A FILIPINO TRANSNATIONAL ADVOCACY NETWORK:
A CASE STUDY OF THE US BASES CLEANUP CAMPAIGN IN THE PHILIPPINES
AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

By

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In hopes of inspiring the Filipino people
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“Gratitude is the memory of the heart.”
– St. Mary Euphrasia, 1796-1868

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Ad majorem Dei gloriam. Amen.
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ABC  Alliance for Bases Cleanup International

APEN  Asia-Pacific Environmental Network

BOD  Board of Directors in the People’s Task Force for Bases Cleanup

CAB  Clark Air Force Base

CDC  Clark Development Corporation

CERCLA  Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (also popularly known as Superfund)

CLASP  Central Luzon Alliance for Sovereign Philippines

CSO  Civil Society Organization

DENR  Department of Environment and Natural Resources (Philippines)

DFA  Department of Foreign Affairs (Philippines)

DOH  Department of Health (Philippines)

ED  Executive Director of the People’s Task Force for Bases Cleanup

EJ  Environmental Justice

EPA  Environmental Protection Agency (US)

FACES  Filipino American Coalition for Environmental Solidarity (formerly Filipino/American Coalition for Environmental Solutions)

FFP  Friends of the Filipino People

FoE  Friends of Earth

GAO  Governmental Accountability Office (formerly General Accounting Office)

HCWH  Health Care without Harm

HQ PACAF  HQ Pacific Air Force

ICPH  International Institute of Concern for Public Health

JUSMAG  Joint US Military Advisory Group
<table>
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<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>KDP</td>
<td>Katipunan ng mga Demokratikong Pilipino (Filipino Democratic Movement)</td>
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<td>MAA</td>
<td>Military Assistance Agreement</td>
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<td>MBA</td>
<td>Military Bases Agreement</td>
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<td>MFP</td>
<td>Movement for Free Philippines</td>
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<td>MNC</td>
<td>Multinational Corporations</td>
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<td>NCRCL</td>
<td>National Coalition for the Restoration of Civil Liberties in the Philippines</td>
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<td>NFPC</td>
<td>Nuclear-Free Philippines Coalition</td>
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<td>NIMBY</td>
<td>Not in my backyard</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Nongovernmental Organization</td>
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<td>NSA</td>
<td>Non-state Actor</td>
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<td>POP</td>
<td>Persistent Organic Pollutant</td>
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<td>PTFBC</td>
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<tr>
<td>RTC</td>
<td>Regional Trial Court (Philippines)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SBMA</td>
<td>Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (Philippines)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SMO</td>
<td>Social Movement Organization</td>
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<td>TAN</td>
<td>Transnational Advocacy Network</td>
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<td>USWG</td>
<td>United States Working Group for Bases Cleanup</td>
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<td>WHO</td>
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This research analyzes the nature and processes involved in the emergence, development and decline of transnational advocacy networks. By taking up a case study of a local environmental campaign that emerged in the Philippines and later on transformed into a transnational advocacy network, this research unearths concepts and themes that contribute to the knowledge-building on this type of social action by non-state actors. Using grounded theory as tool for analysis, I design a qualitative case study research and examine archival documents and 31 in-depth interviews to understand the lived experiences of the partner-organizations of the transnational advocacy network for the environmental cleanup campaign on the toxic contamination in the former US military bases in the Philippines.

The emerging themes and concepts highlight four major insights on transnational advocacy networks in general and the toxic cleanup campaign in particular. First, I assert that the toxic cleanup campaign is an offshoot of enduring social movements against the US interventionist policies in the Philippines. Second, I theorize that given time and space, the nature of relationships among partner-organizations within...
transnational advocacy network can evolve from mere information sharing into a more engaged collaboration based on a combination of dimensions salient to the ongoing processes in the network. In the case study, the technical/legal, ethical and ethnic dimensions are more prominent in solidifying such transnational advocacy network. Third, I maintain that the dynamics within transnational advocacy networks as well as the social milieu in which they exist can create wedges of misunderstanding and distrust and can lead to the premature decline of transnational advocacy networks prior to achieving major successes and goals. In the case study, these factors include lack of accountability, security issues, or continuing disinterest on the advocacy. And fourth, I conclude that following decline of the transnational advocacy network, former partner-organizations are absorbed by various abeyance structures until such time these partners are ready to take on where their former advocacy work left off. In conclusion, the better-resourced partner has a greater success in moving forward after the decline, which is in keeping the cultural aspect of its organization, maintaining its vision, and restructuring its networks; and the least-resourced partners resort to being absorbed by assisting NGOs that can provide for their welfare.
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

In the current epoch of globalization, transnational non-state actors have increasingly become important participants in international politics. Participation by non-state actors (NSAs) permeates many issue areas in world politics and challenges state-centered approaches in understanding international relations (see Risse-Kappen 1995). While transnational NSAs operate independently of the state, they may also work in collaboration with the state in pushing for various agendas, and thus are not necessarily in contentious relationships with the state (Wu 2005). Notably, transnational NSAs diffuse or share ideas and values across national political boundaries (see Keck and Sikkink 1998). Transnational NSAs seek to legitimize their status in the international arena by depending largely on access to information and strengthening relationships to the poor and marginalized sectors they often claim to represent (Hudson 2001).

Nonetheless, the emergence of these NSAs in the international arena has interested intellectuals, scholars, and activists for several reasons. First, several emerging issue areas by nature and extent require a certain degree of cooperation between two or more sovereign states. For example, environmental issues are increasingly recognized not only as durable problems that require sustained mobilization to address, but also as problems that may emerge in a single political territory but still have far-reaching effects, and thus require transnational advocacy to support local mobilization.

Second, there is a rising number of international and domestic organizations that desire to access the international system and share with states the power to influence policy institutions through the design and implementation of development projects for
their constituents. According to the Yearbook of International Organizations, for example, there was a dramatic increase in the number of non-profit organizations from 6,000 in 1990 to more than 50,000 in 2006 (see www.worldbank.org). Examples of these non-profit organizations are Greenpeace International (www.greenpeace.org), Oxfam International (www.oxfam.org), and CARE International (www.care.org). NSAs which often attempt to access the international system may do so due to obstructions set up by states against efforts to change the status quo in their respective countries. Local NSAs may require the assistance from international organizations to target another state to which local, foreign actors lack access (see Keck and Sikkink’s (1998: 12-13) discussion on The Boomerang Pattern).

And third, the involvement of NSAs in the international arena has increased contact among previously isolated communities through conferences, workshops and other meetings. The mounting visibility of indigenous peoples’ organizations in the international arena is a good example. With increased global contact among indigenous activist groups with international organizations, the plight of the indigenous peoples gained more and more attention from the international system. Attention to the issues of indigenous peoples culminated not only in the declaration of the United Nations of 1993 to be the International Year of the Indigenous Peoples, but more importantly, it led to the institutionalization of a UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues to keep these issues salient at a global level (see UNPFII’s website, http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/).

Transnational NSAs come in varied forms depending on their agendas and structures. Some NSAs function to achieve international cooperation. Others challenge
the current international system, even through violence and terrorism, and are referred to as terror transnational advocacy networks (TANs) (Asal et al. 2007). Other forms of NSAs include multinational corporations (MNCs), international media, diaspora communities, epistemic communities, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

MNCs are for-profit organizations that can be viewed as an interorganizational collection of “geographically dispersed and goal-disparate organizations that include headquarters and other national subsidiaries” (Ghoshal and Bartlett 1990: 603). International media, on the other hand, are networks through which information flows among international and domestic actors. Diaspora communities refer to transnational populations which have been “deterritorialized” and whose networks extend beyond national boundaries (Vertovec 1999), while epistemic communities are networks of professional and technical experts who claim authority over policy-relevant knowledge either in domestic or international settings (see Haas 1992). Finally, NGOs are defined as “formal (professionalized) independent societal organizations whose primary aim is to promote common goals at the national or the international level” (Marten 2002: 282).

Operationally speaking, the World Bank subsumes these organizations except MNCs under the umbrella term civil society. Civil society refers to the:

- wide array of non-governmental and not-for-profit organizations that have a presence in public life, expressing the interests and values of their members or others, based on ethical, cultural, political, scientific, religious or philanthropic considerations. Civil society organizations (CSOs) therefore refer to a wide array of organizations: community groups, NGOs, labor unions, indigenous groups, charitable organizations, faith-based organizations, professional associations, and foundations. (see World Bank at www.worldbank.org)

These NSAs may operate singly or collectively in pursuing their agenda for their intended audiences. One of the most formidable ways by which NSAs operate in the
international setting is through the creation of TANs among NSAs. These networks may materialize in various ways based on political opportunities, collective identity, policy orientation, targeted states, and constituencies, among other possibilities.

**Transnational Advocacy Networks**

Fundamental to discussions of TANs is the pioneering work of Keck and Sikkink (1998). They define TANs as:

> those relevant actors working internationally on an issue, who are bound together by shared values, a common discourse, and dense exchanges of information and services (Keck and Sikkink 1998:2)

For Keck and Sikkink (1998), TANs are formed through “voluntary, reciprocal and horizontal patterns of exchanges” (8) between NSAs among multiple countries whose main purpose is to promote particular agendas based on certain principled ideas.

Unpacking Keck and Sikkink’s concept of TANs involves the examination of the “boomerang” pattern they proposed to illustrate the political context and dynamics by which TANs operate (refer to Figure 1-1). According to Keck and Sikkink, TAN arises when a blockage exists between domestic activist groups and their government, rendering established domestic channels of communication ineffective for resolving conflicts between the two parties. Consequently, domestic activist groups seek out and mobilize other NGOs across national borders. Using their available resources and opportunities, these NGOs transform into international advocates, who then lobby their own government or inter-governmental organizations to pressure the targeted state.

**Significance of the Study**

This conceptual framework guides this research. As Keck and Sikkink (1998) asserted, academia has been lagging behind in terms of research on TANs, and I intend to enrich the discussion of TANs through this dissertation. What is important about
TANs is the fact that they offer analytical opportunities for understanding social mobilization in a global perspective in the following respects. First, TANs “embody elements of agency and structure simultaneously” (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 5). By examining TANs in terms of their organization and patterns of interactions among the members and partners in the networks, we are actually looking at the structures of the network. As Risse-Kappen (1995) asserts, domestic structures also influence the outcomes of TAN activities. These domestic structures include the type of political regime (i.e., democratic or not), degree of state decentralization, and the number of civil society groups. On the other hand, by examining the extent and effectiveness of their advocacy, we are assigning a certain degree of agency to TANs.

Second, TANs as a research area allow us to delve into the complex interactions between the micro and macro levels on which a TAN operates simultaneously. As networks, TANs embody interactions among non-state and state actors across various levels of scale. When analyzing the repertoire of protest of a TAN, we are actually trying to tie the micro-level interactions among individual activists to the collective goals of the entire TAN, and vice versa. In doing so, we also look at how the TANs negotiate their own agendas, strategies and tactics with regard to the way they perceive the states they target. This analysis may also elucidate whether there is inequality in power relations, not only among the partners in a given TAN, but also between the TAN and the state and non-state actors during negotiations and collaborations in question.

And third, as collective entities, TANs offer analytical opportunities for understanding the processes by which they are constituted and strengthened as well as undermined, which in turn reflects on the fate of the causes they seek to advance.
Transnational activism has a life span, and by apprehending the life span of a given TAN, we are bound to understand the ongoing processes of collaboration, protest and negotiation as the TAN seeks to advance its agenda in the face of external resistance as well as possible internal tensions.

**Contributions of the Research**

This dissertation takes up the case of a local environmental campaign that emerged in the Philippines and later transformed into a TAN. This dissertation contributes to the understanding of TANs in three key respects. First, I pay particular attention to the life span of the TAN. I trace how a local environmental campaign emerged in a domestic context and then transformed itself into a TAN in order to access the international system to gain allies and resources and thereby advance its agenda, which included targeting a foreign as well as the domestic state. The analysis here highlights concepts from the social movements literature on political opportunity structures, framing of issues, and collective identity.

Second, this dissertation focuses on the dynamics of TANs in bridging state and NSAs within the context of the relationship between First World and Third World actors. In examining TANs as actors, this dissertation seeks to clarify the agency and structure at work in TANs. By adopting a social constructionist perspective, I seek to unearth key concepts grounded in the experiences of diverse participants in the TAN. This permits refinement of concepts such as engaged collaboration, multiple victimization, and solidarity work. The articulation of these concepts also illuminates how micro and macro levels of approaches can be incorporated in research on TANs.

And third, this dissertation contributes to the literature on social movements by focusing on the abeyance of TANs. TANs as partnerships face internal challenges of
conflicting agendas and strategies among partners, which can result in network breakup. I therefore focus on the decline in the campaign of the TAN in question. This affords a better understanding of the internal dynamics of TANs which may involve fluctuating membership, leadership conflicts, changes in financial support, and organizational modifications. Such dynamics have important ramifications for TAN campaigns, and also bear implications for the responses by former partners after a TAN breaks up. Movement decline may or may not lead to eventual revival, and understanding the factors at play in TAN dynamics may help charter new directions in social movements and organizational research by extending understanding of TAN life cycles to moments of network conflict, break-up, abeyance, and partner response.

Overall, this research contributes to the knowledge-building on TANs and how they are constituted and evolve over time, especially with reference to their relationships with governments. In particular, I offer an alternative route to Keck and Sikkink’s (1998) “Boomerang” pattern, where TANs seek to circumvent obstructive domestic states by engaging foreign collaborators and foreign states. I highlight engaged collaboration as a means whereby local organizations ally with foreign partners to go beyond information sharing in order to influence domestic states in the hopes of thereby influencing foreign.

**Research Objectives**

This dissertation therefore aims to explain how a TAN working on environmental issues not only emerges, but also becomes divided and goes into decline, and how such dynamics affect individual partner organizations. Specifically, I take up a case study of a transnational environmental advocacy network pursuing a cleanup campaign focused on toxics left on former military bases of the United States in the Philippines. In so doing, this dissertation addresses the following research questions:
• How does a local advocacy network concerned about environmental issues emerge?
• How does a local advocacy network expand across national boundaries and initiate collaboration with foreign partners, thereby constituting a TAN?
• How does a TAN experience divisions and decline which leads to a period of abeyance?
• How do the partners adjust their goals, strategies and tactics to the decline of a TAN?

Dissertation Outline

The remainder of this dissertation is divided into seven chapters. Below I sketch the goals and general content of each.

Chapter 2

The next chapter presents a brief review of two related literatures, namely, previous work on social movements and TANs. I argue that a social movement encompasses a dialectic of micro and macro aspects of collective action, which is organized according to the movement’s agenda setting, framing of issues, collective identity, and repertoire of protest. The literature review therefore examines how different social movement theories conceptualize the dynamics of a social movement, commencing with its emergence and development while raising questions about its decline. Further, I explore the idea of transnationalism as a strategic option for domestic social movements to access the international system. This motivates a discussion of how social movements transform their core organizational setup to accommodate structural elaboration via partnerships. In the transnational mode of operation, social movements engage in diffusion of information and practices, internalization of transnational issues in domestic settings, externalization of the issues by bringing in collaborators, and finally engaging in coordinated transnational action by forging links
and networks. This chapter concludes by identifying gaps in the TAN literature as a segue to discussing the research questions.

Chapter 3

In Chapter 3, I present the methods used to investigate my research questions. Given that my research questions emphasize processes of mobilization, partnering and contestation, I pursue a social constructionist approach to the research methodology. I adopt a qualitative design with a TAN as a case study. I use the case of the People's Task Force for US Bases Cleanup (hereafter referred to as PTFBC), a local NGO in the Philippines to advocate for cleaning up former US military bases. PTFBC forged network ties with NGOs in the United States (US), particularly with the Filipino American Coalition for Environmental Solidarity (FACES), to pursue a cleanup campaign. I focus on these two organizations and the communities affected by toxic contamination as key players in the TAN in question. Qualitative methods included 31 in-depth interviews, review of more than a hundred archival documents, and observational field notes. The interviews involved one or more sessions with each respondent, conducted either through face-to-face, phone or internet interviews. I downloaded pertinent archival documents from legitimate websites, or scanned them from files owned by organizations who were involved with the advocacy. Data analysis involved the use of grounded theory as a tool for coding. The software MAXQD 10 allowed me to efficiently use line-by-line coding to generate a total of roughly 5000 Level 1 codes. I reduced this number of codes in subsequent analysis. Using the most frequent or most significant codes, I identified analytical themes to address each research question. I discuss these themes in the analytical chapters, from 4 to 7.
In writing each analytical chapter, I followed a format involving three main parts. Part 1 opens each analytical chapter with an outline, which offers a map of what to expect in the subsequent sections. Then I introduce the themes that emerged from the analysis in order to articulate and substantiate my main arguments. Finally, I conclude each analytical chapter with some theoretical propositions emanating from the discussion of the themes.

Chapter 4

The first analytical chapter narrates the emergence of the local environmental campaign initiated by PTFBC. I argue that the emergence of the cleanup campaign was an offshoot of an older social movement against continuing US interventions in the Philippines. I therefore examine the long-standing colonial relationship between the Philippines and the US. This historical relationship culminated in the nonrenewal of the Military Bases Agreement (MBA) by the Philippine Senate in 1991.

I then spell out the political opportunity structure that facilitated the emergence of the cleanup campaign in the former US bases. I argue that the anti-US intervention movement set the stage for the birth of the bases cleanup campaign. This political opportunity structure included the victory of the anti-US intervention movement culminating in the non-renewal of the MBA in 1991, increased international interest in environmental issues surrounding the US bases, mobilization of a local campaign to become a national NGO, and the effective framing of toxic contamination issues in the US bases as victimization of Filipino people.

The framing of issues used by the cleanup campaign to emphasize victimization was strategic in defining the environmental agenda, invoking a collective identity among the victims, and constituting a repertoire of protest which in turn influenced the
effectiveness and success of the cleanup campaign. I argue that the adoption of a victimization frame for the campaign underscored the connection between the historical roots of US colonialism in the Philippines and the lived experiences of the victims and their families exposed to toxics at former US bases.

Chapter 5

Having established how the cleanup campaign emerged, Chapter 5 tackles the question of how the local campaign became transnational. I argue that the cleanup campaign required a TAN to support the achievement of its goals, given the responsibility of the US military for the toxics. The main strategy employed by the cleanup campaign therefore entailed building network ties both within the Philippines and with the US in order to promote bilateral cooperation between the two governments for the cleanup.

Chapter 5 focuses on two themes to illustrate the transnational strategy that the cleanup campaign employed. The first theme highlights transnationalism in the tactical repertoire of the campaign. This transnational repertoire included networking, information sharing, participatory and direct action, and legal engagement. Each depended on international partnerships in order to advance. The second theme involves critical milestones in the achievements of the campaign. As illustrations, I highlight the creation of the Filipino American Coalition for Environmental Solidarity (FACES) which became the partner NGO for PTFBC and worked to pressure the US government to clean up the toxic contamination in its former military bases in the Philippines. With the mounting advocacy against the denial and neglect of both the US and Philippine government, the latter officially acknowledged the presence of toxic substances in the former US military bases by 1999. I discuss in this chapter an alternate approach in how
TANs are constituted. Whereas Keck and Sikkink’s (1998) Boomerang pattern posits the formation of transnational alliances to circumvent domestic states by seeking the aid of foreign states, I show that the TAN in question used alliances to engage the domestic state in order to seek reparations from a foreign state. Grounded theory analysis highlights the importance of engaged collaboration, by which relationships among partner organizations can move beyond mere information sharing. In this case study, the technical/legal, ethical and ethnic dimensions are more prominent dimensions that gave impetus to such transformation.

Chapter 6

Ironically, this momentous success led to a series of unfortunate events which led to the rift among the TAN’s members and the decline of the cleanup campaign. Chapter 6 discusses various factors that led to the rift, notably conflicts among the TAN’s leadership. I argue that the rift in the TAN was threefold: 1) the rift within the PTFBC, 2) the rift between PTFBC and FACES, and 3) the rift within the community of victims.

I identify several factors that brought forth the rift in the cleanup campaign. These factors include a crisis in leadership and financial accountability, misinformation, lack of connections to the community, and homeland security issues. I argue that these factors brought about a premature “deradicalization” in the campaign, which in turn led to the decline of the campaign. I argue that the PTFBC’s early successes undermined its focus on the larger goal of establishing bilateral cooperation between the Philippine and US governments. When the Philippine government finally acknowledged the toxic contamination in the former US military bases, PTFBC failed to sustain pressure on the Philippine government in order to ensure that the cleanup agenda was carried to the US government. There was a window of opportunity for the Philippine government to assert
its own agenda on the bases when the negotiations on the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) were underway with the US government. However, requests through institutional channels for including the cleanup in the VFA went ignored.

Another problem with the TAN’s campaign was the fact that the PTFBC was preoccupied with internal problems. A wedge of disunity arose between the Board of Directors (BOD) and the staff, which in effect divided national leaders based in Manila and local leaders with direct ties to the communities exposed to toxins. This fragmentation resulted in a crisis of leadership, which also corresponded to a crisis over strategy.

The crisis was tied to deradicalization as manifest in the legal strategy employed to pursue the cleanup campaign. Once the acknowledgement of the Philippine government came in 1999, the campaign aggressively filed lawsuits against the Philippine and the US governments. Both lawsuits were dismissed, which served as a major blow to the cleanup campaign and reinforced conflicts among TAN partners.

Chapter 7

Chapter 7 pursues the question of what happened to the TAN’s partners after the decline of the cleanup campaign. The chapter focuses on FACES, the PTFBC, and the affected communities, and considers the responses of each to the breakup of the TAN. Among these three partners, FACES fared best by taking several strategic decisions and repositioning itself as a transnational NGO among new partners and funders. FACES understood its unique position in the Philippines and the US. It fully embraced its transnationality to cater to the environmental issues among Filipino communities in the US and the Philippines. In doing so, FACES also claimed a collective identity as a Filipino organization, asserting its ethnic identity more than before. FACES leveraged
this identity by highlighting itself as a transnational environmental justice (TEJ) organization, something that resonated with US as well as Philippine constituencies.

Through the initiative of its former executive director (ED), PTFBC is starting from scratch again. That is, it is seeking new collaborators to support the cleanup campaign. The ED immigrated to the US and uses her immigrant status to build a bridge between the campaign in the Philippines and potential partners in the US. However, it remains to be seen what this strategy will produce, whether in the form of a new TAN or in the reinvigoration of the cleanup campaign.

The community of victims is still waiting for external assistance to ease their difficult everyday living conditions. As of this writing, the community is not hopeful toward the campaign, nor is it satisfied with the outcome of the TAN’s operation. While there are other new NGOs coming into the community to give partial assistance to the needs of the victims, the community still hopes for the revival of the TAN’s cleanup campaign in order to finally settle the problems that have haunted them for almost a quarter of a century. The community has options, but only within the confines of dependency on outside organizations whose fortunes local peoples scarcely control.

Chapter 8

Chapter 8 concludes the dissertation. I first offer a distillation of the key findings of the four analytical chapters. This provides the basis for reflections on the broader insights generated by the analysis. I highlight three insights on TANs. First, this dissertation unpacks the complex processes by which local movements and advocacy campaigns become transnational, by identifying some core factors. These factors include, but are not limited to, the presence of political opportunity structures (i.e., local and international), availability of resources (i.e., material and symbolic), and clear
definition of an opponent (i.e., a common out-group adversary, in this case both domestic and foreign states) to whom grievances and demands are expressed. Likewise, issue framing is also critical in bridging two or more NSAs and state actors across borders in a TAN. Finally, this dissertation contributes to knowledge-building on how and what constitutes TANs by presenting an alternative route to Keck and Sikkink's (1998) Boomerang pattern.

Second, this dissertation illustrates the fragmentation of a TAN by highlighting the challenges that TANs confront in terms of managing and maintaining networks. Partners may start on an unequal footing in terms of the social and political capital they bring in to the table, and such asymmetrical conditions may translate into internal tensions among network partners. Structural problems external to the network may also cause rift within TANs, causing their decline.

Lastly, this dissertation contributes to the analysis of TANs in abeyance by examining the differential experiences among TAN partners after break-up. In doing so, this dissertation extends the analysis of the impact of inequalities among TAN partners on their divergent fortunes after network break-up and campaign decline. The better-off partners (i.e., with greater social and political capital) do better after the decline (i.e., in terms of reorganization or continuance of the advocacy work). The least-privileged partners (i.e., with lesser social and political capital) fare the worst. Whereas TANs often form to provide assistance to weaker partners, the break-up of TANs may perpetuate or increase inequalities among former partners.
Figure 1-1. The Boomerang Pattern. When State A blocks nongovernmental organizations, they link up with other organizations across borders and form advocacy networks wherein members pressure a third-party organization or their own state to pressure State A into hearing out redress from the NGOs within it. (Source: Keck, Margaret E. and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, p. 13)
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

As befits a literature review on the study of social movements across borders, I examine two bodies of literature, namely Social Movements Theories and Transnational Advocacy Networks (TANs). My purpose in reviewing both is to consider the extent to which the social movements literature informs understanding of the processes and dynamics of TANs. How can social movements theories be extended to explain the workings of TANs? Do the tenets of social movements readily lend themselves to the conceptualization of TANs?

