RE-ENVISIONING GERMANY’S MAPPED SPACE:
(RE)CONSTRUCTING NATIONAL IDENTITY, 1945-1961

By

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A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA

2013

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To Lindsey
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

A great number of people were critical to the completion of this project. In fact, had it not been for particular individuals, I doubt that I could have withstood a great deal of the institutional nonsense that passes for ‘administration’ in American academia today. I am, however, obligated to say kind things about ‘the hand that feeds’ and so I admit it: the University of Florida subsidized my ability to eat, rent an apartment, and do very little else.

There have been other, more reasonable sources of financial support for my research. The UF History Department provided me with a dissertation research grant which helped launch me across the Atlantic and into the German archives. The Leibnitz-Institut für Länderkunde in Leipzig was also kind enough to help fund my trip abroad and provide me access to their wonderful library and archive. Ute Wardenga, Norman Henniges, and Bruno Schelhaas were particularly helpful and enthusiastic about my project. I hope that this dissertation does not disappoint them. The American Geographical Society Library awarded me the Helen and John S. Best Research Fellowship which allowed me to visit its archive in Milwaukee (where I ended meeting two of the finest geographical minds I have ever had the pleasure of encountering: those of Geoffrey Martin and Norman Stewart). These trips, along with quick jaunts to the National Archives & Records Administration in Washington, D.C., and to the University of Nebraska’s map collection in Lincoln, provided the foundational research upon which this entire project rests. Any bits I got right throughout the following pages, I owe to the incredible individuals who staff such institutions. Omissions and errors are mine alone.
The individuals most integral to the design and content of this dissertation have been my Committee members. My advisor, Geoffrey Giles, provided excellent guidance to this project, demanding from me both academic rigor and a level of intellectual deference that has never been natural to me. In this same way, Peter Bergmann (who advised my Master’s Thesis) served as a constant reminder of what historians should be: patient, thorough, thoughtful, and kind. Sheryl Kroen forced me to constantly re-learn how to write (and, often, how to think) while providing me with invaluable source material. Alice Freifeld changed the way I ask questions about postwar Europe, and for that I will always be grateful. I hope that this dissertation reflects the generosity and intelligence this Committee, nearly by default, put at my disposal.

I would not have made it this far without the emotional release of friendship. My colleagues in the history department were particularly supportive and helpful. Lisa Booth, Jen Lyon, Johanna Mellis, Rachel Rothstein, Elana Thurston-Milgram, and Wesley White have been great friends and intellectual allies. Greg Mason, in particular, has been one of my most constant sources of support. I could not have asked for a more competent, reliable, and challenging person with which to share an advisor. This dissertation would not exist without inspiring teachers and scholars like Tammy Bowman, Norman Goda, Louis Mancha, John Moser, and William Vaughan. My studies would have never gone in such interesting directions without the influences of Wesley Beal, Jordan Dominy, Paige Fowler, Yen Loh, Regina Martin, Mike Mayne, Emily McCann, Patrick McHenry, and Christina Van Houten. Moreover, I am grateful to Bobby Bond, Johannes Eichholz, Kathleen Hartman, Michael Hartman, Jeff Hoskins,
Rich Ottens, and Aaron Spector for their ability to make me, at times, completely forget about this dissertation.

I am most indebted to my partner, Lindsey. Her support (emotional and financial) for this project never wavered, but it has been nice to spend so much time with someone who so easily maintains a healthy skepticism towards academic work. While working on this project, she has (unwittingly) been a constant source of inspiration, my most ferocious friend, and my most important influence. It is to her that I dedicate this dissertation; she is (and will always be) my favorite audience.
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Abstract of Dissertation Presented to the Graduate School of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

RE-ENVISIONING GERMANY’S MAPPED SPACE:
(RE)CONSTRUCTING NATIONAL IDENTITY, 1945-1961

By

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August 2013

Chair: Geoffrey Giles
Cochair: Peter Bergmann
Major: History

This dissertation proposes a history about maps, the interests behind their (re)production, and the consequences they generate. Particularly, this is a story about one of the largest mapmaking and map dissemination projects in the history of the world – a moment which literally re-defined Germany and emphasized the value of cartography to the governments, corporations, and people operating within its borders (and sometimes, problematically, on them). From the Second World War to the erection of the Berlin Wall in 1961, this project tracks the development of geospatial thought and its various influences in Germany. A nation-state once so reliant on expansionist spatial policy was, after its defeat in the Second World War, forced to denazify its understanding of maps, cartography, and geography. The individuals and institutions involved in that (re)construction of German identity are explored here, with particular interest given to Emil Meynen and the Abteilung für Landeskunde. The history of Germany’s territorial development from 1945-1961 undermines both the perceived objectivity of mapped space, and the nationalist narratives built from within (or along the borders of) state and corporate cartographies. It encourages the investigation of space
as a category of historical study, and makes clear the need for a deeper exploration of the realities constructed by the manipulation of that space.
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Soon enough we have forgotten [the map] is a picture someone has arranged for us (chopped and manipulated, selected and coded). Soon enough . . . it is the world, it is real, it is . . . reality.

—Denis Wood, The Power of Maps

This dissertation seeks to provoke a new discussion regarding the very old question of Germany’s geography. Located in the sometimes contentious center of the European continent, German territory has regularly served as a primary tool through which to understand and study Germany’s economic, cultural, and political development. Many German geographers throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (as will be discussed at length in the next chapter) became deeply invested in geopolitical determinism, the idea that a nation’s territorial holdings (or losses) dictated every other aspect of its existence.¹ In part, this dissertation agrees with that view: cartographic expressions of national territory, real or imagined, heavily influence cultural and national identity.

Appealing to the importance of a nation’s place on the map, though, need not suggest that all claims of geographic influence and determinism are equal. During the Historikerstreit of the 1980s, right-wing revisionist historians in Germany attempted to soften the image of the Third Reich by approaching totalitarian regimes comparatively. Michael Stürmer, one of the controversy’s central participants, wrote in his book Das ruhelose Reich: Deutschland, 1866-1918 (or, The Restless Empire: Germany, 1866-1918) that geography played a prominent role in developing Germany’s aggressive

¹ David T. Murphy. “A Sum of the Most Wonderful Things: ‘Raum,’ Geopolitics and the German Tradition of Environmental Determinism, 1900-1933” in History of European Ideas, Vol. 25, No. 5 (September 1999), pp. 121-133.
foreign policy. According to Stürmer, Germany’s central position in Europe exposed it to an environment entirely unlike that of other Western European states. His argument is explicitly one of German geographic uniqueness – a geographic Sonderweg which explains (if not excuses) the atrocities of the Third Reich. Stuck between France and Russia, democracy in Germany was doomed to be little more than inevitably problematic. Surrounded by hostile ‘others’, the existence of the German state required the installation of authoritarian government.

Stürmer’s argument denies many historical realities, is too obviously informed by his nationalist brand of political ideology (one so entrenched that he was tapped as an advisor to German Chancellor Helmut Kohl), and has been (rightly) criticized by leading scholars both inside and outside of Germany. Stürmer's critics, however, have been too quick to dismiss all potential forms of a “new geopolitical Sonderweg thesis.” It is easy to claim, as the British historian Richard Evans does, that “history is made not by geopolitics but by people.” People are, though, integral to the construction and production of the mapped spaces upon which geopolitical narratives depend. Maps are


3 Hans-Jürgen Puhle. “Die neue Ruhelosigkeit: Michael Stürmers nationalpolitischer Revisionismus” in *Geschichte und Gesellschaft*, Vol. 13, No. 3 (July 1987), pp. 382-399. It should come as no surprise to those familiar with the Historikerstreit that this publication – in my view, one of the most scathing criticisms of Stürmer’s academic work – comes in an edition of the Bielefeld School’s journal. Bielefeld historians, committed to the new social history of the 1950s and 1960s, had little patience for nationalist renditions of their nation’s past (a practice too similar, they believed, to the type of historical approach promoted by Nazism).


6 Richard J. Evans, 785.
the primary way through which national territory is codified and disseminated. While every nation-state has its own unique spatial development, – the story of how it fought (or is fighting) its place into our collective cartographic dogma – Germany’s geographic Sonderweg after the Second World War is particularly alluring. Fraught with spatial ideology associated with Nazi expansionism – Lebensraum and Geopolitik – German geographers were denazified and then forced to re-map an already established cartography of their nation-state under the supervision of the Allied occupation. This re-mapping was an explicit attempt to re-produce a new national identity through the disciplines of geography and cartography, an exercise – especially regarding the immediate post-World War II years – that today’s German historians and geographers have avoided investigating. This is understandable: criticizing the Allied Powers’ postwar efforts to truncate the territory of Germany could be construed as an attempt to avoid responsibility for the outcome of the Second World War. While German scholars have worked hard, particularly since the 1990s, to account for the relationship between German geographers and the Nazi leadership of the Third Reich, it does not seem as though Germans have the same responsibility to account for the relationship between those geographers and the Allied occupation authorities. Even in 2013, sixty-eight years after the end of World War II, Germany’s national (and appropriate) insistence on its responsibility for that conflict and for the Holocaust keeps most German academics sympathetic to the initial Allied occupation of their country. While understandable, this is not good history. Obviously, as an occupational force the Allied powers had a vested interest in controlling the reconstruction and re-mapping of German space. From the earliest days of the Second World War, the creation and maintenance of a carefully
plotted German spatial identity was a priority for the Allied military and, throughout the postwar era, became a serious point of contention and collaboration between the Germans and their Allied occupiers. This problematic relationship deserves study, not simple admiration.

This dissertation proposes a history about maps, the interests behind their (re)production, and the consequences they generate. Particularly, this is a story about one of the largest mapmaking and map dissemination projects in the history of the world – a moment which literally re-defined Germany and emphasized the value of cartography to the governments, corporations, and people operating within its borders (and sometimes, problematically, on them). It should come as no surprise that this moment occurs alongside and immediately after the Second World War, one of the largest conflicts in history (both geographically and militarily). As John K. Wright, the International Geographical Union President on the Committee of Cartography, so astutely observed in 1949, “modern war is the most powerful of all stimulants to human mobility.”

Wright might have also mentioned that those forces most heavily invested in modern war were also those most interested in the subsequent stimulation of that mobility. The nation-state with the greatest interest in all postwar German cartographic projects (besides Germany itself) was the United States, the most powerful military and economic force involved in the German occupation. Yet the beginning of the Second World War caught the American military spatially off guard. With practically no maps to guide the massive conflict they had committed to, the United States became obsessed

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with standardizing and centralizing its mapmaking efforts. The consequences of this prioritization were two incredibly well-funded and highly respected military mapping agencies: the Army Map Service and the Office of Strategic Service Map Division. Together, they would collect, analyze, and produce maps of the various world regions in which the United States was militarily involved on a scale never before realized. Whereas the United States had produced roughly 9,000,000 maps during the First World War (few, if any, of which were ever catalogued or stored by the government after the end of the conflict), they would produce over 500,000,000 maps between 1941 and 1945.⁸

But it was not simply the Second World War itself which spurred the production of maps. The postwar period, in which the American military (alongside the French, British, and Soviet forces) demanded the re-territorialization of a defeated Germany, prompted the difficult process of drafting, interpreting, and publicly explaining a very consciously constructed cartographic narrative. The most obvious and useful mapmakers of these new cartographic propositions were German geographers themselves. Furthermore, freshly proposed projections of this newly oriented Germany needed to be disseminated to the rest of the world. By utilizing German geographers (many of whom had worked for the German military during the Third Reich), the American military government developed a strategy of map collection and dissemination meant to serve as insurance against ever being caught with their cartographic pants

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down again. Governments, however, were not the only agents of map dissemination after World War II. The rise of international public relations firms in the early twentieth century provided a unique outlet through which to effectively convince the world and its nation-states of Germany’s new boundaries. Coupled together, the efforts of the American military, the German geographers they employed, the postwar German government(s), and the PR firms they hired all attempted to impose a purposeful and carefully prepared cartographic narrative tailored to perpetuate a cultural occupation of spatial perception.

As much as this is a story of American history, it is just as much a story of an active and continuously self-mapping Germany, a nation-state and culture with a long and influential cartographic history. While the occupation forces of several powerful nation-states used maps to exploit colonial holdings and previously “unexplored” regions, Germany had been one of the most technologically advanced states to consistently contribute to the creation of the cartographic and geographic disciplines. Its mapmakers, government land surveyors, and academic cartographers/geographers are all vitally important to this study if we are to understand how a nation-state is authoritatively and (for the most part) unquestionably re-drawn. Moreover, it is only through a study of postwar Germany that we can begin to see the cultural effects that radical cartographic change at a level never before attempted can have on individuals who suddenly do not know (in the abstract sense) where they are, but have long been taught to defer to the authority of the map. By evaluating the spatial relationships of governments, universities, private corporations, and other institutions, this project hopes to emphasize the importance of understanding history in spatial terms and persuade
historians of all stripes to recognize not only the constant spatial narratives within which they operate, but also those narratives (both past and present) within which their histories take shape.

**Orientation**

Knowledge is a product of a wrestling not only with the ‘facts’ but with one’s self.

—Hayden White, *Metahistory*

History, like mapmaking, is a subjective experience rooted in ontological orientation. To undertake a deconstructive study of maps without briefly admitting my own bearings would be, at the very least, disingenuous. When I was thirteen years old, I saw a man pluck a chicken clean in fifty-eight seconds. He achieved this feat during the creatively named “Farm Festival”, an annual celebration of tractor pulls, rail-spike driving, and livestock slaughter held each summer by the small Ohio town in which I grew up. I was shocked not only by the speed of this man’s movement, but by the subsequent pile of pink flesh left behind – a strange transformation from the feathered bird of yester-minute. Chickens, I learned that day, do not look like chickens after being de-feathered. Moreover, the pale and smooth body of the plucked chicken looked to me to be distinguishable from other lumps of meat only by size and weight. That stripped

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9 Apparently, this was a relatively slow speed. The Guinness Book of World Records claims that four women from Masaryktown, Florida plucked three chickens apiece with an average time of two minutes and ten seconds in 1970 (Dick West. “The Lighter Side” in The Bryan Times (4 November 1975), 4). Even more astonishing (and perhaps unbelievable?) was Wisconsinite Ernest Hausen’s 4.4 second chicken pluck in 1939 ( “Flying Feathers” in Weekly World News (16 April 1985), 26).

10 I am completely aware that personal anecdotes are largely frowned upon in academic exercises. However, many of my favorite histories and historians (feminist historians in particular, like Catherine Hall, Kathleen Canning, and Natalie Zemon Davis) have briefly used their own subjective experiences (real or imagined) to more honestly approach the past. I attempt to emulate that here.
chicken was no longer a chicken, as I understood that animal to be. It had become something else, something so torn apart that it seemed foreign and unidentifiable.

In recent years, some historians have undertaken projects which (like an amateur chicken plucker) focus far too much on simple deconstruction. Often without the slightest sigh of apprehension, these scholars work to obliterate even the most beautifully and carefully crafted narratives of the past.\textsuperscript{11} It is important that this concern regarding hyper-criticism not be misunderstood: the triumphant narrative, objectivism, and nationalist renditions of an idyllic past are, indeed, vulgar oversimplifications that exploit the historical discipline to frame dogmatic socio-political ideologies unable to stand on their own merits. The German historian Hanna Schissler has argued that it is “the thankless task of historians to deconstruct what once seemed miraculous.”\textsuperscript{12} But deconstruction is no longer “thankless”, especially in academia; it is (and should be) expected. The real trick now – the (relatively) new problem facing historians – is how to utilize that deconstructive impulse to further some useful end while still approaching the past with a critical eye.

Several historians have addressed this issue. The most successful among them have recognized the importance of maintaining a tension between universal historical narratives, and the fragmentary and subjective experiences of the people living within the past those narratives hope to recreate. The “literary turn” and the ascendance of

\textsuperscript{11} I am not the only person concerned about the hyper-criticism of academia (not to mention the hyper-critical training of graduate students in the humanities). See Chris Lorenz. “Comparative Historiography: Problems and Perspectives” in \textit{History & Theory}, Vol. 38, No. 1 (February 1999), pp. 25-40.

post-structuralist theory in the late twentieth century prompted the historical studies of, among others, Hayden White. For White, history’s only genuine form is narrative, and the past is always more told than it is found. 

In his *Metahistory*, he lauds thinkers like Karl Marx and Friedrich Nietzsche for their attempts to bring “the nature of objectivity itself . . . under question.” “Proper” historians (exemplified, for White, in the positivism of Leopold von Ranke, the “father” of modern history) pretend to discover something that they, in fact, create through “a particular combination of modes of emplotment, argument, and ideological implication.” For White, then, the historian who claims a modicum of objectivity is being disingenuous. This dilemma was identified by H. Stuart Hughes a decade earlier, when he wrote that the historian “alone is both wedded to empirical reality and condemned to view his subject matter at second remove.” Earlier still was E.H. Carr’s definition of history as “a continuous process of interaction between the historian and his facts, an unending dialogue between the present and the past.” White’s reading of history, however, nullifies any lunges toward empiricism; all that remains is the ability to stare from a position of second remove. Dialogue exists, but the


14 White, 280.

15 White, 29.

16 H. Stuart Hughes. *History as Art and as Science: Twin Vistas on the Past* (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), 5. It was for this reason that Hughes saw in his students (even in the 1960s!) an acknowledgement that “Hitler today is scarcely more real than Attila the Hun.” (page 89).

evidentiary referent is an illusion: the historian only ever interacts with a past he himself (or she herself) creates.

White’s radicalism (understandably) provoked – and continues to provoke – a great deal of response. Perhaps the most influential of these responses has been *Telling the Truth about History* by Joyce Appleby, Lynn Hunt, and Margaret Jacobs. Appleby et al. criticize White’s position (indirectly) as one born from the increasing democratization of Western culture. As deference to political elitism has eroded, so too has deference to expert opinion. But Appleby, Hunt, and Jacobs are not antidemocratic; quite the opposite is true. For them, democratic histories – histories which work hard to be inclusive – are those which promote the healthiest of skepticisms. Rather than get sucked into the “cynicism and nihilism that has accompanied contemporary relativism”, pluralistic attempts to grapple with the past find truths, even if those truths are never absolute. “Telling the truth,” we are told, “takes a collective effort.” The subjective experience is held up as all-important, as the foundation of collective memory. Yet, in order to wrangle the past into some kind of teachable narrative, the vast majority of subjective experience is subsumed into a larger framework. In this larger framework there continues to be a hierarchy of personalities and events contingent upon the ethnocentric, ideologically, and monetarily driven constructions of textbook editorial staffs. But the value of democratic history, to Appleby


19 Appleby, et al., 4.

20 Appleby, et al., 309.
and her colleagues, is not a radical de-centering of our grand narratives. Rather, the democratization of the past makes us aware of those stories which continue to be peripheral to mainstream history yet call into question its authority. Pluralism encourages skepticism in one’s own worldview without completely denying the possibility that the past can be accurately recollected and reconstructed through narratives based on detail and empirical evidence. The grand narratives, then, slowly shift to accommodate what had once been peripheral and, in doing so, become more “true” as they become more inclusive.

Not all historians find solace in this inclusive approach. An easy combination (at least in theory) of the universal narrative and the subjective experience is not viewed by all scholars as possible (or even desirable). In his book *Provincializing Europe*, Dipesh Chakrabarty identifies these two seemingly contradictory “points of view” as “History 1” and “History 2”. To Chakrabarty, the universal historical narrative – or “History 1” – is the story of capitalism.21 As a post-Enlightenment thinker dedicated to issues of social justice and equality, he finds the stark realities of late capitalism’s globalization undeniable. Chakrabarty, however, contends that most Western historians (and he is particularly critical of well-meaning Marxists) fail to recognize their own benign ethnocentrism. He points to thinkers like Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri who, in their book *Empire*, write scathingly about the evils of nationalism and the “cult of the local”.22


For Hardt and Negri, the attachment to particular places corrupts any attempt to create a unified and globally transcendent anti-capitalist movement. Chakrabarty is not as concerned. As someone approaching this problem from an initially non-Western point of view, he points out that Hardt and Negri do not hail from countries which have had their cultures stolen from them. English and Italian would almost certainly be languages of this new Marxist movement (and the consequent establishment of a new “Multitude”). It is not clear that the languages of the East would fare so well.

“History 2”, then, is a category of subjective histories, of “more affective narratives of human belonging where life forms, although porous to one another, do not seem exchangeable through a third term of equivalence such as abstract labor.”

These are the histories which constantly crash into “History 1”, making it impossible to comprehensively systematize or rationalize the past. Historical difference is the natural consequence of this socio-cultural friction. For Chakrabarty, Marx may be right about capitalism, but his rationalization of historical processes attempts to negate the individual and totalize subjective experience in an undeniably (and unapologetic) grand narrative. Only by embracing the impossibility of reconciling subjective experience with universal rationalization can historians create “necessarily fragmentary histories of human belonging that never constitute a one or a whole.”

That, to Chakrabarty, is the most honest approach to the past.

23 Chakrabarty, 71.
24 Chakrabarty, 255.
In the following section, this introduction will attempt to articulate an approach to history that maintains the necessity of historical fragmentation while also allowing the incorporation of those subjective fragments into a larger explanatory narrative. In doing so, it will clarify both this dissertation’s interest in the history of cartography and its importance as a field of study.

**Fractals and History: A Proposition**

The following chapters write a history that helps tease out subjective mapped propositions within a larger universal framework of space. In a sense, then, it reflects Immanuel Kant’s theory of the transcendental aesthetic: a singular spatial framework is understood to make up (along with time) the subjective, cognitive groundwork for all experience, recognition, and conceptualization.²⁵ While the abstraction of space can be constructed and made concretely manifest differently, depending on one’s cultural environment,²⁶ existing within space-time is accepted in this dissertation as a universal condition. By recognizing this condition, the discipline of history can expand upon both Chakrabarty’s turbulent narrative-clashing and Appleby/Hunt/Jacob’s democratic pluralism.

Furthermore, because this project is grounded in empirically guided and detail-oriented research, it works hard to avoid the obvious pitfalls of postmodern relativism. Unlike Hayden White and (even more radically) the historian Alun Munslow, this


dissertation refuses to subscribe to the belief that the past is narrative alone, or that the nature of history is “essentially literary.”

Narrative construction is essential to history – that is true –, but the idea that the collection and analysis of archival evidence brings the historian no further to a more accurate portrayal of a very real past is rejected. In an attempt to help bolster the arguments of historical reconstructionists, historians should consider the mathematical fractal. In fact, when working with visual narratives – especially those which, like maps, merge cultural identity and mathematics into one visual representation – articulating historical reconstructionism in visual terms, as presented below, helps to clarify a thinking-through of those narratives.

While the humanities have, in recent years, approached interdisciplinary work favorably, and chipped away at some of the inherent biases of the seemingly objective “hard” sciences, historians have largely failed to attempt incorporating many scientific theories into their own work. Mathematics, in particular, is a discipline which seems to be outside the scope of many historians. A few historians have, in fact, attempted to use theoretical mathematics to shift a locus of historical study. Such undertakings are attractive – mathematics has a kind of universality and genuine abstraction that literary forms (owing to the necessity of their self-conscious subjective properties) can never project. As hyper-masculine and as notoriously cold-hearted as proponents of

27 Munslow, 3.

28 This is particularly true in the fields of “history of science”, “history of communications”, and “history of technology”, all of which continue to enjoy a small, but strong, presence in academia.

mathematical rationality and logic have often been, the foundations of their discipline serve as the basis for all (empirically based) critical thought. Indeed, considering recent developments in math might do certain brands of historical scholarship a great service.

In the wake of deconstructionist challenges to ‘wholeness’ throughout the latter half of the twentieth century, a French mathematician named Benoit Mandelbrot (1924-2010) sought to abandon the traditional Euclidian form of geometry in an effort to analyze shapes outside the scope of normal mathematics: mountains, coastlines, clouds, etc. Mandelbrot discovered that if certain Euclidian shapes (cones, spheres, cylinders, etc.) were repeated over and over at different scales of length, the result was a very different-looking geometric structure. He called these structures “fractals” (a term he first coined in 1975) because their existence was dependent upon the “fracturing” of more standard geometric shapes. Mandelbrot’s favorite visual manifestation of this process was “Koch’s Snowflake” (Figure 1-1). In Koch’s Snowflake, equilateral triangles are continuously used eventually to construct a mathematical structure that reproduces itself ad infinitum, but of which no one part can be differentiated from any other. Mandelbrot used this method to begin studying mathematical patterns in nature which had, for a very long time, remained mathematical mysteries. One of his earliest prominent publications was, for example, an article entitled “How Long is the Coast of Britain?” (1967) in which he attempted to use fractal geometry to solve the “coastline paradox” (that the smaller one’s increment of measurement when measuring a coastline, the longer the coastline’s length).30 While unable to provide actual

geographic dimension to Britain’s coastline, Mandelbrot showed that a mathematician could give a reasonable estimate based solely on the projection of smaller, self-similar lengths to the larger whole. Mandelbrot later went on to create the now-famous “Mandelbrot Set” with the kind of geometric repetition only afforded by the use of computers. The result was a fractal shape which has inspired artists and scientists alike, but which humanities scholars have largely failed to investigate (Figure 1-2).

The images made from the Mandelbrot Set are aesthetically complex. They make manifest a ‘whole’ established by the continuous recursion of self-similar ‘parts’. To study any one part of the Mandelbrot Set is also to study its entire structure. Each piece mirrors the larger whole (Figure 1-3). History, the art of preserving subjective narrative while subsuming it into a grander scheme, seems to be more about emulating mathematical fractals than about simple deconstruction. By studying small details and case studies of the past, larger patterns which mirror those case studies emerge. Just as the fractals which exist in nature – seemingly disparate pieces autonomous from one another – can be transformed through mathematics into a larger (although, it is important to note, not entirely comprehensible) whole, history transforms the events of the past into a (not entirely comprehensible) whole through both archival study and narrative form. This way of approaching history recognizes not only the temporal constellations that make up the past and then traces those patterns, but admittedly and unabashedly makes patterns out of them – it makes its own lattice-patterns out of temporal constellations. Like the Mandelbrot Set, historians can (and many do!) render structures of genuine beauty and small-t truths from an endless number of geometric points. Each point is its own subjective case, its own version of the whole, and/or its
own microcosm of an endless mirrored pattern of recursion, but structure can still be maintained. Historians can use the Atlantic slave trade (the “ending without end”) to critique the marriage of modernity and finance-capitalism. They can offer fragmentary “readings” of culture to purposefully disorient the totality of the market without entirely abandoning Marxism. Studies of taxation, transportation, exhibitions, informal economies, and subaltern oppression can all possess and project their own subjective readings of the past, but structural connections and historical patterns do not need to be entirely abandoned. Dipesh Chakrabarty is right to emphasize the tension that must be maintained between universal grand-historical narratives and affective histories of individual subjects. He is too quick, however, to abandon the grand narrative as a purely totalizing project. If, like fractal geometry, ‘whole’ narratives can open up our eyes to the importance and complexity of their subjective ‘parts’ while simultaneously emulating and maintaining those ‘parts’, then we can begin to idealize universal structure without establishing a differentiated hierarchy of particulars. History becomes genuinely democratic without having to deny the real and inherent value of democracy. The chaos of the past becomes a pattern which can be both studied and predicted, but an openly constructed pattern (full of openly constructed subjectivities) all the same.


The most honest structural patterns and explanatory narratives of history are neither linear nor sporadic; they are fractal.

**Making It Spatial**

A history of Germany’s postwar cartography is an excellent way of articulating a fractal approach to the study of the past. Created by geographers and cartographers with various interests, the mapped narratives offered throughout the following chapters were clearly developed within a larger narrative context of post-World War II reconstruction and denazification. As a discipline dependent on both the deconstruction of seemingly objective structures (i.e. maps) and the perpetuation of empirical archival authority (i.e. historical scholarship), the history of cartography can serve as a scholastic medium through which to study the important convergences of time and space.

The discipline of history is spatializing itself and as contemporary culture grows increasingly dependent on location-based media and an ever-“globalizing” economy, historians have begun to recognize the importance of spatial constructions when building their respective narratives. Of particular interest are the early modern and modern periods – eras in which a cartographic explosion of navigational charts, colonialism, and nation-state building demanded the abstraction, production, and dissemination of real space through the instrumental medium of the map. While ancient Greek and Roman societies could (and did) use maps to orient themselves and exploit natural resources, and while various religions took turns depicting the medieval world according to their heavenly (and truly) imagined communities, it was only during the European Enlightenment that cartography gained the scientific confidence it defends to this day. Moreover, the necessity of disseminating cartographic material and,
consequently, popularizing particular orientations only became imperative in the modern world – where to be left off of the map might mean the loss of one’s place in real-space.\textsuperscript{33}

Many historians have understood the importance of studying these spatial developments and have investigated them through several different thematic lenses.\textsuperscript{34} The history of cartography as an academic discipline, as an art, as a technological development, and as an instrument of exploration (and, subsequently, exploitation) has become the subject of hundreds, if not thousands, of published histories. Space itself has also recently been a well-worn subject of interest, invoking the concepts of borders, bodies, geopolitics, environmental history, and (perhaps most relevant to this project) imperialism. Journals such as \textit{Imago Mundi}, \textit{Cartographica}, and \textit{The Portolan} (among others) have provided an academic forum in which to investigate these particular issues. Maps, however, have also appealed to a more broadly theoretical body of scholarship. Henri Lefebvre’s \textit{Production of Space}, the “géohistorie” of the Annales school, Michel Foucault’s call for a “history of spaces”, and David Harvey’s attempts to hammer out critical readings of various geographies are a few of the more famous and interdisciplinary examples of useful academic exercises undertaken so as to

\textsuperscript{33} In fact, one scholar has convincingly argued that “there were no maps before 1500” in the sense that we understand today. The function of the map as a site of discourse and contention directly coincides with the production of the early modern state, an institution that necessarily depends upon the authority we grant to the map. For more on this see Denis Wood’s \textit{Rethinking the Power of Maps} (New York: Guilford Press, 2010), pp. 22-25.

\textsuperscript{34} One of the most promising combinations of history and space is the emerging field of Historical Geographic Information Systems (HGIS), which forces geographers to include time in their analyses and historians to use space as a category of historical understanding. For more on this see Anne Kelly Knowles. \textit{Placing History: How Maps, Spatial Data, and GIS are Changing Historical Scholarship}. Redlands, CA: ESRI Press, 2008.
deconstruct our respective perceptions of our environments. More recently, the geographers Geoffrey Martin, Neil Smith, Dalia Varanka, and Jeremy Crampton have offered important histories of how society has mapped itself. Critical cartographers such as Denis Wood, John Krygier, John Pickles, and Mark Monmonier have chosen to focus on the institutionalization, professionalization, and political/economic interests involved in mapmaking and the academic disciplines of geography and cartography. By undertaking deconstructive projects, historians, theorists, geographers, and cartographers alike call the map’s assumed objectivity and scientism into question. As I will point out throughout this dissertation, many scholars (in German and in English) have examined the cartographic history of Germany. Few, however, have examined its developments after World War II and very few have discussed these developments within the context of American occupation.35

The lack of attention to postwar Germany is surprising. The history of cartographic development throughout Europe and its role in determining sovereignty, defining the concept of the nation-state, and coping with contentious territories has been fruitful. Yet there is still much to be done, and while this project cannot offer a complete and comprehensive analysis of postwar German cartography, it can (and will) attempt to answer some important questions raised by other scholars studying other historical periods and geographic areas. How, for example, have particular nation-states relied upon maps for their sovereignty? Does a state’s sovereignty require control over its 

35 I am not the only one pointing out this lack of scholarship, or the “strange aversion to maps” historians seem to have. See Helmut Walser Smith’s The Continuities of German History: Nation, Religion, and Race across the Long Nineteenth Century (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 47.
cartographic development? Does a map matter if no one grants it any authority? How is a public convinced of a map’s authority? How can a nation-state re-assert its place on the map, and how can it convince foreign powers that it belongs there? These are not original questions. This dissertation relies on the efforts of previous historians and geographers. It will, however, be applying their deconstructive insight to an exceptional period of obvious cartographic fluidity, a period in which a country full of incredibly skilled modern mapmakers was re-mapped under a foreign occupation force. In doing so, this project hopes to serve as a foundation for further research. Much more needs to be done on this particular period and region so that we might better understand the relationship between governance and maps, especially during episodes of postwar occupation.

Such critical approaches to cartographic history are hardly universal. While many historians, particularly those interested in the modern era, might understand their chosen temporal category of “modernity” as being full of consciously self-creating subjects,36 too often cartographies are overlooked in favor of more traditional literary forms. Furthermore, the contemporary student of history is hard pressed to find any scholastic work in which early modern or modern maps are used as explanatory narratives alongside text and, simultaneously, cited as narratives. The geospatial information utilized to create such narratives, the mathematical projections assumed, and the professionals or amateur cartographers who drew the narratives are rarely ever exposed. Rather, the map is too often used as an aesthetic representation of the past,

ready to perpetuate the student’s undying loyalty to the combination of spatial abstraction, cartographic objectivity, and Truth. This is particularly troubling when one considers how much emphasis contemporary historians have placed on the discourses surrounding the ‘nation’. Ernest Gellner’s *Nations and Nationalism* and Benedict Anderson’s *Imagined Communities* provoked an explosion of interest in this topic, one which has largely ignored cartographic propositions of nations despite the “primary function of cartography” being its ability “to help citizens imagine the state as a unified territory”.

Spatial relationships are tricky, especially when they are being mediated by an occupying force. The means by which such relationships were forged, their continuous renegotiation, and the perpetuation of these relationships into our contemporary era shed light on how the narratives within which we find our respective places are built and maintained. Maps, the United States, and Germany blended into a triune which would recast and redefine one another in a complex combination of manipulation, politics, war, and capital. But, as cartographer John Pickles notes, “[cartography] has always been a multitude of practices . . . coded and recoded by forms of institutionalized power, but always with leakage.” This is one spatial relationship (with plenty of “leakage”!), during one historical period, which saturated the world with maps and, through constant self-affirmation, erected a new world. The result would be an artificial rendering of the real,


a deeply interested proposition created for mass consumption and rooted in the
cartographic development of Europe: it is the world in which we find ourselves today –
but it did not have to be. And that is the most important part of (this) history.

**Doing It with Germany**

German historians have made this project easy to fit into their scholastic optics.
As Chapter 2 points out, the territorial instability of Germany has been one of the driving
forces of European history. Not only did the flexibility of central European borders
produce military conflict, but also conflicts of religious and national identity. After briefly
outlining an explicitly spatial rendition of German history, Chapter 2 then explores the
creation of geography as an academic discipline and the particularly precarious position
Germany found itself in after the First World War. *Geopolitik* and *Lebensraum* as
ideological lodestones of expansionist and imperialist cartographies are both discussed,
as is the incorporation (and importance) of geographers and cartographers in the
government of the Third Reich. Of particular interest is the role of Emil Meynen, who
later became a significant geographic agent for the American military government after
the Second World War. The second chapter concludes by discussing negotiations
between Allied powers regarding postwar German territory.

Chapter 3 focuses primarily on the reconstruction of Germany’s mapped space in
the initial post-World War II years of 1945 to 1949. From the earliest days of German
defeat until the eventual division of Germany into two separate states, the United States
and other Allied powers were interested in collecting as much information about the
Germans (and, in some cases, each other) as possible. Geographers maintained a
prominent position in these undertakings, and many of the Third Reich’s most
successful mapmaking academics were extracted by the American military in Operation Dustbin and utilized throughout the postwar era. Denazification played an obvious role in this transition, and this third chapter deals specifically with the denazification of German geographers and school-room geography. Again, as an important and accessible case study, this chapter invokes Emil Meynen's attempts to maintain a group of geographic intellectuals (not to mention the academic discipline of geography) in a nation-state defeated primarily because of its obsession with territorial expansion-through-expulsion/liquidation. By 1949, Meynen controlled one of the only independent mapmaking and map-analyzing agencies in Germany, was working for the United States military government, and simultaneously helped to reestablish Germany's network of geographers. The many ways these functions overlapped are an important part of German history, not only in regards to its spatial reconstruction but also with respect to the complexity and murkiness of postwar individual opportunism and generosity.

The fourth chapter grapples with the polarization of geography between geographers in the East and in the West. As both the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic struggled to gain some semblance of sovereignty after Allied occupation, the participation of their geographers was vital, but often difficult to politicize (especially after the days of Lebensraum and Geopolitik). The formal split between East and West, their different approaches to geographic education, and the increasing ideological tension along the “Iron Curtain” were all important historical developments in which mapmakers were deeply involved and interested. Understanding literally how these lines were drawn, and who was drawing them, is an
aspect of Cold War history that has been largely overlooked. This chapter seeks to rectify that.

Chapter 5 outlines the territorial history of the Federal Republic from the 1952 construction of Germany’s internal “control strip” border to the August 1961 erection of the Berlin Wall. Emil Meynen’s growing prowess as an academic and the difficult relationship between the self-mapping of a nation-state and its sovereignty are both explored here. The fifth chapter concludes with an examination of how the growing popularity of “public relations” came to help dictate the spatial patterns of German territory, and how that space was projected to both German and non-German audiences. Concluding at the Berlin Wall is not an accident – it was there that the abstract spatial posturing of Cold War rhetoric merged with the radical fortification of an intra-national border, causing continual eruptions of violence. The spatial history of Germany from 1945-1961 is a long slope downward from the abstract to the concrete, from the mind to the map, from ideology to border-violence.
Figure 1-1. These four pictures show the process of creating Koch’s snowflake.
Figure 1-2. One of many depictions of the Mandelbrot Set
Figure 1-3. A "close-up" of one part of the Mandelbrot Set displayed in Figure 1-3.
CHAPTER 2
GERMANY’S CARTOGRAPHIC COLLAPSE

Before we present you matters of fact, it is fit to offer to your view the stage whereon they are acted. For as Geography without History seemeth a carcass without motion, so History without Geography wandereth as a vagrant without certain habitation.

—Capt. John Smith

The spatial condition of Germany after the Second World War can only be understood as one key moment in a long and continual process. The development of German identity and nationalism, particularly regarding the inclusion or exclusion of territory deemed “German”, has a turbulent history. This is not a remarkably unique or unusual history. Nearly every contemporary nation-state has worked incredibly hard at forcing itself onto the world map, typically either pulling itself out from under the shattered framework of an imperial hegemon or by stamping out the territorial claims of an ‘Other’ usually proclaimed as perennially inferior. In this sense, then, Germany mirrors other modern nation-states in its awkward march towards the combination of space and sovereignty, as well as the subsequent territorial solidification necessary for such an abstract amalgamation. Only after the Second World War, when Germany was quartered under Allied occupation and its cartography used as a tool for spatial self-mutilation, did it experience a kind of geographic Sonderweg. Getting to this turning-point, however, required Germany’s involvement in some of Europe’s most monumental cartographic upsets and shifts – a participatory undertaking which, when studied, nicely sets the stage for what came after its 1945 collapse.

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The epigraph presented at the beginning of this chapter was cited in Norman R. Thomas. “On the Relation of Geography to History (or History to Geography, if you prefer)”, paper presented at the American Historical Association, 1972.
Medieval and early modern maps of German states recall an almost entirely foreign procedure for mapmaking. Not only were the boundary lines drawn often as nothing more than “porous” dashes or dots, but hundreds of Germania’s maps were variants stemming from merely seven 16th-century base maps. Only by the mid-17th century did cartography begin to enjoy its own renaissance throughout various German territories as map production shifted from the somewhat useful – yet almost always artful – depictions of private space to public undertakings commissioned more and more often by burgeoning nation-states. Emboldened by the Peace of Westphalia (1648) and spurred on by a new and uneasy balance of powers, European nations and empires began experimenting with large-scale cartographic representations of sovereign territory. The Holy Roman Empire was no exception, even if its spatial expression differed slightly from its neighbors.

Created in 800 A.D. by Charlemagne and Pope Leo III, the Holy Roman Empire was, in the words of David Blackbourn, “a product of historical accretion, loosely draped over an array of independent, highly diverse territories” – not so much a “territorial unit” as “an archipelago of jurisdictions.” Blackbourn categorizes these “jurisdictions” into three groups: major powers (Prussia, Austria, Saxony, Bavaria, Hanover, and Württemberg), small “statelets” (Lippe and Lichtenberg), and ecclesiastical units (Mainz and Cologne). Despite minor territorial quibbles and borderline-ambiguity, the Holy

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Roman Empire’s states remained largely unchanged until the Confederation of the Rhine was established by Napoleon in 1806. Prior to German defeat, however, and very much in accordance with the problems of its contemporary nation-states, the Germans were forced to grapple with the definition of state citizenship in the late eighteenth century. In 1794 the administration of Prussia’s Frederick the Great proposed a new *Allgemeines Landrecht* which, among other precepts aimed at centralizing the government, defined state membership.\(^4\) The *Allgemeines Landrecht* managed, in great detail, to codify Prussia’s feudalist economy and absolute monarchy. Yet while this 17,000-paragraph document succeeded in making citizenship an important status for both the state and the individual, it simultaneously failed to describe exactly how citizenship was determined and simply made broad and ambiguous gestures as to what citizenship actually was. Nevertheless, the Prussians living under Frederick the Great now had an irretrievable new relationship to the state and to the territorial negotiations that took place between Prussia and the neighbors along its borders.

