THE CABANAGEM AND POSTCOLONIAL NATION-BUILDING IN THE BRAZILIAN AMAZON, 1830-1860

By

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A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA

2013
Para minha família e meus amigos
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I owe a great debt to the many people who have helped me with this project. I would like to thank the Fulbright Scholars Program for financial support as well as the opportunity provided to meet so many talented and inspiring scholars. I would also like to thank the Fulbright, Brazil staff for their help in navigating everything from visas to conferences. I would also like to thank the History Department and the Graduate School of the University of Florida for the financial support which allowed me to finish the dissertation.

In Belém, Clarisse Correa Pinto took me into her home and into her family. I would never have been able to get to know the city without her kindness and generosity. Clarisse made Belém feel like home and I would never have survived without her friendship. I would also like to thank Celso Castro for his invaluable introduction and hospitality. Clemilde Castro served as a wonderful touring companion and took me through Belém and Rio, as well as on a fun beach trip to the family home in Mosqueiro. I would also like to thank my paraense friends, Norma, Martin and Ana Beatriz for rescuing me from the power outage and providing excellent dinner company. I would like to thank Ducelia, Duda, and Andrea for our conversations, and for laughing at my poor attempts to joke in Portuguese. I owe a great debt to Lourdes for putting up with my American antics. I would also like to thank the welcoming and helpful archival staff in the State Archive of Pará, and the director, João Lúcio Manzzini.

In Rio, I owe a great debt to Marisse Machado, Vovó Theresa, and Yasmin Saab. They opened their home to me and became minha familia brasileira. I would like to thank Andrea Ferreira for introducing me to her wonderful friends. Adelino Nishitani has
been a wonderful teacher and friend. I would also like to thank the professionals at the Arquivo Nacional and the Bilbioteca Nacional for their invaluable assistance.

At the University of Florida I benefitted from my cohorts in the Latin American Reading Group: Andrea Ferreira, Roberto Chaco, Rob Taber, Angela Diaz, Erin Zavitz, Chris Woolly, Diana Reigelsberger, and Bill Fischer. I would also like to thank Jon and Kat Scholl for their friendship and for caring for my pets when I was doing research in Brazil. Richard Phillips and Paul Losch at the Latin American collection at UF always provided welcome help and advice, and allowed me to sneak over to the newer microfilm readers. I would also like to thank my committee. Mariane Schmink is an inspirational scholar in Amazonian Studies and I was fortunate that she agreed to serve on my committee. Juliana Barr and Ida Altman offered me advice and support at every step of my academic career, and served as wonderful role models. David Geggus pushed me since my undergraduate career to do better, and for that I am grateful. I would also like to thank Jon Sensbach, Sue O’Brien, Mark Thurner, Elizabeth Ginway, and Steve Noll for their support throughout my career at UF. My advisor, Jeff Needell, is owed many thanks. He knew when to push me and when to let me come to him for advice. He also managed to assure my mother that I would be perfectly safe in Brazil, a monumental task, indeed. I am very grateful for his continued faith in my abilities and his encouragement.

I would also like to thank my family. My Mom and Dad taught me that I could achieve anything I set my mind to and offered their support throughout this process. My sister Molly has always been a loyal supporter and friend. My wonderful friends Katherine, Claudia, and Kat kept me going and reminded me that there was a light at
the end of the tunnel. Finally, Patrick helped me at every stage, reading many drafts and listening to hours of ideas. I am grateful for his help and advice in every aspect. All mistakes contained in what follows, of course, are my own.
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Abstract of Dissertation Presented to the Graduate School of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

THE CABANAGEM AND POSTCOLONIAL NATION-BUILDING IN THE BRAZILIAN AMAZON, 1830-1860

By

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December 2013

Chair: Jeffrey D. Needell
Major: History

My dissertation reintegrates the history of the Cabanagem, a rebellion in the province of Grão-Pará in Amazonia from 1835 to 1841, into a broader political narrative of Brazilian history. Scholars of Brazil have mostly concluded that the Cabanagem was an elite political squabble that quickly descended into race warfare. Many continue to treat the Cabanagem in isolation, with little concern for how the regional rebellion influenced national politics, and how national pressures reshaped local power relations. Based on archival research in the Arquivo Público do Pará in Belém and the Arquivo Nacional in Rio de Janeiro, I argue that the Cabanagem’s repression was the beginning of a national project to incorporate this vast amount of territory. Rio de Janeiro sent troops not only to subdue and control the province, but also to order it and nationalize it. The general in charge of the military mission became a virtual dictator and organized members of society into work corps, explicitly to "civilize" and teach morality to Amazonians in order to prepare them for "the gifts of the Brazilian Constitution." My dissertation contributes to conversations about postcolonial nation-building, the multidimensional impact of race and class on citizenship and national identity, and the
imposition of Eurocentric notions of civilization on the supposedly “backwards” regions of the Americas. The history of the Cabanagem disrupts the narrative of a peaceful transition to nationhood that has long defined nineteenth-century Brazil. It provides a chance to see the uneven process of nation-building. In the aftermath of the rebellion, when the state imposed political authority and cultural dominance in the distant provinces, new forms of negotiation and restructured power relations emerged in unanticipated ways. I propose that the Cabanagem informs the beginning of the nation-building processes that, in some ways, defined the history of nineteenth-century Brazil, and provides insights into understanding the evolving and contested relationships between the nation and its citizens.
Brazil’s relatively peaceful transition to independence has often been juxtaposed with the violence that spread throughout Spanish America in the early nineteenth century.¹ In fact, regional violence threatened the integrity of the nation and challenged the credibility of Brazil, a newly independent monarchy embroiled in a crisis of political legitimacy. I demonstrate how the Cabanagem, a rebellion in Amazonia from 1835 to 1841, resonated in the capital, Rio de Janeiro. My work suggests that Brazil’s nineteenth-century history was more violently contested than scholars have previously acknowledged, and it explores the relationship between imperial dictates from Rio and events in the furthest reaches of the national territory.² My work also challenges the traditional view of the Amazon as “a land without history,” and the more general marginalization of tropical peoples.³ I argue that the Amazon was a crucial part of defining “Brazil” and what it meant to become “Brazilian.” More broadly, my work adds to a literature which challenges top-down theories of state-formation, contested citizenship, and the role of race in national-identity formation. The Brazilian nation was never the contiguous physical territory imagined in Rio, or the relatively peaceful, if


hierarchical, society depicted by historians. Brazil was forged in the heat of violence, rebellion, and repression.

On the eve of independence from Portugal, Brazil occupied over half of South America. In 1822, less than one third of Brazil's population was white, while approximately thirty percent of the population remained enslaved. In regions such as Amazonia there was also a large indigenous population. Racial and ethnic tensions threatened the stability of the Empire. These popular tensions were often exploited by the elite in an attempt to shape the struggling nation. Elite in-fighting, however, also allowed the lower classes a chance to assert their own agency, often through violent rebellion. My dissertation reintegrates the history of the Cabanagem into a broader political narrative of Brazil's transition from liberal, decentralizing reform and regional turmoil to the reactionary centralization that followed. Depending on the analysis of historian Domingos Raiol, modern scholars of Brazil have mostly concluded that the Cabanagem was an elite political squabble that quickly descended into race warfare. Even more successful interpretations from David Cleary, Mark Harris and Madga Ricci continue to treat the Cabanagem in isolation, with little concern for how the regional rebellion influenced national politics, and how national pressures reshaped local power relations. These studies also neglect the aftermath of the rebellion, a critical period which illuminates the incorporation of some of the “fragments,” and the suppression of others.\textsuperscript{4} I argue that the Cabanagem forced the central government to recognize its lack over control of its vast northern territory and helped to shape the centralizing policies of the 1840s.

The Cabanagem was the most deadly uprising in Brazilian history, with estimates of over 30,000 casualties, approximately twenty percent of the province’s population.\textsuperscript{5} Most of the casualties were rebel cabanos, a group that included Indians, free blacks, former slaves, poor whites and members of the elite. Politically, the Cabanagem affected a larger amount of national territory than any other uprising and it was a substantial threat to the imperial government.\textsuperscript{6} The majority of the fighting took place in the city of Belém at the mouth of the Amazon, though violence quickly spread into the interior. A distant frontier port, with a large population of detribalized índios (people of indigenous descent) enslaved Africans, free people of color, and a contingent of foreign residents, Belém had a long history of political instability and a reputation for resistance to imperial consolidation.\textsuperscript{7}

\textbf{Theoretical Issues}

Theoretically, my project draws on the work of Benedict Anderson, who posited that the nation is not an ahistorical given. However, I extend Partha Chatterjee’s challenge to Anderson, arguing that the nation is not a cohesive whole, but rather constituted by different “fragments.”\textsuperscript{8} The Cabanagem represents one of these “fragments” of different groups that are often silenced in the official historical narrative. As William Roseberry has argued, subaltern and provincial concerns allow historians to


\textsuperscript{6} Ibid., 113.


recover not only contestations of identity, but alternative visions of the nation. My work is also informed by the subaltern school, which views subalterns as autonomous political actors. As Ranajit Guha argues, scholars who depict peasant action as merely brutal violence deny the political agency of the people involved. The rhetoric of the cabano leaders, found in newspapers, correspondence, and council minutes displays an engagement with the political discourse of Rio and a desire to participate in the decisions surrounding citizenship. Long trivialized and essentialized, the cabano represents the independent realm of subaltern politics intersecting with elite discourse at the local and national level. The methodology articulated by the subaltern school, which differentiates hierarchies within repressed classes, allows me to complicate a traditional historiography which views the rebellion as a simple binary, either white/non-white or elite/underclass. In the complicated and messy reconstruction of rebellion this more analytical approach is essential. As articulated by Florencia Mallon, “these ever-shifting lines of alliance or confrontation…are not deduced from specific, already existing subaltern identities or subject positions. They are constructed historically and politically, in struggle and in discourse.”

I use the vision of the nation proposed by the cabanos in the distant Amazon in contradiction and in negotiation with the vision imposed by central government in Rio. Once viewed as a barbaric interlude in the national story of Brazil, the Cabanagem

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represents a moment in which we can hear the distant echoes of those silenced voices. The cabanos were seen by contemporaries and historians as violent Indians or bloodthirsty runaway slaves, and were erased by a national history that had no place for such people as political actors. Moving beyond the tendency to view the Cabanagem as a race war, I analyze the violence of the rebellion to explain how the Brazilian nation was in some ways defined in the Amazon. I also build on the work of scholar Candace Slater, who deconstructs representations of the Amazon as either a “green hell” or “edenic utopia.” I move beyond caricatures of the Amazon and its people and argue for a re-centering of the Amazon as a key component of the nation-building process in Brazil.

I hope to provide a unique opportunity to discuss the historical transformation of the cabano, and suggest that the study of race and nation in Brazil needs to be expanded. As the recent historiographic trend of “everyday forms of state formation” makes clear, the nation was not imposed by the elite, but was negotiated between the center and periphery and between the elite and subaltern. My project challenges the elite and Rio centered narrative of Brazilian historiography, and extends theories of state-formation by illuminating how contests over the definitions of community, state, and race in Amazonia evolved in complex ways and offered alternative visions of

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citizenship. Racial categorization influenced legal notions of citizenship and defined the criteria for inclusion within the national community.

I also add to the literature on race and nation in Brazil, which focuses on the legacy of slavery and builds upon the pioneering work of social theorist Gilberto Freyre, but neglects a critical engagement with Brazil’s efforts to incorporate the racially-complex regions of the Amazon. The concept of “racial democracy,” often neglects the importance of indigenous citizens in identity formation. I show that people of indigenous descent complicated simple racial dichotomies and played a crucial role in national identity formation. The dissertation adds to a small but growing historiography which challenges this limiting focus and builds on the work other scholars of race and nation in Latin America. My work shows that people of indigenous descent played a crucial role in national identity formation, and clearly shaped and were shaped by inclusion/exclusion from Brazilian citizenship.

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Historiographic Issues

Though it is a particularly unique episode in Brazil's history, few scholars outside of Brazil have devoted any serious attention to the Cabanagem. Long classified as a race war, the historiography suffers from simplifications and generalizations that emphasize racial motivations and solidarities. The Brazilian scholarship provides a historiographical narrative that can be separated into several enduring paradigms, beginning with the writings of contemporary observers. Rebels (cabanos) were often portrayed as violent and cruel by elite observers who viewed cabanos as uncultured, marginal and inferior. Early scholarship did not contextualize the violence. Additionally, the brutal government response was often downplayed or omitted entirely. In later work, scholars mobilized the image of the Cabanagem (and the cabano) as a heroic moment of national liberation, often mistakenly attributing cabano demands to the French Revolution. Traditionally, the participants in the Cabanagem are presented as either criminals and bandits or popular revolutionaries. A third, more recent strand attempts to contextualize the rebellion within the socio-economic structures and the ethnic and political culture of the Amazon, and fails to place the rebellion within a framework of national politics.

The first and still most important work of scholarship is Domingos Antônio Raiol’s *Motins Políticos* (political riots), published in five installments beginning in 1865 and concluding in 1890. Raiol painstakingly reconstructed the political situation in the

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19 Ibid., 10.

province, and collected and reprinted hundreds of letters and government documents. Raiol was a prominent member of the Liberal party of Pará, and heavily influenced by regionalist politics. Cabanos killed his father during the rebellion, and there is some evidence that he served as a commander in the repressive forced labor program put into place to punish cabanos of color. His interest in affairs of state was manifested in the description of the minute details of the political parties involved in the Cabanagem. Raiol also chose to remember and valorize only those actors involved in the repression of the rebels; men like Marshal Francisco José de Andreá, Prudêncio José das Merces Tavares and Marshal Manuel Jorge Rodrigues are prominent in the text, whereas Eduardo Francisco Nogueira Angelim, the leader of the rebel government, is marginalized. Motins Políticos minimized the social and political importance of the Cabanagem. Raiol viewed it, instead, as an anarchic event caused by petty political squabbling.21

Two other important interpretations of the Cabanagem were articulated by writers in the nineteenth century as well. Manoel Duarte Moreira de Azevedo’s 1884 História pátria: o Brasil de 1831 a 1840 viewed the rebellion through basic race and class analysis. He argued that when the provincials rebelled, they split along these lines: cabanos (índios, negros [people of African descent], and slaves) against whites, and the urban rich against the rustic poor.22 Daniel Parish Kidder, a North American missionary and contemporary observer, published his reflections in the 1866 book, Brazil and the Brazilians Portrayed in Historical and Descriptive Sketches. He interpreted the rebellion

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21 Raiol, Motins políticos: 6-10.
22 Manoel Duarte Moreira de Azevedo, História pátria: o Brasil de 1831 a 1840 (Rio de Janiero: B.L. Garnier Editor, 1884), 50-51.
as an act of instinctive revenge, a natural reaction of the Indians after centuries of Portuguese degradation in Amazonia. While representing varied perspectives, all three nineteenth-century authors presented the rebellion in simplified terms, presenting a binary between the violent rebels, depicted as either oppressed or inferior people of color, and the regional white elite. Not only did these authors ignore the heterogeneous, sometimes contentious, dynamic within each social group, they also neglected the complex ways in which political differences between national and regional elites created openings for violent reactions from below. In the early twentieth century, scholars reproduced the analytical binaries of these predecessors, though they were often more sympathetic towards the rebels.

The second main phase of scholarship, represented by the Instituto Histórico e Geográfico do Pará (IHGP), began at the turn of the century and, in some ways, continues to this day. Such scholars, affiliated with the Instituto Histórico e Geográfico Brasileiro, aimed to rewrite the history of the country, specifically centering on the political and cultural life of Brazil. Their project was a conscious effort to remember the material and moral progress of the nation. Though it was a regional rebellion against the

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23 Daniel Parish Kidder, *Brazil and the Brazilians Portrayed in Historical and Descriptive Sketches* (London: S. Low, Son, and Marston, 1866), 539-562.

24 Established by article 1º of the statute of 1838, the purpose of the Instituto Histórico e Geográfico do Brasil (IHGB) the national organization of the society, is to collect and publish documents which record Brazilian history and geography. Each provincial branch was to specialize in funding provincial projects designed to preserve the province’s history and to teach it to future generations.

25 Jorge Hurley, *A Cabanagem* (Belém: Livraria Clássica, 1936). Interestingly, there is a book dedicated to the memory of “those sacrificed in the wars with the cabanos,” published in 1943, that takes a strong anti-rebel tone which stands in sharp opposition to the dominant historiographical trend. The author, a former naval officer, was obviously biased towards a positive valorization of the naval impact in the rebellion. Relying on solely secondary and naval accounts, the work falls short of the efforts of many other more successful contemporaries. See Capitão Lucas Alexandre Boiteux, *Marinha imperial versus Cabanagem* (Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Naval, 1943).
central government, nationalist scholars attempted to incorporate the Cabanagem into a broader positive narrative of the nation. IHGP scholars viewed the Cabanagem as a nativist movement, citing its anti-Portuguese and anti-foreigner ideology. They also saw the rebellion as proto-nationalist or politically emancipatory.²⁶ In 1936, IHGP released a special edition of its publication and organized a centenary celebration focused on the redemption of the cabanos (now viewed as solely índios). The centenary effectively turned the Cabanagem into an occasion for a civic party, an occasion to celebrate paraense (people from Pará) culture and history. As Pinheiro sarcastically notes, the "revolt became a vaudeville."²⁷ This period also saw a resurgence of art valorizing the cabano as the guardian of regional integrity.

No one epitomizes this phase of scholarship better than Jorge Hurley, an IHGP organizer of the centenary celebration, who published A Cabanagem in 1936. He sought to reset the timeline of the rebellion, choosing to end the narrative on May 13, 1836. Hurley ignored previous scholars’ focus on Pará’s previous political independence from Rio.²⁸ Hurley also added to the valorization of the Indian in Brazil’s national identity formation.²⁹ Hurley transformed índios from “savage” to “noble savage. " Hurley painted indigenous Amazonians as valiant and courageous, and able to stop the excesses of western society.³⁰

²⁶ Pinheiro, Visões da Cabanagem, 70.
²⁷ Ibid., 80.
²⁸ Hurley, A Cabanagem, 120.
²⁹ Ibid., 3-7.
³⁰ Ibid.
By the mid-twentieth century Marxist scholars and regional specialists became prominent in the historiography. Though they shared little common ground with earlier nationalists, or with one another, they were all united in a project to rehabilitate the image of the Cabanagem and the cabanos. Cáio Prado Júnior was an influential figure within this intellectual current. In his 1933 book, *Evolução política do Brasil e outros estudos*, Prado Júnior offered a brief, but expressive chapter on the Cabanagem.\(^{31}\) His work served as a base for a new interpretation of the rebellion, one focused on materialist and economic explanations of the popular movement. Prado Júnior celebrates the Cabanagem primarily as a class war. Though his research was based on little documentation, his notion of the "passions of the masses" influenced a generation of scholars who viewed the rebels as proto-revolutionaries.\(^{32}\) One of the main problems with this methodology, however, is that it overly simplifies social classifications. Historical actors were presented as “the masses” fighting against their oppressors, imprecise terms that illuminate nothing of the complexities and shifting loyalties among people at the local, regional, and national levels.

The influence of such materialist interpretations continued with Marxist scholars intent on transforming the cabanos into proletarian revolutionaries. Unfortunately, such anachronistic descriptions only served to obscure the complex motivations of the cabanos and the complex political history of Brazil in the 1830s. One prominent example of this Marxist interpretation is Gustavo Moraes Rêgo Reis’ 1965 *A

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\(^{32}\) Ibid., 8.
Cabanagem, which outlined the variety of factors that, in his interpretation, made Amazonia a favorable or unfavorable site for social revolution.\(^{33}\)

In addition to the Marxists, in the middle of the twentieth century there was also a strong contingent of regional specialists who served as apologists for the cabanos. Such scholars viewed the Cabanagem as a double revolt: at once a defining landmark of a regional identity, while simultaneously, a decisive moment in the fight for the consolidation of the Brazilian nation.\(^{34}\) In a manner markedly different from that of Marxist historians, regionalists compared the goals of the Cabanagem with the liberal revolutionary ideas of the French Revolution. Pasquale di Paolo’s *Cabanagem: a revolução popular da Amazônia* serves as a classic example of this historiographic thread.\(^{35}\) He argues that the Cabanagem represents "the most authentic and significant popular revolutionary movement in all of Brazilian History."\(^{36}\) Paolo contends that the colonial Portuguese military incursion into French Guiana encouraged a French republicanist sentiment amongst the troops who would begin the rebellion. There is no documentary evidence for this claim and it misrepresents the original, more mundane,


\(^{34}\) Cleary, "’Lost Altogether to the Civilised World,’" 134. A good example of the popular regionalist construction of the *caboclo* is a book of poetry dedicated to the memory of their bravery. See: José Ildone Favacho Soeiro, *Romanceiro da Cabanagem: poesia* (Belém: SEMEC, 1985).


\(^{36}\) Ibid., 17.
motivations. While revolutionary slogans of the era were not uncommon in the rhetoric of the cabano leaders, Di Paolo’s argument that the Cabanagem was a war for "social independence . . . liberty, fraternity, and equality" stretches the source material too thin and is ahistorical.\textsuperscript{37} Di Paolo claims that the cabanos were "at the vanguard of the abolition movement" because they gave slaves who joined their ranks freedom. Here Di Paolo seems to forget his own contention that international context is important for understanding the rebellion. It was commonplace for armies in Spanish America to give freedom to slaves in return for service, as it was for British loyalists during the North America war of independence.\textsuperscript{38} Di Paolo also disregards the continuation of slavery under the cabanos as merely "political pragmatism," rather than recognize that the cabanos saw no contradiction in fighting for their own "liberty" while still maintaining a slave society.\textsuperscript{39}

Another, more recent, proponent of what can be called a regionalist school, Roberto Monteiro de Oliveira, shares several of the previously outlined biases and misrepresentations in his \textit{Utopia de uma região: estudos regionais - Cabanagem}.\textsuperscript{40} He adheres to the notion that the Brazilian invasion of French Guiana by people from Pará exposed them to ideas of the French Revolution, creating a liberal discourse of liberty, fraternity, and equality, and he mistakenly treated the \textit{povo} (people) as a cohesive unit, with no mention of ethnic differences. He also championed the cause of regionalism,

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{37} Ibid., 22.
\textsuperscript{39} Paolo, \textit{Cabanagem}, 133.
\textsuperscript{40} Roberto Monteiro de Oliveira, \textit{Utopia de uma região: estudos regionais - Cabanagem} (Brasilia: SER, 2000).
\end{flushleft}
arguing that "the Cabanagem, in truth, was a manifestation of democratic regionalism in Amazonia in opposition to authoritarian nationalism and centralization of the Brazilian state."\textsuperscript{41} Oliveira categorized the rebellion as a violent expression of the consequences of state repression against regionalism, arguing that it was a fight for universal rights.\textsuperscript{42}

There has also been a resurgence in research that celebrated polemical agitation and even borders on conspiracy theory, exemplified by Julio José Chiavento’s 1984 \textit{Cabanagem: o povo no poder}. Chiavento asserted that the lack of scholarship about the Cabanagem is a deliberate omission by the elite, as it could serve as an example of what can happen when the people know their power.\textsuperscript{43} One should note, however, that while such work celebrating the cabanos has certainly dominated the historiography for much of the twentieth century, there has also been a marked return of political conservatism in the analysis. A small contingent of scholars remains critical of revisionist trends and argues that the cabanos did not have any ideology or organized plans.\textsuperscript{44}

In a different sort of regionalist study, Arthur Cezar Ferreira Reis, a native of Amazonas, took a distinct anti-cabano stance in a chapter entitled “Comarca do Alto Amazonas.”\textsuperscript{45} In Reis’s narrative the legalist forces from the interior exhibited the only

\textsuperscript{41} Ibid., 38.
\textsuperscript{42} Ibid., 66.
\textsuperscript{43} Julio José Chiavenato, \textit{Cabanagem: o povo no poder} (São Paulo: Brasiliense, 1984), 12.
\textsuperscript{44} Pinheiro, \textit{Visões da Cabanagem}, 104, argues that there are many regional and amateur historians who ignore the ideological history of the Cabanagem, focusing solely on issues of race. Within this thread there is a racist conservatism which views many \textit{cabanos} as unable to understand complex political realities.
\textsuperscript{45} Arthur Cezar Ferreira Reis, \textit{História de Amazonas} (Manaus: Officinas Typographicas de A. Reis, 1931), 149-75.
real sense of valor and bravery as they fought against the rebels of Belém. Reis viewed the subservience of Amazonas (known as the Captaincy of the Rio Negro) to Pará as the result of criminal neglect, or worse, by the Imperial government in Rio. He explains that, during the first decade of independence and the instability of the Regency, the elite of Rio Negro hoped to continue its traditional independence. The emperor, however, put the region under the control of Grão-Pará. Reis argued that the true wealth of the Amazon belonged to the people of the interior, and the merchants of Belém imperiled the region’s economic independence.\(^{46}\) When the cabano fighting erupted in Belém, the elite of Amazonas joined the legalist cause in hopes of elevating their region to an independent status in which the people of the interior could govern themselves as their own province. His focus is narrowed by an emphasis on legalist victories and personalities, while cabanos are treated as a homogenous enemy in opposition to the narrative’s heroes.

Most recent Anglophone histories of Brazil mention the Cabanagem in passing, some allotting two to three paragraphs to the rebellion. These mostly conclude that Cabanagem quickly became a race war, devoid of political ideology.\(^{47}\) Without analysis

\(^{46}\) Ibid., 149.

of the complex interplay among varying levels of politics, such scholarship begs the question: exactly how, and why, did elite squabbles descend into subaltern violence? Older Anglophone scholarship represents the same oversimplifications and flawed analysis of the Brazilian scholarship that preceded it. Robin Anderson defines the *caboclo* (a term meaning copper-colored which referred to people of mixed race, problematically used interchangeably with cabano) as a "poor revolutionary" committed only to short term goals. He views cabanos as a "classic example of 'cannon fodder' for elite squabblings over post-independence leadership."\(^{48}\) Anderson has a poor opinion of these "revolutionaries," arguing that "the caboclo actually doing the violence had little if any concept of why he was fighting, other than the fact that his local sources of authority asked it of him."\(^{49}\) Representing a laudatory perspective, John Hemming classified the Cabanagem as "the most revolutionary of all rebellions in nineteenth-century Brazil."\(^{50}\)

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49 Ibid., 61.

Hemming celebrates the cabano and deprecates the *branco* (white) oppressors.

Hemming romanticized the cabanos as "the oppressed Indians and coloureds [sic] of Pará united in a revolt that hoped for social change."

While there is a growing body of case studies, the three most important current scholars are David Cleary, Magda Ricci, and Mark Harris. David Cleary categorizes the Cabanagem as a civil war and argues that ethnic identity, or lack thereof in the case of the detribalized índios who made up most of the cabano ranks, is a key analytical component in understanding colonialism and state formation. Cleary admonishes his Brazilianist colleagues for neglecting the Cabanagem. He claims that “no scholar thinks of it as a defining moment in Brazilian history.” Yet, Cleary himself fails to integrate the events in Pará into a broader political narrative. He focuses on the construction of identity among detribalized Indians to challenge analyses of race in Brazil that rely solely on an intellectual model defined by a “black-white spectrum.” However, his examples and conclusions remain applicable only for the north, and he treats the Cabanagem as a watershed moment in the formation of regional identities, never as a key event in the struggles for the Brazilian nation as a whole. Mark Harris provides an excellent historical ethnography of the area and links the socio-economics of the colonial period to the early independence period. He also provides an invaluable case

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53 Cleary, ‘Lost Altogether to the Civilised World,’ 111.

54 Ibid.

55 Ibid., 121.
study of a cabano controlled interior town. Yet, he completely ignores the political implications of the rebellion or the national context in which it took place.⁵⁶ Magda Ricci largely follows Domingos Raiol’s interpretation of the Cabanagem (without the elitist disdain for the rebels), arguing that struggles over independence contributed to the instability of the region. She does recognize the political turmoil of the Regency, but only in a cursory way.⁵⁷ All stop their analysis in the early 1840s, negating the true cost of the rebellion and the impact it had on state formation and the creation of a citizenry in the aftermath of the violence.

Cabanos were critically engaged with larger transatlantic debates surrounding the end of slavery (and the Haitian Revolution), forms of representative government, and political power.⁵⁸ Scholars have challenged the view that conflict in nineteenth-century Latin America was simply a senseless tragedy, arguing that many revolts were intensely ideological and important to negotiations over state formation and proper governance.⁵⁹ As John Chasteen argues, “the struggle to propagate an insurgency frequently implies a contestation of official national identity, and thus insurgent

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⁵⁶ Mark Harris, *Rebellion on the Amazon: The Cabanagem, Race, and Popular Culture in the North of Brazil, 1798-1840* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), chaps. 2 & 3.


discourse should not be ignored.\textsuperscript{60} As noted above, many scholars of the Cabanagem deny any ideological underpinnings of the rebellion. While there might not have been clear \textit{shared} ideology, this does not necessarily mean that cabanos (or legalist supporters) had no clear personal ideological motive for their opinions or involvement. As Eric Van Young has argued for provincial peasant rebels in Mexico, individual rebels, even those who simply got caught up in the violence, will have different motives or goals at different points during a rebellion.\textsuperscript{61} To deny such change over time is to deny cabanos individual agency, absence from the historical process, or, worse, to oversimplify ethnic, racial, or class categories as the sole defining factor of subaltern historical actors.

A fruitful comparison to the Cabanagem, in both historiographic and narrative terms, is the Caste War in Yucatán, Mexico, 1847-1855. Traditionally presented as a race war, which pitted indigenous Mayans against Spanish \textit{ladinos}, recent scholarship suggests that political goals were much more important to the struggle.\textsuperscript{62} Local grievances or perceived advantages and alliances motivated indigenous people to join the rebellion or fight against it. Terry Rugeley argues that Yucatán’s constitutional crisis, much like the political crisis caused by the emperor’s abdication in Brazil, is a window into the way subalterns would behave when “social structures of dominance have been


partially withdrawn.\textsuperscript{63} Further, “the events of the war were not necessarily indiscriminate jacqueries, but, rather, instances of peasant justice based on a history of local grievances.”\textsuperscript{64} Additionally, the repression of the rebellion and the discourse surrounding it strike similar tones to those of the Cabanagem, as a battle of civilization against barbarism.\textsuperscript{65} More, public health campaigns put into place after the rebellion sought to “civilize” the Mayan rebels and turn them into productive citizens.\textsuperscript{66} As we shall see, a similar program took place in Pará after the Cabanagem.

\textbf{Organization}

In this study, Chapter 2 outlines the geography and ethnography of the Brazilian Amazon. It introduces the reader to the people and the colonial history of the region. Chapter 3 reintegrates the history of the Cabanagem into a broader political narrative of Brazil in the 1830s. I argue that the political ideology of the cabanos, who were concerned with renegotiating their position within the Empire of Brazil, offers a moment to view the “fragments” of the nation. National political debates resonated in distant Pará and created the opportunity for political dissension and divisions among the provincial elite. In turn, these divisions created opportunities for both repressed social

\begin{footnotes}
\item[64] Ibid., 160.
\item[65] For the classical account underpinning this ideology in Latin America, see Domingo Faustino Sarmiento, trans. Kathleen Ross, \textit{Facundo: Civilization and Barbarism} (Latin American Literature and Culture) (Berkley: University of California Press, 2003).
\end{footnotes}
groups and political actors from the interior to break free of the stranglehold of Belém, the regional center of political and economic power.

The Chapter 4 follows José Soares Andréa, the military commander sent from Rio, in his efforts to extend the military’s presence in the province in order to suppress the rebellion as it spread further into the interior and to extend the military’s presence in the province. I utilized previously unexamined material, such as local correspondence that was never sent to Rio, to extend the historical narrative beyond events in Belém to include a study of the rebellion in the interior. I focus on Santarém and its surrounding indigenous communities and small towns. I compare the motivations of the Mura, and other indigenous peoples (many of whom fought as allies of the cabanos) and the Mundurucu, another such people (many of whom took the opposite position), complicating the notion of racial retribution in the last years of the Cabanagem.

Andréa’s repression of the interior and the rebellion centered on a labor program he created called the *corpo de trabalhadores* (workers’ corps), which eventually included one third of all able-bodied men in the province and buttressed a general militarization of the Amazon. Andréa used his military command to extend his authority in the province, subverting traditional power and authority. According to theories popular among military leaders, work led to order. The program aimed to rebuild and make the province economically viable as well as politically articulated into the national project.

The *corpo* was not the only institutionalized repressive measure, however; military recruitment (for service elsewhere in the empire), recruitment into police units, and impressments into fishing collectives forced all paraenses into easily understood

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categories and useful occupations. Increased vigilance in the destruction of runaway slave communities and other marginal communities also marked the 1840s and 1850s.

Chapter 5 examines the issue of national frontiers and state-funded missionary and military colonies in such borderlands, which, while staking out national limits, sought to instill patriotism and acceptable values, creating Brazilian citizens who could properly contribute to the nation. The nation needed that contribution. The province of Grão-Pará had the longest international border in Brazil in the 1840s, with a frontier on the Guianas and the Andean nations of Spanish America. The Cabanagem opened a space for ambitious foreigners to make inroads into land that was claimed by the Brazilian state, but remained loosely mapped and sparsely inhabited. During the revolt, the British moved to claim the Pirara, a territory above the Rio Negro, while the French invaded the territory that would become the state of Amapá (Cabo do Norte). Provincial revolts, along with key foreign action during the Regency, highlighted the permeability of Brazilian borders and convinced Rio that securing Pará’s borders should become a key concern. The Brazilian government adopted uti possidetis (actual possession), also used during the colonial period, to define national frontiers. For Pará and Amazonas (made an independent province in 1851) this meant sending settlers or “civilizing” Indians to protect or extend national territory.

Much like military colonies and missions, “hygiene” campaigns focused on creating a citizenry that could labor in the nation’s interest. Chapter 6 thus focuses on public health and sanitation campaigns, seen in Rio as vital steps to unlocking the potential of the Amazon and its people. Officials battled cholera, smallpox, malaria,

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yellow fever, and dysentery in the hopes of improving commerce. Quarantine of ships slowed down exports and international business, and constant illness affected productivity in the province. Rio reacted with great energy, mandating hygiene committees with police inspection privileges and sending doctors and scientists to examine conditions and mandate change, all in the struggle against tropical nature and disease.

Finally, Chapter 7 is a political, economic, and social overview of the province in the 1860s at the start of the rubber boom. I reassert the importance of the Cabanagem, not only as a rebellion, but also as window into the contestations over state building in the provinces.

In these chapters, I contribute to conversations about postcolonial nation-building, the multidimensional impact of race and class on citizenship and national identity, and the imposition of Eurocentric notions of civilization on the supposedly “backwards” regions of the Americas. The history of the Cabanagem disrupts the narrative of a peaceful transition to nationhood that has long defined nineteenth-century Brazil. It provides a chance to see the uneven process of nation-building. In the aftermath of the rebellion, when the state imposed political authority and cultural dominance in the distant provinces, new forms of negotiation emerged and restructured power relations in unanticipated ways. I propose that the Cabanagem informs and illustrates the beginning of the nation-building processes that, in some ways, defined the history of nineteenth-century Brazil, and provides insights into understanding the evolving and contested relationships between the nation and its citizens.
CHAPTER 2
‘HOW POMPOUS AND ARROGANT NATURE IS!’

Sheets of water, borders of green so large that the eyes of man cannot see the end . . . the traveler, never tires of contemplating and admiring the generosity of a grand and pompous nature.¹

One of the challenges for scholars of the Amazon is that there are many different “Amazons.” Most generally mean the Amazon River, its drainage basin, and its 1,100 tributaries, yet, as David Cleary points out, the water ebbs and flows, creating new connections depending on the time of year. Along its length, the Amazon River itself has three separate names in Spanish and Portuguese: the Amazon, the Solimões, and the Marañón. The Pantanal in Matto Grosso floods and connects to the Paraguai River. The same is true of the Rupununi in Guyana to the Essequibo and the Llanos de Mojos in Bolivia to the Guaporé. The Orinoco links to the northern headwaters of the Rio Negro. These connections matter because they linked the Amazon River to the Andes, the Orinoco, and the Caribbean geographically and culturally.² Attempting to reduce the Amazon to simply a water drainage system excludes these interconnected systems. No river in Guyana, Surinam, or French Guiana drains into the Amazon, yet they are generally considered Amazonian countries, because the watershed of the Guiana

¹ Juvenal Ramos Torres, “Viagem de Sua Excelência o Sr. Dr. Antônio Coelho de Sá e Albuquerque, presidente da província do Pará, para o Tocantins e Rio Amazonas,” Jornal do Amazonas, no. 81, 10 April 1860, 22, [enclosed in President Antônio Coelho de Sa e Albuquerque to Minister of War Sebastião do Rego Barros, 11 April 1860, AN, série guerra, Pará- correspondencia de presidente, IG-546- 1859-60].

² Though not entirely connected through water, these regions were connected through centuries old overland trade routes as well as water travel.
Highlands joins them to the Amazon Basin. The same is true of Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia, where roughly half the national territory of each shares the Amazon Basin with Brazil. Amazonian language families are present throughout the Orinoco and the southern Caribbean and extend into Spanish America to the west and south. Geographically, taken as a whole, the Amazonian Basin is larger than the continental United States and makes up about forty percent of South America.

For the purposes of this dissertation, I focus on the Brazilian Amazon, though not without noting the permeability of national borders. Even with this nationalist reduction, I must offer a further caveat that I define the Brazilian Amazon even more narrowly as the Province of Grão-Pará, a region that is now composed of roughly four Brazilian states (Pará, Amazonas, Roraima, and Amapá), yet excludes Maranhão, Tocantins, Acre, and Matto Grosso, now also considered Amazonian states. The connected rivers linked the Brazilian provinces, and cabanos crossed amorphorous borders to escape or join the Cabanagem. Cabanos, runaway slaves, deserters, and other enemies of the state took advantage of the basin’s connected rivers to seek refuge in more remote territory. Yet, Grão-Pará is seen by most Brazilians, and foreign observers, as the heart of the Amazon. The capital city of Belém was the first colonial city to exploit the wealth of the interior, and much of the region’s products are still exported through Belém. A large tributary of the Amazon River, the Pará, flows past Belém and empties fresh water over two hundred miles into the Atlantic Ocean. The mighty river-sea, with dangerous waves

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and a breadth so wide that one cannot see the opposite shore, defines Grão-Pará. The shores along Grão-Pará’s major rivers were the most densely settled areas, and most of the government administration and repression during the Cabanagem took place in Grão-Pará. Thus, I feel justified referring to the Brazilian Amazon, and its inhabitants, in this manner with the knowledge that the reader understands I have limited its definition for the purposes of historic specificity rather than geographic precision.

Anyone who has traveled to the Amazon realizes the importance of rivers to everyday life. Amazonians depend on waterways for transportation, agriculture, communication, fishing, and shipping. The ebb and flow of the rivers defines the seasons along the equator. In many places along the rivers, forests and farms are flooded six months out of the year. The river has been manipulated by Amazonians for centuries to aid in agriculture or travel. Amazonians dug canals and redirected the water to make their lives easier. Access to the main rivers of Grão-Pará, the Negro, Branco, Solimões, Tapajós, Tocantins, and the Amazon imposed limits on settlement. All of the major population centers of the Amazon are located along the banks of one or more of these rivers. The geography of this vast territory is important to the historical process of nation building in the mid-nineteenth century. This chapter will highlight the major towns and cities discussed in the dissertation. It outlines the main economic activity of the area as well as the relative population demographics (where information is available). This chapter will also briefly outline the colonial settlement patterns and history of the region to provide the reader with context for the events of the nineteenth-century.

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5 David Cleary, “Towards an Environmental History,” 81. For a description of how Amazonians use the river, see Raffles, In Amazonia, 35-37.
Landscapes and History

As gateway to the entire river basin, the economy of Belém was primarily based on trade. The capital dominated the region economically and politically. Santa Maria de Belém do Pará was founded in 1616 by Francisco Caldeira de Castelo Branco. After expelling the French (1614-15) from São Luís in Maranhão, the Portuguese, with their native allies, had traveled north to extend and then protect Portuguese territory from the French, English, and Dutch. They founded the State of Maranhão, with the first capital at São Luís, in 1621, including Ceará, Maranhão, and Pará. Missionaries quickly followed the military settlement. Franciscans arrived in 1617, followed by Carmelites in 1625 and Mercedarians in 1639. After a brief period of peace, Tupinamba and groups from Marajó Island battled the settlers. Confronting reinforcements from Pernambuco, along with the ravages of disease, indigenous groups surrounding Belém were either enslaved or dispersed into the interior. The Portuguese used enslaved Indians or alliances with independent tribes to expel other European intruders. In 1637, following the threatening success of a Castilian expedition from Quito to Belém, Pedro Teixeira, the preeminent Portuguese explorer and conqueror of the era, countered this Castilian move by ascending the Amazon River to Quito, claiming the territory up to the Napo River for Portugal (despite the Papal donation of Tordesillas in 1494, which marked the boundary of Portuguese territory 1,500 miles further to the east).

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6 John Hemming, *Tree*, 49.

