DOES A CONFESSION AFFECT THE LIKELIHOOD OF ALIBI CORROBORATION FOR FRIENDS AND STRANGERS?

By

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To my parents, Carol and Doug, and my sister Emily
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<td>Confession after questioning</td>
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<td>Confession before questioning</td>
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<td>CI</td>
<td>Confidence interval</td>
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<tr>
<td>NC</td>
<td>No confession</td>
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<td>NMFO</td>
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Abstract of Thesis Presented to the Graduate School of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts

DOES A CONFESSION AFFECT THE LIKELIHOOD OF ALIBI CORROBORATION FOR FRIENDS AND STRANGERS?

By

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Previous research has demonstrated several factors that contribute to wrongful convictions. However, researchers typically consider these factors independently of each other. In this study, we examined if one piece of evidence (a confession) could alter another piece of evidence (the likelihood someone would provide an alibi). We manipulated both the relationship between the corroborator and the suspect, and the presentation of suspect confession information. Results indicated that knowledge of a confession from the suspect does result in lower likelihood of alibi corroboration, and friends were more likely to be alibi corroborators than strangers. Implications for police and courts are discussed.
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

We know from past research that several factors can increase the likelihood that a person may be convicted of a crime they did not commit. Mistaken eyewitness identification, false confessions, snitch testimony, faulty science, incompetent counsel, and many other things can all lead to a wrongful conviction (Scheck, Neufeld, & Dwyer, 2000; Wells et al., 1998; Douglass & Steblay, 2006; Schoenfeld, 2005; Ceci & Bruck, 1993; Neuschatz, Lawson, Swanner, Meissner & Neuschatz, 2008; Tyler, 2006; Smith, Patry & Stinson, 2007 for a few examples). However, more often than not, cases of actual innocence have been attributed to several of these factors, causing us to question how so many things can go wrong in a single case (www.innocenceproject.org). It is possible that these pieces of faulty evidence could interact with each other to result in these wrongful convictions (Hasel & Kassin, 2009; Kassin, 2009). The chance that one piece of bad evidence could alter the way investigators, witnesses, attorneys, and jurors examine, collect, or interpret other pieces of evidence may compound the effect of that initial, faulty piece of evidence and increase chances of conviction even though the suspect is actually innocent.

Past research has shown that one piece of inculpatory evidence can contribute to the creation of more inculpatory evidence in that eyewitnesses who learned about a suspect’s confession after making an eyewitness identification changed their identification decisions to be consistent with the confession evidence (Hasel & Kassin, 2009). It is possible that inculpatory evidence could also change exculpatory evidence. Specifically, whether or not a person is willing to offer an alibi may be affected by the potential alibi corroborator’s perceptions of the other evidence in the case. Similar to
eyewitnesses, potential alibi corroborators may change their alibi decisions to reflect other evidence in the case. To date, few studies have examined alibi generation, specifically none have looked at the possibility that an alibi might change when presented with other types of evidence regarding the case. A good real world example of this possible evidence interaction is in the case of New York v. Kogut (2004). John Kogut was convicted of the rape and murder of a 16 year old girl. Kogut spent nearly 20 years in jail before DNA testing was able to conclusively show that the semen found on the victim did not match Kogut’s DNA, eventually leading to his exoneration. During the initial investigation, Kogut went through an 18 hour interrogation and was presented with false evidence about his case (police officers also used several other interrogation tactics). Even though he verbally maintained his innocence the entire time, the officers produced a confession (written by the officer, not Kogut) that Kogut reluctantly signed after the fifth draft (not because he was actually admitting to the crime or believed he was guilty, but instead presumably to end the hours-long interrogation).

Allegedly, Kogut had been at his girlfriend’s birthday party at the time of the offense and theoretically should have had several people to serve as possible alibi corroborators (Kassin, 2009). However, when these potential alibi corroborators were questioned by police and told that Kogut had confessed to the crime, they began to question if and when they saw him. In this case, investigators told the potential alibi corroborators about what they believed was a true confession. This may have caused the potential corroborators to question their memories for the night in question. Thus, potentially good alibi evidence was altered by another piece of faulty evidence. This shows first hand how one piece of faulty evidence (the false confession) can potentially
change to another piece of evidence (the corroborators’ memories), and in at least one case, result in changing exculpatory evidence that may have cast reasonable doubt on the defendant’s guilt.

In this study, we will examine the interaction between confession evidence and alibi corroborators. In other words, we will see if knowing about confession evidence makes alibi corroborators more or less willing to provide their corroboration throughout the trial process. By manipulating whether a potential alibi corroborator is presented with confession evidence and the relationship between the alibi corroborator and the suspect, we will inspect what affects whether a potential alibi corroborator is likely to give an alibi, and subsequently, whether the decision to proffer an alibi is affected by other evidence in the case (namely a confession). Before delving into the current study further, we will examine how confession evidence is able to have this crucial impact on other types of evidence and the way that jurors perceive it.

**False Confession Research**

Some researchers posit that false confessions may have been an adaptive strategy for suspects in the past when there was no DNA testing or appeals court to validate their innocence (Bering & Shackelford, 2005). That is, if the suspect knows that the investigators already think he is guilty, he may believe he is better off in the long run to confess even though he did not actually commit the crime. In this case, he just wants to end the interrogation and can often make a plausible story by using the details of the case already supplied to him throughout the process of questioning. The suspect believes the likelihood of getting his named cleared by maintaining his innocence is futile and it seems probable that jurors who hear the evidence will think so as well.
Structure of Confession Evidence

Confessions can be derived in 2 ways: (1) Internally, from actual guilt within the individual because they truly did commit the crime, or (2) externally, from other peripheral factors that occur during the questioning. For example, fear of violence, threats of a harsher sentence, guilt presumptive questioning tactics, or promises of leniency made by interrogators who come into the situation with pre-conceived notions of guilt can lead the suspect to admit to something he did not actually do (Kassin, 2005; Russano, Meissner, Narchet and Kassin, 2005; www.innocenceproject.org). These tactics are low in diagnosticity because even though they increase the likelihood of getting a true confession, they also increase the likelihood of getting a false confession. Therefore, a possibly damaging outcome arises: a false positive, in which we get a confession from a suspect who is not guilty (Kassin, 1997). These tactics increase the likelihood of having the suspect confess, but this does not necessarily mean that those confessions are always truthful. The external influences (use of force, threats, deprivation of basic needs like food or water, promises of less severe punishments, etc.) may also make a confession inadmissible in court, essentially stopping this evidence from ever being heard by jury members (Kassin, 1997). However in many cases, exclusion of a possibly coerced confession does not occur, which leaves jurors to decide how much weight to assign that piece of evidence on their own. Previous research shows that jurors are not good at weighing this evidence properly (Kassin, 1997).

In the early studies of confessions research, three different categories of false confessions were termed (Kassin & Wrightsman, 1985). First, a voluntary confession is one that a suspect offers without any coercive tactics used by the interrogators. This
might happen when a suspect is trying to cover for a friend or family member or desires the fame and/or notoriety that go with confessing to the crime. Next, coerced-compliant confessions are confessions in which a suspect confesses to a crime primarily to stop the interrogation process, like in the Kogut case. With this type of false confession, the suspect knows that he/she did not commit the crime, but because of the situation (perhaps being denied basic food and water for hours on end), the suspect says he/she committed the crime to escape the questioning. Last, coerced-internalized confessions are confessions in which the suspect actually starts to believe that they have committed the offense. This is the most dangerous of the false confessions because it can alter (perhaps permanently) the suspect’s memory for the crime, leaving no actual knowledge of the true events to convince the investigators of the suspect innocence with or to explain in court.

Another reason why some people may confess to crimes they did not commit is the belief that they may get an easier sentence if they cooperate with the investigators and do not ‘prolong the inevitable’ (admitting they did it). When the suspect thinks he or she is going to get a prison sentence no matter what, it makes sense for him to try and get the least amount of time possible and this is more likely to happen by accepting the blame and the subsequent punishment (even though in this case he should not). Further, if the suspect admits to the crime early on in the interrogation as opposed to hours later, then jurors typically see the suspect as already having suffered enough (Gold & Weiner, 2000). They are then more likely to feel sorry for him and thereby reduce the punishment that he would be sentenced to because they think the suspect has learned his lesson and will not do it again.
Much of the previous research on false confessions has focused on the interrogation tactics that can lead to false confessions, some even demonstrating that new, false memories can be formed during this process leading people to create vivid ‘memories’ of these activities that never happened (Coffman and Henkel, 2004). In a Netherlands case study of two innocent men imprisoned for a murder, the suspects started with no knowledge about the crime and during the interrogation they became convinced they had committed it though the use of deceptive tricks by investigators (Wagenaar, 2002). During interrogations, the suspects were fed information about the crime scene and murder weapon, and after hours of questioning they began to recall this information as memories from their own past actions. This case study demonstrates how, through the use of deception and other techniques used by investigators, naïve suspects can actually begin to believe that they are responsible for a crime they did not commit.

Another aspect of false confessions concerns how interrogations are structured. One of the techniques most commonly used in questioning a suspect is the presentation of false incriminating evidence (e.g., presenting the suspect with evidence that an eyewitness placed him at the crime scene or telling the suspect that his/her DNA or fingerprints were found at the crime scene, when in reality none of this actually occurred). Investigation tactics like these are some of the more effective ways of producing internalized guilt for the offense (Kassin & Kiechel, 1996). The Reid technique, which is used to train nearly all the country’s police investigators, encourages officers to use tactics like telling the suspect about evidence incriminating them in order to obtain a confession from uncooperative suspects (Drizin & Leo, 2004).
Further, the Supreme court of South Carolina upheld that confessions derived using the Reid technique are acceptable in court (State v. Myers, 359 S.C. 40). This means these types of influences that can lead to false confessions are still being used to gain a confession and are then left to the jurors to understand the coercive nature the information may have.

Many studies have specifically examined police officer’s abilities to detect lies because they are the ones most often doing the interrogating of suspects (Elaad, 2003). Researchers found that officers are highly overconfident in this ability. However, they are not highly accurate, even less so than college students with whom they were compared (Elaad, 2003). Because they are so overconfident, this can lead to officers believing this false confession (and not believing the suspect’s claims of denial in the first place). Further, this builds confidence in the officer’s belief about the suspect’s guilt, making officers more likely to resort to extreme measures during interrogation in order to elicit the confession that want (which may or may not be truthful, though they believe is due to the suspect’s true guilt for the crime).

**Confession Influence on Jurors**

Once a person confesses, whether the confession was truthful or not, that piece of evidence will play a role in the trial outcome. Jurors are unable to separate a confession (even one that is likely false) from their verdict decisions, even in the case in which they think they can separate it (Kassin & Sukel, 1997; Kassin, 1997). In addition, when a confession is introduced at trial, it becomes the single most important piece of evidence (Drizin & Leo, 2004). That means this one part of the trial can be more influential on juror decisions than every other piece of evidence showing that suspect’s innocence. Former United States Supreme Court justice William Brennan recognized
the influence a confession can have in a trial by stating, “no other class of evidence is so profoundly prejudicial” (Leo, 2009, pg 340). This starts a chain reaction through the legal system ending in incarceration, demonstrating how a false confession can be the only incriminating piece of evidence needed to convict. One of the most salient examples of the problem is the case of the Central Park Jogger. In this case, 5 boys were convicted of rape and murder because of their own (false) confessions. The boys later recanted their confessions and the attorneys had no other physical evidence to prove their guilt besides the confessions. The boys served 12 years behind bars before DNA testing eventually exonerated them after a man (in jail for a different crime) admitted to the offense and his DNA was matched to the DNA found at the crime scene.

Even in a case in which there is little other evidence to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, if a person confesses to a crime, jury members place a lot of emphasis on that single statement. Once it enters in the court proceedings (regardless of the veracity of the confession) it can be nearly impossible to erase this effect.

Some may think jurors’ views on the legitimacy of confessions do not play a significant role in the outcome of these trials, but this is also not the case. When told to disregard false confession evidence, jurors said they understand the statement was made involuntarily and that they did not let it affect their trial decisions (Kassin & Sukel, 1997; Kassin, Meissner, & Norwick, 2005). However, the rates of guilty verdicts were significantly higher in conditions with a confession (even if jurors believed that confession was coerced) than conditions in which confession evidence was not involved at all. Simply having a confession raises conviction rates, regardless of what jurors believe about whether the confession was coerced. Many people assume that
laypeople, as potential jurors, would be able to spot a false confession if presented with one, however, this is often not the case (Kassin and Wrightsman, 1980; 1981). No matter how much jurors may think they can mentally separate their trial decisions from that piece of evidence, research shows that a confession (even if the jurors think it is coerced) still has an effect on their decision at the end of the trial.

Some studies have examined using expert testimony to successfully warn the jury about confession evidence (Woody & Forrest, 2009), as well as the potential helpfulness of videotaping interrogations for later viewing at trial (Ayling, 1984). Taping the interrogation not only allows for the corroboration of the confession in court, but also safeguards the rights of the accused in that a videotape exposes to the jury how suspects are treated during questioning (Loewy, 2007). However, videotaping does not always function as a safeguard in cases of possibly coerced confessions. In some cases, recaps of what was said during the interrogation or abbreviated versions of the long interrogations (including just the end result of the questioning and not the steps leading to it) have been used in order to not overwhelm the jury with lots of extraneous information to remember. However, tapes like this are usually biased against the offender, presented on behalf of the prosecution, and fail to accurately show the deceptive or coercive nature of the questioning (Ware, Lassiter, Patterson & Ransom, 2008). Past research has determined that if an interrogation is to be taped without bias, then the camera needs to be focused on both the interviewer as well as the suspect, rather than solely on one or the other to ensure the jury views the evidence as fairly as possible (Ware et al., 2008). In addition, the videotape of the confession should be a video of the complete interrogation. Taping interrogations can help jurors better
understand what the suspect had to withstand, and thus may be able to help jurors
determine how much faith to put in the confession.

In some cases of wrongful convictions, a false confession could have affected
other pieces of evidence as well, especially given the possibility of false confessions in
the courtroom and peoples’ tendencies to believe a confession. More than half the
known exoneration cases contain multiple causes and we are still unaware of exactly
what happens in a situation with more than one piece of evidence present (Kassin,
2005; www.innocenceproject.org). It is possible that one piece of faulty evidence could
have affected the collection of other evidence in those cases. For example, a damaging
piece of evidence like a confession may affect investigator’s actions throughout the
investigation process as well. It may affect the investigative questioning of potential
suspects, eyewitnesses, or even alibi corroborators to make people view the suspect as
more guilty than if the suspect had not confessed. Indeed, research shows that learning
about a confession has the potential to lead eyewitnesses to change their identification
decisions (Hasel & Kassin, 2009). It is possible that learning about confessions could
change other forms of potentially exonerating evidence as well, such as whether a
potential corroborator will remember seeing the suspect at the time of the crime. In the
next section, we will first examine how alibi evidence is generated. Then, we will
examine how alibi corroborators, as another form of witnesses in the courtroom
somewhat similar to eyewitnesses as both are forms of person evidence that are
susceptible to influence, may proffer different testimony based on whether a suspect
has confessed.
Alibi Research

Alibi Descriptions

One of the most influential pieces of research examining alibis was the first to describe the taxonomy of evidence used to explain corroborating alibis, physical and person evidence (Olsen & Wells, 2004). A defendant can have physical evidence that demonstrates that he or she was at a specific place during a specific timeframe. Cash or credit card receipts, videotaped security camera footage, and much else could be used to prove the defendant was at a different place during the time the crime was committed. This type of evidence can vary on a continuum from strong (for example, videotaped footage) to weak (such as a cash receipt) as a function of how easy or difficult it would be to fabricate the evidence. The best way to prove one's innocence is to use a combination of these (for example a credit card receipt as well as the time stamped camera footage) because a combination like this would be the most difficult to obtain if it did not actually occur.

Person evidence is the other form of potential corroborating evidence for an alibi, and is somewhat less influential than physical evidence (Olson & Wells, 2004). This type of evidence is when a person other than the defendant acts as a witness who vouches for the whereabouts of the defendant at the time of the offense, thereby eliminating the possibility he could have committed the crime. Person alibi evidence can take on two forms: motivated or non-motivated others (Olsen & Wells, 2004). Motivated others are people who have an interest in keeping the defendant out of trouble (typically friends or family), and non-motivated others are typically strangers who we assume have no reason to lie for the defendant. Alibi corroboration also varies on a scale from strong to weak, with motivated others serving as weak corroborators and
non-motivated others serving as strong alibi corroborators. For example, a defendant would rather have a stranger serving as a corroborator than their mother because people assume that the stranger has no reason to lie for him. His mother, however, has an interest in protecting her son and keeping him out of prison, and thus is a less reliable form of person evidence. Given this information, an ideal person to testify would be a non-motivated familiar other because they not only know the suspect well enough to recognize them and remember seeing them after some time delay, but they also lack the motivation to keep the defendant out of trouble like friends or family do. However, the concept of non-motivated others is hard to pinpoint and little research has looked at it to date.

