the “tame and docile people” who would benefit from baptism into the church, as well as the positive impact their labor would have on the output of the mines. The king and his advisors saw no reason not to expand Spanish dominion across the cordillera.\textsuperscript{23}

\textsuperscript{21} The only evidence of Chiriguana attacks at this time on the Charcas frontier comes from Díaz de Guzmán, who references an attack upon a Spanish property near San Juan de Rodas in 1598. See Díaz de Guzmán, “Los chiriguanos,” 78. The incident does not appear in other surviving documentary evidence. Solís Holguín’s 1603 testimony contradicts that there had been any attacks. He claimed that since the foundation of San Lorenzo, “never more have the Chiriguanaes done any harm in this province of Charcas, and the citizens and peoples of this province have lived quietly and peacefully and the royal roads secure.” See “Información de oficio de los servicios del Governor Gonzalo Solis Holquin … (1603),” 73. The people of San Lorenzo were subject to occasional Chiriguana threats for a brief time after 1595. See below.

\textsuperscript{22} “Carta de la Audiencia de Charcas acerca de cuanto consideraba … (La Plata 10 Abril 1597),” 315-16; “Carta a S. M. de la Audiencia de Charcas en la cual después de dar cuenta del … (La Plata 6 Marzo 1600),” 433-34; “Carta a S. M. del Dr. Arias de Ugarte sobre la necesidad de aumentar jueces en la Audiencia … (La Plata 10 de Noviembre 1600),” in Levillier, \textit{Audiencia de Charcas}, vol. 3, 457-59.

\textsuperscript{23} “Real Cédula to don Luis de Velasco (12 Apr. 1601),” AGI, Charcas, 415 L. 2, 131v-132r.
Velasco maintained his stance against an invasion when he responded to the king in 1602. His reasoning shows that he had heeded not just the lessons of the *entradas* of the 1570s and ‘80s, but also the lessons of the Chichimeca frontier in Mexico. His letter questioned the feasibility of Ulloa’s plan in arguing that it would likely result in a protracted war that would cost far more than what Ulloa pledged to provide. Velasco understood that the presence of soldiers, especially poorly paid ones, often contributed to the conflict they were assigned to contain and made enemies out of neutrals. The effect would be particularly problematic on the Chiriguana frontier because the proposed *entrada* was driven by the desire to incorporate the natives’ labor by a variety of methods. Removing excess soldiers from the frontier and fighting the efforts of slave hunters had opened the door for peace in Mexico. He was not about to do the opposite in Charcas.\(^\text{24}\)

Velasco also questioned the economic benefits of the proposed *entrada*, even if it were to go as planned. He was uncomfortable, legally and morally, with the prospect of incorporating the labor of the peoples of the cordillera and the eastern lowlands into the mining economy. He openly criticized the proponents of the *entrada* for their unwillingness “to consider … if it is just to condemn [the natives] to captivity and such harsh slavery.”\(^\text{25}\) The statement served to highlight the hypocrisy inherent in the act of liberating the non-Chiriguana peoples from slavery only to subject them to coercive labor by a different mechanism.

Instead, Velasco floated the possibility of a peace by purchase plan. His letter described for the king an incident that suggested the Chiriguanas’ might be receptive of such a program. According to Velasco, some Chiriguanas leaders had come to Potosí to proclaim their friendship

\(^{24}\) “Fragmentos pertinentes de una carta del Virrey Don Luis de Velasco … (Mayo 5, 1602),” 52-56.

\(^{25}\) Ibid., 55. The term “slavery,” here is a figurative one since he is referring to a wide group of peoples, the vast majority of whom would not be subject to slavery in the legal sense.
with the Spanish. They departed after “having been given something to wear and a few other things.” Their delight over the gifts caused them to return peacefully to Potosí and, eventually, to request a priest for their village. Velasco granted that the priest was not sent at the time “because one cannot and should not trust them without assurances,” but he opined that “if one were able to achieve the pacification, it would be better to do so [in this way] rather than by war,” as the Audiencia advocated.  

Velasco never went any further with the implementation of a peace by purchase plan than merely mentioning it on this occasion. Nor did he express any inclination toward a program aimed at resettling specific native communities to the frontier for the purposes of civilizing the Chiriguanaes. The most likely reason for his reticence was that the costs of carrying out such plans were prohibitive. In Mexico, both programs involved significant royal expenditures to implement. Velasco was able to argue during his time in New Spain that the costs of the programs were immediately justified because they prevented other outlays related to war. The silver mining sector in Mexico lay in the heart of the gran chichimeca, so, short of abandoning the mines, he faced a choice there between waging war and purchasing peace. Velasco wrote just prior to his departure for Peru that “even at its most liberal, [the cost of the programs] has not equaled the costs of war.” But he could not make the same argument in Charcas. The highland silver mines of Peru and their supply routes were no longer in any significant danger of Chiriguana attack. The frontier had been relatively peaceful for some time even though there had been no royal expenditures of any note allocated to defense since the 1570s. Instead of proposing

26 Ibid., 52-56.
27 Powell, Soldiers, Indians, & Silver, 198-99; Powell, “Peacemaking on North America’s First Frontier,” 221-47.
a new and costly program, he argued that continuing along the same path of strict separation and vigilance along the frontier would keep “damages to a minimum.”

Velasco’s response satisfied the crown in the matter, but his arguments did little to dissuade Spaniards on the frontier from continuing to propose additional methods and means for the pacification of the cordillera. Pedro López de Zavala, son of the former corregidor of Tomina Pedro de Segura, made an offer in 1602 that bore great resemblance to Ulloa’s in 1596. It proposed the foundation of two towns in Chiriguana territory in exchange for the position of governor of Santa Cruz, the Río de la Plata, and Tucumán.

The San Lorenzo Frontier, 1594-1604

The same year, 1602, a prominent Spaniard in San Lorenzo named Martín de Almendras Holguín expressed a desire to pacify part of the cordillera in order to expand the grazing land available to the settlers of the northern portion of the Charcas-Chiriguana frontier. Almendras Holguín’s proposal is a bit out of character, coming as it did from a resident of San Lorenzo. The Spaniards in the province of Santa Cruz remained more oriented towards the northern Mojos region and the possibility of discovering the wealthy civilization that had eluded them for so long, much as they had been since the time of Ñuflo de Chávez. This is not to say that the Spanish residents of the province, and particularly those in San Lorenzo, had no interactions with the peoples in the cordillera during the 1590s and early 1600s. There is reason to believe they participated in the exchange of captives with certain Chiriguana factions throughout the era.

---

28 “Fragmentos pertinentes de una carta del Virrey Don Luis de Velasco … (Mayo 5, 1602),” 55.

29 “Capitulación de Pedro Lopez de Zavala en que ofrece poblar en los Chiriguanos … (1602),” 57-64. There is no record of any official response to the proposal.

30 “Luis de Velasco to the Audiencia of La Plata (1 Jul. 1602),” ANB, Corr., Ficha 364, 1r; “Luis de Velasco to the Audiencia of La Plata (1 Aug. 1602),” ANB, Corr., Ficha 368, 1.
Their participation likely matched or exceeded that of their counterparts on the Tomina frontier.\textsuperscript{31}

Officials in the region had also arranged the first semi-official attempt to evangelize the Chiriguanaes in 1594. That year, a Jesuit priest named Diego de Samaniego entered the cordillera from Santa Cruz. Samaniego was among the first Jesuits to arrive in the city in 1587 following an invitation extended to the order by Governor Suárez de Figueroa five years earlier. Samaniego’s initial work involved the evangelization of Itatín communities to the east of the city, during which time he learned the Guaraní language. Viceroy Marqués de Cañete urged him to make a similar attempt in the cordillera. Suárez de Figueroa and Solís Holguín struck a deal with a Chiriguana cacique, who agreed to accept the clergyman on the condition that the Spanish would aid him against his enemies. Samaniego made the journey in the company of a mestizo layman from Santa Cruz. They were initially well received, but rumors persisted that the priest was planning to drown the Chiriguana villagers during baptism, take their children to Santa Cruz, or pledge the adults to the Spanish. Samaniego left the cordillera after less than a year and joined an exploratory mission to Mojos that departed in June of 1595.\textsuperscript{32}

The Mojos expedition of 1595 failed to yield any notable discoveries, but it greatly changed the political landscape of Santa Cruz. It also indirectly reignited conflict between the

\textsuperscript{31} García Recio, \textit{Análisis de una sociedad de frontera}, 119-21, 189-91; Renard-Casevitz, Saignes, and Taylor, \textit{Al este de los Andes}, vol. 1, 266-68; “Relación del P. Diego de Samaniego, con muchas noticias sobre misiones hechas a los Itatines, Chiriguanas y Chiquitos (1600),” in \textit{Historia general de la Compañía de Jesús en la provincia del Perú}, 2 vols., ed. Francisco Mateos (Madrid: Consejo superior de investigaciones científicas, Instituto Gonzalo Fernández de Oviedo, 1944), vol. 2, 483.

residents of the province and the Chiriguanaes. The expedition was plagued by heavy rainfall, swollen rivers, and supply shortages, and Governor Suárez de Figueroa was among the scores of Spanish participants who succumbed to disease.\(^\text{33}\) Officials in La Plata, Lima, and even in Spain had found Suárez de Figueroa’s experience and skill in fighting the Chiriguanaes indispensable. The fact that hostilities renewed between the two groups immediately following his death suggests that he had played a key part in keeping the peace.\(^\text{34}\) Testimony recorded eight years after the fact suggests that certain Chiriguana factions took the occasion of the governor’s death to send spies in preparation for an attack on San Lorenzo. Another factor that likely contributed to the renewed conflict was the relocation of San Lorenzo to its final location along the Piray River (Figure 9-1), also in 1595.\(^\text{35}\)

The new location of San Lorenzo seems to have brought the population into more direct contact with Coyagua—the longtime enemy of the Spaniards on the Tomina frontier—and his faction. Suárez de Figueroa’s successor as governor, Gonzalo de Solís Holguín, responded to the

\(^{33}\) For more on the Mojos expedition, see “Carta a S. M. del Licenciado Cepeda, con particular relación del estado … (La Plata 28 Marzo de 1595),” 260; “Carta de la Audiencia de Charcas acerca de cuanto consideraba de importancia … (La Plata 10 Abril 1597),” in Levillier, *Audiencia de Charcas*, vol. 3, 315-16; García Recio, *Análisis de una sociedad de frontera*, 58-60; and Humberto Vázquez Machicado and José Vázquez Machicado, *Santa Cruz de la Sierra: apuntes para su historia (siglos XVI al XX)*, (La Paz: Editorial Don Bosco, 1992), chap. 1.x.

\(^{34}\) “Información de oficio de los servicios del Governador Gonzalo Solis Holguin … (1603),” 65-90. Suárez de Figueroa’s distinguished leadership in Santa Cruz resulted in proposals that he take up leadership roles elsewhere, including Chile and Chucuito. But King Philip II confirmed in 1591 that Suárez de Figueroa should remain in Santa Cruz due to the difficulty of finding a suitable replacement for that jurisdiction. See “Carta a S. M. del virrey D. García de Mendoza sobre materias tocantes al gobierno temporal … (Los Reyes, 26 Febrero 1590),” in Levillier, *Gobernantes del Perú*, vol. 12, 108; and “Copia de la que su majestad escribe al gobernador don Lorenzo Suárez de Figueroa (Madrid, 6 de febrero de 1591),” in Enciso Contreras, *Cedulario de la Audiencia de la Plata de Los Charcas*, 505-06.

\(^{35}\) The 1595 relocation of San Lorenzo was actually the second relocation of the settlement. In 1591, officials in the new settlement (it was not officially a town until 1592) moved the population a short distance. Four years later, the move was more significant. The site on which the town was refounded was five or six leagues distant from the previous site. The precise reasons for both relocations are unclear. For more on both moves, see Vázquez Machicado and Vázquez Machicado, *Santa Cruz de la Sierra*, chap. 1.vii, ix; and Finot, *Historia de la conquista del oriente boliviano*, 241-45.
attempted encirclement by leading a contingent of 60 Spanish soldiers into the cordillera. They burned Coyagua’s town during the course of their brief *entrada*. In late 1596, a party of Spaniards traveling from Santa Cruz to the highlands came under an attack that left one dead. The following year, several factions of Chiriguanaes—Coyagua’s among them—reportedly united and took aim at San Lorenzo a second time. The Spanish organized another army of 60 soldiers, which fought a series of battles before managing to negotiate a peace with eight caciques from the cordillera. The Spanish believed that the peace would be stable in the area for the foreseeable future. Their confidence that the Chiriguanaes were not likely to attack in the future was among the factors that precipitated the official relocation of the city of Santa Cruz from its original location in Chiquitos to the banks of the Guapay (the previous location of San Lorenzo) in 1601 or 1602.

When Almendras Holguín proposed extending Spanish rule into the cordillera near San Lorenzo in 1602, he did so during a period of relative peace in the region. His goal, like that of those who advocated an invasion of the cordillera from the west, revolved primarily around the resource capabilities of the land rather than security concerns. His orientation towards the cordillera set him apart from the vast majority of his peers in San Lorenzo. Indeed, Almendras Holguín had come of age on the other side of the cordillera. His family was a prominent one that

---

36 “Información de oficio de los servicios del Governor Gonzalo Solis Holguin … (1603),” 72-75, 85-90; “Información de servicios del capitán Francisco Hurtado,” ANB, EC, 1611.4, 7r-7v, 32r-32v, 38v; “Viceroy Luis de Velasco to the Audiencia of La Plata (2 Jan. 1597),” 1r.

37 The transfer of the population and resources of Santa Cruz to the llanos near San Lorenzo took place in stages throughout the 1590s and 1600s. When Santa Cruz was refounded along the Guapay (Grande) River in 1601 or 1602, few Spanish settlers remained at the original site. The two towns would officially merge in 1621. The new town bore the name Santa Cruz, but it was on the site of San Lorenzo. Other reasons for the relocation of Santa Cruz included the continued belief that the best route to the Mojos ran through the llanos rather than Chiquitos, conflict with natives in the Chiquitos region, and the poverty of the remaining settlers after the flight of the richest to San Lorenzo. See Vázquez Machicado and Vázquez Machicado, *Santa Cruz de la Sierra*, chap. 1.xii, xiii, xv; and Finot, *Historia de la conquista del oriente boliviano*, 245-51.
maintained the rights to an encomienda near Tomina. He also remained a vecino of La Plata despite his residence in San Lorenzo. It comes as no surprise, then, that his interest in the cordillera mirrored that of his contemporaries near Tomina.38

Within a matter of two years, the residents of San Lorenzo began again to suspect an impending Chiriguana attack. Many complained that the town had become vulnerable due to mismanagement on the part of its governor, Juan de Mendoza Mate de Luna, a Spanish courtier who had traveled to America with dreams of becoming the next great conquistador. Mendoza Mate de Luna secured a royal appointment as governor of Santa Cruz from King Philip III in 1599 after hearing tales of the riches of Amazonia from a traveler in Madrid. He arrived in San Lorenzo in 1601 and arranged an expedition bound for the Mojos the following year. The expedition went poorly. His Spanish troops, many of whom already resented the governor as an outsider undeserving of his position, blamed him for the difficulties they experienced. Most deserted. Upon his return to San Lorenzo, Mendoza Mate de Luna attempted to reestablish his authority through unpopular autocratic measures.39

Displeasure with Mendoza Mate de Luna’s governance peaked in 1604. Reports from the region dating to that year claim that residents were abandoning the province in large numbers. According to one account, long-time citizens of Santa Cruz and San Lorenzo, including men with wives and children, “flee as if [there were] a plague.” According to another, San Lorenzo had enjoyed a population of over 100 men, but “on the day that I write this, no more than 44

38 “Almendras Holguín, Martín de,” in Barnadas, Diccionario histórico de Bolivia, vol. 1, 96; García Recio, Análisis de una sociedad de frontera, 64-67.