7 Ibid., 55. The Portuguese expansion against Castilian claims may have seemed less threatening because both Portuguese and Castilian possessions in the Americas were, at the time, holdings of the same monarch. The Spanish Habsburg dynasty successfully held the Portuguese crown from 1580 to 1640.
All aspects of the economy in the Portuguese Amazon depended on forced native labor. Enslavement of indigenous people was technically illegal in Portuguese colonies, but there were two main loopholes that colonists could exploit to bind native people. The Portuguese, often through missionaries, moved Indians into aldeias (villages) near towns where they were forced to labor for the local settlers. Indians were supposed to be paid for their labor, yet the local administration depended on Indian labor as well and was thus unlikely to enforce this inconvenience. The second option for legally taking Indian slaves was through “just war.” Tribes who resisted conversion to Christianity or forced relocation, upon defeat, could be enslaved as a consequence of a “just war.” Those who could be classified as other natives’ prisoners of war and, thus, allegedly in danger of death or cannibalism by another tribe could be taken as “ransomed” – effectively “saved” from barbarism and justly put to service. In practice, “slaving” and “ransoming” were the same thing. Beginning in the 1620s, Portuguese slavers went deeper into the Amazonian frontier looking for new victims.\(^8\) Warfare and overwork took their toll on the indigenous population of Grão-Pará, but the biggest killer was Old World diseases to which New World people had no immunity. Scholars estimate that from seventy five to ninety percent of the population of the New World succumbed to disease.\(^9\)

Missionaries were in an ambiguous position in this milieu. They wanted to settle the indigenous population into European-style towns so they could teach Christianity

\(^8\) Hemming, *Tree*, 59.

and “civilization,” yet they also wanted to protect the tribes from colonists’ exploitation. Jesuit Father Antonio Viera won concessions from the king of Portugal in 1647 which granted exclusive rights to missionaries to administer aldeias. When Father Viera arrived in Belém in 1653, he encountered only a tiny town of 300 Portuguese settlers that grew sugar and tobacco using Indian slave labor. The settlers completely ignored the law prohibiting Indian enslavement and depended on indigenous labor for everything. From these early encounters, conflict between settlers and Jesuits was continual in the Amazon. Conflicts between the Jesuits and colonist led to crown intervention. In the 1680s, the Crown decided that the Jesuits would be compelled to work with the settlers in the latter’s “just” need for labor to settle and maintain the territorial claims of the crown. Viera lobbied for African slaves to replace indigenous laborers, though the much more lucrative sugar plantations of the northeast took the lion’s share of captive laborers despite Amazonian pleas. Outside of Belém, missionaries controlled most of the Amazon. Jesuits administered the southern shore as far up stream as the Madeira. The Franciscans operated on the northern bank of the Amazon. The Carmelites settled the upper Amazonian Basin, along the Rio Negro and the Solimões

Portugal officially designated Belém a city in 1655. Lisbon directly administered the Brazilian Amazon, or the State of Maranhão, until the Marquis de Pombal, serving as prime minister of Portugal, united that state with the State of Brazil in 1774 (the South Atlantic coastal captaincies had been hitherto governed under a distinct administration). Due to the tides and winds, it was simpler to travel from São Luis (the

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10 Hemming, *Tree*, 71.
capital of Maranhão) or Belém to Lisbon, than it was to sail to Rio de Janeiro. Nonetheless, Pombal determined the reduction of the two states to one, under the Viceroy ruling the State of Brazil. It was the first time the two colonies were administered as one unit. Outside of the main port city and its immediate hinterland, Grão-Pará was sparsely populated by Europeans or their descendants. By that century cacao became the main export. Missionaries continued to control the labor and administration of the indigenous populations in the interior. Until their expulsion in 1759, another Pombaline reform, Jesuits were the dominant religious order in the Amazon.\footnote{Kenneth Maxwell, \textit{Conflicts and Conspiracies, Brazil and Portugal, 1750-1808} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), 29.}

Influenced by enlightenment thought and mercantilism, Pombal instituted directives which lusophied Amazonian towns through such mechanisms as forced labor for the state, an emphasis on racial intermarriage, and the renaming of indigenous towns. Pombal also introduced monopoly companies which imported a large number of African slaves to labor on plantations around the city of Belém.\footnote{Kenneth Maxwell, \textit{Pombal: Paradox of the Enlightenment} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 88-90, 118-119.} By 1800, African slaves made up about twenty percent of the population. While a large plantation economy familiar to scholars of Brazil did not develop in Grão-Pará, the riverine basins around Belém and the Baixo (lower) Amazonas did have a smaller version, complete with a planter class with slaves producing rice, cotton, and cacao. These planters were influential in their county and captaincy governments, though not nearly as influential as planters in other parts of Brazil.\footnote{Oscar de la Torre Cueva, “Freedom in Amazonia: The Black Peasantry of Pará, Brazil, 1850-1950” (Unpub Ph.D. diss., University of Pittsburg, 2011), 30.} Following the Pombaline reforms of the 1750s, rice,
coffee, cotton, and cacao became the main exports. Cacao was the most profitable, and remained so until the discovery of vulcanization and the ensuing natural rubber boom of the second half of the nineteenth century. Pombal sought to settle the Amazon with Portuguese, but a lack of willing immigrants forced him to turn towards the indigenous people of the Amazon to exploit the region’s resources.

After the expulsion of the Jesuits, Pombal instituted a new program to administer indigenous people of the Amazon called the Directorate. Through the Directorate, indigenous people would be introduced to Portuguese language, dress, and religion. Pombal granted special permissions for individual colonists to re-settle Indians from their homes to Directorate villages, as missionaries had done in the aldeia system, but now under tighter government control. Material incentives encouraged white, male colonists to marry Indian women.14 Only in Paraguay, which also had a large indigenous population, did an Iberian monarchy encourage and legitimize such racial and ethnic mixing.15

Forced labor, seen as necessary to turn indigenous people into productive and loyal Portuguese subjects, was the main method of controlling Directorate villages. Appointed Directors of the villages were charged with luring Indians into colonial society through a combined strategy of reward and coercion. Some of the village Indians worked for private employers in exchange for trade goods. Other laborers performed services for the village by producing manioc, the region’s staple. Directorate villages

14 Hemming, *Amazon Frontier*, 11-19, 43-60.
also sent villagers deep into the forest to collect the traditional export products of the region: wild cacao, Brazil nuts, and sarsaparilla. Directorate villagers were also compelled to work for the colonial government in military service or on exploratory border expeditions, in timber mills, ship-building, or for the maintainance of public works.\textsuperscript{16}

The Pombaline reforms played a key role in the increased settlement of the regions beyond Belém and its immediate hinterland. North of Belém, Marajó Island, an island the size of Switzerland, is a flat swamp, crisscrossed by \textit{igarapés} (streams), rivers, and lakes with small “tree islands.”\textsuperscript{17} There were three main towns: Soure, Breves, and Chaves. The villages of Muaná, Boa Vista, Monsarás, São Sebastião, and Ponta de Pedras were also located on the island.\textsuperscript{18} Marajó has two seasons: one dry (from September to December) and the other rainy. Since there were no roads connecting the island, water transportation was the only option. During the rainy season, one could canoe across the entire island. \emph{Marajoenses} navigated the swamp with small canoes called \textit{igarités} made from burned out tree trunks and paddled among dense vegetation.\textsuperscript{19} In the late 1640s, a group of Jesuit missionaries were shipwrecked on their way to Belém, and followed the current to Marajó Island. One of the local indigenous groups, the Aruans (Arawak language group), killed and reputedly ate the unlucky religious. Ten years later in 1659, the Jesuit Antônio Veira won the friendship of

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{18} Hemming, \textit{Tree}, 85.
\bibitem{19} Palmatary, “Pottery,” 265.
\end{thebibliography}
the various groups of Marajó before the Portuguese King declared a “just war” against the hostiles. Jesuit accounts differ about the people of the island. Veira recorded that there were over twenty-nine different groups on the island all speaking different languages. Another Jesuit, João Filippé Betendorf, chronicled seven different tribes on the island who spoke different languages and warred with each other. 20 Most of the indigenous people fled or were forced into slavery, and by the eighteenth century there were no independent groups left on the island.

Cattle made up the primary Portuguese economy on Marajó, though sugar and coffee were also grown there. Cattle ranching on the island began in the early eighteenth century. Missionaries were the largest landholders and the Jesuits administered enormous cattle fazendas (productive landholdings). After their expulsion in 1759, 135,000 head of cattle were confiscated from their properties. The Mercedarians came to Brazil with Pedro Teixeira and founded the convent of Nossa Senhora das Mercês in Belém in 1640. Throughout the seventieth century, the Mercedarian order administered several missions in the interior, all the way up to the Urubu (near Manaus). In 1749, the Mercedarians were forced to withdraw to Maranhão, and their properties were confiscated. They had between 60,000-100,000 head of cattle. 21 By 1758, they had only five remaining missions. In 1785, Pope Pius VI

20 Ibid., 269.
21 Hemming, Tree, 81.
secularized their convents in Pará.\textsuperscript{22} By independence, their vast holdings on Marajó belonged to the provincial government.\textsuperscript{23}

Macapá, north of Marajó Island, bordered the French colony of Guyana. Macapá had a fort and was primarily of military importance. The town was founded by a Portuguese military detachment, ordered to the area in 1738. As part of the Pombaline project, Francisco Xavier de Mendonça Furtado, governor of Pará and Pombal’s half-brother, ordered the town of São José de Macapá to be founded on the site twenty years later. The fort of Macapá, planned in 1764, took eighteen years to complete due to illness and desertion among the Indian workers.\textsuperscript{24} In the 1830s, Macapá was still a rural backwater dominated by the fort. For the few settlers that lived in this region subsistence agriculture and cattle husbandry were the primary activities. Macapá also served as a safe haven for runaway slaves, deserters, criminals, and other people trying to avoid the administration in Belém.

Along the Atlantic coast there were rice plantations, and an economy based on fishing.\textsuperscript{25} The main town, Bragança, is about 200 km east of Belém. Bragança, renamed and organized as part of the Pombaline reforms in 1753, began as a French outpost on the Rio Caeté. The local Tupinamba were decimated in the ensuing wars between the Dutch, French, and Portuguese. The remaining indigenous people were forcibly moved to a nearby aldeia or to the capital. The small town of Souza de Caeté depended on the


\textsuperscript{23} Ernesto Horácio da Cruz, \textit{História do Pará} (Belém: Universidade do Pará, 1963), 184.

\textsuperscript{24} Cruz, \textit{História do Pará}, 58.

\textsuperscript{25} Harris, \textit{Rebellion}, 35.
local Jesuit administered aldeia, São João Batista. Colonists, angry over the Jesuits’ control of indigenous labor, expelled two Jesuits from the aldeia in 1741. Following the expulsion of the Jesuits, Pombal renamed the settlement after the ruling Portuguese dynasty.

With the Pombaline reforms, Portuguese administrators attempted to establish a direct line of communication between Bragança and Belém. Mendonça Furtado established the town of Ourém as a midway point to the capital.26 A successful road leading from Bragança to the capital city would elude officials. Indeed, the longest public works program of the post-Cabanagem period failed to resurrect the project, and Brazilians could not fully exploit the potential of Bragança’s advantageous location, in between Belém and São Luis, until Pará constructed a railroad at the turn of the twentieth century.

Some 150 km further south from Belém, the city of Cametá was the center of the Tocantins region. The city served as an interior port for products from the forest (cacao and Brazil nuts), and had small-scale sugar and cotton plantations. Founded on the west bank of the Tocantins River by a Franciscan friar in 1617, Cametá became a launching point for missions deeper into the interior. The modern town, recognized in 1635, was built on a slight elevation. When the provincial president toured Pará in 1860, Cametá, “one of the most important interior cities,” had “four streets, eight or ten cross streets, four squares, and two beautiful roads, one that goes to the aldeia of Socorro and the other to Curimam.” In 1860, the president estimated there were 4,000 souls

living in the city. During the Cabanagem, the city became the alternative seat of the provincial government. The acting vice president of the province would lead the town council in proclaiming Cametá the true, loyal capital of Pará.

Slave raiders and explorers, known in the Amazon as cunhamenas (sertanistas, more commonly), forced indigenous people into settlements along the river banks. The Portuguese established forts at Gurupá, Óbidos, and Santarém to protect against independent Indian tribes. Gradually, settlers moved to the area, and established farms. Further in the interior, the Baixo (Lower) Amazon traded in timber and other forest products. The region’s main town, Santarém, situated at the confluence of the Tapajós and Amazon Rivers, served as an important interior trade city and linked the province of Mato Grosso to Pará, by way of the Tapajós. Founded by the Jesuits in 1751, the aldeia Tapajós was located at the site of the modern city. In the nineteenth century, the lower Amazon was identified as all of the land in between Belém and the Rio Negro. Santarém was the second largest city of Grão-Pará, and the area was also second only to the capital in economic importance. Slave raiders focused most of their efforts on the native peoples of the lower Amazon. Most of the indigenous inhabitants were forcibly moved to the capital, died of disease, or fled deeper into the interior. By the 1750s, the demographic collapse of the native peoples made African slaves critical to meet labor needs. Thus, as Portuguese and native Brazilian colonists moved to the

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region, African slaves accompanied them. German explorers Spix and Maritius visited Santarém in 1819. They found that the few whites and their slaves lived on the cacao plantations surrounding the town. Most of the inhabitants were indigenous people who lived in small clay houses and slept on hammocks or straw mats. Diamonds from the Tapajos River enriched the interior city, making it the prettiest of the area.

There were two important indigenous groups that controlled the lower Amazon in the eighteenth century and who fought on opposing sides of the Cabanagem. They moved into a sort of vacuum in the region, created by disease, enslavement, and assimilation. The largest and most powerful independent indigenous group, the Mundurucu, often sided with the legalist (those who supported the government in Rio) troops during the rebellion. The Mundurucu expanded throughout the eighteenth century into the lower Amazon, displacing other indigenous groups and fighting the Portuguese as they conquered new territory. The Mundurucu were feared in battle as indiscriminate killers and barbarians. Finally, in exchange for tools and other commodities, the Mundurucu signed a peace treaty with the crown in 1795 that gave them a settlement in the lower and middle parts of the Tapajós, south of Santarém. There continued to be conflict between settlers and groups of Mundurucus. Though the treaty included all of the different groups of Mundurucu, individual headman could negotiate better conditions for their individual groups. These groups were chosen as elite warriors to serve the Portuguese as favored allies. They defended traders and controlled the economy of the Madeira River down into Matto Grosso.

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31 Harris, Rebellion, 44.
The Mura, the second important indigenous group in the lower Amazon, were known as river pirates during the colonial period and raided for slaves (both Indian and African), tools, and foodstuffs from settlers. Jesuits claimed that a less than scrupulous missionary tricked the Mura into slavery in the early eighteenth century and the remaining Mura vowed revenge against Portuguese settlers. Originally from the Madeira region, the Mundurucu pushed the Mura westward towards the lower tributaries on the main Amazon. Resistance to colonialism and forced resettlement made the Mura semi-nomadic. The fort at Óbidos guarded against possible Mura attack until a peace treaty was negotiated in the 1780s. Since the Mundurucu often served as important allies for the Portuguese, the Mura—enemies of the Mundurucu—were often seen as thieves, hostile, and “wild,” despite suing for peace. The Mura also integrated their captives into their society, making their group multi-ethnic and multi-racial. The chief who negotiated the peace treaty was described as tall and black. It is likely that runaways of all kinds joined the Mura in their anticolonial struggle. In Amazonia the term “Mura” was used to describe not only the indigenous group, but also to refer to any anti-Portuguese group. In fact, new groups of “Muras” seemed to appear all over the Amazon during the colonial period. Both groups signed peace treaties in the 1780s with the Portuguese. Two centuries of constant frontier warfare ended. Both the Mura and Mundurucu resisted colonial rule, but in different ways. The Mura spread out and began living semi-

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nomadic lives. The Mudurucu defended and gained territorial rights. The colonial sphere continued to encroach on these groups, and at the eve of independence no settlement outside of Belém was free from fear of Indian attacks or raids. Later, during the Cabanagem, most Mura would fight alongside the cabanos against what they saw as continued Portuguese attempts at domination.

Following the River Solimões further west, the Alto (Upper) Amazon, known as the Rio Negro, was sparsely populated with only a small town and fort at Barra (now Manaus). During the second half of the seventeenth century, missionaries established settlements along the Solimões, Negro, and Branco Rivers. Despite territorial claims from European rivals, in 1750, the treaty of Madrid recognized the de facto reality that the territory belonged to Portugal. Small forts were constructed to guard the border, though they were poorly staffed and supplied, making them mostly symbolic.

**On the Path to Independence**

In 1808, the Portuguese Court fleeing Napoleon’s army, relocated to Brazil. The State of Brazil was raised to the status of a co-equal kingdom with Portugal by Prince Regent D. João VI in 1815. D. João VI became king of both Portugal and Brazil the following year, upon the death of his mother, D. Maria. The court brought with it a printing press and libraries, and allowed Brazilian ports to trade with British merchants. An independence movement in Pernambuco, in 1817, was quickly put down, but found

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34 The Alto Amazon referred to the Portuguese area west of Barra (Manaus). Government officials often referred to it as the Rio Negro region to better stake Portuguese claims to the areas. São José do Rio Negro was set up in 1755, thus it remained until subordinated to Belém in the early independence period.

35 Reis, *História de Amazonas*, 123.

36 For the court in Rio, see: Kirsten Schultz. *Tropical Versailles: Empire, Monarchy, and the Portuguese Royal Court in Rio* (New York: Routledge, 2001), chap. 5.
sympathy in the Amazon. Brazil’s path to independence began in 1820. A liberal revolt in Portugal persuaded D. João VI to return to Lisbon. For the first time in two hundred years the Côrtes would be convened in Lisbon. Delegates from Portugal, Brazil, and the Portuguese overseas possessions would compose a written constitution. Pará was one of the first provinces to send representatives. The elite of Pará supported the Côrtes. For Portuguese loyalists, the Côrtes offered an even stronger relationship with Lisbon. For liberal Portuguese and Brazilians, elections were thought to offer an equal, representative political voice in imperial affairs.

After D. João VI’s return to Lisbon, the prospect for a co-equal Kingdom of Brazil dimmed. Upon news that the Portuguese intended to resubmit Brazil to colonial policies, many paraenses began to support the call for independence. D. Pedro, João VI’s heir, had remained in Brazil as the kingdom’s prince regent; he now put himself at the head of a growing independence movement. After refusing to return to Lisbon, in 1822, D. Pedro declared Brazilian independent empire and was acclaimed and then crowned its first emperor. In 1823, John Pascoe Grenfell, second in command to the celebrated British mercenary, Lord Cochrane, who had just organized an imperial navy to defend the interests of the new emperor, sailed to Pará from São Luís to ensure loyalty to the new Empire of Brazil. Opinions were divided; many of Belém’s elite had strong kinship and commercial ties to Lisbon and would have preferred to remain a loyal captaincy of the Portuguese kingdom. Many others, influenced by the liberalism spreading from the

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37 Raiol, Motins políticos, 1: 34.; For the events in Pernambuco, see Jeffrey Carl Mosher, Political Struggle, Ideology, and State Building: Pernambuco and the Construction of Brazil, 1817-1850 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2008), 23-40.

French, American, and Bolivarian revolutions wished for more local control and independence. A group of Brazilian soldiers demanding that a paraense be elected to govern Pará were rounded up by Grenfell and imprisoned on the ship *Palhaço*. The men were left in the ship’s stifling hull without food or water in Belém’s sweltering harbor. Of the 256 men imprisoned, only two survived the ordeal. Though most paraenses supported independence, the mercenaries paid to ensure loyalty to Pedro I had brutally murdered Brazilians. Outside of Belém, fear that Grenfell’s actions were really an attempt to bring Pará back under Portuguese control. The treatment and death of Brazilian soldiers on the prison ship only further inflamed these ideas. Anti-Portuguese revolts took place in Oeiras, Portel, Melgaço, Anapu, Igarapé-Miri, Moju, Conde Beja, and Marajó in response to the tragedy.\(^{39}\)

The *Palhaço* incident lived in the collective memory of paraenses for decades and was cited during the Cabanagem as evidence of the duplicity of distant rulers. By the decree of 20 October 1823, the provincial councils were disbanded throughout the Empire in favor of a provincial president, appointed by the imperial government, and advised by a council. The vice-president would be chosen by the electors of the council, formed by six members elected in the same way as deputies were elected to the imperial legislative assembly. Deputies had to be at least thirty years old and had to have resided in the province for six years. The council met for two months a year in regular sessions, but the president could call them when he wished. If the president was absent, the president of the municipal chamber of Belém would assume his duties.\(^{40}\)

\(^{39}\) Raiol, *Motins políticos*, 1: 54.

\(^{40}\) Ibid., 1: 81.
Clearly, under the new Empire, representative local government had suffered a series of setbacks. Over the 1820s, small villages and towns throughout the Amazon experienced expectations and disappointments over the unfulfilled promises of independence. As this brief survey of the complex natural, political, and social landscape suggests, shifting local loyalties, liberal ideology, and fluid identities made independence a complicated experience. As we shall see, more than ten years later, the Cabanagem’s complexities were no fewer—they also demand that scholars avoid oversimplifying its violence and the agendas of its participants.
On the night of 6 January 1835, the President of the Province of Grão-Pará, Bernardo Lobo de Souza, celebrated an evening at the theater in honor of the festa of São Tomé. Instead of returning to the government palace after the theater he went to his lover's house. All the while, a plot to depose him was in motion. Angry paraenses met at Nazaré da Boavista on the Ilha das Onças a short distance from the capital. The majority favored deporting the president back to Rio de Janeiro, though others had more sinister aims. Just as the festa began, National Guardsmen met in the Aranha household under the command of brothers Antônio and Francisco Vinagre. Filled with the spirit of dissatisfaction the National Guardsmen would not be mollified by merely deporting the president and the Commander of Arms; they were out for revenge. Rebels marched to the government palace, went up the stairs without the least resistance from the guards, and went to the rooms belonging to the president and Commander of Arms. The Commander of Arms, Coronel Joaquim José da Silva Santiago, fled into the garden. He climbed a tree and fell, severely injuring his legs. With the strength brought on by fear he ran toward his brother’s house. Before he could get to the street, a tapuiro named Filipe shot him. Rebels repeatedly stabbed and beat the body long after he had expired. Lobo de Sousa refused to seek safety and flee aboard

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1 The imperial government in Rio de Janeiro appointed presidents; they were the executive of each province.

2 Raiol, Motins políticos, 2: 452.

3 Ibid., 453.

4 Ricci, "Um Morto," 522. Tapuiro refers to an assimilated or Portuguese-speaking indigenous person.
a ship. Instead, he tried to enter the government palace. As he was climbing the stairs, João Miguel Aranha called out “there is the Malhado,” Lobo de Souza’s nickname because his hair appeared to be spotted. A tapuio, Domingas Onça, shot Lobo de Sousa before he could speak a word. By dawn, all key positions in the capital were under rebel control and the two main provincial authorities lay dead.

The dramatic events of January 1835 marked the beginning of a rebellion that would claim the lives of nearly 30,000 people, destabilize the largest amount of national territory ever in Brazilian history, and reshape Amazonian society in the years that followed. The Cabanagem, however, was part of a larger struggle that engulfed the Empire of Brazil during the 1830s. Though it took many weeks for news to reach Belém from Rio de Janeiro, the north was intimately connected to events in the capital.

Though often portrayed as a simple race war, the Cabanagem arose from the complex political history of Brazil in the 1830s. The Cabanagem has also been portrayed as a regionalist struggle for independence from Brazil. However, this negates the more-nuanced political ideology of the cabanos, who were more concerned with renegotiating their position within the Brazilian Empire than with complete political independence. The cabanos were interested in provincial autonomy, particularly the right to name their own president, not a complete break from Brazil. In addition, simplistic interpretations of the events in Pará obscure the similarities with other provincial struggles in the 1830s and the impact that regional violence had on political fortunes in Rio. Debates over the political shape of the new Empire took place over the whole of the country. Scholars are only beginning to move beyond interpretations centered on race or regional identity to integrate the story of provincial violence into a
broader historical narrative that recognizes the turmoil that threatened the Brazilian Empire during the Regency (1831-1840). This chapter ties events in Pará more closely to the political crisis that engulfed the new nation at that time.

**The Regency and National Context**

Within a decade of the declaration of Brazilian independence, political dissatisfaction with the first emperor’s rule resulted in the seemingly spontaneous abdication of Pedro I in favor of his young son on 7 April 1831. Economic and financial difficulties, marked by inflation and large outstanding loans to English banks, plagued the new country. Fear of absolutism and possible re-colonization by Portugal, particularly after a crisis of monarchical succession in Portugal, made Pedro I an unpopular head of state for many Brazilians. This was also part and parcel of the constitutional struggle over the issues of primacy or partnership with the monarch in the parliamentary debates at the time. Many members of the Brazilian elite also viewed the monarch’s close links with the Portuguese community in Rio de Janeiro and the anti-slave trade treaty with Britain as major sacrifices of national interests. Additionally, the emperor’s unsuccessful policy in the Rio de la Plata resulted in the loss of a significant portion of national territory, a region which became the modern state of Uruguay. These early failures contributed to popular discontent, which culminated in the *Noites das Garrafadas* (the night of broken bottles), a major political uprising in Rio on 5 April 1831.

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5 The British were historic allies of the Portuguese. In 1808, when the Portuguese court fled Lisbon during the French invasion of the Spanish Peninsula, it was escorted by ships of the British navy. In 1822, when Brazil declared its independence from Portugal, Britain was the preeminent political and economic power and had significant influence in Brazilian affairs. Interested in ending the transatlantic slave trade, the British offered recognition of Brazilian independence in exchange for Brazilian abolition of the slave trade in their ports. While the new emperor agreed to this, the Brazilian elite, traditionally dependent upon slavery for plantation exports, reacted with indignation. Leslie Bethell, *The Abolition of the Brazilian Slave Trade: Britain, Brazil, and the Slave Trade Question* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), chap. 2.
Soon thereafter, Dom Pedro was on a ship to Portugal, leaving his five-year old son as heir to the Brazilian throne. News of the abdication sparked turmoil throughout the Empire. Many Brazilians interpreted the abdication as a revolution, one associated with independence and liberty. The conditions were ripe for Brazilians to experiment with a new form of politics. The Regency also coincided with a phenomenal growth of the press. Discussions were generally free and open (due to anonymous publishing). The press broadly influenced public opinion. Newspapers were often read in public, allowing illiterates to participate in the political discourse. Parliament took control and a temporary regency claimed authority in the name of the young Pedro II.

After the abdication, the liberal opposition to Pedro I broke apart. Though more radical liberals, called exaltados, had been critical allies in provoking the crisis of political legitimacy, moderate liberals, known as moderados, quickly established supremacy within the Chamber of Deputies as the majority. They severely limited executive powers, "regents could not declare war, grant titles and honors, veto laws, or dissolve the Chamber of Deputies." In August 1831, the General Assembly passed a law that replaced the army-controlled militias with a civilian National Guard. The National Guard functioned on prevailing liberal assumptions that the pátria's (fatherland's) domestic order should be entrusted only to men of property and social

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7 Ibid., 64.
8 For a more detailed look at the politics of the Regency see Barman, Brazil, 160-188; and Needell, Party, 30-72.
9 Barman, Brazil, 172.
stature, though in practice property restrictions were rather low. Unlike the army, the National Guard within each region had authority only within its own province. The moderado party leadership allowed significant regional autonomy, giving provinces control of policing and their National Guard units.\textsuperscript{11} In spite of, or perhaps because of, these changes, political turmoil embroiled the young nation.

Disagreement among the elite in Rio resulted in several compromise measures, including the Additional Act of 12 August 1834. With this measure the Chamber approved a significant "devolution" of power to the provinces.\textsuperscript{12} The act gave newly created provincial assemblies much greater power than the old Conselhos Gerais.\textsuperscript{13} It also eliminated the Council of State, effectively crippling the moderating power of the monarch.\textsuperscript{14} The act further blurred the distinction between provincial and imperial authority, opening the door to disagreements over jurisdiction. However, reformers significantly neglected to include the federalist goal of provincially-elected executives. Presidents continued to be appointed and removed according to the will of the imperial government. According to Roderick Barman, the compromise failed due to conflicts

\textsuperscript{11} Ibid., 145.

\textsuperscript{12} Barman, Brazil, 184, 191.; Needell, Party, 56-75.

\textsuperscript{13} “Reform Constitucional, Ato Adicional” in Dantas de Feitosa, org., Fundamentos históricos do poder legislativo do Grão-Pará (Belém: Assembléia Legislativa do Estado do Pará, 1999), 26-7.

\textsuperscript{14} The Brazilian Constitution of 1824 granted the monarch a personal role as the fourth constitutional power, along with his substantial role as head of the executive power and his extensive influence in the function of the judicial and legislative powers. This fourth power was known as the poder moderador. This was to serve to oversee the interplay of the other powers, as a direct representative of the Brazilian nation. It allowed the Emperor to summon Parliament between sessions, sanction its decrees, laws, and resolutions, dissolve the Chamber of Deputies, grant titles and honors, declare war, appoint and dismiss cabinet ministers, and appoint senators and councilors of state. During the Regency, the Chamber of Deputies denied the Regents’ critical attributes of this power. Barman argues that the Regents were in truth subordinate to Chamber, as they were chosen by it and lacked any basis of power outside of it; indeed, Barman argues that, of the two houses (Senate and Chamber), the Chamber dominated then. See: Barman, Brazil, 114, 117, 163.
among the ruling elite over conceptions of "the nation." Certain members of the moderado party looked to the United States model of federalism, while other politicians looked to the July Monarchy of France, specifically the political theory of constitutional monarchist François Pierre Guillaume Guizot. A recent scholar has interpreted the Additional Act as one of the key factors in the emergence of reactionary leaders who divided and left the moderado party.

Fighting among the liberal elite centered on contested understandings of the state's role. Many liberals viewed the state as peacekeeper among the provinces and as protector against foreign interlopers (including Portuguese residents). The opposing view, which eventually gained supremacy, argued that the nation needed to be centralized, with the monarchy as the font of all authority. More radical views, including those of monarchical restorationists (before Dom Pedro's death in 1834) and republicans, created visible fractures among the elite. In a highly stratified and unequal society, where in many places slaves formed a majority of the population (though the province of Pará also had a large population of índios and caboclos, who were mixed race, "copper colored" people who lived on the rivers) these ruptures represented an opportunity to challenge the status quo. After the abdication of the monarch, the Additional Act proved one of the most contentious political acts of the Regency. As Barman argues, “the newly created provincial assemblies simply intensified the rivalries and magnified the rewards offered [rival factions] . . . the devolution of power contained in the Ato Adicional guaranteed that the implementation of the constitutional

15 Ibid., 167-73.
16 Needell, Party, 76-80.
17 Ibid., 55.
amendment would produce confrontation in the pátrias.”¹⁸ The Additional Act also shifted power within provinces. Judy Bieber argues that while the liberal reforms of the 1830s increased provincial autonomy, they also increased the strength of the provincial elite, which caused municipalities (counties) to steadily lose local political power.¹⁹

This was a political situation the interior paraense elite, who were used to controlling local government, found unacceptable.²⁰ The provincial legislative assemblies created new taxes, distributed budgets, deliberated about public works, security and public instruction, and controlled public employees (except the judiciary). The office of the presidents was the most important tool for Rio to influence provincial affairs. The short stay of provincial presidents assured that they did not form local ties. The president convoked the assemblies, expedited the instructions, order and regulations for the execution of provincial law, made sure public offices were functioning well, and used the National Guard if necessary to maintain order and security in the province. Vice Presidents were elected until 1840; after that they were also appointed by Rio, though it was always a notable from the province. The provincial assembly made all the laws and could not be dissolved by the president.

The decade of the Regency was, thus, an era of tremendous political upheaval. As one scholar notes, ”debates over reform showed that it was the most politically diverse and rich of any of the epochs of the Empire, for many of the time, the revolution

¹⁸ Barman, Brazil, 180.


²⁰ Óbidos’s municipal council rebelled against Belém in 1832, Rio Negro’s leaders in 1833, Cametá’s in 1835. Raiol, Motins políticos, 1: 243-6, 257-9; 2: 651-655.
of 7 April was the initial mark of a great process of transformation in Brazilian society.\textsuperscript{21}

These debates also informed dozens of rebellions throughout the Empire. These rebellions can be broadly grouped into two categories. Military and primarily urban movements that were relatively small and unorganized composed the first wave of revolts. They expressed the general dissatisfaction of the exaltados or caramurus (conservatives who often wanted the monarch to return), general lusophobia, and a response to economic crisis, especially over counterfeit coins.\textsuperscript{22} A second category encompassed the Cabanagem and the other major rebellions of the era.\textsuperscript{23} Though frequently radical in their demands (and actions), rebels often couched demands in provisional terms. Much like colonial rebellions which swore loyalty to the King, while deposing his local representatives, rebels framed their disobedience as temporary, lasting only until a new president arrived or Pedro II reached his majority.\textsuperscript{24}

\textsuperscript{21} Marcelo Basile, "O laboratório da nação: a era regencial (1831-1840)," in Keila Grinberg and Ricardo Salles, 2:84.

\textsuperscript{22} Lusophobia refers to the hatred of Portuguese; in Brazil, it was based on colonial grievances of Portuguese preferential treatment and, after independence, Portuguese presence in the highest ranks of government and, over the decades, continued domination of local commerce. In the discourse of the day Portuguese citizens as well as adoptivos, the Portuguese-born who acquired Brazilian citizenship, were often conflated. Both groups had their loyalty questioned. In Amazonia, most of the merchants, the elite of Amazonia, fit into these two groups. On Brazilian lusophobia at the time, see Eugene Ridings, \textit{Business Interest Groups in Nineteenth-Century Brazil} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 33, 35, 80-81; and Mosher, \textit{Political Struggle}, 23-24, 27 118-119. Portuguese dominance of retail commerce caused the public to blame the Portuguese more generally for rising prices on consumer goods. Easily counterfeited copper coins robbed many of their income, and Portuguese merchants were blamed when the fake coins were refused. See: Mosher, \textit{Political}, 106-107.

\textsuperscript{23} There was another sertão rebellion in the 1830s associated with the word “cabano, but it took place in the backlands of Pernambuco. This \textit{Guerra dos Cabanos}, was led by men who had put down the Confederation of the Equator in 1824, and who had been rewarded by the first emperor with various provincial positions. With the emperor’s abdication, their power was threatened, and they revolted. Their rebellion was quickly put down in Recife, but lasted longer in the hinterland. Rio followed a scorched earth policy to put down the rebellion, as they would in the repression of the Cabanagem. See Mosher, \textit{Political}, 113-117.

\textsuperscript{24} There were thirty revolts over the decade. The rebellions, along with the Cabanagem, that most seriously threatened the stability of the Brazilian nation were: The Farroupilha in Rio Grande do Sul, 1835-45, which pitted estanciero (great rancher) interest against the imperial government. Rebels
Adding to the confusion and dissatisfaction of the Regency, the military was also significantly reformed. The Regency's reduction in military troops resulted in a number of unemployed former military men, called *avulsos*. Complaints about low pay were further exacerbated in 1831 when the Regency created permanent municipal guards. These men were militarized police forces whose pay scale exceeded that of the army. Previously the army performed many police duties in Brazilian cities alongside a municipal force.\(^\text{25}\) The militias, hitherto organized by racial category and occupation, were replaced by “the parish-based National Guard, in which only eligible voters could serve…. [the former militia members’] sudden integration into the National Guard meant that colored militiamen faced more discrimination than previously,” because they were explicitly forbidden to transfer their rank to the army or the National Guard, they lost their institution and their status all at once.\(^\text{26}\)

\(^{25}\) Kraay, “‘As Terrifying as Unexpected,’” 512.

\(^{26}\) Ibid., 514.
The Cabanagem Begins

The province of Grão-Pará, roughly half of the Empire, covered a vast amount of territory, with an estimated population of 150,000 people in small villages centered on the river systems of the Amazon basin. In 1835, the provincial capital, Belém do Pará, had a population of approximately 13,000 brancos, tapuios, mestiços (people of mixed race, usually of African, European, and indigenous descent), caboclos, and African slaves. Situated at the mouth of the Amazon, the main economy of the city rested on export trade goods from the interior. The city also had a large foreign population, mainly composed of merchants from Portugal, England, and France. Economic power rested in the hands of these foreigners, and many Brazilians resented their presence. As noted previously, the region around Belém also produced cotton, rice, cacao, and cattle. Many merchant families also owned land. Interconnected merchant and planter families controlled the local economy and local politics.

Due to the sailing distance from Rio, the Additional Act, granting greater power to the provinces, was only published in Pará on 10 October 1834, two months after its promulgation. The news inflamed the passions of the president’s enemies, as exaltados continued to demand the right to elect their own provincial president. The next day, President Lobo de Sousa received word that a man from Acará appeared in

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27 David Cleary, "'Lost Altogether to the Civilised World', 119.


29 Raiol, Motins políticos, 2: 498. Raiol states that paraenses received the news with general applause, noting that friends of the president went to the palace and saluted the reformed constitution.

30 Ibid. At the houses of Batista Campos and Lavor Papagaio (the authors of those seditious papers) one could hear “Viva a federação republicana! Morra o malhado!” (Long live the Republican federation! Kill the spotted one. "Malhado" means spotted or stained, and was a nickname of Lobo de Sousa, because he had patches of white hair.)
the quarters of the artillery corps trying to enlist the guards of Bujaru in a revolution. Many in the province denounced the revolt. Yet, five days later the first rumblings of the Cabanagem resonated in the parish of Rio Acará. Insurgents killed the commander of a municipal guard after he was ordered to arrest the publisher of "seditious papers." In Belém, Lobo de Souza responded with swift military reprisals. He sent several armed vessels to quash the insurgency. After the Brazilian commander’s death, Captain James Inglis, a British mercenary commanding the Brazilian corvette *Defensora*, successfully apprehended the rebels. Inglis quickly overwhelmed the insurgents and had their ringleader, Felix Antônio Malcher, a Brazilian-born landowner, taken prisoner as Inglis destroyed his fazenda. Despite such initial successes, rumors of further conspiracies swept Belém. Francisco Pedro Vinagre, a rising leader among the new rebels, avoided capture with the assistance of the local Justice of the Peace. Public opinion in the province further soured against the president, as many people viewed the destruction of Malcher's fazenda as an arbitrary act of vengeance. Lobo de Souza wrote that the province was:

[[I]]n imminent danger that a Civil War would ignite which would cause as much damage as in other provinces, for Malcher clearly has the motives of the enemies of order. He has congregated people because his aim is to proclaim a Republican government on the ruins of the Representative

31 Ibid.
33 Responding to the President's questions, the commander of Pauxis (now Óbidos) noted that the residents of his area were happy to hear of rebel defeat and Malcher's capture. Of course, by the time of his response, Belém had already fallen, further illustrating the communication problems for government troops. Major Manuel Pedro Marinho to President Lobo de Souza. Pauxis, 27 January 1835, APEP, códice 888, correspondências dos diversos com o governo, 1829-38, 123.
Constitutional Monarchy and with it sacrifice the lives and properties of all of the men of standing.\textsuperscript{35}

The President urged his fellow paraenses to protect not only their lives, but the Brazilian nation.\textsuperscript{36}

In Belém, during the early hours of 7 January 1835, however, soldiers turned on their officers in open rebellion. Within an hour rebels opened the prisons, proclaiming Malcher president of the province. American and British representatives present on 7 January later wrote that Lobo de Souza, Captain Inglis, and the military commander Joaquim Santiago were murdered by the rebels before the opening of the prison, and thus before Malcher's release.\textsuperscript{37} Later accounts blamed the "cannibal and bloodthirsty" Malcher for the murders, though this appears more fearmongering than truthful. A report published in Rio even claimed that the "evil conspirators [from Acará] seduced the soldiers" into rebellion.\textsuperscript{38}

Discontent with Lobo de Souza had begun a full year before. Historian Magda Ricci argues that in many ways the cabano sentiment against Lobo de Souza was justified. He foolishly persecuted locally powerful paraenses, moved against the Church hierarchy in the province, alienated the Portuguese community, and generally proved

\begin{footnotesize}
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  \item \textsuperscript{36} In a letter to Rio, Lobo de Souza seemed more secure, stating "the district of Acará is pacified and there are no other adherents to the plan for revolt . . . . I want you to know that the troops of the first line are in a state of discipline, subordination, and [are] brave [men]." His confidence was soon betrayed. President Lobo de Souza to Minister of War Antônio José Ferreira de Brito, Belém, 24 November 1834, AN, Série Guerra, IG¹, 1828-34.
  \item \textsuperscript{38} \textit{Aurora Fluminense}, 30 March 1835, 1.
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himself incompetent. In particular, he had persecuted João Batista Gonçalves Campos (a popular priest and liberal independence leader) and Felix Malcher (the rebel noted earlier and a well-liked landowner in the province). Common persecution pushed the two men, originally enemies, into the same camp. The attack on Batista Campos was especially important. For one thing, by persecuting Batista Campos, a priest, Lobo de Souza also offended other priests, who were a traditional influence in the province. More, as an editor of an influential newspaper, Batista Campos could use his influence and status against Lobo de Souza in retaliation. Batista Campos, facing possible arrest, turned over publication to his friend, Vicente Ferreira Lavor Papagaio. After Papagaio took over as editor, he published *pasquins* (political satires) almost daily against Lobo de Souza.\(^{39}\)

On 7 April 1834 Batista Campos closed the doors of the Cathedral to government officials trying to celebrate the anniversary of the abdication of Pedro I. Lobo de Souza tried to have him arrested for treason, and Batista Campos fled to Acará (seeking refuge on Malcher’s fazenda). There, he died. His death was caused by gangrene from a shaving cut. Paraenses, however, blamed the president for the loss of one of their beloved priests. People began to gather in Acará, many of whom were also fleeing persecution, and planned to avenge Batista Campos’s death and to free Malcher.\(^{40}\)

Lobo de Souza managed to offend both the exaltados and the restorationists who wished Pedro I to return (caramurús). Strong feelings of *lusophobia* were common among exaltados in Belém, a city with a large Portuguese population, which by and


\(^{40}\) Ibid., 539.
large remained in most positions of power after Independence.\textsuperscript{41} Lobo de Souza was not Portuguese, but he alienated exaltados by maintaining Portuguese commercial, civil, and political advantages, thwarting exaltados who hoped that independence would break up the Portuguese commercial and political monopoly. Lobo de Souza also alienated the restorationists, generally associated with the Portuguese and others in the conservative establishment. He implemented the liberal reforms coming from Rio, destabilizing Pará and angering the traditional elite. In 1834, many restorationist merchants and their wives went through the streets wearing red, a color that was associated with the old Portuguese court, in protest against the reforms. Many were arrested, angering the traditional elite against Lobo de Souza. Now both sides of the political spectrum opposed the president. In response, Lobo de Souza started a campaign against the restorationists. This action, seemingly undertaken to ingratiate him with the paraense exaltados, was immediately undercut when Lobo de Souza hired Padre Gaspar de Siqueira Queirós (a known enemy of Batista Campos) as editor of the official government journal.\textsuperscript{42}

\textsuperscript{41} As noted earlier, lusophobic feelings were strong throughout the province, not only in Belém. The justice of the peace of Villa Nova sent recommendations to end the rivalry between Brazilians and Portuguese in his village. Similarly the justice of Porto de Moz requested measures to maintain order between "Brazilians and adoptivos." (Adoptivo is a reference to a naturalized Portuguese.) See Justice of the Peace of Vila Nova to President José Joaquim Machado de Oliveira, Villa Nova, 9 June 1833, APEP, códice 854, correspondências de diversos com o governo, 1827-1838, 76; Justice of the Peace of Porto Moz to President Oliveira, Porto de Moz, 9 July 1833, APEP, códice 854, correspondências de diversos com o governo, 1827-1838, 79.; Lusophobic violence erupted in Santarém and along the Tapajós river. Initially, the violence was against adoptivos. The second outburst became a full blown uprising against the authorities, though it was quickly put down by the commander of the National Guard in Santarém. See Lieutenant Colonel Manuel de Azevedo Coutinho Rapozo to President Oliveira, Santarém, 26 April 1833, APEP, códice 888, correspondências dos diversos com o governo, 1829-38, 64.; Lieutenant Colonel Manuel de Azevedo Coutinho Rapozo to President Oliveira, Santarém, 4 August 1834, APEP, códice 888, correspondências dos diversos com o governo, 1829-38, 109.