Overview of the Chapter

Thus, in this chapter, I divide the discussion into three parts. First, I discuss different social movements theories, focusing on how they explain the emergence and development of social movements while raising questions about their decline. Second, I explore the literature on TANs understood as a networking strategy to strengthen domestic social movements via formation of alliances with external organizations. And third, I identify gaps in these literatures as a segue to the identification of my research questions.

Social Movements Theories

The study of social movements is central to the discipline of sociology. Like other durable sociological concepts, social movements reflect the socio-political and historical conditions by which they were produced (see comprehensive discussion in Eyerman and Jamison 1991:10-44). For the purpose of this review, I briefly examine three strands of sociological approaches to the study of social movements. These
approaches include the: (1) collective behavior; (2) resource mobilization theory; and, (3) political opportunity structures.

**Collective Behavior Approach**

Between the 1930s and 1950s, social movements were viewed as “spontaneous forms of collective action” that when left unmanaged, could potentially damage established norms and values (see Eyerman and Jamison 1991:10, 11; also Heberle 1951). This collective behavior perspective resulted from the combination of the work of Herbert Blumer using a symbolic interactionist perspective, and the work of Talcott Parsons using a more structural-functionalist perspective (Eyerman and Jamison 1991). Blumer (1951) proposed that social exclusion and marginalization spawn collective action towards social change. This notion of deprivation became one of the pioneering explanations for the emergence of social movements.

Earlier social movement scholars assumed that the origins of social mobilization were largely linked to the shared frustrations and grievances among social actors (Gurr 1970; Smelser 1963; Turner and Killian 1972). There was a heavy emphasis on the socio-psychological perspective on collective behavior, which regards social movements as anomalous and problematic conditions that threaten social order (Hoffer 1951; Kornhauser 1959). However, it also makes sense to say that the structures of social inequalities in terms of wealth, power and prestige also result in deprivation to some segments of society, making them ready clienteles for social movements. People who are deprived of opportunities and life chances are easy to recruit and mobilize, especially by social movements catering toward a redistribution of societal rewards and privileges (Oberschall 1973).
Resource Mobilization Theory

By the late 1960s and early 1970s, the resource mobilization theory challenged the claims of the collective behavioral approach. Resource mobilization theory argued that the study of social movements should not only be limited to the collective behavior among disgruntled segments of the society (Jenkins 1983). The emphasis should instead center on 1) the mobilization of available resources, specifically money and labor, 2) the interrelationships among social movement organizations, and 3) the dependence of movements upon external support (McCarthy and Zald 1977). In particular, the resource mobilization approach underscores the different resources that can support or constrain social movements, including but not limited to the linkages forged with other groups, the dependence of social movements on third parties such as funding agencies or experts, and the strategies and tactics used by authorities in trying to control social movements (Zald and McCarthy 1977).

Political Opportunity Structures

If the emergence of social movements depends largely on people’s access to resources, then marginalized groups (i.e., women, ethnic and racial minorities, the disabled, to name a few) would not be able to participate in any collective action. At this point, social movement scholars shifted their focus from movement participants and their resources to understanding the structures (which others refer to as political climate) that facilitate the formation and maintenance of social movements (Goodwin and Jasper 2003). Pre-existing structures contain resources that facilitate social mobilization. In fact, existing structures provide myriad ideas with which social movements can define a collective identity, goals, activities, ideology, and even adversaries and collaborators (Sztompka 1993: 286).
Challenging the notion of resource mobilization, the political opportunity structure approach expands the view concerning the rise of social movements to consider the importance of context via shifts in economic and political structures that are independent of the protestors’ own efforts (Jenkins and Perrow 1977; McAdam 1982; Tarrow 1998). By viewing social movements as primarily political, this approach considers changes in the state as the most important political opportunity structure that a movement needs in order to propel social change. Other political opportunities may include the reduction of repression against organizers, divisions among political elites over the issues at hand, general crisis within the government, or engaging in war (Skopcol 1979).

Political opportunity structures are facilitative contexts that may render the political system more accessible and responsive to the public at specific moments (Keck and Sikkink 1998; also see Tarrow 1998). Social movement scholars use terms like “open structures versus closed structures” or “weak states versus strong states” to differentiate the degree of institutional accessibility of the political system and the propensity of states to repress emerging social movements (Kriesi 2007:69, 71). However, the availability of political opportunity structures does not directly result in increased protest, due to the disparity of power between political elites and their challengers (Koopmans 2007:24). As power does not reside in political authority alone, this concept is also extended to “political economic opportunity structures” to emphasize the complex relationship between the state and the economic institutions, and their subsequent weight on social movements, capturing the role of elite allies in any social movement (Pellow 2007; Taylor 2000).
Moreover, political opportunity structures perform other functions. Aside from producing a field of constraints and opportunities for the emergence of social movements, political opportunity structures also determine the ease and extent of recruitment and participation in social movements (see Zald and Useem 1987). The presence of social movements in turn affects how far people are able to participate.

**Life of Social Movements**

Social movements function in "some degree of temporal continuity" (Snow et al. 2007:10). Being temporally continuous implies that social movements are “episodic” (McAdam et al. 2001: 5), that is, they are neither routine nor ephemeral. Although there is some variability in life span, social movements persist over time and are more than fads. Over their life spans, most social movements experience highs and lows as they progress in their struggles, as via the so-called cycles of protest (Tarrow 1998). Some social movements may have very brief careers such as Not-in-my-backyard (NIMBY) campaigns (see NIMBY Experts’ website at http://www.nimbyexperts.com). Others may have a prolonged existence such as the Heaven’s Gate “cult” (Snow et al. 2007). Others may oscillate between periods of prominence and dormancy such as the case of the women’s movement (Bagguley 2002; Rupp and Taylor 1987; Taylor 1997).

The internal dynamics of social movements capture the underlying processes that social movements undergo in between periods of emergence and decline. Sztompka (1993: 286) proposed four distinct stages in the life of social movements, namely, 1) emergence, 2) mobilization via recruitment, 3) structural elaboration, and 4) termination. In the remainder of this section, I focus on different theoretical perspectives on each of these stages of the life cycle of social movements.
Emergence of Social Movements

Sociological research on social movements largely focuses on explaining the emergence of social movements, in terms of the timing, social base, and form of action (Bagguley 2002). The basic questions usually asked include “When and where do social movements arise?” I argue that social movements emerge at historical junctures that compel individuals to pursue issues through collective and non-institutionalized routes (see Sztompka 1993).

According to Goodwin and Jasper (2008:14), a number of factors can propel the emergence of social movements. Social movements may arise in response to political factors such as crises in the state, divisions among elites, and reduced repression by the police. Indeed, the type of political regime, degree of state decentralization, and extent of participation by civil society groups also influence the birth and outcome of the TANs (Risse-Kappen 1995). Second, economic factors such as an increase in the ability to make contributions to social movements are also relevant for accumulating material resources for protest activities. Third, organizational factors influence the emergence of social movements in terms of the presence of social networks or formal organizations in support of social movements. Fourth, cultural factors such as an increase in awareness among constituencies inclined to support the movement’s cause can also have a profound impact not only in the emergence of social movements but also in maintaining membership.

Recruitment and Participation in Social Movements

Social movement research also focuses on who participates in social movements, and the broader context in which these movements arise. What motivates individuals to participate in social movements despite the myriad socio-political constraints that
confront mobilization? In general, social movements scholars assume three main reasons for movement participation, namely (a) instrumentality, which refers to people’s desire to influence social and political conditions; (b) identity, which refers to people’s yearning to identify with an organization or group; and (c) ideology, which refers to people’s search for meaning and self-expression (Klandermans, 2007:361).

Earlier social movement theorists looked at those who participate in social mobilizations as people who are alienated and marginalized from the larger society (Kornhauser, 1959). Such agitation depends largely on the relative deprivation that these individuals feel about their conditions, which they perceive to diverge from their expectations (Gurr, 1970). These theorists oftentimes assume that protestors are people who compensate for personal inadequacy through participation in social movements (Goodwin and Jasper, 2003). However, there are other factors beyond socio-psychological incentives that play a role in social movement recruitment. For one, established communication networks can be good avenues to recruit and mobilize participants, as seen in the case of women’s liberation movement (Freeman 1983).

Waves of recruitment. Sztompka (1993: 288) analyzed two waves of participants who are recruited into social movements. The first wave of recruits includes those people who are directly affected by a problem, those who are most committed to the movement’s causes, and those who believe that the movement is instrumental in attaining the desired social change. Once the social movement emerges, the second wave of participants joins in out of convenience rather than conviction (289). The second wave of participants may include those who seek “community and meaning of life” or those at the fringe who are “cynical opportunists” trying to get tangible benefits
from the successes of the social movement (288). Other scholars call the latter “free riders,” or those people who stay outside social movements but hope for their success, believing they would benefit them ultimately (Olson 1965).

**Structural availability.** Resource mobilization theory focuses on the structural conditions that facilitate protest participation (McCarthy and Zald 1977). Researchers have established that the social networks of participants already in a social movement are the best predictor in determining recruitment of future members (Snow, Zurcher and Ekland-Olson 1980). Thus, social networks become both a requirement and predictor for the emergence of a movement. In fact, McAdam (1982) identified the strength of social network ties as one of the important factors in explaining who among those who signed up for the “Freedom Summer of 1964” actually turned up and participated in the program. He concluded that the participants in this movement who actually joined were those people who knew others who were also joining the program. Networks that were previously utilized in other political activities can also serve as a means of recruiting members in forming a new social movement (McAdam, 1986).

Furthermore, Walsh (1981), in his study of the Three Mile Island anti-nuclear movement, argues that personal contacts played an important role in transmitting cultural messages through networks to convince people to join. These direct personal contacts become conduits in aligning the organizers and the participants so that they can reach a common understanding of the target problem and the means to address it (Snow et al., 1996). However, “weak ties” (i.e., social networks with fewer social relations in common, such as ordinary acquaintances) also play an important role in facilitating the diffusion of contention to larger constituencies, since stronger ties (i.e.,
social networks which are close and intimate such as family members or close friends) are less likely to communicate information that is novel to the recipients. In modern societies, such diffusion is normally assisted by mass media technology (Koopmans, 2007).

**Leadership in social movements.** According to Morris and Staggenborg (2007:188), leadership within social movements can be classified into four ideal types. The first type consists of formal leaders who occupy the top positions in social movement organizations (SMOs). Examples are Boards of Trustees, Boards of Directors, and National Coordinating Officers. The second type of leader constitutes the team that supports the formal leaders (e.g. staff). The third ideal type consists of “bridge leaders,” who are those who work on the ground such as community organizers or neighborhood leaders, and at the same time, have the capacity to connect with the formal leaders. Finally, the fourth tier includes local organizers who also help other members of social movements to organize their own groups, while at the same time engaging in routine leadership activities within the movement. This helps build connections with members of other groups and helps them develop organizations (Morris and Staggenborg 2007:188).

**Structural Elaboration**

Beyond questions of recruitment and movement formation are issues of how movements grow and change. Structural elaboration is the stage of development of the social movements which may result in the formation of a full-fledged movement organization, usually referred to as a social movement organization (McCarthy and Zald 1977). According to Sztompka (1993), the first indication of internal morphogenesis or structural elaboration involves the articulation of ideas, beliefs, creeds, tactics and
strategies, and even a vocabulary of protest (289). This results in the formation of new norms and values that regulate the functioning of the movement, and establishes new bonds of loyalty and comradeship. Morphogenesis may even specify various ways of dealing with enemies and allies, called “repertoires of contention” (Tilly 1985). In the process of structural elaboration, the emerging normative structure within the movement usually distinguishes rules for forming alliances and working with collaborators, or the “ethos of solidarity,” and rules for doing business with the opponents, called the “ethos of struggle” (Sztompka 1993: 290).

Structural elaboration of social movements involves the “crystallization of new opportunity structures, new hierarchies of dependence, domination, leadership, influence and power within the movement” (Sztompka 1993: 290). The movement may evolve an internally stratified membership which includes sharing various levels of participation, commitment and responsibility among its members. The most desirable effect of structural elaboration should be, according to Zurcher and Snow (1981:472), “the alignment of individual interests and movement goals.” This is the stage when members feel satisfied with being part of the social movement, which in turn reflects back on the achievement of social change by the movement itself (Sztompka 1993).

I argue that becoming transnational constitutes a specific form of structural elaboration for social movements. By recruiting participants to increase its reach across national boundaries, a social movement accesses the international system wherein it may increase its chances of achieving its goals by tapping resources from international allies and sympathizers. This option is obviously open to social movements which are pursuing issues that cross national boundaries. However, other social movements may
also pursue this form of structural elaboration. Such movements include but are not limited to: (a) those whose issues are repressed by home country governments, and thus seek international support; (b) those whose issues require influencing international policy regimes; and (c) those whose struggles involve activities by multinational corporations (Keck and Sikkink 1998). I discuss transnationalization further later in this chapter, using the Transnational Advocacy Networks (TAN) Approach.

**Social movement organizations (SMOs).** There is a debate among social movement scholars concerning the functions and consequences of formal organizations in the character and activities of social movements (Snow et al 2007). Some sociologists argue that formal organizations can impede or retard the growth of social movements. Some even believe that formal organizations in social movements can be hostile to the growth and effectiveness of mobilization (Piven and Cloward 1977). However, others emphasize the role of social movement organizations (SMOs) in managing resources in social movements and in working to support the movement’s objectives (Snow et al. 2007). Others emphasize that social movements are not organizations but “networks of interaction of different actors” (Della Porta and Diani 1999:6) or “connective structures or networks” (Tarrow 1998: 123) which may not necessarily include formal organizations.

**Framing.** In the context of structural elaboration, individual interests and movement goals can be aligned through framing. Framing of issues is consequently one of the most crucial tasks in developing social movements. Framing is a strategy used in designing and presenting ideas that can be understandable to the target audience or general public in order to persuade them to join and thereby legitimate collective action.
(see Tarrow 1988; originally from Goffman 1974). Further, one of the most important keys to success in becoming transnational is the framing of issues by social movements to align their concerns with the interests of their prospective international allies.

Snow and Benford (1988) differentiate three types of framing that can be used in movement elaboration. The first type refers to the diagnostic framing wherein target audiences or the general public are persuaded to accept the relevance and immediacy of the issues being pushed by the organizers. Second is the prognostic framing wherein target audiences, having accepted the problem, are convinced to take on the strategies of action that the organizers deem as viable responses to such problem. Finally, the third type of framing is motivational framing wherein target audiences, aroused by emotional attachment to the movement, are therefore compelled to get involved in the various activities of the social movement. Moreover, these frames should at least reverberate with some of the most fundamental beliefs among potential recruits (Goodwin and Jasper, 2003).

Furthermore, in the age of information technology, social movements also grapple with the use of mass media. In general, social movements can exist and maintain their status even without media focus (Zald and McCarthy 1977). However, in cases where resource mobilization largely depends on continuous media coverage, then the success of social movement campaigns and strategies depends on maintaining time in the limelight. Framing of issues is thus critical in capturing and maintaining the attention of people on the issues being carried by the social movements, especially using mass media as a conduit.
**Collective identity.** Another important aspect in the structural elaboration of social movements is the creation of a collective identity among the members. Collective identity is usually seen as a microstructural factor emanating from personal ties and membership in organizations (Taylor 2000). At the same time, collective identity serves as a mechanism in determining the macro-historical context within which movements emerge (Polletta and Jasper 2001). The formation of a collective identity is linked to the social location of the participants, which in turn helps determine their ability to mobilize resources effectively (Taylor 2000).

One of the most important characteristics of social movements concerns their intimate connections to social conflict as a source of social change via collective mobilization. In social movements, there is sustained interaction between the opponents (i.e., existing authorities) and the proponents (i.e., representatives of an identified constituency). This elucidates the temporal continuity of social movements as compared to crowds or clubs (see Tilly 1978). Moreover, social movements can be viewed as a collective political struggle that has “some degree of organization and continuity outside of institutional channels” (Snow et al. 2007:11). Often, the degree of organization necessitates social movements to expand into formal organizations in order to accomplish their goals.

A collective identity can be generated around a strong sense of solidarity. Solidarity refers to various types of relationships that link members of one group to members of another. Such linkages can be drawn from relationships based on friendship, kinship, participation in organizations, and even from subordinate-superordinate relationships (Zald and McCarthy 1977: 21-22).
Examples of collective identity in social movements abound. For instance, in the environmental justice movement, the formation of collective identity among members based on the common experience of victimization determines how these activists portray themselves in their environmental justice advocacy (Checker 2001). Collective identity also influences how target audiences (i.e., government officials, local communities, or various publics) will understand such portrayals (Einwohner 1999). Finally, collective identity determines how activists reach across ethnic divides to negotiate their identities in specific social contexts (Herda-Rapp 2000; Pulido 1996).

Furthermore, in environmental social movements in general, women are said to be the more prominent participants and leaders of grassroots environmental organizations. It is frequently women who build cases documenting the toxicity they experience in their neighborhoods (Bantjes and Trussler 1999; Brown and Ferguson 1995), despite the challenge coming from experts against their claims (Allen 2007; Robyn 2002; Tesh and Williams 1996). Women’s proclivity towards toxic waste activism is explained in terms of socialization processes, recruitment patterns, structural availability, and accessibility of motherhood images (Cable 1992; Sturgeon 1999).

While social movements effect change in the wider society, they also change in the process. External changes that a social movement brings to the wider society in turn affect its membership, organizational structure, context of protest, and even the endowments of the participants (Sztompka 1993). Social movements occupy an intermediate status of influence as “bearers of social structure,” while simultaneously producing and transforming such rule systems through their actions and transactions (Burns et al. 1985: xiii). Thus, the study of social movements is concerned not with
established groups but with groups that are “in the process of becoming” (Killian 1964: 427).

**Decline of Social Movements**

The last stage in the life span of social movements involves their decline and termination (Sztompka 1993). Despite the political fervor that social movements exude, a significant portion of them may not be able to maintain their advocacy and produce significant social change; others may simply lie low in terms of visibility in the political arena. Social movement scholars, however, are primarily engrossed with the emergence and development of social movements (Bagguley 2002). The notion of a social movement decline is partially challenged by the notion of “cycles of protest” or “waves of mobilization” (Koopmans 1997; Tarrow 1995), wherein the decline of a social movement can leave residues that can fuel succeeding mobilizations.

Nonetheless, an understanding of social movement decline is important for three reasons. First, it enriches our understanding of the complex nature of social movement dynamics that can shed light on the various factors that sustain or eviscerate social movements. Second, it allows us to explore how participants and social network partners evolve and adjust to the decline of the social movement. And third, it provides new opportunities and directions for social movement research by addressing an issue left understudied.

**Pathways to decline.** In general, there are three possible pathways for social movements to decline. The first two pathways are labeled in the literature as a “crisis of victory” and “victory in defeat” (Adamson and Borgos 1984). A crisis of victory occurs when the movement achieves its goals and wins its struggle and thus loses its reason for existence. This in turn may dissolve the social movement itself. Victory in defeat, on
the other hand, happens when a social movement comes back after losing its struggle, and then enters a period of decline. The third pathway is the worst scenario, when a social movement is defeated and suppressed, and eventually decays without achieving any victory (Sztompka 1993).

Factors of decline. These pathways raise questions as to how and why social movements decline. The decline in any collective action, such as social movements and TANs, is a consequence of the complex relations among various external factors (i.e., broad trends within the larger societal context) and internal factors (i.e., micro-organizational dynamics).

Several hypotheses attempt to explain the decline in social movements via one or another pathway of decline (Goodwin and Jasper 2003; Taylor 1989). One hypothesis indicates that when a social movement has achieved its goals and its participants are satisfied with the outcome, the movement starts to wane. Another hypothesis explains that because of the success of a social movements in making inroads in the establishments of power (i.e., the state), there can result a widespread governmental recognition of the social movement. Such acknowledgment can lead to the institutionalization of the social movement wherein participants may opt to conduct their business under more legalistic procedures rather than via disruptive protests and non-institutional venues. These processes may yield the “crisis in victory” scenario.

The decline of social movements can also be explained by the changes in the socio-political and economic climate surrounding social movements. These changes may eliminate certain political opportunity structures that facilitated mobilization in the past. This process may yield the “victory in defeat” or defeat scenarios. Aside from
changes in the political context, internal power inequalities in a social movement network or organization can also play a crucial role in movement decline. Competition and tensions among groups within the network can lead to breakups, especially in more complex networks with several partners (Mendelson 2002).

And fourth, internal dynamics in social movements may imperil group solidarity. This process most likely yields the defeat scenario. According to Zald and Ash (1966:337), there are two factors that lead to factionalism within social movements. These are the heterogeneity of the social base, and the basis of authority. They also propose that factionalism is more likely to defeat movements if 1) their social bases are heterogeneous, and 2) they rely heavily on external contributions.

These crises in leadership are not new to social movements, nor are they concentrated in grassroots movements. Even big international nongovernmental organizations (BINGOs) are threatened by factionalism. In his research on the British environmental movement, Rootes (2005:37) claims that it is difficult to maintain loyalty and commitment among members and supporters in environmental movement organizations. For example, the formal and top-ranking leaders of Friends of Earth (FoE) and Greenpeace International have also grappled with challenges to the leadership hierarchy, and have had to strike compromises via power-sharing arrangements with local members and mass bases to ensure the survival of their respective organizations. In the case of FoE, an alliance between national office staff and local groups challenged the leadership of the board of directors. Under the threat of rift, FoE learned to compromise its campaign agenda by becoming “acutely aware of the need to be responsive to members’ local and often scientifically questionable concerns”
In the case of Greenpeace, the threat to the leadership hierarchy came in the form of a fluctuating number of donors in the 1990s. Taking this as a criticism, Greenpeace opened up its organization to the participation of local members in order to harness their energies and thereby expand support (Rootes 2005: 37-38).

**Abeyance thesis.** The notion of “abeyance” refers to the occurrence of “decline, failure and demobilization” of a social movement (Bagguley 2002:170). The concept of abeyance comes from the works of Mizruchi (1983). Mizruchi used this concept to denote the gap between the available status positions in society and the number of possible claimants to those positions. As a result, “abeyance organizations” are created to absorb surplus and marginal populations to defuse any disruptions they may cause in the larger society.

Applying the concept of abeyance to social movements, Taylor (1997) suggests that abeyance organizations can provide continuity to social movements. Indeed, a movement in abeyance often foreshadows further mobilization in the future. Abeyance structures are typically formalized social movement organizations which sustain the collective identity of the movement and “retain activists between waves of mobilization” (Bagguley 2002:171). When the socio-political climate is hostile to social movements, the main goal of these abeyance structures is to redirect movement energy away from the targeted opponents or governments, and instead concentrate on “preserving enduring values and identity” of their organizations for future mobilization (Sawyers and Meyer 1999:761). Movements in abeyance must first and foremost maintain their organizational culture rather than attempt to transform the larger society. This is because in a period of abeyance, society is non-receptive to social movements and
their issues (Taylor and Whittier 1997: 557). In brief, movements in abeyance are focused on self-preservation and on maintaining their networks. Challenges to the state, if any, are conducted through “unobtrusive mobilization” (Bagguley 2002:174).

**Social Movements in Transnational Settings**

When the socio-political climate in the domestic setting is hostile, social movements may encounter the need to elevate their issues and concerns to the international arena wherein they may find new allies and opportunities for achieving their goals via collaboration. Transnationalization assumes that it is the local or domestic social movements which are attempting to access the international arena for outside support. Thus, for the purpose of this review, I explore the literature on TANs to provide a theoretical approach for understanding the dynamics of social movements and their networks in transnational settings.

**Processes in Transnational Settings**

Once social movements participate in political arenas on differing scales (i.e., local, national, international), movements inevitably transform themselves and their organizational structures, collective identities, repertoire of protest, and framing of issues. Research on transnational social movements has identified at least four processes that constitute transnationalization. These processes include diffusion, domestication, externalization, and transnational collective action (Della Porta and Tarrow 2005).

**Diffusion.** As defined by Della Porta and Tarrow (2005: 3), diffusion refers to the proliferation of ideas and practices across national boundaries brought about by technological innovations such as the Internet and traveling internationally. Diffusion does not necessitate direct connections across borders since social movements in one
country only take on or modify the organizational setup, collective action frames, or targets of those social movements in other countries.

**Domestication.** Domestication (or internalization) refers to the process of transnationalization by bringing issues from other countries into the domestic arena (Della Porta and Tarrow 2005: 4). In short, social movements in one country play out the issues and conflicts that originate outside the domestic territory. A good example would be protests aimed at international organizations, such as European Union institutions, being carried out in individual countries (Imig and Tarrow 2001, 1999).

**Externalization.** Externalization refers to the process of transnationalization by bringing in transnational institutions to arbitrate in domestic problems or conflicts (Della Porta and Tarrow 2005: 5). This insider-outsider coalition is more likely to occur when: (a) channels in resolving conflicts between domestic groups and their governments are blocked or hampered; (b) activists across borders actively promote networks in furthering their campaigns; and, (c) conferences and other intellectual interactions form and strengthen existing network, or create new ones (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 12).

**Transnational collective action.** Finally, transnational collective action refers to “coordinated international campaigns by networks of activists against international actors, other states, or international institutions” (Della Porta and Tarrow 2005: 7). Details of this type are discussed in the next section.

