INTERETHNIC RELATIONS AND SETTLEMENT ON THE SPANISH FLORIDA FRONTIER, 1668-1763

By

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A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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To my husband Jason
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<tr>
<td>AGI</td>
<td>Archivo General de Indias, or Archive of the Indies</td>
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<td>CPR</td>
<td>Catholic Parish Records, Photostats held at St. Augustine Historical Society Research Library</td>
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<td>NC</td>
<td>North Carolina Historical Commission</td>
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<td>PKYL</td>
<td>P.K. Yonge Library, Gainesville, Florida</td>
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<td>St. Augustine Historical Society Research Library</td>
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Abstract of Dissertation Presented to the Graduate School of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

INTERETHNIC RELATIONS AND SETTLEMENT ON THE SPANISH FLORIDA FRONTIER, 1668-1763

By
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Chair: Ida Altman
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In the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, Florida was one of many embattled provinces on the frontiers of the Spanish empire. At its peak, Florida was adjacent to French, English, and other Spanish colonies as well as the Native American Creek Confederacy. This dissertation argues that rather than the margins, Florida was the crossroads of empires, where imperial social and racial ideologies collided. It examines Spanish attempts to settle the frontier in Florida and the influence of this policy on the populations of indigenous, African, European, and mixed racial descent. This study connects imperial policymakers to the lived experiences of the men and women who held the frontier in the name of the King of Spain.

Like other Spanish territories in the Caribbean basin, Florida was not well populated with Spanish colonists. This made the region vulnerable to temporary and permanent occupations by other European powers. Despite the variety of legal attitudes and precedents for claiming sovereignty over a territory, effective settlement of the region was the only truly compelling case for claiming ownership of land. Although Florida remained under-populated, its strategic significance demanded that the Spanish prevent it from falling into foreign hands. To compensate for the lack of Spanish settlers, Spanish officials attempted to incorporate others,
including Native Americans, Africans, and other Europeans, into their strategic designs for the settlement and defense of the province. This need created limited opportunities for these otherwise marginal groups to assert themselves in the Spanish sphere. The willingness of Spanish officials in Florida to adapt to the demands of the frontier shaped race relations between the various sectors of Spanish society. People of Native American, African, and European descent learned the rights and privileges that settlers and vassals of the King of Spain might demand. Those concepts became central to the language individuals and groups utilized to establish their place in colonial society.
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Florida was one of many embattled provinces on the frontiers of the Spanish empire. It was first settled by Pedro Menéndez de Avilés in 1565 with a combined force of soldiers and settlers. News of Fort Caroline, a French settlement at the mouth of the St. John’s River, motivated King Philip II of Spain to help finance and outfit the venture. Menéndez’s first task was to destroy the French settlement.\(^1\) Afterward he could begin building a colony. He planned to colonize the region from the southern tip of the Florida peninsula north to the Chesapeake Bay through a string of outposts and missions. Then he could carve out a marquisate for himself in the interior of the continent. Unfortunately, Menéndez spent most of his time trying to keep his fledgling settlements alive. By the end of the sixteenth century St. Augustine was the only town with Spanish settlers. It served as an anchor for a chain of Franciscan missions along the Atlantic coast.\(^2\)

Nevertheless, Spaniards thought of the region as the continent of La Florida well into the eighteenth century, despite the settlement of colonies by the English and the French on the eastern seaboard of North America.\(^3\) Juan Ponce de León, the individual often credited with

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\(^1\) Menéndez was born in Avilés in 1519 to a hidalgo family. Hidalgo comes from the phrase “hijo de algo,” or “son of something”. This implied some degree of nobility, honor, and purity of bloodline. He made his early career as a privateer pursuing French corsairs who prowled Spanish waters in times of peace. After a failed French attempt in Florida in 1562, King Philip II commissioned a report from Menéndez. The report proved persuasive and Menéndez used his experience in the region to win the title of Captain-General of Florida with four ships under his command. Eugene Lyon, *The Enterprise of Florida: Pedro Menéndez de Avilés and the Spanish Conquest of 1565-1568* (Gainesville: University Presses of Florida, 1974), 8-15, 41-2.


\(^3\) When Ponce de León and subsequent explorers claimed Florida for the King of Spain, the Spanish thought of the claim in the most expansive of terms based on the 1494 Treaty of Tordesillas. The treaty granted the Spanish hemispheric rights to colonize and Christianize the land. Despite numerous settlements, the Spanish continued to refer to the eastern seaboard of the continent as it had been designated on sixteenth and seventeenth century maps: *La Florida*. Andrés Gonzales de Barcía Carballido y Zuñiga, *Chronological History of the Continent of Florida*, trans. Anthony Kerrigan (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1951), 264; Antonio de Arredondo, *Arredondo’s Historical Proof of Spain’s Title to Georgia*, edited by Herbert Bolton (Berkeley: University of California Press,
“discovering” Florida received a grant to claim and colonize the peninsula known today as Florida. Grants for other parts of the region were given to successive would-be conquistadors such as Lucas Vazquez de Ayllón and Hernando de Soto. These grants came with time limits and they expired, one after the other, since no one managed to establish a successful settlement until the expedition of Pedro Menéndez de Aviles in 1565. Menéndez’s grant for Florida was actually a combination of all the previous, expired grants, giving him claim to a vast swath of the North American continent. Like other Spanish territories in the Caribbean basin, the region was not well populated with Spanish colonists. This made it vulnerable to temporary and permanent occupations by other European powers. Despite the variety of legal attitudes and precedents for claiming sovereignty over a territory, effective settlement of the region was the only truly compelling case for claiming ownership of land, and even then, settlements could be uprooted. The Spanish term for this concept was población, meaning the population of the land. It had deep roots in the Reconquista, but took on new meaning in the colonization projects of Spanish America.⁴

Florida remained under-populated, but its strategic significance demanded that the Spanish prevent it from falling into foreign hands. To compensate for the lack of Spanish settlers, Spanish officials attempted to incorporate others, including Indians, Africans, and other Europeans, into their strategic designs for the settlement and defense of the province. This created limited opportunities for these otherwise marginal groups to assert themselves in the

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⁴ Lyle McAlister, Spain and Portugal in the New World 1492-1700 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), 108-9. The Reconquista was the lengthy effort of Iberian Christians to retake the Iberian Peninsula from the Moors. Its impact is discussed further below.
Spanish sphere. The policy of población in Spanish Florida shaped race relations between the various sectors of Spanish society. It became part of the conceptual language individuals and groups utilized to articulate their place in colonial society. This dissertation examines the policy of población, the factors that contributed to its particular construction in Florida, and the influence of this policy on the populations of Indian, African, and mixed racial descent in Florida. This approach connects imperial policymakers to the lived experiences of the men and women who held the frontier in the name of the King of Spain.

**Población**

Población provides a useful framework for this study for several reasons. First, it connects Florida to the events of the rest of the Spanish empire by focusing on the topic which preoccupied royal officials most: retaking control of the Florida provinces. The policy of población was utilized with varying degrees of success on numerous frontiers throughout Spanish America. This approach provides a consistent perspective from which to examine the attitudes of royal officials toward people of African and indigenous ancestry. It also provides an opportunity to study the interactions between Spaniards, Indians, and people of African descent. Examining población also incorporates the two most dominant institutions in Florida, the church and the military, into the study without allowing either to dominate the narrative. Furthermore, it is well-suited to the surviving source material, which is composed primarily of correspondence between the governor, the royal officials, and representatives of the Council of the Indies, the primary governing body of the empire. Finally, it offers a potentially useful framework for future comparative studies.

From the perspective of Latin American history, colonization in Florida proceeded according to traditional formulas, legacies of the recently completed *Reconquista*, or reconquest. The Reconquista was the lengthy effort of Iberian Christians to retake control of the Iberian
Peninsula from the Moors. It became a prolonged crusade that entailed the distribution of land, vassals, and wealth as more and more territory was reclaimed. A consequence of this system was the imperative to settle and populate the newly acquired lands to defend them. New opportunities in these lands led Christian Iberians to migrate southward and engage in repoblación, or the repopulation of Iberia. As the Spanish turned to colonize the Americas, the term was shortened to población. Settlers were called pobladores. The term, however, meant more than just the population of the land. It implied the establishment a Christian polity where individuals were organized by rank and status and engaged in agriculture and commerce. According to one historian, población “ennobled” the land. In the Americas, the crown sought to incorporate the indigenous population into this vision as well. If they could be brought to live according to Hispanic customs and religion, they too would be vassals and pobladores.

Attempts to colonize Florida began in 1513 when the former governor of Puerto Rico, Juan Ponce de León, arrived on the coast and claimed the land for Spain. Ponce de León failed to establish a successful colony, and those who followed in his footsteps, were equally unsuccessful. Florida confounded nearly half a century of would-be conquistadors. Spanish interest in the peninsula itself might have faded, had it not been so vital to the security of Spanish shipping, particularly the galleons loaded with silver from the more profitable colonies in New Spain and Peru. Florida’s long coast ran parallel to the Gulf Stream, the essential sea route for Spanish ships returning to Europe. The dangerous passage around the Florida Keys regularly stranded shipwrecked sailors on the unfriendly Florida coast. More importantly, contraband trade

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6 McAlister, Spain and Portugal, 4-5, 108-9.
and piracy by other European powers were a frequent problem in the Caribbean and pirates could take advantage of the long Florida coastline dotted with barrier islands to the west and the Bahama Islands to the east. From a strategic perspective, Florida may have been unappealing, but it was necessary to the security of more lucrative parts of the empire.\(^8\) Despite early attempts by Menéndez to create a self-sustaining settlement, there was little to entice settlers to the province compared with other parts of the Americas. The province did not yield any easily exploitable resources, and until the mid-seventeenth century, royal officials were generally unwilling to permit the enslavement of the Indians or the alienation of indigenous lands for the benefit of private individuals.\(^9\)

Florida remained a sparsely populated frontier in the seventeenth century, much like other parts of the Spanish circum-Caribbean. There, the legal, political, and military definitions of possession continued to matter. A brief discussion of the competing concepts of sovereignty in the sixteenth century is necessary, since differing models of possession underpinned nearly a century of struggle between the Spanish and the English for dominion in the region. The events of 1668-1670 marked the escalation of territorial conflict, but the competition had begun much earlier. Patricia Seed argues that the Europeans who colonized the Americas had different,

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\(^8\) Lyon, *Enterprise of Florida*, 60-2. For the seventeenth century, a critical mass of correspondence mentioning the Bahama Channel can be found in the reports related to the 1668 pirate attack and the founding of Charleston. Discussion appears in letters from the governor as well as reports produced in Sevilla and Madrid. Junta de Guerra de Indias (War Council of the Indies), January 22, 1669, Stetson Collection, microfilm held at the P.K. Yonge Library, Gainesville, Florida (SC), 58-2-2/11; Junta de Guerra, March 8, 1669, SC 58-2-2/12; Governor Francisco de la Guerra to the King, January 27, 1670, SC 58-2-2/17; Gabriel Bernardo de Quiros to Casa de Contratación, May 6, 1670, SC 41-5-34/9; Governor Cendoya to Queen Regent, November 6, 1671, SC 58-1-26; Francisco Dávila Orejón to Francisco Fernández de Madrigal, January 3, 1672, SC 58-2-5; A later deposition taken in 1726 cited the Bahama Channel as an important reason for early settlement in St. Augustine, September 16, 1726, Archivo General de Indias (AGI), Santo Domingo (SD) 844.

\(^9\) The earliest land grants may have to the family of former governor Luis de Horruytiner (1633-38). Most, however, were given by Governor Pablo de Hita Salazar in an attempt to develop agriculture and create a self-sustaining countryside. He was able to do so in large part because disease, raids, and political upheavals had caused a steep decline in the indigenous population in the interior, leaving more lands unoccupied. Amy Bushnell, “The Menéndez Marquez Cattle Barony at La Chua and the Determinants of Economic Expansion in Seventeenth-Century Florida,” *Florida Historical Quarterly* 56 (1978): 417, 421-2, 426-8.
conflicting ideas about what it meant to possess land. The Spanish frequently cited the 1493 Bull Inter caetera and the 1494 Treaty of Tordesillas, brokered by Pope Alexander VI. The 1494 treaty divided claims to newly discovered lands between Spain and Portugal to the exclusion of other European powers. Other monarchs, however, rejected this division of territory, particularly as the Spanish territories began to yield extravagant wealth. Queen Elizabeth I of England (1558-1603) maintained that a declaration or a decree was not sufficient to constitute a title to land. Thus, English settlements on unoccupied Spanish land did not constitute any transgression. In his history of French colonization in the early Caribbean, Philip Boucher recalls the popular anecdote that when presented with the Iberian claims to the Americas, King of France François I (1516-47) asked to see the will left by Adam which granted all of the Americas to the Iberians. Boucher goes on to note that the French king “insisted that legitimate claims to areas overseas depended on de facto occupation, not grandiose papal grants.” If the first sentiment is the more famous, the second is the more telling. Discovery and notarized testimonies of formal acts of possession were important, yet insufficient. To be truly effective, claims to land had to be exercised.

All the major European powers that came to struggle for control of the southeastern region of North America recognized that the single most effective claim to the land was to occupy and alter it with man-made elements such as towns, fortifications, farms, or missions. This principle had deep roots for many of the emerging European colonial powers. Roman law

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10 Patricia Seed, Ceremonies of Possession in Europe’s Conquest of the New World, 1492-1640 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 10-11. Although the English presence in the Caribbean in the mid and late sixteenth century was based on maritime activities, rather than settlement, the privateer Sir Francis Drake worked to weaken or destroy Spanish settlements. The French were actively seeking to strengthen their position through garrisons and other fortified positions.

provided a foundation for this interpretation through the concept of *res nullis*. Briefly put, *res nullis* argued that “…all ‘empty things,’ which included unoccupied lands, remained the property of all mankind until they were put to some, generally agricultural, use.” Anthony Pagden argues that European empires felt compelled to legitimize their acts of appropriation in the New World, particularly when “obvious spoliation had taken place.” He also notes that these acts of rationalization were directed primarily at other European audiences rather than indigenous populations. The Spanish presented another type of rationalization to native populations in the form of the *requerimiento*.¹²

The requerimiento was another legacy of the Reconquista, based on the argument that Christian kings could wage a just war against pagans or infidels who resisted Christianity or Christian dominion. Juan Palacio Rubios, a Spanish jurist, formulated the requerimiento as an explanation that would be read to the natives of the New World in order to inform them of this principle and ask them to subject themselves willingly to the King of Spain and Christianity. Although the document was designed with sincere intent, it was thoroughly abused by many would-be conquistadors in the Indies. The document was read to indigenous populations in Spanish or Latin and subsequent hostility was then interpreted as cause for just war and enslavement.¹³ In the case of Florida, Menéndez read the *requerimiento*, but proceeded

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¹² Anthony Pagden, “The Struggle for Legitimacy and the Image of Empire in the Atlantic to c. 1700,” in *The Oxford History of the British Empire Volume 1: The Origins of Empire*, ed. Nicholas Canny (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 37-50. Pagden notes that for English, the primary interest was in securing rights to lands rather than people since they sought to segregate or remove the indigenous population. English notions of legitimate claims were strongly influenced by Locke’s theory of property set forth in his *Second Treatise*. Locke built upon the Roman legal idea of *res nullis* to argue that land in America was still in that unoccupied state given the incomplete political development of the Amerindians. He then argued that Amerindian hunter and gatherer societies had no legal claim to the land beyond what they needed to survive since it was labor which produced commodities and altered the land from its natural state. Finally, Locke concluded that land was to be used by the industrious and the rational. Thus rights to the land did not depend on need or presence but “rational human action.” Locke did not seek to utilize this explanation to separate Native Americans from their lands entirely, however, and his contribution to the Carolina Constitution included stiff penalties for those who defrauded Indians of their land.

¹³ McAlister, *Spain and Portugal*, 90.
cautiously and diplomatically. He recognized that with a small force and potential French competition, displaying military dominance was not as important as winning allies.\footnote{Lyon, \textit{Enterprise of Florida}, 115-9; Elliott, \textit{Empires of the Atlantic World}, 11; Jerald T. Milanich, \textit{Laboring in the Fields of the Lord: Spanish Missions and Southeastern Indians} (Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1999), 100-101. The settlement of Jamestown motivated the crown to continue to support the Florida colony at a time when the utility of this remote outpost was being questioned at court. This decision was made easier by the conversion of more indigenous chiefdoms in Florida to Christianity.}

As historians have observed, the notion of altering or improving the land frequently served the English more effectively than the Spanish. The English had very specific ideas about what it meant to “improve” the land. Land ownership was demonstrated through building a house, erecting fences, or engaging in agricultural or pastoral pursuits. This understanding of land ownership had roots specific to English laws and customs. English settlers used this rationale to claim lands that were occupied, but not “improved” by Native Americans. They also used it to undermine the expansive Spanish claims to the Eastern seaboard and whatever lay beyond.\footnote{Elliott, \textit{Empires of the Atlantic World}, 19-21, 31-2; Seed, \textit{Ceremonies of Possession}, 18-20, 24-5.} In 1607, for example, the successful settlement of Jamestown, Virginia challenged the Spanish claim that La Florida constituted the entire eastern seaboard.\footnote{Hoffman, \textit{Florida’s Frontiers}, 98; Hilary McD. Beckles, “The Hub of Empire: The Caribbean and Britain in the Seventeenth Century,” in \textit{The Oxford History of the British Empire Volume 1}, 219-21.}

It should be noted that while these ideas about rightful claims were important, none of the European powers had any qualms about launching attacks to claim or reclaim territory should the opportunity have presented itself. Colonial claims could be undermined and settlements could be uprooted. Menéndez demonstrated this when he destroyed the fledgling French settlement on the St. Johns River in Florida in 1565. The English would later remind the Spanish of this lesson when they established the colonies of Carolina and Georgia. Such competition grew as other colonial powers expanded and Spanish power weakened. Throughout the seventeenth and early
eighteenth centuries, the physical occupation of territory, whether by mission, town, or outpost, dominated imperial policies in the colonial southeast.\textsuperscript{17}

From a modern perspective, the true power of de facto occupation in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries lay with the Native American societies that inhabited the region. Historians such as Richard White and Juliana Barr have demonstrated the extent to which Europeans were forced to adapt to Native American norms of communication and diplomacy to achieve their goals in other parts of North America.\textsuperscript{18} European-Native relations in the colonial southeast have only recently begun to enjoy the same critical and theoretical analysis.\textsuperscript{19} In Zamumo’s Gifts, Joseph Hall Jr. corrects this problem, including Florida Indians in the patterns of migration, destruction, and ethnogenesis, the creation of new ethnic identities, in the colonial Southeast. He argues that relations of exchange, gift-giving, and mutual obligations shaped indigenous political and social activity. Success in proselytization and politics was largely contingent upon the ability of the Spanish to understand and operate within the framework of indigenous politics. The Franciscan missionaries who successfully established themselves in 1573 built their missions in the towns of the head chief and integrated themselves into local political structure. They also engaged in gift-giving as a means of creating alliances with unconverted, but friendly

\textsuperscript{17} McAlister, \textit{Spain and Portugal}, 306, 308. McAlister describes this process in terms of another Roman legal precept, \textit{uti possidetis}. The Spanish were forced to given up on the notion of \textit{uti possidetis de jure}, the right to possession by law, and were forced to recognize \textit{uti possidetis de facto}, possession by way of effective occupation. These concepts emerged again after the Spanish American wars of independence when newly independent countries sought to deny European powers a foothold in the region by invoking \textit{uti possidetis de jure} to argue that the colonial borders would necessarily also be the borders of the new nations.


chiefdoms.\textsuperscript{20} At times, Spanish and indigenous power structures worked well together. For example, rooted in the tradition of Islamic and then Christian conquests of the Iberian peninsula, the Spanish treated the mission Indians as subjects and vassals. This system allowed the Indians to maintain their own forms of government and administration as long as they acknowledged the superiority of the King of Spain and the Catholic religion.\textsuperscript{21}

The language of Christian vassalage was another legacy of medieval Spain. It implied a contractual relationship between the subject and (at the highest level) king. It provided each subject with a place in the hierarchy of Spanish society, moderated by factors such as race and class. Nevertheless, it also created some limited space for the recognition of talent and merit, as well as limited avenues of recourse to correct abuses, both public and private.\textsuperscript{22} The language of vassalage appeared most frequently in the petitions of individuals from Spanish Florida, particularly soldiers seeking pensions after a lifetime of service or rewards for valor in battle.\textsuperscript{23} This language also appears in the petitions of Indians and Africans seeking the intervention of the King on their behalf. These petitions generally emphasized the valor and the loyalty of the subjects to the King and their status as devout Catholics. They also emphasized the sacrifices of


\textsuperscript{21} Seed, \textit{Ceremonies of Possession}, 85-7; Amy Bushnell, “Ruling the ‘Republic of Indians’ in Seventeenth-Century Florida,” in \textit{Powhatan’s Mantle: Indians in the Colonial Southeast}, ed. Peter H. Wood, Gregory A. Waselkov, and M. Thomas Hatley, 134-50 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1989), 139. Circumstances differed, of course, from those of the Reconquista insofar as these were not Jews or Muslims, but pagans newly converted to the faith, subject to the authority of the Franciscans rather than the Inquisition.


\textsuperscript{23} Examples of some of the leading captains of the late seventeenth century Florida who will be mentioned again in subsequent chapters include Petition of Alonso de Argüelles, 1670, SC 54-5-18; Petition of widow of Alonso de Argüelles, May 12, 1687, SC 54-5-19; Petition from Francisca de Leyba y Artiaga, wife of Capitán Matheo Luis de Florencia, January 29, 1671, SC 54-5-18. These documents are noteworthy for their length and detail of service to the king.
the subjects in the name of the king, citing poor health, injuries, or general impoverishment. The language of población incorporated the language of vassalage as it involved individuals colonizing land in the name of the king.

**Borderlands and Frontiers**

The lengthy period of frontier relations in Florida created the continuing need for pobladores. Many such sites existed on the edges of the Spanish empire, however, and Florida was not an appealing destination for voluntary Spanish settlers. The region may be considered in the context of two related historiographical veins, both of which have been reexamined and reinvented by scholars in recent years. The first is the evolution of the notion of frontiers and borderlands. In his 1893 essay “The Significance of the Frontier in American History,” Frederick Jackson Turner presented a triumphalist narrative of American expansion from east to west across the North American continent. The thesis was criticized as imperialistic and oversimplified as it presented a narrative of pioneer progress and Indian retreat. Subsequent historians wrote instead about borderlands, a concept proposed by one of Turner’s students, Herbert E. Bolton. The borderlands recognized the lengthy coexistence of Spanish settlers and

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24 See for example, Letter from the Caciques of Apalache to the King, enclosed in, Quiroga y Losada to King, April 1, 1688, Manuscript Collection (MC) 63, box 3, file 2, from the Buckingham Smith Collection, Saint Augustine Historical Society Research Library (SAHSRL). Memorial of the Fugitives from Carolina, and Memorial of Chief Jorge, both enclosed in Governor of Florida to the King, March 3, 1738, SC 58-1-31; Memorial of Francisco Menéndez, November 21, 1740, SD 2658.

25 Secretary don Fernando Trivino, February 23, 1744, SD 1020; Juez de Indias en Canarias, Account of families remitted to the Americas, 1718-1765, February 18, 1765, SD 1020.

indigenous peoples in the American southwest and touched on conflicts between imperial powers in early North America. Bolton’s work was meant to celebrate the Spanish heritage of the American southwest and southeast, and to counter the perception of Jamestown as the beginning of American history. His discussion of “old Florida” included the romantic exploits of the numerous would-be conquistadors who led relatively fruitless *entradas* into the American southeastern interior, as well as the missionaries who eventually followed. One of Bolton’s most influential contributions for Florida historians was his presentation of the Spanish missions as a successful frontier institution that brought the finer aspects of Hispanic culture to the indigenous populations.27 Fifty years later, one of Bolton’s students, John Francis Bannon, produced a more concentrated synthesis perpetuating Bolton’s triumphalist tone, giving little attention to the costs to the native populations of Spanish success.28

The concept of borderlands survived, but as historians began to investigate the effects of the missions from an indigenous perspective, scholarship took on an increasingly critical perspective. Borderlands scholars focused instead on intercultural exchange and the contingent nature of relations between Indians and Europeans. As scholars have approached the field with more methodological tools and better access to source materials, the focus of borderlands studies has become increasingly specific, usually focusing on the interactions between one or two specific sets of European and indigenous actors.29 More recent critiques of borderlands scholarship suggest that this focus obviates the effects of imperial rivalries between various

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29 This has not necessarily inhibited the publication of comparative works. See for example Robert H. Jackson, ed., *New Views of Borderlands History* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1998).
European powers in the Americas. Such a focus also overlooks the politics of indigenous states and rivalries.30

The “frontier,” rather than the “borderlands,” has been the primary mode of analysis for similar sites in Latin America. The notion of the frontier lacks a unified tradition in Latin American historiography, but has begun to yield a dynamic body of scholarship. The terms in Spanish, *frontera*, and Portuguese, *fronteira*, carry their own connotations and are equally laden with culturally specific meanings. Over subsequent centuries, Latin American authors fashioned and refashioned past and present frontiers in their writings. The frontier in Latin American literature and history came to connote wilderness, disputed territory, and people who inhabited the fringes of civilized society. Until the 1990s, most studies of frontiers took place in the context of national or regional developments, with very little in the way of comparative studies. They were similar to the Turner thesis in that they tended to emphasize military conquest and the superiority of European culture and values.31 More recent work has begun to focus on the fluid nature of frontier relations, “go-betweens,” Indian and African enslavement, and environmental history. Some works, particularly those influenced by post-colonial theories, have begun to compare the frontiers of the Spanish American empire with those of other empires.32


Until recently, only a few scholars have attempted a synthesis or comparative analysis across regions. This appears to be due, at least in part, to the lack of a unifying concept or category of analysis. For similar fields with a more specific focus, such as mission histories, scholars have produced a number of interdisciplinary and comparative works in recent years.

The problem for frontier history is primarily one of definition: what constitutes a frontier or a borderland? One early example is *The Frontier in Latin American History* by Alistair Hennessy. Hennessy examines a variety of “frontier types” that include frontiers based on institutions, commodity production, people, and politics. His broadly drawn definition of frontier is meant to encompass the complex and varied experiences of frontiers across Latin America. Such recognition signifies an important contribution and a useful counterpoint to American historiography. His failure to offer a consistent definition of frontier, however, inhibits his ability to develop the notion as a useful heuristic device.

The publication of David Weber’s work *The Spanish Frontier in North America* in 1992 reflected the substantial developments taking place in the field. As he observes in his introduction, scholarship had begun to move beyond the framework utilized by Bolton and Bannon, although it had fragmented into increasingly specialized monographs and articles. Weber’s work offers a fresh review of the scholarship to that date, with attention to the changing


35 This question was the subject of a roundtable at the 2013 American Historical Association meeting. The participants remained divided, debating whether or not historians should even seek consensus on a set definition.

Weber’s treatment of the province of Florida offers a comprehensive overview of institutions and political development as well as its role in the imperial rivalries of the region. However, by perpetuating the North American focus, his work isolates these provinces from other Latin American regions and significant frontiers, ranging from the border in Chile between Spanish and Araucanian lands to the Mosquito Coast of Central America where the Spanish vied for influence with the British. Moreover, the main protagonists of this work are Europeans and Native Americans. Individuals of African descent receive only passing mention.38 Numerous

37 Weber, Spanish Frontier in North America, 11. He defines frontier, as: “… zones of interaction between two different cultures—as places where the cultures of the invader and the invaded contend with one another and with their physical environment to produce a dynamic that is unique to time and place…frontiers represent both place and process, simultaneously.” He argues for the inherently transformative effect of frontier interaction for all cultures involved no matter what the power dynamics may be.

38 Ibid, 268, 278, 298.
historians have highlighted the importance of the free black community and militia in the Caribbean and circum-Caribbean colonies, as well as other parts of the Spanish empire.\textsuperscript{39}

The 1994 volume \textit{Where Cultures Meet: Frontiers in Latin American History}, edited by David Weber and Jane M. Rausch offers a detailed and critical discussion of the concept for Latin America. They define frontier neutrally as “geographic zones of interaction between two or more distinctive cultures,” and include the possibility that such a frontier might include urban spaces as well as sparsely populated areas.\textsuperscript{40} They highlight the “kaleidoscopic variety” of frontier spaces in the history of Latin America. The essays in their volume are a mix of foundational and new studies examining a variety of different frontiers across Latin America. Weber and Rausch offer some broad conclusions based on the research presented in this volume.

First, Iberians arrived with existing ideas about frontier development, based on their experiences in the reconquest of the peninsula from Muslim occupation. Moreover, the new Latin American frontiers played an important role in shaping new societies during the colonial era. Frontier societies entailed “more intense racial and cultural blending…and provided opportunities for upwardly mobile non-Indians.” The development of powerful and extensive family networks, however, ultimately circumscribed opportunities for those who were unconnected, and contributed to greater inequality.\textsuperscript{41} The excerpts on missions, military, urban


\textsuperscript{40} Weber and Rausch, \textit{Where Cultures Meet}, xiv.

\textsuperscript{41} Ibid., xxxi.
spaces, and family offer useful ideas for the examination of similar topics in St. Augustine, though they do not constitute a unified concept or theory.42

Weber addresses the isolation of the Spanish North American provinces on a grand scale with his 2005 work *Bárbaros: Spaniards and Their Indians in the Age of Enlightenment*. Another work of remarkable breadth, *Bárbaros* seeks to correct the image of the Spaniards as blundering their way through the failed occupation of the North American borderlands. He places these efforts in the context of other points of interaction among Spaniards, other Europeans, and unconquered native populations. His work seems to suggest that such relationships were actually commonplace and might be found anywhere that native groups fiercely defended terrain which the Spanish found uninviting. Such areas range from northern Mexico to the Gran Chaco, an interior lowland plain incorporating parts of modern-day northern Argentina, western Paraguay, and eastern Bolivia. Weber examines the ways in which Spaniards of the Enlightenment understood these un-subjugated peoples and the various methods which the Bourbon monarchy employed to advance its interests among them.43 Though they employed both defensive and aggressive military tactics, the preferred mode was trade. This study begins in the mid-eighteenth century, leaving the early period of relations between the native peoples and European powers in Florida out of this useful context. Nevertheless, it suggests an important point of departure for future comparative work and a useful way of understanding Spanish activity in these parts of the empire.


43 David Weber, *Bárbaros: Spaniards and Their Indians in the Age of Enlightenment* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005), 4-9, 68-71. The Bourbon dynasty assumed control of the Spanish throne in 1700. They were influenced by French Enlightenment thinkers and desired to exert more direct and streamlined control over the Spanish empire. Charles III (1759-1788) was the most energetic in his efforts to make the colonial government more efficient and more profitable to Spain.
One of the major accomplishments of the evolution of borderlands and frontier scholarship is the recognition that these spaces are not fringes of civilization at the edge of an empty countryside, but complex regions populated with diverse individuals who actively sought to influence the development of their world. They demonstrated that the frontiers were built by women, children, free blacks, African slaves, and wide range of people of mixed racial descent. The definition of borderlands has expanded as well to include long-neglected regions such as the Gulf Coast. Another useful concept to emerge from borderlands and frontier scholarship is the notion of the “go-between,” an individual fluent in two different cultures and able to act as a broker or mediator between the two. By interpreting frontiers as cultural as well as physical, this approach has broadened the study of individuals who lived at the interstices of


empires and connected frontier scholarship to other fields that examine transnational interaction, such as Atlantic history. Historian Amy Bushnell offers one such framework, suggesting that Florida might be redefined as a “maritime periphery.” In *Negotiated Empires: Centers and Peripheries in the Americas, 1500-1820*, Bushnell and others not only challenge conventional center-periphery relationships, but suggest alternative models for understanding these dynamics. They broaden the conceptual range of “frontier,” and incorporate examples from across the colonial Americas. These essays offer numerous insights and directions for future research, although there is little consensus in the final analysis.

Located in a borderland region, but deeply connected to the Atlantic maritime world, the colonial conception of “La Florida” is well-positioned to answer the call to connect these different types of transnational histories. This dissertation demonstrates that Weber’s concept of the many frontiers of Spanish America can be applied to Spanish America even in the seventeenth century. As such, Florida was one of many frontiers that the Spanish sought to populate and defend from the encroachment of other powers, whether European or indigenous. The dynamics of population, military power, and exploitable resources naturally varied from one frontier to the next. Common to all these frontiers was the struggle to occupy and control the physical territory of the frontier while simultaneously negotiating the cultural differences that came to the fore in such a process. Within this framework, the potential from cross-regional and even cross-cultural comparison is substantial. In the case of Florida where población was

47 Amy Bushnell, *Situado and Sabana: Spain’s Support System for the Presidio and Mission Provinces of Florida* (Athens: University of Georgia Press and American Museum of Natural History 1994), 210. She develops a model based on four stages of development marked by the extent of the Spanish crown’s financial investment and support for the province. As a model of financial development for Florida, her “periphery paradigm” offers a useful and detailed narrative structure, but it does little to place Florida in a broader or comparative context.

48 Christine Daniels and Michael V. Kennedy, eds., *Negotiated Empires: Centers and Peripheries in the Americas, 1500-1820* (New York: Routledge, 2002).
paramount, the ability of both Spaniards and non-Europeans to contribute to the occupation and defense of the province created a space in which the Spanish were willing to negotiate the rights and privileges of individuals and groups who traditionally occupied the lowest rungs of the social ladder.

**Terminology: The Language of Race and Status**

A brief discussion of terminology is necessary here. Birthplace, socioeconomic status, race, and ethnicity all played a part in the social ordering of people in Spanish America. The terms described here paint only the broadest strokes, and their interpretation, particularly for individuals of mixed racial descent, was highly subjective. At the top of the social order were *peninsulares*, or individuals born on the Iberian Peninsula. People of Spanish descent born in the Americas are called *criollos*, or creoles. In the case of Florida, historians utilize the term that Spaniards used for those born in Florida, calling them *Floridanos*. Like many criollos, Floridanos presented themselves as of pure Spanish descent, although most families had at least some small degree of racial mixture. People of Native American descent are referred to as such, or as Indian, after the Spanish term *indio*. Individuals of mixed European and Spanish descent were called *mestizos*. People of African descent were called *moreno* or *negro*. I use the general terms “black” or “of African descent” to describe the general population, and “African” or “African-American” only when the specific birthplace of an individual is known. People of mixed African and European descent in Florida were referred to as *pardos*, although the term *mulato* was occasionally used. Contemporaries in Mexico commonly used the term *zambo* to describe people of mixed Indian and African descent, but the parish priests of Florida employed
the word *chino* as a general term for individuals of mixed African and Indian descent. The clergy and royal officials of Florida rarely employed more specific racial designations.\(^{49}\)

One of the prevailing themes in the southeast during this era is the movement of people. The terminology that the Spanish employed to name these movements is also telling of their attitudes toward various groups. Although the Spanish sought to populate the countryside with Spanish immigrants, they rarely had that luxury. Instead, they were forced to rely on groups and individuals to whom they sometimes gave dubious descriptors. Indians who fled the destruction of the mission provinces after 1706 or the fallout of the Yamassee War in 1715 were defined by their Christian status. Indians who had come from the long-established mission communities were recognized by authorities as “Old Christians” in order to distinguish them from recently acquired indigenous allies who had just converted to Christianity. Those who had not yet converted were called “*infieles*” or “*gentiles*,” infidels or gentiles.\(^{50}\)

The term “old Christian” is yet another legacy of the Reconquista. It was accompanied by the term “new Christian”, which referred to Jews or Muslims who had been forced to convert to Catholicism under the authority of Isabel and Ferdinand or previous monarchs. To be an Old Christian was to be able to demonstrate that one had come from a traditionally Christian family. This was referred to as *limpieza de sangre*, or purity (literally cleanliness) of blood. New Christians were recent converts from Judaism or Islam. The Spanish held Jewish and Moorish

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50 Good examples of this usage may be found in: Governor Zuñiga y Cerda to the King, March 30, 1702, SC 58-2-8; Governor Córcoles y Martínez to the King, November 16, 1707, SC 58-1-28/23; Interim Governor Ayala y Escobar to King, November 22, 1717, SC 58-1-30; Governor Benavides, Visitation of the missions and census, December 1-12, 1726, SC 58-2-16/12; Letter from the King to the Governor of Florida, September 11, 1735, SD 837; John H. Hann, *A History of the Timucua Indians and Missions* (Gainesville: University Presses of Florida, 1996), 306-18.
peoples in contempt as those who had actively rejected Christ and the Catholic faith. As such, they were considered tainted, and intermarriage with New Christians, also called *conversos*, stained one’s bloodline. Moreover, Catholic doctrine insisted that conversion and baptism were binding, even if conducted under duress. Thereafter, converts were required to abide by Catholic practice or risk being investigated for apostasy. New Christians were barred from holding political office and in theory were prohibited from travelling to Spanish America. By the eighteenth century these conventions had been solidified by custom and law.  

By utilizing the labels of old and new Christian, Spanish authorities and indigenous leaders in Florida were replicating the language of the Reconquista. The demands of población, however, forced the Spanish into a different relationship with the *infieles* of the southeast. By the end of the seventeenth century, the Spanish did not have the military advantage necessary to impose their terms upon the indigenous population. They needed allies and royal authorities found themselves courting the favor of independent chiefdoms, offering lavish gifts in exchange for their loyalty to the Spanish King and the Catholic faith.  

To refer to the groups of Indians who fled either the ruins of the missions or the Yamassee War, I often use the term refugee, which is less value-laden, though not free of negative connotations in modern usage.  

Another group of individuals that played a central role in the development of población was the cohort of slaves who fled Carolina and Georgia. These individuals arrived in Florida asking for shelter and baptism in the Catholic faith. They too capitalized on the language of vassalage and Catholicism by emphasizing their voluntary request for baptism and the risks they

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51 McAlister, *Spain and Portugal*, 52-3, 56, 61-2. Despite the best efforts of Spanish bureaucrats, many conversos did travel to the American colonies. The Inquisition was designed to ensure that conversos were not still secretly practicing their old faiths. Many fled to the Americas to avoid persecution by the Inquisition or because the institution was far less rigorous in the colonies and responsible for other concerns such as the influence of African based religious practices often interpreted as witchcraft.

52 Governor Benavides to the King, September 30, 1718, SC 58-1-30.
ran in order to take up the faith. Despite the social capital some of the slaves managed to attain, Spanish officials continued to refer to them as *fugitivos* or fugitives rather than Christians or converts.\textsuperscript{53} The legacy of their enslavement was difficult to shake. Some of the slaves who fled Carolina received their freedom, and some did not. Moreover, they entered a community already populated with free and enslaved people of African descent.\textsuperscript{54} In this work, I utilize the term run-away slave or fugitive slave from Carolina to describe this particular subset of the black population in St. Augustine. Arguably, these individuals were refugees as well, removed from war torn states in Africa, and in search of shelter or asylum from their enslaved state in Carolina.

**Periodization**

The history of Spanish Florida is generally divided into two periods. The first period stretched from settlement in 1565 to the cession of the colony to England in the 1763 Treaty of Paris which ended the Seven Years War. In this treaty the Spanish exchanged Florida for Cuba, which had been occupied by the English. The second period lasted from the second Treaty of Paris in 1783, through which the Spanish reacquired Florida, until 1821 when the United States purchased the land from Spain. This dissertation focuses on the period from 1668 to 1763. Because the era was one long contest for territory in the Americas, it was a vital period for the development of Spanish frontier policy in Florida and elsewhere. In the year 1668 an attack by an English pirate based out of Jamaica revealed the weakness of the garrison at St. Augustine and spurred the Council of the Indies to release funds to improve fortifications, armaments, and manpower, essentially re-militarizing the presidio. This was the moment when English encroachment ceased to be an abstract concern and resolved itself into the reality of fire and

\textsuperscript{53} Governor Quiroga y Losada to the King, February 24, 1688, SD 227B; Consejo de Indias (Council of the Indies), October 2, 1739, SC 58-1-20; Governor Montiano to King, August 10, 1740, SC 86-7-21/76.

death. After the raid of 1668, Spanish authorities in Madrid, Mexico City, Havana, and St. Augustine began to circulate ideas to improve the defenses of Florida in anticipation of future hostilities. The year 1763 is a natural end point. As noted, Spain ceded Florida to Britain in exchange for the return of Cuba in the Treaty of Paris. The Spanish government offered to evacuate all who wanted to leave, including Catholic Indians and free blacks. By the end of 1764, Spanish society had vanished from the peninsula. As a final testament to the spirit of imperial rivalry, one Spaniard, Luciano de Herrera, was left behind to settle property debts and later served as a spy.\textsuperscript{55}

Despite pivotal events, Spanish society in this era has been subjected to comparatively little study, particularly the years before 1700. This is in part the product of prevailing historiographical trends focused on the role of Spanish missions and institutions of Spanish colonialism, discussed in greater detail below.\textsuperscript{56} Most histories of seventeenth-century Florida focus on the Catholic missions as the primary form of Spanish-Indian relations. As a result, there has been little study of social relations in the city of St. Augustine, which was also the site of interaction between Spaniards, Indians, and people of African descent. Many of these works of institutional history are, of course, vital, since they reveal how the colony worked at the most

\textsuperscript{55} Weber, \textit{Spanish Frontier in North America}, 199.

Research in recent decades has demonstrated that “Spanish society” in St. Augustine included not just people of Spanish descent, but Africans and Indians who also spoke Spanish and lived as part of Spanish society. Most works, however, continue to examine these groups independently, rather than as contemporaries inhabiting the same city.\textsuperscript{58}

The following chapter provides an overview of the history of Florida between 1668 and 1763. It examines the Spanish struggle to maintain control of Florida in the face of English and French incursions. By the early eighteenth century, it had become a struggle to retake control of the region. Throughout most of this period, the Spanish in Florida were in need of pobladores. The third chapter examines patterns of Spanish immigration to Florida. Most individuals who did come to Florida were soldiers or officers in the king’s service. Until the 1740s, the volume of such immigration was slow, but produced important patterns in local society. Perhaps most importantly, the prosperity of some created a positive example that inspired local officials to request that the king sponsor expeditions of settlers to populate Florida. Over nearly a century of correspondence, royal officials and leading citizens in Florida wrote to the king proposing various plans for importing groups of Spanish pobladores from regions such as Galicia and the Canary Islands. The fourth chapter examines the evolution of these plans. Over time, Spanish officials constructed a specific set of criteria and expectations for their ideal settlers.

Unfortunately, the crown did not send settlers to Florida until 1757. In the meantime, Spanish authorities attempted to capitalize on the presence of Africans, Indians, and others in the region to achieve their strategic and defensive objectives. This need created opportunities for


individuals from these groups to pursue their own ambitions. Chapter Five discusses the presence of Indians in Spanish St. Augustine in the seventeenth century. Indigenous visitors and residents of the city participated in a vibrant popular culture. They constructed social networks at every level of society. This chapter in particular investigates connections between the African and Indian populations of St. Augustine. Chapter Six examines the changes which took place after the chain of Spanish missions was destroyed in 1706. Refugees from the mission communities congregated around St. Augustine and the politics of Indian identity took on new complexity. Chapter Seven examines Spanish policies toward people of African descent. Like the indigenous population, many slaves and free blacks discovered that they could employ the language of Christian vassalage to further their own aspirations.

**A Note on Archives**

Most of the primary source material used in this dissertation is located in the Archive of the Indies in Seville, Spain. A selection of documents from this archive, called the Stetson Collection, is held on microfilm in the United States. Since most of the microfilm was taken in the first half of the twentieth century, the Stetson Collection utilizes a numbering system that is now outdated. The Archive of the Indies has since converted to a simplified system. In the interest of providing the greatest possible transparency, I have preserved the disparate numbering systems so that the reader may easily assess which documents are located on microfilm and which were obtained from the Archive of the Indies in Seville.
By 1668, the province of Florida was just over one hundred years old. The number of Spanish residents in the province was less than one thousand, but it was augmented by an indigenous population of roughly ten thousand who lived in the Catholic missions established in Florida by Franciscan friars. The missions marked the northern and western boundaries of Spanish settlement and military presence in the province, stretching from St. Augustine north along the Georgia coast and west to Apalache, near present-day Tallahassee.¹ The city of St. Augustine was populated by soldiers, some local families of Spanish or mestizo heritage called Floridanos, and members of the royal government. The city had a number of small shops for dry goods, food, and drink, as well as a mill, a parish church, a Franciscan monastery, and a decrepit wooden fort. It had the requisite town plaza at the center, surrounded by the cathedral, the homes of the governor and the royal treasurer, and other residences of the city’s elite citizens. By 1668 Franciscan friars, soldiers, and Floridano families had begun to develop the countryside to the west of the city with ranches and haciendas. Although the indigenous population still resided overwhelmingly in towns attached to missions, some were moving into the commercial sphere as wage laborers or as independent suppliers of foodstuffs and trade goods to Havana and indigenous chiefdoms north of Apalache.²

¹ Bushnell, Situado and Sabana, 126-7.

² The sense of separation between city and countryside is largely an accident of writing the history of Florida rather than an intentional division. Scholars have tended to focus either on the missions or the city of St. Augustine. On the emerging wage labor market and trade see Governor Aranda y Avellaneda to the King, November 10, 1688, Escribanía de Cámara (EC) 156C, cited from microfilm, PKYL; John H. Hann, “Translation of Alonso de Leturiondo’s Memorial to the King of Spain,” Florida Archaeology 2 (1986): 177-9; Bushnell, “The Menéndez Marquez Cattle Barony at La Chua and the Determinants of Economic Expansion in Seventeenth-Century Florida,” 408-9.
The seventeenth century, however, was a tumultuous period for the Spanish in the nearby Caribbean. Competition for colonial territory was growing and the Spanish lost territory to the British, French, and Dutch. Royal authorities in the province of Florida watched these events with no small amount of anxiety.Raids by hostile indigenous groups from the interior as well as pirate attacks from the sea plagued Florida in the second half of the century. With the news in 1670 that the British had established a colony to the north, Florida’s geopolitical importance took on new meaning. The King of Spain took a renewed interest in the defenses of Florida and a fresh wave of capital and soldiers followed. Tensions between the Spanish and English colonies in the southeast peaked during the War of Spanish Succession, and between 1702 and 1706, the English and their indigenous allies destroyed the Florida mission system. This reduced the land effectively governed by the Spanish to that which could be protected by the guns of the fort in St. Augustine. Spanish officials spent the next fifty years trying to reclaim and populate the land they had once controlled before the English occupied it instead. This chapter examines Florida’s geopolitical significance to the Spanish empire and outlines the course of events through which población, the act of populating land, came to be the most pressing aspect of Spanish policy on the Florida frontier. It examines the historical events that characterized the Spanish struggle to maintain control of Florida in the face of Native American, English, and French encroachment. The chapter provides a chronological framework for the subsequent chapters and a background for the historical processes already in motion among European and Native American societies. It also illustrates the external forces which

3 Hoffman, Florida’s Frontiers, 141-6; Bushnell, Situado and Sabana, 138-42.
4 Bushnell, Situado and Sabana, 22; Landers, Black Society in Spanish Florida, 19-23.
drove the Spanish to rely not only on Spanish settlers, but also on African, Indian, and mestizo immigrants and refugees to populate the presidio and maintain their claim on the province.

**English Incursions**

The English presence in North America and the Caribbean grew throughout the course of the seventeenth century. They chipped away at Spanish claims by building colonies in areas unoccupied by the Spaniards. In 1655, the English went beyond settling in under-populated regions and took the Spanish island of Jamaica by force.\(^5\) The loss of Jamaica alarmed officials in Florida. The current governor of Florida, Diego de Rebolledo (1654-8), feared that his province would be the next likely target, given its small garrison and strategic importance to Spanish shipping. It seems he had several reasons to be concerned. He had received a warning of possible English designs on Florida late in 1655. Spanish sailors also conveyed rumors which supported such fears. Then, in April of 1656 news arrived that an (allegedly) English ship had stopped at the port of St. Mark’s and traded knives, hatchets, and other finished goods with the natives in exchange for provisions (Figure 2-3).\(^6\)

Governor Rebolledo immediately began planning fortifications and a garrison to protect the Apalache province. Surrounded by Spanish farms and ranches in the hinterlands, Apalache was developing into a prosperous region with successful agricultural and pastoral endeavors. The St. Mark’s River also offered access to the interior of the province from the Gulf of Mexico and

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\(^5\) In 1654, Oliver Cromwell sent Admiral William Penn and General Robert Venables to seize Spanish possessions in the New World as part of the plan called the Western Design. The primary target was the island of Hispaniola. The fleet failed to take Santo Domingo, but succeeded in May of 1655 in taking the under-populated island of Jamaica.

\(^6\) Hann, *Apalachee*, 198; Verne E. Chatelain, *The Defenses of Spanish Florida, 1565 to 1763* (Washington D.C.: Carnegie Institution, 1941), 59-60; Elliott, *Empires of the Atlantic World*, 113; Hoffman, *Florida’s Frontiers*, 128, 364, n. 15. I use the English name for the port and the river for consistency and because those reflect modern place names, as with the use of St. Augustine instead of San Agustín. Fortifications built in the area were called San Marcos, although the river itself was frequently referred to as San Martín.
facilitated a small, but lively commerce with Havana. Governor Rebolledo also moved to reinforce the presidio at St. Augustine with Indian warriors. He summoned the native chiefs in the mission villages in the main provinces of Guale, Timucua, and Apalache to St. Augustine to provide five hundred warriors to defend the city from potential English attack (Figure 2-1). Rebolledo also demanded that they supply their own corn as well as excess for the presidio. Overall, the period was one of severe depopulation for the Timucua due to drought and disease, making demands for labor and service all the more unreasonable. The order to carry their own rations was the last straw for local chiefs and led to outright revolt in the Timucua province. As historian Paul Hoffman notes, the Timucua were not challenging Spanish authority as a whole, only its excessive demands. After the revolt was put down, the missions in this region were reorganized and relocated to better serve the road from St. Augustine to Apalache. In these attempts to prepare for an English invasion, Rebolledo had jeopardized the stability of the Florida missions and perhaps the presidio itself. Spanish forces were already spread thinly, and would have been unable to resolve a mission revolt and repulse an English invasion. Even the loss of just the mission provinces would have been devastating since the presidio relied on corn from the provinces to survive.

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7 Hann, Apalachee, 196-9; Bushnell, Situado and Sabana, 131. The governor, the criollos of Florida, the local caciques, and the Franciscan friars all had an interest in controlling the flow of goods in and out of this port. In particular, Rebolledo sought to limit the influence of the friars with a military installation. The friars portrayed themselves as advocates for the Apalache, though they too were enriched through the St. Mark’s trade, often through the exploitation of indigenous labor. Rebolledo had made enemies of the friars when he took office in the previous year by “reverse[ing] his predecessor’s policy of giving the friars, the only Spaniards in Apalache, free rein over the natives.” The friars opposed both the existing military presence as well as future prospects for expansion. They encouraged the chiefs to oppose the governor’s plan. In the long run, their influence contributed to the arrest of Rebolledo not long after.

8 Hall, Zamumo’s Gifts, 70. He stipulated that they bring their own corn to the post: those from Apalache and Timucua missions were to carry three arrobas of corn each - one for themselves and two to contribute to the city stores. This would amount roughly to a seventy-five pound load. Through his demand that they carry their own goods, the governor had reduced “these principal men to cargo-bearers”.

9 Bushnell, Situado and Sabana, 129-131; Hall, Zamumo’s Gifts, 70-1; Hoffman, Florida’s Frontiers, 128-33. Another policy which Rebolledo had terminated upon his arrival was that of giving gifts to the Christian chiefs.
Traditional historiography of the British conquest of Jamaica suggests that its loss was viewed as unfortunate, but not particularly devastating in comparison to the other potential targets of Cromwell’s Western Design such as Hispaniola or Cuba. It argues that Jamaica was lightly populated and, even more than other parts of the West Indies, held little economic significance for the Spanish. This sentiment, however, is expressed more frequently in historical assessments of the event from the English perspective. The archives demonstrate that the Spanish in St. Augustine clearly felt threatened. Rebolledo’s initial response to news of the loss of Jamaica and the presence of English ships was to call up indigenous warriors to defend the city. What is apparent in the letters of the governor and the friars is the fear of increased English

abiding by a 1615 statement that gifts were only necessary for the enticing pagan Indians to Catholicism. Christian caciques supposedly already had their rewards. Since alliance was based on continued relations of exchange, this was a significant strategic misstep. In his summons to the indigenous chiefs, however, Rebolledo’s disregard for local customs finally took its toll. Hoffman suggests that part of the reaction to Rebolledo’s policies was the fact that his predecessor, a criollo interim governor named Horryutiner, had done his best to placate Indian and Spaniard alike with extremely liberal trade and gifting policies. Rebolledo’s actions were more typical of governors at the time that had to find a way to make a living from their office. It was Horryutiner’s liberality that made him look stingy by contrast. Spanish success in ending the revolts actually allowed them to consolidate their power. It was part of a larger process already underway: the transition from diplomacy to force in Spanish-Indian relations. This was one of several revolts which took place in the Florida mission provinces. Like the others, much of the cause lay in the tensions created by the imposition of mission life. Unlike the others, those tensions were exacerbated by the fear inspired by the loss of territory elsewhere in the empire.

10 Elliott, Empires of the Atlantic World, 113. Hoffman, Florida’s Frontiers, 128, 364, n. 15. The Western Design was a plan on the part of Oliver Cromwell to attack what he believed to be the weakly defended holdings of the Spanish Caribbean including the major cities of Santo Domingo and Havana. He sought to establish a Caribbean base for English ships, attack Spanish shipping, and to weaken the Spanish Catholic presence in the region. In 1654, he sent Admiral William Penn and General Robert Venables to seize the island of Hispaniola. Spanish resistance was stronger than Cromwell had expected and his invasion of Santo Domingo was an embarrassing failure. Cromwell’s forces, however, did manage to take the lightly populated island of Jamaica, providing the desired Caribbean base.

11 For historical assessments from English and Spanish perspectives, see respectively Beckles, “The Hub of Empire,” 219-21; Hoffman, Florida’s Frontiers, 126-7. A striking exception to the pattern is historian Timothy Paul Grady, who states “The invasion of Jamaica sent shockwaves through the Spanish Empire.” He cites one of the most important sources for the study of Rebolledo’s actions, the Testimonio de Visita of Governor Diego de Rebolledo and outcome, 1657, though this source does less to substantiate his claims for the rest of the empire. Timothy Paul Grady, Anglo-Spanish Rivalry in Colonial South-East America, 1650-1725 (London: Pickering and Chatto Ltd., 2010), 28. Other sources in addition to the visita do substantiate this claim by demonstrating the correspondence between the Junta de Guerra in Madrid and authorities in Cuba and New Spain. For examples, see Governor of Cuba Francisco Davila Orejón to the King, October 29, 1668, SC 54-5-18; Viceroy of New Spain Marques de Mancera to the King, April 20, 1669, SC 58-2-2.
sea traffic, especially pirates. They also feared that Cuba would be taken next. If it were, they would be constantly harassed by pirates, making the continued occupation of Florida ultimately untenable. Their fears were well founded. Raids by English pirates did prove to be a frequent problem. English pirates plundered St. Augustine in 1668. Pirates on the Gulf Coast destroyed the fort of San Marcos de Apalache in 1682. They also used the river to raid the rich ranches and farms of the interior, including the large ranch at La Chua. More raids took place along the Atlantic coast as far north as the Guale missions in 1684. Another attack in 1688 forced the inhabitants of St. Augustine into the shell of the fort under construction, though the pirates did not come ashore.

The first raid in 1668 was by far the most devastating and it had a significant impact on Spanish policy in Florida. That year, a pirate from Jamaica named Robert Searles attacked St. Augustine. He had captured a ship from New Spain which was bound for St. Augustine carrying the annual subsidy from the crown which supported the garrison, called the situado. Another

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12 Letter from Fray Juan Gomez to the King, April 4, 1657 and letter from Governor Diego Rebolledo to the King, October 18, 1657, SD 233.

13 Some, such as that of Robert Searles in 1668 were explicitly based out of Jamaica. Others merely enjoyed the added markets and shelter the colony provided.

14 Bushnell, *Situado and Sabana*, 126, 162; Hann, *Apalachee*, 199-201; John E. Worth, *The Struggle for the Georgia Coast: An Eighteenth-Century Spanish Retrospective on Guale and Mocama* (Athens: University of Georgia and America Museum of Natural History, 1995), 40-3. Numerous governors had advocated the construction of a fort at Apalache. After pirates were sighted off the coast in 1677, Governor Hita Salazar initiated the project with local funds. It was completed in 1679. There was also an unauthorized port on the mouth of Suwannee River, San Martín which drew those interested in illicit trade.

15 Viceroy of New Spain Marques de Mancera to Queen, March 15, 1670, SC 58-2-2/18 and December 26, 1670, SC 58-2-2/19; Governor of Florida to the Queen, March 24, 1672, SC 58-1-26; Governor of Florida to the Queen, August 24, 1675, SC 58-1-26/39 and SC 58-1-26/40.

