To James and Malcolm. Out of the frying pan and into the fire.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This seven year process would never have gotten to this point without the advice, support, mentorship and love of several people. Although the proverb says “it takes a village to raise a child”, it truly takes a village (or perhaps in my case, a small city) to finish a dissertation. The chair of my committee, Benjamin Smith, deserves more gratitude than I can give. Throughout this process he has been an inspiring mentor, a brilliant teacher, and confidant and friend. Improving my subject-verb agreement, adding to my repertoire of Indonesian recipes, and showing me how to be a good scholar, teacher, and parent all at the same are just a few of the lessons I’ve learned under his tutelage. The rest of my committee, Ken Wald, Dan O’Neil, Leo Villalon, and Abe Goldman also deserve accolades. Ken always had a wise word and funny joke to tell, Dan encouraged me to ‘think outside the box’, Abe provided a voice on Africa and the Great Lakes, and I benefitted from Leo’s tremendous knowledge of political processes and connections across the continent, in addition to him and Fiona’s hospitality many times over. I’ve also benefitted from the work, time, and advice of other scholars in this process: the two “lions” of African Politics at UF, Goran Hyden and Rene Lemarchand influenced me greatly from the beginning of my studies. Will Reno and Zacariah Mampilly read chapters, helped with framing thoughts, and provided hours of entertainment, usually at their own expense. Tim Longman, Marc Sommers, and Peter Uvin generously shared their extensive knowledge of the Great Lakes and helped me to make many connections both before and during fieldwork. The Department of Political Science and the Center for African Studies at the University of Florida provided me
tremendous financial support, camaraderie, office space, a place to present new ideas, and supportive colleagues. The United States Department of Education Fulbright-Hays Doctoral Dissertation Research Abroad committee took a chance on a project in a country that had not seen a fellow in decades, for which I am eternally grateful and could not have finished the project without. The University of Rochester generously provided me with a year to complete the majority of the writing, and my colleagues there, especially Bethany Lacina and Adam Cohon gave valuable insight and drafting advice. My colleagues at Grinnell College provided motivation to “finish the job” all while introducing me to life of a faculty member. Jennifer Holmes has been a friend, mentor and inspiration in the discipline and in life upon our first meeting ten years ago.

This project was influenced in a thousand ways by the people I lived and worked with in Burundi. Samson Munahi greeted me and taught me about Burundi from my first trip in 2008. Audifax was an inspiration in the field and taught me how to eat urorobe like a Burundian. Jean-Marie Ngendahayo, Aloys Batungwanayo, Johan DeFlanders, and Patrick Hajayandi gave lots of academic and practical advice about research, the topic, and life in Burundi during and after the war. Finally, my anonymous interview subjects, market sellers, bar patrons and students who generously shared their time, their lives, their food and drink, and their spirit with me. While I don’t know that fieldwork changes everyone for the better, it certainly did for me.

My colleagues in graduate school, especially the notorious Africanist Mafia, earn special thanks here. Wynie Pankani, Ramon Galinanes and Steve Lichty all began graduate school with me, Ann Wainscott and Nic Knowlton a couple of years later. They have provided companionship, commiseration, and valuable feedback along the way.
Kevin Fridy, Aaron Hale, Ashley Leinweber, Steve Marr, and Fredline M'Cormack-Hale were encouraging and helpful, especially with navigating procedures and classes, conferences, and the job market. Steve Marr deserves high praise for creating science with me, sharing internet videos, and all the Hobbit Christmas cards.

My family, including my parents, my siblings, and my aunts, uncles, grandparents and cousins all provided spiritual, mental, and sometimes financial support. Without the Beck-Jones Fund for Wayward Scholars, my research would have suffered tremendously. The ability to afford over-priced Nutella in the field is integral to good research. My mother, Mary, has been especially crucial to the process: She is and has always been a teacher, both as a profession and within our family. I have no doubt that it is this legacy that the work embodies. She also generously came to visit us in the field, bringing an extra suitcase of goodies and a bit of home, financed by and carrying the goodwill of my long-suffering father, who not only had to deal with me as a child, but also continues to allow me to kvetch on a weekly basis. The family of my spouse (The Reaves, Prices and Hammetts) also generously accepted me and my desires to take their son to a far-flung corner of the world and miss several holidays. They provided prayer, material support and a place to crash, mentally and physically, when we returned from the field.

Finally, I would be remiss if I failed to mention the man behind the curtain. James Reaves has seen this process from idea to print, including the somewhat dubious honor of a year and half in Burundi, followed by a year in Rochester, New York, and all the temperature changes in between. As a spouse, partner, and friend, he never fails to steer me in the right direction, whether it be in regards to my writing or to my choice in
music for the car. The work that he has put into this project cannot be measured. It was truly a labor of love for him to accompany me on this adventure, and although at times the results were unexpected, it has never been anything other than extraordinary. Our beautiful son Malcolm Bennett Reaves gestated the same time I wrote and finished the dissertation and provided his very own special form of moral support during the defense. Although I have never been so sleep deprived, I have also never been more proud of all of our achievements this year. It is to James and ‘Baby Bear’ that most of the credit for this work should go.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.................................................................................................................. 4

LIST OF TABLES.................................................................................................................................. 13

LIST OF FIGURES.................................................................................................................................. 14

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS.................................................................................................................. 15

ABSTRACT ........................................................................................................................................... 22

CHAPTER

1  GIVING UP THE GUN: REBEL TO RULER TRANSITIONS IN AFRICA’S GREAT LAKES.......................................................... 23

   Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 23
   The State in Africa: Background to Rebellion .......................................................................... 34
   Why Rebels? ............................................................................................................................ 40
   The Argument .......................................................................................................................... 43
   Layout of the research ............................................................................................................. 51
   Tables and Figures ................................................................................................................... 53
   Notes ......................................................................................................................................... 57

2  A THEORY OF REBEL REGIME SUCCESS ................................................................................. 60

   Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 60
   Civil Wars and Rebellions ........................................................................................................ 61
   Contextualizing Civil Wars in Africa: Marginalization, Greed, And War: Why do they Rebel? .......................................................................................................................... 64
   Ethnicity and Conflict .............................................................................................................. 70
   Approaches to Civil Wars ....................................................................................................... 75
   Quantitative and Qualitative Methodological Tools in the Study of War ......................... 78
State Formation and Rebel Organization: The Linkages ............................................. 80
Rebellion Outcomes: How do they (or don’t they) Win? .......................................... 82
The Conduct of War: The Contribution to Peacetime Success ...................................... 86
Behaviors of Rebel Groups during Negotiated Settlements: The Keys to Success .......... 92
Theorizing Rebellion Success: After the Conflict Ends ............................................. 93
Counter-Examples: Failed Groups ............................................................................... 100
Alternatives to the Theory ............................................................................................. 100
Conclusion ....................................................................................................................... 106
Tables and Figures .......................................................................................................... 107
Notes ................................................................................................................................ 111

3 ANTECEDENT STATE CONDITIONS, ORGANIZATIONAL AND SOCIAL POWER ............................................... 113

Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 113
A Short History of Burundi ............................................................................................... 115
A Political History since the Founding of the Republic .................................................... 123
Violence and Ethnic Conflict: Pre-Cursors to Rebellion ................................................ 130
  Independence and Violence ......................................................................................... 131
  A ‘Selective’ Genocide .................................................................................................. 131
  The Interim Period, 1972-1988 ................................................................................... 132
  Lead Up to Civil War 1988-1992 ............................................................................... 133
  La Crise, 1993 ............................................................................................................... 134
Rwanda ............................................................................................................................... 136
  Dual Colonialism: The Tutsi and Belgium .................................................................. 136
  Political Changes over the post-Independence period ................................................. 140
  Ethnic Conflict in Rwanda leading up to the Genocide, 1990-1994 ......................... 142
  The Rise of the RPF ..................................................................................................... 146
Rwanda and Burundi: False Twins and Rebel Incubators? .............................................. 148
Uganda ............................................................................................................................... 150
  Another Kingdom, Multiple Sovereignties ................................................................. 150
  Independence ............................................................................................................... 153
  Early Changes and Dictatorship ................................................................................. 154
  The Bush War and the Rising of the NRA ................................................................. 154
The Legacy of Uganda’s Political Struggle on the Region ............................................. 156
Ugandan History in Comparison ....................................................................................... 157
The Democratic Republic of the Congo ......................................................................... 158
  King Leopold’s Ghost ................................................................................................. 159
  Independence: Promise and Failure ........................................................................... 161
  Mobutu’s Pocket: Kleptocracy and the Regime ......................................................... 164
  The West and the East: Two Congos, too Many Problems ....................................... 166
Kabila, Rwanda, and the AFDL ....................................................................................... 167
Comparing Congo to the Rest of the Region ..................................................................... 168
How does State History Matter to Rebellion? ............................................................... 169
# LIST OF TABLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-1</td>
<td>Reform Rebel Insurgencies in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1975-2009</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-1</td>
<td>Aspects of Rebel Behavior and the Literature by Period</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-2</td>
<td>A New Typology of Rebel Behavior</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-1</td>
<td>Summary Statistics of African Rebels Dataset</td>
<td>343</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-2</td>
<td>Examples of Measures on Major Cases in Study</td>
<td>343</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-3</td>
<td>Multinomial Regression Results</td>
<td>344</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-4</td>
<td>Multinomial Regression Results with Addition of Independent Variable Age of Rebel Movement</td>
<td>344</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-5</td>
<td>Multinomial Regression Results using the Proxy Measure for Organizational Power</td>
<td>345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-6</td>
<td>Multinomial Regression Results holding Foreign Assistance constant (&quot;Outside Help&quot;)</td>
<td>345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-7</td>
<td>Multinomial Regression Results, the Effect of Peacekeepers</td>
<td>346</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-8</td>
<td>Robustness Check on Centralization and Leadership</td>
<td>346</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-9</td>
<td>Robustness Check on Rebel Strength</td>
<td>346</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-10</td>
<td>Robustness Check on Rebel Capability</td>
<td>347</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-11</td>
<td>Robustness Check on the Natural Log of Rebel Strength</td>
<td>347</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-12</td>
<td>Robustness Check on Centralization and Leadership and the Natural Log of Rebel Strength</td>
<td>348</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-13</td>
<td>Robustness Check on Rebel Capability and the Natural Log of Rebel Strength</td>
<td>348</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-14</td>
<td>Robustness Check on Rebel Capability and Centralization and Leadership</td>
<td>349</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# LIST OF FIGURES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-1</td>
<td>The Cases: Africa’s Great Lakes</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-2</td>
<td>Map of Africa’s Great Lakes Region and Rebel Groups</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-3</td>
<td>Administrative Map of Field Sites, Province and Commune Levels</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-4</td>
<td>Administrative Map of Field Sites, Bujumbura City, Burundi</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-5</td>
<td>A Temporal Sequencing of Rebellion and Civil War</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-1</td>
<td>Actors in the Burundian Civil War, 1993-1994</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-2</td>
<td>Actors in the Burundian Civil War, 1998</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-3</td>
<td>Actors in the Burundian Civil War, 2002</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-4</td>
<td>A Temporal Timeline of Civil Wars</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-5</td>
<td>Theoretical outline of Civil Wars</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-6</td>
<td>Temporally Important Behavioral Variables during the scope of a Civil War</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-1</td>
<td>A Temporal Diagram of the Major Events Burundian Civil War, 1993-2005</td>
<td>228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-1</td>
<td>Diagram of Relations in Civil Wars</td>
<td>286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-2</td>
<td>Temporalities and Interactions with Civilians</td>
<td>287</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-3</td>
<td>Abagumyabanga membership cards, CNDD-FDD</td>
<td>287</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-4</td>
<td>Examples of Cotisation Receipts, 2001-2004</td>
<td>288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABAKO</td>
<td>Bakongo Alliance (Alliance du Bakongo)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACLED</td>
<td>Armed Conflict Locator Events Dataset</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADC-Ikibiri</td>
<td>Democratic Change Alliance (Alliance pour Democratie et Change- Ikibiri)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADP</td>
<td>Alliance for Democracy and Progress (Alliance pour Democratie et Progres)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFDL</td>
<td>Allied Forces for Democracy and Liberation, (Alliance du Forces democratique pour la liberation du Congo-Zaïre)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFRC</td>
<td>Armed Forces Revolutionary Council, Liberia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AI-SHABAAB</td>
<td>Mujahideen Youth Movement (Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMC</td>
<td>African Marine Commandoes, Cameroon</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APRD</td>
<td>People's Army for the Restoration of Democracy (L'Armée Populaire pour la restauration de la république et la démocratie)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAMPERE</td>
<td>The Student Movement for Progressives in Burundi (Mouvement des Etudiants Progressistes Burundi)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BINUB</td>
<td>United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi (Bureau Integree Nations Unies Burundi)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDR</td>
<td>The Committee for the Defense of the Republic (Comite pour la Defense de la Republique)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CENI</td>
<td>National Independent Electoral Commission (Comision Electorale Nationale Independant)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNDD</td>
<td>National Council for the Defense of Democracy (Conseil national pour la defense du la democratie)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNDP</td>
<td>National Congress for the Defense of People (<em>Congres Nationale pour la défense du le peuple</em>)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNRD</td>
<td>National Council for the Resistance and Democracy (<em>Counsel National du Resistance pour la Democratie</em>)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONAKAT</td>
<td>Confederation of the Tribal Association of Katanga (<em>Confederation des Associations Tribales du Katanga</em>)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPJP</td>
<td>Convention of Patriots for Justice and Peace (<em>Convention les patriotes pour la justice et la paix</em>)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAC</td>
<td>East African Community</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EALA</td>
<td>East African Legislative Assembly</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EIJM</td>
<td>Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPLF</td>
<td>Ethiopian People’s Liberation Front</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPRDF/TPLF</td>
<td>Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front/ Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAN</td>
<td>Northern Armed Forces (<em>Force Armées du Nord</em>)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAPC</td>
<td>People’s Armed Forces of Congo (<em>Force Armées du Congo</em>)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAB</td>
<td>Burundian Armed Forces (<em>Force Armees Burundais</em>)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAR</td>
<td>Rwandan Armed Forces (<em>Force Armees Rwandaise</em>)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FARC</td>
<td>Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (<em>Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia</em>)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAZ</td>
<td>Zairian Armed Forces (<em>Force Armees Zairois</em>)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FARS</td>
<td>Revolutionary Armed Forces of the Sahara (<em>Force Armées Révolutionnaire du Sahara</em>)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDD</td>
<td>Forces for the Defense of Democracy (<em>Forces pour la défense du la démocratie</em>)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDLR/Interahamwe</td>
<td>Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (<em>Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda</em>)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDPC</td>
<td>Democratic Front for the People of Central African Republic (<em>Front Démocratique du Peuple du Centrafrique</em>)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDR</td>
<td>Democratic Revival Front (<em>Front du Démocratique Réveille</em>)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIAA</td>
<td>Islamic Arab Front of Azawad (<em>Front Islamique Arabe de l'Azaouad</em>)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLAA</td>
<td>Liberation Arab Front of Azawad (<em>Front Libération Arabe de l'Azaouad</em>)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FN/MPCI</td>
<td>New Forces/ Ivory Coast Patriotic Movement (<em>Force Nouvelles/Mouvement Patriotique Cote D'Ivoire</em>)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FNI</td>
<td>National and Integrationist Front (<em>Front des Nationalistes et Intégrationnistes</em>)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPLA</td>
<td>Popular Liberation Front of Azawad (<em>Front Populaire de Libération de l'Azawad</em>)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRPI</td>
<td>Patriotic Resistance Forces, Ituri (<em>Front Resistance Patriotique du Ituri</em>)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRELIMO</td>
<td>Mozambican Front for National Liberation (<em>Frente de Libertacao de Mocambique</em>)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRODEBU</td>
<td>The Front for Democracy in Burundi (<em>Front pour la Démocratie au Burundi</em>)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FROLINA</td>
<td>National Liberation Front (<em>Front de Libération Nationale</em>)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRONASA</td>
<td>Front for the National Salvation of Uganda</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRUD</td>
<td>Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FUDC</td>
<td>United Front for Democratic Change (<em>Front Unité du Démocratie et Change</em>)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEDEBU</td>
<td>Democratic Generation in Burundi (<em>Generation Democratique du Burundi</em>)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDI</td>
<td>Human Development Index</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INPFL</td>
<td>Independent National Patriotic Front Liberia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JRR</td>
<td>The Revolutionary Youth of Rwagasore (<em>Jeunes Revolutionnaires du Rwagasore</em>)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KM</td>
<td>Kikosi Maalum</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KY</td>
<td>Kabaka Yekka (The King Alone)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LPC</td>
<td>Liberia Peace Council</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LRA</td>
<td>Lord’s Resistance Army</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTTE</td>
<td>Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, “Tamil Tigers”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDR</td>
<td>Democratic Republican Movement (<em>Mouvement Democratique Republicain</em>)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MLC</td>
<td>Congo Liberation Movement (<em>Mouvement Liberation du Congo</em>)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MLCJ</td>
<td>Movement of Central African Liberators for Justice (<em>Mouvement des Centrafricain libérateurs pour la justice</em>)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNC</td>
<td>National Congolese Movement (<em>Mouvement National Congolais</em>)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNJ</td>
<td>Nigérienne Justice Movement (<em>Mouvement des Nigériens pour la Justice</em>)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPA</td>
<td>Azawad People’s Movement (<em>Mouvement Populaire de l’Azaouad</em>)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPLA</td>
<td>Angolan Popular Liberation Movement-Worker’s Party (<em>Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola-Partido do Trabalho</em>)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRC</td>
<td>Congolese Rally Movement (<em>Mouvement Rassemblement Congolais</em>)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRLZ</td>
<td>Zairian Revolutionary and Freedom Movement <em>(Mouvement Revolutionnaire pour la Liberation du Zaire)</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRND</td>
<td>National Republican Movement For Democracy <em>(Mouvement Republicain National pour la Democratie)</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRNDD</td>
<td>National Republican Movement For Democracy and Development <em>(Mouvement Republicain National pour la Democratie et Developpement)</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPFL</td>
<td>National Patriotic Front, Liberia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NRM/NRA</td>
<td>National Resistance Movement/Army</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PALIPEHUTU-FNL</td>
<td>National Forces of Liberation, Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People <em>(Force nationale du liberation)</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PALIR</td>
<td>People in Arms for the Freedom of Rwanda <em>(Peuple en armes pour la liberation du Rwanda)</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PARECO</td>
<td>Resistant Congolese Patriots <em>(Patriotes Resistants Congolais)</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PARMEHUTU</td>
<td>Movement Party for the Emancipation of Hutu People, <em>(Parti du Mouvement de L'Emancipation Hutu)</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDC</td>
<td>Party of Christian Democrats <em>(Parti Democratique Chretien)</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRP</td>
<td>Popular Revolution Party <em>(Parti Revolution Populaire)</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSA</td>
<td>African Solidarity Party <em>(Parti Solidaire Africain)</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RaFD</td>
<td>Rally for Democratic Forces <em>(Rassemblement des Forces Democratiques)</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RANU</td>
<td>Rwandese Alliance for National Unity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCD-Congo</td>
<td>Rally for Congolese Democracy <em>(Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie)</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Name</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCD-Goma</td>
<td>Rally for Congolese Democracy- Goma (<em>Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie</em>)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCD-Kisangani</td>
<td>Rally for Congolese Democracy- Kisangani (<em>Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie</em>)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RENAMO</td>
<td>Mozambique National Resistance Movement (<em>Resistência Nacional Moçambicana</em>)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPF(<em>FPR</em>)</td>
<td>Rwandan Patriotic Front/Army, Rwanda (<em>Front Patriotique Rwandais</em>)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RTLM</td>
<td>Free Radio and Television of the Thousand Hills (<em>Radio Television Libre du Mille Collines</em>)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RUF</td>
<td>Revolutionary United Front</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SANDANISTA</td>
<td>Frente Sandinista de Liberacion Nacional</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLA</td>
<td>Sudanese Liberation Army</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPLA</td>
<td>Sudan People's Liberation Army</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UBU</td>
<td>Labour Party of Burundi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCDP</td>
<td>Uppsala Conflict Data Program</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDSM</td>
<td>University of Dar-Es-Salaam</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UFDD</td>
<td>Union of Forces for Democracy and Development (<em>Union des Forces Démocratiques pour le Démocratie et Développement</em>)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UFDR</td>
<td>Union of Democratic Forces for Unity (<em>Union des Forces Démocratiques pour le Rassemblement</em>)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ULIMO-J</td>
<td>United Liberian Movement for Democracy-Johnson</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ULIMO-K</td>
<td>United Liberian Movement for Democracy-Kromah</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMIR</td>
<td>United Nations Assistance Mission to Rwanda</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAR</td>
<td>Rwandan National Union (<em>Union Nationale Rwandaise</em>)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNITA</td>
<td>National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (<em>União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola</em>)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
UNLA  Ugandan National Liberation Army
UPC  Ugandan People’s Congress
UPC  Union of Congolese Patriots (Union des Patriotes Congolais)
UPC-K  Union of Congolese Patriots-Kisembo (Union des Patriotes Congolais)
UPC-L  Union of Congolese Patriots-Lubanga (Union des Patriotes Congolais)
UPRONA  Party of Unity and National Progress (Unite et Progres National)
UPDS  The Union for Democratic and Social Progress (Union pour la Democratie et le Progres Social)
ZANU  Zimbabwe African National Union
The question of rebel to ruler transition is a fascinating line of inquiry connecting conflict behaviors and choices with the reality of post-conflict governance. Rebels, eager to assume the mantle of government must often work with former opponents in combat, in addition to regional and international actors, all of whom maintain wildly divergent goals in a fragile context. This study draws upon fieldwork in Central Africa, mostly conducted in Burundi, but also Rwanda, Uganda, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, to assess how rebels become rulers, gaining and maintaining majority political power. It finds that the pathways to power are myriad, and rebel fates in the post-conflict period are determined by specific types of power possessed and perfected by the rebel organization during the rebellion. Specifically, that the type of organizational power and source of social power and relations the rebel group pursues helps to shape post-conflict success when the goals of the rebel group shift from attaining power through force and into maintaining it within a democratizing context.
CHAPTER 1
GIVING UP THE GUN: REBEL TO RULER TRANSITIONS IN AFRICA’S GREAT LAKES

Introduction

A former CNDD-FDD rebel described the civil war in Burundi to me as, “The war was always on our minds … We were fighting every day against our enemies. We went hungry and cold because that is the way of war. We fought the soldiers when they found us. We did these actions because we wanted to be able to rule ourselves, and not let them think for us.”¹ After twelve years the Conseil National Pour la Défense de la Démocratie–Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie (CNDD-FDD) gained power in Burundi. This interviewee’s description of the reasons and behavior of war bring to mind both an old and a newly emerging question in rebel studies: why do some rebel groups succeed at post-conflict governance and others do not?

These questions spring from the disorder and disarray of post-colonial politics over the last forty years in sub-Saharan Africa. From the time when states came into their own in the 1960s, politics in the region became a contest for ethno-regionalist or religious power, the game of the ‘big man’, or a dispute over state resources and control of the population. Some posit that because of the “fact that it [the African state] has never had to really fight for its life, neither in order to come into existences, nor to survive” (Kaarsholm 2006: 4). As former colonies not born of war, African states and their politics were subject to different forces than those driving state politics in the conventional understanding of state development vis-à-vis the history of Western Europe. Given this history, it is unsurprising that a vast number of rebel movements...
have sprung up around the continent: at least two hundred distinct rebel movements have arisen since 1970 (UCDP 2011). These rebellions have translated into the dominant form of civil war since the end of the Cold War (Tull 2005:1). What is surprising is how successful some rebels have made the transition from non-state anti-government actors to government leaders and power-keepers. This is in direct contrast with other seemingly similar rebels-cum-rulers who have failed to do so. This work explores this in a process of sequencing from civil war to post-conflict state. I concentrate on the region of sub-Saharan Africa known as the “Great Lakes”, which encompasses Rwanda, Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda and Tanzania, because of similarities in pre-colonial legacies, post-Independence politics, and ethnic tensions. In this region, which some call a ‘conflict neighborhood’: four of the five governments are former rebel movements that gained power through military victory or negotiated settlement out of a civil war.

This chapter serves as an introduction to my research, and proceeds in four sections. Section one defines the research puzzle, the cases under study and the methods of inquiry used in the analysis- in short, the basics of the research design. Section two gives the background to rebellion, an explanation of the state and its role in African politics and clarifies ‘rebellion’, detailing the environment and actors the project concerns. Section three offers an introduction to the framework of the causal argument and finally, section four provides a detailed layout for the rest of the work.

The Research Puzzle. In the Great Lakes and sub-Saharan Africa more generally, the rebel turned political figure is an increasingly common phenomenon. While these individuals and groups can take on a range of roles following the ending of
conflict, I address a specific pathway to the possession of majority state power and political control. Civil wars have victors and losers. Therefore, this work examines a range of victor (successful) and loser (unsuccessful) rebel groups to determine what effect rebel behavior has on post-rebellion politics. It does so by focusing in particular on the CNDD-FDD in Burundi to highlight the variables at play and the causal linkages in the rebel and post-conflict periods. Ted Robert Gurr remarked in 1980 that “the outcomes of violent conflict are problematic and intrinsically worthy of study” (245), but while subsequent studies of civil wars have probed the causes, patterns, behaviors and solutions, post-conflict outcomes have yet to receive significant attention. Significantly, the post-conflict literature fails to engage the importance of conflict behaviors upon post-conflict decisions made by both rebel organizations and governments, instead focusing on how to further solidify the end of conflict and prevent new conflict emerging.

In sub-Saharan Africa, numerous rebel groups have emerged to challenge the state, seeking an overthrow: some are ideological, some religious or ethnic in character, and some for material or resource gains (Reno 2011: ch. 1), with varying degrees of success or failure in military victory against state forces. To speculate as to how these groups with extreme military prowess came to power seems rather obvious: scholars argue that the ending of conflict in a total war with a clear victor facilitates the post-conflict regime’s legitimate claims to power (Luttwak 1999, Toft 2010, Dereun and Sobek 2004). This is especially true in collapsed or failed states where military power can be the only expression of legitimacy (e.g., Zartman 1995 and Rotberg 2003). But not all post-rebellion governments are the military victors. To reiterate the initial puzzle of this work, why and how do some unsuccessful rebel groups (those unable to
overthrow incumbent regimes by taking control of the financial and power locales of the state (Reno 2011: ch.1) become the post-rebellion regime? Furthermore, how do these groups build and maintain power as the post-conflict ‘honeymoon’ recedes from memory? These are the questions central to this research. The comparative framework provided in Figures 1-1 and 1-2 (located at the end of this chapter) conceptualize the cases discussed and their respective outcomes.

The matrix (Figure 1-1) and map (Figure 1-2) illustrate a set of rebel organizations that show the range of outcomes in the Great Lakes region of transitions from rebel group fighting a government army to post-rebellion regime. In these cases, some rebel groups that were successful at rebellion (meaning that they defeated the government and seized power) were able to transition to successful governments that were able to take, build and expand political power. A successful government in this study is one in which the rebels are able to gain political power following the cessation of conflict and then maintain political power through at least one legitimate post-conflict election, maintain political and social legitimacy among citizens, and resists overthrow or seizure of power by other rebel organizations or the military. Other rebel groups were not so fortunate in the struggle, and were unable to win control of the state or were unable to maintain control of the state post-conflict. I suggest below that antecedent state conditions, the type of victory, and leaders are not the key to political transformation and longevity: but that the type of organizational power and the nature of social power of the group during the rebellion period determine post-rebellion success, even when it is unable to take victory militarily. Hence, the behaviors of the group during the rebellion are crucial to later successes as a government, a necessary but not
sufficient condition for successful transitions. The case of the CNDD-FDD in Burundi illustrates a fundamental challenge to the traditional premise of rebel victory because it failed to take power decisively through a civil war victory but yet built a stable and successful government. The CNDD-FDD built a regime that has lasted for almost a decade and two election cycles, while at the same time resisting credible challenges to its power and expanding its base of support: It is these outcomes that are most central to the work. Analysis of the CNDD-FDD’s transition will help to build a theory of rebel to ruler transitions that reflects the realities of civil wars in sub-Saharan Africa. Moreover, it suggests ‘post-conflict’ does not mean the slate has been wiped clean of previous political goals, behaviors or strategies of the groups involved and thusly, suggests that history of the group now holding power matters to the future of the state.

**Case Selection.** This project analyzes post-rebellion governments in sub-Saharan politics on three levels: the specific, the small N case study, and the larger comparative dataset. First, I address the research puzzle of how and why a successful post-rebellion government has arisen in Burundi under the CNDD-FDD following an unsuccessful rebellion. I utilize various methods to illuminate specific features of the CNDD-FDD transition that are then used to locate rebel to ruler transitions in two larger comparative contexts. The project focuses the bulk of the fieldwork regarding the various rebel groups operating in Burundi and situates them in broader set of rebel movements in the Great Lakes region. All of the countries in the region are near the bottom of the United Nations’ Human Development Indicator (HDI) ranking list, employment and production are mainly agricultural, and have experienced intensive civil war in the last twenty-five years. Although these countries in which rebel movements
have become governments are multi-ethnic, two in the region, Rwanda (under the RPF) and Burundi, exhibit what Fearon and Laitin call “ethnic dominance” (2003:78), wherein one ethnic group makes up at least forty-five percent of the population. Ethnicity is not the main thrust of this work, but if as Clapham suggests “insurgencies derive basically from blocked political aspirations, and in some cases also from reactive desperation” (1998: 9), then it seems appropriate that these blocked aspirations could be over ethnic grievances and changes in post-conflict could reflect this. It also seems appropriate to delineate places in which severe ethnic fractionalization and previous ethnic conflicts might impact post-conflict outcomes, as in Rwanda (RPF) and Burundi, and to some extent, Uganda (under the government of the National Resistance Army (NRA)).

A case study is not meant to stand as an expression of a particular phenomenon in one place, but rather to “elucidate features of a larger class of similar phenomena” (Gerring 2004: 341). Accordingly, my case work on the CNDD-FDD and the FNL-Palipehutu (Forces Nationales de Liberation-Parti pour la libération du peuple Hutu, the other active rebel group in Burundi) illuminate the features of rebel-cum-ruler transitions that support successful and failed post-rebellion politics. There are three additional countries and their rebel organizations that experienced rebel-to-ruler transition in the region from which I draw comparison: Rwanda, with its formidable Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and its ruling Alliance des Forces Democratique pour la liberation du Congo-Zaire (AFDL), and Uganda with its National Resistance Movement/Army (NRM/A). Two represent significant improvements in economic development and have been lauded by the international donor community for doing so-Uganda under President Yoweri Museveni’s NRA and Rwanda under
President Paul Kagame’s RPF movement. At the other end of the spectrum, the DRC has suffered extreme dysfunction in the post-conflict period under the AFDL and its ruler, President Joseph Kabila, and lacks basic capacity and institutionalization across much of the country, including President Kabila’s own region. Causal mechanisms directly related to rebel behavior gleaned from the Burundian case study show similarities among the Great Lakes cases because there are fewer structural variations that could provide alternative explanations. Finally, this research addresses rebel to ruler transitions in a broader manner, testing the implications and findings of the comparative case studies and fieldwork quantitatively. Here I utilize a dataset of all rebel groups in sub-Saharan Africa from 1975-2009 and test quantitative models using the main hypotheses.

Integrating multiple approaches in case selection and methodology in the research allows for the exploration of both descriptive and causal inference (King, Keohane, and Verba, 1994:9), generating a new study of post-rebellion politics. The case selection proposed strives for internal and external validity in research design. Internal validity is whether or not the inferences for a given case or set of cases actually apply to those cases (Brady and Collier 2004: 292), in effect, whether the concepts and measurements actually ‘fit’ the variables under study and can reliably provide causal inference for the question under study. External validity can be likened to ‘generalizability’, where the theory, concepts, and measures developed for one case can be applied to other settings and studies (ibid: 288). The work here provides for both a specific accounting of the rebel to ruler transition in Burundi, but then also attempts for application beyond these borders, by testing concepts, variables, and theories derived
from the case study to other case studies and broader cases across the continent. These tests bolster the findings of the work and show the range and depth of the theory of rebel transitions that begin to emerge here. Thus, the work strives for both internal validity in providing specific knowledge about the CNDD-FDD and external validity as it uses the knowledge generated to examine other cases.

**Method of Inquiry.** With an eye toward locating the processes that allow for successful rebel to ruler transitions, I apply multiple methods of analysis in the research: quantitative statistical techniques as well as extensive qualitative analysis based upon fieldwork. The case studies rely upon eighteen months of work between the years 2008-2011 in Burundi, Rwanda, the DRC, and Uganda. I conducted the bulk of the fieldwork in Burundi, focusing on multiple rebel organizations there- the CNDD-FDD, the current ruling party, and the FNL- a failed rebel group, as well as a potential emerging new group that split from the CNDD-FDD. I carried out research in twelve primary field sites in five provinces, conducting two hundred and thirteen interviews from private citizens, government officials and politicians and collecting one hundred and seventy-two surveys from ex-combatants. Provided in Figures 1-3 and 1-4 (at the end of the chapter) are the administrative field site maps illustrating data collection.

I used several techniques to elucidate a causal framework accurately describing the history of the movement and particular critical junctures of decisions concerning the future strategy, including participant observation, vignette analysis, survey research, semi-structured interviewing and questionnaires. Additionally, I analyzed archives at both national and regional party headquarters of the CNDD-FDD and its youth wing, the *Imbonerakure*, as well as archived newspapers *Le Reneoveau*, *Iwacu*-Burundi, and Arc-
Interviews were conducted individually or in small groups when it was appropriate, for example, with a husband and wife or other family members who knew each other well with my translator and me. Although I spoke and used Kirundi, Kiswahili, and French in the interviewing process, a translator was necessary to interrogate the many culturally specific expressions Burundians use to describe life during the war. My translator was for all intents and purposes Hutu, although of a Congolese father, and thus was able to identify as “other” if subjects asked him to identify himself politically. He was of lower socio-economic class and bore no identifying characteristics or distinguishing patterns of speech or language that would mark him as wealthy, or a government collaborator, or any other features that might put the data gathered from the interviews in jeopardy. Before conducting interviews, I obtained permission to research in Burundi with both the Interior Ministry and the Ministry for Higher Education. In every field site, my translator and I first visited the provincial administrator’s office followed by the communal administration to inform them of our desire to do research in their areas and our intent. When available, we also stopped by the office of the chef du zone (burgomaster) or the mayor’s office to also request permission. Interviews were semi-structured in nature and very few subjects were considered out of scope, although I prepared questionnaires beforehand. I let the interviewees dictate the length and location of interviews, with most lasting approximately two hours. I conducted follow-up interviews where appropriate, especially with those subjects with specialized, historical knowledge of the CNDD-FDD or the FNL. When choosing interview subjects, we
randomly sampled from amongst the communes we visited, walking up and down the collines (hills) and randomly choosing participants. We strove for a wide variety of ages and ethnicities to gain a full picture of life during the war and perspectives of rebellion there. We followed this procedure in the urban and rural environments. Interview participants were offered no material compensation for their participation.

Before and after fieldwork, I also relied on Rene Lemarchand’s archives at the University of Florida as well as secondary and primary accounts of rebellion in the Great Lakes. I conducted semi-structured interviews with leaders and foot-soldiers of movements in Rwanda, Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo, including exiles in Kenya and Tanzania, who possessed historical knowledge of these movements and their developments. I conducted work on groups operating in Eastern Congo by utilizing networks of former rebel combatants now living in Burundi, and supplemented these with archival work at the University of Nairobi. Additionally, I collected supporting primary and secondary source material and searched African news sources to locate key pieces of data about these rebel groups and their transitions.

Finally, I built a quantitative data set by categorizing and coding according to the typologies developed in the qualitative case work for over sixty active rebel groups from the years 1975-2009 in sub-Saharan Africa. I determined possible rebel groups through their inclusion in Uppsala University’s Conflict Data Project (hereafter UCDP) Conflict Encyclopedia. This data was used to test the findings of the qualitative work and provide preliminary evidence of a theory of rebel to ruler transitions.

In the vein of Day, Clapham, Reno and other rebel studies scholars, I devise a set of four ideal types of rebel movements that categorize their behavior by their
organizational and social powers during the rebel period used to explain post-rebellion politics. Typology has become a de rigueur methodological tool in the analysis of rebel groups (Beardsley and McQuinn 2009) and more broadly in comparative politics and international relations (Collier et al. 2012 lists over 100), both for its parsimony in explanation and ideal type formation. A new typology was generated in this case to help identify post-conflict behaviors, while most other typologies stop at identifying those during conflict.

An explanatory typology method is useful for comparing rebels in this case because it allows for the testing of several claims about rebel characteristics and potential post-rebellion outcomes in a way that can compound attributes across variables and show variations among in-case comparisons as well as cross-case contexts. Typology is an important tool to understanding rebel behavior because it can provide structure for understanding broad features of rebel movements in an idealized format that creates a standardized reference point. My typology allows for categorization and measurement according to characteristics that have previously not been measured in relation to each other, thus combining technique and a new focus of rebel analysis. The typology will be further elaborated in Chapter 2, but it is important at this juncture to establish how I coded the research and how to understand the mechanics of the theory I present. Now that the details of the research have been discussed, this next section explores the more substantive issues of my research. I explain the background to which rebellion is made more likely in sub-Saharan Africa, notably the weakness and malleability of the state and politics there. This provides the
context for understanding how rebels emerge, with a further explanation of why rebels become the crucial actors in this research.

**The State in Africa: Background to Rebellion**

An examination of the state and its impact upon civilians in Africa is necessary to determine the environments in which rebels operate there and the potential impact that these conditions will have on the outcome of civil wars. ‘The state’ in sub-Saharan Africa is often loosely defined and poorly controlled (Herbst 2000 and Boone 2003) by politicians, citizens, and outside observers. Some argue, there are fewer barriers to rebellion in weakened states (Rotberg 2003, Reno 2002), although some also argue that the very nature of post-colonial African states (weak internally but still juridically sound externally) ensures that rebellion is unlikely (Englebert 2009). Further troubling definitional issues of the state in Africa are the embedded relationships between the regime and the state and the newness of democracy that are much more so than in other polities. The state, according to the Weberian definition, has “compulsory jurisdiction”, “continuous organization” and “claims a monopoly of force over a territory and its population…and the area of its jurisdiction”.

In sub-Saharan Africa, the lack of definitive authority over large swaths of territory (Herbst 2000:ch. 2), especially in the hinterlands, directly contributes to rebel movements. This is alluded to in the literature on rebellion in Africa highlighting the split between urban centers (the locus of state power) and the rural highlands where most of the population lives.5 Because of the lack of state control in the hinterlands, rebel groups can operate effectively in these areas without government interference. For example, the CNDD-FDD in Burundi was formed in Bubanza, a notoriously under-
governed province in northwestern Burundi, which was considered a weakly governed area in a fairly weak state. The AFDL in Congo coalesced in the perpetual chaos of Eastern Congo, where the state had completely failed from the immediate post-Independence period. According to Herbst, the nature of state formation in sub-Saharan Africa was historically more so about the control of people as opposed to the Western state-formation tradition of control of territory (2000:183). It logically follows then that African rebels might strive first for control over populations as opposed to territorial gains. This implies that rebels will necessarily undertake processes of civilian relationship building to provide more support for their political goals and desired outcomes.

The logic of state formation in Africa was arguably fundamentally different from that in Western Europe, in that the boundaries of modern African states were not determined by victories and expansion during war or by voluntary inclusion of kingdoms, but by the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885, wherein colonial powers divided lands and settled boundaries. Very few changed boundaries or new states have emerged from these divisions, which often set in place arbitrary divisions between co-ethnics, divided pre-existing traditional political units, and united disparate populations under one state. Because of this birth, states and their power apparatuses, even in the post-Independence period, are often viewed by the population as arbitrary and historically imposed by an alien regime during colonialism. Furthermore, because of illogical border divisions and forced multicultural make-ups, loyalties can tend to favor kinship, tribal or regional identifications first and national identities much later. States and their laws, structures, and leaders floated above societies and often failed to capture the peasantry.
according to Hyden (1980, 1986). These conditions as described above often lead to disconnect between civilians and governments, contributing to later patterns of rebellion and anti-government sentiment in post-colonial political development. While some scholars of African politics may attribute this to all parts of sub-Saharan Africa, many variations of these attributes, including strong states with durable power and obedience throughout history, like Rwanda and Ethiopia, exist in the region. The legacy and interaction of the nature of state power versus the ability of the rebel organization to first break and then imitate such power is a key component of this study, and will be discussed further.

Now to discuss one of the key tenets in the literature on African politics: the state has been the source of neo-patrimonialism, a form of abuse of state resources for private or personal gain. Neo-patrimonialism must be discussed in conjunction with rebellion because many rebel groups cite specifically anti-patrimonial goals or seek the destruction of previous networks that privileged one group above another. In Burundi, this government exemplified this by Tutsi-Hima domination of one particular region under the military presidents until 1993, a feature that both the FNL and the CNDD-FDD mention in anti-government propaganda of the time. Neo-patrimonialism, or the ‘economy of affection’, is the “constitution by personal investments in reciprocal relations with other individuals as a means of achieving goals that seem otherwise impossible to attain” (Hyden 2006:186). State employees and politicians provide resources (money, material, goods) to their co-ethnics, family, friends and others to engender relationships that exist outside of the state formalized networks. There are two dimensions to this relationship: one, the existence of this network outside of the
state, and two, the linkages in these networks based on other forms of association—ethnicity, regional association, religion, or kinship. Given the practices of this form of politics in most of Africa, one may suspect that rebel groups may use violence for the purposes of the dismantling of old economies of affection and the creation of new ones. When rebels do take power, certainly some rewarding of the spoils of victory according to supporters and group members occurs, and the literature suggests this is the case in Rwanda, sometimes called the “Tutsification” of the state, and also in Uganda, with the appointment of Museveni’s kin (including his wife, daughters and other relatives) to positions of power. This evidence does not conclusively indentify the aims of the rebellion and its post-rebellion success, but deserves further examination nonetheless to highlight relationships between rebel groups, civilians and governments. In the work, further motivations of profit and personal gain will be explored amongst the rebel groups under study to see the effect these particular motives have on behavior and outcomes.

Further compounding the problems of the state in Africa are porous borders between states and the predation of external rebels across state borders that make politics and civil wars more complex. Lack of security in many border regions allows civilians to take advantage of this to engage in commerce in multiple countries. These conditions matter in peace as well as war, but in war, external actors often play bigger roles than they would in normal commerce. Furthermore, porous borders mean that rebel groups can self-finance by engaging in predation and looting of resources across borders, or alternatively, can become their own exporters of formerly state-controlled resources. Consider for example the case of the AFDL in Congo, which exported minerals out of the Eastern region of the country through Rwanda and Uganda to
finance its insurgency, a tactic that was mimicked and later practiced against them by several upstart rebel groups in the second Congo War. Many of the rebels listed below in Table 1-1 at the end of this chapter (seventy percent) have received some form of outside aid- either from co-ethnics across borders or supportive neighboring governments, who might also be ethnically or kin-related. Cooperative neighbors (Saleyhan 2007, 2010) able to shuffle resources diminish the potential costs of warlordism\(^6\), as rebel groups can take advantage of these nearby illicit markets.

Previous statistical studies (Fearon and Laitin 2003) noted the role that anocracy\(^7\) plays in contributing to decisions to rebel. The weakness of the state in Africa in regards to its inability to consolidate power and strengthen institutions also allows for rebel groups to mount successful challenges and takeovers. However, while states in Africa are among the weakest in the world, almost three-fourths of the rebel group challengers provided in figure Four resulted in a failure to gain state power through military victory. Hence, the conditions of “state” and the malleability of its power in Africa are not explanatory for the purposes of rebel to ruler transitions. This essentially means that despite confronting states notoriously understood to project little in terms of power, African rebels still typically lose in a struggle against the state. If the fundamental weakness of the state in Africa was an explanation for post-rebellion success, then the continent would see many more internal challenges and potentially, more turnovers through rebellion and civil war, in addition to secessions. The weakened state provides the environment for a power grab (Wilkinson 2004), but it is not sufficient to result in rebel victory. Furthermore, the operational environment of a weakened state creates just as many challenges for a rebel group turned government as it did advantages when
the roles were reversed. A civil war does not wipe the slate clean of the previous Achilles’ heels of the state: violent conflict is unable to erase patterns of the past. Finally, it must be remarked upon that the state in sub-Saharan Africa is not uniformly weak across all forty-eight countries: certain states, like Rwanda, Burundi, and Ethiopia had complex histories of centralized and highly powerful states extending from the pre-colonial period. Interestingly enough, these states are ones that experienced successful rebel to ruler transitions. Thus, post-colonial government experiences and shapes of the state matter to the questions of how and why rebellion occurs and why outcomes are different. This raises a question that my theory of rebel to ruler transitions also addresses: namely, that a successful post-rebellion regime is determined by the capacity of the rebel group to interact with both civilians and previously existing or newly formed state structures. Thus, the behaviors of the rebel group are endogenous to the prior condition of the state. I elaborate on this concept further in subsequent chapters. Societies with certain historical legacies of state-society relations can then be co-opted by rebel groups to provide support for both the rebel group and the post-rebellion regime, ensuring success. For example, outside observers marveled at the speed in which Rwandan society ‘healed itself’ with the coming to power of the RPF and the subsequent recovery from war (Gourevitch 1998), but scholars suggest that this was due to the legacy of the Rwandan state and its ability to structure political, economic and social life rather than the actions of the RPF itself (Prunier 2009: ch. 3). This brief statement is not extensive in its explanation as to why some strong states experience rebellion and successful post-rebellion regimes, and many weak states do not
experience rebellion at all, and hence, will be explored more extensively in Chapters 2 and 3.

**Why Rebels?**

It is of paramount importance to define the actors under study. To that end, how does contemporary scholarship define the term "rebel" and who, exactly, are they referring to when discussing sub-Saharan Africa? A rebel movement, according to de Zeeuw, is a “non-state organization with clear political objectives that contests a government’s authority and legitimate monopoly on violence and uses armed force in order to reform, overthrow or secede from an existing state regime” (2008:10), although this particular study does not address cases of rebels who desire secession. This definition specifies a particular political objective to the rebel group: it does not assume indivisibility amongst group members or even that all group members are aware of the goals. The terms rebel and insurgent are often used interchangeably by scholars in rebel studies and generally mean anti-state violent actors (Mampilly 2011: 9-11). In this work I use the word rebel as opposed to insurgent as a matter of personal taste. Clapham initially typologized rebels in sub-Saharan Africa in the late 1990s, with four ideal types of rebel movements based on goals: *liberation movements,* *separatist movements,* *warlord movements* and *reform insurgencies.* Some scholars argue that the motivations and desires of rebel groups are so complex as to warrant multiple and potentially competing typological identifications (Boas and Dunn 2007: ch. 1). By far in sub-Saharan Africa, the most prevalent groups of rebels according to this typology are the ‘reform insurgencies’. Reform insurgencies target postcolonial governments and focus on changing the rulers, system or parameters of political power. They “seek
radical reform of the national government”, (Clapham 1998: 7) without express desires of personal gain and personalized power. Others argue that these particular rebel groups are indicative of a particular time and pattern of politics put in motion by the third wave of democratization (Reno 2011: ch. 4 and Kirschke 2000) and that reform rebels should be treated as a separate category because of these foundations. Because of both their number and their temporally specific political goals, I find it appropriate to separate out these “reform rebel” groups in analyses of rebels more generally. Furthermore, to return to the issue of competing typologies, many of the groups who come to be associated with definitions of warlordism (notoriously, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone) or separatism (the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) in Sudan, for example) began their lives as rebels with reform interests in the states they operate against. Especially in this work, the goals and interests of a group help to determine outcome, and thus necessarily will be studied.

Using this typology and definition, I identified sixty such movements in Africa since 1975, provided in Table 1-1. I do so at this juncture to illustrate the variation in geographic location and years of activity of these groups and show the sheer number of groups that have emerged in the modern era. I provide them at the end of this chapter, along with the outcome of the civil wars in which they took part. The figure shows the vast number of groups, differences in their longevity and outcome, and the various countries in which they operate. The groups enumerated are used in the research to build a dataset of rebel groups to test hypotheses about transitions.

Reform insurgencies provide a foundation as to the desires of the rebel group which can be expanded on to theorize in this particular research. It follows that reform
insurgencies provide a place to start looking at groups with explicit ideas and goals about the reform of the state, and thus we assume that taking power is of paramount importance to them. I focus on these groups specifically because of these goals. I also assume something about the groups themselves and their future goals and focus beyond the immediacy of the rebellion and civil war. In this desire, reform rebels may be more likely than other rebel groups to have goals, plans and strategies for not only the rebellion, but the post-rebellion period as well. The goal of the rebellion, however, is not of paramount importance to this research: the outcome of the drive to take power from the state is. These goals are often antecedent to the outcomes of rebellion, as illustrated in the matrix, but not all so-called reform rebels have succeeded at this goal. The discordance between goal and outcome for reform rebels also raises another interesting issue that will be addressed later in the work- that of failed groups and what their patterns of behaviors, decisions, organizations, and power structures illustrate about successful transitions. Hence, groups that failed to grab power both in Burundi as well as in other contexts will be examined to contrast with more successful transitions, to further isolate how and why social and organizational powers work to enable rebels to become governments.

The section following lays out the framework of the argument of the research, detailing the variables under study and providing further explanation to the diagram laid out on page three and four. It also provides a summary of the argument that will be elaborated upon further in Chapter 2.
The Argument

Here briefly I define the parameters of the argument of my study, including its conditions, assumptions, and temporality. I then detail my hypotheses and the variables under study here. Finally, I conclude with a brief introduction to the argument.

Scope conditions of the argument: My argument makes an assumption about the groups under study explicated here: that the rebel group receives some sort of credible political power in the post-conflict transition, no matter the outcome of the civil war (i.e., whether it ends by negotiated settlement or by outright military victory). I assume this in order to tailor the exact mechanisms at play—those that specifically affect post-conflict transitions from rebel to ruler. Hence, all groups that have failed at their quest for political power (as illustrated in Table 1-1 in the large numbers of groups that ‘fail’ in the outcome of the war) are not considered within the typology presented. They will not be excluded from research, however, as they can illustrate features of successful rebel to ruler transitions.

My argument is one of political stability and post-conflict outcomes. My research examines a temporally limited political space from civil war to transition to the immediate post-conflict context (after transitional ceasefires but well before democratization or consolidation). To highlight the period under study, I illustrate the sequencing of rebellion and civil war in Figure 1-1.

Hypotheses: I contend that essential to understanding the post-conflict development of rebel groups are their organizational relations and capacity, and that the interactions of these two variables produce different outcomes in post-conflict governance. In this research, I tested two hypotheses about the nature of rebel to ruler
transitions. Based on the brief literature review provided above, several factors became apparent about the nature of the African state, power, and would-be rebel rulers. First, the nature of the state in Africa fundamentally shapes the ways in which rebels plan and carry out their reform insurgencies. Because of a lack of state-building both before and after Independence, many opportunities arose for potential African reformists to act as proto-state builders during the rebellion. These actions provide long-ranging implications for post-conflict state–takeover for the would-be victors, who can use the practices, strategies and power structures put in place during conflict to expand bases of support. Also significantly, would-be rebel conquerors depend on the same resources for social power that states themselves rely on: historical state structures, legacies of the pre-conflict state, civilian-state relationships, and civilians themselves. Thus, I hypothesize the following about would be rebel rulers:

H1: A rebel group with wider ranging organizational power is more likely to transition successfully from rebel to government.

H2: Relationships to the civilian population and existing state structures matter to the successful post-rebellion behavior of a rebel group. Thus, groups with cooperative, transformative social powers as opposed to exclusions from civilian populations and states are more likely to be successful in their rebel to ruler transitions.

The hypotheses speak to the two variables I find most important to the understanding of rebel to ruler transitions: organizational power and social power. I assume that each variable is independent of the other, but allow for potential interaction between the two. To put it plainly, I assume that a group may “win” political power with either centralization and infrastructure built within the group or social capacity, but find it
unnecessary to possess both, and that groups that exhibit both characteristics would be
the most able to achieve political order and change in their transitions.

**Definition of Variables:** Here I define the dependent and independent variables
under study. As stated above, the dependent variable is the outcome of post-rebellion
government, which can be defined as Success or No Success\(^\text{10}\). While simply winning
power can be defined easily enough when a rebel organization takes the capital and
defeats the government army, it is not enough to define success. A rebel group must
overcome a number of factors to be described as a successful post-conflict government,
including shoring up political support to win at least two post-conflict elections, resist a
return to serious violence, contain potential political and military threats to government
success, and gain acceptance from the population as the legitimate, legal, and
representative government. This is measured in this study by collecting interview data,
perceptions, and international and domestic journalistic accounts of the rebel regime. I
elaborate upon this further in Chapter 2. The independent variables are Organizational
Power, and Social Power. Additionally, there are components of another intervening
variable within these two, that of the nature of the pre-conflict state. While this last
variable is not explicitly tested in the hypotheses, it is nonetheless important to the
typology and I elaborate further upon this in Chapter 3. Organizational Power is
categorized as either Infrastructural or Cellular (Chapter 4), and Social Power as either
Inclusive or Exclusive (Chapter 5). I provide a brief operationalization below.

**Organizational Power:** By organizational power, I refer to the level of
centralization between the cadre, the foot-soldiers and the high command in warfare in
the armed wing of the rebel movement, and the relationship between civilians,
mobilizers, and political elites in the political structure of the rebel movement\textsuperscript{11}. I focus on these relationships of control and obedience because they most illustrate the capabilities of the internal infrastructure of the rebel organization, and the abilities of the group to act in a proto-state manner. Similarly, this organization translates correspondingly to the relationship of supporters, the mobilizers and the party vanguard in the post-rebellion period. A brief example will help to illustrate this concept. The RPF instilled a high level of centralization in the movement from its development in the late 1980s wherein which all decisions would stem from the leaders at the top and all information would pass up and down the chain accordingly. This method of organization even continued after the primary leader Fred Rwigema was killed in action in October 1990 and leadership passed to Paul Kagame. I provide more examples of this in Chapters 2, 4 and 6, but this group exemplifies a version of Michael Mann’s infrastructural power, defined in state terms as “the capacity of the state to actually penetrate civil society and to implement logistically political decisions throughout the realm” (1984:189). I take this definition of infrastructural power and substitute the rebel organization for the state and territory under domination for civil society in Mann’s definition. Making these substitutions affects not the meaning of the definition of infrastructural power, but rather provides an alternative use applicable for non-state actors. On the other hand, the AFDL was a highly decentralized movement that sprang from collaboration between Rwanda and four influential community figures from Eastern Congo (Stearns 2011). Because of the very nature of the way the group formed, decisions came from multiple actors and locations, and it was unclear during the war exactly who was in charge either militarily or politically, often leading observers to
assume the RPF and Rwanda dictated orders to Congolese underlings. These types of decentralized, chaotic relationships often crumble under pressure and face serious challenges both during and after the war. Thus, these examples of organizational power within rebel groups can be classified as ‘cellular’- headless without a dominant power structure and with equality or unknown positionality between cells and without the complete penetration of both society and territory that other groups possess. While these categorizations suggest that ancephalous organizational power is more likely a result of mismanagement and poor decision-making by the rebel organization itself, it is entirely possible that a rebel group could pursue a cellular organizational power structure in order to minimize capture or information about the network, as expressed in cellular development of the terrorist network al-Qaeda in the Middle East.

I recognize that some scholars may code military and political organization differently, and the implications of such difference are that distinct structures and methods of organization existed between different branches of the rebel group. Michael Mann, in his landmark work on states and social power, describes political powers as “those of centralized, institutionalized, territorial regulation” and military powers as those of “organized physical force whenever they are required” (1986:11). In this research, I bundle military and political organization under the rubric of organizational power, because although rebel groups claim to have separate branches, interviews revealed this was more often a ‘talking point’ to be used politically after the war than an actual physical separation of combatants, politicians and civilians. Furthermore, many former rebel politicians described these separations as separation of powers similar to those in American democracy rather than truly separate entities. Discussing the political and
military organization under the umbrella term of organizational power also allows for more fruitful argumentation about infrastructural power within the rebel organization as it relates to participants, the state, and civilians. An example illustrates this: modern rebel movements in the post Cold-War period, like that of CNDD-FDD in Burundi and SPLA/SPLM in Sudan often develop in twofold: an armed wing (FDD and SPLA) and a political wing (CNDD and SPLM). They do so in this manner to both divide and focus energies into segments as well as in preparation for the post-war context. The armed wings tend to be more centralized and cohesive in organizational structures and relationships, often comprised of rebels with military training, a highly centralized enterprise, although, again, I do not find these post-conflict desires reason to separate the wings in the discussion, in fact I find this evidence to bolster my claim that we should discuss both under one umbrella term.

I measured the level of organizational power by developing political histories of the rebel movement and behavior in the field, and especially, the development of these organizational networks in the transition period to when the rebel movement gained political power. In particular, the research will discuss structures of organization in regard to: leadership, funding, and tactics (both military and political). I coded the level of organizational power into two ideal types, using Mann’s refined definition: infrastructural and cellular. Infrastructural organization follows Mann’s definition of a cohesive, centralized, and organized group that projects power over the entirety of its territory held. Cellular organization, on the other hand, denotes a type of organization only able to project power in a small radius around territories held, lacks
communications and cohesion between divisions, and fails to hold constant central authority. I elaborate upon these ideal types in Chapter 2.

**Social Power:** Social power refers to the ability of the rebel organization to extract from, dismantle, co-opt, and create structures both as a rebel organization during conflict, and later when they have assumed power as a government. It also contains a measure of civilian relations and support. This matters to the rebels’ ability to conduct mobile campaigns with support and to the conduct of voter mobilization campaigns and leverage of resources post-conflict. Social Power can be thought of as either inclusive or exclusive of the civilians and the state. A rebel organization with inclusive social power becomes a cooperative and transformative actor upon the state and civilians, using this source of power to bolster resources both during and after the conflict. A group that experienced high levels of cooperative social power with civilians was the NRA/NRM in Uganda. During the civil war (1980-1986), civilians provided material support to the rebels while in the bush, and the rebels in turn created civilian run governance councils in territorial areas under their control (Kasfir 2005). These relationships helped to build tremendous support for the NRA in the civil war and post-civil war periods and a high level of support for Yoweri Museveni, the President of the movement and the country since 1986. Citizens felt strongly that they were part and parcel of the movement even in the early days, and this sense of camaraderie and group participation bolstered the group’s relationships with civilians.

On the other hand, the RPF, again in Rwanda, had uncooperative and exclusionary relationships with civilians during the war: using them as human shields, never allowing them to participate in the decision-making structures, and some scholars have
suggested that the tactics of the RPF actually contributed to the massive number of deaths in the civil war and genocide (Stam and Davenport 2009). This continues to be a problem for the RPF in the post-war context, as it is accused of only representing Ugandan Tutsi interests, and not those of interests of Tutsi who survived the genocide in Rwanda or the majority Hutu who remain in-country. An exclusive rebel group either cannot or is unwilling to rely on social power as a means to provide support for the rebellion. The state and civilians can be ignored as a source of power, as in the case of the highly-exclusive RPF in Rwanda, or cannot be tapped into because of the nature of the state or existing politics, like the AFDL in Congo.

I measured the level of capacity by studying political histories and narratives of development of the rebel organization, as well as the use of voting data, participant-observation, and archival research focused on the post-conflict period. Of particular importance to the discussion of capacity are state structures and the ability of the rebel group to use, deform, or transform the state or community apparatus to the benefit of the group. Although these are not the same phenomenon, they are both related to the pre-existing state (that the rebel organization seeks to replace), and thus can be considered in the same discussion. Also of importance to this variable are civilian relations and support, which is the level of support, financial, military or otherwise, provided by civilians to rebels that creates exclusive or symbiotic (inclusive) relationships with the group. The idealized types of this variable are coded in this manner, as either inclusive in the source of social power, or exclusive.