**Forms of Engagement**

How do domestic social movements participate in transnational settings? According to Khagram et al. (2002), there are at least three types of transnational collective action by which social movements deal with transnational arenas, namely, TANs, transnational coalitions, and transnational social movements. These types are
not mutually exclusive, but they are situated in ascending order in terms of the extent of engagement and coordination for transnational collective action (Khagram et al. 2002:6).

**Transnational advocacy networks (TANs).** TANs are the most informal configuration of non-state actors. A network is a group of actors who are bound together by shared values, exchanges of information and services, and articulations of common discourses, despite their location across national boundaries (Keck and Sikkink 1998). Most TANs are based on informal contacts such as friendships and kinship, among others. Other networks are more formal such as those based on occupation or organizational affiliations. The main activity of TANs is to share information, and not to be involved in a sustained manner in coalition-building or mobilization of large constituencies (Khagram et al. 2002: 7).

**Transnational coalitions.** On the other hand, transnational coalitions are more consolidated in terms of coordination and mobilization than TANs. Transnational coalitions are groups of actors linked across country boundaries whose main activity is to share strategies or tactics to bring about social change (Khagram et al. 2002: 7). These transnational campaigns require a formal level of contract that would allow groups of actors to actually meet and agree upon tactics and strategies in implementing campaigns and reporting to each other on the campaign progress. Similar to domestic social movements, transnational coalitions can also use protest tactics such as boycotts and sit-ins, institutional tactics such as letter-writing or lobbying, or both (Tarrow 1995; Meyer and Tarrow 1998).
Transnational social movements. Finally, transnational social movements are defined as groups of social actors who conduct joint social mobilization in more than one country to bring about social change (Khagram et al. 2002). Compared to both transnational networks and coalitions, transnational social movements promote collective action through the use of protest or disruptive action. This definition corresponds to the definitions that characterize domestic social movements, and their use of disruptive action in their mobilization (see Rucht 1996; Tarrow 1998).

In whatever forms they may appear, social movements have an important role in influencing social change in transnational settings. Transnational social movements can also play an important role in “countering cultural homogenization” brought about by globalization, and in recovering “damaged peace cultures in every country” (Smith et al. 1997: ix). They can also propagate relationships with members of intergovernmental organizations at the international, in order to advance their causes, specifically when they are being stalled at the national level (see Smith et al. 1997:42). Such action by transnational social movements can further erode the credibility and legitimacy of the state, especially authoritarian states (see Kriesberg 1997:4).

Transnational Advocacy Networks (TAN)

In this section, I focus the discussion on TANs formed by transnational social movements. I define TANs by exploring the political spaces in which they are formed and sustained to influence nation-states to change their behavior or policies. I then discuss transnational networks in general, and highlight relationships between TANs and the state.

Definitions. While there is a vast literature on global governance and international relations studying transnational networks of various sorts (e.g. Keck and Sikkink 1998;
Newell 2000; Risse-Kappen 1995; Wapner 1996), in this review I focus on TANs. Other approaches include the “epistemic community” and “world civic society.” The epistemic community approach looks at transnational networks as groups of experts with a common understanding of the significance of disseminating factual and consensual knowledge in fostering policy learning (see Haas 1990). The epistemic community perspective is similar to that concerning TANs as regards the role of information exchange among network members in order to favorably transform the behavior of nation-states. The main difference is that only a focus on TANs acknowledges the political undercurrents surrounding information sharing among network participants (see Betsill and Bulkeley 2004; Hudson 2001). On the other hand, the global civil society approach moves the discussion away from the realm of nation-states, and suggests that global governance mainly happens through “systems of rules” which represent the combined manners by which “individuals, institutions, public and private, manage their common affairs” (O’Brien et al. 2000: 9). Unlike the TAN approach, the global civil society approach views the state as peripheral to the ensuing international regimes.

The pioneering work of Keck and Sikkink (1998:2) highlights the innovative ability of non-traditional international actors to mobilize and exchange information “to persuade, pressure and gain leverage over much more powerful organizations and governments.” By TANs, they mean either of two things. First, TANs refer to social actors who share values and discourses, and exchange information and services internationally in pursuit of specific issues (such as human rights, women’s rights, and the environment). And second, TANs refer to political spaces that allow differently situated actors operating from various institutional and value perspectives to negotiate
(formally or informally) the meanings and mechanics of their joint enterprise. The fundamental leverage of TANs comes from their global reach in spreading basic norms about human rights, including rights to healthy environments. Such global reach is viewed as a means of supporting local struggles, since these TANs have the ability to transmit information, invoke norms, and shift political venues in a global arena (Evans, 2000).

Wu (2005) interrogates Keck and Sikkink’s (1998) framework in analyzing the rise of TANs working on environmental and health issues in China. She asserts that the literature on TANs has been theoretically biased toward contentious politics as the context for the emergence of TANs. Using the case of China, Wu proposes the notion of double-mobilization “to capture the gradual, consensual and sustainable aspect of transnational activism” (Wu 2005:40) which is not captured in the literature of contentious politics.

Participants. One of the major participants of TANs includes nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), which usually occupy the role of supporting social movements, often in the form of SMOs, including transnational SMOs. SMOs are rooted at the local and national level, where groups change the framing of domestic political conflicts to allow them to simultaneously deal with governments on various levels, as part of a strategy for pursuing their contentions transnationally (Della Porta and Tarrow 2005). Consequently, SMOs in TANs operate in multiple political spaces.

Political spaces. Political spaces are constituted by specific types of politics, classified by Keck and Sikkink (1998) into four types: information politics, symbolic politics, leverage politics, and accountability politics. Information politics refers to the
exchange of information among network members which is not normally available in mainstream channels. Symbolic politics is defined as the framing of issues and events that act as a catalyst for the expansion and growth of the constituencies of the network. Leverage politics refers to the strategies used by networks to gain influence over target actors such as governments, financial organizations, and private sector firms (particularly transnational corporations), among others. And finally, accountability politics refers to the use of the public commitments and mandates of these target actors to make them change their positions and policies on the issues at hand. The influence of these transnational networks is measured according to goal achievement based on issues and agenda creation, influence on discursive positions, influence on institutional procedures, influence on policy change, and influence on state behavior (Keck and Sikkink 1998:25). I note here that this analytical framework only considers social movement tactics that occur during emergence, recruitment and elaboration; it lacks a discussion of the decline of transnational advocacy networks.

**Issues.** NGOs in TANs endeavor to promote the interests of their constituencies, and often encounter various issues related to having recognition in the international system. For example, developmental NGOs from the global North, such as Oxfam, Christian Aid and World Vision, are often challenged concerning their legitimacy, representation and accountability (Hudson 2001). What right do international NGOs have in contributing to global governance? Who do they represent? How are they accountable to those they claim to be representing? While NGOs face these challenges, Hudson (2001) argues that NGOs need to improve their relationships to the
constituencies they claim to represent, bearing in mind that “relationships are the building blocks of networks and are key to their effectiveness” (Hudson 2001:332).

Furthermore, Keck and Sikkink (1998: 121) assert that:

Because TANs normally involve people and organizations in structurally unequal positions, networks can become sites for negotiating over which goods, strategies, and ethical understandings are compatible.

This power differential among member NGOs in TANs can also be observed between NGOs from the global North and global South, wherein North-South dynamics are extended and reflected even among NGO activists within the TAN (Nelson 2002). These relationships among TANs and NGOs are seats of power relationships manifested in terms of access to and control over resources and information being shared among network members (Jordan and Tuijl 2000).

In fact, those members who hold key resources and information are the ones who can link together networks, and thus become the focal point of power relationships within TANs (Collins 1988). To illustrate how key persons affect power relationships in a network, Collins (1988:436) further classifies network relationships in terms of “positively connected networks” versus “negatively connected networks.” Positively connected networks are open networks “where A deals with B and C” while B and C can also access each other (Collins 1988:436). Negatively connected networks, on the other hand, are closed networks “where A can deal with both B and C” but B and C are unable to access each other.

**Relation to state.** TANs center on nation-states as a key locus of governance (Betsill and Bulkeley 2004: 475). This means that the influence and effectiveness of TANs are measured in terms of how TAN are able to shape and facilitate change in the behavior of the nation-states toward TAN objectives (see Auer 2000; Litfin 1993;
Rosenau 2000). As a perspective, some scholars focus on TANs by assuming a unitary state as either a participant in the network or the object of its advocacy activities (Betsill and Bulkeley 2004: 476). Other authors point out the limits of this view of the state, which should be seen not as unitary, but as “a complex process within an international context of contending and cooperating associations” (Smith et al. 1997: ix).

**Identifying Gaps in Research**

In the light of this review, I identified three gaps in the TANs literature. First, there has been limited emphasis devoted to the decline of TANs. The ongoing discussion on TANs centers on emergence and dynamics, and not much on decline or collapse. How does a loosely connected network such as a TAN disintegrate? What are some factors that contribute to the decline of TANs?

Second, directly related to the first gap, there remain inadequate explanations as to how TAN partners go forward after a TAN declines. What happens to the network partners when TANs collapse? Are there abeyance structures to absorb the resulting surplus of “unattached” activists?

And third, there has been limited attention to TANs emanating from the global South. How do TANs initiated in the global South emerge and develop to gain access to the international system? Do they need to link with other NGOs in the global North to be successful in participating in the international system?

In this research, I seek to complement both the social movement and TAN literatures by responding to these three gaps. Using as a case study the TAN that emerged from protests against toxic contamination in former US military bases in the Philippines, I emphasize how it emerges, recruits, expands and then declines. I also highlight how domestic and external partners react and adapt to such a decline. In the
process, I provide an account of social movement rise and decline, emphasizing the formation of a TAN in the process, using a study case featuring a collective action that originated in a developing country.
CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY

This research develops an in-depth case study on a transnational advocacy network (TAN) surrounding an environmental cleanup campaign. My goal with this case study is to address the three gaps identified in the literature review in the previous chapter. I take up the case of a local environmental campaign in the Philippines that the People’s Task Force for Bases Cleanup (PTFBC) started, and which was then transformed into a TAN by linking with US-based individuals and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), particularly the Filipino American Coalition for Environmental Solidarity (FACES). However, at the peak of its campaign, the TAN experienced political pressures and internal discord that subsequently led it into abeyance.

Overview of the Chapter

To illustrate the research methodology, I focus on three tasks in this chapter. First, I define my research questions to provide a clear vision of what I would like to accomplish in this research. Second, I discuss the theoretical and methodological underpinnings that informed the strategic decisions I made in using qualitative research methodology in general, and case study design in particular. Lastly, I describe the data collection and analysis processes and discuss some ethical issues I have encountered during the research.

Research Questions

In order to capture the complexities of this case, I pose four questions based on the preceding literature review. The first two questions are informed by the review of the
Social Movements literature which deals mainly with the emergence and development of TANs, while the last two emanated from the gaps identified from such literature.

First, how does a local advocacy network on environmental issues emerge? More specifically, I sought to document how PTFBC organized its advocacy at the local level. I also discussed how PTFBC used the grievance and victimization frames as seeds for its mobilization. I pursue an analysis of the emergence of the PTFBC in Chapter 4.

Second, how does a local advocacy network become transnational? In addressing this question, I examined how PTFBC established a TAN via outside contacts (i.e., individuals and organizations, notably including FACES). In the process, the PTFBC aligned its goals and activities with its external partners to gain financial and other forms of support for its campaign. Chapter 5 presents an analysis of the transnationalization of the PTFBC via its alliance with FACES.

Third, how does a TAN enter a period of decline? What are the factors that lead to such decline? These questions address the gap in attention to the decline of social movements and TANs in prior social movements research. I analyze both the external and internal factors leading to the organizational rift within the TAN, and between the PTFBC and FACES, and the decline in the campaign itself. The analysis of the rift among organizations in my study case appears in Chapter 6.

The fourth and final research question is, how do partners adjust to the decline of the TAN? This question also addresses the gap in previous attention to the decline of social movements, by focusing on how specific partners respond by adjusting their goals and tactics. Specifically, I explore how both PTFBC and FACES addressed the decline itself and re-examined their strategies in pushing forward their own goals and
activities in lieu of the former TAN. Chapter 7 provides an analysis in response to the fourth and final question.

**Qualitative Research Methodology**

These four research questions necessitate the use of a qualitative research methodology. In general, qualitative research methodology traverses various disciplines and topics as a wide-ranging label assigned to various forms of social inquiry that aim to build in-depth knowledge and elaboration of concepts (Creswell 1998; Denzin and Lincoln 2000; Ragin 1994). It sees reality as constructed by “individual definitions of the situation” (Firestone 1987:16) as it unearths deeper meanings and textures of the lived experiences among a small number of people, using largely non-numeric data in the form of words (Creswell 1998). The strength of qualitative research lies primarily in its interpretive understanding of human experiences to provide vivid illustrations of the social phenomena being studied (Bernard 2000; Creswell 2003). This ability of qualitative research to analyze “actual practice in situ” offers an analytic focus mainly on “how people do things” (Silverman 1998:3). Such understanding is mainly facilitated by various interpretive paradigms that clarify the boundaries of any inquiry (Denzin and Lincoln 2000; Guba and Lincoln 2005).

Qualitative researchers collect data directly from naturalistic settings. Naturalistic settings refer to social contexts where the reality being studied is generated and reproduced (Lincoln and Guba 1985). This commitment sensitizes qualitative researchers to engage with both the local situations of their research participants and the larger milieu surrounding the phenomenon being studied (Creswell 1998). This makes researchers more proactive and responsive to unforeseen challenges that may occur during the study (Emerson et al. 1995; Fine et al. 2000).
Qualitative research is useful in studying a limited number of cases in great depth, in contrast to quantitative research which can analyze numerous cases using sophisticated statistical methods (Creswell 2003). As such, qualitative research is able to generate more information from small samples (Bernard 2000), describe and understand people’s personal experiences and stories (Gubrium and Holstein 2009), and provide rich details and subtle nuances concerning the complexity of social phenomena (Denzin and Lincoln 2000).

**Standards of Good Qualitative Research**

The challenge in qualitative research arises from the need for evaluation in terms of validity and reliability. Reliability is defined as the replicability of the research, while validity refers to the accuracy or authenticity of the study based on available evidence (Altheide and Johnson 1994; Kvale 1995; Maxwell 1992). These epistemic criteria in social research are achieved in qualitative research using appropriate standards of evaluation (Burns 1989).

Good craftsmanship in qualitative research depends on two critical factors, namely, the strength of the methods and the integrity of the researcher (see Kvale 1995). With these in mind, I use four evaluative standards of good qualitative research. For one, dependability is a standard of qualitative research which is analogous to reliability, and is achieved by conscientiously documenting the procedures and logic used in generating and interpreting data (Kirk and Miller 1986; Whittemore et.al. 2001). Added to that, I also strived to attain reliability by systematically transcribing the data (see Silverman 1998) and by organizing a chain of evidence that demonstrates the logic of research (see Yin 2003).
A second criterion is credibility, which refers to the conscious effort to assure the fit between the respondents’ views and their actual representations in the research (see Carboni 1995; Whittemore et al. 2001). I accomplished this standard by seeking out and presenting a multi-vocal perspective on the subject matter as expressed by various different respondents (Charmaz 2008; Lincoln 1995). Being reflexive about my position in the research process also helped me recognize my role in the ongoing construction of knowledge in this research (see Lincoln 1995).

Transferability is the third criterion, which deals with the issue of generalization and requires the researcher to provide readers with a sufficient amount of information about the case being studied so that the readers are able to connect the research findings to other similar cases (Leininger 1994; Whittemore et al. 2001). I achieved this standard by using the method of constant comparison in data analysis, wherein I contrasted my findings with the available literature (see Glaser and Strauss 1967).

Finally, confirmability calls for linking assertions, findings, and interpretations to the data themselves (see Kirk and Miller 1986; Lincoln and Guba 2000; Silverman 1993). This I have accomplished by maintaining the chain of evidence, as well as going through the iterative process of grounded theory as a coding technique for data analysis.

**Interpretive Paradigm**

To further ensure quality in data analysis, I anchored the interpretive paradigm of this research in social constructionism, given the nature of the research questions. This tactic of following the lead of research questions guarantees that the choice of paradigm would not stifle the ongoing iterative and creative process of research (Atkinson 1995; Stew 1996).
Social constructionism outlines the processes by which social reality is brought into meaningful existence (Gubrium and Holstein 2008). Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann in their pioneering work on “The Social Construction of Reality” (1967) provided the basic ontological and epistemological foundations of social constructionism. They asserted that people create an intersubjective world that is communicated through the reality of everyday life. Such intersubjectivity allows people to create their own understanding of events, and be engaged simultaneously in the “ongoing correspondence” between their interpretations and those shared with others (Berger and Luckmann 1967:23).

This constructionist perspective helped define the process by which I pieced together various lived experiences and meanings articulated by the research participants. I focused on how meanings are produced and practiced through social interactions across time and space (see Creswell 2007; Guba and Lincoln 2005). More specifically, I focused on the spatial-temporal processes involved in the emergence, transformation and decline of the TAN surrounding the toxic cleanup campaign in the former US bases in the Philippines. Having a constructionist project, I viewed the reality surrounding this cleanup campaign as a locus of claims, contestations and compromise over some putative conditions surrounding the TAN, without prejudice to the truthfulness of these claims. In fact, I argue that a constructionist perspective is crucial for understanding claims-making because such a perspective highlights the interpretations involved in the process of making and contesting and otherwise negotiating claims.
My decision to engage environmental issues as a locus for claims-making and negotiation is not new to the field of environmental sociology, or in the study of environmental social movements. Many researchers have already ventured into understanding the social bases of environmental social movements and the framing of environmental issues (e.g., Cable et al. 2002; Capek 1993; Taylor 2000). Viewed from a social constructionist perspective, environmental problems are regarded as products of human interaction and collective processes, wherein groups identify and define environmental problems by sharing their own meanings and interpretation (Best 1989; Hannigan 1995; Taylor, 2000).

In contrast to social constructionism, a realist-materialist perspective defines environmental issues as readily identifiable, concrete, and objective conditions (Hannigan 1995; Spector and Kitsuse 1973), and approximates what Buttel (1996:57) refers to as the “materiality of social life.” Materiality, in the environmental sense, pertains to human dependence on natural resources and the biophysical environment for sustenance and growth. Such recognition of materiality in defining environmental problems in turn modifies the social constructionist stance as practiced in environmental sociology. Riley Dunlap (1997:31), a pioneer environmental sociologist, labeled this compromise as “cautious constructionism” (which others refer to as “contextual constructionism,” see Troyer 1992) to describe the contemporary research in American environmental sociology wherein social constructionist projects contextualize an environmental problem to accommodate its material basis. Dunlap (1997) regarded the use of this version as a way to deal with the strong empirical tradition of the field, and still be able to explore the important roles of various social actors (i.e., activists,
scientists, community leaders, policy-makers, also referred to as non-state actors (NSAs in general) in understanding and negotiating environmental issues.

This discussion of cautious constructionism also factored in my decision to clarify the social constructionist stance I took in this research. I recognized that the subject matter of this research involves significantly material and historical components that need to be examined in order to capture the bases of the creation of the TAN in the first place. While Dunlap (1997) critiqued the protracted use of constructionism in environmental sociology, I argue that in this research, cautious constructionism is the most viable option to deal with the materiality of the toxic contamination issues that forms the core of the TAN, while analyzing the competing articulations of TAN members regarding their lived experiences surrounding such environmental issue.

**Case Study Research Design**

Given this epistemological foundation, I opted to use the case study design to organize the data collection and analysis. Case studies involve a research design geared toward an understanding of the “dynamics present within single settings” (Eisenhardt 1989:534). Case study research is said to be ideal when: (a) the inquiry entails how or why questions; (b) the researcher has little control over the phenomenon being studied; (c) the research involves contemporary and real-life contexts; and, (d) the research requires multiple sources of evidence including documents, archives, interviews, direct observation, participant observation, and physical artifacts (Creswell 1998; Yin 2003). The primary aim is to generate knowledge of the particular, and pursue insights regarding issues intrinsic to the case itself (Stake 2005).

The features enumerated above fit the conditions surrounding the present research. A case study design allowed me to analyze the processes and issues
involved in the emergence, transformation, and decline of the TAN on the toxic cleanup campaign in the former US bases in the Philippines. This case study is a single-case, multi-sited, and issue-oriented case study (see Stake 1995; Yin 2003). Since this social phenomenon being studied occurs in a naturalistic setting over which I did not have any control except on matters pertaining to the research design, I needed to use different sources of information, such as archives, interviews, and observations, to capture the real-life situations experienced by the research participants.

I selected this particular case because it possesses unique elements that are instructive to the understanding of the intricate processes involved in the emergence, transformation and decline of a TAN. What is unique about this case is that it is a TAN that had emerged from a less developed country (i.e., the Philippines) and expanded to a developed country (i.e., the USA), which is not very well documented in either the social movements or TAN literature. This case also illustrates how the issues of national identity can complicate the pursuit of environmental agendas in a transnational context. Finally, this case provides valuable insights regarding movement decline or abeyance, which is also less of a focus in the social movement and TAN literatures.

Practically speaking, I chose this case because of its methodological advantages. This research presents a single-case study of the phenomenon of interest, which can be analyzed within a contemporary and real-life context. It involves multiple sources of information (i.e., internet sources, organizational files, and government archives). Finally, there is a sufficient number of available respondents (n=31) who could give in-depth interviews and thereby provide information to answer the research questions.
Procedures of Data Collection and Analysis

In presenting both the data collection and analysis procedures, I intend to demonstrate my prolonged engagement with the data in order to generate a dependable, credible, transferable, and confirmable analysis of the case. I start by discussing in detail the data collection process, and then I outline the procedures of the data analysis. Finally, I identify some ethical and methodological issues I encountered.

Data Sources

This research depended first of all on data from 31 semi-structured face-to-face (27), telephone (3), and internet (1) interviews. The in-depth interviews were complemented by data gathered through extensive archival research using the internet and secondary documents from NGOs to substantiate or supplement the information gathered through interviews. The use of interview and archival data in varying combinations was instructive in answering my research questions. For example, for the first two research questions, I relied largely on organizational documents that chronicled the emergence of both organizations in trying to draw a time line of events. However, I also used interviews to look for more detailed narrations of landmark events and to verify the information from other archival documents including organizational profiles. In contrast, the last two research questions relied mainly on interview transcripts. These interviews were the main source of information on members’ recollections and interpretations of the many events that transpired leading to the decline of the TAN, and the subsequent adjustments of both organizations to this decline and abeyance. Such data were not readily available in the internet archives.
Data Collection

Data collection in case study designs involves a painstakingly iterative and extensive process (Stake 1995; Yin 2003). In this section, I present the data collection techniques I employed throughout the research, and in so doing, narrate my experience as a reflexive researcher.

Internet archives. The internet has become the “most comprehensive electronic archive of written material” (Eysenbach and Till 2001:1103), and scholars increasingly recognize it as an innovative and legitimate site for qualitative data collection (e.g., Broad and Joos 2004). That said, due to the public character of the internet, researchers have to be cautious in checking the credibility of sources and the veracity of information being downloaded (Hine 2005; Jones 2000). Internet research does involve some ethical issues, such as “lurking” (i.e., accessing virtual communities and subscribing to their mailing lists without actual participation in the community) and “harvesting” (i.e., using online material in ways other than what was originally intended by their creators) (see Berry 2004:327).

Since May 2008, I began systematically downloading important documents on the historical background and organizational activities, newsletters, photographs, and other documents from verified websites such as FACES (www.facesolidarity.org), YONIP (www.yonip.com, a website hosting documents from PTFBC), and ARC Ecology (www.arcecology.org, the official website of ARC Ecology as one of the pioneer supporters of the PTFBC campaign). I also began accessing the internet via search engines like Google Scholar (http://scholar.google.com) to acquire additional information about PTFBC and its activities. Examples of search words I used include “Filipino Americans + Environmental Justice,” “Toxic Contamination + US Bases +
Philippines,” “Philippine Task Force for Bases Cleanup,” among others. These search engines yielded an average of 7300 results which were then screened to find documents fit for this research.

These online resources informed my inquiry. They not only oriented me with the toxic campaign issues but also gave me valuable insights on how the TAN had presented its advocacy to reach a larger public through various media. Internet websites also allowed me to connect to the virtual community of FACES by signing up on its mailing list and posting inquiries on its online message board. Through this I was able to contact the current head of FACES and introduce my research plans to her. I continued downloading updates and new materials over a two-year period until May 2010. The total number of documents downloaded was more than 110, totaling more than 1500 pages.

**Other documents and archives.** In addition, I compiled hard copies of documents shared with me by individual participants I met during fieldwork. These materials were not readily accessible online. I had to make copies and scan them into electronic format for easy filing and analysis. This system served me well in establishing a more dependable qualitative database on which I built a chain of evidence for this research. These scanned documents total about 95, containing more than 1000 pages.

I classified these archival documents into four groups (see Appendix A for the list of archival documents used in this research). The first group comprised organizational documents I gathered from both FACES and PTFBC, such as organization profile, list of members, and photographs, which allowed me to deepen my understanding of the historical background and activities of these organizations. The second group included
state documents from government agencies such as court documents, Philippine Congress hearings on US bases, and the US General Accounting Office (GAO) report on toxic contamination in US bases. The third group consisted of media documents which were mainly news clips written by journalists and reporters, and published in newspapers and the internet. Sample newspapers include the Philippine Daily Inquirer (www.inq7.com) and Philippine Star (www.philstar.com). Finally, the fourth group contained previous technical documents by Woodward Clyde, ARC Ecology, and the International Institute of Concern for Public Health (IICPH); such documents reported research on the toxic contamination of former US military bases in the Philippines.