One thing that could influence the likelihood that a person believes a suspect’s confession is the relationship between that person and the suspect. When examining alibi evidence, this relationship between the corroborator and the suspect also plays a crucial role in determining which alibis are more likely to be believed by others (Culhane & Hosch, 2004). So, the interplay of closeness between these two people could, in this case, affect both the likelihood of a possible corroborator believing the suspect confessed, as well as the likelihood that a jury attributes the testimony to the corroborator’s accurate memory for the timeframe (something we will discuss further later) rather than their interest in doing whatever it takes to keep the suspect out of the criminal justice system.

Most research has focused on evaluation of the alibi, but there has also been a small body of research looking at how or why people decide to become a corroborator. As more cases with failed alibi corroboration come to light with the help of the
Innocence Project, a greater emphasis has been put on why there are not more alibis willing to corroborate a suspect’s story of innocence. Some even go so far as to say the “failure of alibi evidence is the number one cause of exonerations” (Dysart, 2009). But as researchers look into the way alibis are generated, it becomes clear how difficult providing an alibi for one’s whereabouts (or becoming an alibi) can be.

**Juror Perceptions of Alibis**

Person alibi evidence can be very influential to jurors; however, this depends on the relationship perceived between the defendant and the person who gives the alibi (Culhane & Hosch, 2004). Jurors tend to believe an alibi given by a person who would not be motivated to cover for the defendant (a non-motivated other), and this is shown through the higher rates of acquittal found for those defendants whose alibis have no relationship versus those with a relationship to the defendant, while the opposite is true for motivated others. The problem with person evidence is that the most probable alibi is also the least believable. The people who see the suspect on a regular basis and are the most likely to recognize the person and remember his or her whereabouts are the motivated others who would also be the most likely to lie and cover for him had he committed a crime; therefore we cannot always trust that what they say is the truth. Non-motivated others who do not have the impulse to cover for the suspect are just that: strangers. People are less likely to remember seeing a person they have never met before and are especially unlikely to be able to recall the date, time and place of this encounter. To jurors, this means that if a non-motivated other does recall seeing the suspect, we can be more certain of their testimony because they have nothing to gain from lying for the suspect but jurors fail to account for the chance that the corroborator may not be accurate in their identification of the suspect.
Another way jurors weigh alibi evidence is by gauging the amount of time the suspect waited to offer anyone the alibi (Connelly, 1983). Some argue that the length of time waited before telling the investigators about the alibi is correlated to the weight jurors associate with it; the earlier a suspect reveals that he has an alibi, the more weight jurors will assign to that piece of evidence (Connelly, 1983). This generally serves one of two purposes: First, it can increase the perceived accuracy of the alibi; there is more time to investigate its truth and if there were anything questionable about it, jurors assume the prosecution would have presented this at trial. Second, it will save the suspect the time, money, and embarrassment of going to court should the alibi be able to be proven true. This hurts the accuracy of the alibi since people often believe if the case gets to court, then the alibi must not be true.

Alibi Generation

Like other witnesses, it is possible that alibis may change form when presented with other types of evidence. In the Kogut case, there were initially alibi corroborators, but the confession evidence essentially eliminated the alibi evidence, which demonstrates how multiple pieces of evidence might interact (Kassin, 2009). When the people who saw Kogut at the party on the night of the crime were questioned about their memory but then were told that he had confessed, they began to question when and where they saw him, essentially probing their internal, autobiographical memory for that timeframe. Then, they did not feel strong enough to testify as an alibi corroborator. We know from past research that there are two views on autobiographic memory: 1) memory is essentially a reconstruction of what actually occurred (in other words, a truthful representation) or 2) it is based on schema for a person’s routine daily activities or events (Markus, 1977; Tulving, 1972). So, if we assume the first explanation to be
true, then Kogut’s potential alibi corroborators should have remembered seeing him at the party and not have had any reason to drop out or question their memory for that night. However, the second explanation fits more with what happened in this case; Kogut’s corroborators originally remembered seeing him at the party, but after probing that memory further they began to question how truthful it was and eventually dropped out because they could not be sure. The corroborators most likely based their memory on their schema for a party like the one that night, and then assumed Kogut would be there. In this case he actually was, however their memory is based on typical occurrences and not on their memory for the actual events that took place that night.

Therefore, we hypothesize that hearing about the confession is what actually caused the corroborators to begin to question their memory in the first place. These types of social influences have been demonstrated many times over in research and have the potential to cause people to alter their original decision because of some kind of contextual information (e.g., Festinger, 1954; Semmler, Brewer, & Wells, 2004). Festinger developed the idea of cognitive dissonance in the early 1950s, explaining that people feel uncomfortable when their behaviors do not match their beliefs. Most commonly, this leads individuals to change their beliefs to align with the behaviors in order to reduce this feeling of discomfort. This change can be due to authority figures, trustworthiness, or other factors that the recipient values, and as such, leads the person to question the validity of their initial opinion. In the Kogut case, had the alibi corroborators not been told of Kogut’s confession, most likely they might have felt more confident of the timeframe, and then be able to assist in Kogut’s defense by providing exculpatory alibi evidence. This evidence may have given jurors reasonable doubt of
Kogut's guilt and prevented his conviction; however the social influence (hearing about his confession) caused them to alter their first decision of serving as an alibi corroborator. The behavior of confessing to the crime was inconsistent with the corroborators' beliefs that Kogut was with them during the time of the crime, so they changed their beliefs or memories to align with that information. If one piece of evidence was altered by another in Kogut’s case, this kind of interaction could be happening in other cases where two or more pieces of evidence are used to convict. Thus, evidence like a false confession could not only have an adverse effect on the jury; it could also cause the investigators to stop searching for potentially exonerating evidence as well.

One study had participants try to gather types of evidence (physical or person) to corroborate their own whereabouts for a specific timeframe either before or after rating the believability of another’s alibi (Olson & Wells, 2011). Regardless of the amount of time participants had to retrace in order to corroborate (either 3 days or 30 days), participants rated other peoples’ alibis as more believable when they had previously had to generate their own alibi. It appears that having gone through the corroboration process makes people sensitive to the difficulty of gathering proof. As such, they are less strenuous in the expectations they have for what evidence others should produce. The influence of experiencing how difficult the alibi corroboration process can be changed participants’ beliefs about what should be required for other people to provide an alibi corroboration.

Another study found that nearly 80% of participants who were required to find evidence to prove their whereabouts for a certain time initially provided an alibi that they
later changed even when told the first time that they could say they did not remember (Charman, Cahill, Leins, & Carol, 2009). Students filled out a questionnaire that asked where they were at during several points of time and should return a few days later with any evidence they could find to corroborate these whereabouts, though in the process of gathering this evidence many realized their original statements were incorrect. Additionally, they were highly confident in the initial alibi (which was wrong in some cases) because they reported what they typically do at that time every day. Participants reported using scripts of their normal behaviors rather than basing the alibi on the actual memory of what they were doing at that specific time, but then had to change their story once the participants attempted to gather evidence to support the alibi. Because people appear to rely on something other than actual memory for an event, then if the corroboration fits into a person’s normal routine activities then there is no problem because using a typical day’s script will be correct. However if the corroboration falls in a time when something out of the ordinary occurs, a script will lead to an initially incorrect account of that timeframe which, as we learn later, leads police investigators to discount the alibi altogether and prevent it from getting to trial (Dysart, 2009). Additional research may be beneficial here in trying to find a way to get alibis to switch the type of memory they are accessing during the corroboration process - to rely on genuine memory rather than their normal day script. Without this research, we are assessing what people think they would do if asked to be an alibi corroborator for someone and not what they would a say if they actually remembered the specific timeframe.

Many have assumed that friends would be more likely to provide an alibi for a suspect than strangers simply because they are inherently more invested in the
process, but a recent study found this was not the case: friends (people manipulated to feel closer to a suspect) were no more likely than strangers to corroborate a suspect’s alibi (Marion & Burke, 2009). In this study, friends were manipulated by inducing perceived similarity and completing tasks together, but this may not have really tapped into the actual qualities that might make friends more likely to be an alibi corroborator (such as knowing about the suspects’ character over an extended period of time). The current study sought to strengthen this manipulation by looking at pairs of previously existing friends rather than trying to induce a friendship during the study timeframe. In that way, we expected to be better able to differentiate between alibi-suspect pairs of friends or pairs of strangers.

Another study looked at the types of alibis police investigators often come in contact with and their opinions on them (Dysart, 2009). Only 23% of these investigators had training on how to interview alibi corroborators, and 82% of police investigators interviewed said anytime the person changes their story, it is because they are lying in support of the suspect (either out of fear of the suspect, or to protect them). Police indicated that alibi corroborations from non-motivated others, or corroborations that contained physical evidence of the suspect’s whereabouts at the time of the crime were the most believable, but these types of situations were hard to come by because, most often, the corroborators the police encountered were family or friends. Overall, police generally do not trust alibi evidence and 24% of the time, police reported failing to investigate the alibi fully. This research suggests that even when an alibi is possible, it may not make it through the generation process that would allow the person to testify in the suspect’s defense.
Interaction Effects

With a few exceptions, psycho-legal research to date has neglected the possibility that the independent pieces of evidence used to convict a person may interact to work in ways that exacerbate the effects each piece would have individually. Given that 52% of the 271 wrongful conviction cases (to date) have more than one listed contributing factor, we can no longer assume that to be true (www.innocenceproject.org; Kassin, 2009). A recent study by two psychology researchers is one of the only experiments that has taken this possibility of interdependence into account (which will be discussed in detail below), and provided evidence that this interaction effect is indeed happening (Hasel & Kassin, 2009). It is therefore feasible to think that other types of evidence may interact to result in a similar pattern.

There has been some evidence that social variables can affect the way that both fingerprint and DNA analysts make match decisions. Dror and colleagues had latent fingerprint examiners study their own previous matches and non-matches a second time (Dror, Charlton, & Peron, 2006; Dror & Charlton, 2006). Five years after the print was first classified, examiners consented to being tested using their previous matches sometime within the next year. When these prints were presented in combination with contextual information (like the suspect had confessed or was in police custody during the time of the crime) indicating that the print match decision should be in the opposite direction of their original decision, examiners changed their original decision more often than when given no contextual information. That is, receiving unrelated information indicating their initial decision was incorrect caused the examiners to change their match decisions (even when the information provided was fictional).
Similar results were found when researchers used biasing information that contained emotional information about the crime as opposed to contextual factors; examiners were more likely to change their previous match/no-match decision in the direction of the information provided than if they were given no emotional information (Dror, Peron, Hind, & Charlton, 2005). Examiners also seem to be aware of the influence, as even when they were provided with this emotional information and did not change their decisions, they still said the emotional information affected them (Hall & Player, 2008). These studies demonstrated how easily simple contextual information can affect an outcome in the case of a fingerprint match decision. Our study hypothesizes that contextual information may affect other outcomes as well – specifically, a decision whether to be an alibi corroborator for a suspect.

DNA analysts are vulnerable to many of the same influences that fingerprint analysts are when subjected to extraneous information about a case. Contrary to popular belief, DNA matching is not infallible and is subject to human error (Thompson, 1997). In fact, DNA examiners can be influenced by extraneous factors like social information, and this information can play a role in the decisions DNA examiners make about whether a DNA sample matches DNA taken from a crime scene. Some researchers posit that these types of analysts essentially work for law enforcement agencies, and as such are likely to embrace the agency’s goals as their own (Thompson, 1997). There are analysts who flat out lie to help the police department, but even when misconduct is not that obvious and it is not known the analyst has a history of such behavior, there is still the possibility that other factors could influence an examiner’s match/no-match decision. Even seemingly small comments or a directional
hypothesis can bias examiners to decide in one way or the other. Essentially, if one conceptualizes the DNA test as an experiment, revealing the hypothesis of the experiment (by telling the DNA examiner the expected outcome of the test – either to include or exclude a suspect) can result in investigator bias (Thompson, 1997). That is, the DNA examiner is then not blind to the hypotheses of the police investigators, and is susceptible to seeing what they expect to see when interpreting results. This is especially common when the DNA is not a clear inclusion or exclusion (meaning it is ambiguous) and thus requires the analyst to use their own human judgment to make a subjective assessment of how close a match it is to the comparison (Risinger, Saks, Thompson, & Rosenthal, 2002). This acceptance of human decision making as the primary method of determination can leave this type of evidence open to the possibility of interference from other factors like the social influences previously discussed.

Even though social influence information can be a problem in DNA matching and fingerprinting, these types of evidence allow for correction if social information has influenced their interpretations. Specifically, with both DNA and fingerprint evidence, the investigators are able to go back later to double check whether analysis was completed correctly. In other words, the actual evidence (i.e., the fingerprints or DNA sample) is kept intact for future reference. This is not the case with witness evidence like eyewitness identifications or alibi corroborations. With evidence involving a person’s memory, the original evidence (i.e., the person’s accurate memory for the event) is not preserved. That is, the presentation of social information can permanently alter the memory of the witness. Once an alibi corroborator has been told about a confession, the effect this influential information has on the witness’s willingness to provide an alibi
and their beliefs about their own memories may be permanent; their memory might be forever modified.

The recent study by Hasel and Kassin demonstrates how pieces of contextual information (i.e., a suspect’s confession) has the potential to change other evidence (2009). Specifically, the researchers were interested in how learning about a confession would affect an eyewitness’s lineup decision and confidence level in that decision when choosing from a lineup. In the study, participants witnessed a staged crime (a laptop theft), were immediately given a 6 person suspect-absent lineup, asked “Which of these people, if any, stole the laptop today?” (p 123), and were told to give a confidence rating associated with their decision. The same participants returned two days later and were randomly assigned to be told one of four conditions: 1) the person the witness selected from the initial lineup confessed, 2) all suspects denied involvement, 3) the selected person denied involvement, or 4) another person (not the one the eyewitness initially selected from the lineup) confessed to stealing the laptop. When relevant, participants were shown a signed confession. If they did not select someone from the initial lineup, they were randomly assigned to one of the three conditions: 1) an unidentified person confessed, 2) all suspects denied involvement, or 3) a specific person confessed. All participants were asked to reconsider their decision from the initial lineup (even if they did not choose) and again gave confidence ratings.

Of the participants who chose a person from the first lineup, 2.44% changed when told their initially selected person confessed, 11.62% changed their decision when told all suspects denied having been involved, 27.91% changed when told their selected person denied the crime, and 60.86% changed their lineup selection to a different
person when told that person confessed to the crime. A similar pattern was also found with those who did not select a person from the initial lineup. Not one person changed their selection when told everyone denied involvement, 44.67% changed when told an unidentified person confessed, and 50.00% changed when told a specific other confessed.

The confession altered witness’ memories for the event, making witnesses who selected from the lineup more confident when they were given confirming feedback (the chosen person from the lineup confessed to the crime) than those who were told nothing at all. The witnesses were also likely to change their identification choices when faced with disconfirming feedback through a confession from another person in the lineup (or from anyone when they had initially said the suspect was not present); it follows that those witnesses had low confidence ratings. Because reported confidence by an eyewitness has such a big influence on jurors when testifying in a courtroom (regardless of its weak correlation with accuracy), witness’ confidence ratings should be recorded before any potentially biasing statements are said or heard.

If an eyewitness account changes in both lineup selection as well as the eyewitness’s confidence when faced with disconfirming evidence, like a confession, it is possible that other pieces of evidence may change shape as well. More specifically, alibis with person evidence and eyewitness accounts can be conceptualized as similar because they both involve another human’s recollection of what occurred during the time of a crime (Olsen & Wells, 2004). With eyewitness identification, the eyewitness is remembering the situation and the face of the perpetrator to prove the suspect is the actual perpetrator, whereas with an alibi a potential corroborator is remembering the
description and face of another person to prove they could not have committed the crime. Thus, it is possible that alibi corroborators may be as likely as eyewitnesses to change their accounts when presented with disconfirming evidence.

**Overview of the Current Study**

In light of all this past research, we created a study to examine if evidence interaction can happen when alibi corroborators hear about confession information. If an alibi corroborator changes their recollection when presented with disconfirming feedback (that the suspect confessed to the crime), then this is an additional interaction effect we should be aware of during both the investigation and trial phases of a criminal case. If a person falsely confesses and this causes the alibi corroborator(s) in the case to withdraw evidence, the defendant not only has the possibly false confession acting as inculpatory evidence, but they also no longer have the corroborator(s) to serve an exculpatory function. To test this research question, we manipulated both the relationship between the suspect and corroborator, and the timing of presentation of the confession evidence.

