For my family
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I am profoundly grateful for the experience working with Gregory Ulmer the past four years and for the opportunity to develop an extensive project, which this dissertation is the start of and which he has guided as an inspirational and encouraging Chair. As he wrote to me, “Don't expect to be knocked down in the public thoroughfare by an illumination! Not that you were. The increments of satisfaction are more subtle, as you probably already know. When you are on to something, the tension of rising action emerges all on its own. It is wonderful! We want more of that! And then graduate school seems like this enormous (infinite?) detour” (12 Feb 2008).

We have been on to something and it has been an exhilarating process, an on-going endeavor indeed: not following in footsteps but still seeking what was sought (to paraphrase your motto). With signature Keys of G: Rock, Tree, Spiderweb; Spiral, Choreography, Oblio; Conatus.

I thank my committee members Phil Wegner, Marsha Bryant, and Jack Stenner, who have been supportive and challenging readers—and whose participation has helped me maintain both the theoretical innovation and rigor of this project. As a Graduate Teaching Associate in the Department of English for five years, I also appreciate the professional and personal support of Kenneth Kidd, Sidney Dobrin, Laurie Gries, and Terry Harpold. And for their feedback at various stages, I thank Jacob Riley, Kevin Sherman, John Tinnel, and Elise Takehana.

Finally, and fundamentally, my family’s support can not be overstated, as they have constantly assisted me throughout graduate school in many ways. Thank you most dearly to my mother Donna, my father Gary, my brothers Brian and Andrew, and my partner Alexia. You have continually helped me toward what the greatest philosophers of life have sought: “because no one knows ahead of time the affects one is capable of,” experimentation while having prudence and wisdom—increasing my capacity to be affected and to affect others, perpetually. Resonating.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ...............................................................................................................4

ABSTRACT.....................................................................................................................................8

CHAPTER

1 CONSTRUCTIVISM IN THE AESTHETIC PARADIGM ..................................................10

   Apparatus Theory: Discourse and Conditions of Possibility ...........................................15
   Project Frame and Approach (Apparatus Theory) ..........................................................16
   Fundamental for Method: Understanding the *Dispositif* ...........................................21
   Multiple Regimes ............................................................................................................28
   Engaging the *Dispositif*: Introducing Pragmatics of the Aesthetic Paradigm .................33
   Paradigm Thinking ..........................................................................................................38

   The Problem of a Concept ..............................................................................................42
   Apparatus Theory: Philosophy, Science, Art—Constructivism ......................................43
   Target for Method (Introduction) ....................................................................................48
   Methodological Perspective: Problematics, Pragmatics, Invention (Introduction).........51

2 “PHILOSOPHY AS OPERA” WHEN WORKING WITH ART ..........................................55

   Encounters and Problematized Concepts........................................................................55
   Empirical Orientation ......................................................................................................59
   Revised Image of Thought ..............................................................................................62
   “Pedagogy of the Concept” .............................................................................................69

   Art Encounters ................................................................................................................76
   Pragmatics of Aesthetic Figures—Percepts ...................................................................78
   Affects and the Language of Sensations .........................................................................82
   Affirming Possibility .......................................................................................................87
   Mediators—Lessons (Introduction) ..................................................................................89
   Target for Method (Continued) ......................................................................................91

3 PRAGMATICS OF LITERARY ENCOUNTERS ................................................................95

   Developing Encounter Pragmatics (Methodological Study) .........................................95
   Deleuze’s Literary Mediators ..........................................................................................97
   The “problem of writing” ...............................................................................................103
   Twists, seizes, rends, and wrests—philosophical discourse ........................................107

   Literary Encounters 2: From Series to Assemblage in Pynchon’s Early Novels ..........112
   Pynchon Mediators: Serial Detectives, Transversal Signs ............................................116
   “Irresolvable” Counter-series .......................................................................................122

   Deleuzean Method for Literary Pragmatics (Scholarship Lessons) ...............................128
   *Pragmatics*—Literary Percepts ....................................................................................132
   *Pragmatics*—Literary Affects ......................................................................................138
Encountering Sensation and Deframing Style.................................................................144

4 DIAGRAMMING A NOVELISTIC ASSEMBLAGE ..........................................................150

Study: Invention in Practice..........................................................................................152
  Artisanal Praxis Observed 1: The Logic of Sense.........................................................155
  Serial Poetics and “reading for sense” ......................................................................157
  Lessons for Method .....................................................................................................162
Pynchon Mediators: Shift from Discovery to Invention...................................................164
  Encountering Temporal Logics: Hothouse, Street, Null, Projectile .........................165
  Generative Lessons......................................................................................................168
Literary Encounter 3: Inventive Poetics, Gravity’s Rainbow Dis-mantling .......................172
  Diagramming Assemblage Edges .............................................................................173
  Artisanal Practice: Ellipsistic Bandwidth .................................................................176
Paralipsis (review for praxis)........................................................................................181

5 ASSEMBLAGE INTERFACE—THEORY AND PRACTICE ..............................................186

Novelistic Philosophy....................................................................................................186
  Reading Poetics ..........................................................................................................187
  Exemplar Study 2: Kafka Experimentation ................................................................189
  Abstract Machine, Concrete Lessons .......................................................................194
  (Reprise) Working at “the frontiers of our knowledge” .............................................198
Literary Encounters Assemblage: Atemporal Historiography ......................................202
  Writing the Timeless Disaster—Outside the Slaughterhouse ....................................203
  Historical Rhetorical Choices (1945-2001) .................................................................206
  Small-Scale History (Writing Time at the Frontier) ...................................................211
Imipolexia Interface: Invention Testfire (Pynchon Mediator Concluded) ......................217
  Imipolectique Writing ..............................................................................................222
  Choragraphy 1: Decision Paths (Discovered and Invented) .....................................227

6 AFFECTIVE ENCOUNTERS, RESONANCE ASSEMBLAGE........................................232

Literary Encounters (6-8): Inventing with Three Machines of Temporality...................234
  Time-lost in Acker’s Senseless Empire—serial fragments ........................................237
  (Choragraphy 2) “Pirate(d) Scenes”—Elegy for Serial Scholarship (Abhor Writes) ....240
  Time-lost Lessons......................................................................................................247
Encountering Thanatos in Ceremony—Time-lost Storytelling .....................................248
  (Choragraphy 3) Story Interface ..............................................................................254
Lessons of Writing Lost Time......................................................................................256
Expressing “Eros and Mnemosyne”—Foer’s Machines of Resonance .........................258
  (Choragraphy 4) “How do you arrange your books?” ...........................................264
Lessons of Eros............................................................................................................270
Coda: Heuretics of the Resonance Assemblage ............................................................272
  Artisanal Praxis (reviewed) ......................................................................................272
  Philolographic Style—Keys of G .............................................................................275
  Apparatus Theory and Encounter Heuretics.........................................................278
As both a study and description of method for scholarly innovation as well as demonstration of experimental work with literature, *Apparatus Theory and Heuretics of Literary Encounters* explicates theory and practices for disciplinary invention. The approach is guided by the perspectives and writing of poststructuralist philosophy that uses art and particularly literature toward new and significant ends. Understanding this orientation as scholarship in what can be called the “aesthetic paradigm,” the methodology first derives and identifies practical rhetoric and poetics for discursive practices in Humanities disciplines.

The main exemplar of the study is the French philosopher Gilles Deleuze, and key lessons are drawn from his extensive work with art. With the “case study” of creating concepts through encounters with literature and its particular qualities, the perspective of “pragmatics” reading proceeds from established practices of literary scholarship: as productive alternative to analyzing novels, strategies for invention are identified as well as performed in order to show how meaning is both discovered and invented. Within a general scope of knowledge creation in philosophy, culture, and academic discourse, the specific cases of literary encounters and innovative discourse emphasize the perspective enabling this endeavor; fundamentally, apparatus theory recognizes crucial properties, distinctions, and transitions between types of thought and
expression. Moreover, this view is shown valuable in its application in other endeavors, by engaging problems “paradigmatically”—as demonstrated here, considering the reciprocal relationships of Philosophy, Science, and Art, within the historical shift beyond literacy and strictly rational forms of knowledge.

The occasion and agency created by encounters, in this case with art, is made evident in the transition from the model of discovery to one of invention, or “heuretics,” using the conventions of literature, most importantly narrative. The object of study provides the means for “artisanal praxis”—the original method proposed—in scholarship: the experimental efforts use influential novels by Thomas Pynchon, Kurt Vonnegut, Kathy Acker, Leslie Marmon Silko, Jonathan Safran Foer, and other contemporary American authors. The theory and literary encounters generate a “resonance assemblage” concept and interface, thus showing the outcome of the heuretic attempt and the strategies advocated for inventive disciplinary practices.
CHAPTER 1
CONSTRUCTIVISM IN THE AESTHETIC PARADIGM

Prelude: As a methodological study and experiment in practice, this project connects several issues from multiple related areas of the Humanities. That it is ambitious, perhaps overly so, in this regard as well as in its scope and aims is an effect of its object of study: art, in this case literature, involves different conditions for what is possible and thus expands opportunities for what can be created in thought and in expression. This understanding is a key insight of Apparatus Theory, an inclusive term for philosophical perspectives upon particular features of knowledge, discourse, and other practices situated within respective arrangements recognizable by disciplinary field or epoch. This discerning orientation recognizes the unique qualities, distinctions, and developments in divisions such as Science, Art, and Philosophy, on a “horizontal” axis, as well as the historical eras of Orality, Literacy, and Electracy (post-Literacy); beyond artificial separations or unexamined assumptions, especially important are the affordances and limitations of each apparatus—conditions for possibility, particularly regarding knowledge and expression. In addition to forms of knowledge, the conditions and constraints are evident in institutions, identity experience, and social forms such as communication.

In its numerous uses of language, literature offers additional advantages to thought, as mentioned, given certain qualities of aesthetic composition and its functions, effects, and logics. Far from abstract, the compound method evoked here connects literary studies, rhetoric, and theory toward new knowledge, both concepts and forms of expression, as well as a poetics for continued undertaking and application. Additionally, the target and self-reflexive area of investigation, “theory” is understood as a particular genre of academic writing and an intermediary knowledge form between philosophy and an object of study, for instance forms aesthetic, cultural, social, technological, or communicative. The aim of theoretical work toward
practical ends and new possibilities thus explores opportunities for invention rather than merely producing discourse “on” a topic or case study. Specifically, this project investigates what is possible for and seeks to offer to disciplinary concerns of literature and rhetoric alike, beginning in academic practices and extending applicably to knowledge creation and expression.

Working at the general level of Apparatus Theory and the specific focus upon a paradigmatic problem, the project both shows the potential for the innovative praxis proposed and offers a methodology, one that could be emulated using other exemplars to different ends. Additionally, the investigation and results generated by the philosophical approach emphasizes the utility of this perspective for future studies and experimental efforts: engaging a problematic—consisting of question, problem, and response—without simple “answer” or “solution.” The problematic of knowledge and the unknown, undertaken in the model of discovery and invention, in a specific case involves the question of how to create ideas following from and employing our encounters; furthermore, as Humanities scholarship, it concerns our encounters with sensations conveyed by aesthetic composition. The conditions for what counts for knowledge and what can be conveyed bear upon this situation specifically regarding experiential dimensions, including perceptions and affections—precisely including, rather than discounting or foreclosing, new ways of perceiving, feeling, and thinking.

Given their focus upon and innovation working precisely with aesthetic objects of study, the theory of several poststructuralist philosophers motivates and enables this endeavor in significant and productive ways. Recognizing the issues noted and approaching a disciplinary concern in this fashion bear this influence fundamentally; beyond granting the inventive value of such philosophy in itself, my work shows precisely the utility of the method that I advocate, in the epistemology, vocabulary, and strategies that appear throughout. The exemplar theorist most
influential and advantageous this way, particularly for his inventing philosophically using art, is Gilles Deleuze—whose work is employed extensively in the service of method, rather than as a framework for analysis. One such instance, evident in the overall scope of this discussion, is the conception of knowledge in the model of discovery and the model of invention: demonstrating the processes of each model, my work shows the shift I advocate at large, to the second while employing certain advantages of the first approach. Put otherwise, one progression recognizable through the chapters is the transition from the student or critic position regarding literature toward the artisan role of creating meaning in stylistic forms. This dynamic process undergone correlates as well to the stances that I offer as alternative: encounters, rather than “interpretations” in reading; expression, opposed to “arguments” in scholarly discourse.

Artisanal praxis is the method that I propose and the innovative attempt that I show for creating new ideas and suitable articulations using aesthetic encounters, with the “test study” undertaking the challenge of theorizing a concept of sensation. Moreover, this names a discursive strategy for academic work first, potentially applicable more broadly (further theorized later), using the conceptual and formal innovation provided by the object of study (literature, for me). Although understated compared to the extensive discussions of philosophy and novels, rhetoric is indeed a crucial understanding for this goal, and the poetics presented can be considered in canonical terms—innovation and kairos, arrangement and style, delivery. On this point, Apparatus Theory recognizes that only vestiges of memory persist in literacy—and decreasingly now, with the database as the prevailing form for organizing information. A mere observation in itself, this additional example of utility also opens an area for investigation, concerning the experiential category analogous in post-literate rhetoric, one that is developing underway and that presently needs still to be tested further and theorized extensively.
Likewise, important in my praxis as style and delivery particularly, the developments of contemporary literature within changing historical and cultural paradigms can be recognized for their innovative formal features and extraordinary uses of language. This view, a “new pragmatics” derived from Deleuze and Guattari, makes use of the literary writing encountered toward inventive ends—in ways more productive, I contend and demonstrate, than interpretation or argument. Specifically, the conventions of literary studies this way enable practical application: in this framework, we can make intelligible the sensations experienced in the parallel ways that authors do in their composition strategies. Keeping in mind this greater goal, my “pragmatics readings” of novels encountered focuses on the material levels of writing, including notable uses of textual ecology, mediality, and narrative especially. A crucial finding of this approach, most significant for theoretical developments and rhetorical praxis, is the role of interface: narrative functions notably as temporal and sensible mediation, contributing in 

*artisanal production* of “novelistic philosophy” and moreover toward what I propose ultimately—the *resonance assemblage*, a concept and interface both intelligible and affective.

This compound product of constructivism, one that connects concepts with experience and expression, results from a method that I have “discovered”* and “invented,”* in parlance for the process of knowledge. Starting with my *point of departure*, the perspective, orientation, and practices of Apparatus Theory and poststructuralist philosophy are described extensively in the first two chapters. First, the question, rationale, and tasks of method, generally termed “invention by art encounters,” are presented with specific descriptions of the theoretical framework, including issues such as problematic, paradigm, and *dispositif* (conditions of possibility). The second chapter elaborates the orientation and methodological study derived from Deleuze as the exemplar theorist, introducing his pragmatics reading and use of literary mediators.
The pragmatics method for literary encounters is thoroughly explicated in chapters three and four, using examples from Deleuze and secondary scholarship. Engaging the disciplinary problem and providing an alternative to analytic literary criticism, the methodological description for “encounter pragmatics” thus focuses considerably upon the percepts, affects, and sensations mediated by aesthetic composition, “reading for sense” and multiple logics. In incremental progress and instructive attempts, I test the practice detailed using the early novels of Thomas Pynchon; influential to my theoretical development, the novels along with my discernment of Pynchon’s style assist the shift from the discovery model, in the detective or “logocentric critic” role, to the invention model of knowledge in the role of creative author. An important strategy emphasized is finding “intensive features” to use toward inventive efforts—the generative and transformative qualities of literary writing, in multiple semiotic regimes.

While the methodological study continues in chapters five and six, I increase the balance of artisanal praxis to theoretical components from Deleuze; likewise, the crucial lessons of noticing experiential dimensions inscribed, such as passion and temporality, are presented through literary examples to greater extents. Moreover, the integrated and “non-linear” sequence in the “novelistic” composition subtly dramatizes the aforementioned shift from clinical-critical scholar to affective artisan—with “meaning making” beyond the conventions for knowledge in rational discourse. Applying in experimental writing practices all the lessons identified, several segments employ formally and conceptually the “intensive features” encountered toward my artisanal praxis: indicating the Resonance Assemblage (not yet fully developed), they combine sensible and intelligible qualities as the interface for and expression of an affective and temporal concept experienced. Thus I present my method for Heuretics of Literary Encounters, which I have designed and which can be further developed through Apparatus Theory.
Apparatus Theory: Discourse and Conditions of Possibility

A scholarly discourse that resonates the effects unique to its object of study will have become situated in the apparatus proper to its conventions. With the production of new knowledge at stake, a Humanities discipline lacking definitive method and object of study, in this case, requires a reflexive orientation beyond “critical thinking” for undertaking this task. This discursive approach most certainly proceeds by way of clear method, although one fundamentally distinct from Reason (scientific method). The present methodological account and demonstration derives a poetics and explicates a praxis for working with culture, from studying several theorists whose discourse reflects their purposeful and explicit orientation within contemporary philosophy. On the last point, the first tenet understood for Humanities scholars toward our productive efforts is that a particular “disciplinary situation” or perspective of intellectual and aesthetic convergence must be viewed paradigmatically.

Specifically, this focus is guided by a cohort of respective theorists labeled “poststructuralist,” primarily Jacques Derrida, Gilles Deleuze, and Michel Foucault. Although sometimes grouped with other thinkers—Jacques Lacan, Julia Kristeva, Jean-François Lyotard, Luce Irigaray—by ostensibly similar interests in language and semiotics, the homologue applied here to include Maurice Blanchot, Roland Barthes, and Hélène Cixous is the evident influence of Nietzsche in terms both philosophically and methodologically. Besides a viewpoint of “archeology” qua “genealogy,” a “Dionysian” orientation of affirmation, and a consideration of rhetorical tropes along with ontological forces, the most patent quality bearing “Nietzschean” qualities appears their anti-Platonism and subversion of metaphysics as established by the Western philosophical tradition (through Kant and Hegel, and up to Heidegger). In general, a “poststructuralist perspective” emerges to varying degrees across these theorists’ “target” areas or objects of study. Concerned with issues of immanence and transcendence, as well as “an
"analytic of finitude" in Foucault’s terms (Order of Things 343)—differentiating the relation of “the finite” and “the infinite”—they chiefly focus on conditions of possibility for a particular (given) paradigm or episteme. Given the importance of this topic, it is necessary to distinguish and situate several related terms theorized respectively, before turning to the main focus of “problematics” and the guiding exemplar of Gilles Deleuze.

Project Frame and Approach (Apparatus Theory)

“Here is a principle of chorography: do not choose between the different meanings of key terms, but compose by using all the meanings (write the paradigm).” —Gregory Ulmer, Heuretics (48)

Defined respectively and interdependently, the range of perspectives comprising a provisionally-titled “Apparatus Theory” entail variously the notions episteme, paradigm, apparatus, dispositif, regime, and discipline. This scope appears most general at the level of Foucault’s episteme, discussed throughout The Order of Things (1966); he writes, “In any given culture and at any given moment, there is always only one episteme that defines the conditions of possibility of all knowledge, whether expressed in a theory or silently invested in a practice” (183). A more specific focus is one of “grammatology,” theorized by Derrida and applied by Gregory L. Ulmer; recognizing the apparatus through the invention of writing, this view is apparent in Derrida’s critique of Western philosophy since Plato as “logocentrism” or the metaphysics of presence (Margins 329).

More precisely, Ulmer (1994) similarly perceives a distinct apparatus operating in the modes of Orality, Literacy, and “Electracy.” In Heuretics: The Logic of Invention, he explains, “For grammatology, hypermedia is the technological aspect of an electronic apparatus (referring to an interactive matrix of technology, institutional practices, and ideological subject formation)” (17); additionally, “What is under way in [Electracy] is the collective invention of a new mode of reason (based on a new relationship among technology, institutions, and the human subject)
whose symptoms it has been one task of grammatology to describe” (93). Important to note is that the apparatus modes both define an epoch and coincide synchronically, on the one hand; yet, significantly, Electracy is understood particularly “in the light of the new possibilities of thought manifested in electronic technology” (17).

This theorization of “apparatus” differs from the Foucauldian sense as defined by Giorgio Agamben (2008)—much like the distinction between Foucault’s “paradigm” and the term as employed respectively by Thomas Kuhn (1962) and Félix Guattari (1992) discussed subsequently. Because all senses of these terms operate within this discursive orientation and inform the present discussion, it is worthwhile to elucidate and deliberately apply within my approaching the “paradigmatic problem” evoked at the outset. In this way, Agamben focuses the abstraction of Foucault’s general theory toward concrete manifestations (incidences?) of dispositif and singularity—his descriptions of “apparatus” and “paradigm.” In the latter case, Agamben presents his understanding of Foucault’s paradigm in a distinct, even antithetical way to conventional meanings of the term; yet, this particular instance illustrates the general sense of episteme. Within an episteme—and quite unlike Kunn’s “disciplinary matrix” of science (11)—Agamben states, “the paradigm is a singular case that is isolated from its context only insofar as, by exhibiting its own singularity, it makes intelligible a new ensemble” (Method 18).¹

On the one hand, the “singular case” definition directs our focus onto the empirical instance or model—e.g. “the concentration camp” and “the state of exception” for Agamben, the prison and the clinic for Foucault—cited significantly. Yet, the more instructive point to emphasize here is the logic motivating the theorist’s exemplar, “to make intelligible series of phenomena” (Method 31). At the risk of complication, this description appears more akin to

¹ This citation refers to a chapter in Signature of All Things: On Method (Zone Books, 2009), distinct from a 2002 lecture also titled “What is a Paradigm?” that is slightly different.
Ulmer’s category of Literacy, at the grammatological level of one apparatus among several, than to Agamben’s use of “apparatus” to mean Foucault’s dispositif. A separate understanding, also less-narrowly applied, emerges in the further classification by Agamben: “By neutralizing the dichotomy between the general and the particular, it replaces a dichotomous logic with a bipolar analogical model” (31); additionally notable among the six theses, ”The historicity of the paradigm lies neither in diachrony nor in synchrony but in a crossing of the two” (Method 31).

The question evoked in this case concerns the character of an apparatus as “horizontal” (trans-historical), as with Foucault’s episteme, or “vertical” (disciplinary); for now, the compound understanding of “paradigm” re-directs the main focus to the matter of epistemology proper, whether filtered reductively or taken in its complexity.

For instance, Agamben clarifies how a paradigm “goes from singularity to singularity and […] transforms every singular case into an exemplar of a general rule that can never be stated a priori” (22). He elaborates this definition more clearly in the conclusion of an earlier lecture, “What is a Paradigm?” (2002): “In it being and seeming are undecidable. Philosophy and poetry coincide insofar as both are contemplation of phenomenon in the medium of their knowability, as examples” (par. 18, my emphasis). Although these quotes bear tacit relation to the Deleuzean methodology discussed in the next section, the deliberate inclusion of “paradigm” into Apparatus Theory requires still further illustration, by way of nuanced examples.

Instructing how to write (with) the paradigm as “chorography”—a compound and catalytic neologism “named for the term chora, which Derrida borrows from Plato” (Heuretics 39)—Ulmer emphasizes, “I do not choose among possibilities but enter them into the paradigm of the diegesis, creating a network in which to catch an invention” (138, my emphasis). To be

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2 “What is a Paradigm?” Lecture at European Graduate School, August 2002. <http://www.egs.edu/faculty/giorgio-agamben/articles/what-is-a-paradigm/>
clear, the present discussion does not yet perform chorography, but understands first by means of Ulmer’s method two aspects of the problem implicated within this approach: the concept of paradigm as enacted in the discourse of poststructuralist exemplars, and the utility of this perspective not only for analytic examination but for application in praxis. The first case illustrates the quality of “singularity” noted by Agamben, recognizing the import of Ulmer’s proposition that “The chorographer, then, writes with paradigms (sets), not arguments” (38).

Working toward a nascent method without being “a generic chorography in rhetoric” (40), Ulmer cites the inventive precedents by Derrida and Lacan as guides for “using the inventio of writing with the paradigm” (81). Derrida demonstrates the productive use of image logic, in the case of European topography, as the organizing principle—Chora over Topos, the dual senses of premises in terms of logic and place, “the ‘grounds of reason’” (48)—for paradigm thinking. This gesture performs an aspect notable here as the first quality of paradigm to highlight: “the image opens a connection between the particular and the general,” Ulmer notes (81). The latter insight similarly appears in the case of Lacan’s using Poe’s “The Purloined Letter” in his seminar on “The Ego”; as Ulmer articulates, “The context of the whole seminar is important for chorography […] because it clarifies the specific analogy Lacan wanted to make” (100, original emphasis). Thus, the emergent theme of mediating can be classified as an effect of the paradigm as concept, which is still characterized here too narrowly only in the sense of exemplar—to be examined otherwise more productively for praxis in the sense of chora.

The second quality of paradigmatic theory writing emerges in the case of chorography as “hyperrhetoric” for Ulmer in Electracy, linked with the first insofar as “The justification for inventing a method to be called ‘chorography’ is that it is specifically an electronic rhetoric, one meant to exploit (but not limited to) the digital convergence of media in hypermedia” (34). As
with the examples of Derrida and Lacan, the qualification “but not limited to” evokes the rationale of method as “applied theory,” in that this perspective “makes it possible for anyone to write ‘with the paradigm’” (29). The aspect identified here qualifies *paradigm* as the organizing principle both motivating and facilitating intellectual discourse through Chora logic, in the practical sense of “the making of a pattern (gathering a paradigm rather than following a path)” (203)—in other words, radically different epistemologically than the Aristotelian tradition of rhetoric in concert with logocentric Western philosophy at the level of theory discourse.

“Gathering” rather than *filtering*, or reductively sorting *qua* “arguing a stance,” thus enables the emergent pattern underway in this extended explication, one that seeks to produce a “workable” application of poststructuralist method in order to engage subsequently a “problematic” by using these independent theorizations. Ulmer shows precisely this type of conclusion, while incidentally evoking a potential option for application: “[Lyotard’s term] The ‘differend’ names an aspect of what is at stake in chorography […] as well: to write the paradigm, or to write the discourses of all the institutions of the popcycle, is to negotiate the passages among genres separated by differends” (26).

Most productive for the purpose of guiding innovative research is that Ulmer’s chorography, as paradigm discourse, addresses the problem—“the search for ‘passages’ bridging the ‘differend’ (the lack of translatability between incommensurable genres of discourse)” (25)—without simply resorting to Kant’s aesthetic faculty (*The Critique of Judgment*) and the incompatible implications therein. At the expense of

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3 Ulmer’s quotation from *The Differend: Phrases in Dispute* (1988) is worth noting in full: “‘Each genre of discourse would be like an island; the faculty of judgment would be, at least in part, like an admiral or like a provisioner of ships who would launch expeditions from one island to the next, intended to present to one island what was found (or invented, in the archaic sense of the word) in the other, and which might serve the former as an ‘as-if intuition’ with which to validate it’ (Lyotard, 131)” (*Heuretics* 25).

4 Thus my exclusion of Lyotard from this account of poststructuralist Apparatus Theory, using the cohort of Derrida, Foucault, and Deleuze: an orientation “post-,” “non-,” or “anti-” Kantian, regardless of their treatment.
lengthy discourse on this point, the question raised by the relation of chorography to the differend connects immediately to another element in the network discussion of paradigm—one concerning “new possibilities of thought” (Ulmer 17, my emphasis).

By focusing upon conditions of possibility in the case of Electracy, Ulmer’s example subtly connects the notion of paradigm as pattern or set and the alternative references by Agamben (2008) within the aforementioned discussion, Foucault’s concerns of “discursive regime” (Signature 14) and “thresholds of epistemologizations” (15). With these understandings established, we can recognize how addressing conditions of possibility relates ostensibly more to the term dispositif and Agamben’s translation of the term to “apparatus.” To keep in mind, the present exploration of terms seeks to produce a paradigmatic “web” of interconnected concepts that yield the method and object of study, even in their semantic distinctions; in other words, not presenting a “Foucauldian perspective” exclusively, but discerning the problem at hand through the poststructuralist orientation demonstrated by several theorists’ discursive procedures.

**Fundamental for Method: Understanding the Dispositif**

“As a philosopher for whom I have the greatest respect once said, terminology is the poetic moment of thought.”

— Agamben (What is an Apparatus? 1)

An obstacle to applying the insights of the primary philosophers discussed here seemingly appears in the variety of terms employed, particularly by respective theorists presenting unique understandings in their “readings” (innovative theory); yet, this same ostensible “hazard” can be for us a catalyst, the means for application. To clarify the rationale for studying these secondary conjectures of philosophers’ concepts, I am discerning a method for new scholarly work from formidable applications by theorists in their original efforts toward innovation or examinations of different objects of study; this is not yet an argument so much as a deliberate position and approach. As any approach is subject to epistemological conditions,
Apparatus Theory facilitates such work precisely by recognizing and working from within the conditions—evoking, in this case, the strategies and limitations operating within Foucault’s term for apparatus, *dispositif*. The two exemplary guides thus not only illustrate via “case study” this method for new work, Deleuze’s “bringing up-to-date” and prospective trajectory and Agamben’s genealogical tracing; they also contribute to the complex explication of “apparatus” underway thus far, with distinct insights and implications posed. This connection begins from the simple correspondence of both philosopher’s posing the question “What is an apparatus?” concerning Foucault’s term *dispositive*. Further, the point of departure proceeds by way of resonance and evocation, supplementing the theoretical “assemblage” in development with discussions of Jacques Rancière and Félix Guattari to conclude this section on Apparatus.

In both his elucidating Foucault’s concept and method as well as demonstrating an idiosyncratic reading, Deleuze presents in “What is a *Dispositif*?” a clear and specific sense of apparatus as *dispositif*, providing an approach and task for productive work with the concept. Defining a *dispositif* as “a multilinear whole” (also translated as “ensemble”), Deleuze (1992) states that “It is composed of lines of different natures” (*Two Regimes* 338); his language of dynamic processes identifies concrete dimensions of an apparatus (*dispositif*), describing how each one is “composed of lines of visibility, utterances, lines of force, lines of subjectivation, lines of cracking, breaking and ruptures that all intertwine and mix together” (342). These types of lines articulate conditions within a particular *dispositif* for the respective production of “Knowledge, Power and Subjectivity” (338) as the relationship or “dimension” between concrete social manifestations (340), such as possible utterances, for instance.

Secondly to note, the general language in this case of “a *dispositif*” does not indicate

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abstraction. On the contrary, Deleuze explains each type of line with regard to Foucault’s historical specificity: the Subject within Greek, Christian, Modern societies (341); the “historicity of reason” (343); possible utterances during the French and Russian Revolutions (344). Thus, while a certain dispositif identifies conditions with an historical perspective, this description more so names a epistemic regime operating upon the creation of Knowledge, Power, and Subjectivity. The first explicit lesson to derive from this point is the qualitative understanding, how lines within a dispositif appear “aesthetic, scientific, political” or otherwise, across a “threshold” of a regime (339).

An additional implication is that through this perspective and his language, Deleuze resolves the problem of describing an apparatus or a dispositif in “horizontal” or “vertical” terms, as I have noted, by focusing simultaneously upon the complexity and the specificity of a regime. The consequence for method is the imperative for our withholding judgment by “universal” criteria, in favor of understanding the unique processes “immanent to an apparatus” (342). Readily apparent in Deleuze’s language is how his perspective and philosophical orientation enables this productive position. For example, in the discourse we can come to understand as “Deleuzean,” he mentions the “variations and even mutations of the assemblage,” while adding that “Each apparatus is therefore a multiplicity where certain processes in becoming are operative and are distinct from those operating in another apparatus” (342).

While this instance might not elucidate matters for those readers unfamiliar with Deleuze’s terminology, the instructive points to reiterate are two-fold: first, how Deleuze proceeds productively with Foucault’s dispositif concept in contradistinction to Agamben, in the subsequent discussion; also, how we acquire greater understanding from these “secondary readers,” with direct methodological consequences. The last point appears specifically through
Deleuze’s articulating “the repudiation of universals” as the first consequence for a philosophy to adequately theorize dispositif, such as Foucault has: “Thinkers like Spinoza and Nietzsche showed long ago that modes of existences had to be weighed according to immanent criteria, according to their content in ‘possibilities’, freedom, creativity with no call to transcendental values” (343-4).

More directly, this second understanding from Deleuze’s insight produces a task for theory and a challenge of perspective. One “target” for examination, by which to decipher the lines of a dispositif as regime, is subjectivity. In this case, Deleuze states that “In every apparatus, we have to distinguish between what we are (what we already no longer are) and what we are becoming” (345); or, understood in the historical terms of Foucault, the task appears that “we must untangle the lines of the recent past from the lines of the near future” (346). In both instances, a methodological and epistemological hazard immediately appears, perhaps in analogous fashion to our confusing “means” as “ends,” with scholars finding it sufficient merely to identify subjectivity as such or even in its particular forms, e.g. the free citizens of “the Athenian city-state”; or a “marginalized existence of the ‘excluded’” (341).

On the contrary, undertaking this object of study requires a “typology of subjective formations in changing apparatuses” in order to understand the dispositif, as Deleuze articulates, “with combinations to be untangled everywhere: productions of subjectivity escaping the powers and knowledge of one apparatus to reinvest themselves in another through other forms to be created” (342). This work would generate an understanding of the regime only partly through its outcomes, whether subjectivity or another form. More important is the application of immanent criteria, in order to “bring up-to-date” the identification of a line within the present dispositif, undertaking the approach that Deleuze states: “When we read Foucault’s last books, we must do
our best to understand the program he is offering his readers” (344).

Before turning to an examination of immanent criteria with regard to particular regimes, it is worthwhile to review another method in parallel fashion, particularly for cautionary insights. Besides using transcendental criteria to unproductive results, this case also illustrates the outcome of narrowly focusing upon the “subjectivation” line of a dispositif—a deceptively easy approach much akin to our taking particular forms to be universal or generalizable beyond an apparatus. The example is instructive given how Agamben (2006) proceeds in “What is an Apparatus?” from the same point as Deleuze—and actually quotes a more substantial interview of Foucault’s— in his recounting dispositif as a “heterogeneous set” and concrete strategic function, which “appears at the intersection of power relations and relations of knowledge” (Apparatus 3). These are immediately recognizable as the aspects that Deleuze describes in terms of ensemble or assemblage, lines or processes, and dimensions. Thus, the different outcome clearly does not result from disparate interpretations, as all the various terms resonate; this includes, Foucault’s stating (1977), in the interview Agamben cites, “The apparatus is precisely this: a set of strategies of the relations of forces supporting, and supported by, certain types of knowledge” (Apparatus 2). My goal in tracing the ultimate disparity is not to advocate one interpretation, particularly given the little investment in either case except for the overall benefit to the paradigmatic explication of apparatus in progress; rather, I seek to demonstrate how philosophical outcomes result directly from the point of departure, and consequently what is at stake in terms of productive trajectories and perspectives.

On the one hand, Agamben indeed follows Foucault in avoiding “the universals” while negotiating the “general character” (7) of the dispositif concept; from his “investigation of concrete modes” (6), Agamben concludes that “Apparatus, then, is first of all a machine that
produces subjectifications, and only as such is it also a machine of governance” (20). This conclusion itself is not an obstacle or dilemma, and in fact it elucidates both processes of subjective formation and governance; however, the logic and perspective employed create problems of incompatibility and inconsistency, accounted for by Agamben as an inevitable condition of interpretation—remarked upon as the unavoidable moment when the interpreter “knows that it is now time to abandon the text that he is analyzing and to proceed on his own” (13). While this forthright statement is helpful in reminding the imperative for reflexivity and deliberation “whenever we interpret and develop the text of an author” (13), we too must maintain the premises of the original thought when undertaking or applying Foucault, Deleuze, or any philosopher. In contrast, Agamben fashions his understanding and application of dispositif, as though ostensibly Foucault’s inherent conception and intention, by proceeding by means of etymology as genealogy: beginning with the influence upon Foucault of Hyppolite’s reading Hegel (regarding “positivity”), tracing back its meanings to early Christian era theology.

The resulting conclusion turns upon Agamben’s directly applying the ancient Greek concept of oikonimia, as an originary “management” (governance) apparatus and inherent term within subsequent translations: “The Latin term dispositio, from which the French term dispositif, or apparatus, derives, comes therefore to take on the complex semantic sphere of the theological oikonomia” (11). Granted, Agamben presents the sequence as his respective “theological genealogy of economy” (8), and the hermeneutic explication is both logical and enlightening. However, we must question Agamben’s unequivocally attesting, “What is common to all these terms is that they refer back to this oikonomia, that is, to a set of practices, bodies of knowledge, measures, and institutions that aim to manage, govern, control, and orient—in a way that purports to be useful—the behaviors, gestures, and thoughts of human beings” (12).
First, we can question the specious use of an “ahistorical” (transcendental) application of the “secularized oikonomia” (literally: “profane”) with which Agamben concludes the essay (19), on the basis that such a maneuver betrays the “immanent criteria” condition articulated by Deleuze as a perspective proper to “a philosophy of apparatuses” (342). While this condition certainly owes to the “Deleuzean position” of citing Spinoza and Nietzsche, Agamben’s extracting from a particular dispositif, Christian theology, a general statement about “every apparatus” bears upon the potential for adopting let alone applying his conclusions. We can recognize this hazard in Agamben’s derisory judgment of the present-day apparatus and the reciprocal techno-media subjectivity (21), quite in contrast to Deleuze’s instruction to chart modes of existence instead of judging with general criteria. In the resolute language addressing the “catastrophe” of world governance as his conclusion, Agamben insists upon the dispositif narrowly producing “the massive processes of desubjectification” and “the eclipse of politics” (22), accounted for because “The capture and subjectification of this desire [for ‘animalistic’ happiness] in a separate sphere constitutes the specific power of the apparatus” (17).

If there is a task for scholars posed by this discussion, it is only by implication: Agamben’s advocating an imperative to resist abstractly the general “apparatus of capture” and to restore the ideal (“pre-apparatus”?) subjectification modes. This conclusion leaves us without any recourse except to affirm or dispute the fatalistic claims, which amounts to the same response, insofar as any way to proceed with the concept of dispositif is foreclosed, as when Agamben remarks that “the problem cannot be properly raised” within an apparatus (24). By way of provisional explanation, I would account of for this outcome by recognizing that Agamben investigates the creation of the concept (dispositif) and its present manifestation with this understanding, whereas Deleuze (albeit ambiguously) offers the means for applying the
conception of \textit{dispositif} relative to object of study (e.g. Knowledge, Subjectivity). Alternatively, we might still find a problem to undertake within Agamben’s treatise; however, not in his diatribe about “desubjectification” but in the problem of separation that he articulates.

Given the fundamental division insisted upon by \textit{oikonomia} (16), Agamben seeks to counter (the effects of) the \textit{dispositif} by addressing its theological grounds: “But what has been ritually separated can also be restored to the profane sphere. Profanation is the counter-apparatus that restores to common use what sacrifice had separated and divided” (19). This instance might yield a “poetic moment” for terminology by returning to the premises of \textit{dispositif} as concrete social relations of power and knowledge, rather than resigning to the transcendental terminology of \textit{sacred} / separation and \textit{profane} / common that forecloses recourse. By this I mean our intervening in the separation of concepts from experience—which appears to me an effort demonstrated by most if not all progressive knowledge discourses regardless of object—in order to engage directly and productively the processes of a \textit{dispositif}. The task specifically concerns scholars who might undertake this problem not only as it bears upon subjectivity and “visibility,” but at the level of apparatus and the conditions for possibilities, in the form of processes regarding utterances, legibility (?), Knowledge, and Power. The particular undertaking of remedying subjectivity is left to other endeavours and perhaps other disciplines; addressed presently, the question that emerges precisely concerns how to do this, approaching the problem.

\textbf{Multiple Regimes}

“Could this be the intrinsic aesthetic of modes of existence as the ultimate dimension of \textit{dispositifs}?”

—Deleuze, “What is a \textit{Dispositif}?“ (344)

Returning to the paradigmatic problem, at the level of apparatus, reorients our perspective onto the question, the proper one I would add, of the conditions of possibility. In this way, we avoid the stymied progress caught in the bog of examples, in favor of ascertaining the operative
problem implicated (“within”) the example— provisionally, a particular disposífit—in order to proceed in productively. The productive quality of this procession is concrete (literal) in terms of creating novel concepts, e.g. Foucault’s Subject, Knowledge, Power, through discursive practices; demonstrative, by illustrating the processes of the regime (disposífit) within which we are situated; qualitative, in terms of the positive attribute of agency opposed to blocked or foreclosed recourse by the regime. This approach is directly guided by Deleuze’s identifying “a change in orientation” as the second consequence of apparatus theory in “What is a Disposífit?,” which proceeds from the first, “the repudiation of universals” (342), toward “turning away from the Eternal to apprehend the new” (344). For my purpose, it is less imperative to delineate which aspects indicate or how overall this manifests “Deleuzean” or “Foucauldian” or another’s thought; rather, we can recognize an articulation of a perspective that is not nominally “poststructuralist” but fundamentally at work in the theory and praxis studied at present. Still concerned with the empirical qualities of a disposífit, but avoiding the transcendental assessment of Agamben, Deleuze (1992) directly articulates this position: “The new is not supposed to designate fashion, but on the contrary the variable creativity for the apparatuses: in conformance with the question that began to appear in the 20th century of how the production of something new in the world is possible” (344, my emphasis).

Proceeding from this point, the following discussion intends to connect several perspectives and terms with regard to conditions for production, guided by this parlance: “What counts is the newness of the regime of enunciation itself,” Deleuze writes, continuing that “Each apparatus is thus defined by its content of newness and creativity” (344). First, understanding the operation of a disposífit might result, in more concrete way pertaining to concepts and not strictly subjectivity, by examining in terms of “regime.” Additionally, the following examples—
Rancière, Deleuze and Guattari, and Guattari—contribute to the greater objective of this overall discussion by demonstrating a distinct perspective, here developed as Apparatus Theory.

Given the fundamental objective of producing and disseminating new knowledge (and types of knowledge), the “regime of enunciation” focus greatly concerns our disciplinary interest, which it bears upon; we can understand this in general terms as identifying “what can be said” or “the articulations of which we might be capable” and not purely possible. Jacques Rancière—evoked presently via semantic connection to Deleuze’s “regime”—describes this situation much like Foucault’s dispositif, as a “distribution of the sensible” in *The Politics of Aesthetics* (2000): a delineation process, which “produces a system of self-evident facts of perception based on the set horizons and modalities of what is visible and audible as well as what can be said, thought, made, or done” (Rockhill, 85).^6^

As emphasized by Deleuze’s explication of dispositif, and worth reiterating, each regime operates with (or by?) a “distribution of the sensible,” which must be understood respectively. The regime in this perspective effectively names the conditions for possibility as manifested in measures of “visibility” and “intelligibility” (50). In order to grasp, let alone change these conditions, though, we must connect “the modes of intelligibility” (35) relative to a regime with our discursive procedures with an object of study. This simple point evokes a method, deliberately following from the perspective demonstrated; for example, Rancière’s remarks that “the aesthetic mode of thought is much more than a way of thinking about art. It is an idea of thought, linked to an idea of the distribution of the sensible” (45).

First, completing the prior point about the implications for enunciation, the particular

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regime and its mode presupposes (and at worse, determines) both an “intelligibility” and a framework for possible articulations. This empirical quality is not exclusive to matters of language, to be clear: Deleuze (1992) begins with visibility, stating that “Each apparatus has its regimen of light [...], distributing the visible and the invisible” (339), and then names “regimes of utterances” as another defining quality of a dispositif. The general parlance concerns variations of science, “literary genre[s],” “social movement[s]”—each a “line” or concrete process within a dispositif. Rancière implicitly bears the influence of this (Foucauldian) thought, applied effectually in his examining regimes of art and their sensibility-intelligibility—ultimately in the service of his objectives concerning politics and history, but instructive here generally.

More specific than Foucault’s general episteme categories, and yet in parallel fashion to the epochs, Rancière analyzes “within the Western tradition [of art], three major regimes of identification” (20): “ethical,” concerning conditions for visibility of images; “the poetic—or representative—regime,” organized by the principle of reproducing the substance of the content in its “ways of doing and making” (22). Although this latter regime appears prevalent during the Classical Age, we know that the mimetic principle of art is not rendered inoperative simply by its historical displacement; or rather, “the logic of representation” (22) still appears at work in cases even today, although another mode emerged in “the Modern Age” (vaguely defined by Rancière here, but mostly corresponding with Foucault’s modern period as the 19th century).

With the primacy of resemblance and the hierarchy of logic (Reason) apparent in scholarly discourse, one might examine Rancière’s representative regime as it bears upon discourse similarly to art; yet, the corresponding conclusion about enunciation would likely be akin to Agamben’s despair about subjectivation in the techno-capitalist apparatus. Thus, seeking
first to grasp and then to proceed productively within a given dispositif, the mode of greater interest is Rancière’s “aesthetic regime”: “the identification of art no longer occurs via a division within ways of doing and making, but it is based on distinguishing a sensible mode of being specific to artistic products” (22). For the present discussion, the qualitative designations serve greater purpose than the historical designations of the modes—a rationale that is also evident in Rancière’s contrasting two types of historicity within the mimetic and aesthetic regimes (24).

Indeed, while I ostensibly “detach” Rancière’s from politics and history through this gesture, the intent is to emphasize the potential of a mode’s unique quality, which might be overlooked by our focusing too narrowly upon isolated incidents with the privileged perspective of designation. For example, discussing a second type of avant-garde, within the aesthetic regime, Rancière recognizes “the invention of sensible forms and material structures for a life to come” (29).

In keeping with the distinction provisioning against designation and in favor of “immanent modes” for qualitative assessment, I further characterize this example of the avant-garde, a paragon for much critical scholarship, as an exemplar not in the individual writers’ actual historical acts, recognized retroactively as significant; rather for the mode of thought indicated therein, which demonstrates a line of enunciation within the aesthetic regime. Alain Badiou (2005) articulates both distinctions in his reading of André Breton’s Arcanum 17 in The Century; the second sense of mode is worth quoting at length:

For Breton, the formula names the change of sign, the rebellious passage from suffering to the affirmative intensity of life. A large part of the century’s undertakings—political as well as artistic—devoted themselves to finding the formula, this slightest point of attachment to the real of that which announces its novelty; this explosion in language whereby one word, one word alone, is the same thing as a body. (146-7)

For Badiou, this “formula” fashions “the creative act” (146) as the effort in art to “produce an unknown intensity” (147) in the present and for the future. Beyond strictly the actual products of
Surrealism as “Rebellion” (143) or “reconstruction of love” (145), though, the example attests the productive potential of the aesthetic mode of thought for enunciation in a given regime.

This recourse can partly be accounted for by Rancière’s describing the intelligibility and sensibility unique to the aesthetic mode with the logic of his term “literarity” (La Littérarité). As a paradigm within the aesthetic regime, in Agamben’s sense of exemplar, literarity evinces “the condition and the effect of the circulation of ‘actual’ literary locutions” (39); like political statements, these locutions, Rancière adds, “define models of speech or action but also regimes of sensible intensity”—potentially with the ability to “reconfigure the map of the sensible” (39).

I describe this concept of literarity in terms of Agamben’s “singular case” because it operates both within and as an exceptional case of the regime, in its singularity. At minimum, literarity as paradigm “makes intelligible a new ensemble” (18), as Agamben (2006) states; not arbitrarily, Rancière likewise insists that “The aesthetic regime asserts the absolute singularity of art” (23).

By undermining the imperative for resemblance and meaning in the mimetic regime, the aesthetic regime facilitates further possibilities by maintaining this singularity, or phrased in the particular case of “The aesthetic sovereignty of literature” (37), free from oppressive conditions. One effect of the alternative dispositif—or “distribution of the sensible” in Rancière’s terms—is a distinct intelligibility through the form of fiction, with both history and stories written “under the same regime of truth” (38). In this way, Rancière explains, the “logic of stories” manifests as “material rearrangements of signs and images, relationships between what is seen and what is said, between what is done and what can be done” (39).

Engaging the Dispositif: Introducing Pragmatics of the Aesthetic Paradigm

One conclusion from this examination, that the singularity of art changes the conditions of the regime, answers the problem for “newness and creativity” within a regime of enunciation (Deleuze) by providing both methodological perspective and tasks, in “the invention of sensible

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forms” (Rancière). The aim of the preceding maneuver has been toward application, in order to proceed in productive ways upon adequately surveying the problem and orientation articulated by these related theorists. Indeed, a secondary argument emerging consequently is that the proper use of theory is not self-evident (and can not be “self-satisfied”); nor is it applicable methodologically to diagnose an intellectual-aesthetic situation, with the negative effect of limiting or preventing recourse for further work. The rationale of catalyzing lines of inquiry and progression partly informs the associative exploration and creation of a semantic network in favor of explication that is exhaustive, deferring a comprehensive treatment to the principle object of study in the next section.

Likewise, far from an arbitrary “magpie-of-theory” approach, the attempt to “write the paradigm” has intended to illustrate the advantageous quality of this type of experimental work, “generalizable” toward developing the derived “poststructuralist orientation” and Apparatus Theory on the one hand. Also, we can recognize an additional benefit of this work specifically in applying rather than interpreting (or ostensibly “arguing with”) philosophical concepts: focusing more specifically than the general level of episteme or the abstract language of dispositif or singularity, in examining innovative and facilitative examples including Ulmer’s apparatus, Agamben’s paradigm, and Rancière’s regime. Despite the relation I have proposed, these terms certainly are not identical, and it is especially imperative not to conflate them. The point here concerns negotiating a specificity of focus—avoiding an easy tactic of examining and concluding from minute examples—with regard to what we might call “discipline” once turning to Deleuze and Guattari ultimately. First, it is necessary to review the strategy for innovative enunciation with regard to the regime of signification, which indirectly emphasizes the imperative to go beyond analytic-diagnostic discourse; this discussion also demonstrates
On the former point of focus, first, from an example in *A Thousand Plateaus* taken out of context relatively simply: when Deleuze and Guattari (1980) insist that there can not be any “general semiology” (136) they instantiate the principle of concrete theoretical discourse instead of transcendental (ideal, abstract, universal) claims. We can recognize this deliberate action similarly in the examples thus far mentioned, such the processes of a *dispositif*; even ostensibly general statements might indicate their finite derivation, as with Derrida’s fundamental analysis of Western Philosophy as logocentric concluded from an analysis of binary logic in presence and writing (*Margins*). In order to describe and understand adequately the various semiotic regimes they recognize, Deleuze and Guattari substitute “pragmatics” and its tetrad of tasks:

1. making a *tracing* of the mixed semiotics, under the generative component;  
2. making the transformational *map* of the regimes, with their possibilities for translation and creation, for budding along the lines of the tracings;  
3. making the *diagram* of the abstract machines that are in play in each case, either as potentialities or as effective emergences;  
4. outlining the *program* of the assemblages that distribute everything and bring a circulation of movement with alternatives, jumps, and mutations. (*ATP* 146-7)

In this case, pragmatics as method serves their purpose of addressing the four components, “the object of Pragmatics” (145) of a particular regime of signs, in a way not based in linguistics. The means of this study directly results consequently from their premise—an argument itself, too complex to summarize here—that regimes are not strictly linguistic in nature, whether “more” or “less” than language (and simultaneously). Expressing the logic of *dispositif*, “every regime of signs effectuates the condition of possibility of language […]”; Deleuze and Guattari add, “As Foucault clearly shows, regimes of signs are only *functions of existence* of language […]” (140).

Without needing to explore the full extent of their theorization of pragmatics, we can recognize the effectiveness of the approach in their analysis (“immanent criteria”), in a way

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neither tautological nor teleological. The emphasis of this point hinges upon my understanding the use of “regime” by Deleuze and Guttari in this instance to be akin to dispositif. This term is described markedly through its negative effects in the case of the signifying regime, for instance manifested through religion and psychoanalysis (121 passim). Moreover, “the regime of signs” (451) is stated in another context even more adversely—like Agamben’s (2006) terminal diagnosis of the present “apparatus”—as it bears upon subjectification within the apparatus of the nation-state and capitalism (457-8). With this said, I am not overstating the import of their conclusion about the four regimes given there is little use in adopting, in order to further recognize, the “horrors of the signifying regime” that Deleuze and Guattari discuss. (And such a strategy would be simply attempted, given that this is the most prevalent regime.)

Rather, more advantageous is attending to the product of pragmatics, and the evocations, describing respectively at least four of many regimes, which are all mixed in various instances (119): “signifying”; “primitive, presignifying” (117); “countersignifying” (118); “postsignifying” (119). A task qua philosophical question emerges, stated as a concluding proposition: given the premise I have set, that regimes of signs operate in the same manner as the dispositif concept that Deleuze (1992) describes; and given the concrete processes respective to a regime and its conditions; then, we might explore what manifests in a particular regime in forms such as Knowledge, Discourse, subjectivity—especially querying the postsignifying regime. In this chapter, Deleuze and Guattari explicate thoroughly the last form, in terms of “subjectification”; far from “exhausted,” a line of research remains to be explored and articulated newly, examining through pragmatics any signifying regime and its concrete processes.

With the perspective of Apparatus Theory, I have begun this inquiry by positioning the aesthetic mode of thought as a paradigm within the inchoate, as-yet unnamed apparatus: a
postsignifying regime is not (simply) “brought to bear upon” but is engaged toward producing uniquely new forms of intelligibility and enunciation of knowledge. The rationale for this approach is found in the exemplar of Deleuze and Guattari, which suggests a trajectory to be followed in parallel fashion. By this I refer to the development proceeding from the point of departure in the postsignifying regime, which Deleuze (1992) articulates: “[Because] they escape the dimensions of knowledge and power, lines of subjectivation seem particularly apt to trace paths of creation, which are constantly aborted but also taken up again and modified until the old apparatus breaks” (“Dispostif” 345). Without surveying its entire development, we can clearly recognize the “logical end-point” of a theorization of subjectivity regarding an emergent regime, in the final work of Félix Guattari, *Chaosmosis* (1992). To be clear, the apparent objective in this perspective is not to work in manners redundant (*e.g.* additional recognition) or contrary (*e.g.* ostensibly oppositional instances); rather, discerning the method from the novel theorization and prospective praxis articulated by Guattari guides a similar approach to new work.

Although briefly summarizing the complex theory and unique discourse that Guattari presents in *Chaosmosis* is difficult to present toward the aim of elucidating, several key points can demonstrate the aforementioned purpose and suffice for a lesson. In the concluding chapter, “The Ecosophic Object,” Guattari’s ultimate objective and conclusion concerns—fundamentally and radially defined—nothings less than “the production of subjectivity” (133). For him, the “means” to this “end,” as it were (itself a *means*), appear in the conditions of *the aesthetic*

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9 Without overstatement, Guattari asserts the conclusion of his “schizoanalytic” pragmatics: “The future of contemporary subjectivity is not to live indefinitely under the regime of self-withdrawal, of mass mediatic infantilisation, of ignorance of difference and alterity […]. Its modes of subjectivation will get out of their homogenetic ‘entrapment’ only if creative objectives appear within their reach. What is at stake here is the finality of the ensemble of human activities. Beyond material and political demands, what emerges is an aspiration for individual and collective reappropriation of the production of subjectivity” (133).
paradigm, discussed by Guattari homologously to the postsignifying regime and to Rancière’s aesthetic regime. Certain parlance echoes the potential enabled by reconfigured conditions:

“The work of art, for those who use it, is an activity of unframing, of rupturing sense, of baroque proliferation or extreme impoverishment, which leads to a recreation and a reinvention of the subject itself. […] The event of its encounter can irreversibly date the course of an existence and generate fields of the possible ‘far from the equilibria’ of everyday life” (Guattari 131, my emphasis). Indeed, by charting the apparatus, through pragmatics, we can proceed.

Paradigm Thinking

Freed from a fixation upon meaning (denotation), pragmatics can recognize the effects of an artistic “rupture with signification” and pose the more crucial question, whether “a work leads effectively to a mutant production of enunciation” (Guattari 131)—now a manifest engagement with the aforementioned “condition of possibility” within a regime generally. In “The New Aesthetic Paradigm” chapter, Guattari describes “Science, technology, philosophy, art and human affairs” as each operating in the apparatus/dispositif sense of paradigm: they “confront respectively the constraints and resistances of specific materials”—the finite modes and concrete processes of a paradigm—through “codes, know-how and historical teachings” (100). For art, unlike the paradigms of philosophy and techno-science, “the finitude of the sensible material becomes a support for the production of affects and percepts” (Guattari 100-1). As the former point refers to a distinct objective of Guattari’s in this chapter, renegotiating the infinite and the finite, the latter implication of art’s production relates more to the present concern of invention. For example, Simon O’Sullivan (2010) describes overall how “the aesthetic paradigm might be thought of as an expanded field of creative life practices that are not necessarily restricted to
what is typically considered art […]” (258-9).10

With this focus on the paradigm, I have not presented even a cursory account of Guattari’s conjecturing the concrete forms of “processes of creation” in the aesthetic paradigm (106), including new enunciation and ethics (107) as well as subjectivity production (108). Rather, as part of the compound methodology developing in this chapter, I have sought to emphasize the perspective employed, as well as the discernible mode or paradigm that most highlights “the variable creativity for the apparatuses”—addressing the fundamental question “how the production of something new in the world is possible” (Deleuze Regimes 344). In this regard, one of Guattari’s key discursive strategies appears his describing how the paradigms operate by assemblages of varying types (qualitative and quantitative), which is an instructive lesson for method. A consequence of this theorization, Guattari’s complex description of the paradigms through “pragmatics” avoids the epistemological pitfalls of any totalizing discourse or Likewise, there is a solid benefit to the nuance describing the respective types of assemblage and recognizing that any of the three might be operative at present (105): this rigor resolves the discursive need to posit in rigid terms of successive period or peremptory “break.”

Two brief examples, and their direct implications for method, illustrate this contrast. The first sense of demarcation and period can be seen in the Thomas S. Kuhn (1970) The Structure Of Scientific Revolutions—which includes “at least 21 different meanings of paradigm” (Zima 193)—and the “paradigm shift” as “a break in the condition of knowledge” (Conte 8). Viewed in general, this recognition does not pose a serious hazard for theory discourse. However, the

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10 Additionally worth noting is that in his examining the ontology and politics of Chaosmosis, O’Sullivan markedly explores “Guattari’s modelling of a processual and ecological subjectivity […] in which asignifying components become crucial […] and in which aesthetic practices play a privileged role” (257). A second quote, which relates to my discussing the problematics of Philosophy and Art in a later chapter, conveys O’Sullivan’s perspicacious approach to Guattari’s text: we “experience and produce the [aesthetic paradigm] through a number of distinct practices […] each of which operates as an interface between the finite and infinite” (259, my emphasis).
perilous outcome can be seen in liberal arts scholars’ uncritically adopting scientific developments as the “given” situation of the changed apparatus—taken in the totalizing sense of a new episteme—without adequately positioning within a paradigm. A patent instance of this outcome in recent decades, likely overshadowed soon by “posthumanism” in cultural studies, is the attempted application of scientific chaos and complexity theory to literary scholarship. Following N. Katherine Hayles (1990)—and representative of this scholarly trend, beginning with Hayles’ *Chaos Bound* and including work by Rice (1997) and Best and Kellner (2001)—Joseph M. Conte soundly reasons “chaotics” (17) as an “exemplary” approach for the “interdisciplinary knowledge” of the paradigm shift into postmodernism (13).

Surely, chaos theory as an historical development in science is indisputable—just as the output by these writers is “novel,” granted. However, without digressing into this contentious detour fully, I must point out the implication of this sort of work: such scholarship in this parlance operates strictly within the dispositif acting upon discourse (Knowledge), without a developed (or even clear) understanding of the present apparatus, the “shifted paradigm” as it

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11 Although contemporaneous with and perhaps originating from the same illogical point as importing chaos theory, “posthumanism” in cultural studies certainly appears a critical wave continuing this decade. For example in *The Routledge Companion to Literature and Science*, Neil Badmington (2010) surveys “the sheer range of academic disciplines in which posthumanist concerns have been addressed” (375). Works that lack the distinct orientation of Cary Wolfe’s *What is Posthumanism?* (2009), for example, suggest that this misplaced effort with art objects is “unworkable”—evident merely in publications’ titles, *e.g.* *Posthuman Metamorphosis: Narrative And Systems* (Fordham UP, 2008) or *Nature In Literary And Cultural Studies: Transatlantic Conversations On Ecocriticism* (Rodopi, 2006). In any case, my contention questions the futility of any discourse that lapses into merely referential (denotative) exercises, with a convoluted focus lacking discernable method or object of study, as I continue below.

were; consequently, it yields little if any means for possible new (forms of) enunciation, by remaining strictly within the signifying regime of referential discourse.