**Preparing the informed consent.** Institutional Review Boards (IRB) are ethics committees requiring compliance with federal laws to protect human subjects from harm and deception, ensure informed consent regarding all human research procedures, and avoid breaches of confidentiality and anonymity (Lincoln and Tiernney 2004). These federal regulations, however, do not guarantee that researchers are immune from the power of subpoena (Emerson 1981). Thus, in the informed consent, I had to assure my participants that I would never inquire about subject matters that may put them at risk with the US government (refer to Appendix B).

I recognize that the task of protecting the subjects, which the IRB ideally pursues as its primary goal, is enmeshed with the nature of the relationship between the researcher and the researched (e.g., Irwin 2006). While some people find the IRB protocol to be intrusive to their research and only there to protect the institutions from being liable to the failures of the researcher (see Lincoln and Tiernney 2004), I argue that this do-no-harm principle should also be applied to me as a researcher. I should
also come out of this research process unscathed by the inevitable interaction with participants, especially in highly contentious situations such as those I seek to document in this research.

I therefore submitted two IRB protocols each, for the Philippine and the US fieldwork. Both protocols contained similar sets of questions and methods. I provided a Filipino translation of the informed consent for the local Filipino respondents, to guarantee that they would be able to understand the content and intent of my research. In retrospect, such translation helped me in various ways. First, while informed consent is usually regarded as only a formality (Emerson 1981), it nonetheless formalized the introduction of myself and my research, and facilitated the recruiting of participants (e.g., “She told me, ‘there is a person going around asking questions… have you been interviewed yet?’ I said not yet… Oh, so, it was you.” Interviewee 5).

Likewise, the informed consent helped me delineate my position as a researcher during interviews. While some of my respondents hinted that I might be able to help them, I was able to point out clearly and respectfully that I was just a mere graduate student trying to understand the subject matter at hand, and it would be helpful if I remained that way throughout the research. Being reflexive about my position as a researcher at all times made me clearly demarcate the boundaries between my desire as an advocate and my responsibility as a researcher. This was not easy, but I managed by focusing on the research protocol with my participants.

Finally, the protocol protected me from becoming entangled with intense interpersonal conflicts expressed during fieldwork and in interview sessions. When necessary, I used the protocol to remind myself and the research participants of the
central issues that needed to be addressed. This way I was able to maintain my position as a non-partisan in asking questions about and being present in contentious situations during fieldwork. In turn, this helped me connect with different parties to conflicts without fear of getting involved or being perceived as a partisan.

**Recruiting participants.** I recruited my research participants in two ways, namely, through computer-mediated communication and personal meetings. Computer-mediated communication involved communicating my research intention to key persons through the internet either as electronic mails or discussions (see Mann and Stewart 2000). For example, through the FACES website’s message board, I was able to send electronic mails to the head of FACES as early as April 2009 stating my intention to do research with FACES.

Using the internet, I tracked former Board of Directors members of both PTFBC and FACES by using their names in search engines. This yielded a list of electronic and physical addresses of their recent NGO affiliations. I then sent them electronic messages introducing myself and my research. Although some of the listed personal electronic addresses were no longer functional, I was still able to use the physical addresses in locating them, especially during my fieldwork in the Philippines. This technique yielded five additional participants.

Moreover, I used virtual social networks such as Facebook ([www.facebook.com](http://www.facebook.com)) and LinkedIn ([www.linkedin.com](http://www.linkedin.com)) in locating participants in the US. I sent short messages explaining my purpose. I also attached the Informed Consent and my own account information to show the authenticity of my identity on the internet. In my experience, Facebook had a better turnout in generating responses from would-be
participants (i.e., 4 out of 8 for Facebook and 0 out of 4 for LinkedIn). These messages prompted the recipients to contact other key persons in FACES through electronic mails to verify the authenticity of my invitation. For example, one of the recipients included me in a series of electronic exchanges leading to at least four commitments for interviews prior to my fieldwork in San Francisco. These online social networks ultimately produced 6 additional participants.

The final mechanism I used in recruiting potential participants was through face-to-face meetings. During fieldwork in the Philippines and the US, I was able to meet with potential participants through the help of other recruits. For example, in the Philippines, the coordinator of FACES forwarded to me the contact information of a PTFBC community organizer, who then accompanied me in the community and facilitated the recruitment of the mothers of the victims of military base pollution. Two other meetings occurred in San Francisco. This technique by far was the most effective, resulting in 20 participants.

**Sampling techniques.** The qualitative sampling I employed in this research was generally purposive. In the first part of the research, I used snowball sampling to generate respondents, especially during the Philippine fieldwork. Snowball sampling refers to the method of locating key respondents and asking them to identify other possible participants. This technique applied well in the TAN because snowball sampling takes advantage of network ties, especially in difficult-to-find populations (see Bernard 2000:179-180).

The second sampling technique I used was informed by the concept of theoretical sampling. Theoretical sampling refers to the process of simultaneous collection, coding,
and analysis of data that informs the researcher “what data to collect next and where to find them, in order to develop his theory as it emerges” (Glaser and Strauss 1967:105). Thus, while concurrently coding and analyzing the interviews I did in the Philippines, I identified some theoretical leads for follow-up. For example, one path of inquiry required me to look at how founding members of both FACES and PTFBC view the events surrounding the decline of this cleanup campaign. Thus, I sought additional PTFBC Board of Directors and FACES members. Another path also led me to seek out the lawyer who represented the victims and other parties in the lawsuits filed against the Philippine and US governments. In my analysis, it turned out that these lawsuits were critical turning points in the life of the campaign.

**Entering the field.** While this research was not particularly ethnographic, I deemed it important to visit the two main places where most of my participants live and where most of the events surrounding the TAN occurred. Fieldwork in this sense subscribes to Goffman’s (1989:124) idea of “getting into place.” In getting in, my main task was to achieve a deeper sense of familiarity with participants’ conditions, to provide contextual details of the case study (see Emerson 1981).

In June 2009, I visited the Madapdap Resettlement Center in Mabalacat, Pampanga, Philippines, which became the main relocation site for the victims of the Mt. Pinatubo eruption in 1991. Also known as Sitio Madapdap, this area currently houses some of the local community members of PTFBC who survived the exposure to toxic contamination in former US military bases in Clark, Pampanga.

While in the area, I visited 18 community members in their homes. These members were mostly mothers and grandmothers whose ages ranged from 32 to 65
years old. They were mainly the caregivers of their victim-children. These home visits were facilitated by a former community organizer of PTFBC who was referred to me by the Philippine coordinator of FACES. Their extended families live in small single-story row houses with lots ranging from 25 to 45 m² in area (see Figure 3-1). While the conditions of these families suggested poverty, Sitio Madapdap is in fact a thriving community bustling with small businesses and infrastructure that are not characteristic of a normal “sitio” (i.e., a small community within a barangay, the smallest political unit in the Philippines). This impression is best described in my field notes when I first arrived in the area:

On board the jeepney, I was imagining the area to be far, secluded and rural, just like any sitios I have visited in the past. When the jeepney pulled over at a small terminal, I looked around the community and was impressed by how it was relatively more progressive than what I had imagined. Going around the community, I saw elementary and high schools. The roads are concrete, and the public transportation is regular and efficient. There are pawnshops, which are usually a good indicator of relative economic abundance in a community. There are small businesses on almost every corner, ranging from eateries to meat shops to small banks. There are at least 2 clinics in the community. This is far from what a common sitio looks like, much farther from the images I have for the lahar-ravaged areas in the 1990s. (Field notes 1, June 2009)

Moreover, I learned that some of the community members had already sold their houses to private individuals who combined two to three lots to build larger houses that usually line the main streets of the sitio. The presence of these beautiful houses gives the sitio a façade of economic progress, while the other end of the area contains dilapidated row houses, where some of my research participants live. I was able to interview virtually all of the local PTFBC members who have managed to remain in the area.
While in the Philippines, I was also able to visit two former members of PTFBC’s Board of Directors (BOD) in their respective offices, which are all located in Quezon City, about 81 kilometers (50 miles) from Sitio Madapdap. One BOD member was connected to Greenpeace Southeast Asia, while the other worked at Focus on the Global South. Both NGOs are international. In addition, I was able to visit the current office of PTFBC, which is in a private residence in Quezon City.

From a Third World sitio to a First World city, my second stint of fieldwork involved a visit to San Francisco, California in July 2010. San Francisco is home to thousands of Filipino immigrants and Filipino Americans who intermingle with an ethnically diverse population. Historically speaking, San Francisco has also witnessed some of the country’s most dramatic urban social movements across race/ethnicity, gender and sexuality, and environmental issues.

Due to its efficient public transportation system, navigating through San Francisco was never a problem for me as a stranger in the city. I was able to find my way to various locations where I met my research participants. For example, using Google maps (maps.google.com), I was able to locate ARC Ecolog, which became the unofficial host during my stay in San Francisco. The staff generously gave me access to their facilities and documents on FACES. Coincidentally, two of their officers were pioneer members of FACES. Thus, I gained access to some exclusive information not available online. Like PTFBC in the Philippines, FACES was lodged in a private residence. FACES used to have a physical office, but let it go due to cost cutting. Besides, FACES has no permanent paid staff because membership is voluntary and the budget largely depends on grants and donations.
Five days into my stay in San Francisco, I was becoming frustrated by the low turnout of responses from potential participants. Later in an interview, a FACES member explained that this was due to the fact that there is no existing campaign in FACES on the cleanup issue, thus the lack of enthusiasm among the members. Those who are currently active in FACES have not been involved in the cleanup campaign, and those who used to be involved in the campaign are not active. Furthermore, some potential participants had very hectic schedules to sit in a two-hour face-to-face interview. Such difficulty compelled me to change my strategy from face-to-face interviews to phone and electronic interviews to accommodate more participants. Thus, I interviewed the last set of participants using either phone or the internet.

**Conducting in-depth interviews.** Interviews are a widely used method of creating field texts (Mishler 1986). A qualitative interview differs from conversation in that it is not primarily a spontaneous exchange of ideas, but is planned and conducted with structure and purpose (Rubin and Rubin 1995). Qualitative interviewing, in general, is an interpretive process of finding out what others feel and think about their existence, without imposing the interviewer’s preconceived notions and categories (Patton 1980:196). It involves the process of meaning-making, not only of the respondent but also of the interviewer, as both engage in the active construction and understanding of the meanings of their interview encounter (Holstein and Gubrium 1995).

The interview logic that I used in this research followed the active interview as explained by Holstein and Gubrium (1995). I viewed the interview process as co-construction of meanings with my respondents, a perspective that allowed me to interview my participants while being reflexive about my own position as co-narrator and
interpreter of their stories. The use of semi-structured interviews, however, was important in constituting a uniform base of information from each participant to contextualize the understanding of the multidimensionality of their experiences and participation in the campaign activities. Thus, I prepared interview guides.

The initial interview guide included four open-ended questions: (a) Please tell me about yourself; (b) Please tell me about your experiences before, during, and after the operations of the US military base in your area; (c) What were the issues or problems (if relevant) that you knew existed during and after the US military base operations in your area?; and, (d) How do you assess your life now in the community? As I added more participants in the research, I expanded on these questions to suit the experiences of the community organizers, PTFBC’s Board of Directors, FACES members and other key-respondents (see Appendix C). I used these follow-up questions to clarify details on the history, activities, issues, and status of both PTFBC and FACES, and to solicit their opinions on the issues surrounding the dynamics of the toxic cleanup campaign.

Furthermore, I used three types of interviews, namely face-to-face, telephone, and electronic or internet interviews. During face-to-face interviews, I first introduced myself and my research purpose to the respondents. Then I handed them the informed consent for their reading. Once the respondents verbally agreed, I asked them to sign the consent, and began the interview sessions. These face-to-face interviews lasted between 45 minutes to 2 hours as approved in the protocol.

In using telephone interviews, I either sent electronically the informed consent to the participants or read it out loud over the phone prior to the interview. After getting a written or verbal confirmation from the respondents, I then began the interview session.
These phone interviews lasted between 35 minutes to 1 hour. Together, these interview sessions resulted in a total of 35 hours of recordings.

To accommodate some key respondents, I used electronic or internet interviewing. Although somewhat unorthodox, internet interviewing has been increasingly recognized in qualitative research as a valid way to conduct interviews (see Mann and Stewart 2000). Using this technique, I first sent the protocol to the potential participants. Once they signified consent through email, I then sent them the interview questions. These electronic exchanges continued as I requested clarifications of their responses.

The research participants were mostly women (25 to 6 males), with ages ranging from 28 and 65 years old. In terms of their position and participation in the campaign, these respondents can be grouped into: (a) victims’ mothers and grandmothers (18); (b) PTFBC Board of Directors and staff (5); (c) FACES members and advisors (6); and, (d) a technical assistant and legal representative (2). While the number of actual research participants from FACES was smaller than what I proposed (i.e., 10 to 15), I was nonetheless able to get the crucial key-informants as far as the toxic cleanup campaign is concerned. Of these six FACES members, three were pioneer members who helped establish FACES. Two of these respondents had served in the US Working Group for Philippine Bases Cleanup that supported the PTFBC during its formation. Two of them worked as staff and volunteers of PTFBC. Furthermore, these respondents were the “recognized spokespersons” of FACES on matters concerning the involvement of FACES in the cleanup campaign. To illustrate, one response I received when I attempted to recruit newer FACES members was:

I won’t be your best source since I’m newer on the FACES board and more familiar with the Chevron oil depot struggle than our previous base cleanup
Given the theoretical sampling that informed the recruitment of my participants, I was more interested in the information I could get from key respondents rather than the number of respondents per se. For the purpose of this dissertation, I cut off data gathering by October 31, 2010.

**Transcribing interviews.** As transcription is an essential process of qualitative analysis (Lapadat and Lindsay 1999), I include details on the transcription process to maintain transparency in my reporting. To start, I recorded these interviews using a digital audio recorder and uploaded them into digital audio files to facilitate transcription. In the interest of time management, I asked a native Filipino speaker to help me transcribe the Philippine interviews (18). I personally transcribed 10 of the remaining interviews taken while three were not transcribed to save time. I specifically asked that the transcripts be in the language actually used in the interview (i.e., Filipino or English or both; since some respondents used both). In the final write-up, I only translated those segments that I used as quotations in support of my arguments.

After transcription, I listened to the audio files to check the accuracy of the transcription. Specifically, the transcription was orthographic (i.e., verbatim), including repetitions (e.g., ano ano), false starts (e.g., ano nga iyon), and hesitations (e.g., hmm). I also included in the transcripts the questions I actually asked. Background noises as well as intonations, pauses and emotions were not included or noted in the transcripts.

I coded the names of persons and places in the final transcripts. I kept a master list of all codes. While some respondents allowed me to use their actual names, I decided to use pseudonyms given some controversial issues surrounding this research.
I also avoided mentioning any signifiers, to maintain anonymity, given familiarity among the respondents. This transcription process generated a total of 600 double-spaced pages.

**Procedures of Data Analysis**

Data analysis in case study research can either be holistic (i.e., analysis of the entire case) or embedded (i.e., analysis of a specific aspect of the case) (see Yin 2003). In this case, I opted for an embedded analysis of the emergence, transformation and decline of the toxic cleanup campaign in the former US bases in the Philippines. This is because I focus especially on NSAs, including conflicts among them, within the TAN in the study case. My analytic objectives included: (a) providing a contextual description of the case (see Merriam 1998); (b) narrating the study by presenting a chronology of major events; (c) analyzing the emerging themes and issues in the development and rift among members of the TAN (see Stake 1995); and (d) reporting the lessons learned from the case (see Creswell 1998).

**Establishing a chain of evidence.** One of the most important tasks in case study research is to maintain a chain of evidence. This is critical in establishing the credibility and accountability of the researcher, and in setting up an auditing trail for external evaluators, in my case, the dissertation committee (see Stake 1995). In order to achieve this, I have created a case study database wherein I compiled and organized the various sources of information I used in this research. I kept a master list of all documents to facilitate the tracing back of evidences presented in this manuscript (see Appendix A).

In writing the dissertation, I maintained a “draft version” of each of the substantive chapters where I marked all the arguments and evidences I provided in the final version.
I used a labeling system which aids me in locating the source of information in the database. For example, I used the following system “<evidence/argument#>/<document code>/<page#>” to signify that evidence 1 <img-7281544-0001/001/20> means that I used the document “img-7281544-0001” (A Survey of Environmental Restoration Activities at Overseas US Military Bases, p. 1) in support of evidence 1.

**Using MAXQDA.** Given the bulk of data I accumulated, I decided to use MAXQDA as software for analysis. MAXQDA is a computer-assisted qualitative data analysis developed by Verbi GmbH which features an efficient coding and memo-writing system. MAXQDA also has the ability to deal with a large volume of both qualitative and quantitative data (see [www.maxqda.com](http://www.maxqda.com)).

In general, Qualitative Document Analysis (QDA) is a method that emerged from conventional content analysis (see Altheide et al. 2008). Unlike content analysis, QDA goes beyond counting words and phrases, and seeks to unearth subtle concepts, symbols, images, and relationships that are embedded in the texts. QDA works very well with grounded theory methods.

Prior to coding, I converted all transcripts and documents to rich text format (RTF) as this is one of the acceptable formats used in MAXQDA. I uploaded these documents to the case study database I created for MAXQDA, and proceeded to organize these sources. Using MAXQDA, I was able to juxtapose both the documents and transcripts in the database, which allowed me to code them separately but at the same time trace coded words or passages back to their original sources. MAXQDA provides a codebook as an embedded feature for easy reference.
**Coding procedure.** This research borrowed its coding procedure from grounded theory methods to analyze both the interview transcripts and the archival documents. Grounded theory refers to a set of rigorous procedures that aims to discover a theory that is closely related to a particular social phenomenon (Glaser and Strauss 1967). Unlike grand theory, Glaser and Strauss (1967) argued that this theory must be “grounded” in the data collected from the actions, interactions, and social processes. This theory can also assume the form of a narrative statement (Strauss and Corbin 1990), or a series of theoretical propositions (Creswell and Brown 1992). The result of data collection and analysis in grounded theory research is a substantive theory that should be subjected to further empirical testing although the study per se may conclude that the generation of such theory is also a legitimate outcome of the study (Charmaz 2008). In this dissertation, I did not aim necessarily to generate a substantive theory but to achieve a level of theorizing that can help analyze the processes involved in the emergence, transformation, and decline of a TAN.

To achieve this, I adopted the coding procedure described by Charmaz (2008), since her version uses an interpretive and constructionist approach to grounded theory. I first started with open coding to generate Level 1 codes. I began with the interview transcripts from my fieldwork in the Philippines, and then proceeded to archival documents downloaded between 2008 and 2009. At this initial stage, I started with line-by-line coding wherein I named each line of the interview transcript by answering the basic question, “What is happening here?” I used gerunds in coding (e.g., identifying research areas) because this particular verb form indicates actions very clearly. The use of gerunds was strategic to avoid coding topics rather than actions or processes.
Halfway through the transcripts, I had generated around 200 codes. However, line-by-line coding became arbitrary since most of the lines I encountered did not contain complete sentences. Thereafter, I coded sentences and sentence groups instead of lines as I gained a better and better grip of the data. Later on, when coding the archival documents, I used incident-to-incident coding, corresponding to the events or behaviors surrounding the emergence, transformation, and decline of the TAN being studied.

Throughout the coding process, I wrote short memos on codes, which defined what they were and why I decided to create them. These memos proved useful in my transitioning between coding and analysis. For one, these memos assisted me in comparing segments, by revisiting why I created the codes in the first place. If a given segment did not have commonalities with other coded segments, I would then create another code for it. These memos also guided me in noting and following the analytic leads that were emerging out of the Level 1 coding.

This process was very tedious as I constantly compared segments with the list of segments already coded. This constant comparison technique helped break down larger chunks of data into parts as I coded. I employed a constant comparative method in order to find similarities and differences among segments. As I moved further along, I employed various ways to compare data such as comparing segments to segments, segments to codes, events to events, interview statements within the same interview, and incidents among different interviews, or comparing data in earlier and later interviews of the same key-informant. Overall, I generated more than 5,000 Level 1 codes (including repetitions and sub-groups). Through this initial coding, I was able to identify some gaps in the data. This prompted my decision to add more key informants.
I also paid attention to in vivo codes, which included respondents’ own terminologies to signify a certain concept, image, or event. These in vivo codes are symbolic markers of the meaning-making processes among the respondents. Examples of in vivo codes are “building solidarity,” “part activist part global citizen,” among others. Other in vivo codes were in Filipino.

For the documents, I started with the organizational profiles of both the PTFBC and FACES. In coding these documents, I also paid attention to organizational landmarks such as date of organization, initial activities, and reorganization, among others. Marking off these occurrences helped me establish a time line of events surrounding the study case.

Once done with Level 1 coding, I moved to more focused coding in order to pore through the large amount of data I generated from the initial coding. I concentrated on the most significant and frequently used codes, and combined similar codes to help me in building categories. Aside from the two already mentioned above, other examples included “recruiting members,” “protesting,” “speculating about the future of the campaign,” among others. As it is not a linear process, focused coding allowed me to go back to clarify some topics or incidents in the transcripts and documents that might have been overlooked during the initial round of Level-1 coding. This iterative process of revisiting data coding is one of the main strengths of grounded theory (Charmaz 2008). Using focused coding, I was able to reduce the number of codes to about 200.

After focused coding, I progressed to axial coding. Axial coding refers to the phase where data which are broken down in the first two levels of coding are brought back together to form a logical whole (see Charmaz 2008:60-63). Axial coding allowed me to
identify the dimensions of categories that emerged from the preceding levels. The main
tasks I performed in this phase was comprised largely of sorting, synthesizing and
organizing codes in new ways. Finally, I wove these categories into a “story line” to
present some conditional propositions in response to my research questions (see
Charmaz 2008). One of the most significant results of this research was the generation
of a theory of engaged collaboration, details of which I present in Chapter 5.

Issues Encountered During Data Collection and Analysis

There were some ethical issues that arose during the conduct of this research, which influenced how I progressed throughout the process. These ethical concerns include issues of confidentiality in sampling and recruitment, use of the internet as venue for research, and reflexivity.

Confidentiality issues. The use of snowball sampling can breach the confidentiality clause in the informed consent. Since I was dealing with a small group of people, many became the resource persons in identifying other respondents. As a result, virtually all of my respondents knew at least three others interviewed. One respondent even asked me, “So what did Ms. X tell you about the issue?” Knowing this limitation of maintaining confidentiality in a small snowball and purposive sample, I decided to use pseudonyms instead, and to remove any signifiers in describing my respondents (e.g., age, location, and date of interviews). Although a majority of the respondents (26/32) agreed to use their real names in any publication coming out of this research (see Appendix B), I nonetheless employ the generic label, “Interviewee #,” to conceal their true identities. Even though they knew who was interviewed, I would keep the respondents guessing as to who is quoted in this dissertation.
**Internet ethics.** Another critical issue I encountered was the internet ethics involving “lurking” and “harvesting” that are commonly done with regard to online communities. I recognized that at first, I was actually lurking and harvesting information from these online communities when I was conducting initial probing for my proposal. However, recognizing these ethical issues in online research, I actively went out of my way to introduce myself and my research to the leaders and members of both PTFBC and FACES who were involved in the creation of these online communities, in order to amend these initial mistakes.

**Reflexivity issues.** During the course of interviews, a respondent commented that “some of those who were involved in the movement used the campaign mainly to further their academic career” (Interviewee 22). This statement continuously keeps me reflecting on two things: (a) my role as a researcher; and (b) the impact of my dissertation on the movement itself. As discussed earlier, I chose to maintain my role as a researcher rather than as an advocate for the movement so as to avoid being involved in the contentious environment surrounding my research. Admittedly, in the future I am looking forward to continuing my research on this subject matter while also pursuing advocacy that might support this campaign. For present purposes, I uphold the basic aim of this research, which is to develop an in-depth case study on the cleanup campaign itself.
Figure 3-1. Photographs taken in Sitio Madapdap in June 2009. A) taken at a respondent’s house showing a *pedicab* driver, one of the most viable sources of livelihood in the sitio, B) taken along a narrow alley where row houses were located, C) an elementary school and D) taken at one of the big houses found along the main road of the sitio.
CHAPTER 4
THE EMERGENCE OF THE US BASES CLEANUP CAMPAIGN

This chapter examines the emergence of a local environmental campaign for the cleanup of former United States (US) military bases in the Philippines which were contaminated with toxic chemicals left undeclared by the US. I argue that the emergence of this campaign was an offshoot of a social movement against continuing US interventions in the Philippines. To illustrate this argument, I weave together three thematic sections to present a story of a local environmental campaign that emerged out of relationships involving colonization, protests and collaboration, and commenced by adopting a victimization frame to advance its advocacy.

