A CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS OF AL-AHRAM AND ALJAZEERA'S ONLINE COVERAGE OF EGYPT'S 2011 REVOLUTION

By

MAJID ALHUMAIDI

A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA

2013
To my Mother and Father
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First and foremost, I am extremely grateful to Allah the Almighty for His uncounted blessings. I am also grateful to my chair, Professor Diana Boxer, who has supported and guided me from the inception of this project until the end, and made every step of writing this dissertation a very unique learning experience; I owe her my deepest gratitude for her patience and professionalism. I would also like to extend my thanks to my co-chair, Dr. Fiona McLaughlin, and to my committee members, Dr. Youssef Haddad and Dr. Badredine Arfi. Their invaluable comments and feedback made the completion of this study possible.

I owe inexpressible love and gratitude to my mother, Munirah Alsoghayer, and my father, Mohammed Alhumaidi. To them I dedicate this work. Last but not least, this work could have never been achieved without the support and sacrifice of my beloved wife, Arwa Alkhalifah. To her I am truly indebted.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF TABLES</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1 Overview</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2 The Event: a Background</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3 Review of Literature</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4 Purpose of the Study</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.5 Research Questions</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.6 Significance of the Study</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.7 Why Al-Ahram?</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.8 Why Aljazeera?</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.9 Dissertation Layout</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND DISCURSIVE PRACTICE</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1 Overview</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2 Theoretical Framework</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2.1 What is CDA?</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2.2 Media Discourse Analysis</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2.3 CDA Approaches</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2.3.1 van Dijk’s framework</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2.3.2 Wodak’s framework</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2.3.3 Fairclough’s framework</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2.4 Model of Analysis</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2.4.1 Lexicalization and predication</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2.4.2 Presupposition</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2.4.3 Verbal process</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2.4.4 Intertextuality</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2.4.5 Topics</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3 Discursive practice</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3.1 Ideology</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3.2 Power, Hegemony, and the Role of the Media</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 METHODOLOGY AND TEXTUAL ANALYSIS</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1 Overview</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LIST OF REFERENCES ........................................................................................................ 236
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH .................................................................................................. 247
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2-1</td>
<td>Describing/attributing positive action:</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-2</td>
<td>Sayer, Verbal process, and Verbiage example</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-1</td>
<td>Predications used by <em>Al-Ahram</em> and <em>Aljazeera</em> to describe opposing groups</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-2</td>
<td><em>Al-Ahram</em> and <em>Aljazeera</em>’s naming of the antagonists</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-3</td>
<td>The naming and description of the protests by <em>Al-Ahram</em> and <em>Aljazeera</em></td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-4</td>
<td><em>Al-Ahram</em> and <em>Aljazeera</em>’s reference to casualties at the beginning of the protests</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-5</td>
<td><em>Al-Ahram</em> and <em>Aljazeera</em>’s reference to casualties from Feb. 2 until Mubarak’s departure</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-6</td>
<td>Other occurrences of the term martyr in <em>Al-Ahram</em> and <em>Aljazeera</em> coverage</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-7</td>
<td>Occurrences of the term <em>Revolution</em> in <em>Al-Ahram</em> and <em>Aljazeera</em> coverage</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-8</td>
<td>The portrayal of the Revolution after Mubarak’s downfall</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-9</td>
<td><em>Al-Ahram</em> and <em>Aljazeera</em> use of the term <em>baltagiyya</em> and its derivatives</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-10</td>
<td><em>Al-Ahram</em> presuppositions</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-11</td>
<td><em>Aljazeera</em> presuppositions</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-12</td>
<td>Verbal process in <em>Al-Ahram</em> and <em>Aljazeera</em> coverage during the first days of the protests</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-13</td>
<td>Verbal process in <em>Al-Ahram</em> and <em>Aljazeera</em> coverage after Feb. 2</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-1</td>
<td>A sample of voices included in <em>Al-Ahram</em> coverage</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-2</td>
<td>Indirect quoting in <em>Al-Ahram</em></td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-3</td>
<td><em>Aljazeera</em>’s reporting on government officials through other sources</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-4</td>
<td>A sample of voices included in <em>Aljazeera</em> coverage</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-5</td>
<td>Examples of government voices in <em>Aljazeera</em>’s reporting</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-6</td>
<td><em>Aljazeera</em>’s reporting of eyewitnesses</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4-7 Aljazeera’s use of scare quotes and expressions like the so-called .................. 163
4-8 Aljazeera’s reference to baltagiyya in the authorial voice by the end of the Revolution ........................................................................................................... 163
4-9 Al-Ahram’s reporting on Internet blockage and cut off of Aljazeera transmission .................................................................................................................. 164
4-10 Al-Ahram’s reporting of Tahrir Square clashes on Feb. 2 ......................... 164
4-11 Headlines of articles on protests in Al-Ahram’s coverage in the outset of the uprising ........................................................................................................ 164
4-12 Other headlines and lead paragraphs on protests in Al-Ahram’s coverage in the outset of the uprising ................................................................. 165
4-13 Headlines of articles on protests in Al-Ahram’s coverage by Feb. 2 .......... 165
4-14 Aljazeera’s reporting of the protests throughout the Revolution ............. 166
4-15 Headlines on demonstrations outside Egypt in Aljazeera’s coverage ........ 167
4-16 Aljazeera’s articles on the Egyptian government’s practices during the uprising ............................................................................................................. 167
4-17 Headlines of articles on Mubarak before his stepping down in Al-Ahram’s coverage .............................................................................................. 168
4-18 Headlines of articles on Mubarak after his stepping down in Al-Ahram’s coverage .............................................................................................. 168
4-19 Headlines of articles on government and NDP officials in Al-Ahram’s coverage before Mubarak’s stepping down ............................................... 169
4-20 The NDP in Al-Ahram’s coverage after Feb. 11 ...................................... 169
4-21 Headlines of articles on Mubarak that emphasized opposing sources in Aljazeera’s coverage ........................................................................... 170
4-22 Headlines of other articles on Mubarak in Aljazeera’s coverage ............. 170
4-23 Headlines of articles on the Egyptian government and the NDP in Aljazeera’s coverage .................................................................................... 171
4-24 Al-Ahram’s reporting of the religious institutions’ position .................... 171
4-25 Aljazeera’s reporting on the position of the Church ............................... 172
4-26 Al-Ahram and Aljazeera’s reporting on the Ministry of Awqaf ............ 172
4-27  *Al-Ahram* and *Aljazeera’s* reporting of fatwas on protesting .......................... 173
4-28  *Al-Ahram’s* reporting of world reactions in the outset of the Revolution .......... 173
4-29  *Al-Ahram’s* deemphasizing of positions against the regime ............................ 174
4-30  *Aljazeera’s* reporting of world reactions toward the protests ....................... 175
4-31  *Aljazeera’s* reporting of Israeli reactions toward the protests ..................... 175
4-32  Headlines of articles on President Obama in *Al-Ahram* and *Aljazeera’s* coverage .................................................................................................................. 176
4-33  The inclusion of different U.S. sources in *Aljazeera’s* coverage ...................... 177
4-34  *Al-Ahram’s* negative presentation of the Obama administration ..................... 178
### LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TERM:</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CDA</td>
<td>Critical Discourse Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDS</td>
<td>Critical Discourse Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CL</td>
<td>Critical Linguistics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DA</td>
<td>Discourse Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISA</td>
<td>Ideological State Apparatus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MB</td>
<td>Muslim Brotherhood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDP</td>
<td>National Democratic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSA</td>
<td>Repressive State Apparatus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Utilizing a Critical Discourse Analysis approach, this study compares and contrasts *Al-Ahram* and *Aljazeera* online coverage of Egypt's 2011 Revolution. Following Fairclough's three-dimensional framework, the study examines how the two outlets represented the protests and the antagonists both textually and discursively from Jan. 25, 2011, the first day of the uprising, until Feb. 14, 2011, three days after President Hosni Mubarak stepped down. It also investigates the social and political context to relate text to context and provide a comprehensive explanation of media discourse during the Revolution. It examines five textual and discursive practice features to analyze the data textually and discursively, including lexicalization and predication, presupposition, verbal process, intertextuality, and topics. The study finds differences between *Al-Ahram* and *Aljazeera*’s coverage on both the textual and discursive level; it also finds that the two outlets had group polarization characteristics in their reporting of the uprising: the ingroup in *Al-Ahram*’s reporting was the Egyptian government and the outgroup was the protesters, while the ingroup in *Aljazeera*’s reporting was the protesters and the outgroup was the Egyptian government. Certain
textual and/or discursive practice features, however, were more salient or manifested themselves differently after Feb. 2, 2011, which was considered a turning point in the two outlets' reporting of the event. I examine the immediate social and political context and observe that the shift in *Al-Ahram* and *Aljazeera*'s reporting strategies was due to two sociopolitical developments during the uprising: 1) the US withdrawal of support to Mubarak's regime and 2) the Battle of the Camel. Despite the role played by the media during Egypt's 2011 Revolution, it is expected that genuine, grass-roots media change in Egypt will depend on political change and consistent steps toward democracy and freedoms.
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

1.1 Overview

On Feb. 11, 2011, Egypt embarked on a new era of its history after a popular uprising overthrew President Hosni Mubarak, who had ruled the country for 30 years. A few days after the Tunisian Jasmine Revolution that ousted President Ben Ali, Egyptians from different walks of life took to the streets in different Egyptian cities with a unifying demand: the downfall of the regime. The Revolution took the world by surprise; only a few days before the protests broke out, many analysts and Egyptian elite thought that having a Tunisian style uprising was impossible in Egypt.

The media played an integral role in the Egyptian Revolution by reporting the events as they unfolded. The wide array of media outlets yielded the production of news reports that portrayed one event in many different ways to the extent that it seemed that they were reporting different stories. The variation was primarily due to different ideological stances: official media, on the one hand, represented the voice of the government whose aim, throughout decades, was to promote government practices and maintain dominance through a hegemonic discourse. Counter to this discourse was a more independent discourse represented by transnational media outlets such as Aljazeera, which had gained prominence in the Arab world by the mid-nineties.

With the influx of transnational media pioneered by Aljazeera, the hegemonic discourse of official media was challenged and uncovered. As El-Nawawy and Iskandar (2002:12) put it: “by questioning everything, Aljazeera had opened a window to issues avoided and restricted by the Middle East.” Aljazeera has rendered government media discourse less reliable by presenting events from a different perspective and
consequently affecting people’s perceptions, attitudes, and views about reported events. In other words, the emergence of Aljazeera, and other transnational media outlets, broke the official media monopoly of dissemination of information. It also provided a non-Western alternative to official media. Before the proliferation of transnational media networks, only the elite in the Arab world had access to Western media outlets such as CNN and BBC, which presented a non-official narrative of their causes and issues (Seib, 2007). Although these services provided more reliable news coverage than those provided by official media, Arab viewers were frustrated that they received the news about their own context from a Western perspective (Pintak, 2006).

Different groups compete to control the media as an instrument of social power, or an Ideological State Apparatus (ISA) in the sense of Althusser (1971), to legitimate and naturalize their ideologies, beliefs, and values (Van Dijk, 1995). The “hidden” battle between official media discourse and transnational media discourse at times of crisis is the focus of the present study. During the eighteen-day Egyptian Revolution, Tahrir Square at the heart of Cairo was the source of breaking news around the world. Official and independent media outlets reported the developments in different narratives by emphasizing certain actions and de-emphasizing others and affiliating themselves with either side of the conflict, i.e. the government and the protesters side. The aim of the present study is to unveil how discourse was employed by Al-Ahram and Aljazeera to shape power relations during the Egyptian uprising by investigating how they represented the protests and antagonists. It seeks to compare and contrast the ideologies of the two media outlets during the uprising and shed light on the future of
the media landscape in Egypt in light of the social and political developments that immediately followed the Jan. 25 Revolution¹.

1.2 The Event: a Background

Although Egypt’s Revolution seemed spontaneous in that it started and developed drastically resulting in the fall of Mubarak’s regime, a number of factors accumulated throughout 2010 and before, leading in one way or another to the outbreak of the demonstrations on Jan. 25, 2011. As Joya (2011: 368) puts it: “there were clear signs that there was a potential for a mass uprising, although no one was sure when such a mobilization would take place.”

A number of opposition activities were taking place during the year 2010, including forming ElBaradei’s National Association for Change, calls to boycott the People’s Assembly elections after the measures taken by the government to forbid the opposition from gaining victory in the elections, and intentions to form a ‘shadow parliament’ after the results of the elections were announced. Activists also made appeals to the U.S. administration to place pressure on the Egyptian government to undertake reforms (Cook, 2012). These activities coincided with the establishment of a number of youth movements and Facebook pages, like the April 6 Youth movement and the ‘We are all Khaled Said’ Facebook page, whose role was decisive before and during the Revolution.

Established by Ahmed Maher and Esraa Abdelfattah, the April 6 Youth movement’s primary goal was to support workers’ rights and civil reforms. In 2008, it

¹The study focuses in particular on the developments that immediately followed the ousting of President Mubarak on Feb. 11, 2011 until the June 30, 2013 events that led to the ousting of President Mohammed Morsi. It does not go beyond that to investigate the implications of any other major political or social event that took place in Egypt after the Jan. 25 Revolution as this is beyond its scope.
launched a Facebook page to organize a strike protesting low wages and high food prices in Mahalla al-Kobra, a large Egyptian industrial and agricultural city. The strike took place on April 6, and security forces cracked down on the dissidents, killing four and arresting 400. After that, the activities of the movement included discussions and debates on its Facebook page, which in early 2009 had around 70,000 members who were young and educated, but never had political activities before; their demands were free speech and economic and political reforms. The movement was one of the main active players in the Revolution (Cook, 2012).

The other Facebook page that was also influential was the ‘We are all Khaled Said’ Facebook page, which was launched by Wael Ghunim, a young computer engineer living in Dubai. Khaled Said was an Egyptian blogger from Alexandria who was beaten to death by two security forces officers on June 6, 2010. His death caused outrage across the country, triggering protests led by political figures, such as Mohammed ElBaradei, former head of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The Facebook page was a symbol of rejection to all sorts of humiliation, brutality, and suppression practiced by security forces. This rejection developed later into active mobilization of the public; on Jan. 14, 2011, Ghunim posted on the page: January 25: Revolution against Torture, Corruption, Unemployment and Injustice.

Jan. 25 is a national holiday in Egypt to celebrate Police Day. Security forces did not take seriously the mobilization by different Facebook pages for a Revolution. The mobilization was considered as a call that would end up like previous protests in which a few hundreds would gather and protest for a few hours. Contrary to these calculations, thousands marched in Cairo, Alexandria, Mansura, Tanta, Aswan, and
Assuit calling for change, real change. The numbers that showed up on that day were not as they were in days to come, but they motivated many to take to the streets and join the demonstrations after viewing posts on Facebook pages. The Ministry of Interior issued a statement on that day blaming the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) for the unrest that caused the killing of three citizens and a police officer. Two days later, Jan. 27, ElBaradei arrived to Cairo and joined the protests, a move that intensified mobilization of the public. On Jan. 28, President Mubarak gave his first speech in which he announced that he had sacked the government, but was not going to step down. And for the first time, Mubarak appointed a vice-president, Omar Suleiman. His speech changed nothing in the scene; protesters were still asking for a change of regime, chanting ‘the People want the downfall of the regime’ in different cities where the protests were taking place. More people started flooding to Tahrir Square in Cairo, and stability was a concern for countries around the world.

On Feb. 1, Mubarak offered more compromise in his second emotional speech by announcing that he would not run for re-election in the following presidential elections, but confirmed, as he did in the first speech, that he would not step down from office. After his speech, clashes broke up between his supporters and the protesters, who reached around a million in Tahrir Square on that day. These clashes continued on the following day, Feb. 2, where some of Mubarak’s supporters, or baltagiyya, rode onto camels into Tahrir Square and escalated violence with the protesters; the event was dubbed the ‘Battle of the Camel.’

Thirty-year old Wael Ghunim, who was Google’s regional manager, was detained on Jan. 26 for call for the demonstrations on Police Day. He tricked his bosses at work
by telling them that he needed to leave from Dubai to Cairo for personal circumstances, which turned out to be leading the protests on Tahrir Square. He was the leader of the largest opposition group on the first day after 70,000 members on his Facebook page, ‘We are all Khaled Said’, confirmed they would participate in the protests. For unclear reasons, he was released on Feb. 7 (Cook, 2012).

Despite the negotiations held between the newly appointed Vice-president, Omar Suleiman, and representatives of the opposition, protesters continued flooding in large numbers to Tahrir Square and elsewhere around the country. The army undertook more security measures to protect main facilities such as the Egyptian Museum of Antiquity. Mubarak’s third speech was on Feb. 10 amid speculations that he would announce his resignation; however, it provided nothing new to ease the situation and rather intensified anger and frustration among the protesters. A day later, Feb. 11, Vice-president Omar Suleiman announced Mubarak’s resignation.

A number of factors had accumulated throughout the years leading to the Revolution. With all opposition activities taking place in 2010, Egyptians could not believe their own eyes when they saw an Arab president flee his country seeking refuge in another Arab country, Saudi Arabia. The psychological barrier was broken, and they thought, “If they can do it, we can do it too.” Thus, it could be safely said that the Tunisian factor triggered protests in the whole region, not only Egypt. The wave continued later in other Arab countries like Libya, Yemen, Bahrain, and Syria. Only eleven days after Ben Ali was ousted, Cairo was the center of attention around the world.
Like almost all revolutions, unemployment, high prices, and political oppression were main causes of the Egyptian Revolution. To begin with, it must be noted that, surprisingly, as the country was witnessing protests that overthrew Mubarak, it was witnessing economic growth that was considered the highest compared to other Arab neighboring countries such as Jordan and Syria. GDP grew by 7% between 2005 and 2008, and affected by the global economic crisis, dropped to 5%. According to a 2010 International Monetary Fund (IMF) Report, “sustained and wide-ranging reforms since 2004 had reduced fiscal, monetary, and external vulnerabilities, and improved the investment climate.” Officials in the World Bank praised Mubarak for lowering taxes and tariffs and considered economic reform in Egypt as “one of the champions of economic reforms in the Middle East and North Africa region.”

However, about 20% of Egyptians were below the poverty line; 44% were either illiterate or semi-illiterate; inflation reached 12.8% in 2008; unemployment and underemployment were high; and corruption was common. In an interview with DailyFinance, David Schenker, Director of the Program on Arab Politics at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, mentioned that the economic growth the country was witnessing since 2004 was one that an average Egyptian did not benefit from; the economy was doing well only in a wider sense.

Beyond a narrow perspective of what the economic situation was right before the Revolution and accounts of why it occurred although the overall economic situation was getting better, Egyptians were outraged by Mubarak’s economic policies throughout his thirty years in power; it was not simply a matter of a fiscal year’s performance or even a decade’s economic achievements. Throughout thirty years, the ousted Egyptian
The country was under emergency law during Mubarak’s era. Under this law, security forces practiced the most brutal practices against any suspects. The law prohibits any political demonstrations, non-governmental political activity, and unregistered donations. Detentions under this law were indefinite and without trials. Despite U.S. pressure to implement democracy as part of the U.S. administration’s ‘soft’ war against terrorism, and despite promises to halt the law, Mubarak kept on extending the law (Williams, 2006, May 1).

1.3 Review of Literature

Studies on media discourse in the Arab world are diverse, focusing on the content of media outlets and utilizing different theoretical frameworks of content analysis such as CDA and framing analysis to depict how certain events were portrayed and investigate ideological stances. Central among these studies are studies examining the content of Aljazeera network as a leading transnational network in the Arab world, including the content of talk shows, news bulletins, and the network’s online website.
These studies have either focused on a certain event such as the Palestinian-Israeli conflict (De Graaf, 2008), Egypt’s 2011 Revolution (Fornaciari, 2011; Yehia, 2011), and others, or on how Aljazeera framed certain issues or concepts, such as terrorism (Ammar, 2010), in its news coverage and talk shows.

In most studies, Aljazeera was compared to leading Western networks such as CNN or the BBC to depict how different outlets portrayed different events and explicate how Aljazeera countered the hegemony of Western media discourse. In other studies, it was compared with U.S.-funded Arabic-language news networks such as al-Hurra. In these few studies the aim was to explain why these networks were not as successful and popular as Aljazeera and how Aljazeera represented a challenge to U.S. public diplomacy in the Arab Middle East (Abdel Samei, 2010). Thus, the bulk of work on Aljazeera was geared toward establishing the assumption that the network provided “alternative voices to the Anglo-American monopoly of media outlets, such as CNN or the BBC, that have dominated the world of international journalism” (Fornaciari, 2011: 226) because it emphasized an Arab identity that incorporated culture, history, and religion, unlike other networks which Arab audiences considered alien.

Abdel Samei (2010) used a CDA framework to compare the coverage of certain international events in the American al-Hurra and the Qatari Aljazeera news networks. The study aimed to examine how media networks challenge U.S. public diplomacy in the region and found that the two networks represented two opposing ideologies: al-Hurra reflected liberal voices in the region and tended to marginalize the role of religion and history, while Aljazeera promoted pan-Arabism with its constituent elements such as history, language, and religion. The study concluded that the popularity of Aljazeera
was due to the fact that it discussed and presented the concerns of its Arab audience unlike *al-Hurra*, which was unwilling to open a dialogue about the U.S. unpopular policies in the region. *Aljazeera*, thus, stood as a challenge to U.S. public diplomacy in the Middle East, and the network that the U.S. established to achieve public diplomacy goals in the region was unable to rise against the challenge presented by *Aljazeera*. Indeed, *Aljazeera* has sought to adopt a collective voice that transcends geographic boundaries in the Arab world; it has treated significant causes in the region as causes that concern all Arabs, thereby creating a pan-Arab perspective in its news coverage. Hence, the network was able not only to construct but also alter Arab reality (Abdel Rahim, 2005).

More recently, a number of studies have investigated *Aljazeera*’s media discourse during the Egyptian Revolution (Fornaciari, 2011; Yehia, 2011). These studies were centered on how the Revolution was framed by Arab and Western media outlets and the role of social media during the uprising. Interestingly, studies investigating the discourse of *Aljazeera* during Egypt’s Revolution reported contradictory results, depending on the language version that was examined. That is, differences were found between *Aljazeera* Arabic and *Aljazeera* English in their coverage of Egypt’s Revolution.

Fornaciari (2011) utilized content analysis to examine how *Aljazeera* English and the *BBC* framed the Egyptian Revolution. He found that both networks focused on the attribution of responsibility and conflict frames in their coverage, while downplaying other frames such as human interest, economic and morality frames. However, he reports that, on the one hand, *Aljazeera* English tended to report on issues by
distancing itself and offering a coverage that does not take a stand towards or provide solutions to the unfolding events or highlight instances of power differentials. On the other hand, the BBC provided a coverage that distinguished between winners and losers in the conflict and provided solutions to the problems reported.

Yehia (2011), however, reported findings that contradict Fornaciari’s findings about Aljazeera English coverage of the Revolution. He found that Aljazeera Arabic reported the events with an explicit stand that backed the protesters and had a group polarization in its coverage. In its comparison between Aljazeera and CNN framing of the Egyptian Revolution, the study found that Aljazeera Arabic framed the Revolution from the perspective of protesters and framed democracy as a notion that could only be achieved by removing Mubarak’s corrupted regime. CNN, on the other hand, based its framing of the topic of democracy on U.S. senior officials’ statements with an ambivalent stand about the future of democracy in Egypt. It also had reluctant and shifting views about President Mubarak as the events unfolded. The two studies on the same event reveal that international networks accommodate their audiences by providing different narratives on the same story.

As a matter of fact, a line of research on media discourse analysis has been dedicated to revealing whether different networks take their audience into account when devising their editorial policies; that is, whether different events are framed and constructed differently depending on the target audience. In his comparison between English –language CNN and Arabic-language CNN, Elbadri (2010) found considerable differences between the two at both the macro and micro levels of analysis. Utilizing CDA as a framework for analysis, he found that CNN Arabic and CNN English were
different in topic selection, and the stories they presented were different in lexical choices, sourcing, length, foregrounding and backgrounding, and syntactic and functional structures. More interestingly, CNN Arabic and CNN English showed cases where ‘othering’ relationships were reversed: what CNN Arabic considered as the ingroup was considered the outgroup by CNN English and vice versa.

In studies comparing Aljazeera Arabic and Aljazeera English, though, the results reported were inconsistent. Adopting a CDA framework, Barkho (2011) reported that Aljazeera English and the BBC portrayed controversial events such as the war on Gaza differently. He states that Aljazeera English “attempts to achieve linguistic parity between the sides of the conflict by distancing itself from the centers of power and focusing more on the popular or the ‘market place’” (Barkho, 2011: 37-38). He adds that both the Palestinian and Israeli sides are treated equally on the discursive and social levels. The BBC, on the other hand, reflects power differentials through discursive disparity with which the protagonists are presented.

Nevertheless, Loomis (2009) reported that contrary to the assumption that Aljazeera presents a stand that is different from Western news networks, Aljazeera English’s coverage of world events was similar to networks such as the BBC, CBS, and CNN. The only difference between Aljazeera English and other networks with which it was compared was in the lower number of stories with a positive tone towards the U.S. However, no differences were found on the content level. Although Loomis’ (2009) conclusion differs from Brakho (2011) in that the former did not report differences with the BBC while the latter did, the two studies agree that Aljazeera English did not represent a counter-hegemonic discourse to the Western media dominant discourse.
Other studies, however, maintain that *Aljazeera* English portrayed critical events in the region such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the same way its Arabic counterpart did. De Graaf (2008) compared the coverage of *Aljazeera* English and *CNN* of the withdrawal of the Jewish settlers from the Gaza Strip in August 2005 to investigate whether *Aljazeera* English produces a counter-ideology that opposes the dominating Western worldview of news. Utilizing a CDA framework for the analysis, the study found that *Aljazeera* English did present a counter-ideology that was either exhibited explicitly or implicitly. The two networks had an ingroup and outgroup polarization: the ingroup in *Aljazeera* English's coverage was the Palestinians and the outgroup the Israelis, while the opposite was true for *CNN*’s coverage.

The reason for the discrepancy in findings on *Aljazeera* English is far from clear: some studies claim that they had no stand in the network’s English version reporting of critical events in the region, while others claim that it had group polarization in its reporting. The only interpretation for such discrepancy is that *Aljazeera* English might have adjusted its editorial policies given that there is consistency in the findings of recent studies (i.e. Loomis, 2009; Fornaciari, 2011; and Barkho, 2011) compared with De Graaf’s (2008) study which investigated an event that took place in 2005.

Studies investigating the Egyptian daily *Al-Ahram* within a CDA or framing analysis framework were not as common as *Aljazeera*. These studies were mainly focused on how certain social groups were portrayed by mainstream official media in Egypt and how state-controlled media have employed discourses that maintain the dominance of the ruling group. Pasha (2011) used CDA to examine how Islamists, particularly the MB, were represented in front-page news articles in *Al-Ahram* online.
website in the years 2000 and 2005. He found that the Egyptian regime has consistently excluded the MB from the Egyptian political arena either through sheer power or soft power through negative presentation in official media. He claims that this exclusion is because the group is the strongest and most organized political group that could cause threats to the ruling regime in Egypt.

Other studies have focused on the Coptic situation in Egypt and how Christian Egyptians and their causes are dealt with in mainstream media. Iskandar (2012) investigated the discourse of *Al-Ahram* to illuminate how Egyptian Muslim-Christian relations are presented. She found that the main discourse used by *Al-Ahram* is the discourse of national unity, which although it might seem positive, she argues, is not necessarily constructive since it does not address the needs of a section of a community. She claims that the Egyptian regime maintained social stability by reinforcing a discourse that was not supported by practical strategies and policies.

*Al-Ahram’s* coverage of the Egyptian Revolution has also been studied vis-à-vis the coverage of independent and social media in Egypt. Using framing analysis as a tool of analysis, Hamdy and Gomaa (2012) compared Egyptian state-run, independent, and social media coverage during the Egyptian Revolution. They found that state-run media, including *Al-Ahram*, framed the uprising as a conspiracy against Egypt, while social media framed it as a Revolution of freedom and justice. Independent newspapers, however, used an intermediate frame that combined the two other frames.

This brief overview of studies on media discourse analysis in the Arab world, particularly those involving *Aljazeera* and *Al-Ahram*, shows that CDA, as well as other frameworks of content analysis, have been useful tools in understanding how critical
social and political issues in the Arab world have been portrayed by the media. Of course, Aljazeera as an influential network that has changed the media landscape in the region had the lion’s share of studies examining its content. These studies, however, were centered on the question of whether Aljazeera presented a counter-ideological and counter-hegemonic discourse to Western media by comparing its content with that of leading Western networks at a certain point of time or during a major event in the region. Although such studies have been insightful in that they revealed perspectives about the hidden ideological battle, or lack thereof, between Arab and Western transnational networks, they have all been geared toward one direction: Arab versus Western media at times of crisis.

There is a gap in the literature on how Aljazeera compares and contrasts with other Arab media, especially official media in the Arab context in general, and Egyptian in particular. The challenge that Aljazeera represented to Arab official media, before international news networks, was enormous and has even caused mainstream media to relatively change their strategies and become more open and transparent about certain issues. Yet no study, to the best of my knowledge, has investigated the difference in news coverage between official, controlled media and transnational, semi-independent media in the Arab world. One of the aims of this study is to fill this gap in the literature.

1.4 Purpose of the Study

Utilizing a Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) approach, the present study aims to compare and contrast how the Egyptian Revolution was portrayed by online news articles of two leading media outlets representing official and semi-independent media in the Arab world: Al-Ahram and Aljazeera. In so doing, the study reveals the
ideological differences between controlled and independent media in reporting events at times of conflict. It also discusses the prospects for Egypt’s media landscape in light of the ongoing political change.

The study examines a corpus of online news articles published by *Al-Ahram* and *Aljazeera* during the days of the uprising ranging between Jan. 25, 2011, the first day of the Revolution, and Feb. 15, 2011, four days after President Mubarak stepped down. CDA differs from other frameworks of discourse analysis in that it is not only centered on textual, linguistic analysis, but goes further to incorporate the historical, political, social, and cultural context that surrounds text production and consumption. Therefore, drawing on Fairclough’s critical approach to media discourse, the study addresses the micro-level of social action, which primarily deals with linguistic strategies, and macro-level social structure, which draws on the sociopolitical and cultural context, to link discourse to society and text to context. A comprehensive multilayered analysis that links the textual to the social should yield a better understanding of the subtle ideologies of the examined media institutions and account for the potential difference between the outlets in representing the protests and portraying the two sides of the conflict; it gives insights into how unequal relations of power and hegemony played out in the outlets’ reporting of the uprising.

The study also draws on van Dijk’s (1998) concept of Ideological Square where the representation of ideological groups is based on an Us/Them dichotomy and an identification of an ingroup and an outgroup. It, therefore, attempts to depict how *Al-

---

2 I use ideology in its critical conception as ideas and beliefs employed to establish and sustain unequal relations of power and dominance in a society. I elaborate on the notion of ideology and its different conceptions in 2.3.1
Ahram and Aljazeera formed ingroup and outgroup identities by their presentation of different sides of the conflict and how linguistic features were utilized in doing so. Moreover, the study endeavors to draw consistent themes in the news articles of both outlets and explicate those themes by relating them to the wider social and political Egyptian and Arab context.

Since the study compares and contrasts official and independent media in terms of their linguistic portrayal of the Egyptian Revolution, the results of the comparison will be expanded to discuss the implications for the future of media landscape in post-revolutionary Egypt. That is, the study concludes by investigating the interrelation between media change and political change in autocratic states and highlights the different views on the controversial causal relation between political change and free press. It also discusses the future of official media in light of the recent changes in Egypt and the region.

1.5 Research Questions

The study’s research questions aim to address how the two news outlets, Al-Ahram and Aljazeera, covered the Egyptian Revolution by investigating how they represented the protests and portrayed the antagonists. Relying on Fairclough’s three-dimensional framework, these representations are investigated both textually, by analyzing lexicalization and predication, verbal processes and presupposition, and discursively, by analyzing intertextuality and topics. Further, the study explores the sociopolitical context to provide a nuanced explanation of discourse as it pertains to society and tackles the implications of the results for the future of media landscape in Egypt.
Specifically, the study aims at answering the following research questions:

1. How were the protests represented in *Al-Ahram* and *Aljazeera* news coverage of the Egyptian Revolution?

2. How were the protesters represented in *Al-Ahram* and *Aljazeera* news coverage of the Egyptian Revolution?

3. How were the Egyptian government, President, and ruling party represented in *Al-Ahram* and *Aljazeera* news coverage of the Egyptian Revolution?

4. Given any differences between the news coverage of *Al-Ahram* and *Aljazeera*, what are the discursive and sociopolitical practices that can explain these differences?

5. What are the implications for the future of the media situation in Egypt?

To answer the three research questions, the following sub-questions are addressed to provide a textual and discursive analysis of the coverage:

1. What kind of lexicalization and predication is utilized in the coverage of *Al-Ahram* and *Aljazeera*?

2. Which verbal processes can be depicted in the news coverage of *Al-Ahram* and *Aljazeera*?

3. What types of presuppositions are used in the news coverage of *Al-Ahram* and *Aljazeera*?

4. What kind of intertextuality is employed in the news coverage of *Al-Ahram* and *Aljazeera*?

5. What topics did *Al-Ahram* and *Aljazeera* address in their coverage of the Egyptian Revolution?

### 1.6 Significance of the Study

The Egyptian Revolution and toppling of President Mubarak is one of the main social and political events in Egypt’s history. During his thirty years in power, Mubarak and his National Democratic Party (NDP) have maintained control over local media, whether official or private. Although opposition parties were allowed to have their own publications, “arrests and abuse of journalists—police assaults and raids, detentions, even torture—continued” (Rugh, 2004: 156). Therefore, to say that there was free press
in Egypt is not accurate (Iskander, 2006; Sakr, 2010; Black, 2008; Cooper, 2008). Indeed, there was a margin of freedom, but there were also ‘red lines’ that journalists in Egypt were aware of and could not cross (Cooper, 2008; Elmasry, 2011). However, many of these ‘red lines’ were definitely crossed by the Aljazeera network, causing tensions in diplomatic relations between Egypt and Qatar, the host and sponsor of Aljazeera (Seib, 2008).

As the protests broke out, Egyptian local media and transnational media reported the events with different ideological stances. The significance of the present study is that it is the first, to the best of my knowledge, that compares and contrasts official, controlled media with transnational media in the Egyptian context at a very decisive point in the history of Egypt. The two media outlets investigated in the study – Al-Ahram and Aljazeera – represent two different types of media, newspaper and television, respectively. Yet, each of these outlets has its online news website that provides round-the-clock coverage of news around the world. El-Gody (2007) found that the online news websites of Aljazeera and Al-Ahram were among the top viewed websites in the Arab world. They came second after search engines such as the Arabic version of Google and Yahoo in terms of number of views. Analyzing the online news articles of Al-Ahram and Aljazeera allows for a comparison between the two as pioneer media institutions, representing two sides of the media spectrum in Egypt: Al-Ahram is the most widely circulated official newspaper in Egypt and second oldest and Aljazeera is the first Arab semi-independent news network and most widely viewed in the Arab Middle East (Seib, 2007). This is significant in that, on the one hand, it adds to the body of research on the two media outlets and, on the other hand, sheds light on the content
of one of the main sources of news in the Internet age, online news (Salwen, 2005), which usually parallels a media outlet’s content on newspapers and telecasts (Loomis, 2009).

One of the shortcomings of qualitative studies in Arabic sociolinguistics is that there is a residual space between Arabic sociolinguistics and other disciplines due to the compartmentalization of disciplines, and the dismissive attitude towards interdisciplinarity (Suleiman, 2011). The study adds to the body of qualitative research on Arabic sociolinguistics to further bridge the gap between the linguistic, on the one hand, and the media, social and political, on the other hand, in studies on the Arab Middle East. The study compares hegemonic and counter-hegemonic discourse in the Egyptian context and addresses the implications of the coverage of the Egyptian Revolution for the future of media in post-revolutionary Egypt. Thus, it goes beyond a linguistic description of news stories to examine the interrelation between political change and media change in post-revolutionary Egypt.

The present study also fills a gap in research on media discourse analysis in that it addresses an area that, to the best of my knowledge, has not been addressed before: revolutions. Studies on media discourse analysis employing a CDA approach have addressed different critical issues that reveal relations of power, struggle, and dominance in different societies; yet, no study has investigated media discourse during revolutions. Moreover, the study fills a gap in the literature on revolutions. Despite the different topics addressed in studies on revolutions, only a few studies have touched on the connection between revolutions and discourse (e.g., Moaddel, 1992; Apter and
Saich, 1998; Ileto, 1998), and where discourse was investigated, the focus was on the discourse of revolutions, not that of the media during revolutions.

Last but not least, the study is timely as it deals with a recent historic event in Egypt, the Arab world, and the world.

1.7 Why Al-Ahram?

Established in 1875, Al-Ahram is a semi-official newspaper that is owned by the Egyptian government, and is considered the most widely circulated Egyptian daily and second oldest. Cooper (2008) estimates that Al-Ahram's daily circulation during the latter years of Mubarak's presidency was between 500,000 and 600,000. The Forbes Middle East, a leading international source for business news, has listed Al-Ahram news website as the most popular news website during a one-year span time from August 2011 to August 2012 (Ahram Online, 2013, December 27).

The daily was established as an independent publication, but when the media were nationalized under President Gamal Abdul Nasser, Al-Ahram became the government’s voice and has remained so since then (Iskandar, 2012); it is considered the paper that expresses the government’s views and is the intellectuals’ newspaper (Pasha, 2011). In his study that investigated news production in Egyptian press during the last years of Mubarak’s presidency, Elmasry (2011) states that there was a consensus among Al-Ahram reporters, with whom he had interviews, that the editorial policy of Al-Ahram was ‘pro-Mubarak government loyalty’ (p. 134); he reported a journalist as saying: ‘we are part of the government’ and another stressing: ‘We are the tongue of the condition of the government. What the government wants to say it says through the newspapers it owns’ (p.134). A senior editor also notes that the paper allowed for critical opinions about the government in opinion pieces, but news reports
remained uncritical and representative of the government side (ibid). Cooper (2008) suggests that the paper was in particular the voice of the ruling party, the NDP; he reports Mohammed Samir, a managing editor of Almasry, a private Egyptian newspaper, as saying that Al-Ahram has been traditionally been the organ of the ruling party and its journalists consider the paper as representing the NDP.

Opposition groups and parties were silenced in Al-Ahram news reports. The only voices reported were those representing the government (Cooper, 2008; Pasha, 2011). Any group that could compete with the elite voice or cause a threat to the ruling party was excluded and even presented negatively. Among the groups that were negatively portrayed by Al-Ahram was the MB, who were described as the ‘devil’s advocate’ and as the nightmare of the people (Paha, 2011: 250).

The topics covered by Al-Ahram were also restricted in that they did not include topics that would trigger public opinion against the government such as corruption, human rights, domestic issues and poverty and only relied on government officials as sources. Independent newspapers such as Almasry and the Daily News were more likely to address such sensitive topics (Cooper, 2008). It goes without saying that the paper, like all other Egyptian papers, also drew limits on reporting on the personal life, wealth, and family of President Mubarak. The Armed Forces were another ‘red line’, about whom nothing could be reported unless with a press release sent or permission granted (Elmasry, 2011).

Al-Ahram represents one end of the media spectrum in the Egyptian context, which this study aims to compare and contrast with the other end of the media spectrum represented by Aljazeera. Given the above background about Al-Ahram as an official
media outlet, examining the paper’s discourse during the most critical period in
Mubarak’s presidency provides insights into how hegemonic discourse plays out during
times of conflict and crises. Comparing such discourse with more independent media
discourse should reveal how complex the media situation is in Egypt and how it is
bound to sociopolitical factors which are also addressed by the study.

1.8 Why Aljazeera?

The Qatar-based Aljazeera news network is the leading news network in the
Arab world that has attracted both world and regional attention since its establishment in
1996. It was the first Arab network to provide 24-hour uncensored news service to its
viewers and is the most popular Arab news channel according to different polls, reports,
and recognition from influential institutions (Pareene, 2011; Wikileaks/Twitter, 2011).
Adopting Western-style journalism, Aljazeera is viewed as breaking ground in Arab
news reporting and addressing issues that official media considered ‘red lines’ (El-
Nawawy, 2003; Dresner, 2006).