The second example that contrasts Guattari’s assemblage-paradigm discourse is more well-known, although less obviously specious, precisely for its focus on forms of discourse. In *The Postmodern Condition*, Jean-François Lyotard (1979) employs Wittgenstein’s “language games” as his perspective (10) for examining narrative knowledge & scientific knowledge, and the modality of statements, as they function by and as “legitimation.” In a representative conclusion about the new apparatus, he evokes the “impact on the status of knowledge” (38) by the historical (apparatus) shift in the 20th century: “In contemporary society and culture—postindustrial society, postmodern culture—the question of the legitimation of knowledge is formulated in different terms. The grand narrative has lost its credibility, regardless of what mode of unification it uses, regardless of whether it is a speculative narrative or a narrative of emancipation” (37).

Overall, Lyotard analyzes the discourses of knowledge—modes and limits of enunciation, effectively—strictly based upon the criterion of legitimation. In my context, this criterion can be understood mainly as an effect of a *dispositif*; furthermore, Lyotard’s description only diagnoses without offering recourse within the apparatus, presented not only as “given” but irrevocable. Indeed, in a later appendix, Lyotard (1984) describes postmodernism explicitly by the status of “Ideas of which no presentation is possible” due to the limited capacity of the separate faculties (78): “They remain inexplicable without the incommensurability of reality to concept which is implied in the Kantian philosophy of the sublime” (79). In a subordinate current emerging here, which connects both to Guattari and to the relation of philosophy and art
addressed in the next section, Lyotard’s recourse to *the sublime* demonstrates his aporetic view of “the differend between the infinite and the finite” (Zima 179).

Returning to Guattari's model following these contrasting instances, there appear two lessons for method consequently. The imperative to situate knowledge discourse within a defined paradigm (and first *discipline*, even) emerges as the relative condition for efficacy; in this case, work with “cultural objects” best proceeds within the *aesthetic paradigm*, especially concerning the *postsignifying regime*. Attending to the complexity of an apparatus view, *pragmatics* recognizes the types of processes and assemblages that operate respective to the paradigm charted. Historicity shows one aspect how an apparatus theorization is contingent, along with attention to mode, most importantly—and while this view offers how to “negotiate” level of specificity and generality, the question of relating *the finite* and *the infinite* remains secondary and deferred for now. With these points, I turn to an examination of “discipline” as presented by Deleuze & Guattari, toward the method of study and exemplar of my overall aims in this work.

**The Problem of a Concept**

“the rule is that the interfering discipline must proceed with its own methods.”
— Deleuze and Guattari, *What is Philosophy?* (217)

With a complex perspective of conditions, Apparatus Theory recognizes not only the epistemic shifts that occur but the new problematics created, as well; for respective disciplines, the consequences of both for their output will vary by paradigm (or *dispositif*). Rather than accept a general period label, we must consider more scrupulously the epistemological conditions within a Humanities discipline that whose focus and aim are to create new (forms of) knowledge. Generally in terms of thought, Philosophy within the new apparatus is at least “post-Enlightenment” and most likely “Post-Kantian,” non-transcendental; anti-Platonist, not Idealist, as empirical and materialist. Art, as aesthetic composition and expression, appears non-
representational, multimodal and heterogeneous opposed to conventionally defined forms or genre; and not limited to signification (meaning), indicating a postsignifying regime.

Admittedly, such attempts remain too general and abstract without an object of study or the concrete processes of a dispositif to consider. As a provisional way to address both aspects, I posit the status of “the concept” as such today; in *What is Philosophy?* Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari (1991) conjecture, “If the three ages of the concept are the encyclopedia, pedagogy, and commercial professional training, only the second can safeguard us from falling from the heights of the first into the disaster of the third—an absolute disaster for thought whatever its benefits might be, of course, from the viewpoint of universal capitalism” (12). Although this conjecture might seem overstated, we can not underestimate what is at stake in the creation of new knowledge and enunciation. The nature of this creation requires extensive understanding of the respective discipline, which Deleuze and Guattari present in *What is Philosophy?* and which I summarize next to this end—a simple yet crucial determination, as Agamben (2006) states, given “There is no method that would be valid for every domain, just as there is no logic that can set aside its objects” (7). The additional benefit of this goal bears directly upon a discipline invested in novel forms of knowledge and confronted with “problems of interference” (216), in Deleuze and Guattari’s terms, as when Philosophy “attempts to create the concept of a sensation” (217).

**Apparatus Theory: Philosophy, Science, Art—Constructivism**

Although “analogous problems are posed for each [discipline]” (216), this situation appears to me precisely the task facing Humanities work with culture toward new enunciations of concepts. To these ends, I shall summarize efficiently yet systematically the way Deleuze and Guattari explicate their notion of Philosophy in relation to elements of Science and Art, in order

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13 Deleuze, Gilles and Félix Guattari *What is Philosophy?* (1991). Trans. Tomlinson and Burchell. (Columbia. UP, 1994). Note, in all subsequent quotations, the emphasis is the author’s except when noted.
to illustrate the schema and problems of all three disciplines. Taken broadly, “Philosophy is a
constructivism” with “two qualitatively different complementary aspects: the creation of
corcepts and the laying out of a plane” (35-6). The greater issues and implications concern
epistemological problems, insofar that “Planes must be constructed and problems posed, just as
corcepts must be created” (27). Deleuze and Guattari focus extensively upon corcepts, defining
Philosophy as “the art of forming, inventing, and fabricating corcepts” (2), producing
“knowledge through pure corcepts” (7). Emphasizing the latter quality, they differentiate its
status from scientific functions and artistic sensations, emphasizing that “the concept is real
without being actual, ideal without being abstract” (22), its virtuality: the concept itself “speaks
the event, not the essence or the thing—pure Event, a haecceity, an entity” (22).

The three characteristics of the concept are its relation to other concepts (19); its
“accumulation of components” as “pure and simple singularity” (20); most importantly, its
“render[ing] components inseparable within itself” (19). The latter point “defines consistency of
the concepts, its endoconsistency,” in that the components “are distinct, heterogeneous, and yet
not separable” (19). This integral consistency without homogenization manifests “nondiscursive
resonance” between the heterogeneous components, in that concepts “are centers of vibration”
(23). Additionally, the nature of the consistency is “the inseparability of a finite number of
heterogeneous components traversed by a point of absolute survey at infinite speed” (21)—what
Deleuze and Guattari describe as “heterogenesis” of the components within “zones of
neighborhood” (20). Closely related, although more distinct, are the “conceptual personae” that
operate in philosophy. In any of their five possible manifestations, for Deleuze and Guattari,
“conceptual personae carry out the movements that describe the author’s plane of immanence,
and they play a part in the very creation of the author’s concepts” (63). The conceptual personae
are “the powers of concepts” (65) in this sense, as well as “points of view” (75); more significantly, “The role of conceptual personae is to show thought’s territories, its absolute deterritorializations and reterritorializations” (69).

A key distinction for understanding this and the other two schema are that none of these elements is originary or derivative or consequential for Deleuze and Guattari (40). Rather, there is “coadaption” between the three elements that philosophy presents in its constructivism (77): “the prephilosophical plane it must lay out (immanence), […] personae it must invent and bring to life (insistence), and the philosophical concepts it must create (consistency)” (76). The consistency that occurs with the “infinity of possible concepts on a plane [that] resonate and connect” (76) does not produce homogeneity, but rather maintains “variations” (202). This characteristic displays both Philosophy’s positive and generative relation with chaos (208) and its effort to preserve the infinite, “To give consistency without losing anything of the infinite” (42); in both cases, Philosophy seeks to “retain infinite speeds while gaining consistency, by giving the virtual a consistency specific to it” (118). This is the plane of consistency that Philosophy institutes or “casts” over chaos (202), in an effort not against chaos but against opinion (doxa) (203). This point manifests as a fundamental undertaking and quality of the discipline; also, the view of a plane clearly distinguishes the disciplines and their processes.

First, as a specific plane of immanence particular to an epoch (39) and to a case of Philosophy’s “instituting” (41), the “plane of immanence or consistency” (118) can be understood as the plane of consistency and as “the plane of immanence of concepts, the planomenon” (36). The planomenon is described uniquely: it is “formless, unlimited absolute,” “neither surface nor volume but always fractal”; the “absolute horizon,” of “purely conceptual events”; the “indivisible milieu in which concepts are distributed” (36). As the plane that
Philosophy institutes, like the plane of reference by Science and plane of composition by Art, the planomenon is “the image of thought, the image [that] thought gives itself of what it means to think, to make use of thought, to find one’s bearings in thought” (37); furthermore, “It is not a method […] Neither is it a state of knowledge” (37). This description differentiates it from a general plane—“the pure plane of immanence of a Being-thought, of a Nature-thought” (88)—on which “events are the reality of the virtual, forms of a thought-Nature that survey every possible universe” (178). Distinct from Philosophy’s “image of thought,” Deleuze and Guattari explain, “THE plane of immanence is, at the same time, that which must be thought and that which cannot be thought. It is the nontought within thought. It is the base of all planes […] the most intimate within thought and yet the absolute outside” (59). Consequently, “the supreme act of philosophy” regarding “THE plane” is “to show it is there, unthought in every plane […] the outside and inside of thought” (59-60). Only in this way would Philosophy thus engage with immanence as conceived by Spinoza—“the ‘best’ plane of immanence,” which does not “restore any transcendent” (60).

Thus we again see the imperative for pragmatics to qualify processes in terms of modes, as in the case of Philosophy’s deploying transcendence or engaging with immanence in its creation of a plane; indeed, the appeal to transcendence appears a quality of Philosophy, like other types of thought such as religion, throughout much of its history and today. In a mode distinct from Philosophy and Art, Science institutes a plane of reference regarding the virtual (118) and chaos (202); it is this quality, not that affirms or deploys transcendence (125), which Deleuze and Guattari present as culpable and detrimental to new types of thought. Specifically in this regard, Science “relinquishes the infinite, infinite speed, in order to gain a reference able to actualize the virtual” (118)—whereas chaos precisely exists as this “infinite speed” (118). First,
this point informs my deliberate position against the limiting characteristic of denotative and referential discourse, such as the confused attempt to describe literature (aesthetic paradigm) in the fashion or parlance of Science. As Deleuze and Guattari further explain, this “slowing down in the chaos or the threshold of suspension of the infinite” (119) is a function of limits, (e.g. in the form of numbers), and these limits or borders “give the plane its references” (120); these are the “first functives,” “the limit and the variable” (118). In contrast to concepts (Philosophy) and sensations (Art), the object Science creates is functions: “elements of functions are called functives. A scientific notion is defined not by concepts but by functions or propositions” (117).

Whereas a philosophical concept “expresses an event that gives consistency to the virtual on a plane of immanence,” a scientific function “determines a state of affairs, thing, body that actualizes the virtual on plane of reference” (133). A function thus illustrates a different paradigm, in the problems and plane that Science institutes as a discipline of equal creation akin to the other two (127). To clarify, the term “function” appears in What is Philosophy? relative to the scientific discipline, without reference to a philosophical question of “literary functions,” the sort of which Deleuze and Guattari pose in earlier texts.¹⁴ This understanding, like Lyotard’s modes of statements, might be erroneously inferred, especially from the discussion of functions in “discursive systems” (117) and in the form of logical propositions (156). However, the focus here maintains the disciplinary distinctions, consistently, except when Deleuze and Guattari mention the parallel prospect of “a new, specifically philosophical type of function” (141).

In Science, integral to the creation of functives are “partial observers,” for example “proper names” (24). As “necessary intercessors as respective ‘subjects’ of enunciation” (129) and “points of view in things themselves” (132), Deleuze and Guattari explain, the “ideal partial

¹⁴ Deleuze and Guattari (1975), Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature; Deleuze (1972), Proust and Signs; Deleuze (1993) Essays Critical and Clinical. These are all discussed in the next two chapters, regarding literary “function.”
observes are the perceptions or sensory affections of functives themselves” (131). These observers correspond to conceptual personae and aesthetic figures in the respective disciplines, as “sensibilia that are doubles of the functives” (131). This quality is “the basis of the relationship between [the three disciplines], such that we can say that a function is beautiful and a concept is beautiful” (132). Thus, while a negative connotation about Science might be evoked, particularly in its overall referential-limiting function and its producing variables from chaos (202), Deleuze and Guattari ultimately present the discipline as a respective epistemology, which creates (functions) and institutes a plane (reference). Their pragmatics perspective guides the way to regard an issue in parallel and in conjunction, evident in specific postulates; for example, “The special perceptions and affections of science or philosophy necessarily connect up with the percepts and affects of art, those of science just as much as those of philosophy” (132).

**Target for Method (Introduction)**

Unique to the discipline of Art, “percepts and affects” are the sensations that artists extract from lived experience—perceptions and affections regarding states of affairs—which they preserve (167) and express through “aesthetic figures” (177). In the relative category, these are analogous to concepts–personae and functions–observers. Independent from individuals’ experience, the “compounds” or blocs of sensations (164) distinguish this conception and vital status of Art: “the work of art is a monument,” but “not something commemorating a past [:] it is a bloc of present sensations that owe their preservation to themselves and that provide the event with the compound” (167). The passage featuring this quote emphasizes the significance of sensations: the vibration and/or resonance of sensations (168) occur in the “sonorous blocs”—“colors, postures, sounds”—of aesthetic figures (184). Uniquely, these figures exist within the refrain, “the being of sensation” (184)—and indeed, Deleuze and Guattari remark paradoxically that “everything begins with refrains” (189).
Although simply one effectual process within the schemata of Deleuze and Guattari, these descriptions of the aesthetic paradigm bear great significance and fertile implication for the method under discussion presently. First, like the heterogeneity of concepts (“endoconsistency”), the quality of refrain does not elide or normalize difference(s) but inheres precisely through the varieties (202) that artists maintain through “chaotic variability,” composing works of “chaosmos” (204). In this sense, Art for Deleuze and Guattari engages chaos in the most productive way of the disciplines in its varieties: “Art indeed struggles with chaos, but it does so in order to bring forth a vision that illuminates it for an instant, a Sensation” (204). The varieties thus composed through chaos manifest in aesthetic figures such as “the relations of counterpoint” and “the compounds of sensations” (188)—insofar as “no art and no sensation have ever been representational” (193). Consequently, a feature to note for method, it is through this process that Art employs “the finite in order to rediscover, to restore the infinite” (197, my emphasis).

From the pragmatics of constructivism that Deleuze and Guattari explicate, there appear several lessons and tasks for the creation of concepts pertaining to the aesthetic paradigm. First, to clarify the paradigmatic or “structural” view, they remind that “Thinking is thought through concepts, functions, or sensations and no one of these thoughts is better than another, or more fully, completely, or synthetically ‘thought’” (198). If our investment is the creation and articulation of new knowledge, then our objective is not to confront concepts, functions, or sensations but the condition of the doxa, (“non-thinking,” consensus, uncritical opinion): a discipline’s “struggle with chaos is only the instrument of a more profound struggle against opinion” (206). Indeed, chaos—whether taken as variations, variables, or varieties (202)—is not a “problem” to be “solved” in conventional terms; neither, likewise, is the relation of the
disciplines. Proceeding from the latter point, a Humanities discipline such as “English” can be understood as situated between Philosophy and Art. In terms of working with the aesthetic paradigm, this can not be “interdisciplinary” insofar as we would not manage to undertake the problem of a concept or the singularity of art respectively and unique to their modes—especially in the dilemma of our “attempts to create the concept of a sensation” (217).

Reviewing the tasks presented by Deleuze and Guattari envisions an apt trajectory for such work, the principle objective of which being to create concepts. A correlative aim is to “lay out a plane”—determining the type of which, Planomenon, Reference, or Composition, by discipline—or to “chart the apparatus” and distinguish the paradigm, as I have phrased. A subordinate issue implicated in this endeavour is our identifying within the apparatus the “unthought” plane of immanence (in this parlance). Finally, in an effort connecting both concept and plane, we must pose a problem, articulated adequately to the concept and plane—for “when they are stated, it is no longer a matter of discussing but rather one of creating concepts for the undiscussable problem posed” (28).

The first two objectives identify the central concern of my project, evoking the question and method of how to create concepts with heterogeneous consistency (resonance), which do not limit referentially but inhere and express adequately the variety of sensation; the “answer,” but not yet or ever a “solution,” appears in the aesthetic paradigm, through our encounters with Art in its singularity. Even with its virtual status, an ontic concept thus created would not limit but incorporate the chaotic variety of sensation; in this way, the aesthetic mode precisely manages the problem of how to maintain or restore the infinite by means of the finite, in this case the material composition of aesthetic figures. Yet, given the imperative to pose the problem of a
concept, an examination of the multiple regimes within the aesthetic paradigm requires further consideration of the operative apparatus—a perspective in this regard named “problematics.”

Methodological Perspective: Problematics, Pragmatics, Invention (Introduction)

“The 'problematic' is a state of the world, a dimension of the system, and even its horizon or its home: it designates precisely the objectivity of Ideas, the reality of the virtual.”

—Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition* (280)

As I have proposed, Apparatus Theory recognizes the epistemic shift—post-Enlightenment philosophy, non-representational art—and generates a method for how to work with emergent currents in theory & cultural objects of study. Toward the aim of producing new knowledge discourse, apt concepts must be created; these concepts address philosophical problems, which might be unstated, without “solving” or “closing” the problem in the sense of a denotative statement or referential question. This perspective is another facet of the “poststructuralist orientation” that I have described thus far, a crucial consideration for a disciplinary procedure, and one that Foucault and Deleuze articulate uniquely in response to Kant. Addressing the stance that Deleuze exhibits in *Difference and Repetition* (1968), which I apply in detail in the next chapter, Foucault (1999) articulates the general view of this programme in his 1970 review essay on Deleuze, “Theatrum Philosophicum”: “We must think problematically rather than question and answer dialectically” (359, my emphasis).

Just as Foucault recognizes, Deleuze serves as the exemplar for methodology—treating concepts and problems on a particular plane. Describing “what happens when Deleuze reads other philosophers, as well as works of art” (256), Jean-Jacques Lecercle (2002) emphasizes the compound methodology at work in Deleuze’s constructivist project: “by extracting a problem and constructing a concept, often against the grain of the text […] he reads for style. He extracts the problem and constructs the concept that will express the specific philosophical gesture of the text, its philosophical and literary style” (*Deleuze and Language* 256). Instructive for the present
discussion, Lercercle here identifies the fundamental step for constructivism, in practical parlance echoing the imperatives to “institute a plane” and “pose a problem” from Deleuze and Guattari; in order to “work like Deleuze,” we must first ascertain the problem addressed.

Directly guided by Deleuze’s method, new discursive productions can result through “the extraction of a problem” (37). For example, in order “to produce a concept of language” (68), Lercercle recognizes that his scholarly task “will involve constructing language in Deleuze as a problem, in the strict sense that he gives to this concept” (3, original emphasis). In another case, by adequately recognizing the paradigm of his concepts—the plane of immanence—Branka Arsic (2003) can assert how “The possibility of a Deleuzean reading of Bartleby emerges” (144): she writes, “There is no answer to his question because Bartleby is neither a literary character nor a ‘figure’; neither a metaphor nor a proper name; neither a question nor an answer but a problem; a problem in the Deleuzean sense of the word.” (Between Deleuze and Derrida 135).

A corollary to this perspective concerns the undertaking of specific concepts that Deleuze creates, which implicitly evoke a unique problem addressed. In the case of his working with particular art forms, concepts that involve aesthetic figures and sensation address a problem on the plane of composition; such an application would thus require the attendant opposition to interpretation, the signifying regime of representation, any referential or limiting discourse, and appeals or applications of transcendence. Within this context, for example, Brian Massumi (2002) posits that “Deleuze’s logic of seriality and potential is what allows him to make sense of asignifying expression. In turn, it is the idea of asignifying expression that allows him to argue that speech and gesture can be literally [...] creative: ontogenetic; adding to reality” (A Shock to Thought 24). In this “idea” is a fundamental problem inherent in the Deleuzean concepts, which addresses the aesthetic paradigm in terms of the postsignifying regime. Furthermore, the notion
of “asignifying expression” names the object of study undertaken in my examination, relating to Deleuze’s description of literature’s functioning though aesthetic figures of sensation.

Considering the general task of knowledge production, a propositional description of the dilemma in the present apparatus can be sketched. Fundamentally posed with creating new knowledge and perhaps new types of discourse, disciplines employ denotative or referential language to posit ideas. When the aim is further characterized by seeking to express experience through concepts—which to me appears the investment and struggle of most contemporary “discordant” currents, especially with concerns of identity and politics—the resorting to transcendental discourse is not only inadequate but misguided. This error is exacerbated in cases when scholarship seeks to work with cultural forms (Art) in “productive” ways: at minimum, given the further detachment from the encounter; at worst, incidentally proceeding in antithetical fashion, by capturing or limiting (aesthetic) sensation through referential discourse. Thus, there emerges the question of how to create concepts expressive of experience (encounters).

An alternative way to work: “Deleuze’s proposed image for the philosopher is that of the artisan,” Lercercle notes; this “system of concepts is a box of tools. Deleuze takes this conception seriously: each new book demands a new set of tools, or concept; they are needed to extract the problem that is the object of the book” (100). Considering the full implications of this perspective, my project proceeds with two primary tasks: fundamentally explicating Deleuze’s constructivist methodology for inventing philosophical concepts through encounters with art; demonstrating this procedure of working with literary texts, in order to illustrate the disciplinary relevance and to explore the philosophical problem immanent within Deleuzian concepts pertaining to literature. On the latter point, I undertake the problem addressed by Deleuze’s
prevalent work with literature as a pragmatics of the *postsignifying regime*.

Presenting a research trajectory for scholars, Deleuze (1977) asserts that “philosophy is born or produced outside by the painter, the musician, the writer, each time that the melodic line draws along the sound, or the pure traced line colour, or the written line the articulated voice” (*Dialogues* 74). An additional issue implicated within this method for creating concepts concerns the nature of encounters. Given the overall framework discussed thus far, I will contend the paramount importance for scholars: whether our work functions to “capture” or limit the object of study, in the signifying regime or referential paradigm; or to invent apt concepts through variety provided to us by the sensory composition of aesthetic figures. To this end, the next chapter explicates an understanding of concepts and encounters in Deleuze’s philosophy, understanding his work as constructivism and expressionism before applying this method.
CHAPTER 2
“PHILOSOPHY AS OPERA” WHEN WORKING WITH ART

Encounters and Problematized Concepts

“Suppose we say instead that the movement goes not from the hypothetical to the apodictic but from the problematical to the question”
—Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition* (197)

Proceeding from the problem articulated at the prior chapter’s conclusion, considering the implications of Apparatus Theory for scholarly method, involves elliptical progress: before attempting the application and invention of novel concepts, careful study of primary works is necessary in order to ascertain thoroughly the method for invention working with art, beginning now and continuing throughout the next several chapters. The first point of clarification raised by this endeavor concerns the disciplinary convention and Humanities orientation grounded in philosophy; insofar as this project is positioned not as *philosophy proper* but as an intersection of theory, method, and art or culture (specifically literature), the proviso for my work is that we can study philosophers’ method without adopting their wholesale ontology. The latter point emerges paramount within the scope of my aims, applying toward scholarly invention and discourse the insights derived from studying elucidative works from the oeuvre of Gilles Deleuze.

Without exaggeration—and without further delaying the progression of this discussion by needlessly qualifying with substantial citation—Gilles Deleuze remains one of, if not the most original contemporary philosopher in terms of novel concepts. Regarding the breadth of objects of study as well as the range of distinct materials with which he worked, Deleuze presents a viable and productive guide for invention, respective to disciplinary endeavor: beyond the voluminous output in recent decades, I will show qualitatively the rationale for Deleuze’s work motivating scholars’ continued efforts to across fields and contexts. Beyond this incidental gesture, my examination and application seeks to present Deleuze as a highly instructive model
for invention of complex concepts concerned with Art, thereby addressing the question and
problem of creating scholarly discourse within the changing epistemological regime and cultural
paradigm within the present inchoate apparatus.

In this chapter, I first review in detail Deleuze’s method, as he discusses it in terms of
“encounter” and as he describes the qualities of concepts as explained in *Difference and
Repetition* and *What is Philosophy?*. As foundation for subsequent examination, topics and
passages are selected with regard to the present study; they are necessarily detailed, while not
comprehensive—after all, this review works mainly to establish both the method and orientation
that appears throughout his oeuvre. Before engaging directly with examples of Deleuze’s literary
readings and then presenting initial attempts to emulate his perspective, in this chapter’s separate
interlude, I provide fundamental descriptions of literature as oriented by Deleuze and Guattari in
the distinct discipline of Art, introduced earlier. Imperative for any such scholarly experiment
that “apprentices to” primary philosophy, this understanding enables our successfully employing
the method and concepts in dynamic and constructive ways, rather than deploying in simple
fashion or toward pernicious ends by reinforcing the hegemonic regime of thought and discourse.
This chapter thus begins the study that continues for the duration of my project: discerning an
understanding of Deleuze’s style as connecting constructivism and expressionism, in order to
emulate the method displayed by his prodigious output of highly original philosophy.

Calling *Difference and Repetition* part “detective novel” and part “science fiction,”
Deleuze explains that empiricism “treats the concept as an object of an encounter”; he adds, “I
make, remake and unmake my concepts along a moving horizon, from an always decentered
center, from an always displaced periphery which repeats and differentiates them” (xx-xxi). As

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an aside, it is this remark that directs my arranging into single focus both *Difference and Repetition* and *What is Philosophy?*—principal “bookend texts” of a prolific twenty-five-year span—in order both to gauge Deleuze’s sense of this horizon and to emphasize his emergent method with regard to concept creation through encounters. More significantly to note, my study is less invested in reinforcing the nomenclature of “transcendental empiricism,” or in privileging narrowly Deleuze’s early work at the expense of a more inclusive and observant perspective. Instead, I seek to extrapolate the method most beneficial to constructivism—one more suitable, in the sense of “problematic,” to the question of creating concepts through encounters. Two disparate passages, both indicating a similar desire for learning from Deleuze this way, reveal the necessity for deliberation in one’s point of departure; in this way, I mean that scholarly discourse must be oriented properly upon beginning so as not to veer incidentally or consequentially into an incompatible paradigm (e.g. reference, verification).

Constantin V. Boundas (2009) implicitly evokes the issue I earlier broached, in the introduction to *Gilles Deleuze: The Intensive Reduction*:

Gilles Deleuze taught us that philosophy is the creation of concepts aiming, in a precarious manner, to impose, consistency upon a chaos that he himself preferred to see as the [Unlimited] rather than as a void and a naught. He placed plenty of demands on the creating philosopher: he asked her to face her canvas, and, like an artist, to begin by wiping away the cliches and the ready-mades of the *doxa* that stand in the way of her creation; to suspend the chattiness that the dominant ideology of communication encourages, and to opt for the desert of thinking and writing […]. The result of this condition, he promised, is not a dreaded *aphasia*, but rather the creative *glossolalia* of indirect discourse. As for the veracity of this *glossolalia*, Deleuze dares us to find it in the interesting and remarkable concepts that would punctuate and sustain it—in other words, in their ability to offer solutions to their parent problems or—perhaps the same thing—in their ability to make existing problems resonate together. (1, original emphasis)

Although most of the points that Boundas presents are ostensibly accurate, despite the convoluted arrangement, the trouble in this case is the specious circular logic and subordination posed thus: to create concepts that are “interesting and remarkable,” which thereby confirm the
truth or reality of “the creative glossolalia of indirect discourse” by which we create varied concepts. Of course, the imperative for thought against the consensus and ideology of argument accurately articulates Deleuze’s position; however, beyond the logical flaw, the danger of this approach lies in our privileging simply a value or “interest” in multiplicity (or diversity, or difference) itself. The latter quality can not be a condition for “successful” work, as suggested by Boundas, given that this point of departure calls merely for identification (verification).

Certainly, from the perspective of Apparatus Theory and problematics, concepts must be more than “interesting and remarkable” as qualified by their multiplicity or the difference that they illustrate—the second lesson discerned, a summary of which I will present at section’s end. In contrast to the product, an additional warning concerns precisely “the desire to outline a Deleuzian methodology,” as Simon O’Sullivan (2008) states; he argues, “One might be able to extract such a method or system but this would be to render Deleuze’s thought inoperative, to freeze it in, and as, a particular image of thought, to capture its movement, precisely to represent it” (3). This hazard indeed concerns my project underway, and O’Sullivan rightly identifies the crucial importance of scholarly process informed and oriented in the manner appropriate to the exemplar. O’Sullivan thus describes his book *Art Encounters Deleuze and Guattari* (2008):

In order to avoid this systematization of Deleuze the book proceeds in a rather piecemeal fashion, jumping from one aspect of Deleuze’s thought to another, picking up the same threads in different contexts and repeating key notions with different emphases. Indeed, rather than giving a systematic overview of Deleuze, the volume offers a series of thought experiments—different attempts at bringing Deleuze into contact with different milieus. In fact, the volume […] might be said to attend to certain *resonances* between the field of philosophy […] and the field of art and art history […]. (3, original emphasis)

I am indeed attentive to avoiding the precarious outcome that O’Sullivan states in the former case; concurrently, I seek both to make “operable” Deleuze’s thought and, more importantly for broader disciplinary stakes, to explicate *encounter constructivism* for applied practice.
To resolve the issue of method, then, in terms not specific to Deleuzian parlance or philosophy. First, I will not interpret Deleuze’s writing, nor interpret literature by means of Deleuze’s philosophy; rather, I attempt to work with Deleuze’s concepts in the service of invention, testing the viability or application of specific ideas and his method as exemplar. Composing a lucid methodology additionally produces generalizable lessons for scholarship, extrapolated from Deleuze’s creating philosophy in conjunction with Art, Science, and other disciplines. Regarding seriously the “critical importance to keep alive a certain style of Deleuze’s thought without over-academicising [sic] his writings or endlessly repeating his own words” (3), as O’Sullivan states, the outcome of this examination might very well enable scholarly work and discourse in the mode suited to the aesthetic paradigm. Underscoring my approach, he continues: “We need to repeat the energy and style of his writings without merely representing his thought. For me this difficult project […] entails giving attention to the pragmatic and constructive nature of Deleuze’s thought whilst at the same time creatively bringing it into contact with other worlds and always with our own projects and our own lives” (3).

**Empirical Orientation**

“Something in the world forces us to think. This something is an object not of recognition but of a fundamental encounter.” (*Difference and Repetition* 139)

A practical reason, beside the scope of this project, for marginalizing Deleuze’s metaphysics in favor of his poetics is that many elements of the philosophy he presents are nominally inconsistent if not antithetical to such an attempt: specifically, much of his ontology is explicitly oriented and explicated respective of (*i.e.* “before” or “beside” or “beyond”) human subjectivity—chiefly all of his major theorizations concerning temporality, which is fundamental within his philosophy as one centered upon events. And yet, given that my concern is not primarily Philosophy discourse proper but the philosophical gesture of constructivism, we can
distinctly examine Deleuze as a thinker in process in order to “repeat the energy and style of his writings” in O’Sullivan’s terms. Moreover, a prudent balance accommodating Deleuze’s theory and his inventive gestures can effectively guide our emulating his working as an artistan—a quality increasingly and markedly evident in *The Logic of Sense* (1969) and *A Thousand Plateaus* (1980), both discussed in later chapters. For now, we might begin with the simple empirical notion the individual’s experience, conjectured by Deleuze: “On the basis of which signs within sensibility, by which treasures of the memory, under torsions determined by the singularities of which Idea will thought be aroused? We never know in advance how someone will learn: by means of what loves someone becomes good at Latin, what encounters make them a philosopher, or in what dictionaries they learn to think” (*DR* 165). In the case of thought, if sensibility, memory, and torsions are attributed to an individual, then the correlative terms signs, treasures, and singularities register ontic and supremely important in the dynamic of an encounter that produces thought—and these are not objects of our recognition.

A key distinction “from the point of view of an empirical exercise of the senses” (*DR* 140) concerns signs and their unique relation to the faculty of sensibility, alternative to the notion of “object[s] which can be recalled, imagined or conceived” in the mode of recognition (139). Rather than understand strictly and simply in terms of our interpretive faculty, Deleuze asserts that “The object of encounter, on the other hand, really gives rise to sensibility with regard to a given sense” (139). Therefore, the relational terms to consider in terms of thought—which I will elaborate subsequently—are signs, sensibility, and encounters; before describing the type of signs specific to art in the next section, it is valuable to review further Deleuze’s theorization of encounter, as a crucial premise both of his following work and the present line of reasoning.
Chiefly, Deleuze posits, “it is the fortuitousness or the contingency of the encounter which guarantees the necessity of that which it forces to be thought” (DR 145). This contingency compels our focusing on the encounter itself, in Deleuze’s view, in order to acknowledge and examine sufficiently “that which forces thought to raise up and educate the absolute necessity of an act of thought or a passion to think” (139). Deleuze expounds this process:

In effect, the intensive or difference in intensity is at once both the object of the encounter and the object to which the encounter raises sensibility. [...] What we encounter are the demons, the sign-bearers: powers of the leap, the interval, the intensive and the instant; powers which only cover difference with more difference. What is most important, however, is that—between sensibility and imagination, between imagination and memory, between memory and thought—when each disjointed faculty communicates to another the violence which carries it to its own limit, every time it is a free form of difference which awakens the faculty [...]. (145)

Thus, we can discern both the importance of difference as a quality of the object encountered, as well as the relative connection between encounters and a certain faculty (in this case sensibility); both attributes must be considered significantly henceforth, regarding distinct sensible encounters. Incidentally, this passage complements an aspect of the problem introduced earlier in the book, then described as “the principle of a repetition which is no longer that of the Same, but involves the Other” and “involves difference” (23); Deleuze adds, moreover, “To learn is indeed to constitute this space of an encounter with signs, in which the distinctive points renew themselves in each other, and repetition takes shape while disguising itself” (23).

Setting aside the metaphysics of repetition and the imperceptibility in recognition (140), we might understand “learning” in general terms as catalyzed by an encounter: the inverse perspective of purely cognition-based interpretation, sign-objects affect us at least to the extent of forcing thought by their unique qualities of difference. Consequently, the type of thought evoked relates crucially to the sign encountered, by the “difference which awakens the faculty”
—reorienting the situation as one to examine with a perspective of complementarity and contingency rather than subordination of objects to faculties.

Returning to Deleuze’s asking “On the basis of which signs within sensibility […] will thought be aroused?” (165) now regarding the primacy of difference, we can understand how to accommodate adequately the object of study into a method for invention, acknowledging or “promoting” it on the basis of contingency. This is the case for singular concept creation through signs as well as for disciplinary discourse more generally. Deleuze and Guattari (1991) articulate the both points in What is Philosophy?:

In short, philosophy does have a principle, but it is a synthetic and contingent principle—an encounter, a conjunction. It is not sufficient by itself but contingent in itself. Even in the concept, the principle depends upon a connection of components that could have been different, with different neighborhoods. The principle of reason […] is a principle of contingent reason and is put like this: there is no good reason but contingent reason; there is no universal history except of contingency. (93, my emphasis)

The tenet of conditional and relational concepts, seemingly banal or axiomatic, indeed guides my study overall in significant fashion—particularly, as a factor motivating the shift “from the problematic to the question” as Deleuze states (DR 197). To reiterate, the developing effort toward working in the aesthetic paradigm undertakes the problem and question of creating concepts through “the intensive or difference” encountered in the sensible qualities of aesthetic figures. An additional lesson given the contingency of encounters thus demands the reconsideration of the conception of thought itself, one of Deleuze’s main overall efforts.

**Revised Image of Thought**

“More important than thought is ‘what leads to thought’; more important than the philosopher is the poet”

—Deleuze, Proust and Signs (95)

Concerning the primacy of representation and the subordination of difference historically, Deleuze—following Nietzsche, and directly intervening into the disciplinary developments following Kant—asserts that “The task of modern philosophy has been defined: to overturn
Platonism” (DR 59). Beside the expansive scope of history and thought, along with Derrida and Foucault, the interest for Apparatus Theory in developing a method for new constructivism lies in Deleuze’s conjecturing an image of thought within a paradigm different from that of Reason. Specifically applicable to this end, he states that “The conditions of a true critique and a true creation are the same: the destruction of an image of thought which presupposes itself and the genesis of the act of thinking in thought itself” (139). This alteration revises the conception of thought as being inherently or necessarily grounded in truth, reason or “common sense,” and cognition—“a dogmatic, orthodox or moral image” (132).

The latter point, the moral image of thought, reflects the understanding specific to the development of Western epistemology from Greek philosophy, following Plato and Aristotle. With a viewpoint of episteme or dispositif, we see that this conception is contingent and thus subject to “revision” (re-conception) with regard to a particular paradigm, either historically or qualitatively different. Deleuze dedicates much effort exploring this other conception within Difference and Repetition and The Logic of Sense, illuminating alternatives to Platonism ranging from the Stoics and Pre-Socratic Greek thinkers; to Leibniz and Spinoza; to Nietzsche and Bergson. This endeavor and perspective appear throughout his oeuvre, engaged directly in What is Philosophy? ultimately.

Just as Deleuze focuses on “the genesis of the act of thinking and the sense of truth and falsehood” (DR 158) in these earlier books, he and Guattari interrogate the epistemological processes of paradigms in What is Philosophy? as part of their examination of Philosophy, Science, and Art as distinct apparatus systems concerning knowledge and discourse. Informing our approach by elucidating the modern episteme, their descriptions enable our better undertaking the problem of a concept and the task of constructivism appropriate to the particular
apparatus, the aesthetic paradigm in the case of my project. The main premise and guiding principle for this approach follows Deleuze and Guattari in their succinctly stating, “As Nietzsche succeeded in making us understand, thought is creation, not will to truth” (WP 54).

As explained in the prior chapter, a particular dispositif manifests concretely in institutions, identity, and forms of visibility or utterance (knowledge, discourse, technology), which we can recognize through “pragmatics” or typology of these processes. This lesson derived from Deleuze and Guattari is generalizable and broadly applicable to scholarly discourse, both evident in their insights and able to be practiced toward productive ends.

Concerning types of thought, they distinguish from the Greek and Classical models the modern image of thought through three characteristics. Given that “the relationship of thought to truth […] has never been a simple, let alone constant, matter” (WP 54), they write, the first quality is “the complete renunciation of this relationship so as to regard truth as solely the creation of thought, taking into account the plane of immanence that it takes as its presupposition, and all this plane’s features […]” (54). This attribute is complicated by the second aspect postulated, following Nietzsche, in that “there is no will to truth” but only possibility of thinking (54): rather than the subjective cogito, the encounter that catalyzes thought is drawn in to relief in this case, with Deleuze and Guattari asking “what violence must be exerted on thought for us to become capable of thinking” (55).

Beside the shift in perspective—the alternative to an “anthropocentric” basis, which interests scholars with other aims—onto the conditions of thought, the third characteristic evokes a complex and important aspect of the modern image. If this condition is “an ‘Incapacity’ of thought, which remains at its core even after it has acquired the capacity determinable as creation,” Deleuze and Guattari write, “then a set of ambiguous signs arise, which become
diagrammatic features or infinite movements” (WP 55, my emphasis). The third characteristic stated succinctly here is that these features “take on a value by right, whereas in the other images of thought they were simple, derisory facts excluded from selection” (55)—in other words, qualities included within the modern image of thought. Relating to and reinforcing the second trait, the description that Deleuze and Guattari provide is slightly oblique: “as Kleist or Artaud suggests, thought as such begins to exhibit snarls, squeals, stammers; it talks in tongues and screams, which leads it to create, or to try to” (55). More lucid and comprehensible for us to apply is their perspective of pragmatics, demonstrated in this passage and intricate chapter of What is Philosophy?.

This discussion contrasting the modern image of thought to those of prior epistemes provides two exemplary efforts, which aid the overall project underway. First, the case of diagrammatic features elucidates the explication of particular philosophical “planes,” the parlance of Deleuze and Guattari approximately for—although not synonymous with—what I have termed dispositif or “apparatus” thus far. This explanation leads directly to the proper focus, additionally, that we can conclude and thus proceed onto the main task adequately. In both cases, the central topic of philosophical planes supplements the basic understanding of respective images of thought, as “there are varied and distinct planes of immanence” that, depending upon which infinite movements are retained and selected, succeed and contest each other in history”—for instance, for “the Greeks, in the seventeenth century, and today” (WP 39). Deleuze and Guattari clarify, “The plane of immanence is not a concept that is or can be thought but rather the image of thought, the image thought gives itself of what it means to think, to make use of thought, to find one’s bearings in thought” (37).
This constitutes a crucial distinction for understanding Deleuze and Guattari, and the orientation of their nuanced points: for instance, “What thought claims by right, what it selects, is infinite movement or the movement of the infinite. It is this that constitutes the image of thought” (WP 37). We can thus follow their further distinguishing that “elements of the plane are diagrammatic features” (39), which are “movements of the infinite,” independent from the “intensive ordinates” of concepts (40). Their parlance reflects the relative orientation by discipline or apparatus—Philosophy, Science, Art—pertaining to its engagement with chaos (pure multiplicity, variability, difference). Philosophy operates in the specific mode of thought insofar as, Deleuze and Guattari explain, “From chaos the plane of immanence takes the determinations with which it makes its infinite movements or its diagrammatic features” (50)—the variability of which concepts retain and reflect, without renouncing infinite speed (42).

With a focus upon how philosophers “draw up” a particular plane, the examples that Deleuze and Guattari provide for the respective images of thought proceed from this “typology” or pragmatics of the episteme. Shifting “from the problematical to the question” (DR 197), they ask, “Can the history of philosophy be presented from the viewpoint of the instituting of a plane of immanence?” (WP 44): transcendence in Plato and Christian philosophy (44-5); subsequently, “Beginning with Descartes, and then with Kant and Husserl, the cogito makes it possible to treat the plane of immanence as a field of consciousness” (46).² More patent is the “principle feature” exemplifying the classical image of thought, demonstrated by Descartes (although “traced back to Socrates”): “Error is the infinite movement that gathers together the whole of the negative”

² As “the coexistence of planes, not the succession of systems” (WP 59), philosophical history remains a matter of relative constructivism: “In the end, does not every great philosopher lay out a new plane of immanence, introduce a new substance of being and draw up a new image of thought, so that there could not be two great philosophers on the same plane?” Moreover, “it seems that each plane of immanence can only claim to be unique, to be the plane, by reconstituting the chaos it had to ward off: the choice is between transcendence and chaos.” (WP 51)
Overall, changes in both concepts and the image of thought reflect the diagrammatic features of different planes; for example, Deleuze and Guattari recognize that in the eighteenth century occurs “the substitution of belief for knowledge—that is, a new infinite movement implying another image of thought” (53).³

Attempting pragmatics in order to comprehend the modern image of thought, then, involves our querying the diagrammatic features or infinite movements—analogous to error and belief in prior epistemes—of the respective plane, that which has been “drawn up” by post-Enlightenment and contemporary philosophy. This could indeed be the work of constructivist concept creation, without necessarily instituting a new plane: given the features of the plane (third characteristic), rather than confusing or convoluting our orientation, we might explore what thought results from encounters (second trait) without truth (first trait) being the primary or supreme relation to thought. Deleuze and Guattari provide the rationale, implicitly in their model to follow, and the task, explicitly stated; the former case takes into account that they do not “draw up” another plane but indeed attempt to engage immanence itself as a “prephilosophical” plane (WP 40), following Spinoza. They declare “Spinoza, the infinite becoming-philosopher: he showed, drew up, and thought the ‘best’ plane of immanence—that is, the purest, the one that does not hand itself over to the transcendent or restore any transcendent, the one that inspires the fewest illusions, bad feelings, and erroneous perceptions” (60). Stated another way, Éric Alliez

³ Helpful here is a passage extending this reference: “Under what conditions can belief be legitimate when it has become secular? This question will be answered only with the creation of the great empiricist concepts (association, relation, habit, probability, convention). But conversely, these concepts, including the concept of belief itself, presuppose diagrammatic features that make belief an infinite movement independent of religion and traversing the new plane of immanence[;] (religious belief, on the other hand, will become a conceptualizable case, the legitimacy or illegitimacy of which can be measured in accordance with the order of the infinite).” (WP 53)
(2005) remarks that “for Deleuze (and Guattari), no one better than Spinoza showed what are the conditions of constructivism qua real experience of thought” (12).

Distinguished from “the plane of immanence of concepts, the planomenon” (WP 35), the Spinozist plane names for Deleuze and Guattari a “problematic” (with inherent question and “solution”) with which and within which they work—given how it avoids transcendence and illusion in favor of true thought of infinite becoming (59). Rather than delve into Spinoza’s ontology, for now we can ascertain important insight about the perspective demonstrated; two key passages guide this study. First, Deleuze and Guattari expound the “best” plane:

\[ \text{THE plane of immanence is, at the same time, that which must be thought and that which cannot be thought. It is the nonthought within thought. It is the base of all planes, immanent to every thinkable plane that does not succeed in thinking it. It is the most intimate within thought and yet the absolute outside [...]: it is immanence, ‘intimacy as the Outside, the exterior become the intrusion that stifles, and the reversal of both the one and the other’ [(quoting Blanchot)]— [...]} \text{ infinite movement. (59, my emphasis)} \]

This theorization reflects a pragmatics of the apparatus or \textit{episteme} at the most fundamental level. In this way, Deleuze and Guattari articulate a stance shared with Blanchot, Foucault, and Derrida, in the “poststructuralist” viewpoint and method I have posited; specifically, they reference Blanchot (\textit{The Infinite Conversation}) and Foucault (\textit{The Order of Things}) directly regarding the “unthought,” as I discussed in chapter 1.

Finally, we can understand the imperative principle posed, “the supreme act of philosophy,” which Deleuze and Guattari assert: “not so much to think \text{THE plane of immanence as to show it is there, unthought in every plane, and to think it in this way as the outside and inside of thought, as the not-external outside and the not-internal inside—that which cannot be thought and yet must be thought” (59-60). This focus on “the unthought” (the plane) escapes the inapt criterion of truth and the misguided efforts of recognition and interpretation toward the
means—rather than self-sufficient “ends”—of beginning the constructivist endeavor of concept creation with a sense-able if not sensible and intelligible image of thought.

“Pedagogy of the Concept”

“If the three ages of the concept are the encyclopedia, pedagogy, and commercial professional training, only the second can safeguard us from falling from the heights of the first into the disaster of the third—an absolute disaster for thought whatever its benefits might be, of course, from the viewpoint of universal capitalism.” —Deleuze and Guattari, *What is Philosophy?* (12)

Examining and taking into account “the unthought” of an apparatus or *episteme*, we can focus aptly (“correctly”) on the philosophical problem rather than regard concepts as mere effect or process of a *dispositif*. One such shift “from the problematical to the question” evokes the approach that Deleuze and Guattari convey in asking, “what relationship is there between the movements or diagrammatic features of an image of thought and the movements or sociohistorical features of an age?” (*WP* 58). Another way to approach concept creation through pragmatics, as mentioned, would involve an inquiry surveying the modern image of thought in terms of its features or movements, which subsist and inhere through encounters; these moments both catalyze thought and convey the “unthought” plane uniquely. No longer excluding—as in other *epistemes*, such as the classical image—but integrating varied features as (qualities of) multiplicity or difference, this effort involves “taking on the more modest task of a pedagogy of the concept, which would have to analyze the conditions of creation as factors of always singular moments” (*WP* 12).

This instruction recalls and reiterates “the problem of a concept,” re-establishing the perspective in Deleuze’s terms that “Ideas are problems, but problems only furnish the conditions under which the faculties attain their superior exercise” (*DR* 146). Beyond the examination of conditions and the concurrent integration of *diagrammatic features*, the effort implied names and requires an empirical exercise: but one of creation rather than recognition
(e.g. toward verification or identification or similar aims), “one which treats the concept as object of an encounter” \((DR\ xx)\). On the basis that constructivism manifests in the disciplines of Philosophy, Science, and Art as creative activities respectively, there is a \textit{craft} and thus method for concept creation; such craft thus implicates a particular “problematic” through epistemology we might consider \textit{aesthetic} in terms both “artisanal” and sensibility (“the \textit{sentiendum}”). Deleuze states plainly, “Empiricism is by no means a reaction against concepts, nor a simple appeal to lived experience. On the contrary, it undertakes the most insane creation of concepts ever seen or heard” \((DR\ xx)\). Consulting further \textit{Difference and Repetition} as well as scholarship on Deleuze assists this undertaking. For instance, Alliez states that “In \textit{practice}, the question is that of a theory of thought capable of diagnosing in our becomings the ontological conditions for the real experience of thought” \((Signature\ of\ the\ World\ 2)\); however, we must go beyond “diagnosing.”

In \textit{practice}, indeed, the empirical exercise of two-fold constructivism consists of our creating concepts that include and reflect the conditions of the plane: as ontic objects, produced through encounters, conveying the powers of sensibility as much as those of the other faculties. Such a “product” would incorporate the conditions and features of the plane (modern image), and this sort of concept would address the philosophical problem implicated—or, more properly, \textit{posed} by the constructivist effort. The latter point enables our escaping circular logic or the impasse of “infinite regress”: for Deleuze as for Bergson, “to pose the problem is instead to \textit{invent} and not only to dis-cover; it is to \textit{create}, in the same movement, both the problem and its solution. [Bergson states] ‘And I call a \textit{philosopher} someone who creates the solution, which is

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\(^4\) “Only an empiricist could say: concepts are indeed things,” Deleuze declares. The full passage of these remarks are worth quoting, for context and for the pertinence to the subsequent paragraph. “Empiricism is by no means a reaction against concepts, nor a simple appeal to lived experience. On the contrary, it undertakes the most insane creation of concepts ever seen or heard. Empiricism is a mysticism and a mathematicism of concepts, but precisely one which treats the concept as object of an encounter, as a here-and-now, or rather as an \textit{Erewhon} from which emerge inexhaustibly ever new, differently distributed ‘heres’ and ‘nows’” \((DR\ xx)\).
then necessarily unique, of the problem that he has newly posed’, with ‘the new sense which words assume in the new conception of the problem’,” Alliez explains (Signature of the World 113). An empirical exercise, again, the task consists not merely in asking “Why, through what necessity, and for what use must concepts, and always new concepts, be created?” (WP 8); rather, the “problematic” (question—problem—solution) posed by great constructivists warrants our querying that which is addressed by the concept. In other words, this names the line of inquiry and provides the guide for creating concepts that adequate address the problem.

As with most of Deleuze’s monographs that expound his original philosophy, Difference and Repetition appears exemplary in this way. In the quote earlier referenced, he remarks that “A book of philosophy should be in part a very particular species of detective novel, in part a kind of science fiction” (DR xx). This proposition and Deleuze’s explication both warrant examination for their appeal to the creative endeavor discussed thus far in the double sense of constructivist and “artisanal.” Vitally important to qualify, regarding both points, is that Deleuze describes philosophy by way of these comparisons precisely within a discussion about “the notion of a problem” and the earlier-quoted statement about empiricism as equally immanent and creative.

By detective novel we mean that concepts, with their zones of presence, should intervene to resolve local situations. They themselves change along with the problems. They have spheres of influence where […] they operate in relation to “dramas” and by means of a certain “cruelty.” They must have a coherence among themselves, but that coherence must not come from themselves. (DR xx)

To clarify the last point, I understand Deleuze to mean “coherence” strictly in terms of the particular problem, as in a certain apparatus, given that he describes his empiricism as “one which treats the concept as object of an encounter, as a here-and-now” (xx, my emphasis). Certainly the “genre” of detective novel does not imply a hermeneutic search for Truth or meaning; rather, this stance relates again to the contingency and specificity of concepts and
respective problems. Or understand simply, that “each new book demands a new set of tools, or concept” (100), as Lecercle states: “Deleuze’s proposed image for the philosopher is that of the artisan” and “a system of concepts is a box of tools” (Deleuze and Language 100).

The second novelistic genre, “Science fiction in yet another sense” (DR xxi), articulates the empirical exercise in a another way, in creative terms:

How else can one write but of those things which one doesn't know, or knows badly? It is precisely there that we imagine having something to say. We write only at the frontiers of our knowledge, at the border which separates our knowledge from our ignorance and transforms the one into the other. Only in this manner are we resolved to write. To satisfy ignorance is to put off writing until tomorrow—or rather, to make it impossible. (DR xxi)

This description reiterates the earlier-cited notion of the modern image of thought, reinforcing subtly the importance of thought catalyzed by the forces of an encounter. Additionally distinguishing from the classical image, Deleuze subverts the conventional movement of ignorance toward knowledge. Whereas the former conception assigns to knowledge the value of Truth or significance in transcendental terms, privileging through universal Ideal, writing at the frontier/border reorients the priority onto the activity of creating contingently for the particular problem. Dorothea Olkowski assists indirectly our comprehending this sense of science fiction; she addresses the matter of “frontiers of knowledge,” partly by means of the detective novel. Discussing the importance of posing a problem adequately—for it to be “problematized”—in Gilles Deleuze and the Ruin of Representation, Olkowski explains that the Detective-SciFi activity “requires invention; it gives way to something new, in this case to the intuition of the being of becoming […]” (179). Put another way, we can see that the classical image of thought and the subordination of ignorance “distort the real problem by stating it in terms that can never lead to a resolution” (Olkowski 178).
To remind, this discussion does not yet engage the chief problem of “interference” and the task of creating “concept(s) of a sensation”; rather, all of this description still serves to characterize philosophy as a constructivist exercise in terms of aesthetic practice. This strategy deliberately takes into account the imperative for properly and adequately orienting an approach and method, regarding carefully how, in Olkowski’s terms, “Everything depends on how we ask the question, what we take the problem to be, the pragmatics of our situation that brings into the performative this or that particular sense” (Ruin of Representation 233). The question “through what necessity” we must create new concepts, ask Deleuze and Guattari put forward, directs one’s inquiry on a particular and limited course: proceeding this way risks neglecting “the pedagogy of the concept” by focusing erroneously, even if inadvertently, on the ignorance-knowledge relation from the perspective of the classical image; or, on the product at the expense of an empirical exercise that undertakes the question most suitable in terms of pragmatics.

One such dynamic question, articulated in “problematized” fashion, is Alliez’s asking, “What becomes of art when it is regarded from the perspective of a vitalist ontology of the sensible?” (Signature of the World 69). Although relevant, the question stated this way entails a divergent exploration, in that it would require Alliez to theorize, via Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy, art’s “rendering Life sensible in its ‘zones of indeterminacy’” (69), as he concludes. For now, we must still undertake “the more modest task”—querying the concept within the problematic of the modern image of thought and examining “the conditions of creation.” One term that Deleuze and Guattari use regarding this process is “heterogenesis” (WP 12), which provides provisionally a label for the pedagogy-task and names the pragmatics therein. As Alliez states, in parlance independent Deleuze and Guattari, “There follows a triple genesis of the concept: as an open, consistent and intensive multiplicity” (Signature of the World 81). This
description is helpful, as the term “heterogenesis” appears within the third of six conclusions about “the nature of the concept” (WP 19) that Deleuze and Guattari posit. Linked with the first two conclusions, the third quality in my view presents the greatest opportunity for constructivism of the six attributes, (some of which will guide my discussion at later points in the project).

As “the point of coincidence, condensation, or accumulation of components,” a concept “constantly traverses its components”—the third conclusion—“in a state of survey” (20); moreover, the concept “renders components inseparable within itself” (WP 19, original emphasis), Deleuze and Guattari explain as the second quality. They add two crucial descriptions to each point: “Components, or what defines the consistency of the concept, its endoconsistency, are distinct, heterogeneous, and yet not separable” in that “each partially overlaps, has a zone of neighborhood, or a threshold of indiscernibility, with another one” (19); this defines the relationship of the concept’s components as one of “pure and simple variations ordered according to their neighborhood” rather than as constant-variable or genus-species (WP 20), for example. From this, we must understand components as each being “an intensive feature” that is unique in its singularity—resulting in the paradoxical endoconsistency among heterogeneous features. This principle is fundamental for understanding, let alone working with the declarations that Deleuze and Guattari posit, such as their insisting that it is self-referential, “has no reference” insofar as it “is defined by its consistency” (WP 22). As a creative enterprise within the new apparatus or with the modern image of thought, Philosophy is able to theorize a product that previously or otherwise-thought would be “paradoxical” and thus invalid (or “untrue” etc): “The concept is defined by the inseparability of a finite number of heterogeneous components traversed by a point of absolute survey at infinite speed” (WP 21).
Returning to the notion of “heterogenesis,” we can see that any “pedagogy of the concept” must proceed by way of pragmatics concerning both the image of thought (modern) and the object of study (concept proper), in order to proceed adequately and suitably with an empirical exercise—unlike the quantitative functions and ordinates of Science. Deleuze and Guattari assert that “A concept is a heterogenesis—[...] an ordering of its components by zones of neighborhood” and that “It is an ordinal, an intension [intensionality, i.e. not extensional] present in all the features that make it up” (WP 20, my emphasis). A simple understanding is that they distinguish the concept’s properties as qualitative rather than quantitative, contrasting Science and logical-linguistic philosophy; the latter both are inhibited by their the mode and primacy of reference (e.g. “extensional” propositions). And yet, this shift enables and re-orients the empirical exercise, as Alliez separately states: “Fortified by this conceptual vitalism, thought acquires a pedagogy of the concept that starts to function in the manner of a natural history” (84, original emphasis)—a natural history that we write, as with producing a concept, by means of qualities, (“conceptual vitalism” implying vitalist concepts). This view recognizes the concept’s “evental power [puissance d’événement],” Alliez explains: “a power that must befall the thought that creates it in order to act directly upon the brain, displacing the line between the concrete and the abstract, the sensible and the intelligible; that is, engendering the interference—on a background of non-dialectical disparity—of art, science and philosophy” (84, original emphasis).

Both quotes by Alliez evoke the sense of artisanal practice for constructivism, learning from a revised notion of concepts in the modern image of thought and then creating concepts with both sensible and intelligible faculties. One such possibility appears that if concepts have inseparable endoconsistency of heterogeneous components, then perhaps this qualitative nature indicates an “unthought” aspect of our episteme or modern image; at the very least, the prospect
seems likely in terms of the *plane* on which concepts operate. Additionally, the notion of an *aesthetic epistemology* and empirical exercise opens effectively the line of inquiry regarding the “interference” between intelligibility and sensibility, toward the concept of a sensation. “The history of philosophy is comparable to the art of the portrait,” Deleuze and Guattari write; “These are mental, noetic, and machinic portraits. Although they are usually created with philosophical tools, they can also be produced aesthetically” (*WP* 55). To this end, the next section examines further the aesthetic objects encountered—precisely *heterogeneous intensive features*, with which we might infuse concepts created—before concluding with a summary of the key lessons for the method under development. The chapter’s separate “interlude” segment then shifts to studying the specific art form of literature in this manner.

**Art Encounters**

“that which can only be sensed (the *sentiendum* or the being of the sensible) moves the soul, ‘perplexes’ it—in other words, forces it to pose a problem: as though the object of encounter, the sign, were the bearer of a problem—as though it were a problem.” (*Difference and Repetition* 140)

Certainly we could identify several types of “interference” as creative enterprises to undertake, beyond mere “thought experiment”: the scientific function of a concept, or of a sensation, as Deleuze and Guattari ask, “are there functions—properly scientific functions—of concepts?” (*WP* 162); the aesthetic sensation of a concept, or of a function; the philosophical concept of a function, or of a sensation. The latter prevails as my exclusive focus, leaving the five other types to respective projects and disciplines.⁵ The hypothesis following Deleuze and Guattari, that we can create aesthetic concepts through encounters with art, is premised upon the view of Art as operating through, or in the mode of sensation, distinct from Philosophy and

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⁵ We might consider as example Manuel Delanda’s *Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy* (Continuum, 2002); also see the Special Issue of *Paragraph* 29.2 (2006) “Deleuze and Science” for other explicative efforts.
Science. This view presents the object of study in terms of the aesthetic compositions that we encounter: signs, figures, percepts, affects. As complement to the problem of a concept discussed in the prior section, a detailed examination of art’s typology is essential in order to take full account of the encountered discipline’s respective operation and proceed with the constructivist study. First, I must make clear that this focus is not merely incidental or arbitrary; rather, integral to Deleuze’s method and philosophy generally, the study of objects encountered is necessary—given that the extra-noumenal elements are essential for creating concepts.