Overview of the Chapter

The first two sections rely primarily on archival documents, while the last section is an output from the analysis of interview transcripts. The first section revolves around the historical relationship between the US and the Philippines, culminating in the nonrenewal of the Military Bases Agreement (MBA) by the Philippine Senate in September 1991. I pulled this theme from codes such as “establishing US bases in the Philippines” (18), “abandoning US bases” (16), and “highlighting US interventions” (14) (refer to Appendix D; original sources are labeled as “Dissertation Document” (DD) and followed by corresponding number).

These codes were generated from data segments which highlighted some significant historical events surrounding the nature and extent of relationship between the Philippines and the US vis-à-vis the presence of US military bases in the Philippines. For example, I coded the following text as “establishing US bases in the Philippines” to highlight the extent of the US military presence in the Philippines:
Even when the Philippines gained her independence after World War II, the United States had maintained a strong military presence in the Philippines with Camp John Hay in Baguio City, Northern Luzon, Subic Bay Naval Base near Olongapo City, Northern Luzon and Clark Air Force Base near Angeles City, Northern Luzon. (DD-37)

This quote also prompted me to trace back some historical events leading to the installation of the US military bases in the Philippines even prior to World War II, and in turn recreate a narrative of the colonial past between these two countries. Thus, I argue that the military bases became a solidifying monument to the US stranglehold on the Philippines, as the US military presence was always positively portrayed by both governments as contributing to the defense of the country against invasion by nearby Asian superpowers such as Korea, Japan and China. I intend to capture the complex issues surrounding the enduring colonial bond between these two countries, and the ensuing resistance from Filipinos and concerned individuals in the US against such bondage.

The second thematic section underscores the various political opportunities that provided the context for the local environmental cleanup campaign. The same political opportunities supported the later emergence of a transnational advocacy network (TAN) between organizations already resisting US interventions in the Philippines, and thereby seeking Philippine sovereignty. I pulled this theme from codes such as “continuing toxic legacy of US” (16), “highlighting nonrenewal of MBA by Philippine Senate” (7), and “presenting events surrounding abandonment of US bases” (4), among others (refer to Appendix D), which reveal some socio-political context that might have facilitated the emergence of the toxic cleanup campaign. For example, the following text was coded as “highlighting nonrenewal of MBA by Philippine Senate”: 

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In a landmark decision in 1991, the Philippine Senate rejected an extension of the RP-U.S. bases treaty, thereby ending an almost century-long presence of the U.S. military on Philippine soil. The Senate decision was the culmination of decades of struggle of the nationalist and anti-bases movement that made possible the Senate rejection of the Treaty to extend American presence. (DD-107)

While this code emphasized the nonrenewal of MBA by the Philippine Senate, it also underlines the anti-bases social movement that had continuously put forth these issues in Philippine politics. Thus, I argue that the victory of the anti-US intervention movements both in the US and the Philippines, specifically the anti-bases campaign, has set the stage in pushing the toxic cleanup campaign in the former US military bases in the Philippines.

Finally, I focus on the framing of issues used by the campaign around grievances and victimization. Framing of issues for this local environmental campaign was critical as local advocates tried to present an agenda for cleanup of the US bases to national and international audiences and the Philippine and US governments. Starting off with a public health frame, the campaign moved on to emphasize grievances against the injustices purveyed by the US military bases on Philippine society, particularly those who were directly exposed to toxic chemicals.

I pulled out this theme from codes such as “identifying victims” (19), “describing the conditions of victims” (7), and “describing as ‘toxic victim’” (6), among others (refer to Appendix D) to illustrate how the local environmental campaign represents notions of grievances and victimhood to endorse its agenda. For example, the following quote shows how a respondent saw the conditions of the victims vis-à-vis the campaign:

Matagal na naming gusto ng katarungan mula noong nagkasakit sila at umalis sa CABCOM. Sana mabigyan ng katarungan ang nangyari noon sa mga nabiktima ng contamination (“We have been demanding justice ever
since they got sick and left CABCOM. We hope that justice will be served to those who were victimized by the contamination”). (Interviewee 9)

This quote illustrates how respondents, in general, articulated the struggles of the victims (who are usually their children or grandchildren). Similar codes led me to analyze further how such victimization frame invoked the collective identity among the people who were once exposed to the toxic contamination in the former US military bases. I argue that without this frame, the toxic cleanup campaign would just mirror the core of the anti-bases campaign that preceded it.

Later on, when the campaign had become transnational, the framing of issues evolved into a victimization frame. This change was not only rhetorical but strategic, especially in speaking for and about the directly afflicted to a larger audience of funders, policy-makers, and government officials. The campaign became more focused on “individual” victims, rather than the “collective” victims. These individual victims had gradually and fully internalized their victimhood and started to articulate the rhetoric of victimization. However, the adoption of a “victim self” became problematic as an avenue for contestation among those who had also lived in the same toxic environment, but were not included among the “list” of the victims recorded by this local environmental campaign.

A Colonial Past Revisited

Perhaps the history of the Philippines is best captured in the following excerpt written by Renato Constantino, a renowned Filipino historian. He said:

The Filipino people have had the misfortune of being “liberated” four times during their entire history. First came the Spaniards who “liberated” them from the “enslavement of the devil,” next came the Americans who “liberated” them from Spanish oppression, then the Japanese who “liberated” them from American imperialism, then the Americans again who “liberated them from the Japanese fascists. After every “liberation” they
found their country occupied by foreign “benefactors.” The people resisted each ruler; although each struggle sought to change certain objective conditions, it had its most profound effect on the people themselves. (Constantino 1975: 12)

A deep sense of such colonial domination remains potent in the collective psyche among Filipinos who strive to achieve national sovereignty, identity and pride. For instance, the impact of colonialism among Filipinos, having been under the Spanish regime for 377 years and the US for 48 years, is embedded in the Filipino society that had developed some Western-oriented values, notably: (a) internalization of a sense of inferiority based on skin color; (b) associating anything foreign with ascendancy and indigenous with inferiority; and, (c) perceiving official authority as corrupt and not for the people (see Gochenour 1990: 6; Nadel and Curtis 1964: 24). Despite the lingering influence of colonialism over Filipino society, Filipinos have nonetheless fought many revolutionary battles against both Spain and the US in hopes of achieving independence from foreign rulers (Pomeroy 1974: 5).

In this section, I focus the discussion on the colonial relationship between the Philippines and the US as being the most relevant in this research. I argue that by presenting a historical narrative of oppression, the local environmental campaign was able to underscore its struggle against the continuing victimization of the Filipino people by US foreign policies. I therefore begin this brief historical account with the secession of the Philippines after Spain’s defeat in the Spanish-American War of 1898. I then discuss events leading to the establishment of the US military bases in the Philippines, and the eventual nonrenewal of the MBA by the Philippine Senate in September 1991.
American Colonialism

The acquisition of the Philippines by the United States in 1898 marked the beginning of US colonial power (Go 2003). This expansionist strategy necessitated direct political domination through a colonial state that would claim sovereignty over and govern the native inhabitants of the newly acquired territory. Indeed, US colonial rule in the Philippines was carried out by enforcing policies and decrees to suppress Filipino patriotism and anti-imperialist movements (Capulong 2004).

Colonial form. American colonialism is “a distinct form of imperialism that involves the explicit and often legally codified establishment of direct political domination over a foreign territory and people” (Go 2003: 5). American colonialism in the Philippine context is congruent to the definition of colonialism, which is “the condition of a subject people, exclusively of non-European societies when under the political control of a European state or the US” (Fieldhouse 1981: 6). The Americans utilized the existing colonial infrastructures that had already been established by the Spaniards. Since the American government continuously portrayed itself to the US mainland population as “bestowers of education, public health, development, and democracy to their little brown brothers,” ordinary Americans did not know about the gruesome campaign that the US engaged in to demolish Filipino resistance movements (Gochenour 1990:7).

American colonial rule in the Philippines stood out in three ways (see Go 2003: 7-8). First, American occupation did not require massive colonization or expulsion of the native population or appropriation of land. Second, the acquisition of the Philippines required unique Congressional legislation that eventually resulted in Supreme Court decisions to classify the Philippines as an “unincorporated territory” (7). This implied that the Philippines would not be included as a full-fledged state in the union but would
instead be designated as a foreign port for the expansion of American capitalism abroad. By virtue of the Organic Act of 1902, the US government would nevertheless exercise full sovereignty over the islands (Miller 1982). At the same time, being in an “unincorporated territory,” Filipinos would not enjoy full citizenship or all constitutional rights bestowed upon ordinary Americans, but rather they would be treated as “wards of the US government” (Gochenour 1990:8). Furthermore, America’s colonial policies robbed Filipinos of the confidence necessary to sustain their early showing of nationalism, leaving them little room to articulate their own collective identity and pride.

Since then, Filipino attitudes toward America have “vacillated between imitation and resentment, subservience and defiance, adulation and contempt” (Karnow 1989: 16).

The Philippines as a US possession. The Philippine islands were ceded to the US by Spain on December 10, 1898 via the Treaty of Paris for $20,000,000 (Davis 1989:30; Wolf 1961:173). By that time, the Filipino people were winning their battle against Spain, and had already established the Malolos Republic as the central governing body (Constantino 1975). Nonetheless, the islands became a US possession as a result of two wars of conquest fought against Spain, and against the Filipino masses that resisted the American forces vehemently (Storey and Lichauco 1926).

At the outset, US foreign policy in the Philippine islands was rather ambiguous, if not lacking. While it was clear as to what the US government wanted out of Cuba (i.e., protecting their economic investments in Cuban industries), the US Congress debated the utility and rationale for acquiring the Philippines as a territory of the US (Constantino 1975). Despite the fact that the acquisition was problematic, some American politicians, including then-President William McKinley, believed in the altruism of the American
society in bestowing upon the Philippines the gift of education, particularly in developing

The American public was fed myths about the ongoing business in the Philippine
islands. For example, the American public was made to believe that the Filipinos could
not be left alone since they still needed training, under American auspices, on self-
government. This claim was reified further by President McKinley when he expressed
his concern over the Philippines as follows:

I sought counsel from all sides – Democrats as well as Republicans – but
got little help. I thought first we would take only Manila; then Luzon; then
other islands, perhaps, also… And one night it came to me this way – I
don't know how it was, but it came: (1) that we could not give them back to
Spain – that would be cowardly and dishonorable; (2) that we could not turn
them over to France or Germany – our commercial rivals in the Orient – that
would be bad business and discreditable; (3) that we could not leave them
to themselves – they were unfit for self-government – and they would soon
have anarchy and misrule over there worse than Spain’s was; and (4) that
there was nothing left for us to do but to take them all, and to educate the
Filipinos, and uplift and civilize and Christianize them, and by God's grace
do the very best we could by them, as our fellow-men for whom Christ also
died… (Wolf 1961: 174)

Unpacking his vision of the Philippines as a US territory requires a view of the many
components in which President McKinley had wrapped his notion of duty. Duty for him
was providential, mixed with quest for “economic profit, national honor, evangelism,
altruism, racial condescension, and world glory” (Wolf 1961: 173). The bottom line was
that President McKinley’s vision was grounded in his preconceived notion that the
Filipinos were unfit for self-government and needed the assistance of the Americans
(Storey and Lichauco 1926: 158).

Another myth that had been perpetuated in the US was that the Filipinos were all
welcoming to the US troops. This was not even close to what had transpired during the
Philippine-American War, which is usually referred to as the “Philippine Insurrection,”
denoting the struggle as rebellion rather than as resistance to US occupation. This war was ignited in February 1899 when Willy Grayson of the Nebraskan Regiment killed a Filipino soldier (Karnow 1989; Miller 1982:61). With 70,000 troops in the Philippines, the Americans tried to topple the resistance among the Filipino masses, but at the same time undertook negotiations with the Filipino *ilustrados*, the elite class (Constantino 1975). The total casualties among Filipinos was 200,000 lives lost directly in the war, and the American troops that took part in this war of suppression totaled to 126,000 (Constantino 1975:251; 247). The defeat of the Filipinos in the war was attributed to the combined effect of the inability of General Emilio Aguinaldo, the first President of the revolutionary Malolos Republic, to mobilize the peasantry, and of the schemes of the Filipino *ilustrados* to secure their place in the American occupation of the country (see Constantino 1975; also Karnow 1989).

The conduct of war in the Philippines by the US was ruthless, and the Filipinos were treated harshly by the new captors. US representatives in Manila were unsympathetic and disrespectful, US troops were abusive and imperious, and despite talk of altruism, US policy toward the Philippines ignored Filipino needs and profoundly disrespected Filipinos. For instance, the following excerpt captures in summary the attitudes of the Americans in the Philippines:

The American volunteer regiments marched into Manila in good order like regular troops, but as soon as the novelty of their strange environment had worn off they gave themselves up to all sorts of excesses, debauchery, and vice. Drinking bars were opened all over the city and suburbs. Drunken brawls, indiscriminate revolver firing, indecent assaults on women, kicks and cuffs to any Filipino, burglary in broad daylight, and thefts from shops and street vendors were of hourly occurrence. Towards evening intoxicated groups took possession of the highways, entered any Filipino’s house, maltreated the inmates, stole what they liked and attempted to ravage the women. Especially in the suburban thoroughfares no native’s life, liberty or
honour was safe. After the day’s drinking was over, heaps of besotted humanity were seen lying helpless in doorways or in the gutters – a sad spectacle never before witnessed by any Filipino. (Foreman 1904: 393-394)

To arrest such seeming anarchy in the Philippines, President McKinley created the Philippine Commission in April 1900. Between 1900 and 1902, the commission enacted 449 laws that organized the entire form of government in the Philippines, with insular bureaus, and provincial as well as municipal administrations (Barrows 1914: xiii). Despite this colonialism, the policy of the United States was portrayed positively to be that of a “policy of conciliation and generous concession,” emphasizing: (a) Filipino participation in legislation and administration; (b) increase in autonomy as “enlightenment and experience advanced”; (c) conservation of natural resources; and (d) education and training of Filipinos for leadership (Barrows 1914: 1; 2). These were characteristics of the benevolent assimilation that President McKinley’s US policy pursued in the Philippines (Karnow 1986).

These “improvements” in US policies in the Philippines did not however prevent a significant segment of Filipino masses from joining the armed struggle against the new conquerors, who were abusive just as the Spaniards had been. Even when the Philippines were nominally granted independence by the US government, mass-based resistance movements such as the Hukbalahap (since1899) and the Sakdalista (since1935) continued to fight against the presence of the US on Philippine soil. Much later, these ultranationalist sentiments would be invoked by groups of peasants, students and even professionals for various social movements against the installation of US military bases, the continuing interventionist policies of the US, and the storage of nuclear weapons in US facilities in the country. Streams of nationalism among Filipinos would eventually converge on resentment over US bases in the Philippines, which came
to be the most evident mark of American presence in the country (Karnow 1989; also Taruc 1953).

**Military bases agreement (MBA).** As early as 1916, legislation had been introduced by then Representative William Atkinson Jones of Virginia that promised independence to the Philippines. However, it was only in 1934 that the US Congress ratified the Tydings-McDuffie Act, which directed the US representatives in the Philippines to proceed with a ten-year period of transition to eventual Philippine independence (Miller 1982). By this time, American occupation had become entrenched in the entire Philippine archipelago, covering virtually all parts via the installation of military bases.

This transition period was interrupted by the invasion of the Philippines by the Japanese imperial army at the onset of the World War II. General Douglas MacArthur, then the military adviser to the Philippine Commonwealth President Manuel L. Quezon and appointed supreme commander for the Pacific in 1941, retreated to Bataan with American and Filipino soldiers, and then fled the Philippines. While fleeing, he uttered, “I shall return,” which became a quintessential remark remembered by Filipinos ever since, and made General MacArthur the most beloved American in the Philippines. When he indeed returned in 1945, he heralded Philippine independence on July 4th, coinciding with the American Independence Day (Karnow 1989; Kerkvliet 1977).

The Philippines experienced tremendous devastation and trauma under Japanese rule. The devastation amounted to nearly a billion dollars (Karnow 1989: 333). WWII consequently changed attitudes among Filipinos towards the presence of American forces in the country. For most Filipinos, US bases became a security blanket against
future invasions. For the Americans, however, these bases became indispensable as a means of US military access into other parts of Asia, and for US “diplomacy in the Orient” (Karnow 1989: 331).

The possibility of partnership through US bases was explored even a month prior to the proclamation of Philippine independence. A small group of American experts headed by Ambassador Paul McNutt and the newly elected President Manuel Roxas discussed the details of these transactions. Negotiations centered on mechanisms by which US bases could be made permanent in the Philippines without jeopardizing the newly acquired sense of sovereignty among Filipinos. After long deliberations, the MBA was finally signed on March 24, 1947 (Davis 1989). Nonetheless, on the bases issue, even the most pro-American Filipinos were enraged by the fact that US gave tougher terms to the Philippines, a long-time ally, than it did to Japan, a former enemy, in acquiring bases in both countries. This unfair treatment of the US in the basing agreement with the Philippines would have lasting impacts, especially on how US responded to the demand for the cleanup of toxic contamination in its bases in the Philippines (Karnow 1989: 331-332).

Moreover, through this agreement, the United States retained full control of 23 military base sites across the archipelago, encompassing hundreds of thousands of hectares for a renewable lease period of 99 years. Included among these sites were the huge naval and air base complexes located at Olongapo-Subic Bay-Cubi Point at the junction of Zambales and Bataan provinces that served as the home base of the US 7th Fleet, and the enormous Clark Air Base in Pampanga province, where the US 13th Air Force was stationed. The Subic Bay navy yard and the Clark air field became America’s
two largest overseas military installations, occupying about 36,000 and 136,000 acres of land, respectively. Capital investments for Subic Bay and Clark Air Base were estimated at about $236.4 million and $150 million, respectively. Both bases sat on premier lands, with Subic Bay occupying a prime property with beaches and coves, ideal as natural docks for ships, while Clark Air Base occupied prime agricultural land at the heart of Central Luzon (Pomeroy 1974: 21-22).

Both bases played very important roles in carrying out the Korean and Vietnam wars, as well as during the height of the Cold War. The Philippines occupied a strategic location in the US agenda to exert control in the Asia-Pacific region in order to counteract the influence of the USSR bloc. In public, the role of the US bases in the Philippines was painted as means of avoiding the conversion of the Philippines into a communist country. This discourse was substantiated insofar as the Philippine government had perpetual problems with insurgencies by the New People’s Army (NPA), the revolutionary arm of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) in Luzon and Visayan islands, and the Moro Nationalist Liberation Front (MNLF) in Mindanao. These internal struggles constituted leverage for the Philippine government to regularly justify the continuous presence of these US bases in the Philippines (Davis 1989; Martinez 2002; Taruc 1953).

**Continuing US Intervention in the Philippines**

Through the MBA, the Philippine government had given virtually total freedom to the US Air Force and Navy. Indeed, with the MBA, Philippine sovereignty literally stopped at the gates of the US bases. Philippine courts had no jurisdiction over crimes or offenses committed by US servicemen on and off duty, including crimes against Filipino citizens. Philippine labor laws were rendered inapplicable for Filipino workers on
the bases, and natural resources within the bases were off limits to Filipinos. Given these excessive terms of the MBA, nationalist feeling against the US bases mounted, and led to renegotiation of the MBA in 1956 as requested by the Philippine government. This failed to change the terms of the MBA except for shortening of the lease agreement from 99 years to 25 years, culminating in 1991 (Pomeroy 1974: 22-23).

With the military bases installed on Philippine soil, the relationship between the US and the Philippines evolved from prewar colonialism to postwar neo-colonialism. Neocolonialism refers to the continuing involvement of developed countries (i.e., in this case, the US) in the internal dealings of developing countries (i.e., in this case, the Philippines) (see Gochenour 1990: 10; Karnow 1989). While the US bases were off-limits to the Philippine government, the US continued to meddle with the political and economic affairs of the Philippines. While there were a number of issues that mattered most to the Filipinos in terms of the US-Philippines neocolonial relationship, I focus mainly on two issues especially salient in this dissertation: 1) the interventions in Philippine military affairs through the Joint US Military Advisory Group (JUSMAG), and 2) US backing of the repressive and dictatorial government of President Ferdinand Marcos (1972-1986). These two interventions by the US were disclosed to a few elite groups of Filipino politicians who were either protégés or beneficiaries of deep-seated relationships with the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) or high-ranking military brass (e.g., Gen. Douglas MacArthur). This intervention combined with exclusion motivated the emergence of enduring social movements that fought against the continuing presence of the US, leading to the ousting of the US military bases in the Philippines.
**JUSMAG.** The MBA signed between the US and the Philippines in 1947 was accompanied by a Military Assistance Agreement (MAA) that bound the two countries in a military cooperation. The MAA mandated the creation of JUSMAG, a delegation of US military advisers to the Philippine military. These military advisers focused on the logistical and training requirements of the Armed Forces of the Philippines against insurgencies and other internal conflicts. The JUSMAG and the MAA were jointly responsible for the fact that despite more than 40 years of special relations, the Philippines did not have an external defense capability (Gochenour 1990; also Kerkvliet 1977).

**Support to Marcos dictatorship, 1972-1986.** Although the US would never admit to its involvement in Philippine politics, including the choice for the next presidents of the republic, it was a standard assumption among Filipinos that somehow the US had a finger on Philippine political affairs. One of the Philippine presidents who had undoubtedly been favored by the US government was President Ferdinand E. Marcos.

Marcos was the 10th President of the Republic of the Philippines. He had one of the most controversial political careers among Filipino politicians, rising from being a House representative (1949-1959) to being the Senate President (1959-1965). As elected president, he served two constitutional terms from 1965 to 1973, when he put the country on fast-tracked industrialization. Despite this seeming economic development, his term was marked by excessive spending and corruption, which resulted in economic turmoil and government bankruptcy. Economic crises also in turn catalyzed protest movements from a restive student body against the venality of the Marcos regime. The regime’s behavior also prompted the re-emergence of the
communist movement in the Philippines. Eventually, Marcos declared a dictatorial government on September 21, 1972 to halt the economic and political unrest in the country. Marcos remained president until 1986 (Sison 1989; Wright 1988).

It is impossible to explain why Marcos held on to power for so long without invoking US support of his regime. Marcos was extremely fond of his affiliations with the US government, especially his friendship with US President Ronald Reagan, who in turn thought of Marcos as a loyal friend. Marcos used this connection to his advantage by securing various forms of support from the US. In particular, military assistance was crucial to the Marcos regime’s continuing domination. Brilliant as he was, Marcos persuaded many Filipino leaders and American presidents that he was the only one who could crush communism in the Philippines and in turn assure the continuity of US bases. He also used the US bases as leverage in negotiating the loans and aid from the US, thereby resulting in increased US financial support. The Marcos regime consequently amassed a foreign debt of about $26 billion for his entire term, until his downfall in 1986 (Karnow 1989: 366).

The collapse of the Marcos regime climaxed in the historical mobilization among thousands of Filipinos during the bloodless People’s Power Revolution of February 1986 (more popularly known as the EDSA Revolution). For four days, demonstrators lined the Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (thus the name EDSA) to protest against the results of the General Elections dubiously favoring Marcos. On February 25, 1986, Marcos and his family were ousted and transported by US aircraft to Honolulu, Hawaii, where he died in 1989.
Historical Precursors of Anti-US Intervention Movement

Filipino nationalist sentiments have ebbed and flowed in response to monumental events throughout Philippine history, the height of which is usually expressed during social mobilizations. Some social movements were more enduring than others. In this discussion, I focus on four such movements, namely, the Hukbalahap, the Sakdalista, the Communist movement, and the anti-US intervention movement, to elaborate on the struggles against US neocolonialism. The last of these laid the foundation for the anti-US bases movement in the Philippines and the toxic cleanup campaign on which I primarily focus in this dissertation. I discuss the other social movements because they provide historical context in which I situate the anti-US bases movement, insofar as all four of these movements reacted to injustices in the Philippines, often purveyed by Philippine governments supported by colonial and neo-colonial interests. These examples also provide insights into the dynamics of social movements that emerged in response to the colonial relationship between the US and the Philippines.

The Hukbalahap. The Hukbalahap was a social movement among poor peasants who were seeking to reform the agricultural sector by eliminating abuses of landowners, though they did not necessarily strive to radically replace the system. They were agreeable to being tenants as long as the landowners were willing to give them “easy credit, a fair share of the crop and protection against repression by local authorities” (Karnow 1989: 337). This resistance group, which was led by Luis Taruc, a true peasant, was originally named the Hukbong Bayan Laban sa Hapon (People’s Army against the Japanese), or the Huks, and became a guerilla movement against the Japanese invasion. Taruc later claimed that the Huks killed a total of 20,000 Japanese soldiers and Filipino collaborators during WWII (Karnow 1989; also see Taruc 1953).
Because of their contribution in fighting against the Japanese Imperial Army in the Philippines, some Filipinos thought that the Americans would reward the Huks. Instead, in February 1945, months before the proclamation of Philippine Independence, the Huks were arrested by US counterintelligence units and handed to Adonis Maclang, a rival guerilla chief. Maclang and his followers rounded up the Huks, forced them to dig a mass grave, and killed them. In return, the Americans appointed Maclang mayor of Malolos (Karnow 1989:340).