\textsuperscript{42} Magda Ricci, "Do patriotismo à revolução," 241-244.
As in other parts of the Empire, military forces in Pará were in a dismal state. Forced recruitment, abuse by the authorities, and dismal living conditions encouraged rebellion and desertion. Commander of Arms Joaquim Santiago complained to the Minister of War about the province’s difficulty in filling the recruitment numbers required by the central government. Even if the province could fulfill the requested numbers "the only recruits will be from the lowest class, and of color, without any education." Further, "the captains cannot find anyone to fill the lower posts due to the absence of any soldiers who know how to read. “Any better recruit who strikes a figure, and is white, is the son of a widow that cannot be recruited because it is against the law, or has some other similar impediment.” Santiago urged the government to enact measures to provide the province with "good soldiers and, most importantly, officers." To make matters worse, the president was unable to pay the troops because the Regency had replaced the easily falsified copper coins with a new paper currency and Pará had just sent all the old currency to be exchanged in Rio de Janeiro, leaving the provincial administration with no ready funds.

In the end, all of this came to a head, and Malcher finally acted. Arguing that Portuguese merchants and hidden restorationists were impeding commercial activities and ignoring the property rights of Brazilian citizens, Malcher overthrew Lobo de Souza. In his message to the Regency, he swore his allegiance to the emperor and the

43 In one example, the military commander reported that the justice of the peace of Óbidos abused his authority with military recruits, asking them to perform personal tasks. See: Major Manuel Pedro de Marinho to President Lobo de Souza, Óbidos, 6 March 1834, APEP, código 888, correspondências dos diversos com o governo, 1829-38, 103.

44 Commander of Arms Santiago to Minister of War Antônio José Ferreira de Brito, Belém, 17 June 1834, AN, Série Guerra, IG¹267.

Brazilian nation; however, Malcher staunchly refused the appointment of any more provincial presidents from Rio. Many authors emphasize Pará’s relative autonomy and weak connection to the government in Rio as a key causative factor of the Cabanagem rebellion, yet Malcher’s demands fit neatly into a larger pattern of loyal political dissent heard elsewhere in those years. Despite coming to power in a coup, Malcher felt it important that Pará remain a part of Brazil, and thus he strove to justify cabano actions to the imperial government. Malcher notified the court in Rio that, as the elected president of the province, formally supported by the municipal chamber of Belém, he vowed to “defend the empire and the province, maintain constitutional liberties, and execute the laws.” Malcher’s emphasis on liberties is critical. Malcher felt that Lobo de Souza’s flouting of constitutional liberties gave paraenses the right to appoint a president who would uphold them. His actions suggest that he did not see this as a definitive break with Brazil; rather, he employed a common strategy in the Regency, in which a rebel against local authorities pledged allegiance to the distant monarch while simultaneously deposing that monarch’s local representatives.

Malcher assured American, British, and French representatives that their commercial interests and the personal safety of their citizens would be protected. Despite these assurances, many foreigners began to flee to the ships in Belém’s harbor, although the city did return to some semblance of normality. Indeed, Vinagre kept a firm control over the soldiers, enforcing a strict anti-looting policy. The American consul

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46 Jornal do Commercio, 28 March 1835, 1.

noted "the new government here has been enabled to preserve the utmost degree of quiet and good order, though confidence is very far from being restored among the generality of the inhabitants."48

This "quiet and good order" was soon disrupted by a conflict between Malcher and Vinagre. Many of the cabanos expected some sort of reward for their success; however, Malcher declared the revolution over and told everyone to go back to their homes and start working again. This produced little effect; rebels stayed in the capital waiting for something to happen. The military was also unsatisfied; Malcher ordered the soldiers to be paid but they did not have enough coins, so he decided to pay in silver and paper money, though suspicions about possible counterfeits ran rampant. Rifts also began to develop among the cabano leaders. Debates over implementation of the Additional Act, and over whether or not Malcher was actually breaking the law, showed the cabano concern over national policy and debates. They also served to weaken the bonds between leaders.

Domingos Raiol asserts that Malcher and Francisco Vinagre never had complete confidence in each other. As Commander of Arms, Vinagre let many cabano targets escape to Maranhão, undermining Malcher's authority. Malcher, in turn, ordered the seizure of the French consul, which directly violated the Brazilian constitution and the chain of command, straining the cabano partnership to the breaking point.49 Fed up

48 Charles Smith, Consul of the United States, Pará, to John Forsyth Secretary of State, Belém, February 1835, UFLAC, US foreign dispatch.

49 French Consul Diniz Crouan was denounced as an enemy to the government, and armed troops came to his house. He protested but fled to a French ship and arrived in Barbados to tell the governor there what had happened. Cabanos did not discover anything incriminating in his house. See: Raiol, Motins políticos, 2: 558-60
with Vinagre, Malcher wanted to discharge him of his duty and influence.\textsuperscript{50} Adding to the tension, Malcher had already alienated many revolutionaries and the rank and file troops supported Vinagre. The imprisonment of the commander of the National Guard of Bujaru aggravated the military only further. Soon, pasquins against Malcher began appearing. Malcher was convinced that they were instigated by Vinagre, though Lavor Papagaio (Batista Campos’s friend and influential newspaper editor) was rumored to be the author. Since the troops wanted Francisco Vinagre as Commander of Arms, it was impossible for Malcher to depose him. To go against the military would cause civil discord. Still, the pasquins kept appearing. Malcher ordered Lavor Papagaio to be arrested and deported to Ceará, even though it was the arbitrary deportation of Papagaio for publishing seditious material that had caused the cabanos to rebel against Lobo de Souza in Acará.\textsuperscript{51} The press called Malcher an "\textit{acaraense} tiger, a wicked tyrant, and a monster."\textsuperscript{52} On 27 January 1835, Malcher published a decree that tried to intimidate the rumor mongers. He promised public tranquility and vigilant loyalty to the Empire and threatened that "wicked forces with sinister ends will always be felled by legal orders."\textsuperscript{53}

Unable to depose Vinagre, and suspicious of other possible challenges to his fragile power, Malcher turned on Eduardo Francisco Nogueira, known as “Angelim.” Angelim, named after a tree known for its strength, had earned the nickname in 1831 for

\textsuperscript{50} Ibid., 556-561.
\textsuperscript{51} Ibid., 563-564.
\textsuperscript{52} \textit{Constitucional do Maranhão}, 13 March 1835, by the editor of the \textit{Sentinela Maranhense}, Vicente Ferreira de Lavor Papagaio, reprinted in Raiol, \textit{Motins políticos}, 2:564-565.
\textsuperscript{53} Raiol, \textit{Motins políticos}, 2: 569-570.
his support of the appointed president during an uprising in Belém in response to the news of Pedro I’s abdication. Angelim now worked as a bookkeeper for Malcher and was part of the exaltado middling Brazilian class which sought to unseat Portuguese power. Though Malcher and Angelim had been close friends, Angelim did not sign the act of 7 January which declared the support of “the people and the troops’” for Malcher as president of the province. Angelim had also turned down the government position Malcher offered him, an obvious snub. Malcher had become convinced that Angelim and his brothers were the authors of the new pasquins. Malcher confronted Angelim, who denied the accusation. Malcher's desire to extinguish the opposition, which he imagined was principally represented by Francisco Vinagre and Eduardo Angelim and their brothers, trumped reason. On 19 February Malcher ordered the imprisonment of Angelim and his brothers. Angelim submitted, but demanded an audience with Malcher. Angelim protested to Malcher that he had always acted as a peacemaker between the rebels. Malcher interrupted him and said he did not believe him and had proof that he and his brothers were agitating against him. The argument became heated and Angelim

54 As the last rebel leader and a charismatic twenty year old, Angelim has remained a towering figure in the historiography of the Cabanagem, often subjected to hero worship. For Angelim as a revolutionary hero see: Dilke de Barbosa Rodrigues, *A vida singular de Angelim (a Cabanagem)* (Rio de Janeiro: Irmãos Pongetti editores, 1978). It is clear that Angelim was a strong leader, inspiring respect from foreign observers; See Cleary, "Lost Altogether to the Civilised World," 124.

55 The act stated “On the seventh of January 1835, in the city of Santa Maria de Belém, capital of the province of Grão-Pará, and in the government palace of the same, the most conspicuous citizens, signed below, have met as witnesses to the acclamation by which the people and the troops meeting in the palace square have declared his Excellency Senhor Felix Antônio Clemente Malcher on the death of the ex-president Bernardo Lôbo de Sousa [sic], who has fallen from power because of his government’s constant despotism and arbitrariness in every act….we ask that the Regency not nominate another president for this province until S.M.I. Senhor D Pedro II reaches the age marked by the constitution to take the reins of the government of the Empire, because the unfortunate experience of this province shows that [the Regents]….only care for their interests, and we will not receive another president nominated by the Regency, certain that this ill-fated province will not prosper without the worthy and patriotic citizen who has been jubilantly acclaimed [president] today.” Reprinted in Raiol, *Motins políticos*, 2: 550-551.
declared Malcher a despot. Malcher lost his temper and hit Angelim with the hilt of his sword. The guards stopped him from causing further damage and placed Angelim under arrest. On the way to the prison, Angelim cried out to the crowd gathered that Malcher was now the true despot. Meanwhile, Francisco Vinagre, hearing about Angelim’s arrest, went looking for Malcher. When he found him, Vinagre declared that Malcher’s actions subverted his position, since the Commander of Arms was to be consulted about all arrests. Vinagre argued that Malcher’s arbitrary decisions could implant in the troops a sense of insubordination and a lack of discipline. Malcher responded that he was the first authority in the province and he did not have to explain his actions. Vinagre ordered the troops to return home and they obeyed him. Malcher, humiliated, returned to the government palace in a rage.

Losing no time, Vinagre ran to the military quarters and ordered the troops to march on the war arsenal to capture as many weapons as possible. As the column marched through the streets, Vinagre asked people they passed to spread the word to their friends. Malcher heard Vinagre coming and fled to the Castelo (the old fort), where he met with his supporters. Malcher had a force of 300 men, though they were mostly unarmed and out of munitions. After fortifying the arsenal, and arming his men, Vinagre marched his men to the Mercês plaza and fortified the west side when they were attacked by Malcher’s troops. Discharging shots into the line Vinagre’s supporters were able to force João Pedro Gonçalves Campos (Malcher’s commander) to retreat. By 3 o’clock in the afternoon, Vinagre had invaded the surrounding houses and the military

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56 Raiol, Motins políticos, 2: 573.
57 Ibid., 574.
hospital, cutting his enemy off from the rest of the city. That night, Malcher fled aboard one of the ships docked in Belém’s harbor. He ordered all the ships there to fire upon the city, causing panic in Belém. However, realizing that his men were too depleted to either resist or conquer, Malcher and his advisers decided to enter peace negotiations on the condition that the people would decide who would be president. Malcher and Vinagre agreed to appoint the imprisoned Eduardo Angelim as a mediator, though Malcher held Angelim’s brother, Geraldo, as hostage to prevent Angelim from escaping his imprisonment after the negotiations.  

Vinagre ordered a cease-fire. He called on the authorities of the city to meet at the government palace. Those who gathered declared that the "people and the troops" acclaimed Vinagre president until a replacement could be sent by the Regency. Furthermore, Vinagre would also continue to serve as the Commander of Arms and continue in that position even with the arrival of a new president. Malcher was imprisoned, and during his transport to Barra Fort, Quintiliano Barbosa (who had been imprisoned by Malcher and was able to escape during the confusion of the attack that morning) waited in a small canoe to get his revenge. With a shot to the chest, Barbosa killed Malcher instantly. Estimates indicate that, by then, from 80 to 200 people had been killed in the two days of fighting.

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60 Ibid., 578-579.


63 The American consul estimated that 80 to 100 people were killed. Charles Smith, Consulate of the United States, to John Forsyth, Secretary of State, Pará, February 1835, UFLAC, US foreign dispatch.; John Hesketh, the English representative estimated “no less than 200” were killed; John Hesketh British
After Malcher’s murder, the city was in a state of chaos. Most people refused to come out of their houses, and no one wanted to return the seized weapons to the war arsenal. Vinagre proclaimed that he was acting according to the constitution and that all would be well now that despotism was over in Belém.\footnote{Francisco Pedro Vinagre, President and Commander of Arms of the Province, Government Palace, Belém, 22 February 1835, reprinted in Raiol, Motins políticos, 2:612.} In a published speech, Vinagre also argued that Malcher needed to be deposed because of his anti-constitutional actions, and added that he was overly ambitious and hypocritical, and exercised arbitrary repression of the troops.\footnote{Jornal do Commercio, 25 May 1835, 1.} Vinagre eloquently justified both the actions of the troops against Lobo de Souza and his own mutiny against Malcher. Vinagre blamed Malcher’s poor management for the ultimate failure of his regime and added that he had tried to convince the insurgent president to obey the 1834 constitutional reforms, but Malcher proved dangerously stubborn. In addition, Vinagre promised to allow a new president appointed from Rio to take power, in the interest of preserving the pátria from more violence, as long as he, himself, remained head of the military. He urged that such a measure was necessary in order to restore public tranquility and peace.\footnote{Ibid.}

Rumor spread rapidly throughout the Empire, as many believed the exaltados would encourage similar revolts elsewhere. The newspaper, Echo do norte, in Maranhão, reported that the rebel leaders had allowed Belém to be sacked. The paper further claimed that there was a conspiracy afoot between rebel leaders and the

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Vice Consul to His Excellency Henry Stephen Fox, Esq., Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, Pará, 28 February 1835, in Cleary, Cabanagem: documentos ingleses, 31.
common people, primarily people of color, to assassinate all whites. As the violence and political instability spread from the provincial capital into the *sertão* (backlands) in 1835, reports became more fanatical in their representation of the rebels. An article in the *Aurora Fluminense* (foremost newspaper of the governing moderados in Rio) proclaimed:

Pará seems reduced to barbarism, it seems that its inhabitants have reverted into the original ferocious tribes of Indians . . . only a little freedom excites their natural ferociousness . . . unhappy Pará, the government will not forget you . . . these miserable people will not have to suffer the intrigues of barbarians who have conquered the city for long. The government will not show indifference in the face of the cruelty committed against our officials.

The new rebel leader, Francisco Vinagre, was vilified. He was the subject of a scathing biographical sketch which painted him as a “famous criminal” (*criminosa celebridade*). The author argued that members of his family were “brancos pobres” (poor whites), saying that no amount of education could civilize the leader as he read and wrote so poorly in his mid-thirties. Vinagre was, indeed, far from being a member of the provincial elite. However, he had inspired enough of a following to begin his political career in the 1828 deputy elections. He truly emerged as a leader, however, after a stint as an officer in the National Guard, which explains his later connection to the rank and file of the army. To observers in Rio, however, Malcher, a landowner, seemed preferable to the upstart Vinagre. Though Malcher was more cruel, class status

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69 “Noticia biographica sobre Vinagre,” *Jornal do Commercio*, 29 June 1835, 1.

apparently smoothed over his violence; he was considered more honorable than
Vinagre, whom Rio’s prestigious *Jornal do Commercio* described as an "obscure man
without talent, education, virtues, a simple fanatic of a rebellious nature." 71

Foreigners joined moderados in their concern. On receiving the news from Pará,
British Minister Stephen Fox wrote from Rio to London of the difficulties the Regency
was experiencing, stating that "the present position of the monarchy in Brazil is. . .
excessively precarious." 72 Indeed, in the diplomat's mind there was a direct connection
between the events in Pará and the moderados’ position in Rio. He confided that the
imperial government made a show of attempting to recover their authority over the rebel
province, yet was unable to provide a significant force to assure for victory. Fox went on
to say, "the present unsettled state of the Regency, and of the administration and the
extraordinary weakness which they exhibit; together with the violent progress of the
federal spirit all over the Empire; render the [moderados’] success. . . extremely
uncertain." Fox noted that the imperial government even issued an antedated decree,
after news of the rebellion arrived, dismissing the appointed President Lobo de Souza
before his murder, presumably to undercut the perception of a public attack on the
imperial delegate. 73

Despite such opposition, Vinagre attempted to control the province
constitutionally. He sent Rio accounts of his treasury as well as the names of those
officials that he had appointed to provincial positions. On 1 April, he divided Belém’s

71 "Noticia biographica sobre Vinagre," *Jornal do Commercio*, 29 June 1835, 1.
73 Ibid.
National Guard unit into three companies, appointing Eduardo Angelim and his own brother, Antônio Vinagre, as commanders. 74 On 7 April 1835, the first election of provincial deputies was held under cabano rule. The election conformed to the procedures outlined in the 1834 Additional Act. Interestingly, the electoral results reflected the influence of exaltado priests in the leadership among the cabanos, an element which provided them legitimacy. Indeed, according to the 1834 Additional Act, the province of Pará had a twenty-eight-member legislative assembly; of those elected twelve were members of the clergy. 75 The electoral results reflected the post-Jesuit traditional power structure of Amazonia, in which many priests controlled economically successful aldeias, making them powerful community leaders. 76 Indeed, at the time, the indigenous peoples that made up a majority of the cabano troops viewed priests as traditional powerbrokers. This, in turn, points to other provincial peculiarities. For example, Pará lacked a powerful local landowning upper class, such as the fluminense planter elite of Rio de Janeiro. Instead, merchants, mostly the foreigners who would ultimately be deposed by the cabanos, were the traditional elite of Belém. 77 In the

74 Jornal do Commercio, 26 October 1835, 1. In fact, the cabano government functioned like the one before it; from January to the retaking of Belém in August 1835, the records available in the APEP show little change. Magda Ricci found records of slaves registering their purchase of freedom as one example of the continued normalcy of government proceedings. See Magda Ricci, "Cabanos, patriotismo e identidades: outras histórias de uma revolução," in Keila Grinberg and Ricardo Salles, orgs., O Brasil Imperial, 1831-70 (Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 2009), 209.

75 “A Assembleia Legislativa Provincial 1835,” in Feitosa, Fundamentos, 35.

76 Aldeias were Indian villages created by Jesuit missionaries who sought to convert them to Christianity through permanent settlement. See Moreira Neto, Índios da Amazônia. Barbara Sommers, “Negotiated Settlements: Native Amazonians and Portuguese Policy in Pará, Brazil 1758-1798” (Unpub. Ph.D. Dissertation, University of New Mexico, 2000).

77 While there were cacao and sugar plantations near Belém they were less economically successful than in provinces like Pernambuco and Bahia. The merchant class of Belém held most of the power, and Brazilian land owners saw them as the primary obstacle and rivals to their own ascendancy. The landed elite did hold some positions of power on the municipal councils and in the military, two institutions under attack during the Regency period. On the landed elite in the areas surrounding Belém see: Torre Cueva,
absence of an established, Brazilian local ruling class, the priests had significant influence. In turn, electoral support for prominent men of the cloth lent credibility to the cabano regime.

Vinagre’s emphasis on the legality of his administration revealed his desire for Pará to remain a part of the nation, despite many assertions in the historiography that the Cabanagem represented a secessionist movement. In truth, cabano leaders were motivated by a desire for a redistribution of provincial political power (from Portuguese merchants to the emergent native Brazilian elite), rather than a complete break from Brazil or an attack upon the whole social order. Indeed, Vinagre’s concern with constitutional legitimacy resulted from his attempt not only to secure the legal presidency for himself, but also from a desire to control political dissent within the province. During the struggle between Malcher and Vinagre, a desperate Malcher offered his supporters three days of plunder in the city. British Captain George Daniell heard of the intended rampage and directed his vessel up river. Happily, after his victory, Vinagre refused to allow the plundering of any foreign property, at some risk. Indeed, Daniell worried that Vinagre’s “influence with his party had been much lessened


78 The Jornal do Commercio published two official statements from Francisco Vinagre, dated April 18 and 19, in which he swore allegiance to the “order of the Regency in the name of the Emperor Dom Pedro II, whom the paraenses adore.” Jornal do Commercio, 27 August 1835, 1.

79 Reis details a troop insubordination in Rio Negro in April 1831, which was brutally repressed by Belém. Additionally, the Act of 25 June1833 divided the province into three districts, which denied Rio Negro its traditional autonomy and elevated the still small village of Barra (now Manaus) to the district capital. When cabano violence erupted in the city, the câmara of Barra agreed to resist in support of the constitution. Many of the elite in Barra wanted to separate from the province of Pará and form their own province. See: Reis, História de Amazonas, 149-153.
by his refusal to sanction the plunder of the town,” and concluded that “it is very doubtful that in the event of any popular commotion he would be able to afford…protection.”

Despite these efforts, in Rio, the moderados’ most influential journal, the Aurora Fluminense, called Vinagre the "usurper President of Pará" who had maintained order only with the support of the rebellious paraense National Guard. The paper responded to Vinagre’s claims of popular support by saying that he was "elevated by the ruin of many families," and argued that though he spoke about the glory of the pátria, the reality looked more like disorder and anarchy. The paper’s commentator asked "who is more anarchist than he?" Pará was identified with “ferocity,” “brutality,” and “ignorance.” The article added that events in the province of Pará insulted the honor of the Brazilian nation. The violent example in the distant province compromised the nation's credibility with foreign nations as well as Brazil's internal prosperity.

The moderado response to such provincial disorder actually preceded such opinion. The first waves of government troops, sent to Belém on 10 April, were sent by the order of Antonio Pedro da Costa Ferreira, President of Maranhão, under the command of Lieutenant Captain Pedro da Cunha. The president, though it stretched his own jurisdiction and constitutionality, decided to send a force to help support the return of public order and "insure Pará abides by the laws of the Empire and is in submission to the constitutional authorities." In Belém, growing mistrust between the rebel leaders

80 Ibid.
81 Aurora Fluminense, 27 June 1835, 1.
82 Ibid.
83 President Antônio Pedro da Costa Ferreira, Government Palace of Maranhão, 10 April 1835, reprinted in Raiol, Motins políticos, 2: 630.
and Brazilian ship commanders in the port strengthened Pedro da Cunha’s position. Vinagre had sent orders to replace all the commanders and to disarm the warships under the pretext of a law from the Minister of the Navy. The commanders had then called a meeting aboard the Defensora and had decided to resist these orders, which they did until the arrival of Pedro da Cunha. Upon his arrival, Pedro da Cunha notified Vinagre that he was there to enforce the laws of the Empire. Vinagre responded the same day arguing that he was loyal to the Regency and that the captain was the one who was overstepping his legal bounds. In fact, Pedro da Cunha’s arrival under the order of the imperial president of Maranhão served to reignite the old provincial rivalry between Maranhão and Pará. Fear and mistrust ran high. On land, the rebels, under Eduardo Angelim’s supervision, began to fortify the Castelo and amass weapons.

In April 1835, elections for the vice president of the province elevated Ângelo Custódio Corrêa to a position of regional prominence. Contrary to the provincial president, the vice president was elected by the provincial câmaras (town councils). Moreover, constitutionally, he was the successor to Lobo de Souza until a new

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84 The officers thought that the force from Maranhão sought to “tranquilize the province and reestablish the lawful Empire.” They agreed that “this satisfying news is [highly] anticipated by the good people of the province who respect the laws, and desire to see an end of the horrors.” They also chided President Vinagre for not stepping down as he had promised. See: “Act of the officers’ council of the armada,” Defensora, 31 March 1835, reprinted in Raiol, Motins políticos, 2: 632.

85 Pedro da Cunha even complimented Vinagre on staving off anarchy and hoped that he would prove cooperative with “legal” forces. See: Pedro da Cunha, commander of maritime forces, to Francisco Vinagre, Belém, 18 April 1835, reprinted in Raiol, Motins políticos, 2: 635. Vinagre responded, “I have to ask of your excellency if you are stationed in the province with that force by order of the Regency in the name of our Emperor Dom Pedro II, who the paraenses love, respect, and obey . . . for sometimes official letters from the central government to Pará are arbitrarily usurped . . . by the government of Maranhão.” Francisco Vinagre to Pedro da Cunha, Belém, 18 April 1835, reprinted in Ibid.

86 Raiol, Motins políticos, 2: 633.

87 The results of the election were published in the Jornal do Commercio. The election was held in Cametá, according to the paper. “Lista dos Cidadãos que obiterão maioria de votos para Deputados Províncias,” Jornal do Commercio, 27 August 1835, 1.
president could be nominated by the imperial government. Pedro da Cunha wrote to Corrêa congratulating him on his victory and asking him to take his rightful place and return the province to the rule of law. Upon receiving news of the election, Vinagre boarded a frigate and declared that he was ready to resign his authority. Immediately, a boat was dispatched to convey Corrêa from Cametá to Belém. However, despite his apparent acquiescence, Vinagre plotted resistance against da Cunha and Corrêa. After he agreed to resign the presidency, Vinagre ordered his followers to steal weapons from an English customs house. He later used the pilfered weapons to “arm the Indians who were drawn together by hopes of plunder.” As rumors spread throughout the city, residents tried to seek refuge aboard the ships moored in port. Vinagre confronted Pedro da Cunha about this 'evacuation.' Da Cunha responded that he was not soliciting them to join, "it is simply a love of legality that makes them come." Fearful paraenses fled to the ships to escape the seemingly inevitable return of hostilities. The rebels set up armed canoes to keep people from escaping. Da Cunha ordered all the ships under his command to be ready to fire at the city at his signal.

As the cabanos prepared to defend the capital, the municipal chamber of Cametá met to discuss letters from Pedro da Cunha offering leadership in restoring order to the province. The chamber decided to request arms and a warship to remain in the city’s vicinity.

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88 Captain George Daniell, Commander HMS Dispatch, to Captain Charles B. Strong, HMS Belvidera, Senior Officer, HMS Dispatch at anchor off Pará, March 20, 1835 in Cleary, Cabanagem: documentos ingleses, 38.
89 Ibid., 41.
port to keep "the anarchists" at bay.91 Pedro da Cunha responded by saying he would send the warship *Mundurucu* to protect the vice-president, and citizens should be armed and prepared to march.92 This spread the rumor that Cametá was ready to threaten the capital, since they had already tried to arm people against the cabanos. The Cametá chamber responded to rumors with a provocative tone, offering "thanks to the dignity of the cametaenses, who, informed of the apparition on our borders of blood drinking hordes, prepared to march immediately upon us, have decided to teach them to respect the courage of our forces."93

Thus, aware of Vinagre's plans to resist in Belém, da Cunha sent ships to Cametá to protect Corrêa from attack. He also warned Corrêa that Belém was in the hands of "a vile band of assassins and evil-doers, who are always at the ready to fight."94 Corrêa arrived in Belém escorted by the frigate *Imperatriz* on 9 May. He brought with him only some two hundred poorly armed legalist supporters as he prepared to assume control of the city. Vinagre sent two heavily armed boats to intercept and assassinate the vice president. A skirmish between the vessels ensued, but the *Imperatriz* successfully arrived in Belém’s harbor. Vinagre invited the vice president to come to the government palace and take his position but Corrêa wisely stated that he would refuse until the rebels disarmed. Vinagre then became openly disobedient. He


refused to resign his position and claimed that he was the legal representative of the Regency. In response, Corrêa attempted to land and take the center of the city. The attempt was a failure. The rebels and legal forces exchanged shots for a few hours, until the legalists believed that the Castelo had been abandoned. As they tried to land, the rebels fired on their ships and forced them to retreat. This created mass confusion as the legalists rushed for the boats on the beach. Many of them were killed and some were taken prisoner by the rebels. The few legalist troops left on land were quickly felled by the cabano army, reportedly with “considerable slaughter.”

The events in Belém inspired scorn for the imperial government from a number of different quarters. Antonio Pedro da Costa Ferreira, President of Maranhão, reported that many imperial troops deserted. He warned that “barbarians now dominated the city.” The Jornal do Commercio criticized the Chamber of Deputies in Rio de Janeiro for its “poor energy and dangerous intrigues” in its dealings with Pará. The Commander of the Brazilian Navy in Pará, British mercenary John Taylor, attributed the loss of Belém to insufficiencies in troops and weaponry. In each of three concurrent

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95 “Participação do commandante da fragata Imperatriz ao president do Maranhão,” Jornal do Commercio, 26 August 1835, 1-2.; Charles Smith, Consulate of the United States, Pará, to John Forsyth, Belém, 6 June 1835 contains a translated letter from Corrêa which also outlines events, UFLAC, US foreign dispatch.

96 John Hesketh, British Vice Consul, Pará to Henry Stephen Fox, Esq., Belém, 1 July 1835 in Cleary, Cabanagem: documentos ingleses, 35.

97 “Participação do commandante da fragata Imperatriz ao president do Maranhão,” Jornal do Commercio, 26 August 1835, 1.

98 Ibid., 2.
dispatches, he requested more manpower, arguing that he was not able “to help the miserable inhabitants of the places where there are still hoards of cannibals.”

Imperial forces abandoned the city and made camp on Tatuoca Island, near the harbor in Belém, while they awaited reinforcements. Corrêa ordered da Cunha back to Maranhão, and returned to Cametá, indignantly informing Rio that he retreated only to save Brazilian lives. Cametá declared itself the new legal capital of the province. In Belém, residents were still fearful. Vinagre only nominally held Belém. Mob violence increased and many of his subordinates resented the fact that he restricted their right to plunder and loot the city. Some even called for Vinagre’s head. Additionally, food was scarce, as merchants refused to leave their homes to bring their products to market. Copper coins, which were easily counterfeited, had resurfaced and Vinagre had to ban their use, causing more panic. British residents of Belém worried about the “determination of the mob to assassinate the person at the head of affairs . . . their intention being to get rid of every obstacle in the way of the plunder and the murder of the white inhabitants.”

Reinforcements from Rio finally arrived. On 19 June, John Taylor led an expedition of five vessels. On board was the appointed provincial president, Marshal

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99 Jornal de Commercio 24 September 1835, 1. (articles dated July 5, 7, and 12), 1. Cabanos were often referred to as “barbarians,” “savages,” and “cannibals” by legalist supporters as a way to undermine their political position by referencing their supposed origin as Indians. The rhetoric surrounding cabanos strongly indicates the perception of Rio elites and doubtless helped to justify the brutal repression of the rebellion. Legalist use of such language effectively delegitimised and racialized cabano demands.

100 Correa Oficial do Rio de Janeiro, n. 51, 31 August 1835, reprinted in Raiol, Motins políticos, 2: 692-693.

101 Raiol, Motins políticos, 2: 717-718.

Manuel Jorge Rodrigues, along with six hundred troops gathered from other provinces. The men landed on 25 June, and Vinagre formally offered his resignation, his own authority now seriously challenged by the insubordination of his unruly forces. Rodrigues assumed his post the next day. Vinagre’s followers delivered the forts and military arsenals as well as the cabano guns and ammunition to legalist forces on the twenty-seventh. Foreign representatives hoped that order would be restored to the “hitherto distracted province.”

The British believed Vinagre’s about-face in support of the new president was due to fear “of being sacrificed or sold [out] by his own party.” Vinagre soon became the most passionate advocate of the imperial government in the city. Belém was “restored to tranquility,” though the peace would be short lived. Imperial forces knew that a large party of insurgents had retreated to Acará, an interior town about one hundred kilometers southeast of Belém where the Cabanagem had begun, and that their numbers were growing. In addition, the imperial government remained concerned about Vinagre. Despite his recent compliance and valuable diplomatic skill in negotiating with the cabanos, officials viewed Vinagre with extreme suspicion. Fatally, in late July, Rodrigues ordered Vinagre’s arrest.

Without Vinagre’s moderating presence, cabano flames reignited. Rodrigues also


104 Henry Stephen Fox, British Minster in Rio, to Lord Palmerston, Rio de Janeiro, 26 September 1835, in Cleary, _Cabanagem: documentos ingleses_, 60.

105 _Jornal do Commercio_, 9 September 1835, 2. The paper published three letters from Vinagre dated June 25, July 1, and July 2; each one asks his fellow paraenses to submit to the new president and forget any desire for revenge- whether this is genuine sentiment or written under duress is unclear, but they were originally published in the _Mercantil Paraense_, 5 July 1835 and would have been read by elite cabanos in the province.
attempted to arrest several prominent cabano leaders, including Eduardo Angelim (who managed to escape), charging them with the murder of the former President, Lobo de Souza.\textsuperscript{106} This campaign only served to send more cabanos into the interior and it roused Antônio Vinagre and Eduardo Angelim to action. They took control of the remaining cabanos in the city and moved into the interior to prepare for the reconquest of Belém.

The rebels under Antonio Vinagre occupied Acará, Capim, Guama (and all the offshoot rivers) and the fazenda Taboca in Moju, where Vinagre established his headquarters. Angelim centered himself in Conde (near Marajó) and had Beja, Barcarena, Muana under his control. Tatuia, Caraparu, Guajara, Ourem, Benfica, Colares were also occupied by the rebels.\textsuperscript{107} Issuing an angry and impassioned plea, Angelim urged his followers to Belém:

Paraenses! All of the laws of the state have been violated; the constitution of the Empire had been crushed underfoot by this Marshal with the title of legal President; ingrate foreigners provoke our self-respect, usurp the police of the city, and the government of our land! . . . I invite the good paraenses, the dignified sons of Pará, with all speed, to take up arms, to abandon your farms, and your families, and your homes; well known for your honor and dignity, run my patriots, fly if it were possible to join me in the heart of the capital to liberate our pátria from the yoke that oppresses it and to punish the cowards, who challenge our self-respect, throwing down the gauntlet! What audacity! The paraense who will not aid in the reclaiming of the pátria will be called a traitor and a vile coward. Dear patriots, we will defend the dignity of the province.\textsuperscript{108}

\textsuperscript{106} Jornal do Commercio, 30 October 1835, 2.

\textsuperscript{107} Raiol, Motins Políticos, 3: 814.

Rodrigues sent a desperate letter to the British consul in Pará, John Hesketh, soliciting British military assistance “to unite with the National Forces in repelling the threatened attack of insurgents upon this city.”

The President argued that the movement had grown by recruiting black slaves of the province under the pretext of offering them liberty. The specter of *Haitainismo* remained palpable forty years after the great Caribbean slave revolt and Rodrigues attempted to take full advantage of British fears. The recent Malê rebellion in Bahia also intensified fears of slave revolt among both the British and the Brazilian elite. The growing number of reactionaries across the Empire looked to Pará as another example of the need for authoritarian government to control the large repressed or enslaved colored population.

John Taylor, the mercenary naval commander in Pará, warned that “the war had taken a more serious character, not due to the passions of rebellion or political principals, [but that] its only goal is to end the whites (*casta branca*) of Pará.” He echoed other commentators’ racialized fears “the revolution of Pará, in addition to the others, has not been appreciated…if Pará is lost to Brazil, America will have on its continent a new Haiti.” A letter from Pará warned Rio that “the slaves have already started to rebel,

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112 “Os cabanos,” *Jornal do Commercio*, 10 October 1835, 1.

113 João Taylor, Commander of Naval forces to Minister of the Navy José Pereira Pinto, Belém’s Harbor, 18 August 1835 in *Jornal do Commercio*, 29 October 1835, 1.

114 Ibid.
and the cabanos are adding them to their forces…the cabanos have lost all idea of virtue and are more barborous than savages.”

Fear and rumors quickly spread throughout Pará. The flames of violence and revenge engulfed many areas. In August, word spread about a massacre in the town of Vigia, where, reportedly, nearly seventy whites were indiscriminately killed. The news sent shockwaves through the city of Belém. Soon after, on Marajó Island, the same “aggressors of Vigia” committed “atrocities” against the white population. The remaining foreign merchants composed a public protest letter to the imperial government in Rio, complaining of the government’s general inability to protect foreign residents, saying that they were “in imminent danger from the machinations of the Indians and coloured [sic] populations and [they requested the] absolute entry [of imperial troops] in immense numbers … [to take] possession of this city.” The foreign merchants feared that “the threats of the insurgents have held out that they will not spare any whites…natives or foreigners.”

In August 1835, a cabano army marched on the city of Belém under Antônio Vinagre and Angelim. Several reports claimed that all the slaves of the Portuguese joined the rebellion after their owners had been murdered, though this is most surely hysteria. On 14 August, the army, approximately 2,000 armed cabanos, began a

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115 “Pará, 9 de Agosto, Carta Particular,” Jornal do Commercio, 2 November 1835, 1.
116 Mercantil Paraense, 30 August 1835 reported that “adults and children where indiscriminately killed.” Reprinted in the Jornal do Commercio, 30 October 1835, 1
117 Ibid.
118 Copy signed by Hugh Goodais, Henry Dickenson, A. Campbell, James Campbell, B F Corbett, and John Hesketh in Cleary, Cabanagem: documentos ingleses, 55.
119 Copy of a letter from an observer (name unclear), Belém, 12 May 1835 in Cleary, Cabanagem: documentos ingleses, 57-59. This contention is highly unlikely. There is documentary evidence that many
brutal struggle against a small legalist force of 700, which was mostly composed of volunteer civilians or people pressed into service. After nine days of street fighting, President Rodrigues fled aboard a Brazilian warship, taking with him 5,000 people. Antônio Vinagre was killed in the fighting, but Angelim survived and was proclaimed president of the province. Observers reported that “there [was] reason to fear that every white inhabitant native or foreign, who could not escape [would be] put to death.”

Following the cabano victory, John Taylor reported a city in ruins, with the best houses smoldering in rubble. Rumors about the rebels and their brutality quickly circulated throughout the Empire. These rumors often shaped future historiographic interpretations of the rebellion. According to one commentator, the army, “or rather the troop of savages” was chiefly Indian, black, “or various cross breeds between Indians and Negros… [who were] among the most worthless of the varieties of the human species.” The prospect of any sort of government or “civilization” seemed the most

slaves did not join the movement at all and stayed working for their senhores. The majority of the slaves who did join did so at the behest of their masters. Magda Ricci points to lavrador (farm hand/laborer) Antônio Pereira Lima, who argued before a tribunal that he was not and had never been a rebel, citing his slaves’ lack of participation as proof. In fact, slavery seemed to operate normally, at least under early cabano rule. Slaves are listed in the records as buying their freedom under cabano control, operating in the normal manner to purchase one’s freedom. Ricci found twenty-seven such slaves, listed in the early months of 1835, who went through normal channels to freedom. Magda Ricci, “Do patriotismo à revolução,” 245-246.

120 Jornal do Commercio, 29 October 1835, 2; Charles Smith, Consul of the United States, Pará to John Forsyth, Belém, 19 September 1835, UFLAC, US foreign dispatch.

121 Henry Stephen Fox, British Minister in Rio to Lord Palmerston, Rio de Janeiro, 10 November 1835 in Cleary, Cabanagem: documentos ingleses, 63.

122 Jornal do Commercio, 29 October 1835, 2.

123 Henry Stephen Fox, British Minister in Rio to Lord Palmerston, Rio de Janeiro, 10 November 1835 in Cleary, Cabanagem: documentos ingleses, 64. From prisoner lists and other accounts it is clear that the cabanos were composed of all colors and social classes, including some foreigners. The racialized sensationalism of the legal forces, most likely to legitimize their own immediate losses and, then, the brutal repression, fundamentally influenced the way the Cabanagem is remembered to this day. See Magda Ricci, "Cabanos, patriotismo e identidades."
remote possibility to Stephen Fox, the British Minister in Rio. Fox considered the cabanos to be “much less advanced towards civilization than the blacks of Santo Domingo.” He feared that the loss of Pará would provide a devastating example for other provinces in the Empire. Fox believed that, considering the potential for widespread provincial violence, the Brazilian nation faced a disastrous struggle for national integrity if the cabanos were not stopped quickly. To Fox, the Regency clearly demonstrated Brazil’s inability to protect both its citizens and foreign nationals.

Brazilian observers agreed with the British minister. A letter to the Jornal do Commercio argued that “if the infestation of the areas close to the city [is not stopped], if Tocantins and Amazonas fall to the [cabanos], Brazil will lose Pará.” A Pernambucan author feared renewed cabano violence in his own province, and warned that the imperial government would have to act quickly to protect its citizens. The problems of Pará served to push political agendas on all fronts. The Aurora Fluminense decried the journalists who blamed the moderados for the cabanos. Instead, the paper argued that the exaltados were to blame, and that in fact only moderado leadership, specifically the election of Diogo Antônio Feijó as sole regent, would solve the problems of the Empire. According to the moderado commentator, the cabano example continued to

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124 Henry Stephen Fox, British Minister in Rio to Lord Palmerston, Rio de Janeiro, 10 November 1835 in Cleary, Cabanagem: documentos ingleses, 64. John Taylor, leader of the naval battle in Pará, made a similar reference and argued that the revolution, if not stopped quickly, would give the Americas a new Haiti, see Jornal do Commercio, 29 October 1835, 2.