In Negotiations, Deleuze emphasizes this necessity: “Now concepts don’t move only among other concepts […], they also move among things and within us: they bring us new percepts and new affects that amount to philosophy’s own nonphilosophical understanding. And philosophy requires nonphilosophical understanding just as much as it requires philosophical understanding” (164). Albeit vaguely stated and quoted out of context presently, this principle in the abstract sense underscores the earlier discussion of any catalysts to thought; moreover, this view now distinguishes further—by way of “pragmatics” (beyond typology)—the qualities of that which is encountered. The latter point will prove crucial, indeed, in the process described and attempted later, the empirical exercise of constructivism no longer hypothetical.

Specifically, the “three poles of philosophical style” are “concepts, or new ways of thinking; percepts, or new ways of seeing and construing; and affects, or new ways of feeling” (Negotiations 165). Discussing Spinoza’s style, which he emulates overtly, Deleuze emphasizes these as “the philosophical trinity, philosophy as opera: you need all three to get things moving” (Negotiations 165, original emphasis). Thus, the process is characterized once more in terms of the artisanal endeavor, beyond incidental “interference” of disciplines; additionally, we can
recognize the rationale for examining varieties of percepts and affects. Understood simply, yet a fundamental premise: the concept created is contingent upon these types.

**Pragmatics of Aesthetic Figures—Percepts**

The chapter “Percept, Affect, and Concept” in *What is Philosophy?* presents extensive theorization of Art as the aesthetic composition of sensation, the discussion of which correlates and expounds Deleuze’s independent work. As understanding thoroughly the specific treatment of Art is essential for subsequent investigations and discussions, detailed yet efficient summary of the key points follows. Specifically describing painting, music, and literature, Deleuze and Guattari characterize Art generally in two ways overall: as sensation, rather than representation, and in terms of percepts and affects; the salient relation of the two categories is made explicit in the term “aesthetic figures.” In the perspective of Apparatus Theory, Art as a distinct discipline thus involves its own typology of aesthetic figures or composed sensations—parallel to concepts in Philosophy and to functions in Science—that reflect and engage the particular plane, as a respective type of thought: “Everything (including technique) takes place between compounds of sensation and the aesthetic plane of composition,” Deleuze and Guattari assert (*WP* 196).

The fundamental and stark point of departure for understanding Art in these terms, in “pragmatics,” is that “no art and no sensation have ever been representational” (*WP* 193). A similar claim, although perhaps equally radical, that might serve as premise is Deleuze and Guattari’s positing, “The work of art is a being of sensation and nothing else: it exists in itself” (164). Such a premise is necessary in order to undertake a study of Art and regard its particular mode, or ontology in this case; this way, the mode is discernible in its implications for artistic

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6 From my studying most of Deleuze’s oeuvre, I find neither cause nor reason to differentiate stringently his work with Guattari from his solitary authorship in this context. Rather, as begun in this section, I will discuss—much like Alliez in *The Signature of the World*—in the service of methodology the related theorizations in *What is Philosophy?* along with those in *Negotiations, Proust and Signs,* and *Essays Critical Clinical.*
aims and aesthetic effects, for example, which are respective and must not be confused with those of Philosophy or of Science.

Viewed this way, Deleuze and Guattari describe Art as working to preserve, insofar as “What is preserved—the thing or the work of art—is a bloc of sensations, [...] a compound of percepts and affects” (164). The aesthetic “monument” thus composed preserves, or more accurately consists of sensations (168); to this end, the crucial task for artists becomes the aim of extracting and conveying sensations or forces (or simply “Life”). One rationale for this study of Art concerns the process of constructivism by encounters, regarding seriously the artisanal production, immensely effective, of new monuments. Deleuze and Guattari articulate subtly this stance, in other terms: “If there is progress in art, it is because art can live only by creating new percepts and affects as so many detours, returns, dividing lines, changes of level and scale” (193). The ultimate value and implication for this view will be reviewed subsequently, after further examining the particular pragmatics of Art.

Considering that a work of art is “a bloc of present sensations” consisting of “a compound of percepts and affects” (WP 164), the main principle to understand is how sensation operates within Art, in the mode of expression rather than in the mode of representation, reference, or denotation (again, not semiotics or semantics but pragmatics). In lieu of explicating a comprehensive rationale or posing a polemical argument, I can most assuredly posit that applying the views of conventional semiotics or linguistics serves only to obstruct one’s understanding Deleuze and Guattari on this topic and in methodological terms. Also, as the artistic employ of writing will be treated in further detail in subsequent chapters, I qualify for now language as the material of aesthetic composition for writers, as discussed by Deleuze and
Guattari in their general system of Art, insofar as “We paint, sculpt, compose, and write with sensations”—indeed, “We paint, sculpt, compose, and write sensations” (WP 166).

In this way, aesthetic figures express those sensations that artists extract from lived experience, in the particular forms of percepts and affects (WP 177). “Percepts are no longer perceptions; they are independent of a state of those who experience them. Affects are no longer feelings or affects; they go beyond the strength of those who undergo them,” Deleuze and Guattari explain; furthermore, “Sensations, percepts, and affects are beings whose validity lies in themselves and exceeds any lived” (164). Herein emerges the crucial re-orientation of perspective, delineating percepts and affects in aesthetic composition as independent from any subject’s experience conventionally conceived. Consequently, blocs of sensation must be understood, rather than as signification, in their particular significance—ranging from nature, as with songbirds, to the most technical of arts—given that aesthetic construction implies “the emergence of pure sensory qualities, of sensibilia that cease to be merely functional and become expressive features” (183).

The shift to a view of Art as non-representational thus entails examining via pragmatics how artists particularly “write sensations,” composing a monument that preserves and conveys the perceptions and affections that they have extracted from Life. Proceeding in this way requires our understanding what Deleuze and Guattari mean when theorizing literature in terms of the work of novelists, specifically, as operating in a mode beyond signification. One way that Art succeeds will be considered thoroughly: “In each case, style is needed—the writer’s syntax, the musician’s modes and rhythms, the painters lines and colors—to raise lived perceptions to the percept and lived affections to the affect” (WP 170). Style in writing, thus serves for Deleuze and Guattari the effective alternative to conventional understanding of literature; in other words, the
novel is composed and operates by the aesthetic figures of percepts and affects, against rather than through individual memory, experience—“our perceptions and affections, our memories and archives, our travels and fantasies, our children and parents”—observation, imagination, opinion, characters (170). As the implications and the specific examples cited are investigated further in the separate interlude section of the chapter, the present question appears how the artist, including the novelist, goes beyond the perceptual states and affective transitions of the lived”—as Deleuze and Guattari state, “The artist is a seer, a becomer” (171).

The examination of literature as object of study offers a model that is salient to consider and attempt, particularly against the conventional epistemology of signification—or simply in terms of writers not merely reporting their perceptions and affections with language. In other words, these cases make apparent the degree to which Art, through style, functions as expression beyond signification. Like the “oceanic percepts” of Melville and the “urban percepts” of Woolf, Deleuze and Guattari identify the success of Tolstoy, Chekov, and Faulkner in composing percepts of the landscape: great writers, they state, “create these beings of sensation, which preserve in themselves the hour of a day, a moment’s degree of warmth” (WP 169). The parlance of painting and reference to Cézanne are instructive, as Deleuze and Guattari further describe the percept as “the landscape before man, in the absence of man” (169); aesthetic material thus becomes the means toward non-representational or non-individuated style, including those characters which “have passed into the landscape and are themselves part of the compound of sensations” (169). Although seemingly most contentious toward literary theory, Deleuze and Guattari diverge from the perspective of “psychosocial” models more so in their emphasizing the nature of Art that exceeds individuals (or humanity): as observed in Balzac, Flaubert, Joyce, and
Beckett, “Percepts can be telescopic or microscopic, giving characters and landscapes giant dimensions as if they were swollen by a life that no lived perception can attain” (171).

Earlier in this section, I began the investigation of Art’s typology in the view of Deleuze and Guattari from the premise that artists compose “monuments,” which both preserve and express sensation; these stylistic creations offer the opportunity for encountering original “ways of seeing and feeling,” perhaps not foreseen or imagined. Even in summary, we can recognize that the matter is complicated by those non-individual qualities of Art, thus demanding that we discern the specific types and operations of aesthetic figures. First, the category of percepts answers and implicates the problem of preservation in aesthetic monuments; Deleuze and Guattari ask, “How can a moment of the world be rendered durable or made to exist by itself?” (WP 172). They elaborate, “Virginia Woolf provides an answer that is as valid for painting and music as it is for writing: ‘Saturate every atom’ […] and keep only the saturation that gives us the percept. ‘It must include nonsense, fact, sordidity: but made transparent’ […]” (172). Artists not only succeed in the effort to extract, preserve, and express the sensations and forces of Life, but they also compose stylistically those percepts and affects that attain to levels or modes beyond individual (i.e. one’s own) experience. Indeed, “A great novelist is above all an artist who invents unknown or unrecognized affects and brings them to light as the becoming of his characters […]” (174); Deleuze and Guattari further explain that “artists are presenters of affects, the inventors and creators of affects” (175, my emphasis). Beyond strictly artisanal epistemology, Art as true constructivism this way evokes a compelling inquiry for study.

**Affects and the Language of Sensations**

To clarify, Deleuze and Guattari do not arrange their categories—percepts, affects, sensations—in the way that I have ostensibly presented; however, I am deferring a detailed study of aesthetic figures and novelistic affects in favor of emphasizing the mode of Art as expression,
in order to understand the particular value and function of artistic creation. Both Alliez and Simon O’Sullivan guide this perspective with their extensive readings of *What is Philosophy?*, directing attention aptly onto aesthetic *blocs of sensations* and positioning Art as expressive. “A new vocabulary is needed, a vocabulary not from semiotics, not to do with representation, and Deleuze and Guattari give us one,” O’Sullivan writes (*Art Encounters* 54); indeed, productive work with their vocabulary proceeds from focusing upon Art’s operation and modality in terms of sensible forces, as Alliez emphasizes (*Signature* 70).

Expressed by artists’ style and composition, *affects* can be understood as a specific type of sensation within Deleuze and Guattari’s taxonomy, pertaining to “*nonhuman becomings of man*” (*WP* 169) and relating in parallel to *percepts*—both of which exceed individual lived experience and inhere “preserved” in Art. This subordinate category is implied when Deleuze and Guattari identify harmony, consonance, and dissonance as affects (*WP* 164): the primacy of aesthetic “*compounds of sensation*” (188) emerges through their prevalent discussion of *counterpoint* and *refrain*. “The whole of the refrain is the being of sensation,” they write (184); and as all this parlance is neither metaphorical nor respective to artistic medium, the perspective of Deleuze and Guattari primarily concerns modality—expression and sensibilia, positing that “Monuments are refrains” (184).

In the prior quote about counterpoint and compounds of sensation, Deleuze and Guattari reference the work of novelists—citing Dostoyevsky, Dos Passos, and Proust especially—to convey that which they have extracted through the percepts and affects of aesthetic figures, including characters, particularly within “relations of counterpoint” (*WP* 188). This type demonstrates what Deleuze and Guattari indicate when they write, “Whether through words, colors, sounds, or stone, art is the language of sensations” (176): specifically, in their aesthetic
composition, writers make words “pass into sensation that makes the standard language stammer, tremble, cry, or even sing: this is the style, the ‘tone’, the language of sensations, or the foreign language within language […]” (176). In this way, what can be provisionally termed artistic writing operates in the expressive mode of sensation, beyond denotative or communicative functions in semantics or semiotics. Markedly distinguished from linguistics in this case, Deleuze and Guattari describe literature precisely within the context of Art, akin to painting and music—for instance in their identifying the task for all artists, to extract and create “new harmonies, new plastic or melodic landscapes, and new rhythmic characters” (176). Thus it is to this end, rather than for any semantic or referential purpose, that “The writer twists language, makes it vibrate, seizes hold of it, and rends it in order to wrest the percept from percepts, the affect from affections, the sensation from opinion […]” (176).

Those writers who make language vibrate could be understood as effectively composing aesthetic monuments that are refrains, in the terms of Deleuze and Guattari. Far from being abstract, though, such an operation indicates the “types or ‘varieties’ of sensations”—like affects of harmony or counterpoint—that they identify within art: “the vibration, which characterizes the simple sensation”; “the embrace or the clinch (when two sensations resonate in each other […]”); “withdrawal, division, distension (when, on the contrary, two sensations two draw apart, release themselves [but are] brought together by the light, the air, or the void […]” (WP 176). These types of sensation provide not only the “new vocabulary” beyond signification, as O’Sullivan evokes, but a way of thinking about the unique mode and processes of Art in parallel distinction to the concepts of Philosophy and the functions of Science. Moreover, these

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7 This differentiation is crucial for our understanding their perspective, and I have only avoided a comprehensive explanation in favor of continuing the discussion specific to artistic expression and sensation. In one of many instances that emphasizes their pragmatics of literary style—which I reprise in later chapters—Deleuze and Guattari explicitly state, “Aesthetic figures, and the style that creates them, have nothing to do with rhetoric. They are sensations: percepts and affects, landscapes and faces, visions and becomings” (177).
categories elucidate the notion of affect beyond an individual’s experience; we can certainly comprehend how artists indeed convey the clinch or the withdrawal of respective sensations, which operate aesthetically by sensibilia—unlike intelligible concepts and functions. In music, Deleuze and Guattari identify “three modalities of a being of sensation, for the air [refrain] is a vibration, the motif [melody and counterpoint] is a clinch, a coupling, whereas the theme does not close without also unclenching, splitting, and opening” (190, my emphasis).

The typology of sensation does not imply a general analysis of artistic expression regardless of medium; on the contrary, as in the example of music, discerning the type of sensation directly involves our considering the specificity of material like Deleuze and Guattari. On the one hand, they state, “The relationship of sensation with the material must therefore be assessed within the limits of the duration, whatever this may be” (WP 193). And yet, beyond the persistence in the terms of the monument, Deleuze and Guattari further posit the relation of material and sensation in aesthetic expression. Analogous to painting and music, they write, “It is characteristic of modern literature for words and syntax to rise up into the plane of composition and hollow it out rather than carry out the operation of putting it into perspective” (195, my emphasis).

Recognizing “words and syntax” as the material of literature, akin to color in painting and sound in music, we can see these as the means for artistic technique—concerning the earlier emphasis of style—beyond strictly viewing a medium in its technical properties. Matthew Fuller’s reading of What is Philosophy? in “Art Methodologies in Media Ecology” assists in comprehending the relation of composition, in material and stylistic terms, and sensation by which aesthetics operates uniquely. Fuller expounds upon the three types of sensation: “These mark spatial and sensual forces of arrangement, the fluctuating distribution of closeness
providing a moment of sheer transit, or a gasp, a pause, a shudder that opens up thought and serenity or the clenching that sends shocks from one element in the composition to another […]”

(Production of the New 49, my emphasis).

Besides reinforcing the turn away from abstraction, the description of “spatial and sensual forces” by Fuller turns our attention to another important way in which Deleuze and Guattari describe art forms in terms both specific to medium and generally pertaining to aesthetic operation. Although I have been discussing sensation with limited reference to affect, the theorizations of percepts feature equally important. For instance, considering the question that Deleuze and Guattari pose: “Is this not the definition of the percept itself—to make perceptible the imperceptible forces that populate the world, affect us, and make us become?” (WP 182). In their view, art forms effectively convey particular sensations in unique ways: in the geometry and color of painting, the forces of gravity and its dynamic effects; music “make[s] the sonorous force of time audible”; time becomes “legible and conceivable” in literature (182).

Thus, what we encounter in aesthetically composed percepts are sensations (sensibilia) experienced as forces, now able to be thought (intelligible); for instance, finding in or rather through Proust “the forces, of pure time that have now become perceptible” (189). The evocative case of time accentuates the ability of Art to enable, through percepts and affects, our thinking sensory forces as “legible and conceivable” concepts. In addition to their identifying this great potential generally, Deleuze and Guattari show the imperative for understanding art forms in “their own right,” as we might say, or more literally in terms of the particular operations by aesthetic compositions.

On one hand, the question shifts from one merely of quantitative or qualitative typology to one of discerning how style and material operate within the apparatus of Art. Specifically,
Deleuze and Guattari write, “It is on this condition that matter becomes expressive: either the compound of sensations is realized in the material, or the material passes into the compound, but always in such a way as to be situated on a specifically *aesthetic plane of composition*” (WP 196, my emphasis). The prior case of Proust elucidates how the *compound of sensations* attains a greater salience beyond reiterating (or “re-presenting,” *i.e.* denoting) a single perception or affection, an instance experiencing the force of time either lost or regained (189). Significantly, the *aesthetic plane* names the “unthought” of the apparatus, in one way, as well as the problematic for Art uniquely, in terms of “finding what monument to erect on this plane, or what plane to slide under this monument” (196)—the problem addressed by aesthetic composition and expression. Only with a simultaneous perspective of the general operation of Art as well as the particular function of style and material can we effectively undertake the theorization that Deleuze and Guattari posit: “Everything (including technique) takes place between compounds of sensation and the aesthetic plane of composition” (196). The question and problematic implicated herein concerns not only our “treatment” of Art—analytic, anagogical, heuristic, empirical, experiential—but our relating to concepts the qualities of sensibility (“the sensible”) offered by percepts and affects, which provide uniquely those “unthought” sensations.

**Affirming Possibility**

“Resonance constitutes the truth of a problem as such, in which the imperative is tested, even though the problem itself is born of the imperative. Once chance is affirmed, all arbitrariness is abolished every time [and] divergence itself is the object of affirmation within a problem.” *(Difference and Repetition 198)*

The effect of supplementing philosophical concepts with the percepts and affects of Art entails the modification (or “expansion”) of the limits to thought; this consequence is merely ideal (or idealistic), but empirically exercised through creative praxis. On this point, my invoking discussions of Deleuzean theory as it bears upon artistic practices, by Matthew Fuller and Simon
O’Sullivan, appeals to an orientation that is grounded in a constructivism that avoids abstraction. In this way, the augmentation of the conditions of possibility by means of Art occurs actually, effectively through the very nature of the aesthetic plane. O’Sullivan expounds this process:

“Such an encounter, or ‘accessing’ of the event, might involve what Henri Bergson calls attention; the suspension of normal motor activity which in itself allows other ‘planes’ of reality to become perceivable (this is an opening up to the world beyond utilitarian interests) [...]. The event then emerges from the world but from a world usually imperceptible.” (*Art Encounters* 45, original parenthetical note). The effect of making sensible and “legible” the forces of the world, as established, is one aspect of Art encountered in aesthetic compositions—actual sensations.

Additionally and alternatively, Deleuze and Guattari describe how aesthetic “universes” affirm “the existence of the possible” by incorporating the virtual event (*WP* 177). The modality of the virtual is distinguished crucially: “It is the virtual that is distinct from the actual, but a virtual that is no longer chaotic, that has become consistent or real on the plane of immanence that wrests it from the chaos—it is a virtual that is real without being actual, ideal without being abstract” (*WP* 156). In this way, their conception of virtuality does not entail simulation, reference, or transcendental status but an ontic category of its own—and more directly this quote articulates an axiom of Deleuze’s entire philosophy. Furthermore, premised upon the notion that the aesthetic plane of composition incorporates the virtual, possibility (“the possible”) thus functions equally “real” in art forms, such as literature, as those actual forces of the world, such as percepts of gravity in painting and affects of harmony in music. This is not to suggest a false opposition between virtual and actual modes within Art; rather, the principle with which to proceed in working with art forms is that both modes are equally ontic for Deleuze and Guattari.

In developing concepts that are contingent upon the typology of aesthetic composition—
percepts, affects, sensations—through our encounters, the implications for pragmatics require our attending to art forms suitably. In my view, this approach addresses the problematic of artisanal constructivism more effectively than the limited angle posed by Daniel Smith: “The properly Deleuzian question would therefore be: What are the ontological conditions under which something new can appear in the world? […] what exactly does it mean to speak of the conditions of the new?” (Production of the New 151, original emphasis).

Mediators—Lessons (Introduction)

Returning to the scope of Apparatus Theory, several conclusions can be drawn, toward provisional principles of constructivism through art encounters. Emerging at the end of the prior discussion, the first premise generally might be that “art does not so much offer up a set of knowledges as set up the conditions, we might say the contours, for future knowledges still to come”; O’Sullivan continues, “It is in this sense also that art involves the posing of new questions and as such will always make demands on any already existing audience” (Art Encounters 146). In specific art forms, I would say that aesthetic composition not only poses new questions but in fact asserts the mode of possibility, very much in the sense of the problematic—not a question to be answered nor a problem to be solved.

In this way, the form of literature can be understood as functioning through the expression of sensations both actual and virtual, conveying the forces of percepts and affects and maintaining virtuality (“the possible”) on the aesthetic plane of composition. The latter point evokes the question of virtual aesthetic blocs, which certainly escape the impasse of classifying art forms as strictly fabulation or lived perceptions and affections. In any case, the mode of Art in this context fashions literature as both conveying sensations and maintaining the virtual—“the possible as aesthetic category, the existence of the possible” (WP 177)—as well, both of which we encounter. As O’Sullivan elsewhere asserts, “The crucial factor here is the production of
something different, but also our encounter and engagement with this difference” (Production of the New 99, original emphasis).

In the early sections of the chapter, I established that constructivist concepts are contingent upon the percepts and affects encountered, whether in nature or art—with which we invent new philosophical thought just as new aesthetic compositions, by means of encountering difference both actual and virtual. This contingency is integral within the first two of the five lessons for the *artisanal method* that I have explicated in this chapter, which are worth enumerating before concluding. With the premise that we can adopt the methodology of philosophers and artists without their ontology wholesale, an empirical exercise of invention can operate as both “detective novel” and “science fiction,” in Deleuze’s view: *artisanal products* whether philosophical or artistic are respective to a problem; additionally, creation is not exclusive to the powers of the intellect but occurs through sensibility as well. In both cases, systemization, denotation, and reference—in the mode of Science—are avoided in favor of creativity, by means of attempting “to repeat the energy and style” of the exemplar, in O’Sullivan’s terms (*Art Encounters* 3). These qualities fashion as “problematized” the artisanal product, insofar as it addresses the particular problem of an apparatus.

The second lesson proceeds directly from the first, if we now work with a revised Image of Thought—method and object of study being particular historically to the modern episteme and respectively to the aesthetic paradigm. A changed conception of thought expands the conditions of possibility, specifically the limits of what is considered thought. Recognizing that encounters affect both the intellect and the senses, the forces encountered register as both catalysts to thought, as well as unique factors in the type of thought produced. For instance, whereas in other systems the following statement would be incomprehensible, we can understand within the
revised apparatus of knowledge (*dispositif*) when Deleuze and Guattari describe that “The concept is defined by *the inseparability of a finite number of heterogeneous components traversed by a point of absolute survey at infinite speed*” (*WP* 21, original emphasis). No longer regarded as purely intellectual (*noumenal*), concepts themselves have empirical properties described in terms of dynamics, forces, movements. This consequence occurs partly as a result of the revised apparatus (or *plane*), and yet partly contingent upon “nonphilosophical” factors.

**Target for Method (Continued)**

The phrase and perspective “philosophy as opera” (*Negotiations* 165) articulated by Deleuze not only names provisionally the nascent method in non-figurative terms; it also links all five lessons under discussion, in terms of *mediators* (the fifth idea), insofar as “philosophy requires nonphilosophical understanding” (*Negotiations* 164). This view connects rather than differentiates the method and implications for Philosophy in the former class with the pragmatics of Art in the latter. Although I am somewhat taking liberty with the Apparatus Theory of *What is Philosophy?* in making this connection, the rationale for explicating and attempting a constructivist methodology emerges in the effort to parlay Deleuze’s *energy and style* into artisanal production.

This effort establishes aptly the potential for aesthetic epistemology to exceed (and escape) the limitations placed upon thought by the mode of Science, wherein Philosophy consists no more than of denotation or reference. The necessity for the composite *artisanal endeavour* is implied by Alliez when he describes “philosophy as the expression of a constructivism that would be mere protocol or procedure were it not for the Event that exceeds it, and which, in a manner that is not immediately discursive, announces the concept in the processual immanence of its self-positing” (*Signature* 15). Indeed, Alliez explicitly references in this case the “Opera-Machine” with regard to the weaving of a *plane*—in other words, artisanal.
More concretely, the complementary parts to thought in the Opera-Machine—which enable, fashion, and characterize artisanal production—serve as mediators to the process. “Mediators are fundamental,” Deleuze says: “Creation’s all about mediators. Without them nothing happens. They can be people—for a philosopher, artists or scientists; for a scientist, philosophers or artists—but things too, even plants or animals […] . Whether they’re real or imaginary, animate or inanimate, you have to form your mediators. It’s a series” (Negotiations 125). This perspective articulates precisely the logic for artisanal creation through encounters with “nonphilosophical” elements, as well as the means for expression philosophical or otherwise. By this I mean to posit the aesthetic mode as vital to constructivism—not that this is imperative for the process Deleuze and Guattari describe—insofar as the conditions of possibility change by creating through series and by encountering sensations that catalyze thought.

Although the latter point has been established and explained thus far, it is important to re-contextualize as the third and fourth lessons the productive potential for encounters with aesthetic composition. To reiterate the first, Art that operates in the mode of expression, rather than that of representation or reference, consists of compounds of sensations; in the view of Deleuze and Guattari, these aesthetic “monuments” function to preserve and convey at present the sensations, forces, perceptions, and affections that artists extract from life. Herein lies the prospect for novel encounters, especially when regarding given that artists are “the inventors and creators of affects” (WP 175, my emphasis), as they do. One function by artists is thus presenting actual forces of the world, made sensible, through aesthetic percepts and affects.

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8 The title of this selection is “Mediators,” a conversation with Antoine Dulaure and Claire Parnet, L’Autrejournal 8 (October 1985); appears in Negotiations: 1972-1990. Trans. Martin Joughin. (Columbia. UP, 1995): 121-34. Perhaps due to the format, although worth noting regardless, Deleuze frankly elaborates: “I need my mediators to express myself, and they’d never express themselves without me: you’re always working in a group, even when you seem to be on your own. And still more when it’s apparent: Felix Guattari and I are one another's mediators” (125).
Additionally, and the fourth lesson to consider, Art succeeds—better than Philosophy and Science, Deleuze and Guattari argue—at managing to create, on the *aesthetic plane of composition*, by means of virtuality. Affirming possibility, “The monument does not actualize the virtual event but incorporates or embodies it: gives it a body, a life, a universe” (*WP* 177). Indeed, my study explores in the next three chapters the pragmatics of sensation and virtuality within Art, specifically the form of literature—the prospect that “Art can involve the actualization of a specifically different set of virtualities; the production of a different kind of world,” as O’Sullivan asserts (*Production* 98).

The five principles summarized here comprise a nascent poetics for constructivist work, concept invention through encounters, following and connecting the method as well as the Apparatus Theory articulated by Deleuze and Guattari. This methodology bears promise regarding two features of the problematic under consideration. First, as I introduced in chapter one, Art works and succeeds to “create the finite that restores the infinite” by its encountering “chaos” (pure difference) and virtuality in productive fashion, with the *aesthetic plane of composition* (*WP* 197). This premise motivates the hypothesis I am positing, following Deleuze and Guattari, along with the explicit problematic: for Philosophy this involves attempting to “save the infinite by giving it consistency,” but a paradoxical consistency of heterogeneity, rather than how Science “relinquishes the infinite in order to gain reference” over chaos (*WP* 197). Beyond this problem at the level of Apparatus Theory, the implications for heterogeneity bear upon concept creation insofar as the intensive features are and must remain diverse, as introduced in this chapter; a clue for method emerges in the parallelism that Deleuze and Guattari state, adding how “Conceptual becoming is heterogeneity grasped in an absolute form; sensory becoming is otherness caught in a matter of expression” (*WP* 177). From a review of
their aesthetic theory, we can now understand how this difference or novelty—chaos, virtuality, actual forces—operates within Art, preserved and expressed in the *monument*.

The developing hypothesis for constructivism regards seriously that we encounter not only the results of artists’ incorporating chaos and virtuality in *artisanal production*, but the sensations and forces, both actual and virtual, expressed by aesthetic composition. Concept creation that proceeds in this fashion thus promises to invent by means of and preserve precisely heterogeneity and intensive features. Consequently, the result addresses and plausibly enacts the second feature of the problematic for Philosophy, thought and concepts by means of Art: “The composite sensation, made up of percepts and affects, deterritorializes the system of opinion that brought together dominant perceptions and affections within a natural, historical, and social milieu” (*WP* 197). As ideology and belief impede or perhaps foreclose thought, antithetical to invention, this great capability of Art is not merely an undercurrent to the aims of Deleuze and Guattari. Indeed, undertaking the problem of “interference,” creating philosophically a concept of (a) sensation, the next chapter further examines what and how Art “deterritorializes” by means of aesthetic composition—specifically, the form of literature and the functions of writing. In this way I seek to emphasize the import of Deleuze’s task for constructivist philosophy, as when he remarks, “What we should in fact do, is stop allowing philosophers to reflect ‘on’ things. The philosopher creates, he doesn’t reflect” (*Negotiations* 122).
CHAPTER 3
PRAGMATICS OF LITERARY ENCOUNTERS

“The most difficult thing is to make chance an object of affirmation, but it is the sense of the imperative and the questions that it launches. Ideas emanate from it just as singularities emanate from that aleatory point which every time condenses the whole of chance into one time.” —Deleuze, Difference and Repetition (198)

Developing Encounter Pragmatics (Methodological Study)

Continuing the nascent methodology of constructivism through encounters, the present discussion surveys Deleuze’s treatment of and work with literature as a model for practices of creativity toward philosophical or scholarly aims. Applying to this end the lessons of Apparatus Theory from the prior chapter, one hypothesis guiding this section is Deleuze’s emphasis upon “mediators”—those nonphilosophical elements encountered that serve as both the catalyst and the expression of new forms of thought, with the logic of the series. While we can discern the productive evidence from Deleuze’s entire oeuvre, there also appears a particular rationale for this approach regarding the limits upon invention in terms of dispositif and the conditions of possibility. In the same 1985 essay “Mediators,” Deleuze remarks “We have to see creation as tracing a path between impossibilities” (Negotiations 134); citing Kafka writing in German and Pierre Perrault writing in French, Deleuze adds that we “have to work on the wall, because without a set of impossibilities, [one] won’t have the line of flight, the exit that is creation, the power of falsity that is truth” (134, my emphasis).

Considering the prospect of creating a concept of sensation, the problem of interference that I have posed, from a perspective of Science or logocentric Philosophy, the hegemony of Reason emerges markedly as the conditions upon creation—intelligibility, articulation and iterability, denotation or reference. And while the issues of degree and implications will be treated at other points in my project, for now I must qualify that creating a concept of sensation is not an act of translation or adaptation; rather, the interference in this problematic occurs
between the faculties, intelligibility and sensibility, as well as between disciplines. More specifically, additional difficulty and nuance occurs with respect to “material,” given that language serves as the medium (form) and practice (technē) for both rational communication and artistic writing. At the expense of a thorough discursus on this point but in favor of progressing the present topic, I consider Deleuze’s prevalent claim that certain artistic writers fashion “a new syntax [that] is a foreign language within the language” (Negotiations 134).

That Deleuze evokes this perspective within the context of creation and impossibility in “Mediators” bolsters the theoretical recourse for constructivism to his theorizations of intensive language in writing. In other words, by employing this “foreign language,” artistic writing (literature) operates by means of other modes of thought within the dominant dispositif: aesthetic practices, particularly style, thus “situate” writing within multiple apparatuses—Art affirms virtuality as ontic, as established. Indeed, O’Sullivan addresses precisely this prospect: “art involves a new combination, a new dice throw as perhaps Deleuze would say. Such art does not so much offer up a set of knowledges as set up the conditions, we might say the contours, for future knowledges still to come. It is in this sense also that art involves the posing of new questions and as such will always make demands on any already existing audience” (Art Encounters 146, my emphasis). The problematic as well as the opportunity that emerges, which I am advocating and engaging, expressly involves the “frontiers of our knowledge” (DR xxi), at which we write and create, Deleuze states, as I earlier cited.

Proceeding with this fecund view of Art generally, bearing in mind the previously-discussed properties of the aesthetic plane of composition, this chapter—a link between studying theory and applying its lessons in propositional fashion —examines further the form of literary writing as the “mediator” for constructivist “output,” both for Deleuze and for emulative
attempts. The discussion proceeds from a consideration of Deleuze’s literary mediators and his idiosyncratic reading: concluding with description and clarification of pragmatics concerning literary percepts and affects, with a review of secondary scholarship on this topic, the second section tests the method for reading in my first two “encounters” with novels as “mediators.”

Keeping in mind, the limits upon what can be produced—the concepts thought or expressed—include not only opinion, belief, and ideology, but two other operations of the dispositif upon knowledge in scholarship: the alterity and distinct apparatus of creating philosophical concepts and discourse, without the means or aims of aesthetic composition; also, the implications of denotation within literary language for acts of interpretation. The latter condition involves the inherent risk of enacting hermeneutics as the sort of limitation that Deleuze and Guattari describe, creating the plane of reference of Science, or in the simpler fashion of descriptive logic, for instance. This problem is treated partly here and then circumvented through alternative strategies for rhetoric and literary scholarship: this chapter and the next three introduce and explain additional topics necessary for engaging sufficiently and avoiding the issue of “capture” and limitation, beyond the basic notions of “translation” or “adaptation,” toward a concept of sensation. Continuing the discussion of pragmatics for now, intensive language is the object of study within the constructivist procedure. Evoking indirectly the first difficulty of the dispositif stated prior, Ronald Bogue (1996) notes that “Deleuze does not attempt to paint and sing through words, as do literary writers, but he does push language to its limits as he tries to say the unsayable and think the unthinkable” (“Deleuze’s Style” 264).

Deleuze’s Literary Mediators

Certainly, Philosophy might be catalyzed by other “nonphilosophical understanding” besides Art—Science or Nature, another apparatus—and by art forms other than literature,
including notably for Deleuze painting, film, and music. Another project could indeed investigate those concepts that Deleuze creates through mediators from natural sciences, mathematics, or architecture; likewise, scholarship on visual arts has proliferated, occasionally with apt method and toward inventive ends. Any research must keep in mind that “philosophy is born or produced outside by the painter, the musician, the writer, each time that the melodic line draws along the sound, or the pure traced line colour, or the written line the articulated voice,” Deleuze asserts; moreover, “it is necessarily produced where each activity gives rise to its line of deterritorialization” (Dialogues 74). To this end, my study overall focuses upon Deleuze’s work with narrative literature in order to discern first his literary pragmatics as well as the problematic to which certain concepts respond—both concerning the methodological aim of constructivist invention with my chosen object of study. Additionally, the particular investigation of literary writing is positioned against the challenge for scholarship and artistic language alike, whether—or the degree to which—the composition succeeds as creation. In this way, Deleuze directly informs the approach and articulates the stakes: “Writing is very simple. Either it is a way of reterritorializing oneself, conforming to a code of dominant utterances, to a territory of established states of things. […] Or else, on the other hand, it is becoming […] something other than writing” (Dialogues 74, my emphasis).

The hypothesis motivating a study of his constructivist method with Art is that Deleuze fashions the resulting concept within a series consisting of the aesthetic mediators—thought and philosophical discourse particular to its catalysts and demonstrative of their properties, as Bogue attempts to theorize in his article “Deleuze’s Style.” This effort appears to address the question (or problem) whether new knowledge in rational language, operating by the intellectual faculty,

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1 As just one example, see Arkady Plotnitsky’s “Algebras, Geometries, and Topologies of the Fold: Deleuze, Derrida and Quasi-Mathematical Thinking (with Leibniz and Mallarme)” in Between Deleuze and Derrida (98-119).
can avoid “(re)territorializing” or limiting the object of study; or, whether there are other possibilities for discursive practices beyond remaining strictly referential, incorporating or appealing to other faculties such as sensibility. In the same passage quoted prior, Deleuze remarks, “Not every becoming passes through writing, but everything which becomes is an object of writing, painting or music. Everything which becomes is a pure line which ceases to represent whatever it may be” (*Dialogues* 74). Although greatly compact, this instance articulates two methodological and philosophical aims: for intellectual discourse to enact, if only to a degree, creative effort—via *becoming*, deterritorialization—beyond denotation, “dominant utterances”; for this discourse not to represent but to express the qualities of its particular catalyst, for example the *intensive features*. Continually averting a false opposition, we must recall and keep in mind the assertion by Deleuze and Guattari in *What is Philosophy?* that Philosophy is equally *creative* as Art and Science. Taking all these points into account, we can understand that in his endeavor to construct *intensive concepts* and *adequate discourse*, provisionally labeled, Deleuze employs as mediators the art forms apt to problematic.

While increasingly evident in his later work, Deleuze consistently composes his inventive thought using the work of literary writers as mediators, or in other parlance as *vehicle* or *interface*. This can be considered a feature of methodology, regardless of the number of texts that I address—in fact, twelve of his twenty three texts markedly use literary works, including even *Foucault* (1986) and *The Fold* (1988)—or the prevalence of references. Additionally, this perspective is one angle for discerning and engaging the overall character of Deleuze’s method implied when he remarks, “I make, remake and unmake my concepts along a moving horizon” (*DR* xx). In the scope of Deleuze’s oeuvre, we can observe no limiting or fixed “horizon” of the encounter-constructivist problematic in his working with literature: from Proust and Sacher-
Masoch in his early “divergent” texts; to Borges and Lewis Carroll in his first “experimental” works, *Difference and Repetition* (1968) and *The Logic of Sense* (1969); to the increased number and variety of authors in *A Thousand Plateaus* (1980) and *Essays Critical and Clinical* (1993), most notably Kafka, Beckett, Woolf, Kleist, D.H. Lawrence, and Melville.\(^2\)

In this context, the “horizon” of concepts pertaining to literature refers more to the use of pragmatics and aesthetic interface than to the limited set of authors discussed or points reiterated. By the former I mean that we should consider Deleuze’s *literary mediators* by their function in his philosophical discourse: Borges, regarding Leibniz and the Baroque; Carroll and nonsense; Kafka, Beckett, and Kleist for their composed affects and *becomings*; likewise percepts and forces in Proust, Melville, and Woolf; the intensive language—which is “carved” through a “linguistic procedure” (*ECC* 9)—of Artaud, Whitman, Wolfson, Roussel, Brisset, and D.H. Lawrence. An efficient review of several examples suffices to demonstrate this methodological principle; however, because certain topics and texts require thorough treatment in order to ascertain and apply effectively, I discuss in subsequent chapters literature by Carroll and Kafka in terms of series and deterritorialization. The present survey examines two key instances of Deleuze’s using Borges as well representative examples in *Essays Critical and Clinical*. Besides “charting” Deleuze’s oeuvre and method across periods, this discussion throughout demonstrates the key principle to discern: the “nonphilosophical” material of literature as the catalyst and means for creating intensive concepts and philosophical discourse, working with Art that “determinorizes the system of opinion” (*WP* 197), as established.

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Although arbitrary in one view, beginning with Deleuze’s use of Jorge Luis Borges in his work appears apt when considering the context of the first appearance. Deleuze first evokes Borges and his story “Pierre Menard, Author of the Quixote” in the Preface to *Difference and Repetition*, within precisely the passages I have cited regarding the creation of philosophical texts *(philos-o-graphy?)* as part Detective Novel and part Science Fiction. In Deleuze’s view, Borges “goes further when he considers a real book, such as *Don Quixote*, as though it were an imaginary book, itself reproduced by an imaginary author, Pierre Menard, who in turn he considers to be real. In this case, the most exact, the most strict repetition has as its correlate the maximum of difference” (*DR* xxii). Implied here is that this composition succeeds toward what Deleuze posits should be the aims of new commentaries upon historical philosophy texts; moreover, the recourse to the logic of fiction via Borges follows Deleuze’s calling for, instead of reproduction, one’s writing “a real book of past philosophy *as if it were* an imaginary and feigned book” (xxi-ii, my emphasis). However, promising though this recourse appears, the later passage from “The Garden of Forking Paths” introduces the principal use of Borges that recurs in two later texts: “On this question of the game of repetition and difference as governed by the death instinct, no one has gone further than Borges, throughout his astonishing work” (115). The philosophical inquires into the “Ideal Game” and the Eternal Return consist of Deleuze’s engaging the modal logic of Leibniz, through Borges, beginning in *Difference and Repetition*.

Subsequently elaborating the conditions of a problem in *The Logic of Sense*, Deleuze sharpens his focus in terms of “incompossibility”; significantly, he employs the logic of fiction when stating, “The incompossible worlds become the variants of the same story” (*Logic* 115). One view of his quoting “The Garden of Forking Paths” might be that Deleuze elucidates points through literature, shifting from the philosophical parlance of “aleatory point” and
“singularity”—for instance, writing, “In Ts’ui Pen’s work, all possible solutions occur, each one being the point of departure for other bifurcations” (Logic 113). Alternative to this simplistic view, we can observe that the logic of fiction not only serves as the vehicle for theory but also informs Deleuze’s thinking in *The Logic of Sense*, the stories of Lewis Carroll especially. This understanding is underscored partly by Deleuze’s later engaging the modal logic of Leibniz with the theoretical interface of aesthetics, particularly the music, architecture, and design of the Baroque period. In *The Non-Philosophy of Gilles Deleuze*, Gregg Lambert expresses the latter view, first noting the similarity of *Difference and Repetition* to Borges’ story “The Library of Babel” (75) and then asserting “that Borges has prefigured the solution that Deleuze later discovers in *The Fold*” (76). Although a nuanced reading, Lambert ultimately privileges Borges, “the Baroque Detective,” to the extent of this radical conclusion: “that Borges is the precursor of Leibniz; that it was not possible for Deleuze to read Leibniz without Borges” (89).³

Regardless of interpreting literature simply as vehicle or deterministically as schema for Deleuze, the more important lesson from the case of Borges and Leibniz is the salient function of the logic of fiction in philosophical *artisanal practice*. And just as I earlier exalted Art as the *catalyst to thought* in the aesthetic paradigm, Lambert reconciles his over-estimating the influence of Borges upon Deleuze’s reading by describing “the Borgesian solution” for modal logic as distinctly literary (90): indeed, Deleuze fashions an aesthetico-philosophical “species of repetition that is deployed by a process of reading that now belongs to the concept of modern literature” (76). In other words, the properties of literature within the apparatus of Art offer

³ For context, and to underscore the fairness of my quotation, Lambert’s passage is worth noting in full: “In my discussion of Deleuze & Leibniz, what I argued is something so simple and at the same time Borgesean, that in conclusion I want to return to emphasize it again: that Borges is the precursor of Leibniz; that it was not possible for Deleuze to read Leibniz without Borges. This is something so simple and yet evident, that Deleuze himself did not often see it, or did not choose to see it exactly in that way, perhaps due to an anxiety of influence, and this caused him to locate Borges still in terms of his own earlier reading of Borges as a player in the absolute game of chance, ‘the game without rules’ (Fold 63)” (*Non-Philosophy* 89).
Deleuze the non-philosophical complement for invention, the artisanal philosophy-as-opera. I regard this as a means for Deleuze’s creative practice rather as bearing any inherent connection between Borges and Leibniz; this relation is distinct from the topical discussions of The Fold, in which the “counterpart” to Leibniz’s thought appears in “the Baroque sensibility expressed in the arts,” in Ronald Bogue’s terms (Intensive 31).

In “The New Harmony,” Bogue effectively identifies this perspective: “An especially intriguing and instructive instance of the philosophy-arts parallels established in The Fold is that which Deleuze draws between Leibniz’s concept of harmony and the harmonic practices of Baroque composers” (Intensive 31). Ultimately, while scholars of certain expertise or motivation might parse and dispute Deleuze’s composite perspective, more significant for this methodological study is how Deleuze creates his concept of the fold through Borges’ fiction as well as Baroque aesthetics—how he can “enter the Leibnizian universe” (99), Alliez writes, “a way of addressing the modern image of thought” (Signature 100). Finally, we might thus see Lambert’s recourse to Borges as a “Deleuzean strategy” for innovation, his insight made convoluted due to using the same author to different ends.4

The “problem of writing”

Whereas the fiction of Borges enables conceptual invention as “thought experiments,” the majority of literary mediators for Deleuze provide the means for avoiding and disrupting the “code of dominant utterances” (Dialogues 74), analytic denotive discourse, through technique and intensive language. Deleuze’s encounters and constructivist work with aesthetic composition in this regard are evident in his collaborations with Guattari, particularly Kafka (1975) and A

4 Also intriguing for poststructuralist methodology: “Like Kafka, Borges’s signature underwrites philosophical projects of Deleuze, Foucault (hence the citation […] in the preface to The Order of Things) and Derrida (can one even conceive of the process of ‘deconstruction’ of the text of Western Metaphysics without the precursor of Borges’s ‘total library’?)” (Non-Philosophy 81). cf. essays by Lambert and Arsić in Between Deleuze and Derrida.
Thousand Plateaus (1980), in which the pragmatics of literature emerges prominently. The latter is the perspective markedly apparent when Deleuze directly treats the “problem of writing” later in Essays Critical and Clinical: the interrogation becomes a matter of whether writing operates either as “reterritorializing” or as becoming “a pure line which ceases to represent” (Dialogues 74). However, before or rather instead of simplifying the problem and object of study in these terms, we must keep in mind the intricate philosophical position and aesthetic theorization that inform this perspective, developed progressively since Proust and Signs in 1964 and 1972. Indeed, while in this text Proust provides an interface with the philosophical topics explicated respectively by Leibniz and Bergson, Deleuze refines the constructivist pragmatics that is apparent more patently in later texts, the tenor articulated more explicitly in Dialogues and Negotiations. The direct programme and nuanced perspective are clear in What is Philosophy?:

Art does not have opinions. Art undoes the triple organization of perceptions, affections, and opinions in order to substitute a monument composed of percepts, affects, and blocs of sensations that take the place of language. The writer uses words, but by creating a syntax that makes them pass into sensation that makes the standard language stammer, tremble, cry, or even sing: this is the style, the ‘tone’, the language of sensations, or the foreign language within language […]. The writer twists language, makes it vibrate, seizes hold of it, and rends it in order to wrest the percept from perceptions, the affect from affections, the sensation from opinion […]. (WP 176, my emphasis)

In the service of examining the vivid examples in Essays Critical and Clinical, I have quoted this passage for the instructive principles that contribute to a pragmatics of literature; as stated, this appears to be the perspective that enables inventive results, at least to the extent that is evident in Deleuze’s work, I am positing. This “typology” complements the tasks of pragmatics stated in A Thousand Plateaus, to make first “a tracing of the mixed semiotics, under the generative component” and second “the transformational map of the regimes, with their possibilities for translation and creation” (ATP 146). In this way, Deleuze could be said to map
and then invent with the “countersignifying” (118) and “postsignifying” (119) regimes of aesthetic composition, working with certain literature. As introduced earlier, the foreign language within language appears in this view the opportunity and means for creation within the constraints or conditions (“impossibilities”) of the dispositif; or in other terms, style in the aesthetic paradigm fashions language into sensation, rather than reverting to the “dominant code” of signification and mimesis. It is this quality that offers a rich potential for constructivism.

Inventing this foreign language is the problematic that writers address, Deleuze begins Essays Critical and Clinical: “They bring to light new grammatical or syntactic powers. They force language outside its customary functions, they make it delirious [délier]” (lv). Before discussing two instances of Deleuze’s inventive work with literary mediators, it is worthwhile to review the illustrative examples of writing that twists, seizes hold, rends and wrests language—“makes it vibrate,” in other words, infuses with intensity. On this point, I would also clarify that the essays on literature in Essays Critical and Clinical can ostensibly be read in two ways, particularly from the first chapter “Literature and Life”: the second and obvious view regards the writer as “a physician of himself and of the world,” concerning literature as “symptoms” and “an enterprise of health” (3).\(^5\) This perspective informs the English title and the introduction by Daniel Smith, regarding these essays within Deleuze’s “‘critique et clinique’ project” (xvii) and “literature as delirium,” derived from Anti-Oedipus (xl). However, the exploration of the problem of writing, as I have presented, supersedes this narrow view of artists as “clinicians or diagnosticians,” literature as “symptomatology” (li), and interpretations as “critical” or

\(^5\) The eighteen essays are split fairly evenly between discussions of literary and philosophical works, in terms of topic and objects of study, often with insights and assertions about both appearing throughout, constituting “overlap”—for instance the essay on Spinoza by means of Nietzsche, D.H. Lawrence, Kafka, Artaud, “To Have Done with Judgment.” Overall, this collection is characteristic of Deleuze for appearing syncretic; my selective treatment of the literature theorization is deliberate, in the service of the on-going discussion.
“clinical”—scholarly maneuvers “reterritorializing” aesthetic composition into the “dominant code” and signification regime of denotation.

In contrast, through his pragmatics readings Deleuze recognizes how an author “carves out” the foreign language (ECC 71); this results through a “linguistic procedure” (9) by Wolfson, Roussel, and Brisset (9), and is evident as well as in the work of D.H. Lawrence, Kleist, and Gherasim Luca (110). Discussing the first three authors, Deleuze describes “a procedure that treats an ordinary language, a standard language, in a matter that makes it ‘render’ an original and unknown language” (72). This description appears in the essay on Melville, who “carves out” a similar effect through his “formula”—“neither an affirmation nor a negation” (71)—in Bartleby, the Scrivener. As it “hollows out” language toward counter- or post-signification, the formula “will also send language into flight, it will open up a zone of indetermination or indiscernibility in which neither words nor characters can be distinguished” (76). The main technique that produces this effect is Melville’s “dramatizing” or composing with the disruption of signification: versus self-referential and constative speech acts, “It is this double system of references that Bartleby ravages” with “a new logic” (73). As this aspect of the novella does not appear ostensibly to be a matter of Form, we can only follow Deleuze’s unconventional reading of stylistic indiscernibility—as with the “man without references” (74)—if we are to regard productively the procedure of Melville’s writing that succeeds as intensive composition, becoming something other than signification, the non-representative “pure line.”

This point bears consideration as an instructive strategy for understanding and emulating Deleuze’s treatment of literature, grasping the insights and generative work in favor of

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6 One example of ambitious yet limited attempts at working “like Deleuze” suffices. “The possibility of a Deleuzean reading of Bartleby emerges,” Branka Arsić writes: “the fact that Bartleby is living on a rhizome could be interpreted now as a composibility of two series that through contractions and habits produce another rhizome, the rhizome of Bartleby’s body, the becoming-rhizome of Bartleby that enables the ‘local renovations’ of his body. (Between Deleuze and Derrida 144). This type of reading is limited by remaining in the regime of signification.
classifying to support some other ends. In this way, although Deleuze discusses quantitatively more Francophone writers—Balzac, Hugo, Rimbaud, Proust; Roussel, Brisset, Genet, Dhotel, Le Clézio; poets including Péguy, Michaux, and Luca—the qualitative import of the pragmatic readings demonstrate the more significant features. Deleuze unequivocally posits “the schizophrenic vocation of American literature: to make the English language, by means of driftings, deviations, de-taxes and sur-taxes (as opposed to the standard syntax) slip in this manner” (72); in the essay on Whitman, discussing his technique of the fragment, Deleuze similarly posits that American writers “have to dismantle the English language and send it racing along a line of flight, rendering language convulsive” (58). From these readings, the principle for recognizing counter- and post-signification aesthetics thus entails discerning those techniques that work to intensify language beyond ordinary use, “sending it into flight, pushing it to its very limit in order to discover its Outside, silence or music” (72).

**Twists, seizes, rends, and wrests—philosophical discourse**

I began this chapter by introducing the view that literary mediators provide Deleuze the means for escaping the “dominant code” of philosophical discourse, in addition to catalyzing new and particular types of thought. The literary pragmatics evident in several texts further illustrates the qualities upon which conceptual developments are contingent; additionally, some products of constructivist encounters show more markedly how Deleuze produces generative work through the aesthetic paradigm and its particular properties or modes, accentuating the view of Philosophy as a creative enterprise. Three works in Essays Critical and Clinical illustrate formally the literary-constructivist poetics of philosography, and a fourth, “To Have Done with Judgment,” demonstrates subtly the inventive work of this method. In the latter essay, Deleuze recognizes in place of judgment the relations of forces, such as “combat,” in the “four great disciples” of Spinoza: evident in Nietzsche’s aphorisms, Kafka’s parables, Artaud’s
aesthetic cruelty, and D.H. Lawrence’s apocalyptic symbols (ECC 134). In the perspective that I am contending, however, designating this exegesis as “recognition” is inapt ad rem; rather, more suitable is our regarding how Deleuze invents his unique Spinoza-as-concept, much like Kafka-as-concept, through these literary mediators. Likewise, he similarly refashions and composes a distinctive version of Dionysus and the labyrinth as affirmative in “The Mystery of Ariadne, according to Nietzsche” (1987), along with Deleuze’s conception of Kafka with Guattari.

More concrete and patent instances of Deleuze’s philosophical poetics appear in “On Four Poetic Formulas that Might Summarize Kantian Philosophy” (1984) and “The Greatest Irish Film” (1986). While slightly less creative formally, the essay on Kant epitomizes the method of artisanal practice discussed earlier regarding Borges and Leibniz. In this case, Deleuze uses several literary references from Shakespeare, Borges, Rimbaud, Beckett, and Kafka to engage four Kantian notions—time, consciousness, the law, the faculties. On the last point, for example, Deleuze notes the “unregulated exercise of all the faculties, which was to define future philosophy, just as for Rimbaud the disorder of all the senses would define the poetry of the future” (35). Although this correspondence might appear to have been artificially produced by Deleuze, the four epigrams from Shakespeare, Kafka, and Rimbaud respectively serve as the interface and the vehicles that enable his productive innovations on Kant’s ideas, with remarkable precision and economy. Indeed, in the first case, the problem of time out of joint is treated as a matter of the aesthetic plane of composition: first evoking Borges’ labyrinth, as well as Oedipus according to Hölderlin & Nietzsche, Deleuze posits how Hamlet “completes the emancipation of time” (28). A similar recourse to aesthetic composition concerns the modulation of consciousness, about which Deleuze remarks that “it is as if in Kant, one could already hear Beethoven, and soon Wagner’s continuous variation” (30).
Beyond mere variation, the insights and new theorizations of Kant’s ideas discussed in this brief essay emphasize the aesthetic dispositif operating in artisanal practice: it is through literature that Deleuze renders intense the established and perhaps “reified” concepts, the aesthetic mode that “makes it vibrate.” A corollary point is that Deleuze’s literary approach in method is particularly apposite to the object of study. By this I do not mean simply that the literature invoked serves as apt reference or correspondence, in depicting Kant’s concepts, as for instance in Hamlet or Murphy; rather, Deleuze undertakes the Kantian problematic by means of the “Four Poetic Formulas” in his prioritizing the third Critique, even noting a “Shakespearean aspect of Kant” (35). One understanding is that he resolves the “dead-end” line of reasoning, which refers only to Kant’s explications of the four concepts, by innovating with the gesture and import of The Critique of Judgment: an aesthetic of The Sublime, “in which the sensible takes on autonomous value” (34)—that which “brings the various faculties into play” (34).

The artisanal poetics for creativity, even if only innovation in this case, are evoked philosophically in that the aesthetic plane is inherent within the problematic (to which Kant’s concept of The Sublime is a response). In another sense, the particular dispositif of aesthetics “situates” the concept for Kant and the constructivist endeavor for Deleuze in terms of conditions for and the recourse to creativity—thus the fourth epigram, from Rimbaud, “To attain the unknown by disorganizing all the senses…a long, boundless, and systematized disorganization of all the senses” (33). Finally, Deleuze articulates not only a rationale but this fertile line for creation in his acknowledging how the four literary formulas might be “arbitrary in relation to Kant, but not arbitrary in relation to what Kant has left us for the present and future” (35).

The artisanal poetics in “The Greatest Irish Film” likewise show this logic, rather than a strictly arbitrary application, in composing philosophical thought via recourse to the aesthetic
plane. Unlike the essay on Kant, the rationale or discernment for this approach appears in other instances when Deleuze explices the intensive foreign language of artistic style; he posits in the Melville essay, for example, that writing with the fragment tries to finds “a music in its stuttering language, a pure sound and unknown chords in language itself” (ECC 89). Theorizing further theses implications and uses of language in “The Exhausted” (1992), the last chapter of Essays Critical and Clinical, Deleuze thoroughly discusses Beckett’s works, particularly Quad, Ghost Trio, and Nact und Nacht. In his reading, Beckett’s creativity exhausts “the possible” with three types of language, ultimately producing a third—a “language of images” (159)—that surpasses those of names and voices, types of metalanguage.

Invoking Blanchot, Deleuze proposes that this “exhausted” language “forces speech to become image, movement, song, poem” (159); no longer “a representation of an object” (169), its form and force “free itself from memory and reason” (159). The latter point emphasizes a manifest “strain” of thought that Deleuze has theorized throughout his career, to this late discussion, particularly in his referencing The Logic of Sense explicitly: Beckett’s image-language “frees itself from its object in order to become a process itself, that is, an event as a ‘possible’ that no longer even needs to be realized in a body or an object, somewhat like the smile without a cat in Lewis Carroll” (168). This way of understanding regards intensive or expressive literature as “not an object but a ‘process’” (159)—like Carroll’s “Surface nonsense,” operating “like the ‘Radiance’ of pure events” (22).

Articulating a pragmatics of the postsignifying regime in “The Exhausted,” Deleuze asserts that the image-language is “pure intensity” (170), comprised of forces, as a “ritornello, whether visual or aural” (ECC 159), in the case of Beckett: “The image is precisely this: not a representation of an object but a movement in the world of the mind” (169). Bearing this
perspective in mind, we can observe the applied poetics in “The Greatest Irish Film,” in which Deleuze employs Beckett’s style—and not even literal text—to propose in brief fragments a “theoretical film,” one that would resolve Bishop Berkeley’s problematic of perception in favor of a Deleuzean invention, *becoming imperceptible* (26).

Proceeding from “The History,” “The Condition,” and “The Givens of the Problem” of being perceived, Deleuze proposes a fictional treatment—even casting Buster Keaton as Berkeley in his imaginary film (23)—through cinematographic descriptions of “The Wall and the Staircase, Action” (24); “The Room, Perception” (25); and “The Rocking Chair, Affection” in which the camera reveals “the perception of affection, that is, the perception of the self by itself, or pure Affect” (25). Engaging the problematic through the logic of aesthetics, both the cinematographic sequence and the non-resolution of Beckett, Deleuze asks, “Is this not precisely what is needed, to cease to be in order to become imperceptible, according to [Berkeley’s] conditions?” (25). Indeed, the interminable quality of Beckett’s aforementioned image-language, which alters the conditions of possibility, provides for Deleuze “The General Solution”—that which facilitates the concept of *becoming imperceptible* “without cessation or condition” (26). 7

“Creative” in senses both *generative* and *aesthetic*, these essays “On Four Poetic Formulas that Might Summarize Kantian Philosophy” and “The Greatest Irish Film” demonstrate the particular way that Deleuze engages established philosophical issues, toward innovative ends, by means of the *aesthetic plane*. That his composition sometimes appears in a markedly “literary” fashion directly evokes the question of the *dispositif* for thought and writing. To be

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7 Of course, Deleuze had already invented this notion earlier in *A Thousand Plateaus* (1980) with Guattari; however, without digressing to account fully, it is worth noting that in this essay, it takes on the property of aesthetic means, for resolving Berkeley’s problematic, rather than an “end” itself as a type of *determinitorialized* rhizomatic relation between bodies. Left to another project to explore fully, the relation of cinema as catalyst and conduit for Deleuze’s thought in this regard, as evident in *The Movement-Image* and *The Time-Image*, can not be overstated. Alternatively, also see Garin Dowd *Abstract machines: Samuel Beckett and philosophy after Deleuze and Guattari* (Rodopi, 2007).
clear, the “recourse” to aesthetics does not imply that creativity requires switching (from philosophy) to the apparatus of Art—as though Berkeley’s problematic of perception could only be resolved through an actual film, for instance. Rather, what I have thus far termed artisanal practice for philosophical discourse involves integrally the mediators of constructivism at the conceptual and rhetorical levels of invention. In view of his oeuvre, this relation and technique emerges patently as Deleuze’s method and style—ranging to these late essays, beginning from The Logic of Sense through A Thousand Plateaus.

