THE POLITICS OF INDIGENOUS NATIONALISM: THE CASE OF BOLIVIA

By

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To all of those who supported me along the way
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Abstract of Thesis Presented to the Graduate School
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THE POLITICS OF INDIGENOUS NATIONALISM: THE CASE OF BOLIVIA

By

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This project analyzes recent shifts in the methodologies of studies of the politics of subaltern groups in the Andean region, and more specifically Bolivia. Since the 1950s, the political studies that focus on Andean communities have transformed their perspective to coincide with shifting intellectual and political notions. This project identifies a number of factors that indicate shifting methodologies. Furthermore, this project analyzes current changes that are occurring within the realm of the political system in Bolivia. These changes are used to suggest an academic shift away from essentializing notions like “indigenous politics” and back towards more detailed studies of political culture.

The case of Bolivia is used to support an academic shift back toward political culture studies by focusing on the growth of “indigenous” nationalism and its role in shaping the political perspectives of particular population sub-groups. The emergence and ultimate success of nationalist “indigenous” political groups in Bolivia have helped to reshape the public image of the “indigenous” and influence academic approaches to studying these groups. However, recent shifts in the Bolivian political power structure have indicated that political groups may be moving away from nationalist “indigenous” discourse and towards micro-level community based
politics. This project suggests future studies to account for these shifts by conducting research on political culture at the community level.
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Since the 1980s Latin Americanist scholars have written extensively on the politics of subaltern groups on the margins of national societies. At the same time, scholarly interest in nationalism has boomed, in part in response to the seminal work of Benedict Anderson.\(^1\) Much of this work has been concerned not only with class struggle but with what has come to be known as “identity politics” and, in a somewhat different critical vein, “political culture.” According to the anthropologist Charles Hale, Jr., “identity politics” refers to the actions and discourses of a group that come from a particular social and cultural location within a given national society. The location of the group derives from a collective social memory as well as a distinct place in society. One goal of such groups is to challenge state policies that seek to suppress or erase the identity they imagine for themselves.\(^2\) Approaches to “political culture” and practice have been more diverse than simple “identity politics,” often blending Marxist or Post-Marxist concerns with those of postcolonial and cultural studies.\(^3\)

In the Latin American field, anthropologist Eric Wolf raised critical questions about “peasant politics” in the 1960s, and historian Steve Stern extended Wolf’s view in a historical and theoretical review of “Andean peasant politics” in 1987.\(^4\) Subsequently, anthropologist Orin Starn raised critical questions about Andean studies or “Andeanism” as a form of “Orientalism.”


This study builds on these seminal critiques with an examination of the emergence of the discourse and practice of “indigenous politics” in contemporary Bolivia.

While I refer to “political culture” throughout this project, I am not using the political science “behavioral” concept of “political culture” that orients a specific group, or culture, within the larger scheme of politics by identifying a distinct and static form of political practices. Instead, I use “political culture” as it has been approached by historians and anthropologists. In these cases “political cultures” are attributed to political actions that have been formed by a combination of interactions with power structures. As a result, individuals and groups shape their political demands, actions, and discourses based on the community that they find themselves to be a representative. From this perspective “political cultures” are not static in nature, rather they can change as individuals’ and groups’ relations with power structures change over time.5 Specifically, Nils Jacobsen and Cristóbal Aljovín de Losada define “political culture” as “a perspective on processes of change and continuity by any human polity or its component parts which privileges symbols, discourses, rituals, customs, norms, values, and attitudes of individuals or groups for understanding the construction, consolidation, and dismantling of power constellations and institutions.”6 While many factors shape “political cultures”, the historical and anthropological approaches have paid significant attention to cultural perspectives and how they have shaped political actions throughout history. In this project, it is my intention to speak of “political culture” as a way of addressing these cultural elements.


The differentiation between the political science and historical/anthropological
definitions of “political culture” is important to note for this project. If we were to use “political
culture” as it is commonly defined by political scientists, we would be using essentialist notions
when discussing the political practices of Quechua and Aymara language communities because
to be “Aymara” or to be “Quechua” would be the key to understanding an individual’s political
culture. However, by using the historical/anthropological definition of “political culture”, we
save ourselves from essentializing criticisms because from a cultural perspective Quechua and
Aymara interactions with power structures throughout history have shaped the way that they
currently conduct political practices. In this case, being “Aymara” or “Quechua” does not
necessarily define an individual’s political culture, but it does link them to a particular history
that has been used to form the way that they participate in politics; a subject that is discussed in
detail in Chapter 4. This “political culture” is not ingrained, but formed by particular histories
and interactions.

The purpose of this thesis is two-fold. First, I trace the history of Latin Americanist
studies of subaltern groups and the emergence of the concept of “indigenous politics” in Andean
Studies. I criticize “identity politics” scholarship and argue for a critical return to “political
culture” approaches. Second, I examine the exceptionalist discourse of “indigenous politics” in
Bolivia and argue that it actually constitutes a typical form of cultural nationalism.

Chapter 2 reviews the recent history of Latin American and Andean studies of the politics
of subaltern groups, most notably “peasants” and “Indians” and “natives.” Chapter 3 reviews the
recent historiography of pre-colonial, colonial, and republican politics in what is today the
territory claimed by the national state named Bolivia. Chapter 4 examines the recent history of
the discourse and practice of indigeneity in the national politics of Bolivia. Chapter 5 presents
quantitative data on the political tendencies of Bolivia’s Quechua and Aymara speakers. In the conclusion I suggest some promising avenues of inquiry on the political culture of indigenous nationalism.
Since the 1950s, the politics of subordinate groups have been studied primarily under the rubrics first of “peasant politics,” then “Andean peasant politics,” and finally “indigenous politics.” These terms or rubrics reveal a history of thought and action that allows us to contextualize the emergence of “indigenous politics” in Bolivia. Therefore, by contextualizing the emergence of “indigenous politics” in Bolivia we can also hypothesize about the possible trajectories of future research projects on the subject of political culture in Bolivia.

The Study of Peasant Politics in Latin America

During the period between the late 1950s and the early 1990s scholarly interest in “peasant politics” in Latin America grew substantially. The scholars of this period ultimately took a class perspective that emphasized peasant responses to hardship and “moral economy” in agrarian communities. The importance of a class- and location-based term such as “peasant” (or petty commodity producer, in some cases) held considerable weight in Latin America where economic and social inequalities between city and countryside were marked, and where programs and policies of agrarian reform were implemented on a large scale.¹

In his 1955 article “Types of Latin American Peasantry: A Preliminary Discussion” anthropologist Eric Wolf identified Latin America’s “peasants” as being bound by three characteristics. According to Wolf, “peasants” are defined as individuals who are primarily agricultural producers, retain effective control of their landholdings, and favor subsistence

production over reinvestment. These characteristics were used to establish who falls under the category of “peasant.” In his classic study *Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century*, Wolf analyzed the most significant peasant rebellions of the century, with two chapters notably devoted to the Latin American cases of Mexico and Cuba. Here, Wolf presents the peasant movements as “cultural encounters” between “the capitalist center, the metropolis, and the pre-capitalist or non-capitalist periphery.” These encounters culminate in revolutions as peasants resist the social changes that are brought about by the capitalist model.

Following the influential work of the British Marxist historian Eric Hobsbawm, many Latin Americanist scholars during this period portrayed the “peasant” as a reactionary group that did not act in national politics unless provoked by outside forces. This concept, also known as the “parochial reactor” thesis, stems from the idea that peasant interaction with the capitalist system resulted in a stratification of the peasant class. In this respect, terms such as “bourgeois farmers,” “middle peasants” and “proletarianized paupers” emerge to identify the different sectors of the peasant class. According to historian Steve Stern, the parochial reactor concept is rooted in the idea that inter-class stratification forces peasant groups to clash with one another and look inward towards local issues and debates, therefore limiting their political horizons. As a result, it is the task of outside forces to organize peasant interest and channel it into national level politics. Stern explains that these forces can appear in a number of forms, including “the leadership and influence of urban groups, rural-to-urban migrants, and intellectuals allied with

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2 Wolf defines “effective control” as land that “is generally insured through direct ownership, through undisputed squatter rights, or through customary arrangements governing the rental and use of the land.” Eric Wolf, “Types of Latin American Peasantry: A Preliminary Discussion,” *American Anthropologist* 57:3 (1955), 453.

3 Wolf 1969, 278.

the peasants.”

Playing by the rules of the “parochial reactor” thesis, peasant involvement in national level politics occurs only in reaction to changes that are implanted by these outside forces.

As late as 1975, some influential scholars were still depicting “peasant” groups in Latin America as isolated groups sitting on the margins of society. In a 1974 study, Charles Wagley perpetuates this “peasant” stigma by arguing that the “peasant” groups of Latin America are located in proximity to the “tribal Indian” on a social spectrum that ranged from the most isolated, backwards “sub-cultures” (“tribal Indian”) to the most accessible, progressive “sub-cultures” (“white metropolitan”). Wagley defended his position on the “peasant” class by arguing that peasants and the “Indian” were agriculturalists that used many of the same tools and techniques, and depended on subsistence farming, noting that they showed little or no interest in politics, and then only when influenced by outsiders.

By the 1980s, this isolated and limited view of the “peasant” and his politics came under attack. Historian Steve Stern’s historical and theoretical critique of the “parochial reactor” thesis was fundamental for the subfield of Andean Studies. Here, Stern is critical of the methodologies used to construct the “parochial reactor” thesis arguing that scholars of this approach use isolated cases and historical references to generalize peasant political behavior and consciousness. Stern proposes that scholars rethink this paradigm by expanding their scope of peasant studies and utilizing a number of methodological suggestions. Stern’s suggestions include “the role of peasants as continuous initiators in political relations, the selection of appropriate time frames as

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7 Wagley 1974, 32.
units of analysis in the study of rebellion, the diversity of peasant consciousness and political horizons, and the significance of ethnic factors in explaining ‘peasant’ consciousness and revolt.” Stern’s broad approach reconstructs peasant political behavior and consciousness as being more complex than it appeared under the “parochial reactor” thesis. In this light peasant groups occupy a wide range of political horizons as they are “continually engaged in their political worlds.” This approach opens the door to a number of new avenues for studying peasant political behavior and consciousness; including a synthesis of ethnic and class based factors.8

In a similar vein as Stern, anthropologist Orin Starn is critical of studies that generalize peasant behavior and consciousness through static cultural depictions in a phenomenon that he refers to as “Andeanism;” an Andean twist on Edward Said’s “Orientalism.”9 According to Starn, “Andeanism” is a “representation that portrays contemporary highland peasants as outside the flow of modern history.” Elaborating further, “it dichotomizes between Occidental, coastal, urban and mestizo and the non-Western, highland, rural and indigenous.”10 In this case, Starn argues that scholars of this current present generalized depictions of Andean culture that are formulated from unique, isolated cases. Based on Starn’s argument, it is apparent that “Andeanism” falls victim to the same trappings as the “parochial reactor” thesis. While examples of “traditional” Andean communities exist, there is an array of cases that depict highland communities covering a complete range of interaction with non-highland systems. Starn suggests that scholars of the Andean field should consider the complex system of interaction when analyzing significant historical events.

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8 Stern 1987, 6-9.
Peasant and Indigenous Politics in Bolivia

In the Bolivian scholarship, global trends coupled with local events shaped political discourse and academic studies on “peasant politics.” In a typically paternalistic fashion, the Creole-led 1952 Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario (MNR) Revolution helped to “usher the peasant” into Bolivia’s political arena. Prior to the 1952 Revolution, political elites used the term “Indian” to establish a barrier between white, land owning citizens with full rights and non-white individuals excluded from the benefits and decision making processes of the state. During this period, “Indian” was used as an exclusionary term and ensured that non-white individuals remained in a lower social stratum than Creole and mestizo compatriots. After the 1952 Revolution, the use of the term “Indian” changed as the Bolivian government implemented a revolution from above that sought to reclassify “Indians” as campesinos and Indian communities as peasant unions, or sindicatos. In doing so, the registered communities were to drop their colonial ethnic identity as “Indians” and assume the modern, class-based, national identity of “peasants.” One of the underlying purposes of this modernization project was to solve Bolivia’s “Indian problem” by simply removing “the Indian” from the equation, reinventing him as a “union member” or sindicalista.11 The new legal status of “Indians” as campesinos and “Indian communities” as sindicatos remained until the newly drafted Bolivian constitution of 2009, which purported to “reclaim” the cultural roots of the indigenous or native.

Despite the legal recognition of the “peasant” by the Bolivian state in the 1950s, a number of social movements appeared in the Andean region in the 1960s and 70s that challenged that label, including the Federación de Centros Shuar (Ecuador, 1964), Ecuador Runakunapak

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Rikcharimuy (Ecuador, 1972), and Consejo Regional Indígena del Vaupés (Colombia, 1974).\textsuperscript{12} By the 1970s a number of “Indian” and/or “indigenous” movements also appeared in Bolivia, including the Partido Indio de Bolivia (1967), the Kataristas (1968), the Indigenistas (1970), Confederación Sindical Única de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia (1979), and the Confederación Indígena del Oriente Boliviano (1982), all of whom made demands that relied heavily on an indigenist language and “ethnic” platform.\textsuperscript{13} Notably, however, many of these groups did not refrain from calling themselves “peasants” or “campesinos.”

The doctrines of these movements, such as the Manifiesto del Partido Indio de Bolivia (1970), the Kataristas’ Tiahuanaco Manifesto (July 1973) or the Tésis Política of the CSUTCB (June 1983), opened the doors for Bolivianist scholars to pursue new methods of study which combined class analysis with cultural or identity politics. In the political sphere, these movements created symbols and resurrected traditional heroes that made it possible to imagine “peasant” Bolivia as an oppressed but unified indigenous homeland.

During the 1970s the perspective of scholars on Bolivian “peasant politics” was very similar to that of the rest of Latin America. During the 1980s, however, the trend of analyzing Bolivia’s “peasant” class was transformed. In his 1980 study, Gregorio Iriarte argued that the most important aspects of “peasant politics” had been ignored by previous studies. Iriarte sheds new light on this history by focusing on the behind-the-scenes organizing of Bolivia’s first


“peasant” unions. He argued that the “peasant” class was not reactionary. In another, ethnohistorical vein, British anthropologist Tristan Platt argued that Andean communities or Ayllus had developed a political and tributary “pact” with the colonial state, and that in the republican period those communities had successfully resisted the “enlightened liberalism” of republican elites. Platt’s study suggested that Andean communities were forceful political actors in Bolivian history, in part because they had defended “ethnic” or “Indian” rights of colonial origin, and in part because they had defended traditional Andean patterns of transhumance which were at odds with the liberal regime of private property and individual citizenship which Platt called a form of “ethnocide.” In another ethnohistorical study, Roger Rasnake focused on the social and political roles of Indian authorities or kurakas. Rasnake argued that a rich Andean political culture had survived in the rural areas of Bolivia. In yet another ethnohistorical study, in this case informed by Marxist social history, Brooke Larson examined Andean life in Cochabamba during the colonial and republican periods. In this examination she explains how Andeans actively chose to fully assimilate to some European elements while also choosing to fuse other elements with pre-existing Andean traditions. For the cases in which Andeans assimilated, Larson provides examples of how groups in Cochabamba utilized the colonial legal system to their own advantage. Larson depicts the colonial and republican eras as periods of gradual adaptation and resistance as opposed to absolute conquest.

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and domination. Furthermore, she describes particular groups of Andeans as effective political actors that were fully conscious of their political capabilities.\footnote{Brooke Larson, Colonialism and Agrarian Transformation in Bolivia: Cochabamba, 1550-1900 (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1988).}

In the late 1980s and early 1990s Bolivian scholars continued to push the field of “peasant politics” toward cultural critiques of Bolivia’s Creole nationalism and neoliberalism. In their 1990 study, Xavier Albó and Josep M. Barnadas argue that the “Andean peasant” was the central force in the making of Bolivian history.\footnote{Xavier Albó and Josep M. Barnadas, La cara india y campesina de nuestra historia (La Paz: UNITAS, 1990), 258.} Furthermore, the “Andean peasant” was able to play a significant rule in politics by having direct interactions with political elites and policy makers.

In a 1987 compilation that includes some of this Bolivian work, Steve Stern argues for a more historical approach to “peasant politics.” In this introduction, which we have already cited above, Stern emphasizes the role that the Cold War played in stimulating interest in “peasant politics” in the United States, England, and France. Wolf’s work is a prime example of this trend, as was the early work of James C. Scott on Southeast Asian peasant politics.\footnote{Wolf 1969; James C. Scott, The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976); James C. Scott, Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985).} Furthermore, he acknowledges that, since the 1960s, the field of “peasant politics” had grown into a stable and “self sufficient” field of research. Stern noted that stability in the field indicated that there would be methodological diversification which in turn would resolve the troubles of past “peasant” studies in the Andean region. Primarily, he finds it difficult to ignore the role that “indigenous”, ethnic, and racial issues play in Andean political life. What is more, he argues that, since “peasant” is an ethnically blind term, it is difficult to apply it to an Andean region where
ethnicity plays such a significant role. Stern accounts for these troubles by introducing some theoretical suggestions for studying the “peasant.” Included in these suggestions is a new historical perspective that recognizes ethnicity as a key component in the study of Andean peasants, and the need to study the politics of such groups over time, not merely focusing on events like “rebellions” or protests. It is noteworthy that the title of Stern’s compilation utilizes the ethnogeographical, class inflected term of “Andean Peasant,” favored by many anthropologists. The scholars that follow Stern’s theoretical suggestions utilize both the terms “Andean Peasant” and “Indian Peasant” as a way of continuing the “peasant studies” tradition while also accounting for the strong ethnic colonial or neocolonial dimensions of Andean life. In some cases this combination of class based or Marxist and ethnic approaches to peasants produced such concepts as “class culture.”

By the 1990s, terms, such as “Andean peasant” and “Indian peasant”, come into common usage as scholars investigate more detailed dynamics of the once singular “peasant” class. By placing geographical or ethnic boundaries on the “peasant” class, scholars of this period recognized the diversity and complexity of politics in the Andes. Following Stern’s suggestions,

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21 Orin Starn et al, “Rethinking the Politics of Anthropology: The Case of the Andes [and Comments and Reply]”, *Current Anthropology* 35:1 (1994), 13-38. Although Stern called for a shift in perspective, from a purely class based to a mixed class cultural perspective, works that introduce this method had already been published by scholars at Latin American institutions. In a 1981 study Guillermo Bonfil Batalla adds to the academic discussion of identity politics by publishing a compilation of the manifestos of the various ethnic movements that emerged throughout Latin America in the 1960s and 1970s. Although he emphasizes the role of the ethnic movements of the 1960s and 1970s, he argues that, as a social class, the “Indian” is a vital part of the “peasant” movement. Bonfil Batalla reinforces this argument by explaining that the “Indian” of Latin America qualifies as “peasant” based on Eric Wolf’s original standards. This publication is important to the transition of identity politics for a couple of reasons. First, he explains how the “Indian” movements of the time period can also be recognized as being “peasant” movements. In both of these cases, the native Andean groups sit on the margins of both ethnic and class based models. To identify this group he uses the “Indio Campesino” which utilizes both the ethnic and class based labels, or class culture. Second, Bonfil Batalla argues that the various ethnic movements that emerged in Latin America share a number of similarities. According to Bonfil Batalla this is most recognizable in the official publications of the most prevalent ethnic and “peasant” political groups. The publications that emerge from separate places follow very similar outlines and they follow a very similar set of demands, such as the recuperation of history, cultural recognition, and equal state rights. Most important of these similarities is that they all place “nuestro” against “lo otro.”
one way that historians and anthropologists investigated this diversity and complexity was by “reconceptualizing” the recent history of peasant politics along ethnographic lines, as Mark Thurner explains. In an ethnographical history of the hacienda system in the Ecuadorian highlands Thurner examines the intricate system of relationships that existed between the hacienda “peasants” and the landlord or *patron*. Thurner criticized the “open triangle” theory of the Andean hacienda system which depicted peasants as being completely dominated and isolated by the landlord. By examining the ethnographic complexity of “Andean peasant” relationships within the hacienda system, Thurner is able to tease out the cultural politics of symbolic exchange and everyday resistance that shaped class and culture.

Extending the ethnographic history approach to Peru, Thurner disabused a previous history that had inscribed Peru’s “Indians” or “natives” as “pre-political” peasants. To do so, he analyzes colonial and postcolonial peasant-state relations. Thurner breaks with all scholarly labels and, in a linguistic turn, traces the political discourse and practice of Andean peasants as engaged “republicans” and “Peruvians.”