By 1806 France had dismantled the Holy Roman Empire. In 1792, after declaring war against Austria and Prussia in a bout of revolutionary fervor, the French military began seeping into Germania’s northwestern borders. After the rise of Napoleon and the intensification of the French invasion, the German territories along

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the left bank of the Rhine River fell under the occupation of the Revolution. By 1802 the entire Rhineland had been ceded to the French through a series of treaties made between Napoleon, Prussia, and Austria – settlements which typically ceded parts of the Holy Roman Empire to the French in order to maintain the autonomy of the Empire’s major powers (i.e. Prussia and Austria). As the historian Thomas Nipperdey notes, during 1803 the “map of Germany was redrawn . . . [and] effectively simplified . . .”. The Mittelstaaten, or middle states, which had been territorially chipped away at over the last decade were consolidated into one territorial bloc and finally allowed a brief taste of the sovereignty and power which had, until this point, been enjoyed almost exclusively by the political and military polar juggernauts of Prussia and Austria. After a series of battles in which the Austro-Russian coalition against Napoleon was repeatedly overwhelmed, – most importantly at the Battle of Austerlitz in December 1805 – Austrian Emperor Franz I abdicated his throne as Holy Roman Emperor in August 1806. Consequently, large swathes of Austrian territory were ceded to the Mittelstaaten and to Italy.

Franz I’s abdication had a great deal to do with the shifting territorial development of greater Germany. On 16 July 1806 Napoleon established the Confederation of the Rhine, a new territorial bloc created by a geographic mass exodus


6 Blackbourn, 47.

7 Nipperdey, 1.

8 Ibid.
of *Mittelstaaten* from the Holy Roman Empire. Under the protection of the Napoleonic Empire, this new Confederation was meant to serve as a “third Germany” that could counter-balance Prussia and Austria – a territorial and military buffer zone for France. While the Confederation maintained the sovereignty of several of its German member-states, the larger kingdoms and principalities such as Baden, Württemberg, Bavaria, and Hesse-Darmstadt effectively sucked up many of the small ecclesiastical territories.9 As with many of the territorial changes imposed onto the European map by Napoleon, the cartographic consolidations and border-lines lasted well beyond the political unit established to maintain them. By 1813, after incrementally pushing French forces out of the region, the Confederation was dissolved by the Sixth Coalition of anti-Napoleonic allies, including Austria, Prussia, Russia, and the United Kingdom. Almost immediately, Prussia annexed the state of Saxony and was soon granted Westphalia and the Rhineland for its participation in liberating the Confederation of the Rhine. These adjustments were solidified at the Congress of Vienna (September 1814 – June 1815) and after the defeat of Napoleon at the Battle of Waterloo on 15 June 1815, effectively doubling the population of Prussia and providing it with some of the most resource-rich and productive territory in Europe.

1815 also saw the creation of the German Confederation, a loose conglomerate of German states that almost entirely mirrored the territorial demarcations of Napoleon’s Confederation of the Rhine with the important exception of including Prussia and Austria as member-states. From 1815 to 1866 the German Confederation succeeded at

9 Nipperdey, 3.
maintaining relative peace between its German participants and, subsequently, was also able to maintain the cartographic status quo. The one exception to Germany’s territorial stability during this period was the national revolution of 1848. From 1848-1849, an elected German national assembly met in Frankfurt and attempted to establish a unified nation-state. While parliamentary discussion concerning national borders “took up only a small amount of time”,¹⁰ and while the Assembly was eventually dissolved in 1849, problematic German-speaking states like Schleswig, Posen, and Tyrol made clear the difficulties of establishing the borders of a greater Germany. The Frankfurt Assembly, for the first time in Germany history, pushed the issue of territorial unity to the forefront of the national consciousness and forced members of the German public to begin searching for spatial solutions to their national ‘question’.¹¹ Mobility increased tremendously during this period as the relatively long-lasting transnational German Confederation allowed easier inter-state movement for German residents.¹² By the mid-1800s, many German states had also built a substantial network of railways – a development Wolfgang Schivelbusch convincingly argues helped to “annihilate” previous cultural understandings of space and time in Europe.¹³ The combination of (relatively) high-speed transportation and diluted intra-German border-lines had steep political consequences as migrant workers throughout greater Germany became more


¹¹ Breuilly, 16.

¹² Brubaker, 69.

and more prominent. As foreign labor became more influential in state economies, and as the foreign poor became more taxing on public budgets, German states began passing legislation to expel migrants. Prussia, for example, created a law in 1842 establishing its right to unilaterally oust the foreign poor. In doing so, the state had to also establish what it meant to be “foreign”, laying the legal groundwork for modern German citizenship.\textsuperscript{14} It should come as no surprise that as mobility increased, and as German states began to define who did and did not belong to their respective territorial holdings, the 1840s also brought with them the first maps of a greater German nation.\textsuperscript{15} While war and conflict may have carved its boundaries, the production of spatial representations of the German nation were spurred by both a changing infrastructure and by the urgent need to categorize those who were “German” and those who were not.

But if war and conflict did not necessarily prompt the initial gestures toward modern citizenship and nation-drawing, it most certainly solidified those concepts as fundamental complements to 19\textsuperscript{th}-century German nationalist movements. Moreover, war in the latter half of the nineteenth century drove the development of cartographic techniques and map dissemination in German states (particularly in Prussia) to unprecedented levels of spatial acumen. The first maps produced for the General Staff of the Prussian military, for example, were finished in 1841.\textsuperscript{16} That is an embarrassingly

\textsuperscript{14} Brubaker, 70-71.


\textsuperscript{16} Todd Presner. “Remapping German-Jewish Studies: Benjamin, Cartography, Modernity” in \textit{The German Quarterly}, Vol. 82, No. 3 (Summer 2009), 303.
late date when we compare it to France, a state that had been drafting maps for its military commanders (and by its military commanders) since the 16th century. Maps were, in fact, particularly useful and heavily relied upon during France’s War of Devolution (1667) and War of the Reunions (1683-1684) against Spain. Yet by the Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871), not thirty years after Prussia began integrating maps into its military, the Prussians had developed far more maps, more accurate maps, and more comprehensive maps than their French counterparts. As the historian Michael Howard notes, the French had been caught cartographically unprepared for war, having almost no maps of even their own nation-state’s terrain. French military officers were often forced to “requisition maps from the local schools and estate offices.” The Prussian mapmakers, on the other hand, had been preparing for this conflict for some time, sending many of their most talented artists into the French borderlands to plot the terrain there clandestinely. While the Prussian victory over the French in 1871 is usually (and rightly) recognized by historians as a result of Prussia’s dense network of railways, its allies in the German Confederation, and the productivity of the Prussian steel industry, it certainly did not hurt to have accurate spatial data to rely on. In fact,


the detail-oriented focus of German military geography left a deep impression not simply on the French military, but also on France’s civilian population.\textsuperscript{20}

What accounts for this shift in cartographic expertise, this inversion of French and German spatial innovation and production? How, in the span of roughly thirty years, did the Germans so quickly find themselves on the cutting edge of mapmaking? One small piece of this puzzle can be found in the development of Germany’s academic geography departments and associations, a story dealt with at length later in this chapter. Several other historians and sociologists have also fleshed out important factors related to this problem. Rogers Brubaker has argued that Germans had always seen themselves on some sort of cultural frontier. Whereas France found spatial stability not only in its geographic position but also in the relatively early solidification of its national boundaries, German space often overlapped with a perennial Slavic ‘Other’.\textsuperscript{21} Brubaker goes on to claim that this geographic situation caused German nationalism to identify as primarily ethnocultural rather than (as in France) political, and because this nationalism came to full fruition prior to the establishment of a modern German nation-state in 1871, the creation of that state was bound to be imperfect: some Germans (especially Austro-Germans) somewhere were going to be left out, just as some French, Danes, Poles, and Slavs somewhere were going to be brought in. As has already been mentioned, this problem became particularly clear during the Frankfurt Assembly’s discussions on national territory during Germany’s 1848

\textsuperscript{20} Schivelbusch, 163.

\textsuperscript{21} Brubaker, 3-4.
revolution. So, when modern Germany was established in 1871, millions of Austro-Germans were kept out of the new state because Austria was excluded from German integration and centralization. But by including Alsace-Lorraine, North Schleswig, and East Prussia in the new Germany, tens of thousands of French, Danish, and Polish people were suddenly living under centralized German rule. By constantly reassessing and working to analyze their (literal) position on the European map in relation to the Slavic ‘Other’, 19th-century Germans may have emphasized the importance of maps and orientation more than their French counterparts simply because of the perceived vulnerability of their national character and the instability of their spatial structure.

The creation and consolidation of a modern Germany in 1871 was, then, a triumphant ending to a national narrative couched in largely spatial terms. Prussian Chancellor Otto von Bismarck’s vision for a modern (Prussianized) German state was accomplished through an orchestrated series of battles concerned with re-shaping the map of central Europe. The Prussians successfully goaded the Austrians into a territorial dispute with Denmark over Schleswig-Holstein in 1863 (and, subsequently, war in 1864). After jointly defeating the Danish, the victors agreed at the Gastein Convention (1865) that Prussia would control Schleswig and Austria would control Holstein. Shortly thereafter, Bismarck called for an end to the German Confederation and a renewal of commitment by smaller German states to the Zollverein, the German Customs Union which excluded Austria from the economic benefits of inter-state

\[22\] Brubaker, 12-13.
commerce among greater-German continental territories. The changes proposed by Bismarck so blatantly favored Prussian hegemony at the expense of Austrian influence, that the Austrians declared war against Prussia in 1866. Within a few short months Prussia had handily defeated the Austrians and, by the following year, had established a new North German Confederation. Postwar annexations, consolidations, and occupations led to a Germany dominated by Prussia, and a clear-cut territorial demarcation between this new Germany and its Austrian counterpart. Yet only after the defeat of the French in 1871 did Prussia finally unify Germany under its influence, declaring at Versailles the creation of a Second German Reich.

As previously mentioned, the inclusion of territories into this new Reich which had traditionally vacillated between two different cultural polar-points was problematic. As the ‘long nineteenth century’ wore on, German nationalists and their various counterparts along an ever-solidifying ‘linguistic frontier’ worked to destroy whatever national ambiguity was left among border-dwellers. By 1880, Germany had begun releasing an imperial census, making it easy for fervent nationalists to pinpoint the whereabouts of linguistic infiltration – the small leaks in the cultural dam of Germanism. Historians have done an excellent job of studying these situations and pointing out the superficial construction of these ‘frontiers’. Nancy Wingfield has analyzed the competing cultural icons throughout these contested territories, identifying the term ‘frontier’ as nothing more than the categorization of a place (real or imagined).

23 Blackbourn, 184.

where Germans spoke another language.\textsuperscript{25} Pieter Judson has written about the Moravian Compromise (1905) which split large swaths of land into Czech or German provinces. According to Judson, these types of agreements were not unusual and concerned themselves with contentious spaces such as Bukovina, Galicia, and Budweis throughout the early twentieth century.\textsuperscript{26} Tara Zahra, too, notes the rising nationalist rhetoric along the German-Czech borderlands during the fin-de-siècle. While Zahra mentions the importance of “maps and census statistics” which, according to her, “have notoriously served to obscure bilingualism and national ambiguity in East Central Europe”,\textsuperscript{27} her primary focus is the targeting of children for the purposes of border solidification. Children, she argues, were problematic for nationalists because of their ability to learn languages quickly and live happily as bilingual (or even trilingual) residents of a space which was difficult to culturally categorize. In an effort to curb this development, Czech and German nationalists promoted a political culture in which children were identified as belonging more to their respective ‘nation’ than to their respective parents – a dichotomy so popular that it lasted deep into the twentieth century (and, arguably, still lingers to this day).\textsuperscript{28}

For all of these cultural attempts at identifying various ethnic and linguistic distinctions and cordonning off their respective places to the most appropriate state


\textsuperscript{26} Judson, 13-14.


\textsuperscript{28} See Zahra.
power, it was another military conflict which most effectively wreaked havoc across the
continental map (yet again) and determined the new borders of German space. As
other historians have noted, maps prior to the First World War (1914-1918) tended to be
isolated representations, spatial narratives drawn as individual responses to Europe’s
territorial questions. After the First World War, however, mapping became a much
more deliberate and systematic undertaking, with an entire enterprise constructed for
the dissemination of this new (and increasingly abundant) cartographic information.
Part of this shift had to do with the increasing prominence of geography as an academic
discipline – a development to be discussed at further length in the following pages.
Another, perhaps more urgent, contributing factor to the systematization of mapmaking
was the collapse of Europe’s imperial powers after the defeat of Germany in 1918. The
division of the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires, the territorial uncertainty
surrounding a defeated Germany, and Russia’s self-imposed spatial diminution led to
the emergence of what geographers would later call Europe’s “shatter zone”. In
response to this cartographic “shattering”, the Allied Powers (and particularly the United
States) took an active role in reshaping Europe according to the ethnographic and
linguistic ‘frontiers’ which had been so contentiously constructed by various nationalist
functionaries and organizations. This re-drafting of the European map has been
carefully studied by both geographers and historians (although the geographers tend to
pay a bit more attention than the historians to the maps themselves). Neil Smith has
argued that this Anglo-American re-mapping, done under the careful watch and

29 Herb, Under the Map, 8.
supervision of President Wilson’s (and later President Roosevelt’s) geographer Isaiah Bowman, helped to usher in the age of globalization.\textsuperscript{30} Wesley Reisser, in his analysis of the famous \textit{Black Book} which bound together all of the Allied map proposals, argues that this project was far less devious than Smith would have us believe. According to Reisser, what geographers and historians refer to as “The Inquiry” was an attempt by the American State Department to fairly and objectively redraw Europe after the Great War, an effort that (again, according to Reisser) was largely successful. Today’s European maps maintain many of the same lines drawn by this “Inquiry”.\textsuperscript{31} To read Reisser’s account of Europe’s postwar mapping, though, is to read a history of doe-eyed idealists working their utmost in an effort to save Europe from its territorial ambiguity – a kind of salvation-by-place-name.

Thank goodness, then, for the historians. Rather than a shift to globalization, as Neil Smith would have us believe, the cartographic “shattering” and rebuilding of central and eastern Europe was a point of continuity, one comma in a long sentence admiring spatial self-flagellation. And rather than adopt Reisser’s glossy apologia for the U.S. State Department (if only we had kept all of the lines they drew!), historians are right to point out just how messy things got after the First World War. Rather than tempering growing nationalist sentiment, the lines drawn by “The Inquiry” did not end territorial categorization and forced even more people into classifying themselves with a particular

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national affiliation. Armed with the righteous proclamations of Wilson’s “Fourteen Points”, many new European nation-states began to mold public space into an affirmation of self-created and self-determined historical narratives. The Germans, for example, worked hard to “de-Austrianize” Czechoslovakia, while the Czechs tore down the German, Habsburg, and Roman Catholic monuments and symbols which littered their newfound political boundary-line. The most (in)famous of these cases, of course, was the Sudetenland – that stubborn German state within a Czechoslovakian state. Under the guise of pan-German protectionism the Third Reich would use the nation-states drawn by “The Inquiry” to make its own case for ignoring the boundaries of those states in service to the nations living within them. The lines on the map, rather than annotating internationally recognized points of demarcation, would come to symbolize “the incompleteness of the national project.”

Germany lost roughly 13% of its territorial holdings after adopting the Treaty of Versailles including Alsace-Lorraine, the Polish Corridor, and northern Schleswig-Holstein. It should come as no surprise, then, that after both defeat and re-mapping by Allied Powers, “the discourses of German self-determination became thoroughly cartographic.” Moreover, the initial geographic framework for justifying the expansionist foreign policy of the Third Reich did not come from proto-Nazis but from angry Weimar-

32 Zahra, 91.
33 Wingfield, 137 & 141.
era mapmakers.\textsuperscript{36} Few Germans were pleased with the new postwar boundaries imposed on them by the Allied Powers. And while Germany’s spatial development had always been fluid, the Treaty of Versailles marked the end of a particularly border-flexible era. The historian Annemarie Sammartino writes that any German fifty years old and living in Germany in 1920 would have “lived through at least four German states with five different borders.” And, she adds, “Not one of these states perfectly expressed the unity of ethnic, linguistic, and cultural homogeneity that lay at the basis of the nationalist imaginary.”\textsuperscript{37}

As border changes intensified, and as they became more politically important and contentious after the First World War, geographers and cartographers became more and more committed to the dissemination of a particular national picture. While the study of “geopolitics” had existed prior to World War I, many of its adherents began arguing for a geopolitical Sonderweg in Germany after the War. Germany was geographically situated to orient itself on a middle path and refuse to completely adopt Western liberalism or Eastern socialism.\textsuperscript{38} Political statements reflecting this often became favored over cartographic “accuracy” as territorial tensions increased.\textsuperscript{39} The Germans, of course, were not the only nation using maps to bolster their spatial

\textsuperscript{36} Herb, Under the Map, 2.

\textsuperscript{37} Sammartino, 5.


\textsuperscript{39} David Thomas Murphy. The Heroic Earth: Geopolitical Thought in Weimar Germany, 1918-1933 (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1997), 165.
objectives. Along their eastern boundary, for example, the Czechs became more and more vigilant in blocking mobility along the border. Those happy (but unlucky and increasingly hard-to-find) residents of nationally ambiguous towns and villages were forced into choosing between Czech nationalists and “their own cross-border social networks.” As the twentieth century drove on, the maintenance of trans-border social relationships became more difficult as spatial fluidity was increasingly seen as a threat to state sovereignty and cultural insulation. Yet, as international borders solidified, nations expanded within cultural imaginations. If anything was learned by geographers after the First World War and the attempts of “The Inquiry” to map an ethnographically accurate Europe, it was that finding “true” borders was an impossible task. The mental maps established by cultural histories and engraved into the psyches of nationalists, were rarely reflected in full by the internationally sanctioned maps of Europe. Solutions to this contradiction varied, but the German response – to, eventually, just ignore other territorial claims – rightfully became the most notorious. As Heinrich Himmler was so fond of saying, “Blood is our border.”

The historian Theodore Hamerow has written – in what must be one of the most melodramatic displays of Sonderweg history – that “to study German history is to witness the unfolding of a national tragedy.” Many historians still give too much purchase to the idea that the German past is a “site of pathology, where social and


41 Sammartino, 205.

political development had from the beginning gone ‘wrong.’” As Geoff Eley and David Blackbourn make so clear, historians had assigned a “special path” to Germany long before the First World War. Since that Great War, however, Germany’s “path” has not been portrayed as a positive one, but a mark of backwardness and aggressiveness, of “dark turns” and of “national tragedy.”

While I reject the carving of a uniquely evil German notch into the bedpost of modern historiography, I refuse to dismiss outright the concept of exceptionalism in historical development. Germany is exceptional. As Max Otte points out, it is Germany which has been at the epicenter of Europe’s most radical twentieth-century remappings: 1919, 1945, and 1990. Whether one is working to discover the origins of cartography and geography as academic disciplines, the most systematic ethnic cleansing in the history of the world, the front lines of the Cold War, or the viability of today’s European Union, one cannot help but find Germany as a source (usually the primary source) driving these histories. Germany – this engine of countless historical narratives and analyses – is a spatial creature, yet its geography remains largely under-studied. While this chapter has attempted to provide the reader with a brief history of German territorial changes up to the Third Reich in the previous pages it has yet to show how this flexible geographic positioning influenced (and was influenced by) the academic study of space.


Geography: A German Profession

As professional and academic disciplines, geography and cartography were born in Germany. In fact, the historian of geography Geoffrey Martin argues that classical geography – a geography which could be mastered by scholars of all stripes – died in 1859 alongside its final (and perhaps most notable) adherents, Carl Ritter and Alexander von Humboldt. It was these two German scholars who helped usher geography from the periphery of academic study into the Age of Specialization. As Martin so aptly notes, by the late nineteenth century any hope of one individual embracing “universal knowledge” was dead. But Humboldt (1769-1859) and Ritter (1779-1859) were considered by most of the educated world to have gotten pretty close and were hugely influential in establishing the study of space among specialized academic disciplines. As two of the last great preeminent scholars, Humboldt’s work on Erdbeschreibung, or “earth description”, and Ritter’s book Die Erdkunde (1817-1818), or “earth studies”, helped lay the groundwork for more detailed investigations of geography within an ever-growing network of German higher education.

In 1874 Prussia became the first state to create a chair for the study of geography in each of its universities. Having only consolidated the German territories into a modern nation-state three years earlier, and having seen the advantages brought on by having proper maps during the Franco-Prussian War, the Prussian government

46 Martin All Possible Worlds, 107.
47 Martin, All Possible Worlds, 120-124.
saw this as an important academic investment. By 1880, Prussia had ten chairs of geography, with another three yet to be filled.\(^{48}\) This commitment to studying space helped spur on development throughout Prussia and in other parts of Germany. In 1882 the Central Commission for Scientific Regional Geography was founded and geography continued to expand throughout German universities, prompting one British observer to note in 1886 that “Now [as opposed to a dozen years ago] geography is on an equal footing with other [academic] branches in more than half of the German universities.”\(^{49}\)

Germany also became an increasingly important participant in international geographical undertakings. Indeed, it was a German geographer – Albrecht Penck (1858-1945) – who recognized that in order to truly draw an accurate world-picture, international cooperation and uniform mapping processes and procedures were necessary. In 1891 Penck proposed the drafting of an “International Map of the World”, a project doomed to eventual failure but which nonetheless made clear Germany’s role as a world leader among the community of mapmaking and map-studying states.\(^{50}\) It was in this period of avant-garde geographic internationalism that academics in German geography departments would begin to develop concepts such as \textit{Lebensraum} and \textit{Geopolitik}.

\begin{footnotes}
\item[48] Martin, \textit{All Possible Worlds}, 165.
\item[50] “Geography Teaching in Germany”, 178-179.
\end{footnotes}
Friedrich Ratzel (1844-1904) was the first to popularize the concept of Lebensraum with the 1897 publication of his Politische Geographie, which became the literary bedrock of modern political geography.\(^{51}\) Within thirty years of publication, Politische Geographie had been reissued three times and had become enormously popular in German universities.\(^{52}\) The book also received a great deal of praise from English-speaking geographers for its ability to turn political geography into a respectable discipline which had been “hitherto treated in [English] textbooks . . . [as] the driest and most unprofitable of all tasks.”\(^{53}\)

Indeed, Ratzel’s theory of political geography did just that. A trained zoologist turned journalist-geographer, Ratzel focused largely on implementing a Darwinian view of struggle into an organic, almost Hegelian understanding of the state. He saw the state as a natural result of geography. As one historian notes, “It was, in fact, the land itself, according to Ratzel, that called forth the state.”\(^{54}\) In this sense, geography played an important role in the lives of the people who inhabited it. Each nation (or, as Ratzel would call it, Volk) and land (or, Boden) went through a semiotic exchange on which both eventually came to rely. This exchange was understood by Ratzel to be very explicit; his use of the term Boden invokes not only the abstract idea of territory, but translates literally to “soil”. Thus, for a nation to lose its geographic space or for the


\(^{52}\) David Thomas Murphy, The Heroic Earth, 7.


\(^{54}\) David Thomas Murphy, The Heroic Earth, 9.
By characterizing the state in such a way, the agrarian life – that is, the closest relationship possible between Volk and Boden – was glorified throughout the Politische Geographie. Moreover, in true Hegelian form, Ratzel emphasized the importance of movement, growth, and struggle for both human life and the life of the organic state. To draw “inorganic” borders, to artificially limit the state from its natural desire to undertake the dialectical expansion necessary for the existence of any organic life-form, upset the natural balance of both the nation and the land (an idea later utilized in full force by German nationalists after the Treaty of Versailles). The concept of Lebensraum was introduced by Ratzel as a prerequisite for a state's existence. It was, in fact, necessary for Volk and Boden to exist in a dynamic geographic space where both could naturally grow free from seemingly arbitrary, unnatural restriction.

However, an overtly political and racial theme would not be added to Ratzel's geodeterminist concepts until the academic ascension of the Swedish Germanophile Rudolf Kjellén (1864-1922). Kjellén had been trained in the German discipline of Staatswissenschaft, which combined law, politics, economics, and history. He was strongly influenced by the geographical theories of Ratzel and in 1917 (notably, in the

55 David Thomas Murphy, The Heroic Earth, 9.

56 The importance attached to the agrarian life was not an emphasis invented by Ratzel. Nor was it the first time German thinkers had encountered such an idea. The French Physiocrats were the first group of intellectuals to promote the agrarian lifestyle as the more 'natural' and beneficial alternative to urban society, and worked to establish an economy fundamentally (and explicitly) dependent upon agricultural production. For more on the influence of Physiocrats in Germany (although evidence does not suggest any overt links to Ratzel) see Kurt Braunreuther. “Über die Bedeutung der Physiokratischen Bewegung in Deutschland in der Zweiten Hälfte des 18. Jahrhunderts” in Wissenschaftliche Zeitschrift der Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Vol. 5, No. 1 (1955), pp. 15-65.

57 Herb, Under the Map, 51.
throes of the First World War) published *Der Staat als Lebensform*, which was an explicit attempt to politicize Ratzel’s work.\(^5^8\) Kjellén argued that Ratzel was far too simplistic in analyzing the nature of the organic state. The expression of the state as a territory (which Kjellén termed *Geopolitik* – the first to coin such a term) was only one of five ways the life of the state made itself manifest. The other four included *Demopolitik* (in which consisted a racial hierarchy), *Wirtschaftspolitik*, *Soziopolitik*, and *Herrschaftspolitik*. Through the use of these five elements, the state preserved its own existence.\(^5^9\) According to Kjellén, the state was an instinctual, organic being whose existence was contingent upon obeying “the categorical political imperative of expanding [its] space by colonization, amalgamation, or conquest.”\(^6^0\) Only by solidifying its power internally and externally through the use of its five media could a state truly thrive.

While these ideas had been circulating throughout Germany for years and had grown in popularity within the confines of academia, it took the outbreak of the First World War and Germany’s subsequent humiliating defeat to unify the majority of the German populace behind them. The new and unnatural territorial lines drawn by the Allies’ meeting at Versailles contradicted the fundamental principles of German geographic study as outlined by Ratzel and Kjellén. It would be through the use of these two thinkers that German geographers would attempt to reconstruct post-WWI

\(^{5^8}\) Rudolf Kjellén. *Der Staat als Lebensform*. Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1917. This book was originally published in Sweden in 1916 as *Staten som livsförm*. The 1917 publication was the first German translation.


\(^{6^0}\) Dorpalen, 52.
Germany. While nearly all academicians and politicians would clamor for a renewed national character, the different politicizations and interpretations of Lebensraum and Geopolitik, however, would make the decision on how to go about doing this incredibly difficult and hotly contested.

Ironically, but unsurprisingly, the first calls for an overtly political cartography were made by a geographer who had studied the persuasiveness of Allied maps. Joseph März, an employee of the new Weimar Republic's Reichswehrministerium (or Ministry of Defense), published an article in 1921 which contrasted British maps with “the bland, ineffectual, and overly scientific style of German maps.” He claimed that while the British had falsified geographic locations on their maps, the more interesting and necessary aspect of their cartography was a “clever presentation” of geographic information which bolstered the national identity of the British populace. März’s critique of German cartography fell short of establishing a concrete method of implementing his suggestion, but he did offer one important practice he hoped would be implemented: a call for German geographers to only publish maps which showed “the pre-First World War boundaries . . . to ensure that the lost German territories would never fade from the memory of the German people.” This prompted many German geographers to begin creating inventories of territorial descriptions for potential use in making territorial claims throughout Eastern Europe. Moreover, many postwar German maps began to

61 Herb, Under the Map, 78.
62 Herb, Under the Map, 79.
emphasize German settlements beyond its Eastern borders and as far as Polotsk, Minsk, Kamenets-Podolsky, and Siebenbürgen/Transylvania. The borderlines of these maps were often heavily exaggerated to favor German expansion and were “intensively propagated”\textsuperscript{64} until 1945 (for example, Figure 2-1).\textsuperscript{65}

A mere month after the publication of März’s cartographic critique, the Weimar Republic’s national geography convention met and passed a resolution proclaiming that it is a national necessity and duty that the link to Germandom of the areas which were torn from the German Empire in the Treaty of Versailles, including the colonies, remains clearly visible in atlases and maps, and advocates that only those works for which this is the case, be used for instruction in all school grades.\textsuperscript{66}

By 1922, General Karl Haushofer – a geographer at the University of Munich and a hero of the First World War – began to offer a more comprehensive way to implement a kind of suggestive cartography through a series of articles published in the academic journal, \textit{Grenzboten} (“Messages from the Border”). Haushofer demanded that cartographers and geographers alike utilize maps and atlases as overt political media for inculcating a desired national German character (as he, like März, claimed the British had been doing for decades by this time).\textsuperscript{67} Rather than merely rely on older maps dated before the


\textsuperscript{65}In my citations of maps, I will attempt to adhere as consistently as possible to the standards established in Christine Kollen, Wangyal Shawa, and Mary Larsgaard’s \textit{Cartographic Citations: A Style Guide, Second Edition}. Chicago: American Library Association, 2010.

\textsuperscript{66}Hackmann, 95-96.

\textsuperscript{67}Hackmann, 81.
Treaty of Versailles, German cartographers should focus on presenting a contemporary world drawn contrary to the mappings of the Allied powers. As Haushofer would write several years later, “Nothing is more dangerous than to resign oneself to a loss which is not the result of natural necessity, but of an artificial and arbitrary act . . .”\(^{68}\)

In order to gain academic acceptance for his ideas as well as to include different perspectives on geopolitics from other disciplines, Haushofer gathered together a group of like-minded political geographers and founded the *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik* (“Journal of Geopolitics”) in 1924. This academic monthly journal would eventually come to dictate the intellectual discussion on geography in the Weimar Republic, as well as influence several prominent politicians and institutions over the next decade. Within a few years of initial publication, the *Zeitschrift* would enjoy an annual circulation which fluctuated between three and five thousand until the journal’s suspension in 1944.\(^ {69}\)

The members of the *Zeitschrift*’s editorial board had very different ideas about how the concepts of *Lebensraum* and *Geopolitik* should be applied to their journal or to the German national identity they hoped to revive. The four primary geographers who made up the editorial core of the *Zeitschrift* during the duration of its publication were Haushofer, Kurt Vowinckel, Erich Obst, and Otto Maull. Haushofer and Vowinckel were both committed relatively early on to the political goals of the Nazi party and wanted to use their journal as a catalyst through which to combine the theoretical thought of Kjellén with the National Socialist movement. Maull was particularly upset by this, and

\[^{68}\] Dorpalen, 95.

\[^{69}\] David Thomas Murphy, *The Heroic Earth*, ix.
felt that the racial and political implications of such a merger were a distraction from the real theoretical underpinnings of political geography. In a 1928 editorial, Maull explicitly declared Ratzel and his theory of natural territory as the only manifestation of the state to be the true foundation of geopolitics. In the same article, Maull implicitly suggested that Vowinckel and Haushofer’s glorification of Kjellén, their political activism (including their inclination to produce publications focusing on political science rather than geography), and their racial understandings of the state had forced the Zeitschrift into a “regrettable digression” of nongeographical orientation. According to Maull, geopolitics and political geography were one and the same and were distinct from political science and contemporary political institutions.

Haushofer and Vowinckel immediately responded, producing essays undermining Maull’s assertion and declaring geopolitics and political geography to be two separate disciplines. They believed that whereas political geography mapped out a political distribution of the world through the use of cartography, geopolitics was the use of political institutions and ideologies to educate and shape a national collective consciousness in respect to that distribution. This rift between Maull and his editorial peers is important when one considers the connection Haushofer and Vowinckel were attempting to build between politics and geography as well as their early political endorsement of the NSDAP. Ratzel’s theory of Lebensraum did not argue for a unified


71 Natter, 194-195.

72 Kiss, 641.
nationalism defined by biological or ethnic differences, which was a key tenet of the National Socialist movement. Rather, during his lifetime Ratzel openly criticized scholars who attempted to racialize his *Lebensraum* concept.\(^73\)

Yet, as the political climate of the Weimar Republic began to favor the movements of conservative nationalists, Haushofer and Vowinckel's intellectual persuasion won out in the *Zeitschrift* and the journal increasingly became more a political instrument than a vehicle of scholarly debate. After Adolf Hitler was appointed Chancellor in January 1933, Vowinckel became especially interested in establishing *Geopolitik* as a central tenet of Nazi ideology. However, the Nazi leadership found the *Zeitschrift*’s efforts to legitimize geopolitical study as unreliable. Hitler himself found Haushofer personally intolerable (although this may have had to do with Haushofer suggesting in 1938 that Germany should be satisfied with its foreign policy achievements).\(^74\) While the ideas of Haushofer and Vowinckel (and Kjellén) seemed to serve as a convenient intellectual buttress for German geographical expansion and cartographic propaganda, their direct influence over the policies of the Third Reich was severely limited.\(^75\)

While the National Socialist movement may not have been interested in these ideas, the government of the Weimar Republic had been convinced. When the Nazis rose to power, there was already a scattered government infrastructure dedicated to

\(^{73}\) Natter, 195.

\(^{74}\) Natter, 190. Even Haushofer’s student Rudolph Hess was no help to his former teacher in regards to this strained relationship.

\(^{75}\) Natter, 198.
mapping and planning the ecological resources and provincial boundaries of nearly all of Germany's regions. Often, the various leadership organizations which founded these area planning centers were explicitly influenced by the *Zeitschrift* and its editorial board.\(^{76}\)

Hitler's rise to power and the subsequent Nazification of German universities was a welcome change for the vast majority of geographers, who embraced this new regime in hopes of finally putting into place their academic vision of a reinvigorated national identity.\(^{77}\) In 1942 – a year in which the German Reich seemed committed to Eastward territorial expansion and colonization – there was a growing interest among geographers regarding the concept of *Lebensraum*. In an attempt to save this idea from serving as nothing more than a practical military term, Ernst Friedrich Flohr published an article attempting to "clarify" it. He claimed that only a “true Volk” could really benefit from the existence of *Lebensraum*.\(^ {78}\) During the Weimar Republic health professionals and educators had done an excellent job of linking “race hygiene” to geography in an effort to influence public policy.\(^ {79}\) This had also been a fairly common argument in intellectual circles and had already been used extensively throughout all levels of the German geographical education system as a means for promoting the idea of a


\(^{78}\) Rössler, “Geography and Area Planning under National Socialism”, 63.

“wandering” Jewish people. The Jews were not entitled to any place of their own because, in fact, they were not a Volk at all. Flohr, however, added to this notion the need for a definite distinction between a “true” and “false” orbit of Lebensraum. The “false” was simply a pragmatic zone, occupied for economic use (his example for this was an African colonial territory) in order to secure the “true” Lebensraum. Several other geographers contributed to this discussion, all of them consistently agreeing that there was a great deal more to the concept of Lebensraum than some sort of simple, “applied geography” which had “a much more practical commitment to fight for German space.” All of these geographers, like the Zeitschrift group, were discarded by the Nazis in favor of a more militarized version of Lebensraum – a version which was both seemingly beneficial to the national character of Germany and to Hitler’s own personal vision, a vision he seemed to have developed long before these academic disagreements. Regardless, the development of geography and cartography, of Lebensraum and Geopolitik, characterized a German discipline which was internationally admired and which the universities and faculty of other nation-states (many of whom, like Britain and the United States) attempted to emulate.

80 Wegner, 147-156.
82 Natter, 190.
Mapping World War II and Its Aftermath: German Geography under the Third Reich

After coming to power in 1933, the National Socialists inherited a vibrant class of intellectuals studying geography and cartography. Determined to revise German education to meet their political goals, the NSDAP made a habit of exploiting ideological tension between university faculty to their benefit. Opportunistic faculty members often had no qualms about exposing the racial and/or political identity of their colleagues in effort to more quickly and easily advance their own careers. While several geographers happily worked to propagate the racialized geographies of the Nazis through text books and maps, many more simply remained silent on political issues under the Third Reich. This was relatively easy to do as so few geographers were released after the April 1933 passage of the Law for the Restoration of the Professional Civil Service. Whereas 25% (that is, 188) of German university mathematicians went into hiding or exile during the Third Reich, only six geographers left or were removed from their respective posts.

There was, however, some resistance to the changes imposed on German universities by the National Socialists. One example is that of Carl Troll, a geography professor at the University of Munich and an individual who became prominent after the

83 Herb, Under the Map, 94.
86 Butzer, 228.
Second World War. One of Troll’s colleagues, Alfred Philippson, was a geographer who studied the Mediterranean region and happened to be Jewish. Philippson was first fired, then imprisoned at Theresienstadt, and finally slated for deportation to Poland. Troll interceded on Philippson’s behalf by contacting his friend and Swedish geographer Sven Hedin. Hedin was a sympathetic Nazi collaborator who shared political values and a mutual admiration with Hitler. Pressured by Troll into vouching for Philippson, Hedin made sure that the Nazi higher-ups kept him out of the Polish death camps. Philippson managed to survive the Holocaust and died in 1953 after resuming his work.\(^87\) Troll was never reprimanded or punished for working on his behalf.

Another important Jewish geographer who was removed from his position was Alfred Hettner. Hettner had been a student of Friedrich Ratzel and a staunch political conservative. He had held the first chair in geography at the University of Heidelberg and had retired in 1928. While he published a great deal of literature mocking the holistic approaches of Nazi spatial theory, he was forced into permanent retirement for being one-quarter Jewish. Hettner died in 1941 before the full implementation of the Holocaust, but lived out his final years labeled as a *Mischling* under the Third Reich.\(^88\) His work on regional geography had an immediate impact in his field (particularly on Carl Sauer at the University of California, Berkeley) and influenced countless students of geography. His dismissal, however, was not met with opposition. In fact, by 1936, geography professors at the University of Heidelberg had begun organizing special

\(^{87}\) Martin, *All Possible Worlds*, 183-184.

\(^{88}\) Martin, *All Possible Worlds*, 184.
seminars that focused on the borders of the new Nazi Germany and worked to establish institutional links between their department, their community, and the Volksgemeinschaft (or “people’s community”, a term used to invoke a sense of national, collective identity). Examples of institutional cooperation with the racist agenda of the National Socialists like this have led some historians to argue that the majority of academic resistance to Nazi-imposed personnel changes was prompted not by sympathy for the Jews, but by the threat of losing departmental autonomy. 89

This brings up some interesting questions: just how involved were German geographers in the spatial politics of Nazi Germany? While some of them (notably Carl Troll) stuck their necks out for particularly close colleagues, did any of them help plan the invasion and occupation of surrounding European nation-states? How, exactly, was a new Nazi geography imposed onto German mapmaking? These are important questions to address before moving on to the reconstruction of Germany after World War II. Many of these pro-Nazi (or, at the very least, complicit) geographers would help to re-shape their nation-state under the supervision of a victorious Allied coalition. The radical changes to German maps and their authors from 1933 to 1945 deserve some investigation.

As has already been mentioned, after the 1933 appointment of Hitler and the institutionalization of National Socialism, the discipline of geography became a hot ticket to funding opportunities and political relevance. Suddenly, at least for many geographers, the global depression of the 1920s came to an end and funding for

conferences, studies, and publications became available once again. But there were deep and significant changes to the structure of academic geography. German cartophiles, for example, had an extensive network of geography societies and associations by the early twentieth century. Like so many other nations, German mapmakers (and map admirers) had begun establishing these organizations by the mid-nineteenth century. Germany’s first professional society for geographers and cartographers was the Gesellschaft für Erdkunde zu Berlin, founded in 1828. That is only seven years after the Parisian Société de Géographie was established, and over twenty years before the creation of the American Geographical Society in New York City. And while the first “prototype” association for geographical societies was founded by the British Empire in 1788 as the Association for Promoting the Discovery of the Interior Parts of Africa (APDIPA), Britain’s Royal Geographical Society only came into existence with the merging of the APDIPA and the Palestine Association in 1830.

By 1933, all of the professional geographical societies were broken up by the Nazi leadership and slated for reorganization. This re-shaping of all mapping agencies (private and public) was incredibly complex and almost absurdly detailed. The development of these efforts is recounted below not (simply) to boggle the reader’s mind, but to illustrate the Third Reich’s inclination to micromanage its bureaucracy and


91 Martin, All Possible Worlds, 157.

its private industry. These changes also help to show just how vital the Nazis understood geography and cartography to be to the new Reich and its expansion.