In these cases of mediators including Borges, Melville, Rimbaud, Beckett, et al., what must be emphasized as a fundamental principle of methodology is that philosophical innovation or invention by Deleuze is enabled by his pragmatics of literature in the first place. With this said, I engage the problematic of the unknown and the creation of philosophical discourse (philosophy) as “part Detective Novel and part Science Fiction”: beginning with the discovery model, as in the “Baroque detective” of Borges, invention like Deleuze’s work on Kant via Beckett is enabled by mapping the multiple semiotic regimes and sensations or senses encountered, as he finds in the work of Carroll and Kafka. In my experiment, Thomas Pynchon this way provides literary mediators for the discovery model first, introduced in the next section, as well as the generative means for experiencing and inventing new knowledge, presented in the next three chapters—encountering and diagramming intensive features, toward a novelistic assemblage in theory and practice.

**Literary Encounters 2: From Series to Assemblage in Pynchon’s Early Novels**

when “novelists install themselves in this aleatory point, this imperative and questioning ‘blind spot’ from which the work develops like a problem by making divergent series resonate—[...] they make the work a process of learning or experimentation” (Difference and Repetition 199, my emphasis)
From this extended review and careful consideration for method, I can now proceed to apply and “test” the strategies detailed and proposed, at least in one brief section here and continued henceforth. The rationale for the methodological study has been to discern lessons that can be applied, in apt experimental praxis—even if the results require further development in later work. On this point, the compound view motivates and guides my approach to working with literature, specifically novels with multiple semiotic regimes, toward demonstrating *artisanal praxis* and potentially inventing an experienced concept of sensation. Thomas Pynchon is the author in whose work I have encountered *generative* and *transformative* writing, first and most compellingly concerning the logic and production of series—even though his novels are highly episodic in narrative as well. This aesthetic mode of narrative offers potential for the constructivist method undertaken from Deleuze, specifically to investigate given the inherently temporal properties of terms and their bearing upon invention.

Expanding the pragmatics of *percepts*, the Deleuzean vocabulary of *point, line, series,* and *transversal relation* additionally enables a view of Pynchon’s work that recognizes literary expression and composition through signifying and counter-signifying regimes; this way, we can discern other productions of “sense” and other logics at work in the aesthetic paradigm. As one consequent insight, I am conjecturing a shift demonstrated in Pynchon’s first three novels—*V.* (1961), *The Crying of Lot 49* (1965), and *Gravity’s Rainbow* (1973)—from *serial logic* to assemblage style, in both thought and writing. This shift is less important for my purposes as an aesthetic observation (disciplinary “argument”) than as a catalyst for and guiding influence of my project. Incidentally, it is a similar progression in thought from the series model and literary readings of *The Logic of Sense* and *Proust and Signs* to the assemblage-style concept-making by Deleuze in his later oeuvre, from *A Thousand Plateaus* through *What is Philosophy?*.
In addition to the methodological terms thus far developed, Pynchon’s three novels provide promising “diegesis” for invention, which I am using experimentally akin to how the works of Borges, Carroll, and Kafka are innovation mediators for Deleuze. Concerning this phrasing of diegesis in scholarship, I am attempting a poetics of *artisanal praxis* in the compelling language of novelistic philosophy: Deleuze remarks, “Philosophy’s like a novel: you have to ask ‘What’s going to happen?’, ‘What’s happened?’”. Except the characters are concepts, and the settings, the scenes, are space-times. One’s always writing to bring something to life, to free life from where it’s trapped, to trace lines of flight” (*Negotiations* 140-1). Finding the “space-times” for invention in Pynchon’s novels, the “narrative” and “character” analogues in *artisanal expression* will be treated subsequently, using literary mediators from other authors. Furthermore, this perspective guides how I am using Pynchon’s novels particularly encountered, toward invention rather than exegesis or other ends.

The principle for innovation within the restrictive *dispositif* (rational discourse) emulates similarly how Deleuze employs Carroll and Kafka for renderings of nonsense and of desire in his writing. In order to foreground the position of “first-person” role in constructivist encounters, rather than remain or become abstract, an additional value of these first “encounter texts” is their “dramatizing” the very process that they catalyze in my project. To this end, although perhaps ultimately ending up a “detour,” I begin with literary “structural portraits” of the *narrative of discovery* within a trajectory of invention.

In *Heuretics*, Ulmer points out how the language about method since Francis Bacon indicates a convention for scientific inquiry in Western knowledge systems “associated with the metaphor of the voyager” (24); common spatial language inflecting the *discovery of knowledge* rhetoric includes “voyaging explorer,” travel, frontier, adventure, “pioneers,” “visionaries,”
“trailblazers” (26). Of course, the process of invention also “unfolds as a narrative” (7), as Ulmer notes in Internet Invention—itself an unconventional textbook on method and praxis structured by series and progression, a model for my present attempt. In my work with Pynchon here and subsequently, two general principles emerge and are “dramatized” in the narrative process: most obviously, the classification of knowledge and the discovery process within and contingent to the Modern Episteme and Literate Apparatus, which is not universal; also, the experienced (“first-person”) story of the invention process, particularly in the absence of logocentric Meaning or Truth in the postmodern episteme. The latter began long before this project, first encountering The Crying of Lot 49 and theorizing a “rhizomatic” or network epistemology as alternative to hermeneutic readings of “binary” oppositions—a “prologue” to the present work, indeed.

In a structural portrait use, adopted from Roland Barthes, the literary text serves as “simulation” of the immediate position of articulation, “in order to stage an utterance, not an analysis” (A Lover’s Discourse 3). For example, Barthes employs Werther as a “structural” portrait (3) for the amorous subject, a discursive role: this “identification” with literary characters—for him, Werther and Heinrich, the madman (130-1)—he explains, “is not a psychological process [but] a pure structural operation” (129). With the rationale of composing figures of “amorous feeling” (4), within a knowledge milieu dominated by psychoanalytic and Marxist theory, Barthes’s insights motivate his producing affective writing within a dispositif that seemingly precludes such scholarly discourse.

This is quite notable for my purposes, extending the principle from amorous subject to the subject and experience of discovery and invention. Specifically, one understanding toward this aim is how “the figure takes its departure from a turn of phrase, a kind of verse, refrain, or cantillation” (5); in Barthes’s estimation, “Each figure explodes, vibrates in and of itself like a
sound severed from any tune—or is repeated to satiety, like the motif of a hovering music” (6).

Although certainly a practice for composing the eventual *artisanal concept*, I temper my use of literary fragments in my methodological study for now, in favor of using Pynchon’s work as instructive example here and as inventive diegesis subsequently: intensive language use, *generative or transformative* beyond signification.

**Pynchon Mediators: Serial Detectives, Transversal Signs**

The first literary encounter with serial logic percepts and the two structural portraits for my initial position are Pynchon’s novels *V.* and *The Crying of Lot 49*: the seriality of proliferating signs and meanings, in the signifying regime, connects markedly with the narratives of quest and investigation in both. For clarity and efficiency, I will mostly discuss the latter and then conclude briefly with “diagrammatic” speculation for invention; also, although my process begins with the “irresolvable” alternatives and “non-ending” of *Lot 49*, I start with *V.* given the critical discourse and yet discuss the novels together whenever possible for expediency. Most obviously, both novels present the “hermeneutic detective” role, through prevailing “quest” narratives: the question of what *V.* is, for minor character Sidney Stencil; as well, the ostensible mystery and investigation by protagonist Oedipa Maas into the relation and meanings of the muted post-horn symbol, W.A.S.T.E., “Trystero” (or “the Tristero,” or other variants), and “legacy” in *Lot 49*. Pynchon’s plot structures and narrative discourse (or *sjuzet*) invite readers’ structural identification and “paranoid” stance toward signs and references, as I discuss second, across lines of stories and levels of fiction and historical reality. Encountered thus, the works prompt our considering—especially in a project of invention—the particular epistemological approach of interpretation and “trajectory,” with its assumptions about discovery and meaning.

The paranoid reader, paralleling the narratives of Stencil and Oedipa, proceeds likewise in the rational paradigm with the “metaphysics of presence;” in Derrida’s terms for the dominant
Western episteme, and with investment in the “voyage” of discovery. Pynchon’s works employ conventions of narrative closure and reader expectations specifically in dramatizing these characters’ travel, motivated by quest and investigation, in plot progression; the detective role begins assuming transcendent Truth or Meaning exists, albeit absent or elsewhere, and that it might be found or become disclosed, revealed as though hidden. The metonymic “clues” imply a mystery to investigate and solve, not a problematic in which to work: “V.,” an identity located elsewhere and in the past time of Stencil’s father; Trystero prevalent ostensibly everywhere, persisting as vestigial and elided operation, if Oedipa’s findings and deductions are true. Despite the conventional and flawed epistemological bases, and perhaps all the more compelling despite Pynchon’s refusal of closure-solution to the detective role, the structural portrait is worth briefly examining given the profuse academic interest and the counter-signifying regimes encountered.

The serial logic of Pynchon’s composition, accentuated in counterpoint by episodic storytelling, unfolds most in the accounts of Stencil’s and Oedipa’s hermeneutic quests; this mode also compels interest for methodology and rhetoric, given the conventions for meaning-making and the limited alternatives. Unlike Lot 49’s plot and sequential discourse, the detective narrative of Stencil is only one interpretive option, as Molly Hite points out (Ideas of Order 48-9), for engaging V., a highly episodic novel; however, an exegetical treatment of the novel’s content identifies with this structural role as with Oedipa, “that logocentric critic for whom signifiers stand to be decoded in order to yield a precise meaning” (Hassan 88, my emphasis).

Moreover, selecting (however unconsciously) this role not only makes evident our filtering material progressively toward singular conclusion, using deduction in the rational dispositif; this perspective also regards inherent and observed connections as transversal relations across the narrative lines of the present-time story and the historical episodes. Indeed,
this inclusive view of the novel’s ostensibly disparate stories—Benny Profane and the “Whole Sick Crew” set in New York in 1956; international espionage across Europe and Africa, periodically during years 1898-1943—results by recognizing, as Seed articulates, that they “are linked by the search of one Herbert Stencil for a mysterious figure called V.” (*Labyrinths* 71).

By invoking these scholars, I mean not only to consider disciplinary conventions and these astute readings but as well to keep in mind the exegetical orientation that the novels entice. For example, in an early critical account of the obsessive “quest” (1971’s *City of Words*), Tony Tanner describes Stencil as the novel’s “key figure” (*Mindful Pleasures* 58), particularly given the mode of *inference*—proceeding with both “very little” and “far too much to go on, [because] he is bound to find clues everywhere” (58), like the novel’s hermeneutic reader. Indeed, Stencil articulates late in *V.* how “in this search the motive is part of the quarry” (Pynchon 415); this endeavor might be motivated by boredom and desire for intrigue, or “need[ing] a mystery, any sense of pursuit to keep an active metabolism” (415)\(^8\), very much like the characterization plot-propulsion of *Lot 49*. Just as Stencil’s inference-treatment of evidence into “cabals” (159), Oedipa’s investigating a myriad of signs, like the reader of iterations, illustrates how, in Hite’s terms, “the invitation to *play literary detective* is duplicitous. Too many clues turn out to be red herrings” (*Ideas* 49, my emphasis). More significantly, I would argue, is that the detective role in all three cases proceeds with investment in *discovery* and with inferential meaning-making of the series encountered, whether grouping *or* filtering toward conclusion.

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\(^8\) Parenthetical citations refer to the 1999 Harper Perennial Classics edition of *V.* (J. B. Lippincott 1963) and the 2006 Harper Perennial edition of *The Crying of Lot 49* (J. B. Lippincott 1966). Pagination differences can be remedied easily, one way, by consulting PynchonWiki.com <http://pynchonwiki.com/>. I have not consulted this resource extensively for this discussion; and yet, this instance indicates a secondary and reflexive concern of my project—academic research and writing in the electronic apparatus of searchable databases and digital books. Tangentially, my 2006 paperback of *Lot 49* has a detail that I view as incredulously as Oedipa Maas examining stamps and *The Courier’s Tragedy*: “Cover design by Aesthetic Apparatus” (yet, I have not investigated further).
The semiotic series that proliferate throughout the novels emphasize the prominence of the signifying regime in Pynchon’s composition as well as the components effectively counter-signifying for the detective role, seeking a singular truth or meaning to discover. First, the equivocal list of “V. symbols” and “V. words” (Hite 48, 53) includes identities—Queen Victoria, Victoria Wren, Vera Meroving, Veronica Manganese, Veronica (rat)—in addition to the anonymous V. agent; places, chiefly Valletta, “the V-Note” bar (55), and Venezuela or Vesuvius volcano, both possibly encoded “Vheissu” in one case (207); concepts referenced, including “virtū” (209), virginity and sacrifice (59 passim), and Vheissu, mythical place and/or “dream of annihilation” (217) and/or “symptom” (517). Granted, the narrative of Herbert Stencil does not include all of these variations; however, although “no one V-word encapsulates the significance of the letter V” (Hite 53), the signs tempt deductive conclusion by the detective reader who adopts Stencil’s desideratum—the kabbalist “truth” about the V. agent character (or characters) in the historical episodes and narrative of Stencil’s father.

In Lot 49, Pynchon creates the inverse situation for Oedipa and the structural role of “logocentric critic,” with meaning sought by interpreting relation among a heterogeneous set of signs: the estate and legacy of Pierce Inverarity; private couriers in Europe and the U.S. (77), the muted post-horn graphic graphic (38) and motto, “And Tacit lies the gold once-knotted horn” (58); the acronym “W.A.S.T.E.” (70); “the Tristero system” (31) and/or the signifier “Trystero” (58). This semiotic set extends in Oedipa’s vantage to include esoterica such as U.S. postal reform (143) and stamp forgeries (144), as well as the Jacobean revenge play, The Courier's Tragedy (48) and textual variants.

Further, the reader’s perspective incorporates references to multiple anarchist groups, in Russia and Mexico; the Holy Roman Empire, Protestants, and Calvinism; Germany history,
including the Thurn and Taxis postal company and prevalent Nazi elements, notably Buchenwald and Auschwitz (111-2); battles in the French Revolution, at Austerlitz, in the Civil War, in Turkey and Italy during World Wars I and II. In this view, the reader’s identification with Oedipa exceeds her detective role by applying her surname, “Maas”—with its foreign etymology of “web” or “net” (CL49.PynchonWiki.com)—and her metaphysical interpretation of the Remedios Varo painting “Bornando el Manto Terrestre” (“Embroidering the Earth’s Mantle”), insofar as “the tapestry was the world” with “no escape” (11).

The question becomes whether we seek a unifying sign (“Trystero”?) and meaning from this varied network, an arrangement recognizable in the narrator’s noting circuit-resembling streets (14), railroad tracks and freight cars, “a web of telephone wires” (149); a “secret” potentially deciphered by the “miracle of communication” (149) in linking signifiers with singular referent. The detective role is faced with meaning-making in view of proliferating series and assortment alike; further, it is not as though Pynchon’s works merely parody—the “mythic journey” in V. (Seed Labyrinths 87) and “the genre of quest narrative” (Hite Ideas 73) in Lot 49. Creating both parody and diegetic integrity (an irresolvable issue), Pynchon composes with and calls attention to perceptions, whether it is the signifying or counter-signifying regime encountered by the detective role.

The issue of how best to proceed must be considered given the meaning-obscuring qualities, as several critics have discussed about Lot 49 extensively—notably including John Johnston, Wail Hassan, and William Gleason. In addition to Hite’s cautionary observation about the signs Oedipa that “misses or discounts because she is on a quest” (Ideas 80), which entices

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9 The German “V-2 missiles” referenced off-handedly in Lot 49 (112) continue the series begun in V., with its character’s developing at Peenemunde the “Vergeltungswaffe Eins and Zwei” (241)—German for “vengeance weapon one and two” (PynchonWiki – Index Page “V.” <http://v.pynchonwiki.com/wiki/index.php?title=V>). This relation is not Stencil’s “The magic initial!” but an intrinsic link and acceleration toward Gravity’s Rainbow.
our seeking obscure or opaque connections (as in the prior paragraph), we must further question
the mode of detective search underway in the structural role. Specifically, as signs “are no less
uncertain for the reader” as for Oedipa (Johnston 52): in “Toward the Schizo-Text: Paranoia as
Semiotic Regime in The Crying of Lot 49,” Johnston observes that signs “proliferate with an
ambiguous, insistent, and even seductive logic” (50). “Seduced” thusly, like Stencil’s “paranoiac
mode of secret history” (McHale 91), the investigation proceeds as though the unknown is a
mystery to “solve,” rather than a problematic to engage, which motivates the search for Meaning
and Truth; a “paranoid” mode consists, in Johnston’s terms, of recognizing and interpreting
signs, given the detective’s presumption of and attribution of significance to signs not overtly
meaningful (“Schizo-Text” 73). Paranoia—literally “beyond, beside, or against” (para) the mind
(nous)—is integral (perhaps even against good sense?) to the hermeneutic search, considering
how Oedipa distinguishes signs personally significant, concerning “Trystero”; readers likewise
identify “meaningful” elements with reductive logic, excluding or incorporating details toward
an interpretive conclusion, whether “embroidering” or “sorting” (as in the diegesis of Lot 49).

In the paranoid mode, Oedipa interprets signs of Trystero, the muted post horn and
W.A.S.T.E., as the “‘clues’ that promise revelation” (Hassan 89). And yet, in Hassan’s view, the
novel—both its narrative and our experience with it—conveys “the failure of the positivism that
informs reading and interpretation in their effort to ‘make sense’ of the text” (“Not a Novel” 97).
After all, Oedipa switches investigations, from bone-charcoal cigarette filters (Lot 45-7) in the
executrix narrative to the more seductive mystery of “the Trystero thing” (63) that is related
coincidentally. While deductive readers approach the text as implying or suggesting the
disclosure of meaning or truth about either/both/any aspect, the inherent problem, William
Gleason points out, for the detective role is that the “central truth” might “ultimately be lost,
leaving only clues” (“Postmodern Labyrinths” 87). The “clues” operate by the signifying and counter-signifying regimes for both, the role dramatized when Oedipa—like Stencil in *V.*, with his father’s journal—researches a spoken reference in textual variants in paperbacks (61) and in footnotes (82), and in a simple example, when she wonders about an ostensible clue, “A cross? Or the initial T?” (71).

Readers receive at least minimal “satisfaction” of revelation by certifying any of the abundant references, through research, and especially by diegetic clarifications of signs such as *D.E.A.T.H.*, “Don’t Ever Antagonize the Horn” (98), *I.A.*, “Inamorati Anonymous” (91), and finally *W.A.S.T.E.*: “We Await Silent Tristero’s Empire,” printed on a stamp with the title “Tristero Rapid Post” (139). However, Pynchon evokes self-reflection: “You guys, you’re like Puritans about the Bible” (62), a character tells Oedipa and readers by extension (in plural address)—the “logocentric critic” expecting or even forging (a *forgery*)? unified and transcendental Meaning or Truth from a heterogeneous assemblage. Just as “Oedipa’s quest to make connections” motivates the plot (92), Gleason notes, so too can this narrative be described as exploring “rhizomatic labyrinths” (96), by the structural role of detective.

**“Irresolvable” Counter-series**

“You didn’t see the thing because you don’t know how to look. And you don’t know how to look because you don’t know the names.”

—Don DeLillo *Underworld* (540, my emphasis)

“Everyday things represent the most overlooked knowledge. These names are vital to your progress. Quotidian things. If they weren’t important, we wouldn’t use such a gorgeous Latinate word.”

(*Underworld* 542)

At this point in the process, Pynchon’s serial production using the signifying and counter-signifying regimes has created an impasse for the hermeneutic detective role—the structural position having “too much and too little to go on.” Indeed, “Truth depends on an encounter with something that forces us to think and to seek the truth” (*Proust and Signs* 14), Deleuze writes,
about Proust, in a salient text for this project hitherto unremarked. The “truth of the matter”
might be the end of the line for the detective, although we are just getting started. The structural
role of Stencil and of Oedipa conveys the position of “waiting for a symmetry of choices to
break down, to go skew” (Lot 150, my emphasis)—a temporal experience encountering the
series, lines, and transversals of the literary percepts and mixed-semiotic assemblage.

Of course, “the logocentric critic” does not yet work with or think in terms of
multiplicity, in that “Binary logic is the spirituality of the root-[book]” (Thousand Plateaus 5),
Deleuze and Guattari assert. This condition of the logophile accounts for this impasse in two
ways, beginning with “overlooked knowledge” in a sense other than the pure signal, Oedipa’s
lost “epileptic Word” (95). In order to produce a diagrammatic understanding of the generative
or transformative elements and to posit Pynchon’s work as a diegesis for invention, I briefly
discuss next what I recognize as the impediment to a productive encounter, toward an alternative
explored in the next chapter regarding Gravity’s Rainbow: escaping the false binary between
“Another mode of meaning behind the obvious, or none” (Lot 150) as well as the mistaken belief
in knowledge discovery as spatial trajectory and not temporal process. ¹⁰

The structural roles and textual elements as well as conventional scholarship assist to this
end; secondarily, I will attempt to use both to demonstrate the poetics of my inventive process.
First, just as V. and Lot 49 are described as “epistemological quest” or even “a detective story
[...] blown up to gargantuan proportions” (McHale 21), so too are the novels noted for the
particular condition or effect created, especially beginning in the middle period of Pynchon
scholarship (the 1980s): the irresolvable state of “dualities”—e.g. by the “proliferating

¹⁰ In this case having forgotten the fourth dimension in the product of artisanal praxis; like Pynchon’s detectives,
mistakenly seeking Alêtheia, truth that is revealed, rather than Léthê (Greek)—“forgetfulness,” “concealment,”
duplications” (Hite 66) of signs—and the uncertainty, an “inescapable” and “ultimate effect” of Pynchon’s writing (Cooper 174). Readers face “a margin of confusion or uncertainty” created by proliferation and multiplicity (Seed 115), not only at narratives’ ends but prevalent in both novels as well. The prominent theme in scholarship concerning the irresolvable meanings and the unknown (unknowable) mysteries aptly reflects the experience of reading, gesturing toward pragmatics in articulating the textual qualities thus. However, I am deliberately approaching a problematic, rather than a “puzzle” to solve (or abandon) by “singling up all lines” (Lot 20) in Pynchonian terms; the novels’ “irresolvable” qualities and their narrative endings, as well as the metaphysical orientation of conventional treatment in scholarship, all call this into relief.

The narrative trajectory of *V.* toward “discovery” and knowledge integrally relates both the condition of uncertainty and the critical approach that remains exegetical, while *transformative* elements identifiable in the novel and in *Lot 49* suggest an alternative: not only “meta-commentary on the human need for order,” as Kerry Grant remarks, but also providing a “degree of exhilaration it affords the reader who tunes in to its most postmodern frequencies” (*Companion to V.* xiv). In the detective narrative, Stencil seeks the singular truth behind (and semantically “over”) the myriad of *V.*-iterations, specifically the Kabbalist revelation of historical conspiracies, most especially his father’s death. Most reductively, there are “One of two conclusions,” Hite articulates: “Either the lady *V.* exists, in which case the Plot Which Has No Name dominates the fictional present, or the lady *V.* does not exists, and Stencil has hypothesized or even hallucinated relations between random events. In the first case, a repressive order manipulates events; in the second, apparent order veils real chaos” (47).

This artificial “symmetry of choices” motivates the plot toward confirming one option, specifically by the *voyage* toward truth, located some place. Just as the Epilogue recounts the
senior Stencil’s fated trip to Malta, so do Stencil and Profane travel there during the quest plot:

“But he stayed off Malta. He had pieces of thread: clues. Young Stencil has been in all her cities, chased her down till faulty memories or vanished buildings defeated him. All her cities but Valletta. His father died in Valletta. He tried to tell himself meeting V. and dying were separate and unconnected” [...]

“You are expecting to find this chick in Malta?” Profane said. “Or how your father died? Or something? Wha.” (V. 416)

The logocentric assumption of closure through *discovery*, or through *disclosure* of meaning, reveals the *spatial epistemology* dominant in this paradigm. As structural role, Stencil, traveling to Malta and then to Stockholm (487) tracing “clues,” demonstrates “our archaeological expectation that a ‘real’ reconstructible story or theme lies latent in the local intractabilities of the narrative,” in Kowaleski’s apt description (qtd. by Grant xii).

Although more subtle in its plot ending, the language of *Lot 49* regarding the “symmetry of choices” likewise underscores the spatial orientation toward truth/meaning for the detective role. Concerning the ostensible mystery discerned, Oedipa deduces four possibilities for interpreting the signs and narrative developments of her investigation: the W.A.S.T.E. system of postal communication exists; she is “hallucinating it” (141); the clues all reveal a conspiracy against and implicating her, designed by Pierce Inverarity; or, she is “fantasying some such plot” (141), in which case she is crazy—like marginalized characters Mucho Maas and Dr. Hilarius. Viewing these “symmetrical four” options, she mentions, but *does not interrogate*, that “Every access route to the Tristero could be traced also back to the Inverarity estate” (140, my emphasis). Moreover, after investigating articles and stamp forgeries (142-4), as the logocentric critic, Oedipa ultimately invests in the promise of revelation, as the detective who explores various localities of Southern California throughout the novel.

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11 The “paradigm” of *knowledge discovery*, by “voyaging” seeker; as earlier stated, this feature correlates with the Modern Episteme and Literate-Scientific Apparatus—manifesting in the *dispositif* of Reason, for Truth/meaning.
Like Stencil’s seeking knowledge about V. on Malta, Oedipa as the voyager role assumes discovery of evidence, some confirmation one way or other—indeed seeking “her target, her enemy, perhaps her proof” (152). Like the tower and mantle of Varos’s painting and the lake-submerged bones, this final location of the auction-house room, the culminating position but interminable path, conveys Oedipa’s spatial epistemology toward truth or meaning. Specifically, such a view of the unknown mystery extends the x-variable of Tristero and dispossession throughout “her Republic” (148): from Kinneret-Among-The-Pines, Berkeley, and Orange County (California), South to Mexico City, perhaps East to Cornell (Ithaca); certainly Northeast to the “Low Countries” around the Meuse (“Maas”?) river, then South to Italy, toward the Vatican and Lago di Pietà, and onward boundlessly.

Unlike the diegesis of V., in which the text privileges spatially-located truth by the final chapter and Epilogue in Valetta (Malta), the narrative discourse of Lot 49 proliferates with signifying and counter-signifying series without conclusive truth or meaning in either regime. Ending with the absence of appearance by the “mysterious bidder [who] may be from Tristero” (145), the plot’s terminus drives the hermeneutic detective to interpretive impasse or even “full circle into some paranoia” (151)—truth not only deferred but forestalled, a final position like V. and Stencil Sr. dying on Malta, and Oedipa sitting in the locked auction-house room. Thus far, I have been “mapping” the diagrammatic components of these novels, in order to “chart” the regimes encountered and to convey the experience of thinking hermeneutically as well as writing

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12 Author of The Locked Room, Paul Auster dramatizes the condition for writer and critic alike, providing structural portrait in Oracle Night: “I opened the notebook, and when I glanced down at the page in front of me, I realized that I was lost, that I didn’t know what I was doing anymore. I had put Bowen into the room. I had locked the door and turned out the light, and now I didn’t have the faintest idea of how to get him out of there. Dozens of solutions sprang to mind, but they all seemed trite, mechanical, dull. Trapping Nick in the underground bomb shelter was a compelling idea to me—both terrifying and mysterious, beyond all rational explanation—and I didn’t want to let go of it. But once I’d pushed the story in that direction, I had diverged from the original premise of the exercise.” (108)
partly in the aesthetic paradigm; although belaboring the former, the disciplinary conventions help identify generative or transformative elements toward the latter, still yet reached.

Two final points work to this end, aided first by Pynchon’s textual lesson—not a “theme” or logic—of entropy: the concept in Thermodynamics and Information Theory is only ostensibly similar (Lot 85-7) in the legible formulas. Besides demonstrating an “irresolvable” condition, this fact subverts the signifying regime, which does not produce a Kabbalist Truth or Meaning of “dispossession.” For instance, just as Stencil remarks that “V.’s is a country of coincidence, ruled by a ministry of myth” (V. 485), so too does Oedipa recognize “The dead man [Inverarity], like Maxwell's Demon, was the linking feature in a coincidence” (Lot 98, my emphasis). And yet both detective characters, like exegetical critics, mistake a different logic for the absence of sense; moreover, denotative language emerges as the (only?) solution to “overlooked knowledge,” as in the earlier-cited passage from DeLillo. This recourse is evident even in highly apt descriptions of Pynchon’s mixed-semiotic compositions, as in Hite’s “pluralistic” conception of “multiple” and “conflicting ideas of order” (10); and when, similarly, Gleason notes, “The irresolvability of Lot 49’s polar oppositions enforces uncertainty; multiple possibility displaces binary order” (93). Despite an affinity, I hesitate to translate the novel this way to the level of denotation. Rather, in pragmatics-constructivism, the aesthetic logic encountered in the novels catalyzes and enables new work, as I have posited.

We must keep in mind that entropy, in this example, is an actual scientific concept—used as signifier-reference by Pynchon and as a heuristic by literary critics. For example, Stephen P. Schuber surveys “entropic” readings in “Rereading Pynchon: Negative Entropy and ‘Entropy’,” Pynchon Notes 13 (Oct. 1983). Whether coincidence or confirmation bias, 1983 was “A very good year for Pynchon criticism, with two excellent books and a strong book-length collection of original essays on this writer who lends himself to academic study” (313), Jerome Klinkowitz asserts in American Literary Scholarship: An Annual / 1983—a text I selected from a discard pile given the coincidence of my birth year. Also citing Cooper's Signs and Symptoms and Approaches to Gravity's Rainbow, Klinkowitz notably articulates a persistent scholarly view discussing Hite’s work: these novels “experiment with ordering devices themselves; by contrasting

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legible coincidence and the concurrent knowledge overlooked reminds that there are other series at work: “focalization” via the detective-role characters ignores the “parallel” lines or contrapuntal relation of generative elements. In my view, this accounts for the limited conception, as in the “symmetrical choices,” and limited innovation beyond observations of “uncertainty.” The second lesson connects with the first this way, and it potentially remedies the type of critical treatment that further classifies or mystifies literature with the dispositif of reason.

For example, like Hite, McHale regards both the ending of V. and the unresolved “possibilities” in Lot 49 as leaving “epistemological skepticism […] suspended, finally unresolved” (22): he claims, “Oedipa does not break through the closed circle of her solipsism in the pages of this novel; nor does Pynchon break through here to a mode of fiction beyond modernism and its epistemological premises” (24)—only accomplishing an ontological orientation in Gravity’s Rainbow (25). Describing the effect of V., how “we are left not with an ontological projection but an epistemological puzzle” (68), McHale notes diegetic “solutions” epistemological and ontological (24); these might pertain equally to the mythical land of Vheissu as to the conspiracy or dispossessed-Republic of Tristero. However, substituting a metaphysical “grounding” in space (world or being) for a problematic of the unknown remains inert toward new knowledge, as in the detective roles: truth lost at sea or on Malta, and revelation deferred in the locked room. Stalled for now in the discovery process, the project’s present progress in the detective model pauses in order to review the methodology further, as well as several attempts in recent scholarship, before continuing toward invention progressively in subsequent chapters.

Deleuzean Method for Literary Pragmatics (Scholarship Lessons)

The goal of invention through encounters motivates the scholarly genre of methodology

eXternal authority with internal chaos, Pynchon ‘generates a myth of origins for both freedom and language’, which he then plays against reader expectations to show how meanings often create themselves” (313, my emphasis).
that I am developing; beyond identifying principles for method, part of my study tests whether pragmatics reading is beneficial toward invention, and thus whether similarly recognizing percepts, affects, and sensations in literary compositions enables new thinking or expression. An additional rationale in describing how Deleuze works in productive fashion with literature concerns the issue of disciplinary conventions, particularly the use of Deleuzean philosophy—as with theory generally—as a perspective and vocabulary for analysis. Generally, the objective of constructivism clarifies and refocuses the activity of aesthetic encounters toward creative practice, rather than denotative or descriptive discourse. More specifically, Deleuze’s work provides example and poetics for artisanal practices using the aesthetic paradigm, something remarkably few scholars have discerned or articulated thoroughly. Working in the Humanities, this discussion of “applied theory” directly involves and contributes to the disciplinary endeavors of both rhetoric and literary studies, particularly with these artistic and cultural mediators.

In the prior two decades, the proliferation of scholarship treating the philosophy of Deleuze in relation to cultural forms has demonstrated that the methodological question is hardly resolved, univocal, or thoroughly engaged. Indeed, on the contrary, a variety of perspectives and approaches have emerged among Humanities and Cultural Studies scholars. One type of work attempts to treat cultural objects “as Deleuze might,” with his implicit approach directly guiding the “procedure”—reading literature for new results, as he does in *Proust and Signs, Kafka, A Thousand Plateaus*, and *Essays Critical and Clinical*. A different point of departure follows Deleuze’s axiom, “Experiment, never interpret” (*Dialogues* 48): privileging novelty, variations and even divergences motivate a new approach, not anchored to Deleuze’s actual procedures but licensed to “work like” Deleuze more creatively.
The continued scholarship connecting Deleuze and cultural-aesthetic works compels consideration of this focus, especially given that scholars undertake a certain problematic when working with concepts and perspectives pertaining to literature specifically. Although ambitious efforts to “work with” Deleuzean ideas, several texts show the results of overlooking or disregarding this perspective of the problematic, such as works by Hughes, Zamberlin, Monaco, and Bourassa. Indeed, applying philosophical terms of deterritorialization or of percepts and affects when analyzing literature requires focusing upon the unique conditions or qualities addressed, I contend. In the case of aesthetic composition, the question of expression as sensation and its functions or effects inheres: as I have proposed, following scholars like O’Sullivan, the potential consequently emerges for our encountering asignifying forces and responding in the productive fashion of philosophical constructivism.

The earlier discussion of Deleuze’s literary mediators and his “readings” calls attention to the problematic, as explained in the prior chapter, that consists of his theorizations as well as the conditions of the dispositif upon philosophical discourse. More apparent, the scholarly collection Deleuze and Literature (2000) names indirectly the new apparatus of modern literature and contemporary philosophy, the episteme in which Deleuze’s constructivist method proceeds from his encounters with sensations in aesthetic composition. To reiterate, I am drawing attention to epistemological-discursive conditions perhaps overlooked (“given,” “unthought”). One

14 John Hughes, Lines of Flight Reading Deleuze with Hardy, Gissing, Conrad, Woolf (Continuum, 1997); Mary F. Zamberlin, Rhizosphere: Gilles Deleuze and the “Minor” American Writings of William James, W.E.B. Du Bois, Gertrude Stein, Jean Toomer, and William Faulkner (Routledge, 2006); Beatrice Monaco, Machinic Modernism: The Deleuzian Literary Machines of Woolf, Lawrence and Joyce (Palgrave Macmillan, 2008); Alan Bourassa, Deleuze and American Literature: Affect and Virtuality in Faulkner, Wharton, Ellison, and McCarthy (Macmillan, 2009). These texts are representative examples of using Deleuze mostly as an interpretive vocabulary.
additional benefit, albeit idealistic, is that focusing on method eschews the question of “orthodoxy” in favor of identifying an apt and feasible practice derived from Deleuze.

While the contributors to *Deleuze and Literature* (2000) generally reflect the positions staked as disciplinary treatment, five respective views express the intent of my latter point, how to relate Deleuzean philosophy and literature toward the aim of inventive outcomes. Drawing upon the transcendental empiricism that Deleuze explicates in *Difference & Repetition*, André Pierre Colombat reiterates the practice of producing concepts through encounters with signs and forces (*Deleuze and Literature* 29). With apt parlance, Bruce Baugh articulates “a revolutionary pragmatics” (34), a promising way for experimental work with literature in the fashion of Deleuze. A variation of this approach is Tom Conley’s regarding literature as precisely the difference, “the domain of comparative styles,” that serves to philosophers as generative “practice” (263)—aesthetic style both encountered and potentially emulated. T. Hugh Crawford similarly presents a perspective of Deleuze focused not on interpretation but on poetics, in that “literature is a source for his philosophical concepts and mode of argumentation” (56). The reciprocity in this dynamic is not hermeneutic but generative of novel types of thought, given how “literature functions with and plugs into the larger desiring machine he calls philosophy” (Crawford 56). Finally, another sense of the relation between philosophy and literature can be understood according to John Marks as *entretien*, “which literally means ‘conversation’ or ‘discussion’ but also indicates that which is ‘between’, an interrelational space” (80).

With a limited scope, Marks’ theoretical configuration provides a practical way for scholars to work toward philosophical and literary insights, as demonstrated in recent work such as Monaco’s and Bourassa’s texts. However, scholarship like these entails considerable effort in “the *entretien*” toward descriptive discourse—effort that makes difficult other results, such as
invention, as I am demonstrating first-hand. This prevalent critical-rhetorical strategy underscores the necessity of orienting deliberately and aptly one’s point of departure: thus my reviewing and the utility of these other stances from *Deleuze and Literature* (2000), older stances perhaps neglected or forgotten—ones even preceding this publication, such as Lambert’s “Deleuzian Critique of Pure Fiction,” Marks’ *Vitalism and Multiplicity*, and Colombat’s “Deleuze and the Three Powers of Literature.”\(^{15}\) Indeed, the perspectives of “Deleuzean method” articulated by Baugh and Conley appear markedly in the discursive procedure by Jon Clay in his recent book *Sensation, Contemporary Poetry and Deleuze* (2010).

In the terms of Lecercle and Alliez discussed in chapter two, both Bourassa and Clay undertake the problem of Deleuzean aesthetic theory as an encounter with expressions of forces, particularly deterritorialization as literary function and effect; however, they vary in their work as *entretien* and as constructivist pragmatics. Among relevant scholarship, Clay’s and Bourassa’s texts apply most directly to my study, whether in topical or methodological terms; when including these works in my discussion, I intend to illustrate the respective ways of working with literature in the style of Deleuze, in order to highlight the effectiveness of discursive choices regarding scholars’ objects of study.

**Pragmatics—Literary Percepts**

In the hopes of avoiding and clarifying the convolution of compound scholarly work, “Deleuze and Literature” as a problematic, the next two sections present a pragmatics treatment of salient topics in the context of literary mediators toward constructivism: I explicate the philosophical term from Deleuze, literary examples encountered, and the potential lesson for

\(^{15}\) These are important early contributions, all still compelling for scholars to consider, I contend: Gregg Lambert, “The Deleuzian Critique of Pure Fiction” (*SubStance* 26.3 1997); John Marks, *Vitalism and Multiplicity* (Pluto Press 1998); Colombat, “Deleuze and the Three Powers of Literature and Philosophy: To Demystify, to Experiment, to Create” in *A Deleuzian Century?* Ed. Buchanan (Duke UP, 1999).
constructivism consequently derived. Also, to be clear: for now, I separately discuss percepts, affects, and sensations; henceforth beginning with the next chapter, I more suitably treat fiction within the framework of the plane of composition and the aesthetic figures of literature, those elements that function as “the relations of counterpoint” and “the compounds of sensations” (What is Philosophy? 188). To elucidate and make viable Deleuze’s instructive results is the aim of this systematic discussion, one more nuanced than the earlier sections—with delay of the project’s progression also serving to demonstrate an important constituent aspect of the “pragmatics-constructivist” approach.

Earlier in the chapter, I described Deleuze’s pragmatics regarding the intensive use of language in literature, particularly the post-signifying logic and expression by Borges, Melville, and Beckett. This relation between aesthetic composition and his work extends further to the notable case of literary percepts, introduced in the prior chapter. In both Essays Critical and Clinical and What is Philosophy?, Deleuze remarks upon the sensible forces composed by Proust, Melville, and Woolf; this notion generally evokes “the definition of the percept itself—to make perceptible the imperceptible forces that populate the world” (WP 182). Beyond this general idea, the specific literary cases encountered serve to illustrate obliquely the particular or contingent role for Deleuze’s invention. On the one hand, descriptions of Melville’s “oceanic percepts” and Woolf’s “urban percepts” (WP 169) are exceedingly specific; likewise, Proust’s aesthetic composition of temporal forces is too significant to Deleuze’s thought to be treated briefly—indeed, this encountered percept appears throughout the duration of my project.

The creation of landscape percepts by Tolstoy, Chekov, and Faulkner (WP 169) is a promising example, and yet one that is not respective to literature, applied analogously from Cézanne. This is characteristic of Deleuze’s discourse, though, with visual description indicating
how thought is image within the aesthetic plane and new apparatus. For instance, subsequently referencing T.E. Lawrence, Proust, and Melville, Deleuze asserts that “The finest writers have singular conditions of perception that allow them to draw on or shape aesthetic percepts like veritable visions, even if they return from them with red eyes” (ECC 116). In this way, Deleuze’s work instructs how to think this way, to consider by adjusting our focus upon aesthetic concepts.

This is not to insist an understanding of percepts as being visual, the narrow or literal extension of perception, however: while these examples are markedly optical (ocular)—percepts “telescopic or microscopic” (WP 171)—even with shifting or conflated sensibilia, the perceptual qualities accentuate the aesthetic mode of thought. Continuing with the earlier-cited essay on Melville, Deleuze extols “the affirmation of a world in process” (ECC 86) evident in American literature with its fragmentary features; he explains, “This requires a new perspective, an archipelago-perspectivism that conjugates the panoramic shot & the tracking shot” (ECC 87).

Although difficulty to recognize this case as a particular percept, Deleuze here provides a distinct principle of his aesthetic logic, encountered in literature. The cinematic description is an interface for thought, akin to the ones offered by architecture, painting, and music: in What is Philosophy?, the auditory percepts of counterpoint, polyphony, and refrain feature prominently in the description of deterritorialization (187-8), fashioning this concept distinctly within the aesthetic paradigm. Generally discussing literature, Deleuze and Guattari remark, “What matters is not, as in bad novels, the opinions held by characters in accordance with their social type and characteristics but rather the relations of counterpoint into which they enter” (WP 188).

In this case, distinct from “the compounds of sensations” composed, counterpoint in literary works is a percept that Deleuze and Guattari recognize through pragmatics. In their discussing the deframing operation of Art, deterritorialization that occurs within the aesthetic
apparatus, they discern in Dostoyevsky “the coexistence of contrapuntal, polyphonic, and plurivocal compounds with an architectonic or symphonic plane of composition” (WP 188, my emphasis). This description emphasizes precisely how novelists—Dostoyevsky, Dos Passos, and Proust notably for Deleuze and Guattari—render sensible the imperceptible forces as percepts, “legible” in literature and thus enabling intelligibility. Moreover, beyond stating any denotation or signification, such descriptions express the aesthetic mode and its “deframing” vector for thought. For example, Deleuze and Guattari posit, “Dos Passos achieves an extraordinary art of counterpoint in the compounds he forms with characters, current events, biographies, and camera eyes, at the same time as a plane of composition is expanded to infinity so as to sweep everything up into Life, into Death, the town cosmos” (WP 188).

Keeping in mind in the contingent quality of “chance” encounters, methodological lessons can be extrapolated concerning these percepts of archipelago-perspectivism and counterpoint, with aesthetic composition enabling and mediating philosophical concepts. First, as evident in the earlier discussions, percepts change the conditions for possible perspectives: no longer is thought confined to either subjectivism or objectivism, fundamentally—thus Deleuze’s new theorizations about Leibniz, Kant, and Barkeley through Borges, Beckett, and other writers. Like literary characters who have “passed into the landscape” of sensation (WP 169), concepts too can be infused with dynamic forces and effects, as with the rhythm and melody of counterpoint. The aesthetic mode of thinking appears patently in the pragmatics readings of Dostoyevsky and Dos Passos; moreover, this encounter finds in literary composition the means of duration, how percepts “wrested from” particular perceptions are preserved in artistic material. By understanding the percept as aesthetic thought generally, with particular artistic compositions, the categories of viewpoint-landscapes and characters appear as means of making
sensible the forces observed. This case of language offers promising means for scholarly constructivism, using percepts to create and mediate the heterogeneous components of a concept; in this way, thought itself is characterized in its non-totalizing consistency across fragments—a crucial principle developed henceforth in my study of Deleuze’s pragmatics-constructivism.

A second question for method concerning archipelago-perspectivism and counterpoint emerges concerning the “product” of artisanal practice contingent upon distinctly literary expression of sensible-intelligible forces. One account for Deleuze’s thought is the free indirect style that he encounters in literature, with instances appearing throughout his oeuvre. In Vitalism and Multiplicity, John Marks proposes, “Deleuze’s ‘deconstructive’ method is best considered as a project of ‘free indirect discourse’. Deleuze seeks to work with other thinkers and artists so that his own voice and the voice of the author become indistinct. In this way, he institutes a zone of indiscernibility between himself and the authors with whom he works” (25). Foregoing a comprehensive review of Deleuze’s mediators in this regard, for the sake of focusing upon method, the topic of free indirect style in the context of pragmatics directly reflects aesthetic thinking, a literary mode fashioned through non-signifying language use and applied in concept creation and description. The percept, perception without subjective perceiver, of counterpoint in Deleuze’s reading of Dostoyevsky and Dos Passos might be considered this way, akin to this type of discourse, evident in the phrase and notion symphonic plane of composition. The “musical” and “cinematic” quality of their work is probably understood more clearly through the synonymous term “melodic landscape” (WP 176), which evokes the non-fixed perspectivism of free indirect style in literature.

This type of discourse shows potential for artisanal practice in creative scholarship: evident in both Deleuze’s literary mediators and his philosophical concepts, free indirect style is
a technique native to the aesthetic paradigm, coextensive with modern literary theory and scholarship on Modernist literature. However promising, we must caution not to skew the “conversation,” Marks’ term entretien, between literature and philosophy toward hermeneutic ends one way or another. For instance, as Marks later asserts: “Deleuze and Guattari might have extended Bakhtin’s analysis to a contemporary ‘postmodern’ novel such as Don DeLillo’s Libra (1998). DeLillo explores the polyphonic aspects of narration, and also the free indirect discourse of conspiracy, information and ideology” (Vitalism and Multiplicity 106). Learning from the cases of Deleuze’s readings, noted prior, and applying the insights of pragmatics would mean inventing (or at least innovating) ideas in scholarly discourse using the free indirect style encountered in DeLillo’s novel by Marks, percepts that enable aesthetic thought, like archipelago-perspectivism and counterpoint. In other words, as I have established, literary discourse—especially countersignifying or postsignifying regimes of language—can be “the means” (as catalyst and mediator) for invention in a new paradigm, rather than strictly the object of analysis within a “Deleuzean reading,” interpreting the novel using his terms toward an “end” goal of description or signification.

A final, composite point about literary percepts, important to remember, is that the language that preserves perceptions and renders forces sensible also expresses the forces observed or experienced, however “subject-less” the position in the aesthetic composition. An instance of a literally post-signifying use of language would be the preservation—the duration of percepts, affects, and sensations—in the aesthetic monument beyond strictly

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16 In Narrative fiction: Contemporary Poetics (Routledge, 2002), the update to her 1983 study, Shlomith Rimmon-Kenan explains the treatment of free indirect discourse in scholarship: “Although the study of this phenomenon received a special impetus in the last ten years, there are earlier descriptions which should be mentioned. […] In France it was called ‘style indirect libre’ and studied mainly by Bally (1912) and Lips (1926). Ullman (1957) was the first to introduce the term ‘free indirect style’ into English criticism. […]” (163-4).
communicating (whether locutionary or narrative) or representing (mimetically) the perceptions or affections undergone directly or indirectly. In Deleuze’s terms, the melodic landscape “in the absence of man” (WP 169) clarifies this process: percepts and affects endure within aesthetic composition by the work of artists through their material and technique, whether from their encounters or their “creative fabulation” (WP 169). Although free indirect style functions this way, akin to archipelago-perspectivism and counterpoint, the “psychology” of a work must be revised, as the latter terms remind, from the literate-rational paradigm to the aesthetic paradigm. The “novelist goes beyond the perceptual states and affective transitions of the lived,” Deleuze and Guattari assert (WP 171); this occurs precisely through the composition, preservation, and expression of the aesthetic monument, literature, by authors’ conveying through post-signifying or “intensive” language the percepts that separate from cognitive perception. At the risk of understating this point by glossing the topic, the lesson for artisanal practice is to think and work in the aesthetic mode using techniques “cinematic” or “musical,” as Deleuze has.

**Pragmatics—Literary Affects**

Rich concepts with which to think, such as the melodic landscape, indeed reflect his encounters and constructivism with literary percepts and unique modes of discourse; however, we must be careful not to overestimate a “non-subject” prospect—as when Marks writes, “Literature is characterised by ‘the force of the impersonal’, freeing us from the first and second person” (Vitalism 125). I have emphasized thus far that writers render sensible, and potentially intelligible, the forces that they perceive and experience, by their aesthetic means like

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17 In this section I reference extensively, Deleuze and Guattari elaborate this conception of the aesthetic monument that persists and mediates the percepts and affects beyond single subjectivity, (although not “impersonal” meaning non-personal). For instance, with parlance and points that likely give rise to much misinterpretation they posit that phenomenology must become the phenomenology of art because the immanence of the lived to a transcendent subject must be expressed in transcendent functions that not only determine experience in general but traverse the lived itself here and now, and are embodied in it by constituting lived sensations” (178, my emphases).
perspective and characters. While the latter part of Marks’ statement pertains to work with percepts through pragmatics and encounters, the focus and privileging of “the force of the impersonal” relates more to Deleuze and Guattari’s theorization of affects—a particularly difficult conception or framework for scholars, as indicated in much scholarship on literature, film, and cultural studies. Toward developing this methodology (study of method) and identifying “workable” principles, I will review and clarify the topic of literary affects, in order to conclude with lessons for artisanal practice with literary mediators.

In the context of aesthetic composition, rather than a socio-biological perspective, a key designation by Deleuze and Guattari principally frames our understanding: “in relation to the percepts or visions they give us, artists are presenters of affects, the inventors and creators of affects. They not only create them in their work, they give them to us and make us become with them, they draw us into the compound” (WP 175, my emphasis). Like with percepts, writers compose the material that preserves, with duration, the relational sensations observed or invented through aesthetic figures, such as characters. In the particular case of affects, instances of going “beyond affections” consist “not [in] the passage from one lived state to another but [in] man’s nonhuman becoming” (WP 173); along with the term “becoming,” this language likely gives rise to scholars’ misunderstanding or misuse, which is potentially compounded by the discussion of literary characters in this context.18

18 Without digressing to review thoroughly the trend (or trace the lineage) in scholarship, a cautionary point in this regard appears in the overwhelming prevalence of references that cite passages in A Thousand Plateaus, particularly chapter 10 “1730: Becoming-Intense, Becoming-Animal, Becoming-Imperceptible…” and use the terms “becoming-woman” and “becoming-animal” far out of proportion or even relation to their original context. As in numerous journal articles, unceasingly, these terms are used narrowly for literary analyses, as seen in texts as Bourassa’s e.g. “becoming-wolf” in Cormac McCarthy. Part of my goal in this discussion is remedying the limited use of Deleuzean vocabulary and method toward productive ends, upon our encountering affects in literature and cultural works generally. To this end, and demonstrating methodological coherence, I examine points specifically concerning art in What is Philosophy?, rather than evoking and resorting to the “universal” scope of A Thousand Plateaus—in which aesthetic examples illustrate the ontological theses by Deleuze and Guattari.
First, a “becoming” names a “zone of indetermination” or indiscernibility between two beings: neither “imitation” nor “identification,” “becoming is an extreme contiguity within a coupling of two sensations without resemblance, or, on contrary, in the distance of a light that captures both of them in a single reflection” (WP 173, my emphasis). Although occurring in the natural world, this dynamic can be created by artists within the virtual ontology (“real without being actual”) of aesthetic composition; that we can encounter in literature such affects previously “unknown or unrecognized” makes possible new effects and responses, whether epistemological at minimum or constructivist in best cases. I say “best cases” on the empirical premise of Deleuze and Guattari’s view, as when they articulate that “The artist is always adding new varieties to the world”; moreover, “Beings of sensation are varieties, just as the concept’s beings are variations, and the function’s beings are variables” (WP 175).

Understanding the notions of affect and “becoming” in this sense of varieties, we can better recognize artists as inventors and creators in their composing aesthetic expressions of sensation. In pragmatics, literary techniques can be discerned this way, initially; for example, Deleuze and Guattari extol “Kleist [as] no doubt the author who most wrote with affects, using them like stones or weapons, seizing them in becomings of sudden petrification or infinite acceleration” (WP 169). Like their references to Melville and André Dhotel, one way Kleist composes in this fashion is through his use of characters. As nothing in Deleuze and Guattari’s discussion suggests that all authors’ characters convey affects—becomings, indiscernibility, sensation—beyond psycho-social affections, we might regard a special case of intensive use, in the earlier parlance, in which certain characters and dynamics exceed the signification of moral-psychological opinions or consciousness (WP 188).
Indeed, they posit, “A great novelist is above all an artist who invents unknown or unrecognized affects and brings them to light as the becoming of his characters” (WP 174)—a view enabled by their pragmatics of literature, unlike critics’ attempting “what psychoanalysis does,” analyzing (or diagnosing) characters. Just as this criterion conveys the aesthetic principle of going beyond affections to preserve affects, so too does such composition add ontic (if virtual) varieties of sensation invented—as in works by Chrétien de Troyes, Mme. de Lafayette, Zola, Proust, Beckett, and Faulkner (174-5). More helpful are illustrative instances, like Proust’s descriptions of jealousy: “When Emily Bronte traces the bond between Heathcliff and Catherine, she invents a violent affect, like a kinship between two wolves, which above all should not be mistaken for love” (175, my emphasis). This comprehension of affect within the context aesthetic composition, particularly the pragmatics of characters as intensive figures, resolves a question and misapplication of disciplinary efforts.

Returning to the problematic “Deleuze and literature” earlier evoked and how best to work, the implications compel reconsideration of the entretien approach that John Marks describes: discovering “impersonal forces” in novels, positioned “in-between” both, “A literary reading of this sort should also aim to provide new ways of activating and evaluating concepts used by Deleuze, to put these concepts into a new kind of motion” (Deleuze and Literature 81). Although promising in an ideal sense, this approach is complicated in practice in terms of producing innovative scholarship (“concept variation”) using rather than about literature (“sensation varieties”)—especially regarding the Deleuzean treatment of aesthetic affect.

To this end, descriptive scholarship analyzing cultural works using the philosophical vocabulary or concepts of Deleuze and Guattari might entail limited potential for or practice of invention. A recent illustration of this entretien effort—and an instructive example regarding my
work with literature—is *Deleuze and American Literature* (2009), in which Alan Bourassa examines the philosophical concepts of “the human” and “the nonhuman” *vis-à-vis* an extended theorization of aesthetic character. Through analyses of ten American novels and their “defining features of the novelistic character” (24), Bourassa proposes a new taxonomy that transitions from six qualities of “the human” manifest in fiction—“emotion, interiority, individuality, experience, potential, and meaning” (23)—toward an understanding of “the nonhuman” as a problem characterized by Deleuzean concepts: Affect, the Event, Force, Singularity, the Outside, and *the Virtual* (24-38).

A key lesson for method in the context of my present discussion appears in Bourassa’s prevalent attention to affect in novels. Specifically, he analyzes characters in taxonomical fashion: Lily Bart, in Edith Wharton’s *The House of Mirth*, exhibits active and passive types (48); the “Becoming-Temporal” of Quentin in Faulkner’s *Absalom, Absalom!* (166), and Billy Parham as “Becoming-Wolf” in Cormac McCarthy’s *The Crossing* (110); Ralph Ellison’s narrator-character in *Invisible Man*, with the novel’s “conjunction of history-affect-race” and three “affective movements” (67-8). This work perhaps indicates Bourassa’s beginning with a perspective of pragmatics, as when he notes, “It would be the work of a book-length study to map out all of the affective movements of *Invisible Man*, so I will restrict myself to three: what I will call the affective movement of sensation and energy, the history of invisibility, and the transformation of class to mass” (68, my emphasis). Such laborious effort analyzing characters this way shows not only the limitation of descriptive discourse, as I mentioned earlier, regarding innovation but also the hazard of restricting pragmatics to (just another) typology.

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19 Deleuze scholars will immediately recognize that these concepts are not contingent to literature or native to the aesthetic plane of composition, thus my describing this as demonstrating Marks’ *entretien*. Overall, Bourassa attempts to use these terms as the means for new insights about both literature and “the nonhuman”—specifically by linking to manifestations in the novels, mostly in the form of characters as representations.
Instead, the method I advocate begins by recognizing the generative or transformative components encountered, like affects for Bourassa, and then creating new ideas by means of literary elements—most especially those in counter- and post-signifying regimes. In the model of Deleuze and Guattari, intensive language and aesthetic affects composed are the latter type, as O’Sullivan reminds: “Affects then are not to do with signification or ‘meaning’ as such. Indeed, they occur on a different, asignifying register” (Art Encounters 43). Literary scholarship performing “applied theory,” such as Bourassa’s—who seeks to produce a new understanding, if not a new concept, of “the nonhuman”—involves the vital importance of method, the need to proceed deliberately and suitably if one’s goal is constructivist rather than hermeneutic.

This understanding of affects pertaining to characters is crucial for proceeding through pragmatics, distinguishing signifying and post-signifying elements of literature, toward constructivism from encounters. In other words, the approach refrains from “encoding” these aesthetic figures of sensation into the signifying regime, as though mimetic; likewise, from using Deleuzean vocabulary for analyses of characters as psycho-social persons in strictly descriptive (or worse, “clinical diagnostic”) discourse. Works composed through intensive language—rather than the style in “bad novels,” as referenced earlier—thus fashion characters as aesthetic figures of sensation: rather than psychology or opinions of the social figures composed, new varieties of percepts, such as counterpoint, and of affects, as in dynamics of intensity (“becomings,” indiscernibility).

20 On the one hand, O’Sullivan “differentiates art from language” on the basis of the asignifying register, such as affects—a questionable distinction to make rigidly, further complicated by stating “From a deconstructive perspective it might be argued that ‘affects’ are only ‘meaningful’ ‘within’ language” (43). Yet, as I am advocating throughout, this is reconciled by a qualitative view of “intensive use” in aesthetic composition versus communication. Ultimately O’Sullivan demonstrates the alternative-seeking position fundamentally compelled by Deleuze and Guattari, rather than zealously aligning with binary positions, by qualifying aesthetic affects; he also remarks that “we have an affective relationship with writing – as Deleuze often reminds us” (43).
“It is in this way that, from one writer to another, great creative affects can link up or diverge, within compounds of sensations that transform themselves, *vibrate, couple, or split apart,*” Deleuze and Guattari assert; furthermore, “it is these beings of sensation that account for the artist’s relationship with a public, for the relation between different works by the same artist, or even for a possible affinity between artists” (175, my emphasis). Besides clarifying the uncertain or equivocal approaches of literary scholarship, this compound quote provides two lessons for a method of pragmatics and constructivism. First, we encounter and recognize, without capturing (by “encoding”), the post-signifying affects—intense instances of vibrating, coupling, splitting, experiencing jealousy or violence or otherwise—created and expressed by writers through characters; consequently, we might innovate thought in the aesthetic paradigm and invent new concepts through these “unknown or unrecognized” forces.21

**Encountering Sensation and Deframing Style**

Whether individually or with Guattari, Deleuze works with—rather than “works on”—aesthetic compositions and literary mediators that consist of and express sensations. Whether the forces composed in percepts and affects can be recognized in any art work, as the myriad examples might suggest, or only in certain forms is less a concern for method; admittedly, one might equally argue that Deleuze perceives forces in his idiosyncratic way across objects of study, as well that he selectively discusses works of personal import. Rather than contest these matters, inconsequential except for debates of orthodoxy, a position that follows Deleuze feasibly in practice regards pragmatics as the perspective for discerning types of regimes with respective forces and selects for literary mediators those works that affect thought—catalysts and

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21 Important to note here is a key distinction by Deleuze and Guattari: characters are *aesthetic figures*, which express sensations and “sensory becoming” (*plane of composition*, Art); these are not the “conceptual becoming” expressed by *conceptual personae* in concepts (Philosophy). They write, “Conceptual becoming is heterogeneity grasped in an absolute form; sensory becoming is otherness caught in a matter of expression” (177)—an important distinction relevant to the prospects for artisanal practice in knowledge discourses (scholarship or theory, if not philosophy).
means for invention from encounters, rather than objects selected for analysis. Working this way
undertakes the “revolutionary pragmatics” that Bruce Baugh describes, regarding Deleuze’s
procedure: “An experimental approach is thus innovative, results-oriented (pragmatic) and
experiential (empirical), […] new in ways that could not have been predicted or determined in
advance […] in order to discover what effects can be produced” (Deleuze and Literature 35-6,
original emphasis). In light of the challenge working with asignifying expression encountered,
such as percepts and affects as discussed, I advocate Baugh’s account because it encompasses in
concert the positions articulated by Colombat, Conley, and Crawford; it accentuates the
constructivist orientation and goal; and, not insignificantly, it includes the experiential dimension
of scholarship, which indisputably characterizes Deleuze’s thought and discourse.