Another way that scholars of this period investigated the various aspects of the “Andean peasant” experience was by investigating the internal conflicts of class and culture that commonly exist among “peasant” organizations. In one case, Juliana Strobele-Gregor argues that “Andean peasants” are torn between traditional norms of community and ethnicity and the hard

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23 Thurner 1993, 66.

ideological “class line” of official “peasant” organizations. This conflict in discourse and practice places great strain on Bolivia’s peasant organizations, she argues, as highland “Andean peasants” feel the need to choose between supporting a strictly “indigenous” movement or remaining within the ranks of the “peasant” organization. Strobele-Gregor deals with this conflict by explaining that Bolivia’s “peasant” organizations adopted a unified structure that combined the “peasant” union model with the traditional Andean patterns of organization.

In another important study, anthropologist Thomas Abercrombie develops a sophisticated, “intercultural” approach to the cultural politics of ethnicity in colonial Alto Peru and postcolonial Bolivia. Abercrombie examines the ways in which carnival pageants serve as a stage for forming the public image of particular cultures, cultural interactions, and histories. In the case of Oruro’s Carnival, Abercrombie explains that over the last two decades the departments’ “indigenous” communities have been using the pageant to present “‘authentic original’” shows of rural culture and demonstrate pride in their cultural traditions. According to Abercrombie, there are numerous motivations behind these shows. First, these rural groups desire to disabuse previous images of rural cultural that have been displayed by “non-indigenous” elites throughout previous generations of Carnival. Second, they use the parade as a political mechanism to be recognized as “authentic rural ‘base communities.’” Abercrombie argues that this type of recognition could pay dividends when these groups “petition for development money and hope for a more direct form of representation in national politics.” In Abercrombie’s portrayal of the cultural drama, “indigenous” rural culture is presented as being


complex as opposed to singular, as the Carnival pageant would indicate. Furthermore, “indigenous” rural groups are actively participating in cultural politics by using the image of their traditions as a means of registering their “authenticity.”

The Invention of “Indigenous Politics”

While the sophisticated scholarship on “Andean peasant politics” sought to diversify and extend the fields of “peasant politics” and “subaltern studies,” the fall of the Berlin Wall and the Quincentennial of 1992 helped bring about the resurgence of the concept and discourse of “indigenous politics.” In part as a consequence of these events, some scholars shifted from post-Marxist studies of political culture (i.e., “Andean peasant politics”) to indigenous “identity politics.”27 During this period there is a re-invention of “Indian” or “indigenous” groups in Latin America and beyond. No longer were these groups seen as parochial reactors to oppressive governments, but instead as highly organized and influential organizations fueled by radical nativist rhetoric and growing in power and visibility, and with the ability to change or overthrow the governments that ruled over them.

In a 1994 study, Donna Lee Van Cott identified three key factors that cleared the way for “ethnic” or Indian and indigenous movements to emerge on the national and international political stage, ultimately influencing a scholarly shift towards an ethnic identity politics perspective.28 The three factors she identified were (1) the transition to democratic rule in Latin America, (2) the fact that “indigenous” groups participated in the democratic movement, and so were obligated to participate in the electoral process, and (3) the fall of the Soviet Bloc, which


28 By “ethnic” movements I am referring to particular social movements that establish “indigenous” as an ethnic category and use this “indigenous ethnicity” to form their demands and political practice. While the sign “indigenous” is dubious as an “ethnic” category, social movements and the studies that focus on them conventionally use the term “ethnicity” to refer to indigeneity.
led to the decline of Latin American Marxism.\footnote{Van Cott 1994, 10.} Van Cott’s scheme is problematic, and clearly does not apply to Peru, but in the cases of Ecuador and Bolivia makes some sense. She ignores, however, the strong activism of “indigenous” leaders in world forums, or that the United Nations declared the year of 1992 as an “indigenous” year, or that Rigoberto Menchu was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1992.\footnote{Initially, this was supposed to be a month long honor, but as members of the council of the United Nations felt that one month was not long enough they decided to dedicate an entire year to this cause. Van Cott 1994, 8.}

In another vein, anthropologists Greg Urban and Joel Sherzer help to introduce “a discourse approach” to identity politics on the eve of the quincentennial in their 1991 book on ethnic movements and the nation state in Latin America. The priority of their work is to reorient the global perspective so that “indigenous” groups are no longer studied as an isolated “other.”\footnote{Greg Urban and Joel Sherzer, \textit{Nation-States and Indians in Latin America}, (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1991), 2.}

Such an approach, of course, was always central to the anthropological and historical study of peasant politics. The authors compile a number of essays that deal with “indigenous” groups throughout Latin America and the ways in which they deal with their place in a nation-state. This process de-colonialized the “indigenous” groups by explaining how they interact with their nation as opposed to how they remain isolated, but again this was nothing new when seen in relation to the history of research on peasant politics and ethnicity (e.g., Wolf and Stern).

Michael Brown, for example, looks to familiarize the “indigenous” political leaders of Brazil’s Amazonian region by investigating their purpose in portraying distinct tribal ethnicity. Brown argues that these groups use their ethnicity as a discursive tool to achieve political success.

Although it is tempting to see the “indigenous” identity politics scholarship as reinventing the wheel, there is a distinct difference between the scholars of “peasant” or “Andean
peasant” politics and the scholars of the newly emergent field and discourse of “indigenous” identity politics. In a 1996 study, Michael Kearney exemplifies this phenomenon as he argues that the term “peasant” is outdated and that new post-peasant perspectives should be recognized. He argues that the standards that scholars such as Wolf used to identify “peasant” groups be re-evaluated. Although Kearney argues that “peasant” needs to be “more complexly structured” he ignores much of the critical scholarship of the 1990s. 32 Kearney argues that one of the many identities coming out of the post peasant era is the “indigenous,” although scholars such as Thurner have demonstrated that the political use of the “indigenous” label is at least 200 years old in the Andes. 33

“Indigenous Politics” and Bolivianist Scholarship
Forrest Hylton and Sinclair Thomson link the reemergence of “indigenous politics” in Bolivia to the 1970s birth of the first major ethnic movements, the Kataristas and Indigenistas. These movements condemned the “non-indigenous” political elites for “using mestizaje as a national revolutionary ideology” while also focusing on colonialism and “the Indian question.” 34 The ethnic movements of this period called for the union of native Andean groups to fight against their exploiters. Hylton and Thomson credit the ethnic consciousness of these early ethnic movements with laying the framework for the type of political activity that became typical in the 1990s. In this case, “indigenous politics” was defined by the demand for a constitutional assembly in which native Andean groups seek to achieve proper forms of political


representation, expand the domain of communal autonomy, and defend local autonomy. While Hylton and Thomson characterize “indigenous politics” today as being focused on these key concepts and demands, they argue that the characteristics of these politics were actually crystallized during the late 18th century. In a second study, Nancy Grey Postero explains that “indigenous politics” is a combination of methods of resistance developed during the colonial period and political knowledge gained during native Andean struggles with the Bolivian government in the 19th and 20th centuries. Also, Postero acknowledges that the term “indigenous politics” began to circulate as a result of the Ley de Participacion Popular (LPP), which enabled native Andean groups to use formal political avenues to make demands for change. Postero identifies “indigenous politics” as reaching beyond demanding basic rights and into rethinking and reshaping the cultural meaning of social relations in Bolivia.

In a third study, Robert Albro defines “indigenous politics” as the ways in which “indigenous” groups frame their demands. These demands are particularly familiar to the native Andean sectors of the population. He argues that “indigenous” political leaders, such as Evo Morales, translate standard political rhetoric into an ethnically fuelled agenda. These political leaders achieve this by stressing the preservation of cultural heritage while pushing broad based social enfranchisement. Furthermore, Albro explains that “indigenous” political leaders adopt methods that connect cultural history to the need to gain political support. These tactics include protests, hunger strikes, and mass marches which strengthen these groups’ imagined ties to long

35 Hylton and Thomson 2005, 45.


37 Postero 2007, 6.
standing historical conflicts. In summary, these three studies identify “indigenous politics” as the ways in which native Andean groups claim certain sets of demands, reshape the cultural meaning of social relations, and use cultural history to gain political support.

In one recent Bolivian study, Ricardo Peñaranda compiles a list of demands that commonly accompany contemporary ethnic movements. Peñaranda argues that ethnic movements are able to present a political platform that relates to many of the displaced Andean groups by sticking to particular demands that have a cultural resonance. Included in these demands are discourses for land and autonomy.

In a second case, Esteban Ticona Alejo speaks directly of the political ideologies of native Andean leaders and how certain aspects of their life experience, such as mining and an urban lifestyle, contribute to these ideologies. Ticona Alejo explains that the ideologies of early ethnic leaders, such as Paulino Quispe, Antonio Alvarez Mamani, and Jenaro Flores, were forged by their direct interactions with the inequalities of the Bolivian state. As workers in mines and on haciendas, these types of leaders became motivated by the desire to have the needs of their fellow workers heard and their demands met. While their political ideologies were forged by their experience with the Bolivian social system, these ethnic leaders learned political discourse and practice through interaction with the urban center, or other native Andean political leaders who had migrated to the urban center. Jenaro Flores, for example adopted much of his

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knowledge about political discourse and practice through personal interaction with Raimundo Tambo, who had received formal education at the Universidad de Villarroel in La Paz.

In a third, Peruvian study, Rodrigo Montoya Rojas indentifies characteristics of modern native Andean groups that focus on cultural history. He explains that the principals of reciprocity and solidarity are pillars to the “indigenous” approach to politics. Furthermore, Montoya provides a list of key elements that shape the native Andean political participation of the late 20th and early 21st centuries. These key elements included the preservation of language, culture, identity, and spirituality, as well as the establishment of self governance and collective community rights. 41 While Montoya explains that native Andean groups apply certain techniques to gaining political influence, he argues that their techniques are not unique to the native Andean populations of the Andean Region. He argues that these attributes have been key elements of political struggles around the world. To better express this concept, Montoya links the defense of language, culture, and identity to ideas that were motivating factors during the French Revolution of 1789.42 Although Montoya argues that native Andean political practices are nothing unique to the realm of politics, he does identify a number a trends that characterize the political culture of these groups.

Is “Indigenous Politics” a Unique Form of Politics?

The Andean examples of “indigenous politics” appear to pertain to making certain demands, reshaping the cultural meaning of social relations in the nation, and appealing to an idealized cultural history and native cultural traits to gain political support. However, as Montoya argues, these techniques are not unique to the realm of “indigenous politics” in the


42 Montoya 2008, 366.
Andes. If the term, then, does not refer to an ethnically unique form of politics, what is its purpose? Does being “indigenous” indicate that individuals adhere to a particular form of political behavior, or does a particular form of political behavior indicate that an individual is “indigenous?” The answer is clearly “no” in both cases. The “indigeneity” phenomenon in politics is actually similar to the “parochial reactor” thesis and the “Andeanism” charge that Steve Stern and Orin Starn forwarded in earlier decades. Unique cases that are made politically visible now set the standard for generalizations or essentialisms of how “indigenous” groups participate in politics; a.k.a. “indigenous politics.”

Although recent studies attempt to characterize “indigenous politics” in Bolivia, many scholars fail to explain why politics conducted by the “indigenous” sectors of the population should be considered “indigenous”, or what distinguishes “indigenous politics” from politics in general. Is there some characteristic approach to politics that may be called “indigenous” and that is distinct from Bolivian political practice in general, or from political practice at large? If so, what are the distinctions, and how did they come to be? Albro and Montoya believe that a characteristic approach does not exist. They argue that the “indigenous” style of politics, which stresses demands and utilizes tactics, has been typical of social and national movements in other parts of the world, and at other points in time. In short, “indigenous politics” appears not to be “indigenous” to any place in particular. This does not mean that people who call themselves “indigenous” do not have a particular political history in colonial Alto Peru and postcolonial Bolivia, however.

**Conclusion**

In this chapter I have reviewed the recent scholarship on the politics of subaltern groups by analyzing the shift from “peasant politics” to “indigenous politics.” Throughout the 50 years
or so covered, studies of the politics of subaltern groups have continued to diversify methodologically as both intellectual and political factors exert effects on the field. Here I have noted the important influences of the critiques of, Steve Stern and Orin Starn vis-à-vis the “peasant studies” tradition. Stern criticized the “parochial reactor” thesis that contributed to the once dominant view that peasants were provincial and at best “pre-political” reactors to outside forces of change. Within his critique, Stern argued that new studies should acknowledge the importance of historical and ethnic factors among “Andean peasant” populations. In the second case, Starn criticized scholarly works that fell victim to what he called “Andeanism,” which portrayed native Andean groups in a static manner that placed them outside the flow of modern political history. In both of these cases, Stern and Starn were critical of the isolated and unique experiences that generalized “indigenous” political behavior and consciousness. Their criticisms ultimately suggested a diversification of the field of “peasant politics,” toward historical approaches to political culture.

Currently, Andean scholarship is faced with another critical moment in the history of studies of subaltern politics. Recent changes, for example, within Bolivian national politics highlight the internal differentiation that exists within the “indigenous” and “peasant” and “Andean/Indian peasant” groups and their discourses. For this reason, it is important to back away from essentializing terms that classify diverse groups and historically comparable practices under exotic labels such as “indigenous politics.”
CHAPTER 3
THE INVENTION OF INDIGENOUS NATIONALISM

Most studies by political scientists tend to argue that modern ethnic movements, such as the Confederación Sindical Única de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia (CSUTCB) and Confederación Indígena del Oriente Boliviano (CIDOB), have only recently become politically active, and that “indigenous politics” were forged in response to late 20th century events, beginning with the 1952 Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario (MNR) revolution.¹ These political science studies, however, generally ignore that historians have traced the contemporary political culture of Andean communities to the late colonial period. Clearly, the recent emergence of “indigenous politics” responds to global shifts in political and scientific discourse. Nevertheless, the tactics employed by the contemporary movements in Bolivia are not new to the Andes, and at the same time they are not unique to the Andes. The ways in which the contemporary movements push sets of demands, reshape the cultural meaning of social relations and political representation, and deploy an idealized cultural history to gain political support are deeply rooted in Andean history, but this history is not divorced from wider trends in world history. In this chapter I historicize the emergence of “indigenous politics” and argue that recent political practice and discourse in Bolivia may be understood as an Andean variant of cultural nationalism.

As noted in Chapter 2, anthropologist and ethnohistorian Tristan Platt established in *Estado Boliviano y Ayllu Andino* that native Andean groups in Alto Peru and Bolivia have long shaped the contours and limits of the administrative politics of the colonial and national state,

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and other historians and anthropologists have confirmed and extended his arguments. Platt demonstrated, for example, that Ayllus resisted the “enlightened liberal” reclassification of “Indians” as “citizens” throughout the Republican period. Creole elites had sought to dismantle the Bolivian “Indian” communities, or Ayllus, and thus oblige them to participate as propertied citizens in the capitalist economy and society of the Bolivian Republic. The liberal state attempted to abolish the old colonial practices of tribute and communal land tenure, but these measures were successfully resisted. By transforming the native Andean populations into citizens, the Creole elites would solve the “Indian problem” by getting rid of the term “Indian” altogether. Such a reform, Platt noted, was quite similar to those carried out by the MNR in the 1950s, and also those which, later in the twentieth century, were proposed by neoliberal Creole regimes. Those reforms would meet similar ends.

In his ethnohistorical study, Roger Rasnake explains that in the waning years of the colonial period the process of political participation among the native Andean communities began to change as the colonial power structure broke down. It broke down in part because the colonial political structure of Andean society, whose lynchpin was the hereditary chief, or kuraka, was destroyed. This destruction was brought about both by Bourbon reforms and by

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4 Rasnake 1987, 121.

5 The terms mallku, kuraka, and cacique were all used to denote traditional community leaders of pre-Colombian groups at this point in time. However, their use is dependent on the group applying the term. Typically, mallku is used by Aymara speaking communities, kuraka is used by Quechua speaking communities, and cacique is a term
Andean protest against abusive kurakas. The breakdown of the role of the kuraka brought native Andean communities in more direct contact with the colonial authorities. As we shall see, historian Sinclair Thomson will later argue that this late colonial restructuring of the relationship between Andean peasants and the colonial state amounted to a revolutionary “democratization” of Andean politics with far-reaching consequences.

According to Rasnake, prior to the arrival of the Spanish the kuraka was a hereditary position that mediated the relationships between living individuals and the world of the ancestors. The kuraka had two significant duties that enabled them to keep the two worlds connected. First, they were a representative of the community during ritual and ceremony. Through this function, members of the community entrusted the kuraka with the task of representing their best interests in making offerings to the ancient ancestors, which were usually embalmed and placed in sacred caves or on mountaintops. In doing so, they would remain in the good graces with the mountain gods who oversaw productive activities in the communities. In effect, the kuraka was a representative or medium of the sacred world of the ancestors. Due to their hereditary connection to the ancients, kurakas were entrusted with maintaining the living world. In fact, the term kuraka in Quechua may be translated as “he who has the voice for all.”

Soon after the Spanish arrival in the Andes the position of the kuraka began to change. The kuraka was in some case still the intermediary between the living world and the world of the ancestors that was brought to the Andes by way of the Caribbean by the Spanish. For purposes of simplicity, I will refer to these community leaders as kuraka.


7 Karen Spalding, De Indio a Campesino: Cambios en la estructura social del Perú Colonial (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1974), 35.

8 Diego González Holguín and Raúl Porras Barrenechea, “Vocabulario de la lengua general de todo el Perú llamada a quichua o del Inca” (Lima, Perú: Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos, 1989), pg 55.
ancient ancestors, but in addition he mediated relations between Andean communities and the colonial magistrates and inspectors. Although in some cases the *kurakas* had also done this under Inca rule, the colonial regime of “divide and rule” actually increased the importance of the *kurakas* since they were indispensable to the local functioning of the colonial regime of tribute and draft labor. Thus, the colonial regime of indirect rule relied heavily on the *kurakas*. Not only could, ayllu members post complaints and pursue policy changes through their *kuraka*, but it was the duty of the *kuraka* to mediate tribute collection and *mita* (labor draft) requirements.9

The *kurakas* of course could and did abuse their position as tribute and *mita* administrators. They sometimes met Spanish demands for Indian goods by selling off locally produced items that were in high demand. In theory, the profits collected from the sale of Indian tribute goods would be used to alleviate some of the pressures of the required tribute. In reality, however, in some cases profits were used for the *kuraka’s* personal gain.10 As the colonial period wore on, a combination of miscegenation and colonial structural adjustments changed the face of the *kuraka* as they became increasingly of mixed descent. Also, as early as the 17th century the Spanish stopped recognizing Andean succession practices as magistrates hand-picked chiefs to mediate between them and the ayllus. According to historian Susan Ramírez, “the old-style *kurakas* were slowly replaced often by hand-picked cronies of local Spanish overlords who had no traditional claim to community leadership.”11 By the late 18th century *kurakas* were outwardly abusing their powers and adding their own demands to those of the colonial regime. The combination of the lack of traditional blood ties and exploitative tendencies resulted in a

9 Rasnake 1987, 263.
10 Spalding 1974, pg 55.
11 Ramírez 2002, 23.
stark decline in legitimacy for the *kuraka* in the eyes of ayllu members.\textsuperscript{12} As a result of *kuraka* illegitimacy, ayllus could no longer rely on them to parlay local demands to the colonial administrators. Instead, commoner ayllu officials, or elected *alcaldes*, sometimes called *varayoc*, began taking matters into their own hands.

Sinclair Thomson examines this aspect of native Andean political participation by explaining that the transformation of the *kuraka*’s identity removed the apex of the colonial Indian/Spanish political structure, thus opening up a more democratic and horizontal political practice vis-à-vis the state. Without the *kuraka* in place, the members of the ayllus no longer lobbied to the *kuraka* for change, but directly with the colonial authorities. In this manner, native Andean communities were often able to organize and push their demands upon the colonial functionaries. According to Thomson, when communities were faced with an abusive or ineffective *kuraka* they confronted the colonial order to oust him and install a more responsive, democratic structure of rule. As a result of the weakened state of the traditional structures of the colonial regime and the local democratization of Andean politics, communities often succeeded in achieving their demands. Thomson, following Stern, refers to this period as the “Age of Insurgency” because it is characterized by direct confrontations between Andean communities, which were growing in strength, and colonial officials, who were losing their grips on power. Furthermore, these confrontations provided these communities with valuable experience in political dealings with the state.\textsuperscript{13}


Prior to Platt’s 1982 research, Bolivian scholars were inclined to assume that native Andean groups only participated politically in passing moments of violent protest. While rebellion was an important tool in the political toolbox of colonial and postcolonial Andean communities (the Tupac and Tomas Katari rebellions of 1781-83 and the Chayanta rebellion of 1882 are significant examples), following his advisor Steve Stern’s research agenda (discussed in Chapter 2) Thomson demonstrates that protest was not just a spontaneous action but instead a weapon used to threaten and persuade ruling elites to accept Andean demands. According to Thomson, once demands were met, the uprising was disassembled.14

In short, the historical studies of Thomson, Rasnake, Platt, and others help to identify the characteristics of Andean politics vis-à-vis the state. These coincide with the characteristics identified by Stefan Varese for contemporary ethnic movements, and confirm the notion that Andean groups have established a political style that has its roots in the late colonial period.15 This historical political practice or culture, however, does not make “indigenous politics” distinct or unique.

