LEAVING HOME: GEOGRAPHY IN VOLTAIRE’S PHILOSOPHICAL TALES: 
ZADIG, MICROMÉGAS, CANDIDE, AND L’INGÉNU

By

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To Matt, my very best friend
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LEAVING HOME: GEOGRAPHY IN VOLTAIRE’S PHILOSOPHICAL TALES:
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In this project, I provide a reading of four of Voltaire's philosophical tales – Zadig (1748), Micromégas (1751), Candide (1759), and l’Ingénu (1767) – through the analysis of Henri Lefebvre's "production of space" (La Production de l'Espace (1974); The Production of Space (1991)).

Drawing from Denis Diderot and Jean le Rond d'Alembert's Encyclopédie, ou dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers (1751-1772) and some of Voltaire's philosophical essays such as the Dictionnaire philosophique (1764) and the Philosophie de l'Histoire (1765), as well as his lengthy, yet relatively unknown work the Questions sur l'Encyclopédie (1770-1772), I show how space is "produced" in the four tales, that is, how man occupies space and for what purposes.

Voltaire's philosophical tales, and these four in particular, are fictional stories which deal with philosophical issues such as happiness, Providence, government and power structures, politics and society, and scientific inquiry. While the "voyage" has often been used as the principal analytical tool from which to examine the tales, in my project I offer a close reading of select spaces in each tale, and discuss how the
characters (male and female) live in these spaces. I explore what these "lived spaces" signify both for Voltaire during the Enlightenment, and for our twentieth-century understanding of conceptions of space and place.
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION: A TIME AND PLACE FOR SPACE

Spatializing the Eighteenth Century, Spatializing Voltaire

The Enlightenment conceived itself as a critique aiming at changing "la façon commune de penser," as Diderot wrote in the article "Encyclopédie" of his Dictionnaire raisonné. That purpose was not limited to Europe, but spanned several continents. It is thus considered to be "an international movement that included French, English, Scottish, American, German, Italian, Spanish, and even Russian schools" (Kramnick x). In Les géographies de l’esprit, Marc Crépon explores the history of what he calls "la diversité humaine" (23), diversity existing among people’s customs, languages, and religions, and begins in the context of German and French philosophers, specifically in the eighteenth century with Leibniz and continuing until Hegel. Many studies on modern history commence with a study of Enlightenment, for it is best known as a revolution of ideas that opened avenues to new forms of knowledge.

Special attention must be paid to the philosophe François Marie Arouet de Voltaire (1694-1778), for as John Leigh states in The Search for Enlightenment: An Introduction to Eighteenth Century French Writing: "Voltaire is the author most responsible for guiding the eighteenth century out of the seventeenth, for giving it new directions while embodying its propensity to look back. Like many of his contemporaries, Voltaire often appreciated the methods of his illustrious predecessors without approving of the conclusions to which those methods led" (15-16). Voltaire is often considered as the philosophe most representative of the period, even being referred to as an "apotheosis of the personification of the Enlightenment" (O'Brien 21). Along with his contemporaries he wrote extensively on topics such as politics, religion, science, art, and literature, and
used critical reason in his interpretations as a way of fighting against what he perceived to be excessive reliance on religious dogma and superstition. In Voltaire’s opinion the acceptance of theological inferences in the political sphere had only led to much suffering and injustice throughout history, thus truly inhibiting the advancement of mankind. Hence, he wanted knowledge itself, along with other notions such as happiness and well being, to be considered chiefly for the purpose of serving the betterment of humanity. Yet, to a large extent, the claim by Voltaire and the other *philosophes* that they had broken with the past was a strategic account on their part. While they were celebrating their age as enlightened, they were also aware of the ongoing uphill struggle, as is shown through Voltaire’s discussions of optimism (*in Zadig* and *Candide*) and tolerance (*Le Traité sur la Tolérance*), or in the conflicts surrounding the publication of the *Encyclopédie*, for example.

The dark side of the Enlightenment has been exposed by several critics of our time. In *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, Horkheimer and Adorno explain that "The Concept of Enlightenment" revolves around the emancipation of thinking: "Enlightenment, understood in the widest sense as the advance of thought, has always aimed at liberating human beings from fear and installing them as masters" (1). For them, Enlightenment is a condition more than a period, a movement aiming to promote the use of reason to replace more archaic beliefs like divine faith, animism, and myth as absolute truths, and thus discover human freedom.

However, while doing so, Horkheimer and Adorno also claim that Enlightenment relapses into myths of another kind which bring about other threats: "Enlightenment, specifically positivism, falls prey to myth – the 'myth of facts'" (Caton 1308), and
"enlightenment at the stage of advanced capitalism returns to myth" (Caton 1308): "Enlightenment is mythical fear radicalized. The pure immanence of positivism, its ultimate product, is nothing other than a form of universal taboo. Nothing is allowed to remain outside, since the mere idea of the 'outside' is the real source for fear" (Horkheimer and Adorno 11). *Dialectic of Enlightenment* analyzes the far-reaching consequences of such a totalizing, and even totalitarian, thinking.

Voltaire's works have been studied from a variety of perspectives, mostly by literary scholars who focus on his texts in themselves or in comparison with those of his contemporaries, but also by historians of ideas and of philosophy. My approach to his work will be an analysis of "the production of space," Henri Lefebvre's term for the human occupation and interpretation of space, in four of Voltaire's best known philosophical tales: *Zadig* (1748), *Micromégas* (1751), *Candide* (1759), and *l'Ingénu* (1767). I will first inquire into the place of geography in the Enlightenment and Enlightenment studies, and analyze how it has been treated previously by eighteenth-century scholars over the last four decades. I will then examine Voltaire's considerations of geography. In my study, geography is the starting point that allows me to examine a larger question, that of the "production of space," elaborated by Lefebvre and other authors, such as Michel de Certeau. Lefebvre does not only reflect on the ways in which space is scientifically measured, but also on how it is lived, experienced, and represented by man. When these considerations of space are linked to fiction, for example Voltaire's philosophical tales, it is possible to interpret the tales differently. Critics have consistently pointed out that in the tales, the main protagonist is often led (willingly or unwillingly, generally by traveling) to encounter others (which
entails discovering other customs, other religions, other laws), which leads to an enlightened assessment, often designed to reflect obliquely the state of affairs at home. The emphasis on the production of space displaces that critical objective by focusing on conditions of social coexistence. Voltaire's tales produce an imagined sociable space in which to live with others.

I was first drawn to this project while reading *La Philosophie de l'Histoire* (1765), which was later to become the Introduction to Voltaire's *Essai sur les Moeurs* (1756). I noticed that Voltaire had, for the most part, divided his chapters "geographically," or that a majority of the titles of the sections are names of different peoples of the world and different places on the globe. For example: I. Changements dans le globe; III. De l'Antiquité des nations; VII. Des sauvages; VIII. De l'Amérique; X. Des Chaldéens; XI. Des Babyloniens devenus Persans; XII. De la Syrie; XIII. Des Phéniciens et de Sanchoniathon; XIV. Des Scythes et des Gomérites; XV. De l'Arabie; XVII. De l'Inde; XVIII. De la Chine; XIX. De l'Egypte; XXI. Des monuments des Égyptiens; XXIV. Des Grecs . . . ; XXXIX. Des Juifs en Egypte; and L. Des Romains . . . (*La Philosophie de l'Histoire* 295-297).

The different place names made me realize that "geography" was indispensable to Voltaire's philosophical approach to culture across the ages. Voltaire presents these chapters in a way that allows one to believe and to understand that the various peoples and cultures of the world are crucial in defining the very make-up of a geographic location. For Voltaire, place names are not simply geographic in their physical sense – a country or a nation is not just a series of latitudinal and longitudinal measurements, for example. Instead, place names and names of peoples belonging to specific nations
resonate with one another, in a way that Voltaire strives to elucidate. But I was far from understanding then the many ways in which geography was addressed at the time, linked as it was with determined conceptions of place and space.

For example, in "Changements dans le globe," the first chapter of *La Philosophie de l'Histoire*, Voltaire calls for a search of revered "monuments" to provide us with a philosophy of history: "Tâchons de nous éclairer ensemble; essayons de déterrer quelques monuments précieux sous les ruines des siècles" (25). We need to begin by finding and examining monuments left from man's occupation of the Earth, which give accounts of human interaction, of triumphs and tribulations throughout history. Voltaire places man in space by saying that man has inhabited the globe throughout history: "Commençons par examiner si le globe que nous habitons était autrefois tel qu'il est aujourd'hui" (25).

In "De l'Amérique," Voltaire does not ask about the physical landscape of America, but of the inhabitants of that land instead: "Se peut-il qu'on demande encore d'où sont venus les hommes qui ont peuplé l'Amérique?" (61). In "De l'Inde," Voltaire shows that mankind thrives there because of the beneficial proximity of the Ganges: "S'il est permis de former des conjectures, les Indiens, vers le Gange, sont peut-être les hommes les plus anciennement rassemblés en corps de peuple . . . Or il n'y a pas de contrée dans le monde où l'espèce humaine ait sous sa main des aliments plus sains, plus agréables et en plus grande abondance que vers le Gange" (103). He refers to the Chinese people as excellent geographers and scientists in "De la Chine:" "Si quelques annales portent un caractère de certitude ce sont celles des Chinois, qui ont joint, comme on l'a déjà dit ailleurs, l'histoire du ciel à celle de la terre. Seuls de tous les peuples, ils ont
constamment marqué leurs époques par des éclipses, par les conjonctions des planètes" (113). And perhaps truest to Voltaire's critical style, in "Des monuments des Égyptiens," he uses the example of monuments to criticize tyranny and absolutism: "Leurs pyramides coûtèrent bien des années et bien des dépenses; il fallut qu'une grande partie de la nation et nombre d'esclaves étrangers fussent longtemps employés à ces ouvrages immenses. Ils furent élevés par le despotisme, la vanité, la servitude, et la superstition. En effet il n'y avait qu'un roi despote qui put forcer ainsi la nature" (131). Voltaire puts the construction of the Egyptian pyramids at the center of a political critique. The physical object that we observe is an "immense" work, to be admired. But what this object represents concerns the oppression of people, both Egyptians and non-Egyptians alike.

Voltaire's philosophical approach to history and culture is discernible as well in essays such as Les Lettres philosophiques or Les Lettres anglaises (1734), Le Siècle de Louis XIV (1752), and several of his plays and poems. Voltaire contributed to what has been called the age of dictionaries with Le Dictionnaire philosophique ou La Raison par alphabet, also known as the Dictionnaire philosophique portatif (1764). In addition, he wrote several entries on various topics for Denis Diderot's and Jean le Rond d'Alembert's L'Encyclopédie ou Dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers (1751-1772), such as the entry for "Histoire." Perhaps one of his biggest encyclopedic contributions is the lesser known but very rich work Les Questions sur l'Encyclopédie (1770-1772), in which Voltaire responds to a number of entries present in Diderot and D'Alembert's Encyclopédie.
During his life, Voltaire was mostly celebrated as a magnificent writer of plays and poetry. Critics often point out that Voltaire's *Romans et Contes* were not the part of the repertoire that defined him as a great writer and as a *philosophe* during the Enlightenment, whereas today, *Candide, ou l'Optimisme* (1759) is deemed by most critics as Voltaire's *magnum opus*, and it is precisely this reason which led me to choose the *contes philosophiques* as the vehicle to present an analysis of "the production of space."

**The Production of Space and Voltaire**

According to Barbara Piatti: "Under the terms of literary theory a fictional or narrated world is made of three components: characters (1), plot/timeline (2), and space (3). While characters and plot have been and are subject to countless philological studies, the topic of space and place in literature is rather neglected" (1). Geography was a discipline developing in the Enlightenment in the wake of studies dating back to the Antiquity, and at present there are a few studies on geography and the eighteenth century. Those that have been the most influential to my work are Numa Broc's the *Géographie des Philosophes: Géographes et Voyageurs Français au XVIIIè siècle* (1974), David N. Livingstone (Ed.) and Charles W.J. Withers' (Ed.) *Geography and Enlightenment* (1999), and Charles W.J. Withers' *Placing the Enlightenment: Thinking Geographically about the Age of Reason* (2007). Numa Broc traces the study of geography at the dawn of European history, and demonstrates that since Antiquity geography was not only considered as a physical discipline, but also one which dealt with man in his milieu. Broc shows that in the eighteenth century the *philosophes* embraced this notion and expanded upon it (7-8). In "Lights in Space," Daniel Brewer gives different eighteenth-century "spaces," one of which is "social space," a term most
notably tied to the philosopher Henri Lefebvre in *The Production of Space* (1974) (Brewer 178).

My project focuses especially on Henri Lefebvre's "production of space" as a way to interpret Voltaire's philosophical tales. In *The Production of Space*, Lefebvre shows that space is always apprehended through human perception, even physical space. Man understands space; he lives in space; and he can represent space. This three-pronged approach to space constitutes the production of space. In other words, space is "produced" through culture. Lefebvre's conception of space can shed light on Voltaire's approach: in *La Philosophie de l'Histoire*, he argues that the customs adopted by human communities were determined by their geographical background, and that they affected it in return; and in his philosophical tales, he shows that considerations of space must rely on the ways in which it is inhabited.

Some of the better known tales by Voltaire include: *Le Monde comme il va* (1748), *Memnon ou la sagesse humaine* (1749), *Histoire des voyages de Scarmentado* (1756), *Histoire d'un bon brahmin* (1761), *Jeannot et Colin* (1764), *Pot-pourri* (1765), *La Princesse de Babylone* (1768), *L'Homme aux quarante écus* (1768), *Les Lettres d'Amabad* (1769), *Le Taureau blanc* (1773-1774), *Le Crocheteur borgne* (1774), *Histoire de Jenni ou le sage et l'athée* (1775), and *Cosi-Sancta* (1784). But this study focuses on four tales: *Zadig*, *Micromégas*, *Candide*, and *l'Ingénu*. Among his abundant production, they are often grouped together for analysis. For example, Aram Vartanian explains that the purpose of the Voltairian philosophical tale is to reconcile fiction and philosophy as a means to get out of problematic issues, and that works such as *Candide, Zadig, l'Ingénu, Micromégas, Le Monde comme il va, Histoire des voyages de*
Scarmentado, and *Histoire de Jenni ou le sage et l’athée* are good examples of Voltaire’s tales representative of this purpose, whereas other tales such as *La Princesse de Babylone*, *Le Taureau blanc*, and *Jeannot et Colin* are more comparable to "parables," as they do not deal directly with (a) philosophical issue(s) (Vartanian 471).

In *Zadig*, and especially in *Candide*, the Leibnizian thesis on Providence is tested throughout the narrative. *Micromégas* is a science fiction tale that presents arguments on scientific relativity. In *l’Ingénu*, Voltaire tests the myth of the noble savage in the France of his time. The sustained treatment of philosophical issues within a fictional story, and the contrast between the seriousness of the thesis and the incoherent, often amusing incidents of the plot, make these four tales stand out from the rest.

A great number of the critical studies on Voltaire’s philosophical tales have concentrated on the education and evolution of the hero throughout the story. In that view, travel is a metaphor of his progress and development toward enlightenment. Of course the element of travel is essential to the tales, and cannot (and should not) be ignored. However, while still accounting for the movements described within each tale, I will focus upon the representations of the occupation of space by mankind, which is not necessarily a movement, comparable to Voltaire’s study of different people inhabiting different places around the world in *La Philosophie de l’Histoire*. My study builds on Henri Lefebvre’s notion of "production of space" in order to examine Voltaire's imagined sociability and ethical intersubjective relations.

In the second chapter, "Geography in the Eighteenth Century: *L’Encyclopédie* and *Les Questions sur L’Encyclopédie*," I start by presenting the critical framework for my project through the works of Broc, Livingstone, Withers, Brewer, and Lefebvre. This
chapter shows on the one hand that geography was a discipline taken seriously in the eighteenth century by specialists (such as Didier Robert de Vaugondy) and by philosophers. On the other hand, as Brewer recalls, works centrally associated with the Enlightenment, such as the *Encyclopédie*, were themselves apprehended in spatial terms. The *Encyclopédie* was referred to by Diderot and D'Alembert as a "world map," and Brewer argues that knowledge from the *Encyclopédie* crosses both real and imaginary space (182). Extending that spatial metaphor, I show that the *Encyclopédie* can be read as a "rhizome" and a "deterritorialized space" as expounded by Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari. The end of the chapter examines Voltaire's entry on "Géographie" in his *Questions sur l'Encyclopédie* as a starting point in my analysis of the way in which space functions in general in Voltaire. In this entry, Voltaire remarkably writes that "Il est bien difficile en géographie comme en morale, de connaître le monde sans sortir de chez soi" (320). I show that there are two approaches to understanding what Voltaire is here emphasizing, approaches which are epistemological and ethical.

Chapter 3, "Geography and Fiction: The Place of the Voltairian Philosophical Tale" traces the critical attention paid to space as an integral part of fiction, specifically through the works of Gaston Bachelard, Edward Said, Edward W. Soja, and Henri Lefebvre. Furthermore, I examine the position of the Voltairian philosophical tale in the literary canon by looking back to the entries on "Conte" in the *Encyclopédie* by both Diderot and D'Alembert, as well as recalling contemporary assessments. Roland Barthes is one of those contemporary critics who have provocatively invited readers to put into question the commonly held opinion that the Voltairian philosophical tale is a
roman d'apprentissage – a tale that shows the education and evolution of the hero through travel or the voyage. Barthes' invitation to read tales not as figures of movement (physical travel as well as mental evolution) but of "immobility" has been an inspiration for me to examine the tales as producing a space of coexistence with others.

Chapters 4 and 5 examine the ways in which "the production of space" functions in the four tales, by focusing on patterns of sociability and intersubjective relations. Chapter 4, "Writing Space in Voltaire's Philosophical Tales" analyzes modes of inhabitation which can become exemplary and can be generalized beyond the tales. For instance, my reading of Zadig shows that in the tale, nomadism, with its specific approach to the desert, determines a relation to others in space that extends to other parts of the story, including those that seem most remote from it, such as the Court of Moabdar. While Chapter 4 is about representing or imagining sociable spaces, Chapter 5, "Leaving Home: Ethics, Alterity, and the Feminine in Voltaire's Philosophical Tales" is about analyzing the ethical consequences of such patterns of sociability. I return to the ethical discussion of "sortir de chez soi" – "leaving home" or "leaving the self" – which was first presented in the discussion of Voltaire's entry on "Géographie" in the Questions sur l'Encyclopédie, and emphasize the feminine as a figure of alterity and of hospitality (Emmanuel Levinas) and of marginalization (bell hooks).

The concluding chapter draws together and expands upon what has been presented in this project. I also present the possibility of opening up this study to include other philosophical tales of Voltaire, or to those of other eighteenth-century philosophes, in addition to further possible critical approaches to the topic.
Some of Voltaire's more famous tragedies include *Oedipe* (1718), *Zaïre* (1732), *Alzire ou les Américains* (1736), *Le Fanatisme ou Mahomet* (1736), *La Mort de César* (1743), *La Princesse de Navarre* (1745), *L’Orphelin de la Chine* (1755), and *Les Scythes* (1767); and some of his major poems are *La Henriade* (1723), *Le Temple du goût* (1731), *Le Temple de l’amitié* (1732), *Le Poème de Fontenoy* (1745), *La Pucelle d’Orléans* (1755), *Le Poème sur le désastre de Lisbonne* (1756), along with his many Épitres, Stances, and Odes.


I will refer to the English translation, *The Production of Space*. *La Production de l’Espace* was originally published by Henri Lefebvre in 1974, and reprinted for the fourth time in 2000.
CHAPTER 2
GEOGRAPHY IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY: L’ENCYCLOPÉDIE AND LES QUESTIONS SUR L’ENCYCLOPÉDIE

Geography in the Eighteenth Century

The title of David Lowenthal's book, *The Past is a Foreign Country*, calls one to consider the close relationship of history and geography: "The past is everywhere. All around us lie features which, like ourselves and our thoughts, have more or less recognizable antecedents. Relics, histories, memories suffuse human experience" (xv). How close is this relationship between history and geography? And how important is the role of the human within it? In *Geography and History: Bridging the Divide*, Alan R.H. Baker offers a response:

The fundamental difference between them is better expressed in terms of history's focus upon periods and geography's focus upon places, fully recognizing that both periods and places were (and are) peopled and were (and are) constructed and experienced by people. Historical geographers tell us stories about how "places" have been created in the past by people in their own image, while historians tell us different stories about how "periods" have been created in the past by people in their own image. (2-4)

History and geography can be viewed as having a codependent, interrelated relationship, and the role constructed by "people" in both time and space truly links them together. In other words, it is the "human experience" that Lowenthal writes of that binds these two disciplines, and this is what we will consider when speaking of geography and the Enlightenment.

Contemporary scholars of geography have paid close attention to the Enlightenment. For example, Numa Broc's *La Géographie des Philosophes: Géographes et Voyageurs Français au XVIIIe siècle* (1974), David N. Livingstone's (Ed.) and Charles W.J. Withers' (Ed.) *Geography and Enlightenment* (1999), and Charles W.J. Withers' *Placing the Enlightenment: Thinking Geographically about the
Age of Reason (2007) provide meaningful insights into the ways in which geography was understood in the epistemology of the eighteenth century. These works make it clear that geography and philosophy were intricately linked in the eighteenth century.

Numa Broc is one of the first critics to discuss geography and the French Enlightenment. He shows that since Antiquity there was an understanding of geography as human geography – geography which was both historical and philosophical – an aspect that was developed by sixteenth and seventeenth century-humanists in addition to the study of a physical, descriptive geography. The humanists developed four main trends of geography that existed during Antiquity:

1. Le courant ptoléméen, qui représente la géographie mathématique, soucieuse de préciser la "figure" de la terre et de résoudre les délicats problèmes de la détermination des coordonnées et de la géographie cartographique du globe.

2. Le courant aristotélicien, qui intégré à la physique classique, étudie les océans et les terres, les montagnes et les fleuves. Cette ébauche de géographie générale s'intéresse aussi aux "Météores" qui affectent l'atmosphère et les profondeurs souterraines.

3. Le courant strabonien, ou descriptif, grande description de la terre, est particulièrement actif depuis les "grandes découvertes" du XVIe siècle. Voyageurs, navigateurs, missionnaires, apportent chaque jour leur contribution à une meilleure connaissance des pays et des peuples.

4. Aux confins de l'ethnographie et de l'histoire, les disciples d'Hérodote et d'Hippocrate méditent sur les rapports entre l'homme et son milieu, et semblent jeter les bases d'une géographie humaine. (7-8)

The first three trends above explain geography in a physical, descriptive manner. The fourth one, however, calls attention to the fact that there is a human element to geography, and this is amplified in the eighteenth century, according to Broc:

La géographie est non seulement une 'description de la terre,' mais encore une prise de conscience progressive de l'étendue de l'œkoumène, une science objective de l'espace, détruisant ou rendant caducs les vieux systèmes cosmogoniques. Jamais peut-être, plus qu'au XVIIIe siècle,
In the eighteenth century, geography comes to embrace an objective science of space, and especially, amplifying the positions of the preceding centuries, becomes a source for knowledge and a "philosophical" field. A "philosophical" geography entails a dual attention to time and space, and concerns the human occupation of space in time. This understanding merges temporality and spatiality, using one as a leverage to explain the other, when addressing human experience. In the eighteenth century, the study of human geography coincided with several positions and modes of investigation that are often attributed to the Enlightenment.²

In his article "Lights in Space," Daniel Brewer explains Michel Foucault's phrase "the epoch of space" by saying that "to know things in a contemporary way means knowing them in a spatial as well as a temporal dimension" (172).³ Brewer speaks here of a contemporary or twentieth-century epistemology, but later suggests that one must reflect on the relationship between space and history in the eighteenth century as well. Brewer gives "a double reflection on their relation" (173), specifically, "space in the eighteenth century" (175), or "real and symbolic places" (175) such as "palaces and roadways, coffeeshouses and ships, bedrooms, drawing rooms, laboratories, libraries, gardens, and restaurants" (173), and "space of the eighteenth century" (175), be it physical (176), social (178), colonized (179), epistemological (181), and esthetic (182). These eighteenth-century "spaces" show the ways in which history and space are "produced" (175).
Before expanding upon the notion of "production of space," let us first turn to the two other contemporary critics mentioned above, David N. Livingstone and Charles W.J. Withers. We have shown that Numa Broc called attention to the importance of philosophical geography in the eighteenth-century, and Livingstone and Withers point out that there was a gap that existed in the eighteenth-century scholarship of the late twentieth century: "Scholars of the Enlightenment, only too ready to debate essential characteristics, such as the 'what,' and even the 'why,' have been less confident about the 'where' of Enlightenment" (3-4). Furthermore, Livingstone and Withers show that the location of epistemology was international: "The existing corpus of work on this theme has tended to assume that the geography of Enlightenment necessarily and neatly followed the contours of national boundaries. Yet Enlightenment was also about the movement of ideas across borders and over time" (4). Voltaire often resided abroad, both far away from and bordering France. In doing so, he contributed to this movement of ideas. For example, the Lettres philosophiques, based on his experiences while in exile in England, were first published in London in 1733 as Letters Concerning the English Nation; In 1735, he was permitted reentry to Paris, but remained at Madame du Châtelet's in Cirey, on the border of France; In 1736, Voltaire goes to Holland after the publication of his poem Le Mondain, and in 1738, he publishes Éléments de la philosophie de Newton; For the next several years, he continued to move within Europe, to Prussia, coming and going from France; Voltaire was eventually banned from both the court of Paris and the court of Berlin (1754), and in 1755, he bought a house in Geneva (Les Délices), where he published l'Essai sur les moeurs in
1756 before making his residence in Ferney, in France but close to Geneva (Cronk xi-xii).

In *Placing the Enlightenment: Thinking Geographically about the Age of Reason*, Charles W.J. Withers explains that in the eighteenth century geography was its own discipline and also a source of theories concerning humanity that were developed by the *philosophes*: “The geographical location of Enlightenment ideas, personnel, and artifacts and their movement over space – that is, questions to do with place and travel between places – are key elements in understanding how the Enlightenment was made and what, actually it was” (9).

In order to demonstrate how to address the Enlightenment geographically, Brewer emphasizes that practices of sociability and patterns of exchange take place in a given space: "the physical space of the eighteenth century should be thought of as a social space, not simply because people dwell in space but because of the way the spatial paradigm was used to symbolize intersubjective relations" (178). Brewer explains two ways in which one can "comprehend this symbolization" (178): "Two particularly powerful analytic instruments have been developed during the past few decades . . . These are the paradigms of urbanization and of colonization" (178). Such perspectives are relevant to "the second kind of eighteenth-century space," "social space," which has been particularly analyzed and developed in the work of Henri Lefebvre, *The Production of Space* (178).

Lefebvre’s main thesis in *The Production of Space* is to "distinguish between more abstract kinds of space (absolute space) and lived and meaningful spaces (social space)" (Cresswell 12). "Social spaces" are a series of complex "spatialities" that are
significant, according to Lefebvre, because they are culturally or "socially produced." As Cresswell says, "Social space in Lefebvre is very close to the definition of place, which focuses on the realm of meaning and experience. Place is how we make the world meaningful and the way we experience the world; It is space invested with meaning in the context of power and happens across the globe at all scales throughout human history" (12). Brewer insists on the valorization that space acquires through human occupation:

Space is not a geometric entity or an absolute abstraction. It is not a box or frame capable of holding anything one wants to invent. This, Lefebvre would argue, is the notion of space implied in the stories of "stuff" that are told by historians of material culture. Space is not neutral or objective; nor is it fixed, transparent, innocent or indifferent. Instead, it is willfully produced, a product resulting from the transformation of matter, the application of knowledge, of technology, and of labor. Space is a social product, moreover, generated by a social subject, be it an individual subject, or just as likely, a collective one. In either case that subject's reality results from and depends upon its ability to occupy and master space, which it does often enough in violent fashion. To ignore the social nature of space thus defined, or worse, to cover over that nature, amounts to what Lefebvre calls a "theoretical error," an "illusion" that has all the trappings of a fetish. (179-180)

In *The Production of Space*, Lefebvre theorizes three "fields" of spatialization, which are, however, profoundly united:

The aim is to discover or construct a theoretical unity between "fields" which are apprehended separately. The fields we are concerned with are first, the physical – nature, the Cosmos; secondly, the mental, including logical and formal abstractions; and thirdly, the social. In other words, we are concerned with logico-epistemological space, the space of social practice, the space occupied by sensory phenomena, including products of the imagination such as projects and projections, symbols and utopias. (11-12)

Lefebvre is analyzing the process of the production of space, which he also calls a "triad" (39), more specifically as "the perceived-conceived-lived triad (in spatial terms: spatial practice, representations of space, representational spaces)" (40). In other
words, we must consider the following: (1) the physical "field" or material production / "spatial practice" / "perceived" space; (2) the mental "field" or knowledge production / "representations of space" / "conceived" space; and (3) the social "field" or production of significance and experience / "representational spaces" / "lived" space. For Lefebvre, social space is intricately linked and should be considered along with the two other "fields;" the mental field and the social field entail the conception and production of significance and experience, that of "representational spaces," and the occupation of a "lived" space (39).

Likewise, Michel de Certeau's formulation in *The Practice of Everyday Life* (1980) analyzes what he calls "strategies" and "tactics," leading to specific behaviors. De Certeau refers not to a "production" but to a "practice" of a "place" or a "space." Cresswell notes the comparison of terminology: "Though de Certeau's *The Practice of Everyday Life* has proved to be one of the books most useful in thinking about the issue of practice in relation to space and place, it uses space and place in a way that stands the normal distinction on its head. To de Certeau place is the empty grid over which practice occurs while space is what is created by practice" (12-13). For example, De Certeau writes: "Space is a practical place. Thus the street geometrically defined by urban planning is transformed into a space by walkers" (117).

Such assessments of geography, history, space and place are a useful point of departure if we want to understand how social reality was filtered through spatial paradigms in the eighteenth century. In Jean le Rond d'Alembert and Denis Diderot's *Encyclopédie, ou dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers* (1751-1772), and in Voltaire's *Questions sur l'Encyclopédie* (1770-1774), and in later chapters,
in Voltaire's four philosophical tales, "logico-epistemological space" and "the space of social practice" are strikingly articulated.