39 “Relación de D. Luis de Velasco, virey del Perú, dada á su sucesor el conde de Monterey, sobre el estado del mismo (1604),” in Relaciones de los vireyes y audiencias que han gobernado el Perú, 2 vols., ed. Sebastián Lorente (Madrid: Imprenta del estado por J.E. del Campo, 1867-71), vol. 2, 17; García Recio, Análisis de una sociedad de frontera, 60-67; “Mendoza Mate de Luna, Juan de,” in Barnadas, Diccionario histórico de Bolivia, vol. 2, 202-03.
remains.” The complaints about Mendoza Mate de Luna’s leadership highlight the fact that Chiriguanaes in the vicinity of San Lorenzo and Santa Cruz had become a more significant threat since the governor had arrived. They reportedly took advantage of the discord and the lack of Spanish residents in order to plot a campaign to get rid of the Spanish and reassert their dominance in the region. A similar rumor circulated among the native populations of Mizque.40

Velasco and the Audiencia quickly managed to put an end to the discord in San Lorenzo and the re-emergent Chiriguana threat by suspending Mendoza Mate de Luna from office and recalling him from Santa Cruz. Velasco also approved the official foundation of a town in the repartimiento of Mizque, known officially thereafter as the Villa de Salinas del Río Pisuerga, in part in order to ensure further against potential Chiriguana incursions.41

**Conclusion: Velasco’s Legacy**

The removal of the governor of Santa Cruz and the founding of a Spanish town in Mizque would be among the last matters that Velasco dealt with as viceroy of Peru. He surrendered his post and returned to Mexico later in the same year, 1604. As he left office, Velasco defended his approach to the Chiriguana problem and credited the relative peace on the southeastern frontier to his opposition to military action in the cordillera. He wrote to his successor that his continual opposition to the many proposals to pacify the Chiriguanaes had

40 “Carta á S. M. del Virrey D. Luis de Velasco de 10 de Mayo de 1604 sobre disturbios de Santa Cruz y primeras fundaciones de pueblos en la Provincia de Mojos,” in Mujía, Bolivia-Paraguay, vol. 3, 161-63; “Juan Paredes to the Audiencia of La Plata (16 Feb. 1604),” ANB, Corr., Ficha 461, 1r-1v; “Padre Alonso Ramos to the Audiencia de La Plata (15 Mar. 1604),” ANB, Corr., Ficha 469, 1r-1v; “Don Diego Osorio to the Audiencia of La Plata (15 Mar. 1604),” ANB, Corr., Ficha 470, 1r-1v; “Audiencia of La Plata to Viceroy Luis de Velasco (2 May 1604),” ANB, Corr., Ficha 484, 2r; “Cabildo of the Villa de Salinas del Río Pisuerga to the Audiencia de La Plata (29 Mar. 1604),” ANB, Corr., Ficha 475, 1r-1v; “Licenciado Francisco de Alfaro to the Audiencia of La Plata (3 Apr. 1604),” ANB, Corr., Ficha 478, 1r-1v.

41 “Relación de D. Luis de Velasco, virey del Perú, dada á su sucesor … (1604),” 18; Gutierrez-Brockington, Blacks, Indians, and Spaniards in the Eastern Andes, 42-45.
been in the interests of the king. He was likely correct. As far as the Chiriguana frontier was concerned, Velasco’s long tenure as viceroy was a relatively stable time. His firm and unyielding official policy of separation brought about an era during which there were no instances of large-scale attacks on Spanish interests. His approach also prevented any costly, protracted Spanish invasions of the cordillera.

But another aspect that contributed to the peace between the Spaniards and Chiriguanaes in the southeastern Andes came in spite of Velasco’s policies rather than because of them. On the Chichimeca frontier in New Spain, an important element of the continued peace were the government programs designed to promote cooperation and friendship between the Spanish and the natives. Velasco implemented no similar programs in the southeastern Andes, yet similar bonds were forming. These bonds came about precisely because of the continued violation of the prohibition on commercial exchange. In many ways, this illicit contact served the same purposes as the peace by purchase and acculturative efforts implemented on the Chichimeca frontier. The exchange relationships between frontier Spaniards and Chiriguanaes served to change the incentive structure that governed relations between the groups. The ability to trade for metal goods and clothing, among other sought-after commodities, meant that it was not in the Chiriguanaes’ interest to seize what they wanted in frontier raids on Spanish properties. They could get what they desired most through mechanisms that precluded the type of devastating and disruptive war fought in the 1580s. The illicit trade also supplied the Spanish on the frontiers with what they desired most, a source of labor, though the supply was often insufficient for their liking. Throughout Velasco’s tenure, they responded with continual calls to roll back the frontier and take more direct advantage of the populations of the cordillera and eastern lowlands, but

42 “Relación de D. Luis de Velasco, virey del Perú, dada á su sucesor … (1604),” 13.
Velasco’s opposition to a large-scale *entrada* prevented them, also, from taking what they wanted by force.

It bears underlining that a glaring difference between the cooperative efforts on the Chichimeca and Chiriguana frontiers was the inherently violent and dehumanizing nature of the latter. Though the captive trade contributed to peace between the Spanish and the Chiriguanaes, the most apt characterization of it comes from a Jesuit memoir, which describes “merchants and peddlers [from Santa Cruz province] daring to enter among [the Chiriguanaes] and tell them to go to war, where they kill many Indians in order to capture one, in order to buy and sell [captured Indians] as if they were slaves.”

The passage serves as a reminder that the trade did not necessarily prevent war; it merely changed the setting and the combatants.

---

43 “Relación del P. Diego de Samaniego, con muchas noticias sobre misiones hechas a los Itatines, Chiriguanas y Chiquitos,” 483.
Figure 9-1. Locations referenced in Chapter 9. Adapted from Wikimedia Commons, http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Bolivia_Topography.png.
CHAPTER 10
GRADUAL REENGAGEMENT & RENEWAL OF CONFLICT

Viceroy Luis de Velasco’s policy of segregation and containment had succeeded in its most fundamental aims of providing security from major frontier attacks and preventing a costly offensive war. He had had to maintain his policy, however, against opposition from Spaniards in Charcas, including the members of the Audiencia and residents of the Tomina frontier. Velasco’s policies did not satisfy their longer-term goals for the frontier region: the pacification or elimination of the Chiriguanaes and the incorporation of additional territory and subject peoples into the range of Spanish settlement. These more local perspectives would come to exert greater influence over official policy towards the frontier in the years to come. The shift toward reengagement with the Chiriguanaes was gradual and resulted from a number of factors. Early in the post-Velasco period, they included the reorientation of San Lorenzo’s population toward the cordillera and another substantially long vacancy in the office of viceroy. Years later, in the 1610s, wider Spanish imperial concerns would have a greater influence on policies that allowed more official engagement with the Chiriguanaes, including efforts to found Spanish settlements in Chiriguana territory. Throughout this period, the ongoing evolution of Chiriguana culture and Chiriguanaes’ responses to the imperial frontier environment were important. They had an impact on Spanish policy as well as how those policies played out.

This chapter examines the step-by-step resumption of official interactions between Spaniards and Chiriguanaes in the decades following Viceroy Velasco’s departure from Peru. It begins with an attempt to evangelize a Chiriguana faction on the southern, Tarija frontier. It then describes a semi-official Spanish intervention in the heart of the cordillera that originated in San Lorenzo. The relative success of these two instances opened the door for a strategy that called for greater interactions between the two groups. The strategy centered on the foundation of a
Catholic missions system among the Chiriguanaes that resembled contemporary efforts among the Paraguayan Guaraní. These plans would collapse, however, as all apparent progress toward Spanish-Chiriguana cooperation unraveled in spectacular fashion. The next sections of the chapter describe attempts to devise and implement a policy that essentially married Velasco’s concerns about Spanish aggression reaping violent responses and the increasing Spanish desire to settle territory to the east of Charcas. The resulting strategy was an idealistic one that called for “populating without conquest” (*poblar y no conquistar*). The actual attempts to carry it out varied far from the ideal. The Spanish made two such efforts to found settlements beginning in the late 1610s. Both were heavily militaristic, and both failed in the face of Chiriguana resistance by the 1620s.

**An Opportunity in the South, 1605-1606**

Gaspar de Zúñiga y Acevedo, known as the Conde de Monterrey, assumed the position of Viceroy of Peru in late 1604. Like Velasco, Monterrey had previously served as viceroy in New Spain, where he continued Velasco’s policies on the Chichimeca frontier, effectively altering them only by focusing the strategy more centrally on native settlement into missions.¹ The same might be said of his effect on the Chiriguana frontier during his brief period of rule over Peru, where he permitted the first sanctioned attempts to evangelize to Chiriguana populations since 1594.

The impetus for the evangelization attempts undertaken during Monterrey’s tenure came from the southern frontier near Tarija. The last surviving documentary evidence discussing Spanish-Chiriguana relations in the region dates to 1590, when the Chiriguanaes reportedly sought peace with the Spanish in the wake of the protracted war of the 1580s. In 1605, a

powerful Chiriguana leader named Tambobera and several companions reportedly approached the *corregidor* of the Spanish frontier near Tarija, Álvaro de Paz Villalobos, and requested a priest. Tambobera assured officials in Tarija that his intentions were pure and that the priest would be safe among his people. He further agreed to send “some of his young sons to the people of Tarija in order to start indoctrinating them so that [the sons] could help the priest in the future.”

Tambobera’s willingness to turn over his sons to the Spanish represented precisely the type of “assurances” (*prendas*) that Velasco had discussed in 1602 when he raised the possibility of sending priests into Chiriguana villages. The boys’ presence in Tarija would help ensure the safety of the priest, a necessary step “since his majesty has ordered … [those in] the Audiencia to take great care in similar situations.” Paz Villalobos brought Tambobera and four other Chiriguanaes with him to La Plata so they might make a proposal before the members of the Audiencia. The Audiencia determined that “priests and other people who know the language and want to enter” could do so, at least provisionally. The viceroy had no objection to the plan, provided the priests and their companions took precautions upon entering Chiriguana territory.

The decision opened the door for Father Simón de Sampayo to enter the southern cordillera east of Tarija. Sampayo was among the few who qualified according to the stipulated language requirement. He spoke Guaraní as a result of his upbringing in southern Brazil, where he was born to Portuguese parents. There is no indication of how Sampayo came to be in Charcas or his precise position within the church hierarchy, but he responded to the cacique’s invitation “with much pleasure and hope of a great outcome.” He departed Tarija in November of

---

2 “Audiencia de La Plata to Viceroy Monterrey (4 Sept. 1605),” ANB, Corr., Ficha 510, 1v.

3 Ibid., 1v; “Fragmentos pertinentes de una carta del Virrey Don Luis de Velasco … (Mayo 5, 1602),” 54; “Viceroy Monterrey to the Audiencia of La Plata (1 Nov. 1605),” ANB, Corr., Ficha 515, 1r.
1605 with a small contingent of Tomatas (natives from the Tarija region) who also spoke Guarani. Sampayo reported upon his arrival that he and his companions had been “well received and cherished” by his hosts, “who showed him great signs of love.” Both adults and children responded well to his teachings, and caciques from surrounding villages showed interest in welcoming Spanish evangelists as well.4

Sampayo’s work among Tambobera’s people continues below, but the priest’s auspicious beginnings in the southern cordillera coincided with Viceroy Monterrey’s final days. He died in March of 1606 with no successor close at hand. The power of gobierno reverted to the Audiencia just as the first hints of a new phase of more official interaction between the Spanish and the Chiriguanaes presented itself in the northern part of the cordillera near San Lorenzo.

Inter-Factional Politics and the Almendras Holguín Entrada, 1606-1608

Sometime during the first half of 1606, representatives of a cacique named Cuñayuru approached officials in San Lorenzo in order to request Spanish assistance in a dispute with a rival Chiriguana cacique named Charagua. Cuñayuru was a powerful leader, a tuvicha rubicha, of a coalition of allied Chiriguana villages in the northern section of the cordillera nearest San Lorenzo and the Guapay (Grande) River (Figure 10-1). He was the successor and member of the same faction as Coyagua, the participant in the destruction of San Miguel de la Laguna in 1583 and at least three more attempted attacks on Spanish settlements between 1589 and 1597. By

4“Audiencia de La Plata to Viceroy Monterrey (4 Dec. 1605),” ANB, Corr., Ficha 520, 1r; “Audiencia of La Plata to the King (1 Mar. 1606),” 5v-6r; “Simón de Sampayo to Álvaro de Paz Villalobos (16 July 1606),” ANB, Corr., Ficha 553, 1r; “Declaration of Juan Macocha and Juan Chirire, Tomatas Indians (25 July 1606),” ANB, Corr., Ficha 553, 1v. Information on Sampayo’s background comes from “De las Misiones, y entradas, que los Religiosos de esta provincia han hecho a la tierra adentro, a la conversión de los indios infieles (1665),” in Presencia Franciscana y formación intercultural en el sudeste de Bolivia según documentos del archivo Franciscano de Tarija 1606-1936, 7 vols., ed. Lorenzo Calzavarini Ghinello (Santa Cruz, Bolivia: Centro Eclesial de Documentación, 2004), vol. 1, 163. Sampayo appears to be a secular priest. He is referred to as a “presberty clerk” (Clerigo Presbítero)—an ordained priest with the training to perform the sacraments—as well as with the titles “padre,” and “Licenciado.” Never is he associated with any religious order.
1606, however, Coyagua no longer appears in the documents, and there is no evidence that Cuñayuru had any track record of animosity toward the Spanish. He was, rather, “a friend to the people of [San Lorenzo], and he had sustained the peace for many years and maintained his word and faith with [them].” Regardless of his reputation, officials in San Lorenzo responded cautiously. They notified the Audiencia about the matter, and the Audiencia recommended against intervention. The populations of San Lorenzo and Santa Cruz had not yet recovered from the depopulation of the Mendoza Mate de Luna era, and the members of the Audiencia feared that the help requested by the Chiriguanaes might be a ruse designed “to remove people from [San Lorenzo] so that it remain helpless and with less force and defense” so they might attack and “do damage, as they always find occasion [to do].”5

Cuñayuru was persistent. In the subsequent months, he redirected his entreaties towards officials in Tomina, this time framing and contextualizing his request in a fashion more likely to appeal to Spanish officials. In October, Julio Ferrufino, the corregidor of the Tomina frontier, received an envoy from Cuñayuru. The envoy explained that the primary figure behind Cuñayuru’s troubles was not a Chiriguana rival, per se, but rather the “mestizo apostate Sebastián Rodríguez.”6

Investigations in the years to come would help piece together the history of Sebastián Rodríguez. They establish that he had been born in Paraguay to a Guaraní mother and a Spanish

5 “Miguel de Orozco, oidor de la Audiencia de La Plata, al teniente de gobernador de Santa Cruz de la Sierra (6 June 1606),” ANB, Corr., Ficha 545, 1r-1v. Cuñayuru’s association with Coyagua’s faction comes from “Diligencias hechas por el capitán Julio Ferrufino (15 Oct. 1606-20 Apr. 1607),” ANB, Corr., Ficha 606, 2r. For his cooperative relationship with the Spanish, see “Información de servicios del capitán Francisco Hurtado,” 3r.