16 The annual situado was the main source of cash in the colony. It was a subsidy designed to support the crown employees, soldiers, sailors, and missionaries of the colony and actually consisted of several different sources of funds. These included mermas, a fund to compensate for lost or spoiled goods, specific sums for construction and other special projects, a fund for the habits and footwear of friars, and a fund to cover Indian expenses. The situado consisted of goods as well as cash, including flour, wine, oil, and other necessities. It was also notoriously unreliable. Over the years it was drawn from several sources. In the seventeenth century it was drawn primarily from the treasury of the viceroyalty in Mexico City. In 1702 it became a charge on the sales tax or alcabalas of the city of
small frigate which had recently made a run to Cuba was also captured in open waters. Searles sailed both to St. Augustine. Searles was able to mimic the usual process for arriving ships which often waited offshore for the right tide to take them over the sand bar in the harbor. He launched his attack in the middle of the night. Corporal Miguel de Monzón, who was fishing at the time, saw the pirates. They shot him twice, but he still managed to give a least some advance notice to the soldiers of the fort. The pirates plundered the city and made an unsuccessful attack on the fort. While the assault on the fort took place, Sergeant Major Nicolás Ponce de León was able to remove 130 men, women, and children to the safety of the woods and regroup the soldiers not on duty at the fort. Governor de la Guerra y de la Vega (1664-71) escaped his house and fled to the fort, but his secretary Alonso de Ojeada was killed. The pirates kept a poor watch on activities around the fort, and the governor was able to contact Ponce de Léon and locate other soldiers who arrived at the fort at dawn.

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17 Arana, “The Basis of a Permanent Fortification,” 5-7; Francisco de Sotolongo to the King, on conditions in Florida, July 4, 1668, SC 54-5-20; Juan Menéndez Marquez to King on conditions in Florida, July 4, 1668, SC 54-5-18/70; Governor de la Guerra y de la Vega to King on Florida, August 8, 1668, SC 54-5-10/1. In later assessments, the governor blamed Ponce de León for leading soldiers to the forests rather than organizing a counterattack while the buccaneers looted the town. This was part of a larger contest to find someone to blame for the extensive sacking of the city. One priest, Friar Francisco de Sotolongo, recounted the event in a letter to the king and placed the blame squarely upon the governor. A letter from the royal officials in the colony, namely the accountant and the treasurer, did the same. Though they were also ostensibly representatives of the crown interests, Menéndez Marquez were closely connected to the elite criollo faction in St. Augustine. Sotolongo was embroiled in conflicts of jurisdiction between the governor and the clergy, so each had reason to find fault with the Governor.
The pirates took both material and human prizes, including the treasurer José de Prado and ten or twelve young women of elite families. The parish priest, Francisco de Sotolongo, offered himself as a prisoner in place of the young ladies in order to protect their honor. The next day, Searles wrote to the governor, asking for water, meat, and wood in exchange for the captives. Governor Guerra y Vega accepted and all the young ladies were returned with honor intact in exchange for Sotolongo. Upon complete delivery of the supplies five days later, the priest and all other Spanish captives were put ashore. Searles kept the others he had taken prisoner, arguing that his patent from Governor of Jamaica allowed for the capture of Indians, mulattos, and blacks who would be sold as slaves. Sotolongo’s account of the events states that while aboard the ship, he accused Searles directly of enslaving free people who were black, mulatto, indigenous, and others of mixed race. Later he wrote to the king that Searles had enslaved Indians who were free vassals of the king and worked for citizens in the city. He attempted to explain that these were free and rational people, the same as Spaniards.

Sir, among the prisoners that the enemy held were some Indians of this province that were in the service of some citizens and I could not get the enemy to let them go with the rest of the prisoners. As they were free and possessed of the same reason as the Spaniards, I also mentioned proposing also the esteem your majesty has for the Indians, to which he [presumably Searles] responded that it was a specific point in his instruction and patent from the governor of Jamaica that they would be given back no color but that of the Spanish, considering as slaves Indians, mulattos, and blacks, although they are by nature free…

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18 Arana, “The Basis of a Permanent Fortification,” 7-8. Among the goods stolen was a large quantity of silver, sail canvas, wax candles, 2,000 pesos worth of altar decorations, and jewelry. Seventy men, women, and children were also taken captive.

19 Friar Francisco de Sotolongo to the King, July 4, 1668, SC 54-5-20. All translations are mine unless otherwise noted. “Señor entre los prisioneros que logia el enemigo fueron algunos indios desta Provincia de los que asistían en servicio de algunos vecinos, y no pude conseguir con el enemigo, que los largaste con los demás prisioneros, pues eran libres y militaba en ellos la misma razón que en los españoles proponiéndole también la estimación que VM hace de los indios, a que me respondió que era particular capítulo de su instrucción y patente de su gobernador de Jamaica el no reciban ningún color sino fuese el de español, dando por esclavos a Indios, mulatos, y negros, aunque por su naturaleza sean libres…”
Searles expected to profit from the sale of all the nonwhites he took from the colony selling them to the labor-hungry Caribbean and had little regard for the priest’s pleas. In his letter to the king, Sotolongo asked him to find a way to secure the freedom of his vassals. Sotolongo’s account is valuable because it highlights the presence of free people of color, urban indigenous servants, and free people of mixed racial descent in the city at this period before city censuses became frequent.²⁰

Before leaving, the pirates mapped the inlet. They did not burn the town, but threatened to return soon with greater numbers from Jamaica.²¹ The fears of Menéndez in 1565 and Rebolledo in 1655 seemed finally to have been realized. News of the attack was dispatched to authorities in Havana, Mexico City, and Madrid. The attack by Searles had justified Spanish fears that a strong Caribbean base for the English would increase the threat of pirates and confirmed their interest in Florida. In anticipation of future hostilities, Spanish officials in St. Augustine requested assistance in the form of more soldiers and funds to construct a stone fortification. The current wooden fort was decrepit, suffering from a lack of repairs and the unavoidable depredations of the subtropical climate. Although wresting men, money, and supplies from the imperial bureaucratic system proved a challenge, construction of a new stone fort was underway within three years of Searles’ attack. The small influx of laborers, engineers, soldiers, weapons, and currency gave the city of St. Augustine a brief moment when commerce and construction expanded. The rate of marriages and births increased during the late 1670s and the 1680s. Historical geographer Theodore Corbett has suggested that this may reflect greater

²⁰ Francisco de Sotolongo to the King, on conditions in Florida, July 4, 1668, SC 54-5-20.
²¹ Arana “The Basis of a Permanent Fortification,” 9-10; Hoffman, Florida’s Frontiers, 145. One individual who went with the pirates willingly was Dr. John Henry Woodward, an English surgeon who had been captured by the Spanish while living with Indians at Port Royal. He had spent more than a year living in St. Augustine. Woodward appeared again in 1674, visiting a Westo village on behalf of the English to arrange a trade and military alliance. He was one of the early architects of Anglo-Indian relations in the region.
stability in the town due to steady employment and food supplies, as well as the expanded pool of male marriage candidates. It should be noted, however, that the sense of stability would have been limited primarily to Spanish and criollo citizens. Temporary Indian laborers were often at risk of underpayment or falling behind with the planting and harvesting in their home villages.  

The attack by Searles was yet another jarring indication of the ever-expanding English presence in the region. Rumors came from natives further south that more English sails were seen in the Keys and the Bahamas Channel. For the Floridians, shock culminated in the settlement of Charleston, Carolina two years later. From the perspective of the Spanish in Florida, the English settlement of Jamestown in 1607, the Lesser Antilles in the 1620s and 1630s, Jamaica in 1655, and Charleston in 1670 must have appeared an alarming pincer movement closing in from the north and south over the course of the century. The news that the English had established another permanent colony, “Charles Town,” in North America reached Madrid late in 1670. The settlement was not far from where the Spanish settlement at Santa Elena had once been located, but it had been abandoned since 1587. Although the English posed the greatest threat, they were not the only European power to encroach on undefended Spanish land. The Dutch established settlements on Curaçao and St. Eustatius which were formally recognized in the Treaty of Münster (1648). The French built a number of settlements

22 Viceroy of New Spain Marques de Mancera to the King, April 20, 1669, SC 58-2-2/14; Governor Francisco de la Guerra y de la Vega to the King relative to the English, January 27, 1670, SC 58-2-2/17; The Viceroy of New Spain to the King March 15, 1670, SC 58-2-2/18; Theodore G. Corbett, “Population Structure in Hispanic St. Augustine, 1629-1763,” Florida Historical Quarterly 54 (Jan. 1976): 269. For the difficulties faced by Indian laborers, see Governor Manuel de Cendoya to the King, March 30, 1672, SC 58-2-3/5. Draft labor based on the repartimiento system used elsewhere in Spanish America was the punishment assigned to those who had participated in the 1655 uprising against Governor Rebolledo.


in the Lesser Antilles, and by mid-century had gained a foothold on Hispaniola. In the Treaty of Ryswick (1697), Spain formally ceded part of the island to the French, establishing the colony of Saint Domingue, later Haiti.\textsuperscript{25}

The de facto English control of the Charleston area was formalized by accident earlier that year in the 1670 Treaty of Madrid. This agreement between the English and the Spanish marked an important turning point in the geopolitics of the Southeast. Under the terms of article seven of the treaty, Spain and England agreed to set aside all previous offenses, and the English would be permitted to keep legally any territory they currently occupied. The treaty was signed on July 18, just three months after Charleston was established, but before news had reached Madrid. Thus, the Spanish unintentionally recognized the English presence there, at least at the diplomatic level. Authorities in St. Augustine were officially ordered not to harass the English, but secretly advised to dislodge them if at all possible. The Governor in St. Augustine launched several expeditions designed to collect intelligence and one ill-fated attempt to remove the English colonists. The English themselves made no immediate attack on St. Augustine, but their presence created new and troubling patterns. As they established plantations the need for coerced labor grew. The English at Charleston soon began to participate in the Indian slave trade discussed below. As the trade expanded, raiders began to target the Spanish missions. They targeted natives allied with the Spanish at the behest of English authorities, but it is likely that the sedentary, poorly armed mission populations were also easy targets. The settlement of Carolina ushered in an era in which the English constituted a more immediate and ongoing

\textsuperscript{25} Beckles, “The Hub of Empire,” 221; Boucher, Tropics of Discontent? 69-70, 75-81, 87; McAlister, Spain and Portugal, 308.
threat. It underscored the strategic significance of Florida and added greater importance to the process of re-militarization underway since the attack in 1668.26

**Impact of the Indian Slave Trade**

Just as this study begins in the midst of European colonization it also begins in the midst of Native American processes of political reorganization. These political and social changes were exacerbated by contact with expanding colonial empires, and English incursions altered geopolitics for the Spanish and indigenous populations alike.27 The Spanish had been present in the region for over a century by the time this study begins. As a result, the Native American population had already been exposed to European diseases and experienced several waves of epidemics. Many archaeologists suggest that the early invasions by Ayllón, de Soto, Narváez and others introduced diseases to the native populations, leading to demographic devastation long before the Jesuit and Franciscan friars established their missions. Epidemics plagued the early mission communities as well. Travel between St. Augustine and the villages exacerbated the spread of disease. Thus, the native populations of Florida had already suffered substantial population loss and the attendant political and social upheaval by the middle of the seventeenth century when Indian slave raiders began to add to their woes.28

Many indigenous societies maintained the practice of taking war captives and slaves. The English colonists who had settled Virginia half a century earlier in 1607 had begun to purchase

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such captives to serve as agricultural laborers. Over time, they and nearby native groups developed a market for Indian slaves.\textsuperscript{29} The opportunity created by this market gave rise to predatory groups whose commerce revolved around making war upon other native groups, taking captives, and selling them in Virginia in exchange for muskets, cloth, tools, ornaments, and other trade goods. In many respects this pattern resembled that of African slave raiding and trading, as outlined in recent works.\textsuperscript{30} By 1661, their predation had reached the Florida missions. Spanish authorities called these people the “Chi\textsuperscript{c}chimecos,” drawing upon the terminology used in New Spain to describe the nomadic groups on the northern frontier of New Spain who resisted pacification.\textsuperscript{31} The Muskogee speakers of the Southeast referred to the raiders as “Westos” which simply meant “enemies.” The group was likely composed of individuals who had lived on the southern banks of Lake Erie and were driven out by their rivals, the Iroquois. Those who survived war and migration briefly established a settlement outside Jamestown, Virginia before moving south again to the Savannah River area (Figure 2-1). They soon developed a profitable trade with the residents of Jamestown for beaver pelts and human captives. The Westos raided further and further to the south and west in search of more Indian captives, drawing town after town into what Hall calls, “vortices of raiding, counter raiding, captivity, and death.”

\textsuperscript{29} Alan Gallay, \textit{The Indian Slave Trade: The Rise of the English Empire in the American South, 1670-1717} (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), 40-43. Captives were taken, at least in part, during warfare between Iroquois and Algonquin peoples to the west. This warfare also caused other tribes to migrate eastward.

\textsuperscript{30} Gallay, \textit{Indian Slave Trade}, 46, 294-5. Alan Gallay alludes to the similarities between the African slave trade and the export of European bonded servants, but does not compare the systems in great detail. He notes that the legal and moral precedents for African slavery established a foundation for Indian slavery as well, and that there were other precedents for the brutal control of subservient populations, such as the treatment of the Irish under Cromwell. For descriptions of the connections between European trade goods, predatory groups, and the African slave trade, see Linda M. Heywood and John K. Thornton, Central Africans, Atlantic Creoles, and the Foundation of the Americas, 1585-1660 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Joseph C. Miller, \textit{Way of Death: Merchant Capitalism and the Angolan Slaves Trade, 1730-1830} (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1988).

\textsuperscript{31} Worth, \textit{The Struggle for the Georgia Coast}, 15. The documentary sources for the region come from the governor, sergeant major, royal accountant and treasurer, and the Franciscan provincial. They are referred to generally as the “authorities” in the province. When perspective or politics created differences of opinion within the group, specific designations are used.
Spanish learned about the Westos firsthand in 1661, when the sedentary mission population in the Guale province became a target for slave raiding. In the Southeast, Spanish and English colonists interacted with indigenous populations through different means, religion and trade, respectively. In doing so, they engaged with indigenous leaders who were already in the midst of negotiating tumultuous regional politics.\(^\text{32}\)

After 1670, the English at Charleston began to participate in the Indian slave trade, trading with the Westos, exchanging weapons and manufactured goods for deerskins and Indian slaves. Their commerce inspired an escalation of the trade, driving the Westos to seek more and more captives. Colonists in Carolina initially sought profit by producing foodstuffs for the West Indies. Exports of corn and peas became common, as did a small livestock industry, but none of these pursuits made men wealthy. Other attempts were made to cultivate desirable commodities including indigo, cotton, citrus, silk, olives, and wine. By 1688 most colonists combined a number of different enterprises, including provisioning privateers and trading with the Indians for human captives and deerskins.\(^\text{33}\) The Proprietors of the Carolina colony sought to maintain trade relations with the Indians for their own profit, to the exclusion of the other colonists. Control over the trade was supposed to remain with officials appointed by the Proprietors. The colonists, however, looked to the Indian slave trade as a source of quick profits which could provide them with the necessary capital to expand their plantations. Two connected economies developed in the Carolina colony, one based on plantations, the other on frontier exchanges.

\(^{32}\) Gallay, Indian Slave Trade, 42; Hall, Zamumo’s Gifts, 76-83, 86; Worth, The Struggle for the Georgia Coast, 18-22, 26-30. In 1661 they attacked with firearms and in large numbers. The Guale warriors resisted wherever possible, but many of the northernmost missions were abandoned, and refugees crowded into others.

\(^{33}\) Robert M. Weir, “‘Shaftesbury’s Darling’: Settlement in the Carolinas at the Close of the Seventeenth Century,” in The Oxford History of the British Empire Volume 1: The Origins of Empire, ed. Nicholas Canny (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 375, 380-1, 385-92. To counteract the growing Barbadian influence, the Proprietors invited Lord Cardross to establish his settlement of Scots at Port Royal in 1684. Disease and an attack led by Marquez Cabrera wiped out Stuart Town and carried off some of the slaves. These actions highlighted the continued danger of close proximity to St. Augustine.
According to Allan Gallay, “at the heart of both systems lay slavery- slaves as laborers and slaves as salable commodities.”

The Indian slave trade had important consequences for both the Spanish missions and St. Augustine. By the mid-1660s a group of Indian towns of various ethnicities, all fleeing the Westos, began to emerge as a coherent group in the Escamaçu region. They became known as the Yamassee. Continued Westo violence pushed the Yamassee eastward, sometimes directly into Guale and Mocama. They were just one of many indigenous groups pushed into the region, and initially the Spanish considered them allies. They often participated in mission life and even contributed to the repartimiento, sending laborers to work on the fort in St. Augustine.

Repeated raids, however, ultimately weakened the Guale mission system. With many of the able-bodied men away from the villages serving their time constructing St. Augustine’s fortifications, the northernmost missions were even more vulnerable. Some of the Yamassee became disillusioned with Spanish promises of protection and moved away. Others participated in the consolidation of the missions which would ultimately bring these natives closer and closer into the sphere of Spanish life.

**Impact of the African Slave Trade**

Tensions between the Spanish and the English escalated in the 1680s and 1690s. Contact between the English and Spanish took various forms, influenced by the geographic mobility of peoples in North America and the Caribbean. Native Americans, African slaves, pirates, soldiers, shipwreck victims, and merchants all passed through the region, their actions informed by

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36 Worth, *The Struggle for the Georgia Coast*, 30-1.
colonial rivalries. Officials in St. Augustine continued to seek more soldiers and weaponry, even sending Captain Juan de Ayala Escobar to Spain to collect munitions, slaves, and reinforcements. The threat of pirates also led to a change in military personnel. Despite the preference for Spanish soldiers, Floridanos were permitted to serve as soldiers rather than militia given their knowledge of the terrain, their skill as mariners, and the decreased likelihood of desertion. A previously small subset of the population also took on new roles in the city: free and enslaved people of African descent.37

English settlement had always included African laborers, who contributed to the early labor of clearing the forest, building houses, and planting crops. While their numbers remained small, there were few restrictions on the activity and movement of African slaves. Some worked as cowboys for livestock owners, moving freely through the woods to round up cows or hogs. The practice of using slaves as cowboys was fairly common in the rest of Spanish America as well.38 By 1690, the slave population in Carolina totaled about 1,500. No slave code was formally enacted until 1696, when leaders finally adopted Barbadian statutes. In 1698 Parliament opened the slave trade to all English vessels thereby increasing the number of available African slaves and lowering their prices. By this time, naval stores and rice were showing signs of profitability and colonists had more income at their disposal for the purchase of laborers. By 1710 the slave population had reached 4,100 and more than half the population of Carolina (not including Native Americans) was black. Indentured servants continued to arrive as well, though Carolina was not high on the list of desirable places since the Low Country tended to reproduce

37 Royal Cédula to the Governor of Florida on aid, May 26, 1687, SC 58-1-22; Letter to the King, May 10, 1687, SC 54-5-15; Royal Officials to King, March 8, 1689, SD 227B; Governor Quiroga y Losada to King, June 8, 1690, SD 227B.
the unkind disease environment of the West Indies. This demographic shift had important implications for all the inhabitants in the region, but particularly those native groups who had profited from the sale of Indian slaves. The full effect of these changes would not be felt until the Yamassee War of 1715.

In 1687, the presence of African slaves in Carolina took on new significance when eight adults and one infant fled to St. Augustine. They claimed they were seeking the Catholic faith, which was denied them in the Protestant colonies. Governor Diego Quiroga y Losada allowed them to stay, putting the men to work on the construction of the fort along with the other royal slaves. William Dunlop, an agent from Carolina, arrived to reclaim them in 1688. The Governor refused to return them, but agreed to buy them at 160 pesos each as soon as the next situado arrived. Dunlop left with only the promise of future payment. The Governor and the Royal Officials were unsure of exactly what to do with these new refugees and wrote to the crown repeatedly for assistance.40

In 1693, the King finally issued a proclamation determining that all runaways would be freed. Many continued to work in slavery, an issue not formally resolved until 1738. Jane Landers explains the royal decision to grant freedom to the slaves in the context of repoblación, the process of re-occupying land taken from the Muslims in Iberia during the Reconquista.41 The runaway slaves in Florida were declared free with the goal of “populating and holding territory

39 Weir, “Shaftesbury’s Darling,” 389-92. Indentured servants from England were considered to be worth any two from Barbados since the latter were given to drinking far too much rum.

40 Governor Quiroga y Losada to King, Feb. 24, 1688, SC 54-5-12; Royal Officials to King, March 8, 1689, SD 227B; Governor Quiroga y Losada to King, June 8, 1690, SD 227B.

41 Both the title of adelantado and the concept of repoblación issue from the historical experience of the Reconquista in Spain. After the conquest of the Iberian Peninsula in the eighth century by the Moors, Catholic leaders began expanding southward, slowly pushing the Muslim population back out of the peninsula until 1492. Landers, Black Society in Spanish Florida, 24-5.
threatened by foreign encroachment.” In this statement, she covers the actions of a number of governors between 1687 and 1738. There is ample evidence that the Spanish were looking for settlers to bring to Florida, but in 1687 they had not yet begun to consider people of African descent as viable settlers or pobladores. In his first year in Florida, Quiroga y Losada was likely more interested in manual and skilled laborers than repoblación. In agreeing to purchase the slaves, he came up with a diplomatic solution that allowed him to add to the number of hands working at the fort. The runaways labored alongside Indians, mestizos, criollos, the occasional Spanish soldier, forzados of various races, and royal slaves.

The presence of St. Augustine as a refuge for runaway slaves soon became a sore spot in the relations between the English and the Spanish in the Southeast. Quiroga y Losada’s successor, Don Laureano de Torres y Ayala, actually returned some runaway slaves to Carolina agents. The traditional interpretation has been that tensions were too high between the English and the Spanish, and keeping the runaways would contribute further to the provocation. Hoffman has recently suggested that the governor’s primary concern was actually that the English might make a habit of allowing the slaves to slip away in order to make inflated claims for them against the Spanish treasury. Either way, the policy of sanctuary had its limitations. Despite Torres y Ayala’s decision, however, slaves continued to flee to St. Augustine even after the devastating attack in 1702. Subsequent governors were optimistic about the military prowess of these slaves, though they too were occasionally forced to return or sell runaways rather than employ them in the city. Nevertheless, by welcoming the first runaways from Carolina, Governor Quiroga y

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42 Cédula, November 7, 1693, SC 58-1-26; Governor Zuñiga y Cerda to King, October 10, 1699, SD 844;
43 Arana and Manucy, Building the Castillo de San Marcos, 38.
44 Governor Zuñiga to King, October 10, 1699, SD 844; Hoffman, Florida’s Frontiers, 159, 380, n.32.
Losada set an important precedent for future governors and the growing African-American community in St. Augustine.  

**French Colonization on the Gulf Coast**

The Spanish faced a new threat in the 1690s from French exploration in the region. French activity in the Gulf region in the 1680s had caught the attention of both the English and the Spanish. In August of 1684 René Robert Cavelier, Sieur de La Salle, set forth with a small expedition to establish a settlement on the mouth of the Mississippi River where it entered the Gulf. He was unable to locate the mouth of the river and chose a site on the mainland coast of modern-day Texas. The settlement did not last long, destroyed by mutiny and attacks from the nearby Indians. The expedition remained secret for almost a year before Spanish officials discovered the plan. As it had more than a century before, news of a potential French colony alarmed them, inspiring action. David Weber notes that despite their claims to the continent, the Spanish had not contested the settlement of French Canada in 1608, or later expansion into the Great Lakes in the 1670s. The French presence on the Gulf, however, was seen as a direct threat to the silver mines of northern New Spain. Numerous expeditions were sent to look for La Salle, though the Spanish had to re-learn much of the geography of the neglected Gulf Coast. The Spanish also sought to gain greater influence among the indigenous groups living along the Gulf. This became an extension of their struggle with the English for influence among the native populations as both empires sent emissaries westward in order to prevent the French from gaining native allies.

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45 Letter from the Governor to the King, February 24, 1688, SC 58-1-26; Royal Officials to King, March 8, 1689, SD 227B; Landers, *Black Society in Spanish Florida*, 26-8.

46 Royal Cédula, June 5, 1687, SC 54-5-15/44; Governor Aranda y Avellaned of Florida to the King, June 22, 1687, SC 61-6-20; Governor Torres y Ayala to the King, January 5, 1699, SC 61-6-22; Weber, *Spanish Frontier in North America*, 148-9. In fact, this development generated three legajos, or thousands of pages of documentation. Those considered here are testimonies from Florida and New Spain on the fortification and population of Pensacola, also
Over the course of four years, the Spanish sent no less than six land and five sea expeditions in search of La Salle’s settlement. In Madrid, officials entertained plans to extend missions into Texas and to establish a new presidio on the Gulf Coast. Rather than attempt a settlement on the delta of the Mississippi which was still not well understood and difficult to navigate, the Spanish opted for the luxurious deep water bay discovered by Tristán de Luna. He named it the Ochuse Bay, but in 1686 the Spanish used Santa María de Galve, or the local Indian name, Panzacola. One enthusiastic mariner who had led three of the seaborne expeditions after La Salle even proposed that the Crown might save money by relocating St. Augustine from its deeply unpleasant harbor to the much more accommodating Pensacola Bay. The War Council rejected this proposal and remained indecisive about a new settlement. From St. Augustine, the governor notified the King of English traders among the chiefdoms beyond Apalache and their success in spreading influence and gaining allies. In response, the King ordered a settlement in 1694, but as with most royal orders regarding the settlement of Florida, nothing happened due to the lack of funds. Events in 1697 and 1698 finally galvanized the Spanish into action.\textsuperscript{47}

During a brief respite from war beginning in 1697, the French launched another round of expeditions.\textsuperscript{48} Settling the conflict permitted the English and the French to turn their energies elsewhere before war broke out again. Upon receiving the news, the Spanish scrambled to construct a pinewood fort at Pensacola. Just two months later Pierre LeMoyne, Sieur d’Iberville

called the Bahía de Espíritu Santo. These are located in SC 61-6-20 through 61-6-22 or AGI, Mexico 616-618. The Stetson Collection copies are cited here.

\textsuperscript{47} Governor Aranda y Avellaneda of Florida to the King, June 22, 1687, SC 61-6-20; Governor of Torres y Ayala to the King, January 5, 1699, SC 61-6-22; Weber, \textit{Spanish Frontier in North America}, 148-58.

\textsuperscript{48} In 1697, the conflict known in North America as King William’s War was concluded with the Treaty of Ryswick. In the treaty, the Spanish acknowledged France’s possession of the western region of Santo Domingo. This is the term that was used in the English colonies to describe the North American theater of the war of the Grand Alliance from 1688 to 1697. The War began when King William III of England joined the League of Ausburg against France. Much of the conflict in North America took place in New France and the English frontier in the northeast and involved French Iroquois allies.
sailed into Pensacola Bay, noted the presence of the Spanish and the absence of a great river, and sailed away. He found the mouth of the Mississippi almost by accident in the midst of bad weather. He completed his task by establishing Fort Maurepas at Biloxi Bay. Another fort was built on the Mississippi in 1699 cementing French control of the strategic River. In fact, the French had been driven to action in order to prevent English colonization of the region. English traders were not the only threat. London physician Dr. Daniel Coxe purchased an extensive piece of real estate which stretched west from Carolina to the Pacific. He planned to initiate settlement with a colony on the Gulf Coast. French control of the Mississippi effectively prevented English occupation of the region, connected New France to the Gulf Coast, and drove a wedge between the Spanish outposts in Florida and the silver mines of New Spain they were once designed to protect. The Spanish had only a brief window in which they could have attempted to dislodge the French, and decision-making proceeded too slowly. In 1700, King Carlos II of Spain named the grandson of the French King Louis XIV, Phillipe d’Anjou, as heir to the throne. As King of Spain, Phillipe d’Anjou, now Felipe V, overlooked the French presence on the Gulf. Soon French and Spanish energies were swallowed up by the War of Spanish Succession (1701-1713) which followed the accession of d’Anjou, a member of the French Bourbon family, to the Spanish throne.49

**The War of Spanish Succession in Florida**

The opening salvo of the War of Spanish Succession in Florida took place in 1702, a Chacato attack on the Apalache. Spanish-led attempts to respond with a counter-raid failed miserably, an early hint at the Spanish inability to adequately protect the mission populations. War between the Spanish and the English offered Governor James Moore of Carolina an

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opportunity to attack St. Augustine. He raised men for the expedition by offering them a share of the plunder and slaves which would result from the attack. Moore also had strategic concerns. He feared, correctly, that the French would try to reinforce Florida and use it to flank the English colonies on the Atlantic. Moreover, the French success at creating alliances with indigenous groups on the Gulf Coast such as the Tallapoosas and Alabamas threatened to undermine the English-Indian provincial trade. Taking control of the fort in St. Augustine was essential to the security of Carolina. Likewise, according to Verner Crane, the French viewed Florida as the “first line of defense” for Louisiana. From Crane’s perspective, the battle for Florida was really about the contest for the Gulf of Mexico and access to the Mississippi. Hoffman builds on Crane’s interpretation, stating that Moore’s attack on Florida was a preliminary strike at the French. Yet again, Florida’s significance was strategic, though Spanish shipping was no longer the only imperial concern. The English colonists sought to expand westward, but their expansionist vision was blocked by the French presence on the Mississippi. The Spanish still thought of Florida as vital to the protection of the Bahama Channel, but the colony was rapidly becoming a pawn in a contest between the French and the English. Spain’s imperial claims to the entire Southeast and Gulf Coast were being steadily chipped away.50

In late October, Governor Zúñiga y Cerda received news from the provinces of a possible English attack. The governor immediately dispatched letters for aid to Madrid, Havana, and Pensacola emphasizing the likelihood of an English attack and the military weakness of Florida. The royal officials in St. Augustine wrote a similar letter to Havana, though they called for a counter-offensive. Carolina, they argued, must be exterminated, and since the colony had no fortification, it should be easy to do. By the time Zúñiga y Cerda had dispatched his first round

of letters in early November, the English were already on the edge of the Guale province. They began their attack on November 3, and the small, undermanned Spanish garrisons were forced to retreat from Amelia Island with the surviving mission populations. As the English and their indigenous allies marched southward, Governor Zúñiga y Cerda gathered the residents of St. Augustine into the fort, including any of those Indians who had sworn obedience to the Spanish King. For the governor, the choice to gather the city inside the fort was a calculated risk. His forces were small and weapons were insufficient, and he determined that the survival of the colony would hinge on reinforcements from Havana, rather than any pitched battle he and his men could hope to offer. Church vestments were brought inside, and the governor requisitioned all of the corn in the city to feed the citizens in the fort. Moore’s attacking force was divided into two. One group, led by Colonel Daniel, proceeded overland from Amelia Island to St. Augustine. Moore led his forces by water. Intelligence gained from a few English scouts told the Spanish governor that the English had brought shovels and other items to build trenches and besiege the fort. Fortunately for the Spanish, the English did not have any large explosive shells which could have been lobbed into the courtyard of the fort. For the Spanish, this meant they might survive the siege with few casualties—if Havana answered in time. By November 8, the English ships had appeared off the coast. On November 10, Colonel Daniel’s forces entered St. Augustine and occupied it with no resistance. Everyone was inside the fort.\footnote{Arnade, \textit{Siege of St. Augustine}, 22-7, 35-6.}

The most detailed historical description of the siege was written in 1959 by Charles Arnade and has not yet been superseded for its research and detailed play-by-play of events. The events of the siege are reviewed briefly here. The siege lasted for almost two months. Within the fort, Zúñiga y Cerda maintained order among its 1,500 occupants. Strict discipline and latrines in
the fort (which were washed out with every outgoing tide) prevented any major outbreaks of disease. In a heroic show, a Spanish patrol on horseback drove 163 cattle through the English forces and into the dry moat of the fort, thus securing the food supply. Moore’s artillery proved insufficient to damage the fort, so he sent to Jamaica for bigger guns and the bombs that the Spanish so feared. Both the Spanish and the English waited for reinforcements. Moore struggled to maintain discipline among some of his forces that had been promised plunder and slaves, not a slow and uncomfortable wait. The relief fleet from Havana arrived on December 26, though the governor had difficulty establishing communication with the commander of the ships. The reinforcements appeared threatening, but actually engaged in very little combat. General Estévan de Barroa was slow to order his troops ashore and the Galician relief forces were green and unwilling to pursue and attack the English. Moore was able to retreat with his forces overland and by December 30 the siege was over and the fort opened.52

Although the siege was the most dramatic event for the Spanish in St. Augustine it was only the beginning of the war. Having failed to take the fort, the English settled for the destruction of the mission provinces and haciendas of the Florida interior, often encouraging their indigenous allies to undertake the attacks. Moore’s failed attack cost Carolina dearly, and in 1704 he led another retaliatory attack with English and Indian allies on the missions of Apalache and Western Timucua. The goal of the campaign was slave-raiding to recuperate some of the expenses of the failed attack in 1702. Moore, however, did offer some Apalache groups the opportunity to save their lives by abandoning the Spanish and moving to live within the English sphere. Some of those with kinship ties to the Carolina area agreed to move. Estimates vary, but English forces may have enslaved up to four thousand individuals. The rest migrated either to

52 Ibid., 37-8, 46-50, 55-7.
English territory or to independent chiefdoms to the north or west. The next Spanish governor, Córcoles y Martínez cited a population loss of about ten thousand natives by 1708, though this may have been overstated.53

The impact of the destruction of the missions was significant both in St. Augustine and abroad. In the decade after 1704, independent villages for Christian Indians became almost untenable unless they were built within the radius of the fort’s guns. The Spanish reorganization of the missions in the seventeenth century and Moore’s raids in 1704 had worked to create a vacuum in the region. Roads were not patrolled, river crossings went unguarded, and hostile raiding parties could move through the wilderness unchecked. Governor Córcoles y Martínez established a cavalry company to better patrol the countryside, but with little apparent effect. Many indigenous refugees built small settlements near the city and relied on corn delivered with the situado. By 1708, 300 native refugees had migrated to the city, and by 1711, there were 401.54 Their presence would have increased the population of the city by at least one third and added to the pain caused by extreme food shortages in 1712. Shipping was frequently interrupted because of the war and the mission provinces no longer existed to serve as the city’s breadbasket. The interethnic dynamics created by this group of refugees are examined in detail in chapter 5. In correspondence among officials in Europe, the Spanish seem to have taken the enslavement and murder of their mission populations personally. Beyond several reports from the Junta de Guerra,


54 Governor Córcoles y Martínez to King on cavalry company, November 30, 1706, SC 58-1-28/16A; Governor Córcoles y Martínez to King on expenses provisioning refugee Indians, December 7, 1708, SC 58-1-28/54; Auto and Memorial to King of Indian Persons, April 9, 1711, SC 58-1-30/20; Bushnell, *Situado and Sabana*, 194-5; For an in-depth discussion of the struggle of Christian Indians to maintain villages in the interior, see Amy Bushnell, “Patricio de Hinachuba, Defender of the Word of God, the Crown of the King, and the Little Children of Ivatucho,” *American Indian Culture and Resource Journal* 3 (1979): 1-21.
a cédula was issued to the Spanish Ambassador in Rome, the Duque de Uzeda, to protest the cruelties exhibited toward Christian Indians.⁵⁵

The description of these events found in histories of the missions tends to highlight the poverty of St. Augustine and inability of the Spanish government to arm or defend its “bow and arrow” mission populations against English-allied Indians wielding Dutch guns. The piecemeal destruction of the mission provinces which took place between 1703 and 1706 was not the result of Zúñiga y Cerda’s failure to understand his circumstances or to act. Once the 1702 siege was lifted, the governor immediately began to reinforce his defenses, and his successor did the same. The presidio simply had never been prepared to withstand constant guerilla-style warfare of this nature. Those who expected the Spanish royal forces to successfully defend their indigenous vassals had every right to be disappointed, of course, though perhaps not surprised. With few indigenous warriors left in the mission provinces and inferior supply lines, the defenses of Spanish Florida were simply insufficient. Although Florida was ultimately a small frontier in a large war with a number of theaters, it remained one of strategic significance. By 1715 the Council of the Indies was again entertaining reports on how Florida might be improved, how to counter its chronic weaknesses of men and materiel. These included the typical calls for more Spanish settlers and better fortifications and armaments. The 1715 report is also remarkable for recommending that an auxiliary bishop be assigned to Florida to better serve the Spaniards and Christian Indians, especially since Florida needed to be defended from “enemies of the religion.”⁵⁶

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⁵⁵ Junta de Guerra to the King, July 11, 1704, SC 58-1-28/6; Junta de Guerra to the King, July 18, 1704, SC 58-1-20/91; Cédula to Spanish Ambassador in Rome, Duque de Uzeda, August 22, 1704, SC 58-1-27/71.

⁵⁶ Diego de Morales to Consejo de Indias, February 12, 1715, SD 837; Hoffman, Florida’s Frontiers, 177.
The Yamassee War

Part of the continued danger in the countryside was produced by Yamassee and Creek raiders. The destruction of the missions and ranches in the interior depopulated the area, and left it open to hunters and raiding parties. The Yamassee, who were now one of five groups living near the English settlements in Carolina, coped with the Indian slave trade by acting as another predatory nation, seeking ever further afield for potential captives to trade to with the English. By the beginning of the eighteenth century they had replaced the Westos as the provider of Indian captives to the colonists. By 1714 relations between the Yamassee and the English were under pressure. The many cycles of violence and slave raiding had destabilized the region. The English Commissioners of the Indian Trade were losing control. Factionalism among the English and Scottish traders and frequent squabbles consumed the time of the Indian agent and the commission, preventing them from dealing with rising complaints and abuses from the indigenous population. In 1715 the grievances of the Creek and Yamassee peoples began to coalesce around shared frustrations with the English. The causes of the conflict were rooted in structural problems with the trade and cultural discord.58

English Indian agents Thomas Nairne and John Wright were sent out to reassure the Yamassee, but their attempts were unsuccessful and may have actually proved provocative. After

57 Joseph Hall defines the Creek as “A collection of towns that initially included the towns along the Ochese Creek but that after 1715 also included Creek allies in the Alabama, Tallapoosa, and Coosa Valleys.” The British tended to subsume these groups under the term “Creek,” artificially imposing uniformity where it did not exist. The Spanish customarily refer to the Ochese with the spelling Uchise. Hall, Zamumo’s Gifts, 137, 217.

58 Gallay Indian Slave Trade, 331-4; Hall, Zamumo’s Gifts, 122-4. The traditional explanations for the Yamassee attack emphasize the abuses by the English traders and mounting debts coupled with the growing scarcity of slaves and deerskins, their two most profitable commodities. Alan Gallay suggests that the real reason for the attack was that as the Indian slave trade declined, the English colonists desired the fertile Yamassee lands, making the conflict inevitable. Joseph Hall argues that debt and distrust of the English were the primary issues, and that the Coweta chief, called Emperor Brims by the English, sought first to change the terms of the trade from one based on the violence of slave taking to a peaceful alliance based on deerskins. Persistent rumors and conflicting messages from the English, however, prevented such a shift.
speaking with a group of Yamassee in the principal town of Pocotaligo, the following morning of April 15 the Yamassee murdered Thomas Nairne and numerous other English traders stationed in other native towns. The Yamassee then attacked the town of Port Royal where colonists had frequently come into conflict with the natives over control of fertile lands. Some Creek and Chickasaw towns also murdered their Carolina agents, although they carefully explained to the English that their quarrel was with the excesses of these specific men not the English a whole. Unlike the Yamassee, who attacked English plantations and settlers, the Creek, Chickasaw, and Cherokee used the conflict to further other ends, taking advantage of their ability to shift the balance of power.\textsuperscript{59}

Despite the element of surprise, the Yamassee advantage did not last long. The Carolina militia conducted reprisals against the Yamassee later on in the summer of 1715. By the fall, they were defeated and some retreated to St. Augustine. Most other native groups sought peace that same year in 1715 since they were now in a position to dictate their terms to the English. The Creek, Cherokee, and Chickasaw emerged stronger from the war insofar as they were able to play off one European group against another, accepting gifts from all but committing to military alliance with none. Other groups, such as the Ocheses, Alabamas, and Choctaws, found themselves in a potentially advantageous position as well. Their distance from the English permitted them to follow a policy of multilateralism, maintaining diplomatic ties and trade relations with the Spanish and French as well as the English. The war dispersed the Yamassee people further. One quarter of the Yamassee population was either killed or enslaved. Five hundred of the twelve hundred survivors went to St. Augustine. The rest fled to the Lower Creek towns on the Chattahoochee River. The Yamassee War had exposed the limits of both Spanish

and English power in the Southeast, and demonstrated the extent to which the Native Americans still dominated the geopolitics of the region.\textsuperscript{60}

The war also left St. Augustine with yet another wave of indigenous refugees camped outside the walls of St. Augustine. The Spanish incorporated the Yamassee into the system of small villages visited by the Franciscan missionaries. The Yamassee were not as interested in the practice of Catholicism as the remaining refugees from the mission provinces of Timucua and Apalache. The Spanish attempted to incorporate the Yamassee and Creek refugees through traditional means such as the mission villages, called \textit{doctrinas}, but their success was limited. These groups resisted abandoning their old ways and the cacophony of Muskogee and other unfamiliar dialects further frustrated missionary efforts.\textsuperscript{61} In 1717, of the ten pueblos listed in the mission census, five included Yamassee speakers. By 1726, there were thirteen mission villages, listed more formally as doctrinas now, and five still included people of the Yamassee.\textsuperscript{62}

Throughout this period the villages were not fixed in one location, but moved around the outskirts of the city, seeking better land or greater protection. It was difficult for the refugees to maintain subsistence agriculture and they relied on an allotment from the Spanish situado in St. Augustine to augment their supplies. In 1715 Governor Córcoles wrote the king requesting an


\textsuperscript{61} On the continuing difficulties with languages and failure to correct the “vicious customs” of the natives: Letter from Fray Ignacio de Cantabio and response from Consejo de Indias, September 27, 1721, SC 58-1-24; Letter from Fr. Domingo de Losada, Franciscan Comisario General de Indias, May 3, 1736, SD 837.

\textsuperscript{62} Worth, \textit{Resistance and Destruction}, 147-55. Primo de Rivera, Census. In Ayala y Escobar, Letter to the King with attached census, April 18, 1717, SD 843. The 1717 villages including Yamassee speakers were Pocosapa, Pocotalaca, Nuestra Señora de la Candelaria de la Tamaja, and San Buenaventura de Palica (aggregate Yamassee and Timucua). Antonio de Benavides, Visitation of the missions and census, December 2-12, 1726, SD 866; Gerónimo Valdés, Autos regarding the state of the Florida missions, September 20, 1728, SD 2226.
increase in the funds designated for supporting the indigenous people associated with the garrison. The current aid was set at 1,500 ducats, but that generally distributed in the form of corn, tools, and other supplies. Córcoles portrayed these as temporary costs meant to cover the care of the Indians upon their arrival and tools with which they might begin to farm.63

The ultimate fates of Native American refugees have not been fully explained. Many of those who fled the early attacks by Moore were captured and enslaved by other predatory Indian groups. Others slowly moved away from the city and followed their own kinship and alliance networks back into the interior. Some may have left the outer villages and managed to assimilate themselves into city of St. Augustine. Some of these individuals can be identified in the military rosters or the parish records, as Susan Parker has demonstrated. This process will be examined more fully in Chapter Four.64 Refugees continued to trickle into St. Augustine as imperial warfare continued through the 1720s. Bushnell estimates that between 1722 and 1726 there may have been as many as 480 new refugees. Life near the city, however, was still dangerous, as repeated attacks demonstrated. Densely populated settlements around the walls carried other risks. In 1727 an epidemic swept the area and cut down the population dramatically.

Nevertheless, in 1728 the indigenous refugee population was at a peak of 1350 individuals. In March of that year Colonel John Palmer led an attack on the mission town Nombre de Dios with fifty Carolina militiamen and one hundred Indians. Fifty of the Nombre de Dios population was killed and another fifty were taken prisoner. Hoffman observes that the Spanish did not sally forth to counter the attack, a choice carefully noted by the Creek, for whom the attack was meant as a warning regarding the wisdom of alliance with the Spanish. The warning was well taken,

63 Letter from Governor to the King, November 28, 1715, SD 843.
and many of Yamassee and Creek left. After the attack, Benavides ordered the remains of many of the refugee pueblos cleared away from the Castillo.\textsuperscript{65} The refugee villages are still mentioned, though less and less frequently in government correspondence by the late 1730s, usually in connection with either the corn provided for them in the situado or the presence of the Franciscan missionaries. Their numbers continued to decline until the Spanish evacuated in 1763.\textsuperscript{66}

**Spanish Attempts to Re-occupy Florida**

In the wake of the war, officials in St. Augustine attempted to improve relations with the native peoples living near the Apalachicola and Chattahoochee rivers to better secure the countryside between St. Augustine and Pensacola. Some indigenous chiefs found an alliance with the Spanish appealing, particularly members of the Lower Creek who were allied with the Yamassee and sought to lessen the hold of English influence. Four caciques approached the governor only a few months into the war and, citing abuses by the English, requested alliance with the Spanish crown. They claimed to represent 161 other villages that were willing to join the Spanish in exchange for trade and protection from the British and their Indian allies. These caciques go unnamed in the documents, but modern scholars categorize them as members of the Lower Creek people. In July of that year, the governor proudly wrote that one hundred and sixty one villages sought to declare their obedience to the Spanish monarch and the Catholic faith. This offer was perceived as an opportunity to reclaim the lost territory of Apalache and control


\textsuperscript{66} Letter from Fr. Domingo de Losada, Franciscan Comisario General de Indias, May 3, 1736, SD 837; St. Augustine *Principales* in Depositions on Governor Francisco del Moral y Sánchez, 1736, SD 861; Hoffman, *Florida’s Frontiers*, 197, 203. When the Franciscan missions in Florida were secularized in 1745, the population of the doctrinas had declined to about 200. By 1758, there were only 158 recorded. When the Spanish evacuated in 1763, only 89 Indians were recorded.
of the land in between. In 1716 the governor reported the resettlement of the 161 villages in the area of Apalache and some nearer to St. Augustine, although in truth, the migration had only just begun. Former residents of the Apalache province, some of whom also referred to themselves as “old Christians” from the mission era joined with the Lower Creek who occupied the region. It was among these groups that the Spanish found their most willing allies. Among these were Adrián, chief of a former Apalache village and Chislacaliche, chief of two villages near the Flint and Chattahoochee Rivers, and heir to Brims. Brims was the cacique of Coweta (sometimes referred to as Cabeta) and acknowledged leader of the Creek. The British referred to him as “Emperor Brims.” The Creek had taken advantage of the Yamassee War to improve their bargaining position, and they were prepared to renew their relations with the English if the price was right.67

The Spanish continued to pursue alliance with these groups through the brief term of Fullana’s government (1716), the leadership of interim-governor Juan de Ayala y Escobar (1716-18), and the lengthy term of Antonio de Benavides (1718-34). Once again, the Spanish relied upon native forms diplomacy, engaging in gift-giving, although they also promised to maintain a protective military presence.68 Despite the destruction of the Spanish defenses in the war, the Spanish continued to promise indigenous groups that they would use their military might to protect them from the depredations of the English and predatory Indians. Before moving their people into proximity with the Spanish, Emperor Brims and others wisely insisted on seeing the

67 Grady, Anglo-Spanish Rivalry, 136-7; Hann, Apalachee, 288-9; Letter from Governor Córcoles y Martínez to the King, July 5, 1715 and Real Cédula, February 18, 1716, SC 58-1-24; Letter from don Miguel Duran, February 18, 1716, SC 58-1-30.

68 Consejo de Indias, March 26, 1715 and January 8, 1716, SD 837; Junta de Guerra de Indias to Governor of Florida, February 5, 1716, SD 837; Juan de Ayala y Escobar to King, November 19, 1717, SC 58-1-35/74. For complaints regarding excessive amounts spent on gifts to maintain Indian loyalties see: Interim Governor Juan de Ayala y Escobar to King on expenses of entertaining chiefs in St. Augustine, including aguardiente and chocolate, November 22, 1717, SC 58-1-30. Two letters from the Viceroy of New Spain to the King complaining of the 9,561 pesos spent by officials in St. Augustine in the previous year on Indians, October 31, 1722, SD 837.
material evidence to back up this promise in the form of outposts, men, and guns. Some outposts were rebuilt under Benavides, but did not last.69

In 1718, after many years of service on foreign battlefields, Governor Benavides found himself appointed to one of the more violent frontiers in the Spanish Americas. St. Augustine was, at worst, a doomed garrison, doing its best to survive the swirling eddies of raiding and retaliation in the region. At its best, it might be poised to reclaim lost territory and seriously challenge the struggling French and British projects in the region. Despite the sorry state of the presidio, Benavides grasped the opportunity present in 1718. He wrote to the king that with five hundred soldiers and the dispatch of new families to settle the countryside, the Spanish might win back lost ground.70 Repopulating and refortifying the city and countryside was difficult because peace after the Yamassee War was not long-lasting. The War of the Quadruple Alliance (1719-1723) led to another scramble for colonial territory, although military action on land in the Southeast was less than many anticipated.71

This conflict pitted Spain against an alliance of Great Britain, Austria, France, and the Netherlands as French and Spanish Bourbons fought over the French throne. The Spanish fortified their frontier and attempted to regain the allegiance of the Yamassee now associated with St. Augustine. When French forces took Pensacola in 1719, the garrison stationed at the

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69 On refortifying Apalache: King to Governor of Florida, February 17, 1716, SD 837; Interim Governor Juan de Ayala y Escobar to King, November 22, 1717, SC 58-1-30; José Primo de Rivera report on progress, April 28, 1718, SC 58-1-30.

70 Governor Benavides to King, August 12, 1718, SC 58-1-30; Governor Benavides to King, September 30, 1718, SC 58-1-30.

71 Most action took place at sea. A Spanish force was amassed in Havana to take Charleston once and for all. Meanwhile, Jean-Baptiste Le Moyne de Bienville, then the commandant of Louisiana, managed to take Pensacola for the French. The Havana force had to be diverted to rescue Pensacola first, but was intercepted by a French fleet in the Caribbean and never made it to either city. Rumors of an attack on Charleston by a large Spanish fleet circulated in 1719. The fleet, however, was the same one that was destroyed by French on its first expedition to Pensacola. Thus, the attack never materialized. Hoffman, Florida’s Frontiers, 183-7.
blockhouse in Apalache was removed to St. Augustine, leaving the native population settled there to fend for itself. Later that year fifty English and Creek assailants attacked three Yamassee villages settled near St. Augustine. A Spanish counter-attack failed, leading to more casualties. After these attacks, the colonies on the continent limited themselves to improving their defenses while conflict continued elsewhere. Benavides assembled the funds designated for rebuilding the town after 1702 as well as local pledges and used them to rebuild the city’s defenses. He ordered the repair of the Cubo Line, a wall which extended west from the Castillo de San Marcos. He also added a defensive line along the western side of the city, named the Rosario Line.\textsuperscript{72}

The English also improved their fortifications with the construction of Fort King George on the mouth of the Altamaha River in 1721. Many rounds of diplomatic activity by the Spanish in the 1720s could not dislodge it, including appeals to the 1670 Treaty of Madrid which gave the Spanish legal claim to the land. Although the fort was abandoned before diplomatic discussion could resolve anything, one fact emerged repeatedly from the discussions. All issues of legality aside, the English were ready to claim the land through settlement and the Spanish were not.\textsuperscript{73} Nevertheless, in contemporary histories, the Spanish claimed the land of Florida, which they still imagined to include all of the yet-unexplored landmass to which it was attached. This concept of “Florida” as pertaining to most of the continent endured into the eighteenth century. For example, Andrés Gonzales de Barcía Carballido y Zúñiga titled his book published in 1723 as “Chronological History of the Continent of Florida” and presented a history of activity from Canada to the Gulf.\textsuperscript{74} Even an English travel account published in 1762 observes


\textsuperscript{73} Hoffman, \textit{Florida’s Frontiers}, 188-192.

\textsuperscript{74} Barcía, \textit{Chronological History of the Continent of Florida}, 264.
that “the general name of Florida was given by the Spaniards to all that part of North America lying to the north of the Gulf of Mexico, and bordering on the Atlantic Ocean to the east.”

Further evidence is found in the 1742 *Historical Proof of Spain’s Title to Georgia* written by engineer Antonio Arredondo. Arredondo was a military engineer sent from Havana and his report represents the most comprehensive source on the borderlands between Florida and Georgia at this period. He participated in the governor’s shuttle diplomacy and issued an extensive report on the need for improvements in St. Augustine’s defenses as well as the type of force which would be necessary to launch an attack on Georgia. Among Arredondo’s proofs was the assertion that everything belonged to Spain by virtue of the discovery of Columbus. Moreover, Florida was part of the *Tierra Firme*, or mainland of the Spanish Empire. Arredondo uses the term *Tierra Firme* denote all of North America. This is noteworthy since the term usually had a narrower meaning. *Tierra Firme* was used as a general term to describe the Spanish American mainland, the core of early settlement from Mexico to South America in the sixteenth century, as in: “Islas y Tierra Firme,” or “Islands and firm land (or mainland).” As exploration continued *Tierra Firme* became a political unit which encompassed the southern coast of the Caribbean Sea from the tropical lowlands of Central America to the northern coast of South America. In his report, Arredondo was writing or re-writing historical geography in order to legitimize Spanish claims to Georgia.

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76 Arredondo, *Arredondo’s Historical Proof of Spain’s Title to Georgia*, 225-6. Arredondo states “con quanta mayor razón y justicia por este propio derecho, deven ser dueños del todo, siendo como es la Florida tierre firme con los Reynos de Nueva España.”