Despite this attack on the Huks, surviving Huk leaders still sought to participate in the political process. During the 1946 elections, the big landowners incited the local authorities to harass the candidates fielded by the Huks under its party, the Democratic Alliance. The Huks were banned from conducting public meetings, and their headquarters were ransacked on the eve of elections. Huks fought back in many places but they were no match for goons in the pay of their opponents. Even so, six Democratic Alliance candidates won seats in the national legislature. Taruc even won against his opponent by 29,000 votes without delivering a single speech (Karnow 1989; Taruc 1953).

Although the Huks won their seats fairly, then-President Manuel Roxas denied the Democratic Alliance its legislative offices. This sparked further conflict between the government and the Huks, which escalated to the killing of Juan Feleo, a veteran leftist leader in 1946. Taruc accused Roxas of acceding to the “enemies of democracy and progress” (Karnow 1989: 341), and Roxas vowed to subdue the rebels in sixty days. Roxas’ resolve led to bombing and terrorizing of rural villages, which drove rural populations to side with the Huks. Copying Mao Zedong’s guerilla force, the Huks
adopted the new revolutionary name, the *Hukbong Mapagpalayang Bayan*, the People’s Liberation Army, to mark the onset of their rebellion against the new Philippine government (Karnow 1989; Taruc 1953).

**The Sakdalista.** Sakdalista was a popular movement in the 1930s which was led by Benigno Ramos, a former Senate clerk to Senate President Manuel Quezon. In 1930, Ramos joined a demonstration against an American teacher who was insulting Filipino students. This angered Quezon who ordered Ramos to desist from supporting the students. Ramos adamantly refused to do so and Quezon demanded his resignation (Constantino 1975: 373).

This event led Ramos to set up *Sakdal*, a weekly Tagalog tabloid bearing the masthead: “Independent with no master but the people.” *Sakdal* criticized the colonial establishment, accused national politicians like Quezon of being servants of the Americans, and called Philippine independence a misnomer. Through their paper, the Sakdalistas presented radical positions that were not only radical for the time but in fact anticipated many of the demands of future protests. For one, Sakdalistas adopted the position that “independence is not given but must be taken through the united action of the people” (Constantino 1975:373). They described the educational system as colonial, glorifying American culture over Filipino culture. The Sakdalistas also objected to the proposed establishment of American military and naval bases in the country, charging that such bases would undermine Philippine security and would only benefit the US. Above all, the Sakdalistas opposed further investment of American capital in the country, as it only led to the exploitation of the natural resources of the country, and was regarded as the root cause of poverty in the country (Constantino 1975:375).
Unfortunately, Ramos, acting in anticipation to his rise to power through his organization, drastically watered down his demands against the Philippine government by first denying his anti-American stance. Ramos claimed that the Sakdalistas wanted independence only so that the country’s resources could be fully developed. He then listed down some “reasonable” objectives which were directed toward peripheral issues such as demanding for a new investigation on former friar lands (i.e., lands amassed by the Spanish clergy), reductions in the per diems of senators and representatives, increases in the pay of the policemen, constables, teachers and laborers, the teaching of native dialects in public schools, and the use of voting machines to prevent fraud during elections (Constantino 1975:375).

While Ramos and his cohort began negotiating their positions of power, local Sakdal leaders continued with their campaigns in the barrio, rallying people to boycott the plebiscite for the Commonwealth Constitution in order to demand complete and absolute independence no later than 1935. This action was ruled seditious by the governor general, and under such dictum, arrests and harassment of Sakdalistas followed. In protest, on May 2, 1935, one hundred fifty peasants marched to the municipal building of San Ildefonso, Bulacan, hauled down the American and Philippine flags, and raised the red Sakdal flag. Other Sakdalistas engaged in similar actions in the provinces of Cavite, Rizal, and Laguna. Almost 60,000 peasant Sakdalistas were involved. Disorganized and poorly armed as they were, the Sakdalistas were no match for the government forces, and by noon of May 3, the rebellion was squelched (Constantino 1975:376).
This uprising was a grassroots decision, since Ramos was in Japan during that time, apparently courting Japanese support for his party. Thus disowned by their leader, the peasants drifted away from the organization, and Sakdalista influence practically disappeared from the countryside. The Sakdalista movement, despite its opportunist and fascist-inclined leadership, was a genuine expression of protest by the disenfranchised members of the Philippine society. Sakdalista’s insights on the colonial establishment, the interrelation between colonialism and the poverty of the people, the role of elite leaders, and the economic strings attached to the independence “granted” by the Americans, had raised the level of consciousness of the masses (Constantino 1975:376). Later on, the Sakdalistas were converted to Makapili (or the Makabayan Katipunan ng mga Pilipino or Alliance of Philippine Patriots) during the brief occupation of the Japanese imperial army in the Philippines (see Taruc 1953). The Makapilis are best remembered as Filipino allies to the Japanese army, who turned in suspected Filipino rebels to the Japanese troops by pointing at them in the line-up while wearing a bayong (i.e., Filipino basket) over their heads to cover their faces.

**The Communist party.** The Communist movement in the Philippines presents another type of social movement wherein the radicalization of some of the Filipino labor leaders was given impetus by their attendance at world conferences and their affiliation with international organizations of the Left. Labor leaders attended the Hankow, China conference of the League Against Colonial Oppression in the Far East, and the Second Brussels Conference of the League Against Imperialism. Others attended the Red International of Labor Unions in Moscow in 1927. Some Filipino radical leaders also met with leaders of the Chinese Communist Party members, among them Chou-En-lai.
These international contacts were very strong influences on radical Filipino leaders, specifically in their decision-making toward the plight of the workers and peasants (Constantino 1975; also Kerkvliet 1977).

Among the demands of the radical labor leaders included the organization of factory committees as a first step toward “the formation of industrial unions, the establishment of a workers’ political party, the advocacy of class struggle, the condemnation of the Nacionalista and Democrata parties, and a demand for independence from the US” (Constantino 1975:367). These demands were perceived as too radical by the Philippine government, and the influence of the party was believed by the government officials to be stimulating strikes among peasants and laborers. Thus, when the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) was formalized on November 7, 1930, its legal lifespan was already deemed short. Communist leaders were arrested and charged with sedition on the basis of the platform, actions and demands of the Communist Party (Kerkvliet 1977). They were subsequently found guilty by the Court of First Instance of Manila and were sentenced to jail. Furthermore, the CPP was declared an illegal organization, and this decision by the state was affirmed by the Supreme Court on October 26, 1932 (Constantino 1975:368-369).

The anti-US intervention movement. The foregoing social movements provide a sense of the historical political context in which the anti-US bases movements have operated. In this section, I discuss the anti-US intervention movement, to provide an example of the solidarity between Filipino and non-Filipino activists in the US context. Based on Schirmer’s work (1989), there were two waves of anti-US intervention movements in the US. The first wave happened at the turn of the century. This
movement was called the Anti-Imperialist League which led millions of US voters to protest against the acquisition of the Philippines. The second wave was concerned with the indirect domination by the US of the Philippines through US policies supporting Marcos and his dictatorship. For present purposes, I focus on the second wave, which is directly relevant to the social movement and TAN on which I focus in the remainder of this and subsequent chapters.

With the proclamation of martial law in the Philippines in 1972, there was growing concern among young Filipinos living in the US regarding the political conditions back in the Philippines. These Filipinos, who clustered around two groups, namely the Kalayaan (Freedom) and the Committee for Democratic Filipinos, created the organization called National Coalition for the Restoration of Civil Liberties (NCRCL) in the Philippines. The membership of this coalition was mainly Filipinos who had been active in the militant student movement in the Philippines prior to martial law. Non-Filipinos were also welcome to support and join this organization, though the coalition directed its efforts toward the Filipino communities in the US (Schirmer 1989).

In June 1973, NCRCL conducted an anti-Marcos rally in Washington, D.C. It was attended by Filipinos and non-Filipinos alike. During the social gathering following the demonstration, some non-Filipinos were discussing the need to pressure the US government against the appointment of William H. Sullivan as Ambassador to the Philippines because of his involvement in the bombing of Laos during the Vietnam War. Upon hearing this discussion, some members of the NCRCL addressed the issue and threw it back to the non-Filipinos, saying that the Filipinos could not do so because they were not US citizens. This incident sparked interest and commitment among non-
Filipinos to form an anti-US intervention organization, which would be called the Friends of Filipino People (FFP). FFP targeted the non-Filipino segment of US population to hear out its petition to halt the interventionist policies of the US in the Philippines (Schirmer 1989).

Among Filipinos, the NCRCL branched out to more organizations to partake in the movement. There was the Katipunan ng mga Demokratikong Pilipino (KDP, translated as Filipino Democratic Movement), which had a more progressive and militant viewpoint than NCRCL. There was also the Movement for a Free Philippines (MFP), a more conservative and anti-Communist organization composed of well-to-do Filipinos in the US. Eventually, the KDP and the FFP became allies, resulting in a broader movement called the Anti-Martial Law Coalition. MFP, due to its anti-Communist stance, chose to operate separately but in parallel (Schirmer 1989).

By 1976, the FFP asserted that the root cause of US interventions in the Philippines was the presence of the US bases. The Anti-Martial Law Coalition picked up on this issue and in 1978, a Campaign to Remove US Bases from the Philippines was born. The campaign conducted public meetings, speaking tours, and demonstrations against the US bases in the Philippines. Later on, these activities would be supported by democratic-minded Christian clergy, both Catholic and Protestant, who were responsive to the suffering of the Filipinos during martial law (Schirmer 1989).

By 1979, a split in the progressive wing of the anti-intervention movement began to manifest between the KDP and FFP. The cause was mainly the weak leadership in the KDP, and the basic disagreement regarding positions on different issues. It was the desire of the leaders in KDP to move the focus of KDP toward a “major and inclusive
preoccupation with US affairs,” and abandon its organization’s original goal of support to the Philippines (Schirmer 1989).

**US Toxic Legacy in the Philippines**

With the victory of the anti-US bases movement, a movement for the cleanup of US bases followed suit. However, I should emphasize that the latter was never a central agenda of the campaign on the non-renewal of the MBA. An official country report prepared by the PTFBC for an international conference stresses that:

> although the issue became one of the arguments against the continued stay of the U.S., it was never considered during the negotiations. As a consequence, the Philippine government neither filed a formal claim for U.S. cleanup nor requested copies of drawdown reports. Thus, the U.S. quietly walked away from its responsibility. (DD-107)

Such attempts to understate the environmental issues in the US military bases would be challenged by the succeeding events that would compel local activists to pursue these toxic contamination issues. Thus, in this section, I discuss the US toxic legacy in the Philippines as a theme emerging from the narratives of the lived experiences of the women whom I interviewed in the Philippines. The narrative of the toxic contamination in the US bases almost always began with the story of the Mt. Pinatubo eruption, which marked the exodus of large communities affected by *lahar* (lava flows) to the temporary relocation in Clark Air Force Base (CAB). I therefore examine two events, the Mt. Pinatubo eruption, and the discovery of toxic contamination in the former US bases in the Philippines.

**Mt. Pinatubo eruption.** In 1991, Mt. Pinatubo, an ostensibly dormant volcano, erupted, spewing ash over Central Luzon and nearly covering the province of Pampanga. The eruption of Mt. Pinatubo would go down in the history of the Philippines as one of the most violent eruptions on record. It buried numerous villages, towns and
municipalities, and uprooted thousands of people from their homes that led to relocation in cramped evacuation centers in nearby areas.

Mt. Pinatubo also buried the entire CAB in Pampanga, rendering all of the facilities non-operational. In an environmental review conducted by the HQ Pacific Air Force (HQ PACAF) Environmental Protection Committee in 1991, the CAB was described as follows:

The volcanic ash has caused damage to many of the buildings, facilities, utilities, and equipment upon Clark AB. The airfields are inoperable, allowing only helicopter operations. Volcano surveillance missions are being flown by UH-1N to monitor volcanic activities and to survey damage to the base. At least 112 facilities were damaged, including school buildings, recreation areas, maintenance shops, employee housing, storage facilities, administrative offices, docks, tennis courts, and security fences. (DD-108)

Upon seeing the conditions of these facilities, Clark Air Force Base Command immediately withdrew its troops from the base. The US troops left behind buildings and facilities, including the bunkhouses where some of the crews stayed. After a few days of being buried in ashes, CAB was cleared of any US troops and became available for the Philippine government to occupy.

The Philippine government, being the custodian of the abandoned base, saw its utility as an evacuation center for communities who were fleeing the lahar (lava) flows. At the base, the Philippine government built the Mount Pinatubo refugee center atop the US Air Force Motor Pool at CAB. This evacuation center accommodated approximately 20,000 families who became exposed in the next several years to the toxins buried underneath, which had also leaked down to the groundwater (DD-13; also DD-40).

The evacuees who did not have enough resources to support themselves had to depend on the donations and aids from outside. They also depended on the rations
given by the local government agencies, welfare authorities, and private donors. Evacuees also used the available lots to plant root crops like sweet potatoes and cassava. The Philippine government drilled deep wells for their water supply. Although this provided water rations to evacuees, the rations were not sufficient for their daily needs.

Although a natural disaster by itself, the Mt. Pinatubo eruption played a very significant role in unearthing the underlying disasters brought about by the US bases. The eruption not only became an impetus for driving away the American troops from the base itself due to the damage the base sustained; the ensuing evacuation and its outcomes in terms of exposures to toxins on the base also became a driving force for concerned groups to solve the contamination in CAB and other bases.

**Discovery of toxic contamination.** The evacuees noticed the different smell and texture of the water coming from the wells. Some respondents described it as “foul-smelling and oily” water. Others described it as “putrid and easily spoiled” even after hours of boiling. They did not know that the quality of water was not the result of bacterial activities, but of toxic contamination of the water table. They also did not know until much later that their living quarters in CAB were built atop a motor pool which was highly contaminated with toxic chemicals being used to maintain and repair US aircraft.

In order to ensure that they were drinking “clean water,” evacuees boiled their water. But the water still smelled rusty, and the color was muddy. When boiled and stored overnight, there was a thin layer of oil that would accumulate on top, making the texture of boiled water somewhat oily. Nonetheless, the evacuees used this water to drink, water their plants, prepare food, feed babies, bathe, and other uses. They
assumed that the boiling process had already killed whatever was bad about the water from the deep wells. Besides, the US military had not informed the evacuees about the contamination in the base.

The evacuees began to observe a relatively higher rate of miscarriages and deformities among babies. They assumed that these illnesses were stress-related, having been through the traumatic experience of the Mt. Pinatubo eruption and ensuing relocation to life in the squalid environment of CAB. Community leaders nonetheless started to negotiate for improved conditions in the evacuation center, especially for the immediate relocation of families from CAB to a more conducive environment. Soon, these evacuees would be given relocation sites in Madapdap and Mauaque, among others (DD-13).

Through it all, the US had not issued any information regarding the toxicity in CAB. Not until 1992 did the US publish any pertinent information concerning contamination on its bases. It was only with the GAO’s 1992 Report on the Financial Responsibilities of the US regarding its military bases in the Philippines that the fears and apprehensions of the local communities, especially evacuees, were confirmed about the presence of toxic contamination. The information was not comprehensive though, especially in specifying the nature and extent of the toxic contamination in the bases.

**Political Opportunities surrounding the Birth of the Bases Cleanup Campaign**

Oily water and the pattern of health problems nonetheless stimulated social mobilization surrounding suspicions of toxic contamination at CAB. I argue that the cleanup campaign emerged as organizers took advantage of particular political opportunities in the 1990s. Specifically, there were three political opportunities that provided the basis for the emergence of the cleanup campaign. These are: 1) the
rejection of the MBA by the Philippine Senate in 1992; 2) the organization of “toxic tours” on former US bases in 1994; and 3) the relocation of the campaign from local to national non-governmental organizations (NGO). These became key turning points leading to the full-blown campaign against the toxic contamination in the CAB. Below I discuss these political opportunities, showing how they fostered the emergence of the cleanup campaign.

**Rejection of the Military Bases Agreement**

On September 16, 1991, the Philippine Senate voted on whether to renew the 1947 MBA. The vote came after the devastating Mt. Pinatubo eruption and the withdrawal of American troops from both CAB and the Subic Naval Base, as well as from many satellite US bases in the Philippines. The debate among the Senators raised many issues concerning the significance of the US bases for the Philippine economy and political welfare. The opposition to renewal mainly argued that terminating the lease would finally achieve Philippine sovereignty, without foreign military bases occupying tremendous areas of the archipelago. Invoking the 1986 Philippine Constitution, which banned nuclear facilities in the country, the opposition also confirmed suspicions that the US military bases had in fact stored nuclear weapons on Philippine soil, especially at the height of the Cold War (Karnow 1989). Moreover, the Filipinos, in general, had already developed animosity against US because of its support to the Marcos dictatorial regime (Simbulan 2002).

As a result of such arguments and incriminating documentation, the Senate voted against the renewal of the MBA (see Shenon 1991). Some of these Senators were also former political detainees, or served as human rights lawyers to other political prisoners during the Marcos dictatorship (Simbulan 2002). This decision, however, was met with
different emotions among Filipinos. Those who were on the left welcomed the vote as a great victory for the Filipino people, who finally asserted their collective resistance against the American presence in their country. On the other hand, Filipinos who depended on the industries created to cater to the needs of the US servicemen, such as restaurants, hotels, and prostitution dens, were dismayed and fearful that the economies of their cities would decline. Some even thought that the removal of the US troops in the Philippines would put the Filipinos in a vulnerable position because of their lack of knowledge to defend its territories from external threats. This suggestion was countered by the anti-bases movement, which claimed that the presence of the US troops itself had brought threats to the Philippines.

With the MBA vote, the Philippine Senate signaled to NGOs and activists that in fact, through lobbying and other social movements, changes could happen in the Philippines. Activism now grew as never before. Activist organizations now focused on a new problem: “What to do with the bases which were abandoned by the US troops?” This uncharted course in Philippines history, a monumental success in terms of mobilization against the US, created a small window of political opportunity for local and national activist groups to exploit. While the elites of the land were still overwhelmed by the defeat of their agenda, these activist groups seized the opportunities to expand their collective action and repertoire of contentions.

Meanwhile, the evacuees were still occupying the CAB. National and local governments were working towards providing a more permanent relocation site for these families, who could no longer come back to their homes because they were wiped out. Evacuees were still negotiating with local and national governments on how to
alleviate them from the multiple burdens of the Mt. Pinatubo eruption, poverty in the evacuation areas, and exposure to toxic substances in their drinking water. In fairness, governments at all levels were doing their best to assist evacuees, but their efforts were typically marred by corruption, which slowed and reduced provision of aid. There were a number of media reports exposing how corrupt the Mt. Pinatubo Commission was in managing the funds allocated for the welfare of evacuees. Thus, the combination of these two events gave different civil society groups, including NGOs, the chance to confront the state actors at all levels (i.e., local, regional and national) with their agenda. Using various repertoire of protest, these civil society groups became a powerful and dynamic sector in Philippine politics.

**Toxic Tours**

In the 1990s, there was a series of “toxic tours” that were organized and sponsored by the Mennonite Central Committee or MCC (http://mcc.org; also based on narratives provided by the respondents). The MCC took it upon itself to investigate what was happening in the Philippines, especially around the US bases. The MCC sent two parties from the US to the Philippines. The visiting parties consisted of 1) experts on policies, and 2) experts on technical sciences. These tours were instrumental in encouraging NGOs in the Philippines to consider the environmental impacts of the US bases as a means of focusing on how to tackle the issues on US bases. They also inspired some of the technical experts to continue providing technical research on the toxicity of the US bases. This technical research formed part of the core documents used by the cleanup campaign to argue for its agenda.

These tours were conceived by MCC in response to the research published on the toxic contamination in domestic military bases across the US in the 1980s. When made
public, these studies played a pivotal role in the upsurge of claims-making under the mantra of environmental justice (EJ). Alarmed by the gravity of toxic contamination in these military bases, the MCC conducted these toxic tours to determine the conditions of the US military bases in the Philippines. The experts who toured in the Philippines also trained some Filipinos who got involved with these experts in one way or another. The following quote summarizes the impact of these tours on one trainee:

Because of the delegation, I learned how to become technical. I learned chemistry even if I don’t like chemistry. I also translated for them. I ended up like a little expert. In the end, they gave me a certification saying “This certificate [is awarded] to a person who learned so much of the process.” (Interviewee 20)

Likewise, these toxic tours were instrumental in bridging the anti-US intervention movement in the US and in the Philippines. Most of the participants of this tour became pioneer members of the US Working Group for the Bases Cleanup in the Philippines, which further formed the foundation for the creation of the Filipino/American Coalition for Environmental Solutions (FACES), the first US-based organization solely dedicated to support the cleanup campaign in the Philippines.

**Relocation of the Cleanup Campaign from the Local to the National Level**

Meanwhile, the local NGOs, especially in Central Luzon were also preoccupied with what to do with the abandoned bases. The Central Luzon Alliance for Sovereign Philippines (CLASP) was one of the local NGOs that were working hard with the local government to try and figure out how to better use the abandoned bases.

A small segment of the CLASP was particularly interested in the environmental contamination on the former US bases as a focus for advocacy. However, the higher leadership of CLASP did not have the same perspective as the small group. There was
a debate over whether to include the environmental impacts of US bases in the CLASP agenda, given the limited financial and human resources of the organization.

The larger context of this debate is that the environmental agenda was usually frowned upon by left-leaning organizations, which regarded environmental advocacy as elitist. The Philippine Left looked at environmental advocacy as a divisive and diversionary tactic to deflect attention from a “more important” aspect of the anti-bases struggle, which was sovereignty and democracy. The view of environmental concerns as distractions was also shared by leftist organizations at the national level. By the 1990s, although the environmental movement was blooming in the Philippines, the great debate on the food security/poverty agenda versus environmental health was very much alive in academia and in broader public debates. A respondent explained:

During that time, the environmental awareness in the Philippines was very low. It was difficult for a common tao (person) to understand that there are potential poisons in what he eats. He seems to say that “it is my choice whether I die today because I do not have something to eat or die 10 to 20 years from now.” I think this was also how the organizational leaders see these [environmental issues]. So they decided that the bases clean-up campaign was less important. But our leader did not cave in. She saw the cause as important, and so we packed up and went to Manila. (Interviewee 26).

Negative perceptions of the environmental agenda by the Philippine Left in general, and the CLASP in particular, did not stop a handful of experienced activists-organizers who broke away from CLASP. They relocated to Manila, the capital city of the Philippines, to establish a campaign desk at the Nuclear Free Philippines Coalition (NFPC). NFPC during that time saw the campaign desk as another way to articulate the importance of freeing the Philippines from nuclear armaments and production. The environmental aspect was an added dimension to its advocacy, and thus, was welcomed into the NFPC.
For awhile, the People’s Task Force for Bases Cleanup (PTFBC), as it was eventually called, was nominally under the NFPC, but it was starting to be recognized among other NGOs in the Philippines. The PTFBC started with its advocacy at the local level but was rejected by its originating organization. Then it too moved to Manila and hooked up with a national organization, the NFPC. This move did well for the advocacy campaign because it gave PTFBC national media exposure, which caught the attention not only of Filipino audiences but also audiences abroad.

The PTFBC’s separation from a local NGO and attachment to a national NGO contributed to the growth of the cleanup campaign. The campaign became national, and was recognized as the legitimate campaign organization for the cleanup question. Indeed, PTFBC was not only seen as representing the victims of the toxic contamination in CAB but also as advocating for the cleanup of all US military bases in the Philippines. The PTFBC formally registered itself as independent organization apart from NFPC in 1997. This decision resulted from the tremendous support coming in specifically for PTFBC as a small campaign desk of NFPC.

The break-away was also a result of the decision of NFPC to let go of the PTFBC’s cleanup campaign, since it was already “diverting the attention of the NFPC to environmental issues rather than concentrating its attention on its original mandate” (Interviewee 24), which did not include environmental causes. NFPC saw that by freeing PTFBC, it would have the power to decide its own course and not be subsumed to the mandate of NFPC. From a small group of break-away activists from a local NGO, to attaching itself as a small campaign desk to a national NGO, to becoming a small
national NGO, PTFBC had finally emerged from the ground up. In this case, PTFBC was an organic NGO that soon would carry a transnational issue on its back.

**Adopting a Victimization Frame**

I argue that one of the most important factors of the emergence of PTFBC from a local to national status was its effective adoption of the victimization frame. Frames are “interpretive packages” that are created by activists in order to mobilize their target constituents and adherents (Benford and Hunt 1992; Gamson 1988; Polletta 2003; Snow and Benford 1988; Snow et al. 1986; Tarrow 1998). One of the debatable issues in framing contentions is in determining whether social movement activists need to develop new symbols to create collective identities or to capitalize on existing symbols that are “familiar to people who are rooted in their own cultures” (Tarrow 1998:107).

In this case study, the framing of victimization that the PTFBC adopted was rooted in two things: (1) the existing cultural symbols that condemn the continuous US intervention in the Philippines and delegated Filipinos as victims of the US colonial regime; and, (2) the recently articulated experiences among people who were exposed to the toxic contamination during their stay in the US military bases. By combining these two, PTFBC capitalized on the commonality of experiences among the many people who at one point in time occupied the CAB to pursue its main strategy of making the US take responsibility not only for the land and water that it polluted, but also for the lives that it had affected because of its negligence in divulging important information to the Philippine government, and to extend technical and financial resources to clean up the toxic substances on its former bases.