6 “Diligencias hechas por el capitán Julio Ferrufino,” 2r. The envoy from Cuñayuru, named Condorillo, was yet another interesting figure emblematic of the growing number of people at this time who managed to maneuver in both Spanish and Chiriguana societies. Despite his highland-origin name, Condorillo is described as a Chiriguana native, but he was also a baptized Christian and a Spanish speaker.
father and lived in “Peru” (probably highland Charcas) in 1596. Around that time, he left his wife and children and entered the cordillera “with the goal of living with [the Chiriguanaes] and helping them and becoming their leader.” He married the daughter of a Chiriguana leader and eventually became a sort of *tuvicha* in his own right. He established himself in a fortified village on the eastern edge of the central cordillera. His proficiency in the Guaraní language and culture was undoubtedly important to his acceptance in Chiriguana society, but his association with Spanish society also helped him significantly. Rodríguez was a trained smith, and he set up forges in the cordillera on which he fashioned metal objects using iron ore collected from deposits in the region. The Spanish investigations suggest that he used his metallurgical knowledge to revolutionize Chiriguana warfare. The projectiles he crafted multiplied the potency of an arrow fired from the already-powerful Chiriguana bow. They were also capable of piercing armor and neutralizing the advantage of horses. Rodríguez also knew how to fashion gunpowder out of saltpeter deposits in order to take advantage of the small collection of muskets that he and his followers possessed.7

It is not clear whether the Spanish frontier residents near Tomina or San Lorenzo were aware of Rodríguez and his Chiriguana following prior to Cuñayuru’s appeals. Those carried on commerce in the cordillera presumably had heard about the mestizo cacique, but he does not appear in any surviving documents written before 1606. After that point, it became quickly apparent to the Spanish that Rodríguez was a significant figure. The surviving documents describe differently his precise standing in Chiriguana political society—whether a “powerful

---

7 “Información de servicios del capitán Julio Ferruffino,” AGI, Charcas, 81 N. 11, 32v-33r; Saignes, *Ava y karai*, 73-74; Saignes, “Entre ‘bárbaros’ y ‘cristianos,’” 25-26; “Memoria y instrucción de lo que ha de hacer Diego Antón en la Cordillera de los Chiriguanaes,” 4v, 6v-8r; “Martín de Almendras Holguín to the Audiencia of La Plata (29 Aug. 1607),” ANB, Corr., Ficha 600, 1r-1v; “Relación de todo lo que en el viaje del socorro … que salió de la ciudad de San Lorenço con su canpo (10 Aug. 1607),” ANB, Corr., Ficha 600, 5v.
king,” as Cuñayuru’s envoy described him, or a high-ranking military leader subject to another cacique. In any case, he commanded an army of Chiriguana and Chané soldiers and was a formidable adversary to those who stood in his way.

The Audiencia was divided on the matter. Some members were strongly in favor of assisting Cuñayuru. One official described it as an “opportunity not to be missed” to ally with “the foremost cacique of the cordillera” and finally pacify the Chiriguanaes. Like Tambobera in the south, Cuñayuru demonstrated his good faith toward the Spanish by sending his son to Tomina. Ferrufino sent the boy on to La Plata so he could be “treated with the love he deserves” and given the opportunity for baptism and to learn the rudiments of the Christian faith.

Cuñayuru’s son lodged with this official during his stay in La Plata, and he raved about the boy’s inclination toward the teachings of Christianity. Others were less convinced. They organized an investigation to be overseen by Julio Ferrufino, who empowered a Spaniard or mestizo named Diego de Antón to enter the cordillera to examine Cuñayuru’s claims and especially the matter of Sebastián Rodríguez. Antón was a citizen of Tomina, but he had grown up in Paraguay and spoke Guaraní. He, his brother, and two yanaconas from Tomina left for the cordillera in December of 1606. Ideally, they might contact the renegade mestizo and persuade him to leave the cordillera and “submit to our faith, which he has already professed.”

8 “Diligencias hechas por el capitán Julio Ferrufino,” 2v-3r, 10r; “Memoria y instrucción de lo que ha de hacer Diego Antón,” 4r.

9 “Licenciado Francisco de Alfaro to the King (22 Nov. 1606),” AGI, Charcas, 18 R. 3, N. 35, 1r-1v; “Diligencias hechas por el capitán Julio Ferrufino,” 2v.

10 “Memoria y instrucción de lo que ha de hacer Diego Antón,” 4r-5r. Ferrufino took the occasion of the birth of the royal prince who would become King Philip IV (word of which had apparently just reached Charcas) to offer a blanket amnesty to Rodríguez if he return to Tomina. The infante had been born in April of 1605.
Antón returned to Tomina after five months in the cordillera and recommended intervention in support of Cuñayuru. According to his report, Rodríguez and his companions—who included “Don Pedro” (described in a later document as Pedro de Ovalle, likely another mestizo) and two Africans (likely escaped slaves from Charcas or Santa Cruz)—were the scourge of the cordillera. They regularly went about the region, taking “all the laborers and treasures and clothes and other things that belonged to others.” Cuñayuru requested a force of 20 Spanish soldiers “to scatter his enemies … for the deaths and great robberies they had caused.”11 Other documentary evidence corroborates the fact that Rodríguez had led a significant attack on Cuñayuru’s community in May of 1606. He and his allies killed members of Cuñayuru’s family, captured “two villages of slaves” (Chané or other tapuy people under Cuñayuru’s control), and made off with a great deal of property.12

But Cuñayuru may have overstated the degree to which Rodríguez and company had terrorized the other Chiriguana communities. It is clear that Rodríguez had the support of the broad coalition of Chiriguana communities in the central cordillera. The leaders of these communities were largely under the leadership of Charagua, the tuvicha rubicha on whom Cuñayuru’s first pleas for assistance centered. Charagua was also the longtime rival of Cuñayuru’s predecessor, Coyagua. Reports from San Lorenzo also present matters in the cordillera a bit differently than Cuñayuru’s testimony. A letter dating to August 30, 1606—a time after Rodríguez’ raid on Cuñayuru’s community and prior to the envoy arriving in Tomina—states that the cordillera was at peace. A confederation of caciques known to be friendly with both Cuñayuru and the Spanish in San Lorenzo asked officials “not to trouble

11 “Memoria y instrucción de lo que ha de hacer Diego Antón,” 6v-8r; “Diligencias hechas por el capitán Julio Ferrufino,” 10r.
12 “Relación de todo lo que en el viaje del socorro,” 3v.
themselves any longer about the request for their help because it was no longer necessary.” At about the same time, Rodríguez made contact with officials in San Lorenzo in order to explain that he posed no threat to Spanish interests. His messengers claimed that his “intention was not to be against the Spanish” and that, rather, he remained “a son of theirs.” On these bases, officials in San Lorenzo determined not to intercede in the dispute between Cuñayuru and Rodríguez.13

Julio Ferrufino, the Tomina corregidor, ultimately recommended the same course of inaction to the Audiencia after discussing Antón’s report with the citizens of the Tomina frontier in April of 1607. García Mosquera, the mestizo who bore witness to more than 30 years of frontier history encompassing many unsuccessful Spanish interventions in the cordillera, made the case against sending aid to Cuñayuru. He argued that Rodríguez and his allies had no track record of attacking the Charcas frontier or Spaniards traveling through the region. Sending soldiers to fight against them could invite them to lash out and plunge the region into open warfare. The proposed entrada simply had too many potential drawbacks and not enough potential advantages. The Spaniards on the Tomina frontier insisted, however, that they would be in favor of an intervention that might lead to a permanent settlement in the cordillera. In that case, they would be willing to send far more than the 20 soldiers that Cuñayuru requested, but rather “more than two hundred,” along with “weapons, and ammunition [as well as] teams of oxen,” and implements necessary to tame the land. Their stance demonstrates clearly that the residents of Tomina still had designs on the development of the cordillera. They rejected involvement in what they considered a war between Chiriguana factions. But if they could

---

13 “Cristóbal de Molina Salazar, teniente de Santa Cruz, a la Audiencia de La Plata (30 Aug. 1606),” ANB, Corr., Ficha 555, 1r-1v.
benefit by opening more land to cultivation and accessing new labor sources more directly, they supported pushing back the frontier.14

In San Lorenzo, the decision about whether to intervene followed a logic that was a bit different. Most residents there were less interested in developing territory in the cordillera. They were particularly disinterested in assisting Cuñayuru because they felt that dissention between the Chiriguana factions served a beneficial purpose. It prevented the peoples of the cordillera from organizing and rising against the Spanish. As the lieutenant governor wrote in August of 1606 regarding the question of intervening on Cuñayuru’s behalf, “more important [than the wellbeing of Cuñayuru] is that [the Chiriguanaes] do not cause harm [to the Spanish] and that they do not trust one another.”15 A year later, officials in San Lorenzo reconsidered their stance on the matter using precisely the same logic. Rodríguez and his allies were threatening to attack Cuñayuru’s community again in the middle of 1607, and Cuñayuru communicated to the Spanish that, “if [he and his people] were not aided, they would have to unite with” Rodríguez and his allies and rise against the Christians in a general rebellion.16 Though the Audiencia had ordered officials in San Lorenzo to “resolve by other means the differences that the Indians have,” the acting governor decided to intervene militarily in order to prevent the prospect of an uprising.17

---

14 “Diligencias hechas por el capitán Julio Ferrufino,” 8v-11r. It is not entirely clear why the Audiencia did not empower volunteers to settle the cordillera during the time when they held the power of gobierno. The members of the body certainly favored similar plans in the recent past. Perhaps they learned from the 1580s about the inherent difficulties of waging such a war without viceregal support and funding.

15 “Cristóbal de Molina Salazar … a la Audiencia de La Plata (30 Aug. 1606),” 1r-1v.

16 “Audiencia of La Plata to the Audiencia of Lima (18 July 1607),” ANB, Corr., Ficha 595, 1r-1v; “Relación de todo lo que en el viaje del socorro,” 3r-3v.

17 “Martín de Almendras Holguín to the Audiencia of La Plata (29 Aug. 1607),” 1r-1v; “Audiencia de Lima to the Audiencia of La Plata (1 Sept. 1607),” ANB, Corr., Ficha 601, 1r; “Relación de todo lo que en el viaje del socorro,” 2r.
An additional factor in the intervention was the fact that the acting governor of Santa Cruz at the time was Martín de Almendras Holguín, the advocate of expansion into the cordillera dating back to before Mendoza Mate de Luna’s tenure. He gathered an army in San Lorenzo and departed for the cordillera on July 12, 1607. The Spanish force consisted of 90 soldiers, a priest, and 200 native, African, or *mulato* auxiliaries. It was the largest *entrada* into the region in more than two decades. As it marched toward Rodríguez’ fortified stronghold, the Spanish-led army grew. Soldiers from at least three additional Chiriguana factions, all allies of Cuñayuru, lent their assistance to Almendras Holguín. At its final strength, the force included 250 Chiriguana and Chané warriors.\(^{18}\)

The majority of the native troops allied with the Spanish army were far less interested in attacking Rodríguez than they were in making war for their own purposes. They particularly wished to attack their enemies, Mapae and Areya, the Chiriguana brothers involved for so long in events on the Tomina frontier. Mapae and Areya were also allies of Charagua, and their rivalry with Almendras Holguín’s Chiriguana companions dated at least as far back as 1589, when they helped save San Juan de Rodas from an attack by Coyagua. Almendras Holguín learned that only days earlier, Mapae and Areya had led an army into battle against two of Cuñayuru’s allied communities. The leader of one community died during the conflict. Those who survived urged Almendras Holguín “first [to] attack Mapae and Areya’s people and then attack those of Sebastián Rodríguez.”\(^{19}\)

\(^{18}\) “Martín de Almendras Holguín to the Audiencia of La Plata (29 Aug. 1607),” 1; “Relación de todo lo que en el viaje del socorro,” 4r-4v; “Información de servicios del capitán Francisco Hurtado,” 3r-3v, 8r-8v, 22v-23r, 42r-42v, 48v-49r, 55v, 59v-60r.

\(^{19}\) “Relación de todo lo que en el viaje del socorro,” 3r-4v, 6r.
In all likelihood, Mapae and Areya’s attack on Cuñayuru’s allies was timed to coincide with the entrance of the Spanish in the ongoing war. Mapae, particularly, had been attempting to derail an alliance between Cuñayuru and the Spanish for some time. In a seemingly unrelated passage from Diego de Antón’s 1607 report to Julio Ferrufino, it explains that while Antón was conducting his investigation, Mapae sent his son to intercept the Spanish investigators and “beg Antón to come to his community.” He even “promised to give him eight very fine captives” if he would visit. The goal of the offer, Antón explained, was “to get them out of Cuñayuru’s community.” It is not entirely clear what the relationship was between Rodríguez and Mapae and Areya, but Mapae’s town was only a league (~5 km) distant from Rodríguez’ community, and the two lived in apparent peace. Additionally, all three fell into the broad Charagua alliance.\(^\text{20}\)

All of this information suggests that the Chiriguana political situation into which Almendras Holguín inserted himself in 1607 was about far more than Sebastián Rodríguez. For some time, two broad blocs—that of Cuñayuru/Coyagua in the northern cordillera and that of Charagua (which included Mapae and Areya) in the central cordillera—had largely kept in check the other’s power and ambitions. Rodríguez and his military technology had begun to upset that balance. As a result, Charagua and his allies had begun to overwhelm Cuñayuru and his allies. Cuñayuru had sought out Spanish assistance in order to turn the tide back in his favor, or at least to reverse the enemy’s recently gained advantages.