Jean le Rond d'Alembert and "la mappemonde"

The Encyclopédie ou Dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers was written under the direction of the philosopher Denis Diderot (1713-1784) and the mathematician and philosopher Jean le Rond d'Alembert (1717-1783) between 1751 and 1772. The Encyclopédie can be considered as the most inclusive or best comprehensive reference work of the French Enlightenment, as Marie Leca-Tsiomis notes: "ce livre monde fut bien d'abord, comme Diderot n'a jamais cessé de l'écrire, un recueil du meilleur, du meilleur de ce que les siècles et, surtout, les décennies ou les années précédentes avait produit en savoirs, en outils et en représentations des savoirs" (250).⁶ Examining the project of the Encyclopédie can also provide insight into the entire project of Enlightenment, for the Encyclopédie itself can be considered as a metaphor for the Enlightenment. The Encyclopédie contains around 72,000 articles by around 140 contributing authors. There are around twenty volumes of text and eleven volumes of etchings (or "plates"), which illustrate many of the articles. Many articles contained in the Encyclopédie were written by Louis de Jaucourt, or le Chevalier de Jaucourt, who "ended up writing approximately a quarter of the total number of articles – some 17,000 out of roughly 72,000" (Lough 11). Voltaire also contributed to the project, providing 43 articles to the Encyclopédie, the majority on grammar or on morality (Leca-Tsiomis 414).

Diderot wrote the article entitled "Encyclopédie," where he gives both the etymology of the word and the goal of an encyclopedia:
* ENCYCLOPÉDIE, s. f. (Philos.) Ce mot signifie enchaînement de connaissances; il est composé de la préposition greque ἐν, en, & des substantifs κύκος, cercle, & παιδεία, connaissance. En effet, le but d'une Encyclopédie est de rassembler les connaissances éparse sur la surface de la terre; d’en exposer le système général aux hommes avec qui nous vivons, & de le transmettre aux hommes qui viendront après nous; afin que les travaux des siècles passés n’aient pas été des travaux inutiles pour les siècles qui succéderont; que nos neveux, devenant plus instruits, deviennent en même temps plus vertueux & plus heureux, & que nous ne mourions pas sans avoir bien mérité du genre humain. ("Encyclopédie")

Diderot and D'Alembert's original plan for the Encyclopédie was to publish a translation of Ephraim Chambers's *Cyclopaedia or an Universal Dictionary of Arts and Sciences* (1728), as John Bender notes in *The Culture of Diagram*:

The *Encyclopedia* seemed a new organization and presentation of knowledge. And so it is. At the same time, the authors reached freely into the encyclopedias, dictionaries, manuals, and compendia of imagery that formed the modern tradition within which they lived intellectually. They were inspired by Francis Bacon and guided by figures like Pierre Bayle, Antoine Furetière, John Harris, and, above all, Ephraim Chambers, whose two-volume *Cyclopaedia* of 1728 they intended initially to translate. Diderot and d'Alembert acknowledged their debt to Chambers' vision of an encyclopedia as the chain by which one can descend without interruption from the first principles of an art or science all the way down to its remotest consequences back up to its first principles. They recognized the cross-references as his great innovation, although they believed he had failed to exploit fully their potential. They also note that Chambers "had read books but he scarcely saw any artisans" so that his work does not contain "many things that one learns only in workshops." In an *Encyclopedia*, they argue, these omissions break the "enchainment and are harmful to both the form and the substance" of the work. (10-11)

In addition, Antoine Augustin Bruzen de la Martinière's *Grand dictionnaire géographique historique et critique*, published in the 1730s and 1740s, was also a source for the Encyclopédie, along with Chambers' work and system of cross-references. Marie Leca-Tsiomis notes that La Martinière's "protocole géographique" was followed in the Encyclopédie (Leca-Tsiomis 177). Leca-Tsiomis also notes that "famous men" were more likely to be discussed, for example by Jaucourt, under a geographical heading:
"On sait que le Chevalier, pour proposer ses biographies d'hommes célèbres, passait par leur ville de naissance" (155). In doing this, Jaucourt links history and geography, or the human and the physical.

The *Encyclopédie* strove to organize and classify knowledge. In doing so, Diderot and D'Alembert figured the project or very writing of the *Encyclopédie* spatially as a geographical map, or "mappemonde," a term used by D'Alembert in the *Discours préliminaire de l'Encyclopédie* (1767):

C'est une espèce de Mappemonde qui doit montrer les principaux pays, leur position & leur dépendance mutuelle, le chemin en ligne droite qu'il y a de l'un à l'autre; chemin souvent coupé par mille obstacles, qui ne peuvent être connus dans chaque pays que des habitans ou des voyageurs, & qui ne sauroient être montrés que dans des cartes particulières fort détaillées. Ces cartes particulières seront les différents articles de notre Encyclopédie, & l'arbre ou système figuré en sera la mappemonde.

Voilà toute la partie poétique de la connaissance humaine, ce qu'on en peut rapporter à l'imagination, et la fin de notre distribution généalogique (ou si l'on veut mappemonde) des sciences et des arts, que nous craindrions peut-être d'avoir trop détaillée, s'il n'était de la dernière importance de bien connaître nous-mêmes, et d'exposer clairement aux autres, l'objet d'une ENCYCLOPÉDIE. (*le Discours préliminaire)*

D'Alembert explains that this collaborative project of the *Encyclopédie* is a figurative "world map," which is made up of each of the different articles representing smaller, individual maps, along with the tree or systemic chart found at the beginning of the *Encyclopédie*. This metaphor of the map is remarkable, for D'Alembert is emphasizing the connection that must be made explicit between all subjects of human knowledge within the arts and sciences as they are represented in the *Encyclopédie*, just as Diderot mentioned the "chain of knowledge" (*enchaînement de connoissances*) in his article on "Encyclopédie." The need to be explicit is all the more necessary since the path to knowledge is not always straight, but can be interrupted by all sorts of hurdles.
The "chain" of the map is therefore figuratively represented by roads that are drawn on maps, roads being the means that lead from one destination to another, linking together at least two points. Thus, as is diagrammed first by the tree/systemic chart, each of the interlocking articles of the *Encyclopédie* are the figurative road map connecting all forms of knowledge making up this "world map" in the end, and therefore become a metaphor for the Enlightenment as a whole through direct representation of its fundamental goal of expanding and promoting ordered or organized knowledge: "The 'map' that D'Alembert speaks of in his introduction was a common classificatory device used to put Enlightenment knowledge to order" (Withers 13).⁹

Furthermore, D'Alembert remarks that such a mapping out of knowledge is "poetical" as well as scientific. He explains in poetical and figurative terms the ways in which, just as the map or the tree stand for the classificatory system so widely adopted by authors at the time, so does the country stand for knowledge itself, and travelers or inhabitants for the readers of the *Encyclopédie*. In an essay on "The Time of Encyclopedias," Maurice Blanchot emphasizes the poetical excess of the *Encyclopedia*'s "mapping of the human mind": "Diderot does not believe in a nature that could be naturally divisible into layers of knowledge" (*Friendship* 50-51). Blanchot explains that "this idea pushes the Encyclopedia forward as a living creation, preventing it from being merely a bookish reality, but would have prevented it from ever taking form had D'Alembert not had a concern for a momentary ordering in the whole of science where the supreme mapping of the human mind could be expressed in its diversity but also in its aspiration to unity" (51).
In Brewer's words, "the Encyclopédie establishes linkages, connections, and communication through all space and time . . . Like the mappemonde or world map, . . . the Encyclopédie is a utopian network of knowledge whose effects can be measured in the gap between the real and the imaginary" (182). Brewer states that spatial analysis of the "gap" "must be historical as well, designed to account not only for spaces in the eighteenth century but also for the space of the eighteenth century" (184). The spaces of the century, spaces such as Lefebvre's "social space" or "produced" space, "involve the symbolic production of imaginary spaces" (184), in this instance the epistemological space of the Encyclopédie, "where forms of knowledge are set up" (184).¹⁰

Diderot and D'Alembert speak of difficulties when describing a tree of knowledge in reference to the Encyclopédie, namely, that one can get lost in the system:

Le système général des Sciences & des Arts est une espèce de labyrinthe, de chemin tortueux où l'esprit s'engage sans trop connaître la route qu'il doit tenir. Pressé par ses besoins, & par ceux du corps auquel il est uni, il étudie d'abord les premiers objets qui se présentent à lui; pénètre le plus avant qu'il peut dans la connaissance de ces objets; rencontre bientôt des difficultés qui l'arrêtent, & soit par l'espérance ou même par le désespoir de les vaincre, se jette dans une nouvelle route; revient ensuite sur ses pas; franchit quelquefois les premières barrières pour en rencontrer de nouvelles; & passant rapidement d'un objet à un autre, fait sur chacun de ces objets à différents intervalles & comme par secousses, une suite d'opérations dont la génération même de ses idées rend la discontinuité nécessaire. Mais ce désordre, tout philosophique qu'il est de la part de l'âme, défigurerait, ou plutôt anéantirait entièrement un Arbre encyclopédique dans lequel on voudroit le représenter . . .

Il n'en est pas de même de l'ordre encyclopédique de nos connaissances. Ce dernier consiste à les rassembler dans le plus petit espace possible, & à placer, pour ainsi dire, le Philosophe au-dessus de ce vaste labyrinthe dans un point de vue fort élevé d'où il puisse appercevoir à la fois les Sciences & les Arts principaux; voir d'un coup d'œil les objets de ses spéculations, & les opérations qu'il peut faire sur ces objets; distinguer les branches générales des connaissances humaines, les points qui les séparent ou qui les unissent; & entrevoir même quelquefois les routes secrètes qui les rapprochent. C'est une espèce de Mappemonde . . . (le Discours préliminaire)
Diderot and D'Alembert explain here that the "tree of knowledge" cannot follow the same process of scientific acquisition adopted by a scientist or inquisitive mind because the system of arts and sciences can be considered as a sort of "maze," where one may enter but not be able to find a way out. Scientific inquiry is a process that can be spatially interpreted as being in a maze. The philosopher counteracts the difficulty by classifying knowledge in the figure of the tree. He does not reproduce the process, but the outcome of scientific inquiry.

Withers also interprets the placement of entries as reflective neither of a process nor a definitive outcome of knowledge: "Neither the definition of historical geography in the *Encyclopédie* nor the position of geography on the Tree of Knowledge should be seen as fixed positions in the structure of knowledge. The Tree of Knowledge was not an actual history or mappemonde, but an account of how the sciences might logically have come into being if they had followed a rational sequence of discovery" (261). For Withers: "Geography was part of the science of Nature, in which humankind was placed. Geographical knowledge drew upon reason and upon all other knowledge as part of what was viewed by contemporaries as a profoundly useful scientific enterprise" (261).

Metaphors such as "map" and as "tree of knowledge" were attributed to the project by Diderot and D'Alembert themselves, and I will show here that there are ways in which the *Encyclopédie* can also be considered as a "rhizome" and as a "deterritorialized" space, as expounded by Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari. By examining Deleuze and Guattari's six principles of the "rhizome," we can say that the
Encyclopédie is a "rhizome" in and of itself. In A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari define the "rhizome" through a series of principles.

The first and second principles of the rhizome have to do with connection and heterogeneity: "at any point the rhizome can be connected to anything other, and must be. This is very different from the tree or root, which plots a point, fixes and order" (7). Diderot and d'Alembert present a tree of knowledge in the Encyclopédie, but the structure of the Encyclopédie is also that of a maze ("Le système général des Sciences & des Arts est une espèce de labyrinth de chemin tortueux où l'esprit s'engage sans trop connoître la route qu'il doit tenir") with open or empty-ended directions; just as a rhizome "ceaselessly establishes connections between semiotic chains, organizations of power, and circumstances relative to the arts, sciences, and social struggles" (8). Through the reference to "chains," "connections and circumstances relative to the arts and sciences" and the mention of "social struggles," Deleuze and Guattari depart from their original botanical metaphor and address an aspect dealing directly with human endeavor, or "the production of space."

The third principle of the rhizome is the principle of multiplicity. For Deleuze and Guattari: "There are no points or positions in a rhizome, such as those found in a structure, tree, or root. There are only lines . . . Multiplicities are defined by the outside: by the abstract line, the line of flight or deterritorialization according to which they change in nature and connect with other multiplicities" (8-9). The fourth principle of the rhizome is the principle of asignifying rupture. This means that "a rhizome may be broken, but it will start up again on one of its old lines or on new lines . . . Every rhizome contains lines of segmentarity according to which it is stratified, territorialized,
organized, signified, attributed, etc., as well as lines of deterritorialization down which it constantly flees" (9). In the *Discours préliminaire*, D'Alembert speaks of "rupture" when he writes "chemin souvent coupé par mille obstacles" in reference to the "mappemonde" that is the *Encyclopédie*. The understanding of the *Encyclopédie* as a rhizome enables us to make sense of what escapes the logic and structure of the tree of knowledge, an escape that both Diderot and d'Alembert account for (maze, obstacle, etc.).

The final principles of the rhizome, principles five and six, are of cartography and decalcomania: "a rhizome is not amenable to any structural or generative model . . . It is altogether different, *a map and not a tracing*" (12). Deleuze and Guattari say: "What distinguishes the map from the tracing is that it is entirely oriented toward an experimentation in contact with the real" (12). What space is therefore being "mapped" in the *Encyclopédie*? Brewer pointed out differences between "real" and "utopian" or "imaginary" space and argued that "the *Encyclopédie* is an imaginary space that signifies the real but does not reduplicate it . . . (it) is a utopian network of knowledge whose effects can be measured by the gap between the real and the imaginary" (182). For Deleuze, the map is oriented toward an experimentation "in contact with the real," and the *Encyclopédie* also requires "contact with the real," as it is a deterritorialized space interweaving the real and the imaginary. In other words, we must pay attention to the middle space that the *Encyclopédie* occupies, another commonality with the rhizome, as Deleuze and Guattari say: "(The rhizome) has neither beginning nor end, but always a middle (milieu) from which it grows and which it overspills" (21). Brigitte Weltman-Aron notes the political and ethical consequences of that position:

Gilles Deleuze's writings take place in the middle of an interrogation of spatiality, or to put it more simply, they happen in 'the middle.' It is indeed a
constant trait in Deleuze to 'install' [him]self on this plane [of immanence] – which implies a mode of living, a way of life (Deleuze 1988,122). This plane is not given in advance, but must be constructed (Deleuze 1988,123). Diagramatics, rhizomatics, cartography, de – (or re -) territorialization, are markers which trace spatial and temporal lines. (56-57)

In addition to being written spatially and even rhizomatically, the *Encyclopédie* included several entries on "geography." The way in which geography was addressed and the space it occupied within the larger project of *Encyclopédie* demonstrates the ethos of a productive intervention of man over space, without which space could be neither experienced nor lived in.

**"Géographie" in the *Encyclopédie***

Numa Broc, referring back to D'Alembert's *Discours préliminaire*, shows that the eighteenth century privileged history over geography, a privilege that is visible in the very organization of the *Encyclopédie*:

Dans le *Discours préliminaire* où il présente une classification des sciences, d'Alembert relègue d'emblée la géographie à l'ombre de l'histoire: "La chronologie et la géographie sont les deux rejetons et les deux soutiens de la science dont nous parlons: l'une place les hommes dans le temps; l'autre les distribue sur notre globe." Servante de l'histoire, la géographie dépend uniquement, comme elle, de la mémoire; c'est dire qu'elle joue un rôle assez effacé dans l'*Encyclopédie*, où l'érudition pure n'est guère appréciée. (250)

But geography and history, or space and time, work together by first "placing" and then "distributing" (Withers' "travel between places") people; recalling Lefebvre, a human subject is necessary to produce a space. As was mentioned earlier, Jaucourt often discussed the work of influential men under a geographical heading. These headings were also geographical pretexts for the presentation of philosophical arguments (as D'Alembert did in the entry "Genève," for example).
Jean-Jacques Rousseau discusses geography in an unfinished essay dating from the late 1730s entitled, "Cours de Géographie," in which he evaluates the distinction between "physical" and "historical" geography. According to Rousseau: "La Géographie est une science qui traite de la connaissance du globe terrestre, et qui enseigne la position de toutes les régions les unes à l'égard des autres et par rapport au Ciel. Le mot de Géographie vient du grec, et signifie précisément, description de la terre" (535). He is defining geography as a "physical" science, which he continues to do in the third paragraph, when speaking of "géographie cosmographique:" "On la [=cette science] peut encore diviser en cosmographique et historique; la cosmographique divise le globe terrestre par les cercles, par les oppositions, par les ombres, par les zones, et par les climats;" (535). But, more importantly, Rousseau discusses "géographie historique," which he explains thus: "l'historique considère le gouvernement, les forces, la religion, et les mœurs des différents peuples qui l'habitent" (535). Rousseau does not develop this part regarding historical geography in this fragment of his unfinished essay. However, we can see that it supports a prevailing view about the historical factor that was deemed necessary when studying geography in the eighteenth century. We will see that Didier Robert de Vaugondy also divides geography into separate categories, with special emphasis on "historical" classifications.

The "Géographie" article appeared in 1757 and was published in Volume VII (before the banning of the work) by two authors that Broc considers rather famous (250). It is divided into two distinct parts, each part having been written by a different author. The first, shorter part was written by Didier Robert de Vaugondy (1723-1786), a French mapmaker and geographer to King Louis XV. The second, longer part is
entitled "Géographie physique" and was written by Nicolas Desmarest (1725-1815), a French geologist and writer during the Enlightenment. In *The Encyclopedists as individuals*, Frank A. Kafker notes that Desmarest made several contributions to the *Encyclopédie*, writing articles which mainly dealt with topics concerning natural and physical science. Kafker explains that Desmarest's article on "Géographie physique," "is general, largely a survey of the subject matter of physical geography, a branch of knowledge in its early stages at that time and which encompassed parts of what is today geology" (104). In addition: "It provides advice on proper scientific method: that a physical geographer should, among other things, be a patient collector of information from earlier researchers and from his own meticulous observations; that he refrain from generalizing when the facts are lacking; and that he oppose dogmatic system-building and unrestrained flights of imagination" (104). We will not be focusing on this second section of the *Encyclopédie* article on "Géographie," since we want to concentrate on parts that can be related to "the production of space."

Didier Robert de Vaugondy was the son of another famous geographer, Gilles Robert de Vaugondy, both men having come from "a family tradition that began with their noted ancestor Nicolas Sanson (1600-1667), geographer-in-ordinary to the King and one of the French pioneers in the study of geography" (Kafker 330). Both published several geographical works together, such as *La Géographie sacrée et historique de l'Ancien et du Nouveau Testament* in 1747, and in 1757, *l'Atlas Universel*, which at the time was considered to be "a very fine, and comparatively modern general atlas" (Fordham 37).
Didier Robert de Vaugondy himself authored three articles on geography in the *Encyclopédie* that were published in 1757. These three articles are listed as: "Fuseau," "Géographie," and "Globe." In "Globe," he describes the careful process of the current trends in the art of globe making as seen here, for example:

Vous diviserez chaque espace en deux parties égales; & par tous ces points de division vous élèverez des perpendiculaires. Pour lors, si vous posez avec précision ce demi fuseau de cuivre, en sorte que sa base convienne avec la ligne, & sa pointe avec la perpendiculaire qui tombe sur le milieu de chaque douzième partie de cette même ligne, vous tracerez les courbes des fuseaux. (*Globe*)

De Vaugondy's reference to globemaking and to mapmaking link to D'Alembert's very shaping of the writing of the *Encyclopédie*. In other words, we have here an instance of *mise en abyme* – as with the article "Encyclopédie" within the *Encyclopédie*, De Vaugondy's geographical references are also found within his articles on geography in the *Encyclopédie*.

The article on "Géographie" is the longest of his three articles. Critics agree that in the article Didier Robert de Vaugondy gives a detailed description tracing the development of geography in all parts of the world. He does so in two different ways. First, he compares the different instruments used to record geography over the centuries (mapmaking and globemaking, for example) based on the changing available research methods such as travel, navigation, and astronomical observation. Second, he recounts various approaches to geography that took place throughout history, illustrating thus "the production of space":

Il faut considérer présentement la *Géographie* en elle-même. Elle doit être envisagée sous trois âges différents.

1. *Géographie ancienne*, qui est la description de la terre, conformément aux connaissances que les anciens en avoient jusqu'à la décadence de l'empire romain.

3. *Géographie moderne*, qui est la description actuelle de la terre, depuis le renouvellement des Lettres jusqu'à-présent. ("Géographie")

De Vaugondy considered geography in three different ways, specifically in three different historical ages, again reinforcing the strong relationship between history and geography with the role of the human at the center: "Geography had both current credibility and significance in historical inquiry about the development of peoples and nations" (Withers 174). The article shows "ways in which political and cultural landscapes were traced as the background and explanatory context to certain moments in human history" (Withers 174). As Kafker notes, the article dwells at length on "those who had advanced the knowledge of the subject since antiquity" (331). De Vaugondy then ends the article with a short, brief, and general summary of the principal divisions of "Géographie" with six the six areas described below:

L'on distingue encore la *Géographie*:

1. en *naturelle*; c'est par rapport aux divisions que la nature a mises sur la surface du globe, par les mers, les montagnes, les fleuves, les isthmes, &c. par rapport aux couleurs des différents peuples, à leurs langues naturelles, &c.

2. En *historique*, c'est lorsqu'en indiquant un pays ou une ville, elle en présente les différentes révolutions, à quels princes ils ont été sujets successivement; le commerce qui s'y fait, les batailles, les sièges, les traités de paix, en un mot tout ce qui a rapport à l'histoire d'un pays.

3. En *civile ou politique*, par la description qu'elle fait des souverainetés par rapport au gouvernement civil ou politique.

4. En *Géographie sacrée*, lorsqu'elle a pour but de traiter des pays dont il est fait mention dans les Ecritures & dans l'Histoire ecclésiastique.
5. En *Géographie ecclésiastique*, lorsqu'elle représente les partages d'une jurisdiction ecclésiastique, selon les patriarchats, les primaties, les diocèses, les archidiaconés, les doyennés, &c.

6. Enfin en *Géographie physique*; cette dernière considère le globe terrestre, non pas tant par ce qui forme sa surface, que par ce qui en compose la substance. ("Géographie")

Geography was first divided into three historical ages ("ancient," "Middle Ages," "modern") in order to emphasize the progress achieved over time in the scientific study of the discipline, and, in conclusion, it is distributed into six separate areas, one of them being history, so as to illustrate the variety of approaches available to modern geographers. The fact that only one of these parts is labeled as "historical" does not undermine the essentialness of history to geography (and vice versa) and the importance of the human experience across space and time. This is true because in examining each of the six areas, we see that the first five are all related to the "production of space" in one way or another: *Géographie naturelle* speaks of the "colors and languages of different peoples;" *Géographie historique* addresses past events of a "country" or "town" which makes up its history; *Géographie civile ou politique* describes "sovereigns" relationship to "government;" *Géographie sacrée* mentions the "ecclesiastical history" of "countries;" and *Géographie ecclésiastique* directly describes the different parts of the church's "jurisdiction." *Géographie physique* is the only section leaving out the human historical dimension, focusing instead on "that which makes up the substance of the earth."

De Vaugondy's organization and classification of geography into separate divisions is a good illustration of the general organization of the branches of the *Encyclopédie*. "Géographie" itself as a subject is its own large branch on the tree with separate smaller branches emerging from it – these chosen branches then showing the
various divisions of geography as De Vaugondy saw them after reflecting on the past centuries and considering the present time. The article is also a good example of the structure of cross-references announced by Diderot and D'Alembert, also showing the horizontal shape of the rhizome. Throughout the article there are several instances where De Vaugondy refers to other articles of the *Encyclopédie* to clarify or expand his explanations.¹³

De Vaugondy reiterates the interdependence that was, as we have mentioned earlier, commonly upheld at the time between geography and history – geography is related to historical events or institutions retained by human memory, or, one redoubles the other (Brewer). In "Geography in its time," Withers states that the "sub-division" "*Géographie historique*" shares something of the other sub-divisions of (human) geography, most closely associated with "*Géographie Civile ou Politique*" and with "*Géographie Ecclesiastique,*" as these two "sub-divisions" speak of power structures – "civil or political government" and of "ecclesiastical jurisdiction" (261). In other words, the study of geography allows readers to orient themselves not only in space but also within social and political groups. Thus, there are actual, useful benefits to readers of geographical treatises. In that respect, Withers writes that: "Geography, a means to descriptive world knowledge both human and physical, was placed within a map of knowledge that prioritized reason and signaled to its practical possibilities" (*Placing the Enlightenment* 178). Even though De Vaugondy’s article includes the physical study of the Earth, he and his contemporaries strikingly apprehend space primarily as occupied by, and relevant to humans. We have seen earlier that space becomes a place once it is socially or culturally "produced" (Lefebvre / Brewer). We have also argued that the
space of the *Encyclopédie* could in fact be considered as an "imaginary," "utopian," or "deterritorialized" space (Brewer / Deleuze). We will now look to the entry on "Géographie" found in Voltaire's *Les Questions sur l'Encyclopédie* (1770-1774). Here, we will explore how Voltaire takes the human aspect of geography in a different direction than that of the *Encyclopédie* by suggesting a moral, ethical connection to geography.

**Voltaire's "Géographie" in the *Questions sur l'Encyclopédie***

Numa Broc speaks of "La géographie historique" (257) and "Le roman géographique" (258). The "roman géographique," particularly Voltaire's "contes philosophiques," will be the subject of our subsequent chapters. Broc specifically treats Voltaire in this section, where he opens with a rather strong statement in praise of Voltaire's conscious effort and enthusiasm to include history and geography in his literature. Broc even refers to the *contes* as good indicators of the emphasis that Voltaire places on history and geography:

> S'il est un écrivain du XVIIIe siècle, dont l'œuvre entière est marquée par le double relativisme historique et géographique, c'est bien Voltaire; qu'on l'aborde par le biais de la 'philosophie,' de l'histoire, du roman, de la critique, partout se manifeste un souci constant de replacer l'homme dans le temps et dans l'espace. (263)

> Il n'est pas douteux que Voltaire ne se soit, durant toute son existence, passionné pour la géographie: il affirme dans le *Dictionnaire Philosophique* que c'est 'une de ces sciences qu'il faudra toujours perfectionner' (article *Géographie*) et l'*Essai sur les Moeurs*, montre que l'histoire et la géographie de la plupart des pays du monde lui sont familières. (263)

In *Les Questions sur l'Encyclopédie*, Voltaire's article on "Géographie" (1772) testifies to the fascination entertained in the eighteenth century with the production of space. Broc asserts that Voltaire was attuned to and interested in geography throughout his life, and that this is reflected in various genres of his writing.
The article on "Géographie" is part of his Questions sur l'Encyclopédie and is very often mistaken as being part of of the Dictionnaire philosophique, as it is cited above. The Voltaire Foundation has recognized this long-standing error concerning the publication of the Questions sur l'Encyclopédie:

Les Questions sur l'Encyclopédie sont l'oeuvre de Voltaire la plus volumineuse, et cependant l'une des moins connues. Elle a été perdue de vue en tant qu'oeuvre à part entière suite à la décision des éditeurs de Kehl, dans les années 1780, de regrouper tous les articles alphabétiques de Voltaire sous le titre générique de Dictionnaire philosophique. La confusion s'est perpétuée à travers les éditions Beuchet et Moland de Voltaire au dix-neuvième siècle. (<http://www.voltaire.ox.ac.uk/www_vf/ocv/Questions08.pdf>)

At present, the Voltaire Foundation is publishing the first critical edition of the Questions sur l'Encyclopédie in its own separate series of volumes, a project which scholars can agree, is very relevant and extremely overdue: "Aujourd'hui après plus de 200 ans, la Voltaire Foundation publie la première édition authentique et critique des Questions sur l'Encyclopédie qui, souvent confondues avec le Dictionnaire philosophique, retrouvent leur statut d'oeuvre à part entière" (<http://www.voltaire.ox.ac.uk/www_vf/ocv/Questions08.pdf>).

In the Introduction to his dissertation entitled, An Introduction to Voltaire's 'Questions sur l'Encyclopédie,' William C. Archie opens with the correct description of the details of the Questions sur l'Encyclopédie as an entire work: "During the years 1770-72, Voltaire published a nine volume work, composed of 423 articles, arranged alphabetically, under the title Questions sur l'Encyclopédie par des Amateurs" (1); and in an earlier article entitled, "Voltaire's Dictionnaire philosophique: Les Questions sur l'Encyclopédie," he also points out how the Questions sur l'Encyclopédie incorrectly became known and accepted as part of edited versions of Voltaire's Dictionnaire
philosophique: "This editorial Dictionnaire philosophique is composed of five elements: Le Dictionnaire philosophique portatif, Les Questions sur l'Encyclopédie, the 43 articles that Voltaire contributed to Diderot's Encyclopédie, l'Opinion par alphabet, and the articles that Voltaire wrote for the Dictionnaire de l'Académie" (317).

Voltaire's article on "Géographie" contained within his Questions sur l'Encyclopédie was published in 1772 and is found in the sixth part of the work, and is the first entry of the second section. We can now therefore ask the following question: Why the Questions sur l'Encyclopédie? Voltaire, who was a contributor to the Encyclopédie, wrote the Questions sur l'Encyclopédie while he was in Switzerland. Nicholas Cronk has shown that unlike the Encyclopédie which was collectively written by scientists and philosophers, the Questions sur l'Encyclopédie were meant to be the work of a very different group altogether: "Voltaire présente les QE comme un ouvrage collectif répondant à la grande entreprise collective du temps, l'Encyclopédie . . . il se propose seulement de présenter un 'essai de quelques articles' qui complète ou corrige sur certains points le grand dictionnaire . . . son objectif et son originalité: présenter les questions de ceux qui se déclarent 'douteurs et non docteurs'" (Cronk, Questions sur l'Encyclopédie 3). Voltaire retained, however, from the Encyclopédie the critical purpose crucially underscored by Diderot in "Encyclopédie."

In an article about the Questions sur l'Encyclopédie, James Hanrahan speaks of the implications of the title that Voltaire chose for this work, citing the "Introduction" to the Questions sur l'Encyclopédie: "The full title suggests, just as the introduction confirms, that 'Quelques gens de lettres qui ont étudié l'Encyclopédie, ne proposent ici que des questions, et ne demandent que des éclaircissements (II, 3)'" (157). Hanrahan
says that the *Encyclopédie* is "a work that is praised in the highest terms in Voltaire’s introduction" (157). Hanrahan is here referring to such spatial evocations by Voltaire as "L’Encyclopédie est un monument qui honore la France" (4) and "Le discours préliminaire qui la précédé était un vestibule d'une ordonnance magnifique et sage qui annonçait le palais des sciences" (4). Hanrahan recalls that: "In 1769 the Parisian printer Panckoucke proposed a new, extended edition of Diderot and D’Alembert’s monumental work, with which Voltaire had agreed to collaborate" (157). To "prepare" (157) Voltaire "recruited collaborators of his own" (157); however, "the new edition was abandoned" (157). Voltaire did not give up on this endeavor, though, for he had "a series of articles already prepared" (157), and he "set about increasing their number in order to produce this work, with the modest ambition to 'présenter aux amateurs de la littérature un essai de quelques articles omis dans le grand dictionnaire, ou qui peuvent souffrir quelques additions, ou qui ayant été traités selon les vues des directeurs de cette entreprise immense [II, 11]'" (157).