Peruvian anthropologist Rodrigo Montoya has classified “indigenous politics” as a set of demands that has been of continual importance over the last 500 years.16 According to Montoya, these demands include the preservation of language and culture, the assertion of local economic autonomy, and the respect of community or “Indian” rights. Such demands are of colonial origin, but in the late colonial and postcolonial eras they have become increasingly democratic and national in flavor as the scope of demands has led to the creation of a national indigenous

14 Thomson 2002, 144.
16 Montoya 2008.
“we” that is in some ways reminiscent of Benedict Anderson’s concept of “imagined community.”

In Bolivia, the rise of “indigenous politics” as a field of study follows the resurgence of identity politics in the public sphere of the nation. The indigenous movements have helped to change the public perspective by pushing a nationalist rhetoric that represents heterogeneous groups as a unified imagined community of “natives.” The scholars of Bolivian “indigenous politics” have a tendency to perceive this invented identity as something real and organic. Although the first ethnic movements laid out national demands as early as the 1970s, it was not until President elect Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada named the self proclaimed member of the Aymara community Victor-Hugo Cárdenas as his Vice President in 1993 that these groups achieved major political success at the national level. After this period, their influence in the national realm of political discourse continued to expand, coming to a head with the presidential election of the first president with roots in native Andean communities, Juan Evo Morales Ayma, in 2006. Once Morales assumed the presidency in an invented indigenous ritual or coronation at the pre-Inca ruins of Tiawanaku on the shores of Lake Titicaca, it was clear that the “indigenous we” had attained sufficient political acceptance to serve as a powerful symbolic frame for an authentic form of nationalism that would “nationalize” Bolivia’s resources and society.

The growth of the indigenous national project in Bolivia can be divided in two phases, starting with the publication of the first ethnic manifestos in 1970 and ending with the drafting of the new Bolivian constitution in 2009. The first phase focuses on the growth of the imagined “indigenous” nation from 1969-1993. The second phase is the re-conquest of political power that occurred between the years of 1993-2006.

17 Anderson 1983, 84.
Inventing the National “Indigenous” We

The first Bolivian groups to publish new plans for indigenous political participation appeared during the period between the late 1960s and early 1980s. During this period, three major publications emerged that expressed a new nativist Andean political awareness. First, the Partido Indio de Bolivia, led by Fausto Reinaga, appeared as a purely “Indian” movement that was forged by centuries of oppression and exploitation by leaders of the western world.19 Reinaga expressed his ideals and demands by publishing the “Manifiesto del Partido Indio de Bolivia” in 1970. By 1973, a second ethnic movement emerged under the name “Kataristas.” This movement was constructed by a group of rural Aymara youths hailing from the province of Aroma, the former Aymara community of Sica-Sica. During the 1960s, these youths moved to La Paz to receive formal education in the Villarroel secondary school. While at the Universidad de Villarroel, they helped to organize a student organization under the name of the Movimiento Universidad de Julien Apasa (MUJA). Fuelled by the struggles of city life and the literature of Fausto Reinaga, MUJA’s main proponent, Raimundo Tambo, ventured back to the rural areas to educate Andean communities about their new, pro-indigenous political movement. During this mission, Tambo connected with Jenaro Flores, a rural community leader, to organize a formal movement by the name of the Kataristas.20 The scope of their mission is encapsulated in their “Manifiesto de Tiahuanco” which the group first drafted in 1973.

Later, during the latter half of the 1970s, a third stream of ethnic movement appeared in the form of the CSUTCB, a national labor union. The CSUTCB functioned primarily as a peasant union, but they were openly partial to the demands and needs of its native Andean members. Because the CSUTCB was officially a national union, they functioned more formally

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19 Fausto Reinaga, Manifiesto del Partido Indio de Bolivia (La Paz, Bolivia: Ediciones PIB, 1970), 11.

20 Albó 1987, 391.
than the PIB and the *Kataristas* as leaders were democratically elected instead of being self-appointed. By 1978, many of the prominent figureheads from other purely ethnic movements held influential positions in the CSUTCB; most notable is Jenaro Flores’ position as Secretary General from 1978-1987. Although the CSUTCB is officially a labor union, it is difficult to ignore ethnic motivations that are hidden under a cloak of labor issues. This concept is exemplified in their official 1983 publication titled “Tesis Politica de la CSUTCB”.

While all three of these documents appear at different times from different movements, the methods used to present their political demands generally follow the same pattern. Most importantly, these three publications demonstrate how ethnic movements used the various powers of the written word to spark a national cultural revival. To do so, they erected four pillars for building indigenous nationalism, or Bolivian indigeneity. The nationalist indigeneity that emerged from these documents introduced a new “native Andean” identity that was openly nationalist. First, the documents claim a broad national unity of indigenous culture. Second, they re-write history from this unified, “native Andean” but always in reality thoroughly Bolivian perspective. Third, they imagine a utopian society in national ways, harking back to an ideal image of a lost past as the origin myth of the nation, much like cultural nationalisms around the world since the 18th century.

**Cultural Unity of a National “We”**

The first technique that is used to build national indigeneity in Bolivia is a discourse of cultural unity. In this case, the early ethnic movements utilized terminology that grouped the various Andean groups of Bolivia into one distinct nation opposed to one common enemy. They achieve this by addressing their audience as a familiar group with common histories, traditions, and ancestors. This method re-imagines diverse and disparate communities as a single national

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group under the authenticating identity of “indigenous.” Throughout the publication they use a
genealogical “we”, “us”, and “our” to refer to their target audience. This technique was first
introduced to indigenous doctrine by the PIB in 1970. After providing an extensive historical
section, Fausto Reinaga links the contemporary Andean groups to those that suffered in the past
by stating:

We have resisted all of this infernal torture; we have carried all of this suffering
for four long centuries, and we have not disappeared. And it is not only that we
have not disappeared, but that-and this is the largest-we have persisted in our fight
for liberation. And we have not been conquered because we are a thousand year
old culture and race. Because we are a town, like the Andes, fatally strong.
Because we are, finally, a Nation amassed by the Inkas.

Here, Reinaga is able to place a divide between the “Indian” culture that has been oppressed and
los blancos that have exploited this culture. Furthermore, by using “we”, and “our”, Reinaga is
placing the interests of the PIB on the side of the oppressed “Indian.” Also, he connects a large
pool of disparate native Andean communities by linking them to one common ancestor, the Inca.
In doing so, Reinaga is able to portray the new “Indian” identity as “a thousand year old culture”
with a fluid line of ancestry. Notably, this discourse is strikingly similar to the Creole discourses
of independence upon which the nation of Bolivia was founded in the 1820s.

Similar to Reinaga, the Kataristas use a discourse of cultural unity to corral their target
audience and make clear for whom they are speaking. In the Katarista “Manifiesto de
Tiahuanaco” they erect this pillar by explaining that:

Inca Yupanqui told the Spaniards ‘A people who oppress another people cannot
be free’. We, the Qechwa and Aymara peasants and other indigenous peoples of
the country say the same. We feel economically exploited and culturally and
politically oppressed. There has been no integration of cultures in Bolivia; it has
been a question of imposition…We are foreigners in our own country.22

In this manner, the Kataristas refer to the various Andean groups of Bolivia as “we.” In doing so,
the writers of this document are able to personally link themselves to the communities that they

address. This cultural connectivity enables the Kataristas to legitimize their ability to make broad demands for every person that claims roots to ancient Andean communities. Furthermore, they connect communities to ancient, reputable cultures by using a quote from Inca Yupanqui to buttress their argument.

Ten years later, the CSUTCB also borrows from Reinaga’s technique and re-establishes the social divide by clearly depicting the various Andean groups as a singular, oppressed class and non-indigenous ruling groups as the oppressor class. In the opening statement of the “Tesis de la CSUTCB” they narrow their scope by stating that their message is “to the peasants of the nine departments, to the brothers of the original nations and cultures of our country…. The Aymara, Quechua…and others, we are the legitimate owners of this land.” These statements establish for whom their plan of actions represents and seeks to benefit. Also, by using the terms “us”, “we”, and “our” the CSTUCB is able to speak for all the Andean communities by establishing their legitimacy as a member (or a representative at least) of these groups. Beyond establishing their representative base, the CSUTCB also created a clear cut enemy in the non-indigenous class. They explain that during the colonial period the enemy was the Spanish Crown and its representatives. Skipping through Bolivia’s history they stress that a similar “oppressor” existed during each epoch. First, the Republican period brought an enemy in the Creole oligarchy. Second, the early 20th century introduced an enemy in the “pseudoleftists who disguise themselves with populist language to gain the ability to represent the majority and maintain their privileges.” Lastly, the current period brings an enemy in the “capitalist exploiters”, and the state which channels neocolonial and imperialist interests through multiple mechanisms of domination. Through these descriptions, the CSUTCB plants the idea that, even

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23 Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui and Confederación Sindical Única de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia, Oprimidos pero no Vencidos: Luchas del Campesino Aymara y Qhechwa de Bolivia, 1900-1980 (La Paz: HISBOL; CSUTCB, 1984), 185-188.
though the name of the enemy has changed over time, the face of this enemy has remained unchanged since the colonial period. Furthermore, they connect themselves to the Andean groups by using “we”, “us”, and “our” to refer to these groups.

The method that these ethnic movements use to create unified interest groups out of diverse Andean communities borrows from what Jürgen Habermas refers to as “the public sphere’s political function.” According to Habermas, the voting population consists of two groups; a small minority that is politically active and aware and a large majority that is inactive and unaware of the workings of the political game. The small minority typically uses public interest to attract the support of the large majority. To properly do so, they create a community in which inactive voters feel connected or “part-of.” The easiest way to connect inactive voters to a certain political community is to use cultural attractions that link them to particular experiences that occurred in the distant past or over generations. Due to the fact that individuals’ memory of the past is often clouded and vague, these groups are able to manipulate the distant past to fit their political agenda. This technique is applied by each of the aforementioned ethnic movements as they connect their target audience to the Inca, Aymara, Quechua, Guarani, and other Andean groups of the past. In doing so, they are using the public domain to attract supporters from the reserves of inactive and unaware voters.

**Rewriting History**

The second technique that the first national indigenous movements used to build indigeneity is the rewriting of history as a heroic struggle of unity and resistance. In this case, these early movements used elements of history to shift the attention of the public to the long standing “struggle of the indigenous people.” To do so, they emphasize a previously

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unrecognized struggle and resurrect past cultural heroes to evoke a national spirit of resistance. Ultimately, each of the publications that emerged during this period sought to disabuse the Bolivian history that was told from the perspective of the Creole ruling class so that their current demands would have historical relevance. This rewriting of history for the purposes of national unity is of course a universal trait of all cultural nationalisms, as Benedict Anderson makes clear.\textsuperscript{25} Historians build nationalism by rewriting historical narratives in a way that explains the interests of diverse and conflicting groups as the continuation of the struggles of their ancestors which began more than 500 years earlier.\textsuperscript{26} Also, by re-writing history as a national saga of resistance, these leaders are able to revitalize cultural heroes from previous eras of struggle, in particular the Kataris of the 1780s. The connection to the struggles of past cultural heroes helps to imagine their current interests as concepts that are linked to the struggles of recognizable and revered cultural figures. By rewriting histories and resurrecting heroes, these leaders are able to use the idea of indigeneity as a way to conjure up nationalism. From this perspective, to be “Indian” in Bolivia is to support these leaders and their national demands. It is not out of the ordinary to hear references to these revised national histories and resurrected cultural heroes in the speeches and rhetoric of ethnic movements.

Fuasto Reinaga, first, dedicates more than half of the “Manifiesto del Partido Indio de Bolivia” to re-writing the history of Bolivia, starting with the reign of the Inca. Here, his primary intention is to tell the story of Bolivia from the perspective of the “Indian” whose glory had been omitted from the national history and hidden by the oppressive western civilization. Notably Creole narratives of Bolivian history did and do the same vis-a-vis narratives of Spanish

\textsuperscript{25} Anderson 1983, 37.

imperialism. Reinaga’s new Bolivian history focuses on the Andean groups that fought to salvage their culture and communities. During the colonial period, he focuses on the groups that succeeded in fending off Spanish exploitation. Groups, such as the “Indians” of Arequipa that proclaimed Casimiro Inka as their king and of the “Indians” of La Paz that gathered to claim “Death to the King of Spain”, highlight strong points for Andean groups during the colonial period. Reinaga continues through the War of Independence, Republican period, and 1952 agrarian reforms following the same trend of highlighting valiant attempts to defend their culture. This technique re-imagines the modern “Indian” class as a strong, resilient class instead of an oppressed, marginalized class.

Reinaga also uses history to resurrect cultural heroes that symbolize the 500 years struggle of the Andean groups in Bolivia. Scattered throughout the “Manifiesto del Partido Indio de Bolivia” are endless references to past cultural heroes. Distant heroes, such as Juan Bélez de Córdoba, Tomás Katari, Tupac Amaru, Tupac Katari, and Bertolina Sisa are used to symbolize one common struggle that spans generations and persists into the modern era. Reinaga is able to connect their current struggle to those of the distant past by connecting the current ethnic movement to these heroes. This technique is best exemplified on the final page of the manifesto. Instead of signing his name, Fausto Reinaga signs Rupaj Katari; a name that Reinaga assumed at the end of the 1960s. By signing this name, Reinaga is claiming himself to be a direct descendent of Tupac Katari, thus strengthening his legitimacy to lead his campaign of re-conquest.

While Reinaga dedicated a considerable amount of space to re-writing the history of Bolivia, the Kataristas utilize similar tactics in a much more efficient manner. The Kataristas re-established distinct social divisions between the “indigenous” and non-indigenous classes by rewriting the history of Bolivia from a native Andean perspective. Unlike Reinaga, the Katarista

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27 Reinaga 1970, 32.
historical perspective focuses on the constant exploitation of the native Andean groups. This is in opposition to the national history that focuses on progress. They state:

During colonial times our culture was neither respected nor acknowledged…Independence, inspired by liberal principals, did not liberate the Indians; rather, the Indians were treated as a passive element useful only as cannon fodder…Two important laws promising freedom were passed after the Revolution of 9 April [1952]…Sadly these laws did not live up to the expectations because they were designed on the basis of excessively individualistic principals.28

Statements such as these deploy an essentialized anti-Occidental history to deepen the long standing colonial dichotomy and pits one, non-indigenous or Creole Bolivia against the “indigenous” Bolivia. According to the Kataristas, the Spanish and Creole elite have failed to provide the native Andean groups with any true progress. While independence was achieved and steps were taken towards progress for Bolivia, the “indigenous” nation remained in the same position as it was at the time of the conquest. These words are used to bring this history into the spotlight and bolster nationalism among the “indigenous” class as it is defined by the Kataristas.

Nationalism is further bolstered as the Kataristas resurrect cultural heroes and place their motivations in a national historical context. Within their manifesto the Kataristas state that, “liberation as embodied in Túpac Katari’s struggle for Indian freedom remains shackled. Indian policy briefly raised the hopes among the peasant masses but the life of Indians continues to be degraded by shame, exploitation, and contempt.” Later, they also state that “there must be a revolution, one which holds up once again the banners and ideals of Túpac Katari, Bertolina Sisa, and Willka Zárate. The starting point of the revolution should be our people.”29 Here, the Kataristas are legitimizing their political intentions by linking them to the struggles of cultural ancestors. The ideas of the Kataristas appear to be synonymous with the ideals of the cultural

28 Hurtado 1986, 304.

revolutionaries that existed during the Colonial and Republican eras and by identifying with these cultural revolutionaries, individuals should also identify with the Katarista agenda.

The later publication of the CSUTCB also looks to re-writing history to create nationalism. They desire to develop their own history while tossing the lies of the official history to the side. To do this, the CSUTCB provides an extensive summary of Bolivian and colonial history that places “Indians” on the receiving end of continued exploitation, mistreatment, and misrepresentation. By doing this the CSUTCB is able to depict the role of the “Indian” in history as one that needs to be disabused.

The CSUTCB also dedicates a considerable amount of thought to resurrecting cultural heroes who, according to the CSUTCB, are “the true liberators of the colonial period.” Once again, the names of past leaders, such as Julien Apaza, Bertolina Sisa, Gregoria Apaza, Tupak Amaru, Micaela Bastidas, and Pablo Willka Zárate are used to connect the current political push for control to the 500 years struggle of all native Andean peoples. In doing so, the CSUTCB is able to imagine themselves as representing the interests of past peoples and continuing the fight that was started by their colonial ancestors.

These techniques applied by ethnic movements rely heavily on manipulating the memory of the target audience to re-imagine native Andean identity and build “indigenous” nationalism. These tactics are ultimately used to win the support of an ethnically charged political agenda. In each of these examples, history was re-written to stir up strong emotions and connect the target audience to the interests of the movements. For the PIB, the emotion was pride. For the Kataristas and the CSUTCB it was anger, resent, and hope. Either way, “true history” is being used to construct a new political community and disguise political interests. As Benedict

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30 Rivera-Cusicanqui 1984, 188.
31 Rivera-Cusicanqui 1984, 190.
Anderson rightfully argues, re-writing history allows social movements to speak for distant groups whose struggles and interests are in no way connected to those of the modern era. However, by re-writing history and speaking for past cultural heroes these movements are able to create a connection between the two eras of struggle.32 In doing so, nationalism is constructed by making it seem as if past generations of revolutionaries paved the way for the current movements to succeed. In this way, by supporting the ethnic movements, native Andean communities were supporting their ancestors, and vice versa.

**Remembering Utopia**

The third technique that is used to build an “indigenous” political community is the reference to past utopias. Each of the movements discussed refer back to a utopian society that pre-dates Spanish arrival. At the heart of this utopia lies a glorious past that existed free of corruption and deception; a time when all groups were able to exist free of tyranny. The ability to conjure a historical image of a utopian society allows these groups to motivate native Andean groups to regain the once great culture that was lost by retaking control of the Bolivian government. As Thurner explains for the case of Peru, such narratives of past glory are typical of Creole nationalist narratives in postcolonial Latin America and beyond.33 Fausto Reinaga builds an image of a utopian society in his “Manifiesto del Partido Indio de Bolivia” as he speaks of “pre-American” cultures that existed free from European corruption. He does this by explaining that, “the man of Inca society has a clear conscience of his dignity. He does not lie, he does not rob, and he does not exploit his fellow man. The Inca man works; and works happily…In the Inca kingdom there is no hunger… The land is a common good, everyone works it, and

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33 Thurner 1997, 164.
Pachamama provides generously to all.”34 These statements depict the pre-Spanish world as a perfect model that provides equally for its entire community. With the arrival of the Spanish also came a disruption to this utopian model. According to Reinaga, destructive tendencies, such as exploitation, syphilis, and leprosy, were introduced to their society by the Spanish.

The concept of utopia was also utilized by the CSUTCB as they also depicted pre-Spanish society as being free from hardship. The following statement expresses the manner in which they feel that the ancient indigenous societies were free from the corruption of modern Bolivian society:

Before the arrival of the Spanish we were communal villages. In our land we were not familiar with hunger, robbery, and lies. In the Andean zone, our ayllus, markas, and suyus were a base of grand civilization in which the autonomy and the diversity of our forms of organization and work were respected...All of this development was violently interrupted with the invasion of Spain in 1492.35

This passage clearly expresses how utopian society can be shaped to meet the needs of current movements and organizations. As previous studies have indicated, pre-Spanish Andean society was not void of personal struggle.36

Both of these groups make references to an Inca society that existed free from hardship and exploitation. If we recall correctly, the Inca were an imperialistic culture who also conquered and exploited the various cultures of the Andes. However, “true history”, if there ever is one, is not of importance here. What is important is the fact that groups, such as the PIB and the CSUTCB, imagine pre-Spanish society as utopian. The purpose of this utopian imagination is to garner support from the native Andean communities and to evoke nationalism.