Cuñayuru had conspired brilliantly, in this regard. Many of the advantages that Rodríguez had against a typical Chiriguana force were neutralized by Almendras Holguín’s army, with its firearms and steel. The battle between them proved to be anticlimactic. Spanish musket fire

\(^{20}\) “Memoria y instrucción de lo que ha de hacer Diego Antón,” 7v; “Relación de todo lo que en el viaje del socorro,” 6r.
managed easily to disperse the Chané and Chiriguana guard at the palisades outside Rodríguez’
community. The residents fled into the mountains as the town went up in flames. Almendras
Holguín offered Rodríguez and his mestizo companion Don Pedro a chance to surrender and
extricate themselves from “among those barbarians,” with a promise to “receive [the two of]
them well.” But Rodríguez responded skeptically, saying that the governor “would sooner blind
himself in both eyes than see [Rodríguez treated well].” He escaped into the surrounding
mountains while Almendras Holguín’s army seized captives and property from the village.
Soldiers burned the large *maloca* housing structures and any nearby food stores and crops. They
also razed two forges on which Rodríguez had fashioned his metal projectiles.²¹

Almendras Holguín had ostensibly entered the cordillera with the sole intention of
removing the disruptive Rodríguez, yet the behavior of the assembled army in the days following
the destruction of Rodríguez’ community suggests that the focus of the mission had shifted. The
native allies accompanying the Spanish used the opportunity of the *entrada* to pursue their
traditional enemies. The Spanish, meanwhile, sought to secure the spoils of battle. Almendras
Holguín’s own account describes bands of native “*amigos*” venturing out into the region
surrounding Rodríguez’ village targeting their enemies. Groups of Spanish soldiers, themselves
eager to bring home captives, accompanied and supported the raids. Almendras Holguín reported
that his force took a total of 115 captives, “male and female, adults and children,” but other
witnesses estimated the number brought back to San Lorenzo was between 300 and 400. These
latter figures did not include captives that remained in the Chiriguana allies’ own communities.
At the same time, Almendras Holguín allowed Rodríguez to slip through his fingers. The
governor learned shortly after the battle that Rodríguez was being held in a nearby Chiriguana

²¹ “Relación de todo lo que en el viaje del socorro,” 4v-5v.
village. The cacique in charge of the village sent his son to act as the intermediary—presumably to negotiate the delivery of the mestizo in exchange for the return of other captives—but the Spanish quickly lost patience and left, taking the cacique’s son with them as yet another of their prisoners.\textsuperscript{22}

The members of the Audiencia responded negatively to Almendras Holguín’s entrada. They argued that his actions fell outside his power as governor because there had been no immediate threat to the province. The news reaching Tomina suggested that his primary impetus had rather been the opportunity to take captives. Chiriguana representatives from the Charagua faction appeared at the Tomina frontier in the days or weeks after the battle and reported widespread attacks on their communities by Almendras Holguín’s forces. They demanded the return of the victims, who included “the wives of high-ranking caciques.” The Audiencia accused Almendras Holguín of making war without legitimate cause, illegally taking captives, and pushing the Chiriguanaes to the brink of war. Officials in La Plata feared, as Mosquera had warned, that the participation of the Spanish army would destabilize the region and the Spaniards and natives on the Tomina frontier would suffer as a result. They took steps to fortify Tomina with additional munitions and powder as the Audiencia ordered an end to Almendras Holguín’s tenure as provisional governor.\textsuperscript{23}

For some time after the entrada, officials on the Tomina frontier remained wary of unrest owing to the discontent over the captives taken by the Spanish and their allies. The Audiencia

\textsuperscript{22} Ibid., 4v-7v; “Información de servicios del capitán Francisco Hurtado,” 3v, 23r, 48v.

\textsuperscript{23} “Audiencia of La Plata to Martín de Almendras Holguín (22 Aug. 1607),” ANB, Corr., Ficha 598, 1r-1v; “Audiencia of La Plata to Julio Ferrufino, corregidor of Tomina (23 Aug. 1607),” ANB, Corr., Ficha 599, 1r; “Audiencia of Lima to the Audiencia of La Plata (1 Sept. 1607),” 1; “Audiencia of La Plata to Viceroy Marqués de Montesclaros (22 Jan. 1608),” ANB, Corr., Ficha 617, 1v-2r; “Real Cédula to Viceroy Marqués de Montesclaros (1 May 1610),” AGI, Charcas, 415 L. 2, 241r-241v.
ordered their immediate release and return to their homes in September of 1607, but the residents of San Lorenzo demurred. The captives had been meted out far and wide—again, in clear violation of Spanish law—and many had reportedly taken baptism and wished to serve the Spanish rather than returning home. Sebastián Rodríguez remained a wildcard as well. The Audiencia feared that his continued presence in the cordillera would contribute to the destabilization of the region.24

The fear of upheaval persisted on the Tomina frontier as Juan de Mendoza y Luna, the Marqués de Montesclaros, took office as viceroy in December of 1607. Like his two immediate predecessors, Montesclaros had previously served in the same capacity in New Spain. Among his first orders of business in Peru was addressing the fallout from the Almendras Holguín entrada. Montesclaros shared the Audiencia’s distaste for the illegal captive taking and supported the order that the victims be returned, but he modified the order in a way that greatly undermined it and allowed for effective circumvention. Under the argument that he did not want to stand in the way of the propagation of the faith, Montesclaros dictated that those captives who had become Christians were “free” to remain where they were “so that they can take advantage of serving among the Spanish where and for whom they see fit.” His orders led to the liberation of certain captives who returned home, including the wives of the caciques who had complained to officials in Tomina.25 Others presumably remained in San Lorenzo and elsewhere, whether by choice or due to the compulsion of their new masters.

24 “Audiencia of La Plata to the Audiencia of Lima (1 Oct. 1607),” ANB, Corr., Ficha 606, 1r-1v; “Audiencia of La Plata to Viceroy Marqués de Montesclaros (22 Jan. 1608),” 1v-2r; “Audiencia of La Plata to Viceroy Marqués de Montesclaros (1 June 1608),” ANB, Corr., Ficha 622, 5r-5v; “Viceroy Marqués de Montesclaros to the Audiencia of La Plata (1 June 1608),” ANB, Corr., Ficha 623, 1r-1v.

25 “Viceroy Marqués de Montesclaros to the Audiencia of La Plata (1 June 1608),” 1r-1v; “Audiencia of La Plata to Viceroy Marqués de Montesclaros (1 Aug. 1608),” ANB, Corr., Ficha 626, 1v.
The fear that the Charagua faction would turn against the Tomina frontier dissipated throughout 1608. By July, messengers from Charagua and his allies had approached the Spanish in hopes of an alliance. Officials in La Plata credited the rapprochement to the homecoming of the most highly valued captives, but in truth, the leaders of the Charagua faction were likely acting more strategically. From their perspective, the involvement of the Spanish in the most recent chapter of their ongoing war with Cuñayuru had proven devastating. The enemy had seized the upper hand by seeking out Spanish assistance, and he sought to sustain it in the aftermath by securing a longer-term relationship with the residents of San Lorenzo. Almendras Holguín reported that Cuñayuru and his allies had requested to accept the holy faith and priests to instruct them in it. Shortly afterward, Charagua and his allies also requested priests.\textsuperscript{26} When the Spanish expressed hesitancy to send priests to Charagua owing to Sebastián Rodríguez’ continued presence in the region, Charagua and his allies turned over the mestizo to officials in Tomina.\textsuperscript{27}

**Towards a Missions System, 1609-1611**

The apparent advance of Christianity among the foremost Chiriguana populations in the cordillera altered official opinion regarding Almendras Holguín and his *entradita*, as well as the overall approach to the Chiriguana frontier. By 1609, the Audiencia and viceroy had begun to

\textsuperscript{26} “Audiencia of La Plata to Viceroy Marqués de Montesclaros (1 Aug. 1608),” 1v; “Audiencia of La Plata to Viceroy Marqués de Montesclaros (1 Aug. 1609),” ANB, Corr., Ficha 647, 1r-1v; “Relación de todo lo que en el viaje del socorro,” 8v.

\textsuperscript{27} “Viceroy Marqués de Montesclaros to the Audiencia of La Plata (1 Mar. 1609),” 1r-1v; “Carta del Virrey Marqués de Montes Claros á S. M. de 25 de Marzo de 1609 … sobre pacificación de los Chiriguanos,” in Mujía, *Bolivia-Paraguay*, vol. 3, 266-67; “Real Cédula to Viceroy Marqués de Montesclaros (1 May 1610),” AGI, Charcas, 415 L. 2, 241r-241v; Pilar Latasa Vassallo, *Administración virreinal en el Perú: gobierno del marqués de Montesclaros, 1607-1615* (Madrid: Editorial centro de estudios Ramón Areces, 1997), 620-21. There is little surviving documentation on the capture of Rodríguez. On the first of March 1609, Montesclaros considered sending a force into the cordillera to arrest him but decided against it. The caciques appear to have turned him over sometime in the same month because Montesclaros wrote on March 25 that Rodríguez was in Spanish custody and *en route* to Lima. What became of him once he arrived in Lima (if he ever did) is a mystery.
divert from the longstanding official policy of separation and cautiously to pursue a policy of pacification through evangelization. As they eventually came to see it, the ousted governor had opened the door for further involvement in the cordillera by demonstrating that the Spanish could operate in the region without falling victim to an ambush or other disaster. Viceroy Marqués de Montesclaros, particularly, began to view Almendras Holguín as a figure of some repute among the native peoples there. He appeared the most capable of overseeing the new policy without resorting to arms. In 1610, Montesclaros appointed him permanently to the position of governor of Santa Cruz.28

The shift toward a policy of pacification through evangelization also came as a result of similarly encouraging news from the southern cordillera throughout 1607 and most of 1608. Father Sampayo reported continued progress in the southern Chiriguana community where he resided, and a group of Jesuit priests followed him into the cordillera in order to expand his efforts. Montesclaros offered his full support of their plans and recommended the continued expansion of the program “with all necessary help so that [the priests involved] can persevere.”29

The optimism wavered, however, in late 1608, when a pair of Jesuits who followed Sampayo into the southern cordillera began to question the Chiriguanaes’ reception of the Catholic message. Their report to the viceroy explained that “the people of those towns [where Sampayo was preaching] not only did not accept the doctrine of the holy gospel, they showed a clear aversion to it.” The report was a jarring setback for the new policy. The viceroy and Audiencia feared for Sampayo’s safety and ordered him to exit the cordillera and return to La

28 Latasa Vassallo, Administración virreinal en el Perú, 620-23; García Recio, Análisis de una sociedad de frontera, 111-13.

29 “Audiencia of La Plata to Licenciado Alonso Maldonado Torres (15 Oct. 1607),” ANB, Corr., Ficha 609, 1v; “Viceroy Marqués de Montesclaros to the Audiencia of La Plata (1 June 1608),” 1r-1v.
Plata in October of 1608. Sampayo obeyed the order, but only under protest. He disagreed with the Jesuits’ assessment wholeheartedly. He had already baptized “people” (there is no clue to whom or how many) in Tambobera’s community and did not want to leave the new Christians without their spiritual guide.

The priests’ differing views on the matter were a product of past experience and different approaches to evangelism. The Jesuits who reported their concerns to Montesclaros, referred to as “Father Ortega and a companion,” were almost certainly Manuel de Ortega and Jerónimo de Villarnaú. Both had been active in Paraguay before the head of the order in Peru called them to the area in 1607 because they could speak Guaraní. They, no doubt, perceived a significant gulf between the reception of the Christian message on the upper Río de la Plata and the southern cordillera. The former was a region with a long tradition of Hispano-Guaraní interaction. It would be the site of the Jesuits’ hugely successful missions project in the years to come. Near Tarija, European-Chiriguana relations had been largely confined to violence, when they occurred at all. Furthermore, as Jesuits, they would have been instructed that adult baptism was meaningless without a clear understanding of basic tenets of the faith and a demonstrated repentance from practices that the Church considered sinful. Their fellow Jesuit Father

30 “Audiencia of La Plata to Viceroy Marqués de Montesclaros (1 Aug. 1608),” 1r-1v; “Audiencia of La Plata to Viceroy Marqués de Montesclaros (20 Oct. 1608),” ANB, Corr., Ficha 628, 1r; “Viceroy Marqués de Montesclaros to the Audiencia of La Plata (1 Mar. 1609),” ANB, Corr., Ficha 638, 1r-1v; “Real Cédula to don Diego de Portugal, President of the Audiencia of La Plata (5 June 1610),” AGI, Charcas, 415 L. 2, 242r-242v; “De las Misiones, y entradas … a la conversión de los indios infieles (1665),” 164-65; “Carta del Virrey Marques de Montes Claros á S. M. de 25 de Marzo de 1609,” 266-67.

31 “Viceroy Marqués de Montesclaros to the Audiencia of La Plata (22 May 1609),” ANB, Corr., Ficha 642, 1v-2r.

32 “Audiencia of La Plata to Viceroy Marqués de Montesclaros (1 Aug. 1608),” 1r; R. P. Pablo Pastells, Historia de la Compañía de Jesús en la provincia del Paraguay (Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay, Perú, Bolivia y Brasil) según los documentos originales del Archivo General de Indias (Madrid: Librería General de Victoriano Suárez, 1912), 221-23; Corrado and Comajuncosa, El Colegio Franciscano de Tarija y sus misiones, vol. 1, 60. For the reception of Christianity among the Guaraní of Paraguay at this time, see Frederick J. Reiter, They Built Utopia (The Jesuit Missions in Paraguay): 1610-1768 (Potomac, MD: Scripta Humanistica, 1995), 21-23.
Samaniego had followed this approach in the northern cordillera in 1594 when he reportedly denied baptism to those who requested it because “the time was too short to catechize them and [convince them] to leave behind their vices, which is necessary for doing so.” The viceroy echoed the Jesuits’ concerns when he wrote in 1609 that it was important “not to give holy baptism nor introduce the faith where there was probably no hope of its conservation.”

The setback in the south was not fatal for the new Chiriguana policy. As Samaniego returned to La Plata, officials in Charcas remained at work devising a strategy to evangelize among the Chiriguanaes. In many ways, their proposals were close parallels to the Jesuit undertakings in contemporary Paraguay. The goal in both locations was to entice the natives into settlements (reducciones) managed by missionaries. Once they were within the missions system, the clergymen could instruct them in the faith and the type of life considered most conducive to practicing it. In other ways, the approaches to the two Guaraní-speaking peoples were different. The plan advocated by the Audiencia of Charcas and other regional officials envisioned a strong secular Spanish presence in the cordillera. They believed that a nearby population of armed Spaniards was necessary to help support the clergymen and their neophytes during the establishment of a mission. The Spanish population might also protect the investment of time and resources that would go into the foundation of the mission. There was no shortage of volunteers to help establish the towns. In 1609, a high-ranking city official in La Plata had drawn up a proposal to fund and lead an army of 300 soldiers into the cordillera to populate it. In

33 “Relación del P. Diego de Samaniego,” 420; “Viceroy Marqués de Montesclaros to the Audiencia of La Plata (1 Mar. 1609),” 1r. For more on the Jesuit approach to evangelization among the Chiriguana people during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and specifically how it differed from the Franciscan, see Saignes, *Ava y karai*, 85-88, 97-126. For more on the Jesuits’ rigidity regarding their charges’ development of doctrinal understanding, see García Recio, “Los jesuitas en Santa Cruz de la Sierra hasta los inicios de las reducciones,” 78-81.
January of 1610, an official in San Juan de Rodas boasted that he could easily raise a force of 200 for a similar mission.  

Despite the support for the project, no coordinated efforts to establish missions in the heart of the cordillera came about until many years later. A number of factors contributed to the frustration of the plan. The first was a shortage of Guaraní speaking missionaries in Charcas. Clerical language training in Peru tended to focus on languages far more common in the highlands. Samaniego and his fellow Jesuits in Santa Cruz had learned the local languages only after the completion of their training at the Jesuit mission school in Juli (on the shores of Lake Titicaca) in the 1580s. The situation was little changed in 1611, when Montesclaros expressed his frustration with the lack of priests who spoke Guaraní and other lowland languages.