We have discussed the human experience as being essential to the production of space. In his biography on Voltaire, René Pomeau notes that: "En Janvier 1770 Voltaire commence les *Questions sur l'Encyclopédie*, qui l'occuperont jusqu'en 1772; tâche immense: 9 volumes; le dernier grand effort de Voltaire" (192). The years before the beginning of the *Questions sur l'Encyclopédie*, Voltaire had continuously moved within Europe, in England and in Prussia, for example, mainly due to various scandals and bannings of his work.\(^\text{15}\) Voltaire’s life had been rather tumultuous in the years leading up to his move to Geneva and his eventual (and permanent) move to Ferney. Much of his work had been considered scandalous and therefore he often had to flee
Paris. In 1754, he was "unwelcome at the courts of Paris and Berlin" after a "rift with Frederick of Prussia" (Cronk, *The Cambridge Companion to Voltaire* xii). In 1775, Voltaire purchased Les Délices in Geneva, and lived there for the next three years (Cronk xii). In 1759, he purchased land in Ferney, France, very close to Geneva and to the border of Switzerland, and the Château de Ferney remained his residence for the rest of his life (Cronk xiii). Voltaire bought the property in Ferney so that he could easily cross the border into Geneva if he was threatened by French authorities, and also so that he could easily cross the border back into France if he was threatened by Swiss forces. The safety of that location ensured for Voltaire a relative peace of mind with which he could write with less fear of retribution. In that respect, notable is the fact that "Voltaire fait son entrée à Genève" in 1754, and the following year we find "le début de sa collaboration à l'Encyclopédie" (Pomeau 189). Voltaire was in Ferney when he wrote the *Questions sur l'Encyclopédie* and they were first published in Geneva.\(^\text{16}\) The *Questions sur l'Encyclopédie* were considered scandalous mainly because of Voltaire's discussion of religion, as is shown in his *Correspondence* from 1770-1771. In December 1770, the Genevan authorities wrote that they wished to examine the orthodoxy of the *Questions sur l'Encyclopédie*:

Il y avoit tout lieu de croire que dans l'ouvrage de Mr. De Voltaire intitulé *Questions sur l'Encyclopédie* qui s'imprime actuellement à Genève, & dont les trois premiers volumes paroissent déjà, il y a bien des morceaux qui attaquent la Religion révélée & qu'il proposoit que l'on prit une résolution à cet egard. Dont opiné, l'avis a été de nommer une Commission pour examiner ce qui paroit de cet ouvrage & Nous donner les informations nécessaires. (468)

and his *Correspondence* from 1771-1772 shows the same concerns:

On a dit qu'il se répand dans la ville des livres contraires aux moeurs et à la
In his article "Géographie" in the *Questions sur l'Encyclopédie*, Voltaire brings to light an ethical necessity at the heart of spatial epistemology. Voltaire's entry on geography can be interpreted two ways. The first approach is epistemological, having to do with the ways in which to dispel ignorance or error in order to acquire more accurate knowledge. The second is ethical, and both can be analyzed through the following quotation, which arguably summarizes Voltaire's position: "Il est bien difficile en géographie comme en morale, de connaître le monde sans sortir de chez soi" (320).

Concerning epistemology, Voltaire describes what he calls "inaccuracies." In the opening line of the article he writes: "La géographie est une de ces sciences qu'il faudra toujours perfectionner" (318). Voltaire implies how crucial it is for one to know the measurements of the globe and of the countries on Earth. He points out the inaccurate "measurement" of the world at the time. He blames sovereigns for pursuing power over scientific undertakings: "Il faudrait que tous les souverains s'entendissent & se prêtassent des secours mutuels pour ce grand ouvrage; ils se sont presque toujours plus appliqués à ravager le monde qu'à le mesurer" (318). Voltaire uses here two different verb tenses very closely to each other, as he passes from "il faudra" to "il faudrait" in these opening lines. The future tense indicates that perfecting geography is an endless task, or geography will always be "inaccurate." Voltaire's insistence on not repeating errors that are known to be errors is great evidence of the pedagogical posture of the *Encyclopédie*. This can be considered as both positive and pessimistic at
the same time, as is discussed by Foucault in reference to Kant's *What is Enlightenment?*. Geography will always have to be updated or "perfected" over time.

In using the conditional mood, Voltaire implies a request, that science should be an internationally funded or protected endeavor. This is imperative in order to avoid the mistakes highlighted in this entry, which would help the discipline of geography be more scientifically accurate and would promote peace in the world.

Voltaire spends the majority of this first part on "inaccuracies" giving a long, harsh critique of the work of Johann Hübner (1688-1731), a German geographer and teacher during the Enlightenment who was the author of a widely available book on geography, *La Géographie Universelle* (320). We see here that Voltaire is concentrating heavily on the repetition of geographical mistakes of the past, while also discussing the present state of affairs concerning knowledge on geography in Europe and in France. Voltaire dedicates almost four full pages of "Géographie" giving the accounts of numerous mistakes in Hübner's work and he therefore criticizes its acceptance as *the* reference book on geography during the Enlightenment.

Hübner becomes the comical target of Voltaire's wit, demonstrating how fraudulent scientific discourse can be, through a compilation and accumulation of errors pervading Hübner's book. Voltaire's critiques of Hübner are blatant and quite comical, for he notes inaccuracies on a variety of issues: on "temperature" (320), on "population" (321), on "habitable and inhabitable land" (322), and on "history" (322-323), for example. Voltaire presents these criticisms in list form, a satirical device which appeared in texts well before the eighteenth century, going as far back as the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. In *The List: The Uses and Pleasures of Cataloguing*, Robert E. Belknap
explains that: "Patterns of listing have been identified and conceptually categorized for centuries. For example, in the sixteenth century, Henry Peacham recorded many of these strategies in his catalogue of rhetoric *The Garden of Eloquence*" (7). Lists establish links and chains that are not necessarily connected in a linear fashion: "To build lists, the compiler connects one link to another. These chains can have all kinds of compositions, and endless variety of lengths, and any number of purposes" (34). Just as a rhizome, a list is multidirectional in form and in meaning: "The format of a list is its vertical or horizontal orientation" (23). We can consider Voltaire's article "Géographie" in his *Questions sur l’Encyclopédie* and De Vaugondy's article on "Géographie" in the *Encyclopédie* to have similar structural patterns.

The second approach to Voltaire's article on "Géographie" in the *Questions sur l’Encyclopédie* has to do with ethical implications of Voltaire's notion of "sortir de chez soi," meaning literally leaving home or one's place, and by extension leaving the self, encountering and giving place to the other. Voltaire considers the ethical dimension of geography when he notes a comparable difficulty in geography and morality, namely that knowing (the world) can happen only by "sortir de chez soi" – knowledge can only happen by leaving one's home. By writing this phrase Voltaire poses questions of ethics and alterity within the self or of a knowledge that needs to be spatialized in order to come to fruition. He says that there is no knowledge at home, in the self ("chez soi") that does not go through an experience of the other or "sortie" out of one's home or oneself. Here we can refer to the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas, specifically to his writings on responsibility to the other.
In his *Traité sur la Tolérance*, Voltaire discusses fraternity. For example, he states: "Il ne faut pas un grand art, une éloquence bien recherchée, pour prouver que des chrétiens doivent se tolérer les uns les autres. Je vais plus loin. Je vous dis qu'il faut regarder tous les hommes comme nos frères. Quoi! mon frère le Turc? mon frère le Chinois? le Juif? le Siamois? Oui, sans doute; ne sommes-nous pas tous enfants du même père, et créatures du même Dieu?" (111). Fraternity for Voltaire may be understood as being based on resemblance, shared by children of the same father. Humankind is fundamentally one and the same in spite of superficial differences. The other is my brother, for we have a similar fundamental nature. However, consideration of Levinas' notion of fraternity may help us interpret Voltaire's position differently.

In *Totality and Infinity*, Levinas states that he will found subjectivity in the idea of infinity, and as an "impossible exigency" of hospitality and justice (27-28). Levinas explains that his work "will present subjectivity as welcoming the other, as hospitality" (27). *Totality and Infinity* explores how to let the other be. For Levinas, the notion of fraternity based on resemblance does not respect the separateness of the individual. In that respect, he speaks directly to the responsibility that we have to the other:

Equality is produced where the other commands the same and reveals himself to the same in responsibility; otherwise it is but an abstract idea and a word. It cannot be detached from the welcoming of the face, of which it is a moment. The very status of the human implies fraternity and the idea of the human race. Fraternity is radically opposed to the conception of a humanity united by resemblance. Society must be a fraternal community to be commensurate with the straightforwardness, the primary proximity, in which the face presents itself to my welcome. (214)

This idea of "fraternity" is crucial to Levinas, for he states that it is central to "the very status of the human." Conversely, he shows that "resemblance of a united humanity is radically opposed" to this "fraternity" and that society cannot properly exist without the
"fraternal community." In that sense, fraternity does not entail being or thinking alike, but being gathered in a space hospitable to and in proximity with each singularity. When Voltaire mentions leaving one's home, he says that the people of "la Rue St. Jacques" (a metaphor for Parisians) are guilty of failing to see beyond their immediate vicinity, which becomes in their eyes the standard against which everything must be appraised: "Votre sotte voisine, & votre voisin encore plus sot, vous reprochent sans cesse de ne pas penser comme on pense dans la rue St. Jacques" (323-324). The ignorant people on the rue St. Jacques reject difference, and therefore cannot perceive what is common to humankind. In many essays, as we shall see, Voltaire is attentive to the plurality of customs and therefore to difference, but he also believes that differences can always ultimately be related to a common way of thinking. For a non-provincial mind, it is always possible to understand difference. One may also interpret Voltaire's "leaving home" as the urge to encounter alterity, including within the self, or, as Levinas writes, "the astonishing feat of containing more than it is possible to contain" (27).

Deleuze and Guattari's deterritorialization can also be read ethically. Paul Patton writes about "the ethics of deterritorialization" in Between Deleuze and Derrida:

Consider the concept of deterritorialization which lies at the heart of the political ethic elaborated in their mature work. In the concluding statement of rules governing certain key concepts in A Thousand Plateaus, deterritorialization is defined as the complex movement or process by which something escapes or departs from a given territory, where a territory can be a system of any kind, conceptual, linguistic, social or affective. On their account, such systems are always inhabited by 'vectors of deterritorialization' and deterritorialization is always 'inseparable from correlative reterritorializations.' Reterritorialization does not mean returning to the original territory, but rather refers to the ways in which deterritorialized elements recombine and enter into new relations in the constitution of a new assemblage or the modification of the old. (21)
Thus "reterritorializing" does not mean "returning to the original territory," or returning "home." Instead, forming "new relations" in order to "modify the old" is desired, or, as Voltaire says, "leaving one's home" is how one can "know," thereby perhaps allowing oneself to gain the opportunity to "modify the old," to reevaluate one's "home" and one's self.\textsuperscript{19}

By focusing on Voltaire's "leaving home" or "leaving the self" in his article on "Géographie," I wanted to call attention not only to the relevance of social space in the Enlightenment, but also to the ethical obligation of the self to the Other that is often associated to thinkers of that period, and especially to Voltaire. The following chapter will address the ways in which fiction may be read spatially, and then examine the philosophical tale as a genre embraced by Voltaire for its aptitude to produce space.

\begin{enumerate}
\item See "Venn Diagram of the relations of geography, history, and their subject matter," (Baker 3) in Geography and History: Bridging the Divide, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003. Baker provides this illustration in order to show that these three areas overlap, and therefore must be considered together when being analyzed.

\item In The Order of Things, Michel Foucault writes: "Histories of ideas or of the sciences – by which is meant here an average cross-section of them – credit the seventeenth century, and especially the eighteenth, with a new curiosity: the curiosity that caused them, if not to discover the sciences of life, at least to give them a hitherto unsuspected scope and precision. A certain number of causes and several essential manifestations are traditionally attributed to this phenomenon" (125).


\end{enumerate}
Another comprehensive guide to contemporary thinkers on "space" and "place" is *Key Thinkers on Place and Space*, London, SAGE Publications Ltd., 2004, by Phil Hubbard (Ed.), Rob Kitchin (Ed.), and Gill Valentine (Ed.).

For the scholarship on the publication of the *Encyclopédie*, see Jacques Proust, *Diderot et l’Encyclopédie*, Paris, A. Colin, 1962. According to Proust, "La publication de l’*Encyclopédie* ne fut pas seulement la mise au jour d’un grand inventaire des connaissances reçues, éclairé par une philosophie souvent neuve et hardie; l’*Encyclopédie* serait en effet à sa date une entreprise véritablement révolutionnaire, par la nouveauté de la conception, l’ampleur des moyens financiers et techniques mis en jeu, l’étendue du public atteint, soit dans la recherche des collaborateurs, soit dans celle des souscripteurs, le développement progressif et sûr de l’affaire à travers mille dangers qui ne furent pas tous d’ordre idéologique ou politique. Tout cela fait de l’*Encyclopédie* l’équivalent des plus grandes entreprises françaises à la fin du XVIIIe siècle" (45).

See also the University of Chicago’s online ARTFL Encyclopédie Project found at the following university website: <http://encyclopedie.uchicago.edu/>. Proper citation is as follows: *Encyclopédie, ou dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers*, etc., eds. Denis Diderot and Jean le Rond d’Alembert. University of Chicago: ARTFL Encyclopédie Project (Spring 2011 Edition), Robert Morrissey (ed), <http://encyclopedie.uchicago.edu/>. I should also note here that the University of Michigan currently has an ongoing project entitled "The Encyclopedia of Diderot and D’Alembert: Collaborative Translation Project" found at this university website: <http://quod.lib.umich.edu/d/did/>. The University of Chicago’s ARTFL Encyclopédie Project recognizes the work currently being done at the University of Michigan, as is shown in another part to the ARTFL website: <http://encyclopedie.u.chicago.edu/node 18>.

The article "Encyclopédie" functions as a *mise en abyme* of the *Encyclopédie*. Both Diderot and D’Alembert presented knowledge spatially and even, in the case of D’Alembert, through a tool used by geographers, the map. By writing that it was organized as a "chain of knowledge" and its geographical basis as "the Earth’s surface," the *Encyclopédie* adopted a spatial form. The spatial form of the *Encyclopédie* has a dual function. First, it discusses space within itself – the article entitled "Géographie" by Didier Robert de Vaugondy and its corresponding article "Géographie physique" by Nicolas Desmarest appears within it. Second, as an entire work, it is written as a map, as a tree of knowledge, as a labyrinth, that is to say, it adopts specific spatial forms.

See the map of "Human Knowledge" ("Système figuré des connoissances humaines") from the *Encyclopédie*.

The term "map" as a metaphor is an appropriate figure for the project of *Encyclopédie* and is also specifically related to Didier Robert de Vaugondy’s articles on "Géographie" and "Globe" in the *Encyclopédie*. 
See "Geography charted" (Withers 177) and "Geography in the 'Tree of Knowledge'" (Withers 177) in *Placing the Enlightenment: Thinking Geographically about the Age of Reason*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2007.

For the botanical image of a rhizome, see the following webpage: <http://candidcandidacy.files.wordpress.com/2008/07/rhizome.jpg>.

For example, he begins these references with the term "voyez," and we note the following "cross-referenced" articles that he chooses in "Géographie:" "Voyez Périple;" "Voyez Climat;" "voyez Latitude;" "voyez Gnomons;" and "Voyez Mésures itinéraires" ("Géographie").

Entries quoted here from the *Questions sur l'Encyclopédie* are taken from the University of Florida Libraries Eighteenth Century Collections Online.

See Pomeau, 188-190.


In *What is Enlightenment?* Foucault discusses the fact that the Enlightenment was and is a good project for human history, and it can also be considered as an endless project (318-319).


A detailed discussion and analysis of the ethics of both Emmanuel Levinas and Jacques Derrida as it relates to Voltaire's philosophical tales is presented in the fifth chapter.
CHAPTER 3
GEOGRAPHY AND FICTION: THE PLACE OF THE VOLTAIRIAN PHILOSOPHICAL TALE

Geography and Literature

In the preceding chapter, I gave a theoretical analysis of space in the eighteenth century by examining the essays on "Géographie" in the Encyclopédie and the Questions sur l'Encyclopédie. This chapter is dedicated to a discussion of space writing in fiction and the Voltairian philosophical tale.

Increasingly, critics have drawn attention to space as an integral part of the make-up of a fictional story: "Territorial and topographical aspects of literature have received renewed academic attention within the last decades (also labeled as the 'spatial turn' in humanities)" (Piatti 3). In "Lights in Space," Daniel Brewer discussed how the eighteenth century, or, "the past," can be thought of as "spatialized." This is due in part to "an eighteenth century produced in the twenty-first" (Brewer 175). According to Brewer: "this object of the past is always inseparably linked to a present, through complex operations that allow us to cast our glance back to an anterior moment and another place. It is an object, moreover that increasingly has become spatialized, and not only because certain kinds of texts have been more privileged over others (travel narratives, for instance, over tragedy)" (175). Brewer says that at present one must "spatialize" the Enlightenment and its literature: "the question of knowing the eighteenth century cannot be dissociated from reflection on the particular way we know it, and increasingly we know that object according to a dialectic involving an historical space and a spatializing historical practice" (176). In addition to Brewer's mention of "travel narratives," one can also consider the philosophical tale, and Voltaire's in particular, as
a type of text which "spatializes" the eighteenth century. It is the human experience or "the production of space" (Lefebvre) which gives a place its meaning:

Evocative descriptions of geographical places by novelists enable the essences of sense of place to be felt strongly by the reader. Places are more than the sum of their physical components; they take on deeper significance which cannot easily be quantified. They may well be associated with attitudes and values which are best captured by novelists who are more interested in revealing the nature of human experience than in explaining and predicting human behavior. They bring about a more creative description of landscape than could be reached by a more objective orientation. (Mallory and Simpson-Housley xi)

Thus, a reader can relate to the "sense" of a place – the meaning or memory the "lived space" evokes – and not merely its "physical" description. This can perhaps explain why Didier Robert de Vaugondy and Nicolas Desmarest wrote separate articles on "Géographie" – reflecting the distinction made since Antiquity (Broc) that "physical," descriptive geography was to be differentiated from "human" geography.

In Humanistic Geography and Literature, Douglas C.D. Pocock distinguishes between literature as an "artistic creation" and geography as a "scientific construction" (9). He clarifies, however, that "human geography" may be considered as "an art" or "social science," and that "human geography as social science can be acknowledged as a stance from which to engage literature" (9). This is true because "events 'take place'" (12), both in our 'real,' personal lives and in the 'imagined,' fictional lives of characters: "We are what we are largely as a result of our life's experiences, all of which have an integral environmental context or setting" (12). Human geography "explores the nature and aspects of environmental experience as part of the human condition," and it is this which has "the deepest engagement with imaginative literature" (15). Literature, therefore, can enhance the understanding of human geography, for, according to Pocock, "literature becomes both a source for new insights and a testing ground for
hypotheses in exploring the experiential foundation of our world" (15).¹ Like Lefebvre, Pocock insists that both real and imagined space can be "produced." Inhabiting a space is possible in both "social space" and "literary space," and this can lead to the "production of space." I will show that this is the case in Voltaire – the apprehension of space in philosophy, which is itself related to the inhabitation of a social space, applies to literature, particularly in Voltaire's philosophical tales.

A fictional place is not simply a copy of the real or of the world. It is not only a realistic setting or a realistic mode of inhabitation. A fictional place can also imagine and form geography. For example, it is true that Voltaire uses Paris in some of his writings, but he also writes about the utopian society of Eldorado in Candide. Franco Moretti says that "geography is not an inert container, it is not a box where cultural history 'happens,' but an active force, that pervades the literary field and shapes it in depth" (3).² Moretti is here referring to the work of Gaston Bachelard. In The Poetics of Space, Bachelard explains the philosophy of place in "house and universe:" "In the dynamic rivalry between house and universe, we are far removed from any reference to simple geometrical forms. A house that has been experienced is not an inert box. Inhabited space transcends geometrical space" (47). Bachelard and Moretti insist that geography must be "lived," it must be embraced when reading literature. In the quotation above, Bachelard is explaining the difference between a "house" and a "home." A "house" is something which is not "experienced" or not "inhabited" – it is a shell, a physical space meant for or to provide shelter. A "home" is a "house" which is "experienced" and "inhabited," or, according to Emmanuel Levinas, "occupies a privileged place" in human experience:
Habitation can be interpreted as the utilization of an "implement" among "implements." The home would serve for habitation as the hammer for the driving in of a nail or the pen for writing. For it does indeed belong to the gear consisting of things necessary for the life of man. It serves to shelter him from the inclemencies of the weather, to hide him from enemies or the importunate. And yet, within the system of finalities in which human life maintains itself the home occupies a privileged place. Not that of an ultimate end; if one can seek it as a goal, of one can "enjoy" one's home, the home does not manifest its originality in the possibility for its enjoyment. For all "implements," besides their utility as means in view of an end, admit of an immediate interest. Thus I can take pleasure in handling a tool, in working, in accomplishing, using gestures which, to be sure, fit into a system of finality, but whose end is situated beyond the pleasure or pain procured by these isolated gestures themselves, which fill or nourish a life. The privileged role of the home does not consist in being the end of human activity but in being its condition, and in this sense its commencement. (Totality and Infinity 152)

We can say that the "physical space" of a house becomes the "lived space" of a home through "the production of space." For Levinas, the home is "the condition of human activity;" it is the representation of the human element "occupying" or "inhabiting" space.

In Orientalism, Edward Said concurs with Bachelard's analysis of the "inside of a house" which "acquires a sense of intimacy, secrecy, security, real or imagined, because of the experiences that come to seem appropriate for it" (Said 54-55). In Said's reading of Bachelard, the "objective space of a house," whether it be "corners," "corridors," or "cellar rooms," is for Bachelard "far less important than what poetically it is endowed with, which is usually a quality with an imaginative or figurative value we can name and feel" (Said 55). Therefore, Bachelard has shown that "space acquires emotional and even rational sense by a kind of poetic process" (Said 55), and "the same process occurs when we deal with time" (Said 55). Said explains this similarity with time by saying that: "Much of what we associate with or even know about such periods as 'long ago' or 'the beginning' or 'at the end of time' is poetic – made up. For a historian of Middle Kingdom Egypt, 'long ago' will have a very clear sort of meaning, but
even this meaning does not totally dissipate the imaginative, quasi-fictional quality one senses lurking in a time very different and distant from our own" (55). "Imaginative geography" and imagined time, therefore, have a mutual relationship, for real versus imagined space provides fictionalization in the narrative: "For there is no doubt that imaginative geography and history help the mind to intensify its own sense of itself by dramatizing the distance and difference between what is close to it and what is far away" (55).

In GEO/GRAPHIES: Mapping the imagination in French and Francophone Literature and Film, Jeanne Garane comments on Said's concept of "imaginative geography" by pointing out that it is "a result of arbitrarily distinguishing between the self, with its sense of belonging to a familiar space, and the other, relegated to unfamiliar space," (ix), and that "Said's 'imaginative geography' extends beyond the positive, empirical knowledge of geographical place to include its arbitrary constructions" (ix). According to Garane, "the term 'imaginative geography'" that Said uses "implies the two elements contained within the word 'geography' itself: Geo, 'earth,' and graphein, 'writing,'" that "very aptly define the textualization of space as those signifying practices which, while they may mimic reality, also constitute it" (ix). Fiction constitutes space. For Garane, "this understanding of geography as discursive construct thus problematizes the representation, or 'mapping,' of space" (ix). Thus, Said brings together notions of space and time: space in a text is not necessarily mimetic – it is the same and different; and something is created within the "lived space" of the house to become a home in both reality and fiction.
These critics have explained what interpretation of a place can accomplish: a reader can relate to the meaning or the memory a place evokes in a text (Mallory and Simpson-Housley); events "take place" in both our "real," personal lives, and in the "imagined," fictional lives of characters (Pocock); and Bachelard and Said demonstrated how a fictional place can also imagine and form geography. Physical space becomes inhabited / lived space by social experience (Bachelard / Levinas), and space can be constituted or made up (it is not merely a reproduction) (Said).

In *The Production of Space*, Lefebvre wonders whether it makes sense to speak of a "reading" of a space (142). Before discussing this part of Lefebvre’s analysis, let us recall how space is produced according to Lefebvre: one must "construct a theoretical unity between three fields – the physical, the mental, and the social" (*The Production of Space* 11-12), which makes up a "triad" (39), or "the perceived-conceived-lived triad" (39-40). We saw in reading the *Encyclopédie* and Voltaire’s "Géographie" from the *Questions sur l’Encyclopédie* that the three spaces – physical ("perceived") space, mental ("conceived") space, and social ("lived") space – are all interpreted and experienced by man. Not even physical space escapes man's intervention. Lefebvre defines "the perceived-conceived-lived triad" "in spatial terms" (40): "perceived" space is "spatial practice" (40); "conceived" space is "representations of space" (40); and "lived" space is "representational spaces" (40).

Nedra Reynolds and Edward W. Soja mix all of the categories of the "triad" to denote that all three parts must be thought of together. Reynolds explains the "three fields" of Lefebvre’s triad thus: "Perceived space is spatial practice, which is what we see or smell or otherwise register with our senses; it is the material expression of social
relations in space" (15); "Conceived space or representations of space is made up of conceptual abstractions like geometry that may in fact inform the actual configuration of spatial practices (think maps or signs or canons). This second formation makes the rules for spaces" (15); and: "Thirdly, lived spaces are representational spaces of inhabitants and users; they need not obey any rules of consistency or cohesiveness" (15). In Thirdspace, a book which is both "a tribute to and an engagement with Lefebvre" (Reynolds 16), Soja "continues the project of theorizing space as a product of human practice" (Reynolds 16). Soja points out that "the three concepts of Lefebvre's triad cannot be separated" (Reynolds 16): Soja's Thirdspace figured ""the trialectics of spatiality' in a swirl, not as a chart or graph or map . . . where the spatial and temporal are joined by the social" (Reynolds 16). Specifically: "there is one blended, swirling concern with how space is lived, perceived, and conceived . . . Lived, perceived, and conceived space fold into and spin across one another, working together to accomplish the production of space" (Reynolds 16).3

Soja says that "the central argument in Lefebvre's Production of Space is a "metaphilosophy" of "the ontological, epistemological, and theoretical rebalancing of spatiality, historicality, and sociality as all-embracing dimensions of human life" (Thirdspace 9-10). Soja describes his term "trialectics" as "not just a triple dialectic but also a mode of dialectical reasoning that is more inherently spatial than the conventional temporally-defined dialectics of Hegel or Marx" (10). The "method" of trialectics is "used to re-describe and help clarify what Lefebvre was writing about in the thematic 'Plan' of The Production of Space" (10), which, according to Soja, is "a trialectics of spatiality, of spatial thinking, of the spatial imagination that echoes from Lefebvre's interweaving
incantation of three different kinds of spaces: the *perceived* space of materialized Spatial Practice; the *conceived* space he defined as Representations of Space; and the *lived* Spaces of Representation ('Representational Spaces')" (10). Soja says that "Lefebvre's perceived space is often thought of as 'real'" (10) and his "conceived space is often thought of as 'imagined'" (10), while "lived space was typically seen as a simple combination or mixture of the 'real' and the 'imagined' in varying doses" (10). For Soja, "simultaneously real and imagined and more (both and also . . .), the exploration of Thirdspace can be described and inscribed in journeys to 'real-and-imagined' (or perhaps 'realandimagined'?) places" (10).

When considering whether space can be read, Lefebvre provides two answers. The negative answer rests on the understanding that "social space can in no way be compared to a blank page upon which a specific message has been inscribed" (142). Lefebvre says that "rather than signs," "one encounters directions – multifarious and overlapping instructions," and that "text, inscription or writing to be found is in a context of conventions, intentions and order (social order *versus* social disorder)" (142). According to Lefebvre, "that space signifies is incontestable; it signifies dos and don'ts; it 'speaks' – but does not tell all" (142). "Above all," Lefebvre writes, space "prohibits," and "its mode of existence, its practical 'reality' (including its form) differs radically from the reality of something written, such as a book" (142). Space can also have a sort of dual function, for it is "at once result and cause, product and producer" (142). In addition, space "is also a stake, the locus of projects and actions deployed as part of specific strategies, and hence also the object of *wagers* on the future – wagers which are articulated, if never completely" (142-143). Lefebvre also explains here the
existence of "a spatial code" or "the decoding process" in "levels of interpretation" (143). For Lefebvre, "activity in space is restricted by that space," and, consequently, "space 'decides' what activity may occur" (143). However, there are "limits" to this "decision" because "space implies a certain order – and hence also a certain disorder" (143). "Interpretation," then, "comes later, almost as an afterthought" (143).

His positive answer relies on the possibility "to envisage a 'reader' who deciphers or decodes and a 'speaker' who expresses himself by translating his progression into a discourse" (142). Lefebvre's approach to reading as reading a text or a book is a very literal interpretation. One must extend or expand the understanding of a text, for a text goes beyond the written word and includes non-verbal signs. Several philosophers and literary critics have problematized the understanding of a text.⁴ Even Lefebvre concedes it in his own essay: one can read space if it is agreed that space is produced first. Lefebvre says that "space commands bodies, prescribing or proscribing gestures, routes and distances to be covered," and that "space" is therefore "produced with this purpose in mind," or, "this is its raison d'être" (143). Lefebvre privileges the production of space as experience and declares that "the reading of a space comes first from the standpoint of knowledge," and thus, "space is produced before being read; it is not produced in order to be read and grasped, but rather in order to be lived by people with bodies and lives in their own particular context" (143). But to the extent that Lefebvre grants the possibility that space can actually be read and interpreted, he wonders "what the virtue of readability actually is," particularly because "spaces made (produced) to be read are the most deceptive and tricked-up imaginable" (143). In sum, Lefebvre's wariness about reading may depend primarily on the recognition that interpretation
remains tentative and liable to error. There seem to be fewer pitfalls in inhabiting space than in interpreting it:

It is pure illusion to suppose that thought can reach, grasp or define what is in space on the basis of propositions about space and general concepts such as message, code and readability . . . There is a proper role for the decoding of space: it helps us understand the transition from representational spaces to representations of space, showing up correspondences, analogies and a certain unity in spatial practice and in the theory of space. (162-163)

The main purpose of "reading" therefore, is to "decode the spatial text," and this, in turn, allows us to comprehend the interaction between the social field or "lived" space and the mental field or "conceived" space. Here Lefebvre is more positive when addressing "reading," by emphasizing the connections it makes possible between spatial theories and practices.

The following two chapters will show that one can "read space" in Zadig, Micromégas, Candide, and l'Ingénu. They will demonstrate the relevance of cultural geography and "the production of space" to the interpretation of the tales through the twentieth-century understanding of the social nature of space – that "social space" or "lived space" which is "produced" by Voltaire should be considered as an integral part of the interpretation and analysis of the tales. Before turning to this analysis, I will explain why Voltaire uses the philosophical tale as the means to explore "the production of space."