Aljazeera has been controversial in both the West and Arab world, adding value
to its credibility. On the one hand, the U.S. has accused Aljazeera of anti-Americanism
and aiding terrorists, especially during its wars in Iraq and Afghanistan in the aftermath
of the Sep. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks (Mekay, 2004; Pintak and Ginges, 2008; Fahmy
and Johnson, 2007). On the other hand, Arab governments accuse it of being an agent
of the CIA, serving American interests in the region (Zayani & Ayish, 2006). Arab
governments have not been accepting the fact that controlled, censored media which
served their interests for decades was challenged, and, consequently, they closed their
embassies in Qatar and temporarily shut down Aljazeera offices in their countries
(Fahmy and Johnson, 2007). Despite such pressure, the Qatari government rejected
intervening in the editorial policy of the network (El-Nawawy and Iskandar, 2002). El-Nawawy (2003) argues that the common understanding in news business is that you must be doing something right if you are not convincing to both sides.

“All this trouble is from a matchbox like this,” Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak once said when he visited Aljazeera’s headquarters in Qatar (Whitaker, 2003, February 7; El-Menshawy, 2005, December 29). The relationship between Aljazeera and the Egyptian government under Mubarak was controversial and Egyptian officials have repeatedly raised concerns over Aljazeera’s coverage of political and social issues in Egypt. In 2000, Aljazeera opened production offices in Egypt’s ‘free media production zone,’ a step that many critics thought would compromise the network’s editorial policy towards Egypt (El-Nawawy and Iskandar, 2002). Aljazeera officials denied such claims and confirmed that they were given guarantees from Egyptian officials that there would be no intervention in editorial policies. The free zone agreement was a win-win deal that had nothing to do with editorial decisions; the Egyptian government, on the one hand, viewed the zone from an economic perspective that would enhance media production business in Egypt and needed the prestige of a network like Aljazeera. On the other hand, Aljazeera was able to expand in one of the most important states in the region (ibid).

Indeed, the editorial policies did not change toward Egypt. In the 2005 presidential and parliamentary elections in Egypt, Aljazeera was at the forefront of Arab and international news outlets reporting electoral violations and protests against these violations while state-run media was disregarding these events and broadcasting reports about Mubarak’s economic accomplishments (Seib, 2008). Commenting on this
coverage of the Egyptian political developments, Salama Ahmed Salama, a prominent Al-Ahram columnist, wrote, “Aljazeera has initiated a transformation in Egyptian society. We would not have known about these violations if it wasn’t for Aljazeera” (El-Menshawy, 2005, December 29). As much as these events intensified the government’s brutality against Aljazeera and its staff in Egypt, the network’s popularity and credibility was rocketing.

With the emergence of the Egyptian Movement for Change, better known as Kefaya (Enough!), in 2004 with reformist plans and aspirations to remove the Mubarak regime, Aljazeera intensively covered the movement’s protests that initiated in Dec. 2004, where thousands gathered chanting ‘Enough’ and “No to inherited power!” In the summer of 2005, the movement organized seventeen protests against torture, harassment, and unemployment (Fahmy and Johnson, 2007), and all were given emphasis in Aljazeera coverage. Kefaya’s initiative was considered the cornerstone of anti-government protests led by different movements and social groups between 2004 and 2011. When the April 6 movement formed in 2008 evolving from Kefaya movement, Aljazeera also provided full coverage of the strikes organized by the movement on April 6, 2008 and April 6, 2009 and was a platform for young activists and bloggers who later played an integral role in mobilizing people on Jan. 25, 2011.

During the decisive eighteen days of the Egyptian Revolution, Aljazeera played a very influential role so that some analysts have gone as far as to call the Egyptian Revolution ‘The Aljazeera Revolution’ (Pintak, 2011). U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that Aljazeera is winning what she called ‘the information war’ and is providing more informative news
coverage than American mass media. “Aljazeera has been the leader in that they are literally changing people’s minds and attitudes. And like it or hate it, it is really effective,” Clinton stated (Bauder, 2011, March 5). After the Egyptian Revolution, Wikileaks tweeted: “Yes, we may have helped Tunisia, Egypt. But let us not forget the elephant in the room: Aljazeera + sat dishes” (Wikileaks/Twitter, 2011).

The network’s online website reported the uprising’s developments as they unfolded and saw a remarkable increase in page views and search attempts after the Internet was switched back on Feb. 2: Alexa, a web information company, reports that online viewership of Aljazeera.net hit a record during the Egyptian uprising by 2500% (Aouragh and Alexander, 2011) and its Twitter accounts provided live coverage of the events instantly. Aljazeera was the only Arab or Western news outlet whose journalists and offices were attacked and transmission interrupted by Egyptian authorities; its Arab and Western counterparts such as Al-Arabiya, CNN, and BBC did not go through the same hardships (Hussain, 2011).

Given the controversial nature of the relationship between Aljazeera and the Egyptian regime under Mubarak and its advocacy of the demands of civil groups and movements, Aljazeera demonstrates a discourse counter to the official media discourse in the Egyptian context. Analyzing this discourse vis-à-vis official discourse during this critical stage of history both adds to the wide literature on Aljazeera and reveals the underlying conflict between discourses and ideologies during the Revolution.

1.9 Dissertation Layout

In Chapter 2 I discuss the theoretical framework for the study and the discursive practices that govern the production of discourse with particular focus on the Egyptian context. I focus in particular on Fairclough’s three-dimensional framework, which is
adopted in the study, and discuss the analytical tools that are used to examine the data textually and discursively. Since the analysis is multilayered in that it goes beyond micro-textual analysis to explain organizational routines of discourse production and sociocultural practices, which constitute the larger-scale macro-analysis, I address three notions that are central in CDA studies: ideology, power, and hegemony. I also show the relevance of these notions to the present study by shedding light on the institutional and political constraints that influence news production in Egypt and providing an overview of the media landscape under Mubarak.

In Chapter 3 I discuss the methodology for the study, including data collection, sampling, and translation. After that, I analyze the data textually by explicating how linguistic concepts, such as lexicalization and predication, presuppositions, and verbal processes, were used by the two outlets to represent the protests and the antagonists. In my discussion of lexicalization and predication, I explain the variation in the two outlets' utilization of certain controversial terms, such as *baltagiyya*, and how they referred to the two sides differently. I also show how negative and/or positive predications were employed with each side of the conflict. Under presupposition, I discuss how *Al-Ahram* and *Aljazeera* employed this feature to present proposition as commonsensical and taken for granted. Finally, in my discussion of verbal process I explain how the two outlets reported the antagonists with an attitude; that is, how they employed positive, neutral, and negative verbal processes differently.

In Chapter 4 I analyze the data discursively by explaining how intertextuality and topic selection were used in the coverage of *Al-Ahram* and *Aljazeera*. Specifically, I explain the inclusion and exclusion of different voices throughout the event, and explain
how different types of reporting, such as direct reporting, indirect reporting, and strategic reporting, were used with each side differently. Following that I thoroughly discuss the topics included and excluded in each outlets’ coverage, and how certain themes were emphasized and others marginalized by Al-Ahram and Aljazeera. The main topics that are addressed under topic selection are: 1) the protests; 2) the President, government, and the NDP; 3) the religious institution; 4) the international community; and 5) the U.S. position.

Throughout my textual and discursive practice analysis in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 I attempt to observe whether or not the use of different features was consistent in each outlets' reporting or whether there were points in time during the uprising where there were shifts in using different features. Overall, Feb. 2 marked a transition in Al-Ahram and Aljazeera's reporting strategies both textually and discursively; certain features were more salient or manifested themselves differently after that date.

I expand the insights of textual and discursive practice analysis in Chapter 5 to investigate the wider sociopolitical context. After addressing the 'how' in my analysis, I turn to the 'why': why did Al-Ahram and Aljazeera address the Egyptian Jan. 25 Revolution the way they did? What are the social and political aspects that help understand discourse? I specifically address textual and discursive group polarization characteristics in the reporting of the two outlets in light of van Dijk’s (1995) ideological square. In my critical analysis which examines the sociopolitical context to explain discourse, I address aspects such as the nature of the relationship between the state and the religious institution in Egypt; Fatwas, Islamic rulings, during the Revolution; the role of the Mosque in the (de)mobilization of people through the Ministry of Religious
Endowments; the Israeli stance and how the two outlets utilized the representation of Israel in the Arab context in their coverage; and the U.S. stance during the days of the protests and its implications for theories on revolution. I also investigate the immediate social and political context to account for why *Al-Ahram* and *Aljazeera* changed their reporting strategies by Feb. 2, which was one of the main findings of textual and discursive practice analysis. I conclude Chapter 5 by briefly discussing the prospects for media transition in Egypt in light of its 2011 Revolution.

In Chapter 6 I conclude the study by summarizing its findings and highlighting the main factors that contributed to the contrast between official and semi-independent media discourse. I also point out the study limitations and implications for future research.
CHAPTER 2
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND DISCURSIVE PRACTICE

2.1 Overview

The present Chapter lays down the theoretical framework for the study, and, departing from Fairclough’s three-dimensional framework, sheds light on the relevant discursive and social practices. As to the theoretical framework, I define CDA with a focus on its applications to media discourse. Following that, I introduce the three main approaches to CDA: van Dijk’s approach, Wodak’s approach, and Fairclough’s approach. Since it is the approach adopted in the study, I elaborate on Fairclough’s approach by explicating its three main dimensions: text, discursive practice, and sociocultural practice. I conclude this segment of the Chapter by discussing the five analytic tools used in the study, including lexicalization and predication, presupposition, verbal process, intertextuality, and topics.

Discursive practice is concerned with how the news is produced and with the role of the media in sustaining or challenging relations of power and dominance. Thus, the second part of the Chapter first explains the meaning of ideology in the present research and notions of power, dominance, and hegemony in CDA research. Following that, it addresses the media situation in Egypt with relevance to its social and political context. Specifically, it discusses the relationship between the media and the ruling elite during Mubarak’s era, and the role played by transnational media in Egypt.

2.2 Theoretical Framework

In this section, I introduce the theoretical framework of the present research by first defining CDA and spelling out its main features as a tool for analyzing media discourse with a critical stance. Second, I present the three main approaches to CDA:
1) van Dijk’s cognitive approach; 2) Wodak’s historical approach; and 3) Fairclough’s social approach. I focus in particular on Fairclough’s approach and discuss its three main dimensions, as it is the framework adopted in the study. I conclude the section by thoroughly addressing the analytic tools that are utilized in the analysis of media discourse.

2.2.1 What is CDA?

Much of the success of CDA can be attributed to the works of analysts such as Norman Fairclough, Teun van Dijk, and Ruth Wodak (Billing, 2002; Blommaert, 2005). The field that emerged in the early 1990s stemmed from the work of Fowler, Hodge and Kress (1979) on language, power, ideology, and control, on the one hand, and Michael Halliday’s systemic-functional linguistics, on the other hand (Blommaert, 2005).

The term CDA replaced Critical Linguistics (CL), which originated in the 1970s with a concern for incorporating the social context in the study of language rather than a scientific description of language that isolated it from its context. It attempted to bridge the gap between the linguistic, on the one hand, and the social, political, cultural, and historical, on the other hand. The terms CDA and CL are used interchangeably, although the former seems to be preferred and used to refer to the same theory formerly known as CL (Wodak, 2001); however, some researchers still use the term Critical Linguistics, and, more recently, some scholars have used the term Critical Discourse Studies (CDS) to refer to CDA (ibid).

Weiss and Wodak (2003) distinguish between the use of the term “discourse” in the German and Central European context, on the one hand, and the English-speaking world, on the other hand. In the former a distinction is made between ‘text’ and ‘discourse’, relating to written and spoken language, respectively; in the latter,
‘discourse’ is used for both spoken and written language. To Blommaert discourse “comprises all forms of meaningful semiotic human activity seen in connection with social, cultural, and historical patterns and developments of use” (ibid).

Discourses can be interdiscursive since they are not restricted to one field when addressing a certain topic. Reisigl and Wodak (2009) argue that discourses are linked to each other in different ways, and if we assume that they are topic-related, we would observe that a discourse on climate change, for example, would include topics and sub-topics of other fields, such as finance and health. Thus, discourses are hybrid and open as new sub-topics are formed and incorporated into the main topic.

What distinguishes CDA from other approaches to Discourse Analysis (DA) is its critical aspect; it is critical of present social order and social relations and their connections to power, dominance, discrimination, and ideology. It makes a stance on different social issues by demystifying ways in which language is manipulated in relations of power and dominance; it relates text to context to investigate social and ideological language effects that are sometimes overlooked or simply considered ‘natural’ (Wodak, 2001; Fairclough, 2001). One of the ways the elite secure unequal relations of power and dominance is through normalizing discourse and introducing concepts and propositions that are favorable to them as givens. CDA takes an explicit stance toward such unequal relations of power and attempts to depict ideological traces, criticize them, and remedy them (Blommaert, 2005).

Since CDA is concerned with language in use, it first identifies a social problem and critically analyses power relations and those responsible for unequal power relations in a society. Hence, the targets of CDA are power elites that sustain social
inequality (van Dijk 1993) and it has the aim of “improving society” (Huckin, 1995: 95) by “empowering the powerless, giving voice to the voiceless, exposing power abuse, and mobilizing people to remedy social wrongs” (Blommaert and Bulcaen, 2000: 499).

Autocratic regimes normalize their dominance by controlling discourse and access to its production in society. One of the means to achieve this is by controlling the media and filtering its content to maintain power. Instead of acting as a watchdog of the system, state-run media serve as a tool for securing the interests of the ruling elite. In so doing, they reinforce the hegemony of one social group and deflect attention away from the failures of that group and the system as a whole; they are mobilized in the service of this group. Thus, a critical analysis of power relations and how they play out in official discourse is important for exposing such power abuse.

As a form of social practice, the relationship between discourse and a social event, institution, or structure is dialectal in that it shapes them and is shaped by them (Fairclough and Wodak, 1997). To fully understand discourse, the surrounding social, political, ideological and historical context must be taken into account. Because of this interdisciplinarity of CDA, the field lends itself to different areas of social science, including, political science, anthropology, education, sociology, and psychology.

Media discourse production in Egypt was bound to social and political restrictions such as the monopoly of the government or groups close to the government over media institutions. On the other hand, transnational media discourse in the Arab world enjoys more freedom, although it is still constrained by certain political restrictions. Thus, understanding the discourse produced by different Arab media institutions must take into account how these restrictions, or lack thereof, affect the production and
consumption of discourse. It ought also to consider the overall political situation and power balances in a society as well as the regional and international context.

2.2.2 Media Discourse Analysis

Little attention was given to the analysis of media discourse in the 1970s and 1980s. van Dijk (1985) attributes this lack of classical mass media research in the field of linguistics to three reasons: First, linguistics itself did not have much to offer to those interested in media discourse analysis because linguistic grammars were not concerned with analyses on the ‘text’ level until the 1970s, and mainly dealt with abstract descriptions of isolated sentences. Second, since media research was in areas of social sciences, such as political science and sociology, the focus was on macro-phenomena such as institutions, the public, large-scale processes of effect, or overall functions of media in society. Third, the nature of questions in mass communication research required the analysis of large amounts of message data, for which only quantitative methods were available.

However, since the late 1980s and early 1990s a considerable number of studies were dedicated to studying relations of power and uncovering issues of dominance, discrimination, race, and power abuse in the press utilizing CDA. The reason for this interest in the media in particular is because it is the domain where social reality is shaped and commonsensical ideologies are normalized (Richardson, 2007). Book-length works have attempted to draw the attention to the importance of media language in studying social and cultural change (van Dijk, 1988a, 1988b; Bell, 1991; Fairclough, 1992, 1995; Matheson, 2005; Richardson, 2007; among others).

In spite of the merits of quantitative methods of analysis such as content analysis in that they highlight the formal characteristics of media content in terms of what has
been said and with what effect (Richardson, 2007), they still miss many features that could only be captured within a qualitative framework of analysis such as CDA.

First, content analysis does not take the social and institutional factors into account as its primary focus is the manifest content; it does not address the “relationships between purposes, contents, and effects” (Richardson, 2007: 17). This limitation is accounted for by qualitative methods such as CDA as it incorporates and analyzes different aspects of text production and consumption, including the social and institutional. As a matter of fact, two of the dimensions of analysis in the present study, discursive practice and social practice, deal with these factors that are downplayed by content analysis.

Second, content analysis ignores connotative meanings of words and assumes that decoders equally understand the content the way the producer intended it. CDA accounts for this shortcoming by dealing with the issue of meaning thoroughly by investigating what is present in the text and by also examining why certain features are absent in a text, a feature that has meaningful implications in and of itself. Consider for examples the absence of the agent in certain syntactic structures which is sometimes utilized in media texts, as well as other texts, to deemphasize negative actions of the ingroup or positive actions of the outgroup.

Within media discourse analysis, a distinction is made between different types of media: press, radio, and TV. The obvious difference between the three types is their channel of communication: the press is written; the radio is oral; and the TV is both visual and oral. Fairclough (1995) explains that this difference in channel of communication has meaning potential implications. That is, press is the least personal
since it is written and TV is the most personal since it is both visual and oral, while radio is in the middle of the spectrum.

The present study is concerned with a press genre of media discourse: online news articles. In his book 'The Language of News Media', Bell (1991) addresses some of the main topics that relate to the interaction between language and media with a focus on methodological aspects of media discourse analysis. He points out that anything in a newspaper other than advertising is called ‘editorial’, and that editorials include service information, opinion, and news.

News reports or news articles are one of the main genres of media discourse. Although they are not as subjective as editorials, where “the voice of the journalist is either too loud or too central for them to be objective” (Richardson, 2007: 87), they are still biased and driven by policies of media institutions. Otherwise, all news would be relatively reported in the same way by all media outlets.

Hall (1982) holds that the notion of representation is different from reflection in that it involves "the active work of selecting and presenting, of structuring and shaping; not merely the transmitting of an already existing meaning, but the more active labor of making things mean" (64). To sustain power, he explains, dominant groups use the media to produce and reproduce their interpretations of events and portrayal of different social groups. The more recurrent these representations are, the more likely they become naturalized and turn into cognitive concepts.

The study of the content of online news websites to understand the ways through which different media outlets construct their representations of reality is common in recent studies on media discourse. Even if the content of these websites does not
exactly mirror that of TV broadcast or newspaper print, it includes a wide range of topics and maintains the same editorial line of the main medium, TV or newspaper. A former CNN writer and producer states, “it is likely that even if CNN coverage online does not exactly mirror what is broadcast, it nonetheless carries the same range of topics in a similar fashion as their television networks” (Groshek, 2008: 53).

Aljazeera Net also holds the same values and objectives of its counterpart, Aljazeera TV. Former site manager, Mahmood Abdulhadi, told The Wall Street Journal that “Aljazeera.net is the electronic version of Aljazeera Satellite Channel” and maintains its editorial policy in its coverage. Speaking about the editing process, he mentions that Aljazeera.net as a different type of media edits news according to news websites’ standards, which are different from TV news, but with the same news policy (Grenier, 2001).

Different studies have shown the social impact of online news services at times of conflict, disasters and outstanding events because of their immediacy. Salwen (2005) reports that online news sites were overwhelmed during the week after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. Millions of users turned to online news sites from their offices to view developments hours after the event, “causing online traffic jams and crashing some servers” (ibid: 68-69), which caused many offline news outlets, such as CNN, the BBC, and The New York Times, to add extra servers to satisfy the increasing demand. Many Americans have also viewed international news sites, like Aljazeera Net, “for a uniquely Arab perspective on the attacks” (ibid: 69).

During Aljazeera’s Net coverage of the war on Afghanistan in 2001 and the war on Iraq in 2003, the website was jammed due to extensive demand. The number of
page views during Aljazeera Net’s coverage of the war on Afghanistan reached 70 million page-views per month. During the war on Iraq, the number of visitors hit one billion with 14 million page views. After Aljazeera Net’s coverage of the war on Iraq, it became the 45th most visited website in the entire World Wide Web (Abd Elatti, 2003 cited in Abdel Rahim, 2005).

Likewise, the developments during the Egyptian Revolution were very rapid, given the short period of time the uprising lasted. During the eighteen days of the Revolution, breaking news were reported constantly and people across the world, and in the Arab world in particular, were eager to keep up with the latest developments. Accessibility to TVs or radio was not possible at certain times or places and newspapers lack immediacy when it comes to the unfolding of events. Thus, news websites were jammed with users waiting for the latest news throughout the day. They even have advantages over newspapers in that they are not constrained by space limitations, which allows for thorough coverage and interaction and providing content that is not provided by the offline service. Accessibility of online news websites during times of crisis testifies that they “can, if properly harnessed, contribute original information, stimulate public debate about issues, and emerge as important news media and social forces” (Salwen, 2005: 49).

2.2.3 CDA Approaches

Meyer (2001) introduces a wide range of theories that are borrowed from larger theoretical traditions and adopted as approaches to discourse. Among these are middle-range theories, which focus on society and power and their relation to discourse (Fairclough); linguistics theories, which try to describe patterns of language systems
and verbal communication (Wodak); and socio-psychological theories, which focus on the social conditions of emotions and cognition (van Dijk).

In the present study I follow Fairclough’s social-discoursal approach. My choice of this approach is because it addresses all levels that are crucial for a fully-fledged analysis of media discourse. The approach considers elements that examine the relationship between text and discourse, on the one hand, and discourse and society, on the other, to arrive at a full understanding of discourse in society. The framework has been widely employed to analyze media discourse as it draws upon a number of critical social theories and is the most comprehensive framework of CDA. Nevertheless, the study also utilizes some of the features of van Dijk and Wodak’s approaches that would give further insights into the analysis of Arab media discourse during Egypt’s Revolution. In the following I address each of the three theoretical frameworks with a focus on Fairclough’s three-dimensional approach.

2.2.3.1 van Dijk’s framework

van Dijk’s (1993, 1996, 1998, 2001, 2006) conceptual framework is based on three dimensions: discourse, cognition, and society. Discourse analysis under van Dijk’s conceptual triangle involves an interpretation of linguistic aspects of discourse, such as syntax, local semantics, lexicon, topics, etc., while social analysis is concerned with the social context of discourse. He focuses on the relation between discourse and social structure through cognition. Thus, to understand a macro-level social notion such as power and dominance, and a micro-level notion such as discourse, one must consider mental representations that are socially shared and personal models that are based on personal experiences. The construction of meaning will always depend on how these representations and models are cognitively shaped.
There are three types of belief under this framework: knowledge, opinions and attitudes, and ideologies. First, knowledge can either be shared by a specific group or be common throughout the society; the latter is referred to as Common Ground Knowledge, which is usually presupposed in discourse and taken for granted. Some factual beliefs are taken to be ‘true’ and taken for granted only within a certain group; outside the group, they are not considered knowledge, but belief. Second, opinions and attitudes are beliefs that are shared on the basis of evaluative criteria (good vs. bad) rather than truth criteria.

Finally, ideologies must apply to many different attitudes in different social domains (van Dijk, 2001). They are considered a special type of social belief in that, unlike other social beliefs such as sociocultural knowledge or social attitudes, they are more fundamental or axiomatic. Ideology is central in van Dijk’s framework as it is responsible for shaping mental representations and models that define different groups. They are sometimes shared so widely that they seem to have become part of the “generally accepted attitudes of an entire community” (van Dijk, 2006: 117), as beliefs, opinions, or common sense. They represent social characteristics of a group such as their identity, values, and resources (van Dijk, 1995).

van Dijk (1995) focuses on the effects of media discourse in formulating models and social representations based on his framework. He explains that the public will largely rely on the media to construct models and mental representations, especially in issues where such personal models are lacking. The diversity of such models and mental representations in a society depends on the diversity of information in mass media. Therefore, access to public discourse is restricted to those who serve the
interests and ideologies of media institutions. van Dijk calls those the *elite* because of their control of text and talk and their preferential and active access to public discourse. He states, “the routines, actors, events, and institutional arrangements in newsmaking are biased towards the reproduction of a limited set of dominant, elite ideologies” (van Dijk, 1998:188).

State-run media in Egypt is a symbol of soft power controlled by the ruling elite; it constructs models that reproduce government dominance through the exclusion of other groups. This type of media was especially influential at times where an alternative was not available; the public was only exposed to one narrative that constructed mental representations to serve the interests of one social group. However, with the diversity of information in the media more recently, namely after the emergence of transnational media, access to public discourse became available to other competing groups, creating different models and different representations of reality and social actors. During the Egyptian Revolution, this diversity was reflected in the discourse of media outlets such as *Al-Ahram* and *Aljazeera*, which represented different ideologies.

van Dijk’s conceptual framework views discourse analysis as ideological analysis; thus, “any property of discourse that expresses, establishes, confirms or emphasizes a self-interested group opinion, perspective or position, especially in a broader socio-political context of social struggle, is a candidate for special attention in such an ideological analysis” (van Dijk, 1995: 22-23). van Dijk employs a number of discourse structures to identify ideologies and reveal group struggles. These discourse structures include: lexical items, propositions, implications, presuppositions, descriptions, semantic moves, and other discourse structures (van Dijk, 1995, 1998).
One of the main concepts in van Dijk's framework is what he refers to as the Ideological Square which is expressed in terms of emphasizing the positive actions of what a media institution considers the ingroup and deemphasizing its negative actions, while, on the other hand, deemphasizing the positive actions of the outgroup, and emphasizing its negative actions. Thus, the Ideological Square aims to: (i) emphasize positive things about Us; (ii) emphasize negative things about Them; (iii) de-emphasize negative things about Us; and (iv) de-emphasize positive things about Them. van Dijk identifies certain discourse structures that are utilized to identify ideological structure; these structures are presented in Table 2-1.

The Ideological Square and discourse structures are employed in the present study to show how Al-Ahram and Aljazeera identified the ingroup and the outgroup in the struggle between the government and the demonstrators by emphasizing the positive actions of the ingroup and negative actions of the outgroup and deemphasizing the negative actions of the ingroup and positive actions of the outgroup.

2.2.3.2 Wodak’s framework

Wodak’s discourse-historical framework places emphasis, as its name implies, on the historical context and its role in the interpretation of texts. This interest in the historical context evolved from her work on anti-Semitism in 1990. With her colleagues, she found that the historical context was crucial in explaining the structure and function of utterances (Wodak, 1995). Like van Dijk, Wodak argues that discourse involves power and ideologies, and that background knowledge plays a role in the interpretation of a discourse.

Fundamental to this approach is the concept of social critique, which includes three interconnected aspects (Wodak 2001: 64-65):
1. ‘Text or discourse immanent critique’ aims at investigating the internal structures of texts or discourses to discover inconsistencies, (self-) contradictions, paradoxes and dilemmas.

2. ‘Socio-diagnostic critique’ investigates the possibly persuasive or ‘manipulative’ character of discursive practices. In this layer, the analyst relies on his/her background and contextual knowledge within the frame of social and political relations, processes and circumstances. The theory of context is crucial at this point.

3. ‘Prognostic/prospective critique’ aims at contributing in improving communication. This is achieved by elaborating guidelines and proposals for reducing language barriers or avoiding certain language use in different spheres. Ideological struggle between ingroups and outgroups, under this framework, is discussed in terms of derogation and euphemization. Wodak and Koller (2008: 302) explain that five discursive strategies are involved in ‘positive self-presentation’ and ‘negative other-presentation’: reference/nomination, predication, argumentation, framing/discourse representation, and intensification and/or mitigation.

2.2.3.3 Fairclough’s framework

Fairclough’s framework draws upon systemic functional linguistics (Halliday 1985) which attempts to analyze language based on the social functions it serves (Meyer 2001). Fairclough (1992, 1998) regards language use as a social practice, since discourse is implicated in all various orientations of social practice – political, economic, ideological - without any of them being reducible to discourse. He introduces a three-dimensional discourse analysis framework that aims to connect language “to social and political thought” (Fairclough, 1992: 92) under what he refers to as a ‘social theory of discourse’. The three dimensions of his framework are textual analysis, discursive practices, and sociocultural practices.

**Textual analysis:** Textual analysis deals with the structuring, combining, and sequencing of propositions. In interpretive approaches to discourse such as CDA,
textual analysis is concerned with both what is present and what is not present in the text because “every aspect of textual content is a result of choice” (Richardson, 2007). It can be organized under four main headings: vocabulary, grammar, cohesion, and text structure. Vocabulary deals with words at the lowest level of analysis; grammar is concerned with a higher level that deals with how words are combined to form phrases and clauses; a higher level is cohesion which has to do with how clauses and sentences are linked together; and text structure deals with large-scale organizational properties of texts.

**Discursive practice:** Discursive practice “involves processes of text production, distribution, and consumption, and the nature of these varies between different types of discourse according to social factors” (Fairclough 1992:78). At this stage, analysis becomes discourse analysis rather than textual analysis as it analyses texts in relation to social conditions of production and consumption. Discourse mediates between textual and sociocultural practice by means of shaping ways in which texts are produced and consumed. Understanding texts, particularly media texts, involves more than encoded and decoded meanings that depend on the encoder’s intention; it involves professional practices and organizational routines that “are based in particular social relations, and particular relations of power” (Richardson, 2007: 40).

Explaining the dialectal relationship between producer and text, on the one hand, and text and consumer, on the other hand, Richardson (2007) mentions that a journalist in a particular news outlet may report a news report and an editorial with the same ideological message; however, the difference between these two genres results in encoding the ideological message in different ways. Thus, “the producer shapes the text
but the text, and its conventions, shapes its production too” (p. 41). This dialectal relationship also exists between text and consumer. On the one hand, the message encoded in a text shapes the understanding of the decoder; this explains the continuous struggle over controlling the media. On the other hand, readers consume texts with “perspectives, agendas, and background knowledge” (ibid) that contribute to the understanding or misunderstanding of encoded meanings.

Production and consumption of a discourse require an activation of shared mental representations to achieve the highest level of communication. Meaning construction depends on how close or far the mental representations are between the producer of the discourse and its receiver. Discourse production requires the speakers or writers’ awareness of surrounding functions that are associated with the social, historical, and cultural context of the discourse to make themselves understood, and the interpreter of the discourse, whether listener or reader, employs the same functions to make sense and construct meaning from the discourse; a mismatch in social representations yields communication breakdown. Hall (1980: 54) argues that the meanings achieved through the processes of encoding and decoding depend on the degree of “asymmetry between the codes of the ‘source’ and the ‘receiver’ at the moment of transfiguration into and out of the discursive form.” Also, meaning has an individual, idiosyncratic dimension that draws on personal beliefs and experiences that are responsible for different individual understanding.

**Sociocultural practice**: Sociocultural practice means “the social and cultural goings-on which the communicative event is part of” (Fairclough 1998: 311). According to Fairclough, it could be at different levels of abstraction; that is, it may be involved in
the immediate situational context, the institutional practice within which the event is embedded, or the wider context of society and culture. He differentiates between three aspects of sociocultural practice that enter into CDA: economic, political and cultural.

The insights of textual and discourse analysis (i.e. the first two dimensions of the framework) are expanded to include the wider society in which the text is produced (Richardson, 2007). At this level the analysis aims at addressing questions pertaining to the text’s resemblance of the society in which it was produced and its role in maintaining or breaking down inequalities in a society as well as its impact on social relations.

Critical analysis, which is undertaken under this dimension, involves an ethical and political critique of discourse and depiction of features that contribute to power abuse and social inequality. Similar to discursive practice, the relationship between discourse and society is dialectical in that discourse shapes society and at the same time is constituted by it.

The three frameworks of CDA presented above complement each other and are similar in many ways; they mainly differ in the emphasis they place over one aspect or the other. van Dijk and Wodak consider ideology central in meaning construction and how different groups consume discourses differently. A comparison between van Dijk’s framework and Fairclough’s framework shows that they both set text and context as main dimensions, but differ in what mediates these dimensions: cognition, according to van Dijk, and discourse practice, according to Fairclough. Wodak and Fairclough share the notion that language manifests and at the same time constitutes social practices. Wodak’s central concept of historical context is dealt with under Fairclough’s intertextual level of analysis.
2.2.4 Model of Analysis

Drawing on Fairclough’s (1992) theoretical framework that is based on three dimensions: text, discursive practice, and sociocultural practice, the study first examines textual and discursive practice features to analyze the data textually and discursively; the third dimension is the critical analysis which is discussed separately after retaining the details of textual and discourse analysis.

The choice of textual and discursive practice features that are examined in the study was based on the findings of an initial pilot study that showed that three textual strategies and two discursive practice strategies provided the most interesting results. The tools for textual analysis include: lexicalization and predication, presupposition, and verbal processes, and for discursive practice: intertextuality and topics. In the following I shed light on each of these textual and discursive practice features.

2.2.4.1 Lexicalization and predication

The analysis of lexicalization involves studying the denotations and connotations of lexical items. Such analysis is significant because “words convey the imprint of society and of value judgments in particular” (Richardson, 2007: 47). Since two or more expressions do not convey exactly the same meaning, or at least have different connotations, “vocabulary encodes ideology, systems of beliefs about the way the world is organized” (Fowler, 1987: 69). A classic example of the interrelation between lexicalization and ideology is the use of ‘freedom fighter’ vs. ‘terrorist’ (Kress, 1983).

Naming, or referential strategy, is one of the lexicalization strategies used in media discourse. It refers to the ways in which social actors are referred to which “can signal the type of relationship between the namer and the named” (Richardson, 2007: 49). Reisigl and Wodak (2001) explain that referential strategies establish an
identification of ingroups and outgroups through membership categorization devices. Fowler, Hodge, Kress, and Trew (1979: 200) state that “the different possibilities [of naming] signify different assessments by the speaker/writer of his or her relationship with the person referred to or spoken to, and of the formality or intimacy of the situation.” The ingroup is often described in detail, while the outgroup is marginalized by providing little or no detail in their description. Members of the ingroup are also sometimes referred to using terms of politeness that “indexes a particular social status” (Blommaert, 2005: 11).

The analysis will also focus on predicational strategies which “appear in stereotypical, evaluative attributions of positive or negative traits and implicit or explicit predicates” (Wodak and Meyer, 2001: 27). Reisigl and Wodak (2001: 55) identify specific forms through which predications are realized which include: forms of reference, attributes, predicates or predicative nouns / adjectives / pronouns, collocations, and explicit comparisons, similes, metaphors and other rhetorical figures. Labeling implies categorization based on ideological grounds and also involves a dichotomy between the ingroup and outgroups. Thus, describing different social actors negatively or positively gives insights into group affiliations.

Relevant to the distinction between the ingroup and outgroup in terms of referential and predicational strategies is van Dijk’s ‘ideological square’ which is based on positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation; thus, positive referential and predicational strategies are associated with Us and negative ones are associated with Them (van Dijk, 1998).
2.2.4.2 Presupposition

Presuppositions are what encoders treat as common ground and are known by decoders. In making presuppositions a speaker/writer asserts the content of the utterance and considers it unchallenged and taken for granted. Wodak (2007: 214) argues that “presupposed content is, under ordinary circumstances, and unless there is a cautious interpretive attitude on the part of the hearer, accepted without (much) critical attention (whereas the asserted content and evident implicatures are normally subject to some level of evaluation).” Therefore, an analysis of presuppositions reveals encoders’ beliefs as well as what they want their recipients to take as a given (van Dijk 1998).

Fairclough (2003) distinguishes between three types of presuppositions, or what he calls assumptions: existential, propositional, and value-laden. Existential assumptions are about what exists; propositional assumptions are about what will happen; and value-laden assumptions are about what is considered right or good. Ideological presuppositions are value-laden as they make judgments and express values.

Richardson (2007: 63) lists four linguistic structures as cues to presupposed meaning – he attributes the first three to Reah (2002): first, words such as change of state verbs (stop, begin, continue) or implicative verbs such as (manage, forget). For example, the sentence ‘The government continued suppressing the protesters’ presumes that the government used to suppress the protesters. Second, the definite article (‘the ----) and possessive articles (‘his/her ----) indicate presuppositions. For example, ‘the Egyptian Revolution’ presupposes that the Revolution exists and acknowledges it.
Third, 'wh-questions' also indicate presuppositions; for example, a question like ‘Which group is responsible for destruction?’ presupposes that there is destruction. Fourth, adjectives or nouns that are used to quantify nouns also trigger presuppositions. For example, in the sentence: 'the old way of suppressing protesters,' employing the adjective 'old' presupposes that protesters used to be repressed.

Levinson (1983) adds other presupposition cues like referential expressions, factives, and cleft sentences. As to referential expressions, the use of the expression *inciters* in 'The inciters of the protests were arrested' presupposes that there were inciters. The classic example for referential expressions is 'The King of France has/hasn't talked to Jane' which presupposes that the King of France and Jane exist. An example of factives is 'Ghonim regrets the killing of innocent protesters' which presupposes that protesters were killed, and also involves sympathy with those protesters as they are described as innocent. Finally, cleft sentences are employed to trigger presuppositions by focusing on the agent and taking the action for granted. For example, 'It was the security forces who started the clashes' presupposes that there were clashes.

2.2.4.3 Verbal process

Halliday (1994) states that experiential meanings are represented by different processes in the transitivity system. Under his system of transitivity, Halliday identifies six process types: material process, behavioral process, mental process, verbal process, relational process, and existential process. Relevant in this section is verbal process which relates to “any kind of symbolic exchange of meaning” (Halliday, 1985:129).
Halliday (1994: 140) identifies three participants in a verbal process: the Sayer, the Receiver, and the Verbiage – the function that corresponds to what is said. To clarify this, consider the following example that is further explained in Table 2-2:

Barack Obama, the US president, said the move was the beginning, not the end, of the transition to democracy in Egypt. (*Aljazeera* English, Feb. 11, 2011).

An analysis of verbal processes in media discourse is important in that it shows how reporters utilize verbal processes to emphasize certain meanings and marginalize others and push readers’ understanding of verbiage to a certain direction. Thus, verbal processes not only introduce what is said, but also reveal the reporter’s attitude toward what is said. As Fowler (1991: 231) put it: “Critical analysis should pay particular attention to how what people say is transformed: there are clearly conventions for rendering speech newsworthy, for bestowing significance on it.”

Chen (2004, 2005) developed a comprehensive analytic tool of verbal processes. She classified verbal processes into three sub-types: positive, negative, and neutral. Examples of positive verbal processes include: pointed out, announced, explained, declared, indicated, and urged; negative verbal processes include: denied, claimed, admitted, insisted, and complained; and neutral verbal processes include: said, told, described, asked, and commented (Chen, 2004).

In the present study, I examine how different verbal processes – positive, negative, and neutral – played out in the discourse of the two media outlets during the Egyptian Revolution. The analysis ought to reveal how reporters encoded their experiences and understanding of reality and their attitudes toward Sayers representing different sides of the conflict. The claim is that the consistent use of a type of verbal
process, whether positive or negative, with a particular group is a trace of the reporter’s stance toward that group and, hence, the outlet’s ideology about the antagonists.

2.2.4.4 Intertextuality

“In its simplest form” Blommaert (2005: 46) explains “intertextuality refers to the fact that whenever we speak we produce the words of others, we constantly cite and recite expressions, and recycle meanings that are already available.” The analysis of intertextuality falls under the second dimension of Fairclough’s framework: discursive practice. Fairclough distinguishes between two types of intertextuality: manifest intertextuality, overtly drawing on previous texts, and constitutive intertextuality or interdiscursivity, which means that texts are composed of heterogeneous elements: generic conventions, discourse types, register, style (Blommaert, 2005). Analyzing how reported speech is selected and included in texts is an important aspect of manifest intertextuality (Baynham and Slembrouck, 1999).

Texts are composed of fragments of previous texts and cannot be produced or consumed in isolation from these texts (Richardson, 2007). Bell (1991) describes the production of a news story as layered and embedded in that earlier versions of a news article are embedded in newer ones. There are many stages through which a news article is produced starting with a journalist, a translator, or a news agency (e.g. Associated Press or Reuters) to which a media organization is subscribed and ending with the chief editor. In each of the stages of production, earlier versions are recontextualized across what Fairclough (1995) calls “a chain of communicative events which links source events in the public domain to the private domain consumption of media texts” (p. 49). This process of transformation and recontextualization is
responsible for the different ways in which a news item - that could be taken from the same source - is reported in different ways, with different emphases on different events.