The second factor was a creeping suspicion that the Chiriguanae’s apparent inclination toward the Christian faith masked ulterior motives. Father Samaniego had undertaken a second visit to the cordillera sometime between 1607 and 1609 in response to Cuñayuru’s invitation. There is no surviving direct account of his experiences, but a 1610 letter from an official in San Juan de Rodas describes the resistance he encountered. Cuñayuru’s brother and second in command, Mocapiri, reportedly dismissed Samaniego after a brief time and explained that “if


35 “Relación del P. Diego de Samaniego,” 405-06; “Viceroy Marqués de Montesclaros to the Audiencia of La Plata (1 Apr. 1611),” ANB, Corr., Ficha 674, 3r-3v.
[the Spanish] did not come to provide [to Cuñayuru] people who would go and finish off Charagua’s faction …, there was nothing for them but to leave.” He and his people were not interested in baptism nor the teachings of the faith; they only wanted Spanish allies “who would help them to destroy Charagua’s people,” as Almendras Holguín had done in 1607. The official in San Juan de Rodas took Samaniego’s failure as reason to abandon attempts at peaceful pacification of the region. By his reasoning, the ongoing rivalries between the Chiriguan faction necessitated that the Spanish establish a strong military presence prior to establishing missions.36

The plan paralleled the Audiencia’s own proposals, but it clashed with the viceroy’s more idealistic vision for the peaceful pacification of the cordillera. This discrepancy was an additional factor in the abandonment of large-scale evangelization efforts in the northern and central sectors of the cordillera. Newly received orders from the king additionally undermined any calls to establish a military presence in the cordillera. Philip III and his advisors had written a series of royal communiques in February of 1609 in response to the Audiencia’s optimistic messages about the conversion and pacification of the Chiriguanaes. The king was very much in favor of the peaceful advancement of the faith in this instance, but he made clear in his cédulas that the Audiencia and viceroy “assure on their part[s] … that people of war do not intervene in these

36 “Diego de Quintela Salazar to the Audiencia of La Plata (16 Jan. 1610),” 1r-2r. Mocapiri is called “Bocapire” in this document. He is called Mocapiri in “Relación de todo lo que en el viaje del socorro,” 2v.
discoveries and conversions.” The cédulas had arrived in Peru by March of 1610, at which time Montesclaros professed his opposition to all armed entradas into the lands beyond the frontiers.

Montesclaros and the Audiencia still held out hope, however, for the peaceful pacification of the Chiriguanaes on the Tarija frontier. After his recall to La Plata, Father Sampayo vociferously refuted his Jesuit companions’ assertions that his evangelism had fallen on deaf ears. He assured the secular authorities that the Chiriguana people to whom he had ministered expressed interest not only in the faith, but also in relocating to a mission reducción. He was certain he could make progress toward pacification without the assistance of any soldiers. Sampayo convinced the Audiencia and viceroy to allow him to return to the region at the end of 1609. The Audiencia tried to work with the Jesuit leadership of Peru to provide a new team of evangelists who might focus on sound indoctrination of the Chiriguana neophytes, but the Jesuits declined. Instead, Sampayo made his return to Tambobera’s community in November in the company of two Franciscans and a small team of Guaraní interpreters.

The evangelists’ first months among Tambobera’s people were encouraging. Sampayo reported in February of 1610 that the community, now dubbed San Juan Bautista, had received the clergymen with great affection. The people’s reception of the faith was even more emphatic.

37 “Real Cédula to Licenciado Alonso Maldonado de Torres, President of the Audiencia of La Plata (20 Feb. 1609),” AGI, Charcas, 415 L. 2, 218v-219r; “Real Cédula to Viceroy Marqués de Montesclaros (20 Feb. 1609),” AGI, Charcas, 415 L. 2, 220v; “Real Cédula to the Audiencia of La Plata (20 Feb. 1609),” AGI, Charcas, 415 L. 2, 223r-223v.

38 “Carta á S. M. del Virrey Marques de Montes Claros, contestando á una Real cédula … (18 Marzo de 1610),” in Mujía, Bolivia-Paraguay, vol. 3, 268-83, esp. 276-79.

39 “Viceroy Marqués de Montesclaros to the Audiencia of La Plata (22 May 1609),” 1v-2r; “Audiencia of La Plata to Viceroy Marqués de Montesclaros (14 July 1609),” ANB, Corr., Ficha 646, 1v; “Audiencia of La Plata to Viceroy Marqués de Montesclaros (5 Oct. 1609),” ANB, Corr., Ficha 649, 1v-2r; “Audiencia of La Plata to Viceroy Marqués de Montesclaros (28 Oct. 1609),” 2r-2v; “Audiencia of La Plata to Viceroy Marqués de Montesclaros (20 Nov. 1609),” ANB, Corr., Ficha 651, 1r; “Audiencia of La Plata to Viceroy Marqués de Montesclaros (1 Feb. 1610),” ANB, Corr., Ficha 656, 2r.
than it had been a year earlier. More than 100 submitted to baptism, and they were beginning to leave behind their evil customs, including polygyny. Sampayo reported that it was merely a matter of time before the church could replicate his efforts throughout the cordillera and into the lands beyond.40

The Franciscan histories of the journey paint a similar picture of the warm reception and mass baptism, but they go on to describe the quick unraveling of the whole endeavor. Sampayo’s Franciscan companions, Agustín Sabio and Francisco González, did not speak Guaraní, so they relied heavily on Sampayo and the interpreters. Sampayo justified the mass baptism by explaining that the new Christians had sufficient understanding of the faith owing to his first stint in the village. The Franciscans soon learned that the neophytes had next-to-no understanding of the faith. The Chiriguanaes viewed the sacrament of baptism only as a means to acquire gifts, including beads, knives, bells, and clothing, which the priests had brought with them as a means to establish friendly connections with the people. The Franciscans hoped that such connections might, over time, lead to knowledge of the faith, but instead, Sampayo reportedly offered them in direct exchange for the Chiriguana people’s baptismal commitment. Sabio halted adult baptisms and departed for La Plata in order to report the situation to the secular authorities. González remained behind with the interpreters in order to oversee the neophytes and continue predicating the faith. Despite the setback, they retained hope of resettling a group of Christian Chiriguanaes in a mission in the nearby Salinas Valley.41

Sampayo remained as well. By this point, he and González did not see eye to eye, but his relationships with Tambobera and the people were key to any hopes for establishing the mission.

40 “Simón de Sampayo to the Audiencia of La Plata (8 Feb. 1610),” ANB, Corr., Ficha 659, 1r.
41 “De las Misiones, y entradas … a la conversión de los indios infieles (1665),” 164-67; Corrado and Comajuncosa, El Colegio Franciscano de Tarija y sus misiones, vol. 1, 61.
According to the Franciscan account, Sampayo destroyed those hopes by turning the people against González and the Christian doctrine. He reportedly persuaded the people “not to allow the Spanish into their territories … because they came with the intent of enslaving them, much like the Indians of Peru, and [forcing] them to serve on their farmlands, in carriage and transport duty, and underground in the mines.” Sampayo also allegedly soured the Chiriguanae on the prospect of moving to a mission by explaining that they would have to turn over all the products of their labor to the priests. “If they wanted to become Christians,” he reportedly explained, “it was enough that he baptize them.”

The accusation against Sampayo is exaggerated. There is no doubt that he differed with the Franciscans about the best means to evangelize the Chiriguanaes, but he was not the source of the rumors about Spanish enslavement. The Chiriguanaes’ correlation between evangelization and servitude was persistent, widely held, and not entirely unfounded. Sampayo himself complained of a Chiriguana man from a neighboring community who “tells [Tambobera’s people] a thousand lies,” about the missionaries’ purposes, including that “when they are baptized and become Christians, they will be handed over into servitude.”

The growing mistrust toward the Christians and their doctrine quickly came to a head. In late 1610 or early 1611, a Portuguese Guaraní interpreter named Luis Farias set out to return briefly to Tarija. A group of Tambobera’s people opposed to the presence of the Christians took the opportunity to ambush him during his journey. After killing Farias, they divided up his possessions and seized Farias’ yanacona companion. They proceeded to the village where they sacked the small mission church and ordered González out of the community. Tambobera intervened, punished the guilty parties, and convinced González to stay, but the peace would not

42 “De las Misiones, y entradas … a la conversión de los indios infieles (1665),” 168-70; Corrado and Comajuncosa, El Colegio Franciscano de Tarija y sus misiones, vol. 1, 61-62.

43 “Simón de Sampayo to the Audiencia of La Plata (8 Feb. 1610),” 1r.
last. In March of 1611, a bit more than a year after Sampayo made his return to the southern
cordillera, a Chiriguana troop associated with Tambobera’s faction attacked a Spanish property
outside of Tarija. The Spanish residents of the area had responded to the Chiriguanas’ apparent
pacification in the prior years by beginning to develop the agricultural lands and fisheries
southeast of Tarija on the Bermejo River. One _hacendado_ named Hernando de Arango was
living on his vineyard with his family and a team of native workers. In early March, a single
Chiriguana reportedly approached Arango’s estate requesting baptism. Arango responded that he
would sponsor the sacrament at Easter, and the two parted the following day in apparent peace.
That afternoon, 200 Chiriguana warriors reportedly rode in from the east and attacked the
property. A number of arrows struck Arango, and he died on the spot. The Chiriguanas captured
his wife and children and most of the native workers, as well as a great many cattle and some
mules and horses, before burning the house. The native workers fortunate enough to escape
reported news of the attack in Tarija.⁴⁴ Officials in Tarija were certain that Sampayo and
González had been killed in the course of the uprising, but as it turns out, their fate was not quite
so dire. The Franciscan history explains they were imprisoned as the attacks took place and
eventually transported eastward, farther into the cordillera, as the community fled the certain
Spanish reprisals for the recent violence. At some point along the journey, the Chiriguanas
released the Spaniards and some of the captive natives. González, Sampayo, Arango’s family,
and the freed natives managed to make their way back to Tarija, but only after an extremely

---
⁴⁴ “De las Misiones, y entradas … a la conversión de los indios infieles (1665),” 170-71; “Autos sobre la muerte de
Hernando de Arango que mataron los y(ndi)os chiriguanas de guerra (6-14 Mar. 1611),” ANB, Corr., Ficha 683, 1r-5v; Latasa Vassallo, _Administración virreinal en el Perú_, 623-24. The Franciscan history dates the attack to 1610,
a clear error.
difficult ordeal that involved traversing hundreds of kilometers through rough terrain with nearly no food or other supplies.  

Reports of other attacks at this time ranged as far north as Tomina. The additional victims included two separate parties of Spaniards, 13 people in total. Both groups were in the cordillera illegally trading for captives when they were reportedly ambushed. Officials responded by distributing munitions to the frontiers and calling the Spanish citizens to arms. A contingent of 50 soldiers eventually rode out from Tarija into the southern cordillera where they captured and hanged 16 Chiriguanaes whom they held responsible for the attack. The offensive effectively ended the threat to the Spanish frontier, but it also removed any fledgling hopes of restoring trust with the local Chiriguana populations. The era of pacification through evangelization was over.

There is no single factor that can explain why the first significant evangelization effort among the Chiriguanaes sparked violence while contemporary efforts in Paraguay managed to bring thousands of Guaraní speakers into reducciones, but scholarship relating to the Chiriguana peoples of the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries may help elucidate the reluctance of their ancestors in 1611 as well. Missionaries working in the cordillera and the Chaco in the later eras regularly expressed frustration that their charges within the missions system felt the missionaries owed them a continued supply of gifts and supplies once the pattern was established. Saignes has theorized that this expectation stemmed from the apparent parallels between a missionary and a

---

45 “Autos sobre la muerte de Hernando de Arango (6-14 Mar. 1611),” 5r-5v; “De las Misiones, y entradas … a la conversión de los indios infieles (1665),” 171-72. There is no indication of what happened to the remaining captive natives.

traditional Chiriguana *tuvicha*. The latter was responsible for his people’s wellbeing in exchange for their loyalty. When the missionary began to dispense valued goods, he assumed a similar role with its similar responsibilities. According to this theory, when Sabio halted the giving of gifts for fear it tainted the baptismal rite, some within Tambobera’s community scoffed at the priests’ failure to live up to expectations. Farias and Arango were among those who paid the price.

**Poblar y (no) Conquistar, 1612-1615**

The disastrous results of the attempted evangelization of the Chiriguanaes on the Tarija frontier, following as it did on the failure to develop a suitable strategy for the evangelization of the primary Chiriguana population centers in the northern and central cordillera, forced Viceroy Montesclaros to develop a new approach the Chiriguana frontier. He resigned himself to the belief that the Chiriguanaes could not be pacified through the efforts of missionaries alone. This put him in a difficult position, because the king had made clear his wish to exclude Spanish military men (*gente de guerra*) from the pacification process, a sentiment that Montesclaros personally shared. The constraints of the situation led him to attempt to devise a strategy by which the Spanish might populate the cordillera without displacing or mistreating the Chiriguanaes.

In 1612, he wrote that a strategy of “populating without conquest would overcome many difficulties” that had derailed earlier attempts to pacify the cordillera. He would maintain the policy throughout the remainder of his tenure. As he left Peru in 1615, he advised his successor: “the best means of waging war against [the Chiriguanaes], and also the surest to maintain a clear

---

47 Saignes, *Ava y karai*, 121-22; Combès, *Etno-historias del Isoso*, 97. Reff’s work on the Paraguayan missions and their Jesuit leaders takes a slightly different approach to a similar issue. He also argues that the priests assumed a role akin to native leaders (though not by providing gifts, which he downplays as an element in the formation of the missions), but because they could best explain and deal with epidemic disease. See Reff, “The Jesuit Mission Frontier,” 20-27. It is not clear if epidemic disease was an issue in the southern cordillera at this time.
conscience, is to go into their land by way of [establishing a] population, without other harm or ill treatment towards them.” And because cost was an overarching concern for the crown and its representatives in Peru, Montesclaros added that a crucial aspect of the strategy involved the funding for the populations in question. He wrote, “in order to avoid costs for His Majesty, the most advisable strategy is … making a contract with particular individuals who will take charge of these missions.”

The strategy was an optimistic one that appears naive, in many ways. To achieve success, it relied on the peaceful coexistence of Spanish and Chiriguana populations. All prior attempts to establish Spanish populations in Chiriguana-controlled territory dating back to 1561 met great resistance. The only one to endure in any sense was San Lorenzo, which benefitted from the devastation wrought in that area during the wars of the 1580s. But the largely peaceful intervening period brought reason to believe in the potential for peaceful cooperation. Almendras Holguín’s entrada, furthermore, had demonstrated that such a relationship could form under the right circumstances.