The Voltairian Philosophical Tale

The philosophical tale can be considered as a legacy of the Enlightenment, Voltaire being a major (if not the major) contributor to this legacy; as Frederick M. Keener notes: "it is the best literary gift to posterity of which Candide must be the most
renowned example" (3). How can we classify the philosophical tale, or the Voltairian philosophical tale?

There were efforts to define the tale in the eighteenth century because it defied classification. In the *Encyclopédie*, we find two separate entries for "Conte." The first, by Diderot, is simply entitled "Conte," and is listed under the heading "Belles-Lettres:"

*CONTE, s. m. (Belles - Lettres.) c'est un récit fabuleux en prose ou en vers, dont le mérite principal - consiste dans la variété & la vérité des peintures, la finesse de la plaisanterie, la vivacité & la convenance du style, le contraste piquant des événemens. Il y a cette différence entre le *conte* & la *fable*, que la *fable* ne contient qu'un seul & unique fait, renfermé dans un certain espace déterminé, & achevé dans un seul temps, dont la fin est d'amener quelque axiome de morale, & d'en rendre la vérité sensible; au lieu qu'il n'y a dans le *conte* ni unité de temps, ni unité d'action, ni unité de lieu, & que son but est moins d'instruire que d'amuser. La fable est souvent un monologue ou une scène de comédie; le *conte* est une suite de comédies enchainées les unes aux autres. Lafontaine excelle dans les deux genres, quoiqu'il ait quelques fables de trop, & quelques contes trop longs. ("Conte")

Diderot compares the tale with the classical fable, which follows Nicolas Boileau's "trois unités." In *l'Art Poétique*, written in 1674, Boileau gave the rules of classical aesthetics.

Plays required respecting "les trois unités:"

Que le lieu de la scène y soit fixe et marqué . . .
Mais nous, que la raison à ses règles engage,
Nous voulons qu'avec art l'action se ménage;
Qu'en un lieu, qu'en un jour, un seul fait accompli
Tienne jusqu'à la fin le théâtre rempli.
(Chant III, v. 38-46)

Even though Diderot touches on fables and not plays, he retains from Boileau his classical rules about time, space, and plot (the plot should take place in one given time, in one determined space, and should avoid subplots). Boileau also underscored that plays had to be in conformity with two expectations: "vraisemblance," which is credible
truth, and "bienséance," which avoids what is offensive to the eyes of polite society, or in opposition to the norms of social propriety:

Jamais au spectateur n'offrez rien d'incroyable:
Le vrai peut quelquefois n'être pas vraisemblable.
Une merveille absurde est pour moi sans appas:
L'esprit n'est point ému de ce qu'il ne croit pas.
Ce qu'on ne doit point voir, qu'un récit nous l'expose:
Les yeux en le voyant saisiraient mieux la chose;
Mais il est des objets que l'art judicieux
Doit offrir à l'oreille et reculer des yeux.
(Chant III, v. 47-54)

Diderot, in his discussion of fables, also notes that the purpose of a fable is its moral lesson, "the moral of the story," even though a fable, as D'Alembert will note in his own entry on the tale, is not necessarily credible, for instance because of its characters (talking animals). Instead, the story makes the instruction or the truth of the moral lesson more palatable ("d'en rendre la vérité sensible").

The "conte," on the other hand, does not follow any of the "trois unités" ("il n'y a dans le conte ni unité de temps, ni unité d'action, ni unité de lieu"). Boileau explains that another rule of classicism is to "instruct" (Chant III). The tale is inscribing a difference in classicism, as Diderot shows: "son but est moins d'instruire que d'amuser." Finally, while the "fable" does contain some "comedy" ("La fable est souvent un monologue ou une scène de comédie"), the "conte" is a "chain" of "comedy," where comedic scenes "follow each other" ("le conte est une suite de comedies enchaînées les unes aux autres"). Diderot ends by naming La Fontaine as a master of "the two genres."

Eugène Van Bennel and Ferdinand Gravard note how Boileau leaves out both the fable and the tale in Chant II of *l'Art poétique*:
Le deuxième chant est consacré aux genres secondaires de la poésie, ou plutôt à ceux qui sont inférieurs, par l'étendue, aux poèmes épiques et aux poèmes dramatiques. Ce sont, dans l'ordre où les a placés l'auteur, l'idylle et l'églogue, l'élegie, l'ode, le sonnet, l'épigramme, le rondeau, la ballade, le madrigal, la satire, le vaudeville et la chanson. Boileau omet la fable et le conte, et l'on a d'autant plus lieu de s'en étonner qu'il était intimement lié avec la Fontaine; il laisse de côté l'épître, bien qu'il en eût lui-même composé d'excellentes. (175)

However, we may consider that for Boileau, the fable is not a minor genre, which could be why he leaves it out of Chant II. For example, in Chant III, Boileau writes:

La fable offre à l'esprit mille agréments divers:
Là, tous les noms heureux semblent nés pour les vers,
Ulysse, Agamemnon, Orestes, Idoménée,
Hélène, Ménélas, Pâris, Hector, Enée.
(Chant III, v. 237-240)

Diderot's entry considered both the fable and the tale as "classical," but stressed that the tale played with or defied the rules of classicism both in its form and in its overall purpose.

The second entry for "conte," by d'Alembert, is entitled "Conte, Fable, Roman," and it is listed under the heading "Grammaire" (as compared to Diderot's "Belles-Lettres"), a difference I will return to:

CONTE, FABLE, ROMAN, syn. (Gramm.) désignent des récits qui ne sont pas vrais: avec cette différence que fable est un récit dont le but est moral, & dont la fausseté est souvent sensible, comme lorsqu'on fait parler les animaux ou les arbres; que conte est une histoire fausse & courte qui n'a rien d'impossible, ou une fable sans but moral; & roman un long conte. On dit les fables de Lafontaine, les contes du même auteur, les contes de madame d'Aunoy, le roman de la princesse de Cleves. Conte se dit aussi des histoires plaisantes, vraies ou fausses, que l'on fait dans la conversation. Fable, d'un fait historique donné pour vrai, & reconnu pour faux; & roman, d'une suite d'aventures singulières réellement arrivées à quelqu'un. ("Conte, Fable, Roman")

According to D'Alembert just as for Diderot, what opposes the fable to the tale is its moral intention. When discussing the relation of the tale to truth, D'Alembert is more
moderate than Diderot, for whom "la vérité des peintures" was characteristic of the tale. D'Alembert rather insists on its verisimilitude ("qui n'a rien d'impossible"), but does so in order to oppose it to the fable, "dont la fausseté est souvent sensible." Marie-Hélène Cotoni notes that the lack of truth of fables is also denounced in Voltaire's *L'Ingénu*:

"Ah! s'il nous faut des fables, que ces fables soient du moins l'emblème de la vérité! J'aime les fables des philosophes, je ris de celles des enfants et je hais celles des imposteurs" (233). Just as D'Alembert emphasized the excessive distance of fables from truth, Voltaire wanted to remedy the lack of truthfulness of fables by contributing to another kind – fables written by philosophers, or philosophical tales.

The use of "common language" by the Encyclopedists was especially important to Diderot, for whom definitions relied on a preexisting vocabulary which was perhaps too hastily assumed to be shared by all: "Diderot fit entrer la langue commune dans le *Dictionnaire raisonné*. On s'est peu avisé de l'importance de cette opinion, si opposée, il est vrai aux schémas de pensée contemporains. Pour nous, en effet, une encyclopédie, recueil et classification des sciences et de l'ensemble des activités humaines, n'a pas à se poser la question de la langue usuelle" (Leca-Tsiomis 252).

Diderot classifies knowledge alphabetically and through cross-references, and combines the lexis of arts and sciences with the critical study of the common idiom. According to Leca-Tsiomis, attention to the relevance of the common idiom was called after the *Encyclopédie* had already been started, which explains its place in the *Dictionnaire raisonné*: "Lorsque viendra pour eux [= les Encyclopédistes] le temps de la définition des mots de la langue, il n'y aura d'autre place, d'autre branche dans 'l'arbre encyclopédique,' pour accueillir ce savoir nouveau que la division 'Grammaire,' dans
l’Encyclopédie, cette branche accueillera donc non seulement la terminologie grammaticale mais aussi la langue usuelle" (211). Most importantly, the implementation of "common language" by Diderot in the Encyclopédie creates a space for its readers to learn about society, to learn about others, to learn about the world: "[L]a langue, aussi, comme lieu d’expérience fondamental, cadre de la pensée, appréhension du monde; comme espace décisif de l’échange et de l’erreur, de la maîtrise et de la servitude” (Leca-Tsiomis 253); and "la langue, à la fois moule premier de l’usage, où s’inscrivent toutes les conventions, tous les implicites d’une société, et espace essentiel de la liberté de penser et de l’exercice de l’entendement" (Leca-Tsiomis 253). We have mentioned that D'Alembert’s entry on "conte" belongs to the category "Grammaire." Writing it under that heading allowed D'Alembert to define the word "tale" as it was used in common language. The "conte" in colloquial language can mean something different than in the literary definition. In that case, telling a tale means telling a funny story ("plaisante") and one, moreover, which may be a true story ("vraie ou fausse"), in contradiction, therefore with the definition of the tale as a literary piece, which, though it may be verisimilar, is not a real story. In the same vein, D'Alembert mentions the meanings "fable" and "roman" have in ordinary language. In every case, what is at stake is the status of a reported story in connection with truth or an event purported to be real: in colloquial language, "it is a fable" means that the story is "historically given as true" and should be given as an actual fact or given as historically true; and "roman" indicates "a series of astonishing adventures that really happened to someone." D'Alembert here complicates the relationship of truth to fiction or to the real.
Gianni Iotti labels the Voltairian philosophical tale as "the quest for truth" (112). He mentions the "philosophical problems" (112) that Voltaire treats in the tales, namely "the limits of human knowledge (Micromégas), fate (Zadig), the problem of evil (Candide)" (112), and "social and historical problems" (112) such as "the link between nature and civilization, and the question of toleration in the reign of Louis XIV (l'Ingénù)" (112). Iotti also explains the central notion in the Voltairian tale: "But at the heart of the Voltairian conte lies always the intractable confrontation between characters and the truths of the world, the problem of exercising virtue which, in the humanist tradition, ought to coincide with the acquisition of knowledge" (112).

Roger Pearson notes that of "the twenty-six stories which are traditionally seen as constituting the corpus of Voltaire's contes philosophiques, the majority were written over a thirty year span, between 1740 and 1770" (6). Pearson says that "the term conte philosophique, convenient as it now is, was rarely used by Voltaire himself" (6), and instead: "For the most, he referred to his stories either simply as 'histoires' and 'petits ouvrages,' or else dismissively as 'fadaises,' 'rogatons,' 'petits pâtés'" (6). This can be explained by the fact that Voltaire's tales were not classical in the sense recalled by Diderot in the Encyclopédie. Unlike a large part of Voltaire's corpus, namely his numerous poems and plays, the tales do not fit well into the classical style. Thus by minimizing the tales as "petits ouvrages, etc.," Voltaire is showing that he does not want to admit to them, or appear to grant them any value. He wanted to distance himself from producing something which was considered to be non-canonical.

In the Encyclopédie entry discussed earlier by Diderot and D'Alembert, there was no reference to the specificity of the philosophical tale. Aram Vartanian gives an
intelligent theoretical assessment of the tale, and makes such a specificity explicit in "On Cultivating One's Garden." Concerning the place of the philosophical tale at this point in history, Vartanian states that "the conte philosophique was widely known and appreciated at the time (in France during the 18th century under the stimulus of the Enlightenment) in a variety of subgenres" (470). We can note "the tale of love; oriental tales reminiscent of The Thousand and One Nights; the didactic conte moral; fairy tales, erotic tales; folkloric contes; and still others" (470) as examples. Vartanian says that "all these kinds of tales" were somewhat "philosophical" tales, as they "could, and often did, contain material that mirrored the "philosophical" tendencies of the age" (470). However, it is Voltaire's philosophical tale which "drawing on various features of a rich literary background, achieved a form that was unique" (471). This is "unique" in that Voltaire's philosophical tale "may be defined as an episodic narrative, more imaginary than realistic, structured by frequent changes of scene resulting from travel, and controlled by a central theme – optimism, destiny, providence, progress, relativism, natural law – that involves the problem of evil" (471), of which "the unfolding of the plot confirms, undermines, or otherwise qualifies the idea under consideration by testing it against a series of concrete experiences and observations in the world at large" (471).

Also "unique" to the Voltairian philosophical tale is "the relationship between fiction and the philosophical lesson" (Cotoni 233). As Cotoni says: "Si Voltaire a fait entrer la philosophie dans la fiction, il est donc tout aussi vrai qu'il a fait entrer la fiction dans la philosophie, non constamment mais fréquemment" (249). Vartanian labels Voltaire’s conte philosophique as "a sui generis hybrid of fiction and philosophy," the "fusion" of which is "a product that differs from either taken separately" (469). Vartanian states that
"the philosophical component, in being fictionalized, is freed from the necessity for analytic examination and logical proof of what it asserts, as well as from the necessity of weighing objections and avoiding inconsistencies. It is content to argue its case and disarm criticism by essentially rhetorical strategies, such as illustration, fabulation, wordplay, wit, irony, and satire" (469). Then, "conversely, the fictional component, by being philosophized, also loses some of its usual qualities. One decisive result is the abandonment of verisimilitude. The literary development of an idea or theme through generalization and a testing of its limits causes the narrative (in Candide) to be not only unrealistic but at times fantastic" (469). Vartanian says that for Voltaire, "there is an art of exaggeration, as of everything else" (469), as Voltaire’s "intent" to "exaggerate" "reverses, injustices, and absurdity is not, of course, to misrepresent the facts, but to emphasize their abnormality, while also preparing the ground for all sorts of comic and satiric side effects" (469). This, according to Vartanian, "is a measure of Voltaire’s mastery that the grotesque and improbable features of the tale soon acquire a plausibility of their own, as realism ceases to be the sole criterion of reality" (469), and this proved useful for Voltaire, since "by expressing prohibited opinions through a fiction without claims to realistic reference, the author was freer to say what he wanted in a climate of intellectual repression" (469).

Vartanian mentions (along with Candide) "Zadig ou la destinée, l’Ingénu, Micromégas" as some of "Voltaire’s other contes philosophiques" which "conform in varying degrees to the paradigm" (471), while "other of his tales" only "bear some resemblance to those works but can more accurately be called parables; for, though they deal with some point of moral truth or common wisdom, they do not pose any
recognizable problem of philosophy” (471). Let us now turn to a discussion of different considerations of Voltaire’s philosophical tale.

The doxa, Roland Barthes’ term for "opinion" (The Pleasure of the Text 18), of the philosophical tale, and Voltaire's in particular, has been that of Bildungsroman or of roman d'apprentissage. This is because travel was assessed as educational in itself in the century. In the Encyclopédie, we find three entries for "Voyage" written by Jaucourt in 1765: Grammaire, Commerce, and Education, which can be considered as "a classical appreciation of the problem of travel" (Van Den Abbeele xv):

"Voyage, (Education.) Les grands hommes de l'antiquité ont jugé qu'il n'y avait de meilleure école de la vie que celle des voyages; école où l'on apprend la diversité de tant d'autres vies, où l'on trouve sans cesse quelque nouvelle leçon dans ce grand livre du monde; & où le changement d'air avec l'exercice sont profitables au corps & à l'esprit.

Aujourd'hui les voyages dans les états policés de l'Europe (car il ne s'agit point ici des voyages de long cours), sont au jugement des personnes éclairées, une partie des plus importantes de l'éducation dans la jeunesse, & une partie de l'expérience dans les vieillards. Choses égales, toute nation où regne la bonté du gouvernement, & dont la noblesse & les gens aisés voyagent, a des grands avantages sur celle où cette branche de l'éducation n'a pas lieu. Les voyages étendent l'esprit, l'élevent, l'enrichissent de connaissances, & le guérissent des préjugés nationaux. C'est un genre d'étude auquel on ne supplée point par les livres, & par le rapport d'autrui; il faut soi-même juger des hommes, des lieux, & des objets.

Ainsi le principal but qu'on doit se proposer dans ses voyages, est sans contredit d'examiner les moeurs, les coutumes, le génie des autres nations, leur goût dominant, leurs arts, leurs sciences, leurs manufactures & leur commerce. ("Voyage")

The beginning phrases show that travel benefits both "the body and the mind." Jaucourt writes that to travel is important for people of all ages, and it is beneficial for "all nations." Van Den Abbeelee points out that "the profits to be gained from travel are as corporeal as they are intellectual or commercial," and that "if travel posits the risk and anxiety of death (and of potential loss of profit), it also signals the way to health, wealth,
and wisdom" (xvi). In *l'Ingénu*, the young man is urged to petition for a pension in Versailles: "Chacun l'exhorta de faire le voyage de Versailles pour y recevoir le prix de ses services" (256). "Faire le voyage de Versailles" had monetary as well as social overtones.

Jaucourt closes this entry by citing Montaigne's *Essais* (xxix):

Cependant le principal n'est pas, comme dit Montagne, «de mesurer combien de piés a la santa Rotonda, & combien le visage de Néron de quelques vieilles ruines, est plus grand que celui de quelques médailles; mais l'important est de frotter, & limer votre cervelle contre celle d'autrui.» C'est ici sur - tout que vous avez lieu de comparer les tems anciens avec les modernes, «& de fixer votre esprit sur ces grands changemens qui ont rendu les âges si différens des âges, & les villes de ce beau pays autrefois si peuleées, maintenant désertes, & qui semblent ne subsister, que pour marquer les lieux où étoient ces cités puissantes, dont l'histoire a tant parlé.» (*Voyage*)

According to Van Den Abbeele, this section highlights "the voyage to Italy," which was considered to be "a veritable subgenre of European travel narrative" and of which "enjoys an exemplary status among travelogues" (xxix). Van Den Abbeele reminds us that this "voyage" was mentioned in the first definition (xxix), and at the end of the third and final definition it "reinforces Italy's prestige as a prime locus of historical, aesthetic, and moral reflection as well as the stereotypical place to finish off a young gentleman's education" (xxix). In addition, the voyage is defined through Montaigne as an opportunity to develop thinking more than acquiring knowledge by confronting the self to others.

The first entry, entitled "VOYAGE (Grammaire)" gives the definition of a voyage as being the movement of someone from somewhere to somewhere else: "transport de sa personne d'un lieu où l'on est dans un autre assez éloigné." According to Van Den Abbeele, this part is "from an anthropological perspective: it refers to the movement of
human beings, of 'a person,' from one place to another" (xv). The entry continues: "On fait le voyage d'Italie. On fait un voyage à Paris. Il faut tous faire une fois le grand voyage. Allez avant le temps de votre départ déposer dans votre tombeau la provision de votre voyage." Van Den Abbeele explains that "le grand voyage" is "the metaphorical voyage that is death" (xv) and that this "voyage" "is not simply something 'one does,' such as travel to Italy, but what 'is necessary for everyone to do" (xv). This "voyage" is termed as an "economic anxiety" (xvi).

The second article is entitled "VOYAGE (Commerce):" "Les allées & les venues d'un mercenaire qui transporte des meubles, du blé, & autres choses. On dit qu'il a fait dix voyages, vingt voyages." Again references to movement abound, this time "in the commercial sense of travel" which is "not so much the person that is moved, but things that are moved back and forth" (xvi). Van Den Abbeele stresses the "return" of "things" here in reference to the "person" named in this entry, the "mercenary," or, "someone working for monetary remuneration," someone whose "revenue depends upon his return, upon the successful completion of his circular movement" (xvi).

Travel has also been perceived as a major component of the philosophical tale. The spaces in the narratives of the eighteenth century are often very closely (or directly) related to travel. Travel in French literature was popular well before the eighteenth century. As Patrick Henry notes: "The theme of travel in French literature goes all the way back to the jongleurs of the Middle Ages and is frequently, as in Marguerite de Navarre, a literary pretext for the narration of a series of tales" ("Travel in Candide" 193). This popularity was directly tied to the history of the time, to voyages of discovery: "At times of great exploration and discovery of new worlds, the theme of travel appears
frequently" (193). For example: "in the sixteenth century, Gargantua and Pantagruel voyage to worlds old and new, real and imaginary. Montaigne too utilizes tales of travelers for philosophical purposes. Later, picaresque novels examine a particular country and criticize contemporary manners, customs, and morals" (193). It is during the Enlightenment, however that "the theme of travel reached its apogee in the eighteenth century, where one frequently finds in philosophically oriented literature a device for juxtaposing nature and convention" (193), the most famous first example of the century being "Montesquieu's Lettres persanes (1721)" (193).

James P. Gilroy, Haydn Mason, and Yvon Belaval concur with that view. James P. Gilroy emphasizes the multifaceted transformation undergone by characters in philosophical tales: "The educative process that takes place in the conte philosophique is one where the hero becomes something he was not as yet at the beginning of his career. The main purpose of the tale is to show how he reaches greater wisdom" (582); and "the progress and growth illustrated in the tale are epistemological as well as moral and psychological" (582-583). "The hero," Gilroy adds, "learns to know and assess himself, to understand how his mind works, to trace the concatenation of thoughts and associations through which he has arrived at his present ideas about things," and "his awareness of this 'chain of becoming' helps him to free his mind of prejudices and idées recues and gain greater mastery over its future development" (583).

Haydn Mason and Yvon Belaval discuss the Voltairian voyage as a "technique" (Mason 57) and as a "function" (Belaval 310) in Voltaire's philosophical tales. They also emphasize that Voltaire's tales are about furthering the education of the traveler. We saw in the entry for "Voyage" in the Encyclopédie that to travel was educational in itself.
Mason writes: "la technique se joue sur un aspect fondamental des contes voltairiens: les voyages" (57). He describes the first part of this "technique" as travel to foreign, "exotic" space: "Les personnages ne cessent de se déplacer" (57). For example, "Micromégas descend de Sirius sur terre;" "Zadig quitte Babylone pour errer à l'aventure dans l'Orient avant de rentrer triomphant à sa ville natale;" "l'Ingénu passe du Canada en France;" and "Quant à Candide, son itinéraire est des plus complexes" (57-58). The second part of the "technique" is the encounter with the Other: "Le voyage permet une autre formule chère à Voltaire: celle de l'étranger;" "Un tel personnage, séparé de son milieu habituel, doit faire son éducation à travers la surprise" (Mason 58). The Voltairian hero, the one who comes in contact with the Other, is a "naïve" character, according to Belaval: "Le voyage a une fonction éducatrice . . . la naïveté (ou l'ignorance) que corrige l'expérience" (310-311). Mason and Belaval focus on the hero's education through travel and through meeting with the other in Voltaire's tales.

In the subsequent chapters I will relate the voyage in the tales to Voltaire's notion of "leaving home" or "leaving the self," as was stated in "Géographie" in the Questions sur l'Encyclopédie. This will provide a different reading or a new consideration of Voltaire's philosophical tales through the approach of "the production of space." Roland Barthes gave the paradoxa, his term for "dispute" (The Pleasure of the Text 18), of the philosophical tale in "The Last Happy Writer." Barthes proposes another sort of analysis, that of the "immobility of the hero" in Voltaire's philosophical tales. Barthes does not simply treat travel and the voyage in Voltaire's philosophical tales, but rather discusses how space functions in the tales, and to a larger extent, in the works of Voltaire.
Barthes places Voltaire in time and in space: "We might assume that the relativist lesson of the past is at least replaced in Voltaire, as in his entire age, by that of space. At first glance, this is what occurs: the eighteenth century is not only a great age of travel, the age in which modern capitalism, then preponderantly British, definitively organizes its world market from China to South America" (86-87), but, for Barthes, "it is above all the age when travel accedes to literature and engages a philosophy" (87). Barthes states that "exoticism" (87) is central to this, that the eighteenth century "produced a veritable typology of exotic man" (87), for example, "the Egyptian Sage, the Mohammedan Arab, the Turk, the Chinese, the Siamese, and most prestigious of all, the Persian" (87). As concerns the philosophical tales, Barthes writes that "just when Voltaire begins writing his Tales, which owe a great deal to Oriental Folklore, the century had already elaborated a veritable rhetoric of exoticism" (87), and Voltaire would continue to implement this rhetoric, since "for him, as indeed for any of his contemporaries, the Oriental is not the object, the term of genuine consideration, but simply a cipher, a convenient sign of communication" (87). Concerning the "Oriental countries" (88) which Barthes says "today have so heavy a weight, so pronounced an individuation in world politics" (88), for Voltaire "are so many forms, mobile signs without actual content, humanity at zero degrees, which one nimbly grasps in order to signify oneself" (88).9

Therefore, "the Voltairian journey has no density" (87), or, more explicitly, "the space Voltaire covers so obsessively (we do nothing but travel in his Tales) is not an explorer's space, it is a surveyor's space" (87). Thus, the "surveyor's space" that we find in Voltaire's tales "are less investigations than inspections of an owner whom we 'orient'
in no particular order because his estate never varies" (87), and also "whom we interrupt by incessant stops during which we discuss not what we have seen but what we are" (87). Therefore, according to Barthes, "the Voltairian journey is not realistic" (87), neither is it "an operation of knowledge, but merely an affirmation" (88). Barthes radically revises the understanding of the Voltairian tale as a narrative of progress and development of the self:

For such is the paradox of the Voltairian travel: to manifest an immobility. There are of course other manners, other laws, other moralities than ours, and this is what the journey teaches; but this diversity belongs to the human essence and consequently finds its point of equilibrium very rapidly; it is enough to acknowledge it in order to be done with it: let man (that is, Occidental man) multiply himself a little, let the European philosopher be doubled by the Chinese Sage, the ingenious Huron, and universal man will be created. To aggrandize oneself in order to confirm, not in order to transform oneself – such is the meaning of the Voltairian voyage. (88)

By stating that there is an "immobility" in Voltaire's tales, Barthes is saying that there is no transformation of the self, here going against the doxa according to which the Voltairian hero "becomes" something else at the end of the tale. Barthes shows that the hero finds himself or confirms himself throughout the tale, through the voyage, a reading that could productively be linked to other postcolonial studies of the Enlightenment, such as Mary Louise Pratt's Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation, "a study of travel writing, European expansion, and the dynamics of meaning-making on the imperial frontier, focusing on travel and exploration writing about Africa and South America in relation to European economic and political expansion since around 1750" (1). As Brewer also noted: "Thanks to work on travel literature, and more generally on what I would call 'space writing,' we have learned to see how the constitution of 'home' is dependent on imaginary encounters with the foreign, the exotic, the other" (180). For Barthes, although the hero's experiences through the voyage confront him to diversity,
the diversity in question confirms an inner contradiction in the character, not that others are fundamentally different from us.\(^\text{10}\)

As Cotoni notes: "Le voyage fictif va souvent de pair avec un tour d'horizon intellectuel. L'imaginaire sert des enjeux philosophiques. Outre sa fonction ludique, liée à l'attente des lecteurs, l'écrivain donne au récit fictif une fonction épistémologique . . . L'imaginaire ne conduit pas au délire, il tend à l'empêcher" (249-250). Sociability in fiction imagines other modes of intersubjectivity that are not merely reproducing those we can witness everyday. Cotoni sees in such fictions a safety valve, preserving the sanity of the author and of the socio-political space, with the hope to produce real effects through the presentation of an imaginary space. As in the *Encyclopédie*, Voltaire's philosophical tales write a "social space," or sociability, which is one approach to Lefebvre's "production of space," the forms of which I will explore in the next chapter. We will also see how this sociability calls for a return to ethics, so as not to supersede and annihilate the other (Chapter 5).

\(^1\) See also Leonard Lutwack's *The Role of Place in Literature*, Syracuse, Syracuse University Press, 1984.

\(^2\) Franco Moretti's *Atlas of the European Novel: 1800-1900* shows how: "Making the connection between geography and literature explicit – mapping it – allows us to see some significant relationships that have so far escaped us" (3). For Moretti [literary geography] "may indicate the study of space in literature; or else, of literature in space" (3). Moretti says that "in the first case, the dominant is a fictional one" (3), such as "Balzac's version of Paris, the Africa of colonial romances, Austen's redrawing of Britain" (3). Richard Maxwell explains that: "In treating the first subject [Moretti] has drawn on Vladimir Propp and Mikhail Bakhtin; he insists throughout that certain novelistic actions and narratives are spatially marked, that is, that they are connected with particular places" (695). Moretti describes "the second case" (3) as "real historical space" (3), such as "provincial libraries of Victorian Britain, or the European diffusion of *Don Quixote* and *Buddenbrooks" (3). According to Maxwell: "In treating the second subject, [Moretti] has drawn on the flourishing discipline of publishing history, as well as from work in social geography, putting particular emphasis on his conviction that
everything counts, bad books as well as good" (695). For Moretti, "the only real issue of literary history is society, rhetoric, and their interaction" (5), and "geography shapes the narrative structure of the European novel" (8). Moretti argues that "the novel as a genre revolves around imagining nations or cities, with special emphasis on tricky, evocative borders" (Maxwell 698). Moretti "maps" this argument to show a shift "in the second half of the eighteenth century" (53). He shows that "the narrative role of France and Europe remains roughly the same, while that of non-European countries slightly decreases" (53). He also illustrates "the most radical change" which "concerns imaginary and utopian settings, which in fifty years decline from 13 to 2 percent" (53). In "Mapping Literature: Towards a Geography of Fiction," Barbara Piatti refers to Moretti's work: "Only with Franco Moretti's Atlas of the European Novel (1998) the beginning of a new era in literary geography is marked, where maps become truly tools of interpretation, allowing to see something which hasn't been evident before" (6).


6 I provide here some examples of French "travel literature" from the Middle Ages to the twentieth century. For the eighteenth-century, I am excluding works by Voltaire, which will be discussed separately: (1) The Middle Ages: La Chanson de Roland, Raoul de Cambrai, Tristan et Iseult (Béroul et Thomas), Yvain ou le Chevalier au lion (Chrétien de Troyes), Le Roman de Renart (Pierre de St. Cloud), Le Roman de la Rose (Guillaume de Lorris); (2) The sixteenth century: l'Heptaméron (Marguerite de Navarre), Gargantua et Pantagruel (François Rabelais); (3) The seventeenth century: l'Astrée (Honoré d'Urfé), Le Roman Comique (Paul Scarron), Voyage dans la lune (Cyrano de Bergerac), Les Six Voyages (Jean-Baptiste Tavernier), Les Contes de Fée (Charles Perrault); (4) The eighteenth century: Lettres persanes (Montesquieu), Supplément au voyage de Bougainville (Denis Diderot), Paul et Virginie (Jacques-Henri Bernardin de Saint-Pierre), Mille et Une Nuits (Antoine Galland), Gil Blas (Alain-René Lesage), Cléverland (Antoine François l'abbé Prévost), Histoire d'une grecque moderne (Antoine François l'abbé Prévost), Lettres d'une Péruvienne (Françoise de Graffigny), l'An 2440 (Louis-Sébastien Mercier); In addition, I am adding here one French-American example: Lettres d'un Cultivateur américain (Michel Guillaume Jean de Crèvecoeur (J. Hector St. John de Crèvecoeur), one Irish example: Gulliver's Travels (Jonathan Swift), and one English example: Rasselas (Samuel Johnson); (5) The nineteenth century: Atala (François-René de Chateaubriand), Le Père Goriot (Honoré de Balzac), Adieu (Honoré
de Balzac), La Vénus d'Ille (Prosper Mérimée), Indiana (George Sand), Voyage en Orient (Gérard de Nerval), Salammbô (Gustave Flaubert), Pêcheur d'Islande (Pierre Loti); (6) The twentieth century: La condition humaine (André Malraux), Les bouts de bois de Dieu (Ousmane Sembène), l'Aventure ambiguë (Cheikh Hamidou Kane), La Nuit (Elie Wiesel), Hiroshima Mon Amour (Marguerite Duras).