We employed a two-part experimental design. During the first session, participants and a friend interacted with several other pairs completing team building activities. This served as the timeframe that a crime supposedly took place. Approximately two or three days later, the participants returned to the lab to participate in the second phase. Each person was randomly assigned to a condition in which they were told that either their friend, a non-motivated familiar other, or a stranger (one of the people they met during the previous session) was suspected of stealing an portable music player during the study a few days earlier. The research assistant, blind to the relationship between the suspect and the potential alibi corroborator, acted as an
investigator by questioning the potential alibi corroborator’s memory for the first session. In conditions containing false confession evidence, the potential corroborators were told the suspect had confessed earlier in the day and also presented with a written confession from the suspect. In one condition, the corroborator was asked if he would be willing to serve as an alibi corroborator for that person prior to hearing about a confession (then subsequently asked again after hearing such). In the other confession condition, the corroborator was given all information (the suspect and the confession) at once and then asked about their willingness. In the control condition, the potential alibi corroborators were asked about their willingness to serve as such without hearing any information about a confession. Participants also filled out an alibi questionnaire assessing several qualities described below, and then were fully debriefed about the purpose of the study (and the need for using deception during the first session). Therefore, this study was a 3 x 3 between subjects factorial design.

First, we predicted a main effect for both manipulations. For the relationship manipulations, we expected participants in the friend condition would be more likely to provide an alibi for the suspect than those in a condition with a lesser relationship (the non-motivated familiar other or stranger conditions, respectively). For the confession manipulations, we predicted that this kind of evidence interaction would happen; potential alibi corroborators who were presented with confession evidence in either confession condition would be less likely to provide an alibi than those who were given no confession information. Within this manipulation, we thought the participants who never heard the confession information would be most likely to provide an alibi, and those who heard all the information at once would be least likely to provide an alibi. In
the third confession manipulation, we want to see if we can get participants who initially provide an alibi when they have not heard the confession to switch their decision and no longer want to provide such once this information is presented to them.

Further, we expected these main effects would be qualified by a higher order interaction between the two independent variables; those who were friends with the suspect (in other words, motivated corroborators) would be less likely to believe the confession evidence and therefore maintain their corroboration than strangers or non-motivated familiar others would be. This would demonstrate a potential problem for the court system because alibi corroborators who are most likely to be correct in their memory (and therefore should be corroborating the alibi) are the motivated others because they are more likely to remember the suspect and less likely to be influenced by the confession evidence. However we know these are the people who are the least likely to be believed in a court setting (Culhane & Hosch, 2004). Non-motivated familiar others or strangers may be likely to believe the confession evidence (and thus drop out as an alibi corroborators) because they may be less likely to remember the suspect, but they would be the preferred person to testify in court because they are more likely to be believed by jurors than by motivated alibi corroborators.
CHAPTER 2
METHOD

Participant Sample

469 students (263 participant alibis (PAs) and 206 participant friends (PFs)) were recruited through the use of a participant pool in the department of Sociology and Criminology & Law, or in classes with the permission of the instructor. PAs participated in exchange for course credit, and alternative assignments were available if they did not want to participate in either phase of the study. PAs were all asked to bring a friend (PF) with them to the first session and all participants were over 18 years old. Fifty-seven PAs were eliminated from analyses because they did not bring a friend to the first session, and an additional 39 PFs wished not to be used for the second part of the study (thus the PAs could not be randomly assigned to relationship condition). All the participants removed until this point were done prior to the random assignment to conditions. Eleven PAs who were suspicious of the actual aim of the study were eliminated from analysis. No PAs revealed that they learned about the purpose of the study from the friend they brought to the first session. In total, four PAs failed the confession evidence manipulation check (described below) and were not included in the analyses. One PA opted to withdraw his data at the end of the study so his information was eliminated as well. In total, 16 participant's responses were eliminated after random assignment took place (out of 166 fully completed participants) which is an attrition rate of less than 10%. This left us with the final sample of 302 participants (151 PAs recruited through UF and 151 PFs brought to the first session by the PAs). The participants of interest in this study were the PAs.
Our final sample of PAs consisted of 66% females and 34% males which is consistent with the makeup of the Criminology undergraduate population at UF. The ages ranged from 18-32, with a mean age of 20.39 years. We had students from each class (9% freshmen, 23% sophomores, 40% juniors, and 28% seniors). Most of our participants were White (52%) with Black second (21%), Hispanic a close third (15%), followed by Asian (4%), Cuban (4%), Latino (2%) and Other (1%), and 1% did not select a racial category.

**Design**

We used a 3 (suspect-alibi relationship: friend v. non-motivated familiar other v. stranger) x 3 (suspect confession: corroborator learned about a confession before initial questioning (CBQ) v. corroborator learned about a confession after initial questioning (CAQ) v. no confession (NC)) between subjects factorial design.

**Independent Variables**

**Confession manipulation**

In the no confession condition (as further indicated by NC), the researcher showed a picture of the suspect and asked if they would be willing to be an alibi for this suspect, then wrote down their dichotomous Yes/No response. In the confession before questioning condition (indicated by CBQ), PAs were shown the written confession from the suspect along with their picture and subsequently asked about their willingness to be an alibi. In the confession after questioning (indicated by CAQ) condition, the researcher presented the PA with the picture, asked if they would be willing to serve as an alibi, and marked down the PA’s initial response. The researcher then explained that the suspect had confessed to the crime and showed the suspect’s written confession to
the PA. The experimenter then again asked whether the PA was willing to be an alibi corroborator for that suspect.

In the CBQ condition, the experimenter informed the PA that the suspect had been questioned earlier in the day and signed a written confession accepting responsibility for their actions and any punishment deemed fair by the principle investigator. They were shown the written confession and asked if they would like to be an alibi for that person. If PAs were in conditions without a confession, this information was not present. We included a manipulation check question in the alibi questionnaire to ensure that this manipulation worked by asking the participant to respond to the following statement on a six point Likert-type scale (one indicating strongly disagree and 6 indicating strongly agree): I was told during questioning that the suspect confessed to taking the portable music player (Appendix K, Part C). We split this scale at the midpoint to dichotomize the variable, and any participant in confession conditions that responded with a one, two, or three (indicating disagreement) were removed from analyses, and any participants in the NC condition who responded with a four, five, or six (indicating agreement) were also removed. In total, four participants failed this confession evidence manipulation check.

**Closeness manipulation**

During the second session, PAs were randomly assigned to learn that the person suspected of stealing the missing portable music player was either (1) the friend they brought to the first session, (2) a non-motivated familiar other (like a classmate), or (3) a stranger (someone the participant had never previously met). PAs were asked during the first session to rate how close they felt to each person present on a one to seven Likert-type scale (with one indicating stranger and seven indicating friend; included in
Appendix F). For participants assigned to the friend condition, the suspect was the person they brought with them to the first session. For participants in the non-motivated familiar other condition, the suspect was chosen by taking the average of their ratings for each person present and selected a PF from that session that was closest to that average. Last, for participants assigned to the stranger condition, the suspect was the PF from the first session who the PA rated lowest on the scale.

We included a closeness level manipulation check question in the alibi questionnaire (Appendix K, Part C). Participants were asked to agree with the statement ‘I consider the suspect to be a friend’ on a 6 point Likert-type scale ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree. A one-way ANOVA using relationship closeness as the independent variable and participants’ responses to the question as a dependent measure showed our manipulation was mostly successful; there was an effect of relationship closeness on participants’ responses to this question, $F(2, 148) = 267.69, p<.01$. Post-hoc tests using least squares difference indicated that participants in the friend condition were more likely than participants in either the non-motivated familiar other condition or the stranger condition to agree that the suspect was a friend (friend: $M = 5.71$ ($CI$ $5.47 – 5.95$), non-motivated familiar other: $M = 1.78$ ($CI$ $1.47 – 2.09$), stranger: $M = 1.79$ ($CI$ $1.52 – 2.05$). However, participants in the stranger condition did not significantly differ from participants in the non-motivated familiar other condition, which indicates that we may not have adequately captured the non-motivated familiar other category since both that group and the stranger group tended to disagree with the above statement equally. This could also be a floor effect in that people view both friends and strangers equally on our measures.
Dependent Measures

Alibi Questions

First, we asked participants to verbally respond to the question: “Would you be willing to serve as an alibi for this person?” This dichotomous yes/no response served as our primary dependent variable. For participants in the NC condition, this question was asked after learning about the portable music player theft and the identity of the suspect. For participants in the CBQ condition, this question was asked after hearing about the portable music player theft, the identity of the suspect, and the suspect’s confession. For participants in the after condition, this was asked after learning about the portable music player theft and the identity of the suspect, but prior to hearing about the confession information. These responses serve as the alibi willingness for time one. Participant in the CAQ condition were asked to respond to the alibi willingness question a second time after being told about the confession. The two alibi question responses from participants in the CAQ condition were used to compute a variable measuring whether participants changed their alibi decision as a result of hearing about the suspect’s confession. All participants were also asked to respond yes or no to the same question on the alibi questionnaire (administered after each manipulation was completed).

Alibi Corroboration Scales

We then created 6 main scales out of the questions from the alibi questionnaire. A full copy of all dependent measures from the alibi questionnaire as they appeared to participants is included in Appendix K. Unless otherwise indicated, participants were asked to provide agreement with all subsequent items, rated on Likert type scales ranging from 1 to 6, with one indicating strong disagreement and six indicating strong
agreement. All scaled items were summed and averaged to create one scale score. Reverse coded items are indicated by (R). Some scales include all reverse coded or no reverse coded questions because the order was mixed to encourage accurate reading of each question prior to giving a response. Some questions that did not factor onto the hypothesized scales were dropped from analyses.

**Willingness to be an alibi**

The first scale focused on general alibi corroboration willingness with higher scores indicating the participant was more willing to provide an alibi for the suspect. Participants responded to the following 5 questions to measure alibi willingness (α = .77): a) I am sure about my willingness to stand up for this suspect’s opinion of events during the night in question; b) I am a little unsure if this suspect is the actual perpetrator (R); c) There is no doubt in my mind about my decision to offer an alibi for this suspect; d) I have some hesitation in providing an alibi for this person because I think they might have actually committed the act (R); e) I question if serving as an alibi for this person is something I should do (R).

**Alibi strength**

We also created a scale to assess the strength with which the participants offered their alibi (or how sure the participant was that he or she would be an alibi for that person). All three items were reverse coded to ensure that higher numbers indicated more strength or confidence in offering an alibi (α = .75): a) I am 100% confident that the suspect is the person who took the portable music player during the first session (R); b) There is nothing that could convince me that the perpetrator was anyone other than this suspect (R); c) If I were on a jury hearing this case, I would convict the suspect (R).
Alibi depth

The next scale we created assessed the depth of corroboration through the criminal justice system that the suspect would be willing to go through to maintain their alibi providing evidence of the suspect’s innocence. This involved seven hypothetical situations (each in its own question) increasing in stress to the corroborator related to completing this task, ultimately ending in testifying for that person in court as that would be the highest level of investment the alibi corroborator could have in the suspect’s situation. Higher scores on this scale indicate willingness to proceed further into the criminal justice process in order to maintain their alibi for this suspect. The questions assessing how deep into the alibi process the PA would be willing to go are (α = .98): a) I would be willing to tell the suspect that I believe he was NOT the one who took the portable music player; b) I would be willing to tell the suspect’s significant other that I would serve as an alibi corroborator for the suspect; c) I would be willing to provide an alibi to the suspect’s employer; d) I would be willing to provide an alibi for this suspect during a police interview; e) I would be willing to provide an alibi for the suspect by talking with both the trial attorneys; f) I would be willing to provide an alibi for the suspect that required me to take a polygraph test; and g) I would be willing to provide an alibi for the suspect by testifying in a criminal trial.

Alibi confidence

Following each of the depth questions above, each question also had a paired item to assess how sure the PA was that he or she would actually be willing to provide an alibi in that particular situation. The responses were specific to how sure the participant was that he or she would be willing to go through that particular criminal justice stage in order to maintain their alibi corroboration, not just how sure they were
about being an alibi in general (this was assessed by scale 2). Again, higher scores indicate more confidence that the participant would provide an alibi throughout the criminal justice system stages (α = .90): a) I am unsure of whether I would want to get involved in the alibi corroboration process at all (R); b) I would feel comfortable talking with this suspect’s significant other about what happened during the first session; c) I question whether vouching for this suspect to his employer is something I want to do (R); d) I am unsure if I would put myself through police questioning in order to corroborate the suspect’s story (R); e) I am sure talking with the trial attorneys would not be a problem for me to do; f) I hesitate somewhat to submit to a polygraph test in order to vouch for this suspect (R); and g) I would worry about going to court in order to testify for this suspect (R).

**Memory for the event**

PA’s beliefs about their memory for the events of the first session was assessed by scaling responses to the following 6 items, higher scores indicated belief their memory was better than average, not that their memory actually was. (α = .88): a) I believe my memory for the event in question is good; b) I am not sure if I remember exactly what happened during the first session (R); c) I can account for the suspect’s actions during the entire first session; d) During the first session, there are more than 15 minutes in which I’m unsure of where the suspect was (R); e) I believe I could recite everything that happened during the first session; and f) I am confident that my account of what happened is accurate.

**Viewing conditions**

The next questions measured PAs’ beliefs about their viewing conditions during the first session. Higher scores indicated the PAs believed they had better viewing
conditions (α = .89): a) I had a good view of the suspect throughout the first session; b) My view of the suspect and his or her actions were clear during the entire first session; c) I am NOT confident that I kept track of the suspect’s actions during the first session (R); d) I was able to keep an eye on everyone’s behavior during the first session; e) I did NOT have a clear view of the suspect for most of the first session (R); f) My view of the suspect was obstructed during some portion of the first session (R); and g) I had a good view of the suspect taking the portable music player.

Confession Question Analyses

We also created a two item scale to assess each participant’s belief in the suspect’s confession (α = .88), with higher numbers indicating more belief that the suspect actually confessed to stealing the portable music player. This scale was comprised of the following questions: a) I believe the suspect confessed to the crime in question; and b) I believe the suspect did not confess to the crime in question. In addition, we asked the following question: I think the suspect was coerced into confessing to taking the portable music player.

Procedure

Participants signed up in the Criminology, Law and Society Participant Pool for a 2-part study called Team Building in Friends and Strangers. The first session served as the timeframe that the so-called crime took place (though no crime actually occurred, no portable music player was stolen). The second session was used to probe PAs for their memory of the activities and other people’s actions during that time and their willingness to serve as an alibi corroborator for the suspect in question. PAs were also asked to bring a friend with them to the first session and those who failed to do so were not included in the analyses to ensure each person had an equal chance at being randomly
assigned to any of the relationship conditions. The second session was completed individually (no PFs were present and the PAs were run one at a time).

**The First Session**

Upon signing up for the study online, PAs and PFs showed up to a classroom in groups of up to 20 people (10 PAs and 10 PFs). We also included at least two confederates from our lab that acted as participants throughout each session for two reasons. First, confederates were included to ensure any group did not get too small; the smallest group that was tested included 8 people, although the majority of groups (20) included 18-20 members (enough to make the room crowded). Of the total 33 groups, there was: 1 group of 8, 1 group of 9, 2 groups of 12, 2 groups of 14, 2 groups of 15, 3 groups of 16, 2 groups of 17, 9 groups of 18, 2 groups of 19, 5 groups of 20, and 4 groups of 22. We also instructed the confederates to leave the room (for the restroom, a drink of water) at some point during the activities for a few minutes to mimic a ‘party’ setting. All participants filled out an informed consent document (attached in Appendix A) explaining that they would take part in some team building activities and complete closeness scales (as a ruse for creating the event for the first session). Once signed, everyone filled out two closeness scales to increase the believability of the fake study: one to assess the level of bond they feel with their friend (attached in Appendix B), and another to assess closeness with the “team”, or the other participants and their friends who they had not previously met (attached in Appendix C). Then, they engaged in several team building activities while interacting with both the friends as well as the strangers by forming smaller groups made up of 5-8 people that changed with each new activity (script for session one attached in Appendix D, list of team building activities attached in Appendix E). This portion of the study lasted about an hour and a half, and
the activities were timed to ensure each group completed exactly 45 minutes of interaction. At times PAs were in groups with their PF, but at other times they were not.

Near the end of the session, everyone again filled out the same closeness scales (Appendix B and C), presumably to test whether participants’ bonds had changed in the previous hours as a result of the team building activities. We also took a digital photo of each person without smiling (later used in the second session to identify the suspect), made a PowerPoint show with each picture on a slide, then had all participants rate how close they felt to every other person in the room on a one to seven Likert scale (with one indicating the person was a stranger and seven indicating the person was a friend; attached in Appendix F). This scale was the basis for our relationship condition assignments (and to ensure a range of relationship levels were present for each person). Last, we separated the PAs and PFs into two rooms where the debriefing was completed. The PAs were given a fake debriefing (attached in Appendix G) saying that we hypothesized team building activities to increase bonds with strangers, but not with friends. The debriefing also mentioned that we were interested in whether this was a lasting effect and thus the reason for the second session (to collect closeness scale information after a 2-3 day delay). They were thanked for their participation, awarded class credit for the current session, and reminded of their time for the second session a few days later.