Before concluding this chapter, it is worth reviewing an example that demonstrates the
latter two motivating reasons and the successful practice of the encounter-constructivist
approach, understood and enacted in Baugh’s terms. In Sensation, Contemporary Poetry and
Deleuze: Transformative Intensities (2010), Jon Clay stages a “procedure” toward theorizing
aesthetic deterritorialization by working with innovative contemporary poetry. Evident in the
title, the chapter “Deleuzean Aesthetics: Reading Innovative Poetries” functions as the keystone
component to Clay’s success, following from the fundamentally crucial and informed premise of
poetry as non-represenational, as ontic and encountered in its own right (37-8). This is how Clay
effectively formulates an inspired theory of encountering poems and their deterritorializing
functions or effects, insofar as “These forces and intensities cannot be adequately grasped by
readings that assume that an innovative poem is simply a representational signifying regime”—
regarded instead as sensation (49-50).
The result is the transformative “change in the reader” evident in Clay himself, an entailment following from the procedure set into motion at the outset: “Reading this poetry is not just an experience but an encounter. Not only the first time but every time, which is part of its value: while the initial force of the poetry might diminish with increasing familiarity, the material impact, the sensations, will remain” (2, original emphasis). Although poetry, with its similarity to music as as asignifying expression, raises the question of object encountered, nothing here precludes comparable work with prose fiction, encountering forces composed in percepts of time and space or affects of intense relations between characters.

On the last point, Clay’s detailing the transformative effects of poetry addresses three levels of concerns, ranging from philosophical implications of encounters with sensation and disciplinary treatment of the formal aesthetics, to the socio-political salience of transformation as function and effect. The motivated study persists throughout regarding encounters with aesthetic sensation, even when shifting contexts. In other words, Clay maintains the method modeled on Deleuze and explicitly established, with variations as additional qualities or valences of the key concept—for example, understanding Virtual and Actual categories through Performance Theory (52, 72) and likewise through the intensive affects and percepts of becoming (145-7). This deliberate consistency throughout various contexts and dual focus is worth citing at length:

Each poem is a unique object, one that is active and even, given that an actualized poem is always in conjunction with a living reader, alive: this latter is true of all poetry, but innovative poetry, as always-renewed experimentation, is therefore always-renewed experimentation with life and with potentialities for living […]. This is why every innovative poem, whatever the political desires apparent in its composition, is in some sense revolutionary and will, when the experiments are successful, leave a residue of change in the reader. (Clay 183)

The key point to emphasize for future practice is that certain literature, as “sensation varieties,” poses opportunities to encounter “transformative intensities” toward new effects and outcomes.
For example, noted in the chapter “Innovative Poetry as Social Thought,” the works of Denise Riley and J.H. Prynne, like those by Paul Celan, act upon the material conditions of readers through the singularities and “transformational” effects of poetry (Clay 87). More immediate than the external social milieu, aesthetic expression functions to deterritorialize readers directly in our encounters (116), as Clay posits about on subjectivity regarding three poets’ works.

Mostly working to theorize the actual functions of poetry, Clay expounds specifically the resonance and disruption effects of sensation as deterritorialization (171), demonstrating Baugh’s “experimental pragmatics” through his reading two poems about the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, for example. Finally, connecting the aesthetic and social perspectives produces the compelling result of Chapter 6, “The Significance of Sensation: The Politics of Contemporary Innovative Poetry”; this undertakes the radical ambitions advocated by Deleuze and Guattari in *A Thousand Plateaus* (162) regarding the intensive powers of art—the theoretical recourse offered by *What is Philosophy?*, as I have presented throughout my study. Moreover, although only proposing the transformative potential of poetry, Clay shows the productive effect of undergoing first-hand the encounters with asignifying expression and the consequent change in the *dispostif* for thought and discourse, much like O’Sullivan does in *Art Encounters Deleuze and Guattari: Thought beyond Representation*. In terms of scholarship, besides epistemological innovation, I highlight these works for their showing the valuable effect of pragmatics as a reading strategy—one that can further emulate Deleuze by working with aesthetically-composed forces and multiple semiotic regimes toward invention.

**Toward a concept of a sensation:** This detailed review of Deleuze’s work with literature and various approaches for emulating his model has sought to identify and make clear the key principles for a method of pragmatics-constructivism: how best to work from our encounters
with sensations expressed through aesthetic composition in various forms, including the challenge of post-signifying uses of language. I have emphasized Deleuze and Guattari’s pragmatics as a feasible and suitable perspective for discerning aesthetic figures as forces made sensible by artists, such as in percepts and affects; the prospect for new thought emerges in the “legible” and intelligible nature of the encountered forces, ones perhaps previously unthought or unrecognized. The value of this view to a constructivist project is our suitably treating the respective regimes and intensive features of literature, rather than translating or transferring (“encoding”) into the signifying regime in analytic discourse, which would privilege meaning over the forces of asignifying expression. This issue persists as a disciplinary difficulty, more so than a true philosophical problematic, as evident by the several examples noted; my work attempts to clarify and provide a “workable” strategy for artisanal practice with literature, emulating the method demonstrated by Deleuze in my pragmatics readings of Pynchon’s novels.

Specifically, this chapter further develops an important aspect and identifies the stakes of the constructivist project working with any art forms, particularly the unique challenge posed by literature and the various uses of language. The focus on pragmatics and on “literary mediators” assists toward the aim of creating new concepts—a concept of sensation, the problem of “interference” between Philosophy and Art—as the means to innovate thought and expression, within the seeming impossibility of the rational dispositif. Henceforth, I develop the pragmatics-constructivist method, an alternative to the discovery model for knowledge, primarily through conceptual and formal innovation and partly by examining Deleuze’s inventive style in two important works. The goal remains a methodology discerned from his Deleuze for poetics of artisanal praxis, which can be applied in scholarship as rhetoric and composing practices.

Specifically working with post-signifying aspects and intensive features of literature, this effort
entails a “diagrammatism” of the multiple regimes encountered, in order to innovate in scholarly discourse through the transformative and generative elements in literature. Continuing with Deleuze’s theorizations and uses stylistically of intensive literary writing, I next establish in practice an idea of the novelistic assemblage as well as the inventive results of using the method and this concept in my encounters with multiple authors.
“It is at about this point in the play [...] that things really get peculiar, and a gentle chill, an ambiguity, begins to creep in among the words. Heretofore the naming of names has gone on either literally or as metaphor. But now, [...] a new mode of expression takes over. It can only be called a kind of ritual reluctance. Certain things, it is made clear, will not be spoken aloud; certain events will not be shown onstage; though it is difficult to imagine, given the excesses of the preceding acts, what these things could possibly be.”

—Thomas Pynchon, The Crying of Lot 49 (55)

Thus far I have established the rationale for and productive role of literary “mediators” within constructivism, regarding the problem of “interference”: employing the aesthetic paradigm in order to create a (noumenal) concept of (sensible) sensation—through the method I am calling artisanal practice for scholarship—increases the conditions for possibility within the dispositif, the limits upon knowledge and expression. Following the exemplar of Deleuze’s using literary mediators in his philosophical innovation, the challenges and the broader stakes addressed by my project emerge in my attempting to emulate the method advocated in productive literary “encounters”: whether scholarship remains analytical, with the inherent risk of “capturing” the literary works (aesthetic paradigm) into the signifying regime of denotative or referential discourse; or imposes interpretation and by extension, ideological or other transcendental claims, worse insofar as limiting conditions of possibility would be a negative act by the dispositif. The alternative is what I advocate and “test,” both generally and particularly here, guided by Deleuze’s patent invention throughout his oeuvre (and with Guattari). To this end, furthermore, new elements and examples serve to expand and clarify the approach previously described, progressing from recognizing generative and transformative elements in pragmatics reading to Deleuze and Guattari’s “diagrammatic” perspective toward invention.

The rationale for this premise is that such an understanding might best enable our treating a “mixed ecology” of semiotic regimes—ranging from signifying to asignifying elements—in
literature, balancing *hermeneutic* (interpretive) and *heuristic* (inventive) “maneuvers” and working toward the latter ends. This goal remains attendant to the problematic introduced in the first chapter, a problematic that calls for concepts adequate to the sensations encountered in art and that consists of thought and expression characterized by a paradigm of knowledge different from that of analytic reason and mimesis. I continue “exploring” henceforth the prospect and qualities of a scholarly rhetoric that supports and resounds in its discourse the unique thought and expression of the aesthetic paradigm, as encountered in the particular operations of literary writing and use of language. As with the prior chapter, but to limited extent, the method attempted and its consequences reported subsequently is provided by the productive work by Deleuze with literature, including specific concepts that help go beyond hermeneutic discourse—terms that moreover reflect the strong link between concept, method, and expression, which assists the greater aims of outlining a rhetoric of “innovative philosography.”

I thus begin with a final review of his artisanal praxis, in three specific and helpful cases, before presenting my “encounter pragmatics” and then my continued attempts at the method being developed: finding and using “generative elements” for invention (constructivism) in novels by Kurt Vonnegut, Kathy Acker, Leslie Silko, and Jonathan Safran Foer—beginning in the second section, continuing my *diagrammatic* work with Pynchon’s novels. Presenting my proposed *artisanal praxis* and the encounter-invention method for creating an adequate concept of sensation, I also include scholarly conventions of working “on” (and with) narrative fiction and provide an heuristic alternative to the disciplinary *dispositif* of hermeneutics. As the “assemblage” model for thought and expression provides this recourse, I discuss throughout this chapter the method and conceptual-discursive *style* of Deleuze and Guattari, which is evident early in Deleuze’s career in *The Logic of Sense.*
Before examining the specific exemplars that I will attempt to emulate in practice subsequently, I must first clarify the method I have thus far described as the “new pragmatics” from Deleuze and Guattari. I ended the prior chapter noting the challenge for treating the multiple semiotic regimes in literature, including any non-signifying uses of language, in productive ways; the goal and “operating principle” remains finding the generative and transformative elements in literary texts encountered and maintaining their properties of the aesthetic paradigm in knowledge discourse—rather than capturing and transferring into the rational dispositif. Discussing the various uses of “American language today,” Deleuze directly explains in Dialogues the method of study that I describe and apply: “To take account of these alternatives, we must introduce a third component which is no longer simply generative or transformational, but diagrammatic or pragmatic. We must discover in every regime and every assemblage the specific value of the existing lines of flight [. . .]”(118, original emphasis).

Not only does this third conception describe his work with literary language in The Logic of Sense and in Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature; Deleuze also provides practical “tasks” for innovating as he has and for producing concepts in the aesthetic paradigm. Notably, these instructions appear in a chapter (“Dead Psychoanalysis: Analyze”) of Dialogues that addresses how we might escape in thought and produce knowledge discourse alternative to linguistics and hermeneutics—thus, contextually apt and salient for my purposes.¹ The “first task” is to study

¹ “A clinic without psychoanalysis or interpretation, a criticism without linguistics or significance,” Deleuze states (Dialogues 120). Because this is a paramount issue of Kafka, I discuss it further in the later section. Worth noting to this end, though, is Deleuze’s reflexive methodological aside: “this is what I wanted to do when I worked on some writers, Sacher-Masoch, Proust or Lewis Carroll. What interested me [. . .] was not the psychoanalysis, or the psychiatry, or the linguistics, but the regimes of signs of a given author. This only became clear to us when Félix arrived, and we did a book on Kafka” (119). Although self-contradictory regarding the author as individual subject, as opposed to the “proper name” as “one or several assemblages” (120), Deleuze articulates an understated principle for artisanal praxis: “Give back to an author of little of the joy, the energy, the life of love and politics that he knew how to give and invent” (119)—i.e. aesthetic paradigm, rather than dispositif of tyrannical Reason.
the semiotic regimes of an author, finding the “generative component” as well as “what the flux of writing is connected with” (121). The latter point is particularly important in understanding writing as an assemblage rather than as the linguistic vehicle of an individual “subject of enunciation” (120); throughout this discussion Deleuze notes as examples the writing of Charlotte Brontë, Virginia Woolf, Sacher-Masoch, Kafka, and Proust (120-22).

The second task, in my understanding, observes how authors compose assemblages with “a multitude of regimes of signs,” using the transformational component, as exemplified for Deleuze by Proust: he writes, “each time new regimes are produced, where what was expression in the earlier ones becomes content in relation to forms of expression; a new usage of the language-system excavates a new language-system in language” (122). This quality appears both as the intensive feature, discussed in the prior chapter as “the foreign language within the language” or deterritorialization; moreover, as alternative to linguistic or mimetic orders, writing that consists of “fluxes of expression” as assemblage (121).² Indeed, crucial for method, in this “diagrammatic or pragmatic” treatment of literature Deleuze asserts that “there is no longer any fixed distinction between content and expression” (122).

Beyond the modal logic of Borges, “diagrammatism” would seem more to concern intensive writing uses such as in Melville’s formula and Beckett’s image-language, to reconsider the examples described in the prior chapter. The description in Dialogues, highly valuable for its self-reflexive perspective, further elucidates the method that I am discerning, by which Deleuze

² For the sake of a clear methodological description, I have in this instance separated two interconnected points by Deleuze and elided the second: “it is the regime of signs itself that will determine a particular assemblage of enunciation in the fluxes of expression and a particular assemblage of desire in the fluxes of content” (121, my emphasis). The latter point refers to the author as assemblage-function, not “subject of enunciation,” in Deleuze’s thought; this is actually the first distinction Deleuze makes in this section for criticism, which “would simply be a matter of knowing three things” (120). I have glossed this matter in order to focus more productively for outlining “diagrammatism” of mixed semiotics here, with the rationale that the alternative of assemblage to subjectivity relates more to the radical ontology and epistemology described in Anti-Oedipus, Kafka, and A Thousand Plateaus.
invents aesthetic concepts in several of his works: “Virginia Woolf’s Wave, Lovecraft’s Hypersphere, Proust’s Spider Web, Kleist’s Programme, Kafka’s K-function, the Rhizosphere” (122), to which I would add Melville’s “Bartleby-formula” and Carroll’s paradox-nonsense. The “third task,” beyond recognizing the generative and transformative elements encountered, seemingly consists of one’s thinking of the work encountered as assemblage—forming an assemblage with the literary work encountered, the dynamic fundamentally reconfigured, but even more simply in one’s regarding the multiple semiotic regimes and their functions. I will identify and explain how this orientation appears to have proven highly productive for Deleuze, thus presenting an inventive alternative to hermeneutic discourse indifferent to encounters.

Finally, to clarify, I have provisionally stated “seemingly consists of” in this description because the lesson discerned is conveyed obliquely by Deleuze, not only in his demonstrations but even in this passage. Discussing assemblage writing by authors—indeed quoting Woolf, and using her parlance of “saturate each atom” (122)—and not necessarily scholars, Deleuze writes that “Diagrammatism consists in pushing a language to the plane where ‘immanent’ variation no longer depends on a structure or development, but on the combination of mutating fluxes, on their productions of speed, on their combinations of particles […]” (119). Regardless, significant for my purposes is that Deleuze throughout is thinking in the aesthetic paradigm and explaining through Woolf, Kafka, Kleist, and Nathalie Sarraute: this is indeed an “aesthetic mode,” alternative to analysis specific, psychoanalysis or linguistics, and generally hermeneutic. The point to emphasize for method is the inventive prospect in our “discovering” in assemblages with multiple semiotic regimes “the specific value of the existing lines of flight” (118, my emphasis). Generative, transformative, and diagrammatic elements are thus all employed in practice.
Artisanal Praxis Observed 1: The Logic of Sense

I have several times thus far noted Deleuze’s use of Lewis Carroll’s literary work toward inventive ends in The Logic of Sense (1969); and although accurate, any such statement about this work is fractional, overly-limited, perhaps astray, and surely reductive. Along with Difference and Repetition, Deleuze presents his radical metaphysics with complexity of both thought and composition—philosophical style, as I have suggested. With the earlier established principle of emulating method without necessarily adopting wholesale a philosopher’s ontology, we can gain purchase on this text and extract principles for poetics later applied; fundamentally, this reasoning accounts for my using The Logic of Sense selectively as exemplar of artisanal praxis, invention through the aesthetic paradigm. One of few to note the constructivist “double heading” of these two works by Deleuze, Alliez observes the “dazzling play of conceptual variation [. . .] taken up again and thought through as such: Spinoza filtered through Cervantes, Borges through Bergson; Nietzsche, unfastened from Heidegger, meets Lewis Carroll before being delivered over to the becomings-animal of his ‘poietic’ metamorphoses” (Signature 5). This broad but valuable summary indicates partly my approach herein: verily, the writing of Modernist authors provide Deleuze the alternative to the signifying regimes and epistemological constraints of Platonism, psychoanalysis, and linguistics.

Working on the problem of language—or problematic, entailing question posed and concept created—is the specific aim of Deleuze, within his greater project opposing both Platonism and Analytic Philosophy. With compound development of both Sense and Event, Deleuze employs as generative the ideas of paradox and nonsense, particularly that of literary language, i.e., composition within the aesthetic paradigm. In addition to logocentrism and contemporary philosophy of language, this endeavor engages the epistemological orientations of Plato (height), Nietzsche (depth), and the Stoics (surface), as well as the thinking of Leibniz,
Sartre, Husserl, Kant, Spinoza, Blanchot, Heidegger, Freud, and Lacan, to respective degrees. Any or all of these references can be considered a dispositif within which Deleuze works, with imposed conditions for intelligibility and “legibility” (or articulation). Significant to note, and the first of the three main principles for poetics, is that the thirty-four “series,” through which Deleuze presents his innovative philosophy, fashion The Logic of Sense as “a logical and psychological novel” (xiv), as described evocatively in the Preface.

Viewed this way, the fragmented, non-sequential, and complex qualities of both each series and the overall collection reflect obliquely a literary style of writing: this is especially evident through any “statements” or language alternative and/or contrary to logics of verification, denotation, signification. One possible example, “the event is sense itself” (22), indicates the anti-Platonic conceptual equivalence between Sense, Event, and Expression, which is further complicated in that the surface serves as “the locus of sense and expression” (104). Deleuze asserts, “Sense is the fourth dimension of the proposition. The Stoics discovered it along with the event: sense, the expressed of the proposition, is an incorporeal, complex, and irreducible entity, at the surface of things, a pure event which inheres or subsists in the proposition” (19, original emphasis). The inherent “circular logic” violates the prohibition of such by Reason, a dispositif that Deleuze likewise counters in its opposition between sense and nonsense—operating instead with the logic of paradox, one of “the two verbal figures of nonsense” (81). The connection of the content of Deleuze’s thought and the form of his expression in The Logic of Sense joins this first component to the second principle for method in my discussion: employing in constructivism the particular logic and “intensive use” of language in literary writing, most especially for Deleuze the paradox and nonsense of Lewis Carroll.
Serial Poetics and “reading for sense”

Besides the specific case using Carroll’s texts, Deleuze’s working more broadly within and via the aesthetic paradigm is evident in the literary material that appears throughout, additionally including works by Artaud, Sade, Proust, Borges, Stephen Crane, Fitzgerald, Malcolm Lowry, and others. In a minor instance that emphasizes the aesthetic logic of his temporal metaphysics, for example, Deleuze regards the “chaosmos” of James Joyce in terms of Nietzsche’s eternal return; the composite “chaodyssey (chao-errance)” (264) that he identifies indicates the “circular” time outside Rational Sense and “verifiable” language, reflecting instead the “Dionysian sense-producing machine” (107) noted elsewhere. Another selective example is Deleuze’s positing humor, “the co-extensiveness of sense with nonsense” (141), as the logic prevailing after the irony theorized by Plato, Kant, and Romanticism respectively and sequentially. On one hand this could be considered a case of diagrammatism, locating an alternative to the dominant regime(s) of language previously subordinate, minor, unnoticed. In any case, humor in expression is transformative for Deleuze as “the art of” surface, singularity, “static genesis,” “pure event,” and “four person singular” in his metaphysics—as “with every signification, denotation, and manifestation suspended, all height and depth abolished” (141).

Although not the same, an affinity readily appears between this specific description of humor and the exemplar of paradox, the general operation of nonsense. Moreover, the logic of aesthetic language might even be considered more significant for Deleuze than as recourse or means for alternative philosophy.

In Chapter 1 of this project, I presented an important point of guidance from Jean-Jacques Lecercle, who Deleuze’s method as “extracting a problem and constructing a concept” (Deleuze and Language 256). It is worth noting that while Lecercle discusses The Logic of Sense in terms of engaging a problematic of language, he focuses far more specifically in recognizing the
significant role of Carroll’s literature for Deleuze’s encounter-constructivism (as I have called it): “The problem extracted from Carroll, therefore, bears the name of the two concepts created to extract it: sense and event” (Deleuze and Language 101). Although exceptionally narrow, this case aligns The Logic of Sense within the consistency that Lecercle establishes of Deleuze’s greater method, in recognizing how he “extracts” problem in Carroll just as he has done earlier with Nietzsche, Spinoza, Leibniz, and Proust. This insight is valuable for emphasizing the method evident as much as the broader metaphysics, for instance the Deleuzean “problem of the event” and that Lecercle characterizes events as problems and problems as events (101). While Lecercle seeks specifically “to produce a concept of language” (68), he articulates an alternative to “conduct[ing] a Deleuzean interpretation,” more importantly: “What Deleuze allows us to do, on the other hand, is read for sense—to become aware of the faint traces[,] the aura of sense that envelops the text [and] disseminates in it” (153). Although resonant with the problem extracted, this understanding remains limited to the first component for method, diagrammatic reading; from encounter pragmatics, constructivism further entails “application” of the aesthetic paradigm in praxis, as Deleuze does conceptually and formally with Carroll’s literature.

Perhaps the significance of Carroll’s literature will have been overstated—for instance, in Lecercle’s citing the source of a problematic “extracted,” or as I am presenting it, in the case of recourse for philosophical invention, specifically the intensive use of language in literary nonsense. After all, Deleuze certainly presents intelligible concepts in The Logic of Sense, with readers’ reaction that the text is ostensibly “nonsense” remaining a condition of limited understanding, rather than an epistemological alternative to Rational Sense (Reason). For example, distinguishing clearly in the “Eleventh Series of Nonsense” he declares, “Nonsense is that which has no sense, and that which, as such and as it enacts the donation of sense, is
opposed to the absence of sense” (70)—positing between sense and nonsense “an original type of
intrinsic relation” (68). On the other hand, I am identifying in this work a poetics for artisanal
praxis—the beginning of the radical experimentation of discursive style observed later,
culminating particularly in A Thousand Plateaus—as part of my on-going methodology. Just as
Deleuze employed the literature of Borges to engage the philosophy of Leibniz, as with the three
authors and Kant, like Beckett and Bishop Berkeley, so can we regard his using Carroll to “work
on” the problematic of language. Viewed this way, the aesthetic logic of paradox appears to
serve similarly as the intensive “procedure” with language by Wolfson and Brisset; or perhaps
better still, as Melville’s “formula,” in the conceptual figures of Ahab and Bartleby.

Beyond this comparison, another view of Carroll’s function, less direct but equally
compelling for method, perceives its unique role for philosophy in the taxonomy of fiction: with
the “characters” of The Logic of Sense appearing primarily in Plato, Nietzsche, and the Stoics,
the concepts developed substitute for narrative; Carroll’s literary language thus provides a
setting, as Deleuze remarks, “the first great mise en scene of the paradoxes of sense” (xiii). The
diegesis and corresponding “story logic” invoke a dispositif wholly different from Analytic
Philosophy, to name one prevailing regime upon language, and thus enable Deleuze’s thinking
and expressing through an aesthetic paradigm with respective conditions for intelligibility. The
key strategy for encountering texts in this productive fashion for invention, as I am proposing
and which I attempt, is diagrammatic reading.

Deleuze finds in Carroll’s writing counter- and post-signifying regimes of expression. In
a remark indicative of his method, he states that “Carroll’s entire logical work is directly about
signification, implications, and conclusions, and only indirectly about sense—precisely, through
the paradoxes which signification does not resolve, or indeed which it creates. On the contrary,
[his] fantastic work is immediately concerned with sense and attaches the power of paradox directly to it” (22, original emphasis). Before concluding with the third principle for poetics, it is worthwhile to examine quickly both some illustrative examples that Deleuze finds as well as the “philosophical” form of paradox and its epistemological “structure” (composition). This review is important for method so as to emulate the inventive results rather than strictly replicating, using Deleuze as hermeneutic “lens,” as I will reiterate in the separate discussion of *Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature*.

As I have noted, the key “line of flight” for inventing a concept of sense, by recourse to another paradigm, is paradox: although a partial view of *The Logic of Sense*, this generative means for expression appears as both a salient concept and form in his own writing and in Deleuze’s reading of Carroll’s literary works. For example, describing the fourth dimension of sense and expression, he references Carroll’s poem “The Hunting of the Snark” and notes, “Perhaps the dimension is the hunt itself, and sense is the Snark” (20); this relates to the earlier point, how “Humor is the art of the surface, which is opposed to the old irony, the art of depths and heights” (9), insofar as “Paradox appears as a dismissal of depth, a display of events at the surface, and a deployment of language along this limit” (9). In this case, the sense-mode of “surface” or ‘width’ becomes clear by considering the logic or structure of paradox, as when Deleuze writes, “The strange word ‘Snark’ is the frontier which is stretched as it is *drawn by both series*” (26, my emphasis). The *transformative* language operation by Carroll is evident in the portmanteau—“Snark,” like “frumious” (67)—or esoteric word; the *paradoxical element* of expression is undecidable between sense or nonsense, being instead an operation of both sense and nonsense in its non-signification.
This shift away from regimes of signification or denotation in language and nonsense accounts for much of the way Deleuze explicates his concept of sense; beginning with Carroll’s “What the Tortoise Said to Achilles,” the salience and function are more readily observable in the literary references, especially *Alice's Adventures in Wonderland* and *Through the Looking-Glass*. The mode of indiscernibility is recognizable in the aesthetic figures of simultaneity: “In the singularity of paradoxes, nothing beings or ends, everything proceeds at once in the direction of both past and future” (80). Referencing Alice and Humpty Dumpty, Deleuze likewise finds “the two senses or two directions of the becoming-mad” in the characters Mad Hatter and March Hare, like Tweedledee and Tweedledum (79), and in the temporality of battle scenes (101). These are specific diegetic and linguistic instances of the general mode presented as alternative to the spatio-temporal epistemology of semantics, “a simultaneity of becoming” (1) as Deleuze remarks: “Good sense affirms that in all things there is a determinable sense or direction (*sens*); but paradox is the affirmation of both senses or directions *at the same time*” (1, my emphasis).

To clarify this point—a matter further complicated when Deleuze discusses paradoxes of both signification and sense (75)—about simultaneity and becoming: I find in the concepts in *The Logic of Sense* a fundamentally temporal orientation, even when semantically “spatial” as in *surface* and “directions.” The key insight about paradox as generative and transformative style, in thought and expression, connects *sense* and *event* with its structure of *series*. First, understanding that “the event is sense itself” (22) is established by Deleuze’s premise: “Sense is the fourth dimension of the proposition. The Stoics discovered it along with the event: sense, the *expressed of the proposition*, is an incorporeal, complex, and irreducible entity, at the surface of things, a pure event which inheres or subsists in the proposition” (19, original emphases). Without explicating this *new image of thought* and “paradoxical constitution” (xiv), we can
recognize that paradox consists of two series, undecidable and simultaneous rather than resolvable with singular meaning; in this arrangement, the paradoxical element, as in the example of Carroll’s portmanteaux, functions to “traverse heterogeneous series, to coordinate them, to make them resonate and converge” (66). This operation produces the expressed sense—no longer rational-sense or non-sense—in the series, even if nonsense, “at the surface” (81). This orientation is apparent in Deleuze’s recognizing “two resonating series” in place of “psychological and moral characters” (55) in Carroll’s *Sylve and Bruno*, for example; his qualifying that “We can speak of events only as singularities employed in a problematic field” (56) situates the expression and sense in terms of resonating series in time, in my understanding.

**Lessons for Method**

Although not exclusive to literature or language, situated within a greater context—Deleuze’s two conceptions of time, *Chronos* and *Aion*—the use of paradox elucidates both the original philosophy invented and the practice for method. On the latter, this is indeed the third component for artisanal praxis: to begin, read in temporal terms of points, lines and series, finding any resonance by reading for expressed-sense, as Lecercle notes, rather than for signification with rational-sense.

The aesthetic paradigm for thought and expression, in my terms, thus escapes the logic of Reason and its logocentrism, by beginning with diagrammatic reading encounters. For example, in the “floating” signifier and signified of Carroll’s portmanteau “Snark,” like onomatopoeiae for the Stoics (66), Deleuze finds the characteristics that make heterogeneous series “resonate and communicate and form a ‘tangled tale’” (67)—coordinating the series in a relation of sense, unlike the relation between true and false (68). Just as when he defines sense in terms of quantity, quality, modality, relation, and type (101), his creating a concept beyond true/false is markedly apparent in the “Fifth Series of Sense,” by way of four paradoxes: “of regress, or of
indefinite proliferation” (28); “of sterile division, or of dry reiteration” (31); “of neutrality, or of essence’s third estate” (32); of the absurd, or of the impossible objects” (35). In the taxonomy of novelistic philosophy earlier introduced, heterogeneous series might thus be the “narrative” lines of concepts. This analogue gains additional salience insofar as for Deleuze, “Everything happens through the resonance of disparates, point of view on a point of view, displacement of perspective, differentiation of difference, and not through the identity of contraries” (175).

Besides the diagrammatic reading of texts both literary and philosophical, we can observe an aesthetic and intensive presentation of the concept of sense, using signifying and counter-signifying elements. To reiterate, the artisanal poetics discerned throughout consists of expressing the qualities of a concept through style, rather than through denotation—a single, verifiable (true/false) statement—in “argumentative” discourse. For Deleuze, this entails composing thought in The Logic of Sense beyond the opposition between sense and nonsense that Reason would demand, generally, and instead employing the aesthetic paradigm in his “logical and psychological novel” specifically. Considering how “[t]he force of paradoxes is that they are not contradictory; they rather allow us to be present at the genesis of the contradiction” (74), the result of this style is to express a concept sensed or encountered in its non-signifying operation. Finally, this type of reading and the salience of paradox that I have discussed are underscored throughout, as well as explicitly stated: “Sense is thus inseparable from a new kind of paradoxes [sic] which mark the presence of nonsense within sense, just as the preceding paradoxes marked the presence of nonsense within signification” (70, my emphasis).

As noted in the chapter-series of Sense, Nonsense, and Paradox, the temporal orientation of key qualities enables both new understanding and innovation, thinking and composing in terms of lines, singularities, heterogeneous series, and resonance. On one hand, this view better
enables our comprehending when Lecercle states that for Deleuze, “the highest task of literature is not to represent the event [. . .] but to be the event itself” (*Deleuze and Language* 130). Additionally, and more practically for praxis I would say, is that three related principles discerned for method relate *sense* and *event* to the quality of experienced concepts, in their temporality, rather than remaining abstract and noumenal. As Deleuze explains, “The logic of sense is inspired in its entirety by empiricism. Only empiricism knows how to transcend the experiential dimensions of the visible without falling into Ideas, and how to track down, invoke, and perhaps produce a phantom and the limit of a *lengthened or unfolded experience*” (20, my emphasis). With my goal of extracting a method and producing a poetics for artisanal practice, seeking to invent an *experienced concept of sensation* through encounters with literature, this review of *The Logic of Sense* has added a component to the constructivism methodology, significant philosophically and promising for praxis: style, in thought and expression, through series; with *resonance*, occurring as a post-signifying operation and a sensible-empirical mode.

**Pynchon Mediators: Shift from Discovery to Invention**

Resuming my pragmatics reading of the prior chapter with this in mind, serial logic in thought and writing evokes the question and problem of the *discovery model* for knowledge, whether I am proceeding “toward” ideas in a trajectory. The unconventional logics of multiple senses, established in the previous section, provides an alternative to the epistemological “grounding” in space and in the rational dispositif: specifically, *diagrammatic* reading finds intensive elements that enable engaging the *problematic* of the unknown otherwise—experienced temporal concepts, in encounters, by which to *produce* new knowledge. Thus, *artisanal praxis* applies in style the conceptual and formal features encountered: this way, I shift to theoretical and rhetorical practices of *invention* from the discovery model and the detective roles, the
logocentric paradigm in which truth is located “someplace,” or perhaps lost at sea; and information is deferred, presumed as though it is hidden or concealed in a “locked room”

Encountering Temporal Logics: Hothouse, Street, Null, Projectile

In the latter case, reprising the conclusion of Chapter Three’s reading section, *The Crying of Lot 49* ends with Oedipa settling into the locked room, “to await the crying of lot 49” (152, my emphasis). The second lesson from studying Pynchon’s first two novels, with which to shift toward now, emerges from a diagrammatic reading of the other series, which comprises a counter-signifying logic and a temporal orientation. Reconsidering the detective role, a compelling “clue” emerges in *V.*, in which Stencil contemplates the phrase, “Events seem to be ordered into an ominous logic” (Pynchon 484, my emphasis). Implicitly relating to this point, Seed articulates an obvious yet salient fact of the interpretive position: “If we try to reorder [the] chapters we run the risk of ‘Stencilizing’ events and damage the way in which Pynchon plays off historical time against novelistic chronology” (*Labyrinths* 111). In his latter phrasing, Seed identifies a key aspect of Pynchon’s style, which I later employ creatively.

Rather than examining thoroughly the temporal settings of the main narrative and historical episodes, I am noting briefly the novelistic time in the novels as the catalyst toward the new understanding and the next section. For instance, *V.* includes references to “mirror-time” (243), “null-time of human love” (441), and “a hothouse sense of time” (53). The latter description by Stencil takes on additional resonance when, echoing Pynchon’s earlier story “Entropy” (1958), the character describes his V.-obsession as “a hothouse: constant temperature,

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3 “My emphasis” notably differs from Stencil’s, as the narrator here remarks upon the act of creative pondering: “A phrase [. . .] kept cycling round and round, preconsciously, just under the threshold of lip and tongue movement: ‘Events seem to be ordered into an ominous logic.’ It repeated itself automatically and Stencil improved on it each time, placing emphasis on different words—’events seem’; ‘seem to be ordered’; ‘ominous logic’—pronouncing them differently, changing the ‘tone of voice’ [. . .]. Events seem to be ordered into an ominous logic. He found paper and pencil and began to write the sentence in varying hands and type faces” (*V.* 484-5, original emphasis).
windless, too crowded with particolored sports, unnatural blooms” (483). Pynchon later expounds a fuller sense of the asynchronic (or “non-seasonal”) duration, implied specifically by “unnatural blooms,” in the “intolerable double vision” noted by Stencil Sr. as “the hothouse of the past” for the Right and “the dreamscape of the future” for the Left in the street (506); this is later amended in free-indirect narration as, “No time in Valletta. No history, all history at once” (524).4 With two notable exceptions, The Crying of Lot 49 much less overtly concerns temporal orientations other than the irrevocable time of the past retrievable as information. Yet, this case still features the lesson I have noted, particularly that we experience sense or meaning-making “in time” (and not strictly “in space”).

To be clear, I am not positing a temporal alternative to the “spatial interpretation” of narrative, in simple opposition; rather, I am attempting to explore the particular aesthetic logic encountered—the unique temporality of “literary machines,” as I employ in the last chapter. Worth recalling is the “disregard for the possible historical dimension of synchronic analysis and a tendency to view the internal, temporal sequence of narrative as a spatial or structural organization,” as Currie recounts; he continues, “In theory [,] structuralist narratology was neither ahistorical nor disinterested in the temporal organization of narrative, but in practice anything temporal was quickly translated into spatial relationships or differences” (Postmodern Narrative 77). Given as well that “it is always tempting to dechronologize and logicize” in Structuralist analysis, in Ricœur’s view, we must be attentive to the opposition “of narrative temporality to simple chronology” (Volume 2 47), within the unique spatio-temporal qualities of

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4 Notably, the narrative discourse of the Epilogue reflects the spatio-temporal orientation of both the historical episodes and the narrative of Stencil and Profane, although “set” in 1919 in Malta. Most evocative are the last two iterations, both concerning Stencil Sr. and Veronica Manganese: “‘Absolute upheaval,’ a nostalgic smile: ‘that is your way, Victoria, of course’,” (527) Stencil begins; the narrator adds, “The street and the hothouse; in V. were resolved, by some magic, the two extremes. She frightened him” (527). Last is the “hothouse-time” of Veronica and Stencil together, “an alienation from time, much as Malta itself was alienated from any history in which cause precedes effect” (529). Indeed, Pynchon’s next two novels dramatize experiencing effects first, discontinuously.
the diegesis. *Lot 49* calls attention to the imperative for treating the heterogeneous configurations—with greater nuance than McHale’s epistemology-or-ontology schema—suitably, with terms or views beyond Bakhtin’s *chronotope* category: for example, Dannenberg’s “ontological plotting” and “temporal orchestration” (*Coincidence* 45), like Punday’s noting “the dynamic relation between space, time, and materiality” (*After Deconstruction* 107).

In order to conclude the present investigation without additional delay, I further discuss this reference in the subsequent chapters, conjecturing the utility of certain narratological perspectives and the prospects of “a performative rather than a constative narratology,” in Currie’s terms (52). Toward invention, the detective reader-writer will have “forced himself into the real present, perhaps aware it would be his last time there” (*V.* 531), as Stencil Sr. ruminates in *V.*’s Epilogue. The lost time of the past reverberates in the present of *Lot 49* intelligibly as information and sensibly as affect—as in phenomena like the “dandelion wine” plucked from a roadside cemetery (79) becoming seasonably cloudy, unlike the *hothouse-past* logic.

Although the latter, as *transversal* relation across series, suggests inventive potential, I forgo this in favor of the lesson inferred by two notable examples of the former, in concluding this inquiry into a diegesis for invention. An easily “overlooked” character, marginalized by Oedipa’s hermeneutic quest narrative, articulates one peculiar conception: Mucho Maas remarks “nonsensically” (while on LSD), “Everybody who says the same words is the same person if the spectra are the same only they happen differently in time, you dig? *But the time is arbitrary.* You pick your zero point anywhere you want, that way you can shuffle each person’s time line sideways till they all *coincide*” (*Lot* 116-7, my emphasis). This view evokes not only “another

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5 The logic of Mucho’s *chorus* sensibilia is non-rational, indeed: he continues, “you hear and see things, even smell them, taste like you never could. Because the world is so abundant. No end to it, baby. You’re an antenna, sending your pattern out across a million lives a night, and they’re your lives too. [. . .] The songs, it’s not just that they say something, *they are something*, in the *pure sound.* Something new” (118, my emphasis).
mode of meaning behind the obvious” (150) but how while interpreting the novel, “We try to read diachronically and synchronically,” Gleason notes (90).

The arbitrary, coinciding, and asynchronic qualities of non-linear temporality complement indirectly the logocentric search for meaning: ostensibly “retrievable,” rather than irrevocable as lost time of the past, within a database of information. The logic of information, beyond the “promise of communication,” is reflected in the narrative discourse throughout, beginning with the resemblance of suburban “sprawl” of houses and streets to a circuit card and Oedipa’s inferring in “both outward patterns a hieroglyphic sense of concealed meaning, of an intent to communicate” (14). The mediated-electronic sense of time is implicit in Pynchon’s composing with the signifying regime of technology throughout, including explicit references to computing, particularly the IBM 7094 and its “twelve microseconds” of decision-making (93); and generally, the binary logic (”zeroes and ones”) in the “matrices of a great digital computer” (150). Whether necessarily intelligible though the temporality of data, “present” in time and space, database experience is expressed. Moreover, Johnston describes Lot 49 in Information Multiplicity as “the first novel about information in the contemporary sense of the word. For the first time in American fiction, the idea of information is not only treated thematically but is also deployed to generate a fictional story rich in multivalent meanings, the historical implications of which Pynchon investigates more fully in his next novel, Gravity’s Rainbow” (7).

Generative Lessons

It is the second lesson, as I have posited, about temporality that enables an intelligible transition in the abrupt sensory break to the next phase, encountering Gravity’s Rainbow—one that precisely concerns interval logic. Unlike the “asynchronous” time of information in the database conception, Oedipa also notes the experience dimension beyond signification, in the “metaphor” of delirium tremens, after realizing “so much could be lost, even the quantity of
hallucination” (104). With the associative logic of the entropy formulae, she links the sign $DT$ to the time differential of calculus: “a vanishingly small instant in which change had to be confronted at last for what it was, where it could no longer disguise itself as something innocuous like an average rate; where velocity dwelled in the projectile though the projectile be frozen in midflight [. . .]” (105). First, the concrete understanding of the small instant, which notably demands our confronting change, evokes in one sense the interval or duration calculated, phenomenon made intelligible, as well as the inherently diachronic process.

This conception contrasts the atemporal database or asynchrony of information transmission, most obviously; and yet, the unusual phrasing that concludes the description, “where death dwelled in the cell though the cell be looked in on at its most quick” (105), seems to evoke the former. Irresolvable, I reiterate that it is the diegetic context of metaphor in which this heterogeneous discourse appears, and thus we encounter in Pynchon a logic of language, like in Carroll, and not strictly mathematical laws of reason (or good sense). Indeed, the narrative voice acknowledges seeming disorientation, insofar as “The act of metaphor then was a thrust at truth and a lie, depending where you were: inside, safe, or outside, lost. Oedipa did not know where she was” (105).

On the one hand, the “detour” in the present investigation concludes as the “dead end” as for the detective roles. In this last point, we have surely encountered Pynchon’s serial logic and poetics, finding directly in the logic of metaphor two series, supposedly “opposite directions,” as Deleuze finds in Carroll’s paradox structure. Viewed another way, the process—aided by my structural portraits—does not result by closing “full circle into some paranoia” (151), in that I “abandoned” the detective quest in favor of a pragmatics-encounter with Pynchon’s style. Moreover, the process has meant not “an alienation from time” ($V$. 529) but due consideration of
temporality, particularly by interrogating whether “Events seem to be ordered into an ominous logic” (V. 484, my emphasis)—one contingent upon the hermeneutic “discovery” trajectory.

In any case, another “ordering” of the material with regard to Pynchon’s style could have explored the counter-signifying regime in the compositions, such as jokes, names, and songs, the “nonsensical” quality of which all appear in Pynchon’s first three novels. Perhaps a diagrammatic study of these elements might have found a diegesis for invention; here, the “structural portraits” have at least expressed a condition and catalyzed a shift to another mode, for both reading and constructivism. This shift avoids an outcome that Lot 49 describes: “Oedipa wondered whether, at the end of this (if it were supposed to end), she too might not be left with only compiled memories of clues, announcements, intimations, but never the central truth itself, which must somehow each time be too bright for memory to hold” (76)

The project underway has reached a certain “edge” of the assemblage, Pynchon’s literary machines of sense-production, particularly by considering the style of multiple regimes and the “second axis” of time, in Deleuze and Guattari’s sense (Plateaus 88). The next section begins the subsequent work with other semiotic regimes, testing the method and experimenting with Pynchon’s diegesis for invention, beyond diagrammatic recognition of postsignifying elements in Gravity’s Rainbow. On the first, now an important methodological component, Lecercle reminds that Deleuze “defines the ‘problem’ of the Proustian oeuvre as the problem of signs,” thus invoking “the concept of style”: “the treatment of materials that turns the work into a work of art; it is the establishment of unknown or unexpected relations between objects, through the organization of materials” (Deleuze and Language 219).

6 I have referenced this passage with the “edges” of the assemblage, the “two axes” of which I use in approaching Gravity’s Rainbow. The assemblage is collective and machinic “horizontally,” and the “vertical axis” of process, temporal in my reading, includes the “cutting edges of deterritorialization” (ATP 88). Thus, a line of invention?
While this provides a general point of inquiry for reading Pynchon and others, the theorization in *Proust and Signs* brings together the two concerns directly, in that Proust’s style for Deleuze is *transversality*. Specifically, this notion accounts not only for a unity of heterogeneous fragments without totality (168), but time as the “transversal of all possible spaces” (130)—“the whole of these parts without totalizing them, the unity of these parts without unifying” (*Proust* 169, original emphasis). This conceptions of *transversality* and time brings to attention the literary “production machine,” the *second axis* of the assemblage encountered in pragmatics-constructivism, as I explore with the subsequent authors’ work. Finally, Proust’s “new linguistic convention,” the *transversal structure* (168), corresponds for Deleuze to the poetics of Carroll’s paradox and Kafka’s assemblage; thus, I encounter Pynchon attentive to his *style*, provisionally devised as *serial-transveral assemblage*.

**Inventive Interlude:** A simple recollection of Deleuze’s method and vocabulary also produces an inventive gesture toward the next development and attempted praxis: the term “line of flight” is a process of *deterritorialization*, which can be abbreviated “DT.” Separately, Pynchon’s texts suggest a composition by the logic of “differential time” (or ΔT), as Ursula K. Heise describes in *Chronoschisms*—even titling her chapter five, “*delta-t*: time’s assembly in *Gravity’s Rainbow*.” With this chance similarity—like the ostensible resemblance of entropy’s legible formula in Thermodynamics and Information Theory, noted in Pynchon’s 1958 story “Entropy” and *The Crying of Lot 49*—there emerges a new possibility, thinking in the aesthetic paradigm: “ΔT” = “DT,” in other words, differential time as *deterritorialization*. This is a prospect to explore, adding *deterritorialization* to the series that Oedipa Maas observes in her linking *delirium tremens* and differential time: “because there was that high magic to low puns,

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7 Although I have not quoted Heise, her work is worth consulting, along with Dannenberg and Punday, for studies of unconventional temporality in novels: *Chronoschisms: Time, Narrative, and Postmodernism* (Cambridge UP, 1997).
because DT's must give access to dt's of *spectra beyond the known sun, music* made purely of Antarctic loneliness and fright” (*Lot 49* 105, my emphasis). A transverse line, by the sensible order beyond the metaphysics of vision or presence—from Antarctic “annihilation” in *V.* (217) to the “Panorama” (419) of *Gravity’s Rainbow*.

**Literary Encounter 3: Inventive Poetics, *Gravity’s Rainbow* Dis-mantling. . .**

“[. . .] *a theatre of multiplicities* opposed in every respect to the theatre of representation, which leaves intact neither the identity of the thing represented, nor author, nor spectator, nor character, nor representation which, through the vicissitudes of the play, can become the object of a production of knowledge or final recognition. Instead, *a theatre of problems* and always open questions which draws spectator, setting and characters into [. . .].”

—Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition* (192, my emphasis)

. . .an assemblage, both *machinic expression of desire* and *collective enunciation*, to paraphrase Deleuze and Guattari (*Plateaus* 22). Perhaps *drawn into* the Orpheus Theatre—the problem’s diegetic coordinates simultaneously Germany, 1945 and Los Angeles, 1970(?)—explicitly by the concluding “Now everybody—” of the narration: “. . . or, if song must find you, here's one They never taught anyone to sing, a hymn by William Slothrop” (760, original ellipsis). And yet, although this response might remedy the pitfalls of the structural role trajectory and its hermeneutic “dead end,” I have also learned to hesitate from too quickly rendering a novel in the assemblage configuration and vocabulary, as emphasized throughout this and the prior chapter.

In other words, I am still attempting the reading and writing strategy of *diagramming* the elements encountered, as well as testing the poetics of first finding a diegesis for invention in *Gravity’s Rainbow*. This deliberate application of the method discerned seeks to avoid certain limited (or counter-productive) outcomes, namely “constative narratology,” in favor of accelerating the process, particularly toward proposing conceptual analogs to “characters” and

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“narrative” in the next chapter. In the first case, Pynchon’s style as “object of study” and “focalizer” facilitates thinking and working in the aesthetic paradigm indeed; thus, further describing the former will better introduce my particular use or scholarly “treatment” of the novel in the latter sense, in my experimental attempts of *artisanal praxis*.

**Diagramming Assemblage Edges**

Provisionally, the notion of *transversality* describes Pynchon’s writing aptly, in the way Deleuze regards Proust; by this I mean the relation and/or intersection of disparate lines or series, in the sense “geometric” rather than numerical (as in “sets”), specifically in “non-signifying” relation. Although potentially extending this description in further digression, the musical terminology of harmony and counterpoint better elucidates by analogy. For example, as cited earlier, Deleuze describes novelists’ working at “this aleatory point, this imperative and questioning ‘blind spot’ from which the work develops like a problem by *making divergent series resonate*” ([*Difference* 199, my emphasis])—with *transversality* of disparate lines.

The latter premise evokes my view of Pynchon’s style and my approach to the novels discussed. Beyond coincidences and correspondences in semiotic series, as I noted in *V.* and *Lot 49*, *transversality* as style can be recognized as well in Pynchon’s composing markedly with “lines” actual-historical and fictional: relations both prevalent and not easily discerned or distinguished, in both the narrative strategies and the “ecology” of his material. Important to reiterate is that my encountering literature, in Deleuze’s method, does not distinguish “real” and “fictional” but instead recognizes in various semiotic regimes any elements *generative, transformative, or diagrammatic*—intensive use of language in writing, *lines of flight* toward *determinitalization*.

The latter case appears to be how Deleuze understands the counter- and post-signifying “production” of effects, such as temporality, in Proust’s writing, and thus how we might read
multiple semiotic regimes in greater nuance. Keeping in mind that “there is no longer any fixed distinction between content and expression” (Dialogues 122), we can equally regard historical and fictional material in Pynchon’s writing as potentially generative, in innovating expression beyond the rationale dispositif and constative language; transformative, configuring into assemblage; diagrammatic, “dismantling” the assemblage into intensive expression, post-signifying or non-referential writing, and finally deterritorialization of thought and expression.

My aim is proposing means for conceptual invention and discursive innovation, though, beyond strictly identifying these novelistic elements encountered. On one hand, Deleuze’s terms and (to lesser extent) method have been used to describe Pynchon’s work in new fashion, for example by Johnston and Mattessich. When efficient and useful, I include several scholars’ points in my diagrammatic work with Gravity’s Rainbow—careful about confusing “ends” and “means” in scholarship, as so much diligent treatment of this novel in the latter sense reminds.

*Transversality* as style—in practice, beyond analysis—addresses several methodological concerns, beginning with the question whether a lexiphile can compose is ways and with rhetoric other than that of the “logocentric critic.”\(^9\) Aided by the exemplar of Pynchon’s “polymath” writing style, much like Deleuze, and guided instead by this feature instead of their erudition, working with *Gravity’s Rainbow* in post-structuralist fashion will entail creative “treatment” of

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\(^9\) “Lexi-” here used in the manner of the French “lexis” rather than the American spelling “lexo-phile” in the fashion of *logophile*. Apropos the present discussion, and the source of my variation, Barthes (1966) asserts that “today, writing is not ‘telling’ but saying that one is telling and assigning all the referent (‘what one says’) to this act of locution; which is why part of contemporary literature is no longer descriptive, but transitive, striving to accomplish so pure a present in its language that the whole of the discourse is identified with the act of its delivery, the whole logos being brought down – or extended – to a lexis” (*Image-Music-Text* 114). This point extends textually “backward” to Genette, in his footnote, and “forward” to Paul DeMan’s 1990 article, “Roland Barthes and the Limits of Structuralism.” Noting “the liberation of the signifier from the constraints of referential meaning,” DeMan elaborates, like Derrida, “the inherent tension that shapes literary language—polarities such as content /form, logos (that which is being said) and lexis (the manner of saying it), meaning/sign, message/code, langue/parole, signifié / signifiant, voice/writing [. . .]—the implicit valorization has always privileged the first terms and considered the second as an auxiliary, an adjunct in the service of the former” (*Yale French Studies* 77 1990, 180).
material from various “databases” and discourses, in the aesthetic logic of the novel. One feature of this formal quality discernible by using the perspective of Deleuze and Guttari is that the “lines” actual-historical and fictional, which they elaborate elsewhere about Kafka’s work, might both operate at the “cutting edges of deterritorialization” on the “vertical axis” (Plateaus 88). In other words, the assemblage conception replaces a narrow view of Pynchon’s writing, as in finding “series 1: historical” and “series 2: fictional”; the former is necessarily territorial for being actual or referential, the negative “regime of signs” explained in A Thousand Plateaus.

“The tetravalence of the assemblage” (89) thus keeps in mind that writing strategies or stylistic formulae might produce intensive functions—against signifying-territorializing use—in language within the aesthetic paradigm. And although obfuscated, Stivale indirectly reinforces my understanding of a point largely overlooked: “On [the horizontal] axis, the literary element serves an exemplary function, of revealing more clearly the abstract concepts suggested by the rhizomatic process. The machinic assemblage [. . .] develops in direction relation to transformation [sic] unfolding [. . .] as collective assemblages of enunciation” (Two-Fold Thought 109). The present tasks necessitate my “side-stepping” this intriguing orientation—which requires theorizing more logically “the literary element” being situated on the vertical rather than the horizontal axis—as well as the temptation to “bookmatch” Gravity’s Rainbow with A Thousand Plateaus thusly, as McHoul and Wills attempt with Derrida in their inventive and “prototype” work, Writing Pynchon.

Yet, the “tetravalence” view has obscured the theatre of problems that is crucial to engage as promising diegesis. Instead, it is intensive writing and transversality that have “four-fold” importance for encountering Pynchon: the post-signifying regime, the temporal orientation(s), resonating series, and effective deterritorialization all bear upon my study.
Moreover, what I want to “test,” putting *transversality* into practice and demonstrating the poetics of method, is an experimental composition using the novel’s logic and formal strategies. Indeed, few critics have engaged Pynchon’s work for its value as “writing practice,” as McHoul and Wills note (1), excepting to limited extent Johnston in *Information Multiplicity* and Mattessich’s *Lines of Flight*. And while the latter purports to “emphasiz[e] a practice of writing that conjures the object of its analysis through its own production” (Mattessich 12), the results of all three are less significant for their respective outcomes than for their innovative attempts—most especially *Writing Pynchon*, guided similarly by poststructuralist method.

The specific efforts by McHoul and Wills to innovate include “bookmatching” Pynchon and Derrida (10ff.), as well as reading by using the *mise en abyme* model through “*material typonymy*” (54) and parable-parabola (59), for example. Although creative endeavors, more instructive is their rationale for the “post-rhetorical supplanting” of dualisms in Pynchon’s three novels (62). This approach relates to my “non-interpretive” or “counter-analytic” exploration in the next section: “exploring” akin to Pynchon’s “polymath” style, ideally, rather than the “voyager” metaphor—working in the aesthetic paradigm and recalling the lesson of apparatus theory. Specifically, paradigm-writing or “Chorography,” Ulmer explains, “is designed to introduce into the narratives and arguments of the print apparatus a Heuretic code [of invention], to supplement and replace the Hermeneutic code and its drive to reduce enigmas to truth. The rationale for disengaging curiosity from ‘truth’ this way derives from the transformation of literacy underway in the electronic [post-literate] apparatus” (*Heuretics* 106).

**Artisanal Practice: Ellipsistic Bandwidth**

“ellipsistic, derived from *ellipsis*. A species of blank interval, a nod or fugue in which he was [. . .] struggling to finish a thought nor to begin one. Merely between.”

—Jonathan Lethem, *Chronic City* (3)
Investigating, by positing, the diegesis of “a theatre of multiplicities” does not in fact begin in the Orpheus Theatre at the arrested conclusion of Gravity’s Rainbow. Unlike with the hermeneutic search trajectories in V. and Lot 49, the approach does not use a structural role to simulate the quest plot toward knowledge discovery; although there are quests—particularly for the 00001 rocket (Schwarzgerät), by characters like Slothrop, Blicero, Enzian, and their pursuers (e.g. Major Marvy, Tchitcherine)—in several narratives, the literary assemblage encountered can not adequately be treated in a “characterological reading” (McHoul 37) of the earlier sort. A “paranoid” serial progression and treatment of proliferating signs or connections, as with detectives Stencil and Oedipa, would not effectively grasp let alone employ the aesthetic logic(s) offered by Pynchon’s writing.

Moreover, I might keep in mind a cautionary point from the text directly, as when “Slothrop’s dumb idling heart sez: The Schwartzgerät is no Grail, Ace, that’s not what the G in Imipolex G stands for. And you are no knightly hero” (Gravity’s 364). Instead, recalling the transformative qualities earlier discovered posits an alternative approach and at least two points with which to begin. Fundamentally, Pynchon’s “formula” or intensive writing has “transformed” the material and literary composition into an assemblage; the latter includes components that function as “dismantling” in lines of flight, particularly the post-signifying regime, in Deleuze’s terms. Thus, the logocentric critic and hermeneutic detectives alike have “missed a clue”—or better, misperceive a generative understanding of a serial narrative effect.

Changing the premise that knowledge is discovered to the view that meaning is made, in the production of sense or sensation, by the literary machines in Pynchon’s composition, not only provides expressions of but catalyzes new situations experienced: inchoate, perceptual, affective, non-rational. While not suggesting any deliberate succession, the progression through Pynchon’s
first three novels this way entails a productive and intelligible transition in forms of knowledge and discourse (perhaps worth exploring further in another context). For my purposes, I am able to discern at least one formal logic of *Gravity’s Rainbow* from my encounters thus far: first, V. becomes “a remarkably scattered concept” (*V*. 418) for characters and readers; this recognition relates subtly to the temporality of information and particularly Oedipa’s investment in retrieval-as-discovery. The novel’s narrator explicitly dramatizes her faith in “gemlike clues,” chiefly the post-horn symbol, for communication and knowledge, and describes them as “only some kind of compensation. To make up for her having lost the direct, epileptic Word, the cry that might abolish the night” (*Lot* 95). While the latter clause pertains to my second point, this “compensation” lament underscores the narrative of “search-and-discover” Truth by Stencil and Oedipa and their unexamined methods—particularly Oedipa’s not attempting to use the W.A.S.T.E. postal system and fixating only on one word in research, like Stencil. More to the point, the “structural” properties of information and communication pertaining to technology evokes other temporal configurations, as non-chronological of the database described earlier.

The first insight (if not “inroad”) consequent of this review concerns the non-rational aesthetic logic created and employed in *Gravity’s Rainbow*; this focus is more particular, and accelerates the “conductive” logic of transversal style, than discussing generally the present-tense narration throughout the novel. Without overestimating the narrative significance or textual coincidence with *V.*, the notion of “temporal bandwidth” is presented to account for how Slothrop “has begun to thin, to scatter” as serial effect late in the novel: Kurt Mondaugen, an electrical engineer character from *V.*, explains that “Personal density [. . .] is directly proportional to temporal bandwidth” (509). Although this effect-explanation account is not great
evocative, the narrator’s elaborating, seemingly in the voice of Mondaugen, in “real-time” commentary upon Slothrop is worth quoting for the promising elements invoked:

“Temporal bandwidth” is the width of your present, your now. It is the familiar “\(\Delta t\)” considered as a dependent variable. The more you dwell in the past and in the future, the thicker your bandwidth, the more solid your persona. But narrower your sense of Now, the more tenuous you are. It may get to where you're having trouble remembering what you were doing five minutes ago, or even—as Slothrop now—what you're doing here, at the base of this colossal curved embankment. . . .