9 In Writing Degree Zero (1953), Barthes argues that neither language nor style is completely creative, but that writing is an original and creative act: "conceptual geography, style resides 'outside art' (since it is "outside the pact that binds the writer to society") just as much as language does. If language stands on the "hither side of literature," style is located beyond it" (xiii).

10 In "Contre Barthes," Patrick Henry says that Barthes' "immobility" is applicable to some of Voltaire's philosophical tales, such as Micromégas and l'Ingénu, since in these tales "the traveler is a stranger only on the social level" (22). I believe that Barthes' immobility is also applicable to Zadig. For example, we see that the state of Zadig is the same both at the beginning of the tale: "Au temps du roi Moabdar il y avait à Babylone un jeune homme nommé Zadig, né avec un beau naturel fortifié par l'éducation. Quoique riche et jeune, il savait modérer ses passions; il n'affectait rien; il ne voulait point toujours avoir raison, et savait respecter la faiblesse des hommes" (86); and at the end of the tale: "Zadig fut roi, et fut heureux . . . L'empire jouit de la paix, de la gloire et de l'abondance; ce fut le plus beau siècle de la terre: elle était gouvernée par la justice et par l'amour. On bénissait Zadig, et Zadig bénissait le ciel" (153-154).
CHAPTER 4
WRITING SPACE IN VOLTAIRE’S PHILOSOPHICAL TALES

Space Writing

What is "space writing," and how does it work in Voltaire? Brewer writes: "Thanks to work on travel literature and more generally on what I would call 'space writing,' we have learned to see how the constitution of 'home' is dependent on imaginary encounters with the foreign, the exotic, the other" (180). Voltaire "produces space" in Zadig, Micromégas, Candide, and l'Ingénu. Through the technique of narrative repetition, Voltaire escapes the logic of the linear tale, and gives the philosophical tale a circular form. For example, the philosophical thesis "tout est bien," or the question of the relevance of Providence, is given throughout Zadig and Candide. Shown throughout Candide and Micromégas is the theme of displacement; and in l'Ingénu, we note the philosophical thesis of nature as opposed to culture. Comparable to the refrain of a song, this gives a rhythm to the tales.

We have already studied space in the eighteenth century through the work of Broc, the Encyclopedists, and Lefebvre. Broc recalled that there was a human element to geography, as well as a physical, descriptive geography. This was made evident in the article "Géographie" in the Encyclopédie. Geography (Didier Robert de Vaugondy)\(^1\) was divided into different categories (ancienne, moyen âge, moderne; naturelle, historique, civile ou politique, sacrée, ecclésiastique), and a final category, physique (Nicholas Desmarest), which became a separate entry. Lefebvre made a similar distinction with respect to "the production of space." Lefebvre's "triad" addresses space as perceived (physical), conceived (mental), and lived (social). Even physical, abstract,
or absolute space is considered through human perception, never without it. Both conceived (mental) and lived (social) space are spaces which are "produced" by culture.

Lefebvre’s concepts of space confirm and expand eighteenth-century considerations of geography. Voltaire’s four philosophical tales evince forms of sociability that testify to a production of space. This chapter will explore how different spaces are inhabited in the tales and for what purposes. Through sociability, Voltaire’s characters interact in “foreign, exotic, other spaces” (Brewer) as well as in France. Each produced space deals with philosophical problems, and can also be representative of specific locations or historical events of the age, such as the court of the Ancien Régime in Zadig (Court of Moabdar) and Micromégas (Planet Sirius), the Lisbon Earthquake of 1755 and Leibnizian Optimism in Candide, and the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes of 1685 in l’Ingénu. Each of the four heroes leaves home: Zadig returns home, Candide and the Ingénu remain elsewhere, and Micromégas continues his exploration. Throughout their journeys, Voltaire shows different types of sociability. I will show which space is produced through this social interaction in each tale.

The Figure of the Nomad in Zadig

Zadig, ou la Destinée² was originally published as Memnon in Amsterdam in 1747, and in 1748 it was reedited as Zadig ou la Destinée (Deloffre and Van den Heuvel 418). Voltaire had been banned from court for the "jeu de la Reine" incident with Madame du Châtelet, and was received at Sceaux by the Duchess of Maine (Deloffre and Van den Heuvel 418). This incident came about while Voltaire was watching Mme. du Châtelet gamble during a card game with other members of court at Fontainebleau. She lost a considerable amount of money, and Voltaire angrily asked her why she had insisted on playing with dishonest people. Afraid that he might have been overheard by other
courtisans, and subsequently possibly be reported and imprisoned, he and Mme. du Châtelet immediately departed for Sceaux. Zadig was greatly influenced by these years in the life of Voltaire: "le conte porte en effet vigoureusement l'empreinte de ces années 1745 et 1746 durant lesquelles Voltaire apprend à ses dépens la distance qui existe entre un rêve de bonheur," (Deloffre and Van den Heuvel 418) and "de solitude tranquille, d'amour et de sagesse, tel qu'il a été entrevu à Cirey, et les réalités d'une existence imprévisible dans son capricieux développement" (Deloffre and Van den Heuvel 418). In that respect, Zadig illustrates the providentialist belief that in the end, "tout est bien," though Voltaire shows that the belief is not always easy to sustain: "Il est fort probable que Zadig a été écrit à un moment où Voltaire essaie encore de se rattacher, malgré de nombreuses difficultés, il est vrai, aux arguments providentialistes de Leibniz" (Deloffre and Van den Heuvel 420).

In Zadig, the Arabian Desert is a space that might at first glance appear to be unlikely to harbor any sociability. Under Egyptian law, Zadig was condemned to be a slave because he was guilty of having killed a man (Chapter 10, "l'Esclavage"). An Arabian merchant named Sétoc purchased both Zadig and his servant, the servant at a higher price because he was more fit for labor, and set out together for the Desert of Horeb:

Sétoc, le marchand, partit deux jours après pour l'Arabie déserte, avec ses esclaves et ses chameaux. Sa tribu habitait vers le désert d'Horeb. Le chemin fut long et pénible. Sétoc, dans la route, faisait bien plus de cas du valet que du maître, parce que le premier chargeait bien mieux les chameaux; et toutes les petites distinctions furent pour lui. (115)

The desert is a place considered to be a difficult space for human occupation, as Voltaire notes above: "Le chemin fut long et pénible." The article for "Désert" in the
Encyclopédie describes it as a "savage," "uncultivated," "uninhabited," as well as a "sacred" place:

DESERT, (Geogr.) [Original Class: Géographie] [Author: unknown] {Machine Class: Géographie}

DESERT, s. m. (Géogr.) lieu sauvage, inculte, & inhabité, tels qu'étoient autrefois les deserts de la Lybie & de la Thébaïde.

Les Géographes donnent ce nom en général à tous les pays qui ne sont que peu ou point habités. Dans l'Ecriture, plusieurs endroits de la Terre sainte, ou voisins de cette Terre, sont appelés deserts. Le desert pris absolument, c'est la partie de l'Arabie qui est au midi de la Terre sainte, & dans laquelle les Israélites errèrent pendant quarante ans, depuis leur sortie d'Egypte jusqu'à leur entrée dans la Terre promise. Chambers. ("Désert")

Likewise, The Dictionnaire de la Géographie et de l'Espace des Sociétés³ points out that the desert is "inhospitable," a "difficult" place for "sustainable societies:" "Désert:

Espace faiblement habité, réputé inhospitalier. Personnage clé de la géographie, le désert est, dans son acception classique, inhabité du fait de la difficulté pour les hommes à s'y installer en sociétés viables" (241).

The desert in Zadig, however, is a place where commercial activity is emphasized:

Un chameau mourut à deux journées d'Horeb; on répartit sa charge sur le dos de chacun des serviteurs; Zadig en eut sa part. Sétoc se mit à rire en voyant tous ses esclaves marcher courbés. Zadig prit la liberté de lui en expliquer la raison, et lui apprit les lois de l'équilibre. Le marchand, étonné, commença à le regarder d'un autre oeil. Zadig, voyant qu'il avait excité sa curiosité, la redoubla en lui apprenant beaucoup de choses qui n'étaient point étrangères à son commerce; les pesanteurs spécifique des métaux et des denrées sous un volume égal; les propriétés de plusieurs animaux utiles; le moyen de rendre tels ceux qui ne l'étaient pas; enfin il lui parut un sage. Sétoc lui donna la préférence sur son camarade, qu'il avait tant estimé. Il le traita bien, et n'eut pas sujet de s'en repentir. (115-116)

Work is being accomplished, as Zadig and his servant are moving merchandise from the Egyptian village to Sétoc's tribe in the Desert of Horeb. Thanks to Zadig's problem solving skills (he is now acting as Sétoc's adviser), trade and commerce are also
happening here: "Arrivé dans sa tribu, Sétoc commença par redemander cinq cents onces d'argent à un Hébreu auquel il les avait prêtées en présence de deux témoins" (116); and "mais ces deux témoins étaient morts, et l'Hébreu, ne pouvant être convaincu, s'appropriait l'argent du marchand, en remerciant Dieu de ce qu'il lui avait donné le moyen de tromper un Arabe. Sétoc confia sa peine à Zadig, qui était devenu son conseil" (116). Therefore, there is a progression from slavery to work, trade, and commerce in the Arabian Desert.

The relation of nomads to space is relevant in Zadig. Deleuze and Guattari speak of "nomads" and "nomadism" in A Thousand Plateaus, and show that the desert is a space which can be inhabited by humans, as the Desert of Horeb in Zadig. They say that "the nomad has a territory" (380) and that "he follows customary paths; he goes from one point to another; he is not ignorant of points (water points, dwelling points, assembly points, etc.)" (380). They ask "what in nomad life is a principle and what is only a consequence" (380). The response is the "in between:" "A path is always between two points, but the in-between has taken on all consistency and enjoys both an autonomy and a direction of its own. The life of the nomad is the intermezzo" (380). This is because "the nomad goes from point to point only as a consequence and as a factual necessity; in principle, points for him are relays along a trajectory" (380). Deleuze and Guattari compare what they call "closed space" versus "open space" as concerns the "nomadic trajectory:"

Even though the nomadic trajectory may follow trails or customary routes, it does not fulfill the function of the sedentary road, which is to parcel out a closed space to people, assigning each person a share and regulating the communication between shares. The nomadic trajectory does the opposite: it distributes people (or animals) in an open space, one that is indefinite and noncommunicating. (380)
There is then a "significant difference between sedentary space and nomad space" (381): "sedentary space is striated, by walls, enclosures, and roads between enclosures, while nomad space is smooth, marked only by 'traits' that are effaced and displaced with the trajectory" (381). It is in this "smooth space" that "the nomad distributes himself" (381): "he occupies, inhabits, holds that space; that is his territorial principle" (381). According to Deleuze and Guattari: "It is therefore false to define the nomad by movement" (381) because "whereas the migrant leaves behind a milieu that has become amorphous or hostile, the nomad is one who does not depart, does not want to depart, who clings to the smooth space left by the receding forest, where the steppe or the desert advances, and who invents nomadism as a response to this challenge" (381).

Are nomads, therefore, "deterritorialized"? For Deleuze and Guattari: "Nomads have no points, paths, or land, even though they do by all appearances. If the nomad can be called the Deterritorialized par excellence, it is precisely because there is no reterritorialization afterward as with the migrant, or upon something else as with the sedentary" (381); and "with the nomad, on the contrary, it is deterritorialization that constitutes the relation to the earth, to such a degree that the nomad reterritorializes on deterritorialization itself. It is the earth that deterritorializes itself, in a way that provides the nomad with a territory" (381). Deleuze and Guattari explain that nomads do "inhabit" "a smooth space," or a desert, "the nomad space:"

The nomads are there, on the land, wherever there forms a smooth space that gnaws, and tends to grow, in all directions. The nomads inhabit these places; they remain in them, and they themselves make the desert no less than they are made by it. They are vectors of deterritorialization. They add desert to desert, steppe to steppe, by a series of local operations whose orientation and direction endlessly vary. (382)
They also recall here the "rhizome" as compared to the desert and also to the nomad: "The sand desert has not only oases, which are like fixed points, but also rhizomatic vegetation that is temporary and shifts location according to local rains, bringing changes in the direction of the crossings. The variability of directions is an essential feature of smooth spaces of the rhizome type, and it alters their cartography. The nomad, the nomad space, is localized and not delimited" (382). Deleuze and Guattari's nomadic trajectory sheds light on Zadig's mode of inhabitation of space – Zadig is always at one with the space he inhabits or occupies. In other words, he can inhabit everything properly, be it the Desert of Horeb or the Court of Moabdar.

The Court of Moabdar can be compared to the Court of Versailles. As Brewer notes: "For the present-day scholar or tourist, the architecture and gardens of Versailles tangibly represent that courtly space. But during the ancien régime, this location was the matrix where a symbolic space was created, a psycho-political space of subjects, subjectivity, and subjugation" (179). He says that: "Courtly space was filled with lavish display, forms of representation that involved not so much personal and private gratification as social and public judgement and regulation" (179).

Zadig eventually becomes minister, liked and respected by all: "Le roi avait perdu son premier ministre. Il choisit Zadig pour remplir cette place" (101); "on l'admirait, et cependant on l'aimait. Il passait pour le plus fortuné de tous les hommes; tout l'empire était rempli de son nom" (103); and "toutes les femmes le lorgnaient; tous les citoyens célébraient sa justice; les savants le regardaient comme leur oracle; les prêtres même avouaient qu'il en savait plus que le vieux archimage Yébor. On était bien loin alors de lui faire des procès sur les griffons; on ne croyait que ce qui lui semblait croyable" (103-
The success of Zadig at court is due to his ability to interpret and experience spaces of sociability – both with the citizens of Babylon and with the monarchy. Being promoted to First Minister by the King allows Zadig to reach the height of his social ascension, but we see that he does not rule in the ways of the absolute monarchy: "Il fit sentir à tout le monde le pouvoir sacré des lois, et ne fit sentir à personne le poids de sa dignité. Il ne gêna point les voix du divan, et chaque visir pouvait avoir un avis sans lui déplaire. Quand il jugeait une affaire, ce n'était pas lui qui jugeait, c'était la loi" (102); and "mais, quand elle était trop sévère, il la tempérait; et, quand on manquait de lois, son équité en faisait qu'on aurait prises pour celles de Zoroastre" (102). Zadig advocates justice and tolerance in Babylonian society – a lawful system which engages with the people for the purpose of protecting them. Zadig, himself, engages with the members of the society and with the King and Queen:

Il trouva ainsi le secret d'expédier le matin les affaires particulières et les générales: le reste du jour il s'occupait des embellissements de Babylone: il faisait représenter des tragédies où l'on pleurait, et des comédies où l'on riait; ce qui était passé de mode depuis longtemps, et ce qu'il fit renaître parce qu'il avait du goût. Il ne prétendait pas en savoir plus que les artistes; il les récompensait par des bienfaits et des distinctions, et n'était point jaloux en secret de leurs talents. Le soir il amusait beaucoup le roi, et surtout la reine. Le roi disait: «Le grand ministre!» la reine disait: «L'aimable ministre!». (104-105)

Thus, through Zadig's encouragement of education, equality, fairness, and justice, the sociability which he demonstrates provides society with a closer approach to humanity, a more human approach that allowed a period of stability and prosperity to be present in Babylon. The barren desert is not an empty, motionless, inanimate area. And the court is not a despotic space – it is an open space under the rule of Zadig, a space of sociability and stability.
The Immutable *Ingénu* and Natural Law

Voltaire's *l'Ingénu* was written in 1767 in Ferney (Deloffre and Van den Heuvel 469). It appeared around the same time as *La tragédie des Scythes* and as Louis Bénigne François Berthier de Sauvigny's *Les Illinois* (Deloffre and Van den Heuvel 469). These works shared a common interest in "ces peuples libres dont les moeurs s'opposent à celles des courtisans" (Deloffre and Van den Heuvel 469). In *L'Ingénu* Voltaire addresses natural man as a man with "toute la vigueur d'une plante très saine, qui ne demande qu’à s'épanouir" (Deloffre and Van den Heuvel 471).

In *l'Ingénu*, Voltaire uses the main character "the Huron" / "the Ingénu" / "Hercule de Kerkabon," or the "bon sauvage" as a tool to analyze social phenomena, as was common at the time. Voltaire demonstrates the myth of the noble savage in *l'Ingénu* by portraying the noble savage (the Ingénu) as already a European construction.

For example, Voltaire shows the natural beauty of the Ingénu by referring to Western canons of beauty. Upon his arrival to Lower Brittany, we see that the Ingénu is the epitome of physical perfection, which causes the brother and the sister to stare at him in both surprise and in admiration: "Sa figure et son ajustement attirèrent les regards du frère et de la soeur. Il était nu-tête et nu-jambes, les pieds chaussées et petites sandales, le chef orné de longs cheveux en tresses, un petit pourpoint qui servait une taille fine et dégagée; l'air martial et doux" (232). We also see that he has "European" physical traits: "Ce grand garçon-là a un teint de lis et de rose! qu'il a une belle peau pour un Huron!" (233). In addition, the Huron is seen by the French after having encountered other Europeans, the English – he came to France on an English vessel that brought him to France from Canada – which explains why he wears European clothes. When the English sailors get ready to leave Lower Brittany and
return to England, the Ingénu says to them: "je reste ici; retournez à Plymouth, je vous donne toutes mes hardes" (240). Likewise, the Ingénu is carrying with him food and drink from other European colonies ("Il tenait dans sa main une petite bouteille d'eau des Barbades" (232-233)), or from the ship as an instrument of colonization ("et dans l'autre une espèce de bourse dans laquelle était un gobelet et de très bon biscuit de mer" (233)). Voltaire emphasizes here the fact that savage man is filtered through civilized man who projects on him conceptions that he attributes to man in the (near) state of nature.

Since the Ingénu corresponds to the figure of the noble savage, Richard A. Francis rightly notes that "[In l'Ingénu] Voltaire does not set out to give a detailed and accurate portrayal of the life of the Amerindian. Its hero is a tabula rasa ripe for education, as much as the representative of a specific savage culture, and exotic detail is of little importance" (19). What is important, according to Francis, is the Ingénu's "notion of freedom" (31). It is this "which gives him his frankness, his scorn for anything other than natural law, and at the same time a sense of dignity and nobility. The spontaneous politeness that he demonstrates on his first arrival, so superior to the indiscreet curiosity of the Bretons, is part of the same attitude" (31-32), as is shown here, for example: "Messieurs, dans mon pays on parle l'un après l'autre; comment voulez-vous que je vous réponde quand vous m'empêchez de vous entendre?’ La raison fait toujours rentrer les hommes en eux-mêmes pour quelques moments. Il se fit un grand silence" (233-234). The Ingénu gives political, religious, and social critique of society throughout the tale from the standpoint of natural law.6
The Ingénue, who is close to the state of nature, embodies the right principles of
natural law. In the *Encyclopédie*, D'Alembert provides three explanations for "Nature"
which reconcile the physical and the philosophical. The first definition refers to the
physical make-up of the globe: "Nature signifie quelquefois le système du monde." The
second refers to the materialistic or mechanistic make-up of the universe: "la machine
de l'univers;" and the third refers to metaphysics: "ou l'assemblage de toutes les choses
créées" ("Nature").

Voltaire wrote an entry for "Nature" as a dialogue in the *Questions sur l'Encyclopédie*. He entitles the entry: "Nature: Dialogue entre le philosophe et la
nature." In this article, he poses questions about the "nature" of nature, how it came into
being, why it exists. For example, the "Philosophe" asks: "Qui es-tu, nature, je vis dans
toi, il y a cinquante ans que je te cherche, & je n'ai pu te trouver encore?; J'ai bien pu
mesurer quelques-uns de tes globes, connaître leurs routes, assigner les loix du
mouvement; mais je n'ai pu savoir qui tu es" (113), to which "Nature" responds
(reflecting D'Alembert's three divisions for "Nature" in the *Encyclopédie*): "Je suis le
grand tout. Je n'en sais pas davantage; je suis eau, terre, feu, atmosphère, métal,
minéral, pierre, végétal, animal. Je sens bien qu'il y a dans moi une intelligence; tu en
as une, tu ne la vois pas. Je ne vois pas non plus la mienne; je sens cette puissance
invisible" (113-114). The "Philosophe" persists, continuing to pose questions about the
"existence" of "nature:"

Ma chere mere, dis-moi un peu pourquoi tu existes, pourquoi il y a quelque
chose? Le néant vaudrait-il mieux que cette multitude d'existences faites
pour être continuellement dissoutes, cette foule d'animaux nés & reproduits
pour en dévorer d'autres & pour être dévorés, cette foule d'êtres sensibles
formés pour tant de sensations douloureuses; cette autre foule
d'intelligences qui si rarement entendent raison, à quoi bon tout cela, nature? (115)

To this very direct question, "Nature" has no more response except to say: "Oh! va interroger celui qui m'a faite" (115). Voltaire is inquiring into the purpose of life, into the problem of evil and of pain for sentient and intelligent animals, including mankind.

Nature does not answer that "all is well" but states that She is not to blame for this state of affairs – deferring the explanation to the invisible power that created Her. As Voltaire also shows in the tale Micromégas, it is possible to know at least part of the mechanism of nature (measuring the globe, etc.) without, as he writes here, understanding the purpose of acts of nature, that remain elusive to man's reason: "à quoi bon tout cela, nature?"

Voltaire also provides a similar question and answer model in Zadig. In Chapter 18, "L'Ermite," we note the exchange between Zadig and the angel Jesrad:

— Mais quoi! dit Zadig, il est donc nécessaire qu'il y ait des crimes et des malheurs? et les malheurs tombent sur les gens de bien! — Les méchants, répondit Jesrad, sont toujours malheureux: ils servent à éprouver un petit nombre de justes répandus sur la terre, et il n'y a point de mal dont il ne naisse un bien. — Mais, dit Zadig, s'il n'y avait que du bien, et point de mal? — Alors, reprit Jesrad, cette terre serait une autre terre, l'enchaïnement des événements serait un autre ordre de sagesse; et cet ordre, qui serait parfait, ne peut être que dans la demeure éternelle de l'Être suprême, de qui le mal ne peut approcher. Il a créé des millions de mondes, dont aucun ne peut ressembler à l'autre. Cette immense variété est un attribut de sa puissance immense. Il n'y a ni deux feuilles d'arbre sur la terre, ni deux globes dans les champs infinis du ciel, qui soient semblables, et tout ce que tu vois sur le petit atome où tu es né devait être dans sa place et dans son temps fixe, selon les ordres immuables de celui qui embrasse tout. (149-150)

This discussion contradicts Providence and providentialist interpretations ("tout est bien"). Zadig asks why evil exists in the world, even though he ends up endorsing resignation to and acceptance of the order of the world, which cannot be fully
understood. As with Voltaire's "dialogue between the philosopher and nature," where the philosopher is left wondering at the end of the conversation, so too is Zadig, as the angel Jesrad takes off while he continues to pose questions about evil: — "Mais, dit Zadig... Comme il disait mais, l'ange prenait déjà son vol vers la dixième sphère. Zadig à genoux adora la Providence, et se soumit." (150). However, resignation to the ultimate views of the Providence on the part of Zadig is just one aspect of what Zadig shows – modifications are possible within certain limits – or in Lefebvre's terms, space can be produced through human intervention.

In *The Production of Space*, Lefebvre takes up the concept of nature in order to situate mankind within it: "What common parlance refers to as 'matter,' 'nature,' or 'physical reality' has obviously achieved a certain unity" (12) and that these "three terms adequately sum up the properties of the 'substance' of this cosmos or 'world,' to which humanity with its consciousness belongs" (12). Lefebvre states that "nature" "does not produce" unlike mankind. Both humans and nature are active, but within different spheres, and human activity is valorized by Lefebvre: "Nature creates and does not produce; it provides resources for a creative and productive activity on the part of social humanity; but it supplies only use value, and every use value – that is to say, any product inasmuch as it is not exchangeable – either returns to nature or serves as a natural good" (70). He highlights here his central thesis that it is humans which "produce" social space, or "produce" culture: "The 'beings' nature creates are works; and each has 'something' unique about it even if it belongs to a genus and a species. To say 'natural' is to say spontaneous in the ancient metaphysical and theological
senses. Humanity, which is to say social practice, creates works and produces things" (70-71).

The entry for "Loi naturelle" in the Encyclopédie is reflective of the position of the Ingénu. The author (unknown) defines natural law in the opening sentence: "Loi naturelle (Morale) La loi naturelle est l'ordre éternel & immuable qui doit servir de règle à nos actions" ("Loi naturelle"). Later in the entry, the author says that there are two sides to natural law: "La loi naturelle est fondée, comme nous l'avons dit, sur la distinction essentielle qui se trouve entre le bien & le mal moral, il s'en suit que cette loi n'est point arbitraire. «La loi naturelle, dit Cicéron, liv. II. des lois, n'est point une invention de l'esprit humain, ni un établissement arbitraire que les peuples aient fait, mais l'impression de la raison éternelle qui gouverne l'univers . . . »" ("Loi naturelle").

Chapter 10, "l'Ingénu enfermée à la Bastille avec un Janséniste" highlights examples of the comparison between man in nature and man in civilization. In their shared prison cell, while discussing how the Ingénu ended up in prison, Gordon, "the Jansenist," says that it must be due to predestination or Providence, to which the Ingénu strongly disagrees:

«Il faut, dit le janséniste au Huron, que Dieu ait de grands desseins sur vous, puisqu'il vous a conduit du lac Ontario en Angleterre et en France, qu'il vous a fait baptiser en basse Bretagne, et qu'il vous a mis ici pour votre salut. — Ma foi, répondit l'Ingénu, je crois que le diable s'est mêlé seul de ma destinée. Mes compatriotes d'Amérique ne m'auraient jamais traité avec la barbarie qu'éprouve; ils n'en ont pas d'idée. On les appelle sauvages; ce sont des gens de bien grossiers, et les hommes de ce pays-ci sont des coquins raffinés. Je suis, à la vérité, bien surpris d'être venu d'un autre monde pour être enfermé dans celui-ci sous quatre verrous avec un prêtre; mais je fais réflexion au nombre prodigieux d'hommes qui partent d'un hémisphère pour aller se faire tuer dans l'autre, ou qui font naufrage en chemin, et qui sont mangés des poissons: je ne vois pas les gracieux desseins de Dieu sur tous ces gens-là.» (263)
We anticipate the Ingénu’s response to Gordon here. As Francis noted above, as noble savage, he "scorns anything other than natural law." Natural man is not opposed to reason, but, on the contrary, shows a profound reason. The Ingénu is immutable (Barthes) – He remains dedicated to the reasonable principles of natural law, even in obtaining a "classical" education in the arts and sciences from Gordon within the walls of the man made prison: "Chaque jour la conversation devenait plus intéressante et plus instructive. Les âmes des deux captifs s'attachaient l'une à l'autre. Le vieillard savait beaucoup, et le jeune homme voulait beaucoup apprendre" (264).

We see that the Ingénu is studying geometry: "Au bout d'un mois il étudia la géometrie; il la dévorait" (264). Under Gordon's instruction, the Ingénu reads "la Physique de Rohault" (264) and the first and second volumes of "la Recherche de la vérité" (264-265), after which "il conclut qu'il est plus aisé de détruire que de bâtir" (265). Gordon was surprised by this observation, and understands that education only serves to enrich the Ingénu: "Son confrère, étonné qu'un jeune ignorant fît cette réflexion qui n'appartient qu'aux âmes exercées, conçut une grande idée de son esprit et s'attacha à lui davantage" (265). In the following chapter, "Comment l'Ingénu développe son génie," we learn that Gordon is desperate to reach his level: "Il mit par écrit beaucoup d'autres réflexions qui épouvantèrent le vieux Gordon. «Quoi! dit-il en lui-même, j'ai consumé cinquante ans à m'instruire, et je crains de ne pouvoir atteindre au bon sens naturel de cet enfant presque sauvage! Je tremble d'avoir laborieusement fortifié des préjugés; il n'écoute que la simple nature»" (269).

There is a way of adapting the seeming disjunction between natural law and civilization – Natural law does not discard the positive aspect of sociability. The
question of whether man was by nature a social animal or not was amply discussed by both Rousseau and Voltaire, among others. In the *Discours sur l'origine et les fondements de l'inégalité parmi les hommes*, Rousseau says that man in the state of nature is solitary, and not sociable. He relates sociability to slavery: "en devenant sociable et esclave, il devient faible, craintif, rampant, et sa manière de vivre molle et efféminée achève d'énerver à la fois sa force et son courage" (43). And he explicitly states that primitive man had a less "miserable" and a more "tolerable" life state than the civilized man of the Enlightenment:

Nous ne voyons presque autour de nous que des gens qui se plaignent de leur existence, plusieurs même qui s'en privent autant qu'il est en eux, et la réunion des lois divine et humaine suffit à peine pour arrêter ce désordre. Je demande si jamais on a ouï dire qu'un sauvage en liberté ait seulement songé à se plaindre de la vie et à se donner la mort ? Qu'on juge donc avec moins d'orgueil de quel côté est la véritable misère. Rien au contraire n'eût été si misérable que l'homme sauvage, ébloui par des lumières, tourmenté par des passions, et raisonnant sur un état différent du sien. Ce fut par une providence très sage que les facultés qu'il avait en puissance ne devaient se développer qu'avec les occasions de les exercer, afin qu'elles ne lui fussent ni superflues et à charge avant le temps, ni tardives et inutiles au besoin. Il avait dans le seul instinct tout ce qu'il fallait pour vivre dans l'état de nature, il n'a dans une raison cultivée que ce qu'il lui faut pour vivre en société. (61-62)

For Rousseau, man in the state of nature is free, which also means solitary, and is not led by reason but rather by instinct, which ensures his conservation as well as the satisfaction of his needs. Nature provides him with all that is necessary to live in this state.