Therefore, a full understanding of a text is only possible when relating it first to other texts and other social practices. Intertextuality is important in media discourse, particularly news coverage, because it involves constructing “fragmentary and ill-defined happenings” (Fairclough, 2003: 84). News reporting involves a narration of events taking place, comments on these events from different sides, background information about the events, and opinions and views about them; thus, news articles are composed of fragments of other texts. Sourcing, or reported speech, is an important aspect of news reports. By including and excluding voices reported and selecting what is to be reported, reporters control the framing and ideologies expressed in reports, even if they were distancing themselves from the content by downplaying their own voice.

van Dijk (1998b) considers sourcing as a means through which hegemony is achieved. News outlets allow access only to dominant groups and “represent leaders or speakers of movements as unreliable sources in newsgathering” (ibid: 260). Moreover, the voices of the ingroup are legitimized by attributing them with authoritative quality such as titles and credentials that renders what they say reliable and unquestioned. The outgroup, on the other hand, is not reported as frequently as the ingroup, and when members representing the outgroup are reported, the aim is “to criticize them or discredit them” (Rojo, 1995: 54).

Richardson (2007: 102-06) identifies five ways of reported speech that are most relevant to the study of news journalism. First, reporting speech through direct
quotation. In this common kind of reporting the exact words of the reported person, entity, or institution are included in quotation marks. The readers’ interpretation of the directly reported speech will be most influenced by the kind of verbal process employed, as explained earlier. Second, reporting speech through strategic quotation, known as ‘scare quotes.’ This kind of speech reporting is used with phrases or expressions that are of “contentious nature.” News outlets distance themselves from the content of certain expressions by reporting them using scare quotes. Examples of such use include the reporting of controversial terms like “terrorism” and “freedom” which may mean different things for different groups. Relevant to this kind of reporting is the use of expressions like: the so-called, the so-described, what they call, and others, which are also employed to keep distance from the content of the reported speech.

Third, reporting speech through indirect reporting. In this type of reporting the reporter provides a summary of “the content of what was said or written, not the actual words used” (Fairclough, 2003: 49). Thus, it is difficult to distinguish between “the representing discourse and the represented discourse – between the voices of the reporter and the person reported” (Fairclough, 1995: 81). Fourth, reporting speech through transformed indirect quotation. What distinguishes this kind of reporting from indirect reporting is that it drops reporting clauses such as said, accused, alleged, etc. and replaces it with transitive action (e.g. discovered) or mental state verbs (e.g. believes) (Richardson, 2007: 104). Finally, reporting speech through ostensible direct quotation. This kind is different from direct quotation in that it is made up to propose that “the view is too direct, extreme, or outlandish to have come from the source involved” (ibid: 105).
In the present study, it is expected that an analysis of intertextuality will help depict the way reporters of Al-Ahram and Aljazeera produced their news stories in terms of selecting what to report and who they considered newsworthy. It would also reveal which group they identified as the ingroup by referring to its members as authoritative social actors and which group they identified as the outgroup by means of marginalization and delegitimization. And even if news reports appear “balanced” and “objective” in the sense that they include both sides of the conflict, “it is often easy to divide voices into protagonists and antagonists” (Fairclough, 2003: 82).

2.2.4.5 Topics

Topic selection is the second tool utilized in the present study to analyze discursive practice. By selecting certain events and leaving out others in their reporting, the media “help to legitimate the existing power structure and existing ways of seeing and doing things” (Dunlevy, 1998: 129). Topic selection is also important in the creation of preferred ideological models and, consequently, in the confirmation of ideologies (van Dijk, 1998).

The value of news when it comes to news selection is relative and depends on the editorial policy of media institutions; that is, what one media outlet considers as significant is not necessarily considered so by another. Fowler (1991) explains that reporting events does not reflect their importance but rather reveals selection criteria that provide us with a partial view of the world. Also, he explains, the process of transformation of selected topics is influenced by various political, economic, and social factors. The two processes are guided unconsciously by ideas and beliefs that do not necessarily reflect reality neutrally, but intervenes with what is called ‘the social construction of reality’.
Following Stuart Hall and Greg Philo, news to Fowler is a *creation* that is centered on news value or news worthiness set by media outlets. In the process of selection, journalists take into account the interests of their audience as well as what Richardson refers to as ‘ground rules’ that decide what is considered ‘news’ and what is considered an ‘event’.

There is no agreement among media institutions as to what constitutes the criteria for news worthiness; however, in their account of news value criteria and review of various lists of criteria, Harcup and O’Neill (2001) suggest a ten-criterion list for news value. They argue that the more an event satisfies these criteria, the more likely it would be reported; the criteria include: reference to the power elite; reference to celebrity; entertainment; surprise; good news (i.e. rescues or personal triumph); bad news (i.e. tragedy or accident); magnitude; relevance (i.e. cultural proximity or political importance) follow up stories; and the newspaper’s agenda (Richardson, 2007: 92).

Reporting at times of crisis focuses on the development of events as they unfold; hence, most stories are follow up stories. Depending on their political, economic, and national interests, media outlets choose to emphasize certain events and deemphasize others. At first sight, *Aljazeera* seemed to have focused on topics that were either excluded or downplayed in *Al-Ahram*’s coverage of the Egyptian Revolution and vice versa. Each media outlet focused on topics that served its institutional interests and affiliations with the antagonists. That is, topic selection was based on victim worthiness in the sense that our victims are worthy of reporting and their victims are unworthy of reporting.
Therefore, investigating topic selection uncovers how the two institutions constructed reality differently and how their topic selection contributed to sustaining or challenging relations of power in Egyptian society. It also gives insights into understanding the different criteria for news worthiness employed by different media institutions and how they relate to ingroup and outgroup presentation and political and ideological affiliations. In short, it reveals the news-agenda of Al-Ahram and Aljazeera during Egypt’s uprising.

Relevant to the analysis of topic selection is the analysis of the way in which propositions are emphasized or deemphasized through foregrounding and backgronding. In news articles, the main idea is introduced at the onset, and what follows is further elaboration on the story which may include reactions of different parties on the story, incidents or events related to it, background information, etc.

Fairclough (1995: 72) distinguishes between three elements of a news article structure: a ‘nucleus’ which consists of the headline and lead paragraph which includes the main idea of the story; a series of ‘satellite’ paragraphs which provide details about the story; and the ‘wrap up’ paragraph which presents a sort of resolution of the story or some background information.

News stories are thus described in terms of an inverted pyramid where the most important is foregrounded and the least backgrounded. In a sense, the title and the first paragraph are viewed as a summary of the story, and what follows is information presented in a descending order of importance. The five important questions that are addressed in the beginning of the story include who, what, when, where, and why; these are referred to as the Five Ws in news style.
One of the most important features of hard news articles is that they are written with the assumption that the reader may stop at any point in the text; therefore, reporters utilize van Dijk’s Ideological Square strategically by emphasizing their ingroup positive actions and the negative actions of the outgroup foregrounding them either in the headline or lead paragraph. They also seek to deemphasize their ingroup negative actions and the outgroup positive actions by backgrounding them either in satellite paragraphs or the wrap up paragraph.

*Al-Ahram* and *Aljazeera* have utilized the structure of news articles published during the days of the Revolution to emphasize and deemphasize the actions of both sides of the conflict. Understanding how foregrounding and backgrounding were operationalized by the two outlets sheds light on what each institution attempted to highlight and what it attempted to ‘hide’ in their news coverage. I incorporate the process of foregrounding and backgrounding in my discussion of topics to explain how the structural organization of news articles was intended to achieve ideological purposes.

### 2.3 Discursive practice

Discursive practice is the second dimension of Fairclough’s framework and is concerned with the underlying notions and processes involved in news-making. Due to the significance of this aspect, I discuss in this section the factors that govern the production of discourse and the role of the media in establishing and sustaining social practices. Specifically, I address the notions of ideology, power, and hegemony and how they play out in the media with particular focus on the Egyptian context prior to the Revolution. Since the present study addresses discursive practice as it pertains to news production, not consumption, I first discuss the different definitions of ideology, and then
explain the institutional and political constraints that influence the production of media discourse in Egypt with reference to the notions of power and hegemony.

2.3.1 Ideology

Ideology is one of the most complex and fuzzy concepts of philosophical and sociological discussion (Kress, 1985; van Dijk, 1998; Wodak, 2007). The term ideology is not restricted to one unified concept in the field of social sciences; it has been defined from different perspectives that associate it with either neutral or negative connotations.

Neutral conceptions of ideology treat it as a natural social phenomenon that does not serve the interests of particular groups but is rather an aspect of social life. Under this conception, ideology is available to all social groups and may be used as a weapon to achieve particular goals. It could be present in any political program regardless of its aims and beholders; thus, subordinate groups may hold fundamental beliefs in their struggle against social order in the same way dominant groups hold fundamental beliefs to maintain their domination. This definition of ideology suffices for the type of research that aims to depict different ideologies in discourse without taking a stance toward them or being critical of them (Thompson, 1990).

Blommaert (2005) explains that within this conception of ideology, different ‘–isms’ are realized such as fascism, socialism, liberalism, libertarianism, communism, anarchism, and others, as well as other categories that are attributed to individuals or schools such as Marxism, Leninism, Rooseveltism, and others. Within particular political positions, other ideological categories are also realized such as conservative, progressive, sexism, and others. These ideologies are often codified, have a clear origin and pattern of development, and, in some cases, may disappear (ibid).

Critical conceptions of ideology, on the other hand, imply that the notion of
ideology is misleading in that it serves the interests of particular groups. The one-sidedness of ideology in this sense implies a critical stance towards it (Thompson, 1990). Ideology under this conception stands for the ideational aspects of a particular social system and the ‘grand narratives’ that represent its existence. It cannot be attributed to a particular actor but “penetrates the whole fabric of societies or communities and results in normalised, naturalised patterns of thought and behavior” (Blommaert, 2005: 159) that may serve to establish and sustain relations of power and domination.

Fairclough’s view of ideology falls under its critical conception. He defines ideology as “meaning in service of power” (Fairclough, 1995: 14) and posits that meaning production and reproduction plays an important role in maintaining social order. He focuses on the relation between discourse and ideology in his account of the latter and explains that ideologies exist in “class societies that are characterized by relations of domination” (ibid: 82) and discourse is ideological in that it contributes “to sustaining or undermining power relations” (ibid: 82).

In his view, each ideology creates its own discourse as a result of group struggle to compete with other discourses for domination. The discourse of the elite is more powerful, though, as its members have access to means of interpellation such as the media. That being said, Fairclough does not rule out the role of consumers in countering manipulation and their capability of making connections between different practices and ideologies.

The main difference between ideology as “systems of ideas” and ideology as “false consciousness” (Kress, 1985: 29) is that the former is direct and clear whereas
the latter is concealed. In this research, I use ideology in its critical conception as ideas and beliefs employed to establish and sustain unequal relations of power and dominance in a society. The aim is to reveal how hidden relations of power played out in Egyptian official media discourse at a time of conflict and to examine how semi-independent media discourse represented a counter-ideology. To do so, the study investigates how representations that form the basis of social cognition were formulated in the two competing discourses.

2.3.2 Power, Hegemony, and the Role of the Media

Power in CDA research refers to the illegitimate use of power, i.e. power abuse or domination. In this sense, power serves the interests of the powerful and is directed against the less powerful, the dominated. Hegemony, on the other hand, refers to treating the beliefs of the dominant as a given and not subjecting them to contestation. Gramsci (1971) argues that popular consensus, along with coercive power, enables one social group or class to rule a multi-cultural society as people are driven to embrace the ideologies that are controlling them. Powerful social groups seek to normalize their discourse by controlling institutions that generate discourse, such as the media, school, and religious institutions, which serve as tools to sustaining hegemony in a society (Blommaert, 2005).

Althusser later expanded on the role of government institutions in ideological interpellation, which is “not the system of real relations which govern the existence of individuals, but the imaginary relation of those individuals to the real relations in which they live” (Althusser, 1971: 155). In his Marxist account of ideology, Althusser tackled the issue of reproduction of dominance in societies by emphasizing the two aspects addressed by Gramsci, i.e. hard power and soft power. He argues that for the state to
maintain its dominance and continue to produce in society, it must reproduce the conditions of production. State power, Althusser posits, is the exercise that secures the reproduction of relations of power. He distinguishes between two types of apparatus that complement one another to achieve this purpose: Repressive State Apparatus (RSA) and Ideological State Apparatus (ISA).

RSA has to do with coercive power including the government, army, police, courts, etc., while ISA, which is more relevant to the present study and includes schools, the Church, the legal system, and the media, comprises the soft power, which aims at persuading dominated groups to surrender to unequal relations of power and view them as natural and commonsensical.

The media play a central role in the production of ideologies, and, hence, in sustaining the power of the elite. Although it represents one of the ideological state institutions, such as the school, the Church, and family, it is considered the primary locus for shaping social beliefs and representations, especially that the role of other institutions is either reduced or restricted to certain groups (van Dijk, 1998).

Article 7/1980 of the Egypt’s Constitution, which was effective prior to the post-Revolution 2012 Constitution, stipulates that freedom of expression is guaranteed for every citizen; that confiscating and censoring media institutions is prohibited; and that any group or individual has the right to issue and publish a newspaper or any other form of media (Pasha, 2011). However, in reality this was not the case. Although Mubarak’s era was different from his predecessors, Abdel Nasser and Sadat, in that it witnessed media privatization, the launch of private satellite television channels, the emergence of private newspapers, and growing Internet accessibility (Khamis, 2011), the media
situation in Egypt before the Jan. 25 Revolution was still an example of government
hegemony. Changes in the media landscape in Egypt during Mubarak’s rule, it could be
argued, were due to changes in the regional and world media landscape as a whole and
to political pressures by superpowers and human rights organizations for more
democratization and promotion of human rights; otherwise, the attitude towards the
media was the same since Abdel Nasser, with different game plans.

Newspapers in Egypt during Mubarak’s era can be classified into three types, according to their distance from the government (Peterson, 2011):

1. State newspapers included three newspapers: Al-Ahram, Al-Akhbar, Al-Gomhoria. These newspapers were the voice of the government; they were funded by the government and their editors were appointed by the Ministry of Information.

2. Party newspapers included fourteen small newspapers which were published weekly with the exception of two dailies: Al-Wafd and Al-Ahrar. Although these papers were published by officially sanctioned parties that were anti-government on many issues, the fact that they relied on subsidies from the government limited their critical tone. Moreover, government practiced control by prosecuting journalists and editors under emergency law that prohibited the reporting of issues relating to the President, his family, the Army, senior government and ruling party officials, among others.

3. Independent newspapers included newspapers such as Al-Masry Al-Youm, Al-Dostor and El Shorouk. Because these papers are referred to as opposition papers and attempt to break the barriers of censorship, the State Information Service can revoke the license of these newspapers at any time. To establish a newspaper, owners go through a long process of clearance that includes a number of security and intelligence services and not any owner qualifies, by intelligence and security standards, to receive a license in the first place. Licenses are issued by an authority appointed by the government and it is therefore expected that only people favorable to the regime would be licensed (Pasha, 2011).

Thus, regardless of the type of the press - state, party, or independent – it was
directly or indirectly controlled by the government. Peterson (2011) also points out to an
interesting issue pertaining to censorship: by intimidating journalists and subjecting
them to prosecution under emergency law, which had vague laws such as ‘public order’,
national unity’, ‘public values’, etc., journalists never had clear guidelines on what the taboos or ‘red lines’ were; they never knew what was explicitly allowed and what would make police show up at their front doors to arrest them. This, consequently, created a state of self-censorship, whereby journalists avoided critical issues while the government confidently claimed that it did not practice state-censorship.

The shift from a monolithic to a pluralistic media scene has raised the bar of press freedom, but it was still bound to government intervention. In December 2011, Egypt ranked 127 out of 178 in the Press Freedom Index of Reporters Without Borders, which evaluates both print and television (ibid). Access to mainstream media was restricted to groups affiliated with the government while other groups resorted to non-mainstream media, such as blogs and more recently to social media networks, to make their voices heard; transnational media networks also served as platforms for dominated groups to express their political thoughts and views.

Dominant groups can sustain relations of power and dominance if their ideologies are not countered by other ideologies (van Dijk, 1998). To achieve that, they seek to divide non-dominant groups, prevent intra-group solidarity and the creation of counter-power, and deny other groups access to public discourse. When dominated groups consolidate to protest a shared interest, at least their lack of power, ideology can be a driving force against the interests of the dominant group. Domination, therefore, involves group social struggle over material and symbolic resources, suggesting that under hegemonic discourse there is always an underlying, hidden dissident or counter-hegemonic discourse that may surface at times of conflict or crises (Blommaert, 2005). While the hegemonic discourse seeks to implicitly reproduce unequal relations of
power, the discourse of the dominated groups aims at “uncovering and exposing domination and inequality, and to manifest and legitimate as ‘just’ their own counter, ideologies” (van Dijk, 1998: 168).

Aljazeera emerged as the first uncensored news network in the Arab world with the aim of countering the international hegemony of Western media institutions (Seib, 2005) and providing an alternative to official, propagandist media that served as a mouthpiece for governments in the Arab world. It redefined the media context in the Arab world by freeing the flow of information from censorship and re-routing it from foreign production (Eickelman and Anderson, 1999). In doing so, the network created an Arab public sphere where the Arab audience was able, for the first time, to discuss its issues and criticize the status quo through talk shows that served as forums for individual callers (Sakr, 2005). It was also a platform for opposition movements and dissident voices.

In sum, the present study utilizes Fairclough’s three-dimensional framework to examine how two media outlets representing official and semi-independent media in Egypt portrayed the Egyptian Revolution and represented the two sides of the conflict. The reason for opting for this framework is two-fold: first, it is a widely adopted framework in CDA studies; second, it emphasizes the discursive and social in addition to the textual. Thus, it addresses meaning from different perspectives providing a comprehensive understanding of Arab media discourse during the Egypt’s Revolution. Nevertheless, the study also utilizes concepts from other CDA frameworks, such as van Dijk’s (1998) Ideological Square to explicate group polarization and the representation of antagonists in the coverage of the two outlets.
Also drawing on Gramsci’s (1971) notion of hegemony and Althusser’s (1971) sense of Ideological State Apparatus, the study aims to reveal how media discourse was textually and discursively utilized at times of crisis to sustain unequal relations of power in a society or counter them.
Table 2-1. Describing/attributing positive action (van Dijk, 1995: 144)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ingroup</th>
<th>Outgroup</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Emphasis</td>
<td>De-emphasis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assertion</td>
<td>Denial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hyperbole</td>
<td>Understatement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Topicalization</td>
<td>De-topicalization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Sentential (micro)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Textual (macro)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High, prominent position</td>
<td>Low, non-prominent position</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Headlining, summarizing</td>
<td>Marginalization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detailed description</td>
<td>Vague, overall description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attribution to personality</td>
<td>Attribution to context</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explicit</td>
<td>Implicit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct</td>
<td>Indirect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Narrative illustration</td>
<td>No storytelling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argumentative support</td>
<td>No argumentative support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impression management</td>
<td>No impression management</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2-2. Sayer, Verbal process, and Verbiage example

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sayer</th>
<th>Verbal process</th>
<th>Verbiage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Barack Obama, the US president</td>
<td>Said</td>
<td>the move was the beginning, not the end, of the transition to democracy in Egypt.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY AND TEXTUAL ANALYSIS

3.1 Overview

In this Chapter I first introduce the methodology for the present research. The remainder of the Chapter is concerned with the first dimension of analysis within Fairclough’s three-dimensional framework, textual analysis. Under this dimension, I analyze three textual features, lexicalization and predication, presupposition, and verbal process, in Al-Ahram and Aljazeera’s reporting of the uprising. I explain how each feature was used in the two outlets’ coverage by describing how they compare and contrast with relevant excerpts presented in tables at the end of the Chapter. I conclude with the main findings of textual analysis.

3.2 Methodology

The data for the present study is a corpus of news articles that have been collected from the official websites of Al-Ahram and Aljazeera. The search period was Jan. 25, 2011, the first day of the uprising, to Feb. 15, 2011, four days after Mubarak’s ousting. The reason for including articles published after former President Mubarak stepped down on Feb.11 was to examine whether or not either or both outlets changed in the way they reported the events after Mubarak stepped down.

The corpus includes a total of 354 articles for Al-Ahram and 334 articles for Aljazeera during this time period. Following Elbadry (2010), each article in the corpus was coded by assigning it a letter that indicates the media outlet (A for Al-Ahram and J for Aljazeera) followed by the date of the article and a number that distinguishes stories published on the same date. For example, a news article coded J-Feb. 2-6 is an Aljazeera article published on Feb. 2 and is the sixth article published on that day.
The data is in Arabic; therefore, relevant excerpts were first translated into English and then analyzed. The aim for opting for a translation conducted by the researcher rather than investigating the originally English data in *Aljazeera* English, for example, is that previous research has shown that the English version of *Aljazeera* is not equivalent to its Arabic counterpart on all levels (Fornaciari, 2011; Yehia, 2011); *Aljazeera* English has its own independent editorial policy that targets a different audience. Since the focus of the present study is on news produced with an Arab audience in mind during the Revolution, originally Arabic data were translated into English.

The textual and discursive practice features examined in the research consist of five tools that were discussed thoroughly in Chapter 2; they are: lexicalization and predication, presupposition, verbal process, intertextuality and topics. The first three tools relate to textual analysis, which is the focus of this Chapter, and intertextuality and topics are concerned with discursive practice analysis, which will be discussed in Chapter 4.

### 3.3 Textual Analysis

Textual analysis is the first dimension of Fairclough’s three-dimensional framework. To address this aspect, I first explicate how the two outlets used lexicalization and predication in their coverage to refer to the antagonists and describe them. It is assumed that each outlet employed editorial strategies in referring to both sides of the conflict; depicting such strategies gives insights into how *Al-Ahram* and *Aljazeera* affiliated either with the government or protesters during the uprising.

Second, I discuss how presuppositions were employed to serve the interests and ideological stance of each institution; particularly, I show how taken-for-granted
propositions were employed to sustain or challenge power and dominance during the Revolution. This aspect is also expected to show variation between the two outlets in terms of the kind of presuppositions they make. The questions raised in this regard are: what ideology does a given presupposition serve? Is it intended to sustain power relations or challenge them?

Finally, I discuss how verbal processes – neutral, positive, and negative – were used by the two outlets in the coverage; the aim is to shed light on how social actors on both sides of the conflict were reported.

3.3.1 Lexicalization and Predication

Lexicalization and predication is one of the main features of textual analysis. To offer a nuanced account of this feature, I divide this section into four sub-sections relating to different aspects and dealing with different themes; these sub-sections are: 1) the two sides of the conflict; 2) Death or martyrdom?; 3) A Revolution?; and 4) Who are the baltagiyya? Each of these sub-sections is thoroughly discussed in the following.

3.3.1.1 The two sides of the conflict

In this section, I discuss how Al-Ahram and Aljazeera described opposing groups and the strategies they employed in referring to the two sides of the conflict. I also address how they delineated the protests. First, I explain how the two outlets described the protesters by shedding light on the predications employed by each outlet. Table 3-1 presents examples of the use of predications to describe different groups in Al-Ahram and Aljazeera.

Al-Ahram assigns negative predications to groups and movements leading the demonstrations and opposing President Mubarak’s regime, casting doubts on their legitimacy and significance. Among these groups and movements are the MB, the April
6 Movement, *Kefaya* “enough” Movement, and the National Commission for Change. The most negatively presented group to which activities of violence were attributed was the MB shown in (a) – (d). Throughout the Revolution, with the exception of very few instances, the group was described either as *disintegrated* or as *banned* – the latter was in most cases. In some cases like (c), only the adjective *banned* was used to refer to the group and its members were referred to as *elements* as in (d). Other groups, such as the April 6 Movement, *Kefaya*, and the National Commission for Change were described, as shown in (e) as the *so-called*. (f) shows that unlike members of the MB group, members of these groups were referred to as *activists*, although their groups were downgraded by being described as *illegal*.

*Aljazeera* did not use negative predications such as *banned* and *illegal* to describe opposing groups, who were presented either neutrally by referring to the names of the groups or positively by describing their members with positive words such as *activists* and *supporters* as shown in (a’) – (e’). Employing *activists* to refer to members of opposition groups differs significantly from *Al-Ahram’s* use of *elements* to refer particularly to members of the MB group. The word *ناشط* activist has positive connotations in Arabic; the Dictionary of Contemporary Arabic defines it as someone who works hard to achieve something (Omar, 2008). Thus, the labeling presents opposition groups positively as advocates of political change, implicitly legitimizing their actions. On the other hand, labeling members of the MB as *elements* “socially excludes them from Egyptian mainstream. It singles them out in a negative way as different and few” (Pasha, 2011: 154).

The message of predications in *Al-Ahram* is that the protesters are groups who lack legitimacy and seek to destroy the country and implement their own political...
agendas; they are involved in a conspiracy with other foreign powers to weaken Egypt and tarnish its image. In referring to the protesters, the paper also employed attributes such as the inciters المحرضون, hidden hands أيادي خفية, inciters of unrest and destruction المثيري الشغب والتخريب والعناصر الإجرامية, the uprising of thieves and criminal elements انفاضة للصوص والعناصر الإجرامية, the hateful الحاقدين, the malicious المغرضين, etc. Although issues of corruption, rights, and unemployment were mentioned as reasons that led to the protests, *Al-Ahram* focused on what it thought was an exploitation of the events to achieve personal goals.

*Aljazeera*, on the other hand, presented the different opposing groups as legal groups participating in the demonstrations to make their voices heard; they were presented without the use of negative predications or lexical items that hold negative connotations. Rather, opposition groups were assigned with descriptions that hold positive connotations, such as activist. The Egyptian government or government officials were not assigned negative or positive predications and were described neutrally.

Another important aspect that explicates how the two outlets represented the two sides of the conflict is naming. The main questions I address in this regard are: how did the two outlets refer to the antagonists? Did the outlets utilize proper name and position in referring to members of each side? Were members of any side of the conflict excluded or marginalized?

*Al-Ahram* uses position, proper name, and sometimes forms of address, i.e. honorifics, like Mr. to refer to Egyptian senior government officials and sometimes even lower ranking officials as shown in (a) and (b). According to the Dictionary of Contemporary Arabic, the word سيَدَ Mr. signifies respect and higher social status (Omar,
ElAdly and Suleiman were top Egyptian government officials referred to with a politeness term entitled by the proposed social status. The use of such a term, however, was not consistent in all the articles and the context for using it was not clear; Mr. was not used whenever ElAdly and Suleiman were referred to, for example, and was not used with officials holding higher positions, such as the President. It was also used once to refer to an opposition figure, Amr Mousa.

On the other hand, *Al-Ahram* referred to opposition groups in different ways. In (c), for example, Amr Mousa, former Egyptian Foreign Minister under Mubarak and Arab League Secretary General during the days of the Revolution, was referred to by a term of address, proper name, and official position. The same applies to Nobel Prize winner, Ahmed Zewail, who was referred to as the *Egyptian scientist*. Amr Moussa was one of the main political figures who called for a transition of power early in the Revolution. Ahmed Zewail was also a prominent figure who presented a five-step initiative on Feb. 6 that called for an immediate step down of Mubarak’s regime and allowing for a transitional government. Yet, they were referred to positively in the article, unlike other opposition figures such as former Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency and president of the National Committee for Change, Mohamed ElBaradei, who was referred to by last name only in (d) and (e).

A possible interpretation for this difference in referring to Moussa and Zewail, on the one hand, and ElBaradei, on the other, is that the former were less aggressive in criticizing Mubarak’s regime and calling for people’s protests. ElBaradei came to Egypt from his residence abroad only to participate in the protests in Tahrir Square, giving momentum to the demonstrations (Khalil, 2012). Moreover, Moussa and Zewail did not belong to any political movements opposing the regime, and only represented
themselves, whereas ElBaradei was the president of one of the main movements calling for Mubarak’s departure and participating in the protests. And if ElBaradei was referred to by proper name – at least in this article – members representing other groups were not, even if they were recognized figures in the opposition who had held positions such as parliament members as in (f).

The first instance in which an opposition member was referred to positively in an article was on Feb. 8 after the release of Wael Ghonim from prison and his emotional televised interview where he broke into tears after seeing photos of the casualties of the demonstrations. (g) shows that Ghonim was referred to by proper name and title. Other than these two cases where opposition members ElBaradei and Ghonim were referred to by proper names, the opposition - represented by different movements and groups - were referred to collectively and often assigned with negative predications as explained above.

Aljazeera presented members of opposing groups, such as the National Committee for Change, the MB, and Kefaya, differently; they were referred to by proper name and position - if they hold one as in (a’) – (f’). This shows that Aljazeera recognized all opposition groups and their representatives as well as independent activists. The different group members were referred to by proper name and official position or by proper name and the word activist, recognizing them as a legitimate side in the conflict. (g’) and (h’) reveal that the other side, government officials, was also referred to in the same way, i.e. by proper name and position.

The analysis of naming and description of the protesters reveals a contrast between the two outlets in terms of how they affiliated with the antagonists. Al-Ahram delegitimized the protesters by playing down the significance of their leaders as political
figures; this was reflected in the lack of reference to these figures by name and in the negative delineation of the protesters. Negative attributions of the protesters, however, were traced from the first day until Feb. 3, where the tendency was shifted towards a positive portrayal of the Egyptian government rather than a negative portrayal of the protesters. That is, there was a change in the paper’s reference and predication strategy from a focus on negative presentation of the outgroup to a focus on positive presentation of the ingroup. *Aljazeera* employed positive descriptions to refer to figures on the protesters side and referred to these figures by name and position, providing them with legitimacy and recognizing them as political actors. It also referred to Egyptian officials by proper name and position.

The delineation of the protests is another important aspect relating to the representation of the two sides. In the following, I address how the outlets named and described the protests at different points in the Revolution. In the outset of the uprising – as in most of the coverage – *Al-Ahram* described the demonstrations negatively, raising doubts about the intentions and loyalty of the demonstrators and emphasizing and generalizing negative actions performed by some of them as shown in (a) – (c). *Al-Ahram* utilized the negative side of the demonstrations, even if it was not the norm, to make generalizations about them and distract from their main purpose; emphasis was on destruction rather than demands to present the protesters negatively, at least in the beginning of the events.

*Aljazeera*, on the other hand, described the protests with a focus on the demands of the protesters, especially Mubarak’s departure as in (a’) and (b’). It also reported the unrest that accompanied the protests, but did not attribute it to a particular side. Rather, it occurred, according to *Aljazeera*’s reporting, as a result of *confrontations* or *clashes*
between the demonstrators demanding Mubarak’s departure, on one side, and security forces, supporters of Mubarak, or “baltagiyya”, a term I discuss thoroughly in 3.3.1.4, on the other side. Both terms, *confrontations* and *clashes*, which are used in (c’) – (e’), involve two conflicting groups, indicating that there was no particular party in the conflict responsible alone for the violence and chaos that took place during the protests.

### 3.3.1.2 Death or martyrdom?

The process of news production involves choice between seemingly synonymous terms to express propositions. Once a reporter or a news outlet makes a choice between words such as *martyrdom* and *death* to refer to one side of a conflict, they are explicitly taking an ideological stance toward an event. In the outset of the protests, *Al-Ahram* employed the word *martyr* as opposed to *dead* in its articles to refer to the government side of the conflict. *Aljazeera*, however, employed the term *the killed* and its derivatives to refer to members on both sides.

By Feb. 5, *Al-Ahram* employed the term *killed* and its derivatives to refer to both sides of the conflict, while *Aljazeera* continued employing the same term it used since the beginning of the protests, i.e. *killed*. Therefore, there was no contrast between the two outlets in terms of reference to casualties at that point in time, as Table 3-5 shows. Both *Al-Ahram* and *Aljazeera* employed the term *martyr* and its derivatives to refer to the protesters at two different points in the Revolution. Table 3-6 provides examples of the occurrences of the term *martyr*.

Other than its utilization of the term *martyr* in the beginning of the uprising, *Al-Ahram* used the term at two other points in the Revolution. First, on Feb. 8 after the release of Wael Ghonim, the paper described protesters’ casualties as *martyrs* as shown in (a). Second, a day after Mubarak stepped down, casualties on the protesters’
side were even presented more positively as in (b). Hence, Al-Ahram used martyrdom and its derivatives at three points in the Revolution, attributing it to different sides of the conflict and sometimes to both: (i) casualties on the government side, namely security forces, were described as martyrs in the beginning of the Revolution, (ii) casualties on the protesters' side were described as martyrs on Feb. 8, and (iii) casualties on the protesters' side, or perhaps both sides, were again referred to as martyrs after the step down of Mubarak.

Taking different positions in the conflict indicates the reluctance on Al-Ahram's side: at the beginning of the protests when the size and effect of the demonstrations were not yet clear, the paper used a term that indexes a religious frame or a frame of sacrifice for a cause or principle to refer only to the government's side of the conflict. As the wave of demonstrations escalated, the neutral term killed or dead was employed to refer to both sides. When Wael Ghonim was released, he appeared in an emotional television interview and broke into tears when seeing pictures of the casualties of the protests. Hundreds of thousands of Egyptians participated in the demonstrations the following day, which was considered a decisive day in the Revolution (Khalil, 2012). In its coverage of the release of Ghonim from prison and his TV interview, Al-Ahram referred to the casualties as martyrs for the first time. It then turned back to referring to both sides as dead until the protesters finally prevailed and Mubarak announced his stepping down. At that point, the term martyr showed up again to describe the casualties of the protests, associated with other positive attributes such as hero.

There were also occurrences of the term martyr and its derivatives in Aljazeera's coverage after Mubarak's downfall, as shown in (a') and (b') above. In (a'), the network refers to the casualties of the protests as martyrs, and in (b') it employs the term to
describe Tahri Square, which was the symbol for the Egyptian Revolution. After the historic event and the fall of Mubarak’s regime, the article refers to the Square in three ways: Tahrir Square, Martyrs Square, and Jan. 25 Square. These different ways of referring to the same referent is a means to establish - or rather underscore - the connection between the Revolution and the Square, which was the center of gatherings from different parts of Cairo. The labeling Martyrs Square in and of itself holds positive connotations about the revolutionaries and can only be understood as referring to them.

In sum, the analysis reveals that Al-Ahram’s employing of the terms dead and martyr and their derivatives were inconsistent; the term martyr was blatantly used in the outset of the events to refer only to the government side, implying that the protesters were more of an enemy rather than citizens demanding change. As the wave of the protests escalated, the strategy became different in that casualties on both sides were referred to as dead. Farther in the Revolution, and as the protesters achieved victory, their casualties were referred to as martyrs. Aljazeera was also inconsistent in its use of the two terms; although it referred to casualties on both sides by employing the term dead and its derivatives throughout the Revolution, the term martyr was employed after Mubarak was ousted to refer to the casualties of the Revolution, indicating that it took sides with the protesters.

3.3.1.3 A Revolution?

Aljazeera employed the term Revolution as early as Jan. 28, the third day of the protests, both in the authorial voice and in reporting on other sources. It also used the term Revolution more frequently than Al-Ahram did in its coverage and either described it with a predication like popular, youth, or Egyptian or used it with no predication. In the fourteen times in which the term was employed in a sample data, it was used three
times with no predication and five times with the predication *Egyptian* or *Egypt’s*. It was used with the predications *popular* and/or *youth* six times.

*Al-Ahram* employed the term only by Feb. 5, and did not use it as frequently as *Aljazeera* did; the term was used only twice in *Al-Ahram*’s sample data. Table 3-7 shows examples of the occurrences of the term in the two outlets’ sample data. It is worth mentioning that in *Al-Ahram*’s utilization of the term Revolution, it was described as *Egypt’s Revolution in its modern era*, acknowledging the 1919 Revolution and, more importantly, the 1952 Revolution, in which the Free Officers’ Movement overthrew King Farouk and established the modern republic. Since then, generals claimed power until the departure of Mubarak in 2011. *Al-Ahram* acknowledges that Revolution, although implicitly, as Mubarak belongs to the military institution ruling the country since 1952. Thus, the choice between *Egypt’s Revolution*, on the one hand, and *Egypt’s Revolution in its modern era*, on the other hand, is of ideological significance; choosing the former indicates that the Jan. 25 Revolution is *the* Revolution, while choosing the latter acknowledges that it is *one* of the Revolutions in Egypt’s history, the other being the 1952 Revolution – also referred to as the July 23 Revolution.

The term *stealing the Revolution* as shown in *Al-Ahram*’s excerpt above was coined during the Revolution and continued to be used after it; yet it is unclear to whom the Revolution “belongs” to know who “stole” it as the term is employed by antagonists to accuse each other. *Stealing the Revolution*, therefore, is a term that involves group polarization.

*Al-Ahram* and *Aljazeera* praised the Revolution and the protesters after the downfall of President Mubarak. Table 3-8 provides examples of how each outlet portrayed the Revolution after the former president’s resignation. The predications used
by Al-Ahram to describe the Revolution were great, pure, popular, and the greatest in the history of revolutions, which reflect an attitude totally different from that realized at the beginning of the uprising. Also, the examples show that Al-Ahram seeks to link the Revolution to the youth or people in general. Aljazeera also praised the Revolution and protesters after the downfall of Mubarak; the Revolution was described as the unprecedented in the history of Egypt and as a white Revolution, referring to its bloodlessness.

Al-Ahram and Aljazeera showed similarities and contrasts in employing the term Revolution in their coverage. As to the similarities, both outlets described the Revolution with the same predications, such as the youth and/or people Revolution. Also, both outlets praised the Revolution after the collapse of the Mubarak regime; yet, the praising and positive description of Aljazeera was softer than that of Al-Ahram, which went as far as to describe it as the greatest in the history of revolutions; Aljazeera described it as the unprecedented in the history of Egypt and as bloodless. The two outlets differed in the time the term was first employed and in the frequency of the term's usage. Aljazeera employed the term much more than Al-Ahram, which used the term only by Feb. 5 when it turned out that more protesters were flooding in different cities of Egypt insisting on their demands and rejecting calls to end the protests.

The timing and frequency of employing the term Revolution is of ideological significance. First, the use of the term Revolution implies a massive social movement in which people of different social class participate “to alter drastically or replace totally existing social, economic, or political institutions” (Defronzo, 1991: 8). Second, the Tunisian Jasmine Revolution had very recently ended with the departure of Tunisian President Ben Ali at the time the Egyptian uprising initiated. Using the term, thus,
acknowledges the massiveness of the protests and their demand for grassroots social change and triggers the recent Tunisian model. Therefore, *Al-Ahram* tended to avoid using the term until the eleventh day of the protests, while *Aljazeera* used it on the third day.

### 3.3.1.4 Who are the “baltagiyya”?

The word *baltagiyya* – singular *baltagy* – is an Egyptian term, originally Turkish, that means “paid gangs” or “paid thugs.” Issandr El Amrani, a political analyst and writer, states that *baltagiyya* “might be gangs, police informants, or unemployed youths that can be hired, or just poor people who are paid off” (Jacinto, 2011). The term is mainly associated with assault for political reasons, but is also used to refer to gangs hired for any purpose.

Although the word is not new in the Egyptian lexicon, it has received attention recently because of its frequent use during the Revolution. *Al-Ahram* and *Aljazeera* used the term from the first day, attributing it to different sides of the conflict, making it unclear who the *baltagiyya* were in the protests: were they on the protesters’ side who were following a hidden agenda and conspiring against Egypt, its regime, and its people? Or were they hired by the regime to abuse the protesters and abort the demonstrations? Or were there *baltagiyya* on both sides?

*Al-Ahram* used *baltagiyya* and its derivatives such as *baltaga* “participating in gang acts” to refer to the protesters; it was part of the general negative presentation of the protests and protesters that was discussed earlier. In some cases, the paper did not directly state that the protesters were *baltagiyya*, but implied that the intentions of the protesters who belonged to different groups were responsible for *baltaga*; in other words, protesters sought to incite chaos, destruction, theft, and *baltaga*. It also reports
that the *baltagiyya* and gangs exploited the protests for destructive purposes. In other cases, as shown in (b), the paper was more explicit in stating that the demonstrations were acts of *baltaga* and that those on the street were a group of *baltagiyya* exploiting the instability for their own purposes.