Because Montesclaros remained in charge of Spanish Peru only through 1615 and he never fully implemented his new policy, there are few clues indicating how he envisioned the strategy of poblar y no conquistar playing out. Among those that do exist are his notes, from 1613, on a proposal to found two or three fortified Spanish towns in the cordillera using a force of 300 soldiers. The proposal had originally been drawn up in 1609 on behalf of Diego de Contreras, an official from La Plata. The viceroy’s annotations show that he took particular issue

---

48 “Copia de carta que escribió el Marques de montes claros Virrey del Peru al Capitan Diego de Contreras en primero de otubre de 1612,” in Mujía, Bolivia-Paraguay, vol. 3, 178-80; “Relación del estado en que se hallaba el Reino del Perú … al Excmo. Señor Principe de Esquilache, su sucesor (12 Sept. 1615),” 201. For Montesclaros’ general stance on the efficacy of soldiers in the pacification of native peoples, see page 172 of the same document.
with the fortresses that Contreras proposed to build in the new Spanish towns. Montesclaros wrote that “whatever is built with the title of fortress must be only that which is sufficient for the defense of the people and their livestock [against] invasions of Indians aimed at them.” He indicated that the structure should not serve as a means “to mistreat [the surrounding peoples] or stage offensives.” Montesclaros also rejected Contreras’ proposed approach to native labor in the proposed settlements. Where Contreras wrote of “the Indians that would be settled and conquered,” Montesclaros clarified that “he could not assign any rights to native laborers … unless they consist of Indians who have been settled peacefully” and guaranteed certain rights. Montesclaros ultimately rejected Contreras’ proposal on the basis that it was oriented too much toward the conquest of the Chiriguanaes rather than the peaceful occupation of the cordillera.49

In the time between 1612 and 1615, Montesclaros looked more favorably upon three other proposals to found Spanish towns in or near Chiriguana territory. The first, and the only to be undertaken before Montesclaros left Peru, resulted in the foundation of the Ciudad de Jesús y Montes Claros de los Caballeros del Vallegrandre (modern Vallegrande, Bolivia). Pedro de Escalante, Montesclaros’ kinsman, received official permission from the viceroy in March of 1612 to found a population in a frontier valley midway along the road between San Lorenzo and La Plata. The city had its roots in a small Spanish settlement in the same area dating to 1609 or 1610. At that time, Escalante and a group of settlers repurposed a grouping of Inca defensive structures in order to protect the agricultural colony from potential native attacks. There is no evidence to suggest that the area immediately surrounding the settlement was particularly subject

49 “Copia del memorial que el Thesorero Pedro de Vergara en nombre y con poder del Capitan Diego de Contreras … Dio al Marques de Montes claros … Ba responndido á la margen de cada Capítulo lo que le parece al Virrey (1613),” in Mujía, Bolivia-Paraguay, vol. 3, 181-96; “Real Cédula to Viceroy Montesclaros (18 Dec. 1609),” AGI, Charcas, 418 L. 3, 5r-5v.
to violence—at least not since the 1580s—but travelers between San Lorenzo and the highlands always took particular care during the stretch of the journey between Samaipata and Tomina. The road between the two points not only ran through lands within the reach of Chiriguana populations, northern Mojos peoples were known to frequent the area as well. The renewal of hostilities along the Tarija and Tomina frontiers the previous year seems to have convinced the viceroy to establish a more active Spanish presence along the route.  

Montesclaros also approved a plan for a Spanish town in the Salinas Valley near Tarija. It was the same location as the proposed Chiriguana mission to be developed under Father Simón de Sampayo. The proposed founder and leader of the new town was Juan Porcel de Padilla. Porcel de Padilla had amassed a fortune as a mine and mill owner in Potosí and was additionally the only heir to Luis de Fuentes, founder and long-serving *corregidor* of Tarija. The latter died in 1598, and his estate and titles became the subject of lengthy legal battles. Porcel de Padilla only won full recognition of his inheritance in 1615, based in part on his promise to secure the frontiers near Tarija by founding a Spanish town to the southeast.  

The approved foundation agreement called for the town to consist of 60 Spanish *vecinos*, “the majority of them married” and willing to relocate their families with them. In a statement likely influenced by


Montesclaros’ *poblar y no conquistar* strategy, the document acknowledges that populating the land in this way “is the best solution there is to settle the wild Chiriguanaes to the Catholic faith.”

The Porcel de Padilla proposal developed not only in the context of the failed mission *reducción* and frontier attacks of 1611, but also in an environment in which the crown and viceroyalty were striving to improve travel to and communications with the Spanish provinces of Tucumán and Río de la Plata. The massive expanses between Charcas and the Atlantic Ocean had long been notorious for such crimes as smuggling and native enslavement, but the colonial state had been largely incapable of enacting policies effective in combating such illegal behavior. Concern from King Philip III and Montesclaros regarding the abuse of native laborers spurred the commissioning of an investigation (*visita*) of the far-flung, semi-autonomous territories. Francisco de Alfaro, an Audiencia official from Charcas, undertook the long journey to and from Asunción (Alfaro wrote that he traveled more than 1,500 leagues) in 1610-12. His experience underlined, among other things, the incredible difficulties and hazards that such a journey entailed. A safer and better route would be necessary if officials in Peru were to exercise effective oversight of the distant populations.

This was not the first time that officials in Peru had sought to establish a route from the highlands of Peru to the Río de la Plata. Shipping silver and other products to Europe from the

---

52 “Capitulaciones celebradas entre el capitán Juan Porcel de Padilla y el virrey del Perú … en el año de 1614 …,” in Edelmiro Porcel, *Documentación inédita de Tarija*, 11-16.

highland mining centers in Charcas entailed a difficult, multi-legged journey that ran over land to
the Pacific, by sea from Peru to Panama, and over land again to the Caribbean, before joining the
Atlantic fleet. The Pilcomayo River offered an enticing potential alternative route to the ocean,
but due to the presence of the Chiriguanaes and other potentially hostile peoples, the Spanish had
not managed to explore thoroughly the possibility.54

The events of the 1610s brought new urgency to the development of a way to eschew the
Pacific leg of the journey. The negotiation of a truce between Spain and the United Dutch
Provinces in 1609 brought a halt to the long-running conflict between the two parties in Europe,
but it freed the Dutch to concentrate their military resources on Spanish and Portuguese interests
overseas, where the terms of the truce were hazy or simply ignored. The Dutch were particularly
focused on attacking the Iberian colonies in Asia in the years to come, but a fleet led by Joris van
Spilbergen also managed to expose the inadequacy of the Spanish naval defenses on the Pacific
coast of America. Van Spilbergen scored a major victory against the Spanish Pacific armada off
the coast of Peru in July of 1614 before sailing northward to target the trade between Mexico and
the Philippines. The incident caused Spanish colonial officials to doubt the security of their
shipments, particularly in the Pacific.55

Porcel de Padilla’s official commission as corregidor came six weeks after the Peruvian
naval defeat by van Spilbergen. By that time, the goals of Porcel de Padilla’s mission had

54 The role of the Chiriguanaes as a barrier to Spanish travel and transport between different provinces is an
overarching theme of Saignes’ work on the Chiriguanaes of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. It is most

55 “Relación del estado en que se hallaba el Reino del Perú … al Excmo. Señor Príncipe de Esquilache, su sucesor
(12 Sept. 1615),” 199-200; Jonathan I. Israel, The Dutch Republic and the Hispanic World, 1606-61 (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1982), 25-28; Kris E. Lane, Pillaging the Empire: Piracy in the Americas, 1500-1750 (Armonk,
NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1998), 79-84; Engel Sluiter, “The Fortification of Acapulco, 1615-1616,” Hispanic American
expanded from the pacification of the Chiriguanaes on the Tarija frontier to include, in the language of Montesclaros’ secretary, “the opening of the road and [ensuring] security and trade with the provinces of Paraguay and the Río de la Plata, and to found other populations for the benefit of the royal crown and his majesty’s service.” The same document characterizes the community to be established by Porcel de Padilla as vital to the goal of “assur[ing] the passage, trade, and commerce of the provinces of Paraguay, Tucumán, and Río de la Plata, which the Indians have typically impeded, committing much harm and theft.”

Montesclaros additionally planted the seeds for another series of Spanish settlements in and beyond the cordillera when he granted Ruy Díaz de Guzmán the right to populate within Chiriguana territory in March of 1614. Díaz de Guzmán, already 60 years old (or nearly so), had been born to a mestizo mother in Asunción and learned Guaraní as a native speaker. He was the grandson of the famed governor of Paraguay, Domingo de Irala, and began at a young age to participate in expeditions of war and discovery throughout the interior of the continent. Díaz de Guzmán occupied a variety of municipal and royal positions in Tucumán and Río de la Plata throughout the 1590s and 1600s. In 1610, he traveled to La Plata in order to seek recognition for his service to the crown and to write his famous history of the early settlement of the Río de la Plata. Montesclaros granted him the title of Governor and Captain General of the Llanos de Manso, an imprecise geographical area that corresponded to the central cordillera and the plains of the Chaco to the east.

---

56 “Provisión del virrey, Marqués de Montesclaros, al señor presidente de la Audiencia de La Plata … Los Reyes, 31/08/1615,” in Edelmiro Porcel, Documentación inédita de Tarija, 24-26.

57 Ch. de Crozefon, “Estudio preliminar,” in Relación de la entrada a los chiriguanos: edición crítica de los manuscritos existentes en la Biblioteca Nacional de París, ed. Ch. de Crozefon and Hernando Sanabria Fernández (Santa Cruz, Bolivia: Fundación Cultural Ramón Darío Gutiérrez, 1979), 15-26; Saignes, “Entre ‘bárbaros’ y ‘cristianos,’” 27-28; “Carta del Príncipe de Esquilache, acompañando copias y extractos … que tratan de la entrada de Ruy Díaz de Guzmán á los indios Chiriguanaes … (1617-19),” and “Carta del Príncipe de Esquilache de 16 de
Both Porcel de Padilla’s and Díaz de Guzmán’s proposed settlements varied in key ways from the ideal that Montesclaros described with the strategy of *poblar y no conquistar*. In the former case, the imperative of ensuring the passage to the southeast led Montesclaros to ease back from his opposition to tactics of conquest. He granted permission for Porcel de Padilla to bring natives from the Tarija region precisely because they were known to be soldiers capable of fighting the Chiriguanaes. Porcel de Padilla was also given the latitude to grant *encomiendas* “of those Indians that are conquered or pacified” and to outfit the town with a “fortress, tower, and stronghold … that serve for offensive and defensive [war].”

The documents pertaining to Díaz de Guzmán’s 1614 commission have not survived, so it is not entirely clear how Montesclaros instructed him. A pair of later documentary references suggest that the overall tenor of the agreement was precisely *poblar y no conquistar*, but Díaz de Guzmán had built his reputation as a soldier—particularly one who knew how to fight the so-called barbarians beyond the frontiers. He belonged, in many ways, squarely among the *gente de guerra* that the king hoped to exclude from this type of mission. Additionally—and it turns out, critically—Díaz de Guzmán was not wealthy by the standards of one who might take on a task of this type. Porcel de Padilla had to take pains to demonstrate his ability to cover the costs of his new population by mortgaging

---

58 “Capitulaciones celebradas entre el capitán Juan Porcel de Padilla y el virrey del Perú … en el año de 1614 …,” 15; “Provisión del virrey, Marqués de Montesclaros, al señor presidente de la Audiencia de La Plata … Los Reyes, 31/08/1615,” 24. Emphasis mine in both quotes.

59 For the reference to the peaceful goals of the expedition, see “Carta del Príncipe de Esquilache, acompañando copias y extractos … que tratan de la entrada de Ruy Díaz de Guzmán á los indios Chiriguanaes … (1617-19),” 198-99; Ruy Díaz de Guzmán, “La expedición – Manuscrito No. 2,” in Crozefon and Sanabria Fernández, *Relación de la entrada a los chiriguanos*, 91. For Díaz de Guzmán’s reputation as a soldier, see Crozefon, “Estudio preliminar,” 15-23.
nearly all his extensive property. Díaz de Guzmán did not have access to the same means, and he was not subject to the same scrutiny. In time, all of these factors would greatly affect the mission.

The Final Entradas, 1616-1620s

Porcel de Padilla’s and Díaz de Guzmán’s entradas would drift even further from the ideal of poblar y no conquistar when they actually took shape under the supervision of the Audiencia of Charcas and local officials during the tenure of Montesclaros’ successor. The new viceroy, Francisco de Borja y Aragón, better known as the Príncipe de Esquilache, had not previously served in any official administrative capacity when Philip III chose him from the highest levels of royal society and appointed him Viceroy of Peru in 1614. Esquilache would assume the office in December of 1615, the delay owing in part to the presence of the Dutch squadrons in the Pacific. There was no official interregnum during which the Audiencia exercised the power of gobierno, but Montesclaros had ceded the responsibility for seeing off Porcel de Padilla’s and Díaz de Guzmán’s entradas to the Audiencia. The Audiencia further delegated elements of their oversight to local officials. Esquilache made no initial alterations to the arrangement.

60 For the details of Porcel de Padilla’s self-funding of his mission, see “Capitulaciones celebradas entre el capitán Juan Porcel de Padilla y el virrey del Perú … en el año de 1614 …,” 12-13; “Fianza otorgada por terceros a favor de don Juan Porcel de Padilla … para garantizar el pago de las obligaciones asumidas para la entrada y población 6/05/1616,” in Edelmiro Porcel, Documentación inédita de Tarija, 23-24; and “Provisión del virrey, Marqués de Montesclaros, al señor presidente de la Audiencia de La Plata … Los Reyes, 31/08/1615,” 24-26. The demonstration of his compliance with the terms of his contract, including financial terms, plays out in a number of other documents in the same volume.

61 “Carta del Príncipe de Esquilache de 16 de Abril de 1618 sobre los apuros de Ruy Diaz de Guzman en los chiriguanaes,” 214; “Carta del Príncipe de Esquilache de 27 de Mayo de 1619 sobre el siento de Ruy Diaz de Guzman …,” in Mujía, Bolivia-Paraguay, vol. 3, 224-26; “Relación que el Príncipe de Esquilache hace al Señor Marqués de Guadalcazar sobre el estado en que deja las provincias del Peru (1621),” in Beltrán y Rózpide, Colección de las memorias o relaciones que escribieron los Virreyes del Perú, vol. 1, 252-53, 256.

62 Vargas Ugarte, Historia general del Perú, vol. 3, 153-57; “Relación que el Príncipe de Esquilache hace al Señor Marqués de Guadalcazar … (1621),” 257. Esquilache is far more noted for his literary work, to which he dedicated himself after returning from Peru, than for his capacity as an administrator. See Javier Jiménez Belmonte, “Las
Díaz de Guzmán’s expedition became mired in violence and conflict before it even began. In October of 1615—just before Esquilache arrived in Lima and several months before Díaz de Guzmán would depart for the cordillera—a delegation of Chiriguana messengers arrived in La Plata to plead for assistance from the Spanish. The messengers had come on behalf of two caciques from the central cordillera and the Charagua faction long familiar to the Spanish residents of the Tomina frontier. The messengers reported that the ongoing war between the Charagua and Cuñayuru factions had reignited when the latter, identified in this period as the Guapay faction (Cuñayuru himself no longer appears in the documentation), attacked them. With the Audiencia’s permission, Díaz de Guzmán sent out a vanguard of 15 soldiers to intervene. They led an assault on a Chiriguana town in the northern cordillera and killed the apparent overall leader of the faction, Cuñayuru’s brother Mocapiri, among others, and carried off a number of captives. The incident placed Díaz de Guzmán and his followers squarely within the matrix of the decades-long Chiriguana inter-factional conflict, and they did little to deescalate the situation in the subsequent months and years.