In Voltaire's *La Philosophie de l'Histoire*, the Introduction to *l'Essai sur les Moeurs*, Voltaire says that man is social by nature, a stark contrast to Rousseau's philosophy: "*La Philosophie de l'histoire* presents the savage as being in the earliest stages of social evolution, who has not yet developed the full panoply of culture and social institutions,
but is clearly a social creature by nature, and one whom Voltaire is not in the least disposed to idealize" (Francis 77-78). In this essay, it is clear that Voltaire is directly responding to Rousseau's *Discours sur l'origine de l'inégalité*.

Voltaire contradicts Rousseau by saying that man was already sociable in the state of nature, and that Enlightened man has not "degenerated miserably," as he explains in "VII. Des sauvages."

Entendez-vous par sauvages des animaux à deux pieds, marchant sur les mains dans le besoin, isolés, errant dans les forêts, *Salvatici, Selvaggi*; s'acciouplant à l'aventure, oublant les femmes auxquelles ils se sont joints, ne connaissant ni leurs fils ni leurs pères; vivant en brutes, sans avoir ni l'instinct ni les ressources des brutes? On a écrit que cet état est le véritable état de l'homme, et que nous n'avons fait que dégénérer misérablement depuis que nous l'avons quitté. Je ne crois pas que cette vie solitaire, attribuée à nos pères, soit dans la nature humaine. (53)

Voltaire explains that the present state of man is representative of man's full potential in human nature – He has reached the state that he was designed to be in, and therefore in no way has his nature been "perverted," as Rousseau claimed:

Comment l'homme seul aurait-il changé? S'il eût été destiné à vivre solitaire comme les autres animaux carnassiers, aurait-il pu contredire la loi de la nature jusqu'à vivre en société? et s'il était fait pour vivre en troupe, comme les animaux de basse-cour et tant d'autres, eut-il pu d'abord pervertir sa destinée jusqu'à vivre pendant des siècles en solitaire? Il est perfectible; et de là on a conclu qu'il s'est perverti. Mais pourquoi n'en pas conclure qu'il s'est perfectionné jusqu'au point où la nature a marqué les limites de sa perfection? (54-55)

Voltaire goes on to describe how society is (and always has been) "instinctive" to man.

Cultural aspects of the present day certainly enhance the "lived" and "social" spaces of society, but man has always desired sociability:

Tous les hommes vivent en société: peut-on en inférer qu'ils n'y ont pas vécu autrefois? n'est-ce pas comme si l'on concluait que si les taureaux ont aujourd'hui des cornes, c'est parce qu'ils n'en ont pas toujours eu?
L'homme, en général, a toujours été ce qu'il est: cela ne veut pas dire qu'il ait toujours en de belles villes, du canon de vingt-quatre livres de balle, des opéras-comiques, et des couvents de religieuses. Mais il a toujours eu le même instinct, qui le porte à s'aimer dans soi-même, dans la compagne de son plaisir, dans ses enfants, dans ses petits-fils, dans les œuvres de ses mains.

Voilà ce qui jamais ne change d'un bout de l'univers à l'autre. Le fondement de la société existant toujours, il y a donc toujours eu quelque société; nous n'étions donc point faits pour vivre à la manière des ours. (55)

For Voltaire, being on the side of nature does not mean being primitive. Instead, it means being less refined, but reasonable. We can say that Voltaire justifies the reason of the Ingénu – The Ingénu testifies to the sociable consistency Voltaire assigns to man, his natural good sense gets fortified through education and exchanges, but his moral compass does not fundamentally shift, which supports Barthes' notion of "immobility."

Candide's Garden

*Candide, ou l'Optimisme*, first published in Geneva in 1759, is considered to be "une somme des expériences de Voltaire à cette date" (Deloffre and Van den Heuvel 407), including his reaction to the Lisbon earthquake: "L'immensité du désastre de Lisbonne a pour effet de réveiller brutalement Voltaire de sa somnolence épicurienne, et de le rendre à ses imaginations morbides" (Deloffre and Van den Heuvel 407), and also his *Poème sur le désastre de Lisbonne*: "Le Poème sur le désastre de Lisbonne, composé en quelques jour dans la fièvre, n'est pas à l'origine une dissertation philosophico-théologique, c'est un cri de détresse et de pitié sur le sort de la créature aux prises avec l'absurdité fondamentale de l'existence" (Deloffre and Van den Heuvel 407-408). It is also interesting to note certain "geographical" influences that Voltaire had in writing *Candide*: "Au hasard de ses expériences, de ses recherches, de ses rencontres, se sont donc constitués en profondeur chez Voltaire certains axes

Throughout *Candide*, Candide both witnesses and experiences many events, such as death, destruction, and lost love. We often see the ironic repetition of "tout est bien" after a terrible event takes place. This is stated (and restated) most notably throughout the tale by Dr. Pangloss, and Candide himself repeats this philosophy as well in the tale. For example, Candide says: "Il n'y a point d'effet sans cause, tout est enchaîné nécessairement et arrangé pour le mieux" (15). He continues: "Il a fallu que je fusse chassé d'auprès de Mlle Cunégonde, que j'aie passé par les baguettes, et il faut que je demande mon pain jusqu'à ce que je puisse en gagner; tout cela ne pouvait être autrement" (15). We note here that Candide is suffering from several different causes at the same time: the physical displacement and current lost love of Cunégonde, the threat of physical danger, and starvation. However, he insists that everything is "linked" or "arranged" "for the best." Another example of "tout est bien" is given by Pangloss as he accompanies Jacques the Anabaptist to Lisbon: "Tout cela était indispensable, répliquait le docteur borgne, et les malheurs particuliers font le bien général, de sorte que plus il y a de malheurs particuliers, et plus tout est bien" (19). Pangloss, even in a seriously injured state, continues to proclaim that "all is for the best," or "for the greater good."
The most famous instance of "tout est bien" is found at the end of the tale, where Pangloss is speaking directly to Candide in Candide's garden.\textsuperscript{9}

Tous les événements sont enchaînés dans le meilleur des mondes possibles; car enfin, si vous n'aviez pas été chassé d'un beau château à grands coups de pied dans le derrière pour l'amour de Mlle Cunégonde, si vous n'aviez pas été mis à l'Inquisition, si vous n'aviez pas couru l'Amérique à pied, si vous n'aviez pas donné un bon coup d'épée au baron, si vous n'aviez pas perdu tous vos moutons du bon pays d'Eldorado, vous ne mangeriez pas ici des cèdres confits et des pistaches. — Cela est bien dit, répondit Candide, mais il faut cultiver notre jardin. (108)

Again Pangloss states that "all events are 'connected.'" He then recounts the various troubles that Candide has encountered throughout the tale: being "brutally forced from the castle for his love of Cunégonde;" "his imprisonment;" "his painful, difficult travels in America;" "his killing of the baron;" "his losing the sheep from Eldorado." All of these dreadful experiences had to happen, according to Pangloss, so that Candide could be here, in the garden, "eating" pleasant foods. Candide somewhat agrees, but states that "they must cultivate the garden."

There are many different interpretations of Candide's garden, or, as David Langdon puts it, "on the vexed question of the meaning, or meanings, of the conclusion of Candide" (397). We can agree that the philosophical lesson at the end of the tale is that "for Candide and his followers, their communal routine of work preserves them from the three great ills: want, idleness, and vice" (Vartanian 466). One of the more intriguing debates is whether or not Candide's garden is made to be in the image of the utopian country of Eldorado. I will now recall the terms of this debate and show how it illustrates the garden as sociability.

According to C.J. Betts, Candide's "petite société" (100) which inhabits his garden, "is strongly egalitarian" (100) in that "the Jesuit Baron de Thunder-ten-tronckh, who
symbolically unites in himself the nobility and the Church, has been expelled" (100), and "as replacements an ex-prostitute and a renegade monk arrive, Paquette and Giroflée (monks often came from the lower social classes)” (100). Betts says that, in addition, "the egalitarian atmosphere derives from the Eldorado chapters" (100), since "the members of [Candide's] little society seem to be as free as the Eldoradans to make up their minds how to live" (100). Candide is "displaced" often throughout the tale, but Eldorado is particular in that it is an "imaginary world," a "utopia," a "perfect world:" "Quel est donc ce pays, inconnu à tout le reste de le terre, et où toute la nature est d'une espèce si différante de la nôtre? C'est probablement le pays où tout va bien; car il faut absolument qu'il y ait de cette espèce” (55-56).

The country of Eldorado is indeed perfect, which becomes obvious to Candide and Cacambo immediately: "Le pays était cultivé pour le plaisir comme pour le besoin; partout l'utile était agréable. Les chemins étaient couverts ou plutôt ornés de voitures d'une forme et d'une matière brillante, portant des hommes et des femmes d'une beauté singulière, traînés rapidement par de gros moutons rouges qui surpassaient en vitesse les plus beaux chevaux d'Andalousie, de Tétuan et de Méquinez” (53). Eventually, we learn of all of Eldorado's perfections: There is the conveniency of trade, which is upheld by the government: "Toutes les hôtelleries établies pour la commodité du commerce sont payées par le gouvernement” (55); There is total religious tolerance: "Cacambo demanda humblement quelle était la religion d'Eldorado. Le vieillard rougit encore. «Est-ce qu'il peut y avoir deux religions? dit-il; nous avons, je crois, la religion de tout le monde: nous adorons Dieu du soir jusqu'au matin” (57); There is an almost over-tolerance of justice, for there are no courts in the entire country: "Candide demanda à
voir la cour de justice, le parlement; on lui dit qu’il n’y en avait point, et qu’on ne plaidait jamais. Il s’informa s’il y avait des prisons, et on lui dit que non” (59); And each citizen of Eldorado has complete and total individual freedom, as the King of Eldorado says: “je n’ai pas assurément le droit de retenir des étrangers; c’est une tyrannie qui n’est ni dans nos moeurs, ni dans nos lois: tous les hommes sont libres” (60). In taking this “egalitarian” approach, one can conclude that Candide’s garden is “Eldoradean:” “The conclusion of Candide does hold promise of solid humanistic advancement, of augmentative and ameliorative evolution in the direction of Eldoradan values” (Bottiglia 83).

However, the other side of the debate is eloquently discussed by Patrick Henry as one of a "discontinuity" (93) between Eldorado and Candide’s garden. According to Henry, "Eldorado the country is not inhabited by man as we know him" (93). This is why Candide and Cacambo ultimately decide to leave Eldorado (93), as is shown in this scene from the text:

Ils passèrent un mois dans cet hospice. Candide ne cessait de dire à Cacambo: «Il est vrai, mon ami, encore une fois, que le château où je suis né ne vaut pas le pays où nous sommes; mais enfin Mlle Cunégonde n’y est pas, et vous avez sans doute quelque maîtresse en Europe. Si nous restons ici, nous n’y serons que comme les autres; au lieu que si nous retournons dans notre monde seulement avec douze moutons chargés de cailloux d’Eldorado, nous serons plus riches que tous les rois ensemble, nous n’aurons plus d’inquisiteurs à craindre, et nous pourrons aisément reprendre Mlle Cunégonde.” (59-60)

Candide is here "driven from Eldorado by the natural exigencies of his human essence" (93), in particular, "woman (his hope of finding Cunégonde), vanity (his desire to shine among his fellows), and restlessness (his urge to be on the move)” (94), all three together "pave the way out of the country of gold" (94).
Therefore, Eldorado may be "the best of all possible worlds," but it is "in glaring opposition to the civilizations that precede and succeed it in the text" (Henry 94). In other words, it "represents the cultivated garden" (Henry 95), and "offers no challenge to man as we know him and, as the cultivated garden, it is truly mythical in nature because it is complete" (Henry 94). Candide's garden, on the other hand, "needs cultivation" (Henry 95), for it is "at the end of the tale, not only the reader, but even Candide realizes that, at the social level, our world can be ameliorated" (Henry 95). Candide's garden is a "social space" which is neither natural nor artificial. The "work" in the garden, of course, deals with natural elements, but it is a construction, a highly functional place created through sociability.

The garden is a universal symbol about the human condition. The garden as a "natural" symbol is a place to produce nourishment, also a place of beauty for one's own "pleasure," as Jaucourt states in the article "Jardin" in the Encyclopédie: "lieu artisement planté & cultivé, soit pour nos besoins, soit pour nos plaisirs" ("Jardin"). The Dictionnaire de la Géographie et de l'Espace des Sociétés describes the garden in a similar fashion: "Jardin: Espace le plus souvent enclos où les hommes cultivent pour leur alimentation ou pour leur agrément" (527). It is also labeled as a "sociable space:"

"Le jardin est un objet spatial riche et complexe. Territoire, bien distinct des espaces voisins, et lieu dense d'objects, d'activités et de sociabilités, le jardin existe dans la plupart des espaces passés et actuels des sociétés" (527). In particular, the garden requires "work," or, it requires "production:" "Il est un travail intense et perpétuel, un ensemble technique, une architecture, et un art. Il est un lieu du social, du jardin secret au jardin public, espace d'une urbanité plus intime que celle des rues et des places,
qu'il tend à envahir d'ailleurs" (528-529), and: "Il est de tout temps une vision du monde, une symbolique constamment resignifiée, et en cela possède toute une histoire" (528-529).

As discussed above, Candide's garden is not like Eldorado (Henry's "discontinuity"). There is no entry for "Utopie" in the *Encyclopédie*, but there is an entry for "Imaginaire," written by Diderot:

**IMAGINAIRE, (Gram.)** [Original Class: Grammaire] [Author: Diderot] {Machine Class: Grammaire}

* IMAGINAIRE, adj. (Gram.) qui n'est que dans l'imagination; ainsi l'on dit en ce sens un *bonheur imaginaire*, une *peine imaginaire*. Sous ce point de vue, *imaginaire* ne s'oppose point à réel; car un bonheur *imaginaire* est un bonheur réel, une peine *imaginaire* est une peine réelle. Que la chose soit ou ne soit pas comme je l'imagine, je souffre ou je suis heureux; ainsi l'*imaginaire* peut être dans le motif, dans l'objet; mais la réalité est toujours dans la sensation. Le malade *imaginaire* est vraiment malade, d'esprit au moins, sinon de corps. Nous serions trop malheureux, si nous n'avions beaucoup de biens *imaginaires*. ("Imaginaire")

Eldorado is such an imaginary object – It is the dream of an ideal society, at least in some respects. This is underscored in the *Dictionnaire de la Géographie et de l'Espace des Sociétés*, which defines "Utopie" as follows: Territoire imaginaire, parfaitement organisé, où règne la concorde entre les habitants. Par extension, modèle et / ou projet révolutionnaire, audacieux, et idéal" (969). For Voltaire, the utopia of Eldorado is not the social space that we are left with in the end. The space that Voltaire favors for society is Candide's garden.

In *Candide*, we learn that there is a danger in both Europe and in Eldorado. This danger is the disappearance of the individual in the social order. In Eldorado, "tout est bien" is strikingly true, but man can disappear within this ideal, "perfect" society. Individuality cannot be noticed or appreciated if "all is well" and all are the same
constantly. In Europe, the same danger exists, but for different reasons. Social inequalities cause man to disappear through the practices of government, and through the treatment of the subjects of monarchies. The same severity of laws prevails out of Europe. There is an ambiguity in being socialized. The ambivalence of being social works only if one has the possibility of hiding or being detached somehow. For Voltaire, it is well documented that Ferney was his preferred refuge from the madness of the social space. And for Candide, his garden is a similar refuge, for it functions as a preservation of the self and of a social space.

**Out in Space: *Micromégas' Intergalactic Voyage***

*Micromégas*\(^{10}\) was published in 1752 while Voltaire was in Prussia (Deloffre and Van den Heuvel 409). This tale is considered to be one of the first works of science fiction. Voltaire poses ethical questions about the self through travel to other worlds, which I will return to in Chapter 5: "cette excursion à travers les mondes, cette confrontation entre leurs habitants, montrent la vanité qu'il y aurait à vouloir sortir de soi-même pour échapper à sa condition planétaire. La réponse à nos faiblesses et à nos grandeurs, c'est à l'échelle du cosmos qu'on la trouve . . ." (Deloffre and Van den Heuvel 410). As Bradford Lyau notes:

In *Micromégas*, two visitors from other worlds visit Earth and comment on human beings, their outlook, and their society in a very satirical manner. The visitors turn out to be giants of incredible height and have developed levels of senses and intelligence far beyond the comprehension of the humans who inhabit Earth. This emphasizes how humanity on Earth can no longer claim to be the center of creation and how the new scales of the cosmos will force humanity to re-evaluate itself. (26)

*Micromégas* evokes the displacement of two extra-terrestrials. Chapters 1 through 3 recount their voyage before they "invade" Earth. As Lyau explains: "Modern science fiction stories use familiar science fiction themes such as alien invasions, nuclear war,
advanced alien civilizations, and the dramatic impact of new technologies to serve as props for the stories, much as the various fantastical scenes and events did for Voltaire's *Candide* and *Micromégas*" (29). Furthermore, as Kitchin and Kneale note: "There is a belief that science fiction opens up a space in which authors and readers or viewers can reflect upon the nature of a wide variety of things (including space, nature, and material things themselves)" (3).

The technological and scientific advancement of the travelers is emphasized. They are setting out on an intergalactic voyage, "jumping" through the solar system: "nos deux curieux partirent; ils sautèrent d'abord sur l'anneau, qu'ils trouvèrent assez plat, comme l’a fort bien deviné un illustre habitant de notre petit globe; de là ils allèrent aisément de lune en lune" (49). Once they land on Earth, they find it "uninhabitable," "disagreeable:" "Mais, ce globe-ci est si mal construit, cela est si irrégulier et d'une forme qui me paraît si ridicule! tout semble être ici dans le chaos; En vérité, ce qui fait qu'il n'y a ici personne, c'est qu'il me paraît que des gens de bon sens ne voudraient pas y demeurer" (52).11

The travelers then "capture a minuscule vessel:" "Micromégas étendit la main tout doucement vers l'endroit où l'objet paraissait, et, avançant deux doigts et les retirant par la crainte de se tromper, puis les ouvrant et les serrant, il saisit fort adroitement le vaisseau qui portait ces messieurs, et le mit encore sur son ongle, sans le trop presser de peur de l'écraser" (54). They notice the "atoms" can speak, reflecting the scientific inquiry into size verses intelligence, or intelligence among different beings: "Micromégas, bien meilleur observateur que son nain vit clairement que les atomes se parlaient; et il le fit remarquer à son compagnon, qui, honteux de s'être mépris sur
l'article de la génération, ne voulut point croire que de pareilles espèces pussent se communiquer des idées. Il avait le don des langues aussi bien que le Sirien; il n'entendait point parler nos atomes, et il supposait qu'ils ne parlaient pas" (56). Besides intelligence, these small beings must also have a "soul:" "D'ailleurs, comment ces êtres imperceptibles auraient-ils les organes de la voix, et qu'auraient-ils à dire? Pour parler, il faut penser, ou à peu près; mais, s'ils pensaient, ils auraient donc l'équivalent d'une âme. Or, attribuer l'équivalent d'une âme à cette espèce, cela lui paraissait absurde" (56).

Now in direct contact with the "atoms," a social space is created between the large extra terrestrials and the minute Earthlings, and the purpose of their voyage is made clear: Micromégas and the Saturnien set out on a space voyage into the unknown, into indefinite space, and, armed with scientific knowledge, they embark on a quest for truth, a search for the expansion of knowledge, an Enlightenment ideal represented by the epistemological space of the Encyclopédie, in this greatest of all expandable places – open space, outer space. Their conversations with the Earthlings show that human beings represent the current stage of science, knowledge, and power in society, as is shown in Chapter 7, "Conversation avec les hommes." For example, though men are frail, they are not ignorant, and are scientifically knowledgeable. Micromégas is impressed with their scientific knowledge: "Combien pèse votre air?" Il croyait les attraper, mais tous lui dirent que l'air pèse environ neuf cents fois moins qu'un pareil volume de l'eau la plus légère, et dix-neuf cents fois moins que l'or de ducat" (61). This advance has not yet manifested itself equally in other respects, however. For example, Micromégas and the philosophers of Earth discuss happiness: "Je n'ai vu nulle part le
vrai bonheur; mais il est ici, sans doute.» A ce discours, tous les philosophes secouèrent la tête . . . «Savez-vous bien, par exemple, qu'à l'heure où je vous parle, il y a cent mille fous de notre espèce, couverts de chapeaux, qui tuent cent mille autres animaux . . . »" (59). Micromégas wonders why so much violence exists considering humans' frailty: "Le Sirien frémît, et demanda quel pouvait être le sujet de ces horribles querelles entre de si chétifs animaux" (59). A philosopher also remarks the corruption of government: "«D'ailleurs, ce n'est pas eux qu'il faut punir, ce sont ces barbares sédentaires qui du fond de leur cabinet ordonnent, dans le temps de leur digestion, le massacre d'un million d'homme, et qui ensuite en font remercier Dieu solennellement.»" (60). Micromégas then inquires about the soul: "Puisque vous savez si bien ce qui est hors de vous, sans doute vous savez encore mieux ce qui est en dedans. Dites-moi ce que c'est que votre âme, et comment vous formez vos idées" (61). Philosophers (and one theologian) are shown to be unable to agree on "le fond de la chose" (62). Micromégas promises then to compose a book of philosophy for them which would demonstrate the essence of things, in response to their explanations of Aristotle, Descartes, Malebranche, Leibnitz, and Locke (61-62), which we see is a book containing all blank pages: "il ne vit rien qu'un livre tout blanc" (63).

The fact that Micromégas offers a book which does not contain any information within shows that philosophy, as it is understood in the discussion above between Micromégas and humans, is not directly comparable to science; it is not a subject in which definitive answers and outcomes can be clearly obtained in a controlled environment over a specific period of time. As Voltaire also showed in his entry on "Nature" in the Questions sur l'Encyclopédie, mankind comprehending the first cause of
things is either too complicated a task at this point in time (there is only partial knowledge available at the moment of how nature works, let alone of why it works as it does or what caused it to work as it does); or perhaps it is not meant to be looked into, and no clear-cut answer may ever be found. The blank pages may indicate another approach, focusing on usefulness. In the *Dictionnaire philosophique*, Voltaire explains that a philosopher is the one who knows useful truths: "amateur de la sagesse, c'est-à-dire, de la vérité. Tous les philosophes ont eu ce double caractère, il n'en est aucun dans l'antiquité qui n'ait donné des exemples de vertu aux hommes, & des leçons de vérités morales" (426-427). Voltaire distinguishes between scientific truths and moral truths, and finds a uselessness in disputing: "Ils ont pu se tromper tous sur la physique, mais elle est si peu nécessaire à la conduite de la vie, que les philosophes n'avaient pas besoin d'elle. Il a fallu des siècles pour connaître une partie des loix de la nature. Un jour suffit à un sage pour connaître les devoirs de l'homme" (427). Under the guise of Confucius, Voltaire says that some may not understand science, but everyone understands morality: "J'ai vu des hommes incapables de sciences, je n'en ai jamais vu incapables de vertus" (428).

Voltaire’s science fiction tale leads us to inquire into the ways in which man's relation to the world can be transformed by an assessment of and even travel to outer space. At the time, this was an obvious impossibility, but during the "Space Race" of the twentieth century, we see the appearance of philosophical essays on man in space, in particular, by Maurice Blanchot and Emmanuel Levinas. In "The Conquest of Space" (1961), Maurice Blanchot writes: "Man does not want to leave his own place" (269). In this essay, he is referring to the first human journey to outer space, when the Soviet
pilot and cosmonaut Yuri Alekseyevich Gagarin completed an orbit of the Earth in his Vostok spacecraft on April 12, 1961. He says that technology "detracts from our relationship with the world," rehearsing here the view, which he opposes, that "true civilizations are those of a stable nature," and that "the nomad is incapable of acquisition" (269). Against that view, he recapitulates what has been gained by travel to outer space:

It is extraordinary, we have left the earth. Herein lies, indeed, the true significance of the experience: man has freed himself from place. He has felt, at least for a moment, the sense of something decisive: far away – in an abstract distance of pure science – removed from the common condition symbolized by the force of gravity, there was a man, no longer in the sky, but in space, in a space which has no being or nature but is the pure and simple reality of a measurable (almost) void. Man, but a man with no horizon.

The freedom gained with regard to 'place,' this sort of levitation of man as substance, of man as essence obtained by breaking away from "locality," came to prolong and briefly to conclude the process by which technology upsets sedentary civilizations, destroys human particularisms, makes man leave the utopia of his childhood (if it is true that each of us wants to return to our place of origin). (269)

According to Blanchot, Gagarin was "escaping ordinary forces and placing himself in a movement of pure dislocation, begun to become a detached man" (270). By welcoming him back home, President Khruschev was "reintegrating him into the species," "unable to accept the advantages of technology for prestige, unable to realize its consequences, namely the breaking down of all sense of belonging and the questioning of place, in all places" (270). Gagarin's voyage to space "changed the physical relationship with the Outside in a decisive manner. The superstition about place cannot be eradicated in us except by a momentary abandonment to some utopia of non-place" (270).

In "Place and Utopia," first published in 1950, Levinas states that "this is the moment at which to reflect on what seems to us to be utopia" (99). According to
Levinas, "one can choose utopia" (100), or, in other words, "one can uproot oneself from responsibility, deny the place where it is incumbent on me to do something" (100). "On the other hand," he writes, "in the name of spirit, one can choose not to flee the conditions from which one's work draws its meaning, and that means choosing ethical action" (100). The mode of dislocation from Earth, or, the act of leaving home can be a positive experience, for it can be promising ethically by examining anew the relation of the self to place. The intergalactic journey is not only positive in epistemological terms. In ethical terms, this dislocation from the planet out into the universe can also teach us about ourselves and relations with others.12

In Zadig, l'Ingénu, Candide, and Micromégas, Voltaire is outlining an inhabitation of space that imagines forms of sociability that do not simply mimic those of Voltaire's time. After the examination of sociability in the four philosophical tales, we end with considerations of ethical questions and see how Voltaire reframes intersubjectivity through that compass.

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2 For a comprehensive guide of classic editions of Zadig, ou la destinée, see pages 22 to 32 entitled "Tableau des Éditions et et choix d'un texte à publier" in Georges Ascoli, Voltaire: 'Zadig ou La Destinée, Histoire Orientale.' The author also provides a chronological list called "Les sources du roman" (35), "La Couleur Orientale" (47) to "les récits arabes, turcs ou persans" on pages 50 to 65. This list goes back throughout literary history, but specifically, throughout the literary history of France, beginning with Molière and ending with Voltaire. With respect to religion and the Orient, see Irving Babbitt, 'Zadig' and Other Stories: "In Zadig, we have Voltaire in his most edifying mood" (vii) and William Raleigh Price, The Symbolism of Voltaire's Novels With Special Reference to 'Zadig': "The character of Oriental thought was to Voltaire the secret of the abuse of the Bible in later centuries: the figure was taken for the letter, and
the letter for the figure, to suit the ambitious schemes of a few leaders of the new sect of Christianity" (43). H.T. Mason comments on the "spatiality" and "rhythm" of Voltaire's prose in *Voltaire: 'Zadig' and Other Stories*: "If Voltaire's contes are successful, it is surely above all because of the great diversity, vitality and movement which they contain" (16); "One of the most marked characteristics of Voltaire's prose style is its strong sense of rhythm. There is an immediately recognizable Voltairean tempo, just as there is a Pascalian or a Flaubertian movement unique to its author" (17). Concerning the title *Zadig*: "The work is subtitled 'La Destinée,' but in fact one can be a little more precise and say that it really revolves around the question of Providence, for Voltaire himself tells us that he would have preferred this sub-title if he had dared to 'se servir de ce mot respectable de providence dans un ouvrage de pur amusement' (Letter to Cardinal de Bernis, Oct. 14, 1748)" (27).

3 I have incorporated into this chapter entries from a "modern day" French language dictionary which combines studies of geography and society: *Dictionnaire de la Géographie et de l'Espace des Sociétés*. Editors Jacques Lévy et Michel Lussault describe their work as follows: "Bien loin de n'être qu'une simple description de la surface de la terre, la géographie s'affirme comme une véritable science sociale, attachée à penser l'espace des sociétés humaines. Ce dictionnaire offre la synthèse la plus actuelle des concepts et des méthodes de la géographie aujourd'hui. Cet ouvrage ce veut, davantage que le reflet d'une "géographie française," une point de vue francophone sur une géographie de plus en plus universelle. Ainsi, il a été choisi de prendre largement en compte des géographies étrangères, anglophone et germanophone notamment. Le tout constitue une somme indispensable à tous ceux qui veulent analyser les espaces complexes des sociétés. En même temps, ce dictionnaire montre l'apport de la géographie à la comprehension du Monde contemporain" (5-21).

4 In addition to *l'Ingénu*, other works which show the figure of the "bon sauvage" include Montaigne's "Des Cannibales" (*Essais*, 1580); Rousseau's *Discours sur l'origine et les fondements de l'inégalité parmi les hommes* (1755); Voltaire's "Des Sauvages" (*La Philosophie de l'Histoire*, 1765); and Diderot's *Supplément au voyage de Bougainville* (1772). In *Voltaire: 'l'Ingénu'*, William R. Jones provides a contrary view by opposing this work to the three other tales being studied: "En tant que satire sociale, politique et religieuse, c'est un livre qui se distingue des autres romans de Voltaire. Car *Zadig, Micromégas, Candide* et d'autres, malgré leur part d'actualité, sont plutôt basés sur une thèse qui est de tous les temps, soit le rôle compensateur que semble jouer le destin dans notre vie, soit l'optimisme 'ridicule' des leibniziens" (20).

5 In some respect, Voltaire understood and denounced some aspects of colonialism, arguments which have been taken up in a much more systematic way by authors such as Edward Said and Mary Louise Pratt. In *Orientalism*, Said critiqued the West's historical, cultural, and political perceptions of the East. He defines "Orientalism" as "a way of coming to terms with the Orient that is based on the Orient's special place in European Western experience" (1). Said says that "the Orient is not only adjacent to Europe" (1), or, it is not only a "physical" place that one must recognize, but "it is also
the place of Europe's greatest and richest and oldest colonies, the source of its civilizations and languages, its cultural contestant, and one of its deepest and most recurring images of the Other" (1). In other words, "Orientalism" is a "philosophical" approach to discovering the eastern world. Said comments on these distinctions more directly by explaining that "Orientalism is not a mere political subject matter or field that is reflected passively by culture, scholarship, or institutions; nor is it a large and diffuse collection of texts about the Orient; nor is it representative and expressive of some nefarious "Western" imperialist plot to hold down the 'Oriental' world" (12), but "rather a distribution of geopolitical awareness into aesthetic, scholarly, economic, sociological, historical, and philological texts; it is an elaboration not only of a basic geographical distinction (the world is made up of two unequal halves, Orient and Occident)" (12), here a "physical" distinction, "but also of a whole series of 'interests' which, by such means as scholarly discovery, philological reconstruction, psychological analysis, landscape and sociological description, it not only creates but also maintains" (12), or, Orientalism as a global "philosophical" consideration: "Orientalism is – and does not simply represent – a considerable dimension of modern political-intellectual culture, and as such has less to do with the Orient than it does with 'our' world" (12). See also Mary Louise Pratt's *Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation*. Pratt's work "shows how travel writing goes about creating the domestic subject of European imperialism," and "how travel writing has produced 'the rest of the world' for European readerships;" it "examines how metropolitan reading publics have been engaged with expansionist enterprises whose material benefits accrued mainly to the very few" (1). Pratt uses "the concept of transculturation to introduce questions about the ways in which modes of representation from the metropolis are received and appropriated by groups on the periphery – and how transculturation from the colonies to the metropolis takes place" (1). For Pratt, "transculturation is a phenomenon of the contact zone," and "'contact zone' refers to the space of colonial encounters, the space in which peoples geographically and historically separated come into contact with each other and establish ongoing relations, usually involving conditions of coercion, radical inequality, and intractable conflict" (6). Pratt's work is based from what she calls "a specific point of departure" (9): "It is marked in the mid-eighteenth century, by two simultaneous and intersecting processes in Northern Europe: the emergency of natural history as a structure of knowledge, and the momentum toward interior, as opposed to maritime, exploration" (9).