35 Rivera-Cusicanqui 1984, 189.

Nevertheless, this technique is nothing new to politics. In the original construction of utopia, Sir Thomas More presents Utopia as a country that is the exact mirror of England at his time of writing (1556). All the problems that existed in England were unknown in Utopia. In this way, More was able to present an example of what the world could be like if their problems were fixed. Furthermore, he was able to discretely criticize the English monarchy by disguising his criticisms as a historical narrative. While More introduced the case of “Utopia”, historian Alberto Flores Galindo argues that “the Andean Utopia” functions in a different manner than More’s. In Flores’ examination of “the Andean Utopia” he explains that it has a long history that serves to meet the needs of a variety of groups. On one hand, during the early colonial period “for the millenarianists, for all those rejected from the old world, America appeared as a place where they would be able to execute their dreams.” For Europeans coming to the New World “the Andean Utopia was a mechanism to build a new identity. On the other hand, for native Andean groups “the Andean Utopia” was used as a mechanism to conserve their identity. Flores argues that this was especially true in the Andean regions because “revolt and rebellion had been frequent, but the peasants had never entered into the capital and held possession of the palace of the government.” These groups coped with the struggles of the colonial system by enacting histories and traditions that preserved their identity. In both of these cases individuals’ perception of “the Andean Utopia” had been influenced by periods of crisis as their memories interpreted their situation to fit their needs.

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39 Flores Galindo 1986, 15.
In collaboration with Flores, historian Manuel Burga explains how native Andean communities used a synthesis of history and creation myths to build “the Andean Utopia.”

Throughout Burga’s examination of 16th and 17th century utopia he discusses a number of stories of Inca creation that reposition native Andean communities within the colonial structure. From the perspective of these stories, the hardship faced by native Andean communities during the colonial period is a small part of a larger story that ends with the resurrection of the Inca as supreme ruler. In this case, the colonial tragedy is a self fulfilling prophecy in the eyes of the native Andean communities.

The movements of the 1970s refer to past utopian societies in ways that are similar to each of these examples. First, as a way of critiquing their current government they explain that, what did not exist in pre-Spanish society was everything that these movements were arguing against in the 1970s and 1980s; no exploitation, no hunger, no lies, no private property. These aspects all relate to the demands placed by the ethnic movements. Ultimately, these descriptions of utopia use pre-Spanish society as a picture of what Bolivia could look like if their demands were all met. Second, these manifestos culminate in depicting the return of the Inca to power. In this way these groups are continuing the myths that circulated during the colonial period.

**Constructing a Political Base**

By erecting the previous three pillars (cultural unity in a national we, rewriting history, and remembering/reviving a past utopia) the major Indian and indigenous movements of the 1970s and 1980s imagined a single, genealogical “indigenous” nation that was on a 500 year journey to achieve liberation from their oppressors. These three pillars evoked “indigenous” nationalism and legitimized the demands of the movements themselves by linking them to the

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colonial struggle. From this perspective, it appeared as if these ethnic movements were only reiterating the demands of their ancestors in what Anderson refers to as reverse ventriloquism.\textsuperscript{41} They speak for past generations and portray their present struggle as a continuation of cultural struggles dating back 500 years. Furthermore, they express concern about losing their culture and their connection to past generations. Only by salvaging what is left, and regaining what was lost, can these groups save their culture. In this way, they are able to classify all Andean communities with distant cultural connections as one common group. The pillars to constructing nationalism allowed each of the ethnic movements of the 1970s and 1980s to combine sentiments of the aforementioned tactics to present a clear cut list of demands that could only be achieved by native Andean self-rule.

First, Fausto Reinaga used this nationalism to state that:
This land is our land…This country is our country. Yesterday we fought Spain, today we fight against the imperial yankee. We fight for the liberation of Bolivia…Because in this Bolivia is our life, our land, our houses, and our family. In this Bolivia are our ancestors and our children…Power or death!\textsuperscript{42}

Second, the Kataristas used this nationalism to argue for economic restructuring that would allow hard working peasants to benefit, educational restructuring that would permit academic programs to be available in local languages and culturally significant curriculums, and political restructuring that would allow for the indigenous class to fully represent themselves.\textsuperscript{43} Third, the CSUTCB stressed their desire to create a new form of representation that is constructed on the part of the new awakened campesino. They stress the importance of constructing a union that

\textsuperscript{41} Anderson 1983, 198
\textsuperscript{42} Reinaga 1970, 64
\textsuperscript{43} Hurtado 1986, 305.
acknowledges the importance of their culture and languages, follows community democracy, and exists free from all forms of capitalist exploitation and colonial oppression.  

**Conclusion**

In brief summary, the doctrine of the first ethnic movements imagined the diverse native Andean groups as one nation against a long reigning exploiter. This re-imagined vision of the native Andean groups reshaped the public perspective of “Indians” and their role in Bolivian society. Ultimately, the leaders of these organizations were conducting politics of their own by creating politically active populations out of previously politically inactive (or politically active but disorganized) populations. In these cases, these ethnic organizations that relied on ethnic jargon would build images of what the “indigenous” past was like, but in many cases these images are “products of new social situations and relationships”, as Joanne Rappaport explains. They accomplished this by re-writing history to emphasize the native Andean struggle, resurrecting past heroes, and by laying out the demands of the native Andean group. Furthermore, these ethnic organizations strengthened the public image of the “indigenous” by plunging indigeneity into the public spotlight. By drilling the imagined “indigenous” heritage into the public, these groups could solidify the new image of the native Andean communities. They accomplished this by publically displaying their “indigenous” heritage in everything from public festivals to political debates. This concept of using the public arena to build national identity is a concept that is brought to light by Thomas Abercrombie. According to Abercrombie, identity of a particular group is strengthened by the general public’s perception of that group.  

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44 Rivera Cusicanqui 1984, 200.  
46 Abercrombie 2003, 178.
In this case, when the general public sees “indigenous” groups during festivals and ceremonies, they believe that they are seeing history right there in front of them; “indigenous” groups acting the way that they had prior to the European invasion. In this way, indigeneity becomes something real, something tangible. The role of indigeneity in shaping public perspective is the subject of the next chapter.

While this project suggests that the ethnic movements of the 1970s re-imagined an Andean variant of “indigenous” nationalism, there is a discussion, particularly in the field of political science that would link these discourses to the global indigenous movement. This discussion recognizes global indigenism as the discourse and movement aimed at advancing the rights and status of indigenous peoples at a global level. Furthermore, the global reach of the indigenous movement is understood as being established during the 1960s under the tutelage of supranational political organizations, such as the United Nations. The primary goal of the global indigenous movement is to write new norms of indigenous rights into international law. According to Erica-Irene Daes, the movement stresses the recognition of a number of demands, but the “central tenant and main symbol” of the global indigenous movement is self-determination. In the case of Bolivia, the United Nation’s Working Group on Indigenous Populations (WGIP) has been actively involved with the Bolivian government since its formation in 1982. While it is tempting to argue that the discourses presented by the indigenous movements in Bolivia have only recently been developed and have been influenced by the global indigenous


movement and its international goals, it is important to understand that discourses for indigenous
rights, or “derechos indígenas”, date back to the 18th century in the Andes.\(^{50}\) In this way, the
discourse of the indigenous movement in Bolivia- and to a larger degree the Andes- is linked to a
complicated history of community/state or community/colonial regime relationships. Embedded
in these relationships are similar colonial discourses that revitalized pre-Colombian cultures and
used their social relevance to push political rhetoric.

\(^{50}\) Thurner 1997, 138; Thomson 2002, 140-179.
CHAPTER 4
HISTORICIZING NATIONAL “INDIGENOUS POLITICS”

The way that indigenous movements imagined the nation in the early 1970s ultimately reshaped the political game for decades to come. Even though Andean communities were active in politics prior to the 1970s, documents such as the “Manifiesto de Tiahuanacu” attracted many of them to the national scene and “high” organized politics. After the publication of the doctrine of the 1970s, ethnic parties, movements, and candidates appeared on the presidential ballots more frequently. The presidential elections of 1979 hosted four candidates from “indigenous” parties; two as presidential candidates and two as running mates. The Frente Revolucionario de la Izquierda (FRI) selected campesino leader Casiano Amurrio as their presidential candidate with Domitila de Chungora, a female movement leader from the mining district of Catavi, as his running mate. Also, the Movimiento Indio de Tupak Katari (MITKA) selected ex-miner Luciano Topia Quisbert and native Andean academic Isidoro Capa Coyo as the presidential and vice presidential candidates, respectively. While FRI eventually pulled out of the election, MITKA successfully completed the elections and received 2% of the national vote.¹ Later, Movimiento Revolucionario de Tupak Katari (MRTK) president, Jenero Flores, campaigned as Juan Lechin’s vice president in 1980 and again as presidential candidate for the Movimiento Revolucionario de Tupak Katari Liberación (MRTKL) with the Aymara speaking Victor-Hugo Cárdenas as his running mate in 1985; also appearing in the 1985 election was Macabeo Chile of the MRTK.² Together, the two candidates tallied 3% of the national vote. Again in 1989, both Flores and Cárdenas participated in the presidential elections, but this time as leaders of separate parties,


Frente Único de Liberación Katarista (FULKA) and MRTKL respectively. In this election both candidates received a combined 2.5% of the national vote.

Although the “indigenous” candidates of the 1979, 1985, and 1989 elections failed to capture significant percentages of the national vote, their consistent participation in national politics after 1979 is a clear indication that the methods of the ethnic movement had reshaped the political game in Bolivia. By 1978, these organizations brought ethnically fuelled demands into the national spotlight and used indigeneity to raise nativist Andean political awareness. In doing so, they forced presidential candidates to focus on gaining the support of the “indigenous” vote. According to the Latin American Weekly Review of 1978, “the campaigning parties cannot even cede a modicum of control over the campesinos and still hope to win elections.” Again in 1985, the political influence was recognized in the Latin American Regional Report when they explained that “the latest electoral process in Bolivia has highlighted a development which most outside observers have not yet fully noted: the rise of the aboriginal based peasant movement.”

These exclamations, although wildly outdated, indicate that, even though the these candidates were not winning elections at the national level, they were slowly chipping away at the power of the long standing major political parties, such as the Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario (MNR) and the Acción Democrático Nationalista (ADN). They were doing this by influencing larger proportions of the native Andean demographic to participate in national politics, thus causing the opposing candidates to cater to the native Andean vote.

The new method of using national indigeneity as a political force is better understood by analyzing the ballots of the 1979 presidential election. The ballots of this election were the first to incorporate the electoral law of 1965, which facilitated the electoral process by utilizing

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multicolor, multi-symbol ballots. Furthermore, the law allotted each candidate equal space to provide their candidate picture, party affiliation, party symbol, and party color. At first glance of the 1979 ballot the use of indigeneity to separate Luciano Topia Quisbert and MITKA from the rest of the field is obvious [Figures 3-1 and 3-2]. First, Quisbert is depicted in the candidate photo wearing a highland style woven poncho accompanied with a traditional Andean knitted hat, or “lluchu.” The rest of the candidates are pictured in a very traditional western style wearing suits either with or without a tie. This characteristic plays on Fausto Reinaga’s original declaration for “Indian” groups to wage a political war against their western oppressors. Obviously, this war spilled over into the realm of fashion by ditching the traditional garb of the western politician. Second, the MITKA party symbol displays the image of a tradition “Indian”, also dressed in a highland style poncho and “lluchu.” Beyond his attire, the Indian is shown with his hands in the air with broken chains dangling from each wrist; a gesture symbolizing liberation. In this case, Quisbert is using the space offered to him to place as many connections to the imagined “indigenous” community as possible. Furthermore, Quisbert is the only candidate whose social connection can be recognized at first glance. Even though the lack of literate native Andean voters may have influenced such a distinct party symbol, its ability to evoke emotion and tell a story is impressive. Although other candidates utilize the party symbol option to insert a symbol meaningful to their party, only MITKA uses it to include an ethnic symbol. In this case, it is clear that Quisbert and MITKA are portraying the idealized native Andean tradition by ditching the western suit of the opposition and donning the garb of their ancestors.


Aside from using ballots, the use of indigeneity as a political tool also appears in movement name selection. After the emergence of Reinaga’s PIB, a number of ethnic movements appear with names that link their political struggle to the colonial struggle of the distant past. Groups, such as the Kataristas, MRTK, MRTKL, FULKA, Movimiento Universitario de Julien Apaza (MUJA), MITKA, Movimiento Indígena de Pachakutik (MIP), and Federación Nacional de Mujeres de Bolivia-Bertolina Sisa (FNMB-BS), all look to cultural heroes of the past to legitimize their movements as being “indigenous” movements. In these ways, during the 1970s and 1980s, indigeneity was used as a political tool to push the demands of the marginalized populations. However, while documents, such as the “Manifiesto de Tiahuanaco”, created an imagined “indigenous” political community, the success of native Andean groups in the political realm was limited by a two challenges; a lack of open political space and poor voter turnout. Once they were able to overcome these challenges, they achieved greater success in the polls.

**Setbacks to Early Political Success for the Candidates of National Indigeneity**

The first factor that stalled the political success of ethnic movements was the closing of political space that occurred under the dictatorship of Hugo Banzer in the 1970s. Even though two pro-indigenous publications had surfaced by 1973, a candidate from this current of thought does not appear on the presidential ballot until 1979 with Luciano Topia Quisbert. Between 1973 and 1979 President Hugo Banzer closed political space by placing a ban on all trade unions and student unions.\(^7\) Since the majority of native Andean interest was consolidated in unions, Banzer’s ban stymied the “indigenous” rise to political power. However, after the removal of the ban, political space opened, and continued to open, for native Andean groups throughout the

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1980s and 1990s. Much of this is due to a push for democracy promoted by a number of presidential strongmen as early as 1979; oddly enough Banzer and Victor Paz Esternssoro in particular. An important factor in the push for democracy was the desire to extend political participation to all social and political sectors of Bolivia. The results of the extension of political participation first appear with the introduction of the multicolor, multi-symbol ballot that was used in the 1979 presidential elections, which was discussed in the previous section. While the Bolivian government drafted the law to use this ballot in 1965, military dictatorships of the late 1960s and 1970s had suspended its use until 1979. With this ballot, illiterate voters and voters with limited knowledge of party affiliation or party agenda could cast their vote simply by recognizing their candidate’s photo or party symbol. Also, the extension of political participation provided smaller parties and movements a greater opportunity to participate directly in national elections. After 1979, candidates of the “indigenous” current of thought appear regularly on the presidential ballots either as presidential candidates or as the running mate of a presidential candidate.

A second factor that stalled the growth of “indigenous” political success was the lack of voter turnout. According to the Bolivian Institute of Statistics, as late as 1992 49.73% of the rural population failed to present the proper voter identification card at the polls. This pales in comparison to the 26.35% of the urban population of the same grouping. However, even as it is common to assume that every rural Bolivian is “indigenous”, this is not the case. Therefore, some real information needs to be teased out of this statistic. This is done by cross referencing

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9 Rivadeneira Prada 1980, 59.

10 Instituto Nacional de Estadística (Bolivia), *Estadísticas Electorales* (La Paz, República de Bolivia: Ministerio de Planeamiento y Coordinación, Instituto Nacional de Estadística, 1993), 36-43.
rural/urban inhabitants with a variable that determines “ethnicity.” According to a 1998 geographical survey conducted by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), 71.94% of Bolivians who speak a native Andean language, or auto identify as “indigenous”, reside in a rural area of 2,000 inhabitants or less. This differs from the 30.58% of non-indigenous, Spanish speaking Bolivians that live in rural regions of 2,000 inhabitants or less.¹¹ Since the rural communities have traditionally been the focal point of the ethnic movements, these numbers are indicators of the amount of possible supporters that were not able to vote in previous elections, although we are not able to pin down an exact statistic. In the elections that followed, voter participation steadily raised allowing candidates of the “indigenous” current to achieve greater political success. By 2006, nearly 91.6% of Bolivians who auto-identify as “indigenous” voted in the presidential elections. This is up from the 64.6% that voted in the 2002 elections. Furthermore, 91.9% of respondents living in a rural region of 2,000 inhabitants or less voted in these elections. This statistic is up from the 65.7% that voted in the 2002 elections. Oddly enough, 2006 is the same year that the ethnic movements achieved their greatest political success by winning the national election, but this event will be discussed later in the chapter.

By 1994, the challenges to political success had been reduced and, as a result, the performance of ethnic parties and movements changed drastically. The first of these changes is indicated by Gonzalo Sanchez de Losada and the MNR’s nomination of the first vice president to claim native Andean roots, Victor-Hugo Cárdenas. According to Salvador Romero Ballivián, Cárdenas’ nomination was “the first time that this current [Katarismo] had the opportunity to directly make its mark on public politics.”¹² For the first time since their emergence in the late


1960s, nativist Andean interest was in the national spotlight for everyone to experience. This period in Bolivian politics is important for studying indigeneity for a number of reasons.

First, Sanchez de Losada was the first candidate from a major political party to select a running mate from the “indigenous” current of thought. In previous elections, candidates from the ethnic movements had been nominated by traditional parties, such as FRI, but never by a party with the power and reputation of the MNR. Sanchez de Losada’s selection reveals a lot about the importance of obtaining the votes from the native Andean class. If a presidential candidate wants to harness the vote of a marginalized sector of the population, what better way to do it than to select a respected member of their community? It is also important to keep in mind that this election also occurred in close proximity with the quincentennial of the European Conquest. As was discussed in Chapter 3, the global perspective at this time was focused on reconciling for the atrocities brought upon native Andean communities during the colonial period. They reconciled with this issue by promoting and celebrating native Andean culture. It is only fitting that this is also the same election year that Bolivia’s most powerful political party, who had been under much criticism after the 1980s, decided to select its vice presidential candidate from the same “ethnic” pool that was in the global spotlight. This action is “politics” at its finest. Sanchez de Losada’s larger than expected success in the 1993 election was due in no small measure to his decision to choose a native Andean politician as his running mate. According to the Latin American Regional Report, “this attracted the votes of members of the increasingly assertive indigenous organizations and many campesinos.”

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13 Juan Lechin selected Jenero Flores as his running mate in the fraud-ridden 1980 elections. However, Lechin’s party was much smaller in size as the traditional parties of the MNR and ADN.

Second, the native Andean cultural revival that began some 20 years prior was in full bloom and Cárdenas’ victory symbolized this. The victory celebration quickly turned into a cultural event that played on as many aspects of indigeneity as possible. Given that Cárdenas was given access to the largest public stage in Bolivia, it is not odd that he used it to strengthen the public perception of “indigenous” culture. Soon after the victory, roughly 7,000 native Andean citizens attended a celebration at a La Paz stadium in what was considered to be “an unprecedented event.” At this event Cárdenas was presented with traditional ceremonial staffs (vara) from a number of native Andean communities. To receive a vara is of the highest honor in the Andean perspective because it signifies the highest position in traditional Andean ayllus and has ties to deities of Andean cosmologies.15 The delivery of varas to Cárdenas symbolizes the social role of Cárdenas in the eyes of the native Andean community as they mark him as their official leader. To strengthen the cultural importance of this event, Nobel peace prize winner Rigoberta Menchu, a Guatemalan Indian, delivered the opening speech for the ceremony. This action depicts the “indigenous” struggle as one that transcends national borders and is connected by a singular cultural bond that places one marginalized culture against the other dominant one. However, the use of indigeneity during Cárdenas’ victory goes beyond the victory celebration. During his inauguration, Cárdenas delivered his vice presidential address to the Bolivian Congress in Spanish, Aymara, Quechua, and Guaraní. This action not only raises general awareness of the native Andean languages, but also depicts Cárdenas as a leader that recognizes the various Andean communities and who will fight for the rights of these groups.16 In these ways Cárdenas represented a victory for the entire “indigenous” community as it had been


16 “Good Start with Indians” 1993, 6.
imagined 23 years earlier. The important variable of this victory was not Cárdenas, as many would believe. The important variable was the fact that the “indigenous” current of thought had finally achieved a significant victory. The candidate could have been anybody, as long as they openly represented the native Andean communities.

After 1993, capturing the native Andean vote continued to be at the top of the political agenda during campaign periods. In 2002, two candidates of the indigenous movement appeared on the presidential ballot and, for the first time as parties independent of larger parties, they claimed a significant percentage of the national vote. Evo Morales of the Movimiento Al Socialismo (MAS) and Felipe “Mallku” Quispe (MIP) received 20.94% and 6.09% of the national vote, respectively.17

Looking back, the years from 1970-1993 can be marked as the rise of nativist Andean political awareness. The “indigenous” political community was first imagined by the ethnic movements of the 1970s and fully blossomed with the nomination of Victor-Hugo Cárdenas as vice president in 1993. What occurred between 1993 and 2009 is an onslaught of indigeneity in the political arena. While the methods of nativist Andean political participation remained unchanged, the growth of their political efficacy finally reached a level that fostered major political successes.