On 3 July 1934, the Prussian Minister of the Interior Wilhelm Frick created a basic law – the “Law Concerning the Reorganization of Surveying” – to govern every mapping agency in Nazi Germany. Among other stipulations, the law made clear that the “Reich is in control of all surveying”, that the “Minister of the Interior will regulate the professional training of surveyors and the operation of private surveyors”, and that the Minister held the authority to regulate all land surveying, the administration of all land registers, the unification of measurements, and any taxation associated with map surveying and mapmaking.93 This law was primarily focused on gaining regulatory control over Germany’s chief mapping agency, the Reichsamt für Landesaufnahme (RfL), or the Reich Office of State Survey. The RfL had existed since the First World War and had, throughout the Weimar years, slowly transitioned from a cartographic institute focused purely on the military into a more general mapmaking center.94 The new Nazi government believed that without centralizing control over spatial representations, they could not keep important maps up-to-date or accurately plan infrastructural projects. Moreover, the Ministry of Interior justified the new law as necessary so as to best “utilize the German area fully for settlement”.95 Signed by both

93 Report from Allan Evans to Mr. C. Hitchcock (7 April 1947): “German Cartographic and Map Collecting Agencies: Controlling Laws and Regulatory Statutes” prepared by the Division of Map Intelligence and Cartography (5 February 1947), 2-3; 31-32.


95 Evans Report, 32.
Frick and Adolf Hitler, the new legislation was quickly enacted and was applied to all German Länderey, with some exceptions in the southern states (particularly Bavaria and Würtemberg, which still maintained their own autonomously funded state mapping agencies and had maps which were generally considered to be more reliable than those of other states96) who were allowed a bit of flexibility but were still subject to the jurisdiction of the Minister of the Interior and the RfL.

Comprehensive implementation of spatial centralization was not, however, immediate. Some of these reforms, as a 1947 United States government report on these laws states, would have taken “decades to complete even in peacetime.” Even those parts of the law which could have been quickly implemented nationally were first experimented with in Westphalia and the Rhineland under close supervision.97 The early centralized political control of maps was often problematic, with Nazi department heads disagreeing over minute details such as the color of particular nation-states on the world map. Frick, for example, believed that Germany should be depicted on world maps (or maps of Europe) as red, whereas Nazi Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels wanted to reserve that color for the British Empire (Figure 2-2). This forced geographers and cartographers (who were already, like most other social scientists, not particularly thrilled with methodological change) to relinquish their editorial decisions to political


97 Evans Report, 3.
higher-ups, opting for adherence to orders rather than chance drawing a line or adding a color that had not been pre-approved.98

By the end of May 1935, Frick had given the Reichsamt für Landesaufnahme “exclusive” rights over the production of Germany’s most basic topographic maps: the 1:50,000 Deutsche Karte, the 1:100,000 Karte des Deutschen Reiches, the 1:300,000 Übersichtskarte von Mitteleuropa, and the 1:1,000,000 Übersichtskarte (or World Map). These maps would be drawn up by the RfL and produced by their state offices throughout the Reich. The RfL also made good use of the map agencies still open (but slowly losing their autonomy) in Bavaria and Württemberg, charging them with the maintenance and production of the 1:25,000 topographic map sets and the 1:5,000 map sets known as the Deutsche Grundkarte und Katasterplankarte.99 Building this centralized and heavily regulated mapmaking infrastructure was important to the goals of the Nazis, who in September 1936 made it illegal for any private business firm to sell, or even distribute, maps of any kind which had not been pre-approved by an agency of the Reich.100

1937 was the year that the implementation of widespread regulations began to be more strictly imposed onto agencies throughout Germany. A new Deutsche Kartographie Gesellschaft (German Cartography Association) was created for professional cartographers, a uniform set of symbols and measurements was

98 Evans Report, 19.
99 Evans Report, 12; 33-34.
100 Evans Report, 36-39.
established, and place-names became heavily regulated. There were still, however, some gestures toward cartographic diversity and inter-departmental conflict. The Latin script, for example, was the only style authorized to be used by the Reichsamt für Landesaufnahme even though the Ministry of Propaganda and other German departments concerned with the dissemination of information had already banned it in favor of the German script-type.¹⁰¹ So, while every other official publication released during the Third Reich boldly displayed German script, all maps maintained the Latin script. Moreover, while the use of symbols chosen by the RfL was made obligatory, the state of Bavaria was allowed to produce its maps with its own place-marker for churches and its own method of drawing topographic contour lines.¹⁰² No exceptions were made for place names, however. By April 1937, every map in Germany was to apply German place names to any area which had belonged to Germany before 1918. Cartographers could label a particular territory with its new, post-Versailles Treaty label, but the German name had to be published next to it in bold while the foreign name was subjugated into parentheses. If there was room on the map for only one label, the German place name was always to be given precedence. The rules were even more stringent concerning bodies of water (many of which bordered, or ran through, the German state). Any sea near Germany (and, every sea surrounding Great Britain!) was to be designated by its German name. Rivers that ran through Germany could, at some point on the map, be labeled with a foreign name, but that name had to be in

¹⁰¹ Evans Report, 14.
¹⁰² Evans Report, 15.
parentheses and the German name had to be listed multiple times along the river’s demarcation.\textsuperscript{103}

Spatial totalitarianism continued to set in as the years drove on. In January 1938 a statute requiring all surveyors to take a loyalty oath to the state and join a state-sponsored professional organization was enacted. Surveyors could also no longer change their office addresses without permission from the Ministry of the Interior, they could not open any new offices, and they were not supposed to turn down any work “for which [they were] considered competent.”\textsuperscript{104} The next month, as the eventual incorporation of Austria into the Third Reich drew closer, the Ministry of Interior ordered all private cartographers to remain in their current positions. Cartographers were effectively banned from changing jobs so that the Nazi government could easily pluck them from the private sector in case they needed them to serve in the mapmaking departments of the Reich.\textsuperscript{105}

On 12 March 1938, Austria was annexed by Nazi Germany in the Anschluss. Six days later, and obviously anticipating future expansion, Wilhelm Frick, Adolf Hitler, and the Reich Minister of Finance Johann Ludwig von Krosigk all signed the “Law Concerning the Organization of the Hauptvermessungsabteilungen” (or “Main Surveying Offices”). While each of the German Länders had had its own surveying office under the supervision of the Reichsamt für Landesaufnahme, these offices were now to be

\textsuperscript{103} Evans Report, 18; 45-46.
\textsuperscript{104} Evans Report, 23-24; 50.
\textsuperscript{105} Evans Report, 22.
entirely defined and controlled directly by the Minister of the Interior. Prior to their creation and consolidation, “there was no systematic collection of data on topographic changes” in the German Länder. The Law went into effect on 1 April 1938 and required the Länder to pay for part of the surveying operations undertaken by these Hauptvermessungsabteilungen. The new districts of these offices were, however, not explicitly made clear until June 1938 when the Ministry of the Interior established fourteen different mapping districts:

I. The Province of East Prussia
II. The Province of Silesia
III. The State of Saxony
IV. Berlin, the Potsdam “region” (Regierungsbezirke), and Frankfurt/Oder of the Province of Brandenburg
V. The Province of Pomerania, the Grenzmark region of the Province of West Prussia, and the Prenzlau “district” (Kreis)
VI. The State of Mecklenburg, the Hanseatic City of Hamburg, and the Province of Schleswig-Holstein
VII. The States of Oldenburg and Brunswick, the Hanseatic City of Bremen, the State of Schaumburg-Lippe, and the Province of Hanover (excluding the Osnabrück region)
VIII. The States of Thuringia and Anhalt, and the Province of Saxony
IX. The State of Lippe and the Osnabrück region
X. The Rhine Province
XI. The State of Hessen, the Province of Hessen-Nassau, the Saar Territory, and the Bavarian region of the Palatinate
XII. The States of Württemberg and Baden, and the Sigmaringen region
XIII. The State of Bavaria (excluding the Palatinate)
XIV. The State of Austria

As the Third Reich seeped further into Eastern Europe with the October 1938 acquisition of the Czech Sudetenland, more associations and more districts were

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required for effective occupation, planning, and territorial assimilation. In January 1939, the Reich created the Research Council for Surveying and Cartography (Forschungsbeirat für Vermessungstechnik und Kartographie) and divided it into the three subdivisions of geodesy, surveying techniques, and cartography (later, in 1941, it would add a fourth branch on colonial cartography and surveying).\textsuperscript{109} By February 1939, all laws concerning the manufacture and production of maps and other spatial representations were imposed on Austria and the Sudetenland. All mapping agencies which had existed prior to German occupation, perhaps most importantly the Austrian Cartographic Institute, were simply subsumed into the Hauptvermessungsabteilungen, and the Sudetenland was territorially split up and attached to its surrounding districts (specifically, districts II, III, XIII, and XIV).\textsuperscript{110} After the invasion of Poland on 1 September 1939, the Ministry of the Interior established a fifteenth district for Danzig and West Prussia and a sixteenth for the Wartheland. A special survey division was also set up in Krakow and made available to the Governor General of Poland.\textsuperscript{111}

By the Spring of 1940, the sheer volume of maps (and their accompanying regulations) was forcing many German geographers to recognize the need for a more collective approach to the academic study of mapmaking during the Second World War. On 6 February 1940, maps containing any information that “might be detrimental to the common good” were banned, even if those maps were published after January 1933.

\textsuperscript{109} Evans Report, 29.

\textsuperscript{110} Evans Report, 7.

\textsuperscript{111} Evans Report, 8. Hauptvermessungsabteilungen I and II were also enlarged to include the provinces of East Prussia and the provinces of Upper Silesia, respectively.
Restrictions were broadened to not only include sheet maps and maps in atlases, but also “cartographic illustrations in books”. The importance of consolidating the study of geography became even more evident as Germany settled into its occupation of Eastern Europe. New provisions governing the cartography of the “Eastern Areas” mirrored the German laws, but often included the important disclaimer that all regulations were valid only for those geographers, surveyors, or mapmakers “of German blood.”

Two months after the Polish invasion one of Germany’s more prominent geographers and a member of the Zeitschrift für Geopolitik editorial board, Erich Obst, sent a confidential newsletter to every geography department in Germany (“Bitte vertraulich behandeln! Nicht für die Öffentlichkeit bestimmt!”). For Obst, the war brought about exciting opportunities for each of the academic sciences. Geography, however, was particularly important to the war effort and the cooperation of academic geographers with their military counterparts was seen as necessary and important. So, Obst proposed the creation of a new umbrella organization which would help protect and promote all of the fragmented geography associations through the German Reich. This new organization – which Obst called the Deutsche Geographische Gesellschaft (or the German Geographical Association) – would publish its own journal and organize inexpensive lecture tours. For Obst, the war provided an impetus for consolidating what until the Third Reich had been an enormously fragmented academic discipline that had

113 Evans Report, 68.
produced far too much written material under substandard scrutiny, and had no uniform policies for dealing with international academic exchange.¹¹⁴ By the end of 1941, the Deutsche Geographische Gesellschaft would be established and would encompass the interests and participation of university professors, secondary school geography teachers, and independent geographers. The new Gesellschaft was planned to, in effect, help organize the current geographical societies of Germany and help them cope with the territorial expansion of the Third Reich as it inevitably grew larger and larger.¹¹⁵ It would, however, remain of marginal importance throughout the war and postwar years largely because it lacked the funding and institutional power of another geographic institute founded during the Second World War: the Abteilung für Landeskunde (or the Office for Regional Studies).

The Abteilung für Landeskunde (AfL) was the brain-child of Emil Meynen. Meynen had been born in Cologne to Josef and Anna Meynen on 22 October 1902. Already by the age of twenty he had managed to become a research assistant in the Geography Department at the University of Cologne.¹¹⁶ Meynen was an ideological product of the pan-German movement and was attracted to institutions (and professional colleagues) who shared his interest in studying the German Volk both

¹¹⁴ Erich Obst. “Rundschreiben an die Geographischen Gesellschaften und die Inhaber der Lehrstühle für Geographie in Grossdeutschland” (November 1939), LfL 335-26/1.


within and outside the borders of the German nation-state. In the 1920s, Meynen joined Friedrich Metz’s Foundation for German Folk Culture and Soil Science (*Stiftung für deutsche Volks- und Kulturbodenforschung*) in Leipzig while continuing to work as a research assistant in Cologne and Berlin. Meynen’s training and networking resulted in his acceptance to the London School of Economics in 1929\textsuperscript{117} and subsequent external grants which allowed him to travel abroad (even after the Great Depression) in his attempt to study how German culture adapted to new places.

Meynen received a Rockefeller Foundation fellowship almost immediately after his acceptance to the London School of Economics. By January 1930, Meynen had used the Rockefeller funds to travel to the United States in an effort to complete “a research study of the economic and ethnographic geography of the German settlement district in Pennsylvania.”\textsuperscript{118} He was fascinated by the Amish in particular, as they seemed to have maintained semblances of their German-ness (like language and cultural traditions) while living peacefully alongside other immigrant groups that more readily embraced Americanization.\textsuperscript{119} His research was to culminate in a map of Amish congregations throughout Pennsylvania which would provide the histories and population growth of each settlement. Meynen also told the Rockefeller Foundation that he planned to create a bibliography of academic work on the Pennsylvania Dutch.\textsuperscript{120} In fact, the Pennsylvania German Society helped Meynen find a publisher for his

\textsuperscript{117} Letter from the London School of Economics to Emil Meynen (31 May 1929), LfL 761-3/203.

\textsuperscript{118} Letter from the Rockefeller Foundation to Emil Meynen (4 January 1930), LfL 761-3/258.

\textsuperscript{119} Wardenga, “Emil Meynen”, 33.

\textsuperscript{120} Letter from Emil Meynen to the Rockefeller Foundation (1 May 1930), LfL 767-6/369.
bibliography121 and one of Meynen’s articles, “The Farmland of the Pennsylvania-Dutch” ("Das pennsylvaniendeutsche Bauernland") was translated into English and published in The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography in 1940.122

Meynen’s work on the Amish was, however, one small part of a much larger project. He returned from the United States in 1933, and on 15 April 1935 Meynen presented his Habilitation thesis at the University of Cologne. His thesis was titled Deutschland und das Deutsche Reich and was published in 1937. Meynen would later characterize this work as running directly counter to the totalitarianism of the state at the time (and even that the sale of the book was eventually banned by the Ministry of Propaganda).123 There is no evidence that Meynen’s book was ever banned, and several geographers and historians have pointed out the pan-German revisionism with which Meynen approached the concept of the German nation in his Deutschland und das Deutsche Reich.124 There is also no denying that Meynen enjoyed a very prosperous career under the Third Reich. From 1935 through October 1944, he served as director of the Office of Research on German Folk Communities (Geschäftstelle der Volksdeutschen Forschungsgemeinschaften). This Office has become incredibly controversial in recent years, especially after it became evident that it was eventually relocated next-door to the offices of Group II C of the SS-Reichssicherheitshauptamt, or,

121 Letter from Tracy B. Kittredge to Emil Meynen (17 December 1934), LfL 761-3/257.

122 Letter from Julian P. Boyd to Emil Meynen (19 January 1940), LfL 761-3.

123 "Lebenslauf" (30 March 1953), LfL 818-2/94.

that is, the Jewish section of the Nazi Gestapo. The historian Michael Fahlbusch has claimed that locating the Office of Research on German Folk Communities right next to the SS office was not at all coincidental, but was necessary for Meynen and his geographers to be as effective as possible in legitimizing the exclusion of Jews from the German Volk.\textsuperscript{125} Perhaps the greatest confluence of these two offices was made manifest in the \textit{Generalplan Ost}, the Nazi plan for the ethnic cleansing and German settlement of eastern European territories. From 1939 to 1945, somewhere between 31,000,000 and 45,000,000 people living under the \textit{Generalplan Ost} were displaced.

As a territorial expression of the \textit{Lebensraum} concept, individuals who were excellent at solving spatial problems were called upon to assist Germany’s expansion. The Lublin District was, in particular, a territory pegged for experimentation by the SS – experimentation implemented and planned by land-use experts like Konrad Meyer and geographers such as Walter Christaller.\textsuperscript{126}

On 17 February 1936, Meynen was married and, a few months later, was appointed to a lectureship at the University of Berlin.\textsuperscript{127} While Meynen claims to have not joined the Nazi Party until 1938,\textsuperscript{128} most historians believe he had joined already in

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\textsuperscript{127} Fahlbusch, 423.

\textsuperscript{128} Letter from Emil Meynen to Jan. O.M. Broek (30 December 1947), LfL 761-5/460.
By 1938, Meynen had also become editor of the Publication Office East (Publikationsstelle Ost), one of the primary points of information collection and dissemination of all things concerned with policy toward the Soviet Union, the Ukraine, and other areas of Eastern Europe. Before the end of the war, Meynen would serve as an advisor for Central European Affairs to the Ministry of Interior, would head the Committee on the Historical Atlas of Europe, and would maintain a presence as one of the most knowledgeable experts on German-speaking enclaves in eastern and southeastern Europe. Michael Fahlbusch has argued that Meynen was deeply entrenched in re-drafting central and eastern Europe, helping not only to re-draw Czechoslovakia after the 1938 Munich Agreement but also consistently working to help re-settle Germans into the eastern occupied territories and re-Germanize (Umvolkung) the Volk living there. At the very least, Meynen was in Poland during the Fall of 1939 and almost certainly contributed in some way to its initial invasion and occupation. This was no secret – Albrecht Penck wrote to Meynen while he was at the front, as did Meynen’s students and colleagues at the University of Berlin. Only in August 1940 was Meynen recalled from the eastern territories to resume his academic work.

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132 Letter from various colleagues to Emil Meynen (5 September 1939), LIfL 761-3/256c. Also see Letter from Albrecht Penck to Emil Meynen (22 October 1939), LIfL 761-3/220.
133 Letter from Ernst Correll to Emil Meynen (23 April 1949), LIfL 761-6/488.
It should come as no surprise, then, that after Meynen’s return he was interested in the creation of a new central institution devoted to “regional studies”. In October 1940, Meynen submitted a formal report to the Ministry of the Interior which carefully outlined the need for this new institution. It was quickly approved, although it was not given the autonomous status Meynen had requested. Instead, on 1 April 1941, the Abteilung für Landeskunde (AfL) was established in Berlin as a branch of the Reichsamt für Landesaufnahme and charged with undertaking research concerning all German regional studies. While the AfL was allowed to do a certain amount of its own research, it also was required to participate in the collection and dissemination of cartographic data (a process which was becoming slower and slower as the war dragged on) and shared a fairly intimate relationship with the government and military institutions of the Third Reich during World War II. From April 1941 onward, the AfL would play a major role in the development of, and the regulation of, cartographic material produced for the Third Reich.

By the summer of 1941, the National Socialist government had come to realize that the Second World War was not going to be as short as they had hoped. The Reichsamt für Landesaufnahme was ordered to streamline the dissemination of maps. From May 1941 until the end of the war, maps would only be made available to the public through pre-approved distributors in each of the

134 “Berichte zur deutschen Landeskunde, Bd. 36” (1966), LIfL 816-3/49.

135 Evans Report, 6.

136 Evans Report, 11. Also see Wardenga, et al., 27.
In what was initially a somewhat spontaneous attempt to help organize and distribute the new edicts from the Nazi government, as well as changes in academic appointments and a running list of German geographic publications, Emil Meynen’s AfL began publishing a newsletter, the “Berichte zur Deutschen Landeskunde” (“Report on German Regional Studies”), in October 1941. Within a year, the Berichte had become so authoritative and so helpful to the cartographers and geographers of the Nazi regime, that the Minister of Interior issued a memorandum in August 1942 encouraging administrators of his various offices to subscribe to it. The Minister had good reason to do this – Meynen was more than happy to toe-the-line of the Third Reich in his academic and public publications. For example, one of the first publications of the AfL was a gazette assembled by Meynen entitled the Official and Private Gazetteers of the German Reich and the Central and Eastern Neighboring Area, 1910-1941 (Amtliche und private Ortsnamenverzeichnisse des Großdeutschen Reiches und der mittel- und osteuropäischen Nachbargebiete, 1910-1941). In its foreword, Meynen emphasized the importance of adhering to the Nazi regulations requiring German place names to be used in all maps, even if those places were beyond the German frontier. In an effort to be as helpful as possible (to, I imagine, both the Third Reich and its mapmakers) this publication included a place-name directory and a list of every gazetteer which portrayed the German Reich and its

137 Evans Report, 78-80.
139 Evans Report, 87.
central/eastern neighboring areas from 1910-1941.\textsuperscript{140} In the same year Meynen published an article on German land acquisition in the United States titled “The Expansion of European Lebensraum in North America” (”\textit{Die Ausweitung des europäischen Lebensraumes in Nordamerika}”) which was so popular it went through a second printing in 1943.\textsuperscript{141} There is little evidence that Meynen was attracted to the Nazi party because of antisemitism, but as these publications show, he was very willing to promote the Third Reich’s understanding of the German nation and its expansion into other parts of the world.

It was in 1942 that maps began to be heavily censored. While place names, border lines, and other territorial semiotics had been regulated since the dawn of the Third Reich, it was only in the summer of 1942 that these regulations were extended to “all textual explanations of cartographic works . . . especially tourist guides and hiking manuals, even if no maps are attached.”\textsuperscript{142} In fact, by the end of 1942, all descriptive names on maps were ordered removed. No maps published since, and all maps published prior, had to exclude any and all references to “gasworks, power plants, waterworks, chemical factories, blast furnaces, oil tanks, transmission stations, barracks, powder storage, and ammunition factories . . .” Moreover, many rail lines and public roads were also ordered off of the Reich’s maps.\textsuperscript{143}


\textsuperscript{141} Letter from Emil Meynen to Jan O.M. Broek (30 December 1947), LIfL 761-5/460.

\textsuperscript{142} Evans Report, 87.

\textsuperscript{143} Evans Report, 15.
By 1943, of course, things were not going well for the Axis Powers. Allied bombing raids were devastating many of Germany’s urban centers, and geographers were not immune from the destruction. On 22 November 1943, Emil Meynen’s home in Berlin burned to the ground. While his family survived in-tact, his entire personal library was obliterated.\(^{144}\) Meynen quickly sent his family off to live with his mother-in-law in East Prussia and moved what little remained of his cartographic collection to the AfL offices. Unfortunately for Meynen, on 4 December 1943 the AfL headquarters in Berlin was hit by some bombing, and many of its holdings were also destroyed. This “terrorist attack” (Terrorangriff), as Meynen called it, forced the Abteilung für Landeskunde to take refuge in the small town of Worbis, Thuringia.\(^{145}\) Because of his work on various projects and in various offices of the Third Reich, Meynen did not follow the AfL until mid-March 1945.\(^{146}\)

As the Second World War grew worse for Nazi Germany, and the Third Reich grew more desperate, attempts to control cartographic material reflected a certain level of anxiety. On 20 February 1944, individuals and organizations that were not “official agencies, schools, armed forces, organizations of the Nazi Party, and the Red Cross” were banned from acquiring maps at a scale of 1:300,000 or larger.\(^{147}\) While this ban (strangely) did not require Germans to hand over any maps they had already previously

\(^{144}\) Letter from Emil Meynen to Jan O.M. Broek (30 December 1947), LfL 761-5/460.

\(^{145}\) “Bericht an den Vorsitzenden des Verwaltungsrates Herrn Oberbürgermeister Ministerpräsident Freyberg” (20 December 1943), LfL 581-1. Also see Letter from Gottfried Pfeifer to Mr. De Graff (24 February 1947), LfL 779-7/594.

\(^{146}\) Letter from Emil Meynen to Jan O.M. Broek (30 December 1947), LfL 761-5/460.

\(^{147}\) Evans Report, 21.
purchased or obtained, the new restriction was logistically problematic. On 21 February 1944 millions of Germans showed up at their local train stations only to find that the rail maps had all been taken down and were no longer available for distribution. The Ministry of Interior, then, was forced to quickly re-draft the regulation, allowing for railway stations (and tourist guides) to produce maps at a scale of 1:300,000, but only “provided they are sketchy and schematic, have no scales, and show no industrial plants.”

By the end of 1944, things were really starting to collapse. The eastern front had shifted from deep into the Soviet Union back to the territory of East Prussia. Geography organizations within the German military, such as the German Navy’s Mar-Geo (Marine Geographie) unit, the German Army’s Forschungsstaffel unit, and the Mil-Geo (Militärische Geographie) unit, eventually disbanded as the war drew to a close. A small team of Mar-Geo mapmakers, in an effort to keep compiling and disseminating war material, moved out to Kronach, Bavaria in February 1945. By 16 March, the Mar-Geo’s re-located headquarters had been bombed and it was dissolved by “wireless order”. German academic associations and government branches, however, were forced to figure out ways in which to make conciliatory gestures toward an oncoming enemy while maintaining their most valuable cartographic material. Many, such as the Geographical Institute at Bonn University (where Carl Troll was professor at the time) chose to flee. The Geographical Institute moved from Bonn to the small Bavarian town

148 Evans Report, 90.

149 Emil Meynen. “Geographical and Cartographical Institutions and Organizations, Remarks on Changes at the End of the War” (17 December 1946), LfL 781-7/575.
of Scheinfeld in the late winter of 1944. Scheinfeld was in no small part chosen among the many other small German towns because Troll’s mother lived there. Other organizations did, however, sometimes disband. The Reichsamt für Landesaufnahme – that massive mapping institution under which the Abteilung für Landeskunde operated – was dissolved after the German surrender on 8 May 1945, along with nearly every other government agency and institution. The AfL, though, was still holed up in Worbis. Meynen, who had not heard from his family in months, along with the majority of his staff, was stuck at the end of the war in (ironically) a territorial limbo. Where they would end up, exactly, was no longer a decision they could make on their own. Their future place, both literally and in service to a future German government, would be dictated to them by an Allied occupational power.

**Mapping World War II and Its Aftermath: American Geographers Go to War**

The somewhat abrupt entry of the United States into the Second World War left the American military with little time to prepare cartographically for a worldwide conflict. Even after the reliance of Allied Powers on maps during World War I, the United States had failed to organize any semblance of “systematic map collecting” or cataloging. Captured maps from the Central Powers were largely discarded or allowed to be clumsily stored in various unidentified libraries throughout the world. Even if the U.S. military had cared to begin building a major cartographic archive after the Great War,


152 Letter from Emil Meynen to Jan O.M. Broek (30 December 1947), LIfL 761-5/460.
most of the participants’ maps were limited to areas of “relatively static trench warfare” and fairly useless more than twenty years after the enactment of the Treaty of Versailles.\textsuperscript{153} Shortly before (and certainly after) the United States Congress declared war against the Axis Powers in December 1941, a state of cartographic panic enveloped all branches of the United States military as they realized that they needed to begin deploying troops into various theaters for which they “had virtually no maps.”\textsuperscript{154}

It was almost immediately clear that the American military was not even bureaucratically prepared for the acquisition and production of the much-needed cartographic material. The Army’s Geographic Section and Engineer Reproduction Plant – the organization initially responsible for map collection and dissemination – was hastily renamed “The Army Map Service” and moved from its out dated and relatively small facility at the Army War College in Pennsylvania to a new, much larger plant in Brookmont, Maryland, a few months after the announcement of war. Over the next few years, its staff would expand from 150 servicemen and women to 3500.\textsuperscript{155} Charged with mapping what would eventually become the most geographically extensive military conflict ever undertaken, a genuinely global conflict, the initial acquisition procedure of


the Army Map Service (AMS) was easy and straightforward: take “any map from any one kind enough to give or lend it.”  

The most obvious domestic source for recent foreign maps were large public and university libraries, many of which had departments or divisions dedicated to cartography and geography. In fact, during the build-up to war the Army’s Geographic Section had already begun making isolated requests for maps from libraries to use during various Army maneuvers in the fall of 1941. They had also begun borrowing material related to Germany from the New York Public Library’s (NYPL) Map Division as early as August 1941. Unfortunately most, if not all, of the maps received from libraries were somewhat out dated. For example, the two most well used and authoritative documents borrowed from the NYPL were Westermann’s Plan von Gross-Berlin (dated 1938, the most recent of the bunch) and the London Times Atlas (dated 1922), both of which were considered to be “primary reference atlas[es] of the period.” When the Geographer of the United States, S. Whittemore Boggs, requested any and all important German geographic material from the American Geographical Society Library in the fall of 1940, he was told that his query would take quite some time to complete as those files were not really very “up to date”. To make matters worse, the material being lent

156Mary Murphy, 2.


159Letter from S.W. Boggs to Elizabeth Platt (15 November 1940), AGS Library Records, Box 4, Folder 27. Boggs was geographer of the United States from 1924 to 1954 – see Martin, All Possible Worlds, 437, fn. 3.
to the military by various libraries was under constant demand by regular patrons, particularly those immigrants from Czechoslovakia and the Sudeten area who, after the crisis of 1938, were hard-pressed to discover their exact political status for the purposes of naturalization, voting, and Social Security registration. Figure 2-3, for example, shows the increase in patronage at the American Geographical Society Library from 1939-1952 – an increase of over 250% percent. Moreover, the lack of authoritative cartographic resources (especially in the late 1930s as Hitler's aggression became more and more apparent) and their seemingly random placement in libraries across the globe resulted in what could be described as a “competitive scramble” between London and Berlin to guard both their own territorial representations and to gain information concerning each other's counterpart. Such efforts took a serious toll on those librarians and archivists expected to keep map materials accessible to the public and their own military while simultaneously scouring their resources for potentially dangerous cartographic information.

Fortunately, individuals were another source of valuable (and sometimes not so valuable) cartographies. So desperate was the American military for material during the first few months of 1942 that Major General William J. Donovan, Director of the Office of Strategic Services (the institutional predecessor to the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency) made a nationwide appeal for maps on the radio. The response was overwhelming and

160 Hudson, 13-14.

161 Leonard S. Wilson. “Lessons from the Experience of the Map Information Section, OSS” in Geographical Review, Vol. 39, No. 2 (April 1949), 298. An interesting example of the consequences of this “scramble” is the Royal Canadian Air Force’s borrowing of the New York Public Library’s most recent copy of Berlin’s telephone book in order to plan on bombing particular addresses. For more on this see Hudson, 11.
lasted throughout the War.\textsuperscript{162} Among these were Austrian-American veterans of the First World War who sent Italian maps they had used in collaboration with the German military\textsuperscript{163} and a seemingly overzealous Italian-American who wished to be contacted by a “trusted agent” so that he could disclose information regarding the area of his birth (the province of Aquila).\textsuperscript{164} The military often replied to such responses with gratitude, thanking various citizens and acknowledging their help in filling cartographic “blank spots.”\textsuperscript{165}

Filling in the “blank spots”, however, helped little if the cartographers receiving these maps were unable to translate and/or understand foreign mapping processes. Very few American geographers and cartographers had any experience with different methods of creating cartographies. Often, the military requested irrelevant maps simply because it misunderstood the “sources of supply or the nature of the material.”\textsuperscript{166} Such requests added an unnecessary burden to the already overworked staffs of map collections and prompted several attempts to collect and organize all of the major mapmaking nation-states’ cartographic systems into one publication. One of these projects, \textit{Foreign Maps} by Everett C. Olson and Agnes Whitmarch, made explicit the

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  \item Wilson, 302.
  \item InterOffice Memo entitled “Maps of Italy and Corsica” from Mr. Lester Rouck to R. DeVecci (September 4, 1943), NARA RG 226, Stack 190 5/30/7, Box #229.
  \item Letter from B.J. De Chanso to the War Department (November 6, 1943), NARA RG 165, Stack 390 35/22/05-07, Box #784.
  \item Letter from C.C. Jadwin to Lt. R.S.G. Hall (22 September 1943), NARA RG 165, Stack 390 35/22/05-07, Box #784.
  \item Wilson, 298 & 307.
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immediacy of its content, claiming that its publication “had to be advanced because of the urgent wartime need for [its] information.”

The United States, even if it somehow had an incredible quantity of maps ready by its entry into World War II, did not have a huge pool of qualified mapmakers and map analysts. While geography had been a burgeoning academic discipline ever since the employment of William Morris Davis (the “father of American geography”) by Harvard University as a geography instructor in 1878, no English-language cartography textbook was published until 1938. Those few individuals who were called upon by the United States government for their cartographic expertise quickly became vital to the war effort.

One geographer whose importance to the war (and postwar) effort has been recognized by geographers and historians alike was Richard T. Hartshorne (1899-1992). Hartshorne had received his doctorate at the University of Chicago in 1924 and landed a faculty post at the University of Minnesota through 1940. In the summer of 1941, Hartshorne was asked to help establish and head the Office of Strategic Service’s Geography Division, and would eventually also become Acting Director of the OSS Research and Analysis Branch. He was not the first geographer asked to help with this new top-secret undertaking (that honor belonged to Preston James, who served as chief of the Latin American Section, Division of Special Information, and who had recommended Hartshorne), but his organizational skills and talent for managing his staff made Hartshorne among the most influential. One could argue that, perhaps, he was


168 Denis Wood. *Rethinking the Power of Maps* (New York: The Guilford Press, 2010), 122. The first American geography department was installed at the University of Chicago in 1903.
much more influential as a bureaucrat than he was as a scholar. Under his leadership, the OSS compiled geographic studies of Brittany, Normandy, the Balearic Islands, South France, Sicily, Southern Italy, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Albania. His geography division drew up civil affairs handbooks for the military in Germany during 1944 and, in September of that year, produced a 6-volume regional study of southern Germany.\textsuperscript{169}

While working as a professor of geography at the University of Minnesota, Hartshorne became interested in the boundaries of Central Europe and eventually, in the late 1930s, traveled abroad in an effort to learn more about them. He initially went to Vienna (and later, after he could “no longer stand it in Germany”, to Zurich) but was disappointed when he had “almost no chance to look at” the boundaries themselves. In Hartshorne’s own words, “they were too ‘hot’.” He was forced to return to the United States in early 1939 (much earlier than he had wanted) because of the looming Nazi invasion of Poland.\textsuperscript{170} After his return, he published an essay in 1940 titled “Suggestion for a More Stable Settlement of European Boundary Problems.” In this essay, Hartshorne argued that ideas of abstract “justice” could not adequately be applied to the European map – there were just too many nations and ethnicities with legitimate claims to large swaths of disputed territory. Already thinking about potentially redrawing Europe after the Second World War, – a war the United States had not even entered yet – Hartshorne immediately rejected calls for a return to the imperial boundaries that

\textsuperscript{169} “Contributions and Problems of Geographers in the Europe-Africa Field”, AAG, Part II, Box 22, Folder II.

\textsuperscript{170} Letter from Richard Hartshorne to Elizabeth Platt (5 November 1939), AGS Map Department Records, Box 2, Folders 37.
existed prior to WWI. In a bit of an ideological departure from the post-WWI days of Isaiah Bowman and *The Black Book*, Hartshorne readily admitted that after the new World War, no reasonable European would see national sovereignty as a means through which to attain the solidification of national borders or international security. Instead, he prophetically advocated for a Europe in which nation-states would give up some sovereignty in exchange for some security, a Europe in which it would be “less critical just where the boundaries [were] located.”

Coming from an academic discipline which (rightly) revered German scholarship, which was in fact only possible through the transmission of German ideas into the United States from across the Atlantic, Hartshorne was understandably sympathetic to Germans living under the Third Reich. For him, it was Hitler that was the problem. If only, he wrote in early 1941, Germans would take the time to stop focusing on the faux internal and external enemies produced by Hitler, then they would see how ridiculous their economic and political systems had become. It was these political systems which, in 1941, were at war, not “good vs. bad.” Hitler’s aggression had to be stopped and, Hartshorne noted, “If we were sure Britain could do it, we could rest on our oars; since not, we are in for it.”

Between 1939 and 1943, the combined aggression and expansion of Hitler’s Third Reich and Stalin’s Soviet Union had resulted in the territorial displacement of

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171 Richard Hartshorne. “Suggestions for a More Stable Settlement of European Boundary Problems” (September 1940), AAG, Part II, Box 187, Folder M.

172 Letter from Richard Hartshorne to Stephen Jones (14 January 1941), AAG, Part II, Box 194, Folder O.
30,000,000 Europeans.\textsuperscript{173} This created a huge problem for Allied geographers who, by 1941/42, were actively trying to figure out how to solve the problem of European territorial restructuring after the Second World War. The most urgent concern, however, was what to do with Germany. Prior to the war, Hartshorne had warned against splitting Germany into separate states because little “faith could be placed in an arbitrary division forced upon Germany that no major group within Germany would support.”\textsuperscript{174} President Franklin Roosevelt’s Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, also warned that any new division of Germany would create more problems than it would solve. But Roosevelt and two of his closest policy advisors, Sumner Welles (Under Secretary of State) and Henry Morgenthau (Secretary of the Treasury), all genuinely wanted to dismember what had become Europe’s chief aggressor-state. Almost immediately after the entry of the United States into the Second World War, then, the Roosevelt administration began planning postwar territorial changes for the Continent.

Six days after the bombing of Pearl Harbor, a “Geographical Program of Studies” was organized within the U.S. State Department. It was charged with bringing together, “in a concise, detailed, and organized form, all available information of a geographical nature . . . needed for the formulation of policies and the execution of plans that deal with the development of a sound political, economic, and social basis for international relations after hostilities cease.”\textsuperscript{175} One month later, in January 1942, this program was

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  \item \textsuperscript{174} Richard Hartshorne. “Suggestions for a More Stable Settlement of European Boundary Problems” (September 1940), AAG, Part II, Box 187, Folder M.
  \item \textsuperscript{175} Otto E. Guthe. “Geographical Problems of Studies with Department of State for Current Post-War Use” (12 December 1941), AAG, Part II, Box 141, Folder Q.
\end{itemize}

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clarified to be under the supervision of the State Department’s Office of the Geographer. It was divided into two “operating units”: a section on geographic research charged with assembling data, and a section on cartography which was responsible for producing maps. The January 1942 memorandum made it clear that the State Department, while finding geographic problems “extremely complex and of major importance”, was not prepared to dedicate any great amount of resources to this new program. Rather than hiring dozens of new government workers, the Office of the Geographer was to solve Europe’s territorial problems with a very small staff and hired consultants. The process through which geographic issues would be dealt with was three-fold. First, the “most authentic and recent information and maps” would be acquired and studied. Second, the “implications of the geographic facts presented” were to be “clarified”. Finally, the staff would prepare and present reports to the State Department about their findings and their policy suggestions.

The first meeting of this new quasi-organization was called on 17 January 1942. It had ten participants, including Richard Hartshorne, the State Department’s Geographer S.W. Boggs, and the academic geographers George Cressey and Robert Platt. The meeting was opened by Boggs who suggested that the current war would be relatively short, so it was urgent that postwar territorial problems be dealt with as soon as possible. To Boggs, peace settlements rarely brought peace, but “a careful and detailed organization of material and people” could certainly help make that happen.  

Boggs then raised the issue of what the group should focus on. “Those areas where

176 “Minutes of Conference of Geographers, January 17-18, 1942” (17-18 January 1942), AAG, Part II, Box 141, Folder Q, pg. 1.
boundaries appear to have raised serious problems in recent years,” he argued, “should receive first attention.” His colleagues, however, disagreed and collectively decided that those issues should be reserved for the end of their meeting.

Instead, the first issue the committee wanted to discuss was the problem of population. Most of these men had studied, and all had some familiarity with, the remapping of Europe after the First World War. The various drafts of maps proposed at this meeting make clear the pressure these men felt, having been made responsible for fixing the shattered spaces of Europe – an achievement geographers had (obviously, by early 1942) been genuinely unable to stabilize. Among the standard maps of a postwar reconstruction (population density, productive capacity, food consumption, housing, etc.), several of the geographers suggested creating a language map of Europe. Ethnographic and linguistic maps had been popular prior to the Second World War, but this new map would also include a catalog of language-mixture “zones”. Moreover, any language maps created were also to be accompanied by a mapping of “population pressure” – that is, the psychological desire of a particular nation or people to territorially expand.

After hours of discussion, it was decided that the committee would produce two different kinds of maps to deal with population. One would focus on social issues, drawing “ethnography, linguistics, religion, literacy and ideologies” onto the spaces of Europe. The other would deal with the economic problems of population

177 “Minutes of Conference of Geographers, January 17-18, 1942” (17-18 January 1942), AAG, Part II, Box 141, Folder Q, pg. 3.

178 “Minutes of Conference of Geographers, January 17-18, 1942” (17-18 January 1942), AAG, Part II, Box 141, Folder Q, pgs. 3-5.
(of which Figure 2-4 serves as an example): “population pressure and over-population, levels of living, per capita power potentials, and occupations.” 

For the rest of the day, the geographers discussed pragmatic cartographies which would help keep individuals alive within a chaotically postwar spatial framework. Agricultural maps showing raw materials, food deficiencies/surplus, and market consumption were proposed. Interestingly enough, when it came to food mapping, several of these American geographers brought up a particularly well-done series of land productivity maps in Germany ("Eine Bonitierung der Erde") as an example of how to correctly undertake this project. Mineral maps were also clearly an important enterprise, and the committee agreed that it was vital to show the State Department not only where current resource mining was taking place but where it could take place in the future. They also planned to create maps which would show the “administrative attitudes and legislation regarding mineral exploitation and conservation which have been adopted by the states of the world”, “the varying relations between underground and surface mining rights”, and “the extent of foreign ownership and imperialistic exploitation of mineral resources”. With that, they ended their meeting for the day.

On the second day of their planning, the scope of the committee seemed to expand. Not only did the geographers seem interested in mapping and re-mapping

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179 “Minutes of Conference of Geographers, January 17-18, 1942” (17-18 January 1942), AAG, Part II, Box 141, Folder Q, pg. 7. 