“Uh,” he turns slackmouth to Närrisch, “what are we. . . .”

[. . .]

“You said, ‘What are we. . . .’, then you stopped.”

“Oh. Gee, that was a funny thing to say.”

As for Närrisch, he’s too locked in to business. He has never seen this great Ellipse any other way but the way he was meant to. (Pynchon GR 509)

Not merely “promising,” the four components—scattering, delta-\(t\), temporality, ellipsis—implicate a paradigm with which to work, discerning the aesthetic logic employed. However, counter-signifying at best, this passage likely functions only as generative and not yet transformative (into assemblage), let alone diagrammatic as deterritorialization. On this point, I will limit my using Deleuze’s framework this way henceforth, in the interest of the present exercise, while exploring and proposing inventive poetics—an ellipsis for the interval.

Although the narrator’s describing “this great Ellipse” here likely refers to the geometric perspective—the jargon “Gauss curve” (508) relating to the “curved embankment”—of “Test Stand VII at Peenemünde, the familiar conception of ellipsis within the discourse of rhetoric and literary writing evokes the question of what is omitted or what of this account trails off. In this case, Pynchon textually employs ellipsis in multiple ways, both referential and rhetorical as well as for the syntax of narrating and of presenting speech (i.e. as “natural” pauses) throughout the novel. Thus it is obvious and yet salient to recognize how Gravity’s Rainbow operates not with the “the direct, epileptic Word” of logocentrism but through its ellipsistic composition. More than just syntactic idiosyncrasy, this feature is worth examining briefly in the paradigmatic
sense, before proposing my diegetic figure for invention in the next section. In the first sense, literal use of the term appears only once: “But where will Leni be now? Where will she have wandered off to, carrying her child, and her dreams that will not grow up? Either we didn't mean to lose her—either it was an ellipsis in our care, in what some of us will even swear is our love, or someone has taken her, deliberately, for reasons being kept secret, and Sachsa’s death is part of it too” (Pynchon 218, my emphasis). In this peculiar “modulation” of voice (Schaub 130), the narrator reflects in the subjunctive mood about Leni Pökler, a character of tertiary significance as wife to Franz Pökler and mother to Ilse, both of whom feature more prominently. Of course, precisely such disregard in our reading is implicated by Pynchon with the self-reflexive irony of switching to the first-person plural narrative voice—an ellipsis in our care. . . ?

The issue of narration raised here might be less a matter of “an omission of our concern” in this sense than it is a moment directing attention precisely to the perspective or “focalization,” one that shifts throughout the novel. In this regard, ellipsis as “editing” technique relates to the “cinematic” descriptions of Pynchon’s writing by several critics—most blatantly in Kittler’s remark that “Gravity’s Rainbow is a film” considering the “technical and temporal sense[s]” (Reading Matters 163). Thus the non-sequential composition unfolds in present tense, through editing or “time-axis manipulation” (Kittler 164); Moore—who recognizes the novel’s structure as four filmic “reels” (Connectedness 30)—likewise describes extensively the “framing” (33), beyond general focalization, of Pynchon’s cinematographic style, in ways such as “roaming and panning effects” along with the diegetic filming (37). Such understandings are beneficial, unlike the scholarly prevalence of excessively discussing content such as the abundant movie references and the (relatively) prominent characters German filmmaker Gerhardt von Göll (or “Der Springer”) and actress Margherita (Greta) Erdmann. Beyond the level of content, or considering
along with style, this view recognizes how Pynchon’s writing draws attention to processes of aesthetic mediation and media themselves: in this case, it is film’s “methods of organizing information” (*Information* 132), as Stark notes, by which Pynchon “cinematically manipulates time much more frequently than space” in distinctly “cinematic” fashion (140).

Although indeed particular to the contemporary media age, with technology connecting the temporality of film and rocketry that Stark, Moore, and most others note, the “mediality” of filmic writing techniques (*Reading Matters* 175), in Johnston’s terms, must not simply be yet another (an additional and different) heuristic for analysis, as a discuss subsequently. Notable for pragmatic study, Johnston explains that “mediality refers to the ways in which a literary text inscribes in its own language the effects produced by other media”; furthermore pertinent, “The critical task will be to ascertain how these effects are narrativized or can be seen to determine the representation of consciousness as a ‘reading effect’” (175, my emphasis). Thus, rather than using “medial heuristic,” I continue with the paradigm of *ellipsis* and Pynchon’s writing with its multiple “registers”—finding a *diagrammatic* component, which acts in transversal connection between history and fiction: *preterition*, as rhetorical ellipsis and as epistemological concept. Avoiding a cinematic “jump-cut” switch in topics, this transition is aided by the textual post-signifying regime and formal logic of *interval*, specifically discerned in “hypodiegetic” texts and explicitly in the earlier passage: “So here passes for him one more negligence . . . and likewise groweth his Preterition sure. . . . There is no good reason to hope for any turn, any surprise *I-see-it*, not from Slothrop” (Pynchon 509, original formatting).

**Paralipsis (review for praxis)**

The focus upon preterition and writing also re-orients the discussion to my study of narrative as interface and of diegesis for invention, avoiding as well a structural identification with the narrators’ shifting cinematic “focalization” (upon Slothrop or otherwise). To this end, I
find coincidental and generative assistance: in *Narrative as Communication*, Didier Coste discusses not only a “transversal axis” of communication (81), an alternative to rhetoric in which “assumption of authority is the dominant gesture” (82), but rhetorical “preterition” (albeit in another context) and “fictionality” (105). I invoke this understanding not for its coincidental phrasing, certainly, or as counterpoint to “mediality,” but in complementarity, akin to the “X-Y axes” of Deleuze’s assemblage view—and more directly, because I understand Pynchon’s deploying Preterition fundamentally in terms narratological and rhetorical.

Granted, the use is highly referential in Pynchon’s writing as a concept from Calvinist theology, the Preterite being those “passed over” unlike the Elect. However, it is not mere antecedent that relates textually William Slothrop and the author’s ancestor William Pynchon, as noted by most scholars, most notably Moore concerning “interface” (*Connectedness* 136). The utility of this connection extends beyond the analytic means critics have found in the “Puritans’ dualism” (Stark 123). For example, Sanders links the Calvinist doctrine to Slothrop’s dissolution, as to “to be dropped from conspiracies is to lose all connection with past and future” (*Mindless Pleasures* 152): using a frequently-cited passage, Sanders fixates on how “paranoia is a secular form of the Puritan consciousness” insofar as “Slothrop is possessed by ‘a Puritan reflex of seeking other orders behind the visible, also known as paranoia’ ([*GR*] 188)” (*Mindless* 144). To be clear, I am identifying a compelling element of the novel not as (yet another) hermeneutic vantage but as diegetic focus on *writing*—the fictional book, William Slothrop’s *On Preterition* and the historical publication *The Meritorious Price of our Redemption* by William Pynchon.

By viewing the two 17th-century books of similar origin as calling attention to the practice of writing, more so than the “theme” of preterition in Calvinist terms, we can better recognize the *generative* and *transformative* effects of Pynchon’s composing in ways other than
referential or signifying language. As I am conjecturing, this potentially identifies a writing formula, Pynchon’s “polymath” style, and one that is apt for the lexiphile to think and write paradigmatically with assemblages. The idea of “narrativity” names one aspect to this literary assemblage, in fiction and possibly in scholarly rhetoric. Beyond integrating multiple texts in storytelling, the variations and forms of diegetic writing, markedly in Pynchon’s works, create multiple levels of discourses and regimes within the manifold assemblage. Another helpful angle for grasping “preterition-ellipsistic style” derives from Coste, who thoroughly expounds Gerald Prince’s “narrativity” term, and one of the three definitions of “literariness” provided: “the activation and productive transformation of the nondominant functions of an act of discourse, whatever functions of it cannot be dominant in the reception milieu” (Communication 86, original emphasis). In an experimental pragmatics discerning Pynchon’s writing, ellipsis in form, rhetoric, and reference might quite rightly be regarded as a “nondominant function” of discourse that produces qualities of literariness beyond denotative or constative statements.

The first major diegetic text occurs in Chapter Eleven of V., “Confessions of Fausto Maijstral,” authored by tertiary character (father of Paola, who is pursued amorously by Pig Bodine in the present-day narratives), and signed “Valletta: 27 August 1956” (372). Although spatial epistemology is foregrounded, “Why use the room as introduction to an apologia?” (352), the misperception of ontological levels is avoided by noticing it is phrased in direct address to future recipient (from “your father”): Maijstral is “sealed against the present” in order “to deal with the past” (352) through his writing. The character’s accounts of the 1930s in Malta include historical reports, literary references, a “vulgar song” (349), and even citations of his own writing—in Coste’s terms, “polyreference” (125) and “intratextual echo” (127), the metafictional qualities of Pynchon’s writing. Although not ellipsistic rhetorically in stating, “Fausto Maijstral
is guilty of murder: a sin of omission if you will” (372), the narration of this significant event—the “disassembly of the Bad Priest” (i.e. V.) by children (369)—is comprised within a diegetic letter read by a character, Stencil, in an interval secondary to the main discourse.

The rhetorical technique of *apophasis* or “paralipsis”—not quite a portmanteau of *ellipsis* and *preterition* but approximately, given the Greek origin *paraleipsis*—is employed in the “dramatic” narrative of *Lot 49* concerning “Trystero.” On one hand, the device of indirectly invoking a subject, Trystero, by explicit omission is not employed in the diegetic play, *The Courier’s Tragedy*, that Oedipa views—a departure from the original text by the company.

Indeed, scholar Emory Bortz clarifies to Oedipa the findings of her investigating textual variants as “logocentric critic”: “In the text I go along with personally [. . .] that other couplet has the last line suppressed. The book in the Vatican is only an obscene parody” (*Lot* 126). In the scholarly view, ostensibly, Trystero is thus *preterite* textually and “thematically”—absent and silent diegetically in *Lot 49*, and yet functioning as significant precisely in writing.¹⁰ Moreover, it is by this variant edition, which *officially* should be elided, that Pynchon evokes another frequency (or “sector”) of the *paraleipsis* paradigm, the religious writing of William Slothrop *qua* William Pynchon: “D’Amico thinks this edition was a Scurvhamite project.” (127), Bortz remarks, further in the style of scholarly citation; “Robert Scurvham had founded, during the reign of Charles I, a sect of most pure Puritans” (128). And while this connection invites “decoding” *Gravity’s Rainbow* using preterition in the narrowly Puritan sense, potential invention by the *nondominant function* of ellipsis turns my attention to textuality and writing otherwise. In the

¹⁰ Indeed, another diegetic text prominently features in the proliferation of the Trystero mythology: the appearance in *The Courier’s Tragedy* is accounted for by the author, Richard Wharfinger, having used as “source material” a book titled “An Account of the Singular Peregrinations of Dr. Diocletian Blobb among the Italians, Illuminated with Exemplary Tales from the True History of That Outlandish And Fantastical Race” (*Lot* 129). The alleged prevalence of Trystero refashions the notion of *peregrinations*—of Stencil, Oedipa, and Slothrop, linking the novels—potentially in “chorography” from *quest trajectory* to elliptical ellipsis or better yet, *ellipsistic ellipse.*
next chapter, I keep these lessons and rhetorical understandings in mind as I more directly
develop my theorizing and using narrative as an interface and fictional material as diegesis for
invention—particularly encountering sensations expressed by aesthetic composition uniquely.
CHAPTER 5
ASSEMBLAGE INTERFACE—THEORY AND PRACTICE

Novelistic Philosophy

Accelerating in the experiment from the developments in the prior chapter, the present focus undertakes diagramming literary expressions, aesthetic monuments, of sensations and experience more specifically. In concrete social assemblages, literary writing mediates the inchoate dimensions and multiple senses outside rationale thought: as in the cases of desire, for Deleuze and Guattari, and of historical events or moreover the unintelligible disaster (all discussed here). Although it is feasible and enticing to identify instances of heterogeneous series and transversal lines, using the earlier vocabulary, that I find in novels by Pynchon and other writers, the salience of senses experienced (not yet “legible”) raises the on-going question of encountering expressed sensation and progressing toward knowledge (both experienced and created). Specifically, this idea compels not only scholarly pragmatics of multiple semiotic regimes first, but as well to apply these aesthetic features in creative practice—quite likely a suitable method for encountering post-signifying expression, especially.

Before attempting to use novels encountered in this regard, I thus examine an important complementary component, considering what “pragmatics-encounter” reading finds expressed by intensive language. In a brief section, I next identify additional lessons for method on this topic discerned from Deleuze and Guattari’s Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature (1975), including an earlier pitfall using their work. The subsequent literary encounters with several novels then re-engages the problematic, the frontier of knowledge, from another approach philosophically and rhetorically: beyond the discovery model, in the mode of invention—as a writer, and confronting the limits of writing, aided by novelistic expression in the aesthetic paradigm. This progression, particularly in testing the possibilities for creating new knowledge,
and the initial praxis advances the methodological study and discursive experiment toward the conclusion of the project; creating a concept of sensation, through \textit{artisanal praxis} using a novelistic assemblage, is thus attuned to dimensions temporal as well as affective.

\textbf{Reading Poetics}

Additionally helpful to these ends is the perspective of Hélène Cixous, a theorist similar to the other poststructuralist exemplars I have invoked thus far given her focus on language. Her attention to functions and effects of writing beyond signification, \textit{diagrammatism} in this parlance, elucidates and bolsters both the treatment of literature and the encounter method I am developing. Cixous’s concerns presented throughout her collection \textit{Readings} (1991) relate generally to my project, as well. For example, in the seminar “Apprenticeship and Alienation,” she remarks upon the limits of knowledge: “The problem with philosophical discourse is that it can be developed rapidly in an abstract way, in spirals” (92). Concerning what of life can be incorporated into forms intelligible, she asserts that “To work on what escapes [philosophy] can only be done poetically” (92)—perhaps through the “not-knowing (\textit{non-savoir})” of literary logic, “not an ignorant nonknowing but an open knowing, which lets things happen” (91).

This alternative perspective of Cixous’s—presented in a context discussing Derrida, Heidegger, and Blanchot, moreover—invokes the broader issue of a \textit{dispositif} and the limits for legitimate knowledge, which frames the specific insights and types of “minor” readings observable in the works of Cixous as well as Deleuze and Guattari. One new possibility is created by her approach to literature and language, considering “corporeal intelligence” (53) for example, as Cixous reads in Heinrich von Kleist and Clarice Lispector. More instructive is the statement of method in another seminar, “Poetry, Passion, and History”: Cixous states, “I want to work on passion as path and on the encounter, perhaps the struggle, between passion and history. All this, for me, goes through \textit{the inscription of passion} in writing” (110, my emphasis). This
diagrammatic reading of works by Kleist, Lispector, Paul Celan, and Marina Tsvetayeva identifies literary ("poetic") uses that "transform language" (132). Not strictly poetry proper, Cixous notes that in addition to diction, "we have to pay attention to the technique of storytelling (83), including narrative, dialogue, and characters. Finding in these "a true desire that is not expressed" (88)—as Cixous does reading Lispector’s “The Foreign Legion”—might be a goal too narrowly defined, granted.

Yet, this attentiveness to other registers or regimes understands intensive language in writing as expressive (or "poetic") communication closer qualitatively to music or movement, encounters normally “disenfranchised of knowledge” (67) by the dispositif of Reason. As Cixous articulates, “[I]t is also difficult because we are inhibited, disquieted; and communication of movement is something physical, related to the body. It scares. It is to make love. But most people resist it. They go back into their selves and become rigid" (46). This description extends doubly to scholarly discourse, as I am arguing and seeking to remedy, given the limits upon thought and expression, conveying sensations encountered—perhaps “what is incommunicable” by signification (46), and yet possible by musico-poetic writing (149) in Cixous’s framework. Indeed, she theorizes expression of experienced or embodied sensation “above” or “beyond” signification, which to me appears recourse against the dispositif acting upon knowledge discourses: “In music, events are much closer to our reality. One should be able to write the way one sings” (29). Viewed another way, these conditions for possibility are “thematized” in literature as semantic and/or epistemological limits; an intensive procedure might thus be writing bodily “gesture” or movement (68), or with “the noise of the law” and aural register as does Joyce (9), unlike Blanchot and Kafka. in her readings.
Describing properties of gesture or music this way might appear figurative, when referencing literal instances in literary texts; however, as Cixous’s postulations indicate, the metalanguage for diagrammatic reading is inadequate, especially when discussing qualities beyond signification as experienced, encountering expression of sensation. Stated otherwise, working in the aesthetic rather than referential or denotative paradigm treats the language of sense and event unlike that of “good-sense” and verification, to repeat. Like Cixous, Deleuze recognizes an experiential register in aesthetic expression, including “the inscription of passion,” by reading literary language for its functions and effects, particularly in works with Guattari. Declaring that “the question becomes: how does it function? What function does it have?” (Kafka 49), they present an explicit and reflexive principle. In Kafka, they find a minor literature that operates by intensive language, unlike the “ordinary [,] extensive or representative” use (Kafka 20)—beginning with a fundamental reworking of the signifying “gesture” and broader gestus in their “new rhetoric [and] new mode of reading” (Bensmaïa Kafka xii). As extended demonstration of their method and explication of key concepts, Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature (1975) serves as a “case study” that presents both a marked exemplar for working against a dispositif and a hazard for praxis, which I briefly describe after discussing the former.

Exemplar Study 2: Kafka Experimentation

Reiterating that the terms used herein are not figurative, pertaining to Kafka’s literature as well as to Deleuze and Guttari’s concepts, is important “thematically” with Kafka and methodologically, in that no referent is privileged or evoked by this parlance. More directly, and akin with Cixous’s sensory-reading, we can understand that the chief concern is the “concrete” level of language and its operation: pragmatics, overtly, fashions their reading at levels separate from representation and abstraction, recognizing the counter- and post-signifying regimes. Significantly, Deleuze and Guattari present complex ideas through aesthetic figures encountered
in Kafka, such as the “two states of desire,” evident in the image of the raised head or the bent head “as an index of submission, the gesture of one who is judged” (61, my emphasis). At the broader level of method, in their view Kafka “deliberately kills all metaphor, all symbolism, all signification, no less than all designation” (22). This understanding compels the treatment of language they insist upon against interpretation: literature consists not of resemblance but of intensity—“intensives or tensors” being “‘any linguistic tool that allows a move toward the limit of a notion or a surpassing of it’, marking a movement of language toward its extremes, toward a reversible beyond or before” (22). Although my interest concerns linguistics less than this discussion might suggest, the approach appears to be the point of departure for Deleuze and Guattari, their pragmatics reading that conceptualizes a particular deterritorialization in Kafka.\(^{11}\)

Moreover, the invention of minor literature as concept concerns integrally the method of encounter-pragmatics as well as the understanding of the literary assemblage and its operations, both equally important to my purposes. First, to clarify, my earlier discussions of intensive language use in literature relate here to minor literature, whether in specific lines of flight or greater senses of deterritorialization. The specific circumstances for Kafka—in his combining vernacular Czech and Yiddish, vehicular and referential/cultural German, and mythic Hebrew—fashion him as exemplar for Deleuze and Guattari. However, minor literature concerns issues of socio-political identity less than the act of deterritorialization, insofar as the task is “To make use of polylingualism of one’s own language, to make a minor or intensive use of it” by which “an assemblage comes into play” (26-7). Although posing great potential and interest for other scholars, in my context this notion is more significant one way, for innovating within the

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\(^{11}\) Just as with “line of flight,” the concept does not involve spatial movement literally or figuratively but degrees of intensity, as evident in the intensive use of language in minor literature (19). Moreover this functions in assemblages machinic, novelistic, collective, or “dismantled” (47)—immanent points with potential for changing conditions of possibility, as in minor literature’s intensive “language […] with a high coefficient of deterritorialization” (16).
*dispositif* of the “majority” language; and in another, greater sense that the recourse is the aesthetic paradigm, *literary machines* in Kafka and for Deleuze and Guattari that generate possibility. Asserting that “Language stops being representative in order to now move toward its extremities or its limits” (23, original emphasis), for instance, articulates a problematic of *deteriorialization* evident at levels aesthetic, epistemological, and social in the case of Kafka.

Beyond the narrow consideration of counter- or post-signifying regimes, and minor literature for that matter, this exemplar is valuable for my methodological study given the specific theorizations of deteriorialization and the *literary assemblage* within constructivist project working with the “Kafka-machine” (7). Indeed, Deleuze and Guattari describe their work as “a Kafka experimentation that is without interpretation or significance and rests only on tests of experience” (7). This text explicitly addresses ways of working with literature, valuable especially for praxis this way as exemplar for innovation with *and about* Kafka’s writing—directly raising the earlier question of emulating style or using a *dispositif*. As I noted in Chapter Three, recent scholarly texts, such as those by O’Sullivan and Clay, have emerged as productive methodological counterpoints to strictly interpretive works. And while I cited only a few among many publications that demonstrate the over-emphasis (and frequent misunderstanding) of “becomings” and “lines of flight,” the hazard of hermeneutic discourse is equally valid to note so as not to incorrectly recognize or “encode” such concepts at the level of signification; in other words, reading ostensible representations of terms rather than “mapping” (*diagramming*) the multiple regimes and their functions or effects. On the contrary, encountering experiments in writing fundamentally enables innovation beyond simply encoding into a terminological schema. The latter approach could be misinterpreted about Deleuze and Guattari’s reading authors like
Proust, Beckett, Artaud, as Stivale implies (Two-Fold Thought 44)—in whose view Kafka “reveal[s] the possibilities of an extended literary schizoanalysis” (68).  

In another sense, Peter Trnka emphasizes constructivist praxis in his article “Experimental Empiricism and the Ethic of Minor Literature,” noting the experimentation of “minor literature as bachelor production” in Kafka; in Trnka’s view, this conception enables our connecting “concept production” and event (56). With the goal of invention, it is this approach I am advocating and describing, in this methodology of encountering generative and transformative literary functions: chiefly, the pragmatics of and innovation with deterritorialization and the literary assemblage, especially given the demands for interpretative discourse—a dispositif for scholarly writing. My productive “finding” and salient interest are thus the constructivist experimentation with the “Kafka-machine” by Deleuze and Guattari. Their inventive results specifically displace the “three worst themes in many interpretations of Kafka [:] the transcendence of the law, the interiority of guilt, the subject of enunciation” (45); adding that these themes “are connected to all the stupidities that have been written about allegory, metaphor, and symbolism” (45), they instead produce a Kafka-concept, or “abstract machine” in their parlance (48). Just as in his “long experimentation” (45), the Kafka text demonstrates an “active dismantling” (49) in discursive practice as well, presenting alternative perspectives: against a content-form dichotomy, the form of content and of expression (28); against the territorialized photograph (61), sonorous expression (6, 26, 86); against social

12 That Stivale equivocally frames an understanding of Kafka and A Thousand Plateaus in the ostensible original schema of Anti-Oedipus discounts his insights from apt inclusion for praxis in my methodology—which I qualify reluctantly, given Stivale’s notable focus upon “literary elements” in the philosophy Deleuze and Guattari. This notwithstanding, he quotes an intriguing response from Guattari, found in another scholars’ work: ‘It’s not a question of method or doctrine….The book [Kafka] (sic) is a schizoanalysis of our relation to Kafka’s work, but also of the period of Vienna in 1920 and of a certain bureaucratic eros which crystallized in that period, and which fascinated Kafka’ (1979b, 60; Genosko 1996, 207)” (Stivale 68, my emphasis). This is worth noting given its relevance to the lessons for scholarship that I describe from experience and research such as I cite here.
criticism (58), the “novelistic machinic assemblage” (48); against the transcendental or “paranoid” law, “Schizo-Law” (73); against stratified territory, an unlimited field immanence (86); finally, against reified and transcendental machines, abstract machines on the field of immanence as “dismantled” assemblages (86-7).

Beyond reconfiguring a critical perspective or producing a new exegesis of Kafka’s oeuvre, which indeed it could be considered, the results produced in Kafka indicate a style in thought and writing by means of the aesthetic paradigm—not simply because Deleuze and Guattari recognize and compose in the form of series, as I earlier described The Logic Of Sense. The “literary machine” of Kafka, more than other authors Deleuze encounters, enables in epistemology and discourse the heterogeneous assemblage, rather than univocal Idea governed by exclusion or binary opposition within the dispositif of Reason. We can observe this crucial point for method in perhaps the most salient point of this text: “Writing has a double function: to translate everything into assemblages and to dismantle the assemblages” (47).

A constructivist project could thus integrate this additional view beyond pragmatics of semiotic regimes, a prospect for method I will attempt subsequently; moreover, the statement aptly describes Deleuze and Guattari’s as much as Kafka’s texts. Viewed from one angle, this function and effect is evident in Kafka as a literary progression: first, machinic indexes,” “signs of the assembly,” as in the stories; “then, abstract machines,” series in the novel; “and finally, the assemblages of the machine” (47-8, original emphasis). In a more concrete sense, the three components of Kafka’s “machine of writing or of expression” are his letters, short stories, and major novels: in Deleuze and Guattari’s view of these heterogeneous series, “Between three elements there is a constant transversal communication” (40, my emphasis).
Abstract Machine, Concrete Lessons

Before identifying what they find at this transversal dimension, it is important to note—for attempting similar diagrammatic reading—that within each component Deleuze and Guattari encounter virtual lines of escape in “possible states” (7), which might actualize as “enunciations or expressions” (86) and transform the assemblage through deterritorialization. Transformative or generative elements appear for example in literary instances of becomings -animal, -woman, and -child, as in the “childhood block” line of flight against memory (78); in triangulation that works to proliferate series, rather than repress with power (11); in the “bachelor machine” and “artistic machine” (70). In the parlance of intensive use, Deleuze and Guattari postulate that Kafka “attempts to extract from social representations assemblages of enunciation and machinic assemblages and to dismantle these assemblages” (46, my emphasis). For them, the nascent “machine of expression” by Kafka emerges as one “that is all the more social and collective insofar as it is solitary, a bachelor, and that, tracing the line of escape, is equivalent to a community whose conditions haven’t yet been established” (71); minor literature this way functions in the “production of intensive quantities […], proliferation of series, [and] polyvalent and collective connections” (71). A key lesson for method, and a hazard that I have erroneously performed in past work, is to undertake the unique and contingent conclusion drawn from precisely the invention strategy—that which might be emulated, as I have advocated.

In the case of Kafka, the unique conclusion from diagramming the Kafka assemblage, and the main theme or transversal concept within the “Kafka-machine,” is desire (in the sense of intensity, not in limited terms of sexuality or psychology). Both the “bachelor machine” (71) and minor literature (86) in this reading function to this end: “There is no machinic assemblage that is not a social assemblage of desire, no social assemblage of desire that is not a collective assemblage of enunciation” (82). Contingent to their conceptions, this compound description
otherwise conveys Deleuze and Guattari’s invention of a Kafka-abstract machine. Desire this way is what they find resonating as effect—no longer “within” or “above” or “throughout” in spatial parlance—of the literary assemblage, a post-signifying function of expression actively dismantled in affirmation. Indeed, in one of four questions for evaluating intensive writing, they specifically posit, “what is the ability of a literary machine, an assemblage of enunciation or expression, to form itself into this abstract machine insofar as it is a field of desire?” (88).

On one hand this inquiry could motivate an entire project, highly compelling for encounter-pragmatics of any object of study. Diagramming the desire expressed by a literary assemblage, or recognizing an inchoate abstract machine, might this way correspond with Cixous’s reading the inscription of passion, like Derrida’s finding “a dominant affect, a Stimmung or a pathos, a tone” (Acts of Literature 291) in the “vibration” and “event” (308) of Ulysses. To wit, I approached Joyce’s novel in an earlier project thusly, undertaking the last question of Kafka: using the alternative understandings noted previously, I posited a becoming-music of the text and its expression of desire, describing its deterritorialization of mimesis in the affective paradigm through expressed intensity, encountered at levels diegetic and corporeal.

By recognizing semiotic regimes of music and gesture against photography, employing the binary of affirmation and “bent-head” guilt from Kafka (5), I proposed a new conception of desire that supplants the territorializing “Pornosophical philotheology” (Joyce 353) of discourse generally and dismantles specifically the Oedipal Triangle of “captured desire” (Kafka 61).

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13 Perhaps this will have been the counter-signifying regime after all, with continued relevance for method in any case. “Theorem Seven” from A Thousand Plateaus is worth quoting at length for the elucidative value additionally: “the deterritorializing element has the relative role of expression, and the deterritorialized element the relative role of content (as evident in the arts); but not only does the content have nothing to do with an external subject or object, since it forms an asymmetrical block with the expression, but the deterritorialization carries the expression and the content to a proximity where the distinction between them ceases to be relevant, or where deterritorialization creates their indiscernibility (example: the sound diagonal as the musical form of expression, and becomings-woman, -child, -animal as the contents proper to music, as refrains)” (Deleuze and Guattari ATP 307).
Approaching the novel with Deleuze and Guattari’s *abstract machine* conclusion motivated my recognizing and reconfiguring an understanding too narrowly, using the “two great points of deterritorialization” (*Kafka* 86): “one turning the expressions into a sound that takes flight or into a language or intensities (against the photos) […] the other taking the contents ‘head over heels and away’ (against the bent head of desire)” (*Kafka* 86). And while this approach certainly finds *lines of flight* in intensive *becomings*, potentially transformative and immanent within the literary assemblage, the machinic functions and semiotic regimes encountered must be employed in constructivism rather than denotative discourse. This problem is evoked for instance in my regarding seriously a “Stephen-Bloom-Molly chord of affective parallax” (as I wrote); likewise in mapping an extant assemblage between reader (me), the *Ulysses* machinic expression, and the Deleuzean theory machine—integrating into my study not only the points from *Kafka* but “ethology” of intensity from *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy* as well as the deterritorialization (*e.g.* “becoming-music”) and “field of immanence of desire” from *A Thousand Plateaus* (154).

To state plainly, although “productive” for new understanding, the “procedure” mostly appears to have *encoded* affective relations or encountered sensations into Deleuzean philosophy. Although not incorrect or inapt, this effort did not produce a new concept through an encounter-constructivist method. Thus, to parallel Deleuze in method, rather than using as heuristic for ostensibly “critical discourse,” remains crucially the key goal—a lesson as well being to employ terminology “productively,” toward invention beyond simply identification. To this end, the method for practice to attempt consists of finding the generative and transformative elements of multiple semiotic regimes, as well as possible transversal coordination of heterogeneous series; then, “diagramming” a literary assemblage encountered and the dismantled expressed therein, an effect created by its machinic function, such as *sensation* perhaps.
It is not as though the abstract machine of desire found in *Ulysses* is not immanent, or that the “affective parallax” and “becoming-music” intensity could not be used as the transformative elements within the literary assemblage. Besides the ambivalence noted about encoding the sensations encountered, though, there remains the concern over creating a transcendental concept of desire—an idea returning the sensible to the intelligible only, by using Deleuze and Guattari as heuristic. Moreover, although the many semiotic regimes Joyce employs might serve as generative literary machine for reinventing a concept of desire akin to Caroll’s fiction, the necessary element in the present methodology is a diegesis for inventing a concept of sensation: that which is encountered and experienced, not exogenous and applied analytically. Keeping with this contrast, the case of expressed desire might too easily slip from the lines of flight by Joyce’s intensive writing to the regime of signification, if using mimetic instances, and worse still to levels of abstraction and even territorialization in positing relations between writer and character as ostensibly “representative,” allegorical, or symbolic.

More concretely, I am raising the issue of method and constructivism, specifically whether a transformative element such as the “becoming-music” deterritorialization that I have “diagrammed” is suitable for inventing a concept experienced, as in this case of desire. The immanent “affective parallax” in my reading generates a line of flight toward expressive “becoming-music,” beyond territorialized signification (form), as “triangulated” desire (content) freed from Oedipal “territorialization.” This concept could now be inscribed Δ-desire—an intensive abbreviation that evokes both the “DT” of deterritorialization as well as that of “differential time,” a key lesson from my working with Pynchon’s novels. In this way, the noted flaw in my applying *Kafka* as heuristic for analysis not only emphasizes the utility of pragmatics.

Moreover, recalling the perspectives of Cixous and Deleuze and Guattari, thinking the entire
paradigm includes an imperative for our incorporating the experienced dimensions in the product of *artisanal praxis*—temporal and affective sensation encountered, made intelligible.

*(Reprise) Working at “the frontiers of our knowledge”*

In continuing to propose a rhetoric for *artisanal praxis*, expressive scholarly writing in the fashion of its object of study, my approach is motivated by and continues applying the lessons derived from my examination of Deleuze’s style as exemplar. With the problematic of “the unknown,” or better, the unknown as problematic, the question or “mystery” is occasion and opportunity for invention; rather than strictly “answering” a question with a “solution,” a problematic consists of question, problem, and concept. To this end, the prior chapters partly demonstrated the limits of the “discovery” model in the “hermeneutic detective,” using Pynchon’s characters and narratives as “structural portrait” for my position as scholar. This approach also addressed the first half of Deleuze’s description, in his reflexively stating that “A book of philosophy should be in part a very particular species of detective novel, in part a kind of science fiction”—not denoting hermeneutics, but reminding that concepts “should intervene to resolve local situations” (*DR* xx) in problematics.

Undertaking the prospect that “Philosophy’s like a novel” (*Negotiations* 140), I have thus far posited analogically Pynchon’s diegesis for invention in parallel fashion to Deleuze’s finding in Carroll a *mise en scene* of nonsense (*Logic* xiii). Additionally, this position corresponds to how novelists, and *artisanal composers*, “make the work a process of learning or experimentation” by working with the “questioning ‘blind spot,’” in Deleuze’s terms (*DR* 199). With this in mind, the second part of Deleuze’s description might better identify the “axis” with greater potential for innovation—especially in our needing to avoid the conventional *discovery model* for knowledge, when encountering unknown and unintelligible events mediated.
As I introduced in Chapter 2, the “frontier of knowledge” names the coordinates (ostensibly “spatio-temporal,” for now) for the process of philosophy generally and encounter-scholarship with particular objects of study. Worth reiterating is that Olkowski, while discussing problematics (question-problem-concept), notes that the Detective-SciFi writing of philosophy “requires invention,” with hermeneutics shifting to “the intuition of the being of becoming” (Ruin 179, my emphasis). The artisan philosopher in this way approaches the unknown precisely as opportunity for invention, the moment when “we imagine having something to say,” Deleuze states: “We write only at the frontiers of our knowledge, at the border which separates our knowledge from our ignorance and transforms the one into the other” (DR xxi).

Notably, Deleuze describes this epistemological status (or “position”) for the thinker in the context of philosophical writing as Science Fiction, in the preface to Difference and Repetition—when he emphasizes empiricism as “undertak[ing] the most insane creation of concepts” (DR xx). Thus keeping in mind that encounter heuretics does not (merely) relay observations, the method for praxis moreover shifts from the classic detective-discovery model to the SciFi-author paradigm for invention, while still maintaining the contingency of concepts to problems (“local situations”). This shift in orientation, which I have “undergone,” and “dramatized” using novelistic elements, poses a compelling opportunity: rather than the hermeneutic-detective model, innovation might emerge by approaching as “Sci-Fi author” the task of novelistic philosophy that Deleuze elsewhere asserts—“you have to ask ‘What's going to happen?', ‘What's happened?'” (Negotiations 140).14

14 This chapter of Negotiations originally published “On Philosophy,” Conversation with Raymond Bellour and Francois Ewald, Magazine Litteraire 257 (September 1988). I note the sources as significant given the context, contemporaneous with the project with Guattari and appearing between A Thousand Plateaus (1980) and What is Philosophy? (1991)—what I have identified earlier as Deleuze’s period of increasingly aesthetic objects of study. Additionally, and more applicable presently, is that this remark reprises the typology of narrative lines in ATP: with “What happened?” characterizing the Novella, “What is going to happen?” the tale, and elements of both in the novel, “the variation of its perpetual living present (duration)” (192)—as I discuss subsequently.
As a second component of novelistic philosophy and artisanal praxis particular to literary encounters, in addition to diegesis, the retrospective-prospective questioning evokes the temporal qualities of narrative. This is both a methodological principle, provisionally, and a guiding perspective for the present chapter, particularly considering narrative as apt interface for experience. Applying the literary analog for philosophical discourse and/or composition is not “uncomplicated,” though, beyond tenuous extension discursively of the object of encounter to the method of study. For instance, Alliez ambiguously re-frames Deleuze and Guattari’s work in the aesthetic paradigm, describing how “The concept thus becomes narrative and philosophy a new genre of story in which description takes the place of the object, in which the point of view replaces the subject […]” (5, my emphasis).

For the sake of progressing and avoiding a tangential argument, I continue in the analogical typology that narrative is a rhetorical feature of composing, distinct from concepts and problematic (diegesis correlative to plane, apparatus, dispositif). Beyond adhering, albeit practical in simplicity, to Deleuze’s remarking that “the characters are concepts, and the scenes, the settings, are space time” (Negotiations 140-1) in this context, I am moreover using narrative for its temporal qualities, as pertains experience; as well, given that the formal organization and logic (interface) derives from my and is particular to my object of study—a contingent choice variable by project and discipline. With this in mind, the “characters” of Sci-Fi chorography are the concept and the artisan, at least to the degree of style individually: the “first-person” (experienced) position of encounter includes both the conditions (dispositif) and the change (line of flight), particularly by employing narrative as an affective and temporal interface.

The Sci-Fi author approach, instead of the detective search, toward the “frontier of knowledge” draws upon the features of literary writing in the aesthetic paradigm, thus enabling
new types of knowledge. More specifically, the discursive “meaning making” beyond rational knowledge is enabled by identifying—and being sensitive to—the features expressive of elided dimensions, as Cixous and Deleuze and Guattari have shown. Particularly instructive are their diagrammatic readings of senses and sensations such as passion or desire, deterritorialized, that are inscribed and expressed by intensive language, with the literary mediators encountered linking the reader to concrete social assemblages of experience. Toward the aim of discourse that is not merely denotative (or territorializing), the lessons derived from Pynchon’s style thus far also assist with novelistic analogs for scholarly rhetoric—most especially in using as diegesis the logic and praxis of paradigm, transversality, and assemblage. As I have emphasized, one key insight for application is finding and then using the intensive feature of materiality and textuality, which operate with functions and effects at semiotic regimes transformative and diagrammatic.

Concerning temporality, particularly orientations historical and future, the “productive” means for innovation and expression are found by “diagramming” features of literary language employed in narrative. This is the interface for my encounter with percepts, affects, and sensations in aesthetic compositions—mediated always, as opposed to experienced directly, just as the artisanal composition will be. In other words, we encounter and thus compose with the temporal sensations of “What’s happened?” and “What’s going to happen?” at the level of writing. Just as Pynchon’s “polymath style”—not just multi-disciplinary, but in ways historical, fictional, and personal—makes intense a diegesis for invention by composing uniquely, so too have other novelists called my attention to writing in their aesthetic monuments, compositions of percepts, affects, sensations. Before concluding with my first “inventive interface” attempt, one notable example to examine in this regard is Kurt Vonnegut’s Slaughterhouse-Five (1969), with its historical, literary and personal composition and its textual ecology of multiple discourses.
Literary Encounters Assemblage: Atemporal Historiography

“Forgetfulness […] refers us to nonhistorical forms of time, to the other of all tenses, to their eternal or eternally provisional indecision, bereft of destiny, without presence.” —Blanchot, The Writing of the Disaster (85)

During an inconsequential scene in Jonathan Safran Foer’s Extremely Loud & Incredibly Close (2005), eight-year-old Oskar Schell—the protagonist and one of three narrators—gives a class presentation on the bombing of Hiroshima. The episode begins with an audio-recorded interview with a survivor who recounts her experience seeking and finding her dying daughter, prompted by her interlocutor’s conventionally remarking “Can you describe the events of that morning?” (Foer 187) and “It must be hard to talk about these things” (189). After playing the recorded testimony, the character reports his “fascinating” research about scientists’ observing the height and diameter of the blast “by observing the shadows cast by intervening objects” (189); to illustrate how characters were “neatly burned out” of found documents, he presents a die-cut “sheet of paper, with the first page of A Brief History of Time in Japanese” (190).

Beyond the characterization function of the reference, Foer much later “bookends” the peculiarity and irony of the dual-approach to performative research by Oskar, a boy who perpetually invents scenarios and technical solutions (and feels anxiety about this compulsion), when including a diegetic letter-response from Stephen Hawking: addressing the question the boy had posted, “What if I never stop inventing?,” Hawking both confesses the desire to be a poet and reassures Oskar, “Maybe you're not inventing at all” (305). In recounting these passages, I mean both to highlight Foer’s transversal axis of narrative construction and to evoke by literary encounter the precarious issue of presenting information directly or indirectly—constructing knowledge and discourse by means of denotation or performance.

The issue “dramatized” in miniature here is the question of one’s selecting an interface in terms of discursive paradigm, mode or logic, and materials; composing by semiotic regimes
signifying (*e.g.* representation, testimony) or otherwise, including mixed or “multimodal” typology. This rhetorical decision-making, put plainly, and its inherent dilemma are foregrounded by Kurt Vonnegut in *Slaughterhouse-Five*, most explicitly in the metafictional framing of chapters one and ten. As Foer later replicates with his device of a character both database-searching (by Google) and imaginative, Vonnegut rhetorically confronts a *frontier of knowledge* regarding the exceptional case of experiencing a disaster first-hand.

**Writing the Timeless Disaster—Outside the *Slaughterhouse***

To be clear from the outset, I am exploring the focus upon creating expression that novelists direct, continuing from the prior chapter my approach of “making meaning” using an interface. Avoiding the issue of testimony given the scope of this project, a key component of encounter heuristics is composing expressions and articulations (broadly summarized) of our various types of knowledge—*making* sense of experience, rather than evincing “good sense” in the rational *dispositif*. In reflexive fashion, Vonnegut’s “working on my famous Dresden book” (4) within the very novel calls attention to the “choice of materials,” in Coste’s terms, as a “decisive step in the production of narrative,” one that is “as important indeed as the transformation of these materials by the *performances* of linguistic syntax, narrative syntax, and aesthetic composition” (*Communication* 242, my emphasis). Overtly, the *knowledge frontier* is engaged by Vonnegut’s including this process, most instructively, in ways explicit and inherent: the metafictional elements, as well as genre conventions of science fiction and historiography.

What I find most generative in Vonnegut’s text and particularly valuable for method, if not necessarily encountering sensation aesthetically, is the recourse to modes of writing given the inability, literally and philosophically, to produce an “eye-witness” account of the firebombing of Dresden, 13-15 February 1945. Indeed, even though he calls the book a “failure” because “it was written by a pillar of salt” (28)—looking back like Lot’s wife—Vonnegut, in his opting
against signification, demonstrates the value of indirect aesthetic vehicles for expression.

Expressing *avant la lettre* the philosophical mediations of Maurice Blanchot in *The Writing of the Disaster* (1980), Vonnegut reflexively addresses the reader (and his publisher):

> It is so short and jumbled and jangled, Sam, because there is nothing intelligent to say about a massacre. Everybody is supposed to be dead, to never say anything or want anything ever again. Everything is supposed to be very quiet after a massacre, and it always is, except for the birds.
> And what do the birds say? All there is to say about a massacre, things like ‘Poo-tee-weet?’ (24)

Foregoing an extensive theoretical investigation in favor of exploring the modes of textuality as recourse, I am compelled forward by two points of coincidence that link (paradigmatically?) Vonnegut’s style and novelistic invention; both of which concern the respective semiotic regimes and conventions of metafiction, Sci-Fi, and historiography included in the novel.

First, in the same section describing material choices—“linguistic, cultural, and compositional” (242)—for narrative, Coste reminds that there are “at least two blind spots on the plane of available materials”: the socio-linguistic *dispositif* of “the unutterable” and moreover the types of “ignorance,” such as “the forgotten, the uninvented, the unimaginable, the unconceivable, or other faces of memory, experience, and beliefs” (*Communication* 244). Coste thus names the problematic and the frontier facing Vonnegut specifically and *artisanal scholars* generally in my scope of encounter heuretics, how possible to create types of knowledge(s). One type is addressed directly by Blanchot, evoking Vonnegut’s poetics, in his asserting, “But the experience of the disaster—the experience none can have […] obliges us to disengage ourselves from time as irreversible […]” (*Disaster* 78). This is the second co-inciding point, which I discuss to lesser extent after the first, with which I try to connect concerning Vonnegut’s Sci-Fi invention strategies. For example, noting how Vonnegut avoids representing the disaster and conventional “ways of speaking about the unspeakable” (48), Klinkowtiz highlights techniques
reflecting “the timeless and spaceless dimensions of Tralfamadorian fiction” (72), such as Billy Pilgrim’s space-time travel, “like the science fiction writing of Kilgore Trout” (Reforming 72).

More importantly, the first perspective specifically recognizes the limits and affordances of materials for composition, as I have been asserting about working in the aesthetic paradigm. With the problematic of experience being degrees unintelligible and inexplicable, qualitatively (such as exceptional events) as well as progressively during the past sixty years, a specific task and activity for contemporary writers can be considered within this general scope summarized by Kittler: “The quotidian data flow must be arrested before it can become image or sign. What is called style in art is only the switchboard of these scannings and selections” (Gramophone 104).

As I earlier posited, an interface for sense making might enable our shift from “making sense” of the world intelligibly (analytic) to composing expression (intellect and sensation) by using, stylistically and perhaps intensively, the “available materials” to confront the uninvented or the unimaginable (Coste 244). Considering the prior example of Gravity’s Rainbow, the “cybernetic jamming of the headline’s message of Hiroshima” (Moore 225) calls attention to the material, textual, and discursive means for sense-making in the newspaper photo of the mushroom cloud and unintelligible caption, “MB DRO ROSHI” (Gravity’s 693). Just as the discourse of Slothrop’s final scene (?) is explicitly phrased with sexual associations in free indirect narration, the process of mediation and experienced knowledge is moreover evoked in his learning of the cataclysmic event impossibly “At the instant it happened” (694)—casually, unaffected, sitting on a curb, while “Strips of insulation hang up in the morning fog” (693, my emphasis). Similarly, and to greater degrees, Slaughterhouse is comprised of expression variously mediated textually.
Historical Rhetorical Choices (1945-2001)

The elements generative and transformative in Slaughterhouse that emerge most notable for my project are the respective types of writing in Vonnegut’s composition. Thus far I have been avoiding analysis in favor of trying partly the indirect approach he uses as well as the unintelligible disaster paradigm, which ranges at the “poles” of Vonnegut and Foer from Dresden and Hiroshima 1945, Vietnam and Massachusetts 1968, and New York City 2001. In both ways, the rhetorical choice appears to be using an other historical disaster as vehicle: using Dresden as story and not synecdoche, Vonnegut’s account(s) indirectly addresses “military science in Vietnam” in 1968 (268); while the referent in Foer’s novel motivates the narratives of two significant characters, Grandfather and Grandmother, and the device using them as diegetic writers (although not literary authors), especially in chapters titled “Why I’m Not Where You Are” (108ff.) and “My Feelings” (75ff.).

A simpler account of their poetics might be the “the aesthetic problem” for Vonnegut as described by Lundquist (1977) in an early article, “How to conceptualize and define the night terrors of an era so unreal, so unbelievable, that the very term fiction seems no longer to have any currency” (Bloom 43). The re-invented form of the novel that Vonnegut produces through imagery, stylistic syntax, and “telegraphic-Tralfamadorian-atomic structure” appear to Lundquist to serve as “one of the best solutions we have to the problem of describing the unimaginable” (53). Likewise, Klinkowitz later summarizes how “the writer’s art of rearranging the elements […] gives readers the chance to experience the world in fresh new ways, and not be prisoners of any one culture’s typical forms of description” (Reforming 105). In this regard, Kittler’s

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15 James Lundquist (1977), “The ‘New Reality’ of Slaughterhouse-Five”; found in Kurt Vonnegut’s Slaughterhouse-Five (Chelsea House Publishers, 2001). Although I diverge from his exalting the “Tralfamadorian structure” as the means “to embody a new reality in his novel” (45), Lundquist like Klinkowitz later is instructive for the focus upon how “The process of re-invention is made vivid by Vonnegut’s style” (52), dually concerning the process formally for writers and experientially for individuals in unintelligible society.
“switchboard” of modes, evident in various textual discourses, operates notably as Vonnegut’s style, one that is similar to the formula observed in Pynchon’s invention and even more evident. The textual “ecology” or typology includes discourses autobiographical and metafictional, Vonnegut’s war experience, recollection, and novel-writing process; generic of fiction, or fantastical and fabulatory, including space-time travel (29ff.) and alien abduction to the planet Tralfamadore (34), the inhabitants of which see in four dimensions (35); intertextual of literary writing, including *Valley of the Dolls* (111), *The Red Badge of Courage* (125-6), and *The Brothers Karamazov* (128) in the fictional narrative, and works by Roethke and Celine in the frame-chapter (26); and historical, in the references to World War II (and Vietnam) events and locations as well as in the writer-character of Bertram Rumfoord (235).

A counterpoint to this Harvard professor and Air Force historian character, Pilgrim’s “favorite author” (128) Kilgore Trout appears not only as an obscure science fiction writer of works like “Maniacs in the Fourth Dimension” (132); he also functions with “intra-textual” transversality and reflexive intertextuality, featuring in several other Vonnegut novels, like Howard Campbell (206), the Nazi ex-patriot playwright, from his 1960 novel *Mother Night*. Notably, chapter eight begins with scenes in 1945 of Billy and Campbell in the P.O.W. camp and transitions to several 1967 episodes featuring Trout before concluding, with Billy’s recalling—“he did not travel in time to the experience” (226)—several events of the Dresden bombing and evacuation upon surviving in the meat locker (226-32).16

16 Klinkowitz—one of the most prominent Vonnegut scholars—notes the “recycling” of *Player Piano*’s setting, *Sirens of Titan*’s Tralfamadarians, *Mother Night*’s Nazi Germany, *Cat’s Cradle*’s “apocalypse as experienced by a writer” (65) and of characters from *Mr. Rosewater*. He writes, “To keep himself and his fictional characters together, Vonnegut must reinvent the novel’s form. To help him do this, he looks back on his previous novels to see how their characters have survived his own twenty-year writer’s block with the matter of Dresden” (*Reforming* 64).
By not choosing exclusively but instead writing with both historical discourse and science-fiction conventions, Vonnegut engages and creates by means of the knowledge frontier in multiple ways, without “resolving” the unimaginable or inexplicable dimensions of the paradigm. Moreover, the ostensibly “contrapunctal” relation, without privileging one discourse—a key lesson for readers of this novel, I would add—between science fiction and historiography produces an inventive result through both the aesthetic and rational paradigms. On one hand, the device of Trout as character-author indirectly accounts for the science-fiction genre tropes like time-travel and the Trafalmadorians, while his characterization of total obscurity—“He did not think of himself as a writer for the simple reason that the world had never allowed him to think of himself in this way” (215)—and sales location of the “tawdry bookstore” (257) subtly and reflexively undermine the novel’s fabulation elements (beyond any simple philistine-bourgeois divide of literary standards).17

Besides questioning the certainty of the main narrative, given the similarity Pilgrim ostensible experiences to Trout’s novels like The Big Board (257), and beyond questions of “escapism,” the generic conventions like time-travel and the episodes on Tralfamadore operate in Vonnegut’s composition only at the signifying regime. By this I mean that that tropes of being “unstuck in time” (29) and perceiving four dimensions simultaneously or as “permanent moments”—“the way we can look at a stretch of the Rocky Mountains” (34)—are presented

17 Another perspective is articulated by McHale, while describing “about the interaction between science fiction and postmodernist writing”: regarding Breakfast of Champions (1973), he views Trout as Vonnegut’s “self-caricature, […] imagining himself as the more or less “straight” science-fiction writer that he had started out to be in early novels like Player Piano (1952), The Sirens of Titan (1959), and Cat’s Cradle (1963)” (Postmodernist Fiction 72). Regardless of the “romantic irony” that McHale reads, the meeting of author-character and character-author in Breakfast is compelling to consider as “one of the genres of ontological poetics” (72) in metafiction. Another view of this dynamic, and counterintuitive insight, appears more recently in Toth’s The Passing of Postmodernism (2010): “While Trout’s character typically voices a type of nostalgia for the possibility of truth and stable meaning […] Vonnegut (as narrator) repeatedly suggests that a writer has a responsibility to express the impossibility of truth, meaning, stable categories, order” (96).
straightforward, using denotative (representative) language for this seemingly inventive content. This quality provides little recourse for invention, by diagrammatic reading, and instead facilitates conventional work in the limited discourse of interpretation. For example, reading the novel using Nietzsche’s *amor fati* as perspective, Tally asserts that “in its formal or stylistic organization and in its content or philosophy, *Slaughterhouse-Five* functions as an extended meditation upon the eternal return” (*Iconography* 71).

Given the question of encountering sensations (percepts, affects) and of changing conditions for invention by the aesthetic paradigm, the recourse to “Tralfamadorian stratigraphy” appears limited for *artisanal praxis* concerning historical events. Likewise, Vonnegut’s narratives put into stark relief the shared problem of testimony in the counterpoint of science-fiction conventions to historiography, accentuated in Billy Pilgrim’s radio reporting about Tralfamadore (32) and his retort, “I was there” (245), to the historian Rumfoord. The alternative, using “available materials” for sense-making, is more akin to the rhetorical choices we face as scholars, which Vonnegut “thematizes” (satirically, but without irony I would say) in narrative using Rumfoord: the Harvard professor is ostensibly composing “a readable condensation of the twenty-seven volume *Official History of the Army Air Force in World War Two*,” even though “there was almost nothing in the twenty-seven volumes about the Dresden raid […]” (244).

Vonnegut foregrounds the *knowledge frontier* and our recourse markedly in this way, much like the earlier scene of experiencing the bombing within the shelter of the meat locker (228), emerging later to the surface of “the moon”—with its curves “smooth only when seen from a distance” (229). *What is there to say about a massacre?*, we wonder, much less a “secret” kept and elided from official history for twenty-three years (244); this evinces the operation of a dispositif in several ways (institutional, discursive) and evokes the rhetorical issue of expression
when having “nothing intelligent to say.” Like the earlier narrative inclusion of *Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds* (1841) by Charles Mackay in the reflexive frame chapter, this section references actual historical texts, such as “*The Destruction of Dresden* by an Englishman named David Irving” (238), as well as “Truman’s announcement of the atomic attack on Hiroshima” (237-8). Despite the rational dispositif of referential discourse, the identification of a knowledge frontier in the collective ignorance of Americans compels the historian, who notes “I’ve got to put something about it in my book. From the official Air Force standpoint, it'll all be new” (244).

**Inventive Interlude:** Another transversal line and virtual “fork” of path we can envision having taken, in resonance heuretics: while “on maneuvers” in South Carolina, Billy Pilgrim plays an organ in with only “thirty-nine keys and two stops—vox humana and vox celeste” (39), as part of his characterization as a chaplain’s assistant before being deployed to the Battle of the Bulge in 1944 (where my grandfather fought, we think). This organ, Vonnegut mentions curiously, is “made by a vacuum-cleaner company” in New Jersey (39). Linking by this association, another character from New Jersey—Seymour “the Swede” Levov in Philip Roth’s (1997) *American Pastoral*—narrowly misses “meeting the manly, patriotic challenge [that he] secretly set for himself just after Pearl Harbor” of combat in the Marine Corps: “He was just finishing up his boot training at Parris Island, South Carolina […] when the atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima. As a result, the Swede got to spend the rest of his hitch as a ‘recreation specialist’ right there on Parris Island” (*Pastoral* 14). Imagining this way that the “umpire” who announces to Billy’s company they are all “theoretically dead” (39) is instead an umpire of a baseball game: playing against The Swede’s team from Parris Island, by way of Newark; imagining an organ with more than two voices, using other frequencies typically excluded—
composing with the aesthetic paradigm, not naïveté or idealism but creative response at the frontier of knowledge.

**Small-Scale History (Writing Time at the Frontier)**

Before concluding by discussing the implications for temporality and transitioning to the next section, I am compelled by this feature of the novel to consider the problem of historical writing regarding multiple modes of discourse in practice. Viewed this way in relation, both synechdocal figures of Trout’s Sci-Fi conventions and Rumfoord’s historiography evoke the limitations of certain types of writing and rhetorical tropes: most concerning for me is that either view entails an atemporal status of the composition, whether the four-dimensional perception of “frozen moments” (Tralfamadorian) or the encyclopedic re-configuration of events into “readable condensation” volumes. Generally stated, both cases store knowledge into retrievable database form, which excludes and perhaps precludes temporal experience in encountering this information, as I have posited. Both this problem and alternative recourse emerge in the textual ecology of Vonnegut’s composing with discourses and tropes of SciFi, historiography, and metafiction—the latter of which I recognize provisionally as possible solution at least in praxis.

First, I must acknowledge that this is my main concern, finding potential means for innovation within the *dispositif*, beyond the disciplinary descriptions of texts; useful to this end, however, are touchstone theorizations about postmodern historiographic fiction by Jameson (1984/91) and Hutcheon (1989), which have been employed in more recent years throughout (and can be compounded with) discussions of narrative temporality, as for example by Currie (1998) and Richardson (2002). Admittedly, this connection and present approach arises from an intriguing mention of historical writing by Currie, apt to my reading of *Slaughterhouse-Five*. Discussing the prospect for “performative rather than a constative narratology,” as I have been attempting, he notes that through “non-novelistic thinking” like historical sources,
“historiographic metafiction often does the opposite[:] incorporating into the fiction some explicit, constative statement which would traditionally belong to the discourses of criticism or theory” (Postmodern Narrative 69). Although general, this view links in rhetoric—for praxis, potentially—the multimodal writing Vonnegut employs, as Jameson and Hutcheon describe.

As my focus remains the rhetorical choices of narrative techniques and literary vehicles for expressing experienced concept, through aesthetic composition (percepts, affects, sensations), the problem of novelistic historicity described in simpler cases is helpful toward understanding and using the formula Vonnegut compounds by the reflexive and metafictional qualities. A particular instance of this perspective is the example of Doctorow’s Ragtime (1975) in Jameson and Hutcheon’s theorizations, and the use of historical characters, unlike Doctorow’s The Book of Daniel (1971) with its metafictional character-author and dual settings like Slaughterhouse. As I mentioned generally, Hutcheon identifies how the historical figures in Ragtime “challenge our perhaps unexamined notions about what might constitute historical truth” (Politics 91); this function “both confirms and subverts the power of the representations of history” (91). More akin to the composition of Slaughterhouse is the use of historical documents in Daniel, which “stress both the discursive nature of those representations of the past and the narrativized form in which we read them” (Hutcheon 84, my emphasis). This insight further describes the textual effect of the Rumfoord-historiography device in terms of “available materials,” and yet beyond “historicity,” there persist the question of temporality at the knowledge gap or SciFi-frontier.

At the level of fictional writing, the author characters Rumfoord, Trout, and Vonnegut create an effect of reflexivity that maintains fundamentally the process and experience of sense-making regardless of genre/discourse, beyond the level of tropes. Taking license with Jameson’s formal descriptions, a performative narratology becomes clearer when considering the two types
of “postmodern ‘fantastic historiography’” the he identifies (Postmodernism 368). The first type, fabulation as “chronicle,” both uses “the form or genre of historiography” and transforms “historical verisimilitude […] into multiple alternate patterns” (368); Doctorow, like Vonnegut and Pynchon, thus shows rhetorically how the approach offers “writers the most remarkable and untrammeled movement of invention” (368). Although “fabulation” and its implications of Sci-Fi creation call to mind the fantastical elements a la Trout’s novels and Pilgrim’s episodes, Jameson notably emphasizes how narrative writing “by way of its very implausibility becomes the figure of a larger possibility of praxis” (369, my emphasis) concerning actual historical content and experience. And while authors like Doctorow, Pynchon, and Foer might ultimately appear better methodological exemplars for their not having undergone events first-hand like Vonnegut, the formula and possibility articulated by Jameson resounds regardless: “agency here steps out of the historical record itself into the process of devising it” (369). Directly evoking the important frame device of Slaughterhouse, the reflexive status of writing considered this way connects Jameson’s second type of historiographic metafiction, an invented diegesis and plot with historical characters as well—evident in Ragtime, likewise as Hutcheon describes.