**National Indigeneity and the Re-Conquest of Bolivian Politics**

If 1993 marks the arrival of the imagined “indigenous” nation in national politics, the period after marks their gradual re-conquest of the Bolivian government. During Cárdenas’ term as vice president, a number of laws that recognized long standing demands for solidarity were

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17 Chávez Zamorano 2007, 615.
put into effect. Most recognizable is the Ley de Participacion Popular which was signed in 1994. Through the LPP the structure of the Bolivian government faced a number of significant changes. First, it expanded the jurisdiction of the municipal government to include the rural areas surrounding the direct urban district of the municipality. Second, through the inclusion of the rural regions, the citizens living within the rural areas were permitted to vote in the municipal elections, as well as, run for municipal office. Finally, the LPP decentralized government spending by allowing financial resources to be allocated by the municipal governments. The restructured government spending brought new decision making power down to the local level.

As a result of the LPP, new political space was offered to the native Andean populations in Bolivia. Since the emergence of the ethnic movements of the 1970s, the LPP marked the second opening of political space for native Andean communities; the removal of Banzer’s ban on trade unions and students unions being the first. Although the actual ability of these populations to access this space is debated, it is clear that the LPP led to a major increase in the formal political participation of such populations and ultimately increased the success of later candidates of the “indigenous” current. Prior to the passing of this law, ethnic organizations, such as the Confederación Sindical Unica de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia (CSUTCB) and the MRTKL needed to find support in larger mixed organizations that had the power to formally access political space; Victor-Hugo Cárdenas and the MNR is one example.

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18 While these laws were passed under the same administration that employed Cárdenas, I do not intend to make it seem as if Cárdenas was the sole body behind their ratification. During the passing of the Ley de Participacion Popular, Cárdenas was actually more of a background player than a driving force.


21 Postero 2007, 145.
While the vice presidency of Cárdenas indicates the start of national “indigenous” political success, the following elections reveal the gradual takeover of the Bolivian government. In 2002, two candidates that claim to have roots in native Andean communities appear on the presidential ballots; Evo Morales, head of the coca growers union and candidate for MAS, and Felipe “Mallku” Quispe, former general secretary of the CSUTCB and candidate for MIP. For the first time in electoral history, candidates of the “indigenous” current, independent of non-indigenous party affiliation, received a significant percentage of the national vote; Morales receiving 20.94% and Quispe 6.09%. Although neither party won the election, Morales and Quispe reached a number of benchmarks for ethnic political parties. First, Morales captured more votes than any previous candidate of native Andean heritage, placing 2nd. Second, MAS was able to secure 8 of the 27 seats in the Senate and 27 of 130 seats in Congress; MIP secured 6 seats in congress. Third, Morales won the majority vote in 4 of the 9 departments; La Paz, Cochabamba, Oruro, and Potosi. The results of the 2002 election revealed the growing power of the “indigenous” vote with 42.6% of native Andean voters voting for either Morales or Quispe.

During these elections Morales and Quispe utilized many of the tactics previously used by ethnic movements to build “indigenous” nationalism and shape the public perception of “indigenous” culture. Even though native Andean culture in Bolivia is extremely diverse, these candidates preached a platform that encompassed all groups. During speeches, Bolivian President Evo Morales would often appear dressed in traditional outfits of native Andean culture while sporting coca leaf necklaces. This tactic is simply a means of emphasizing his native Andean roots. Furthermore, these candidates glorify cultural artifacts that the original ethnic

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22 Chávez Zamorano 2007, 615.

movements established as “indigenous” cultural symbols, such as the wiphala and native languages. These cultural artifacts establish their legitimacy among native Andean voters. What is more, they make references to traditional Andean concepts of spirituality by recognizing the distinctly traditional deities such as Pachakuti and Pachamama. Once again, these are examples of how presidential candidates are able to mask political issues as cultural references. By presenting an ethnically fuelled campaign, candidates, such as Morales, are able to evoke “indigenous” nationalism and use indigeneity to capture political support. These techniques are further exemplified by Morales as he states that “in my community [we] lived in solidarity. In my community there was no private property. In my community one lived in a fashion together with the family…In my community, we did not know about money, but we lived well.”

There is obviously more to this statement than is actually stated. Deeper analysis of this statement reveals that it is eerily reminiscent of passages in the first publications of ethnic movements in the 1970s. In a short period of time, Morales is able to utilize a number of the same techniques as the Partido Indio de Bolivia (PIB), Kataristas, and Confederación Sindical Única de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia (CSUTCB). First, Morales uses cultural connectivity by referring, repeatedly, to “my community.” This technique gives the statement a personal feel by physically placing Morales in the context of the examples. Next, he relates the “indigenous” lifestyle to the way that things should be; a utopia in a sense. In this manner, he imagines “indigenous” life as everything that is right in life and the capitalist lifestyle as everything that is wrong with the world. Lastly, he presents a political base that communicates a political agenda in cultural terms. The native Andean populations can relate with Morales’ demands by simply being members of native Andean communities and sharing similar


experiences. By stressing these aspects, candidates of the “indigenous” current are able to imagine the modern “indigenous” political agenda as being linked to a five century old struggle of native Andean culture against the exploiters. The methods that are used to accomplish this are very similar to the methods used by the ethnic movements of the 1970s as they laid the groundwork for the imagined “indigenous” nation.

Again in 2005, Morales and Quispe participated in the presidential election gaining 53.74% and 2.09% of the national vote, respectively. Furthermore, MAS secured 12 seats in the Senate and 72 seats in Congress. The success of the 2005 presidential election marked a number of key accomplishments for the native Andean communities of Bolivia. First, for the first time in their history a candidate with cultural ties to native Andean communities was elected as president. Second, the overwhelming electoral success of MAS gave them majority control of Congress and slightly less than majority control of the Senate. Third, the results of the election represented the demise of the traditional elite political parties; MNR, MIR, ADN, and NFR. Furthermore, the persistently powerful MNR was almost dissolved of power, clinging to 7 seats in Congress and 1 seat in the Senate. For the first time in Bolivian history an ethnic movement gained majority control of the decision making process in Bolivia.

The role of indigeneity in these elections is best demonstrated by the celebration that took place during Morales’ inauguration on January 21, 2006. For this event, Morales pulled out all of the stops. First, he held his inaugural speech on the steps of the Pyramid of Akapona at the sacred site of Tiwanaku. The decision to hold the ceremony at the most publically sacred of sites for the “indigenous” nation -as it had been imagined- symbolizes the completion of a journey that had been started during the colonial period by distant groups of native Andean communities. Morales stresses this achievement by stating that “today starts a new era for the pueblos

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26 Chávez Zamorano 2007, 627.
originarios for the world. A new era for everyone from Tiwanaku, Bolivia convinced that only with the force of the town and the unity of the town could we put an end to the colonial state and neoliberal model.”27 Morales further demonstrated his indigeneity by donning a red traditional highland tunic (unku) with horizontal stripes and the traditional four pointed knitted cap (chucu) [Figure 3-3]. Similar to the inauguration of Cárdenas, community leaders presented Morales with multiple vara, proclaiming him the maximum authority in Bolivia and Latin America. The ceremony commenced with the sounding of traditional Andean ceremonial horns (pututus) as Morales offered incense and alcohol to their traditional deity Pachamama (Mother Earth).

The public arena was further used to display indigeneity as 30 mallkus surrounded Morales at the foot of the Pyramid of Akapona. Each of the 30 mallkus carried two flags, their community flag and the wiphala [Figure 4-4]. The entire inaugural ceremony encapsulated the traditions of the “indigenous” nation that had been imagined 36 years prior. Judging by the events of the inauguration, it is clear that the imagined nationalism established by the ethnic movements of the 1970s had finally grown enough to regain control of the Bolivian government. The events that took place on that January morning played out exactly as the first movements planned. Political demands had been embedded in cultural preservation and the continuation of the colonial struggle.

If the victory of Víctor-Hugo Cárdenas marked the start of the re-conquest of Bolivian politics, the ratification of the Bolivian constitution in 2009 symbolizes its end. By analyzing the 2009 constitution it is clear that many of the original demands of the first ethnic movements had been realized. This is best expressed in the preamble stating that the new constitution “leaves behind the colonial, republican, and neoliberal state.” The first chapter further denotes a number of changes that relate to the long standing cultural struggles. First, the official language of the

state is changed to include all the languages of the native Andean nations. Second, the official capital has been placed solely in Sucre. Previously, the Bolivian state capital held its constitutional seat in Sucre and its governmental seat in La Paz. The history of this situation was typically viewed by native Andean communities as another symbol of European dominance of the native Andean people. The elite class was once again demonstrating their power over the native Andean people by taking sole authority out of Sucre, the long standing capital of the native Andean groups, and splitting it between Sucre and La Paz. The reversal of this policy symbolizes the removal of another reminder of colonial style dominance. Third, the wiphala is added as the national flag, along with the red, yellow, and green tricolor flag. These changes that occur within the first chapter of the new constitution symbolize the removal of the oppressive, exclusionary role of previous non-indigenous governments. Furthermore, these amendments denote the end of the “indigenous” re-conquest of the Bolivian government.

A New Era for National Indigeneity

After the Morales administration ratified the new constitution, the demands of the ethnic movements of the 1970s had been realized and majority control of decision making power had been restored to the native Andean communities. During this period, indigeneity - or simply ethnic politics- was thrust into national politics by candidates claiming roots to an “indigenous” community; an “indigenous” community imagined by the social movements of the 1970s. Oddly enough, this period also marked the “hey day” of the stream of identity politics known as “indigenous politics.” In many ways internal changes that were brought about by ethnic movements helped to change the way that scholars viewed native Andean communities and their

28 Bolivian Constitution, 2009: Chap. 1 Art. 4 Sec. 1.
29 Bolivian Constitution, 2009: Chap. 1 Art. 6, Sec. 1.
30 Bolivian Constitution, 2009: Chap. 1 Art. 6 Sec. 2.
role in Bolivian politics. This was primarily achieved by a transformation of the public image of “indigenous” identity. These groups took obscure histories, heroes, and cultural symbols and re-invented them as being distinct parts of an “indigenous” nation. By the early 1990s, “indigenous” identity in Bolivia was promoted as a singular culture made up of many parts, but also having deep roots in one non-western heritage. The studies that emerge between 1993 and 2009 focus on key points that were used to build this “indigenous” nationalism twenty years prior; such as a 500 year struggle, the use of protest, and the demands for autonomy.

During this period, studies of “indigenous politics” did properly analyze the primary political battle that was taking place in Bolivia. This battle pitted the various native Andean communities against western oppressors; or more simply one against the other. However, as Steve Stern argued about “peasant politics” in the 1980s, the field of “indigenous politics” is at an important point of transition. While “indigenous politics” has an appropriate place in Bolivian politics between 1993 and 2009, recent changes have reshaped the political scene in Bolivia which suggest that a new perspective to studying native Andean groups may emerge. Ultimately, changes in the structure of the “indigenous” political movement hint towards a possible point of transition for this particular field.

After the Morales administration passed the 2009 constitution the power of indigeneity as a tool to gain political power began to fizzle out. The theory behind this phenomenon comes from a question that follows the triumph of any social movement in any place at any period of time. How does a movement, which is predicated upon struggle and the need to influence change, survive once it achieves absolute power?

The answer to this question is illustrated in the political campaign of the 2009 Bolivian presidential elections. Of the eight active candidates, five of them claim roots in what could
traditionally be labeled as “indigenous” groups; Evo Morales (MAS), Rene Joaquin (Alianza Social), Roman Loayza (Gente), Rime Choquehuanca (Bolivia Social Democrática), and Alejo Véliz (Pueblos por la Libertad y Soberanía). For the first time in recent electoral history indigeneity alone would not garner votes. Furthermore, the power of indigeneity as a political tool broke down as candidates criticized one another for being histrionic about their heritage. In a newspaper interview, Alejo Véliz is openly critical of the ways in which native Andean political leaders, particularly Morales, milk indigeneity to gain political ground. In the article, Véliz states that “[Morales] wants to return our people to something that existed 600 years ago, but he is trying to relive something idealized that never existed.”

This statement says a lot about how the power of indigeneity has changed since 2009. By dressing the part, rewriting histories, and resurrecting past heroes, candidates are putting on a show that makes it seem as if the “indigenous” community is something real and not imagined. However, Véliz cracks the system as he realizes that it is simply a tool that is imagined and used to raise attention and garner political support.

Although Morales won the 2009 presidential election, and MAS further consolidated their control over Congress and the Senate, indigeneity had less influence on his victory than on previous elections. What ultimately gave Morales the advantage was his ability to garner support from the non-indigenous sectors if the population. This is distinctly different than past elections that hosted non-indigenous candidates who gained an advantage by attracting support from the native Andean sectors of the population.

These changes in Bolivia’s political makeup illustrate the complexities of studying political participation, or political culture, under generalized terms, such as “ethnicity.” Whereas, in many cases, “ethnicity” is used to differentiate between “indigenous” and “non-indigenous”

political interests, a single “indigenous” class against a non-indigenous oppressor is falling out of the spotlight in Bolivian politics today. The common enemy that was defined in the first ethnic manifestos has been defeated; or at least temporarily removed. With the once common enemy out of the picture “indigenous ethnicity” as a demarcation of interest breaks down as individual linguistic groups now politick over political issues. This is best illustrated by an example coming out of Potosí, one of Bolivia’s traditional native Andean departments. Beginning on July 28, 2010, the Comité Cívico de Potosinista (COMCIPO), a Potosí-based social movement led by Celestino Condori, organized a road block that prohibited all traffic from entering or leaving the city for more than 15 days. COMCIPO organized the demonstration to show their discontent with the Bolivian government for failing to solve priority problems within the city of Potosí.32 During the roadblock, Condori met with a number of government officials, including President Morales, where he laid out the demands of the movement. Similar to the manifestos of the 1970s, COMCIPO presented these demands in a formal letter written to the government. Included in the demands were the need to settle a territory dispute between the ayllus of Coroma (Department of Potosí) and Quillacas (Department of Oruro), the need to solve efficacy issues with the elected local officials, and the need to resolve a number of labor issues.33

The breakdown of the imagined “indigenous” community of Bolivia is further demonstrated by Andean communities that are emerging with the goal of prying decision making power away from MAS at the “micro local” level. According to the Latin American Regional Report, native Andean groups that once supported Morales and MAS, such as Confederación Indígena del Oriente Boliviano (CIDOB) and the Consejo Nacional de Ayllus y Markas del Qullasuyu (CONAMAQ), are currently at odds with the ruling party over unfulfilled promises.

Aside from Morales’ inability to follow through on campaign promises to native Andean communities, CIDOB and CONAMAQ are also disheartened by Morales’ attempt to “de-ruralize” MAS by supporting urban middle class candidates over native Andean candidates from the rural regions. As a result of these inefficiencies, “micro local” native Andean political groups have been able to win local elections in municipalities that have traditionally been strongholds for Morales and MAS, such as Achacachi and Plan Tres Mil. These conflicts mark changes in the shape of the native Andean political sector as individual groups feel left out from Morales’ policy making and seek better local representation.

While these ayllus could work together to face threats at a level larger than their internal differences, they continue to dispute among one another after that larger threat is removed. This social structure is best described as a “collapsible social system.” This means that these individual ayllus will organize to whatever level is needed to solve the most serious problem of the time period. Once that problem is removed, the social system collapses to deal with the less serious conflicts. In the past, these communities had organized at the highest level to deal with problems of a completely foreign nature, a European dominant class. Now that this dominant class has been removed, the social system will collapse to focus on the next level of problems. This is a topic that I will discuss to a much further extent in the following chapter.

Recently, issues, such as territory and national resource development, have replaced previous struggles to remove the colonial, republican, and neoliberal regimes. The changes in the political perspective and organization of social groups in Bolivia raise important questions about where the study of “indigenous politics” should progress next. How should “indigenous politics”, and other types of identity politics that focus on native Andean groups, adjust to properly capture the internal differentiation that exists among the individual communities? Traditionally,

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“indigenous politics”, “peasant politics”, and “Andean/Indian peasant politics” study one marginalized group against a dominant other. One way to capture the internal differentiation that exists within these groups is to narrow the scope of study and focus on individual communities that exist within the previously singular “peasant”, “indigenous”, or Andean/Indian peasant classes. While there are many possibilities to narrowing the scope of study, one possibility is to analyze variables of political culture for the various linguistic groups that are actively involved in national politics.
Figure 3-1. 1979 Bolivian presidential election ballot

Figure 3-2. Close-up of the 1979 Bolivian presidential election ballot
Figure 3-3. Evo Morales (far right) donning a traditional *Unku* and *Chucu*

Figure 3-4. View of the Mallkus and flags of the 2002 presidential inauguration
The 2009 presidential elections in Bolivia affirmed significant changes in the ways that political groups deployed the discourse of indigeneity to consolidate national power. For this election, more than 50% of the registered candidates self identified as members of indigenous groups. The easy winner, Evo Morales, achieved victory by securing the votes of the mestizo and white sectors of the population. What is more, several candidates from the “indigenous” current narrowed their message to gain the support of specified Andean communities. This more selective approach differs from the discourse and strategy of previous elections where candidates such as Morales and Quispe deployed indigeneity to unite native communities into one or two blocks or movements. While the focus of the 2009 candidates became more community-oriented, the 2009 elections also marked the removal from power of the traditional ruling parties of the Creole and Mestizo classes. The traditional political powerhouses, such as the Movimiento Al Socialismo (MNR) and Acción Democrático Nacionalista (AND), no longer hold seats in Congress or the Senate, as movement-based politics has come to rule the national scene and government. Furthermore, the 2009 municipal elections witnessed the emergence of local groups that managed to wrestle decision making power away from the ruling party (Movimiento Al Socialismo) in municipalities that had formerly supported Morales and MAS. This phenomenon marks the end perhaps of the long standing oppositional tactics that have tended to define the “indigenous nation” in the past vis-à-vis “Western” or Creole politics and society.

Another key change is the Morales administration’s approach to natural resource development. Currently, political issues regarding natural resource development are creating inter-community debates and have prompted native groups to organize along community rather than “indigenous” nationalist lines. This phenomenon is best represented in the debate over
Bolivia’s new lithium market. Lithium is used to power the batteries of a number of technology era toys, including iPods, cell phones, laptops, and electric cars. A recent boom in these markets means that new attention has been brought to countries that have ample lithium reserves. According to William Tahil, research director for Meridian International Research, 40.3% of the world’s lithium reserves (or 5.4 million tons) are located in Bolivia.¹ On one hand, Bolivia can capitalize economically on the benefits of lithium by exploiting its resources. On the other hand, improper lithium development programs can have adverse effects on the delicate surrounding environments and the people that inhabit them.² Once again, Bolivia is at the center of global natural resource attention and the national debate over lithium exploitation is dividing native groups along community lines.

The new Bolivian Constitution declares that all natural resources belong to the nation and that the industrialization of any natural resource must respect and protect the environment and the rights of local communities.³ Although many native groups want lithium development to be solely in the hands of the state, the Evo Morales government has proposed a mixed market approach that could attract much needed capital to fund lithium development. To keep Bolivian critics of foreign investors at bay, Morales is emphasizing the power of the new Constitution and claiming that any contract with a foreign investor will include social welfare conditions. Under these conditions the contracted company will be required to dedicate an agreed upon sum annually to the development of social programs, such as the building of schools and

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infrastructure. Through these measures, the Morales administration hopes to ensure that lithium mining will help to improve the conditions of life in local communities.

However, many native groups are weary of these kinds of promises and negotiations with foreign firms. The manifestos of the 1970s, for example, expressed the sentiment that the movements already felt “let down” by governments that promised social benefits in return for exploitation. This time around many communities appear to be less willing to fall into the same trap. According to Raquel Gutiérrez of The Guardian, “the indigenous populations of Bolivia’s western areas…appear to disagree with the policy. The social movements that brought Morales to power have mobilized over recent months around the demands for local development. In the minds of many Bolivians, the most important thing is that local communities decide on the uses of resources in their own territory.”4 In the past, natural resource issues would have been cited as another attempt by the oppressor Creole class to exploit the “indigenous” population and consolidate its political interests. In his 2003 presidential speech, Evo Morales proclaimed:

We know that there are two Bolivias; One Bolivia…who always makes promises and signs agreements they never fulfill, and the other Bolivia which is always tricked, subjugated, humiliated, and exploited. I denounce before the Bolivian people that this is a cultural confrontation: the culture of death against us, the indigenous peoples.5 Today, the mobilization of interests is occurring along community lines that cannot be defined by the broad “us versus them” ethno-nationalist categories of the old indigenist rhetoric. There are no longer “two Bolivias.” However, there may be at least two “indigenous Bolivias” that in turn are fragmented in a myriad of local communities with distinct political tendencies.