When they assembled in Tomina in April of 1616 before setting off, they projected an unmistakably military demeanor. Díaz de Guzmán described the expedition as consisting of “many important people with the ranks of captains and war officials with a quantity of soldiers

---

Indias políticas y poéticas del príncipe de Esquiache,” Colonial Latin American Review 15, no. 2 (2006): 143-59. For the ceding of power over Porcel de Padilla’s entrada and Esquilache’s approval of the designation, see “Provisión del virrey, Marqués de Montesclaros, al señor presidente de la Audiencia de La Plata … Los Reyes, 31/08/1615,” 24-26; “Carta del virrey del Piru, Francisco de Borja y Aragón, príncipe de Esquilache, a Juan Porcel de Padilla, Los Reyes, 1/04/1616,” and “Auto de Martín de Ormache, teniente de corregidor de la Villa de Potosí …, 2 de julio de 1616,” both in Edelmiro Porcel, Documentación inédita de Tarija, 27-29. For the ceding of power over Díaz de Guzmán’s entrada, see Díaz de Guzmán, “La expedición,” 82-83.

Díaz de Guzmán, “La expedición,” 81-83. The name is transcribed “Mocapini,” in this document. It appears as “Mocapiri” and “Bocapi” in others. What happened to Cuñayuru is not clear. He does not appear in any documentation from this era. Charagua, the individual, likewise does not appear, though the name is applied often to the confederation of allied communities.
… all well-armed.” Once assembled, Díaz de Guzmán received representatives from both principal Chiriguana rival blocs, Charagua and Guapay, each offering fealty and alliance. Díaz de Guzmán would eventually write that the reason the Chiriguanaes sought alliances with him “was to avail themselves of [Díaz de Guzmán] and his forces in order to attack their enemies in revenge for the harm they have received.”\(^{64}\) Much as had happened nine years earlier in the wake of Almendras Holguín’s entrada, the disputing Chiriguana factions recognized the potential advantage of a partnership with the Spanish, as well as the likely costs of facing a Spanish-allied enemy. All parties sought to win the favor and assistance of the Christians.

Díaz de Guzmán reported peaceful encounters with the various Chiriguana populations he and his followers met during their march into the heart of the cordillera. They eventually reached the principal population of the Charagua faction on the Parapetí River and established ties with the overall leader, Guayrapiru, whom they baptized Rodrigo Guayrapiru. Díaz de Guzmán named him the governor of the natives of the region. His brother, christened Martín Camaripa, received the title of alguacil mayor (akin to sheriff). Díaz de Guzmán set up his headquarters nearby in an Inca-era fortress (dubbed La Magdalena) that sat above the Parapetí River.\(^{65}\)

Their close ties to the Charagua leaders made the Spanish the targets of attacks from rival factions beginning shortly after their establishment in the cordillera. Already in August of 1616,

---

\(^{64}\) Ibid., 82-83, 89. Even the priest who accompanied the mission is described as the “field chaplain.” The Spanish arranged a captive exchange with the faction they had just attacked, whereby the Spanish would return the women from their village, and they would return the women seized from the Charagu faction. The representatives from the Charagua faction included Areya.

\(^{65}\) Ibid., 83-102; “Carta del Príncipe de Esquilache, acompañando copias y extractos … que tratan de la entrada de Ruy Díaz de Guzmán á los indios Chiriguanaes … (1617-19),” 201-02. There is no archaeological structure associated with this reference, though it would have been in fairly close proximity to the Cuzcotoro, Dilava (Iñao), Conima (Incahuasi) line of defensive structures. See Chapter 4.
the Spanish found themselves besieged inside La Magdalena by a force reportedly made up of 2,000 to 3,000 Chané and Chiriguana warriors from the Mayriye faction (from to the south). Díaz de Guzmán and company managed to break the siege after arranging a meeting with the leader of the opposition, who overestimated the strength of his position, as well as the goodwill of the Spanish. He and six advisors entered the Spanish fortress, but when they attempted to leave, the Spanish blocked the exit. According to Díaz de Guzmán’s letter to the viceroy, “some of them threw themselves upon the points of [the Spanish soldiers’] swords … leaving [the soldiers] no choice but to kill them all.” The Spanish cavalry took advantage of the resulting confusion and rode through the encirclement. Díaz de Guzmán eventually led a combined force of Spanish and Chiriguana soldiers against the Mayriye communities along the Pilcomayo. He reported having burned seven villages and killed the leaders of the enemy faction after a long and bloody campaign. Within months, the Mayriye and Guapay factions were not the only ones openly opposed to the presence of the Spanish. Others, including increasingly more members of the Charagua faction, also reportedly had designs on expelling the Spanish from the region.66

The conflictual nature of the relationship between Díaz de Guzmán and many of the peoples of the cordillera was inimical to his mission to populate. First and foremost, the near-constant warfare left the expedition critically short on supplies. Díaz de Guzmán wrote the viceroy in July of 1616 requesting emergency help in the form of soldiers, weapons, and munitions. As time wore on, the Spanish and their native auxiliaries remained either on campaign or refuged within their fortified headquarters at La Magdalena. They were unable to settle and develop the lands around them as they had planned, and they ran increasingly short on

basics such as food and clothing. Officials in San Lorenzo, Tomina, Vallegrande, and La Plata each arranged emergency interventions involving military assistance and supply shipments at various times between 1616 and 1619. At least some of that help was funded by unbudgeted emergency expenditures from the royal accounts.\textsuperscript{67}

The growing expenditures were not the only problem. Viceroy Esquilache was growing increasingly exasperated by the reports about Díaz de Guzmán’s failure to populate and pacify the region as he had been ordered. It was November of 1616, a year and a half after his departure, before Díaz de Guzmán finally established a Spanish municipality of any type. At that time, he oversaw the symbolic foundation of San Pedro de Guzmán at a site a quarter league (1-2 km) from La Magdalena. The “city” would remain little more than an unoccupied piece of land. The delay reflected another of the viceroy’s major complaints: the lack of interest that many of Díaz de Guzmán’s followers seem to have had in establishing a peaceful population and evangelizing the Chiriguanaes in the first place. Word from the Spanish frontier populations indicated that they were rather more focused on fostering additional conflict so they might continue to participate in the captive trade. As Esquilache put it in a letter to the king, “they did not go for any reason but to take Indian slaves in order to make them work on the properties they have in Charcas.” The viceroy promptly ordered the liberation of all slaves sent from Díaz de Guzmán’s camp to the Tomina frontier.\textsuperscript{68}

\textsuperscript{67} Díaz de Guzmán, “La expedición,” 100-01, 105-06; “Carta del Príncipe de Esquilache, acompañando copias y extractos … que tratan de la entrada de Ruy Díaz de Guzmán á los indios Chiriguanaes … (1617-19),” 208-09; “Carta del Príncipe de Esquilache de 16 de Abril de 1618 sobre los apuros de Rui Díaz de Guzman en los chiriguanaes,” 213-18; “Carta del Príncipe de Esquilache de 27 de Mayo de 1619 sobre el asiento de Ruy Díaz de Guzman …,” 224-26. Military assistance to La Magdalena may even have come during this time from Porcel de Padilla’s new population in the southern cordillera. See Saignes, “Andaluces en el poblamiento del sur boliviano,” 197.

\textsuperscript{68} Díaz de Guzmán, “La expedición,” 99-100; “Carta del Príncipe de Esquilache, acompañando copias y extractos … que tratan de la entrada de Ruy Díaz de Guzmán á los indios Chiriguanaes … (1617-19),” 206-12; “Carta del
Throughout much of 1617, Díaz de Guzmán and his followers found themselves on shifting political ground as the displeasure with their presence spread. “Governor” Rodrigo Guayrapiru withdrew his support of the Spanish in June and began a brief campaign against them, but Díaz de Guzmán was able to regain some standing among the natives due to the fracturing of the Charagua faction. His brother Martín Camaripe remained behind the Spanish. Díaz de Guzmán also managed to strike a deal with the Mayriye faction, whom the Spanish had devastated only the year before. But the peace would not last. Díaz de Guzmán’s chronicle of the expedition describes his forceful suppression of a number of subsequent uprisings on the part of his allies during that same month (June 1617) alone. By August, much of the Charagua contingent was in negotiations with their traditional enemies—the Mayriye faction in the south and the Guapay in the north, with whom they had already begun to cooperate—in hopes of driving out the Spanish. Several Spanish traveling parties fell victim to attacks in different parts of the cordillera in the subsequent months, as did a group from Vallegrande riding out to assist Díaz de Guzmán. The cooperation between the Charagua and Guapay factions was historic. It represents a significant departure from their antagonistic relations during much of the previous 30 years. For the first time since the wars of the 1580s—the last time the Spanish attempted an official settlement within the cordillera—the two primary Chiriguana political blocs determined to rise in conjunction against the same enemy.

---

Príncipe de Esquilache de 16 de Abril de 1618 sobre los apuros de Rui Diaz de Guzman en los chiriguanaes,” 213-214.

The clergymen charged with indoctrinating the peoples of the cordillera had meanwhile made little headway. Díaz de Guzmán’s attempt to settle a Chané population he had “liberated” from the Mayriye Chiriguanaes was fleeting. Those who gathered within the short-lived reducción rejected the teachings of the faith on the basis of the familiar fear that “the sacred gospel … [was] the means by which [the Spanish] ha[d] come to enslave them.” Likewise, the approximately half-dozen Franciscan and Dominican monks who had come to the cordillera in 1616 and early 1617 in order to evangelize the allied Chiriguana communities could not manage to win significant numbers of dedicated converts. The clergymen were initially well-received by the leaders of the Charagua faction and other associated communities, but tolerance toward the monks began to waver as the political situation changed.70

In early 1618, as Díaz de Guzmán sought assistance with his impending military response to the heightening conflict, Esquilache was losing patience. The viceroy had begun to recognize that any settlement in the heart of the cordillera was likely to require continual and costly emergency intervention if it were to last. Furthermore, Díaz de Guzmán had been unsuccessful in converting any significant number of natives, so the abandonment of neophytes was not an issue. He revoked Díaz de Guzmán’s commissions and ordered him to return to La Plata. He also ordered Escalante to abandon the city of Vallegrande. The residents of Vallegrande remained in their frontier city despite the order.71


71 “Carta del Príncipe de Esquilache de 16 de Abril de 1618 sobre los apuros de Rui Diaz de Guzman en los chiriguanae,” 216-18; “Relación que el Príncipe de Esquilache hace al Señor Marqués de Guadalcázar … (1621),” 252-56; “Carta del Príncipe de Esquilache de 27 de Mayo de 1619 sobre el asiento de Ruy Diaz de Guzman …,” 224-26; Melgar i Montaño, Historia de Vallegrande, vol. 1, 14-15.
Díaz de Guzmán’s *relación* ends in January of 1618, so much of the detail of the following years is lacking, but it is clear that Díaz de Guzmán also refused to comply with the order. Instead, the conflict would continue to escalate as soldiers from Tomina and San Lorenzo rode out to assist his forces at La Magdalena. The only surviving documentary evidence about the conflict at this stage consists of indirect testimony collected years after the fact in San Lorenzo. Witnesses described a major Spanish victory over 8,000 Chiriguana warriors, “the forces of the entire cordillera,” occurring in 1619 or 1620. But the testimony appears to skew the truth. The Spanish ultimately lost the war for control of the cordillera. By 1621, Díaz de Guzmán and his followers abandoned La Magdalena and San Pedro de Guzmán for good, and the residents of San Lorenzo and Santa Cruz found themselves isolated and on the defensive. All travel to and from the city required extensive protection and preparation. The Chiriguanaes even managed to push back the frontiers of Spanish settlement in the region. Officials decided in 1621 to evacuate the small, poorly defended town of Santa Cruz, located on the banks of the Guapay River. The population was absorbed into San Lorenzo and the name changed to Santa Cruz.72

While the Spanish retreated from the heart of the cordillera and the banks of the Guapay, it is not entirely clear what was happening to the south in the Salinas Valley, the site of Juan Porcel de Padilla’s newly established population in Chiriguana territory. Porcel de Padilla founded the city of La Nueva Vega de Granada there (the site of modern Entre Ríos, Bolivia) in mid-to-late 1616. The character of the founding population appears to have fit within the mandates stipulated by Montesclaros. Its founding citizens consisted of 87 men, 35 of whom

72 “Relación que el Príncipe de Esquilache hace al Señor Marqués de Guadalcázar … (1621),” 255-56; “Carta del Príncipe de Esquilache de 16 de Abril de 1618 sobre los apuros de Rui Diaz de Guzman en los chiriguanaes,” 218; “Autos levantados por Don Nuño de la Cueva gobernador y capitán general de Santa Cruz de la Sierra (1621),” in *Actas capitulares de Santa Cruz de la Sierra, 1634-1640*, ed. Gabriel Feyles, Marcelo Terceros Banzer, and Hernando Sanabria Fernández (La Paz: Universidad Boliviana Gabriel René Moreno, 1977), 239-44; “El General y Justicia Mayor de Santa Cruz de la Sierra … durante su ausencia al General Antonio de Rojas (1628),” 231-35.
were married. They came from a variety of professions and walks of life so as to complement each other and come together quickly as a functioning community. The priest serving the new town was none other than Simón de Sampayo. Unfortunately, no additional documentation exists regarding his role in the history of the settlement.

Very little documentation has survived regarding the town and its residents following their departure from Tarija. In April of 1618, Esquilache wrote that the city had lost a bit of its Spanish population; it had fewer than 60 vecinos, but the total number of Spanish and mestizo residents still neared 300. Nevertheless, those who remained enjoyed fertile land, a variety of resources, and sufficient proximity that they might carry on trade with Potosí and the highlands. They also enjoyed peace and cooperation with the natives, many of whom had agreed to adopt the faith. The residents planned to continue their efforts to evangelize and settle the natives living to the east as well.

In the years to come, the town would come increasingly under pressure from Chiriguana forces. The first evidence to this effect comes from a Franciscan history that describes a native resident of the town who by chance discovered a large wooden cross in a nearby cave. The people brought it to town, where it reportedly performed miracles, including healing a soldier who had suffered an axe wound. Esquilache’s April 1618 letter mentions the discovery of the cross, so it likely occurred sometime in or around 1617. According to the Franciscan history, “shortly thereafter,” Chiriguanaes attacked the town. In the course of what the Franciscan history deems another miracle, a single man was able to carry the heavy cross to safety as the church

73 “Muestra de los jefes, oficiales sargentos, soldados, sacerdote, barbero, cirujano y artesanos … Tarija el 6 de julio de 1616 …,” 29-36.