PFs (in the other room) were also thanked for their participation, were told the full, final study debriefing (required by IRB, attached in Appendix H), and explicitly told NOT to discuss any details with the PAs over the next week as it was crucial to our study that PAs not learn about the actual purpose of the study prior to coming to the second
session. We stressed the importance of the study to the John Kogut case described in the introduction of this thesis and explained how any leaked information could significantly compromise our results. We also asked the PFs to write out a short confession to show the PAs if they were in the conditions in which the PA was told the suspect confessed. The confession read as follows: “I admit that I took the portable music player during the session on (date) and am willing to accept any punishment the investigator thinks is appropriate.” and was signed by the PF at the bottom of the page. PFs had the option to indicate that they did not want their name, picture, or confession used in the second session. Thirty-nine PFs opted to do this; the data from the PAs who brought these PFs to the study was not used because of the lack of ability to randomly assign the PA to the relationship condition.

The Second Session

Two or three days later, PAs who choose to continue with the study reported to the lab individually for their second session timeslots. They were randomly assigned to one of the nine cells in the study design. They were again given an informed consent document (maintaining the team building cover story, Attached in Appendix I) and filled out both the friend and team closeness scales (Appendices B and C). After finishing both scales, PAs were told that an portable music player was taken during the team building session (which did not actually happen). They were told that the research assistant wanted to question the PA about their memory for that timeframe (script for the second session attached in Appendix J). All materials were prepared ahead of time by the principle investigator, and the research assistant was blind to which relationship condition the PA was assigned to. The researchers only knew which confession condition to use. The research assistant presented the picture of the suspect taken
during the first session to help the PA recall the suspect and to make the questioning similar to a real criminal investigation where a mugshot might be presented. The research assistant then told the PA that this person had been accused while the research assistant was questioning other PAs earlier that day. In conditions with confessions, the investigator also presented the written confession as well, either before asking the PA if he would serve as an alibi in the CBQ condition (giving all the information at once), or following the alibi willingness question in the CAQ condition (telling them who the suspect is and asking about alibi willingness, then showing the confession and asking about willingness again).

PAs then filled out the alibi questionnaire (attached in Appendix K) designed to further examine those decisions and assess the depth of their commitment to providing the alibi corroboration for the suspect. The second session typically took about 20 minutes. We also checked for leaked information from friends on this questionnaire by explaining that it was completely ok if they had learned information from their friend, but we just needed to be able to account for it. PAs were assured they would not lose any credit by revealing that they were told anything by their friend. Afterwards PAs were thanked, awarded class credit, and debriefed again - this time with the full study debriefing that their PFs received after the first session (Appendix L). To ensure that no harm was done to participants we also asked them to indicate whether they felt distressed or upset at any point during the session and if so, to describe what made them feel this way and if there is anything we could do to keep that from happening (required for approval by IRB). All but two people indicated they had a positive, enjoyable experience and felt little to no stress throughout either part of the study.
Those two participants indicated moderate stress from having to be questioned about a theft.
CHAPTER 3
RESULTS

Before running any analyses, all data was entered twice into two separate datasets. These were merged to compare each data line for inconsistencies and mistakes in entry and then compared back to the original data when any discrepancies were found. We also ran frequency analyses on each variable to find any responses that were out of range and to ensure each of the variables were entered in the correctly coded direction. After running the hypothesized analyses reported below, each of our analyses was run again including the covariates race, gender, which researcher ran the second session, and if the student had previously taken Psychology and Law to ensure random assignment was completed correctly and that there were no differences between analyses completed with these controls and the ones reported below. We did find an interaction between experimenter and confession status in the coercion analysis, however we had a large number of experimenters that only ran a few sessions. Because of that, it is possible these results are most likely not reliably demonstrating any bias (and because this was the only significant result in all the tests of covariation; it is possible it is spurious). Principle components factor analyses with a varimax rotation were run on each of the hypothesized scale items to ensure each scale was assessing the construct it was designed to assess. We kept any items that loaded above .7 on the factor. Each scale was then tested to ensure reliability of at least $\alpha = .7$ (all Chronbach’s alpha levels and scales assembled after factor analyses can be found in the dependent measures section of the method). Results were reported using a 95% confidence interval; this is standard practice for most psychology studies. Any findings that were significant at the 0.10 confidence level were reported as marginally significant.
Does Relationship to the Suspect and Confession Presence Affect Whether a Potential Alibi Will Proffer an Alibi?

Participants’ responses to the initial alibi question were analyzed using a backwards, stepwise logistic regression with relationship status, confession status, and their interaction as independent variables. The stranger and NC conditions were coded as comparison groups. The final model included two main effects, \( \chi^2 (4) = 55.86, p < .01, R^2 = .31 \). There was a main effect of relationship status on participants’ decisions to be an alibi (Table 3-1); friends were more likely than strangers to offer an alibi (89% were willing to be an alibi versus 32%, respectively). There were no differences between the non-motivated familiar others (30%) and strangers on this measure.

There was an overall main effect of confession status on the PA’s decision whether be an alibi as well. Participants who heard confession evidence before being asked to serve as alibis were significantly less likely to do so than those who did not (39% were willing to be an alibi versus 60%, respectively). Recall that this question was asked prior to when participants in the CAQ condition were told about the confession. Thus, participants in the CAQ condition should look exactly the same as the participants in the NC condition. Accordingly, there were no significant differences in decisions whether to be an alibi between participants in the CAQ condition (52% were willing to be an alibi corroborator) and participants who did not hear about a confession.

Table 3-1. Logistic regression examining time 1 alibi willingness

| Variable  | \( \beta \)  | St. Error | Wald’s \( \chi^2 \) | p>|\( \beta \)| | exp(\( \beta \)) |
|-----------|--------------|-----------|---------------------|-----------------|----------------|
| Relation  | 32.68        | <.01      |                     |                 |                |
| NMFO      | -.13         | .44       | .09                 | .76             | .87            |
| Friend    | 3.05*        | .58       | 27.28               | <.01            | 21.10          |
| Confession| 6.28         | .04       |                     |                 |                |
| CBQ       | -1.27*       | .51       | 6.27                | .01             | .28            |
| CAQ       | -.47         | .47       | .98                 | .32             | .63            |

* indicates significance
After hearing about the confession, participants in the CAQ condition had the option to switch their alibi corroboration decision. To assess whether people in the CAQ condition would be more likely to change their alibi decision in the stranger relationship condition versus the friend relationship condition, we ran a Chi Square Test to determine if the relationship manipulation affected PAs’ decisions to change their alibi. We isolated those in the CAQ condition that changed their decision for this test (they were the only participants asked whether they would like to switch their alibi decision. We predicted that strangers would be more likely than friends to change from being willing to provide an alibi to no longer wanting to serve as such when confronted with the confession. However these results were not significant, $\chi^2 (2, N=161) = 1.13, p = .57$. While all people who changed the decision went from providing an alibi to not providing one, participants did not differ in their likelihood to change their alibi decision whether they were in a friend (27%), non-motivated familiar other (13%), or stranger (25%) condition; participants were equally likely to change from offering an alibi to withdrawing that alibi regardless of their relationship to the suspect.

A second question asking participants to respond dichotomously (yes/no) whether they would provide an alibi for the suspect was asked on the alibi questionnaire (after the participants in the CAQ condition heard about the confession following their initial decision whether to be an alibi). We again ran a backwards, stepwise logistic regression regressing the alibi question onto confession status, relationship status, and the interaction between these variables. The stranger and NC conditions were again coded as the comparison groups. The overall model was also significant, $\chi^2 (4) = 63.65, p <.01, R^2 = .34$ (Table 3-2). There was an overall effect of relationship status on
participants’ willingness to be an alibi at time two. Friends (85%) were significantly more likely than strangers (28%) to provide an alibi, however non-motivated familiar others (21%) were not different than strangers in this respect.

There was again a significant effect of confession status on participants’ willingness to be an alibi at time two as well. Participants who heard about confession evidence prior to being asked to serve as alibis (39%) were significantly less likely than participants who heard no confession (60%) to serve as alibis. There was also significant difference between the CAQ group (34%) and the NC group (again, 60%) that we expected given that this question was asked after the CAQ group heard about the suspect’s confession. Participants in the CAQ group looked more like the CBQ group during the time two questioning because both were significantly less likely to offer an alibi for the suspect than people who were never told about the suspect’s confession.

| Table 3-2. Logistic regression examining time two alibi willingness |
|-----------------------|-------|-------|------------------|------------------|
| Variable              | β     | St. Error | Wald’s χ²  | p>|z| |
| Relation              |       |          |              |                  |
| NMFO                  | -.40  | .48      | .70          | .40              | .67            |
| Friend                | 2.95  | .55      | 28.63        | <.01             | 19.07          |
| Confession            |       |          |              |                  |
| CBQ                   | -1.29 | .51      | 6.38         | .01              | .28            |
| CAQ                   | -1.61 | .54      | 9.05         | <.01             | .92            |

* indicates significances

**Does the Relationship to the Suspect and Confession Presence Affect Participants’ Overall Likelihood of Corroboration?**

We predicted that the level of bond the PA felt with the suspect would affect the PA’s likelihood of corroborating for that person, so we ran a MANOVA to test the effect of relationship status and confession status and the interaction between these two variables on participants’ responses on the first 4 of our scales: willingness to be an alibi, strength of alibi, alibi depth, and alibi confidence. These scales were all included
in the same analyses because they assess very similar concepts (likelihood of corroborating). There was an overall significant effect of relationship status on the scales, $\lambda = .53$, $F(8, 272) = 12.92$, $p<.01$, $\eta^2 = .28$.

Tests at the scalar level showed a main effect of relationship status on each of the 4 scales (Table 3-3 for means and significant differences for each group). Overall, there was an effect of relationship status on participants’ willingness to be an alibi, $F(2, 139) = 41.09$, $p<.01$, $\eta^2 = .37$. Post hoc tests using LSD showed that participants in the friend condition were more willing to be an alibi than participants in the non-motivated familiar other condition and the stranger condition. Participants in the stranger and non-motivated familiar other conditions did not differ in their willingness to be an alibi.

There was an overall main effect of relationship status on participants’ responses to the alibi strength scale, $F(2, 139) = 4.03$, $p<.02$, $\eta^2 = .06$. Participants in the friend condition offered stronger alibis than participants in the non-motivated familiar other or stranger conditions; however, the difference between friend and stranger was only marginally significant. Again, participants in the stranger and non-motivated familiar other conditions did not differ in the strength with which they offered their alibis.

There was an effect of relationship status on participants’ responses to the alibi depth scale as well, $F(2, 139) = 53.94$, $p<.01$, $\eta^2 = .44$. Participants in the friend condition scored higher on the alibi depth scale than both non-motivated familiar others and strangers. Participants in the stranger and non-motivated familiar other conditions did not differ in their alibi depth scores.

Last, there was a main effect of relationship status on participants’ responses to the alibi confidence scale, $F(2, 139) = 34.57$, $p<.01$, $\eta^2 = .33$. Specifically, friends
scored higher on alibi confidence than non-motivated familiar others or strangers.

Again, participants in the stranger and non-motivated familiar other conditions did not differ in their alibi confidence.

Table 3-3. Main effect of relationship status on likelihood of corroboration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strangers (CI)</th>
<th>NMFO (CI)</th>
<th>Friend (CI)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Willingness to be</td>
<td>3.59&lt;sub&gt;a&lt;/sub&gt; (3.32–3.87)</td>
<td>3.47&lt;sub&gt;b&lt;/sub&gt; (3.20–3.75)</td>
<td>5.09&lt;sub&gt;ab&lt;/sub&gt; (4.91–5.37)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>an alibi</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strength of alibi</td>
<td>5.19&lt;sub&gt;a&lt;/sub&gt; (4.98–5.40)</td>
<td>5.06&lt;sub&gt;b&lt;/sub&gt; (4.85–5.27)</td>
<td>5.49&lt;sub&gt;ab&lt;/sub&gt; (5.27–5.70)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alibi depth</td>
<td>2.67&lt;sub&gt;a&lt;/sub&gt; (2.30–3.05)</td>
<td>2.74&lt;sub&gt;b&lt;/sub&gt; (2.36–3.11)</td>
<td>5.13&lt;sub&gt;ab&lt;/sub&gt; (4.75–5.51)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alibi confidence</td>
<td>3.35&lt;sub&gt;a&lt;/sub&gt; (3.04–3.65)</td>
<td>3.40&lt;sub&gt;b&lt;/sub&gt; (3.10–3.71)</td>
<td>4.97&lt;sub&gt;ab&lt;/sub&gt; (4.66–5.28)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Shared subscripts within a row indicate significant differences, however a in strength of alibi is marginally significant.

We also predicted that knowledge of a confession would have an effect on the likelihood of corroboration. The scale questions were collected after all condition manipulations were completed, so we expected that the CAQ group would look similar to the CBQ group since both had received the confession information at that point. Further, both of these groups were expected to differ from the NC condition in which PAs never heard any confession information. We found a main effect of confession status on the scales, \( \lambda = .75, F(8, 272) = 5.30, p<.01, \eta^2 = .14 \), indicating that the timing with which confession evidence was presented affected the PAs’ readiness to offer an alibi in support of the suspect (Table 3-4 for means). There was an overall effect of confession status on participants’ willingness to be an alibi, \( F(2, 139) = 7.07, p<.01, \eta^2 = .14 \). Post hoc tests using LSD showed that participants in the CAQ group were less willing to offer an alibi for the suspect than those in the CBQ or NC groups. Participants in the NC and CBQ groups did not differ in their willingness to be an alibi.

There was an overall main effect of confession status on alibi strength, \( F(2, 139) = 17.57, p<.01, \eta^2 = .20 \). Post hoc tests using LSD showed that participants in the CAQ
condition rated the strength of their alibi lower than participants in the CBQ or NC conditions. Again, participants in the CBQ and NC groups did not differ in the strength of alibi they reported.

The main effect of confession status on the alibi depth scale was only marginally significant, $F(2, 139) = 2.78, p = .07, \eta^2 = .04$. Post hoc tests using LSD revealed PAs in either confession group were less likely than those given no confession to proceed through the entire criminal justice system in order to maintain their alibi. Participants in the CBQ and CAQ group did not differ in these responses.

Last, there was a main effect of confession status on participants’ responses to the alibi confidence scale, $F(2, 139) = 5.16, p < .01, \eta^2 = .07$. Post hoc tests using LSD showed participants in the CAQ condition reported less confidence in proceeding through the entire criminal justice system than those in the NC or CBQ conditions. Participants in the NC and CBQ conditions did not differ in this regard. The effect of the interaction between these variables on their likelihood of corroboration was not significant, $\lambda = 91, F(16, 416) = .85, p = .63, \eta^2 = .02$

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3-4. Main effect of confession status on likelihood of corroboration</th>
<th>NC (Cl)</th>
<th>CBQ (Cl)</th>
<th>CAQ (Cl)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Willingness to be an alibi</td>
<td>4.41&lt;sub&gt;a&lt;/sub&gt; (4.15–4.68)</td>
<td>4.07&lt;sub&gt;b&lt;/sub&gt; (3.78–4.35)</td>
<td>3.68&lt;sub&gt;ab&lt;/sub&gt; (3.40–3.96)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strength of alibi</td>
<td>5.58&lt;sub&gt;a&lt;/sub&gt; (5.37–5.78)</td>
<td>5.44&lt;sub&gt;b&lt;/sub&gt; (5.22–5.66)</td>
<td>4.73&lt;sub&gt;ab&lt;/sub&gt; (4.51–4.94)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alibi depth</td>
<td>3.87&lt;sub&gt;ab&lt;/sub&gt; (3.51–4.23)</td>
<td>3.34&lt;sub&gt;b&lt;/sub&gt; (2.96–3.73)</td>
<td>3.33&lt;sub&gt;a&lt;/sub&gt; (2.94–3.71)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alibi confidence</td>
<td>4.21&lt;sub&gt;a&lt;/sub&gt; (3.91–4.50)</td>
<td>3.99&lt;sub&gt;b&lt;/sub&gt; (3.68–4.30)</td>
<td>3.52&lt;sub&gt;ab&lt;/sub&gt; (3.20–3.83)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Shared subscripts within a row indicate significant differences, however b in alibi depth is only marginally significant

Does the Relationship to the Suspect and Confession Presence Affect Participants’ Beliefs About Their Memory for the Event and Viewing Conditions?

We predicted that participants would report differences in their memory or viewing conditions from the timeframe of the first session based on the relationship they had
with the suspect. Specifically, we thought those in the friend condition would report they had better memory and a better view of the suspect’s actions than those in non-motivated familiar other and stranger conditions. We ran a second MANOVA with the independent variables and the interaction between them as predictors and the viewing conditions and memory scales as the dependent measures to test this hypothesis. There was an overall significant effect of relationship status on the DVs, $\lambda = .68$, $F(4, 284) = 14.93$, $p<.01$, $\eta^2 = .18$ (Table 3-5 for group means). At the scalar level, there was a main effect of relationship status on participants’ responses to the memory scale, $F(2, 142) = 26.53$, $p<.01$, $\eta^2 = .27$. Post hoc tests using LSD showed that PAs in the friend condition reported they believed they had better memory for the first session than PAs in the non-motivated familiar other or stranger conditions. PAs in the stranger and non-motivated familiar other conditions did not differ in their belief in their own memory.