125 Henry Stephen Fox, British Minister in Rio to Lord Palmerston, Rio de Janeiro, 10 November 1835 in Cleary, Cabanagem: documentos ingleses, 64.

126 “Carta Particular,” Jornal do Commercio 11 November 1835, 2.

127 O Velho Pernambuco, 13 November 1835 reprinted in Jornal do Commercio 27 November 1835, 2.

128 Aurora Fluminense, 1 April 1835, 1.
spread rapidly, noting that the recent political disturbances in Ceará "brought forth the memory of the melancholy events of Pará; if it follows the same line . . . another Province [will be lost] to catastrophe." The article argued that only further liberal reforms could save the Empire. However, as it turned out, once elected sole Regent later that year, Feijó would prove unable to deal with the political crisis that engulfed the provinces. In fact, his election would be the last of the liberal victories during the Regency.  

As a last resort, the Brazilian Navy under the command of John Taylor implemented a naval blockade of the city of Belém. One observer feared that the blockade would do nothing to discourage the cabanos, as they were uncivilized and had no want for trade goods. All they had to do was to go into the forest for their every necessity. The blockade continued throughout the next year, though its effects are difficult to judge. French traders on the Island of Marajó and American merchants in Marapanim, a coastal area north of Belém, frequently broke the blockade to engage in contraband trade. Such transgressions demonstrated the willingness of foreign merchants to disregard the wishes of the weakened Brazilian government.

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129 *Aurora Fluminense*, 3 August 1835, 1.

130 Bethell and Carvalho, "1822-1850," 65.

131 *Jornal do Commercio* 29 October 1835, 2.

132 Henry Stephen Fox, British Minister in Rio to Lord Palmerston, Rio de Janeiro, 10 November 1835 in Cleary, *Cabanagem: documentos ingleses*, 64.

133 Captain Sir James Everard Home, Bart to Sir George Cokburn, Vice Admiral, CinC West India Station, 20 December 1835, in Cleary, *Cabanagem: documentos ingleses*, 70.; For the French illegal trade with the Island of Marajó, see John Hesketh, English Consul at Pará to Mal Francisco Jose de Souza Soares d’Andrea, President of Pará, Belém, 9 December 1836, in Cleary, *Cabanagem:documentos ingleses*, 125.
In addition to the struggle for Belém, imperial forces and their supporters clashed with the cabanos in a series of battles to control other paraense towns. By late October 1835, President Rodrigues knew he could not defeat the cabanos, so he attempted to harness the traditional antipathies that the elite in the interior felt toward Belém. Rodrigues focused his attention on Marajó Island and the town of Cametá as the two centers of his campaign to regain control over the province. He found an ally in one of the justices of the peace in Cametá, Father Prudêncio José das Merces Tavares, who successfully urged fellow cametaenses to defend the pátria at all costs.¹³⁴ Father Prudêncio convinced the city to oppose the rebels in Belém. In all but name he quickly became a virtual dictator of the city and its hinterland. The vice president relied on his advice, giving him a free hand to preserve "public order." He maintained strict discipline (even going so far as to imprison his own brother) and had the city guarded at every possible ambush point.¹³⁵ He made sure that every house had lights lit for easier patrolling, banned the sale of gunpowder, and cleared the streets and the surrounding forests of hiding places.¹³⁶ Prudêncio banned the movement of slaves without written permission, the assembly of people without prior approval, the firing of pistols and pushed for any other "measure judged to be advantageous for the conservation of order."¹³⁷ He urged cametaenses to continue the fight for "the salvation of our province,

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¹³⁴ Jornal do Commercio 20 February 1836, 1.
¹³⁵ Raiol, Motins Políticos, 2: 704-710.
¹³⁷ Prudêncio José das Merces Tavares, “Edital,” Cametá, 6 June 1835, reprinted in Raiol, Motins políticos, 2: 709-710.
submerged in the final abyss by a gang of thieves and assassins." "Cametaenses," he proclaimed:

The black stench and carnage of tyranny . . . has darkened our capital . . . one thousand victims have been sacrificed to the furor of these tigers and panthers thirsty for human blood . . . the only remedy for these ills is our bravery, valor, and patriotism.¹³⁸

Rodrigues also attempted to rouse the sympathies of the slaveholding elite by declaring that "the spirit of rebellion manifested itself among people of color and Indians in the interior," and throughout the province its development was spreading.¹³⁹

Small towns, loyal to the legal forces, faced many challenges. Many lacked weapons and soldiers. The village of Bujaru, down river from Belém suffered from the blockade of the city. As the curate of Bujaru noted in a letter to President Rodrigues, "we have strong and determined men, but they do not have arms or munitions." He feared that the rebels would easily overrun them despite their "courage and commitment."¹⁴⁰ In sum, the weakened central government of the Regency could not provide enough troops to defeat the regional rebellion. The resulting local stalemate between Rodrigues and the cabanos eventually drew the entire province into a vicious civil war, in which the fighting became increasingly brutal and undisciplined.¹⁴¹ It seemed, for example, that Angelim had lost all control over the cabano rank and file.¹⁴²

¹³⁹ Ibid.
¹⁴⁰ Vigário José Gonçalves Chaves to President Rodrigues, Bujaru, 1 March 1836, APEP, código 854, correspondências de diversos com o governo, 1827-1838, document 98.
¹⁴¹ Jornal do Commercio, 22 April 1836, 1.
¹⁴² The report stated “[T]he rebels had been fighting much among themselves and that a great number had been killed.” Charles Smith, Consul of the United States, Pará to John Forsyth, Belém, 7 August 1835, UFLAC, US foreign dispatch.
Though he fortified the city of Belém, he had little influence over the caboclos, runaway slaves, and Indians in the interior, or as one observer put it, “the hoard of savages who committed the majority of the barbarities.”

A prominent example of Angelim’s lack of control over cabano supporters in the interior territories involved the capture and murder of the crew of a British ship, the *Clio*. The death of British citizens compelled the British government to dispatch Captain Charles Strong from Barbados to Brazil. Upon arriving, Strong decided to conduct his own investigation into the events. The Captain went to the towns of Vigia, Salinas, and Cintra, within territories nominally controlled by the cabanos. Alexander Paton, an eyewitness and the attack’s only survivor, identified the men responsible, but punishing the offenders proved difficult. Angelim promised to bring the guilty parties to justice, but he was unable to convince local leaders to submit the guilty to his authority. British patience ran out. Lord Palmerston wrote to the Brazilian cabinet, stating, “if a government is too weak to cause its own authority to be respected in its own territory, and by its own people, it must not be surprised that foreign powers should take it upon themselves to redress wrongs which may be inflicted on their subjects.”

Captain Strong wrote similar letters to Angelim and Rodrigues asking for assistance in the capture of those responsible. Angelim responded that Pará did not “exist dismembered

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144 Sir George Cockburn, Vice Admiral to Captain Charles B. Strong, HMS *Belvidera*, Bermuda, 30 April 1836, in Cleary, *Cabanagem: documentos ingleses*, 86.

145 Lord Palmerston to M. Galvão Brazilian Minister in Rio [sic], Rio de Janeiro, 26 April 1835, in Cleary, *Cabanagem: documentos ingleses*, 85. There is an error in Cleary’s attribution. Galvão was a minister of Empire only in 1839-40. The likely intended recipient in 26 April 1835 was Antônio Pinto Chichorro da Gama, Minister of Empire, or Aureliano de Sousa e Oliveira Coutinho, interim Minister of Foreign Affairs.
from the Empire.” It is possible that Angelim feared that the British would seek reparations for the loss of life and property, and he pronounced his subservience to the Brazilian Empire to deflect such inquiries toward the national treasury and away from his unstable regional government.

Angelim had problems controlling mob violence within the city, as well. One of his militia officers, Joaquim Antônio, favored the immediate abolition of slavery. When Angelim refused to meet his demands, Joaquim Antônio led an armed band intent on killing slave owners and freeing slaves. Angelim executed him and brutally punished all members of the mutinous band that he could identify. David Cleary argued that Angelim’s reaction represented an attempt to placate slaveholders, and as such proved the continuing influence of the elite during the Cabanagem. Just as likely, perhaps, the cabano leader viewed the officer’s revolt as an intolerable usurpation of his own fragile power. In order to keep some semblance of order within the city, and to guard his own position of authority, Angelim used extreme measures to punish the insubordinate officer.

Desperate for military aid, the embattled Regent, Feijó, requested a confidential meeting with the British, Portuguese, and French consuls. He asked that foreign ships assemble in Pará “as if by accident” with troops ready for service. Feijó hoped the envoys would keep the meeting confidential, as his request directly violated the Brazilian constitution. Increasingly unpopular due to his inability to put down

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146 Eduardo Francisco Nogueira Angelim to Captain Charles B. Strong, HMS Belvidera, Belém, 18 March 1836, in Cleary Cabanagem: documentos ingleses, 96.

147 Cleary, “Lost Altogether to the Civilised World,” 124.

rebellions in many different provinces, yet hemmed in by his own party’s commitment to devolution of power to those provinces, Feijó had no other option than to secretly solicit aid from powerful foreign allies. All three foreign representatives refused to lend support to the Regent, citing transgressions of Brazilian law as their primary reason, though they may have also harbored other motives. Each country’s representative expressed a desire to remain neutral enough to trade with Pará should the cabanos prove successful in wrestling regional autonomy from the weakened Regency. Speaking on behalf of Britain, Lord Palmerston expressed his doubts about the competence of the imperial government when he declared that “the lamentably disorganized state of a large portion of Brazil can hardly be exaggerated.” He continued his scathing critique by proclaiming that “there is no doubt … that the measures of the government were dilatory, inefficient, and marked by want of energy and foresight.”

With no options remaining, the government in Rio responded to President Rodrigues’s desperation and finally dispatched the greatest force to date against the cabanos, under the leadership of Marshal Francisco José Soares de Andréa. Andréa was a Portuguese officer who had come to Brazil with the royal court in 1808 and stayed on after independence. He had fought against insurgents in Pernambuco and Santa Catarina, and he would later be sent to fight the rebels in Rio Grande do Sul. In effect, Andréa was acquiring a specialty in the repression of some of the most threatening provincial uprisings. Due to distance and slow travel, it would be months

149 Lord Palmerston to William G. Ouseley, Charge, [location unclear], 9 May 1836 in Cleary, Cabanagem: documentos ingleses, 108.
151 Cleary, "Lost Altogether to the Civilised World," 127.
before Andréa arrived in Belém; he only got there in April 1836. However, he made up for delay with policies of brutal efficiency.

Andréa arrived with a large military force of about 800 men, which joined 500 men drawn from Pernambuco.152 The Bishop of Pará, Dom Romualdo, wrote to the newly arrived president asking for amnesty for his fellow man, and for an end to bloodshed.153 Andréa chose to ignore the Bishop’s request, and instead pursued a merciless policy, refusing amnesty to any rebel or army deserter. Andréa increased the naval blockade and arrested anyone carrying a weapon in the area surrounding Belém. Angelim, who had seen his always fragile position threatened by a lack of munitions, infighting in the city, and civil war in the provinces, sent a plea for amnesty to Andréa. The request was promptly refused. On 12 May, Angelim finally abandoned Belém with about 5,000 followers, leaving behind a population comprised almost exclusively of women.154

General Andréa arrested any remaining rebels in the capital and gave orders to shoot on sight those who resisted. He then proceeded to enforce an unsparing policy of extermination in the province, offering no amnesty to any paraense dressed in cabano style. Andreá burned and brutalized the territory still in rebellion, quickly achieving military supremacy in an area long suffering under civil war and anarchy. The city of Belém would never be threatened again by the cabanos, yet the fighting in the interior continued for many years. Angelim fortified himself in Luzeia, deep in the interior just

152 Ibid.
153 Bishop Dom Romualdo to President Andréa, Belém, 29 April 1836, APEP, códices 854, correspondências de diversos com o governo, 1827-1838, document 100.
east of Manaus, with several of his followers. Slaves and other rebels of color had joined cabano ranks. Many feared extreme reprisal for their action, and undertook a desperate guerrilla campaign to survive. Indeed, even after Angelim was captured in early 1836, cabano resistance continued for years to no avail. Andréa ruthlessly pursued the rebels deeper and deeper into the interior. The nature of the province’s subjugation to imperial rule is the focus of Chapter 4.

Let us sum up the origins and nature of the revolt. After the Imperial government’s loss of political authority when Dom Pedro I abdicated, dissension, warfare, and violence marked the decade of the 1830s. These national political debates resonated in distant Pará and created the opportunity for political dissension and divisions among the provincial elite. The Cabanagem, as much or more than other episodes of regional violence, threatened the integrity of the Brazilian Empire and the established social order of the nation. It helped inspire the reaction against liberal reform in the Regency’s waning years, as well as the centralized, authoritarian policies of which Andréa’s repression is an extreme example.

The Cabanagem was thus part of a larger national context, in which political instability threatened the Empire. Indeed, the imperial government’s inability to control the distant provinces directly influenced the fall of the liberal Regency. As the despairing Regent Feijó lamented:

I am a cardboard regent, a bystander at what is perhaps the burial of Brazil. The anarchy which has been planted has grown and is progressing in the shadow of parliament, it has undermined the edifice, which totter on all sides and falls. Humanity and duty oblige me to greater efforts to see if Pará can be conquered, saving our happy Maranhão from contagion…we lack laws, we lack strength, and we lack the rest!155

155 Quoted and translated in Needell, Order, 62.
The Cabanagem originated over the issue of local governance—the right of the province to choose its own president. It became something else due to those it threatened; it was local elite and foreign opposition to the rebellion, and the fearful press in Rio, that painted cabano rebels as brutal savages bent on the total destruction of the whites of Pará. Regresso leaders, represented by Andréa, used racialized fear to brutally suppress the rebellion and institute a total militarization of the province. More, events like those in Pará were thought by the imperial parliament to lay bare the supposed “backwardness” of the Brazilian people. Liberal ideals of local governance or political inclusion imported from North America or Europe were thought to hold no place in a country with such a population, unready to take on the mantle of citizenship.\textsuperscript{156}

Nor has the historiography improved our understanding dramatically. Following the analysis of historian Domingos Raiol, modern scholars of Brazil have mostly concluded that the Cabanagem was an elite political squabble that quickly descended into race warfare. Even more successful interpretations continue to treat the Cabanagem in isolation, with little concern for how the regional rebellion influenced national politics, and how national pressures reshaped local power relations. Critically, the aftermath of the rebellion is entirely neglected in the scholarship. The two decades following “peace” illuminate the incorporation of some of the nation’s “fragments,” and the suppression of others. I argue in the following chapters that the Cabanagem forced the central government to recognize its lack over of control over its vast northern territory and helped shaped the centralizing policies in the Amazon of the 1840s.

\textsuperscript{156} Barman, Brazil, 189-195.; Needell, Party, 181.; Mosher, Political Struggle, 130-131.
Figure 3-1. City of Belém, 1835. 1- Cathedral, Main Square; 2- Fort; 3- Arsenal. Adapted from Boiteaux, Lucas Alexandre. *Marinha Imperial versus Cabanagem*. Rio de Janeiro: Imp. Naval, 1943., 407.
CHAPTER 4
‘THE DISPOSITION TO CRIME’

The current state of war authorizes [the government] to attack the enemy by any method, until we have utterly destroyed their forces, and because of this I had to rescind the formalities that the law gives to criminals.¹

Acting President and Military Commander, Marshal Francisco José de Sousa Soares Andréa decreed that the constitution of the Empire no longer applied to a province in rebellion. Speaking to the provincial assembly of Pará in 1838, Andréa justified the repressive and brutal measures that had been employed since he arrived in Belém two years previously. Total victory against the rebels was the stated goal of Andréa’s administration and no tactic was too odious for the commander. The repression had lasting consequences for the politically weakest members of society: runaway slave communities, mixed race subsistence farmers and hunters, and indigenous people in the interior. Total militarization of the province, however, served the elite of Belém. It allowed the elite to discipline and control the lower classes. Indeed, the militarization of the province continued well after Andréa’s tenure, though his successors struggled to maintain order and obedience, even with such measures.

At the outset of such policies, Andréa became a virtual dictator, and organized all members of society’s lower ranks into companies, explicitly to "civilize" and teach morality to Amazonians, and to prepare them for "the gifts of the Brazilian Constitution."² This explains the special emphasis on eliminating runaway slave communities and other extra-legal settlements. Such settlements threatened the hierarchical nature of Para’s

¹ President Soares d’Andréa, Discurso, Pará, 2 March 1838, 16, Center for Research Libraries (CRL).
² Andréa, Discurso, 1838, 3.
social order. Andréa emphasized their destruction because they offered an alternative
space for the lower class to escape the repressive and controlling projects he found so
vital for the progress of the province.

In the Empire, such a repressive project was congruent with the times. In Rio, the
politics of the Regency were shifting dramatically. A reactionary party centralized and
consolidated authority, rejecting the liberal debates that had inspired the cabanos during
the beginning of the struggle. This reassertion of central rule, carried forward by new
legislation, became known as *o Regresso* (the Return). It gained traction precisely
because of the decentralizing, liberal failures of the 1830s. In Pará, like-minded leaders,
Andréa and many of those who followed him, attempted to centralize and rationalize the
Amazon, in line with this larger national project. The work companies they would
institute represent another “return” for the Amazon, a return to the forced indigenous
labor regime and “civilizing” project of the Pombaline Directorate.

After successfully retaking of the city of Belém, Andréa proposed an effort not
only to subdue the rebels, but also to police, control, and rebuild the province. Though
appointed by the liberal regent Diogo Antônio Feijó, Andréa thus represented the views
of the coalescing reactionary party. However, unlike many of the Regesso leaders,
Andréa had never subscribed to the liberal ideology of the early Regency period in the
first place.³ Portuguese born, he faced a military trial in 1833 for his restorationist
opinions. Andréa viewed the violent province as just another manifestation of the
disorder that struck the Empire after the confusion of the abdication. He saw the

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Cabanagem as a violent example of reform’s failure in Brazil, and he apparently likened such reforms to the abandonment of a divine, established order. Andréa argued that:

The boastful impudence with which ignorant men flaunt their immorality, lack of religiosity, and profound contempt of . . . the Supreme Being . . . caused the appalling disgraces that occurred in the Province; they were the causes of the evil in the Province of Rio Grande [do Sul]; and they threaten Bahia . . . they threaten the existence of the Brazilian Empire.\(^4\)

The threat that the Empire would collapse justified the extreme measures Andréa used to control Amazonia.

In order to reassert central authority, Andréa divided the province into nine military commands and put officers in complete control of their regions.\(^5\) A similar program existed in Amazonia under previous administrations. The president felled by the cabanos, Lobo de Souza, proposed the creation of a similar military command in Amazonia to control the “public will.” Andréa’s commands exercised broad powers over civil authorities. In many ways these commands were essentially a cover for the punitive actions of regular troops or bands of so-called “patriots.” These groups were often very violent, they attacked quilombos (runaway slave communities), and Indian and tapuio communities.\(^6\) As we shall see, the infamous legalist of the interior during the Cabanagem, Ambrosio Ayres “Bararoá,” participated in this sort of command.\(^7\) These

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\(^{4}\) Andréa, *Discurso*, 1838, 1.

\(^{5}\) Ibid., 24-26.


\(^{7}\) Bararoá acted with complete impunity. He was probably a German, though his exact heritage is unclear. He had success against cabano strongholds in Tapajós, Maués, and the Madeira. Notorious for his ‘systematic massacre’ of the rebel prisoners or people suspected of aiding the rebels, the local people loathed him. He used the Cabanagem as an excuse to persecute various indigenous groups, including the Mundurucus, Maué, and Mura, a practice that eventually caught up with him. The Muras killed him towards the end of the rebellion; see Moreira Neto, *Índios da Amazônia*, 276.
units also intentionally dispersed Indians who were on land considered valuable. Military commanders and the companies reinvigorated colonial methods of labor exploitation, like those practiced under the Pombaline Directorate. Supposedly free Brazilian citizens were forced to serve the state, much as their colonial-era ancestors had done for missionaries and then civil directors. Andréa used the military command to delegate his authority in the province, subverting civil power and authority.  

As part of this, Andréa totally reorganized the military in the province, for he criticized the regular army as having “entered into the philosophy of the times” and thought it could not be trusted. Andréa told the provincial assembly that the regular army “revolted twice a year and were always assaulting and killing their own officers.” A new National Guard replaced the auxiliary troops. He argued that his new National Guard, unlike the more inclusive unit formed under the Additional Act of 1834, would only include officers drawn from “quality citizens.” Recruitment however, remained a pressing issue. There were:

Almost 2,000 men, of which 1,300 are from other provinces, who make up this garrison, but they are not sufficient today nor will they be for very long, to conclude the pacification and sustain the peace, because in the end the extent of this territory is very large and the disposition to crime is almost general. 

In order to fulfill the province's need for military men, Andréa gave his commanders the power to conscript any individual that could bear arms between the ages of fifteen and fifty. Commanders were ordered to areas known to be rebel territory

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9 Andréa, Discurso, 1838, 19-20.

10 Ibid., 19.

11 Ibid., 21.
to enlist anyone unlucky enough to cross their path. Military commanders killed anyone who resisted. Once disarmed, most rebel cabanos were considered deserters and were enlisted into one of the many corps in the province (only the "wicked" were imprisoned). They were then obliged to fight against the rebels. Men were not the only targets; Andréa intended to control all of the lower classes, including women and children. Commanders enlisted all the families in their districts to apprehend vagabonds and "loud women, without occupation who disturb the peace," to make them work for the public good.¹²

Rio allowed the suspension of all constitutional rights in the province for six months after Andréa's arrival in order to suppress the rebellion. The president extended this policy until his departure in 1839.¹³ This measure allowed him to arrest and imprison paraenses without due process for the crimes of resistance, conspiracy, sedition, rebellion or homicide. It also banned all secret societies (like the Masons, many of whom were cabano leaders), and made it legal for Andréa to consider all armed men as rebels, even if they were merely hunting in the woods. This also allowed Andréa to impose the death penalty without approval from Rio for all crimes committed after 6 January 1835 until complete order was restored to the province.¹⁴ Additionally, the Imperial government disbanded the National Guard battalions, instead authorizing

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¹² Raiol, Motins políticos, 3: 986-987. The regions were: Belém, Vigia, Bragança, Marajó, Macapá, Cametá, Gurupá, Santarém, and the Rio Negro.

¹³ Raiol, Motins políticos, 3: 937. The rights are those mentioned in art. 179, sec 6,7,8,9,10 of the Imperial constitution.

¹⁴ "Decree of 4 November 1835," Collecção das Leis da Provincia do Gram Para (Pará: Typ. de Santos & filhos, 1840), APEP.
the president to arm 600 citizens, organizing them as he saw fit. Arguing in front of the first provincial legislative assembly in 1838, Andréa justified his continued use of extreme measures, noting that the Minister of Justice had authorized another year of the suspension of rights, even though the policy had informally been in place for the past two years. Andréa told the gathered officials that they would not have:

[M]ade it to this day, without continuation of the law, because it was not possible in six months to try or execute all of the rebels in the province, what is more, we are not able to say that . . . these very factious people, encouraged by the results of their crimes would have stopped inciting new ones, to satiate their souls, which have every malady.

While Andréa's claim that he could not have stopped the rebels in six months is probable, the suspension of constitutional rights and brutal repression in fact encouraged further rebellion, as desperate rebels fled deeper into the interior. In many ways, Andréa's repression only made the rebellion last longer. Offers of amnesty, common for rebellions of the time, would have most likely brought the rebellion to an earlier end. Moreover, continued warfare gave slaves the opportunity to escape. Further, many rebels joined existing quilombos as the violence spread into the interior.

**War in the interior**

As we have seen, before Andréa’s arrival, fighting between cabanos and legalists erupted in the Amazonian interior. While Marshal Manuel Jorge Rodrigues awaited reinforcements on Tatuoca Island in the mouth of the Amazon and Angelim’s tenuous support eroded in Belém, an independent legalist movement opposing cabanos in the interior began to take shape centered in the Alto Amazon. Desiring their own

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independence, the elite of Barra (Manaus) in opposition to the cabanos, associated with Belém and the lower Amazon. The first battle between legalist *amazonenses* and cabano forces took place in the final months of 1835 at Ecuipiranga, close to the Tapajós River. Ambrosio Ayers, known as Bararoá, became a leader in the interior fight against the cabanos for control of the Rio Negro.\(^{17}\) Ayers, rumored to be either an ex-soldier from Lima or a German mercenary, was known for his cruelty. Additionally, a group of Mura living in aldeias around Luzeia, who fought for the legalists, made significant inroads into cabano territory and protected families fleeing the cabanos.\(^{18}\)

The fighting on both sides became increasingly brutal and vindictive in nature. In one example, Father Francisco Martins led an attack against the rebels in Itaboca, an interior area about 500 kilometers south of Belém near Marabá. The attack resulted in the death of many “innocentés,” but it was touted as a success because 103 cabanos died in the fighting.\(^{19}\) By January 1836, the entire region was engulfed in the struggle between the cabanos and the imperial government. Barra, Cametá, Vigia, and the margins of the Tocantins River favored the central government, whereas the area around Belém, Acará, Marajó, Macapá (other than the military fort), and the areas surrounding the Guamá and Capia rivers, southeast of the city of Belém, were in cabano hands.\(^{20}\)

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17 Reis, *História de Amazonas*, 165.

18 Ibid., 166. The motivations for this are not entirely clear, but the Priest they were under seems to have been a legalist supporter. Perhaps a strong attachment to this priest led them to side with the legalist forces.

19 *Jornal do Commercio*, 27 February 1836, 1.

20 Ibid., 2.
On his way to Belém, Andréa sent his commanders to break up a cabano stronghold close to the capital city. In April 1836, under the command of Lieutenant João Luiz de Castro Gama, a force of 300 men from Abaeté and Cametá went to attack the town of Igarapé-Mirim. Upon their arrival, the defenders of the town laid down their weapons and swore allegiance to Dom Pedro II. Despite the peaceful display, the legalist forces determined to “open the way” and attacked under the cover of nightfall. The “rebels” suffered great losses, with less than half escaping the assault. Igarapé-Mirim’s position made it a crucial launching point to attack all of the rebels in the Rio Mojú up to the mouth of the Acará River. Lieutenant Gama’s men found the town abandoned at daybreak. Left behind were the bodies of forty three men, four women, and a child. In the next few days the soldiers found several bodies in the fields and many wounded, who were imprisoned. One of the imprisoned cabanos, Justo José Domingues, had killed a legalist commander in his sleep and let his body be devoured by vultures.\(^{21}\)

Two weeks after the legalist victory in Igarapé-Mirim, as noted in Chapter 3, Angelim abandoned the city of Belém on 13 May 1836. After blockading the capital with his warship, Andréa turned to rebel encampments around the city and focused on capturing Angelim. As Andréa’s men advanced, cabanos fled deeper into the interior. Andréa’s men often found only abandoned homesteads. Women had packed their belongings and headed into the forests with their husbands. Rumors had it that Angelim had taken refuge in the place where the Cabanagem began, Acará and he was pursued there. An índio guide shot Angelim in the right leg, seriously hindering his ability to

escape. Friends had to carry him into the forest. Andréa returned to Belém, leaving Ensign Pedro José Gonçalves in charge of the manhunt. Another índio offered to guide Gonçalves and his men to Angelim’s location. The man, upset that a cabano had given up a relative to the legalist forces for illegally trading with the rebels, wanted revenge on the cabano leader. Destitute, feverish, and injured, Angelim offered no resistance to his capturers when they finally found him, 4 October 1836. His condition was so pitiful, that even the legalist troops sent to capture him offered the cabano leader their rations. Upon his return to Belém, Angelim joined Francisco Vinagre on the prison ship Defensora in Belém’s harbor. The men were sent to the court in Rio to await trial.

All along the main rivers, cabanos, or those fleeing Andréa’s forces, made makeshift encampments. The reader will recall that the first battle between legalist amazonenses and cabano forces took Ecuipiranga, about fifteen miles from Santaréém. It was the largest cabano encampment after the legalist recapture of the capital. Calling themselves the United Brazilian Forces, most of the cabano commanders in the camp were former National Guardsmen. To legalist commanders, these men were deserters and criminals, though the cabanos saw themselves as protectors of Brazilian interests against foreign interlopers. Violence erupted between a legalist police chief and judge from Santaréém and cabanos in Ecuipiranga. Local residents were caught up in the violence, until a peace treaty was signed between the camp and the city in March 1836.

22 Raiol, Motins políticos, 3: 978-979.

23 Raiol, Motins políticos, 3: 1003-1004. Both would eventually be amnestied in 1840. They were both exiled to Pernambuco for ten years, after which both men returned to Pará. Angelim arrived back to Pará May 1851, and lived on his fazenda, Madre de Deus, with his family. He died in 1882 in his home after an illness. Francisco Vinagre shied away from politics on his return to the province, refusing to even answer questions about the events of 1835. He remained in Belém and died of natural causes November 1873.

24 Harris, Rebellion, 225-226.
The abusive judge, most likely unpopular in Santarém as well, fled to Macapá and joined the legalist forces there.

The town council of Santarém had voted to recognize Angelim’s presidency at his request, and pledged their loyalty to the cabano cause in 1835. At the same time, however, the town council was careful to swear allegiance to the Catholic faith, to Dom Pedro II, and to the Regency. Their proclamation of allegiance to Angelim also claimed fidelity to “the defense of individual rights of the citizens.”

This ideological appeal suggests the liberalism that suffused the cabano struggle; it also suggests its vagaries, something important to note in discussing the ongoing struggle. What the “individual rights of the citizens” meant differed from person to person, of course. In one example, a cabano soldier wrote that all he wanted was for Rio to follow the constitution, which said that the provincial president must be “Brazilian born,” and administer in a “fair and fraternal way.” In fact, the Brazilian constitution made no such provisions, yet this is what this particular cabano, a freed slave, believed he was fighting for. This example highlights the engagement of cabanos in the larger national debates of the Regency era, even as it points to the confusion over basic liberal ideas central to those debates.

As we have already seen, the cabanos were not a homogenous group socially, but there was a general liberal ideological underpinning for the rebels who continued the struggle. Most leaders thought that Pará should have the right to elect its own provincial

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26 Raiol, Motins políticos, 3: 1036.
27 Exiled from Pernambuco for murder, Francisco Bernardo de Sena, a freed slave, stormed Barra with 1,800 soldiers in March 1836. Before the Cabanagem he was a ranchhand on a cattle farm in the Rio Branco region. One of his soldiers killed him later that year; see Harris, Rebellion, 237.
president, and that there should be fair application of the laws of the Empire. A lack of centralized leadership meant there was no one in firm control over any of the rebels, ideologically or militarily, especially after the fall of Belém. Loyalties shifted as the de facto situation became more and more unclear. In one example, a former rebel turned legalist commander complained that he could not understand how Angelim could inspire any loyalty, as he was not even a native son (he moved to Pará from Ceará when he was five).28

Despite a shared, general ideological liberalism, there were limits to the cabanos’ attitude towards equal rights, particularly when it came to their former oppressors. Some rebels felt that as long as Portuguese or other local power brokers remained, the constitution would continue to be undermined – they conflated class conflict with a defense of the national charter. Roving cabano bands, loosely affiliated but not under the control of any one leader, raided, burned, and murdered Portuguese-or those seen as enemies to the cabano cause- who had not already fled. Matters were blurred by plain personal interests; increased confusion allowed bandits or others to exact revenge for personal or financial gain. African slaves, some of whom joined cabano ranks, but who were never welcomed by cabano commanders, also took advantage of the chaos to escape their masters. Most people of the interior attempted to stay neutral, as it was unclear often which side partisans were on. Though cabanos sometimes wore cloth that was dyed red, often it was impossible to tell the legalist troops apart from the cabanos.29


After the recapture of Belém, rumors spread about racialized violence. As we have seen, such charges had been made against the cabanos since the beginning regardless of the facts. Recent cabano attacks on landowners only lent credence to the fearful rumors of whites being murdered. The town council of Santarém began to turn against the cabano leadership of Ecuipiranga. A Mundurucu leader, Joaquim Fructuoso, present at a town meeting, offered his services protecting the town against the cabano forces. The Mundurucu, so he argued, would serve as noble allies to Santarém and would protect the city from the injustices perpetrated by uncivilized tapuios, índios, mestiços, mamelucos, and runaway slaves. Fructuoso most likely wanted to protect his own territorial interests and keep cabano intruders out of Mundurucu villages. Santarém was divided; food and resources were running thin. Imperial forces arrived by ship 3 October 1836 and after a day of cabano resistance, retook the city. Upon hearing the news the entire population of the nearby village of Alter de Chão fled into the forest.

Gradually legalist troops were able to reconquer the towns along the main river banks, forcing cabanos into more and more rural areas. Imperial ships attempted to blockade rebel strongholds, though these measures were largely ineffective because of the labyrinthine streams and rivers that could be used as alternative routes. Conflict between legalist and cabano forces continued almost daily until July 1837. Legalist forces chased cabanos into the interior, and cabanos would attempt to retake the towns and villages they had once held. Impatient with the continued cabano presence, Andréa ordered more men to the area. Legalist troops and cabanos were armed with the same

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31 Harris, *Rebellion*, 246-247.
equipment, as cabanos often stole theirs from the same supply ships. Both sides were ill clothed and ill fed. Gunpowder was in short supply, and desertion rates on both sides were high. After a failed attempt at a peace treaty, the cabano stronghold at Ecuipiranga fell to legalist troops in July 1837. The 500 men captured received 100 lashes each and were enlisted in the imperial forces.

Andréa noted with frustration the continued cabano encampments on Marajó, Curuá, and around Gurupá. More similar to mocambos (runaway slave communities), such cabano settlements focused more on survival tactics rather than on offensive attacks after the fall of Ecuipiranga. Rebel forces were pushed deeper along the Tapajós and Madeira rivers and formed new alliances with the Mura, who had been fighting legalist troops from Manaus. Andréa’s tactics of repression grew more brutal, and rebels who might have otherwise surrendered continued to run deeper into the interior. Nonetheless, though the cycle of violence continued, the major towns of Pará were no longer threatened by cabanos again. Rather, all paraenses who had survived the horror of the Cabanagem, regardless of their loyalties, were now subject to government repression, food shortages, and loss of their homesteads and right to their own labor. Rebel flight and resistance continued until Andréa’s successor, Bernardo de Sousa Franco, was appointed president and offered amnesty to all in 1840. The last

32 Reis, História de Obidos, 140.

33 Andréa’s successor, Bernardo de Sousa Franco, was a native paraense, with a prestigious law degree from Olinda, Pernambuco, who returned to the province only after legalists regained control of the province. An imperial magistrate, he served as a juiz de direito before Rio’s nomination to the presidency in August 1839. He would hold a long and influential government career, earning the title visconde de Sousa Franco. He became a general deputy, the president of various provinces, minister to the crown, a senator, and a member of the council of state. The appointment of Sousa Franco is puzzling. He was appointed by the foundational cabinet of the reactionaries and held power eight months. Yet, he is known in imperial history as one of the most principled Liberals of the party that emerged over the 1840s. It is most likely that his later liberal politics were as yet unknown and he was picked because of his birth, his intelligence, and his legal and administrative training up to that point – he had an Olinda degree and two
remaining cabanos submitted to government authority in 1841 at Luzeia (a former Mura aldeia), surrendering with only bows and arrows.34

**Suppression of Mocambos**

The nature of Andréa's actions in regard to runaway settlements is telling in terms of the larger issues in question. The primary fear of the Brazilian slave holding elite was a possible repeat of the bloody Haitian Revolution. Slaves and free people of color joined cabano ranks, or simply used the confusion to run away into the forest. Fears over Haitianismo clouded the debate about the cabano rebels in the Rio press (Chapter 3). One of the primary goals of Andréa's administration was thus to destroy mocambos in the Amazon.35 Many of the expeditions sent to hunt cabano rebels were ordered to search out and destroy mocambos. As late as 1841, missions to hunt cabanos often overlapped with the search for deserters and runaway slaves.36 By 1837, it must have been difficult to distinguish the three groups, though government officials continued the attempt. There were interesting distinctions between depictions of the cabanos in the

__or three years in fiscal administration when he was chosen. Perhaps the court thought he was just the man to try to reestablish the province in terms of the rule of law and commerce.____

34 Cleary, "Lost Altogether to the Civilised World," 130. In addition to the horrendous loss of life and the physical destruction of the Cabanagem, there were also lasting social consequences for Amazonia. Andréa militarized the whole province through the creation of an auxiliary corps, as will be explored in here, below. The **corpo de trabalhadores** authorized the president to claim the labor of all those over ten year of age who had no formal evidence of property or occupation. The law forced those enlisted to work either for private employers or for a small wage in public works. Importantly for later developments in Amazonian history, rubber tappers were not considered formally employed. Thus, at the beginning of the rubber boom, indigenous or **caboclo seringueiros** lost their right to their own labor. See Weinstein, *The Amazon*, 41-2.

35 I use the terms mocambo and **quilombo** interchangeably because they are both used in this way in the sources. Mocambo (generally defined only as a rustic shelter for a fugitive slave) is used in the Amazon as the more common term for a runaway slave community, while **quilombo** (generally used for a fugitive slave community in the rest of Brazil) is more common in the historiography and for contemporaries in Rio.

36 Vice President Bernardo de Souza Franco to Major José Olimpio Pereira, Chaves, 26 October 1841, APEP, código 1126, correspondência dos presidentes com diversos, 1840-41, document 792.
press and the Court in Rio, and the way legalist commanders in Pará perceived the rebels. In Rio, cabanos were seen as threatening precisely because their ranks included runaway slaves. In Pará, commanders distinguished between cabanos and slaves, often arguing that cabano rebels enticed slaves to join them. Commanders never used the terms interchangeably, probably because they were incapable of seeing the slaves as independent, rational political actors. Other scholars of the Cabanagem have noted the curious lack of slaves in the prison records, hypothesizing that slaves were much too valuable to be kept in prison.37 I would argue that there was a cognitive disconnect for legalist commanders who could not perceive of slaves as having political agency and blamed cabano rebels, defined primarily as tapuios, for enticing slaves to run from their masters. This does not mean that slaves did not participate in the Cabanagem, or in the turmoil of the times. The sources do record slaves being re-sold after their master could not be located, people of African descent whose freedom was challenged during the Cabanagem, and slaves being found guilty for killing their masters.40 Slaves did participate in the Cabanagem, but their participation was treated differently by the legalist commanders and Rio’s provincial representatives. Belém’s longstanding war against mocambos intensified during the repression of the cabano rebels after Angelim’s capture, though commanders viewed the two groups as more distinct than they perhaps were.

37 Magda Ricci, “Do patriotismo à revolução,” 245.; Harris, Rebellion, 263.

Since the colonial period the areas around Macapá, Santarém, Belém, and Marajó had a constant, though fluctuating, mocambo presence. No distinction was made during the colonial period between Indian and African slaves who ran away. Indians helped African slaves escape along the rivers, and also served as suppliers and go-betweens for the mocambos. At the end of the Directorate, Indian mocambeiros (people who live in mocambos) were much less common as African slaves replaced Indian laborers in Belém and the city’s hinterland. The Mundurucu, enemies of the Portuguese only two decades earlier, were enlisted as African slave catchers. In 1812-13 the Mundurucu found three large mocambos and with help from the regular army, captured and returned seventy four slaves for twenty three different masters. Close to the large cities and centers of trade, yet far enough away to resist capture, runaway slave settlements began to overlap with cabano camps as the war spread into the interior. One commander reported that cabanos had organized mocambos on Marajó, though rebels might have simply been seeking refuge within an existing community. In 1836-37, legalist commanders focused much of their energy on the island of Marajó. Two small towns, Breves and Chaves were the trading centers for the island’s cattle industry. Large amounts of land and the difficulty of access made Marajó the perfect place for mocambos and rebel encampments. In 1836, a commander reported to

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42 Harris, Rebellion, 166.


44 Lieutenant Commander Antônio Fernandes d'Andrade to President Andréa, Chaves, 1 January 1837, APEP, código 853, correspondência diversos com o governo, 1827-37, document 115.
Andréa that a “gang” of cabanos had united with military deserters and runaway slaves. This “gang,” composed of sixteen to twenty men, was led by one of the deserters and guided by an Indian through the swampland of Marajó Island. The commander in Breves reported to Andréa that the rebels and the runaway slaves used small canoes carved out of a tree trunk, an igarité, to navigate through the shallow swampland of the island. A small group of rebels, including women and children, had broken away from their cabano leader and were hiding on the island. The next day, a group of runaway slaves had the misfortune to come across the legalist troops. The expedition managed to capture one runaway and killed another as the small group scattered.

The commander in Chaves reported to Andréa that a slave belonging to Francisco Paula de Souza denounced rebel plans to attack the city within the next eleven days. Rebels from Portel and Melgaço, two communities down river from Breves on Marajó Island, were said to be planning to attack the city and the ports of the island. One mocambo, deep in the interior of the island, was said to have well over three hundred people, composed of “criminal blacks and deserters” and led by a “black crioulo” (a Brazilian born person of entirely African descent). To reach the settlement was a five day walk through the forests without even a path. The provincial president of the time, Tristão Pio dos Santos, wanted to send in a military force, yet he hesitated to do so. Writing to the Minister of Justice in Rio, he argued that it might be more prudent

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45 João Raimundo Carneiro Senqueira to President Andréa, Chaves, 29 December 1836, APEP, código 853, correspondência diversos com o governo, 1827-1837, document 111.

46 Commander Freire to President Andréa, Breves, 25 March 1838, APEP, código 876, correspondência diversos com o governo, 1828-1839, document 45.