In adopting a victimization frame, the PTFBC pursued three important activities, namely 1) defining who the victims were, 2) demonstrating their legitimate victimhood,
and 3) representing the victims in public. PTFBC used effectively the victimization frame by organizing as a community a selected group of marginalized individuals (i.e., children, elderly and women) whose exposure to the toxic contamination in CAB had resulted to physical deformities or illnesses that were terminal. As the PTFBC developed and used this frame, the individuals and families who were organized as victims gradually connected their previous experiences in the CAB with the tenets of the victimization frame of PTFBC. This process of frame alignment enabled the organized “community of victims” to internalize the collective victim frame, but at the same time, allowed them to articulate their individual “victim selves.” In this section, I focus on these processes by which the victimization frame was developed and promoted by the PTFBC, and the ways in which individuals defined by the PTFBC as victims began referring to themselves as such.

**Defining and Identifying the Victims**

Defining the victims entails some familiarity with the victims themselves. Upon analyzing various documents, I found out that the PTFBC campaign presented two types of victims. The first type of victims was the “collective victim.” In general, the victims are collectively defined as “infants and children, women, the disabled and the weak” (DD-25). These notions of a collective victim are usually employed to give an impression of a multitude and thereby document the extent of the impacts of the toxic contamination as a public health concern. This multitude and collectivity is usually captured when the victims are represented in terms of percentages and numbers. For example, when victims are being enumerated, a collective definition does it more powerfully because the collectivity sums up the scope of the toxic contamination.
The dead and the 90 other victims still living with leukemia and cancer were relocated to the former US bases when volcano Pinatubo erupted. (DD-36)

In other instances, the definition of a collective victim is also used to present mortality rates among those who were exposed to the contamination. The number, although not exact, makes it more powerful in asserting responsibility over these people whose lives have been negatively affected by the exposure to toxic contamination.

Today, more than one hundred people have died from illnesses believed to be linked to the toxic waste. (DD-23)

Another powerful way to present the collective victim is to situate its proximity to the polluting facility. The use of the notion of the collective victim constitutes powerful rhetoric in asserting connections between exposure to toxins on former US bases, and the diseases that ensued. For example:

Over the last decade, dozens of Filipinos living near the former military bases have been killed or maimed by contact with unexploded bombs; more recently there has been an increase in cancers and other ailments - among children living on and around the facilities. (DD-24)

In this quote, the collective victim is identified with its national identity, proximity to the military bases and the nature of various incidents. Although used in a broader sense, this notion of collective victim as defined in the quote delineates a selective group of people whose common lived experiences include 1) being Filipinos, 2) having lived in or near these military bases, and 3) having experienced in some degree medical conditions related to the alleged toxic contamination in the former US military bases. This definitive characterization of the collective victim also helped in narrowing down the list of the victims that PTFBC would use all throughout its campaign.

This particular portrayal of the collective victim also returns the issues of toxic contamination on the former US bases back to their colonial roots by asserting national
identity as a collective identity of victimization. The proximity aspect is used similarly to the one being used by environmental justice (EJ) activists in the US. By portraying this collectivity, the PTFBC campaign gained leverage in making assertions about the extent of the impact. Like EJ advocates, who invoked collective identities based on race and class, the PTFBC campaign used nationality not only to assert being victimized by the contamination, but also to link such victimization to the status of being colonized for almost a century by the US.

The use of children as another way to identify collective victims is also strategically powerful frame because it highlights the helplessness of the collective victim to decide and have choices. Since most of the victims were children, the collective identity became more powerful by combining ideas of human rights with a lack of agency to avoid exposure to contamination. Although in the case of the PTFBC campaign, I did not encounter many explicit assertions of human rights as the main framework for advocacy, the fact that the campaign invoked children in describing the collective victim implies an emphasis on human rights. The use of this collective victim was legitimated by the Philippine Senate when it listed that there were “144 people in communities around Clark and Subic who have died of cancer and other illnesses believed [to be] linked to toxic wastes” (DD-19).

The second type of victim that was used by PTFBC was the “individual victim.” The “individual victim” is defined and identified by respective names. For example:

The most prominent is six year old Crizel Jane Valencia, dubbed the "Toxic Warrior. (DD-36)

Crizel Jane Valencia, who died in March 2002 due to complications brought about by leukemia, became the symbolic representative of other children who had been exposed
to toxic contamination in CAB and had contracted various diseases since birth. Crizel, as she was referred to in numerous documents, had died while on board the Rainbow Warrior. Rainbow Warrior is Greenpeace’s ship that travels between Canada and other destinations to bring awareness to some of the most flagrant environmental issues that are transnational in nature and extent. Crizel, knowing of the existence of the Rainbow Warrior, wished to see and ride in it. So when Rainbow Warrior was scheduled to sail via Manila, the Greenpeace crews made sure to bring Crizel and other children-victims on board the ship, and to sail on Manila harbors. However, once on board, Crizel felt lightheaded and began vomiting. Within moments after this happened, Crizel was pronounced dead. She died in the arms of her mother while on board Rainbow Warrior.

Since this incident happened on the Rainbow Warrior, the press releases centered on Greenpeace and its Rainbow Warrior rather than PTFBC and its campaign.

PTFBC also highlighted several other prominent individual victims as symbols for the cleanup campaign. Another “prominent” victim who had been the “most photographed” among the remaining survivors in Madapdap was Abraham Taruc. Abe, as he was fondly called by the family and eventually the entire campaign, had cerebral palsy when he was born in the CAB. Other individual victims who had been featured in the media included Sheila Pineda, a girl of the same age as Crizel who was suffering from a congenital heart disease; Dianne Liwanag, a 6-year old girl who was afflicted with cerebral palsy and was usually brought to demonstrations to be shown to US officials at the US Embassy; and Alberto Carlos, a 65-year old grandfather who was suffering from lead and mercury poisoning (DD-36).
The use of individual victims was powerful in the sense that it gave a human face to the toxic contamination, and thereby the cleanup campaign. Second, it helped in promoting the campaign outside the Philippines, either in forging new network ties with other NGOs across the world, or in raising funds for the campaign. In fact, with the individual victims whose photographs and names were being published on the internet, a number of possible philanthropists became interested in helping these individuals. For example, according to a respondent, the Prince of Monaco (son of Princess Caroline who also visited the area) visited the victims of Madapdap to meet with the victims of the toxic contamination whom he got to know through photographs published on the internet. When Abe, who was not included among those presented to the Prince, was not around, the Prince particularly looked for Abe, whose photographs had moved him (Interviewee 2). Finally, the use of individual victims allowed the campaign to file a class action lawsuit against the two governments, naming as plaintiffs the survivors and heirs of the victims of the toxic contamination (DD-13).

**Demonstrating Victimhood**

PTFBC employed multiple criteria in order to demonstrate victimhood. Location became one criterion. The people represented collectively and individually were first and foremost depicted as “Mt. Pinatubo victims.” They were uprooted from their towns and municipalities because of lahar, and were lodged temporarily in CAB. There was no contestation to this victimhood, since the areas where these people came from originally were buried with mud from the lahar. In fact, the government immediately recognized this demonstration of victimhood and tried to work towards the alleviation of the suffering of evacuees, in large measure due to the loss of their homes and communities. For example,
more than 20,000 Filipino families who sought refuge from Mount Pinatubo spent years at Clark … as they waited for government housing. (DD-40)

The second demonstration of victimhood concerned the poor conditions in the evacuation center at CAB. While in CAB, most respondents (16/18) described their conditions as pitiful, having to wait for government rations and private donations for their daily subsistence. Although some of them (2/18) tried to work on the land, the small plots and the quality of the soil did not permit them to secure sustainable livelihoods. Others (3/18) found some seasonal jobs by selling *tinibag na bato* (crushed stones) on the roadside, or working in other places. One respondent said that her family only lived a few months in CAB because her brother’s family was able to get them out. This was the case of those evacuees who had the means to move out of CAB. The rest had to live with the CAB’s conditions. Living in CAB thus presented serious hardships, even setting aside the toxic contamination, and thus constituted a second demonstration of victimhood.

Finally, the third demonstration of victimhood came from the exposure to toxic contamination itself. Respondents identified themselves as being victims of both Pinatubo and toxins at CAB. They already came to accept their poor conditions even after they were relocated in Madapdap. In CAB, these respondents complained of “foul-smelling and oily water” (DD-40). Even after boiling the water from wells, the quality did not improve. However, since they did not have enough water being rationed for their household, they used the water from wells.

These anecdotal accounts of the toxicity of the water were confirmed by other research done on some areas of the former US bases (see discussion in Chapter 5). PTFBC presented these results in conferences and advocacy events of the campaign in
order to prove not only the toxic contamination but the victimhood of these children and adults who were afflicted by illnesses caused by the toxic exposure and contamination of the area. These accounts included stories on stillbirths, miscarriages, cancer, and leukemia, among others.

**Representing Self as Victim**

Beyond PTFBC’s demonstrations of victimhood, the victimization frame was legitimated insofar as it was adopted by evacuees themselves. This process involved individual internalization of the term “victim” by aligning their previous experiences in CAB area with the claims of toxic exposure. I observed during my interviews among the respondents that they automatically used the word “victims” when they were introducing themselves, their children, and the rest of the family. In fact, the word “victim” or “biktima” was used in the 31 interviews around 120 times. Interviewees readily labeled and referred to themselves as victims, and easily narrated to me their victimhood. By the time of interviews, I believe that the respondents had very much internalized the victim label and had resolved to represent themselves as such.

In representing themselves or their children as victims, the respondents used mostly the notion of individual victims – themselves. When using the collective victim idiom, the respondents would refer to them in plural form as “mga biktima” or “victims.” When asked when they realized that they had been victimized, most of them (10/18) answered “when PTFBC started organizing” them in CAB. This information is crucial, as it implies that it was indeed the campaign that made the respondents realize that they had been victimized by being exposed to toxic contamination in the former US bases. Only one respondent, who claimed to be one of the original community leaders even when they were still in CAB, said that she was already very much aware of the
Contestation among Victims

The process of defining and identifying victims, however, raises questions about who is not defined by the PTFBC as a victim, but may nonetheless feel themselves victimized. I interviewed one respondent who kept raising the question that “why was [her] granddaughter not included in the list of victims” from Madapdap? While identification as victims within families is subject to expansive definitions, to include kin in the same category, definitions of victimhood among families also can lead to competition over who is really a victim.

Women also compared one another in terms of “whose child is more victimized,” or “whether the child-victim has actually been conceived, born or lived in the CAB.” Both counterclaims were projected towards breaking the connection between the illnesses of these child-victims and the cause of their diseases. Either way, these counterclaims were there for three reasons, namely: 1) as a symbolic protest against not being included in the “list of victims”; 2) as a means to discount the credibility of the children-victims and their parents; and 3) as a legitimate way of asking questions.

First and foremost, these contestations can be rooted from how the official list of victims was set up by the PTFBC. In an interview with a PTFBC leader, I asked:

Question: Were all occupants of CAB organized or only those whose children were sick?

Respondent: Not really, because we are talking of 350,000 individuals.

Question: That’s a lot.

Respondent: Yes. Do you know where we got those data? We accumulated [the data] over time once we entered CAB.
This excerpt explains, above all else, two things. First is that the PTFBC considered the huge population that occupied the CAB to generate a mass base for its campaign while also selecting particular people as victims to highlight those who were most affected by the contamination. And second, the resulting list was limited to people who were afflicted with particularly obvious and serious medical conditions including leukemia, skin diseases, congenital heart disease, and motor sensory imbalance (DD-13). This list has become instrumental in justifying the campaign of the PTFBC, but more importantly, it served as a basis for soliciting and distributing assistance to the victims on the list. Those victims who were officially on the list (i.e., those who were exposed to the toxic contamination in CAB) received some medical assistance from philanthropic individuals and other government agencies and nongovernmental organizations. However, the exclusivity of the list, and its function as the basis for distributing medical assistance and other benefits, made the list an object of contestation among the victims themselves.

As a symbolic protest, contestations among victims were rather complicated. For example, I encountered this personally while doing fieldwork. My presence in the community became questionable to some of the respondents (2/18) when they came to see a community leader (1/18) in her house. According to the community leader whom I already had met a day prior to the visit by the two other respondents, these two respondents came to her to “report” my activities in the community. They were asking if the community leader had been interviewed already before they had, claiming that “[she] should be the first to be interviewed because [she] is the more qualified among them in the first place.”
I interpret this instance in two ways. At first, I viewed this action as an act done out of respect. However, once I got the details, I realized that this incident was a reflection of a deep-seated tension among these women who are vigilant in avoiding "conflicts of interest" by leaders or gatekeepers in the community. The women seek to ensure that they are included in whatever assistance is made available to the community through these gatekeepers. Indeed, the role of leaders in organizing these women as beneficiaries of incoming NGOs is crucial in determining who is on which list.

This process of identifying the rightful beneficiaries of various philanthropic programs coming into the community on the heels of the PTFBC became another venue for contestation among victims. For example, at the time of my interviews, there were NGOs supporting two groups of victims. One group consisted of those children-victims or their siblings who are being supported by the Philippine Scholars, which is an organization sending children to school from elementary to college. In Madapdap, one had already finished a bachelor's degree and was now teaching at the nearby high school in the relocation center. This program was being carried out through a former community organizer of PTFBC.

Another group consisted of the beneficiaries of the Virlanie Foundation, an NGO based in Makati City, which provided for the daily medical needs and maintenance of these children-victims. Through the community leader who was also a former community organizer of PTFBC, the Virlanie Foundation sent supplies and money on a regular basis or upon request from the families. Recipients were being monitored by the community leader who personally handpicked who would be included in her list. When asked how she was choosing children-victim-beneficiaries, she claimed that she had
personal knowledge of whether that child had actually been born or raised in CAB, that is, if she or he was “truly a victim.” Being a community leader of those evacuees of CAB, she knew who was just faking and who was truly a victim. She even claimed that some who were highly photographed might not really be victims if you could just trace them back to their place and time of birth.

This form of contestation may not be entirely valid, but it reveals the intrigues involving mothers of child-victims (Interviewee 15). Even if it was true that some who were included in the original list of victims by the PTFBC were not actually born or raised in CAB, the fact remained that these women who represented their children-victims were contesting everyone’s credibility. To prove that they were more victimized than others amounted to contestation of credibility; the same applied to efforts by mothers who argued that they should be getting more benefits than those of other children-victims.

While the individualized notion of being a victim led to contestation, even with the collective notion, people would still contest who should belong to the list. “The list” amounts to a collective aggregation of victims, and it serves as the utmost legitimization of the victimhood of these individuals. Being included in “the list” means being represented, having a voice, and being active. Being included in “the list” also means being able to access benefits by legitimately making a demand for benefits. Further, being included in “the list” means being recognized as individuals, and having one’s victimhood authoritatively acknowledged. And being included in “the list” provides the justification for one’s claims-making. Not being included in the list means being a
persona non grata as far as the toxic contamination in the former US bases in the Philippines is concerned.

The instances surrounding these contestations can be partly explained by Olson (1965), who asserts that collective action cannot be mobilized through collective benefits as free riding can become a problem. Free riding refers to the notion that rational beings would not want to get involved in any collective action but still expect to receive benefits from the impact or success of such mobilization. Olson further asserts that in order to combat the problem of free riding, selective benefits have to be delineated. In this case study, these selective benefits became visible once the victims who became members of PTFBC started receiving assistance from PTFBC and its partner-organizations.

The lack of access to these benefits had prompted other members to challenge the composition of the list to the point of even discounting the victimhood of some PTFBC members. Thus, when a grandmother came to me and asked me “why is my granddaughter not on the list,” I could not answer her directly. In the interview, she claimed that her daughter was too shy to ask the community organizers when they were going around their neighborhood asking for children who were born or raised in CAB. She faulted her daughter for not being assertive enough to volunteer her granddaughter, even though she suffered from difficulties in breathing and stunted growth, after being born and raised in the CAB. She expressed her frustrations at watching other children being labeled as “victims” and not her granddaughter, who she claimed had every right to be included in “the list” because of her conditions. Had she been present during the survey, she could have volunteered in the PTFBC for her
granddaughter’s sake. She said she was willing to come to every meeting and rally that the organization would require of her just for her granddaughter to be included. Watching other mothers and grandmothers being given assistance to feed and sustain their children-victims, she got more frustrated because of that missed opportunity of not being included in the list. Finally, she asked, “Is there another chance to be included in the list?” and became involved in the campaign.

**Chapter Conclusion**

In this chapter, I argued that the emergence of PTFBC as a local environmental campaign was a result of enduring social movements against US interventions in the Philippines. I supported this argument through documentation in three thematic sections that narrated the historical circumstances surrounding the birth of PTFBC. First, I traced the colonial history between the US and the Philippines to show how the installation of the US military bases in the Philippines had solidified the US stranglehold on the Philippines, and how Filipinos resisted against such bondage through various social movements. This first section outlined the nationalist backdrop that inspired the succeeding mobilizations among Filipinos to strengthen their claim of a collective identity. By presenting a historical narrative of oppression, the local environmental campaign highlighted the continuing victimization of the Filipino people by US foreign policies.

Moreover, the first section generated insights about the dynamics of the social movements arising within the context of the Philippines-US relations. These insights include the following: (a) the demands of the social movements arising within the context of the US-Philippines colonial relationship varied, ranging from modest social reforms to complete independence from the US; (b) the power struggles between
leaders and ordinary members played a crucial role in determining the outcome of movements; and (c) both the Philippine and the US governments variously repressed or evaded social movements whose agendas directly questioned the legitimacy of state authority.

In the second section, I discussed the political opportunities that set the stage for the emergence of PTFBC. These political opportunities included both domestic and transnational political opportunities, such as: a) the nonrenewal of the MBA in 1991 and the total withdrawal of US military bases in 1992; b) the toxic tours in 1994; and c) the relocation of a breakaway group of seasoned activists from a local NGO to an advocacy desk of a national NGO, which became the PTFBC. By becoming national, PTFBC captured broader media attention, both nationally and internationally. This discussion demonstrated the importance of political opportunity structures in facilitating the rise of a local environmental campaign. In general, the political commotion among the elites created by the removal of US bases in the Philippines allowed a momentary opportunity for civil society organizations to push their agenda into mainstream Philippine politics.

Finally, the third section examined how PTFBC framed its environmental advocacy in terms of victimization. I proposed three activities that PTFBC pursued in adopting a victim frame, including 1) defining and identifying the victims, 2) demonstrating victimhood, and 3) representing the victims in public. PTFBC represented these victims both as collective and individual. This dual notion of victimhood enabled the PTFBC to push its advocacy using either the power of numbers (collective) or the power of emotions (human face) to effectively affect the public. In time, the victim label became
fully internalized and articulated by the victims and their families, and the campaign became more focused on individual victims than collective victims.

While this process of defining the victims by PTFBC might have given voices to the afflicted individuals, it has also become a locus of contestation by individuals who were excluded from the list even though they too may have been exposed to the same toxins while living within the CAB. This discussion provided an understanding of the importance of framing not only in amplifying the issues, but also in distributing the benefits among the participants of the campaign. In the next chapter, I will discuss how this local environmental campaign mobilized a transnational advocacy network in support of the cleanup campaign of the toxic contamination in the former US military bases.
CHAPTER 5
FROM LOCAL TO TRANSNATIONAL ADVOCACY

The previous chapter examined the emergence of the local environmental campaign as an offshoot of enduring social movements against colonialism. This chapter discusses the second research question, which focuses on how a local environmental campaign evolves into a transnational advocacy network (TAN). Becoming transnational in this case has a threefold meaning. First, transnationalization involves developing strategies to promote awareness and invoke international support for local advocacy. Second, it means opening up the local setting to the participation of other international actors to enable local-international collaboration on environmental issues. Finally, becoming transnational ultimately denotes the deployment of resources from international partners by local actors in order to change the behavior of government agencies concerning toxic contamination, and thereby facilitate remediation.

Transnationalism as Strategy

Developing strategies that are both compelling and successful is critical in any social movement. Strategies encompass goals with general blueprints, which guide a social movement organization in the pursuit of its goals. In contrast, tactics are specific actions that contribute to carrying out the strategy (Lauer 1976). Strategic decisions are critical in establishing the legitimacy of the movement, identifying other social movements where cooperation is possible, and attaining the goals and objectives of the movement (Heberle 1951).

A key strategy in the case of the People’s Task Force for Bases Cleanup’s (PTFBC) cleanup campaign was to organize a TAN to persuade both the Philippine and
United States (US) governments to acknowledge the toxic contamination at US military bases such as Clark Air Force Base (CAB), and to deal with it. As articulated in one of the documents I consulted on the cleanup campaign,

[t]he strategy was to build networks within and between both the US and the Philippines, and assist in improving bilateral dialogue and cooperation between the two governments. (DD-45)

In order to achieve this goal, the PTFBC designed its transnationalism strategy involving two sequential processes. These processes are illustrated in Figure 5-1. First, transnationalism as strategy entails blurring the political-geographic divide between two nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) located across borders, by initiating a TAN and sharing information to advocate for the clean-up campaign. Using pertinent information, the network endeavors to change the behavior of the targeted states through persuasion and protest.

In this case, PTFBC shared information with the US Working Group (USWG), a group of experts and scientists in the US. The USWG volunteered their services to obtain many technical documents available in the US regarding the former bases in the Philippines, and to translate them from cryptic jargon into more accessible terms. Through shared information, both PTFBC and USWG (which eventually became another NGO, the Filipino American Coalition for Environmental Solidarity, or FACES) attempted to persuade and protest to their governments (i.e., the Philippine and US governments, respectively) in order to change their behaviors favorably toward the cleanup of the toxic contamination in the former US military bases in the Philippines.

Second, given time and space, a TAN can also move past mere information sharing to more engaged collaboration, as both NGOs reach out to the community of victims whom they represent publicly. The use of a participatory approach ensures the
involvement of community members in the advocacy work through grassroots organizing. A TAN can also further reach out and deepen its involvement with the community through projects geared toward helping the community members in specific household concerns (i.e., providing medical assistance, scholarship, and even clean water).

In this case study, PTFBC organized the community of victims to ensure their meaningful participation in the advocacy network. At the same time, PTFBC also welcomed Filipino American interns to engage in community immersion under PTFBC and expose them to the problems of the victims, in hopes that these interns would bring their experiences back to the US and start a similar campaign in support of PTFBC. These Filipino American interns would later become instrumental in spreading the word across various cities in the US about the toxic contamination at CAB and other US military bases in the Philippines, and the importance of the cleanup campaign. Together with members of USWG, these interns and other concerned individuals would consolidate their support of the PTFBC’s cleanup campaign by creating FACES and deepening their relationships with the individual victims and their families, through small projects such as medical assistance, scholarships, and deep well construction. These processes together do not necessarily follow the Boomerang pattern described by Keck and Sikkink (1998) in describing the pathway for TANs (see Figure 1-1). Instead, this dissertation presents an alternate route for TANs, highlighting the role of engaged collaboration.

**Overview of the Chapter**

This chapter focuses on the tactical repertoire used by the TAN consisting of PTFBC and FACES, including networking, information sharing, participatory and direct
action, legal engagement, and engaged collaboration. This comprises the first part of my analysis in this chapter. In addition, I address the issue of how the TAN engaged governments by way of pressing in an international context for a cleanup of former US bases in the Philippines. Government responses from both the Philippine and US governments are also analyzed in terms of the success or not of TAN in achieving its objectives using transnationalism as a main strategy. For this part of the analysis, I drew on themes from codes such as “lobbying of politicians” (22), “acknowledging toxicity” (11), and “invoking people’s participation” (17), among others because they invoked strategies and tactics that the PTFBC used in translating its agenda into a TAN (see Appendix D). For example, the following quote describes how PTFBC invoked people’s participation in the campaign by first raising awareness among them and then soliciting their support in lobbying of local government to support them via PTFBC:

We also organized the community. We gave them information on the issues surrounding their illnesses and the toxic wastes within the US bases. At the same time, we also encouraged them to express [their concerns] to the government through PTFBC. As a result of our advocacy work, many senators and politicians became supporters of the campaign and the victims of the toxic waste. (Interviewee 1)

Likewise, the following quote also suggests a similar awareness campaign conducted in the US through FACES wherein pioneer members toured major cities to promote the toxic cleanup campaign in the Philippines:

Because we believe the US military is evading its responsibility for the public health damage and threat it has left in the former base, we want to raise awareness on the issue in the United States, where citizens can effectively pressure the US government. We would like to present the stories, facts, and images around the Philippines bases cleanup to you, your school, community, or organization. We look forward to hearing from you and collaboration in this struggle for justice and environmental human rights. (DD-36)
Using these codes, I demonstrate in this section how the issues surrounding the toxic contamination in the former US bases in the Philippines are transnational in nature, and thus require transnational a TAN to address these issues.