When James Oglethorpe founded Georgia in 1733 in what had once been the province of Guale, he set off yet another flurry of organizing declarations, titles, and other formal documentable Spanish claims to the land. In 1736 he placed a small garrison on San Juan Island just north of the St. John’s River in order to establish a claim to Georgia’s southernmost point, also called Fort George (Figure 2-3). Despite the obvious superiority of de facto occupation, the Spanish still sought to reinforce their title to the land formally. In this instance, the imperial and intellectual exercise of proving title to the ownership of land touched the lives of the average citizens of St. Augustine. Governors and notaries in St. Augustine assembled histories of Florida. Long-time residents were interviewed and their testimonies notarized in order to convert oral history into legal documents. Concern for claims to the land influenced local practices and strategies. Hoffman suggests that ultimately, the competition for Georgia was caught up in a larger battle between Spain and England which was being played out on the seas and culminated in the War of Jenkins’ Ear (1739-48). In the 1739 Convention of El Pardo, the two nations debated “the questions of English claims against Spanish coast guard ships and ‘English rights’ in the Americas.” Despite Spanish insistence that the English support their claims with documentary evidence, the House of Commons called upon the government to uphold “English possessions.” As discussed at the beginning of the chapter, the English defined “possession” by the permanent occupation of land. These differences precluded any resolution on the border issues in Florida.78

In his own bid to occupy territory and in anticipation of hostilities with the English, Governor Manuel de Montiano established the fortified free black settlement of Gracia Real de

78 Hoffman, Florida’s Frontiers, 192. The interpretation of the Florida-Georgia border conflict as part of the larger dispute over rights to movement and occupation in the Americas which led to the War of Jenkins’ Ear dates to 1925 in Bolton, The Debatable Land, cited above. It was published again in 1974 in a volume edited by Francis Bannon, Bolton and the Spanish Borderlands (University of Oklahoma Press, 1974).
Santa Teresa de Mose in 1738. The founding population was composed largely of former slaves who had fled South Carolina and been granted their freedom. Thirty-eight men and their families built the initial homesteads, composing a total population of about one hundred people, according to Landers. As the black slave population grew, so too did the number of runaways. Governor Montiano offered asylum and settlement at Fort Mose to those who made it to Florida in 1738 and 1739. Florida was also the destination of the slaves who participated in the Stono Rebellion of September 1739 in South Carolina. The men of Fort Mose were formed into a militia and expected to defend St. Augustine from English attack. Fear of re-enslavement by the English was probably more motivational than loyalty to their new king.79

The disputes between the Spanish and English culminated in the War of Jenkins’ Ear, beginning in 1740. Oglethorpe took advantage of the outbreak of hostilities and launched an attack on St. Augustine. He brought troops and volunteers from South Carolina and Georgia, 600 Creek and Uchise allies, 800 slaves, and seven warships from Jamaica to bear on the city. The Mose militia, accompanied by Spaniards and Indians composed patrol units who met Oglethorpe’s scouts. As English forces began to capture Mose homesteaders, Governor Montiano withdrew the people of Mose to the Castillo. The Spanish were once again crowded inside the fort writing for aid and waiting for reinforcements. This time, however, their forces were stronger. Spanish troops, free blacks, and Indians left the fort and re-took Mose in a bloody surprise attack. The victory was extremely demoralizing to the English forces, and like Moore, Oglethorpe faced discontented men who had been promised easy spoils. With the arrival of support from Havana and the onset of hurricane season, the siege was lifted. The Jamaican warships sailed away, leaving Oglethorpe and his men to struggle home on foot. In 1741,

Montiano launched an unsuccessful counter-attack on South Carolina. Oglethorpe attempted two more assaults in 1742 and 1743, but neither was successful. For the duration of the war, colonists settled into an uncomfortable stalemate. Meanwhile, slaves continued to flee to Florida.80

Ownership of the land between English-occupied Georgia and Spanish-occupied Florida remained unresolved, as both nations continued to claim it as their own. Bolton, in his work on the Spanish Southeast gave the region the nickname the “debatable land.” Though the Spanish and the English had discussed using this area as a buffer zone, it was hardly neutral territory.81 Raids, counter-raids, and corsair attacks took place so frequently that at one point Montiano described St. Augustine as a hospital. Once again, the countryside was a dangerous place. The homesteaders who had fled Mose in 1740 did not return. Farming was limited and provisions were scarce. Spanish attempts at populating the countryside became increasingly desperate. Officials even offered a pardon to deserters in exchange for building a farm in the country. Given the naval nature of this war, imported food supplies were also unreliable. Despite commercial and political prohibitions, St. Augustine had come to rely heavily on trade with Charleston, Savannah, and New York in recent decades.82 Thus, the war interrupted both the legal and illegal commerce. The situado was supposed to have been reformed with the advent of the Havana Company in 1740. In exchange for a license from the crown, the company agreed to undertake the provisioning of the Florida situado and the delivery of Canary Islander settler families to the presidio. Everyone agreed that given the war, it was too dangerous to transport settlers, and so the Canary Islander scheme was set aside again. Peace in 1748 led to several changes including

81 Bolton, Debatable Land, 81, 98-100.
increased trade with the English colonies through the licensed trade of the Havana Company and illicit commerce. The Spanish military forces were also reorganized with four fixed companies (390 men) and one rotating company from Havana (110 men). The increase in trade and the number of soldiers likely also contributed to increased economic activity in the city including shops and taverns. Finally, the Spanish made new attempts to repopulate the countryside.83

Governor Fulgencio García de Solís sought to reestablish Fort Mose in 1752, but found that the African-American community resisted his orders. They complained that the frontier was too dangerous, but Solís dismissed this, saying that their reticence was due to their “desire to live in complete liberty.” This was apparently an unacceptable excuse. The black townspeople were finally forced to move. The governor paid them from the royal treasury in order to build new homes and fortify the town. They were also given a detachment of Spanish cavalrymen to supplement the militia. Fort Mose continued to receive new residents while it appears that others managed to return to life in St. Augustine.84 The Canary Island settlers who arrived in 1757 found that less convincing provisions had been made for their arrival. Three hundred sixty-three arrived that year and were given land between St. Augustine and Fort Mose. The next year, another group arrived and was settled just south of the city at the old Indian village of La Punta. Isleño colonists experienced the same problems that the Indian refugees had: unproductive soil and a violent frontier. Most of the 664 Isleño settlers eventually settled into small cottages around the city walls.85 Many participated in the militia or infantry and some intermarriage

83 Hoffman, Florida’s Frontiers, 199-201; Landers, Black Society in Spanish Florida, 45-7.
84 Landers, Black Society in Spanish Florida, 47-50, 53.
85 Letter from Governor of Florida to King, November 1, 1758, SD 2660; Hoffman, Florida’s Frontiers, 201-2; Marchena Fernández and Pozo Redondo, “La Emigración Canaria a la Florida Oriental Española (1600-1821)” in Equipo Florida (Sevilla: Universidad de Sevilla, 1992), 38-9. When the Isleños arrived, the city was currently under siege by hostile Uchises (members of the Lower Creek). Though the Spanish were nominally neutral in the French and Indian War, they were not exempted from the violence of the frontier. On the difficulty of cultivating the land
occurred. Overall, however, they seem to have been a marginalized population occupying the outer rim of urban life and suffering a high mortality rate.\footnote{Marchena Fernández and Pozo Redondo, “La Emigración Canaria,” 39-40; CPR, Interments, 1757, located on microfilm, SAHSRL. The first Isleño settler to appear in the internment records was Sebastian Callo, on September 23, 1757 which was just shortly after the group’s arrival.}

Military reforms also continued. New regulations in 1753 made Florida an outpost dependent on Havana. Meanwhile, frontiersmen from Georgia continued to venture into the unofficial buffer zone. As David Weber explains in his work, part of the clash over territory stemmed from the incredible population growth in the English colonies. Within thirty years of its founding, the white population of Carolina was double that of Florida. There were roughly 1,500 Spaniards, mestizos, and people of African descent in St. Augustine in 1700, as compared with 3,800 whites and 2,800 slaves in Carolina. By 1745, the total population of Carolina was 20,300 as compared to 2,100 in Florida.\footnote{Weber, \textit{Spanish Frontier in North America}, 179, 214.} Settlements often appeared in the buffer zone unofficially, established by malcontents from Virginia and Georgia who had settled out of reach of their English governors.\footnote{By 1755 multiple settlements had appeared on the Satilla River, the most recent called New Hanover. Some of these residents were called “Gray’s Gang”. They also engaged in trade with the Indians. The English suspected that the Spanish had welcomed the trouble-makers into the territory.}

The Spanish had managed to stay neutral in the Seven Years War between England and France, and relations between the Spanish and English in the Southeast had been calm, though low-intensity, internecine raiding continued between hostile native groups. The Spanish finally entered the war in 1761 on the side of the French. Two years later, with the English in possession just north and south of the city: Andrea P. White, “Living on the Periphery: A Study of an Eighteenth Century Yamassee Mission Community in Colonial St. Augustine,” (M.A. thesis, College of William and Mary, 2002), 106-110; Willet Boyer III, “Nuestra Señora del Rosario de la Punta: Lifeways of an Eighteenth-Century Colonial Spanish Refugee Mission Community, St. Augustine, Florida,” (M.A. thesis, University of Florida, 2005), 98-101. The Yamassee appear to have dug trenches for irrigation, used raised beds for the maize, and fertilized the area with shell and lime in order to compensate for problems of the low soil pH and high water table. These methods are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5.
of Havana, the King of Spain reluctantly acceded to the British offer to exchange it for Florida. Meanwhile, Louisiana was transferred to Spain. The final evidence of Florida’s perceived strategic significance was the English preference for Florida instead of all of Louisiana, which the French offered as an alternative.\(^{89}\) In 1763, the presidio of St. Augustine was signed over to the English. Preparations to evacuate the city began immediately. The records kept by Eligio de la Puente offer historians an excellent inventory of the homes and moveable goods of the final St. Augustine residents in 1764.\(^{90}\)

Despite two hundred years of colonization, Florida was still a frontier province in 1763. Permanent Spanish settlement in the region had been constricted to a radius of a few miles outside the city. Although officials in St. Augustine, Havana, and Madrid could produce endless documents and testimonies to support Spanish claims to ownership of the region, these were insufficient. During the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, floods of immigrants arrived from England and its colonies and the English definition of colonization prevailed. The expansive Spanish claim to all of North America was steadily eroded by French and English settlements. The governors of Florida were almost all military men with experience on foreign battlefields. All intellectual and diplomatic arguments aside, they understood the basic principle that to maintain control, they needed effective occupation. Even on the frontier, however, the prejudices displayed in other parts of the Spanish Americas continued to operate. The subsequent

\(^{89}\) Hoffman, *Florida’s Frontiers*, 208-9. Though the Seven Years War was fought primarily between the French and the English, the Spanish chose to join the fray and assist the French in 1762 in order to prevent an English victory. They were unsuccessful, and the English managed to take Havana later that year. In treaty negotiations, Spain was forced to choose between Florida and Havana, and elected to cede Florida to the English in exchange for the return of Havana. Aside from the opportunity to establish strategic ports for maritime activity, the actual potential for profitable economic endeavors in Florida was the source of much debate.

\(^{90}\) Reports by don Juan José Eligio de la Puente, January 9, 1764, AGI CUBA 372, ff. 1-31. This section of the legajo was labeled part E, but the parts did not appear in order. Casas de Florida, July 28, 1764, CUBA 372; Weber, *Spanish Frontier in North America*, 199.
chapters examine the opportunities and limitations faced by Spaniards, Floridanos, Indians, and Africans in living and working in St. Augustine.
Figure 2-1. The Southeast, 1650

Indigenous Groups Near Spanish Florida c. 1650
- European town
- Native town
Figure 2-2. Yamassee Raids on Spanish Missions, 1680s
Figure 2-3. European Settlements c. 1739
CHAPTER 3
PATTERNS OF HISPANIC IMMIGRATION AND POPULATION

Spanish authorities in Florida tried to solidify their claims to the territory through whatever means were available. Their strategies were consistent with those used in other parts of the Spanish empire such as seeking the support of unconquered indigenous allies, employing black militias, encouraging the settlement of Spanish colonists, and expanding the garrison with reinforcements.\(^1\) In Florida officials employed these methods simultaneously and adapted as opportunities arose.\(^2\) For most governors, the priorities were acquiring settlers and increasing the number of soldiers allotted to the presidio. Soldiers and settlers could be recruited from either Spain or Spanish America, although authorities in Florida and the Council of the Indies preferred Spaniards.\(^3\) Despite regulations stipulating that only Spaniards and their descendants could serve in the Spanish Army in the Americas, criollos, mestizos, and mulattos were frequently enlisted in some regions, such as Mexico.\(^4\) Officials in Florida managed to obtain large groups of


\(^3\) On the preference for Spaniards, Juan Marchena Fernández, *Oficiales y Soldados en el Ejército de América* (Sevilla: Escuela de Estudios Hispanoamericanos, 1983), 112-14, 271-2. Almost all of the governors of Spanish Florida were peninsulares with extensive service records in the Spanish army, serving on the battlefields of Italy, Flanders, and Northern Africa. For those serving after 1700, see Tepaske, *Governorship of Spanish Florida*, 16-19. For service records of the governors of Spanish Florida, see Residencias found in EC, Legajos 155-C, 156 A-C, 157 A-C, PKYL.

\(^4\) Letter from Interim Governor Ponce de León to the Queen, May 8, 1674, SD 226; Marchena Fernández, *Oficiales y Soldados*, 272-7. In theory, only Spaniards and their descendants could serve in the Spanish infantry. Historian
reinforcements from 1670 to 1690, in 1702, and again from 1740 to 1753. The process of reinforcement was gradual before 1690, as only several hundred men trickled in over a twenty year period. In 1702 approximately one hundred men were sent as reinforcements by the Governor of Cuba. The third period was characterized by the arrival of over five hundred men at once and the regular rotation of companies between Florida and Havana, guaranteeing the regular introduction of new troops.⁵

Florida officials did not enjoy the same success in obtaining settlers for Florida. As a result, the arrival of soldiers constituted the majority of Hispanic immigration until the 1750s. Some officers arrived with families, but most soldiers were bachelors. Many chose to make the best of their posting by marrying into local families. Those who prospered provided a concrete example upon which officials could build their expectations for future groups of settlers. This chapter examines patterns of military-driven immigration to Florida. It provides a fuller narrative of how immigration took place and examines some case studies to illuminate interpersonal relations. The chapter begins with a discussion of the sources and historiography of previous demographic studies of Spanish Florida. Next it provides a narrative of Hispanic immigration to the city utilizing correspondence, muster rolls, and parish records. Finally, it examines some of the groups with distinct regional or provincial origins. This discussion of actual immigration will, in turn, provide context for the following chapter, which examines the construction of an

Juan Marchena Fernández, however, argues that as with other restrictions, this was often disregarded. The need for more soldiers was constant and led to the recruitment of individuals with notably darker complexions. In particular, two Florida governors remarked upon the mestizos and mulattos who the Viceroy of New Spain sent to St. Augustine as reinforcements in the wake of the 1668 Searles raid. In Florida, the admission of criollos was formally approved in 1692 as a means of keeping complete the dotación, the full complement of soldiers assigned to the garrison.

idealized settler-soldier that emerges in the correspondence of royal officials throughout this period.

**Sources of Population Data**

The records available to reconstruct the demography of colonial St. Augustine are scattered and inconsistent for the first period of Spanish occupation. The Catholic parish records represent the best source of demographic data for the colony, though the quality of the records varies with each parish priest. Most other extant population data come from two sources: censuses derived from ecclesiastical visits and occasional estimates of the population in and around St. Augustine. The latter usually appeared in reports of the number of civilians taking shelter in the fort as a result of attacks on the city, and provide only a rough estimate of the total headcount. A third source is the body of reports from the treasury officials which contained muster rolls and lists of all those in St. Augustine receiving pay through the situado. These too reflect inconsistent reporting.

Given the absence of consistent censuses of the civilian population, the Catholic Parish Records represent the best source for demographic information on the colony, and most population studies have focused on those individuals who appear in the records of baptisms, marriages, and interments. The simplicity of these lists masks the complexities of colonial life surrounding these sacraments. Baptismal records represent a variety of different individuals introduced to Catholic life. In most cases, a healthy baby was baptized two or three weeks after its birth, usually by the parish priest or his assistant. Another type of entry was baptism “in necessity.” These baptisms could be conducted by any competent Catholic adult to save the soul of someone who was dying. This was most frequently carried out by a midwife or godparent if the baby’s life was in danger. Shipwreck victims who were not already Catholic were often also
baptized this way.\textsuperscript{6} There were also adult baptisms, especially those of runaway slaves from Carolina.\textsuperscript{7} The rate of abandoned babies increased significantly after 1740 when larger numbers of soldiers were stationed in the city and rotated regularly. Most babies were abandoned at the door of the church or the home of a prominent citizen and therefore were also baptized. Related data such as the origins of the parents were recorded inconsistently, making it difficult to track the backgrounds of parents accurately. Baptismal records for the years of 1668 to 1763 were examined for this study.\textsuperscript{8}

Marriages were festive occasions and important in terms of social standing in the community. Marriage to a soldier provided access to privileges in St. Augustine including pensions for widows and children. The marriages in the St. Augustine parish records do not include any Spaniard who married an Indian woman of the mission provinces, since such marriages would have been conducted by the friar presiding over the bride’s village. Thus, it is likely that the marriage records fairly closely represented the actual rate of marriages only among partners living in the St. Augustine parish. Moreover, the marriage records do not represent the number of informal unions in the city and especially in the countryside. Substantial evidence of short-term, informal relationships in St. Augustine appears in the complaints of the parish priests and the auxiliary bishop as well as criminal cases. As noted above, the increased number of

\begin{footnotes}

\item[7] Robert L. Kapitzke, \textit{Religion, Power, and Politics in Colonial St. Augustine} (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2001), 14. Some professed to be Catholic already, but the priests seem to have doubted the extent of their knowledge and catechized and baptized them again for good measure.

\end{footnotes}
abandoned children, coinciding with the peak presence of soldiers in the colony also hints at impermanent and extra-marital relationships.⁹

There were probably some long-term, stable, yet unofficial relationships as well. Recent scholarship on colonial Spanish American cities has suggested that this type of relationship was probably more common than previously thought.¹⁰ Several factors, however, may have inhibited such a practice in St. Augustine. Despite the official designation of “city,” St. Augustine was a small town with active priests and friars who took it upon themselves to correct indecent behavior. Moreover, most individuals were attached to military service in some fashion, and widows and orphans could petition for support from the crown if a soldier died. Thus marriage would have offered an extra degree of protection.¹¹ One noteworthy exception was Governor Francisco de la Guerra y Vega who waited until his term ended in 1672 to marry his mistress, Doña Lorenza Aspiolea. This also entailed the subsequent legitimation of their daughter Augustina, born on February 10, 1671. For this study, all marriage records from 1668 to 1763 were examined. As noted in the table below, separate books for black and white marriages were

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⁹ CPR, Baptismal Records, 1594-1763; Francisco de Sotolongo to the King on the mistresses kept by Governor Guerra y Vega, July 4, 1668, SC 54-5-20; Autos collected by Antonio de Benavides in 1721 regarding allegations of an illicit relationship and terminated pregnancy involving parish priest Pedro Lorenzo de Acevedo, 1721, SC 58-1-29. Bishop of Cuba to King on scandalous behavior as a result of lack of appropriate oversight, December 22, 1722, SC 58-1-29/47; Auxiliary Bishop Francisco de San Buenaventura Martinez Tejada to the King, April 29, 1736, SD 863; Testimony against don Juan de Paredes, auto March 10, 1735, SD 2584, cited from Kapitzke, Religion, Power, and Politics, 156. On rates of illegitimate children, see Juan Ignacio Arnaud Rabinal, Alberto Bernárdez Alvarez, Pedro Miguel Martín Escudero, and Felipe del Pozo Redondo, “Estructura de la Población de una Sociedad de Frontera: la Florida Española, 1600-1763,” Revista Complutense de Historia de América 17 (1991): 102-3.


¹¹ Francisco de Sotolongo to the King, July 4, 1668, SC 54-5-20. For examples of detailed petitions, see Petition of Alonso de Arguelles, 1670, SC 54-5-18; Royal Cédula, February 4, 1671, SC 58-1-21/60; Petition of Francisca de Leyba y Artiaga, January 29, 1671, SC 54-5-18. Petitions on the part of soldiers in Florida for either an increase in salary or a plaza muerta, or similar petitions from widows, make up a significant amount of the correspondence related to St. Augustine. They represent one of many survival strategies for residents in Florida. Although they have been utilized as sources of service records for soldiers, the social significance of these documents has not received thorough analysis.
established in 1735, and the record of white marriages in the city from 1758 through 1763 has been lost (Table 3-1).  

A large number of parish interment records have also been lost. Those that survive do not reflect events such as mass burials, which took place in the wake of epidemics. Thus, it is likely that the number of deaths exceeds the number of interments recorded by the parish priests. Further, there is very little information recorded regarding the burial practices for Spanish individuals who died outside the city, although some archaeologists have begun to correct this problem. The absence of records of these events makes it difficult to calculate rates of mortality for the soldiers and civilians of St. Augustine between 1638 and 1719.

Ecclesiastical censuses represent the next important category of demographic data (Table 3-2). The secular clergy of Florida were under the jurisdiction of the Bishop of Cuba. Most bishops tried to avoid the wild and unpleasant Florida frontier, and visited only once, or preferably, avoided the trip altogether. After years of negotiation with the crown and with unwilling appointees, the position of auxiliary bishop was finally successfully filled in 1735. When he arrived in 1675, Bishop Don Gabriel Díaz Vara Calderón was the first in seventy years to conduct such a visit. He spent ten months in Florida conducting confirmations and seeking to expand the mission field. The bishop’s report is valuable for its description of the missions and

12 CPR, Baptismal Records, 1671; CPR, Marriage Records, 1672.

14 Bonnie G. McEwan, “Hispanic Life on the Seventeenth-Century Florida Frontier,” in The Spanish Missions of La Florida, ed. Bonnie G. McEwan (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1993): 313-7; Bushnell, Situado and Sabana, 86-8; Kapitzke, Religion, Power, and Politics, 78-9; Only some of the interments record books have survived, leaving a large gap in the record, as illustrated in the table below. A final point worth noting is that the full cost of burial was also high. In St. Augustine, there were several cofradías, or lay religious organizations, designed to assist members with the expenses of the appropriate burial and obsequies. Those who died without any family or cofradía to support them had their burials paid by the royal treasury which was frequently slow to compensate the priest performing the ritual.

estimates of their current population as well as his observations on the religious practices of the indigenous population. Another report submitted in 1689 by the Bishop of Cuba, Diego Evelino y Compostela offers an estimate of the total number of Christians and their families in the province. Censuses of the mission population were also taken by civil authorities. Each governor was obligated to conduct a tour of the mission provinces, called a visita, to ensure the good treatment of the indigenous population, hear complaints, and adjudicate disputes between Indians and Spaniards. The governors also attempted to avoid the lengthy and dangerous trip through the provinces by delegating the responsibility to lieutenants. Not all the visita records survive, but those which do reveal not only mission populations, but evidence of larger patterns of demographic change.

Once the missions were reduced to refugee villages, alternately called doctrinas or simply pueblos, civil authorities and Franciscan friars recorded their numbers as well. The early refugee population was documented frequently in terms of the quantities of corn received through the situado. Once the Yamassee and Creek arrived in 1715, they increased the population of the refugee pueblos substantially. Population censuses between 1717 and 1728 reveal a substantial indigenous refugee population, peaking at 1,350 people in 1728. Shortly thereafter, however, a

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16 Letter of Bishop don Gabriel Díaz Calderón, 1675, SC 54-3-2; Letter from Diego Evelino y Compostela, September 28, 1689, SC 54-3-2/9. Diego Evelino y Compostela used this information to argue for the need of an auxiliary bishop to be assigned to Florida. His own distaste at the prospect of a journey through Florida was part of his motivation as well.

17 Domingo de Leturiondo, Visitations of the Provinces of Apalache and Timucua and Antonio de Arguelles, Visitation of the Province of Guale, 1677-8, enclosed in residencia of Pablo de Hita Salazar, EC, 156B, ff 519-615v; Joaquín de Florencia, Visitations of the Provinces of Apalache and Timucua and Juan de Pueyo, Visitation of the Province of Guale, 1694-5, enclosed in residencia of Laureano de Torres Ayala, EC 157A, ff. 44-205.

18 Letter from Governor Córcoles y Martínez to the King, 1711, April 9, 1711, SC 58-1-3/20; Letter from Córcoles y Martínez to the King, January 25, 1716, SC 58-1-30.

19 Census enclosed in Interim Governor Juan de Ayala y Escobar to the King, April 8, 1717, SC 58-1-30. This 1717 census was conducted by cavalry captain Joseph Primo de Rivera who visited each of the ten settlements and provided a list of the political allegiances of each group as well as population data. It is the most detailed source on the Yamassee population of the pueblos.
raid from Charleston conducted by Colonel John Palmer killed and captured many of those individuals and drove many of the Yamassee peoples settled around the city to abandon their alliance with the Spanish. This significantly reduced the indigenous population surrounding the city. Subsequent reports demonstrate a declining indigenous population, reaching a low of eighty-six individuals at the time of evacuation in 1763. The causes of this apparent decline are examined in detail in chapters four and five.

A general headcount was recorded on several occasions when St. Augustine was under attack, and the citizens of the city fled to the fort for protection. These reports include the number of individuals in the city on business and the repartimiento laborers as well as permanent residents. Thus they represent the average number of people in the city at a given time rather than solely its permanent residents. In an attempt to assess the status of the beleaguered province of Florida, the Council of the Indies commissioned several reports on the population of the city and the state of the province in the 1750s and 1760s. These reports varied in quality and detail. The 1756 report produced by Don Pedro Sánchez Griñán is interesting because it is a descriptive assessment of life in St. Augustine in the 1730s and 1740s. Unfortunately for demographers, Griñán wrote the report from memory ten years after his time in Florida, so many...

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21 Subsequent reports on the dwindling number of Indians left living in or near St. Augustine came from the Auxiliary Bishop Buenaventura Martínez Tejada (1736), military engineer Antonio de Arredondo who surveyed the province in 1736 and produced a plan of the city which identified Indian villages (1737), and letters from Governor Manuel de Montiano in 1738 and 1739. Although the number of Indians continued to be recorded, they were consolidated into fewer and fewer villages. As the number of villages diminished, so too did the need for reports outlining the various villages and their ethno-linguistic composition. In subsequent years they were included as just another subset of the population of St. Augustine. Antonio de Arredondo to King, November 27, 1736, SC 87-1-1/60; Plano de la Ciudad, May 15, 1737, map photostat, St. Augustine Historic Preservation Board; Letter from Governor Manuel de Montiano to the King, June 4, 1738, SC 58-2-1; Letter from Governor Manuel de Montiano to the King, June 23, 1739, SC 58-2-1.

22 Viceroy Marques de Mancera to the King, April 20, 1669, 58-2-2/14; Governor of Florida to the King, April 28, 1685, SC 58-2-6/3; Letter from Governor Zuñiga y Cerda to the King, November 5, 1702, SC 58-2-8/243; Governor Montiano to Governor of Cuba Juan Francisco de Güemes y Horcasitas, May 13, 1740, SC 87-1-3.
of his assessments are estimates. Historians have concluded that his account is reliable in
general, with small discrepancies, such as the number of buildings in the city. In 1760, Juan
Joseph Solana also produced a report on the population of St. Augustine for the king. This was
the first to systematically identify every individual in St. Augustine. Three years later, the
Spanish ceded Florida to the British in the Treaty of Paris which ended the Seven Years War,
and St. Augustine was evacuated. The evacuation records produced by Eligio de la Puente
include an exit census as almost everyone associated with Spanish society evacuated the colony.
The Puente report is most useful since he enumerates every individual leaving St. Augustine,
providing data on the origins of each evacuee.

Military and defensive assessments also provide important demographic information. Muster
rolls and reports from the royal treasurers revealed that the number of individuals on the
crown payroll in some form or another included royal officials, friars, officers, soldiers, exiles,
penal laborers, royal slaves, widows and orphans, and Indians. The most extensive of these is
the 1752 Gelabert Report which presents a description of individuals on the royal payroll. This
included royal officials, friars, officers, and soldiers, destierros or exiles, forzados or penal
laborers, and Indians. Muster rolls are useful in that they enumerate the name and rank of all

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23 Michael C. Scardaville, and Jesus Maria Belmonte, “Florida in the First Spanish Period: The 1756 Griñán

24 Juan Joseph Solana Report to the King, April 9, 1760, SC 86-7-21/41; Reports by don Juan José Eligio de la
Puente, January 9, 1764, CUBA 372.

25 Junta de Guerra de Indias, March 8, 1669, SC 58-2-2/12; Nicolas Ponce de Leon to the King, July 8, 1673, SC 58-
1-21; Governor Hita Salazar to King, August 26, 1675, SC 54-5-14/140; Governor Zúñiga y Cerda to King, March
15, 1702, SC 58-1-28; Governor Benavides, September 30, 1718, SC 58-1-30.

26 Royal Officials to King, April 18, 1696, SC 54-5-15; José Gelabert to the King of Spain, January 10, 1752, SC 87-
1-14/2. Muster rolls exist for the years 1671, 1680, 1683, 1687, 1699, 1701, 1706, 1707, 1708, 1709, 1712, 1714,
1719, 1737. Subsequent revistas and extracts are recorded annually, located in CUBA 336 and 337.

27 José Gelabert to the King of Spain, January 10, 1752, SC 87-1-14/2.
the military men in St. Augustine. \footnote{Black militia rosters also contribute to our understanding of demographic diversity in St. Augustine. Pardo and Moreno Militia, 1683, SD 226; Black Militia Company of Gracia Real de Santa Teresa de Mose, January 22, 1764, SD 2595; see also slaves petitioning for freedom, 1738, SD 844.}

Although the ingress of particular soldiers is not recorded, it is possible to identify individuals who must have arrived between one muster report and the next. By comparing these reports to the Catholic Parish Records, it is possible to identify which soldiers were relatively new, if and when they chose to marry, and what their average length of service was in St. Augustine.

These reports demonstrate that population assessments varied widely, due primarily to variations in the groups that were counted. The table below is composed of civil and ecclesiastical censuses and illustrates the variations. Several observations about the table below are significant to the discussion of immigration to St. Augustine. First, the extremely low number reported in 1675 is too low. Bishop Díaz Calderón mentions three hundred Spanish inhabitants of the city in his report. Elsewhere he recognizes that there are three hundred men in the dotación. It has been assumed that his estimate was three hundred people for the entire city. \footnote{Letter from Bishop Calderón, January 4, 1676, SC 54-3-2; see also Lucy L. Wenhold, trans. and ed., “A 17th Century Letter of Gabriel Díaz Vara Calderón, Bishop of Cuba, Describing the Indians and Indian Missions of Florida,” \textit{Smithsonian Miscellaneous Collections} 95 no. 16 (1936).}

This is obviously too low, especially given that Corbett has estimated 3.4 births per marriage during this time period, based on the parish records. \footnote{Corbett, “Population Structure in Hispanic St. Augustine,” 269. This measure of births is based on baptismal records (for which there are no corresponding internment records during these years) and thus does not account for infant and early childhood mortality. The sum of three hundred people total is first mentioned in Lucy L. Wenhold, 1936.} It is possible that Bishop Calderón’s report reflects the movement of people from the missions to the city. With the influx of around one hundred soldiers since 1668, it is possible that Calderón’s account actually represents three
hundred city inhabitants and three hundred solders in the dotación. This would make more sense in the context of the other demographic data for the city.\textsuperscript{31}

Second, the non-Spanish population of St. Augustine was also growing during this period, as slaves, forzados, and mission Indians came to the city to work on the construction of the new fort. Letters from the friars and the caciques of the mission provinces indicate that indigenous workers were often held for long terms of labor in the city. Others abandoned mission life entirely to pursue lucrative wage work in carpentry and construction in the city.\textsuperscript{32}

\textbf{Previous Population Studies}

The earliest study of St. Augustine’s population was published by geographer John R. Dunkle in 1958. He incorporated the Catholic parish records and reports found in official correspondence and offered important insights about overall patterns. Unfortunately, the article was published without footnotes in the \textit{Florida Historical Quarterly}, making his analysis difficult to verify, although the research is based on his unpublished 1955 dissertation.\textsuperscript{33}

Dunkle’s work was followed by two articles by Theodore G. Corbett. In these works, Corbett demonstrates a better understanding of his sources and uses correspondence, the few censuses, and military rosters to augment his research. His first article dealt with migration to Florida, particularly the origins of Hispanic immigrants. In this article he goes so far as to suggest that despite the utility of quantitative studies, the inconsistent data make them “at best tentative and

\textsuperscript{31} This estimate is based on the groups of fifty-one and forty-four listed above, plus the unidentified number that arrived on El Sevillano. Letter from Governor Cendoya to the King, October 31, 1671, SC 58-1-26; Interim Governor Ponce de León to the Queen, May 8, 1674, SD 226; José de Veitias Liange de Alberro to Queen, December 11, 1674, SD 226.

\textsuperscript{32} Construction of the Castillo appears in the second letter, beginning, ff. 19v. Also see letter 5 on manpower in Apalache, beginning ff. 22. Cendoya to Queen, March 24, 1672, SC 58-1-26; see ff. 19-22 on large number of Indians working on fortifications.

approximate.” Given the inconsistencies of other sources such as passenger lists and population schemes, he utilizes marriages records as the most consistent method of recognizing individuals who put down roots in St. Augustine. Corbett relied on Dunkle’s work only to determine the periodization of his study, grouping years based on Dunkle’s assessment of change over time, which he found to be consistent with his own research. Corbett divides this study into four time periods: 1658-1670, 1671-1691, 1692-1732, and 1733-1756. The second and fourth periods both show overall population growth in terms of the increased number of marriages. His research corrects the earlier assertions by Verne E. Chatelain and Albert C. Manucy that Canary Islanders or Galicians made up the largest groups who migrated from the Iberian Peninsula to Florida. Instead, Andalucians made up the largest percentage of peninsular grooms. Finally, he observes that by the 1750s, 11.5% of St. Augustine grooms were black. This corresponds with the 1764 evacuation report which identified people of African descent (free and enslaved) as 14% of the total population.

Corbett’s second work of historical demography relies primarily on the Catholic parish records, although he considers the censuses produced in 1689 by the Bishop of Cuba, in 1736 by the Auxiliary Bishop, in 1760 by Juan José Solana, and in 1763-4 by Eligio de la Puente. He uses the data to estimate rates of population growth and decline, rates of marriage, births per marriage, and mortality. He finds generally high mortality and low birth rates per marriage. Demographic decline was only limited by the constant arrival of new immigrants, primarily male. Corbett offers some initial insights into patterns of immigration based on marriages. He also attempts to compare these models to certain community typologies, but he draws these

34 Corbett, “Migration to a Spanish Imperial Frontier,” 414-8.
typologies from research on English colonies rather than Spanish colonies. Corbett’s studies were comparatively short, but laid important groundwork by demonstrating how the limited sources might be used. His work has been utilized in subsequent histories of St. Augustine, but no major studies of the city population have been published in English since these articles. The demography of the missions, on the other hand, has received extensive attention in recent years as historians and anthropologists examine the causes behind the significant demographic changes in the region among the indigenous population.

Researchers at the University of Seville have published in Spanish journals some of the best demographic studies of Spanish Florida since Corbett’s work. Scholars in Seville collected significant volumes of data from the Archive of the Indies which contains much of the documentation from the colonial Americas. Their database has yielded several useful demographic studies. Juan Marchena Fernández’s research focuses on the military population of Spanish St. Augustine. His 1981 article on the garrison and military population of Spanish Florida utilized service records and military rosters to examine the distribution of age, social class, regional origin, marriage patterns, and years of service for officers and soldiers in Florida in the eighteenth century. He incorporated this data into his book, published the following year, which presented a demographic study of officers and soldiers across the Americas in the


eighteenth century. In 1991, Equipo Florida, a team of researchers at the University of Seville, published an extensive demographic study on Spanish Florida. The team produced a database of 30,000 entries related to Florida in the Spanish archives and incorporated data from the Catholic Parish Records. They examine rates of birth, illegitimacy, mortality, marriage, and second marriages. They also examine rates of natural population increase versus overall population growth between 1740 and 1751. They find that only after 1748 did births begin to outpace deaths. In each period population growth took place due to immigration rather than reproduction.40

The shortcoming of most of the works described above is that they reveal little about the pace of immigration to Florida and how individuals did or did not settle into the community. Corbett, for example, suggests that St. Augustine never developed a town council or any civic life because the city was overwhelmed by transient and irresponsible soldiers. In support of this point he notes that the forzados and others who may have entered the service with criminal records were unlikely to be upstanding citizens. He is also likely correct that the soldiers may have disdained the idea of manual agricultural labor, although this was by no means limited to St. Augustine.41 Nevertheless, many soldiers married and became part of the city’s religious, social, and economic life. These studies also reveal little about the nature of interactions between groups such as Spaniards and criollos, soldiers and civilians, Indians and blacks.

Susan Parker’s research begins to fill this gap by examining the regional identities of Spanish immigrants, usually soldiers, who settled in St. Augustine during this period. She also examines means by which at least a few of the eighteenth-century Indian refugees managed to

41 Corbett, “Migration to a Spanish Imperial Frontier,” 420-1.
integrate themselves into the local society in St. Augustine. Her research reveals that largely through marriage or militia service, some were able to establish themselves as residents of the city rather than as Indians of the doctrinas. She provides several detailed examples of individuals who succeeded in becoming not just residents of the city, but individuals and families of some status. The majority of indigenous refugees were not so fortunate. The experiences of the indigenous population in St. Augustine after 1702 are examined in detail below in Chapter Four. The following section examines the typical process of immigration to the Florida frontier, the demographic impact of such migration, and the examples set by successful individuals and families.

**Hispanic Immigration and Population**

When he recruited the forces with which he would colonize Florida, Pedro Menéndez sought a combination of soldiers, farmers, and skilled craftsmen, men, women, and children. Before 1668, European immigrants arrived in a slow trickle and adapted to the ways and customs of the Floridanos. A small number also arrived against their will as *forzados*, criminals sentenced to penal labor. The early residents of Florida did not discover any readily exploitable resources or lucrative commodities (other than indigenous labor, which was protected by the Franciscans), so there was little to draw immigrants to Florida. Of the soldiers who were sent as reinforcements after 1668, it seems that a significant number chose to marry and start a family in Florida. Corbett attributes this behavior to desperation and loneliness. Marchena Fernández

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offers a more pragmatic interpretation, arguing that the soldiers in the Americas knew they were unlikely to be reassigned and went about developing their social lives accordingly. Soldiers could of course develop relationships in the community besides marriage. Single men, however, are far more difficult to identify in the documentary records unless they stood as witnesses to a marriage or as a godfather in a baptism. Through marriage records, service records, and muster rolls, the rest of this chapter will examine the arrival of soldiers, their ethnic backgrounds, and the rates at which they married.

Service records and petitions for retirement reveal that at least some Spanish soldiers managed to marry well and prosper during their time in Florida. Their children also served in the army, drew a salary, and usually married local women. Many such individuals had attained positions of power and influence by the beginning of the time period examined here. For example, Alonso de Argüelles declared in 1670 that his father had come to Florida in 1632. Alonso had served since 1646 and worked his way up from ensign to infantry captain. He had also been entrusted with the journey to Mexico to collect the situado. He petitioned the king for an augmented salary since, as he claimed, he was old, sick, and poor. Records show that his family owned a number of slaves, received a large land grant in the interior of Florida, and his son went on to serve as an infantry captain also. His heirs acquired a substantial amount of property on the eastern bank of the St. Johns River. Another example is that of Captain Matheo

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44 Corbett, “Migration to a Spanish Imperial Frontier in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries,” 415-6; Marchena Fernández, Oficiales y Soldados, 295.

45 Petition of Alonso de Argüelles, 1670, SC 54-5-18; Royal Cédula, February 4, 1671, SC 58-1-21/60. The best record of Argüelles family slaves is actually the Catholic parish records. Two slaves of Captain Antonio de Argüelles, Maria and Catharina, stood as godparents to a number of white children. This phenomenon is discussed further in Chapter Seven. CPR, Baptisms, Lorenzo, 1675, Alonso Joseph, 1694, Augustina de la Concepción, 1696, Lucia Catharina Carr, 1698, Aguedo Maria, 1699, and Francisco Joseph, 1699. On Spanish land grants, see James Miller, An Environmental History of Northeast Florida (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1998), 122-7. The extent to which the Spanish altered the landscape is difficult to determine, although small ranches were built on the eastern side of the river.
Luis de Florencia, who served in the presidio for fifty-six years. He worked his way up from regular soldier to captain and was also trusted with the collection of the situado. His sons went on to hold a number of important posts and the family acquired a large tract of land in the interior of Florida where they developed farms and ranches in the 1670s.\textsuperscript{46}

These men and their families are obviously examples of some of the most successful individuals in Florida. Most soldiers were not so lucky or long-lived. Nevertheless, these families demonstrated that the province was not as poor as some might suggest. Moreover, they built important family networks through which subsequent generations of Spanish soldiers could also attain property and influence in Florida. Here it is important to note that these connections were largely built upon marriage to locally-born women. Floridano brides often brought houses, urban plots, or rural land to their marriage as part of their dowry. Since they frequently raised daughters who also married in Florida, property inheritance in St. Augustine often took on a matrilineal pattern. A prime example is the Avero family, discussed at the end of this chapter.\textsuperscript{47}

The Searles attack in 1668 was a significant moment because it initiated imperial efforts to increase the number of able-bodied soldiers stationed in St. Augustine. The population of St. Augustine was small enough that such migration substantially influenced the city’s demographic composition.\textsuperscript{48} Following news of the attack, officials in Florida received encouraging responses

\textsuperscript{46} Petition of Francisca de Leyba y Artiaga, wife of Captain Matheo Luis de Florencia, January 9, 1671, SC 54-5-18/87; Royal Cédula, February 14, 1671, SC 58-1-21/62; Royal Cédula, February 14, 1671, SC 58-1-21/63; Visitations of Joachín de Florencia and don Juan de Pueyo, 1695, enclosed in Residencia of Governor Laureano de Torres y Ayala, November 16, 1700, EC 157A, PKYL. The Florencia family was one of the largest landowners in the province as well as employers of Indian workers. That Captain Joachín de Florencia also conducted the 1694-5 visita and dispensed justice for the Indians in the governor’s name served to further consolidate his power to the great disadvantage of native towns. Weber, \textit{Spanish Frontier in North America}, 126-8.

\textsuperscript{47} CPR, Marriages, 1668-1757; Parker, “Second Century,” 125-9. Criolla brides made up seventy percent of all brides recorded in the parish records and ninety-nine percent of all white brides. Criollo grooms, by contrast average only forty percent of all grooms recorded. Foreign Hispanic grooms averaged forty-three percent.

\textsuperscript{48} Marchena Fernández, “Guarniciones,” 91-4.
in letters from the King and the Viceroy of New Spain, promising men and materiel. Immediate assistance was dispatched from Cuba in the form of 1,200 pesos for assistance with a frigate crew, mast, and rigging since Governor Guerra y Vega needed to send a ship to the mission provinces for corn to feed the presidio. Guerra y Vega requested one hundred replacement soldiers, two gunners, fifty flintlock muskets, and payment of the current situado, plus an additional amount for extraordinary expenses. An emergency general council decided to pay the current Florida situado plus more from arrears. This was deemed adequate to send soldiers, gunpowder and lead, and order weapons from Mexico City. Shortly thereafter, Queen Marianna ordered the viceroy to add 50 extra soldiers and increase the situado accordingly. Initially, there were 300 plazas, or soldiers’ positions allotted to the presidio, but 43 were reserved to pay the friars, leaving a real maximum of 257 for soldiers. The Queen also ordered that the clergy be paid separately, creating a real increase of almost one hundred salaried positions. This increased the total number of soldiers stationed in the province to 350. The need for more soldiers was particularly important, not only because of low numbers, but because in the opinion of Guerra y Vega, the quality of the soldiers in St. Augustine was completely inadequate. He complained that many were old and no longer pulling their weight, having served thirty or forty years in the garrison already. He also requested that the Queen send Spanish soldiers and artillerymen, as he found those in St. Augustine to be generally

49 The council also authorized 24 escopetas to be shipped to Florida. This is the first documented introduction of flintlock weapons into the garrison in Florida. This would have been a welcome advancement since during the pirate attack some soldiers were killed as their matchlocks gave away their location at night. The council also permitted Floridians to keep a bronze cannon they had salvaged.

50 Viceroy of New Spain Marques de Mancera to Queen, March 15, 1670, SC 58-2-2/18 and December 26, 1670, SC 58-2-2/19; Governor Cendoya of Florida to Queen, March 24, 1672, SC 58-1-26; Governor Hita Salazar to the Queen, August 24, 1675, SC 58-1-26/39 and SC 58-1-26/40; Luis R. Arana, “The Basis of a Permanent Fortification,” 10; Luis R. Arana, “Aid to St. Augustine after the Pirate Attack, 1688-1670,” El Escribano 7 no. 3 (1970): 11-17. Sergeant Major Salvador de Cigarroa was sent to New Spain to collect men, materials, and the annual situado. He was joined by the treasurer Menéndez Marquez. They both petitioned the Viceroy for immediate aid for the colony.

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incompetent. He also objected to the reformado system, through which (usually) criollo soldiers in Florida received a soldiers’ pay, but were not required to carry out the typical duties such as standing guard and conducting routine patrols. Many governors, who were career military men, objected to this system, but few were willing to risk the hostility of the criollos to restrict the practice. Other individuals who received pay but did not serve, called *inefectivos*, also weighed down the dotación. These included widows, children, and pensioners. To correct some of these problems, the Queen removed the forty-three friars from the military payroll in 1673 and put them on the religious payroll instead. Another five soldiers were authorized in 1687, bringing the total for the garrison up to 355 plazas. This increase in the total plazas available opened the way for more reinforcements.

The number of reinforcements who arrived over the course of the next thirty years was not large, but it was significant enough to influence patterns of marriage and the overall demographic face of the colony. The number of soldiers requested, or even promised, cannot be interpreted as representative of the number of soldiers who arrived. Moreover, records of actual ingress are inconsistent or absent. The following reconstruction of immigration is based on surviving correspondence and the accounts of the royal treasury officials. The first

51 Governor Guerra y Vega to the Queen enclosed in Governor Francisco Davila Orejón to the Queen, October 29, 1668, SC 58-5-18/76.

52 Junta de Guerra de Indias to the Queen, March 8, 1669, SC 58-2-2/12; Kapitzke, Religion, Power, and Politics, 38; Marchena Fernández, Oficiales y Soldados, 77. The term reformado had multiple meanings. In the Spanish American army, Marchena Fernández describes the reformado as an officer who does the job of a higher rank, without having attained that rank. For example, a Teniente Reformado de Capitán would be a lieutenant carrying out the functions of a captain without the corresponding promotion. The practice in Florida, as described in the text above, was more along the lines of getting paid as a soldier, but only being held to the obligations of a militia man. Kapitzke explains that this phenomenon developed as “natives of Florida were allowed to enlist briefly as ensigns and then to promptly retire as reformados…the men served as reserve officers of the garrison and received the pay of a common foot soldier but were not subject to guard duty.” As reformados were considered equivalent to soldiers, every reformado meant one less active duty soldier on the roster.

53 Bushnell, Situado and Sabana, 46; Kapitzke, Religion, Power, and Politics, 38.
reinforcements arrived on June 1, 1669, but only two thirds of the promised men arrived. The Viceroy had finally agreed to send an extra seventy-two men to augment the garrison, but he struggled to obtain the necessary recruits, noting that there were few willing to give up their comfort for the violent frontier. The initial seventy-two men were depleted in various ways. Some were diverted for service in Campeche. Of the replacements that were provided by the criminal tribunal in Mexico City, many died or deserted. In total, the garrison received fifty-one men from New Spain in June: thirty-two soldiers and nineteen criminals forced into military service on the frontier. They were mostly mestizos and mulattos, and they met with a mixed reception in St. Augustine since some felt they would not make the best soldiers. That same day an unknown number of soldiers, led by Don Juan de Prado, also arrived with a load of flour on the vessel *El Sevillano*, but there is no surviving description of this force.54

The Junta de Guerra apparently understood the Governor’s complaint about criollo soldiers and communicated the problem to the Queen succinctly, noting that proper reinforcements were needed in Florida because the soldiers from New Spain were not “legitimate Spaniards.” The Junta recommended depositing one hundred Spanish soldiers in Florida to remedy the problem. This was more than an idle complaint since the army was supposed to be composed entirely of Spaniards and prohibitions existed against recruiting into the regular militia people of mestizo or African descent. In reality, the sheer size of the territory under the control of the Spanish empire made it necessary to enlist criollos, mestizos, mulattos, and others.55

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54 Arana, “Aid to St. Augustine after the Pirate Attack, 1688-1670,” 17; Corbett, “Migration to a Spanish Imperial Frontier,” 427-8.

55 Landers, *Black Society in Spanish Florida*, 22-3; Marchena Fernández, *Oficiales y Soldados*, 60-1; King Felipe IV of Spain issued a series of restrictions on the soldiers who could be levied in the Indies between 1643 and 1652 which appear in the Recopilación de Indias 3-10-12 and the Cedulario de Encinas, IV-56, cited in Marchena Fernández, *Oficiales y Soldados*, 61. By the mid-seventeenth century, the Spanish had begun to formally raise black and pardo militias, particularly in the circum-Caribbean. See Chapter 7, note 60 for literature on black and pardo militias.
Junta ordered that the garrison be reinforced with Spaniards, especially some who were artillerymen, since that skill set was apparently lacking in St. Augustine.\textsuperscript{56} Guerra y Vega was probably hoping for professional soldiers with some sort of combat experience and artillerymen with formal training. Neither quality was to be found exclusively in soldiers from Spain, but his desire for veteran peninsulares was understandable, particularly given his struggles with the local criollos and their exploitation of the reformado system.\textsuperscript{57}

Many of the recruits who arrived between 1669 and 1670 married over the course of the following twenty years. Of those who are listed in the muster roll of 1671, nine married in their first decade in Florida, and another ten in their second decade. Thus, about two-thirds of the soldiers in the first wave of reinforcements married into the local community. All the brides, with only one exception, were listed as white. Nicolás Mendes de Servantes married Juana Rodríguez de la Encarnación, a Timucua Indian, in 1687.\textsuperscript{58} The dotación stood at 257 able-bodied men in 1669 before the new arrivals appeared. Thirty-two additional men would have brought the total up to 289.\textsuperscript{59} The number that came on \textit{El Sevillano}, and stayed, is unaccounted for in the records. At least seventeen more men arrived the next year with the new governor, Manuel de Cendoya.\textsuperscript{60} In 1671, Cendoya asked for an increase in the dotación as he claimed to

\textsuperscript{56} Junta de Guerra de Indias to the Queen, March 8, 1669, SC 58-2-2/12. The need for trained artillerymen apparently persisted since it was repeated in Alonso de Leturiondo’s letter to the King, written c. 1700. John H. Hann, “Translation of Alonso de Leturiondo’s Memorial to the King of Spain,” \textit{Florida Archaeology} 2 (1986): 170.

\textsuperscript{57} Junta de Guerra de Indias to the Queen, January 22, 1669, SC 58-2-2/11; Junta de Guerra de Indias to the Queen, March 8, 1669, SC 58-2-2/12.

\textsuperscript{58} CPR, Marriages; Troop roll, July 6, 1671, enclosed in Governor Manuel de Cendoya to Crown, March 24, 1672, SC 58-1-26/16A; Troop roll, December 4, 1680, enclosed in Governor Marquez Cabrera to the King, June 28, 1683, SC 54-5-12/9. The marriage of Nicolás Méndes de Servantes to Juana Rodríguez de la Encarnación took place on November 5, 1687. Her parents were from the Timucua mission village of St. Catherine.

\textsuperscript{59} Besides the fifty-one men that arrived on June 1, 1669, the Viceroy of New Spain claimed that he sent another forty men, although no new groups arrived until 1671. Viceroy Marques de Mancera to King, April 20, 1669, SC 58-2-2/14; Viceroy Marques de Mancera to King, 7/18/1670, SC 58-2-2/14.

\textsuperscript{60} Consulta del Consejo de Indias, May 12, 1672, SC 58-2-2/25.
have only 280 men between captains, soldiers, officers, and artillerymen. He should have had, at minimum, 306. The difference is likely the result of deaths, injuries, and desertions.\(^{61}\)

The next year, the Queen granted his request. She ignored his request to levy soldiers from the Canaries and ordered that the soldiers be sent from Havana instead. Historian Luis Arana estimates that forty-four more men arrived from New Spain between July 1671 and 1673. By July of that year, interim governor Nicolás Ponce de León recorded that 307 plazas were now filled, but 25 of those men were in Apalache and others were stationed in Guale.\(^{62}\) Ponce de León also complained that the soldiers sent to Florida were still being diverted in large numbers, and those who did arrive from New Spain were mulattos and mestizos. Supposedly this was remedied with the transport of fifty new reinforcements raised from various ports of the Indies in 1674, but it is unclear whether this order was carried out.\(^{63}\) In 1675, as noted above, Bishop Don Gabriel Díaz Vara Calderón conducted a tour of the Florida provinces and reported a dotación of three hundred.\(^{64}\)

Fifty infantrymen for Florida were enlisted in Cádiz in 1680, though it is unclear if they arrived. Two more groups of soldiers arrived in 1685 when Juan de Ayala y Escobar returned from a trip to Spain in search of reinforcements. Apparently, he was supposed to be carrying men from the Canary Islands to Havana. Instead, he simply refused to put in at Havana and sailed directly for Florida where 38 of the hapless recruits were then enlisted. A pirate attack a few

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\(^{61}\) Expediente sent by the Governor of Florida, October 3, 1671, SC 58-1-26.

\(^{62}\) With the forty-four additions from New Spain, the total should have reached 324. This suggests the loss of another seventeen men. Due to various causes, the presidio appears to have lost forty-three soldiers over the course of four years. Expediente sent by the Governor of Florida, October 3, 1671, SC 58-1-26; Interim Governor to Queen, July 8, 1673, SD 839; Luis R. Arana, “Military Manpower in Florida, 1670-1703,” \textit{El Escribano} 8 no. 2 (1971): 52.

\(^{63}\) Letter from Interim Governor Ponce de León to the Queen, May 8, 1674, SD 226; José de Veitías Liange de Alberro to Queen, December 11, 1674, SD 226.

\(^{64}\) Letter from Bishop Calderón, January 4, 1676, SC 54-3-2.
months later justified Ayala Escobar’s bold move and approval (or perhaps acceptance) from the Governor of Cuba completed the matter. He also brought seven African slaves and two new friars to St. Augustine. Later that year the labor pool of the city was expanded with one hundred forzados from Spain. Their crimes were usually desertion from the peninsular army or incorrigible vices and excess. In 1687 another eighty reinforcements were recruited from Cádiz and Sevilla, also transported to Florida by Ayala Escobar. They arrived in St. Augustine, and governor Quiroga y Losada complained that they were of mixed quality, some being very poor soldiers. As restrictions on the enlistment of criollos were removed, some Floridanos enlisted and this stemmed some of the demand for more soldiers until the siege of 1702. Up to this point, at least new 211 soldiers can be documented and 119 forzados. The forzados are not listed by name until later reports, but a comparison of muster rolls and marriage records demonstrates that roughly half of the soldiers who arrived during these years married before 1702.

In 1702 in anticipation of the English invasion, Captain Don Enrique Primo de Rivera conducted a last-minute assessment of the forces available to defend St. Augustine. He found one

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65 Juan de Ayala Escobar was one of the individuals in Florida who operated as a private contractor, essentially an unofficial procurador. He owned his own frigate and was appointed by Governor Marquez Cabrera to obtain supplies from Havana, Campeche, and the Canary Islands when necessary. He also had enough capital, relatives in Havana, and contacts in New Spain, to save the presidio money by financing purchases himself. He also sometimes used his house as a warehouse and sold goods to soldiers and widows on credit, though at inflated rates. William R. Gillaspie, “Survival of a Frontier Presidio: St. Augustine and the Subsidy and Private Contract Systems, 1680-1702,” *Florida Historical Quarterly* 62, no. 3 (1984): 286-7, 291.


67 Governor Quiroga y Losada to the King, April 1, 1688, SD 227. The initial number had been 100, but the Governor of Havana diverted 20 recruits for his own purposes. Gillaspie, “Survival of a Frontier Presidio,” 289.


69 CPR Marriages, 1668-1702. Troop roll, July 6, 1671, enclosed in Governor Manuel de Cendoya to Crown, March 24, 1672, SC 58-1-26/16A; Troop roll. December 4, 1680, enclosed in Governor Marquez Cabrera to the King, June 28, 1683, SC 54-5-12/9; Muster Roll, May 27, 1683, enclosed in Governor Marquez Cabrera to the King, June 28, 1683, SC 54-5-12/9; April 20, 1687, enclosed in April 28, 1687, Governor Pedro de Aranda y Avellaneda to King, SC 54-5-14/41.
hundred sixty-four soldiers in the three regular companies, although this included the old and infirm. The rest were spread out across other outposts or in Apalache. Other forces in the city included forty-four militiamen and officers, although this included old men and young boys who had never before fired a weapon. There were one hundred twenty-three Indian men including servants, repartimiento workers, and residents of the nearby mission village Nombre de Dios. Captain Primo de Rivera noted that most were unskilled with firearms. There were also fifty-seven free and enslaved blacks in the city, although the captain estimated that only about twenty would be useful since the rest, although they owned weapons, did not know how to shoot. There were others abroad that had yet to answer the muster call, including Indians and free blacks, but Primo de Rivera expected them to be of little military use. After Cuban forces lifted the siege on the city in early 1703, they departed, leaving only one hundred reinforcements: 70 men from Galicia, 30 from Havana. Although the frontier was clearly still vulnerable, the war of Spanish Succession stretched the military and financial resources of the Spanish empire. Florida was not a priority and did not enjoy the same royal attention as the province had in the wake of the 1668 raid.

Many criollos fled St. Augustine in the wake of the siege. This loss was compounded by a smallpox epidemic near the end of 1702 which likely caused a severe drop in the population of the city from Zúñiga y Cerda’s estimate of around 1,500. A number of Galician grooms appear to have married into the local community. Seven of the newly arrived soldiers were married in

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71 Arnade, “Siege of St. Augustine,” 55, 60.
72 Tepaske, Governorship of Spanish Florida, 67, 112-13. There is an interesting correlation between English raids and smallpox outbreaks that has yet to be investigated. A similar sequence of raid and epidemic took place in 1728.
their first ten years, and another fifteen during the next ten years. As noted in the previous chapter, subsequent raids by English and Native American forces dismantled the mission chain and forced hundreds of Indian refugees to flee to St. Augustine. By 1711, there were 296 Christian and 105 pagan Indian refugees living in villages around the city. They were usually recorded separately in census records. Although they did not live within the walls of the city, they interacted constantly with the city’s residents in social, spiritual, and economic contexts. They also intermarried with criollos and Spaniards in the city, creating jurisdictional conflicts between the regular and the secular clergy.

The population of St. Augustine was roughly the same in 1736 as it was in 1702. Several epidemics and continued raids from hostile Indians contributed to high mortality rates. The absence of burial records makes it difficult to measure mortality rates, but it appears that the St. Augustine population did not achieve natural population growth until the late 1740s. Throughout the 1720s, fugitive slaves, legally imported slaves, and Indian refugees were the majority of immigrants to the city. Less than one hundred individuals arrived between 1700 and 1724. A number of changes, however, took place in the 1730s. First, Auxiliary Bishop Francisco de San Buenaventura Martínez Tejada, (also called the Bishop of Tricale), arrived in Florida and began

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73 CPR, Marriages; Troop roll, December 31, 1706, 1707, 1708, 1709, enclosed in Governor Francisco de Córcoles y Martínez, February 9, 1713, SC 58-1-35/61; Troop roll, December 31, 1712 enclosed in Royal Officials of Florida, June 12, 1714, SC 58-2-3/59; December 31, 1714, Royal Officials of Florida, enclosed in April 4, 1716 Viceroy Duke of Linares, SC 58-2-4/17; Governor Antonio Benavides to King, August 12, 1719, SC 58-2-4/25. The reinforcements from Havana are difficult to identify in the marriage records. Soldiers from Havana were probably born elsewhere, and simply stationed in Cuba most recently. Thus, when asked for their birthplace, they might blend into the lists of grooms from Spain or New Spain.

74 Governor Córcoles y Martínez to the King, April 9, 1711, SC 58-1-3/20.

75 Parker, “Second Century,” 38-76.

76 Governor Córcoles y Martínez to King, November 12, 1707, SD 841. These conflicts are examined further in Chapter Six.

to shape up a province which he considered to be in an utterly scandalous state. In various accounts he gives population estimates of 1,428 and 1,409 although it is not clear whether or not all the slaves in the city were counted as well.\textsuperscript{78} Martínez Tejada found much work to do in St. Augustine, from reforming the soldiers to combating the Protestantism that might be spread by English visitors.