**Argument in Brief:** I theorize that post-rebellion behavior does not derive from whole cloth following the cessation of a civil war, but rather, it is a function of power
relations from the rebellion period. Variations in post-rebellion success are directly related to variations amongst these sources of power. The end of a civil war does not end rebel behavior and magically transform groups into democratic politicians, and thus, rebel behaviors matter to post-conflict outcomes. Again, to return to the intervening variable in this research: the legacies of the state in these countries in which the rebel groups operate matter. They matter in that rebels can use pre-existing state conditions to continue the disrupted state-building process, thus shoring up their own infrastructural power as well as social support. They also matter in that the very nature of the state structures the way civilians respond to potential authority figures, affecting both the source of social power for the rebel group as well as the potential for penetration by the group into territory under its control. I return to these points and elaborate upon them in Chapter 5. I contend that social power and organizational power are both sufficient but not jointly necessary conditions for successful (although whether they are the same type of success is debatable) post-rebellion outcomes. Groups with higher levels of organization with more cohesive internal structures can and do win political power, and this organization is vital to explaining successful rebel to ruler transitions. Groups that engage in cooperative relationships with civilians and co-opt, subvert, or demolish and replace pre-existing state structures and relations also win political power, and this capacity is paramount to explaining their successful rebel to ruler transition.

**Layout of the Dissertation**

The research will proceed in six additional chapters. Chapter 2 offers a theory of post-rebellion outcomes, explaining why some rebel groups are more likely to be
successful and survive over time. It also situates the expected outcomes and the unexpected variations and further elaborates on the temporality of rebellion. Chapter 3 explores the relationship between rebel characteristics and state and social characteristics, further illuminating the typology and the interplay of the type of social power under study. Chapter 4 explores the transformation of the CNDD-FDD following the signing of the peace agreement and the laying down of arms in 2003. It will detail the paradox of regime survivability despite factors that would seem to make this difficult. It will also provide an ethnography of the movement as seen from the perspectives of civilians, participants, and leaders, specifically detailing the CNDD-FDD’s rise to power and the FNL’s failure to do so. This chapter lays the foundation for the argument about the type of organizational power a rebel movement exhibits and the outcome the rebel group achieves. Chapter 5 dissects the nature of state power and state-society structure vis-à-vis the formation and outcome of rebel group organizations. Chapter 6 focuses on the comparative cases: the NRA in Uganda, the RPF in Rwanda, and the AFDL in the Democratic Republic of Congo. I focus on these cases because the geographic area has remarkable political, social and economic similarities (especially between Rwanda and Burundi) that provide for comparison between the groups and the development of the typology further, and also expands the central logic of the argument to a larger group of rebel movements in sub-Saharan Africa employing quantitative methods to test the core argument of the research. Finally, in Chapter 7 I conclude with a summary of the claims made and tested and a potential for future work.
Tables and Figures

Figure 1-1. The Cases: Africa’s Great Lakes

Figure 1-2. Map of Africa’s Great Lakes Region and Rebel Groups
Figure 1-3. Administrative Map of Field Sites, Province and Commune Levels
Figure 1-4. Administrative Map of Field Sites, Bujumbura City, Burundi
Table 1-1. Reform Rebel Insurgencies in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1975-2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Country of Origin</th>
<th>Years of Activity in Conflict</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RENAMO</td>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>1975-1992</td>
<td>Fail</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNITA</td>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>1975-2002</td>
<td>Fail</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPLA</td>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>1980-2009</td>
<td>Fail</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPLA</td>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>1990-2009</td>
<td>Fail</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INPCL</td>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>1989-1992</td>
<td>Fail</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIAA</td>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>1990-1991</td>
<td>Fail</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPA</td>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>1990-1991</td>
<td>Fail</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPLA</td>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>1990-1992</td>
<td>Fail</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLNA</td>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>1991-1993</td>
<td>Fail</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRUDI</td>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>1991-1994</td>
<td>Fail</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ULIMO-J</td>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>1991-1996</td>
<td>Fail</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LINP</td>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>1993-1998</td>
<td>Fail</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNDD-FDD (Nyangoma)</td>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>1990-1997</td>
<td>Fail</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ULIMO-K</td>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>1994-1995</td>
<td>Fail</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPR</td>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>1994-1998</td>
<td>Fail</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAULN</td>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>1994-2000</td>
<td>Fail</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDLR</td>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>1994-2009</td>
<td>Fail</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FARS</td>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>1997-1999</td>
<td>Fail</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNDD-FDD (Ntchikengwirwe)</td>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>1997-2003</td>
<td>Fail</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MLC</td>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>1988-2002</td>
<td>Fail</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCDD/Roma</td>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>1992-2006</td>
<td>Fail</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCD-Nkongani</td>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>1996-2005</td>
<td>Fail</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAPC</td>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>2001-2005</td>
<td>Fail</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPC</td>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>2001-2005</td>
<td>Fail</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPC-K</td>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>2001-2005</td>
<td>Fail</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPC-L</td>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>2001-2005</td>
<td>Fail</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FNL</td>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>2001-2007</td>
<td>Fail</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPS</td>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>2001-2007</td>
<td>Fail</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCD-Congo</td>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>2002-2005</td>
<td>Fail</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLA</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>2002-2009</td>
<td>Fail</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFDP</td>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>2002-2009</td>
<td>Fail</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDD</td>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>2002-2007</td>
<td>Fail</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRC</td>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>2004-2007</td>
<td>Fail</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Shabab</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>2005-2009</td>
<td>Fail</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNB-Pi-Nuonsi</td>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>2005-2009</td>
<td>Fail</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FUDC</td>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>2005-2009</td>
<td>Fail</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JEM</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>2005-2009</td>
<td>Fail</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NMD</td>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>2005-2009</td>
<td>Fail</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPDO</td>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>2005-2009</td>
<td>Fail</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNJ</td>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>2007-2009</td>
<td>Fail</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPF</td>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>2008-2009</td>
<td>Fail</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MLG</td>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>2009-2009</td>
<td>Fail</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PARECO</td>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>2009-2009</td>
<td>Fail</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 1-5. A Temporal Sequencing of Rebellion and Civil War

Notes

1 Personal Interview, March 21, 2011

2 Meaning an area prone to civil war—there are 3 such areas in sub-Saharan Africa—the Great Lakes, the West African states (Sierra Leone, Liberia, Cote D’Ivoire), and the Central African states (Sudan, CAR and Chad).
I participated in political rallies, elections, and political meetings associated with these in the election period May-September 2010.

UCDP lists incidences and actors of conflicts, state, non-state, and one-sided in the world since 1946.

Although this is changing to reflect a more urban population, especially in larger African countries like Nigeria and Kenya.

Of which some scholars accuse a few in this study of doing: see Reno 1999 for discussion of the RUF and NPCL/APRC.

Anocracy is the gray space between democracy and authoritarianism as defined by measures on the Polity datasets.

All three of which have had recent successful rebel to ruler transitions, despite powerful state apparatuses.

For clarity, the unit of observation is the rebel organization itself.

Refer back to figure 1-1 for an illustration.

As will be discussed further in the case study, many reform rebel groups have dual structures in conflict- a political wing as well as a separate armed wing. While the lines between the two blur, the rebel group itself is quick to delineate the two.

Personal Interview, November 21, 2010
13 Personal Interview, February 21, 2011
CHAPTER 2
A THEORY OF REBEL REGIME SUCCESS

Introduction

In 1994, the fledgling Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) government inherited offices pockmarked by mortars, state hospitals with virtually no medical supplies, and a completely empty treasury. Its task seemed almost insurmountable to transform this fragile rebel movement turned government with very little in the way of physical infrastructure, to a state capable of ruling over a majority population hostile to RPF interests. To compound this environment, over three million Rwandese citizens living abroad, out of fear or exile, needed to return to the homeland. However impossible this looked in July 1994, by 1998 Rwanda’s recovery elicited positive remarks from then President Bill Clinton about the strength of resolve in the recovery, both economic and social, from the genocide. This chapter provides a theory of how groups like the RPF make the daunting transition from rebels to rulers. It focuses in particular on the structure in which rebels operate in: the civil war, its particularities and immediate aftermath, laying the groundwork for linking rebel behavior with post-rebel behavior. It then proceeds from this background to explore the outcomes of rebellion and identifying key variables of rebel success. The next section discusses rebellion temporally, from before the advent of violence to after, illustrating a theory of post-rebellion behavior. This shows similarity and change in behavior over time. Finally the chapter explores failed groups, those that did not gain political power, and potential challenges to the theory.
Civil Wars and Rebellions

The environment in which a rebel group operates is not always clearly defined until the dust of the war has settled. A rebel group does not exist in a vacuum, and soon encounters the state government in violent conflict. A civil war is “armed combat within the boundaries of a recognized sovereign entity between parties subject to a common authority at the outset of the hostilities” (Kalyvas 2006:5). Most of the wars of the late twentieth century have been of this kind of war, killing more than sixteen million and raging in more than seventy-three countries (Fearon and Laitin 2003, Humphreys and Weinstein 2008: 436). Civil wars are generally fought over longer periods of time than interstate wars (Fearon and Laitin 2003). Moreover, conventional wisdom has held that civil wars are also becoming increasingly international (Salehyan 2010), as neighbors are willing supporters of a rebel group, and international or regional bodies step in to resolve conflict that threatens natural resources, regional stability, or borders. In sub-Saharan Africa especially, over twenty countries, or forty percent of the continent, had experienced at least one civil war by 2000 (Elbadawi and Sambanis 2000: 244), and many have experienced recurring civil conflict and war in the decade since.

Although it is easier to think of civil wars as wars between unitary actors, it is often not the case: in fact, most civil wars have multiple actors on opposing sides. A government may fight with a civil defense unit or ruling party militia versus multiple rebel groups who may or may not be working together. It is also worth mentioning that actors can and often do, change over time. Thus, groups that are aligned at one point may not at another. Conversely, one group can become many, as the rebels faction or split. With advent of peace and power-sharing agreements as an end to civil wars (Zartmann
1995, Fortna 2008), actors can change alliances or even sides of the conflict as these agreements are set in place. A visual example of this concept provided in Figure 2-1 will suffice for clarity and provide a diagrammatic view of the actors in the Burundian Civil War, at the beginning of the war in late 1993 to early 1994. However, relationships between actors can change dramatically over time. I provide a diagrammatic view of the actors in the Burundian Civil War at the midpoint of the war in 1998 in Figure 2-2 showing consolidation and conflict amongst rebel groups. Finally, at the end of the war, peace-agreements and power-sharing, amongst other reasons, promoted the disappearance of some groups and the emergence of other factions. I illustrate this in Figure 2-3.

This brief discussion of actors provides context for the actors of importance in the Burundian Civil War, the civil war which provided the CNDD-FDD's entre into political power discussed in greater detail in Chapters 4 and 5. Now that the environment and actors of a civil war has been established, I move on to a discussion of how the literature explains civil wars.

The scholarly literature on civil wars and rebellion focused on the why and how of the war, especially causality or behaviors during conflict. Further, it has treated these factors as contained to the scope of conflict, and not extending to post-conflict outcomes. On the other hand, the post-conflict transitions literature also downplays the importance of previous group behaviors during the war and instead focuses on how conflict ends and the durability of peace after it does so (e.g. Walter 2004, Roeder and Rothchild 2005, and Toft 2010b) These inconsistencies lead to literatures that compete in some ways, rather than complement.
Now to address the civil wars literature: in recent years civil war scholars addressed questions of rebels and ethnic power (Fearon and Laitin 2003, Cederman et al. 2010), rebellion and financial support structures (Weinstein 2005, 2007), and relations between rebels and civilians (Wood 2010, Mampilly 2011), why rebels take to arms against the state (Gurr 1970, Clapham 1998), predatory behaviors of rebels during conflict (Reno 1998, Collier et al. 2004, Fearon and Laitin 2003) rebel governance during conflict (Mampilly 2011), and even the ‘fates’ of rebel groups in conflict outcomes (Day 2011), but still lacks when it comes to explaining post-conflict outcomes. If, as Tilly elaborates, “war makes states” (1975:42), then so too can war-makers. Tilly’s assumptions⁠¹ suggest that when groups move from the bush to the parliament, they attempt to consolidate power, monopolize the legitimate use of force, possibly achieve ethnic changes in leadership, and resist credible threats to their newfound legitimacy.

The literature weakens this position in translating the capacity for state-building to rebel groups. I illustrate below that when applying Tilly’s logic to the rebel organizations themselves, the shape, condition and scope of the prior state power and its apparatuses crystallizes and thus, crucial to this examination of the rebel group is the examination of the rebel group and its relations to this state power. The summary of the literature on rebel studies in Table 2-1 shows the comparative lack of studies conducted on these questions and the causal directions that lead to more successful and durable post-rebellion regimes.

As Table 2-1 shows, literature on rebellion has focused mostly on the causes of and behaviors during conflict and less on the rebel group themselves and future goals, to say nothing of the lack of studies pertinent to this conducted after the war ends. In
doing so, the literature ignores that rebels are not just creatures of warfare, but changing entities that emerge out of conflict but do not stay at war. Hence, we come to the current weakness in civil war studies: the assumption that civil wars create a tabula Rosa for the actors, states, and governments that fight them (Bermeo 2003). This assumption brings serious challenges to our understanding of civil wars and rebellion: in doing so, the scholarly, policy and governing communities assigns static roles to these groups divided by time periods in conflict that do not accurately reflect reality. Groups can and often do change behaviors and roles as the war progresses or the dynamics of violence and capabilities change. Yet very few scholars have investigated this discrepancy thoroughly\(^2\), either in the conflict or the post-conflict literatures. This chapter presents a theory that directly challenges these assumptions. To begin this, however, I lay a foundation about the nature of war, rebels, and the state in conflict.

**Contextualizing Civil Wars in Africa: Marginalization, Greed, And War: Why do they Rebel?**

For all the above discussion of the lack of post-war study, it is nonetheless still important to discuss why the civil war began in the first place. It is imperative to illustrate civil war motivations because these determine the behaviors, structure and logic behind actions undertaken in war and beyond. They shape who participates in the war, and how willing participants are to continue the battle, even when the war seems lost. Examining motivations can be used as a benchmark by which to measure the rebel organizations desired outcomes versus reality. As one scholar expounds, “logically, the patterns of exit from the war [and thus post-war outcomes] reflected the reasons for getting involved in it” (Prunier 2009: 286). Interrogating the causes of the war also
provides evidence of the logic and actions rebel leaders undertook at critical junctures during the history of the war and rebellion.

Scholars like Ted Gurr (1970), Fearon and Laitin (2000), Reno (2011) and Sobek (2009) all examine the motivations and causes of war. To begin, motivation provides the first key to understanding rebellion as a process consisting of continuous nature of conflict and post-conflict behaviors. An understanding of motivation shows causal mechanisms and potentially illuminates post-war desires. Post-war changes to governments can be evaluated against these motivations to measure success or failure of the rebel organization in changing government structures. Lastly, motivation is central to understanding how and why civilians provide support to rebel groups, before, during, and after the conflict.

This literature on rebellion has focused heavily on ‘why men rebel’, and particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, how marginalization leads to conflict. If scholars agree, as Clapham suggests, that “insurgencies derive basically from blocked political aspirations, and in some cases also from reactive desperation” (1999:15), then a review of literature contextualizing civil wars can show where and how rebels are marginalized and at what point violent conflict becomes a solution to these failed aspirations. Additionally, political and economic marginalization among victimized groups happens equally across the board, to both those that seek violence and those that do not. Rebel groups then use these grievances to convince and coerce participation from otherwise neutral or reluctant civilian actors.

While there are many schools of thought regarding motivations for war, two primary ones in sub-Saharan Africa stand out. The first is ‘greed’, situated in the study
of the political economy of war, and the second, grievances, like those described above relating to marginalization. To begin, I discuss the greed literature and its insufficiency when it comes to explaining civil wars. Some theorists posit that civil wars in sub-Saharan Africa are a type of ‘new war’ (Kaldor 1999) in which greed over material resources and not political grievances drives conflict. Notable proponents of these material explanations for war find that Africa’s wars are made more likely by the poor economic conditions of the countries themselves (Collier and Hoeffler 2002: 22). Moreover, new developments in trafficking and global resource markets provided expanded economic opportunities and incentives for African rebels to profit from conflict in their political and financial goals (Boas and Dunn 2007: 10). Certainly, this trade is a facet of wars over the last two decades across the continent- diamonds traded out of Liberia and Sierra Leone provided material incentive for warfare there, and the coltan, gold, and the industrial diamond trade in Congo is expressed as a primary cause or determinant of the war (Eichstaedt 2011, Auteresse 2011, Stearns 2011). It is also worth noting the ability of rebels to subvert major trades in larger spheres of influence— one only has to look at the influence of the FARC rebels on the drug trade in the Western Hemisphere for confirmation of this. The edited volume *Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars* explores the key assumptions emerge underlying the theory, attributed to Collier, of why greed is a stronger motivation for engaging in civil war than are grievances. The theoretical models for greed based arguments find themselves grounded in rational choice, assuming that actors have all information necessary about potential costs and benefits to actions. This assumption is interesting given that most of the recent work on greed and rebellion in Africa (Humphreys and
Weinstein 2008) deals with actors with low levels of education and interconnectedness with society. Critics often challenge the applicability of this assumption, especially in societies like those in Sub-Saharan Africa, which do suffer from information problems among citizens in even the very best of cases. A greed-based approach to motivation in civil war allows for a more inclusive focus on the players of war, especially at the micro-levels. These theoretical approaches are especially useful in this regard, as small actors are overlooked in conflict studies and in the political implications of outcomes of civil wars. New work on greed motivations in conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa has been especially illuminating— in this regard showing the role of material incentive to the ‘everyday’ participant. These resources do not have to be those that bring extraordinary wealth— they can be as simple as enough money to feed the would-be rebel’s family for a season or similar ‘loot’ (Metelis 2009). Access to high-wealth resources is rare, even in the exceptionally mineral and natural resource wealthy continent of sub-Saharan Africa, so an understanding of a greed motivation must extend to even the lowest level of rebel.

I find that natural resource greed is explained differently and applied more often in sub-Saharan Africa than the standard explanations for greed motivations in civil war, and thus will discuss it in detail now. The greed thesis pointed to by media representations of war in Sub-Saharan Africa and popularized in movies depicts warlords operating diamond mines (as in 2001’s Blood Diamond) or controlling oil pipelines (as in the Niger Delta), and inducing often very young, very poor, and very uneducated men to fight for their share of these vast riches, far out of proportion with what the mine owners will receive. In academic literature, the model holds that
participants in civil war and violence are likely induced to participate by a desire for material wealth and security as opposed to an ideological motivation (Collier and Hoeffler 1998, 2001, 2004, Humphreys and Weinstein 2008). This thesis may be relied on more than it should because of the frequent abundance of natural resources in the region. Of course civil wars, some of the continent’s longest and bloodiest, occur in resource-rich countries. Gamba and Cornwell’s state that “in many respects what we are seeing in the conflict zones of Africa is the playing out of rivalries for the control of scarce [natural] resources” (2000:169). In places as diverse as Sierra Leone (diamonds), Congo (diamonds, gold, timber, minerals), and Angola (oil), the presence of natural resources all provided incentive to rebellion, as rebel organizations diverted or exported these resources for financial benefit. However, the existence of this behavior in some cases of civil war does not account for whether the presence of natural resource wealth and a corresponding paucity of that wealth to citizens make civil wars more likely. Indra de Soysa addresses the issue of natural resource wealth and scarcity in the same edited volume. He finds the abundance of resources tends to increase civil violence, although a scarcity does not. The evidence provided for the rebel groups under study here both confirm and discredit this notion, as some rebellions take place in countries with resources (again, most notably the Democratic Republic of Congo) and others do not- like Burundi.

Whereas ‘greed’ and economic incentives may provide a foundation for conflict involvement, or even fuel conflict progression, greed alone cannot explain behavior before or during conflict and more importantly, the linkages that this research examines between behavior and outcome post-conflict. If greed was an explanatory variable, the
rebels, in many cases, would continue to enrich itself after the conflict ended and it became a government, to no end other than that of increasing its own bounty. To be sure, this is an accusation and many times a reality of post-conflict politics: that the group in power utilizes state resources for its own material benefits (for example, Zaire under Mobutu). But these regimes are rarely post-rebel ones, and don’t tend to exist in the modern era of reform and international intervention. Olson also theorizes that bandits, whether stationary or roving, evolve towards a happy medium of extraction as they look to future prospects for rule (1991). Finally, as elaborated later, different rebel organizations pursue various strategies of organizational control and social relations: in doing so, varied patterns of extraction would also emerge (Weinstein 2007, Kalyvas 2006).

Furthermore, if greed was substantially explanatory, civil war and rebellion would more likely break out in places where natural resource wealth was in abundance—for example, Gabon or Botswana (all places where no war has occurred) instead of the continent’s most resource-poor areas—Burundi and Rwanda, where no significant natural resources exist. Finally, I elaborate later, greed may be an explanatory motivation for some of the participants of civil war, but cannot be a group attribute or mass ideological position. It stands to reason that while there may be some leaders who actively pursue material wealth, the incentives and rewards between participation at the higher and lower levels of the rebellion are often very different. So it may be the case that greed fuels some, but not all decisions to engage in warfare. Even the literature on the subject tempered a bit in recent years, with scholars embracing correlations between economic conditions and war rather than direct causations. As Paul Richards rightly describes, “war does not break out because the conditions happen to be ‘right’,
but because it is organized” (2005:4). It is with this notion that I understand how rebel organizations pursue their goals of political power.

**Ethnicity and Conflict**

Other explanations of violence in Africa center on grievance models, specifically on how ethnic conflict and marginalization drive violence. Ethnicity became a key explanation for violence and conflict in Africa because of a history of fractured ethnicities between many states. The Berlin Conference of 1884-1885 divided sub-Saharan Africa according to decisions made by the Great Powers of Western Europe, and these divisions not only maintained their powers throughout colonialism but throughout the modern history of Africa as well. In these divisions, ethnic groups became divided among colonial boundaries and groups with little in common became one under the colonial power, like the hundreds of ethnic groups that suddenly composed Kenya, for example. African states were often cobbled together because of the needs of European colonizers, and the many varied groups living within these borders were expected to get along and share control of the state following the end of colonialism, often with no overarching unifying ideology. Ethnicity, as Hyden explicates, can be both a means and end in politics. The focus in sub-Saharan African studies concentrates on ethnicity as a means to an end, in the Great Lakes this end has typically been the gaining or retaining of state power (2006: 186). In fact, part and parcel to the gaining and maintenance of state power there was the answer to the question about the nature of the ethnic group-state relationship. This was most frequently determined by contesting and rewriting history, with competing versions and narratives emerging out of political disgruntlements. This presents itself every conflict in the Great
Lakes since Independence, and I unravel further in later chapters with particular attention to consociational character of relations between clans and ethnicities and the nebulosity of ethnicity as social order. Understanding the particular grievances at play in civil wars in Africa illuminates the historical incidences and narratives which rebel groups utilize to garner participants and support. These grievances often become part of the official founding statement and philosophy of the group, and remain a point of reference these even after the war ends.

This merits brief consideration of the literature on ethnic wars. A rich tradition of considering ethnicity as a factor to conflict culminated in Horowitz’ influential *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* in 1985, finding that positionality of ethnic groups within the state can lead to conflict and violence. Thus ethnicity in and of itself, does not cause war, as other scholars agree with (Fearon and Laitin 2003), but heterogeneous societies with pre-existing discriminations may devolve into civil war more easily than others.

This is worth considering in terms of theoretical developments in the study of ethnic conflict. The study of ethnicity in comparative politics focuses on explaining ethnicity’s effects upon political life. Ethnicity is a set of cultural markers that denote common ancestry (kinship), cultural elements and shared historical past (Horowitz 1985:41), although some only characterize the historical dimension as a “sometimes occurrence”(Ottoway 1999: 300). Culture includes things like language (Laitin 1992), religion, dress, and regional affiliation. Two schools of thought regarding the origins of ethnicity present themselves in the literature: primordialism/essentialism and social constructivism. Geertz’ definitions exemplify those of the primordialist position, accepting the bounded identities of “blood, race, language, locality, religion or tradition”
(1973: 258) as fixed elemental givens. These sentiments are “ineffable”, “overpowering” and “coercive” (1973: 259) and preferences are homogeneous and fixed according to them. Even more crucial to the persistence of ethnicity over time in the literature is the matter of when and how it matters in political life. Instrumentalization of identity by political elites is in sizable part responsible for its persistence. Instrumentalization conceptually assumes by its nature that identities are constructed and fluid and aspects of identity can be highlighted and downplayed for political gain. Socially constructed identity only becomes a dimension of cleavage when groups come into the sphere of other groups. Hence, instrumentalized ethnicity is constructed by the definition of the ‘other’ (Barth 1969), maintains fluidity across boundaries (Gellner 1983) and is not inherently fixed (Chandra 2001: 337 and Fearon and Laitin 2000: 848).

The origins of ethnicity are by themselves somewhat uninteresting because of the lack of linkage between the existence of ethnicity and conflict. However, in comparative politics and in political life the conflation of origins and persistence that continues to misidentify roots of conflict when discussing ethnically divided societies like the ones in the Great Lakes region. This conflation of definition leads one to question ethnicity as both a means to achieve a political aim and as an end itself to create societies, nations, and states. There is a need to make clear the distinction between ethnicity and ethnic mobilization. Ethnic mobilization is the process by which these groups and their relational boundaries become salient, sometimes causing violent conflict. While mobilization has been used to explain nation-building and the shoring up of political support around the nascent state (Geertz 1963 and 1973, Barth 1969, and Young 1973) and political structures, scholars have also explored when ethnic mobilization leads to
state disintegration and rebellion (Fearon and Laitin 2003, Lemarchand 1996), or state-sponsored, ethnically-based violence (Kaufman 2001, Lemarchand 1996, Straus 2006). These forces can be seen in Burundi’s failed transition and return to ethnic violence in 1993 and in the Hutu power movement that caused total state breakdown in Rwanda in 1994. In both cases, calls to ethnic population bases by political elites led to forcible removal through murder and exile of another ethnic group from the state, encouraging rebellion and war. Civil war in Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda, and the eastern DRC suffers from the problem of ethnic power relations. This essentially means that even if the stated composition of rebel groups are multi-ethnic or non-ethnic, there remains distinct desires to shift or change the ethnic makeup of power to reflect fairer shares amongst ethnic groups.

In the Great Lakes region many ethnic groups are divided amongst juridical states further compounding political issues. For example, people known as “Hutu/Tutsi” in Rwanda and Burundi are known variously as Ha in Tanzania, Banyamulenge in the eastern DRC, and Hima in southwestern Uganda. Hence, there exists potential for cross-border networks that could provide external support for rebellion among these groups. Some have theorized about such networks and the ability for rebel groups to gain and keep power of their respective states due to outside support (Salehyan 2007, 2010, Wood 2010). Some groups in the Great Lakes region behave this way, as evidence by support the Tutsi-led RPF provided the Banyamulenge in the first and second Congo Wars (Stearns 2011, Prunier 2009, Reyntjens 2009). I discuss ethnicity and ethnic mobilization here because many scholars, observers, and even participants in the Burundian Civil War mention the role ethnicity played in the decision to engage in
war, encouraging civilian support, and ethnic voting in the transitional elections of 2005. Ethnicity became a way of identifying potential allies, shoring up support, and marking enemies across the Great Lakes. It is important to understand ethnicity here as not only a potential cause for the civil war, but also a driving factor in all political, social, and economic life regardless of war. Thus ethnicity may be a cause of civil wars, but may also be a mechanism for peaceful post-conflict governance to be utilized by the victor to shore up power amongst co-ethnics. This brief discussion of ethnicity and its mechanisms in conflict solidifies that civil wars are multi-dimensional and motivations of actors are only part of a larger process. The explanation of this debate also provides valuable insight into how these motivations matter to post-conflict outcomes. To restate an earlier point, understanding a rebel group’s motivations, whether they be of greed or grievance, shows a potential post-conflict effect of these motivations. This is exemplified in Rwanda by the RPF’s changes in ethnic power structures, enhancing the power and scope of positions previously unavailable to ethnic Tutsi, an important, if unvoiced, motivation in its war on the Habyarimana government. Similarly, the CNDD-FDD in Burundi also made ethnic changes in power following the end of the civil war. These examples show how motivations matter to post-conflict outcomes, and I return to this point later in greater detail in later substantive chapters.

In the next section, I discuss the approaches to the study of civil war in the discipline, and the differences in these approaches and their applications. I do so to situate my theory within these traditions, and offer an account of the CNDD-FDD that uses multiple approaches to promote a more complete vision of the conduct of war and the behaviors of rebel organizations.
Approaches to Civil Wars

Above I made reference to the difference between causation at the micro and macro levels, between low-level actors and elites, and between individual motivations and global ones. The question remains as to how the scholarly community understands how these causations work in the practice of civil war. These are often tested, in cross-national level studies of global factors that make conflict likely, like Collier et al., and also in studies at the micro-level, like what propels ordinary citizens and others without specific access to weapons or calls to arm to fight (Humphreys and Weinstein 2008). In the last decade, scholars have examined the differences between the macro-level explanations of civil war and micro-level processes of recruitment and inducement. By studying the micro-level of conflict, scholars are able to further clarify motivations, whether material or not, at the individual level. I mention this as an introduction to a brief review of the literature of causation at multiple levels within a civil war. The evidence I present on the CNDD-FDD in Burundi shows both universally accepted causalities and behaviors and the motivations of individual actors by utilizing top-down and bottom-up data to provide a more holistic account of the civil war.

Macro-Level Approaches: These approaches to the study of civil war are the most widely embraced and oldest in the discipline. Traditionally these comprehensive theories were presented within case studies that provided a broad picture of the civil war and society under study. They tended to focus on the characteristics of the state (Scott 1977) or society (Gurr 1970, Huntington 1968) than drivers of conflict at the individual level, and searched for universal motivations among the population. These accounts often highlighted change in political models, at least in the initial study of
comparative politics in the 1960s and 1970s. But macro-level approaches to the study of war are not a thing of the past, and studies on ideology and war (Palacios 2006), religion and war (Stiansen 2004, Prunier 2005), economy and conflict (Collier et al. 2001, Sambanis and Eldawabi 2000, Fearon and Laitin 2003) illustrate contemporary saliency. Macro-level accounts focus more on structures in and of conflict, not specific actors, and thus are more suited for providing general causality. A variety of methods are employed in macro accounts- qualitative accounts based on fieldwork as well as large N quantitative methods tested using datasets, highlighting that macro approaches do not follow a certain kind of methodological tool.

I now discuss the benefits and drawbacks to these approaches. For one, macro perspectives on conflict provide 'big-picture' analysis, simplifying complex histories and wars into something understandable to non-specialists. This is important to both the discipline as well as the policy community, for those who may not have time to invest in learning languages, country-specific knowledge, and conduct fieldwork. But these benefits are not without negatives. Macro level approaches to civil wars can hide variance amongst individuals and behaviors during civil war. This becomes especially clear when dealing with the aftermath of war, where potential combatants receive equal treatment, despite obvious differences in practice, in both the scholarly literature as well as in the punishment structure. By this I mean that individuals choose to participate in a civil war for a variety of specific motivations, like ideological connections to rebel movements, promise of financial gain, religious connections to the rebel leaders, and pressure from peers (Kilcullen 2009: ch. 1 and 2)\textsuperscript{5}. While scholars can sort out a general set of motivations that many rebel participants ascribe to in the larger context of
the war, it yet remains that among individuals preferences vary. This extends to behaviors engaged during the war: for example, rebel participants in CNDD-FDD described their varying levels of participation, from acting as information gatherers and early detectors of government army presence, to full-fledged active combatants. The post-conflict period is no different, with some rebel members receiving material benefits as part of a reintegration program and others receiving no material rewards and ostracization from former communities for their participation.

In this thesis, I investigate whether or not there are overarching themes to which interviewees ascribed causation of the civil war in Burundi. I did so in order to ascertain the way in which people think about and conduct rebellion and whether there were universally accepted “truths” about wars. By searching for a global perspective on the war, I determine what characteristics of the rebel group appealed to people most, and how that message was effectively spread (or in some cases, was not) among varied groups in the population. I highlight this more thoroughly in Chapters 4 and 5.

**Micro-foundational Studies of Civil War:** Now I turn to the contrasting micro-level studies of war, because this particular study utilizes both macro-level accounts of the Burundian civil war as well as micro-level interview data focusing on individual logic of rebellion. By studying the micro-level of conflict, scholars clarify motivations at the individual level and are able to further parse out data on a smaller level. These are often carried out by conducting massive survey collection projects or employing many semi-structured interviews in the form of questionnaires to see variability. Micro-foundational studies have special applicability to the research I carried out in Burundi because they show variation amongst individuals and across temporal dimensions concerning
behaviors and perceptions of the war. These differences are crucial, because many Burundi specialists discovered global causes and uniform motivation to the war, and employed these in their analyses, although not without caveats (Lemarchand 1970, 2009, Daley 2007, Krueger 2009). The data presented in Chapters 4 and 5 provides additional information about the consistency of global assumptions for the war, and extends arguments about the civil war to the post-conflict period.

**Quantitative and Qualitative Methodological Tools in the Study of War**

In the study of civil wars, much has been made about the differences between quantitative, large-N data based studies and more specific qualitative accounts of wars. Although each approach has its staunchest proponents, the newest innovative work about civil wars uses qualitative accounts in conjunction with larger tests of theory across contexts, to show similarities and differences among civil wars (Kalyvas 2006, Weinstein 2007, Mampilly 2011). I give a brief introduction to these methodological positions in civil war and conflict studies now, in order to better situate my theory and evidence among previous work and preview the usage of both in this research. I used both types of evidentiary support in order to more completely satisfy questions about rebellion and post-rebel governance in Burundi as well as across sub-Saharan Africa.

**Qualitative Approaches:** Qualitative approaches are those that use tools like case studies, participant observation and other forms of analyses to develop a rich contextual and causal narrative. Qualitative evidence is typically gathered by the researcher conducting fieldwork, living and working amongst the population under study, requiring background knowledge and potential new language skills. For many years, the case study method of qualitative analyses was de rigueur in the study of
comparative politics, because it required the researcher to use a vast array of tools developed through detailed and intensive training in graduate schools to produce specific knowledge about particular events and places. These approaches understand particularities of human events and provide exact data, especially in understudied populations and peoples where other forms of data may be unreliable or unavailable. They lack in the ability to generate quantified, mathematically-driven data across many cases. My work here comprises a large portion of qualitative field studies conducted in four countries in the Great Lakes, providing detailed political histories of active rebel movements there.

**Quantitative Approaches:** Quantitative approaches are those that use mathematically oriented data and tools to provide models showing relationships between variables. Scholars utilize them by gathering data and then compile it into sets for further analyses. Sometimes researchers gather data by conducting surveys in the field: Other times, they are compiled by coding variables and events according to rigorously developed schemas. Quantitative analyses provide incredible breadth of data when used to measure the impacts of characteristics of the conduct of war—duration, number of troops, material support and the like. They are also beneficial for testing hypotheses and relationships among a large number of data points. Where these approaches are not sufficient is in targeting outliers and understanding contextual specificities that may not be apparent in large N regression equations. These approaches are complementary to the qualitative data I gathered because they illustrate relationships between variables and rebel group success on a larger scale, where I test
social and organizational power among sixty rebel groups across sub-Saharan Africa from 1970-2009, confirming my qualitative work in the Great Lakes.

The theory I present about how rebel groups become governments attempts to fill some of the gaps exposed by this review of the substantive and methodological literature of civil wars. It provides a new understanding of rebel to ruler transformations as multilayered processes, not discrete events, and using manifold methodological tools is necessary. Thus, the causes and behaviors of war at both at the elite and foot soldier level are important factors that shape the outcome of post-rebel governance and stability. I present a capture of the timelines of civil wars in my theory in Figures 2-6 and 2-7. I use these diagrams to underscore a crucial part of this research— that scholars should not view civil wars as separated by temporal categories, but rather as linked events in a chain that follow and affect one another. Further, behaviors found in one temporal aspect continue to other temporal aspects of a civil war and post-conflict time.

Social and Organizational Power matter at all times of the war, but are highlighted at certain critical junctures to ensure success. I examine this in greater detail later, but for now I provide a conceptualization of the temporally important variables in Figure 2-8.

State Formation and Rebel Organization: The Linkages

This section demonstrates the historical processes of war-making as state-making to show the legacies of war as a form of dominance to produce a new state. The rebels in question in this research seek this, although it is not the creation of a new state, but rather the dismantlement of previous governments and the beginning of a new political order.
With the question of banditry and greed should arise the similarities between the state-building ‘stationary bandits’ of Tilly and modern African rebels, because some scholars believe that a rebel group can operate more effectively when they are able to claim territory and extract rents from it (Mampilly 2011). I provided a discussion of the state in sub-Saharan Africa in Chapter 1 as a background to the larger discussion of the historical relationship between rebellion and processes of state formation. Scholars have long posited the European state development was a process of stationary banditry (Olson 1993: 567) wherein which rulers took to settling and taxing the population while providing security creating feudal structures that developed into states. Mann and Tilly, among others, built theories of state formation based upon the logic of the Weberian state, that states sought a monopoly on the legitimate use of force and violence, so gained by first proving on the battleground the ability to organize violence. According to Tilly, European states were shaped by war-making, extraction from the population to support war making ventures, and capital accumulation to fight future conflicts (Tilly 1985:172). The process finds familiarity in the actions of modern day rebel groups in sub-Saharan Africa, who, through conflict are able to extract resources from populations or banditry of state resources to further their capabilities. But rebels not only accumulate capital for the purposes of enlarging the war chest-modern day rebels also concern themselves with sustaining their enterprises in the post-conflict period. For example, the CNDD-FDD engaged in a campaign of fund-raising for the purposes of raising an electoral war chest as early as 2001\(^{10}\), long before the actual elections and while violence was still ongoing. The purpose of these funds was clearly articulated to future constituents and receipts were even provided to citizens to legitimize the process. While
not all rebel groups engage in stationary banditry or state formation in the Western European tradition, enough of these behaviors are conducted to make scholars pay attention to these kinds of transitions and the potentiality for new states (Weinstein 2007, Reno 2000). This is important when considering how these potential goals of the rebel organization map on its behaviors and strategies during the various time periods of the civil war, which I explore in the following section.

Rebellion Outcomes: How do they (or don’t they) Win?

This section seeks an understanding of rebel behavior during the actual conduct of the civil war. In this section, I identify literature on how rebels win the civil war and control of the state- or barring that, the path to political victory. In this literature review, I address the benefits and challenges to each type of victory- either through military means or through negotiated settlement. Finally, I identify the key variables of rebel behavior under study here- social and organizational power and link these to the process of rebel to ruler transformations.

What aspects of rebel behavior are critical to conducting a war? The social sciences studied many aspects of these in regards to the sociological, political, economic, religious, and cultural aspects of civil war, as demonstrated earlier in this chapter. This review focuses these studies in hopes of identifying the primary and ancillary. In some sense all behaviors during this period are primary to the conduct of warfare and this is not to be debated here. But it stands to reason that “Someone has to resolve to embark on the high-risk strategy of seizing power through mobilization and violence. The venture has to be planned. Fighters have to be trained, the weapons obtained. Tactics have to be devised and a campaign executed.”(Richards 2005: 4).
This section explicates how this occurs, and the various types of victories that are possible for rebel groups.

**Winning through Military Victory:** The statement above suggests the traditional method of ‘victory’ through civil war of winning outright through battle and seizing the capital and organs of power by force. This position finds root in historical understandings of war and state-building, which see violence as a means of reinforcing power and hierarchal relationships that established dominion over lands and people, at least in so far as the process was understood in the building of civilization in Western Europe. Scholars argue that historically this was not the case of state development in Africa (Thies 2009, Herbst 2000, Boone 2003), and this posits some explanation as to the number of failed rebel takeovers. The notion of “fixed borders”, that Africa’s state borders were no longer in dispute post-Independence (Thies 2009: 629) made it so that all challenges to sovereignty would be of an internal nature, thus drastically cutting the reach and resources necessary for ‘weak’ African governments to fight wars, while also cutting the incentives for rebel groups to wage war. That is not to say that rebel groups in Africa are unsuccessful at winning military victories- to refer to Figure Four provided in Chapter 1, seventy-three percent of the rebel groups that came to power did so through military victory, and the so-called most successful ‘reform rebels’- the National Resistance Army(NRA) in Uganda, the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front(EPFL) in Ethiopia, and the RPF in Rwanda- claimed power through total military victory (Reno 2011: 119: 128). The civil wars literature is somewhat divided as to what type of victory is more common- Fearon and Laitin (2008) state that military victory is the most common form of civil war termination and Walter (1997) pointed out that wars rarely
ended in settlement before in the 1940-1990 period, while the vast majority of scholars that study post-Cold War conflicts find negotiated settlement to be the most common (Mason et al. 2011, Johnston 2007). Using the UCDP dataset also yields results favoring more negotiated settlements than military victories to the termination of conflict. Of 288 outcomes in civil wars worldwide from 1945-present, only 48 were ended in victory by the rebel army. Similarly, in the dataset presented in Chapter 6, only 11 of 60 rebel groups won power by military victory.

There are far more immediate benefits for the rebel group in question if they take power militarily rather than through negotiated settlement. For one, groups that win the war militarily have a clear mandate for post-war agendas, as all other credible players are necessarily trounced (Luttwak 1999, Duffy Toft 2010a, Duffy Toft 2010b: 41). With a clear military victory, there can be no indecisiveness about who will be in power post-conflict (Weinstein 2007, Duffy Toft 2010b: ch. 3). With decisive victories, the rebel group can be seen as stronger victor in eyes of international community, and thus may be more likely to receive financial and political support that can be used to further solidify power.

In the long-term the benefits are better still, as the historical record shows. The NRA, in power since 1986 in Uganda, has successfully consolidated its regime and grip on Ugandan political life (Kasfir 2005). Similarly, the EPLF in Ethiopia consolidated power for a successful solidification of its regime (Reno 2011: ch. 3). Both of these regimes have benefitted significantly from being in power, in access to the international community and its financial and political resources. Internally and perhaps more significantly, by winning the war militarily and these groups have been able to rewrite
the history of their struggle and their countries. In no place is this more apparent than under the RPF government in Rwanda, in power since 1994. The RPF have rewritten pre-colonial relationships, the processes of colonization, and Independence, wholly changing the narrative of struggle and ethnicity in the tiny country that lost three quarters of its Tutsi population to the genocide. The RPF narrative positions itself the dominant story of the genocide as exhibited and taught by the Gisozi Kigali Memorial Centre, the official national genocide memorial. This is an extremely powerful position for the RPF government, as it allows it to manipulate domestic and international policies and agendas in favor of its position of power and to write the definitive national narrative for future generations (Lemarchand 2009).

Despite benefits to winning the civil war militarily, there are some challenges, post-conflict the rebel victor must face. To begin, winning a war militarily is incredibly costly in terms of time, money, and human capital. A lengthy civil war expends not only the lives of combatants, but also can result in negative civilian perceptions as the war drags on (Samii 2010: 12). A victorious rebel group must combat all of these losses and build legitimacy amongst those who did not support them during conflict. A victor rebel group often suffers from the problems of asymmetric information in warfare, wherein the government may be far better informed, trained, and prepared. This becomes very apparent in the post-conflict period, where rebel governors face a lack of training in government practices and transitioning into new roles may be difficult. For example, much was made about the supposed lack of governing ability of the CNDD-FDD’s former rebel commander of the western region, Manasse Nzonbimpa, who was thought to by party officials to be a much better commander than governor\textsuperscript{11}. This led to a new
factioning in the post-rebel CNDD-FDD government, wherein which Nzonbimpa was expelled from the party and leadership roles while still maintaining immense support among the populace, a splitting to be discussed further in Chapter 5. In short, the rebel faces an uphill battle in conflict and post-conflict governance. Although a military victor may be viewed by the international community as the decisive victor, the nature of the civil war itself may increase its reputation as vicious, tyrannical, or bold beyond measure. This is especially problematic for future relationships between the rebel group and international actors, who hold the power to create embargoes and extend much needed loans to these new governments.

The Conduct of War: The Contribution to Peacetime Success

What behaviors do rebels exhibit during the civil war that shapes the outcomes of these wars? There are behaviors that some have specified lead to the winning of the war itself: strong leadership, tactical accomplishments, strategic battle decisions, and the maintenance of a territorial base. All these are important to victory in the war, but also speak to a broader characteristic of a rebel organization, that of the ability to act quickly, coherently, and without internal conflict or dissent. These characteristics echo Michael Mann’s definition of the infrastructural power of the state,” the capacity of the state to penetrate … and implement logistically political decisions throughout the realm” (1993:5). In practice, he defines this as:

“A division of labor between the state’s main activities which it coordinate[s] centrally…. Literacy, enabling stabilized messages to be transmitted through the state’s territories by its agents… allowing commodities to be exchanged under an ultimate
guarantee of value… [and] rapidity of communication of messages and of transport of people and resources” (ibid: 9)

While obvious differences between a state and a rebel organization preclude the applicability of Mann’s theory in its entirety, with some small modification, the theoretical foundations are still quite applicable, and furthermore, show the ability of rebel organizations to act as proto-states and their state-building capabilities. I term this more generally ‘organizational power’- the level of control and ability to project power expressed by the group that allows them to maintain order, give direction to followers, and accomplish goals. This organizational power of the rebel group affects the leadership’s control over armed combatants, whether or not foot-soldiers actually follow commands given (obedience and loyalty), addressing the division of labors and communications described in Michael Mann’s theory. Groups with high levels of obedience can effectively plan strategy and tactics without dissent, but also influence the relationships between civilians and combatants. They can do so by providing a united front, easy and timely communication and planning, as well as providing a strong group for the civilians to “look up to” and side with in conflict. Not all rebel groups seek a positive relationship with the civilians in their area of influence: some actively commit violence against civilians, whether randomly, like the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone, or at the behest of their leaders, like the RPF in Eastern Congo. These decisions may not be static over time: a rebel organization may initially pursue a strategy of cooperation with civilians and then later result to intimidation through violent means. Some groups even shift dramatically during the course of the civil war. Rebel groups must also provide management of civilian areas and protection of territory they
intend to hold. For example, the NRA provided both civilian protection, when possible, and organized local civilian leadership councils while fighting the Obote Government in the Ugandan Civil War from 1980-1986 (Kasfir 2005: 275). Again, organizational power plays an important role in how these behaviors are expressed.

**Rebel Preferences**: Do groups that take up arms against their governments have a preferred strategy for ending the civil war? This question is central to understanding the type of strategy pursued during the war. As illustrated, different ways of winning are more amenable to different strategies. In some ways, rebel preferences depend on the context of the civil war itself. If the war becomes protracted and a clear victory cannot be easily won, other options may prove more attractive. In Burundi’s civil war, some scholars argue that the goals and preferences of the rebel group changed over time as the likelihood of a clean military victory diminished, as early as 1997 (Nindoera 2010: 4). The strategy of the group moved from military victory against the government army to a political victory through negotiated settlement and transitional elections. Once leaders chose to pursue this, communications between the military and political commands reflected new tensions, eventually leading to a split in the movement between the more war-oriented members who believed military victory to be the only victory (under Commander Jean-Bosco Ndayikengurukiye) and those who were willing to accept smaller political victories (under the uncle of Jean-Bosco and original founder, Leonard Nyangoma). On the other hand, other groups like the RPF would accept nothing but total military victory, even at the expense of Tutsi civilians whom they could have protected (Stam 2009). They did so because a total military victory would ensure
absolute power post-conflict and allow the RPF to provide for Tutsi interests within a potentially ethnically hostile social environment.

**Winning through Negotiated Settlement:** As conflict changed in the post-World War II era, so did the ways in which governments addressed it. As scholars have argued, “power-sharing arrangements between embattled incumbents and insurgents have emerged as the West’s preferred instrument of peace-making in Africa” (Tull and Mehler 2005: 376). These agreements are often cheaper overall than total wars, reduce necessities of third-party military interventions, and provide protection for human and material resources. Furthermore, these agreements act as a foreign policy strategy for world powers, and serve as a domestic strategy to allow governments to maintain some power while providing concession for rebel demands and effectively (at least in theory) stop violence. These agreements are not new form of discourses, but rather find root in Arend Lijphart’s landmark 1969 work, “Consociational Democracy” in *World Politics*, which argued that pluralism was good for the health of democracy and could be used in a manner to mitigate conflict and promote governance. Lemarchand notes the role consociationalism has played in the potential durability of the settlement of conflicts in the Great Lakes, noting that Burundi’s consociational post-conflict strategy seemed to be the most likely durable post-conflict country in the region (2006: 423-425).

**Benefits:** While the benefits of winning power through negotiated settlement seem less immediate and less apparent than those of military victories, they can be nonetheless enticing to a rebel movement seeking political power. In the immediate aftermath of a civil war, a negotiated settlement can be an attractive option because of guarantees embedded in the settlement. Often times, these settlements contain
provisions for re-integration of combatants into civilian life or government armed forces, seen by everyday rank and file soldiers as a form of protection from elite negotiators for ‘their’ soldiers. Additionally, these agreements are often accompanied by an international peacekeeping force, which reduces the burden of a rebel group having to provide security services to its civilian population, as well as ensuring (at least theoretically) the rebel group’s safety from retributive government forces. As Walter notes, one of the most significant factors for rebel group disarmament is the fear or reality of ‘surprise attack’ wherein which a “rival can more easily seize control of the state and permanently exclude them from power” (2002: 21, 26-27). Peacekeeping troops or an international force can allay these fears. Finally, negotiated peace agreements can end protracted conflicts that seem unbreakable, especially when the population and combatants suffer from ‘war fatigue’ (Samii 2010:12). Often times, “war-weary populations are likely to prefer order and economic advancement” (Walter 2002: 29), even if one side must necessarily negotiate away some political power. Thus, rebel organizations are sometimes pressured by citizens and civil society figures to end the conflict in a peaceful manner.

In the long-term, the benefits of negotiated settlements become somewhat cloudy, much of this due to the vagaries of settlements. Because of the relatively contemporary nature of these agreements, it is yet unclear if these have sunsets and can be guaranteed for longer term prospects (Roeder and Rothchild 2005:14). In some cases, peace agreements are to be supplanted by new agreements or constitutions, as in the case in the agreements in the wake of the 2007 post-election violence in Kenya. In other cases, as in civil wars in Burundi and the DRC, the limits of the agreements are
unclear. For example, in Burundi transitional elections and even transitions to a Hutu leader (during the transition period) were pushed back several times because of 'concerns over the process and reintegration of combatants', which the CNDD-FDD viewed as stalling for time for the Buyoya-led (Tutsi) government. This vagary can open up potentially troubling political minefields, for now, opposition parties can use the strategy of negotiation to stall politics and push for new agreements or changes, as in the case following the 2010 elections in Burundi. In Burundi, elections occur in a five-round cycle, with the order consisting of Communal, Presidential, Senatorial, Parliamentary, and Colline-level. In May 2010, allegations of fraud launched soon after reports of the CNDD-FDD winning the communal elections. This led to a boycott of the Presidential and subsequent elections by major political parties, and a call by the major opposition coalition ADC-Ikibirí (Alliance pour Democratie et Change-Ikibirí) to return to the drawing board and change the 2005 Constitution (the result of post-conflict settlement). Some also argue that because of the very nature of give and take found in a negotiated settlement, transitions are delayed and strong institution building is hindered (Duffy Toft 2010b: 40-41), thus problems like the one described above could be avoided by quicker consolidation of constitutional processes.

**Challenges:** Although a political victory through negotiated settlement is no less as meaningful to a rebel group, challenges remain to building legitimacy and post-conflict power and stability with this type of win. First, the victory is not as decisive as a military one, and usually results in a power-sharing arrangement for the transitional and immediate post-conflict governments. Rebel groups and governments may be unwilling to share power with former enemies (Duffy Toft 2010b:ch. 3, Walter 2002: ch. 1). A
degree of political skill and finesse is necessary in these types of governments, and many rebel groups are inexperienced in these types of ventures. The problem also exists of trying to build political support and power in a consensus government with defined parameters that may work against the group to limit these powers (Licklider 1995). For example, the Burundian constitution delineates that the vice-presidents must be composed of one Hutu and one Tutsi. This often leads to one vice-president coming from the CNDD-FDD and another from a majority Tutsi party, thus limiting the power of CNDD-FDD in this role by constraining who can hold office. Finally, it must be noted that many scholars have found that a war that ends in negotiated settlement is more likely to return to conflict (Fearon and Laitin 2008, Walter 2004, Mason et al. 2011).

**Behaviors of Rebel Groups during Negotiated Settlements: The Keys to Success**

What behaviors of a rebel group lead to successful post-conflict government and political power even when the group itself did not win power in the war outright? A key factor contributing to rebel success in this case is the capacity of the group to use civilian support during the negotiations and in the transition and the scope of this support. Rebels then translate this support into political support as a party if and when elections come post-conflict. Hence, the rebel group’s relationship with civilians becomes incredibly important at this time. The success of the rebel group during negotiations also depends in large part on the group’s ability to interact with and transform state structures to suit its needs. This can include things like co-opting state leaders at the local levels, like the CNDD-FDD did in Burundi as the war wound down in the early 2000s, replacing or supplanting state structures, or rewriting constitutions and redesigning institutions. I provide a few examples here to illustrate how this supplanting
occurred. It did this by creating its own *ubashingatahe*, the traditional court of elders, to dole out justice and enforce the rebel law in rebel controlled areas. The CNDD-FDD also co-opted *nyumba-cumi* (in Kirundi, “10 houses”) leaders by providing them material and intangible benefits alike to join the movement and spread the message amongst their households. These political strategies are part and parcel of a larger group of strategies employed during both the civil war and the transitional post-conflict period to gain support for the rebel organization as it becomes a political movement.

**Theorizing Rebellion Success: After the Conflict Ends**

This section focuses on the post-conflict time period, to provide a two pronged approach that accounts for both historical and proximate factors that shape the post-rebellion performance of rebel groups. I first take the time here to clarify ‘rebel success’. While in Chapter 1 I specified that success is defined as whether a rebel organization gains and maintains power post-conflict, I take a moment here to more thoroughly define success here. Success in post-conflict governance is more than just gaining power through an election or series of elections: it carries a degree of regime and state cohesiveness that allows the former rebel organization to effectively govern the state with all the rules and rights (authority, tax collection, monopoly of force) with no serious violent entrepreneurs that could spark additional rebellions. Success also entails the ability of the former rebel group to maintain enough internal cohesion so that the rebel group, despite some potential fragmentation, maintains enough consistent logic and group identity as to be the same group before, during, and after conflict. I illustrate this in later chapters through the rise and maintenance of power of the CNDD-FDD in Burundi. Based on this definition of success, I theorize that a rebel group does not
arrive at this without significant reliance of the behaviors, conditions, and actions of the rebel organization during the civil war. These factors are part and parcel of the rebel organizations source and reliance on social power, and type of organizational power developed as a rebel group and continued onto the post-conflict temporal period. I measure success in comparative perspective in Chapter 6 by using conventionally accepted measures of state and success.

**Why these characteristics matter.** As I discussed above, the two characteristics of rebel groups that maintain importance even over the temporal dimensions of a civil war are the type of organization and source of the rebel group’s social power with civilians and the state. The preconditions of the state itself also play an important role in the abilities of the rebel organization, discussed further in Chapter 5. But these characteristics capture broader dimensions of the study of warfare—specifically, that organization speaks to a broader focus of scholars on contemporary and modern dimensions of warfare, while social power speaks to historical models of the development of states and societies.

**The type of organizational power.** All rebel groups have some form of organization, but what do rebel scholars mean in the use of the term and how do they objectively measure levels of organization in the rebel movement? Scholars define organization along a number of dimensions: sociological, political, and economic. My definition captures multiple dimensions, but most prominently views organization as a degree of internal cohesion, power, and congruency that allows the movement to express unified political will and dominate others. This centralization captures more than roles within the military structure and leadership itself, also capturing these relationships
as they move beyond these realms. By organization, I refer to the internal logic, cohesion, and order of the rebel organization. I measure the type of organization in the substantive chapters by investigating the development of the rebel group in the battlefield, especially development of organizational networks and capacities from the field to the transition period to when the rebel movement gained political power. From these accounts, a coding schema develops that specifies how a rebel movement has organized itself and indicates changes over time\(^{13}\). I also analyzed the level of organizational power quantitatively according to this schema for a robust measure in a larger test of the data, explicated in Chapter 6. Organizational Power can be classified into ideal types falling in two categories: infrastructural and cellular. These classifications capture directionality, projection, and cohesion of power within the rebel organization. I choose to use the terms infrastructural and cellular because they accurately describe the two ends of a continuum of the organizational power a rebel movement possesses. As explicated above, infrastructural organizational power denotes a group with a substantial internal frame, one in which orders are given and followed, communications are without problems, and tactics, strategies and decisions are made at the head of the rebel organization and carried out, in hierarchal fashion, by those underneath. On the opposite end of the spectrum, a group with cellular organizational power exhibits very few of these characteristics, and instead is limited in its range and capabilities in internal and external affairs. A few examples of what this looks like in practice illustrate these: A completely centralized (infrastructural) relationship would mean that all battle decisions come from one place of authority and are disseminated downward through the ranks, from high command to foot soldier. This
was very much the case in both the NRA in Uganda’s civil war (1980-1986) and the RPF in Rwanda’s civil war (1990-1994), where military orders were issued directly from one leader in each case (Yoweri Museveni and Paul Kagame, respectively.) This is in direct comparison with the decentralized style of command utilized by the CNDD-FDD during Burundi’s civil war, where regional commanders were able to issue parallel, sometimes conflicting orders, leading to a serious splitting of resources. The downstream effect of these is thus: a group that exhibits strong and unified infrastructural power is more likely to continue to do so even after a transition from rebel to ruler, and can take these internal networks and divisions into the government, securing resources and power along the way. A group with cellular organizational power will have an uphill battle in its transition, as the very diffuse nature of the rebel organization may prevent the significant holding of government power at the center of the rebel group’s political structure. I draw further examples substantively in later chapters of the continuum of organizational power.

**The Nature of Social Power: Inclusivity.** Capacity is usually a discrete quantitative measure of a rebel group’s material ability to carry out war (Wood 2010) and scholars use capacity and capability interchangeably to signify the relative material strength of a rebel movement while conducting a war. These definitions often do not speak to conditions of the state or interactions with civilians, and thus are confined to the scope of the civil war itself. In my definition of social power is in a two-pronged manner: one, as the rebel group’s approach to civilians and communities, and two, the rebel group’s interactions with pre-existing state structures under rebel control. These comprise of the ability to use pre-existing structures, or to transform them. This
definition catches both the source and extent of the capacity of the rebel group as it applies to civilians and the state.

The degree of social power refers to the ability of the rebel organization to extract from and create new state and civilian structures of support both as a rebel organization during conflict, and later, when they have assumed power. This matters to the rebels’ ability to conduct guerilla mobile campaigns with support and to the conduct of voter mobilization campaigns and leveraging resources post-conflict.

I measure the source of social power in later chapters by employing post-hoc narratives of development of the rebel organization given to me by participants. I also relied on post-conflict voting data, participant-observation in the 2010 elections, and archival research of relevant political documentation, showing the outcome of the rebel group’s nature of social power and embeddedness in the post-rebellion period. I classify the nature of social power here as inclusive or exclusive. I do so in thinking of this type of power along a continuum, wherein which one side would be inclusive and the other, exclusive. Rebel organizations vary in their degrees of willingness or ability to interact with citizens and the state, and a continuum captures this variation. It is then translated into a typology by employing ideal types and categorizing rebel groups by which side of the spectrum they fall along most closely.

**The Typology.** In the tradition of other scholars in contemporary rebel studies, I use these variables to categorize the post-rebellion behavior of rebels in a typology. The typology contains four types of rebels, as measured by the type of organizational power and nature of social power, and the interactions of these two variables. I created a typology by listing descriptive qualities on an x and y axes of a matrix, creating a two by
The interaction of these independent variables describes an ideal predictive type for my theory's dependent variable - the outcome of post-rebellion politics. According to Elman, this type of model has a “descriptive role (that) builds types from the 'compounds of attributes' of concepts” (Elman 2005: 296), allowing for the incorporation of otherwise messy conceptualizations of behaviors. Further, Elman elaborates that “[it] is primarily a complement to deductive approaches, because filling in the cells requires working through the logical implications of the theory: given its posited causal relationships, what particular outcomes are associated with different combinations of values of the theory's variables” (ibid: 298).