47 Commander Francisco Joaquim Ferreira de Carvalho to President Andréa, Chaves, 16 November 1836, APEP, código 853, correspondência diversos com o governo, 1827-1837, document 95.
to first make it known in the community that rebels had been granted immunity by the Imperial government. The president had heard that one of the rebel leaders had sought protection in the community. The president implied that a good portion of the community might be former cabanos who were now able to reintegrate into society, leaving the runaway slaves fewer defenders for their community.48

Santarém had a long history of trading with mocambeiros who had settled lower down the Tapajós River. As the repression spread into the interior, the area around Santarém became the new focus of the campaign against rebels and the mocambos. In 1837 the legalist expedition struggled to break the rebellion. The commander complained that the rebels had seemingly endless escape routes into the forest. Groups of runaway slaves also threatened the expedition and their number appeared to grow daily.49 Even after the defeat of the cabanos, mocambos continued to thrive around Santarém. In 1849, President Coelho ordered a military expedition against the mocambo “plague” in Santarém. A force of seventy five regular soldiers and thirty three Mundurucu managed to capture only eleven mocambeiros, most of whom managed to flee deeper into the forest ahead of the expedition.50

Mocambos continued to threaten paraense life long into the 1840s and 1850s. In Óbidos, a small town across the river from Santarem, fazendeiros reported that many of their slaves had fled to the existing mocambos in the area. The military commander in Santarém asked to use the guarda policial, as well as the corpo de trabalhadores and

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48 President Tristão Pio dos Santos to Minister of Justice Antônio Paulino Limp de Abreu, Belém, 9 October 1840, AN, série justiça, IJ-1-201.

49 Commander Lourenço Justiniano da Serra Freire to President Andréa, Pauxis, 26 May 1837, APEP, código 888, correspondência diversos com o governo, 1829-1838, document 141.

50 Torre Cueva, “Freedom in Amazonia,” 51.
“índios with naval experience” to track down the exact location of the mocambo so it could be put down.51

In effect, government concern over mocambos continued well after the last cabanos were captured. In 1845, provincial Vice President João Maria de Morais told the provincial legislature that the continued spread of mocambos threatened their hard earned peace. He noted that even in the capital city, mocambeiros assaulted, robbed, and murdered residents. Many of the interior cities asked the government for aid in combating the growth of mocambos. The mocambos threatened the recovering economy as well as the public peace.53 The following year, 1846, Morais noted the difficulty the towns on Marajó Island and Santarém had in putting down the mocambos. The settlements not only offered shelter to runaway slaves, but also wayward rubber tappers, escaped criminals, and military deserters. The provincial funds allocated for the destruction of these communities was far too low, and Morais argued that despite the dedication of local authorities, nothing could be done without more financial support.54 A volunteer force of forty men were able to capture and return some runaway slaves who had taken refuge on the islands between Chaves (on Marajó Island) and Macapá, and Morais hoped that this success would breed hope in other localities that slaves could be returned.55 Experience suggested otherwise. Most missions into the forest found only

51 Commander of Amazonas to Vice President João Maria de Moraes, Santarém, 1 April 1845, APEP, códice 1168, correspondência de diversos com o governo, 1843-1846, document 227.

53 Moraes, Discurso, 1845, 4-5. recitado pelo exm.o snr. doutor João Maria de, vice-presidente da provincia do Pará na abertura da segunda sessão da quarta legislatura da Assembléa Provincial no dia 15 de agosto de 1845 (Pará: Typ. de Santos & filhos, 1845), 4-5, CRL.

54 Ibid., 5.

55 Discurso recitado pelo exm.o snr. doutor João Maria de Moraes, vice-presidente da provincia do Pará na abertura da segunda sessão da quinta legislatura da Assembléa Provincial no dia 15 de agosto de 1847 (Pará: Typ. de Santos & filhos, 1847), 5, CRL.
abandoned campsites. In Turvassú, fifty soldiers marched eight days to recover only three slaves. They did find a community with fifty nine small huts, manioc, sugarcane and other crops, and the tools to manufacture farinha (manioc flour) and aguardente (liquor). However, they found no fugitives.\textsuperscript{56}

Despite the continued struggle against mocambos, clandestine communities continued to thrive in the Amazon. In 1858, the president reported to the minister of justice that there were a “great number of quilombos” in the province. He estimated that there were over 2,000 runaways and many military deserters and criminals. One community, called Mocajú, was only eight leagues away from the capital city. Another, located only sixteen leagues from Belém on the Guamá River had a population of one hundred and fifty. The provincial government feared to attack one mocambo, with over 400 people, located near Santarém until a steamship returned from Manaus that could carry troops there.\textsuperscript{57} The minister of justice in his appraisal of the situation emphasized the large number of criminals and deserters who found shelter among these communities. Underlining the great danger posed to “paraense society” the minister urged diligence in suppressing the many opportunities for escape.\textsuperscript{58}

\textbf{“Bodies of Labor”}

Any number of peons, or as they are called in Brazil, tapuios, may be had for an almost nominal rate of pay for this traffic with the Indians. All the Christianized [sic] Indians of the province of Pará are registered and compelled to serve the State, either as soldiers of the Guarda Policial, or as


\textsuperscript{57} President João da Silva Carrão to Minister of Justice Francisco Diogo Pereira de Vasconcelos, Belém, 16 January 1858, AN, série justiça, IJ-1-205.

\textsuperscript{58} Minister of Justice Francisco Diogo Pereira de Vasconcelos, Rio de Janeiro, 27 January 1858, AN, série justiça, IJ-1-205.
a member of “Bodies of Laborers,” distributed among the different territorial divisions of the province.  

The repression of the province not only focused on perceived enemies of the state such as runaway slaves and rebels, but also on controlling the free people involved in subsistence agriculture in the province. Ratified in April 1838, the most draconian and longest lasting of Andréa’s reforms, the corpo de trabalhadores re-institutionalized a forced labor regime explicitly for the non-whites of Pará. Imperial authorities, allied with the elite of Belém, intended to use the corpo not only to bring an end to the continuing rebellion in the interior, but also as a means to rebuild the province, desolated by civil war.

The desire to control the population of the interior informed the debate surrounding the formation of the corpo. In this discourse, the corpo formalized an attempt to moralize the population through labor. Seen this way, the corpo fits into a


60 Most scholars of the Cabanagem devote a few paragraphs at the end of their studies for the corpo. Two examples: Vincent Salles in *O Negro no Para*, argued that the creation and continuation of the *corpos de trabalhadores* sustained the slavery regime, while contributing to the continued fracture of a marginalized population.” While it is true that the province suffered from a want of money and labor, the corpo was not a ‘continuation of slavery’ but rather a program that operated independently of slave labor which still existed in the province. Slaves were exempt from the corpo, furthermore corpo members worked for pay and had time off.” See Vicente Salles, *O Negro*, 271-275. Itala Bezerra da Silveira used the corpo to prove the Cabanagem was a class war, she saw it as an important instrument to imprison the forces of free labor. Her interpretation, influenced by Marxist theory, misses the goals of the program: it was not an attempt to stop free labor, but, on the contrary, to create available laborers. Elites feared that *índios*, and other people of color, would simply return to subsistence farming, leaving the province in economic shambles. They forced free people to work in order to create the dependable labor source necessary for trade and commerce. See Itala Bezerra da Silveira, *Cabanagem: uma luta perdida* (Belém: Secretária do Estado da cultura, 1994), 153-154. Claudia Fuller and William Gaia both have short articles focused on just the corpo. Fuller is more interested in the discourse of the program, while Gaia asserts that “the decision of the government that most represented the interests of the elite was the creation of the corpo de trabalhadores,” in controlling labor in the province, though he notes that workers resisted enlistment. See: Claudia Maria Fuller, “Os Corpos de Trabalhadores, : Política de controle social no Grão-Pará,” *Fascículos Laboratório de História*, Dept. de História, CFCH, UFPA, no.1 (1999), and William Gaia, “Os Corpo de Trabalhadores no Pará: Estado, Controle Social e Resistência ao Recrutamento,” in Edilza Fontes (org.), *Coleção Contando a História do Pará: Da Conquista à Sociedade da Borracha* (séculos XVI-XIX) (Belém: E-Motion, 2003), 265-291.
larger national desire in the mid-nineteenth century to modernize the poor of the interior, by forcing the rigor of work onto the populace.\textsuperscript{61} In Pará, this was explicit. For example, in 1840, President João Antônio de Miranda urged the military commanders in charge of the corpo to instill love of labor into their men, and to lead by example.\textsuperscript{62}

Much of the language used by the creators highlights not only the need to rebuild the province, but also this need to force people in the interior to be moralized by the market economy of the province. An article in the local paper outlined this sentiment further. The author reminded his readers that “work is not a punishment, it is a pleasure,” and that labor had redeemed many “from disgrace and crime.” According to the paper the “dignity” of a society depended on the labor of its populace.\textsuperscript{63} The corpo is thus an early example of the Brazilian elite’s efforts to instill moral progress in their “inferiors,” who were deemed unready to take on the mantle of citizenship. Leaders of the Regresso, and their intellectual successors, argued that Anglo-American style liberalism had failed during the Regency because of Brazil’s alleged “irregular qualities of civilization, violence, and

\textsuperscript{61} A large amount of unsettled land made it difficult for plantation owners to attract free laborers. Despite legislation in 1850 meant to regulate the sale of public land, squatters had access to vast land that was impossible to regulate from Rio or even the provincial capitals. The end of the transatlantic slave trade combined with open land for immigrants made control over labor a vital concern for the elite of Brazil. See: Warren Dean, “Latifundia and Land Policy in Nineteenth-Century Brazil,” \textit{The Hispanic American Historical Review} 51: 4 (Nov., 1971): 606-625.; Emilia Viotti da Costa, \textit{The Brazilian Empire: Myths & Histories}. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000, 78-85.; Fuller, “Os Corpos de Trabalhadores,” 2.

\textsuperscript{62} “Circular,” President João Antônio de Miranda to Military Commanders, Belém, 21 May 1840 in \textit{Treze de Maio}, 27 May 1840, n.5, 19, BN. A native of Sacramento, Minas Gerais, Miranda served as president Ceará and Maranhão, and as an Imperial Senator. Miranda represented the increased centralization of the Empire. He served as president for only one year, as was common for other administrators. Rio believed that loyal administrators did not benefit from getting to know local elite powerbrokers that represented their own interests and could influence administrators without local kinship/patronage networks.\textsuperscript{62} The Vice Presidents of Pará often spent more time leading the province as presidents sent from Rio cycled through.

\textsuperscript{63} “O prazer de trabalhar,” \textit{Treze de Maio}, 13 March 1844, n. 394, 1705, BN.
backwardness. The conservative elite viewed the vast majority of the populace as not yet suitably civilized to participate in liberal institutions. The liberal reforms were decried as naïve, foreign imports, that did not recognize the peculiar circumstances of Brazil. In many ways, the corpo also represented a return to the old Amazonian labor regime as noted earlier. Military commanders used their power to reinforce the traditional methods of exploitation of indigenous labor, a return to the Pombaline Directorate. Yet again, the corpo neatly fit in a larger national discourse, one related to notions of education, civilization, and progress for Brazil. Viewed as an instrument of discipline, it was seen as a viable method to obtain control over constitutionally free men, guiding their productive labor.

The corpo’s design specified that free men without gainful employment or property between the ages of ten and sixty were eligible for recruitment as forced laborers; the most able men, however, were separated out for police duty. The program exclusively targeted non-whites, though a few whites served as commanders or porters. Though many whites participated in the Cabanagem, the corpo was not only about suppression of the rebels but also a re-delineation of a hierarchical society based on racialized distinctions. There were exemptions for only sons as well as married

64 Needell, *Party*, 181.
67 Fuller, "Os Corpos de Trabalhadores," 2.
68 Assembléia legislativa provincial, APEP, série decretos, 1838, caixa 7, document 5.
69 The second article of the law stated: “this corpos will be composed of índios, mestiços, and pretos, that are not slaves, and do not have property or establishment to which they are applied constantly.” Assembleia legislativa provincial, série decretos, 1838, APEP, caixa 7, document 5.; Fuller, "Os Corpos de Trabalhadores," 11.
men, similar to exemptions from military service, yet the documents show that many of the corpo workers were married. Members of the corpo were usually recruited from their home towns to serve in the local branch, under the jurisdiction of the military commander. Any man caught without certification from the local commander outside his district was subject to imprisonment and enlistment.

The organization operated under a military structure with commanders supervising workers in brigades. Workers served the state under contracts, supervised by the justice of the peace. Even if there was no work to be done by recruits, Andréa decreed that "when there is not work for the vagrants/idlers of a district, the respective military commander will chose some undeveloped land and…claim it…so the workers are not lost to the government…they will be forced to work under guard." There were attempts to conscript women as a solution to the problem of provisioning the workers. Provisions and foodstuffs were vital to maintaining men working on the roads and other projects which required them to leave their homes. Women were obliged to farm the manioc fields, which the men had abandoned, in order to supply food to the corpo.

The sources do not reveal any systematic conscription effort, yet there is evidence that women served the Church and worked in food production under the auspices of the

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71 Corpo commanders sent Belém biannual statistics of the workers conscripted into their companies. Often, age, race, origin, and marital status were included. One example: Commander Domigos Pedro Bruce to President João Maria de Morais, 2 July 1845, Faro, APEP, secretaria da presidência da província, série 13 ofícios caixa 95, document 145. There are over one hundred examples: see APEP, secretaria da presidência da província, série 13 ofícios, caixa 48, 54, 63, 95, 122, 176, 196, 211.

72 President Andréa to Military Commanders, Circular, 14 July 1838, APEP, código 1020, document 31.

corpo. The annual provincial registry shows that a majority of the participants were identified as indio by the commanding officer, though mamelucos, mestiços, pretos, pardos, and cafuzos were also listed in the registries. Values paid for services were stipulated by a contract that was supervised by the justices of the peace.

By 1841, the program had expanded to include Alto Amazonas and Barra (Manaus). In 1849, the corpo encompassed some 7,626 workers with the highest numbers in Rio Negro, Marajó, and Macapá (table 4-1). Frontier regions with only small population centers, these areas relied on corpo laborers for all types of manual labor.

Many men tried to resist recruitment, arguing that they were fishermen or farmers. As they had no title to their land or formal proof of occupation, military commanders dismissed their attempts as nothing more than a ruse to avoid conscription. Significantly, for later developments in Amazonian history, rubber tappers were not considered dutifully employed. Thus, at the beginning of the rubber

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74 Vicar of Moju to President Bernardo Franco, 3 September 1839, APEP, secretaria da presidência da província, série 13 ofícios, caixa 53, ofícios de autoridades religiosas, 1839, document 17.; Eliana Ramos Ferreira, a doctoral candidate at UFPA, is currently working on a dissertation focused on women in the corpo de trabalhadores, but she has yet to publish on the topic (conversation with the author, 19 March 2010).

75 Fuller, “Os Corpos de Trabalhadores,” 9.

76 President Tristão Pio dos Santos to the Military Commanders, Belém, 16 November 1841, APEP, código 1126, correspondência dos presidentes com diversos, 1840-41, document, 856.

77 Falla dirigida pelo exm.o sñr conselheiro Jeronimo Francisco Coelho, prefeito da província do Gram Pará à Assembléa Legislativa Provincial na abertura da segunda sessão ordinaria da sexta legislatura no dia 1.o de outubro de 1849 (Pará, Typ. de Santos & filhos, 1849), 21, CRL. Enlistment remained stable at above 7,000, though the area with the largest number of workers changed. In 1842 there were 7,386 trabalhadores, with the highest concentration in Rio Negro, Santarém, and Cametá. Large public work programs drew men away from their districts, which accounts for the differences. See: Salles, O Negro no Pará, 273.

81 President Tristão Pio dos Santo to Major Anadezo Jose da Costa, Belém, 9 December 1840, APEP, código 1126, correspondência dos presidentes com diversos, 1840-41, document 73.
boom, indigenous or *caboclo seringueiros* lost their right to sell their own labor, and profit from the export boom.\(^{82}\)

Corpo members worked as privately engaged employees, or were in "service of the state." Government service took up a large portion of corpo labor. The military commanders and the town councils employed corpo workers in almost every imaginable task. They not only worked on roads, and other large public works, but also served as mail carriers, tax collectors, police escorts, fisherman for the capital, and various other jobs necessary for the running of a province.\(^{83}\) Corpo members were even organized into search parties to seek out quilombos in the interior.\(^{84}\) Since the province depended on water-borne traffic for communication and trade, much of the attention of the corpo commanders focused on clearing waterways, digging canals, building docks, and general maintenance of their cities' waterways.\(^{85}\) Workers were sent from town to town

\(^{82}\) Weinstein, *The Amazon Rubber Boom*, 41-2.

\(^{83}\) *Trabalhadores* ran the mail canoes created in Vigia; even the head of the post was a *corpo* worker: see Lieutenant Casemiro Jose Rodriguez to President Rego Barros, 2 and 6 November 1854, Vigia, AEP, secretaria da presidência da província, série 13 ofícios, caixa 176, ofícios das companhias de trabalhadores, document 201 and 206.; The military commander of Bragança used *corpo* members to serve "as província tax collectors," who he cautioned still needed to be watched to make sure they did not do something "improper" with the money they collected: Major Fiscal Francisco Jose dos Navegantes to President Rego Barros, 29 April 1855, Bragança, AEP, secretaria da presidência da província, série 13 ofícios, caixa 196, document 60.; The commander of Santarém sent four *trabalhadores* as escorts for the prisoner Domingos Pereina: see Xavier Tapajós to President Rego Barros, 14 August 1854, Santarém, AEP, secretaria da presidência da província, série 13 ofícios, caixa 176, ofícios das companhias de trabalhadores, document 157. Presidents also ordered commanders to send men to serve as fishermen for the city of Belém; see, e.g., President Tristão Pio dos Santos to Military Commander of Pauves, 27 April 1841, AEP, correspondência dos presidentes com diversos, códice 1126, 1840-41, document 385.

\(^{84}\) Salles, *O Negro no Pará*, 273.

\(^{85}\) A few examples: The província budget allocated funds to clean the *varga* (swampy lowland) of the Tapajós River to facilitate the passage of canoes from the province of Goiás: Assembléia legislativa províncial, série decretos, 1839, 14 October 1839, Article 13, section 53, AEP, caixa 7, document 37; the president wrote that the *trabalhadores* working on a canal were not sufficient and ordered the military commander in Vigia to make sure *corpo* commanders sent workers until it was finished: see President Tristão Pio dos Santos to Colonel João Henrique de Mattos, 13 March 1841, AEP, códice 1126, correspondência dos presidentes com diversos, 1840-41, document 311.; The corpo commander used
when they were requested for special projects. One of the largest of these projects was a road built from the capital to Bragança, a city in the northeast of the province about 200 kilometers from Belém. Requests for workers to clear and clean the road came to commanders in all the surrounding parishes. The commander of Ourém complained about having to send workers, and worried that the road construction, though projected to last three to four months would really take three to four years due to the difficulty in maintaining workers and to the weather restrictions from heavy rainfall. His words proved prescient; as late as September 1859, engineers were requesting workers for the Bragança road project. Other commanders bragged about the amount of work they were able to achieve with limited funding. In 1845, the military commander in Vigia reported to President Sousa Franco about the success of the program. He boasted that “workers, who had been vagrants and useless, with vicious habits due to their inaction” now cleaned the surrounding roads up to eight leagues away from the village in service of their “town and nation.”

Workers also served in the timber mills and ship building industries. One

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86 Commander Navegantes sent thirty workers to work on the road project under Capt. Francisco Ribeiro da Silva as mandated by provincial law 248, 11 Sept 1854: see Major Fiscal Francisco José do Navegantes to Vice President Miguel Antônio Pinto Guimarães, 6 September 1855, APEP, secretaria da presidência da província, série 13 ofícios, caixa 196, ofícios das companhias de trabalhadores, document 81.

87 Lieutenant Antônio Fernandes Ribeiro to President Rego Barros, 11 January 1855, Bragança, APEP, secretaria da presidência da província, série 13 ofícios, caixa 196, ofícios das companhias de trabalhadores, document 7.

88 Ensign Francisco Antônio de Salles to President Vasconcelos, 8 September 1859, Bujarú, APEP, secretaria da presidência da província, série 13 ofícios, caixa 211, ofícios das companhias de trabalhadores, document 152.

89 Commander João Henrique e Matos to President Bernardo Sousa Franco, Vigia, 27 January 1840, APEP, caixa 54, ofícios de comandantes militares, 1840, document 10.
commander, ordered to build a ship for the emperor himself, received orders to recruit workers from all of the surrounding commanders. Private timber mill owners also used corpo labor. One such request came with the promise that the labor would be in “the interest of the nation.” Workers also labored in the production of rubber in the interior.

The church also requested many workers from the corpo. The Vicar of Mojú employed seven women and men from the corpo in the main church of the town, though he requested more laborers due to an absence of people in the town who could give one day a month to the church as they had in the past. He expected the provincial government to provide laborers and to pay for their upkeep. In 1854, the commander in Cametá noted that ten of his workers were permanently employed in services to the church. In 1856, the military commander of Santarém was sending workers from outside their freguesia (parish) to work in the main church of Óbidos. The church continued to depend on the program for labor until its end in 1859.

Rio’s appointed presidents sought to organize all segments of paraense society.

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91 Author unknown to President Bernardo Sousa Franco, 5 April 1842, APEP, secretaria da presidência da província, série 13, ofícios, caixa 63, document 32.
92 Major José Roberto Pimental to President Sebastião do Rego Barros, 11 October 1854, Porto de Móz and Gurupá, APEP, secretaria da presidência da província, série 13 ofícios, Caixa 176, document 181.
93 Vicar of Moju to President Bernardo Franco, 3 September 1839, APEP, secretaria da presidência da província, série 13 ofícios, caixa 53, ofícios de autoridades religiosas, 1839, document 17.
94 Lieutenant José Vicente de Leão to President Rego Barros, 7 September 1854, APEP, secretaria da presidência da província, série 13 ofícios, caixa 176, ofícios das companhias de trabalhadores, document 166.
95 Pedro da Cunha to President Rego Barros, 4 March 1856, APEP, secretaria da presidência da província, série 13 ofícios, caixa 196, ofícios das companhias de trabalhadores, document 138.
In 1840, the 1600 troops of the first line of the regular army were not enough to meet the needs of the province to maintain public order for a population of about 140,000. The *corpos policiaes* (police corps) were charged with filling that void. Even the capital did not have enough troops to serve the garrison. Under the immediate control of the commander of arms, the police corp’s “organization and discipline has offered unequivocal guarantees to order and to public liberty.” The police were to be seen as a part of the public force of the nation, “the same sort as the National Guard, who were replaced during the disasters of this province.”

The town council of Cametá complained about the suffering of farmers and the “more industrious” with the continued service requirement for the police corp, but Belém was unable to provide more troops to ease the burden. In fact, the police corp was a complicated problem. In 1839, the Imperial government ordered that the police force be substituted. Sousa Franco argued that such an act would prejudice the brave men who had served since 1835. Instead he asked Rio to substitute the National Guard with the current Police Guard, maintaining the well serving officers, and allowing the officers to be elected as they were in other provinces. Sousa Franco continued to speak glowingly about the police in the province. In 1842, 11,602 men made up the province’s

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96 *Discurso recitado pelo exm. snr. doutor João Antônio de Miranda, presidente da provincia do Pará na abertura da Assemblea Legislativa Provincial no dia 15 de agosto de 1840* (Pará: Typ. de Santos & menor, 1840), 10, 55, CRL.


98 Miranda, *Discurso 1840*, 11.


100 *Discurso recitado pelo exm.o snr. doutor Bernardo de Souza Franco, presidente da provincia do Pará na abertura da Assembléa Legislativa Provincial no dia 14 de abril de 1841* (Pará: Typ. de Santos & menor, 1841), 9-10, CRL.
newly formed police, an expansion of the original corp. Sousa Franco particularly
honored the police from Amazonas and their “brave” commander Lieutenant Coronel
Manuel Muniz Tavares. 101 Sousa Franco also praised the now absorbed police corp,
originally created to “preserve discipline.” In Rio Acará (near Belém) corpo members
had searched for condemned cabano criminal Felix José Gonçalves, who had escaped
from a poorly constructed prison. Their success was evidence used by Sousa Franco to
point to the men’s loyalty to the Empire in his case for their continued employment. 102

In 1841, the General Assembly in Rio passed the law of 3 December which
amended the criminal procedure code. This centralizing measure created the new
deleagados (sheriff) and subdelegados (deputy) of the police who were directly
appointed, effectively giving the Imperial government control over local police. No longer
would local town councils have a say in the judiciary appointments. 103 In Pará, the new
law had not produced the “beneficial results that were hoped for.” Still poorly understood
and misused, the reform created confusion in the province. In 1844, President Veloso
complained that the police authorities could not perform their jobs. Due to “either
ignorance or bad intentions they undercut the rights of citizens.” 104 Veloso argued for
reforms from the legislature to elevate police superiors to the higher “degree of
perfection that other nations have achieved.” 105 He too, praised their loyalty and

101 Franco, Discurso, 5.
102 Franco, Discurso, 7-8.
103 Barman, Brazil, 213.
104 Discurso recitado pelo exm.o snr. desembargador Manoel Paranhos da Silva Vellozo, presidente da
provincia do Pará, na abertura da primeira sessão da quarta legislatura da Assembléa Provincial no dia
15 de agosto de 1844 (Pará: Typ. de Santos & menores, 1844), 6, CRL.
105 Ibid., 7.
faithfulness to the Empire in a time of need, and requested that the commanders remain in their places.\textsuperscript{106}

In addition to the corpo de trabalhadores, and the guarda policial, President Sousa Franco created a large corpo de milicianos which were divided into subunits. One of these, the corpo de capitães-de-mato, was a rural militia ordered to capture runaway slaves and assure the functioning of the slave system. Another, the corpo de pedestres, was an urban militia of the capital. Both were also formed to ensure that the capital had enough laborers.\textsuperscript{107}

Confusion, mismanagement, and deliberate misapplication led to many abuses of corpo workers. The confusion over the law extended to the commanding officers. \textit{Treze de Maio}, the paper of record in Belém, published several circulars and official letters explaining the proper way to employ and enlist corpo members.\textsuperscript{108} “[L]ittle care is taken by the government officials in their registry or proper government, and a majority of them [corpo workers] are either entire drones, or have become, in fact, the slaves of individuals.”\textsuperscript{109} The actual everyday functioning of the corpo was much less organized than government decrees made it seem, as shown by explorer William Lewis Herndon. Herndon requested corpo laborers during his exploration of the Amazon basin to guide and row his boats. Herndon negotiated a contract with the local justices of the peace to insure laborers in each military region he visited. He chronicled the dysfunction,

\textsuperscript{106} Ibid., 8.
\textsuperscript{107} William Gaia, "Os Corpo de Trabalhadores no Pará," 280.
\textsuperscript{108} President João Antônio de Miranda to Lieutenant Coronel Pedro Borges de Faria, Belém, 2 June 1840 in \textit{Treze de Maio}, 13 June 1840, n.10, 42, BN.
\textsuperscript{109} Herndon and Gibbon, \textit{Exploration}, 263.
incompetence, and abuse perpetrated by the commanders.

Letters from the presidents in Belém throughout the corpos’ existence reiterated the proper policies to commanders who mismanaged their charges. In 1840, President Tristão Pio dos Santos extorted the commander in Santarém to “observe literally the articles in the August 1838 law, [it was] organized only with the purpose of eliminating vagabonds and idle men” and not for any other purpose. 110 Although this itself is vague, the president’s concerns were made obvious in other correspondence. Commanders were using this public source of labor for private benefit. To the commander in Macapá, Pio dos Santos ordered more workers for the fort, noting that too many were “hidden in private homes.” The president reminded the commander that he was obliged to send workers for public service and ordered him not to abuse his government position. 111 After several warnings to another commander, President Pio dos Santos relieved him of his duties. Upon the death of their owners, the commander had been enlisting slaves into the corpo, even though this had been strictly forbidden. 112

This private abuse of public labor was general. The justices of the peace, ordered to supervise payment and contracts often used corpo workers as personal laborers. As President Miranda in 1840, noted, “some justices . . . cause a great detriment to the service . . . and create conflicts that are easily avoided.” 113 The justice of the peace in Tocantins “abused and exceeded the limits of his jurisdiction in the use of an individual

110 President Tristão Pio dos Santos to Commander Tavares, Belém, 8 December 1840, APEP, código 1126, correspondência dos presidentes com diversos, 1840-41, document 90.

111 President Tristão Pio dos Santos to Major Marcizo Gomes do Amaral, Belém, 14 December 1840, APEP, código 1126, correspondência dos presidentes com diversos, 1840-41, document 120.

112 President Tristão Pio dos Santos to Major Fernando Maria Cabral de Teive, Belém, 14 December 1840, APEP, código 1126, correspondência dos presidentes com diversos, 1840-41, document 117.

113 President Miranda, “Letter,” 25 May 1840, in Treze de Maio, 3 June 1840, n. 7, 26, BN.
from the corpo de trabalhadores” and “insulted” the commander when corrected. In 1841, the military commander in Cametá complained bitterly to Belém about the insubordination and unwillingness of one of the justices to follow the letter of the law. Ordered to send corpo workers to a sawmill, the justice instead “charmed the workers” into staying on in his private service. He also frequently enrolled men who were deemed ineligible for service, those over fifty years of age and married men. The military commander asked that the justice be relieved of duty, as he was “opposed to the public cause” and only sought to personally profit from his position.

Commanders also enlisted independent indigenous groups into the corpo. This practice, especially deep in the interior, countered the provincial government’s efforts to peacefully incorporate groups along the borders to protect Brazilian territory from foreign encroachment (Chapter 5). Abuse of “índios” occurred most frequently in the Rio Negro area. President Manuel Paranhos da Silva Veloso had direct evidence showing that the captain of the trabalhadores practiced “violence” against “índios” from the Anderá people. The captain intimidated the Anderá so as to force them to labor for him personally by threatening military recruitment far to the south in Rio Grande do Sul. The president ordered the juiz de direita to fire the captain and keep a watchful eye on the other commanders. “Unhappily, I am informed that this is a common practice in this

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114 President of the Town Council of Tocantins to President Bernardo Sousa Franco, Tocantins, 11 December 1839, APEP, códice, 1040, correspondência dos presidentes com diversos, 1836-1840, ofícios da presidência as camaras municipas de Abril de 1836 a Fevereiro de 1840, document 527.

115 Major Diego Voz da Moija to President Bernardo Sousa Franco, Cametá, 3 April 1841, APEP, secretaria da presidência da província, série 13 ofícios, caixa 73, ofícios dos comandantes militares 1841-1842, document 82.
province . . . so I am making it public that Indians are not to be terrorized and persecuted and are to be well treated."\textsuperscript{116}

Unsurprisingly, paraenses did not willingly participate in the militarization of the province. They found ways to resist forced labor through several tactics, from everyday forms of resistance to flight or violence. One corpo member, assigned to work for a private citizen, simply refused to complete his tasks, causing his employer to ask for a replacement.\textsuperscript{117} Paraenses also resisted forced recruitment through desertion or failure to report for duty, a large concern for the authorities.\textsuperscript{118} One military commander bemoaned the constant flow of trabalhadores into the hinterland. Workers fled most often from timber sites where it was easy to pass unnoticed into the forest. Even in the area surrounding the capital city, desertion was a key concern.\textsuperscript{119} In one dramatic example corpo enlistee Luís Francisco dos Santos, ordered to the *fabrica de Jambú*, evaded a group of four soldiers for several days. The soldiers caught up to him deep in the forest. Dos Santos climbed up a tree and leapt from branch to branch, managing once again to evade capture. A day later, another four soldiers saw a fire pit and questioned a woman living in the area. She had allowed dos Santos to stay overnight in

\textsuperscript{116} President Manuel Paranhas da Silva Vellozo to Dr. Juiz de Direita of the Comarca of Rio Negro, Belém, 10 September, 1844 in *Treze de Maio*, 15 November 1844, n. 459, 1-2, BN.

\textsuperscript{117} Gonçalves Jose Rodrigues Cabral to Police Chief Pedro Borges de Farias, Belém, 22 June 1840, APEP, secretaria da presidência da província, série 13 ofícios, caixa 63, ofícios das companhias de trabalhadores, document 3.

\textsuperscript{118} Gaia, "Os Corpo de Trabalhadores no Pará," 284.

\textsuperscript{119} President Tristão Pio dos Santos to Major Anadezo José da Costa, Commander of Vigia, Belém, 3 December 1840, APEP, código 1126, correspondência dos presidentes com diversos, 1840-41, documento 73.; President Tristão Pio dos Santos to Major Alfonso de Albuquerque e Mello, Inspector of the patrols, Belém, 9 January 1841, APEP, código 1126, correspondência dos presidentes com diversos, 1840-41, documento 173.
her cabin, noting that he was armed. Dos Santos was eventually captured, but managed to escape yet again from the poorly constructed prison back into the forest.¹²⁰

The obvious difficulty commanders had capturing deserters is clear in the amount of letters written to Belém asking for assistance. Many commanders defended the use of violence as a way to guarantee subordination of those unlucky enough to be enlisted.¹²¹ Many paraenses preemptively fled enlistment deeper into the interior.

Traveler William Herndon complained, “It is now difficult for the passing traveler to get a boat’s crew, though I have no doubt that judicious and honest dealing with them [tapuios] would restore to civilization and to labor many who have retired from the towns and gone back to a nomadic and nearly savage life.”¹²²

Deeply concerned about the extra-legality of Andréa's policies, Sousa Franco attempted to return the rule of law to the province. The circumstances were difficult. Sousa Franco faced a continuing rebellion in the interior and a new culture of fear and repression. He pushed Rio to offer the 1841 amnesty to the remaining rebels, as noted earlier. He even held a hearing to judge Andréa and his commanders’ wartime conduct.¹²³ Sousa Franco also held a memorial for those who lost their lives in the rebellion, including the some 4,000 who died in the prison ships of Belém and military hospitals.¹²⁴

¹²⁰ Lieutenant Manoel Nicolhini to Coronel Marcos Antônio Brição, Abaite, 30 May 1839, APEP, ofícios dos comandantes militares, caixa 48, 1839, document 27.


¹²² Herndon and Gibbon, _Exploration_, 263.

¹²³ “Parecer da Comissão de Constituição e Justica" 14 September 1839, in Feitosa, (org.) _Fundamentos históricos_, 57-60. The trial was largely meaningless; Andréa was exonerated for his conduct.

Sousa Franco also challenged the legality of the corpo de trabalhadores. Whatever his concern with the morality of the program, he focused upon the constitutionality of Andréa’s repressive methods. In an 1839 letter to the Minister of Empire, Sousa Franco asked for clarification from Rio due to the “many and serious disadvantages [the program] causes.” Sousa Franco argued that the difficulty of enlistment and discipline of the recruits made the program unworkable. He also noted that the wartime provincial assembly did not follow the proper channels outlined in the Additional Act of 1834 to approve the new law.125 Sousa Franco’s protest went unheeded, as Rio and the provincial assembly found that the benefits of the program outweighed the obvious unconstitutionality and the difficulties of recruitment, discipline and organization. Sousa Franco persisted against the pressure. In 1842 Sousa Franco argued that the corpos de trabalhadores, “disorganized since its beginning,” continued to suffer from desertions and wasted resources because there was no legal punishment for desertion.126

Sousa Franco’s efforts were in vain. He was not alone, though, in his opposition. In September 1846, Marcelino Cardoso Napoles introduced a bill to revoke the law that created the corpo.127 Though his project failed, in 1849, another group in the provincial assembly tried to extinguish the corpo. An editorial argued that the program was unjust, pointing to that fact that "the anarchy of this province was not led by men from the

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125 President Bernardo Sousa Franco to Minister of the Empire Francisco de Paula Almeida e Albuquerque, Belém, 26 October 1839, AN, série Interior, IJJ-9-110, 272.

126 Discurso recitado pelo exmo snr. doutor Bernardo de Souza Franco, vice-presidente da provincia do Pará na abertura da Assembléa Legislativa Provincial no dia 14 de abril de 1842 (Pará: Typ. de Santos & menor, 1842), 33, CRL.

127 “5th legislature of Pará, 12 September 1846,” Treze de Maio, 26 September 1846, n. 640, 2, BN.
inferior classes." In fact, as demonstrated earlier, the cabano rebellion had been instigated by elements of the regional political elite. The author pointed to the fact that many of the former rebel leaders currently held important positions in the province, which he felt was natural, as they had been punished or amnestied. Corpo workers were not as lucky, though. Many of them were too young to have participated in the revolt, and suffered for "the actions of their parents." Additionally, the author did not feel that the program effectively prevented further disturbances, one of the justifications of its continuation; only "spiritual power" could prevent future upheavals.  

The Vice President vehemently opposed the measure, arguing that it was necessary to keep the program, otherwise those men would return to crime if they were not working under coercion. Domingos Raiol viewed it positively. He argued that it "gave a regular occupation to the idle and turbulent, subjecting them to military discipline and developed in them a love of work and the sentiment of morality." Yet again in 1854 a critic in Santarém took aim at the program, arguing to President Sebastião Rego Barros that a program designed to aid the public interest in practice only benefited "idlers with local power" who misused workers for their private gain. The provincial assembly finally rescinded the corpo in 1859. Perhaps this was because its benefits to the regional economy had become dubious. The rubber boom, based on a product found deep in the forest, did not lend itself to large work groups. The emergent rubber elite needed to

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130 Raiol, Motins Politicos, 3: 988.
131 Pedro Meatara Ribelho to President Sebastião Rego Barros, Santarém, 25 April 1854, APEP, caixa 176, document 63.
recruit dependable laborers who could be made to work alone in the forest. The method used was to find people who could be individually tied to rubber merchants through debt. State-coerced labor in press gangs no longer made sense.

Conclusions

After the emperor Pedro II assumed his responsibilities in 1840, he was backed by a resurgent Party of Order. Smarting from the failures of the Regency, and fearful of the instability unleashed by liberal reforms, the party sought to assert centralized control over troubled, distant provinces. Pará was the most extreme of many cases. The Cabanagem forced the central government in Rio to contend not only with a rebellious population, but a vast and “wild territory” which had only been poorly integrated into the nation. In an extreme case, extreme measures seemed called for. In Amazonia, those measures took the form of a forced labor regime, to craft Indians and other people of color into productive citizens, and by extension make them “Brazilian.” The corpo de trabalhadores represents the struggles of the Brazilian state to incorporate its vast territory and diverse peoples. The corpo also illuminates the contradiction between the liberal ideal of a new nation supported by free citizenry and the perceived need to return to a colonial forced labor regime. It is important to remember that the conservative backlash existed within the constitutional order. The leaders of the Regresso adapted liberalism to what they saw as the specific circumstances of Brazil, within the framework of a constitutional, parliamentary monarchy. The Party of Order and its policies represented a middle way between restoration of a centralized, colonial absolutism and experimenting with a decentralized, new republic. Yet, in the Amazon, a

constitutional, parliamentary monarchy nonetheless undertook to reduce supposedly free citizens to conscript labor in apparent disregard of the Brazilian constitution which granted their rights. It was a contradiction that provincial president Sousa Franco had sought to expose – fruitlessly.

Happily for the elite, by the era of the rubber boom, the repressive regime following the Cabanagem had created a stable social order and “the province of Pará [was] in a state of perfect tranquility. There [were] no political fights, nor party divisions, and because of this there [were] neither oppressors or oppressed, neither reprobates nor exploiters…paraenses regardless of their opinions, live[d] together like members of a single family.” In such familial bliss, the free poor could be made to do difficult, dangerous work as independently contracted debt peons.

\[133\] Raiol, Motins políticos, 1:109.
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CHAPTER 5
INTEGRATING AND PROTECTING ORDER IN THE AMAZON

This chapter, like the last, argues that the Cabanagem forced the central government’s provincial agents in Grão Pará to recognize the state’s lack of control over their vast northern frontier province and helped shape the centralizing policies of the 1840s. In the aftermath of the Regency rebellions, when the state imposed political authority and national integration over the distant provinces, new forms of negotiation emerged and restructured power relations in unanticipated ways. In this chapter, I focus on provincial officials’ desire to integrate the area and its indigenous people into the nation. State-funded military colonies sought to create outposts which could properly extend state domination. The colonies, founded deep in the interior of the Amazon, were charged not only with protecting waterways from outsiders, but also with “civilizing” their indigenous neighbors. The provincial government allocated funds to move families into these colonies, thought to be located in areas naturally abundant and easy to farm, with the hope that, through such exemplary settlements, “wild Indians” would come to see the wonders of civilization. The Cabanagem, following colonial efforts in many ways, represents another step in a “civilizing mission” that gave the new, more centralized state the impetus to carry out an internal form of colonization over the Amazon and its “savage” people.

The province of Grão-Pará also had the longest international border in Brazil in the 1830s and 40s. It bordered four independent Hispanic states as well as three other colonial territories, the Guianas. The Cabanagem had opened a space for ambitious foreigners to make inroads into land that was claimed by the Brazilian state, but
remained loosely mapped and sparsely inhabited. The British had moved to claim the Pirará, a territory north of the Rio Negro, while the French had invaded Cabo do Norte (now the state of Amapá). Provincial revolts along with key foreign actions during the Regency highlighted the danger to Brazilian integrity and convinced the court that such matters should become a key concern.¹ In this chapter, then, I also explore how the military missions served to emphasize internal pressure and control over this threatened frontier. The Brazilian court adopted uti possidetis, also used during the colonial period, as the basis for legal possession in dealing with the diplomacy of such challenges.² For Pará and Amazonas (Grão Pará’s component units, made into two separate provinces in 1851) the military missions then had two purposes: “civilizing” Indians and protecting or extending national territory.

**Military Colonies and the Frontier Province**

Pedro Segundo was the first in a string of military colonies used during the nineteenth century to secure Grão Pará, the nation’s northern frontier. The establishment of well-defined boundaries was a concern of many modernizing Latin American nations in the nineteenth century. During the colonial period, Spain and Portugal had relied on the uti possidetis principle to assert territorial claims. This had confirmed Portuguese claims to most of Amazonia, since the region had been explored

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¹ The Farroupilha Revolt in Rio Grande do Sul challenged Brazil’s southern borders. The Rio de la Plata had been a contested territory from the colonial period, and Brazilians continued to have interests in Uruguay. Rio also increasingly faced a possible war with regional rival, Argentina. Additionally, the Bolivian governor of Chiquitos illegally bestowed sesmarias (land grants) in the Brazilian province of Mato Grosso. Finally, as indicated here, French and British troops invaded Brazilian territory in Cabo do Norte and in the upper Rio Branco.