During the 1730s, correspondence and treasury records suggest the presence of a small population of foreign merchants. In times of food shortage, the people of St. Augustine had relied on aid from passing ships, usually English, although there are incidents of trade with the French and Dutch also. Trade with other nations violated Spain’s mercantilist policies, but in most cases, the purchase of flour or corn to prevent starvation was recognized as a necessary expedient.\textsuperscript{79} Under the governorship of Francisco Moral y Sánchez, however, regular trade with English ships from Charleston and New York boomed in 1735 and 1736. At least fifteen different vessels arrived during those years, and most came and went more than once. Worse yet, complained the royal officials, Moral y Sánchez permitted English merchants and sailors to walk about the town. They were free to assess the strength of the garrison and spread Protestant heresy.\textsuperscript{80}

These were not the first Englishmen in St. Augustine, but other residents of English heritage had attained respectability by learning Spanish and converting to Catholicism. One man,

\textsuperscript{78} For the 1,428 count, see: Letters of Auxiliary Bishop Francisco de San Buenaventura Martínez Tejada, August 27, 1735, SD 844; for the 1,409 count, see: Letters of Auxiliary Bishop Francisco de San Buenaventura Martínez Tejada, April 29, 1736, SC 58-2-14.

\textsuperscript{79} Libro de Mancomunidades of Contador don Francisco Menéndez Marquez and treasurer don Joseph de Pedroso, 1714-1731, dated 1731, SD 861; Harman, \textit{Trade and Privateering in Spanish Florida}, 13-14.

\textsuperscript{80} Tepaske, \textit{Governorship of Spanish Florida}, 37, 46-7. The actual extent of the English presence in the town is difficult to gauge, although complaints from Charleston suggest that Spanish policy of offering sanctuary to runaway slaves was advertised to slaves aboard the merchant vessels. Landers, \textit{Black Society in Spanish Florida}, 33. She cites \textit{Journal of the Commons House of Assembly}, vol. 3, May 18, 1741-July 10, 1742, ed. J.H. Easterby (Columbia, S.C. 1951), 83.
William Carr, even married locally and raised eight children. He served as a stone mason and an interpreter.\textsuperscript{81} As early as 1736, however, the William Walton Company of New York had agents permanently located in St. Augustine.\textsuperscript{82} The English presence was substantial enough to draw negative attention to Moral y Sánchez’s administration. In 1736 the Governor of Cuba, Francisco de Güemes y Horcasitas, ordered a secret investigation to be carried out by engineer Antonio de Arredondo who was also to survey Florida’s defenses and confer with James Oglethorpe, Governor of Georgia, on the disputed border. Arredondo produced a decisive indictment of Moral y Sánchez’s illicit activities.\textsuperscript{83}

The English presence declined rapidly after Moral y Sánchez’s exit. Hostilities between the Spanish and the English were escalating, and his successor, Manuel de Montiano, had other priorities.\textsuperscript{84} Montiano would preside over the next significant wave of reinforcements in St. Augustine. At the end of 1736, another 100 reinforcements arrived from Havana. Then, the military build-up in Havana in 1738 yielded 491 soldiers and forzados for the St. Augustine presidio.\textsuperscript{85} The reinforcements were well-timed. The next English attack came in 1740, led by

\textsuperscript{81} Governor Cendoya to King, March 30, 1672, SC 5-2-3/5; Petition of Juan Calens, June 8, 1690, SD 227B; CPR, Marriage Records, 1668-1757; Bushnell, \textit{Situado and Sabana}, 137.


\textsuperscript{83} Antonio de Arredondo to King, November 24, 1736, SC 87-1-1/59 and November 27, 1736, SC 87-1-1/60; Tepaske, \textit{Governorship of Spanish Florida}, 53. From 1736 to 1737, Arredondo conducted his survey of the city, noting the location of the existing Indian villages and estimating their total population. He also produced a report on the border dispute as well as the secret report on Moral y Sánchez. Among other things, he was charged with allowing English merchants to sell illicit goods in town. Güemes y Horcasitas had him removed from office. After a brief power struggle, the interim governor Joseph de Justís finally managed to remove Moral y Sánchez from power and ship him to Havana in March of 1737. Moral y Sánchez’s permanent replacement, Manuel de Montiano conducted his residencia, located in EC 157B. For the full list of charges see Cuaderno de Comprabaciones, 1738 in this legajo.

\textsuperscript{84} Harman, \textit{Trade and Privateering in Spanish Florida}, 17, 53. Montiano was a practical leader and actually urged the King to consider free trade policies for supplying Florida. The exchange could even take place on Anastasia Island in order to limit contact with the Protestants. Governor Montiano to the King, April 15, 1746, SD 848.

\textsuperscript{85} Governor Montiano to the King, April 28, 1738, SC 58-2-16/45 and June 4, 1738, SC 58-2-16/46; Tepaske, \textit{Governorship of Spanish Florida}, 136-9; Chatelain, \textit{Defenses of Spanish Florida}, 165, n. 68. That same year,
Oglethorpe. Correspondence from Montiano mentions 2,400 people in the city in 1740. It likely included the Native Americans living in and around the city as well as members of the free black community, Fort Mose, just north of St. Augustine. When their settlement was overrun by the English invasion, residents of Fort Mose were evacuated to St. Augustine. The population of this community and its role as a buffer settlement is discussed further below in Chapter Six.

More Cuban reinforcements arrived to lift the 1740 siege. Military build-up in St. Augustine also took place in anticipation of a retaliatory attack on Georgia. The attack included one thousand regular troops, and four hundred ninety-two members of the pardo and moreno militias from Cuba. The attack was unsuccessful and St. Augustine endured two more raids from Oglethorpe in 1742 and 1743. Most of the reinforcements appear to have left, although the four companies of Cuban piquetes sent to Montiano remained. The revistas, or summaries of the musters, reveal that on average, there were 222 Cuban soldiers stationed in Florida between 1743 and 1748. It appears that forces were allowed to deplete from 1743 until 1745 when reinforcements arrived. The companies were allowed to deplete again until 1749. Between 1749 and 1753 a number of regulations were put in place to make St. Augustine an outpost of Cuba and to rotate companies of soldiers through Florida and back to Cuba regularly in order to improve morale and stem desertion rates.

Governor Montiano noted that there were 10 “houses of Indians” totaling 24 individuals in the city, and 350 in eight villages in the surrounding area.

86 Governor Montiano to Governor of Cuba Juan Francisco de Güemes y Horcasitas, May 13, 1740, SC 87-1-3.
89 Extractos de Revista de los Piquetes, 1743-48, CUBA, 336.
90 Marchena Fernández, “Guarniciones,” 93-5; Tepaske, *Governorship of Spanish Florida*, 156. The Arreglamento of 1749 overruled all previous determinations regarding command and discipline and put Florida under the regulations of the Battalion of Havana established in 1719. This move was important in that it standardized the Florida garrison and brought it in line with the system used in other parts of Spanish America. In 1753, the Viceroy
By the late 1740s, St. Augustine was beginning to experience positive population growth through both natural increase and immigration. The rate of marriages increased, and births outpaced deaths for the first time in 1747.\textsuperscript{91} Despite prohibitions against the practice, many of the Cuban piquetes married local women and stayed in Florida. The governor asked that they continue to receive a salary and to serve the presidio since these men were generally good soldiers and hard to replace. The quality of their brides was an important factor in his petition. The governor commented that the Floridano women were poor, but they were the daughters of the explorers and conquerors of the province and were known to be of good quality.\textsuperscript{92} Regular maritime traffic also brought more people to the city. The newly chartered Royal Havana Company took on the responsibility of supplying the presidio of Florida in 1740 and although shipments of foodstuffs were unreliable, a regular circuit of travel between Florida and Cuba had developed by the end of the 1740s. This corresponded with a period of overall economic growth in the 1750s, and the rise of a small export industry in naval stores.\textsuperscript{93} This facilitated the movement of people between Cuba and Florida and introduces the possibility of frequent travel between the two locations into the narrative of Hispanic immigration to Florida.\textsuperscript{94} The

\textsuperscript{91} CPR Marriages, 1668-1757; Arnaud Rabinal et al., “Estructura de la Población de una Sociedad de Frontera,” 108. In the 1730s, there was an average of fifteen marriages per year. In the 1740s, that grew to an average of twenty-five per year. This decade was the peak for marriage rates in both the white and nonwhite registers. Marriage rates per year decline for both groups in the 1750s.

\textsuperscript{92} Governor Navarrete to the King, July 30, 1750, SC 87-3-13.


\textsuperscript{94} Few men were remitted to Cuba for treatment of an illness during most of the first Spanish period in contrast with the fairly high rate of petitions and travel to Cuba in the second period of Spanish occupation, 1783-1821. East Florida Papers, To and From Military Commanders and Other Officers, 1784-1821. EFP Bundles 158B13 to 168G13, Reels 66-69. Memorials, 1784-1821. EFP Bundles 179J14 to 194K15. Reels 76-82, microfilm, PKYL. This was likely influenced by the need for soldiers in the first Spanish period, the dangers of travel, and the small likelihood of contracting something both serious and lingering. Marchena Fernández, \textit{Oficiales y Soldados}, 295.
comparative peace on the Florida-Georgia border after 1743 also contributed to the stability necessary for population growth.95

Until these changes, it was possible to recognize the arrival of soldiers in Florida as a form of permanent immigration since their chances of leaving were limited, short of desertion or return to Cuba for illness.96 Beyond this point, the ingress of troops and marriage records can no longer be treated as sources representative of overall immigration patterns in the colony. Most studies such as those of Dunkle or Corbett do not progress past 1757, given the absence of white marriage records, but it may be that marriage records ceased to be representative of overall immigration as many as ten years earlier. Several factors support this idea, although none are conclusive in and of themselves. First, in 1752, Joseph Antonio Gelabert prepared for the Council of the Indies a report of everyone receiving government pay in St. Augustine. He also provided an account of how much each individual was paid and offered suggestions on how to adjust pay schedules. Gelabert identifies more than 3,000 people of all different classes in the city by this period.97 The large population suggests that more people than just soldiers were arriving in the colony. It may have been that some brought wives and families. This period, however, is also the first in which the population of St. Augustine grew organically, that is, the

95 Arnaud Rabinal et al., “Estructura de la Población de una Sociedad de Frontera,” 99-100; Tepaske, Governorship of Spanish Florida, 154-5. Tepaske attributes the decrease in English hostilities to the growing rivalry for influence between the English and the French, and the inability of English forces to breach the fort and take the city of St. Augustine.

96 Those in active service required a license to leave for Cuba. Governor Benavides to the King, September 30, 1718, SC 58-1-30.

97 See parts one and two for competing totals. Joseph Antonio Gelabert to the King, 1752, SC 87-1-14/1 and 2. His estimates for those in the pay of the king vary and the difference seems to hinge on the number and accounting of the indigenous population. In one summary he listed 666 individuals, including the four surviving villages of Indian refugees. Elsewhere, he lists 587, not including the villages. The discrepancy of 79 people is not accounted for simply through subtracting the indigenous population. In the Lista General, there are 244 Indians listed as living in the villages. In the village by village census, however, he only identifies 158 people by name.
birth rates consistently exceeded death rates.\textsuperscript{98} Evidence of frequent travel in and out of the colony also appears in criminal cases regarding the introduction of contraband.\textsuperscript{99} Incidents of travel to Cuba by regular citizens also appear more frequently. In particular travel by women such as María de los Angeles Menéndez Marquez suggests that not only soldiers and merchants were coming and going from St. Augustine.\textsuperscript{100} Finally, the people of St. Augustine engaged enthusiastically in privateering from the War of Jenkins’ Ear through the final stages of the French and Indian War.\textsuperscript{101} It is possible that this is merely the result of improved reporting of incidents, but given the increased population and the frequency of shipping, it is more likely that travel to and from the colony was also increasing.

There were two final injections of peninsular populations into St. Augustine in the last years of the Spanish occupation. The first were Canary Islanders. Officials in Florida had been asking for Canario pobladores for nearly a century. Their desire for these settlers may well have been influenced by the success of individual Canario soldiers who had been assigned to Florida and become prosperous local citizens through their own efforts. Some soldiers, such as Andrés Pérez, attained a significant rank. Pérez was born in La Laguna and appears in the Florida records first in 1671 when he married a criolla, Catalina de Florencia, member of the wealthy

\textsuperscript{98} Arnaud Rabinal, et al., “Estructura de la Población de una Sociedad de Frontera,” 107. This is interesting since they show that the overall rate of marriages declines for these years. My own assessment of the Catholic parish records confirms these patterns.

\textsuperscript{99} Autos of the confiscation of a trunk of seized illicit goods brought by D. Guillermo Amblard, of the French nation, 1753, CUBA 472; Autos on the embezzlement of clothes [“el descamino de ropas”] by Scotsman Diego Bruze, and two other Englishman, 1758, CUBA 472; Autos regarding the illicit introduction of four blacks, May 8, 1762, CUBA 472; Harman, \textit{Trade and Privateering in Spanish Florida}, 51-5. As noted above, illicit trade had always taken place, but usually with at least the tacit approval of either the governor or the royal officials. These incidents were undertaken by individuals with no assistance, suggesting that they had their own means of transportation into or out of the city.

\textsuperscript{100} Expediente de María de los Angeles Menéndez Marquez and Miguel Días versus Fernando José de Izquierdo, 1757, (item A), CUBA 426.

\textsuperscript{101} Harman, \textit{Trade and Privateering in Spanish Florida}, 63-70.
and well-connected Floridano Florencia family. Pérez worked his way up to Captain of Apalache, where he served from 1683 to 1692. In many instances, Isleño fathers raised daughters who went on to marry Spaniards, sometimes also from the Canaries. One of the best examples is the Avero family. Susan Parker uses the genealogy of this family in her dissertation to demonstrate how real estate in St. Augustine was often passed down through Florida women since they tended to inherit property as a dowry and outlive multiple husbands. Like Pérez, Victoriano de Avero’s earliest appearance in the records is his marriage to a local woman, Francesca María García de Acevedo Peñaloza, in 1711. Based on later title claims, it seems likely that they built their house in 1712. Francesca was connected to two prosperous Floridano families with property in the city, though most of the buildings had been destroyed in the 1702 siege. Victoriano and Francesca amassed a number of properties on northern St. George Street. Together they also had six daughters and one son, although the boy and one girl did not live to adulthood. For the Averos, marrying off five daughters with appropriate dowries would have been a challenge, but they had one advantage: the girls could bring real estate in St. Augustine to their marriage.

102 Ibid., 29-30, 51.

103 Charles Arnade, “The Avero Story: An Early St. Augustine Family with Many Daughters and Many Houses,” Florida Historical Quarterly (July 1961): 10-16. The oldest daughter, Alfonsa, was born in 1713 and married at the age of sixteen. Her first husband was another Isleño, Fernando Rodríguez. Their only son died at a young age and Rodríguez died two years later in 1731. Alfonsa married a local man three years later, with whom she had six children. Juana was born in 1715 and married at the age of sixteen, like her older sister. She married a man from Havana, Simón de Morales, whose family also hailed from the Canary Islands. They had one child, but Simón died a few years later as well. Again like her sister, her next husband was a Floridano, Gerónimo de Hita, with whom she had six children. The third daughter, Antonia, finally bucked the trend and married a man from Cartagena de Indias, with whom she had five children. Her husband died also, but she waited ten years before finally marrying a local member of the administrative elite. The fourth daughter, Manuela, does not appear frequently in the records. She married a local man, Marcos Rosendo. Ursula, the fifth daughter, was also married twice. Her first marriage was to Lieutenant Diego Repilado. He was listed as born in Palermo, Sicily, but his parents were from Extremadura, Spain. Together, they had five children, three of whom lived to adulthood. Like the other men, Diego died young, and Ursula remarried. Unlike her sisters, she married another Spaniard, Raimundo Arrivas, from Arabelo.
The Avero daughters tended to marry more than once, outliving their first husbands. Several of them chose to marry other Canarios, demonstrating a tendency to create new networks in Florida. Though the Averos are uncommon given the lack of any sons, the case study is useful here because it is representative of the prospects for locally-born women and Spanish soldiers, particularly Canary Islanders. Some went on to continue the pattern, raising daughters who would inherit the claim to houses in St. Augustine. Another example is Tomás González, an Isleño sailor who married a local woman, Francisca de Guebara. One of their daughters, María, married Juan de Las Casas of Palma. The other daughter, Leonor, married Juan Francisco Galero, another Isleño of Palma. In 1745, Galero owned a ship called the Nuestra Señora de Regla and worked for the Havana Company. These families demonstrate the strong connections among Isleños in St. Augustine and the reputation for prosperity which they earned on an individual basis.\textsuperscript{104}

The reputation of Isleños as soldiers and settlers varied across the Spanish Americas based on the time and the circumstances of their service. According to geographer James J. Parsons, the Canary Islanders developed a reputation as “reliable, hard-working folk and ideal colonists.” In eighteenth-century Cuba, they were considered “superior agriculturalists.” Parsons’ article relies largely on secondary sources, however, so it is difficult to determine the origins of such opinions. He does observe that most of the scholarship on Canary Islander migration has been written from an Isleño perspective and with principally island-based sources, lending it a favorable bias.\textsuperscript{105} Other descriptions are not so rosy. Isleños in Caracas, for example, struggled to

\textsuperscript{104} CPR, Marriages, 1700-1763; Arnade, “Avero Story,” 17-23, 26-7; Marchena Fernández and Pozo Redondo, “La Emigración Canaria,” 51.

\textsuperscript{105} Parsons, “The Migration of Canary Islanders to the Americas,” 451-2, 460. There is little English-language work on Isleño immigrants in Latin America. Several works examine their place in the colonization of Spanish America: Gilbert Din, The Canary Islanders of Louisiana (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1988); Felipe Fernández-Armesto, Before Columbus: Exploration and Colonization from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic, 1229-
fit into local society as small cacao farmers. Some members of the colonial elite even viewed them as an acceptable alternative to African slaves. Criticism also issued from places like Florida and Santo Domingo, where not all immigrants lived up to authorities’ expectations.

This was the case in Florida in 1757. That year, 363 Canary Islanders arrived as a force of settlers who were to settle the countryside in order to reclaim the land and reinvigorate agriculture in Spanish Florida. Unfortunately, royal officials were not notified of this development, and the settlers found the government of Florida completely unprepared for their arrival. St. Augustine was under siege by hostile indigenous forces, and short on supplies. Without the necessary cash, tools, seeds, and livestock they were supposed to receive, most built small shacks on the outskirts of the city. They took up the position of the refugee Indians from half a century earlier, both physically and figuratively. They occupied the same physical location at the outskirts of the city. This reflected their social standing as an unplanned burden on the royal treasury and a buffer between the safety of the city and the hostile raiding parties of the interior. Nevertheless, the Isleños enjoyed one distinct advantage over the Indians: their peninsular ties. Their background permitted them to participate in the institutions of the Spanish

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106 Ferry, Colonial Elite of Early Caracas, 4-5, 159.

107 Governor of Florida to the King, November 1, 1758, SD 2660; Governor Cárdenas to King, December 22, 1761, SD 2585; on the vices of Isleños in Santo Domingo, see King to don Domingo Miguel de la Guerra, 1742, SD 1020. This letter also contains a reference to a complaint about sending families, and not men like those brought by don Bernardo de Espinosa in 1737 to Hispaniola which were composed of few laboring men and mostly vagabonds, delinquents, and “mujeres viciosas y solteras, sin formalidad de familias.”
empire, such as military service.\textsuperscript{108} Due to the absence of marriage records for whites after the year 1757 and the evacuation of the colony in 1763, it is impossible to determine whether or not any single Isleños married into the Hispanic population. Most of the Canario immigrants came as family units, but those units included a roughly equal number of unmarried adult men and women. They were usually siblings or other relations of the married couple at the head of the family.\textsuperscript{109} From the survival of non-white marriage records it is clear that the Isleños did marry into the local population, at least at the lowest social levels.\textsuperscript{110} Thirty-six Isleño men were recruited into the piquetes and appear on the roster at the time of evacuation. Another fifty-two served in the militia forces.\textsuperscript{111}

The final group that arrived was a company of Catalan fusileers and their families in 1762. They expected to receive land to cultivate also. They arrived on the eve of evacuation of the province, so the 36 Catalanian families that arrived had little time to integrate themselves into the community.\textsuperscript{112} The final census for the population of Spanish Florida is the evacuation lists of Eligio de la Puente from 1764 and 1770. His records detail the ethnicity and property, if any, of every individual who left Florida and the ship that carried them to Cuba or Campeche. Since almost everyone left, including the remaining Catholic Indians attached to the city, it is

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{108} Letter from Governor of Florida to King, November 1, 1758, SD 2660; Governor Cárdenas to King, December 22, 1761, SD 2585; Marchena Fernández and Pozo Redondo, “La Emigración Canaria,” 38-9.
\bibitem{109} Morales Padrón, “Colonos Canarios en Indias,” 31-7.
\bibitem{110} CPR, Marriages, \textit{Libro de Morenos, Pardos e Indios}, 1757-1763.
\bibitem{111} Eligio de la Puente report, January 22, 1764, SC 86-5-19, ff. 7v-8, 10-10v.
\bibitem{112} Governor Melchor Feliú to Juan de Arriaga, March 26, 1762, SD 2660.
\end{thebibliography}
comprehensive. Puente’s lists reveal 961 individuals on the royal payroll and 3,096 individuals total.\textsuperscript{113}

St. Augustine was undoubtedly a small and isolated frontier presidio, but it was never cut off from the Spanish and Spanish American world. The continued need for reinforcements guaranteed that Spaniards and criollos from elsewhere in the Americas continued to arrive, marry, and forge connections with the local population. A closer examination of the marriage records from this era reveals the diversity contained within larger categories of analysis such as peninsular and criollo. Men from Andalucía remained the largest percentage of grooms, although the sources may be distorted here. Many men were recruited from cities such as Cádiz and Sevilla. Sometimes these were given as the soldiers’ city of origin when in fact it was just their most recent location.\textsuperscript{114}

Conclusions

Immigration drove population increases in Spanish St. Augustine until the colony’s final years. For most of this period, immigrants were overwhelmingly single males in the military, born in other parts of the Spanish empire. Whatever their feelings about Florida may have been, significant proportions of these men chose to marry local brides, guaranteeing themselves a place in the documentary history of the city. A number of prosperous families emerged during this period. Individuals such Alonso de Argüelles, Matheo Luis de Florencia, and Victoriano Avero built families, acquired property, and over time came to compose the Floridano elite. Florida’s significance to the Spanish empire was strategic rather than economic, and patterns of immigration to the colony reflected this priority. By the end of the 1740s, this was beginning to

\textsuperscript{113} Eligio de la Puente report, January 22, 1764, SC 86-5-19; Eligio de la Puente report, May 8, 1770, SC 87-1-5, ff. 17.

\textsuperscript{114} Corbett, “Migration to a Spanish Imperial Frontier,” 421-2.
change. More merchant shipping, increased population, and new economic opportunities all contributed to greater traffic between Florida and the rest of the Atlantic world. While marriage records still offer excellent insight into the identities of men who chose to marry local women, soldiers were no longer the only ones coming to St. Augustine, and muster rolls and marriage records are no longer sufficiently representative of immigration.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parish Records</th>
<th>Dates of Available Records 115</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interments</td>
<td>1629-1638, 1719-1763</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White Marriages</td>
<td>1629-1756</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Marriages</td>
<td>1629-1763</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baptisms</td>
<td>1629-1763</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

115 Some records begin as early as 1594, but are not recorded consistently, making the data difficult to utilize in population studies.
### Table 3-2. Civil and Ecclesiastical Censuses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Population</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Category of Analysis</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>300 or 600</td>
<td>1675</td>
<td>Residents in the city of St. Augustine (possibly not inclusive of the dotación)</td>
<td>1675 Visitation by Bishop don Gabriel Díaz Calderón 116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,400</td>
<td>1685</td>
<td>Population that took shelter in the fort when the city was under attack</td>
<td>Letter to the King, April 28, 1685 117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,444</td>
<td>1689</td>
<td>City population</td>
<td>Father Juan Ferro Machado, on behalf of Bishop of Cuba Diego Evelino de Compostela 118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>1702</td>
<td>Population that took shelter in the fort when the city was under attack</td>
<td>Report by Governor Zúñiga y Cerda 119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,409</td>
<td>1736</td>
<td>Residents of the city (does not include the refugee indigenous villages outside the city)</td>
<td>Report by Bishop Francisco de San Buenaventura Martínez Tejada 120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,400</td>
<td>1740</td>
<td>People in the city at the time of attack</td>
<td>Governor Manuel de Montiano to Governor of Cuba Juan Francisco de Güemes y Horcasitas 121</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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116 Letter from Bishop Calderón, January 4, 1676, SC 54-3-2.

117 Governor Marquez Cabrera to the King, April 28, 1685, SC 58-2-6/3.

118 Bishop of Cuba Diego Evelino de Compostela to the King September 28, 1689, SC 54-3-2/9.

119 Governor Zuñiga y Cerda to the King, November 5, 1702, SC 58-2-8/243.

120 Letters of Auxiliary Bishop Francisco de San Buenaventura Martínez Tejada, April 29, 1736, SC 58-2-14.

121 Governor Montiano to Governor of Cuba Juan Francisco de Güemes y Horcasitas, May 13, 1740, SC 87-1-3.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Population</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Category of Analysis</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2,446</td>
<td>1760</td>
<td>Residents of the city and Indians</td>
<td>Juan Joseph Solana Report 122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3,096</td>
<td>1764</td>
<td>Evacuation list for all of Florida, including Apalache</td>
<td>1763 Eligio de la Puente Evacuation Report 123</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

122 Juan Joseph Solana Report to the King, April 9, 1760, SC 86-7-21/41.

123 Reports by D Juan José Eligio de la Puente, January 9, 1764, CUBA 372; January 22, 1764, SC 87-1-5/3-4. April 16, 1764, SC 86-6-6/43; September 26, 1766, SC 87-1-5/3-4.
Hispanic immigration to Florida was overwhelmingly male and military until the final years of the Spanish occupation. Some officers and officials brought their wives and families, but this did not take place in any systematic way. Nearly a century of correspondence demonstrates that the demand for more settlers in St. Augustine rarely flagged. Instead, it was the instability of the region, its poor prospects, and the lack of financing which hindered the transport of large groups of settler families. Officials in Florida proposed settler groups that were less expensive to transport such as Mayan Indians from Campeche and free black families from Havana\(^1\), but overwhelmingly, the governors and royal officials of Spanish Florida asked for Canary Islanders or Galicians.\(^2\) In the seventeenth century these two regions were suffering from overpopulation and unproductive agriculture. Spanish royal officials developed policies designed to alleviate these pressures by recruiting colonists for under-populated territories of the Americas.\(^3\) These requests exhibited a clear preference for Spaniards. Moreover, when proposing settlement schemes many governors borrowed or expanded upon their predecessors’ plans. The Council of

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\(^1\) On Mayan Indians from Campeche, Petition from Captain Domingo de Leturiondo to the Queen, 1673, SC 58-2-5/3; Cédula to Royal Officials of Florida (draft) 1673 SC 58-1-21/97; Hann, “Translation of Alonso de Leturiondo’s Memorial to the King of Spain,” 179; Royal Cédula to the Governor of Florida, March 8, 1702, SC 58-1-23/136; On free black families from Havana, see Interim Governor of Florida to King, January 12, 1718, SC 58-1-30/69.

\(^2\) On Canary Islanders, see Interim Governor Nicolas Ponce de Leon to Queen, March 24, 1675, SC 58-1-35/18; Governor Hita Salazar to Queen, August 24, 1675, SC 54-5-11/23; Governor Marquez Cabrera to the King, November 10, 1681, SD 839; Governor Marquez Cabrera to the King, June 28, 1683, SD 226; Torres y Ayala to King, January 5, 1699, SC 61-6-22/7; Cédula to the Viceroy of New Spain, 2 documents, February 17, 1716, SC 58-2-4/16; Governor Benavides to King, August 12, 1718, SC 58-1-30; Governor Benavides to the King, June 12, 1720, SC 58-2-16/5; Governor Benavides to the King, March 8, 1722, SC 58-1-29; Moral y Sánchez to the King, June 30, 1734, SC 86-5-23; Governor Montiano to King, February 25, 1745, SD 1020. A copy of this letter may also be found transcribed and translated at SAHSRL, MC 63, box 3, file 52. The transcription has some errors and the original copy in the AGI was used for the purposes of this discussion. On Galicians, see: Governor of Florida to the King, February 24 and April 1, 1688, SD 227B; Crown to Count Frigiliana, November 26, 1715, SC 58-1-20/154; Governor Benavides to King, August 12, 1718, SC 58-1-30; Consejo de Indias, June 7, 1724, SD 837; Royal Cédula, July 14, 1738, SD 1020.

\(^3\) Manuel Hernández González, *Canarias: La Emigración* (La Laguna: Centro de la Cultura Popular Canaria, 1995), 26-7; Consejo de Indias to the Conde de Montijo of Galicia, July 14, 1738, SD 1020; Governor of Cuba, December 12, 1738, SC 87-1-3/55.
the Indies, the administrative body which made the strategic recommendations for Florida, was reminded of the problem at least once every five to seven years by the plaintive correspondence issuing from the governors of Florida. By the middle of the eighteenth century Spanish officials in Florida and Madrid had a clear plan and budget for the settlement of Florida with several hundred families from the Canary Islands. They also had clear expectations for the settlers: hard-working Catholic peasant farmers and artisans with large families and the willingness to defend their new home to the death against hostile indigenous and European forces.

The construction of these ideal settlers is relevant to this study for two reasons. First, this ideal was not constructed in isolation. Over the course of a century, peninsular Spaniards, mainly soldiers, trickled into St. Augustine. Many chose to marry women from St. Augustine and stay in the city. These soldiers often had some secondary occupation, such as farming, raising livestock, or commerce. If the woman was from a prominent Floridano family, she might bring a house or land to the marriage as well as important local connections. The result was that governors and royal officials had, before their eyes, examples of the success of Spaniards who immigrated to Florida. There are, of course, many vital differences between the arrival of individual soldiers and a ship filled with several hundred families, a point that will be developed further below.

These descriptions of ideal settlers are also important because no such group arrived until two ships full of Canario families appeared unannounced in 1757. A better planned expedition followed in 1761 which brought a company of fusiliers and their families from Catalonia to

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4 Antonio de Rocas to Casa de Contratación, February 11, 1676, SC 41-5-39/14; Guerra y Vega to Antonio de Rocas, May 27, 1676, SC 58-2-5/6; Memorandum from the Junta de Guerra, October 6, 1681, SD 226; Cédula to the Viceroy of New Spain, 2 documents, February 17, 1716, SC 58-2-4/16; Memorial from the King, February 12, 1717, SC 58-1-30; Two enclosures from the Consejo de Indias, April 28, 1724, located in Governor Benavides to the King, June 12, 1720, SC 58-2-16/5: In many ways, the proposal provided by Montiano represents the peak of this ideal expression. He states clearly that he is using the work of his predecessors, corrected for inflation and new military circumstances. Governor Montiano to King, February 25, 1745, SD 1020.

5 Arnade, “Avero Story,” 1-34.
Florida. Instead, authorities in Florida made do for ninety years with others: many mestizos and people of African descent served in the army and the militia, and Creek and Yamassee warriors conducted patrols. For settlers to reclaim their countryside, they relied upon unconverted Indians, refugees from the ruined missions, runaway slaves, and free blacks. For master artisans and commercial contacts, they employed English Protestants (whom they called “heretics”), although a few who lived in the city eventually converted to Catholicism. Despite these myriad adaptations, Spanish governors and other officials still demonstrated typical Spanish preferences for peninsulares. These expectations presented obstacles to indigenous, African, and other non-Iberian peoples who sought to carve out space for themselves in Spanish Florida. This chapter examines the construction of the ideal settler through the correspondence of officials in Florida, Cuba, and the Council of the Indies. Subsequent chapters will consider the application of these ideas on relations with the non-Iberian populations of Spanish Florida.

**Evolution of the Ideal Settler**

In his study of Canary Island emigrants, Manuel Hernández González argues that the loss of Jamaica and the expanding French presence in Santo Domingo served as important catalysts for new population policies by revealing that the Spanish policy of leaving islands depopulated in order to limit contraband trade was unsuccessful. If the crown wanted to maintain control of

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6 The consequences of the unannounced arrival were disastrous. St. Augustine was currently in the midst of a conflict with hostile Indians and had no supplies or cash to support the settlers. In particular, the letter from the Bishop of Havana recounts their hardships. Two letters from the Juez de Indias en Canarias, November 15, 1756 and December 23, 1756, AGI Indiferente General (IG), 3093; Royal Order, March 29, 1757, IG 3093; Letter from Governor of Florida to King, November 1, 1758, SD 2660; Bishop of Havana, March 31, 1758, SC 86-6-6/11.


9 Governor Cendoya to King, March 30, 1672, SC 5-2-3/5; Petition of Juan Calens, June 8, 1690, SD 227B. For the marriage, see Guillermo Carr, CPR Baptismal Records 1675, Marriage Records, 1676.
peripheral areas, it would have to populate them. In 1663, the Council of the Indies came to an agreement with the Captain General of the Canary Islands and the Canario merchant oligarchy. In exchange for continued commercial privileges, Isleño ships would recruit colonists and carry them to the frontiers of Spanish America. Officials were able to recruit settlers from the islands because local pressures pushed many to migrate. The greatest problem was large estate holders who limited access to land and water resources for others. As the sugar industry declined, smaller farmers struggled to make a living too. Emigration to Spanish America served as an escape valve for an increasingly impoverished population with limited resources. The majority of those who designated a specific island of origin came from the largest of the chain, Tenerife. A royal cédula was sent to St. Augustine that year, asking the governor to describe Florida and recommend a site for families of Canario farmers. Governor Manuel Cendoya submitted a report in support of the idea in 1671, noting that an earlier proposal sent by his predecessor should be reconsidered. He reiterated expectations set forth in the cédula from 1663, namely that the settlers would increase the local population, contribute to the wealth of the colony, serve as good Christian examples to the Indians, and act as a defensive barrier against potential enemies. The Governor of Cuba, Francisco Dávila Orejon, also wrote to the Council of the Indies to support the plan.

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10 The sugar industry in the Canaries had begun to decline, unable to compete with the volume of sugar produced in the New World. Wine became a major export for the islands, but Isleño merchants also suffered from political developments which cut off their access to other European markets, such as the loss of trade once the Portuguese separated themselves from the Spanish empire. The English Navigation Acts further restricted trade opportunities. Moreover, the merchant class in the islands was facing pressure from the merchant monopoly in Sevilla which felt that the trade conducted through the Canaries facilitated too much contraband and robbed the crown of profit and cut Sevilla out of the trade. They sought to end the traditional commercial privileges which allowed the Isleño merchants to trade with Spanish American ports. The merchant oligarchy in the Canaries perceived those commercial privileges as essential to survival and sought ways to protect them, leading to the 1663 agreement with the Council of the Indies. Vieira, “Sugar Islands,” 49; Hernández González, Canarias, 11-15, 20-2.

In theory, the transportation of families to Florida should have been straightforward. Officials in Florida and Cuba had expressed their support. St. Augustine was already licensed to receive two ships a year from the Canary Islands to facilitate trade, although it seems the presidio did not take full advantage of those licenses.\(^\text{12}\) It is possible that the Viceroy in New Spain was unwilling to remit the necessary funds to support a new group of settlers. He was already responsible for paying the large amounts necessary to continue the construction of the stone fort in St. Augustine, and the delivery of the situado continued to be unreliable.\(^\text{13}\) Nevertheless, authorities in Florida continued to petition for settlers. In a 1675 letter, interim Governor Nicolás Ponce de León petitioned the Queen Regent for families to settle the Apalache province in order to cultivate and settle the region and set a good example for the Indians.\(^\text{14}\)

After taking up his post, the new Governor, Juan Pablo de Hita Salazar, wrote his own letter to the king asking for Isleño colonists. He called attention to the constant shortage of food and the difficulty of transporting corn safely from the mission provinces to St. Augustine. He suggested the introduction of farmers from the Canary Islands could solve this problem, arguing that with their efforts it would not be difficult to make the colony self-sufficient. Arming the settlers would also be a potent means of defense against English or Indian incursions. The proposal received tentative approval, but the cost was a major concern. When asked to give his opinion on the matter, former governor Guerra y Vega agreed it would be too expensive to transport one hundred families from the Canary Islands to Apalache and provide them with the

\(^\text{12}\) Consejo de Indias to Casa de Contratación, 1673, SC 41-5-36/11.


\(^\text{14}\) Interim Governor Nicolás Ponce de León to Queen, March 24, 1675, SC 58-1-35/18.
necessary supplies. This assessment put an end to the discussion of settlers for several years, so Hita Salazar took a different route to development. In 1677 he wrote to the Queen asking for more soldiers so that he could replace the criollos in the army. They had other occupations that were vital to the survival of the colony: growing crops and raising livestock. To encourage these developments, Hita Salazar had actually begun to give out grants and licenses in the name of the king. He also began to raise money to fund the construction of the fort by selling land and by charging quitrents. This usurpation of royal prerogative was part of a larger process of decline in Spain and an example of how that decline translated into reduced control of affairs in the colonies. This reduced control was apparent in other aspects of colonial government as well, such as the preponderance of criollos serving in the Spanish army, a phenomenon discussed further below.

The individuals who received these grants and licenses came primarily from prosperous Floridano families, such as the Menéndez Marquez family and the Florencia family. This moment of economic growth in the 1670s demonstrated the potential for a successful agricultural colony in the interior from St. Augustine to Apalache. In the 1670s and 1680s, it looked as if Spanish Florida might become an attractive destination that could thrive on the export of beef, hides, tallow, and furs obtained from the Indians. This fired the ambitions of Floridano families and encouraged them to settle in the interior near the missions where they might find both laborers and consumers. This newfound prosperity made a more appealing case for attracting

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15 Governor Hita Salazar to Queen, August 24, 1675, SC 54-5-11/23; Antonio de Rocas to Casa de Contratación, February 11, 1676, SC 41-5-39/14; Guerra y Vega to Antonio de Rocas, May 27, 1676, SC 58-2-5/6.

16 Governor Hita Salazar to the King, September 6, 1677, SD 226; Treasury officials to King, July 10, 1685, SD 227; Consejo de Indias, October 13, 1687, included in letter of Governor Marquez Cabrera, April 28, 1685, SD 227; McAlister, Spain and Portugal, 438-9; Marchena Fernández, Oficiales y Soldados, 3-5.
new settlers, and produced a successful model of agriculture and commerce that officials would seek to rebuild after the destruction of War of Spanish Succession.\(^\text{17}\)

Governor Juan Marquez Cabrera repeated the petition for Isleños in 1680, requesting one hundred families with horses and oxen, paid for by the crown. He intended to settle them on Santa Catalina Island, one of the embattled coastal islands of present day Georgia. His hope was to reinforce the Guale region against the continuing encroachment of the English and their Native American allies. He argued that halting English incursions would be worth the high one-time cost of establishing a new town. The plan was initially approved in 1681, but the Junta de Guerra suspended the order until Marquez Cabrera could make a better case for the settlement of that outpost. The Junta worried that this particular outpost was already too embattled and the energies of settlers could be better utilized elsewhere, such as the prosperous lands around Apalache. Although Marquez Cabrera appears to have complied with the request in 1683, the council took no action again until 1689, when it once again asked for a report on Santa Catalina.\(^\text{18}\) The 1689 cédula requested a description of all the Florida provinces, the quality and types of native produce, the risk of foreign encroachment on the island of Santa Catalina, and a map of its location. Governor Quiroga y Losada also requested Galician settlers to occupy the frontier to the north. His efforts reveal an early attempt to respond to the English threat posed by Carolina not only with soldiers, but settlers as well. These individuals were expected to cultivate the land, thus relieving pressure on the food supply. They would also create a defensive buffer

\(^{17}\) Bushnell, “The Menéndez Marquez Cattle” 422-6. Bushnell argues that ranching began only in the mid to late 1600s because the best lands for ranching were occupied by native peoples upon Menéndez’s arrival. Only after a century of depopulation due to warfare and epidemic disease was land available for the taking.

\(^{18}\) Governor Marquez Cabrera appears to have complied with the initial order from June 1683, which included a detailed map drawn by Alonso Solana. It is possible the map and report had been misplaced by the time the Junta de Guerra came to rule on the matter again in 1689. Governor Marquez Cabrera to the King, December 8, 1680 and Memorandum from the Junta de Guerra, October 6, 1681, SD 226; Governor Marquez Cabrera to the King, November 10, 1681, SD 839; Royal Cédula, November 10, 1681, SD 834; Governor Marquez Cabrera to the King, June 28, 1683, SD 226.
between the English settlement and the Spanish mission villages. In that sense, then, these settlers were expected to fill similar needs as those who were brought by Menéndez a little over one hundred years earlier. They were to cultivate and develop the land as well as defend it from the threat of other European powers. Governor Quiroga y Losada was also unsuccessful in bringing settlers to Florida due to dissent over their final destination in Florida, lack of funds, and risk stemming from the War of the Grand Alliance (1688-97).\(^\text{19}\)

As the needs of Florida administrators evolved, so too did their plans for the Isleños. A call for Spanish settlers appears in the correspondence again around the end of the seventeenth century. In 1699, Governor Laureano de Torres y Ayala wrote to the King requesting colonists from the Canary Islands yet again. He had been assigned some of the responsibility for exploration of the Gulf Coast and assisting with the settlement at Pensacola. He suggested that Isleños would be ideal colonists to settle the region and prevent French occupation and English expansion.\(^\text{20}\) One of the best articulations of the uses of Canary Islanders comes from a letter written by Father Alonso de Leturiondo. He was a criollo of Florida who had left for formal training as a priest and returned to work in St. Augustine. His father, Captain Domingo de Leturiondo, had been an influential local leader. Around 1700, possibly while in Spain on business, Leturiondo wrote a memorial to the King detailing the state of life in Florida. This document is especially useful since the priest took the time to describe many aspects of daily life which would have otherwise gone unrecorded. Leturiondo referred to the 1681 request by Marquez Cabrera for settlers for Santa Catalina. He presented four reasons why the King should send settlers there. First he highlighted the island’s fecundity, not only for crops but also for

\(^{19}\) Cédula to Governor Quiroga y Losada, May 20, 1689, published in Worth, The Struggle for the Georgia Coast, 172-3. On Galicians see, letters from the Governor to the King, February 24 and April 1, 1688, SD 227B; Bushnell, Situado and Sabana, 149; Marchena Fernández and Pozo Redondo, “La Emigración Canaria,” 29.

\(^{20}\) Governor Torres y Ayala to King, January 5, 1699, SC 61-6-22/7.
grazing livestock such as hogs. Next he stated that the Indians who lived in San Jorge with the English were not getting along well there. If the Spanish settled Santa Catalina and demonstrated that the land was secure, the Indians, particularly the Yamassee, would be likely to return. His third point was the general depopulation of the region north of St. Augustine. With no settlements, there was no first line of defense or any lookouts who could announce an attack from the north. His fourth and final point was that the settlement would contain English expansion, preventing colonists from settling further and further south. In a moment of prescience, Leturiondo noted that if the territory was left unoccupied, the English might take the opportunity to settle the region and claim it. In that case it would cost more to oust them than it would to build good Spanish settlement on Santa Catalina. Even though Florida had a bad reputation among Spaniards, he argued, it was greatly desired by foreigners. Whether one settlement on Santa Catalina would have been enough to halt English expansion is doubtful, but it might have strengthened Spanish claims to the region.

Plans to transport settlers were put on hold again due to the War of Spanish Succession. After the 1702 attack, authorities and colonists were desperately trying to recuperate their own losses, feed the refugee Indians outside their gates, and keep from starving themselves. Unable to sustain and protect even the nearby indigenous villages, they probably had little interest in trying to maintain other settlers as well. The former governor of Cuba, Francisco Davila de Orejón, expressed a similar sentiment in a letter to the King in 1703. He added that the only exports Apalache might produce were wood and foodstuffs and they were not well connected enough to regular trade routes to profit from it. The Governor’s skepticism is interesting here since

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21 Hann, “Translation of Alonso de Leturiondo’s Memorial to the King of Spain,” 198-9.

22 Expediente from Governor of Cuba to the King, 1703, SD 855; Marchena Fernández and Pozo Redondo, “La Emigración Canaria,” 29.
Indians and Spaniards in Apalache had carried on a profitable, illicit trade in foodstuffs with Havana since at least the 1670s.\(^{23}\)

By 1715, though its existence was still precarious, the city of St. Augustine had begun to recover a little and the governor of Florida looked to reclaim the interior between St. Augustine and Apalache. Officials in Madrid must have felt similarly, and Davila de Orejón’s opinion was apparently overlooked. The war between the Yamassee and the English was also significant because it provided the Spanish with new Yamassee allies and temporarily weakened the English presence in the region. In the plans to reclaim Florida, settlers were to play an important role again. In 1716, the Junta de Guerra submitted a report to the King suggesting that the capital of Florida be moved to Apalache which was by all accounts more fertile and had a better harbor for large ships. All of the elderly and incapacitated soldiers should be transferred out of St. Augustine to be replaced with new men and one thousand new muskets. They would be joined by one hundred Galician families who would be provided with tools, seeds, and land in order to produce the crops necessary to feed the presidio and free it of its dependence on the situado. New fortifications, streets, and houses would be built as well. Although this proposal was discussed for over ten years, it was never enacted, due in part to the reluctance of Cuban engineer Bruno Caballero to visit Florida and make the necessary surveys. A letter from the king in 1717 directed Caballero to find a good site to build a fort, preferably along a narrow strip of land which could be easily defended, like Cádiz. He was to be mindful of the cost and employ materials that could also be put to use building houses for the settlers, or pobладores, who would live there. The king also issued instructions to the Viceroy of New Spain to assist financially in

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developing the new colony. In 1725, the council reissued orders for Caballero to go to Florida and make the necessary surveys.24

Plans to colonize Apalache with Spaniards were put on hold between 1716 and 1718 when four chiefs representing a large number of Lower Creek towns made new advances toward an alliance with the Spanish in St. Augustine. They promised to move one hundred and sixty-one villages to Apalache as soon as the Spanish had fortified the area with a new blockhouse. This was very welcome news, and the Council of the Indies suggested that the Creek could serve as new settlers just as well and far more cheaply than Spaniards shipped across the ocean.25 José Primo de Rivera was assigned to oversee the construction of a blockhouse (called a casafuerte) in 1718 at St. Marks or San Marcos, the site of the old port on the St. Marks River (Figure 2-3). The King sent the Governor of Florida his congratulations on obtaining the loyalty of these new villages, but there is no evidence to confirm that such a large group of Lower Creek actually moved to the region.26 Hann notes that the limited Native American interest in Apalache was due in part to the absence of a Spanish presence. Ayala y Escobar and others had promised to build a new fort and a well-stocked store at the old site of San Luis to attract indigenous settlers, but the Spanish never accomplished more than laying out the stakes to mark where the buildings would go.27 In the politics of Native American alliances, military strength and trade were key qualities.

24 Cédula to the Viceroy of New Spain, 2 documents, February 17, 1716, SC 58-2-4/16; Memorial from the King, February 12, 1717, SC 58-1-30; Consejo de Indias, June 1724, SD 837; Tepaske, Governorship of Spanish Florida, 123-4. Governor Benavides said he was willing to make the necessary surveys and recommendations, but the Council of the Indies refused his offer.


26 Interim Governor Juan de Ayala y Escobar to King, January 28, 1717, and February 28, 1718, SC 58-1-30; Hann, Apalachee, 291-3. The stone fortification in St. Augustine was called the Castillo de San Marcos and the Apalache fortification was known as the casafuerte de San Marcos, which signified a strong house or block house.

27 Consejo de Indias draft of letter to King, June 1724, SD 837; Hann, Apalachee, 291-3.
Thus, populating Apalache with adequate Spanish soldiers and support staff was a necessary part of building alliances with the nearby native chiefdoms.

Although plans to send Canary families to Florida had been put on hold, they proceeded in other parts of the Caribbean basin such as Santo Domingo and Caracas. In 1718 the Council of the Indies initiated a new agreement, the *Reglamento de Comercio de Canarias con las Indias*. This regulation required Isleño merchants to transport fifty families of five persons each annually to Santo Domingo. The owner of the ship was supposed to pay a penalty every time the number of families was not complete.⁹⁸ Officials in Florida used the 1718 reglamento as a model for their requests as well, beginning with Governor Antonio de Benavides who arrived at his post in Florida in 1718. Benavides was an active administrator who held his position in Florida for sixteen years. Prior to Benavides, the average term for governors was closer to five to seven years. He was from the Canary Islands, a soldier who had worked his way up to the post of Governor and Captain General in Florida. He knew, perhaps better than most, the potential value of Isleño settlers, and wrote many letters advocating their settlement in Florida.⁹⁹ Upon his arrival in Florida Benavides set out to reform the presidio and take control of the government from the Floridano elite.³⁰ He issued several letters to the king detailing all the shortcomings of the presidio with his recommendations for improvements and immediately requested that Spanish families from Galicia or the Canaries be sent to populate the Apalache region. He also asked that they be accompanied by one hundred soldiers, with new munitions as well as three

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³⁰ Governor Benavides to King, August 23, 1721, SC 58-1-29/18.
hundred hoes and ploughshares. They should also come well supplied with flour, other dry goods, and rum.\textsuperscript{31}

Governor Benavides seemed to have gained rapid insight into the presidio’s problems as well as the larger power struggle in the region. He wrote two letters shortly after his arrival in the summer of 1718. At the end of the second letter, he emphasized the need for more Spanish soldiers, asking that the current dotación be increased from 355 to 500. He estimated that less than 150 of the current group were actually able to bear arms. He also repeated his request for Spanish families to settle the area. He appears to have understood the advantage which the native chiefdoms in the region enjoyed. While the Spanish, French, and English colonies were all clinging to existence, the Indians could choose to ally or trade with whomever they pleased. In the case of a conflict with another European power, the natives could easily side against the Spanish and help their enemies take control of the presidio and the countryside. If the King could provide more people and soldiers for Florida immediately, the Spanish could demonstrate themselves superior allies and gain the allegiance of more local tribes.\textsuperscript{32}

Until Benavides’ arrival, the list of reasons for bringing settlers to Florida had not varied much since the initial report of 1663. As a military leader, he was not unique in considering the natives as pawns in an imperial struggle, but he was also quick to recognize the power of the native chiefdoms in the region. He saw población as important for convincing not only other European powers of Spain’s claims to authority in the region, but the indigenous populations as well. From Benavides’ perspective in St. Augustine, the rapid population growth in the English

\textsuperscript{31} Governor Benavides to King, August 12, 1718, SC 58-1-30. He explained that rum was the most highly esteemed trade good among the Indians, thanks to the English and the French.

\textsuperscript{32} Governor Benavides to King, August 12, 1718, SC 58-1-30; Governor Benavides to King, September 30, 1718, SC 58-1-30.
colonies must have made the most compelling argument for población. Benavides also went beyond his predecessors in developing a concrete plan to bring Canary Islanders to Apalache. In 1720, he began writing letters to the King requesting five hundred Canary Islanders to be transported to Havana and then to the port of San Marcos in Apalache. He asked that the royal treasury outfit the settlers with everything they needed in Havana so that they would be properly supplied upon their arrival. Once settled, they could export the product of their farms and ranches from the ports of St. Marks or St. Augustine. The settlers would receive assistance for the first year. Their produce would also make the food supply more secure and less expensive. Moreover, their presence would be useful in enticing the unconverted chiefdoms, the “barbarous nations,” in the countryside, to recognize the king’s authority and settle within the Spanish sphere.

In subsequent letters, Benavides suggested that the Islanders could also provide a reliable food source for the presidio, and that profits might be used to offset the cost of gifts and food for the natives, which averaged about 9,516 pesos annually between 1717 and 1721. Benavides sent out one letter in 1721 and two more in 1723 requesting Spanish settlers. Initially, the Council of the Indies repeated the earlier argument that the new Indian allies should be settled in Apalache instead. It was far less expensive and the Indians could farm and defend the land from English encroachment just as well. If he needed further explanation, he could consult the earlier opinion rendered on the matter in 1715. As far as the Council of the Indies was concerned, población in Florida would be about holding territory against foreign encroachment. As long as

33 Weber, Spanish Frontier in North America, 179, 214.
34 Governor Benavides to the King, June 12, 1720, SC 58-2-16/5.
35 Governor Benavides to the King, June 12, 1720, and Governor Benavides to the King, March 8, 1722, SC 58-1-29.
they were loyal to the King of Spain, the council was apparently not as picky about who the pobladores should be, especially if the financial benefits were obvious. Unfortunately for the Spanish, the one hundred and sixty-one promised villages of lower Creek and Yamassee settlers never came, and the native population near the newly built blockhouse at St. Marks never exceeded more than a few small villages totaling less than two hundred people.36

This was hardly the end of Benavides’ letter-writing campaign, and his arguments took on new importance as hostile raiding parties of Englishmen and Indians began to take their toll near the end of the 1720s.37 In response to the three letters from Benavides and another from the Franciscans, the council of the Indies revisited the need to settle Apalache to maintain control of the province. In 1724 and 1727 the council repeated the recommendation to send fifty families per year for ten years on ships bound for Havana. In order to defend the newly populated territory they would also send one hundred fifty veteran soldiers. Perhaps with an eye to French settlements west of Apalache, the council also recommended that the governor construct another large fort like the one in St. Augustine that could withstand all hostilities. This was meant to be supported by a large civilian population and the engineer, Caballero, was expected to draw up a proposal for what would amount to another city so that it would be easy for the new population to form a city agreeable to the eye, convenient for commerce, healthy, and well-designed.38

The Council of the Indies also extolled the fertility of the Apalache province claiming it would yield so many riches there would be no trouble at all attracting a permanent indigenous

36 Two enclosures from the Consejo de Indias, April 28, 1724, SC 58-2-16/5; Hann, Apalachee, 292.

37 Consejo de Indias to King, March 30, 1727, SD 837; Expediente from the Consejo de Indias, February 1727, SD 837. This expediente is largely recycled from the draft of the letter to the King from the Consejo de Indias June 7, 1724, SD 837 cited below. It seems that no progress toward the surveying of Apalache was made in the meantime.

38 Consejo de Indias draft of letter to King, June 7, 1724, SD 837. Caballero remained delinquent and the province was not properly surveyed until Antonio de Arredondo remitted his reports in 1737.
population. The Council envisioned this population as sedentary peasant agriculturalists and pastoralists. It is difficult to say whether these expectations were built upon the example of other sedentary agricultural chiefdoms or Spanish peasant farmers, as there were precedents for both. The Apalache people living in the region when the Spanish arrived were some of the few sedentary agriculturalists Spanish explorers found in Florida. In a letter to the king, the priest Alonso de Leturiondo also advocated bringing Indians from Campeche to teach the natives of Florida how to grow cotton and weave. In 1687, Captain Juan de Ayala y Escobar petitioned to buy creole slaves to sow wheat in Apalache. Governor Quiroga y Losada also suggested in 1688 that Spanish farmers be sent to teach the Indians in Timucua and Apalache how to sow wheat. This vision of agricultural, sedentary society was most suitable to founding new missions and converting the pagan Indians. The expectation that the new settlers would become peasant farmers, whatever their origins, demonstrated the council’s expectations for the role that the new settlers would fill. This is demonstrated further in the council’s response to another one of Benavides’ requests. The governor had also complained about the large population of widows and orphans in his letters, proposing to remove them to Havana where they would be safe. The council responded by asking for a report from the governor on whether or not these families were able to go to Apalache instead, where they might be put to good use farming and might serve as a good example for the Indians.

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39 Consejo de Indias draft of letter to King, June 7, 1724, SD 837; Expediente from the Consejo de Indias, February 1727, SD 837.

40 Hann, “Translation of Alonso de Leturiondo’s Memorial, to the King of Spain,” 179. On early Apalache culture, see Hann, Apalachee, 5-9.

41 Royal Cédula, May 9, 1687, SC 58-1-22.

42 Governor Quiroga y Losada to the King, April 1688, SC 54-5-12.

43 Consejo de Indias, July 13, 1728, SD 837, document two.
Governor Benavides’ term ended in 1734 and successor was Francisco del Moral y Sánchez. Despite charges against Moral y Sánchez addressed in Chapter One, he also sought to develop Florida economically and free it from its dependence on the situado. Among his plans was the desire to settle Apalache with Canary Islanders. He repeated the arguments that it would increase economic activity and serve as a line of defense against English incursions. They could also support a new line of missions. Ever interested in making money, he also suggested that profitable fur trade might be developed there. If Benavides had added the promise of profits to the list of Isleño advantages, Moral y Sánchez offered a concrete explanation of how to attain them. Meanwhile, diplomatic and trade relations with the Creek had continued, but never produced a loyal group of pobladores.\(^{44}\) His successor, Governor Manuel de Montiano, also approached his governorship with a great deal of energy and innovative ideas. Montiano also served a long term, from 1737 to 1749.\(^ {45}\)

Like those before him, Montiano thought new settlers were the answer to many of Florida’s problems. The initiative received royal approval and the Council of the Indies approved a budget of 14,856 pesos for the transportation and outfitting of fifty families of Isleño settlers. The families were to be given two cows, one pig, five hens, one rooster, one horse, and one mare, at total a cost of 875 pesos. They were also granted a fanega of corn and an arroba of rice, and all the necessary seeds for 225 pesos.\(^ {46}\) The cause of sending Canary Islanders to Florida was finally given a boost by the formation of the Real Compañía de Comercio de Havana, or the

\(^{42}\) Governor Moral y Sánchez to the King, June 30, 1734, SC 86-5-23; Tepaske, Governorship of Spanish Florida, 45-9, 53.