7 For bibliographic information on Voltaire leading up to and during his work on *Candide*, see Daniel Gordon, 'Candide' by Voltaire (1-41), and Haydn Mason, 'Candide': Optimism Demolished (3-21).

8 Rousseau argued with Voltaire on the subject of the Lisbon Earthquake and Optimism: See Gérard Malkassian, 'Candide': Un débat philosophique: La critique de Leibniz par Voltaire (77-88): "Si l'on sait qu'outre Leibniz, Voltaire vise dans Candide le
providentialisme de Pope, il atteint également une cible collatérale qui était intervenue en faveur de l'optimisme face à la déploration du Poème sur la catastrophe de Lisbonne de 1756: Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Celui-ci avait en effet répondu à Voltaire en lui adressant une Lettre sur la Providence en date du 18 août 1756. Tout d'abord la responsabilité humaine est en cause. La plupart des maux naturels et moraux sont l'unique fait de 'l'homme libre, perfectionné, partant corrompu.' Par exemple, si, à Lisbonne, beaucoup d'habitants sont morts, c'est à cause des conséquences de leur vie dans les grandes villes, de l'entassement des personnes et des priorités qu'une culture marchande produit en eux: il leur importait plus de sauver leurs biens matériels que leur vie. Dans le désert ou dans un habitat plus dispersé, les tremblements de terre n'auraient eu qu'un impact limité" (77). See also David Wooton's 'Candide' and Related Texts (95-123).


10 For bibliographic information on Voltaire about the publication of Micromégas, see the "Introduction" to Haydn Mason's 'Micromégas' and Other Short Fictions. For a "scientific study" of Micromégas see Ira O. Wade's Voltaire's 'Micromégas: A Study in the Fusion of Science, Myth, and Art. Ira O. Wade has also published a large, well recognized work on French studies, specifically a two volume set on "the structure and form of the French Enlightenment:" The Structure and Form of the French Enlightenment. Volume I: 'Esprit Philosophique'; and The Structure and Form of the French Enlightenment. Volume II: Esprit Révolutionnaire. For a narrative approach to the tale, see "Micromégas, ou le disfonctionnement des procédés de la narration" by Vic Nachtergaele.

11 Likewise, the Ingénu says that man is a machine or cog in the divine machine: "nous sommes sous la puissance de l'Être éternel, comme les astres et les éléments; qu'il fait tout en nous, que nous sommes de petites roues de la machine immense dont il est l'àme; qu'il agit par des lois générales, et non par des vues particulières. Cela seul me paraît intelligible; tout le reste est pour moi un abîme de ténèbres" (265).

12 In The Production of Space, Lefebvre explains a "science of space" (8) which "embodies at best a technological utopia, a sort of computer simulation of the future, or of the possible, within the framework of the real – the framework of the existing mode of production" (9). He says that the "starting point" "is a knowledge which is at once integrated into, and integrative with respect to, the mode of production. The
technological utopia in question is a common feature not just of many science-fiction novels, but also of all kinds of projects concerned with space, be they those of architecture, urbanism, or social planning” (9).
CHAPTER 5
LEAVING HOME: ETHICS, ALTERITY, AND THE FEMININE IN VOLTAIRE’S PHILOSOPHICAL TALES

A Space for Ethics

In Chapter 3, I showed how Gaston Bachelard, Edward Said, and Emmanuel Levinas conceive the inhabitation of space or the home. In Chapter 4, I discussed space writing as sociability in Voltaire’s philosophical tales. Chapter 2 ended with an ethical analysis of Voltaire’s article "Géographie" in his Questions sur l’Encyclopédie. In this chapter, I return to an ethical study of Voltaire by examining the relationship of the self to the world, and the feminine in Voltaire's philosophical tales.

It is possible to interpret space for ethics in Voltaire’s tales by first looking at how ethics is considered in both the eighteenth century and the twentieth- and twenty-first centuries. In "Adieu," Jacques Derrida gives his farewell to Emmanuel Levinas. He says that Levinas' contribution to critical theory is immeasurable: "I cannot find, and would not even want to try to find, a few words to size up the oeuvre of Emmanuel Levinas. It is so large that one can no longer even see its edges" (3). Derrida mentions Levinas' seminal work Totality and Infinity as being the prime, and perhaps the most important example of his corpus: "And one would have to begin by learning once again from him and from Totality and Infinity, for example, how to think what an 'oeuvre' or 'work' is – as well as fecundity" (3). Derrida explains what we have taken from Totality and Infinity: "– the reverberations of this thought will have changed the course of the philosophical reflection of our time, and of the reflection on philosophy, on that which orders it according to ethics, according to another thought of ethics, responsibility, justice, the state, and so on, another thought of the other, a thought that is newer than so many novelties because it is ordered to the absolute anteriority of the face of the
Other" (3). Bettina Bergo notes that in an essay on Levinas\(^1\) entitled "Violence and Metaphysics" in *Writing and Difference*, Derrida writes: "It is true that Ethics in Levinas's sense is an Ethics without law and without concept, which maintains its non-violent purity only before being determined as concepts and laws;" However, Derrida continues by saying: "This is not an objection: let us not forget that Levinas does not seek to propose...moral rules, does not seek to determine a morality, but rather the essence of the ethical relation in general...in question, then, is an Ethics of Ethics [which]...can occasion neither a determined ethics nor determined laws without negating and forgetting itself" (<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2011/entries/levinas/notes.html>). Derrida shows here that Levinas makes a kind of distinction between ethics and morality – He does not consider them to be the same, or think of them as being co- or interdependent. As Bergo explains: "An ethics of ethics means, here, the exploration of conditions of possibility of any interest in good actions or lives. In light of that, it can be said that Levinas is not writing an ethics at all. Instead, he is exploring the meaning of intersubjectivity and lived immediacy in light of three themes: transcendence, existence, and the human other" (<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2011/entries/levinas/>).

We shall return to a specific discussion of *Totality and Infinity* later in the chapter.

Concerning considerations of ethics and morality, in the eighteenth century they were thought of together. For example, if we look at the entry for "Ethique" in the *Encyclopédie*, a very short entry of which the author is unknown, we see that the term, though "no longer commonly used," is cross referenced with "Morale:"

ETHIQUE, [Original Class: unclassified] [Author: unknown] [Machine Class: Grammaire]

ETHIQUE, s. f. est la science des moeurs. Ce mot qui n'est plus usité, ou dont on ne se sert que très rarement pour désigner certains ouvrages,
The next logical step, therefore, is to examine the entry for "Morale," authored by Jaucourt. "Morale," also known as the "science of manners or customs," is initially explained as the "science of man," since rational, "reasonable" beings deal with it:

MORALE, (Science des moeurs) [Original Class: Science des moeurs]  [Author: Jaucourt] {Machine Class: Histoire de la philosophie}

MORALE, s. f. (Science des moeurs) c'est la science qui nous prescrit une sage conduite, & les moyens d'y conformer nos actions.

S'il sied bien à des créatures raisonnables d'appliquer leurs facultés aux choses auxquelles elles sont destinées, la Morale est la propre science des hommes; parce que c'est une connoissance généralement proportionnée à leur capacité naturelle, & d'où dépend leur plus grand intérêt. Elle porte donc avec elle les preuves de son prix; & si quelqu'un a besoin qu'on raisonne beaucoup pour l'en convaincre, c'est un esprit trop gâté pour être ramené par le raisonnement. ("Morale")

Jaucourt explains that morality is the "science of man:"

J'avoue qu'on ne peut pas traiter la Morale par des arguments démonstratifs, & j'en sais deux ou trois raisons principales. 1°. le défaut de signes. Nous n'avons pas de marques sensibles, qui représentent aux yeux les idées morales; . . . 2°. les idées morales sont communément plus composées que celles des figures employées dans les mathématiques . . . 3°. l'intérêt humain, cette passion si trompeuse, s'oppose à la démonstration des vérités morales; ("Morale")

For Jaucourt, morality and religion ought to be considered as separate subjects, and moreover, morality can outweigh faith: "Enfin ce seroit mal connoître la religion, que de relever le mérite de la foi aux dépens de la Morale; car quoique la foi soit nécessaire à tous les Chrétiens, on peut avancer avec vérité, que la Morale l'emporte sur la foi à divers égards" ("Morale").

Jaucourt explains five different reasons for this: First: Morality is more useful than faith: "1°. Parce qu'on peut être en état de faire du bien, & de se rendre plus utile au
monde par la *Morale* sans la foi, que par la foi sans la *Morale*;" Second: Morality perfects human nature: "2°. Parce que la *Morale* donne une plus grande perfection à la nature humaine, en ce qu'elle tranquillise l'esprit, qu'elle calme les passions, & qu'elle avance le bonheur de chacun en particulier;" Third: Moral rules are more common amongst civilized nations than differing rules of faith: "3°. Parce que la regle pour la *Morale* est encore plus certaine que celle de la foi, puisque les nations civilisées du monde s'accordent sur les points essentiels de la *Morale*, autant qu'elles different sur ceux de la foi;" Fourth: To be a sceptic of faith is not as serious as being immoral: "4°. Parce que l'incrédulité n'est pas d'une nature si maligne que le vice; ou, pour envisager la même chose sous une autre vue, parce qu'on convient en général qu'un incrédule vertueux peut être sauvé, sur - tout dans le cas d'une ignorance invincible, & qu'il n'y a point de salut pour un croyant vicieux;" and finally: The human conscience seems to be directed by morality: "5°. Parce que la foi semble tirer sa principale, si ce n'est pas même toute sa vertu, de l'influence qu'elle a sur la *morale* ("Morale").

Voltaire wrote a rather brief entry for "Morale" in the *Questions sur l'Encyclopédie*, in which we can see that he picks up where the *Encyclopédie* entry left off, as he speaks exclusively of religion and morality:

Bavards prédicateurs, extravagans controversistes, tâchez de vous souvenir que votre maître n'a jamais annoncé que le sacrement était le signe visible d'une chose invisible; il n'a jamais admis quatre vertus cardinales & trois théologales; il n'a jamais examiné si sa mère était venue au monde maculée ou immaculée; il n'a jamais dit que les petits enfans qui mouraient sans batême seraient damnés. Cessez de lui faire dire des choses auxquelles il ne pensa point. Il a dit, selon la vérité aussi ancienne que le monde, Aimez DIEU & votre prochain; tenez-vous-en là misérables ergoteurs, prêchez la morale & rien de plus. Mais observez-la cette morale; que les tribunaux ne retentissent plus de vos procès; n'arrachez plus par la griffe d'un procureur un peu de farine à la bouche de la veuve & de l'orphelin. Ne disputez plus un petit bénéfice avec la même fureur qu'on
Voltaire is here explaining that the clergy should focus on spreading the word of God in the "moral" lesson that essentially makes up part of the Roman Catholic Church's Ten Commandments: Love the Lord your God and love your neighbor as yourself. He here criticizes the institution of rites not found in the Bible as well as the greed of the Church. Voltaire separates morality and religion. The present behaviors of the Church do not show moral acts towards fellow man, and in order for citizens to "believe" their moral teachings, they need to observe changes in the Church's actions. In short, the Church needs to practice what they preach.

We must recall from Chapter 2 that Voltaire linked morality to geography in his entry on "Géographie" in the Questions sur l'Encyclopédie by stating that "it is difficult in geography as in morality, to know the world without leaving oneself or one's home" ("Il est bien difficile en géographie comme en morale, de connaître le monde sans sortir de chez soi"). By linking both geography and morality together, Voltaire spatializes the observation of moral practice with respect to human interaction and to human occupation of the world. Without a passage through the other both geography and morality would be inadequate and incomplete. Though they are not directly comparable, both have similar effects.

Geography, the Feminine, and the Eighteenth Century

Geography has been addressed through the lens of gender or feminism.² Perhaps the best known feminist works on geography and space are Gillian Rose's Feminism and Geography: The Limits of Geographical Knowledge (1993) and Writing Women and Space: Colonial and Post Colonial Geographies (1994). Feminism and Geography
"opened up new forms of engagement about the varied forms of patriarchy within the discipline [of human geography] and also outside geography in the area of cultural studies and literary theory" (Mahtani 232). Rose writes that her work: "In exploring the masculinism of geography at some length, is not about the geography of gender but about the gender of geography; it considers the itinerary of the silencing rather than the retrieval" (4-5). It "argues that feminist theorists imagine a geography based not on the exclusions of a mode of knowing that is dependent on a relation of dominance between Same and Other, but on an acknowledgement of difference" (14). For Rose: "By introducing issues of race and sexuality, and by considering the absences of masculinism, the hegemony of Man/Woman is challenged and new geographies are imagined" (14). Writing Women and Space "explicitly articulated the complicity and complicated relations between gender, race, class and sexuality through essays about women’s multiple, contested, and shifting senses of subjectivities as experienced through written representations of spatial differentiation" (Mahtani 232-233). Rose and Blunt "examine questions of mapping space and difference, the intersection of, most notably, race with class and gender, complicity and/or resistance, and strategies of critique and disruption" (20), in which "a critical study of women’s colonial and postcolonial geographies should address not only the multiple and complex construction of subjectivity but also of space itself" (20).

There are misogynist overtones in the entry for "Femme" in the Encyclopédie, of which there are four headings: the entry for "anthropologie" is by Barthez/Barthès; "droit naturel" by Jaucourt; "morale" by Desmahis; and the fourth entry is "jurisprudence" by
Boucher d'Argis. The entry of concern for our purposes is that of "morale."  Joseph-François-Édouard de Corsembleu, Sieur de Desmahis writes:

Desmahis advocates that in nature there is a strong difference between the two sexes, and that there is a redeeming factor in the sweet character of the woman ("les graces & la beauté, la finesse & le sentiment") as being complementary to the strong qualities of a man ("la force, la majesté, le courage, la raison"). Desmahis says that instead of focusing on that which makes the two sexes "unequal," it is instead beneficial to stress the "advantages" which make them "compatible."  However, Desmahis is also explaining that differences of nature justify differences in education ("Les différences de la nature devoient en mettre dans l'éducation") – that nature provides men with reason ("la raison") along with strength and courage.

In Voltaire's *Questions sur l'Encyclopédie* appears an article for "Femme," where we find a similar description of women.  There are three sections: "Physique et Morale" (24), "Polygamie" (31), and "Pluralité des Femmes" (36).  Concerning the first section on "Physique et Morale," Voltaire writes: "Le physique gouverne toujours le moral" (27).  What one is physically capable of determines what one is morally capable of.  Voltaire connects "work" to physical capability, and to morality.  What work one can do will
determine where one can work. It will also determine how one will interact with the Other in that space. Voltaire explains how a woman's work differs from a man's: "Les femmes étant plus faibles de corps que nous, ayant plus d'adresse dans leurs doigts beaucoup plus souples que les notres, ne pouvant gueres travailler aux ouvrages pénibles de la maçonnerie, de la charpente, de la métallurgie, de la charrue, étant nécessairement chargées des petits travaux plus legers de l'intérieur de la maison, & surtout du soin des enfans, menant une vie plus sédentaire . . . " (27-28). A woman's work in the home requires a "sweet" demeanor: "elles doivent avoir plus de douceur dans le caractere que la race masculine" (27-28). "Douceur" can be considered as being a positive aspect to the female character – the woman's demeanor is less violent, and therefore more ethical, or more welcoming.5

Marc Serge Rivière discusses "modern perceptions of how Voltaire viewed women and his own pronouncements on them" (26). He concurs with D.J. Adams' study, according to which "[Voltaire] adopted a paradoxical stance towards women, as he did on so many other issues" (26).6 According to Adams: "Voltaire peut critiquer le sexe en général sans cesser d'estimer les femmes comme des individus" (Rivière 27). Concerning "the representations of women in his writings" (Rivière 27), Adams writes: "Voltaire exprimait son mépris ou son adoration selon son opinion de la dame en question, et non pas selon le genre qu'il employait" (Rivière 27).

However, Rivière notes that "the fact remains that in some of his more private statements either made in his correspondence to members of his inner circle or confined to his notebooks, Voltaire is far from complimentary about women" (27). For example: "Their frivolity, which is repeatedly stressed in the Contes, is commented upon
in the notebooks" (27). Rivière gives two examples from Voltaire’s *Notebooks*. The first, on women's "frivolity" (27): "Les femmes ressemblent aux girouettes: elles se fixent quand elles se rouillent (i. 414)" (27); and the second, on women's "garrulousness" (27): "Women use their tongue as their fans for noise (i. 71)" (27).

On the other hand: "In his dealings with many of his female contemporaries . . . the *philosophe* did not let such negative views detract from the respect and admiration which he openly professed for his patronesses" (Rivière 27). For example, for Catherine II of Russia, "[Voltaire] was more than willing to act almost as a public relations officer . . . His complex relationship with the empress resulted in a mutually beneficial propaganda campaign in the 1760s" (27); and perhaps the best known of all, Mme. Du Châtelet: "There is little doubt that Voltaire also respected and revered Mme. Du Châtelet above all women of her era" (28). In a letter from Voltaire to his friend Everard Fawkener, an English merchant and diplomat, from March 1740, Voltaire indicated that "I would pass some months at Constantinople with you, if I could live without that Lady; whom I look at as a great man, and as a most solid and respectable friend. She understands Newton, she despises superstition, in short she makes me happy" (Rivière 28). According to Rivière: "Herein lies a typical Voltairean assessment of great women who had in his estimation risen above their own kind: they were in his eyes philosophers and 'great men.' Such is the conclusion we may reach from his examination of the role of great female monarchs in history" (28).

**The Feminine in Voltaire’s Philosophical Tales**

We turn now to a discussion of the feminine in *Zadig, Micromégas, Candide*, and *l'Ingénu*. Voltaire displays misogynist overtones in the philosophical tales. However, we can say that he is poking fun at those who consider the role of the woman to be
purely domestic or marginalized. In the philosophical tales, Voltaire often portrays women as either having a ridiculous personal character, or he gives detailed scenes of great cruelty in which women are the helpless victims. However, I will show that Voltaire also opens up such scenes and provides a space for his female characters to redeem themselves – to use their feminine qualities in a positive way, as a means of strength – to have the potential to occupy the margin in which they are placed differently.

In Zadig, we recall that Zadig is an excellent example of a ubiquitous hero. Despite the many difficulties he encounters, "the hero is at the same time fate's victim and its agent for others" (Sherman 33). A productive way to analyze the feminine in Zadig is to compare Astarté and Missouf. Astarté, Queen of Babylon and wife to King Moabdar before later becoming Zadig's wife, is portrayed by Voltaire as the representation of Enlightenment ideals, as the symbol of order and reason. Missouf, King Moabdar's second wife, on the other hand, is portrayed as the complete opposite, as the symbol of total disorder and extravagance.

For example, in Chapter 16, "Le Basilic," we find Astarté, while working as a slave, reunited with Zadig. Zadig and Astarté had been forced to separately flee Moabdar's palace, since he was threatening to take both of their lives after realizing that they were in love with each other (Chapter 7, "La Jalousie"). Here, Zadig wishes to know what has happened since they were last together. Astarté tells him that she had been pursued by Moabdar's couriers after her escape, but that they brought the wrong woman back to him: "Ils coururent à ma poursuite, sur le portrait qu'on leur faisait de ma personne: une femme de la même taille que moi, et qui peut-être avait plus de charmes,
s’offrit à leurs regards sur les frontières de l’Egypte. Elle était éplorée, errante; ils ne doutèrent pas que cette femme ne fût la reine de Babylone; ils la menèrent à Moabdar” (136). At first, Moabdar was outraged: "Leur méprise fit entrer d’abord le roi dans une violente colère;" (136), but he soon fell in love and married this woman – Missouf: "mais bientôt ayant considéré de plus près cette femme, il la trouva très belle, et fut consolé. On l’appelait Missouf. On m’a dit depuis que ce nom signifie en langue égyptienne la belle capricieuse. Elle l’était en effet ; mais elle avait autant d’art que de caprice. Elle plut à Moabdar. Elle le subjuga au point de se faire déclarer sa femme” (136).

Astarté explains that after their marriage, Missouf’s outrageous and extravagant behavior became very apparent: "Alors son caractère se développa tout entier: elle se livra sans crainte à toutes les folies de son imagination" (136). For example, she acted in a cruel fashion towards some of the King’s subjects: "Elle voulut obliger le chef des mages, qui était vieux et goutteux, de danser devant elle; et sur le refus du mage, elle le persécuta violemment. Elle ordonna à son grand-écuyer de lui faire une tourte de confitures. Le grand-écuyer eut beau lui représenter qu’il n’était point pâtissier, il fallut qu’il fit la tourte ; et on le chassa, parce qu’elle était trop brûlée" (136); and it was in this same fashion that she "governed Babylon:" "C’est ainsi qu’elle gouverna Babylone” (136).

Astarté explains that due to her absence – the absence of order and reason – replaced with Missouf’s complete disarray of judgement and disregard for the well-being of the kingdom, led to both Moabdar losing his mind:

Tout le monde me regretta. Le roi, qui avait été assez honnête homme jusqu’au moment où il avait voulu m’empoisonner et vous faire étrangler,
semblait avoir noyé ses vertus dans l'amour prodigieux qu'il avait pour la belle capricieuse. Il vint au temple le grand jour du feu sacré. Je le vis imploiner les dieux pour Missouf aux pieds de la statue où j'étais renfermée. J'élevai la voix; je lui criai: «Les dieux refusent les vœux d'un roi devenu tyran, qui a voulu faire mourir une femme raisonnable pour épouser une extravagante.» Moabdar fut confondu de ces paroles au point que sa tête se troubla. L'oracle que j'avais rendu, et la tyrannie de Missouf, suffisaient pour lui faire perdre le jugement. Il devint fou en peu de jours. (136-137)

and to Babylon going into a state of civil war: "Sa folie, qui parut un châtiment du ciel, fut le signal de la révolte. On se souleva, on courut aux armes. Babylone, si long-temps plongée dans une mollesse oisive, devint le théâtre d'une guerre civile affreuse" (137).

From this last quote of Astarté, we see that Babylon had not only fallen due to the lack of order and reason which she had presented while governing as queen, but also due to the lack of "an idle softness" in which "Babylon had been so long immersed." Voltaire therefore presents Astarté as the ideal head of an almost utopian society, a society which benefits from her feminine presence in conjunction with her role as a leader. Voltaire opens up the possibility for Astarté to return to her original role, which happens in the final chapter, "Les Énigmes," when Zadig is named king and peace is completely restored in Babylon under the rule of Astarté and Zadig: " Il fut reconnu roi d'un consentement unanime, et surtout de celui d'Astarté . . . L'empire jouit de la paix, de la gloire, et de l'abondance: ce fut le plus beau siècle de la terre; elle était gouvernée par la justice et par l'amour. On bénissait Zadig, et Zadig bénissait le ciel" (153-154).

In Micromégas, "Voltaire uses encounters with aliens to show up mankind as the prisoners of an ideology, of a limited and self-interested system of thought. Ideologies habituate us to the particular conditions of the civilization we inhabit, so that we look upon these conditions as if they were normal and natural adjuncts of living" (Parrinder 47). There is not a very large feminine presence, nor an abundance of detailed
discussions about women or by women in *Micromégas*. There is, however, one scene in particular in Chapter 3, "Voyage de deux habitans de Sirius et de Saturne" where the wife of the Saturnian is visibly distraught upon their departure into outer space. We note that the two men are attempting to finalize their preparations in order to leave the atmosphere: "Nos deux philosophes étaient prêts à s'embarquer dans l'atmosphère de Saturne avec une fort jolie provision d'instruments mathématiques, lorsque la maîtresse du Saturnien qui en eut des nouvelles, vint en larmes faire ses remontrances. C'était une jolie petite brune qui n'avait que six cent soixante toises, mais qui réparait par bien des agréments la petitesse de sa taille" (49). We then see the wife's intense sadness, anger, and overly emotional response just before takeoff: "Ah! cruel! s'écria-t-elle, après t'avoir résisté quinze cents ans lorsque enfin je commençais à me rendre, quand j'ai à peine passé cent ans entre tes bras, tu me quittes pour aller voyager avec un géant d'un autre monde; va, tu n'es qu'un curieux, tu n'as jamais eu d'amour: si tu étais un vrai Saturnien, tu serais fidèle" (49).

She continues by asking questions and by declaring her everlasting fidelity to her husband: "Où vas-tu courir? Que veux-tu? Nos cinq lunes sont moins errantes que toi, notre anneau est moins changeant. Voilà qui est fait, je n'aimerai jamais plus personne" (49). However, the moment that the two philosophers take off and are gone, she immediately becomes unfaithful to her husband by having a love affair with a younger, more elegant man: "Le philosophe l'embrassa, pleura avec elle, tout philosophe qu'il était; et la dame, après s'être pâmée, alla se consoler avec un petit-maître du pays" (49).
Adams says that "il est également possible qu’il veuille ironiser au dépens du Saturnien, car la femme ne tarde pas, malgré ses dires, à aller se consoler avec un petit-maître" (149). Even though Voltaire portrays the woman here as being overly emotional and hysterical, the fact that she has an immediate love affair with a younger man upon her husband’s departure shows a great liberation and sexual freedom on her part. The power of a woman’s seduction and the heartache that can arrive in the affairs of love have no spatial limit, for either man floating around in outer space or man grounded on Earth can be afflicted.

In *Candide*, "Except for Eldorado (most of the time), *Candide* dramatizes the antithesis of beneficence – a kaleidoscope of people turning their backs on others except when using them in economic or religious or physical exploitation" (Wolper 276). Voltaire includes many scenes in *Candide* where women are the subject of much cruelty, namely physical violence. For example, Cunégonde goes from being a young baroness to being a servant and a slave: "ajoutez que je suis née baronne avec soixante et douze quartiers, et que j’ai été cuisinière" (33). The Old Woman has a similar story, falling from the stature of a princess: "Je suis la fille du paper Urbain X, et de la princesse de Palestrine" (33), to that of a servant. However, as with Astarté in *Zadig* and the Saturnian’s wife in *Micromégas*, Voltaire opens up the potential for both Cunégonde and the Old Woman to redeem their situation, to use their current position in a positive way, or to occupy the margin in which they are placed differently.

For example, we begin with the "Histoire de Cunégonde" (Chapter 8). We note Cunégonde recounting to Candide what misfortunes had fallen upon her: "Agitée, éperdue, tantôt hors de moi-même, et tantôt prête de mourir de faiblesses, j’avais la tête
remplie du massacre de mon père, de ma mère, de mon frère, de l’insolence de mon vilain soldat bulgare, du coup de couteau qu’il me donna, de ma servitude, de mon métier de cuisinière, de mon capitaine bulgare, de mon vilain don Issachar,” (28-29).

Cunégonde has been the victim of both rape and physical abuse, along with being forced to act as a slave and a witness to the murder of her family.

The last example she states above concerns her encounter with "Don Issachar," a man "qui aimait passionnément les femmes" (27). Cunégonde says that indeed Don Issachar tried to rape her: "[don Issachar] s’attacha beaucoup à ma personne," (27). However, Cunégonde resists and is successful: "mais il ne pouvait en triompher;" (27). Cunégonde explains that due to her previous violation from the Bulgarian soldier, she has learned of the weak position in which women are placed, but that they can gain and build strength from their misfortunes, and choose to resist rather than succumb to such violence: "je lui ai mieux résisté qu’au soldat bulgare : une personne d’honneur peut être violée une fois, mais sa vertu s’en affermit" (27).

Through Voltaire’s description of the "Histoire de la vieille" (Chapter 11) and "Suite des malheurs de la vieille" (Chapter 12), we see that the Old Woman’s unfortunate experiences are similar to those of Cunégonde. While traveling with Candide and Cunégonde, the Old Woman recounts her troubled past: "Figurez-vous quelle situation pour la fille d’un pape, âgée de quinze ans, qui en trois mois de temps avait éprouvé la pauvreté, l’esclavage, avait été violée presque tous les jours, avait vu couper sa mère en quatre, avait essuyé la faim et la guerre, et mourait pestiférée dans Alger! Je n’en mourus pourtant pas;" (37-38).
The Old Woman survived all of these miserable events, and gives us the impression that she has overcome, or perhaps never experienced, any negative effects from them, whether psychological or physical. For example, she does not display self pity, but rather says that she has explained all of these horrible occurrences so as to just pass the time during their voyage: "Je ne vous aurais même jamais parlé de mes malheurs, si vous ne m'aviez pas un peu piquée, et s'il n'était d'usage, dans un vaisseau, de conter des histoires pour se désennuyer" (40). She also uses her difficult experiences as a means to enlighten her own "knowledge of the world:" "Enfin, mademoiselle, j'ai de l'expérience, je connais le monde;" (40). She shows that she does not consider herself as a sole victim, but rather as a part of humanity, for which good and evil affects all, as she explains to Cunégonde: "donnez-vous un plaisir, engagez chaque passager à vous conter son histoire, et s'il s'en trouve un seul qui n'ait souvent maudit sa vie, qui ne se soit souvent dit à lui-même qu'il était le plus malheureux des hommes, jetez-moi dans la mer la tête la première" (40).

We recall that the Ingénu "begins with the abbaye de Notre Dame de la Montagne at Saint-Malo in 'la Basse-Bretagne' and the arrival of the hero (with 'les Anglais') from Canada" (Howells 307). In l'Ingénu, Voltaire portrays a strong feminine presence through the character of Mlle. Saint-Yves. In Chapter 13, "La Belle Saint-Yves va à Versailles," we see that she has been put in a convent because of her continued passion for the Ingénu, her godson: "Elle aimait toujours son cher filleul autant qu'elle détestait le mari qu'on lui présentait. L'affront d'avoir été mise dans un couvent augmentait sa passion;" (274). Mlle. Saint-Yves is now removed from the convent and being forced to marry the bailiff's son: ". . . le maudit bailli pressait le mariage de son
grand benêt de fils avec la belle Saint-Yves, qu'on avait fait sortir exprès du couvent" (274), which causes her great distress: "l'ordre d'épouser le fils du bailli y mettait le comble. Les regrets, la tendresse, et l'horreur bouleversaient son âme" (274).