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5 Evo Morales, “Bolivia, the Power of the People” (Presented at the En Defensa de la Humanidad conference, Mexico City, Mexico, 2003).
Two Indigenous Bolivias?

Jose Lucero acknowledges that “one of the current weaknesses in much of the existing literature and contemporary discourse” on Bolivian politics “is the tendency to speak of the Indian movement as a unitary actor, overlooking its organizational and ideological diversity.” This tendency is in part a consequence of the fact, noted by Postero, that “while the historical hostility between individual groups was an initial obstacle to organizing, one central issue organized them: the need to defend and control their land from outsiders.”

The first major political push of Andean groups came during the sindicato land and labor reform implemented by the Bolivian state following the 1952 MNR Revolution. The underlying purpose of the sindicato project was to solve Bolivia’s “Indian problem” by simply removing the “Indian” from the equation and making him into a national campesino with land. The movements that emerged at this time were organized by Aymara speaking leaders from highland communities who viewed the sindicato project as a threat to their identity. To counteract the project, these leaders began preaching an ethnic or ethno-nationalist agenda that recognized the political and social needs of Andean peoples. The first wave of Bolivian ethnic movements, the Kataristas and Indigenistas, was spawned in the Aymara speaking districts of Pacajes and Aroma by Aymara university students. These districts were hotspots for movement growth because they had remained culturally strong and organized over time by resisting earlier transformative moves by the Bolivian government in the 19th and early 20th centuries. This is a much different history from

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7 Postero 2007, 195.

8 Xavier Albó 1987; Postero 2007.
that of their Quechua speaking counterparts whose communities were, in contrast, weakened by the “peasant” transformation of the MNRistas.\(^9\)

Notably, the leaders of the Kataristas promoted native rights under the more formal class organization of the Confederación Sindical Unica de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia (CSUTCB). The CSUTCB, according to Deborah Van Cott, has been the largest organization in Bolivia uniting Andean peasant groups from all nine of the departments in Bolivia.\(^10\) The CSUTCB united the various groups by organizing the different ayllus of these communities into larger groups, called sub-centrals. The sub-centrals were then organized into centrals, which were part of the largest section of the movement, the federation.\(^11\) Essentially, the organizational structure of the CSUTCB resembles a pyramid; with the base being formed by the ayllus and the apex representing the top officials of the movement. The CSUTCB structure is illustrated in Table 4-1. Through the use of a pyramid structure, the CSUTCB was able to shed the differences that set them apart as communities and channel their demands to preach a primarily ethnic agenda under a national, class umbrella. It is for this reason that the Andean peasant communities of the CSUTCB were discussed as uniform “indigenous” and not as a union of Andean communities with varying attitudes and demands.

While the CSUTCB formed in the highlands of Bolivia, a second organization, the Confederación Indígena del Oriente Boliviano (CIDOB), assembled along explicit “indigenous”

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\(^9\) Yashar 2005, 168.

\(^10\) Although the CSUTCB was technically considered a “peasant union”, due to the sindicato project of the 1950’s and 1960’s, the term “peasant” typically identified highland Indian groups in Bolivia. Although the goals and political approaches of these first movements are important to the history of indigenous movements, they are not relevant to the focus of this section. What is relevant is that the agendas of these organizations were established, first, by Aymara intellectuals and that they were first formal organizations to outwardly seek political gains on the basis of being “Indian”. Van Cott 1994, 53.

lines in the lowlands. Forming in 1982, CIDOB first consolidated the interests of communities of Guarani, Ayoreo, Chiquitanos, and Guarayos. Similar to their highland counterparts, CIDOB consolidated local ayllus into 34 sub-regional groups, which were then organized into 4 major regional organizations: the Central Indígena de la Región Amozónica de Bolivia (CIRABO), the Central de Pueblos Indígenas de Beni (CPIB), the Consejo Yuqui, and the Coordinador Étnico de Santa Cruz (CESC). Finally, these four organizations represented the major functioning parts of CIDOB.  

Much like the CSUTCB, CIDOB was able to shed the differences that set them apart as communities in order to establish a list of demands that best represented the movement as a whole. CIDOB’s goals are to strengthen its representatives and to fight for the effective incorporation of indigenous groups in national political, economic, and social decision making.  

In a recent study Mitchell Seligson uses survey data to study the differing political cultures among the standard demarcations of blanco, negro, indigena, mestizo, and cholo. Seligson provides data on the sub-categories that recognize particular native Andean communities, but he only goes so far as to provide basic demographic statistics, such as the percentage of individuals who identify with each group. This section raises questions about where “indigenous politics” is to advance next by using Seligson’s Latin American Public Opinion Project (2006) survey data to identify differences in various indicators of political participation of Bolivia’s two most prominent linguistic groups, the Quechua and Aymara. Of

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12 Van Cott 2005, 61.


the respondents that auto-identify as “indigenous”, 84.7% of them further identify as either Quechua or Aymara, with corresponding estimates of 2,298,980 and 1,549,320 in the total national population, respectively.\textsuperscript{16} Due to the low representation of Bolivia’s other linguistic groups within the survey, further research needs to be conducted to extend the results to the national level.

In this section I utilize Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Regression analyses to properly conduct statistical analyses on the political participation of Aymara- and Quechua- speaking respondents. This statistical test allows for the effects of Aymara and Quechua language affiliation on target dependent variables to be isolated as a number of controls are set. The controls that I will be using for the regression analyses indicate other individual characteristics that may have an effect on concepts of political participation. The basic explanatory variables include: age, gender, urban/rural place of residence, and socio-economic status. Furthermore, I introduce a number of non-demographic controls that also affect an individuals’ concept of political participation. First, education is controlled for with the understanding that increased levels of education may affect the way that an individual thinks about politics. Second, individual interest in politics is used as an independent variable with the understanding that, the higher an individual’s interest in politics the more likely they are to participate in politics. Third, crime victimization is used to account for the fact that individuals who have been a victim of a crime take significantly different approaches to politics than those who have not been victims.\textsuperscript{17} Fourth, religious regularity is controlled for with the understanding that religious affiliation and dedication may alter an individual’s perception of politics. In total, the left side is as follows:

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{16} Van Cott 2005, 50.
\end{itemize}
age, gender, urban/rural place of residence, socio-economic status, education, political interest, crime victimization, and religious regularity. The descriptive for these independent variables are listed in Table 4-2.

The method of isolating respondents’ linguistic background borrows from methods used in a 2004 study conducted by Xavier Albó and Victor Quispe. They construct a more complex method for determining an individual’s affiliation with native Andean communities. While studying trends in survey data they discovered that community connection could be more accurately determined by combining survey questions regarding auto-identification with those regarding language affiliation. To do so, Albó and Quispe construct an index using four primary variables that reflect an individual’s affiliation with native Andean communities:

1. Do you consider yourself part of a pueblo originario, if so, which? 2. What was the first language that you learned as a child? 3. Which language do you speak the most as of now? 4. Where were you born? The index, which they titled the índice combinado etnicidad, ranges from 1 to 4 based on respondents’ answers to these questions.

Aymara and Quechua language groups are properly isolated in this section by utilizing a number of variables that indicate linguistic group affiliation. The LAPOP survey (2006) asks respondents 4 questions that determine community affiliation and language use. These 4 questions are used to indirectly determine their appropriate linguistic background. First, they ask: Which of the following pueblos originarios do you consider yourself a member? This variable

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18 While there are many ways to construct a socio-economic status variable, I use the index provided by LAPOP which uses levels of annual income as the primary indicators. The descriptive for the socio-economic status index are listed in Table 4-2.

allows respondents to auto-identify as a number of native Andean communities, including Aymara and Quechua. Second, they ask: What is the first language that you spoke as a child? Third, they ask: Which language did you speak the most in your house as a child? These two questions get at the heart of the respondents’ cultural background by figuring how deeply they are entrenched in the Aymara of Quechua language communities. Fourth, they ask: What was the language of the interview? This variable is a solid indicator of specific language affiliation because it determines which language the respondent is most comfortable speaking. Furthermore, if a respondent chooses to take the interview in Aymara or Quechua, their commitment to that specific community can be assumed to be high. For this analysis, I combine these 4 variables into an index that represents levels of Aymara and Quechua linguistic groups, or scale of linguistic affiliation. For each variable, a positive answer is one that registers a respondent as either of the Aymara community or the Quechua community. Furthermore, 4 grades of language affiliation exist for each group; Aymara I/Quechua I for the respondents that answered positively for 1 variable, Aymara II/Quechua II for those who answered positively for 2 variables, Aymara III/Quechua III for those who answered positively for 3 variables, and Aymara IV/Quechua IV for those who answered positively for all 4 variables.

When we analyze Quechua and Aymara linguistic affiliation it is important to use indices as opposed to singular identifiers of “ethnicity” because variables of simple auto-identification fall under significant scrutiny. This scrutiny focuses on two particular social phenomena. First, in some cases “indigenous” respondents will auto-identify as “mestizo.” Second, “mestizo”, or respondents that are not fully “indigenous”, will auto-identify as “indigenous.” In both cases, respondents use the vagueness of the ethnicity question to place themselves in other ethnic or community groups. The ability to change social categories in single phrase enables respondents
to deal with social issues that are linked to their true identity, whether they are ashamed of their “ethnicity” or feel it to be to their advantage to be categorized under different identifiers. The indices constructed by Albó and Quispe and used in this chapter attempt to minimize the issues of auto-identification by searching for community attachments in a more indirect manner. While these indices are vital for identifying respondents of Quechua and Aymara language affiliation, it is troublesome to compare the effects of two indices on a dependent variable through regression or other types of analyses. As a result, the role of the Quechua and Aymara indices in the regression analyses and the discussions that follow will indicate differences in the sign, significance, and size of the Quechua/Aymara coefficients and not exact quantitative variances.

Before moving ahead, it is important to provide one caveat: moments of aggressive political action have existed and still exist for both Quechua and Aymara linguistic groups. For the Quechua, the hacienda occupations of the early 1950s and the Water Wars of 2000 are good examples of their ability to use aggressive political tactics. For the Aymara, recent examples include the La Paz farmers’ union protests in 2000 and the Gas Wars of 2003. In the discussion that follows it is not my intention to portray Quechua groups as never using aggressive political tactics, but to provide data to support historical references that suggest that Aymara groups have adopted a more aggressive political culture throughout the long duration of history. With this being said, the following analyses highlight key differences in the political cultures of Quechua and Aymara respondents.
Public Demonstration

As one scholar has noted, “the Quechua long enjoyed a reputation of being much more [politically] open and flexible than the hostile and recalcitrant highland Aymara.”20 The largest rebellions of the 20th and early 21st centuries have been historically instigated by Aymara speaking groups, only later to be joined by the more reluctant Quechua groups. For example, in September of 2000, Aymara farmers’ unions were able to organize and shut down ground transportation within the city of La Paz for roughly three weeks. Also, most famously, during the Gas Wars of 2003, Aymara groups waged violent conflict over the privatization of gas in La Paz.21 Even the most famous rebellions of the distant past have been organized by Aymara leaders whose names still ring loud among modern ethnic social movements. Both Tupak Katari, and later Pablo Zárate Willka, proclaimed their Aymara roots as they led their rebellions in 1781 and 1898, respectively.22 Although these rebellions suggest that Aymara groups may organize protests more frequently than Quechua groups, is there an actual difference in their general population’s measurable willingness to engage in acts of protest?

The answer to this question can be found by analyzing the LAPOP survey data for Bolivia (2006). Within this survey, LAPOP provides a variable that asks how often respondents participate in public demonstrations. The results for the effects of Aymara and Quechua language affiliation on respondents’ frequency to participate in public demonstrations are illustrated in Table 4-3. Model 1 of Table 4-3 illustrates the effect of Aymara or Quechua language affiliation

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22 José Teijeiro, La rebelión permanente: Crisis de identidad y persistencia étnico-cultural aymara en Bolivia (La Paz: PIEB, 2007), 111 and 153.
independently on the frequency of public demonstration, while Models 2-9 illustrate this trend net of the set controls. As displayed in Table 4-3, the size of the coefficients suggest that being more strongly identified as Aymara (1.869) will have a greater impact on an individuals’ willingness to participate in public demonstration than being more strongly identified as Quechua (0.235). Also, the variance indicated by Aymara respondents is statistically significant at 0.005 or less (s.e. = 0.002). After introducing the explanatory variables, Aymara and Quechua language affiliation explains 75.8% of the variance (R²) in the frequency of public demonstration.

With these statistics in hand, we may entertain the hypothesis that Aymara respondents are more likely to engage in protest than Quechua respondents. While the aforementioned historical events indicate that public protests are more frequently organized by Aymara groups, these survey results indicate this trend among the general populations of these groups. However, public protest is only one aspect of political culture that may in part explain the differences in these two “indigenous” groups.

**Support for Military Control of the Government**

The following section will analyze the willingness of Quechua and Aymara groups to tolerate governments under certain circumstances. It examines the circumstances that may lead members of each language group to support a military takeover of the government. While “military takeover” has many faces, the variables used to test these data do not specify the exact nature of military control of the government. In this case, more detailed research needs to be conducted on this subject.

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23 This will be the trend with the regression analyses that follows.
Within the LAPOP survey of Bolivia (2006), respondents were asked a number of questions that pertained to their willingness to accept rule from inefficient governments. The questions are gauged in a way that present a number of circumstances to the respondent and asks whether or not they would support military takeover of the government under each circumstance. If the Quechua and Aymara groups’ tolerance of governments does vary, this variable should indicate this variance. An index which illustrates the aggregate variance of each circumstance is utilized to properly gauge the Quechua and Aymara trends regarding their support for military takeover of the government (Table 4-4). As displayed in Table 4-5, the coefficients of the regression analysis suggest that being more strongly identified as Aymara (1.052) may be related to a lower tolerance for inefficient governments and a higher level of support of a military takeover than their Quechua counterparts (-0.008). Of the two language groups only Aymara linguistic affiliation is statistically significant (s.e. = 0.1). Furthermore, Aymara and Quechua language affiliation explains 90.3% of the variance ($R^2$) in support for military takeover. It is also important to note that age and level of education have a statistically significant impact on a respondents willingness to support a military takeover of the government.

The results of the comparisons indicate that there are significant differences in the perception of Quechua and Aymara speaking respondents in regards to military overthrow of inefficient governments. This comparison indicates that, in general, Aymara groups show a higher tendency to reject their governments, in any case, than Quechua groups. Furthermore, when a government is viewed as inefficient, Aymara groups may step outside of the democratic boundaries and physically replace the government.

Although the previous test suggests that being more strongly identified as Aymara may have a greater impact on what is judged to be an inefficient government, we still must indicate
whether or not they are less willing to recognize a government that they do not support. A second variable in the LAPOP survey for Bolivia (2006) gets to the heart of this hypothesis by asking respondents whether or not they would support an elected official that had not received their support. On one hand, the size of the coefficient for this variable indicate that being more strongly identified as Aymara (-0.748) has a statistically significant (s.e.= 0.039), negative impact on a respondent’s willingness to accept an unsupported elected official. On the other hand, the size of the coefficient for Quechua (-0.027) respondents is relatively small and statistically insignificant (s.e.= 0.937). The results of this analysis are listed in Table 4-6. Also, a respondent’s level of interest in politics has a statistically significant impact on their willingness to accept an unsupported elected official. This test is significant because it supports the hypothesis stating that Aymara groups are more likely to resist governments that are not viewed as legitimate in their eyes.

**Principles of Democracy**

While the previous two indicators of political cultures help to explain the differing roles of Quechua and Aymara speaking groups, a comparative study of their perception of key principles of democracy can be used to provide insight into the future of democracy in Bolivia. The variables that are used to analyze principles of democracy derive from 5 of Robert Dahl’s vital political institutions for modern democracy. According to Dahl, these 5 political institutions (elected officials, freedom of expression, alternative sources of information, associational autonomy, and inclusive citizenship) are the first institutions that should be installed by democratic governments.24 Fortunately, the LAPOP survey for Bolivia (2006)

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provides variables that operationalize each of Dahl’s 5 key principles of democracy. A full list of
the key pillars of democracy and their operational definitions is listed in Table 4-7.

Support of Elected Officials

The first variable of analysis is the institution of supporting elected officials. According
to Dahl, the institution of elected officials is vital to democracy because it allows for the
demands of large scale populations to be represented by an elected official that is trusted by their
representative population base.25 In this vein, the institution of elected officials simplifies the
decision making process by consolidating the interests of large populations into a set number of
elected officials. For this study, the LAPOP survey provides a question that asks whether or not
respondents would support an elected official that did not receive their vote. This variable works
best as an operational definition of this particular principle of democracy because it expresses
respondents’ trust in the representative system to express and achieve their personal demands.

The results of the regression analysis for this variable have already been presented in the
section regarding Military Takeover, but they are applicable to this principle as well. If we recall
correctly, the coefficient for strength of Aymara identification has a statistically significant,
negative impact on a respondent’s willingness to support an elected official that did not receive
their vote while the coefficient for strength of Quechua identification is relatively small and
statistically insignificant (Table 4-6). The results of this comparison, coupled with voting trends
from the 2005 election, point toward possible trends in the future for democracy in Bolivia.
According to the LAPOP survey, in the 2005 presidential election 84% of Aymara respondents
voted for Evo Morales, with no other candidate receiving more than 8% of the Aymara vote.

Currently, President Morales, who claims to have both Aymara and Quechua roots, has a stronghold on the presidential seat.

The fact that Morales is able to garner such a large percentage of Aymara votes, as well as votes from native Andean populations in general, may present future opposition with some major obstacles. If Aymara language affiliation has a negative impact on a respondent’s decision to support an elected official that did not receive their vote and the majority of Aymara voters support a native Andean candidate with Aymara roots, it is possible they would outwardly refuse to recognize the election of a candidate that is not of native Andean decent, or more specifically a non-Aymara candidate. Furthermore this concept is supported by the fact that, statistically, being more strongly identified as Aymara has a greater impact on a respondent’s willingness to support a military takeover of an inefficient government.

**Freedom of Expression**

The second variable of analysis is the institution of supporting the freedom of expression. According to Dahl, freedom of expression means that individuals are able to openly oppose the ruling government without the fear of punishment. This definition primarily applies to the formulation of opposition groups.\(^{26}\) The freedom of expression is an important component of democracy because it permits citizens to participate equally in the political game. Furthermore, it allows for the organization of opposition groups that help to check the legitimacy of the ruling party. The operational definition of this principle within the LAPOP survey consists of a variable that asks respondents whether or not they would support a law that prohibits the organization of opposition groups. This variable properly reflects this principle because it estimates respondents’

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\(^{26}\) Dahl 1998, 97.
perception of opposition groups and their ability and right to democratically challenge the existing government.

The coefficient of the regression analysis for respondents’ perception of freedom of expression, in Dahl’s sense, suggests that being more strongly tied to the Aymara (0.783) will have a greater impact on a respondent’s willingness to support a law that prohibits the organization of opposition groups than being more strongly identified as Quechua (0.489). On a scale of 1-5, the difference in the coefficients for Quechua and Aymara language affiliation is relatively small. However, if we consider the fact that the coefficient for Quechua language affiliation is not statistically significant, the relative variance within this analysis increase (Table 4-8). Also, gender and crime victimization have a statistically significant impact on this dependent variable.

After general analysis of these data, it is clear that both Aymara and Quechua language affiliation have a negative impact on a respondent’s willingness to support a law that prohibits the organization of opposition groups than those who identify with neither language groups. These data go against the general hypothesis that states that Aymara language affiliation will be less democratic in their perception of key principles of democracy than Quechua respondents. Although Aymara and Quechua groups are generally on the side of the ruling party at the time of this survey, they had been on the side of the opposition groups prior to the 2006 victory of Morales and MAS. Since the emergence of the first ethnic political groups in the 1970s these communities had been active members of the opposition who were working to pry power out of the hands of the omnipotent political elite. Through their experience as opposition groups they understand the importance of these groups in influencing positive change in the political system. Furthermore, if we consider changes that are occurring in Bolivian politics today, Aymara and
Quechua respondents may still consider themselves as part of the opposition as they are attempting to restrict the overall power of the ruling party (MAS). However, more current research needs to be conducted to properly support this statement.