By stating that there is a difference between peaceful demonstrations and *baltagiyya* exploiting security vacuum, as shown in (c), *Al-Ahram* is pointing out that the event cannot be described as a peaceful demonstration and that protesters were a group of *baltagiyya* and bandits. The paper also employed the term *baltagiyya* to refer to the other side of the conflict, the government, but that was through intertextuality. (d) shows that *Al-Ahram* reports on a MB’ member as explicitly holding officials representing the regime responsible for the events on Tahrir Square, including the *baltagiyya*’s attack on protesters. By doing so, he identifies *baltagiyya* in a way different than that identified in the other examples; the *baltagiyya* in this context are on the government’s side of the conflict. This characterization, though, does not represent the paper’s own stance as it is an indirect reporting of a member belonging to an opposition group.

After Mubarak stepped down, *Al-Ahram* described *baltagiyya* as representing the government side of the conflict as shown in (e). This time it was not through sourcing, but was the paper’s own explicit stance. Thus, *Al-Ahram* referred to *baltagiyya* as representing the protesters in the beginning of the Revolution and by the end they were hired by members representing the regime. In between these two attributions, *baltagiyya* were presented through reporting on other voices as representing the government side of the conflict.
Aljazeera also employed the term to refer to perpetrators of violence during the protests; the term was used in direct or indirect reporting of different sources, with an expression like “the so-called”, or with quotation marks, distancing itself from the use as shown in (a’), (b’), and (c’). Yet, even when distancing itself from using the term, the network did not refer to the baltagiyya as representing the protesters. The two sides of the conflict during the uprising were presented as the popular committees, which were formed by the demonstrators, on the one hand, and the baltagiyya, on the other hand. (d’) also shows that the two sides of the conflict were presented as the citizens and the baltagiyya, who were not presented as protesters or groups within the protesters. Later in the Revolution and as the events escalated to clashes between supporters of the regime and protesters, Aljazeera employed the term baltagiyya, through reporting other voices, to refer to the government’s side of the conflict: baltagiyya supporting Mubarak’s regime and Interior Ministry elements attacked the protesters as in (e’). By the end of the Revolution, the term baltagiyya was used in the authorial voice that reveals Aljazeera’s stance: in (f’) the network described baltagiyya as being affiliated with the ruling NDP without distancing itself from the claim.

Aljazeera’s coverage can be divided into three stages when it comes to employing the term baltagiyya: in the first stage, which was at the beginning of the protests, the term was used to refer to gangs causing violence during the demonstrations but did not represent the protesters in any way; rather, these gangs were in conflict with the demonstrators. In the second stage, the term was employed to refer to baltagiyya as supporters of the regime who were abusing protesters; yet, the network distanced itself from the claim by using the word in reported speech, scare quotes, or preceded by expressions such as the so-called, or the so-described. In the
final stage, which was after the collapse of the regime, *baltagiyya* was used to refer to supporters of the regime in the authorial voice.

The analysis of the use of the term *baltagiyya* during the uprising reveals that it was a controversial term employed to present the outgroup negatively. *Al-Ahram* used the term to refer to one side of the conflict, the protesters, at the beginning of the Revolution, and to the other side, the government, towards the end. This indicates a drastic change in the paper’s position as power balances changed on the ground and a change in what it identified as the ingroup and outgroup. *Aljazeera*, however, used the term to refer only to one side but showed variation in terms of explicitness; i.e. the network’s position was more explicit in identifying the ingroup and outgroup towards the end of the Revolution.

### 3.3.2 Presupposition

Both *Al-Ahram* and *Aljazeera* employed presupposition strategically in their coverage either by reporting on other sources or in the authorial voice. In the following I discuss *Al-Ahram*’s use of presuppositions and then shed light on how *Aljazeera* utilized the same strategy. Examples (a), (b), and (c) in Table 3-10 show that *Al-Ahram* utilized presupposition strategy to describe the protesters and the protests negatively; the presuppositions include:

1. The inciters followed a provocative approach
2. The organizers of the gatherings are inciters
3. The demonstrations’ slogans are false

The opposing groups, especially the MB, were presented as practicing their usual criminal actions during the protests. Employing *as usual* in (c) indicates that destruction is a permanent group behavior.
The government, on the other hand, was presented positively; a presupposition frequently made was that Egypt was a country of freedom of expression and democracy, and that allowing the protests was part of that democracy. When freedom and democracy are presented as one of the demands of the protesters in (e), they were preceded by the quantifier more which presupposes that it is taken-for-granted that Egypt is a country of freedom and democracy.

Later in the uprising, precisely on Feb. 5, Al-Ahram’s position started to gradually change; it presupposed by reporting participants in the demonstrations that prior to Jan. 25 there was a psychological barrier as shown in (g) and that the Egyptian people were not able to demand freedom. This presupposition contradicts earlier presuppositions that the protests were part of freedom of speech and democracy in Egypt:

A few days later, Wael Ghonim was also reported in an article in which he presupposed that the youth were underestimated and not taken seriously by the government. The use of anymore in (h) presupposes that the youth were treated as children prior to the Revolution.

Examples of presupposition in Al-Ahram articles show the same pattern found in lexicalization and predication: in the beginning of the Revolution, the protesters and protests were delineated negatively while the government was presented positively. These presentations were in the authorial voice that depicts the paper’s ideology. The main themes reported through presupposition were that the protesters were inciters practicing their usual acts of violence to achieve their questionable goals, while the government is on the track of freedom of expression and democracy.

Later in the Revolution the paper started presenting opposite themes through presupposition such as the lack of freedom. Although these presuppositions were
presented indirectly through reporting other voices, they reveal a change of tone when it comes to the paper’s position toward the antagonists.

*Aljazeera* also employed presupposition to present the Egyptian government negatively and confirm that the protesters want nothing less than the fall of the regime. In doing so, it followed two strategies: in the beginning of the Revolution when it was not yet clear how intensive and decisive the demonstrations would be, presupposition was made through sourcing; that is, *Aljazeera* reported on opposition voices that made presuppositions presenting the government negatively. Later, presuppositions were more explicit utilizing the authorial voice. (a) – (d) in Table 3-11 are examples of the former and (e) – (i) are examples of the latter.

The movements and groups reported included April 6 movement, the MB, and *Kefaya* movement. The presuppositions made through reporting other voices in (a) – (d) include:

1. The Ministry of Interior is deceptive
2. The demonstrators insist on overthrowing President Mubarak’s regime
3. There is increasing evidence that makes it unacceptable to forgive the regime or allow the President a safe exit
4. The demonstrators insist that Mubarak step down immediately
   There is political congestion and divide due to violence

In presenting these presuppositions, the network employed lexical items such as *old, more, and further*. In (a) *old* was used to describe *deception*, presupposing that such practice is habitual by the Egyptian government. In (b) and (d) *more* was used to modify *insistent* and *political congestions*, respectively. This strategy implies that the protesters were already insistent, and that there had been political congestion and divide in the country. Finally, the adjective *further* was used to modify the noun *evidence*, indicating that there was previous evidence against Mubarak.
As the events developed, presuppositions were made more explicit by reporters; these presuppositions revolved around the same themes that were presupposed by reported opposition members. The presuppositions made in (e) – (i) include:

1. The demonstrators demand the downfall of the regime
2. Security forces and militia practiced violations against the unarmed demonstrators
3. Egypt witnesses corruption, violations, and freedom restrictions
4. Official media fabricates facts
5. Police forces prevented protesters from protesting in the past

It is important to point out, though, that there was no dividing point in the Revolution where *Aljazeera* started making presuppositions in the authorial voice rather than through sourcing. As can be seen above, there were points in the Revolution – perhaps between Feb. 1 and Feb. 5 – where both types of presupposition were employed. The generalization that can be made, however, is that presupposition through reporting other voices tended to be more toward the outset of the uprising and authorial voice presupposition was more towards the end. Nonetheless, *Aljazeera* was persistent in employing presupposition, whether through reporting or in the authorial voice, to support protesters’ propositions.

### 3.3.3 Verbal Process

Employing verbal processes was another way through which *Al-Ahram* and *Aljazeera* presented what they considered the ingroup positively and what they considered the outgroup negatively. The two outlets, however, adopted different strategies of verbal process utilization at different points in the protest, which can be divided into two stages: the first stage is from the outset of the protests until Feb. 2, and the second stage is between Feb. 3 and Mubarak’s departure. The two stages differ in terms of the verbal processes used (i.e. positive, negative, and neutral) and the sides
that were reported. Table 3-12 reveals how the two outlets utilized verbal process in their coverage early in the protests.

When reporting government voices, which were the dominant voices early in the Revolution, *Al-Ahram* utilized either positive or neutral verbs. Examples of positive verbal processes utilized by *Al-Ahram* include *confirm* and *announce* shown in (a) – (c) in Table 3-12.

*Aljazeera*, on the other hand, employed all types of verbal processes - positive, negative, and neutral - in reporting both sides of the conflict at the beginning of the demonstrations. The negative verb *warn*, for example, was used in reporting April 6 Movement and Egyptian government on the first day of the protests in (a’) and (b’), respectively; positive verbal processes such as *confirm* and *announce* were also used with both sides as shown in (c’) and (d’); and neutral verbs such as *said* and *mentioned* were also used in reporting both sides as shown in (e’) and (f’). Feb. 2 marked a change in both outlets’ use of verbal processes. In the following I shed light on the utilization of this strategy in the second stage.

At this point in the uprising, *Al-Ahram* began reporting opposition voices by employing neutral verbal processes, such as *said* and *called upon*. In (a) ElBaradei, a main opposition figure during the protests, was reported on by using a neutral verbal process although he was calling for the departure of the President. Voices demanding change and action on the part of the government were also reported using neutral verbal occurrence in (b) and (c); this included the voices of the National Progressive Unionist Party and Turkish prime minister. Turkish Prime Minister is not, of course, a member of the opposition; however, his reported speech is in harmony with the demands of the opposition and was reported employing a neutral verbal process in the
background of the story. Although rare, positive verbal processes were also used when reporting protesters at around the same time in the protests as in (d). (e) and (f) show that the paper still employed positive verbal processes with government officials and pro-government protesters at this stage. The first negative presentation of the government through a verbal process was on the day Mubarak stepped down; the verb used to report Egyptian rights groups was *accused* in (g).

*Aljazeera* coverage shows that the strategy of employing different verbal processes with both sides of the conflict continued until Feb. 2. After that date, the network explicitly sided with the protesters by employing either neutral or negative verbal processes to refer to the government side of the conflict. There were no negative verbs used to refer to the protesters. (a’) – (d’) are examples of these negative verbal processes used to report on the government side; they include the verbal processes *accused, condemned, refuted, and warned*, respectively.

To sum up, two stages are recognized when it comes to *Al-Ahram*’s employing of verbal processes during the Revolution. In the first stage, which was between the beginning of the Revolution on Jan. 25 and roughly Feb. 2, the verbal processes were used either positively or neutrally to report voices representing the government; there were no negative verbal processes employed with opposition voices simply because these voices were absent at the outset of the events.

The second stage included the use of neutral or positive verbal processes with members of both sides of the conflict; that is, opposition members and government officials were reported by employing the same verbal processes. However, official voices were still more dominant in terms of number of occurrences and foregrounding.
Later, verbal processes showed a positive presentation of the demonstrators and negative presentation of (former) government officials.

In general, negative verbal processes were not common. This indicates that positive ingroup presentation was more common than negative outgroup presentation in terms of the use of verbal processes in *Al-Ahram’s* coverage. Part of the reason for this, at least at the beginning of the protests, is that there was a tendency to exclude the voice of the outgroup in the first place, as will be discussed in Chapter 4.

The use of verbal processes in the coverage of *Aljazeera* also reveals two stages: the first stage starts at the beginning of the protests and ends by Feb. 2; during this stage, *Aljazeera* employed verbal processes in a balanced manner as both sides of the conflict were reported using the same verbal processes. As a matter of fact, all types of reporting verbs, positive, negative, and neutral, were used with voices representing the government and voices opposing it. Feb. 2 marked the beginning of the second stage where more negative verbs were used in referring to the government side, whose voice was absent during this stage.

### 3.4 Summary

The present textual analysis of *Al-Ahram* and *Aljazeera* articles reveals that the outlets took sides with either side of the conflict: *Al-Ahram* sided with the government and *Aljazeera* with the protesters. That being said, the degree of explicitness and consistency in showing this Us vs. Them dichotomy differed from one outlet to the other and also differed at different points in the protests; *Al-Ahram* tended to be more explicit about its position that was supportive of the regime in the beginning of the protests and *Aljazeera* was more explicit about its stance that was supportive of the protesters by the end of the protests.
First, the investigation of lexicalization and predication shows an absolute contrast between *Al-Ahram* and *Aljazeera*. For instance, *Al-Ahram* utilized predications such as the *banned* and *illegal* to describe opposing groups; it also used terms such as *elements*, compared to *activists*, to refer to members of those groups. This was not the case with *Aljazeera* which acknowledged these groups as legitimate political groups, referring to its members as *activists*. Similarly, *Al-Ahram* used proper name, position, and even honorifics to refer to government officials or to individuals against the regime who did not belong to any particular group. If mentioned at all, members of opposing groups, such as the April 6 movement, the National Commission for Change, and the MB, were referred to only by proper name.

The two institutions also employed the terms *dead* and *martyr* and their derivatives differently; *Al-Ahram* referred to casualties on the government side as *martyrs* and on the protesters side as *dead* in the beginning of the Revolution. Later in the Revolution it used the term *dead* and its derivatives to refer to casualties on both sides. After Mubarak’s stepping down, the term *martyr* and its derivatives was used to refer to casualties on the protesters side of the conflict. *Aljazeera* was more consistent in its use of the terms during the days of the protests as it employed the term *dead* and its derivatives to refer to casualties on both sides. After Mubarak’s stepping down, though, it employed the term *martyr* and its derivatives to refer to the protesters’ casualties.

Second, the analysis of *presupposition* indicates that both outlets used this strategy to present the ingroup positively and the outgroup negatively. Yet, the way this strategy was employed varied at different points in the protests: *Al-Ahram* presented negative presuppositions about the protesters in the authorial voice at the beginning of
the uprising, and by the end of it presented negative presuppositions about the
government by reporting other sources. *Aljazeera* was different in that its
presuppositions in general tended to represent the government negatively; yet, it was
more explicit about its presuppositions by the end of the Revolution as they were used
in the authorial voice.

Finally, the investigation of verbal processes shows that the two outlets followed
different strategies in employing positive, neutral, and negative verbal processes before
and after Feb. 2. In the beginning of the uprising, *Al-Ahram* utilized positive and neutral
verbal processes in reporting government officials and totally excluded representatives
of the protesters. After Feb. 2, it started reporting opposition sources using positive and
neutral verbal processes. *Aljazeera*, on the other hand, used all types of verbal
processes with both sides before Feb. 2. After this date, it employed negative verbal
processes to refer to the government and government officials.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predications used by Al-Ahram and Aljazeera to describe opposing groups</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Al-Ahram</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) جماعة الإخوان المسلمين المحظورة ...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The banned MB group .... <em>(Al-Ahram, Jan. 25)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) جماعة الإخوان المحظور نشاطها ...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The MB whose activity is banned .... <em>(Al-Ahram, Jan. 25)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) شهدت جميع محافظات الجمهورية أمس مظاهرات حاشدة فيما سمي بجماعة الغضب شارك فيها عشرات الآلاف من الشباب من الجماعة المحظورة والمعارضة والقوى السياسية</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A number of the Republic’s governorates witnessed massive demonstrations on the so-called the Friday of Rage, in which tens of thousands of the youth of the banned group, opposition, and political forces participated <em>(Al-Ahram, Jan. 29)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d) وقامت تلك العناصر الإخوانية بتحفيز المشاعر وكسر حاجز الالتزام بالطوارئ السلمي</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The [Muslim] Brothers elements incited emotions and broke the barrier of commitment to peaceful demonstration <em>(Al-Ahram, Jan. 30)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MB group mentioned that its activists received security threats <em>(Aljazeera, Jan. 26)</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

106
Table 3-1 Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Al-Ahram</th>
<th>Aljazeera</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(e) وما يسمى بحركتي 6 أبريل وكفاحية...</td>
<td>(e') وأعلن شباب حركة 6 أبريل - الذين يقودون الدعوة للمظاهرة - أن عشرات النشطاء قد اعتقلوا</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... وكذللك الجمعية الوطنية للتغيير ...</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and the so-called April 6 and Kefaya movements as well as the National Commission for Change. (Al-Ahram, Jan. 25)</td>
<td>The April 6 movement youth, who are leading the call for the demonstration - announced that tens of activists were arrested (Aljazeera, Jan. 26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(f) الناشطين في الحركات غير الشرعية ...</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activists in illegal groups ...</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Al-Ahram, Jan. 30)</td>
<td>(Aljazeera, Jan. 26)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3-2 Al-Ahram and Aljazeera’s naming of the antagonists

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Al-Ahram</th>
<th>Aljazeera</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) السيد وزير الداخلية حبيب العادلي ....</td>
<td>(a') رئيس الجمعية الوطنية للتغيير محمد البرادعي ...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Interior Minister Habib ElAdly .... (Al-Ahram, Jan. 26)</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) نائب الرئيس السيد عمر سليمان ....</td>
<td>(b') الدكتور محمد البيلتاجي القيادي في جماعة الإخوان المسلمين ...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vice President Mr. Omar Suleiman .... (Al-Ahram, Feb. 8)</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) واختار المتظاهرون كلا من السيد عمرو موسي أمين عام جامعة الدول العربية، والعالم المصري أحمد زويل لعرض مطالبهم الخاصة بالتغيير</td>
<td>(c') نائب المرشد العام للإخوان المسلمين رشاد بومي ...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The demonstrators chose Mr. Amr Moussa, Secretary General of Arab League, and the Egyptian scientist Ahmed Zewail to present their demands for change (Al-Ahram, Feb. 2).</td>
<td>Deputy General Guide of the MB Rashad Bayoumi .... (Aljazeera, Feb. 3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Al-Ahram</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d)</td>
<td>The demonstrators refused to delegate ElBaradei to speak on their behalf (<em>Al-Ahram</em>, Feb. 2).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(e)</td>
<td>ElBaradei and the MB group insisted on their part on change (<em>Al-Ahram</em>, Feb. 2).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(f)</td>
<td>and a number (of members) of banned MB group, especially former parliament members (<em>Al-Ahram</em>, Jan. 26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(g)</td>
<td>Engineer Wael Ghonim, the opposing activist .... (<em>Al-Ahram</em>, Feb. 8)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| (h) | ... to meet with Omar Suleiman, the Vice President (*Aljazeera*, Feb. 4) | ... لمقابلة عمر سليمان نائب الرئيس...
Table 3-3 The naming and description of the protests by Al-Ahram and Aljazeera

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Al-Ahram</th>
<th>Aljazeera</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) بعد أن نجحت بعض الأيدي الخفية في استثمار الأحداث والقفز فوق مطالب الشباب المشروعة لتحقيق مصالحها الخاصة وأهدافها السياسية بتدمير هذا البلد، وإشاعة حالة من الفوضى والخراب….after some hidden hands succeeded in investing the events and jumping over the legitimate demands of the youth to achieve their personal interests and political goals by destroying the country, and spreading chaos and destruction (Al-Ahram, Jan. 30).</td>
<td>(a') الاحتجاجات المطالبة بتنحي الرئيس حسني مبارك وإزالة النظام بالكامل ... The protests demanding Mubarak’s departure and removing the whole regime… (Aljazeera, Feb. 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) تطورت المظاهرات إلى حشود من مثيري الشغب والتخريب والعناصر الإجرامية The demonstrations developed into gatherings of inciters of unrest and destruction and criminal elements (Al-Ahram, Jan. 30).</td>
<td>(b') المظاهرات المطالبة برحيل النظام ... The demonstrations demanding the departure of the regime … (Aljazeera, Jan. 30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) فجأة تحولت المسيرات السلمية التي تطالب بالإصلاح إلى مظاهرات عارمة خرجت عن إطارها المشروع حتى أصبحت الفوضى عنوانا لما يحدث Peaceful marches calling for reform turned suddenly into outrageous demonstrations that have gone beyond legitimacy, and chaos became a title to what happened (Al-Ahram, Jan, 30).</td>
<td>(c') مواجهات دامية بين المتظاهرين وأنصار الرئيس حسني مبارك … bloody confrontations between the demonstrators and supporters of President Hosni Mubarak … (Aljazeera, Feb. 3)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3-3  Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Al-Ahram</th>
<th>Aljazeera</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(d’) في مصادمات بين المتظاهرين وقوات الأمن</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(e’) أفادت مصادر للجزيرة بأن اشتباكات عنفية اندلعت في ميدان مصطفى محمود .. بين متظاهرين وعناصر وصفت بالأسلحة</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3-4 Al-Ahram and Aljazeera’s reference to casualties at the beginning of the protests

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Al-Ahram</th>
<th>Aljazeera</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a)</td>
<td>استشهاد مجند أمن وشابين بالسويس</td>
<td>سقط أربعة قتلى - أحدهم من رجال الأمن - في مصادمات بين المتظاهرين وقوات الأمن</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Martyrdom of a recruit and two young men in Suez (Al-Ahram, Jan. 26)</td>
<td>Four people, including a security officer, were killed in clashes between demonstrators and security forces (Aljazeera, Jan. 26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b)</td>
<td>وصرح مصدر أمني بأن المجند أحمد عزى من قوات الأمن المركزى استشهد..... كما لقي شابان مصرعهما</td>
<td>A security source stated that recruit Ahmad Aziz of the Central Security Forces died as a martyr..... and two young men died/perished (Al-Ahram, Jan. 26)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3-5  

**Al-Ahram** and **Aljazeera**’s reference to casualties from Feb. 2 until Mubarak’s departure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Al-Ahram</th>
<th>Aljazeera</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) ... وخلفت وراءها ـ وفقا لوكالة الأنباء الفرنسية ـ 300 قتيل ... which resulted in the death of 300 people, according to AFP (Al-Ahram, Feb. 2)</td>
<td>(a’) ... وسقط في الاحتجاجات قتلى يقدر عددهم بما بين 150 و200 قتيل، كما أصيب منات الجرحى ... between 150 and 200 people died/perished in the protests, while hundreds were wounded (Aljazeera, Feb. 2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) ... حتى لا تتكرر المأساة التي شهدتها مصر مساء يوم الأربعاء الماضي والت سقط فيها نحو عشرة قتلي ... to avoid the tragedy that Egypt witnessed last Wednesday in which ten were killed (Al-Ahram, Feb. 5)</td>
<td>(b’) إن ما يقرب من 300 شخص قتلوا في الاضطرابات في الوقت الذي كان فيه محتجز Around 300 people were killed during the unrest while he was arrested (Aljazeera, Feb. 9)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3-6 Other occurrences of the term martyr in **Al-Ahram** and **Aljazeera** coverage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Al-Ahram</th>
<th>Aljazeera</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) صور شهداء الأحداث الأخيرة ... photos of the martyrs of the latest events (Al-Ahram, Feb. 8)</td>
<td>(a’) إن أثر سقوط أكثر من 300 شهيد و5 آلاف جريح ... after the fall of 300 martyrs and 5 thousand wounded (Aljazeera, Feb. 13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) شهدائنا الأبطال ... our hero martyrs (Al-Ahram, Feb. 12)</td>
<td>(b’) وفي ميدان التحرير أو الشهداء أو ثورة 25 يناير ... In Tahrir or Martyrs or Jan. 25 Square... (Aljazeera, Feb. 13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 3-7 Occurrences of the term <em>Revolution</em> in <em>Al-Ahram</em> and <em>Aljazeera</em> coverage</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Al-Ahram</strong></td>
<td><strong>Aljazeera</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) وحثهم على عدم التوجه أو التحرك إلى أي مكان آخر سوى ميدان التحرير, ذلك الميدان الذي يشهد ثورة مصر في عهدها الحديث…</td>
<td>(a') ولا يعلم على وجه التحديد إلى أين ستفضى الثورة الشعبية في مصر No one exactly knows what the outcomes of Egypt’s popular Revolution would be .. (<em>Aljazeera</em>, Jan. 28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>… and urging them not to move to any place but Tahrir Square, the Square that witnesses Egypt’s Revolution in its contemporary era (<em>Al-Ahram</em>, Feb. 5)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) لن يستطيعوا خطف ثورة الشباب المصري الخائف على بلده…</td>
<td>(b') وأكد الحزب [حزب الغد] استمرار ما وصفها بالانتفاضة حتى تحقيق مطالب الشعب, ودعا الشباب إلى التمسك بما أسماها &quot;ثورة الشعبية&quot; The Party [El-Ghad Party] confirmed resuming what it called the uprising until the people’s demands are met, and called upon the youth to hold on to what it called “the popular Revolution” (<em>Aljazeera</em>, Jan. 29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>… they cannot steal the Revolution of Egyptian youth who are worried about their country (<em>Al-Ahram</em>, Feb. 8)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c') وأكد المتظاهرون في هتافاتهم على شعبية وشبابية الثورة The demonstrators confirmed in their chants the popularity and youthfulness of the Revolution (<em>Aljazeera</em>, Feb. 4)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d') دموع غنيم تلهيم ثورة مصر Ghonim’s tears inspire Egypt’s Revolution (<em>Aljazeera</em>, Feb. 9)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(e') ثورة مصر بدلت مشهدا الإعلامي Egypt’s Revolution changed its media scene (<em>Aljazeera</em>, Feb. 10)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3-7 Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Al-Ahram</strong></th>
<th><strong>Aljazeera</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(f')</td>
<td>يثورة الشباب المصري</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Egyptian youth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Revolution (Aljazeera, Feb. 10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(g')</td>
<td>أحداث الثورة</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Revolution events</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Aljazeera, Feb. 10)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3-8 The portrayal of the Revolution after Mubarak’s downfall

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Al-Ahram</strong></th>
<th><strong>Aljazeera</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a)</td>
<td>لا إخوان ولا أحزاب ثورتنا ثورة شباب</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not [Muslim] Brothers, not</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>parties, our Revolution is a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>youth Revolution (Al-Ahram,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Feb. 11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a')</td>
<td>الثورة الشعبية غير المسبوقة في تاريخ مصر</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The popular Revolution that is</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>unprecedented in the history of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Egypt (Aljazeera, Feb. 12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b)</td>
<td>يهنئ الشعب المصري بثورته</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The youth white Revolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Aljazeera, Feb. 13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b')</td>
<td>العظيمة</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| (c)          | خيرة شباب مصر |
|              | ... for their great pure |
|              | Revolution that was led by |
|              | the cream of Egyptian youth |
|              | (Al-Ahram, Feb. 12) |
| (d)          | حماية الثورة الشعبية الأعظم في |
|              | تاريخ الثورات |
|              | ... protect the greatest |
|              | popular Revolution in the |
|              | history of revolutions (Al- |
|              | Ahram, Feb. 12) |
Table 3-9 *Al-Ahram* and *Aljazeera* use of the term *baltagiyya* and its derivatives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Al-Ahram</strong></th>
<th><strong>Aljazeera</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>(a)</strong> The second goal is that the Egyptian citizen becomes insecure about himself on the street due to the ongoing theft, stealing, <em>baltaga</em>, and horriification of citizens (<em>Al-Ahram</em>, Jan. 30)</td>
<td><strong>(a’)</strong> ... and that after attack and retreat between popular committees formed by the inhabitants and “<em>baltagiyya</em>” (<em>Al Jazeera</em>, Jan. 30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>(b)</strong> A number of <em>baltagiyya</em> and gangs exploited the situation by breaking into the large shopping center Carrefour (<em>Al-Ahram</em>, Jan. 30)</td>
<td><strong>(b’)</strong> <em>Aljazeera</em> reported a media source in Damanhr as saying that what he described as “<em>baltagiyya</em>” are threatening citizens with weapons... and are robbing and stealing (<em>Aljazeera</em>, Jan. 30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>(c)</strong> There is a difference between peaceful demonstrations that everyone respects and a group of <em>baltagiyya</em> and bandits exploiting security vacuum (<em>Al-Ahram</em>, Jan. 30)</td>
<td><strong>(c’)</strong> Media sources accused what they described as elements belonging to the Interior Ministry wearing civilian clothes and the so-called “<em>baltagiyay</em>” of attacking demonstrators in Tahrir Square (<em>Aljazeera</em>, Feb. 3)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(d) They [businessmen, parliament members, and NDP members] organized a demonstration supporting the president in Mustafa Mahmoud Square in which laborers in companies owned by the businessmen, laborers from the Laborers Union, soccer players, artists, and baltagiyya who were gathered from a number of popular neighborhoods in Cairo and were riding camels, horses, and mules participated; (Al-Ahram, Feb. 14)

(d') وكانت تقارير إعلامية قد أشارت إلى أن حصيلة المواجهات التي تواصلت أمس بين "بلطجية" مؤيدين لنظام مبارك والمحتجين بلغت عشرة قتلى

Media reports pointed out that the death toll of confrontations that continued yesterday between “baltagiyya” supporting Mubarak’s regime and protesters reached ten (Aljazeera, Feb. 4)

(e') بين أكثر المشاهد درامية في أحداث الثورة المصرية المتوالية، كانت لحظة دخول بلطجية الحزب الوطني الديمقراطي الحاكم إلى ميدان التحرير في القاهرة على ظهور الجمال والخيول

One of the most dramatic scenes in the series of the Egyptian Revolution events was the NDP baltagiyya entering Tahrir Square in Cairo riding camels and horses (Aljazeera, Feb. 10)
Table 3-10 *Al-Ahram* presuppositions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><em>Al-Ahram</em></th>
<th><em>Aljazeera</em></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) على الرغم من النهج الآثري الذي تبناه المحرضون على التجمع يوم 25 الجاري...</td>
<td>In spite of the provocative approach that was adopted by the inciters of the gathering on the 25th of the present month... (<em>Al-Ahram</em>, Jan. 25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) الداخلية تناشد المتجمعيين بعدم الانسياق وراء شعارات زائفة</td>
<td>The Ministry of Interior calls on demonstrators not to be misled by false slogans (<em>Al-Ahram</em>, Jan. 25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) وكعادتها استثمرت الجامعة المحظورة كثافة الحشد الأمني في مواجهة مثيري الشغب من المتظاهرين وقاموا بإحراق أقسام الشرطة والاستيلاء على الأسلحة والمستندات</td>
<td>As usual the banned group invested the fact that many security forces were confronting disorder inciters to set police department on fire and seize weapons and documents (<em>Al-Ahram</em>, Jan. 30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d) صرح مصدر أمني أنه في إطار إتاحة الفرصة لوقفات احتجاجية للتعبير عن مطالب سياسية أو فردية طوال الفترات السابقة توافقا مع المسار الديمقراطي وإتاحة الفرصة للتعبير عن الرأي</td>
<td>A security source announced that allowing protest gatherings to express political demands or demands of certain groups during the past period is consistent with the democratic track and allowing for freedom of expression (<em>Al-Ahram</em>, Jan. 25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(e) شارك عدة آلاف في مظاهرات حاشدة أمس بالقاهرة وعدة محافظات ورددوا الشعارات، التي تطالب برفع فرص العمل ومكافحة البطالة، والسيطرة على اتفاقيات الأسعار، والمزيد من الحرية والديمقراطية</td>
<td>A few thousand participated in massive demonstrations in Cairo and a number of governorates yesterday and chanted slogans that called for providing job opportunities, fighting unemployment, controlling the rise of prices, and more freedom and democracy (<em>Al-Ahram</em>, Jan. 26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(f) طالب خلالها المتظاهرون بمزيد من الحرية والديمقراطية...</td>
<td>...during which demonstrators demanded more freedom and democracy (<em>Al-Ahram</em>, Jan. 26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(g) وضمت المظاهرات أسرا كاملة وشبابا وشيوخا، حيث أكد المشاركون أن الحاجز النفسي للشعب المصري تم كسره وأصبح قائدا على طلب الحرية</td>
<td>The demonstrations included families, youth, and elderly; the participants confirmed that the Egyptian people's psychological barrier has been broken and the people have become able to ask for freedom (<em>Al-Ahram</em>, Feb. 5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(h) لذا اطلب المسئولين بالتعامل مرة أخرى كالأطفال</td>
<td>I hence call upon officials not to treat us as children anymore (<em>Al-Ahram</em>, Feb. 8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Al Jazeera</em> presuppositions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Table 3-11</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Al-Ahram</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a)</td>
<td>A statement issued by the movement [April 6] warned the Ministry of Interior from practicing “the old deception” (<em>Al Jazeera</em>, Jan. 25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b)</td>
<td>Protesters gathering in Tahrir Square said they were more insistent on the downfall of the President Hosni Mubarak’s regime (<em>Al Jazeera</em>, Feb. 3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c)</td>
<td>Deputy General Guide of the MB Rashad Bayoumi confirmed that the assaults on demonstrators on Tahrir Square give further/new evidence that it is not acceptable to forgive the regime or allow President Mubarak safe exit (<em>Al Jazeera</em>, Feb. 3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d)</td>
<td>The group warned that acts of violence would only lead to more political congestion and divide (<em>Al Jazeera</em>, Feb. 3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(e)</td>
<td>The participants [in the demonstration] renewed their demand of the President’s step down and removal of the whole regime (<em>Al Jazeera</em>, Feb. 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(f)</td>
<td>It is worth mentioning that Egyptian authorities cut off Internet and cellular phone services on the first days of the uprising in an attempt to obscure police forces and armed militia violations against armless demonstrators (<em>Al Jazeera</em>, Feb. 9)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3-12 Verbal process in Al-Ahram and Aljazeera coverage during the first days of the protests

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Al-Ahram</th>
<th>Aljazeera</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a)</td>
<td>حذرت حركة شباب 6 أبريل وزارة الداخلية المصرية من التعامل مع الشبان بعنف بج电站 من الشوارع اليوم</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a')</td>
<td>April 6 Movement warned Egyptian Ministry of Interior from dealing violently with activists and demonstrators who will take to the streets today (Aljazeera, Jan. 25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b)</td>
<td>وصرح مصدر أمني بأن المجند أحمد خليفة عزيف من قوات الأمن المركزية استشهد</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b')</td>
<td>On its part the Egyptian government warned against any attempt to break the law (Aljazeera, Jan. 25)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3-11 Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Al-Ahram</th>
<th>Aljazeera</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(g)</td>
<td>في هذا السياق لجأ مقدما برنامج &quot;84 ساعة&quot; في قناة المحور إلى محاولة تشويه صورة المطالبين بهاء الفساد والانتهاكات واستعادة الحرية عبر التشكيك في وطنيتهم وتقديمهم في صورة العملاء الذين يخدمون مصالح الخارج</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In this context, the presenters of the TV show 48 hours on Mehwar Channel sought to tarnish the image of those demanding an end to corruption and violations and calling for restoring freedom by casting doubts about their nationalism and presenting them as agents serving external interests (Aljazeera, Feb. 10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(h)</td>
<td>وعمل رئيس تحرير الصحيفة – وهو معروف بقربه من الحكومة. على النأي بنفسه عن الفبركة</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The editor of the paper, known for his close relation with the government, attempted to distance himself from the incredible fabrication (Aljazeera, Feb. 10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(i)</td>
<td>لم تستطع قوات الشرطة بكل أعدادها وتجهيزاتها أن تحول – كما كان في السابق – دون وصول الثائرين إلى ميدان التحرير</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The police force with all its members and capacity was not able, as it did before, to prevent revolutionists from reaching Tahrir Square (Aljazeera, Feb. 13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 3-12 CONTINUED</td>
<td>Al-Ahram</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) فان الوزارة [الداخلية] تؤكد على ضروره إنهاء تلك التجمعات تفاديا لما قد يخل بالأمن العام. The Ministry [of Interior] confirms the necessity of ending the gatherings to avoid whatever might affect general security (Al-Ahram, Jan. 25)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c') وأعلن شباب حركة 6 أبريل -الذين يقودون الدعوة للمظاهرة- أن عشرات النشطاء قد اعتقلوا. April 6 Movement Youth – who are leading the call for the demonstration – announced that tens of activists were arrested (Aljazeera, Jan. 26)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d') مؤكدا (مدير أمن القاهرة) أن الحكومة أرسلت تحذيرات لمنظمي الاحتجاجات. …. confirming (Head of Cairo Security) that the government has sent warnings to the organizers of the protests (Aljazeera, Jan. 25)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(e') وقال مدير أمن القاهرة إسماعيل الشاعر في بيان Head of Cairo Security Ismael ElShaer said in a statement (Aljazeera, Jan. 25)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(f') جماعة الإخوان المسلمين ذكرت أن نشطاءها تلقوا تهديدات أمنية MB group mentioned that its activists received security threats (Aljazeera, Jan. 26)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3-13 Verbal process in Al-Ahram and Aljazeera coverage after Feb. 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Al-Ahram</th>
<th>Aljazeera</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) وقال البرادعي: إن الرئيس يجب أن يرحل بحلول يوم الجمعة المقبل</td>
<td>(a') واتهمت مصادر صحفية للجزيرة - ما وصفته بعناصر من وزارة الداخلية بلباس مدني ومن يوصفون بـ&quot;البلطجية&quot;، بمهاجمة المتظاهرين في ميدان التحرير</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ElBaradei said: the president must leave by next Friday (<em>Al-Ahram</em>, Feb. 2)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) وقد طالب حزب التجمع رئيس مجلس الوزراء أحمد شفيق باتخاذ إجراءات فورية تستجيب لمطالب المتظاهرين</td>
<td>(b') وأدانت المنظمة العربية لحقوق الإنسان ما وصفته بالاعتداءات على المتظاهرين المعارضين في ميدان التحرير</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The National Progressive Unionist Party called upon Prime Minister Ahmad Shafik to take immediate measures that obey the demonstrators' demands (<em>Al-Ahram</em>, Feb. 2)</td>
<td>The Arab Organization of Human Rights condemned what it called assaults on opposing demonstrators in Tahrir Square (<em>Aljazeera</em>, Feb. 3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) ودعا رئيس الوزراء التركي رجب طيب أردوغان أبرز الرئيس مبارك إلى الإصغاء إلى شعبه وتلبية متطلباتهم الراامية إلى تحقيق التغيير الديمقراطي بالبلاد</td>
<td>(c') وقد كتب كل شهود العيان المرابطين في ميدان التحرير على شاشة الجزيرة هذه الدعاوى</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish Prime Minister Rajab Teyeb Erdogan called upon President Mubarak to listen to his people and obey their demands that aim to achieve democratic change in the country (<em>Al-Ahram</em>, Feb. 2)</td>
<td>All eyewitnesses in Tahrir Square refuted these claims on Aljazeera (<em>Aljazeera</em>, Feb. 4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Al-Ahram</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d)</td>
<td>حيث أكد المشاركون أن الحاجز النفسي للشعب المصري تم كسره وأصبح قادرًا على طلب الحرية. The participants confirmed that the psychological barrier for the Egyptian people was broken and they have become able to demand freedom <em>(Al-Ahram, Feb. 5)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(e)</td>
<td>مؤكدين أن الرئيس مبارك لبى مطالب الشعوب واستمع إلى المظاهرات السلمية التي نظمها شباب مصر الوعي. .. confirming [protesters supporting Mubarak] that President Mubarak obeyed the demands of the people and listened to the peaceful protests that were organized by the aware Egyptian youth <em>(Al-Ahram, Feb. 3)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(f)</td>
<td>وصرح اللواء نبيل العزبي محافظ أسيوط بأن المتظاهرين رفعوا جميعا شعارا واحدا (هو الشعب يريد بقاء الرئيس) ويؤكد اجتماعهم على قلب واحد وشعار واحد حبهم وتقديرهم للرئيس مبارك الذي وفر الأمن والأمان وحقق السلام لشعبه. General Nabeel El-Ezaby, governor of Assuit, announced that the demonstrators all raised one slogan (the people demand the stay of the President) and confirms their agreement on the love and appreciation of President Mubarak <em>(Al-Ahram, Feb. 3)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(g)</td>
<td>اتهمت جماعات حقوقية مصرية أجهزة أمنية بشن حملة ترويع منظمة ضد المحتجين. Egyptian rights groups accused security authorities of launching an organized horrifying assault against demonstrators <em>(Al-Ahram, Feb. 11)</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER 4
DISCURSIVE PRACTICE ANALYSIS

4.1 Overview

Discursive practice has to do with the processes involved in text production and consumption. However, the focus of the present study is on the institutional practices and organizational routines that govern text production. In their production of texts, reporters take into account the institutional character that involves editorial procedures and guidelines of their media outlet. Thus, the encoding of texts varies due to the variation in editorial procedures and to the targeted audience of each media institution. As explained in Chapter 2, two analytic tools are utilized to analyze discursive practice and depict the underlying ideology of Al-Ahram and Aljazeera; these are intertextuality and topics. Relevant examples on each section are provided in tables at the end of Chapter 2.