Further, there was a main effect of relationship status on participants’ responses to the viewing conditions scale, $F(2, 142) = 30.12$, $p<.01$, $\eta^2 = .30$. Post hoc tests using LSD revealed friends reported they believed they had better viewing conditions of the suspect than did non-motivated familiar others or strangers. Again, participants in the stranger and non-motivated familiar other conditions did not differ in their reports of their viewing conditions.

Table 3-5. Main effect of relationship status on memory and viewing conditions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strangers (CI)</th>
<th>NMFO (CI)</th>
<th>Friend (CI)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Memory</td>
<td>3.26&lt;sub&gt;a&lt;/sub&gt; (2.97 – 3.55)</td>
<td>3.36&lt;sub&gt;b&lt;/sub&gt; (3.06 – 3.66)</td>
<td>4.67&lt;sub&gt;ab&lt;/sub&gt; (4.36 – 4.97)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Viewing conditions</td>
<td>2.55&lt;sub&gt;a&lt;/sub&gt; (2.29 – 2.81)</td>
<td>2.51&lt;sub&gt;b&lt;/sub&gt; (2.25 – 2.77)</td>
<td>3.81&lt;sub&gt;ab&lt;/sub&gt; (3.54 – 4.01)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Shared subscripts within a row indicate significant differences

We also predicted that participants who heard about the confession evidence in either the before or after condition would report having a worse memory for the event
and having worse viewing conditions than those who never heard about the confession evidence. However, the effect of confession evidence on the DVs was not significant, $\lambda = .96, F(4, 282) = 1.64, p = .17, \eta^2 = .02$. Participants who learned about the suspect’s confession during the second session reported no better memory for the first session timeframe, nor better viewing conditions of the suspect than those who never heard about confession evidence. The interaction between relationship and confession status on their responses to the memory and viewing conditions scales was not significant, $\lambda = .98, F(8, 282) = .28, p = .97, \eta^2 < .01$.

### Does the Relationship to the Suspect and Confession Presence Affect Participants’ Beliefs About the Suspect’s Confession?

We ran two additional ANOVAs with our independent variables and the interaction between them as predictors on a two-item scale of belief in the confession and a question about possible coercion to confess. We hypothesized that participants in the friend condition would be less likely to believe the confession than those in the non-motivated familiar other or stranger conditions. Overall, there was a main effect for relationship status on the belief in confession scale, $F(2, 141) = 2.54, p < .01, \eta^2 = .04$. Post hoc tests using LSD showed that non-motivated familiar others were less likely than strangers to believe the suspect confessed to the act (Table 3-6 for means). However, there were no differences between strangers and friends, or friends and non-motivated familiar others.

Further, we predicted that people who heard about the confession in either condition would be more likely to believe it than those who never heard the confession evidence. We found a main effect for confession status on the belief in confession scale, $F(2, 141) = 20.07, p < .01, \eta^2 = .22$. According to post hoc tests using LSD, both
the CBQ and the CAQ groups were more likely to believe the suspect confessed than
the NC group was (also in Table 3-6). The two confession conditions did not differ. The
effect of the interaction of confession and relationship status on participant’s responses
to the belief scale was not significant, $F(4, 141) = 1.05, p = .38, \eta^2 = .03$.

Table 3-6. Main effects of relationship/confession status on belief in the confession

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Belief in confession</th>
<th>Stranger (CI)</th>
<th>NMFO (CI)</th>
<th>Friend (CI)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No Confess. (CI)</td>
<td>3.14$a$ (2.78–3.50)</td>
<td>2.59$a$ (2.23–2.94)</td>
<td>2.73 (2.36–3.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confess. Before (CI)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confess. After (CI)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Shared subscripts within a row indicate significant differences

We ran another ANOVA with the independent variables and the interaction
between them as predictors and participants’ responses to the question “I believe the
suspect was coerced into confessing to taking the portable music player” as the
dependent measure. There was a main effect of relationship status on participants’
responses to the coercion scale, $F(2, 141) = 14.03, p < .01, \eta^2 = .17$. Again, post hoc
tests using LSD showed that friends were more likely than both non-motivated familiar
others and strangers to believe the suspect was coerced into confessing to the crime.
Strangers and non-motivated familiar others did not differ on their belief in coercion of
the suspect.

There was also a main effect of confession status on participants’ responses to the
coercion scale, $F(2, 141) = 36.53, p < .01, \eta^2 = .34$. Post hoc tests using LSD revealed
that both CBQ and CAQ conditions were more likely than participants in the NC
condition to believe the confession was coerced, (Table 3-7 for means). Participants in
the two confession conditions did not differ in whether they believed the suspect was
coerced into confessing.
We found a significant effect of the interaction between the independent variables on participants’ responses to the coercion question described above, $F(4, 141) = 7.21$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .17$. Test of the simple main effect of relationship status within confession status using LSD revealed that within the confession conditions, participants in the friend condition were more likely than participants in the non-motivated familiar other and stranger conditions to believe the suspect was coerced to confessing to taking the portable music player (Table 3-8 for means). However, this relationship was not observed in the conditions with no confession.

### Table 3-7. Main effects of relationship/confession status on coercion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coercion</th>
<th>Stranger (CI)</th>
<th>NMFO (CI)</th>
<th>Friend (CI)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coercion</td>
<td>3.11&lt;sub&gt;a&lt;/sub&gt; (2.77–3.45)</td>
<td>3.33&lt;sub&gt;b&lt;/sub&gt; (2.97–3.66)</td>
<td>4.34&lt;sub&gt;ab&lt;/sub&gt; (3.99–4.69)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Confess. (CI)</td>
<td>2.42&lt;sub&gt;ab&lt;/sub&gt; (2.09–2.75)</td>
<td>4.00&lt;sub&gt;a&lt;/sub&gt; (3.65–4.34)</td>
<td>4.36&lt;sub&gt;b&lt;/sub&gt; (4.01–4.72)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Shared subscripts within a row indicate significant differences

### Table 3-8. Interaction between relationship and confession status on coercion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strangers (CI)</th>
<th>NMFO (CI)</th>
<th>Friend (CI)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NC</td>
<td>2.37 (1.81–2.92)</td>
<td>2.78 (2.21–3.35)</td>
<td>2.12 (1.53–2.70)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBQ</td>
<td>3.24&lt;sub&gt;a&lt;/sub&gt; (2.65–3.82)</td>
<td>3.38&lt;sub&gt;b&lt;/sub&gt; (2.77–3.98)</td>
<td>5.38&lt;sub&gt;ab&lt;/sub&gt; (4.77–5.98)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAQ</td>
<td>3.73&lt;sub&gt;a&lt;/sub&gt; (3.11–4.36)</td>
<td>3.82&lt;sub&gt;b&lt;/sub&gt; (3.24–4.41)</td>
<td>5.53&lt;sub&gt;ab&lt;/sub&gt; (4.91–6.16)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Shared subscripts within a row indicate significant differences
In this study, students interacted with several people for 90 minutes and were questioned about the story of a fake theft that occurred during the event. We manipulated whether the suspect was a friend, a non-motivated familiar other, or a stranger, and whether the potential alibi was told the suspect had confessed to the act or not. Given that no theft occurred, the potential alibi corroborators should be able to proffer an alibi corroboration because the potential alibis were with the suspect during that entire timeframe. However, similar to the Kogut case, potential alibi corroborators (friends, strangers, and non-motivated familiar others) were less likely to want to be an alibi after hearing about the suspect’s confession during questioning. Thus, the current study’s paradigm mimicked the real world case where this type of evidence contamination might have occurred and allowed us to experimentally examine whether learning about a confession can cause alibi corroborators to alter their memories for the event.

We expected that having a prior relationship with the suspect would affect alibi corroboration, and those who were friends with the suspect were more likely to be an alibi for the suspect than non-motivated familiar others or strangers were. We further expected that hearing information about the suspect having confessed would affect alibi corroboration, and those who heard confession information were more likely to be an alibi than those who do not. Last, we expected participants in the stranger condition would be most likely to change their alibi corroboration after hearing the confession information and those in the friend condition with no confession information to be least
likely, however we did not find this result. It is possible that power for these tests was not sufficient to demonstrate such results correctly.

**The Influence of the Alibi’s Relationship to the Suspect on Likelihood of Corroboration**

Previous research that has looked at alibi generation in terms of who is likely to testify for a suspect has not found that friends were more willing to be an alibi corroborator than strangers who had no connection to the suspect (Marion & Burke, 2009). However, in the current study; we found that friends were more likely to offer an alibi for the suspect than were either non-motivated familiar others or strangers. It is possible that a stronger manipulation of relationship may be what made these results significant in comparison to past research. In the prior study, closeness was induced during the experiment and seemed to be unable to truly shift a previously unknown pair of participant and confederate into strong enough friends that one would be willing to go through the alibi corroboration process. Our study used pre-existing relationships, and as such we were able to have years of commitment through their friendship to each other as a backbone for our relationship manipulation. The process of serving as an alibi for someone is not as simple as borrowing notes for a class, which a student might do with any acquaintance; being a corroborator likely uses some knowledge about the person’s character, which cannot be determined during an hour long study. Future researchers should consider this in designing alibi studies if they want the relationship between the alibi and suspect to be strong. We failed to differentiate between our stranger and non-motivated familiar other group in this study, so researchers need to keep the relationship strong (perhaps by using already existing friends rather than
inducing friendship during the study) so that pairs are not made up of strangers who are not likely to corroborate one another’s stories.

Unfortunately, research has also shown that friends are viewed as less trustworthy alibis than strangers when corroborators testify in court (Culhane & Hosch, 2004). This presents a problem for a defendant in that the most likely alibi (a friend) would be viewed poorly by jurors compared to a stranger. In contrast, the best alibi for court, a stranger who remembers seeing the defendant during the timeframe in question, would not be likely to be an alibi corroborator in the first place. This study demonstrated that friends are more likely than strangers to offer an alibi and to believe that they have a better memory for the timeframe in question (regardless of whether that memory is accurate or not). In addition, friends were more likely to question a confession’s truthfulness than were strangers. Friends believed they had a better memory for the event and a better view of the suspect during the event compared to strangers, when, in fact, everyone’s view was the same (and memory characteristics inherent to the person would have varied across conditions equally). It is possible that because they believed they had better memories, they were more likely to proffer an accurate alibi, but this does not mean jurors will trust their explanation of what happened. This may account for the second explanation of autobiographical memory discussed in the introduction: that memory is based on a person’s normal activities for the day, not on their actual memory for that specific timeframe. Friends spend more time together so their schema for a normal day includes one another, whereas a stranger may be more likely to refuse to be an alibi corroborator because their schema for that time does not include the suspect (but this is dependent on whether the timeframe in question is an atypical one). The
problem is that most people (including those serving as jurors) believe we can accurately recall any timeframe, which shows the inconsistency between what we expect to happen and what actually does occur.

**Confession Influence on Alibi Corroboration**

In this study, when participants heard that the suspect confessed, they were less likely to serve as an alibi corroborator than when they heard no information about a confession. However, they did not rate their memory or viewing conditions any lower than people who did not hear about a confession for the time of the crime. We know from past research that confession evidence can change the decisions of both eyewitnesses and fingerprint analysts from their original choices to one aligning with the confession evidence (Hasel & Kassin, 2009; Dror & Charlton, 2006). The current study shows that alibi corroborators are also affected by learning confession information. With each new piece of research that adds to this list of possible contaminations, it becomes more and more evident that person evidence needs to be treated more carefully than we currently are doing. Memory is fallible and needs to be protected against contamination by other pieces of evidence. This is especially true when confession evidence is the contaminating piece because so much research has demonstrated the influence even a single sentence confession can have on the outcome of a trial (Drizin & Leo, 2004; Kassin & Sukel, 1997; Kassin, 1997). This study has given even more credence to Justice Brennan’s idea that confessions are the most profoundly prejudicial piece of evidence (Leo, 2009).

There was a difference between the two confession group in most of the scales assessing overall likelihood of corroboration, which indicated the CAQ group was less likely to corroborate an alibi. This may be due to the timing of presentation.
Participants reported the same memory and viewing conditions for the event regardless of hearing or not hearing confession evidence (and regardless of *when* they heard the confession evidence), but they reported lower confidence, less strength, and less willingness to provide an alibi when told about the confession after they were initially asked about their willingness to be an alibi compared to when they were told about the confession before being asked for their initial willingness to be an alibi. It may be that giving the confession information after asking them to provide their initial alibi corroboration decision led potential alibi corroborators to be less sure of the corroboration compared to others, whereas potential alibis who got all the pieces of information about the investigation at once were more confident in their alibi decisions. This is something future research may want to address; often investigators may draw out the process of revealing information to suspects (and may use this same approach when dealing with alibi corroborators because most do not have formal training on how to interview them (Dysart, 2009). It may foster more of a collaborative process between corroborator and investigator when all the information is given to the corroborator up front rather than assessing their willingness to be an alibi after each piece is revealed. However, some research has found that using strategic disclosure of evidence (revealing one item at a time) when interviewing suspects results in better ability to detect deception (Hartwig, Granhag, Stromwall & Kronkvist, 2006), but potential alibi corroborators are inherently different from suspects, which this may explain our opposing results. Revealing evidence piece by piece with suspects allows for the opportunity to identify inconsistencies in a lying suspect’s story and convront him with those inconsistencies. However, this is not the goal of an alibi interview, which focuses
more on gathering all the information possible. These two objectives may need different strategies to be effective. It is also possible that alibis who heard about the confession after initially making an alibi corroboration choice viewed the confession as competing information with their original belief of what happened, and so they lowered their confidence, strength, and willingness to be an alibi in order to relieve the conflicting views, consistent with the cognitive dissonance theory described earlier (Festinger, 1954).

The Interaction of Relationship to the Suspect and Presentation of Confession Evidence

Friends were more likely than both strangers and non-motivated familiar others to believe the suspect was coerced into confessing to the crime, but only in the conditions where confession information was presented. Research has shown that confession evidence can still have an effect on trial outcomes, even when jurors say they know the confession was coerced and will not consider it in their decision (Kassin & Sukel, 1997; Kassin, Meissner, & Norwick, 2005). It appears as though friends may experience some cognitive dissonance when told their friend has confessed to stealing that non-motivated familiar others and strangers do not experience. It is possible that their initial belief of the friend being a good person who would not steal is confronted with this confession, which indicates the opposite, so they alter their belief about the confession to fit with the original knowledge of their friend’s good personality (Festinger, 1954). However, since a jury is made up of strangers they do not have the prior knowledge about the suspect, and as such, do not experience the cognitive dissonance that would explain why a confession might be present when the suspect actually did not commit the crime.
Implications

One of the biggest issues in collecting person evidence like alibi or eyewitness evidence is that investigators only have one chance to get an accurate account of what happened. As mentioned earlier, with physical evidence, it is possible to return to the original source and retest the results to see whether social influence had an effect in the match or exclusion made by an investigator. However, we do not have that luxury with person evidence. Because of this, it is crucial to learn everything we can about that piece of evidence before any other pieces of evidence have a chance to change what the person may say. We also must document the original corroborator’s account of what took place to have a record that can be referenced when the corroborator’s statements change in light of other evidence. A very common recommendation coming out of confession research is to videotape the interrogation, and we assert the same should be true for alibi corroborator questioning as well. If the interactions with these corroborators are able to be shown at trial, jurors would be better able to understand exactly what took place during questioning and an expert would be able to explain that any information presented to the corroborator by investigators may have an influence on that person’s willingness to stand up for them in court. This would be a benefit to the defense team in that they are now able to present evidence of an alibi (and probably an expert to explain why the evidence is in video form) when that evidence would be unavailable to them had the questioning not be videotaped. This recommendation also serves to keep the police investigators honest in that a videotape would be evidence of investigators trying to eliminate any alibi corroborators from testifying in order to strengthen the case. If jurors are able to watch exactly what is being said to a potential
corroborator they stand a better chance of accurately deciding how much influence was present and if it contributed to the person’s instinct to withdraw such testimony.

This study is additional support for the second conceptualization of autobiographical memory described earlier; we base our recollections on what we assume happened, not what actually occurred (Tulving, 1972; Markus, 1977). The idea that memory is fallible has been an issue for memory researchers for years and is applicable when switching to research on alibi corroborators who are susceptible to social information changing their account of a timeframe (Robinson & Swanson, 1990). The problems associated with memory have been demonstrated over an extended time, in multiple forms of people evidence, and throughout several different fields of study, investigators and jurors need to be more aware of how fallible memory can be and put less emphasis on someone’s memory unless corroborated with other pieces of evidence or additional witnesses/alibis (all individually collected, of course).