\(^{45}\) Tepaske, Governorship of Spanish Florida, 89-91.

\(^{46}\) Royal Cédula, July 14, 1738, SD 1020. This authorized Galician families, but the budget proposal from the Consejo de Indias considered the following year was for Isleño families: Consulta del Consejo, July 19, 1739, SD 1020. This shift was probably due to the inability to raise Galician volunteers. Morales Padrón, “Colonos Canarios en Indias,” 25-6. An arroba is a unit of weight approximating 25 pounds. A fanega is a unit of volume roughly equivalent to a bushel which varies by region from 22 to 55 liters.
Havana Company. Chartered in 1740, the Havana Company was a joint-stock company designed to encourage Cuban trade with Spain and the royal tobacco monopoly. The company also undertook a number of obligations designed to improve Spanish administration in the Caribbean. As Tepaske explains, some of these included the obligation “to maintain a coast guard around Cuba, to repress smuggling, to carry military goods free of charge to military bases and naval bases in the Caribbean, to build its own ships at its own cost, and to furnish Florida its annual quota of money and supplies.” In exchange for these services, the company enjoyed a number of privileges, including a monopoly on Cuban tobacco and exemption from duties on other valuable exports such as sugar, wine, and rum. Historians of Florida have generally emphasized the troubled relationship between the Havana Company and St. Augustine caused by disputes over the situado.\footnote{Tepaske, \textit{Governorship of Spanish Florida}, 97-103; Hoffman, \textit{Florida’s Frontiers}, 195-6.} The Havana Company charter, however, contained another set of obligations to Florida. It was required to transport fifty Isleño families to Florida each year for ten years and supply them with the necessary tools, seeds, and livestock.\footnote{Royal Cédula, December 18, 1740, Compañía de la Habana, SD 1020.}

Montiano sought to take advantage of the opportunity presented by the Havana Company charter. In February of 1745 he wrote to the King stating his enthusiasm for the plan. He pointed out, however, that the cost of transporting the settlers and providing them with adequate provisions would be higher than the Council of the Indies estimated in 1739. The War of Jenkins’ Ear made transportation risky and imported goods more costly. He provided a detailed list with the estimated costs of all of the goods and cash necessary to establish fifty Isleño settlers in two towns. As an alternative to Apalache, Montiano proposed the St. John’s River as a site for a new settlement where they might enjoy the benefits of the river and be near enough to St.
Augustine to facilitate commerce. The list is similar to the proposal in the 1739 consulta, but merits close examination because it is so well-planned. Montiano considered the needs of the new settlers in far greater detail than his predecessors. Moreover, the challenges he highlighted in 1745 offer numerous insights into the causes for the failure of the Canary Islander project which actually took place in 1757.49

Montiano envisioned spitting his first group of two hundred and fifty Isleños into two villages. In the budget, he planned for a pension of two reales per person, per day for one year. This was supposed to sustain the new settlers until they could grow crops to sell. He noted, however, that this pension was not enough for the settlers to procure clothing, food, and shelter. Even the forzados were allotted two reales and that sum was insufficient to meet their limited needs. To speed the construction of houses and chapels for the settlers, he requested that fifty forzados who were carpenters, blacksmiths, and brick masons be sent from New Spain. He also budgeted for the salary of a surgeon and a barber. His recommendation for livestock was the same as the 1739 proposal, although he projected the total cost at 3,500 pesos. Most of the inflation was due to the cost of cows and horses. He claimed these had to be transported from Havana to Florida since the war prevented the cultivation of much livestock in St. Augustine. He also budgeted for corn and rice at a cost slightly lower than the 1739 estimate. Finally, he included the necessary tools for cultivation and canoes for navigating the river. The total cost amounted to 32,221 pesos and 2 reales.50 His estimate was more than double that which was proposed by the Council of the Indies six years earlier. The War of Jenkins’ Ear had undoubtedly

49 Governor Montiano to King, February 25, 1745, SD 1020.

50 Ibid.
contributed to inflation, but the Council’s grasp of the cost of goods in Florida may also have been limited.

Montiano drafted his plan with the assistance of the royal treasurer and accountant and in the conclusion of his letter suggested a number of ways that the crown might cut corners and thus reduce the overall cost of the plan. Given the difficulty with which the St. Augustine presidio procured the soldiers and the annual situado which were already approved, this scheme was likely a top-of-the-line fantasy rather than a real plan. Nevertheless, Montiano’s attention to detail is important. His provisions presaged the difficulties of future settlers with striking accuracy. At every turn, Montiano had highlighted the poverty of St. Augustine and the importance of getting the necessary supplies and people from somewhere else. Rather than use settlers to entice Indians, however, he argued that by settling Creeks in Apalache, he could make the province secure and more appealing for Spanish families. Ultimately, the Council of the Indies deemed it too dangerous to transport settlers across the ocean during the War of Jenkins’ Ear, and Montiano’s carefully laid plans were tabled for a decade.

Over the years, authorities had proposed a number of purposes and goals for Spanish settlers in Florida. Whatever the problem, these settlers were almost always the solution. They were first expected to expand the occupation and economic development of Florida. As hostile forces encroached on Spanish lands, settlers became a means of holding on to the frontier as

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51 In response to an earlier letter from Montiano, the council helpfully suggested that the new settlers could be used to engage in any number of industries to support commerce and shipbuilding in Havana, including cutting trees. Consejo de Indias to Governor of Florida, December 24, 1744, SC 86-7-21.

52 When 363 Canaries Islanders arrived at the port in St. Augustine unannounced, Governor Alonso Fernández de Heredia was completely unprepared. He had to get supplies and livestock from Havana and write for assistance in paying the one-year pension. He had not planned to house a large group of colonists and they were forced to cobble together small shacks as best they could. Governor Montiano to King, February 25, 1745, SD 1020; Governor of Florida to King, November 1, 1758, SD 2660; Bishop of Havana, March 31, 1758, SD 2260.

well. After the attacks of 1702-4, as the Spanish attempted to build new alliances with Native Americans, settlers were considered a civilizing force, a positive Christian example for the pagan chiefdoms. As governors such as Moral y Sánchez and Montiano searched for economic solutions, settlers and their labor became the panacea for that as well. Over the course of this correspondence, it also becomes clear that most, if not all, governors saw the settlers as pawns in the service of larger goals. Presumably, one of the qualities of the ideal settler was that he and his family would not object to being pawns. As mentioned in the previous chapter, Robert Ferry illustrates this conflict in his work on colonial Caracas. While the elite of Caracas considered the Isleño peasants an exploitable labor force, the Isleños went so far as to march to Caracas in defense of their interests. This body of correspondence illustrates the preoccupation with populating or repopulating the Florida province and the sometimes unrealistic expectations attached to such a task. For those who did undertake the settlement and defense of St. Augustine the results were invariably mixed. Even for the much desired Canario settlers who finally arrived in 1756, carving out a place in society proved difficult.

Isleño Settlers Finally Arrive in Florida

In 1756, the Spanish again laid plans to export Canary Islanders to Caribbean frontiers in Santo Domingo and Florida. Although this was not a period of peace, Spain took a neutral position at the beginning of the Seven Years War. This made the prospect of transporting families across the Atlantic safer, ostensibly, than it had been during the War of Jenkins’ Ear lasting from 1740 to 1749. Authorities in the Canaries, however, struggled to find recruits. By September of 1756, fifty-three families were ready to embark for the Caribbean, which was

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55 Officials in the Canaries had complained of the difficulty of finding enough families of exactly five members as early as 1742. Don Domingo de la Guerra Juez del Comercio de las Indias en Canarias, April 4, 1742, SD 1020, ff. 109; Señor Secretario don Fernando Trivino, February 23, 1744, SD 1020.
roughly half of the set quota: fifty families for Florida, fifty for Santo Domingo. A royal order in March of 1757 shows that they were sent to Florida.\textsuperscript{56} The first two groups of colonists, consisting of 363 individuals, arrived in St. Augustine in September and October of 1757. According to one surviving certificate from Santa Cruz de Tenerife, the cost of transporting the colonists in 1757 was 78,546 reales and 12 maravedís, or about 9,818 pesos.\textsuperscript{57}

The expedition was fraught with problems. The ships had to take refuge at Matanzas, Cuba, during a storm. The families were held in the fort there in order to prevent them from deserting. When they arrived in St. Augustine they discovered that no one had informed the governor that they were coming. After decades of petitions and plans by local authorities, the governor was caught unprepared to receive the settlers. Moreover, the city was currently under siege by hostile Uchises (members of the Lower Creek). Though the Spanish were nominally neutral in the French and Indian War, they were not exempted from the general violence of the frontier and raids had been taking place for nearly seventy-five years. Since he had been given no notice, Governor Fernández de Heredia had not assembled the tools, livestock, and seeds promised to the Isleño settlers. Neither was the royal treasury in St. Augustine prepared to disburse the pension promised to the settlers during their first year in the new colony. Worse yet, the arrival of the next annual subsidy was nowhere in sight. Under these circumstances the governor chose to put the colonists in an area surrounding the city, but outside the walls. In 1758 when forty more people arrived, they were placed at the old site of La Punta, which had been abandoned by the refugee Yamassee who had lived there before moving to the mission village Nuestra Señora de la Leche north of town. The governor himself admitted that the land was

\textsuperscript{56} Copy of edict of Juez de Indias en Canarias, November 15, 1756, IG 3093; Two letters from the Juez de Indias en Canarias, November 15, 1756 and December 23, 1756, IG 3093; Royal Order, March 29, 1757, IG 3093.

unproductive and would not produce beans and vegetables enough to feed the settlers.\textsuperscript{58} Spaniards and Indians had tried and failed to cultivate crops in this site before. Archaeological research at this site shows that the pH balance in the soil and the water table level was not ideal for maize cultivation. Yamassee refugees had cultivated corn, legumes, peas, and watermelons, there. Even utilizing special methods to get the most out of the soil, they had struggled to make the land productive in 1715.\textsuperscript{59}

Given the urgent need of the settlers, it was decided that the Royal Treasury would loan the money to St. Augustine. However, costs had gone up since the last estimate made in 1744. The governor mailed a list of prices to the Secretary of the Indies in Madrid, noting that the usual sources of money, such as a chaplaincy, were insufficient there. In October of 1758 in accord with the plan of 1740, they ceased to pay the settlers the daily salary. However, the land they were on was not sufficient to make a living and so the colonists wrote a Memorial to the bishop of Havana to send to the King. In the memorial they asked that the promised compensation of 2 reales per day (which had never actually been achieved) be administered. The bishop remitted the letter, signed with the words, “Los Ysleños de Este Presidio.” For his part, the governor asked for a donation from the king to assist the settlers and asked that the export of settlers be suspended until he could provide for those that he had. The settlers were composed primarily of five-person family units, with two parents and three children, although the family members were

\textsuperscript{58} Governor Fernández de Heredia, November 1, 1758, SD 2660.

\textsuperscript{59} White, “Living on the Periphery,” 106-110; Boyer, “Nuestra Señora del Rosario de la Punta,” 98-101. The Yamassee appear to have dug trenches for irrigation, used raised beds for the maize, and fertilized the area with shell and lime in order to compensate for problems of the highly acidic soil and high water table. These methods are discussed in greater detail in chapter 5.
sometimes cousins, nieces, and nephews. The gender ratio in this group seems to have been relatively equal, at least upon arrival.  

The governor also complained that the Isleños were not good farmers and artisans, but rather individuals with “malísimas costumbres y peores vicios,” very bad customs and worse vices. In another letter he complained their situation was worsened by their great laziness, lack of order, and frequent drunkenness, a vice which was to be found in many of the women and children. There are several explanations for such reports. First, under the circumstances in St. Augustine, the Isleño settlers hardly had the resources to carry out the “exemplary” behavior hoped for by the governor. He was unable to assign enough soldiers to protect settlements as far as the St. John’s River, much less Apalache. Unable to protect themselves from attacks by the English and Indians, the Isleños were forced to stay close to the city under the protection of the garrison and the fort guns. They constructed cottages around the city and did the best they could, building two small neighborhoods near the safety of the presidio. One was immediately south of the city walls at La Punta, the other due west. Occasionally the Indian attacks actually forced them to take refuge inside the city itself, and it is unlikely that they were able to cultivate the amount of land necessary to turn a profit.  

Marchena Fernández and Pozo Redondo note that complaints about the laziness of Canarios are found elsewhere in the New World as well. They seem to have appeared wherever

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61 Governor Fernández de Heredia to King, November 1, 1758, SD 2660.

62 “…grande pereza, poco gobierno, y frecuente embriaguez, vicio que aún se prueba en muchas mujeres y niños.” Governor of Florida to King, December 22, 1761, SD 2585, Cited from Marchena Fernández and Pozo Redondo, “La Emigración Canaria,” 39.

Canary Islanders were sent to bring Spanish civilization to an unpleasant post.\textsuperscript{64} Is it possible that some of the criticism stemmed from their inability to tame the frontier and fulfill the (potentially) unrealistic expectations of local authorities? Though disappointed expectations may have been part of the problem, it is likely that the settlers were not ideal candidates either. The difficulty of finding Isleños willing to volunteer for these expeditions may have left local authorities scraping the bottom of the social barrel. As early as 1742, authorities in the Canaries were expressing concerns that it would be difficult to raise the requisite number of families, given the fear of sailing during the war, the low population of the Canary Islands, and the need to send fifty to Santo Domingo also.\textsuperscript{65} Moreover, in a decree in 1738, the Council of the Indies ordered the Captain General and the Audiencia of Galicia to raise two hundred families for Florida. While the families were supposed to volunteer, the council suggested it might be easier to meet the quota if they chose to relocate the undesirables in the Galician population. While a similar order for the Canaries has not been found, such a precedent may have been influential.\textsuperscript{66}

Isleño efforts to build their own cottages and farm the poor land demonstrated their interest in settling the area and contradicted the accusations of the other inhabitants of the city. The Canary colonists also served in the armed forces: fifty-one militia men, thirty-six in the Piquetes de Infantería. Some intermarriage also took place. Between 1758 and 1763, there were fourteen marriages between Canarios and others. The majority were Canary women who married Spanish soldiers and thus improved their status. Two Canarios married free blacks, and one

\textsuperscript{64} On the vices of Isleños in Santo Domingo, see King to don Domingo Miguel de la Guerra, 1742, SD 1020. This letter also contains a reference to a complaint about sending families, and not men like those brought by don Bernardo de Espinosa in 1737 to Hispaniola which were composed of few laboring men and mostly vagabonds, delinquents, and “mujeres viciosas y solteras, sin formalidad de familias.”

\textsuperscript{65} On the difficulty of recruiting enough families, see don Domingo Miguel de la Guerra to the King, April 4, 1742, and August 15, 1742, SD 1020; Letter from the Comandante General de las Islas Canarias y Juez del Comercio, April 25, 1743, SD 1020.

\textsuperscript{66} Original decree and copy July 14, 1738 and May 21, SD 1020.
married a slave. Marchena Fernández and Pozo Redondo suggest that the small number of marriages to non-Canarios suggests that they were marginalized overall and for the most part, were stuck at the lowest social level. Their evidence for this statement is based on marriage records, which alone do not seem to suggest low status. Moreover, the high rate of mortality, the difficulty of earning a sufficient living, and their comparatively short tenure in the city before evacuation (six years), would have limited any opportunities for marriage and social integration. More compelling evidence of low status was the location of their cottages outside the city walls. They were by no means the first to occupy this space. For nearly fifty years, refugee Indian communities had settled in the same area. Fort Mose, for all its benefits, was equally a community exiled from the city. A small enclave of German and Swiss immigrants appears to have developed near the Tolomato village just outside the city walls sometime in the 1740s or 1750s.

Conclusions

Over the course of almost one hundred years, Spanish officials insisted on the need for more people to hold the frontier in Florida. Over time, their plans became more refined. Some of their expectations for the settlers remained constant: they were to build farms and provide St. Augustine with a reliable food supply. Other expectations evolved over time in response to the English threat. For example Marquez Cabrera wanted the settlers to occupy the old Guale province where they could serve as a buffer between the English and St. Augustine. Father Leturiondo described the colonists not so much as a buffer but as a physical barrier to English encroachment. Once the mission provinces were destroyed, however, officials imagined the


longed-for Spanish settlers would fill a number of roles. Not only would they provide food for the presidio, they were expected to produce surpluses which might generate profits. The settlers were also expected to set a good example for the Indians and to demonstrate Spanish power and presence in the region. Last but not least, they were supposed to occupy land and defend it from armed raiders. This may have been the most unrealistic expectation of all. Small villages of families such as Benavides and Montiano envisioned could hardly have resisted the war parties of Moore or Oglethorpe, and they would have suffered substantial casualties at the hands of Yamasssee and Creek raiders.

The sheer volume of paper and ink spent on plans for the remission of settler families to Florida has been noted by previous historians. Bushnell even refers to this body of correspondence as a “favorite bureaucratic pipe dream.” Nevertheless, the plans have significance beyond their general failure to coalesce. First, they demonstrate the importance of policies of población on the Florida frontier. Royal officials all agreed on the need to populate the land to maintain control of it. Second, the need was sufficiently great that officials were willing to consider other individuals if they were closer or cheaper than transporting Spanish families across the Atlantic. The role those individuals were expected to fill, however, was that of peasant farmer, preferably one also capable of providing military defense. Third, despite their willingness to accept Indian or African settlers, officials in Florida repeatedly asked for Spanish settlers, demonstrating their own cultural preferences and prejudices. Even though Indian villages might have been used to hold the land, they still needed Spaniards to provide them with examples of how to better live, worship, and conduct commerce. Finally, these plans demonstrate changing royal attitudes toward the fringes of empire and increasing efforts to

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claim, populate, and control them over the course of the eighteenth century. Florida was not a lonely problem presidio-it was one of many problem presidios. By the late eighteenth century, Galician and Canary Islander families had been dispersed among settlements in Puerto Rico, Santo Domingo, Cuba, Rio de la Plata (Uruguay), Venezuela, the Yucatan, the Mosquito Coast, Texas, Louisiana, and Florida, where they met with mixed success.70

70 Hernández González, *Canarias*, 24-9, 38, 48, 53, 61-5. As the years progressed, Isleños learned which destinations, such as Florida, were violent and unappealing. They opted for better locations instead, such as Puerto Rico.
CHAPTER 5
SPANISH-INDIAN RELATIONS AT THE END OF THE MISSION ERA, 1668-1702

After 1702, St. Augustine began to absorb large numbers of indigenous refugees from the mission provinces. The residents of the city, however, were no strangers to the Native American population of Florida. As a garrison town supported by active missions in the interior, St. Augustine was home to a significant population of Indian ladinos and mestizos. Ladino was the term commonly used by the Spanish to describe those Indians who had adopted Spanish cultural customs, clothing, and language. The indigenous population of St. Augustine was ethnically and socially diverse, but there were also indigenous communities living near St. Augustine throughout the first Spanish period. One of the oldest was the mission of Nombre de Dios, located about a mile north of the city.1 Individuals from these communities regularly interacted with the inhabitants of St. Augustine and built relationships based on kinship, religion, labor and commerce.2 Native Americans also travelled between the missions, the ranches, and Spanish settlements frequently, and they often visited St. Augustine.3

Despite early works by a few scholars, the indigenous presence in St. Augustine has received little study. This is a reflection in part of the bias of colonial administrators and in part a reflection of the interests of scholars who focused primarily on the missions in their research.4 The ladino Indian population of St. Augustine interacted regularly with soldiers, slaves, and

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1 Nombre de Dios dates from 1587, and remained occupied through the end of the first Spanish period. The 1675 report by Bishop Díaz Vara Calderón describes it as half a league north of St. Augustine with more than thirty householders. Letter from Bishop Calderón, written in 1675, enclosed in January 4, 1676, SC 54-3-2; Hann, History of the Timucua Indians and Missions, 70, 246.


3 Letter from the Caciques of Apalache to the King, enclosed in Quiroga y Losada to King, April 1, 1688, MC 63, box 3, file 2, from Buckingham Smith Collection, SAHSRL; Governor of Florida to King, April 1688, AGI 54-5-12 in Serrano y Sanz, Documentos Históricos, 221-3.

4 Letter from Bishop Calderón, written in 1675, enclosed in January 4, 1676, SC 54-3-2. See Table 3-2 for descriptions of population estimates.
other Indians from the mission provinces, creating networks across race and class lines. As with other Spanish American cities, Indians, ladinos, mestizos, slaves, and free blacks composed the laboring classes of St. Augustine and occupied their own spaces of work and leisure. The first part of this chapter addresses the sources and historiography of Native Americans and Spanish Florida. The second part documents the extent of the interactions between Indians, ladinos, and the other residents of St. Augustine before 1702 and provides the necessary context for the changes that took place in the eighteenth century. The processes through which indigenous refugees were assimilated into the St. Augustine community after 1702 are the subject of Chapter Six.

**Sources on the Indigenous Population**

The sources available for the study of the missions are few in comparison with other parts of Latin America. The records kept by the Franciscan missionaries were transported to Cuba during the evacuation of the colony in 1763 and were subsequently lost. It may be that they survive in the archive of the Archdiocese of Havana, or elsewhere, but historians have yet to uncover them.\(^5\) The last quarter of the seventeenth century, however, is somewhat better documented than previous years due to the efforts of unusually diligent civil and religious authorities. In 1675, Bishop Calderón made the arduous journey to Florida to conduct an inspection of the missions, called a visita. This was a tour of the mission provinces to ensure the conversion and religious care of the Catholic Indians. Unlike the civil visita, which was an investigation of the conduct of royal authorities, the Bishop attempted to assist the Franciscans in their efforts at conversion and conducted sacraments such as confirmation. Most bishops tried to avoid visiting Florida altogether, so Bishop Calderón’s report was as uncommon as it was

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informative. He provided a description of the different provinces he visited, as well as his attempts to assist with the establishment of new missions among the Chacato. The Chacato people lived northwest of the Apalache province and east of the Apalachicola River and had intermittent contact with the Spanish over the course of the seventeenth century. The shortcoming of Calderón’s report is that he documented the number of Indians in the missions and the number of Spaniards in the city, but apparently paid little attention to the size and character of the ladinos and Indian wage laborers in the city. Since his purpose was to document the missions those living in the city were likely excluded from the report and the related correspondence. The presence of Indian laborers is implied, however, in the Bishop’s observation that some Indians regularly helped the citizens of the city by laboring in their fields.⁶

Each governor of Florida was also required to conduct a visita of the missions at least once during his term. The governors sent a lieutenant in their place on these long trips, if they bothered at all. During the visita, the governor’s representative was deputized to administer royal justice and resolve disputes, particularly those between Indians and Spaniards. Difficult cases were reserved for the governor and addressed in St. Augustine. Records of their investigations vary, but there are extensive reports for the years 1677-8, and 1694-5 which offer insight into the demographic and political changes taking place. Other sources may also be used to augment the visita records. The residencia conducted at the end of each governor’s term verified that the visita of the missions had taken place and reviewed judicial rulings. The residencias are an important source because they often contain the details of the resolution of conflicts mentioned in the visitation records. Correspondence, judicial cases, and reports on the laborers at the

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⁶ Bishop Calderón, written in 1675, enclosed in January 4, 1676, SC 54-3-2. Hann notes that the population estimates of 1675 are substantially lower than those of 1689 in the report of Bishop Evelino de Compostela. He suggests that perhaps the 1675 count was meant to assess the pool of candidates for repartimiento labor. Hann, *History of Timucua Indians and Missions*, 258.
Castillo de San Marcos offer further insights into activities of the era from the Spanish perspective.\(^7\)

The indigenous perspective is difficult to assess in many cases, due to the limited documentation. There are several useful sources, though they also have certain drawbacks. The chiefs of indigenous communities exercised their rights as Spanish vassals by submitting petitions to the governor and to the King of Spain. A discussion of these sources first requires some elaboration on the nature of Spanish government and relations with the indigenous populations of the Americas. The *encomienda*, the primary mode of rewarding conquistadors in the new world was rooted in the Reconquista. In Spain, the encomienda constituted a seigniorial relationship: those who led the conquest of a particular area granted control of conquered towns and villages as a reward to specific individuals. It was not title to the land itself, but the right to collect services and tribute or dues.\(^8\) This institution was extended in the conquest of the Antilles and later the mainland. Lacking in funds, Indians usually rendered labor or goods to the *encomendero*, or holder of the encomienda. This was also interpreted as a seigniorial relationship and the crown stipulated that in exchange for their labor, the encomenderos were required to organize their Indians into settled communities and oversee their conversion to Christianity, the two fundamental components of civilization. The system proved more effective on the mainland where the Spanish found sedentary native societies with stratified social hierarchies and systems of tribute already in place. Encomenderos abused the system by settling on the land that technically belonged to the Indians or demanding personal service and sexual favors from their Indians.\(^9\)


\(^8\) In Spain, it also entailed jurisdiction over the area, though this was not true of the American form.

Equally significant in the development of Spanish-Indian relations was the lengthy debate regarding the humanity of the Amerindians. In theory, the issue was resolved by Pope Paul III in the 1537 papal bull, Sublimis Deus, which declared that Indians did have souls and should be converted to Catholicism. The Spanish monarch also served as the head of the Catholic Church in Spain and the call to oversee the conversion of the Indians of their American colonies was a serious obligation. Missionaries undertook the task of converting the native populations to Catholicism first in core areas, and then later on the fringes of empire. The friars also sought to teach their native charges to live according to Spanish cultural expectations which they closely associated with the notion of Christian life or civilization. When working with newly converted peoples, they often began with the education of the chiefs and their descendants, hoping to educate and indoctrinate the leaders of the next generation. Not all Spaniards, however, set the best example. From rapacious encomenderos to drunken soldiers, missionaries often found themselves having to explain away the bad behavior of many “Christians.” They sought to isolate their indigenous charges from the negative influence of Spanish society. The crown shared this notion and initially envisioned dual societies, a “republic of Indians” and a “republic of Spaniards”. Some practical applications of this concept were prohibitions against Spaniards or blacks living in Indian villages or limitations on when mission Indians could travel to Spanish towns. In reality, this division proved impossible to enforce as Indian servants lived and worked with Spaniards and members of the two groups intermarried.10

The notion of a relationship based on vassalage between the King of Spain and his indigenous subjects was reinforced through a variety of colonial institutions. As noted above, the requerimiento asked native peoples to subject themselves willingly to the King of Spain and

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Christianity. Whatever their motives, many native chiefs in Florida eventually agreed to convert to Catholicism and journeyed to the city of St. Augustine to formally pledge their allegiance to the governor and, by extension, the King of Spain. The governors of Florida fêted these chiefs and their entourages whenever they arrived and gave them gifts. The ability to distribute gifts and wealth upon subjects and warriors was an important aspect of authority in the indigenous political tradition of the region and the governors’ actions reinforced relationships of patronage and reciprocity. Indigenous and European constructions of patronage differed, of course, and relations of power were constantly tested through negotiation and rebellion. By the late seventeenth century, the chiefs of Spanish Florida understood the contours of their relationship with the King of Spain and his royal representatives. It is likely that they learned from the friars to use the language typical of Spanish petitions and memorials, referring to themselves as loyal vassals.  

The petitions of indigenous chiefs are informative and often excellent examples of careful political calculation. Unfortunately, they focus on the affairs in the mission villages and tend to reveal little about life among those Indians who lived in the city of St. Augustine. Another

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11 Milanich, Laboring the Fields of the Lord, 107-8; Hall, Zamumo’s Gifts, 20-2, 26-7. To a limited extent the shared construction of patronage resembles the processes described in Richard White’s The Middle Ground wherein French and native peoples capitalized on what they perceived to be shared concepts. The situation in Florida differed, however, in that for the first century of colonization and missionary activity, the Spanish were able to impose their expectations through military force, leaving negotiations inherently unequal. White, The Middle Ground, cited above in Chapter 1, note 18.

12 For examples utilized in this chapter, see letter from the Caciques of Apalache to the King, enclosed in Quiroga y Losada to King, April 1, 1688, MC 63, box 3, file 2, from Buckingham Smith Collection; don Patricio, Cacique of Ivatucho, and Don Andres, Cacique of San Luis, to the King, February 12, 1699 and don Patricio Hinachuba to don Antonio Ponce de Leon, April 10, 1699, SC 58-2-14. Specific petitions are more common in the correspondence after 1702. See for example, Petition of Chief Francisco Jospogues, October 12, 1724, SC 86-7-21/5; St. Augustine Principales in Depositions on Governor Moral y Sánchez, 1736. SD 861; Juan Ignacio de los Reyes in Montiano to the King, August 30, 1738, 86-6-5, cited from Serrano y Sanz, Documentos Históricos, 260. Governors more consistently visited or sent lieutenants to the mission villages in the last quarter of the seventeenth century. Much of the communication was included with the residencies of the governors as evidence that they had met their obligations and so that any judicial rulings could be assessed. See also the residencia and visita collections cited below.
significant source is testimony in judicial cases and residencias. The bias in these accounts must be considered critically since in most cases the testimony was part of a criminal case which involved a crime perpetrated by or against another Indian. Even in residencias, where native residents were sometimes asked to testify to the governor’s efficacy in matters such as maintaining roads and adequate defenses, there were political implications to every answer. Typically, a native interpreter, called an atiqui, was appointed for those who did not speak Spanish. This would have added another layer of mediation to native testimony. Despite these shortcomings, a critical assessment of these sources can offer a limited view of daily life in St. Augustine and its surroundings.

Finally, the Catholic parish records are useful here as well. Many Native Americans who lived in St. Augustine became members of the parish church, and their marriages, births, and deaths may appear in the records. As noted in chapter two, these records have limitations. Baptismal records are particularly problematic. A baptismal record in the parish register contains a name, a date of baptism, and a formulaic benediction followed by the names of the parents, witnesses, and sponsors, or godparents. Other information such as grandparents and birth date might be included, but the collection of this information varied by priest. The child’s name is also listed in the margin, with a racial designation if the individual did not appear Spanish. The inclusion of the racial label could also vary by priest. Thus, a child clearly born to indigenous parents might not receive any official racial designation until much later in life. Cope suggests

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13 Residencia of Francisco de la Guerra y de la Vega, 1671, EC 155C, especially Cuaderno 2 Pesquisa Secreta; Residencia of Manuel de Cendoya, 1674, EC 156A; 1678 Visitations conducted by Antonio de Argüelles and Domingo de Leturiondo, 1678, EC 156B; Residencia of Pablo de Hita Salazar, EC 156A; Residencia of Juan Marquez Cabrera, EC 156A-C; Visitations of Joachín de Florencia and don Juan de Pueyo, 1695, enclosed in Residencia of Governor Laureano de Torres y Ayala, November 16, 1700, Escribanía de Cámara leg. 157A, PKYL. Testimony also took place in less formal settings, for example when Indians reported information on the movements of the English or other groups. See for example: Letter from Cendoya with testimony of Indians and English prisoners from San Jorge, October 31, 1671, SC 58-1-26.
that for most members of plebeian society in Mexico City, racial designation was less likely to be set at childhood and might vary later in life, making marriage records a better representation of the perceived race of an individual as an adult.\(^14\) This appears to be true in St. Augustine as well, particularly before 1735.

In 1735, Auxiliary Bishop Francisco de San Buenaventura Martínez Tejada insisted on separate books for baptisms and marriage records. One book contained entries for Spaniards, the other for blacks and Indians.\(^15\) Despite the Bishop’s attempts to better organize racial categorization, the criteria for identifying race in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century could extend beyond phenotype to include genealogy and the performance of Hispanic cultural traits such as language, dress, and armament. Thus, an individual could attempt to influence the perception of others by conforming to culturally constructed indication of culture and class. For example, by speaking Spanish and dressing in Hispanic clothes, Indians could and did pass as mestizos. Cope demonstrates that the fluidity of race was typical of life in Mexico City. José Cuello has identified a similar pattern for Saltillo, a city in northern Mexico.\(^16\) The Catholic parish records suggest that this was true of St. Augustine as well.

\(^14\) Cope, *Limits of Racial Domination*, 51-5; CPR Baptisms, 1668-1757. In Florida even armaments mattered since the Indians living in the missions were discouraged from owning firearms. One governor even called them bow-and-arrow Indians to distinguish them from their Creek counterparts who traded with the English for flintlocks. This of course was not strictly a criterion of race since both the mission populations and the Creeks were considered Indians. Nevertheless, the term “bow and arrow,” connoted one who practiced a traditional native way of life, not a Hispanic one. In Florida, even recognition as a ladino could be an advantage since it freed men from the obligation of repartimiento labor, an organized levy of Indian laborers that will be discussed further below.

\(^15\) Auxiliary Bishop Martínez Tejada to the King, April 29, 1736, 58-2-14/118-124.

\(^16\) Cope, *Limits of Racial Domination*, 55-7; José Cuello, “Racialized Hierarchies of Power in Colonial Mexican Society,” in *Choice, Persuasion, and Coercion: Social Control on Spain’s North American Frontiers* eds., Jesús F. de la Teja and Ross Frank (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2005), 220-1. Cuello challenges the argument that increasing fluidity of racial categories represented a disintegration of the sistema de castas. Fluidity among the racial categories of plebeian society did not threaten social control. Rather, the system served to govern access to resources and to preserve positions of power for members of the Spanish elite.
Archaeologists and anthropologists have also contributed significant insight into life among the indigenous populations of colonial Spanish Florida. Material culture in St. Augustine reveals extensive evidence of indigenous influence in Spanish households, particularly in kitchen wares. This suggests the presence of native women as wives or housekeepers where they directed daily food production. Most anthropologists, however, have focused on either independent chiefdoms or those living in the mission communities. This research has revealed much about indigenous ways of life, but it has obscured the nature and frequency of contacts between the Spanish and indigenous populations.

**Previous Studies of the Florida Indians**

Trends in anthropological and historical research have shaped the historiography of native Florida in other ways. Early historical research on the native population took place largely in the context of the Spanish Catholic mission system. This work was influenced by Robert Ricard’s triumphalist narrative and Herbert Bolton’s interest in missions as a frontier institution meant in part to civilize native populations. Over time, historians moved away from the debate over the success of the missions, as framed by Bolton. Scholars interested in the indigenous experience of the missions and aided by anthropological and archaeological tools developed a more sophisticated interpretation that accounts for the cultural and demographic changes.

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experienced by the indigenous population and have definitively refuted many of Bolton’s conclusions. For instance, Amy Bushnell’s work focuses on the economic activities of Florida and reveals complex patterns of labor and trade in St. Augustine and its mission provinces. Her research also demonstrates that the notion of two separate spheres, a “republic of Indians” and a “republic of Spaniards”, was not the reality of daily life in St. Augustine.\textsuperscript{20} Her conclusions are similar to those reached by other scholars who have noted the breakdown of this dichotomy elsewhere.\textsuperscript{21} They are also supported by the archaeological research conducted by Kathleen Deagan and others. Their work has been essential for establishing a significant and sustained indigenous presence in the city.\textsuperscript{22} Such studies indicate dynamic and multi-faceted interactions between the Spanish, indigenous, and African populations of Florida, but relatively little historical work complements this research.\textsuperscript{23} Historical and anthropological studies have yet to develop the theoretical sophistication of similar work for other regions.\textsuperscript{24} 

Recently, some scholars of Florida have begun to expand beyond the framework of triumph and decline by demonstrating the complex processes of adaptation and political

\textsuperscript{20} See, for example, \textit{Situado and Sabana} and “The Menéndez Marquez Cattle Barony,” both cited above; Bushnell, “Ruling the ‘Republic of Indians’ in Seventeenth-Century Florida,” 134-50.


\textsuperscript{22} Deagan, “Accommodation and Resistance,” 297-314; Deagan, \textit{Spanish St. Augustine: Archaeology of a Colonial Creole Community} (New York: Academic Press, 1983); Kathleen S. Hoffman, “The Development of a Cultural Identity in Colonial America: The Spanish-American Experience in La Florida,” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Florida, 1994); One of the major archaeological sources of evidence for Spanish-Indian relationships is the high rate of Amerindian pottery as the primary form of cookware in Spanish homes. This suggests that unions were primarily composed of Spanish men and native women, as in other parts of early Spanish America.

\textsuperscript{23} See in particular Jerald T. Milanich, \textit{Laboring in the Fields of the Lord: Spanish Missions and Southeastern Indians}, which still seeks to counter triumphalist narratives with a description of the decline and destruction of indigenous culture.

negotiation underway in the region during the colonial era. Much of the work continues to come from the fields of anthropology and archaeology. These studies reveal that the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries were periods of dynamic change for the indigenous population. A recent monograph, *Zamumo’s Gifts*, by Joseph Hall (2010) is the first to incorporate the Native Americans of Florida fully into the geopolitics of the southeast and examine their place in larger regional patterns of warfare and ethnogenesis, or the formation of new ethnic identities. The scope of Hall’s work, though, prevents him from investigating closely the relationship between the mission populations and other groups. Almost all of the research produced by historians continues to focus on the Spanish missions and the friars as the central point of interaction between the Spanish and the indigenous populations of the southeast. While these relationships were undoubtedly powerful, this focus has created an artificial separation in the scholarship between those who lived under mission rule and those who did not. Individuals travelled the roads between missions, Spanish settlements, and Indian towns regularly. Men were drafted in large numbers for construction of the Castillo de San Marcos. Meanwhile, the violence caused by the Westo and Yamassee raids weakened the Guale missions, driving many even closer in to the Spanish sphere (Figure 2-2).

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25 Gifford Waters, "Maintenance and Change of 18th Century Mission Indian Identity: A Multi-Ethnic Contact Situation," (Ph.D. dissertation: University of Florida, 2005); Christopher M. Stojanowski, *Biocultural Histories in La Florida: A Bioarchaeological Perspective* (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2005). Extensive archaeological research was conducted in order to locate the original Spanish missions and excavate the sites. Most of the results, however, are presented in the form of short reports. They constitute a large body of resources which are available to the public, but not published in a peer-reviewed format. Moreover, the research which has been published rarely seeks to compare the findings in Florida with sites from other parts of colonial Spanish America, Saint Augustine Historical Society Research Library.

26 Hall, *Zamumo’s Gifts*, 6-10.

These processes contributed to the creation of a linguistically and ethnically diverse indigenous population in the city. From the existing sources, it is difficult to determine how frequently racial identity was a contested issue. For example, Douglas Cope utilizes criminal and Inquisition records in Mexico City to examine how racial identity was asserted and manipulated.\footnote{Cope, \textit{Limits of Racial Domination}, 52-5. Racial status mattered because the Inquisition did not prosecute Indians. They were referred instead to the Provisor de los Indios, where their sentence would likely be less severe.} The documentary record of Inquisition and other judicial activities in seventeenth-century St. Augustine is much smaller by comparison. Thus there is little indication of how frequently an individual’s status was challenged, whether Indian, mestizo, or Spaniard. The work of scholars such as Bushnell and Hann, however, indicates that the surviving documentation is rich enough to offer some insights into the dynamics of race in seventeenth-century St. Augustine. Parker has led the research on this topic in the eighteenth century. Her work demonstrates that despite protective friars, some Indians who lived in the environs of St. Augustine after 1702 were able to integrate themselves into Spanish society, losing their documentary identity as “Indian” within a generation.\footnote{Parker, “Second Century,” 51-70; See also, Susan Parker, “Spanish St. Augustine’s Urban Indians,” \textit{El Escribano} 30 (1993):1-15.} Her research and the details of this process will be examined further in Chapter Six.

Some Native Americans appear to have been successful in blending into Spanish society, but many others continued to live in St. Augustine as repartimiento laborers, contract laborers, or ladinos. They often lived and worked alongside the free black and enslaved population in St. Augustine. Sometimes they intermarried and sponsored each other’s children at baptism. Together they filled out the lower classes of St. Augustine’s society. An examination of the urban Indian population of St. Augustine reveals patterns similar to those observed for seventeenth-century Mexico City. Most Native Americans who chose to live and work in
Hispanic society adapted to its linguistic and cultural expectations. The rest of this chapter examines Indians living and working in St. Augustine and the relationships that framed their interaction with Spaniards and people of African descent.\textsuperscript{30}

**Kinship and Religion in the Construction of Social Networks**

Religious activities in St. Augustine were an important part of daily life, and they provided a number of avenues for the construction of social ties in the community. The clergy presided over the creation of new and extended families as they performed and recorded marriages and baptisms. Native American residents of St. Augustine were connected to others in the city through the various ties of kinship and non-familial networks such as membership in a confraternity, a lay religious organization.\textsuperscript{31} This section examines the ways in which the Indian residents of St. Augustine used participation in the religious life of the city to build relationships with other members of the community.

Intermarriage between the Spanish and Native American populations began at the time of settlement and continued throughout the period of Spanish occupation. In his 1606 visita to Florida, Bishop Altamirano visited the town of Nombre de Dios which was located just a little over a mile north of the city. While there, he confirmed the cacica (female chief), her mestizo children, and twenty Spaniards. His account suggests that a number of Spaniards were living in the village, most likely as part of indigenous families. Their records of marriages and baptisms would have been kept by the Franciscan friars who served the villages, and as noted above, these records have been lost.\textsuperscript{32} Governor Aranguíz y Cotes also noted the presence of Indians in the

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{30} On the long presence of Spanish-speaking Indians and mestizos in St. Augustine, see Governor of Florida to the King, November 12, 1707, SD 841.


\textsuperscript{32} Bushnell, *Situado and Sabana*, 120.
\end{flushleft}
city in his report on the presidio in 1662. The intermarriage of Spaniards and Indians had become a point of dispute by 1707 when Governor Córcoles y Martínez wrote to the king to inform him of a dispute between the Franciscans and the parish priest over who should officiate at marriages between Spaniards and Indians.

Eleven marriages between and partners of a different race appear in the parish marriage records between 1668 and 1702 (Table 5-1). Seven more interethnic marriages are mentioned in the baptismal records, although the couples’ marriages are not listed in the parish registers (Table 5-2). These marriages highlight the inconsistency of racial categories ascribed in religious records. They also demonstrate how compadrazgo was used to form connections between families. For example, in 1695 a Spanish soldier, Luis Maroto of Castile, married María de la Concepción, described as a mestiza woman. A corporal in his company, Patricio Monzón, served as godfather to both his children, Juana Catharina and Luis. Although their mother’s mestiza status was noted, neither child received any racial designation in the baptismal record. Another case is that of Juan de Andrada, who is described as an Indian native of Puebla de los Angeles in Mexico. He married Micaela de Salas y Antanilla, born in St. Augustine. Her parents were Dionisio de Antanilla, native of the city of Santiago de Guatemala, deceased, and María de Salas, also of St. Augustine. Andrada was a soldier, likely among the dark-skinned reinforcements from

33 Governor Aranguíz y Cotes to the King, September 8, 1662, SD 225.

34 Governor Córcoles y Martínez to the King, November 12, 1707, SC 58-1-28/21. The governor commented that traditionally, the marriage was performed and recorded in the parish of the Spaniard. He felt the friars were just causing trouble by trying to claim jurisdiction over ladina and mestiza women who had lived in St. Augustine for decades and spoke fluent Spanish. This letter is examined in greater detail in Chapter Six.

35 CPR, Marriages, 1668-1757, Marriage of Luis Maroto to Maria de la Concepcion, October 12, 1695; CPR, Baptisms, 1650-1763, Juana Catharina, 1698 and Luis 1701. Maroto appears for the first time in the 1698 muster role. Officials of the Royal Hacienda, December 31, 1698, enclosed in Viceroy of New Spain Duke of Albuquerque to King, November 8, 1703, SC 58-2-3/25. Maroto could have arrived in St. Augustine any time between the previous muster roll in 1687 and the one cited above from 1698.
New Spain, about which the governors of Florida complained.\textsuperscript{36} Andrada’s marriage illustrates how immigration gave rise to increasing diversity within marriages and extended families.\textsuperscript{37} Andrada also served as the godfather to Francisca Antonia, the daughter of Victoria María described as a mestiza from “la Costa,” probably the territory of the Aís people.\textsuperscript{38} Victoria María had no father listed in the records.\textsuperscript{39}

Another example of the variability or racial identity is the marriage of Manuel Palma, a criollo who served as an artilleryman, and Cecilia Ponce, a St. Augustine resident. In their marriage record in 1676, Cecilia is described as mestiza. There is no information listed about her parents and no baptismal entry for her in the parish records, making her heritage impossible to pinpoint. Cecilia gave birth to nine children over the course of the marriage. She was listed as an Indian in three of these baptism records, a mestiza in three, and was given no racial designation in three others. The records do not suggest an arc in which Cecilia’s status improved over time. Instead the racial designations varied with no apparent logic. Here the inconsistencies in the records are most clear, because Cecilia’s children have no racial designation beneath their names. Moreover, in the records of Cecilia’s daughters who went on marry in the city, Cecilia’s heritage is erased completely. The brides and their parents were each recorded as “natives of this city.” The inconsistency of racial designations for the children of these unions was not
uncommon for the time period.\textsuperscript{40} Two of her daughters married soldiers from abroad. María married Angel Peres, native of the island of Tenerife, and raised three children. Bernarda married Nicolás Estiveres and also had three children.\textsuperscript{41}

Five marriages took place between an Indian bride and a groom who was a black slave. There is evidence of three more of these marriages in the baptismal records. Although there is no record of the marriage of those couples in the parish records, their children were baptized as legitimate, indicating that the marriage took place elsewhere (Table 5-2). Each of the brides came from a different part of Spanish Florida and from parents who had differing degrees of exposure to Catholicism.\textsuperscript{42} It seems that what they had in common was residence in the city and membership in the parish church. The grooms had more in common: they were all slaves of prominent citizens or officers in St. Augustine. Only one is described as having been born in Africa although he is also described as the legitimate child of parents with Spanish names, suggesting that he was likely familiar with Spanish society and culture, not a bozal, an individual recently arrived from Africa. It is possible that the status of their owners permitted these slaves

\textsuperscript{40} Cope, Limits of Racial Domination, 54-5.

\textsuperscript{41} CPR Baptisms, 1650-1763: see baptisms for Maria Antonia 1677, Francisca 1681, Antonio 1684, Juana 1686, Catherina 1689, Joseph 1692, Josepha 1693, in necessity, Francisco Geron 1695, and Bernarda, 1698; CPR Marriages, 1668-1757: Manuel Palma and Cecilia Ponce, February 18, 1676; Maria Palma Gonzales and Angel Peres, September 22, 1695; Bernarda and Nicolás Estiveres, November 9, 1727.

\textsuperscript{42} One came from Nombre de Dios and one from Apalache. Three were daughters of gentile parents of the Yamassee and the Mayaca, a mission field located south of Lake George, due west of modern-day Daytona Beach, Florida. Although initiated as early as 1602, missions to the Mayaca were not as well developed as the provinces to the north. Comparatively little is known about the Mayaca culture and language. They were occasionally listed as part of the Timucua mission system, although anthropologists believe that culturally they were much closer to the Ais, a native group to the south. The Mayaca appear to have maintained a hunting-gathering-fishing economy, which perhaps contributed to the inconsistent mission presence. John H. Hann, “The Mayaca and the Jororo and Missions to Them,” in The Spanish Missions of La Florida, ed. Bonnie G. McEwan (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1993), 111, 120-1.
access to resources that made them appealing spouses. Of the interethnic marriages documented here, indigenous women and slave men were the most common pairing (Table 5-3).43

The family of Gabriel Cardoso and Juana Antonia also demonstrates the subjectivity of racial designations and the influence of criteria other than phenotype. In 1694 Gabriel Cardoso, a free pardo of the Canary Islands, married the Indian woman Juana Antonia. It is interesting to note that Cardoso does not appear in the muster rolls or government payrolls for the time period, suggesting that he arrived independently of military service.44 Cardoso is listed as a pardo and Juana as an Indian. Their children, however, were not designated as chino, the most common description for mixed African and Indian descent. The first child was described as Indian, the second and third as mestizo, and fourth again as an Indian.45 The reason why other pardo fathers had chino children, but Cardoso’s were described as Indian or mestizo, is unclear. Since all the other examples for this time frame involved enslaved pardos, perhaps Cardoso’s free status was a mitigating factor. Cardoso’s family is also noteworthy because the godfather of his third and fourth children was Joseph Reyes. Reyes was a Mexican soldier who was married to Francisca Solana, an Indian ladina originally from the village of Tolomato.46

43 Six of the eight couples had children baptized in St. Augustine (Tables 5-1 and 5-2). The others may have had children on the ranches or farms of the interior and had them baptized by one of the Franciscans. There is another possibility as well. Three of the marriages took place in the year 1675, the same year that Bishop Calderón made his visit. It is possible that the Bishop’s presence, directly or indirectly, encouraged couples to marry formally. CPR, Marriages, 1668-1757 and Baptisms, 1668-1763: Phelipe de Santiago Candia and Micaela Maria married on April 15, 1692 and had Antonio Joseph, baptized in 1696; Juan Francisco and Anna Petronila married on June 17, 1699, and had Petrona Catalina Mora, baptized in 1701.

44 CPR, Marriages, 1668-1757, Gabriel Cardoso to Juana Antonia, January 7, 1694.

45 In the first two baptisms, Juana is described as a ladina, in the third she has no racial designation, and in the fourth, she is called an Indian. Cardoso’s African heritage was mentioned in the baptism of his first, second, and fourth children. In the third baptism he is only identified as an Isleño.

46 CPR Marriages, 1668-1757, Gabriel Cardoso to Juana Antonia, January 7, 1694; CPR Baptisms, 1650-1763, Marcos Gabriel in 1695, Balthasar in 1697, María in 1700, and Juana in 1702.
The baptismal records also reveal a number of unofficial unions between Indian women and Spanish, Indian, and black partners. Between 1650 and 1702, fourteen infants were baptized to Indian mothers with fathers listed as unknown, but the distribution is significant. Only one was baptized before 1687. Between 1687 and 1702 there were thirty infants baptized with unknown fathers and thirteen were born to Indian mothers. This would represent a significant increase in the rate of illegitimate children born to Indian mothers, assuming the reporting for earlier years is reliable. Of the thirteen babies born after 1687, four had no racial designation. Four infants were designated mestizos, and four as Indians. One was described as *pardo*. In some instances, members of the interethnic families described above served as godparents for these infants. As noted above, Juan de Andrada was godfather to one such girl. María Antonia de Palma and her husband, Angel Pérez, sponsored another girl, Anna María. Sometimes slaves served as godparents to these children as well. These connections suggest networks of kinship and support developed among members of plebeian society in St. Augustine.

Social networks could also be constructed through confraternities or *cofradías*. These were religious mutual aid associations. Members were usually male heads of households,

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47 Between 1650 and 1687, the total number of infants baptized with an unknown father was one hundred three. Of these one hundred three infants, only one had an Indian mother. If there were other Indian or mestiza mothers, their race was not included in the record. The illegitimacy rate for the city as a whole actually declined slightly during this period. Between 1650 and 1687, there was an average of 3.59 illegitimate births per year. From 1687 to 1702 there was an average two 2 per year. CPR, Baptisms 1650-1763.

48 CPR, Baptisms, 1650-1763: María, in 1651; Francisca Antonia, October 12, 1687; María Geronima, Indian, October 6, 1690; Joseph Nicolás April 17, 1692; Josepha, mestiza, October 24, 1693; Antonio, Indian, May 11, 1695; Antonio Joseph, Indian Guascara, June 28, 1696; Manuel Antonio, pardo, April 2, 1697, was born to Sebastiana, a china slave of the heirs of Manuela Rodriguez; Juana, mestiza, January 17, 1698; Anna María, September 7, 1698; Nicolasa Catharina, February 11, 1699; Gregorio Joseph, mestizo, November 28, 1699; Lucia, mestiza, July 13, 1701; Francisca, Indian, July 27, 1702.

49 María Antonia was the oldest daughter of Manuel Palma and Cecilia Ponce, now married with her own children. Nicolasa Catharina appears to have been named after her sponsor, Catharina, a black slave of don Juan de Hita Salazar. Another slave of Hita Salazar, María de la Encarnación, sponsored the pardo baby Manuel Antonio. CPR, Baptisms, 1650-1763: Francisca Antonia, October 12, 1687; Manuel Antonio, pardo, April 2, 1697; Anna María, September 7, 1698; Nicolasa Catharina, February 11, 1699.
although there were confraternities composed entirely of women and others in which women could participate. Membership in more than one at a time was common. The cofradía served to venerate a specific patron saint by honoring his or her feast day with masses and processions. The cofradía also assisted members through death and salvation by providing for last rites, burial fees, or obsequies. Many also adopted a charitable cause, such as the Cofradía of Nuestra Señora de la Soledad in St. Augustine which supported the hospital. All cofradías required a license from the king and authorization from the local bishop. In theory, all meetings were to take place with the supervision of both the local priest and a representative of the king. This was understood as a dual jurisdiction between church and royal government. In St. Augustine, cofradías were important parts of the political, social, and spiritual life of the city, and given the prestige often associated with rank and membership within the institution, fertile ground for power struggles among community leaders. 50 For example, in his work on the religious life of the city of St. Augustine, Kapitzke documents the conflict that erupted between Governor Marquez Cabrera and the clergy, particularly Father Pérez de la Mota. One of the ways in which Pérez de la Mota retaliated against the governor was to deny his representatives entry to a meeting of the Cofradía of Nuestra Señora de Soledad. Marquez Cabrera responded the next day by gathering testimony that became part of a lengthy legal proceeding he initiated against the priest. 51


51 Kapitzke, Religion, Power, and Politics, 41-4. The cofradía sponsored the hospital chapel and was planning to elect a new mayordomo or leader that evening. Marquez Cabrera argued that presence of the governor or his representative was custom and part of the cofradía charter as approved by the Bishop. Moreover, it was important to have a representative of the king present at all gatherings to prevent potential disturbances. For the suit against Pérez de la Mota, see Marquez Cabrera, February 8, 1684, SD 227A, number 2.
In many parts of Spanish America, indigenous communities maintained their own cofradías. These sodalities functioned as a vehicle for self-expression among indigenous communities as well as a tool of Hispanicization and social control for Spanish authorities. They were utilized early in the colonization in Mexico and elsewhere to teach the native converts about Catholic rituals and to assist priests and missionaries in regulating indigenous Catholic life. Indigenous cofradías also provided another avenue for indigenous leadership and community organization. The ability of an indigenous cofradía to venerate its patron saint in style was an important source of community pride, and large amounts of resources might be consumed in this pursuit. In St. Augustine, several mission communities maintained their own cofradías. For example, as early as 1606, San Pedro and San Juan del Puerto both maintained a Cofradía of the True Cross. Hann suggests that these sodalities were organized at the instigation of the friars as a means of reinforcing Catholic life and rituals among the newly converted populations. Whether or not the origins of the native cofradías were voluntary, it seems that most indigenous communities participated actively in the decoration of their churches and the veneration of their patron saints.


53 Hann, History of the Timucua Indians and Missions, 161-2.

54 Hoffman, Florida’s Frontiers, 153, 155-8. Knowledge of the adornments of the mission churches comes from commentary by priests as well as assessments of materials lost to pirate raids in 1683 and 1684. Some materials were recovered in the Spanish raid on Stuarts Town in 1686. For description of the material wealth of the mission churches, see John H. Hann, “Church Furnishings, Sacred Vessels and Vestments Held by the Missions of Florida: Translation of Two Inventories,” Florida Archaeology 2 (1986): 147-164; Pride in the indigenous community church and cofradía was common in other areas in Spanish America as well, Lockhart, Nahuas After the Conquest, 218-222; Van Oss, Catholic Colonialism, 89-91; Nancy M. Farriss, Maya Society under Colonial Rule: The Collective Enterprise of Survival (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 323.
Closer to the city, the mission villages of Nombre de Dios and Tolomato maintained cofradías as well.⁵⁵ Both soldiers and Indians from Nombre de Dios participated in the Cofradía of Nuestra Señora de la Leche. This organization dated from the early days of the colony’s founding and illustrates the extent of the contact between the Spanish and the Indians who lived in and around the city of St. Augustine. In 1678, the members of Nuestra Señora de la Leche elected the current governor, Pablo de Hita Salazar, as their steward and the other royal officials in related positions of power. Hita Salazar understood well his responsibility as patron and sponsored the construction of a new stone church in the village of Nombre de Dios.

Unfortunately, the records of the St. Augustine cofradías are also lost to historians. Aside from the 1685 report submitted by royal officials, the documentation regarding their activities is more substantial in the years after 1735, when the auxiliary bishop’s presence generated more frequent correspondence on the subject and internment records began again. Parker’s study of cofradías provides an excellent study of the patterns of wealth and patronage in the bequests and material wealth of the confraternities in eighteenth-century St. Augustine. She observes that participation in the confraternities offered a means of participating in the spiritual life of the city as well as access to avenues of patronage for the indigenous community.⁵⁶

Labor and Commerce

When the Franciscan missionaries began their initial work converting indigenous populations, they adapted to native lifeways by settling the main mission in the head town. This approach added to the prestige of the local chief and the friars could capitalize upon his authority to expand conversions and maintain obedience. Small satellite towns became visitas, places

⁵⁵ Royal Officials to the King, April 30, 1685, SC 54-5-12/18.