Europe, but they began to talk about the importance of mapping other parts of the world. In a discussion on industrialization, several members brought up the growing importance of India, Siberia, and Brazil. After spending some time on this, Hartshorne brought the committee back to its primary concern: “It would be extremely useful at the present time,” he explained, “to prepare maps to aid our understanding of the post-war picture.” In particular, Hartshorne wanted to know which industries (especially war-time industries) would survive the current conflict. After some discussion, the committee determined that they should draft maps of current employment, the regional distribution of skilled and unskilled labor, and also a map comparing the prevalence of war-time industries in 1914 to those in 1942.

Finally, the State Department’s team of geographers could no longer avoid the most difficult question they had to face: what were they to do with Europe’s contentious borders? And what would the political geography of Europe look like after the war? How to combine nationalities and ethnicities into “workable” states, and deciding on the size and boundaries of those states were the primary topics of their meeting’s second and final day. After lamenting over their situation – one in which none of them found much enthusiasm (a stark contrast to their counterparts during and after the First World War) – one geographer in attendance suggested that the new postwar states of Europe

184 “Minutes of Conference of Geographers, January 17-18, 1942” (17-18 January 1942), AAG, Part II, Box 141, Folder Q, pg. 17.
invest themselves in transnational federations. He noted that few of the gathered members were interested in drawing entirely new lines for the various European states, and if these obviously imperfect states were going to survive alongside one another they needed some kind of “higher authority” to maintain a territorial stasis. Nearly all of the geographers agreed (the one exception being Robert Platt, who felt that the decision violated the 1941 Atlantic Charter agreement between the United States and Britain promising that territorial changes would only be made with the approval of the people living within the territories affected).¹⁸⁵ This idea of creating regional clusters of states quickly became the dominant way (in the United States, at least) of thinking about, particularly, Eastern Europe.

Long before the historian Timothy Snyder identified them as the “bloodlands”, Richard Hartshorne understood the territories between Germany and the Soviet Union as a cartographic “shatter zone”.¹⁸⁶ Within this area – “the Balkan and Danube countries [along] with Poland” – were four main ethnic groups: the Slavs (who were divided further into north-plain Czechs, Slovaks, and Ruthenians, and south-plain Slovenes, Croats, Serbs, and Bulgarians), the Magyars, the Romanians, and the Germans.¹⁸⁷ It was in a territory like this, Hartshorne argued, where a federation could really work at keeping peace. The geographers who mapped Europe after World War I

¹⁸⁵ “Minutes of Conference of Geographers, January 17-18, 1942” (17-18 January 1942), AAG, Part II, Box 141, Folder Q, pg. 18.
¹⁸⁷ Richard Hartshorne. “Political Organization of the Danube Region” as attached in a letter from Stephen Jones to S.W. Boggs (2 June 1942), AAG, Part II, Box 187, Folder M, pg. 2.
had failed miserably by creating a volatile Eastern European bloc based on the nation-state system. According to Hartshorne this resulted in five inevitable problems: the ethnic majority-minority dichotomy, the marginalization of minorities, the political under-representation of minorities, the division of nations into ethnically homogenous states, and the near impossibility of economic cooperation within post-WWI states. A federation would fix these problems by establishing an Eastern Europe with “no dominant culture and hence no true minorities”, an Eastern Europe where “each group that was a majority in one state would also be represented as minorities in the others . . .” 188 If this federation included Slovaks, Greeks, Albanians, Magyars, Bulgarians, Romanians, Bohemians, Austrians, and Poles altogether, if it maintained a capital city “in a linguistic borderland”, and if it properly utilized the industrialized regions of Upper Silesia, Moravia, Bohemia, and Austria, it could be a real and stable European power of 108,000,000 inhabitants. 189 While none of this would come to fruition (because, of course, the United States was not invited to play the role of neutral territorial arbiter that it had so enjoyed after World War I), this kind of plan makes clear the idealism and the creativity with which American geographers were approaching European territorial problems.

However, it was only in 1943 that the urgency felt by the State Department’s geographers was also adopted by the American military leadership and shifted from

188 Richard Hartshorne. “Political Organization of the Danube Region” as attached in a letter from Stephen Jones to S.W. Boggs (2 June 1942), AAG, Part II, Box 187, Folder M, pg. 7.
189 Richard Hartshorne. “Political Organization of the Danube Region” as attached in a letter from Stephen Jones to S.W. Boggs (2 June 1942), AAG, Part II, Box 187, Folder M, pgs. 8-10.
Eastern Europe to Germany itself. As the Soviet Union repelled the military advance of the Third Reich at Stalingrad in the winter of 1942/43, and as the Western Allies built up momentum in North Africa, it became ever clearer that there was not going to be any kind of peace negotiation between the Axis and the Allies. The war was going to be won only by invading the bloated German nation-state and, with the Soviet Union having joined the Allied Powers in the summer of 1941 (and making clear its intent to hold dominant influence in Eastern Europe), remapping the “shatter zone” was soon eclipsed by the very real possibility of having to re-map a shattered Germany.

In April 1943 British General Frederick Morgan was made Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander (a strange post considering there was no appointed Commander quite yet) and charged with planning Operation Overlord, the largest amphibious military invasion in the history of the world. While there was little chance that Germany would collapse before the invasion (which was schedule for 1944), Morgan believed that he needed to prepare for the possible occupation of Germany by Allied forces. In an emergency plan code-named RANKIN, Morgan and his staff worked out where into Germany each member of the Allied Powers would send their respective troops. Because he was simultaneously planning Operation Overlord, Morgan counted on primarily using the British and American troops which were being mobilized on the British Isles for this potential occupation. RANKIN required British troops to push into northwestern Germany while the Americans moved into southwestern Germany. The Soviets had consistently refused to cooperate adequately with Allied Command, so

eastern Germany (including Berlin) was ignored by Morgan’s staff because they assumed that they had no authority over the Soviet military.\textsuperscript{191}

One month later, British State Secretary of War Anthony Eden, pitched the RANKIN plan to the British War Cabinet. In effect, Germany would be split into three zones of occupation. Several members of the Cabinet were unconvinced and the issue was sent to the British military’s Armistice and Post-War Committee (chaired by Clement Attlee). The Committee soon agreed with Eden and Morgan, but further added the suggestion that Berlin be divided between Allied Powers as well. The three zones, as drafted by the committee, included a British “Northwest Zone” made up of Hanover, Hessen-Nassau, the Rhine province, Schleswig-Holstein, and Westphalia, an American “Southern Zone” made up of Baden, Bavaria, Hessen-Darmstadt, Westmark (the Saar and Palatinate), and Württemberg, and a Soviet “Eastern Zone” made up of everything else except East Prussia (which, the Committee assumed, would be ceded to Poland) and Berlin.\textsuperscript{192} This plan was never entirely adopted, but it served as a launching point for territorial negotiations. The Committee’s suggestion to divide Berlin was, of course, taken up by the Allies, as was their demarcation of the Soviet Union’s Western border of their zone of occupation. Moreover, the Committee’s attempt to create zones by using already-established \textit{Länder} became part-and-parcel to Allied postwar planning. On 23

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\textsuperscript{192} Franklin, 7-8.
August 1943, the Combined Chiefs of Staff accepted the RANKIN plan at the First Quebec Conference, along with the plans for Operation Overlord. 193

While President Roosevelt had been at the First Quebec Conference, he had not been present for the adoption of the RANKIN plan. He was also absent when, in October 1943, Cordell Hull presented Anthony Eden and Vyacheslav Molotov (the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs) his own plan for an Allied occupation which encouraged the creation of an “Inter-Allied Control Commission” and was intentionally vague about the territorial demarcations of an occupied Germany. Historian William M. Franklin claims (convincingly) that Hull’s plan was purposely filled with ambiguity because he did not want to “encourage Roosevelt’s inclination toward dismemberment” and was concerned about turning the proposed zones into “lines of permanent cleavage.” 194 Nevertheless, within a month Roosevelt was clearly aware of the RANKIN plan and used it regularly as a great example of how to split up Germany into smaller sovereign states. While Roosevelt maintained this position throughout 1943, the number of little Germanys he wanted swung back and forth. He told the Joint Chiefs at one point that “practically speaking there should be three German states after the war, possibly five”, then proposed five states with an additional two internationalized regions at the Tehran Conference (28 November – 1 December 1943), and finally proposed somewhere between five and seven at the Yalta Conference (4-11 February 1945). 195

193 Franklin, 7-8.
194 Franklin, 3-4.
195 Franklin, 10.
Indeed, Roosevelt had his own idea of how the occupation zones of Germany should be drawn and who, exactly, should occupy what. At a meeting in November 1943, Roosevelt haphazardly drew lines on a National Geographic Society map that just happened to be sitting near-by (Figure 2-5). From that moment on, there would be a serious disconnect between FDR’s often ambiguous and ever-shifting understanding of German space and the pragmatic approaches of his State Department and OSS Geography Division staffs. As recounted by the Assistant Chief of the State Department’s Division on Territorial Studies at the time, Philip E. Mosley, the State Department also had to cope with the unrealistic expectations of the War Department. According to Mosley, the War Department constantly insisted that postwar zones of occupation were of no concern to anyone besides the military – it was a “military matter” that would be decided “at the proper time” and at the “military level”. The State Department was concerned, however, at the military’s clumsy braying. The War Department’s plan for zonal occupation was simply to let the chips fall as they might – the United States would occupy whatever territories its troops were in at the time of German defeat. The American military was not alone in adopting this position, and in late 1943 a member of the British Foreign Office also proposed avoiding the creation of zones altogether. Instead, Allied troops were to simply be dispersed throughout the nation-state, intermingled and forced to rely on cooperation with one another. This plan was never adopted. Neither the United States, nor the Soviet Union, was willing to

196 Philip E. Mosley. “The Occupation of Germany: New Light on how the Zones were Drawn” in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 28, No. 4 (July 1950), 587-588.

197 Mosley, 588-589.
risk leaving troops potentially isolated from the centralized logistical and military support the establishment of zones offered.

By 1944, the abstract lines being planned and tentatively drawn by Allied cartographers began to solidify and become more concrete. At this time more than two hundred geographers had been recruited by American departments and agencies, and were working on making new maps not only of Germany but of territories in Asia and Africa. This engagement with the world (an engagement which included the American public through newspaper maps, burgeoning map libraries, and fresh textbooks) stood in stark contrast to the narrow European focus of the small geography unit within the State Department during the First World War.\textsuperscript{198} But, of course, it was the territorial problems of Germany which spilled the most ink, and the proposals came hard and fast in 1944 as the war began winding down in favor of the soon-to-be Allied victors. Catchwords like “denazification” and “reconstruction” began accompanying nearly every Allied report.\textsuperscript{199} Figuring out exactly who would be denazifying whom, and who would be rebuilding what, was becoming more and more urgent as the year wore on.

On 14 January 1944, the British submitted their preliminary official maps of the planned occupation at the first formal meeting of the European Advisory Committee (EAC) in London.\textsuperscript{200} The map depicted a return to Germany’s 1937 boundaries (which came as a surprise to no one), and divided that territory into three zones of occupation

\textsuperscript{198} Richard Hartsorne. “Geography” (January 1944), AAG, Part II, Box 190, Folder I, pgs. 1-3.
\textsuperscript{200} Franklin, 13.
mirroring the RANKIN plan. Despite the initial lines drawn by Roosevelt, this division was surprisingly equitable. The British would occupy all of northwestern Germany (Brunswick, Hesse-Nassau, the Rhine region, and everything north of it) while the Americans would control the Saar, the Bavarian Palatinate (west of the Rhine River), Hesse-Darmstadt, Württemberg, Baden, and Bavaria. The Soviets, according to this British proposal, would occupy Mecklenburg-Pomerania, Brandenburg, Saxony-Anhalt, Thuringia, and everything eastward (with the exceptions of East Prussia – which would become part of a new Poland – and Berlin, which was to be jointly occupied). In effect, the Soviets would control what Allied geographers had agreed was 40% of Germany’s territory, 36% of its population, and 33% of its resources. This proposal received mixed reactions. The Soviets were thrilled, despite not receiving more territory and resources to counter their disproportionate losses during the war. According to the British proposal at the EAC, the American and British troops which had plunged into eastern Germany would be forced to relinquish control of that territory to the Soviet Union. The Americans, however, refused to adopt the plan. Roosevelt, after hearing about it, personally intervened and demanded that the United States be granted the northwestern zone Britain had allotted itself. The U.S. would still be fighting a war in East Asia after Germany’s defeat and Roosevelt wanted easy access to the North Sea for the redeployment of troops. Moreover, FDR did not believe that it was the job of the United States to take up the “postwar burden of reconstituting France, Italy, and the

201 Mosley, 589-590.
Balkans” – effectively, British problems. Britain, he believed, should swap zones with the U.S. and maintain the southern German zone along with Austria.\textsuperscript{203}

On 18 February 1944, the Soviet Union submitted its own draft of a postwar Germany. This map was incredibly similar to the British proposal in several ways (and these characteristics immediately became the least controversial): Berlin was still shared by the Allies and the western border between the Soviet Union’s zone and the American/British zones remained unchanged. Austria, however, was split up between the three powers rather than being solely occupied by the United States. Moreover, East Prussia was clearly demarcated within the zonal borders of the Soviet Union (a move that surprised few, considering the Soviet Union had cut ties to the London-based Polish government in-exile by 1943).\textsuperscript{204} This proposal – which seemed to accept the most fundamental boundary lines of the earlier British proposal – appeared, according to Philip Mosley, as “a sign of a moderate and conciliatory approach to the problem of how to deal with postwar Germany.”\textsuperscript{205} Everyone at the EAC believed the big territorial issues were settled. It would not be the Soviet Union, then, that forced the issue. Rather, it would be the continual refusal of an unnecessarily stubborn and erratic American President.

After being informed that the Soviets had submitted a territorial proposal to the EAC, Roosevelt quickly jotted a note to the Acting Secretary of State Edward Stettinius,

\textsuperscript{203} Mosley, 590 and Franklin, 14.

\textsuperscript{204} Franklin, 13, 17 and Szaz, 106-107.

\textsuperscript{205} Mosley, 591.
Jr: “What are the zones in the British and Russian drafts and what is the zone we are proposing? I must know this in order that it conform with what I decided on months ago.” Stettinius rushed this impromptu query along to the State Department. The State Department had no idea what to do! What was Roosevelt talking about? The Tehran Conference? His National Geographic map? Which of the multiple territorial proposals – the five state plan? the seven state plan? the three state plan? – did Roosevelt want them to draft? The only thing Roosevelt had consistently made clear was his opposition to occupying the southern zone of the British proposal. A few days later, on 25 February 1944, the State Department received a zonal plan from the War Department. It was a mess: while it proposed the U.S. receive an enormous northwest zone of Germany (51% of its population and 46% of its territory), it had nothing about Berlin, and the boundary lines it proposed “cut crudely across geographic features and administrative boundaries . . . not actually [even] meet[ing] the German-Czech frontier.” Mosley describes the proposal as having “penciled lines radiating north, west and south from Berlin, a plan that only ceded 22% of German territory to the Soviets (and was, therefore, certain to be met with hostility if actually proposed to the other Allies). The State Department demanded that the military mapmakers at the War Department explain this plan, but they could not. They readily admitted that the plan had not been negotiated, but had come directly from the President.

206 Franklin, 14.
207 Franklin, 14.
208 Franklin, 17-18.
209 Franklin, 17-18 and Mosley, 591.
The State Department eventually convinced FDR to adopt the zonal line drawn by the British and Soviet EAC delegations.\textsuperscript{210} Throughout the first half of 1944, then, the lines were solidified but Roosevelt refused to give up on the possibility of occupying northwest Germany. Maps dealt with in negotiations marked eastern Germany under the occupation of the Soviet Union, but were forced to leave the other two zones unlabeled. Churchill and Roosevelt both refused to entertain the idea of occupying the southern zone. Only in July was this “deadlock” broken, when General Dwight Eisenhower – after successfully invading the beaches of Normandy on 6 June – made clear his intention to follow the RANKIN plan and protect the southern flank of the British troops as they moved into northwest Germany. Roosevelt never intervened with Eisenhower's decision and, at the Second Quebec Conference in September 1944, eventually caved and accepted the southern zone of Germany for American occupation. He did, however, require certain changes: the Saar and Palatinate would be transferred to the British northwest zone in exchange for the state of Hesse-Nassau. He also only agreed after being promised the small states of Bremen and Bremerhaven, which would supply the United States with access to the North Sea (Figure 2-6 and Figure 2-7 for cartographies of the final agreement). Roosevelt also refused to occupy Austria alone.\textsuperscript{211}

On 6 February 1945, despite protest from Roosevelt, France was granted a zone of occupation in Germany (and a sector of Berlin), derived from the American and

\textsuperscript{210} Franklin, 19.

\textsuperscript{211} Franklin, 21-22; Mosley 596.
British zones.  The French were allowed to control the Rhineland-Palatinate and the Hessen territories west of the Rhine River. Initially, the French delegation – particularly at the Yalta Conference on 11 February – asked also for control of Baden, Württemberg, Hesse-Kassel, and Hesse-Nassau so that they could have direct access to the Soviet Union. Baden and the southwestern half of Württemberg (renamed Württemberg-Hohenzollern) was granted to the French, but their requests for northern Württemberg, Hesse-Kassel, and Hesse-Nassau were denied because it would cut off the American and British zones from one another. The Curzon Line was also established as a new Poland’s eastern border at the Yalta Conference, a decision accompanied by many an empty promise regarding the demarcation of its eventual western frontier.

President Roosevelt died on 12 April 1945, leaving his Vice President, Harry Truman, in charge of planning and reconstructing a postwar continent. As Germany went through the final death-throes of the Second World War, and as Allied forces marched deeper and deeper into German territory, Churchill proposed to his new counterpart that it might be advantageous to postpone the occupational zonal plan and to maintain the presence of American and British troops in East Germany as a kind of bargaining chip with the Soviet Union. Truman refused, but not because he had any

212 Franklin, 23.
213 Mosley, 600.
215 Mosely, 602.
empathy for the Soviets. In fact, by the end of April the Allies would not only win the war in Europe, but would also begin work on re-drafting a German map that would reflect the values of the United States at the expense of the Soviet Union. The future of German space, as the Americans understood it, would need to be drawn by Germans if it was to have any real meaningful authority. Most of those Germans, having worked out of Berlin by the end of the war, were scattered throughout the future Soviet zone. Finding them, finding their maps and mapping equipment, and convincing them to draw a new, post-
Lebensraum state would be a fascinating (yet hugely overlooked) chapter in Germany’s history. The Allies could “denazify” German space, but they knew it would take the genuine cooperation of German mapmakers if their new postwar orientation was to be an integral part of Germany’s democratic “re-education.”
Figure 2-1. This is a great example of post-WWI mapmaking, with its emphasis on territorial diminution and a the greater German Reich. Reproduced by the New York Times. *A Geography Lesson for Young Germany*. No scale given. New York: New York Times, March 1935. Courtesy of the American Geographical Society Library.
Figure 2-3. Map Patronage and Inquiries at the American Geographical Society Library. Based on annual reports stored in the AGS Archive, Map Department Records, Box 1, Folders 26-39.
Figure 2-4. Here is an excellent example of a map published by the OSS for, primarily, postwar use. The location of Nazi Party district boundaries would help in the territorial transition from Third Reich to occupied nation-state. Research and Analysis Branch, OSS. *Germany: Party Gau Boundaries*. Washington, D.C.: Reproduction Branch, OSS, December 1943. Courtesy of the American Geographical Society Library.
Figure 2-5. Franklin D. Roosevelt. *Roosevelt’s Concept of Postwar Occupation Zones for Germany drawn in pencil by the President himself on a National Geographic Society map while en route to the Cairo conference. No scale given. In: Maurice Matloff. Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943-1944 (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1959), 341.*
Figure 2-6. This is a map, drafted by the Department of State’s Geography Division, of the eventual zones of occupation in Germany. Department of State, Division of Geography and Cartography. Germany: Zones of Occupation, International Frontiers 1937, Internal Boundaries 1944. Scale 1:2,500,000. Washington, D.C.: State Department, September 1945. Courtesy of the American Geographical Society Library.
Figure 2-7. Department of Research & Analysis, OSS. *Berlin: Zones of Occupation*. Scale 1:135,000. Washington, D.C.: State Department, Division of Geography and Cartography, September 1945.
Nazi Germany’s May 1945 surrender to the Allied powers only complicated the territorial disputes which had plagued wartime meetings between the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union. In fact, it escalated the urgency of laying down solid and specific borders around the soon-to-be established German zones of occupation. On 5 June 1945, the central German government was entirely dissolved and submitted to complete Allied occupation.¹ That very same day, the United States and Britain formally turned over the territories of Saxony, Thuringia, and Mecklenburg, territories that they had invaded/occupied during the Second World War, to the Soviet Union. In response, the Soviet Union assured the British and American governments that they would be allotted regions of Berlin for occupation, according to their earlier territorial agreements (Figure 3-1 shows the final zonal demarcations after the war).² This all seems very amicable, but both the Western Allies and the Soviets were working desperately to undermine the geopolitical importance of their counterpart’s territorial holdings.

¹ “Neugliederung der Länder nach 1945”. LfL 770-8/1.

It is generally accepted that those individuals forced to flee Nazi Germany during the Third Reich “were the greatest collection of transplanted intellect, talent, and scholarship the world has ever seen.”³ Similarly, the immediate postwar years saw the (often forced) exportation of German intellectuals and scientists to their respective Allied occupiers.⁴ Even while the Allies prepared to finalize some of their territorial agreements at the upcoming Potsdam Conference (17 July – 2 August 1945), they each rushed to secure any and all potentially important individuals their militaries had come into contact with. One of these attempts – “Operation Dustbin” – has been largely overlooked by historians in favor of the more prominent “Operation Paperclip”, despite its important outcome for the German zonal area controlled by the United States.

Three weeks before the Potsdam Conference began, Captain Lloyd Black and Lieutenant Thomas Smith were recruited by the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) to help participate in “Operation Dustbin”. “Dustbin” was a joint venture between the OSS and British intelligence focused on obtaining scientific information by securing the scientific institutes of universities and the various agencies of the now-defunct German government.⁵ “Dustbin” was a subsection of “Operation Paperclip” and a counterpart of the more politically-oriented “Operation Ashcan” (“Dustbin” and “Ashcan” were presumably named for their potential ability to “sweep up” after the German defeat in


⁴ The most famous of these migrations – at least in the United States – was “Operation Paperclip” which helped lay the groundwork for the American space program. For more on “Operation Paperclip” and other similar efforts, see John Gimbel. *Science, Technology, and Reparations: Exploitation and Plunder in Postwar Germany*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990.

⁵ “Report on the Progress of German Government Agencies of Supplying Scientific Institutes with Materials other than Air Photographs” (10 January 1947), LIfL 781-6/493.
Germans vetted for denazification through “Operation Paperclip” were either sent to “Dustbin” (if they had important technical knowledge and/or expertise) or “Ashcan” (if they were high-profile Nazi politicians).

Geographers were a prime commodity targeted by “Operation Dustbin” for denazification – many had been killed in the war, had fled Germany altogether, or were still in captivity. Black and Smith were assigned to locate prominent German geographers for “Dustbin”, and were both enthusiastic about this new assignment. Black had been a high school teacher before joining the war effort and was deeply interested in the socio-political causes of population transfers (as evidenced in his 1940 dissertation for the University of Michigan, *The Peopling of the Middle Willamette Valley, Oregon*). Smith was the son of prominent geographer J. Russell Smith and, prior to receiving his Economics PhD from Columbia University in 1943, had traveled the world (spending a great deal of time in Europe) with his father throughout the 1920s. Moreover, the importance of their affiliation with the American military cannot be overstated. Unlike the cartographic redrafting of Europe after the First World War, the civilian academics of the OSS Research & Analysis Branch who had planned for a new post-WWII Europe were, by October 1945, either allowed to go back to their universities or absorbed by the State and War Departments. By the end of the year, the OSS had

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8 Letter to Richard Hartshorne (30 September 1945), AAG, Part II, Box 200, Folder II.
been significantly downsized (and the Research & Analysis Branch no longer existed). In 1945, then, it was Black and Smith who were jointly charged with finding Emil Meynen and his Abteilung für Landeskunde, and then quickly moving the institution out of the soon-to-be Soviet zone of occupation into the American zone. The OSS was aware that the AfL had been moved from Berlin to the town of Worbis in northwestern Thuringia, and they badly wanted access to its staff, its equipment, and its maps. Acquiring excellent German geographers and cartographers would make the mapping of an occupied Germany all the easier in the eyes of the American intelligence community, and could potentially hinder the mapmaking capabilities of the Soviets (a hope that would turn out to be prophetic).\(^9\)

On 28 June, nearly a month after the United States had formally ceded the German state of Thuringia to the Soviet Union, Black and Smith drove into the small town of Worbis. They had already contacted Meynen, collected the names of his staff, and had picked up many of their immediate family members. Time, however, was not on their side. Upon Black and Smith’s arrival at the make-shift headquarters, the staff of the AfL was ordered to grab whatever they believed to be of importance (Smith supervised this selection of material), load these items into an equipment truck, and then squeeze themselves into the passenger truck which already held some of their family members.\(^10\) Meynen and thirty-four of his staff members had been chosen for export – quite the squeeze. From all accounts, it was a terrible and rushed experience.

\(^9\) Ute Wardenga, et al., 25.

All furniture was left behind, a great deal of out-dated and/or unimportant cartographic material was abandoned, and it rained the entire day. As the AfL staff would later recount, Black and Smith had retrieved them in the nick of time. The Soviets had already lined the roads in and out of Worbis with red banners, just as they had at many towns and cities prior to formal liberation-through-marching-parade.

The AfL staff was headed for Scheinfeld, the Bavarian town where Carl Troll’s Geography Institute at the University of Bonn had found refuge during the war. The American military had initially promised that the AfL would be housed in Scheinfeld’s Schwarzenberg Castle, the very building where Troll had managed to keep his own staff and materials safe from harm. After arriving, however, the military reneged and housed Meynen and his staff in an abandoned restaurant/hotel named the “Hotel Krone.” The AfL employees were now – whether they liked it or not – employees of the United States military government and were paid on a temporary monthly basis, a much nicer financial arrangement than what most Germans experienced in the initial months after the end of World War II. Their employment was, however, vital to the reconstruction of both Germany itself and German identity. Like most postwar stories of individual German subsistence, the work these geographers were required to do for their respective occupation power was the justification for their economic well-being – an end to which

11 “Berichte zur deutschen Landekunde, Bd. 36” (1966), LfL 816-3/49.
13 Letter from Gottfried Pfeifer to Mr. DeGraff (24 February 1947), LfL 779-7/594.
14 “Berichte zur deutschen Landekunde, Bd. 36” (1966), LfL 816-3/49.
the means of survival and (in rare cases) personal economic prosperity could be bargained.

After all, the postwar situation was bleak. Many of Germany’s most critical problems were spatial in nature, and required the attention of geographers and cartographers familiar with German infrastructure, land-use planning, and urban development. One of the most pressing issues during the Second World War had been the problem of displaced persons, a population estimated to have been nearly 30,000,000 (roughly 16,000,000 of whom were German).\(^{15}\) By September 1945, the number of displaced persons still hovered around 1,800,000.\(^{16}\) Through the summer of 1945 over 450,000 German expellees rushed back into the German Land of Saxony, sometimes sitting on the engines and coal cars of overloaded trains packed to the brim with freshly homeless faces – the all too human consequences of the Third Reich’s expansionist policies and attempts to colonize Eastern Europe. By 1948, five million people had passed through Bohemia, two million of them settling in Saxony.\(^{17}\) Finding housing for these individuals, the first step toward political normalization and a return to a peaceful Europe, was a priority for the Allied Powers. The AfL – while housed in Bavaria – was almost immediately charged with helping to solve this transzonal


problem, and while they may have been the most involved and independent of the agencies assisting, they were certainly not alone.

After the German surrender all geographical and cartographical societies, in all zones, were banned and forced to apply for re-establishment.\textsuperscript{18} Of course, this did not mean all work by geographers and cartographers immediately halted, or that coordination between individuals did not pick back up after the war. In fact, the Allies encouraged coordination. Black and Smith, the OSS operatives responsible for retrieving geographers in “Operation Dustbin”, were permitted to appoint zonal supervisors of spatial reconstruction. Each important \textit{Land} in the American zone was given a geographer-representative: Wilhelm Credner for northern Bavaria, Emil Meynen for southern Bavaria, Gerhard Bartsch for Hesse, and Heinrich Schmitthenner (who had, like Meynen, been evacuated from eastern Germany by the American military)\textsuperscript{19} for Baden-Württemberg. Moreover, Smith and Black appointed chairs for the other zones: Walter Behrmann was placed in charge of the Soviet zone, Hermann Lautensach for the British, and Carl Troll for the American and French zones. Finally, Emil Meynen was made general coordinator and became responsible for the bulk of cartographic and geographic material produced by this group.\textsuperscript{20} By August 1945, Meynen had already

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\textsuperscript{20} Sandner (1995), 144. While organized, no meeting of this new network took place until 1947. See Schelhaas, 31.
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begun work on a 1:1,000,000 map of Germany (a project he had begun with many of these same colleagues in 1942) and by the fall of that year this core group appointed by Black and Smith helped establish a Central Committee for German Regional Studies (Zentrauausschuß für deutsche Landeskunde).\textsuperscript{21}

Not all notable geographers, however, were recruited by the United States. In fact, “Operation Dustbin” was executed in order to obtain very specific individuals (like Meynen and Schmitthenner) and resources (like the holdings of the AfL). For example, Rudolf Reinhard, director of the German Institute for Regional Studies in Leipzig (Deutsches Institut für Länderkunde), seems to have been much less involved in the National Socialist government than either Meynen or Schmitthenner and yet was not targeted by the American OSS.\textsuperscript{22} As a resident of Saxony, Reinhard and his Institute were functioning under American occupation for the first few months after the war. During that short time, the U.S. army frequented the Institute and regularly borrowed maps and other literature. Already by the 12\textsuperscript{th} of May, the American and British occupation forces had confiscated over 12,000 maps from the Institute, along with nearly 200 cases of books, four cases of atlases, and seven cases of archive material.\textsuperscript{23}

In his many requests for institutional reparations after the war (bombing raids had destroyed much of the Institute’s equipment, but most of their cartographic material had been housed in the nearby town of Glauchau), Reinhard constantly repeated the use of

\textsuperscript{21} “Berichte zur deutschen Landeskunde, Bd. 36” (1966), LIfL 816-3/49.

\textsuperscript{22} Rudolf Reinhard. “Lebenslauf” (17 July 1945), LIfL 590-50.

\textsuperscript{23} “Deutsches Institut für Länderkunde” (1 February 1946), LIfL 587-36.
his holdings by the American military as evidence of his Institute’s postwar importance.\textsuperscript{24} He drafted a list of where he had hidden maps and geographic data during the war for the Americans: a castle at Glauchau, a castle in Podelwitz, and a castle near the town of Oschatz (where the Soviets had apparently found the material and confiscated it, much to Reinhard’s chagrin).\textsuperscript{25} Nevertheless, when the American military pulled out of eastern Germany – and took the AfL staff with them – Reinhard was left behind. After a brief period of internment,\textsuperscript{26} he re-opened the Institute under the auspices of the Soviet Union and worked (often begrudgingly) alongside the Soviet occupation. While the Anglo-Americans, then, were interested in exporting certain geographers and their material, it seems that in at least some cases the personnel could be abandoned if the cartographic material had already been attained.

Creating new material, though, became the job of Meynen’s \textit{Abteilung für Landeskunde}. By consistently securing contracts with the American occupiers, the AfL became the leading producer and disseminator of cartographic material in the tri-zonal area after the Second World War. No other geographers or geography institutes had the relative financial security of the AfL. As will be discussed in the next chapter, even re-opened geography departments at state universities were forced to rely on shaky government funding while the AfL had a direct financial connection to the American military (and this continued after the creation of West Germany in 1949).\textsuperscript{27} On 1

\textsuperscript{24} Letter from Rudolf Reinhard to the Military Government (11 May 1945), LIfL 587-36.

\textsuperscript{25} Letter from Rudolf Reinhard to the Police-state Centre (Leipzig) (16 May 1945), LIfL 588:38-1.

\textsuperscript{26} “Deutsches Insitut für Länderkunde” (2 January 1946), LIfL 587-36.

\textsuperscript{27} Ute Wardenga, et al., 28.
December 1945, the AfL was formally absorbed as an agency of the United States Military Government with, according to Captain Black, "a mandate to initiate and coordinate geographical research in Germany".\footnote{Lloyd D. Black. "Further Notes on German Geography" in \textit{Geographical Review}, Vol. 37, No. 1 (January 1947), pp. 148.} Meynen would report to the U.S. State Department's Division of Map Intelligence and Cartography. While the \textit{Abteilung} would be required to prioritize work for the occupation, a certain level of autonomy was allowed and the staff could work on their own projects if time permitted. Perhaps the most important work that came from this ability to draw unauthorized cartographies was the \textit{Landkreis Scheinfeld}, a comprehensive atlas of the town and district of Scheinfeld eventually published in 1950 (for some maps of the \textit{Landkreis Scheinfeld}, maps Captain Black proclaimed to be both beneficial for the administration of the Scheinfeld district and also "a useful laboratory for geographic research methods",\footnote{Letter from Lloyd D. Black to the Military Government Detachment at Scheinfeld (6 November 1945), LItL 779-8/626.} see Appendix A). The \textit{Landkreis Scheinfeld} helped to lay the foundation for a uniform approach to small-scale geographic study. By 1959, Meynen's institute had published thirty-two volumes of this \textit{Landkreis} series, each volume carefully chronicling the space of a distinct German geographic district.\footnote{1 June 1959.} One of the first projects given to the AfL by the American military government, however, was the compilation of a report on the situation of German maps and mapmakers after the Second World War. Meynen's staff was also immediately given the task of re-writing Germany's place name index so as to reflect the

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state’s 1937 boundaries. By December 1945, the AfL had been hired by the U.S. Military Government to draft a new map of Germany according to those 1937 borders which would be ready for publication by the following March. While clearly a determination made for political purposes, the understandable imposition of these boundary-lines on German space was veiled in scientific rhetoric. This map would be entirely disinterested, a “purely geographically oriented spatial structure” (”eine rein geographisch ausgerichtete Raumgliederung”). Of course this was not the case (and had never been the case). Various publishing houses lobbied Meynen to choose their particular firm’s “ground map” of regional divisions for this project. The map had to go through a screening process and needed to receive the approval of the American occupation authorities before it could be published but, as both the American supervisors and their German mapmakers consistently testified, this new map was somehow both apolitical and a cartographic rebuking of German aggressiveness and expansionism under the Third Reich.

But everything about reconstructing postwar Germany was political. In an effort to genuinely denazify and re-democratize German territory, rebuilding education (and, particularly, geographic education) was a serious concern for the Allies after the Second

31 “Aktenvermerk über die Aufgaben des Amtes für Landeskunde”, LIfL 779-7/589. While perhaps the only nation-state forced to change its place names, many other states also used place names to help revise their postwar places. Czechoslovakia, for example, was quick to change German place names into Czech place names. See Norman M. Naimark. *Fires of Hatred: Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth-Century Europe* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), 122.


World War. At the Potsdam Conference the victorious nation-states made it clear that “German education shall be so controlled as to completely eliminate Nazi and militarist doctrines and to make possible the successful development of democratic ideas.”

Some of the most virulently anti-democratic and militaristic educational tools of the Third Reich had been spatial doctrines: Lebensraum, Geopolitik, and the Generalplan Ost.

To truly denazify Germany, the Allies had to first denazify the way Germans thought about space. The most obvious way to accomplish this goal in the immediate postwar years was by reforming German education and by inundating the German public with maps depicting the freshly truncated German state.

**Displacing the Spatial Imagination of National Socialism**

As already discussed in the previous chapter, the academic study of space found its origins in 19th-century German universities. While the incorporation of geography and cartography into the universities of other nation-states helped to solidify the importance of those subjects on an international level, the Germans remained the avant-garde of spatial studies up through the Second World War. The prominence of German faculty members and the relatively unusual reverence the German public had for its professors were not lost on the Allied occupiers (just as it had not been lost on the Nazis). As they strove to “reeducate” many of Europe’s most intelligent and

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36 As pointed out in the last chapter, geography (as well as history) was one of the most heavily nazified school subjects. See Winfried Müller. *Schulpolitik in Bayern im Spannengsfeld von Kulturbürokratie und Besatzungsmacht, 1945-1949* (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1995), 255.
educated minds, the Allies worked hard to target specific disciplines for revision (at both the secondary and post-secondary school level). Subjects such as history, geography, and biology were seen as particularly vital to re-democratization. The denazification of educational materials was a process undertaken differently by each of the occupation powers, but common themes certainly existed (and were often couched in references to territory and space). In German textbooks and school maps after World War II, postcolonialism, globalization, and transnationalism were emphasized at the expense of ethnocentric territorial aggrandizement. While these changes and the project of "reeducation" were slow to start (and certainly did not attract much attention from the military administrations charged with governing the defeated Germany), the emerging Cold War – a war of ideologies in which Germany would serve as ‘ground zero’ – eventually prompted enormous financial and personnel investments from the United States, Britain, France, and the Soviet Union.


In the American zone of occupation, for example, General Lucius Clay (a deputy to General Dwight Eisenhower and, by 1947, military governor of the American zone of occupation) allotted only roughly 1% of the military occupation’s budget to education. In fact, at the time of the German surrender, the United States had only ten trained education officers for a zone with a population of almost 20,000,000. Initially, the American occupation administration was interested only in re-opening university medical facilities and actively exploiting the technological, scientific, and industrial achievements of the Germans in their zone to the advantage of U.S. businesses. On 25 August 1945, President Truman issued Executive Order 9604, effectively opening up “all information concerning scientific, industrial and technological processes, inventions, methods, devices, improvements, and advances” to the American public. As one businessman put it, flying into Germany after August 1945 was “just like going out on a hunting trip into unexplored territory.” With nearly 5,000 American applicants approved for travel to Germany for the sole purpose of obtaining and disseminating the trade secrets of German businesses (and, often, the scientific processes responsible for industrial/technological development), university research in the American zone – particularly in the sciences (geography being no exception) – came to a stand-still.

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Only in the summer of 1947, after General Clay determined that Executive Order 9604 was hampering research and, thereby, subsequently hampering Germany’s economic recovery, did the United States stop allowing its business interests to prey on German research institutes and universities.44

The predatory inclination of American capitalism, however, was the last thing on the minds of many German university faculty members. In January 1946, the Allied Control Council released Directive No. 24. While there had been several threats by the Allied powers concerning German denazification in the lead-up to the Third Reich’s defeat, Directive No. 24 was the first to offer specific details as to how this process would occur and exactly what professions would be forced to undergo it.45 Professors were, of course, included and, from the fall of 1946 to the spring of 1947, 15% of them were fired.46 Even before the January 1946 directive, several professors had been dismissed from their posts. A few of these had even been geographers. Wolfgang Panzer, for example, was forced out of his position at Heidelberg University in November 1945 for his service as a high-profile cartographer for the Third Reich from 1934 to 1939.47 Most geographers, however, were recognized as having joined the Nazi party for the sake of opportunity – not to have joined would have been an obstacle

45 Charles B. Lansing, 147.
to further research. Yet, as many of the natural scientists enjoyed relatively relaxed
denazification proceedings (especially if they were considered valuable to the
occupation or to the American occupier), many geographers were in the strange
position of having helped justify the aggressive spatial planks of the Nazi political
platform.48 Before the creation of their own new state in 1949, these same geographers
would be called upon by the Americans to help revise the territorial narratives they had
so carefully crafted. This transition, from (at the very least) passive bystanders – and
benefactors – of the destructive spatial policies of the Third Reich to active participants
in re-drawing a truncated and more peaceful Germany, was a messy enterprise.

The U.S. military occupation wasted little time in its attempt to re-make the
German education system in its own image. By September 1946, a ten-member
commission created by the American Council on Education recommended changing the
time spent in elementary school from four years to six years, educational exchanges,
and “improved teaching aids and library facilities.”49 This was particularly problematic
because by the end of 1946 roughly 20,000 (of 28,000) general education teachers in
the American zone had been fired as a result of Directive No. 24.50 Moreover, between
1945 and 1947, “a considerable number of students had no books, pencils, paper, or


48 Steven P. Remy, 157.
50 Christoph Führ. The German Education System since 1945: Outlines and Problems (Bonn: Inter Nationes, 1997), 13.
other aids to learning.”51 Those subjects prioritized for educational dissemination were often, during this period, broadcast from radio towers in the form of the U.S. occupation’s Schulfunk program. Even though radios were few and far between throughout the American zone of occupation, the lack of teachers and lack of course material for regular schooling made these broadcasts incredibly necessary (and often popular). Geography was one of the earliest segments taught in this format, alongside English, music, animal science, and economics. Teaching students how their particular space coexisted next to various other nation-states was seen as an important step toward democratization (Figure 3-2).52 These sentiments were also clear in the planning (and slow production) of text books within the American zone. Already by December 1946, American education specialists had begun demanding the de-emphasis of borders on German maps, preferring, rather, to stress the common “connection between all people and nations” (“Vor dem Kinde soll das Bild der ganzen Welt und der Zusammenhang aller Menschen und Völker erstehen.”).53

Such attempts by the American military were not exclusive to formal education. Printed material – magazines, journals, and newspapers – published and disseminated by the U.S. military government, were often heavily peppered with depictions of the postwar German state. Take, for example, Heute Magazine, a German-language magazine distributed biweekly by the American military government from 1946 to 1951.