Thus, the outcome of the rebel group CNDD-FDD in Burundi will be illuminating to filing in the outcomes in the rest of the matrix shown in Figure 2-9, because they illustrate a particular set of variable interactions that contrast with others. An explanatory typology method proves most for comparing rebels in this case because it allows for the testing of several claims about rebel characteristics and potential post-rebellion outcomes in a way that can compound attributes across variables and show variations in these variables in in-case comparisons as well as cross-case contexts. The intervening variable present in both the source of social power and the type of organizational power are the preconditions of the state, a variable discussed in detail in Chapter 3.

**Type A-CNDD-FDD.** These rebel types exhibit cellular organizational relations and inclusive social power as a rebel group and as a government can be classified as a Type A rebel group. They gain political strength from its abilities to revamp state
structures and also benefit from popular support. However, it is unable to consolidate decisions under one hierarchy and frequently experience problems with discipline inside the group and leading to lack of cohesion. The downstream implications for this are that strength of the rebel group over time may diminish, especially as internal splitting and divisiveness may weaken the base as supporters leave following leaders. This could result in both a problem of succession with the leadership structure of the rebel organization in addition to overall lose of strength and numbers.

**Type B-AFDL II.** These rebel types exhibit cellular organizational power and exclusive social power as a rebel group and as a government can be classified as Type B rebels. They are the type of the four with the most to overcome, as its structure provides for no central direction and they are unable or unwilling to rely on civilians or the ability to transform state structures for additional power or stability. These groups are likeliest to experience direct threats and challenges to their holds on political order and stability post-conflict.

**Type C-NRA.** These rebel types are characterized by infrastructural organizational power and inclusive social power as a rebel group that leads them to become stable governments. In essence, these groups are the ‘super-groups’, who have the best of both worlds. They shape state structures and have the benefit of popular support, while also possessing a command structure that discourages dissent and encourages a solid face against the opposition. They draw upon these pre-existing characteristics when they gain power to consolidate and expand political gains and further stabilize the post-conflict context.
**Type D-RPF.** These rebel types are characterized by infrastructural organizational power and exclusive social power as a rebel group which leads them to become internally strong but externally challenged governments. These groups are able to centralize decision-making capabilities and exhibit strong leadership, but are unable or unwilling to rely on popular support as a mechanism for consolidating power. The governments that result from these rebel organizations can maintain political power but often face accusations of authoritarianism and despotism from the civilians they rule.

**Counter-Examples: Failed Groups**

While not included in the typology itself, failed rebel groups (those that do not gain any sort of political power either through military victory or through negotiated settlements) provide another method of comparison by which to examine successful rebel to ruler transitions. An examination of these groups shows how differences in strategies and conduct of war, especially in organization and capacity, matter to the success of a rebel group, both before, during, and after conflict. Furthermore, comparing groups that operate within the same civil war and among the same population, like the CNDD-FDD and its rivals, the Palipehutu-FNL (*Parti pour la libération du peuple Hutu- Forces nationales de libération*), highlight these differences. These will be discussed further in Chapters 4 and 5 in conjunction with more detailed discussion of organizational power, social power and the data collected.

**Alternatives to the Theory**

While Chapters 3, 4, and 5 discuss the key variables of the theory presented here in greater detail, nonetheless I address potential challenges to my theorizing here. These alternatives can roughly be categorized into characteristics of the rebel group
and characteristics of the war and the general environment. It could be that successful rebel to ruler transitions are less a function of the characteristics and type of organizational power and source of social power of the rebel group itself, and more closely related to other characteristics of the group. For example, it could be that the ideology of the movement matters to post-conflict success. There are Marxist and Socialist groups that have succeeded in transitioning from rebels to political power, like the Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO) in Mozambique and the Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (Sandinistas) in Nicaragua. While ideology induces followers to participate in conflict, as yet there are no accounts or evidence for how ideology affects post-conflict success. Even the EPLF in Ethiopia, while nominally considered Marxist, is awarded far more credit in its successful rebel to ruler transition for its organization and discipline (Pool 2001:ch.1). Similarly, some ethnically based movements that have succeeded in gaining post-conflict power, like the RPF in Rwanda and the CNDD-FDD in Burundi. Although these groups claim to be multi-ethnic and do in fact contain members of multiple ethnic groups, ethnicity alone does not drive their success. For one, in Rwanda, the minority ethnic group gained power, not the majority, and thus civilian support is not a contributing factor. In Burundi, although the CNDD-FDD is a majority Hutu movement that came to power in a majority Hutu government after years of Tutsi rule, very few Hutu claim to support CNDD-FDD purely because it is a “Hutu movement” in the post-conflict period and the party does not outwardly rely on ethnicity during election time. While ethnicity may induce some to join, it certainly cannot explain the participation of all, whether or not the war is ongoing. Finally, it could be that groups that are ‘older’, i.e. have been established for longer, succeed better at
attaining post-conflict power than others. This would be due to the practice and experience of the rebel organization that allows for decisive and cohesive decision making, command structures, and logistical training earned over a long period of time, characteristics that serve them well when achieving power. While this argument cannot be easily dismissed, the same factors that support it also support an argument favoring rebel groups with prior military experience. Furthermore, groups may weaken, and not strengthen, over time, as shown by the gradual lack of popular support, demonstrated through protests, editorials, and citizen sentiment, especially by urban Ugandans, of the NRA in Uganda as the movement ages (Crisis Group 2012).

The second set of rival explanations center around characteristics of the civil war from which the rebels emerge. Some argue that the way in which the war is won determines the shape of the post-conflict government and political order more so than any actor in the conflict (Weinstein 2007, Fortna 2008, Luttwak 1999). An “autonomous recovery” (Weinstein 2007) leads to more stability than a negotiated end to a war, and we should “give war a chance” (Luttwak 1999) to determine the post-war political landscape. Others may argue that the duration of the war affects post-conflict outcomes more than the rebel group itself. Some scholars argue that Burundi’s successful post-conflict transition into peace depended on the fatigue of a decades-long war and a thirst for peace rather than other factors (Uvin 2009). While respondents spoke to me of this fatigue and politicians describe Burundians as “oh, nous sommes tire des guerre!” (Oh, but we are tired of the war), combatants expressed that they were willing to continue the fighting should they be so asked, and civilians responded that while war conditions were disheartening, life in general in Burundi was generally the same regardless of war
or peace. Finally, much scholarly debate exists over the role of neighbors, international peace-keepers and the presence of outsiders as a factor that contributes to post-war political order. Neighbors can provide sanctuary (Salehyan 2007, 2010), financial support (Schultz 2010), or even logistical and military support (Stearns 2011, Prunier 2009, and Reyntjens 2009) to a rebel organization, crucial to attaining its political goals. For example, much scholarly discussion centers on the role of Rwanda in the overthrow of the Mobutu government by the *Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Zaïre* (AFDL). Rwanda actively gave weapons, military and logistical support including troops, as well as financial support to a group that was formed in Kigali, Rwanda during a meeting of all potential rebel leaders active in the Eastern Congo, organized by the RPF (Stearns 2011: 23). Clearly, the role of neighbors in conflict can be understated, as they can be responsible for much of the early victory in conflict. But the support of neighbors does not explain how and why rebel groups can transition to post-conflict power, as the support of the external nation can only feasibly continue for so long, and governance is often not the goal of the external government (as in the case of the RPF in Congo, whose interests lie more towards border security and financial prosperity). Other external actors also play important roles in civil wars. Much as the United States acted to restore order to Germany and Japan in the post-World War II era, so have South Africa, the United Nations Department of Peace-Keeping, and various other international governing agencies intervened to restore order and promote political development in Burundi, the DRC, and other post-civil war settings around the world. United Nations Peacekeeping troops deployed in MONUC, the United Nations Organization Mission in Democratic Republic of Congo (known by its French
name *Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies en République démocratique du Congo* under chapter VII (active peacekeeping with the ability to use force) guidelines to enforce the 1999 Lusaka Agreement there. In other post-conflict contexts in Africa, an African Union mission is often deployed as a peacekeeping force: recent examples include Cote D'Ivoire and Somalia. While there may be some effect these international forces have on conflict, the far more likely international involvement is that of neglect, as in the case of the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, where the United Nations Assistance Mission to Rwanda pulled all but a skeletal force out in the earliest days of the killings. Further, it would be incredibly difficult for any sort of outside group to significantly affect politics at this point in history when total war, like World War II, is a rare occurrence. Finally, as Rothchild and Roeder note, “the presence of third party enforcers … does not diminish the underlying need for reliable institutional protections for vulnerable groups “(2005:14). Thus even with a peacekeeping force, institutions and democracy-building activities must occur within the country to stabilize a post-conflict government.

The final set of rival explanations center around the characteristics of the environment in which the rebels operate. It may be that post-conflict political power is more dependent on the nature of the state, the geography, or the pre-existing political legacies of the country of the civil war. I find these arguments significant to my own. To return to Jeffrey Herbst’s argument, if the African state historically developed as a projection of power over people and not territory, than the ways in which governments achieve stability will have less to do with war and more to do with civilian support (e.g., Weinstein 2007, Mampilly 2011, Metelis 2009). This dovetails my argument about a rebel group’s capacity to interact with and draw from the civilian population. The prior
conditions of the state not only affect the way in which a war is conducted and the background barriers or conditions, but more importantly, affects how a rebel group is able to manage and conduct itself during and after conflict. The pre-existing state may structure relationships as to make groups more reliant upon their own infrastructural power, or conversely, may do so in a way that prevents rebel organizations from fully developing this kind of power. Additionally, the prior institutions of the state matter a great deal as to how the rebel organization is able to depend and use civilian resources. If a state’s prior relationships with civilians are symbiotic in nature and civilians feel more supported during the civil war, the source of social power available to a rebel group may be curtailed. Hence, prior institutions matter a great deal to this analysis, but are an intervening independent variable, that further elaborates the relationships between post-conflict rebel success and organizational and social power of the rebel group itself. But even Herbst himself accepts that this was not the case in all countries in Africa (2000:183), and the Great Lakes, with its history of territorial accumulation through war and pre-colonial expansion of kingdoms, may be an exception. While measuring the prior conditions of the state is not a directly quantifiable property (although Freedom House, Polity IV scores or the Failed States Index may be illuminating), further elaboration in Chapter 3 shed more light on this concept.

While qualitative accounts of causation of successful rebel to ruler transitions vary and cannot be fully examined in this research, a preliminary test exists a way to quantitatively test the power of these rival explanations, carried out here in Chapter 6. By proxying variables for these explanations and testing them amongst a population of rebel groups in Sub-Saharan Africa, the power of such explanations can be examined
and compared with that of my hypotheses. While this may not fully provide explanation for all transitions, at the very least I can test my hypotheses vis-à-vis these rival explanations to further develop a preliminary model.

**Conclusion**

This chapter briefly reviewed the literature theorizing rebellion over the various temporal dimensions of a civil war, from the pre-conflict stage to the post-conflict one. In doing so, it highlighted the relationship between motivation and causation, conduct of the war, and outcome of the war, further underlining the notion that civil wars and post-conflict stability are a process and not divided spaces. The chapter also presented a new theory of rebel behavior that carries into the post-conflict period, a theory that focuses on the effects of the type of organizational power and source of social power of the rebel movement as they apply across temporal periods. I expand this theory in detailing the rise of various rebel groups in the following chapters.
Tables and Figures

Figure 2-1. Actors in the Burundian Civil War, 1993-1994

Figure 2-2 Actors in the Burundian Civil War, 1998
Figure 2-3. Actors in the Burundian Civil War, 2002
Table 2-1. Aspects of Rebel Behavior and the Literature by Period

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pre-Rebellion or Structural Factors</th>
<th>Violent Conflict</th>
<th>Termination, Transitions or Post-Conflict</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rebel Finance and Fiscal Capabilities (Weinstein 2007)</td>
<td>Socially Constructed and Instrumentalized Ethnicity (Fearon and Laitin 2000)</td>
<td>Survival or Demise (Day 2010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anocracy, Mountainous Territory and Oil (Fearon and Laitin 2003)</td>
<td>Coercion towards Civilians (Kriger 1992)</td>
<td>Inducing Civilian Participation (Kastir 2005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous State-Society Relations (Gebre-Mahdin 1989)</td>
<td>Conflict Progression</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2-4. A Temporal Timeline of Civil Wars
Figure 2-5. Theoretical outline of Civil Wars

Motivation/Causation → Behavior of War → Outcome

Pre-Rebellion → Civil War → Post-Civil War
Motivation/Causation → Behavior of War → Outcome

Inclusive or Exclusive Social Power
Infrastructural or Cellular Organizational Structure
Historical Nature of the State
Social and Organizational Power

Figure 2-6. Temporally Important Behavioral Variables during the scope of a Civil War

Table 2-2. A New Typology of Rebel Behavior

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Organizational Power</th>
<th>Degree of Social Power</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Inclusive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cellular</td>
<td>CNDD-FDD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructural</td>
<td>NRA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Notes

1 Based in part, upon Tilly 1975, is that “war makes states”. By this logic, once groups have won through violent conflict, they are then enabled to ‘state-build’.

2 One notable exception is Bermeo 2003.

3 whether from material or intangible goods

4 Personal Interview, March 21, 2011

5 Personal Interviews, March 2, 2011, January 21, 2011

6 Personal Interview, February 23, 2011

7 Personal Interview, April 15, 2011

8 Personal Interview March 18, 2011

9 Personal Interview, April 4, 2011

10 Personal Interview January 21, 2011

11 Interview, Bujumbura, November 21, 2010

12 Personal Interview February 21, 2011

13 To not be immediately discussed here, but will be important later.
I recognize that using post-hoc statements is somewhat problematic. I attempted to also use statements made during the conflict when possible, and looked to in-country sources of media for this,

15 Personal Interviews, March 21, 2011 and March 25, 2011

16 Personal Interview, November 12, 2010

17 Personal Interview, December 3, 2010

18 Although this may be a factor in the continuing decline of the AFDL in Congo following the removal of RPF support after 2006.
CHAPTER 3
ANTECEDENT STATE CONDITIONS, ORGANIZATIONAL AND SOCIAL POWER

Introduction

The state in Africa, described briefly in Chapter 1, is thought to shape all social and political order, a momentous task when considering fragmented ethnic groups, slow economic growth, and the persistence of the power of personalities and patronage within African societies. Even when taxed in this way, however, the state in Africa provides structure and coherence in ways far beyond those of citizen and subject, extending to non-state actors and groups, like the rebel organizations this work studies.

The chapter lays out how antecedent state conditions affect and interact with the two variables under study, the type of organizational power and the nature of social power. In doing so, it brings to bear a study of the African state and how pre-colonial, colonial, post-colonial, and “third-wave” democratization structure politics in the Great Lakes region, tailoring the patterns and responses of rebel organizations there. As one scholar wrote, “state power [in Rwanda and Burundi is] one of the causes of social differentiation, not the product of unchanging social differences” (Newbury, D. 2001: 259) and thus, in this historical delving an understanding comes of the comparison between these histories that shaped rebel organizations that sprang to power in the twentieth century. This lays the foundation for explaining how the preconditions of the state act as an intervening variable upon the two independent variables, the type of organizational power and the nature of social power to rebel to ruler dynamics. If, as Staniland wrote, “insurgency and counterinsurgency is a contest over the shaping of political order in a contested area… It is thus conceptually very similar to state formation
and many analysts views civil conflict as competitive state-building”, then understanding how the state emerged and developed proves useful to analyzing rebel organization practices (2012: 246). The chapter focuses in particular on two important Burundian pre-colonial and colonial factors-ethnic structures and the degree of state centralization or coherence, and two post-Independence factors: political instability and the late 1980s transitions as a result of international restructuring of aid. These factors directly contributed to the rise of rebel movements in Burundi and find similar parallels in the histories of the rebel organizations discussed in the work in Rwanda (the Rwandan Patriotic Front or RPF), Uganda (the National Resistance Army or NRA), and the Democratic Republic of Congo¹( Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Zaïre or AFDL). In this chapter, I discuss the histories of the Great Lakes to elicit an understanding of how these histories shaped their respective rebel rulers and the differences in state conditions that shape post-conflict governance. I then examine how the relationship between the prior conditions and structures of the state and the development of organizational power within the various rebel organizations under discussion. This leads to the impact that these have on the development of the sources of social power the rebel organizations depend on. Finally, I explicate the relationship between pre-existing state factors and the variables under study, and why preconditions are an intervening but not wholly separate actor upon the source of social power and type of organizational power the rebel organization exhibits.

I provide the history of Burundi and its pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial developments to show the nature of the African state and its impact there. Referring back to Chapter 1 and the brief discussion of the state as a palpable environment for
rebellion and power seizures, this history shows how the Burundian state emerged as a strong regulator of social and political behavior there, especially in, as Newbury suggests above, cementing the politics of difference. These historical factors were used by the Conseil National Pour la Défense de la Démocratie–Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie (CNDD-FDD) to build their rebel movement internally and legitimate support from civilians. They were also utilized by its competing rebel movement, the Parti pour la libération du peuple Hutu- Forces nationales de libération (Palipehutu-FNL). I also provide accounts of other rebel movements: the RPF in Rwanda, the NRA in Uganda, and the AFDL in the Democratic Republic of Congo, to further illustrate how history shapes outcomes.

A Short History of Burundi

Pre-Colonial Kingdom. The kingdom of Burundi prior to colonialism was divided in a hierarchal form of monarchy under a Mwami (king), with labels of Hutu and Tutsi more suggestive of class than actual cultural or racial differences and steeped in historical lore more so than actual conditions. Scholars generally accept that Hutu indicates a longer historical association with the land (since the 6th century) and Tutsi indicates a migrant one, with waves of presumably Nilotic-Cushtic immigrants arriving in the region about the 14th century (Newbury, D. 2001, Watt 2008, Chretien 2003: ch. 1). Early regional explorers admittedly only hypothesized about the notion of a pre-colonial migration (Newbury, D 2001: 273), and the existence of flexible oral traditions (Lemarchand 1996: ch. 1) that manipulated history make the veracity of such claims suspect. In any case, Burundians themselves tend to accept the pre-colonial existence of classes and labels, which later defined modern ethnic conflicts. The pre-colonial
kingdom bore the addition of a ‘princely class’, the Ganwa, who were considered neither Hutu nor Tutsi, but above both as an extension of the royal family. Governance in Burundi was oligarchical in nature with four clans - the Batare, the Bezi, the Bambutsa and the Bataga- all Ganwa, competing for power and sharing cycles of kingship (Eller 1998:209). The king was also prevented from gaining authoritarian control as in Rwanda because the princes engaged in local conflicts amongst themselves and their supporters, and thus no one king was able to rule with an iron fist completely. The system also had a feature of power-sharing among the four clans, with rotating cycles. This consociational but fragmented system led to structural instability and weakness, as power was easily captured and transferred between various Ganwa leaders. These relationships also created a more decentralized system of governance than existed in similar pre-colonial kingdoms. Power structures were parallel at some levels, and centralization, although static, was much less defined than in the Buganda or Rwandan kingdoms (Chretien 2003: 71-79).

This system had a positive effect on ethnic relations, however: because power was so insecure and fluid, the higher social classes (Tutsi and Ganwa) adopted a more generous and less contentious stance towards the peasant class (Lemarchand 1970:24) and thus ethnic relations were less structured than in Rwanda (Eller 1998:209). Clans were mixtures of Hutu, Tutsi, Twa, and Ganwa. “Ethnic conflicts”, where they did exist before colonialism, were intra-ethnic in nature rather than interethnic (Newbury, D. 1998: 76) and clan, social, and regional cleavages provided more directions for conflict than simply between Hutu and Tutsi.
**Consolidation and the Pre-Colonial State.** Burundi's pre-colonial history is somewhat anomalous on the continent because it is one of the few places where pre-colonial state development mirrored that of development in Western Europe. By this I mean that consolidation amongst the kingdom occurred through conquest by small local wars and centralization, uniting various clans that previously existed side-by-side. Scholars generally accept that the kingdom forming the basis for modern Burundi was established around 1680 by Mwami Ntare Rushatsi of the Batare clan, and generally remained the same size until an expansion project to bring in neighbors and revenue began in the 19th century, stabilizing to current map dimensions around 1850 (Watt 2008: 23).

Mwami Ntare Rugamba took parts of the conquered Bugesera vassaldom, a minor entity between the Rwandan and Burundian kingdoms, enlarging and fusing the state (Watt 2008: 26-27), although borders between the two kingdoms were respected with little overt threats to sovereignty. Tensions between the Rwandan pre-colonial state and the Burundian one ran rather low overall because of the presence of local conflicts over projections of power between various princes of the Burundian royal family (Watt 2008: 27) and the cohesion of the kingdoms internally (Newbury, D. 2001: 259). By 1850, Mwezi Gisabo, the youngest son of Ntare, gained power, sparking a battle between elder (Batare) and younger sons (Bezi) (all members of the Ganwa princely class) for vassaldoms and territory. “The centrality of the Bezi-Batare struggle did not rule out subsidiary conflicts within the groups; each princely claimant sought to consolidate his domains at the other’s expense” (Lemarchand 1996: 37). Thus, while a conflict for the kingship dominated power struggles, internal struggles also remained,
although these “patterns of conflict” (ibid :37) were rarely ethnic in character, and when
did turn towards Hutu-Tutsi conflict, only did so as a result of “highly localized” struggles
“generated by the abuses of local princely authorities” (ibid: 37). In Burundian oral
tradition, lore of anti-Roi(King) ran rampant at this time, with characters like Kilima, an
“anti-Tutsi” folk hero from the northwest region, and Samandari, who rose against Tutsi
pastoralists who “heap[ed] scorn and ridicule on the rich and the powerful, not just the
Tutsi but also chiefs, princes, and even the king” (ibid: 41). Hence, at the colonial
arrival, the kingdom was not split among Hutu-Tutsi lines, but rather among peasant
and lord. Social protest focused on the “capacity [of the Ganwa] as chiefs and princes,
rather than against any specific socio-ethnic category” (ibid: 41). This set of
circumstances allowed for colonialism to fundamentally alter the social context of power
and reshape relationships along different ethnic dimensions suited to the style of rule
imposed after viewing Burundian society from the outside. It did so by allowing the
colonizers to determine which social classes would be utilized in governance and
alliances, and thus could create ethnic conflict by the inclusion or exclusion of Hutu and
Tutsi in these alliances.

Colonialism. The late nineteenth century ushered in the ‘scramble for Africa’ at
the Berlin Conference in 1884-1885, where the ‘Great Powers’ of Europe divided the
continent amongst themselves for colonialism and exploration. Early exploration of the
region by missionaries and adventuresome types began in earnest by 1890. In 1897 the
colony of Ruanda- Urundi was founded by the German government, who administered
the territory, which collapsed the two kingdoms into one administrative unit, through
indirect rule (through the Mwami) until losing all of their colonial territory following their
defeat in World War I. Possession of the joint colony was given in the form of a trusteeship to the government of Belgium after the war in 1921, which instituted policies that eventually played a large role in shaping subsequent episodes of political violence.

The Belgian colonizers crystallized ethnicity by instituting identity cards in the late 1920s. Conflict during this period of colonialism became less intra-ethnic and more macro (and inter-ethnic) in character: “Greater oppression by the state, greater mobility of the workers, and greater visibility of class differentiation, all combined to intensify ethnic consciousness” (Newbury, C. 1998:87). The Belgians relied extensively on the Ganwa and Tutsi class to maintain order, giving the dual effect of amalgamating the Ganwa and Tutsi into one superior ethnic group, while serving the purpose of intensifying differences in status across all ethnic groups (Lemarchand 1996:10). This solidified conflicts already emerging at the threshold of colonialism described above, and instilled the beginnings of power based on Tutsi hegemony. Although the Belgians were able to change some dimensions of identity during the early colonial period, Burundians still primarily referred to themselves by clan identification, a social marker that allowed them to build relationships, find friendly faces while traveling, and provide marriage choice (Chretien 2003: 88). By the late colonial period, though, Belgian-made identities and policies became more dominant markers and carried significant political and social weight. By 1933, about two-thirds of the chiefdoms were consolidated, from 133 to 46, and finally to 35 in 1945 (Lemarchand 1996:43), with none of them Hutu (Gahama 1983: 104).

**Independence.** Although the League of Nations mandates over colonial possessions transferred to the United Nations, little changed in the ways of life for the
Africans living in the Great Lakes Region (Chretien 2003: 263). The “Tutsification” of the political sector continued, with the majority of leaders coming from the Bataga and Bambutsa clans (a historical shift from the Batare and Bezi leaders of the pre-colonial era), solidifying the “Tutsi monopoly” with 43 out of 45 chiefs and 549 out of 559 sub chiefs (Chretien 2003: 271).

The newly established United Nations, post-war environment, and emerging liberation movements across the world combined to make an especially palpable environment for colonies and colonial powers alike, although for Belgium “immobilism remained the hallmark of metropolitan policies in Burundi” (Lemarchand 1996: 51). Movements towards independence across sub-Saharan Africa created a domino effect, but Burundian claims for political independence did not begin with gusto until the late 1950s. Surrounded by such powerful figures in African politics as Patrice Lumumba of Congo (most famous for heartening Congolese liberation with Soviet assistance and murdered under mysterious circumstances with CIA involvement) and encouraged by the liberation theology of the Catholic Church, Burundi’s political elite and monarchy contrived with Belgium to gain independence with traditional rule of the monarchy still in place. In November of 1959 the Belgium government agreed to political reform of the local governments, with the chefferies (chiefdoms) to become provinces and the sous-chefferies to become communes with appointed burgomasters and elected communal councils. A Conseil du Pays would also be elected from the councils and given legislative powers, with the Mwami to retain powers as a constitutional monarch (ibid: 51). This was largely due to the disastrous decolonization experience in neighboring Rwanda, where the “Hutu Revolution” of 1959 triggered massacres, displacement, and
conflict between the Belgian powers the Catholic Church, and inter-ethnically between the new Rwandan citizens. The newly emerging parties came into existence before this declaration, and relied extensively on networks of Ganwa leaders and supporters to put into place the political support needed to win upcoming elections.

The first political party, UPRONA (Unite et Progres National), was formally established by the son of Mwami Mwambutsa, Prince Louis Rwagasore, in 1959 and formally registered in January of 1960 (Daniels 1992: xxi). This party aimed to reflect the democratic ideals put forth by neighbor Julius Nyerere (the Tanzanian nationalist and leader of the independence movement there), lessen ethnic cleavages, and provide a plan for Burundi’s future. Prince Rwagasore was almost uniformly admired for his desires to democratize politics in Burundi, his refusal to play ethnic politics, and his reputation as the favored son of the Mwami. However, that did not help UPRONA to prevail in the first communal elections in 1960, which were won by the PDC (Parti Democratique Chretien, the leading competitor and especially popular amongst Bujumbura city Tutsi and the Belgian colonial authorities). A string of arrests, including Rwagasore, carried out by the Belgian colonial administration to eliminate competition for the PDC ensured the vision of Prince Rwagasore and the UPRONA as nationalist leaders and patriots. This ensured that legislative elections in 1961 were easily won by Rwagasore and UPRONA, effectively cementing Rwagasore’s new role as the prime minister. Mere months later, the presumptive prime minister was assassinated by a Greek agent of the rival PDC on October 13, 1961, with support again coming from the Belgian colonial administration who felt UPRONA was too communist-leaning and antithetical to Belgian post-colonial desires. This act set the tone for future politics in
Burundi, making assassination a formal, accepted expression of political discontent, a claim Burundians would often make over post-Independence period. Belgium hoped to avoid the bloodshed and chaos of the transition in Rwanda in Burundi, but their actions supporting the PDC and these events that transpired under their direction destroyed that hope. The loss of the dynamic leader destabilized the UPRONA party, stifling further expansions of the democratic process and resulting in the overthrow of the monarchy and emergence of a military state. Independence was finally granted by a reluctant Belgium on July 1, 1962, but from 1961 until the takeover by the army in 1966, the political sphere in Burundi remained mired in chaos, bleeding over into the public sphere and causing ethnic massacres and political assassinations. The former ethnically united UPRONA party divided into two factions- the Monrovia (Hutu) and the Casablanca (Tutsi), both named after supposed international factions and philosophies they adhered to. These factions jointly divided Parliament and all prime ministers from Independence until the appointment of Pierre Ngendandumwe, the former ally and friend of Rwagasore and a Hutu member of the Monrovia faction, in early 1965. Tragically, the same day of his announcement of cabinet positions and less than a week after taking office, Ngendandumwe was assassinated by a Rwandan Tutsi refugee on January 15, 1965 (Watt 2008: 31). Modern Burundians now memorialize the great “Héros de L'indépendance” in media and culture, and politicians use them for calls of ethnic unity and the strength of Burundi without foreign intervention. Again, assassination was seen as a viable political option for all players whether Hutu or Tutsi. Hutu-led coup attempts against the monarchy in May and October 1965 culminated in the death of thousands of Hutu and Tutsi civilians (in response to
government and exile attacks), as well as political assassinations of Hutu leadership in UPRONA, including another charismatic leader of the Independence movement, former Rwagasore confidant and Hutu leader Paul Mirerekano. Burundi’s early post-Independence history reflected the position of scholars of the country that violence became the default mechanism to resolving conflict, ethnic or otherwise (Watt 2008: 32). Even though ethnic conflict emerged again, “from before independence in 1962, distinct ethnicity [had] been a facet of life in Burundi and Rwanda, both at the level of state policy and in individual sentiment” (Uvin 1998: 255). Additional, while events in Burundi’s history sometimes follow these patterns, scholars generally acknowledge violence as a political tool (Lemarchand 1996: ch. 2). State repression in the form of a military takeover of government eventually quelled the violence, led by Michel Micombero of the Burundian Armed Forces, which had gradually removed all but token Hutu presence. Until July 1966, Micombero served as a captain in the Burundian National Army, after which he became State Secretary of Defense as part of a new UPRONA government (Chretien 2003: 314). Four months later, he overthrew the Mwami Ntare V (who himself had just deposed his father Mwami Mwambutsa) and proclaimed Burundi a republic, with himself as President and now Colonel in the Armed Forces, and anti-Hutu political reprisals emerged as Tutsi hegemony of government and social life there coalesced.

A Political History since the Founding of the Republic

From 1966 until the first democratic elections in 1993, Burundi remained under military rule despite successive coups. Of the three leaders during this time period, all were military commanders of Tutsi-Hima lineage from the commune of Rutovu in the
southern province of Bururi. Micombero, Bagaza, and Buyoya all sought to keep this hierarchy of Bururi and Tutsi supremacy in both the armed forces and the civil government. This system of governance instituted de facto ethno-regional segregation and discrimination at all levels, including civil service, education, and the armed forces.

**The Regime of Micombero.** Micombero, a Tutsi of the Hima substructure from Bururi, became president of Burundi in 1966. Under his reign, politics became very tense and ethnic repression was high, especially in the army and government, but otherwise free from major acts of ethnic violence until the watershed events of 1972, an episode described by the pre-eminent Great Lakes scholar Rene Lemarchand as a 'selective genocide'. What begin with an attempted overthrow of the government by Hutu army members in 1969 culminated in the killing of approximately one hundred and fifty thousand Hutu intellectuals, school boys, skilled workers and any other perceived threat to the hegemonic control of political power in the hands of the Tutsi-Hima elite three years later (Weinstein 1976). The minor revolt of 1969 led to other minor revolts and signs of political strain, including a plot in 1971 by excluded Tutsi from Muramvya (the traditional seat of power under the Bezi-Batare dynasty). The defining revolt, however, occurred on the 29th of April, 1972, when Hutus attacked “symbols of authority” and “up to 3000 Tutsi lost their lives” (Watt 2008:33). At the same time, the Ugandan government of Idi Amin forcibly handed over the deposed Mwami, Ntare V, back to the Burundian government, where he was almost immediately executed. Among the victims of the violence were many fathers, uncles, and brothers of those who would become the CNDD-FDD, including Pierre Nkurunziza’s father, Member of Parliament Eustache Ngabisha (ibid: 37). Over 300,000 Hutus fled immediately into exile in
Western Tanzania, creating a cauldron of political tension and grudges against the Tutsi government. The events barely even registered internationally, and no interventionary force stepped in to stop the bloodletting. The Micombero government explained in the ‘White Paper’ put out following the events that it sought the elimination of the threat to the Tutsi ethnic group. The document described in detail the events of 1972 and the logic behind the government response. The genocide and removal of any potential Hutu political challengers shored up the political power of Tutsis and the Bururi clan in specific.

**The Regime of Bagaza.** General Micombero was deposed in a bloodless coup while out of the country in August 1976 by his cousin and fellow Rutovu-bred Lt- Colonel Jean-Baptiste Bagaza. Bagaza rode under the banner of the elimination of corruption and a return to order and prosperity. Bagaza deemed any mention of ethnicity illegal (Lemarchand 1996:10) as way of disguising the growing Tutsi and Bururi-centric repression and discrimination, which flourished as the military increased its grip on the state. This was remarkably similar to post-genocide Rwanda under the Rwandan Patriotic Front, which has repressed both Hutu and Tutsi genocide survivors alike. Bagaza’s regime also sought the elimination of the power of the churches over Burundian politics, banning newspapers and radio stations from Catholic and Protestant alike (Watt 2008: 40). The regime also attempted to solidify a “Barundi” culture- making Kirundi the only language of instruction in schools (eliminating future job opportunities for Hutu who could not afford private schooling or tutoring in French, still the language of government and commerce), villagization³ programs to promote “social solidarity” among the peasant classes, and the restoration of oral tradition as a form of historical
discourse (Lemarchand 1996: 107). Under the Second Republic, the new military junta (The Supreme Military Council, of which only 3 of 30 members were Hutu) wrote a new constitution and elected a new parliament in 1981, but much like the regime before, rumors of corruption and anti-democratic sentiment quickly surfaced. Peasants were leery of the forced villagization programs and suspected the government attempts were rooted more in control rather than promoting self-sufficiency (Kay 1987: 8). Tracts began to surface in 1985, gradually eroding the Second Republic’s power and calling for change in the distribution of wealth, resources and reduction of corruption (Lemarchand 1996: 115).

**The Regime of Buyoya.** In September 1987, Major Pierre Buyoya seized power and suspended the constitution (Lemarchand 1996: 118) under the guise of the necessity of regime change while Bagaza attended the Francophonie summit in Quebec, Canada. Buyoya, also a Tutsi from the Hima clan and of Rutovu, Bururi, established a ruling council similar to ones established under other regimes called the Military Committee of National Salvation, which dismissed the constitution and dissolved the Parliament (ibid: 117). Many relationships that suffered under the Second Republic were now restored, including those between the church and state. Buyoya even expressed willingness “to give serious consideration to the question of national unity” in late 1987 (ibid: 119).

But 1988 ushered in waves of political and social repression, including the expulsion of school children based on ethnicity and intra-regional tensions. These events were brought on by tracts distributed in rural areas depicting the Hutu hopes of opening political space, despite the increasingly mixed signals given by the Third
Republic. Acute ethnic tensions rose, and the harassment of Hutu communities continued. Then the events of Ntega and Marangara, coupled with the assassinations of several prominent Tutsi, pushed Buyoya to the edge when dealing with ‘militant Hutu’. The Palipehutu-FNL is long thought to be behind the massacre of Tutsi civilians in Ntega and Marangara, two communes in Ngozi and Kirundo provinces respectively, which previously experienced little ethnic violence, although were the site of the previously described tracts. Many external and internal factors contributed to the events, including a fall in coffee prices in a region where coffee cultivation and smuggling is common, the proximity to the Rwandan border and memories of the 1959 revolution, and poor infrastructure within the provinces themselves (Lemarchand 1996: 122-123). As witness statements provided, the events began when Tutsi communal leaders in both communes used force to arrest so-called local self-defense groups of Hutu. In Marangara, some of these groups had burned bridges and barricades erected after the gendarmie came on August 5th to ‘keep the peace’ following rumors of Hutu meetings at night plotting Tutsi destruction (ibid: 124). The violence shifted to Ntega around the 14th of August, where similar events unfolded. Tutsi civilians became the targets of the roving bands of disgruntled Hutu self-defense groups, with up to 300 murdered (ibid: 125). These actions unleashed a wave of repression and massacre by the army against Hutu civilians, with deaths between five and twenty thousand (Horowitz 2002: 41). Violence continued to be the dominant mode of political discourse throughout the third wave of democratization in Burundi, and the newly-minted National Commission to Study the Question of Unity, put forth by Buyoya in 1989 as an answer to critics, would surely fail in its long-term goals. As the Third Republic and Buyoya demonstrated
before, although willing to engage in politicking about ethnicity, they were more than willing to continue repression and ethnic violence despite these platitudes and promises. Because of pressure from the international community to open political space and restructure politics in order to receive donor funds, the Buyoya regime moved to create a new government, and the charter of unity was drafted by the ethnically mixed commission and ratified by referendum in 1991. A new constitution was established in 1992, introducing multi-party democracy (Chretien 2003: 318-320). This repression also bred success in the form of a new type of politician: Melchior Ndadaye, considered central in the struggle for democracy and ethnic harmony in the early 1990s and a hero and martyr to Burundians, Hutu and Tutsi alike. Ndadaye emerged as the leader and presidential candidate of the FRODEBU (Front pour la Démocratie au Burundi) political party in the early 1990s, writing political expositions about the nature of justice and democracy, explicitly multiethnic in character (Lemarchand 1996: epilogue). Like many other future politicians in Burundi, Ndadaye fled the country as a result of the 1972 genocide and finished his education in education and banking at the National University in neighboring Rwanda. While in exile, he co-founded the Mouvement des Etudiants Progressistes Burundi (Bampere), chairing the organization until the merger of a number of organizations led to the creation of the Labor Party of Burundi (UBU) in 1979 (Reyntjens 1993: 30). He returned to Burundi in 1983, working the banking sector there, and secretly organization FRODEBU around 1986 under President Bagaza. FRODEBU was organized explicitly as a political organization, and not a rebel one, in direct contrast to the other active Hutu organization, the Palipehutu (Palipehutu-FNL).
Finally, I note that the former regime’s “electing to fight” strategy against the short-lived Ndadaye government is a fairly common phenomenon among emerging democracies, especially at the time in Central Africa (Mansfield and Snyder 2005: 5-6). Some literatures suggests that democratization and concurrent economic liberalization causes civil wars (Tirone and Savun 2011, Mann 1999, 2005, Mansfield and Snyder 2007, 2009, Lake and Rothchild 1996) in that instilling (and in some cases, the international community demanding) such processes without strong internal institution building creates weak regimes and can facilitate nationalist violence, which can erupt in ethnic conflict (Snyder 2000). In Burundi, a lack of such institution building directly contributed to the assassination of Ndadaye by an unchecked military regime, which then steamrolled the Parliament, National Assembly, and subsequent government leadership to take power for them and return Buyoya to the Presidency in the early years of the civil war. Thus, the pre-existing centralization structure of the military was able to survive democratic change while institutions were not. This is an important characteristic of the Burundian state, especially in light of how rebel organizational development mimicked this pattern discussed in Chapter 4.

The Election and Promise of Ndadaye: a New Regime. With Burundi’s backdrop of increasing ethnic violence and tension, international donors, mostly Belgium, France and the United States, began to push for new political space and new actors in concordance with liberalization policies more globally. The first democratic elections were to be held in June of 1993, in accordance with principles laid out in the new constitution established in 1992. Ndadaye was seen as a fair, earnest, and wise leader, who immediately installed a technocratic government with Tutsi well represented
(about a third) a month after winning the elections. But his regime suffered from almost immediate attempts by Tutsi military officers to regain power: the first such attempt occurred on July 2, 1993, when forty troops and a ‘handful’ of officers belonging to the Second Commando Battalion tried to seize power (Lemarchand 1996: 178). This early coup attempt foreshadowed later ones and demonstrated the Tutsi military’s unwillingness to accept civilian or Hutu leadership. The October 1993 successful coup was the event that started the rebellion and civil war and dramatically shifted the dialogue of political violence in Burundi into full-scale war.

Now, I move to a discussion of the history of ethnic violence in the post-Independence period in Burundi. While politics and violence there are uniquely intertwined, the timeline of political change does not always follow the timeline of ethnic violence, such as the 1972 genocide occurring in the middle of an otherwise stable Micombero regime. Thus, an examination of these phenomena separately allows for greater understanding of the causes and consequences of both political action and more directly ethnic ones. I also discuss ethnic violence to illustrate how the state previously understood and dispatched this type of violence against its civilians, showing the preconditions of the Burundian state that led to the formation of rebel organizations there.

**Violence and Ethnic Conflict: Pre-Cursors to Rebellion**

Ethnic tensions were never far from the surface of these regimes and erupted periodically into mass violence. Scholars generally agree that there have been four periods of civil war since Independence-1965-66, 1972, 1988 and 1993-2005 (Ngaruko and Nkurunziza 2000:372); although within these periods there have been various other
types of political violence. Ethnic massacres without war occurred in the early 1960s and 1991-1993 and political assassinations took place throughout post-Independence history.

**Independence and Violence**

While not as violent as the Rwandan Revolution, Burundi’s transition to independence was no less tumultuous, and the two influenced each other, reflected in the old adage, “When Rwanda sneezes, Burundi catches the cold”. The Belgian colonial administration had designs on the two colonies remaining a joint enterprise following Independence; but ethnic relations in Rwanda were far too tense for that goal to be realizable. The Hutu Revolution in 1959 sparked three years of interethnic violence there, culminating in the deaths of tens of thousands of Rwandan Tutsis, thousands of Rwandan Hutus, and the expulsion of several hundred thousand Rwandan Tutsi to neighboring countries, including Burundi. These incidents understandably worried Burundian Hutu and Tutsi alike, and scholars have noted the degree to which politics were influenced by ethnicity in the first days of Independence (Chretien 2003: 311-313, Lemarchand 1996: ch.3).

**A ‘Selective’ Genocide**

While ethnic massacres perpetrated by the government of Burundi had occurred historically before the genocide of 1972, none were as violent or as centrally planned and organized as the one that occurred then. This wide-scale attack, accompanied by political repression on Hutu peasants by the Tutsi-dominated army caused serious problems for the region at large. Massive influxes of refugees from Burundi into neighboring Tanzania and Rwanda created long-term destabilization (in Rwanda) and
raised major questions as to the care, maintenance, and potential political rights of refugees (Tanzania). The violence of 1972 became imbedded into the very fiber of ‘Hutu Cosmology’, as described by Lisa Malkki in her fieldwork studies of refugee camps, created in Tanzanian exile that served to further separate and define ethnicities in terms of victim and oppressor (1995:20). This event was also very personal to a great number of future Hutu militants and politicians, and the extent to which it mattered to the founding of the CNDD-FDD and its philosophy was huge. In the early days of the movement, the group was called “Les Orphelins du 1972”, because many of the leaders and soldiers had lost family members to the genocide (Nonyzima 2004: 368).

The Interim Period, 1972-1988

Violence in Burundi tended to be ethnically driven and episodic in nature, meaning that while political violence occurred frequently throughout the country’s history, it was not an everyday occurrence and for long stretches of time ethnic violence ceased. The period after the 1972 genocide until the events of Ntega and Marangara can be described as such a period. While political changes occurred, including the overthrowing of Micombero by Bagaza in 1976, they did so with a minimum of bloodshed, and because the change of power was intra-ethnic in nature, propensities towards ethnic conflict diminished. Furthermore, demographic shifts made control of civilians easier: between 200,000 and 300,000 Hutus were driven into exile in Rwanda, Tanzania, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo as a result of the genocide, and most of the political and social leadership, intellectual leaders, and potential challengers were murdered, leaving a internal population with no choice other than to support Tutsi politicians and hope for lessened discrimination. The one potential violent entrepreneur
was the Palipehutu-FNL, created in exile at the Tabara refugee camp in western Tanzania in 1980 by Remy Gahutu. Gahutu was described as an ‘action man’ who acted on an aid committee at the camp (Watt 2008: 85). He wrote political tracts and books describing the ideology and pre-colonial, distinctly different from that of Bagaza’s Burundian state, as one of invasion and conquest by the Tutsi of the Hutu population. The movement did not aim for armed struggle, but called for it as an acceptable ‘last resort’ (ibid: 86).

**Lead Up to Civil War 1988-1992**

The period of time beginning with August of 1988 ushered in new political violence, repression, and fear amongst the population in Burundi. The Palipehutu-FNL (*Parti du Liberation du Peuple Hutu- Front Nationale du Liberation*), created in exile in a Tanzanian refugee camp in 1980, attacked and killed hundreds of Tutsi civilians in two communes, Marangara and Ntega, near the Rwandan border in August 1988. The military responded in kind with repression and violence and as a result as many as fifty thousand of Hutu died or fled to Rwanda (Lemarchand 1996: 126). Conflict continued to remain just below the surface, and outside events in Rwanda, like the RPF invasion in October of 1990, and subsequent massacres of Tutsi civilians in 1991 and 1992 intensified ethnic sentiment and fear. Coupled with crippling economic circumstances due to the falling coffee and tea prices in the worldwide recession of the late 1980s, Burundi found itself a political powder keg, with the politco-military rulers struggling to find a solution to lead the country to ‘*ubumwe*’ (unity).
La Crise, 1993

In the political vocabulary of Burundi nearly all people call the civil war ‘la crise’- the crisis- probably because the government army at the time tried to downplay the dimensions and directionality of the war. For this reason, the war and coup is sometimes described as ‘creeping’, because it did not happen in one fell swoop, but rather, in a series of events that unfolded slowly over several years. In 1993, the tide seemed to be changing for Burundians- the Constitution had been written and accepted, relatively smooth elections had taken place over the summer, and Ndadaye’s government was seen as full of promise and hope for Burundi to avoid the ethnic clashes plaguing Rwanda. Discussions commenced regarding the return of refugees from the 1972 genocide. However, this vision remained short-lived: mere months after the election, Ndadaye was assassinated by a group of Tutsi army officers fearful of violent reprisals against Tutsi by the new Hutu government and intent on another military coup. Hutu civilians responded in turn with their own expressions of violence. “They killed our President! We must retaliate!” was the common sentiment expressed before commencing pogroms against their fellow Tutsi civilians. Scholars estimate that over fifty thousand Tutsi died at this time (Scherrerr 2002: 48). How many Hutu died over the span of the war remains unclear, but massacres of Hutu also happened in concurrence with the massacres of Tutsi at this time. The Tutsi-dominated army would not stand for the destruction of their kinsmen, and responded with violence and repression as they had before against Hutu civilians. Estimates range from one hundred thousand to two hundred thousand Hutu civilians dead, and almost two million citizens of all ethnicities displaced both internally and externally. In short the war meant that, ‘the
dramatization of the [ethnic] cleavage, with its all-or-nothing stakes, has been carried out through systematic mass violence” and expressed during this time (Chretien 2003: 313). Another decade and much more violence would pass before Burundi knew some measure of peace and resolution to the problem of ethnic violence.

This detour into Burundi’s history of state power connected to ethnic and regional animosity mattered a great deal to the outbreak of civil war in 1993 and subsequently, to the development and framing of the CNDD-FDD. This history, especially of violence and mistreatment, affected Hutu, political and ordinary alike, in a number of ways. For one, this history provided a way for the CNDD-FDD to forage links to the civilian population, who would come to understand the rebel movement as heroes, ‘sons of the soil, and fighting for equality and rights. The rebel movement also had much to learn about state management and the diffuse nature of political power and institutions in Burundi, which would later shape the internal structure and organization of the group.

After this description of the prior conditions of the Burundian state leading up to the civil war, I now move to the comparative histories of other states in accordance with these four factors that I outlined above. Again, in particular I focus on the pre-Independence conditions: ethnic structures and the degree of state centralization or coherence, and two post-Independence factors: political violence and change and the transitions of the late 1980s and early 1990s. It is with these factors in mind that I demonstrate later how these histories affected the development of rebel groups throughout the region, to be elaborated in Chapter 6.
Rwanda

It is perhaps most central to the examination of state development in Burundi to move to state development in Rwanda, for they shared many of the same attributes, kingdom structures, and a colonial power. These characteristics lead many to compare and contrast various points in their histories (Lemarchand 1970, Uvin 1999, Lemarchand 2006, Mansfield and Snyder 2005: 6). Much like Burundi, pre-colonial Rwanda was characterized by a kingship structure to which all subjects fell under its rule, also called the Mwami. But in Rwanda the Ganwa class never existed and thus the pre-colonial power struggle firmly rooted itself in dichotomous issues of Tutsi leadership and oppression against a less powerful Hutu farming community. For many years the history of Rwanda was couched like that of Burundi, with the caste system supposedly minor in its discriminations changed through the advent of colonialism (Macquet 1961). Later scholars determined through oral histories that historical Rwanda created 'cohesion of oppression' through monarchical autocracy and expansion through warfare (Newbury, C. 1988 and Newbury, D. 2001). Rwanda and Burundi shared a colonial power and scholars are not surprised at the similarities in colonial governance across the two, however, many note the degree to which post-Independence events, especially ethnic conflict and genocide, mirror each other.

Dual Colonialism: The Tutsi and Belgium

As expressed above, the colony of Ruanda-Urundi first became a colonial possession in the 1890s as part of German expansion into sub-Saharan Africa. The Belgians took possession of the jointly administered territory following Germany’s loss in World War I, under a very liberal trusteeship (that allowed for almost no oversight) from

The Tutsi in Rwanda were co-opted by the Belgian colonial authority in an effort to govern the colony through indirect rule by the Mwami and the traditional court, a motion cemented by the tales of the official court historian (and Catholic priest) of the colonial period, Alexis Kagame, who wrote of the mythical origins of the three brothers Gahutu, Gatutsi and Gatwa, all accorded responsibilities according to their social capacities. In the traditional myths, the Twa were insignificant, the Hutu lazy and irresponsible, and the Tutsi responsible and trustworthy (Kagame 1952 and 1959). Burundi, on the other hand, never had folktales of this nature underpinning ethnic relations. While similar to rule in Burundi, Rwandan society experienced far more authoritarian tendencies, because of the lack of the intermediary class of Ganwa that promoted consociationalism and local conflict. In pre-colonial Rwanda, traditional authority was reinforced in two ways: by the collection of taxes and the grouping of territories into vertical organizational structures of neighborhoods, hills and districts (Macquet 1961:100-102). These structures characterized the “premise of inequality” that exists in pre-colonial Rwanda, that “people born in different castes are unequal… and have fundamentally different rights” (ibid: 165). During colonialism, the problem essentially remained that even with the Belgian colonial authority, all power and governance decisions rested with the Mwami, who was Tutsi and favored ethnic ties. The decisions of the Belgians in Rwanda were also far starker than those in Burundi: competing identities surfaced as important facets of conflict in Burundi, whereas in Rwanda the colonial authorities reified an existing order, that Tutsi were of higher social caste than Hutu, and thus more
deserving of education, employment, and other benefits. Furthermore, Rwandan society was more homogeneous in its categorizations than Burundi: while intermarriage existed, it was far less common than in Burundi, and traditional clans tended to be of one ethnic group. This is not to say that these differences in region and clan did not exist, but their impact mattered less in Rwanda than in Burundi. It is then very surprising that Rwanda did not follow Burundi’s post-colonial patterns with Tutsi leadership continuing, despite historical dominance. Important in shaping post-colonial politics in Rwanda was the Catholic Church. The Church in Rwanda became an important player during colonialism, with the **Pere Blancs** (White Fathers) establishing missions and schools there as early as 1903, although they did not gain wider influence until the reign of Yuhi V Musinga ended, as he was hostile to religious influence (Longman 1997: 8 and Longman 2001:168). In the 1950s, church and Rwandan state relationships begun to weaken, mostly due to an influx of priests and missionaries influenced by social democratic philosophies of the post-war period (Longman 1997: 12). These priests saw a majority populace under the yoke of minority political control, and actively sought to encourage Hutu consciousness of the political situation, a far cry from previous indirect political actions. The events of the 1950s in Rwanda would have devastating consequences for the region, to say nothing of the deleterious effect that it would have on its neighbor. They concern both the new relationships forged in the church and the legacy of inter-ethnic relationships in Belgium, for it is these forces that shaped the behaviors of international actors that in turn pushed, prodded, and poked the would-be independent country. Most of the priests who arrived in Rwanda post-World War II were of Flemish (Dutch-speaking) origin rather than Walloon (French-speaking), who
experienced first-hand political discrimination and tension in their native Belgium. These priests took their experiences and used them to promote new democratic change in Rwanda, turning away from historical Tutsi leadership and encouraging a Hutu takeover in power (Gourevitch 1998). By 1959, these forces culminated in a “Hutu Revolution”, a mass uprising by the peasant class against not only the Tutsi-led monarchy, but also ordinary Tutsi civilians. In November of 1959 pogroms began, lasting two years and causing hundreds of thousands of Tutsis (as many as 300,000) to flee abroad, including the future leader of the RPF, Paul Kagame (Kinzer 2008:ch. 1 and Longman 1997: 12). The strength of these attacks combined with support from the Church convinced the Belgian colonial government to abruptly switch allegiances, and by independence in July 1962, the government consisted of an almost entirely Hutu presence, removing local Tutsi authority (Straus 2006: 21). It was this change that forever altered the nature of ethnic power in Rwanda, and set in place a chain of events that fell, like dominoes, between state power, political violence, and ethnic rebellion there. By 1959, four political parties existed in Rwanda, the two most vocal of each ethnicity being the PARMEHUTU (Parti du Mouvement de l’Emancipation Hutu) and the UNAR (Union Nationale Rwandaise), which represented the Tutsi monarchists. The violence initially began when UNAR activists roughed up a Hutu politician, setting in place a pattern of attack and counter attack, known as jacquerie, rural riots (Straus 2006: 178 and Lemarchand 1970:168). Armed opposition groups under the UNAR formed in exile during 1959-1962 for cross-border raids, calling themselves “inyenzi” (cockroaches), a term later used during the genocide to describe all Tutsi. In March 1962, for reasons unknown, the raids caused a response in the form of serious ethnic massacres, claiming at least one
thousand Tutsi deaths (Straus 2006: 184). By late 1963, a new round of violence erupted. The new Kayibanda government perceived imminent threat from the one hundred and fifty thousand refugees and supposed ten thousand ‘inyenzi’ fighters (the number was exaggerated) (Straus 2006:185 and Lemarchand 1970: 198-206). Both the UNAR and the PARMEHUTU were factionalized, in addition to the decline of coffee production, the major cash export for the small nation. In December 1963, a band of rebels invaded from Burundi, killing government soldiers, seizing vehicles, and caches of weapons, garnering more than one thousand to seven thousand men by the time they marched on Kigali (Straus 2006:185). Government soldiers eventually turned back the attackers, and the Kayibanda regime arrested and executed Tutsi politicians in UNAR, in addition to organizing local civilian-led self-defense committees. In a foreshadowing of the eerily similar circumstances of the 1994 genocide, many thousands of Tutsi civilians were massacred in concentrated attacks organized at the commune and prefecture levels.

**Political Changes over the post-Independence period**

Rwanda differed from Burundi in terms of who controlled state power immediately from Independence. Straus notes two significant political trends of post-Independence Rwanda: “the principles of the Hutu Revolution [as a guide] for official policy, [and]… regionalism shaped significant political conflict among Hutus” (2006: 23). The first republic under President Gregoire Kayibanda explicitly rewrote Rwandan history, casting the Hutu as the true masters of the state and the Tutsi as a ‘colonizing force’. Tutsi still lived in fear and ethnically motivated killings were commonplace during the early years (until about 1964 and also, significantly, in 1973) of the regime.
Kayibanda downplayed mentions of ethnicity, but enacted far more discriminatory policies than his successor (ibid: 23). Kayibanda also solidified southern rule in the country, as he favored government and military officers from his home region of Gitarama. Like Burundi, Rwanda also experienced a bloodless change in political power. In 1973, on the heels of the genocide in Burundi, northerner Juvenal Habyarimana replaced Kayibanda, stressing peace through the balance of ethnic and regional affiliations and the quelling of communal tensions. By ‘balance’, Habyarimana meant a strict quota system that purposely undercounted the percentage of Tutsi in the population (from fourteen to nine percent) and applied these to all government positions and services, including the provision of secondary and higher education. This was seen by the Hutu population as a way to counteract negative effects wrought by colonialism, instill democracy through ethnic parity, and make up for lost opportunity (Uvin 2002: 165). Habyarimana’s installation came as the result of a military coup led by military officers from the northwestern regions, especially Habyarimana’s home province of Gisenyi. This change in power happened around the same time as the genocide in Burundi caused a massive influx of Burundian Hutu refugees into Rwanda, promoting anger and insecurity, especially along political elites (Straus 2006: 189). In January 1973, Hutu civilians embarked on a purge of secondary schools and colleges to rid them of Tutsi students, which then spread to public and private employers. These actions were framed explicitly in terms of ‘ethnic rebalancing’ (ibid: 190). On July 5, Habyarimana staged a coup and arrested Kayibanda and leaders from his regime, eventually executing “about fifty five of them” (ibid: 191). But after the initial spate of violence, the regime enjoyed a quiet, if completely autocratic rule after five years of
military transition (Chretien 2003: 307). Habyarimana instituted a completely one party state under his ruling party MRND (*Mouvement républicain national pour la démocratie*), where every adult, Hutu or Tutsi, became a member (Prunier 1995). The party system closely resembled the levels already existing in the state, with party organizations at the cellule, commune, and province levels. This built a one party state, focused on ‘development’, with incredibly strong social control and knowledge into the everyday conduct and lives of civilians, ensuring that Tutsi were kept in positions of powerlessness. Habyarimana’s regime of “peasant order” downplayed overt ethnic violence in favor of economic growth supported by “foreign assistance, the Catholic Church and quotidian ethnicism” (Chretien 2003: 307). A heavy period of modernization, morality imposed through religion, and business continued under Habyarimana’s regime up until the civil war.

**Ethnic Conflict in Rwanda leading up to the Genocide, 1990-1994**

Unlike neighboring Burundi, Rwanda experienced remarkably little ethnic conflict following the events of the immediate post-Independence period, and for many years, the international community described it as ‘the Switzerland of Africa’, with peaceful rule, the opening up of the country to international business, and great strides in development. Periods of violence tended to be intense but contained, occurring in the Independence period (1959-1964), again in 1973, and then not again until the civil war and lead-up to genocide in the 1990s, and Straus notes that “during most of the forty years of Rwandan history preceding the genocide, ethnic peace or an absence of ethnic violence was more common than ethnic killing” (2006: 175). This began to change with the end of one party rule and the invasion of the RPF on October 1, 1990. While political
liberalization imposed from the international community did not start the war, it directly contributed to its outcome and the subsequent genocide. Drastic changes in economic and political conditions both at home and abroad reached a crescendo in 1989 (Chretien 2003: 320). The RPF, as discussed later on here and in Chapters 4, 5, and 6, grew out of a cadre of Rwandan exiles born and raised in refugee camps in the southern region of Ankole, Uganda. These young men and women joined Museveni’s guerilla army, the National Resistance Army (NRA) and took up arms against Obote in the Ugandan Bush War (1981-1986), hoping for more tolerance and acceptance in Uganda. Previously existing refugee committees in the camps, most notably the Rwandese Alliance for National Unity (RANU), had for a decade discussed how to gain rights of return from the Rwandan government. But violent rebellion against the Habyarimana regime was never explicit until the future leaders of the RPF, closely allied with the Tutsi intelligentsia of RANU, saw Museveni’s victory in action and established the RPF in 1987, an inside organization with the NRA. I delineate the specifics of this birth in subsequent chapters. The RPF itself became an important character in Rwanda’s transition to democracy with the October 1990 invasion, in which a small band of “inkotanyi” fighters crossed the border and attempted to take over government armories. The fighters were quickly repulsed by the Force Armees Rwandaise (FAR), supported by French, Belgian, and Zairian fighters and weaponry (Chretien 2003: 321). Habyarimana also quickly acted to stir up anti-Tutsi sentiment in the population, even staging a fake attack on the capital, Kigali, on October 4 (ibid: 321). The RPF simultaneously recruited additional troops from exiles living in Burundi, Zaire, and Tanzania (Kinzer 2008: ch. 2). Owing to international pressures, press freedoms and
constitutional reforms legalizing multiple parties became law in June 199. New parties, like the MDR (*Mouvement démocratique républicain*), the supposed heir to PARMEHUTU, emerged as well as the renamed MRND under the name MRNDD (*Mouvement républicain national pour la démocratie et le développement*) (Chretien 2003: 322). But significantly, a new network of Hutu power activists and groups exploded onto the political scene, supported by the *akazu* (little house) of the First Lady’s family as well as other northern political figures. These included the notorious *Kangura* (*The Awakening*) newspaper, which would become the leading voice in the call to genocide and RTLM (*Radio Television Libre des Mille Collines*), the Hutu hate radio station. Pogroms were organized at the communal level by the bourgomasters after every opening of Rwandan political space, resulting in widespread massacres across the country in places like Bagogwe (March 1992), Bugesera (August 1992), and Kibuye (1992- January 1993). (ibid: 325 and Straus 2006: ch. 7). In a foreshadowing of the peace process installed later in Burundi, negotiations began between the rebel RPF and the Habyarimana government in Arusha, Tanzania, in 1992. These negotiations, at least from the outside, opened up political space to opposition parties and were to provide a right of return for Tutsi refugees living abroad. International actors like Julius Nyerere celebrated the intricacy and success of the accords, but Arusha ultimately was “an extraordinary story of a sophisticated conflict resolution process gone disastrously wrong” (Jones 2001: 69). The process culminated in the signing of the comprehensive agreement after a two year struggle on August 4, 1993. Concurrent with the process outside of Rwanda’s borders, internally the political and social context continued on a dangerous trajectory of ethnic polarization, wherein which extremist media, political
parties like the CDR (*Comité pour la Défense de la République*, a group closely linked with the *akazu*) and even ethnically based militia like the *Interahamwe*, the notorious group of genocidaires, rose to action. The peace brought by the accords, however, was to be short-lived. For one, the Habyarimana regime never accepted these agreements as legitimate, sometimes calling them meaningless “scraps of paper” and continuing to incite ethnic conflict and fear of the Tutsi among the population, commit massacres, and arrest opposition leaders. Secondly, the RPF was also a wary partner in the agreements, and showed a willingness to return to war should circumstances warrant it (Kinzer 2008: ch. 2). The RPF resumed hostilities against the government army in October 1993, coinciding with the assassination of Ndadaye in Burundi, “giving apparent plausibility to the notion of a Bahima (pan-Tutsi) conspiracy to re-conquer the entire region and re-impose the old feudal order in Rwanda” (Hintjens 1999: 278).