⁵⁶ Parker, “Second Century,” 228, 229-43.
where the friars would visit, but not stay. As disease, migration, and warfare took their toll on native populations over the course of the seventeenth century, the size of some villages declined dramatically. The solution provided by Spanish authorities was to collect the fragmented village communities and regroup them together, a process called congregación or reducción. Elsewhere, this practice was designed to concentrate the newly converted Christians together where they could be ministered to and monitored. In Florida, it was not utilized until the original town structures began to fail due to disease, violence, and depopulation. Among the Timucua, this process began after the epidemics of 1613-17 ravaged the missions. It was repeated following the rebellion against Rebolledo’s policies in 1657. After the rebellion, the existing mission villages were re-concentrated in order to serve the royal road, called the Camino Real. Under Rebolledo, the missions thus came to serve the purpose of securing the main artery of east-west travel through Florida, providing lodging, protection, and ferry services where necessary. The practice had distinct drawbacks for the indigenous populations. Congregación among the Timucua facilitated the spread of disease by putting the mission villages on the main travel route and increasing potential exposure to disease. It also caused some political upheaval as multiple chiefs and their vassals might find themselves attempting to share authority in a new village.

In Apalache, the missions were more densely settled, though flight from the missions and disease still contributed to depopulation. These missions were the most recent, established in the 1630s. By the 1670s they had matured significantly, and missionaries had begun to reach out to new towns and peoples nearby. Chacato and Tama Indians had lived in the area west of

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57 Both terms signify the concentration of a native group into a central settlement. They are used interchangeably in the literature on Spanish Florida.

58 Milanich, Laboring in the Fields of the Lord, 163-6.
Apalache but moved into the region to settle among the mission villages with encouragement from the Franciscans. Others came from southwestern Florida, such as the Tocobaga. The Spanish also sought to build new mission provinces northward and westward along the Apalachicola, Flint, and Chattahoochee Rivers. Efforts to establish permanent missions in this region were unsuccessful, but lines of communication and trade remained open. Indians in the Apalache missions were particularly successful in cultivating pigs, fowl, corn, tobacco, and other vegetables. The friars sold this produce for a tidy profit. Some of the produce was traded with chiefdoms along the Apalache. Most of the rest of the goods were often shipped to Havana rather than St. Augustine, depriving the royal treasury and storehouses of St. Augustine of any of the benefits of the trade.

Franciscan friars, however, were not the only arbiters of Spanish-Indian relations. From the earliest years of the colony, natives were also forced into coerced labor as servants, penal laborers, or slaves. The primary form of compulsory labor was the repartimiento. The repartimiento was essentially a labor levy through which Spanish authorities assigned native men to rotating work assignments, usually on public projects such as maintaining roads. Menéndez de Aviles established a repartimiento system with the Timucua, and subsequent governors expanded the institution, either as a function of conquest or as a punishment for rebellion against

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60 Bushnell, *The King's Coffer*, 99. The governors of Florida would have preferred that the maize and other goods be sold to the presidio so that they might strike a deal advantageous to themselves or the royal treasury. The friars preferred to sell their produce abroad in order to pay their own debts and acquire decorations for their churches. In some instances, governors managed to win the battle, financing defensive works with tithes from the provinces. A royal cédula formally prohibited the friars from engaging in commercial trade, but it appears this was largely ignored: Cédula, June 20, 1670, SD 226; Response, March 24, 1672, SD 226. This trade was also likely the source of alcohol introduced illicitly into the missions, Hann, *Apalachee*, 255.

the authority of the king. By the mid-seventeenth century each of the major mission provinces regularly sent repartimiento laborers to St. Augustine. The laborers were initially single men, and the rotation was designed to limit their time away from their own fields and families. Distance from the presidio and labor demands dictated the length of service, but Bushnell estimates that the average was about two weeks. The labor was also paid, though usually in the form of trade goods rather than specie. The types of labor they did varied. “Indios de cava” worked in the fields growing maize for the presidio. Although he neglected to mention the urban Indian population, Bishop Calderón did comment that the Franciscans in St. Augustine ministered to the Indians who regularly assist the presidio by laboring in the fields of its citizens. “Indios de servicio” conducted the manual labor in the city which was beneath the dignity (or perceived dignity at least) of the Spaniards in the city: unloading ships, cutting wood, repairing roads, operating ferries, and transporting goods and messages on foot or by canoe. “Indios de fábrica” were those who worked on the construction and maintenance of buildings, especially fortifications.

Repartimiento labor was often undercompensated and coercive. Some of the work was physically devastating, particularly the work of carrying loads to and from St. Augustine or the port at St. Marks. The labor regime was also a source of controversy between religious and

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62 Bushnell, *Situado and Sabana*, 121. Governor Méndez Canzo took the well-recognized approach of sentencing Indians who rebelled against Spanish authority to servitude and attempted to distribute fifty Surruque rebels among the residents of the city. King Philip III ordered the Governor to rescind the act. Méndez Canzo settled the captive Surruques on an island nearby, establishing what Bushnell calls the “prototype of the Florida service town.”

63 Memorial of Fr. Alonso Moral, November 5, 1676, SD 235; Moral was inclined to emphasize the abuses of the Indians in this letter as it is part of his petition to have established a formal office of Protector of the Indians. Bishop Calderón, written in 1675, enclosed in January 4, 1676, SC 54-3-2; Bushnell, *Situado and Sabana*, 119-122; Weber, *Spanish Frontier in North America*, 123-4. Weber notes that frontiers in general fostered exploitation and coercive labor systems. Spaniards who came to make their fortune in the Americas sought to own ranches, farms, and mines, but as they aspired to the status of a gentleman, would not do the labor themselves if any other labor supply was available. On Spanish labor practices in frontier areas, see Susan Deeds, “Rural Work in Nueva Vizcaya: Forms of Labor Coercion on the Periphery,” *Hispanic American Historical Review* 69 (Aug. 1989): 425-49.
secular authorities. The friars accused the Spanish officials and soldiers of abusing the repartimiento system and the officials responded by accusing the friars of inciting the caciques of mission villages to complain. Spanish officials in Florida felt that their use of the repartimiento system was far more benign than in other parts of the Americas, where labor in workshops or mines was common. They struggled to understand why the native population still seemed to resist the system and die beneath it. As on other frontiers, the repartimiento system seems to have continued longer in Florida than in core areas of the Spanish empire. The repartimiento placed even greater demands on the native population with the beginning of the construction of the Castillo de San Marcos in St. Augustine. Indian laborers spent fifteen years digging, cutting, and laying the coquina stones of the fort. Specific counts of the number of repartimiento laborers do not exist, but a report from the Franciscan Comisario de Indias stated that there were more than three hundred workers in the city at a time. Since they expected an extended stay, they often brought their families. The labor levy kept men in the city for longer stretches of time. Contagious diseases, depopulation, raids from hostile Indians, and the demands of the labor levy limited the number of people available to cultivate corn in the mission fields. Shortages put pressure on mission communities and construction alike.

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64 Memorial from Fr. Alonso del Moral, November 5, 1676, SC 54-5-20/104; Caciques of Apalache to the King, enclosed in Quiroga y Losada to King, April 1, 1688, MC 63, box 3, file 2, from Buckingham Smith Collection, SAHSRL; Hann, “Translation of Alonso de Leturiondo’s Memorial to the King of Spain,” 178-9. This was a particularly bitter issue in the wake of the 1657 rebellion, particularly as the friars remitted testimony damaging to Rebolledo’s reputation. Hann, Apalachee, 19-22.


66 Interim Governor to the Queen, May 8, 1674, SD 226; Interim Governor to the Queen, n.d., 1674, SC 54-5-11/10; Governor of Florida to the King, June 14, 1681, SD 226; Comisario General de Indias, Antonio de Somoza, May 2, 1673, SC 54-5-20/97.
Spanish officials attempted to control the large number of repartimiento laborers in the city. Officials sought to manage the population through typical methods, such as attempting to isolate the laborers in their camp outside the town and by asking for more friars to minister to the working population. They needed friars with the language skills necessary to hear the confessions of those Indians who did not speak Spanish. Despite the large initial waves of indigenous laborers, it proved difficult to find and hold on to the necessary number of workers. Governor Cendoya commented on the weakness of Indian workers almost as soon as construction was under way. He complained both of their susceptibility to illness as well as their reluctance to leave their villages for long periods of time. Subsequent governors met with the same problem and sought to replace Indian laborers with African slaves imported from Havana. Interim Governor Ponce de León rationalized the purchase of slaves by suggesting that once they were trained in the skills of masonry they would be useful for other projects or at least would bring a good price if sold. Juan de Ayala y Escobar was granted a license to bring slaves with him from Havana, but only creoles who were born in Spanish America and already spoke Spanish. Although some slaves were purchased and brought into the colony, much of the work was done by forzados sentenced to manual labor. Thus, the Indian laborers at the Castillo and the

67 Governor of Florida to the King, February 3, 1672, SC 58-1-35; Royal Officials to the Queen, February 9, 1672, SC 58-1-35; Consejo de Indias to Queen, 1673, SC 58-1-20/10; Cédula to Governor of Florida, 1673, 54-5-20/101; Cédula to the Franciscan Provincial, 1673, 58-1-21/117. Archaeological research also offers evidence of Indian labor camps in St. Augustine in the areas immediately surrounding the Castillo de San Marcos. Carl D. Halbirt, “The Apocalypse of 1702: Archaeological Evidence of Moore’s Siege,” El Escribano 39 (2002): 34-7.

68 Governor Cendoya to the Queen, December 1671, letter 2, beginning on ff. 19, enclosed in Expediente from the Governor of Florida, First letter dated October 23, 1671, SC 58-1-26; Governor to the Queen, March 30, 1672, SC 58-2-3/5; Auto regarding Castillo labor, ff. 19-20, enclosed in Governor of Florida to the Queen, March 20, 1672, SC 54-5-11; Interim Governor to the Queen, May 8, 1674, SD 226; Comisario General de Indias, Antonio de Somoza, May 2, 1673, SC 54-5-20/97; Captain Juan de Ayala y Escobar, May 9, 1687, SC 58-1-26/121; Royal Cédula to Captain Juan de Ayala y Escobar, May 9, 1687, SC 58-1-22; King to Governor of Florida, May 1687, SC 58-1-22.
quarry worked alongside free and enslaved Africans as well as Spanish or Mexican penal laborers.69

Other demands for labor emerged as Governor Hita Salazar granted land near Apalache to Spanish families. These families could view themselves as true landowners, and as such were above manual labor. They employed Indian servants and African slaves to work on their ranches and in their fields. Some families, such as the Florencias, obtained that labor by demanding workers be sent from the missions as part of the repartimiento.70 Their abuses of Indian laborers, however, generated a number of complaints. Workers were detained too long, and women in particular complained of being held against their will. As the Spanish presence in the region began to expand in the 1670s the system became more regimented, and mission Indians were not permitted to travel outside their village or return from their labor without a signed passport. This facilitated the abuse of laborers (officials could simply refuse to sign) and made it more difficult for natives in Apalache to participate in the commercial activity at the port of St. Marks.71

The repartimiento, however, was not the only labor system in place. Floridano families routinely employed Indian servants in exchange for wages.72 By the mid-seventeenth century, depopulation put increasing pressures on mission villages and many Native Americans had fled


70 Weber, Spanish Frontier in North America, 126-8. This was a common practice. Weber notes that many soldiers and settlers sought to exploit repartimiento labor for their own projects, interpreting very loosely the stipulation that laborers be used for “public good.” This was in part a solution to the search for new methods of coercing labor once the encomienda was no longer permitted.

71 Don Patricio, Cacique of Ivatuchu, and Don Andres, Cacique of San Luis, to the King, February 12, 1699 and don Patricio Hinachuba to don Antonio Ponce de Leon, April 10, 1699, SC 58-2-14; Hann, Apalachee, 19-21, 116-7. Complaints by caciques regarding abuses of the repartimiento in general and the treatment of women in particular date at least to the 1650s: Fr. Alonso del Moral to the King, May 10, 1657, SD 235; Santiago and the Principales of Tolomato, March 21, 1658, SD 233.

72 Matter, Pre-Seminole Florida, 148. Evidence of Indian servants on Spanish households also appears in the two criminal cases discussed at the end of this section.
the villages or sought seasonal work on farms and ranches. By the end of the century, Florida
had come to resemble other parts of the Spanish Americas where the diverse interests of priests,
criollo ranchers, imperial government, and indigenous communities frequently clashed and
occasionally aligned. Some native men and women chose to stay in St. Augustine and engage
in wage labor. During the construction of the Castillo de San Marcos they were able to take
advantage of the increase in capital and the available building materials by working on
construction projects for private citizens. Despite being generally considered unskilled laborers,
a number of Indian males worked in the construction of stone and wood residences for the
citizens of St. Augustine. Bishop Calderón even noted the skill of Indian carpenters, commenting
on the beautiful churches they built in the mission towns. There was likely also a market for
services from laundry to selling alcohol that supported the increased temporary population.
During his visitation of the Timucua and Apalache provinces, Captain Florencia compiled a list
of men who were missing from the missions and either living in other villages or working in St.
Augustine. Of the twenty-nine men missing from the province of Apalache, fourteen were
listed as living in the presidio. Five were described as “with” various officers, probably as
personal servants. One was with the cacique of another village. The rest were resident in other

73 Deeds, Defiance and Deference in Mexico’s Colonial North, 60-3, 147-9; Hann, Apalachee, 146-7; Weber,
Spanish Frontier in North America, 115-18, 125-30; Brockington, Blacks, Indians, and Spaniards in the Eastern
Andes, 215-225; Daniel T. Reff, “The Jesuit Mission Frontier in Comparative Perspective: The Reduction of the
Rio de la Plata and the Missions of Northwestern Mexico, 1588-1700,” in Contested Ground: Comparative
Frontiers on the Northern and Southern Edges of the Spanish Empire edited by Donna J. Guy and Thomas E.
Sheridan (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1998): 19-20; Barbara Ganson, The Guaraní under Spanish Rule in

74 Royal Officials to the King, April 20, 1696, SC 54-5-14/114; Bishop Calderón, written in 1675, enclosed in
January 4, 1676, SC 54-3-2; Manucy, The Houses of St. Augustine, 1565-1821 (Gainesville: University Press of
Florida, 1992), 20-1; Arana and Manucy, Building of the Castillo de San Marcos, 17, 38.

75 The Florencia family was one of the largest landowners in the province as well as employers of Indian workers.
That Captain Florencia also conducted the 1694-5 visita and dispensed justice in the governor’s name served to
further consolidate his power to the great disadvantage of native towns. Bushnell, “Patricio de Hinachuba,” 6-8.
mission villages. Florencia promised to look for them and to have them returned. Spanish emphasis on living in a conjugal state as well as their desire that the mission villages produce corn and other foodstuffs informed the lieutenant’s interest in returning the absent husbands to their village obligations. Nevertheless the presence of indigenous men working as personal servants in the presidio or on ranches was common.\footnote{Visitor’s Orders to List Absent Native Husbands and Debts, and Notary’s List of Husbands Absent from Apalache, January 2, 1695, Visitations of Joachín de Florencia, 1695, EC 157A. A comparison to petit marronage, the temporary flight of African slaves from their plantations, is tempting here since Indians fled the labor demands of the Spanish. Ultimately the comparison is inadequate since there is no evidence that these absences were consistently voluntary or temporary. The movement of some Indians toward the city and ladino life was common in parts of New Spain. Another factor in the movement of people is the semi-sedentary tradition and the temporary nature of the towns established by these groups.}

Another important facet of Spanish-Indian relations was commerce. Trade and gift-giving were the foundations of relationships among the indigenous peoples living inside and outside the influence of the missions. The cacique and other headmen of the mission communities benefitted most from trade with the Spanish since they acquired goods presented in payment for the labor of their townspeople and then redistributed them. They also negotiated the sale of surplus corn and other produce. With these resources they acquired materials for their own aggrandizement, goods to trade with other indigenous groups in the interior, and decorations for their churches.\footnote{Hall, Zamumo’s Gifts, 61-3.} Yet commerce with the Spanish had a dark side: compulsory sales. Each town cultivated a communal field, or sabana. Any surplus could be sold to the presidio, which was almost always ready to buy more maize given the unreliable deliveries of the situado. Treasury officials, however, demanded low prices, the right of first refusal, and long term credit. They also made severe demands on production and occasionally forced the villages to sell their maize on credit. Much like a forced loan, payment could be delayed for years, if not indefinitely.\footnote{Governor of Florida to the Queen, April 26, 1676, SD 839; Bushnell, Situado and Sabana, 123. Workers were paid in cheap goods, bells, and fabric rather than specie.} Once the
construction of the Castillo was underway, royal officials purchased as much corn as possible in order to feed laborers.79

Like labor arrangements, commerce naturally took place outside the official channels as well. In his memorial to the King of Spain regarding Florida, written around 1700, Padre Alonso de Leturiondo explained that the Indians of Apalache had developed a good trade in all livestock, particularly cattle and hogs in the mid-seventeenth century. They sold them to the people of St. Augustine cheaply, and meat was abundant. What he neglected to mention to the king was that they also sold hides, deerskins, and corn to Havana, shipping the goods out of the port at St. Marks from whence it was only an eight-day journey to Cuba. The trade between Apalache and Havana had been flourishing since 1637. Trade goods imported from Havana also filtered north and westward into the interior, connecting the Apalache missions with adjacent chiefdoms such as the Apalachicola and Chacato. Pack horses were often traded north to Apalachicola. The Spanish sought to control this traffic, though with little apparent success.80

As noted in Chapter Two, Governor Hita Salazar began to grant land in the countryside in the 1670s. According to Leturiondo, greedy Spaniards moved to San Luis de Talimali and began to buy up the hogs and cows from the Indians. In other cases the Indians were cheated out of their livestock, or it was taken by force.81 Having gained control over most of the supply, the

79 Bishop Calderón, written in 1675, enclosed in January 4, 1676, SC 54-3-2; Governor of Florida to King, April 1688, AGI 54-5-12 in Serrano y Sanz, Documentos Históricos, 221-3. A corn shortage meant a work stoppage. Although they were the ones in need, the royal officials still managed to obtain favorable terms. The king paid four reales per arroba of corn, although payment was made in clothes rather than cash. From the indigenous perspective, the more desirable trade goods were tools such as knives, hatchets, hoes, and axes, as well as glass beads.

80 Governor of Florida to the King, November 10, 1688, EC 156C; Apalache Visitor’s Orders for the Province to Promote Good Government December 12, 1694, Timucua Orders for Good Government December 24, 1694, Guale and Mocama Orders for the Province to Promote Good Government, February 15, 1695, Visitations of Joachín de Florencia and don Juan de Pueyo, 1695, EC 157A; Hann, “Translation of Alonso de Leturiondo’s Memorial to the King of Spain,” 177-9; Hall, Zamumo’s Gifts, 65-6.

81 Leturiondo refers to these individuals as “Spaniards” throughout, although many were in fact Floridanos. Hann, “Translation of Alonso de Leturiondo’s Memorial to the King of Spain,” 177-9; Hall, Zamumo’s Gifts, 64-7.
Spaniards at San Luis raised the prices. Whereas many Indians once raised livestock for profit, the producers were now just a handful of Spaniards. Some Indians attempted to continue in the business on a small scale, while others quit altogether. The increased controls on Indian movements, such as passports, likely made it even more difficult for them to compete. Furthermore, the ranchers apparently made little attempt to control their animals. The natives complained repeatedly that cows and pigs were allowed to roam and destroyed their fields.\footnote{Hann, “Translation of Alonso de Leturiondo’s Memorial to the King of Spain,” 177-9; Hann, Apalachee, 116-7; Visitations at San Antonio de Bacuqua, November 27, 1694, San Pedro y San Pablo de Patali November 29, 1694, San Martín de Tomoli December 27, 1694, and San Diego de Salamototo December 30, 1694; Visitor’s Order to Marcos Delgado, Diego Ximénes, and Francisco de Florencia to Move Haciendas, December 11, 1694; Requests by Delgado and Ximénes for More Time, December 11, 1694; Visitor’s Order to Pedro de Torres to Move his Corral, December 11, 1694, Visitations of Joachín de Florencia, 1695, EC 157A.}

Leturiondo’s letter strikes notes of nostalgia for better times and righteous outrage at the present depredations. He called for the Spanish families to be removed from the region in order to protect the poor native inhabitants from their injuries and tyrannies. The raising of livestock, he argued, should be reserved for the Indians so that supply would be plentiful and cheap and the Indians would have a way of making money. Leturiondo’s letter suggests Indian frustrations with the Spanish and their disregard for the authority and sovereignty of the chiefs as well as the dignity of the people. Despite the detrimental effects of the Spanish presence, the growth of ranches and farms in the interior does seem to have led to the expansion of trade between Spaniards, the Apalache missions, and the people of Apalachicola.

Some of the best evidence for these expanding trade networks appears in Spanish attempts to regulate or resolve debt between Indian and Spanish individuals. In the mission provinces, one of the duties of the visitador was to resolve issues of debt. Captain Florencia and Captain Pueyo dutifully oversaw the creation of a list of debts owed by Spaniards to natives in their mission provinces. These records reveal an active commercial life in the colony, though the
lack of specie meant that transactions were based largely on the exchange of goods and services, and rarely cash payments. Cash payments were most likely to take place when the Indians were working on the Spanish ranches. These visitation records suggest the indigenous population was actively engaged in commerce and travelled between mission villages, ranches, and the presidio. They also carried that trade into St. Augustine.83

During his tour of the provinces, Governor Quiroga y Losada noted that there were only six blacksmiths to be found in a few central locations. The natives used this as an excuse to leave their villages and go to St. Augustine when they needed iron tools repaired. Quiroga y Losada also complained that the Indians had little in the way of useful skills or valuable products, but it seems more likely that they simply did not produce goods on what the Spanish would consider a commercial scale. A number of Indians produced leather goods and brought shoes to St. Augustine as trade goods when necessary. He also noted that the cultivation of cotton was a long tradition in Apalache, but that they only grew a few shrubs and hardly used them. He aspired to make the Indians more productive, such as those in Campeche, by teaching them to make cotton cloth or sow wheat. He envisioned the mission Indians producing valuable export products that would expand commercial traffic through St. Augustine.84 In this plan, the Indians could be expected to provide the marketable surplus of produce that the Spanish had hoped for from Spanish peasant settlers.85

83 Notary’s List of Debts Owed to Natives of Apalachee and Timucua, January 3, 1695, and Memorial of Debts Owed to Natives of Guale and Mocama, February 15, 1695; Visitations of Joachín de Florencia and don Juan de Pueyo, 1695, EC 157A.

84 Governor of Florida to King, April 1688, AGI 54-5-12 in Serrano y Sanz, Documentos Históricos, 221-3.

85 Cédula to Governor Quiroga y Losada, May 20, 1689, published in Worth, The Struggle for the Georgia Coast, 172-3; On Galicians see, letters from the Governor to the King, February 24 and April 1, 1688, SD 227B; Hann, “Translation of Alonso de Leturiondo’s Memorial to the King of Spain,” 198-9. For more details on expectations that settlers would cultivate surplus produce, see Chapter Three.
The Indians who lived and worked in St. Augustine interacted regularly with free blacks and slaves who also provided services and manual labor in the presidio. Two criminal cases in particular illustrate the intertwined worlds of Indians and Africans in St. Augustine. The first is a murder case that has been examined as an example of the practice of ecclesiastical asylum in St. Augustine. The second is a counterfeiting case which has been fully transcribed and translated by John Hann. These cases offer some insight into the daily interactions of free blacks, ladinos, and indios de servicio in St. Augustine. In December of 1688, Juan Méndez, the slave of former Governor Pablo de Hita Salazar, murdered an Apalache Indian named Silvestre outside St. Augustine. The ensuing investigation focused on the testimony of those closest to Méndez and Silvestre, other Indians and slaves. The location of the crime was at the sabana, or field, of Nicolassillo, located near San Nicolás. San Nicolás was the name of the trail that led to the point where the St. John’s River was typically crossed, called Cow Ford by the English (the location where modern Jacksonville was founded). Silvestre and his companion were cutting wood. Silvestre served Isidrio Rodríguez, a soldier of the presidio. His companion, Panzaca Ignacio, served ayudante Manuel de Torres. Apparently they had divided the labor so that Silvestre was chopping wood and Ignacio was occupied with carrying the wood to the pier or quay, likely located on the St. John’s River. While Ignacio was assembling the wood Méndez arrived and engaged Silvestre in conversation. Varying reports described him as carrying a walking stick of

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87 Hann, History of the Timucua Indians and Missions, 243, 158-9.

88 The region immediately around St. Augustine had experienced a significant degree of deforestation, so servants sent to cut firewood might have had to travel some distance. The Spanish had cut wood to construct and repair eight wooden forts between 1565 and 1668 as well as the construction of individual residences and soldiers’ barracks. Jason B. Palmer, “Forgotten Sacrifice: Native American Involvement in the Construction of the Castillo de San Marcos,” Florida Historical Quarterly 80 no. 4 (2002): 442.
some sort.\textsuperscript{89} Ignacio did not recognize the slave, although Silvestre did. Ignacio left them in conversation in order to carry more wood to the pier.

According to Méndez’s confession, taken while he was imprisoned in the fort, he had stopped to ask Silvestre how to get to the village of Palica. Méndez described San Nicolás as about five leagues outside of town. The full name of the village was San Juan del Puerto de Palica, and it was located near the mouth of the St. John’s River. It was a smaller village with about twenty-five families.\textsuperscript{90} After showing him the path, Silvestre moved toward him, attempting to grab hold of him. Méndez claimed that Silvestre recognized him as a slave who had fled and intended to tie him up and take him to his master. When asked if he was actually fleeing the city, Méndez said only that he wanted to leave his house because his mistress had hit him with a key ring in the face and wounded him. Méndez defended himself from Silvestre with a knife and when the Indian fell, he fled down the path.\textsuperscript{91}

When Ignacio returned, he found Silvestre on the ground bleeding excessively from multiple wounds. Before he died Silvestre managed to identify the slave as one who belonged to former governor Don Pablo de Hita Salazar. Ignacio searched for help and managed to find the old Indian named Nicolassillo, to whom the field belonged, and the mulatto slave Juan de la Cruz. By the time they arrived, Silvestre was breathing his last. According to the presidio

\textsuperscript{89} Palo suggests a stick as perhaps a walking stick. Subsequent testimony described it as a garrote, a walking stick or cudgel. Deposition of Lorenzo Iguala, December 27, 1688, enclosed in Auto of the murder of an Indian, August 16, 1689, SC 54-5-12, ff. 3-20.

\textsuperscript{90} Bishop Evelino de Compostela, September 28, 1689, SC 54-3-2.

\textsuperscript{91} Méndez identified himself as Juan Méndez, born in Cape Verde. He was around twenty-five or thirty years old. As his profession he said simply that he was a field worker, and he did whatever his owner asked of him. Confession of Juan Méndez, February 3, 1689, enclosed in Auto of the murder of an Indian, August 16, 1689, SC 54-5-12. The structure of legal cases was such that the testimony of the accused was always referred to as a confession, whether or not it actually was so. Once formal charges had been made, the defendant would construct a defense that was often designed to reduce a sentence if the governor had already judged him guilty based on testimonies.
surgeon, Carlos Robson, Silvestre had received thirteen different wounds with a machete or a knife. Ignacio did not testify to having heard any noise or argument, so his arrival after Silvestre was attacked but before he expired was fortuitous. Juan de la Cruz, the slave of María de los Angeles, claimed to have seen Méndez running away from the scene at a distance. He identified him as a slave recently arrived on a frigate from Havana.  

The depositions then turned to those who saw Juan after the incident. These are excellent sources that reveal the normally unrecorded details of servant life. Those who were deposed had one thing in common: they saw Méndez while spending the night in the kitchen of the house of Don Pedro Benedit Horruytiner. Based on the architectural preferences of the era and the description of the witnesses, the kitchen was likely a separate building, but with at least one door adjacent to the street that was locked with a key. Another door seems to have opened into an interior courtyard. It is unclear whether the servants and slaves were intentionally locked in with a key, but the witnesses who let Méndez in had to remove the grate from a window in order to do so.  

A number of servants and slaves were sleeping in the kitchen that evening. Based on the combined testimonies, the group was composed of the following: Adrian, a native of San Luis de Talimali who was about forty and gave his testimony through a translator; Lorenzo Iguala of the pueblo of San Phelipe of Guale, who was about sixty and spoke Spanish; Juan de la Cruz, a Mexican slave of the heirs of Horruytiner; and a black slave called Marcos who apparently managed to sleep through the whole commotion and therefore had nothing to tell. Although these

92 Summary opening of the case, December 23, 1688, Depositions of Carlos Robson, December 24, Panzaca Ignacio, and Juan de la Cruz, pardo slave of Maria de los Angeles, December 26, 1688, enclosed in Auto of the murder of an Indian, August 16, 1689, SC 54-5-12, ff. 3-20.

93 Manucy, *Houses of St. Augustine*, 60, 122-4; Deposition of Lorenzo Iguala, December 27, 1688. The actual phrase used is “in the house of the heirs of don Pedro Benedit Horruytiner. Horruytiner died in Cuba with outstanding charges against him for accounting inconsistencies, and so his children were forced to inventory his property, and the inventory made it beyond the typical notarial archives. A description of the house and the kitchen place the property alongside the marina as well as the homes of three other prominent citizens. Inventory of the possessions of don Pedro Ruitiner (sic), 1680-89, AGI 58-2-3/11 from MC 63, box 2, file 64, SAHSRL.
are the only men named in the testimonies, Adrian described Lorenzo Iguala as “one of the Indians there,” which suggests that there may have been others asleep as well.

Iguala stated that it was about eleven o’clock at night and he was awake, talking with Adrian by candlelight when Méndez arrived. He knocked on the door which they told him was locked with a key. It seems that they removed a grate, probably from a window, to let him into the room. Once inside, they asked Méndez where he had been since there were bits of guano on him.  

He claimed to have come from Tolomato, but they countered that there was no guano there. He replied that he had come from the woods, and not to ask him any more questions. He and Adrian spoke a while longer in their native language and then went to bed. Although Adrian told him that this slave carried a machete below his coat, he did not see it. Adrian’s testimony differs: he claimed to have been asleep until he woke early in the morning and Iguala told him that Méndez, the slave who murdered Silvestre, was there. Adrian was either unwilling to incriminate himself or the fullest expression of his account was lost or omitted in translation.

The accounts align again in their description of morning events. They awoke and Adrian went out to alert the guard to his suspicions about Méndez. Méndez, however, did not linger in the kitchen, but joined Juan de la Cruz, the Mexican slave, on his way to the Franciscan convent to hear morning mass. Juan de la Cruz went to hear mass, but Méndez slipped into the back.

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94 Guano can refer to animal or bird droppings or some types of palm thatch. He may have been on the northeast Florida barrier island that is now Guana State Park, which was a common source of thatch for that period. Manucy, *Houses of St. Augustine*, 99.

95 The term he uses is “el monte” which was commonly when Indians who fled the missions and returned to the forest, so it is translated as forest here. For examples usage of “el monte,” see Governor Zuñiga y Cerda to the King, March 30, 1702, SC 58-2-8; Governor Córcoles y Martínez to the King, November 16, 1707, 58-1-28/23.

96 Lorenzo stated that he said to Adrian in the Apalache language: “mal que este es él que mató al indio Silvestre.”
Despite what appears to have been an attempt to seek sanctuary, Méndez was arrested and imprisoned in the fort.  

The testimony in this case reveals a number of details about the servant class in St. Augustine. Unattached male slaves and Indian servants slept in the kitchen of the house of the Horruytiner family, and likely the kitchens of other houses as well. They appear to have been locked in for the night, but were able get around that problem easily. This begs the question of why Juan was admitted to the kitchen at all since he was not part of the Horruytiner household. An inventory of Horruytiner’s goods completed in 1689 lists four slaves: Juan de la Cruz, about twenty-nine or thirty at the time, Juan Lorenzo, a boy of thirteen or fourteen, and two other slaves, Matheo, who was about seventy and Cathalina who was about fifty-five. The involvement of Juan de la Cruz, slave of María de los Angeles, in the field of Nicolassillo is interesting as well, since her home bordered Horruytiner’s residence. What is clear is that the male slaves and Indian servants shared the same social space during their hours of rest. The testimony also reveals that slaves and servants might travel far afield to accomplish tasks such as cutting wood. At San Nicolás, Silvestre and Ignacio seem to have been working together to accomplish their task of collecting wood. When Ignacio went for help, he found the Indian to whom the field pertained, as well as another slave of one of the residents of the city. Since it was located near a pier, San Nicolás likely offered the opportunity for easy water transportation, perhaps making it a popular gathering point for those who worked outside the city.

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97 The final fate of Méndez is not known, but his defense and its insights into slave life in St. Augustine are examined further in Chapter Six. Deposition of Juan de la Cruz, December 26, 1688; Deposition of Adrian, native of San Luis de Talimali, December 26, 1688; Deposition of Lorenzo Iguala of the pueblo of San Phelipe of Guale, December 27, 1688; Auto, Governor Quiroga y Losada, February 1, 1689, enclosed in Auto of the murder of an Indian, August 16, 1689, SC 54-5-12, ff. 3-20.

Evidence of interactions between Indian servants and free blacks appears in another criminal case. The case took place in St. Augustine in 1695 and is included in the residencia of Governor Laureano de Torres y Ayala. It provides more information about those natives from the mission provinces working and visiting in St. Augustine. Two Apalache natives, Ajalap Cosme and Andrés de Escavedo, discovered a discarded tin or pewter plate and used it to make buttons. They then used the leftover material to attempt to cast coins. They got a fellow Apalache Indian, Santiago, to pass them off as silver reales. Santiago was only fifteen or sixteen years old, and was working on the ranch of Sergeant Major don Francisco de Cigarroa. He claimed to have come to town for confession. Santiago spent the coins in the dimly lit pulpería, a type of grocery store, belonging to Crispin de Tapia, a free black man. There he purchased a few rosquetes, small sweet cakes. The first attempt was successful, but he returned to the same shop several more times and Tapia caught on to the scheme. In the investigation that followed, the governor discovered that they had also used the pewter coins to pay a free black woman who went unnamed. Santiago claimed not to understand the deception Escavedo had planned until after the event.

The resolution of the trial was not recorded, but appears in the residencia of Governor Torres y Ayala. Cosme and Escavedo were found guilty and condemned to serve as forzados on the royal works and one (not identified by name) was whipped. Two aspects of the case are of interest here. First, all three of the natives involved had come from San Luis and were working for Spaniards in and around the city. Cosme and Escavedo were from the mission at San Luís de

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99 Residencia of Governor Laureano de Torres y Ayala, November 16, 1700, EC 157A.

100 The woman was described only as a “free morena” and went unnamed. Governor Diego Quiroga y Losada to Crown April 24, 1693, 54-5-15/693; John H. Hann, “Apalachee Counterfeiters in St. Augustine,” Florida Historical Quarterly 67 (July, 1988): 52-68.

101 Ibid.
Talimali, but were in the city serving the corporal Patricio de Monzón under contract. They required an interpreter to give their statements. The notary described them as *bozales*, a term usually reserved for slaves newly arrived from Africa. They may not have spoken Spanish, but they understood Hispanic society well enough to launch a counterfeiting scheme. Second, the fact that they elected to pass their currency to free blacks points to the existence of free black shopkeepers and indicates that at least some of their patrons were local Indians and ladinos.

**Conclusions**

Individuals in Spanish Florida navigated daily the complex expectations of race, class, religion, master, and king. These expectations and prejudices limited their opportunities and framed their choices, as do all cultures. Within the milieu of St. Augustine, however, ladino Indians and visitors from the missions participated actively in the construction of a vibrant and variegated popular culture. Indigenous residents of the city married other Indians, slaves, free blacks, and soldiers and were present at almost every level of society. They participated actively in the public life of the city. Some married Spaniards or Floridanos and raised children who would shed the racial designation of Indian, at least in the parish records. Most seem to have worked as skilled or unskilled laborers. Bushnell and Hann have noted that labor systems in Spanish Florida were in the process of transitioning from repartimiento and compulsory labor to a more competitive wage labor system. Indios de servicio were being replaced by contract and wage workers. These workers, as well as ladinos and their families, were a fixture of life in and around St. Augustine long before the destruction of the missions drove refugee villages to resettle outside the walls of the city. These existing networks and relationships provided the

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frameworks through which subsequent groups of Native American refugees might interact with and gain support from residents of St. Augustine after 1702.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>April 7, 1675</td>
<td>Roque de los Reyes, slave of Captain Don Thomas Menéndez Marquez, legitimate son of Antonio de los Reyes and Manuela de los Angeles to María Gertrudis, daughter of Pedro, infidel Indian and of Corla, a Catholic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2, 1675</td>
<td>Juan, mulatto slave of Captain Lorenzo Joseph de León to Isabel, Catholic Yamase Indian, daughter of Pedro Infidel Indian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 30, 1675</td>
<td>Bernardo Pedrosa [or Pediosa], slave of Captain Don Lorenzo de Horryutiner, to Francisca, widow of Ascensio, Indian of Tolomato</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 18, 1676</td>
<td>Manuel Palma, legitimate son of Manuel Palma and Juana Morales to Cecilia Ponce, mestiza</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 5, 1687</td>
<td>Nicolás Méndez de Servantes, legitimate son of Nicolás Méndez de Servantes and Anna de Valdes, to Juana Rodríguez de la Encarnación, legitimate daughter of Santiago and Dona Antonia, natives of the Pueblo of St. Catherine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 13, 1687</td>
<td>Juan de Andrada, Indian native of Guale, soldier of the presidio and Juana de Urriaga, mestiza, native of the city, both members of the parish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 15, 1692</td>
<td>Phelipe de Sandiago (Santiago) Candia, pardo slave of Adjutant Joseph Rodrigues, legitimate son of Juan de Candia and of Andria María to Micaela María, Indian native of the Pueblo de Nicolás legitimate daughter of Francisco Lojor and María Juntas, natives of the pueblo of Nombre de Dios outside the walls of this city</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 7, 1694</td>
<td>Gabriel Cardoso, legitimate son of Manuel Cardoso and Juana Domingues, Pardo native of Laguna in the Canary Islands, to Juana Antonia, legitimate daughter of Marcos Martin and Inés María, Indios Ladinós and residents of this city</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 12, 1695</td>
<td>Luis Maroto, of El Moral in Castilla, soldier, and María de la Concepción, mestiza, native of this city, daughter of Nicolás de Goyas and María de la Cruz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 17, 1699</td>
<td>Juan Francisco de Argüelles, legitimate son of Francisco de los Reyes and of Isabel Morales, Native of Guinea, slave of Captain Antonio de Argüelles to Anna Petronila, native of the Pueblo of St. Luisa Province of Apalache, legitimate daughter of Marcos and Ana María, Indians native of the province of Apalache</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 19, 1702</td>
<td>Joseph Reyes of Mexico, to Francisca Solana, native of Pueblo of Tolomato, Indian ladina of forty years resident in this city and member of this parish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baptismal Date</td>
<td>Child’s Name</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 5, 1672</td>
<td>Alonso, Indian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 14, 1678</td>
<td>María de los Reyes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 11, 1688</td>
<td>Pedro Manuel, Indian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 28, 1692</td>
<td>Manuela</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 11, 1693</td>
<td>Augustina, china</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 21, 1701</td>
<td>Petrona</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 26, 1702</td>
<td>Manuel</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5-3. Indian Marriages in Baptism and Marriage Records by Frequency, 1668-1702

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Marriage</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indian brides and Black slave grooms</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mestiza brides and Spanish grooms</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mestiza brides and Indian grooms</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian brides and Spanish grooms</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian brides and Free black grooms</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish Bride and Indian Groom</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two Indians</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>18</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total marriages in parish records 1668-1702</strong></td>
<td><strong>341</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER 6
INDIAN IDENTITY IN ST. AUGUSTINE, 1702-1763

Events at the beginning of the eighteenth century altered the course of the Florida provinces decisively. Governor of Carolina James Moore used the War of Spanish Succession as an opportunity to launch a series of attacks on Florida. Moore’s forces destroyed what remained of the Guale missions when they travelled south to invade in 1702. The attack on the fort in St. Augustine was unsuccessful, but in 1704 Moore led a group of English colonists and indigenous allies on a retaliatory raid of the Apalache missions.¹ Moore’s raid was so destructive that the Spanish authorities in St. Augustine chose to abandon the Apalache province and withdraw the surviving soldiers, friars, and Indians. The residents of the Apalache region scattered in the wake of the attack. Moore and his force carried about one thousand captives back to Carolina to be sold as slaves. Most of the residents of the Apalache missions migrated westward to Pensacola and Mobile. Some native chiefs, discontented with treatment by the Spaniards, accepted Moore’s offer to relocate them close to Charleston and moved voluntarily. Others migrated eastward into the Timucua province or southeast into the La Chua area, the site of Spanish ranches.²

Continual raiding between 1702 and 1706 by hostile Indian forces drove most Spaniards and their servants to flee to St. Augustine for safety. Eventually, Spanish soldiers and their native allies were unable to maintain even a few strategic outposts on the St. John’s River. These

¹ Governor of Florida to the King, Autos, November 1, November 4, and November 5, 1702, SC 58-2-8; Royal Officials to the King, August 13, 1706, SD 840. Moore’s failure to take St. Augustine discredited him and also left him in debt. The Carolina Assembly approved the 1704 expedition with the conflicting directions that expedition pay for itself and that Moore attempt to convert the Apalache peacefully. Moore succeeded through a combination of diplomacy in some villages and slave-raiding in those that would not surrender. Hoffman, Florida’s Frontiers, 178-9.

² Bushnell, Situado and Sabana, 193; Hann, Apalachee, 277-85. An initial estimate was “more than six hundred,” but this number grew as raiding continued throughout the year of 1704. Royal cédula to Viceroy of New Spain, July 10, 1704, SC 58-1-23/295. Moore claimed to have collected four thousand, but there is no other evidence to support this. See Hann, Apalachee, Appendix 12 for a discussion of the sources and the likelihood that Moore took about one thousand captives.
assaults forced those in La Chua and the Timucua mission villages to retreat to the city of St. Augustine itself, living in small camps that encircled the city walls. By 1706, the interior of Florida was severely depopulated. The congested conditions in the city and the vacuum in the countryside intensified old problems and introduced new priorities. Among the old questions were how to obtain a steady supply of food and how to defend the city and its inhabitants from future English attacks. Among the new priorities were how to cope with a wave of refugees that doubled the city’s population and how to reclaim control of the countryside. The Spanish, of course, had been losing territory for decades, but the steep losses between 1702 and 1706 threw the problem into sharper relief. In the following years, the Yamassee War (1715) and War of the Quadruple Alliance (1719-1723) drove more refugees into the Spanish sphere. The Spanish sought to incorporate these groups through traditional methods such as employing missionaries to minister to the refugee villages. Those who moved to St. Augustine lived in small villages near the city, in the pattern of Indian service towns and mission communities such as Nombre de Dios. The Spanish also enticed new indigenous allies through gift-giving and trade. They attempted to cement these new relationships by asking for allegiance to the Spanish God and King.


4 Governor of Florida to King on expenses provisioning refugee Indians, December 7, 1708, SC 58-1-28/54; Auto and Memorial to King of Indian Persons, April 9, 1711, SC 58-1-30/20; Bushnell, *Situado and Sabana*, 194-5; Hoffman, *Florida’s Frontiers*, 187-8; Tepaske, *Governorship of Spanish Florida*, 208-209.

5 See Chapter One for further discussion of these events. Letter from Fray Ignacio de Cantabio and response from Consejo de Indias, September 27, 1721, SC 58-1-24; Letter from Governor Benavides to the Conde de Salazar, Oct. 15, 1728, SD 842/100; Letter from Joseph Bullones to don Gerónimo Valdés, Bishop of Cuba, August 13, 1728, SD 865; Letter from Fr. Domingo de Losada, Franciscan Comisario General de Indias, May 3, 1736, SD 837;

6 For calls for more missionaries, see Fr. Antonio de Florencia to King, July 13, 1716, SC 58-2-14/71; Royal Officials to the King, March 10, 1717, SC 58-1-30/63; Governor Benavides to King, September 30, 1718, SC 58-1-30. For attempts to attract new allies and secure allegiances, see Letter from Governor Córcoles y Martínez to the King, July 5, 1715 and Real Cédula, February 18, 1716, SC 58-1-24; Letter from don Miguel Duran, February 18, 1716, SC 58-1-30; Letter from Interim Governor Ayala y Escobar to the King, November 19, 1717, SC 58-1-35/74; Letter from Interim Governor Ayala y Escobar to the King, November 22, 1717, SC 58-1-30.
The Spanish viewed the Indians as Christian vassals, as a potential labor source, and as pawns in the contest for control of the southeast. Policy decisions in St. Augustine were dominated by the struggle to control territory and attempts to advance the frontier through población. Why then did Spanish authorities never seek to colonize the countryside more extensively with the indigenous refugees living in or near the city? The Spanish did make some attempts to relocate the refugee villages strategically, but none of these were particularly successful. This chapter argues that the failure to make the most of these potential settlers so close to home stemmed from the inability of the Spanish to secure the countryside against raiders and the indigenous preference to remain close to the city for protection. Former mission residents capitalized on the relationships and opportunities created by earlier generations of Indians in St. Augustine. By the eighteenth century, however, the Franciscan missionaries had retreated to St. Augustine as well, creating jurisdictional conflicts and politicizing the label of “Indian” to a new degree.

**Indians, Refugees, and Población**

During the mission era, Spanish authorities expected that the Indians would fill the need for agricultural production and military defense in the countryside. They articulated these expectations in terms of loyalty and vassalage. Bushnell argues that the rights of the chiefs in the mission towns were essentially seigniorial. They enjoyed the prestige of rank, the right to hold land, to rule vassals, to make war, and they did not engage in manual labor. As lords and vassals, native chiefs were also expected to defend their land, the land of the King of Spain. The chiefs and their headmen, called *principales*, exercised the privileges of their rank. Whatever their private concerns may have been, native chiefs were astute political leaders and understood how to use the rhetoric of vassalage to their benefit. They were also part of the military defenses of
the province. Native warriors served as militia units under the command of their chiefs. For example, upon receiving news of the English invasion of Jamaica, Governor Rebolledo called upon the caciques of the Timucua province to send warriors to St. Augustine in anticipation of an English attack. As English incursions into Spanish territory escalated, Indian men in the missions were expected to serve as the first line of defense. The visitas and correspondence from the governors reveal that the Spanish policy mandated that every adult male Indian in the provinces should be armed and prepared for battle with fifty arrows in his quiver. In this sense, the native mission populations served as the soldier-settlers of the countryside. They produced the surplus foodstuffs that fed the city, provided armed militia forces in the areas not heavily manned by Spanish soldiers, and occupied towns and villages as vassals of the King of Spain. Some Spanish authorities even relocated mission towns to improve communication, transportation, or military defenses in the province.

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7 Sotolongo to the King, July 4, 1668, SC 54-5-20; Sápala, Chief of Guale to Governor Marquez Cabrera, May 5, 1681, SD 226; Caciques of Apalache to the King, enclosed in Quiroga y Losada to King, April 1, 1688, MC 63, box 3, file 2, from Buckingham Smith Collection, SAHSRL; Bushnell, “Ruling the ‘Republic of Indians’ in Seventeenth-Century Florida,” 139-40, 143-4.

8 Governor Rebolledo to the King, September 18, 1657, SD 839, cited from Serrano y Sanz, Documentos Históricos, 202-5.

9 It was impossible for the Spanish to distribute many men along the long chain of missions and outposts that formed the Florida hinterland and still maintain a reasonable defensive force in St. Augustine. Interim Governor of Florida don Nicolás Ponce de León to the King, February 19, 1664, SD 225; Junta de Guerra, March 8, 1669, SC 58-2-2/12; Expediente of Governor Cendoya to the Queen, October 31, 1671, SC 58-1-26, letter 1, ff. 18-19. See also letter 5 (dated March 25, 1671); Governor Cendoya to the Queen, March 24, 1672, SC 58-1-26; Governor Marquez Cabrera to the King, May 14, 1680, SD 839; Governor Zuñiga y Cerda to the King, January 5, 1699, SC 61-6-22.

10 General Auto of the Visitation of Guale, December 21, 1685, ff. 96-9, transcribed and translated in Worth, The Struggle for the Georgia Coast, 108-11; Apalache Visitor’s Orders for the Province to Promote Good Government December 12, 1694, Timucua Orders for Good Government December 24, 1694, Guale and Mocama Orders for the Province to Promote Good Government, February 15, 1695; Visitations of Joachín de Florencia and don Juan de Pueyo, 1695, EC 157A.

After the violence of the 1702 and 1704 attacks, Spanish authorities continued to expect these services from the native community, but their rhetoric changed. Their influence had been undermined and they were no longer in a position to make demands. During the war, the English and Spanish vied for Indian allies in the southeastern region of North America. The competition gave indigenous communities a greater leverage in their interactions with European powers. After the war, the Spanish were forced to rely more heavily on diplomacy and persuasion to repopulate the Florida territory. They began to frame these expectations more explicitly in terms of resettling lost territory, the terms of población. The Spanish desire to re-occupy Apalache is perhaps best measured in the amount of pesos spent on diplomatic missions and gifts to Creek chiefdoms. In 1715, when a coalition of four Yamasee chiefs arrived to ask for aid from the Spanish, Governor Córcoles y Martínez accepted their offer and initiated a cycle of visits wherein native chiefs would come to St. Augustine and promise an alliance with the Spanish. In return, they received gifts, feasts, titles, and promises of more gifts and military protection to come in the future. To fund further support, he managed to increase the situado allotment for Indians from 2,063 pesos to 6,000 pesos. As Tepaske observes, Córcoles y Martínez courted these chiefs because he hoped to use them as military allies just as the English had. The Viceroy of New Spain protested that this budget was exorbitant. The King approved the costs anyway, arguing that they were indeed necessary for securing the province.

A copy of the diary and letters of Lieutenant Diego Peña further illustrates Spanish plans and perceptions of their potential native allies. One of the most active pro-Spanish caciques was

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12 Hall, Zamumo’s Gifts, 115-6, 153-4, 157-8; Tepaske, Governorship of Spanish Florida, 197-204.

13 Letter from Governor Córcoles y Martínez to the King, January 25, 1716, SC 58-1-30; Cédula from the King to the Viceroy of New Spain to increase the situado by 6,000 pesos, February 17, 1716, SC 58-1-24/45; Tepaske, Governorship of Spanish Florida, 198-9.

14 Viceroy of New Spain to the King, October 31, 1722, SD 837; Royal Cédula, 1722, SD 837.
named Chislacaliche. This cacique came twice to St. Augustine to build an alliance with the Spanish. After his second visit in 1716, he asked that a Spaniard accompany him back to the villages now re-established in the Apalache region to convey the Spaniards’ intentions to the leaders of towns near the Apalachicola River. The new governor, Pedro de Oliver y Fullana, chose Lieutenant Diego Peña to lead the expedition and Diego de Florencia as his second in command. They were accompanied by three other soldiers, as well as Chislacasliche and his entourage. Peña was sent with a fourteen-point list of instructions. This was essentially a diplomatic mission meant to encourage native alliances with the Spanish. Although Governor Fullana was new to the region, the sergeant major, Juan de Ayala y Escobar was a long-time resident of St. Augustine. He served on the council at which Peña’s mission was decided, and likely contributed vital information. The list of instructions suggests that the Spanish were deeply interested in rebuilding their influence in the interior.

As a practical matter, the Spanish also sought to render the complex network of indigenous towns into units that conformed more to a system of European colonial organization. For example, the third item on the governor’s list of instructions directed Peña to persuade the chiefs to move all their peoples to Apalache and settle in groups organized by nation or language. The ideal pattern would be large villages near a river so that they would have access to water and fertile land. This organization served two purposes. It would be more efficient for the

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15 Interim Governor Ayala described him as Uchises, which Hann suggests is likely the most accurate description during this period of upheaval. This designation fits well with Hall’s assessment of the migration and reorganization of ethnic identity taking place during this period, as “Creek” was often used to describe Ochese groups. Hann notes that previous historians have given Chislacaliche other designations. Crane, *Southern Frontier*, refers to him as Creek. There are many variations in the spelling of this name among the Spanish and British sources, including the British “Cherokeeleechee” which they translated as “Cherokee-killer.” Hann, *Apalachee*, 288.

16 Ayala y Escobar had commercial connections in Havana and Charleston and was experienced in the diplomacy of Indian commerce and gift-giving. As Hall notes, this was yet another case where Europeans were forced to conform to indigenous concepts of trade and diplomacy in order to form alliance. Autos, Diego Peña account, included in Viceroy of New Spain to Secretary Junta de Guerra, January 26, 1717, SD 58-1-30; John Diviney, “Word of Our Arrival: The Three Journeys of Diego Peña in Spanish Florida,” 68-76; Hall, *Zamumo’s Gifts*, 130-1.
friars whom the Spanish expected to send to the villages if they only had to learn one language to minister to their flock.\textsuperscript{17} This pattern also illustrates Spanish attempts to “tribalize” indigenous groups: to organize them into tribes or chiefdoms with a hierarchical power structure rather than the existing series of confederations of chiefs and towns.\textsuperscript{18} Scholars have identified examples of the process of tribalization elsewhere on the frontiers of Spanish America such as the Darién in Panama and the Caribbean Coast of South America in Venezuela and Guyana. In these examples and in Florida, colonial officials actively encouraged the political alignments (tribes or chiefdoms) that proved effective and responsive to colonial agendas. In doing so, they created disputes among native peoples that might then lead to future conflicts. Affairs in Florida diverged from these examples because the Spanish never wielded sufficient military power in the region to assert their will.\textsuperscript{19}

The Spanish had utilized this approach in the early colonial days of Florida when they settled friars in the head towns occupied by local chiefs and then relied on their authority to guarantee conversions. Centuries of depopulation and warfare combined with the need to negotiate relations with the Spanish and then the English produced the Native American political organization found in the Southeast in the 1720s. Hall argues that the process was one of mutual transformation for the English and their Indian allies as both groups discovered the need to

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{17} This was a longstanding problem for the clergy in regions with wide linguistic variety. Weber, \textit{Spanish Frontier in North America}, 108-10. Ida Altman, \textit{The War for Mexico’s West: Indians and Spaniards in New Galicia, 1524-1550} (Albuquerque: University of Mexico Press, 2010), 89. Among Texas Indians, friars attempted to utilize the sign language that functioned as a common symbolic language amongst groups with mutually unintelligible languages in the region. Barr, \textit{Peace Came in the Form of a Woman}, 11-12.
  \item \textsuperscript{19} Whitehead, “Tribes Make States and States Make Tribes,” 132; Gallup-Díaz, “The Spanish Attempt to Tribalize the Darién,” 287-9.
\end{itemize}
present a united front in their diplomatic dealings. Peña’s expeditions into the interior suggest that this process was true of Spanish-Indian relations as well. As the Spanish attempted to recruit confederations of Indian towns in alliance, their ultimate goal was to persuade the man whom they perceived to occupy the pinnacle of indigenous power in the area, the Chief of Coweta, called Emperor Brims. Through the authority they perceived in Brims, they sought to control the rest of the indigenous population of the region and prevent the English and French from gaining any further foothold.