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53 Winfried Müller, 255.
Sometimes – usually to accent articles on intrazonal political or economic developments – the American zone was presented as an island, seemingly ripped out of Germany’s territory (Figure 3-3 and Figure 3-4). As the relationship between zones changed, so did their respective representations on the pages of Heute. After the Bizonal Agreement of May 1947, “island mapping” of the American zone was still used, but was often combined with the British zone (Figure 3-5). Even in depictions of the German nation-state, American maps in Heute reflected the western Allies’ desire to keep “their” zones of occupation cartographically distinguished from the Soviet Zone.\(^{54}\) In Figure 3-6, for example, the borders of the German Länder are clearly marked, but only those states subsisting under the watchful eye of the Western Powers are provided capitals and text-box elaboration in this 1949 proposition.

Just as important – or so it seems when one considers the frequency of these mapped-narratives – were depictions of Germany as part of a greater Europe and greater world community. The isolationist “island mapping” of Germany was, by 1949, regularly expanded to depict transnational institutions such as NATO (Figure 3-7). Sometimes illustrators would converge maps with graphs, but – again by 1949, in an American military publication – these maps typically emphasized the importance of transnational economic unity. In Figure 3-8, for example, the projected influx of European productivity (as compared to 1936 levels) was superimposed onto a map highlighting nation-states receiving aid from the European Recovery Program. In those

\(^{54}\) This reflected larger policy decisions, and the desire (particularly by the Americans and British) to divide Germany into two states. For more on that issue, see Carolyn Eisenberg’s *Drawing the Line: the American Decision to Divide Germany, 1944-1949*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
initial postwar years, the United States quickly recognized the usefulness of maps for establishing not only new German boundaries but also Germany’s new role within an economically integrated European continent.

The British, in their northwestern zone of Germany, had begun the process of re-education at a much quicker and more intense pace than their American colleagues. The British were also less determined than the Americans to create reform through a series of top-down decrees, or by re-shaping the German educational framework. British education policy in their zone of Germany was, initially, to revise text books and then to simply assist and advise.55 By July 1945, the British Education Branch had already set up shop in the region of Westphalia under the directorship of Donald Riddy and with the explicit order to smoothly re-open schools and universities while simultaneously denazifying German curricula.56 In December, this Education Branch established a “German Textbook Committee” made up of educators, administrators, and clergy members. As one might expect, this committee was much more effective at criticizing the Nazi textbooks than in creating their own denazified alternatives. Often, they would simply re-use the rhetorical tropes of earlier rabid nationalists and geopoliticians to fit their own needs. For example, while the study of “military geography”, the glorification of nationalism, and the propagation of National Socialist


doctrine had all been explicitly banned, one of the committee’s proposed books – a
cultural Lesebuch – introduces itself with the following forward:

I am sitting before the map of Germany. Germany is the land of our
dreams. Germany is the height of all glory! My school-mate Jürgen
Wieben went to Hamburg once with his father; his boot had trod on ground
where Denmark had no say. Jürgen Wieben’s boot was a hallowed boot.57

This scenario – or, rather, the mental image of Germany presented here – mirrors the
spatial tropes of the Third Reich, but with a very different focus. Rather than incite
frustration with what were, according to the Nazi cartographers, suffocating and
unnatural borders, here Germany’s territorial demarcation (largely, a reflection of its
1937 demarcation) is presented as ideal. Political geography was, in fact, largely de-
emphasized (much to the chagrin of German geographers). Navigation, map reading,
and the importance of German assimilation outside of Germany (the study of the Auslandsdeutsche) were major sections of the geography curriculum in the British zone.
The heavy omission of potentially harmful geographic material was criticized by
geographers throughout the world, and some British administrators recognized that they
were presenting unnecessarily watered-down lessons to Germany’s youth. One of
these educational consultants recounted that many of the Third Reich’s text books
contained much more interdisciplinary and “realistic” problems than the text books back
in Britain. Those problems, however, had all been given a National Socialist tinge.
From 1933 to 1945, while “[British children] seemed forever to have to cope with
plumbers filling plugless baths with water”, German children had been studying

57 Kathleen Southwell Davis. “The Problem of Textbooks” in The British in Germany: Educational
questions such as, “If it takes 50,000 members of the *Wehrmacht* 3 days to conquer Holland [area of the country stated], how many days will it take 80,000 men to conquer England [area stated]?”

British revision of German text books had become, for many British administrators (and surely for many Germans as well), an attempt to replace tragedy with farce.

Britain, then, was also the western occupant most eager to hand control over education back to the Germans. In September 1946, the German Textbook Committee passed off the responsibility of reviewing Nazi textbooks for revision to Textbook Committees in each of its occupied *Länder*. By January 1947, the British had given control of education back to the Germans through Ordinance No. 57 and shifted their focus to supervision and advisement. This same month, U.S. General Lucius Clay announced the tightening of American control on its zone of occupation. After this it became increasingly clear (to the various Allied powers and the Germans) that while the U.S. may have rhetorically understated the role it had initially meant to play in reconstructing Germany’s education, 1947 would be a year of genuine reform. Simply shipping educational consultants to its zone in a lackadaisical effort to “advise” the restructuring of postwar German education had not been working well for the Americans. The British, French, and Soviets had each dedicated much more time and

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59 Kathleen Southwell Davis, 109.


money to education in the immediate postwar years than their American counterparts. By mid-1947 the French had 400 education officers assigned to their zone of occupation while the British had 190. Each German university in the French zone had four officers assigned to it; the British also had at least one officer assigned to each of their occupied universities. The United States, on the other hand, had only seventy educational officers assigned to its very large zone (one much larger than that of the French). The Americans had only appointed one education officer per four universities in the Hessen Land, and only one per eight in Baden-Württemberg! These disparities were not simply apparent at the university level. By the end of 1947, the French had published roughly 800 textbooks per 1000 school-children within its zone; the Soviets, 700 per 1000 (although to be fair, the Soviets did control Leipzig which, at the time, was one of the largest and most efficient centers of book publishing in Europe); the British, 400 per 1000; and the United States, a palsy 150 per 1000. The United States was, from the end of the war through the creation of the West German nation-state, by far the slowest producer of school and university text books.63

But the United States re-committed itself to German education in 1948, with General Clay going so far as to claim that re-education had become the American military’s “most important goal.”64 Throughout that year, the American military spent


63 Edward N. Peterson, 161.

64 Edward N. Peterson, 161.
$100,000 paying for nearly two hundred American education specialists to travel to Germany and help with this effort.65 These specialists produced all kinds of “paper plans” advocating everything from a “free, fully comprehensive secondary school system”66 to Americanizing the calendar of the German school year (which, rather than beginning in September, began in April).67 By 1948 the American administrators had made clear their expectations that each Länder within their zone was required to submit a plan detailing how each would begin incorporating the suggestions of these various educational consultants who had been imported from the United States. Only the city of Bremen (which “had a City Assembly favorable to radical reform”)68 ever actually got around to submitting a plan that was palatable to the American occupiers. Hesse, while it did submit a plan, demanded that higher-income families pay for public school – a requirement the U.S. military government refused to endorse. Bavaria, too, submitted a plan. This plan, however, either willfully ignored the wishes of the Americans or blatantly displayed Bavaria’s refusal to comply with them. The Bavarian plan maintained the traditional German two-track educational system and charged tuition for public school attendance. Württemberg-Baden did not complete or submit a plan; they

65 Helen Liddell. “Education in Occupied Germany: A Field Study” in L’Education de l’Allemagne occupée, ed. Helen Liddell (Paris: Librairie Marcel Rivière et Cie, 1949), 120-121. This, of course, finally increased the number of officers per university to the 1:1 ratio Britain had achieved years earlier.


continually asked for an extension. By the time the American occupation forces had had an opportunity to look over and respond to these plans, the American military was already preparing to hand over the control of German education to the new West Germany. What one British educational consultant during this time called the Americans’ “missionary zeal” in reforming German education had clearly backfired.

German schools in the American zone, while never actually adopting any systemic reforms, did eventually adopt denazified text books. From July 1945 through March 1948, the U.S. military government examined 2,509 text books for pro-Nazi material. They threw out 859 of these books, slated 567 for revision, and allowed 1,047 of them to be used without alteration. The most “nazified” disciplines during the Third Reich were found to be, unsurprisingly, the disciplines of history and geography. Like the geography text books published in the British zone after the war, the new American textbooks employed terminology similar to that used during the Third Reich. Josef Dietz’s 1948 Teure Heimat, sei gegrüßst (Greeting to You, Dear Homeland), for example, still works within its first few pages to encourage nationalism, but an insular nationalism – a nationalism that appreciates what it has and does not long for territory it has lost. He writes:

Yes, our Heimat is like a good mother. She cares for us from our cradle; shares sorrow and joy with us; and after death gathers us into her cool lap.


71 Winfried Müller, 252 & 255. In fact, in the American zone, there were no history textbooks used in classrooms prior to 1948. See Helen Liddell, 120-121.
This little book tells you about her, so that she shall grow ever closer to your heart...\footnote{72}

By 1949, over six hundred new text book titles – many of them focused on history and geography – had been incorporated into Germany’s curriculum. By the fall, when West Germany emerged from the western allies’ occupation zones, the U.S. had managed to publish roughly 14,000,000 copies of text books for the school-children living within the lines of its occupation.\footnote{73} After denazification efforts, 28,000 new teachers had been hired, making up 70% of the profession’s total population.\footnote{74} These developments – text books and teachers – were the only successful marks the Americans made on German education, by and large. Most historians (rightly) attribute these changes (or lack thereof) to the American military government’s tenacious obsession with denazification. However, the collaboration between the American military and German educators also brought about positive changes for the German people. Under the supervision of the American occupation government, Germans were often allowed to take the initiative and re-establish various organizations and institutions in an effort to normalize and legitimize academic/educational life under a foreign occupier.

German geographers were quick to recognize the willingness of the American administrators to permit their re-organization after World War II and allow them to participate in the revision of geography education. In fact, the first formal meeting between academic geographers after the war took place in August 1947 under the

\footnote{72 From Josef Dietz’s \textit{Teure Heimat, sei gegrüsst} (1948) as cited in Kathleen Southwell Davis, 125.}


\footnote{74 Christoph Führ, 13.}
leadership of Carl Troll and was encouraged by OSS operative Lloyd Black. The meeting took place deep in the British zone of occupation, at the town of Lüdinghausen, but included representatives from each of the zones and focused on geography instruction. The very next month this same group of geographers met with English-speaking colleagues to discuss various approaches to incorporating geography back into school curricula at the town of Büren (again, in the British zone, but with representatives from each of the other zones). The American representative at these meetings, Wilhelm Credner, managed to convince the American occupation authorities (not three weeks later!) to re-license the Verband der Hochschullehrer der Geographie (Association of German University Teachers of Geography) on 14 November 1947. A list was kept (in English) of the roughly 120 lecture courses taught at German universities throughout 1947 and submitted to each of the four zonal governments. By early 1948, German geographers had been successful in re-licensing a slew of organizations which had been abolished by the Allied powers after the Second World War: the Gesellschaft für Erdkunde zu Berlin (originally established in 1828), the Geographische Gesellschaft Bremen (1876), the Verein für Geographie und Statistik zu


78 “Newsletter” (2 April 1948), LIfL 783-3/156.

79 “Lectures and Seminars in Geography at German Universities” (1947), LIfL 805-3/98.
By the fall of 1948, German geographers were permitted to hold their first postwar *Geographentagung* ("Geographers’ Conference") in Munich. From 26 September through 2 October, geographers from all over Germany came together (as they had since 1885) to share ideas, teaching methods, papers, and publications. At this meeting, Wilhelm Credner, Emil Meynen, and Kurt Brüning began discussing the creation of an Association of German Geography Professionals (*Verband deutscher Berufsgeographen*). Despite some reservations, Meynen was particularly fond of this idea and used the publishing power of his *Abteilung* to begin laying the groundwork for this new organization. Meynen’s influence, as both an academic and as director of the most well-funded geography institute in Germany, was already made clear in the opening statement of the *Geographentagung* made by Wilhelm Credner. Credner called for Meynen’s Afl to work alongside other research centers in Germany. Collaborative efforts, Credner argued, were vital to the postwar maintenance of geographic institutions – many of which did not enjoy the consistent flow of work (or

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dollars) that the AfL had secured. While flattered, Meynen likely cringed at this reference to his work with the American occupation forces. He had certainly secured steady employment for many of his colleagues (and himself, of course). His cooperation with the Americans, however, had not always been pleasant.

**Interrogation and Internment: the Denazification of the AfL**

As already noted, academic and educational denazification in the American zone was more rigid and prevalent than in the British, French, or Soviet zones. The Americans had, after all, evacuated a great many scientists from the eastern territories of Germany into its own southwestern zone. So, while the British and French allowed questionable individuals to continue teaching (particularly in universities), the American military government had both the political will and the resources at their disposal to undertake long and arduous investigations of former Nazis. Geographers were no exception. Emil Meynen, the director of the *Abteilung für Landeskunde* and the individual who would become central to spatial reconstruction under American occupation, had welcomed the OSS operatives of “Operation Dustbin” with open arms and gone along with his Office’s evacuation from Thuringia to Bavaria. However, by the fall of 1946 he and several members of his staff were being interned at the Kranzberg Castle (Hermann Göring’s headquarters during the Third Reich, north of Frankfurt) and

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84 Gerhard Sandner, 143.
were the targets of formal interrogations and investigations.\(^{85}\) This small piece of postwar history reflects not only the suspicion with which the American military government approached liberated Germans who had helped to serve the Nazi regime, but also just how inconsistent (at both the institutional and individual level) attitudes toward such agents really were.

As the Second World War came to a close in the spring of 1945, and as Meynen and the AfL rushed to Worbis in an attempt to avoid Allied bombing raids, the geographer Otto Schulz-Kampfhenkel hid some geographic material at a monastery in the Bavaria town of Ottobeuren. Schulz-Kampfhenkel had, during the war, been a special geography consultant to the Reichsforschungsrat (Reich Research Council) and had also served as a lieutenant in the Luftwaffe and the SS. In April 1946, Meynen visited the monastery and retrieved this material by claiming, according to the monastery’s prior, that the information was needed for German universities. Instead, though, Meynen took the material back to the AfL in Scheinfeld without mentioning it to the military government.\(^{86}\) This lapse of judgment caught the attention of the U.S. occupation administrators and they began investigating Meynen and his postwar Abteilung. As it turned out, several questionable geographers were working for the AfL. Many of them had loose (or not so loose) ties to the geography section of the Nazi military, the Forschungsstaffel zbV, and to Schulz-Kampfhenkel. Moreover, this investigation uncovered several other concerns for the Allied powers. In the summer of


\(^{86}\) “Top Secret Report: Conclusions”, pg. 8; from the Personal Archive of Geoffrey Martin (PAGM)
1944, Meynen had collaborated with Schulz-Kampfhenkel on two different occasions, presumably doing work for the Forschungsstaffel. The Allies also noted that Meynen had failed to prevent the capture of one of his archives (located in Stassfurt – a city within the Soviet zone of occupation) by the Russians in the summer of 1946. This archive, according to the Allies, most likely contained “secret maps and aerial photographs . . . covering Russian, Balkan, North Italian and, possibly, [Oder-Neisse] line territory.” In fact, the American military had retrieved an OSS report that Meynen had forwarded to a colleague in East Berlin detailing the holdings of this archive after its removal.87 Perceiving Meynen’s actions to have been subversive attempts to undermine the American occupation, the Allies arrested him in the summer of 1946 and, along with Albert Speer’s staff and several I.G. Farben officials, took them to Kranzberg for interrogation.88 As soon as he was arrested, Meynen explained that he was working for the American intelligence community, but had no written evidence to back up that claim. As Meynen recounted the incident, the officers who came to arrest him had never heard of his Abteilung and, therefore, believed he was lying.89

The exact date of Meynen’s arrest, and the exact length of his internment, is difficult to determine. It is clear, however, that from July 1946 to May 1947, Erich

87 “Top Secret Report: Conclusions”, pg. 8, PAGM.
Otremba – not Meynen – was running the *Abteilung für Landeskunde*.\(^9^0\) Otremba, who was formally denazified in September 1946, had once served as a member of the Wehrmacht’s *Forschungstaffel* and had been invited to join the AfL by Lloyd Black in the fall of 1945. He quickly agreed and became a full-time employee in January 1946.\(^9^1\) While under investigation until September, Otremba was allowed to continue his work with only intermittent interruption by the denazification process.\(^9^2\)

The denazification reports which describe the exchanges between Emil Meynen and the Allied officers make clear the strange position of both parties. The Allies wanted Meynen’s cooperation and Meynen, believing himself to have been extremely accommodating since the Allied invasion of Thuringia, remained indignant toward his interlocutors throughout several of these interrogation sessions. Moreover, during this internment Meynen was heavily questioned about Germany’s various geographic institutes and the hiding places of cartographic material, yet the Allied officers continued to approach Meynen with a great deal of distrust. These exchanges make it clear that some members of the Allied occupation felt that Meynen and his organization had not been properly vetted, despite their employment to help re-map the German state almost immediately after the war.

The projection of Meynen here, though, through his reports to the interrogators and through the reports of the Allied officers themselves, is fascinating. He defended

\(^9^0\) Untitled Report on Emil Meynen, LfL 818-3/155. Also see Letter from A.F. Hennings (Capt., Office of the Deputy Director of Intelligence) to “Whom It May Concern” (9 May 1947), LfL 818-3/142.

\(^9^1\) “Interrogation of Dec. 10, 1946 with Major Tilley and Mr. Bailey; Members of the ‘Abteilung für Landeskunde’ being also members of the ‘Forschungsstaffel zbV’.” (17 December 1946), LfL 781-7/559.

\(^9^2\) “Notification of Information Concerning a Research Establishment” (1 April 1947), LfL 781-6/432.
German geography (and many geographers and institutions) as a “purely objective”
enterprise that took no “political initiative” during the Second World War. The only
exceptions to this – and this is an argument he realized would fall onto sympathetic ears
– were the involvement of geographers in helping to establish a scientific basis “for the
defense of the German borderlands and the quest for colonies [particularly in Africa].”

The Allied interrogators, Major Tilley and the State Department’s Mr. Bailey, asked
Meynen about the influence of Karl Haushofer (who had died in March 1946) and
Friedrich Ratzel. Meynen’s response did not stray far from the truth: Haushofer’s
influence was limited. He did not enjoy the same kind of darling-academic status earlier
German geographers (like Humboldt, Hettner, Ratzel, or Albrecht Penck) had enjoyed.
Ratzel and the postwar demonization of his Lebensraum concept were also, according
to Meynen, trumped up by the Allies. Meynen claimed that prior to the invasions of the
Czech Sudetenland and Poland, German geographers only read Ratzel’s Lebensraum
as the application of “biological metaphor to human geography.” Only after the Third
Reich’s foreign policy became more aggressive did geographers also begin working to
scientifically justify that approach with appeals to Lebensraum. In fact, when asked why
German geographers failed to object to the expansionist policies of the National
Socialist regime, Meynen went so far as to justify their silence as a response to the
“rather sensitive boundary lines and borderlands” drawn at the post-WWI Paris Peace
Conference. Even before 1933, he argued, university geographers “had only one

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93 “Interrogation of Dec. 10, 1946 with Major Tilley and Mr. Bailey; Summary of the Homework of Dec. 10,
1946 – Geographical and cartographical institutions and organizations, status 1944” (17 December 1946),
LiF6 781-7/562.
opinion” on controversial territories like the Saar and the Polish corridor. These opinions, as any geographer at the time knew, were not restricted to the Germans. As mentioned in the previous chapter, many Anglo-American geographers sympathized with German territorial frustration during the interwar years. Justifying foreign policy with appeals to geopolitics was a practice adopted by many western geographers before, during, and after the Second World War.95

Many of Meynen’s statements, then, reflect reality: Haushofer’s influence had been overestimated, the imperialist writings of many German geographers were no more ethnocentric or expansionist than their American or British or French counterparts, and the territorial secessions forced onto the German state after the First World War (as well as the justification for those changes – national self-determination and cultural competition) had helped to popularize Pan-Germanism and jump-start conversations about the importance of maintaining German-speaking lands. But many of Meynen’s responses were also self-serving. He was, in effect, telling the Allies what they wanted to hear: his work (and the work of his mapmaking colleagues) had always been “scientific” and had never been “political”. He presented his own work on Lebensraum


95 For a great example of this approach see Richard Hartshorne’s essay “The Geopolitical Position of the United States and the Soviet Union” (October 1946), AAG, Part II, Box 190, Folder H.
(which, as mentioned in the previous chapter, included an article about the potential for German territorial growth into North America) as uninterested in expansionism.  

To put his Allied captors even more at ease, Meynen (while formally being interned) collaborated with his former AfL employees, who were – of course – all working in Scheinfeld at the Krone Hotel. With the help of Gottfried Pfeifer, Erich Otremba, and Seigfried Schneider (who had been denazified in the fall of 1945, and had been a student of Meynen’s), Meynen drafted a nearly exhaustive list of hidden cartographic material and equipment. While this list included the collections of major geographic and cartographic agencies such as Meynen’s own AfL, the Reichsamt für Landesaufnahme, and the Abteilung Kartographie, it also included some really obscure material. Discarded Norwegian sea charts and out-dated aerial photographs of European coast-lines were among some of the seemingly least important collections, but catalogued for the occupation authorities nonetheless. The list also included, among others, the Geographical Institute at the University of Würzburg, the Library of the Reichskolonialbund, the Geographical Institute of the German University at Prague, and the Forschungsdienst Berlin. All of these institutions, according to the list compiled

96 “Interrogation of Dec. 10, 1946 with Major Tilley and Mr. Bailey; Summary of the Homework of Dec. 10, 1946 – Geographical and cartographical institutions and organizations, status 1944” (17 December 1946), LfI L 781-7/562.

97 “Interrogation of December 10, 1946 with Major Tilley and Mr. Bailey; List of hiding places as far as known to members of the Abteilung für Landeskunde” (17 December 1946), LfI L 781-7/518.
by Meynen and his colleagues, hid material during and after World War II to protect it from war damage.  

Attempts by Meynen to convince the Allied officers of his loyalty took a leap backward when, in January 1947, his wife attempted to send him a package. The package contained nothing more than a pair of shoes, but was wrapped in old newspaper published during the Third Reich. When the package was intercepted by the occupation authorities at Scheinfeld (presumably, Frau Meynen did not know where her husband was being interned), Meynen was reprimanded for receiving pro-Nazi materials. He quickly wrote a (surprisingly restrained) response to the Scheinfeld government explaining that his wife had sent him the shoes because she had heard that there was a good shoe-repairman in Scheinfeld. The newspaper wrapping was left over from the evacuation out of Worbis in the summer of 1945. That, he claimed, was why the slogans printed on it were pro-Nazi! Meynen noted that this “shoe-package affair” ranks as one of the more “humorous incidents of [Operation] Dustbin”, but nevertheless this incident grated on his patience. He wrote (in ever-improving English):

Until my detainment I worked willingly and sincerely for the American Authorities and was firmly convinced that I was enjoying their confidence. Therefore I was the more surprised that I was arrested like a criminal and jailed. When I called attention to my collaboration with the Military Government and State Department, I was quite perturbed to receive the answer of the officer in charge: ‘We will find out about your business’.  

98 “Interrogation of Dec. 27, 1946 with Lt. Hosepian and Mr. Bailey; Supplement to the report of Dec. 17, 1946. List of hiding places as far as known to members of the Abteilung für Landeskunde” (28 December 1946), LIfL 781-7/511.

In fact, Meynen’s involvement with the occupation government was questioned multiple times, despite his numerous meetings with Captain Black (and subsequent correspondence) throughout 1945 and 1946. Even more puzzling was the clear disregard the interrogators, Tilley and Bailey, had for Meynen’s concrete evidence. A letter written by Black was taken to the Kranzberg denazification headquarters by Otremba and was immediately “seized away” without any (perceivable) investigation. It would also seem that an easy way to verify Meynen’s collaboration with the American government would be to check the financial records of the AfL, an institute primarily funded by the occupation forces at Scheinfeld.\(^\text{100}\) In fact, throughout the duration of his detention, Editha Meynen had been frantically contacting any English-speaking geographers she had access to and begged them to intervene on behalf of her husband.\(^\text{101}\) If any of these attempts at speeding up Meynen’s denazification were convincing, the length of his detention suggests that it was a painfully slow conversion. It is difficult to see this drawn-out process as unintended, particularly as Tilley and Bailey now had at their disposal one of Germany’s most prized geographers and an occupation tool worth utilizing.

By the end of January 1947, Meynen had been forced to continue providing his detainers with cartographic information. He drafted lists of aerial photographs obtained or produced during the Second World War, lists of every research circle and institution

\(^{100}\) “Interrogation of January 10, 1947: Personal remarks relating to the subjects of the interrogation” (11 January 1947), LIfL 781-6/483.

\(^{101}\) Letter from Dr. Richard Shryock to Editha Meynen (29 May 1947), LIfL 762-5/494. Also see Letter from Emil Meynen to Dr. Richard Shryock (25 June 1947), LIfL 762-5/489.
remotely related to spatial policy, and lists of what happened to those groups and institutions after the demise of the Third Reich.102 He signed an oath declaring that neither he nor his staff members ever “expressed thoughts of future plans relating to Forschungsgruppe or Forschungsstaffel”, and continued to justify the existence of his Abteilung.103 When asked why, even after the collapse of the Third Reich and the Allied order to dissolve all Reich institutions, he refused to close down the AfL he responded by claiming that he had been left without instruction from his German superiors. Perhaps more importantly than this lack of direction, Meynen argued that his Abteilung, while “founded during the war”, “had its aims in peaceful work.” As a hub of geographic and cartographic information, the AfL was in a position to ensure the protection of that material for “either the future German or military government of the occupancy.”104

By the end of May 1947, Meynen was finally released “without prejudice.”105 His unauthorized actions were confirmed to be attempts at compliance with the instructions left to him by Lloyd Black (whom he would soon write after his release, lamenting the long detention with the old German saying “He who has misfortune, need not chase after the mockery” [“Wer Unglück hat, braucht für den Spott nicht zu sorgen.”]).106

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July he had sent the Bavarian State Ministry for Education and Culture proof of his
denazification with letters signed by both Erich Otremba (who had filled in for him during
his detention) and his former adversary Mr. Bailey. On 14 July, Meynen was
reappointed director of the institute he had initially founded under the auspices of the
Nazi regime. Denazification, however, had not simply taken a toll on Emil Meynen,
but also on the discipline and structure of German geography itself.

During his nearly year-long detention, American denazification had changed the
structural hierarchy of academic and professional geography. In March 1947, the
Reichsamt für Landesaufnahme – having outlived its usefulness to the Allies – was
formally dissolved. The Abteilung für Landeskunde, which had up until that point
been one branch under the Reichsamt’s research umbrella, was now forced to declare
a kind of independence. This formal detachment from the oversight of a larger German
organization opened up some intriguing possibilities. On 5 March 1947, Gottfried
Pfeifer, Wilhelm Credner, Mr. Bailey, and representatives from Bavaria’s Legal Division
and Ministry of Education all met to discuss the potential re-establishment of the
Abteilung für Landeskunde (that is, Department of Regional Studies) as an Amt für
Landeskunde (or, an Office of Regional Studies). This new classification would
provide Meynen’s institution with an unprecedented level of autonomy and, to some

107 Letter from Emil Meynen to Prof. Rheinfelder (Bavarian State Ministry for Education and Culture) (10
110 “Aktenvermerk” (5 March 1947), LIfL 783-1/30.
extent, the ability to transcend zonal boundaries and work with other Allied-approved autonomous agencies without an intermediary research organization of supervisors.\textsuperscript{111}

\textbf{From Abteilung to Amt: Meynen’s New Independence}

On 1 April 1947, the new \textit{Amt für Landeskunde} was formally created, becoming the premier (if not lone) independent geographic agency in postwar Germany.\textsuperscript{112} While it would technically work at the behest of the Bavarian Ministry of Education and Culture, it was also granted the leeway to undertake “interzonal tasks” (“\textit{überzonale}”) and allocated an initial monthly budget of 10,000 RM.\textsuperscript{113} For Meynen and his staff, this was phenomenal news! After the dissolution of the \textit{Reichsamt} on 1 March, the employees of the \textit{Abteilung} had not received any salary yet had continued to complete map-work that had been contracted by the American occupation forces. In fact, one of the primary reasons the Bavarian government agreed to incorporate the new \textit{Amt} into its occupation framework was because the American authorities had wanted “to keep the Amt für Landeskunde fit for work.”\textsuperscript{114} The day after its institutional reconstruction, John P. Bradford (Chief of the Governmental Structures Branch, Office of Military Government for Bavaria) released a memo to all occupation authorities operating in Bavaria. The memo made clear that the new AfL was to be allowed an “independent character” and, so as to make things perfectly clear, “is now and has been working for

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{111} Untitled Report (23 August 1947), LIfL 781-6/412.
\textsuperscript{112} Letter from Emil Meynen to Dr. Fr. Hackmann (29 December 1947), LIfL 761-7/602.
\textsuperscript{114} Letter from Erich Otremba to Dr. Gium (Bavarian State Chancellery) (4 April 1947), LIfL 779-9/377.
\end{flushleft}
While that work would evolve throughout the postwar decades, the *Amt für Landeskunde*’s initial tasks were hugely important to the American military government.

During Emil Meynen’s internment, he spent some time drafting proposals of various ways the AfL and the Americans could work to ensure that their cooperative efforts would be mutually beneficial. He offered to, for example, keep records of new German geographical and cartographical publications and maps. The AfL could also forward all new maps “issued by private and official German agencies” directly to the U.S. State Department. Changes in place-names and in German administrative boundaries could all, argued Meynen, be monitored by his institution on behalf of the American occupation. Meynen’s ability to read the situations he found himself in – his particular brand of genius – and his constant attempts to exploit those situations to his own advantage was perhaps best found in how he eventually fulfilled these promises to the Americans. Not only would the AfL (discreetly) pass on information to the American State Department well after the Federal Republic was established, but it would work to produce maps (not simply disseminate them) in order to further the interests and maintain the favor of its postwar occupier.¹¹⁶

When, on 1 April 1947, the *Amt für Landeskunde* became an independent office under the supervision of the Bavarian military government, they were explicitly charged

¹¹⁵ Letter from John P. Bradford (Chief, Governmental Structures Branch, Office of Military Government for Bavaria) to “Whom It May Concern” (2 April 1947), LIfL 779-7/581.

¹¹⁶ “Some Proposals concerning the Abteilung für Landeskunde, Scheinfeld, in her collaboration with the State Department, Map Intelligence and Cartography” (7 December 1946), LIfL 781-7/680.
with the promotion of “regional geographical research work on Germany in cooperation with university geographers and other regional research agencies”, as well as the promotion of “regional geography as a basic research of economic development and administration.”\textsuperscript{117} In order to achieve these goals, and with the understanding that they were to funnel as much information and data to the State Department as possible, the AfL immediately went to work on several projects. The first was a place-name directory of Europe. While the directory would be written in German, it would be based on the 1:1 million international map of the world (begun over fifty years earlier by Albrecht Penck) and the place-names would all be presented in the language of the nation-state to which they belonged. This was a stark contrast to the expansionist place-name directories of the Third Reich which, not two or three years earlier, had been replacing all European place-names with their German equivalent. The State Department also requested the Amt to compile a list of all linguistic and ethnographic maps published in Western Europe between 1845 and 1945, as well as all “cartographical information” related to the Oder-Neisse boundary line.\textsuperscript{118} These requests are unsurprising. In order to re-establish Germany in its truncated postwar form, the seemingly scientific justification for its new lines through geographic study and cartographic presentation was understood as an imperative undertaking.

Meynen’s offer to monitor and send reports to the State Department was also quickly adopted by the American military government. Observing changing academic

\textsuperscript{117} Untitled Report (23 August 1947), LIfL 781-6/412.

\textsuperscript{118} Untitled Report (23 August 1947), LIfL 781-6/412.
and institutional trends (as well as the shifting lines of German maps) was an integral task to understanding (and working to control) German perception(s) of space. How the State Department received this information was clever, and unsurprisingly exploited both the arrogance and confusion of postwar German geographers.

Wilhelm Credner had started Germany’s first postwar geography newsletter ("Rundschreiben") in February 1946.\textsuperscript{119} This “Rundschreiben” began as an instrument through which to literally reorient the geography profession after the Second World War. In the second issue of his “Rundschreiben”, Credner attempted to disseminate the addresses of the members of German geography’s intellectual class. He found thirty-nine geographers in the British zone (including luminaries like Carl Troll and Kurt Brüning), fifteen in the Russian zone, ten in the French zone, and forty in the American zone (including, of course, himself along with Meynen, Otremba, and other staff members of the AfL).\textsuperscript{120} Credner’s publication was, however, narrow in its scope and self-published. Emil Meynen knew he could do better.

During the Third Reich, Meynen’s Abteilung had produced a newsletter titled the “Berichte zur deutschen Landeskunde” which had been distributed to all German universities free of charge. With the financial backing of the American-controlled Bavarian state, Meynen re-instituted his “Berichte” and, once again, made it available to many academic geographers at no cost. While the circular did benefit the German geographic community by bringing attention to new publications, lecture series, and

\textsuperscript{119} “Rundschreiben Nr. 1” (25 February 1946), LItL 334-4.

\textsuperscript{120} “Rundschreiben Nr. 2” (10 March 1946), LItL 334-4.
academic appointments, Meynen used it as an easy way to compile information for the State Department. Worried about their postwar lives, and eager to maintain their integrity as members of a larger national and international community, geographers were more than willing to provide Meynen with all sorts of personal and professional information: new maps, new books, new articles, new hires, new fellowships, etc. Much of this was published (often on the blank backs of old maps!), and nearly all of it was forwarded to the U.S. State Department.\footnote{121}

From April through October 1947, the Amt also worked on projects deemed more “scientific” by the American government. Already in the early stages of production was the book that would eventually become one of the first regional geographies published after the Second World War, the Landkreis Scheinfeld of 1950. As previously mentioned in this chapter, the Landkreis Scheinfeld was initially a side-project of the AfL, but would become the seminal piece of German studies developed by the Amt in the immediate postwar years. A comprehensive geography of the Scheinfeld district, it was meant to serve as an example for other geographic institutions throughout Germany. The Amt was also charged with producing a 1:500,000 scale “map on the natural landscape divisions of Germany” and a 1:200,000 scale national topographic map.\footnote{122} More important to the occupation administration, though, were cartographic projects aimed at alleviating postwar problems: a comparative study of war damage

\footnote{121 Untitled Report (23 August 1947), LiFL 781-6/412. Early versions of the “Berichte” were even published in English (as well as German, of course) – see, for example, “News letter” (8 November 1947), LiFL 783-3/174 and also “Newsletter” (10 December 1947), LiFL 783-3/178.}

\footnote{122 Untitled Report (23 August 1947), LiFL 781-6/412.}
done to German cities, a map of German refugees that had resettled in Bavaria, and an updated map of Germany’s regional districts.123 These issues took precedence over any studies unrelated to the occupation. As noted in their 1948-1949 annual report, all Amt personnel were primarily “engaged in projects of the occupying power.”124

Institutional independence did not always bring with it positive experiences. The Amt underwent particularly difficult years from January 1948 until the creation of the Federal Republic of Germany in May 1949. As the Allied occupation forces worked to reinstall some kind of sovereign German government, the financial stability of the AfL (along with many other government-funded institutions) was continually threatened. Meynen’s tenacious opportunism – his ability to sell his maps and data as vitally important to the postwar construction of a new German state – became the primary source of revenue for the office he had managed to create under the Third Reich, move out from under the Soviets immediately after the war, and maintain under the Americans well into the early stages of the Cold War.

On 12 January 1948 the Bavarian military government announced that new austerity measures required a round of deep government spending cuts. The Amt für Landeskunde, which by this point was being allotted 12,000 RM a month, was seen by the Bavarian administrators as an unnecessary expense and its government funding was liquidated.125 American intelligence agencies and the State Department, however,

124 “Annual Report Covering the Period 1 July 1948 to 30 June 1949” (21 July 1949), LIfL 781-4/244.
125 “Berichte zur deutschen Landeskunde, Bd. 36” (1966), LIfL 816-3/49.
were frustrated with this decision. The AfL had offered them a great deal of help, providing military-oriented geographic descriptions of the German landscape (something a few of the Amt staff had mastered while working for the Third Reich’s Mil-Geo), answering questions concerning boundary-lines and place name spellings, and (by January 1948) having completed the first postwar 1:200,000 comprehensive topographic survey of the new (and diminished) postwar German territory.\footnote{126 "Annual Report" (July 1, 1947 – June 30, 1948), LIfL 781-5/329. Also see Emil Meynen’s Report (22 October 1951), LIfL 778-7/249.} Meynen immediately began contacting U.S. State Department officials in an effort to expand the Amt’s work for the occupation powers so as to make up for the lost revenue.\footnote{127 Emil Meynen’s Report (22 October 1951), LIfL 778-7/249.} He was successful in securing “extra allowances”, in convincing the State Department to intervene on the Amt’s behalf and stop the Bavarian government from recovering the Amt’s furniture and equipment, and in keeping his organization afloat for a few months while he figured out what to do next. From January to May 1948, Meynen understood that the money he was receiving directly from the State Department was a “transitory solution”, but was thrilled to have the support regardless. In his own words he makes clear that “there is still no German government and therefore no German agency which would support my work on regional geography.”\footnote{128 "Annual Report" (July 1, 1947 – June 30, 1948), LIfL 781-5/329. Also see Letter from Emil Meynen to Richard H. Shryock (5 January 1948), LIfL 762-5/485 and Letter from Emil Meynen to Richard H. Shryock (22 February 1948), LIfL 762-5/484.} In an effort to make the mutual dependence of Meynen and the Allied occupation concrete and explicit, the Amt applied
for incorporation into the British-American Bizonal administration on 5 May 1948.129

And they waited . . . .

Government contracting might have been the primary means through which the AfL secured funding, but it was not the only way. As early as 1945 Meynen and other German geographers had begun lobbying their colleagues in other nation-states to consider exchanging C.A.R.E. (Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere) packages or other food packages for sought-after (and nearly impossible to get a hold of) German geographic publications. German map distribution (and the distribution of most maps from western and central Europe) had been halted after the 1939 outbreak of World War II, yet the importance of many German publications had not diminished.130

In November 1947, for example, a geographer from New Zealand named D.W. McKenzie wrote to Meynen asking if “it might be possible for us to obtain from you geographical material concerning Germany and Central Europe . . . We might be able to effect an exchange of your materials if we can send you food parcels – containing particularly fats.”131 When Meynen requested cash in exchange for the material, McKenzie grimly responded that no New Zealand bank would exchange his money into Reichmarks. “I am afraid,” McKenzie wrote, “that we shall have to fall back upon the age-old system of barter!”132

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130 “Map Department – Annual Report – year ending December 31st, 1947”, AGSA, Map Dept. Records, Box 1, Folder 34.
131 Letter from D.W. McKenzie to Emil Meynen (1 November 1947), LIfL 762-2/254.
132 Letter from D.W. McKenzie to Emil Meynen (29 October 1948), LIfL 762-2/244.
While usually direct – that is, in exchange for publications the individual receiving them would put in an order to C.A.R.E. on behalf of the individual sending the publications – sometimes strange bartering networks were created out of this postwar condition. One hub of a food-for-publications exchange was the American Geographical Society (AGS) which occasionally found ‘buyers’ for German geographers looking to ‘sell’ material from their libraries for C.A.R.E. packages. The AGS librarian, Nordis Felland would receive the book, map, or atlas from the scholar, forward the material to the American university that had ordered it, then the university would send her a cash payment which she would forward to C.A.R.E. In early 1948 Emil Meynen began publishing (in English) a Rundbrief titled “Neuigkeiten” (or “New Updates”) with basic contact information for both German geographers and international geographers interested in making these exchanges. This new publication also featured the agencies one could contact to receive official maps of Germany (four in the American zone, four in the British zone, three in the French, and five in the Soviet). While initial exchanges between German geographers and their colleagues around the world were neither discouraged nor encouraged by the Allied powers, by late 1949 the Allies were working hard to facilitate these exchanges and construct a consistent and fluid passing of geographic information between the Federal Republic and any democratic nation-state willing to participate.