Simply put, intertextuality refers to how texts are produced from already existing texts. It, therefore, pertains to how and why different voices are included or excluded in news items. I start by discussing how Al-Ahram and Aljazeera reported the antagonists during the Revolution, and whether or not their reporting strategies were consistent throughout the days of the protests. I also discuss whether or not certain voices were emphasized and given prominence and others marginalized and excluded in the coverage of each outlet. In doing so, the aim is to show how hegemony is achieved by allowing certain groups access to media discourse and considering other groups as unreliable sources (van Dijk, 1998b).

The analysis of topics, on the other hand, gives insights into what constituted news-value for each media outlet. Therefore, I discuss the topics that were emphasized and the topics that were deemphasized, or even neglected, by each media outlet
through processes of foregrounding and backgrounding. To do so, I focus on five main topics on which the coverage centered and show how Al-Ahram and Aljazeera dealt with each of these topics; they include: 1) the protests; 2) the President, government, and the NDP; 3) the religious institution; 4) the international community’s reaction; and 5) the U.S. position.

4.2 Intertextuality

Al-Ahram tended to include and exclude voices representing different sides of the conflict depending on power balances during the days of the protests. That is, the first days of the Revolution were characterized by an emphasis on the official voice and marginalization of the protesters. As the events unfolded and protesters started gaining support, their voices were minimally included along with the government voices, with the latter being the dominant voice. Once President Mubarak was ousted, the only voice reported was that of the protesters.

During the first days of the protests, the paper totally excluded the voices of the opposition; the only voices reported were those of government officials such as security sources, the Ministry of the Interior, and official sources. By Feb. 2, an opposition member, Mohammed ElBaradei, leader of the National Association for Change, was reported for the first time; in fact, it was the first time an opposition member was given voice. His reported speech was brief and was preceded by a clause that minimizes the importance of what he said. On that same day, the National Progressive Unionist Party was also reported as calling on the Prime Minister to obey the demands of the demonstrators, and the Turkish Prime Minister was reported as calling on President Mubarak “to listen to his people and obey their demands.” These three voices, although
backgrounded and given less prominence in the article, marked a transition - or perhaps confusion - in the paper’s coverage strategy.

In spite of this relative change, the prominent voice was still the voice of government representatives or voices supporting the government. *Al-Ahram* continued excluding opposition and protesters’ voices and included voices such as citizens supporting Mubarak, Egyptian Chamber of Commerce, Governor of Assiut, Egyptian Prime Minister, and Vice President Omar Suleiman. There were few cases of reporting voices against the government, such as a leader in the MB group and protesters and activists such as Wael Ghonim.

By the end of the Revolution and as protesters made victory, voices critical of the government were included, such as human rights organizations - which had not been referred to throughout the events – international media sources, and demonstrators. In an article dated Feb. 11, *Al-Ahram* reported Egyptian rights groups who told the *Guardian* about violations of Egyptian security forces against the demonstrators. In another article on the same day, lawyers expressing solidarity with the demonstrators were also reported. Table 4-1 shows the voices included during the Revolution based on a random sample data at different points in the Revolution.

*Al-Ahram* employed indirect quotation to report speech; as a matter of fact this was the only type of reported speech used in all the articles, eliminating boundaries between the representing discourse and the represented discourse, or rather between the voice of the reporter and the voice of the person reported. As Fairclough (1995: 81) puts it: “one feature of indirect speech is that although it is expected to be accurate about the propositional content of what is said, it is ambivalent about the actual words that were used.” Thus, although a reporter may claim objectivity by minimizing the
authorial voice and using sources to verbalize truth-claims, ideologically-loaded words may be employed to serve group interests through indirect reporting.

Since Al-Ahram mostly reported members of what it considered the ingroup, this effect may not be clear; however, when reporting neutral or outgroup parties, the effect was more salient. To explain this, I provide an example in Table 4-2.

Reporting the New York Times on Feb. 5, Al-Ahram used the predication banned, which is employed whenever the MB group is referred to in its articles. However, it is not clear from the text whether this word is part of the representing discourse, the reporter’s voice, or the represented discourse, the New York Times voice. It is most likely, if not definitely, the voice of the reporter embedded in reported speech for ideological purposes. By opting for indirect reporting, the reporter transforms the actual words to fit easily with her voice (Fairclough, 1995).

On the other hand, Aljazeera’s coverage was value-laden in terms of the number of voices included and their diversity. Yet, not all voices were given equal prominence throughout the days of the Revolution. Like Al-Ahram, Aljazeera included and excluded different voices at different points in the Revolution. When the protests started, both sides of the conflict were equally presented: the coverage included voices representing the opposition and the government as well as neutral voices such as media sources, eyewitnesses, and high ranking officials in other countries.

The coverage was also balanced when it comes to the opposition voices reported; it included members of different leading groups in the opposition as well as independent activists, and no particular group was given more prominence over the other. Among opposition groups that were reported were the April 6 Movement, MB, National Assembly for Change, and Kefaya (enough) movement.
Egyptian government officials, on the other hand, were always reported through other sources such as another media outlet or a statement. As Table 4-3 shows, Habib ElAdly, Minister of the Interior, was reported by referring to an interview with Al-Ahram and Head of Cairo Security was reported by referring to a statement. This indicates that Aljazeera did not have direct access to government officials, but still sought to include their voices in the coverage by referring to other sources.

These voices, however, were excluded by Feb. 3. The data shows that Aljazeera almost reported no government officials or government supporters after eight days of the protests. The only voices included were the voices of the demonstrators or “neutral” voices such as media sources, eyewitnesses, or international organizations. The following Table 4-4 shows the voices included in a random sample data at different points in the Revolution. It reveals that until Feb. 7, Aljazeera reported both sides of the conflict as well as other neutral parties. However, “equity and balance cannot be assessed by merely noting which voices are represented, and, for instance, how much space is given to each” (Fairclough, 1995:81).

A closer investigation shows that the voice of the Egyptian government was included in most cases to present it negatively or the protesters positively. The voices can be divided into protagonist and antagonist voices. Table 4-5 reveals that although the Head of Archeological Sites and former secretary of Mubarak were reported as government officials, the speech reported was supportive of the protesters, not the government; some of it, as a matter of fact, was offensive against the government.

Another strategy which also creates an impression of objectivity but drives interpretations that are favorable to the ingroup ideology is positioning and contextualizing. On the first day of the protests, Aljazeera reported that the Egyptian
government officials such as Interior Minister Habib ElAdly and Head of Cairo Security as threatening to arrest protesters who did not obtain licenses; this was followed by reporting Amnesty International Organization as urging Egyptian authorities “to allow peaceful protests.” Although Aljazeera included the voice of the government, the interpretation is influenced by the reporting of an international organization that condemns the government’s intended action and urges to allow peaceful protests.

ElAdly’s same statements were directly reported in an article on the second day, followed by indirect reporting of the MB group and April 6 movement saying that some of their activists were indeed threatened and arrested. On the face of it, the article reported both sides of the conflict, but the context serves an interpretation that presents the government as suppressive and intolerant of criticism.

Table 4-4. also shows that Aljazeera has included the voices of other sources, which did not belong to any side of the conflict. The reported voices categorized as Others in the above Table can be subdivided into four sources: 1) international official sources such as U.S. President Barack Obama and U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton; 2) media sources such as Aljazeera correspondents, CNN, Reuters, and AFP; 3) international organizations such as Amnesty International Organization and Arab Human Rights Organization; and 4) unidentified sources such as eyewitnesses and media reports. The question is: how were these voices employed and how did they play out in terms of representing the two sides of the conflict?

The general answer is that they were either neutral in that they described the events as they unfolded or were supportive of the protests and protesters. One of the examples that clearly shows how including voices was utilized to present the demonstrations positively and government negatively is reporting unidentified sources.
such as eyewitnesses. Eyewitnesses were reported seven times in a sample data investigated and in six out of these there was emphasis on the positive side of the protesters and negative side of the government. The protesters were presented negatively in only one of these instances. Table 4-6 sheds light on how reporting on unidentified sources was geared towards supporting the protesters and presenting the government negatively in the coverage. The last reporting of eyewitnesses, did not directly present protesters as perpetrators of a negative action in the sense that they were not introduced as agents of the negative action; however, the government side was presented as being affected by an attack on one of its agencies. Therefore, (e) is not in line with the previous ones in terms of the presentation of the two sides; it was the only exception in *Aljazeera*’s utilization of unidentified sources in its coverage.

*Aljazeera* employed three types of reported speech in its articles: direct quotation, indirect quotation, and strategic quotation, or ‘scare quotes’, which are used with controversial words or thoughts. van Ginneken (2002) explains that the difference between quoting complete sentences and quoting only certain words is that in the former the factualness of the claim is unquestioned, whereas in the latter the content is indirectly being questioned. In other cases, it is used to keep distance from the content of the reported speech.

Similar to the use of scare quotes is employing expressions like 'the so-called', 'the so-described', 'what they call', 'what they describe', and 'according to him' to influence content factualness and to distance the reporter from the implications and truth-claims of certain words and expressions. This strategy has been employed even more than scare quotes in the data investigated and was used with both sides of the
conflict as well as neutral parties. Examples of the utilization of scare quotes and expressions that achieve distance with the content are provided in Table 4-7.

*Aljazeera* used strategic quotation in reporting both sides. For example, in describing the clashes that erupted between popular committees and *baltagiyya* in (a), reporters employ strategic quotation with the phrase *law breakers*. Using scare quotes with *law breakers* emphasizes the way the phrase is formed rather than the content; by following this strategy, the reporter distances herself from what the expression refers to. Since the first day of the protests, the Minister and Ministry of Interior as well as official media referred to the demonstrators as *law breakers*, claiming that they are gathering without obtaining official licenses. *Aljazeera* treats this phrase as controversial and attributes its connotations to the source, in this case the Egyptian government. By so doing, it rejects the presupposition made by the government side of the conflict or at least does not take it as a given.

The network applies the same strategy with the protesters and activists’ propositions. Certain negative predications attributed to the government side of the conflict were reported by employing scare quotes and distancing the network from the claims made as shown in (b). Scare quotes were also used to refer to naming of certain days in the Revolution, such as the first day which was referred to as “the Day of Rage” and the naming of Fridays, which were considered special days during the Revolution when it comes to mobilizing people and encouraging them to join the protests after Friday Prayers. The two Fridays were called “the Rage Friday” and “the Departure Friday”, respectively, and were referred to using scare quotes to achieve distance from the naming of these days.
*Aljazeera* reporters distanced themselves and, perhaps, questioned the truth-claims of expressions like *law breakers* and *protesters supporting Mubarak* by employing expressions such as *what it described as* or *who were described as*, as shown in (c) and (d). In (e) and (f), the network also distanced itself from the claims of the protesters by using the same expressions to refer to *thugs hired by the NDP* and *armed elements assaulting the protesters*.

By using the expressions *what they called* and *described as* above, *Aljazeera* is not adopting the claim that the ruling NDP has hired armed thugs to assault the protesters, at least not explicitly; it is attributing these controversial descriptions to other sources: activists and sources, respectively. However, in later stages in the Revolution, as Table 4-8 shows, these expressions were not used, indicating a more explicit position towards the event. *The Day of Rage* was also used in the authorial voice with no scare quotes or distancing expressions after President Mubarak stepped down; the tone of *Aljazeera* shifted from a cautious tone seeking balance and objectivity by editorial standards to a more explicit voice backing the protests and the protesters.

To sum up, the analysis of intertextuality reveals a variation between *Al-Ahram* and *Aljazeera* in terms of the sources emphasized in the coverage and the ways these sources were reported. It also shows that both outlets affiliated themselves with one side of the conflict. *Al-Ahram* tended to exclude voices representing the protesters, especially in the beginning of the protests and only reported on government officials. Later in the uprising, particularly by Feb. 2, voices of the opposition were included, but the government’s voice was still prominent. After Mubarak’s stepping down, the only voices reported were those of the protesters. In its reporting, *Al-Ahram* only utilized indirect reporting, a strategy which allows for eliminating boundaries between the
representing and represented discourse, making the distinction between the reported speech and authorial voice difficult.

In the outset of the protests, *Aljazeera* was balanced in its reporting of different voices representing the two sides of the conflict, and within the opposition, it did not give prominence to one particular group over the other; all opposition groups were given equal prominence in the coverage. However, by Feb. 2, the network excluded the government side of the conflict and utilized the voices of unidentified sources, such as eyewitnesses, to represent the protesters positively and/or the represent the government negatively. *Aljazeera* employed three kinds of reporting in its coverage: direct reporting, indirect reporting, and strategic reporting. The latter was especially significant in that the network used scare quotes or expressions like 'the so-called' with certain terms or claims during the days of the protests, but then used the same terms and claims in the authorial voice after Mubarak’s downfall. This observation points out an inconsistency in *Aljazeera*’s stance.

4.3 Topics

*Al-Ahram*’s coverage of the Egyptian uprising was characterized by emphasizing the government’s position towards the events and downplaying the size and effect of the protests. In the process of news selection, *Al-Ahram* excluded some important developments that, if included, would have presented Mubarak’s government negatively, and emphasized events that presented it positively. I discuss the topics included in *Al-Ahram*’s coverage later in this section, but first I show how topic exclusion was utilized to achieve the paper’s ideological purposes during the uprising.

One of the main and significant events that was reported by almost all media outlets in the world during the protests was the government’s blockage of Twitter and
Facebook on the 26th of January, and shutting down access to the Internet across the country on January 27th. Another important event was the government’s cut off of *Aljazeera* transmission on Nilesat satellite.

*Al-Ahram* refrained from reporting the two steps undertaken by the Egyptian government: blocking the Internet and cutting off *Aljazeera* transmission. Rather, (a) in Table 4-9 shows that on Jan. 27, the paper reported that the government denied blocking Twitter and Facebook, despite different reports confirming the blockage. The paper reported on Feb. 3, as part of its positive presentation of the government, that Internet services returned in Egypt, as shown in (b) and (c). On Feb. 9, it reported in another story, shown in (d), that *Aljazeera* transmission has also resumed on Nilesat satellite.

Another example that further explains the strategy of exclusion when it comes to news selection is the Egyptian authorities’ arrest of the political activist Wael Ghonim. On Jan. 28, the Egyptian authorities arrested Ghonim, who was the admin of one of the most influential Facebook pages during the uprising, as part of its attempts to confront the strong wave of protests and large numbers of protesters flooding to Tahrir Square. The arrest raised concerns over the way the Egyptian government was dealing with the situation and sparked the reaction of different human rights organizations. *Al-Ahram* did not report the arrest but reported his release. The paper also did not report the arrival of Mohamed ElBaradei, former Director General of Atomic Energy Agency and main political rival to Mubarak’s regime, to Egypt to participate in the protests.

News like blocking Internet service or transmission outage of one of the main news outlets in the Arab world were very significant during the uprising. As a matter of fact, they were main headlines in the coverage of many media institutions in the Arab
world and elsewhere. Failing to report such news gives insights into what constitutes news value for *Al-Ahram* based on political affiliations and ideological stances. Also, excluding a story on Ghonim’s arrest and ElBaradei’s participation in the protests in Tahrir Square sheds light on who is considered worthy of coverage and who is not in *Al-Ahram*’s coverage.

_Ahram* also downplayed one of the main events that took place during the Revolution: ‘the Battle of the Camel’. On Feb. 2, *baltagiyya* loyal to President Mubarak rode camels and horses and clashed with protesters on Tahrir Square in an attempt to disperse the protests (Holmes, 2012). The clashes caused the death of 11 people and injury of 600 others. Despite the fact that this event was significant during the uprising, it was not given prominence in the paper’s coverage. Rather, it was embedded as a secondary event within other stories.

To explain the marginalization of the events on Tahrir Square in *Al-Ahram*’s coverage, consider (a) and (b) in Table 4-10; (a) is a headline that implies that the focus is on protests supporting Mubarak. In the lead paragraph shown in (b), the paper referred to the clashes as part of its description of the marches; in other words, the marches of millions supporting Mubarak’s declarations of reform, not the clashes, were the primary event addressed in the story. This example among others in the coverage shows how this incident was downplayed by *Al-Ahram*; the topic was dealt with as a secondary event that did not qualify to be addressed in a separate news article. Rather, it was incorporated in stories focusing on the positive presentation of the government.

On the other hand, *Aljazeera*’s topic selection differed considerably with *Al-Ahram* and showed a tendency to emphasize the positive actions of the protesters and their voices as well as the negative actions of the government. Except for the arrest of
Wael Ghonim, *Aljazeera* emphasized all topics that *Al-Ahram* excluded or downplayed in its coverage, including Internet outage, *Aljazeera* shutdown, the participation of opposition figures, such as ElBaradei, in the protests, and ‘the Battle of the Camel.’

As to the topics included, the coverage of *Al-Ahram* and *Aljazeera* revolved around five main themes: 1) the protests; 2) Mubarak, the government, and the NDP; 3) the religious institution; 4) the international community reaction; and 5) the U.S. reaction. In the following I discuss how *Al-Ahram* and *Aljazeera* addressed each of these five themes.

### 4.3.1 The Protests

News articles on this topic were follow-up stories reporting the latest developments during the eighteen days of the uprising in a way that was in line with the paper’s overall stance toward the protests and protesters. The coverage can be divided into two stages based on the events emphasized: the first stage is from the outbreak of the protests until Feb. 1, and the second is from Feb. 2 until Mubarak stepped down. The emphasis of stories during the first stage was on chaos, destruction, robbery, theft, and other negative actions of the protesters.

Table 4-11 provides examples of news articles headlines that emphasized these actions. In (a) – (e), emphasis was on negative actions. The aim was to distract the audience from the main goal of the protests and generalize actions that were undertaken by some of the protesters to delineate the protests and protesters as a whole. Actions of violence, destruction, burning assets, and assault might have actually happened, but focus on these negative activities to report the main story shows that events that were against the protesters and their cause were of news value to *Al-Ahram*. Peaceful protests and the legitimate demands of the protesters such as
demands of reform, employment, and human rights, were given less emphasis during this stage as articles on peaceful protests were significantly fewer than those highlighting the negative consequences of demonstrations. And even in these articles, lead paragraphs often tended to present the protesters negatively.

(a) in Table 4-12 is a headline that is different from the headlines in Table 4-11 in that the focus seems to be on demonstrations, not the violence and destruction that accompanied them; yet, the lead paragraph, as shown in (b) delineates the protesters in a way similar to headlines in 4-11. This confirms the paper's tendency to emphasize certain topics over others, and frame the protests from a perspective that is supportive of the regime and against the protesters.

In the second stage, the emphasis shifted from representing the protests negatively to representing the voices of protesters who had different demands: supporting President Mubarak and his government and ending the calls for his downfall. In other words, when the negative presentation of the protesters did not succeed and the number of protesters joining the demonstrations increased day after day, Al-Ahram sought to show that protesters had different demands and that there was another side that was against the calls for the government downfall; only two articles emphasized the protests against the government.

Examples of article headlines during this stage are in Table 4-13. (a) – (d) are examples of headlines that emphasized the protests supporting Mubarak and the steps he undertook as part of his response to the protesters’ demands by dismissing his government and appointing a vice-president; reforms in (a) refers to these steps. Only two articles throughout the uprising, (e) and (f), pointed out to the protests against the government. Thus, the focus was on counter-protests praising Mubarak and supporting
his rule, while the scale and level of protests demanding the downfall of the regime were marginalized, as only a two articles highlighted the large number of protesters and their demands.

Stories on the protests represented the overwhelming majority of stories in Aljazeera’s coverage during Egypt’s Revolution. It reported each development on the ground in different cities and governorates of Egypt with detail and intensity. It emphasized topics such as the size and intensity of protests; the protesters and their demands; the violations of the Egyptian government in dealing with the situation; and protests in other countries that expressed solidarity with the Egyptian uprising.

Starting on the first day of the Revolution, Aljazeera reported news articles that emphasized the massive number of protesters participating in the uprising. In doing so, especially in the first days of the protests, it provided an alternative narrative that stressed that the ongoing events were not acts of violence or destruction as claimed by official media, but rather a wide scale uprising, in which people of different walks of life were participating. This is not to say that criminal actions taking place during the Revolution were excluded in the coverage, but they were deemphasized and attributed to the lack of security caused by the withdrawal of security forces from the streets, as will be explained later. Secondly, in reporting the protests, Aljazeera emphasized the protesters’ main demand, Mubarak’s departure, and consistently reported anti-government chants on Tahrir Square and elsewhere.

In the first days of the uprising, the number of protesters estimated were tens of thousands and the demands reported were reform; however, the demands escalated by the third day of the Revolution to call for Mubarak’s downfall and the number of protesters increased dramatically, according to Aljazeera.
Table 4-14 reveals how the network emphasized the protests and the demands of the protesters in its coverage from the first to the last day of the uprising. (a) - (h) are only examples of many articles that show Aljazeera’s focus on the intensity of the demonstrations and the demands of the demonstrators. In the first five days of the uprising, the network reported that protesters were protesting against corruption, unemployment, and torture, as was announced by Facebook groups organizing the demonstrations. By Jan. 30, though, the protesters’ demand was the President’s downfall.

*Aljazeera* also emphasized demonstrations taking place in other countries that were supportive of the Egyptian uprising as shown in Table 4-15; it sought to report how massive and popular the protests were to the extent that Egyptian communities abroad as well as people of different nationalities participated by gathering in front of Egyptian embassies across the world to express the same demands as protesters in Egypt.

In (a), *Aljazeera* reported under a multiple subheadings supportive demonstrations and gatherings taking place in France, Norway, the U.S., Britain, Italy, Germany, Spain, Greece, Tunisia, Algeria, Yemen, Jordan, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, and Mauritania. It emphasized each of these demonstrations by reporting them with detailed description. (b), (c), and (d) are examples of headlines on stories covering demonstrations that support the Egyptian Revolution in different cities around the world.

*Aljazeera* also emphasized the Egyptian government’s violations during the uprising by addressing the violence that took place on Tahrir Square on Feb. 2 (i.e. ‘the Battle of the Camel’); the practices of Egyptian security forces against the
demonstrators and human rights violations; and the security vacancy caused by the withdrawal of security forces from the streets. Examples are provided in Table 4-16.

In (a), Aljazeera emphasizes the violent clashes that took place in Tahrir Square and held the Egyptian government responsible for such events. In these articles and others, the network reported the developments of the events and claimed, by reporting eyewitnesses and journalists, that the baltagiyya horrifying people on Tahrir Square were either security forces or thugs employed by the government for this purpose; Aljazeera’s narrative was that the Egyptian government attempted to terrify protesters so that they abandon their demands and pull out of the streets.

In (b) and (c), Aljazeera highlights the violations of security forces during the Revolution, including the arrest of activists and journalists and facilitating the escape of prisoners to trigger chaos and attribute it to the protesters. The network also addressed other rights violations such as Internet outage and the shutdown of Aljazeera transmission during the first days of the protests, and reported the condemnation of civil rights organizations of human rights violations in Egypt during the uprising. The shutdown of Aljazeera transmission on Nilesat satellite and the hacking of Aljazeera.net as well as the government’s blockage of Internet services were given prominence in Aljazeera coverage, as shown in (d) – (f). (g) shows that the network also emphasized the demands and calls of human rights organizations to end human rights violations in Egypt.

The analysis of how the two outlets addressed the topic of protests shows that each had its own narrative on the events and sought to report from its own perspective; their reporting and emphases construct two realities for one event. While Al-Ahram portrayed the protests as acts of chaos perpetrated by people conspiring against Egypt,
Aljazeera attributed the chaos to the intentional withdrawal of security forces from important locations and its release of prisoners to create a situation of fear and panic to deter the protesters. Also, at the time Al-Ahram was downplaying the size of protests calling for Mubarak’s departure and reporting that there were counter-protesters supporting the President, Aljazeera emphasized the massiveness of the protests in Egypt and elsewhere as well as the insistence of protesters on their demands; it also reported the violations of Egyptian security forces and the negative practices of the Egyptian government.

4.3.2 The President, Government, and the NDP

Among the recurring topics in Al-Ahram and Aljazeera coverage were President Mubarak, his government, and his ruling Party. However, the way in which these topics were addressed was different from an outlet to another. In the following I discuss how Al-Ahram and Aljazeera addressed the three topics in their coverage.

News relating to the President, the government, and ruling NDP were emphasized during the Revolution. In the news articles covering this side of the conflict, Al-Ahram presented the President in a position of control and authority throughout the days of the uprising, underscoring his sacrifice for the country and patriotism. Government officials were also presented as nationalists, who were striving to obey the people’s demands and bring an end to the crisis. And the NDP was framed as the legitimate and majority party that represents the people.

News articles on President Mubarak resembled the typical coverage of state-run media of news about leaders, including their meetings, receptions, and statements on different issues. Throughout the crisis, Al-Ahram reported news on the President to confirm that he was on top of the situation by holding meetings, appointing ministers,
and giving orders to secure the needs of the people; it sought to create an image of him as the powerful, despite the deteriorating situation surrounding him. However, the representation of Mubarak changed after his stepping down; he was then represented as corrupt and as lacking the ability to deal with the crisis. Table 4-17 presents examples of headlines of articles on Mubarak before his stepping down. The paper went to the other extreme when dealing with news articles on Mubarak after his resignation on Feb. 11. After being presented as the loyal nationalist who was in command of the situation, he was presented differently as shown in Table 4-18.

(a) in Table 4-17 is an example of a headline that clearly explains how institutional and professional practices are main factors when it comes to news production. At the time Mubarak was in office, a story like this dealing with the President’s fortune was one of the ‘red lines’ for official media; however, as the political situation changed, production policies and priorities changed as well. The overall political mood was against the old regime, from which Al-Ahram wanted to distance itself; therefore, stories like this, along with similar ones, were reported in spite of the fact that they contradicted the previous editorial line and news value criteria. (b) is an excerpt of the same news article which shows the change in tone when dealing with issues on Mubarak. Although the article distances itself by utilizing direct reporting, which is very rare in Al-Ahram’s coverage, such were nearly impossible propositions to report only one day before.

Another story, contradicting the image created about Mubarak during the days of the uprising, reported that the President was terrified and not able to make the right decisions at important points in the Revolution; (c) is a headline of an article that described the President as being lost between the advice of his Interior Minister, Habib
ElAdly, and his son, Jamal Mubarak, as shown in (d), and the regime was described as distant from reality and reluctant in dealing with the situation.

The concern of the present analysis is not over the truth value or credibility of the two contradictory propositions about Mubarak during the uprising, but about how these propositions were framed according to surrounding institutional, political, and social factors; *Al-Ahram* introduced Mubarak as the patriot leader before Feb. 11 and as a corrupt, reluctant president after that date. The same is true for the representation of other senior officials and the NDP. The overall selection of topics prior to Feb. 11 shows a tendency of emphasizing the voice of the Prime Ministers, Nazif and Shafiq, Vice President, Omar Suleiman, and the NDP; Table 4-19 presents examples of some headlines.

On the other hand, as explained in the section on intertextuality, the other side of the conflict, the protesters, were excluded in the coverage; news value was determined on the basis of whether or not the voice represented the government side. Yet, by the end of the uprising and the resignation of President Mubarak, articles became critical of former government members and the NDP in the same way they were with the President. For example, in a news article on the resignation of the Party’s Secretary General published after Feb. 11, the NDP, as shown in Table 4-20 was presented as being incapable of ruling the country and obeying the people’s needs.

To sum up, *Al-Ahram* took two contradicting positions when it comes to its representation of President Mubarak, government officials, and members of the NDP: before Mubarak’s resignation, the articles selected emphasized his positive attributes and command of the crisis; they also emphasized the voices and actions of members of the government and the ruling party. However, as soon as the President stepped down,
the paper took an opposing position on these three parties by addressing critical issues such as corruption and lack of proficiency. In other words, Feb. 11, the day Mubarak was ousted, marked a transition in *Al-Ahram*’s topic selection and news worthiness criteria.

Articles on President Mubarak, the Egyptian government, and the ruling NDP were also emphasized in *Aljazeera*’s coverage with a focus on aspects and issues that presented the three parties negatively. To start with, there were two types of articles in *Aljazeera*’s presentation of Mubarak: the first type was articles on Mubarak that emphasized sources opposing him. Although this type has to do with intertextuality in that it is concerned with sourcing particular sides of the conflict over others, it also shows what topics constituted news value for *Aljazeera*; it reveals what the network considered worthy of reporting in its topic selection. The second type was articles in the authorial voice addressing issues such as Mubarak’s wealth, popularity, and the way he was dealing with the crisis.

*Aljazeera* gave prominence to voices critical of Mubarak in different articles, whether these voices were from Egypt or outside Egypt. In so doing, the network presented Mubarak as unable to control the situation; as a dictator killing his people during the protests; and as corrupt and isolated and distant from his people.

In Table 4-21, (a) shows that in the first few days of the uprising, *Aljazeera* emphasized in its coverage a *Time Magazine* analysis of the situation, in which the magazine reported that Mubarak had lost support because of his policies that were inconsiderate of his people, and that he has never been a popular leader. Other articles presented Mubarak as a dictator who was killing and terrorizing his people; in these articles *Aljazeera* emphasized sources such as politicians, intellectuals, actors, religious
figures, and poets opposing Mubarak. In (b), for example, it reported an article for the MB's Supreme Guide criticism of Mubarak, and in (c), Youssef Al-Qaradawi, a prominent Egyptian Islamic scholar, was also reported in an article accusing Mubarak of killing his people after the violent events that took place in Tahrir Square on Feb. 2. It also reported on the Guardian in (d) on the Mubarak wealth.

In other articles, Aljazeera's stance toward Mubarak was more explicit in that it was expressed through the reporting of articles presenting the President negatively in the authorial voice. Examples of headlines of other articles on Mubarak are in Table 4-22. One of the recurring topics was Mubarak’s wealth, as shown in (a) and (b). Other articles, as in (c) – (f), addressed the way Mubarak was dealing with the crisis and how vulnerable his regime was, as well as his controversial hold of power for thirty years and his intentions to pass down power to his son, Jamal. Mubarak was also presented as elusive, and, thus, losing the trust of his people because of the many promises he did not keep during his rule. And by the end of the Revolution, Aljazeera reported articles that emphasized the calls for Mubarak’s trial after his downfall.

Whether through emphasizing voices that were critical of Mubarak or through reporting articles on Mubarak in the authorial voice, topic selection reveals that Aljazeera took an opposing position toward Mubarak from the first day of the uprising until his stepping down. This negative representation was not restricted to Mubarak, though, but also included members of his government and his party, the NDP.

Aljazeera reported articles on the Egyptian government and ruling party that centered on two main themes: human rights violations and the degree of corruption in Egypt. In Table 4-23, (a) - (c) are examples of the former and (d) - (g) are examples of the latter. In these articles, the network emphasized that people had reason to protest
due to their rage over humiliation and torture in prisons as well as suppression of earlier protests and violations of freedom of expression rights. It condemned in its reports the emergency law that has been effective in the country since Mubarak came to power in 1982 and stressed how the Egyptian government, through the Ministry of Interior, had suppressed earlier protests. It also emphasized topics that tackled the issue of corruption and how the marriage of power and money and unrestricted authority that some members in the NDP enjoyed had deteriorated the situation in Egypt and led to increased corruption.

The analysis of how the President, the government, and the NDP were represented by Al-Ahram and Aljazeera gives insights into how the representation of social actors is bound to the ideological stances of different media institutions. Taking the case of President Mubarak as an example, Al-Ahram and Aljazeera seemed as if they were referring to two different social actors named Hosni Mubarak, the then-president of Egypt. On the one hand, Al-Ahram portrayed Mubarak, at least before his downfall, as the powerful, patriotic leader who had sacrificed for his country in war and peace and who was managing the crisis with care and efficiency, seeking the prosperity of his people. On the other hand, Aljazeera represented the former president as a corrupt dictator who lacked leadership and was killing his people; it questioned his legitimacy by raising the issue of fraud in the elections he won, and emphasized his intentions to pass down power to his son.

4.3.3 The Religious Institution

One of the topics emphasized by Al-Ahram during the days of the uprising was the religious institutions’, whether Muslim or Christian, position towards the events. In many articles at different points in the Revolution, the paper reported the condemnation
of Al-Azhar and the spiritual leader of Egypt’s Coptic Christians and Protestants of the protests, and underscored their continuous call for unity among the Egyptian people.

Al-Azhar, also called the honorable Azhar University, represents the top Islamic body in Egypt, and holds a respectable position in the Islamic world as a whole. However, Al-Azhar as a religious institution during Mubarak’s era and before was viewed as an official institution whose senior officials were appointed by the government and some were even members of the NDP. It sided with the government during the Revolution and sought to convince people to end the protests utilizing a religious discourse. As Table 4-24 shows, Al-Ahram emphasized Al-Azhar calls as well as the Christian religious institution’s call for ending the protests and protecting the state’s stability as well as the Pope’s rejection of the demonstrations.

Of concern in the present analysis was Al-Ahram's focus on the position of the religious institution by giving it prominence in its coverage and considering it as valuable news. During the first days of the uprising, Al-Azhar and the Coptic Church, represented by their leaders, announced, as shown in (a), their support for the President and expressed their hope that the country overcomes the crisis. In its attempt to unite different religious groups in the call for ending the crisis, (b) reveals that Al-Ahram also reported the Protestant Church condemnation of any attempts to threaten the security of Egypt and its people. In its support of the government, in (c) Al-Azhar also strongly condemned countries, including the United States, calling on Mubarak to consider a transition of power and listen to the demands of his people; it considered such statements and positions a flagrant interference in national affairs.

On its part, Aljazeera marginalized the calls of the religious institution; in Aljazeera’s intensive coverage of the Egyptian Revolution, there was only one news
article on the position of *Al-Azhar* despite the significance of this institution. The network was also critical of the Church and its position toward the events as shown in Table 4-25. Although the headline (b) seems neutral, the lead paragraph in (c) shows *Aljazeera*’s conceptualization of the role of the religious institution in the events, it criticized the Church for its lack of involvement in the demonstrations, and considered that an abandonment of its national role.

Another religious authority that was reported on differently in *Al-Ahram* and *Aljazeera*’s coverage was the Egyptian Ministry of Awqaf, the Ministry in charge of religious endowments. Mosques were focal points for gathering and starting marches in different governorates during the uprising, especially on Fridays. In an attempt to halt such gatherings, the Ministry of Awqaf instructed Imams to utilize religious discourse, especially during Friday sermons to avoid or at least limit marches and protests.

Table 4-26 reveals that both outlets reported on the Ministry of Awqaf, as the titles in (a) and (a’) show; yet the difference was in the lead paragraphs. *Al-Ahram* emphasized in this paragraph the ministry’s call for solidarity and rejection of violence, which are used to call upon people to refrain from protesting. The opposite is recognized in *Aljazeera*’s lead paragraph which emphasized the view of an opposing independent religious group to counter the Awqaf’s position. The Front of *Al-Azhar* Clerics originated from *Al-Azhar* in 1946 and was dismantled in 1999 because of its stances toward different issues that were not in line with the stance of the official religious institution, *Al-Azhar*. In 2000, the Front launched its own website and announced its independence from the official religious institution. By presenting the Front’s take on the protests and its call on people to participate in the demonstrations in the lead paragraph, *Aljazeera* is providing an alternative religious view on protests, one
that the Egyptian regime does not approve of. It is, thus, refuting the proposition of the official religious authority that utilizes religious discourse to influence people.

*Al-Ahram* also sought to emphasize Imams and Preachers’ position, which was based on religious grounds, toward the protests. The aim, it seems, was to align with another Ideological State Apparatus, the Mosque, in representing protesters not only as lawbreakers, but as sinful and violators of Islamic teachings. *Aljazeera* reported the position of the religious institution from a different perspective and with different emphasis; it emphasized the calls and *fatwas* - legal opinions on Islamic law issued by specialist Islamic scholars - of non-official religious scholars. It provided an alternative narrative to *Al-Ahram*’s through which it attempted to raise doubts about the credibility of the official religious institution.

Table 4-27 shows a contrast between *Al-Ahram* and *Aljazeera* in dealing with the religious discourse on the Revolution; *Al-Ahram* emphasized *fatwas* that called for refraining from protesting and *Aljazeera* emphasized those calling for protesting against dictators. To clarify this, consider in (b) and (b’) in *Al-Ahram* and *Aljazeera*, respectively: *Rope of Allah* in (b) is an expression borrowed from the Quran: “And hold fast, all together, by the rope of Allah and be not divided; and remember the favor of Allah which He bestowed upon you when you were enemies and He united your hearts in love, so that by His grace you became as brothers” (Aal-e-Imran Chapter 3: Verse104). By employing Quranic discourse, the implication is that demonstrations were a violation of the teachings of the Quran.

In (b’) *Aljazeera* challenged the *fatwas* of *Al-Azhar* and the official religious institution that forbade demonstrations and considered them sinful acts by reporting a *fatwa* of an Islamic committee of religious scholars in Jordan that stressed that
demonstrations were not forbidden in Sharia Law and that, to the contrary, they are an act of virtue when organized against brutal regimes.

In sum, the way the two outlets dealt with this topic reveals that there was a ‘battle of fatwas’ between Al-Ahram and Aljazeera as each outlet attempted to emphasize the Islamic ruling on a controversial issue like protesting against the ruler by reporting on different Islamic scholars. Al-Ahram tended to emphasize fatwas of the official religious institution that prohibits demonstrations, while Aljazeera emphasized fatwas of Islamic scholars outside the official circle who hail protests against whom they considered a dictator.

The Church’s position, which was similar to the official Islamic institution, was also reported differently by the two outlets: Al-Ahram emphasized this position by reporting it in several articles and utilized it to strengthen the government’s position, especially that Christians constitute around ten percent of the Egyptian population. Aljazeera, on the other hand, referred to this position in only one news article in which it was criticized by portraying it as an abandonment of an important social role.

4.3.4 The International Community

Among the prominent topics in Al-Ahram and Aljazeera’s coverage of the uprising was the world reaction to the events. The two outlets differed, however, in the type of reactions that were emphasized. That is, Al-Ahram focused on the reaction of countries that expressed support to Mubarak, and Aljazeera focused on reactions of countries that were critical of Mubarak and his regime.

Statements by different world leaders or senior officials were emphasized in Al-Ahram’s topic selection as they were reported in separate news articles. For example, Al-Ahram emphasized the support of countries like Bahrain and Italy to Mubarak’s
regime in its coverage as shown in (a) – (e) in Table 4-28. By Feb. 1, however, Al-Ahram also started including topics on the reaction of countries that were in support of the protesters, or at least in favor of a transition in Egypt. For example, in (e) it reported the position of the European Union and some European countries that were critical of suppressing protests, or were calling for a transition of authority in Egypt.

Nevertheless, reactions against the Egyptian government were not given the same prominence as the reactions of countries supporting Mubarak’s regime; the former were not reported separately as main stories, but were rather included with other stories to deemphasize them as Table 4-29 shows.

The headline in (a) indicates that the article is about the German reaction towards the events since it quoted German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, and, indeed, the article reported the German position, which called for a peaceful and organized transition of power in Egypt, indicating that it was in support of Mubarak’s intention to stay in office until the end of his presidential term. But that was not all; (b) reveals that there was another significant topic embedded within this topic with the aim of deemphasizing it; the position of France, which appeared in satellite paragraphs, was considered a sub-topic by Al-Ahram criteria because it was explicitly siding with the protesters and calling for an immediate transition of power.