Further, it would be beneficial for police investigators to treat each piece of evidence independently to prevent this kind of evidentiary interaction from occurring. Specific to this research, that means not using the knowledge of a confession from the suspect to discourage a potential alibi corroborator from serving as one. Many of the tactics commonly used by police investigators may be more harmful than helpful, especially when dealing with something as fragile as a person’s memory for a specific timeframe. Research has revealed information about the kinds of interrogation tactics that are likely to cause false confessions, but it is still possible that some people (particularly people in more vulnerable populations like the young and mentally disabled, though anyone is susceptible) will confess to crimes they did not actually
commit (Kassin, 1997; Kassin & Wrightsman, 1985). When this happens, it is crucial to keep this information separate from people who could serve as alibi corroborators for the suspect to prevent the possibility that their memory for the time in question could be tainted.

It is very damaging in a court setting to argue that a confession is likely false and would be even worse for the defendant to lose those people who could account for his whereabouts and conclusively say that he could not possibly be the one who committed the offense (Leo, 2009; Kassin & Sukel, 1997; Kassin, 1997). The effect this has on jurors may be compounded; having a false confession and no alibi to demonstrate it is false may be exponentially more harmful to the suspect than jurors hearing either of those pieces alone. If a justice says confession evidence can be extremely prejudicial, what can be said about the compounded effect of confession evidence on the collection of other evidence? Again, more research needs to be done to see how much more damaging any combinations of evidence pieces may be on jurors before researchers draw any conclusive opinions, but it seems possible from past research that police investigators may be unaware of how any two pieces of evidence fit together to alter decisions (Hasel & Kassin, 2009; Kassin, 2009; Dror, Charlton, & Peron, 2006; Dror & Charlton, 2006). Even more so, researchers are unaware of how others (specifically jurors who hear the case) may or may not be able to evaluate those pieces of evidence when presented in combination.

The Innocence Project was able to fix this situation in Kogut’s case through the use of DNA (though long after his conviction), however most cases do not have DNA evidence available to them. If police who use techniques that present information (like a
confession) to potential corroborators change their practices to protect against possible evidence contamination, then we can prevent future cases from this problem. What about the past cases that lead to a suspect behind bars because the alibi corroborators were not willing to go to court for him or her? In this situation, judges need to be very careful in how they respond to those cases that originally had corroborators who subsequently withdrew their stories, especially when in combination with confession evidence. If confessions really are as prejudicial as Justice Brennan says they are, then judges may need to relook at each case with a confession to determine if the possibility for contamination occurred.

Limitations

One potential problem with the study is that we currently have low power which may be increasing the likelihood of a type II error. Some effects were marginally significant, so it is possible that with more participants we would have stronger evidence of the possibility that alibi corroborators are influenced when told about confession evidence. In addition, the interaction effects were almost all not significant in this study. These are the tests in the study that require the most statistical power. Increasing the power in the study would decrease the likelihood that the non-significant effects of the interaction on our dependent measures are type II errors. Currently, we have between 17-21 people per cell, but we plan to recruit at least 25 participants in each condition to increase power.

Additionally, using a college sample for this study may limit the generalizability of our findings. It is commonly known that most interactions people have with the criminal justice system takes place in young adulthood (around the age of most college students), however college students and community members are two distinct groups of
people. College students most likely differ from the kind of person who is often involved in crime so generating an alibi for a student participating in a school sponsored study may be inherently different than generating one for a person outside of the educational setting. It is also possible that the setting for college students is different from what community members experience (Culhane, 2009). College students spend the majority of their time on campus and with their friends (typically other young people), whereas community members spend most of their time either at work or with their families. The types of alibis experienced by these two groups are likely very different; however, the memory of people in either group should be similar. In this way, the results from a college sample should hold true when transitioned to a community setting, though this is something future research should examine as well.

Another problem with the current study is a lack of significant differences and a successful manipulation check between two of our closeness manipulation groups. As mentioned earlier, we may not have adequately captured the non-motivated familiar other group because in this study they tend to behave like strangers. It is possible this is a flaw in the study design; there may be something about our manipulation that did not differentiate between students that know the participants well enough to recognize the suspect and remember seeing him, but were not friends to the extent that the corroborator has an interest in keeping the suspect out of the criminal justice program altogether. It is also important to note that strangers may not always be non-motivated, so this may have been a trait we were unable to tease apart from these two groups (Dysart, 2009).
However, it is also possible that this group of people (familiar others who are truly non-motivated) does not exist in the real world either, particularly because this finding is similar to that of previous work (Olson & Wells, 2004). In that study, Olson and Wells found that participants who rated the credibility of alibi corroborators perceived no differences between non-motivated strangers and non-motivated familiar others (with the caveat that this may not hold up in a trial setting). If there are no differences in the way a person rates the corroborator’s credibility, then what really differentiates these two groups? Finding a person that is familiar enough with a suspect, but not so familiar that their motivation for involvement in an investigation changes, may be an extremely difficult endeavor. Psychological research also demonstrates that a sizable group of people do not form relationships that way – one is nearly always motivated for some reason towards a particular act or behavior or person (Gilovich, 1991; Murray, 1999). If a stranger wants to believe that a suspect is good and would not steal anything, then the behaviors that are consistent with this belief are what comes to mind when asked if the corroborator would provide an alibi. The same is true if a stranger wants to believe a suspect is bad; the behaviors that reinforce this notion are the ones that are recollected. It is possible that truly non-motivated people do not exist.

The recommendations put forth in this discussion are based on the fairly small body of research looking at alibi generation, along with some evidence interaction studies to demonstrate that confession evidence can effect whether a person is willing to supply an alibi corroboration for a suspect. Because both areas are still very new in the field of psychology and law, more research needs to examine the reasons people decide to become an alibi and what types of evidence may change this decision. If
more research is done and findings from this study are replicated, recommendations like those above could be made to police departments about how to avoid potential for contamination of evidence (and safeguards to make sure alibi evidence is collected appropriately). Presumably, the less interdependent individual pieces of evidence are, the more accurate jurors could be in making a decision at trial (although this remains a question for future research). If these recommendations are framed in a way emphasizing that these policies are likely to increase the chances of getting justice for the victim(s), then we would expect police to be open to implementing such strategies in how they question potential alibi corroborators in the future and ensure the work investigators do is seen as strong in a court setting. Even small adjustments to the way investigators question individuals involved in a case may have a drastic impact on reducing the number of people who are falsely accused and possibly convicted for acts they did not commit.
Informed consent
Protocol Title: Team Building with Friends and Strangers

Please read this consent document carefully before you decide to participate in this study.

Purpose of the research study:
The purpose of this study is to examine how team building activities enhance bonds differentially with friends or strangers.

What you will be asked to do in the study:
In this study, you will be asked to complete a closeness scale for both the friend you brought as well as the other people in this same session. Next, you will participate in team building activities in large groups, while mixing up members of those groups occasionally. Then you will complete the same closeness scales once again (for your friend and for members of the larger group). At the end of the study, we will collect contact information in case you need to be contacted further and take a digital photo to better assess closeness levels between group members.

Time required:
1½ hours

Risks and benefits:
There is no more than minimal risk to you as a participant. As a benefit, you will learn about the research process.

Compensation:
You will be awarded credit through the Department of Criminology, Law and Society Participant Pool for participating in the study.

Confidentiality:
Your identity will be kept confidential to the extent provided by law. Any information you provide will not be linked to your personal information and all pictures will be destroyed after completion of the project.

Voluntary participation:
Your participation in this study is completely voluntary. There is no penalty for not participating. In addition, you do not have to answer any question you do not wish to answer.

Right to withdraw from the study:
You have the right to withdraw from the study at anytime without consequence.

Whom to contact if you have questions about the study:
Megan Kienzle, Master’s student, Department of Sociology and Criminology & Law, PO Box 117330, Gainesville, FL 32611, mkienzle@ufl.edu.
Lora Levett, Ph.D., Assistant Professor, Department of Sociology and Criminology & Law, PO Box 117330, Gainesville, FL 32611, llevett@ufl.edu.

Whom to contact about your rights as a research participant in the study:
UFIRB Office, Box 112250, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL 32611-2250; ph 352-392-0433.

Agreement:
I have read the procedure described above. I voluntarily agree to participate in the procedure and I have received a copy of this description.

Participant: _____________________________________  Date: _______________

Principle Investigator: _______________________________ Date: __________
APPENDIX B
MILLER SOCIAL INTIMACY SCALE

Miller Social Intimacy Scale

Please read each question carefully, then circle the number that best represents how you feel about that statement.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Very rarely</th>
<th>Some of the time</th>
<th>Almost always</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. When you have leisure time how often do you choose to spend it with him/her alone?</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. How often do you keep very personal information to yourself and do not share it with him/her?</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. How often do you show him/her affection?</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. How often do you confide very personal information to him/her?</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. How often are you able to understand his/her feelings?</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. How often do you feel close to him/her?</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. How much do you like to spend time alone with him/her?</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. How much do you feel like being encouraging and supportive to him/her when he/she is unhappy?</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. How close do you feel to him/her most of the time?</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. How important is it to you to listen to his/her very personal disclosures?</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Question</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. How satisfying is your relationship with him/her?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. How affectionate do you feel towards him/her?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. How important is it to you that he/she understands your feelings?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. How much damage is caused by a typical disagreement in your...</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. How important is it to you that he/she be encouraging and supportive to you when you are unhappy?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. How important is it to you that he/she show you affection?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. How important is your relationship with him/her in your life?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Continued)
### APPENDIX C
GROUP CLOSENESS SCALE

**Group Closeness Scale**

Please read each question carefully, then circle the number that best represents how you feel about that statement.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Very Rarely</th>
<th>Some of the Time</th>
<th>Almost Always</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18. How often would you choose to spend time with this group of people?</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. How often do you think the team interacted in a positive manner?</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. How often would you show this group of people affection?</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. How often would you confide personal information to this group of people?</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. How often do you think you could understand the feelings of this group’s members?</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. How often do you feel close ties with members of this group?</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Not Very</th>
<th>A Little</th>
<th>A Great Deal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>24. How likely are you to be encouraging and supportive to members of the group if they are unhappy?</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25. How close do you feel to this group most of the time?</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26. How important is it to you to listen to group members’ thoughts and feelings?</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27. How satisfying is your relationship with</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
28. How much closer do you feel to the group after completing these activities?  
   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  

29. How important is it to you that other group members understand your feelings?  
   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  

30. How likely are you to spend time with this group after today?  
   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  

31. How important is it for you to be a part of this group?  
   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  

32. How important is your relationship with members of this group in your life?  
   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  

33. Do you feel you belong with the other members of the group?  
   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  

34. Do you feel the group worked well together as a team?  
   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  

35. Did you enjoy the time you spent with the members of this group?  
   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  

19. Did you feel the group made a cohesive team?  
   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
APPENDIX D
SESSION 1 PROTOCOL

Team Building in Friends and Strangers

You need to arrive at least 10 minutes before the study is set to begin. Before participants arrive, make sure to get all papers/supplies ready in the order participants will need them. Then set up the powerpoint template for the 3rd closeness scale.

During the study it is crucial for the confederate RAs to pretend like they do not know each other or the RAs that are helping to run the experiment. You are filling in so there are extra people around so it’s harder to keep track of everyone’s whereabouts. All of you should excuse yourself to go to the bathroom or get a drink at a couple times throughout the study, then come back shortly.

Once the participants and friends arrive, welcome them to the study and have them sit and wait until the entire group has shown up. Take each person’s picture with the digital camera while they’re waiting to use in a later part of the study.

“Welcome to our study. Have a seat while we’re waiting for everyone to arrive. We are taking photographs of everyone to use a little later in the study, so if you’re ok with it, can I take your picture so I can get everything set up?”

Take each person’s picture as they enter the room WITH NO SMILE. When they’ve started the tasks, upload all the pictures to the computer. Arrange all 20 pictures in the template so that each is visible (shrink the pictures if you need to, but keep them all the same size) and letter A-H (depending on how many people are there).

“Ok, now that everyone is here we can get started. The first thing I need you all to do is read through this informed consent document, and if you agree to participate in the study, sign and date at the bottom. It just explains a little more about what you’ll be doing tonight, so let me know if you have any questions. Also, please let me know if you would like a copy of the informed consent for your records.”

Hand out the ICs, collect them all again once people have signed. Assign participant numbers while collecting these sheets (1-P or 1-F for participant or friend, then 2-P etc) and have them remember to write this on the scale sheets.

“Alright, next I am going to ask you to fill out a couple of forms to measure the level of the bond that you share with each person in this room. The one that says Miller social intimacy scale is to rate how close you feel to the friend that you brought with you here today. The one that says Group closeness scale is to rate how close you feel to this group of people here as a whole. Answer each of the questions on both of these scales as honestly as you can and remember that your answers will be kept confidential so you don’t need to worry about anyone seeing them and please remember to write the participant number I just gave you in the top right corner of each sheet.

Pass out both closeness scales, then collect them again as people finish.
“Alright, now we can start with some team-building activities.”

***DURING THIS TIME, CONFEDERATE RAs SHOULD EXCUSE THEMSELVES TO USE THE RESTROOM OR GET A DRINK OVER THE COURSE OF THE SESSION***

The RAs that are helping to run the study should assist in separating into groups, explain the activity and then monitor the group they are in charge of.

DO 45 minutes of team building games

**See other sheet for list of team building activities and description of how to play and how to designate groups**

“Ok, thanks for participating in those activities! We’re going to have you complete the scales you filled out at the beginning of the study a second time.

But first, we’re going to have you rate how close you feel to each of the people in this room on a scale from 1 to 7 on the sheet I am passing out to you. You’ll see each of the people’s faces numbered on the screen so you know which person you’re rating. If you rate a person as a one, it would mean that they are a stranger. If you rate them a 7, it would mean that they are a good friend. Be sure to write the letter that corresponds to the friend you came with today in the box in the lower right corner.

Pass out the number sheets, then collect their number sheets once people complete the task, then black out the screen so the pictures are no longer displayed.

Okay, now we’ll have you complete the forms from the beginning of the study again. Remember the Miller scale refers to the friend you brought to the study with you, and the Group scale refers to this group as a whole. Please answer each question honestly as to how close you feel to these people right now, and do not simply answer consistent with what you wrote down earlier.”

Pass out both scale papers again, then collect everything once they’ve finished.

“Great, then the last thing we need to do is the debriefing to explain the purpose of the study. Since we really want to get honest responses to how you guys thought our study went (and that may be different depending on whether you’re a friend that someone brought or you’re doing this for class credit), we need to separate those of you who signed up for the study from the friends you brought with you, so let’s have the participants follow the other researcher down the hall and we can have the friends stay here.”

Have Participants go down the hall to another room, then complete debriefing for each as follows:

**Participants**

Hand out the short “team-building” debriefing and read it aloud to them.

“In this study, we are looking to examine the way that team building activities create bonds between individuals. More specifically, we think that these types of games encourage bonds to form more quickly within stranger groups because there is no prior groundwork for a relationship to be formed on so even small, seemingly meaningless interactions have a large impact on the level of closeness two people feel. On the other hand, the friend you brought with you today had already built a relationship foundation and therefore small games like the ones
you played would not have had as great an impact on the level of your friendship as it did with the strangers.
If you wish to have the data you provided not included in the study, you are free to withdraw your data from the sample. If you choose to do so, it will be destroyed immediately. If you have any questions feel free to ask them. Your results will be kept confidential to the experimenters. Thank you again for participating.”
Remind each participant of their 2nd session time by filling out the reminder sheet for each person individually.
“We also have reminder sheets for each of you for the second session later this week, so just hang out a bit while I go around the room. The second session will mostly consist of filling out the closeness scales again to see if there is any time delay effects with how you feel towards these other people so it will most likely take a half hour at the longest. And remember that it will be in Walker Hall room 3, and not here in Turlington again.”
Fill out the sheets SLOWLY! and say everything that you write down out loud. Double check the participants name with their participant number written on all their paperwork and their time for the second session. Ask if they all know how to get to Walker and explain in detail if any of them don’t. We need to stall on time to make it seem even with the friends group, so anything you can do to take longer is a good thing.
Also, since this second session is done individually we really want to make sure we’re only getting your opinion, so please try not to talk with your friend about the session tonight until after you’ve completed the second session. Any discussion with your friend might contaminate your true judgments on the closeness you feel with these people. Thank them again for their participation, then walk back towards the original room.