Unlike Ragtime and Gravity’s Rainbow (and other postmodern historical novels), Slaughterhouse primarily employs and inscribes historicity in its settings and events, more so than using historical figures as characters. For instance, Doctorow presents a “prisca theologia” or “secret wisdom” (Ragtime 146) of history as cyclical—reincarnation, “universal patterns of order and repetition” (148), “occult knowledge” from “the Hermetica” (149)—through caricatures of J.P. Morgan and Henry Ford; whereas in Slaughterhouse, Vonnegut conveys a similar perception strictly through invented characters and narratives of Trout, Pilgrim, and Tralfamadorians. Resembling Pynchon’s narrative contrivances in Lot 49, Doctorow satirizes
types of knowledge particular to literacy and texts: Ford has already learned “everything” he needs about reincarnation from a $0.25 book, *An Eastern Fakir's Eternal Wisdom*, published by the Franklin Novelty Company of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania” (*Ragtime* 152); Morgan, by contrast, has employed scholars to trace the origins of the “prisca theologia” beginning retrospectively from a text he possess, like one of Pynchon’s characters, “a folio of one of the first Rosicrucian text, *The Chemical Wedding of Christian Rosencrutz*” (148). One intratexual irony is that another character, Tateh, creates “movie books” for the novelty company initially off the street, quite literally (133), before joining the film industry and prospering (259). The outcome of the literary scholar remains to be seen, whether we adapt to changing conditions and become creators or remain perpetually devoted to hobbyhorses like Morgan’s:

> My scholars have traced for me, like the best detectives, the existence of this idea and of various mysterious organizations to maintain it, in most of the Renaissance cultures, in medieval societies and in ancient Greece. […] The earliest recorded mention […] comes to us through the Greek in the translated writings of the Egyptian priest Hermes Trismegistus. It is Hermes who gives the historical name to this occult knowledge. It is called the Hermetica. (149)

The key question for writing appears whether “the making up of unreal history is a substitute for the making of the real kind,” as Jameson posits (*Postmodernism* 369); particularly evoking the genre of speculative fiction, inventing “new multiple or alternate strings of events” (Jameson 369) appears limited effectively for encounter heuretics. For example, discussing Philip K. Dick’s novel *The Man in the High Castle* (1962), Dannenberg notes how characters read an alternate-history text called *The Grasshopper Lies Heavy* (208), and conjectures that “Through this device[,] Dick suggests a potentially infinite landscape of possible counterfactual
worlds” (209 Coincidence). On one hand, I maintain this fiction is quite different from the expression-vehicle Vonnegut uses, and less applicable in practice; however, the specific insight about the diegetic novel reinforces the transversal potential of multifarious textuality.

Another conception of this type of writing is “Alternate History and Historiographic Metafiction” (Dannenberg 218), such as Roth’s The Plot Against America (2004). Roth uses not only historical documents (in the Postscript especially) but contemporaneous material and media, notably text “Drawn from the Archives of Newark’s Newsreel Theatre” to narrate critical plot events Tuesday-Friday 06-16 October 1942 (Plot 301-18). Additionally, in counterpoint, one character in pronounces, “History is everything that happens everywhere. Even here in Newark. Even here on Summit Avenue. Even what happens in his house to an ordinary man—that’ll be history too someday” (180); the character’s son, “Philip Roth,” later remarks, “I wanted nothing to do with history. I wanted to be a boy on the smallest scale possible” (Plot Against 233). Sense-making for the boy consists not merely in cognitive mapping his “nightmarish vision of America’s anti-Semitic fury” (343) eastbound to Newark, but in his 1934 National Parks stamp collection emblazoned in a dream “with a black swastika” (43)—his “available materials” for experiencing and narrating unintelligible forces more “locally” and personally.

In the composition of Slaughterhouse-Five, Vonnegut brings history-writing to “the smallest scale” of experience, much the way Roth does in using his hometown (Newark) even in an “alternate history” fiction. Besides the three instances appearing in Pilgrim’s fictional narrative, the last chapter concludes the metafictional frame device, beginning with Vonnegut’s ruminating upon death; this perspective and formal feature poses great potential for practice.

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18 Potential poetics of artisanal praxis, from Dick’s novel instead: “The hands of the artificer […] had wu, and allowed that wu to flow into this piece. […] I recall a shrine in Hiroshima wherein a shinbone of some medieval saint could be examined. However, this is an artifact and that was a relic. This is alive in the now, whereas that merely remained. By this meditation, conducted by myself at great length since you were last here, I have come to identify the value which this has in opposition to historicity. I am deeply moved, as you may see” (Castle 185).
Temporality subtly infuses the discourse and imagery, such as the material figure of guns inherited from his father that rust, phrased strikingly in the present tense: oxidation over time, “exposure” generally like the change to Roth’s stamps, not impermeable. Notably, he is writing this novel in 1968 following the respectively assassinations of Robert Kennedy (the day after) and Martin Luther King, Jr. (a month later); without commentary, Vonnegut adds that “every day my Government gives me a count of corpses created by military science in Vietnam. So it goes” (Slaughterhouse 268)—and later includes a prediction of the world’s population growth to seven billion by the year 2000, given the “net gain” of births and deaths daily (271). Like Pynchon coordinates history, political economy, and autobiography in his inventive formula, Vonnegut more overtly inscribes performative qualities, as in an earlier incidental scene with his daughter:

The two little girls and I crossed the Delaware River where George Washington had crossed it, the next morning. We went to the New York World’s Fair, saw what the past had been like, according to the Ford Motor Car Company and Walt Disney, saw what the future would be like, according to General Motors.

And I asked myself about the present: how wide it was, how deep it was, how much was mine to keep. (23, my emphasis)

The strategy of composing with and precisely expressing a particular temporal instance, as in Vonnegut’s examples, thus emerges with promise for application, one that might convey experience rather than remain “depersonalized” and atemporal writing. A lesson from reading Vonnegut’s style is that I consider not only creativity at the knowledge frontier, but as well what might enable a patina of discourse, in artisanal praxis, no longer “insulated” from sensations. Although I have not discussed the latter to great extent, which I seek to remedy in the next section, Vonnegut’s writing in modes historical, fantastical, and especially metafictional guides practices for performative composition that engage the problematic—perhaps also addressing the question posed by Blanchot: “Would the gift of time be dissonance with all that is in harmony, loss (in time and because of time) of contemporaneity, of synchrony, of ‘community’ (of that
which assembles and gathers together)?” (Disaster 89-90). I have been advocating an alternative for our only “making sense” of archival materials as spectators, which DeLillo illustrates—more akin presently—about our Web-mediated sensorium at the end of Underworld: watching the 1961 Tsar Bomba detonation, “preserved in the computer that helped to build it” (826). Like Vonnegut’s writing at a particular setting, DeLillo’s narrator of Underworld enacts the process of viewing Web pages, loading the “H-bomb home page” with “Keystroke 2” to conclude the novel (Underworld 824-5).

The paradigm is gathered, like in Gravity’s Rainbow, with the effect of connecting—“they are fusion bombs, remember” (DeLillo 826, my emphasis)—by technology both destruction and progress in contemporary society. The paradigm emerges at levels both rhetorical and material: “Everything in your computer, the plastic, silicon and mylar, every logical operation and processing function, the memory, the hardware, the software, the ones and zeroes, the triads inside the pixels that form the on-screen image —it all culminates here” (DeLillo 826). Despite the limitations of DeLillo’s transcendental connotations of “cyberspace” and afterlife in this passage, the narrative voice in direct address functions significantly to remind us (“you”) that we are encountering a mediated archive, with a decision for how to proceed—perhaps finding conditions alternative to the dispositif. Shifting from the proverbial stance that “people aren’t supposed to look back” (Vonnegut 28), encountering Slaughterhouse-Five provokes a compelling question for invention and method: what if following an experience, especially a catastrophe, we were to ask, “what’s going to happen?”

Imipolexia Interface: Invention Testfire (Pynchon Mediator Concluded)

Continuing to explore-invent by means of conduction using diegetic texts and materials, while also considering the post-signifying regime and formal logic of ellipsis-interval, my experimenting with paradigm-writing poetics follows from the prior chapter’s understanding
Pynchon’s transformative style—which facilitates the conclusion of my project. The procedure still attempts partly the application of the method derived from Deleuze, particularly his using the texts of Carroll and Kafka for invention. Moreover, presenting my last “findings” in Pynchon’s work, the diagrammatic elements of *Gravity’s Rainbow* and his paradigm-writing formula are precisely the aesthetic means for innovating and engaging a problematic, an interface within (and one suited to) the *theatre of multiplicities*. Recalling rhetorically the *nondominant function*, a generative feature potentially, the *ellipsis* of a diegetic document facilitates my working (thinking and writing) with an entire paradigm. On this latter point, it is not William Slothrop’s 1634 *On Preterition* “tract” (555)—referenced in narration only, although pertinent to my concluding point—that reorients my approach but a missing text, “Document SG-1” (242).

Unlike the reading investigations by “detectives” Stencil and Oedipa—the writings of Sidney Stencil, Fausto, Warfinger, and Inverarity’s testament—Slothrop can not “track” a peculiar “insulation device” in the A4 rocket textually: “Claim, part and work numbers all have the same flagnote, which directs Slothrop to a Document SG-1. Flagnote on the flagnote sez ‘[…This is a state secrete, in the meaning of § 35 R5138’” (242). Moreover, Slothrop not only learns that “there are no ‘SG’ documents” (242) from Captain Hilary Bounce (“a 110% company man”)—who declares, “It's only a ‘wild coincidence,’ Slothrop” (241) about a British-Dutch contract and rockets fired/guided from The Hague.19 He also discovers a “puzzle” concerning the

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19 Two points to note about Pynchon’s style at work in this passage: first, it is this cited “wild coincidence” about which the narrator remarks that Slothrop “will learn to hear quote marks in the speech of others” (241). Shortly after, the peculiar narrative voice also interjects, “Neither have I, Jackson. Oh, me neither folks…” in the way prevalent throughout the novel—responding to a character’s (Bounce) stating, “Well, I’d never thought of it that way” and shifting from ‘wild coincidence’ to paranoia. The second point of intrigue is the indirect invocation of William Pynchon by this character Bounce, who wears “a gold benzene ring with a formee cross in the center—the IG Farben Award for Meritorious Contributions to Synthetics Research” (243). This is the novel’s sole use of the word “Meritorious”—as in William’s tract “*The Meritorious Price of Our Redemption*,” historic antecedent to the diegetic *On Preterition*. Writing paradigmatically, all registers historical and fictional: Puritan, Cartel, Synthetic. Indeed, Jamf has the same symbol on “a medal of honor from IG Farben” (413), the cross not strictly German but “standing for the tetravalency of carbon” (413)—allegedly, the narration of Pökler’s dream indeterminable.
An intriguing diegetic material with which to invent, Imipolex G emerges for my experiment with great generative potential, even while overlooking and excluding other points or lines, for working paradigmatically (in “chorography”). This approach supplants the hermeneutic quest, just as Slothrop realizes “The Schwartzgerät is no Grail” (64) and that “he’s been seeker and sought” late in the novel: “The Imipolex question was planted for him by somebody, back at the Casino Hermann Goering, with hopes it would flower into a full Imipolectique with its own potency in the Zone […]” (490). Acknowledging “Grail” is “not what the G in Imipolex G stands for” (364), then, I can proceed using Pynchon’s post-signifying Grapheme with license; the curious Imipolectique in particular evokes the question of work critique or esthétique.20

My Imipolectique apothecary is both textual and material in the diegesis, connecting referentially as well to contexts historical, political, economic: like Pynchon, I can think-write (with) an entire paradigm including chemistry, phase states, transnational corporate industry, military rocketry, behavioral conditioning, sexuality. A transformative element, into assemblage; the synthetic paradigm and condition of the twentieth century, “the material of the future” (488). And while most scholars have noted most of these components within this paradigm, sometimes explicitly regarding Imipolex G, no one has yet employed the Imipolectique for invention or even for engaging the referential-diegetic context thus evoked. One issue encountered is the condition within bureaucratic society, just as Deleuze finds in Kafka; as Sanders nicely

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20 Apropos style by Pynchon, characteristically: “Informatique rhymes with automatique, and the -tique suffix seems to be sufficiently striking and meaningful to produce a new series of creations, of terms generally relating to new technologies and their application,” (“New words for new technologies” 176) writes Stephen Noreiko in French Today: Language in Its Social Context (Cambridge UP, 1993). Thus writing, as Pynchon does, with a “boutique” of Imipolex, “puzzle” notwithstanding: a “storehouse” for invention, insofar as “boutique” derives from the Greek apoteke or apothecary, “a place where things are put away” in one sense (<http://www.etymonline.com>).
articulates, “Pynchon is our most accomplished chronicler of the structures of thought and feeling that correspond to the experience of living in the administered society” (Mindless 157).

In choragraphy, I attempt to use Imipolex G as an apt “device” for organizing intelligibly the sensations, perceptions, experiences that are largely inchoate and unintelligible (if not “illegible”). Considered and employed rhetorically this way, it is a figure both diegetic and material that expresses individual position and relation within an incomprehensible assemblage. This use consciously avoids treating the “question of Pynchon’s tropological appropriations of science as a narrative tactic,” as Mattessich dubiously states (Lines 19); likewise, nor is it an analytic heuristic, for “mechanistic and economic” interpretations of the novel or phenomenon, as Brownlie finds in Pynchon’s using Quantum Mechanics (Subjectivity 132). Stark, another scholar who extensively discusses numerous such heuristics, reminds that Pynchon “is not a frustrated scientist merely leaving shards of scientific information strewn around in his novels, particularly in Gravity’s Rainbow” (73): rather, “He assembles these shards […] into a vessel both beautiful and, because it orders and thus explains the world around it, useful” (Pynchon’s Fictions 73, my emphasis). Such an understanding of poetics is applicable in practice, I am arguing, unlike merely descriptive accounts of the scientific material for broader classificatory claims. For example, Mendelson treats Pynchon’s scientific—“expert in ballistics, chemistry, and mathematics” (Mindless 164)—and cultural writing-formula as evidence for one hexa-valent criteria of the novel’s encyclopedic character, in the tradition of Goethe, Melville, and Joyce.

Rather than strictly scientific-economic (industrial), Imipolectique names a greater paradigm and assemblage, with transversal links and both “horizontal” and “vertical” lines, by which Pynchon invents and through which we might make intelligible certain sensations, as dramatized by Slothrop in narrative. The experiment of writing with multiple semiotic regimes is
precarious, insofar as the *signifying regime* and process of *reterritorialization* are inherent with the “axes” of composition. For example, Mattessich takes recourse in finding “the signifier of an objective irony,” positing spuriously that the Rocket serves “figuratively [as] the *instrument of writing* that produces the singular point of analogic and dialectic collapse at work in the novel” (19 my emphasis). Granting that rockets most obviously function in the signifying regime of Pynchon’s writing, the use of the figure remains still only *generative* at most, as in McHoul and Wills deploying their “parable-parabola” device, and narrowly hermeneutic (transcendental, logocentric) when positing it chiefly, as does Mattessich (like most critics). Although suggesting “a deterritorialization of a technological paradigm” results from Pynchon’s syncretism of art and science (200), Mattessich exalts the Rocket beyond “a sign for a creativity or imagination” (204) ultimately to its “standing at the Center of textual subjectivity” (205).

Admittedly, these examples seem “cherry-picked” from scholars without context; however, the lesson of *diagrammatism* resounds, with the key task of recognizing *generative, transformative* (into assemblage), and *diagrammatic* (intensive) elements in compositions. The question is how best to put into practice the inventive stylistic insights, beyond “deconstructive devices” (*Writing* 58) as McHoul and Willis note (in their emulating Derrida and Ulmer). In my view such work remains *generative*, but not yet *assemblage-* or *intensive-*writing; for example, “The parabola is the model therefore for any plotting of dualisms,” and yet “The parable is thus undermined (*mise en abyme*) by the parabola, by its own internal imprecision” (59).21

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21 Perhaps a paradigm is invoked, implicitly or inherently: “The parable, and hence the choice of word, is also the parabolic; in French for instance, the two senses reside within the same world (*la parabole*). It joins that set of geometrical/rhetorical figures which includes hyperbole and ellipsis” (*Writing Pynchon* 59). As acknowledged, I have used wordplay, like Derrida and Ulmer, as well, to generate my *Imipolectique* apothecary; however, this is the “means” (start) of chorography, not an “end” finding. Finally, in fairness, McHoul and Wills work paradigmatically otherwise, with “the material of film” (42)—connecting the politics of Von Goll, IG Farben’s vertical integration, the related chemistry of plastic, Imipolex, and Oneirine; the “delta discontinuities” of film and rocket flight (42).
Shifting from excessive Critique to the mode Aësthétique, using the apothecary of Imipolectique for chorography: Pynchon’s diegesis of “non-sense” (unintelligibility) features conditions shaped by contemporary forces, epitomized by the Cartel. (Incidentally, and not mere “thematic” irony, a relatable point is my engaging an institutional dispositif and attempting to use Apparatus Theory to mediate inventive philosophy and literature toward new means.) Imipolex as rhetorical device first enables “mapping” the forces and conditions of the dispositif, more specifically regarding the changing situation of mid-twentieth century experience. For example, Stark identifies how Pynchon links conceptually, by means of Imipolex, the chemistry of plastic and the political economy of the “cartelized state,” in that the chemical “development also shows the influence of international corporate cartels, [given] Jamf at the time of his discovery worked for IG Farben, and Shell later partially controlled the patent” (GR 48). The composition formula produces more than merely a “plot” (narrative and/or conspiracy) of Slothrop’s discovery, his conditioning by the substance (although evocative, this intimate connection): in creating his diegetic interactions with characters like Captain Bounce, Pynchon expands the assemblage of operating forces beyond the “low-level” or immediate bureaucracy.

“Administered society” experienced by Slothrop features prominently in Book 1 (“Beyond the Zero”), which charts these forces and values by means of emblematic characters: “the Firm” (British Intelligence), “ACHTUNG” (Allied Clearing House, Technical Units, No. Germany) in the office of Tantivy (20); “The White Visitation” (a former? mental hospital), comprising a “catchall agency,” “PISCES—Psychological Intelligence Schemes for Expediting Surrender” (34), which employs in variously-defined roles characters like Teddy Bloat, Pirate Prentice, Roger Mexico (statistician), Jessica Swanlake, Edward Pointsman (Pavlovian behaviorist). With a “dual-axis” configuration, Pynchon can convey certain contingent
perceptions and experiences metonymically, as when Slothrop is transferred inexplicably from ACHTUNG to the White Visitation, in a section beginning notably with a diegetic letters between Slothrop (St. Veronica’s hospital, London) and comic-book character, “the Kenosha Kid” in Wisconsin (60).

Increasingly “non-sensical” are the bureaucratic perceptions presented by Operation Black Wing—“the Firm’s latest mania” (34)—and the Schwarzkommando (African Hereros) in Germany, an initially fictional report which later changes in the diegesis, by their appearance in Nordhausen (286), confirmed “a week before V-E Day” (276), and their autonomous endeavor to assemble an A4 rocket (326). Like Slothrop’s thinking newly in terms of IG Farben, Royal Dutch Shell, and Bataafsche Petroleum upon meeting Bounce, Oberst Enzian, the Herero leader, expands his scope to conjecture that (American) antagonist Major Marvy “must be together with the Russians by now, and with General Electric too” (326). Similarly, his half-brother Tchitcherine (Russian intelligence) no longer sees defined states or borders in the Zone but a barely-intelligible “Rocketstate,” comprised by “IG Raketen”—“A Rocket-cartel. A structure cutting across every agency human and paper that ever touched it. Even to Russia . . . Russia bought from Krupp, didn't she, from Siemens, the IG. . . .” (566).

Although Slothrop meets a representative of IG Farben, Wimpe, “the IG-man” (152), a chorography of a personal position within a cartel-engineered assemblage—what Johnston describes as “the tentacular growth of the new rocket-state, […] a proliferating international cartel of petrochemical and plastic industries” (Information 80)—must be devised in terms other than narrative (episodes) and other than signifier (Rocket). Imipolex G enables thinking and writing by means of assemblage, at the level of paradigm, by its connecting sciences, industry, and individual behavior across text and history. In limited terms, the “instrumentality” of
chemistry deployed, “drugs as a means to control,” (Moore 97), is but a simple effect for the subject position, as demonstrated in the cases of Oneirine for Tchitcerine (702) and of Slothrop’s Pavlovian conditioning to Imipolex (84, 286). However, diagramming Pynchon’s multiple regimes recognizes the assemblage both composed and employed to compose; this configuration includes all “axes” (dimensions) and transverse links across series, provisionally in counterpoint to the “meta-cartel” (566) and the “super-cartel that was both horizontal and vertical” (284). For instance, the text (narrative voice)—not a character’s voice or consciousness—includes in an interval between dialogue, “Oneirine Jamf Imipolex A4. . . .” (464). Thinking “horizontally” to include time in this series is compelled by Pynchon’s writing just as much as thinking textually, “like the A in rocket designations which stands for aggregate, or IG itself, Interessengemeinschaft, a fellowship of interests. . . .” (164, my emphasis).

The Imipolectique assemblage connects and considers past, present, and future as well. One strategy, which informs the second, for working thus recognizes Pynchon’s composing with multiple narratives and creating emphatic relation of history to the present diegesis. Through the Family History Conspiracy, most notably, Pynchon reveals the connection of levels nearly incomprehensible, the recognition of which causes Slothrop vertiginous nausea; in the simplest account, Imipolex connects him personally, by means of Jamf’s conditioning, to IG Farben via “Grössli Chemical Corporation (later Psychochemie AG)” (286). Recognizing T.S., (“Barring the outside possibility of Tough Shit”), as his initials (286), Slothrop realizes he personally is the referent of the “Schwarzknaue enterprise,” an asset acquired by Grössli (an IG acquisition) with stipulations of “continue[d] surveillance duties” (286). Thus “sold to IG Farben” by his family, he personifies a contractual “liability” of the outstanding debt to Harvard University (for Slothrop’s education)—an expression of the “administered” capitalist-bureaucratic society,
indeed. Finally, the origin of this transaction seemingly is the effort of Lyle Bland, who conducted the transaction from Stinnes to Grössli via Jamf. Apparently, Bland had earlier worked “to keep official records clear of any hint of weapons procurement banned under the terms of Versailles” (285, my emphasis) by providing “private currency known as Notgeld to Stinnes,” contracting sometimes “a certain Massachusetts paper mill”—and “The name of this contractor was the Slothrop Paper Company,” Slothrop reads “without that much surprise” (285).

The labyrinthine narrative of “conspiracy” by connectedness for Slothrop—ostensibly motivating the plot of Imipolex G “haunting him now” (286) in the present, a convention deployed by Pynchon—emerges in his reading a dossier on Jamf, except for the narrator’s idiosyncratic interjection, “On the beam, Jackson” (284). However compelling the narrative contrivance, Pynchon’s including the Paper Company adds another way to read, as counterpoint, within the *Imipolectique*. Slothrop’s earlier discoveries—as Cartel Detective, in one of his myriad identities—about the *S-Gerät* and Imipolex concerning IG Farben direct his attention not “to people after all, but to the hardware!” (252).22 Examining instead the materials and “parts list” might find a “nondominant function” (Coste 86) and transformative element of Pynchon’s writing, especially insofar as “well, Document SG-1, which isn't supposed to exist, must cover that....” (252), ellipsis once again. In other words, the present “conspiracy” plot discerned, deciphered, and disclosed hermeneutically would only approach a problem to “solve” ostensibly (*critique*), rather than a problematic (*aesthetique*). Pynchon reflexively calls attention to this by the narrator’s musing about Slothrop’s thoughts: “‘How high does it go?’ is not even the right kind of question to be asking, because the organization charts have all been set up by Them, the

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22 A series seemingly proliferates: *Schwarzknabe* (Slothrop), *Schwarzgerät*, (for sale on the “black market”), *Schwarzkommando*. Yet, Enzian demystifies to Slothrop: “Schwarzgerät, Schwarzkommando. Scuffling: suppose somewhere there were an alphabetical list, […] the two names, Blackinstrument, Blackcommand, just happened to be there, juxtaposed. That’s all, an alphabetical coincidence. We wouldn't have to be real, and neither would it, correct?” (363). Unlike a paradigm, Pynchon emphasizes the arbitrariness of literacy and language throughout.
titles and names filled in by Them, because Proverbs for Paranoids, 3: If they can get you asking the wrong questions, they don't have to worry about answers” (251, modified formatting).

A different “kind of question,” then, might conjecture the uses manifest and alternative of Imipolex G, within the paradigm present and past. At least one passage is feasible to cite:

Imipolex G has proved to be nothing more—or less—sinister than a new plastic, an aromatic heterocyclic polymer, developed in 1939, years before its time, by one L. Jamf for IG Farben. It is stable at high temperatures, like up to 900 C., it combines good strength with a low powerloss factor. Structurally, it's a stiffened chain of aromatic rings, hexagons […] alternating here and there with what are known as heterocyclic rings. The origins of Imipolex G are traceable back to early research done at du Pont. (249)

As a transcontinental and three-decade (or six-decade, more accurately) diegesis for chorography, this account foregrounds Imipolex as an interface, one particularly suited for writing with an entire paradigm—including trajectories both actual and virtual, especially in lieu of composition by a state (missing “SG-1 document”) or industry, as with Jamf’s 1934 advertisement for his similarly-developed “Kryptosam” (71). 23

This inventive writing effectively goes “further than the edge of this meta-cartel” (566) by repurposing—refashioning the material properties conceptually—the plastic as Imipolexia and by re-tracing this origin account to other ends. Now understood for an agent’s (mine) “powerloss factor,” the conspiratorial view of the cartel is that “Imipolex G shows up on a mysterious ‘insulation device’ on a rocket being fired with the help of a transmitter on the roof of the headquarters of Dutch Shell, who is co-licensee for marketing the Imipolex—a rocket whose propulsion system bears an uncanny resemblance to one developed by British Shell at around the

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23 We can imagine Document SG-1 has been composed using Kryptosam, “a proprietary form of stabilized tyrosine developed by IG Farben as part of a research contract with OKW” (71); more concretely, material used to render invisible messages (“Krypto-”) decrypted by semen (“-samen”), as Pirate Prentice shows (72). Or perhaps the contents are only recognizable during Oneirine hallucinations, a drug the effects of which “show[s] a definite narrative continuity, as clearly as, say, the average Reader's Digest article”—“hauntings” that produce “a printed diagram which no amount of light will make readable” (702). In any case, I work otherwise with this ellipsis, paradigmatically, leaving such speculative-generative “play” to Derridean writers like McHoul and Wills.
same time . . .” (251). Abandoning the Rocket as connector- (or master-) signifier, not the “Grail” grapheme anyway, recognizes the true bureaucratic-industrial link in the patent: one “cross-filed” by IG Farben and Psychochemie with Shell joining later, through an agreement with Imperial Chemicals dated 1939” (250).

**Chorography 1: Decision Paths (Discovered and Invented)**

The function of *intellectual property* in the twentieth century, an issue befitting of my requisite citations (juridical in the academic *dispositif*), is called into relief as *artificial* and synthetic—writing contingent to conditions of a particular apparatus—by Pynchon’s prevalent use of *plastic* in the Imipolex diegesis. Illustrative of the century’s condition and perceptions, he explicitly invokes “Plasticity’s central canon: that chemists were no longer to be at the mercy of Nature” (250); moreover expressing the ideals in the *material of the future* (at present), like technical-instrumental writing, “The target property most often seemed to be strength—first among Plasticity’s virtuous triad of Strength, Stability and Whiteness” (*GR* 250). Repurposing my *Imipolexia* interface thus first entails rewriting its trajectory from origin, sensible not in “good sense” (patent, profit) but in sensing aesthetically (sensibility *qua* style): “Plasticity has its grand tradition and main stream, which *happens to flow by way of* du Pont and their famous employee Carothers, known as The Great Synthesist” in the 1920s (249, my emphasis).

The actual corporation du Pont holds a patent (U.S. 3375131) from 1963/68—suitably coextensive with Pynchon and Deleuze—for a “Flexible Coated Film Structure.” 24 The third characteristic of Imipolex G reverberates this nomenclature, in its electronic stimulus: “the projection, onto the Surface, of an electronic ‘image,’ analogous to a motion picture” (*GR* 700). Coincidence notwithstanding, the “Imipolectic surface” is explicitly an “interface” (700), more

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precisely a medium, besides this “Peculiar Polymer” being an erectile plastic “far outside the known phase diagrams” (699). Thinking with the entire paradigm discovers that synthetic polymers for military-industrial production are only one possible outcome for du Pont, the founder of which began as a manufacturer of gunpowder: Eleuthère Irénée du Pont, who died in Philadelphia, for a time worked in Paris with his father’s printing and publishing business.25

In this chorography, Imipolexia emerges liberated from IG Farben by means of transversal deterritorialization—du Pont’s dissemination activity in France, contracting the Slothrop Paper Company, both preterite and ellipsistic within the territorializing international capitalist cartel. Although the refashioned result evokes the question, “Doesn't that imply a switching-path of some kind? a bureaucracy?” (410), the preterition paradigm recalls the nondominant function of discourse by the inventive writer, as by William Slothrop-Pynchon. The ellipsis of bureaucratic functions and forces—proprietary ideas (patents), meta-cartel interest above fellowship (Interessengemeinschaft) via du Pont’s gunpowder—by another powder, titanium oxide (the white pigmentation of paper), changes conditions of possibility, immanent in “the fork in the road America never took, the singular point she jumped the wrong way” (556).

My Imipolexia syncerizes precisely as Slothrop’s recognizes “that there might be a route back,” through intensive lines of flight, in the deterritorialization interval Pynchon effects: “maybe for a little while all the fences are down, one road as good as another, the whole space of the Zone cleared, depolarized, and somewhere inside the waste of it a single set of coordinates from which to proceed, without elect, without preterite, without even nationality to fuck it up. . . .” (556).

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25 From the company’s official history, Eleuthère Irénée du Pont, born 1771 in Paris, died Philadelphia, 1834; “In 1791, after the onset of the French Revolution, he gave up powder-making to assist in his father’s small printing and publishing business. The du Ponts’ moderate political views proved a liability in revolutionary France. In 1797 a mob ransacked their printing shop and they were briefly imprisoned. In late 1799 they fled to America” (<http://www2.dupont.com/Phoenix_Heritage/en_US/1802_a_detail.html>). The inverse trajectory of William Slothrop-Pynchon, thus linking a “horizontal axis” of the assemblage in equal preterition.
“What might happen now?,” we ask. While this inventive conclusion might appear a “misfiring,” circuitous mandala rather than parabola, the findings of an interface with which to work is significant, particularly in demonstrating the process of identifying a feature not only generative but transformative and diagrammatic within the mixed-semiotic assemblage. Indeed, the precise concept and rhetorical means of interface is salient, discerned here in this encounter with Pynchon as with Deleuze. On this point, Johnston describes Pynchon’s writing in Deleuzean terms, identifying how Pynchon “invents an assemblage” through mixed semiotics and specifically “three devices” or “textual means”: “the method of ‘mapping on’, the concept of the ‘interface’, and a topographical multiplicity […]” (Information 65). Whether I have applied Pynchon’s poetics to a great extent is less crucial than the practice experimentally with the aesthetic paradigm, chorography as artisanal practice—adding a new and necessary component, an interface for critique and aesthétique composition by thinking-writing an assemblage.

Now, the Imipolectique apothecary can be “brought to bear” upon the original problematic, in the theatre of multiplicites, and the initial “puzzle” in Slothrop’s narrative. On one hand, Schaub explicitly describes Pynchon’s style in terms of his composing by means of interfaces in form and in content, in that “meaningfulness requires uncertainty” (Ambiguity 107); as “a conjunction and an intersection” (108), Pynchon’s writing entails narrative strategies that “create a threshold experience” (112). Beyond an excellent account of Pynchon’s style at the level of composition, Schaub this way calls attention to the question of encounter, in Deleuze’s sense, and of working with narrative; similarly, Johnston identifies Gravity’s Rainbow as presenting not only “a continuous proliferation of interfaces” but “an interface with the indeterminante” as well (Information 83). Reconsidering interface as Deleuzean literary assemblage, rather than narrowly, as “the two sides of the movie screen” (Johnston 70),
*Imipolexia* thus involves the diegetic material’s properties: “from limp rubbery amorphous to amazing perfect tessellation, hardness, brilliant transparency, high resistance to temperature, weather, vacuum, shock of any kind […]” (*Gravity’s 699*).

The decision “fork” appears whether to use as “Imipolectic Surface,” *interface* “with What lies just beneath […] in the Region of Uncertainty” (700), or as the “mysterious ‘insulation device’ on a rocket” (251). Reverberating both Deleuze’s language in *The Logic of Sense* as well as “chora” as impossible surface, theorized by Derrida and Ulmer, a final passage indicating Pynchon’s transverse-erudite-paradigm style is worthwhile to consider this way:

on the Surface (or even below the outer layer of Imipolex, down at the interface with What lies just beneath: with What has been inserted or What has actually *grown itself a skin of Imipolex* G, depending which heresy you embrace. We need not dwell here on the Primary Problem, namely that everything below the plastic film does after all lie in the Region of Uncertainty, except to emphasize to beginning students who may be prone to Schwärmerei, that terms referring to the Subimipolexity such as ‘Core’ and ‘Center of Internal Energy’ possess, outside the theoretical, no more reality than do terms such as ‘Supersonic Region’ or ‘Center of Gravity’ in other areas of Science). (700, original emphasis)

I am seeking to invent by means of *conduction*, using the paradigm, and yet the polymer’s “thermal conductivity” is minimal, with its resistance (“up to 900 C.”) and tessellation—thus ideal for *insulation*, leaving me unaffected. On the latter, a type of *Imipolectic preterition* would seem to be precisely “an ellipsis in our *care*” (218, my emphasis), insofar as I am insulated against dynamic factors of temperature, speed, forces, or in other words, “environmental” changes and sensations within the assemblage. Remaining “detached” or “clinical” in my work, this device seems apt strictly as conceptual interface for work in the the paradigm *critique*.

However, I am seeking an interface for engaging the *problem of interference* between philosophy (*noumenal*) and aesthetic composition (*sensibilia*), in order to create a *concept of sensation* and compose by means of perceptions and affections in the aesthetic paradigm.
Finally, an insulation device for *Imipolexia* writing must not necessarily be *an ellipsis in our care*: rather, it can be a means for what a character in *V.* suggests, to “Keep cool, but care” (Pynchon 369). Provisionally, narrative is this interface, by which I might compose my encounters with precarious conditions, keeping cool and caring, and include the temporal coordinates—thinking history and the future in present, capable of being affected by both. From my encounters with the literary apothecary of his novels, Pynchon’s inventive style emphasizes the rationale of my proceeding with *assemblage writing as interface in artisanal praxis*: the paradigm *Aesthétique*, ultimately from the Greek *aisthetikos*, “sensitive, perceptive”; as for what to, other frequencies, resonating—even in ellipsis intervals illegible, unutterable, unintelligible.
CHAPTER 6
AFFECTIVE ENCOUNTERS, RESONANCE ASSEMBLAGE

In transitioning from the method of pragmatics reading to an attempt at invention by encounters, I have demonstrated both the practical application of the methodological study discerned from Deleuze, as well as the increased potential that results from working with the aesthetic paradigm. In the first case, the “encounter pragmatics” approach derived has proven apt and productive for reading literature in alternative ways, specifically by finding the generative, transformative, and diagrammatic elements of composition; these features of literary writing enable a new artisanal praxis for scholarship that avoids hermeneutics or other limited critical approaches, which remain constrained by the dispositif for knowledge. Alternatively, invention or “encounter heuretics” by means of employing the properties of intensive language changes the conditions for possible knowledge and expression: my initial target or “test-case” remains creating a concept of sensation, as both an inventive attempt to illustrate the method and to engage the problematic, as well as a new type of scholarship. Indeed, a contingent rhetoric to be developed for the changed apparatus operates as discourse that expresses both particular encounters and the relation of intellectual and sensible properties.

The general idea of style in inventive discourse, in both philosophy and literature, has emerged in my overall project as the prospective means for developing and testing this new rhetoric or poetics for creative discourse. As observed by means of pragmatics study, the exemplars of Deleuze and Pynchon highlight the perspective of “working” (thinking and writing) in terms of paradigm and assemblage particularly. This understanding can be applied specifically to the disciplinary issue of method, or artisanal praxis, concerning encounter heuretics: the shift from reading to inventing continues the initial question of whether and how to express my encounters with percepts, affects, and sensations in aesthetic compositions. As
introduced in Chapter 1, this work engages a problematic rather than “solving” a problem—closing, disclosing, categorizing “meaning”—or question, encountering in art that which I have not experienced or known directly or that which can not be known or “named” intelligibly. More specifically, this method and “test study” attempts newly working with aesthetic sensations to include experience in ways other than strictly discursive (logocentric). In philosophical terms, the approach explores the prospect of Alliez’s declaration, summarizing Deleuze’s method and oeuvre, that “EXPRESSIONISM = CONSTRUCTIVISM” (Signature 103, original formatting)—that which links experience and intellect, in knowledge and composition.

Discussing the latter further in the final section, this chapter first proceeds from the developments of my working with Pynchon’s novels by means of paradigm and interface: the resonance assemblage is posited and demonstrated as both a theoretical approach for innovating within the dispositif and a practical rhetoric for poetics and praxis. In both cases, it serves as the prospective interface for gathering intelligible and sensible qualities encountered in literature uniquely, first noticing and then inventing with percepts, affects, and sensations—conceptually and formally presented in three creative interludes within the following sections.

Understanding aesthetic composition in the philosophy of Deleuze and Guattari, I am undertaking the possibility for artisanal praxis as “expressionist and constructivist,” with the resonance assemblage itself potentially qualifying as a concept of sensation. Specifically, I self-reflexively test whether temporal qualities—“coordinates” excluded in rational sense (dispositif) and literacy (apparatus), like other types of knowledge—can be included in experienced concept and discourse, not strictly “analytic” and “intellectual.” Ultimately, I show the results particular to the changed conditions of the aesthetic paradigm in my innovating through encounters with intensive writing and temporal qualities in novels by Kathy Acker, Leslie Silko, and Jonathan
Safran Foer. Before presenting the literary encounters sections, I review the method earlier established and update accordingly for apt invention and discourse—demonstrated next.

**Literary Encounters (6-8): Inventing with Three Machines of Temporality**

“Every sensation is a question, even if the only answer is silence.”
—Deleuze and Guattari, *What is Philosophy?* (196)

Thus far I have been developing ideas about literary writing and presenting partly in the composition of a *literary assemblage*, using some of the rhetorical techniques discerned from Pynchon and Vonnegut (and Deleuze more generally). The tertiary concern of testing my proposed poetics for artisanal scholarship has motivated the application by analogy of writing the problematic for diegesis, concepts as characters, and heterogeneous series in the fashion of narrative; as I have argued, the latter form entails qualities particularly valuable for conveying formally the logic of temporality and experience, given the interface for both creating and organizing information. The “content” of this information is the persisting subject of my methodological study, literary encounters as specific form of aesthetic composition generally, understood from Deleuze and Guattari in terms of percepts, affects, and sensations.

Provisionally attempted, “performative narratology” includes deliberately the experienced discourse of my position as reader and writer, in analytic as well as inventive fashion by using both pragmatics and heuretics: working in the aesthetic paradigm through repetition of “motifs” or “refrains” and through “non-linear” arrangement, to name two practices, toward assemblage composition. Increasing this innovation effort, the prior chapter both identified and emulated certain aspects of poetics and effects in *Slaughterhouse-Five*. For instance, referencing the “Dresden story” outline using his daughter’s crayons that Vonnegut reflexively describes (6-7), Lundquist speculates how “It is as if he rolls the wallpaper into a tube
so all of the characters and incidents are closely layered”; he continues to imagine that “The tube then becomes a telescope through which the reader looks into the fourth dimension […] The story goes around and around, yet it still leads somewhere, and yet the end is very close to the beginning” (Bloom 49). ¹

Despite the prevailing language of visual perception in both the novel and scholarship about *Slaughterhouse-Five*, I would like to consider this understanding as describing at least partly my composition in these later chapters—although not in “circular” return (immobile) but progressing through elliptical or spiraling “motion” (“backward” and “forward”). More importantly, one crucial methodological issue remaining to be addressed is the heuristics of encounters, beyond pragmatics, concerning aesthetic compositions (percepts, affects, sensations) and experience discourse in artisanal praxis. Additionally, there appears a related disciplinary challenge at which I do not envision succeeding fully in the present project: discussing “the achievement and persistence of postmodern temporal strategies,” Richardson asserts that “The most urgent task of narrative theory is to construct a poetics of nonmimetic fiction that can finally do full justice to the literature of our time” (*Dynamics* 59).

However, a strategy that attempts the former task, and might incidentally address the latter question, is my composing with the important quality of temporality, as emphasized in Deleuze’s earlier works, in the form of narrative for novelistic philosophy. Specifically, I test the proposition that Deleuze’s productive work with literature, as I established thoroughly in earlier chapters, provides not only a way to read and vocabulary to describe but a method for invention as well. Attending to my focus upon aesthetic sensation, I attempt to use in this innovative

¹ Foreshadowing, semiotic regimes and temporality discussed next: Deleuze similarly reasons “to study by telescope. Proust says as much: at a certain level of essences, what interests him is no longer individuality or detail, but laws, great distances, and major generalities. The telescope, not the microscope” (*Proust and Signs* 82).
fashion the three “literary machines” that Deleuze recognizes in Proust’s writing—deliberately, given the textual and temporal qualities, distinguished from other work with painting or music (let alone formal examples from other disciplines like architecture, mathematics, or biology).

On one hand, this endeavor shows still a “tutelage” in applying Deleuze’s understanding of an author’s style—in this case Proust’s transversality, like Kafka’s machinic assemblages—rather than diagramming distinctly and uniquely. However, the suitability and value of application is both productive and purposeful given the explicit relation of transversal logic and style, as I discuss in the last section regarding concept creation; a paradoxical unity of multiplicity and fragments, indeed, “without ever reducing the many to the One, without ever gathering up the multiple into a whole” (Signs 126), Deleuze affirms about the “antilogo” literary work. Concluding the experiment, the following three sections present both pragmatics and innovation—further demonstrating my “Resonance Assemblage” concept and interface, performative narratology—through literary encounters with novels by Acker, Silko, and Foer.

To this end, I continue attempting encounter pragmatics to identify intensive features (diagrammatic), with which to compose directly by multiple regimes and diegetic textuality. Beyond analysis, the key device for innovation in the aesthetic paradigm is the respective literary machines with regard to temporality and to percepts, affects, or sensations encountered. Finally, this experienced praxis transitions fully from the hermeneutic-detective to the artisan creator at the knowledge frontier, particularly using Deleuze’s analysis: “The entire Search sets three kinds of machines to work in the production of the Book: machines of partial objects (impulses), machines of resonance (Eros), machines of forced movements (Thanatos)” (Signs 160).
Time-lost in Acker’s Senseless *Empire*—serial fragments

“the essence of art will be less that of rendering visible the unseen or the invisible as it intersects a seeing visibility [...] than of rendering Life sensible in its ‘zones of indeterminacy’”

—Alliez, *Signature of the World* (69)

To clarify from the outset, I am not using the entirety of Deleuze’s analysis of the literary machines in *Proust and Signs* (least of all the notions later amended, like truth-orders or “Essences”); rather, the perspective and vocabulary assists first in pragmatics and then (prospectively) in innovative work. To review, the first kind of machine “is defined chiefly by a production of *partial objects*”—“fragments without totality, vessels without communication, partitioned scenes”—in literary composition (*Signs* 150). The corresponding effect is “lost time” by the “*machines of partial objects (impulses)*” (160), created by the “general law” of “serial truths” in the fragmented composition of aesthetic figures, such as characters and narratives.

Considering both the temporal “displacement” of the present by serial narrative and the formal disconnection of style, my encounters with the novels of Kathy Acker offer unique lessons for practices with this literary machine. In her novels *Blood and Guts in High School* (1978) and *Empire of the Senseless* (1988), Acker has significantly compelled my attention to literary writing and textuality in senses material, rhetorical, political, and disciplinary; her writing likewise emphasizes *sense-making* of varying types concerning the present context of available materials and the “blind-spot” of authorship and identity expression.

Unlike, and markedly *against* the limited logic of representation and reference in conventional literature, Acker’s writing is composed with and operates through features *generative* toward invention, *transformative* into assemblage, and *diagrammatic* as lines of flight (*dettiorialization*), using multiple semiotic regimes. Indeed, the purposeful deployments of language is evident in reflexive passages such as, “Language, on one level, constitutes a set of codes and social and historical agreements. Nonsense doesn’t per se break down the codes;
speaking precisely that which the codes forbid breaks the codes” (Empire 134). A useful understanding is Deleuze’s asserting that American writers “have to dismantle the English language and send it racing along a line of flight, rending language convulsive” (Essays 58); likewise, he elaborates, “The founding act of the American novel, like that of the Russian novel, was to take the novel far from the order of reasons,” particularly concerning characters (81, my emphasis). Moreover, I conjecture, such composition renders sensible, though not necessarily intelligible (in “codes”) forces or sensations—such as “lost time, by fragmentation of partial objects” (Signs 160). Briefly discussing a pragmatics reading of Empire of the Senseless both illustrates this method and then produces an opportunity for innovation with Acker’s poetics.

First, rather than regarding as signifiers of moral-psychological persons, Abhor and Thivai—the two discernable characters of Empire—can be viewed as aesthetic compounds, Acker’s “extracted” percepts and affects. ² These function similarly as do the free-indirect discourse narration and the myriad roles anonymously “populating” the narratives: parents, pirates, whores, murderers, police, rapists, CIA agents, Terrorists, Algerians, prisoners, doctors, drug dealers, bosses, street musicians. Some characters appear distinct almost to the extent of Abhor and Thivai, such as Thivai’s brief accomplice Mark in the chapter “I Realize Something.” However, an innumerable “population” operates indistinctly as forces institutional or interpersonal, for instance; this intimated by the narration, most often in action, whether concretely like “They were chasing me” (28); or in vague yet still active dynamics of “Cock on cock” and “Hot female flesh on hot female flesh” (140-1). Because the point to emphasize is Acker’s use of non-representational figures, I deliberately avoid overtly characterizing Abhor—

² To reiterate from Chapter 2, drawing upon What is Philosophy?: unique to the discipline of Art, “percepts and affects” are the sensations that artists extract from lived experience, perceptions and affections regarding states of affairs, which they preserve (167) and express through “aesthetic figures” (Deleuze and Guattari 177).
female, part German-Jewish, “part robot, and part black,” (3)—and Thivai, ostensibly a pirate Captain (21), the two most distinct or discernable (sensible) figures.

A redirected focus (diagrammatic) instead understands the idea of sensation compounds, expressed by the many figures employed: characters thus composed “have passed into the landscape and are themselves part of the compound of sensations” (WP 169), in the terms of Deleuze and Guattari. Like characters, narratives (or “Creative fabulation”) this way do not entail memories or fantasies in the psychological sense of the author (WP 171); rather, “Everything that novelists must extract from the perceptions, affections, and opinions of their psychosocial ‘models’ passes entirely into the percepts and affects to which the characters must be raised without holding on to any other life” (188). The lesson of pragmatics is to avoid fixating upon aesthetic figures as mimetic, or in Acker’s case explicit or “abhorrent” language, in favor of encountering literary elements—“unspeakable” actions and descriptions—precisely as compounds of sensations. The specific forces of lost time are expressed by the serial narration of continual events, as well as in rare instances diverging from the displacing flow, such as the critical discourse curiously interjected into the scene of a fight between sailor and tattooer (133):

Ten years ago it seemed possible to destroy language through language: to destroy language which normalizes and controls by cutting that language. Nonsense would attack the empire-making (empirical) empire of language, the prisons of meaning. But this nonsense, since it depended upon sense, simply pointed back to the normalizing institutions. (134, my emphasis)

With its many narrative fragments and frequent shits in scenes or setting and genre, the “chaotic” diegesis and textuality of Empire thus appears Acker’s aesthetic composition of percepts and affects extracted from life. In this way, Acker employs the aesthetic means of literature for conveying the sensation—the rendering sensible of forces in “indeterminacy,” recalling Alliez—of desire captured within society’s forces and of the lost time having passed
due to the fragmentation and lack of communication within serial progression. *Empire* additionally compels considering the textual figures and fragments, in their counter-signifying expression. Again, Acker provokes this perspective with the meta-discursive commentary interspersed throughout, like the narrator’s remarking about the aim “to destroy language which normalizes and controls” through nonsense and taboo (*Empire* 134). One early example also likely indicates Acker’s self-proclaimed plagiarism\(^3\) or appropriation:

> The German Romantics *had to destroy* the same bastions as we do. Logocentrism and idealism, theology, all supports of a repressive society. Property’s pillars. Reason which always homogenizes and reduces, represses and unifies phenomena or actuality into what can be perceived and so controlled. The subjects, us, are now stable and socializable. Reason *is always* in the service of the political and economic masters. It is here that literature strikes, at this base, where the concepts and actings of order impose themselves. (*Empire* 12, my emphasis).

Particularly in the figure of Abhor and her final narrative fragment, Acker dramatizes textually her reflexive commentary upon signification and meaning (*sense-making*); this strategy motivates my attempting her “pirate” writing in the next section, inscribing critically both my engaging disciplinary practices (literary scholarship) as well as the “lost time” of disconnection.

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\(^{240}\) cf. Conte, who cites a 1989 interview “A Conversation with Kathy Acker,” in which she notes, “I did use a number of other texts to write [*Empire*] (sic), though the plagiarism is much more covered, hidden. Almost all of the book is taken from other texts” (*Design* 228-9). Referring to my earlier-cited passage about “language codes,” Conte conjectures the source material as Foucault’s *Archeology of Knowledge*, given partly the similarity of phrasing as well as her familiarity with Foucault as well as Deleuze and Guattari (227). In any case, I am more interested in such passages for their counter-signifying and reflexive functions as distinct from narration of incessant fictional events.

(Choragraphy 2) “Pirate(d) Scenes”—Elegy for Serial Scholarship (Abhor Writes)

> Finding a manuscript, “Deleuzean Analysis of Acker’s Vitalist Empire” by G.M. Hink, Jr. (Franklin Novelty Company, Philadelphia: 2012) in which to write, Abhor ‘blacks out’ and annotates passages to submit for her final assignment—in order to pass “American Literature in the Age of Non-sensical Theory” at The Humanities Institute of Paris. The document begins,
I found something in my research interesting and particularly applicable to the current discussion:

The Federal Inspection Office for Publications Harmful to Minors decided at its 333th meeting held on September 18, 1986 that:

Acker, Kathy, Tough Girls Don’t Cry, *(Blood and Guts in High School)*
Pocketbook No. 18/41 of the series Heyne Scene / Wilhelm Heyne Publishing House, Munich
to be added to the list of publications harmful to minors. *(Hannibal* 142, original formatting)*

Then, “If I could have spoken to the haircutter at that moment, perhaps I could have been free!” *(Empire* 112).

I am writing now just like I have read that

In “Violent Acts, Volatile Words: Kathy Acker’s Terrorist Aesthetic,” Christina Milletti (2004) posits that “Abhor and Thivai […] are themselves terrorists resisting an institution of power disseminated by the media and governed by money, so that ‘Empire’ refers equally to systems of representation and the Western hegemony that governs them” (358).

“The word free means nothing to me. I left. Walking past a pile of rubble was being in a panic. Because rubble was the memory of Thivai. I remembered being panicked all the time Thivai was my partner.” (112)

Through Abhor, “Acker endorses an essential principle of anarchism, that the impulse to personal freedom more frequently leads to salutary and creative behavior, whereas authoritarian strictures imposed on individuals more frequently lead to violent and destructive behavior.” (Conte 72)

*True.*

“’Since I remember I was nothing, my memory is nothing. To remember is to beat war.” (112).

According to Punday, Acker “develops a post-deconstructive narrative poetics around the idea of textual materiality” *(Deconstruction* 129)

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4 This passage is from the 1986 “Immoral” ruling about *Blood and Guts in High School*, the full text of which is reproduced in *Hannibal Lecter, My Father* Ed. Sylvère Lotringer (Semiotext(e), 1991). The Canadian “Federal Inspection Office” text is formatted like this henceforth, citing parenthetically the source material in *Hannibal Lecter*. The unattributed quotations are Acker’s, citing page numbers from *Empire of the Senseless*. 

241
“The structure of the plot is quite difficult to understand. It is partially very hard or completely impossible for the reader to see whether we are dealing with the protagonist’s imaginations or real events.” (Hannibal 144)

In order to receive a passing grade, I will quote and cite properly (I think) by the conventions of the Modern Language Association style guide, having consulted the MLA Handbook for Writers of Research Papers, 7th edition (2009); a writing tutor has revised, abridged, and corrected my document to excluded any profanity and slang, for example, given the rules about language use in this ‘rhetorical situation’ of non-intensive writing for academic purposes and not for self-expression.

“Acker has shifted her focus from a rather abstract and generalized opposition to language itself, to those stories and ways of using language that have been outlawed under historically specific circumstances. She now seeks not to destroy the realm of language and representation but to expand it, to exploit its own contemporary dynamic of expansion.” (Pitchford 96)

Look, “I was the only end which could be present. If I was an end to the present, and I was: in THE FUTURE there will be no end to human tears. Since I saw NO TEMPORAL POSSIBILITY to other than the present, I saw no possibilities.” (113, EMPHASIS MINE, Abhor’s).

“While Empire is by no means a conventional narrative, its structure is more readily apparent and more chronologically consistent than in the works from Acker’s plagiarism period. There is, nevertheless, still plenty of plagiarism in this novel.” (Pitchford 94)

“Death is floating down the Seine. Where’s this future which you’re telling me? Where’s this fortune which you’re telling me?” (116)

La Seine as a River Létèh —we will have forgotten all this.

“The scumbling of levels of discourse in the novel reflects Acker’s anarchistic methodology, undermining the reader’s presuppositions of dominant-intellectual and subordinate-proletarian cultural positions.” (Conte 59)

Like I said, “I’ve always wanted to be a sailor.” (113)

“The textual impediments to Abhor’s pirate dreams are enforced by the male-invoked power of the state—now once again reified in the form of the Revolutionary Algerian Police.” (Pitchford 102)
I have understood the following to mean the ‘new regime’ of knowledge we have learned about:

“The demand for an adequate mode of expression is senseless. Then why is there this searching for an adequate mode of expression? Was I searching for a social and political paradise? Since all acts, including expressive acts, are interdependent, paradise cannot be an absolute. THEORY DOESN’T WORK.” (Kathy Acker, author-construct, page 113)

Although, insofar as

“The artist is a seer, a become. […] [SHE] has seen something in life that is too great, too unbearable also, and the mutual embrace of life with what threatens it, so that the corner of nature or districts of the town that [SHE] sees, along with their characters, accede to a vision that, through them, composes the percepts of that life, of that moment, shattering lived perceptions into a sort of cubism, a sort of simultaneism, of harsh or crepuscular light, of purple or blue, which have no other object or subject than themselves.” (WP 171)

In that moment, “There was no one. I panicked. There was no feeling.” (113)

“To write is certainly not to impose a form (of expression) on the matter of lived experience,” Deleuze writes (Essays 1); rather, art “goes beyond the matter of any livable or lived experience. It is a process, that is, a passage of Life that traverses both the livable and the lived” (1).

Hink notes, “Deleuze and Guattari’s description applies to Acker: ‘It is always a question of freeing life wherever it is imprisoned, or of tempting it into an uncertain combat’ (WP 171).”

This we can all understand: “I had known love in the past, but it was past. Past is dead.” (116)

“For Acker, images are things—arrested acts, fatalities of experience. ‘The past’s OVER. It’s an image. You can’t make love to an image’ (Acker, ‘Models of our Present’ 62). Because such reductions of force come from steering one’s writing into a closed account, she must turn desire into an art that diminishes neither desire’s nor the artist’s vitality.” (Saltzman 113)

“Because I’m stupid, it’s taken me half a lifetime […] for me to learn that I have to say what I want to get what I want. Who. Perhaps if human desire is said out loud, the urban planes, the prisons, the architectural mirrors, will take off, as airplanes do” (112 MY EMPHASIS).

Discussing Acker’s fiction in “The Idiocy of the Event: Between Artaud, Acker and Deleuze,” Frida Beckman (2010) observes hw the “ layering of literature and philosophy
creates subjects without thoughts and thoughts without subjects” (64); adds, “But where is the thought that is without an I? What is the ethics of the thought-event that is beyond the individual subject? We have still not managed to determine what such an event of thought would be” (66).

Lost-time by everything that has brought me to this point. I have been told, “At the present you don’t love anybody. No one loves you. Without relationships a man’s lost at sea.” (117)

(Side note, to whom it may concern; these two seemingly have an explicit textual relationship):

“Plundering the classics is also a way for the female writer to achieve penetration, as HER texts crawl on top of his, seducing the books they host via the female-superior position.” (Saltzman 111)

“Plagiarism, then, is both an attack on the autobiographical ‘I’ and a strategy of originality: not an abdication of authorial control, but a textualization of it.” (Walsh 153)

“The novel merely mirrors social problems without being genuinely creative in any way.” (Hannibal 148)

“By engaging with social reality in ways that reality does not allow, but which are discernibly present in the mentality individuals relinquish in the process of assimilation, Acker calls into question the values prioritized by society and by our construction of it.” (Walsh 142)

What I saw, on my way to class (it is too late by now already):

“Today only a few old white people whose memories are Stephen King novels sat in wheelchairs on the steps of the remains of the Grand Hotels.” (Empire 118) I agree completely: “they are essentially additional narrative grafts, graced with no more intrinsic legitimacy or honor than the dreams, shards of dialogue, political disputations, or pornographic tableaus with which they share quarters” (Saltzman 112).

“There seems to be a suggestion in Acker’s work that we need to be violently shocked out of our ideological stupor, our passive acceptance of the artificial categories that determine our reality. Indeed, we could make the obvious argument that the excessive violence and spectacle in Acker’s texts force us to recognize the arbitrariness of our existence.” (Toth 173)
I recall: “Though the revolution in Paris had eradicated most of the middle class, the middle-
class cops were left.” (119); “Beneath this concrete of repression, the sailors and cops loved one
another” (119).

“Passages like these are not only youth threatening but also dangerous for adults. According to paragraph 18,3 of the Criminal Code (StGB) the distribution of sado-masochistic literature is to be punished and by this the legislature made clear that made clear that media containing such materials go far beyond the limits of what is harmful to minors.” (Hannibal 146).

In another sense (even if I am “not making ‘sense’!”):

“Abhor’s adoption of the nomadic creed expresses the release or de-institutionalization of the individual from the metallic cocoon of Western culture. Here Acker appears to draw upon concepts of ‘deterritorialization’ and ‘smooth space’ from [Deleuze and Guattari], especially in their discussion of the nomad” (Conte 74)

Today “I thought to myself about the woman about whom I had dreamed: What do I want of her?
I should adore if—no, I don’t want anything that stupid, that fearful!—I really should adore if she was feminine and a motorcycle rider. Tough as any weathered rider! Then I’d be able to ask her what to do!” (121).

“The pocketbook is harmful to minors according to paragraph 1, 1 of the Law for the Projection of Minors (GjS). It is confusing in terms of sexual ethics and is therefore equal to ‘immoral texts’ according to paragraph 1,1 GjS.” (Hannibal 145)

Here is some good news, if I understand correctly: “Acker relies on the prerogatives of the ongoing process of desire—desire unmitigated by specific direction, achieved vantage, or ultimate gratification—to evade logical constraints” (Saltzman 122).