These circumstances created a volatile political environment with potentially disastrous consequences for all of Central Africa, one that would have future reverberations eventually engulfing the entire region in “Africa’s First World War”. The event that sparked this chain of events was the downing of the plane carrying both Rwandan president Habyarimana and Burundian president (and a Hutu) Cyprien Ntaryamira, ironically returning from the latest round of Arusha Accords on April 6, 1994. What happened next shocked even the most seasoned of all Great Lakes observers, as the next hundred days saw close to one million Tutsi and moderate Hutu murdered at the hands of the Interahamwe, armed civilians, and the Rwandan army. It became clear from later examination of the “order of genocide” how well the government had prepared for the killing, documenting future victims and distributing weapons in the months
beforehand to eliminate the potential threat any Tutsi could inflict on the hegemony of Hutu political power. The genocide not only caused the immediate problem of violence and a return to civil war in Rwanda (the RPF immediately launched a counter-offensive, taking Kigali in July of 1994 and effectively stopping the ethnic massacres), but more importantly, influenced events region wide. In Burundi, the genocide incited the Tutsi military and government to attack Hutu civilians with even more voraciousness, spurring a simmering low-intensity conflict into an outright civil war. In Uganda and Tanzania, hundreds of thousands of Rwandan refugees streamed across the borders and caused strains on already poor economies. The Ugandan government under the NRA also faced additional issues of the level of support it would provide to former rebel ally-in-arms the RPF, and how willing they were to show their level of involvement to international donors. Finally, the coming to power of the RPF government and fear of retaliation resulting from the Rwandan genocide unleashed approximately two million refugees, most of them Hutu and many of them former Interahamwe and Rwandan government and army leaders, into the Kivu regions of Eastern Congo. This led to imminent human catastrophe, and the nascent RPF government now had serious security concerns in Eastern Zaire (Congo), an already unstable region in a crumbling country under Mobutu Sese Seko (Stearns 2011, Auteresse 2011, Lemarchand 2009). I explicate on the intricacies of the impacts of the genocide and rebellion in the region further in Chapter 6.

**The Rise of the RPF**

Here I briefly summarize the conditions of the state and the civil war that led to the creation of the RPF, providing context for a further discussion of the founding in
more detail in later chapters. This section details the conditions of the state during the immediacy of the civil war begun in October 1990 to the advent of genocide in April 1994. The Rwandan Civil War was so much shorter than the Burundian one because although they occurred at roughly the same time, more international intervention and pressure pushed the actors in the Rwandan conflict into negotiation early. The war in Burundi was also described as a ‘creeping coup’, because periods of violence were followed quickly by periods of relative calm, and never did the rebel organization CNDD-FDD ever reach the kind of military power and threat that the RPF did. Clearly, state power played a vital role in the conduct of the genocide; it was the strong organization and centralization of the state that allowed for lists of victims and weapons to be dispersed, and orders to be quickly given and then carried out. Furthermore, while some called Rwanda a ‘failed state’ at the time, nothing could be further from the truth; the akazu and the Habyarimana regime still exhibited not only political dominance, but social dominance as well. Even though elites cleverly manipulated the population in ethnic polarization that framed the rebel RPF into an “us versus them” zero-sum game, the Hutu power elites were only able to do so by instilling the message through all levels of a highly organized state system, historically determined but perfected under the Habyarimana regime and consolidation of his one-party state (Storey 2001, Prunier 1995). The strength of the state was such that many genocide theorists suggest that it was this state power that demanded loyalty by “doing the work” of the genocide, and thus killing became de facto state policy (Straus 2006: 308).

Another factor worth consideration in the rise of the RPF and its subsequent taking of power is the speed at which the ‘state’ returned under the new RPF regime.
While the genocide left Rwanda penniless, pockmarked from war, and with far less inhabitants than before, within four years a recovery was well under way, with state enterprises functioning at a higher level than most contemporaries with little to no corruption and new industries booming. Undoubtedly, the fast recovery owed some of its success to the strength of the RPF and the leadership. But even more crucial was the ability of the Rwandan state to revert to what it had always been: a highly organized, centralized political and social network with incredible sway over the civilian population, albeit now one cemented largely on Tutsi holding positions of power. The RPF as a governing institution in the post-genocide era fostered and encouraged even more centralization, reducing the number of potential points of power (the number of provinces went from 10 to 4 in 2003) and centralizing business and education concerns.

**Rwanda and Burundi: False Twins and Rebel Incubators?**

I now turn to a comparison of the histories of the states of Rwanda and Burundi across the four dimensions discussed in the introduction: ethnic structures and the degree of state centralization in the pre-Independence period, and political violence and coups and the late 1980s transitions as a result of international restructuring of aid in the post-Independence era. In the pre-Independence period, Rwanda and Burundi seemed to mirror each other—first Germany and then Belgium colonized kingdoms that looked on the surface remarkably similar, with a heterogeneous population ruled under a Tutsi monarch. The colonial powers even chose to jointly administer the two, which led to uniform policies towards ethnicity and indirect rule. But the 1950s and political agitation from the Catholic Church in Rwanda forever altered how ethnicity shaped politics, both in Rwanda but also in Burundi: this marks the first serious divergence in
the colonial histories of the two. From the Hutu Revolution of 1959, a new consciousness was born amongst both ethnicities, but it took two different routes to genocide and violence. In Rwanda, the turnover was immediate, and ethnic violence perpetrated by both the would-be Hutu government and the Tutsi inkotanyi fighters polarized post-Independence politics. In Burundi, although violence occurred, the Tutsi monarchy remained staunchly supported by the Belgian colonial administration, and thus ethnic conflict was downplayed. But the two countries experienced a difference in ethnic conflict due to not only colonial factors, but also the historical legacies of ethnic structures existing before colonialism. As described above, Burundi’s system of consociational rule between royals and an intermediary social class focused political conflict on the internal: inter-clan but intra-ethnic. Rwanda on the other hand slowly consolidated an oppressive political and social structure based on caste and ethnicity over time that marginalized Hutu even before the colonial powers did. Hand in hand with the ethnic structure of the state was the level of coherence the pre-colonial state exhibited. In Burundi, the pre-colonial kingdom was a much more fluid enterprise compared to the tightly controlled monarchy in Rwanda. Rwanda’s kingdom also pursued a more aggressive campaign of territorial expansion through conquest and war, one that also helped in pursuit of centralizing existing subjects and installing tax structures to support these efforts. In the post-Independence period, coups and political violence in Rwanda were kept to a minimum for three reasons. First, the strong grip the Kayibanda and Habyarimana regimes maintained on the state by centralizing and consolidating political power. Secondly and in line with the consolidation of power by the regimes was the concentration of political resources and power at a very small level
among a very small number of people that severely limited the abilities of would-be overthrowers. Finally, past episodes of ethnic violence directed and controlled by political actors ensured a well-founded fear among the population about the violent consequences of political action. In fact, political action within Rwanda effectively did not exist until the October 1990 invasion and subsequent negotiations with the RPF coupled with international pressures opened up the system to a multitude of parties representing all ethnicities and all political ideologies. The international pressures at work included not only the international actors present at the Arusha Accords negotiating table, but also large international agencies like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the United Nations (and the countries who followed their lead), who began to impose political and social conditionalities on aid funds, upon which the Habyarimana historically depended on, even more so after the bottoming out of world coffee and tea prices in 1988. In some ways, both Rwanda and Burundi benefitted from international interventions like conditionality because of a political class otherwise reluctant to add to their numbers. But overall, as later explicated, very few transitions of political power occurred in the Great Lakes region, whether due to international actors or internal struggles.

Uganda

Another Kingdom, Multiple Sovereignties

In Uganda, pre-colonial power also took royal form, as in Rwanda and Burundi, but in Uganda, multiple kingdoms existed over multiple ethnically differentiated groups, although conventional observers sometimes downplay the smaller kingdoms in favor of the larger and more elaborately chronicled Buganda kingdom (Chretien 2003: 140). The
introduction of modern humans to the area happened around the first century A.D., and like Rwanda and Burundi, was a mixture of Bantu agriculturalists and Nilotic pastoralists. The Bunyoro kingdom, with its powerful reputation became the repository of the rituals and rites of the Cwezi religion around the 16th century (ibid:148), and controlled a loosely autonomous peripheral kingdom, although it lacked the centralization and dominance of other kingdoms in the region. The kingdom declined in the eighteenth century, to the benefit of other competing kingdoms in the area, like the Toro in southwest Uganda, and the Nkore dynasty, around Lakes Edward and George. Other smaller kingdoms included the Buzimba, Buhweju, and Kitakwenda, many of which were under the protectorate of the Bunyoro. At the end of the eighteenth century, the Nkore rose to power in place of the Bunyoro, establishing protectorates and attempting to hone in on salt works in Toro (ibid:150).

In the southern regions of Uganda, the Gisaka and Bugesera clans interacted with the kingdom in Rwanda, sharing alliances and marriages (ibid: 151) and the Buha and Buzinza controlled salt and iron enterprises. Thus pre-colonial Ugandan history was more decentralized than other kingdoms, and in general, dynastic clans existed side by side with little inter-kingdom violence or conquest through war. The Buganda kingdom began to expand through territorial conquest in the seventeenth century, consolidating power and replacing Bunyoro by the beginning of the nineteenth century (ibid: 156). Buganda and the other clans differed greatly in their abilities of institutional capacity and change. In Buganda, a centralization process under the kabaka (king) began in the late seventeenth century that included the elimination of potential rivals of the kabaka—often his brothers. Colonial exploration by foreign powers of Uganda began in the eighteen
hundreds, with one missionary holding “that the Government of Uganda is a very perfect form of the feudal system” (ibid: 170), although as explained, pre-colonial Uganda resembled a patchwork of various clans, chiefs, dynasties and fiefdoms rather than one centralized kingdom. Explorations led by the Royal Geographic Society and British Government began in earnest in the 1850s in search of the source of the Nile, systematically exploring the many lakes and waterways. By the 1870s, only two kingdoms of any importance existed: the Bunyoro, under Kabarega, and the Buganda under Mutesa. Because Uganda initially was explored by the English, missionaries and religious explorers were Protestants and not Catholics, like those in Rwanda and Burundi, where natives could be called to the priesthood. Britain proclaimed Uganda a protectorate in 1894 and the 1910 Brussels Conference solidified borders between Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda, with all reflecting “ancient political boundaries” (ibid: 214). True consolidation of the smaller kingdoms under the Buganda finally occurred in 1896, with the Nkore, Toro, and Bunyoro subsumed. The British colonizers took advantage of this, with administrators regulating and validating court processes, which would eventually become the Parliament in the immediate pre-Independence era (ibid: 225). The 1900 Agreement between the British and Uganda modernized the feudalism of the Buganda, keeping the king, the justice system, and the Parliament, cementing indirect rule. However, real self-government did not occur until the 1950s. Colonial Uganda was largely free of the ethnic conditions of comparable Rwanda and Burundi, although Bugandans were given greater benefits. Because of changes in education and industrialization, a new “social stratum” emerged that “transcended tribal boundaries” throughout the early twentieth century (ibid: 266). The new consciousness encouraged
nationalism and civic association, both factors that would gain more importance during the Independence movement. Violent uprisings occurred against both the colonizers and their Ugandan counterparts, the Baganda, in 1945 and 1949, sparking the nationalist struggle. The 1950s brought a crisis in would-be Ugandan identity, as the heterogeneity among people and concurrent modernization led Ugandans to a debate about unity. Because of this, many parties developed throughout the decade, including Milton Obote's Ugandan People’s Congress (UPC) in 1959. Obote, a Lango from the north, pushed for political control outside of Buganda hands.

**Independence**

Independence in Uganda was far less violent than that in Rwanda and Burundi, owing to Britain's history of managing (or mismanaging) independence struggles since the birth of India in 1947. “Self-government” came about in 1961, quickly followed by independence in October 9, 1962. Throughout the process, the old demons of competing regions and kingdoms re-emerged. The Buganda kingdom, which until this point had been awarded great power and autonomy from the British, demanded their own sovereignty, including the continuing of their own parliamentary body. This position was reversed when they refused to participate in the 1961 general elections, thus ensuring a Catholic prime minister, something the protestant Buganda greatly detested. Buganda then agreed to “rejoin the federal process of moving to independence” while still demanding an autonomous council (Chretien 2003:295). The March 1962 constitution unified the five strongest kingdoms and doled the position of the federal presidency to the Buganda, the only autonomous one among them, who created an official party, the *Kabaka Yekka* (KY) (The King Alone in Luganda). Although KY won
the general elections in Buganda territory, overall the UPC gained majority political power in Uganda. Cleavages among religious, ethnic, and regional lines continued to abound in the early independence period, leading to the rise of the Obote dictatorship. Uganda was subject to dictatorship because it was thought that the only way to govern was through absolute authority, in order to keep ethnic and regional loyalties from causing conflict or violence.

**Early Changes and Dictatorship**

By 1964, Obote and the UPC gained an absolute majority over political and military power, including placing northerners in positions of power in the army. In 1966 Obote suspended the constitution and proclaimed himself President (ibid: 296), and the following May forced the kabaka (king) Mutesa into exile, and abolishing all monarchies within Uganda. Life continued without much incident under Obote until an overthrow by Idi Amin, the chief of staff of the President, in January 1971. Almost immediately, violence erupted and the economy tumbled. Asians, who played large parts in the Ugandan business community, were expelled in 1972, followed by massacres, torture, and execution. It would take another eight years for internal rebellion to the regime coupled with Tanzanian military intervention in 1978-1979 to overthrow Amin, and return Obote to power, successfully staging elections in December of 1980 (ibid: 297).

**The Bush War and the Rising of the NRA**

The chaos of the Amin regime, the war with Tanzania, and the overthrow of Amin all led to a lack of development in Uganda and the stifling of political expression and opportunity. In a foreshadowing of patterns to come, many new political opponents
were created when Obote forced former government members into exile, like Yoweri Museveni, a University of Dar-Es-Salaam (UDSM) graduate who served as minister of defense under Obote until forced to take refuge in Tanzania. Museveni was one of a new class of political elite in sub-Saharan Africa, educated at UDSM when the university became a virtual who’s who of future rebel leaders, trained and influenced by a variety of African and Outside Scholars, including Tanzanian Julius Nyerere and fellow University Student’s African Revolutionary Front member, John Garang of the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA). While at UDSM, Museveni cultivated an understanding of African democracy and political change that would reverberate across the continent, and becoming a strong supporter of Mozambique’s Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO). Post-University, Museveni’s career as a rebel began with the development of Front for the National Salvation of Uganda (FRONASA), modeled after FRELIMO and operating in Tanzania against the Amin government (Kasfir 2005: 278). FRONASA also included several Rwandans, like Paul Kagame, who would become instrumental in the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). Although developed in exile in the 1970s, the movement participated heavily in the Uganda-Tanzania War in the later part of the decade to remove Amin, sometimes coming into direct conflict over methods and strategies with Obote’s faction, Kikosi Maalum (KM), both of which operated within the Ugandan National Liberation Army (UNLA). After the assistance of Tanzanian troops, Obote and Museveni returned to Uganda during the transition from war to peace, including the December 1980 elections. It was widely believed that these elections were manipulated by the UPC (ibid: 279), which helped frame the would-be National Resistance Army (NRA) rebellion developing, with Museveni at the head. The
rebellion officially took up arms against the Obote regime in February 1981, with few weapons at their disposal (Museveni 1997: 122). For the next five years, the civil war ebbed and flowed, with the NRA utilizing civilian support and resources to build popular legitimacy while winning military victories against the government army, although it took until 1985 for the rebel organization to gain enough strength to defeat the UNLA (the government army) (ibid: 281). The war finally ended with the seizure of Kampala, the capital city, and the pushing back of the UNLA to Sudan in early 1986.

The Legacy of Uganda’s Political Struggle on the Region

The effect the NRA had upon rebel organizations not only in the Great Lakes region but across sub-Saharan Africa cannot be underestimated. Indeed, without this rebel organization, the RPF, Palipehutu-FNL, CNDD-FDD, and AFDL would never have existed. As one scholar states, “the region’s established order began to change in 1986, the year Museveni’s partisans arrived in Kampala...Mobutu’s regime in Zaire and Habyarimana’s in Rwanda immediately understood Museveni to be an atypical leader—one who was preoccupied with restoring the rule of law” (Chretien 2003: 319).

Museveni’s NRA ushered in a new type of rebel, a “reform rebel” (Clapham 1998) organization that focused less on the leader or liberation from white rule and more on liberation from bad African leaders who plagued the continent from east to west. Not only did the success of the NRA in Uganda illuminate a path to victory for other rebel organizations to follow by example, but the group actively supported other rebel organizations materially, including most notoriously the RPF (which grew out of the NRA), but also the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) in Sudan, the Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Zaïre (AFDL) in Zaire/Congo,
and others. The level of involvement in new reform rebellions allowed Uganda to benefit from economic development (selling weapons and exporting resources in civil war zones) in addition to becoming a major regional power in the East African Community (EAC) and the African Union (AU). The NRA government also provided a post-conflict model for would-be rebel governors, lasting more than two decades and four Presidential elections (two of which were multi-party). While I elaborate in more detail on the rebel organization in later chapters, the effect of the NRA on political dissent and expression in Africa must be highlighted here.

**Ugandan History in Comparison**

Now I focus on how Ugandan history compares to the history of Burundi and Rwanda in regards to the four previously mentioned factors: the degree of state centralization and ethnic relations pre-colonially and during the colonial era, political violence in the post-Independence era, and the transitions period of the late 1980s. The last factor, that of political transitions imposed by the outside in the late 1980s did not have the same effect in Uganda as it did on fomenting rebellion in Rwanda and Burundi, because the NRA regime was establishing itself as the post-conflict political power and thus cannot be compared here. All three countries experienced bloody periods post-Independence, although Rwanda and Burundi had the dubious honor of hosting ethnically driven conflict between Hutu and Tutsi, while in Uganda political violence extended to political enemies of the Amin regime. The regionalist tendencies of conflict in Uganda tended to downplay ethnic violence in favor of political discrimination by region of origin. Similarly, Uganda’s pre-colonial ethnic structures reflected greater diversity than Rwanda or Burundi’s with at least ten major kingdoms and ethnicities.
This meant that emerging Independent Uganda would also be composed of a myriad of ethnicities, both Bantu and Nilotic. No one ethnic group in Uganda controls more than 16.9% of the population, the largest of which is the Baganda, according to the 2002 census. (CIA World Factbook), implying that political dominance by one singular ethnic group would be incredibly difficult and probably impossible without coalition. Finally, comparing the kingdoms across Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi finds some similarities, although less than previous colonial explorers stated. In all three countries, a centralized form of kingship existed; however, in Uganda the diversity of ethnic groups also meant a plethora of kingdoms. The largest and most organized, the Buganda, resembles Rwanda and Burundi most closely. But the resemblance does not become apparent until the Buganda made great strides towards centralization in the 1800s. The Buganda kingdom was not nearly as centralized and structured as the mwamiships in Burundi and Rwanda, and chiefs and sub-chiefs in Buganda had far more autonomy than their counterparts across borders.

**The Democratic Republic of the Congo**

Discussing the preconditions of the state in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, formerly known as Zaire under the Mobutu regime, is perhaps the most difficult task in relation to other states in the region for a number of reasons: the lack of a kingdom like structure in the pre-colonial period to structure subsequent relations, brutal colonialism by an individual rather than a country, the sheer size, and its utterly chaotic post-Independence history. People populated pre-colonial Congo far earlier than other areas, for more than 80,000 years. Modern settlement by Bantus began in the 7th century AD. Although modern day Congo covers an enormous swath of territory, the
namesake kingdom, that of the Kongo people, established itself in the 14th century and dominated power politics there. The Kongo were notorious for selling subjects of smaller dominated kingdoms into slavery, especially to early Portuguese explorers. These explorers also brought Roman Catholicism to the kingdom, beginning conversions as early as the 15th century (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002: 14). A clear difference between the pre-colonial history of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and other countries in the region is the early engagement between the peoples of the DRC and outside influences. The Kongo kingdom was highly militarized, and interstate as well as civil war broke out continuously during its history, although civil war became the more common practice after 1600. Colonialism took its toll on the Kongo and other kingdoms in the country, and by 1900, “virtually all of the African societies of [DRC] had lost their independence as a result of European conquest and occupation in the era of imperialism” (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002: 13). The country today reflects the multitude of kingdoms present in the pre-colonial era, with over 250 separate ethnic groups, the overwhelming majority of which speak Bantu languages.

King Leopold’s Ghost

Livingstone and Stanley’s expeditionary exploits during the 1870s greatly intrigued European monarchs and would-be financiers, including King Leopold II of Belgium. The Brussels International Geographical Conference of 1876 telegraphed these intentions to the rest of the world under the guise of establishing an association of entrepreneurs, journalists and doctors to counter the slave trade (ibid:15). By 1885, Leopold’s International Association of Congo established dominion over the huge swath of territory to be recognized as the Congo Free State (Chretien 2003: 215). Other
European monarchs and leaders assumed, incorrectly as it turned out, that Leopold’s plans for Africa were benign and in any case were happy that Belgium stayed out of the melee of colonial claims at the time. The Congo Free State practiced monopolies over ivory and rubber, both of which caused decades of pain for Congolese forced to work under them. The Congo Free State government seized lands for public or crown use, greatly changing the nature of agriculture in addition to reaping profits from rubber and other products grown on them (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002: 22-23). As many as ten million Congolese died under his tenure, as a result of murder, starvation or exposure, and disease (Hochschild 1997: 225-234). Leopold proved his willingness to fight against other colonial powers in skirmishes that happened along the eastern Congolese border with Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi in the 1890s. Eventually, compromises were signed in Brussels in April 1900, and again in 1907 and 1912, firmly establishing Congolese borders. In 1908, the Congo Free State was dissolved and possession returned (although it had never really left) to Belgium. Leopold died in 1909, although very little changed in terms of governance and economic structures already established according to Free State principles. Belgian colonialism in Congo followed patterns of trade control and economic dominion rather than the indirect models that used traditional monarchies in Burundi and Rwanda. Because of the size of the territory, trading posts were established in key areas to connect trade routes back to important ports and centers of commerce, like the one in Leopoldville (now Kinshasa). State rule was established at the local level using chiefs and traditional rulers in the 1920s and 1930s, and the 1933 reforms set the structure of provinces and territories that was used for the rest of the twentieth century (ibid: 36). After World War II, Belgium took small steps towards
incorporating the few educated and socially connected Congolese into the government structure and society in eventual preparation for Independence. These evolues (civilized Africans) were to be the leaders of Congo after Independence, thus linking the old colonial power to the new country.

**Independence: Promise and Failure**

Resistance to colonial rule in Congo took place at the same structures the colonial government devised: in the tax, labor recruitment, and political autonomy systems. Small rebellions had become common during the early part of the twentieth century, in Shi territory (1900-1916) and in Luba-Katanga (1907-1917) (ibid: 41). Additional strikes occurred among workers in the mining and farming sectors throughout the Belgian colonial era, especially in the World War II era when Africans resented the impositions the colonizers placed on the colonized. These actions paved the way for the January 1959 rebellion in Kinshasa, a major event in the decision to grant Independence. In Congo, all sectors of society banded together against the colonial powers: workers, traditional chiefs, and even the evolues, in direct contrast to elite-driven rebellions in other parts of Belgian Africa. The *Alliance du Bakongo* (*ABAKO*), a group of evolues created in 1950 originally for the purpose of social integration and cultural emancipation of the Kongo people, dealt the first blow to the Belgian colonists in August 1956 with a public meeting designed to agitate Congolese against the Van Bilsen\(^5\) 30 year plan for Congolese independence and instead call for immediate independence. Elections held the following year cemented the vision of ABAKO and defined the nature of Congolese independence protest over the following two and half years. Political reforms of the period installed parties to become the most important
leaders in the revolutionary struggle: the ABAKO, the *Parti Solidaire Africain* (PSA), the *Mouvement National Congolais* (MNC) of Patrice Lumumba, Balubakat of Jason Sendwe, and the *Confederation des Associations Tribales du Katanga* (CONAKAT) of Moise Tshombe. All of the parties except for the MNC were ethnically or regionally based, and many, including the MNC, split over the course of the drive to Independence. Lumumba, Kasai-born and self-educated, surfaced in Kinshasa working as a publicity agent for a brewery, learning organizing principles and engaging in civic associations in his previous career as a postman in Kisangani. He became so well known a political actor that by 1958 he was met by other African independence leaders Tom Mboya and A.R. Mohamed Babu to join the All-African People’s Conference in Accra, Ghana. In Accra, Lumumba interacted with important pan-Africanist leaders of the time, like Kwame Nkrumah (Ghana), Frantz Fanon (Algeria), Gamal Abdul Nasser (Egypt), and many others. This meeting impacted Lumumba’s political philosophy profoundly, and he returned to Congo with a new vision of inclusiveness among Congolese, Pan-African cooperation, and economic independence from colonial powers, a vision he shared at a mass political rally in December 1958. Lumumba continued to agitate for freedom from Belgian rule, and encouraged others to do so. On January 4, 1959, another rally was held by the ABAKO party, although party leaders were denied the permit to hold the rally by the Belgian mayor of Kinshasa. The crowd that gathered refused to disperse, throwing rocks and attacking motorists, setting off three days of riots which other Congolese joined. Official estimates place the number of Congolese dead at 49, injured at 116, and European injuries at 15, although other estimates number closer to 300 dead (ibid: 86). This violence sparked other protests
across Congo, including Lower Congo and Kisangani. The Belgians eventually assented to demands for independence immediate, with a convention held in early 1960 deciding to grant independence on the 30th of June, 1960. The fragile congress of people who fought for Independence, however, would soon fall apart.

Independence ushered in ethnically driven conflict, as rivalries and even small civil wars (between the Hutu-Tutsi in the East and Lulua-Baluba in Kasai) broke out, in addition to a violent call to national unity in Kinshasa, spearheaded by now prime minister Patrice Lumumba. Less than a month after the inauguration of Lumumba and the granting of independence, a rebellion erupted in Katanga, backed by Western mining interests. The army also began to mutiny, furthering Congo’s potential for crisis. The United Nations organized the Operation des Nations Unies au Congo (ONUC) to prevent direct confrontation between the West and the East carried out in the new state, including 20,000 troops and a nation-building brigade (Ngonzola-Njalala 2002: 94).

Lumumba tried to calm initial disquiet in the armed forces, who believed that change between the colonial power and the new state power was not happening quick enough. He did so by installing new leaders (one of which, a colonel designated chief of staff of the new Congolese army, Joseph Mobutu) and promising reform. Lumumba ignored evidence of Mobutu’s close relationship with the West and continued to antagonize both ONUC and Belgium by maintaining relationships with Soviet Russia. This was absolutely unacceptable to Brussels, New York, and Washington, and effectively sealed Lumumba’s fate: he was assassinated February 11, 1961, after being deposed in civilian coup that sparked a constitutional crisis on September 5 1960, quickly followed by a military coup spearheaded by Mobutu on September 14th. At the same time active
rebellion sparked in the south of the country in the mineral-rich region of Katanga. The Shaba rebellion was declared July 11, 1960. Katanga had become a settler region during Belgian colonialism and settlers remaining after colonialism found allies in Moise Tshombe’s CONAKAT party, similar to what would later occur in Zimbabwe. The secession was ended by UN military force in January 1963. Over the next several years, chaos enveloped the Congo, as the “second revolution” commenced. Several small rebellions emerged, including one led by Laurent-Desire Kabila (leader of the AFDL who would take the capital from Mobutu in 1996) in the east and supported by the Cuban revolutionary, Che Guevara.

**Mobutu’s Pocket: Kleptocracy and the Regime**

President Mobutu declared himself head of state on November 24, 1965, after five years of politicking in Kinshasa amongst the post-Lumumbist political elite. The new regime had an “ostensible popular mandate” (ibid: 145), to bring forth a Congo free from strife and conflict and ready to embrace development. Although supported by Western forces, Mobutu employed personal rule as the dominant political strategy, making all political actors dependent on him for spoils and power, and using the state as his personal treasury. He changed the name of the country to Zaire to Africanize the regime in 1971. “Zairianization” (nationalization) of foreign commercial and agricultural enterprises operating in the country slowed the growing economy in 1973, with declining growth throughout the 1980s. By 1978, even the major Bretton Woods economic agencies stepped in to provide stabilization, training, and adjustment (ibid: 151), with no luck reversing the trend. By 1990, most foreign aid fled the country and most Zairians struggled to attain a minimum level of poverty in their standard of living. The state
became a shell of what it was under colonialism, unable to provide even basic services or governance, and theft, neglect and decline ruined the social and economic fabric of life there. Internal opposition was fairly non-existent, although external opposition grew, especially under former Mobutu loyalists who were forced out the regime. The 1980s saw some political change, including the development of illegal opposition parties, like the Union pour la Democratie et le Progres Social (UPDS) led by former Mobutu crony Etienne Tsishekedi that defied the ban and organized pro-democracy rallies in Kinshasa in 1988. International donors in conjunction with internal pressures forced the lifting of the ban on multi-party politics in April 1990, roughly the same time as reforms imposed on other countries in the region. Many of Mobutu’s regime loyalists fled the party at this time, repositioning themselves for greater power in creation of the Union Sacree (Sacred Union), a conglomerate of opposition parties, in July 1991. With 204 opposition parties emerging, Mobutu strategized as to how to maintain power despite clear popular sentiment against him: he did so by appointing Etienne Tshisekedi prime minister, although this only lasted until October 1991. Complicating the political transitions during this period were ongoing battles between Mobutu, the Army, and citizens, as the value of the Zairian franc plummeted and soldiers were no longer able to receive the material benefit of the regime. Mobutu’s policies continued catastrophically even into the twilight of the regime: in late 1994 and 1995 as the former Rwandan Armed Forces and government fled across the border ‘escaping’ the RPF, Mobutu allowed the genocidaires to set up residence among refugees in the East, and refused to collect contraband brought across by them (Stearns 2011: ch. 1 and 2). This immediately soured any potential good relations with the fledgling RPF regime, but also
ensured that Congolese citizens in the East would be trapped between the *genocidaires* in the camps and the RPF forcefully pushing to have them returned and threatening to invade Congo to do so.

**The West and the East: Two Congos, too Many Problems**

One of Mobutu’s strategies in maintaining his kleptocratic regime and autocratic political power was to ensure that Congo stayed divided, ethnically and physically. Security forces controlled exclusively by Mobutu gave priority in membership to his ethnic group, the Ngbandi and co-Equateur (a central province) ethnics, the Ngbaka. Public resources were not used for education reform or building roads, especially the further one traveled from Kinshasa, but instead prioritized according to the patronage principles of Mobutu. Ethnicities and ethnic relations differed tremendously across the provinces, and some (like those in the East) experienced greater inter-ethnic tension than others. In some ways Congo was simply too big, and historically controlling the outer regions was incredibly difficult no matter who was in charge. The proximity of ethnic groups in the East to co-ethnic and co-language group members across borders also slowed any ideas of Congolese nationalism. In the East, the languages of ethnic groups varied: Shi, Kinyarwanda/Kirundi, Kihumu, and many others, but the lingua franca became a dialect of Swahili widely spoken across the Eastern regions. Swahili was brought by slave traders from East Africa in the 1800s, but in the modern era many people use it as the language of commerce, social life, and even religion. In the West, the lingua franca became Lingala, the language of the capital tempered with strong French and Portuguese influences. The linguistic divide helped ensure that the East would never hold political power in the West, although Goma and Kisangani were
historically important ports and centers of higher education. Furthermore, the
development of refugee camps along the Rwandan and Burundian borders in the mid
1990s following their respective civil wars antagonized Congolese citizens who again
saw the interests of Kinshasa and Mobutu overtaking those of the citizens of the East.
But disconnect in the Western and Eastern halves of DRC extended further back. In the
East, issues of land conflict and reform, ethnic tension and conflict between the ‘alien’
Banyamulenge/Tutsi and the native *autochthones* (who were closer to Hutu, although
varied in their ethnic groups) existed in ways that rarely found traction in the West,
although Mobutu meddled from time to time, such as the 1989 identification rulings
passed in the Eastern regions only (Stearns 2011: 65). This shows highly fragmented
sovereignty existing through much of Mobutu’s rule, preventing even the ‘dictator’ from
ever projecting much power.

**Kabila, Rwanda, and the AFDL**

This section describes how Laurent-Desire Kabila, one and the mentioned above
during the rebellions of the 1960s, came to rise up against and eventually overthrow the
Mobutu regime during the mid 1990s. It must be stated of course, that of all the rebel
organizations in the region, the one that benefitted the most from outside influences and
assistance was the AFDL under Kabila, with some scholars directly calling the ‘rebellion’
an invasion force by the Rwandan (RPF) army (Stearns 2011: 43), with support from
former Ugandan rebel Museveni. Museveni had met Laurent Kabila in the 1980s, when
Kabila was based in Dar-Es-Salaam, Tanzania (ibid: 53). Kabila, the former Marxist
revolutionary instrumental in the Katanga revolution of the 1960s, settled into an easy
life in Dar-Es-Salaam with a diplomatic passport from Tanzania, occasionally writing
treatises on Marxist revolutions and traveling to Communist China, but otherwise quietly fading into obscurity. Along with three other Congolese leaders, Deo Bugera, an architect from North Kivu, Andre Kisase Ngandu, an aging rebel operating in the Ruwenzori Mountains near the Ugandan border, and Anselme Masasu, the youngest would–be rebel leader by two decades who currently served in the RPF army (ibid: 87), Kabila and company settled into Kigali in the summer of 1996 along with the Rwandans to plan the attack. They drafted a founding document and discussed questions of Rwanda’s assistance in the matter (to be called the Lemera Agreement), naming Kabila the spokesperson of the movement. Although both Ngandu and Masasu were able to round up some rebels from the East, finding recruits willing to fight against Mobutu’s security forces, weak as they may be at the time, proved difficult. Thus Rwanda and the RPF army stepped into provide military assistance, including troops, material, and weaponry. The first battle occurred in late August of 1996, as Banyamulenge soldiers attempted to cross into Rwanda to attend training camp and were intercepted by Mobutu’s army along the way. This sparked the first Congo war, which many Congolese still refer to as “The War of Liberation” from Mobutu’s grip, despite Rwanda’s heavy involvement.

Comparing Congo to the Rest of the Region

To return to a point made earlier, the Democratic Republic of the Congo is the context hardest to compare to the other countries in the region for several reasons given above. In regards to pre-colonial Congo, ethnic groups were so numerous as to preclude any serious form of ethnic domination, besides that resulting from sheer size of the kingdom (as in the case of the Kongo), occurring as in Rwanda and Burundi. There
were almost no cases of historical kingdoms dominated by one ethnic group socially placed ahead of another. For the most part, the pre-colonial ethnic structures of many minor kingdoms and groups continued long into Congo’s history and many ethnic groups with their respective traditional chief governance still exist today in the DRC. As to the degree of state centralization or coherence existing before colonialism, there was none. The Kongo Kingdom controlled large swaths of territories of what is now DRC, but the formation of Congo did not occur until colonialism knit all the would-be provinces together. Even now, many would argue that Congo suffers from a serious unity problem. As for the post-Independence factors discussed in the other countries, political violence and coups were non-existent in Mobutu’s Zaire until the regime began to fall apart in the 1990s. Kleptocracy and strict control of the security apparatus of the state ensured no credible challengers could emerge, and the disastrous conditions of life wrought by Mobutu’s regime worked to subdue the population into merely trying to subsist. Although Mobutu’s Zaire historically stole most foreign aid money and even required international intervention in the late 1970s to restructure aid and governance, the late 1980s transitions as a result of international restructuring of aid that occurred in other countries across the region did not occur in Congo until later in the 1990s. Even then, the transition in Congo was the longest in time frame and the least violent, with civil war only occurring when outside forces (Rwanda and Uganda) became involved.

**How does State History Matter to Rebellion?**

In this section, I explore how the histories of these states impacted the development and outcome of the successful rebel to ruler transitions, linking state conditions back to the crux of the thesis, rebel movements and their development. I find
that while the preconditions of the state before the rebellion, including historical political and social development greatly affect the behavior of a rebel organization, these patterns and legacies are by no means the only variable that do so. Furthermore, the preconditions of the state have an interaction effect in combination with the rebel organizations’ organizational strategies and sources of social power.

Organizational Power

The nature and antecedent conditions of the state matter a great deal to the way in which a rebel organization develops. As shown in the histories of the various countries and their corresponding rebel rulers the CNDD-FDD (Burundi), RPF (Rwanda), NRA (Uganda) and AFDL (Congo), a legacy of centralized relations and a history of monarchial relations existed in three of the countries: Rwanda, Burundi, and Uganda. Scholars state that it is difficult to argue that these pre-colonial histories had no effect on modern relations (Herbst 2000, Boone 2003, Hyden 2006), and some argue that they conditioned social behavior in such a way as to make genocide possible in Rwanda (discussed in Straus 2006: 149-150). In the DRC, the rebel group AFDL that developed did so in a chaotic fashion similar to that of the DRC itself, with many factions and competing interests. The nature of the previous state governments provides conditioning for which social behavior and political protest (of which rebellion is certainly a form) models itself upon.

Legacies in Practice

The antecedent conditions of the state can provide a model for the rebel group to use in its development. But not all rebel groups follow the same structure that the state did. The question then arises of how much the rebel movement fighting against the
state *chooses* to resemble (or not) the state. Further, how much do these strategies matter to the overall development and trajectory of the rebel movement in their quest to change the political power of the state? It seems easy enough to say that the more hierarchal a pre-existing state, and the longer these hierarchal relationships have existed in society, the more likely it is that the rebel group would emulate these behaviors. In no place is this example more apparent than in the case of the RPF in Rwanda. Unsurprisingly, Rwanda is the country in the region with the most severe of ethnic structures conditioned by a highly centralized pre-colonial kingdom that became a highly centralized post-colonial state. The RPF government is also the former rebel movement in the region most accused of becoming authoritarian in their post-rebel governance (Seay 2012, Longman 2012).

**The Nature of Social Power**

Social relations, in some way are conditioned by state political practices, also matter a great deal to the development and outcome of a rebel movement’s attempts at government takeover. The interactions of society conditioned by the antecedent nature of the state can temper these relationships and provide either a hostile or welcoming social environment upon which would-be rebels can act. This is especially crucial when considering that the literature on rebellion was long focused on “why men rebel” (Gurr 1971) and explaining rebellion as a process of grievance against the standing government regime.

**Grievances**

The preconditions of the state before the civil war erupts can provide a legacy of relationships which rebels may draw upon. For example, legacies of the relationships
between king and subject during pre-colonial times, or citizen and ruler in the modern era can have lasting effects. Social grievances as a result of relative deprivation in compared to a leader’s ethnic group or kin (Gurr 1971) was and is long thought to be a cause for war, and this is certainly the case among rebel groups in the Great Lakes region. In Uganda, torture and ethnic massacres at the hands of Idi Amin ensured strong feelings against the regime sparking the first rebellion, led by Milton Obote and populated by future NRA members. It was this sentiment against the government that cemented Yoweri Museveni’s notion of reform minded rebels unafraid to challenge a government that deprived citizens of rights (Museveni 1997). The grievances against the Amin regime extend into the modern period: Swahili (the language of Amin’s government) is infrequently used among local populations and even less so in government and official usage. Similarly, the RPF also focused on grievance based motivations for rebellion stemming from the ethnic massacres and discrimination of the past suffered under Hutu governments against Tutsi civilians. The CNDD-FDD in Burundi likewise held enormous historically driven grievances against the Tutsi government there, for ethnic violence and discrimination, especially the 1972 genocide. And although the AFDL in Congo grew mighty under foreign direction, it was no less true that Congolese citizens joined and supported the rebellion because of Mobutu’s disastrous policies toward the East, to say nothing of his general disregard for the well-being of those under his government.

**The State as an Intervening Force**

The histories of the various states in the Great Lakes region matter a great deal to the way in which rebel groups there developed and operate, both as rebel
organizations and as governments. That being said, however, the antecedent conditions of the state are not a separate independent variable in this particular analysis. Although countries with similar histories and conditions abound in the region, similar outcomes do not. For example, both Rwanda and Burundi share remarkable similar pre-colonial and colonial histories, as well as strikingly analogous post-Independence features. Even though these countries resemble each other closely enough to be labeled “twins”, their outcomes, including the ones this study is most concerned with, are very different. In Rwanda a rebel group that closely mirrored the organizational relations of the state came to power through a military takeover after a devastating genocide. In Burundi, a rebel group that looked very unlike the state came to power after negotiations with strong civilian support after a decades-long civil war of varying intensities. Thus the state definitely matters to the way in which rebel organizations in the Great Lakes region and interacts with the source of social power and the nature of organization of the groups, but is not a wholly separate phenomenon.

**Conclusion**

The chapter provided an examination of the histories of the states in the Great Lakes region to illustrate how the antecedent conditions of these places conditioned, primed, and influenced the rebel groups that would eventually rise up to take power there. In particular it used Burundian state history and four factors there- ethnic structures and state cohesiveness in the pre-Independence period and violence and coups and internationally imposed transitions in the post-Independence period- as a lens to compare the antecedent conditions of other states in the region- Rwanda, Uganda, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Rwanda and Burundi share the
most similar pre-rebellion conditions, although discussed in later chapters, especially Chapter 6, the development and outcomes of their respective rebel organizations differ greatly. Uganda’s pre-colonial and post-Independence history provides strong patterns and incentive for a rebel organization there to centralize their organizational structure, as the country was used to centralized leadership, if dictatorial in practice. However, both Uganda and the DRC differ wildly from Rwanda and Burundi in terms of ethnic structures and how those structures affected rebellion. Finally, it becomes apparent that comparing Congolese history to those of the others in the region is most difficult, as the legacy of hundreds of ethnic groups and minor kingdoms and a completely dysfunctional kleptocratic post-Independence regime makes any analysis of rebel organizations there complicated. The legacies of these histories in regards to how rebel organizations developed in the respective countries becomes more apparent in the following chapters, but this chapter serves as an introduction to the environment in which rebel organizations emerged from, and the states against which they went to war.

Notes

1 I use Zaire (1970-1997), Congo and DRC interchangeably to signify the same country.

2 The forcible removal of villagers from one part of the country to another in order to break regional loyalties and further control the population.

3 This was not terribly surprising given Burundi’s history or the structure of military power in Africa (Herbst 2004).
Van Bilsen was a Belgian college professor who in 1955 wrote a pamphlet on the gradual transition of Congolese independence over a 30 year period, endorsed by Belgian groups in Congo connected to the Catholic Church.

4 Personal Interview, November 10, 2010

5 Van Bilsen was a Belgian college professor who in 1955 wrote a pamphlet on the gradual transition of Congolese independence over a 30 year period, endorsed by Belgian groups in Congo connected to the Catholic Church.
CHAPTER 4
TYPES OF ORGANIZATIONAL POWER AND THE IMPACT ON SUCCESS: HOW REBEL ORGANIZATIONS GAIN AND MAINTAIN INTERNAL COHESION

Introduction

In the late 1980s and 1990s, rebel groups like the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), National Resistance Army (NRA), the *Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola - Partido do Trabalho* (MPLA), and *Resistência Nacional Moçambicana* (RENAMO) succeeded in changing the African political landscape, bringing change to post-Independence politics in new ways. These ‘second liberation’ rebels (Diamond, 1992: 38-41) sought changes in regime structure and the nature of political power that reflected democratic ideals in concordance with the ‘third wave of democratization’ reforms that occurred in the late 1980s and early 1990s as described in Chapter 3. These groups sought the end of the one-party state, economic liberalization and the freeing of industries from under the thumb of government or parastatal enterprises controlled by cronies, and less ethnic or regional discrimination in public provisions. Many of these rebel groups emerged in civil wars with roots in rapid economic and political changes brought about by liberalization directed by international donors and government agencies. One such group and the subject of this chapter is the CNDD-FDD (*Conseil National Pour la Démocratie* Forcés *pour la Défense de la Démocratie*) in Burundi. The CNDD-FDD emerged out of a civil war brought upon by liberalization of a military regime. The war began as a result of the assassination of the first democratically elected President in October 1993. Melchior Ndadaye’s election itself was due to ongoing pressures from outside for Burundi to quickly democratize and
engage in multiparty politics since the 1990s. Despite all efforts to seize the capital and force a victory, the CNDD-FDD was unable to do so, and consequently, sought political power by negotiation when stalemate seemed inevitable. This chapter explores how the type of organizational power employed by the rebel group prevented it from achieving dominance on the battlefield, stalled the negotiations process, and caused major splits and factionalization among the group while it was still in the bush. Although the CNDD-FDD was unable to take power militarily, it achieved political power through a negotiated settlement that ended the war. The chapter also elaborates on the organizational type and strategies employed after the group left the forest and went to parliament. It proceeds from here exploring in depth the transformation of the CNDD-FDD over its lifetime. First, I introduce the rebel organization, detailing the paradox of regime success despite characteristics of the group and its organizational strategies that would seem to make governing difficult. Further, I provide examples for the theory of rebel to ruler transition described in chapter two and detail a new analysis of the movement as seen from the perspectives of civilians, participants, and leaders. I also focus on how the conditions of the state impacted the development of the CNDD-FDD and its social and political relations. Finally, I introduce another rebel group also active in Burundi alongside the CNDD-FDD, the *Parti pour la libération du peuple Hutu- Forces nationales de libération* (Palipehutu-FNL⁴), and provide a comparison between the types of organizational power of the CNDD-FDD and FNL to elucidate specific characteristics of rebellion in Burundi that apply to groups there more generally.
Rebel movements did not play major roles in Burundian politics until the wave of
democratization in the late 1980s and early 1990s opened up political space, forcing
liberalization, although the factors that scholars associate with rebel movements (exile
populations, government repression and deprivation) existed before these political
changes. The absence of rebel organization for so long a period of post-Independence
history largely owes to the historical occurrence of hierarchal state structures that
sustained themselves from the early consolidation of the kingdom, preventing the
occurrence of ‘multiple sovereignty’ (Tilly 1978:192). While the centralization of the state
was more fluid than elsewhere in the Great Lakes region, as discussed in Chapter 3,
the Burundian state remained a powerful entity with direct local authority and control
even at the community level. Thus the state apparatus remained both strong enough to
 crush opposition when necessary, and also exercised social control over the population
that allowed for some Hutu to gain positions of power, like the father of Pierre
Nkurunziza gaining a seat in Parliament. Routes to power were somewhat open
although tightly controlled, at least until the 1980s, and because conflict was multi-
directional (intra and inter ethnic), would-be challengers could find some inroads.

In 1993, the terms of the scale of violence used to communicate political goals
increased dramatically- assassinations, roving urban death squads and civilian
massacres all became common practices after the death of Ndadaye in October 1993.
Again, while this violence had similarities to other waves of violence, this was a new and
surprising occurrence compared to the relative peace and stability of the 1970s and
early 1980s. This peace and stability had come at the cost of mass repression against
civilians, but still outright state-sponsored violence had been minimal. Rebel groups began to emerge following the assassination of Melchior Ndadaye. Sporadic civil violence began in earnest at this time for several reasons: the activity level of rebel groups in the region expanded dramatically, especially in neighboring Rwanda, the imposition of multi-party democracy by international donors opened up the once severely restricted political space, and increased civil conflict in neighboring countries. Uganda had already seen successful reformist rebels come to power in the mid-1980s, and rumblings of a Tutsi rebel force and civil war in Rwanda (which actively recruited in Burundi) further intensified the political context. This created a dangerous environment and changed the ways in which actions were interpreted by various political players. Nascent groups, whether developed internally or abroad, would no longer be tolerated, as the Palipehutu-FNL was tacitly so in the 1980s, and would be met with swift justice and repression for any ‘supporting’ population from the almost entirely Tutsi army. Following the assassination of Ndadaye and his entire successive line (Sullivan 2005:75), in early 1994 small bands of insurgents began to attack Tutsi civilians, especially in the countryside where military presence was less concentrated (Ngaruko and Nkurunziza 2000:376). This caused counter-attacks by civilians and the military, plunging the country into a maelstrom of violence that generated many more insurgent and rebel movements of Hutu and met with militia and pro-government forces of Tutsi. The nature of Burundian society, history, and previous conflicts made collective group action like rebellion a fractious enterprise- regional differences, multiple claims of representation of a single ethnic identity, and corruption and neo-patrimonialism all
caused deep divides. I discuss later how some groups, despite this history, collaborated at different points during the civil war.

Dissenters created the CNDD-FDD out of dissatisfaction with anti-reformist attitudes of the Tutsi army and Tutsi government and the murder of Ndadaye. The group also laid claim to a number of historical grievances of oppression and political violence as described in Chapter 3, particularly the events of the 1972 genocide. The political arm of the movement was created in exile in Europe in February 1994 from a secret plan of the leaders of the political party FRODEBU (Front pour la Démocratie au Burundi, the Hutu victors of the 1993 elections formerly headed by Ndadaye) to develop an armed militia called the Democratic Generation in Burundi (Génération Démocratique du Burundi, GEDEBU). While this original plan to supply GEDEBU failed, some leaders of FRODEBU were able to shift the resources behind GEDEBU to a new emerging movement. The political movement was officially created and christened the Conseil national pour la défense de la démocratie (CNDD) on November 24, 1994, by Leonard Nyangoma, the former minister of interior and public security under Ndadaye, who became the president of the organization. The Forces pour la défense de la démocratie (FDD) was more ‘homegrown’, in the sense that it emerged in Burundi and not abroad, and many discrepancies exist about the exact location and time of its founding. Officially, the FDD was created during the summer of 1994 in the northern province of Cibitoke (Ninodera 2008:106 and Party Records, collected November 2010), although members lay claim to founding the movement in Kamenge (led by the notoriously violent “Savimbi”), a northern and largely Hutu part of Bujumbura, Kinama, another northern Hutu part of Bujumbura city, Musigati, Bubanza province (the national
forest, Kibira), and Bukavu, Eastern Congo (Vorrath 2009). The reasoning behind the multiple points of creation may be that various groups called themselves “Hutu rebels” and fought against the Tutsi army until a more cohesive strategy (and name) was devised. The CNDD-FDD intertwined with the goals, strategies, and organizations of the FRODEBU party. Various levels of articulated political goals from its conception amongst the branches remained connected to FRODEBU- especially the branch developed in Bukavu by former Government of Burundi military officers trained at the Burundian Military Academy (ICG 2002). Although the Government of Burundi armed forces were almost exclusively Tutsi, there were some Hutu soldiers, especially at the lower levels and combat battalions. Among these Hutu the most significant population possessed an additional linkage to the Government: Bururi heritage. Even though Bururi Tutsis were favored, Hutu from the same region also received benefits: for example, politician Leonard Nyangoma of FRODEBU and former Government of Burundi officer Jean-Bosco Ndayikengurukiye, both of whom would go on to lead the CNDD-FDD at later points. Drawing from government troops also gave the creators of the FDD other advantages: better access to weapons, knowledge of government combat styles and rallying points, and battlefield training. While not all cells of the FDD initially enjoyed the same level of access and communication with the political arm CNDD, by 1995 the major groups managed to unite under the FDD banner. By this point in time the group had also picked up significant players from the Palipehutu-FNL, including Hussein Radjabu, Adolphe Nshimirimana, and Evariste Ndayishimiye, who would go on to play important roles in the rebel organization (ICG 2002). The CNDD-FDD, according to interviews with former combatants, developed a decentralized formal power structure,
with decisions routed from several parallel upper echelons of the movement to the combatants who were responsible for the physical acts of violence. According to interviews, individual battalions were given essentially free reign to operate within their theater of combat, and when ordered to move to another part of the country to shore up support, did so with few linkages to other battalions of the rebel groups and messy communication linkages\textsuperscript{7}. According to a former commander, the logic of these moves dealt with the environment in which the group developed: factions claiming to represent the interests of Hutu and FRODEBU emerging across various geographic locales and among very different groups of people- from educated politicians in Bujumbura to simple farmers in Bubanza. Finding a cohesive organizational strategy and dispersing it was much more difficult than spreading a cohesive, anti-government (and to a lesser extent, anti-Tutsi) message\textsuperscript{8}. This is not to say that the group was unable to accomplish anything militarily: in fact, the group was able to effectively fight skirmishes with the military and coerce the civilian population into support. Dual chains of command not only caused chaos in terms of military order, but also allowed for quick decision making and flexibility. Furthermore, the movement had pockets of success as well as failure in different geographic areas.

The FDD advanced before the CNDD in multiple different regions under an umbrella of “Hutu rebellion”. Because of this birth, various factions that emerged did not share horizontal or equal responsibilities (meaning one faction could hold power over another despite similarities in size and command) and did not have much contact with each other until later in the war; this inability to access other cells would actually help further civilian relationships, phenomena discussed in Chapter 5. To further compound
difference between cells, various regions had differing and unequal command structures and ranks (Ninodera 2008:108). The presence of sub-ethnic loyalties (most of the early leadership was also from Bururi and most of the fighters were not) and differing strategies (where to base territories, war profiteering in Eastern Congo) increased decentralization and eventually fractionalization of the movement. The combined CNDD-FDD self-described as a party that institutionally followed, at least formally, majority rule and sought cooperation but did so through pressuring informal institutions like kinship networks and regional affiliation. Thus while claiming to embrace democracy, the movement built its formal institutions on the back of informal, fragmented loyalties.⁹

Membership in the CNDD-FDD initially consisted of voluntary combatants and participants. As the civil war exploded, forced recruitment became more and more common, especially among cells led by the so-called group of “Five Generals”, who now control the Burundian state security apparatus and after 1999¹⁰. The movement opened itself to all ethnicities,¹¹ although because of connections to FRODEBU and geographical location in mostly Hutu-dominant provinces, most members were Hutu. While Tutsi members gained some positions of power in the political arm of the movement, leadership in the FDD was completely closed to Tutsi because of both lack of members and lack of opportunity and, in fact, had not one Tutsi officer at the end of the war.

Organization and Rebel Behavior by Period

To help situate the CNDD-FDD’s evolution during the course of the civil war, Figure 4-1 provides a temporal diagram of the war, peace accords, and periods of rebel
behavior discussed further following. In the appendices (A and B), I also provide a detail of the important dates in the development of the CNDD-FDD to provide overview and context and list the important actors in the conflict providing further clarity.

1993-1996

This time period can be described as the ‘high rebellion period’- meaning that while tensions were high and the leaders of the movement had taken to exile, interethnic violence was common, and battles, skirmishes, and massacres brought war to the northern provinces and Bujumbura city. “Violence spread from the police post in the center of town and moved towards the homes, especially at the Kamenge (Hutu) - Cibitoke (Tutsi) line” one interviewee said.\textsuperscript{12} The violence in Bujumbura city fell directly along ethnic lines, with no man's land drawn in between Hutu and Tutsi neighborhoods, like the ones described above. Armed insurgency also had a tendency to spiral out from the National University, where students protested the killing of Ndadaye were quickly met with retaliatory violence by both Tutsi students as well as Tutsi civilians living in nearby Nyakibega and Ngagara (\textit{La Renoveau}, December 1, 1993). Protests that often turned violent also sprang up in the forms of the “\textit{villes mortes}” (dead cities) days, where the entire city of Bujumbura ground to halt: markets were shuttered, offices and schools closed, and politicians refused to work. These occurred almost immediately after Ndadaye's assassination in early 1994 continuing into 1995. These protests were led by the Tutsi civilian population, to keep Tutsi off the street while the army did the work of “ethnic cleansing” (Watt 2008:58). The ethnic cleansings led to the arrests and imprisonment of many Hutu youth, many of whom almost immediately turned rebel upon release.
It was also during this time that the Tutsi state army perpetuated civilian massacres, and to a lesser extent violence against civilians by the CNDD-FDD and FNL fighting together. “We shared weapons and battlefields, when it suited us”, said one CNDD-FDD combatant. While the overall goal of the CNDD-FDD and FNL coincided, the tactics, strategies, and push to rebellion did not, conditions which made some, especially in the FNL, resentful. As described above, the FNL also faced the problem of defectors who then joined the CNDD-FDD. This period culminated in the massacre of almost 400 Tutsi civilians by the CNDD-FDD at a displaced-persons camp in Bugendana in July 1996. This was the single largest massacre of civilians at the time, and triggered a successful coup and the turnover of power against the ‘weak’ transitional government, with former President Pierre Buyoya once again gaining presidential power in the name of protection and security, along with mass repression and violence against Hutu civilians. It was also at this time that what Tilly called "multiple sovereignty” emerged, where citizens “pay taxes, provide men to its armies, feed its functionaries, honor its symbols, give time to its service, or yield other resources [to another actor] despite the prohibitions of a still-existing government they formerly obeyed" (1978:192). The rebel organizations CNDD-FDD and Palipehutu-FNL both used these resources (civilians, materials from civilians or materials formerly belonging to the state) to build legitimacy, strengthen their fighting numbers, and bolster territorial control, although the CNDD-FDD enjoyed much more marked success in this endeavor than the Palipehutu-FNL. The discrepancy in resource between the two groups dealt almost exclusively with the history and nature of the rebel organizations. Palipehutu-FNL was created in exile, and the largest number of its supporters still lived in Tanzania.
Within Burundi itself, the movement only had limited support in certain geographic areas, whereas the CNDD-FDD was able to pull members and community support from across the country. CNDD-FDD almost immediately set up parallel (to the already existing Burundian state) administrations and local structures to provide support, protection, and relationships with the civilian population\(^\text{14}\) (Longman 1998). These actions not only included the parallel administrations between the formal government and the CNDD-FDD, but also the organization of forest courts and the collection of tributes and taxes. There also existed a band-wagoning effect, wherein which the rebel organization that seemed most likely to actually compete with the Buyoya government became the most popular. Thus CNDD-FDD successes in both minor battles, especially in the Northern territories as well as success in bringing the transitional and Buyoya governments to the negotiating table provided the group with concrete victories that the population used in their assessments of which rebel group to support or whether or not the rebel organization ultimately succeeded against the state.