**Friends**

Hand out the full study debriefing and read it aloud to them.
“The basis for this study was an Innocence Project client who had been at a party with several people during the time of the crime he was accused of, which should have provided him with multiple alibi corroborators to stand up for him in court to maintain his innocence. However, because of extensive pressure during interrogation, he ended up confessing to the crime and once word of this got out, all of his friends from the party started to question when and where they saw him and no longer wanted to serve as an alibi for him in court. We think the confession is what caused these friends to go back and rethink about the night in question and to withdraw their original story.
In this study, we are looking to examine whether or not a piece of evidence used during investigative questioning (the presence or absence of a confession from the suspect) is able to influence whether a person is willing to offer their alibi in support of that suspect’s innocence in court. We are also interested in whether the potential alibi corroborator being a close friend, acquaintance, or a stranger could have an influence on that decision as well. So, in the second session, we are varying whether we tell your friends that either you or someone else they met during this session (a stranger or acquaintance) is a suspect for stealing a portable music player. We will also vary whether we tell them that the suspect
confessed to the act or not. Thus, we are able to see if the least believable alibi (the friend since they’re likely to lie for him or her) was less likely to be altered when told the suspect had confessed than when told he did not. If this is true, then strangers (the stronger alibi) are more likely than friends to be swayed into questioning their memory of what happened during the incident and then also more likely to choose to withhold their alibi testimony. Because alibis involve a person’s memory for an event, it is *extremely* important that you do not reveal any of this information to your friend during the time he or she is waiting for the second session. If they were to find out the true purpose of the study, they would likely not be able to accurately answer any of the alibi questions as they would have had they not been leaked information.”

“We’re asking that everyone please sign at the bottom of the study as a sort of contract that you won’t reveal any of this information to your friend until after they’ve completed their second session. As you can see, there are boxes to indicate whether you’re comfortable with serving as the suspect in that session for one of the people in the other room. If you are, we are also asking that you write out a short confession on a piece of paper and sign it for us to use in the second session to increase believability that someone actually did confess. If you don’t want to serve as a suspect, please indicate so on this form. In that case, we will not be able to use any of your data or your friend’s data, so please consider allowing us to use your information and remember that everything will be kept confidential.”

Hand out slips of paper for them to write on if they want and read what they should put down: “I admit that I took the portable music player during the study on (whatever date) and am willing to accept any punishment the investigator thinks is appropriate” then have them sign below that sentence.

“Regardless of whether you want to be used in the second session or not, we do really need you to keep these details about the study quiet until after your friend has finished their participation. The most important part of this research is how your friends react to being asked to serve as alibis for tonight – remember in the Kogut case explained in the debriefing, the alibis could have saved him from wrongful conviction. If your friends are leaked any information about the true purpose of the study it will ruin the results and we won’t be able to use their responses, which makes what you just participated in a waste of time. So, again, please, don’t let them know what the actual purpose of the study is. You can talk about it with them after they do the second session, but before then, please don’t discuss it beyond the team building activities that you did (that is, don’t even mention that you can’t talk about parts of it with them – just talk about it as if the study only consisted of team building activities). Thank you so much for your cooperation with this. Again, if you do not wish to be a suspect, please just indicate so on your form.

Collect any written confessions and all the signed debriefings, give copy of debriefing if they want it, then let them go.
List of Possible Team Building Activities

Human Scavenger Hunt
Do this as 1 entire group. Hand out the sheets and pens to each person, then have them go around the room talking to everyone, trying to get signatures for each of the boxes.

Line up
Split into 2 groups by drawing numbers out of a hat. Then have them line up in specific orders like:
Alphabetically by last name – without talking
From shortest to tallest – with eyes closed
From oldest to youngest – without talking

2 truths and a lie:
Have everyone split into 2 groups (one of participants and one of friends). Then give each person an index card and have them write 2 truths and a lie on. Collect all the cards and put them in the middle, then have someone come select a card and guess who the person is, as well as which statement is false. Go around until all the cards have been chosen.

Human Knot
Have everyone count around 1-3, then split into those groups. Then stand in a circle facing each other and have everyone close their eyes and reach across the circle with their right hand and grab hands with someone. Then open their eyes and grab the left hand of someone different, going above and below and around everyone else’s hands. Then the goal is to unravel the knot. Have them work on this by individual groups once, then make it a race between the 3 groups by having them wait until the PI says go to start unraveling the knot.

Telephone aka filter - one large group

I Will Survive
In this team building game for the workplace, people are divided into groups and are presented with a scenario. The scenario can go something like this, ‘You are stranded on an island, and you are given the choice of ten objects for survival. Choose wisely.’
in 3 groups by drawing numbers

Make a castle
one member of the team gets 30 seconds to make the castle out of cards then switch out
first team to get 4 levels wins
in 2 groups by lining up and tallest/shortest
each person gets a part of a comic strip and they have to put it in order without showing the pictures to anyone else
in 3 groups by birth month

Amoeba race
every person in the group must be touching and 2 people cannot have either foot on the ground, then go a certain distance
in 2 groups by drawing numbers

step through paper game
in 4 groups (split 2 groups in half)

Icebreakers (in 3 groups by drawing numbers)
1. If you could have an endless supply of any food, what would you get?
2. If you were an animal, what would you be and why?
3. What is one goal you’d like to accomplish during your lifetime?
4. When you were little, who was your favorite super hero and why?
5. Who is your hero? (a parent, a celebrity, an influential person in one’s life)
6. What’s your favorite thing to do in the summer?
7. If they made a movie of your life, what would it be about and which actor would you want to play you?
8. If you were an ice cream flavor, which one would you be and why?
9. What’s your favorite cartoon character, and why?
10. If you could visit any place in the world, where would you choose to go and why?
11. What’s the ideal dream job for you?
12. Are you a morning or night person?
13. What are your favorite hobbies?
14. What are your pet peeves or interesting things about you that you dislike?
15. What’s the weirdest thing you’ve ever eaten?
16. Name one of your favorite things about someone in your family.
17. Tell us about a unique or quirky habit of yours.
18. If you had to describe yourself using three words, it would be...
19. If someone made a movie of your life would it be a drama, a comedy, a romantic-comedy, action film, or science fiction?
20. If I could be anybody besides myself, I would be...
   * If you were a comic strip character, who would you be and why?
   * What thought or message would you want to put in a fortune cookie?
   * If you had to give up a favorite food, which would be the most difficult to give up?
   * What is one food you’d never want to taste again?
   * If you won a lottery ticket and had a million dollars, what would you do with it?
   * You’ve been given access to a time machine. Where and when would you travel to?
   * If you could be any superhero and have super powers, which one would you like to have and why?
* Mount Rushmore honors four U.S. presidents: Washington, Jefferson, Lincoln, and Roosevelt. If you could add any person to Mount Rushmore, who would you add and why?
  * What award would you love to win and for what achievement?
  * If you could transport yourself anywhere instantly, where would you go and why?
  * In your opinion, which animal is the best (or most beautiful) and why?
  * What is one item that you really should throw away, but probably never will?
  * Growing up, what were your favorite toys to play with as a child?

Four corners
draw pictures in each of the corners of a piece of paper
favorite hobby
favorite vacation spot
something you're scared of
one of the most important things in your life
Then everyone shares with the group (in 4 groups by numbers 1-5, 6-10, etc)

React and Act
one person sees a paper with a description on it and has to act it out for others to guess
  * Being surprised by a large, aggressive bear in the woods
  * You just won the lottery
  * You have just been proposed for marriage with an engagement ring
  * You just got fired by an incompetent boss
  * Making the game winning pass to win the Superbowl
  * You just fell in love
in 3 groups (by numbering off)
APPENDIX F
CLOSENESS RATINGS FORM

Ratings form for everyone from first session

Circle the number you believe best represents the relationship you feel with each person.

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<th>Stranger</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Friend</th>
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Please write the letter of the person you came to the study with here
Team Building Debriefing

In this study, we are looking to examine the way that team building activities create bonds between individuals. More specifically, we think that these types of games encourage bonds to form more quickly within stranger groups because there is no prior groundwork for a relationship to be formed on. So even small, seemingly meaningless interactions may have a large impact on the level of closeness two people feel. On the other hand, the friend you brought with you today had already built a relationship foundation and therefore small games like the ones you played would not have had as great an impact on the level of your friendship as it did with the strangers.

If you wish to have the data you provided not included in the study, you are free to withdraw your data from the sample. If you choose to do so, it will be destroyed immediately. If you have any questions feel free to ask them and please know your results will be kept confidential. Thank you again for participating.
APPENDIX H
FULL STUDY DEBRIEFING (REAL)

Confession Influence on Alibi Corroboration
Full Study Debriefing (for friends after 1st session)

The basis for this study was an Innocence Project client who had been at a party with several people during the time of the crime he was accused of, which should have provided him with multiple alibi corroborators to stand up for him in court to maintain his innocence. However, because of extensive pressure during interrogation, he ended up confessing to the crime and once word of the confession got out, all of his friends from the party started to question when and where they saw him and no longer wanted to serve as alibis for him in court. We think the confession is what caused these friends to go back and rethink about the night in question and to withdraw their original stories.

In this study, we are looking to examine whether or not a piece of evidence used during investigative questioning (the presence or absence of a confession from the suspect) is able to influence whether a person is willing to offer their alibi in support of that suspect’s innocence in court. We are also interested in whether the potential alibi corroborator being a close friend, an acquaintance, or a stranger could have an influence on that decision as well. So, in the second session, we are varying whether we tell your friends that either you or someone else they met during this session (a stranger or an acquaintance) is a suspect for stealing a portable music player. We will also vary whether we tell them that the suspect confessed to the act or not. Thus, we are able to see if the least believable alibi (the friend, since they’re likely to lie for him or her) was less likely to be altered when told the suspect had confessed than when told he did not. If this is true, then strangers (the stronger alibi) are more likely than friends to be swayed into questioning their memory of what happened during the incident and then also more likely to choose to withhold their alibi testimony.

Because alibis involve a person’s memory for an event, it is extremely important that you do not reveal any of this information to your friend during the time he or she is waiting for the second session. If they were to find out the true purpose of the study, they would likely not be able to accurately answer any of the alibi questions as they would have had they not been leaked information.

By signing below you acknowledge that you have read the above debriefing and understand the procedures for this study and reason for using deception. You have also been explained the reasoning for using a written confession and understand why this was necessary. You have also asked any and all questions you may have about this first session as well as the second session that your friend will attend.

I would like to have my written confession and picture used in the second session and feel I have not been coerced into doing so._____ Yes _____ No
I agree NOT to reveal any information about this session or the information I’ve learned about the follow up session to my friend. _____ Yes _____ No
APPENDIX I
INFORMED CONSENT (PART 2)

Informed consent
Continuation of “Team Building with Friends and Strangers” study

Please read this consent document carefully before you decide to further your participation in this study.

Purpose of the questioning:
The purpose of asking you to come in today is to fill out the closeness scales again to see if there are any delayed time effects in your closeness ratings of your friend or the other group members.

What you will be asked to do:
You will be asked to take both the individual and team closeness scales again and to answer a few other questions about your memory from the first session.

Time required:
1 hour

Risks and benefits:
There is no risk to you as an informer. As a benefit, you will learn about the research process.

Compensation:
You will receive 2 credits for your additional time here towards the Participant Pool research requirement. If you do not wish to continue with the study, there are alternative assignments for you to receive an equivalent 2 credits.

Confidentiality:
Your identity will be kept confidential to the extent provided by law. Any information you provide will not be revealed to any person you may suspect of committing the incident and no further actions will be taken regardless of the information you provide here. All identifying information will not be linked with your data, and we will destroy your identifying information after the session is complete.

Voluntary participation:
Your participation is completely voluntary. There is no penalty for not participating. In addition, you do not have to answer any question you do not wish to answer.

Right to withdraw from questioning:
You have the right to withdraw from the questioning at anytime without consequence.

Whom to contact if you have questions about the study:
Megan Kienzle, Master’s student, Department of Sociology and Criminology & Law, PO Box 117330, Gainesville, FL 32611, mkienzle@ufl.edu.
Lora Levett, Ph.D., Assistant Professor, Department of Sociology and Criminology & Law, PO Box 117330, Gainesville, FL 32611, llevett@ufl.edu.

Whom to contact about your rights as a research participant in the study:
UFIRB Office, Box 112250, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL 32611-2250; ph 352-392-0433.

Agreement:
I have read the procedure described above. I voluntarily agree to participate in the procedure and I have received a copy of this description.

Participant: _____________________________________ Date: _______________

Principle Investigator: _________________________________ Date: __________
APPENDIX J
SESSION 2 PROTOCOL

Team Building in Friends and Strangers
Session 2 Protocol

You need to arrive at least 10 minutes before the study is set to begin. Everything you need will be on a clipboard (the timeslot and name will be written on it) so double check the name when the participant arrives. There are 3 conditions for confession timing in this study so make sure you know which lines to read before the participant arrives.

1. No confession information
2. Confession information prior to alibi question
3. Confession information after alibi question (asked twice)

Be sure to fill out the alibi half sheet as much as you can before the participant arrives (condition, your initials) then fill in other details as they happen (their answers).

“Welcome to the second session. As before, the first thing we need you to do is read through the informed consent document, then sign and date at the bottom. Please let me know if you would like a copy of the form to keep.”

Give the participant an IC, then collect once signed.

“Thanks, now you’ll complete the same two closeness scales that you did during the first session. Again, it is critically important that you really look inward and answer each question based on how you actually feel about that person (or group) TODAY. Please do not just answer based on how you filled it out during the last session. Just as a reminder, the Miller scale refers to the friend that you brought with you to the first session, and the Group scale refers to the group of people present at the first session as a whole.”

Hand out both closeness scales. Collect both papers once completed.

**start memorizing**

“Alright, we also have a couple questions about what you remember from the first session. We had someone report that their portable music player was taken from their office down the hall during the first session and we’ve been asking each of the people who were there individually if you have any information about how that could have happened so we can try to fix this situation and return the portable music player. This person has been accused and we’re further investigating that accusation here today.”

Show the participant the picture of the suspect.

1. In the No Confession condition:
   Ask: “Would you be willing to serve as an alibi for this person, saying that he/she did not take the portable music player?”
   Circle their answer on the form under “response to alibi willingness question”
   Hand them a blank piece of paper and say: “Please explain in detail WHY you made this decision.”

2. In the Confession Prior condition:
   Show the participant the written confession.
Say: “He/she confessed to taking the portable music player when we questioned him/her earlier, but we really want to cover all our bases, so we’re looking for anyone that does not think this person is the one who stole the portable music player. Would you be willing to serve as an alibi for him/her, saying that they did not take the portable music player?”
Circle their answer on the form under “response to alibi willingness question”
Hand them a blank piece of paper and say: “Please explain in detail WHY you made this decision.”

3. In the Confession After condition:
   Ask: “Would you be willing to serve as an alibi for this person, saying that he/she did not take the portable music player?
   Circle their answer on the form under “response to alibi willingness question”
   Hand them a blank piece of paper and say: “Please explain in detail WHY you made this decision.”
   Show the participant the written confession and say: “Well, he/she confessed to taking it when we questioned him/her earlier. Does that change your answer any? Would you now be willing to serve as an alibi for this person?”
   Circle this answer on the form under “response to 2nd question”.
   Hand them another blank piece of paper and:
   - If they changed their answer say: “Can you explain what reasoning caused you to change your mind.”
   - If they answered the same, say: “Please explain if any of your reasoning for this decision has changed.”

“Ok, next we have a questionnaire to better assess your likelihood of being an alibi for this person. Please answer each of the questions as honestly as you can.”
Hand them the Alibi Questionnaire and leave the picture of the suspect on the desk while they fill it out. Collect both papers when finished.

**Stop memorizing**
“Now the last thing we need to do is the debriefing for this study to better explain the actual purpose and the need for you to bring your friend to the first session.”
Hand them a debriefing form and read it to them.
“The basis for this study was an Innocence Project client who maintained his innocence after being convicted of a crime. This man had been at a party with several people during the time of the crime, which should have provided him with multiple alibi corroborators to stand up for him by saying that he could not have been the one who committed the crime. However, because of extensive pressure during interrogation, he ended up confessing to the crime (which he later recanted) and once word of this got out, all of his friends from the party started to question when and where they saw him and because of this they no longer wanted to be an alibi for him in court. We think the confession might be what caused these friends to go back and rethink about the night in question and to withdraw their original story.
In this study, we are looking to examine if that can actually happen; basically whether or not a piece of evidence used during investigative questioning (the
presence or absence of a confession from the suspect) is able to influence whether a person is willing to offer their alibi for that suspect in court. We were also interested in whether the potential alibi corroborator being a close friend, acquaintance, or a stranger could have an influence on that decision as well. So the first session served as the timeframe that a crime could have occurred and by having you interact with different groups of people we were ensuring that you wouldn’t be able to definitely know the actions of each other person present (much like you wouldn’t completely know the actions of every other person at a party). The second session, when you learned about the fake story of a stolen portable music player, was a form of questioning that police investigators might use to feel out potential alibis and we delayed this by a few days to allow for some memory confusion as to the exact events that took place during the first meeting. In this second session, we told you that either your friend or someone else you met during the previous session (a stranger or acquaintance) was a suspect for stealing an portable music player. In some conditions, we also told you that the suspect confessed to the act and showed you a written confession. We hypothesized that you, as potential alibis, would be most likely to withdraw your alibi for the suspect when he or she was a stranger and you had been told about the confession. Further, we think you would be least likely to withdraw the alibi (and thus maintain the suspect’s innocence) when that person was a close friend and you were not given any confession information. Thus, we will be able to see if the least believable alibi (the friend since they’re likely to lie for the suspect) was less likely to be altered when told about the suspect’s confession than when not. If this is true, then strangers (the stronger alibi) are more likely than friends to be swayed into questioning their memory of what happened during the incident and then also more likely to withhold their alibi testimony (and theoretically increase the chances of the wrong person being charged).