The situation of Mlle. Saint-Yves seems hopeless, but Voltaire once again presents the possibility for a female character to leave her present situation, as we see that she escapes and heads towards Paris to try and find out what has happened to the Ingénu: "puis, le jour destiné à la cérémonie, elle part secrètement à quatre heures du matin avec ses petits présents de noce, et tout ce qu'elle a pu rassembler. Ses mesures étaient si bien prises qu'elle était déjà à plus de dix lieues lorsqu'on entra dans sa chambre, vers le midi. La surprise et la consternation furent grandes" (275). Voltaire demonstrates her skill and intelligence: "La belle Saint-Yves se doutait bien qu'on la suivrait. Elle était à cheval; elle s'informait adroitement des courriers s'ils n'avaient point rencontré un gros abbé, un énorme bailli, et un jeune benêt, qui couraient sur le chemin de Paris" (275), and her reasoning abilities: "Ayant appris au troisième jour qu'ils n'étaient pas loin, elle prit une route différente, et eut assez d'habileté et de bonheur pour arriver à Versailles tandis qu'on la cherchait inutilement dans Paris" (275). And upon her arrival at Versailles, Voltaire highlights her "douceur" as being influential to successfully navigating through the grounds: "Ayant su de lui que son amant avait été enlevé après avoir parlé à un premier commis, elle court chez ce commis ; la vue d'une belle femme l'adoucit, car il faut convenir que Dieu n'a créé les femmes que pour apprivoiser les hommes" (276), and to ultimately obtaining the very crucial information which she is after, finding out how to locate the Ingénu: "Le plumitif attendri lui avoua tout. 'Votre amant est à la Bastille depuis près d'un an, et sans vous il y serait peut-être
Mlle. Saint-Yves escapes the confines of a difficult situation in which she is unwillingly placed. Along with her "douceur," it is her skillful and intelligent planning, along with her reasoning abilities which ultimately help lead her back to the Ingénu.

The Relationship of the Self to the World

In Voltaire, there are both positive and negative stereotypes of women. Voltaire demonstrates that women are greatly affected by the negative stereotypes. He shows compassion for their situation, as we have seen, by opening up the possibility to a more positive outcome for the female characters in the four philosophical tales. By a slight displacement, we could move to a spatial analysis of these female characters by examining the work of bell hooks. We could also move to a Levinasian moral / ethical analysis of them, as was first introduced in this chapter.

In Totality and Infinity, Levinas analyzes the relationship of the self or I to the world: "The originality of identification . . . is not to be fixed by reflecting on the abstract representation of self by self; it is necessary to begin with the concrete relationship between an I and a world" (37). The self should be affected: "The world, foreign and hostile, should, in good logic, alter the I" (37). However, the way out of this possible danger, Levinas explains, is for the I to be both "at home in the world:" "But the true and primordial relation between them, and that in which the I is revealed precisely as preeminently the same, is produced as a sojourn [séjour] in the world" (37), and "at home in oneself:" "The way of the I against the "other" of the world consists in sojourning, in identifying oneself by existing here at home with oneself [chez soi]. In a world which is from the first other the I is nonetheless autochthonous. It is the very reversion of this alteration. It finds in the world a site [lieu] and a home [maison]" (37).
Levinas explains that there is then a "freedom" with this "being at home:" "The 'at home' [Le 'chez soi'] is not a container but a site where I can, where, dependent on a reality that is other, I am, despite this dependence or thanks to it, free" (37).

Levinas also speaks of "possession" when describing the chez soi: "The possibility of possessing, that is, of suspending the very alterity of what is only at first other, and other relative to me, is the way of the same. I am at home with myself in the world because it offers itself to or resists possession" (38). However: "Neither possession nor the unity of number nor the unity of concepts link me to the Stranger [l'Etranger], the Stranger who disturbs the being at home with oneself [le chez soi]. But Stranger also means the free one. Over him I have no power" (39). For Levinas, the ethical moment is explained as: "A calling into question of the same – which cannot occur within the egoist spontaneity of the same – is brought by the other. We name this calling into question of my spontaneity by the presence of the Other ethics" (43). Levinas shows that "the welcoming of the other" further explains the ethical moment: "The strangeness of the Other, his irreducibility to the I, to my thoughts and my possessions, is precisely accomplished as a calling into question of my spontaneity, as ethics . . . the welcoming of the other by the same, of the Other by me, is concretely produced as the calling into question of the same by the other, that is, as the ethics that accomplishes the critical essence of knowledge" (43).

The house, or the home is a privileged example of possession. As was discussed in Chapter 2, Levinas considers the home as "the commencement of human activity:" "The privileged role of the home does not consist in being the end of human activity but
in being its condition, and in this sense its commencement" (152). Levinas redefines this as "hospitality," and names Woman as a figure of alterity or of hospitality:

For the intimacy of recollection to be able to be produced in the oecumenia of being the presence of the Other must not only be revealed in the face which breaks through its own plastic image, but must be revealed, simultaneously with this presence, in its withdrawal and in its absence. This simultaneity is not an abstract construction of dialectics, but the very essence of discretion. And the other whose presence is discreetly an absence, with which is accomplished the primary hospitable welcome which describes the field of intimacy, is the Woman. The woman is the condition for recollection, the interiority of the Home, and inhabitation. (155)

Diane Perpich analyzes this section of *Totality and Infinity*: "Habitation and the Feminine" (Levinas 154): "Levinas suggests that the world becomes habitable because the feminine creates a refuge in it, a space within which man is able to 'recollect' (Levinas 154) or recover himself and in which an 'inner life' (Levinas 158) first becomes possible" (Perpich 37). Perpich says that Levinas explains "recollection" as "a suspension of the immediate reactions the world solicits,' it is a respite from the roughness of life and from the insistence and immediacy of its demands (Levinas 154)" (Perpich 37), and: "As such, Levinas equates it with a certain familiarity and intimacy with one's surroundings and argues that this interiority does not accrue to the habits that provide master over it. The 'gentleness' of recollection is accomplished by 'Woman'" (Perpich 37). Levinas continues: "To exist henceforth means to dwell. To dwell is not the simple fact of the anonymous reality of a being cast into existence as a stone one casts behind oneself; it is a recollection, a coming to oneself, a retreat home with oneself as in a land of refuge, which answers to a hospitality, an expectancy, a human welcome" (156). But woman is an instance of alterity: "In human welcome the language that keeps silence remains an essential possibility. Those silent comings and goings of the feminine being whose footsteps reverberate the secret depths of being are not the
turbid mystery of the animal and feline presence whose strange ambiguity Baudelaire likes to evoke" (156).  

According to Seán Hand: "It is true that Levinas on occasions appears to offer a male-oriented discourse" (38). However, "it must also be recognized that Levinas emphasizes the formal and cultural nature of the difference between the sexes; and that the priority of the Other forms the very basis of his philosophy" (38). Hand says that Derrida replied to this in Writing and Difference in saying "that Levinas pushes the respect for dissymmetry so far that it seems to us impossible, essentially impossible that [his work] could have been written by a woman. Its philosophical subject is man (vir)" (38).  

Several feminist critics have commented on Levinas' approach to feminine alterity. Morny Joy cited part of an interview of Levinas from his Ethics and Infinity: "Perhaps all these allusions to the ontological differences between the masculine and the feminine would appear less archaic if instead of dividing humanity into two species (or into two genders), they would signify that the participation in the masculine and in the feminine were the attribute of every human being" (Joy 475). However, Joy writes that "Levinas never elaborates this possibility, maintaining, in his designation of the feminine, his own equivocal stance as to whether he is referring to 'the feminine' simply as an epithet, or to actual women grounded in social and political realities" (Joy 475). Joy cites Levinas' discussion of "The Ambiguity of Love" in Totality and Infinity: "Equivocation constitutes the epiphany of the feminine – at the same time interlocutor, collaborator and master superiorly intelligent, so often dominating men in the masculine civilization it has
entered, and woman having to be treated as a woman, in accordance with rules
impresscriptible by civil society (Levinas 264)" (Joy 475).

bell hooks is a feminist critic for whom space must be opened up to several forms
of alterity: "In 'Choosing the margin as a space of radical openness,' hooks argues that
the margin and the centre are neither antithetical nor an indication of a white-non-white
disconnection. Instead, she suggests that racial, sexual, economic and social
differences shape and determine a response to, and therefore a connection with,
existing cultural norms" (McKittrick 191). hooks writes:

I am located in the margin. I make a definite distinction between the
marginality which is imposed by oppressive structures and that marginality
one chooses as site of resistance – as location of radical openness and
possibility. This site of resistance is continually formed in that segregated
culture of opposition that is our critical response to domination. We come to
this space through suffering and pain, through struggle. We know struggle
to be that which pleasures, delights, and fulfills desire. We are transformed,
individually, collectively, as we make radical creative space which affirms
and sustains our subjectivity, which gives us a new location from which to
articulate our sense of the world. (Yearning: Race, Gender and Cultural
Politics 153)

For bell hooks, women can be empowered in the margin by "creating space," and
therefore leave the confines of the marginal space that they were forced into through
"oppression." 9

Through our presentation of ethics and the feminine in Levinas, we have shown
that woman is a figure of alterity: "the world becomes habitable because the feminine
creates a refuge in it" (Perpich 37) and provides "the 'gentleness' of recollection" for the
man (Perpich 37). bell hooks says that though women are marginalized, they may
define themselves according to their own will within the margin in which they are placed.
The eighteenth century was not devoid of misogyny, but it was also in some respects a
promising age for women – a possibility for change in the order of the world, a
possibility which Voltaire portrays in *Zadig, Micromégas, Candide*, and *l'Ingénu*. The rather stereotypical qualities of the feminine character could be considered as a positive attribute to their being – their gentle nature (Levinas), or the way that they could occupy the margin differently so as to promote their own views and desires (hooks).

This chapter is not meant to depict Voltaire as a "feminist," but instead to draw attention to examples in the philosophical tales which express Voltaire’s compassion and sympathy towards the situation of women throughout history and in the eighteenth century. Voltaire does this in *Zadig, Micromégas, Candide*, and *l'Ingénu* by presenting us with certain female characters who do not succumb to their marginalization (hooks), as was shown with Astarté, the Saturnian’s wife, Cunégonde and the Old Woman, and Mlle. Saint-Yves. Voltaire also shows the possibility of some of these women to act as figures of "hospitality" (Levinas), particularly Astarté and Mlle. Saint-Yves. In doing so, Voltaire makes a statement in the philosophical tales that there is the possibility for woman to transform our interpretation of social space (Lefebvre).

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2 For additional consideration on women and space, see the entry on "Judith Butler" (p. 65-71) in *Key Thinkers on Space and Place*, Phil Hubbard, Ed., Rob Kitchin, Ed., and Gill Valentine, Ed., London, SAGE Publications Ltd., 2004. Concerning "spatial contributions" (67): "Although Butler herself has very little to say about space or place, her ideas about performativity have been very influential for critical geography" (65). For example: "First, Butler's theorization of gender has reshaped geographers' understandings of identities / bodies and their spatialities. Second, her notion of performativity has been recast to theorize the concept of space. Third, her work has influenced critical geographers' engagement with non-representational theory" (65); and "Fourth, her conceptualization of performativity has upset feminist methodological debates about reflexivity and positionality" (65).


In "Lights in Space," Daniel Brewer writes about "domestic space" (180): "Situated on the edges of that space and defining its borders are unruly, transgressive subjects, who have not yet been incorporated into domestic space, or perhaps who cannot be and must not be if that space is to continue to exist as such. Women writers such as Françoise de Graffigny and Isabelle de Charrière sought to write their way out of that space, and recent work on gender theory and women's writing has recovered and retraced their efforts" (180). Brewer also links this space with the idea of "home" (183): "[Imaginary] worlds may have appeared foreign and exotic at times – consider for instance Montesquieu's *Lettres persanes*, Graffigny's *Lettres d'une Péruvienne*, or even the alpine idyll of Rousseau's *La Nouvelle Héloïse* – but they ultimately constituted a way of linking up with the world at home. For just like the urban or domestic worlds represented in [Marivaux, Prévost, and Charrière], these works aimed at providing new mappings of a complex social field in France" (183).

See also Léon Abensour, *La Femme et le Féminisme au dix-huitième siècle*, Paris, Editions E. Leroux, 1924, and *La Femme et Le Féminisme avant la Révolution*, Paris, Editions E. Leroux, 1923, as is listed in the Bibliography under "IV. Voltaire et le

Jacques Derrida also wrote of "hospitality" and responded to Levinas. For Derrida as well, there is "first and foremost an affirmation and a desire to open up one's home (oikos/economy) to the call of the other" (Dooley and Kavanagh 109), and "This is why the concept of hospitality is so central to Derrida’s ethical theory" (Dooley and Kavanagh 109). In Of Hospitality, Jacques Derrida claims that one must be hospitable to the Other, but warns of a danger that can exist that goes along with this responsibility: "one can become virtually xenophobic in order to protect or claim to protect one's own hospitality, the own home that makes possible one's own hospitality" (53). Conversely, he later writes, that the openings of the house, such as its door and windows, which make hospitality possible, also provide the house with an interior (61), with a protective privacy. In sum: "in order to constitute the space of a habitable house and a home, you also need an opening, a door and windows, you have to give up a passage to the outside world [l'étranger]" (61). Derrida also discusses what he calls "unconditional hospitality" – a way of responding to the limits of hospitality as they are construed in general (the host is hospitable to the guest, with many undesirable implications). Derrida's "unconditional hospitality" is also his way of favorably replying to Levinas. Derrida writes that the "unconditional law of hospitality" is "a law without imperative, without order and without duty . . . For if I practice hospitality "out of duty," this hospitality of paying up is no longer an absolute hospitality, offered to the other" (83).

Lefebvre does not concentrate on the feminine in The Production of Space. However, he discusses "the female principle," recalling female persecution or male domination throughout history: "All historical societies have diminished the importance of women and restricted the influence of the female principle. The Greeks reduced the woman's station to that of the fertility of a field owned and worked by her husband" (247-248). Lefebvre mentions the "house" as the feminine space: "The female realm was in the household: around the shrine or hearth; around the omphalos, a circular, closed and fixed space; or around the oven – last relic of the shadowy abyss. Women’s social status was restricted just as their symbolic and practical status was – indeed, these two aspects were inseparable so far as spatiality (spatial practice) was concerned" (248). Lefebvre explains here that, historically, women’s physical space and social space were one and the same – that of the domestic space, the house, the
home. Lefebvre later defines "the male principle:" "How is it that different societies assign different roles to the male principle and its dominant form, and that this dominant form itself is differently formulated from one society to another?" (248). He compares Greece and Rome: "Greece, for example, which took Athens as its model, and Italy, which took Rome, differ so radically that one produced and transmitted the Logos (logic and knowledge) while the other produced and transmitted the Law" (248). For Lefebvre, the "aim is to treat social practice as an extension of the body, an extension which comes about as part of space's development in time, and thus too as part of a historicity itself conceived of as produced" (249). Lefebvre distinguishes between "manliness" and "masculinity:" "In Rome the masculine virtues and values, those of the military man and the administrator, were in command. Manliness, by contrast, was a Greek attribute – the kind of manliness that dictates constant defiance towards one's enemies and constant rivalries with one's friends, that cultivates performance, whether in brutal or subtle form, as its basic raison d'être and goal, and that aspires above all to excel;" (249).
CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION: THE SPACES BEHIND AND THE SPACES AHEAD

The purpose of our project has been to show the production of space in *Zadig*, *Micromégas*, *Candide*, and *l'Ingénu*. Henri Lefebvre's "triad" – "the perceived-conceived-lived" triad, showing the three fields: *physical*, *mental*, and *social* (11-12) – has been implemented as the principal method of analysis to illustrate how different characters inhabit different spaces and for what purposes in these four philosophical tales.

Our project began with a discussion of geography and the eighteenth century. In Chapter 2, we saw that the Enlightenment embraced notions of geography as a human, historical, and philosophical discipline, notions that were originally developed during Antiquity (Broc). How man inhabited a given space – how man "produced space" – and what implications this had on society were of interest.

The *Encyclopédie*, along with being a representation of the fundamental goals of Enlightenment – to order and classify knowledge and to promote this organized knowledge to the world – is also a spatial symbol of Enlightenment. D'Alembert says this explicitly in the *Discours préliminaire*, by calling it a "world map" and a "tree of knowledge." Diderot said that the word "Encyclopédie" meant "chain of knowledge" (*enchaînement de connoissances*) (entry: "Encyclopédie"). The "chains" of the "world map" are figurative roads represented by the different "branches" of the *Encyclopédie*. For our purposes, it was beneficial to analyze the branch of "Géographie." We saw that Didier Robert de Vaugondy presented geography as an illustration of the human experience across space and time (*naturelle, historique, civile ou politique, sacrée, ecclésiastique*). De Vaugondy's entry was separate from the entry on "Géographie"
physique” by Nicolas Desmarest, which gave geologic information about the science of geography.

Two conclusions can be drawn from this spatial study of the *Encyclopédie*. The initial conclusion is, as Diderot and D'Alembert have shown, that the *Encyclopédie* was a road map to Enlightenment and to all forms of knowledge. I believe that this conclusion is similar to what Voltaire is saying in his article on "Géographie" in the *Questions sur l'Encyclopédie*. The *Questions sur l'Encyclopédie* are a lesser known work of Voltaire, yet a very rich resource for further inquiry into the combination of epistemology and critique that we associate with the Enlightenment. In "Géographie," Voltaire's notion of "sortir de chez soi" – leaving the home or leaving the self – is tied to both spatial epistemology and ethical necessity. For Voltaire, one does not have knowledge at home or in the self without going through an experience of the other out of one's home or oneself.

We return to that notion in the fifth chapter. In Chapter 3, I recalled the place of the Voltairian philosophical tale in fiction. When analyzing works which deal with geography and literature, "the production of space" is that of "inhabited" or "experienced" space (Bachelard), or "produced space" (Lefebvre). Through my discussion of the Voltairian philosophical tale, we recalled how the *conte* was considered in the *Encyclopédie* by both Diderot and D'Alembert. Diderot explains "Conte" (*Belles-Lettres*) by comparing it with the fable. Drawing on Nicolas Boileau's *Art poétique*, Diderot shows that the fable respects Boileau's classical rules about time, space, and plot. Diderot also shows that there was a moral purpose to the fable – a fable was not considered as such without "the moral of the story" appearing at the end.
The "conte," on the other hand, did not share these same traits. It did not respect Boileau's "trois unités," nor did it contain an overall moral purpose, narrative, or lesson. Diderot says that the "goal" of the tale was "less to instruct than to amuse." While the fable does contain some comedic scenes, the tale is a series (or "chain") of comedic events. D'Alembert's discussion of "Conte, Fable, Roman" (Grammaire) also demonstrates that unlike the moral intent of the fable, the tale does not possess this purpose, but instead shows a short series of events where "anything is possible."

D'Alembert notes that there are also "impossibilities" in the fable – its characters, for example, such as talking animals. D'Alembert says "in conversation" – in colloquial language – the tale has the possibility of being interpreted as a true story, unlike the fable.

Voltaire wished the tales were a way to correct the absence of truth in the fable. Through the use of "illustration, fabulation, wordplay, wit, irony, and satire" (Vartanian 469), the episodes in Voltaire's tales become "exaggerated" or "absurd" (Vartanian 469) as a means to portray philosophical problems. While most can agree with Vartanian's assessment of the specificity of the Voltairian philosophical tale, we must note that there are different considerations of Voltaire's tales that do not follow the doxa (Barthes) of Bildungsroman or of roman d'apprentissage. Barthes offered an interesting assessment of Voltaire's tales – an analysis which does not focus exclusively on travel for the purpose of education, but one which supports the "immobility of the hero." For Barthes, the space portrayed in Voltaire's tales is "not an explorer's space" but "a surveyor's space" (87), and travel in the tales is "to aggrandize oneself in order to confirm, not in order to transform oneself" (88). We retained for our analysis that for the Voltairian
hero, no transformation of the self takes place – the diversity that the characters
encounter shows a contradiction within, and not fundamental differences between
ourselves and others.

Chapter 4 presented "space writing" (Brewer) in Voltaire's four philosophical tales.
Different spaces are produced in different ways in each tale. We began this chapter by
noting that Voltaire did not write the tale in a linear fashion. The philosophical thesis
that is tested throughout the narrative is displayed in a circular form in the philosophical
tales. Lefebvre's "triad" attests to forms of sociability present in the four tales. Voltaire's
heroes interact in "other spaces" (Brewer) as well as in France. Voltaire presents
"productions of space" which deal with philosophical and historical problems: the Ancien
Régime (Zadig's Court of Moabdar and Micromégas' Planet Sirius); the Lisbon
Earthquake (1755) and Leibnizian Optimism (Candide); and the Revocation of the Edict
of Nantes (1685) (l'Ingénu).

The figure of the nomad in Zadig showed the ways in which Zadig was a
ubiquitous character. Zadig inhabits or "produces space" wherever he is, be it as a
slave in the desert or as Minister at court. Sociability seems more promising at court,
but Zadig's success there is based not on the abundance of material goods and lavish
spaces present, but on his interpretations of and experiences in spaces of sociability,
with the Babylonians, through the promotion and practice of a just society, reflecting and
enhancing a human occupation, inhabitation, or production of space.

The immutability of the Ingénu is shown by the way in which he inhabits the
(foreign) space of France by keeping with the fundamentals of natural law. We have
demonstrated that the Ingénu has a rude naïveté, but he is reasonable (the myth of the
noble savage). The article on "Loi naturelle" in the Encyclopédie criticizes what is not natural in positive law. The Ingénu's persistent following of natural law does not disregard what is positive about sociability about which Rousseau and Voltaire hold different views – Rousseau defending the solitary state of natural man and Voltaire advocating the state of man in society. It was shown that for Voltaire, natural man, or the Ingénu, may be less refined, but he exhibits a profound reason in the spaces which he inhabits in Lower Brittany, as is shown, for example, through his exchanges with Gordon.

My analysis of the production of space in Candide approaches the singularity of the garden in that work, particularly with respect to another valorized space by Voltaire, that of Eldorado. I presented this by comparing the garden to the utopia of Eldorado to show how the garden illustrates sociability. In the end, the garden becomes a refuge for Candide and his "petite société:" Pangloss, Martin, Cunégonde, Paquette, and Giroflée. The group needs this refuge space. A danger exists in both the utopian country of Eldorado and in Europe. In Eldorado, all seems perfect, but individuality cannot exist if everything is flawless and remains the same forever. In Europe, there is the presence of the social class system. Man can disappear in this system through continued unjust practices of government and civil law. Candide's garden shows the ambivalence of socialization in that it provides the group with a space where they can detach from society – a space which they then "produce" by creating a social space through its cultivation.

The production of outer space or future space was discussed in our reading of Micromégas. Through the analysis of their intergalactic voyage, we see the interaction
between Micromégas (the Sirien) and his travel partner the Saturnien and the "minute atoms" or the men of Earth. A social space is created through their "conversations" (Chapter 7) on representations of science, knowledge, and power in society. Human beings, though frail, turn out to be scientifically knowledgeable. However, they are not as advanced in other respects, such as happiness and violence. Micromégas offers to compose "a book of philosophy" for the Earthlings, which we see is nothing more than a book of "blank pages," which draws our attention to differences between philosophical and scientific analysis. By examining this science fiction tale, the relation of man to the world – how he inhabits or produces space on Earth – can be evaluated through observation of travel to and from outer space (Blanchot, Levinas).

In Chapter 5 we returned to Voltaire's notion of leaving home or leaving the self. In the eighteenth century, ethics and morality were considered as one and the same. In the Encyclopédie, Jaucourt separates morality and religion in "Morale," as does Voltaire in "Morale" in the Questions sur l'Encyclopédie. We recall that Voltaire linked morality to geography specifically in the entry for "Géographie" in the Questions ("Il est bien difficile en géographie comme en morale, de connaître le monde sans sortir de chez soi.").

The entries on "Femme" in both the Encyclopédie and the Questions sur l'Encyclopédie are presented in this chapter. Both Desmahis and Voltaire highlight the sweet, soft, gentle, and graceful nature of a woman, along with her beauty, for example. This led us to inquire into how Voltaire considered women during his life. Though he was misogynistic and critical of them at times in his writings, several examples illustrate
Voltaire's high regard for some well known women: Catherine II of Russia, and Mme. Du Châtelet.

Voltaire displays misogynist overtones in the philosophical tales by describing women as disorderly and extravagant (Missouf in Zadig), overly emotional (the Saturnien’s wife in Micromégas), battered or ruined (Cunégonde and the Old Woman in Candide), and oppressed (Mlle. Saint-Yves in l'Ingénu). However, he also gives room for a positive portrayal of women in the tales through the orderly and reasonable character of Astarté in Zadig, and through the possibility of dealing with each negative situation differently for the Saturnien's wife, Cunégonde, the Old Woman, and Mlle. Saint-Yves. We presented an ethical analysis of the woman as a figure of alterity and of hospitality (Levinas) and as a figure of marginalization (hooks).

In Totality and Infinity, Levinas analyzes the relationship of the self or I to the world and of being at home in the world (chez soi) (37). The ethical moment for Levinas comes with the calling into question of the self by the Other (43). He redefines the "privileged possession" of the house or the home as "hospitality" (152), and names the "Woman" as a figure of alterity or of hospitality (155). Woman displays hospitality through "intimacy" and through "passivity."

bell hooks remarks that even though she is placed in the margin, woman has the choice, capacity, and capability to either "create" the space of the margin in which she was placed according to her own will, or to move out of or away from the margin towards the center, where man is most often. Lefebvre also discusses what he calls "the female principle" in The Production of Space – a concept which examines the women's place at home.
A reading of *Zadig*, *Micromégas*, *Candide*, and *l'Ingénu* through the lens of Henri Lefebvre's *Production of Space* highlights man's occupation or inhabitation of space. This understanding of the place of the human in the Enlightenment carried on into the nineteenth century, as Sergio Moravia notes: "L'exigence première de [la culture de la fin du siècle], de la culture inspirée par les idéologues, semble être celle de connaître la réalité humaine et naturelle d'une façon finalement positive" (939); and according to Nicole Hafid-Martín: "L'univers, et l'homme en son sein, évoluent grâce à une multitude d'actions qui s'entrecroisent indissolublement" (143). Man is tied to his space / place on earth. Man accomplishes a "production of space." And it is through the production of space that Voltaire's merging together of fiction and philosophy captivates the reader in eighteenth-century space in the philosophical tales.

This project is not an exhaustive or comprehensive study of the production of space in Voltaire's philosophical tales. *Zadig*, *Micromégas*, *Candide*, and *l'Ingénu* were chosen because they are representations of the Voltairian philosophical tale – a work which reconciles fiction and philosophy, as Vartanian explained; and because they are good examples of "the production of space;" each tale dealing with various philosophical problems and different "produced spaces." Vartanian had also mentioned *Le monde comme il va*, *Histoire des voyages de Scarmentado*, and *Histoire de Jenni ou le sage et l'athée* as other tales which "conform in varying degrees to the paradigm" (471). *Le monde comme il va* is a tale which "portera la marque d'événements postérieurs, et notamment du Paris de 1741, durant la guerre de succession d'Autriche" (Deloffre and Van den Heuvel 415). Deloffre and Van den Heuvel note "some important elements of this work" (415): "l'étranger d'une vertueuse simplicité, qui débarque de son
Histoire des voyages de Scarmentado appeared around the same time as the Essai sur les Moeurs (1756) (Deloffre and Van den Heuvel 437-438). Scarmentado's "world" "est un monde désolé et désolant, coupé radicalement de toutes les valeurs, où l'on se sent partout un étranger. L'homme n'est plus dans l'homme, et la loi naturelle n'est qu'une expression vide de sens" (Deloffre and Van den Heuvel 439). In Histoire de Jenni, ou le sage et l'athée, published around April 1775, "on voit comment la lutte contre les théologiens pourra constituer dans son plan un préliminaire destiné à préparer le terrain en vue de la bataille contre l'athéisme" (Deloffre and Van den Heuvel 485-486). I would continue this study by first examining how the production of space functions in these three tales, that is, how the characters "produce space" through sociability or through hospitality. The project may then extend to other non-Voltairian philosophical tales of the eighteenth century, such as those examples mentioned in Note 6 from Chapter 3.

This study may also expand to the analysis of narratives through the twentieth century and up until the present day.¹ The philosophical tale genre may be tied to its time. Voltaire, however, is not, and neither is Candide, for that matter, as it has been defined as his greatest work, translated into dozens of languages, and read today by people all over the world. It is a text that displays, according to Edward Said, "the disorientations of direct encounters with the human" (Orientalism 93). It is also through our use of the twentieth-century understandings of place and space, namely Lefebvre's "production of space," as critical interpretation to which man's role is essential, that we can continue to spatially analyze texts.² Eighteenth-century texts, and Voltaire's tales in
particular, hold a privileged place here, for it is during the Enlightenment that we find serious considerations of human geography with the *Encyclopédie* and the *Questions sur l'Encyclopédie*, and extending to the *contes* of François Marie Arouet de Voltaire.

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1. See also *What is Enlightenment? Eighteenth-Century Answers and Twentieth-Century Questions*, James Schmidt (Ed.), Berkeley, University of California Press, 1996, especially "The Questions and Some Answers" (pp. 47-84), and "The Public Use of Reason" (pp. 85-142).

LIST OF REFERENCES


BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Kathryn (Kate) Elizabeth Fredericks (née Hunter) was born in Buffalo, NY. She attended Orchard Park High School in Orchard Park, NY (a neighboring suburb) from 1994 to 1998. In 2002, she received a Bachelor of Arts degree in French language and literature with a minor in communication studies from Niagara University in Lewiston, NY.

From 2002 to 2004, Kate worked as a graduate student and teaching assistant in the Department of Romance Languages and Literatures at SUNY Buffalo in Amherst, NY. After completing the Master of Arts degree in French language and literature in 2004, she received a Fulbright award for teaching English as a foreign language in France, and from 2004 to 2005 she taught English language and American culture courses at the Institut Universitaire de Formation des Maîtres in Lille, France.

In 2005, Kate came to the University of Florida to pursue a doctorate in French, and completed her dissertation in 2012 under the direction of Dr. Brigitte Weltman-Aron. At UF, she has taught French language, conversation, and culture courses at both the beginning and intermediate levels. She has also worked as research assistant to Dr. William Calin. Most recently, she has worked for Dr. Gayle Zachmann as both Program Assistant and Instructor of French at the UF Paris Research Center.

Beginning in Fall 2012, Kate will work as Visiting Assistant Professor of French at SUNY Geneseo in Geneseo, NY. At Geneseo, Kate will teach courses in beginning French language and intermediate French language, along with an introduction to French literature course. She also plans to get involved with study abroad, and continue to pursue her research.