**Alternative Forms of Information**

The third variable of analysis is the institution of permitting alternative forms of information. According to Dahl, alternative forms of information are defined as information and opinion that come from media sources that are not controlled by the ruling party.\(^{27}\) This principle is important to democracy as a form of governance because it provides citizens access to alternative ideologies and clears them of the feeling that their government is hiding them from something better. In the eyes of John Stuart Mill, the freedom of opinion and information has two possible consequences. First, if the opinion is correct, the government benefits by being provided guidelines to change their inefficiencies. Second, if the opinion is incorrect, the opinions of the ruling government are given greater legitimacy. The government can choose to either accept or deny outside opinions. However, according to Mill, denying these opinions is detrimental to true progress because few new perspectives are able to work their way into the system.\(^{28}\) It is important for citizens to access alternative forms of information if a government desires to continue to change in unison with their population. Without free flowing information, political concepts will become stale and inefficient. The LAPOP survey allows for proper analysis of this principle by providing a variable that asks respondents whether many points of view should exist or if only one should be correct. This variable will serve as the operational

\(^{27}\) Dahl 1998, 97.

definition of this principle of democracy because it is the most appropriate variable to gauge
respondents’ opinion of outside information.

In this case, both linguistic group indices are significantly related to respondents’
perspective of alternative sources of information. However, the sign of the coefficient suggests
that being strongly connected to the Aymara language community has a positive impact on a
respondent’s decision to reject information from outside sources. This differs from the Quechua
coefficient that indicates a negative correlation. Also, the size of the coefficients for both
linguistic group indices hints at the relative variance between Aymara language affiliation
(1.535), Quechua language affiliation (-1.892), and the dependent variable. Considering that the
dependent variable is measured on a scale of 1-7, the range of the coefficients for the linguistic
group indices appears to be significantly and relatively large (3.427). These data are illustrated in
Model 9 of Table 4-9.

How relevant are these data for identifying trends in political culture? According to
LAPOP survey, the population distribution of Aymara respondents is consolidated in the
department of La Paz with 78.5% of their total population. This statistic differs greatly from the
population distribution of Quechua respondents whose most densely populated department is
Cochabamba with only 36.7% of their population (Table 4-10). Furthermore, 50.1% of Aymara
respondents reside in the municipalities of La Paz or El Alto while only the municipality of
Cochabamba holds more than 10% of the Quechua population (10.7%). These statistics are
illustrated in Table 4-11. According to these statistics, the physical consolidation of the Aymara
populations hints toward a more exclusive flow of opinions. The condensed form of the Aymara
populations makes it easier for these groups to refuse outside opinion as they can easily transmit
information and opinions among themselves and develop and sustain a discourse on their
communities and issues. As for the Quechua communities, the diverse spread of their populations illustrates their willingness to navigate the political culture of the ruling classes.

**Associational Autonomy**

The fourth variable of analysis is the institution of associational autonomy. This variable relates to individuals’ right to form and seek membership in political parties and organizations. The institution of associational autonomy goes hand in hand with elected representatives. If a country is large enough to require elected representatives then it is inevitable that individuals with similar interests form political parties and organizations. Furthermore, as Dahl explains, political parties and organizations are also breeding grounds for civic education and enlightenment. Individuals are able to share ideas and interests about politics by participating in independent associations. This ultimately makes the institution of associational autonomy crucial to the development of a country’s politically active population. The LAPOP survey properly analyzes Aymara and Quechua perceptions of this institution by providing two variables that operationalize associational autonomy. First, the LAPOP survey asks respondents whether they feel that political parties are necessary to represent the interests of the people or if they feel that they are unnecessary in the political system. This variable leaves a little bit of room for interpretation. Although the question directly asks about political parties, the lack of additional options and further questioning, such as their opinion of civic groups and social movements, leads one to believe that “political parties” covers all types of recognized political groups. In this case, the institution of associational autonomy is supported by an answer in favor of political parties. The second question that will be used to analyze this principle reaches deeper into the opinions of the respondents. Here, the LAPOP survey asks respondents if they felt that their

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29 Dahl 1998, 98.
interests were best represented by political parties or by civic groups. While the previous question provides information about the party system as a whole, this question isolates the type of political group that the respondent feels is most legitimate.

The coefficient for the first question, the importance of political parties, suggests that being more strongly identified as Aymara (0.608) will have a greater impact than being more strongly identified as Quechua (0.152). These data are displayed in Table 4-12. While both Aymara and Quechua language affiliation have a positive correlation with respondents’ view of political parties, only Aymara language affiliation is statistically significant (0.097). In this case, Aymara and Quechua language affiliation explain 76.2% of the total variance for this variable. Also, it is important to note that the Urban/Rural independent variable is also statistically significant in this regression analysis. These data indicate that both language groups understand the importance of a party system in a representative democracy and support the continuation of this system. Throughout history, these groups have been able to achieve political success by utilizing political parties and organizations to build a solid political base. During the 1980s and early 1990s, native Andean groups looked to the large scale political parties, such as the MNR and FRI, to give them legitimacy in the political game. Although this question investigates whether or not these groups place importance in a party system, the following question analyzes which type of political group is best to represent their interests.

The coefficient for the second question, preference of political parties or civic groups, reveals that being more strongly connected to the Quechua language community (-0.401) will have a greater impact on a respondents decision to support political parties over civic groups than being more strongly connected to the Aymara language community (-0.071). In this case, the coefficients for the language community indices reveal that being more strongly identified as
Aymara is not statistically significant and relatively small, while being more strongly identified as Quechua is statistically significant (0.075) and relatively large. This suggests that Aymara respondents are not more willing to place their confidence in political parties more than civic groups. However, over the last 40 years Aymara political groups have openly criticized “non-indigenous” political parties for not properly representing the interests of the native Andean groups that they supposedly supported. The role of political parties in the last 40 years of Bolivian political history helps to explain these perceptions of political parties and civic groups.

Historically, Bolivian political parties, such as the MNR, have played a major role in consolidating the interests of a number of Andean groups and organizations in order to increase their support base.\(^{30}\) Recently, these traditional types of political parties are losing ground as more modern, leader oriented parties are becoming the norm; Morales’ MAS party is a good example. An example of the way in which this power is shifting is the fact that, in 2002, the MNR held 30% of the seats in the National Congress, while MAS held 22% of the seats. As of the recent 2009 election, the MNR is non-existent in the National Congress, while MAS holds a majority (66%) of the seats.\(^{31}\) Furthermore, of the current political parties represented in the Bolivian National Congress, only MAS held seats during the 2002 term and only MAS and Frente de Unidad Nacional (UN) held seats during the 2005 term. These modern political parties have become more of a “one man show” as political parties are in a constant state of flux as political leaders emerge and subside in the political game. According to Scott Mainwaring and Timothy Scully, major political parties must remain stable and consistent with their views over

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\(^{30}\) Albó 1987, 382.

\(^{31}\) These statistics were listed on the website for the National Congress of Bolivia at [http://www.congreso.gov.bo/](http://www.congreso.gov.bo/).
time in order for the party system to become institutionalized.\textsuperscript{32} Currently, in Bolivia, this does not seem to be the case as political party volatility is extremely high.

The fact that Aymara language affiliation indicates no statistically significant preference for political parties corresponds with their opinions as expressed in the Aymara-led ethnic movements of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century. The Katarista “Manifiesto de Tiahuanacu” openly expressed dissatisfaction with political parties, stating that “… no political party has ever represented the true interests or been inspired by the cultural values [of the indigenous people].” Furthermore, in the introduction to the manifesto, the Kataristas express their understanding that “as we approach the pre-election period professional politicians will approach the [indigenous] once again to obtain their votes and again they will use fraud and make false promises.”\textsuperscript{33} Although this document appears to express the desires of both Quechua and Aymara speakers, it was drafted by Aymara intellectuals of the Puma Aymara Defense Union out of La Paz. Although the differing perspectives of political parties support historical trends, such as those of the “Manifiesto de Tiahuanacu”, what do they reveal about the future of democracy in Bolivia? If Aymara groups are less likely to have confidence in political parties, could there be an even greater increase in political party volatility? For now, it seems that Morales’ MAS party has made its place in Bolivia, but will it remain so after Morales is out of office?

**Inclusive Citizenship**

The fifth variable of analysis is the institution of inclusive citizenship. According to Dahl, inclusive citizenship is defined as a democratic system that provides all adults permanently residing within a country’s borders with the same rights. This includes access to the previous


\textsuperscript{33} Rivera-Cusicanqui 1984, 169-177.
four democratic institutions and, among others, the right to participate in free, fair, and frequent elections and the right to run for political office.\textsuperscript{34} It is commonly understood that inclusive citizenship helps to deepen democracy because it encourages all citizens to involve themselves in the political game and also provides them with the feeling that they are receiving the same basic benefits from their government as every other citizen. In regards to this specific study, the amount of importance that an individual places on inclusive citizenship symbolizes the how inclusive they believe their government should be. In other words, who should be protected under the current system?

On one hand, we could hypothesize that both Aymara and Quechua groups would be more likely to support inclusive citizenship because of their long histories with fighting exclusion from politics. Also, it has been the result of the movement to extend voting rights to all citizens under the Ley de Participación Popular (LPP) that has provided native Andean groups the voter bases to achieve success. On the other hand, we could utilize previous data to hypothesize that Aymara groups may be less in favor of inclusive citizenship because of their unwillingness to accept rule from outside groups. This characteristic indicates that Aymara groups are more exclusionary in their policies toward outside groups. In this vein, it may be so that they are also exclusionary in their view of non-indigenous, or non-Aymara citizens. Furthermore, we could also hypothesize that Quechua groups would be more in favor of inclusive citizenship because of their willingness to accept outside rule and also their history of assimilating to the ruling class. These characteristics indicate that Quechua groups would also be more inclusionary in their view of “non-indigenous”, or non-Quechua, citizens. Unfortunately, LAPOP’s survey for Bolivia (2006) lacks the proper variables to operationalize this principle of

\textsuperscript{34} Dahl 1998, 99.
democracy. Here, there is a dearth of information on this subject for Aymara and Quechua speaking groups, and more research needs to be conducted.

Summary

These survey data point to important differences between Aymara and Quechua speakers in Bolivia. For many Bolivians, these differences in Quechua and Aymara political culture are well known by the general population. In a personal conversation with Dr. Martín Mendoza, a Bolivian born political scientist, he could not help but smile when I presented him with these data. His humor towards my work stems from the fact that I had compiled all these complex formulas to come up with information that is well-known to any cab driver in La Paz.\(^{35}\) This colloquial knowledge and sentiment suggests that the unitary discourse of “indigenous” nationalism is widely suspect in Bolivia. While these data indicate possible differences in the political cultures of Quechua and Aymara linguistic groups, they do not necessarily mean that, popular beliefs notwithstanding, there are not two indigenous Bolivias. Nevertheless, the survey data raise more questions about the internal differentiation of the national “indigenous” and “peasant” identities of the past.

\(^{35}\) Martín Mendoza, interview by author (October 29, 2010).
Table 4-1. Confederación Sindical Única de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia pyramid structure

![Diagram of pyramid structure]

- CSUTCB Officials
- Centrals
- Sub-Centrals
- Ayllus
Table 4-2. Descriptive statistics of independent variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Range</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Quechua (index)</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>0-4</td>
<td>2.13</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quechua Language Group</td>
<td>582</td>
<td>Dummy Variable (non-Quechua=ref)²</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>37.46</td>
<td>0.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quechua as a Mother Tongue</td>
<td>583</td>
<td>Dummy Variable (non-Quechua=ref)²</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>27.43</td>
<td>0.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quechua as Most Frequently Spoken Language</td>
<td>579</td>
<td>Dummy Variable (non-Quechua=ref)²</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>20.69</td>
<td>40.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quechua as the Interview Language</td>
<td>583</td>
<td>Dummy Variable (non-Quechua=ref)²</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3.27</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aymara (index)</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>0-4</td>
<td>1.99</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aymara Language Group</td>
<td>582</td>
<td>Dummy Variable (non-Aymara=ref)²</td>
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<td>43.78</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aymara as a Mother Tongue</td>
<td>583</td>
<td>Dummy Variable (non-Aymara=ref)²</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>28.01</td>
<td>0.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aymara as Most Frequently Spoken Language</td>
<td>579</td>
<td>Dummy Variable (non-Aymara=ref)²</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>19.27</td>
<td>0.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aymara as the Interview Language</td>
<td>583</td>
<td>Dummy Variable (non-Aymara=ref)²</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.17</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age (in years)</td>
<td>583</td>
<td>18-80</td>
<td>38.27</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>583</td>
<td>Dummy Variable (male=ref)²</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>53.45</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban/Rural</td>
<td>583</td>
<td>Dummy Variable (rural=ref)²</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>51.49</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education (in years)</td>
<td>583</td>
<td>0-24*</td>
<td>7.53</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest in Politics</td>
<td>571</td>
<td>1-4**</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime Victimization</td>
<td>576</td>
<td>Dummy Variable (no=ref)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>15.27</td>
<td>0.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Regularity (days of worship per month)</td>
<td>532</td>
<td>0-31</td>
<td>2.65</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socio-Economic Status (annual income in Bolivianos)</td>
<td>473</td>
<td>0-8****</td>
<td>2.63</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Latin American Public Opinion Project, Bolivia 2006

1 For the Variables within the Quechua/Aymara Language Indices; 0= ref; 1= an answer in favor of the corresponding language affiliation
2 Ref= reference category; coded as 0
*0=no education; 1-5= basic; 6-8= intermediate; 9-12=medium; 13-18=college; 18-24=post graduate
**1=none; 2=a little; 3=some; 4=a lot
***0=no income; 1= less than 250; 2=between 251-500; 3= between 501-1000; 4=between 1001-2000; 5=between 2001-5000; 6= between 5001-10,000; 7= 10,001-20,000; 8= more than 20,000
### Table 4-3. Public demonstration (OLS regression coefficient)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>M1</th>
<th>M2</th>
<th>M3</th>
<th>M4</th>
<th>M5</th>
<th>M6</th>
<th>M7</th>
<th>M8</th>
<th>M9</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.353</td>
<td>0.375</td>
<td>-0.435</td>
<td>-0.720</td>
<td>-2.354</td>
<td>-3.482**</td>
<td>-3.627**</td>
<td>-4.290**</td>
<td>-3.812**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quechua</td>
<td>0.224</td>
<td>0.224</td>
<td>0.315</td>
<td>0.290</td>
<td>0.456</td>
<td>0.333</td>
<td>0.346</td>
<td>0.283</td>
<td>0.235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aymara</td>
<td>0.887*</td>
<td>0.885*</td>
<td>1.092**</td>
<td>1.072**</td>
<td>1.272**</td>
<td>1.723***</td>
<td>1.778****</td>
<td>1.855***</td>
<td>1.869***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>0.018</td>
<td>0.018</td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td>0.021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.723*</td>
<td>0.738*</td>
<td>0.761**</td>
<td>0.884**</td>
<td>0.911**</td>
<td>1.067**</td>
<td>0.950**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban/Rural</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.395</td>
<td>0.524</td>
<td>1.127**</td>
<td>1.106**</td>
<td>1.446**</td>
<td>2.021**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.068*</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>0.024</td>
<td>0.108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest in Politics</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.375*</td>
<td>0.396*</td>
<td>0.446</td>
<td>0.277</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime Victimization</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-0.681</td>
<td>-0.834</td>
<td>-1.204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Regularity</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.045</td>
<td>0.068</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socio-Economic Status</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-0.465</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.128</td>
<td>0.128</td>
<td>0.257</td>
<td>0.288</td>
<td>0.384</td>
<td>0.717</td>
<td>0.725</td>
<td>0.726</td>
<td>0.758</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N= 592

Source: LAPOP Statistical Surveys (Bolivia), 2006.
*Statistical Significance of 0.1 or less
**Statistical Significance of 0.05 or less
***Statistical Significance of 0.005 or less

### Table 4-4. Individual variables for support for military control

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Question</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JC1</td>
<td>If faced with high rates of unemployment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JC10</td>
<td>If faced with high crime rates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JC13</td>
<td>If faced with high rates of corruption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JC11</td>
<td>If faced with high rates of social disorder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JC7</td>
<td>If parties of the extreme left win the presidential election</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JC8</td>
<td>If parties of the extreme right win the presidential election</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JC17</td>
<td>If transnational corporations take advantage of the country</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cronbach’s Alpha: 0.853
### Table 4-5. Support for military control (OLS regression coefficient)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>M1</th>
<th>M 2</th>
<th>M 3</th>
<th>M 4</th>
<th>M 5</th>
<th>M 6</th>
<th>M 7</th>
<th>M 8</th>
<th>M 9</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.959</td>
<td>2.087</td>
<td>1.162</td>
<td>0.190</td>
<td>6.618**</td>
<td>5.172**</td>
<td>5.172**</td>
<td>7.441*</td>
<td>7.217**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quechua</td>
<td>1.683*</td>
<td>1.276</td>
<td>1.304</td>
<td>1.134</td>
<td>1.064*</td>
<td>1.127**</td>
<td>1.127**</td>
<td>-0.026</td>
<td>-0.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aymara</td>
<td>1.556</td>
<td>1.250</td>
<td>1.673</td>
<td>1.863*</td>
<td>1.352*</td>
<td>1.010</td>
<td>1.010</td>
<td>1.028</td>
<td>1.052*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.54**</td>
<td>-0.057**</td>
<td>-0.055**</td>
<td>-0.107***</td>
<td>-0.094***</td>
<td>-0.094***</td>
<td>-0.108***</td>
<td>-0.109****</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.950</td>
<td>1.270</td>
<td>0.901</td>
<td>0.690</td>
<td>0.690</td>
<td>1.372**</td>
<td>1.467*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.908</td>
<td>-0.343</td>
<td>0.111</td>
<td>0.111</td>
<td>0.416</td>
<td>-0.230</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest in Politics</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.579*</td>
<td>0.579*</td>
<td>0.355</td>
<td>0.403</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime Victimization</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Regularity</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-0.463*</td>
<td>-0.488</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socio-Economic Status</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.180</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.179</td>
<td>0.374</td>
<td>0.429</td>
<td>0.458</td>
<td>0.809</td>
<td>0.849</td>
<td>0.849</td>
<td>0.902</td>
<td>0.903</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: LAPOP Statistical Surveys (Bolivia), 2006.

*Statistical Significance of 0.1 or less
**Statistical Significance of 0.05 or less
***Statistical Significance of 0.005 or less

### Table 4-6. Acceptance of an unsupported president (OLS regression coefficient)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>M1</th>
<th>M 2</th>
<th>M 3</th>
<th>M 4</th>
<th>M 5</th>
<th>M 6</th>
<th>M 7</th>
<th>M 8</th>
<th>M 9</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>3.868***</td>
<td>3.341***</td>
<td>3.258***</td>
<td>3.000***</td>
<td>2.161**</td>
<td>1.948**</td>
<td>2.005**</td>
<td>2.376***</td>
<td>2.924***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quechua</td>
<td>-0.107</td>
<td>-0.165</td>
<td>-0.145</td>
<td>-0.176</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>0.159</td>
<td>0.220</td>
<td>0.036</td>
<td>-0.027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aymara</td>
<td>-0.606**</td>
<td>-0.661**</td>
<td>-0.649**</td>
<td>-0.608**</td>
<td>-0.584**</td>
<td>-0.659**</td>
<td>-0.597*</td>
<td>-0.651**</td>
<td>-0.748**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-0.018**</td>
<td>-0.018**</td>
<td>0.018**</td>
<td>0.022**</td>
<td>0.019**</td>
<td>0.015*</td>
<td>0.015*</td>
<td>0.012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>0.078</td>
<td>0.060</td>
<td>-0.023</td>
<td>-0.068</td>
<td>0.034</td>
<td>0.051</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban/Rural</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.373</td>
<td>0.383</td>
<td>0.309</td>
<td>0.258</td>
<td>0.297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.049*</td>
<td>0.027</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest in Politics</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.270**</td>
<td>0.268**</td>
<td>0.285**</td>
<td>0.309**</td>
<td>0.324*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime Victimization</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.600*</td>
<td>0.757**</td>
<td>0.682*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Regularity</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-0.072</td>
<td>-0.084</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socio-Economic Status</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>R²</td>
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<td>0.112</td>
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<td>0.171</td>
<td>0.201</td>
<td>0.223</td>
<td>0.198</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: LAPOP Statistical Surveys (Bolivia), 2006.