**Negotiations and Ending the Violence.** I turn now to one of the ways in which the political arm of the CNDD-FDD was able to achieve inroads its quest for power. A regional peace initiative, spearheaded by President Museveni of Uganda and Nyerere of Tanzania first came about in late 1995 (Crisis Group, Finalizing the Peace), although this would later be increased dramatically in scope and aim. The Mwanza Accords (the precursor to the Arusha Accords, also held in Western Tanzania) began on June 25, 1996 (although they would only be symbolic with minimal participation by crucial players until two years later), following pressure from the international community to prevent another round of genocide in the Great Lakes\(^\text{15}\). These negotiations also included new
African political actors: the heads of state and dignitaries from Great Lakes neighbors, like Julius Nyerere, former president of Tanzania. The reasoning behind this involvement was more than the prevention of genocide, however; neighboring countries, especially Tanzania, the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, and Rwanda, had long provided bases and, in some cases, material and symbolic support to the CNDD-FDD, the PALIPEHUTU-FNL, and other rebel movements. This support and the concurrent existence of millions of Burundian refugees in the region caused stress on the already resource-poor governments of these countries. This was especially the case in Western Tanzania, which had supported hundreds of thousands of Burundian Hutu refugees since 1972. In Eastern Congo, refugees had a tremendous destabilizing effect on local and regional politics, and the refugee population in Rwanda during the early part of the war directly contributed to the outbreak of genocide there (Stam 2009). The first round of the Arusha Accords on Burundi led to an embargo by regional players, beginning in July 1996, in the hopes of forcing the Burundian government to negotiate with the rebels to a peaceful settlement.

1996-1998

During this period of time, life in Burundi, although made difficult by the imposition of regional economic sanctions, returned to some degree of normalcy for the civilians. With the government and the CNDD-FDD in the midst of peace talks and the fighters of the CNDD-FDD occupied fighting in the rapidly escalating civil war in Eastern Congo, violence inside Burundi declined. This does not suggest that massacres did not occur: major incidences of violence against Tutsi civilians by the CNDD-FDD happened fairly often, as well as retaliatory violence against the Hutu populace. But overall, the
chaos of the 1994-1996 ebbed, according to accounts published in the state-run newspaper *Le Reneveau*. Regional violence at the time increased markedly: Rwanda and the RPF invaded Zaire, backing the rebel AFDL in the hopes of bringing down Mobutu’s regime, installing a sympathetic rebel group, and cleaning up the serious security dilemma that plagued their northern territory and could potentially topple the new post-rebel regime. In doing so, the RPF ignited “Africa’s first World War”. Because of porous borders with Congo, ordinary citizens long used Congo as a place to run in times of trouble, such as during the 1972 genocide. Rebel organizations took advantage of these as well, with the CNDD-FDD using the eastern portion of the country, especially those areas sharing the Ruzizi river valley. But this came with a new set of problems. The CNDD-FDD had used Eastern Congo as a supply and rear base since the civil war broke out, and now these bases and supply lines were severely limited by the new war. So although the rebel organization could gain new allies: the Mai-Mai (non-aligned indigenous fighters in Congo) and the FLDR (Forces Democratiques de Liberation du Rwanda, the remnants of the 1994 Rwandan government representing Rwandan Hutu interests), other potential benefits were lost.

**Tentative Steps to Agreement**

The political faction of the CNDD-FDD took a step towards resolution of the civil war in late 1996 with the advent of the Sant’ Egidio Talks. These talks, conducted by a non-state, non-African actor in Italy (The Catholic Community of Sant’ Egidio, a negotiating force), were thought to remove many of the barriers to peace that the regional and UN sponsored talks had, because they were conducted by an outside force with no suspected loyalties to any parties involved that would cloud their judgment
(Sriram and Wermester 2003: 339). President Buyoya preferred these talks for a number of reasons, the most important being that the talks were not subject to the sanctions imposed upon Burundi by the regional powers. While the opinion of Sant’ Egidio carried weight amongst the heavily Catholic Burundian population, the group was unable to leverage any powers of sanction or agreement enforcement behind these opinions. The talks lasted until they broke down with no agreement between parties in May of 1997. But during this time, security in Burundi improved markedly, because a large number of fighters from the CNDD-FDD had gone with Commander Jean-Bosco Ndayikengurukiye to Eastern Congo to fight alongside the AFDL under Laurent Kabila and elements of the RPF against the vestiges of the FAZ (Force Armees Zairois, the former Zairian Army). This division of resources and fighters amongst the CNDD-FDD meant that battles and violence against civilians diminished in Burundi itself along with the political maneuverings of CNDD-FDD in Rome to gain political power and end violent conflict. Newspapers and public reporting in Burundi at this time gave the talks more power than they actually had, because everyday violence lessened. The advent of peace talks were both an internal and external process. Some political actors in Burundi, seeing the writing on the walls and not wishing to prolong violence any longer than necessary saw them as a necessary and elegant way to end the war and gain power, all while avoiding a potentially devastating ethnic conflict, like Rwanda’s genocide. This was especially true in the highest levels of decision-makers of the CNDD-FDD,\(^\text{17}\) who saw both their own safety as well as the safety of the movement put in jeopardy by continued conflict. Any organizational power or coherence gained during the early part of the civil war was severely strained by both the decisions to engage in
different aspects of Burundian politics: the domestic in peace talks and the international in Congo. While the CNDD-FDD consumed itself with these tasks, the Burundian government took advantage of the situation and tried to break linkages between the population and the rebel organization, spreading propaganda and providing so-called “safe zones” for civilians in the form of Internally Displaced Persons Camps (ICG 2002). The camp conditions lacked for basic food, shelter and security. Camps were also divided by ethnicity, either because of civilian or government choice, and camps with largely Tutsi population enjoyed far better security because of the existence of the civilian auxiliary units- young men trained by the Burundian army, provided uniforms and weapons, and stipends to encourage their new duties.18

The Break Up, Part One

The dual nature of the CNDD-FDD had both positive and negative consequences for the future of the movement. After four years of squabbling over the role of political and military leadership between the CNDD leadership and battle-hardened commanders, things finally came to a head in May of 1998. On one side, political leaders under Leonard Nyangoma wanted power, prestige, and political influence, and were willing to negotiate to achieve this- even going so far as to allow the government of Buyoya to issue a declaration of peace May 15, 1997 based on the unsuccessful Sant’ Egidio talks. On the other hand, military commanders wanted to thoroughly rout the Tutsi army and take power through a total military victory, storming the capital and the halls of power. The FDD militants also felt that the CNDD were willing to give too many things away in the pursuit of political power, and they felt there had been far too many deaths in the name of justice for Ndadaye to let that happen. The FDD also gained first-
first hand at the battlefields in Congo just what kind of impact a rebel group could have, even in a country much larger than Burundi. In fact, Nyangoma had been accused of ‘going soft’ by his own military commanders, who were then vilified a month later by those participating in the Arusha process as terrorists. The CNDD-FDD in Congo concurrently switched allegiances, now supporting the AFDL government, who took power from Mobutu in 1997 and turned against its Rwandan backers, which allowed for the military wing FDD to gain more power and resources (ICG 2002:8).

1998-2001

During this time, the life of CNDD-FDD was dominated by discussions over the future of the group and competing influences that pushed the group into different directions. With resources split amongst Eastern Congo and Burundi, fighting two wars, both the civil one in Burundi (1993-2005) and the Second Congo War (1998-2006) seemed as though it would become daunting. Furthermore, relations with other formerly cooperative rebel groups like the FNL became strained at this time and led to intra-rebel fighting in addition to rebel-government battles. Most of the battle combatants and even political members of the Nyangoma CNDD-FDD left at the 1998 split to follow Jean-Bosco Ndayikengurukiye, the military commander who helped to found the FDD and Nyangoma’s nephew. But even despite these challenges overall, the rebel organization intensified violence against the Buyoya government. The change in strength and power of the CNDD-FDD caused international actors to lobby harder for peace negotiations, which continued at both Arusha and in South Africa. Civilians also played an important
role at this time, providing more support to CNDD-FDD (some of which was forced) and losing confidence in the Buyoya government and army.

The Break Up, Part Two

A group that has already split once can easily repeat its history of splitting, and a mere three years later the CNDD-FDD did exactly that. In 2001, Hussein Radjabu, the number two in the organization and considered the highest ranked political officer\(^\text{19}\) and Pierre Nkurunziza (a political officer with some battlefield experience), with the support of various generals in the FDD, rose up against Jean-Bosco Ndayikengurukiye in a coup surprisingly similar to the historical coups of the FAB (\textit{Force Armees Burundais}). For one, Jean-Bosco, the nephew of Leonard Nyangoma, was from Bururi province (a southern province that produced the first three Presidents of Burundi), and most of the FDD fighters were from central or northern provinces. As before in Burundi’s history, southern dominance had become a problem for Burundi’s power structures. This was especially noted in regards to violence against civilians, who felt that southern soldiers were harsher, raped more, and imposed stricter “bush law” on them than their northern counterparts.\(^\text{20}\) Combatants accused Jean-Bosco of ordering the murders of non-Bururian soldiers and officers in an attempt to limit competition and maintain hegemony.\(^\text{21}\) The previous years (1998-early 2001) since the split from Nyangoma experienced a marked change in intra-group loyalty and cohesiveness. This was due to two factors: one, the immediate distinction between the armed group FDD, now involved in two wars, and the political group CNDD whose only responsibility was to develop resources in Burundi, and two, the anti-Bururi sentiment rising against Ndayikengurukiye and his regional kin. A stretching of material resources (guns, money,
and food supplies) caused serious rifts between politicians and fighters because the soldiers in Congo felt their resources were being wasted in Burundi and vice-versa\textsuperscript{22}. New actors also rose to power. It was at this time that the power of Hussein Radjabu came into full effect- he effectively courted aid for the movement from African countries with Muslim leaders and populations, funneled material through Eastern Congo to support the war effort both at home in Burundi as well as Congo, and increased his own power within CNDD-FDD. With this new power, Radjabu was able to effectively place Peter Nkurunziza, a previously lower ranking officer, into the highest level of command as President and representative of the rebel organization, and further collaborate with him for the future of the movement. Until this point, Peter Nkurunziza had been a popular, well-liked, but not well-known figure, an 'orphan of 1972' who before the war taught physical education. Because of all these factors, the movement factioned off again, into the CNDD-FDD led by Jean-Bosco Ndayikengurukiye and the CNDD-FDD led by Pierre Nkurunziza\textsuperscript{23}. The formerly united group was now split into two, with both factions claiming to represent CNDD-FDD interests, although the government of Burundi rightly saw the Nkurunziza faction as the bigger and most important threat. After the split, combatants numbered approximately 15,000 in the CNDD-FDD (Nkurunziza) and approximately 1500 in the CNDD-FDD(Ndayikengurukiye), ensuring that the latter rebel organization a very weak position in the peace negotiations and relatively little prospect for post-war governance (ICG 2002).

\textbf{2001-2003}

The crux of the problem with the rebel movement emerges: it was never clear which side of the group (CNDD or FDD) reigned over the other until this later period. At
the beginning of the war, serious questions arose about the role each arm would play. While Nyangoma and his supporters clearly thought the political wing supreme, many commanders and leaders in the army thought otherwise. Many interviewees at the lower levels of the armed forces mentioned dual commands, both in terms of a lack of hierarchy within the armed forces and between the political and armed wings. Foot soldiers generally did not think much about the split because the concerns of the war were of paramount importance\textsuperscript{24}, and in fact they were not initially trained or given information in political message or methods until there was a lull in the fighting, around 1995-1997\textsuperscript{25}. Initially, the tasks of garnering civilian support and education went to the political wing, but over time, the burden shifted to the military wing to earn the trust and loyalty of the population in order to provide support for the entire movement. This was because of increasingly blurred lines between political and military actors of the CNDD-FDD as the war continued on, with clear distinctions only really known to elites. As fate would have it, Burundian politics settled the struggle for CNDD-FDD identity, for concurrent with the split between Nkurunziza and Ndayikengurukiye was the overall diminishment of the Buyoya’s government’s power: the thorough routing of the army several times by the CNDD-FDD enticed civilian support. Even though the Buyoya government waned, the CNDD-FDD was unable to win the capital: this led to increased participation the Arusha Accords and the Pretoria (South Africa) talks, leading to a ceasefire agreement between battle participants in December 2002, although this would not be fully implemented (meaning that fighting continued) until late 2003.
The rebel organization slowly turned into a post-war political actor at this time, and the focus shifted from fighting military battles to fighting political ones. This occurred within an environment with differing levels of organization and strategy among actors within the rebel movement. The differences in organizational strategy and structure between CNDD and FDD became critically apparent, especially as the political wing purported to give up arms while battles still raged in the hinterlands. The initial ceasefire signed by Nkurunziza and the political actors in 2002 led to much fanfare in the international arena, but did not actually change the conditions of battle still active between the combatants and the army. The CNDD-FDD and FAB continued to fight skirmishes well into October 2003 (ACLED 2011). The dual chains of command so prevalent in the conduct of the civil war up to this point finally crystallized. Political actors would alternatively threaten the transitional government with a return to combat or jockey for post-war government positions. Military commanders, on the other hand, still wanted a decisive victory. Battalions remained badly organized, with ongoing violence occurring randomly depending on the leader (Adolphe Nsharimimana’s battalion in the South was known for being especially brutal in enforcing its will) and without a central strategy. Political actors in the CNDD side of the organization did have a better sense of coherency and strategy going forward: they began issuing party proclamations and soliciting funds from the population. However, internal cohesion between the two arms did not fully coalesce until the transitional government accepted CNDD-FDD political leaders. This occurred most spectacularly with the appointing of Nkurunziza in late 1993. His appointment and continued support by both the armed and
political wings united the new political organization (they shed the rebel label with the ceasefire) to face the first post-conflict election of 2005.

**How did Organization change the outcome of the war?**

Because there was no defining central authority and the two branches of the CNDD-FDD often took actions counter to the goals of the other, the actual conduct of the war become frightfully messy. This disorder prevented either branch from ever cleanly achieving its goals- the CNDD of negotiated political success a la the FRODEBU victory of 1993 or the FDD of a military victory and power similar to the coups of the past. Thus, the outcome of the war was greatly influenced by the fragmented nature of the organization of the group. The group was unable to exercise infrastructural power over the course of its lifespan, and rather expressed cellular power in its organization. Had clearer coordination existed amongst all branches, a more cohesive strategy could have been undertaken for how to deal with the Burundian government militarily and politically. By this I mean that if the CNDD-FDD had followed a more elite driven and tightly delineated form of command, like the RPF or NRA, decisions would have been implemented and information spread in a more uniform manner, potentially presenting the Government of Burundi with a stronger, more disciplined foe. Instead, internal politics, lack of communication and effective goal-setting in addition to a pervasive enemy both home and abroad made for an indecisive, indeterminate war. To compound the issue, the war itself went through periods of starts and stops which contributed to further encouraging the CNDD-FDD to remain disorganized. By this mean that the very nature of the Burundian civil war as a temporally long but low-intensity conflict never forced the group into defining itself by a
grand battle or sustained territorial push against the FAB and Buyoya governments. Additionally, the engagement of all parties in peace talks at several points during the conflict meant that the abrupt ending of the war remained a serious concern to leadership of the CNDD-FDD. For example, the early part of the war seemed to draw the organization together, but the middle years (1996-1998) and a competition over resources between fighting the war in Burundi and aiding allies abroad in Eastern Congo’s war eliminated any gains in internal cohesion as resources, people and power were split. The last years of the war saw a shoring up of organizational power for the armed and political wings, but also a rise in violence against civilians, foreshadowing post-conflict behaviors.

**Learning Strategy.** The question arises of from whom the CNDD-FDD learned and how this knowledge affected the outcome of conflict. The role of the Palipehutu-FNL must be attributed most immediately. From the onset of conflict, former members of the Palipehutu-FNL joined the Hutu militias that became the FDD en masse, and some specialists suggest that it was in fact Palipehutu-FNL cadres who infiltrated FRODEBU in the early 1990s, and encouraged it to militarize against the government (Uvin 2009:12) and committing violence against Tutsi civilians. This is confirmed by personal interviews and some older militants of CNDD-FDD, who admitted to first being members of Palipehutu, both in Western Tanzania in the 1980s and in Burundi in the 1990s before joining CNDD-FDD at the time of the assassination of Ndadaye. As explicated above, initial Palipehutu turned CNDD-FDD leaders became critical to the continued success of the rebel movement, even as the rebel organization transitioned into a government: Hussein Radjabu was the party chairman of CNDD-FDD after
Nkurunziza became president, Adophe Nsharimimana became the chief of the secret service, and Evariste Ndayishimiye became the private military secretary to President Nkurunziza. Furthermore, at least during the early days of the war, the two groups fought together against the FAB, sharing tactics and strategic training in addition to weapons and human material. There were also events during the later years of the war where the Palipehutu-FNL and the CNDD-FDD acted as allies (in 5 incidences of violence against civilians and 3 separate battle incidences against the Government of Burundi army), according to the Armed Conflict Locator Events Dataset (ACLED) dataset, although by this time the CNDD-FDD split and was sometimes fighting versions of itself as well as other groups. Similarly, the CNDD-FDD joined forces with the FROLINA combatants at the beginning of the war, and learned strategies for fighting in unfamiliar territories and with a foe trained extensively in amphibious and water combat, as FROLINA was based in the lake region in the south and the CNDD-FDD was more familiar with the hills of the Kabira Forest in the north. This rebel-learning nexus continued to work in circular movements between the rebel groups in Burundi. But the rebel-learning nexus was not stymied by juridicial state borders, and because the CNDD-FDD had bases in two other countries, they were able to gain foreign support, training, and aid from other rebel groups in the area. At various points of time during the Congo War of 1996-2003, the CNDD-FDD worked with the Interahamwe-FAR, the left-over group of *genocidaires* from 1994 Rwanda, the Mai-Mai, local militias fighting against both the AFDL and Mobutu's government, and eventually the RPF against the AFDL. These groups and their strategies, tactics and political maneuverings rubbed off on the CNDD-FDD while they interacted, although directly attributable characteristics...
are difficult to pin down. This is because so many members of either rebel organization considered membership fluid, and thus participated in both. The Palipehutu strategy of maintaining bases in outside countries did leave a mark, however, and the CNDD-FDD quickly adopted this strategy for their own.

After exploring the historical behaviors and outcomes of the civil war, I now turn to the post-rebel behavior of the CNDD-FDD, in specific focusing on how the previous mismanagement in organizational power continued to prove problematic for the CNDD-FDD political party and government.

**The Election 2005: How did Organization Shape the Outcome?**

The first elections in a decade and a half encouraged a hopeful population in Burundi in the summer of 2005. Although there was not to be a direct Presidential election, citizens would nonetheless voice their support for the party of their choosing. The rebels, fresh from the bush, still carried the banners and symbols of the rebellion. The official party flags, symbols and even ballots of CNDD-FDD all contained the eagle carrying a machete and a cassava leaf. This sent a powerful message to both supporters and foes alike, and there was serious concern that the ‘abagumyamabanga’ (“those who keep the secret” in Kirundi, the name given to political members while part of the rebellion) had weapons and plans should the CNDD-FDD lose the election. This group continued to use rumors that served the movement during the rebellion as a way of enticing the population and potentially threatening its enemies.

The propaganda of the movement worked its in favor in the elections, though, and the CNDD-FDD won control of both the National Assembly and the Presidency, giving them a wide base of political power. The decentralized structure of the former
rebel group now turned party worked for and against the group. Although the military and political wings had now been joined by the party declaration, a power struggle between military posturing and political finesse continued. The CNDD-FDD was aided by having multiple party headquarters to direct party supporters at the commune, hill, and province levels. Although these levels were supposed to report a central authority, varying levels of obedience and differences in propaganda tactics prevailed, according to election observers.28 The group was also able to benefit from a non-centralized strategy of voter recruitment, which meant that in areas where vote-buying was necessary to win, this a strategy undertaken with no repercussions from a central authority, either internally from party elites or externally from the National Commission on Elections (CENI). The former rebel movement was present in nearly all of Burundi’s seventeen provinces, with significant representation in both urban and rural communes. Because of its sheer size and nature, the message of CNDD-FDD could be spread: however, the group’s overall strategy lacked in coherency.

The cellular nature of the group also worked against them in the post-conflict election period. For one, the group was not able to centralize the national message and goals of its government, so connecting rural agricultural voters who made up the majority of the population with well-educated, city-dwelling voters became difficult. To overcome this, the CNDD-FDD enlisted outsiders, like Jean-Marie Ngendahayo, who were not original to the movement but added prestige to it. Ngendahayo, a Tutsi with strong Bujumbura connections, was active in politics since before the civil war, having joined FRODEBU in the early 1990s and appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs by Ndadaye. Ngendahayo tried to remain part of the transitional government during the
civil war, until threats to his life forced him to flee the country (described in detail in Krueger and Krueger 2007). Thus, Ngendahayo made a perfect new face to the CNDD-FDD: a former politician, Tutsi, who reflected the ideals and spirit of 1993 the group wanted to recapture. Even with powerful figures like Ngendahayo joining the movement, the problem remained that there was no central figure upon which the group could rely on to provide a physical symbol of the power of the movement. Although the rumor that Peter Nkurunziza, the presumptive President, rode to Bujumbura on a bicycle with his soldiers following closely behind, ushering in the peace agreement and cease-fire, even this rumor was not enough to sustain a national cult of personality around him at the time. It was customary in Burundian culture even in the pre-colonial era for cults of personality to be built upon rumors: the story of Samadari, a Hutu folk hero agitator against the reign of the Mwami provided an example for the balancing of Hutu peasant interests against wealthy cattle-owning royalty. Similarly, rumors spread about Prince Louis Rwagasore’s kind and generous nature in the countryside, although few peasants ever saw him in person. Smaller cults of personalities arose amongst former commanders, and it became unclear as to whether CNDD-FDD supporters were truly supporting the party or the individual. This was especially true in the former stronghold provinces of Bubanza and Cibitoke, where party members sometimes referred to themselves as “men of Manassse.” During the war, Manasse Nzobonimpa commanded the region that included the northern provinces for the CNDD-FDD, and everyone living under his command was aware of his power and authority, although interviewees expressed a lack of connection between the national CNDD-FDD and Manasse’s fighters. Similar cults of personality developed around Peter Nkurunziza
and General Adolphe Nsharimimana, and it proved difficult to integrate fighters from these groups into a larger national group without the former identity remaining. These challenges between regional and national identities also existed among the political wing and political supporters of the CNDD-FDD, who felt split loyalties between the two. These splits were not the result of the civil war, but rather historical circumstance of the nature of the Burundian state that the CNDD-FDD (and even the Buyoya government before it) inhabited. In this I mean that historical geographic tensions and regionalism, especially between the ancient regime of the Mwami, Prince Louis Rwangasore and the hero Melchior Ndadaye (Muramvya) and the regime of the Tutsi ‘usurpers’ Micombero, Bagaza, and Buyoya (Bururi) made it so that discussions about leadership within the CNDD-FDD took this tone as well, with significant resentment of those in power from Bururi (i.e. Nyangoma and his nephew Ndayikengurukiye). Thus to briefly return to a point made in Chapter 3, the pre-conditions of the Burundian state fundamentally impacted relationships and power structures within the CNDD-FDD itself, who found themselves with little alternative to change such structures.

**Changes in Leadership since 2005**

Once in formal power of the CNDD-FDD, Nkurunziza pursued strategies of interethnic and interregional cooperation and strengthened the capacities of the movement and later the state to provide public services- free healthcare for children and expectant mothers and free primary education, although these promises were largely symbolic during the civil war. Nkurunziza, despite his fractionalization from Nyangoma and Ndayikengurukiye, above all sought institutional stability to promote a cohesive movement, and would even sacrifice formal capacity (specifically, military and war-
making capabilities) to gain political power (Lemarchand 2009:166). This means that instead of shoring up the CNDD-FDD to perhaps defeat the FAB militarily, he would instead focus on building political power and civilian support in order to gain control of the Burundian state later. Nkurunziza proved to be the best of both worlds for the CNDD-FDD: he had both the common touch of a man who fought in the trenches as well as political skill in negotiation and power-seeking. His pattern of power consolidation continues to the present from the time he took power of the group in 2001. This is not to say that the results are positive, however, with one unsatisfied citizen remarking, “We really believed that they wanted to change things and bring order to the exercise of power (la gestion du pouvoir). What a disappointment!”

This statement was echoed in interviews I held with Bujumbura city residents, who were non-combatants, who expressed that they had perceived the movement to be more bureaucratically and fairly organized than the previous regimes before it assumed power. Because of this willingness to trade stability and development for power, the group has experienced some hiccups in leadership since becoming a political party and gaining majority power. I elaborate on these further below.

**Affaire du Radjabu, 2007**

Hussein Radjabu was an important figure in the CNDD-FDD since the founding, acting in a hybrid capacity in both the military and political wings, although he was never a combatant himself. Radjabu emerged in Burundian politics in the late 1980s as an ardent political strategist for Palipehutu-FNL and worked behind the scenes to engineer FRODEBU and Palipehutu-FNL cooperation. When the war broke out, he seamlessly transitioned to skilled politician for the CNDD-FDD, especially the arena of foreign
policy, where his numerous connections to sympathetic hosts (Tanzania) as well as sympathetic suppliers of war material (mostly Arab nations like Libya) made him a priceless asset to the rebel organization. He was long considered the number two political operative to all three eventual leaders of CNDD-FDD: Leonard Nyangoma (1994-1998), Jean-Bosco Ndayikengurukiye (1998-2001), and Pierre Nkurunziza (2001-2007). Rumors abound in Burundi that Radjabu eventually planned himself to become ‘boss’ of the CNDD-FDD (he did in 2005 with his election as chairman) and the country following the war. However great Radjabu’s contribution to the war effort, there were still some leaders and cadre that were incredibly uncomfortable to his closeness to Muslim regimes in sub-Saharan Africa, especially as the group relied more on Christian evangelism in the later period of the war (around 1998) to spread the political message and provide new soldiers. Although these countries and leaders (Libya and Sudan) fundamentally secured the power of the CNDD-FDD armed branch, the thought of a Muslim-dominated Burundi (the country is only about ten percent Muslim) frightened the deeply religious Christians, including Pierre Nkurunziza, in the movement. By February 2007, these fears and moves that Radjabu had made towards power consolidation made necessary the calling of a party conference. The ‘consolidation’ of Radjabu’s power, whether real or imagined, provided a way for military leaders within CNDD-FDD to rid themselves of him and increase their own control, again showing tension between the political and armed factions that never left (Watt 2008:198).

Getting rid of Radjabu also allowed political elites within the CNDD-FDD to ascend to new positions, reinforcing a recurring phenomenon within the organization; the replacement of elites through un-democratic means. Shortly thereafter, Radjabu was
arrested in April 2007 for inciting an armed group and convicted a year later and
sentenced to thirteen years in prison. He currently resides in Mpimba prison, the most
notorious of all Burundi’s correctional facilities. As has become customary, interview
requests placed through the Government were denied three times over the period of
time I conducted research.

Problems with Legitimacy, Corruption, and the Leavers

It became very clear over the historical trajectory of the CNDD-FDD that
members would come and go, and although tolerated among the rank and file, high-
profile factionalization, dissent, and defection gave cause for concern. As a rebel
organization, the rumored method for dealing with defection was execution by firing
squad, especially for defectors from the FDD. As for the CNDD political wing, few
verifiable reports exist of these revenge killings during the civil war, but after the war,
murders and disappearances of former allies became common (Ghoshal 2010). Two
such high-profile dissenters emerged in the early post-conflict period. After the ending of
the civil war, the population surged with hope in the future, especially under the
stewardship of the CNDD-FDD – Surveys conducted at the time indicated a desire to
return to peace and (Uvin 2009). Ethnic conflict had ended and the CNDD-FDD
welcomed new members, including Tutsi and former PALIPEHUTU supporters, into its
ranks. Non-FDD fighters like Jean-Marie Ngendahayo, discussed above, and Alice
Nzomukunda became leading figures in the post-rebel government. In September 2006,
Nzomukunda left the party and resigned her post as the second Vice-President of the
Republic, charging the CNDD-FDD with rampant corruption and human rights abuses.
She then took a position as First Vice-President of the National Assembly, attempting to
reform the CNDD-FDD from the inside. The party removed Ndomukunda in early 2008, in a pattern similar to that of the events of Ngendahayo's removal and echoed later by the removal of Nzobonimpa. Her ousting from CNDD-FDD also allowed the government to oust her from the National Assembly, citing her non-affiliation. Political observers in country deemed the move to be entirely political in nature to remove a thorn in the government's (read as the CNDD-FDD) side. This move was entirely in character with the previous behavior of the rebel organization: factionalization and removing one from a position of power on charges of corruption or anti-group sentiment. This pattern of fractionalization and desertion on charges of corruption within the party itself continued long after these first purges. After the ascendancy of the CNDD-FDD to political power, the group continued and expanded upon practices of neo-patrimonialist and personal rule perfected by cellular organization in the war. Cellular power during the civil war allowed for some leaders of the organization to gain followers by promising security and spoils (because the leaders could promise rewards without actually having to ask the central authority of the CNDD-FDD if this was permissible, and then being able to blame the lack of follow-through on this same central authority), as long as they remained under that particular commander. Personal Interviews with men formerly of Adolphe Nsharimimana’s and Manasse Nzobonimpa both confirm this. But these purges like that of Ndomumunda and others accused of in-party corruption and scandal turned those allegations on their heads: the opposition began to accuse the group of corruption in the late 2000s. It became clear from international inquiries into revenue streams and budgets that corruption occurred. Nkurunziza used these purges to advance a political campaign of “zero tolerance” towards corruption and good governance. In reality,
observers contend that the strategy and purges of party elites and political rivals are politicking (ICG 2012). These purges definitively point to cracks in the CNDD-FDD that are then exacerbated by those seeking more power to reformulate the party in a more preferable image. In this, I mean that these purges allow for certain members of CNDD-FDD to gain more political power at the expense of those removed from the organization, that then steer the party in a direction away from that promoted by those removed. These charges are not wholly dissimilar from those charged against Leonard Nyangoma and Jean-Bosco Ndayikengurukiye during the civil war.

Another troubling development was the gradual increase in political violence in the country perpetrated by the CNDD-FDD against dissenters and opposition members, which began to occur with alarming regularity in 2007.

The Cult of Peter

It has long been accepted in the study of African politics that the cult of the ‘big man’ is alive and well conceptually. Charismatic figures have long been influential in the history of post-Independence (Patrice Lumumba, Kwame Nkrumah, and Julius Nyerere to name a few) and in Burundi in particular, including the lionizations of Prince Louis Rwagasore and Melchior Ndadaye. It is therefore unsurprising that a cult of personality has developed around Peter Nkurunziza since he came to power in August of 2005.

Peter Nkurunziza, a former gym teacher from Ngozi province, encapsulates many of the virtues that other Burundians value—religiousity, devotion to family and country, and acting as a fully fledged member of a community. He is purported to detest the political life in Bujumbura and prefers to spend the weekends engaged in travaux communitaire (Traditionally, all pre-colonial Burundians in the kingdom had to do work for the good of
the community. Now, it is a seldom-enforced law that all citizens must participate in community works projects on Saturday mornings.) with citizens, wearing his signature Adidas track suit, planting trees, building schools, or touring hospitals. Nkurunziza’s state-capacity enlargement projects in the post-conflict period, like free primary education and free maternal and child healthcare have gained him many supporters amongst the rural populations, who laud him for these achievements as well as bringing peace to the war-torn country. Nkurunziza joined the CNDD-FDD in 1995, supposedly mobilized into action by the murders of Hutu students at the Universite du Burundi, where he was a lecturer. By 1998, he was elected deputy secretary-general, a political position, and during the split in 2001, was elected chairman of the group over both the military and political factions when Jean-Bosco Ndayikengurukiye was ousted. He was re-elected in 2004 and thought to be on his way to the presidency. Citizens have a generally positive image of ‘Petero’\(^{41}\) and despite party missteps, usually assign no blame to him for corruption or political intrigue. The cult of Peter worked to consolidate the CNDD-FDD in the post-conflict period because now citizens have a visual reference and rallying figure. After he was elected, his value as a figurehead and face to CNDD-FDD policy and progress grew. This effect often masks the internal disorganization of the post-conflict group, and contributes to a short political memory amongst the population. For example, political observers and practitioners in Burundi accuse the CNDD-FDD of having an internal political structure called the Conseil du Sage or the “Five Generals” who make all the political and military decisions for the government. While Nkurunziza is part of this group, he is most certainly not the head, and takes orders rather than gives them.\(^{42}\) Thus citizens see Nkurunziza as the
definitive leader of the organization while in reality he may hold relatively little power. This strategy is in keeping with the cellular nature of the CNDD-FDD that emerged when it was a rebel organization: the group can be represented by one face that holds little to no sway on everyday authority, like the political CNDD during the war at the time of peace talks.

**Election 2010 and Consolidation of the Regime**

The election of 2010 provided another opportunity for the post-rebel CNDD-FDD to entice Burundian citizens to support their ideologies and plans. Pre-electoral violence began in late 2009 (HRW 2010:3) with the CNDD-FDD inciting members of its youth wing, the *imbonerakure* (in Kirundi, “those who see far in the distance”) to commit acts of terror against FNL members in order to coerce silence or a favorable vote. This was in fitting with a previous increase in retaliatory violence between both the CNDD-FDD and the FNL. The election was scheduled for the summer of 2010, with five rounds of voting: Communal, Presidential, Parliamentary, Senatorial, and Collinaire (the lowest level of administration) to take place over a 10 week period from May 23-September 28. News outlets and international observers noted the uptick in violence in the months immediately preceding the elections (Ghoshal 2010) but in general hoped for a smoothly run election cycle. The first election, the Communal, was pushed back a day to be conducted on May 24 instead of the originally scheduled May 23. The Communal elections took place with little fanfare, but almost immediately both the CNDD-FDD and the FNL proclaimed electoral victory. The certification of the results by the national electoral commission on May 25 ensured a modest CNDD-FDD victory (about 68% of the posts went to the party, but over 90% in the rural areas) (EISA 2010) with the FNL
receiving the second largest percentage, about 14.5%. Allegations of fraud, especially in provinces known to be unfriendly to CNDD-FDD, like the FNL stronghold of Bujumbura-Rurale, quickly emerged after this initial release of provisional results by the CENI, the national elections body, even though the European Union’s election observer mission issued a statement of support. The Burundian electoral code allowed for redress of potentially fraudulent election results by challenging the CENI results in the Constitutional Court, which could then decide to invalidate and order fresh elections in parts or the entirety of the country (EISA 2010). The Court refused to hear any actions and the CENI refused to redress the issue of new elections themselves (Nduwimana 2010), prompting a boycott of the upcoming Presidential elections by the five original protesting parties (including the FNL) with eight additional parties joining. Nominations for the Presidency closed on June 7, 2010, and only Peter Nkurunziza remained-indicating that additional parties were protesting as well, including UPRONA. The protesting organization emerged with a name and mission at this time, the ADC-Ikibiri (Alliance Democratique pour Changement- Ikibiri), which now had twenty-four members. Burundian electoral law was not clear as to how the election, if there was to be one, would be conducted with just one candidate standing, but the CENI decided on June 10 to have a vote an up or down vote on Nkurunziza (EISA 2010). This set off a period of tension and politically violence in the form of attacks on party headquarters, grenade attacks on public locations, and assassinations of both ruling party and opposition activists (Boshoff 2010). Nkurunziza won the Presidential election on June 28, 2010, with a 91.6% ‘for’ vote overall. The National Assembly elections took place on July 23, 2010, with some parties once part of the ADC-Ikibiri, UPRONA and FRODEBU.
Nyakuri, returning to take part. CNDD-FDD won 81 seats and 78.5% of the vote, UPRONA won 17 seats and 16.5% percent of the vote, and FROBEDU Nyakuri won 5 seats and 5% of the vote. The elections for Senate were held 5 days later on July 28, 2010, by indirect election by the National Assembly, with the boycott continuing and the CNDD-FDD winning 32 of the 34 seats. Finally, the local elections were held September 7, 2010, with the CNDD-FDD again winning most of the seats, the boycott continuing, and noticeably, no marked decrease in political violence. Assassinations, arsons, and attacks on party headquarters continued to be common, although grenade violence decreased (Boshoff 2010, HRW 2011). This led to an increasingly charged political climate marred by confrontational violence between the CNDD-FDD and the FNL.

**Affaire du Manasse, 2011.** Yet another faction began to emerge in early spring of 2011, following the tumult of the 2010 elections and subsequent political intrigue. What is most fascinating about this split is that it came from a highly regarded and well connected CNDD-FDD insider, the former commander of the Western region during the war, Manasse Nzobonimpa, a crucial member of the party in the northwest. Nzobonimpa had been leader of the *Conseil du Sage* and a trusted compatriot of Nkurunziza’s both before and after the war. Further, in his home region of Bubanza he had a large following amongst civilians and had embarked on a job creation program after the war. But following the election of 2010, Nzobonimpa began to make waves about a particular loan that had transpired between the NRA government in Uganda and the CNDD-FDD during the rebel period that was to be repaid through aid (in the form of school materials and money for demobilization programs) from the Ugandan government to the Burundian one in 2008. The money trail was convoluted, and it was
clear that corruption had occurred. Furthermore, this touched a nerve with citizens, many of whom did not receive the promised amounts for demobilizing out of the CNDD-FDD or FNL (or any amount at all) and were having problems gaining employment and providing for themselves. In March 2011, Nzobonimpa was removed from his role as secretary-general of the Conseil du Sage and forced out of the party. He then sought exile in Arusha, Tanzania, where he had been living as part of the Burundian representation to the East African Legislative Assembly (EALA). Because of this unceremonious removal from the party and the palace intrigue that surrounded it, a number of former CNDD-FDD participants have left the party and joined with Manasse. The group is not yet militarized, although observers warn that this is a possibility in the very near future, as Burundian politics more generally grow more contentious. This new faction shows the inability of the CNDD-FDD to direct the message and create internal cohesion that prevents factioning and creates a stronger front against the opposition. In this I mean that the splits that the CNDD-FDD have undergone throughout its history, first as a rebel movement and now as a political organization, keep the movement from developing stronger internal cohesion (because various entities within the movement are always fighting for control and maneuvering in case of potential or real splits) it could then use to present a stronger movement. To refer to a point made previously and elaborated later, these factions kept the rebel organization from providing a strong enough opponent to defeat the FAB during the civil war: subsequently, these factions kept the CNDD-FDD from being able to effectively eliminate either PALIPEHUTU-FNL or ADC-Ikibiri challenges in the post-war era. The decentralized centers of the movement also encourage party followers to leave with leaders, instead of remaining in
the larger movement. This is part and parcel of the Great Lakes phenomenon of local
loyalties, which will be discussed further in Chapter 5. This incident also directly relates
back to the CNDD-FDD strategy of fragmentation through accusation, especially of the
standby of ‘corruption’, as in the case of Alice Nzomukunda and others. The rebel
organization was unable to manage competing personal interests during the rebellion,
and thus continued to be ruled by personal regimes as a political party and as a
government. Also, because of the separation of rule instilled during the rebel period
wherein which multiple points of sovereignty emerged within the organization itself,
fragmentation occurred along these lines as well, with some choosing to follow
N zobonimpa and others when they were removed from the CNDD-FDD.

Defining the Variable: Organizational Power

It is useful at this point to consider the type of organizational power of the group
before and after the war across categories to paint a more complete picture of the
group’s leadership and control. In Chapter 2, I discussed the difference between
infrastructural and cellular power. In the previous sections, I provided examples of the
ways in which the CNDD-FDD exhibited cellular power as a rebel organization, a
transitional political actor, and finally as a government. I now delve into specific facets of
organizational power that the group displayed.

Leadership, Factions, and Splits

From the brief examples given above, it seems clear that the CNDD-FDD
suffered crises in leadership throughout its history, and that power was never surely in
the hands of one person or even one branch of the group when in the bush.
Furthermore, rival personal branches rose up and competed internally for greater
positions of power, through violence (like that of Adolphe Nsharimimana) or personal and regional loyalty (like that of Manasse Nzobonimpa). This problem seems more apparent now that the group has become a ruling party, and determining who the captain of the ship has become even more challenging. This is confirmed by outside observations and interviews within the organization that indicate dual faces or centers of powers: like the discussion above of the Conseil du Sage and the “Five Generals”. This fragmented nature causes confusion in the population as to who to blame, applaud, or support.45

Although the CNDD and the FDD branches both had separate leaders, it was always unclear as to where the cadre thought the leaders fit into the hierarchy of the group: political supporters naturally assumed that the CNDD political wing had supremacy and vice-versa for the FDD military wing. Furthermore, post-war roles were never clearly explicated, thus the party experiences something of a split personality, with some willing to accept authoritarian type command and disciplinary structures similar to that of the FDD (Nindorera 2008:119). This is echoed again in the largesse of power distributed to prime members of the FDD after the war: specifically, the awarding of the highest posts of the security and armed forces to the “Five Generals”. This ensures that fragmentation and possible fractionalization of the movement would be curtailed by either the threat or use of violence, of which the CNDD-FDD now has a monopoly of the legitimate exercise of such force.

Communications

Communications between different battalions, the CNDD and the FDD, and from general to foot-soldier were often quite messy during the war. The first problem was that
of resources of communication—cellular phones were not available before the turn of the century, and satellite phones were expensive and difficult to move quickly. Although the movement did rely on the use of some satellite phones, it was mostly among the high command in Kibira Forest and not distributed country-wide.\textsuperscript{46} Battalions resorted to short notes and tracts passed between each other, often using civilians to carry them.\textsuperscript{47} More often than not, communications were less than effective and led to many problems inside the movement. For example, take the period of time when the CNDD-FDD went to assist various rebel groups and governments in Eastern Congo during the Great Congo War from 1996-2003: When the group decided to split resources between Burundi and Congo in 1996-1997, one battalion was to go to Congo. Before doing so, they hid their extensive collection of weapons in a cache in the Ruzizi river valley, on the Burundian side, in Cibitoke province, hoping to re-supply and gain more while in Congo. While this battalion was in Congo, another battalion came upon the weapons cache and, assuming they were government or Palipehutu-FNL weapons, took them as loot. The first group returned, assuming that their weapons had been stolen. Several weeks later when communication was finally established between the two battalions, the story of the weapons cache discovery was told by the first group to the second group, who expressed surprise that their comrades had stolen their weapons.\textsuperscript{48} This example illustrates the utter lack of organization between the battalions, and inability to share even basic information amongst the group. This became a pressing issue during battles, when information, especially on allies, positioning, and potential threats, was crucial to the conduct (and winning) of the war. Mixed messages also proved problematic within the chain of command of the organization: commanders would give
messages to sub-commanders, and a game of telephone would ensue. The geographic 
distribution of the group also contributed to this issue: because the centers of command 
were in three places during the war (Kibira Forest (Bubanza/Cibitoke), near Bukavu, 
DRC, and in Western Tanzania), messages were incredibly difficult to coordinate, and 
sometimes, the group closest to the battalion would not be the one issuing orders to the 
battalion. This led to various units of CNDD-FDD acting in various tactics of battle 
counter to each other (discussed below) as communication became faulty or ineffective.

**Funding**

The CNDD-FDD undertook various strategies of funding during their 
development and while fighting the civil war. In the few territorial areas under their 
control, various battalions of the FDD utilized methods of looting and asking civilians for 
contributions of food, money, firewood, and human labor. There was supposed to be a 
central taxing authority that directed the gathering of the *cotisation*, or subscription fees, 
which provided for the rebel group’s upkeep and, theoretically, the safety and welfare of 
the civilians.\(^49\) However, this was more grand theory than practice. Although certain 
areas where CNDD-FDD presence was stronger and the battles were more immediate 
(Bubanza, Cibitoke, and in the south, Rutana and Makamba) who could impose and 
collect the subscription, returning revenue to a central authority was spotty at best and 
often disappeared up the chain of command from the soldiers to the generals. The FDD 
armed wing was also able to secure funding and safe haven by courting foreign 
support- President Mobutu initially provided aid and bases to the rebels in Congo in 
1996. Upon his demise the rebel organization lost its bases there, and struggled in its 
war against the FAB. The AFDL initially provided no comfort or aid to the group, only
later did the AFDL allow the CNDD-FDD to use Congo as a rear base when the CNDD-FDD agreed to aid the AFDL against the Rwandan and Ugandan government forces (the second Congo War, 1998-2003).

Funding of the CNDD political wing occurred along many of the same lines, with foreign support from the Burundian diaspora in Europe helping to maintain the group’s financial stability. Especially critical to this was Hussein Radjabu, whose tireless fundraising amongst other African groups and governments permitted the group as a whole to build a war chest. The lack of centralization internal to the funding operations prevented this from ever growing much past subsistence however. Further compounding the problem of general funding, there was the problem of individual enrichment at the expense of the group—this was especially noted during the time of Jean-Bosco Ndayikengurukiye’s reign, when various commanders of his inner circle profited immensely from their Congolese adventure as part of the FDD armed wing (Nindorera 2008:113). This later led to his ousting and an attempt at reforming financial procedures intent on finally unifying the CNDD and FDD bodies in theory and practice under Peter Nkurunziza in the later war period (2001-2003). Although the collection and distribution of the funding of the group is a matter of organization, sources and development of these relationships is part and parcel of the source of social power the movement experienced vis-à-vis civilians, and thus I return to this topic in Chapter 5. I say this because these relationships require more than just the point of the gun to develop: stealing and forced tax collection are tactics of a rebel organization directly related to their institutional capacity to make themselves known as a physical threat. But, more importantly in this case, the CNDD-FDD had to develop voluntary support for
both immediate (supporting the war effort) and long-term (winning government power) goals.

Tactics of Battle

Although the CNDD-FDD fashioned itself a rebel army in the style of other armed groups and even the FAB (Force Armees Burundaise, the government army under Buyoya), battle tactics were greatly affected by the level of disorganization present in the group. Confusion ruled when it came to who gave orders and where the CNDD-FDD was to go to most effectively fight the enemy ruled the day. In the beginning of the war, battles were haphazard in the best of cases, and it was unclear whether there were to be actual military battles between the groups or if civilians were to be fought against as well. There was no central training force or plan, and the FDD essentially was a rough organization of officers trained in the FAB and the Burundian Military Institute before the war and those soldiers trained “on the job” during the war. Although the headquarters existed in Kabira Forest, Bubanza, the process was never streamlined enough to train the numerous fighters who joined, and many left and returned at will. Other battle training camps existed in Congo and Tanzania, especially as the war progressed and routes to Kibira were blocked by the FAB, but these were weakly staffed and supplied. This lack of centralized training became chaotic during battles, as soldiers were unclear as to what actions were to be pursued and which tactics would be employed. This disorganization became even more complicated due to lack of centralization in communications among battalions and cells, with no central authority to direct. This strategy gave the CNDD-FDD a strategic advantage over the FAB in terms of flexibility and ability to conduct “lighting strikes” against strategic targets, but this advantage
never allowed for any centralized large-scale strike against high-value targets, like the centers of government and commerce in Bujumbura City. This prevented the group from winning outright, as there was never a clear strategy or path to take to military victory.

**Political Tactics**

Like problems of centralization and organization when it came to military tactics, similar ones arose when it came to the political tactics of the CNDD-FDD. While Nyangoma directed political tactics for the group until his ouster in 1998, there was a clear distinction between the goals of the FDD armed branch and the goals of the CNDD political branch, and this became apparent when deciding how the group would deal with other groups and potential allies. This also became a challenge when negotiating with both former supporters and sometimes financial backers FRODEBU and the government of Burundi, with whom certain elements of the CNDD-FDD desired to broker a peace. Some observers contend that the CNDD never intended to do anything but win power through negotiation (Nindorera 2008:111-115), and thus deliberately stalled political negotiations at the expense of decisive military victories. Which is to say that the political arm of the CNDD-FDD, the CNDD never thought military victory an achievable goal, and hence never planned for anything but strategic and small victories through political negotiation and transitional government. This ultimately ended up being one of the causes of the removal of Nyangoma in 1998. Again, this leads to the conclusion of dual chains of command and multiple centers of power that did nothing by stifle the CNDD-FDD’s ability to make political or military inroads against the Buyoya government. The problem of differing central authority and goals between the CNDD and the FDD once again raised its head.
Present Day Organization

Although in complete political control of Burundi, the present-day CNDD-FDD still suffers from many of the same afflictions that plagued its organizational structure from its inception. There is still no clear division between the armed and political wings of the CNDD-FDD, and the lines between war and politics are still very blurry. Thus, the youth wing of the party, the Imbonerakure, is accused of being a militia for the group, to intimidate and commit violence against wayward civilians (HRW Report 2010). Even though the current Burundian Army is commanded by former leaders of the CNDD-FDD, dual centers of command and authority exist between the youth group, the armed forces, and the security forces (like the Secret Police) in Burundi. This helps the CNDD-FDD government by allowing for plausible deniability of violence committed by the Imbonerakure, as well as deniability of ‘rogue elements’ in the armed and security forces. Many of the personnel in the modern party were FDD officers first, and this history is hard to forget for both civilians and the officers themselves. For example, when Manasse Nzobonimpa was to be removed from the party, the outcry on both sides was palpable- on the one hand, he was a lauded general responsible for a great many battle successes during the war. On the other, he was still seen as a military man, and unsophisticated in his approach to politics and democracy. Media reported that this inability to transition from military to political contributed to his poor political performance, including accusations of corruptions\(^5\). There are some in the Burundian media and observer community who accuse the CNDD-FDD of still being run as an armed group, with generals in charge instead of political leaders who respect law, order, and non-violence\(^5\) (HRW Report 2010). This belief is further influenced by the
existence of the so-called ‘Five Generals’- a group of five former military leaders in high positions of power who control the armed and security forces, especially the secret service.\textsuperscript{53} Although internal party dynamics are governed by the \textit{Counsel du Sage} (Elder Council) system, in recent years the group has been accused of having dual council systems (public and private), that compete for power within the organization.\textsuperscript{54} In further confirmation of evidence that emerged about the rebel period, the CNDD-FDD appears to be continuing the behavior of multiple points of leadership and sovereignty, with little direction for the party milieu to follow. This internal struggle over organization, decentralized centers of power, and the general lack of transparency are held-over from the days of the war, and the group has not been able to transition into a government with differing organizational strategies post-conflict.

\textbf{The FNL and the CNDD-FDD}

It seems reasonable to suggest that the CNDD-FDD and FNL share similarities in cause and motivation. They came into great power out of the civil war, were considered representative of Hutu interests, and used violence to provoke political change. Even during the civil war, there were many instances of CNDD-FDD and FNL collaboration against the FAB, at least in the early days. Some evidence suggests that even later when the CNDD-FDD split for the second time, these groups return to collaboration with specific factions like that of Jean-Bosco Ndayikengurukiye (ACLED 2011). The Palipehutu-FNL (now known as the FNL after the 2008 peace agreement that eliminated ethnic naming in political organizations) was created in a refugee camp in Western Tanzania in 1980 by Remy Gahutu, to vocalize Hutu dissatisfaction with political and social discrimination in Burundi, the 1972 genocide, and the lack of ethnic
parity. From its founding the Palipehutu-FNL expressed this message with force and violence, and during the 1980s conducted many cross-border raids from their bases amongst 1972 refugees in camps in Tanzania. They are thought to be responsible for the attacks on civilians in the late 1980s and early 1990s at Marangara and Ntega.

While the Tanzanian government was not a direct supporter of the movement, there is plenty of evidence to suggest that they had knowledge of the movement and their use of Tanzanian soil as a base (Longman 1998: 49). Researchers identified the existence of political parties organizing within the refugee camps and their potential abilities to impact politics, especially in regards to the development of an ethnically driven “Hutu cosmology” in Tanzania (Mallki 1995). While an outside actor for most of the 1980s and 1990s, the death of Ndadaye provided opportunity for the Palipehutu-FNL to return to Burundi. Elements of FRODEBU and the fledgling CNDD-FDD courted those within the movement trained and active in recruitment of civilians and fighters (like Adolphe Nsharimana) to build an active anti-government force. The Palipehutu-FNL, however, resisted the CNDD-FDD overtures to subsume one organization over the other because although both groups fought against the government, the Palipehutu-FNL rejected the multiethnic character of CNDD-FDD.

The basic ideology of the Palipehutu-FNL focused on the supremacy of the Hutu people and their need to regain power lost at the hands of the Tutsi governments of the past that worked to keep them in subservient positions through discrimination and lack of opportunity. This ideology found resonance amongst would-be members of the CNDD-FDD in the early 1990s, especially as political repression and violence ran high and actions of the Tutsi-led government to democratize were seen as lacking in follow-
through. It was no surprise when the two groups began to work together against the common enemy FAB in the early days of the war. Although theoretically the CNDD-FDD was to be multi-ethnic, the FDD, the branch that the Palipehutu-FNL interacted with most closely, was entirely Hutu. This led to radicalization and violence against Tutsi civilians that was often blamed on Palipehutu-FNL and their influence within FDD.

Palipehutu-FNL tended to draw strong support from rural Burundians, especially in “neglected” provinces, like Bujumbura-Rurale and the southern border provinces with Tanzania. This was because of their development as an external rebel group that had little in common with Burundian political actors living in Bujumbura. For that matter, the group initially even had trouble recruiting among civilians because of this outsider status. In the later period of the war as stalemate became the clearer option for all involved parties, they later voiced their support for equality amongst the ethnic groups during the Arusha Accords process, a tactic directly counter to their previous efforts, which did not go unnoticed by the Buyoya government. Although the Palipehutu-FNL and the CNDD-FDD shared similar ideas for post-conflict governance and power, only one could ultimately win, and competition necessarily begat conflict between the two entities. Some jealousy also emerged as a result of competition for military resources and outside support: the CNDD-FDD garnered the lion’s share due to skill and political knowledge of actors and other rebel organizations in the region. The Palipehutu-FNL received some support from other rebel organizations, especially the FDLR (*Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda*) operating in Eastern Congo, but was unable to petition for weapons or bases from allies, because of both competition and their comparative lack of capacity and troop strength.
Further, there were periods of time during the war where the two groups stole weapons and material from each other,\textsuperscript{57} conditions of war that did not lead to a strong friendship. The relationship between CNDD-FDD and Palipehutu-FNL can be described as schizophrenic at best, as over the civil war the groups went from cooperating to competing to actively engaging in violence against each other. At times, they actively competed for civilians, killing and torturing those accused of joining the other camps, and stealing each others’ war materials. Other times, battalions would fight together against the common enemy of the FAB.

After major hostilities ended between CNDD-FDD and the Buyoya government in 2002-2003, the Palipehutu-FNL took the opportunity to continue acts of violence against both government targets as well as civilians, including the 2004 massacre of Banyamulenge (Tutsi) Congolese refugees at the Burundian border town of Gatumba, mere kilometers from Bujumbura. The continued aggression towards civilians led to the organization being labeled a ‘terrorist organization’ by both the transitional Burundian government as well as political actors involved in the negotiation process, like South Africa. An initial peace agreement was signed by the group and the Nkurunziza government in late 2006, although violence remained ongoing, especially in Bujumbura-Rurale province. Direct attacks against the capital continued well into 2008, when grenades and shelling ramped up against the capital in April and May. The Palipehutu-FNL targeted government officials and buildings in an expression of dissatisfaction with the CNDD-FDD government, although when questioned, expressed that the violence was mere retaliation against the CNDD-FDD’s campaign against suspected Palipehutu supporters. By the end of 2008, however, political strong-arming by government and
international actors led to a final peace agreement where the group dropped Palipehutu from its name in order to participate as a political party (now known solely as the FNL) in the 2010 elections.

I now turn to the problems of internal conflict and dissent within the movement. Like the CNDD-FDD, the Palipehutu-FNL also factioned and split over its history. The first split occurred in 1990, when members of Palipehutu-FNL split to form FROLINA (name here), another rebel organization to fight the Buyoya government in the South, led by Joseph Karumba (ICG 2002:6). This split was driven by fights over leadership and direction the movement would take. Palipehutu-FNL continued to launch small attacks against military targets during this time, even while planning peace negotiations with the Buyoya government. Like the CNDD-FDD, central control over the organization never emerged in a way that would silence internal critics, and the movement split between Etienne Karatasi and Cossan Kabura in late 1992. Kabura was seen as more militant and willing to engage in violence than Dr. Karatasi, and thus more willing to achieve the goals of the organization. Karatasi and his associates remained at the head of a more political Palipehutu, rather than the Palipehutu-FNL of Kabura. The Palipehutu-FNL received considerable support and an increase in reputation through participation in the Rwandan genocide, where they received military training and support, even returning to bases within Burundi and Tanzania with some ex-FAR (Force Armees Rwandaise) in tow. This also led to continuing relationships between anti-RPF Hutu rebel groups operating in Eastern Congo during the Congo Wars, who provided weapons, training, and bases. The lack of planning for the future and what to do after the war led to another split, in late 2001-early 2002, this time between Agathon Rwasa
and Cossan Kabura. Rwasa was a military leader of the organization actively in Bujumbura-Rurale who accused Kabura of mismanagement and accepting funds from the Buyoya government to discontinue the rebellion (ibid: 7). Rwasa proved to be a chaotic force to reckon for both the rival CNDD-FDD and the Buyoya and transitional governments, as attacks on civilians and risky bombings of government targets began. Despite this disorder, Rwasa remains in power of the FNL even today, although his role after the 2010 election shifted. After the loss of the communal elections in May 2010, the FNL elected to boycott the Presidential and all subsequent elections as part of the opposition coalition, the ADC-Ikibiri. Although Rwasa was not the spokesperson of the group, he continued to play the part of the major opposition leader in Burundian politics. Several times after the election rumors persisted of his flight abroad to seek personal safety and protection in Eastern Congo or Tanzania.\(^{58}\) It was suggested by interviewees, especially those connected to the government, that Rwasa continued to direct the FNL to commit acts of violence against CNDD-FDD operatives, especially in Bujumbura-Rurale\(^{59}\), and observers blamed the massacre at bar *Chez Les Amis* in Gatumba 2011, where approximately 40 civilians were killed, squarely on the FNL (HRW 2011b).

This leads to a discussion of the current status of the Palipehutu-FNL. Ongoing violence between the CNDD-FDD government and the opposition force continues, with nearly daily assassinations in 2010 and 2011. In 2012, the FNL remains active but the goals and even directly attributable actions remain unclear. What is clear is that Rwasa is still the head of the organization, one which continues its two decade long clash against the CNDD-FDD. The group still enjoys marked support in some rural areas,
especially Bujumbura-Rurale, although its ability to build on this support is incredibly limited. International observers continue to lobby for political dialogue between the opposition and the CNDD-FDD, although the CNDD-FDD continues to maintain near-total political and social power.

**Conclusion**

In this chapter examining the organization of the CNDD-FDD and its influence on the war and the post-conflict outcome, many things become apparent. The first is that within the history of a fairly centralized state, the group emerged as a decentralized and disparate fighting unit. In direct contrast to the levels of organization present in state government, multiple points of authority with little central command emerged to challenge the state. These cellular pockets of power ensured that the rebel group could not pursue an overall coordinated strategy to win the civil war militarily outright. Within the history of the country itself, though, emerges a pattern of parallel pockets of leadership, a pattern that the CNDD-FDD followed in its trajectory into a government. This disorganization and lack of centralized strategy leads to a movement (and government) that acts in chaotic fashion, and factions and splits became common. The fact that the CNDD-FDD government remains in power today is somewhat surprising, given this lack of ability to maintain internal cohesion and discipline. The CNDD-FDD also seems to change very little over its history: even as a government with access to prior state structures of control and authority, the internal disorganization continues. Communications, tactics, and strategies remain an exercise in confusion and deniability, and rumors abound of dual centers of powers within in the organization. Similarly, the group’s largest rival, the Palipehutu-FNL experienced similar disorder in its history, with
the group splitting several times due to differences in strategies and goals among rival leaders. One may assume that Burundian historical development (specifically, the competition for political and social power among the clans and regional rivalries discussed in Chapter 3) contributed significantly to the ways in which rebel organizations thought about the type of organizational power the groups would develop. This is to say that the rebel groups emulated previous political developments in the state by allowing personal and geographic rivalries to determine the trajectory of these rebel movements. While the CNDD-FDD and the FNL were never able to wrest control of the state during the civil war, the CNDD-FDD despite its internal disorganization, exercised considerable more absolute strength, in terms of civilian support (discussed extensively in the next chapter) and combatants than the FNL, and this served them well in winning post-conflict political power. However, both groups still to this day continue to suffer from lack of cohesion.

Tables and Figures

![Figure 4-1. A Temporal Diagram of the Major Events Burundian Civil War, 1993-2005](image-url)
Notes

1 I use various names for the Palipehutu-FNL terminology interchangeably, although after 2009 they are known exclusively as the FNL.