² Alarcón Medeiro, 79.
by the Portuguese, who had continually pushed west from the Atlantic. Much of the
territory had not been surveyed or mapped during the colonial period, however, leaving
large amounts of contested and “empty” territory (that is, territory without a
Europeanized presence). The Cabanagem, which engulfed most of the Brazilian
Amazon, left this “empty” territory particularly vulnerable to foreign incursions. The
Portuguese had relied on military colonies during the colonial period to protect strategic
points in the north and the west; later, under Pedro I, independent Brazil pursued a
similar policy to defend the border with Argentina. These colonies proved to be
prohibitively expensive, and the Regency suspended official support for military
settlements. However, lack of treaties with neighboring Spanish American countries,
French and British incursions into the Brazilian Amazon from the Guianas, and the
threat posed by Argentina to southern Brazil reinvigorated calls for colonization at the
end of the Regency period in 1840. The French and Portuguese contested the territory
of Cabo Norte throughout the colonial period. The Treaty of Utrecht in 1713 had
determined the frontier between Portuguese and French territory in the northern
Amazon as the Rio Oiapoque. This border would be again confirmed in Vienna in 1751.
Dom João VI, resident in Rio after fleeing Napoleon’s invasion of Lisbon, took Cayenne
from the French in 1809, only to leave the territory again in 1817. In 1835, the French
established a military base on the east side of the Oiapoque, territory recognized as
Brazilian.

4 Ibid., 4.
The French argued that they had to occupy the territory to protect their citizens from the violence of the Cabanagem, which brought many refugees to the area. The French occupied two key points, one on the margins of Amapá and the other on the island of Maracá. The court in Rio managed to convince France to abandon the post in Amapá, but not the one in Maracá. In 1840, when peace returned to the province, Brazil tried to demarcate the territory, but France refused to participate. Still, both governments agreed that the area between Oiapoque and Araguari would remain unoccupied. The Rio Oiapoque became the official border between Brazil and French Guiana through the nineteenth century, and the question was finally resolved only in 1900.5

During the Cabanagem, the area between the rivers was a refuge for cabanos, army deserters, runaway slaves, and other criminals. French representatives claimed that their military outposts were meant simply to defend against violent incursion spreading into French territory. Provincial President Bernardo de Sousa Franco viewed this claim skeptically:

I believe that the French Government supposes that the disorders of the province gave them space to renew with reward their old attempts on the coastline of Portuguese Guiana from the Oyapock [sic] to Macapá, and sheltering the wanted rebels they will easily claim these lands, attracting some savage Indians…[in order to] augment…the population of their colony.6

Colonization seemed the only option to protect Brazilian territorial rights. Sousa Franco’s predecessor, Francisco José de Sousa Soares de Andréa, the ruthless military

leader sent to subdue the Cabanagem, had attempted to settle families along the rivers, though his efforts had failed to attract many willing colonists. In 1839, Sousa Franco told Rio that there were 400 rebels, involved in fishing and agriculture, settled in the area around the French posts.⁷ Rio responded with alarm, requiring the president to extend all help and aid possible to maintain these settlers within the Brazilian sphere and reintegrate the cabanos into the national fold. Sousa Franco felt this to be an impossible task. In addition to the difficult location, the local population mistrusted the government of Belém, even after amnesty to the cabanos was offered in 1840. Rio also wanted to stimulate colonization along the rivers Jari, Paru, Anaurapucu and Araguari. Sousa Franco believed that there were already enough people living in the first three and that the unfamiliarity with the land, topographic difficulties and endemic illnesses would keep possible foreign invaders at bay. However, the northern territory of the province, Cabo Norte, did concern the provincial president a great deal. Sousa Franco recommended a military colony at Araguari to counter a possible French incursion into the city of Macapá. Throughout the 1840s and 1850s, the area continued to be a constant concern for the provincial government.⁸

In 1840, Sousa Franco proposed a military colony, which would be populated by families who had male members subject to military enlistment. The men would be obliged to protect a garrison, defend neighboring borderlands, and cultivate the surrounding land. Sousa Franco, however, was not enthusiastic about the prospects of

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⁷ President Bernardo Souza Franco to Minister of War, João Vieira de Carvalho, the Marquês de Lages, Belém, 29 July 1839, AN, série guerra, Pará, correspondência do presidente IG-1-10- 1835-40.

⁸ Alarcón Medeiro, “Incompreensível colosso,” 98.
the future colony. “[A]las it is impossible to establish and sustain these points, or colonies in places so remote, and where communications still do not exist.”

Nonetheless, Sousa Franco’s successor, João Antônio de Miranda, announced in March 1840 that a military colony, named Dom Pedro II, in honor of the young emperor, would be built. The Regent, Pedro de Araújo Lima, authorized the creation of the colony and issued instructions from Rio. The imperial government proscribed that the commanding officer act as “father” of the colony, and “instill in his soldiers the love of work.” The government also allowed provisions for civilian families to join the colony, offering transportation, tools, and a small stipend. Twenty-five military men with their families left Belém for the Island of Bailique, an area about 100 miles northeast of Macapá.

Rio commissioned José Joaquim Machado de Oliveira to study the military colonies on the borders. Machado de Oliveira presented his work to the court in 1844. His study saw the colonies as possible farmsteads for retired veterans. The Court could lure these men and their families with promises of free land. The men would do better under military command than average civilians, and would be used to poor conditions in the desolate areas where the colonies would be founded.

A key to the success of the colony would be cooperation with the indigenous people of the surrounding area. Provincial president Miranda encouraged the military...

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9 President Bernardo Souza Franco to Minister of the Empire Manuel Antônio Galvão, Belém, 19 January 1840, AN, Ministério do Império, correspondência do presidente da província do Grão-Pará, 1840, IJJ9 110-A.

10 Ibid.

colonists to establish friendly relationships with the neighboring Indians. Though
disease, enslavement, and warfare had severely depleted the indigenous population of
the Brazilian Amazon, indigenous people still represented a large proportion of the
population. In 1822, “pure” indigenous people accounted for about 78% of the
population of Grão-Pará (this did not include mestiços, people of mixed European and
native descent). Brazil’s Spanish American neighbors also used “uncivilized” tribes to
bolster claims to territory. The Republic of Venezuela used religious missions among
native peoples to settle its border region with Brazil. The Republic of New Granada and
Bolivia also seemed to be following the Venezuelan model.

In Brazil, colonists were instructed to offer Indians gifts of clothing and tools. The
government offered any colonist who brought an Indian to live in the colony a financial
reward (an amount equivalent to three months’ salary). Miranda also supported the
colonists intermarrying into the tribes of the region. The policy was a continuation of the
late colonial tradition, established by the Marquis de Pombal, which made up for the
lack of Portuguese women by encouraging intermarriage and valuing legal marriage as
a stabilizing social institution. In the 1840s, a soldier who married an Indian woman and
lived in the colony with her was given an additional 50 mil reis and extra land to
cultivate. Thus, soldiers became “civilizing” agents for the imperial government, which
sought to use indigenous populations to enhance claims to contested territory. Miranda

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12 Moreira Neto, Índios da Amazônia, 37-38. Amazonas possessed an even higher indigenous
Lourenço da Silva e Araujo Amazonas in his Dicionário Topographico (1852) counted about 40,000
people in Alto Amazonas, of those 58% were indigenous, 26% were mamelucos, 9% were white, 4%
were mestiços, and 3% were slaves. These data excluded independent tribes.

also encouraged soldiers to welcome the Cabanagem rebels who had already taken refuge in the area.

Still, from its foundation the military colony of Dom Pedro II fared poorly. In 1841, provincial vice-president Sousa Franco wrote to Rio about the difficulties in sustaining the colony. There were only "19 houses . . . 4 women have died and the majority of the children." Illness and death were not the only impediments to success. Sousa Franco’s then superior, provincial president João Antônio de Miranda, lamented that “in a province that has lands so immense and the easiness of earning a prodigious life, it is a difficult thing to get residents . . . to go to a faraway place, cut off from the communication of other men or a market for their goods, and when these inconveniences are part of unhealthy climate any project of colonizing the district is foolhardy." The imperial government ordered the president to continue to sustain the colony, despite his warnings. Finally, in 1845, Rio angrily submitted to reality and ordered the president of the province to call a retreat from the colony, an order that was largely unnecessary as it had already been abandoned.16

Yet, the strategic importance of the area and the continued French threat put the possibility of a colony back on the agenda. President Francisco Coelho re-established Dom Pedro II in 1848, in response to fresh concerns about the borderland.17

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14 Bernardo Souse Franco to Minister of War José Clemente Pereira, série guerra, correspondência do presidente, 26 June 1841, AN, IG-1-11- 1841-1843, document 69.

15 João Antônio de Miranda, to Minister of the Empire Antônio Carlos Ribeiro de Andrade, 3 September 1840, AN, Ministério do Império, correspondência do presidente da província do Grão-Pará 1840, IJJ9 110-A.


17 Alarcón Medeiro, “Incompreensível colosso,” 121.
Coelho warned that a dangerous mix of criminals and fugitive slaves threatened the small town of Macapá, and that the news of the abolition of slavery in French territories only made the situation more urgent. To make matters worse, at the end of 1848 the governor of French Guiana wrote the president of Pará that it would no longer be possible for him to return runaway slaves. Once in French Guiana Brazilian slaves were guaranteed freedom.

President Francisco Coelho wanted to build the new Dom Pedro II along the Lago de Amapá. Rio did not approve the location over fears of the French government's reaction to building on contested ground. Instead, in 1849 Rio ordered amnesty for "deserters and criminals, whose crime was not too atrocious, so that in the future we will be able to establish some police authority there . . . avoid residents seeking asylum [in French territory]," and maintain territorial claims in Amapá. In the end, the new colony of Dom Pedro II suffered a horrible epidemic of fevers which almost instantly wiped out a third of the colonists. Coelho divided the survivors into two groups. One half would rebuild Dom Pedro II and the second would found a new military colony, São João de Araguaia, on the Araguaia River. In 1851, the Araguaia colony had 57 colonists of both

18 President Jeronimo Francisco Coelho to Foreign Minister Bernardo de Souza Franco, 5 September 1848, AN, correspondência do presidente da província do Grão-Pará 1842-1848, 308, document 2.

19 Alarcón Medeiro, "Incompreensível colosso," 106.

20 Ibid., 105-6.

21 Minister of Foreign Affairs, Visconde de Olinda, to President Jeronimo Francisco Coelho, 7 June 1840, APEP, série 13, caixa 67, ofícios 1840-9.
sexes, small farms, and a chapel. Communication with the rest of the province was still difficult and the colony suffered from a series of fevers and a lack of supplies.22

In 1850, with the support of Rio, Belém established another military colony on the edge of the Tocantins River, Santa Thereza. The goal was to create roads of communication and give auxiliary support to the navigation between the provinces of Grão-Para and Goiás. Though this territory was not threatened by the French or the British, the Tocantins was part of the larger strategy of populating and controlling Grão Para, as a vulnerable frontier province. The forts along the Tocantins River were considered vital for protection against hostile Indians. The fort also provided assistance for ill traders and provided supplies. Rio projected another colony along the Rio Branco, but the idea came to naught due to the lack of troops to man the colony. The government transferred Santa Thereza to São João do Araguaia for the purpose of promoting regional development. The colony could also provide resources for river navigation and control of criminals and smugglers.23 Rio founded still another military colony, Óbidos, close to the town of the same name, to promote occupation of the area and agricultural development.24 None of the colonies were very successful endeavors. The constant need for supplies, the lack of manpower, and high desertion rates insured that. In the end, for the most part, Rio would choose missionaries over military men to assert their territorial claims.

22 Relatorio feito pelo exm.o sñr. conselheiro Jeronimo Francisco Coelho, presidente desta provincia, e entregue ao 1.o vice presidente em exercicio, o exm.o snr. dr. Angelo Custodio Corrêa, no dia 1.o de agosto de 1850,(Pará: Typ. de Santos & filhos, 1850), 21.


24 Ibid., 10.
Missions and the British Threat

The special relationship between the British and Brazilian governments, as discussed in Chapter 3, did not protect the Amazon from British incursion. Letters between the British consulate in Rio and London made it clear that economic opportunism would be the effective British foreign policy in the Amazon. To that end, as we have seen, London waited to see how the Cabanagem would end, rather than intervene on Rio’s behalf. Colonists from British Guiana, however, did not wait; they used the confusion to move deeper into Brazilian territory. In official terms, this border region between British Guiana and the northwestern territory of the upper Rio Branco was sparsely populated, ill-tended by agents of the state, and ill defined. The only Europeans many indigenous groups of the Rio Branco came into contact with were missionaries. However, as we shall see, that did not signify a lack of friction. Competition between Protestant British missionaries and Catholic Portuguese missionaries for souls also led the religious into conflict.

By 1838 the violence of the Cabanagem reached the Rio Branco. Cabanos, or people who could be confused with them, fled deep into the interior to avoid certain enlistment or death. Incursions between legalist troops and cabanos made governance virtually impossible. Indigenous groups of the area joined both sides of the rebellion and, as they did in the colonial period, sought out the best ally to protect their own interests. In the colonial era, many of these groups saw the British as a better choice than the infamous slave trading Portuguese; in this era, the choice for the British could be just as attractive.

See chapter 3.
The Fort of São Joaquim, founded on confluence of the Uraricoera and Tacutu River (they feed into the Rio Branco, about 30 miles north of modern Boa Vista, Roraima) protected the border with British Guiana. In the 1750s, the Portuguese crown had seen the need for some sort of protection against Dutch and indigenous incursion and trade into the area; rumors of a Spanish settlement in 1755, however, decided the matter, and the Portuguese began fortification. Completed in 1778, Portugal garrisoned the fort with thirty soldiers and indigenous militiamen.26 The indigenous people of the area, the Macuxi, suffered greatly under Portuguese colonization. The Portuguese forced the Macuxi to leave their homes, resettle, and labor on the fort. In the 1780s the Macuxi rose up against the Portuguese, culminating in 1790 in the revolta da praia de sangue (the Bloody Beach Revolt). Portuguese repression was so brutal local legend says that the White River (Rio Branco) turned red.27

In the early nineteenth century, the area was largely abandoned until the British in Guiana took interest in the region, as mentioned. Access to the Rio Branco could be a very lucrative proposition for trade in the Amazon, and, though the territory had been acknowledged as Brazilian, its sparse population invited the risk. In 1835, the British Royal Geographic Society sent Sir Robert Hermann Schomburgk, a naturalized German, to explore the region. His mission "was simply to make discoveries along the unexplored frontier areas." Schomburgk even requested a passport from the Brazilian government to cross into their territory. In his report for the RGS, Schomburgk spoke of a village called Pirara, where Anglican missionary Thomas Youd was already present,


27 Moreira Neto, Índios da Amazônia, 34.
and preached to the Macuxis. Youd’s mission attracted between 300 and 400 people, until the Brazilian government sent a militia unit to dispatch Youd to Britain’s “undetermined southwestern boundary.” Schomburgk lamented that fearing Brazilian enslavement, the Macuxis dispersed into the forest.28

In 1838, Youd established another mission along the Pirara River for the Macuxis and Uapixanas. The commander at São Joaquim Fort reported to Belém about the incursion. Belém responded by sending a Brazilian missionary to the area and fortifying São Joaquim. The increased Brazilian presence forced Youd to abandon his mission towards the end of the year. Many of the Macuxis and Uapixanas came with him into British territory.29 This population movement directly challenged Rio’s explicit policy of keeping indigenous groups under the jurisdiction of Brazil. This was of vital importance: Rio needed indigenous groups to secure the border and validate Brazilian territorial claims. The British minister in Rio claimed the troublesome missionary in the Rio Branco did not act under direct orders from London. He also countered that, in 1838, Brazilians had “appropriated” 500 Macuxis, and went on to note that the British considered this an invasion of British Guiana territory. He also argued that the independent tribes of Macuxis, Adonais, Wassihananas, and Joannay had British protection. The British representative claimed that, as in North America, the British made treaties with Indian groups as sovereign nations. National boundaries did not matter, as the British


29 President Bernardo Sousa Franco to Minister of War José Celmente Pereira, Belém, 26 June 1841, AN, série guerra, Pará, correspondência de presidente, IG-1-11- 1841 to 1843, document 69.
considered such groups independent.\textsuperscript{30} Of course, the Brazilians disagreed with this policy.

After Youd’s retreat, the governor of British Guiana sent Inspector General of Police William Crichton and a Lieutenant Hackett to the area with a small group of soldiers. The men arrived 5 March 1841. After an altercation, the British forced the Brazilian commander of São Joaquim, Captain Antônio de Barros Leal, to retreat, after which Britain occupied the area.\textsuperscript{31} In February 1843, a British Guiana military expedition arrived with 40 men commanded by Lt. Edward Hayter Bingham, accompanied by Schomburgk, only to leave the area once again in September after the two governments came to an accord that the area would be neutral.

In response to the neutral decision, however, Rio decided to reinforce the forts of São Joaquim, Marabitanas, and Tabatinga, and increase the pay soldiers received to keep them at their posts. Belém repeatedly ordered commanders at the forts to keep a watchful eye on British movements.\textsuperscript{32} Brazil and Britain designated the neutral territory as Macuxi, though missionaries from both sides continued to evangelize there.

**Missions and a Larger National Presence**

Without a large population, [a province] cannot grow rich, nor can the state be maintained, and if there ever was a province in Brazil that needed laborers, and hardworking men, it is certainly Pará. This truth is my dogma.\textsuperscript{33}

\textsuperscript{30} Declaration made by British Minister in the Court of Rio de Janeiro with the objective of limits of Suriname or British Guiana with Brazilians, AN, código diversos, código 807, v. 17.

\textsuperscript{31} Friar Martinho de Santa Rosa de Lima to Commander João Henrique Mattos, Forte de São Joaquim do Rio Branco, 5 May 1843, APEP, série 13, caixa 89, 1843-46, ofícios das autoridades religiosas.

\textsuperscript{32} Clementino Antônio Delgado to Vice President Moraes, Fort São Joaquim, 11 December 1846, APEP, série 13, caixa 105, 1846 ofícios das autoridades religiosas, document 226.

\textsuperscript{33} Discurso recitado pelo exm. snr. doutor João Antonio de Miranda, presidente da provincia do Pará na abertura da Assemblea Legislativa Provincial no dia 15 de agosto de 1840 (Pará: Typ. de Santos & menor, 1840), 60.
As one can see, missionaries were at the center of the territorial struggle in the Rio Branco area. It was not, however, the only region where they played a significant role. Belém’s presidents sought to reinvigorate colonial missionary settlement in order to finally incorporate the interior and its people. The mission also addressed other needs. The need for a large population to labor for the economic development of the province provided an additional impetus for new missions. As noted earlier, at Brazil’s independence from Portugal, indigenous people accounted for about three quarters of the population of Grão Pará. The captaincy of Rio Negro, later the independent province of Amazonas, had an even smaller non-indigenous population. However, the Cabanagem represents the final step in a long process of population decline among such peoples, and gave the state the motive to colonize, incorporate, and build up the Amazon and its “wild” people. William Herndon, traveling in the area after the Cabanagem, noted the context of dramatic depopulation, the loss of so many of the “people [who were] the principal crew of the canoes and boats of business in the interior where everything is done by water…already the province feels the loss, and will not be able to suffer another large amount being taken.”

Provincial president João Antonio de Miranda, as early as 1840, argued that there were two essential ways to augment the falling population of Grão Pará. He saw population growth as crucial to the province’s future economic success; the province needed to attract free laborers, and to create missions for “errant índios.” Miranda estimated that there were between sixty and seventy missions administered by different

34 Moreira Neto, Índios da Amazônia, 37-38. See, e.g., the data in n13.

35 Herndon and Gibbon, Exploration, 221-2.
orders during the colonial period. In 1840, one man administered the spiritual needs of an area of 70 to 80,000 square leagues in Alto Amazonas. Miranda lamented the (imagined) lost past, when Father Antônio Vieira spread religion throughout the Amazon. Miranda argued that disease and the recent disorders were not the only cause of the loss to the province. According to Miranda, the end of the religious missions had led to the catastrophic population decline of the Directorate, and the continued lack of missionaries made it impossible to convince “children of nature” to heed the call of Brazilian civilization. The one religious currently on the Rio Branco had 1,000 souls in his settlement, Miranda noted, and he argued that three or four well-chosen missionaries could change the shape of the border region for the Brazilian nation. They could develop colonies made up by the “sons of our land, educated in our religion and our habits” to protect the border and increase the productive population. Miranda argued that most of the Amazon’s Indians were already familiar with Brazilians, were “friends of labor,” and most could already communicate in lingua geral. In effect, he argued that these “wild” Indians were not really wild at all—they had the potential as laborers and citizens to protect Brazil’s territorial claims. In contrast, it would prove difficult to convince foreign immigrants to come to the rural frontier of the Amazon. Belém had enough trouble sending paraenses to the borders in the military colonies, let alone convincing newly arrived Europeans to move to an area without communication or basic supplies, and characterized by the possibility of early death from disease or Indian

36 Discurso Miranda 1840, 60.

37 Ibid., 62.

38 Ibid., 65.
attack. In addition, there were much more attractive areas in Brazil which were already vying over such foreign immigrants.\(^{39}\) In sum, rather than settle the province with foreigners, the most expedient measure would be to integrate the indigenous people already living on the frontier.

Sousa Franco, Miranda’s vice-president in 1841, supported missions as well. However, he claimed that, in order to win índios over peacefully, Belém should allow índios to continue their economic activities unchanged. Instead of forced, settled agriculture in missions, Belém should allow men to extract forest products up river. Men could return to their families and hear the sacraments in the planned village. He pointed to the failures of the North Americans who forced their Indians to settle under European style models.\(^{40}\) The children of the first generation of the new missions in Brazil would have the benefit of a sedentary lifestyle centered on religious education. These children would serve as future citizens, indigenous yet civilized.

As it transpired, then, missions, the traditional civilizing agent during the colonial period, were now put to work in conjunction with the military colonies. They had three primary goals: spiritual (catechism), “civilizing” (forced, European-style agricultural labor – despite Sousa Franco’s arguments), and nationalization (settling the interior and border of Grão Pará as newly-made Brazilian citizens).\(^{41}\) In 1840, Grãoo-Pará had a population of 90 to 100,000 índios. Rio’s budget gave Grão-Pará a third of the empire’s


\(40\) *Discurso Franco 1841*, 15.

\(41\) Alarcón Medeiro, “Incompreensível colosso,” 151.
total funding allocation for missionaries. The province’s presidents felt that the number of missions needed would have to be greatly multiplied to have any effect.\(^\text{42}\) However, their arguments were not rewarded; by 1844 there were only four established missions: São João do Araguaia with no vicar, Xingu under Padre Torquato Antônio de Sousa, São Joaquim do Rio Branco under Friar Martinho de Santa Rosa de Lima, and Rio Jary under Father José Antônio Alves.\(^\text{43}\) Part of the reason was clear; a lack of vocation. The province lacked religious willing and able to minister to the people of the interior in general, let alone missionaries willing to travel deep into the interior.

In response, in 1843, the Court in Rio approved a resolution authorizing Belém to contract Capuchin missionaries in Italy to catechize and civilize the índios. Headquartered at Rio, the Capuchin effort was overseen by the central government, which had power over appointments and decisions about the locations of the new missions.\(^\text{44}\) As we have seen, this centralization was typical in the empire after the Regency. The court tried to centralize all local politics and decisions, not only in the Amazon, but in the provinces more broadly. However, such management was particularly impractical for this endeavor. Logistically, the religious on the distant borders of the empire proved just as difficult to oversee and support as the military colonies. Despite the constant speeches from Belém and Rio’s promises of financial support, missionary success seemed doomed to remain in the colonial past. In 1848,

\(^{42}\) Discurso recitado pelo exm.o snr. doutor Bernardo de Souza Franco, presidente da provincia do Pará na abertura da Assembléa Legislativa Provincial no dia 14 de abril de 1841 (Pará: Typ. de Santos & menor, 1841), 14.

\(^{43}\) Discurso recitado pelo exm.o snr. desembargador Manoel Paranhos da Silva Vellozo, presidente da provincia do Pará, na abertura da primeira sessão da quarta legislatura da Assembléa Provincial no dia 15 de agosto de 1844 (Pará: Typ. de Santos & menores, 1844), 15.

\(^{44}\) Ibid., 13-14.
Coelho still complained that many of the parishes had no vicar to tend to the flock. Besides distant decision-making, a critical issue was money. Rio claimed that they would send enough funds for ten missions, but they never allocated enough funding to support the plan. A falling, unproductive population would figure in Belém’s continued arguments about the need for financial support for the missions, but to no avail.\textsuperscript{45}

There were other serious reasons for the missions’ failure besides Rio’s oversight and lack of funding. One of the key obstacles to the successful resettlement of indios on the frontier was the fear of military recruitment. This had an ample basis in fact. Able bodied or not, native men were taken from their families and homes and sent away, usually to the military frontier in the far south, from which most would likely never return.\textsuperscript{46} Though there were legal exemptions for only children and married men, local authorities flouted or ignored the exemptions to make the required enlistment numbers. In addition to regular military service the various corpos de trabalhadores (Chapter 4) of the province promised loss of individual freedom for those unlucky enough to be caught.

Sousa Franco regretted Andréa’s foolhardy policies in regards to the indios of Rio Branco. The capture and forced enlistment in the military or corpos de trabalhadores of these men "enraged the indios," many of whom went to the British mission of Pirarara for protection. In 1840, Sousa Franco fought Rio’s military recruitment orders for 4,000 men, despite their recognized value as excellent naval rank and file. Sousa Franco complained that recruitment among tapuios was bad enough; reaching out to the independent natives would simply increase their flight and,

\textsuperscript{45} Discurso Coelho 1850, 93.

\textsuperscript{46} See Chapter 3 for the conflict in the Rio de la Plata region and Chapter 4 for recruitment in the Amazon.
consequently, growing provincial depopulation.\textsuperscript{47} William Herndon pointed directly to the issue in terms of native settlement in the province. He recorded that “recruitment causes endless difficulties in civilizing the Indians because the tribes flee and disperse when they hear of it.” \textsuperscript{48}

More, beyond the problem of forced recruitment, indigenous men and women faced disruption and certain eviction from their homes as Brazilian colonists moved deeper into the interior. For example, the year 1840 brought news to Belém of a nation of indíos called Coranoti (most likely the Mekranoti, a group of Kayapó) living at the head of Rio Pacajá, south of Gurupá. The town leaders in Gurupá met with a tribal chief who brought with him twenty-five other leaders. The men asked for “clothes for them and their people, tools, \textit{farinha}, and salt . . .” The military commander excitedly reported that once these terms had been met, the chief agreed to resettle his people in an aldeia under the “Brazilian constitutional guarantees for nations that come under the law.” The military commander agreed to support the aldeia for one year, until “there [was] sufficient time to obtain the fruits from their farming.” \textsuperscript{49} Newly in charge in Belém, Vice President Sousa Franco responded to the commander, asking him to coordinate with the missionaries of the area to make sure the Coranati became settled and productive Brazilian citizens. Sousa Franco also hoped that many more in the area would follow

\textsuperscript{47} Bernardo Souza Franco, \textit{Treze de Maio}, 25 November 1840, BN.

\textsuperscript{48} Herndon and Gibbon, 221-222.

\textsuperscript{49} Major Raimundo Joaquim Pantoja to President Tristão Pio dos Santos, Portel, 11 December 1840, APEP, cédice 1126, correspondência dos presidentes com diversos, 1840-41, document 106.
the example set by this first Xingu group and cautioned the commander to follow the
treaty agreements carefully.⁵⁰

Realizing the importance of pacifying the Xingu and the possible trade links with
Matto Grosso, Sousa Franco was particularly concerned with friction between Brazilian
settlers and the new native settlement. He explicitly ordered his military commander to
control the labor demands of the colonists. Sousa Franco wished to extend the peaceful
settlement of “wild” índios of the Xingu into the Rio Branco area. In a letter to the military
commander of Alto Amazonas, he urged Lieutenant Colonel Manuel Munis Tavares to
follow the “model of the Xingu” and to not force Indians to labor until they were
peacefully settled and ready for the trappings of modernity. Sousa Franco noted the
success the British missionary Youd (see above) had had attracting Indians to his
settlement in the region. If the Brazilian settlers were constrained by the letter of the
law, the new Indians settling among them could become loyal Brazilian citizens, instead.
Sousa Franco also ordered that no more would be taken from their homes for military
service. Sousa Franco argued that the natives’ fears of recruitment and forced
relocation had driven most indigenous people into the arms of Brazil’s neighbors.⁵¹ Of
course, this carefully proposed pacification of the Rio Branco area did not proceed
without controversy. In an angry letter to a subordinate, Sousa Franco ordered that the
commander of Pedreira (near Barra, now Manaus) immediately allow those índios of
Rio Branco who had already been uprooted by force to return to their homes. He noted

⁵⁰ Vice President Bernardo Sousa Franco to Major Raimundo Joaquim Pantoja, Belém, 13 March 1841,
APEP, código 1126, correspondência dos presidentes com diversos, 1840-41, document 305.

⁵¹ Vice President Bernardo Sousa Franco to Lieutenant Coronel Manuel Munis Tavares, Belém, 11 May
1841, APEP, código 1126, correspondência dos presidentes com diversos, 1840-41, document 407.
that the commander had "already been asked to do this and he [had] failed to comply" and that he had only given "more energetic excuses for why he has not complied."  

Aside from friction with the Brazilian settlers, the model of peaceful missionary work among the Xingu had other problems, as well. In a letter to the missionary assigned to the Xingu, Sousa Franco scolded the lack of independence shown by the settlement. The índios living in the small town still depended on the provincial treasury to supply their basic needs. Sousa Franco insisted that the community become self-sufficient. Later, while the president congratulated the missionary for his godliness for attracting forty-three new “wild” índios to the village, Sousa Franco gently reminded the missionary that his goal was to teach these men civilized ways, which included independent labor and participation in the provincial marketplace.  

Nor was such settlement spared the abuse from recruitment Sousa Franco had opposed. The military commander of Gurupá reported that the local commander of the corpo de trabalhadores had treated the índios of Rio Moju (Xingu) inhumanely. Belém ordered the justice of the peace to arrest the commander. The cooperation of the índios of the Xingu was too important to let the excesses of a commander go unpunished.

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52 Vice President Bernardo Sousa Franco to Lieutenant Colonel Manuel Munis Tavares, Belém, 25 June 1841, APEP, códice 1126, correspondência dos presidentes com diversos, 1840-41, document 500.

53 Vice President Souza Franco to Missionary of Xingu, Belém, 17 April 1841, APEP, códice 1131, correspondência de presidentes com diversos, 1840-1842, document 149.; Vice President Souza Franco to Missionary of Xingu, Belém, 27 April 1841, APEP, códice 1131, correspondência de presidentes com diversos, 1840-1842, document 156.

54 Vice President Souza Franco to Missionary of Xingu, Belém, 30 December 1841, APEP, códice 1131, correspondência de presidentes com diversos, 1840-1842, document 109.

55 President Tristão Pio dos Santos to Justice of the peace of Souzel, Belém, 7 January 1841, APEP, códice 1132, correspondência de presidentes com diversos 1840-1842, document 113.
Authorities in Belém had great difficulty controlling their commanders on the borders. In his annual address to the provincial assembly, President Manuel Paranhos da Silva Veloso outlined the responsibility Barra’s local officials should take regarding the missions. The índios of the Rio Negro were not to be enlisted in the army or navy, and were only to be enlisted in the corpo de trabalhadores or the police guard at the justice of the peace’s discretion. Of course, the number of people enlisted in the corpo for Rio Negro, over 1900 in 1849, implies that the justice was not particularly discriminating. Lack of resources, tools, and foodstuffs, only added to the mistrust over forced enlistment and ensured that the índios would not be attracted to newly formed mission settlements.\textsuperscript{56}

Finally, despite repeated exhortations from Belém to proceed with mission settlement “gently,” letters denouncing violence towards indigenous people came regularly to the capital. President Veloso proclaimed: “the civilization and catechism of the índios must be done by gentle and conciliatory methods; we must energetically halt those who practice violence and abuses that upset [índios] and separate them from contact with us.” The president warned that “those who participate in persecution, violence and excesses against the said índios” will face certain police prosecution as their actions were “so offensive to humanity and to the interests of the state.”\textsuperscript{57}

\textbf{Conclusion}

However crippled by practical problems, the policies analyzed here remain critical in trying to understand the impact of the Cabanagem on the history of Brazilian

\textsuperscript{56} Discurso recitado pelo exm.o snr. desembargador Manoel Paranhos da Silva Vellozo, presidente da provincia do Pará, na abertura da primeira sessão da quarta legislatura da Assembléa Provincial no dia 15 de agosto de 1844 (Pará: Typ. de Santos & menores, 1844), 14.

\textsuperscript{57} Discurso Silva Vellozo, 13-14.
Amazonia. Smarting from the failures of the Regency, and fearful of the instability unleashed by liberal reforms, post-1840 administrations in Rio sought to assert centralized control over the distant provinces. In Grão Pará, this took the form of military colonies as a way to protect the nation’s borders and waterways from foreign incursion, while simultaneously encouraging “civilizing” missions to incorporate indigenous people of the vast interior. Officials in Belém hoped that these campaigns would turn “wild” people into Brazilian citizens who would defend the nation’s interests. Fears over labor shortages added to the effort, driving the state to incorporate indigenous people as new citizens. It was the Cabanagem that forced the central government in Rio to such efforts. The rebellion compelled the imperial court to contend with this vast and “wild territory” which had only been partially integrated into the nation after independence and then destabilized and ravaged by rebellion and made vulnerable to foreign penetration. The military colonies and missionary settlements, however difficult to sustain and promote, represent the struggles of the Brazil’s newly centralized imperial state to incorporate its vast territory and diverse peoples, explaining provincial policy over two generations.
Figure 5-1. Map of Contested Brazilian Territory. Adapted from Garner, Lydia M. “Settling the Brazilian Frontier: The Role of Military Colonies, 1849-1889.” *Journal of Borderlands Studies* 13, no. 1 (Spring 1998): 1-28, 3.
Twenty-one years after the Cabanagem, the legalist vice president, Dr. Ângelo Custódio Correia, once again attempted to protect the province from destruction. This time, Correia battled an epidemic that would claim thousands of lives. Cholera, the scourge of the nineteenth century, arrived on Brazil’s shores in the 1850s and exacted a horrible toll on the populace. The disease caused panic because seemingly healthy people died randomly in a just a few hours.¹ Moreover, it struck the rich as well as the poor. Hearing that his home town of Cametá lacked the medical supplies to properly battle the disease, in June 1856, Correia “did not hesitate to go to Cametá as a true paraense.”² Correia set to work helping the survivors, yet he soon succumbed to the illness himself. The elite of Pará held up Correia’s act of bravery as a model of proper governance, a model which was lauded but rarely imitated. As one commentator noted in 1860, “acts of this order are unhappily rare in the story of our administrations.”³

Yet, at the very least, Correia’s attack on disease was only one of many. In the two decades following the Cabanagem, successive provincial governments battled disease in the hopes of rebuilding the province’s population as a foundation for economic growth. Public health campaigns furthered the state’s attempt to reconstruct the social order as well as the state’s attempt to re-build a new economic order. This

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² Juvenal Ramos Torres, “Voyage of his Excellency Senhor Dr. Antônio Coelho de Sa e Albuquerque, president of the province of Para, to the Tocantins and Amazon River,” Jornal do Amazonas, no. 81, 10 April 69, 22, IG-546- 1859-60, AN.

chapter focuses on public health and sanitation campaigns, seen in Rio and Belém as vital steps to unlocking the potential of the Amazon and its people. Much like military colonies and missions, “hygiene” campaigns focused on creating a citizenry that could protect national interests. The history of Yucatán, as I suggested in Chapter 1, is a useful comparison for Pará. Not only is there a similarity between the Cabanagem and the Caste War, the repression and “civilizing” campaigns of the post-rebellion periods are also strikingly similar, particularly when one examines public health initiatives. As in the Yucatan, paraense officials battled smallpox, yellow fever, and cholera, as well as malaria and dysentery in the hopes of improving commerce in a province still reeling from the Cabanagem. Traditional quarantine of ships slowed down the transportation of exports and inhibited international business. Constant illness affected productivity in the province. The province’s severe population losses necessitated broad public health initiatives unique to the province. These health initiatives also served as a way for Belém to reassert its hegemony over the interior of the province through scientific knowledge and control.

The province’s appointed presidents reacted with great energy, though they saw uneven results. Successive presidents established hygiene committees with police inspection privileges, and sent doctors and scientists to examine conditions and mandate change in the struggle against tropical nature and disease. This chapter traces these evolving, if haphazard, efforts of the state to impose a formal public health regime (akin to the corpo labor regime) in the Amazon. The conclusions suggested by the evidence from Pará require that we rethink, or at least complicate, our theoretical

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understandings of the links between public health campaigns and larger nation building projects. While comparative examples from the Yucatán are instructive, the limits of the state’s efforts in the Amazon suggest a more complicated story in which the regional elite, plagued by the threat posed to potential economic prosperity from death and depopulation, embraced state-led public health campaigns and the national civilizing mission to ensure their survival in uncertain economic times but failed—repeatedly.

As critics have pointed out, there are inherent problems in drawing broad conclusions about the links between public health campaigns and nineteenth-century nation-building projects. In particular, the episodic nature of disease outbreaks and the subsequent state responses often prevent a more systematic analysis of change over time. Evidence from public health campaigns in the Amazon is suggestive, however, considering the state’s contemporaneous efforts to impose discipline over the region’s potential labor force, to secure the nation’s borders, and to civilize the local population. Public health campaigns in nineteenth-century Brazil complicate our understandings of the very process of nation-building, itself. Rather than suggesting a concerted and coherent elite project, the efforts to combat outbreaks of disease in Pará represent at once an attempt to impose abstract paternalist ideas of “civilization” on a so-called “barbarous” population, an effort to reverse the downward demographic trends that could threaten future economic growth, and a pragmatic and haphazard response to

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repeated moments of crisis. Such efforts brought together the often overlapping and entangled, but occasionally divergent, interests of the imperial government in Rio, the regional elite, and the burgeoning community of scientific professionals.

Officials faced numerous obstacles. First, there were practical issues. A lack of formally trained doctors and incomplete medical knowledge made imposing scientific knowledge impractical. Constant shortages of supplies and doctors, along with the geographic challenges of treating people over such a broad area, made fighting disease expensive and ineffective. Second, paraenses (like many Brazilians) distrusted formal medicine and they continued to rely on folk remedies. Third, there were divisions between officials and the elite on basic issues. For example, many in the elite of Pará saw public health as private charity rather than a public priority, making it difficult to implement vaccination campaigns even in the capital city. Finally, there were concerns over the nature of medical knowledge and practice. The intransigence and elusiveness of the diseases themselves made it difficult for officials to identify, much less effectively treat, a variety of illnesses whose origins and nature remained poorly understood.

Despite these obstacles, administrators continued to pursue public health policies not only to build up the potential labor force of the province, but also as part of an effort to protect and incorporate the large indigenous populations, who were of prime geopolitical importance in the border areas (Chapter 5). In such regions, with large indigenous populations, there was still another goal: “public health issues were folded into a larger ideology pitting ‘civilization’ against ‘barbarism.’”6 Along with the corpo

6 McCrea, 1.; President Bernardo Sousa Franco explicitly linked civilization to public health in his annual address to the provincial assembly, see: Discurso recitado pelo exm.o snr. doutor Bernardo de Souza Franco,12.
labor regime and the state’s attempts to mark, civilize, and defend the nation’s borders, the public health campaigns in the decades after the Cabanagem were congruent with key elements of nation-building in nineteenth-century Brazil. Increased militarization and monitoring of the province after the Cabanagem extended to the regulation of healthy and infirm paraense bodies and a strengthened claim on the integrity and incorporation of the citizenry and its territory through the imposition of health campaigns on both. This chapter begins with a discussion of public health campaigns in the provincial capital city of Belém, naturally the easiest target for such campaigns, before discussing measures in the interior of the province, where all of the problems noted above were compounded.

The Subdued and Bedridden City

Observers conceived of Brazil as a healthy country in the early nineteenth century. Undeservedly, the city of Belém also enjoyed this reputation, despite the fact that in the aftermath of the Cabanagem, provincial officials battled smallpox and malarial fevers in order to protect a dwindling population. In the 1850s, Belém’s reputation changed drastically with the arrival of the great plagues of the nineteenth century, cholera and yellow fever. Epidemic yellow fever (1849-50) and cholera (1855-6) “claimed upward of a quarter of a million lives [in Brazil] over a period of 50 years.”

In Pará, the new epidemic diseases joined established ones—smallpox, tuberculosis, leprosy, malaria, dysentery, and other unidentified fevers—to create a public crisis.

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years after the last dissidents of the Cabanagem were silenced. The 1840s and 1850s were especially unhealthy for the province. Disease affected every social group of the population, not just the poor. Yellow fever killed foreign merchants at a higher rate than the province’s natives, making public health a crucial economic problem and an international embarrassment. Still, while the 1850s represent a marked increase in public health policy initiatives, public health campaigns were hardly new to Pará. Successive post-Cabanagem provincial governments had spent considerable energy on an issue largely ignored in the rest of the empire. Officials in Pará simply could not afford to ignore the plight of the poor in the wake of the Cabanagem’s demographic losses. One American observer noted the extreme population loss which necessitated Pará’s unique outlook. He stated that “[t]he province…has a population of 129,828 free persons, with 33,552 slaves. From ten to twelve thousands [a low estimate] persons were killed by the insurrection of the Cabanos, in 1835. Since that time, ten thousand have been drawn from it as soldiers for the southern wars, and the yellow fever and small-pox [sic], in one year carried off between four and five thousand more.” The depleted population stoked fears that the province would never recover economically.

Thus, as early as 1839, President Bernardo de Sousa Franco lamented that the “disorders and anarchy that engulfed the province” also caused a crisis in public health. In the years since imperial recovery of Belém, “a quarter of the population had been

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9 Dr. Augusto Thiago Pinto, Inspector of Public Health, Belém, 30 January 1861, Série Interior IJJ-9-114, document 250, AN, 2.