In another article on the U.S. position towards the events, voices of other world leaders critical of the Egyptian government were embedded. The headline of the story and its lead paragraph focused on Obama’s comments on the developments in Egypt, as shown in (c). Yet, in satellite paragraphs, the article reported the comments of Turkish Prime Minister, as shown in (d), and Austrian Foreign Minister, as shown in (e), which were calling on Mubarak to step down and demanding an end for the violence in
Egypt; the statements did not qualify to be emphasized in separate news articles, or at  
least be foregrounded in the headline or lead paragraph.

On the face of it, Al-Ahram did report the reaction of government officials and  
leaders supporting Mubarak and those supporting the protesters and calling for a  
transition of power. However, stories on the former topic were emphasized and on the  
latter deemphasized. A comparison between the two reveals that an article in which the  
Italian Minister of Economic Development praises the freedom of expression in Egypt,  
for example, was introduced as a main story, while British Prime Minister’s warning of  
suppressing the demonstrators; French President’s support of the demonstrators; and  
Turkish Prime Minister’s call on Mubarak to consider other decisions to end the crisis  
were presented as secondary topics embedded within other stories. This shows which  
topics were of value, and, hence, were worthy of emphasizing and which were not in Al-  
Ahram’s topic selection strategy.

Aljazeera, on the other hand, reported the reactions of world governments,  
officials, and organizations in its coverage of the Revolution; however, most emphasis  
was placed on the Israeli reaction to the developments as they were unfolding. Thus, I  
divide this segment into two parts: in the first part I shed light on how Aljazeera reflected  
on the reactions of different world countries, and in the second, I focus exclusively on  
the network’s emphasis of Israeli reactions.

The structure of Aljazeera news articles allows through subheadings for  
emphasizing a number of topics under one main heading. In its reporting of the  
reactions of world governments and officials, Aljazeera utilized subheadings to  
emphasize different world reactions, but, at the same time, did not “overemphasize”  
such reactions by reporting them in separate articles, as was the case with Israeli
reactions. In Table 4-30, (a) is a heading of an article reported on the first days of the uprising where Aljazeera included the reactions of four Western world organizations and six countries to the events in Egypt. Under this heading, there were ten subheadings, each emphasizing the stand of a country or an organization toward Egypt; the subheadings were: United Nations, European Union, the U.S., Britain, Germany, Italy, France, Israel, Human Rights Commission, and Amnesty International. Aljazeera reported all positions with equal emphasis, regardless of whether they were supportive of Mubarak or not. For example, the Italian position that was supportive of Mubarak and the Israeli position that implicitly supported Mubarak and stressed the good relations between Israel and Egypt for over 30 years were given the same prominence as other positions which emphasized the right of freedom of expression and warned of violence against the protesters.

A number of other articles utilized the same structure in reporting the attitudes of officials in different countries around the world and organizations toward the uprising at different points in time. In these articles, however, the positions reported were against the Egyptian government, either demanding that it undertakes genuine reforms, calling for across-the-board political change, or hailing Mubarak’s stepping down; (b) – (f) in Table 4-30 are examples of these articles.

In a few other articles, however, Aljazeera emphasized the position of certain world leaders in separate articles. For example, it reported late Venezuelan President, Hugo Chaves’, criticism of the United States and Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s, call on Mubarak to obey the demands of his people. Yet these do not constitute a pattern, and the overall tendency was reporting different positions from around the world under one heading.
The Israeli case was an interesting one when it comes to *Aljazeera’s* reporting of its position. Despite the fact that Israeli reactions were reported under subheadings along with the position of other countries as explained above, there were many articles that were exclusively emphasizing the Israeli position throughout the uprising, reporting different voices in the Israeli government. Table 4-31 reveals that the overriding theme of articles on the Israeli reaction to the situation in Egypt is that Israel was dissatisfied with the Revolution, fearing the reach of groups that could put peace in jeopardy and threaten Egyptian supply of gas to Israel. By losing President Mubarak, Israel was concerned about the future of the Peace Treaty with Egypt signed in 1977 and also concerned, as the articles report, about how to deal with groups such as Hamas, which was isolated from the political scene due to the coordination and cooperation with Mubarak. The articles report Israel’s disappointment with the United States’ abandonment of Mubarak and present Mubarak as a close friend to different Israeli governments since he came to power in 1982. They also report desperate attempts by the Israeli government to save Mubarak’s regime by urging the U.S. administration to support him.

The implication of this to an Arab audience is that Mubarak’s government is Israel’s ally in the region, participating in executing its policies and adhering to its demands. Thus, although there is no explicit negative presentation of Mubarak in articles on the Israeli position towards the events, contextualizing the production of these articles and taking the audience into account reveals that the intensive coverage of the Israeli position was for a reason: *Aljazeera*, as a network fueled by pan-Arab nationalism ideology, is proposing that Mubarak is a strong ally to Israel, which was and
still is in conflict with Arabs; he is therefore not qualified to be president of Egypt. This also explains why such topic was excluded in *Al-Ahram’s* coverage.

4.3.5 The U.S. Position

*Al-Ahram* and *Aljazeera* emphasized the U.S. position toward the events in their coverage, but with varying degrees. In general, *Al-Ahram* only emphasized one source, the U.S. president, in its reporting of the U.S. position, while *Aljazeera* gave prominence to the voice of many sources in the U.S. administration, as I explain later, indicating that in general the topic was given more prominence by *Aljazeera* than it was by *Al-Ahram*. The position of the U.S. was unclear in the sense that it first called for democracy, respect of protesters, and reforms, and then gradually started demanding real change by calling for a transitional government that represents all Egyptians. Whether supportive of Mubarak and his government or not, *Al-Ahram* consistently reported articles on President Obama’s reactions and statements throughout the Revolution. Likewise, President Obama’s statements and position toward the developments were given prominence and reported in separate news articles from the beginning of the Revolution until the end and beyond in *Aljazeera’s* coverage. Table 4-32 shows how the two outlets emphasized articles on President Obama.

Although it is clear that stories on the U.S. position in *Al-Ahram’s* coverage were consistent in that they were included on almost all days of the uprising, and although the position was reported regardless of whether or not it was on the side of the government, there was a clear tendency to marginalize other voices in the U.S. administration. The news articles on this topic focused on Obama and his statements, while statements of other U.S. officials, such as Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, White House spokesperson, Robert Gibbs, or others, such as the President of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, John Kerry, were downplayed. In almost all articles, Clinton’s statements were included within stories emphasizing the voice of the President. The implication of this topic selection strategy is that *Al-Ahram* sought to report the U.S. position, which was decisive and crucial in the events, but, at the same time, tended to minimize the number of articles on this topic through embedding the statements of senior officials within stories reflecting Obama’s stance.

In contrast, *Aljazeera* emphasized the U.S. position by intensifying its coverage on this topic; the articles on the U.S. position were persistent and were not restricted to certain sources. Rather, the network emphasized different U.S. voices that were placing pressure on the Egyptian government to take the necessary steps to obey the protesters’ demands. The reason for this intensive coverage, it seems, is that although the U.S. stance toward Mubarak was not decisive at the outbreak of the uprising, its support of protesters and assurance on their right to express their demands was; the U.S. underscored from the very first days of the Revolution the people’s right of freedom of expression and disapproval of violence against protesters. As part of its overall tendency to support the protesters, *Aljazeera* prioritized this topic.

Thus, unlike *Al-Ahram*, the network emphasized many voices in the U.S. administration and Senate. It reported in separate articles the voices of Vice President, Secretary of State, White House spokesperson, and President of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, as in Table 4-33. An important aspect about *Aljazeera’s* coverage on this topic was that the inclusion of different U.S. sources and the frequency of articles was more after Feb. 2 than it was before it. For example, in *Aljazeera* data, there were seven articles on the U.S. position towards the events before Feb. 2. However, between Feb. 2 and Feb. 11, it reported 19 articles on the U.S. Even if the
number of days in the second stage is more than the number of days in the first, 11 and 8, respectively, articles on this topic were by average one times more in the second stage.

*Al-Ahram* sought to present the Obama administration negatively as its position that was against Mubarak became more explicit as the events unfolded. That is, it reported voices that were critical of Obama in dealing with the crisis, and represented the U.S. as conspiring against Egypt. It also addressed the worsening economic situation in the U.S. and the administration's failure in improving it.

In examples (a) and (b) in Table 4-34, *Al-Ahram* reported in a separate article former U.S. Vice-President, Dick Cheney’s, take on the events in which he praised Mubarak and implicitly criticized the way the Obama administration was dealing with the situation in that its diplomatic effort was public. Emphasizing the voice of a former U.S. official while marginalizing the voice of then-current U.S. officials gives insights into what constitutes news value for *Al-Ahram*, even if it had included the U.S. position in its coverage. Reporting the voice of Cheney in a separate article while embedding voices of the U.S. administration in a single article explains that the latter was not due to space limitations, for example, but because it did not meet the conditions of what deserves to be emphasized in the coverage, while Cheney’s praise of Mubarak measured up to the standards of emphasis.

As the U.S. administration started putting more pressure on Mubarak and his government to make change and explicitly called for a transitional government after the violence in Tahri Square, *Al-Ahram* depicted the U.S. as conspiring against the Egyptian people; (c) was a headline of an article on Feb. 5, the same day Obama called for a transitional government headed by Suleiman. The article presented the U.S. as
conspiring with Iran and the MB to allow the MB to rule in Egypt against the will of the youth who initiated the Revolution. The paper was suspicious of the U.S. change of position by demanding a transitional government at the same time MB leaders and Iranian authority were issuing statements confirming that the Revolution is an Islamic Revolution.

The paper also started criticizing Obama not only in the way he was dealing with the Egyptian crisis, but also in his dealing with domestic issues such as the economy and U.S. debt; (d) is a headline of an article that highlighted the hardships facing Obama in dealing with national debt in his attempt to reelect himself for a second term. By topic selection standards, the story’s news value is based only on Al-Ahram’s position toward Obama and its dissatisfaction with his reaction towards the Egyptian regime. Otherwise, it is a domestic U.S. issue that is emphasized at a very critical stage in the history of Egypt. In other words, the paper is addressing U.S. economy in the midst of a Revolution for the sake of presenting Obama negatively because of his stand against Mubarak.

**4.4 Summary**

On the whole, discursive practice analysis revealed findings that are similar to those arrived at in textual analysis: in general, Al-Ahram sided with the Egyptian government in its coverage and Aljazeera sided with the protesters. Specifically, Al-Ahram reported sources representing the government and totally excluded the voices of opposition groups in the beginning of the protests. It then changed its strategy after Feb. 2 by including opposition voices but still gave prominence government side of the conflict. Aljazeera showed a contrasting tendency: it equally reported on both sides in the outset of the protests, and then totally excluded the government side by Feb. 2. It
also strategically utilized reporting on unidentified sources, such as eyewitnesses, to either present the protesters positively or the government negatively; there was a clear tendency of reporting eyewitnesses supporting the network’s ideological stance which was supportive of the protesters.

As to topic selection, both outlets’ coverage centered on the same topics: the protesters; the President, government, and the NDP; the religious institution; world reactions; and the U.S. reaction. The difference, though, was in how they addressed these topics and which aspects they emphasized and which aspects they marginalized. As to the protests and protesters, Al-Ahram excluded topics that represented the government negatively, such as the Internet blockage, the cut off of Aljazeera transmission, and “the Battle of the Camel.” Rather, it emphasized topics on chaos and destruction, and by Feb. 3 emphasized protests supporting the regime. On the contrary, Aljazeera attributed chaos to the intentional withdrawal of security forces from the streets and intensively covered the size of the protests in Egypt and elsewhere; it also marginalized pro-Mubarak protests.

Al-Ahram and Aljazeera also showed contrast in their reporting of topics on the President, government, and ruling party. On the one hand, Al-Ahram emphasized positive traits of Mubarak, his government, and the NDP; many articles emphasized Mubarak’s daily activities during the uprising and his determination to secure the people’s demands of democracy and reform. It, however, addressed topics such as Mubarak’s wealth and lack of leadership only one day after he was ousted. On the other hand, Aljazeera tackled issues of corruption, human rights violation, and presidential elections violations from the first day of the uprising, and was critical of government officials and members of the NDP throughout the Revolution.
*Al-Ahram* emphasized the position of the official religious institution, which expressed solidarity with the regime from the outset of the uprising. It also reported on *fatwas* and calls of Imams and Preachers upon people to bring an end to the protests. On its part, *Aljazeera* focused on *fatwas* of the non-official religious institution that praised protesting against dictatorships. As to the international community reactions, *Al-Ahram* tended to emphasize reactions of world leaders and senior officials who rejected the protests and praised Mubarak. It also reported reactions that called for a transition in Egypt, but these were deemphasized and reported as secondary topics; they were reported either in satellite or background paragraphs. In contrast, *Aljazeera* highlighted the reactions of world leaders, senior officials, and organizations calling upon Mubarak to step down. It also emphasized the Israeli reactions that were in favor of Mubarak’s remaining in power and fearful of the future of Israeli-Egyptian relations post-Mubarak.

Finally, *Aljazeera* gave prominence to the U.S. stance that was respectful of the protesters’ demands and assuring of their right of expression; its coverage on this topic was not restricted to President Obama’s take on the events as they unfolded, but also reported the voices of different sources in the U.S. administration in separate news articles. Although *Al-Ahram* reported the U.S. position, which cannot be neglected in an event like that, by reporting articles that emphasized Obama’s voice and marginalized other voices such as the Secretary of State and the White House spokesperson, among others. Also, it tended to represent the U.S. administration negatively, especially when its stance became more explicit in supporting the protesters and calling upon Mubarak to step down; *Al-Ahram* portrayed the Obama administration as conspiring against Egypt and as incapable of solving its own domestic problems.
### Table 4-1 A sample of voices included in *Al-Ahram* coverage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date/voice</th>
<th>Government/Government supporters</th>
<th>Protesters/Opposition/Voices critical of the government</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 25</td>
<td>Security source</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 26</td>
<td>1. Security source</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Ministry of the Interior</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 30</td>
<td>Official source</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb. 2</td>
<td></td>
<td>1. ElBaradei</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2. National Progressive Unionist Party</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3. Turkish Prime Minister</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb. 3</td>
<td>1. Popular forces</td>
<td>Participants in the protests</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Factory and company laborers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Chamber of Commerce</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Governor of Assuit</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5. Citizens supporting the regime</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb. 5</td>
<td>1. Egyptian Prime Minister</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Vice President</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb. 7</td>
<td></td>
<td>Leader in the MB group</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb. 8</td>
<td></td>
<td>Wael Ghonim</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb. 11</td>
<td>1. Egyptian rights groups</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Protesters/demonstrators</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Lawyers spokesperson</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb. 12</td>
<td></td>
<td>TV and Radio Union (praising the Revolution)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 4-2 Indirect quoting in *Al-Ahram*

The paper said that the proposal also included that the temporary government calls on a wide range of opposition groups including the banned MB group (*Al-Ahram*, Feb. 5)
Table 4-3 *Aljazeera’s* reporting on government officials through other sources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Government/Government supporters</th>
<th>Protesters/Opposition</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 25</td>
<td>1. Egyptian Government</td>
<td>April 6 Movement</td>
<td>1. Head of <em>Aljazeera</em> office in Cairo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Head of Cairo Security</td>
<td></td>
<td>2. <em>Aljazeera</em> correspondent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. ElAdly (Interior Minister)</td>
<td></td>
<td>3. Sources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 26</td>
<td>Security and Medical sources</td>
<td>1. April 6 Movement</td>
<td>1. Activist Omar Jamal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. MB</td>
<td></td>
<td>2. Reuters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 30</td>
<td>1. Security sources</td>
<td>1. Middle East News Agency (official news agency)</td>
<td>1. French Press Agency (AFP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Minister of Information</td>
<td></td>
<td>3. Media source</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb. 1</td>
<td>1. Ministry of Information</td>
<td>Activists</td>
<td>1. Media sources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Security sources</td>
<td></td>
<td>2. <em>Aljazeera</em> correspondent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Minister of Information</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Army spokesperson</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4-4 A sample of voices included in *Aljazeera* coverage

(a) On his part, ElAdly said yesterday – in an interview with *Al-Ahram*… (*Aljazeera*, Jan. 25)

(b) Head of Cairo Security Ismael AlShaer said in a statement… (*Aljazeera*, Jan. 25)

160
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date/Voice</th>
<th>Government/Government supporters</th>
<th>Protesters/Opposition</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Feb. 3</td>
<td>Head of Archeological Sites</td>
<td>1. Political activists</td>
<td>1. Media sources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2. Deputy General Guide of the MB</td>
<td>2. Local sources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3. Opposing powers</td>
<td>3. Arab</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4. Demonstrators</td>
<td>Organization for Human Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5. Activists</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6. Political activists</td>
<td>4. Sources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7. Leader of National Assembly for Change</td>
<td>5. Aljazeera correspondent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb. 4</td>
<td>1. Egyptian Prime Minister</td>
<td>1. Leader in Kefaya Movement</td>
<td>6. Reuters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Former secretary of Mubarak</td>
<td>2. Activist Ahmed Hamdy</td>
<td>(reporting eyewitnesses)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3. Activists</td>
<td>7. CNN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4. Political activist Nawara Najm</td>
<td>1. Eyewitnesses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5. Lawyer</td>
<td>2. Media sources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb. 7</td>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
<td>Wael Ghonim</td>
<td>Amnesty International Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb. 9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1. Journalist Mohammed Aljarhi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2. Mesrawi website</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb. 12</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1. A journalist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2. Aljazeera correspondent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb. 13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3. Reports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1. Ahmed Zewail</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2. President Obama</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 4-5  Examples of government voices in *Aljazeera's* reporting

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Head of Archeological Sites in Egypt considered – in a phone call with <em>Aljazeera</em> – the attack on the National Museum in Egypt supported by the regime (<em>Aljazeera</em>, Feb. 3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

### Table 4-6  *Aljazeera*’s reporting of eyewitnesses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><em>Aljazeera</em></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) An eyewitness said that the protesters attempted to destroy the picture [of President Mubarak] but their leaders cried: “peaceful, peaceful.” (<em>Aljazeera</em>, Jan. 26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) An eyewitness told <em>Aljazeera</em> that there were 12 killed by snipers shooting at demonstrators from a building inside the Ministry [of Interior] (<em>Aljazeera</em>, Jan. 30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) Eyewitnesses said that <em>baltagiyya</em> backed by security trucks are gathering to attack Tahrir Square (<em>Aljazeera</em>, Feb. 4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d) The witnesses confirmed that gatherings of <em>baltagiyya</em> supported by security forces are blocking the reach medicine and food to the protesters with the Army’s knowledge (<em>Aljazeera</em>, Feb. 4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(e) Eyewitnesses said that unidentified armed people attacked the building of State Intelligence using RPG bombs this morning (<em>Aljazeera</em>, Feb. 4)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4-7  *Aljazeera*’s use of scare quotes and expressions like the 'so-called'

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aljazeera</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) <em>Aljazeera</em>’s reference to <em>baltagiyya</em> in the authorial voice by the end of the Revolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Army intervened and arrested a number of “law breakers” (<em>Aljazeera</em>, Jan. 30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Leader in Kefaya movement George Ishaq warned “<em>baltagiyya</em> and criminals” from attacking the demonstrators (<em>Aljazeera</em>, Feb. 4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) <em>Armed Forces</em> arrested what it described as law breakers amidst a rise in the number of killed people (<em>Aljazeera</em>, Jan. 30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d) That demonstrators demanding the departure of President Hosni Mubarak control Tahrir Square after clashes with offenders described as supporting the President (<em>Aljazeera</em>, Feb. 3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(e) Political activists protesting in Tahrir Square today confirmed that the confrontations are still ongoing with what they called National Party hirelings and security and police elements (<em>Aljazeera</em>, Feb. 3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(f) Sources told <em>Aljazeera</em> that violent clashes erupted in Mustafa Mahmoud Tahrir in Muhandiseen quarter between demonstrators and elements described as armed (<em>Aljazeera</em>, Feb. 3)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Table 4-7  *Aljazeera*’s use of scare quotes and expressions like the 'so-called'

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aljazeera</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) <em>Aljazeera</em>’s reference to <em>baltagiyya</em> in the authorial voice by the end of the Revolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The <em>baltagiyya</em> hired by the ruling NDP… (<em>Aljazeera</em>, Feb. 10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Armed people who seemed to be hired by the former regime decided to put an end to the youth’s white Revolution (<em>Aljazeera</em>, Feb. 13)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4-9  *Al-Ahram’s* reporting on Internet blockage and cut off of *Aljazeera* transmission

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Al-Ahram</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4-10 *Al-Ahram*’s reporting of Tahrir Square clashes on Feb. 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Al-Ahram</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4-11 Headlines of articles on protests in *Al-Ahram*’s coverage in the outst of the uprising

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Al-Ahram</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thousands destroy National Party’s headquarter in Ismaileya (*Al-Ahram*, Jan. 29)

Burning state and citizens’ property in Cairo (*Al-Ahram*, Jan. 29)
### Table 4-11 Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Al-Ahram</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| (c) | أعمال عنف وتخريب وترويع في الشوارع  
Violence, destruction, and intimidation on the streets *(Al-Ahram, Jan. 30)* |
| (d) | أعمال نهب للمنشآت الحكومية والتجارية بالإسكندرية  
Looting at government and commercial facilities in Alexandria *(Al-Ahram, Jan. 30)* |
| (e) | القبض على 1200 من مثيري الفوضى بينهم 200 سجين  
Arresting 1200 chaos inciters including 200 prisoners *(Al-Ahram, Feb. 1)* |

### Table 4-12 Other headlines and lead paragraphs on protests in Al-Ahram’s coverage in the outset of the uprising

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Al-Ahram</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| (a) | تجدد المظاهرات في السويس  
Demonstrations reoccur in Sweis *(Al-Ahram, Jan. 28)* |
| (b) | أكد المحافظ سيطرة الأجهزة التنفيذية والأمنية على أمن المحافظة وأن عناصر خارجة عن القانون وبعض الصبية استغلوا الموقف وأشعلوا الفتنة وأعمال التخريب والنهب والسلب  
The governor emphasized that executive and security authorities are in control of the governorate’s security and that lawbreakers and some children exploited the situation and initiated acts of destruction, theft, and robbery *(Al-Ahram, Jan. 28)* |

### Table 4-13 Headlines of articles on protests in Al-Ahram’s coverage by Feb. 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Al-Ahram</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| (a) | مئات من الشباب في المحافظات يؤيدون الإصلاحات  
Hundreds of youth support reforms *(Al-Ahram, Feb. 2)* |
| (b) | محافظات الجمهورية تشهد هدوء نسبيا ومظاهرات مؤيدة للرئيس مبارك  
The Republic’s governorates witness relative calmness and demonstrations supporting President Mubarak *(Al-Ahram, Feb. 3)* |
| (c) | الملايين يؤيدون مبارك في مسيرات بالمحافظات  
Millions support Mubarak in marches in governorates *(Al-Ahram, Feb. 3)* |
| (d) | معظم المصريين يؤيدون الإنهاء الفوري للمظاهرات  
Most Egyptians support an immediate end to the demonstrations *(Al-Ahram, Feb. 6)* |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4-13  Continued</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Al-Ahram</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(e) مظاهرة مليونية تطالب بالتغيير</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demonstration of a million people demanding change (<em>Al-Ahram</em>, Feb. 2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(f) مظاهرات غاضبة بالقاهرة والمحافظات</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rage demonstrations in Cairo and governorates (<em>Al-Ahram</em>, Feb. 11)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4-14  <em>Aljazeera</em>’s reporting of the protests throughout the Revolution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Aljazeera</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) مظاهرات مصر من الخبز إلى مبارك</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt’s Mubarak from bread to Mubarak (<em>Aljazeera</em>, Jan. 28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) الملايين تتظاهر بمصر والجيش ينأى</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Millions demonstrate in Egypt and the Army distances itself (<em>Aljazeera</em>, Jan. 31)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) غضب مليوني بمصر قبل العصيان</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Millions in rage in Egypt before disobedience (<em>Aljazeera</em>, Jan. 31)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d) إضراب عام بمصر ومسيرة مليونية غدا</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General strike in Egypt and a march in millions (<em>Aljazeera</em>, Jan. 31)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(e) حشد مليوني في ميدان التحرير</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A gathering of a million people in Tahrir Square (<em>Aljazeera</em>, Feb. 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(f) الاستعداد لمظاهرات مليونية بمصر غدا</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preparations for a demonstration of one million people in Egypt tomorrow (<em>Aljazeera</em>, Feb. 5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(g) مظاهرات مليونية بمصر تتصعد نفاذ الضغط</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demonstrations of a million people in Egypt intensify pressure (<em>Aljazeera</em>, Feb. 8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(h) مظاهرات مصر تتسع وترتفع</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt’s demonstrations expand and continue (<em>Aljazeera</em>, Feb. 9)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 4-15  Headlines on demonstrations outside Egypt in *Aljazeera*’s coverage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>English</th>
<th>Arabic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a)</td>
<td>Demonstrations in the world in solidarity with Egyptians (<em>Aljazeera</em>, Jan. 30)</td>
<td>تظاهرات بالعالم تضامنا مع المصريين</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b)</td>
<td>Solidarity in Berlin with Egypt’s Revolution (<em>Aljazeera</em>, Jan. 31)</td>
<td>تضامن برلين مع ثورة مصر</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c)</td>
<td>Demonstrations in Italy in solidarity with Egypt’s Revolution (<em>Aljazeera</em>, Feb. 1)</td>
<td>مظاهرات بإيطاليا تضامنا مع ثورة مصر</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d)</td>
<td>Demonstrations in London demanding Mubarak’s departure (<em>Aljazeera</em>, Feb. 1)</td>
<td>مظاهرات بلندن تطلب برحيل مبارك</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 4-16  *Aljazeera*’s articles on the Egyptian government’s practices during the uprising

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>English</th>
<th>Arabic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a)</td>
<td>Armed [people] horrify protesters in Egypt (<em>Aljazeera</em>, Feb. 2)</td>
<td>مسلحون يروعون المتظاهرين بمصر</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b)</td>
<td>Revealing the violations of security [forces] in Egypt’s protests (<em>Aljazeera</em>, Feb. 7)</td>
<td>كشف انتهاكات الأمن باحتجاجات مصر</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c)</td>
<td>Egypt’s police facilitated the escape of prisoners (<em>Aljazeera</em>, Feb. 7)</td>
<td>شرطة مصر سهلت فرار السجناء</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d)</td>
<td>Egypt closes <em>Aljazeera</em> office and suspends transmission (<em>Aljazeera</em>, Jan. 30)</td>
<td>مصر تغلق مكتب الجزيرة وتلغي البث</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(e)</td>
<td><em>Aljazeera</em>.net hacked intensively (<em>Aljazeera</em>, Feb. 4)</td>
<td>الجزيرة نت يتعرض لقرصنة مكثفة</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(f)</td>
<td>After the suspension of the last Internet provider in Egypt Google allows Egyptians to connect to Twitter (<em>Aljazeera</em>, Feb. 1)</td>
<td>بعد توقف آخر مزود للإنترنت بمصر غوغل تتيح للمصريين الاتصال بتويتر</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(g)</td>
<td>A call to respect freedoms in Egypt (<em>Aljazeera</em>, Jan. 30)</td>
<td>دعوة حقوقية لاحترام الحريات بمصر</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4-17 Headlines of articles on Mubarak before his stepping down in *Al-Ahram*’s coverage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Al-Ahram</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| (a) | مبارك يطمئن على توفير احتياجات المواطنين  
Mubarak reassures securing citizens’ needs (*Al-Ahram*, Feb. 1) |
| (b) | الرئيس مبارك يترأس اجتماعا موسعا  
President Mubarak heads an expanded meeting (*Al-Ahram*, Feb. 7) |
| (c) | مبارك يعد اجتماعين لبحث الأوضاع الداخلية وتنفيذ الإصلاحات السياسية  
Mubarak holds two meetings to discuss the domestic situation and the execution of political reforms (*Al-Ahram*, Feb. 8) |
| (d) | مبارك: ولاني لمصر وحدها وسأبقى فيها حتى الممات.. وخوفي من الفوضى سبب البقاء  
Mubarak: my loyalty is to Egypt only and I will stay in it until death; my fear of chaos is the reason for my stay (*Al-Ahram*, Feb. 4) |
| (e) | شفيق يؤكد ضرورة بقاء الرئيس مبارك في منصبه حتى نهاية فترة ولايته الرئاسية  
Shafiq confirms the necessity of Mubarak’s stay in power until the end of his presidency term (*Al-Ahram*, Feb. 7) |

Table 4-18 Headlines of articles on Mubarak after his stepping down in *Al-Ahram*’s coverage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Al-Ahram</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| (a) | توقيعات تطالب العالم بتجميد حسابات قادة نظام مبارك التي تبلغ ما بين 200 و300 مليار دولار  
Signatures demanding the world to freeze the accounts of leaderships in Mubarak’s regime that are worth between 200 and 300 billion dollars (*Al-Ahram*, Feb. 13) |
| (b) | وأضاف البيان أنه “في فترة رئاسة الرئيس السابق حسني مبارك التي دامت 30 عاما كانت أموال الشعب المصري تتنهب نهائيا منظما بواسطة النظام و رجال الأعمال والمقربين للسلطة  
The statement added that “during the presidency of former president Hosni Mubarak that lasted 30 years, the money of the Egyptian people was systematically stolen by the regime, businessmen, and those close to the authority…” (*Al-Ahram*, Feb. 13) |
| (c) | أيام حسني مبارك الأخيرة في الحكم  
Hosni Mubarak’s last days in office (*Al-Ahram*, Feb. 14) |
They did not understand what was really happening. Official statements did not satisfy people on Tahrir Square or in different Egyptian cities because the mentality of the ruling regime did not change; the stereotype did not change and had nothing to do with reality: they were demonstrations that could be under control if satellite channels stopped triggering them (Al-Ahram, Feb. 14).

---

Table 4-19 Headlines of articles on government and NDP officials in Al-Ahram’s coverage before Mubarak’s stepping down

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Headline</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>نظيف: حريصون علي حرية التعبير</td>
<td>Al-Ahram, Jan. 27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prime Minister tightens the protection on public and private assets</td>
<td>Al-Ahram, Jan. 27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>شفيق: مستعد للحوار مع المتظاهرين</td>
<td>Al-Ahram, Feb. 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dialogue is the first way to end the crisis and the alternative is a</td>
<td>Al-Ahram, Feb. 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Party underscores its respect of people’s right to express their demands</td>
<td>Al-Ahram, Jan. 26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4-20 The NDP in Al-Ahram’s coverage after Feb. 11

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Headline</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>قدم الدكتور حسام بدراوي الأمين العام للحزب الوطني وأمين السياسات استقالته من جميع مناصبه بالحزب الوطني وذلك بسبب عدم وفاء الحزب بمطالب الشعب وأولويات ثورة الشباب</td>
<td>Al-Ahram, Feb. 12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Secretary General of the NDP and Secretary General of the NDP Policies, Dr. Husam Badrawi, resigned from all his posts in the Party due to the party’s inability to secure the demands of the people and the priorities of the youth revolution (Al-Ahram, Feb. 12).
### Table 4-21  Headlines of articles on Mubarak that emphasized opposing sources in *Aljazeera’s* coverage

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a)</td>
<td>تايمز: مبارك فقد شعبه&lt;br&gt;Time: Mubarak lost his people (<em>Aljazeera</em>, Jan. 29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b)</td>
<td>بديع: مبارك يمارس إرهاب دولة&lt;br&gt;Badie: Mubarak is practicing state terrorism (<em>Aljazeera</em>, Jan. 30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c)</td>
<td>الفرضاوي: مبارك بدأ يذبح شعبه&lt;br&gt;Al-Qaradawi: Mubarak started killing his people (<em>Aljazeera</em>, Feb. 3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d)</td>
<td>غارديان: ثروة آل مبارك بالليارات&lt;br&gt;Guardian: the Mubarak wealth in billions (<em>Aljazeera</em>, Feb. 5)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 4-22  Headlines of other articles on Mubarak in *Aljazeera’s* coverage

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a)</td>
<td>طلب للتحقيق بتروية مبارك&lt;br&gt;A request of investigation into Mubarak’s wealth (<em>Aljazeera</em>, Feb. 8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b)</td>
<td>مبارك استغل آخر أيامه لتامين ثروته&lt;br&gt;Mubarak secured his wealth during his last days [in office] (<em>Aljazeera</em>, Feb. 13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c)</td>
<td>مبارك أهمل قواعد انتقال السلطة&lt;br&gt;Mubarak neglected the rules of power transition (<em>Aljazeera</em>, Jan. 31)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d)</td>
<td>مبارك... ساعة الرحيل&lt;br&gt;Mubarak... the time for departure (<em>Aljazeera</em>, Feb. 4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(e)</td>
<td>نظام مبارك يترنح لكنه لم يسقط&lt;br&gt;Mubarak’s regime vulnerable but did not collapse (<em>Aljazeera</em>, Feb. 8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(f)</td>
<td>مصر.. الشعب يريد محاكمة الرئيس&lt;br&gt;Egypt.. the people demand the trial of the President (<em>Aljazeera</em>, Feb. 12)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4-23  Headlines of articles on the Egyptian government and the NDP in *Aljazeera*’s coverage

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a)</td>
<td>A record full of right violations in Egypt (<em>Aljazeera</em>, Feb. 2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b)</td>
<td>Accusations of beating protesters to National Party (<em>Aljazeera</em>, Feb. 4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c)</td>
<td>Police violations triggered the Revolution (<em>Aljazeera</em>, Feb. 8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d)</td>
<td>The marriage of authority and money burden Egypt (<em>Aljazeera</em>, Feb. 2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(e)</td>
<td>Revealing fortunes of former officials in Egypt (<em>Aljazeera</em>, Feb. 8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(f)</td>
<td>The amount of money theft strikes Egyptians (<em>Aljazeera</em>, Feb. 11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(g)</td>
<td>Corruption exhausts the Egyptian economy (<em>Aljazeera</em>, Feb. 11)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4-24  *Al-Ahram*’s reporting of the religious institutions’ position

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a)</td>
<td>Al-Tayeb and Shenouda confirm their trust in the President (<em>Al-Ahram</em>, Jan. 31)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b)</td>
<td>Protestants: We call upon all classes of people to consolidate against whoever attempts to harm Egypt (<em>Al-Ahram</em>, Feb. 2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c)</td>
<td>Al-Azhar condemns Iranian policies and European and American statements that intervene in Egyptian affairs (<em>Al-Ahram</em>, Feb. 6)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 4-25 Aljazeera’s reporting on the position of the Church

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Al-Ahram</th>
<th>Aljazeera</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a)</td>
<td>الأزهر ينتقد فتاوى تدعم الاحتجاجات</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Al-Zharn criticizes fatwas supporting the protests (Aljazeera, Feb. 7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b)</td>
<td>الكنيسة يندى عن مظاهرات مصر</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Church distances itself from the demonstrations in Egypt (Aljazeera, Jan. 29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c)</td>
<td>كان الغياب اللافت للكنيسة ومدن الصعيد مثار تساؤل المراقبين الذين رأوا في موقف الأولى &quot;تخليًا&quot; عن</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The noticeable absence of the Church and the cities of Upper Egypt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>concerned many observers who viewed the position of the former as</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“abandoning” the well-known national role of the Christian religious institution (Aljazeera, Jan. 29)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 4-26 Al-Ahram and Aljazeera’s reporting on the Ministry of Awqaf

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Al-Ahram</th>
<th>Aljazeera</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a)</td>
<td>الأوقاف تحرز عن &quot;جامعة الغضب&quot; بمصر</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[Ministry of] Awqaf: Friday sermon about rejecting violence (Al-Ahram, Feb. 4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(a’)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Aljazeera, Jan. 27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b)</td>
<td>حذرت وزارة الأوقاف المصرية من استخدام صلاة يوم غد الجمعة في التظاهرات التي</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>تدعت إليها جماعات المعارضة، في حين</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>دعت جبهة علماء الأزهر المواطنين إلى</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>مواصلة الاحتجاجات وعدم الرضوخ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>للتحذيرات</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Egyptian Ministry of Awqaf warned of utilizing Friday Prayer for demonstrations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>called for by opposition groups,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>while the Front of Al-Azharn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Clerics (Ulama) called for</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>continuing protests and not</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>adhering to warnings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Aljazeera, Jan. 27)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4-27  Al-Ahram and Aljazeera’s reporting of fatwas on protesting

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Al-Ahram</th>
<th>Aljazeera</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| (a) | (a’)
| أئمة المساجد يناشدون الشعب التمسك بوحدتهم | فتاوى وفعاليات تأييدا لمعتجلي مصر
| مساجد ينادون بالوحدة | فتاوى وفعاليات تأييدا لمعتجلي مصر
Mosque Imams call upon the people to hold on to their unity (Al-Ahram, Jan. 29) | (Aljazeera, Feb. 3) |
| (b) | (b’)
| خطباء المساجد يطالبون بالاعتصام بحبل الله | القالة لجنة علماء الشريعة في حزب جبهة العمل الإسلامي بالأردن - في تعليق على الاحتجاجات التي تشهدها مصر - إن الثورة على الطغيان أمر مشروع ومجدد بإذن الله |
| Mosque Preachers call for an adherence to the rope of Allah (Al-Ahram, Jan. 29) | The Committee of Sharia Scholars of the Jordanian Islamic Labor Front Party said, in its comments on the ongoing protests in Egypt, that revolting against dictators is “religiously lawful and rewarded religiously, Allah Willing” (Aljazeera, Feb. 3) |

Table 4-28  Al-Ahram’s reporting of world reactions in the outset of the Revolution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Al-Ahram</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The stability of Egypt is stability to all Arab countries (Al-Ahram, Jan. 27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahraini monarch King Hamad Bin Isa Al-Khalifah stressed in a phone call with President Hosni Mubarak yesterday that the stability of Egypt is stability to all Arab countries (Al-Ahram, Jan. 27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italian praise of freedom of expression in Egypt (Al-Ahram, Jan. 27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paulo Romani, Italian Minister of Economic Development, emphasized that Egypt and its leadership respect the freedom of expression (Al-Ahram, Jan. 27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(e)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berlusconi: Mubarak's remaining in power is important in the transitional stage (Al-Ahram, Feb. 5)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
European Union calls for a smooth transition of authority in Egypt (Al-Ahram, Feb. 1)

Five European countries demand an immediate transition of power (Al-Ahram, Feb. 4)

Merkel: Change must be peaceful in Egypt (Al-Ahram, Feb. 6)

As a continuation of the positions of European leaders towards the ongoing events in Egypt, French President Nicolas Sarkozy stressed the importance of an immediate transition to democracy delay, expressing his support of the demonstrators in Egypt (Al-Ahram, Feb. 6)

Obama: the Egyptian people have inspired the people of other countries and reform must start now (Al-Ahram, Feb. 3)

In Ankara, Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, called upon Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak a day after he announced he will step down next September to take a different step, confirming that the Egyptian people were expecting a totally different decision (Al-Ahram, Feb. 3)

Austrian Foreign Minister, Michael Spindelegger, described the situation in Egypt as very serious, calling upon Egyptian authorities to refrain from dealing violently with the demonstrators (Al-Ahram, Feb. 3)
### Table 4-30 Aljazeera’s reporting of world reactions toward the protests

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Aljazeera</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| (a) | تجربة تونس تعجل مواقف الغرب ب مصر  
Tunisia’s experience quickens Western positions toward Egypt (Aljazeera, Jan. 28) |
| (b) | عالمي من وضع مصر  
International concern over the situation in Egypt (Aljazeera, Jan. 30) |
| (c) | العالم يطالب مصر بإصلاحات سياسية  
World demands Egypt of political reform (Aljazeera, Jan. 30) |
| (d) | الغرب يدعو إلى التغيير بمصر  
The West calls for change in Egypt (Aljazeera, Feb. 1) |
| (e) | دعوات لعملية انتقالية حقيقية بمصر  
Calls for a real transitional process in Egypt (Aljazeera, Feb. 2) |
| (f) | الشخصيات ترحب بتنحي مبارك  
Figures hail Mubarak’s stepping down (Aljazeera, Feb. 11) |

### Table 4-31 Aljazeera’s reporting of Israeli reactions toward the protests

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Aljazeera</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| (a) | مصير السلام والغاز يقلق إسرائيل  
The fate of peace and gas exports worries Israel (Aljazeera, Jan. 30) |
| (b) | نتنياهو يخشى تكرار نموذج إيران بمصر  
Netanyahu fears the reoccurrence of an Iranian model in Egypt (Aljazeera, Jan. 31) |
| (c) | نتنياهو يطالب بالالتزام مصر بالسلام  
Netanyahu demands Egypt to commit to peace (Aljazeera, Feb. 2) |
| (d) | ما بعد مبارك يثير ذعر إسرائيل  
Post-Mubarak panics Israel (Aljazeera, Feb. 2) |
| (e) | صمت إسرائيلي إزاء سقوط مبارك  
Israeli silence over Mubarak’s downfall (Aljazeera, Feb. 12) |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4-32  Headlines of articles on President Obama in <em>Al-Ahram</em> and <em>Aljazeera’s</em> coverage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Al-Ahram</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| (a) أوباما يطالب مبارك بخطوات ملموسة لزيادة الديمقراطية | (a') أوباما يدعو مبارك لإصلاح شامل  
Obama calls upon Mubarak to take tangible steps to enhance democracy (*Al-Ahram*, Jan. 30)  
Obama calls on Mubarak to undertake comprehensive reform (*Aljazeera*, Jan. 28) |
| (b) الشعب المصري أصبح مصدر إلهام لشعوب الدول الأخرى ..والإصلاح يجب أن يبدأ الآن | (b') أوباما: مبارك يدرك حتمية التغيير  
Obama: The Egyptian people have inspired the people of other countries and reform must start now (*Al-Ahram*, Feb. 3)  
Obama: Mubarak realized the inevitability of change (*Aljazeera*, Feb. 2) |
| (c) أوباما يصلي من أجل انتهاء العنف في مصر | (c') أوباما: مستقبل مصر بيد شعبها  
Obama prays for the end of violence in Egypt (*Al-Ahram*, Feb. 4)  
Obama: the future of Egypt is in the hands of its people (*Aljazeera*, Feb. 5) |
| (d) أوباما: أناق أن الحكومة المصرية القادمة ستكون شريكة لأمريكا والإخوان لا يتمتعون بالأغلبية  
Obama: I am confident that the next Egyptian government will be a partner of the U.S. and the [Muslim] Brothers do not enjoy a majority (*Al-Ahram*, Feb. 7)  
Obama renews his call for an orderly transition of power (*Aljazeera*, Feb. 6) |
| (e) أوباما: ما قدمه مبارك في بيانه غير كاف  
Obama: What Mubarak offered in his statement is not enough (*Al-Ahram*, Feb. 12)  
Obama: Egypt must obey the demands of people (*Aljazeera*, Feb. 11) |
Table 4-32  Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Al-Ahram</th>
<th>Aljazeera</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(f) أوباما: ما حدث في مصر من اللحظات القليلة في حياتنا التي نشهد فيها تشكل التاريخ</td>
<td>Obama hails Egypt's commitment to its treaties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Aljazeera, Feb. 12)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4-33 The inclusion of different U.S. sources in Aljazeera’s coverage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aljazeera</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) بايدن يدعو لانتقال منظم للسلطة بمصر</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) كلينتون تدين العنف ضد المحتجين بمصر</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) دعا رئيس لجنة العلاقات الخارجية بمجلس الشيوخ الأمريكي حكومة بلاده إلى أن تتجاوز بنظرها عهد الرئيس حسني مبارك، وأن تصوغ سياسة جديدة تجاه مصر</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d) في أوضح رفض أميركي لمحاولة الرئيس المصري البقاء في السلطة حتى نهاية ولايته في سبتمبر/أيلول مقابل عدم ترشحه مرة ثانية، قال المتحدث باسم البيت الأبيض روبرت غيبس إن الولايات المتحدة تريد التغير الآن، وليس في سبتمبر/أيلول</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(e) أعرب البيت الأبيض الأمريكي عن استنكاره للهجمات على المظاهرات السلمية المطالبة بتنحية الرئيس المصري حسني مبارك، كما أبدى قلقه البالغ من الهجمات على وسائل الإعلام</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Table 4-34</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Al-Ahram</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cheney: Mubarak is a good man and his fate is in the hands of his people (Al-Ahram, Feb. 7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>He said it is important to make diplomatic efforts in secret, adding that it is so difficult for a foreign leader to act on American advice in a visible way (Al-Ahram, Feb. 7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran, the Brothers, and America: the triplet of jumping to power against the will of the youth (Al-Ahram, Feb. 5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obama between the events in Egypt and U.S. economy (Al-Ahram, Feb. 9)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER 5
DISCUSSION

5.1 Overview

The analysis of how Egypt’s Revolution was covered by state and transnational media shows variation on all levels of analysis, and, in cases, it seemed that the two news outlets were reporting two different stories. In this Chapter, I expand the insights of textual and discursive practice analysis to investigate the wider sociopolitical context with the aim of depicting features that contribute to power abuse and social inequality. In other words, the present Chapter deals with the ‘critical’ dimension of the study.