133 Letter from Nordis Felland to Gerhard Schott (15 March 1948), AGSA, Library Records, Box 5, Folder 34.

134 Among the Americans listed were Chauncey Harris and George Cressey.

135 “Sonder-Rundbrief” (25 May 1949), LIfL 773-13/670. Meynen’s English-language Rundbrief was hugely popular among German geography faculty – see LIfL 773-13/752.
Receiving food from abroad served as an important nutritional subsidy for the families of many German geographers and, as will be discussed in the next chapter, the reinstitution of publication exchanges (that is, publications for publications) after the war was enthusiastically welcomed by German and non-German academics alike. Finding consistent funding for geographic institutions, however, remained elusive. In fact, by December 1948 Meynen wrote to a colleague that the immediate postwar concerns about finding cartographic materials and paper for letters or publications had finally been eclipsed by the problem of financing. The introduction of the Deutsche Mark in June 1948 had "stripped off all former resources."\textsuperscript{136} Months after applying for incorporation into the Bizone, Meynen’s \textit{Amt für Landeskunde} had received no response and was still relying on contractual arrangements with intelligence agencies and the U.S. State Department.\textsuperscript{137} In July 1948 the American occupation forces moved the \textit{Amt} from the Krone Hotel in Scheinfeld to a housing project within the southeastern Bavarian city of Landshut.\textsuperscript{138} From his new office in Landshut, Meynen produced a litany of letters to the Bizone administration touting the importance of the work the AfL had been doing for American military intelligence and the State Department. Meynen continued, well into the summer of 1949, to send Lloyd Black geographic information about German military organizations, which Black would, in fact, attempt to publish in the \textit{Annals of the Association of American Geographers}. Indeed, by April 1949 Lloyd

\textsuperscript{136} Letter from Emil Meynen to Dickson Y. Hovsepian (28 December 1948), LfL 761-7/686.

\textsuperscript{137} Letter from Emil Meynen to Jan O.M. Broek (6 January 1949), LfL 761-5/454.

\textsuperscript{138} Letter from Emil Meynen to Dickson Y. Hovsepian (28 December 1948), LfL 761-7/686.
Black was directing all military and academic inquiries regarding German geography to Emil Meynen.\textsuperscript{139} However, the Americans continued to refuse to establish an autonomous budget for the \textit{Amt}. The Bizonal territorial arrangement between the British and American occupation forces had technically always been a violation of the Potsdam agreement and was on its way to dissolution.\textsuperscript{140} While a new and quasi-sovereign West German state would be established in the summer of 1949, the spatial delineations of that state (and the extent to which Germans would be allowed to draft and publish representations of that space) were still contentious.

From the Potsdam Conference of 1945 to the adoption of the constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany in August 1949, the exact boundaries of Germany remained problematic. The territory of West Germany was stipulated in the May 1949 “Basic Law” approved by the Allied occupation, but various \textit{Länder} (particularly Baden, Württemberg-Baden, and Württemberg-Hohenzollern) continually requested “boundary modifications”.\textsuperscript{141} From June 1948 to May 1949, the Soviets imposed a blockade on West Berlin. As historians so love to say, the Cold War was “heating up”, and its hot glow was being fueled by territorial considerations. How those considerations were affected by the growing international conflict between western democracies and eastern

\textsuperscript{139} See Letter from Emil Meynen to Capt. Lloyd Black (April 1949), LifL 761-5/398, Letter from Emil Meynen to Dr. Gottfried Pfeiffer (31 August 1948), LifL 762-6/394, and Letter from Emil Meynen to Lloyd D. Black (13 April 1949), LifL 761-5/401.


\textsuperscript{141} Documents on the Creation of the German Federal Constitution (Prepared by Civil Administration Division Office of Military Government for Germany, 1 September 1949), 46-47. Also see Beate Ruhl von Oppen. “List of Resolutions Prepared by the Conference of Ministers President at Königstein and Submitted to the Military Governors for Consideration (24 March 1949) and “Washington Three-Power Meeting: Agreed Minute on Württemberg-Baden Plebiscite” (8 April 1949).
communist states (not to mention the German geographers living on both sides of this infamous “iron curtain”) is the subject of the next chapter.
Figure 3-2. This is a photograph of a German student studying geography in the American zone of occupation, as published in \textit{Heute} (1949). UNLA, MS 069, Boxes #1-3.
Figure 3-3. Author Unknown. *Untitled*. No scale given. In: "Verfassungen", *Heute* (1946): 15. UNLA, MS 069, Boxes #1-3.
Um die Zoneneinheit

Die Wirtschaft in der amerikanischen Zone

Verzerrungen der Wirtschaftsleben zwischen den englischen und den amerikanischen Besatzungszone und die Zusammenarbeit der beiden großen westlichen Zonen ist der erste Schritt dazu.

Die vier Besetzungszonen

Verzerrungen des Lebens zwischen den englischen und den amerikanischen Besatzungszone und die Zusammenarbeit der beiden großen westlichen Zonen ist der erste Schritt dazu.

Die Wirtschaft in der amerikanischen Zone

Industrielle, die nicht von Rohstoffproduktion aus anderen Zonen oder aus dem Ausland abhängig sind, sieht in der amerikanischen Zone nur wenig, das Besonderenwegsrecht ist die amerikanische Zone auf Einzelfälle angewiesen.

Figure 3-4. Author unknown. *Die Wirtschaft in der amerikanischen Zone*. No scale given. In: “Um die Zoneneinheit”, *Heute* (1946): 6. UNLA, MS 069, Boxes #1-3.
Figure 3-6. Author Unknown. *Untitled*. In: "Wer die Wahl hat -", *Heute*, 89 (20 July 1949): 3. UNLA, MS 069, Boxes #1-3.
Figure 3-7. Erich Haase. *Untitled.* In: “Der Atlantik-Pakt,” *Heute,* 82 (13 April 1949): 3. UNLA, MS 069, Boxes #1-3.
CHAPTER 4
THE END OF OCCUPATION?

We have met at a great hour in the earth’s history. It is obvious that the people of the world face sober problems, but it is equally certain that we face thrilling opportunities. Let us not despair or look backward, this is a moment for courage and constructive action.¹

These words personified the excitement of the group of men gathered from twenty-nine countries, all seated in Lisbon’s Portuguese National Assembly hall, on 8 April 1949. The speaker was not, however, any kind of legislator or government functionary. Rather, George B. Cressey – an American geographer from Syracuse University and new Vice President-elect of the International Geographical Union (IGU) – opened the Sixteenth International Geographical Congress with those encouraging and hopeful words. In fact, Cressey’s address served as a prophetic assumption of the new postwar geopolitical reality and the role of geographers who would be called upon to shape it. The men he was addressing, seated at the desks of statesmen in a building designed for statecraft, were all mapmakers of the highest order. Each was a delegate sent by their respective nation-state and each recognized postwar Europe as a land of territorial opportunity. They believed it would be geographers who, just like after the First World War, would be once again called upon to help re-establish the new Europe. At this same meeting, the American cartographer and IGU Chair on the Committee of Cartography John K. Wright remarked that “Since modern war is the most powerful of all stimulants to human mobility, it is not surprising that the mightiest of wars has

brought about a cartographic revolution.” Indeed, nothing short of a cartographic revolution could mend the broken boundary-lines of Europe.

As earlier chapters have made clear, the territory of Germany enjoyed a central role in this re-mapping project. The participation by actual Germans in this project was, however, often limited. At the 1949 IGU Congress, for example, there was only one German present to hear Cressey’s words: Hermann Lautensach. Germany had been expelled from the Union during the Second World War and would not be re-admitted as an official member state again until the Seventeenth IGU Conference in 1952 at Washington, D.C. (and only West Germany would send delegates). By August 1951, Marshall Plan agents from the United States were pushing hard for West German participation in a new Cartography and Photogrammetry program of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation. The Germans, however, had neither the capital nor the time to rebuild their industrial mapmaking plants. Moreover, they were concerned that by participating in the centralization of Western European cartography it would become more and more difficult to efficiently create and effectively distribute goods for both the German and European markets.

The Germans were, however, to be counted on as an obvious means of disseminating material produced by their discipline’s international Congress. As was so often the case, foreign geographers turned to Emil Meynen, director of the *Amt für Landeskunde*, for information concerning their German colleagues. Meynen had been consistently collecting and publicizing the addresses, appointments, and accomplishments of German geographers since the end of the war – simultaneously as a newsletter of academic interest and as a report for his supervisors from the American occupation government. He was the obvious choice, then, for the IGU to contact when attempting to distribute their newsletter to German academicians (including those Germans living in the new communist East Germany). The IGU’s Secretary-General, George H.T. Kimble sent two hundred and fifty copies of the organization’s newsletter to Meynen in 1950, thanking him for his willingness to send them out and promising that the IGU’s Executive Committee was “anxious to assist German geographers in every possible way.”  

Such sentiments seemed genuine, and the IGU set aside a large amount of travel funds to help encourage a significant German delegation to attend the 1952 IGU Congress in Washington, D.C. These funds would prove instrumental in attracting a relatively large contingent of twelve Germans from the Federal Republic to the United States.

Strangely, even after the formal 1949 territorial split between the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany, geographers (both in

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6 Letter from Emil Meynen to George H.T. Kimble (28 September 1950), LfL 783-4/190.

7 "28. Rundbrief" (15 November 1950), LfL 773-12/561.
Germany and abroad) continued to refer to the states together as “Germany” – even as late as the 1952 IGU Congress. The delegates sent to Washington D.C. included usual West German collaborators like Emil Meynen, Hermann Lautensach, Gottfried Pfeifer, and Carl Troll, but also included East Germans such as Ernst Blume and Edwin Fels. All were listed in the Congress’s Proceedings under the member state name of “Germany” (and keep in mind that place-names were something taken very seriously by the world’s leading geographers). Such a name suggests that while Soviet and American politicians were beginning to engage in the Cold War, most German academics (at least in the discipline of geography) were still hopeful for unification and more interested in the state of their maps and materials than in who lived behind which side of the new “iron curtain”. How things were going seemed more urgent than who was running the show. Indeed, Edwin Fels expressed this in his report to the IGU on Berlin’s Geographical Society (the Gesellschaft für Erdkunde), the same society which had counted Alexander von Humboldt, Carl Ritter, and Albrecht Penck among its early membership. The Society, by 1952, he explained:

works in a city which now geographically – I am sorry to say – is perhaps the most noteworthy and interesting capital in the world . . . The house of the Society has been destroyed. The famous library is in Eastern hands. The fortune is lost . . . In spite of these vicissitudes the Society has been rebuilding since 1948. We have already more than 600 members . . . [and are exchanging publications with] 260 societies all over the world.

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8 Proceedings: Eight General Assembly and Seventeenth International Congress (Washington, D.C., August 8-15, 1952), AAG, Part I, Box #83. 8-15 August 1952, 55. It should be noted, however, that the American report on German activity did make a clear distinction between East and West Germany. See Mildred A. Moorman, ed. “The Status of Geography in Countries Adhering to the International Geographical Union” (8-15 August 1952). AAG, Part I, Box #83.

This seemingly near-universal sense of camaraderie, however, would not last beyond this 1952 meeting. Some of these Germans who had delivered papers at the IGU Congress and then traveled the United States together afterward, visiting the country’s major libraries and also its academic hubs of Russian/Soviet studies, would turn against each other in just a few short years.

Before approaching this shift in attitude, it is important to emphasize the problematic territorialization of the formal split between the German East and the German West. Immediately after the Second World War, the lack of communication and subsequent tension between Allied zones of occupation became incredibly problematic. As more and more displaced persons and refugees swarmed into the post-war German state proper, the possibility of emigration from Germany into the territory of one of the occupying powers quickly sprang to the minds of many Europeans. Often, geography served as the only factor determining whether or not a family or individual could emigrate and, if they could, where they were allowed to emigrate. As noted by one American consulate staffer:

It is one thing to say to a man in Hamburg that he can not go to America although his friend in Frankfurt can; it is quite another thing to say to a man in Berlin-Wilmersdorf that he cannot go to America while his friend and neighbor one-half or one-fourth or one-eighth of a mile away in Berlin-Schoeneberg can. And it is near tragedy to say, as has actually occurred in

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Dr. Herbert Schlenger. “Die Ostforschung in den USA (Bericht über eine Reise durch die USA vom 24.7 – 27.9.1952)”, LfL 802-2/88. These libraries included the Library of Congress, the Public Library of Chicago, the Public Library of Buffalo, the Widener Library of Harvard University, the Public Library of New York, the Library of the American Geographical Society (New York City), and the Library of the National Geographical Society (Washington, D.C.). The research centers visited were the Russian Research Center in Cambridge-Boston at Harvard University, the Russian Institute at Columbia University, the Research Program on the USSR (New York City), the Mid-European Studies Center (New York City), the Institute of East European Studies at Indiana University, and the Russian Center for Languages at Syracuse University, among others.
several instances, that one family on the south side of a street may qualify, while their friends and neighbors on the north side of the street, which happens to be the British sector, may not . . . 11

Originally, the United States military had, by September 1945, split its respective occupation zone – which largely consisted of southern German states – into three provisional Länder (excluding Berlin): one encompassing nearly the entire state of Bavaria according to its pre-occupation administrative boundaries and the other two incorporating sections of Württemberg-Baden, Hesse, and Bremen with little regard for “traditional administrative lines”. 12 But by March 1946, the U.S. State Department had established six consular districts meant to make resettlement within Germany and emigration from Germany more efficient in accordance with President Truman’s Directive (22 December 1945) which emphasized the importance of allowing European displaced persons to apply for emigration to the United States. The new consulate offices were based in Berlin, Hamburg, Bremen, Frankfurt, Stuttgart, and Munich which, in theory, allowed for the expanded ability of the United States to cope with territorially sensitive issues (i.e. resettlement and emigration). 13

The fluid nature of these provisional administrative boundaries, however, often resulted in confusion for the administrators and frustration for those individuals living

11 “Memorandum: Problems Arising in Berlin in Connection with Immigration to USA Under the Truman Directive” (29 June 1946), NARA RG 84, Stack 350 58/11/05, Box #2.


13 “Memorandum No. 55” (8 March 1946), NARA RG 84, Stack 350 58/11/05, Box #2.
within lines recognized by everyone as artificial. For example, one particularly problematic section of Germany was the “Bremen Enclave”, a small slice of land smack in the middle of the British occupation zone. As mentioned in Chapter 1, the U.S. had requested control of Bremen because the city-state acted as a convenient port on the Weser River, which flowed into the North Sea, giving the American military a foothold in northern Germany. Prior to 10 January 1946, the American-occupied “Bremen Enclave” consisted not only of Bremen, but also of three surrounding districts: Osterholtz, Wesermarsch, and Wesermünde. After January 10th, the administrative authority over these three districts was transferred to the British Military Government and, subsequently, became subject to British resettlement and immigration policies. Problematically, however, many individuals living in the Osterholtz, Wesermarsch, and Wesermünde districts appealed to the U.S. consulate in Frankfurt (which was responsible for the “Bremen Enclave” until the March 1946 territorial reorganization) for immigration to the United States on the basis that they had been occupied by the American Military Government when the Truman Directive was issued in December 1945. After all, it was typical American military policy to accept the registrations and visas from “qualified displaced persons and persecutees who resided in the American zones of occupation prior to December 22, 1945.”

14 Letter to John Stone from George Häring (15 June 1946), NARA RG 84, Stack 350 58/11/05, Box #2.
“Bremen Enclave”, and that individuals living in the three districts which had in December 1945 been under American occupation were no longer eligible to be considered for immigration to the United States, despite what the immigration policy might have been elsewhere in Germany. A map was, of course, sent to the Consul General, clearly delineating the four sections of the old “Bremen Enclave” to serve as a refresher course for cartographic memory and make clear exactly what territories were no longer under American control (Figure 4-1).\(^{15}\)

By the spring of 1947 the immediacy of establishing administrative control over Germany had waned. Having etched into the German map their respective occupation zones, the four Allied powers sent foreign policy representatives (named, appropriately enough, the “Control Council”) to a series of meetings in which they were charged with rebuilding “a Europe better than it replaces.”\(^{16}\) Furthermore, they were commissioned to “establish a precise definition of the administrative and territorial division of Germany as of May 1, 1947, indicating boundaries of lands and provinces.” Such a task would not be an easy accomplishment, especially when they were required only to solidify cartographic propositions of Germany that were met with approval from all four Allied powers.\(^{17}\)

\(^{15}\) Letter to Travers from Häring (8 April 1946) and Letter from Altaffer to Häring (10 April 1946), NARA RG 84, Stack 350 58/11/05, Box #2.


\(^{17}\) “Territorial Reorganization” (2 April 1947) in The Council of Foreign Ministers: Documents on Germany, Sessions I-VI, 1945-1949 (Washington, D.C.: Division of Historical Policy Research, Department of State, March 1950), pg. 299, NARA RG 84, Stack 350 57/30/05-07, Box #3.
On 15 March 1947, the Control Council met for the first time with position papers in-hand. From the outset it was clear that problems were going to arise – even before the mapping could begin. The delegation from the Soviet Union began their statement by railing against what they perceived to be the conceptual basis behind territorial re-allocation by the British. According to the Soviets, the U.K. had made it clear during an Allied meeting in November 1946 that “the territorial frontiers of the Lands in the British Zone were determined in such a way that the Lands should not be very small and consequently could not be swallowed by the future central government.” The Soviet delegates found this type of attitude wholly unacceptable. In their eyes, the British were attempting to “predetermine the future structure of the State of Germany in the direction of federalization.” How, asked the Soviets, could re-territorialization even begin to take place if the British were already trying to rig the eventual political environment in a way favorable to their own ideology? Yet the French released a statement not one week later supporting the British position and emphasizing the necessity of a German territory which would encourage de-centralization and "local responsibility." Somewhat surprisingly, however, the United States agreed with the Soviet delegation that Germany should eventually be free to determine its own political environment and that


19 “Questions Relating to Germany: Form and Scope of the Provisional Political Organization of Germany, Statement by the Head of the French Delegation” (22 March 1947) in The Council of Foreign Ministers: Documents on Germany, Sessions I-VI, 1945-1949 (Washington, D.C.: Division of Historical Policy Research, Department of State, March 1950), pg. 205, NARA RG 84, Stack 350 57/30/05-07, Box #3.
all amendments to the German map had to be met with unanimous consent.\textsuperscript{20} Having not really at all resolved the various underlying sentiments of each Allied power regarding German re-territorialization, the Control Council trudged on to more tangible problems.

One such concern was the Polish-German border. It had already been established at the Potsdam Conference (July-August 1945) that Poland would gain a considerable amount of eastern German territory. What still needed to be worked out was “how and where to draw the final line so as to avoid unnecessary and unjustified economic upset and to minimize inescapable irredentist pressure in Germany.”\textsuperscript{21} The Allies projected that some sixty-six million people would be residing in Germany by 1950 and were concerned about squeezing them all into a smaller nation-state. Simultaneously, however, the Allies easily admitted that Poland needed to be compensated for what had happened to it during the Second World War and for its most eastern territory which had been permanently consumed by the Soviet government. Thus, the Council agreed to cede southern East Prussia and German Upper Silesia to Poland, effectively granting Poland all German territory east of the Oder River.\textsuperscript{22}

\textsuperscript{20} “Territorial Reorganization” (26 March 1947) in \textit{The Council of Foreign Ministers: Documents on Germany, Sessions I-VI, 1945-1949} (Washington, D.C.: Division of Historical Policy Research, Department of State, March 1950), pg. 239, NARA RG 84, Stack 350 57/30/05-07, Box #3.


\textsuperscript{22} Ibid.
The French delegation was willing to go along with such cartographic addenda so long as the other Powers supported the transfer of German territories which would be advantageous to them. The Saar territory (or, as it would be known after this date and until 1957, the Saar Protectorate) was ceded to France in April 1947, its large deposits of coal downplayed by the French who claimed that such an act of re-territorialization was a humanitarian endeavor, depriving “Germany of a portion of her war potential.”\footnote{Questions Relating to Germany: Memorandum by the French Delegation, Regime for the Saar (10 April 1947) in The Council of Foreign Ministers: Documents on Germany, Sessions I-VI, 1945-1949 (Washington, D.C.: Division of Historical Policy Research, Department of State, March 1950), pg. 365, NARA RG 84, Stack 350 57/30/05-07, Box #3.} In fact, if the French delegation was to be believed, France only ever acted out of the impulse to “offer to the world a genuine guarantee of security . . . guided by no spirit of private ambition.”\footnote{Questions Relating to Germany: Future Frontiers of Germany, Statement by the Head of the French Delegation (9 April 1947) in The Council of Foreign Ministers: Documents on Germany, Sessions I-VI, 1945-1949 (Washington, D.C.: Division of Historical Policy Research, Department of State, March 1950), pp. 362-365, NARA RG 84, Stack 350 57/30/05-07, Box #3.} Somehow, though, France could not help but benefit by playing world-savior along with the Americans, British, and Soviets. They managed to gain substantial economic advantages in the Ruhr region and along the Rhine River, pushing for their internationalization under the watchful eye of the French government.\footnote{Ibid.} Even when supporting the claims to territory by other Allied nation-states – such as Belgian settlement claims and the re-drafting of Czechoslovakian borders to their 1938 boundaries – the French could not help but “say a few words about the Franco-German frontier”, barraging their colleagues with tales of the many historical
“vicissitudes” suffered by the French at the hands of the ever-aggressive Germans.26 Such an attitude on the part of the French would create territorial problems later after the war, allowing the Saar protectorate to serve consistently as a potential “stumbling block to [the] establishment of a European Defense Community” throughout the early 1950s.27

The majority of the Control Council’s work had been completed by 1 May, in accordance with their mandate. Talks lasted well into the fall of 1947, but few things changed (including each nation-state’s rhetoric). In November 1947, the Control Council officially concluded territorial talks, allocating any further re-mapping problems to each Allies’ respective German Deputy for study and report.28 What followed, obviously, would permanently divide Germany into two states. The Berlin Blockade of 1948 and the subsequent year-long airlift resulted in the eventual division of Germany


27 “Weekly Foreign Information Policy Guidance, No. 101” (12 March 1952), pg. 2, NARA RG 335, Stack 631 46/43/05, Box #1.


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into two quasi-sovereign nation-states (Figure 4-2 and Figure 4-3). This is a familiar story, but how did the Americans, British, and French respond administratively to this permanent division? How did they utilize their influence in West Germany and the polarization of East-West European politics to their advantage? What happened after the division?

After receiving official approval from the Allied occupiers earlier in the month, the West Germans adopted the “Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany” on 23 May 1949, simultaneously creating the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). Unlike the “founding documents” of many nation-states, the “Basic Law”, or Grundgesetz, of the FRG explicitly defined its territorial holdings. Its preamble, in fact, predicated the document’s (and, thereby, the new Republic's) legitimacy on the authority of “the German people in the Länder Baden, Bremen, Hamburg, Hesse, Lower Saxony, North-Rhine-Westphalia, Rhineland-Palatinate, Schleswig-Holstein, Württemberg-Baden and Württemberg-Hohenzollern . . .” Moreover, claimed the preamble, “[the Basic Law] has also acted on behalf of those Germans to whom participation was denied. The entire German people,” it evangelized, “are called upon to achieve by free self-determination, the unity and freedom of Germany.” As if arming itself with that bit of self-assurance was not quite enough, it went on in Article 23 to repeat the Länder which would operate under its dictates and predicted that this “Basic Law” would “be put into force in other

29 For more on this period and the development of the permanent division, see Carolyn Eisenberg’s Drawing the Line: The American Decision to Divide Germany, 1944-1949. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

parts of Germany on their accession.”31 One telling difference between Article 23 and
the Preamble, however, was the inclusion of Greater Berlin. In fact, even in the
Grundgesetz’s initial drafts during the summer of 1948, Greater Berlin had continuously
been excluded as a territory to be directly governed by the FRG. Rather, Article 23
initially stated that “Greater Berlin has the right to send representatives to the
Bundestag and the Bundesrat.”32 Understandably, after the nearly year-long Berlin
blockade from June 1948 to May 1949, the Allied powers decided to apply West
Germany’s new foundational document directly to the former capital.

The territory of the Federal Republic was not completely solidified yet, and the
“Basic Law” made provisions for territorial shifts and changes. Realizing that some
Germans found the postwar Länder too artificial, Article 29 laid out circumstances under
which the German people themselves could re-shape their map. Any territorial changes
had to be mapped within one year of the ratification of the “Basic Law”. Changes could
be made only by general referendum, and ten percent of a Länder’s voting population
had to participate in the petition for a referendum. Any majority decision made by that
referendum would be final, so long as the change took into account “regional ties,
historical and cultural connections, economic expediency and social structure.”33 One
notable exception to Article 29 was permitted: the territorially contentious Baden,

31 Documents on the Creation of the German Federal Constitution (Berlin: Office of Military Government,
Civil Administration Division, 1949), 11.

32 Documents on the Creation of the German Federal Constitution (Berlin: Office of Military Government,
Civil Administration Division, 1949), 65.

33 Documents on the Creation of the German Federal Constitution (Berlin: Office of Military Government,
Civil Administration Division, 1949), 11.
Württemberg-Baden, and Württemberg-Hohenzollern states. This was due to, in part, the size of these Länder and their complicated territorial origins. Baden and Württemberg-Hohenzollern had initially been sub-divisions under French administrative control, whereas Württemberg-Baden had been occupied by the Americans. Article 118 of the “Basic Law” allowed these states, which had been considering a cartographic merger since early 1949, to operate outside of the Article 29 provisions and hold a referendum later than one year after inclusion into the FRG. The three Länder held a referendum in 1951 (which the state of Baden rejected, but the more populous Württemberg states approved) and were united in 1952 as “Baden-Württemberg”, the only state created after 1949 by popular German vote.34

By 1951, West Germany had clearly regained some semblance of sovereignty. A Federal Assembly, the Bundestag, was elected in August 1949 and on 9 July 1951, President Truman called on the American Congress to terminate its state of war with Germany.35 By October 1951 the Allies had seriously relaxed their commercial oversight of the country by means of an agreement signed between Allied foreign ministers in September 1950.36 None of this, of course, meant that West Germany had been relieved of Allied military government control, but such quasi-independence lent itself to problematic circumstances – particularly in regard to cartography.


35 “Weekly Foreign Information Policy Guidance, No. 66” (5 July 1951), pg. 3, NARA RG 335, Stack 631 46/43/05, Box #1. Also see “National Affairs: War’s End” in TIME (16 July 1951).

36 “Weekly Foreign Information Policy Guidance, No. 74” (28 August 1951), pg. 2, NARA RG 335, Stack 631 46/43/05, Box #1.
geography were still seen by Allied administrators as potentially subversive disciplines, and were heavily regulated. In September 1949, shortly after the election of the FRG’s first Federal Assembly, the Allied powers imposed “Law No. 23” on the West German state, prohibiting the development of scientific research and application “to the extent to which it may be used for warlike ends or contribute to the establishment of war potential . ..” Making unapproved maps, an undertaking considered to be ‘scientific’, had the potential to result in life imprisonment, a 500,000 DM fine (or both), and the closing of any participating organization.37 Perhaps the only exception to strict regulatory control of mapmaking research and processes was found in those institutions operating with the implicit approval of the Allied Powers – namely, universities.

Geography Education in the New Federal Republic

As has been mentioned in previous chapters, the Allied powers all attempted to re-democratize Germany through reforming its education system. Despite having approached the issue in very different ways, the British, the French, and the Americans all spectacularly failed to transform German education into something new, or into an emulation of their own education systems. Those Länderr which had been favorable to reform – Schleswig-Holstein, Hamburg, and Bremen – had all initially lengthened their required years in primary school from four to six after Germany’s defeat. This had the effect of adding two years of collective general education before a child’s admission into the Gymnasium or Mittelschule, a ‘tracked’ divergence which the Allied powers (and particularly the Americans) found crudely undemocratic. By the mid-1950s, under

37 “Military Government – Germany, United States Area of Control, Law No. 23, Control of Scientific Research” (effective 12 September 1949), LfL 782-4/163.
pressure from the other German Länder, Schleswig-Holstein, Hamburg, and Bremen all reverted back to the traditional system and encouraged students to move into the split tracks after only four years of primary school. This “falling into line” was caused by what one historian of education calls a “conspicuous lack of enthusiasm for any modifications of the established highly selective system.”38 This “lack of enthusiasm” was also felt by the Allied powers who, after years of attempting to impose structural changes, had been consistently ridiculed or ignored (and usually both) by the majority of the Germans states’ education administrations. The Allies made sure to avoid mention of education at all in the April 1949 “Occupation Statute of Germany”, the document which dictated the relationship between the new West German government and the occupation authorities.39 By 1950/51, the West Germans had managed to oust the last few remaining Allied education officers and were once again in the position of molding the minds of their own primary, secondary, and postsecondary students without the direct supervision of an American, a Brit, or a Frenchman.40

While heavily regulated outside the gates of German universities, the discipline of geography was thriving after the 1949 founding of the FRG. By 1950 there were twenty-four department chairs between twenty-five universities (the University of Hamburg had two chairs!). Those departments, during the 1949-50 academic year,


were training over sixteen-hundred students.\textsuperscript{41} Professors who had been initially fired during denazification were slowly reincorporated back into academia with the help of the German Education Association (\textit{Hochschulverband}).\textsuperscript{42}

\textbf{Meynen and the Marshall Plan}

Aside from universities, there was another geographic institution working with the implicit support of the Allied occupation powers, and that was Emil Meynen’s \textit{Amt für Landeskunde}. The collaboration between the AfL and, in particular, the American government only grew after West Germany was granted sovereignty. Meynen’s own newsletter indicates that by the summer of 1949, his institution was receiving direct funds from the European Recovery Program (ERP). The Marshall Plan had dictated that ERP deposits be channeled through various West German government agencies in order to create maps and topographic studies, and Meynen’s \textit{Amt} (having been an early participant in Germany’s postwar remapping) was an obvious funding choice.\textsuperscript{43}

In October 1949, the AfL – which up until this point had been operating under the supervision of the American military government – was put under the direction of the new Federal Ministry of the Interior. Despite this shift, the \textit{Amt’s} primary purpose was still to produce information for the Allied military (and, in accordance with its continued


\textsuperscript{42} “Rundschreiben Nr. 32” (13 January 1951), LIfL 761-7/652.

\textsuperscript{43} “Berichte zur deutschen Landekunde, Bd. 36” (1966), LIfL 816-3/49.
reliance on English-speaking approval, the AfL continued to submit its annual reports in English; only in the summer of 1951 did its reports begin to be submitted once again in German\textsuperscript{44}. The combination of postwar work for the Allied forces and, now in 1949, funding from the ERP allowed Meynen to maintain a staff of fifty-five employees, including nineteen geographers and eight cartographers.\textsuperscript{45} No other institution in Germany, even after the initial postwar years, had such consistent funds, staff, and influence. By 1950, all German maps drafted since 1939 and all German literature concerning geography since 1910 were catalogued by the 

\textit{Amt für Landeskunde}. The official geographical encyclopedia of Germany, the only sanctioned 1:500,000 scale maps of Germany’s regional subdivisions, and the authoritative \textit{Kreislandeskunden} (“regional descriptions”) were all created, edited, maintained, and under the publishing authority of the AfL. It is no wonder that, writing for the \textit{Geographical Review}, Capt. Lloyd Black announced that it represented “the greatest actual and potential force in German geography” of the postwar period.\textsuperscript{46}

As with the authority of any geospatial institution, government support and recognition can only go so far. The lines of a map, and the agencies that draw them, are nothing but empty propositions – cartographic fantasies – if unrecognized by the international community of nation-states. Even those lines forced on to the globe through the violence of capitalism, military conquest, and/or colonialism serve only as

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\textsuperscript{44} “Jahresbericht des Amtes für Landeskunde” (22 June 1951), LiFL 781-3/181.

\textsuperscript{45} Letter from Emil Meynen to Thomas R. Smith (30 January 1950), LiFL 762-5/504.

\textsuperscript{46} Excerpt of the \textit{Geographical Review} sent from Lloyd D. Black to the Amt für Landeskunde (10 October 1949), LiFL 780-6/465. For the full article see Lloyd D. Black. “Further Notes on German Geography” in \textit{Geographical Review}, Vol. 37, No. 1 (January 1947), 147-148.
markers of territorial resentment and frustration without (and usually even with) international acknowledgment. A hugely important part of Emil Meynen's job, then, was to convince his academic colleagues abroad of the AfL's continued importance. Black's report to the Geographical Review could sing the Amt's praises for eternity, but it was Meynen who had actually to perform.

As has already been noted in other chapters, one important way to maintain authority over Germany's maps was to carefully (but enthusiastically) collaborate with the Allied military government. Another way to hold on to that status, and also cultivate important international ties and acceptance, was to broaden and deepen his intellectual/academic network. While this dissertation has mentioned, in Chapter 2, the informal maps-for-food agreements undertaken by Meynen with his international colleagues, the existence of such agreements simply suggests that the world's geographers were desperate for geographical information regarding Germany after the Second World War. It does not necessarily follow that the AfL had established itself as the premier geographical institute in postwar Germany.

By late 1949, then, Meynen had begun to heavily promote the Amt. Equipped with the blessing (and ERP funds) of the Allied powers, and untethered to the politics of postwar universities, Meynen undertook a massive project of cartographic dissemination. Many libraries and geographical societies were still very interested in receiving German maps and cartobibliographies and, as time went on, most of these societies wanted to work with institutions rather than with individuals (relationships with whom, after the Second World War, were becoming much too complicated). Chief among them was the American Association of Geographers (AAG), which

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commissioned none other than Lloyd Black to bolster its postwar contacts with European geographers.\textsuperscript{47} Black then made Meynen the AAG’s chief contact in West Germany and was even able to convince the AAG to allocate the AfL space for regular updates in its \textit{Professional Geographer} periodical.\textsuperscript{48}

As a gesture of gratitude, Meynen went out of his way to inform the AAG that there were too few English-language geographical periodicals in West Germany, despite the opportunity to disseminate them. Meynen pointed to the new \textit{“Amerika- Häuser”} (“America Houses”) program as an easy way to promote the study of geographic materials.\textsuperscript{49} These \textit{“Amerika Häuser”} were fairly popular centers of American information and literature, especially among well-educated Germans. “The idea behind them,” as one historian writes,

\begin{quote}
[w]as to provide Germans with ‘windows to the West’ and to acquaint them with democratic ideas and classics that had been closed to them during the twelve years of Nazi propaganda and cultural isolation . . .\textsuperscript{50}
\end{quote}

A few had been established as early as 1945, but by 1950 there were twenty-seven large centers in West German cities and one hundred and thirty-five “affiliated reading rooms in smaller towns.” These spaces of rigidly unapologetic democratization and Americanization helped to lay the groundwork for later German-American exchange

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\textsuperscript{\footnotesize 47} Letter from Walter Ristow to George Kish (13 October 1950), AAG, Part I, Box #91.
\textsuperscript{\footnotesize 48} Letter from Shannon McCune to Emil Meynen (21 May 1950), AAG, Part I, Box #91.
\textsuperscript{\footnotesize 49} Letter from Evelyn L. Petschek to George Kish (30 December 1950), AAG, Part I, Box #91.
\textsuperscript{\footnotesize 50} Rebecca Boehling, “The Role of Culture in American Relations with Europe: The Case of the United States’ Occupation of Germany” in \textit{Diplomatic History}, Vol. 23, No. 1 (Winter 1999), 66.
\end{flushright}
programs and cultural institutions.\textsuperscript{51} It was Meynen who facilitated the inclusion of the *Professional Geographer* – perhaps the most popular and informative geographical journal for non-academics from the United States – among the many periodicals of the “Amerika Häuser”.\textsuperscript{52}

Meynen also spent a great deal of his own personal time working to broaden the influence of the *Amt für Landeskunde* during the early years of the Federal Republic. He drafted maps for the books of prominent American geographers, helped leading geographical societies complete their research aids, and sent university instructors maps of Germany for their respective classrooms.\textsuperscript{53} He broadened his collaboration with other domestic West German scientific academies, such as the *Institut für Raumforschung* (Institute for Spatial Research) and the *Statistisches Bundesamt* (Federal Office for Statistics). Most importantly, however, Meynen facilitated a smooth transition of the *Amt*f's existing contracts with the Allied military government to the government of the new Federal Republic. The majority of the FRG’s official maps were produced and disseminated by the *Amt für Landeskunde*: the 1:1,000,000 scale map of its new administrative boundaries, the 1:1,000,000 scale map of the first Bundestag election, the 1:300,000 scale map of new German municipal boundaries (in collaboration with the *Institut für Raumforschung*), the 1:1,000,000 scale utility map of West Germany, the 1:1,000,000 scale transit/highway map, among many, many

\textsuperscript{51} Boehling, 66.

\textsuperscript{52} Letter from Evelyn L. Petschek to George Kish (30 December 1950), AAG, Part I, Box #91.

All of these maps were produced, or production had begun on them, within six months of the Federal Republic’s coming into existence.

The AfL flourished as a subsidiary of the Federal Ministry of Interior. But Meynen did not want to simply work as an instrument of a government agency; by 1950, he had made it clear to many of his colleagues that he wanted the Amt to become a federal office in its own right. Only during the Second World War did Meynen’s institution, as an “Abteilung” – or “department” – of the Third Reich’s Zentralkommission für Wissenschaftliche Landeskunde von Deutschland (Central Commission for Scientific Regional Studies of Germany) did Meynen’s institution enjoy the economic security he believed it deserved. If the AfL could, once again, become an agency directly funded by the government (rather than through contractual agreements with the Federal Ministry of Interior and the American military, to name its two largest contributors), Meynen believed it could better serve the German people and the discipline of geography as a whole.

By 1950, though, something else had also been bothering Meynen about the AfL’s position in the FRG’s hierarchy of federal agencies and offices. Even after the 1949 formal split between East and West Germany, Meynen worked hard to consistently include those geographers who ended up on the other side of the “iron curtain”. Well into 1950 he continued to report news updates on his East German

\[54\] Letter from Emil Meynen to Dr. Kessler (17 February 1950), LIfL 778-7/343.

colleagues in the Amf’s Rundbrief. The AfL continued to draft and sell quadrangles of its 1:200,000 scale national map series of Germany – quadrangles which did not account for any division. Indeed, after hosting the “founding assembly” of a new Verband deutscher Berufsgeographen (Association of Professional Geographers), and after the thirty-eight founding members elected representatives from Westphalia, Bavaria, Berlin, Lower Saxony, Hamburg, and Schleswig-Holstein (as well as electing Meynen vice-chair and secretary), Meynen unsuccessfully attempted to organize an ‘advisory council’ to represent the East. He believed in the importance of collaborating with his German counterparts and, if it can be assumed that his earlier work on regional studies, the Pennsylvania-Dutch, and Lebensraum still influenced his geographic thought, he likely despised the “curtain” drawn between German scientists, academics, and intellectuals.

In February 1950, the Amt für Landeskunde was ordered by the office of the Federal Minister of Interior to discontinue all cooperation with East German geographers. Meynen was furious. Here, years after Allied “liberation”, he found his institution in its most compromised position. There is no evidence to suggest that, even during the Berlin crisis of 1948/49 – that moment in which the Cold War began to

56 “23. Rundbrief” (15 June 1950), LIfL 773-12/590.

57 For a comparison of how this map changed, see Figure 4-4, Figure 4-5, Figure 4-6, and Figure 4-7.


59 Letter from Emil Meynen to Dr. Kessler (17 February 1950), LIfL 778-7/343.
come into focus – the Western Allies had required Meynen to stop working with other Germans in the Soviet Zone. But no more, under the auspices of the Federal Republic – the East German geographers were to be deliberately disconnected from the academic goings-on of their West German counterparts. No longer were their appointments and lecture dates to be published in the *Rundbrief*, nor was the line dividing Germany to be overlooked and/or ignored. The AfL could still publish maps which included East Germany, but those maps had to be approved by the Federal Ministry of Interior (a laborious process only made easy under the most exceptional of circumstances, one example being a map of all protestant churches throughout Germany proposed by Meynen in the summer of 1951). While he was never thrilled with these restrictions, and while he continued to occasionally work outside of them (especially in regards to correspondence), Meynen adopted his usual stance of adaptation. If there is one glaring continuity from the Emil Meynen of the Nazi *Abteilung* to the Emil Meynen of West Germany’s *Amt*, it is surely his ability to manipulate the circumstances in which he found himself to the benefit of his research.

By the end of 1951, Meynen characterized the state of his discipline in fairly dark terms. It was a time, he argued in an essay titled “*Die Situation*”, for critical reflection (“*kritische Besinnung*”). He complained that geographers in the East and West were unable to collaborate or cooperate on major research projects, and the Federal Republic was restricted by the Allied powers in its ability to map itself (especially in regards to aerial photography, as will be thoroughly explored later). The essay closed

60 Letter from Emil Meynen to Dr. Kessler (6 June 1951), LiBl 778-7/298.
with an appeal to all governments and their geographers. The freedom to travel, begged Meynen, had to be emphasized in a time of tightening border restrictions and fence-laden boundary lines. He made clear that travel, perhaps more than any other activity, was essential to the study of geography. The more rigid the lines, the less opportunity for exploration.61

But geographic work continued nonetheless. By early 1952 the FRG had commissioned a new group of geographers to figure out the best way of representing agricultural resources and production. The Amt für Landeskunde consistently hosted this group’s meetings, bringing together some of Germany’s greatest spatial thinkers (Meynen, Otremba, Troll, Blume, Hoffmann, Kraus, Lautensach, and Pfeifer among them) in its premier spatial institution.62 But Meynen was under constant political pressure to make clear the importance of his institution’s autonomy. There were rumors that the Federal Ministry for the Interior was considering a merger of the Amt für Landeskunde and Kurt Brüning’s Institut für Raumforschung into one “Institut für Raumforschung und Landeskunde.” Meynen believed that such a merger, if undertaken in 1952, would inevitably create an internal institutional power struggle between himself and Brüning. So, he ignored them, and focused on the spatial problems he was so adept at confronting. He also continually offered up his Amt as a space for high-profile

academic meetings. Such gestures, he found, were always met with great applause, and Meynen loved great applause ("grosser Beifall").