*Statistical Significance of 0.1 or less
**Statistical Significance of 0.05 or less
***Statistical Significance of 0.005 or less
### Table 4-7. Dahl's key political institutions and their operational definitions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Democratic Principle</th>
<th>Operational Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elected Officials</td>
<td>Importance that an official takes office even though you did not vote for them</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom of Expression</td>
<td>Would you support a law that prohibits the organization of the opposition?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alternative Sources of</td>
<td>Although Many Opinions Exist, Only one is Probably Correct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associational Autonomy</td>
<td>Are we better with or without a party system?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inclusive Citizenship</td>
<td>Only People With an Education should Vote</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### Table 4-8. Support of freedom of association/assembly (OLS regression coefficient)

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>M1</th>
<th>M2</th>
<th>M3</th>
<th>M4</th>
<th>M5</th>
<th>M6</th>
<th>M7</th>
<th>M8</th>
<th>M9</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>3.425***</td>
<td>3.214**</td>
<td>2.460**</td>
<td>2.550**</td>
<td>4.025**</td>
<td>4.071**</td>
<td>3.552**</td>
<td>3.938**</td>
<td>3.591**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quechua</td>
<td>0.469</td>
<td>0.483</td>
<td>0.539</td>
<td>0.560</td>
<td>0.442</td>
<td>0.298</td>
<td>0.368</td>
<td>0.454</td>
<td>0.489</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aymara</td>
<td>0.259</td>
<td>0.290</td>
<td>0.479</td>
<td>0.478</td>
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<td>0.603</td>
<td>0.879*</td>
<td>0.793*</td>
<td>0.783*</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-0.008</td>
<td>-0.013</td>
<td>-0.009</td>
<td>-0.010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.958**</td>
<td>0.945**</td>
<td>0.322**</td>
<td>1.172**</td>
<td>1.302***</td>
<td>1.064**</td>
<td>1.148**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>-</td>
<td>0.034*</td>
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<td>-0.054</td>
<td>-0.040</td>
<td>-0.100</td>
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<tr>
<td>Interest in Politics</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-0.186</td>
<td>-0.078</td>
<td>-0.250</td>
<td>-0.127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime Victimization</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-3.433**</td>
<td>-2.746**</td>
<td>-2.477**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-0.109</td>
<td>-0.126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socio-Economic Status</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.337</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

R² | 0.048 | 0.053 | 0.325 | 0.330 | 0.434 | 0.458 | 0.686 | 0.719 | 0.741 |

N= 592

Source: LAPOP Statistical Surveys (Bolivia), 2006.

*Statistical Significance of 0.1 or less

**Statistical Significance of 0.05 or less

*** Statistical Significance of 0.005 or less
### Table 4-9. Support of outside points of view (OLS regression coefficient)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>M1</th>
<th>M2</th>
<th>M3</th>
<th>M4</th>
<th>M5</th>
<th>M6</th>
<th>M7</th>
<th>M8</th>
<th>M9</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Quechua</td>
<td>1.915**</td>
<td>1.790**</td>
<td>1.525**</td>
<td>1.904**</td>
<td>2.069**</td>
<td>1.780**</td>
<td>1.817**</td>
<td>1.743**</td>
<td>1.892*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aymara</td>
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<td>-0.698</td>
<td>-0.818</td>
<td>-1.484**</td>
<td>-1.558*</td>
<td>-1.564*</td>
<td>-1.535*</td>
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<td>-0.038*</td>
<td>-0.024</td>
<td>-0.026</td>
<td>-0.029</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>0.222</td>
<td>0.138</td>
<td>0.072</td>
<td>0.065</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban/Rural</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-1.142*</td>
<td>-1.463*</td>
<td>-0.870</td>
<td>-0.889</td>
<td>-0.957</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>-0.067</td>
<td>-0.071</td>
<td>-0.078</td>
<td>-0.155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest in Politics</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.741*</td>
<td>0.698*</td>
<td>0.569</td>
<td>0.570</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime Victimization</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.814</td>
<td>1.363</td>
<td>1.972</td>
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<tr>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>-0.114</td>
<td>-0.182</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.459</td>
<td>0.515</td>
<td>0.574</td>
<td>0.677</td>
<td>0.705</td>
<td>0.801</td>
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<td>0.814</td>
<td>0.818</td>
</tr>
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</table>

N= 592

Source: LAPOP Statistical Surveys (Bolivia), 2006.

*Statistical Significance of 0.1 or less

**Statistical Significance of 0.05 or less

***Statistical Significance of 0.005 or less

### Table 4-10. Population distribution by department by linguistic affiliation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Department</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tarija</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pando</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chuquisaca</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oruro</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cochabamba</td>
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<tr>
<td>Santa Cruz</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>La Paz</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beni</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tarija</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pando</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chuquisaca</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oruro</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cochabamba</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santa Cruz</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La Paz</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Source: LAPOP Statistical Surveys (Bolivia), 2006.
Table 4-11. Population distribution by municipality by linguistic affiliation

<table>
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<th>Municipality</th>
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<th>Quechua</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>Tomave</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alquele</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tacopaya</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vacas</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potosí</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sucre</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oruro</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quillacollo</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cochabamba</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monetro</td>
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<tr>
<td>Santa Cruz</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coro Coro</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La Paz</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Alto</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quime</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Viacha</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puerto Carabuco</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4-12. Legitimate party system (OLS regression coefficient)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>M1</th>
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<th>M3</th>
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<th>M7</th>
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<th>M9</th>
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<td>-0.146</td>
<td>-0.374</td>
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<td>-0.761</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quechua</td>
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<td>0.168</td>
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<td>0.153</td>
<td>0.170</td>
<td>0.122</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aymara</td>
<td>0.580**</td>
<td>0.657**</td>
<td>0.630**</td>
<td>0.622*</td>
<td>0.564*</td>
<td>0.507</td>
<td>0.646</td>
<td>0.668*</td>
<td>0.608*</td>
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<td>0.006</td>
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<td>0.004</td>
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<td>0.001</td>
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<td>-0.266</td>
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<tr>
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<td>-0.755**</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

R²: 0.176 | 0.212 | 0.234 | 0.238 | 0.260 | 0.228 | 0.299 | 0.740 | 0.762

N= 592

Source: LAPOP Statistical Surveys (Bolivia), 2006.
*Statistical Significance of 0.1 or less
**Statistical Significance of 0.05 or less
***Statistical Significance of 0.005 or less
Table 4-13. Support of Political Parties (OLS Regression Coefficient)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
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<th>M3</th>
<th>M4</th>
<th>M5</th>
<th>M6</th>
<th>M7</th>
<th>M8</th>
<th>M9</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.213*</td>
<td>1.156*</td>
<td>1.143*</td>
<td>1.212*</td>
<td>1.195*</td>
<td>1.279*</td>
<td>1.319*</td>
<td>1.471*</td>
<td>1.464*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quechua</td>
<td>-0.292</td>
<td>-0.299</td>
<td>-0.298</td>
<td>-0.281</td>
<td>-0.277</td>
<td>-0.291</td>
<td>-0.277</td>
<td>-0.384*</td>
<td>-0.401*</td>
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<tr>
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<td>-0.033</td>
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<td>-0.052</td>
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<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
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<td>0.000</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
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<td>-0.058</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime Victimization</td>
<td>-0.131</td>
<td>0.188</td>
<td>0.155</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
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<td>-0.028</td>
<td>-0.044</td>
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<td>Socio-Economic Status</td>
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<td>-0.123</td>
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<td>0.123</td>
<td>0.135</td>
<td>0.184</td>
<td>0.186</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: LAPOP Statistical Surveys (Bolivia), 2006.

*Statistical Significance of 0.01 or less
**Statistical Significance of 0.05 or less
***Statistical Significance of 0.005 or less
CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSIONS

This study has traced trends in the recent scholarship on the politics of subaltern groups in the Andean region, and more specifically Bolivia. Following Stern and Starn, I have argued against essentializing notions such as “parochial actors” and “indigenous politics” and advocated instead a return to studies of political culture. The recent scholarship on “indigenous politics” in Bolivia has followed both larger trends in scholarship and local political factors. I argue that this scholarship and the politics it represents amounts to an Andean variant of cultural nationalism.

Over the last 40 years or so, Andean political groups in Bolivia have constructed an “indigenous” political community by circulating a nationalist discourse that imagines diverse communities as a unified cultural nation in a political battle against “non-indigenous” Creole exploiters. Ultimately, the growth of the “indigenous” ethnic movement played a significant role in influencing scholars to conduct studies of cultural or identity politics. When this period of Andean nationalist politics passes differing methods will emerge. The evidence that previous generations of scholarship have diversified to better suit ever changing intellectual and political factors makes it clear that the current scholarship will continue to diversify once Bolivia’s “indigenous” nationalist period has passed.

As discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, where I historicized national “indigenous politics” in Bolivia since 1970, the manifestos of the Partido Indio de Bolivia (PIB), the Kataristas, and the Confederación Sindical Única de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia (CSUTCB) indicate a shift in political factors as these groups used nationalist discourse to construct an “indigenous” political community. They accomplished this by unifying diverse Andean communities as a cultural “we”, rewriting histories to support nationalist notions, and using the idea of an Andean utopia as a mechanism to insert their cultural identity into the public sphere. Through this
process, these groups were able to establish a cultural nation and ultimately introduce political arguments that were presented as demands to preserve the “indigenous” nation.

During the period from 1970-1993 national “indigenous” identity was in the early stages of construction and the electoral success of the cultural movement in Bolivia was limited. Although “indigenous” political candidates appear on the national electoral ballots in 1979, 1980, 1985, and 1989 these candidates never received more than 3% of the national vote combined. While the electoral success of the cultural movements was limited, the influence of “indigenous” cultural identity is evident in the scholarship on Bolivian “peasant politics” during this period. Throughout the 1980s scholars such as Iriarte, Platt, Rasnake, Larson, and Stern (to name a few) worked to re-conceptualize the role of the “peasant” in Bolivian political society. Ultimately, these studies stepped away from the “parochial reactor theory” and examined “peasants” by mixing class and cultural studies and discussing how Andean groups worked within the Bolivian political system. No longer were “peasant” and “indigenous” groups reactionary. This study recognizes the arguments of Stern (1987) and Starn (1991) as being key indicators of this academic shift toward the cultural analysis of peasant politics.

The political success of the nationalist “indigenous” movement grew significantly after Victor-Hugo Cárdenas was nominated as Vice President in the 1993 national elections. In the elections that followed the political success of candidates from the nationalist “indigenous” movements grew substantially. This trend is indicated by following the presidential campaigns of Evo Morales, who received 20.94% of the national vote in 2002, 53.74% in 2005, and 64.22% in 2009. During the period between 1993 and 2009 the nationalist “indigenous” movement had open access to the national spotlight. Through the public sphere they were able to reshape the public image of the “indigenous” nation by flaunting their newly revived cultural heritage during
public ceremonies, such as political inaugurations. These politics of public performance are analyzed by anthropologist Thomas Abercrombie, who demonstrates that they function as a postcolonial public arena for building Bolivian national identity.1

Shifts in the academic approaches to studying the politics of subaltern groups in the Andean region are related to shifts in political discourse. As I discussed in Chapter 2, the scholarly shift towards an ethnic identity politics perspective in the early 1990s was influenced by a transition to democratic rule in Latin America, the fall of the Soviet Bloc, the proximity of the quincentennial of the Spanish conquest, and the growth of the political participation of self-identified “indigenous” groups. Within Bolivian politics, nationalist “indigenous” discourse helped to increase the political participation of Bolivia’s “indigenous” groups. For the scholarship of this region, studies of “indigenous politics” focused on characterizing the political participation of the growing “indigenous” cultural identity.

However, recent shifts in the Bolivian political system have indicated changes in the effectiveness of “indigeneity” as a political tool. First, for the 2009 presidential elections Evo Morales secured his victory by capturing the votes of the mestizo and white sectors of the population. This differed from the approaches of the “indigenous” candidates in the elections between 1979 and 2005 who gained an advantage by using indigeneity-as described in Chapter 4- to capture the votes of the “indigenous” political community. Morales’ change in methods indicates that he found it to be to his advantage to obtain support from sectors of the population that were traditionally “non-indigenous.” Second, the overwhelming percentage of “indigenous” presidential candidates on the 2009 ballot reduced the effectiveness of nationalist “indigenous” discourse. For these elections presidential candidates narrowed their message to gain the support of specified Andean communities. Third, the results of the 2009 presidential elections marked

1 Abercrombie 2003, 176.
the removal of the traditional ruling parties of the Creole and mestizo classes (Acción Democrático Nacionalista and Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario). This shift in political power also symbolizes the removal the common “colonial, Republican, and neoliberal” enemy of the nationalist “indigenous” movements that tied the diverse Andean communities together, as discussed in Chapter 4. Fourth, the results of the 2009 municipal elections revealed the emergence of “micro-level” politics as community based leaders now attempt to wrench power out of the hands of Morales and Movimiento Al Socialismo (MAS) at the municipal level. This trend steps away from the “us versus them” ethno-nationalist rhetoric and focuses more on individual differences that exist within the “indigenous” nation at the community level.

While recent studies of “indigenous politics” have played on nationalist characteristics, I suggest that these changing factors in the Bolivian political system indicate an academic shift away from essentializing notions like “indigenous politics” and back towards “political culture studies.” In this case, the political culture approach falls in line with the historical/anthropological definition of “political culture” that focuses on various interactions with power structures and how they shape an individual’s or a group’s approach to politics. “Political culture” from this perspective moves away from political science approaches that have characterized political practice to be ingrained in an individual’s identity and towards a more open approach that recognizes the changing nature and complexity of political participation.

The analyses conducted in Chapter 5 illuminate the importance of returning to “political culture studies” by pointing to important differences that exist between two linguistic communities: Quechua and Aymara speakers in Bolivia. From the historical/anthropological perspective of “political culture” we can attribute variances in each group’s approach to politics to a number of variables, including differing relationships with power structures over time. The
effects of these differing variables are recognized in the analyses that indicate notable differences in the political tendencies of Quechua and Aymara linguistic groups. Aymara respondents’ willingness to participate in public protest and support a military takeover of an inefficient government suggests that the Aymara linguistic community may have a more aggressive approach to political participation than does the Quechua linguistic community. Also, Aymara respondents are more likely to disregard Dahl’s principles of democracy, which suggests that the Aymara linguistic community may be less receptive to non-Aymara candidates, information, and discourse than the Quechua linguistic community.

This study has attempted to contribute to the subfield of Andean Studies within the field of Latin American Studies by approaching “indigenous politics” as a form of cultural nationalism. As was discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, since 1970 ethnic movements such as the PIB, the Kataristas, and the CSUTCB managed to construct an “indigenous” political community out of diverse Andean communities. Although their political success was limited in the 1970s and 1980s, they were able to reshape the political game and enable future candidates to use the discourse of indigeneity as a tool to achieve electoral success. What is more, they were able to reshape the public image of the “Indian” in Bolivian politics from a group that was isolated and reactionary to a group that is influential and politically active. By 2006, they achieved their greatest success as Evo Morales and MAS won the presidential election only to later gain majority control of the national decision making power in 2010. Currently, the emergence of micro level politics symbolizes the breakdown of the “national” pyramid structure of the ethnic movements. This trajectory of emergence, political victory, and breakdown may represent a full cycle for the “indigenous” social movement as a nationalist phenomenon. The Bolivian case of “indigenous” nationalism is the first case where the “indigenous” political
movement democratically earned majority control of their respective government in the Andean Region. The Bolivian case also provides us with a first glimpse of what exists after an “indigenous” movement completes their “500 year struggle” in Latin America. For these reasons, it is important to study this social movement cycle to better understand the varieties of Latin American nationalism and their relative efficacy as a cultural instrument in electoral politics.

Lastly, the discussion in Chapter 5 points to another intriguing social question that exists at a level deeper than “indigenous” national identity in Bolivia. Is it possible that there are two indigenous Bolivias? On the level of popular discourse it certainly seems so. Although the tests indicate possible differences in the political culture of Quechua and Aymara linguistic communities, these do not necessarily mean that there are two indigenous Bolivias. It appears that Aymara speaking respondents are more likely to resist rule from outside groups and Quechua speaking respondents are more likely to acquiesce and assimilate to the culture of the ruling class. However, it is also possible that a particular political culture exists beyond the linguistic or textual community. It would be important to analyze, for example, the content of political discourse in the two languages. Over time, experiences with colonial, republican, and neoliberal policies could have formed two poles of the same political culture within Andean communities. One polar tendency is resistant and hostile to policy coming from outside of their immediate social group and more likely to succumb to nationalist discourse. The other polar tendency is more acquiescent and willing to accept policy coming from groups outside of their social group. These polar tendencies were noted by Stern in 1987.² Nevertheless, if we acknowledge the critiques of Stern and Starn, we must also understand that it is likely that the political cultures of native Andean communities are more complex than a simple dichotomy of resistance versus accommodation. In this regard, the various Andean communities could occupy

² Stern 1987, 10.
the complete range of political practices. For this reason, it is important to continue these studies of political practices and culture as a means to obtain a more satisfying set of examples.

This project provides one avenue for conducting this research and opens the door to future projects within the field of Andean studies. However, it is important to conduct more detailed studies of the political cultures of Andean communities in Bolivia by reaching beyond Quechua and Aymara linguistic communities. Will more complex studies reveal trends towards the poles defined by the Quechua and Aymara respondents in our sample? For now, this project provides insight into this question by analyzing the political cultures of Bolivia’s two largest linguistic communities. But, most importantly, this project points to changes that are occurring within the politics of indigenous nationalism and urges for a shift back towards studies of political cultures.
# APPENDIX

## DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Code Name</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Range</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public Demonstration Prot1</td>
<td>Prot1</td>
<td>583</td>
<td>1-3*</td>
<td>1.77</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.92</td>
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<tr>
<td>Support for Military Control (index) MilCon</td>
<td>MilCon</td>
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<td>0-7</td>
<td>2.19</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2.28</td>
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<td>High rates of unemployment JC1</td>
<td>JC1</td>
<td>523</td>
<td>Dummy variable (no=ref)</td>
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<td>0.44</td>
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<tr>
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<td>JC10</td>
<td>523</td>
<td>Dummy variable (no=ref)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>41.33</td>
<td>0.49</td>
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<td>JC13</td>
<td>525</td>
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<td>496</td>
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<td>Parties of the extreme right win the presidential election JC8</td>
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<td>491</td>
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<td>13.34</td>
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<td>Transnational corporations take advantage of the country JC17</td>
<td>JC17</td>
<td>516</td>
<td>Dummy variable (no=ref)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Support of Elected Officials Leg1</td>
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<td>533</td>
<td>1-4**</td>
<td>3.06</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.02</td>
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<tr>
<td>Support of Freedom of Association/Assembly D33</td>
<td>D33</td>
<td>514</td>
<td>1-5***</td>
<td>3.76</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.15</td>
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<tr>
<td>Support of Alternative Forms of Information Dog1</td>
<td>Dog1</td>
<td>465</td>
<td>1-3****</td>
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<td>Dummy Variable (political parties=ref)</td>
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</table>

Source: Latin American Public Opinion Project, Bolivia 2006

1 The code name provided for each variable within the LAPOP data set for Bolivia 2006.
2 ref= reference category; labeled as 0
*1=never; 2=rarely; 3=often
**1=not important; 2=a little important; 3=important; 4=very important
***This variable is coded as a scale with 1=strongly disagree and 5= strongly agree
****1= strongly agree; 2=indifferent; 3=strongly disagree
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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Aaron Gabriel Victoria was born in Jeannette, Pennsylvania to his mother, Elaine Holas. Growing up in Adamsburg, Pennsylvania, he graduated from Hempfield Area Senior High School in 2002. As an undergraduate student, he attended Indiana University of Pennsylvania (IUP) where he graduated Phi Alpha Theta and magna cum laude with a Bachelor of Arts in history and minor concentrations in Latin American studies and economics. While attending IUP, he was introduced to the field of Latin American Studies and was drawn to the complexity of its histories.

He decided to pursue a Master of Arts in Latin American studies with a thematic concentration in Andean Studies. During his time as a graduate student, he worked as a Distance Volunteer for the Democracy Center where he helped conduct research for their special report on “Bolivia and Its Lithium: Can the ‘Gold of the 21st Century’ Help Lift a Nation Out of Poverty”, written by Rebecca Hollender and Jim Schultz. He hopes to pursue a Ph.D. in cultural anthropology as well as a career in academia.