2 Personal Interviews November 12, 2010, November 15, 2010

3 Personal Interviews December 3, 2010, December 7, 2010


5 Personal Interview November 14, 2010

6 Personal Interview, December 3, 2010

7 Personal Interviews, April 21, 2011, March 4, 2011, and January 30, 2011

8 Personal Interview March 14, 2011

9 Lemarchand argues that this modus operandi continues today- with the CNDD-FDD under Nkurunziza formalizing and strengthening the dominant institutions of the state using informal ties.

10 Personal Interview, May 25, 2012
Researchers confirm this as well—see Lemarchand 2009: 151 for greater exploration—and suggest that the multi-ethnic character of Nkurunziza’s government harkens to this history.

Personal Interview, November 5, 2011

Personal Interview, December 3, 2011


These accords are discussed in Nindorera 2008:106-109.

Lemarchand 2009 discusses the effect these groups have had on the region in great detail: See Chapters 1 and 2 especially.

Personal Interview, February 17, 2011

Personal Interview, January 29, 2011

Personal Interview, May 27, 2011

Personal Interviews, March 21, 2011 and March 22, 2011

Personal Interview, January 17, 2011

Personal Interview, February 7, 2011

When the group split, both factions retained the name and were only differentiated from by leadership. Civilians were often unclear as to which branch of CNDD-FDD was
operating closest to them, although later analysis showed that Ndagikengurukiye’s branch favored southern positions.

24 Personal Interview, November 10, 2010

25 Personal Interview, January 23, 2011

26 Personal Interview April 3, 2011

27 Personal Interview March 10, 2011 and February 23, 2011

28 Personal Interview, April 3, 2011

29 Although this changed fairly rapidly, especially with new developments in the 2005-2007 period.

30 Personal Interview, April 2, 2011

31 Personal Interviews, March 13, 2011 and April 4, 2011

32 Personal Interviews, April 12, 2011

33 Quoted in Lemarchand 2009: 158.

34 Personal Interview, 23 year old female Buyenzi resident, church secretary, 23 May 2008. She said that it was not until 2007 that this perception she held of the CNDD-FDD changed.

35 Personal Interview, February 21, 2011
It is difficult to ascertain whether this was true or not in regards to Manasse Nzobonimpa, for at the time he was in the process of being removed from the party. My translator suggested, and I tended to agree, that some former combatants of Nzobonimpa revised these practices at the behest of the regional CNDD-FDD to paint an unflattering historical picture.
Bear in mind that these accusations come from the state-run media, and are not generally expressed by the population without significant prodding.
CHAPTER 5
SOCIAL RELATIONS: HOW TO MAKE OR BREAK A REBELLION

Introduction

During civil wars, rebel fighters and leaders often consider civilians expendable (Humphreys and Weinstein 2008) and a burden on a rebel group’s already limited support system. However, in recent years the civil wars literature expanded upon the role of the civilian as a valuable resource during war (Humphreys and Weinstein 2006, Kasfir 2005, Mampilly 2011, Weinstein 2007). Rebels realize that civilians can provide much needed material aid during the war (food, shelter, and bodies for labor or sexual purposes). Furthermore, rebel groups also recognize the value of enhancing old relationships with civilians and building new ones, creating a base group of supporters if and when they should come to power following the end of conflict, as the NRA did in Uganda in the early 1980s (Kasfir 2005: 286). Rebel groups can also use targeted or selective violence against civilians in the course of war, for example, rape, forced recruitment, or violence against those from a different region, religion, or ethnic group. While relationships between combatants and adults and combatants and children differ, this chapter will focus on how the CNDD-FDD developed and maintained civilian relationships before, during, and after the war. The type of social power a rebel group exhibits captures more than just these critical relationships, however, it also denotes the ability of the rebel group to subvert and/or transform pre-existing state structures. This goes hand-in-hand with civilian relations because states, civilians, and new challengers to the state all exist within the same realm, with the same pool of resources, seeking indivisible political power and control over it. This chapter proceeds in three
sections. The first section describes the relationships that the variable social power catches between the rebel group, civilians, and the state, providing a conceptual foundation. The second section details the history of civilian-state relationships in Burundi most specifically, but also in other parts of the Great Lakes to show similarity in pre-colonial histories. The third section explains the temporal dimensions of the rebel organization’s social capacity: before, during, and after the civil war. This section delves into the changing role of the CNDD-FDD over time, and how the PALIPEHUTU-FNL has failed to capture the same social power afforded to the CNDD-FDD that allowed them to gain post-rebel political power.

Social Power: Civilians and State Structures

Although rebel organizations may not always recognize their value, scholars find relationships between the existing state and its governors, the rebel group, and civilians to be crucial to understanding rebel behavior and civil war more generally. While a wide literature exists on the state’s ability to kill civilians during wartime (Stam 2009, Longman 1998) or a rebel group’s ability to use civilians (Wood 2010), very few scholars find the linkages between these three actors (rebels, the state, and the civilian population) and how and why they operate in wars and post-conflict. My conceptualization of rebel capacity, however, combines these relationships to present a more cohesive concept, because in the conduct of war and politics, they are intertwined. To unpack this, first I discuss why scholars focus on these relationships. The state and civilians have previously existing relations, although these can and may change during the course of the war. When the relationships between rebels and the state and rebels
and civilians are examined, the transitive relationship between the state and civilians is also shown, described in Figure 5-1 at the end of the chapter.

As laid out in the diagram, the relationship that exists before the war between the state and civilians also contains the relationships between rebels and the state and rebels and the civilians, closing the triangle and creating the variable in this research I term social power. Thus, the rebel group's interaction with these two entities is critical to the nature of social power they employ and is captured by the term. Although the actors are separated in the diagram. It is worthwhile to note that rebel organizations are initially drawn from the civilian population and well integrated within it (Weinstein 2007, Humphreys and Weinstein 2008, Metelis 2009, Mampilly 2011). So while the diagram gives the impression of separation, in truth the linkages between rebel organizations and the civilian population are far more entangled. To discover why and how social power can contain both crucial civilian relationships as well as those with the state, a review of the literature on rebel governance is necessary. As discussed in Chapter 1, rebels can follow a Tilly-like trajectory to create new states and new state structures out of wars. In doing so, rebels can conduct themselves as proto-states- collecting rents and doling out goods and services to their citizens. I do note here, that like Mampilly, the view of rebel groups subsuming the state processes and acting as “elementary state builders” (2011:9) can be teleological in the scholarship, and thus in this understanding of the nexus of state, civilian, and rebel relations, reconfiguration of state structures and practices is as worthy of study as the original structures and practices developed by rebel organizations. In many cases, this rebel state-building is an explicit program put in place in the territory under their physical control- for example, the Tamil Tigers in Sri
Lanka enacted decades-long governance activities (Mampilly 2011, ch 3). A rebel group can engage in these activities to replace the state, or at the very least, subvert state activities with their own. But they do not have to create entirely new states separate from their origin; as Pierre Englebert (2009) and Jones (2010) point out, separatism is a rare phenomenon in sub-Saharan Africa, and most rebel groups do not set out with the intention of splitting from the state they fight against— even the SPLA/SPLM did not initially desire separation, but rather a united Sudan. So if rebels intend to change the state, it follows then that they may embark upon their own plans of governance in preparation, even if these plans do not ultimately lead to creating entirely new states. Because civilians are tied to the pre-existing state, it follows then that rebel organizations would be able to gain both credible civilian support and control of state structures (local councils, for example) by courting civilian interests during the war. State structures include things like the aforementioned local councils, but also justice services, taxation, education, and community services (health and welfare).

Traditionally, citizens understand that the government provides these public goods to civilians in exchange for consent to enforce laws and monopolize violence. In sub-Saharan Africa, governments are often unwilling (because of a prioritization of resources along neo-patrimonial relationships) or unable (because of lack of economic resources) to provide these public goods. This in and of itself is a reason many rebel organizations give for going to war against the post-colonial state— the CNDD-FDD, RPF, NRA, and AFDL are no exception. Thus, during a civil war a rebel organization can build civilian relationships in two ways: either by supplanting previously existing state structures and goods with their own supporters and improving upon them or by
creating them entirely in places where public goods and structures were historically limited. I discuss this below and provide further examples as to how this actually occurs in the course of a civil war.

**The History of Burundi and Civilians: Conflict, Continuity, Change**

As examined in Chapter 3, the pre-colonial history of Burundi played an important role in the shaping of the modern state and even rebel organizations that developed there (discussed in Chapters 3 and 4). More importantly to highlight for the purposes of this chapter, the pre-colonial history shaped relationships between citizens and power-holders. The kingdom maintained centralized order and control emanating from the seat of the Mwami (and all political and social power) in Muramvya. Citizen-subjects were generally treated well by the Mwami and power structures, and integration of outsiders, intermarriage between Hutu and Tutsi, and even “Tutsification” of Hutu (wherein which Hutu could acquire property or cattle and move up in social stature) were far more common here than in the neighboring Rwandan kingdom, similarly organized from the center out. The relationships between citizens, the princes (Ganwa, as described in Chapter 3), and the Mwami and high court shaped the way Burundians historically thought about power and the state. The central kingdom was able to project power over its territory through the use of smaller units of power, although this proved detrimental to the establishment of an authoritarian dominant leadership because regional competition and Ganwa loyalties created multiple points of sovereignty and power to which citizens looked to for governance. Nonetheless, these relationships conditioned Burundians to expect some level of centralization in their lives from which authority sprang, even if there were challengers to the central authorities. It
also conditioned them to respond with regularity to named authority figures. But the Mwami and kingdom itself were not based on authoritarian principles as in Rwanda, but rather on cooperation. This added another dimension to the way civilians historically viewed relationships in that they expected cooperation, care, and in general, mutually beneficial relationships. In the words of one Great Lakes historian, “Kingship thus emerged in these societies as a political institution that could arbitrate and further-more concretely than the initiation cult- the coexistence and blossoming of all” (Chretien 2003:144). The locus of power did not rest with one clan, but rather with four, and as such limited the absoluteness of authority there and encouraged both consociational types of governance among clans as well as intra-clan loyalty. This intra-clan loyalty helped to later encourage regional loyalties amongst civilians and combatants during the war. Because regional loyalties never diminished in their importance during the whole of Burundian history (see for example, the Bururi dominance of post-Independence Burundi described in Chapter 3), regional identity always provided a marker for citizens to rely upon. I touched upon this in Chapter 4, remarking on the loyalty accorded to certain leaders as a matter of regional affiliation. I return to this below when discussing citizen-rebel relationships during the civil war. This existence of loyalties is not to say that pre-colonial history was especially rosy and that clans never fought or schemed against one another. In fact, historically the four clans of the Mwami-the Bezi, the Batare (the two being from Muramvya and considered people of the plains), the Bataga and the Bambutsa (the two being from Bururi and considered people of the highlands) clashed politically and socially with each other, but major wars of conquest were not a facet of Burundian history. Peasants followed the direction of their
vassal lords in these clashes, and again, these actions contributed to both creating and cementing clan identities and loyalties, as well as tempering power in Burundi. This was incredibly beneficial to the overall health of state power and civilian life in the country: unlike Rwanda, a culture of cohesive oppression never developed, and thus ethnic tensions and other potentially divisive measures on a grand scale did not occur. To be more explicit, the existence of multiple reference points for identity and loyalty in Burundi ensured that cleavages, when they did exist, cut across multiple dimensions, whereas in Rwanda, the Hutu-Tutsi cleavage based on loyalty to the Tutsi Mwami became the dominant one. These tensions between Bururi and Muramvya continued even into the post-colonial era, as Tutsi leaders and politicians from Bururi (Presidents Micombero, Bagaza, and Buyoya in addition to Nyangoma and Ndayikengurukiye of CNDD-FDD) felt their power was retribution for past discrimination by the plains clans. Citizens still continued to follow clan and regional identities when Independence came, identifying locally first. This pattern of identification reigned even after the birth of the nation of Burundi, as Bururi loyalties determined government careers, educational opportunities, and political advancement.

Historically, citizens also placed the seat of local power in the hands of the abashingantahe, the local council of elders. “Part judge, part ombudsman, part moral interpreter, abashingantahe held their status by their respect in the local community and they often served to articulate local concerns. Although commonly (though not exclusively) Hutu, they were fully recognized within the Burundi political system in a way unknown-even adamantly opposed-in Rwanda” (Newbury, D. 2001:371). These councils provided structure to daily civilian life under the Mwami, and although were disbanded
under colonialism, were still used informally as a place of sage advice and dispute resolution. Because they were composed of townspeople and peasants and not outsiders, their authority went unchallenged among the population. The CNDD-FDD later re-created and co-opted these informal councils and in some cases, local elders, to create new councils in territories under their control, a way of connecting the past and present to give civilians some form of autonomy during the chaos of the civil war. They are continuing this strategy as the party in power: there are current plans to bring back the abashinganteha as a truth and reconciliation council. The CNDD-FDD are widely credited with this return to a more organic and traditional manner of resolution as a way of healing the scars of the war in addition to keeping Burundian history alive.

Local power also played a critical role in both colonial and independent Burundi. The colonial government inherited a state that already put in place a system of leadership that allowed for the king to exercise dominion through levels of representatives: the Belgians drew upon this system to create political chiefdoms, prefectures, and administrative zones that reflected the divisions, but not the ethnic makeup, of the system of old. Because of the linkages to the past kingdom, and the ease in which the newly Independent Burundi could be managed this way, Independent governments continued with this system as a way to reinforce the Tutsi military state under Presidents Micombero, Bagaza, and Buyoya. Local administrative units, like the nyumba-cumi (head of a ten house administrative unit), chef du zone (head of the zone, anywhere from 20 households to a small villages), and mayoral and burgomaster positions remained the backbone of political and social life for most Burundians, especially those living in rural areas far removed from the capital and national politics.
there. These positions were in fact open to all ethnicities, although Tutsi dominated the majority of the political landscape after Independence, a condition reinforced by the purge of potential Hutu challengers during the “selective genocide” in 1972. These local administrations played important roles in the lives of civilians whether in war or peacetime. In times of trouble, for example the early ethnic conflicts of 1988 and 1991 in Ntega and Marangara, local administrators were targets of violence because they were seen as instruments of the state and social arbitrators of ethnic relations. But local administrators also played the role of directing civilians to secure and safe environments and acting as the voice of authority. Thus, civilians saw local administration as both a enemy and friend. This would later serve the CNDD-FDD well, especially as they began to replace administrators with their own members during the war, co-opting this important state resource for their own benefit.

Because of the nature of historical development in Burundi and its proximity to other like kingdoms in the Great Lakes that shared similar cultures and influence, a review of the larger regional history already discussed in Chapter 3 shows similarities and differences among pre-colonial, colonial and post-Independence political and social life. I explore this phenomenon again later with the large number of existing rebel groups in the region (Chapter 6) to understand how history shaped the present in this regard. As one scholar stated, “the existence of Rwanda, Burundi, or even Uganda is not surprising… what is surprising is the persistence of profound internal conflict in such integrated countries” (Chretien 2003:42). These histories become especially critical given the comparisons many scholars make between Burundi and its northerly
neighbor, Rwanda, with some calling them ‘twins’ and others more fittingly, ‘false twins’ (Lemarchand 2009:ch. 1).

In the pre-colonial era, several kingdoms existed side-by-side in the Great Lakes region. Those of the Buganda, Rwanda, and Burundi made up the most contiguous ‘states’ by the late 19th century. Some peripheral kingdoms were subsumed under larger, more aggressive neighbors, like those of Western Rwanda who joined Rwanda in the eighteenth century, and others were generally peaceful and left to their own devices, like the Ha of Eastern Tanzania. While the kingdoms differ in their levels of organization and centralization, Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda’s kingdoms all provided structure to the modern state, and a historical legacy of state and society relations that structured how rebellion occurs.

**Buganda**

Although not as organized and centralized as either Rwanda or Burundi, the pre-colonial kingdom of Buganda provided structure and organization for the clans of what composes modern-day Uganda. Referring back to Chapter 3, pre-colonial Uganda comprised of many kingdoms with varying structures, most of which existed side by side with little violence or battles for subjugation between them. The largest kingdom, the Bunyoro, never controlled a large enough claim either through territory or population to create a cohesive pre-colonial structure, and fell in the eighteenth century. Smaller regional kingdoms provided some structure and governance within proscribed territories, but no wars of conquest or expansion allowed for these kingdoms (the Toro, Nkore, Buzimba, Buhweju, Giseka and Bugesera) until the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. After Bunyoro fell, the Buganda kingdom was able to become dominant
through territorial conquest and protectorate-ship, shaping the perception of the British colonial power that Buganda historically dominated others and thus providing an internal power network to rely on.

In colonial Uganda, the British first explored the territory through Protestant missionaries, seeking to establish religious networks among the Bugandan and flailing Bunyoro kingdoms. By the 1880s, the government of Britain stepped in and claimed Uganda territorially, with boundaries firmed up by the early 1900s. True consolidation by internal Ugandan kingdoms did not take shape until 1896, with the smaller kingdoms, including Nkore, Toro and Bunyoro, subsumed under the Buganda in moves by both the Bugandan kingdom reinforced by colonial actors trying to create an indirect system of rule. Although the Bagandans dominated the political landscape during colonialism, the prioritization of the Bagandan ethnic group above all others did not emerge: this is due to British creation of an educated social class that swept across ethnic lines and acted as the British representation in-country and a potentially self-governing body.

This history shaped relationships between civilians and the Ugandan state by providing a template of regionally based loyalties and divisions that ensured no one ethnic group was able to effectively dominate the post-Independent state, either due to size or political strength. This also meant that the Ugandan state always reflected fractured goals and identities. Even though British colonial rule developed a new social class based on education as opposed to ethnicity or region, strong loyalties to region and ethnicity kept this sentiment from growing and instigating any sort of “pan-Ugandan” movement, although similar ethnic groups and regional affiliates would support each other across political lines and create alliances. These fractures also led to dysfunction
in post-Independence politics, specifically in the development of dictatorial regimes based on personalities rather than ethnicity, like that of military commander Idi Amin.

The population did play a significant role during the 1981-1986 Bush War, however, in providing local support to Museveni’s NRA rebels. For most of the 1970s, Ugandan civilians suffered torture and terror at the hands of Amin. Even when Obote re-claimed power in 1980, the political and social rights of Ugandans were severely limited, and most thought the elections rigged. Ugandan civilians were then willing to provide support to rebels not based on the previously existing state-society relations, but rather based on political alienation and disconnect with government regimes that seemed to care little for them.

**Rwanda**

Scholars have devoted much energy to the study of Burundi vis-à-vis Rwanda and vice-versa, because the two countries are roughly equal in size, ethnic makeup, and culture, and provide for a ‘natural comparison’. The most prominent work on the two, simply entitled *Rwanda and Burundi* (Lemarchand 1970), studies in-depth pre-colonial history, differences and similarities in colonial policies as well as early post-Independence governance, finding that while it is useful to compare the two, it may be unwarranted to focus so heavily on their sameness. In the pre-colonial era, the kingdom of Rwanda experienced far more cohesion and oppression than that of Burundi. In pre-colonial Rwanda, as in Burundi, it is thought that the Hutu and Tutsi migrated into the area in the 6th and 14th centuries, respectively, to live alongside the native Bantu Twa. But there is a caveat: historiography of the region is generally considered to be myth until much later, with one scholar noting that “political hypotheses only become reliable
around the seventeenth century” (Chretien 2003:13). Even with this caution of over-reliance on pre-colonial history, a comparison of the two kingdoms yields fruitful insight. A major difference in the two kingdoms was the pre-colonial seat of loyalty: whereas as local leaders had far more authority and power in Burundi, in Rwanda, loyalty was to the center. This created more cohesion and less regional friction, but also left civilians less free. Catherine Newbury highlights the client-patron system in its effects of reducing local power and reliance on kinship in favor of the Tutsi elite at the center of the kingdom in Rwanda (1990). This continued even into colonialism and Independent Rwanda, where the state exercised enormous control over the citizenry. Like Burundi, the Rwandan state comprised a centralized hierarchal of administrative units, from the local to the national. This structure helped the Rwandan state to gain explicit knowledge about local communities, including ethnic makeup and social relations. Some have posited that this structure lead to the hypothesis of ‘knee-jerk’ loyalty in the Rwandan Genocide in 1994, meaning that this ingrained loyalty to a centralized authority figure caused citizens to follow blindly orders to kill their neighbors (as discussed in Straus 2006:149 and Collins 1998). During the genocide, the knowledge the hierarchal state had spent decades collecting came to fruition, as community leaders and administrators were able to compose death lists of all Tutsi living within the commune. Administrators had both the tools (the citizens) and the information necessary to rid the country of the “Tutsi scourge”, culling the population by almost seventy-five percent.

Thus, in Rwanda historical patterns of control dominated as opposed to Burundi’s historical patterns of cooperation.
Eastern Congo

Congolese pre-colonial history and state formation, as it were, did not occur in the same organic fashion as in Rwanda, Burundi, and Uganda. In the intralacustrine region, Eastern Congo stands out as the primary exception to the rule of small kingdoms assimilated to produce the modern state. In fact, the only kingdom, as it were, that existed as an entity comparable to the other states was that of Ijiwi, a large island in Lake Tanganyika about halfway between Southern Burundi and present day South Kivu province, DRC. This kingdom did not play nearly the central role to the development of Eastern Congo in the same way that they did in other parts of the region. Although the Kongo kingdom dominated pre-colonial relationships between clans and tribes in the country and the European traders, they fell from power in the 18th century, leaving a power vacuum upon which the colonial state imposed a top-down loosely controlled network of trading posts under the guise of the Belgian kingdom. At the Berlin conference of 1884-1885, the Congo was the only territory to be awarded to a non-state power in Western Europe, given the name of the Congo Free State, to be administered and profited from solely by King Leopold II. When international outrage over working conditions in the burgeoning rubber industry and modern slavery arose, the Belgian government annexed the possession in 1908, adding to its growing Central African empire. From almost the moment Western explorers stepped foot on Congolese soil, the size of any potential territory proved daunting. Colonial administration under the Congo Free State amounted to little more than provincial trading posts located along strategic routes with few connections between outposts, and difficulties in transportation and communication from one side of the territory to the other. This inability to project
power over much of the territorial conquest continued under the Belgian colonial administration, initially based in Boma, but moved to Leopoldville (now Kinshasa), thousands of miles from other outposts in Stanleyville (now Kisangani). Thus, in addition to facing challenges of hundreds of ethnic groups, diverse environments and conditions, colonial rulers and those who would follow encountered the challenge of a seemingly vast territory. This disjointedness as a result of size remains a facet of governance in the Congo, even today, with Herbst noting that the DRC is especially prone to rebellion because the population is decentralized and far from the center (2000). Citizens in one part of the country did not resemble those of their erstwhile countrymen, and this led to disconnect not only between the state, whether colonial or independent, and civilians, but also between civilians themselves. This severely limited the impact of popular protests during the time of Independence to form a more inclusive state that accurately reflected views across the entire population. This problem allowed for political power to remain geographically concentrated, first in the hands of Leopoldville colonialists, then in the hands of Kishasa (Kinois) leadership. Even though political leaders rose to prominence from outside of Kinshasa, like Ernest Wamba dia Wamba and Laurent-Desire Kabila, both from the East, they were still seen as outsiders on the main political stage, and the differences between political figures from the East and West remained a splinter point in Congolese politics. The size of the country also allowed for more contentious ethnic and regional clashes, both immediately preceding Independence as well as throughout the history of Independent Congo and Zaire. Social relations between the Congolese Independent State and the citizenry also suffered from the problem of separatist outbreaks frequently occurring as a result of both the enormity of
the country and the diversity of people within and the meddling of outside forces. Katanga, also called Shaba, broke away almost immediately on July 11, 1960, eleven days after the declaration of Independent Congo, led by noted anti-Mobutist and still-active politician, Moïse Tshombe. Kasai followed suit. On both sides, foreign assistance poured in, to either protect valuable mining interests in Katanga and Kasai, the two richest provinces or to support Lumumba’s government. The United Nations, the USSR and the United States all played pivotal roles in the events of the next few years, although the interests and desires of the Congolese people themselves, and their ability to form social organization or for rebels to rely on this kind of internal support were limited by outside force. This eventually culminated in the death of the popular nationalist Patrice Lumumba, supposedly at the hands of the United States (De Witte 2008), and the forcible return of Katanga and Kasai to the Congolese Union. Outside Influences were not only instrumental in the Independence rebellions, however, but continued to remain a problem in Congolese society and politics. In the Southern provinces, mining interests and a supportive government in Angola provided haven for new Katangan rebels to conduct raids, redirect resources, and provide materiel.

In the east, Rwanda, Burundi and Ugandan co-ethnics and even some political regimes provided material support and access to markets for Congolese citizens over the years. Porous cross-border regions in Kivu Sud and Kivu Nord ensured that the migration of Hutu and Tutsi civilians of Congolese, Burundian or Rwandan citizenship occurred at a steady pace for the 20th and 21st centuries, increasing during times of conflict. This cross-border migration also proved problematic during the Great Congo War that began in 1996, for although Kabila received crucial support from both Rwanda and Uganda,
many accused him of having Kinyarwanda blood, spreading the widely-accepted rumor that his son, Joseph Kabila (to become the president of Congo in 2001 after the death of the elder Kabila) was the son of a Rwandan Tutsi mother. The close linkages between Rwanda’s RPF government and the Banyamulenge (Congolese ethnic Tutsi) also sparked ethnic clashes in the border provinces during the war. After the war, the problem of ethnically driven violence and conflict in North and South Kivu continued unabated, with Mai-Mai militia (local ethnic community members) fighting against Banyamulenge rebels who often acted with Rwandan RPF support, like the CNDP (*Congrès national pour la défense du peuple*) or the newly emergent M23.

Overall, the history of Congo shaped social relations in such a way that citizens had very little connections to the central authority in Kinshasa, most often finding bonds with either outside actors or governments, or within their own ethnic or geographic communities. Even though the initial response of citizens to Lumumba was one of hope and change, this overall pattern of disconnect de-emphasized loyalty to the Mobutu regime and made uniting the country under a rebel faction or potential political challenger incredibly difficult.

**The Great Lakes States are Feudal, Too?**

After this brief description of the pre-colonial history of the region, the question arises of the fit of the Western understanding of the process of historical state development here. It seems fitting to describe some parts of the Great Lakes region as one of the few places in sub-Saharan Africa where the kingdoms closely match the modern-day states like the feudal states that underpin Western Europe. This is exemplified by the Rwandan kingdom, historically aggressive towards neighbors, power
concentrated at the center of the kingdom, and the building of the kingdom through
territorial conquest. Maquet’s standard text *The Premise of Inequality* (1961) highlighted
the elaborately feudal system that supposedly composed pre-colonial Rwanda, and
became the dominant narrative about historical development between the lordly Tutsi
and the peasant Hutu in Rwanda, later extended to Burundi by virtue of nearness and
similarity. In Burundi although similar relationships existed, the structure of society was
such that local loyalties dominated those over loyalties to the monarchy. Even in pre-
colonial Uganda, ‘feudalism’ as it was, only existed across small swaths of territory
associated with particular kingdoms, and even then these kingdoms understood
relationships between king and subject very differently than in Western Europe or even
in Rwanda and Burundi. As for the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Kongo
kingdom operated as a slave trader for European interests by conquering smaller tribes
through war and violence and then selling them into slavery. This vaguely resembles
feudalism in that the kingdom grew its power through conquest and expansion.
However, the kingdom never existed across the whole of modern day DRC and unlike
other places in the region where kingdoms expanded and grew their political and social
power into the modern age, the Kongo kingdom largely disappeared by the 1700s. It
would be a misunderstanding of history to assume that feudalism shaped all citizen-
state relationships across the Great Lakes and provided a template for social
interactions that influenced modern day rebellion. This certainly finds little ground in the
Congo, the site of literally hundreds of rebel movements since Independence in 1960, or
in Uganda, where the existence of a plethora of kingdoms and ethnic groups precluded
any overarching dominant historical development. However, the existence of long-
standing relationships of authority and social protections that developed in pre-colonial Rwanda and Burundi did structure civilian-state relationships there, in ways that still resonate in the modern era. Thus a more appropriate statement about the links between feudalism, social relations and the Great Lakes may be that in Rwanda and Burundi conditions bloomed that allowed for social structures conducive to using civilians, either by the state (as in the Rwandan Genocide) or by the rebel organization against the state (as in Burundi). Overall all, however, it is difficult to accept an assumption of a pattern of state and society formation vis-à-vis feudal structures.

**Social Power and Temporal Linkages in Civil Wars**

The variable of social power as I define it is an extremely important variable during all phases of a civil war from inception to most importantly to this study, post-conflict. Furthermore, rebel organizations may likely face an uphill battle in changing the initial conditions of the source of social power. This means that once a relationship has been established (or conversely, has failed to be established), it can be difficult to rewrite the behaviors of the rebel towards the civilian or vice-versa. This is not to say that this cannot be done, as in the case of the NRA in Uganda in 1981 or the SPLA in Sudan in the 1980s, but when doing so, the rebel organization must recalculate potential costs and benefits. I mention these because building civilian support and re-shaping state institutions is a potentially more forward thinking strategy than simply winning the war and hoping to rule through military strength. While the level of organization contributes to the cohesion of the rebel group and the unity of the movement overall, without building a foundation and having enough supporters to see
the movement to its goal of changing state power, these goals may go unrealized. A diagram provided in Figure 5-2 illustrates how this occurs during a civil war.

**Civilian Support before the War**

In the lead-up to civil war, civilian support and the subversion of state structures helps to build the networks and capabilities of would-be rebels. In Burundi, civilian support for FRODEBU, the pre-cursor to CNDD-FDD and the party of Melchior Ndadaye and Leonard Nyangoma, was very high before the war. This was thought to be the party that would usher in a new period of peace and prosperity and the beginning of majority rule democracy, and the honeymoon period following the June 1993 elections had not yet faded. The mood at the time was one of “pluralist democracy” and the “promise of a civil society free of ethnic violence, where citizenship would no longer be held hostage by ethnic identity” (Lemarchand 1996, p. xiii). The party itself started clandestinely among students and Hutu elites in the late 1980s, with Ndadaye and others organizing a worker’s party united around the needs of civilians, and received legalization in 1992, before the 1993 elections. While the election was not won on ethnic lines, (FRODEBU won with sixty-five percent of the vote, and mostly Tutsi UPRONA landed thirty-five percent, not reflective of actual demographics), it was nonetheless assumed by those in political and military circles to be indicative of the advent of Hutu power in Burundi, despite the fact that President-elect Ndadaye immediately assembled a multi-ethnic, multi-party government, including several prominent Tutsi promoted to positions of power, like Sylvie Kinigi as prime minister and Jean-Marie Ngendahayo as minister of foreign affairs. This was largely due to the fact that “FRODEBU's undercover propaganda (during the 1993 election) was largely based on this (ethnic) issue”
(Ninodera 2012:11). Thus, projections to the outside community showed a multi-ethnic movement committed to democracy, but internally, FRODEBU leaders and rousers depended greatly upon the ethnic card as a way to gain voters. This simmering ethnic tension that arose between both those who relied on ethnic calls to vote during the election (FRODEBU) and those who were threatened by a shift to ethnic power (UPRONA) made for increasingly explosive conditions in the fall of 1993, especially between the armed forces and the government. In a pattern to be repeated often over the next two decades, civilians were caught in the middle when violence did break out with the assassination of Ndadaye in October, followed quickly by the gathering of youth militia and armed groups in the capital city.

While most accounts understand the rising of the Hutu-led insurgency as a response to the assassination and crackdowns by the Tutsi army and government-sponsored youth groups, the question arises of whether support for armed insurrection arose before the election. There is some evidence that civilians were willing to support an armed insurgency, both within FRODEBU and within PALIPEHUTU (FNL), although initially the Palipehutu more willingly engaged in violent acts against the government and civilians. In some interviews, former rebels mention the influence of Palipehutu in training and driving Frodebuists (official supporters and party members) to violence.² The Palipehutu-FNL had been making raids on towns in border communes near Tanzania since the early 1990s, destroying property, pillaging, and sometimes killing Tutsi civilians. A further investigation into the history of the PALIPEHUTU-FNL below shows their development, influence and interaction with the CNDD-FDD.

254
A Parallel Movement: The FNL

As detailed in previous chapters, the PALIPEHUTU-FNL -first named the *Parti pour la libération du peuple hutu* (Palipehutu) upon creation in 1980, later amended to Palipehutu-FNL (*Forces nationales de libération*) in 1985, and finally changed again to FNL in accordance with new legislation requiring no ethnic ties in names of political parties in late 2008- was created much earlier than the CNDD-FDD, finding its roots among the refugee camps in Western Tanzania stemming from the 1972 genocide. Remy Gahutu created the group in 1980 in the refugee camp known as Mishamo, and in the following years held elections, congresses, and even created party pillars: self-awareness, unity, the party, leadership, and the armed branch (*umuheto*). In 1984, the movement created the youth league (*Jeunes Patriotique Hutu*) as well as the women’s movement (*Movement Femmes du Patriotiques Hutu*), echoes of which would be later seen in the creation of these same divisions in the CNDD-FDD. In fact, many future CNDD-FDD members got their start in the Palipehutu while it was actively recruiting in refugee camps in Tanzania. The refugee camps made for easy recruits for both the Palipehutu and later on, the CNDD-FDD, because of the development of what Liisa Malkki terms a “Hutu cosmology”, a mythico-historical narrative developed about the genocide of 1972 that was taught and reinforced by survivors and refugees. This narrative was incredibly influential in not only the foundational story of the Palipehutu, but also of the CNDD-FDD, who referred to themselves as “Les Orphelins du Genocide”, and even the Rwandan Hutu Power narrative that begat the genocide there in 1994. Gahutu died somewhat mysteriously in 1990, under uninvestigated circumstances while in police custody in Tanzania. After Gahutu died, Etienne Karatasi
took over, and cross-border attacks aimed at the Tutsi military continued unabated throughout 1991. In 1992, leadership again changed to Cossan Kabura, a militant trained in Rwanda and much quicker to use armed insurrection and combat as a tactic than previous leaders. He remained in power for most of the civil war, until an overthrow by Agathon Rwasa, the current leader, in 2001.

The Palipehutu-FNL undoubtedly influenced the CNDD-FDD in numerous ways: in their philosophy, structure and recruitment strategies. The CNDD-FDD would later use refugee camps in both Tanzania and the Eastern DRC as potential pools of recruits during the civil war. As explained earlier, the prevailing political histories in the camps, combined with contemporary conditions imposed by Tutsi-led governments created profound feelings of persecution and ethnic tension.

Before the civil war, it was fairly easy to separate Palipehutu supporters from those who supported FRODEBU, although there was a fair amount of similarities and overlapping support. As Palipehutu was not yet a political party, political support for the ‘Hutu cause’ went to FRODEBU, and support for armed insurrection went to Palipehutu. Again, Palipehutu also had a much longer history than FRODEBU, which only traced its roots to 1992, in comparison to Palipehutu’s decade long struggle against the Buyoya government. While both parties competed for the same pool of civilians and potential militants in the Hutu population, the tension between the two was not yet ripe, and some reports even state that members of the Palipehutu encouraged the FRODEBU to militarize before and in the wake of Ndadaye’s assassination. It was generally accepted that before the war Palipehutu was nothing more than a fringe group whose main contribution to the general Hutu population was to create more distrust and conflict in
the areas where they attacked between civilians and the Tutsi army, as evidenced by its attack on Tutsi civilians that prompted the incidents at Ntega/Marangara in August of 1988 (ICG 2000: 4), as discussed in Chapter 3. Furthermore, the Palipehutu was unable to gain regional support in many provinces other than Bujumbura Rurale, further localizing its insurrection.

Eventually FRODEBU put in place plans to start its own armed group, called the Génération Démocratique Burundaise (GEDEBU). GEDEBU initially began as the youth league of the political party, operating in the Bujumbura suburb of Bwiza, a section of town mostly known for its large Congolese, West African, and Muslim populations. The group began to operate almost immediately upon the death of Ndadaye, suggesting that earlier plans may have been laid for the group. In fact, some informal observers note that FRODEBU was always split between those willing to work for a political solution to end Tutsi dominance and those who wanted to pursue the “ethnic fight to the end”. The group mostly operated in the urban environment, at first discouraging citizens against participating in the ‘villes mortes’ (literally, dead cities, in French), planned protest by opposition parties that frequently devolved into violence, and later acting against the Tutsi youth militias Sans Échec (Without Failure, in French) and Sans Défait (Without Defeat, in French), in violent clashes in the streets.

For many years of the war, it was difficult for actors, civilians, and outside observers to pinpoint precisely the differences between PALIPEHUTU, CNDD-FDD, and so-called ‘FRODEBU militants’. This was likely due to the fact that at least for the early years of the war (1993-1997 for the CNDD-FDD and PALIPEHUTU together, 1993-2000 for the CNDD-FDD and FRODEBU militants together), these groups often
acted in concert with one another, sharing the battlefields in both rural and urban areas against Buyoya’s army.

**Civilian Support during the war (CNDD-FDD and FNL)**

As the war broke out, civilian support, subverting the resources of the state, and the ability to depend on a local population became critical to the CNDD-FDD strategy. Previous linkages with FRODEBU lent the movement credibility, although as discussed above, confusion about leaders, titles, and goals of the movement may have lent it more support than it actually had among the population (in the way that civilians supported local heroes or leaders associated with the movement, not necessarily realizing the greater connection between local militias and the nascent rebel organization). This is not to say that civilians were ambivalent or unsupportive of the CNDD-FDD and their goals, but that confusion sometimes ruled the day more so than anything else. By 1994, however, it was very clear to civilians, especially in areas most touched by war - the Hutu suburbs of Bujumbura, Makamba, Cibitoke, and Bubanza provinces - who the CNDD-FDD was and their intentions as to the outcome of the war. At first, the message to civilians was explicitly couched in ethnic terms. Parents who joined CNDD-FDD were often encouraged to tell their children, especially those of militant age, the story of how “they killed our President, we must seek justice for ourselves. The Tutsi are afraid of our power.”4 This changed, however, over the course of the civil war as a propaganda campaign of education conducted by mobilizateurs and civilian supporters of the CNDD-FDD, in combination with disastrous policies and practices enacted by the Buyoya government against rural (and Hutu) populations, both worked to change the way Hutu
civilians saw the role of the CNDD-FDD and their potential to change discriminatory political and social conditions.

**Civilian Support and Spreading the Message-The role of the Mobilitizeur**

But how did the CNDD-FDD recruit civilians to their cause in the first place? This message, of ethnic tension and retribution, helped to entice future CNDD-FDD members and supporters. This message was spread by local supporters and *mobilitizeurs* (mobilizers), members of CNDD’s political faction whose job it was to spread ideology and recruit new supporters, both militant and political. These mobilitizeurs were generally, but not always, politically active members of the community who were recruited early on and expected to maintain their political roles in the group following the end of conflict. The methods employed by these members included secret house meetings and the spreading of tracts of support and encouragement among the population. These actors were extremely influential in garnering material support for the FDD armed faction of the group as well: collecting food, firewood, and potential laborers for the group when asked. According to interviews, these mobilitizeurs did not directly participate in conflict, and their roles were confined to political actions. Thus, they were not soldiers or combat participants, but rather acted as the political extension and link between actions the CNDD-FDD pursued on the battlefield against the FAB and the civilian population, who could provide support for military operations as well as a symbol non-armed protest against the Buyoya regime and potential voters or supporters for the CNDD-FDD. This strategy grew more refined as the political philosophy and goals of the rebel organization developed: while initially, mobilitizeurs acted almost exclusively in support of increasing the brute strength
and capacity of the CNDD-FDD fighters (through supplying troops with food, shelter, and materiel), fairly early on (according to one interview, as early as 1996/1997 in Kabere, a commune in Bubanza, these actors began to organize lessons for civilians on democracy and democratic governance at the root of the CNDD-FDD.

The CNDD-FDD pursued a strategy of using civilians as mobilitizeurs for three reasons: the legacy of relationships between authority and civilian in Burundi, the realization that victory would not come as a result of superior military might or tactics, and protecting future interests. The legacy of Burundian state-society interactions detailed in Chapter 3 show that even under the pre-colonial kingdom, local authority figures patterned ways of communication from elite political and social figures to civilians in such a manner that continued to structure behavior even in the modern era. Thus, during the civil war when the rebel organization CNDD-FDD and its elite commands and soldiers were seen as the authority figure for rural residents, mobilitizeurs stepped in to provide a connection between citizen and ruler, and a way for civilians to both understand decisions made by CNDD-FDD as well as provide feedback. Additionally, very recent memories of these kinds of political actions stemming from the failed 1993 elections remained fresh in Burundian minds, with mobilitizeurs playing key roles in the FRODEBU victory (Nindorera 2010). The CNDD-FDD also realized early on that the chance of a military victory defeating the FAB was incredibly unlikely. The rebel organization simply could not win on material strength or capability (as opposed to the RPF who were supported by foreign assistance, trained in military tactics and strategy and prepared for long-term warfare), and thus would need to rely on civilian support to show both the Government of Burundi under Buyoya as
well as international actors observing the conflict that the rebel organization had the
loyalty and desire of the population behind it. Finally, the CNDD-FDD undertook specific
political action from its inception as a matter of strategic planning for the future, planning
action for not only winning the war, but also setting in place a political regime.
Mobilitizeurs were aware of the post-conflict expectation, and although it is difficult to
elucidate what the probable post-conflict expectations were at the time for these actors,
many still hold roles in the CNDD-FDD, and some even mention these roles as a
‘reward’ for their war effort. This begs the question of why civilians would choose to
become mobilitizeurs. For one, participation in the war effort in this manner was far less
costly that combat participation. Those civilians who found the message of CNDD-FDD
and its anti-Buyoya government stance enticing could contribute to the war effort
without placing themselves in mortal danger, although the Buyoya government did
imprison, torture, and even kill those thought to be colluding with the enemy. Many
mobilitizeurs also joined the cause because family or friends did (Samii 2012),
showing a bandwagon effect. Finally, as other researchers (Uvin 2009, Nindorera
2010) have elaborated on more fully, many civilians supported the message, goals and
aim of the CNDD-FDD wholeheartedly, and wanted to show this in any way they could.

**Targeting the population- Hutus and Rural Poor**

Although the CNDD-FDD presented itself as a multi-ethnic group determined to
bring Burundi back to democracy, the makeup of the rebel group, both on the political
side as well as the armed one, was filled with far more Hutu than Tutsi. Part of this was
the logic of the outbreak of the war, where ethnicity seemed to be the overarching
political concern for all parties involved. Another part of this is simple mathematics. As
one interviewee in Musigati, Bubanza province, said, “There were very few Tutsi here to begin with, and they left before the guns came. When the CNDD-FDD came, we joined in solidarity because we were all Hutu”.13 As the war progressed, serious recruitment drives also took place in the refugee camps that sprang up as Hutu civilians fled the country into eastern Congo, Rwanda, and Tanzania.

The CNDD-FDD followed the same template passed down from the PALIPEHUTU-FNL and FRODEBU of devising separate organizations for members, youth, and women. They did this for a number of purposes: the first being an organizational strategy in keeping with the way the other groups were organized, as described previously. As it seemed to be a pivotal strategy for FRODEBU for organizing citizen participation during the 1993 elections, so then, would it be a strategy used by the CNDD-FDD in preparation for future electoral politics. Again, initial recruitment and message spreading happened among Hutu civilians, because, as elaborated above, it was a more convenient strategy to define the civil war ethnically first as a result of actions by the Tutsi government and army. But as the war continued and initial ethnic clashes between CNDD-FDD and the FAB diminished after 1996, so did CNDD-FDD strategy in targeting potential allies and supporters among the population, both as a way to increase their base and as a way to differentiate themselves from the more ethnically defined PALIPEHUTU-FNL.

The Abagumyabanga

During the war, the CNDD-FDD devised plans to maintain confidentiality and secrecy against the interrogators of the Tutsi army, and in doing so, created a name for all general members of the group. The *abagumyabanga* (‘those who keep the secret’ in
Kirundi) formed as a member organization to identify and interact with fellow members both at home, as well as if forced into regroupment camps by the Tutsi army or into refugee camps abroad. Secret signals were to be used if encountering others in a drinking establishment, like marking a beer label with the ‘wings’ of the CNDD-FDD bird,\(^{14}\) as a way of contacting other members and signaling information to be passed, signals that remain in use. This organization formed the core of political and material support during the civil war, to which their name alludes - secrecy was of paramount concern during the war as to avoid detection by the government army. Mobilitizeurs were the heart of this group, but it also encompassed civilians who wished to be associated with the CNDD-FDD without necessarily holding a role as a propagandist. It is unclear either from interviews with participants, internal CNDD-FDD records, or previous academic accounts when this terminology and group came into existence: most scholarly and policy reports only reference this term in the post-conflict period to denote the general league of CNDD-FDD supporters, although interviewees referred to its use before the war.\(^{15}\) The problem also exists that to claim abagumyabanga membership at this point post-war is rather easy: because records did not exist (although mobilitizeurs and combatants in rural areas like Musigati commune claim to know all local supporters,\(^{16}\) it would be easy enough for a Burundian to claim membership for material benefit post-hoc, especially if the citizen had moved from a rural area to an urban city, where verification becomes less likely. Whatever the precise origin of the terminology, its use now separates casual supporters or non-aligned Burundians from those associated with the movement. It was expressed to me that those with membership cards became members during the war, and thus were in better
positions to rely on the CNDD-FDD political machine for employment, assistance, and protection, be it actual or psychological. I provide an example of the modern cards below. According to interviews, no cards were either issued or still in existence (again, the fog of war makes these questions unclear) from the civil war period.

I point to the name, symbols, and behaviors of this set of supporters of the CNDD-FDD to draw attention to the fact that whatever the term used, a group of civilians with a specific relationship and understanding of said relationship to the combatants of the CNDD-FDD existed during the civil war that carry over to the modern period. This long-standing association shows that the CNDD-FDD as a rebel organization thought about ties to Burundian society in ways that would continue to serve them even after the war ended, showing both their commitment to a grass-roots political movement (and not just armed insurrection) and to enlarging the size, scope, and goals of the group.

The Women’s League

The CNDD-FDD also put in place a women’s league, called Abakenyererarugamba, while they were a rebel movement. This group, like the youth league, was to act as a leadership and steering committee for women members of the party, and especially, to provide a voice for women’s issues during the war and in subsequent planning for the future. Although the role of the women’s group was naturally limited during the civil war, the movement nonetheless planned a healthy inclusion of the women’s group into politics, and involved this group in post-conflict planning as early as 2003, when the ceasefires were set in place between the CNDD-FDD and the Buyoya Government (Gasana and Boshoff 2003). Like the
Abagumyabanga, it is unclear exactly when the Abakenyererarugamba was formed or its precise origins: Party elites pointed to an early formation during the civil war, although civilians did not mention this in interviews even when directly questioned. There also seemed to be no mention of this particular terminology in newspaper accounts from *Le Reneveau* of the time. What is clear, however, is the post-war role of the group, especially in its regards to forming part of the CNDD-FDD hierarchy. As discussed in Chapter 4, Alice Nzomukunda, the ousted member of CNDD-FDD, led the women’s league from its inception until her election as vice-president. This shows two things: first, the realization of the CNDD-FDD at some point during rebellion that the inclusion of citizens, especially ones as vital to Burundian social life as women, would help to shape and share the political message following the ending of the civil war. But this of course, is somewhat cynical given that the Burundian constitution, written during the political transition of 2003-2005, includes a provision that both the National Assembly and the Senate consist of 30% female members, in proportion to party representation (i.e. the women must be from different political parties in proportion to the seats won in the National Assembly). Thus, some in CNDD-FDD may have seen the writing on the wall early on and pushed more a more inclusive group with specified roles and sub-organizations for women for this very reason. Secondly, however, it shows a willingness of CNDD-FDD political elite to recognize the importance of society in the process of politics in Burundi. I participated in many women’s group activities during the electoral cycle in 2010, including rallies, community development meetings, and social events. These events allowed for women to know local CNDD-FDD representation, to receive and share literature and propaganda paraphernalia (which would then be worn
as a physical symbol of support), and interact with other members. It also must be noted that the CNDD-FDD understood and accepted the role of women in leadership and combat even before the civil war. Sylvie Kinigi was the prime minister under the FRODEBU government (from which many of the CNDD-FDD political elite originated from) and many women actively participated in the civil war as both battle-field combatants (although the exact numbers are hardly known, with estimates ranging from 494 to 1200 (Lahai 2010:12) and auxiliary support roles. While it may be an overstatement to infer too much about either the CNDD-FDD’s potential feminist feelings regarding the women’s group or the general supporter network, it still shows some recognition between civilian-voter and rebel participant-elite that existed during and after the war.

**The Youth League, Imbonerakure**

The use of youth wings of the various political factions in Burundi to act as party mobilizers, recruiters, and sometimes even violent actors was not original to the CNDD-FDD. In fact, the youth-wing of the pre-civil war UPRONA party, the *Jeunes Revolutionaires du Rwagasore* (JRR, the Youth Revolutionaries of Rwagasore) played an important role in the genocide of 1972. Acting in concordance with the Tutsi army of the Bagaza-led government, the JRR became a secondary killing force in the rural areas, especially when dealing with Hutu students (Lemarchand 2009: 413). Like other youth wings, the CNDD-FDD’s Imbonerakure (“those who look out”) was founded on the principle of providing a place in the movement for those young (18-35), unmarried members (typically male, but there are no provisions as to sex) to participate. It is unclear from interviews or other accounts when and where the Imbonerakure was
created, although there is some recent suggestion that they were founded during the war and actively participated in combat. It is thought that these youth may have been soldiers who then transitioned into these roles as an extension of their support in the post-conflict context. Although interviewees who were combatants were reluctant to admit membership in the Imbonerakure during the period I did research, even when questioned, it is not unlikely that the transition from soldier to Imbonerakure occurred. This reluctance to admit membership had to do with both the popular rumor among the Burundian population (related to me in at least 30 conversations from May to August 2010) as well as reports by international observers and monitors (Ghoshal 2010, ICG 2009, HRW 2010) of intimidation, threats, and physical violence by the Imbonerakure to sway election results. Although their origins may be suspect, the role played by this youth group in the continued consolidation and shoring up of power post-violence is immense, discussed further below.

**State Structures and the CNDD-FDD**

Although civilian relationships are an important component of the capacity factor, the story does not end there. The other half of the variable is the ability of the rebel group to co-opt, subvert, or create new state structures, either taking over or fulfilling roles that the state would normally perform. This emphasis on new roles for the rebel organizations has a dual purpose of both preparing the group for post-conflict governance as well as showing the strength of the rebel group to the population, in its abilities to perform as well as or better than the current state and provide a credible alternative to the existing government. Hence capacity captures both axes of the triangle as described above- the state as well as civilians.

267
These relationships also capture a new dimension explored in rebel studies— that of “rebel state-building” or proto-state capacity. While some scholars explicitly reject the ideas that taking over parts of the state enterprise are a state-building function (Mampilly 2011), others find that either take-over or creation of these functions and institutions can create shadow states (Reno 1999, Reno 2000) that exist within a larger functioning state or alternatively, can provide state resources where none exist (Keister 2011). This section of the chapter focuses on how the CNDD-FDD used pre-existing state structures (and the resources available through these) and the revival or creation of new state structures in order to provide “rebel governance”, order, and support while they were a rebel organization. They did so as part and parcel of a strategy to cement relationships with civilians, subvert badly-needed material resources, and plan strategically for the future of the organization after the war. These strategies undertaken by the CNDD-FDD severely limited the options of the Government of Burundi to pursue effective counter-insurgency tactics to deter civilians from joining the movement and providing support, overall contributing to a civilians desire to see the government overturned as well as creating a legacy of support for the post-war CNDD-FDD political organization.

**Parallel Administrations**

Often times in modern civil wars, a rebel organization will set up a parallel (to the already existing state government) structure of local administration (Wickham-Crowley 1987), as was the case in Uganda under the NRA, which set up local administrative councils run by the NRA and its supporters during the Ugandan bush war (Kasfir 2005). A number of things can occur within these rebel proto-state systems: coercion of the
local leaders previous to the war, persuasion of existing leaders, replacement of unfriendly leaders with rebel supporters, or creation of entirely new administrations separate from the state enterprise. The CNDD-FDD had great success in creating parallel structures of administration for civilians under their control (Longman 1998, Nindorera 2008, 2010, ICG 2002). Especially in rural areas, where administrative control prior to the civil war already suffered from the problem of being isolated and far from the capital and seat of government, the CNDD-FDD set up local councils with elder administrative figures with tax collecting capabilities, judicial capacities, and links between combatants and civilians (as part of the mobilization and education efforts) (Longman 1998:17). These councils provided security in the form of a physical symbol of CNDD-FDD control over the territory, as well as a sounding board to bring civilian concerns to the ongoing military operation. Additionally, the councils could act as intermediaries in the flow of information between those who participated as look-outs or spies on the Government of Burundi’s military and political actions and the FDD military leadership. These parallel administrations provided a way for the CNDD-FDD to organize its civilian operations, not only providing internal logic for the movement, but more importantly, providing civilian support to the movement and vice-versa, again, cementing the relationship in hopes of sustaining it for the future. These thrived in areas under CNDD-FDD territorial control, which served to protect combatants during transit, control flows of information, and corral resources, especially in the areas between Kibira Forest (in the Northeast of the country) and Ruvubu National Park (outside of Bujumbura), including Ngozi, Karuzi, Kayanza, Bubanza, Muramvya, and Gitega provinces (Longman 1998:31). Two pictures emerge from interviews conducted in my
fieldwork: the first, from elites and combatants, of these administrations as self-run entities designed to support the larger combat effort. The second picture that emerges, from civilians, especially in areas under direct CNDD-FDD territorial control, is one of unclear understanding of what exactly these administrations did beyond providing logistical support (Longman 1998:48) although their existence was undisputed. Thus, there seems to be a concentrated effort among elites to reframe these councils as key to the war effort, whether or not civilians actually agreed with this. In interviews, civilians were able to tell me that these councils existed, and acted as ‘ubashingatahe’ (a system of local elders created under the Mwami and gradually done away with after Independence) who heard disputes between neighbors, although the nature of their authority and what the specific issues to be resolved were. The documentation of these councils in other accounts of the war confirms their existence and provides new evidence for their extent.

Local Councilmen and Co-Option of Members of Government

The CNDD-FDD also embarked on strategic co-optation of local members of the Buyoya government, to both shore up support as well as use state resources that the local members had access to, against the state. They did this in plain sight of the government by choosing Hutu members who found the CNDD-FDD cause palatable, usually former FRODEBU members. These members were already seen as susceptible to the cause, and might have been more easily enticed to joining the CNDD-FDD as a way of planning for a political future under the presumed post-war CNDD-FDD regime. The government of Burundi reacted to this by removing most Hutu politicians from positions of power, even at the lower local levels of government. By 1997, only 31 of the
121 communal administrators were Hutu, and 22 of them UPRONA (Longman 1998: 23). This was part of Buyoya’s strategy to reinvigorate the government following his July 1996 Coup, strengthen UPRONA political and social control, and shore up military dominance on the battlefield. One mobilizateur in Bubanza province (Bubanza commune) expressed that co-optation of local nyumba-cumi and zone administrators was seen as a vital role the mobilizateurs would play, because co-optation of local officials operated as both a way to get state resources and a way to spread information about the CNDD-FDD through a respected community figure.22 This strategy does not seem out of context with the larger descriptions of the creation of parallel administrations in other accounts, although it was difficult to question those who led communes during the war without some interviewer effects: i.e. I was seen in those cases as someone influenced by (and possibly spying for) the CNDD-FDD, and the answers to these types of questions were met with a fairly standard response that the leader had always supported the CNDD-FDD, even during the war.23 My translator and I discussed extensively whether or not co-opted leaders actually supported the CNDD-FDD during this time, or if they were simply hedging their bets against victory for either the CNDD-FDD or the Government of Burundi. The fog of war and the current regime made these answers difficult to ascertain with any certainty, but it seems likely that both cases existed: local leaders who were co-opted who genuinely supported the CNDD-FDD and their mission of government turnover, as well as those who wanted to protect their own political power and personal safety should either group win the war.
Creation of a Court System - Forest Justice

Many interviewees mentioned the existence of a localized court system to resolve disputes, sniff out potential spies and informers, and judge local crimes in CNDD-FDD controlled territories, especially near its operating base in Kabira Forest (Longman 1998, Nindorera 2008 and 2010). These courts were staffed by CNDD-FDD members with community ties, mostly belonging to the political faction CNDD rather than the military one FDD. There were, according to surveys with former combatants, separate justice systems for offenses committed by FDD combatants as opposed to civilian actors. Although some accused the courts of being slanted towards CNDD-FDD members, the courts were open to all civilians who lived in the area, not just active members and disputes between neighbors could easily be brought before the courts, especially ones involving conflicts over land or farming areas. There was some suggestion in interviews that these courts did operate as a way for CNDD-FDD sympathizers to gain material advantage through adjudication over their peers who did not support the rebel organization, by bribing judges and administrators, although this only came up in one singular interview in a particular area (near the rebel base location of Kibira forest) and was never highlighted again, even when I prompted civilians with this line of inquiry. As explained above, these forest courts also were presented in interviews as part of the re-emergence of the abashingatahe/village elder system of rule. There was also rumor of a high court connected to the elite levels of the CNDD-FDD operating at the main rebel base in Kibira Forest in Bubanza province, but it seemed to be use more for military violations among combatants than for civilians. The purpose of creating a court system for civilians was two-fold for the CNDD-FDD: one, by
allowing civilians to met out justice themselves, it removed a potential source of work (and headache) from the combatants of the CNDD-FDD, freeing them to focus solely on battle-related matters. Secondly, it allowed for the CNDD-FDD to build stronger relationships with civilians as they could later express the sentiment that the rebel organization tried to maintain societal order and relationships with and between civilians even in the midst of a civil war. The inclusion of civilians within administration and judicial power of the CNDD-FDD provided a credible history of the group as the true and legitimate representatives of the Burundian people and their interests, in a way that other rebel movements and even the existing Government of Burundi under Buyoya could not.

Planning for a Political Future

Observers of the political history of the CNDD-FDD point to the distinct future orientation of the group in the willingness of the political faction CNDD to negotiate and jockey for post-conflict political positions (Ninodera 2008:106-108), both in terms of dialogue with the actors involved in the civil war (the Government of Burundi, international actors who would presumably enforce provisions of peace and transitional agreements, and even fellow rebel groups) as well as with civilians. These actions were more than dialogue and political negotiation, however, towards the end of the conflict (around late 2002), the CNDD-FDD began a program of amassing a war chest to prepare for elections and the transition to a fully-functioning, fully-funded political party. They did so through the process of raising cotisation (contributions), organizing those previously involved with CNDD-FDD as either administrators or mobilitizeurs to act as collectors. Small amounts were collected on a regular basis and receipts were issued to
civilians. The physical representation of a contribution, while illegal to possess, provided physical evidence of the relationship between the rebel organization and the population. These pieces of paper were carefully hidden and kept for many years after the war (all of the examples below were obtained from 2010-2011), and treasured as a sign of CNDD-FDD support and membership. A few examples are illustrated in Figure 5-4.