The Spanish governors and royal officials who wrote Peña’s instructions envisioned a somewhat densely populated string of settlements along a waterway and fertile lands for growing corn and other produce. These settlements would make the province self-sufficient again. Well populated and supplied, Apalache might once again produce surplus crops for the city. Large villages might also deter small raiding parties from attack. The proximity to the old port of San Marcos would permit easier shipment of surplus corn by sea. Essentially, royal authorities were ready to envision a province of native peasant farmers supported by a small presidio and port designed to thrive with the least possible investment of crown resources. Upon receipt of the news of Chislacaliche’s promises and Peña’s impending expedition, the King and the Council of the Indies issued directions to the Governor of Florida and the Viceroy of New Spain. The royal

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20 Hall explains that the confederation of Indian towns in alliance with the English was composed of parts of many different ethnolinguistic groups who had joined together to face the challenges of war from the Cherokee and trade relations with the English. The English treated them as one people, referring to them as the Creek. The first usage of the term appeared in December of 1717, and had become common by 1723. He argues that the Creek also “made” the English. The Yamassee War revealed the divisions between colonists and the proprietors of the Carolina colony and forced the English to reform and to standardize their policies of trade and warfare. Thus, as the English made the Creek, so the Creek made the English. Hall, Zamumo’s Gifts, 137-142. Whitehead makes a parallel argument for the Spanish, although on an imperial scale. He contends that “Without the vast material and intellectual gain that Europe received from the Amerindians, as from other areas of colonial activity, few of the social advances of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries would have been possible.” He contends that such advances contributed directly to the construction of nation-states in Europe. Whitehead, “Tribes Make States and States Make Tribes,” 136.

correspondence envisioned the Creek settlers as an easy solution to reclaiming the lost province of Apalache. These instructions did not reflect the military and logistical realities of Florida. The frontier was in a state of flux and violence was routine. Moreover, competition with the English and French had already begun to stretch Spanish finances in Florida to the breaking point.22

Peña was instructed to record all of the chiefs, nations, languages, and populations they encountered. He was also directed to improve any bad paths in order to improve communication between St. Augustine and Apalache. Despite limited economic resources, the governor had wasted no time at all in attempting to re-open the Florida interior. The plans to rebuild Apalache stood in stark contrast with the reality of indigenous life outside the walls of St. Augustine. The Yamassee refugees outside the walls of the city struggled to grow corn on ill-suited land and were generally more a burden on royal stores than a blessing.23 In the absence of documentary sources, historians may only speculate about what the residents of the refugee pueblos in St. Augustine thought of the gifts, rum, and delicacies showered upon these foreign chiefs.24

Peña made two more trips into the interior and his diary revealed the riches of the abandoned countryside. He recorded cattle, deer, buffalo, and horses. As they travelled down the old road through the abandoned missions they found orchards still bearing some fruit. These accounts undoubtedly fired Spanish desires to resettle the region and gain control of its potential


24 Diviney, “Word of Our Arrival,” 77-109, 120-5; Tepaske, Governorship of Spanish Florida, 199-203. By this time, Olivera y Fullana had died, serving only three months and nineteen days in office. The sergeant major, Ayala y Escoban became the interim governor, a position which he held for almost two years. Ayala arranged for a formal reception consisting of the royal ministers and army captains, squadrons in formation, and the firing of a salute. The fete included dancing and the chiefs were treated with wine, rum, and sweets. Each chief and noble was gifted with a piece of blue cloth, and blanket, and tools such as axes and hoes. To the representatives of Emperor Brims the Coweta chief (who did not deign to come in person) the Spanish also issued a patent of Commander in Chief.
resources. Peña’s expeditions were successful in eliciting more support from chiefs in Apalachicola, but ultimately, only a few groups came to resettle Apalache. As noted in Chapter Three, despite extensive promises, the Spanish never accomplished more than a building a blockhouse which was manned inconsistently. In the absence of a store or other indications of more permanent settlement, they had little success persuading indigenous towns to relocate.\(^{25}\)

According to Peña, Chislacaliche expressed this sentiment most clearly when he refused to move his settlement to Apalache until a garrison was in place. Rumors that the English “walked the trails freely” made the chief hesitant to send Indian couriers and anxious for more gunpowder and flints, and the protection of Spanish infantrymen. In his report to the governor, Peña insisted that the construction of the fort at Apalache was necessary in order to fulfill the promise of protection from the British made to their new native allies, and because the English had told the Indians that the Spanish were liars and would not build a fort for them. Peña was most concerned to make good on the promises made by the Spanish as rivalry with the English continued.\(^{26}\)

When Governor Antonio de Benavides arrived in St. Augustine in 1718 to take up his post, he was shocked by the small size of the garrison and the limited control the Spanish exercised over Florida. Despite the sorry state of the presidio, Benavides grasped the opportunity present in 1718. His argument, discussed in Chapter Three, was that populating the countryside with Spaniards would diminish the importance of occupying the region with Indian allies.

\(^{25}\) Interim Governor Juan de Ayala y Escobar to King, January 28, 1717, and February 28, 1718, SC 58-1-30; Autos, Diego Peña account, included in Viceroy of New Spain to Secretary Junta de Guerra, January 26, 1717, SD 58-1-30; Interim Governor Ayala y Escobar to King, September 28, 1718, SD 58-1-20/82; Consejo de Indias draft of letter to King, June 1724, SD 837; Hann, *Apalachee*, 291-3; Divney, “Word of Our Arrival,” 80-109, 120-5; Tepaske, *Governorship of Spanish Florida*, 11.

\(^{26}\) Interim Governor Ayala y Escobar Florida to King, September 28, 1718, SD 58-1-20/82; Divney, “Word of Our Arrival,” 135-162, 172-182. Peña noted, however, that it would be impossible to march the infantry out to the post since it was 80 leagues of uninhabited wilderness, and it would take close to two months. He cited the delays suffered by his party of eight (exhaustion and drowning of horses, the inability of some soldiers to swim across rivers, the need to transport sufficient munitions and supplies), and pointed out how much more problematic it would be to move a large group of soldiers.
Instead of the native populations allying with each other against the European powers, Benavides imagined a colony populated with soldiers and families. He felt this would make Spain an appealing ally to those Indians seeking a strong protector. Benavides, or at least his advisors, seemed to see an opportunity to change the very terms of political engagement in the Southeast, if only they could muster the appropriate manpower.  

The Council of the Indies took a more pragmatic perspective. As far as it was concerned, loyal Indians had once populated the interior of Florida and they could do so again. The King expected these settlers to come from the Creek and Yamasee towns courted by Peña and the governors of Florida, but no such allies ever arrived. Why, then, did the Spanish officials in Florida, Mexico, or Spain not turn to the Indians encamped outside the city of St. Augustine?

**Raids on the Refugee Villages**

Although their options were limited, some indigenous leaders such as Don Patricio de Hinachuba continued to negotiate the war-torn frontier. His town of Ivatucho would have made an excellent settlement in the countryside. Moreover, Don Patricio did not want to move to St. Augustine. He preferred to maintain the integrity of his town, though he was one of the Apalache caciques who remained loyal to the Spanish after the raids of 1704. Unfortunately, continuing raids by Englishmen and hostile Indians made the maintenance of satellite settlements impossible. By the end of 1704, the Spanish missions in the provinces had been reduced to three.

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27 Letter from Governor Antonio de Benavides to the King, August 12, 1718, SC 58-1-30; Letter from Governor Antonio de Benavides to the King, September 30, 1718, SC 58-1-30.

28 Two enclosures from the Consejo de Indias, April 28, 1724, SC 58-2-16/5; A similar process of courting Indian allies was underway in Pensacola as well under don Juan Fernández de Orta. Barcfa, Chronological History of the Continent of Florida, 361-2.

29 Two enclosures from the Consejo de Indias, April 28, 1724, SC 58-2-16/5; Hann, Apalachee, 292.

30 Don Patricio de Hinachuba chose to maintain his alliance with the Spanish and wrote frequently to the governor of Florida about how best to occupy and defend the countryside. He wrote a number of letters and is thus among the best studied native leaders. Hann, Apalachee, 284-6; Bushnell, “Patricio de Hinachuba,” 1-21.
San Francisco Potano and Salamototo were the only two mission villages left in the Timucua province. They were composed of the surviving Guale, Timucua, and Yustaga peoples who had retreated and regrouped for safety. Zúñiga y Cerda had ordered that the villages be fortified and manned with Spanish soldiers for protection. Don Patricio’s town of Ivatucho was the third surviving mission community. He retreated with his people to the area west of St. Augustine, a region called Abosaya. Don Patricio was attempting to strike a balance between maintaining the independence of his own and protecting his people. In 1705 Don Patricio received news that a hostile force of native warriors was planning to attack San Francisco and Ivatucho at its new Abosaya location. He travelled to St. Augustine to lobby for more weapons, and while he was there, the attacking force besieged Ivatucho. The newly arrived governor, Francisco de Córcoles y Martínez, was forced to send an armed detachment to reclaim control of the St. John’s River crossing, lift the siege, and deliver corn and salt to Ivatucho.

The people of Ivatucho remained short of supplies and unable to cultivate enough to subsist. Some of the men were sent out to round up the cattle wandering the abandoned ranch of La Chua, but this exposed them to other raiding parties. In January of 1706, Don Patricio chose to withdraw his people to the outskirts of St. Augustine. They settled among existing villages south of the city composed of native refugees who had already fled their homes for the illusory safety of the city. The assaults continued. San Francisco Potano and Salamototo were both attacked in early 1706 and the survivors withdrew to the villages outside St. Augustine. Another

31 Consejo de Indias, February 13, 1704, 58-1-23/260. Hann, *History of the Timucua Indians and Missions*, 294-5, 297-300. About twenty Jororo Indians were also living on the Afafá Hacienda upriver from Salamototo, but they were killed in a 1706 raid.

32 The hostile native force was likely Yamasee, but may have also included people from the confederated chiefdoms that would come to be known as the Creek. Hann, *Apalachee*, 285.

33 Royal Officials to the King, April 30, 1706, SC 52-1-27/92.
wave of attacks targeted the villages in the immediate environs of St. Augustine, claiming the lives of Don Patricio and many of his people. These raiding parties were usually large, up to three hundred warriors in some cases, if Spanish estimates were accurate. Spanish royal officials suggested that Don Patricio and the remaining loyal Apalache people had been the specific targets of the raids. By the end of 1706, twenty-nine missions had been destroyed and most of their residents killed or sold into slavery. Their troubles were further compounded by a hurricane in 1707 which drenched the city and destroyed all of the weaker dwellings.

It is unclear how many indigenous refugees retreated to the villages outside the walls of St. Augustine over the following years. In 1706, Córcoles y Martínez described five settlements which he called rancherías, camps or shantytowns. Subsequent officials referred to these settlements as pueblos, a term used by the Spanish to denote Indian villages. Eventually they referred to the villages as doctrinas, indicating the presence of missionaries. The initial population of the pueblos was whittled away by continued raids, disease, and flight to the woods. Meanwhile, the Franciscan friars had retreated to the city, claiming that the poverty of the Indians prevented them from living among their flock. They were told to return and live among their charges. By the census of 1711, there were nine small villages with a total of 416 people. The villages were composed primarily of the former occupants of Apalache, Guale, and Timucua, but they also included some natives of the Atlantic coast south of St. Augustine who

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34 Royal Cédula to the Viceroy of New Spain, July 10, 1704, SC 58-1-23/295; Royal Officials to the King, April 30, 1706, SC 52-1-27/92; Royal Officials to the King, August 13, 1706, SC 52-1-27/87; Hann, Apalachee, 286. Hann states that the royal officials Florencia and Pueyo “implied a Creek design to annihilate the few surviving members of the Apalache nation who remained loyal to Spain.” Since the people designated as “Creek” were likely composed of Ochese people of the Apalachicola region, as well as former residents of the Apalache missions who had fled north or west and joined other confederations. They may also have included Westos, Yuchis and others in the Oconee Valley allied with the English. They may have chosen to target Apalache because of the historically tumultuous relationship between the two groups. Alternatively, as the royal officials suspected, they may have elected to punish the Apalache for their loyalty to the Spanish. Such a motive would suggest that the English traders and allies of the Creek aggressors had some influence in directing their targets. Hall, Zamumo’s Gifts, 218-20.

35 Hann, History of the Timucua Indians and Missions, 304.
did not share the same long history of exposure to the missions. Even with the severe decline in the refugee population, the presence of so many additional people in the environs of the city must have had an impact of daily life. This would have increased the population of the city by almost one third. Although many lived outside the city, like the long-time residents of Nombre de Dios, they interacted with residents of St. Augustine on a regular basis. They also developed connections with the Indians living in St. Augustine. The exact size of the urban Indian population is unclear, but when he assessed the forces available for the defense of the city in 1702, Sargent Major Enrique Primo de Rivera listed 123 Indian men, including those from Nombre de Dios.

Governor Córcoles y Martínez attempted to provide some security for the Indian encampments by commissioning the construction of an earthen palisade north of the Castillo and placing cannons at Nombre de Dios. He also offered Indian warriors a bounty of twenty-five pesos a head on enemies of the Spanish captured or killed. Finally, the governor strengthened patrols of the Matanzas River and formed a cavalry company to patrol the lands outside the city. The actions did little to prevent raiding parties from travelling the interior of the province at will, but they did prevent St. Augustine from falling to the English. The freedom with which hostile

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36 Regular clergy of Florida, April 17, 1704, IG 155-3-5, located in MC 63, box 3, file 13, SAHSRL; Royal Officials to the King, August 13, 1706, SC 52-1-27/87; Governor Córcoles y Martínez to the King, April 9, 1711, SC 58-1-30; Worth, *Resistance and Destruction*, 147-8. The Mayaca and Jororo had contact with friars on and off over the course of the seventeenth century. As late as 1704, Governor Zuñiga y Cerda commented that the ranches and missions to the south remained unmolested. He was afraid the English and Indian raiders would soon target them. By 1708 his fears had come true. Some of the Mayaca, Jororo, and other Indians from south Florida moved to the area around St. Augustine or to the doctrinas. Hann, “The Mayaca and Jororo and Missions to Them,” 128-31.

37 Letter from Governor Zuñiga y Cerda to the King, November 5, 1702, SC 58-2-8/243.

38 Enrique Primo de Rivera Report, November 9, 1702, SC 58-2-8. He concluded, however, that most of them couldn’t handle a gun and would be of little service.

39 Tepaske, *Governorship of Spanish Florida*, 122. Francisco de Córcoles y Martínez took office in 1706 and Zuñiga y Cerda was rewarded for holding St. Augustine with a promotion to Cartagena. Junta de Guerra, April 1704, SC 58-1-23/281.
bands roamed the interior made subsistence all the more difficult. The governor supplied the villages with maize from the royal storehouses as a temporary measure until they could plant and harvest crops, but planting in the immediate environs of the city yielded little. Archaeologists have suggested that the pH balance of the soil and the high water table would have impeded the growth of corn. Travelling farther into the interior to cultivate corn on better soil was inhibited by the continued presence of raiding parties that swept through the region. Beyond retaliating against Indians loyal to the Spanish, Creek raiding parties also collected some of the cattle still roaming the empty ranches.40

There were a few unsuccessful attempts to strategically relocate the refugee villages. At first, military weakness after 1702 made it impossible for the Spanish to hold even small outposts against large hostile bands of raiders. The Yamassee War, however, offered the Spanish a new opportunity. After their uprising against the English, the Yamassee sought protection from the Spanish. With the arrival of hundreds of new allies, interim Governor Juan de Ayala Escobar ordered a resettlement of the most of the existing villages three to five leagues from the city. The villages were to be doctrinas with chapels and priests, and their populations would be augmented with the newly arrived Yamassee. Captain Joseph Primo de Rivera conducted a census of the mission villages two years later. He identified ten villages with a total of 942 residents of mixed Christian and pagan populations. Despite the increased population, most villages contained a fairly small number of warriors, making defense difficult.41

The villages did not stay fixed where Ayala y Escobal directed them, but instead moved around, often retreating to the safety of the city walls. A particularly destructive raid occurred in

40 Royal Officials to the King, August 13, 1706, SC 52-1-27/87; Bushnell, Situado and Sabana, 194-5; Boyer, “Nuestra Señora del Rosario de la Punta,” 97-101; White, “Living on the Periphery,” 106-10.

41 Census of Primo de Rivera, in Ayala y Escobar to the King, April 18, 1717, SC 58-1-30.
1725 during which Yuchis attacked the Yamassee pueblo of La Thama while they were at mass. For several months following the attack, natives and friars alike spent the night inside the city walls. Benavides ordered the villages to settle within the range of the cannons.\(^{42}\) In 1728, Colonel John Palmer led an attack on the mission town Nombre de Dios with fifty Carolina militiamen and one hundred Indians. Fifty of the Nombre de Dios residents were killed and another fifty were taken prisoner. The church was ransacked and images destroyed. Although the attacks were directed at members of the Yamassee confederation, the Native American population in the mission towns had begun to intermarry significantly with members of other Indian villages by this point. Many Africans had joined the Yamassee in rising up against the Carolinians and lived among the Yamassee in Florida as well. Hoffman notes that the Spanish did not sally forth to counter the attack, a choice carefully noted by the Yamassee, for whom the attack was meant as a warning regarding the wisdom of alliance with the Spanish. The warning was well taken, and many of the Yamassee left.\(^{43}\)

**The Problem with Being Indian**

One of the major issues in the history of this period is the dramatic decline of the indigenous population in the villages surrounding the city (Table 5-1). Epidemic disease, violent raids, and enslavement account for many deaths.\(^{44}\) Abandonment of Hispanic life for the chiefdoms of the interior must also account for some of the population decline.\(^{45}\) Parker,

\(^{42}\) Letter from the Vecinos of St. Augustine, November 14, 1725, SC 58-1-29; Bushnell, *Situado and Sabana*, 196.


\(^{44}\) Consejo de Indias on attacks by hostile Indians, March 30, 1727, SC 58-1-24/192; Governor of Florida to the King on an epidemic killing 146 Indians, September 10, 1727, SC 58-1-31/7; Letter from Governor Benavides to the Conde de Salazar, Oct. 15, 1728, SD 842/100; Fray Bullones to the King, October 5, 1728, SC 58-2-16; Worth, *Resistance and Destruction*, 151-2; Hann, *History of the Timucua Indians and Missions*, 317-18.

\(^{45}\) Hann, *History of the Timucua Indians and Missions*, 320-1.
however, argues that the attrition rate may actually be inflated because rather than death or abandonment, many Indians may have successfully integrated themselves into society in Spanish St. Augustine. After a generation, she argues, some succeeded as passing for mestizo or Spanish, thus erasing the racial label of “Indian” from the documentary record. She provides compelling evidence that at least a few native individuals were able to utilize family connections and military service to establish themselves as respected citizens, or vecinos, in the city of St. Augustine.46

Beneath these vecinos in social status, however, was the rank and file of plebeian society. Archaeological and historical evidence suggests that while some Indians integrated themselves into the upper ranks of Hispanic society, many remained living in the outskirts of the city.47 Many lived and worked among other ladino Indians, free blacks, and slaves, just as previous generations had. Moreover, the refugees would have likely found Indians who spoke Guale, Apalache, Timucua, and Yamassee languages already living and working in the city.48 Although the addition of hundreds of hungry mouths to feed was certainly a burden on the city in some years,49 the presence of a working class of Indians, even Indians who did not speak Spanish, would have been unremarkable given the precedents established in the previous century. Parker’s


47 See Table 6-1 for mission censuses. For detailed analysis of the various aggregations and names of the mission villages, see Worth, Resistance and Destruction, 151-5; Boyer, “Nuestra Señora del Rosario de la Punta,” 97-101; White, “Living on the Periphery,” 33-40, 56-8, 97-9, 104-5, 82-91.

48 The court cases addressed in Chapter Four indicate the presence of Indians who did not speak Spanish. Governor Diego Quiroga y Losada to Crown April 24, 1693, SC 54-5-15/693; Auto of the murder of an Indian, August 16, 1689, SC 54-5-12; Bushnell, Situado and Sabana, 205; Hann, History of the Timucua Indians and Missions, 321. Moreover, the continued presence of atquis, or interpreters, indicates that such services were still necessary. One Indian baby was actually abandoned at the house of a St. Augustine atiqui, much as other babies were abandoned at the homes of prominent Spanish citizens. See baptism of Maria Antonia, parents unknown, left at the house of Gerónimo the Atiqui of Apalache, June 18, 1704.

49 With hostile bands ranging the countryside during the War of Spanish Succession, St. Augustine was dependent on the arrival of the situado. In 1712 when the delivery did not arrive, the city suffered a brief famine. Letter from Governor Córcoles y Martínez to the King, November 28, 1715, SD 843.
assessment that the surviving indigenous population likely integrated itself into the life of St. Augustine is valid, but the focus of her study is those who integrated themselves into the uppermost levels. The majority of the refugees living around the city built networks along the lines of their predecessors, becoming integrated to varying degrees into the plebeian classes of the city.

This was not a smooth process of integration, but rather a deeply contested one. As early as 1707 a jurisdictional dispute had broken out between the parish priests and the Franciscan friars. In an exasperated letter to the King, the governor explained that he was attempting to adjudicate a dispute between the friars and the secular clergy. The friars complained that when a Spaniard married an Indian or a mestiza woman, they should be the ones to perform the marriage and any subsequent baptisms. This was counter to the traditional practice, since normally the marriage was performed in the parish of the Spaniard. The friars performed the marriages for the Indians in the provinces because they had jurisdiction over that population and spoke the local languages. The governor accused the friars of stirring up trouble by insisting that they should minister to “families that for thirty, forty, and more years had been ministered to by the parish priest.” He stated that the real reason the friars were defensive was because the Indians were abandoning the doctrinas, little by little. Thus the friars tried to inflate their numbers by claiming even the Spanish-speaking ladino Indians. The governor added that he was attaching testimony to this effect, but a note in the margin states that no such supporting documentation arrived. Without the testimony, the Council of the Indies would not issue a definitive ruling. A comment in the margin, however, stated that since the friars exercised the title of “missionaries” they should minister only to their Indians.\(^\text{50}\)

\(^{50}\) Letter from the Governor Córcoles y Martínez to King, November 12, 1707, 58-1-28/21; Cope, \textit{Limits of Racial Domination}, 53-5.
The question, then, was who qualified as an Indian. Race, as a social construction, had always been influenced by cultural and socio-economic factors. During the seventeenth century, many Indians who lived in St. Augustine had taken on Hispanic culture and been accepted as ladinos or passed as mestizos. When the mission populations numbered in the tens of thousands, such passing was comparatively small in scale and carried less political significance for Spanish clergy and officials. As demonstrated in the previous chapter, the number of such individuals may have increased in the last quarter of the seventeenth century when the construction of the Castillo de San Marcos drew many Indians to the city. After 1702, the refugee Indian populations of St. Augustine continued the process, building on existing networks. They also capitalized on new advantages, such as the Spanish desire for soldiers who could participate in fast-moving, skilled combat units that patrolled the interior and sometimes conducted counter-raids on English plantations. Indian and African soldiers proved extremely valuable in these units.51

Although the avenues into urban society were ample and varied, the Franciscans’ desire to maintain jurisdiction over the spiritual and civil status of the Indians living in the city complicated the process. Individuals of Indian descent were caught in the cross-fire. For example, Pedro Tomás de Ribera and his family formally objected to being listed among those under a friar’s care. They were protective of their status as parishioners of the city. Parker notes that Ribera may have lodged his objections at the prompting of the parish priest, but the difference in status was very real.52 Furthermore, when the Indian doctrinas moved close to the city walls, they were probably also physically located near many of the urban Indian families of

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St. Augustine. The city followed a typical Spanish American settlement pattern, in which high-status occupants lived near the center of the town and low-status occupants lived near the periphery. Deagan finds that many 

 caste or mixed-race households were located on the very edge of town. For the friars, the distinction between those living inside and outside the walls may have been secondary in their quest to expand their jurisdiction.

Catholic parish records suggest that the friars did manage to control some but not all marriages and baptisms in the city. Most of the Franciscans’ records are lost, but a copy of the baptisms conducted by the friars from 1718 to 1723 survives, enclosed in a letter from Governor Benavides. This record lists baptisms for eleven villages and a separate entry for St. Augustine’s native residents. During this six year period, the friars baptized 174 infants, only 7 of which were born to St. Augustine residents. They also baptized 348 adults, 23 of whom lived in St. Augustine. The parish priests only baptized 4 infants and 7 adults of Indian descent during this period. It is likely that a number of Indian parents in St. Augustine managed to have their children baptized by the parish priest with no record of a racial designation, because race was interpreted through the lenses of class and culture as well as phenotype. Records of marriages involving Indians are similarly infrequent between 1707 and the late 1730s. In the six years discussed here, parish priests only performed 3 marriages that involved an Indian partner out of the 79 total marriages performed. From the 1730s to 1760s, Indians appear more frequently in the marriage records. This coincides with two trends: the declining influence of the Franciscan friars and the increase in interracial marriages between Indians, and Spaniards, mestizos, chinos, free blacks, and slaves. The most common union was

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between indigenous brides and Spanish or criollo grooms. Given the extent to which Indian villages’ names were reused and populations aggregated, it is impossible in many cases to determine a native woman’s ethnic affiliation with just the name of the village where she was born. Since the friars monopolized control of the sacramental life of the Indian population, it is difficult to discern whether Indians who lived in the city tended toward exogamous marriages or whether it is simply a bias produced by the nature of the documentary record.\textsuperscript{55}

If the destruction of the mission provinces limited the jurisdiction of the Franciscan friars after 1704, the arrival of the nearly one thousand Yamassee should have given them a new direction for their energies, especially since they had a vested interest in maintain the integrity of the republic of Indians. Unfortunately, there were a number of factors that impeded the friars in converting and controlling their Indian charges. Some were the product of the social circumstances of the indigenous population while others were purely political. The ethnic identity of native individuals and their familiarity with Hispanic life were vital mitigating factors. As raids penetrated deeper into the interior of Florida, many were driven to St. Augustine despite the questionable ability of the city to protect the refugees living outside its walls. Bushnell estimates that between 1722 and 1726 there may have been as many as 480 new refugees from various ethnolinguistic backgrounds.\textsuperscript{56} The friars felt that the Timucua and Apalache Indians were generally better than the rest. They considered themselves Christians and people who “kept their word,” –a very European notion. Many of the refugees who arrived later, such as the Costa,

\textsuperscript{55} CPR, Marriages, 1703-1763. Although the book of Spanish marriages was lost for the years after 1756, the book of non-white marriages was not. This data set continues until 1763. Between 1703 and 1756, 900 marriages were recorded in the parish register. Fifty-eight, or 6.4%, were between partners with different racial labels. On village origins, there are a few exceptions such as those who were born in San Luis de Talimali, the largest village of the Apalache region. This village, however, was home to a few Spanish families as well.

\textsuperscript{56} Letter from Governor Benavides to the Conde de Salazar, Oct. 15, 1728, SD 842/100; Letter from Joseph Bullones to don Gerónimo Valdés, Bishop of Cuba, August 13, 1728, SD 865; Bushnell, \textit{Situado and Sabana}, 196-8; Hoffman, \textit{Florida’s Frontiers}, 187-8; Tepaske, \textit{Governorship of Spanish Florida}, 208-209.
Pojoy, and Jororo traditionally subsisted through hunting, gathering, and fishing. They were uncomfortable with the demands of the sedentary, Hispanic Catholic lifestyle of the missions. It was a source of frustration for the friars who complained that these Indians were “useless.” The natives must have felt the same way about the friars because most eventually left St. Augustine and returned to the southern coast.\(^{57}\)

Alcoholism also appears to have been a genuine problem. References to the drunkenness of the Indians appear as frequent complaints in the friars’ writings.\(^{58}\) The tendency of Native Americans to drink to the point of extreme intoxication was a frequent refrain among religious and civil officials in the colonial Americas, but such complaints have important cultural dimensions. Consuming alcohol, much like consuming food, is a practice deeply shaped by cultural expectations. The notion of “holding one’s liquor” was shaped by European concepts of the purpose of alcohol consumption and imperialist notions of superiority over subject populations. Many Native American cultures were familiar with intoxicants of other sorts, but used them in ritual contexts when the goal was quite specifically extreme intoxication. Since some of the Indians were from the central southern Atlantic coasts they had little familiarity with European colonialism and the attendant expectations. They likely drank to excess in a manner unbecoming to Hispanic social standards.\(^{59}\)

\(^{57}\) Fray Bullones to the King, October 5, 1728, SC 58-2-16; Hann, *History of the Timucua Indians and Missions*, 320.

\(^{58}\) Bushnell, 200-1; Auxiliary Bishop Francisco de San Buenaventura Matínez Tejada to King, October 15, 1735, SD 866.

It is also possible that alcohol consumption was a pattern that was exacerbated over time. This interpretation is supported by the indictments of the Moral y Sánchez administration issued by the indigenous community leaders in 1736. They composed a group deposition for the secret investigation of Governor Moral y Sánchez in which they charged that the governor had made things worse for them by paying their people with rum instead of corn for their labor.\textsuperscript{60} In 1738 when the Franciscan friars composed a report on the mission for the governor, they cited the brief Moral y Sánchez administration (1734-7) as the turning point in the spiritual and social degeneration of the doctrina population because since then many adults had become addicted to alcohol. Governor Moral y Sánchez was accused of demanding uncompensated labor, relocating villages at will, and paying laborers in alcohol rather than corn, clothing, or trade goods. Given the complaints of the caciques, it is likely that the Moral y Sánchez’s policies did lead to increased access to rum (aguardiente).\textsuperscript{61} The extreme stress and vulnerability of refugee life on the frontier probably drove some to partake in the available forms of escapism. In her study of the assembly of kitchen materials at the Indian village of La Punta, archaeologist Andrea White notes that glass was found in numerous shades, some of which may have been spirit bottles. This may have been tied to high alcohol consumption, but it could easily also represent the accumulation of used bottles for other storage purposes.\textsuperscript{62}

Several controversies also plagued the missionary effort. The first was caused by the suggestion of the Bishop of Havana that the doctrinas of Florida be converted from missions to normal parishes. Hann observes that this controversy influences the 1728 account of Friar

\textsuperscript{60} St. Augustine Principales in Depositions on Governor Moral y Sánchez, 1736, SD 861.

\textsuperscript{61} On the friars’ accusations, see Report by Governor Montiano, June 4, 1738, SC 58-2-16; On abuses from the indigenous perspective, see St. Augustine Principales in Depositions on Governor Moral y Sánchez, 1736, SD 861. Hann, History of the Timucua Indians and Missions, 255, 320-2.

\textsuperscript{62} White, “Living on the Periphery,” 91-4.
Bullones and the accompany census of the doctrinas. Bullones argued that the doctrinas were not ready for such an elevation in status, and in some cases clearly underrated the size and spiritual devotion of some villages, such as Nombre de Dios. The second controversy emerged early in the century and peaked in the 1730s. In the wake of the 1704 attacks, many of the peninsular friars who had served their ten year requirement in Florida chose to retire to Cuba. Criollo friars dominated the Franciscan missionaries in Florida, and continued to do so until nine new peninsular Franciscans arrived in 1719. The peninsulares complained that the criollo friars held all the important positions and worked in the best doctrinas. The criollos felt their authority threatened and made life difficult for the peninsular friars by assigning them to hostile missions and moving them frequently, making it hard to learn the native languages. The conflict culminated in 1732 when the criollos and peninsular friars each held their own conflicting chapter elections. Such conflict took place elsewhere in Spanish America as well. This factional struggle continued up the chain of authority. Although the Bishop of Cuba defended the criollos, King Philip V ruled in favor of the peninsulares in 1732, 1737, and 1739. The final ruling ended the dispute, but the years of conflict had taken their toll on the moral authority and the general morale of the missionaries.

When Auxiliary Bishop Francisco de San Buenaventura Martínez Tejada arrived in St. Augustine in the midst of the controversy in 1735, he was deeply distressed by what he felt was the neglected spiritual state of the indigenous population. As an alternative to the factionalism,

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63 Fray Bullones to the King, October 5, 1728, SC 58-2-16; Hann, History of the Timucua Indians and Missions, 312-13.

64 Fr. Domingo de Losada comisario general de Indias, May 3, 1736, SD 837; Governor of Cuba to the King, August 24, 1737, SC 58-2-17/19; Casa de Contratación, November 12, 1736, SC 58-1-25/274; Hoffman, Florida’s Frontiers, 197; Bushnell, Situado and Sabana, 205.

65 Gannon, Cross in the Sand, 81-3. The solution to criollo and peninsular rivalries in seventeenth-century Peru was a process called the alternative through which both factions alternated control of the provincial offices. This process did not work in Florida. Bushnell, Situado and Sabana, 200; Tepaske, Governorship of Spanish Florida, 181-3.
he suggested that the remaining Indians should all be grouped together in one large village with farm land and adequate defenses. The bishop’s motives had more to do with spirituality than población. Former governor Benavides, however, added a strategic component when he proposed that they be relocated to an old mission site north of town called Mose. He argued that the site was a good choice because the land was fertile and offered access to the Intracoastal Waterway, called Matanzas. It was also located north of the city and could serve as a strategic outpost. By the 1730s, however, the regular clergy in St. Augustine were losing their influence with the indigenous population. It was not Indian, but African settlers who occupied the Mose site in late 1738.66

In that year Governor Montiano also composed a report on the state of the missions, based on reports forwarded to him by the friars. He stated that the friars continued to treat the Indians in and around St. Augustine as subject peoples as they would have the mission populations of earlier generations. They contended that the Indians were still fundamentally different from the Spanish in their Christian status and that they should answer to the Franciscans’ authority first and foremost. One friar, Manuel Sotomayor, even complained that Indians refused to acknowledge Franciscan authority or that of their chiefs. Many even completely denied being Indians. He blamed this arrogance on their frequent contact with the Spaniards. Some women, he noted, believed that since their husbands held a military position, they had functionally ceased to be Indians. These women understood the reality of the two republics best: separate spaces, separate functions, separate cultures.67 In 1746 jurisdiction over

66 Letters of Auxiliary Bishop Francisco de San Buenaventura Martínez Tejada, April 29, 1736, SC 58-2-14; Antonio de Benavides to the King, April 24, 1738, SC 58-2-16/45. Benavides sent his report in 1738 from his new post in Veracruz, although it was in response to a request for information from 1736. Hann, History of the Timucua Indians and Missions, 319.

all Christians in St. Augustine, whatever their racial identity, was transferred to the secular clergy.  

With the end of the controversy, the pressure to defend and assert a Hispanicized identity likely decreased. Nevertheless, the population of the doctrinas continued to dwindle. Correspondence from the 1730s and 1740s suggests that Indians continued to live, work, and socialize in St. Augustine. Two censuses from the year 1752 give some insight into the distribution of the Indian population. The first was a report remitted by José Gelabert of all those in the payroll of the King, including 152 Indians who still lived in the doctrinas and thus received a supplement from the situado. A report from the Franciscan friars indicated a total of 372 Indians living in and around St. Augustine, including those who worked as servants. This indicates that as many as 220 individuals of indigenous descent were living and working in St. Augustine. By 1760, the population of the pueblos had declined to 79. High mortality rates continued to plague the indigenous population, but the Catholic parish records indicate that at least some of those who did survive and reproduce tended to do so with partners and families in St. Augustine, blending into the general category of Floridanos.

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70 José Gelabert to the King of Spain, January 10, 1752, SC 87-1-14/2; Franciscan Friars, 1752, SD 2604, cited in Hann, *History of the Timucua Indians and Missions*, 321.

71 CPR Marriages, 1703-1763. Since the records after 1735 were split into separate books by race, a number of individuals appear in the *Libro de Morenos, Pardos e Indios* with no other indication of heritage than “native of Florida,” the same term used for criollos in the white register.
Conclusions

Despite at least one attempt in 1717, Spanish authorities in St. Augustine never successfully utilized the Indian populations in any projects of población. The chronic shortage of funds was the most persistent obstacle to the construction of new settlements. The lack of adequate defenses was close behind.\(^72\) Other obstacles were the product of Spanish colonial policies, such as the insistence on settling Indians into doctrinas modeled on idealized Catholic life. Their unwillingness or inability to arm their Indian allies with modern flintlock firearms was also a weakness.\(^73\) Although some officials such as Governor Benavides expressed a clear preference for Spanish rather than Indian settlers, the Spanish imperial government did not object to Indian pobladores in principle. They had been content to use the mission population in this role in the seventeenth century and were prepared to employ the 161 Creek villages in the same capacity in the 1720s.\(^74\)

The Spanish struggled with formidable external forces inhibiting the development of the hinterland, but there is no evidence that the indigenous population in St. Augustine showed any interest in constructing settlements at great distance from the city after 1706. As Parker demonstrates, many individuals with skills and initiative devoted their energies to furthering their status in the city of St. Augustine. Constant contact with the Spanish and African populations had made ladinos of those who were willing to participate in Hispanic lifestyle. Moreover, the status of a ladino or a mestizo was superior to that of a doctrina Indian and life as

\(^{72}\) On defenses, see Governor Torres y Ayala to the King, January 5, 1699, SC 61-6-22. On inadequate funds, see Consejo de Indias, January 29, 1702, SC 58-1-20. Tepaske, *Governorship of Spanish Florida*, 178-80.

\(^{73}\) Letter from Benavides to King with two enclosures, June 12, 1720, SC 58-2-16/5; Hall, *Zamumo’s Gifts*, 83. The Spanish in St. Augustine were generally in need of new weaponry themselves, much less were they able to adequately supply their Indian allies.

\(^{74}\) Hoffman, *Florida’s Frontiers*, 185.
a doctrinero no longer offered sufficient benefits to outweigh the costs. By contrast, those like the Jororo who were not willing to adopt Catholic, Hispanic life simply abandoned the city altogether.

Rather than an Indian doctrina, the Mose site suggested by Benavides was settled by people of African descent. They chose to take advantage of the land and sea resources and voluntarily served as the new soldier-settlers of the Florida countryside, growing crops, raising livestock, and serving as an armed buffer between St. Augustine and the English colonies. It is to them that we turn next.
Table 6-1. Sources of Demographic Data for the Indigenous Population after 1702

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>123</td>
<td>1702</td>
<td>Indian men in St. Augustine, including Nombre de Dios</td>
<td>Report of Enrique Primo de Rivera&lt;sup&gt;75&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 camps</td>
<td>1706</td>
<td>Rancherías around the city</td>
<td>Letter of Governor Córcoles y Martínez&lt;sup&gt;76&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>416</td>
<td>1711</td>
<td>People in the mission villages</td>
<td>Letter of Governor Córcoles y Martínez&lt;sup&gt;77&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>401</td>
<td>1714</td>
<td>Population of Indian refugees</td>
<td>Cédula of Philip V to Governor of Florida Córcoles y Martínez&lt;sup&gt;78&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>942</td>
<td>1717</td>
<td>People in the mission villages</td>
<td>Census of Primo de Rivera, in Ayala y Escobar to the King&lt;sup&gt;79&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>965&lt;sup&gt;80&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>1726</td>
<td>People in the mission villages (not including those settled in Apalache)</td>
<td>Letter of Governor Benavides to the King&lt;sup&gt;81&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[1,350]</td>
<td>1728</td>
<td>People in the mission villages</td>
<td>Benavides, submitted in 1738&lt;sup&gt;82&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>427</td>
<td>1728</td>
<td>People in the mission villages</td>
<td>Census of Joseph del Castillo&lt;sup&gt;83&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>250</td>
<td>1736</td>
<td>People in the mission villages</td>
<td>Letters of Auxiliary Bishop Francisco de San Buenaventura Martínez Tejada&lt;sup&gt;84&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>477</td>
<td>1736</td>
<td>People in the mission villages</td>
<td>Antonio de Arredondo Report, 1736&lt;sup&gt;85&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>75</sup> Report of Enrique Primo de Rivera, November 9, 1702, SC 58-2-8.

<sup>76</sup> Royal Officials and Governor of Florida to the King, August 13, 1706, SC 52-1-27/87.

<sup>77</sup> Governor Córcoles y Martínez to the King, April 9, 1711, SC 58-1-30.

<sup>78</sup> Royal Cédula dated September 26, 1714, SC 58-1-23/494.

<sup>79</sup> Census of Primo de Rivera, in Ayala y Escobar to the King, April 18, 1717, SC 58-1-30.

<sup>80</sup> This number was checked against Worth, *Resistance and Destruction*, 151. He cites the total number as 1,007. I read the final total to be 1,011 people minus the 46 located at Apalache, which is in agreement with Deagan, “Accommodation and Resistance,” 301.

<sup>81</sup> Governor Benavides, Visitation of the missions and census, December 1-12, 1726, SC 58-2-16/12.

<sup>82</sup> Governor Benavides, April 24, 1738, SC 58-2-16/45.

<sup>83</sup> Census of Joseph del Castillo, enclosed in Gerónimo Valdez, Auto regarding the state of the mission, September 20, 1728, SD 2226.

<sup>84</sup> Letters of Auxiliary Bishop Francisco de San Buenaventura Martínez Tejada, April 29, 1736, SC 58-2-14.

<sup>85</sup> Antonio de Arredondo to King, November 27, 1736, SC 87-1-1/60.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>276</td>
<td>1737</td>
<td>People in the mission villages (two villages possibly excluded)</td>
<td>Antonio de Arredondo Plan of the City, 1737&lt;sup&gt;86&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>348</td>
<td>1738</td>
<td>People in the mission villages, partial exclusion of one village, only warriors listed</td>
<td>Letter of Governor Benavides to the King&lt;sup&gt;87&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>310</td>
<td>1738</td>
<td>People in the mission villages</td>
<td>Letter of Governor Montiano to the King&lt;sup&gt;88&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>354</td>
<td>1738</td>
<td>People in the mission villages</td>
<td>Letter of Juan Francisco de Güemes y Horcasitas&lt;sup&gt;89&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>336</td>
<td>1739</td>
<td>Converted Indians</td>
<td>Letter of Juan de Torres&lt;sup&gt;90&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[5 villages, with 50 or 60 armed men]</td>
<td>1731-1742</td>
<td>Villages and men capable of bearing arms</td>
<td>Don Pedro Sánchez Griñán Report; based on Griñán’s stay from 1731 to 1742, submitted in 1756&lt;sup&gt;91&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>152</td>
<td>1752</td>
<td>People in the mission villages</td>
<td>José Gelabert to the King&lt;sup&gt;92&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>372</td>
<td>1752</td>
<td>Total Indians in St. Augustine, including those working as servants</td>
<td>Franciscan friars’ report&lt;sup&gt;93&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>79</td>
<td>1760</td>
<td>People in the mission villages</td>
<td>Juan Joseph Solana Report&lt;sup&gt;94&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>86</td>
<td>1763</td>
<td>Indians</td>
<td>Eligio de la Puente Evacuation Report&lt;sup&gt;95&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>86</sup> Plano de la Ciudad, May 15, 1737. Map photostat, St. Augustine Historic Preservation Board, St. Augustine, Florida.

<sup>87</sup> Governor Montiano to the King, April 21, 1738, SD 265. Cited from Worth, *Resistance and Destruction*, 153.

<sup>88</sup> Governor Montiano to the King, June 4, 1738, SD 865. Cited from Worth, *Resistance and Destruction*, 153.


<sup>90</sup> Juan de Torres, census of converted Indians, March 6, 1739, SD 867. Worth, *Resistance and Destruction*, 153.

<sup>91</sup> Scardaville and Belmonte, “1756 Griñán Report,” 11.

<sup>92</sup> José Gelabert to the King of Spain, January 10, 1752, SC 87-1-14/2.

<sup>93</sup> Franciscan Friars, 1752, SD 2604, cited from Hann, *History of the Timucua Indians and Missions*, 321.

<sup>94</sup> Juan Joseph Solana Report to the King, April 9, 1760, SC 86-7-21/41.

<sup>95</sup> Reports by D Juan José Eligio de la Puente, January 9, 1764, CUBA 372.
CHAPTER 7
AFRICAN SLAVES, VASSALS, AND SETTLE

Much like the indigenous population, people of African descent were part of Spanish colonial society in Florida from its very inception. In sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century St. Augustine, the black population of the city was small and composed of both slaves and free blacks.\(^1\) Slaves worked at a wide variety of occupations and their contributions were vital to the survival of the colony. A free black community also existed in St. Augustine. Free blacks worked as sailors, cowboys, farmers, carpenters, artisans, and storekeepers, composing another part of the plebeian society of St. Augustine.\(^2\) Beginning in 1683 they also served in the militia. Their occupations and social status were similar to that of free blacks in other parts of Spanish America. As elsewhere, they represented a diverse group and many struggled to improve their status within the matrix of colonial power and prejudices. Some even became prosperous property owners.\(^3\) As discussed in Chapter One, imperial conflict added a new dimension to Spanish-black relations. Beginning in 1687, black slaves fled the Carolina colony in search of shelter and freedom among the Spanish. Capitalizing on the importance of Catholicism, they claimed to have fled to Florida in search of conversion and baptism in the Catholic faith. Over the course of the next fifty years, the Spanish developed an official policy of asylum for those blacks who fled Carolina. Runaways converted to Catholicism and the men proved to be useful

\(^1\) I use the term black here as interchangeable with “people of African descent,” a term which indicates individuals born in Africa as well as the Americas. It is inclusive of people of partial African descent, termed _pardos_ or mulattos, except where specifically noted.

\(^2\) Governor of Florida to the King, April 24, 1693, SC 54-5-15/693; Auto of the murder of an Indian, August 16, 1689, SC 54-5-12; Governor of Florida to the King, November 10, 1678, NC 58-1-26/23. Hann, “Apalachee Counterfeitors in St. Augustine,” 52-68; Bushnell, _The King’s Coffers_, 82-3.

\(^3\) Petition of Diego de Espinosa, May 5, 1738, SD 845; Brockington, _Blacks, Indians, and Spaniards in the Eastern Andes_, 140-1; Cope, _Limits of Racial Domination_, 21-22; Landers, _Black Society in Spanish Florida_, 57, 202-3; Hanger, _Bounded Lives, Bounded Places_, 12, 86-7; Vinson, _Bearing Arms for His Majesty_, 221-6.

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additions to the local militia. Although the King of Spain declared the fugitive slaves from Carolina to be free, the policy was inconsistently followed. Until 1738, a number of those who had fled Carolina still lived as slaves in St. Augustine. Seeing a strategic use for the Carolina blacks, that year Governor Montiano freed them and resettled the group a mile outside the city. The new village was located on an old mission site and was named Gracia Real de Santa Teresa de Mose. It had earthen fortifications and was designed to serve as a buffer and an advanced guard against English invasion from the north.

This chapter argues that Spanish officials approached relations with the black population of Florida with a strategic attitude similar to that which influenced Spanish-Indian relations. They sought to use the population to gain the upper hand in their competition with the English. Some slaves and free blacks were able to find a way to take advantage of that agenda, thus opening a path to freedom or economic and social advancement. Many Africans in Florida, however, remained legal slaves of the Spanish and had to pursue other avenues to freedom as best they could. This chapter begins by discussing slavery and the slave trade in Spanish Florida. Most of the research on blacks in the first Spanish period focuses on the free black population. An examination of the contours of slave life also illustrates the opportunities and the limitations that slaves faced on the Florida frontier. Even as the Spanish freed some slaves in the name of

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4 Governor Quiroga y Losada to King, Feb. 24, 1688, SC 54-5-12; Royal Cédula, November 7, 1693, SC 58-1-26; Governor Zuñiga y Cerda to King, October 10, 1699, SD 844. Capitán don Juan de la Valle, May 28, 1731, SD 837; King to Governor of Florida, September 16, 1740, SC 58-1-25; Royal Cédula, September 24, 1750, SC 58-1-25/177.

5 Consejo de Indias to King, October 2, 1739, 58-1-20/224; King to Governor of Florida, September 16, 1740, SC 58-1-25; King to Governor of Florida, November 11, 1740, SC 58-1-25/90; Montiano refused to compensate their owners, arguing that the King had granted freedom to runaways as early as 1693 and those who chose to enslave these black refugees should have known better. Since they were in direct violation of royal decree, all contracts and financial transactions were null and void. This is the main focus of several works by Jane Landers including *Black Society in Spanish Florida* and “Gracia Real de Santa Teresa de Mose: A Free Black Town in Spanish Colonial Florida,” *American Historical Review* 95 (1990): 9-30.

the king, they imported hundreds of others to be sold to private purchasers or to labor on public projects. The second half of the chapter examines the variety of strategies the Spanish proposed and employed to advance geopolitical aims through the manipulation of the black populations of Florida, Georgia, and Carolina.

**Slave Life in Florida**

The discussion of slavery in Florida requires some historical context to situate it in the larger Spanish American world. The Spanish had a long history of slavery and the institution was influenced by Roman law and the experience of the Reconquista. The reader should bear in mind, however, the vast differences between law and practice. Although the Spanish had long exposure to Africans as slaves and as the religious other, the correlation between African identity and the state of slavery had not yet hardened into rigid determinism. Descending as it did from the Roman tradition, Spanish law recognized slavery as a legal, rather than a natural state.⁷ Some of the rights of slaves were recognized and protected by the Catholic Church, such as the right to marry, to live conjugally, and to raise their children. Other slave rights were codified in the *Siete Partidas*, a thirteenth century legal code upon which much of the early modern Spanish jurisprudence was based.⁸ Perhaps most importantly, the laws created space for slaves to own property and to purchase their freedom, a process called *coartación*. Slaves could also be

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⁸ Laird W. Bergad, *The Comparative Histories of Slavery in Brazil, Cuba, and the United States* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 42; Elliott, *Empires of the Atlantic World*, 107. Some historians argue that although the *Siete Partidas* offered precedents for slaves’ rights it was not equivalent to a living body of law and thus could be easily ignored if some stipulations were found inconvenient. In his study of black life in colonial Mexico, Herman Bennett argues that the Catholic Church played a vital role in creating personhood and private life for slaves through church-recognized family relationships. Herman Bennett, *Colonial Blackness: A History of Afro-Mexico* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009), 1-3.
manumitted either by their master or the state. Slaves were, in theory, also vassals of the King of Spain and could seek his intervention. Slaves might seek intervention from royal authorities to stop excessive abuse, to have a third party set a fair price for self-purchase, or to seek reward for extraordinary valor or service. The extent to which slaves could capitalize on these legal opportunities was often very limited. Slaves experiences varied dramatically, particularly in places where the profits to be gained from the exploitation of slave labor were great. Most slaves in the Americas worked on rural sugar plantations where they did not have access to legal or ecclesiastical protection. Urban slaves often had more opportunities to take advantage of their legal rights and exploit the competing institutions of power in the urban Hispanic world. Spaniards in Florida were unable to launch the large-scale production of any lucrative agricultural products such as sugar or cacao so a large, enslaved plantation labor force did not develop during the first Spanish period. For most of this era, slaves remained a comparatively small percentage of the population and were concentrated in the city of St. Augustine. In small numbers, slaves were considered less threatening than the indigenous masses and were used as overseers of the Indian workers in Florida and other parts of Spanish America from the very outset.

Knowledge about the history of free blacks and slaves in Spanish Florida has expanded significantly in the past twenty years due to the efforts of a few scholars who have worked to shed light on the topic. Peter Wood’s book, *Black Majority*, was central to the discussion of African slavery and connections between colonial Florida and Carolina. Jane Landers has worked to place the experience of blacks in Florida in the context of Spanish Caribbean history.

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in her book *Black Society in Spanish Florida*.\(^{11}\) Her work is part of growing body of research on the experience of free and enslaved people of African descent in the circum-Caribbean.\(^{12}\) In *Black Society in Spanish Florida*, Landers presents her argument in the context of the work of Frank Tannenbaum. His book, *Slave and Citizen, the Negro in the Americas* (1947) began a lengthy debate regarding the comparative severity of slave systems in the Americas and the subsequent influence of race relations. Tannenbaum argued that compared to slavery in the English colonies and the United States, the moral and legal identity of the slaves under Iberian law and Catholic faith eased the severity of the institution and subsequent transition to freedom. This accounted for the difference between the uneasy race relations in the United States compared to more peaceful race relations in Latin America.\(^{13}\)

Critics of the work amply demonstrated that Tannenbaum’s portrayal of slavery in Latin America was overly generalized. The nature of slavery varied widely across the Americas and slaves working on large plantations and in rural areas rarely had sufficient access to legal and religious institutions necessary to enjoy the benefits of the Iberian system. Landers argues that in Spanish Florida, circumstances were different. In the urban environment of St. Augustine blacks

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\(^{13}\) Frank Tannenbaum, *Slave and Citizen, the Negro in the Americas* (New York, Vintage: 1947).
had access to both institutions. The frontier nature of the presidio also played a part. She situates the experience of black slaves and free people in Florida in the context of the imperial struggle for the southeast, demonstrating that the demand for soldiers and settlers created more opportunities for slaves to obtain freedom. The majority of her research on the first Spanish period has focused on the free black community at Fort Mose. She has also examined the lives of free and enslaved blacks in the second period of Spanish occupation from 1783 to 1821, demonstrating the rich detail available from later sources. By contrast, the life of slaves in early Spanish Florida has received less attention.\(^\text{14}\)

In sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century St. Augustine, slaves belonged to private citizens as well as to the King. Generally, the Governor was expected to manage the labor of the royal slaves, while the royal officials kept track of the expenses. When they were not employed in public works, royal slaves were rented out to local citizens and the proceeds used to pay for the slaves’ food and clothing. Goods produced by skilled slaves such as blacksmiths were also sold by the royal officials to the profit of the royal treasury. Occasionally royal officials complained that the governors were using royal slaves for personal projects.\(^\text{15}\) In the absence of marketable commodities for export, however, there was neither the volume of demand nor the capital that might lead to the large-scale acquisition of slaves in the sixteenth or early seventeenth centuries. Slaves were expensive luxuries for private citizens. By the end of the


\(^{15}\) Bushnell, *The King’s Coffers*, 82-3.
seventeenth century, the growth of ranching in the interior and the need for labor on defense projects in the city had begun to alter these conditions. Even some native chiefs owned black slaves. Royal officials and individual entrepreneurs took advantage of increased demand to introduce more slaves into the colony. Compared to other parts of the colonial Southeast or Spanish America, the volume of imports was small, with ten or twenty arriving every few years. Nevertheless, by the end of the seventeenth century, most prosperous families and military officers in St. Augustine owned between one and four slaves. Most slaves contributed to the subsistence of the household, working fields, caring for livestock, cutting wood, cooking, and cleaning. Others worked as cowboys on the ranches in the interior. Royal slaves worked on public projects such as maintenance of roads or improvement of defenses. Between thirty and fifty royal slaves were employed in the construction of the Castillo de San Marcos.

Between the 1720s and 1750s, slave imports grew. By the middle of the eighteenth century, most prosperous citizens owned between five and ten slaves. The trade grew through both legal and illicit channels and was a reflection of the growth in the slave trade in English

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16 Royal Cédula to Ayala y Escobar, May 9, 1687, SC 58-1-22. This cédula stipulated that only ladino slaves, no bozales should be imported. As noted in Chapter Four, bozal was a term commonly used to identify slaves from Africa with little familiarity with European customs or languages. Alonso Carnero to secretary Aperregui on slaves requested by Ayala, April 29, 1703, SC 58-1-27; Juan de Ayala y Escobar to Manuel de Aperregui, July 4, 1704, SC 58-2-2/57; Governor of Florida to Crown, November 16, 1707, 58-1-28/23; Landers, *Black Society in Spanish Florida*, 19-21; Hoffman, *Florida's Frontiers*, 158. On native chiefs owning slaves, see Hann, *History of the Timucua Indians and Missions*, 114, 171.

17 Royal Officials to King, March 8, 1689, SD 227B; See testimonies in Auto of the murder of an Indian, August 16, 1689, SC 54-5-12; Inventory of the possessions of don Pedro Ruitiner, 1680-89, AGI 58-2-3/11 from MC 63, box 2, file 64.


colonies as well as the expansion of commerce through the Havana Company. Under Spanish mercantile laws, trade was closely monitored. Trade goods were controlled and taxed, particularly a lucrative one such as slaves. In 1718, Governor Benavides accused his predecessor, interim-governor Juan de Ayala y Escobar, of permitting the introduction of contraband goods from Carolina. The treasurer, Joseph Pedroso, was charged with assisting him. Sargent Major Don Francisco Romo testified that some Indians arrived with black slaves and other goods for sale and that Ayala y Escobar permitted them to conduct business. Captain Don Ignacio Rodríguez Roso confirmed the testimony, stating that it was public knowledge that the slaves were acquired from the Indians. Apparently the Indians had complained vociferously that Ayala y Escobar had not paid for the goods he had taken, blacks included. Royal officials remitted the treasury account books for the years 1714 through 1721, but there is no evidence of a transaction involving slaves of any sort. The introduction of slaves from foreign locations grew over the following decades. In his history of Florida, Barcía comments that plans to establish an auxiliary bishopric in the 1720s in Florida would be beneficial not only for the conversion of slaves but for the “education of so many blacks being imported by foreigners.” The number of slaves introduced legally into the colony increased slightly, but as Barcía suggests, the real change was cultural. A growing number of the imported slaves were bozales from Africa, rather than blacks from somewhere in the Spanish empire who already spoke Spanish and practiced Catholicism. Many of the slaves who fled Carolina in the 1740s and 1750s were also bozales. Thus, it is no


21 Testimony and complaints against Governor of Florida Ayala y Escobar for illicit trade with the English, September 24 and September 29, 1718, SC 58-2-9/9; Libro de Mancomunidades, 1731, SD 861. Benavides had Ayala y Escobar and the treasurer Joseph Pedroso exiled to prison in Cuba while their cases were being determined. Due to the reluctance of the Cuban official designated to investigate, the case went unresolved for over a decade. Ayala y Escobar, who was already ninety years old when he was exiled to Cuba, died in 1727. Pedroso was offered the opportunity to return to Florida in 1728, but put it off until Benavides was no longer governor. Tepaske, *Governorship of Spanish Florida*, 64-8.
coincidence that Governor Fulgencio García de Solís complained about the “backwardness” of the Carolina slaves who came to St. Augustine.\textsuperscript{22}

Trade with English merchants expanded under Governor Moral y Sánchez in the 1730s. Auxiliary Bishop Martínez Tejada wrote to the king with horror that the governor not only permitted English merchants to enter the city, they walked the streets speaking their Protestant heresies freely. One of the other complaints against Moral y Sánchez was that English traders had become so dominant that they were running the Spaniards in St. Augustine out of business. Beginning in the 1740s, the Havana Company took up the responsibility for provisioning Florida, but sometimes arranged contracts with merchants from Charleston, Savannah, and New York to deliver goods to Florida.\textsuperscript{23} One of the merchants who resided in Florida was an Englishman named Jesse Fish. Fish arrived in St. Augustine as a boy of ten or twelve in 1736, in the service of the William Walton Company of New York, one of the major merchant companies that supplied the presidio. Fish learned the Spanish language and customs and served as a representative for the company until 1763.\textsuperscript{24}

As a representative of the Walton Company, Fish dealt in more than just textiles and foodstuffs. The formal record of slaves introduced into the colony began in 1752 thanks to the efforts of Governor Melchor de Navarrete. According to a letter from Governor Navarrete to the king that year, it had been custom in Florida for governors to allow the introduction and sale of


\textsuperscript{23} Harman, \textit{Trade and Privateering in Spanish Florida}, 37-43; Hoffman, \textit{Florida’s Frontiers}, 195-6. Havana Company supplies were few during the War of Jenkins’ Ear. Floridians engaged enthusiastically in corsair activities, but apparently also continued to trade with English merchant companies.

bozal slaves that came on the English ships delivering provisions to the city. Diplomatically, the governor referenced only the arrival of English ships sanctioned by the Royal Havana Company, though there were likely others. He commented that previous governors had treated it as a normal practice that took place with the tacit consent of the crown. The purpose of his letter was to establish that this was, in fact, an approved practice. The sales were approved and Navarrete appears to have formalized the process, requiring those who wanted to sell slaves legally to appear before the governor, the royal treasurer, and the royal accountant to register the transaction. Whether or not Navarrete was the first to systematize the process is unclear, but surviving registers of slaves introduced legally into the colony begin in 1752 and continue until 1763. Jesse Fish was listed as the owner of the majority of slaves included in the register, suggesting that the trade was already in place before 1752, as Navarrete explained. It was not large, but represented a significant increase for St. Augustine. During that twelve year period, only 28 out of the total 204 slaves introduced into Florida were criollos. The rate of slaves imported per year does seem to have increased slightly compared to the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. Access to the trade and decreased prices were likely the primary causes for this growth. By the 1750s, the average cost of a male slave ranch hand was 280 pesos, nearly half of what it had been a century before.