To do so, I first examine the editorial, institutional, ideological, social, and political aspects that could better our understanding of how the two outlets reported the uprising and portrayed the antagonists. Specifically, I address the ideological structures that were employed by the two outlets on the textual level in light of van Dijk’s (1995) ideological square, and discuss group polarization on the discursive practice level with reference to the relevant sociopolitical context.

One of the important findings of textual and discursive practice analysis was that the two outlets tended to change their reporting strategies at a certain point in the uprising, particularly around Feb. 2. To account for this change, I investigate the immediate situational context and the developments that took place to provide a sociopolitical explanation for the textual and discursive practice shift.

Following that, in light of Gramsci’s (1971) notion of hegemony and Althusser’s (1971) notion of Ideological State Apparatus, I explain how the investigated discourses represented two competing discourses at a very critical point in the history of Egypt: Al-Ahram represented the hegemonic discourse and Aljazeera represented the counter-hegemonic discourse. I conclude by discussing the prospects for Egypt’s media
transition in light of the 2011 Revolution as it pertains to the overall political situation. I argue that despite the breakthroughs in the Egyptian media situation thus far, media transition does not take place without political change.

5.2 Group Polarization on the Textual Level

Recall that in his account of the Ideological Square, van Dijk (1995) proposes that ideologies appear in polarized opinion, thought, action, or discourse. Thus, it is assumed that discourse is characterized by Us/Them dichotomy in which the ingroup is represented positively and the outgroup negatively by employing certain ideological structures and strategies. One of the ways to identify ideological structures is to depict discourse structures that involve a positive presentation of self and a negative presentation of the other (see 1.3.1). Textual analysis of Al-Ahram and Aljazeera coverage revealed a clear group polarization dividing the antagonists into an ingroup and an outgroup. To explain this polarization on the textual level, I focus on the variation in the way the outlets used ideological structures, such as negative lexicalization and predication, detailed description, attribution to personality, and argumentative support, in their reporting of the events.

First, words matter: baltaga (the root for the word baltagiyya) refers to an improper use of violence. It denotes concepts of bullying, coercing, and looting people to comply with certain demands (Ghannam, 2012). An investigation of the word’s uses and the different social actors it has been employed to refer to in the Egyptian context gives insights into how controversial the term is and how different groups make sense of it and utilize it for ideological purposes. The word is originally Turkish, and was first used during the Ottoman rule of Egypt. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Egyptian media used the term to refer to Islamist leaders. However, since the mid-1990s, it has
been employed to refer to violence between government agents and young men in popular squares (Ismael, 2006: 140).

During the Revolution, the term referred to different referents in *Al-Ahram* and *Aljazeera’s* coverage. In reporting acts of violence that occurred during the first days of the protests, *Al-Ahram* was persistent in employing the term *baltagiyya* to refer to the protesters. It attempted to avoid the political nature of the event as a social movement and present it as a threat to peace and security. Hence, according to the paper’s narrative, the peaceful marches of only a few Egyptian youth were exploited by thugs conspiring with external powers against Egypt to achieve their goals and comply with their hidden agenda. This strategy of representation, which was adopted by official media in general, seemed to have worked in the beginning of the protests; Ghannam (2012) reports that members of families residing in poor neighborhoods in Cairo who only had access to official media were not sure what was happening and who the protesters were. Some of those residents blamed the protesters for threatening their safety and destabilizing the country; “they thought poorly of the activists and used the lines offered by government propaganda, describing the protesters as troublemakers who were paid a daily allowance in Euros by outsiders and who were served free meals from Kentucky Fried Chicken” (ibid: 33).

*Aljazeera* also employed the same term at that point in the Revolution, but with a different narrative; it consistently drew a line between the *baltagiyya* and the protesters. Its narrative was that there were groups who exploited the events, but their effect was marginal and that they did not represent the protesters in any way; it focused on the event itself, on the protests and protesters.
The exact opposite happened in the two outlets’ coverage of the events on Tahrir Square on Feb. 2, i.e. the Battle of the Camel. Although this topic was marginalized in Al-Ahram’s coverage, the few instances in which the event was referred to by reporting comments of government officials on it showed a tendency of separating the perpetrators from the regime, and ruling out any link or role played by the government in what had happened. Yet, when the old regime was ousted, the paper was explicit in linking the baltagiyya to members of the ruling party. Aljazeera, on the other hand, associated the government with the events by reporting that the baltagiyya were hired by members of the regime, and that some of them were even members of the security forces. The network was more explicit about its narrative by the end of the uprising than it was a few days after the Battle of the Camel in the sense that it attributed the claim to other sources in the beginning and reported it in the authorial voice toward the end of the uprising. Terms with positive connotations were also employed in the two outlets’ reporting of the uprising. For example, Al-Ahram used the term martyr and its derivatives, at the beginning of the protests, to refer to the ingroup casualties as opposed to the dead which was used to refer to casualties on the other side. Aljazeera had also employed the term to refer to casualties on the protesters’ side by the end of the Revolution.

The significance of employing terms like baltagiyya, which is socially associated with the use of violence for political purposes, and martyrdom, which is socially associated with sacrifice and selflessness, is that they participate in shaping attitudes and positions toward an event through shaping the interpretations of it (Ghannam, 2012). When reporters express their beliefs and ideologies in news reports, they exhibit their shared social representations in text production (van Dijk, 1996); the term
baltagiyya evokes a socially shared negative representation that was utilized by the two outlets to describe the outgroup or, at least, to distance the ingroup. In contrast, the term martyrdom evokes socially shared positive representations to which each outlet associated what it considered the ingroup.

As to description, Al-Ahram described the protesters as norm and value violators by breaking the law and causing destruction and chaos. They were also presented as halting traffic, throwing stones at security forces, threatening the security of citizens and government headquarters, among other things. Members and leaders of opposing groups were referred to with little or no detail, even if they were well-known figures. van Dijk (1995) argues that one of the structures used to represent the ingroup positively is detailed description and attribution to personality. Government officials and security forces, who represented the ingroup, were referred to with detailed descriptions; Al-Ahram used proper names and official positions and, in some cases, honorifics to refer to government officials. President Mubarak was also presented in detail by emphasizing his accomplishments and sacrifice for the country since he was an officer in the Egyptian Air Forces, and his participation in the October 1973 war against Israel.

Another strategy employed by Al-Ahram was that the negative actions of the ingroup were represented with what van Dijk refers to as argumentative support. For example, the articles generally emphasize the security forces’ tolerance of the protesters, and whenever they are reported as using water cannons or tear gas against protesters, the action was presented as a response to more negative actions perpetrated by the protesters, such as throwing stones. Al-Ahram started its coverage of the protests by presenting them extremely negatively. The tone, however, softened after Feb. 2 on all levels, a point I elaborate on later in this Chapter; nevertheless, the
ingroup was still favored and the outgroup was marginalized. As supporters of Mubarak took to the streets to form counter-protests after his second speech, *Al-Ahram* started emphasizing the positive actions of the ingroup instead of the negative actions of the outgroup. This included reporting the size of demonstrations supporting Mubarak and his sacrifices for the country and compromises he made to end the unrest. By the time Mubarak stepped down, *Al-Ahram* drastically redefined the ingroup and the outgroup: it was critical of the regime and respectful of the demonstrators and “the greatest Revolution in the history of revolutions.”

On the other hand, *Aljazeera* reported both sides of the conflict in the same way at the outset of the Revolution (i.e. until Feb. 2): it did not describe or refer to any side negatively; it employed negative, positive, and neutral verbal processes with both sides; and presuppositions were made through reporting other voices, not in the authorial voice. Yet, the position of the protesters was emphasized more and topicalized in the articles, indicating that they were the ingroup.

From the eruption of the Revolution, *Aljazeera* provided *detailed descriptions* of the protests and protesters; it emphasized the large numbers of protesters and their demands and repeatedly reported their slogans and chants, especially those calling for the departure of President Mubarak. It also referred to certain days in the protests by employing the names chosen by the protesters, such as the Rage Day, the Friday of Rage, and the Friday of Departure. Although they were referred to using scare quotes, reference to these days in and of itself implies some sort of acknowledgement of the protesters’ will. Ingroup and outgroup dichotomy was more evident, though, By Feb. 2. First of all, negative presuppositions about the government were more explicit and used in the authorial voice. Secondly, the voice of the government was not included as
frequently as it was before Feb. 2, and when the voice was included, negative or neutral verbal processes were employed.

In sum, whether through lexicalization and description, presupposition, or verbal process, *Al-Ahram* and *Aljazeera* tended to take sides in reporting the uprising by identifying an ingroup and an outgroup, representing what they considered the ingroup positively and what they considered the outgroup negatively. The key discourse structures the two outlets used were negative/positive lexicalization, detailed description, attribution to personality, and argumentative support.

### 5.3 Group Polarization on the Discursive Practice Level

Features of van Dijk’s *ideological square* were also found in discursive practice analysis, which included intertextuality and topic selection. Intertextuality refers to the texts’ dependence on previously produced texts to reinforce the attitudes of the powerful or counter them. Media outlets focus on certain social categories of what Fowler (1991) refers to as ‘accessed voices’ to reproduce relations of power. *Al-Ahram* showed a tendency of including voices of the ingroup, the government, and totally silencing the voice of the outgroup, the protesters and opposition, at least in the beginning of the Revolution, and even when the outgroup was reported later in the protests, the ingroup was still the dominant voice in terms of number of occurrences and prominence in the text; the outgroup was given less prominent positions in texts such as the background.

*Aljazeera*, in contrast, reported the voices of both sides; however, the inclusion of the government voice was positioned and contextualized in ways that would elicit interpretations against the government. The analysis of intertextuality revealed that the statements of government officials expressed intolerance of free speech and a tendency to threaten the organizers of the demonstrations despite the claim that freedom of
expression is one of the rights of Egyptians. The network also distanced itself from some of the government’s claims by employing strategic quotes and expressions like the so-called. It also included voices of parties that did not belong to any side of the conflict, such as international organizations and eyewitnesses; these voices were utilized to support the protesters’ side and present the government negatively.

Goffman’s (1981) theory of footing, in which the person who assumes the role of production can adjust "alignment" with an utterance, is helpful in explaining intertextuality in media discourse. He distinguishes between four speaker roles: Animator or "the person actually producing the talk"; Author or "entity responsible for constructing the words and sentences at issue"; Principal or "the party who is socially responsible for what is said"; and Figure or "a character depicted in the Animator's talk" (Goodwin & Goodwin, 2004: 224).

*Al-Ahram* and *Aljazeera* seem to have assumed three out of the four roles at different points in the Revolution, depending on whether or not they wanted to take an explicit stand toward the event and the antagonists; these roles were animator, author, and principal. For example, *Aljazeera* distanced itself from the use of some controversial terms such as *baltagiyya* or the naming of certain days in the Revolution such as "the Day of Rage" by using them in scare quotes and attributing them to other sources; thus assuming the role of the animator, but not the author or principal. However, the network took an explicit stand toward the event by using the same terms in the authorial voice later in the Revolution; it, therefore, played the role of the principal. In other cases it employed indirect quotation to paraphrase the thoughts of other sources, thereby playing the role of author and animator.
News production institutions are governed by economic, social, and political constraints that contribute to the construction of social reality. Therefore, news is not simply gathered and reported, but rather created as “the world of the Press is not the real world, but a world skewed and judged” (Fowler, 1991). The criteria for news selection and newsworthiness as well as the identification of worthy and unworthy victims (Herman and Chomsky, 1988) are bound to ideological and institutional criteria set by each media outlet. Accordingly, exclusion of certain topics is not unusual in media practice, especially at times of crisis. *Al-Ahram* excluded a number of important topics in its coverage, ones that were breaking news in the coverage of other media institutions; these include Internet cut off, *Aljazeera* transmission blockage, and, most importantly, the clashes in Tahrir Square on Feb. 2, also referred to as ‘the Battle of the Camel’.

As to the topics included, the analysis revealed a considerable contrast between the two outlets as to what constituted news value and was worthy of reporting. *Al-Ahram* and *Aljazeera* constructed reality on certain topics in ways that were consistent with their overall identification of ingroup and outgroup during the conflict; they dealt with the events from their own perspective and conceptualization of reality. For example, *Al-Ahram* attributed chaos and violence that occurred during the days of the uprising to a conspiracy of ‘hidden hands’ aiming to destabilize Egypt. It attempted to frame the protests as acts of destruction and the protesters as a whole as perpetrators of these actions; its message was that protests meant unrest. *Aljazeera* provided a totally different narrative that attributed this violence to the government and security forces in particular. According to this narrative, security forces withdrew from the streets, released prisoners, and paid gangs only to frighten protesters. The difference between
the two outlets’ narratives was also clear in their representation of social actors as the
discussion on the President, government, and ruling party revealed; ‘bad guys’ in one
outlet’s reporting were ‘good guys’ in another outlet’s reporting and vice versa. Also, at
the time when *Al-Ahram* was reporting that supporters of Mubarak turned out in millions
to form a counter-protest, *Aljazeera* minimized the effect and size of the protests. News
stories about the enormous wealth of Mubarak and his family as well as stories about
the corruption and trial of main figures in Mubarak’s regime and the ruling party were
common.

The two outlets also dealt differently with significant matters such as the stance
of religious institutions, whether official or non-official, toward the events. Each outlet
emphasized *fatwas* that served the interests of the ingroup and legitimized its actions.
To better understand how *Al-Ahram* and *Aljazeera* utilized this critical topic to support
their ideological orientations during the Revolution, I shed some light on the nature of
the relation between the religious institution and government in Egypt.

The Islamic official religious establishment in Egypt can be divided into three
institutions: *Al-Azhar, Dar el Ifta*, the official source of *fatwas* (i.e. Islamic religious
ruling), and the Ministry of Religious Endowments (*Awqaf*); the three institutions are
controlled by the government through the appointment of their heads and control over
their budgets (Kodmani, 2005). The relationship between *Al-Azhar* and the government
is complex, but has always been based on mutual interest: on the one hand, *Al-Azhar*
legitimized the policies of the government by endorsing them and securing *fatwas* that
supported them, and, on the other hand, the religious institution gained financial
resources and control over what the government considered issues of secondary
importance; that is, the government granted *Al-Azhar* authority over issues of social life
such as culture, women’s rights, freedom of thought. That said, the government did not hesitate to intervene whenever its vital interests, such as its existence and image both nationally and internationally, were threatened (Barraclough, 1998; Mustafa, 2000; and Kodmani, 2005). By doing so, the government secured the support of this influential and popular institution.

Yet, some of Al-Azhar clerics were concerned about the autonomy of Al-Azhar and did not agree of the government’s intervention in Azhari affairs, whether through appointment of its head or control of its funds. Consequently, dissident clerics established the Front of Al-Azhar Clerics in 1946 and expanded in number and effect in the 1990s (Kodmani, 2005). The official and non-official institutions clashed on a number of issues since the 1990s, and the Revolution, of course, was not an exception. In Islamic Law, there is no clear-cut ruling on demonstrations from the Quran or the sayings of Prophet Muhammad, and, like many other issues of daily life on which there is no explicit ruling from Quran or sayings of Prophet Muhammad, the ruling is bound to the consensus of ulama (i.e. religious clerics) or their Discretion, ijtehad, in passing judgments. Throughout the days of the uprising, Al-Azhar consistently and explicitly announced its stance toward the protests: they harm the nation and people should unite under the leadership of the President. On its part, the Front issued a fatwa that called upon people to resume their protests, refuting the fatwa of Al-Azhar.

The other official Islamic religious institution is the Ministry of Religious Endowments, which is in charge of regulating and supervising the content of religious discourse in Friday sermons. The Minister of Religious Endowments is a member of the cabinet, and his role is considered as important as that of the Ministers of Interior and Information (ibid). The role of the Ministry was especially important during the
Revolution, as mosques were very important mobilizing points. The task of controlling these mosques is not an easy one, given that there are around 150,000 to 200,000 mosques across Egypt and unauthorized mosques and unlicensed preachers were not uncommon (Kodmani, 2005). However, the Ministry sought, through its directives to Imams and preachers of mosques, to minimize this mobilizing effect by controlling the content of Friday sermons in authorized mosques.

In their coverage of the uprising, it has been shown that *Al-Ahram* and *Aljazeera* were consistent in emphasizing the religious take of one side on the Revolution and marginalizing the other. For instance, in the ‘battle of fatwas’ between *Al-Azhar* and the Front of *Al-Azhar* Clerics, *Al-Ahram* emphasized the voice of the official religious institution, *Al-Azhar*, and *Aljazeera* highlighted that of the non-official religious institution, the Front. Also, *Al-Ahram* gave prominence to the voice of the Ministry of Endowments and Imams of mosques in Egypt, while *Aljazeera* marginalized their voice in its topic selection and gave prominence to other preachers, sometimes even outside Egypt, who were supportive of the protests and the protesters.

The two outlets also showed variation in their strategy of reporting the reaction of different countries around the world and organizations on the events: *Al-Ahram* emphasized reactions that supported Mubarak and *Aljazeera* emphasized reactions criticizing him and calling for change. They used strategies of foregrounding and backgrounding strategically in emphasizing and deemphasizing the antagonists. Specifically, voices supporting the ingroup were in prominent positions in the text, such as headlines and lead paragraphs, while dissident voices were given non-prominent positions, such as satellite or background paragraphs. For instance, in *Al-Ahram*’s coverage, reactions of world leaders or organizations critical of the regime were
embedded within articles where voices supportive of Mubarak were highlighted; voices calling for transition of power were suppressed in less prominent positions in texts. *Aljazeera*, in contrast, utilized the structure of its news articles to emphasize a number of topics under one main topic; that is, by employing subheadings under one heading, different reactions from different world officials were emphasized.

Drawing on Arab mental representations, values, assumptions, and beliefs, which Fairclough (2001) refers to as MR (members’ resources), about Israel, and reflecting on Arab-Israeli conflict, the two outlets dealt differently with the Israeli position, either through exclusion or overemphasis. The overall reaction of the Israeli government, think tanks, and press was against the uprising and in favor of Mubarak’s stay in power due to the fogginess of the future of Egypt and the Peace Treaty. Thus, statements of Israeli officials were praising Mubarak, describing him as an ally and a close friend to Israel. Despite *Al-Ahram*’s consistent emphasis of reactions of world leaders and officials praising Mubarak, it totally avoided the topic of Israel.

*Aljazeera*, however, gave this topic prominence by reporting the statements and reactions of Israeli officials and press throughout the Revolution. This issue is better understood within an extended framework of *Aljazeera*’s representation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the Arab leaders’ dealing of this issue. Since the 2000 second Palestinian *Intifada*, or uprising, *Aljazeera* has been providing intensive coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, in which it generally sided with the Palestinians (Zayani, 2005; Barkho, 2008). Zayani (2005: 174) states that this intense coverage “fostered anti-government behavior in the Arab world, making Arab governments vulnerable to charges and open to criticism that they have not sufficiently supported the Palestinians or decisively acted on the Palestinian cause.” Considering *Aljazeera*’s Pan-Arabism
orientation, emphasis of the Israeli stance toward Mubarak in Aljazeera’s reporting can only be understood within this context: Israel is losing an ally that had long failed to support Arab causes, especially the Palestinian cause.

Due to the important role superpowers play in revolutionary movement, it is no surprise that the U.S. reaction toward the event was among the main topics in the coverage of Al-Ahram and Aljazeera, regardless of whether that stance was supportive of the regime or the protesters. The U.S., as the world’s leading power, was observing the Revolution as it was unfolding without any intervention to stop it. Part of the unclear position of the U.S., at least in the beginning of the Revolution, was because the Revolution was not foreseen. This, it appears, is part of the nature of revolutions; they are unpredictable even to the most sophisticated intelligence agencies. At the outset of the uprising, the U.S. did not take a clear, decisive position toward the event; on the one hand, it supported the protesters and stressed their right of freedom of expression, and, on the other hand, expressed confidence in Mubarak’s regime. It only called upon Mubarak to undertake a wide-range of political reform. “Our assessment is that the Egyptian government is stable and is looking for ways to respond to the legitimate needs and interests of the Egyptian people,” said Secretary of State Hillary Clinton on the first day of the uprising, Jan. 25, 2011(Reuters, Jan. 25, 2011).

The U.S. calls for a transition of power were not until Feb. 1, when Obama called upon Mubarak to consider a peaceful transition of power, without explicitly calling upon him to step down. The pressure on Mubarak’s regime escalated each day after Feb. 1 until Mubarak was forced to step down on Feb. 11. Al-Ahram, as shown in the analysis, reported articles that were critical of the Obama administration, portraying it as conspiring with other parties such as Iran and the MB against Egypt and its people. It
also emphasized voices that were critical of the Obama administration in dealing with the crisis and in dealing with the domestic economic crisis. The important relevant point here is that such negative presentation of the U.S. administration was only observed after the U.S. pressure intensified; i.e. after Feb. 1. The criticism raised against the Obama administration coincided with the administration’s pressure on Mubarak to resign. Yet, this negative presentation did not occur before Feb. 1, when the U.S. was not demanding a transition of power. This reveals how Al-Ahram’s coverage was bound to the developing and rapidly changing political scene during the days of the uprising.

Aljazeera, on the other hand, intensified its coverage of the U.S. position toward the situation in Egypt and included various U.S. voices after Feb. 1, although the topic was among the main topics in terms of frequency before that date. The analysis revealed that on average there was two times the number of articles on this topic after Feb. 1 than there was before it. This correlation between the frequency of articles and the changing U.S. attitude toward the Egyptian regime is explained in terms of the overall network’s ideological orientation, siding with the protesters against Mubarak’s regime.

5.4 A Turning Point

Textual and discursive practice analysis uncovered a consistent pattern: Feb. 2 marked a turning point in the two outlets’ reporting strategies. On the textual level, Al-Ahram employed negative attributions and negative presuppositions to describe the protesters and their actions only before Feb. 2. It also shifted from totally excluding the opposition voice before Feb. 2 to reporting opposition sources utilizing neutral verbal process after Feb. 2. As for Aljazeera, the network became more explicit about its use of presuppositions after Feb. 2; that is, whereas it employed negative presuppositions
about the government through reporting other sources before Feb. 2, it used presuppositions in the authorial voice after Feb. 2. The network also showed contrast in its use of verbal process in that it employed all types of verbal process to refer to both sides of the conflict before Feb. 2, but used only negative verbal process to refer to the government side after that date.

On the discursive practice level, *Al-Ahram* excluded the voices of all opposition groups from its coverage before Feb. 2; yet, these voices were minimally included after that date. *Aljazeera*, in contrast, tended to include voices representing the protesters, especially opposition groups, as well as voices representing the government before Feb. 2; the voice of the government, however, was totally excluded after that point in time. As to topic selection, *Al-Ahram* shifted from reporting articles that emphasized the protesters’ negative actions before Feb. 2 to reporting articles on counter-protests supporting Mubarak. In other words, before Feb. 2, the paper focused on articles representing the protesters negatively, and focused after that date on articles representing the government positively. It also started including articles that reported international voices calling upon Mubarak to step down only after Feb. 2.

The question is: why Feb. 2? Two important developments took place on Dec. 30 and Feb. 2 that changed the scene both nationally and internationally, and gave momentum to the protesters: 1) the change in the U.S. position; and 2) the Battle of the Camel. I elaborate on each of these factors in the following.

First, the significance of the U.S. position toward the events does not only stem from the fact that it represents a superpower in the international community, but also because Egypt is one of the closest allies of the U.S. in the region, receiving an annual aid of more than $ 1.5 billion since signing the Camp David Accords in 1979 (Holmes,
2012). Egypt relies heavily on this aid as it constitutes around 30-40 percent of its overall budget (Lahoud et al. 2011).

In general, I distinguish between two U.S. positions during the eighteen days of the uprising: 1) supporting Mubarak from Jan. 25 to Feb. 29; and 2) calling for a transition of power from Jan. 30 to Feb. 11, the day Mubarak stepped down. The main concern expressed in U.S. statements in the outset of the uprising was the safety of the protesters and guaranteeing their right of expression. Yet, it viewed the uprising as a domestic issue that could be solved through reform and dialogue; transition of power was not even an issue at that point. On the first day of the uprising, U.S. Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, expressed her country’s confidence in Mubarak, and described the situation in Egypt as “stable” (Reuters, January 25, 2011). In a phone call with President Mubarak on Jan. 28, the third day of the protests, President Obama told Mubarak “to refrain from any violence against peaceful protesters” and to turn a “moment of volatility” into a “moment of promise” (The New York Times, Jan. 28, 2011).

On Jan. 30, however, the U.S. started to back off from its full-fledged support for Mubarak and called upon him to consider a transition of power as part of a solution to the crisis. The first statements calling upon Mubarak to consider an ‘orderly transition of power’ in Egypt were made by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton on Jan. 30. This position was confirmed by President Obama in a phone call with President Mubarak after the latter’s second speech on Feb. 1. In that phone call Obama allegedly urged Mubarak to resign and present to the Egyptian people their next government (Holmes, 2012). In his public remarks on the conversation, President Obama said:

After his speech tonight, I spoke directly to President Mubarak. He recognizes that the status quo is not sustainable and that a change must take place. Indeed, all of us who are privileged to serve in positions of
political power do so at the will of our people. Through thousands of years, Egypt has known many moments of transformation. The voices of the Egyptian people tell us that this is one of those moments; this is one of those times (Foyer, 2011, February 1).

The effect of this pressure and Mubarak’s disappointment with U.S. statements was clear in his last speech addressed to the nation only one day before his stepping down in which he announced his rejection of any kind of foreign intervention:

The big shame and embarrassment, which I have not done and never will do, would be listening to foreign dictations whatever may be the source or pretext (BBC News, 2011, February 10).

He stressed his rejection of intervention again in the same speech:

We will prove that we are no-one’s servants, that we do not take instructions from anyone, and that only the demands of the citizens and the pulse of the street take our decisions (ibid).

State-structural theories of revolutions underscore the role foreign pressure plays in toppling sultanic regimes by weakening these regimes, and then withdrawing support from them (Defronzo, 1991; Goldstone, 1994, 2011). In his account of neopatrimonial rulers, or sultanic regimes, Goldstone (1994) explains that the U.S., as a superpower, plays a role in weakening sultanic regimes by making them rely on it so heavily through financial and military aid, and it encourages its dictatorship practices at certain points. But at the same time, it restricts the authority and power of such regimes by placing limits on coercion and demanding reform and democracy. As these regimes are weakened, the U.S. withdraws its support, a factor that, combined with other factors, could lead to a revolution.

The Egyptian case was unique in that the U.S. did not withdraw its support from Mubarak’s regime at any point before Jan. 25; in other words, foreign pressure is not in any way viewed as a factor contributing to Egypt’s 2011 Revolution. Nevertheless, it represents a different version of the state-structural theories’ argument that suggests
that foreign pressure may play a role after the outbreak of the uprising (Goldstone, 2011; Holmes, 2012: 401). That was exactly what happened by Jan. 30 and beyond. Nevertheless, the strongest effect that changed power balances and gave momentum to the protests and protesters came a few days later.

Despite the huge wave of protests that in some estimates reached a million people in Cairo in the first days of the uprising (Cook, 2012), some Egyptians were skeptical about the uprising and the aims of the protesters (Ghannam, 2012); they preferred restoring normal life especially that businesses were affected by the revolt, since the police withdrawal from the streets on the third day of the protests threatened security.

In his first address to the nation on Jan. 28, Mubarak announced that he had sacked the government and appointed Omar Suleiman as vice-president, and promised political and economic reforms. Three days later, on Feb. 1, he gave a second emotional speech, in which he persuaded many to sympathize with him (Kortam, 2013, February 3; Ghannam, 2012). In that speech the President offered to step down in September and promised that he will not pass power to his son:

> I am now absolutely determined to finish my work for the nation in a way that ensures handing over its safe-keeping and banner … preserving its legitimacy and respecting the constitution. I will work in the remaining months of my term to take the steps to ensure a peaceful transfer of power (The Guardian, Feb. 1, 2011)

The emotional tone in Mubarak’s speech and his promises convinced many reluctant citizens that the President had offered major concessions, and that resuming protests confirms the government’s narrative that the aim was violence, chaos, and destruction, not reform. They thought that the President should be at least given the chance to finish his term in September 2011. Others, however, especially those
protesting in the Square, did not trust the President and refused to compromise; representatives of opposition forces expressed their rejection of Mubarak’s speech and insisted on resuming their protests until he steps down.

The Battle of the Camel was the straw that broke the camel’s back, and whoever’s call it was in the Mubarak regime to attack the protesters in Tahrir Square, the step backfired: the assaults that were perpetrated by baltagiyya “commissioned by government officials to frighten the demonstrators” (Ghannam, 2012: 33) after Army soldiers allowed them onto Tahrir Square (Holmes, 2012) changed the attitudes and views of many citizens who could have otherwise took side with the regime. This is not to suggest that the Battle of the Camel was the first assault on protesters in Tahrir Square; as a matter of fact, there were more violent attacks that happened before that incident where policemen were “shooting point blank at their own people—and in broad daylight for everyone to see” (ibid: 404), and tear gas was filling the air. It seems, though, that the live coverage and footage of these shameless attacks created a visual image of violence in people’s minds.

Many intellectuals, members of the elite, and citizens who sympathized with Mubarak only one day before changed their views and started to sympathize with the protesters and endorse their cause after watching live footage of men riding horses and camels threatening the lives of their fellow citizens. The violent attacks created a confidence crisis between the people and the government. Explaining how the situation was in Cairo at that point in the Revolution, Ghannam (2012) reports that one of her female interlocutors, who was moved by Mubarak’s second speech on Feb. 1, told her, “The president was making all these promises and asking people to trust him and the next thing we hear about is the attacks on al-Tahrir. How does he expect us to believe
him after that?” (p. 34). Although these assaults created fear among protesters in Tahrir
Square and even took the lives of some them, it gave them momentum and increased
their credibility.

The two developments changed the social and political atmosphere both
nationally and internationally. More citizens joined the protests with a total of around 15
million in different parts of Egypt (Holmes, 2012) and more countries began demanding
meaningful, political change. The relation between discourse and society is dialectic
(Fairclough, 2001), and this interplay explains the shift in the two outlets’ coverage post-
Feb. 2 both on the textual and discursive practice level. As protesters gained
momentum and the government’s position became relatively weaker, *Al-Ahram* and
*Aljazeera* adopted different reporting strategies.

5.5 Hegemonic and Counter-Hegemonic Discourse

Powerful social groups seek to normalize their discourse by controlling
institutions that generate discourse, such as the media, which serve as tools to
sustaining hegemony in a society (Blommaert, 2005). As an Ideological State
Apparatus, *Al-Ahram* was a mouthpiece of the Egyptian government during the days of
the uprising. One day after Mubarak’s ouster, however, it switched sides from
ferociously criticizing the protesters and backing Mubarak to praising the Revolution and
criticizing the former regime. Realizing this apparent bias toward the old regime and in
an attempt to establish a new bond with the readers and protesters, *Al-Ahram* officially
apologized for its unfair coverage of the Revolution in its editorial on Feb. 14 titled ‘*For
the people*’; it wrote:

    Today…… we offer a compulsory apology to the noble Egyptian people
for any bias with the corrupt regime, and we pledge to always be biased
with the legitimate demands of the people and continue to be the
conscience of the nation. We also express our pride of all the pure bloods
that challenged the forces of backwardness and coercion and hope that the families of the martyrs would forgive us for no matter what we offer does not equal one drop of blood; our only consolation is that they sacrificed their lives for the sake of dignity and pride of the nation.

Journalists are often ‘coerced’ rather than ‘persuaded’ in adhering to the discursive policies of power holders (Barkho, 2008). During the days of the protests, some journalists were caught between their own attitudes about objective reporting and the strict guidelines of their institution to the extent that some of them resorted to blogs to practice what they considered journalism while working for state-run media. Al-Ahram journalists had even written a letter to the editor requesting that the paper report objectively and distance itself from the government, but the request was ignored (Peterson, 2011).

Sabah Hamamou, deputy business editor of Al-Ahram, reported that on Jan. 25, she could see from her window at Al-Ahram thousands of demonstrators heading to Tahrir Square. She grabbed her camera and took shots of the demonstrators. Unable to conceal her feelings and write what Al-Ahram wanted and expected her to write, she created her own Youtube Channel and downloaded her videos of Tahrir Square and elsewhere (Hamamou, 2011). Hamamou’s experience shows how rigid and strict the guidelines were during the Revolution. Reporters were expected to report what was dictated upon them, not what they believed was an objective reporting of what they saw. Eager to practice their profession at a very critical time of the state’s history, some journalists in state-run media opted covertly for social media.

Commenting on the issue of state intervention in state-run media during the Revolution and before, Mohammad al-Barghouthi, editor of Al-Ahram’s supplement Tahrir Youth, which was issued on the last days of the Revolution as part of the paper’s coverage of the event, said in an interview with Al-Ahram Weekly that “Al-Ahram, like
everything else in Egypt, was kidnapped by the regime before the Revolution. I do not deny that it had failed and committed mistakes before and during the Revolution… We have distinguished journalists who were professionally killed by former leaderships who turned *Al-Ahram* journalists into representatives of ministries" (Bar’el, 2012). In the same vein, *Al-Ahram* editor in chief, Osama Saraya, who was ousted after the Revolution, claimed that the responsibility was collective and that national press had no choice but to adhere to the dictates of the government. He said in an email exchange with *Newsweek*, “We are victims of the system, we worked under its shadow and we aren’t criminals who can be accused of any charges…. The responsibility is collective, although I accept my personal responsibility” (Khalil, 2012).

*Aljazeera*, on the other hand, represented the counter-hegemonic discourse in the Revolution, at least by including the voice of the other side of the conflict and “giving voice to the voiceless” as its English channel motto suggests. This is not to propose, though, that it was the only counter-hegemonic discourse during the uprising, or that its coverage was balanced and neutral; such claims are beyond the scope of the present research. Rather, the point is that *Aljazeera* gave another perspective on the event, one that challenges government hegemony through soft power.

After its intensive coverage of the Tunisian Revolution that ousted President Ben Ali only ten days before the outset of the Egyptian Revolution, *Aljazeera* started raising questions about whether the Tunisian experience could affect Egypt, especially that groups such as We are all Khalid Said and the April 6 movement had called for protests against torture, corruption, and injustice on Jan. 25, which was a national holiday in Egypt to celebrate the police day.
The Egyptian government was not tolerant of this counter-discourse provided by Aljazeera. Al-Ahram mentioned in one of its articles that “Aljazeera is spreading its poisons among citizens”, and the network was framed as the media leg of the conspiracy against Egypt. State media and government officials openly portrayed the network as “an enemy of the state and a conduit for foreign conspiracies to destabilize Egypt” (Khalil, 2012: 251). Khalil (2012) reports that Aljazeera correspondents were abused, threatened, or arrested by security forces; they had to hide their identities and work under very stressful circumstances; they were always on the run.