**Violence against Civilians during the Burundian Civil War**

Although the chapter thus far focused on the positive aspects of the relationships affiliated civilians enjoyed with the CNDD-FDD, it cannot be said that the CNDD-FDD did not engage in violence against civilians especially those of Tutsi descent or those accused of supporting the Palipehutu-FNL. But even violence against non-supporters was matched in some geographic areas with violence against would-be Hutu supporters as a tactic of intimidation and battle strategy. Violence against civilians was unsystematic in type, temporality, or purpose. As one Burundian proverb expresses, “when two elephants fight, it is the grass that gets trampled” (Longman 1998:96). This was because as the general combat violence in the war waxed and waned over its twelve years, so did violence against and between civilians. In the ACLED (Armed Conflict Locator Events Dataset) dataset, the most comprehensive dataset (to date) on specific, geo-referenced incidences of violence during civil wars in Africa, The CNDD-FDD committed 136 separate, delineated acts of violence against civilians, defined as “Violence against civilians occurs when any armed/violent group attacks unarmed civilians. Rebels, governments, militias, rioters can all commit violence against civilians. This is the only event that involves civilians.” (ACLED codebook 2.0:11). This was over the course of the Burundian civil war that the dataset codes for, from 1997-2005.
same period of time, the Palipehutu-FNL committed 138 separate, delineated, and reported acts of violence against civilians. The reports of these events all came from international media sources, and thus while there may be some data issues, the evidence provided shows that in fact both rebel organizations committed violence against civilians. Additionally, another 543 separate events of violence against civilians are coded by the actor “Hutu Rebels”, which could mean either the Palipehutu-FNL or the CNDD-FDD. In terms of absolute numbers of casualties, the Uppsala Conflict Dictionary Dataset of One-Sided Violence v1.4-2012, during the war CNDD-FDD was responsible for 155 civilian fatalities, the Palipehutu-FNL, 427 civilian fatalities, and “Hutu Rebels”, 2564 civilian fatalities (UCDP One-Sided Violence v1.4-2012). While credible quantitative data on the exact number of fatalities committed against civilians is sparse in regards to the civil war, these data nonetheless point to the use of violence against civilians by both rebel and government as a tool of conflict. By far, the most data that exists about the CNDD-FDD and Palipehutu-FNL committing violence against civilians exists in the form of reports by Human rights organizations and international actors compiled during the war. Many of these reports specify what type of violence was committed against civilians (ethnic, sexual, or political). This helps to show the targeted nature of the use of violence against civilians as another tool to either intimidate or coerce the civilian population into supporting the rebel organization. I now move to specific discussions of the type of violence employed by the CNDD-FDD in relation to civilians.
Hutu and Tutsi Violence

Early on in the civil war as issues remained explicitly fixed in ethnic terms, so too did violence against civilians with the FDD armed branch of the CNDD-FDD attacking Tutsi civilians and Tutsi-held strongholds. Wholesale ethnic cleansing of neighborhoods occurred in Bujumbura city, and in the countryside roving bands of combatants fought the army and the civilians that supposedly supported them. It is hard to distinguish the source, nature and scope of ethnically targeted violence during the early part of the civil war (1993-early 1997) because many reporting agencies, like the United Nations or Human Rights Watch were unable to travel throughout Burundi or gather data. Many civilians when interviewed paint a picture of this time period as one of extreme chaos and violence specifically colored by ethnic tension, especially in rural areas further away from the central military capacity in Bujumbura.29 Scholars describe the events as genocidal acts by the Tutsi government army against civilians with Tutsi and Hutu civilians fighting each other in the milieu (Lemarchand 1996). In 1998, scholars estimated that over 150,000 civilians had died during the war (Ndikumana 1998:30). While the CNDD-FDD actively participated in violence against civilians and the government at this time, the Government response to “la crise” spurred civilians to join the rebel movement in droves, because of the abject failure of the state (described in Ndikumana 1998, Uvin 2009, and Lemarchand 1996) to act as anything other than a “tool of repression” (Ndikumana 1998:40), supplemented by Tutsi militia groups in a eerily similar fashion to the events of 1972. Journalistic accounts at the time (Jelinek 1994, Kiley 1994), point to the violence between “Hutu vigilantes” and Government Army. Again, while it was clear to even casual observers that the violence was ethnic in
nature and the sides clearly demarcated between Hutu and Tutsi, the exact role of the CNDD-FDD in violence against civilians at this time remains murky. This could be due to the fact (elaborated earlier in Chapter 4) that the CNDD-FDD had not yet coalesced, and many would-be CNDD-FDD belonged to smaller, unorganized or unnamed militia.

**Rape and the CNDD-FDD**

Rape became a facet of the civil war as a tactic favored by rebel groups and the FAB (*Force Armees Burundais*, the official name for the government army), especially as the first round of negotiations broke down in 1997. In asking questions about rape during interviews, many civilians were initially reluctant to give me or my translator information, because of community shaming and fear of reprisal attacks from persons in power inherent to the nature of the discussion of sexual violence in wartime (Wood 2003). We approached the questions with delicate phrasing specific to the terminology of the civil war in Burundi to determine whether rape had occurred in the geographic area, if the civilians knew someone who had been a victim, if they themselves had been subject to sexual violence, and finally, if the perpetrators were known. Interviews of civilians by human rights organizations confirm the occurrence of rape in conjunction with civilian fatalities during the war (Longman 1998:88). In interviews, a pattern emerged of rape as a tool of violence against civilians to coerce support in rebel-held areas in one of two ways: by combatants not native to the area (i.e. by Southern rebels operating in Northern provinces) or by combatants in areas thought to be too sympathetic to the Government of Burundi. Women interviewed in Kibira Forest, Musigati and Bubanza communes in Bubanza were quick to note both of these occurrences with the understanding through the interview that the perpetrators were
CNDD-FDD. An interviewee in Mpanda, a commune on the road between urban
Bubanza-ville, the seat of Bubanze province, and Bujumbura, noted that Government
soldiers raped women first, which is fitting with the long-held notion by both civilians
and international observers that the CNDD-FDD did not commit atrocities against
civilians (Longman 1998: 81), a myth long disproven.

Violence against the Palipehutu-FNL and its Supporters

1997 was also the year in which cooperation between the CNDD-FDD and the
Palipehutu-FNL broke down (although other accounts note that the two rebel
organizations had begun to fight each other almost immediately after the war broke out),
and the former collaborators began to fight each other as well as the FAB. According to
ACLED dataset for the period 1997-2005, 21 separate events of battles took place
between the CNDD-FDD and the Palipehutu-FNL, described in the dataset as a “battle-
no change of location control”, which is a battle between two violent armed groups
where control of the contested location does not change. If the government controls an
area, fights with rebels and wins, this is the correct code. If rebels control a location and
maintain control after fighting with government forces, this is the correct code. If two
militia groups are fighting, this is the correct code. Battles are the most common activity
and take place across a range of actors, including rebels, militias, and government
forces, communal groups” (ACLED codebook:6). These events are not coded to include
CNDD-FDD violence against civilians who might be affiliated with Palipehutu-FNL. The
Palipehutu-FNL was a smaller group with a far fewer territorial strongholds, and often in
the unlucky position of finding themselves in close proximity to the Government of
Burundi army, which severely impacted their abilities to fight against both the
Government of Burundi army and the CNDD-FDD. In rural areas in Cibitoke in the north or Tanzanian border provinces in the South, clashes between CNDD-FDD and Palipehutu-FNL occurred, and these areas are the places where the CNDD-FDD committed violence against civilians suspected of harboring Palipehutu-FNL allegiance (Longman 1998:88). This pattern of violence against civilians intensified as the civil war continued, and CNDD-FDD began to plan for the future and the elimination of potential political rivals. This was in fitting with the changing character of the civil war and violence, from a decidedly ethnic struggle to one of political power and authority. This pattern of violence towards civilians with Palipehutu-FNL ties spilled over into the post-conflict period, with a series of extrajudicial killings, intimidations, and political violence against FNL members in both the pre-electoral period (Ghoshal 2010) and 2011-2012 (ICG 2012, HRW 2011).

**The Palipehutu-FNL, Civilians, and the War Effort**

The Palipehutu tended to attract those Hutu civilians who felt more ethnically marginalized than others, because the message and strategy to attract followers was framed in such explicitly ethnic and anti-Tutsi form. This strategy resonated especially with those in marginalized areas of the country: the hinterlands, especially those bordering Tanzania with easy access to the refugee camps that had been there since the 1970s, and the parts of Bujumbura city that were most affected by the Tutsi stronghold on commerce, Kinama, Kenoysha, and Carama, which bordered Palipehutu-FNL strongholds in Bujumbura Rurale province.

The Palipehutu-FNL embraced a strategy of recruiting from the CNDD-FDD and other rebel movements, poaching fighters who were disgruntled with treatment and
conditions who could bring other recruits and war materials with them. This strategy was especially embraced as the civil war continued and the rebel movements grew in size and strength. This was not always a voluntary defection, with the Palipehutu-FNL being the rebel group with the most noted practice of abducting and forcing children into soldierdom, although other rebel organizations, CNDD-FDD included, also relied on forced abduction as a means of growing combat strength, although many combatants expressed they went voluntarily to join the war effort. The exceptions being those accounts found in either those that left the CNDD-FDD or in reports produced by international observers (UNHCR 2004). Voluntary recruitment age during combat was supposed to be set at 16 for both rebel and government forces, but children as young as ten participated in combat. My own housing security guard in Burundi was a child soldier recruited at age 12 to join the CNDD-FDD during the war when it spread to his commune in Mwaro province. But by and large, the convention wisdom was such that the FNL and the Government of Burundi forces employed more child soldiers gained through forced abduction in combat.

The Palipehutu-FNL also set up parallel administrations similar to those set up by the CNDD-FDD in their own rebel-controlled territory (Bujumbura Rurale province) (ICG 2002). Like the CNDD-FDD, the FNL also prepared for the future elections while operating as a rebel organization, also collecting cotisation, even when it was still an active fighting force (2005-2009).
Civilian Support after the war (CNDD-FDD)

The Building of a Political Party: Disparate Goals and New Cleavages

With the war coming to a close with the signing of the Arusha Accords and various ceasefires in 2003, the CNDD-FDD was now tasked with the difficult process of changing a rebel movement into a political party expected to conduct itself as such: i.e. avoiding violence and gathering supporters while navigating a complicated transitional government system. At least, initially, however, public support and the backing of international authorities painted a rosy picture for the incoming CNDD-FDD (Uvin 2009).

At elite levels, a new program to re-invigorate former Tutsi politicians who participated in FRODEBU or those seen as willing to join with CNDD-FDD began. This involved courting politicians through promises of new posts and increased ethnic and political dialogue in the hopes of bringing democratic reform in the spirit of Ndadaye and the 1993 elections to Burundi. The CNDD-FDD courted Jean-Marie Ngendahayo, the Tutsi former member of FRODEBU who was appointed Minister of the Foreign Affairs and the Interior under Ndadaye from 1993-1995 and his wife, Antoinette Batumubwira, to become part of the new political movement and highlight the multi-ethnic character of the movement. But the new recruitment was not limited to Tutsi, it also included formerly non-political Hutu, like Hafsa Mossi, who left Burundi to pursue a career in international journalism at the beginning of the civil war, returning when the CNDD-FDD took power to become the presidential spokesperson.

The continuing use of the militia: Imbonerakure as Intimidation and Enforcement

As the nature of the CNDD-FDD has changed in the transition from war to peace, so too, has the nature of the Imbonerakure, the CNDD-FDD youth league. As I
explicated above, there exists an assumption positing that many members of the Imbonerakure were combatants during the civil war, and thus the Imbonerakure is merely a continuation of political violence in the post-conflict period. The league became especially active in politics around 2007-2008, when the first accusations of political assassinations were leveled against the CNDD-FDD. In the years since, many former members have come forward confirming that the Imbonerakure’s ‘job’ as it were in the party is enforcement, including within party discipline as well as attacks on Palipehutu-FNL members (Ghoshal 2010, HRW 2012). Their roles only grew as the CNDD-FDD attempted to consolidate power in the post-conflict era. But this consolidation was only possible because of the foundation built during the war, attracting members to the cause, setting in place networks, and gathering intelligence for the post-war political climate. Furthermore, some interviewees not in CNDD-FDD living in urban environments (where violence tends to be concentrated) suggested that former combatants were being paid to participate in Imbonerakure and carry out violent acts.38

**Why CNDD-FDD and not FNL?**

When examining the two rebel groups, CNDD-FDD and Palipehutu-FNL, the question that most frequently arises is that given similar histories and trajectories, as well as similar objectives during an ethnic civil war, why did the CNDD-FDD succeed in transforming itself into a dominant political movement, while the Palipehutu-FNL has had to settle for localized levels of support and has proven unable to win national elections? The reasons for varying levels of support are context dependent upon the particular province and commune, but several global reasons can be found for the CNDD-FDD’s success over the FNL in the post-conflict political struggle. The CNDD-
FDD earned more general widespread support than the Palipehutu-FNL, which chooses to pursue deeper ties with smaller communities rather than global linkages in several provinces across Burundi. While it was true the CNDD-FDD had its own territorial strongholds, these were less a factor of inability to expand (like that which plagued the Palipehutu-FNL) than a matter of strategic location of bases to engage the FAB in the civil war. The CNDD-FDD was also able to win more support than the Palipehutu-FNL in terms of the messages delivered to civilians. The CNDD-FDD, although mostly Hutu, always embraced a message of multiethnic composition, welcoming Tutsi into the political factions, appointing Tutsi to important roles in the post-conflict government as a further sign of the commitment to ending ethnic conflict. The Palipehutu-FNL, on the other hand, routinely acted with violence against Tutsi civilians, including mass killings at Bugendana displaced persons camp and other gatherings of Tutsi non-combatants. And the group did not change its message until forced to by the post-conflict government in 2006, when it began to actively recruit Tutsi to the cause (with little success). Historically, the group never opened itself to Tutsi participation.

Even presently, the Palipehutu-FNL represents itself as the party of Hutu and non-urban (read as explicitly Tutsi, Business or Political Elite) interests. The CNDD-FDD was more willing to negotiate with community actors and promise post-conflict political gains to win support and encourage civilians to follow the rebel movement. This ingratiated the movement to the communities they operated in, and as word spread of the actions of the movement, engendered good will on a larger scale. The Palipehutu-FNL, on the other hand, kept power localized to specific regions of Burundi. Thus, the CNDD-FDD was seen as an internal movement, created for all of Burundi, while the
Palipehutu-FNL were seen as outsiders with desires to only represent their own interests. Finally, the CNDD-FDD had great success in dictating the narrative to civilians of being provoked into war by an unyielding Tutsi oligarchy intent on murdering all potential Hutu challengers, whereas the Palipehutu-FNL was seen as an agitator force, from its attacks on civilians in 1988 to its attacks on the city of Bujumbura when peace negotiations broke down in 2008.

Decentralization and Building Civilian Support in Civil Wars

Decentralization of authority, as examined in Chapter 3, plays an important role in the battle conduct of a civil war. But how then, does decentralization affect the relationships between civilians and rebels during the war? It is a question worth considering when looking at the political history and trajectory of the CNDD-FDD, to understand how this organization could have not succeeded militarily and succeeded politically. Or to be blunt, why the FDD (armed branch) failed and the CNDD (political branch) succeeded, both during the war and after. Whereas in armed conflict, separately organized cells are less advantageous than having an overarching leadership, in political organizations, whether leadership is global or local is unimportant (up to a certain point) because support is built in either case. Thus, the fact that decentralization was a central feature of both the CNDD political branch and the FDD armed branch of the movement was a favorable development in building long-term political support among civilians. Furthermore, while both arms of the movement can be characterized by this level of organization, the decentralization was not nearly as severe among the CNDD political faction, as the struggles over leadership and tactics simply never emerged among the mobilitizeurs and political organizers. And the political faction
did at one point gain a strong leader (and an increase in centralization of authority) in the form of Hussein Radjabu, the second in command of the CNDD-FDD under both Jean-Bosco Ndayikengurukiye (1998-2001) and Peter Nkurunziza (2001-2005) with de facto authority over the political activities of the CNDD. Radjabu knit a cohesive political strategy that he was effectively able to use especially in regards to post-conflict planning for both political power of the CNDD-FDD in Burundian politics, as well as his own personal political power. I use these examples to illustrate that while decentralization in the armed branch of the CNDD-FDD worked as a potential deterrent to victory through combat, when it came to managing civilian relations, subverting the state, and building credibility among a population needed to sustain the rebel organization long-term, the effects were opposite. Even though for most of the organization’s life span as a rebel group the political faction CNDD was highly disorganized and decentralized, this positively affected the ability of the group in regards to its source of social power. And even though resulting loyalties post-conflict are uneven (rural areas tend to favor CNDD-FDD in much higher proportions than urban areas, and certain areas (Bubanza and Cibitoke most notably) are thought to be strongholds), the memory of CNDD-FDD and civilian support during the civil war remains an important factor in citizens’ minds. It is assumed, then, that this legacy matters more to the abilities of the CNDD-FDD to retain political power than the manner by which it was accomplished.

**Conclusion**

This chapter explored how civilian support and the ability of the CNDD-FDD to subvert and change state structures contributed to the group’s success as post-conflict
political power holders. While not the materially most capable actor during the civil war, the CNDD-FDD nonetheless emerged victorious, gaining control of the state during the transition and maintaining political power of Burundi since 2005. In this chapter, I examined how the roots and nature of the social linkages between the CNDD-FDD, civilians trapped in between the government and the rebels during the war, and pre-existing Burundian state structures interacted. The CNDD-FDD used civilians during the war, creating social structures for them, both new and borrowed from the existing state. These actions provided a legitimate way for the CNDD-FDD to connect and build credibility among civilians in a way that extended beyond mere physical protection and safety, a good the rebel organization was sometimes incapable of providing. In doing so, the rebel group kept a sharp eye on the future of the movement as it planned for a post-conflict existence gaining political power in Burundi, with the help of the citizens who supported it in the bush.

**Tables and Figures**

![Diagram of Relations in Civil Wars](image)

Figure 5-1. Diagram of Relations in Civil Wars
Figure 5-2. Temporalities and Interactions with Civilians

Figure 5-3. Abagumyabanga membership cards, CNDD-FDD
Figure 5-4. Examples of Cotisation Receipts, 2001-2004
Notes

1 This is important because in the post-colonial period, rebel organizations in Burundi found more ground among civilians when challenging the center, whereas in Rwanda they did not. Clearly, this history had left its mark.

2 Personal Interview, March 21, 2011 and January 22, 2011

3 Personal Interview, March 21, 2011

4 Personal Interview, October 10, 2010

5 Personal Interview, April 2, 2011

6 Personal Interview, April 2, 2011

7 Personal Interview, March 21, 2011

8 Personal Interview March 24, 2011

9 Personal Interview February 27, 2011, January 13, 2011 and March 23, 2011

10 Personal Interview, February 12, 2011

11 Personal Interview, March 7, 2011


13 Personal Interview, February 12, 2011

14 Personal Interview, January 29, 2011

Personal Interview, February 17, 2011

Personal Interview, November 13, 2010

Personal Interviews November 21, 2010 and December 5, 2010


Keister 2011 describes this as “the relative mix of coercion, service provision, and ideological positioning” (p. 29).

Personal Interviews March 4, 7, 8, 9, 23, 25, 2011 and January 28, 29, 2011

Personal Interview, March 14, 2011

Personal Interviews, March 2, 2011 and March 21, 2011

Personal Interviews, November 11, 14, and 17, 2010 and February 16, 21, and 25, 2011

Personal Interviews February 12, 2011 and February 9, 2011

Personal Interview, March 9, 2011

Personal Interview, March 23, 2011

Personal Interviews, December 10, 11, 2011 and May 3, 7, 8, 2011
Again, asking questions of who perpetrated rape, especially if the CNDD-FDD was responsible, was incredibly difficult because of my suspected ties to CNDD-FDD and more general suspicions that community leaders would find out and punish these women.
CHAPTER 6
REBELS, WAR, THE GREAT LAKES AND SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Introduction

In the Great Lakes, rebellion began in earnest with the birth of the National Resistance Army/Movement (NRA/M) as a revolt against the regime of former collaborator Milton Obote in 1980. Although seeming to affect only the internal politics of Uganda at the time, this new movement would cause reverberations throughout the region spanning the next three decades, fundamentally reshaping the dialogue and action of political change there. From its inception, the NRA gave weight to a new philosophy in post-colonial politics: that change was possible, and indeed, necessary from the one party dictatorial regimes that took shape after Independence. Taking insights from the in-depth examination of the CNDD-FDD in Burundi, this chapter explores the other rebel turned ruler transformations in the region: the NRA in Uganda, the RPF/A (Rwandan Patriotic Front/Army) in Rwanda, and the AFDL (*Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Zaïre*) in the Democratic Republic of Congo. While these movements differ in their organizational strategies and sources of social power, they all came about in a region sharing remarkable political, social and economic similarities (especially between Rwanda and Burundi) and emerged out of individual civil wars. Some states in the region also shared analogous pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial histories, and thus I examine the legacies of state conditions and antecedent development in the creation of the rebel organizations as well. In doing so, this chapter illustrates the core logic of the argument presented about rebel to ruler transitions and post-rebel outcomes. After examining these case studies, the chapter
then proceeds to a larger examination of rebel to ruler transitions across sub-Saharan Africa.

**Why the Great Lakes?**

As explored in Chapter 3, some countries in the Great Lakes share similar pre and post colonial histories, especially in terms of previously existing ethnic structures and state cohesiveness and the fragmented politics that resulted after the colonialists left. As independent nations of their own, these countries all experienced military and dictatorial regimes, economic pressures, and eventually, massive political upheaval and civil war. These wars ranged in scope and duration of violence, from the relatively mild Ugandan Civil War- sometimes called the Ugandan Bush War- (1981-1986) with about 100,000 estimated casualties to the all-out destruction of the Civil War in Congo, which became “Africa’s First World War”, ending in over three million casualties. The countries all share primary dependence on agriculture, with the exception of the Democratic Republic of Congo, whose natural resource wealth provides most of its gross domestic product, and rank poorly on the Human Development Indicators Index- Rwanda 166, Burundi-185, the DRC-187, and Uganda-161(in 2011), indicating similar lack of development, advancements in education and public health. With all these similarities in country conditions and civil wars, however, different patterns of organizational power and the sources of social power emerged among the various rebel groups that would eventually come to power, as referred to in Table 1-1.

**The NRA.** The first movement to rise from rebel to ruler in the region was Uganda’s National Resistance Army, led by the charismatic Yoweri Museveni. As demonstrated in Chapter 3, Ugandan history finds similarity to the kingdoms found in
pre-colonial Rwanda and Burundi, although in Uganda because of the sheer number of existing ethnic groups and chiefdoms, a centralized structure to ‘rule them all’ did not emerge until the British colonial power and their policies elevated the Buganda kingdom above the others and favored them in education, social, and political advancement. But, this was done in such a manner that violent anti-Bugandan sentiment never became the overarching statement that drove ethnic relations in Uganda. Anti-Bugandan sentiment did drive the development of the Ugandan People’s Congress (UPC), the primary political movement at Independence. But to again draw a finer point on the interaction between ethnic history and rebellion there, it simply never existed as a serious cleavage between Ugandans. Rather, Museveni saw the purpose of the NRA, even before it was known as that, as an explicitly reformist movement. This view stems from his interactions (described in Chapter 3) with other post-Independence revolutionaries at the University of Dar-Es-Salaam, Tanzania, in the 1960s and 1970s. He took these ideas back to Uganda with him, first working as a political researcher in the first Obote regime (Ngoga 1998: 92), before seeking exile during the Amin regime in 1971. During this exile, Museveni had many opportunities to hone his philosophy on anti-government movements, linking and learning from both the pan-Africanism of Julius Nyerere and the liberation ‘theology’ of FRELIMO (*Frente de Libertação de Moçambique*). These interactions prompted Museveni to start the pre-cursor movement to the NRA, FRONASA (Front for the National Salvation), which even sent troops to overthrow Amin, with little success, several times over the decade. The opportunity to put this philosophy into practice emerged in the late 1970s when Tanzania and Ugandan political elites decided the Amin regime must fall. The Tanzanians invaded with several exile groups,
including FRONASA. The overthrow of Amin led to short-lived political change in Uganda, with Museveni even taking a political role in one of the new regimes. The controversial election of December 1980 rapidly escalated a deteriorating political space in Uganda opened by the elimination of Museveni. Although Obote’s election was deemed free and fair by the Tanzanians, many Ugandans, especially in the political classes found the results suspect and were not willing to sacrifice the political gains of the 1978-1979 war for another potential dictatorship. And for former agitators like Museveni, the path to political change was clearly defined by rebellion and overthrow. Museveni and his very small band of fighters (about 35) previously trained with both FRELIMO and fellow actors in the Ugandan-Tanzanian War (UNLA, FRONASA), gaining valuable tactical battle experience. The war began in the Luwero Triangle region (a rural area hostile to Obote), gaining civilian participants there, and the main recruitment tool was “Obote himself” (Ngoga 1998: 98). The Obote army engaged in heavy-handed tactics against the rebel organization, routinely raping, looting, and arresting those with suspected links, only serving to push students and political dissidents into the movement.

**Actors in the Development of the NRA**

**Ugandan:**


**Rwandan:**

• *Fred Rwigyema*—original commander of the RPF, killed October 2, 1990 under mysterious circumstances in battle, former Ugandan military Chief of Staff under Museveni

**NRA Rebel Strategies during the Civil War (Ugandan Bush War), 1981-1986.**

This section details the history, development, and nature of the NRA in its rise to political power in Uganda from the beginning of the civil war there to illuminate key similarities and contrasts between the NRA and other rebel groups in the region that also rose to power. First I discuss the role of the Ugandan state during the civil war, and how the nature of this state affected rebel development, civilian support, and the ability of the Obote government to maintain political power during war. Second, I discuss the type of organizational power the NRA possessed, and how this was developed and maintained over the civil war and into post-conflict governance. Finally, I address how the source of social power for the NRA directly contributed to its abilities to win the civil war and become a credible, strong, and durable post-conflict governor.

**Role of the State during Conflict.** As discussed in Chapter 3, the Ugandan state never experienced the kind of cohesion or control that the Rwandan and Burundian states did, as the kingdoms that formed modern-day Uganda were disparate and scattered, and consolidation only came about during the colonial exploration period, and was met with significant social resistance by lesser ethnic groups than the Buganda, who were favored by the British with employment, education, and political authority. Post-Independence Uganda continued to be ruled under the one-party state of the Uganda’s People Congress (UPC), headed by Obote. The only balance to UPC
control of the state arose in the form of the Ugandan military, which took power in 1971 under the dictatorial regime of Idi Amin. During Amin’s time pockets of rebellion emerged as a response to ethnic cleansing carried out by Amin, dictatorial policies that left the state economy weak, and lack of progress and advancement opportunities. The Amin regime essentially left the Ugandan state in shambles, with little control over wide territorial areas, and regular purges left the once orderly and disciplined Ugandan military and security forces unable to credibly resist internal challenges to state legitimacy (Baker 2004). Once Obote resumed power following the 1979 overthrow, the state apparatus continued to erode: corruption in the police, government officials and judiciary, torture of political enemies and victimization of civilians (Baker 2004, Kabwegyere 1995) became commonplace. This lack of state structure and responsibility helped to foster pro-NRA sentiment among the areas in the Luwero Triangle where the rebel organization was first able to gain a foothold. It also made it so that the NRA confronted a disorganized government with little ability to exercise power over the military, governmental structures and civilians.

**Organizational Power within the NRA: Infrastructural.** The NRA was one of the most highly organized and disciplined rebel groups in Sub-Saharan Africa. Several high ranking officers, including founder Yoweri Museveni) in the rebel movement were members of the Ugandan state intelligence service, military, and then other previous rebel movements that developed during Amin’s regime.

This history contributed to providing a foundation of discipline, order, and centralized authority within the movement. From its inception, the movement was able to project power over the territories they controlled, had a centralized leadership
command under Museveni with no factional splits or major internal discipline issues. This was in direct comparison to the Obote government, and the NRA used these differences to rob state banks, raid hospitals, and loot private businesses (Mwenda 2007: 26). Like other rebel organizations, the movement developed both the political faction, the National Resistance Movement (NRM) and the armed unit, the National Resistance Army (NRA). They did so as a way of separating combat duties, goals and planning with post-conflict political duties, goals and planning, although according to Kasfir, this distinction was unclear and “the NRA was never controlled by a political wing during the war” (2002:2 and Kasfir 2002:32-33). The NRA was similar to the early development of the RPF in that one person (Museveni) was the chairman of both the National Resistance Movement (NRM) and the commander of the National Resistance Army (NRA). The legislative branch of the rebel organization, called the National Resistance Councils (the branch of the NRA that most closely dealt with civilians and the Ugandan social structure) was also under his command (ibid: 27). Thus, the rebel organization was arranged in hierarchal fashion under one central authority also able to centralize all internal structures of the rebel organization while fighting a difficult military war against better equipped and far more numerous foes. Recruitment was carried out through using the NRM and NRC movements, and accepted members from any ethnic group, although the initial majority was Banyankole, like Museveni. The choice of location of the rebellion also played a part in centralizing the rebel organization: by choosing to operate in the center of Uganda, in the Buganda- dominated Luwero Triangle, rebel soldiers were unable to rely on external support or bases and thus could build more internal discipline and cohesion. The movement also practiced meritocracy
in leadership and advancement (Amaza 1998:32), regardless of whether or not the combat recruits had previous military training or not, were all subject to basic training and promotion in the ‘people’s war’. This equality in opportunity helped to dispel disquiet over potential favoritism early on, preventing future splits.

**Sources of Social Power.** The NRA established a pattern of contact and conflict with civilians that other rebel organizations used to replicate, over and over again all over sub-Saharan Africa. Like other rebel organizations, the NRA never followed a static pattern of relationships with civilians that lasted throughout the five years of the Ugandan Bush War, but was one of the first to institute local rule of civilians perpetuated by civilian governors, but set in motion and controlled by the NRA themselves. The National Resistance Councils, headed by Museveni, established levels of administrative and judicial authority for civilians living in the rebel-held territories at the village (RC 1), sub-county (RC 2) and county (RC 3) level (Baker 2004: 2). These councils served as political forums for civilians living under the NRA, similar to the role that the local administrative councils later established under the CNDD-FDD in Burundi held (ibid:3). But in contrast to other rebel organizations, the plan of these councils was incredibly structured and well-documented, with all adult members of the village able to vote on council issues, with a head of nine civilians forming the RC1 committee, who then in turn acted as liaisons between the NRA, NRM, and civilians. These councils served not only political roles for the civilians, but also funneled aid and supplies to the NRA, protection from betrayal to the UNLA Government army, and military intelligence on positions, strategies, and tactics of the UNLA (Kasfir 2002: 2). These clandestine political networks between the rebel organization and civilians helped to not only draw
potential civilian resources (in terms of either support or material) away from the Obote government, but also helped to build legitimacy and faith in the message and future governing strategies of the NRA.

The NRA also developed a “ten point programme” while in the Bush, that specifically laid out the social, political, and economic goals of reform for the post-conflict Ugandan state. This development was largely the result of the leaders of the NRA (including Museveni) and their early experiences with ideologically based rebellions like FRELIMO, who developed practices based on popular support and civilian inclusion in liberated Northern Mozambique (Kasfir 2002, Museveni 1997). These ten points included plans for the dismantling of traditional structures of oppression utilized by the Colonial and post-Colonial regimes, creating an independent economy and cooperation with other African nations in a solidarity gesture against imperialism (Amaza 1998:29). It was the express goal of the NRM wing of the NRA to educate civilians through the Resistance Councils and spread future goals and plans through propaganda and inclusion (ibid:33).

**The Outcome of the Civil War and the Enduring Power of the NRA.** In 1986, Museveni seized power from the military coup that overthrew Obote just a few months earlier. It was clear that the Ugandan state held very little internal capacity or ability to govern. In coming to power with the support of both a well-disciplined armed group unafraid of combat and very battle-tested as well as a civilian support and governance structure, it seemed as though the NRA (who now transitioned to using the NRM as its primary designation) was poised to lead Uganda into a brighter future.

300
The Structure of the Ugandan State under the New NRA. When the NRA took power in Uganda in 1986, the government and its structures and institutions were in shambles: a military coup had recently overturned the ‘elected’ Obote regime in December 1985, state resources were low because of looting by the regime as well as theft by the NRA. Civilians also had very little faith in the Obote regime and by extension the Ugandan state, and while they supported the NRA, the rebel organization still had to rebuild lost legitimacy and show that they were capable of running the state.

Continuing Internal Discipline. After the NRA became the Ugandan government in 1986, virtually nothing changed in terms of the internal logic of organization of the former rebel movement except the name, which the leadership of the group thought would signify the changing of the movement from a rebel organization to a political one, intent on implementing their ideas and political goals for the future.

The Continuation of the Resistance Councils and Local Administration. One place the NRA did not lack resources was in the support of civilians. The NRA/M established the local resistance councils as part of the overall strategy to ensure credible and legitimate citizen-centered politics throughout the movement. This was more than just war-time strategy, however: the NRA saw these as a way to govern post conflict. This was reflected in both deed (the actual creation and management of the councils) as well as word (within the Ten-Point Programme distributed throughout the Bush War). The NRA almost immediately made these councils and committees into statutes when they assumed power (Commonwealth Law Bulletin 1988: 566 and Katono and Manyak 2010: 7-8). Although initially more centralized, reforms at the behest of donors occurred during the early 1990s which culminated in the Local

**Rwanda**

The History of the RPF. I now contrast the development of the RPF and its conduct during the Rwandan Civil War (1990-1993) and the Rwandan Genocide (1994) with the other rebel organizations in this study. The RPF provides an interesting comparison to both the NRA, who essentially trained and provided the breeding grounds for the Rwandan rebels, as well as a comparison to the CNDD-FDD, who operate within a similar state environment to the RPF.

Rwandans in Uganda. Rwandans had long been refugees in the southwestern portions of Uganda, stemming from the 1959 ‘Hutu Revolution’ in neighboring Rwanda, which saw the violent overthrow of the Tutsi monarchy there and subsequent ethnically charged massacres ensuring the mass exodus of Tutsi from the country in the early 1960s leading up to the declaration of Independence on July 1, 1962. Rwanda’s pre-colonial history and colonial history, while similar to the monarchy that existed in Burundi, was much more rigid in its social categorizations (Hutu, Tutu and Twa) and the kingdom was the only one in the region to grow through military conquest of territory, thus, ethnic violence there took a much more static tone, and flight was common following ethnic massacres and turnovers in political power in the 1960s and 1970s. Consequently, in Uganda, entirely Rwandan communities sprang up around the initial refugee camps established (especially the one called Gahunge), communities that established themselves as part and parcel of the Ugandan landscape. Rwandan students enrolled in Ugandan schools, took employment, even in the Ugandan government, and joined the armed forces. Even though these moves were interpreted
by some Ugandan leaders (notably, Milton Obote, President in the 1970s and over-thower of Amin in the 1980 Tanzania-Uganda war) as indicative of a desire to ‘become Ugandan’, the truth of RPF desire was quite the opposite. Organized opposition to the Hutu-led governments in Rwanda began almost immediately when Rwandans of Tutsi origin crossed the border- bands of rebel groups known as the *Inkotanyi* or *Inyenzi* (described in Chapter 3) raided and attacked government of Rwanda positions during the Kayibanda regime. The Rwandans living in exile held far greater ideals than that of small armed bands pestering the regime: many influential members of the refugee community wanted to build a political organization to petition the now-ruling Habyarimana regime for the right of return of refugees and the equal and fair treatment of all Rwandans, regardless of ethnic origin. The creation of the RPF was itself a creative enterprise: unlike most other rebel organizations discussed in this thesis, “it was created outside the country where it intended to operate, its members were initially recruited among the armed forces of a foreign power, most of its combatants had never set foot in the land where they were going to fight, and they never managed to get any support from the masses of the population in whose name they were struggling” (Prunier 1998: 119). Initially, the Rwandan community in Uganda was not the seat of opposition to Kigali: rather Burundi was, with a much larger refugee population and sympathetic Tutsi-led regimes. Amin’s regime actually used Rwandan Tutsi against the Ugandan population, recruiting into the State Research Bureau - the dictator’s secret service (ibid: 120). Thus, popular sentiment turned against Rwandans there. These circumstances led to the development of the Rwandese ¹ Alliance for National Unity (RANU), a political organization founded by the refugee intelligentsia in 1979 after the
overthrow of the Amin regime, and quickly radicalized by the rigging of the 1980 election that brought Obote to seemingly false power. Obote already earned the ire of Rwandan refugees because his Ugandan People’s Congress (UPC) based itself in Ankole (the most populous area in the southwestern part of the country and the seat of the Banyakole ethnic group) where many Rwandans settled, thus increasing competition over land, cattle and resources.

Many of the youngest members of RANU joined Museveni’s NRA against Obote, seeking the weapons, military training and experience that would be necessary to provoke change in Rwanda. In fact, Paul Kagame and Fred Rwigyema (the leaders of the RPF) were experienced combat veterans by 1980: both had participated in FRONASA during the Tanzanian-Ugandan war, with Kagame even winning a post as interim Minister of Defense in the Obote government. Thus, the would-be RPF foundations were laid: one, a political organization designed to stir up emotion (and funding) among the Diaspora, and two, military training and organization in the NRA. Rwandans played a key role in the victories of the NRA, and by the time the group took the capital Kampala in 1986, at least 3000 Rwandan troops made up their forces.

The Development of the RPF as an offshoot of the NRA. When the NRA took power in Kampala in January 1986, Rwandan Tutsi refugees celebrated their slice of the toppling of the Obote regime. RANU, which had been operating out of Nairobi during the war, returned to Uganda to assess a new strategy for possible duplication of the NRA victory. The seventh congress of the organization held in Kampala in December 1987 expressed these goals more decisively by assuming a new name for the organization: The Rwandan Patriotic Front (ibid: 125). At first, signs in post-Obote
Uganda indicated a rise for the Rwandan population: Kagame, Rwigyema and many other Rwandan NRA fighters were given important government and defense posts, and Museveni even agreed to change citizenship laws to allow for refugees to attain citizenship after ten years. But by 1988, the Museveni and the NRA government backtracked from this position, removing Fred Rwigyema from his post, reshuffling Rwandans active in the military, and dragging out the citizenship question. These actions caused many young Rwandans, especially those in the NRA and government, to question as to whether pursuing life in Uganda was as attainable it seemed to be a couple of years before. The shift among the population was exemplified by their erstwhile leader, “Commander Fred”. Rwigyema long considered himself Ugandan, and until his firing from the NRA, only supported lukewarmly the idea of a return to Rwanda or armed invasion (ibid: 127). Even though the removal of Commander Fred seemed to indicate a turning point in NRA-RPF relations, many other would-be RPF members remained in positions of power and access within the Ugandan military, which allowed for RPF leadership to gain weapons, training, and prepare for invasion.

**Explaining Rwanda: The rise of the RPF, state conditions, and power.** The Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and its named armed group, the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA), grew out of a long history and association between the major leaders of the group and the NRA, but conditions for rebellion simmered in Rwanda long before this association. Listed below are the major actors in the history of the rebel organization.

**Actors in the Development of the RPF**

Rwandan:


- **Fred Rwigyema**- original commander of the RPF, killed October 2, 1990 under mysterious circumstances in battle, former Ugandan military Chief of Staff under Museveni

- Juvenal Habyarimana- former military officer assumed Presidency of Rwanda through military coup 1973, killed in plane crash over Kigali airport April 6, 1994

Ugandan:


**Lead-Up to the October Invasion.** By 1990, it became apparent to the RPF members living in Uganda that matters would have to be taken into their own hands, and tacit plans began to form for battle. Although plans had been made to discuss the status of refugees in detail with the Habyarimana government during the many meetings of the UN supported Rwandan-Ugandan Joint Committee on the Refugee Question, Habyarimana undertook little action on this front, and many RPF members believed it would have to be forced through violence. “We thought we could push Habyarimana to accepting the returnees and gain political voice for our communities”, one interviewee said.² Although the RPF was extensively prepared with a large support network of both civilian political supporters in the refugee camps (Kinzer 2008: 46) and with the quiet support of the NRA leadership, they sorely lacked Rwandan internal support. Some Hutu opposition to the Habyarimana regime existed and chose to join the RPF around this time, for example, future president Pasteur Bizimungu, but most were leery of the strategies and goals the RPF wished to employ. The decision to invade Northern
Rwanda via Uganda was planned for October 1, 1993, exclusively by Fred Rwigyema and Paul Kagame. While extensive planning took place in terms of gathering weapons and vehicles from the Ugandan army and choosing government targets within Rwanda, what happened during those first crucial days shocked the hardened veterans. Rwigyema and Kagame planned the October invasion for a date when both President Museveni and President Habyarimana would be abroad at a United Nations' Children's Summit. They knew they would be confronting an enemy force with little battle experience, but did not account for how their lack of knowledge of the terrain, lack of understanding of the international context, and more importantly, the population, would stymie even the best laid plans.

**The Civil War.** Battles took place over 1991-1992 in the northern provinces, particularly near Habyarimana's home region of Ruhengeri- the RPF proved decisive, but the "liberated zones" resulting from victories did not provide a stable citizen support base: in fact, all Rwandans, Hutu and Tutsi, escaped the path of the RPF due to the influence of government propaganda. The civil war was typical of what war would look like in sub-Saharan Africa in the coming decade, with low-level violence occurring in fits and stops. When it did appear that the RPF was gaining momentum and would potentially reach Kigali, the capital, outside forces, most notably France, stepped in to bolster the government army to push back the rebels. Growing concern by international and regional actors also helped to keep violence at a minimum: negotiations at Arusha, Tanzania, backed by a UN Chapter VI peacekeeping and assistance mission (United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) occupied the main leaders of the
rebel organization and the Government of Rwanda and kept the war from developing much.

I now turn to how the RPF employed and manipulated the type of organizational power, the source of social power, and the antecedent conditions of the Rwandan state. The type of organizational power the rebel organization utilized was a direct result of training, conditioning, and learning by association with Museveni’s NRA. Both organizations developed *infrastructural* power, meaning that they employed centralized, hierarchal leadership strategies and tactics and projected both physical and political power over the territory they controlled and within the rebel organization itself. Although seemingly chaotic at first, the return of Paul Kagame to the leadership (he had been training with US Army officers at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and returned immediately upon hearing of the failure of the invasion), ushered in an era of successful battle and political strategies to force the Habyarimana regime to the negotiating table.

**The Rwandan State.** In nowhere in Central Africa does the state play such a crucial role to the development of Post-Independence politics as in Rwanda. As explained in Chapter 3 and detailed in this chapter, the internal power and control the state exhibited over the population ensured that no rebel movement could credibly find traction among civilians. Even currently, the state the RPF inherited shows this kind of domination. Although the RPF is largely seen as a Tutsi instrument of political power, and well over eighty percent of the population is Hutu, no serious threat of rebellion exists, and has not since 2000 (Thomson 2009). However fortunate this was for the RPF when it inherited the state in 1994, during the civil war this proved to be a burden for the RPF. At the beginning of the civil war in Rwanda, state power was so ensconced
that the Habyarimana government was able to convince civilians to flee rebel held
territory by using the state propaganda machine, from the lowest levels of the nyumba-
cumi system to mayor and burgomasters all the way to the President distributing
convincing messages about the terror the RPF would bring. The power of the Rwandan
state was also such that even though Tutsi had lived in fear of the Habyarimana régime
since its coming to power in 1973, they followed the instructions of the state and its
authority figures instead of the potentially more agreeable rebel organization. This
message was not only state-driven through government channels, but also backed up by a state-sponsored and financed media, especially Kangura, the Hutu power paper and Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM), a private radio station close to the President's family. The message explicitly vilified the RPF as invaders and anti-Rwanda, and encroached on any potential civilian support that the RPF may have received. The state army was also strong enough to rebuff the RPF invasion (with the help of arms and training from foreign sources) and keep the territorial gains of the rebel organization limited to the northeast portion of the country. Some called Rwanda a 'failing state' at the time because the Habyarimana régime was losing ground to the state-sponsored media and the rise of extremist political parties who seemed poised to take power from Habyarimana’s government by force. Additionally, the loss of territorial control in the north also signaled problems with potential state failure. But the true power and capacity of the Rwandan state under Habyarimana remained the tight grip that the government held over the population, and the ability to entice, threaten, and coerce civilian participants into committing acts of extreme violence during the genocide.
Organizational Power in Rwanda

Despite initial setbacks on the battlefield, the groups itself experienced relatively little internal conflict or disorder over its two decades long history. As with the NRA, the RPF had a hierarchal command structure with one central figure at the top, issuing commands and battle decisions with no alternative chain of command or source of power. Upon the death of Commander Fred Rwigyema, Major Paul Kagame assumed command of the RPA, the armed faction of the RPF. Like other rebel organizations, the movement was separated between the RPF and the RPA, although this distinction was not made clear (or even utilized, according to some (Prunier 1998) until after the RPF took power in 1994, when assuming the government mantle necessitated a split between political functions of the new state belonging to the RPF and the military functions to belong to the RPA. The RPF relied heavily on funding through external patrons, most notably the NRA, who now had access to state coffers and resources to support their former comrades in arms with money, material, and weapons as well as from the diaspora, mostly Tutsi, with a fairly high level of education and willingness to support armed struggle against the Habyarimana government, with whom right of return had long been a contentious issue. The rebel organization also took advantage of military victories during the civil war to steal and loot government resources when possible, as the NRA did during the Ugandan Bush War. The RPF was also incredibly dissimilar to other rebel organizations in that it always saw itself as a potential state government (and a very strong one at that) in training, and thus from the beginning, in its behavior during the early part of the civil war and then through the negotiations at the Arusha Accord, showed infrastructural power, the capability to bureaucratize and
delineate specific functions, and the establishment of a system of governance headed by a strong executive, all of these characteristics being practices already in place with the rebel organization itself. It seemed that although the RPF lacked in size compared to the Government of Rwanda, the abilities to control and shape the Rwandan state into their own image were incredibly high, and this potential became increasingly threatening to Habyarimana and his cronies.

Social Power

Because the RPF developed as an almost entirely external rebel organization in Uganda (as opposed to the AFDL, CNDD-FDD and NRA, all of which developed internally to the state they wished to challenge), the opportunities to recruit from the civilian population and utilize state resources were extremely limited from the beginning. While the RPF could rely on the diaspora for funding and recruitment drives, this only exacerbated the notion that it was a foreign, invading force, rather than a group of reformist-minded Rwandans. Furthermore, propaganda and intimidation of the civilian population inside Rwanda kept the movement from gaining many supporters after the civil war began. That being said, however, when the Rwandan state under Habyarimana turned to murdering the civilian population as a control tactic, RPF recruitment inside Rwanda experienced a boon (Prunier 1998:132), as Tutsi Rwandans now saw the RPF as a "rational political project". The type of warfare practiced by the RPF in the civil war against the Habyarimana government of Rwanda also eliminated the potential for reliance on civilian support as the war was fought in traditional “jungle” “classical” (ibid: 132) style, meaning that the RPF approached the Rwandan Government as an “organized power dealing with another organized power” (ibid: 133) with little regard for
the citizens stuck in the middle. The RPF was also unable to rely on the civilian population as simple demographics dictated their positionality— with eighty-five percent of the civilians belonging to the same ethnic group as the hated regime, it would be an uphill battle to convince civilians in an ethnically divided society to support a rebel group composed of ethnic usurpers reminiscent of the historically oppressive king. Despite these challenges to finding inroads with civilians, the RPF was also fundamentally uninterested in pursuing civilian relationships, as it prioritized victory and dominance over any other goal or strategy. Besides failing to build civilian relationships for support during the war, the RPF also failed to pursue the building of legitimacy with civilians in a key way during the genocide in that the rebel organization failed to protect civilians in harm’s way, either by the battles between the RPF and the Government of Rwanda army, or in the massacres committed by the Government army in conjunction with Interahamwe militias (Stam 2009, Reed 1995). This would only exacerbate the disconnect between the RPF and both Hutu and Tutsi civilians, both during conflict and after the assumption of power.

During the civil war and subsequent genocide, there was also evidence to suggest that the RPF failed to protect Tutsi civilians as a matter of strategy—that to focus efforts on civilians would take away from the overall goal of winning the war (Kinzer 2008 describes Kagame’s single-minded approach and Stam 2009 explores the phenomenon of military positions vis-à-vis civilian strongholds or potential protection zones). This did not help to build relationships between civilians and the rebel organization, as Tutsi living in Rwanda (genocide survivors) realized the RPF had little desire to forge relationships with them. On the other hand, the RPF also employed
violence against civilians when it could (Reyntjens 2008, Reyntjens 2011, Prunier 1998, 2009), especially in terms of massacres of Hutus who could be potential genocidaires. This was a practice employed during the civil war and genocide, as well as later in the Great Congo War.

**The Genocide.** Although the RPF fought impressively during the civil war, international pressures to negotiate, the presence of the UNAMIR mission, and general unwillingness of the Rwandan civilian population to support a potential ‘foreign’ government (under the RPF) made it so that events were at a standstill in early 1994. Plans, however, were in development under the Habyarimana government with the collusion of the local militia recruited by government forces called *Interahamwe* (those who work together, in Kinyarwanda) to create killing forces capable of eliminating thousands of Tutsi civilians a day. These forces were provided weapons and training by the Government of Rwanda army in preparation for an ethnic war that would decisively settle the question of who would govern Rwanda, and eliminate the so-called ‘fifth column’ of Tutsi supporters of the RPF, which did not actually exist. Habyarimana’s power had become largely figurative by the spring of 1994, with the akazu (little house) of Hutu extremists closely connected to Madame Habyarimana planning genocidal massacres and potential coups behind closed doors. Habyarimana was killed in a plane crash (along with the Burundian President, Ndadaye’s successor Cyprien Ntaryimana of FRODEBU) April 6, 1994, setting off these plans and engulfing Rwanda in a nightmarish 100 day long genocide. Researchers and scholars speculate as to which group (Hutu extremists or the RPF) was responsible for the downing of the plane, but little concrete evidence has come to light. The genocide was only stopped by the advancement of the
RPF and overtaking of Kigali on July 4, 1994, thoroughly cementing the RPF as the victors of the civil war and the new Rwandan government.

**The RPF in Comparative Perspective**

In this section, I briefly discuss how the RPF’s organizational and social power compared with other rebel organizations in the Great Lakes. The type of organizational power exhibited by the RPF directly contrasts the haphazard development and internal structure of the CNDD-FDD. Similar to the NRA in the formation of a militant organization with centralized leadership, tactics and strategies emanating from a hierarchal command, the RPF practiced infrastructural power, in that they used their centralized authority to create legitimacy throughout the rebel organization during the war, establishing internal coherency. They were also able to project power internally throughout the movement (meaning there was virtually no dissent, and when problems of authority arose, were quickly quelled) as well as externally over the territory they eventually came to control during the civil war. The RPF was different from other rebel organizations in that the group had very little interest or necessity in pursuing a ‘people’s war’. Because the RPF leadership and most of the cadre had nearly always lived in Uganda, the connections to Rwandans living under the Habyarimana regime were not forged until after the civil war began, and even then, tension between returnees (the RPF) and those who suffered in silence under the regime remained high. The RPF was eventually able to do some recruiting of armed combatants among the internal Rwandan population, but the imposition of political order for civilians, as in the case of the NRA and the CNDD-FDD, the collection of material goods and resources for the use of the rebel organization, or the education of a population on political matters
and philosophy never occurred during the war the way it did with the NRA and the CNDD-FDD.

**After the Genocide: Rwanda’s Rebirth, Transition and Change, 1994-Present**

This next section describes the changes the RPF undertook after transitioning from a rebel organization actively fighting a civil war to a newly-established government trying to rebuild a ‘zero state’. When the RPF inherited the Rwandan state in July 1994, the rebel organization chose to implement the existing government agreements and structure made at the Arusha Accords in 1993, with a few notable new stipulations, like a strong executive (as was the case within the rebel organization) (Reyntjens 2011: 24). This would ensure that the RPF remained in power despite the ‘democratic’ structure of the post-conflict state. The new regime also brought back to power ‘old caseload’ Tutsi in civil service, government and judicial positions, Tutsi like the RPF who had grown up outside of Rwanda and most notably, were educated and used the English language instead of French, the official language of the Habyarimana state. This was known as the “Tutsification” of the Rwandan state (ibid: 28). This exemplified the RPF’s command structure and philosophy on political power: that it was entirely up to the RPF high command to dictate the terms of combat, structure, and engagement. Repression and violence continued to be used against civilians as a tactic of intimidation, and rumors of massacres and killings of Hutu civilians plagued the new regime. These killings were seen as a continuation of the type of behavior the RPF practiced as a rebel organization (DeForges 1999, Reyntens 2009: 27). By 1996, the threat of civil war was a very real possibility: attacks on Tutsi civilians by Hutu rebel groups who used the chaos of Eastern Congo to reform and rearm, to which the new RPF government had a
responsibility and duty to address. This new security challenge to the fledgling state allowed for the RPF to continue behaving as a militant organization, as it had not yet made the transition to a political one. This is in direct contrast to the way that the NRA assumed power in Uganda, which almost immediately softened in structure and rigidity, focusing less on war and violence and more on governance. By 1996, well over half of the Rwandans state budget was spent on military expenditures, 20.6 billion Rwandan francs (ibid: 32). These conditions and the overt threat that lax Congolese borders and security constituted left the RPF little choice: it seemed as though war with Congo was imminent. Domestic matters, especially when it came to building support and legitimacy with Hutu civilians or Tutsi genocide survivors, took a backseat to these immediate priorities. That being said, however, the RPF did have a large advantage over other rebel groups that transitioned to state power in that although state resources were completely drained, the Rwandan state itself survived the violence. The administrative structure that existed before, with vertical hierarchy and even the ability to collect taxes and other forms of revenue despite poor conditions, was re-instituted almost immediately following the genocide. (ibid: 33, Lemarchand 2009). This enduring power of the state was also co-opted by the RPF to keep it running like a military organization, using the structures to institute law and policies in centralized hierarchal fashion, and projecting complete power over the state and citizens through physical control, like the forced villagization process called imidigudu, which purported to address population pressures on the land, but actually served as a control measure for the RPF and a way to reward RPF loyalists with land, businesses, and growth opportunities.
Comparing the RPF to the CNDD-FDD as Post-Conflict Governments.

In Rwanda and Burundi, a natural comparison exists because of the closeness in ethnic makeup, pre-colonial kingdom structure, and Colonial experience. It is with this in mind that I now turn to a brief comparison of the RPF and the CNDD-FDD in their post-conflict governing styles and legacy. First and foremost, both former rebel organizations had to address the issue of ethnicity in relation to governing and building legitimacy with civilians. The CNDD-FDD continued to do so by focusing on social programs (like universal free primary education and free healthcare for pregnant women and children under five) and allocating resources to citizens (services, structures, and political order). The group focused less on developing or even maintaining internal discipline, and seemed to accept that former members would leave or be expelled as the needs of the political organization changed. The RPF on the other hand, played to their strength, developed and tested when they were a rebel organization, by focusing on projecting political power through dominance, hierarchy and organizational structure that reinforced internal logic and cohesion. Dissenters were treated harshly, either internal to the organization or in the civilian population, and the group used targeted violence and repression as a way to build power through fear. Although both organizations took control of highly organized states, the difference between the two pre-existing states and their structures became clear: the Rwandan state under the RPF returned to a nearly identical system of centralized governance when the organization took power. The Burundian state, on the other hand, followed a more consociational model under the CNDD-FDD.
The AFDL: Herding Cats in Congo

As mentioned in previous chapters, the AFDL and the environment in which they operate, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, exhibit chaos and weakness in terms of organizational structures, projection of power, and basic ability to function. Although the AFDL under Joseph Kabila still controls the government, many active rebel groups still exist in the Eastern part of the country, and many outside observers predict that the regime will continue to face internal challenges to authority and legitimacy (Stearns 2012, Seay 2012).

Congo, Kleptocracy, and the Struggle against Mobutu. As elaborated in Chapter 3, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, formerly Zaire, experienced many stalls in its post-colonial development. Thirty years of separatism, poorly-run state institutions and bureaucracy, and a dictatorial, kleptocratic leader who used the state as a personal bank all contributed to the labeling of Congo as a ‘failed state’ as it entered the 1990s. State services and government resources were virtually non-existent, and much of the state existed as a black market. Although Mobutu had proclaimed the advent of the “third Republic” in 1990, theoretically opening political space, civil society freedoms, and allowing political parties, this was more a symbolic gesture than one designed to truly allow political liberalization (Prunier 2009: 72).

Mobutu also meddled in African affairs during the 1990s, hoping that in supporting other heads of state, they in turn would prop up his regime and provide material support. These relationships, especially the close one shared with Rwandan President Habyarimana, would ultimately seal his fate. Mobutu even provided arms (Reno 1999) to the Rwandan government in the pre-genocide period. After the fall of
Habyarimana, the genocide in Rwanda caused severe problems for its western neighbor, as over two million Hutu refugees flowed over the border and into the eastern regions (already notoriously ungoverned and highly problematic for Mobutu’s regime), fearing RPF reprisal. This left the both the Mobutu government of Zaire and the new RPF government in Kigali in a difficult situation. Because Mobutu had supported the Habyarimana regime and was seemingly allowing the Rwandan genocidaires (those that committed violence during the genocide) to infiltrate refugee camps in the East and potential re-group and re-arm, the RPF saw the Mobutu government as an impediment to the security of Rwanda. When cross-border raids began to occur, the RPF realized that threats of war would soon be realized. Serious ethnic violence had also erupted over much of the early part of the 1990s in North and South Kivu provinces, as a result of the spillover of ethnic conflict in Burundi and Rwanda. Congolese Tutsi, called Banyamulenge, were targeted for harassment and violence by ‘native’ Congolese (Hutu or other ethnic groups). The influx of refugees from neighboring conflicts (Burundian Hutu and Tutsi into South Kivu and Rwandan Hutu into North Kivu) vastly changed the dynamics of ethnicity in these regions: crystallizing identity into a political tool and mobilization strategy, importing tensions, and providing the wheezing Mobutu regime new political targets. The new violence as well as the uncertainty also caused regional damage and tension: the RPF and the NRA realized the value that rebel groups currently organizing against them (the reformed FDLR/Interahamwe for the RPF, the LRA and other groups for the NRA) saw in regrouping in the undergoverned provinces of Zaire, as well as the burgeoning small arms market flourishing through cities and ports there. By the summer of 1996, it was clear to both Paul Kagame and Yoweri
Museveni that something had to be done. Because of their mutual histories of organic revolution organized in principle on reform and change (which was more important for Museveni than Kagame), the two former rebel commanders decided to 'help' Congolese rebels to overthrow Mobutu. This would provide a Congolese face to the action while also protecting the fledgling NRA and RPF regimes from security threats. To make matters worse in the region, the civil war in Burundi continued to rage and Mobutu was suspected of providing aid and comfort to both Palipehutu-FNL and the CNDD-FDD. A series of meetings in both Eastern Congo and in Kigali in the late summer of 1996 cemented the AFDL from the remnants of several rebel movements and Congolese leaders (Stearns 2011, Prunier 2009: 113), signing the creation agreement at Lemara, South Kivu on October 18, 1996. The primary leader and spokesperson was Laurent-Desire Kabila, a rebel leader who trained with Che during his adventures in Congo in the 1960s and lived for many years in exile in Dar-Es-Salaam, Tanzania (where he met Yoweri Museveni). He previously headed a rebel organization known as the Parti de la Revolution Populaire (PRP). With Kabila, there were three additional figureheads in the movement: Deogratias Bugera of the Alliance du Democratie et Progres (ADP), Anselme Masasu Nindaga of the Mouvement Revolutionnaire pour la Liberation du Zaire, and Andre Kisase Ngandu of the Conseil National du Resistance pour la Democratie (CNRD). Of the four rebel leaders, only Ngandu laid any real claim to having combatants at his disposal, although the troops numbered roughly 400 (Prunier 2009:113). Kabila also had rebel credentials, having ‘fought’ a guerilla style war against the Mobutu regime since its inception (although often from Dar-Es-Salaam), and considered himself the political philosopher of the newly-formed AFDL. With a manifesto
outlining the political strategy of the AFDL created and signed, the RPF and the NRA could now put a Congolese face on to their armies, who made up the majority of the battle troops. Furthermore, the war effort was almost entirely funded by external forces, with little input or resources from Congolese citizens themselves. The war began in earnest in the East in September of 1996, with the ‘Banyamulenge Rebellion’, a cadre of about 2000 Congolese Tutsi troops who had been trained in Rwanda in the RPA (the Rwandan Patriotic Army, the new name for the army of the Government of Rwanda). These troops were able to recruit an additional number of Congolese Tutsi once the military operations began (Reyntjens 2009: 48), exchanging gunfire in small battles with the Zairian army. The Mobutu government in the West responded in September with statements that “Rwanda and Burundi (read: Tutsi governments) were stirring up trouble” in the East (ibid: 49). By October, pogroms and ethnic violence had erupted in the Kivu provinces, with the Zairian army fighting against self-defense groups of Congolese Tutsis. By late October, violence had spread to most of the two provinces, aided surreptitiously by Rwanda, Burundi, and Uganda. By the end of 1996, the territory under rebel control stretched for about 800 kilometers long and 100 kilometers wide, buffering the Eastern borders. Although this constituted little of the whole territorial area of the Congo, in early 1997, the Angolan army joined the rebel cause, providing direct support enough to overtake numerous provincial capitals in the march westward. By May 1997, Kabila, the AFDL, and the regional coalition of willing supporters had overtaken Kinshasa.