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25 Governor Navarrete to the King, February 15, 1750, SC 86-7-21/53. Navarrete concluded that the practice had the tacit approval of the King because it had come up in previous incidents and he had not expressed disapproval in those cases: “Ha muchos años señor excelentísimo que los Gobernadores de esta plaza tiene puesto en carrera como si fuese materia regular y sin inconveniente el indulto de algunos negros bozales que introducen en ella los ingleses al mismo tiempo que las provisiones del cargo de la Real compañía de la Habana y aunque me consta del tácito consentimiento y disimulo de su majestad que no lo ha mandado embarazar habiendo llegado a su Real noticia por incidencia de otros punto…”


An intriguing example of illicit slave trading appears in 1762, when a Spaniard going by
the name Don Thomás attempted to introduce four young African bozales into the city. In
Savannah, he had boarded a ship named Coulican that was carrying corn and rice to St.
Augustine. He told the ship’s captain that he had bought the four boys in Charleston. He assured
the suspicious captain that his travel was legitimate and he would present himself immediately to
the governor in St. Augustine. When they arrived at port, Thomás waited until the captain went
below to shave and then stole a launch and rowed with the boys across the harbor to the beach
near the Franciscan convent. He was spotted by soldiers on patrol, but managed to take sanctuary
within the convent before they reached him. The boys did not enjoy the same immunity as the
Spaniard and were removed almost immediately. They were sold at auction to benefit the royal
treasury. The boys were between the ages of nine and twelve and were assessed at a total of 670
pesos collectively. At auction, they were finally purchased as a group by Joseph de Escalera for
900 pesos altogether. Escalera paid another 44 pesos and 4 reales for the *indulto*, or royal tax.
Records of the testimony and final fate of Thomás could not be located.²⁸

This encounter highlights the growing traffic of slaves, particularly bozales, in the region.
The growth of the slave trade in the final years of the Spanish occupation in Florida raises
several questions. Did the presence of English traders with different ideas about the rights of
slaves influence Spanish authorities, or was the taint of their Protestant heresy sufficient to
discredit their notions? Perhaps more importantly, did the introduction of more bozales into the
city create a greater perceived distance between slaves and other sectors of society? Certainly
Governor Montiano treated the Carolina fugitives much like pagan Indians, assigning members

²⁸ Don Melchor Feliú, May 8, 1762, CUBA 472. The introduction of illicit English goods continued until 1763.
Generally, goods that profited members of the St. Augustine elite were overlooked. English or Spanish traders
working outside the accepted local channels were punished. For example, see Autos regarding attempted
introduction of illicit clothes, thread, knives, hats, etc. by Diego Bruzes, December 29, 1758, CUBA 472.
of the religious community to educate the former slaves at Fort Mose in the Catholic faith. Overall, however, slaves and free blacks continued to construct social networks across lines of race and class through traditional methods such as military service and participation in Catholic life.²⁹

As noted in previous chapters, one of the most effective modes of incorporation into the social fabric of the city was religious life. The comparatively small number of blacks in Spanish Florida in the seventeenth century, combined with a preference for creole or acculturated slaves rather than bozales from Africa, likely promoted greater uniformity of Catholic practice.³⁰ The Catholic parish records indicate that as in Mexico and Central America, endogamous marriage was most common. Over the course of the century examined here, marriages in which both partners were of African descent averaged 13% of all marriages in the parish records, although this rate varied dramatically by year (Table 7-1). Intermarriage between Africans and Indians took place as well, possibly because this substantially broadened the pool of potential marriage partners for blacks. These unions, however, represent less than 1% of marriages in St. Augustine. See Chapters Four and Five for a discussion of the statistical underrepresentation of Indians in the Catholic parish records in the eighteenth century.³¹

Slave women had higher rates of endogamous marriage than slave men. While enslaved women married enslaved men most frequently, enslaved men also married Indian women. Cope finds this pattern in Mexico City as well, and suggests that slave women were less appealing mates since children inherited the status of the mother and thus would also be born into slavery. The children of enslaved fathers and Indian mothers, by contrast, were free. Parish records are

²⁹ Consejo de Indias, October 2, 1739, SC 58-1-20/224.
³⁰ Royal Cédula to Ayala y Escobar, May 9, 1687, SC 58-1-22.
³¹ CPR, Marriage Records, 1668-1757.
not necessarily a strong statistical index of interracial unions, but there are few other sources
with which to address this question in the Florida records. Illegitimacy rates offer some
indication of sexual relations outside of marriage, although there is no method of distinguishing
between consensual and coercive relations.\(^\text{32}\) Children born to slave mothers account for fifty
percent of illegitimate births in St. Augustine on average, although this rate varies substantially
as well, peaking in the 1720s and 1730s. The other fifty percent of illegitimate births were
composed primarily of women who with no racial designation. Free black women make up a
small percentage of illegitimate births until the 1740s and 1750s when their numbers equal those
of women with no race listed. The high rate of illegitimacy among slave women and increasing
rates among casta women are similar to patterns in Mexico at this point in time. The number of
illegitimate births attributed to Indian women is conspicuously low throughout the period under
examination here. There are some references in the documents to the presence of Indian
herbalists in St. Augustine capable of dispensing abortifacients, but more likely the difference is
the product of Franciscan jurisdiction over Indian baptisms. The Franciscans may also have been
able to exert greater pressure on couples to marry in order to legitimize their children.\(^\text{33}\)

\(^\text{32}\) Twinam, *Public Lives, Private Secrets*, 60-5. If they had survived, contracts, wills, and notary records might
reveal anecdotally if not statistically, the frequency of consensual unions and concubinage in Florida. Three types of
baptismal entry indicate illegitimate status. The first is children born to unmarried couples, referred to as “natural”
rather than “legitimate” children. The second is children for whom the father is listed as “unknown.” This is by far
the largest category. The third is children described as “foundlings” or “children of the church.” This designation
might indicate that the infant had been abandoned either at the church or on the doorstep of a leading citizen. It
could also be used to avoid identifying the mother of the illegitimate child in order to protect her honor. In fact, the
number of children born to unmarried couples in St. Augustine is extremely small. Several instances of retroactive
“legitimacy” suggest that even if the father was known, he was not listed until the couple was married. Perhaps the
efforts of Bishop Martínez Tejada to reduce the scandalous lifestyle of Floridians contributed to the decrease in
subsequent decades.

\(^\text{33}\) CPR, Marriages, 1668-1757; Cope, *Limits of Racial Domination*, 79-82; Twinam, *Public Lives, Private Secrets*,
117; Autos and testimonies against Don Pedro de Acevedo, December 6, 1721, SC 58-1-29/19.
Like other members of the St. Augustine parish, blacks also utilized compadrazgo to construct social networks. The choice of godparents usually complemented existing relationships based on personal connections or military service. Sometimes an owner would serve as godfather to the children of his slaves, fulfilling his social responsibility to see to their baptism. Notably, the illegitimate children born to slave women most frequently had only a female godparent, usually a free black woman. It seems many slave women counted upon their connections with members of the free black community.\textsuperscript{34}

In his study of black religious practices in the first Spanish period, Christopher Beats observed that for a twenty-three year period in the late seventeenth century, a small group of non-white slave women served as godparents to white Spanish children. There were eighteen such baptisms between the years 1675 and 1699. These baptisms were all conducted by the same two parish priests, Sebastian Perez de la Cerda and Alonso de Leturiondo.\textsuperscript{35} The women serving as godmothers were slaves of prominent St. Augustine citizens. Catharina, parda slave of Captain Antonio de Argüelles, Margarita, parda slave of Captain Antonio Phelipe de Bustos, and María de la Encarnación, parda slave of the heirs of Don Pablo de Hita Salazar appeared most frequently as sponsors in the baptismal records.\textsuperscript{36} They were always listed as the second godparent. The godfather was always a free Spaniard, usually a soldier or officer. In many cases, Captain Argüelles and Captain de Bustos served as the godfather. This raises a number of

\textsuperscript{34} CPR, Baptisms, 1668-1763.

\textsuperscript{35} Beats, “African Religious Integration in Florida,” 96-100. Perez de la Cerda conducted the baptisms until his death in 1683, when Leturiondo took over.

\textsuperscript{36} Pardo was used consistently by the priests in Florida in place of mulato.
questions regarding the role of these parda women in church life and their relationships with their owners.  

Enslaved and free black women in St. Augustine faced challenges because of both their race and their gender. They struggled to protect themselves and their families in a culture that valued female honor, but made it accessible only to women of Spanish descent. Nevertheless, black women had more opportunities to assert themselves in Spanish society than in the English colonies. Those who lived in St. Augustine could appeal to royal or religious authorities for assistance or protection. When the first runaway slaves from Carolina arrived in 1687, Governor Quiroga y Losada compensated the slaves at the same rate as an Indian laborer until he received official directions from the King regarding their legal status. He easily placed the men alongside the royal slaves and Indians working on the Castillo de San Marcos. Placing the two women (one with an infant) proved more difficult. Initially, one was placed as a house servant with the royal Treasurer Thomas Menéndez Marquez and the other with the governor. Menéndez Marquez paid his slave four reales per day. The royal officials wrote to the King asking whether the women should remain as royal slaves or be sold, since they had little use for the women in construction. Prevailing attitudes toward black women, particularly those focused on their sexuality are evident in the measures the governor felt were necessary to both employ and protect the women.

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37 CPR, Baptisms, 1675-1698. Beats, “African Religious Integration in Florida,” 96-100. Five of the baptisms were performed “in necessity,” but the circumstantial presence of these slave women is at best only a partial explanation. The slave women in question were Juana, slave of accountant don Antonio Menéndez, Catharina, parda slave of Captain Antonio de Arguelles, Margarita, parda slave of Captain Antonio Phelipe de Bustos, Maria Candelaria, black slave of Francisco de Fuentes, Esperansa, black slave of Captain Martin Changary, Maria de la Encarnación, parda slave of don Pablo de Hita Salazar, and Maria Josepha, parda slave of Doña Manuela Horruytiner.

38 Landers, Black Society in Spanish Florida, 137-8; Socolow, Women of Colonial Latin America, 131.

39 “De lo que nos ha sido fuerza el dar cuenta de ello a VM por nuestra parte, para que se sirva de mandarnos si estos negros han de permanecer por su Real cuenta en su servicio acaba la dicha real fábrica para las demás que se
By the end of 1689, Governor Quiroga y Losada had both women in his house, because he could not find anyone who would pay sufficiently for their services. He stated that he kept them in his home, as a sort of recogimiento, in order to avoid further scandal. Apparently, in an attempt to auction them, one soldier bid 100 pesos per day simply to cause a scandal and, as the governor put it, “live depravedly.” Beyond that, the best offer was for two pesos a month, the standard pay for an Indian servant. The term recogimiento has a number of connotations related to female modesty, honor, and enclosure. As an institutional practice, it denoted the collection of women and girls living together in a hospital, convent, or private home, usually under the supervision of nuns or leading female citizen. Enclosure could serve numerous purposes, including protecting a woman’s honor while her husband was gone or isolating fallen women. Since at least one of the slave women were described as married, it seems most likely that the governor was using the term loosely. Recogimiento meant keeping the women under the protection of his household. The woman nursing the child was married to one of the other runaways, Mingo. Why they were not cohabitating is unclear, but the men were likely housed with other royal slaves working on the fortifications. That the governor would refer to slave

ofrecieren o si se han de vender y las dichas negras, por no ser estas necesarias a las fábricas.” Royal Officials to King, March 8, 1689, SD 227B.

40 “Pues hubiese soldado que las pusiera en 100 pesos cada día solo a fin de dar escándalo y vivir estragadamente…” Governor Quiroga y Losada to King, June 8, 1690, SD 227B.

41 The practice was common throughout Spain and Latin America and could include the enclosure of elite girls and women to protect their honor or the enclosure of married women to protect the chastity of their marriage. Likewise, recogimiento was also used to describe the deposit of women seeking divorce in convents in order to secure their honor during this period. It could also be used to describe the enclosure of fallen women, prostitutes, and reformed women. Nancy E. Van Deusen, Between the Sacred and the Worldly: The Institutional and Cultural Practice of Recogimiento in Colonial Lima (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), xii; Asunción Lavrín, Sexuality and Marriage in Colonial Latin America, (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1992), 11.
women in the context of honor and chastity at all indicates the greater recognition that blacks enjoyed in Spanish Florida as compared to Carolina.\textsuperscript{42}

Despite the comparative advantages of life in St. Augustine, slavery remained an essentially exploitative institution, and many slaves attempted to seek temporary or permanent solutions through flight, an action scholars refer to as \textit{marronage}. Although Spanish slaves did choose to flee to the woods or to native towns, they ran a greater risk of being captured and returned than their indigenous counterparts who fled the missions. Indians could follow regional networks of kinship and patronage and flee the exploitation of the mission or the repartimiento entirely. The Spanish, however, held allied native chiefs responsible for returning fugitive blacks who stopped in their villages. There were strict regulations against free or enslaved blacks staying in Indian villages, although it appears that they did so anyway.\textsuperscript{43} Hann documents at least one instance in which slaves were returned. It seems some native chiefs used the return of fugitive slaves as leverage for extracting favors from the Spanish. Spaniards in other parts of the empire attempted to limit the contact between Africans and Indians also, particularly when indigenous contacts increased opportunities for flight. The Spanish also feared that runaway slaves might assist enemy pirates or intruders to penetrate Spanish defenses.\textsuperscript{44} The English in

\textsuperscript{42} In her summary of the documents, Irene Wright suggested that the Governor retained the women “to avoid the scandal he intimated they would cause.” A closer reading, which benefitted from modern technology, suggests that the soldier and his sense of mischief were the real cause of the scandal. Nevertheless, the Governor probably considered it prudent to remove temptation from the soldier’s path. Irene Wright, “Dispatches of Spanish Officials Bearing on the Free Negro Settlement of Gracia Real de Santa Teresa de Mose, Florida,” \textit{Journal of Negro History} 9 (Apr. 1924): 145.

\textsuperscript{43} On Spanish edicts regarding responsibility of chiefs, see Apalache Visitor’s Orders for the Province to Promote Good Government December 12, 1694, Timucua Orders for Good Government December 24, 1694, Guale and Mocama Orders for the Province to Promote Good Government, February 15, 1695, Visitations of Joachín de Florencia and don Juan de Pueyo, 1695, EC 157A.

Carolina also attempted to keep Indian and black populations separate. For example, traders were prohibited from bringing black slaves with them into Indian towns. English authorities asked natives to catch and return escaped slaves.\textsuperscript{45}

It appears that there were never sufficiently large numbers of Spanish slaves in Florida to form an independent community of runaways in the interior.\textsuperscript{46} By the time slaves were being imported in large numbers, the hostility of English and Indian raiders was probably a sufficient deterrent, and as Landers notes, the opportunities in St. Augustine were greater than elsewhere. Some Africans enslaved in Carolina fled to St. Augustine. Others allied themselves with the Yamasee and joined them in their uprising against the English in 1715. When the English finally regained the upper hand, many of the blacks followed the Yamasee into exile in Florida.\textsuperscript{47} Temporary flight, or petit marronage probably also took place, given the complaints about slaves travelling through mission villages, although there is little other documentary evidence. A few slaves and free blacks also resorted to the Spanish practice of seeking immunity from violent retaliation or punishment by fleeing to the church or convent. This was technically a practice reserved for Spaniards, although some blacks did succeed in at least temporarily


\textsuperscript{46} Bergad, \textit{Comparative Histories of Slavery}, 45-6; on maroon communities, see Price, \textit{Maroon Societies}. Runaway Africans did begin to form communities with Native American towns beginning around the time of the American Revolution. Lower Creek towns had begun to move south from Georgia into North Florida. They provided a refuge for slaves fleeing the plantations of British Florida (1763-1783). After the American Revolution, many royalist refugees in the Lower South fled to Florida, which remained a royal colony. Many slaves appear to have taken advantage of the chaos in order to flee their masters. In his attempts to reconcile population movements and coordinate evacuation, Governor Patrick Tonyn calculated that as many as four thousand blacks were missing and had likely fled north and west into Indian country. These Lower Creek and black towns became the Seminole Indians. Riordan, “Finding Freedom in Florida,” 36-9.

\textsuperscript{47} Governor Ybarra to the King, December 26, 1605, SC 54-5-9/64; Bergad, \textit{Comparative Histories of Slavery}, 44-5; Carroll, \textit{Blacks in Colonial Vera Cruz}, 85-7, 91; Landers, \textit{Black Society in Spanish Florida}, 23-8; Riordan, “Finding Freedom in Florida,” 28-9.
avoiding punishment. In the priests and friars they found zealous protectors who were prepared to defend their ecclesiastical authority against that of the governor whenever necessary.\footnote{Governor Quiroga y Losada to the King, August 16, 1689, SC 54-5-12; Autos, Governor Navarrete, November 28, 1750, SC 86-7-21; Bushnell, \textit{Situado and Sabana}, 83; Kapitzke, \textit{Religion, Power, and Politics}, 101-5. For the lengthy legal battle that followed the imprisonment of Juan Méndez, discussed in Chapter Five, see Kapitzke, 112-13. In the same chapter on ecclesiastical asylum, Kapitzke also addresses the case of moreno slave Juan Francisco del Cerro, located in the residencia of don José de Zuñiga y Cerda, 120-22.}

The absence of judicial records or Franciscan archives is particularly unfortunate in this instance because it limits the opportunity to study complaints of abuse from slaves that might lead to flight. The case of Juan Méndez examined in Chapter Four reveals a few details. Single male slaves and servants were apparently locked into a kitchen overnight, controlling their freedom of movement after dark. Moreover, Méndez’s owner demonstrated casual violence toward her slave when she hit him in the head with her iron key ring.\footnote{Confession of Juan Méndez, February 3, 1689, enclosed in Auto of the murder of an Indian, August 16, 1689, SC 54-5-12.} The absence of notarial records for Spanish Florida further limits the study of the contracts and financial instruments between individuals that might shed light on how frequently slaves purchased their own freedom. A few wills and testaments reveal that slaves were often given as gifts or dowries to children. Relations of power were complex and personal, and there are also instances in which owners manumitted their slaves.\footnote{Parker, “Second Century,” 152-5, 208.}

\textbf{Black Floridians, Defense, and Población}

Landers argues that Spanish defensive needs created the opportunities for slaves to obtain freedom during the first Spanish period. She characterizes the policy as \textit{re población}, in the tradition of the Reconquista when the Spanish found it necessary to repopulate the Iberian Peninsula as they slowly won it back from the Moors.\footnote{Landers, \textit{Black Society in Spanish Florida}, 84-5.} Spanish officials approached relations
with free blacks and Carolina fugitives with the same strategic perspective that they had brought to relations with the indigenous population. The examination of slavery above, however, reveals that even the demands of geopolitics had their limits. Although some blacks fought their way to freedom, others still remained property. For them, baptism and military service would be insufficient. Moreover, granting freedom to refugees was not the only way in which Spanish officials sought to utilize the black populations of the southeast to further imperial goals. Spanish authorities in Florida also stole slaves directly from English plantations, proposed sending Carolina fugitives back to the Carolina colonies to incite slave rebellions, and attempted several different schemes for settling the Florida countryside with free blacks who could more than adequately fill the shoes of the soldier-settler.

The most prominent example of Spanish imperial strategy is the policy of offering religious sanctuary to slaves who fled from Carolina and later Georgia. Despite the precedent set by Governor Quiroga y Losada, however, the chances that fugitives from Carolina would find freedom in Florida were mixed.\(^{52}\) During years when the Spanish were formally at war with the English, Carolina blacks had reason to hope that the Spanish would grant them religious sanctuary. They were often placed in the households of prominent citizens in order that they could be adequately supervised while they learned Spanish customs and Catholic doctrine, as in the example set by Quiroga y Losada. They were usually paid the going rate of an Indian servant, but their status as free people or slaves was still ambiguous, despite a royal decree in 1693 declaring their freedom.\(^{53}\) In times of peace when the Spanish wanted to honor the prevailing treaty with England, fugitive slaves were either returned or auctioned for sale to citizens in St.

\(^{52}\) Governor Quiroga y Losada to the King, February 24, 1688, SC 58-1-26.

\(^{53}\) Royal Officials to King, March 8, 1689, SD 227B; Governor Quiroga y Losada to King, June 8, 1690, SD 227B; Royal Cédula, November 7, 1693, SC 58-1-26.
Augustine and the proceeds used to compensate English owners. In other instances, it seems that slaves were given to leading citizens as compensation for money owed them by the royal treasury. Francisco Menéndez became captain of the black slave militia in 1726, and led the efforts of the Carolina blacks to secure an official title to their freedom. The King issued a new decree in 1733 that reaffirmed the freedom of slaves who fled Carolina seeking religious conversion, but stipulated that the slaves should serve four years of indenture first. This did little to advance the freedom of those slaves who had been in St. Augustine for years already.54 Menéndez submitted petitions to Governor Moral y Sánchez and the Auxiliary Bishop in 1735, but these yielded nothing. He submitted another petition in 1737 when the new governor, Manuel de Montiano, took office. Landers notes that the petition came with an endorsement by a Yamassee chief named Jorge. Jorge claimed to have been one of the chiefs who initiated the Yamassee War. He stated that the Yamassee commonly made treaties with the slaves, and some slaves had fought with the Yamassee. They fled with the Indians to Florida, hoping to gain their freedom with the Spanish. According to Jorge, the blacks were instead sold into slavery by a “heathen” Yamassee named “Mad Dog.” Montiano chose to grant unconditional freedom to all those who had been enslaved unjustly. Leading citizens who had acquired these slaves over the years protested, but Montiano declared that they had held the slaves despite royal decrees to the contrary and were not entitled to compensation of any sort. The King approved of Montiano’s bold move and affirmed the freedom of any future fugitives as well.55

Another strategy dating to the 1680s was the formation of a black militia in Florida. The Spanish routinely struggled to adequately man and defend their American territories, as noted in

54 Governor Benavides to King on failure to reach agreement over payment for escaped slaves, Nov 2, 1725, SC 58-1-31/3; Royal Cédula, Oct 29, 1733, SC 58-1-24/258; Landers, Black Society in Spanish Florida, 26-8.

Chapter Two. This was a particularly taxing issue on the Florida frontier where royal officials were almost always in need of more soldiers. Despite the prohibition against it, they had been enrolling criollos out of necessity for years.\(^{56}\) When this practice came to the attention of the King and the Council of the Indies in 1676, they took immediate steps to correct it. The King ordered more Spanish troops to Florida and demanded that the criollos be removed from the roster as soon as the new troops arrived. As was typical of Florida, most of the troops from Spain were diverted to Mexico, Havana, or Santo Domingo before their ships ever reached Florida.\(^{57}\) In 1683, while the debate raged about whether or not criollos could be permitted to serve in the Spanish army, Governor Marquez Cabrera formed a militia unit composed of forty-six free pardo and Moreno soldiers and two officers.\(^{58}\)

Despite the complaints from numerous governors about the mestizo and mulatto troops sent from New Spain, a black militia offered certain advantages.\(^{59}\) Marquez Cabrera was a dedicated officer and believed in the superiority of Spanish troops. Mexican castas would never measure up. Nevertheless, he was also a pragmatist. He was undoubtedly desperate for military manpower given the hostile attacks from English-allied Indians and he likely viewed the black militia in a different light than the regular soldiers. As militiamen, the blacks occupied a station the governor would have likely considered more appropriate to their status.\(^{60}\) Under Marquez

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\(^{56}\) The use of criollos as a stop-gap measure to deal with the insufficient number of Spanish troops was a common problem. Marchena Fernández, *Oficiales y Soldados*, 4-5.

\(^{57}\) Governor Hita Salazar, November 10, 1678, NC 58-1-26/23; Marquez Cabrera’s successor, Quiroga y Losada also lodged complaints: Quiroga y Losada, April 1, 1688, SC 54-5-12/57; Arana, “Military Manpower in Florida, 1670-1703,” 40-2, 44-9.

\(^{58}\) Roster of Black Militia, September 20, 1683, SD 226.

\(^{59}\) Governor Hita Salazar to the King, November 10, 1678, North Carolina Historical Commission (NC), 58-1-26/23; Governor Quiroga y Losada to the King, April 1, 1688, SC 54-5-12/57.

\(^{60}\) Landers notes that black militias were formed for defense as early as the sixteenth century in Havana (1555), Puerto Rico (1557), and Santo Domingo (1583), Landers, *Black Society in Spanish Florida*, 22. On black militias
Cabrera’s leadership, the black militia served with distinction. Not only did they defend the city from a pirate attack, they participated in raids on plantations and settlements in Carolina. They were also active in the frontier conflicts of the early eighteenth century and received royal recognition for their service. Royal recognition of the valor and honor of these militiamen in Florida and elsewhere was significant because it lent them important social capital in a society that valued honor, but did not routinely grant it to people of African descent.

The Spanish also organized a slave militia unit. As noted above, it was partially composed of the male fugitives from Carolina. There were many precedents for arming slaves in the Spanish empire. By the beginning of the eighteenth century, there were even a few precedents for an armed slave militia regularly mobilized for service. Generally, they were established in areas where the need for defense was hobbled by minimal Spanish and criollo populations. This military service may have contributed to the construction of a corporate identity based on African ancestry in St. Augustine, as it did elsewhere. Explicit documentary evidence for such a conclusion, however, is scant. Francisco Menéndez, the captain of the slave
militia, mentioned the loyal service of the slave militia, but emphasized loyalty to the Spanish King and Spanish identity in his petitions. In a society that valued assimilation into Hispanic culture, assertions of African solidarity would not have worked in his favor.\footnote{Memorial of the Fugitives, and Memorial of Chief Jorge, both enclosed in Governor of Florida to the King, March 3, 1738, SC 58-1-31; Paul Lokken, “Angolans in Amatitlán: Sugar, African Migrants, and Gente Ladina in Colonial Guatemala,” in Gudmundson and Wolfe, Blacks and Blackness in Central America, 46.} The presence of a black militia in Florida, however, was perceived as an extreme form of provocation by the English colonists in Carolina.\footnote{Landers, Black Society in Spanish Florida, 33-5. For English accounts of trouble caused by the presence of St. Augustine as a sanctuary for slaves and armed blacks, see Wood, Black Majority, 239-41, 260-63; Mark M. Smith, ed., Stono: Documenting and Interpreting a Southern Slave Revolt (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2005), 3-9.}

Free blacks were also considered as a group to resettle the Florida hinterland. While serving as Interim Governor in 1718, Juan de Ayala y Escobar received a petition from free mulattos and blacks in Havana who were willing to take advantage of the need for settlers. They found out about the concern for the Apalache province and the port at St. Marks and volunteered to relocate to the Apalache province and farm the land. Ayala y Escobar advocated permitting them to settle a village there because they would be useful in defending the port and their surplus crops would be an important source of food for the presidio. He noted that there was so much abandoned land they could also raise cows, horses, and pigs as the Spaniards once had. He also reiterated the argument that if the Spanish resettled the area, many of the Indians would consider it safe to return.\footnote{Governor Ayala y Escobar to the King, Jan 12, 1718, SC 58-1-30/69.} Subsequent surveys of Apalache mention only Indian and not black settlers, suggesting that the scheme was never employed.\footnote{Antonio de Arredondo to Manuel de Montiano, May 28, 1738, SC 87-1-3/49; Governor Montiano to the King, June 4, 1738, SD 865, cited in Worth, Resistance and Destruction, 153.} Since Benavides initiated charges against Ayala y Escobar that same year, it is likely that he never got the chance to initiate the process of
relocating the families. As demonstrated in Chapter Three, Benavides had a distinct preference for Canary Islander settlers, perhaps due to his own Isleño heritage. There were no more organized attempts to settle free blacks in Florida until Montiano’s creation of Fort Mose in 1738.68

As plantations and African slave labor expanded in Carolina, Spanish officials did attempt to harass the English by targeting their slave population. In the years when war between the Spanish and English provided the necessary legal opportunity, the Spanish formed their own raiding parties, usually a combination of Spanish, African, and Indian forces. Governor Marquez Cabrera led a raid on English plantations on Edisto Island in 1686 and stole thirteen slaves from Governor Joseph Morton. In 1727, a Spanish raiding party attacked a plantation on the Edisto River and carried away another seven slaves. The fate of these slaves is impossible to determine from the surviving documentary records, but based on complaints from the English that the stolen slaves were seen in St. Augustine, they seem to have stayed in the city.69 The practice of stealing slaves was meant to insult the English and deprive them of some of their most valuable moveable goods. Whether or not the Carolina fugitives had any say in choosing which plantations to target is unknown. If they had, one could make the argument that the raids gave them the opportunity for retaliation against former masters or perhaps the liberation of friends and family still in slavery. Without such positive evidence, the more likely conclusion is that despite their use of free black militias, the Spanish still viewed African slaves as commodities and spoils of war in the imperial contest for the Southeast. Most likely the slaves became the

68 Testimony and complaints against Interim Governor Ayala y Escobar for illicit trade with the English, September 24 and September 29, 1718, SC 58-2-9/9; Tepaske, Governorship of Spanish Florida, 64-8.

69 Landers, Black Society in Spanish Florida, 27; Wood, Black Majority, 305-7
property of leading citizens who would have been responsible for Hispanicizing and baptizing them.

The Council of the Indies continued to favor the policy of offering sanctuary to slaves fleeing Carolina and in 1731 reviewed a list produced by Captain Don Juan de la Valle of the benefits of this policy for the king. This list reveals the official perspective on the benefits that the fugitive slaves offered to the Florida presidio in the conflict with the English. It also outlines a few of the riskier strategies the Spanish proposed. For example, both Governor Benavides and Governor Montiano also considered inciting slave uprisings in Carolina in order to destabilize the colony and make it easier to dislodge.70

In good form, De la Valle began by observing that all the fugitives requested religious conversion and all those that had arrived since 1718 had been educated in the Catholic faith and baptized. He went on to discuss their valor and perseverance in the defense of the city against the Palmer raid in 1728, noting that some had even died defending the Christian religion and the King of Spain.71 Moreover, the blacks from Carolina were skilled with weapons and they were good leaders. Their constancy and bravery set a good example and inspired the Christian Indians. To return or to compensate the English for these people would lower the Indians’ esteem for the Spanish. This is one of the few comments in the documentary record that speaks directly to the interactions of blacks and Indians in the Spanish military service and suggests that the example

70 Don Joseph Patiño to Consejo de Indias, April 25, 1731, SD 837; Capitán don Juan de la Valle, May 28, 1731 SD 837; Manuel de Montiano to Juan Francisco de Güemes y Horcasitas, January 17, 1740, SC 87-1-3. Although the Spanish never pursued an official policy of inciting revolt, the English believed that several insurrections including the comparatively large-scale Stono Revolt were the product of the Spanish presence in Florida, at least in part because it gave the rebels a destination to which they could escape. Wood, Black Majority, 326.

71 The council went on to describe how Palmer’s men had burned the Nombre de Dios mission and defiled and defaced the statue of the Virgin Mary kept at the chapel in order to drive home the point that these Englishmen were enemies of the faith.
set by black militiamen was not lost on their indigenous counterparts.\textsuperscript{72} Comparisons with the indigenous populations continued. Next, De la Valle stated that the English had about fifteen thousand black slaves who suffered under their cruelty. It would be beneficial if Florida could draw them away from the abusive English as they had the Yamassee in 1715. The Yamassee lived as good Christians around St. Augustine and the blacks slaves could be converted and do the same. Fourth, he argued that the Spanish had no obligation to return the fugitive slaves because Governor Benavides had been trying to retrieve some of their black and Indian prisoners from the English for years with no success.\textsuperscript{73}

The fifth and lengthiest reason presented by De la Valle had nothing to do with the black slaves at all, and everything to do with the threat the English posed to Spanish power in the region. He explained that the English offered their Indian allies fifty pesos, rum, guns, powder, and other goods in exchange for each Spanish head.\textsuperscript{74} He went on to describe the people of Carolina as iniquitous and bent on the destruction of the Florida presidio. They poisoned the minds of the Indians against the Spanish and the Catholic faith. Meanwhile, the English sent their children with the Indians to learn their languages and marry with them in order to advance diplomacy.\textsuperscript{75}

De la Valle’s argument to the council is of interest here because he places the fugitive slaves in the context of the geopolitics of the region. Underneath the language of Catholic zeal

\textsuperscript{72} Report by Governor Montiano, June 4, 1738, SC 58-2-16; Attached deposition of Manuel Sotomayor, July 2, 1738, SC 58-2-16. As Parker has demonstrated, military service was also a means of improving status for Indians in St. Augustine. Parker, “Second Century,” 60, 69; Landers, \textit{Black Society in Spanish Florida}, 27, 36-7.

\textsuperscript{73} Captain don Juan de la Valle, May 28, 1731 SD 837.

\textsuperscript{74} Captain De la Valle uses the term “cabeza” although likely a closer English translation would be scalp. Scalping was not a Mississippian tradition, but appears to have been introduced to the region by the Westos in the mid-seventeenth century. This fits with the theory that the Westos were Iroquoian people had migrated from the Lake Erie area where some groups did traditionally practice scalping. Hall, \textit{Zamumo’s Gifts}, 219.

\textsuperscript{75} Captain don Juan de la Valle, May 28, 1731 SD 837.
and English cruelty are several tactical calculations, as demonstrated in point three. The Yamassee War in 1715 had nearly destroyed the Carolina colony. With fifteen thousand black slaves, a similar uprising against the English would have devastated the English colony and provided the Spanish with a powerful new ally.\textsuperscript{76} This of course assumed that the slaves could be controlled and placated easily. The Council of the Indies expressed doubt that the English had that many slaves or English behavior was so barbarous. It reaffirmed that all the fugitive slaves from Carolina should be granted freedom but declined to endorse more radical measures such as inciting revolts.\textsuperscript{77}

Montiano proposed inciting a slave revolt in 1740 once the War of Jenkins’ Ear had begun. Under his plan, Carolina slaves would be offered freedom and land in Florida in exchange for taking up arms against their English masters. The Governor and Captain General of Cuba, Juan Francisco de Güemes y Horcasitas, approved of the plan. Notes on the document suggest that the Council of the Indies appreciated their enthusiasm, but did not perceive inciting a slave revolt nearby as a feasible or wise course of action. The issue never came to a head because the proposed invasion by Cuban and Floridian forces went badly, and the opportunity to incite rebellion never arose. Montiano’s plan is noteworthy because it offered several solutions to the imperial struggle for territory. Dislodging the English was of course the primary goal. By enticing the black slaves of Carolina to turn on their masters in exchange for freedom and land, Montiano could also solve his problem of población. The freed slaves would occupy the land and cultivate it, thus solving the need for settlers and a base of agricultural production to support the

\textsuperscript{76} “…pues es cierto tienen los ingleses en aquellas inmediaciones bajo su dominio más de quince mil negros ejercitados en todos oficios viviendo violentamente por la crueldad con que los tratan, y de este punto tan importante digno de la mayor atención de SM y justificación… podrá resultar que informados con disimulo los expuestos negros tomen armas contra sus amos y sean causa para asolar y destruir la Carolina…” Capitán don Juan de la Valle, May 28, 1731 SD 837.

\textsuperscript{77} Don Joseph Patiño to Consejo de Indias, April 25, 1731, SD 837.
presidio. Montiano never got the opportunity to carry out his plan, and Mose remained the only black settlement in Florida.\textsuperscript{78}

The history of Fort Mose has been examined in detail, but a few points bear mention. This settlement was in keeping with the idealized models that Benavides and Montiano articulated for Spanish settlers. As Benavides noted in a 1738 letter from Veracruz, the location of the Mose site was excellent. It was adjacent to woods, fertile soil, marsh, and the Intracoastal Waterway, all of which would yield diverse food sources. They would be assisted with food at first, but Spanish authorities expected that the free blacks could farm and raise livestock and sell the surplus to the city. The primary difference was that royal officials were concerned that the free blacks receive an appropriate religious education since many had only recently converted to Catholicism. The site was designed with military defense in mind and contained a walled fort as well as thatched huts. It was located near the San Nicolás trail that went north to the St. Johns River and another trail that went east to Apalache. Montiano anticipated that the freedmen would serve as a defensive outpost. He could expect the men to fight valiantly because for them capture would result only in a return to the slavery they had managed to escape.\textsuperscript{79} Mose was one of the only successful incarnations of the Spanish policy of población in Florida. Its settlers farmed the land and served as a military defensive force. Unfortunately for the residents of Mose, they did not have long to develop their community. The War of Jenkins’ Ear set off a series of attacks and counterattacks which destroyed the settlement.

The Spanish policy of offering sanctuary to English slaves also influenced policy in the newly settled colony of Georgia. From its settlement in 1733 until 1749, slavery was not

\textsuperscript{78} Governor Montiano to Juan Francisco de Güemes y Horcasitas, January 17, 1740, SC 87-1-3; Hoffman, \textit{Florida’s Frontiers}, 193-4; Landers, \textit{Black Society in Spanish Florida}, 34, 38.

\textsuperscript{79} Governor Benavides to the King, April 24, 1738, SC 58-2-16/45; Consejo de Indias, October 2, 1739, SC 58-1-20; Landers, \textit{Black Society in Spanish Florida}, 30-31.
permitted in Georgia. A number of reasons were given for this policy, and proximity to Spanish Florida was one of them. Other arguments were that the charity colonists who settled Georgia could not afford slaves, blacks could not help in the defense of Georgia, and slavery was a bad example for the Georgia colonists who needed to learn the value of industry.\textsuperscript{80} The Spanish considered the settlement of Georgia to be a violation of existing treaties and by 1738 had organized plans to invade.\textsuperscript{81} However, the invasion was cancelled in order to keep Havana fortified, but Governor Güemes y Horcasitas sent a large number of reinforcements to St. Augustine.\textsuperscript{82} The reinforcements were fortuitous. In January 1740 Oglethorpe initiated attacks on Spanish outposts. By June 5 he had besieged St. Augustine. Unable to turn back such a large expeditionary force, the residents of Fort Mose took shelter with the rest of the St. Augustine population inside the Castillo de San Marcos.\textsuperscript{83} Spanish forces were better prepared than in 1702, and carelessness on the part of Oglethorpe’s forces permitted a Spanish counter-attack on Fort Mose. A combined Indian, African, and Spanish force managed to re-take Mose in a long battle that demoralized English forces. English accounts refer to the battle as “Bloody Mose” or “Fatal Mose.” Oglethorpe’s invasion was unsuccessful, and he withdrew in late June when a Spanish warship finally arrived to lift the siege and his own ships abandoned him.\textsuperscript{84}


\textsuperscript{81} Arredondo, \textit{Arredondo’s Historical Proof of Spain’s Title to Georgia}, 225-6; Hoffman, \textit{Florida’s Frontiers}, 190-3.

\textsuperscript{82} Governor Montiano to Marques de Torrenueva, June 12, 1738, SC 87-1-3/51.

\textsuperscript{83} Oglethorpe brought 1,620 men, 7 warships, and 40 small dugouts and easily took an outpost of 57 Spanish soldiers south of the St. Johns River. Tepaske, \textit{Governorship of Spanish Florida}, 141.

\textsuperscript{84} Hoffman, \textit{Florida’s Frontiers}, 192-4; Landers, \textit{Black Society in Spanish Florida}, 36-8.
The free blacks who had built homes at Mose did not return immediately after the invasion. The destruction of the outposts around St. Augustine, including Mose, was complete. Some of the men joined privateering crews, but most stayed in the city where they continued to build connections with the local community. They engaged in numerous dangerous activities including foraging for wood and food, rounding up wild cattle in the spring, tracking escaped prisoners, and patrolling the frontier.\(^85\) In 1752, Governor Fulgencio García de Solís attempted to resettle the free black population of St. Augustine at the Fort Mose site. He was surprised by the stubbornness with which the free blacks in town resisted his efforts and finally resorted to physical punishment. Landers suggests that the increasing presence of bozales among Carolina fugitives and their limited grasp of Spanish language and Christian doctrine may have concerned the governor as well. Resettling the newly freed slaves at Mose fulfilled his duty, but also kept them at some distance from the city. To speed their resettlement, the governor paid them daily wages to construct new buildings and fortifications and appointed a Spanish cavalry detachment to the area to increase security in the area. Solís treated the settlement like an Indian doctrina and put the religious life of the free blacks under the care of Franciscan missionaries. One dedicated Franciscan, Andrés de Vilches, even established a school there. For both Montiano and Solís, then, Fort Mose was a strategic use of what was otherwise a problematic population. For the free blacks and slaves who fought in the militia, however, the prestige of armed service as well as the property they acquired as homesteaders at Mose was an important accomplishment.\(^86\)


\(^{86}\) Governor Solís to the King, November 29, 1752, SC 58-1-31.
Conclusions

Imperial policies influenced race relations in St. Augustine in a number of ways. Slaves and free blacks in Florida learned that they could utilize the language of Christian vassalage to improve their social standing. Individuals such as Francisco Menéndez cited his valor, dedication, and personal impoverishment in the defense of Spanish territories in his petition for compensation. For most of the first Spanish period, however, Spanish officials could also declare blacks to be property, salable commodities used to settle the crown’s debts. María Elena Martínez argues that for the Spanish, voluntarism carried substantial weight in Spanish thought. Although black slaves could be understood as vassals in Spanish thought, their incorporation as slaves complicated that identity since their presence in Spanish territories and conversion to Catholicism was involuntary. Thus, those who had been forcibly integrated into Spanish society were not understood to participate in the contractual relationship between king and vassals. Martínez acknowledges that this concept is problematic when extended to the Indian population. Indians who accepted conversion were considered free vassals of the King, although the Spanish did not always treat them as such. Nevertheless, it offers insight into the variety of experiences in Spanish Florida. Those slaves who fled Carolina in search of baptism and promised to defend the Catholic faith and the Spanish king demonstrated their voluntary desire to associate with the Spanish. Although they still had to petition multiple royal and ecclesiastical authorities to overcome the legacy of slavery and attain their freedom, they were able to utilize the language of

87 Francisco Menéndez to the King, December 10, 1740, SC 87-3-12. Blacks elsewhere in Spanish America also capitalized on the concept of Christian vassalage. María Elena Martínez, “The Black Blood of New Spain: Limpieza de Sangre, Racial Violence, and Gendered Power in Early Mexico,” William and Mary Quarterly 61 no. 3 (2004): 488-90; Bennett, Africans in Colonial Mexico, 4-6, 32-3, 47-8. Bennett advocates rather strongly for this point, arguing on pages 32-3 that “Obligations as vassals and Christians predominated over status as a slave, especially in urban areas where institutional power concentrated.” He recognizes the conflict between slave identity as vassal and property, but contends that vassalage was a functional avenue toward access to greater rights. Martínez suggests that he underestimates the legacy of slavery and its influence on opportunities for blacks. The enslavement of Carolina fugitives in Florida despite royal decrees promising freedom would tend to support Martínez’s criticism.
Christian vassalage as did members of the indigenous population. Spanish slaves had to pursue other avenues to freedom such as coartación or in some cases extraordinary military service.\textsuperscript{88}

The Spanish approached their dealings with free and enslaved blacks with the same strategic mindset as they did other groups. Blacks in the southeast were both vassals and pawns in the imperial battle over territory. As Captain de la Valle’s letter indicates, the Spanish even came to see the slaves of Carolina as a population they might manipulate in order to recreate the devastation of the Yamassee uprising. The creation of Fort Mose was not just an expedient solution. It was built on the ideas and plan of previous governors and officials who hoped to repopulate the Florida countryside with soldier-settlers. As part of this larger framework it stands out as one of the more successful attempts at building a new community, though it too was destroyed by the violence of the Florida frontier.

\textsuperscript{88} Martínez, “The Black Blood of New Spain,” 490-4.
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CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSION

As part of his plans for colonization, Pedro Menéndez de Avilés brought Jesuit missionaries to La Florida in 1567. By 1570, they had built missions as far north as present-day Virginia, on the Chesapeake Bay. The Virginia missions survived only a few years, however, before the Jesuit missionaries were martyred. When English settlers arrived to build the colony of Jamestown in 1607, they were likely aware of the previous Spanish presence in the region, though perhaps not the extent of their influence.  

Among the flora discovered in the area was an unfamiliar rose which colonists assumed was native to the region. Botanist John Gerard entered it in his compendium of plants written in 1597 and then edited and re-published in 1633.  

Today the flower is known as the Cherokee rose and was adopted in 1916 as the state flower of Georgia. The name Cherokee rose dates from the nineteenth century when it became part of Cherokee lore and associated with the process of Cherokee removal. The flower, *rosa laevigata*, is actually a flowering vine native to Asia and is known elsewhere as the Chinese climbing rose.  

How the rose arrived in North America is unclear, but the plant may have been known to the

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Spanish and introduced to Virginia by the Jesuit priests or other Spaniards. Moreover, the early explorers and would-be conquistadors of Florida attempted to introduce useful plants, when possible. Since roses were used extensively for medicinal purposes, they might have been among those transplanted in the sixteenth century.5

The story of the Cherokee rose is instructive for scholars of the southeastern United States as a reminder that this region was also once the northern frontier of a vast Spanish empire. Over the centuries, the vine naturalized to the region and flourished in stately gardens as well as abandoned properties and trails. It serves as a living reminder of the settlements of generations past and the extent to which the landscape and peoples of the region have changed over time. Over the course of the colonial era, European and indigenous nations competed for dominion over the eastern seaboard and the Gulf Coast of North America. Nineteenth-century Cherokee society and the eponymous flowering vine were both the product of the processes of colonial expansion and conflict in the region. By the time of the Cherokee removal in 1838, European, Indian, and African migration throughout the region altered the politics and complexion of the region many times over.7

Florida was a region of interest to English, French, and Spanish empires because of its vital location at the edge of the Caribbean and North America. Although specific motives for


6 Hoffman, _A New Andalucia and a Way to the Orient_, 51; Donna Ruhl, “Oranges and Wheat,” 36-45; Eugene Lyon, “Richer Than We Thought: The Material Culture of Sixteenth-Century St. Augustine,” _El Escribano_ 29 (1992): 92. Some scholars challenge this hypothesis on the basis that the Spanish were not successful in their efforts to introduce plants to Florida. As discussed above, Spanish success was mixed. According to a list of medicines shipped to Florida in 1578 were half an arroba of rose water, 1 pint of rose vinegar, 4 pounds of rose oil, 10 pounds of rose sugar, and 6 pounds of rose unguent.

controlling Florida changed over time, the protection of commerce and shipping were always priorities. Although Florida was not a geographic or economic center, it guarded the Gulf Stream, a vital route for Spanish maritime traffic. In the sixteenth century King Philip II of Spain worried about the possibility of French settlement in Florida because it would threaten Spanish shipping. The French, however, were attempting to settle Brazil as well. Had they succeeded in controlling both territories, they could have flanked Spanish shipping to the north as well as the south. King Philip saw Florida not as a lonely outpost but as a strategic part of a complex system of territories and trade routes. 8

Florida, however, was connected to more than just the Spanish empire. It was a crossroad of empires. By the middle of the eighteenth century it was located at the geographic center of the English empire and visited by English ships from New York, Charleston, Savannah, Jamaica, and Barbados. Legal and contraband trade flourished. One of the most interesting paradoxes of the region was the volume of trade that persisted despite imperial competition for territory and conflicting racial policies and ideologies. 9 Many colonists travelling to or from other colonies ended up in Florida as well. Some, such as the English preacher Jonathan Dickinson, arrived by accident when his ship was wrecked off the Florida coast. Others, such as the German Catholic Bernardo Cush, came voluntarily seeking to raise his family in a Catholic colony and gain access to fertile farmland. By 1763, in addition to individuals of African and Native American heritage, St. Augustine had a small but vibrant community of foreign-born residents from Germany,

8 Hoffman, A New Andalucía and a Way to the Orient, 126.

Switzerland, France, England, Flanders, and Italy.\textsuperscript{10} Florida was not merely an open frontier where Europeans and Native Americans met. It was a crossroad where multiple European and indigenous societies collided. These societies each functioned according to their own culture, laws, and logic. The study of Spanish Florida offers an opportunity to examine how the collision of these varying imperial ideologies influenced the lives of those who occupied the frontier.

As the balance of power shifted in the region, the areas of geographic importance shifted and expanded as well. The Florida coast bordering the Gulf of Mexico grew in importance as French and English colonial projects developed. The Gulf Coast offered access to maritime transportation for the French settlements of Louisiana as well as the English colonial frontier expanding to the west. By the 1720s, the English no longer worried that the Spanish would succeed in reclaiming old territory. Instead, the prevailing fear was that an alliance between the Spanish and the French might permit the French to use Florida as a base for their own projects, thus cutting the English colonies off from the Gulf Coast and the Mississippi, and effectively suffocating further expansion.\textsuperscript{11} At the end of the Seven Years War in 1763, the Spanish chose to cede Florida to the English in exchange for the return of Havana. The English had finally obtained Florida and all its strategic opportunities. For them, control of Florida would reduce the Spanish threat to nearby English colonies such as Georgia and provide a useful base for privateering and commerce. In this same shuffle of colonies, the Spanish took control of Louisiana from the French. Regaining Florida in 1783 at the conclusion of the American

\textsuperscript{10} Governor Solís to the King March 30, 1754 and June 14, 1754, SC 86-5-21; Eligio de la Puente Report, January 22, 1764, SD 2528, photostat, St. Augustine Historical Society MC 63, box 4, file 34; 1770 photostat of Eligio de Puente list, SC 87-1-5, MC 63, box 4, file 34; Amy Bushnell, “Escape of the Nicaeleers: European-Indian Relations on the Wild Coast of Florida in 1696, from Jonathan Dickinson’s Journal,” in Brown, Coastal Encounters, 31-2.

\textsuperscript{11} Crane, The Southern Frontier, 222-3, 227.
Revolution gave the Spanish control of almost the entire coastline bordering the Gulf of Mexico. ¹²

Florida’s significance to the Spanish empire was strategic rather than economic, and patterns of Spanish immigration to the colony reflected that priority. Individual soldiers posted in the city often made the best of their situation and took the opportunity to marry and build a life where even a poor soldier had access to some status, by virtue of his share of the situado and perhaps his peninsular heritage. Not all married, and not all did well. Enough prospered, however, to suggest that all Florida needed was well-supplied Spanish settlers in large enough quantities to build a thriving colonial interior. Arguably, the process was already underway by the late seventeenth century with the ranches in the interior, and might have continued if not for the disruption of Moore’s raids. By the end of the first Spanish period, leading families had carved up and claimed all the land between St. Augustine and the St. Johns River, roughly twelve hundred square miles, and another eight hundred square miles west of the river to present-day Alachua County. The extent to which these families actually altered the landscape is difficult to determine, but at its peak, the La Chua ranch had about one thousand head of cattle. ¹³ St. Augustine’s population was composed of elite families that took pride in their Spanish heritage and descent from the early explorers and conquistadors of Florida. ¹⁴ Criollos and perhaps some mestizos filled out the ranks of Hispanic society. St. Augustine also developed a vibrant plebeian society composed of Indians, ladinos, blacks, and people of mixed descent. The diversity of

¹² Hoffman, Florida’s Frontiers, 208-9, 234-5. In the 1780s, the Spanish government found itself in a boundary dispute with the United States and the Creek Confederation over land between the Apalachicola and Mississippi Rivers.

¹³ Miller, An Environmental History of Northeast Florida, 122-4. The La Chua ranch was situated on Payne’s Prairie in Alachua County. Some of the original breed of Castilian longhorn cows still roams the protected areas of the prairie.

¹⁴ Governor Navarrete to the King, July 30, 1750, SC 87-3-13. Presumably these included the Ponce de León and Menéndez Marquez families.
society in the seventeenth century is vital to recognize because it set the precedents upon which eighteenth century life, with its increased presence of urban-dwelling Indians and Africans, was built.

Despite the urban growth in the mid-eighteenth century, the Florida countryside remained under-populated. In the face of hostile native chiefdoms and European encroachment, the Spanish were forced to recognize that their only hope of maintain control of the region was through effective population. The correspondence on this topic reveals that over a century of conflict, Spanish officials developed a number of settlement plans, designed to suit the geopolitical needs of the moment. They also built upon and expanded the ideas of their predecessors. Through the articulation of these plans and the example of successful individuals in St. Augustine, they formed definite ideas about the ideal soldier-settler: a Spanish Catholic peasant and vassal, capable of agricultural production and militia service, content to coax abundance from a modest piece of land on an often violent frontier. This perspective reveals the extent to which even peninsulares without substance or wealth might also be treated as pawns in imperial conflict. Even these pawns could make choices though, and most chose safer and more appealing destinations than Florida. They conducted their own evaluations of risk and return, and opted for settlements in Santo Domingo, Cuba, or Venezuela where the opportunities for prosperity were greater. In the absence of Spaniards, royal officials considered Native Americans and people of African descent as potential pobladores. The soldier-settler ideal applied to these groups as well, although the Spanish officials had their doubts about these groups, the extent and sincerity of their faith, and their ability to conform to Hispanic customs.

Authorities in Florida were unable to import Spanish settlers to occupy the frontier, but the need for pobladores remained. While they survived, the Spanish missions served as a form of
symbolic población, and Native Americans readily capitalized on the language of Christian vassalage to further their own objectives. Other Indians left mission life altogether in favor of work on ranches or in the city of St. Augustine. In the seventeenth century, Indians, blacks, and people of mixed descent composed the urban laboring classes in St. Augustine. They lived together, worked together, and served in the militia together. In the eighteenth century, the urban population of Indian and African-descended peoples expanded. These new arrivals were incorporated into the city along much the same lines as previous generations, although their sheer volume led royal officials and clergy to attempt to exert greater control and regulation of these populations. Attempts at control took a number of forms such as the decision to maintain a separate record of sacraments performed for non-whites; Franciscan attempts to maintain jurisdiction over all Native American people; the relocation of free blacks to a satellite settlement outside St. Augustine; and the attempt to better document and control the introduction of unacculturated bozal slaves into the colony, especially as their numbers swelled. Despite their concerns, many Spanish officials were also prepared to utilize these groups for the purposes of población. In doing so, they built upon methods that had been tried and tested in the Reconquista and generations of colonization in the Americas. Most of these plans failed in Florida for the same reasons as those mentioned above. The Spanish lacked the financial and military resources to adequately support and defend frontier settlements and royal officials in Madrid and New Spain were generally unwilling to release the funds to make necessary improvements. The shortage of settlers willing and able to initiate extensive colonization also limited development.

In 1740, Don Juan de Castillo proposed a solution to the need for pobladores in Florida that was as elegant as it was traditional. Florida was best populated not at the expense of the crown but through the work of adelantados, leaders such as Menéndez, who would finance the
construction of new settlements in exchange for the privileges of rank and status. Castillo suggested that the king offer titles of nobility and grants of land to anyone who would finance the transport and settlement of pobladores for Florida.\textsuperscript{15} The plan was never carried out, probably because the War of Jenkins’ Ear intervened, making maritime transport of any sort a risky business. The plan was mentioned again in a 1756 report by Don Pedro Sánchez Griñán to Don Julian de Arriaga y Rivera, the new secretary of State for the Navy and the Indies. Griñán repeated Castillo’s plan and commented that it had the support of many in the city.\textsuperscript{16} Had Castillo’s plan proceeded in 1740, the history of Florida might have developed differently. Nevertheless, the Spanish struggle to hold on to Florida is instructive for modern scholars. The absence of settlers and the marginality of Florida led generations of authorities to articulate their hopes and expectations for pobladores. It also caused them to demonstrate, through words and actions, the flexibility and constructed nature of racial categories and the privileges of traditional, yet still powerful, identities of Christian, vassal, and poblador.

\textsuperscript{15} Don Juan de Castillo to the King, January 6, 1740, SC 86-7-21.

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Diana Reigelsperger was born in Central Florida, and is a first generation native to the state. She received her Bachelor of Arts degree from Flagler College in 2007. Living in St. Augustine as an undergraduate gave her a keen interest in the colonial history of the region. She received her Master of Arts in history from the University of Florida in 2009. She will graduate in 2013 from the University of Florida with a Ph.D. in history and a graduate certificate in Latin American studies.