**Tightening the Borders, or Turning Lines into Fences**

Historians tend to gravitate toward terms such as “Cold War” and “iron curtain” not because they are simply easy terms within which to couch temporal book-ends, but because the mental demarcation of Europe – and the ideological confrontation foaming along its edges – was a very real one, and it was experienced by very real people. The historian Larry Wolff aptly describes this (not simply historicized) geographic simplification of Europe: “The map of Europe”, he writes, “with its many countries and cultures, was mentally marked with Churchill’s iron curtain, an ideological bisection of the continent during the Cold War.”

While Churchill's “iron curtain” speech may have been delivered in March 1946, the mental cartography of its rhetoric was beginning to turn into a spatial reality by May 1952. Already, by mid-1952, tens of thousands of Germans had fled the German Democratic Republic since its 1949 creation – an escape into a Federal Republic with (in 1949) a homeless population of still eight million people. Politicians on both sides of Germany’s dividing line, then, wanted their borders to be more secure.

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63 “Niederschrift über die sechsts Mitgliederversammlung des Johann Gottfried Herder-Forschungsrates in Marburg/Lahn” (2/3 May 1952), LIfL 802-2/147.


On 26 May 1952, the Federal Republic of Germany joined the European Defense Community, a western alliance between nation-states aimed at responsibly rearming West Germany without admitting it into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). While the French refused to ratify and recognize the European Defense Community, the FRG’s willingness to sign on was not lost on the German Democratic Republic. On the exact same day, the GDR issued an order titled “Regulation of Measures on the Demarcation Line between the German Democratic Republic and the Western Occupied Zones of Germany” (refusing, of course, to recognize the Federal Republic as anything more than a collection of zones still occupied by the Allied powers). This new regulation made it clear that the space around the border – not simply the border itself – was to be monitored and controlled. A five-kilometer Sperrgebiet (“restricted area”) zone was instituted along the entire East-West divide, as was a more heavily restricted Schutzstreife (“protection strip”) zone of five hundred meters. All border passes were immediately invalidated and, as recounted by anthropologist Daphne Berdahl, “thousands of border residents” were evacuated throughout the following month. In July 1952, the five Länder which had initially been unified into the Democratic Republic of Germany were replaced with fourteen new – largely arbitrarily drawn – districts (Bezirke). By the end of the summer a sand-filled, ten meter “control strip” ran


67 Daphne Berdahl, 144-145.

alongside a freshly built barbed-wire fence – the new and concrete tracing of Germany’s internal border.69

69 Daphne Berdahl, 144-145.
Figure 4-1. Geographical Section, General Staff. *Bremen Enclave*. Scale 1:250,000. GSGS 4346(A). NARA RG 84, Stack 350, 58/11/05, Box #2.
Länder of the Federal Republic after 1949 (Saarland added in 1957)

Figure 4-4. Amtes für Landeskunde. Gemeindegrenzenkarte 1:300 000. Scale 1:300,000. In: Rundbrief, Vol. 4 (November 1951), 6.
Figure 4-6. Bundesanstalt für Landeskunde. Gemeindegrenzenkarte 1:300 000. In: Rundbrief, Vol. 7 (November 1954), 4.
Figure 4-7. Detail of Bundesanstalt für Landeskunde. *Gemeindegrenzenkarte 1:300 000*. In: *Rundbrief*, Vol. 7 (November 1954), 4.
CHAPTER 5
MAPPING/SELLING THE TWO STATE SOLUTION

Sovereignty implies ‘space’, and what is more it implies a space against which violence, whether latent or over, is directed – a space established and constituted by violence.

—Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space

Despite its location at coordinates 36-80, running parallel to the Soviet Union’s northern coastline, the USS Barracuda submarine was forced to surface. Its nuclear reactor had sprung a dangerous leak. Perhaps more importantly, for both the Barracuda’s American crew and for the rest of the world, the submarine had been targeting Soviet surface ships during a military exercise. After being exposed to a lethal dose of nuclear radiation, one American technician overrode computer controls and launched two cruise missiles at the Soviet boats in a fit of bitter rage – an obvious symptom of American cultural egoism, particularly when confronted with mortality. This is the problem confronting the heroic Soviet military in the 1982 thriller, Incident at Map Grid 36-80.

Fortunately, the Soviets are able to destroy the two missiles before they do any damage. Moreover, the Soviets send a rescue team to aid the Barracuda’s crew. The Soviet Navy’s rescue plane, however, does not have enough fuel to make the roundtrip flight and is forced to rely on a Soviet tanker that happens to be in the vicinity. This is not an easy fix, though: the tanker is too far away to both re-fuel the rescue plane and also make it back to the Soviet coast. Knowing this, the two-man tanker willingly sacrifices itself to save the Americans and potentially avert World War III. In a climatic display of bravery, the tanker’s pilot and navigator (an ageing twosome who have served together for eight years) plot a course to an old wartime airstrip constructed by the German military in the 1940s. In a strange twist of events, the relics of a conquered
fascist menace help to save the Communist heroes. Thank goodness the navigator could read his map.¹

Cold War-era movies and literature seem to serve as cultural touchstones, mediums through which each “side” (to use a geopolitical term) propagates its own triumphant narrative. German space was no different. Unlike *Incident at Map Grid 36-80*, however, there is no salvation-through-navigation – no run-down airstrip pointed out to us by an undervalued civil servant, foot soldier, or bureaucratic functionary. In fact, the more the spatial propositions of postwar Germany are studied, and the clearer the boundary lines between Cold War adversaries become, the murkier the narratives seem. From the 1952 construction of Germany’s internal “control strip” border to the August 1961 erection of the Berlin Wall, German territorial disagreements continually permeated the foreign and domestic policies of Germany and its World War II conquerors. As German space became more contentious, the projection of it to both those living within its confines and those foreign powers working to shape it became increasingly important.

**Polarization: Americans, Soviets, Germans, and Geography**

Both the American and Soviet geographers understood the importance of German space. As historian Carolyn Eisenberg so forcefully argues, “the conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union was most geographically expressed in

¹ For a pertinent Cold War analysis of *Incident at Map Grid 36-80*, see William C. Green’s “Russia Eyes the US Navy and Sees Itself: *Incident at Map Grid 36-80* as a Cultural Mirror” in *The Submarine Review*, No. 3 (July 2003), pp. 144-149.
the division of [Germany] . . .”\(^2\). This expression was not a natural development. It was not, as the simplistic Cold War histories still maintain, the obvious consequence of irretrievably dissimilar political ideologies. In fact, during the immediate postwar period, the Soviet Union was not interested in permanently partitioning Germany at all. The United States and its western allies, anticipating the postwar economic crisis, were worried that without a clean break from its Soviet counterpart no politicians or taxpayers outside of Germany would be willing to invest in its re-democratization.\(^3\) It was with this in mind that the American, British, and French military governments consistently violated the treaties outlined at the Yalta and Potsdam Conferences, first by merging their occupation zones in December 1946 and establishing the Marshall Plan in July 1947, and then by implementing currency reform in June 1948 and convening a new and separate West German Parliament in September 1948.\(^4\) Surely – the Soviet Union was no easy partner to cooperate with, and worked to undermine the West just as much as the West worked to undermine it. The historical evidence is very clear, though: the United States helped to create the geopolitical problems of the Cold War – especially in Germany – by consistently rejecting Soviet attempts to compromise on German policy and, by 1949, insisting on the creation of an autonomous West German state.


\(^4\) Carolyn Eisenberg, 485.
The territorially-driven polarization that occurred in the aftermath of Germany’s East/West divide was not confined to military personnel and/or foreign policy officials. Geographers were all too often (but unsurprisingly) dragged into dubious geopolitical rhetoric. Early in 1950, for example, a Professor Zimon from a Soviet geography department accused American geographers working in Germany of acting “as spies [for the military] clearing the path for aggressors” and serving to create maps which could only be classified as “imperialist propaganda.” As explained in Chapter 1, the mapmakers of previous European conflicts (specifically in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870/71) had in fact posed as seemingly benign professionals or artists in order to perform acts of cartographic espionage. Zimon named Richard Hartshorne (the OSS operative and Geography Division chief who, by the end of the war, had begun teaching at the University of Wisconsin-Madison) as “the greatest theoretician among American geographers” and as one of the foremost proponents of a new “field of propaganda presenting geographical grounds for a new war.” These words were initially printed in a Soviet gazette, but were quickly picked up by a communist magazine in France. Its dissemination in continental Europe, and the subsequent attention it received from the American press, forced Hartshorne to respond. His initial reaction was to dismiss Zimon as either a liar or as an indoctrinated propagandist. “Zimon seemingly doesn’t


realize,” Hartshorne wrote in 1950, “that in the United States little attention is paid to the ‘theorist’. In brief, he overemphasizes my importance.”

It is undoubtedly true that the majority of American intellectuals were (and still are) usually underappreciated. Hartshorne, though, was not simply a “theoretician”. He was an academic who had, as outlined in Chapter 1, been integral to the planned redrawing of Europe and Germany after the Second World War. He was also an academic who was extremely familiar with the geography of the Soviet Union (so familiar, in fact, that the U.S. Postal Service began intercepting and withholding mail sent to him – much of it geographic material – throughout the 1950s from the Soviet Union and other “unfriendly countries”).

Zimon’s characterization of Hartshorne, however fair or not, coincided with a shift in Hartshorne’s own language concerning the Soviet Union. Whereas prior to 1950 Hartshorne had made few public comments regarding the Soviet Union (especially in his capacity as a professor of geography), by 1951 he was lambasting the Soviets as a menace “more dangerous than the previous German threats” and warning of “Russia’s [potential] acquisition of all western Europe”. Hartshorne justified his concerns by appealing to the “Heartland Theory” of English geographer Sir Halford Mackinder. The “Heartland Theory”, which was first proposed

7 “UW Geographer Branded Top Foe by Russ. Magazine” in Milwaukee Sentinel (30 July 1950). AAG, Part II, Box 187, Folder E.

8 The Post Office also withheld geographic material from George B. Cressey. See Letter from Alan Reitman (Assistant Director, ACLU) to George Babcock Cressey (27 April 1955) AND Letter from Bruton W. Adkinson to Theodore Herman (13 May 1955). AAG, Part I, Box 83. Also see Letter from Burton W. Adkinson to George B. Cressey (4 September 1956). AAG, Part I, Box 69.

9 “‘Europe Should Be Defended Before Asia,’ Says Geographer” in Columbia Missourian (17 April 1951). AAG, Part II, Box 187, Folder E.
by Mackinder in 1904, claimed that if any one political unit was able to control both
Eastern Europe and Central Europe, that government would have “the greatest
defensive and offensive strength of any world unit.” That government would control an
enormous coastline, the largest (and incredibly resource-rich) territorial block of the
European continent, and the majority of Europe’s food production. For Hartshorne,
Soviet control of East Germany and its satellite states in Eastern Europe had the
potential for realizing what Mackinder had predicted at the outset of the twentieth
century. While he toyed with other potential “heartlands”, Hartshorne never fully
dismissed Mackinder’s theory or his fear of a potentially undefeatable Soviet-ruled
territorial super-state (one of these “heartlands”, proposed by J. Wreford Watson in
1958, identified an American Heartland – “the Great Lakes-Ohio-Mississippi-Missouri
plains” – and claimed that “He who rules the American heartland rules N. America. He
who rules N. America rules the Pacific and the Atlantic. He who rules the Pacific and
the Atlantic rules the World.”).

Hartshorne’s concerns can be easily segued into a larger discussion of growing
Cold War distrust among geographers. It should again be emphasized, as this
dissertation has tried to do in Chapters 2 and 3, that geographers on either side of the
“iron curtain” did not immediately break off relations with each other after 1945 or 1949.
There were different levels of cooperation, distrust, and fear depending on the institution

10 Richard Hartshorne. “Analysis of the Heartland Theory” (1955). AAG, Part II, Box 190, Folder L. One of
the biggest problems with the “Heartland Theory” (and Hartshorne admitted as much) was its
underestimation of technological change, and particularly the introduction of air power into geopolitical
conflict.

11 J. Wreford Watson. “North America in the Changing World” (8 November 1958), 385. AAG, Part II,
Box 190, Folder L.
and/or the individual. Initially, in the immediate aftermath of World War II, many Germans were less interested than their Allied occupiers in establishing a sharp territorial divide through their nation-state. Emil Meynen, for example, constantly complained about the Allies’ obsession with “the unsolved Berlin-struggle” and “the antagonism of West and East”.12 This is not to say, of course, that all Germans agreed with Meynen’s assessment. Kurt Brüning, director of the German Institute for Spatial Research, seriously disagreed with Meynen’s attempts to map Germany after the war without making clear its partitions. According to Meynen, it seemed “impossible to solve the German problem by such limitations of research”, but he admitted that by 1947 even he was excluding the Soviet zone of occupation for lack of information.13 Most of the maps produced by Meynen’s Amt für Landeskunde, however, usually still portrayed a complete “Germany” as late as 1954, even if the East/West division was noted (Figures 5-1, 5-2, 5-3, 5-4, and 5-5).

As with U.S.-Soviet interaction, the relationships between East and West German geographers slowly deteriorated throughout the 1950s. While this development was influenced by politics, it was also spurred on by the paranoia of academics. The politics of this transition are easy enough to explain: German politicians used the new fortified East-West “frontier” to their own advantage. Those municipalities running along the new intra-German border were particularly useful in political rhetoric. When the Soviet Union closed a power plant in the border-town of Harbke, effectively shutting off...


power to portions of West Germany, the Federal Republic staged an enormous ceremony around the foundation-laying of a new power plant on 1 December 1952. Jakob Kaiser, Federal Minister for All-German Affairs, delivered the ceremonially address in which he made clear to the residents of this new “borderland” that all of Germany shared their territorial anxiety:

I do not wish to use big words. But it so happens that it is a national, a European task to create healthy conditions in this area, which is the threshold of the free world . . . I can only say that anyone who makes investments at Düsseldorf, Cologne, Ludwigshafen or Munich is safe – if he is lucky – for about twelve hours longer than he who lives near the zonal boundary. Every German would therefore do well to overcome the fear of running a risk . . . . This frontier is a mockery of all law and dignity of nations. Let us therefore transform this sorely afflicted land along the zonal boundary into a bulwark of our resolve to reunify our country. But not only German industry ought to make investments. The entire free world, which professes its sympathy with the reunification of our country, should also make its contribution.14

In one phenomenal speech, Kaiser hits all of the right notes: solidarity among West Germans, the importance of German reunification, an appeal to the rest of the sympathetic ‘free world’, and the necessity of utilizing contentious space for geopolitical gain.

Contentious spaces needed clear maps, however. As the political rhetoric (and military presence) of both Germanys became more heated, geographers and cartographers were called upon to increasingly isolate themselves from their colleagues on the other side of the line. Collaborative long-term international projects, such as the

International Map of World, were scrapped in favor of smaller, more accurate maps for military use.\textsuperscript{15} While most western nation-states continued to actively send multiple conglomerates of institutions and academics to international geography conferences and congresses, East Germany was often purposely excluded and West Germany usually only sent one representative institution and/or exhibit (and the maps presented were almost always compiled and edited by Emil Meynen’s \textit{Amt für Landeskunde}).\textsuperscript{16}

In 1958, the unwillingness of German geographers to continue to hold a hard line for their respective politicians became problematic. It was in this year that the German Democratic Republic applied for official admittance into the International Geographical Union (IGU). Until this point, East Germany had been completely shut out of the world’s foremost forum on mapmaking. When the IGU Congress had met in 1952 and 1956, only the Federal Republic of German had been allowed to represent the German nation-state.\textsuperscript{17} The GDR’s 1958 application was somewhat scandalous and prompted serious backlash from West German academics and politicians alike. One West German official from the Foreign Office (\textit{Auswärtiges Amt}) wrote to a geographer on the IGU application committee expressing his belief that the GDR would undoubtedly send spies to the IGU meetings. Moreover, this official was concerned that East Germany


would use any recognition from the IGU as an opportunity to assert national sovereignty.\textsuperscript{18} Several other individuals complained to the IGU about the validity of the GDR’s application, but an ad hoc Statute Committee reviewed the issue and concluded that “on the basis of the structures of the IGU . . . no objection can legitimately be raised against the application for membership of [East Germany]” and that “the application shall be channeled through the regular procedures for consideration and decision by the Xth General Assembly [of the International Geographical Congress].”\textsuperscript{19} Indeed, due to the IGU’s appreciation for territorial demarcations and sites of spatial controversy, its bylaws made it clear that any territory recognized as sovereign or not, was free to apply for membership. Whether to include or exclude the geographers and cartographers of the GDR would, therefore, be decided at the 1960 International Geographical Congress in Stockholm.

So, for the first time since the fortified division of Germany, East Germans were invited to the IGU’s International Congress.\textsuperscript{20} The atmosphere was, understandably, tense. From August 6\textsuperscript{th} through the 13\textsuperscript{th}, 1960, nearly 1700 members from sixty-four nation-states attended lectures, participated in exhibitions and field-trips, and met for sessions of the General Assembly. It was in one of these General Assembly meetings that the question of East Germany’s admittance into the IGU was brought to the floor. The IGU members, after some discussion, elected to admit the Democratic Republic

\textsuperscript{18} Letter from Dr. Horst to Dr. J. Büdel (10 May 1958), Lfl 812-4/58.

\textsuperscript{19} “Report of the ad hoc Statute Committee” (May 1958), Lfl 812-4/47.

alongside Australia, Bulgaria, Guinea, Iran, Iraq, Malaya, Rumania, South Korea, Tunisia, and South Africa.\textsuperscript{21} Among the “aye” votes were several West Germans.

The vote to include the GDR in the International Geographical Union infuriated the West German government. Within a few short weeks, Erich Otremba – who had been particularly supportive of the East German geographers – received several angry letters from the Minister of the Interior’s office. A member of that office lambasted Otremba for his decision to ignore what these letters argued was a very clear directive from Stockholm’s German embassy to vote against the inclusion of East German geographers into the IGU. Otremba’s situation was compounded by an interview he gave to a German magazine in which he seemed to criticize the politicization of the vote.\textsuperscript{22}

Another major theme of West German geographic development in the 1950s was a consistently more contentious relationship between German geographers and their Allied military supervisors, particularly in regards to aerial photography. German geographers were expected to maintain maps based on aerial photographs (and often maintain maps for important flight corridors, especially those between West German cities and Berlin).\textsuperscript{23} By the 1950s, aerial photography had become an indispensable


\textsuperscript{23} Letter from Emil Meynen to Bundesminister des Innern (4 December 1952), LIfL 778-7/181. Emil Meynen was often charged with making important changes to mappings of these corridors. In this particular example, he is instructed to make some alterations concerning the Hamburg-Berlin, Bückeburg-Berlin, and Frankfurt/Main-Berlin flight paths.
aspect of producing large-scale topographic maps. Since the end of the war, German cartographers had been compiling and using aerial photographs in close cooperation with the Allied Civil Aviation Board. By 1953 the German Ministry of Transport created procedural guidelines “on the permission, supervision, and release” of aerial photographs which were to be adhered to by both the Allied Powers and the German government. After the Allied Civil Aviation Board was dissolved in May 1955, the German government was still more than happy to work alongside the Allied powers in producing aerial photos, so long as everyone followed the clear procedures as laid out by the Ministry of Transport.24 This worked out incredibly well, without any complaints from either side until the British and Americans began to get nervous about Cold War tension and the possibility of aerial photographs falling into the hands of a hostile world power.

On 30 November 1955, the Supreme Headquarters of Allied Powers in Europe (SHAPE) released a memo to the “National Military Representatives” of Germany explaining how important it was for aerial photographs to be given a certain level of protection.25 The American and British forces promised that they were not interested in “blanket approval” to regulate “all conceivable activities” undertaken by West Germany’s aerial photographs, but they did feel as though they needed to begin supervising the production and dissemination of aerial photographs taken around certain areas of

24 “Aerial Photography: Statement made by the German Delegate at the Meeting of the Steering Committee on 3 December 1955” (3 December 1955), NARA RG 84, Stack 350 57/30/05-07, Box #7.

25 “Classification of Aerial Photographs” (30 November 1955), NARA RG 84, Stack 350 57/30/05-07, Box #1.
Germany in which the Western Allies had a particular interest. Any such activities, the Allies again promised, “would be [of a] character of which [the] Germans would approve.” The Germans, however, did not approve.

Nor did the Germans become more receptive when, in December 1955, a British delegate demanded that the German laws surrounding aerial photography become “more stringent . . . with a view to achieving stricter [Allied] control.” These new restrictions would include the permission of the Western Allied Forces “before disposing of prints or negatives in any way” and would require Allied approval of any sensitive topographical photographs which might be “of considerable strategic value to a potential enemy.” In effect, the British delegate was demanding that the German aerial photographers be constantly subject to Allied security clearance and supervision.

In response, the Germans argued that to re-draft their aerial photography laws would be a violation of their sovereignty. Moreover, they claimed, laws concerning the protection of aerial photography already existed under the “German Aviation Law” of 1953. On 9 December 1955, the Allied Forces ordered that the “German Aviation Law” be evaluated. The Allies found the Aviation Law acceptable, for the most part, and understood the German desire to control their own maps. However, a compromise was reached on 11 April 1956, after months of negotiations, requiring the mutual exchange

26 “German Forces Arrangements – Surveys” (12 November 1955), NARA RG 84, Stack 350 57/30/05-07, Box #14.

27 “Aerial Photography: Summary of the British Delegate’s Statement at the Meeting of the Steering Committee on 5 December 1955” (14 December 1955), NARA RG 84, Stack 350 57/30/05-07, Box #1.

28 “Status Report on the New Forces Arrangements” (31 December 1955), NARA RG 84, Stack 350 57/30/05-07, Box #1.
of cartographic information important to a “common defense” and allowing the United States to make its own map surveys of West Germany under German supervision, if the Germans so desired (unless, of course, the Allies wanted to make these maps in secret – then they were allowed to do so according to the new agreement).\textsuperscript{29} Eventually this agreement was amended, renamed, and ratified in July 1957 as the “U.S.-German Bilateral Administrative Agreement on Aerial Photography”\textsuperscript{30} which required little more than that the West German Ministry of Transport send “copies of all applications for aerial photography licenses which the German authorities intend to approve” to the Allied Forces for review. The Allies could, at any time and for any reason, veto a license.\textsuperscript{31} The Allies also created a “Central Inspection Zone” between East and West Germany which allowed for fly-over aerial photographs to be taken by both the Soviet Union and the U.S./U.K. as an act of mutual confidence in one another.\textsuperscript{32} While the Allied powers wanted West Germany to remilitarize, to an extent (and in order to serve as the front-line of the Cold War), aerial mapping became a contentious and confusing issue. The aerial photography agreements between West Germany and the Allies remained in effect until the March 1991 ratification of the “Treaty on the Final Settlement With Respect to Germany” which eliminated all restrictions on German sovereignty. If a 

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\textsuperscript{29} “German Forces Arrangements – Surveys” (18 April 1956), NARA RG 84, Stack 350 57/30/05-07, Box #14.

\textsuperscript{30} Telegram to SeoState Washington from John Hay” (6 February 1959), NARA RG 84, Stack 350 57/30/05-07, Box #1.

\textsuperscript{31} “Draft US-German Bilateral Administrative Agreement on Aerial Photography” (July 1957), NARA RG 84, Stack 350 57/30/05-07, Box #1.

\textsuperscript{32} Letter to David K. Bruce from Ray L. Thurston (12 March 1958), NARA RG 84, Stack 350 56/35/04, Box #1.
\end{flushleft}
nation-state must have control over its own mapping projects (including the mapping of its own territory) in order to truly be a sovereign state, then it can certainly be argued that West Germany never genuinely achieved the sovereignty it had hoped to deny its counterpart to the East. The seemingly small stakes of the East German geographers’ application to an international academic union were amplified, in part, by a West German government obsessed with denying mapmaking legitimacy to the GDR while simultaneously mapping itself under the supervision of a foreign power.

**Growing Academic Exchanges**

Throughout the 1950s, it seemed as though the geographers of the Federal Republic were frustrated with the politics of their situation (both academically and territorially). The postwar autonomy that many had hoped would develop after the 1949 creation of the FRG had not materialized. In fact, as the ideological and economic divisions between Europe’s communist East and capitalist West deepened, many West German geographers began to realize that their dependence on the Western powers (and particularly the United States) was no longer a temporary circumstance. Rather than work toward reconciling differences between themselves and their colleagues in the GDR, West German mapmakers began to re-focus on emphasizing their usefulness and value to the American military and the American public. High quality production and international dissemination became the twin priorities of most high-profile geographers in the Federal Republic.

By the end of the 1950s, West Germany was producing seventy-six scientific “geographical serials”. This made the FRG the world’s most prolific producer of geography periodicals. The Soviet Union (with forty), the United States (twenty-five),
and France (twenty-five) were the next three most productive publishers. The West Germans were also, especially in their relationship with the United States, very enthusiastic about exchanging geographic information. By 1959, West Germany was receiving more single-copy exchanges of the Association of American Geographers' Annals than any other foreign nation-state, and had the third-highest number of international subscriptions (behind the Soviet Union and Britain). In fact, the Association of American Geographers had more active periodical exchanges with German institutions than with all of its North American, African, and Asian exchanges combined (a fact not lost on the AAG’s financial staff, who were constantly questioning the importance of so many exchanges with one nation-state).

This heavy flow of information between the United States and West Germany is not surprising. Individual geographers and institutions on both sides of the Atlantic were desperate to maintain their libraries. Several prominent West Germans traveled abroad to the United States to deliver guest lectures, and also to bring material back to their home institutions. Emil Meynen and the Amt für Landeskunde (renamed, in 1953, the Bundesanstalt für Landeskunde – a development explained below) were consistently sending and receiving geographic material from the United States. Meynen’s own

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34 Letter from Marie C. Goodman to Arch C. Gerlach (11 August 1958), AAG, Part I, Box 69.

35 “Rundbrief” (February/March 1953), LIfL 773-11/533. Carl Troll was apparently phenomenal at this practice of convincing the Americans how important his work was while simultaneously making clear German dependence on American academic exchanges.
personal contacts in the U.S. often requested up-to-date maps of Germany from his Amt.\textsuperscript{36}

The most important relationship the Amt für Landeskunde was able to maintain, however, was its postwar exchange program with the Association of American Geographers (AAG). The latter provided the Amt with copies of The Professional Geographer and the Annals of the Association of American Geographers – the two premier journals of English-language geography – in exchange for Meynen’s Berichte zur deutschen Landeskunde (“Report on German Geography”). The AAG was a formidable ally – an institution that, as one staff member of the American Embassy in Germany wrote, many German professors “are anxious to exchange information with” and “particularly interested” in.\textsuperscript{37}

Meynen had been able to secure as consistent an exchange with the AAG as was possible in the immediate postwar years, but as more and more German geography institutions were rebuilt and reorganized, the AAG was forced to reconsider its exchange policies. Postage costs were considerable and, until 1955, the AAG leadership had done a poor job of supervising its publication exchanges (in part because to receive anything from some areas of Europe after World War II was difficult, but also in part due to poor managerial skills and oversight).\textsuperscript{38} The costs associated

\textsuperscript{36} Letter from John A. Hostetler to Emil Meynen (4 November 1953), LIfL 761-7/679.

\textsuperscript{37} Letter from Mildred B. Allport (American Embassy, Office of Public Affairs) to the Association of American Geographers (12 September 1955), AAG, Part I, Box 69.
with publication exchanges seemed problematic. An official depository for geography exchanges between members of the Association of American Geographers and foreign colleagues had been established at the University of Cincinnati in 1923. In 1947, as the depository at Cincinnati began to take up considerable space, the University of Chicago offered to house all material exchanged between the United States and the Soviet Union. It was believed that little, if any, material ever actually made it to the University of Chicago. Due to the ever-accumulating boxes of periodicals at the University of Cincinnati, and the AAG’s disorganized approach to exchanges before and during the Second World War, the AAG assigned a group of geographers to study the problem as an ad-hoc “Exchanges Committee” in 1953. The Committee was supposed to submit a report to the AAG by March of that year, but differences of opinion retarded the evaluation process. However, things did not look good for the exchange program from the outset. Two months after the creation of the Exchanges Committee, one member curtly commented that “The AAG is not, in my opinion, receiving any tangible benefits from the exchange program.”

The Committee’s findings seemed to back up this sentiment. In 1953 the AAG was receiving fifty-eight periodicals from foreign

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38 Even after the AAG exchanges were re-evaluated and re-approved, material would still sometimes be lost due to clerical error. An error could often mix up an exchange for years, as was the case with Berlin’s Die Erde (a publication maintained by Berlin’s Gesellschaft für Erdkunde) which – after eight years of being sent to the AGS without reciprocation – was finally fixed and re-established. See Letter from Nordis Felland to Committee on Exchange of Publications, Association of American Geographers (23 March 1959), AAG, Part I, Box 69. The various name-changes of Meynen’s Amt, too, were problematic. After changing its name to from the Bundesanstalt für Landeskunde to the Institut für Landeskunde in 1959, the AAG publications stopped arriving until Meynen complained about the error (and, of course, asked for back copies) in 1960. See Letter from Yetta G. Sternfeld to Emil Meynen (16 June 1960), AAG, Part I, Box 69 and Letter from Emil Meynen to Yetta G. Sternfeld (26 September 1960), AAG, Part I, Box 69.

institutions. In exchange, the AAG had sent out one hundred and thirty-two periodicals at a cost of roughly $50.\textsuperscript{40} The AAG was, effectively, sending out more than twice as many periodicals than it was receiving in 1953. So, the Exchanges Committee, in April 1954, recommended that the Executive Council of the AAG end its exchanges with foreign institutions.\textsuperscript{41}

The Executive Council of the Association of American Geographers refused to close the exchange program, despite the recommendation of the ad-hoc Committee it had created for just such an opinion. Instead, the Council opted to slim down exchange operations, and polled its membership about which institutions to drop from the exchange program, and which to keep.\textsuperscript{42} Many AAG members, particularly the members of the Exchanges Committee, complained bitterly to their executive leadership. One committee member, who immediately resigned after hearing the Executive Council’s decision, declared that he was “completely out of sympathy with the Council’s policy of accumulating periodicals at the University of Cincinnati at considerable expense to the Association, under the guise of spreading geographic knowledge . . . .”\textsuperscript{43} Nevertheless, substantial changes to the exchange program were established by the Council. Journals only of “real significance or quality” and to which “a paid subscription cannot be obtained” were to be approved for exchange, and were

\textsuperscript{40} Roughly $430 in 2013 dollars.

\textsuperscript{41} Marie C. Goodman. “The AAG Exchange Program – History”. AAG, Part I, Box 69.

\textsuperscript{42} Letter from Nordis Felland to Marie Goodman (7 November 1955), AAG, Part I, Box 69.

\textsuperscript{43} Letter from Arch C. Gerlach to Arthur L. Bert (10 June 1954), AAG, Part I, Box 69.
to have their importance to the AAG continually re-evaluated. In the case of Emil Meynen’s Amt für Landeskunde, for example, nearly every member voted to keep making exchanges with the institution, with one important exception being the American Geographical Society librarian, Nordis Felland. Felland fiercely checked the “Disapprove” column next to the Amt’s row, dryly writing in the margin that “They always want a lot!”

From Amt to Bundesanstalt: Emil Meynen’s Ascension

It is unsurprising that Emil Meynen’s Amt für Landeskunde remained an important hub of geographic exchange throughout the 1950s. In fact, because of the importance of his institution, the political consolidation of space (and the contentiousness of that consolidation) in the Federal Republic of Germany is heavily reflected in the changes experienced by the AfL during this decade. Meynen himself admits that the changing names of his Amt “mirrored a troubled time” (“Spiegel einer unruhigen Zeit”). Within six years his office had changed its name three times: from the Third Reich’s “Abteilung für Landeskunde im Reichsamt für Landesaufnahme” in 1941 to the “Abteilung für Landeskunde” in 1945, and then to the “Amt für Landeskunde” in 1947. Those years, amidst a flurry of cartographic chaos, saw Meynen’s work function as the geographic instrument of Nazi Germany, then of the Allied military government, and finally of the state of Bavaria. After considering whether or not to simply merge the AfL with the FRG’s Institut für Raumforschung, the West

45 Letter from Nordis Felland to Marie Goodman (7 November 1955), AAG, Part I, Box 69.
German Parliament, determined that the breadth of the AfL’s work demanded that its autonomy be maintained. Moreover, its work was so compelling that the Bundesrat questioned why the AfL was tied solely to the state of Bavaria.

On 1 April 1953, the Amt für Landeskunde changed hands once again and became an official administrative organ of the West German federal government, adopting the new name “Bundesanstalt für Landeskunde” (or “Federal Institute for Regional Studies”). While it had been continuously publishing geographic information relevant for the entire nation-state after 1949, the AfL had been funded by the Bavarian state government until this point. It had still managed to produce several widely disseminated geographic projects including prominent periodicals (the Geographisches Taschenbuch and the Berichte), a sweeping academic survey of German geographic thought (the Forschungen zur Deutschen Landeskunde, 1885-1953), one of West Germany’s most prominent map series (the 1:300,000 “Gemeindegrenzenkarte” series – see Figure 5-6), along with several other publications concerned with aerial photography, climate, and landforms. Now, with the financial backing of the federal government, Meynen was able to broaden both his political and academic reach even further. The Federal Republic had confirmed the importance of his spatial narratives and, in the wake of its hyper-tightening border with the German Democratic Republic,

47 Letter from Dr. von Göler to Dr. F. Metz (31 July 1952), LIfL 778-7/204 and Letter from Dr. Dittrich to Dr. Schloesser (13 November 1952), LIfL 778-7/183.

48 “Bundesanstalt für Landeskunde, Zentralarchiv für deutsche Landeskunde” (9 June 1953), LIfL 783-7/407.

49 Veröffentlichungen und Neuerscheinungen der Bundesanstalt für Landeskunde (1953), LIfL 786-3/153.
the new Bundesanstalt für Landeskunde (BfL) was poised to serve as the FRG’s primary mapmaking and map-studying agency.

None of this meant, of course, that Meynen’s BfL stopped its work with the American military. In 1954 Meynen was regularly updating the Americans about the BfL’s completion progress regarding “Militär-geographische Erhebungen der US-Armee” (“Military-Geography Surveys of the U.S. Army”) – a series of German topographic maps which included soil, rock, and vegetation demarcations.\(^50\) In fact, while the European Recovery Program (ERP) was officially terminated in 1951, American tax dollars (misidentified by Meynen as “ERP money”) funded several of the Bundesanstalt für Landeskunde’s projects from 1954 through (at least) 1958.\(^51\) This seems to help explain the emphasis the BfL began to place on economic geography during the mid-1950s. On 1 June 1956, and under the direct supervision of Emil Meynen, the BfL published the Geographische Landesaufnahme: Wirtschaftsräumliche Gliederung map series (or, Geographic Topographic Surveys: Spatial-Economic Relationships) in an effort to establish a unified economic framework within which to study German geography.\(^52\) The hope was that by focusing on the productivity rates of the various Länder, the Federal Republic could better allocate its (and American taxpayer) funds.


\(^{52}\) “Geographische Landesaufnahme: Wirtschaftsräumliche Gliederung” (1 June 1956), LIfL 817-5/20.
By 1959, the BfL had identified nine different “economic zones” with which to standardize its economic geographies.53

1. Schleswig-Holstein (with special attention paid to Flensburg and Rendsburg)
2. Lower Saxony (Cuxhaven, Lüneburg, Enden, Oldenburg, Hildesheim, Hamelin, and Göttingen)
3. Westphalia (Paderborn and Siegen)
4. North Rhine (Bonn-Godesberg)54
5. Hesse (Fulda and Limburg)
6. Rhineland-Palatinate (Trier and Koblenz)
7. Saarland
8. Baden-Württemberg (Heilbronn, Ulm, and Konstanz)
9. Bavaria (Würzburg, Bamberg, Bayreuth, Ingolstadt, Landshut, Passau, and Kempten)

In this same year, the FRG Bundesrat merged the Bundesanstalt für Landeskunde with the Akademie für Raumforschung, creating the creatively named “Bundesanstalt für Landeskunde und Raumforschung”.55 Meynen adopted the shorter designation of “Institut für Landeskunde”, and moved his offices from the town of Remagen in the Rhineland-Palatinate – where it had been since 1952 after moving from the Bavarian town of Landshut in 1948 – to the district of Bad Godesberg in North Rhine-Westphalia.56

The independent work of Emil Meynen’s Institut was more autonomous compared to other German geographical agencies and institutions after the Second World War. Only Kurt Brüning’s Akademie für Raumforschung in Hanover had, up until

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54 It should be noted that the economic zones of Westfalen and Nordrhein were considered by the BfL to be two separate zones of one larger zone, but each of which deserved the same amount of study as the other zones listed here.


its merger with Meynen’s BfL, maintained in a similar situation, but its focus was much broader. Brüning, in fact, often called on his more cartographically inclined colleagues in Meynen’s Bundesanstalt to create maps for his “Akademie”. Most geographical societies and research centers were dependent upon the budgets of universities or local governments. After Germany’s defeat in the Second World War, then, geography education had been suffering (as already discussed in Chapters 2 and 3). While material, teachers, and text books became more available throughout the 1950s, the difficulty in teaching German students about the space around them arguably became more complicated as the European cartographic polarization of the Cold War set in. German students were also not the only audience German mapmakers were worried about. Solidification of the intra-German Cold War boundaries and the perceived threat of potentially imminent military action understandably did not go unnoticed by the American government. While the European Recovery Program had been officially terminated in 1951, West Germans (rightly) believed that promoting a particular territorial national narrative – by invoking a kind of “shatter zone” Sonderweg – American policy makers could more easily convince voters that investing in West Germany was a vital piece of its own national security. Indeed, the West Germans had to “sell” the new map imposed on them by an American occupation back to the Americans themselves.
Selling the New German Map

What do advertising and cartography have in common? Without a doubt the best answer is their shared need to communicate a limited version of the truth . . . Neither can meet its goal by telling or showing everything.

—Mark Monmonier, How to Lie with Maps

Maps sell in two ways. Maps are, obviously enough, textual commodities that can be produced, re-produced, purchased, and sold. More than this, though, they are themselves propositional narratives. In effect, then, they are commodities which can be bought or discarded selling a story which can be bought or discarded. This understanding of cartography has led to a great deal of scholarship on touristic mapping and how spaces and places are “sold” to potential customers. Most of this literature, however, fails to examine the specific “public relations” firms deeply entrenched in the creation and diffusion of such maps (although it usually does harbor fairly staunch critiques of the shades of capitalism which allow such (re)productions). As the 1950s drove on, the government of the Federal Republic of Germany began to rely on the emerging discipline of public relations to both create and distribute its maps.

The concept of “public relations” as a practice arose during the early twentieth century. Perhaps its most famous adherent was a nephew of Sigmund Freud named Edward Bernays (1891-1995). His 1928 book Propaganda attempted to combine psychoanalysis with marketing strategy so that a “new propaganda” could be

57 John Krygier and Denis Wood. “Ce n’est pas le monde (This is not the world)” in Rethinking Maps, ed. Martin Dodge, Rob Kitchin, and Chris Perkins (New York: Routledge, 2009), 198-199.

undertaken by those individuals (or governments or corporations) who might seek to “create public acceptance for a particular idea or commodity.” During the Second World War, Bernays created a handbook for potential acolytes entitled *Speak Up for Democracy!* in which he declared that democracy itself depended upon his readers’ abilities to incorporate a kind of public relations strategy which would sell American democracy to those who might seek to sabotage it or those ignorant of its greatness.

He concludes his text with an urgent plea:

> Twenty years ago, the phrase “public relations” was unknown in its current sense. Today we know leadership is largely the result of effective planning, techniques, and methods . . . Democracy depends upon you . . . It is up to you. You will help decide whether Democracy is to live or die. You are the country’s most important figure. You occupy the highest office in the land – American citizen. You determine our destiny. Now is the time to act. Speak up for Democracy!

In 1952 Bernays produced his book *Public Relations*, which sought to establish the origins of PR campaigns, the historical development of public relations throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and how one could “chart” the “hidden urges” of postwar individuals for the sake of making a sale.