Yes, “My Heart said these words. Whatever my heart now said was absolutely true.” (219)

However, I don’t know what ‘to make of this’, as they say (who?):

“Abhor’s creativity takes the form of rewriting the authoritarian Code as a book called The Arabian Steeds because ‘My Heart said these words. Whatever my heart now said was absolutely true’ ([Acker] 219). Purportedly illiterate, Abhor draws pictographic images over the familiar diamond-shaped warning signs of the Code that are reproduced in the novel, icons of a Western industrialized, petroleum-dependent, contaminated,
asphalt-topped, inflammable society. Abhor converts, decipheres, and performs a hermeneutical transformation of the warning signs of an industrialized world in collapse into the vitalism, free will, and Bedouin-nomadic values of North African cavaliers the motorcycle becomes Arabian steed; the partitioned and industrialized city of Paris becomes open desert; cold metal becomes hot sand; and masculine becomes feminine.” (Conte 73)

“The chosen elements of style do not enhance the novel to the level of art. A colorful, exciting and yet banal and trivial gutter language in itself cannot relay any artistic qualities within a novel.” (Hannibal 148)

“At times she makes her text unreadable […] She interpolates text in Persian, an invasion of the Western literary tradition by an Eastern literature”— “Although the Persian text is ‘unknowable’ for most readers, it still signifies the arbitrariness of literary conventions.” (Conte 61)

From my ‘archive’, something I wrote before: “4. Personal History Or Memory. Otherwise I remember only nausea and I remember ad nauseum. Is there any other knowledge besides this remembering?” (Empire 48)

And here is something Thivai wrote, in his ‘Letters from Gaol’:

And his dream ‘rendered’,

“‘Calm was the night when the galley sailed on a warm, smooth sea’.” (168)

A parable, or an account of an episode:

“In getting the tattoo, Agone recognizes that one or other social text will penetrate his flesh, making it a sign for others to read, and that this will always involve pain; he claims, at least, the right to exhibit an awareness of this sign-making—and the right to introduce a “personal” or secret meaning, troubling any act of reading his body.” (Pitchford 100, original emphasis—not mine or Agone’s)

Finally, I am adding to The Highway Code (1986), Rule 55 h:

“The tattoo outline was huge roses surrounding a larger old-fashioned sailing ship. Below the ocean was a water dragon, a carp who had made it through the gate, who rose in folds and loomed over the ship.” (139). “But what of the dreams which the ocean brings? Have you forgotten, lieutenant?” (117)*
“All this makes clear that this novel does not reach the level worthy to be of value to the pluralistic society. The protection of young people takes precedence over the dissemination of this work as art.” (Hannibal 148)

_The ship is one I would take across the ocean from Paris to New Jersey and find on the shore a little dog named Jacques._

“‘No roses grow on a sailor’s grave.’” (132)

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**Time-lost Lessons**

As I have attempted, Acker’s writing presents narrative and rhetorical strategies applicable for invention, particularly toward producing effects of _deteriorialization_. Most notable are the composition techniques of material-textual qualities and non-signifying regimes of language, through fragments and serial-production effects of lost time; in this way, the prior section drew inspiration formally and theoretically from the conclusion of _Empire_. After escaping prison in the parodic-plagiaristic _Adventures of Huck Finn_ scene (183-212), Abhor must supplement her motorcycle driving instincts with consulting “the rules of road behaviour,” in _The Highway Code_ (213)—the book in which Abhor draws pictures of “whatever my heart now said” (219-21).

Indeed, although much can be made of the non-linguistic and “non-Western” elements of the text, the point suggesting greater potential is Acker’s poetics of “discipline and anarchy,” expression in ways other than literal or representative: subverting the rational (logocentric) _dispositif_, as noted, the aesthetic figures comprise _compounds of sensations_. A simple understanding could be the affects (anger or sexual desire) and the percepts (control or freedom) that Acker creates in this text; for example in the earlier-cited instance when Abhor states, “Because I’m stupid, it’s taken me half a lifetime […] for me to learn that I have to say what I
want to get what I want. Who. Perhaps if human desire is said out loud, the urban planes, the
prisons, the architectural mirrors, will take off, as airplanes do” (112, my emphasis).

Additionally, certain phrasing such as this (and other passages I have emphasized)
convey the forces or sensations of lost time as an effect of intensive writing—the serial
production and fragmentation. Understood similarly, it is the blocs of sensations (WP 164) that
we encounter, Deleuze and Guattari assert: “the work of art is a monument,” but “not something
commemorating a past”; rather, “it is a bloc of present sensations that owe their preservation to
themselves and that provide the event with the compound” (167). Thus how we engage and work
with sensible forces and temporality, as Acker conveys in the novel’s understated conclusion:

I stood there, there in the sunlight, and thought that I didn’t as yet know
what I wanted. I now fully knew what I didn’t want and what and whom I hated.
That was something.
And then I thought that, one day, maybe, there’d be a human society in a
world which is beautiful, a society which wasn’t just disgust. (Empire 227)

Encountering Thanatos in Ceremony—Time-lost Storytelling

In continuing and accelerating my work with the three literary machines, a key
clarification is apt to note, particularly by way of transition: despite my pragmatics reading of
Acker’s composed sensations, I must also recall that for Deleuze, the type of aesthetic signs
associated with the first literary machine are interpreted only by the intellect (Signs 23). Indeed, I
am exploring narrative and the temporal literary machines in the resonance assemblage as
suitable interface for encountering both intelligible and sensible qualities. Attentive to
intensive features in diagrammatic reading for encounter heuritics, the task appears to find as
well percepts and affects, composed sensation: one example includes, in Deleuze’s theory, the
experience of “lost time that has been lost in another way, by amplitude of the forced movement,
this loss having then passed into the work and become the condition of its form” (Signs 160).
An exemplary case—one additionally instructive in the practice of composing with percepts and affects not directly undergone but “extracted”—of conveying affect and temporality through narrative and aesthetic figures is Leslie Marmon Silko’s novel *Ceremony* (1977). With Silko’s directly highlighting types of storytelling and evoking sense(s) of loss, the composition renders sensible the effects of “*machines of forced movements* (Thanatos)” (*Signs* 160), the “production of catastrophe” (149) and “idea of death” (158); additionally, this literary machine corresponds to the expression of lost time in the second sense (148). As this understanding is somewhat counterintuitive, expecting conventionally that narrative “recovers” time past, the challenge for method is using a different sensibility in order to develop a new understanding of story and memory with this inscription of temporality. Silko compels this reconsideration generally by connecting the content and formal features of the novel in inventive fashion, which I discuss next through several examples; more importantly, I test my understanding, whether changed by this productive encounter, in the subsequent application of her composition practices regarding the affect of time lost.

In the main narrative of *Ceremony*, Tayo’s recovery from unnamed maladies (post-traumatic stress disorder, currently diagnosed) involves healing rituals conducted by Laguna shamans, which employ mythology in the ritual. On the one hand, the narration situates storytelling in the paradigm of belief, distinct from Western medicine and rational knowledge; however, rather than question needlessly whether Tayo genuinely shifts to the mode of belief, we can more productively understand Silko’s dramatizing the unintelligible status of past events—particularly considering the function of story fragments. Emphasized in the narrative of Tayo, the effect also calls attention to readers’ encounters with aesthetic figures and stories. In one of the earliest analyses, Janer (1979) establishes this parallel relation: “the reader can follow Tayo
from event to event by moving from poetry to prose and back again to poetry. Silko juxtaposes the mythic portions of the novel and the story of Tayo’s efforts by stating the myth in poetic form to contrast with the prose that carries forward contemporary realizations of the meaning stated in poetic sections” (“An Act of Attention” 39).

In the first case, Silko conveys through Tayo the inability to be affected by loss both general, and specific, as in the death of his surrogate brother Rocky and surrogate father Josiah: the narrator explicitly describes “He didn’t feel anything,” even though he expects to experience hatred of both the Japanese and American “destroyers” alike (58).\(^5\) \textit{Thanatos} is fundamentally inscribed in the recollection and impact of disastrous events, American colonization earlier and the Second World War more recently. Just as Tayo tells a V.A. doctor during treatment that “He cries because they are dead and everything is dying” (14), the plot development of his later paralysis by incomprehension suggests an incapacity as existential disorientation at present. A counterpoint Silko presents is a resentment that precludes personally “making sense” of loss and proceeding, given the direct and limited reaction of contempt and self-directed negation: for example, “Here they were, trying to bring back that old feeling, that feeling they belonged to America the way they felt during the war. They blamed themselves for losing the new feelings […] just like they blamed themselves for losing the land the white people took. They never thought to blame white people for any of it; they wanted white people for their friends” (39).

Separately, \textit{Ceremony} is composed with a \textit{generative} and \textit{transformative} formula in Silko’s inventive use of narratives, particularly the traditional Laguna stories that she includes throughout the novel. Rather than classify certain ones as “myth,” an overall collection establishes Silko’s multimodal strategy of diegetic and hyper-diegetic stories: “Thought

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Woman,” Ceremony (frame-story); historical drought and rain; “Spider Woman” and “Gambler”; Fly and Hummingbird; the Gallup Ceremonials; “Shush” / Bear; Coyote (Ck’o’yo magician) and Big Fly; Descheeny and the captive Mexican girl; Laguna Witchery; the hunger, Mountain Lion, and Ts’eh; the Sunrise offering. A simplistic reading would recognize plot causality implicit in the sequencing of the Laguna stories and Tayo’s recovery; for instance, immediately following a fragment of Fly & Hummingbird, Tayo remarks to Robert, “I’m feeling better … I’ve been doing okay. I can start helping you now” (97). Yet at this point in the narrative, Tayo’s ostensible improvement consists of forgetting, specifically the deaths of Rocky and Josiah, rather than being affected by signs of “universal alteration and death” (Signs 158).

Without evaluating the narratives by the true/false criteria of reason, the aesthetic figures of stories both “mythological” and “actual” can be understood in the function of expressing sensation. In this way, time lost by amplitude of forced movement is conveyed by the interface function of narrative in Silko’s poetics, which not only dramatizes the question of sensibility (sensitivity?) but conveys an affect of loss precisely to the “audience” of the stories. In Deleuze’s theorization, “the movement of time, from past to present, is doubled by a forced movement of greater amplitude, in the contrary direction, which sweeps away the two moments, emphasizes the gap between them, and pushes the past still farther back into time” (Signs 159). Silko’s aesthetic composition both presents an encounter (by character and reader) with and evokes “the effect of withdrawal or the idea of death,” in which “it is time itself that becomes sensuous” (Signs 160). From this perspective, the qualitative difference following Tayo’s healing ritual with Betonie illustrates a crucial insight about the potential of affective encounters by means of aesthetic figures: prior to this story-based ceremony, Tayo is “familiar with that hollow feeling”
of absence, which is similarly described in physiological terms as “the empty space of loss, regret for things which could not be changed” (67), concerning his mother’s death.

By understanding Tayo’s “healing” narrative not as a restoration—by fortification of belief—but as a shift to a different mode of sensibility and experience, we can recognize the factor of the numerous stories in relation to his affective transformation in the later events of the plot. Early in the novel, the contrast emerges between the anesthetic “hollow feeling”—a figurative “scar tissue” or lack of sensibility—and the capacity to be affected by experience: “The sensitivity remained: the ability to feel what the others were feeling in the belly and chest; words were not necessary, but the messages the people felt were confused now” (63). This difference can also be understood within a cultural context, as Cartsen (2006) describes:

[Silko’s] strategy challenges the hegemony of Euro-American cultural and literary interpretation that situates the experiences of Indian peoples within plots of tragedy and defeat. The mythic frame of reference offers an alternative way of interpreting the experiences of tribal individuals; it positions the individual in harmonious relationship with the community and with the cosmos. Silko employs the mythical focus on harmony and beauty to highlight the conflict between Euro-American and Native American cosmologies and ethics. (“Storyteller” 117)

Unlike logocentric (Western) epistemology, the problem of sensibility is not resolved by rational hermeneutics insofar as we remain “unmoved” by our analytic response and argumentative discourse, and moreover inattentive to affect or temporality as experienced. Two heterological narratives that accentuate time-lost by Thanatos are the “historical” accounts of the uranium mine and nuclear tests (226-8) and the “mythical” stories of European “destroyers” that Betonie and Ts’eh relay to Tayo. Understood categorically, these parallel views are incommensurate in

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6 Like Cartsen, Mitchell discerns in the productive encounter narrative’s potential “to cure some of the hopelessness and despair”: noting that “Tayo [is] cured by the old stories and changing ceremonies,” she describes moreover how Silko “weaves the old stories and traditions into the contemporary story of Tayo in a way that helps to make the old ways understandable and relevant to the contemporary situation.” (“Ceremony as Ritual” 28, my emphasis).
the respective paradigms of Belief and Reason; the Trinity Site is incomprehensible textually to Tayo’s Grandma just as the witchery origin is “nonsense” to rational thinkers (readers).

Finally, given my project I must consider how scholarly interpretations of novel, as represented by Cartsen and Mitchell, recognize the unique composition and effects by Silko’s composition without necessarily presenting any results of this encounter, even in rhetorical practices. Arnold (1999) similarly observes “a new way of being and knowing” as the plot outcome for the protagonist: “The fragmentation that characterized his mental state and the world around him […] is healed, as the patterns that underlie and interconnect those fragments become visible to him. Tayo relearns a way of seeing he had experienced before the war, listening to Old Grandma tell the time-immemorial stories, visiting the sacred spring of Grandmother Spider” (“An Ear for the Story” 76).

In contrast, I seek not only to apply the strategy of narrative interface, working in the aesthetic paradigm, but to express a resultant affective capacity in sensibility. This creative effort is motivated both by the novel’s poetics and by Deleuze’s re-writing of the Ariadne myth, one discovered by inventing a “sonorous labyrinth [as] the song of the earth” (Essays 104).7 Specifically, the following section attempts to convey rather than strictly explain that which I have only minimally identified, the sensation of time lost by the machine of Thanatos: “The idea of death is henceforth less a severance than an effect of mixture or confusion because the amplitude of the forced movement is as much taken up by the living as by the dead; all are dying, half dead, or racing to the grave” (Signs 159).

7 In Deleuze’s “The Mystery of Ariadne, according to Nietzsche,” once Ariadne turns toward Dionysus from Theseus, her “song cease[s] to be the expression of ressentiment in order to become an active search, an already affirmative question” (Essays 103). Consequently, “The labyrinth is no longer architectural; it has become sonorous and musical” (104)—“no longer that of knowledge or morality, but the labyrinth of life and of Being as living being” (106). The lesson for sensibility is thus my composing with “the ear of Dionysus, the labyrinthine ear” (103).
"Do we have an ear for the collective din?" —Serres, *The Five Senses* (108)

"To hear well is to hear what is never said, what has to be kept silent beyond the message” —Cixous, *Readings* (71)

They have almost arrived after traveling all day, walking the last 3 miles after receiving rides first from San Fidel and then up from Laguna. It will be dark soon, but the cold is not prohibitive without wind, and the walk means seeing the last light of the day cast over the pueblo, between the hills. The young man can not visit there now, can only accompany Tayo as he ventures to wait for the mountain lion. “You are better off not staying in Gallup, along the highway. I will not join you going farther East than we have today,” Tayo tells him.

Volcanic eruptions, occurring over time, created the landscape we call El Malpais. These lava flows formed unique ecosystems and shaped human perceptions.

“It is not much farther,” the young man ventures. “I could not go past the gate earlier, on the way from Grants, to see the rock the rangers mentioned. Tomorrow I’d like to reach the reservoir, and then onto the Valley of Fires. There is a plane somewhere nearby.”

Tayo walked silently, not responding until reaching a point, a ledge on the path. “I will tell you a story now, of a man a bit younger than you are now.”

The man could not make any sense of the death he had seen, not only family members and other natives but animals and the land of his birth. Often times, “He cried, trying to release the great pressure that was swelling inside his chest, but he got no relief from crying any more. The pain was solid and constant as the beating of his own heart” (Silko 35). He felt half-heartedly that he wasted time hearing Betonie’s stories, and he did not know what to do later after spending days with Ku’oosh during the ceremony. This was after he returned, unable to feel any strength against the unnamed forces overpowering. Still, “He never knew how long he had been lost there, in that hospital in Los Angeles.” (Silko 213)

*Tayo stops for awhile, observing the gloaming and recalling Ts’eh in these very mountains.*
Zuni say the bear has healing powers. When faced with conflicts, he helps you meditate to find the answers you need.

He resumes the story, and the tone has changed, like a different man speaking, when he mentions hearing his grandmother’s storytelling.

“He never lost the feeling he had in his chest when she spoke those words, as she did each time she told them stories; and he still felt it was true, despite all they had taught him in school—that long ago things had been different, and human beings could understand what the animals said, and once the Gambler had trapped the stormclouds on his mountaintop.” (Silko 87).

Tayo turns and faces Southwest, where the young man traveled from earlier. “You should not visit Cebolleta. Not now, while the canyon is dry. The mine shafts are exposed, and no animals can reside there. You must know what I mean.”

Once, almost fifty years ago, the mine flooded and needed to be pumped, with machinery brought from Albuquerque. “But later in the summer the mine flooded again, and this time no pumps or compressors were sent. They had enough of what they needed, and the mine was closed, but the barbed-wire fences and guards remained until August 1945. By then they had other sources of uranium, and it was not top secret any more.” (Silko 226)

Continuing the story of the man who could not proceed, Tayo explains what happened after the man no longer alternated between believing and reasoning what he felt.

“The magnetism of the center spread over him smoothly like rainwater down his neck and shoulders; the vacant cool sensation glided over the pain like feather-down wings. It was pulling him back, close to the earth, where the core was cool and silent and as mountain stone, and even with the noise and pain in his head he knew how it would be.” (Silko 187).

Beginning up the path again, Tayo asks the young man where he is from originally. Learning where, he mentions the story of how the ocean lost the moon by Fly and Hummingbird, to recollect another time. “The moon is up. The tides will be angry at your home, given its size.”

The several hundred petroglyphs and 2,000 names inscribed in the sandstone walls of El Morro rock represent 1,000 years of continuous human use and occupation.
Walking alongside the young man, who is looking North, Tayo asks him to recall the easterly winds. “Can you hear them, above the waves breaking, not far from where you sleep? The shoreline will be different tomorrow, gone from today forced into the past. There is nothing for you to read in the sand, whatever has been written. It is not like these rocks, here all during the Fifth World. But what can you hear, rhythms and other echoes, as the bear?”

The young man did not answer, knew not to reply. He turned southeast and tried not to think, opened himself to the twilight sky. After standing a few minutes, he asked Tayo what happened to him in the end of the story of the man lost, whether able to make sense or understand.

“He cried the relief he felt at finally seeing the pattern, the way all the stories fit together—the old stories, the war stories, their stories—to become the story that was still being told. He was not crazy; he had never been crazy. He had only seen and heard the world as it always was: no boundaries, only transitions through all distances and time.” (Silko 229)

When the young man nodded but remained looking away, Tayo remarked, “You can not expect to understand fully while surrounded by plastic. Standing on the sand of the impermanent shore means a different grounding. You will hear someday, with the corrosive salt air winds.”

Formed from raw clay, the figurine is painted by hand then fired in an outdoor kiln to 2000°F. Red hot, it is plunged into a pit with mesquite shavings, igniting a blaze, entirely unique.

Lessons of Writing Lost Time

Although not entirely successful in conveying the sensation of time lost by Thanatos, the prior section demonstrates as performative narratology the potential of composing with an interface of sensibility: as discerned from Silko’s practices, the related “formula” like other authors mentioned uses history, fiction/myth, and personal experience to compose (with) encounters. Moreover, the exemplars of Foer, Acker, and Silko aid in my examining the prospect
for aesthetic compounds of percepts and affects “extracted” and composed, as opposed to
directly experienced (“second-order”). This perspective is valuable in practice generally, in
encounter heuristics, and specifically in undertaking the proposition “that one can remain poetic
in the very midst of history” (Cixous 110): using literary forms and vehicles for temporal effects
and for transformative configurations into (or by means of) an assemblage. Apt to this end,
although framed in a different context, is Currie’s conjecturing, “If time and history are being
readmitted here, it is an unrecognisable form that destroys the linear sequence of past, present
and future with the logic of the trace which understands the components of any sequence as
constitutive of each other” (Postmodern Narrative 78, my emphasis).

As with prior novels in this chapter, I have encountered in Ceremony the composition of
percepts and affects, specifically a sense and sensation of temporality driven by the amplitude of
forces—Thanatos, destruction by the catastrophe, whether a marked disaster in event
(Vonnegut, Foer) or in society and knowledge dispositif (Acker, Silko). In each case, I have
found in the aesthetic paradigm an increased potential for sensibility, even and especially if
unintelligible, of forces and sensations that can be composed in aesthetic style of expressive or
experienced thought. On one hand, this perspective recalls a prospect inherent in Deleuze’s
theorization, as I have been testing: “Each art has its interrelated techniques or repetitions, the
critical and revolutionary power of which may attain the highest degree and lead us from the sad
repetitions of habit to the profound repetitions of memory, and then to the ultimate repetitions of
death in which our freedom is played out” (DR 93). Beyond recollection as activity of the
intellect, though, I seek to propose a method and discourse for affective expression, as in how I
have been testing aesthetic practices for sense-making at the knowledge frontier of experience
and encounters. The next section explores not only the third literary machine, and its temporality
of “time regained,” regarding the destructive forces (Thanatos) and recollection (Mnemosyne); additionally, this identifies the promise of resonance for assemblage composition, heuretic encounters and artisanal praxis in philosophical discourse, as I describe in the final section.

Expressing “Eros and Mnemoysyne”—Foer’s Machines of Resonance

Like the several authors I have discussed thus far, the “formula” I have identified is markedly apparent in Jonathan Safran Foer’s first two novels, Everything is Illuminated (2002) and Extremely Loud & Incredibly Close (2005). And while both novels can be understood as functioning by Deleuze’s third literary machine, I am focusing on the first given my particular examination of writing and diegetic textuality as intensive features. Besides avoiding the additional pragmatics of multiple regimes, like photographs and “mediality” of computer technology, in the latter novel, the approach is motivated by the question of literary invention at the knowledge frontier: while both novels feature fictional writers and readers as well as quest plots (detective model), Illuminated includes to greater extent diagrammatic elements of narrative beyond communication or signification regimes. Moreover, Foer’s compositional practices in both novels present aesthetically certain percepts, affects, and sensations, including not only time lost (Thanatos) but “time regained”—temporality become sensuous (Signs 160)—by the machine of resonance (Eros) in Deleuze’s vocabulary. Most importantly, Illuminated not only presents aesthetic compounds to engage in pragmatics and encounter heuretics; the novel also demonstrates the possibilities of the narrative assemblage functioning as sensibility interface with history, temporality, and experience, at the knowledge frontier of writing.

Like Slaughterhouse-Five and Ceremony, the novel’s organization fundamentally contributes to the effects produced at the level of composition and literary language. To summarize, the textual arrangement consists of serial chapters narrated (and purportedly composed by) Alexander Perchov, with the additional fictional device of the Alex character
corresponding by letters about these chapters with “Jonathan Safran Foer,” who appears in the quest narrative in modern-day Ukraine. While the quasi-picaresque chapters include titles like “An Overture to Encountering the Hero, and Then Encountering the Hero” (27) and “The Very Rigid Search” (105), the seven epistolary interludes are only dated (20 July 1997 to 22 January 1998) and moreover are only composed by Alex; this ostensibly “metafictional preterition” is accentuated in commentary from Alex (in the fictional device) about Jonathan’s novel—serving as one of few links between the eight quest chapters and the eighteen mostly episodic chapters. Also dated—“Recurrent Secrets, 1791-1943” and “The Thickness of Blood and Drama, 1934” for instance—the latter chapters comprise narratives set in the shetl of Trachimbrod, or Sofiowka “on certain maps” (62), concerning Yankel-Safran and Brod during the years 1791-1804; and Safran, the character called by the narrator “my grandfather,” in episodes during 1924-41.

These temporal settings span the invented lineage of eight generations by the narrator-author, consisting mostly of events respectively involving Brod—his “great-great-great-great-great-grandmother” (47)—and his grandfather, Safran, who “escaped the Nazi raid on Trachimbrod” (59); in one instance, an aberrant time-setting, the narrator references his grandmother and mother, who is age twenty one in 1969, “My age as I write these words” at present (98).

The reflexive focus upon writing directly connects the textual features and compounds with issues of temporality, particularly in conveying sensations of time lost and regained; distinct from (psychological/phenomenological) memory, this effect occurs between (or “across”)
disparate figures in the respective narratives of Brod, Safran, and Jonathan. Considered one way, “the resonance machine” that Deleuze describes “does not totalize fragments that come from elsewhere. It extracts its own fragments itself and sets up a resonance among them according to their own finality” (Signs 152). The production by this machine would seem to function beyond simple occurrences of reference (or re-iteration), as when in 1941 Safran recounts to the Gypsy girl—“promising to ask for her help when he one day tried to write Trachimbrod’s history”—the story of Brod’s “tragic life” (233), or when they see a play featuring her origin story, which begins exactly as does the first chapter, “It was March 18, 1791, when Trachim B’s doubleaxle wagon[…]” (8/172). Additionally, “art produces resonances that are not those of memory,” Deleuze explains, which are not limited to involuntary recollection (“most famously”) of earlier moments by some similarity at present, but include desire (Signs 151) and contiguity as well.

Besides direct connections or repetitions, Foer’s narrative constructions and relations convey effects of lost time, which “introduces distances between contiguous things,” and time regained, which creates “a contiguity of distant things” (Signs 129). In the first case, lost time and affects of loss are evoked by the novel’s content, as in the destruction of the entire shetl of Trachimbrod, as well as specific character deaths such as Brod’s father or Herschel, the best friend to Alex’s grandfather, who “murdered him” (228)—“Or what I did was as good as murdering him” (247)—when the Nazi’s came to Kolki, near Trachimbrod, as well. In one of the tranversal lines created, Alex and Jonathan find in the same scene, upon finding Augustine, The Book of Past Occurrences (224), and they (we) read nearly the same text presented earlier (200) in the Book of Antecedents (“The Time of Dyed Hands” from the 18th century), which Safran is speculated to have read as a student (196). Although this book is “archival” in the serial quest plot for Alex and Jonathan, in a variety of historiographic metafiction, the effect for readers
exceeds simple reference by Foer’s employing the book in numerous forms and narrative
instances; moreover, the device does not strictly function in the signifying regime, as literally
inscribing “The Five Generations Between Brod and Safran” (210), as mentioned, for example.

Rather, as a device of indirect and transversal narration, the hypodiegetic book compels
reflexive attention to practices—formal, material, rhetorical, discursive—for sense making at the
knowledge frontier, if only generative and to degrees diagrammatic. One of the novel’s most
notable sections, for example, reports that “The Book of Antecedents, once updated yearly, was
now continually updated, and when there was nothing to report, the full-time committee would
report its reporting, just to keep the book moving, expanding, becoming more like life: We are
writing... We are writing... We are writing...” (196, original emphasis and ellipsis). Appearing
before diegetic excerpts from The Book of Antecedents, this passage and the 18th-century texts
from the Trachimbrod of Yankel and Brod functions as textual resonance of the past in the
present of Safran’s narrative, about whom the narrator muses in the subjunctive mood, “he too
must have skipped from volume to volume, page to page, searching…” (196).

The unusual temporality, or “contemporaneity” of past and present is created partly by
this shift to narration of stories such as “Trachimday, 1796” and “The First Rape of Brod D”
(203) as well as to encyclopedic entries like Art-Artifice-Artifact (202), “Objects That Don’t
Exist” (207), and “Brod’s 613 Sadnesses” (211), in typical fashion of the shetl-citizen characters
throughout the novel. Finally, the dual (or “mixed”) temporal orientations is highlighted by this
transition, from Safran to the Antecedents excerpts for the duration, in this chapter titled “Falling
in Love, 1934-1941,” the same as chapter 21 (along with three others similarly named). Unlike
the occasioned (involuntary?) recollection of Safran’s narrative framing Brod’s in chapter 13,
“The Dial, 1941-1804-1941” (121), the temporal shift occurs by the feature of textuality—just as

Having belabored this point somewhat, and summarizing the narrative arrangement that I find particularly generative of resonant effects, I will conclude with two notable examples in which Foer composes (having extracted?) using transversal lines on the temporal axis, before turning to my performative narratology attempt in the next section. And although my discussion thus far has not been especially affective or “resonant” of sensations encountered, I have at least provisionally found in Foer’s narrative practices how “A forced movement has meshed gears with a resonance”: “the violent contradiction between time regained and lost time is resolved,” in Deleuze’s reading, by “attach[ing] each of the two to its order of production”—the literary *machines of resonance (Eros) and machines of forced movements (Thanatos)* (Signs 152).

In one transverse relation, the scene of watching the televised lunar landing includes the 1969 astronaut’s perceiving *something* (99), the persistent “glow of 1804” Trachimday: “From space, astronauts can see people making love as a tiny speck of light. Not light, exactly, but a glow that could be mistaken for light—a coital radiance that takes generations to pour like honey through the darkness to the astronaut’s eyes” (95). Although the affirmative expression, the copulative light of Trachimbrod persisting through time, “will say in one and a half centuries. *We’re here, and we’re alive*” (96), this description coincides with Brod’s finding the deceased Yankel (97), immediately after having been raped by Sofiowka (203); this outcome creates at present the “echo” of past narration and another transversal, in Brod’s perceiving in the future a boy and girl reading *The Book of Antecedents*, specifically “The First Rape of Brod D” (89).  

Perhaps this fashions “the past as contemporaneous with its own present, as pre-existing the

9 In a scene of fabulation, Brod gazes into the future by “a powerful telescope” and discovers not only the *Antecedents* reading by the children that I have noted, but also the photograph that motivates the search-plot of the novel, which appears to be inscribed “with handwriting that looks like hers” (88).
passing present and as that which causes the present to pass,” as Deleuze theorizes: “Virtual objects are shreds of pure past” (DR 101)—most especially aesthetic writing, in this case.

Likewise, the narrative instance of Safran’s wedding-night copulation occurs in 1941 precisely during the nearby bombing (257). This latter scene connects Eros and Thanatos along the temporal “axis” of 1804-1969, resonating (or “regaining”) the former and contributing to the persistence (retroactively in the novel) in the figure of Safran, as “when he released into the universe a copulative light so powerful that if it could have been harnessed and utilized […] the Germans wouldn’t have had a chance, he wondered if one of the bombs hadn’t landed on the marriage bed […] and obliterated Trachimbrod” (257). Perhaps a less literal instance of Foer’s joining time lost and time regained is the impulse by Safran in 1941 to “write Trachimbrod’s history” one day and include the story of Brod’s “tragic life” (233), at present sensing the effects of her past reverberating, as in the telescope scene when she experiences that “the page—her paper-thin future—is infinitely heavy” (89). Toward my ends of pragmatics and heuristics, another understanding of textuality and time is that “This is the link between Eros and Mnemosyne. Eros tears virtual objects out of the pure past and gives them to us in order that they may be lived” (DR 102-3). In lieu of attempting truly inventive poetics using narrative resonance in the fashion of Foer, the following section at least presents this way my encounters with the textual affects of Illuminated through artisanal praxis (“performative narratology”).
Dear Gary,

first, thank you for the wonderful surprise of the books by Nicole Krauss and Lydia Davis! I look forward to reading them and learning what you write about them (if you have time to share your ideas with me). Also for the CD mix of songs. I know so much better now what you mean saying you ‘think more like music’ about certain moments and experiences. I too feel this way sometimes, as when I am reading parts of novels. But even this is more like films to me. (You will have to say more about this…)

As for your last letter, yes! I found the book you requested! The librarians here at Volyn State University were so surprised that you had even known of it, they said they never expected anyone outside Ukraine to read. I have tried to copy as much I can for you, finding parts I think you will like. (How will you use this in your writing?) I must say the book is very hard to follow. The writer describes a novel named ‘Songs We Would Have Heard’ (this is why you have requested the book?). But there too are about history that do not interest me in my classes (I still have not chosen one concentration, I would like to pursue business law or media journalism. (when will you next resume working as a teacher? next will you try to become a writer of novels or of philosophy? I hope to read your books someday too.)

The attachment file to this email is my best effort to type for you the passages, as fast as I could send you. The parts about the novel story I like best, and I think you will like too. (It seems very sad and also amazingly joyful too. At times I feel like I might be the granddaughter of Zosha and Safran, had their child survived! These parts felt most important to me personally.) I hope this helps your ‘project’ as you say and ‘literary research’! Good luck and tell me soon what you think.

Most sincerely,
Sofka

p.s. will you now try to find the novel to read in translation one day?

Typed (as best I could) passages from the book

**History and Typology of Literature from Pre-War Years** (Kiev, 2000)
(Історія та типологія літератури з довоєнних років, Київ, 2000)

The hero is distressed. “Safran lay in bed trying to string the events of his seventeen years into a coherent narrative, something that he could understand, with an order of imagery, an intelligibility of symbolism. Where were the symmetries? The rifts? What was the meaning of what had happened?” (260) Around Trachimbrod, “Men set up flow charts (which were themselves memories of family trees) in an attempt to make sense of their memories. They tried to follow the line back, like Theseus out of the labyrinth, but only went in deeper, farther.” (259)

Gary, the book has a picture-drawing of the ‘flow chart’ here. —S

Safran walked around aimlessly, first to The Dial but then quickly away once seeing two former one-time mistresses. He saw another man about his age reading The Book of Unlived Recollections under his favorite tree.

This Plaque Marks The Spot
(Or A Spot Close To The Spot)
Where The Wagon Of One Trachim B (We Think) Went In.
Shtetl Proclamation, 1791
(Foer 93, formatting modified)

from The Book of Unlived Recollections:

2:509—The Ghost of What Never Was (Wife)
“It was inevitable: Yankel fell in love with his never-wife. He would wake from sleep to miss the weight that never depressed the bed next to him, remember in earnest the weight of gestures she never made…” (48) making his widower’s remembrances that much more convincing and his pain that much more real. He felt that he had lost her. He had lost her. At night he would reread the letters that she had never written him.” (Foer 49)

2:510—The Memory of the Novel Never Published (XVII)

The Story of the Spiraling Here, which I finished writing and then misplaced. Now I cannot recall how it begins.

5:020—Voices from Another Place (IV)

And then Brod heard from her chamber organ—“She wants to know why her friend saved her wedding ring…”
Finally, Safran found a place to wait for the widow to return home, sitting beside her house. He read, for what felt like an hour although only minutes passed. He no longer had his watch, or cared to find where he’d lost it.

“September 23, 1803: . . . It occurred to me this afternoon that there is nothing in the world I like so much as writing in my diary. It never misunderstands me and I never misunderstand it. We are like perfect lovers, like one person. Sometimes I take it to bed with me and hold it as I fall asleep. Sometimes I kiss its pages, one after another. For now, at least, it will have to do . . .” (Foer 87)

28 October 1997: “I understand what you write when you write that Brod does not love Yankel. It does not signify that she does not feel volumes for him, or that she will not be melancholy when he expires. It is something else. Love, in your writing, is the immovability of truth. Brod is not truthful with anything. Not Yankel and not herself.” (Foer 100)

While there, the young man and the friend Avra approached him with curious excitement.

“Look what we have found! what someone added to The Book of Antecedents,” Avra began. “Under the re-printed entry for Pinchas T”—“the deceased philosopher Pinchas T, who, in his only notable paper, ‘To the Dust: From Man You Came and to Man You Shall Return,’ argued it would be possible, in theory, for life and art to be reversed” (Foer 90).

“every reminiscence, whether of a town or a woman, is erotic. It is always Eros, the noumenon, who allows us to penetrate this pure past in itself, this virginal repetition which is Mnemosyne. He is the companion, the fiancé, of Mnemosyne. Where does he get this power? Why is the exploration of the pure past erotic? Why is it that Eros holds both the secret of questions and answers, and the secret of an insistence in all our existence? Unless we have not yet found the last word…” (Difference and Repetition 85)

“We thought, ‘perhaps Safran has written this!’” Avra added.

“No, not I,” Safran clarified, impatient. “But let us look for a similar section in this volume,” he continued, with a different twinge of intrigue aroused.
Artifice
“Artifice is that thing that was art in its conception and ifice in its execution. Look around. Examples are everywhere.” (Foer 202)

Art
“Art is that thing having to do only with itself—the product of a successful attempt to make a work of art. Unfortunately, there are no examples of art, nor good reasons to think that it will ever exist. (Everything that has been made has been made with a purpose, everything with an end that exists outside that thing, i.e., I want to sell this, or I want this to make me famous and loved, or I want this to make me whole, or worse, I want this to make others whole.) And yet we continue to write, paint, sculpt, and compose. Is this foolish of us?” (Foer 202)

Iface
“Iface is that thing with purpose, created for function’s sake, and having to do with the world. Everything is, in some way, an example of ifice.” (Foer 202)

Artifact
“An artifact is the product of a successful attempt to make a purposeless, useless, beautiful thing out of a past-tensed fact. It can.” (Foer 202)

Ifact
“An ifact is a past-tensed fact. For example, many believe that after the destruction of the first Temple, God’s existence became an ifact.” (Foer 202)

Ifactifice
“Music is beautiful. Since the beginning of time, we (the Jews) have been looking for a new way of speaking. We often blame our treatment throughout history on terrible misunderstandings. (Words never mean what we want them to mean.) If we communicated with something like music, we would never be misunderstood, because there is nothing in music to understand. This was the origin of Torah chanting and, in all likelihood, Yiddish—the most onomatopoeic of all languages. It is also the reason that the elderly among us, particularly those who survived a pogrom, hum so often, indeed seem unable to stop humming, seem dead set on preventing any silence or linguistic meaning in. But until we find this new way of speaking, until we can find a nonapproximate vocabulary, nonsense words are the best thing we’ve got. Ifactifice is one such word.” (Foer 203)

Safran asked for The Book of Antecedents for the night, borrowing the newest “Portable Volume” from Avra. When he finished with the widow—in whose house he spent only a half hour, with twenty minutes having tea—he decided to copy a passage into the Book in the late-afternoon sunlight.
French Poetry
“I bought you some books in Lutsk, he told her, shutting the door on the early evening and the rest of the world. We can’t afford these, she said, taking the heavy bag. I’ll have to return them tomorrow. But we can’t afford not to have them. Which can we not afford more, having them or not having them? As I see it, we lose either way. My way, we lose with the books. You’re ridiculous, Yankel. I know, he said, because I also bought you a compass from my architect friend and several books of French poetry. But I don’t speak French. What could be a better occasion to learn? Having a French language textbook. Ah yes, I knew there was a reason I bought this! he said, removing a thick brown book from the bottom of the bag. You’re impossible, Yankel! I’m possibly possible.” (Foer 81, my formatting)

Safran had not cross-referenced the entries for “Phonautograph” and “France,” or he would have seen that this account had already been recorded (with some variation). The textbook was how Brod (his great-great-greatgrandmother) came to add to her library several books written in French (as well as German, Spanish, and English). But how she acquired the Phonautograph in 1861 is unknown. And most strange is her “phonautogram,” an inscription of sounds she heard one night coming through the pipes of her chamber organ between static:

“She wants to know why her friend saved her wedding ring when she thought that she would be killed.” “So there would be proof that she existed,” the hero said. “What?” “Evidence. Documentation. Testimony.” I told this to Augustine. “But a ring is not needed for this. People can remember without the ring. And when those people forget, or die, then no one will know about the ring.” I told this to the hero. “But the ring could be a reminder,” he said. “Every time you see it, you think of her.” I told Augustine what the hero said. “No,” she said. “I think it was in case of this. In case someone should come searching one day.” (Foer 192)

[static] “This is Trachimbrod,” he said. “It’s also called Sofiowka on certain maps. This is Lutsk. This is Kolki. It’s an old map. Most of the places we’re looking for aren’t on new maps.” (Foer 62)

Also from The Book of Unlived Recollections:

2:509—Voices from Another Place (IV)
“For all I know the writing doesn’t have anything to do with the picture. It could be that he used this for scrap paper.” “Scrap?” “Paper that’s unimportant. Just something to write on.” (Foer 61)

As Safran returned home, he saw the Gypsy girl briefly—only in time to slip her a scrap of paper. Throughout these months, “They exchanged notes, like children”: Safran “made his out
of newspaper clippings and dropped them in her woven baskets, into which he knew only she would dare stick a hand. *Meet me under the wooden bridge, and I will show you things you have never, ever seen.*” (232-3) He recalled a passage from the *Unlived Recollections*:

3:017: Unwritten Thoughts (XLIX)

“Fearing his frequent deficiencies of memory, he began writing fragments of his life story on his bedroom ceiling with one of Brod’s lipsticks that he found wrapped in a sock in her desk drawer. This way, his life would be the first thing he would see when he awoke each morning, and the last thing before going to sleep each night.” (Foer 83) He wrote in *The Book of Recurrent Dreams*: “4:812—The dream of living forever with Brod” (84)

12:0910: Unread Books written by Ancestors (Male)

“I’m looking for a book, he told the librarian, who had cared for the Trachimbrod novels since she was a girl, and was the only citizen to have read them all. *My great-grandfather* wrote it.

What was his name? the librarian asked.

*Safranbrod, but I think he wrote it under a pseudonym.*

What was the name of his book?

*I can’t remember the name. [...] He’d tell me stories from it to put me to sleep.*

*What’s it about?* she asked. *It’s about love.*

She laughed. *They’re all about love.*”

(Foer 201-2)

There are entries in *The Book of Antecedents* that Safran still has not read. For example,

**The Novel, When Everyone Was Convinced He Had One in Him**  (Foer 201)

**The Tale of the Lost Book and/or Novel Title**

*Once, Zivka and Anshel had composed a novel together, about their friend Zosha: ‘Songs We Would Have Heard and The Story of the Spiraling (H)ear’...*

**Realization**  "The only thing more painful than being an active forgetter is to be an inert rememberer”  (Foer 260)

**Fear and Confusion at Misrecognizing One’s Handwriting (IV)**

“She turns away and turns back, as if in that moment she might have acquired some new perspective, but the room remains a puzzle to her. She tries to piece it together: A half-smoked cigarette balancing itself on an ashtray’s lip. A damp washcloth on the sill. A scrap of paper on the desk, with handwriting that looks like hers: *This is me with Augustine, February 21, 1943.*”(Foer 88)
When he arrived home, after a directionless walk fretting over his arranged marriage to Zosha, Safran found the Gypsy girl in his room. “Your books are arranged by the color of their spines,” she said. How stupid.” (236) He had never thought to arrange them any other way, except for the complicated system at the Yankelbrod library. He reopened The Book of Antecedents when she left, thinking to add something about this. Instead he reads—“Brod’s 613 Sadnesses” (55 anyway, “The other 558 sadnesses are lost forever”) (Foer 211).

Several others have been newly added, we can see:


A young soldier tossed the nine volumes of The Book of Recurrent Dreams onto the bonfire of Jews, not noticing, in his haste to grab and destroy more, that one of the pages fell out of one of the books and descended, coming to rest like a veil on a child’s burnt face:

9:613—The dream of the end of the world. (Foer 272)

We are writing. . . We are writing. . . We are writing. . . We are writing. . . We are writing. . . We are writing. . . We are writing. . . We are writing. . . We are writing. . . We are writing. . . We are writing. . . We are writing. . . We are writing. . . (Foer 212, original formatting)

Lessons of Eros

As mentioned, the prior section is not entirely successful and affective expression, in my attempt to present in “performative” fashion my pragmatics reading of intensive features and my encounter with the novel. However, as artisanal praxis it shows significant promise and results in two ways regarding both the approach to working with novels and to using in the fashion writers do the respective literary machines of production and temporality.10 In the latter sense, I

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10 Perhaps I did not need to include the authors’ texts, instead sufficient to identify what could be done in the resonance assemblage later developed; however, as a “literature scholar,” the novels are precisely my available materials for invention at the frontier—which I realize only retrospectively and reflexively by the writing process.
have undertaken by way of Foer’s practices the proposition by Deleuze that “style sets up a resonance between any two objects and from them extracts a ‘precious image’, substituting for the determined conditions of an unconscious natural product the free conditions of artistic production” (Signs 155, original emphasis). Although perhaps “misusing” the techniques in narrative contrivance and a limited context, unlike that of Illuminated, I have at the very least considered this prospect in application. Indeed, the point for method to consider is that “not only does the resonance produce an aesthetic effect, but the resonance itself can be produced & be [...] an artistic effect” (Signs 154, my emphasis); the artist and the reader, or artisanal scholar “disentangles” various meanings and functions, Deleuze posits: “setting up a resonance between two objects, he produces the epiphany, releasing the precious image from the natural conditions that determine it, in order to reincarnate it in the chosen artistic conditions” (156).

Beyond the superior viewpoint—“superior to the two moments” distinctly experienced in time (152)—that emerges through aesthetic style by using the resonance machine, the process and logic of transversality both includes temporal effects and connects heterogeneous fragments without totalizing (163). As a specific affect, resonance in the first way links Eros and Memory in a distinct sense of “time regained” that reverberates at present sensations of the past without being strictly recollection, as both a “contemporaneity” and a new effect. Less strictly accounted for in Deleuze’s terms, one simple yet productive insight is that the sensation is not merely a phenomenon narrated about fictional characters: rather, it is experienced by readers and (surely) by authors while composing, in the very fashion of effects produced by aesthetic style. This quality connects with the second prospect of the formal logic, in that the resonance machine corresponds notably with the transversal composition of an assemblage by fragments. As an
effect of writing that exceeds the signifying regime, the sensation thus highlights the composition as *diagrammatic* in its intensive features—*deterritorializing* conventional sense and discourse.

In this way, I have been using toward invention the three *literary machines* as respective types of writing given their productions of effects, purposefully as practices for *sense-making* at the *knowledge frontier* of experience and encounters. To this end, these categories “native to” the aesthetic paradigm pose the means to include, however subtly or obliquely, temporality and experience by inscribing one’s process of constructivism by sensibility, as I have tried to show. Moreover, philosophical perspectives of literature, such as Deleuze’s theorization, employed both “critically” (pragmatics) and “creatively” (heuretics) can also enable a transition from the hermeneutic-detective model for scholarship to the role of *affective-artisanal creator*. While the implications for one’s capacity for being affected and for affecting others (“ethology”) has remained an understated concern (*pianissimo*) given the methodological primacy of my project, the results of my encounter study in this chapter foreground the great potential for narrative as a *sensibility interface* with history, temporality, and experience. Finally, this *knowledge frontier* can be engaged as a problematic (questions and concepts, without “solution”) by means of the *resonance assemblage*—the prospect and implications of which I describe in the last section, in terms of poetics and praxis in the scholarly *dispositif* and changing apparatus.

**Coda: Heuretics of the Resonance Assemblage**

“Theory is interested in what remains. In the invariant. There is nothing in the intellect that has not first been in the senses: something of the sensible remains. Although it has undergone a transformation, there is something of the invariant in it. In general we are only interested in what remains, in what survives of the sensual in the intellect.”    —Serres, *The Five Senses* (327)

**Artisanal Praxis (reviewed)**

In the scope of my project, the proposed *resonance assemblage* idea is both the result of encountering my objects of study and the interface with which to “conceptualize” and to
organize the effects. On the latter I mean the formal and rhetorical means for the discursive and multi-modal product yet to be invented fully, given the primary aim of my work as a methodological study. To review, the “poetics” of what I have called *artisanal praxis* in scholarship would entail the analogous components of “novelistic philosophy”: a diegesis for discovery and invention, the *dispositif* and knowledge frontier (plane, apparatus); characters and sensible qualities, the concept(s) and new sense(s) produced; narrative, the spatio-temporal coordinates and position of experience for the artisanal creator; style, in thought and expression. These categories emerge not simply from the philosophy of Deleuze but more fundamentally from the object of study (literature), upon which the organizing elements are contingent and to which they are suitable—with variability by discipline, object encountered, and problematic.

More applicable generally, I have explained and demonstrated the method of “pragmatics” for encounters, as discerned from the work of Deleuze (alone and with Guattari) both explicitly and intrinsically. As an alternative to “analysis”—in discourse hermeneutic, descriptive, ideological, or otherwise—this approach affords great potential for innovative praxis in future work, whether in invention or to other ends, by identifying unique and “intensive” features (typology): *generative, transformative, diagrammatic*. Besides the opportunity for invention, as I have shown, this method assists a ripe necessity of scholarship, which still appears ill-equipped for working with formal or semiotic elements of composition that operate at the “asignifying register,” beyond representation, in the terms and focus of O’Sullivan (*Art Encounters* 43).

In contrast, the “mediality” of literature (and the analog in other art forms), with the superabundance of signifying technologies in the past century, might be a specific example of such a study—particularly concerning the literary effects of new media beyond narrative and
reference functions. In any case, the task remains identifying the unique functions and results of aesthetic composition or cultural products; a provisional label for this typology is singular rhythms, in Muckelbauer’s term. Proceeding in The Future of Invention with an approach parallel as I have (incidentally discovered), he conjectures that “intensive, singular rhythms function as a different, affirmative order of invention”: indeed, certain repetitions and forces encountered “indicate an unrecognizable or nonidentical dimension of invention,” one that “must occur before there can be such a thing as ‘thought’,” in Nietzsche’s terms (Muckelbauer 34).

While my focus of pragmatics examines language in literature and philosophy, like Muckelbauer’s attention to rhetorical traditions and practices of invention, the process of “extraction” and application of qualitative (as well as quantitative?) features and effects inherently involves a problem of “interference.” What Serres describes as “the invariant” in the cited passage names this process and “transformation” in the specific method I have advocated, while calling attention to levels material and experienced more concretely than a general understanding of faculties.

Indeed, I have identified the task of creating a “concept of sensation,” of which resonant assemblage (or assemblage resonance?) might be considered an example. Short of proposing a specific type, Massumi likewise conjectures the idea of a “sensible concept,” which is both corporeal (literally) and affective (Parables 118); noting the potential and “unanticipated effect” in terms of invention explicitly (96), he too demonstrates an unconventional approach and productive result in philosophical discourse. What these examples emphasize, as I have advocated from the outset, is the unique capabilities afforded by poststructuralist theory—particularly Deleuze and Guattari, for Muckelbauer and Massumi as well—for new and purposeful disciplinary practices.
On this point, I have identified and availed the particular orientation of Humanities scholarship and literary studies that is situated between Philosophy and Art, informed by both. Considered this way, we can find yet another occasion for invention, rather than argument (using what “proof”?), in Deleuze’s remarking, “It is strange that aesthetics (as the science of the sensible) could be founded on what can be represented in the sensible” (DR 56). With expertise about aesthetic practices of language and writing in terms of modes and media, this position entails a perspective advantageous toward the “interference” problem regarding a concept of sensation, just as other disciplines are better equipped by their conventions: to create expressions of concepts or functions (aesthetically), or to define intelligibly the quantitative attributes of concepts or expressions by way of description or reference (scientifically). And yet, there appear both challenges and means for invention within the disciplinary dispositif, recalling that “Creating concepts is no less difficult than creating new visual or aural combinations, or creating scientific functions” (Negotiations 125).

Philosophic Style—Keys of G

“Thus philosophy, art, and science come into relations of mutual resonance and exchange, but always for internal reasons. […] we really have to see philosophy, art, and science as sorts of separate melodic lines in constant interplay with one another. With philosophy having in this no reflective pseudoprimacy nor, equally, any creative inferiority.” —Deleuze, Negotiations (125)

To a lesser extent and less explicitly than my primary concerns, I have discussed style as an important dimension of work of both philosophical and literary writers—from both of whom much can be derived toward innovative disciplinary work. More specifically, to this end I have recounted instances of Deleuze’s work with literary authors and the observable influence or application in his “aesthetic thought” and creative discourse. Indeed, my purposeful work with “poststructuralist theorists” exceeds mere affinity; one could similarly study the literary influences and correspondences in works by Derrida regarding Joyce, Mallarmé, and Ponge, for
instance; Cixous and Lispector, Kleist, Tsvetayeva; Blanchot and Rilke, Hölderlin, Kafka; Barthes and Brecht, Balzac, Goethe (and many others). Employing the aesthetic paradigm, specifically literature, toward innovating in thought and expression, the concept produced thus in *artisanal praxis* could perhaps be understood in other terms as “*concetto,*” for being highly stylized; moreover, Deleuze writes, “because it is folded in the individual subject” and “projects [propositions] in the images of the cycle or the series” in the specific case of Baroque aesthetics (*The Fold* 126). A focus upon style this way considers more fully implications of what I have emphasized precisely about *encounter heuretics.*

To reiterate, the compound label names a method entailing both the position of experiencing forces, effects, and sensations as well as the invention or output that is consequence (transformed, affected) of and enhanced by the former. More concretely, this relation and prospect can be observed insofar as, Deleuze states, “Style in philosophy is the movement of concepts” in writing become dynamic (*Negotiations* 140). Related thus, Stivale describes Deleuze’s style “as a *perpetual process of encounter* such that he is willing to rewrite his pages continually to achieve the desired concept” (*Deleuze’s ABCs* 62, my emphasis); for example, Stivale reports that about *The Logic of Sense* and *A Thousand Plateaus,* “Deleuze maintains that both are nearly musical compositions” (*ABCs* 62). It is in this way that I mean *encounter heuretics* as method and *artisanal praxis* as suitable discourse achieve theoretical effects in practices of writing or composition with respective types of form, logic, and arrangement.

Thus the connection to the first understanding, inherent in my paradigmatic example of *resonance:* sensations are encountered, whether directly or in art, and they are relayed distinctly through aesthetic means that not only transmit the effects but include the quality of having been encountered and relayed by someone (*concetto*)—bearing a *signature* of style, as I have tried to
convey in my work with literature. This latter quality might be less a “governing” claim (written name) than that of a musical key signature (Stimmung). Just like the relation between (but not “over”) heterogeneous components of an assemblage (ATP 336), “nondiscursive resonance” is a transversal occurrence among the non-totalized features of a concept, insofar as “Concepts are centers of vibrations”—which “is why they resonate rather than cohere or correspond” (WP 23).

This last issue raises the question of whether the “sensible concept” produced in encounter heuristics can relay one’s affective experience as the concetto, given the fragmented assemblage organization without totalizing feature (the signature?). The problem is not strictly theoretical, though, and nor is it contingent to the philosophical framework of Deleuze (et al.); rather, beyond formal or logical questions, the problem of style concerns partly what is a stake for knowledge discourse and expression. In a specific case, the opposition of “performative” to “constative” narratology that I evoked earlier refers additionally to a metalanguage of scholarly discourse regarding work with literature, culture, and art generally. Like technology of communication or information, scholarly conventions can be considered a dispositif, one that provides both the means and the constraints for what can be produced in thought and discourse.

Recently though, several scholars—bearing the influence of poststructuralist thinking markedly or implicitly—have identified more or less directly the potential for expressive scholarly work. For example, considering how “imaginative work has an elective affinity with performance” (113), McGann calls attention to whether criticism is an informative or “deformative activity” (Radiant 114); regardless of potential application, the reflexive consideration of knowledge creation and delivery remains important—especially with changing objects of study. Similarly, Culler articulates this concern in The Literary In Theory: “One aught in principle to be able to analyze one's discipline as a discursive practice, where knowledge is
produced by its ways of writing, and in principle one ought to be able to characterize changes in
the discipline as changes in modes of writing” (222).

Although beginning my project with seemingly abstract and highly theoretical questions,
I have turned my attention increasingly to this practical issue—particularly motivated by the
theory I study and by the reflexive qualities of my object of study. Muckelbauer more overtly
attends to this question, and his rhetorical focus takes on greater significance when noting that he
is “interested in the repetitive encounters that facilitate scholarship in the humanities” (Future
39) precisely toward the aim of invention. The importance of concept creation and innovation
more broadly exceed the quality of novelty, certainly, and yet the perspective throws into relief
the implications of the dispositif and the crucial issue of “what can be said and thought.” Before
concluding about this, I am compelled to reinvoke Currie and consider whether my
“performative narratology” has been a meaningful and productive endeavor; likewise, whether it
succeeds as what he “would call the theoretical fiction or the narratological narrative—the
project of a new kind of literary academic, the writer/critic, who personifies the boundary
between fiction and criticism” (Postmodern Narrative 49).

**Apparatus Theory and Encounter Heuretics**

“The more our daily life appears standardised, stereotyped and subject to an
accelerated reproduction of objects of consumption, the more art must be injected
into it in order to extract from it that little difference which plays simultaneously
between other levels of repetition, and even in order to make the two extremes
resonate” —Deleuze, *Difference & Repetition* (293)

At the general level of my project, the perspective of Apparatus Theory enables us both
to recognize changing conditions and to employ new features in response toward ends necessary
(“solution”) and as yet unknown. On one hand, “literacy” names both an episteme, currently in
epochal transition, as well as a dispositif of reason or logocentrism (Western knowledge in
recognizable forms like hierarchy, patriarchy, transcendental meaning). Manifest at levels of
institutions, technology and practices, and subjectivity, this order is not necessarily supplanted (or *deterritorialized*) fully by the aesthetic paradigm; however, the types of knowledge, logic, and expression particular to this paradigm change *the conditions of possibility*—in which we in Humanities disciplines should be fundamentally invested. Guided by and highlighting the “evidence” of poststructuralist theory, I have endeavored to show the increased potential even in this limited form. Additionally, the recourse of new possibilities means that we might “intervene” or “remedy” not only the limitations but the deficiencies of literacy: aesthetic practices and cultural forms, I suggest, provide “how” in their features and logics, even if inchoate as “experiments.” In both cases, the first task concerns the rhetoric and practices still necessary to be invented for the changing apparatus—especially as counterpoint to the “technical solution” to problems (“miscast” instead of problematics).

The question whether *expressionism* can become the “counterpart” to *constructivism* (*Negotiations* 147) is not merely abstract theoretical conjecture or concern. Rather, in witnessing the ossification of practices and reductions of possibilities by institutions, technology, and forces—against intelligence let alone sensibility (opinion, belief, ideology)—increasingly today, the challenge to innovate and express appears all the more difficult and imperative. Thus it seems especially “idealistic” to purport any relevance or “efficacy” of literature in an *episteme* characterized by images and durations of instantaneousness. (Indeed, the next task for my encounter pragmatics will be to diagram and invent with the unique features of novels in the new media ecology, given these changing conditions for writing and narrative forms.) All the more idealistic to believe, “The literary machine thus becomes the relay for a revolutionary machine-to-come, not at all for ideological reasons but because the literary machine alone is determined to fill the conditions of a collective enunciation *that is lacking elsewhere* in the milieu” (*Kafka* 17-
And yet here precisely is the identification and supplement of “oversights” in the *dispositif* by the aesthetic paradigm—“blind spots” of temporality, desire, expressions.

I have deliberately proposed the *resonance assemblage* as an interface for inchoate conditions of the problematic, inspired by but less anchored to Deleuze and Guattari’s *abstract machine* possibility for literature. More directly, I proceed with how, Ulmer describes, “The choral function, here, is the grid as interface *between the sensible and the intelligible*” (*Heuretics* 198, my emphasis)—with other “organizing formations” including “the spiral, wheel and spokes, lattice, branching tree, and rhizome” (198). Unwittingly, the *spiral* (cochlea of ear) has been *my style of thought* throughout my education. Its dual motion and “undecidable” status knows on one hand the “*perfect pitch*” of “affective relation,” in Barthes’s terms (*ALD* 168). Elsewise too, Cixous reminds: “People do *not* understand each other. The incomprehensible part of each of us makes up the entire basis of life. Perhaps by reading these texts, we can work toward an *effort of mediation on the incomprehensible*. I do not say that we are going to understand the incomprehensible, but we have to accept it” (*Readings* 131, my emphasis).

*A line of flight.* Thus composed—perhaps as *sonorous labyrinth*—with affects, the *aesthetic monument* “*confides to the ear of the future*” the persistent sensations that embody the event: the constantly renewed suffering of men and women, their re-created protestations, their constantly resumed struggle” (*WP* 176-7, my emphasis). A *transversal* assemblage by temporal encounters, our capacity to be affected and to affect others will have increased affirmatively.

*Resonating.*
WORKS CITED


BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Gary Hink, Jr. received his Ph.D. from the University of Florida in August 2012, after earning Master of Arts (2005) in English from the State University of New York at Buffalo and Bachelor of Arts (2004) in Literature and Writing from Richard Stockton College of New Jersey. He currently lives in Albuquerque, where he is teaching and writing—working presently on the manuscript and hypermedia companion of this project. In addition to planning collaborative websites on literary theory and digital pedagogy, he continues volunteering on the editorial board of *The Journal of Undergraduate Multimedia Projects* and as an academic technology consultant. His on-going research and experiments involve heuristics, contemporary American fiction and experimental novels, electracy, media ecology, digital pedagogy, rhetoric, multimodal composition, Humanities methods, and innovative scholarship. He is originally from Ocean City, New Jersey, where he regularly visits his family (and beloved dog, Jacques).