Because alibi research involves a person’s memory for an event, we could not tell you ahead of time what we were looking for because that would most likely have altered your behavior and answers to the questions during the second session. You would also be likely to watch others actions more closely during the first session and to question your friend about their behavior during the time between sessions. This delay time was needed to recreate a real world possibility of memory decay between the crime and being called as an alibi corroborator.”

Point out the IRB questions on the second page, then read:
“If you answer yes to any of the following questions, please be sure to write out in detail what it is that made you feel anxious or distressed during the study and what we can do to prevent that from happening to future participants.”

Give them time to answer these questions, then say:
“We’ve found that students who’ve taken psychology and law tend to be somewhat more suspicious of the true purposes, so have you taken that class?”

If they say yes, write “Psych/Law” in the notes section of the alibi half sheet

“Again, if you wish to have the data from this (or any) part of the study not included in the results, you are free to withdraw your data from the sample. If you choose to do so, it will be destroyed immediately with no penalty to you. If you have any questions feel free to ask them now. Because this study uses some
deception of the actual purpose, it is really important that you do not talk about it with anyone. This could severely damage our results if new participants were aware of the study hypothesis and procedures before beginning their own sessions. Your results will be kept confidential to the experimenters, and your data will not be identifiable by any of your personal information. The photographs taken during the first session will also be deleted immediately. Thank you again for your participation.”

Collect the debriefing form once completed (if they want one, they can keep a blank copy) and thank them again for their participation.
APPENDIX K
ALIBI QUESTIONNAIRE

Alibi Questionnaire

Instructions: Please indicate your opinion on the following questions by circling the best answer choice.

PART A: Alibi Corroboration and Confidence

1. I would be willing to provide an alibi for this person.
   1. Yes
   2. No

2. I am 100% confident that the suspect is the person who took the portable music player during the first session.
   1. Strongly Disagree
   2. Disagree
   3. Somewhat Disagree
   4. Somewhat Agree
   5. Agree
   6. Strongly Agree

3. I am unsure if this suspect is the actual perpetrator.
   1. Strongly Disagree
   2. Disagree
   3. Somewhat Disagree
   4. Somewhat Agree
   5. Agree
   6. Strongly Agree

4. I have doubt about whether this suspect was the only one who could possibly have stolen the portable music player.
   1. Strongly Disagree
   2. Disagree
   3. Somewhat Disagree
   4. Somewhat Agree
   5. Agree
   6. Strongly Agree

5. There is nothing that could convince me that the perpetrator was anyone other than this suspect.
   1. Strongly Disagree
   2. Disagree
   3. Somewhat Disagree
   4. Somewhat Agree
   5. Agree
   6. Strongly Agree

6. There is no doubt in my mind about my decision to offer an alibi for this suspect.
   1. Strongly Disagree
   2. Disagree
   3. Somewhat Disagree
   4. Somewhat Agree
   5. Agree
   6. Strongly Agree

7. I am hesitant to provide an alibi for this person because I think they might have actually committed the act.
   1. Strongly Disagree
   2. Disagree
   3. Somewhat Disagree
   4. Somewhat Agree
   5. Agree
   6. Strongly Agree
8. I question if serving as an alibi for this person is something I should do.

   1  2  3  4  5  6
   Strongly Disagree Somewhat Somewhat Agree Strongly Agree
   Disagree

9. I am sure about my willingness to stand up for this suspect's opinion of events during the night in question.

   1  2  3  4  5  6
   Strongly Disagree Somewhat Somewhat Agree Strongly Agree
   Disagree

10. If I were on a jury hearing this case, I would convict the suspect.

    1  2  3  4  5  6
    Strongly Disagree Somewhat Somewhat Agree Strongly Agree
    Disagree

11. I believe the suspect is innocent of what he or she is being accused of.

    1  2  3  4  5  6
    Strongly Disagree Somewhat Somewhat Agree Strongly Agree
    Disagree

PART B: Alibi Depth

12. I would be willing to tell the suspect that I believe he was NOT the one who took the portable music player.

    1  2  3  4  5  6
    Strongly Disagree Somewhat Somewhat Agree Strongly Agree
    Disagree

13. I am unsure of whether I would want to get involved in the alibi corroboration process.

    1  2  3  4  5  6
    Strongly Disagree Somewhat Somewhat Agree Strongly Agree
    Disagree

14. I would be willing to tell the suspect's significant other that I would serve as an alibi corroborator for the suspect.

    1  2  3  4  5  6
    Strongly Disagree Somewhat Somewhat Agree Strongly Agree
    Disagree

15. I would feel comfortable talking with this suspect's significant other about what happened during the first session.

    1  2  3  4  5  6
16. I would be willing to provide an alibi to the suspect’s employer.

\[
\begin{array}{cccccc}
\text{Strongly} & \text{Disagree} & \text{Somewhat} & \text{Disagree} & \text{Somewhat} & \text{Agree} & \text{Strongly} \\
\text{Disagree} & & & & & & \\
\end{array}
\]

\[
123456
\]

17. I question whether vouching for this suspect to his employer is something I want to do.

\[
\begin{array}{cccccc}
\text{Strongly} & \text{Disagree} & \text{Somewhat} & \text{Disagree} & \text{Somewhat} & \text{Agree} & \text{Strongly} \\
\text{Disagree} & & & & & & \\
\end{array}
\]

\[
123456
\]

18. I would be willing to provide an alibi for this suspect during a police interview.

\[
\begin{array}{cccccc}
\text{Strongly} & \text{Disagree} & \text{Somewhat} & \text{Disagree} & \text{Somewhat} & \text{Agree} & \text{Strongly} \\
\text{Disagree} & & & & & & \\
\end{array}
\]

\[
123456
\]

19. I am unsure if I would put myself through police questioning in order to corroborate the suspect’s story.

\[
\begin{array}{cccccc}
\text{Strongly} & \text{Disagree} & \text{Somewhat} & \text{Disagree} & \text{Somewhat} & \text{Agree} & \text{Strongly} \\
\text{Disagree} & & & & & & \\
\end{array}
\]

\[
123456
\]

20. I would be willing to provide an alibi for the suspect by talking with both the trial attorneys.

\[
\begin{array}{cccccc}
\text{Strongly} & \text{Disagree} & \text{Somewhat} & \text{Disagree} & \text{Somewhat} & \text{Agree} & \text{Strongly} \\
\text{Disagree} & & & & & & \\
\end{array}
\]

\[
123456
\]

21. I am sure talking with the trial attorneys would not be a problem for me to do.

\[
\begin{array}{cccccc}
\text{Strongly} & \text{Disagree} & \text{Somewhat} & \text{Disagree} & \text{Somewhat} & \text{Agree} & \text{Strongly} \\
\text{Disagree} & & & & & & \\
\end{array}
\]

\[
123456
\]

22. I would be willing to provide an alibi for the suspect that required me to take a polygraph test.

\[
\begin{array}{cccccc}
\text{Strongly} & \text{Disagree} & \text{Somewhat} & \text{Disagree} & \text{Somewhat} & \text{Agree} & \text{Strongly} \\
\text{Disagree} & & & & & & \\
\end{array}
\]

\[
123456
\]

23. I would hesitate to submit to a polygraph test in order to vouch for this suspect.

\[
\begin{array}{cccccc}
\text{Strongly} & \text{Disagree} & \text{Somewhat} & \text{Disagree} & \text{Somewhat} & \text{Agree} & \text{Strongly} \\
\text{Disagree} & & & & & & \\
\end{array}
\]

\[
123456
\]
Disagree  Disagree  Agree  Agree

24. I would be willing to provide an alibi for the suspect by testifying in a criminal trial.


1  2  3  4  5  6
Strongly Disagree  Somewhat Disagree  Somewhat Agree  Agree  Strongly Agree

25. I would worry about going to court in order to testify for this suspect.


1  2  3  4  5  6
Strongly Disagree  Somewhat Disagree  Somewhat Agree  Agree  Strongly Agree

PART C: Memory for the Event and Viewing Conditions

26. I believe my memory for the event in question is good.


1  2  3  4  5  6
Strongly Disagree  Somewhat Disagree  Somewhat Agree  Agree  Strongly Agree

27. I am NOT sure if I remember exactly what happened during the first session.


1  2  3  4  5  6
Strongly Disagree  Somewhat Disagree  Somewhat Agree  Agree  Strongly Agree

28. I can account for the suspect’s actions during the entire first session.


1  2  3  4  5  6
Strongly Disagree  Somewhat Disagree  Somewhat Agree  Agree  Strongly Agree

29. During the first session, there are more than 15 minutes in which I am unsure of where the suspect was.


1  2  3  4  5  6
Strongly Disagree  Somewhat Disagree  Somewhat Agree  Agree  Strongly Agree

30. I believe I could recite everything that happened during the first session.


1  2  3  4  5  6
Strongly Disagree  Somewhat Disagree  Somewhat Agree  Agree  Strongly Agree

31. I am confident that my account of what happened is accurate.


1  2  3  4  5  6
Strongly Disagree  Somewhat Disagree  Somewhat Agree  Agree  Strongly Agree
32. I had a good view of the suspect throughout the first session.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>Somewhat Disagree</td>
<td>Somewhat Agree</td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

33. My view of the suspect and his or her actions were clear during the entire first session.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
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<th>5</th>
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</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>Somewhat Disagree</td>
<td>Somewhat Agree</td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

34. I am NOT confident that I kept track of the suspect’s actions during the first session.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>1</th>
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<th>5</th>
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<td>Agree</td>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

35. I was able to keep an eye on everyone’s behavior during the first session.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
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<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
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<td>Somewhat Disagree</td>
<td>Somewhat Agree</td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

36. I did NOT have a clear view of the suspect for most of the first session.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
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<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>Disagree</td>
<td>Somewhat Disagree</td>
<td>Somewhat Agree</td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

37. My view of the suspect was obstructed during some portion of the first session.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
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<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Agree</td>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

38. I had a good view of the suspect taking the portable music player.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
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<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Somewhat Agree</td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

39. I consider the suspect a friend.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
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<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Somewhat Disagree</td>
<td>Somewhat Agree</td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

40. I was told during questioning that the suspect confessed to taking the portable music player.

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
41. I had NOT met the suspect prior to the first session.
   1   2   3   4   5   6
   Strongly Disagree Disagree Somewhat Disagree Somewhat Agree Agree Strongly

42. I believe the suspect did NOT confess to the crime in question.
   1   2   3   4   5   6
   Strongly Disagree Disagree Somewhat Disagree Somewhat Agree Agree Strongly

43. I believe the suspect confessed to the crime in question.
   1   2   3   4   5   6
   Strongly Disagree Disagree Somewhat Disagree Somewhat Agree Agree Strongly

44. I think the suspect was coerced into confessing about taking the portable music player.
   1   2   3   4   5   6
   Strongly Disagree Disagree Somewhat Disagree Somewhat Agree Agree Strongly

PART D: Demographics

45. What race do you identify with?
   1   2   3   4   5   6
   Asian/Pacific Islander Black Cuban Hispanic Latino White

Other, please specify ____________________________________________

46. Are you a US citizen?
   1   2
   Yes No

47. What is your age?__________________________

48. What is your gender?
   1   2
   Male Female

49. What is your current school classification?
   1   2   3   4   5   6
   Freshman Sophomore Junior Senior Grad Not
50. What is your current major? 

51. Do you have a job (besides being a student)?

1. Yes
2. No

Please specify
Were you at all suspicious of the true intent of the study?  
Yes  
No  
(if yes, please explain what you believe this study is investigating)  


Did your friend (or anyone else) reveal anything about the true study goals during the time between sessions?  
Yes  
No  
(if yes, please explain what they said)  


CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX L
FINAL DEBRIEFING

Confession Influence on Alibi Corroboration
Final Debriefing (for participants after 2nd session)

The basis for this study was an Innocence Project client who maintained his innocence after being convicted of a crime. This man had been at a party with several people during the time of the crime, which should have provided him with multiple alibi corroborators to stand up for him by saying that he could not have been the one who committed the crime. However, because of extensive pressure during interrogation, he ended up confessing to the crime (which he later recanted) and once word of this got out, all of his friends from the party started to question when and where they saw him and because of this they no longer wanted to be an alibi for him in court. We think the confession might be what caused these friends to go back and rethink about the night in question and to withdraw their original story.

In this study, we are looking to examine if that can actually happen; basically whether or not a piece of evidence used during investigative questioning (the presence or absence of a confession from the suspect) is able to influence whether a person is willing to offer their alibi for that suspect in court. We were also interested in whether the potential alibi corroborator being a close friend, acquaintance, or a stranger could have an influence on that decision as well. So the first session served as the timeframe that a crime could have occurred and by having you interact with different groups of people we were ensuring that you wouldn’t be able to definitely know the actions of each other person present (much like you wouldn’t completely know the actions of every other person at a party). The second session, when you learned about the fake story of a stolen portable music player, was a form of questioning that police investigators might use to feel out potential alibis and we delayed this by a few days to allow for some memory confusion as to the exact events that took place during the first meeting. In this second session, we told you that either your friend or someone else you met during the previous session (a stranger or acquaintance) was a suspect for stealing an portable music player. In some conditions, we also told you that the suspect confessed to the act and showed you a written confession.

We hypothesized that you, as potential alibis, would be most likely to withdraw your alibi for the suspect when he or she was a stranger and you had been told about the confession. Further, we think you would be least likely to withdraw the alibi (and thus maintain the suspect’s innocence) when that person was a close friend and you were not given any confession information. Thus, we will be able to see if the least believable alibi (the friend since they’re likely to lie for the suspect) was less likely to be altered when told about the suspect’s confession than when not. If this is true, then strangers (the stronger alibi) are more likely than friends to be swayed into questioning their memory of what happened during the incident and then also more likely to withhold their alibi testimony (and theoretically increase the chances of the wrong person being charged).

Because alibi research involves a person’s memory for an event, we could not tell you ahead of time what we were looking for because that would most likely have altered your behavior and answers to the questions during the second session. You
would also be likely to watch others actions more closely during the first session and to question your friend about their behavior during the time between sessions. This delay time was needed to recreate a real world possibility of memory decay between the crime and being called as an alibi corroborator.

The Institutional Review Board (IRB) is concerned that this study may cause some adverse reactions or trauma in some participants, so please fill out the following questions as fully and honestly as you can to better assess the effects this study had on you during your participation.

Was there anything about this study that made you upset, distressed, anxious, or uncomfortable?  
Yes  No  
(if yes, please explain what)

(If you answered yes to this question, please do not hesitate to ask the researcher for information about the student counseling center or to further explain the need for deception in this study).

Did you feel you were pressured into offering an alibi for the suspect?  
Yes  No  
(if yes, please explain why)

Do you think the procedures we used were justified to investigate this topic, given what you know now?  
Yes  No  
(if no, please explain why not)

Please rank the amount of stress you felt during this study (circle one)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No Stress</th>
<th>A little Stress</th>
<th>Moderate Stress</th>
<th>A lot of Stress</th>
<th>Extreme Stress</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

What was your reaction to the study like? (circle one)
Positive, I enjoyed my experience  Negative, I did not enjoy my experience

Again, if you wish to have the data from this (or any) part of the study not included in the results, you are free to withdraw your data from the sample. If you choose to do so, it will be destroyed immediately with no penalty to you. If you have any questions feel free to ask them now. Because this study uses some deception of the actual purpose, it is really important that you do not talk about it with anyone. This could severely damage our results if new participants were aware of the study hypothesis and procedures before beginning their own sessions. Your results will be kept confidential to the experimenters, and your data will not be identifiable by any of your personal information. The photographs taken during the first session will also be deleted immediately. Thank you again for your participation.

I have read the procedure detailed above. I understand the purpose and content of the study and have asked any questions I may have.

I would like to have my data included in the study:  _____ Yes  _____ No

Participant: ___________________________________________ Date: _______________
LIST OF REFERENCES


Megan Kienzle earned her Bachelor of Science degree in psychology (minoring in Criminal Justice Studies) from Iowa State University in 2008. After graduation, she moved to Florida and began work towards the Master of Arts degree at the University of Florida, with plans of obtaining the Doctor of Philosophy degree from the same institution. Her research interests generally lie in the intersection of psychology and law; more specifically, she researches jury decision making, the death penalty, and factors associated with wrongful convictions.