10 Herndon and Gibbon, Exploration, 330.
bedridden and a considerable number of them succumbed.”

He noted that ‘nature’ played a vital role in the diseases of the country. Like other paraenses, Sousa Franco blamed frequent and abundant rains and the equatorial heat for intermittent fevers. Sousa Franco argued for an increased diligence in promoting the health and sanitation of the province. Provincial administrators focused most of their attention on draining standing water, assumed by medical contemporaries to be a source of noxious vapors—a happy coincidence, since the real vector, mosquitoes which bred in such water, remained unknown as the disease carriers for a variety of illnesses. Officials laid out regulations concerning standing water and imposed large fines for disobedience, though repeated legislation implies that the proscriptions were often ignored.²

Belém’s public sanitation campaign was a pioneering program in the 1840s and 1850s. It was not until after the 1870s that public health, in the form of sanitation and public hygiene regulation held any significance in most Latin American cities.³ In the United States, few cities had effective public health measures to stop or prevent the spread of disease in the early nineteenth century.⁴ In response to a yellow fever epidemic, Washington D.C. and New Orleans set up temporary health boards, which were revitalized when cholera threatened in the 1830s, though they had limited

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¹¹ Discurso recitado pelo exm.o snr. dotor Bernardo de Souza Franco, prezidente da provincia do Pará quando abrio a Assemblea Legislativa Provincial no dia 15 de agosto de 1839 (Pará: Typ. de Santos & menor, 1839), 12.

¹² Treze de Maio, 10 February 1847, n.667, 2-3, BN.; Regulamento 29 September 1851.; Treze de Maio, 9 January 1856, no.632, 2-3, BN.; Treze de Maio, n.600, 29 November 1855,1-2, BN.; President Ambrosio Leitão da Cunha to Marquis de Olinda, Belém, 27 September 1858, AN, série Interior IJJ-9-113, 261.


enforcement powers. Even the French central government, so admired by the Brazilian elite, did little to protect public health in the first half of the nineteenth century. During epidemics, port cities would enforce quarantine, but the cholera epidemics revealed how ineffective public health measures were in Europe.\footnote{Ibid., 148, 100.}

In contrast, the city council of Belém published ambitious public sanitation measures as early as 1847. They decreed a fine or jail time for throwing garbage into the streets, designating a few acceptable places for waste material. Vendors could also be fined for selling spoiled meat or fish, or that which was deemed “ruinous” to public health (saúde publica) by doctors employed by the city council. Anyone caught selling indigenous “potions” would be fined or spend 6 days in prison.\footnote{“Artigos das Posturas da Camara Municipal desta Cidade,” Treze de Maio, 10 February 1847, n.667, 2, BN.} All residents were required to wash their entranceways every Sunday or suffer a fine or two days in jail. The same punishment applied to those who dirtied another person’s doorway.\footnote{Ibid., 3.}

In 1856, the provincial assembly attempted to regulate sanitation in the cities, towns, and parishes. Any person with swampland who lived in such a populated area would be responsible for draining the area, or face a fine of 10 mil réis or four days in prison. An inspection to insure that the land was kept “clean and free of filth” would be conducted on the last day of each month. The assembly also prohibited individuals from disposing of “infected water” or other waste in the streets, plazas, or other public places. Individual town councils were charged with keeping the roads clean under penalty of 10
mil réis or four days in jail for each member if the town did not follow the law.\textsuperscript{18} Officials in Belém argued for the importance of sanitation based on the prevalent belief that miasmas, bred in filth, caused illness.\textsuperscript{19} The efficacy of such efforts was more difficult to determine, but they represented an early official attempt to address problems the threatened the economic future of the province according to emerging scientific theories about the prevention of disease.

**New Health Professionals and Hospitals**

The medical community in Brazil divided over the new scientific theories coming from Europe. Belém experimented with the application of these new ideas, often with mixed results. Incomplete medical knowledge, along with a lack of formally trained doctors, impeded provincial officials’ ability to properly impose a meaningful public health regime beyond basic public sanitation efforts. Moreover, these local difficulties were complicated by the fact that the practice of medicine in nineteenth-century Brazil combined new scientific theories with older, “traditional” methods. In fact, the 1830s and 1840s marked a key turning point in Brazilian medicine, when academic, or clinical medicine, sought to discredit and replace established traditional medical practice. Recently, scholars have argued that public debates between formally educated doctors and traditional healers subverted the authority of doctors and forced a dialogue with popular medicine.\textsuperscript{20} In turn, questions over authority in medicine created confusion and

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\textsuperscript{18} *Treze de Maio*, 9 January 1856, no. 632, 2-3, BN.

\textsuperscript{19} *Discurso recitado pelo exm.o snr. desembargador Manoel Paranhos da Silva Vellozo, presidente da província do Pará, na abertura da primeira sessão da quarta legislatura da Assembléa Provincial no dia 15 de agosto de 1844*, (Pará, Typ. de Santos & menores, 1844), 20.

\textsuperscript{20} Luiz Otávio Ferreira, "Medicina Impopular: ciência, médica e medicina popular nas páginas dos periódicos científicos (1830-1840),” 101-122, 105, 119; Tânia Salgado Pimenta, “Terapeutas Populares
suspicion among the populace. In addition, many of the remedies offered by academic medicine were just as useless as, or even more harmful than, those suggested by popular medical practices. Even provincial leaders disagreed about the proper method to protect paraenses from disease. Such disagreements and public health policy failures encouraged paraenses to fall back upon traditional medical treatments. Officials battled not only with a new and divided professionalized medical class, but also the sometimes justified skepticism and fears of the populace they were trying to save.

Scientifically trained doctors were a rare commodity, especially outside of Rio de Janeiro and Salvador, Bahia. These cities had the only two medical schools in Brazil. Less than one hundred doctors graduated per year. This actually represented an advance. In Brazil, academic medical training had begun at the military academies, the first secular institutions of higher education in Brazil, which were established by the crown in 1808 after the arrival of the Portuguese court. The Academia da Marinha and the Academia Militar offered surgery courses, and, for the first time, Brazilians did not have to travel to Europe to receive formal medical training. In 1832, new decrees raised the limited schools of surgery in Salvador and Rio to the status of real medical schools. Prior to this establishment of truly professional schools, the very few doctors who practiced in Brazil had done their medical studies at Coimbra in Portugal, or later at Montpellier in Paris. The Brazilians trained in Europe and some foreign doctors working in the country stayed mostly in the large cities, leaving rural areas (where most of the

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21 Regina Xavier, 331.

population lived) without trained physicians. In addition, most doctors could make a larger income in private practice than in public work. The few Brazilians who had the means paid for in-home treatment from such private professionals. Because of the absence of formally trained doctors, then, most Brazilians sought medical care through curers, prayers, healers, homeopaths, “witch doctors,” and other “traditional” medical practitioners.

There were many reasons why this situation was unlikely to change. Two medical schools were not enough to provide sufficient doctors to attend the population of such a large country. Indeed, even the literate often dosed themselves. The Rio de Janeiro publication of Pedro Luís Napoleão Chernoviz’s *Formulário e guia prático de saúde* (1841) became a sensation immediately and gave elite Brazilians in the countryside new access to medical knowledge and cures. The vagaries of new European practice went beyond this. For example, the first surgery in Brazil to use anesthesia took place at the military hospital in Rio de Janeiro in 1847, yet there are records of amputations in Rio without it in 1869. In many towns the pharmacist (boticário) acted as the preeminent medical professional. In the province of Minas Gerais, doctors were often perceived as outsiders whose “cures” were unfamiliar and often frightening to the local people. There was a racial and class element to the


perception of the practice of scientific and traditional medicine, as well. In Minas Gerais, for example, most surgeons or barbers were listed as mulattoes or blacks (both free and enslaved). In Rio, the majority of *sangradores* (barbers or bleeders) were of African descent (sixty-four percent). Of those, fifty-two percent were slaves and thirty-three percent were freedmen. In Pará, indigenous healers also added local knowledge to the possible choices. Though scientifically trained medical men often derided “popular” medicine by such practitioners as “charlatanism,” nineteenth-century scientific medicine, practiced by a social and academic elite, often did not offer better solutions for illness. Sometimes, they were much worse. For example, cholera patients dying from dehydration were given purgatives and bled, hastening death in most cases. Thus, while “most Brazilians went through life never having been admitted to a hospital, or even been treated by a licensed doctor or pharmacist,” in some cases, this may have been a good thing.

European hospitals, and thus by extension the Brazilian hospitals modeled on them, were based on charity organizations and were primarily seen as sanctuaries for the poor. Brazilian cities, often coastal ports, had hospitals, but they mostly treated the

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27 Ibid., 76.


29 Antônio Muniz de Sousa, “Carta de editor,” *Tapajoense*, 3 November 1855, n.15, 2.

30 Figueiredo, *A arte de curar*, 32.

31 Donald B. Cooper, “The New “Black Death,” 469.; An exemplary case is that of the Marquis de Paraná; see the torments (and doubts) associated with the treatment of his fatal illness. Needell, *Order*, 197, 390n.72.

very poor and sailors. Belém’s only hospital, like many others in provincial capitals, was typical, not least in that it was run by the Santa Casa de Misericórdia, a prestigious Catholic charity, whose role in public hospitals was traditional throughout the Portuguese world. The Belém Santa Casa de Misericórdia, founded in 1650, had a small charity hospital, Senhor Bom Jesus dos Pobres, founded in 1787. Forced to deal with small budgets and large demand for its services, especially during the small pox, yellow fever, and cholera epidemics, the Santa Casa constantly verged on bankruptcy. President Sousa Franco complained about the financial mismanagement of the institution, yet he still maintained that the mission to care for the sick was a civilized and noble one. “I remind you, gentlemen, in respect to the good of Santa Casa, that to employ public funds to this worthy end is a current practice in European countries, and has already begun to be adopted in Rio de Janeiro.” Sousa Franco linked the care of the poor and the ill with his understanding of civilization and progress, a moral imperative which was worthy of public funds to make Belém a civilized city. The Santa Casa’s administrators and doctors, including Francisco da Silva Castro, Frutuoso Pereira Guimarães, Américo Santa Rosa, Antônio Lacerda Chermont (Visconde de Arary), Ferreira Cantão, and Correia de Freitas were celebrated in Belém for their courage during the epidemics. 


35 Discurso recitado pelo exm.o snr. doutor Bernardo de Souza Franco,12. The Santa Casa had an agricultural farm with 99 slaves in Rio Capim, and another cattle farm in Ilha da Caviana with 35 slaves, 28 small buildings in the city that brings in an annual rent of 1:500$000, and they received 1:586$600 from the provincial treasury.

The traditional prestige associated with elite Catholic charity, particularly the Santa Casa, is significant here. In Belém, as elsewhere in the Portuguese world, the elite of the province administered the Santa Casa as members of its brotherhood. The latter funded hospital operations, in a manner similar to the practice of cofradías in Spanish America. As such, the links to the political elite were inevitable; often government officials were members of the brotherhood and helped run the hospital. For example, assembly member João Baptista de Figueiredo Tenreiro Aranha administered the charity hospital in 1844.37 Figures for the Santa Casa are hard to come by. However, we do know that in 1844, the charity hospital cared for 365 individuals, of whom 32 died. Though the brotherhood’s property brought in sufficient funds for the maintenance of the hospital, the unexpected epidemics’ increase in patients (in previous years they had no more than 170) put the Santa Casa in debt.

In 1848, the Santa Casa had 313 brothers, most of whom lived in the capital city. The brotherhood owned a fazenda in Tucunduba, next to the city, where they had the Hospital for Quarantine (Lepers); they also owned the Graciosa Fazenda in Rio Capim with eighty slaves, the Pinheiro Fazenda with thirty slaves, the Bom Jesus cattle ranch on Marajó, and another cattle ranch at the mouth of the Amazonas River. Altogether, the Santa Casa owned a total of 158 slaves in 1845, with 112 working on the fazendas, 15 in a trade, and 13 in the service of the hospital. Twelve were apprentices and

37 During the political turmoil of the early 1830s Tenreiro Aranha fled to the United States and returned to Belém in 1834, he served as inspector of the customs house from 1834-1838, when he was fired and imprisoned by General Andréa. He went to Rio to stand trial, however the Regency freed him and once again appointed him inspector. In 1840 he was elected provincial deputy, and later served in the General Assembly as a deputy from Pará. With his support, Amazonas was elevated to provincial status with Tenreiro Aranha serving as the first president (he served for six months before catching ill and returning to Belém). He also helped bring steam navigation to the Amazon in the early 1850s. Raiol, Motins políticos, 207.
children, four were rented out for their labor, and two were ill in the hospital. That year, the Santa Casa also owned 31 buildings, 30 of which they rented out.\textsuperscript{38} From 1844 to 1848, the hospital treated 1,706 people, of whom 173 died. Of the total patients, 453 were listed as poor, 112 as merchant sailors, 454 as army troops, 32 as boarders, 135 as prisoners, 403 as slaves of the hospital, and 117 were under quarantine.\textsuperscript{39}

Debt was a constant concern. By law, the Santa Casa was responsible for the care of poor prisoners and the provincial assembly needed to allocate more money from the budget to contribute to its maintenance.\textsuperscript{40} In 1848, President Jerônimo Francisco Coelho proposed several much needed reforms to allow the charity hospital to fulfill its mission “with dignity and efficiency.”\textsuperscript{41} He argued that the hospital needed a radical reform in its administration. It needed to develop a regimen that gave proper directions to the nurses in the treatment of their patients, and needed to acquire a new building more suited to a hospital. President Coelho lamented the sorry state of financial receipts, which were kept without any organizing method. As a result he ordered a five member commission to examine the general state of Santa Casa with orders to report at the next year's legislative session.\textsuperscript{42}

Despite the administrative troubles, Coelho noted that the Santa Casa hospital of the imperial court had a much higher death rate; of 5,304 patients, 1,380 died (25%),

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{38} Falla dirigida pelo exm.o snr. conselheiro Jeronimo Francisco Coelho, presidente da província do Gram-Pará, à Assembléa Legislativa Provincial na abertura da sessão ordinaria da sexta legislatura no dia 1.º de outubro de 1848, (Pará, Typ. de Santos & filhos, 1848), 93.
\textsuperscript{39} Ibid., 95.
\textsuperscript{40} Discurso Moraes 1845, 43.
\textsuperscript{41} Discurso Coelho 1845, 89.
\textsuperscript{42} Ibid., 90-91.
\end{footnotesize}
compared to the 8% of patients in the paraense hospital. Individuals put under “quarantine” (lazaros) represented the highest number of casualties; about one-third of those admitted died at the hospital. In terms of the state of medical practice, however, the hospital was hardly successful in European, scientific terms. Folk remedies and treatments were common at the hospital. Hopes over a native cure for leprosy had only recently evaporated as ineffective. Traditional healers had unsuccessfully tried to cure the disease using sap from the assacú tree (*Hura Brasiliensis*), which fisherman used to poison fish.\(^43\) In all, concern over debt and a lack of properly trained doctors prevented the hospital from effectively doing more than feed and house the impoverished sick of the city. After 1850, especially, epidemic diseases like smallpox, yellow fever, and cholera strained a charity hospital already stretched thin. Yet, this Belém institution was the province’s best. Outside of the capital city, there were very few institutionalized charities that could even house the sick and administer such mixed medical care.

**Smallpox**

Whether in Rio or Belém, popular fears of professional medical treatment and a lack of institutional infrastructure were particularly tragic in the case of smallpox. Smallpox is a contagious virus transmitted by inhaling infected liquid particles. It kills about twenty to forty percent of those who contract the disease. Smallpox varies from painful pustules with flu-like symptoms to internal pustules which lead to internal bleeding that ultimately kills its victim. Many people died of smallpox even as paraense doctors pioneered the application of new methods of preventing and treating the disease through vaccination.

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Let us begin, however, in the colonial era. After all, as with all equatorial port cities, Belém had long suffered from a constant influx of diseases carried aboard visiting ships. Efforts at controlling disease were limited until the end of the colonial era, and smallpox was one of the most deadly diseases affecting the city. Over the eighteenth century, slave trading ships brought outbreaks of smallpox with their human cargo. Smallpox is an endemic and epidemic illness. For several years only a few people would die, then the disease would come rushing back, taking a horrifying number of victims. 44

In 1788, in an attempt to deal with the problem, Governor Martinho de Sousa e Albuquerque established a quarantine station on one of the islands in Santo Antonio Bay. There were over forty slave ships in port and the governor decreed that they be inspected at the new station, a safe distance from the city. 45 Unfortunately, quarantine measures alone could not stop the disease. In 1798, Sousa de Albuquerque, still colonial governor, now turned to inoculations, a technique used as a folk remedy in Europe, Asia, and Africa. The method had arrived in the Americas in the late eighteenth century. The first version of inoculation, arm-to-arm, took a smallpox pustule from an infected person and placed it into a puncture made on a healthy person, most often on the arm. In many cases, the patient developed a mild form of smallpox, creating the antibodies for lifelong immunity. Patients who naturally contracted smallpox had about a twenty-five percent mortality rate; those who were inoculated succumbed only about two percent of the time. However, inoculation also represented an infection risk, unless

44 Ian Read, “Sickness, Recovery, and Death,” 65.
45 Vianna, 37.
the entire population received the treatment simultaneously. Only a highly organized campaign could safely protect the population. Englishman Dr. Edward Jenner’s experiments in the 1770s uncovered an immunological link between human pustules and the type of pox found on cow udders. The discovery offered a second version of inoculation, an alternative to the more dangerous arm-to-arm method of smallpox vaccination.

Sousa de Albuquerque seized upon Jenner’s method. He noted that this sort of inoculation “was the only method, which had long been adopted by more civilized nations, to prevent this blight.” A government decree of 28 March 1798 ordered the dispersal of the vaccine, which arrived in Pará on 16 June. His program, however, faced stiff resistance from the populace, which feared such a new remedy. The governor blamed the ignorant assumptions and beliefs of the paraenses for the failure of his measures to protect the people of Belém from infection. He also complained that an absence of able professionals was another major obstacle to stopping the epidemic. Even soldiers refused to be inoculated. As a result, Belém suffered a constant scourge of smallpox, which affected Indians disproportionately, for the next decade.

While between 1806 and 1819, smallpox cases declined, in April 1819, smallpox returned with a vengeance. Captain General Antonio José de Sousa Manuel de Menezes, Conde de Vila Flor, first attempted to quarantine those already taken ill, yet


47 McCrea, 30.

48 Captain General of Grão-Para, Dom Francisco de Souza Coutinho to His Majesty Dom João VI, 16 July 1798, reprinted in Vianna, 43-4.

49 Vianna, 44.
over two-thirds of the city contracted the illness. He ordered the first disinfection of the city streets. The crew used hydrochloric acid which produced noxious fumes, an imperfect attempt, though one that marked an early public health campaign, which linked sanitation with disease control.\textsuperscript{50} An English ship in port quickly inoculated children chosen by the governor, with positive results. Conde de Vila Flor announced his results with much fanfare, urging the immediate adoption of inoculation procedures. He also sent instructions to the vicars and magistrates of the interior asking for their support. The campaign paid off, especially in Marajó, where numerous cattle allowed the cow pox pustule, critical to Jenner’s method, to be produced very quickly. The scale and speed of the deaths also convinced the population to try the vaccination. From April to September 1819, 2,220 people had died.\textsuperscript{51}

Comparisons elsewhere are interesting. Smallpox inoculation in Rio de Janeiro actually began later than in Belém. Still, the Junta Vacínica da Corte was created in 1811, and was the first governmental organ created to monitor vaccinations in Brazil. The loss of two brothers and a child to smallpox prompted D. João VI to experiment with Jenner’s new method.\textsuperscript{52} It was not until 1832, however, that Rio established the first obligatory vaccine for children, a step taken in Pará eight years later. The law stipulated that parents who did not vaccinate their children would be fined. Unfortunately, the law was ineffective and seldom obeyed. Such failure proved the rule, not the exception.

The Imperial government created a vaccination commission. They nominated a doctor

\textsuperscript{50} Ibid., 48. As Vianna notes, this gas is noxious to humans, animals, and plants, a side effect unknown at the time. Concentrated hydrochloric acid forms a mist. Both the mist and the solution have a corrosive effect on human tissue, with the potential to damage respiratory organs, eyes, skin, and intestines.

\textsuperscript{51} Ibid., 49-50. For comparison, in 1801 Belém had a population of 12,500

\textsuperscript{52} Fernandes, \textit{Vacina antivariólica}, 31.
with a small annual salary of 400$000 réis paid through the general treasury. Such half-hearted measures were never adequate to address the problem. Vaccination posts in Rio were rare and often ran out of necessary supplies. The public often associated vaccines with outbreaks of smallpox and the spread of syphilis, a fear which later proved correct. The elite of Rio paid for private doctors to inoculate them, preferably with a vaccine made in Britain. In 1846, the new *Instituto Vacínico do Império* introduced regulations for the new method of vaccine production developed in Europe in 1840, and various Brazilian health professionals tried to expand the use of the vaccine. In the end, Rio did not seriously tackle smallpox until the turn of the twentieth century. The attempts to implement vaccination were unsuccessful until then because of the lack of a technical or bureaucratic apparatus to guarantee its application, a low incentive from the authorities, and a hostile population. Even in the early twentieth century, the most serious and successful campaign until then (1904) failed initially for political reasons linked to popular fears.

Such reverses were not a uniquely Brazilian problem. For example, British success with vaccination campaigns varied as well. Through the poor laws, the British made free vaccinations available in the 1840s. The smallpox vaccine became compulsory for infants in 1853, twenty years after the Brazilian decision. However, as in Brazil, it was a seemingly ineffective measure, as new fines had to be imposed in 1867

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53 Ibid., 31-32.

54 Ibid., 32; Chaloub, *Cidade Febril*, 25.

for parents who did not vaccinate their children.\textsuperscript{56} The vaccine’s reception in other Latin American countries varied widely. For example, in Valparaíso, Chile, Jenner’s coxypox vaccine arrived in 1807, and became mandatory in 1887, though the use of variolation (the older arm-to-arm method of inoculation) began in 1765.\textsuperscript{57} The arm to arm method prevented the spread of smallpox, but about ten percent of those inoculated contracted smallpox. In Guanajauto, Mexico the town introduced variolation in 1796, and quickly changed to the smallpox vaccine. In 1840, the town council made the vaccine mandatory for all children and issued fines for those who did not comply.\textsuperscript{58}

In Pará, the first phase in preventing smallpox noted earlier came to an end when the Cabanagem disrupted the earlier pattern of colonial government efforts. Smallpox returned, though records are poor at best. However, after the Cabanagem, a new incentive emerged. High losses from the Cabanagem, a perennial lack of immigration, and high levels of military recruitment made the provincial government fearful that the province would fall into decay without a healthy laboring population. As such, disease was taken seriously in Belém very early after the rebellion was quashed, as provincial presidents struggled to rebuild the province.

As had been the case in the province before, many paraenses contracted smallpox due to a lack of vaccines. When there were doses available, many were too old to be effective, or individuals received more than one dose due to poor record keeping. President Sousa Franco, the first provincial president after the Cabanagem’s

\textsuperscript{56} Porter, \textit{Health, Civilization, and the State}, 128.


\textsuperscript{58} Thompson, 452-3.
repression, also bemoaned the “general human indifference to all illnesses that do not affect them,” and that the many misconceptions “which ruled over the past” were still prevalent in Pará.\textsuperscript{59} Sousa Franco complained that the populace’s ignorance caused the failure of the province’s vaccination program. He asked, “[w]as not the bother of only a few days worth a certain gain of ten or twenty years of life?”\textsuperscript{60}

Sousa Franco argued that “it is necessary to combat the prejudices against the vaccine.” Towards that goal, he instituted a Directorio Vaccinio, whose members were charged with holding vaccination sessions in Belém on certain days in specified locations. In order for “peace to be maintained” and keep the population from revolting against the vaccine, he established, with the approval of the sheriffs (delegados), a similar program in the main towns of the interior. Sousa Franco ordered that the members of the Directorio be reimbursed from the provincial budget for their work. For the interior, the town councils were charged with paying the sheriffs for the numbers of vaccinations they did.

In 1840, the government of the province declared the vaccine mandatory. President João Antonio de Miranda ordered that all the municipal chambers comply rigorously. “The vaccinators will take note of the name, affiliation, sex, age, residence, and condition of the people who present themselves to be vaccinated, and equally those who are absent on the chosen day…they will monthly remit a chart of the people vaccinated to the town council…this chart will also be sent to the government.” The

\textsuperscript{59} Discurso recitado pelo exm.o snr. dotor Bernardo de Souza Franco, prezidente da provincia do Pará quando abrio a Assemblea Legislativa Provincial no dia 15 de agosto de 1839 (Pará: Typ. de Santos & menor, 1839), 12-13.

\textsuperscript{60} Ibid., 13.
chambers were also ordered to assign fines or penalties for those who refused to vaccinate themselves or those in their care.⁶¹

Despite the mandate, the province allocated only a small amount of resources in the budget to vaccinate people in the interior. That amount was doubled in 1843, in a law that authorized the vaccine’s distribution by teachers. Every town had a teacher, though their numbers fell short of the mandated goal.⁶² Town councils struggled to meet these goals, however, due to the constant shortage of vaccines in the interior. President Manuel Paranhos da Silva Veloso complained in 1844 that none of the town councils, with the exception of the capital, provided the records the provincial government required. From February to May 1844, eighty-eight people received the vaccine before Belém ran out of quality material (pus from a smallpox sore) to make more. The Minister of Empire and a Brazilian Minister in London sent material at the beginning of President Silva Veloso’s term to make a vaccine in Belém for distribution in the province. ⁶³

As in other provinces in the empire, there were strong preconceived ideas against the vaccine.⁶⁴ There had been a few cases in which a vaccinated person still contracted smallpox, and this undercut belief in the effectiveness of the vaccine. The president asked for the right to fine or penalize in some way citizens who refused the

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⁶¹ *Treze de Maio*, n. 16, 4 July 1840, President João Antônio de Miranda, 27 June 1840, 1, BN. Vianna, 51-52.

⁶² Law n. 82 of 21 October 1840 allocated 500$000 reis for the program. Law n. 108 of 6 December 1842 and n. 115 of 18 October 1843 elevated the amount to 1:000$000 reis. See Vianna, 51-52.

⁶³ Discurso recitado pelo exm.o snr. desembargador Manoel Paranhos da Silva Vellozo, presidente da província do Pará, na abertura da primeira sessão da quarta legislatura da Assembléa Provincial no dia 15 de agosto de 1844 (Pará, Typ. de Santos & menores, 1844, 23.

⁶⁴ Ibid.
vaccine. He also sought to punish town councils that did not conform to the instructions of 27 July 1840 to chart the vaccinated people living in their cities and towns. A new decree regulating the missions in 1845 also required that the Director General of the Indians provide vaccinations for those living in *aldeias*.

In addition to the structural failures in the vaccination program noted above, *paraenses* were also reluctant to take the vaccine except during epidemics, which erupted continually over the century. Between 1851 and 1852, for example, another smaller epidemic of smallpox claimed the lives of 598 individuals in Belém. In 1851, President Aguiar had reported another outbreak of smallpox among the poorer residents of Belém. He noted that smallpox had already claimed 193 new victims. Two weeks later, the president wrote that the epidemic had slowed. He noted with gratitude that the people of Ceará had started a society to help the victims in Pará and a subscription service to collect donations had sprung up in several other provinces as well. Vaccination records show that 1,198 people were vaccinated in Belém in 1851. Of these, 776 were free and 422 were slaves (714 were men and 484 were women). Santarém, Vigia, and Igarapé-mirim also sent statistics that year. Santarém vaccinated 1,270 (898 free and 372 enslaved; 673 men and 597 women). Vigia vaccinated 84 (46

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65 Ibid., 24.

66 Article 1, Section 21, Decreto N. 426, 24 July 1845, *Collecção das Leis do Imperio do Brasil, 1845*, Tomo 8, parte 2, secção 24, 89.

67 Ibid., 53-57. Epidemics of smallpox occurred every five or six years: in 1866-1867, 1873-1875, 1884, 1888-1889, 1899-1900, 1904-1905.

68 Vianna, 56.

69 President Fausto Agusto de Aguiar to Minister of the Empire Marquês de Monte Alegre, Belém, 2 September 1851, AN, IJJ2 330, Junta de Fazenda 1821-51.

70 President Fausto Agusto de Aguiar to Minister of the Empire Marquês de Monte Alegre, Belém, 16 September 1851, AN, IJJ2 330, Junta de Fazenda, 1821-51.
free and 38 enslaved: 45 men and 39 women). Igarapé-mirim vaccinated 105 (95 free and 10 enslaved; 60 men and 45 women). Unfortunately, once again, after the epidemic passed, the vaccination campaigns could not be maintained. Vaccination rates dropped in Belém from 1,198 in 1851 to 568 in 1852, and 331 in 1853. In 1859, the pattern repeated. The president of Pará once again reported that an epidemic of smallpox struck the provincial capital and spread into the interior of the province. President Manuel de Frias e Vasconcelos asked for more vaccines to be sent from the court to stave off another terrible loss of life.

Campaigns to vaccinate paraenses against smallpox represented an important attempt of nineteenth-century nation building in Brazil. By sponsoring public health campaigns to bring the people of the distant province under the observation and treatment of medical professionals, public officials sought to impose modern, ‘civilized’ measures to prevent further population declines among the Amazon’s potential labor force. However, such top-down efforts never fully succeeded. The reasons are clear: doctors and public officials faced chronic shortages of trained specialists, the lack of a sustained institutional effort and infrastructure, and, finally, enduring popular fears of unproven medical procedures. Perhaps the latter was the most significant factor. Certainly, contestation of the scientific knowledge of disease would be critical, again and again, as residents of Pará faced further threats by other, newer, diseases, especially yellow fever and cholera.

71 Falla que o exm. snr. conselheiro Sebastião do Rego Barros, prezidente desta provincia, dirigiu á Assemblea Legislativa provincial na abertura da mesma Assemblea no dia 15 de agosto de 1854 (Pará, Typ. da Aurora Paraense, 1854), Mapa 17.

72 President Manoel de Frias e Vasconcelos to Minister of the Empire Sergio Teixera de Macedo, Belém, 2 May 1859, AN, série Interior, IJJ-9-114, document 1.
Yellow Fever

According to one observer, “Pará was a remarkable healthy place, and entirely free from epidemics of any kind, until February 1850” when yellow fever first appeared. During the month of April, yellow fever “carried off from twenty to twenty-five a day.” In April of the following year, smallpox returned to Belém. Observers at the time estimated that about one quarter of the population died from these two diseases.\(^{73}\) Symptoms of yellow fever include bilious vomiting and high fever; to these was an added high mortality rate. Yellow fever’s mortality rates depended on whether it was endemic or epidemic. For endemic areas, the mortality rate was between five and ten percent, but the rate could reach up to fifty percent during epidemics, the case in 1850 and 1851. Survivors have lifelong immunity to the disease, which may help explain why foreigners in Belém contracted the disease more readily. Doctors in Brazil had competing theories and cures throughout the nineteenth century, with partisan supporters advancing their own ideas.\(^{74}\)

The origins of Belém’s epidemic yellow fever lie in Bahia. In 1849, Salvador experienced the empire’s first nineteenth-century epidemic of yellow fever. Rio, suspecting the disease to be yellow fever, imposed quarantine on all ships coming from infected provinces, for, after Salvador, yellow fever spread to all of Brazil’s major port cities. Nonetheless, for all its precautions, the epidemic struck Rio de Janeiro in the city’s rainy season of 1849-1850. More than a third of Rio’s population contracted the disease, which reappeared every such season (between October and March), causing

\(^{73}\) Herndon and Gibbon, *Exploration*, 321.

\(^{74}\) Cooper, “Brazil's Long Fight,” 686.
major embarrassment to the court and limiting commercial activities and immigration.\textsuperscript{75}

In the north, although paraenses knew about the first outbreak in Salvador, they did not know it was also affecting Pernambuco’s port capital, Recife, and allowed two ships’ crews coming from that port to enter Belém.\textsuperscript{76} By the time a steamship arrived in Belém with news of the Recife outbreak, it was too late: two sailors had taken ill and had been placed in the charity hospital. In a short time, a majority of the crew of the \textit{Pernambucana} were taken ill as well. Due to the season (the beginning of January, the onset of the region’s cooler months), the illness claimed few lives at first, but beginning in August, in the midst of the warmer, wetter season, the disease affected a staggering proportion of the city.\textsuperscript{77} Out of those who contracted the illness, 593 succumbed. As noted, foreigners were more likely to die of yellow fever.\textsuperscript{78} The public reaction to the epidemic was widespread panic. Whole families, rich and poor, were affected by the illness. The president of the province, Jerônimo Francisco Coelho, contracted the disease in early April. One after another, the four next in line to the vice presidency were also incapacitated with yellow fever, leaving the reins of government with the fifth in command, Coronel Geraldo José de Abreu. The epidemic was not limited to the

\textsuperscript{75} Chalhoub, “The Politics of Disease Control,” 442.

\textsuperscript{76} Vianna, 79.

\textsuperscript{77} \textit{Relatório da presidência do Pará, O Conselheiro Jeronimo Francisco Coelho, 1850}, 10. The president estimated that 12,000 people out of 16,000 inhabitants had fallen ill. Vianna, 80. The fever intensified during the rainy season because that is when the mosquitoes are most abundant.

provincial capital; Soure, Vigia, Cintra, and São Caetano de Odivelas suffered horribly from yellow fever as well.\textsuperscript{79}

The president nominated two medical committees, one composed of three physicians to propose needed sanitation measures, and the other made up by four doctors to tend to the indigent. He also ordered pharmacists to provide medicine to the poor, forwarding the bill to the public treasury. He asked the police to help the poor to supplement their diets. He also prohibited fever victims' burial inside churches (church burial was a common practice). After the initial epidemic of 1850, yellow fever became endemic in Pará before abating in 1851.\textsuperscript{80} In May 1851, President Aguiar reported that although the epidemic had died down, the province continued to make every effort to improve public sanitation in anticipation of the heat of the drier season.\textsuperscript{81} In 1850, in Belém, 588 people died of yellow fever. By 1852, only 59 people succumbed. The number of victims declined further in the following years with 32 in 1852 and 12 in 1853.\textsuperscript{82}

Two opposing theories about the spread of yellow fever divided the medical community (both Brazilian and foreign) in the 1850s. The first theory held that the disease was communicable, or contagious. Physicians who subscribed to the theory believed that the disease came from a poison that could be spread from person to person. As such, they advocated quarantines for ships and for the sick. By contrast, the

\textsuperscript{79} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{80} Vianna, 81-89.

\textsuperscript{81} President Fausto Augusto de Aguiar to Minister of the Empire, Marquês de Monte Alegre, 21 May 1851, AN, Junta de Fazenda, 1821-51, Letters of the Ministers of the Monarch of the Empire, IJJ2 330.

\textsuperscript{82} Falla que o exm. snr. conselheiro Sebastião do Rego Barros, prezidente desta provincia, dirigiu à Assemblea Legislativa provincial na abertura da mesma Assemblea no dia 15 de agosto de 1854 (Pará: Typ. da Aurora Paraense, 1854), Mapa 16.
opposing side believed that noxious miasmas caused yellow fever. Thus, they advocated public sanitation campaigns which would “cure” a locale of the disease. The true vector of yellow fever, mosquitoes, would not be discovered until the turn of the twentieth century, and effectively melded aspects of the two previous explanations. It is contagious, but it is spread by mosquitoes, which are bred in locations of the type associated with miasmas – low, wet, hot areas.

In Pará, yellow fever continued to plague the population well into the twentieth century. Though the mosquito vector discovered by Carlos Juan Finlay (1881) and Walter Reed (1900) was known in Pará, effective mosquito control along with mandatory vaccinations did not take place until the 1930s. As late as 1920, the government in Belém struggled to provide any protection from yellow fever to the population on the frontiers. Repeated epidemics stunted emigration and agricultural development of the province/state. The efforts to fight outbreaks of new diseases in Pará presented officials with unique challenges that complicate our understanding of nineteenth-century nation building in Brazil. Even as officials attempted to articulate a paternalist vision of national modernity for the peoples of the distant provinces, the realities on the ground often prevented them from imposing a coherent nation building project and forced them to improvise responses to ever more threatening epidemics.

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84 Reed’s experiment which proved Finlay’s theory were known in Pará as soon as the results were published, see: H. E. Durham and Walter Myers, Notes on Sanitary Conditions Obtaining in Pará by the Yellow Fever Expedition June 1900, to April, 1901 (Liverpool: The University Press of Liverpool, 1901), 6.
Cholera

Cholera passes from person to person through contaminated food and water, and strikes quickly. Victims suffer from cramps, vomiting, and diarrhea, and could face death from extreme dehydration in as a little as a few hours. Doctors knew little about the cause, spread, or proper treatment of cholera until Louis Pasteur and Robert Koch discovered the causative bacteria in the 1880s. As devastating as outbreaks of yellow fever could be, the cholera epidemic of the mid 1850s “caused more deaths in Brazil than have been officially attributed to yellow fever in all years combined.” For the Empire as a whole, approximately 160,000 people died between 1855-56, most of them in the Northeast. The first known case of cholera to originate in Brazil was reported in Belém on 26 May 1855. Dr. Americo Marques de Santa Rosa examined two young soldiers who seemed to present the classic symptoms of Asiatic cholera. Both died within a few hours. Dr. Santa Rosa, a recent graduate from Salvador, blamed passengers aboard the Defensor, a recently arrived Portuguese ship for introducing the disease. Vice President Ângelo Custódio Correia created a commission of doctors to examine the crew and the ship. They quickly concluded that spoiled food, improper hygiene and medical care caused the strange illness and that Dr. Santa Rosa was wrong. President Barros reported in 1855 that the province’s health was “sad and regrettable.”

87 Donald B. Cooper, “Brazil’s Long Fight,” 673.
88 Ibid.
89 João Maria de Moraes, Exposição, Belém, 31 July 1855, 3.; Donald B. Cooper, “The New “Black Death,” 471.
Before these events, in 1854, the president of the commission of public hygiene, Dr. Francisco da Silva Castro, recommended that suspected ships be quarantined on Tatuoca Island and that a warship should stay close to the island to enforce the quarantine. The imperial government also sent a confidential decree on 10 October 1854 to all the presidents of the maritime provinces to keep a vigilant quarantine. Unfortunately, these diligent measures were ineffective due to the special circumstances of the Portuguese ship, the Defensor, carrying 280 colonists, which had been permitted to dock. After all, the health inspector of the port attributed the recent deaths (of thirty six passengers) aboard ship to malnutrition and poor conditions rather than to cholera, so the passengers were allowed to come ashore. While the medical community of Belém drew up a charter to stop further abuses by the ship captains carrying colonists to Pará, cholera germinated in the navy and made its way to Óbidos unnoticed. Two soldiers were the first victims of the epidemic. On 26 May, they showed symptoms of the illness, succumbing only a few hours later. Two others from the same battalion, and seven more cases in the Navy, gave the medical community ample proof of a coming crisis. Through the end of May, the epidemic attacked the poor of the city who lived in the cidade velha (the old city center), near the port. The medical community was bitterly divided about whether this was the endemic form of cholera or the epidemic, and much feared, Asian variety. Many argued that, as occurred at the Ganges in India, where cholera originated, the Amazon encouraged the spread of the disease, and that the miasmas from the dead plants and animals in the river carried the

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90 Vianna, 106.
91 Moraes, Exposição,3.; Vianna,109.
illness. Still, the disease’s preference for the poor and the illness’s divergence from the known symptoms of Asiatic cholera confirmed the majority opinion that this was a sporadic and endemic cholera. In the end, however, the growing spread of the disease proved the opposite to be true. By 30 June, the president succumbed to the illness. All of the doctors in the capital were engaged in treating the sick, and the provincial government gave them food, medicinal plants, and appointed a commission to distribute the necessary supplies. The charity hospital did not have sufficient space to treat all of the infirm along with the people aboard the ships, so the Santa Casa da Misericodia established, with government support, a hospital in Campina where all the cholera patients could be treated.

“All of the capital, its outskirts, neighboring parishes, and some areas in the interior, like Vigia, Soure, Salvaterra, Cachoeira, Baião, Cametá, and Obidos” became victims of the cholera epidemic. An 1855 report noted that only Monte Alegre, Macapá, and Bragança had avoided the province-wide scourge. Commissions charged with the distribution of medicines and money for foodstuffs were created in Cametá, Santerém, Chaves, and Cachoeira. The commissions were composed of local officials and “citizens who had been distinguished for their charitable and philanthropic acts.”

The acting vice president, João Maria de Morais, lamented the fact that there were simply not enough doctors in the province to treat all of the ill successfully. Hunger also

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92 Vianna, 114, 117, 122-125.
93 Moraes, Exposição, 4.
94 Commission of Public Hygiene of Pará to Vice President João Maria de Moraes, Belém, 30 June 1855, published in Treze de Maio, n. 512, 10 July 1855, reprinted in Vianna, 125; Moraes, Exposição, 4-5.
95 Moraes, Exposição, 5.
threatened the city, and it was getting worse by the day as more and more of the people producing and transporting food fell victim to cholera.\textsuperscript{96}

Pará asked for help from the imperial government, as well as from the presidents of Maranhão, Ceará, and Pernambuco. These neighboring provinces sent Doctors Eduardo Olimpio Machado and Vicente Pires da Motta to assist Pará in its efforts to quash the epidemic. The president of Maranhão also sent flour, manioc, and dried beef to aid the province.\textsuperscript{97} The Court in Rio sent a sixth-year medical student, Antonio David Vasconcelos Canavaso, who was a native paraense.\textsuperscript{98} Dr. Canavaso arrived in Pará on 17 August 1855. He reported that the public hygiene commission of the province immediately disliked him because he was “the first student from a respected medical school,” who used “facts and tests” to prove his remedies.\textsuperscript{99} The capital suffered less from a lack of medical men, so on 4 September Vice President Pinto Guimarães ordered Canavaso to Gurupá and Porto de Móz along with two ships full of supplies from the capital.\textsuperscript{100}

Canavaso boasted of his early successes in the interior towns. Then cholera reappeared in late October. In the space of fifteen days, cholera attacked 204 people. Of those under his care- a number unspecified by the doctoral candidate- only eight

\textsuperscript{96} Ibid., 6.