Such publications inspired the creation of many public relations firms in the United States. Several of them, in fact, could not help but see the postwar era as one of


60 Edward Bernays. *Speak Up for Democracy!: What You Can Do – a Practical Plan of Action for Every American Citizen* (New York: Viking Press, 1940), 20. It should be noted that Bernays was “no democrat” and “expressed little respect for the average person’s ability to think out, understand, or act upon the world in which he or she lives.” For more on Bernays, see Stuart Ewen’s *PR!: A Social History of Spin* (New York: Basic Books, 1996), 10.


immense opportunity, especially when the newly established state of West Germany decided that it needed to change the American public’s opinion of German culture. Public opinion had been emphasized by Bernays as a “vital” part of “rearmament, economic mobilization, and national defense.” In the FRG “several German officials observed that public opinion played an uncommonly large role in the formulation of American foreign policy, and thus reasoned that the manipulation of representations of Germans in the United States should constitute a major element of their broader plan to win American friendship.” Who better to undertake this task than an American PR firm – one which could “sidestep American fears about renewed German propaganda in the United States”? It had been, after all, American PR firms which had first so successfully represented the interests of Germans in the 1930s, attempting to mitigate the “hostility being bred by Germany’s racial and military policies”: Carl Byoir & Associates, which had worked on behalf of tourism in the Third Reich, and Ivy Lee & T.J. Ross and Associates, which had represented I.G. Farben.

American businesses and map publishers also already had plenty of experience working with their own government during the Second World War. The Office of Strategic Services had purchased some of the maps it had used for intelligence

63 Ibid., 293.


65 Ibid.

operations from corporations such as the International Map Company, Inc.\textsuperscript{67} and Rand McNally & Co.\textsuperscript{68} Of course, such interactions were always done in secret, prompting the repetition of one addendum sentence at the end of each series of correspondence: “As is usual in this sort of work, these maps should not be stamped ‘Office of Strategic Services’.”\textsuperscript{69}

The American military had begun to use the burgeoning discipline of public relations during World War II as well. District engineers (who, prior to the 1942 organization of the Army Map Service, controlled the bulk of U.S. Maps) had been among the first members of the military to be assigned a PR officer in May 1941 and were already told prior to the bombing of Pearl Harbor to avoid giving any information to foreign audiences without first consulting the War Department’s Public Relations Division.\textsuperscript{70} By 21 September 1942, the Public Relations Division had been reorganized into the seemingly more efficient and, at the very least, much more authoritatively sounding “Office of Technical Information.”\textsuperscript{71} By 1944, this office was organizing several promotional events concerning cartography and geography, one of which – the Map Reproduction Train – was a well-planned parade of “ten truck-mounted units . . .

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{67} Letter to W.L. Rehm from the International Map Company, Inc. (25 August 1942), NARA RG 226, Stack 190 5/30/7, Box #229.
\item \textsuperscript{68} Letter to Mr. William M. Drummond from Rand McNally & Co. (12 April 1943), NARA RG 226, Stack 190 5/30/7, Box #229.
\item \textsuperscript{69} Letter to Mr. Charles V. Crittenden from D.W.G. (14 December 1943), NARA RG 226, Stack 190 5/30/7, Box #229.
\item \textsuperscript{70} “Public Relations Organization” (30 April 1941) and “Memorandum for Colonel Hardin: Press Relations” (21 November 1941), NARA RG 77, Stack 390 1/07/02-03, Box #1.
\item \textsuperscript{71} “Memorandum: Reorganization of Public Relations Agencies” (21 September 1942), NARA RG 77, Stack 390 1/07/02-03, Box #1.
\end{itemize}
[with] both lithographic and photographic . . . field mapping units.” The train was
demonstrated in front of the news press at Wisconsin’s Camp McCoy on the 24th of
August 1944.\textsuperscript{72}

The American military's employment of PR firms, and their use of maps,
continued into the postwar period. Many of the U.S. European Recovery Program’s
publications incorporated maps to help illustrate the rebuilding of Europe’s economy
(Figures 5-7, 5-8, and 5-9) in order to more effectively disseminate material which would
“develop [a] sense of common effort and mutual aid.”\textsuperscript{73} Note, however, that the United
States is absent from much of this literature, particularly as a geographic presence. In
Figure 5-7 there is also no “Germany”, per se, but zones of occupation. Furthermore,
Figure 5-7 is a publication of the United States and discusses the importance of “direct
help” in re-building European nation-states but avoids cartographically representing
America in favor of emphasizing the importance of a self-reestablishing Europe (even
when such an emphasis is funded by a non-European power). Figure 5-8 also attempts
to portray a cartographically reconstructed Europe without depicting the United States.
Part of Europe’s recovery, in fact, is the absence of an American imposition on its
continental map. Figure 5-9 is, however, a different example of the use of maps in re-
spatializing postwar Europe. Rather than completely leaving out the United States, this
map portrays (with arrows and ships) the movement of economic assistance from

\textsuperscript{72} “Work Order No. DGN-3801: Demonstration of Equipment for Members of the Press” (17 August 1944),
NARA RG 77, Stack 390 1/07/02-03, Box #2.

\textsuperscript{73} “Outgoing Classified Message No. WAR 84979” (30 June 1948), NARA RG 335, Stack 490 8/35/03-07,
Box #1.
Washington D.C. to Europe. America has drawn itself not as an occupational force, but as a source of economic recovery! None of these maps have any strictly scientific value, but each one counts on the reader to recognize the authority and objectivity of maps so as to establish the spatial reality of various nation-states and the movement of economic resources to/from those nation-states.

While the West German government was looking to hire American public relations firms, the United States was more than happy to encourage West German corporations like Inter Nationes (which merged with the Goethe-Institut in 2001) to distribute its information in the U.S. Inter Nationes, which had mastered the art of depicting a carefully constructed West Germany to non-German audiences since 1952, was not interested in presenting to its foreign publics an “official image of Germany or even the image of Germany per se. The reason for this is quite simple: such an image of Germany [did and still does] not exist.”74 The territorially contentious history of the German nation-state coupled with its expansionist foreign policy during the Third Reich resulted in an inability to articulate a static spatial narrative. In the absence of an official picture, the opportunity was left open for the West German government to cartographically propose a self-consciously drawn nation-state purposefully produced for mass consumption.

Several firms applied to represent the FRG’s public relations interests and the freshly quasi-autonomous government was more than happy to entertain various “plans”

for West Germany. John Maynahan & Associates, for example, sent the government a fifteen-page strategy meant to prove that by choosing them “as public relations representative, [they could] obtain the greatest effectiveness within the shortest possible space of time, with the least expenditure of money.”75 The Hamilton Wright Organization, Inc., which during the war had been forced to stop its activities in continental Europe,76 promised to make Americans more “conscious” of the themes of German recovery and new-found appreciation for democracy by utilizing “large information media.” They offered to work on behalf of the FRG government for six months at the price of $50,000.77 Stephen Goerl Associates sent in their plan with an attached article from Advertising Age which was written for their client, the German Travel Association.78 In fact, all of these plans/applications focus on getting prominent Americans to travel to Germany and write favorably about their experiences. The New York Times, Fortune, Seventeen, and Cosmopolitan are just a few of the publications which regularly show up in their exchanges as being integral to American culture and, therefore, important to influence.

75 “Memorandum Concerning a Plan of Public Relations for Advancing the Interests of WEST GERMANY” (25 February 1953), Appendix A, Pg. 5. BA B145/777, Bd. I. All of the source information from the Bundesarchiv (BA) at Koblenz was generously made available to me by Dr. Sheryl Kroen, professor in the History Department at the University of Florida. This project would not have been possible without her guidance and assistance.

76 Cutlip, 83.


Yet by the time most of these applications reached the FRG, the government was already working with the Roy Bernard Company, Inc. This American firm had signed a three-month, interim contract (which would later be continually extended) with the German government beginning on 1 January 1952 for which they would be paid $12,500 in advance, with another $12,125 to be given to them for up-front printing costs. This contract specified that

The Roy Bernard Co., Inc. shall represent the Federal Republic of Germany as public relations counsel in all matters falling within the general area of public relations that shall be considered by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany conducive to the promotion of harmony, understanding, industrial and cultural intercourse and tourism between the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States.  

One such “matter” was the preparation of “finished art work for . . . literature, pamphlets, brochures and other materials . . . .” As one can imagine, this included maps.

In a 1955 letter to the Press Office for the Embassy of the Federal Republic, a Roy Bernard Co. representative lamented the sorry condition of German maps in the United States, most of which were “either too complicated or too old.” In fact, “even [their] top newspapers [carried] maps that were copyrighted in 1928 or 1933.” Frustrated by this out-datedness, the PR representative began to explain how a new map of the Federal Republic would help serve West German political and economic interests. As this representative went on to explain, the Roy Bernard Co. had “been


80 Ibid., 1. Emphasis added.

81 Ibid.
concerned with this map for almost four years” and it had been one of “the first projects” they had recommended producing. From its conception, they had envisioned it as a “simple map designed to do a very big public relations job, namely, to show the present size of the Federal Republic of Germany and how it has been divided and where the important areas are.” In other words, to namely create a map which would provoke American sympathy and business. It would cost the Federal Republic $300 (or, in 2013 dollars, roughly $2500) to make the printing plates, but the payoff would be worth it.

By May of 1956, the Roy Bernard Co. made sure that over 10,000 American schools and libraries received the map (Figures 5-10, 5-11, and 5-12). The first edition had already been sold out by June. It was one of the only maps produced since the collapse of the Third Reich to depict all of Germany's national territory in one single, easy-to-read sheet. Moreover, the German press covered the map’s dissemination as an objective rendering of a divided Germany — a map that made its cartographic situation a bit more urgent to the typical American. After all, wrote one German newspaper, “Es ist ein Unterschied, ob man von der Teilung Deutschlands gelegentlich hört, oder ob man sie sieht.” Yet the paper also criticized the map for not somehow


84 “Amerika wird das geteilte Deutschland gezeigt” (9 June 1956), 1. BA B145/1277, Bd. I. My translation: “There is a difference between hearing about the division of Germany occasionally and actually seeing it.”
representing the expulsion of the Germans from the eastern territories and the Sudetenland. This, argued the journalist, left the map incomplete ("unvollständig").

Surrounding Roy Bernard’s map are emblems of the German states, implying not only their existence, but their autonomy and importance – although none are as large and bold as the Federal German crest. The most glaring symbols within the version of the map included in the newspaper article (Figure 5-11) are the lines of division in Germany. This, of course, is what the FRG wanted to emphasize at the time, and it is what they paid the Roy Bernard Co. to produce. As the map’s advocate from the Roy Bernard Co. made clear to the Federal Republic’s Press Office, “. . . this map is a public relations map. It is not intended for accurate geographical studies.”

Such transparency was, of course, omitted from the map itself and the news article covering its incorporation into American educational institutions. The press release accompanying the map from the German Embassy Press and Information Office in Washington, D.C. also failed to mention the map’s geographical inaccuracy, but made sure to announce that “A divided Germany means a divided Europe. The reunification of Germany in freedom will make a vital contribution to the stability of Europe and the peace of the world.”

The Roy Bernard Co. had undertaken smaller mapping projects prior to 1955. In a letter written in August 1952 and marked “Confidential”, Roy Bernard’s employee

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85 Ibid., 2.
86 Letter to Bussche from Gittelson, 1. BA B145/1277, Bd. I.

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Charles Campbell wrote to Georg von Lilienfeld (of Bonn’s Press and Information Office) to alleviate his fears that Roy Bernard was not doing enough to publicize a friendly Germany in the U.S. As Campbell tried to make clear: “What is now beginning to appear in the pages of newspapers and magazines was put into the works months ago.” After rattling off the various publications (Esquire, Scholastic, Cosmopolitan, Fortune, etc.) which would soon be printing editorials, pictures of the Bavarian Alps, and articles, he took a moment to mention that a “Facts on Germany” booklet had been sent off to the printer. On the back cover of the booklet was a map of Germany which Campbell wanted to use as a barometer of cartographic public opinion. Apparently, Herr von Lilienfeld had been pestering him about “going ahead . . . [with] a schoolroom map”, but Campbell had remained fairly apprehensive.\textsuperscript{88} Undoubtedly the information gained from the map’s publication and subsequent reception would have been used in the four-year project that eventually ended up in schools and libraries across the United States. In a cordial effort to assuage any lingering doubts, Campbell ended his letter, “. . . I have continued confidence in your understanding of this rather delicate business of molding public opinion . . . There is much at stake.”\textsuperscript{89}

\begin{quote}
This cartographic urgency was often made explicit in maps considered for production by the Roy Bernard Co. In 1952 a draft of a potential map was submitted along with a fictionalized narrative which proposed an alternate version of the Second World War’s end:
\end{quote}

\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{88} Letter to Mr. Georg von Lilienfeld from Mr. Charles E. Campbell (20 August 1952), 1-3. BA B145/775, Bd. I.
\item \textsuperscript{89} Ibid., 3.
\end{enumerate}
The enemies’ armies approached the [United] States from the north in a broad front. The defenders lacked everything. Losses increased . . . and the enemy was pitiless . . . Things came to an end . . . All states were occupied. The military and political leaders had fully surrendered. The victors met in Washington, D.C. and conferred about the future of a nation that lay crushed and powerless at their feet.90

In this inventive history, the United States was “quartered” into various fragments, one of which had been ceded back to Mexico while the other four existed under the occupation forces of the Soviet Union, South America, South Africa, and Canada. The narrative continued in great detail, explaining to the reader how various zones were carved up, how New York City and Washington D.C. became “divided into four sectors under allied administration”,91 and how American place-names were effected (perhaps most alarming to Americans at the time was the changing of Seattle to “Pacificgrad”).92 Self-described as an illustration “of the situation in Germany transferred to the territory of the United States”, this story sought to render to an American audience the unimaginable humiliation, alienation, and suffering experienced under the very real circumstances a new postwar West German government was attempting to assuage.93

This account – aptly entitled “Democracy in Peril” – could not depend upon the written word alone. In order to more adequately project the cartographically catastrophic effects of the Allied Powers’ redrafting of German territory, maps had to be included. The author provided two such maps to complement this unhappy fiction. The

90 “The United States Quartered / Democracy in Peril", 1. BA B145 1277, Bd. I.
91 Ibid., pg. 2.
92 Ibid., pg. 3.
93 Ibid., pg. 6.
first (Figure 5-13) provided the reader with a clear picture of what a fragmented America might look like. While the boundaries and labels of the old states were clear, so too were the lines which divided them into occupied sectors. In the second map (Figure 5-14), the states as an American audience might know them had been erased, leaving only the labels and boundaries of the occupied zones and two dots meant to signify New York City and Washington D.C. – the two cities split between the four occupying powers. To add even further insult, New York City’s name had been changed on this map to “Four Power City”. Clearly, no cartographic referent in which Americans took great pride was safe from the geographic tyranny of their foreign invaders.

The author of this American dystopia is unknown, and the practice of imposing European situations onto the map of the United States was not new (and was especially popular during the First World War, when American mapmakers were searching for ways to quickly and effectively provide the average citizen with a quick lesson in European geography; see Maps 5-15 and 5-16). It was, however, submitted by Dr. Richard Mönning to the Roy Bernard Co. for approval and subsequent public dissemination into the psyche of postwar Americans. Dr. Mönning was employed by the Inter Nationes public relations firm. Located in Bonn, this firm occasionally worked in tandem with the American-based Roy Bernard Co. This particular project was rejected by Roy Bernard as “unusable in the United States,”94 but such collaboration between these two firms mirrors the mutually beneficial relationship between the West German

94 Letter from Charles E. Campbell to Dr. Richard Mönning (16 September 1952). BA B145 1277, Bd. I.
government and several private public relations enterprises (most notably, as already mentioned, was their heavy dependence on the Roy Bernard Co.).

West Germany was interested in utilizing the “science” of PR to, among other things, assert itself cartographically. Only by establishing its territorial place in the imaginations of its domestic citizenry and its foreign audience, could West Germany fully recover from World War II. Only by legitimizing its territorial orientation could the freshly “imagined community” of the FRG rise from the abstract to the concrete – from the mind to the map.

The Roy Bernard Co. worked with the Federal Republic, filing quarterly reports, until 1961 when the FRG’s German Information Center took over, due to a growing wave of anti-German sentiment in America and the PR firm’s inability to quickly and efficiently deal with it. The publication of Anne Frank’s diary (1952) and its subsequent adaptation into a play (1955) and a movie (1959) as well as the Eichmann trial (1961) were difficult issues to have to affix a positive “spin”. There had also been some investigative reporting done in 1960 by the American magazine *The Reporter* which had discussed the Roy Bernard Co. within a less-than-favorable evaluation of how foreign governments used private American enterprises to influence public opinion. The FRG

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95 “The Foreign Legion of U.S. Public Relations”, 17. BA B145 9764, Bd. III.


97 Etheridge, 81 and 85.
dumped Roy Bernard, and West Germany was back to mapping itself (under the watchful eye of the American occupation forces).

Having to cope with cartographic decision-making, however, proved to be more strenuous than the government had been expecting. Choosing “not to become directly involved in the dispute over German territories”, the maps approved by the German Information Center “always included multiple boundary designations in the East”.99 This led to a serious lack in territorial uniformity – just as East Germany (GDR) began cartographically solidifying its boundaries by using the technique of “island representation” (Figure 5-17). Such poor policy regarding its maps has led one geographer to claim that the 1960s and 1970s served as “the low point of the territorial script of the German nation in the FRG.”100

But the genuine “low point” of Cold War-era German cartography began with the construction of the Berlin Wall on 13 August 1961. Only then did the abstract spatial posturing of Cold War rhetoricians combine with the radical fortification of an intra-national border. Less than two weeks later, the Wall’s first casualty – 58 year-old Ida Siekmann – leaped from the third floor of a Berlin building on Bernauer Strasse along

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98 Douglas Cater and Walter Pincus. “The Foreign Legion of U.S. Public Relations” in The Reporter (22 December 1960), 17. BA B145/9764, Bd. III. These concerns did not end with the The Reporter’s expose. The use of public relations in influencing foreign governments and American foreign policy remained a “hot topic” throughout the 1960s. One of the more interesting and least investigated was the “Julius Klein Affair” of 1963, when Julius Klein (a prominent lobbyist for the Jewish War Veterans and PR executive) was grilled over his relationship to the West German government and Konrad Adenauer by the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs. Many of Klein’s papers can be found in the Wisconsin State Historical Archive.


100 Ibid., 158.
the East-West divide. While the building itself was in East German territory, the concrete in front of one of its sides was designated as part of France’s West Berlin. Siekmann landed poorly (as had a 47 year-old man who had jumped just days before and broken his leg)\(^{101}\) and she sustained serious internal injuries. Within a few hours, she had died. Two days later, 24 year-old Günter Litfin was shot trying to swim from East Berlin to the West across a shipping canal that connected the Spree and Havel rivers in the center of the city. By the time the Wall fell, in November 1989, 136 people had died trying to traverse it.\(^{102}\) The manipulation of German space, from the initial East-West split in 1949, erupted in “regular occurrences” of violence.\(^{103}\)

The period from 1952 to 1961 saw a shift in cartographic renderings toward polarization. The most obvious mapped form of this polarization – the literal split between Germanys in 1949 – could only be sustained in West Germany by creating a political culture willing to view its new eastern neighbor with suspicion.\(^{104}\) While generally ignored in most German histories of the period, this culture was in part shaped by the geographers of the Federal Republic. Many of these geographers, however, believed in the scientific authenticity of their maps, appreciated the contributions of their academic colleagues in the Democratic Republic, and were noticeably agitated by

\(^{101}\) The man, Rudolf Urban, died from complications caused by this jump one month later.


\(^{104}\) In a poll of West Germans taken in 1952, 51% of the population claimed to value “security from the Russians” over “the unity of Germany”. Each subsequent year the poll was taken, an increasing number of Germans prioritized their security over reunification. For more on political polling and German reunification, see Anja Kruke. “Western Integration vs. Reunification? Analysing the Polls of the 1950s” in *German Politics and Society*, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Summer 2007), pp. 43-67.
government intervention (especially foreign government intervention) into their affairs. Public relations firms served as a useful medium through which to shape German space without compromising the legitimacy of geography as a discipline. While Emil Meynen’s Institut had become the premier mapmaking center of West Germany, and while the maps it produced were some of the most desirable for his academic colleagues throughout the world (not to mention the American military government), by 1961 simple and convincing cartographic narratives became preferable to accurate ones. Indeed, projections of German space to foreign audiences largely abandoned the dialectic model of academic discussion for the more cost-effective and politically beneficial model of corporate expedience.
Figure 5-1. Amt für Landeskunde. “Gemeindegrenzenkarte, Stand 13.9.1950”. Scale 1:1,000,000. 1952. American Geographical Society Library, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee.
Figure 5-2. Amt für Landeskunde. “Vierzonenverwaltungskarte von Deutschland mit naturräumlicher Gliederung”. Scale 1:1,000,000. 1951. American Geographical Society Library, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee.
Figure 5-3. Amt für Landeskunde. “Karte der Verkehrsbezirke für die Güterbewegungs-Statistiken”. Scale 1:1,000,000. 1950. American Geographical Society Library, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee.
Figure 5-5. Amt für Landeskunde. “Gemeindegrenzenkarte, Stand 13.9.1950”. Scale 1:1,000,000. 1952. American Geographical Society Library, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee.
Figure 5-6. Bundesanstalt für Landeskunde. “Gemeindegrenzenkarte 1:300,000”. Scale 1:300,000. 1953. Leibnitz-Institut für Länderkunde, Leipzig.
Figure 5-7. European Recovery Program. *Wie die direkte und die indirekte ERP-Hilfe 1948/49 verteilt wird* [diagram]. No scale given. In: *Sie Sollen es besser haben!* [pamphlet]. NARA RG 335, Stack 490 8/35/03-07, Box #19. Note: There is no map of the United States.
Figure 5-8. European Recovery Program. *Amerika Hilft Europa, Europa Hilft Sich Selbst* [pamphlet]. NARA RG 335, Stack 490 8/35/03-07, Box #19.
Figure 5-9. European Recovery Program. Untitled [map]. No scale given. In: Amerika Hilft Europa, Europa Hilft Sich Selbst [pamphlet]. This map from another European Recovery Program pamphlet (Fig. 15) emphasized the movement of economic resources across the planet. NARA RG 335, Stack 490 8/35/03-07, Box #19.
Figure 5-10. *Germany: boundaries of 1937 [map].* Scale 1:3,500,000. Bonn, Germany: Cartography Wilhelm Stollfuss Verlag. BA B145/1227, Bd. I. This is sent to the Roy Bernard Co. as an example of the kind of map which was to be published and disseminated in 1956.¹

¹This image, compiled from three separate photocopied portions of the map, was made digitally available in whole form by this author’s terrible use of computer imaging software.
Figure 5-11. Germany [map]. Scale unknown. In: Walter Gong. “Amerika wird das geteilte Deutschland gezeigt.” BA B145/1227, Bd. I. This was the published version of the Roy Bernard public relations map.
Figure 5-12. Germany. Scale 1:1,500,000. United States: World Wide Maps, Inc. 1956. This is a color version of Figure 4-11. Courtesy of the American Geographical Society Library at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee.
Figure 5-13. *Sample 1* [ms. Map]. No scale given. BA B145 1277, Bd. I. The United States split into occupation zones.
Figure 5-14. Sample 2 [ms. Map]. No scale given. BA B145 1277, Bd. I. A map of occupation without typical American state boundaries.
Figure 5-15. *Comparative Areas of Countries at War.* No scale given. Published by Rand McNally, Co. UNL MS 043.
Figure 5-16. *The Relative Areas of the World’s Great Powers*. UNL MS 043.

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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION

Because maps are propositions you must accept responsibility for the realities you create . . .

—John Krygier & Denis Wood, Rethinking Maps

The fluidity of German territory dictated the foreign policies of non-European powers toward Europe throughout the twentieth century. The construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961 established a concrete “Iron Curtain” between a capitalist West and a communist East, as well as a symbol of seemingly absolute cartographic divergence. But on 9 November 1989, the Berlin Wall began to be dismantled. Less than one year later, on 3 October 1990, the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic reunited as one German nation-state. The following year the Soviet Union imploded into a new European “shatter zone”, a zone free from imposed isolation but still plagued by the characterization of Eastern European “Otherness”.

Re-establishing a reunified Germany – particularly regarding its geographic spaces – was not a smooth process. Almost immediately after reunification, a very public debate broke out regarding where the new Germany’s Reichshauptstadt (capital city) would be located. While the Holy Roman Empire had never had a capital city, Berlin was seen by many as the natural choice. It had been Germany’s initial capital, established in 1871 alongside the creation of the modern German nation-state. Berlin was also, however, the capital of Hitler’s Third Reich and a city he desperately wanted to mold into “the centre of Europe and the world”, a city which would “signify visually the

power of the Nazis.” The alternative capital city proposed for the new Germany was Bonn. Bonn had been the capital of the Federal Republic since the formal division of East and West Germany in 1949. To many Germans, housing the new federal government in Bonn would be an indication of the nation-state’s western orientation and commitment to a new Europe (and a democratic Germany). On 20 June 1991 the Bundestag voted to decide between (as it was characterized at the time) “Bismarck’s Berlin or Beethoven’s Bonn” and chose Berlin by eighteen votes. The contentiousness of its capital city quickly faded away, as Germany made clear its intentions for Berlin to represent both the scars of its former national self, and a new pluralistic, Europeanized, and multicultural state.

Germany’s Europeanization, however, quickly became problematic. It was undeniable that (at least by 1990) German denazification had been hugely successful, but many of Europe’s prominent leaders were wary of a unified German state which, in the not-so-distant past, had wreaked havoc throughout the Continent. Until reunification, East Germany had subsisted as a semi-autonomous appendage of the Soviet Union and West Germany operated only under particular restrictions to its sovereignty (not the least of which, as pointed out in Chapter 4, was an imposed supervision over its ability to map itself). In March 1991, with the ratification of the “Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany”, all of these restrictions were eliminated. While Europe’s other powers suspected the inevitability of reunification by


\[ \text{Rössler, “Berlin or Bonn?”, 99. The vote count was 338 to 320 in favor of Berlin.} \]
1989, several prominent politicians remained skeptical of Germany’s promise to abandon any aggressive policy stances. French President Francois Mitterand worried that a new Germany would “result in [their] gaining more European influence than Hitler ever had.”

British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher also felt threatened by what she characterized as a nation-state which “had never found its true frontiers.” On 20 January 1990, she complained to Mitterand that German reunification would result in the new nation-state’s domination of Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, leaving only Romania and Bulgaria “for the rest of us.”

History has shown Thatcher and Mitterand’s concerns were largely unfounded. German reunification did not result in new forms of pan-Germanism, aggressive militarism, or territorial accretion. Only in 2006, prompted by the combination of Germany’s hosting the soccer World Cup and a generation of Germans entirely detached from the politics of both the Second World War and reunification, did Germans once again display and promote their national symbols on a massive scale.


6 This type of rhetoric, however, has been employed throughout the early 2000s (especially in Britain). In 2006, for example, British newspapers claimed that a European Union initiative to encourage transnational tourism and environmentalism was a “German-led ‘conspiracy of cartographers’ [designed] to give Brussels the power to change national boundaries.” Cited in Mark Monmonier. No Dig, No Fly, No Go: How Maps Restrict and Control (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010), 31.

7 A. Dirk Moses. German Intellectuals and the Nazi Past (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 281-282. For an excellent analysis of how Germany’s 2010 ‘multicultural’ World Cup team influenced and was influenced by German identity, see Maria Stehle and Beverly M. Weber. “German Soccer, the 2010 World Cup, and Multicultural Belonging” in German Studies Review, Vol. 36, No. 1 (2013), pp. 103-124.
Germany has grown significantly stronger. One could argue that today, in 2013, Germany is much less Europeanized than Europe is Germanized. Germany’s economic growth has been accompanied by an influx of migrant labor\textsuperscript{8} and a “Euro crisis” brought on (in part) by the 2008 global recession. In the wake of these economic problems, the current nation-states on the European map attempt to retain their territorial sovereignty while simultaneously upholding the European Union. This balance between asserting a kind of nationalism and projecting a European identity is a difficult one, but also an extremely important one. It is necessarily expressed in different ways by the various EU members. Whereas today’s Germany works to stabilize the European economy by centralizing the continent’s budgetary practices,\textsuperscript{9} Hungary (a country which has not adopted the Euro, but has depended on bailouts from the EU in the past) has made a strange statement to its European colleagues by imposing an 1848 map of the Habsburg Empire onto the carpet of the European Council building in Brussels.\textsuperscript{10} Similarly, Estonia – which adopted the Euro on 1 January 2011 – has depicted its national territory on its Euro coins, but the map’s borders clearly include parts of Russia. When confronted with complaints from the Russians, Estonia’s leaders

\textsuperscript{8} Germany has had difficulty maintaining its commitment to inclusion and multiculturalism in the face of rising xenophobia (especially concerning its ever-increasing Turkish population). See Yosefa Loshitzky. “Constructing and Deconstructing the Wall” in \textit{Clio}, Vol. 26, No. 3 (Spring 1997), pp. 275-296.


explained that the map was simply a consequence of the artist’s “artistic vision.”

Examples such as these make it clear that maps remain important and contentious! In fact, as the historian Caitlin Murdock points out, debates surrounding the European Union reflect the same political concerns national and transnational communities had in late nineteenth-century Central Europe. Europe, she argues, has a long history of transforming communal identities by embracing contradictory territorial claims of sovereignty. An addendum should be attached to this observation: just as it was in the nineteenth century, Germany still retains a defining role in how these issues are approached and how they will be resolved (or further transformed). Surely, Annemarie Sammartino is correct when she writes that “the image of Germany’s impossible border – both too strong and too weak, a symbol of threat and possibility – links this sense of crisis in Germany to the broader European crisis of sovereignty.” Germany’s unique position, its inability to articulate a consistent space for itself, has been depicted as both the quality which will make Germany the economic savior of the Eurozone, and as a territorial albatross which cannot help but invoke visions of a twenty-first-century Europe dominated by a new economy-based German Lebensraum. In an effort to reassure its


neighboring nation-states of its total un-interest in expansion, yesterday’s counter-cartographers – those Germans who worked to first establish their dominance on the European map and then their sovereignty within its postwar divisions – have quickly become today’s arbiters of the territorial status quo.

One example of this transition (from mapping an occupation to mapping within an occupation), an example that has been used consistently throughout this dissertation, is that of Emil Meynen. Born in 1902, Meynen came of age and was educated under the auspices of the democratic Weimar Republic. As has been noted in Chapter 1, however, the geographers of Weimar were heavily influenced by pan-Germanism and the study/glorification of the German Volk. In an effort to better understand the development of German communities in non-German cultural environments, Emil Meynen traveled to the United States (with the assistance of the Rockefeller Foundation) to study the Amish in Pennsylvania. After completing his Habilitation at the University of Cologne, he went on to serve as a prominent geographer in the Third Reich, as both the director of the Office of Research on German Folk Communities and as an advocate of the aggressive and expansionist Lebensraum policy (even serving, at times, along the Eastern Front in Poland). In April 1941, Meynen established the Abteilung für Landeskunde, an institution he would head (except during periods of postwar internment) through several transformations (and name-changes) throughout

14 A Spanish newspaper (in El Paris's March 2013 article, "Alemania contra Europe", or "Germany vs. Europe"), in fact, made exactly this assertion. Political activists in nation-states which have been forced by Germany to implement economic austerity measures have been particularly vocal in comparing contemporary German Chancellor Angela Merkel with Adolf Hitler, and her economic policies with attempts to destroy the sovereignty of other nation-states in order to establish the supremacy of Germany on the European continent.
the postwar period. As a newsletter commemorating the 35th anniversary of the Abteilung für Landeskunde wrote so succinctly, “die wechselnden Orte der Arbeit, Spiegel einer unruhigen Zeit.”15 By the time the Berlin Wall was constructed in 1961, Meynen’s Nazi Abteilung was the Federal Republic of Germany’s Bundesanstalt für Landeskunde und Raumforschung, the premier mapmaking and analyzing institution in West Germany. He directed this organization until his retirement in 1968.16 He also created Germany’s Association of Professional Geographers in 1950.17

Emil Meynen died on 23 August 1994 at the age of 92.18 He received many honors for his postwar service – service to both the Marshall Plan and to German geography. Among his many awards were the University of Bonn’s Alexander von Humboldt Medal (given to him in 1969) and the Federal Republic’s Grand Cross of Merit (also given to him in 1969).19 In 1967 he received the Robert Gradmann Medal for his contribution to German Cultural Studies. In 1977 he was awarded the Carl Ritter Medal by the Berlin Geographical Society. As historian Ute Wardenga notes, Meynen also was granted honorary membership in many international geographical and cartographical organizations, including the International Cartographical Association.


19 Fahlbusch, 427-428.
Moreover, he was granted Honorary Chairmanships of the Central Committee of German Area Studies (1987) and Germany’s Standing Committee on Geographic Names (1987). On four separate occasions – his 50th, 70th, 75th, and 90th birthdays – colloquia were organized to recognize, comment on, and contribute to his academic work. Only in the past decade or so have German historians begun to uncover Meynen’s participation in the foreign policy of the Third Reich.

Meynen’s professional experience, generally, is not unique. Other geographers (perhaps most infamously, Walter Christaller) advocated on behalf of Lebensraum during the Third Reich, went through denazification, and then assisted the postwar Allied occupation authorities. As this project has attempted to make clear, though, Meynen’s professional fluidity – his career opportunism – kept his personal power and influence within Germany’s academic community fairly consistent during the political transition from Nazi Germany to postwar occupied Germany. He was able to harness his professional relationships, his institute, and his well-established publications to simultaneously strengthen German geography and satisfy the intelligence needs of the Allied powers (particularly the United States). For Emil Meynen, geographic and cartographic study was more important than any ideology. Whether working for Lebensraum or for the forces maintaining the occupation of Germany, the lives and careers of individuals seemed to have always played a secondary role to the security of the geographic-academic profession.

Geography and cartography, as academic disciplines, changed drastically after the Second World War. Before the postwar occupation of Europe, the most prominent and influential American geographers were often fluent in French or German (or both). The ideological trends of geographical thought (Geopolitik, Lebensraum, the Heartland Theory, Central Place Theory, etc.) migrated to the United States from Europe. After World War II, a significant intellectual shift occurred in which American geographers became the prominent voices of these disciplines. This shift continues to this day, with more and more influential Europeans publishing their work in English while their American colleagues fail to develop foreign language skills that were once central to their profession.\(^\text{21}\) Yet, as unique as this shift might seem, it was (an important, but) ultimately one development within a larger trend of the Americanization of global spatial relationships. Unlike the maps of earlier conflicts, the maps of the Second World War were massively and systematically disseminated so as to establish a particular (and deeply interested) rendering of the world picture.\(^\text{22}\) Ensuring a geographic status quo required a tautological spatial narrative – the boundary lines existed because they existed. Perpetuating a seemingly transparent cartography (that is, one which propagates the map itself, but never the interests hidden within it) has become the fundamental approach to establishing spatial claims on the surface of the earth. As the geographer David Harvey recently noted, “In the early years [that is, prior to the 16th


twenty-first century], maps were guarded as state secrets and kept under lock and key. Now, of course, we have satellites, GPS systems and Google Earth to guide us . . .

West Germany may have, in fact, been the first modern nation-state to have its existing map explicitly re-drawn, publicized, and sold by a foreign corporate entity, but it has certainly not been the last. With the emergence of commercial giants such as the Environmental Systems Research Institute, NAVTEQ, and Integraph, the geospatial data which determines place within contemporary cartographic propositions is becoming increasingly dependent upon marketing strategies, technology, and corporate interests. Moreover, as maps become more displaced from the subjective datasets and cartographers which create them, their self-referential and tautological assertions of authority and objectivity flourish.

Considering the trends of cartographic development – from the individual cadastral maps of land to those sponsored by the state for the purpose of taxation – and its evolution (regression?) into a marketed and mass-produced narrative, strategically placed into particular publications, libraries, school rooms, and internet browsers for public consumption helps to de-mystify the mapped spaces of the nation-state. Germany serves as a perfect example for such an undertaking because of its unique cartographic history, the constant spatial (re)negotiations it has consistently grappled with, and the re-production of its space by an occupying military force. Its purposefully manipulated remapping made clear the importance and possibility cartography and geography held in the twentieth century. Indeed, Germany’s territorial malleability

\[23\] David Harvey. *The Enigma of Capital and the Crises of Capitalism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 156.
should not be forgotten in the twenty-first century, a time in which (as cartographic theorist John Pickles so forcefully argues) “the age of mechanical reproduction . . . is giving way to an age of mechanical hyperreproduction . . . conjoined with a world of infinite manipulability . . .”.24 The illusion that maps are simply objective tools for corporate, government, and/or individual use has never been so strong. The history of Germany’s re-mapping, however, helps to clarify the importance of understanding the interests within spatial representations (and within the narratives of cartographic disinterest).

Nationalism, particularly in Europe, has waned significantly since its ideological heyday in the nineteenth century. The historian George Mosse has argued that, in Europe, “most national symbols, like national monuments, seem to have spent their force.”25 The mapped space of national territory, though, seems just as value-laden today as it was two hundred years ago. Even as Europe’s nation-states cede sovereignty to the continent’s transnational union, the postwar territorial status of those nation-states rarely changes. Whereas the first national maps of European states were established so as to invoke sovereign rule over particular areas, today’s European maps – with their more fluid boundary lines and relaxed residency restrictions – suggest


that sovereignty and territory do not necessarily have to complement one another.

Economic “cooperation,” as Mark Mazower claims, may have “replaced competition” after the Second World War,26 but competing claims for particular parcels of land continue to feed isolationist political rhetoric. In fact, it was nationalist sentiment established by spatial renderings of the nation-state, which helped re-establish Europe after World War II. Postwar Germany became a site of nationalist reconstruction within a context of a new economic internationalism – a (arguably, the) model for a new Europe.27 This dissertation has offered evidence suggesting that maps and mapmakers played a large role in this reconstruction.

One final lesson from Germany’s postwar re-mapping is the importance of cartography and geography for occupational control. This can be applied in two ways: generally and to particular cases. Generally speaking, there is a clear spatial dimension to the expansion of global capitalism. In the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, this has been made especially manifest in the concept of “uneven development”, the trending of capital “toward creating spatial equilibrium as a geographical mirror image of itself” and “the production of geographical space [as] a major way of protecting social and economic equilibrium and of staving off crisis.”28 The


27 Eric Hobsbawm has also made this point, although not specifically regarding mapmaking. For Hobsbawm, late twentieth-century nationalism has become a means to further developments, and is no longer an end to itself. The postwar period is the clear turning point for this shift. See Eric J. Hobsbawm. *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992.

“third world” and “the developing world” are clear constructions of late capitalism – the producers/consumers that (through unabashed exploitation) make “first-world” commodities and services affordable to the global bourgeoisie. Once again, Germany stands as an excellent example here of earlier experimentation, of rapid re-industrialization and of revitalized economic purchasing power, as a place simultaneously dominated and saved by capitalism. On a more particular level, compiling standardized maps is hugely beneficial for imperial hegemons. Utilizing local geographers, local geographic data, and already-established channels of map dissemination make military occupation more viable. As a case-study in occupation, the Allied denazification and reconstruction of Germany was, in part, successful because of its ability to use Germans in reorienting postwar Germany.29

Ultimately, we are responsible for the worlds we create with maps. The history of Germany’s territorial development undermines both the perceived objectivity of mapped space, and the nationalist narratives built from within (or along the borders of) state and corporate cartographies. It encourages the investigation of space as a category of historical study, and makes clear the need for a deeper exploration of the realities constructed by the manipulation of space. Undertakings such as these help to provide a more comprehensive understanding of the past and a more informed engagement

29 While I am unaware of any comparative studies involving the cartographic restructuring of earlier American occupations and current ones, making standardized maps likely to convince local populations of their authority has been problematic in nation-states like Afghanistan. See, for example, John Shroder. “Afghanistan’s Development and Functionality: Renewing a Collapsed State” in GeoJournal, Vol. 70, No. 2-3 (October 2007), pp. 91-107.
with the spaces in which we find ourselves. Fracturing spatial narratives into our own "shatter zones" unveils historical truths always worth re-mapping.
APPENDIX
Der Landkreis Scheinfeld

Some examples of maps from Der Landkreis Scheinfeld, the first volume of a planned series on German regional geography entitled Die Deutschen Landkreise and underwritten by Emil Meynen’s Amt für Landeskunde and Kurt Brüning’s Akademie für Raumforschung und Landesplanung. This particular volume, however, was edited by Erich Otremba and its maps were drawn by the staff of the Amt für Landeskunde.

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Born and raised in rural Ohio, the young Matthew D. Mingus had a seemingly unnatural affinity for language (particularly curse-words). He used these powers (mostly) for good and graduated from Ashland University in Ashland, Ohio with bachelor’s degrees in History, Philosophy, and Political Science (2008). Having fallen in love with the study of history, and having interned for a summer at the Museum of Jewish Heritage in New York City, Matthew decided to apply to graduate schools and was accepted into the doctoral program at the University of Florida. It was there that he received his M.A. (2011) and Ph.D. (2013) in History, specializing in modern European intellectual & cultural history and modern Germany.

On 10 July 2010, Matthew married Lindsey Smith, making their pet adoption of Dixie the dog over a year earlier “legit”. After defending his dissertation, Matthew plans on running away with Lindsey and Dixie. He has accepted a position as an Assistant Professor of History at the University of New Mexico-Gallup and hopes that the weather there is far less humid than that of Gainesville, Florida.