74 “Carta del Príncipe de Esquilache, de 16 de Abril de 1618, dando cuenta de la Capitulación celebrada por Juan Porcel de Padilla …,” in Mujía, Bolivia-Paraguay, vol. 3, 220-23.
burned to the ground. Similar ongoing attacks would impel the population to fortify the town with a number of high lookouts. It would be known most commonly during its existence as Pueblo de las Torres, a name referencing the town’s distinctive defensive architecture.75

The conflict with the Chiriguanaes spurred dissent among the Spanish residents and resistance to Porcel de Padilla’s style of leadership. The Audiencia was charged in late 1619 with investigating the corregidor’s conduct. All the while, residents were abandoning Las Torres until its last Spanish inhabitants finally left sometime in the early 1620s. It is not clear when, exactly, the town ceased to function as a municipality under Spanish law, but the brevity of its official existence led investigators to determine in 1626 that Porcel de Padilla had failed in his duty to establish a town in the Salinas Valley. As a result, he lost his position as corregidor and was forced to pay heavy fines. Part of the physical structure of the town remained in place, however, into the 1630s. By that time, the occupants of the site were exclusively people of African descent. The slaves originally brought to the new settlement in 1616, their descendants, and others who may have escaped from the Tarija frontier in the ensuing years, occupied a mud fort that effectively marked out the boundary between Spanish Tarija and Chiriguana territory.76

Conclusion

The long Luis de Velasco period in Peru and its policy of strict separation between Spaniards and Chiriguanaes gave way almost immediately following his departure to a new

75 “Cómo se halló en tierra de infieles la milagrosa Cruz, que está en el Convento de nuestro Padre San Francisco de Tarija,” in Calzavarini Ghinello, Presencia Franciscana y formación intercultural, vol. 1, 173-76; “Carta del Príncipe de Esquilache, de 16 de Abril de 1618, dando cuenta de la Capitulación celebrada por Juan Porcel de Padilla …,” 222. The cross typically took 12 men to lift it.

76 “Real Cédula to the Audiencia of La Plata (12 Dec. 1619),” AGI, Charcas, 415 L. 3, 49; “Cómo se halló en tierra de infieles la milagrosa Cruz, que está en el Convento de nuestro Padre San Francisco de Tarija,” 177-78; “Juicio efectuado por mandato del virrey, marqués de Guadalcázar … a Juan Porcel de Padilla, referente al cumplimiento de las provisiones y capitulaciones de fundar nueva población … diciembre 1626 y enero 1627,” in Edelmiro Porcel, Documentación inédita de Tarija, 65-69; Saignes, “Andaluces en el poblamiento del sur boliviano,” 197-98. The Audiencia would later reverse the decision and restore his position and property.
policy of more permissive interaction between the two peoples. It began in a limited fashion in the south during the Monterrey administration, but it changed greatly in scale after his death in 1606. The 1607 Almendras Holguín entrada from San Lorenzo—decried at the time as an illegal, risky, and unnecessary overreach—eventually seemed, from the Spanish perspective, to open the door for peaceful and productive interaction with the peoples of the cordillera. But in the years that followed, a shortage of properly trained priests and disagreements over the precise strategy for the missionary enterprise prevented any significant evangelization efforts among the principal Chiriguana factions. The one missionary endeavor that came to partial fruition quickly became a disaster on all fronts. For most Spaniards, it validated the idea that attempts to evangelize the Chiriguanaes would require a strong military presence.

Montesclaros did not agree. He attempted to walk the fine line between his desire to open the road to the Atlantic and avoid conflict with the Chiriguanaes. It was always going to be a difficult task. Poblar y no conquistar, at its best, was a long term strategy that might have allowed for the incremental pacification of territory at the edge of the cordillera, as Escalante achieved in Vallegrande. It was unlikely to work as a means to establish a series of settlements, as the goal had become by 1615. The failures of both Díaz de Guzmán’s and Porcel de Padilla’s attempts to settle in territory held by the Chiriguanaes effectively ended Spanish attempts to populate the cordillera. In the years to come, officials would be far more wary about approving any such endeavors and even went so far as to abandon territory on the frontier for fear of a conflict over it. It is unlikely that the Spanish residents of the frontier ever totally disengaged with the peoples of the cordillera. Evidence from the 1650s shows that Spaniards living in

77 “Juicios de cámara Pablo de Aybar (19 Sept. – 16 Oct. 1636),” ANB, EC 1636.15, 1r-35v. This case involves a dispute over a section of land on the Tomina frontier that the state has ordered Juan de Vargas Machuca to abandon because it lies in the “lands of the Chiriguanaes,” and his cultivation of it might provoke them.
various areas of the frontier maintained unofficial cooperative alliances with certain Chiriguana factions. But even when those allies came to request priests and instruction in Catholicism, the Audiencia mandated caution in a way that reflected the Velasco-era stance toward the frontier.78

78 “Provision para que Alonso Martínez del Villar entre … a sus servicios (1 Aug. – 7 Oct. 1658),” ANB, EC 1658.20, 1r-26v. This case focuses on Chiriguana requests for evangelists along the Pomamaha frontier. It parallels in many ways the circumstances surrounding the 1607 Almendras Holguín entrada, but on a far lesser scale. Like in 1607, the caciques in this case seem to have been far more interested in Spanish military assistance than the adoption of Christianity. And also like in 1607, the limited assistance lent by the Spaniards ended up harming the Tomina Spaniards’ Chiriguana allies. The Audiencia quickly called for an end to these interactions before they went any further.
Figure 10-1. Locations referenced in Chapter 10. The boxes indicate the approximate core territories occupied by communities belonging to (a) the Cuñayuru/Guapay faction, (b) the Charagua faction, and (c) the Mayriye faction. Adapted from Wikimedia Commons, http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Bolivia_Topography.png.
CHAPTER 11
SUMMARY REMARKS

This study of the Charcas-Chiriguana frontier from pre-Inca times through the first
decades of the seventeenth century provides a uniquely detailed look into multiple eras of
intercultural interaction across an imperial frontier. Those interactions ranged from cooperative
to competitive to confrontational and violent. Earlier scholarly studies that touch upon this
history have tended to emphasize the latter types of interactions. This is not particularly
surprising. The vast majority of primary documentation produced about the Chiriguanaes during
the eras under consideration stemmed from episodes of war. Furthermore, it was the
Chiriguanaes’ often-violent resistance to an imperial presence in the region that made the
cordillera a lasting political frontier as well as a geographical one. The earliest scholars cast this
conflict in the context of a struggle between civilization and barbarism. Later revisionists
recharacterized the struggle in terms of indigenous freedom versus imperial domination.
Although evidence of periods of cooperation between Chiriguanaes and Spaniards or
Chiriguanaes and agents of the Inca state has complicated these narratives, they have persisted
nonetheless.

This dissertation has sought to build upon recent advances in scholarship and create a
detailed narrative that provides the context for these many varying types of interactions.
Throughout, I have sought to go beyond the surface of the available documentation and to
understand the historical actors’ behavior in terms of the incentive structures in which they
operated. This approach is possible because of ethnographic research on the Chiriguanaes, not to
mention the far larger body of literature on the early colonial Spanish.

I set out at the beginning of this project to explain the establishment of the Charcas-
Chiriguana frontier and its persistence of over such a long period of time. Now I return to that
question explicitly. Some of the basic factors related to the establishment and persistence of the frontier are undoubtedly geographic and topographic. The convergence of climatic and ecological zones at the cordillera brought about interaction between greatly differing peoples. Inca strategies to secure key pursuits within Charcas turned the geographical frontier into a political frontier as well after the attacks on installations in and near the cordillera in the 1520s. The Guaraní migrants who established themselves in the rugged, mountainous territory of the Andean foothills took advantage of the terrain, presumably already against Inca forces trying to oust them, but certainly in the face of Spanish offensives in later decades. The terrain afforded the Chiriguanaes a measure of protection from what, in other settings, would have been overwhelming military force. It allowed them to retreat ahead of Spanish armies while also positioning forces at key transit points to prevent effective long term enemy occupations. These fundamental strategies of guerrilla warfare allowed the Chiriguanaes to survive the Spanish invasions of the 1570s and ‘80s, though they were significantly diminished in number after the latter instance. The Spanish eventually took advantage of similar terrain on the western side of the frontier in order to limit Chiriguana offensives into Charcas. The foundation of frontier towns in the 1570s (including Santiago de Tomina and San Bernardo de Tarija) was a step in this direction, but only as the Spanish established populations at key transit points between the cordillera and their primary valley populations in the 1580s and ‘90s were they able to secure the frontier in any sense.

Aspects of both Chiriguana, Spanish, and highland Andean culture were also important in the formation and persistence of the Charcas-Chiriguana frontier. The Chiriguanaes’ self-definition as “men without masters” inspired their resistance against a Spanish church and state that they perceived was attempting to “enslave” them. Most periods of official rapprochement
including the times leading up to the conflicts originating in 1564, 1574, 1583, and 1611) were derailed to some degree by Chiriguana resistance to Spanish mechanisms of control. Incadirected efforts to incorporate them into the imperial state may also have contributed to the attacks of the 1520s. Spanish colonial culture, meanwhile, was similarly rigid and self-serving. Spaniards of the era were almost-universally convinced of the superiority of European culture and the Catholic religion. They also followed an Inca and Aymara tendency to look down especially on lowland native cultures like the Chiriguana. This view led to an official policy that called for the Chiriguanaes’ unilateral submission to the Spanish king and Catholic Church.

Viceroy Toledo most explicitly espoused this belief as the justification for his 1574 invasion, but it was implicit throughout the part of the Spanish colonial era under consideration. Nevertheless, practical concerns often led Spanish colonial officials to support ad hoc arrangements aimed at avoiding conflict rather than imposing Spanish rule. These arrangements were especially necessary when other matters of importance to the Spanish empire diverted resources and attention from the Charcas-Chiriguana frontier.

Spaniards and Chiriguanaes still managed to achieve lasting periods of peace and cooperation that privileged mutual economic advantage above rigid concepts of cultural superiority. The same was likely true between Chiriguanaes and representatives of the Inca empire. In the former case, those periods of cooperation were based on the type of market exchange that benefitted the elite on both sides of the frontier. As they usually transpired, Spaniards received a relatively scarce resource (native laborers) in exchange for a variety of relatively abundant resources (chiefly metal goods and cloth). Members of the Chiriguana elite, meanwhile, highly valued Spanish-made goods and had abundant access to captive laborers. This cooperation through market exchange additionally served a security function, as it lessened the
incentive for Spaniards and Chiriguanaes to seek those same resources through military means. The Spanish colonial government limited such exchanges by forbidding them in most instances, though the enforcement of the prohibition varied over time and space. I have argued that the greater enforcement of the prohibition on these exchanges contributed in no small part to the conflict of the 1580s, while the resumption of limited commercial interaction helped reestablish peace in the 1590s-1600s.

On its surface, the scenario I have laid out may appear to be an argument in favor of market capitalism, rather than state intervention, as a way to encourage intercultural peace and cooperation. The reality was, and is, not so simple. This view ignores the factors beyond the superficial peace facilitated by these exchanges. One major reason that the Spanish colonial state prohibited commerce between Spaniards and Chiriguanaes during the era in question was its moral interest in the native peoples who suffered as a result of this commercial activity. The victims of these exchanges were not only those individuals who were captured and sold to work in the fields and mines of Charcas. The Chiriguana mode of captive acquisition required intimidation and violence that sometimes resulted in many deaths for each captive taken. Particularly during the Velasco era, Spanish policy aimed, albeit largely unsuccessfully, to protect the natives beyond the frontier from both violence and forced labor.

This view also ignores the fact that neither side was entirely satisfied by these “peaceful” commercial arrangements. Sporadic Chiriguana frontier raids continued during most periods of relative peace, and Spaniards continually advocated for a more aggressive approach to accessing the native peoples in and beyond the cordillera. It was only because the Spanish colonial state typically reined in the Spaniards on the frontier that they did not come into more direct conflict with the Chiriguanaes. When the state exerted less upper-level control over Spanish frontier
residents and local officials, they most often engaged in far more direct attempts to capture native laborers or efforts to expel or eliminate the Chiriguanaes themselves. This was the case during long periods when no viceroy occupied the position (1583-85 and 1606-07) as well as when there was a compelling imperially strategic reason to populate the cordillera (1615-21). These intervals show that the restraint exerted by the colonial state was also a necessary element of the peace that characterized the frontier during certain stretches.

The Chiriguanaes of the cordillera managed to maintain their territory and their freedom from Spanish “slavery” through the 1620s, and well into the future, though they largely disappear from the official record for the remainder of the seventeenth century. Most likely, Spaniards, both at the frontier and serving at the higher levels of the colonial state, came to recognize the futility of war and the benefits of what Viceroy Velasco called “the best peace available.” But to Velasco’s frustration, this peace also presumably rested on unofficial cooperative commercial exchanges that permeated the frontier and made peoples on both sides dependent on one another.
LIST OF REFERENCES

Archival Sources

Archivo General de Indias (AGI)

Charcas

Mapas y Planos

Patronato

Archivo Histórico de Cochabamba

Expedientes Coloniales de Cochabamba

Archivo Histórico de Tarija (AHT)

Archivo Nacional de Bolivia, Sucre (ANB)

Correspondencia (Corr.)

Expedientes Coloniales (EC)

Biblioteca Nacional de España (BN)

Published Primary Sources

Alcaya, Diego Felipe de. 1961 [ca. 1610]. “Relación cierta … a su Excelencia el señor Marqués de Montes Claros.” In Cronistas cruceños del Alto Perú virreinal. Edited by Hernando Sanabria Fernández, 47-86. Santa Cruz, Bolivia: Publicaciones de la Universidad Gabriel René Moreno.


Enciso Contreras, José, ed. 2005. *Cedulario de la Audiencia de La Plata de Los Charcas (Siglo XVI)*. Sucre: ABNB.


Mujía, Ricardo, ed. 1914. *Bolivia-Paraguay; exposición de los títulos que consagran el derecho territorial de Bolivia, sobre la zona comprendida entre los ríos Pilcomayo y Paraguay: Anexos. Época colonial*. La Paz: Empresa Editora El Tiempo.

Pacheco, Joaquín F., Francisco de Cárdenas y Espejo, and Luis Torres de Mendoza, eds. 1864-84. Colección de documentos inéditos, relativos al descubrimiento, conquista y organización de las antiguas posesiones españolas de América y Oceanía, sacados de los archivos del reino, y muy especialmente del de Indias, 24 vols. Madrid: Imp. de Frias y Compañía.


Toribio Medina, José, ed. 1908. El veneciano Sebastián Caboto, al servicio de España y especialmente de su proyectado viaje á las Molucas por el Estrecho de Magallanes y al reconocimiento de la costa del continente hasta la gobernación de Pedrarias Dávila. Santiago, Chile: Imp. y Encuadernación Universitaria.

Vega, Juan José, ed. 1974 [mid-to-late 1500s]. Relación de la descendencia, gobierno y conquista de los incas. Lima: Editorial Jurídica.


Secondary Sources


—. 2010. Diccionario étnico: Santa Cruz la Vieja y su entorno en el siglo XVI. Cochabamba: Instituto de Misionología.


—. 2003. *Andes orientales y Amazonía occidental: ensayos entre la historia y la arqueología de Bolivia, Brasil y Perú*. La Paz: Producciones CIMA.


Platt, Tristan, Thérèse Bouyssse-Cassagne, and Olivia Harris, eds. 2006. *Qaraqara-Charka: Mallku, Inka y Rey en la provincia de Charcas (siglos XV-XVII): Historia antropológica de una confederación aymara*. Lima: IFEA.


BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Jonathan Scholl graduated from Marquette University with a B.A. in History in 2004. He received his M.A. in History from the University of Florida in 2008. He graduated with his Ph.D. in History from the same institution in 2015. Dr. Ida Altman oversaw his dissertation research. Since 2006, Jonathan has taught and assisted in teaching classes in the University of Florida History Department and Writing Program.