On Feb. 2, Aljazeera’s signal on the Egyptian satellite company Nilesat was cut off after orders from Egyptian authorities (Aljazeera, Feb. 2, 2011). The network, however, resumed its coverage by uploading podcast and videos to its website and sharing the waves with other Arab networks. Viewers in Egypt continued to receive the signal on the two other satellite providers: the Saudi-based Arabsat and the France-based Hotbird (Peterson, 2011). Aljazeera.net also reported on Feb. 4 that there were attempts to hack the network’s website due to the then-ongoing coverage of the uprising (Aljazeera, Feb. 4, 2011).

As the leading transnational satellite network in the Arab world, Aljazeera has indeed created challenges for state-run media. Despite the fact that the media landscape in Egypt during Mubarak’s rule was seemingly diverse in that privately-owned media existed, the government still had a grip on all media institutions. The biggest challenge, thus, came from the outside, from networks like Aljazeera that enjoy relative independence. Propagandistic and hegemonic discourse does not have the same influence it used to have, given that people have alternatives to test truth-claims. As Seib (2008: 144) put it: “state-controlled and Western broadcasters have found that they
are at a significant disadvantage in the Arab world because they are not as credible as *Aljazeera*.”

Lynch (2005) argues that one of the strongest impacts of *Aljazeera* in the Arab world is its coverage of protests in different Arab countries. He points out that Arab satellite stations were necessary for the wave of reformist enthusiasm in the region. *Aljazeera*’s coverage of the Egyptian Revolution put official media on the spot. As the events unfolded, the round-the-clock-coverage of *Aljazeera*, whether on TV or online, supported by footage and videos from the scene created a credibility crisis in terms of people’s attitudes toward state-run media that were propagandistic and far from reporting the reality. This discrepancy between reality and state apparatus distorted coverage contributed to the loss of trust in state-run media, and people’s demand to abolish the Ministry of Information after the Revolution (Khamis, 2011). This is not to suggest that the loss of trust occurred only after the protests broke out, but that media credibility, or lack thereof, is most salient at times of crisis when claims can be spontaneously evaluated.

*Aljazeera*’s coverage, along with the coverage of other Arab and international news networks, also helped in forming an international public opinion (Peterson, 2011). The continuous coverage of the events as they unfolded and reporting of the protesters’ demands and insistence on change led to a gradual change in the attitude of the international community from supporting Mubarak and his regime to asking him to step down and listen to the people’s demands.

**5.6 Prospects for the Future of Egyptian Media Landscape**

In light of the situation in post-revolutionary Egypt and the social and political changes the state had undergone after Jan. 25, the questions are: will state-run media
maintain its status? And what are the implications of the Egyptian Revolution for state-media relationships?

Bar’el (2012) explains that there are three main proposals regarding the future of state-run media in Egypt after the Jan. 25 Revolution: first, some intellectuals suggest the abolition of these media institutions or transforming them into private companies that are not controlled by the government in any way. Second, other intellectuals suggest amendments to press law that would guarantee the freedom of the press. Finally, others demand the ‘purification’ of official press from leaderships that were dominant before Jan. 25.

A number of promising media reform steps were undertaken after Egypt’s Jan. 25 Revolution; however, these changes did not last long. For example, a few days after Mubarak was ousted, the Ministry of Information was abolished and state-media leadership positions were reshuffled (Peterson. 2011). Only five months later, though, the Ministry was reinstated (Committee to Protect Journalists, July 12, 2011). This was not the first time the Egyptian Ministry of Information was abolished and reinstated, though. In 1981, President Anwar Al-Sadat dismantled the Ministry of Information and reinstated it only one year later in Jan. 1982, and it was unclear then why the Ministry was abolished and why it was reinstated. Also, changes in leadership positions are not a strong indicator of grass-roots transformation. Peterson (2011) reports that staff members complain that new leaderships appointed after the Revolution are more comfortable with the traditional media school, and former leaderships are still influential in the media scene as they are kept as media consultants.

No matter how influential the mass media are, they have never been in the forefront of political change, whether this change was through a revolution or through
peaceful reform (Hafez, 2006). Mass media alone are not capable of bringing transition to democracy; this is not to downplay its significant role in creating a public sphere, but to stress that change comes first through political reform.

The Iranian Revolution was one of the prominent contemporary revolutions in the Middle East. Investigating the outcomes and historical stages of this Revolution gives insights into the correlation between political change and media change in autocratic states. Evaluating the media situation in Iran five years after the Iranian Revolution in 1979, Beeman (1984) points out that Iranian media witnessed huge changes after the Revolution, but settled back to resume their role as a regime mouthpiece with an ideology different than that during the shah era.

More recently, Bruno (2009) argues that although there have been improvements in the flow of information in Iran during the last decade, restrictions on media still apply. He reports that journalists who violate press laws “face months of jail time, fines, and even lashings.” Thus, no real progress on the track of democracy, especially in issues pertaining to media freedom, has been achieved by the Iranian Revolution; it only achieved one goal, which is replacing the shah regime with another regime, embracing a different ideology (Sreberny-Mojammadi and Mohammadi, 1994). Put simply, Iranian official media only changed its ideology, not its practice and strategy.

Changes in the media landscape are prone to the political context in any state. Hence, across-the-board changes in the media landscape are only likely when there is a permissive political context promoting democracy. At this stage of political battle for democratization in Egypt, speculations about the future of media landscape are uncertain. It is evident that “the newly born Egyptian democracy will have to overcome a
hostile environment full of skepticism, coupled with huge external challenges” (Sarquis, 2012: 871).

The media landscape in Egypt will be influenced by transnational, semi-independent media and social media, which would impose a more transparent narrative on local media, whether official or private. That is, even if Egypt does not witness political breakthroughs in terms of applying democracy, transformations in the region’s mainstream and non-mainstream media context would render the pre-revolutionary discourse shallow and outdated. The Egyptian people have gone far in the Revolution in terms of demanding rights that a return to the same old way of state-media hegemony is unlikely. However, as Khamis (2011: 1168) put it: although media in the Arab world “may act as catalysts or stimulators of change and reform, one should be careful not to assign too much power to them in the transition toward democratization.” The future of media in Egypt will depend to a large extent on a shift to democracy with an active civil society and an influential multi-party system.

5.7 Summary

The aim of the present Chapter was to relate the findings of textual and discursive practice analysis to their sociopolitical context. On the textual level, for example, terms such as baltagiyya and martyrdom, which hold negative and positive connotations, respectively, were utilized in the two outlets’ reporting. The aim of such use was to draw on members’ resources and mental representations associated with these terms to present the ingroup positively and outgroup negatively. Moreover, Al-Ahram and Aljazeera employed ideological structures in the sense of van Dijk (1995) such as attribution to personality, detailed description, and argumentative support,
which serve as traces of the outlets’ ideologies and what they stood for during the uprising.

On the discursive practice level, the relationship between the state and the Islamic religious institution; the Arab-Israeli conflict; and the role of superpowers in social movements were decisive sociopolitical aspects in topic selection. For example, because of the Egyptian government’s control over the Al-Azhar and other official Islamic religious institutions, Al-Ahram emphasized topics on the official religious institution’s position, which was supportive of the government, while Aljazeera emphasized topics that highlighted the dissident voice among the religious institution that was in agreement with the network’s ideological orientation and stance during the Revolution.

Chapter 5 also attempted to provide an explanation, by relating to the immediate situational context, for the shift in Al-Ahram and Aljazeera’s reporting after Feb. 2. Two important developments took place during the uprising that changed the track of the Revolution as a whole and, consequently, the reporting strategies of the two outlets: 1) the change in the U.S. position, and 2) the Battle of the Camel. These two events had a significant influence on the social and political atmosphere, including media coverage.

In light of the results from the three dimensions of Fairclough’s framework: textual analysis, discursive practice analysis, and social practice analysis, the two outlets represented two competing discourses with different stances and ideologies. By controlling media institutions, including Al-Ahram, as important tools for the production and reproduction of ideologies, the former Egyptian government aimed at normalizing its discourse to sustain its dominance. This hegemonic discourse, however, was
countered by the discourse of transnational media, in the present case *Aljazeera*, which gave prominence to the voice of dissident groups; thus, challenging state hegemony.

As to the future of media landscape in Egypt, many accounts on the interrelation between political reform and media reform suggest that the former feeds the latter. That is, across-the-board media change and freedom of the press is only likely in democratic states. The history of previous social movements has shown that post-revolutionary states witness media reforms that do not last long. With the lack of crucial political change, such states settle back to their pre-revolutionary media situation, only with a different ideology. Therefore, genuine political change in Egypt is decisive in grassroots media reform.
CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSIONS

6.1 Overview

One of the main goals of CDA research is to expose how dominant groups use the language to maintain dominance and unequal relations of power (Fairclough & Wodak, 1997; van Dijk, 1996, 2001, 2006). Thus, the present research has aimed at investigating how issues of ideology, power, and hegemony were enacted and resisted in media discourse during Egypt’s 2011 Revolution.

*Al-Ahram* and *Aljazeera* are on different ends of the media spectrum in Egypt: on the one hand, *Al-Ahram* is the major official newspaper in Egypt with one of the highest circulations. An analysis of the paper’s coverage of the uprising gives insights into how official media portray events at times of crisis and how issues of power and dominance play out in their coverage. On the other hand, *Aljazeera* is one of the main transnational networks in the Arab world whose coverage is considered relatively independent of government influence and, hence, represents free media in the Arab world. To analyze these two outlets’ coverage was of significance in that it allowed for a contrast between controlled and independent media news reporting in the Arab world. In the following, I start by discussing the theoretical reflections of the present study on CDA. Following that, summarize the findings of the study, with reference to its research questions (see 1.5.), and point out directions for future research on media discourse analysis in the Arab world context. I first summarize the findings of how the protests, protesters, and the government were represented in the reporting of *Al-Ahram* and *Aljazeera*. Then, I highlight the main factors responsible for the contrast between official and semi-
independent media discourse, and their implications for the future of the media situation in Egypt. I conclude with the study limitations and implications for future research.

6.2 Theoretical Reflections

The present study utilized CDA and critical theories of ideology, discourse, and hegemony to explain media discourse during Egypt’s 2011 Revolution. It drew on Fairclough’s three-dimensional framework, which takes text as well as discursive and sociopolitical practices into account to explain discourse. By so doing, the analysis embodies a micro-textual level analysis and a macro-social structure analysis that critiques the surrounding immediate and sociopolitical context to understand discourse as it pertains to relations of social power.

It also drew on the concept of ideology in its critical sense as a system of ideas and beliefs that contribute to hegemony and unequal relations of power; it refers to commonsensical assumptions about relations of power that make them appear unchallenged and natural (Fairclough, 2001). Gramsci (1971) distinguishes between coercive power and consent as mechanisms of social power. Underscoring the role of discourse in establishing and sustaining relations of power, Foucault (1991) states that power is persuasive and diffused, rather than purely coercive. Based on these assumptions, the study sought to investigate how the media as an Ideological State Apparatus – in the sense of Althusser (1971) – contributes, through the representation of events and social actors, to producing and/or resisting hegemonic power.

Thus, the present study has attempted “to bring together linguistically-oriented discourse analysis and social and political thought relevant to discourse and language” (Fairclough, 1992: 92) to understand relations of power and dominance. The first three research questions dealt with textual and discursive practice analysis, the first two
dimensions of Fairclough’s approach. In my attempt to answer these questions, I examined text by shedding light on certain linguistic features such as lexicalization and predication, verbal process, and presupposition. I then examined discursive practice as they pertain to text production by analyzing intertextuality and topic selection. The last two research questions (i.e. 4 and 5), take the analysis a step forward by investigating the socio-political factors that help us understand discourse.

In his framework, Fairclough distinguishes between three levels of analysis: 1) description of the formal properties of text; 2) interpretation of the relationship between text and the discursive practice; and 3) explanation of the relationship between discourse and social and cultural reality. In addressing the fourth research question of the study, I attempted to examine the third dimension of Fairclough's approach as the first two were dealt with in the first three research questions. My aim was to explain discourse by resorting to the sociopolitical context to provide an analysis for the strategies used to 'normalize' discourse. Therefore, in Chapter 5, the insights from textual and discourse analysis undertaken in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 were investigated in relation to the wider society. That is, after addressing the ‘how?’ in my analysis, I turned to the ‘why?’: why did Al-Ahram and Aljazeera address the Egyptian Jan. 25 Revolution the way they did? What were the social and political aspects that help us understand discourse?

To answer these questions, I first presented reflections of journalists in Al-Ahram on their reporting of the protests, and how Al-Ahram was more of a mouthpiece for the government and the ruling party. I attempted to shed light on the nature of state-run media in Egypt and the conditions and constraints under which journalists work. Then, I
addressed the tough conditions under which Aljazeera reporters worked and the fact that they were threatened, abused, and arrested by security forces. Investigating the wider sociopolitical context and how it relates to discursive practice, I also discussed the relationship between the state and the religious institution in Egypt; Fatwas during the Revolution; the role of mosques in the (de)mobilization of people through the Ministry of Religious Endowments; the U.S. stance during the days of the protests and its implications to theories on revolution; and the Israeli stance and how the two outlets utilized the representation of Israel in the Arab context in their coverage.

One of the most important findings of the study which utilized the immediate situational context to understand discourse, was why certain features manifested themselves differently at a certain point in the uprising, and why were there two stages in each outlet's coverage. To address these points, I attempted to provide an explanation of the immediate context to reveal the underlying factors responsible for the change in the coverage; specifically, I addressed the role of two major events that changed the scene both nationally and internationally and were thought of as game changers: 1) the battle of the camel, and 2) the change of U.S. position.

Weiss and Wodak (2003: 7) argue that CDA can be thought of as "a theoretical synthesis of conceptual tools", and that principled eclecticism is seen as one of the strengths of CDA. In the present study, I found that utilizing van Dijk's approach – in particular his concept of the Ideological Square – along with Fairclough’s approach, which analyzes text, discursive practice, and sociocultural practice, gave further insights into how group polarization characteristics played out on both the textual and discursive practice level. In other words, features of van Dijk's Ideological Square were helpful in
expanding the discussion on textual and discursive practice analysis, and in addressing data from different perspectives. Moreover, the integration of CDA theories and critical theories, such as the Gramsci's theory of hegemony, Althusser's theory of ideology and Ideological State Apparatus, and Foucault's theory of power has allowed for a nuanced analysis of media discourse during Egypt's 2011 Revolution.

6.3 The Representation of the Protests and the Antagonists

One of the main goals of the study, as implied by its research questions, was to reveal how the two news outlets represented the protests and the antagonists during the eighteen days of the uprising. The significance of such investigation lies in the fact that through their representation of social events and social actors, the media represent and structure their own creation of reality and meaning. To examine these representations, news reports were approached both textually and discursively, utilizing five analytic tools, including lexicalization and predication, presupposition, verbal process, intertextuality, and topics, to reveal how the two outlets constructed their own meanings about the protests, the protesters, and the government to produce or reproduce their ideologies, and sustain or challenge relations of power and hegemony during the days of the uprising.

A polarized structure of ideologies was realized textually and discursively in Al-Ahram and Aljazeera's representation of the protesters, on the one hand, and the former Egyptian government, on the other hand. That is, the protesters represented the ingroup and the government the outgroup for Aljazeera, while the government represented the ingroup and the protesters the outgroup for Al-Ahram. That said, the two outlets showed a change in the strategy of reporting the event after Feb. 2, where some textual and discursive features became more salient or manifested themselves
differently. Other features, however, were persistent throughout the uprising. Feb. 2 marked a turning point in the uprising because of two sociopolitical developments that were game changers both nationally and internationally.

First, the U.S. backed off from its support of Mubarak by Jan. 30, and directly after Mubarak’s second speech on Feb. 1, President Obama urged President Mubarak in a phone call to consider a transition of power in Egypt and obey the demands of the people; this change in position put Mubarak’s regime in a weak position and changed the international community’s stance toward the events. Second, the regime lost the sympathy of many citizens who were skeptical of the uprising and opposing groups after the Battle of the Camel on Feb. 2. Many of those citizens lost their trust in the government and joined the protests after watching live coverage of men riding in on camels, attacking peaceful protesters with whips, swords, and knives. Thus, the representation of the protests, protesters, and the government in *Al-Ahram* and *Aljazeera*’s reporting can be divided chronologically into a pre-Feb. 2 phase and post-Feb. 2 phase.

### 6.3.1 The Representation of the Protests

In the pre-Feb. 2 phase, *Al-Ahram* and *Aljazeera* varied considerably in their representation of the protests on the textual and discursive practice levels. Textually, *Al-Ahram* portrayed the protests from the government’s point of view, labeling it as an act of violence and conspiracy against the country; it employed lexical items and predications such as destruction, chaos, violence, conspiracy, illegal gatherings, looting, robbery, arson, and others to describe the protests. *Aljazeera*, on its part, described the protests from the point of view of the protesters and dissident groups; it stressed that the protesters were practicing their right of freedom of expression after decades of
suppression under Mubarak’s rule, emphasizing the peacefulness of the protests. The network did not employ positive lexicalization or predication to refer to the protests, but differed from *Al-Ahram* in that it did not use negative lexicalization and predication. Although it reported criminal assaults during the uprising, it separated those from the protests, unlike *Al-Ahram*, which framed the protests as acts of violence in and of themselves.

On the discursive practice level, the analysis of topic selection has shown that *Al-Ahram* excluded articles that represented the government negatively in dealing with the events, such as Internet blackout, the cut off of *Aljazeera* transmission, and, most importantly, the Battle of the Camel. The news reports on the protests emphasized violence and marginalized the demands of the people; they avoided describing the event as a massive social movement and downplayed its political significance. On the other hand, *Aljazeera* included all stories that were excluded in *Al-Ahram*’s coverage, and focused on the massiveness of the protests in Egypt and solidarity protests across the world; it also emphasized the people’s main demand: the ouster of the regime.

### 6.3.2 The Representation of the Protesters

As to the representation of the protesters and dissident groups in the two outlets’ reporting during the pre-Feb. 2 phase, *Al-Ahram* utilized predications such as *the banned* and *illegal* to describe dissident groups, and used terms such as *elements*, compared to *activists*, to refer to members of the MB. Members and leaders of opposition groups were excluded in *Al-Ahram*’s reporting, and the negative term *baltagiyya* was used to refer to the protesters. *Al-Ahram* also employed negative presuppositions about the protesters in the authorial voice in the outset of the protests.
The analysis of verbal processes did not yield any findings at this phase because the protesters and leaders of opposition groups were not given voice in the first place.

*Aljazeera*, however, employed textual strategies that were different from *Al-Ahram*. First, negative terms such as *baltagiyya* were not used to refer to the protesters, and when reporting on government sources who described the protesters as *baltagiyya*, the network distanced itself from such claims by using strategic quotes or expressions such as *the so-called*. It also used all types of verbal processes - negative, neutral, and positive – in reporting members of dissident groups, such the April 6 Movement, the National Commission for Change, and the MB. As to naming, the network recognized all opposition leaders in its coverage by referring to them by proper name and position, a feature that was not present in *Al-Ahram’s* reporting.

On the discursive practice level, the two outlets also showed variation in their representation of the protesters during this phase. Intertextuality analysis revealed that *Al-Ahram* totally excluded the opposition; the sources reported represented only one side of the conflict, the government. The paper also marginalized neutral sources, such as human rights organizations, news agencies, and eyewitnesses. *Aljazeera*, however, intensively reported dissident groups with no exception, and did not tend to emphasize a particular opposition group over other groups. It also reported human rights organizations that condemned the government’s violence in dealing with the situation and eyewitnesses who reported actions and practices that represented the protesters positively and/or the government negatively.

### 6.3.3 The Representation of the Egyptian Government

*Al-Ahram* used the term *martyr* and its derivatives to refer to casualties on the government side, particularly in the first days of the uprising. It also used proper name,
position, and sometimes honorifics to refer to government officials. As to verbal processes, the paper employed positive and neutral verbal processes when reporting the government side, which was in fact the only side reported during this phase. On the discursive practice level, *Al-Ahram* reported articles that represented the President, government officials, and members of the NDP positively. Specifically, these articles emphasized Mubarak’s sacrifice for the country and his determination to secure the people’s demands of democracy and reform. The paper also emphasized the position of the official religious institution and the reactions of world leaders and senior officials who were supportive of Mubarak.

*Aljazeera* contrasted with *Al-Ahram* in some features on both the textual and discursive practice levels regarding its representation of the government during the days of the uprising. To start with, the network employed presuppositions to present the government negatively; these presuppositions, however, were not in the authorial voice, but through reporting other sides. As to naming and verbal process, *Aljazeera* did not contrast considerably with *Al-Ahram* as it referred to government officials by proper name and position and employed all types of verbal process when reporting those officials. However, it differed from *Al-Ahram* in this regard in that it did not marginalize the other side of the conflict.

With regards to sourcing, *Aljazeera* reported on members of the Egyptian government, even if that was through other news agencies or media sources. Yet, it reported from the first days of the uprising stories about the security forces’ violations in dealing with the protests and the corruption of senior officials in Mubarak’s government. It also highlighted *fatwas* of the non-official religious institution that encouraged
protesting against the regime, and intensively reported the world reactions that called upon Mubarak to consider a transition of power. Moreover, the network emphasized the Israeli incitement against the Revolution and its support of Mubarak.

Due to the mutually constitutive relationship between discourse and society (Blommaert, 2005), a number of features manifested themselves differently in the two outlets’ reporting after Feb. 2. The change in the US position that was supportive of Mubarak and the Battle of the Camel rendered different discourses in the last ten days of the uprising. On the whole, Al-Ahram began to recognize the protesters and their demands, and ceased representing the protesters as thugs and criminals and the protests as a conspiracy. As more citizens started to sympathize with the protesters by Feb. 2 in the aftermath of the events on Tahrir Square, the old narrative that portrayed the protesters as baltagiyya and the protests as acts of violence was no longer credible to the audience. Therefore, Al-Ahram shifted from representing the protests and protesters negatively to emphasizing counter-protests that were demanding an end to the protests and supporting Mubarak’s regime. Also, a comparison between Al-Ahram’s reporting pre- and post- Feb. 2 reveals that textual features such as negative lexicalization and negative presuppositions about the protesters were more salient in the pre-Feb. 2 phase. After that date, on the discursive practice level, the paper started reporting on opposition sources, and gradually reporting stories that were critical of the government.

Aljazeera represented the opposite and was more explicit about its stance towards the event in the post-Feb. 2 phase. For example, it began to employ negative presupposition about the government in the authorial voice rather than through reporting
other voices. It also totally excluded the government voice from its coverage and emphasized voices representing the protesters and opposition leaders. As far as news selection, Aljazeera intensified its reporting of the U.S. position which placed pressure on Mubarak’s government.

The stepping down of President Mubarak also marked another, somewhat expected, shift, particularly in Al-Ahram’s reporting. The paper redefined members of the ingroup and members of the outgroup by praising the Revolution and the protesters and strongly criticizing the old regime. In terms of lexicalization, Al-Ahram employed the term martyr and its derivatives to refer, for the first time, to the protesters and used positive predications to describe the Revolution. Likewise, the term baltagiyya, which was utilized during the days of the protests to refer to protesters, was used to refer to thugs hired by the regime to terrorize protesters and attempt to deter them. It also reported news articles on the corruption of members of the regime, including the President, and members of the NDP.

6.4 Competing Discourses at Times of Crisis

Al-Ahram and Aljazeera embraced different ideologies during the Egyptian uprising, identifying themselves with different sides of the conflict. Their coverage of the historic event revealed a polarized representation of ingroup members and outgroup members with varying degrees of explicitness. As an official media outlet, Al-Ahram was more of a mouthpiece of the Egyptian regime, while Aljazeera was more of a platform for the protesters. The coverage of Al-Ahram and Aljazeera of the Egyptian Revolution is an example of competing discourses at times of conflict; they reveal the struggle between media antagonists to present different ideologies and establish affiliations with different groups.
Al-Ahram represented the hegemonic discourse, which before the information revolution in the past few decades had gone unchallenged, commonsensical, and taken for granted with the lack of a competing discourse. This type of discourse, which is part of the Ideological State Apparatus, is utilized by authoritarian regimes to sustain power and dominance in their societies. During Mubarak’s reign, the regime controlled media production and censored content by appointing editors, controlling subsidies, revoking newspapers licenses, and prosecuting journalists. However, with the proliferation of transnational media, another type of discourse came into being, creating a challenge to the old hegemonic discourse that was dominant in the media scene. Aljazeera represents this type of counter discourse in the Arab Middle East.

The present study has shown that in their representation of the uprising, the protesters, and the Egyptian government, Al-Ahram and Aljazeera appealed to their audiences in different ways to win their consent. They presented different narratives and framed the event from different perspectives to serve ideological purposes. As an official media outlet, Al-Ahram chose to back the government, but made an abrupt turn as Mubarak stepped down; thus, its credibility, as well as the credibility of state-run media as a whole, is at question, and will be viewed as a propaganda device for the ruling elite (Hamdy and Gomaa, 2012), unless genuine change to the Egyptian media landscape takes place. Aljazeera, in contrast, represented the voice of the protesters during the uprising as part of its endeavor to advocate democracy in the Arab world and serve as a de facto pan-Arab opposition (Zayani, 2005).

Due to this ideological contrast, the two outlets also utilized sociopolitical aspects differently in their reporting of the Revolution. For example, in a country where religion
plays an important role in social life, each outlet sought to win the ideological contest by reporting different religious stands and views, both Islamic and Christian, on the events. *Al-Ahram* emphasized the stance of the Islamic official religious institutions, Al-Azhar and the Ministry of Endowments, which condemned the protests. It also reported the position of the Church, which was supportive of Mubarak. *Aljazeera*, however, attempted to present a counter religious take by reporting the non-official religious institution stance which hailed the protests.

Among the reforms the Egyptian people were demanding after the ouster of the old regime was media reform. However, expecting a grass-root transition in Egypt’s media landscape at this point in time is too optimistic, as it will all depend on how far the country goes in terms of political change and transition to democracy. Although political changes have taken place since the Revolution, the political process is still opaque and confronted with many challenges in the near and far future, and until genuine, consistent steps toward democracy and freedoms are undertaken. It is difficult to speculate about genuine change. Other experiences, like the Iranian experience, have shown that when autocratic regimes replace other autocratic regimes, the result is falling back to the old practices of suppression and hegemony, only with a change in ideology.

### 6.5 Study Limitations and Implications for Future Research

The analysis and findings of the present research are limited by three factors. First, it investigated the representation of the Egyptian 2011 uprising and the antagonists by two media institutions, *Al-Ahram* and *Aljazeera*, which represent official and semi-independent media outlets in the Egyptian and Arab context. Therefore, the conclusions cannot be extended to other official or semi-independent media outlets in
Egypt and the Arab world. Secondly, the study investigated the two outlet’s online reporting of the uprising. Thus, the findings do not necessarily reflect *Al-Ahram*'s newspaper or *Aljazeera*'s televised coverage of the same event. Finally, the findings are limited by time as the analyzed data focused on the period between Jan. 25, 2010 and Feb. 15, 2011, which witnessed Egypt 2011 uprising; they are not generalizable to other events taking place in Egypt before or after this event.

The present research opens horizons for future CDA research on the media coverage of revolutions. In the context of the Egyptian Revolution, future research might study how other official or independent Egyptian media institutions portrayed the uprising and compare those to *Al-Ahram*'s portrayal. Other studies may also investigate how other Arab transnational media outlets, such as *Al Arabiya* and *Alhurra*, compared and contrasted with *Aljazeera* in their reporting of the uprising. Such studies would give a full picture of how the Egyptian uprising was reported.

The Arab Spring Revolutions are critical and historic events in the Arab world where the media played a significant role. Therefore, a critical analysis of media coverage is crucial both for the documentation of this period and for gaining deeper insights into the outlook of the media situation in different Arab countries. Future research may, thus, investigate the official and semi-independent media coverage of other Arab Spring Revolutions, including the Tunisian, Libyan, Yemeni, Bahraini, and Syrian Revolutions, to depict patterns and/or contrasts in the reporting of different revolutions in the Arab world.
وكر حصار الأزهر، بالظاهرة السليمة.

وأضاف المصري أن الأمور الأذنت بأملا من إبطال تحرك هذه 항상نا في
فجر يوم 26 يناير في محاولة للسيطرة على موقف كان في باغ الهوية بجد أن
استمرت الجماعة التي تقدم走去 توجها مسألة لانقطاعه القوسي
والخروج عن الدعوة في سبيل دعوة الهدى على الخروج في
تظاهرات حاشدة ضد صادرة الجماعة واستمداد مطالبة الشبان والقتل على الشارع في
تحقيق أهداف أخرى بعد كل البعد عن أي إصلاح سياسي أو اجتماعي أو
الاقتصادي وصاحب تلك الدعوات بعض العلماء والإعلاميين من قراءة ضرورية
مثل الجزيرة والروي والحوار والذي لم يذهب من وراء تلك التظاهرات سوي التحقيق
على إذاعة الفوضى والنظام والأحداث. في الوقت الذي قامت فيه أجهزة الأمن
بالقبض على 35 من كادر الجماعة المحرطة والمؤمنين بكل ركنين من
التحريك وأعادت، إلا أن ذلك لم يؤثر على عملية التحريك يوم الجماعة المادي.

وعندما في الروابط صورا تظهر التظاهرات إلى حدود من مثير الشغب
والتض (((((((((أجراء الجماعة التي راحت تسمى وتحيى أفراد DOT لخير الدعوة والإنتباه
على ما بها من تلالة، وتعزيز الحبوض، ورفع السرقات، ومنتباً
المجموعات في أعمال السلب والنخبة النفاقه، وتبني، وجمال التجارب، وتهيأت
الомуة على محاولة كفة أحمد دي في مؤامرة للمشغول، ودأبت أفراد DOT قسم الشرطة ونتباه
علي الأشياء والمستجاب، ودعي لتعزز الداعي الشامي من نظام الحركة بالدماني
الذي أشعلت البغت فيها

وفك المصر المستنث أن هدف الجماعة، وهدمتها كان إذاعة الفوضى ونهب
النظام العام، وامتنع وسيلة المحتل.

والأهم هو أن يصوح المتظاهرين في أمن على نفسه في الشارع لما
هدنها من شرارة أشد بكثير، وينتشر، وتزوغ المحتل.

فقد قناع الروابط، ورجعت بعد تعرضه لقمعه الإداري. لم تزعم هذه القوات على يددها
والمحتجين من شباب لييس بوروك، والجماعات السياسية، وذلك عندما تحتفل
السراوات السلمية إلى أي حد في حسب موته، بالجماعة الإمبراطورية استعادت
الرشاعة الصناعية أداها والمراكز. ونلاحظ شارع المتظاهرين وجد تميز من
المجتمعين المحررين لرجلين للدفاع الحاد، وقائمة على سيارات الشرطة،
وإن كان هذه الأحداث الإدارية لأقل من الشروط، ولكن
كأنها وضعت على الجماعة قمة تقرير موطن من إطالة الحركة بالدماني
والنظام الإداري.

بدأ صباح الجماعة المحتشة بظهور مجموعات الشرطة المصرية في جميع مناطق
المؤامرة، وقبل بدء صوت الجموع ورست الأجهزة الأمنية وقائمة السراوات
وابتداء حارات أعدادهم كبيرة. كانت تجاهد وكثيرة من سبيط نحو 300 عصر من
وامنتها على الطريق حتى来的 المحتشة، التي جرت بعد إغلاق المعامل مجددا من
المحتشين لا تتجاوز السنة حتى ظهروا نجوما جماعة الإخوان الناجحة واتهمت
دعم المتظاهرين في بداية الأمور ليس بال قيد أو مجموعات بهذه
نجر قريرا نحو 10 آلاف متظاهر، لأنها عناصر الإخوان من داعية يوسف
عندما يتم قطع شرارة عباس العقاد حتى نقطة عصارة العدو محاولة التحام
منطقة القصر الرئيسي، وعندما تحدث العينة الجلدية، يتم تغييره، وتستقبله إعادة الأدبيات من مناطق
العربية، وتوجه إلى جزء من مصر القديمة.
وعندما تنطلق líمودعة مداخل القصر، يتم تجاوز إعادة السياح، وهو من عناصرها، التي تشكل الساحة الثانية
والنصف هذهها في حد الأدبيات. واستخدمت العناصر النسبية والأطفال لازدياد
قوات الساحة في استخدام العقد المحدود.

لحظة الاستهداف الأولي

أدت تراقب الساحة إلى الثالثة عشرة لتحديد عناصر الإخوان في
المظاهرات بشكل كامل، والبدء في استخدام العقد بالأنشطة الحضارية والجولات
الحافرة. ونتجت بعد من عناصرها، لتشهد سياق الأمني الرئيسي والسياسي
الذي لاقى زجادات الموتى في داخله والاستيلاء عليها في حالة عدم
إبحارها.

كما تمت عناصر الإخوان قيادة سيارات الشرطة لتفعيل دورات الأمن الرئيسي
والسياسي، وانخفضت عنوانيات حظر السير في نفس الوقت الذي قامت خلاله
عناصر أخرى بقيادة المظاهرات إلى أمام الشارع وولوج الموتى المتشترين
بقيان، مع أن الأساليب تسبق الأحداث. وانتهت الجولات الحافرة على أمام الشارع وانتهى حضور
القناة السجية التي بداخلها والتي لا تتجاوز عدة ضباط ودارد نظرا لانشغال
بأعمال الضبط فيمشاركة في عدد المظاهرات بالشوارع والميادين الرئيسية.

وكلت جماعة الإخوان عن قباعتها في استقبالها على الأسلحة من داخل
الأعمال. وتم قطع الحجوز لتحرير عناصر الإخوان من الحوزات، وتمت تلك العناصر إحرار
الأعمال لتحرير الشارع عن المناطق العميقة في ميدان المنطقة حيالها الموتى
من وراء القناة والحصار رصتل النهب التي استمرت إلى ساعات العصر
المليح والقاسية بالكامل.

كما تمت عناصر الجماعة، وأكادها إحرار القنوات المرورية، ووجدت الحماية المدنية
وال网站地图 الإطارات. حتى تمكنوا في اليوم الأول من الحزين. (جمعة الغضب) من خروج
قد يمر و20 نقطة مرورية وإطارات. وأنّ على باني الأقدام صعب أم وقل
الرجوع قابض جزء من الساحة الربيعية.

واستخدمت عناصر الإخوانashles جديدة، الساحة الربيعية التي تم إحرارها من الأدبيات في
محورته عصارة ومباشريهم من المحاور والخريج المختلفة.

وكانت للكازا الجوية من بدء وكاحل المظاهرات على استناده، العناصر الحكازة
لمظاهرات والتي متصلة على الخطوط اسماً في تلقي كر
قادت المظاهرات وأخذت سلسلة الوقاية السبب لها حتى لا تثور عليها.

عناصر الإخوان وأخذت المظاهرات

وعند في كارثة من منشآت الهشسير، ونفذت من مواقع المظاهرات والتحية إلى
المنت辆 السماح بما في ذلك مسلحي النجمة والشريعة والجماعة، وعدد من
المشتقات الأخرى. وعند وصول عدد المظاهرات إلى ميدان التحرير فتحت
عناصر الإخوان إشعارات الكتيبة وأخذت القضاء على المشاكل المشتركية حتى
يمكن التعقيم من استخدام هذا الثكنة في الاستدامة على المستحقات العامة.
Figure A-1. An article on Jan. 30, 2011
لا يوجد نص يمكن قراءته بشكل طبيعي من الصورة المقدمة.
Figure A-2. An article on Feb. 8, 2011
لا إخوان ولا أحزاب توزع ثورة شباب

يرى الشهيد أحمد أسمر في ميدان التحرير على الأعوان السابقة،

فبالمستقبل الخمسة.

لقد ثبتت آلاف من المتظاهرين على ميدان التحرير للتضامن مع المتظاهرين بالمدينة. تم توقيعهم منذ اليوم الأول لإدلاة الثورة، وربما أسبق استهداف المظاهرة المتزامنة هو

الشجاعه بعد يوما يوما واحدا تميز الامان بعد مرو اسمه 17 يوما على الاعتصام. ولم

لتتطلب المتظاهرين من اليوم الأول، بل ارتغبوا قوة ودينارا على استقلال النظام،

وتحكي الرئيس حسني مبارك،

ويعد المتظاهرين البالات شعاراً بكلمة. وجمعوا الشعارات المتعددة بالخطاب بأكمله

وزارت الحكومة الجديدة، وأعضاء الحزب الوطني،

وأما زاد من قوة المظاهرات إذ إدلاة الثورة على تقصيات 25 ألف معلوم يتفوقون

على الامان. في الوقت نفسه أطلقت الأذاعة عن تخصصات 5 آلاف معلوم أمام خسر

وقد استشهدوه أنه لا يوجد الثناء في جهة أو أنسان يتحدى بأسم الامان.

ولكنهم يتحدى بهم في أupertino، وأن لجنة التظيف الموجودة بالمدينة لا

تتم إلى جريدة أو جماعة. إنما هو مجموعة من الشباب يتضمن كل الطلاب

والشعراء.

وأخذت الجهات عدة الإشادة لأي قوية سياسية. ولن شباب 25 يناير يسعون

추적 포음

استخدموا أطرافهم أو ركوب أي فريق وردوا: لا إخوان، لا أحزاب. طرحتن ثورة

شام.

وأتلت إحدى الملاحظات من خلال الإشارة أن الامان تمكن من محاصرة

قصر عدنان وأس ويلوم، وأتلت محتملة باسم المظاهرات أن يتصدون مع

الشام في الميدان. وللذين يوجد التنافس مباشرين في رحل مبارك.

وقد تم تكذيب التفاصيل.
Figure A-3. An article on Feb. 11, 2011
APPENDIX B
ARTICLES FROM ALJAZEERA

The page contains articles from Al Jazeera, discussing various topics including the "global food crisis." The text is in Arabic, discussing economic and environmental issues related to food production and distribution.

The first article mentions the "global food crisis" and its impacts on different regions. It highlights the importance of sustainable agriculture and the need for international cooperation to address the crisis.

The second article focuses on the challenges faced by farmers in the Middle East due to climate change and the need for innovative solutions to ensure food security.

The third article discusses the role of technology in addressing the food crisis, emphasizing the need for investment in research and development to improve crop yields and reduce food waste.

The fourth article examines the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the global food system, highlighting the need for a resilient food supply chain to prevent future disruptions.

Overall, the articles emphasize the urgent need for action to address the global food crisis, with a focus on sustainability, innovation, and international cooperation.
Figure B-1. An article on Jan. 30, 2011
Figure B-2. An article on Feb. 9, 2011
مبارك يبتكروجان بالمغاربة

قلت عمر موسرة، نائب الرئيس المصري، إن الرئيس جمال عبد الناصر كان يفضل المكسيك بفضل الحكمة والعملية في الأفريقيا. ووفق للمصادر، فإن هذا الإفصاح جاء في هذه الظروف المشتركة التي تشهدها المنطقة.

ويقال أيضاً أن موسرة قالت بخصوص معيد ضمن القرن المصور، إن الأشياء التي تحدثت عنها في المقالة تتعلق بالحول والمغرب.

وفقاً للسلطات المحلية، فإن موسرة يتحدث عن أهمية العمل في المنطقة، وتعتبر هذه الحركة انتصارًا في تطورها.

وكتبت في المقالة أن موسرة يتحدث عن أهمية العمل في المنطقة، وتعتبر هذه الحركة انتصارًا في تطورها.
Figure B-3. An article on Feb. 11, 2011
LIST OF REFERENCES


Wikileaks/Twitter (Wikileaks). "Yes, we may have helped Tunisia, Egypt. But let us not forget the elephant in the room: Al Jazeera + sat dishes," January 29, 2011, Tweet.


BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Majid Alhumaidi is a linguist at the College of Languages and Translation, King Saud University, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. He earned his Bachelor of Translation Sciences from King Saud University in 2001. He received his Masters of Educational Linguistics from King Saud University in 2008. In 2010 he joined the Department of Linguistics at the University of Florida and earned his doctoral degree in Philosophy in the fall 2013. Alhumaidi’s dissertation, *A Critical Discourse Analysis of Al-Ahram and Aljazeera’s online coverage of Egypt’s 2011 Revolution*, was supervised by Dr. Diana Boxer. His research interests are focused on Critical Discourse Analysis and educational linguistics.