\textsuperscript{97} Ibid., 15.

\textsuperscript{98} He had previously served as the surgeon at the Santa Casa da Misericordia of the Court; Dr. Antônio David Vasconcellos Canavaso, \textit{Relatorio acércia do cholera-morbus, reinante nas provincias do Amazonas, Pará, Alagoas e Rio Grande do Norte em 1855-1856} (Pará: Typ. Commercial de Antônio José Rabello Guimarães), 1857, 6.

\textsuperscript{99} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{100} Ibid., 6-7; Pinto Guimarães, \textit{Relatorio} 1855, 14-15.
were lost to the illness. The next week, Canavaso continued to Santarém which he found to be a most hygienic city. Although cholera had appeared on the outskirts of the city, many of his patients appeared to be jaundiced, a sign of recovery in the student’s eyes. President Rego Barros then ordered him to help the people of the new neighboring province, Amazonas, in its capital, Barra (Manaus). There the student found a surprisingly healthy population. He noted that for many years the town had not had a single doctor. Outside of town, Canavaso discovered endemic malaria (called sezões or maleitas) which he blamed on swampy miasmas. Malaria rarely caused death among its victims, instead becoming a chronic illness. Feeling his talent to be wasted, Canavaso returned to Pará in December.

Doctors had no idea how to treat cholera. None of the traditional remedies seemed to work. Most offered the “almost standard advice that one should avoid milk, butter, fish of any kind, acidic fruits, and cold drinks.” Doctors tried to bleed their patients, administer purgatives or other teas and opiates. In the first month alone, 670 people fell victim in the provincial capital. Canavaso listed several remedies he used to treat his patients. These included local remedies like Ayapana, an Amazonian herb used to treat all types of gastric problems, fight infection, and eye and ear problems. Healers employed ayapana leaves as a powerful sweat inducing agent. The remedy

101 Ibid., 7.
102 Amazonas became a separate province in 1851.
103 Pinto Guimarães, Relatorio 1855, 8.
104 Donald B. Cooper, “Brazil’s Long Fight,” 674.
105 Ibid., 675.
106 Moraes, Exposição, 9.
could also be used to treat poisonous snake bites. Canavasso also used coca leaves, the bark of Brazilian rosewood (casca preciosa), and Saint Joseph’s herb (mastruço) to make medicinal teas. The medical student also applied foreign remedies like calumba (from Mozambique) and opium to aid his patients.107

While vice president Morais claimed that the disease did not discriminate by occupation, status, or age, he did note that the poor continued to suffer disproportionately.108 Vice President Pinto Guimarães in 1855 noted that agriculture in the province had been seriously affected by the epidemic as “the population of color” (mestiços, negros, tapuios, and índios) suffered much more greatly.109 Historian Arthur Vianna reported that of the 1052 victims in Belém, only 18% of the victims were identified as white.110

The director of the Santa Casa da Misericordia, Doctor Joaquim Fructuoso Pereira Guimarães, and the Public Hygiene Commission were responsible for disinfecting the houses of the sick and making sure that all dead bodies were interred promptly to prevent further infection. President Rego Barros also charged the Chief of Police with examining homes and ordered that all public works in the province be inspected for sanitary conditions. Rego Barros also asked Dr. Pereira Guimarães to form a commission to recommend further sanitation improvements for the city of Belém and its port.111

107 Vasconcellos Canavasso, Relatorio acérca do cholera-morbus, 9.
108 Moraes, Exposição, 5.
109 Pinto Guimarães, Relatorio 1855, 13.
110 Vianna, 169.
111 Exposição apresentada pelo exm.o senr. conselheiro Sebastião do Rego Barros, presidente da província do Gram-Pará, ao exm.o senr tenente coronel d'engenheiros Henrique de Beaurepaire Rohan,
The city of Santarém suffered a great deal from the cholera epidemic which coincided with a new yellow fever outbreak blamed on a recently arrived steamship from Manaus. The town council provided medical care to the poor due to the extreme number of people who had fallen ill. The town council also worried about the need to build a new cemetery. There were fears that graves would have to be dug up in order to hold all of the newly dead. The local newspaper reported that in the month of October 1856, 195 people perished. Of these, 118 were thought to be from cholera, 25 from yellow fever, and 52 from “other” illnesses. Of these, 125 were men and seventy were women. The police had been instructed to disinfect the houses of the dead in the hopes that the epidemic would slow. Another 207 victims were reported from Vigia.

When surveying the damage, “the [medical] commission [could not] be sure of the number of people who have been attacked, [they] estimate[d], however, that more than half the population of the capital has been affected.” In 1856, Rego Barros told his successor that 4,768 people were killed by cholera in the preceding year. Of

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\(^{112}\) Tapajoense, no. 9, 29 September 1855, 1, BN; Tapajoense, no. 15, 3 November 1855, 1, BN.

\(^{113}\) Tapajoense no.5, 7 September 1855, 2-3, BN.

\(^{114}\) Tapajoense, no.7, 15 September 1855, 1-2, BN.

\(^{115}\) Tapajoense, no.18, 24 November 1855, 2, BN.

\(^{116}\) Ze Pitorra, 29 February 1856, Belém, in Tapajoense, no. 34, 8 March 1856, 1, BN.

\(^{117}\) Commission of Public Hygiene of Pará to Vice President João Maria de Moraes, Belém, 30 June 1855, published in Treze de Maio, n. 512, 10 July 1855, reprinted in Vianna, 126.

\(^{118}\) Exposição apresentada pelo exm.o senr. conselheiro Sebastião do Rego Barros, presidente da provincia do Gram-Pará, ao exm.o senr tenente coronel d'engenheiros Henrique de Beaurepaire Rohan, no dia 29 de maio de 1856, por occasião de passar-lhe a administração da mesma provincia. [n.p.],(Pará: Typ. de Santos e filhos, 1856), 8.
those, 1051 were in the provincial capital.\textsuperscript{119} Fearing contagion, the population of the city Cametá had fled, “leaving the sick abandoned, and the fallen unburied.”\textsuperscript{120} To help local authorities deal with the crisis, a military detachment was sent to replace the National Guard who had fled with the appearance of the disease.

Dr. Cassiano Augusto de Mello Mattos reported that cholera had penetrated Amazonas by steamship in late August 1856. In one week, 78 people had taken ill in the town of Bella da Imperatriz. Of those, 38 were reported to be very serious cases, and the Doctor listed their “races” (22 tapuios, 5 mulattos, 4 pretos, 4 brancos, and 3 mamelucos). He listed the common symptoms experienced by the sick: “exhaustion, intense cold, cramps, head and stomach aches, bloodshot eyes, faint voice, vomiting, yellow greenish diarrhea, and pallor.” Locals used Sydenham’s laudanum (an opiate) to calm the symptoms, along with bleeding and other plant based remedies. There were reports of cholera spreading to the surrounding area, but no clear statistics were yet available.\textsuperscript{121}

Developing and implementing treatments for cholera inspired considerable debate among medical practitioners, who often had limited knowledge of the causes or potential cures of cholera and related gastrointestinal ailments. Some medical professionals relied on pseudo-scientific folk remedies. Others, including military doctors, sought the most modern, scientific treatments, while others embraced homeopathic cures that resonated with traditional indigenous practices.

\textsuperscript{119} Ibid., 9.
\textsuperscript{120} Moraes, Exposição, 5.
\textsuperscript{121} Rego Barros, Exposição 1856, 8.
Many doctors reiterated their support for bleeding patients, especially those in grave health.\textsuperscript{122} *Treze de Maio* republished a letter from a doctor working in Rio who insisted that the cholera could be cured with a hot tincture of *mappoam* (perhaps mapoão, a poisonous plant whose sap indigenous Brazilian used on their spears), infused with orange leaves which should be left on the head for twenty minutes until the afflicted began to sweat. The doctor then recommended increasing the dose until the patient sweated profusely, after which the cure could be administered every two hours until the symptoms of cholera disappeared.\textsuperscript{123} In Belém, Ze Pitorra recommended lime juice, as it had been very effective in Pernambuco.\textsuperscript{124} Other local doctors recommended camphor oil, and a diet of rice and meat alone. Any fruit, vegetable, or milk could compromise the patient’s recovery.\textsuperscript{125}

Military doctor João Manuel de Oliveira complained that of those afflicted by the epidemic, the mortality rate was twenty percent, yet he believed that the rate could have been much lower if the victims went to the hospital before they were in the “last stage of illness.”\textsuperscript{126} Doctors João Florindo Ribeiro de Bulhões and Americo Marques Santa Boja spent every moment during the epidemic in the garrison hospital, until they were ordered by the provincial government to Chaves to assist the population there. Retired naval surgeon Francisco de Paula Cavalcanti de Albuquerque also devoted a great deal

\textsuperscript{122} Dr. Cassiano Augusto de Mello Mattos, in Commission of the Central Government of the Province of Amazonas, 9 October 1855, in *Treze de Maio*, 5 January 1856, no. 629, 2.

\textsuperscript{123} Dr. Emilio German, “Ainda o Cholera-Morbus,” *Treze de Maio*, 10 January 1856, no. 633, 2-3, BN.

\textsuperscript{124} Ze Pitorra, 29 February 1856, Belém, in *Tapajoense*, no. 34, 8 March 1856, 1, BN.

\textsuperscript{125} Drs. Achille Hoffman and L. Miguel, *Tapajoense*, no. 39, 3 May 1856, 3-4, BN

\textsuperscript{126} Division Surgeon Dr. João Manoel de Oliveira, *Relatorio*, 1 January 1856, Belém, copy in President Sebastião do Rego Barros to Minister of War Marquês de Caxais, 11 March 1856, AN, Série Guerra, IG-1-544, Ministry of War, Pará, correspondencia do presidente, 1856-7, 20.
to the hospital. By their own accounts, military doctors fought “with weapons of science against fatal illnesses.” 127 If the challenges of combating disease in Belém confounded medical professionals and public officials, alike, the complications in the provinces proved even more difficult to overcome.

The Punished and Destroyed Hinterlands

Population centers in the province of Pará all clung to the banks of the major rivers and depended on trade for their survival. As such, they were vulnerable to the same illnesses as the provincial capital. In addition to smallpox, yellow fever, and cholera, interior provincial cities and small towns faced constant unidentified fevers (most likely malaria). Additionally, tuberculosis might have been the most deadly disease in nineteenth-century Brazil, but it was seldom mentioned in the historical record. A disease closely associated with poverty, it was often seen as untreatable. 128

Malarial fevers continued to plague interior towns and remote settlements with particular ferocity. Military outposts, missions, and other trade posts also suffered from a lack of trained physicians, medical supplies, or communication networks that could alert the population to an epidemic. Successive presidents attempted to tame tropical nature (draining swamps and clearing waterways) in order to cure the interior of constant fevers believed to be caused by the unhealthy environment. Many of these projects, however, were underfunded and never became more than prescriptive. The provincial assembly made public health and sanitation (hygiene) the responsibility of the local town councils, yet the repeated exhortations to take the matter seriously show the lack

127 Ibid., 21.

of cooperation (based on inability, mismanagement, lack of resources, or disinterest) of local leaders. Provincial presidents continued to send medical supplies and the few doctors Belém could spare as a show of their support, but “fevers” were a constant presence in provincial small towns.

Macapá, a small city and military outpost located about 200 miles from Belém, in particular, suffered from debilitating fevers. The city, located close to the equator in a tropical rainforest, received plentiful rainfall, a perfect breeding ground for the mosquitoes which spread fevers. Provincial officials blamed the swamps surrounding Macapá for the constant fevers; as with yellow fever, they believed that the swamps bred the poisonous “miasmas” that were the cause of illness. Provincial officials argued that draining the swamps was a crucial step in improving the sanitation of the city, but the task would prove impossible each time it was attempted.\textsuperscript{129}

Endemic fevers reappeared in Macapá each year with varying strength. Presidents cheerily reported an improvement in the attacks one year, and then the next noted the sad circumstance forcing them to extend aid from the provincial budget to the feverish outpost. The doctor attending the troops in Macapá reported an epidemic of fevers attacking the settlement in December 1843. Fortunately, it was short lived. President Pontes wrote to thank him for his service to “the state and to humanity during that crisis.”\textsuperscript{130} In 1844, President Manoel Paranhos da Silva Veloso ordered a military surgeon, Francisco de Paula Cavalcante de Albuquerque and a pharmacist with

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item[\textsuperscript{129}] President Fausto Agusto de Aguiar to Minister of the Empire Marquês de Monte Alegre, Belém, 9 June 1851, AN, IJJ2 330, Junta de Fazenda 1821-51.
\item[\textsuperscript{130}] Rodrigo de Sousa da Silva Pontes to Surgeon of the Armada Francisco Xavier de Moraes, Macapá, 3 February 1843, APEP, códice 1158, correspondência de diversos com o Presidente da Provincia, 1842-43.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
“appropriate medicines” to leave Belém for the sickly city. Administrators tried to put corpo de trabalhadores laborers to work draining these swamps. Workers constantly ran away, causing their commanding officers to complain to Belém about the lack of able-bodied laborers. Much like other infrastructure projects (Chapter 3) the plans were really only on paper.

The surgeon sent in 1844 to examine conditions told the president that the illness was not caused by the miasmas from the swampland in Macapá between the fort and the town, but rather by those coming from the slaughterhouse and salting houses built within the village, and in a place where the wind constantly carried the poison toward town. Additionally, he noted that the village suffered from poor foodstuffs and the residents practiced unsafe habits, such as taking cold baths in the river in the middle of the afternoon. The slaughterhouse was moved to a more appropriate location, the ditches were cleaned, and the swampland in town drained. These plans were not successful, however, and Macapá continued to be plagued by fevers. The next president, João Tomás Henriques, urged the military commander to have the police increase their “zeal” in monitoring public hygiene and the habits of their citizens to keep the fevers away. Henriques ordered the commander to keep a careful record of the sex, age, and conditions of those taken ill. There is no record that any of this availed.

The town of Gurupá also suffered from a number of debilitating fevers and other diseases. Village vicar and missionary José Antonio Alvares pled with Belém to send

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132 President João Tomás Henriques to Military Commander of Macapá, Captain Alberto José de Mello, 17 November 1843, in Treze de Maio, no. 365, 29 November 1843, 2, BN.
farinha (manioc flour), wheat, and other essentials. So many people had taken ill that there was a high risk of starvation. Alvares also asked for any assistants or supplies that could be spared for the mission.\textsuperscript{133} The symptoms of the epidemic included an inflammation of the bowels, intermittent fevers that lasted from 15 to 30 days, and eye pain, especially in children. Gurupá and the surrounding area faced a new variation of the epidemic, which presented as constipation with strong cold flashes, and other signs of fever. Alvares noted sadly that many residents already had one illness when they contracted the other. Alavares concluded that the disease was far worse for pardos, especially the Indians (whom he included in this category).\textsuperscript{134} He had prescribed ipecac for purging, salt and bitters to wash the body, powdered sulfur and quinine to cut the fever, and a mix of chili peppers and limes to avoid sepsis. Despite his remedies “many had died especially Indian women.”\textsuperscript{135}

The provincial government sent army surgeon Francisco Xavier de Morais Pereira, who reported that from March 1842 to January 1843 between 900 and 1000 had died out of a total population of 1900 souls. He noted the unhealthy swamp and the lakes in the immediate area, but did not place all the blame on the environment, as many people drank too much fermented manioc juice, and ate poisonous fruits and poorly preserved fish. In addition, many people suffered fatal animal bites while hunting or fishing. The surgeon also noted with disdain that the inhabitants’ constitution,

\textsuperscript{133} Vicar and Missionary Jose Antônio Alvares to President João Tomás Henriques, Gurupá, 20 November 1843, APEP, caixa 89, 1843-46, ofícios das autoridades religiosas, document 31.

\textsuperscript{134} President João Tomás Henrique to Military Commander of Macapá, Captain Alberto José de Mello, 17 November 1843, in Treze de Maio, no. 365, 29 November 1843, 3, BN.

\textsuperscript{135} Ibid., 4.
normally so sluggish and debilitated, made it difficult to tell if the villages were suffering from an epidemic.\textsuperscript{136}

In Porto de Móz and Gurupá another fever had developed, yet it was reported that its character was not as malignant and was more responsive to treatment. President Henriques wrote to the town council urging them to adopt Morais Pereira’s recommendations. Most importantly, Gurupá needed to relocate the town cemetery and create a place for clean water storage.\textsuperscript{137} President Silva Veloso reminded his colleagues in the provincial assembly that “public health was something that always deserved great care and solicitude from Government…in any epidemic a commission of doctors, recognized for merit and experience, should be sent to scrupulously explain in detail the possible causes of the illness, the way in which to address these, and the most convenient and appropriate therapeutic methods to cure these plagues.” He noted, however, that “this is not possible in practice because there are not enough able doctors in this city.” The few doctors available were not able to leave the sick they had in their care, and military surgeons were sent, instead, with medicine and given the few funds available from the treasury. According to Veloso, “[t]errible illness is disgracefully too frequent in this province.”\textsuperscript{138} In response, the president created a commission composed of Doctors Marcelino José Cardoso, Francisco da Silva Castro, José da

\textsuperscript{136} Discurso recitado pelo exm.o snr. desembargador Manoel Paranhos da Silva Veloso, presidente da provincia do Pará, na abertura da primeira sessão da quarta legislatura da Assembléa Provincial no dia 15 de agosto de 1844 (Pará: Typ. de Santos & menores, 1844), 21.

\textsuperscript{137} President João Tomás Henriques to the Town Council of Gurupá, 23 January 1844, in Treze de Maio, 31 January 1844, no. 382, 1, BN.

\textsuperscript{138} Discurso recitado pelo exm.o snr. desembargador Manoel Paranhos da Silva Veloso, presidente da provincia do Pará, na abertura da primeira sessão da quarta legislatura da Assembléa Provincial no dia 15 de agosto de 1844 (Pará: Typ. de Santos & menores, 1844), 22.
Gama Malcher, and Camillo José do Valle Guimarens to examine the causes and the
development of the sickness, and to develop methods to remove it.\footnote{Ibid., 22-23.}

In sum, interior towns rarely had proper scientific medical treatment. Residents
thus often turned to traditional indigenous medicinal practices. For example, in the small
town of Oerias, about 125 miles upriver from Belém, the local military official
complained to the provincial government that the townspeople turned to indigenous
medicines to cure their fevers. He claimed that these remedies were inadequate and
asked the vice president to send proper medicine to treat the current epidemic. He
noted that so many residents had taken ill that there were many houses left without a
morsel of food, and that he feared famine was not far behind.\footnote{Commander José Joaquim Alves Picanço to Vice President João Maria de Moraes, Oerias, 5 October 1846, APEP, caixa 105, 1846, document 185.}

In 1845, Vice President Dr. João Maria de Morais began his discussion of public
health in Macapá, Marzagão, Porto de Móz, and Gurupá which were still not free from
fevers that had “punished and destroyed” these towns for the last three years. He
blamed this on a lack of scientific medical knowledge and on the failure to remove the
causes of the fever. However, he claimed that the government was working toward
eradication, and that the disease now showed a more “benign character” and was less
destructive. The government would continue to send medical help to these places, and
hoped that little by little the earlier healthy environment of these towns would be
restored.\footnote{Moraes, Discurso, 1845, 42.} One year later, Dr. Morais happily reported that the sanitation of the
province had improved, relative to the previous years, and that the fevers in Macapá
had lessened in their deadliness, only claiming 60 people from August 1845 to July 1846 - a major victory compared to previous years.

Unfortunately, Monte Alegre suffered a violent attack of fever in August 1845, victimizing the destitute worst of all. The government acted quickly, sending the surgical assistant of the third artillery battalion, José Soares de Sousa, with the "necessary medicines" to combat the illness. From the surgeon's communications, it appears that the illness responded to the remedies and gradually disappeared. In Gurupá, the effects of the disease were so diminished that no one died from fever in the last year. Yet Portel suffered greatly, with 147 deaths to fever, “a number without doubt considerable in relation to the population of that county.” Cametá, Chaves, and Ega also suffered. However, the fevers there were less intense and did not produce such a large scale effect as they had in other areas. Most people who succumbed to these fevers were indigents, which Dr. Morais argued "is natural, because they frustrate the use of medicine, diet and other necessary measure by using, without knowledge or digression, herbs, roots, and other remedies that aggravate the illness and speed them along to their tombs." Morais claimed that “the government needs funds with which they can promptly and effectively help and avoid a reduction in our already too small population.”

In his next annual report to the legislature, Dr. Morais reported that various villages around Santarém and Macapá still suffered from intermittent fevers and that the government was trying to fund the necessary medical care to prevent another

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142 Ibid., 23.
catastrophic loss of life. In 1847, the municipal chamber of Maués (a small town in the comaraca do Alto Amazonas) wrote to Belém to complain about the lack of proper medical supplies. The town also lacked a trained doctor to treat the illnesses affecting the citizens of the town. Struck by fevers, the municipal chamber had no recourse for their residents. The urgency and frustration that Dr. Morais felt highlights just how difficult it was for public officials to be effective in the interior. If Belém faced challenges from a dearth of trained medical professionals, the lack of an adequate institutional support network, and the persistence of traditional popular remedies, such problems were exacerbated in the vast countryside of the Amazon and its interior towns. Yet, however haphazard and uneven it may have been, there was an increased state presence in the interior as a result of the implementation of public health measures and public sanitation campaigns.

In 1854, Pará once again suffered constant fevers, which were blamed on the “abundant rain that fell constantly throughout the province … and alternated with an intense equatorial heat.” As one senator said “the rivers of Para are so unhealthful that not even animals can survive along their banks.” The town of Macapá established a commission charged with treating the poor who were stricken ill. President Sebastião do Rego Barros had been informed, however, that the commission only “nominally existed” and was not providing “anything to anyone.” Barros called upon the

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143 Ibid., 18.
144 José Bispo to President Herculano Ferreira Pena, Maués, 26 June 1847, APEP, caixa 115, 1847-49, document 88.
145 Falla que o exm. sr. conselheiro Sebastião do Rego Barros, prezidente desta provincia, dirigiu à Assembleia Legislativa provincial na abertura da mesma Assemblea no dia 15 de agosto de 1854 (Pará: Typ. da Aurora Paraense, 1854), 18.
146 Cooper, “Brazil’s Long Fight,” 684.
commander of the local corpo to drain the swamp, promising that a shortage of workers would be swiftly dealt with to achieve this important improvement. Barros assured the legislative assembly that the imperial government had assumed a primary interest in this matter, and endowed the province with an institution that was necessary for the future: a commission of public hygiene. Barrios also recommended that a European midwife be contracted to work in the province and establish a school in the capital. He thanked God for protecting the province from another outbreak of smallpox … but he lamented a lack of able doctors to properly administer the province’s vaccination campaigns. In many ways, he summarized both the aspirations and the failures of public authority in regard to public health in the vast province.

Conclusions

In the decades following the violence of the Cabanagem, public officials seeking to unlock the economic potential of the Amazon faced a population crisis. Not only had the region been devastated by social violence, the great killers of the nineteenth century, smallpox, yellow fever, cholera, and malaria ravaged the people of Grão-Pará. In addition to establishing a labor regime with the corpo de trabalhadores and attempting to settle and defend the frontier with religious missions and military settlements, the Brazilian state attempted to extend its reach into the provinces by promoting the professionalization and institutionalization of scientific medicine through public health and sanitation campaigns. In the end, most of these efforts failed. The extension of national authority was neither teleological nor inevitable. It was always

147 Barros, *Falla* 1854, 19.
148 Ibid., 20.
halting and uncertain. Public officials were frustrated at turns by the relative absence of trained medical professionals, by the difficulties of implementing policy in distant provincial towns and their even more remote hinterlands, and by the resistance of local populations that suspected new forms of knowledge and favored traditional practices and methods. Yet, hybrid approaches, such as those employing homeopathic remedies, allowed health care professionals some traction in the Amazon and each successive epidemic prompted officials to establish increasingly well-organized public health institutions. Nonetheless, despite small successes, tropical diseases continued to plague the economic development of the province.¹⁴⁹

I have argued that Brazil’s nation-building efforts in Amazonia involved a multi-faceted attempt to address the concerns of depopulation left in the aftermath of the violence of the Cabanagem. As in other contexts, the challenges of preventing tropical diseases represented one aspect of a larger nation-building project. However, the fragmentary, evidence from Brazil should caution making overly broad generalizations. The haphazard approach that Brazilian officials applied to each successive epidemic illustrates that nation building was a dynamic and contingent process that involved the interactions of multiple historical actors with complex and shifting interests in a daunting disease environment. Never a concerted and coherent project, nation building in nineteenth-century Brazil unfolded in response to both the often unspoken paternalist assumptions about the virtues of “civilization,” and the ongoing negotiations among the imperial government, the regional elite, and the provincial masses in a context of formidable geographic challenges.

In 1808, the Portuguese Court fleeing Napoleon’s army relocated to Brazil. A liberal revolt in Portugal (1820) persuaded D. João VI to return to Lisbon. Upon news that the Portuguese intended to resubmit Brazil to the colonial status that D. João VI had eliminated, many paraenses began to support the call for independence, as did others across the country. D. Pedro, D. João VI’s heir, put himself at the head of a growing independence movement. In 1822, D. Pedro declared Brazil an independent empire and was acclaimed and then crowned its first emperor.\footnote{Russell-Wood, \textit{From Colony to Nation}, 37.; Barman, \textit{Brazil}, 42-50.; Schultz, \textit{Tropical Versailles}, chap. 5} Disatisfaction with the new monarch’s policies and consequent political deadlock led to his abdication in favor of his five year old son in 1831. Given the emperor’s age, the government in Rio declared a Regency to rule in his name.

The Regency (1831-1840) offered the elite of Brazil the opportunity to reformulate a new political order. The consequent elite struggles over that order also allowed subalterns the space to articulate their own visions of the nation and to challenge the elites. The resulting decline of central authority and destabilization caused a conservative backlash that successfully restored centralized control to Rio de Janeiro and the emperor. The Cabanagem, and the threat cabanos caused to national territorial integrity, frightened the imperial elite and added to the belief that the population of Brazil was unready for foreign models of liberalism. The reactionary party that dominated the state argued that Brazil’s particular mixture of “civilization” and “barbarism” made the importation of foreign liberal models naïve and demanded a particular adaptation of
them. One only had to recall the racialized violence of the Cabanagem for evidence of this necessity.

Of course, the Cabanagem was more than the barbarous race war depicted by the contemporary Rio press or later historians. The Cabanagem represents an ideological struggle over the meaning of the liberal reforms coming from Rio and a critical engagement with the debates over citizenship and governance. In Belém, during the early hours of 7 January 1835, when the soldiers turned on their officers in open rebellion, cabanos claimed what they understood as their rights to representative governance under Brazil’s constitutional monarchy. They installed a president of their own, while insisting upon their loyalty to the over-arching national authority of the constitution and the distant monarch. The presence of imperial troops, as well as local elite members concerned about the threat to the established order, engulfed the entire province in civil war. The government in Rio finally dispatched a major force against the cabanos in 1836. The general in charge followed a brutal policy of extermination. He burned and brutalized the territory still considered in rebellion, quickly achieving military supremacy in an area long suffering under civil war and anarchy.

In the Amazon, nation building projects like the corpo de trabalhadores, which forced free people of color to work for the state, linked the poor of the region more intimately to the needs of the nation. Control of free labor, very difficult in a place with seemingly endless forest and unclaimed land, became the obsession of the elite in post-Cabanagem Belém. Sanitation campaigns and mandatory vaccine programs allowed the elite to believe that that they were helping the poor of Pará, while simultaneously insuring that the small supply of able workers would continue to be available for
exploitation. Military colonies attempted to eliminate safe harbors for criminals, runaway
slaves, and other undesirables (as defined by the state) in order to control the
underclass of the Amazon. Territorial concerns also drove the creation of military
colonies and missions. Protecting the River-Sea from foreign encroachment, the act of
mapping and defining national territorial limits for the first time, and reviving a “civilizing"
mission among the indigenous peoples, signaled a new presence of the state in the
deep interior of the Amazon. In the end, the Cabanagem, its repression, and the
aftermath of state intervention and control allowed Rio's statesmen to dominate the
region and its population, in a process that broke or co-opted local power brokers and
made the once rebellious province a loyal support of the imperial government.

The Monarcha: Twenty years after the final cabanos surrendered with bows and
arrows, one of Rio's appointed presidents to Belém became the first to tour part of the
vast interior of his province. For such heroics, the local paper chronicled the president’s
journey through some of the major towns and military encampments. If we follow the the
voyage of the provincial president and his entourage, we catch a glimpse of a province
that ultimately experienced the consequences and the limits of decades of Brazilian
nation building.

In March 1860, President Dr. Antonio Coelho de Sá e Albuquerque boarded the
steamship, Monarcha, for a sixteen-day tour of the interior. The innovations of
steamship travel connected the interior to Belém as never before and helped Rio to
further centralize control of the Amazon. What had two decades of nation building
actually brought to paraenses? Accompanied by a retinue of officials, the president left
the docks of Belém at eight in the evening and arrived at Cametá the following
afternoon. Not wishing to call attention to himself, the president ordered that his presence remain hidden from the cametaenses. The following day the president toured the city with local officials as his guides. The ever-present Tocantins River had claimed many of the buildings; the reporter covering the tour noted that many structures along the banks were collapsing or sinking into the river. The president found the public jail and the city council to be in serious need of repair. Both were located in an “old two-story house, narrow, unhealthy, horribly dirty and in some places ruined.” The city boasted three schools, two for boys (247 enrolled) and one for girls (28 enrolled). The Additional Act of 1834 gave the provinces the responsibility to educate their children, but imperial subsidies for primary and secondary education allowed many provinces to maintain primary schools. In 1845, Rio withdrew this financial support. Nationally, fewer than 61,700 students were enrolled in primary schools. Secondary schools fared much worse, 3,700 students enrolled nationally.² Cametá did not have a secondary school and any family with means hired a private tutor or sent their children to Belém. The city had 25 gas lamps and one paved street for a population of 4,000.³

As the steamship passengers continued along the Tocantins, Breves, Tajapuru and Tiquara Rivers, they saw very few people along the banks. They saw “very few properties that deserve the name fazenda, most were palm huts with only cover (roofing), without walls or any divisions, they were separated by leagues and leagues or even more!” Observers, however, began to note the beginnings of the rubber boom. Rubber trees grow far apart in the Amazon, to survive a native pest, and collection

³ Torres, “Viagem,” 22 March.
required rubber tappers to leave their homes in search of rubber. Often rubber tappers were away for months at a time. “We were told that in this archipelago of this river there are hundreds of people of both sexes working in the extraction and fabrication of elastic latex.”

Landing at the small town of Gurupá the following day, the president was not met by any local authority. He headed to the municipal chamber building where the sheriff of the police, Lieutenant Conceição, also lived, and seeing that he was ill, Albuquerque went to the jail. The president found “basically a hallway” in complete disrepair. He ordered the prison to be opened but no one knew where the key was. It was finally found outside on a railing. Inside were two military recruits, both ineligible—one was an only child and the other was ill—so the president excused them from service. The president then went to the colonial fort, scene of many battles between the Portuguese and the hostile Tupinamabá, and, more recently, fighting between cabanos and legalist forces. A reporter sadly noted that the Fort of Gurupá, a “theater of boldness, courage, intrepidity, and love of country of our forbearers, is today reduced to pieces of walls that still attest to the present generation the force and undefeated life of the past generation.” According to members of president’s party, the current detachment of the National Guard “is encamped and quartered in a miserable shack constructed together with the jail at the gate of the fort…of the ten weapons that are here, none are in a state to fire a shot!” The president was even less impressed with the state of the school and the church. The local instructor protested that the extreme poverty of the area did not

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5 Ibid.
allow his pupils to purchase books or other instructional material; they only had one scripture between them. The president was unmoved by these arguments, noting that poverty among such natural abundance was caused by the laziness of their parents.

Gurupá (about 320 people), one of the small villages plagued with fevers throughout the post-Cabanagem period, still struggled with constant illness. The president allocated funds to build a canal linking two small *igarapes* to keep stagnant water from continually infecting the townspeople. Albuquerque also created a local commission to study more sanitary methods of collecting potable water than the one currently being used by residents.6

In the small town of Prainha, Albuquerque visited three families that had suffered through fevers without medical attention. One of them was a deputy sheriff. Our reporter notes with pride that the blighted poor rejoiced that the primary authority of the province visited their own homes. His visit was what “paternal government is able to offer the people in these cases.”7 The next day, the tour arrived at Santarém. In 1860, the city had five main streets and a square, with a population of about 1,000 souls. Albuquerque found that many of the public buildings were in desperate need of repair. The jail held two slaves at the request of their masters and four military recruits waiting for judgement.8 The school enrolled over one hundred students, but only forty were in attendance. The supplies for the school were in a terrible state, and the president ordered the disbursement of treasury funds to order new tables and books. The town council of Santarém had been caring for sick refugees from the neighboring

6 Ibid.

7 Torres, “Viagem,” 27 March.

8 Brazilian law allowed masters to punish their slaves by incarcerating a slave in public jails.
communities of Urumanduba and Maiaca since the same malignant fever which had claimed so many. The president ordered that medicine be sent from Belém for the populace. Juvenal Torres, a reporter traveling with the president, lamented that weak bodies, unsanitary housing, and unscientific methods of treatment kept the disease alive and well.9

The military colony of Óbidos, founded six years previously about 100 km up the Amazon River next to the town of the same name was the next stop on the president’s voyage. The colony of about one hundred people was the last settlement before the boundaries of the new province of Amazonas began. The small colony had only one pottery kiln, yet the reporter Torres assured his readers that “the fertility of the paraense soil is so great that even the farmer who is short on time will still reap the incomprehensible generosity of nature.” Torres questioned the wisdom of the colony’s location so close to the established city, which made desertion of “government contracted emigrants” almost inevitable. The military colony was really more of a small farm, “a country house on the outskirts,” that supplied the city of Óbidos. The government had spent a fair amount on the project without the desired results. Nevertheless, the city of Óbidos benefited from that one kiln, which might have been the only commercial pottery operation in the area. Torres proclaimed, “This is not utopia: in a city on the edge of the Amazon… with an absence of workers and the labor methods of a modern economy.” He declared that the vast resources might one day be exploited if only the region’s population would show their industry and perserverance.10

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On the day of Albuquerque’s visit, the townspeople of Óbidos hid their children from school fearing it was merely a ruse for military recruitment. In fact, the local teacher confided that the only reason locals sent their children to school at all was assurances that attendance granted a deferral.\textsuperscript{11} As the prisoners encountered by the president show, the exemptions for recruitment were largely ignored. Forced military recruitment continued to be a constant threat for paraenses, especially because the índios of the province were prized as excellent sailors.\textsuperscript{12} The town of Óbidos also had the Colegio of São Luis Gonzaga which educated the “young Indians of a very numerous tribe.” Government officials hoped that these boys would, at the end of their education, “take notions of civilization to their relatives and compatriots.” These students, paid for by the provincial government, would be “the instruments of the government and of religion to reform the habits, industry, and religious notions of their respective tribes.”\textsuperscript{13}

The fear of military recruitment kept many paraenses away from the main towns. Albuquerque heard of an índio, 22 years old, who came to the local school often for instructions. The man “lived in the constant shadow of fear, one that poor people have about recruitment.” The president called for the young man and immediately issued a letter of exemption from recruitment. The reporter lamented that the fear of recruitment “caused by bad intentioned men” made “the glorious profession of arms” something to be feared.\textsuperscript{14} The reporter, Torres, implied that such coersion was not a government

\textsuperscript{11} Torres, “Viagem,” 30 March.
\textsuperscript{12} Alarcón Medeiro, “Incompreensível colosso,” 221-222. For more see Chapter 5.
\textsuperscript{13} Torres, “Viagem,” 30 March.
\textsuperscript{14} Torres, “Viagem,” 31 March.
sanctioned activity, yet the political system Albuquerque represented functioned through the intimidation of local electors by their local political bosses. The threat of military recruitment was a common method of insuring political support for the ruling party during elections.

To that point, the president and his entourage had traveled 744 miles on the Amazon, from its mouth to the western frontier of the Province of Pará. Throughout his journey, Albuquerque found local notables fighting for control over their local institutions. Caused by “personal resentments, differences in beliefs, and the imprudence of the authorities, “infighting over jurisdiction rarely represented “true zeal for…the protection of political or civil rights of the citizens.” Torres confided that true authority, represented by the provincial president, did not care for personal glory, but only for that of the law.15

On his return journey, Albuquerque stopped at the main church of the city of Monte Alegre, one of the large public works programs last assigned to the corpo de trabalhadores, after a beginning dated to 1838. The church still needed to be completed, though its outline was very grand indeed. Torres lamented loss of the past religious zeal that encouraged missionaries to go into the “sertão” and bring the word of god to the people with no thought to their own personal gain or safety. By contrast, the Vicar of Monte Alegre, in a leaky and uncomplete chapel, asked for money from the government to pay laborers to complete the church, rather than relying on tithes from the local parisoners. The Vicar did not talk to his flock or inspire religious feeling.16 Of course, the reporter forgot that many missionaries coerced labor from their charges, and

that as recently as 1857, the Church had requested laborers from the provincial
government.

The *Monarcha* next traveled to the city and military encampment of Macapá near
the northern border of Pará and French Guiana. The president found the fort in good
order, yet the port needed immediate repair. The city itself consisted of small shacks
and two public buildings: a chapel with no roof and no vicar and a military hospital
located in an old church which lay half crumbling. Rubble from a Portuguese jail built in
1752 could still be seen in the town square. A private home housed the town council as
well as the current jail. Prisoners were kept in miserable conditions and the town council
did not provide them food. These prisoners were forced to work under guard to find a
means to feed themselves. Prison sentences were unduly long and onerous.\(^\text{17}\) Torres
implied that Macapá was unique in its poor treatment of prisoners, yet the jails of every
city the tour visited seemed to be less than desirable. Jails, in the interior at least, often
held army recruits and slaves. Justice for other crimes was most certainly exacted in an
extra-legal manner.

More important, despite decades of government assistance, the poor health and
well-being of Macapá’s residents kept the city from reaching its full potential. The city’s
proximity to swamps and wetlands continued to be the focus of the provincial
government’s effort to cure the fevers that kept residents ill and discouraged much
needed emigration to the area. Indeed, travel in the remote region proved to quite
difficult even for the president’s entourage traveling by steamship.

\(^{17}\) Torres, “Viagem,” 2 April.
The president’s itinerary called for a journey 25 leagues north up to the military colony of Pedro Segundo; however, the dangerous tidal waves of the Rio Araguari, known as the pororocas, prevented the group from venturing north.  

The struggling colony had difficulty maintaining communication or getting supplies during the spring months, when pororoca waves prevented boats from making the journey. Despite the technological achievements of steam travel, the Monarcha was still deemed to be no match against such waves. Instead, the travelers headed south to Breves, the only town on the far northern side of Marajó Island. A town of about 500 people, it had small straw-covered buildings in the town square and two primary schools, one for each gender. Torres noted that the Amazon Steamship Company, which had generously offered them their passage, offered a remote town like Breves boundless economic opportunity.  

Today, however, Breves remains isolated and small; three days voyage from Belém. The optimism with which government officials and the reporter viewed the economic development and potential of the province was central to the account, whatever the factors that undercut them.

Indeed, the true reason for chronicling the president’s journey, other than to enhance his reputation, was precisely to boost that potential and to publicize the possibility for economic development. Extolling the endless possibilities of the Amazon is a common theme in the historiography of the Amazon. Seen as an unexplored trove of hidden wealth over the centuries, the site of a city of gold, a source of diamonds, rubber, petroleum, and, now, possible lifesaving medicines, the Amazon has been

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18 Ibid.
viewed as an invaluable national resource that has never been fully exploited by the right people. Though it was “not utopia,” Torres excitedly predicted with national pride the bountiful gifts offered to the Brazilian nation by the Amazon:

The copious and unceasing font for the complete prosperity of a great people!! The valley of the Amazon…is capable of feeding a population superior to 100 million inhabitants… And what is the Mississippi compared to the Amazon? And what are the Ohio, the Missouri to Rio Vermelho? The Arkansas, the Wisconsin and others of the Mississippi compared to the Xingu, Tapajós, Madeira, Purus, Rio Negro, Rio Branco, Trombetas, Coari, Teffe, Jurua, Hintahy, Javary, Napo, Potomayo, Guarupatuba, Araguary, and others of the Amazon?²⁰

During the period between the rebellion and the rubber boom, the national government and the provincial elite of Pará sought desperately to exploit nature’s bounty by asserting control over the lower classes. Memories of the violence of the Cabanagem, and the depopulation that followed, gave urgency to the projects to discipline a potential labor force, to define and garrison the nation’s borders, and to fight the threats from tropical diseases. In the final analysis, understanding mid nineteenth-century nation building in the Amazon requires us to move beyond overly simplistic theories about the ongoing negotiations and contestations between rebellious subalterns and a repressive state. The past demands that we explore a more complex narrative, in which the regional elite sought strategic alliances with the national government, first, to suppress a violent uprising in the 1830s, and, later, to confront the threats that the consequent socio-political destabilization and depopulation posed to the province’s perceived potential and the obvious necessity of maintaining a stable labor force.

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Sarah Kernan was born in Annapolis, MD and grew up in Gainesville, FL. She earned her Bachelor of Arts with high honors from the University of Florida in 2004. She taught seventh grade geography and decided to return to graduate school in 2006. She earned a Master of Arts in Latin American History from the University of Florida in 2008. Sarah participated in the IBEU language exchange in Rio de Janeiro in 2007. She was also a recipient of the Fulbright Grant and spent 2010 in Belém and Rio de Janeiro. She received her Ph.D. from the University of Florida in the fall of 2013.