**Actors in the Development of the AFDL**

_Congolese:_

321
• Laurent-Desire Kabila—leader and spokesperson for the AFDL (1997-2001), trained with Che Guevara, educated and exiled in Dar-Es-Salaam, former head of the PRP

• Joseph Kabila—son of Laurent-Desire, became leader of AFDL upon father’s death, Suspected by other Congolese to be of Rwandan origin

• Andre Kisase Ngandu—figurehead and leader in the early years of the AFDL, leader of the CNRP, more militant than other leaders in AFDL and commander of a previous fighting force.

• Deogratias Bugera—leader of the ADP, North Kivu Tutsi working as an architect in Goma before the war.

• Anselme Masasu Nindaga—leader of the MRLZ, half-Mushi, half-Tutsi political agitator in Bukavu before the war.

• Mobutu Sese Seko—the Zaireian president and dictator from 1966-1997,

• Paul Kagame—vice-president of Rwanda and director of state security, highest – ranking military commander in the RPA

• Yoweri Museveni—president of Uganda

• Pierre Buyoya—newly re-installed President of Burundi

The Civil War and the Great Congo War: The Demise of the Kleptocratic State

I now turn to a brief discussion of how the variables I focused on in the study of CNDD-FDD in Burundi mattered to the outcome of the AFDL rebellion in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, providing further illumination.

The State. The Congolese state in the early 1990s barely functioned— the strongest institutions centered on President Mobutu, including the Praetorian Guard and any others that could be “personalized” to serve the interests of the President exclusively. (Turner and Young 1985). This was the case from the very beginning of
Mobutu’s rule in 1965, creating a totally dependent state apparatus that only served to preserve the kleptocracy. Any potential ways of shoring up ethnic or regional power in contestation to the regime were suppressed. As described in Chapter 3, the lack of a pre-colonial structure followed an inept and cruel colonial experience left Congo in shambles: a large, unwieldy, decentralized country with most of the continent’s supply of natural resources. Any potential creation of a road network linking the thousand miles between East and West was stifled by corruption and mismanagement, inhibiting post-Independence growth. The one bright spot in post-Independence Congo was that the country never experienced the outbreaks of state-directed political violence in the same way that Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi did. This, however, did not alleviate the suffering of the Congolese people, who by the early 1990s were subsisting largely through black-market developments and subsistence agriculture, as most businesses and foreign aid fled the neglect and corruption of Mobutu. Although multi-partyism was introduced in April 1990, like many other ‘political reforms’ of the time, it was farcical at best. The wars in Burundi and Rwanda, as well as Mobutu’s willingness to aid and abet genocidal regimes in those places caused internal ethnic issues to rise to the top. Coupled with land reform issues, citizenship and belonging as Congo approached the 21st century led to distinct uneasiness about what the future held for the country, uneasiness that the AFDL, with foreign backers, was able to capitalize on to use to their advantage.

**Rebel Organizational Power: the AFDL**

From its inception, the AFDL was as mismanaged as the Congolese state itself. Formed from the remains of four rebel-political movements and cemented almost
entirely by foreign backers willing to provide the material necessary for rebellion, but not
the training or support necessary to manage the insurgency. Furthermore, competing
goals and strategies among the four leaders, including serious ethnic tensions bound by
both the rise of autochthony questions in Congolese politics in the 1990s as well as
more general questions of civil war, refugees, and spillover in the region, made it more
difficult to ‘pull together’ after the first goal of routing Mobutu was achieved (Turner
2007, 22-25). Although Kabila studied under or from famous rebels, including Che,
Museveni, and Kagame, he was ultimately unable to put theory and philosophy into
practice that would unite disparate actors and provide a clear sense of leadership and
vision within the AFDL.

To complicate the situation further, whereas other rebel movements were
composed almost exclusively of homegrown troops, with homegrown commanders, and
thus might experience some sort of internal logic and loyalty because of this, many of
the initial fighters, mid-level commanders, and even highest-ranking officers of the
AFDL were not even Congolese, or if they were, like Laurent Nkunda, were again the
wrong kind of Congolese, i.e. Tutsi who had fought with the RPF during the Rwandan
Civil War and Genocide. But even without these larger issues of internal conflict within
the AFDL, the rebel organization was unable to organize on any sort of structural level:
funding, organization, battle tactics and communications were all arranged and
otherwise handled by Rwandan and Ugandan forces operating in the Congo. Because
foreign troops made up so much of the fighting forces, discipline and enforcement
became major issues, as the Congolese troops would easily defect against their foreign
commanders, and foreign troops would find Congolese commanders lacking in order
and ability. Once Kabila came into power, much like the rebel movement itself, he created a government ‘politically and geographically unrepresentative’ that was unable to create any sort of internal support and forced instead to provide autonomy to regional institutions and actors (Turner 2007: 33). This was reminiscent of the Mobutu state in the group’s inability to govern large swaths of Congo also of the AFDL’s rebellion logic, wherein which the tools necessary to build internal capacity and structure were never utilized. Open conflict between separate factions of the rebel movement (both domestic and international) erupted mere months after the rebel group took Kinshasa, necessitating even more intervention from third party actors, like Angola, and causing a new counter-rebellion by other actors, some formerly aligned with the AFDL.

**Relationships with Civilians: the AFDL, Rising Ethnic Conflict, and Managing Interests**

The AFDL was unable to build relationships with civilians, and in fact, like the RPF, never had an initial need to in any capacity other than finding a face for the movement and a cause to nominally rally behind. Because financial support was provided by the regional allies for the movement (Uganda, Rwanda, and later Angola), the need to rely on civilian resources and in turn build relationships not present, much like the case with the RPF in Rwanda. Soldiers were well-equipped on their mission, which from the beginning of the movement was almost exclusively focused on toppling Mobutu, and less so on garnering or building civilian political support. Although the rebel organization designed a manifesto upon their creation, the spreading of the message was almost never practiced, and citizens had a hard time discerning goals other than Mobutu’s removal.
Unlike the CNDD-FDD or the NRA, the movement was also unable to provide security services and public goods to civilians in their quest, as crime and Also, the clear ethnic character of the movement that arose in the middle of conflict erupting in the 1990s, persuading those Congolese who were not Banyamulenge or Tutsi, even though Joseph Kabila was not Banyamulenge himself, to support the movement was an uphill struggle. Allegations of the targeting of Congolese Hutu civilians did not help to persuade potential supporters of the multi-ethnic nature of their cause.

The AFDL in fact often used the opposite tactics, actively pursuing violence against civilians, killing “at least 27,000” civilians in one-sided violence in 1996, the first year of the conflict (HSR 2012: 203). This was not surprising given their training and association with the RPF, a rebel group that had been accused (accusations later substantiated by Stam and Davenport 2009) of also pursuing wanton violence against civilians. This behavior is wholly different than the killing of civilians ‘caught in the cross-fire’, where intent and action in committing violence against civilians is less a matter of strategy targeting non-combatants and more an issue of collateral damage.

**The Dust Settles: The First Governance under AFDL, 1997-2001**

I now briefly turn to the system of government in Congo after the overthrow of Mobutu, and how the first AFDL government, which achieved power through military victory and the storming of Kinshasa, continued strategies, organizational types, and characteristics developed during the rebel period into their new government.

**The Kabila State.** Fresh from the horrors of the civil war and the legacy of Mobutu’s policies of inefficiency and cannibalization of nearly all enterprise, the Kabila
government took power of a chaotic state barely recognizable as a modern entity in May 1997, following a long march across the country. One of the priorities the new regime must put in place was basic governance, including law, order and public goods. Sadly, though, very little changed (Reyntjens 2001: 317). The state remained in pieces, with some places seeing more government services than others, but generally remaining fractioned. The renewing of war a year after Kabila took power did provide for additional state-building activities, however, these came in the form of rebel state-building by contra-Kabila groups, like the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD, Rally for Congolese Democracy), lead by Ernest Wamba dia Wamba, a professor of History, and supported by Uganda who turned against former ally Rwanda in the course of the second war (Mampilly 2011).

**Internal Organization of the New Regime.** When Kabila assumed power in Kinshasa, Congolese and International observers alike hoped that the government would be established quickly, fairly, and capably able to maintain the political order that had long been absent. However, the disastrous, fractious and complicated internal politics of the AFDL continued to plague the organization as a government. Kabila, with no logical internal structure, pursued policies of personal rule, creating a cabal of leaders around him, including a praetorian guard made up of kadago (in Swahili, “little brother or junior”), one of whom would later assassinate him in 2001. The political base of his power remained small, and he instituted more and more divisive policies and arrests to prevent the AFDL from completely fracturing to the point of losing power (Reyntjens 2001: 314). Kabila’s preference for regional actors over Congolese interests also caused disruption within the fledgling regime (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002: 197), as
disputes over how much power Rwanda, Uganda, and later Angola and Zimbabwe should exercise over mining rights, governance, and economic benefits flared up. Although the rebel group professed to lead by "state-led engineering", in reality this led to intimidation of press and the oppositions, the banning of political parties and factions and the concentration of power around Kabila (Reyntjens 2007: 307-308).

The fact that things “fell apart” in the Kabila regime rather quickly is unsurprising, given that during the rebel period they never seemed entirely ‘put together’, but rather cobbled from diverse interests, political philosophies, and styles. Kabila was also an incredibly fickle leader, willing to turn on friends, colleagues and foreign backers when it suited him, with little regard to how this structure future affairs of state. By August of 1998, a new rebellion started, once again in the ungoverned East, which tested the infant regime’s ability to fight renewed civil war.

**Civilians, Social Power, and the New Regime.** Because the AFDL did not rely on civilian support to build legitimacy as a rebel group, strong relationships were never formed between the rebel government and those they governed. While the regime was not violent towards civilians in the same manner as during the war, it did nothing to quell the culture of violence quickly becoming a mainstay of life during the war. This severely limited the rebel government’s ability to build new governance structures or provide goods and services to civilians. It was thus easier for new rebellions to emerge almost instantaneously, because civilians felt no loyalty towards the new regime and lacked physical control over vast amounts of territory where other rebel groups, like the RCD, could provide services and gain legitimacy. The RCD did this, creating a state within a state in the east (Mampilly 2011) that swept streets, provided security and political
order, facilitating loyalty. Many civilians also found the increasingly ethnic nature of the AFDL, whether real or imposed by Rwandan support to be highly problematic. By the time the AFDL took power in 1997, the group was understood to be entirely supportive of Banyamulenge causes to the detriment of others. This was in direct contrast to the disavowal of Tutsi support the AFDL government claimed once in power, leading to another dimension of conflict and new rebel organizations.

**Conclusions about Case Studies**

The additional study of rebel movements in the Great Lakes show the differences in outcomes depending of what type of organizational power and nature of social power the rebel movement pursued in its drive to political power. In the case of the NRA, infrastructural organizational power and inclusive social power ensured both the ability of the rebel movement to succeed in the civil war as well as building long-term support for the post-conflict government. The RPF also chose to use infrastructural organizational power in their desire to overturn the Rwandan government, but chose a strategy of exclusive social power and interaction. In using these types of power, the RPF was able to beat the Government of Rwanda in the course of the civil war and centralize political power after, but relationships with civilians remain rocky. The AFDL, which employed cellular organizational power and exclusive social power was able to win the civil war and reach political power in the DRC with the help of other rebel organizations and supportive governments, although from its inauguration in 1997 experienced numerous problems, divisions, and inability to build strong relationships with civilians. The next section tests these variables globally in a larger setting.
Testing Rebel to Ruler Transitions Globally

Other rebel-to-ruler transitions are indicative of the applicability of testing my theory globally. In sub-Saharan Africa alone, I compiled a dataset of sixty rebel groups operating from the years 1970-2011. In this section I discuss how I took the concepts of organizational power and the nature of social power, quantified them, and applied them to the dataset elaborated on in Chapter 1 and provided in Table 1-1.

The Dataset. I selected possible rebel groups through their inclusion in Uppsala University’s Conflict Data Project (hereafter UCDP) Conflict Encyclopedia, which lists incidences and actors of conflicts, state, non-state, and one-sided in the world since 1946. I then culled possible rebel movements as described in the Encyclopedia by fact-checking major news outlets, journalistic accounts, contemporary research and previous scholarship for descriptions of the groups as rebels and to search for evidence of reform-mindedness. Like Clapham I separated out and did not include rebel groups with specifically separatist aims, for while they might be loosely considered reformers, the ultimate goal of their effort is the creation of a new state and not a change in power or structure in the existing state. It is not enough to be simply identified as a rebel by the media. In this research, I take statements and accounts of rebels in media to be indicative of desires of state change and reform. These desires need not be indivisible, but their presence is a necessary condition to be included in the dataset. I divided rebel groups into their various factions where it was appropriate to do so, i.e. when one group was born from another. I then used the date of the split as the date of inception of the new group. This will be further illuminated when discussing post-conflict outcomes and how factions have won or lost. This is acceptable in fitting with the conditions of the
analysis: not all factions behave the same, and many have different structures, type of organization and features.

**Translating Variables.** One of the more difficult tasks here is translating the large breadth of qualitative research conducted here on rebel victory in the Great Lakes into a parsimonious and quantifiable definition of “victory” for the purposes of statistical analyses. This first analysis tests the concept of state takeover as defined quantitatively. State takeover is, for the purposes of parsimony and explanation through comparable and available data, the winning of simple majority power (51%) in government following the cessation of battle-related conflict. Thus, in this analysis there are three possible outcomes - the rebel group failed in its challenge to state takeover (case 0), the rebel group took over the state through control delegated in a negotiated power-sharing arrangement (case 1), or the rebel group took over the state through military victory (case 2). The figure described in Chapter 1 listing rebel movements active in sub-Saharan Africa includes the outcomes of civil wars in which the rebel movements fought according to this terminology. Of the sixty observations, forty-five cases are failures in that they did not gain majority political power, five cases are examples of case 1, where they won majority power after the implementation of a negotiated peace and/or power sharing arrangement, and ten are examples of case 2, where they won majority power through military defeat of the government forces. It seems fairly intuitive that the most desirable outcome would be that of case 2, wherein which a rebel group challenges the state and gains victory through conflict, a victory scholars have posited is more likely to lead to post-conflict and longer term, stability (Toft 2010b). In this case, rebels are more easily able to replace governments and policies with those of their own party or
inclination. Part of the assumption of reform-mindedness implicit in the definition above is that the goal of the rebel group is to succeed at state power through in a manner like this, because of the weak nature of the state and state power in Africa, a phenomenon to which scholars have devoted much attention.

The analysis that follows provides a first step in identifying characteristics of the rebel group that influence the ability of it to gain political control of a state. The assumption is that these characteristics a) continue to affect rebel behavior in the post-conflict time period and more importantly, b) ensure post-conflict success for the rebel organization. While the subject of rebel behavior is not unexplored in the literature so far, the causal logic for post-conflict transition and how these behaviors influence outcomes of civil conflict is. In keeping with an organizational approach to post-conflict and governance, I hypothesize the following:

- that organizational power matters to post-conflict success of a rebel government, thus groups with a wider range of internally cohesive organizational structures and functions in the pre-conflict period are able to more effectively take over the state
- that groups with hierarchal, centralized leadership structures are more likely to be effective in achieving post-conflict gains, including winning the war
- That groups with inclusive relationships with civilian populations matter to successful post-conflict transitions, including winning the war

These three hypotheses tested provide a preliminary answer to the question of whether groups with high levels of organizational power are more likely to be effective in capturing the state, and thus more effective in post-conflict governance than cellurally
organized groups, who are less able to build credibility or legitimacy. While these hypotheses only indirectly test the implication of rebel success post-civil war, they do provide a promising first cut.

**Data Collection, Coding and Methods.** This section of the analysis details the data collection and statistical methods employed here. While there has been much prior exploration of rebel, anti-government or non-state actors in conflict, there has heretofore been little quantitative analysis focused on the impact of rebel behavior on conflict outcomes or post-conflict legacies. Part of the reasoning behind the lack of previously collected evidence on rebels groups in sub-Saharan Africa may be the sheer number of rebel groups in existence since independence and our inability to code rebel groups’ motives in a way that makes sense. The data I employ here does in fact, suffer from some of these problems, but provides a first attempt at testing these relationships in conjunction with the qualitative data established. I determined the sample of non-state actors for inclusion in the data set through inclusion in the UCDP Conflict Database Encyclopedia, which codes for non-state actor, one-sided and armed civil conflict in the world from 1946 until 2010. This dataset is well-known and well utilized (Gleditsch et al. 2002, Miguel et al. 2004, Haborm and Wallensteen 2005, 2007), making it appropriate for later elaboration and replication efforts building on these initial findings. Once I identified possible rebel groups, I performed searches of news media outlets, including journalistic, international organization and national government data to ‘check’ statements of goals against participation in conflict. I also engaged in literature reviews of accounts of the rebel groups identified. I accepted the description of rebel behavior in media and publication as indicative of goal, whether pre-hoc or ad-hoc, during conflict.
searched for corroborating evidence amongst various claims for rebel groups, and prioritized information that came directly from rebel sources, like statements of purpose, party statements during elections, fieldwork accounts and historical records. Although I am somewhat skeptical of these statements, because rebels can and do self-valorize after the fact, the qualitative analysis discussed in earlier portions of this chapter (vis-à-vis rebel organizations in the Great Lakes) as well as Chapters 3, 4, and 5 (which highlight specifics of the CNDD-FDD) illustrate that rebel groups tend to follow through in some capacity on statements, motivations and goals described during the civil war. Thus I can reasonably accept such as evidence of their commitment to reform and change. Once I identified these groups, I then gathered data on the independent variables. I proxy Rebel Strength with a measure of the number of troop the rebel group commands. Numerical Years of Activity (Age of Rebel Movements) provides the count of how many years the group was active as a rebel movement (and not a government). Rebel Capacity is a measure of capacity and strength devised by Wood 2010. It comprises the ratio of the number of rebel troops to the number of government troops, scaled for multiple anti-state groups in conflict. For the most part, I used his ratios when available, but calculated them myself according to his logic when they were not. I averaged across years of rebel group activity because in this particular set, the unit of observation is not group-year, as in Wood, but rather group size aggregated across all years of activity. This variable represents a proxy of the type of social power the rebel group possesses, because the measure of rebel capacity vis-à-vis the state gives an expression of relationships with civilians and the building of support by amassing volunteers who could have otherwise joined the state army. The variable for measure of
centralization and leadership is an ordinal variable coded for specific behaviors. A 1 value indicates a group with hierarchal structure and centralized leadership that projects power within the rebel organization. In reality, this means that a rebel group reports to a centralized command structure that is known to most, if not all, members, and that this leadership is accepted as the supreme head of the movement (centralization). The second dimension, hierarchy, implies that positions are subordinate and not parallel, and further, that positions are accorded by merit based rank, akin to a state army. These cases are best exemplified by the NRA of Uganda and the RPF of Rwanda, who took power through military victory in 1986 and 1994, respectively. These movements were well-prepared in the bush, and took power against a more formidably equipped state foe, one of which was a former rebel movement (UNLA of Uganda) itself. The capacities of these groups were equal or greater than the capacities of their state foes. They also included former military soldiers, which will be discussed later as a contributing factor for victory. A 2 value indicates a hierarchal group with decentralized command center, meaning that the group may have subordinate ranks and not parallel positions, but the leadership is divided amongst two or more heads with no supreme command. This is exemplified by the FN/MPCI in Cote D'Ivoire and the various RCD groups in Eastern Congo. These groups often splinter and exhibit less survivability in post-conflict transitions. A 3 coding indicates a non-hierarchal, centralized group. This would be a group like Palipehutu-FNL in Burundi, where fighters are not ranked based on merit, there are parallel leadership roles, but yet, the movement has one central command figure or location. These are the rarest of all rebel groups in sub-Saharan Africa. A 4 value indicates a non-hierarchal, decentralized group. This would include
groups like Al-Shabaab in Somalia, ancephalous in nature, difficult to determine membership and harder still to determine leadership. There are two variables in the dataset to account for alternative explanations and testing: Peacekeepers, which is a dummy variable coded for the presence of an international peace-keeping force, and Outside Help, which is a dummy variable coded for support from another government or outside group. The dependent variable here is Outcome, a categorical variable coded based on results of the conflict, according to the case 0, 1, and 2 schema as described above. Summary statistics and example values for the major cases in the study are provided in Table 6-1 and 6-2 respectively.

Using this dataset, I then test my initial hypotheses. I provide the results of a multinominal logistic regression at the end of the chapter in Table 6-3, testing the possible outcomes of the ending of conflict wherein which the rebel group is victorious. The results of this analysis (Table 6-3) are quite interesting. Rebel Capability, the ratio to measure strength in troops of the rebel army versus strength in troops of the government army is statistically significant in neither case of victory, settlement or military might. The measure of Centralization and Leadership is only weakly and negatively statistically significant when looking at cases of military victory, which is in fitting with the hypotheses. Less hierarchal, organized and centralized groups are less likely to win state power through military victory. Surprisingly, rebel strength, the sheer number of anti-government troops, is weakly and positively statistically significant when speaking of groups that have won power through negotiated settlement, but not during cases of military victory.
Now, I perform the same regression analysis but add in an additional variable for age of the rebel movement. It could be the case that groups that succeed have had longer learning histories and struggles, and thus have learned by experience. This provides an additional robustness check, illustrated in Table 6-4 at the end of the chapter. The results of this analysis are somewhat confusing. Rebel Capability, the ratio to measure strength in troops of the rebel army versus strength in troops of the government army is statistically significant in neither case of victory, through settlement or military might. The measure of Centralization and Leadership is only weakly and negatively statistically significant when looking at cases of military victory, which is in fitting with the hypotheses and the results of the first regression analysis. Rebel Strength, the sheer number of anti-government troops, is weakly statistically significant when speaking of groups that have won power through negotiated settlement, but not during cases of military victory. This is most likely due to the immediacy of the threat large numbers of anti-government forces can produce when sitting down to negotiate. The age of the rebel movement is weakly and negatively correlated with the outcome of negotiated settlement, indicating that older groups are less likely to see victory in this manner. This could be, because like the Palipehutu-FNL in Burundi, governments have become used to seeing these rebel movements as weak actors over time, and are thus less likely to give into demands or allow for any entrees into power.

Now, I perform the same regression analysis but test for the most hierarchically organized and centralized behavior factor, providing the results in Table 6-5. The results of this analysis are surprising, there are no statistically significant relationships when
controlling for the most hierarchal and centralized groups. Rebel strength and capability seem to be insignificant factors in victory here.

Logistic regression models also allow for the testing of alternatives to my theory by allowing for testing for dummy variables. It could be the case that having outside help (i.e. foreign support through either material or territory) correlates with a rebel’s ride to victory, indicating a bolstering effect. I provide the results in Table 6-6. The results of this analysis shed some light as to how outside help and influence can change the outcome of a rebel movement’s grab for power. Rebel Capability and Rebel Strength are both weakly correlated with success in negotiated settlement victories when controlling for outside help. This is not surprising, as scholars have pointed to transnational effects of rebellion and costs of supporting a rebel movement from a neighboring country. But this support is not always a case of cross-border co ethnicity or similar political beliefs— it can also be, in the case of the AFDL in Congo, a way to minimize security threats (Rwanda and Uganda) or gain financially (Angola). Rebel Capability is also positively correlated with Military Victory in this analysis, suggesting that outside help and material support can positively turn the ratio of rebel troops to government troops in the rebels’ favor. This could be because outside help allows for rebel movements to better arm and prepare them or to gather more members from cross-border refugees, like the case of the RPF in Rwanda, whose material, logistical and training support from the NRA government in Uganda was critical to winning the war.

Finally, I test for the effect of the presence of international peace keepers. It could be the case that having an international or regional peacekeeping body encourages rebel
victory through negotiated settlements with guarantees of security protection. I provide the results in Table 6-7.

The results of this analysis indicate that no variables of the characteristics of the rebel group are significant when controlling for the presence of peacekeepers in the conflict. This is somewhat unsurprising, as one could logically expect that the presence of an armed body of peacekeepers would not contribute to the rebel group being able to win power militarily, but rather for conflict to stagnate or end (Walter 2002, 2004). However, it seems counterintuitive that peacekeepers would have no effect on victory through negotiated settlement, which might be more attainable if international forces are providing security and force necessary to ensure credible commitments, although this is untested here.

**Robustness Checks**

I ran additional tests on the robustness of my initial findings, as it seems likely that some of these variables suffer from the problem of collinearity. In the results, provided in Tables 6-8, 6-9, 6-10, 6-11, 6-12, 6-13, and 6-14, the robustness of my previous findings in the statistical evidence are confirmed.

**Summary Analysis and Possible Data Challenges**

The results of this analysis provide a first cut at the effects certain characteristics of rebel groups have on their prospects for successful state takeover through military victory or negotiated settlement. In all models except for the Peacekeepers and Centralization and Leadership ones, rebel strength, the physical number of rebel troops is statistically significant and positive for the Case 1 (won through settlement) model. This could be for a variety of reasons- one, the more troops a group has, the more
effective their potential to intimidate, terrorize or persuade both government forces and civilians (Weinstein 2005, 2007). Age of the Rebel Movement, a variable added to the original hypothesized model, is weakly negatively significant in Case 1 victories, because governments might be more familiar and less willing to negotiate with groups that have been in existence longer. Centralization and Leadership is negatively weakly statistically significant in all models but those with controls, meaning that less centralized and less hierarchal groups are less likely to attain Case 2 military victories, although there is no effect on Case 1 victories. When controlling for outside assistance, Rebel Capability becomes a weakly statistically significant variable, meaning that groups with higher capabilities are more likely to see Case 1 or 2 victories when they have an outside ally or base. This raises serious questions about the abilities of rebels to rely exclusively upon themselves, and the rising importance of ‘transnational rebellion’\(^\text{12}\). Although the relationships are only weakly correlated in this particular analysis, the door is nonetheless opened to exploring the relationship between capacity and organization further.

Although this set only has sixty observations, it could be expanded to include group behavior over time, changing the unit of observation from group-aggregate to group-year dyadic form. This might potentially capture changes in rebel behavior and efficacy over time and could even be compared with battle deaths per year or other data to test other hypotheses about capability. Data collection on this topic at this juncture is in the early stages and requires much background analysis at the qualitative level, but this does not hinder my nascent conclusions. The next step in the analysis would add in the determination of winning political power in an election one and two cycles post-
conflict. The problem with the second phase of statistical testing in this regard is that the sample sizes of successful rebel movements become too small to be considered significant, but are worth considering for their potential value added to the qualitative evidence provided in earlier chapters as well as future analysis. Finally, I wish to address the question of whether even temporally slight control of the state equals power. This analysis is severely limited to fully answer that question, and I accept the criticism that the outcome variable may not capture adequately the range of all outcomes. For example, there are many groups within the dataset that signed peace agreements and became political parties and legitimate actors who gained some control of the state, but not all of it. For example, the CNDD-Ndayikengurukiye in Burundi, that hold seats in Parliament, but not the entirety of state power.

Chapter Conclusions

In this chapter, I explored potential similarities and differences among rebel groups in the Great Lakes regions using conclusions reached in earlier chapters about the role of the prior state and its institutions, the type of organizational power the rebel organization possesses, and the nature of the relationships that it pursues with civilians and the prior state in the case of the CNDD-FDD. The range of outcomes illustrated in the Great Lakes show that rebels pursue different types of organizational power in their bids to take over power, and as such, their post-conflict governments reflect these strategies. The differences among the RPF, AFDL, NRA, and CNDD-FDD governments can be illustrative of how these rebel governments mature, and potentially demonstrate how they will continue to develop in the future. Rebel organizations with infrastructural power, that exhibit internal logic and discipline, like the RPF and the NRA, are able to
effectively dominate their states politically and militarily. While their governments may be accused of turning authoritarian, they nonetheless maintain control, hierarchy and power. Rebel organizations with cellular capacities, meaning they lack this internal cohesion while a rebel group, have a tougher time governing: they are often unable to bring disparate actors to the table and build new governments or cannot exhibit total sovereignty. Similarly, the comparative case studies show how rebel organizations pursued relationships with civilians and the pre-existing state in the territories they now control. This also matters to post-conflict governance, as well as the potential for new violence. Groups that aligned themselves with civilians during the war, both in using them as a valuable resource and providing for them, like the CNDD-FDD and the NRA exhibit a different kind of stability and behavior in post-conflict governance. In opposition, those groups who do not use civilian resources often find an uphill battle in connecting with those they are now responsible to. This can prove problematic in maintaining post-conflict power without resorting to violence or authoritarianism to provide stability in the absence of civilian support. In quantitative tests among rebel groups, these two variables and their effect on how the civil war ends and the potential shape of the post-conflict government are borne out. More organized groups are able to win the war through military conquest, showing an inner cohesion that allows them to effectively control chaotic post-conflict states. Also, groups with higher measures of rebel strength (a proxy for civilian relationships) are able to win the civil war through negotiated settlement, which helps them to gain power in the post-conflict state. While the quantitative results require further research and refinement, they support the initial findings of this work and provide for a new application of rebel studies research.
### Table 6-1. Summary Statistics of African Rebels Dataset

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Country of Origin</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Years of Activity</th>
<th>Peacekeepers</th>
<th>Rebel Capability</th>
<th>Ln(Rebel Strength)</th>
<th>Centralization and Leadership</th>
<th>Rebel Strength</th>
<th>Outside Help</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AFDL (1988)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>.675</td>
<td>9.433</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>12500</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFDL (Present)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>9.616</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>15000</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNDD-EFD</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>.231</td>
<td>8.987</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>8000</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nyagoma</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>.366</td>
<td>8.517</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>5000</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNDD-EFD</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>.315</td>
<td>10.127</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>25000</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nkumanzira</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>.514</td>
<td>7.601</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NRA</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8.284</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>4000</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPF</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1.289</td>
<td>8.590</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>8015</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Values rounded to .000

### Table 6-2. Examples of Measures on Major Cases in Study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rebel Group</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Years of Activity</th>
<th>Peacekeepers</th>
<th>Rebel Capability</th>
<th>Ln(Rebel Strength)</th>
<th>Centralization and Leadership</th>
<th>Rebel Strength</th>
<th>Outside Help</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AFDL (1988)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>.675</td>
<td>9.433</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12500</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFDL (Present)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>9.616</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15000</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNDD-EFD</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>.231</td>
<td>8.987</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8000</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nyagoma</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>.366</td>
<td>8.517</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNDD-EFD</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>.315</td>
<td>10.127</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nkumanzira</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>.514</td>
<td>7.601</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NRA</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8.284</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4000</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPF</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1.289</td>
<td>8.590</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8015</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 6-3. Multinomial Regression Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Full Model Negotiated Settlement</th>
<th>Full Model Military Victory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rebel Capability</td>
<td>.1770059 (0.561)</td>
<td>.0627816 (0.793)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centralization and Leadership</td>
<td>-1.489768 (0.265)</td>
<td>-1.96565 (0.073)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rebel Strength</td>
<td>.0000691 (0.057)*</td>
<td>.0000349 (0.291)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-1.17327 (0.9637103)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prob&gt;chi2</td>
<td>.0006</td>
<td>.0006</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Statistically Significant at the .05 level

Table 6-4. Multinomial Regression Results with Addition of Independent Variable Age of Rebel Movement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Full Model, Added Negotiated Settlement</th>
<th>Full Model, Added Military Victory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age of Rebel Movement</td>
<td>-.2215026 (0.095)*</td>
<td>-.0419446 (0.570)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rebel Capability</td>
<td>.0798014 (0.802)</td>
<td>.0284508 (0.908)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centralization and Leadership</td>
<td>-2.830403 (0.199)</td>
<td>-2.102942 (0.080)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rebel Strength</td>
<td>.0001826 (0.050)**</td>
<td>.000052 (0.272)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>.4520584</td>
<td>1.305162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prob&gt;chi2</td>
<td>.0006</td>
<td>.0006</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Statistically Significant at the .10 level
**Statistically Significant at the .05 level
Table 6-5. Multinomial Regression Results using the Proxy Measure for Organizational Power

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Centralized Negotiated Settlement</th>
<th>Centralized, Military Victory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rebel Capability</td>
<td>.228633 (.462)</td>
<td>.1519763 (.547)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rebel Strength</td>
<td>.0000626 (.266)</td>
<td>-.0000753 (.340)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-2.825817</td>
<td>-.2699794</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prob&gt;chi2</td>
<td>0.1065</td>
<td>0.1065</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Statistically Significant at the .10 level
**Statistically Significant at the .05 level

Table 6-6. Multinomial Regression Results holding Foreign Assistance constant ("Outside Help")

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Outside Help Negotiated Settlement</th>
<th>Outside Help Military Victory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rebel Capability</td>
<td>1.841035 (.036)**</td>
<td>1.717332 (.036)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centralization and Leadership</td>
<td>-1.45057 (.284)</td>
<td>-1.681743 (.137)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rebel Strength</td>
<td>.0000723 (.064)*</td>
<td>.000041 (.253)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-2.332099</td>
<td>-.6808009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prob&gt;chi2</td>
<td>.0003</td>
<td>.0003</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Statistically Significant at the .10 level
**Statistically Significant at the .05 level
Table 6-7. Multinomial Regression Results, the Effect of Peacekeepers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Peacekeepers Negotiated Settlement</th>
<th>Peacekeepers Military Victory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rebel Capability</td>
<td>.1121384 (0.723)</td>
<td>.1231493 (0.651)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centralization and Leadership</td>
<td>-1.074257 (0.271)</td>
<td>-15.56461 (0.994)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rebel Strength</td>
<td>.0000641 (0.177)</td>
<td>-.000069 (0.464)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-1.290721</td>
<td>15.07608</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prob&gt;chi2</td>
<td>.0159</td>
<td>.0159</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6-8. Robustness Check on Centralization and Leadership

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Negotiated Settlement</th>
<th>Military Victory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Centralization and Leadership</td>
<td>-.9491268 (0.127)</td>
<td>-2.112581 (0.039)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-.4510181</td>
<td>1.648947</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prob&gt;chi2</td>
<td>.0006</td>
<td>.0006</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**statistically significant at the p>.05 level

Table 6-9. Robustness Check on Rebel Strength

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Negotiated Settlement</th>
<th>Military Victory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rebel Strength</td>
<td>.0000701 (0.027)**</td>
<td>.0000396 (0.164)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-3.210291</td>
<td>-1.836104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prob&gt;chi2</td>
<td>.0007</td>
<td>.0007</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**statistically significant at the p>.05 level
Table 6-10. Robustness Check on Rebel Capability

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Negotiated Settlement</th>
<th>Military Victory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rebel Capability</td>
<td>.2776148 (0.337)</td>
<td>.2790429 (0.230)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-2.449842</td>
<td>-1.75847</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prob&gt;chi2</td>
<td>.4079</td>
<td>.4079</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*statistically significant at the .10 level
*statistically significant at the .001 level

Table 6-11. Robustness Check on the Natural Log of Rebel Strength

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Negotiated Settlement</th>
<th>Military Victory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Natural Log Rebel Strength</td>
<td>1.564002 (0.006)***</td>
<td>.546504 (0.064)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-16.43126</td>
<td>-6.055179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prob&gt;chi2</td>
<td>.0005</td>
<td>.0005</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*statistically significant at the .10 level
*statistically significant at the .001 level
### Table 6-12. Robustness Check on Centralization and Leadership and the Natural Log of Rebel Strength

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Negotiated Settlement</th>
<th>Military Victory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Centralization And Leadership</td>
<td>-0.8381444 (0.385)</td>
<td>-2.072262 (0.049)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural Log Rebel Strength</td>
<td>1.440046 (0.014)</td>
<td>0.3535411 (0.278)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-13.95038</td>
<td>-1.422138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prob&gt;chi2</td>
<td>.0000</td>
<td>.0000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Statistically significant at the p>.05 level

### Table 6-13. Robustness Check on Rebel Capability and the Natural Log of Rebel Strength

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Negotiated Settlement</th>
<th>Military Victory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rebel Capability</td>
<td>0.2161005 (0.493)</td>
<td>0.1475768 (0.545)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural Log Rebel Strength</td>
<td>1.605867 (.009)**</td>
<td>0.4983376 (.105)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-17.12978</td>
<td>-1.422138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prob&gt;chi2</td>
<td>.0030</td>
<td>.0030</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

***Statistically significant at the p>.001 level
Table 6.14. Robustness Check on Rebel Capability and Centralization and Leadership

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Negotiated Settlement</th>
<th>Military Victory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rebel Capability</td>
<td>0.0904033</td>
<td>0.0333636</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centralization and Leadership</td>
<td>-0.9092671</td>
<td>-2.094382</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.6075296</td>
<td>1.590028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prob&gt;chi2</td>
<td>0.0027</td>
<td>0.0027</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**statistically significant at the p>.05 level

Notes

1 An interesting note about the terms Rwandese and Rwandan- in most American reporting, the group is known as the “Rwandan Patriotic Front”. However, the government refers to itself as the “Rwandese Patriotic Front”. A minor linguistic difference between British English and American English that ultimately bears little significance, as the group answers to both names. It is telling that the group does not identify itself using the French acronym FPR (*Front Patriotique Rwandais*), although French speaking scholarship sometimes does.

2 Personal Interview, April 22, 2011

3 Although France has attempted numerous times to try Paul Kagame in French court for the action.
I am well aware of the somewhat arbitrary method of identification of reform-mindedness through news sources. However, I chose to accept rebel descriptions and statements by leaders at face value as indicative of desire.

These designations are ordinal, not categorical.

These assumptions are merely posited at this juncture.

Which is not to say that the future will not bring more, especially with new analysis opened up by Weinstein 2007, Cyrus 2010, and others.

The same claim being made by more than two sources.

Wood describes it as “Number of troops(i) divided by total number of insurgents (I) within a conflict system and then multiplied by government forces(G). This is represented by ((i/I)* G). He discusses the problems with the assumptions of such a measure on the same page. We agree with his logic regarding the difficulties in relying on this measure but find it to be a useful tool for analysis.

At least as described in secondary literature.

See Salehyan 2007 for a discussion of this.

Salehyan 2007 points to it in Iraq and Congo.
CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION

Introduction

This study provides new findings that contribute to the expanding rebel studies and civil wars literature. In exploring the question of why some rebel groups win control of the state following the cessation of conflict and continue on to become durable post-conflict governments, several new developments emerge. These developments specifically focus on how rebel organizations can build both internal legitimacy and strength through organizational type and strategy as well as through relationships with pre-existing states and civilians. Rebel organizations then draw upon these organizational and social powers before, during, and after violent conflict to gain political control of the state, thereby becoming governors themselves. In this concluding chapter, I summarize the findings of the research conducted on the CNDD-FDD (Conseil National Pour la Défense de la Démocratie–Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie), the AFDL (Alliance des Forces Democratique pour la liberation du Congo-Zaïre), the RPF (Rwandan Patriotic Front) and the NRA (National Resistance Army) and provide a final overview of the contributions to the discipline and literature. I then discuss the future implications of the conclusions of this research and potential expansion.

Guiding Theory: I began this work with a statement of proposed theory as to how rebel organizations take power from states they fight against and eventually hold power themselves. My theory holds that the post-conflict behavior of rebel organizations is not dependent upon the way in which the war was won militarily, or the size or composition of the rebel group, but rather, that characteristics of the rebel organization
themselves, developed and nurtured throughout the rebel organization’s life span, matter to the way and manner in which the rebels achieve post-conflict power. Specifically, I claimed that three variables mattered to both civil war and post-conflict governance outcomes: First, that the type of organizational power the rebel group possesses - its ability to maintain internal order and discipline, project power over a territory under its physical control, and centralization of authority - strongly influences the likelihood of victory. Second, that the nature of social power that the rebel group pursues - its relationships with civilian populations and the pre-existing state - strongly influence the likelihood of victory in combat and post-conflict transitions. Inherent in this second hypothesis is the existence and shape of the pre-conflict state (a third intervening variable that acts upon both organizational and social powers), its institutions and structures. The state and its development are important to rebel organization in sub-Saharan Africa because it structures the way rebel organizations, and those citizens of the state that comprise them, are socialized into understanding authority and legitimacy.

Testing the Theory. In this work, I tested the theory laid out above at several levels - first, by providing qualitative accounts garnered through interviews with rebel participants, civilians, and observers who lived through Burundi’s civil war. I then used these data to compare how rebel movements in the geographic region closest and most similar to Burundi fared in their armed struggles against state actors, focusing on the data gleaned about the transformation of the CNDD-FDD and how these variables are present in other organizations. Finally, I presented a dataset of Reformist rebels in post-
Independence Sub-Saharan Africa, of which the CNDD-FDD, RPF, NRA, and AFDL belong to, showing how these variables apply in other contexts.

In this analysis, I showed how in the case of the CNDD-FDD, unable to win the civil war through combat methods due to a lack of coherency, internal discipline, and order (what I term organizational power), the rebel organization developed a program of inclusive social relations in addition to subverting, transforming and recreating state structures to ensure that civilians would support the group long after the civil war ended. This support mattered during the war, for although the rebel organization was unable to coordinate battle plans and thoroughly rout the army of the Government of Burundi, civilians still understood which organization provided them protection, gave them rule of law, and fostered positive relationships. Although Kriger argued that guerillas are able to win conflict while depending on coercion to gain civilian support (1992: 238 and Kasfir 2002: 1), winning the war was not the primary function of these interactions. These interactions served the CNDD-FDD well in planning for a post-conflict political future, and continue to remain a vital part of their strategy in maintaining power. Thus, the argument I make helps bridge the gap between the history and development of a rebel organization and its post-conflict trajectory, showing how behaviors established and perfected during the rebel period matter to if and when the rebel organization achieves post-conflict political power. I then extended the study of these behaviors to rebel groups operating in the immediate geographic area. Across the region, a surprisingly high number of similar transitions from rebel organization to government occurred. The RPF in Rwanda, the state with the most pre-conflict similarities to Burundi in terms of ethnic makeup and power structures, experienced a different pathway to power than the
CNDD-FDD. There, the RPF managed to take political power by strength of force by focusing the goals and strategies of the rebel organization not on civilians or available state structures (as was the case with the CNDD-FDD) but rather, on strict internal discipline, logic and cohesion that created a comprehensive combat strategy that allowed for military victory over a larger and more well-equipped enemy.

The State and Rebellion. In Chapter 3 of this research, I provided an explanation of how the nature and shape of the state before and leading up to conflict influenced the behavior of the rebel organization. The state influences the type of organizational power a rebel group possesses because a) experiences with the military as an institution of absolute power in the state can determine what patterns of authority the rebel group will pursue, and b) state domination and order may be tied to a historical socialization process that rebel groups are unlikely to outgrow, as in the case of the RPF in Rwanda. Moreover, the historical trajectory of the pre-conflict state may determine important aspects of the civil war that go on to influence rebel behavior.

In Burundi, four aspects of the state were discussed: two pre-Independence and two post-Independence. These four factors-ethnic structures and the degree of state centralization or coherence before 1962, and political instability and the late 1980s transitions as a result of international restructuring of aid in the post-Independence period- fundamentally shaped the nature and cause of rebellion there. And because state histories are similar across the Great Lakes region, the chapter then compared these factors to the shaping and outcome of rebellion in Rwanda, Uganda, and the DRC as well. Although these four countries share similar state conditions that led to civil war, the outcomes of their rebellions differed greatly. Although Rwanda and Burundi share
the most similar histories, the more authoritarian nature of the Rwandan state and the lasting legacy of relationships cemented as ruler and ruled there led the RPF to become a highly structured, disciplined and more organized rebel group than the CNDD-FDD, in which authority rested in multiple hands and organization and loyalty were far more lax. In Uganda, multiple sovereignty in the pre-colonial period followed by authoritarian rule post-Independence meant that the NRA also followed hierarchal patterns of leadership and strategy during the Ugandan Bush war, ultimately winning Kampala and the government through military domination. In the DRC, a history devoid of any real political or social organization meant a continuation of the old style of dysfunction and competing agendas. The state clearly left its mark on all of these rebel organizations, as well as the civilians who lived under it and then forged (or did not) relationships with them. Because the state’s impact can be seen in both the type of organizational power as well as the nature of social power the rebel organizations pursue, it is an intervening variable in this analysis.

**The Internal Logic of a Rebel Organization: Type of Organizational Power.**

In Chapter 4 of this work I explore how the organizational power chosen and implemented by the CNDD-FDD affected its capability to carry out a civil war against a much larger and more capable enemy. The type of organizational power utilized by the rebel group, infrastructural, meant that the group was often disorganized, prone to fractionalization, and unable to exercise strength through hierarchical relations and discipline. This made for a longer civil war, tenser negotiations, and a distinct possibility of non-victory. Although the Burundian state was far more centralized than other states on the continent, it still experienced a high degree of consociationality and regional
tension in its pre-war governance, so it is not altogether unsurprising that the CNDD-FDD reflects some of this legacy. Thus, in this chapter I explored both the imprint of the state left on the rebel movement in addition to the organizational power characteristics of the group. I also showed how the CNDD-FDD continued the patterns of behavior implemented while they were a rebel organization when they took the government following the end of the war in 2005. Decentralized authority, splits among members, and problematic discipline plague the newly formed political party, although they have maintained political power through the 2010 election cycle. I also examined the CNDD-FDD’s largest rebel group competitor, the Palipehutu-FNL, to test for in-country variation. The Palipehutu-FNL also experienced many problems with organization and leadership, also showing infrastructural organizational power. This is largely due to the way in which Burundian history, state and political development shaped the nature of conflict there. Rebel groups emulated previous political developments in Burundi by allowing personal and geographic rivalries to determine the trajectory of these rebel movements, undermining any potentially successful military campaign that would have taken Bujumbura during the war. The CNDD-FDD, however, was able to win political power by employing another facet of the rebel organization to better use, that of their loyal networks of civilians who supported first the war effort, and then political power.
Civilians, States and War: Social Power and Rebellion

In Chapter 5 I explored an alternative route that rebels can take to post-conflict success, that of rebels utilizing social relationships with people and the states they live in to sustain political power and change. Inclusive relationships with civilians and the state the rebels operate in create lasting legacies serving the rebel organization well: Not just supporting the insurgency materially, tangentially, and philosophically during the civil war, but also working towards building legitimacy and credibility in a future rebel-controlled state. These types of interactions can provide long-term benefits for all actors, although they may be skewed toward the rebel organizations. Civilians benefit from security services, local governance structures, and food and materiel benefits during the war. Rebel organizations benefit from civilian loyalty and philosophical support, the passing of information and keeping of secrets from the hostile state actor during the war, as well as the ability to use civilian resources for their own purposes during the war to finance and prolong the battle campaign. If the civil war should go to a stalemate then proceed to settlement talks, as many contemporary civil wars do, these relationships can provide much needed pressure on actors to settle disputes and hold elections, especially if the state government involved in the civil war feels citizens turning against them and wants to maintain some post-conflict political power. After the civil war ends and government is restored, civilians can then be mobilized for voting in post-conflict elections, providing the party structure and support networks, and serving as a protesting force if necessary. Both the CNDD-FDD and the Palipehutu-FNL utilized this resource while operating as rebel organizations during the Burundian Civil War from 1993-2005. The CNDD-FDD was more successful in building these relationships with
civilians than the Palipehutu-FNL because they did not practice discriminatory ethnic practices, did not use violence against civilians as a tool of regular warfare, and exercised in a wider geographic area. The evidence provided by studying the behaviors of these two rebel organizations shows how rebel groups have strong incentives to utilize civilians and pre-existing states if possible, and how these can provide a different pathway to power instead of relying strictly on fighting capabilities. This initial definition of “inclusive” rebel groups later provides context for larger tests of comparative rebel organizations in the Great Lakes region who may not have utilized the same strategies during their respective civil wars.

**Rebels in Comparative Context**

In Chapter 6 I focused on how the experiences and development of the CNDD-FDD in comparative perspective to the rebel organizations that developed in Burundi’s regional neighbors: Rwanda (the RPF), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (the AFDL), and Uganda (the NRA). By expanding the geographic area of study, I show that rebels in Sub-Saharan Africa and in the Great Lakes region are neither wholly unique nor wholly similar in their transitions from revolution to regime. In the case of the RPF, Burundi’s closest neighbor and the country most similar in history, size, and structure,

The RPF employed infrastructural organizational power to overthrow the Habyarimana state, a brutal civil war that lasted from its inception in 1990 until the genocide that saw a million civilians massacred in 1994. They were unwilling and unable to adopt positive relationships with civilians of either Hutu or Tutsi ethnicities, and thus chose a strategy of exclusive power and domination. In Rwanda’s post-conflict governance, this has translated to an incredibly strong, centralized state power
apparatus, but an authoritarian domination over civilians. In the case of the NRA in Uganda, infrastructural organizational power and inclusive social power ensured rebel success not only in the Ugandan Bush War, but also the building of long-term support for the post-conflict government, although this has waned over time as the NRA/NRM government has sought to control total political power in Uganda for the last 26 years. As for the AFDL in Congo, the use of cellular organizational power and exclusive social power did not prevent the rebel organization from winning the civil war initially and reaching political power in the DRC: The help of other rebel organizations and supportive governments in the region, especially Rwanda and Uganda, provided enough material and resources to overcome these challenges. However, from its inauguration in 1997 the group experienced numerous problems, divisions, and inability to build strong relationships with civilians.

This chapter also explored the implications of the data gleaned from the intensive fieldwork on the CNDD-FDD in an even more comparative context: testing the variables organizational power and the social relationships rebel groups built to see if patterns or significance emerged across 60 rebel groups in sub-Saharan Africa operating from 1975-2009. Although the initial tests of the two variables only looked at how the civil war ends, the potential shape of the post-conflict government are borne out by the relationships tested and shown. More organized groups are able to win the war through military conquest, illustrating an inner cohesion that allows them to effectively control chaotic civil wars as well as the potential for governing post-conflict states. Groups with higher measures of rebel strength (a proxy for civilian relationships) are able to win the civil war through negotiated settlement, which helps them to gain and maintain power in
the post-conflict state. While these quantitative tests require much further research and refinement, they support the initial findings of the earlier chapters and provide for new applications of work in this area.

**General Contributions to Academia the Discipline**

This research contributes to the discipline of political science as well as the study of Sub-Saharan Africa in several innovative ways. First, by adding to the methodological debates presently occurring about the nature and viability of mixed-method research and secondly, by incorporating anthropological, historical and other disciplines into political science promoting a more holistic research agenda and a focus on African Studies. By integrating a mixed methodological approach that uses qualitative interviewing, ethnography and participant observation as well as quantitative data studies, the project highlights how they complement each other to provide more complete evidence of the likelihood of my theory. This corresponds well to recent innovations in studies grounded in field work and confirmed in data testing put forth (Lindberg 2010, Varshney 2008, Kalyvas 2006). The research also contributes to the enlargement of interdisciplinary studies, incorporating methods, concepts, and approaches from other social sciences, notably history, anthropology, psychology, and sociology. By utilizing these, my project contributes to work within African studies and these disciplines, and thus fit across a broad range.

Beyond these general academic contributions, my study also adds to the study of political science. By focusing on understudied aspects of political behavior, the linkages between studies in comparative politics and other sub-fields in political science can be forged. Instead of treating rebels and other non-state actors as non-rational or
unimportant contributors to the governance of the state, this work shows that rebel organizations have goals, make decisions (whether rational or not is another matter), and become important players in both domestic and increasingly international arenas. The research also contributes to bringing in understudied regions and areas into discussions of broader phenomena, using case study examples to solidify, refine and even criticize existing concepts and theories in political science. For example, the study wholly critiques theories about war and democratization—whereas some see these as separate phenomena that can be imposed at will without regard to previous conditions (see Bermeo 2003 for a lengthy discussion), this work shows that behaviors during civil wars matter to post-conflict outcomes, and that governance styles of rebels can be traced genealogically back to these.

**Contributions to the Specific Civil Wars/Rebel Literature**

In this section, I detail what specific contributions the research makes to the subset of political science literature on civil wars and rebel studies. As described in Chapter 1, while Civil War studies enjoy a prominent and seemingly permanent focus in the discipline of Political Science, only in the very recent past has the subset of Rebel Studies within this broader literature come into vogue. Beginning with Clapham (1998) and Reno (1997), studies on civil wars moved from macro-dynamics (understanding wide scale and philosophical questions about the nature of rebellion) to focusing more on specific questions in rebel studies, i.e. types and distinct goals of different kinds of rebellion, emphasis on specific actions pursued, means of support and authority-building, and rebel-civilian interactions. This research fits squarely within these new literatures on rebellion, civil war, and revolution and political change. It does so by
examining cause and effect of rebel behavior by distinct time periods—before, during and after political violence, to show that these actions are more interconnected than the scholarship may express. The work provides an extension of rebel behavior beyond the conflict itself, showing that rebellion is a process of reform that may manifest itself through violence, but consequentially and fundamentally changes political processes in the state in which it occurs.

**Generating Future Tests.** These first tests of theory can also offer a way forward for tests of rebel behavior, whether they are case studies or quantitative data collection. I plan to expand the research design to include other qualitative work on other suitable cases both inside and outside of Sub-Saharan Africa. Some potential cases to draw more data from include the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) or Tamil Tigers, in Sri Lanka, who were defeated in 2009 by the Sri Lankan state. The LTTE set up a shadow state in parts of Sri Lanka under its territorial control (Mampilly 2011), but was not able to effectively win the civil war. Thus, additional tests of partial control or political power could show how important these variables are, when they become crucial, and what other factors might matter. Other cases, like the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), might illustrate how ideology (in this case, a liberation/independence struggle) might affect post-conflict political outcomes.

I also have plans to expand the dataset in several ways. The first is to test the implications of the variables in the post-conflict setting. I can do this by running multinomial logistic regressions with the outcome variables based on post-conflict elections and the rebel groups winning or losing of the elections. Additionally, I could
‘slice’ the outcome variable into measures of partial control and success. I have plans to turn this into a few journal articles in the immediate future.

**Future Implications and Research.** As previously elaborated, the theory presented here offers several new avenues for future work on rebels, rebellion, and post-conflict transitions. Across sub-Saharan Africa, approximately twenty governments have come to power after rising from a rebel group, and new political developments in the Sahel in 2011 and 2012 may increase this number in the coming years. The implications of this research can provide a way forward to test other transitions in sub-Saharan Africa, especially in terms of ideological or ethnic dimensions of conflict. That being said, sub-Saharan Africa is not the only continent to experience political transition in the form of civil war and rebellion. I put forth a theory that holds no specificity to African transitions, and thus could have potential implications for other rebel turned rulers, in Latin America (as in the case of the Sendero Luminoso in Peru) or in Southeast Asia. Testing the theories in other geographic areas also provides a test of regional effects. If in fact, rebellions are contagious (Ulfelder 2012), then it might matter as to how contagion happens differently (or not) in various regions.

**Manuscript Development.** I plan to expand on the research described above to comprise my first book following the completion of my degree. While the main thrust and hypotheses of the work will remain integral, new chapters will be added on emerging rebel movements that complement the original research. Specifically, I aim to expand the components of the research on the RPF and the AFDL into full chapters, conducting more field research in Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. I also plan to enlarge the section on Uganda’s NRA/M into a full chapter, as this rebel group has the
lengthiest time in office post-conflict. This research will further illuminate how long rebels continue to maintain programs and plans developed while the group was still a rebel organization into its time in governance and state power. This is in fitting with additional plans for the book: The book project also advances the initial findings of the strength of the pre-rebel state, the organizational power and source of social power of the rebel organizations by testing the argument far removed from the immediate post-conflict context, in such contexts as Zimbabwe (under Robert Mugabe’s ZANU) and over a longer history of rebellion, as in the South Sudanese SPLA. The original dataset will also be expanded beyond the borders of sub-Saharan Africa, including rebel groups in Latin America and Southeast Asia, providing additional implications testing “African exceptionalism” (the notion that characteristics only found in African states make African cases a wholly unique set) in the broader context of rebellion and change in political order. By expanding the dataset to other geographic areas, potential geographic particularities owing to specific histories and post-colonial experiences may be illustrated, further allowing for refining and testing of the theory presented in this study.

Conclusion

This brief conclusion attempted to consolidate the breadth of material presented in my work by focusing on the key points, concepts and theory of how rebel organizations in the Great Lakes region of Central Africa have successfully transitioned from anti-government actors to government power holders. My fieldwork and analysis presented contribute to the growing rebel studies literature and will continue to expand in my career as I apply theory generated here to other cases and contexts.
APPENDIX A
TIME LINE OF THE BURUNDIAN CIVIL WAR

October 21, 1993- Assassination of Ndadaye; Hutu groups begin to gather

November 16, 1993- UN Special Envoy dispatched to Burundi

January 1994- Election of Cyprien Ntaryamira

February 1994- Plans for GEDEBU militia made in exile in Belgium

Spring 1994- Development of Hutu defense groups in Northern parts of Bujumbura

April 6, 1994- Death of Transitional President Cyprien Ntaryamira in plane crash, Kigali, Rwanda

Summer 1994- Development of FDD in Bukavu with Hutu former military officers of the Burundian Army

September 1994- Election of Sylvestre Ntibantunganya

November 21, 1994- Official Christening of Group with combinatory name, CNDD-FDD

1994-1995- Collaboration between FNL, FROLINA, and CNDD-FDD against FAB

May 1996- Beginning of Peace Process in Mwanza, Tanzania

June 15, 1996- Arusha Accords Summit convenes

July 1996- Pierre Buyoya retakes power from transitional government of Burundi

July 31, 1996- Regional Summit and Sanctions Imposed on Government and Rebel Forces

1996-1997- Talks with Buyoya and CNDD-FDD at Sant' Egidio, Italy

1997-1998 - Group of CNDD-FDD fighters under Jean-Bosco Ndayikengurukiye goes to fight against Congolese militant groups together with RPF elements and AFDL

May 1998- Splitting of CNDD-FDD into CNDD-FDD Nyangoma and CNDD-FDD Ndayikengurukiye

June 15, 1998- Official resumption of Arusha Accords Summit
January 1999-Sanctions officially end

August 28, 2000-First Peace Agreement signed at Arusha- No Rebel Participation

Late 2001- Ousting of Jean-Bosco Ndayik恩rukiye by Peter Nkurunziza and Hussein Radjabu

November 1, 2001-Launch of three year transitional government

October 2003-CNDD-FDD signs Pretoria Agreement, effectively ending violent conflict

June 2005- First post-conflict elections; CNDD-FDD and Pierre Nkurunziza win
APPENDIX B
LIST OF ACTORS MENTIONED

CNDD-FDD:
Jean-Bosco Ndayikengurukiye

Leonard Nyangoma

Pierre Nkurunziza
Manasse Nzobonimpa

Hussein Radjabu

Agathon Rwasa

Government of Burundi:

Pierre Buyoya
Cyprien Ntaryamira

Key International Players in Burundi’s Conflict:
Nelson Mandela

Julius Nyerere
Jacob Zuma

Congolese Actors:

Laurent-Desire Kabila

Joseph-Desire Kabila
President Mobutu Sese Seko
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>List of References</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cederman, Lars-Erik, Brian Min and Andreas Wimmer. &quot;Ethnic Power Relations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


---


*American Political Science Review* 97 1:75-90.


Gourevitch, Phillip. 1998. *We wish to Inform you that Tomorrow we will be Killed with Our Families*. New York: Macmillan.


1959. La notion de génération appliquée à… l’histoire du Rwanda. Brussels: ARSC.


379


Luttwak, Edward. 1999. “Give War a Chance” Foreign Affairs 78, no. 4: 36-44.


------------------


Seay, Laura. 2012. “How Not to Write about Africa” Foreign Policy.


StataCorp. 2011. Stata Statistical Software: Release 12. College Station, TX: StataCorp LP.


387


BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Cara Eugenia Jones grew up on the Gulf Coast. She studied at the University of Texas at Dallas, earning a Bachelor of Arts degree in government and politics. During graduate school, she studied abroad and worked at MS-TCDC in Arusha, Tanzania, and Bujumbura, Burundi. She earned a Master of Arts degree in political science and a graduate certificate in African Studies from the University of Florida in August 2010. She then returned to Burundi for a year of field study under a Fulbright-Hays Doctoral Dissertation Research Abroad fellowship from May 2010 to July 2011. Cara has worked on political asylum cases in the United States for Great Lakes refugees and served as consultant for the United Kingdom’s Initiatives for Africa. She currently lives and works in Grinnell, Iowa, as an instructor of political science at Grinnell College.