Finally, I propose the notion of an engaged collaboration within TAN. In the process, I suggest that the TAN in this study differs in some important respects from TANs studied previously. This part of the analysis draws on themes from codes including “presenting research results” (27), “evoking international support” (14), and “evoking universal standards” (11), among others as these codes illustrated the notion of engaged collaboration as far as the clean-up campaign is concerned (see Appendix D). For example, the following quote presents a statement by one of the PTFBC leaders in evoking some moral standards in dealing with these issues:

It is unthinkable for a nation to sacrifice the lives of its children and allow them to continue skirting the edge of an abysmal toxic future. When we allow this to happen by our own inaction and by the insensitivity of our own decision makers, we are guilty of betraying not only their future but our future as a nation. After all, our children are all that we have. No one, not even the world’s most powerful nation, has the right to steal our children’s future. (DD-109)

This sentiment is also expressed in similar ways by a FACES member who had first-hand experience in the affected local communities:

What I saw in the Philippines is what is hidden from us. My reactions to the experience have inspired me to find ways through FACES to channel our energy and generate positive change. These stories and these images are not just brochures. I am still learning what to do with them. All of us here, everything, we are showing you, is part of doing something about it, so long as it keeps going from here. (DD-52)

Together these codes led me to inquire deeper into the involvement of both FACES and PTFBC in the lives of the victims. Such analysis shows that the case of TAN that emerged in the Philippines reflects a more engaged collaboration than just mere
information sharing. In reading deeper into these coded segments, I discover that the common identification toward a national identity has linked the members of this network to become more involved in grassroots and community affairs, not commonly exhibited by other TANs.

**A Tactical Repertoire**

Social movement tactics are often dramatic and unconventional, which are oftentimes remembered more than the social movement itself (Taylor and Van Dyke 2007). These tactics are usually geared toward the social movement’s reference groups, which includes not only the authorities being addressed, but also the public, third parties, and mediators (Rucht 2007). Social movement tactics may include nonviolent direct action (e.g., mass demonstrations, educational campaigns, boycotts, sit-down strikes and walkouts), cultural repertoires (e.g., cross-dressing, street theater, music, graffiti, and wearing symbols), and disruptive and violent tactics (e.g., blockades and sabotage) (Taylor and Van Dyke 2007). In the environmental justice movement literature, for example, the most successful and effective tactical repertoire of communities combine the following tactics: (a) finding a receptive audience and venue to whom they feel safe to speak out against domains of power; (b) organizing among the directly affected segments of the population; (c) establishing alliances among local groups and individuals who have expertise concerning the environmental hazard in question; (d) educating and mobilizing the intended audience about the sources of pollution and the risks they pose to the general public, in order to gain support; and (e) seeking legal representation by networking with other regional, national and even international partners to expand the scope of the advocacy (Blodgett 2006; Carruthers 2007; Corburn 2002).
In discussing tactical repertoires, I focus on two themes. First, I discuss the repertoire of protest used in the cleanup campaign, to elucidate the transformation of the campaign from local to transnational. This repertoire includes alliance-building through networks, use of scientific research, participatory organizing, and legal strategies. Second, I analyze the engaged collaboration between the PTFBC, the victims, and FACES. This engaged collaboration further elaborated the transnational structure of the campaign.

**Networking**

Environmental movement organizations often form alliances with other organizations to substantiate their tactical repertoire via grassroots organizing, educational campaigns, protests, boycotts, marches, testimonials, and lawsuits (Bullard 2000; Schlosberg 1999). The bases cleanup campaign of PTFBC utilized a similar tactical repertoire as it had recognized the transnational nature of its advocacy. PTFBC also realized that the only way to fight for its advocacy was to provide hard evidence of toxic contamination in the CAB.

**US Working Group.** PTFBC received assistance from the US Working Group (USWG), which provided the much-needed scientific basis for the cleanup campaign. USWG was a network of American NGOs which formed in 1994 to support the campaign for the cleanup of the former US military bases in the Philippines. Organizationally speaking, USWG consisted of three committees, namely, the Core, Technical, and Organizing Committees. It was the main task of the Technical Committee “to provide ongoing analysis, training and environmental consulting to PTFBC” (DD-99).
The USWG endeavored to share information with PTFBC by translating, commenting on and interpreting the technical documents made available by the US military to the American public regarding the status of the former military bases in the Philippines. As one member of USWG expressed,

during the toxic legacy tour, one of the things that happened is that the US military was forced to release all these documents about Clark and Subic and we confirmed many things that I had predicted in 1989…but they were very technical. But anyway, so the reason I mentioned this is we knew that the first phase of this work had to do with reviewing a lot of technical information because with this information the next stage in a military bases cleanup is to do assessment---take samples, all that stuff. It was very technical so I decided that, even though I have been involved more and more in policies in the past, I decided to focus on the technical stuff, and other people focused on the policy. (Interviewee 27)

In a sense, the USWG became an “epistemic community” in the transnational setting. An epistemic community is defined as a group of experts whose main goal is to share their technical knowledge and know-how to the larger audience in hopes of fostering policy learning (see Haas 1992). Indeed, the members of the USWG Technical Committee were experts in the fields of chemistry, geology, soil science, chemical engineering, and environmental health medicine.

At first, the USWG remained as technical and policy advisor to the partnership between the Central Luzon Alliance in Sovereign Philippines and the Nuclear-Free Philippines Coalition (NFPC), which housed PTFBC as a campaign arm. However, as PTFBC emerged as an independent organization, USWG focused increasingly with the PTFBC. USWG continued collaborating with PTFBC, concentrating on unearthing scientific evidence for the campaign to achieve legitimacy and authority. As technical experts, USWG came up with “An Environmental and Health Impact Report” on the toxic contamination in the former US military bases in the Philippines (Interviewee 27).
This document was almost banned by the Philippine government from being shared with the Filipino public.

Meanwhile, with meaningful collaboration of Filipino Americans in the PTFBC, the USWG saw an opportunity to consolidate its efforts with Filipino Americans who previously conducted community immersion in the Philippines. Together, they founded FACES. Doing so amounted to a transnational strategy which aimed not only to support the PTFBC’s campaign in the Philippines through technical inputs, but also to simultaneously support the campaign in the US to pressure the US government to recognize the toxic contamination in the former US bases in the Philippines. The goal of this strategy was for recognition to result in remediation efforts by the US government in its former military bases in the Philippines.

**Filipino American Coalition for Environmental Solidarity.** FACES was initially named “Filipino/American Coalition for Environmental Solutions.” Its initial objective was solely to provide support for the cleanup campaign in the Philippines. The PTFBC had contributed significantly to the formation of FACES since it facilitated the community immersion of two of the pioneer members of FACES. PTFBC invited Filipino American interns to volunteer in the Madapdap Resettlement Center under the PTFBC. The interns became instrumental in bringing their experiences with the toxic victims in the Philippines back to the US, and started out as pioneer members and founders of FACES. Upon completing their volunteer work in the Philippines, the interns conducted several speaking tours, targeting university student bodies in the US to urge them to support the cleanup efforts in the Philippines. The interns visited major cities and universities with relatively large Filipino constituencies such as San Francisco, Berkeley,
Washington, D.C., Hawaii, and Seattle, among others. They were joined by USWG personnel who provided the technical details on the contamination of former US bases in the Philippines. The speaking tours received an overwhelming response from the Filipino American communities and students. It was just a matter of time before concerned individuals in Filipino American communities realized the need to provide a formal avenue to channel the desire among Americans – of Filipino descent or not – to lend a hand in the cleanup campaign. The following quote sums up these events leading to the formation of FACES through the efforts of these young interns:

They [interns] were extremely effective speakers especially with young Filipino-Americans. And so, I believe it was during their visit here in California that we sat down and … when I was saying, you know… I wished there were somebody working with us to also do the other aspects [aside from what USWG was doing]. …and so that’s how the FACES got started. From that idea, I remember we had a conference called and we talked to some people in, I think, Minnesota. I remember there was a conference called and out of that came a consensus that we would organize a national meeting and here in Berkeley and out of it will merge. In other words what [the interns] had been doing, as they were going around, they were getting the names, you know, of those who would want to get involved and at the same time here we were in US Working Group and all we do is focusing and keying up issues and building up the evidence and all that stuff and testifying. (Interviewee 27)

While awaiting approval of its registration, FACES was formed, and first housed under the auspices of Arc Ecology, a “community-based grassroots organization for peace, environmental responsibility, a compassionate economy, [and] a just society” located in San Francisco, California (see http://www.arcecology.org). Arc Ecology was also responsible for facilitating the work of USWG at its inception, since Arc Ecology’s founder was also a committed member of the USWG. Other organizations which supported FACES comprised some of the organizations who were also active in the anti-martial law and anti-US intervention movements among Filipino and American
activists in the US, such as Friends of Filipino People, Alliance for Philippine Concerns, Minnesota group, and the Philippine Action Group for the Environment.

With members scattered across the US, FACES started launching chapters in each of the states where there was a critical mass of members who were willing to host activities and projects to support FACES. These chapters were established in Honolulu, Washington, D.C., Minneapolis-St. Paul, Berkeley, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Seattle, and New York, among others. These chapters conducted various activities to draw attention to the cleanup campaign. Activities included tabling, lobbying, letter writing, fundraising, speaking tours, film screenings, and others. Other forms of participation involved sending monetary contributions directly to FACES.

**Other NGOs.** While this study focuses mainly on the TAN between the PTFBC and FACES, it is also worth noting that both PTFBC and FACES had their own respective networks in the Philippines and the US. In fact, both PTFBC and FACES were networks of individuals and organizations bounded by their affiliations to other environmental or social justice projects. For example, Arc Ecology’s founder was a former member of Greenpeace, and PTFBC’s key contact in USWG had been affiliated in various Filipino American activist groups which also supported FACES in its work. Such deep and extensive involvement of Arc Ecology at the onset of the campaign is captured in the following quote:

In 1994, Arc Ecology was part of a delegation to the Philippines whose objective was to develop strategies on the technical aspects of both environmental assessment and base clean-up and the health impacts of these base contaminants. (DD-45)

In the PTFBC, the Board of Directors (BOD) was recruited from various existing NGOs in the Philippines. For example, three BOD members were also members of the
NFPC, a national NGO, while another BOD member was Director of Greenpeace Southeast Asia (http://www.greenpeace.org/seasia/ph). Other members came from local government units and agencies, or local chapters of PTFBC in the Metro Clark and Metro Subic Bay areas, which were in direct contact with the PTFBC as the national umbrella organization. All in all, since 1994, PTFBC was able to establish a network of 50 organizations and individuals in Metro Manila, and the Clark and Subic areas.

**Information Sharing**

Researching toxicity is a costly business, and the PTFBC did not have the financial liberty to conduct its own analyses. It therefore relied on various research organizations to gather reliable information about the extent and nature of the toxic contamination in the former US military bases and their neighboring communities. In general, proving toxic contamination had been a struggle among local environmental advocacy groups, especially in deciphering what constitutes a valid claim of toxic exposure or contamination, and how to access appropriate information to make such claims. What comes to mind are the many experiences of grassroots organizations in the US and abroad which are always confronted with the question of the sources of their authority when making claims on toxic contamination or pollution in their communities (e.g., see Levine 1982 on Love Canal incident).

The research I discuss below served the cleanup campaign well by providing information good enough to establish the presence of toxic contaminants in selected areas of former US military bases in the Philippines. This research may have some methodological flaws (i.e., limited sample size, selective testing areas, lack of baseline data, etc.). Nonetheless, the very inadequacy of information generated from the research became an impetus to call for immediate action in terms of a formal if
preliminary assessment of the bases. The results were used to prompt further action from the Philippine and US governments, resulting in calls for the creation of the first US-Philippines joint bilateral task force to clean up the bases.

**Government Accountability Office.** The GAO (formerly named the General Accounting Office) is the investigative arm of the US Congress, and assists representatives in carrying out their constitutional responsibilities to ensure the accountability of the federal government (www.gao.org). The GAO provided the impetus for the mobilization of local environmental advocacy groups surrounding the bases contamination issues in the Philippines. In 1992, a year after US military withdrew from CAB, the GAO published a report entitled “Military Closures: US Financial Obligations in the Philippines.”

In the report, the GAO asserted that both the US Air Force and the US Navy had identified environmental damage in both the CAB and the Subic Naval Base after the US military withdrew in 1991. It also identified a list of contaminants, which included but were not limited to polychlorinated biphenyls (PCB), benzene, and a number of persistent organic pollutants (POPs). GAO pegged the cost of cleanup in both military bases at least $25 million, confirming the claims of Filipino and American activists. However, given the stipulations of the 1947 Military Bases Agreement (MBA), the US could not be held responsible for cleaning up such toxic contamination, and left the task of cleanup as the responsibility of the Philippine government.

**Independent research by Filipino and American experts.** Following the lead of the GAO, a team of scientists, journalists and students conducted a preliminary environmental investigation in the former US bases. Other organizations which were
involved in this pioneer study included the United Nations Development Program (www.undp.org), the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism (www.pcij.org), the Center for Environmental Concerns (www.cecphils.org) and the University of the Philippines Institute of Chemistry (www.chem.upd.edu.ph). Among other things, the team found 300 barrels of toxic chemicals left by the US Air Force in CAB (DD-71). While the results were not conclusive due to limitations in the sampling size, the team concluded that there was an urgent need to assess the nature and extent of contamination in these bases.

**World Health Organization.** The following year, the World Health Organization (WHO) published its mission report with a preliminary assessment of the health and environmental risks from pollution in Subic Naval Base. The document was entitled “WHO Mission Report: Safety and Control of Toxic Chemicals and Hazardous Wastes.” The research conducted site inspections and interviews with current occupants of Subic Naval Base, the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA) employees, and others.

Its overall findings asserted that: (a) there were no obvious widespread pollution problems in the area; (b) the previous and current operations seemed to have been conducted with “reasonable standards of care”; but (c) there were a number of areas which contained “considerable pollution potentials.” These highly contaminated areas were the Ship Repair Facility, the on-site landfills, industrial wastewater, untreated sewage, and the transport of large volumes of fuels and oils between Subic and CAB. The report recommended sampling and analysis of these potential sites of contamination as soon as possible.
**Developer-sponsored researches.** Two developers, the Clark Development Corporation (CDC) and the SBMA, sponsored research to look for evidence of toxic contamination in the former US bases. At first, these two corporations refused adamantly to cooperate with the cleanup campaign, for fear that the allegations would undermine their business operations in converting the former US bases into economic zones. Their main strategy was to manage public opinion to position CAB as a premier area fit to become an international business district. Much later, due to public pressure, these developers were convinced that earlier detection and acknowledgment of toxicity in these areas could expedite the cleanup efforts by the US government.

In 1996, SBMA released the results of the Woodward Clyde Environmental Baseline Survey of Subic Bay. Based on limited sampling, the study found different levels of contamination in many areas but declared that there is “no widespread severe contamination” in Subic. The cleanup campaign disagreed and brought pressure on SBMA to reconsider the survey’s conclusions. It took some time before the CEO of SBMA finally admitted to the widespread toxic contamination in Subic.

In 1997, the CDC also released a summary of the Environmental Baseline Study in CAB done by Asia-Star Weston International. This research identified 13 areas with serious contamination. It further recommended that seven of these sites be further investigated with regard to the nature and extent of toxic contamination. These results were transmitted by the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) to then US Secretary of State Madeline Albright, to request technical assistance from the US in order to confirm the findings obtained by these independent consulting firms on both
bases. In 1998, Sec. Albright issued an impassive letter without actually responding to the request.

**Health survey.** In 1998, upon the request of the NFPC and the PTFBC, the Canada-based International Institute of Concern for Public Health (IICPH) conducted a participatory community health survey. The survey gathered data on the demographic information and health profiles of 13 communities within the vicinity of CAB. The data gathering was carried out by a team of nurses and community volunteers among 759 randomly selected individuals.

The IICPH’s research attempted to connect the illnesses reported by the interviewees with the toxins found in the CAB. The results of the research pointed to an elevated number of illnesses among the households living around the CAB area. The IICPH concluded that the CAB area was heavily contaminated with toxic substances, and that inhalation or ingestion of such toxins would alter the normal bodily functions of the people in ways corresponding to the illnesses being reported.

**Participatory and Direct Action**

Participatory and direct action are the building blocks of any protest movement seeking to persuade other social actors to acknowledge and act upon the movement’s agenda. Using such tactics ensures a more engaged membership and facilitates sharing of information and skills among members. In the case of PTFBC, local participation and direct action were the lifeblood of its environmental advocacy in pursuing its strategic objectives.

**Grassroots organizing.** When the PTFBC was formalized as an independent NGO apart from the NFPC, it recognized the need to organize the victims from the communities it represented. As one community organizer recalled:
As a community organizer, my work involved different resettlements of those who became residents of CAB during the Mt. Pinatubo [eruption]. CAB became a temporary shelter to the victims of Pinatubo while waiting for the construction of the resettlement areas to be finished. We organized those families with victims of toxic waste, specifically those who got sick while living in CAB. The advocacy of PTFBC really centers on local advocacy work, in organizing the community. (Interviewee 1)

PTFBC organized its local chapters in both CAB and Subic. The extensive background of seasoned activist-leaders in PTFBC came in handy in organizing the victims of the toxic contamination in Clark and Subic. PTFBC also trained community volunteers and organizers for work on site in the communities.

In Clark, the newly established chapter organized the victims who were living mainly in the resettlement areas of Madapdap and Mauaque. These victims were afflicted with illnesses ranging from cancer to heart disease to physical deformities. They or their immediate family members were organized into membership in the PTFBC. As they became bona fide members of the cleanup campaign, they were able to join meetings and demonstrations to lobby for their agenda with their respective authorities. Such grassroots organizing also modified the structure of PTFBC, from solely dominated by its BOD, to becoming a more or less participatory organization based on mass membership. Finally, these grassroots organizing activities proved useful to the TAN later as such involvement in the communities helped facilitate a more engaged collaboration among partner-organizations.

**Lobbying of politicians.** Lobbying of politicians is typically used by organizations seeking political redress or policy innovations. Lobbying entails detailed work, not to mention financial support. Having BOD members and leaders who were nationally recognized and individually connected, PTFBC was able to lobby politicians and other entities that could help the cause of the cleanup campaign. It should be noted that
PTFBC’s lobbying came shortly after the Philippine Senate rejected the MBA renewal between the US and the Philippines.

One of the most significant results that the TAN had achieved was when some USWG members were invited to Philippine Senate and House hearings for the investigation on the toxic contamination of the former US bases. This investigation resulted in the passage of a resolution urging Philippine President Fidel Ramos to discuss these matters with US President William Clinton during his state visit to Manila in November 1994. Likewise, the campaign had already accessed the US politics through FACES. The following quote presents how a US Representative who criticized the unfair treatment of the problems in the Philippines by the US government:

“It’s a moral outrage,” said Rep. Barbara Lee, one of the handful of US lawmakers who have taken an interest in the toxic legacy left behind at US overseas bases. “We’ve done more in cleaning up bases of our NATO allies in the northern hemisphere than what we’ve done elsewhere. This is a question of environmental justice.” (DD-77)

**Rallies and demonstrations.** Popular participation is indispensable in keeping up members’ interest in advocacy. This participatory strategy benefitted both the individual members and the organization overall. Individual members were able to draw attention to their personal experiences, as well as those of their children, and thereby solicit numerous donations from across the world. Such donations in turn provided for medical assistance through the PTFBC. In addition, the PTFBC was also a winner in this strategy because it was able to put faces on the “victims” of the toxic contamination in the former bases.

According to a respondent, one of the most memorable rallies she had ever attended was when they went to demonstrate at the gates of the US embassy. She remembered it quite well because it was when PTFBC carried three drums of PCBs
which were dug up from the CAB and brought to the rally to be returned to the “sender,” meaning the US (Interviewee 1). Another community member described her experience in rallies:

I tell you, when we go to the [US] embassy, we come in different styles. When we are in Manila, we go to Senator Osmeña [Philippine Senate] to rally even more. Laman ako ng Senado [roughly translates to “I am always in the Senate”]. (Interviewee 8)

Still another respondent remembered bringing black coffins to represent the many lives that had been taken because the US would not divulge pertinent information about the contamination in the former bases, and moreover would not accept responsibility for the cleanup (Interviewee 15).

With regard to membership, one respondent noted that once they became members of the organization, the media coverage was enormous. She narrated that her son was once one of the most photographed victims in the communities. Local, national and even international journalists would come and visit them to interview her and photograph her son. One time, she said, her cousin who was abroad told her over the phone that “your son is famous; I just saw his picture here” (Interviewee 2).

National and international publicity and media attention became good indicators of the vitality of the campaign. Media exposure validated the legitimacy of the calls for cleanup. In turn, funds came pouring in and many of the PTFBC’s BOD and staff were being invited to various speaking engagements and international conferences where they represented the cause of the cleanup campaign.

**Legal Engagement**

There were two main demands being put forward by the PTFBC and its supporters. The first demand was for the US government to recognize the toxic
contamination in its former military bases in the Philippines. This would provide the basis to apply US standards to cleaning up the hazardous materials that the US military left behind when it pulled out. PTFBC and its partners invoked the provisions of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (otherwise known as CERCLA or more popularly, Superfund) and called for their application to the Philippine case. CERCLA is a federal law which was enacted by the US Congress in response to the threat of hazardous waste sites in the US and its territories. As pointed out by GAO (1992), the military had noted that when US standards were applied in cleaning up the toxic contamination in former US bases in the Philippines, the cost of cleanup would be considerable. Recognizing that the Philippine government did not have sufficient funds to clean up the former US bases, PTFBC and allies urged the US take responsibility for its wastes.

The second demand was to extend reparations to the individual victims who suffered illnesses and disability due to exposure to the toxic materials in the US bases. Such monetary compensation would cover their medical expenses and daily maintenance, given that most of the victims were children. The lifelong diseases that they contracted from being exposed to these chemicals had left them perpetually dependent on family members to support them. However, these families were also poor and could not afford the expensive medical treatment to alleviate the health conditions of these victims.

The litigation option did not enter into the advocacy campaign until much later. Frustrated by the unresponsiveness of the US government to the call for cleanup, and the apprehensiveness of the Philippine government to protect its jurisdiction and
constituency, the PTFBC and FACES eventually resorted to filing lawsuits against the Philippine and US governments. The details of these cases are discussed in Chapter 6.

**Government Response**

While slow to adapt, the Philippine government also made an effort to conduct its own testing despite a fiscal crisis. In 1994, the Philippine House and Senate committees on ecology and foreign affairs invited USWG members to testify as expert witnesses about the incidence of toxic contamination in the former US bases. Such testimonies were used to pass a resolution calling on Philippine President Ramos to converse with US President Clinton during his visit to the Philippines on November 13, 1994 (DD-72).

In a joint press conference, President Clinton denied any environmental problems in the former US bases but promised to gather facts and evaluate them once proven. This promise proved hollow; fact-finding was never initiated. President Clinton, who had just signed the landmark Executive Order 12898 ordering federal agencies to account for environmental justice in their programs in February 1994, did not seem to hold the same concerns in the case of the Philippines.

In 1995, the Department of Health (DOH) in the Philippines made available the results of tests done on the water quality of 32 deep wells in the communities surrounding the CAB. DOH’s findings showed that the water quality in 5 of those wells was positive for oil and grease, thus confirming the reports of local community members on the poor quality of the drinking water. This report drove the DOH Secretary to seek technical assistance from the US Center for Disease Control (US-CDC). In August 1995, the US State Department granted permission to US-CDC to get involved in this endeavor provided that the Philippine government would shoulder all expenses and
consulting fees for US-CDC personnel who would be involved in the assessment. The DOH Secretary did not follow up on their request.

The Philippine government was also responsive to two publications of research done by independent consulting firms on CAB and Subic Bay. In fact, it did create the Philippine Task Force for Hazardous Wastes in former US Military Installations, through Executive Order 202 in 2000. In 1998, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Secretary, as co-chair of this task force (with DFA as chair), confirmed the existence of toxic and hazardous wastes in the former US bases. DENR further claimed that these substances were found in significant amounts that needed to be removed immediately. By doing so, the Philippine government, despite its apprehensions, had finally admitted the existence of such a problem. Specifically, the task force document states:

More recently, after years of persistent lobbying by NGOs and environmental groups, the Philippine Government in September 1999, acknowledged the presence of toxic contamination in areas previously occupied by US military forces. (DD-29)

Such acknowledgment by the Philippine government of the presence of toxic contamination in the former US military bases was a milestone for the campaign as it was one of the two primary goals of the campaign to persuade the Philippine government to recognize the problem, and initiate bilateral cooperation with the US government. In the next chapter, I will discuss the full impact of such acknowledgement on the fate of the campaign.

**A Theory of Engaged Collaboration across Borders**

In the process of engaging the US and Philippine governments, the nature of transnational advocacy in the cleanup campaign itself evolved. Here I focus on the
evolving nature of the TAN formed between PTFBC and FACES. Typically, TANs constitute a communicative structure governed by shared objectives and values among the participating partners, and can either be transitory or permanent depending on the attainment of objectives and satisfaction of the membership (see Keck and Sikkink 1998).

Keck and Sikkink’s (1998) Boomerang pattern suggests that in contentious politics, the weaker NGO seeks the assistance of external NGOs whenever it faces blockage from its targeted domestic state (Figure 1-1). This action to establish a TAN with external NGOs is primarily done toward information exchange between NGOs across borders. Local organizations hope that external NGOs use pertinent information to solicit the assistance of other NGOs and strong states and/or intergovernmental organizations. In turn, TANs hope that these states and intergovernmental organizations will pressure the targeted state to give in to the challenge of the domestic NGOs.

However, it is plausible that these TANs can also operate in ways that serve purposes other than mere information sharing between partner-organizations. Wu’s (2005) concept of “double mobilization” challenges the assumption of contentious politics in Keck and Sikkink’s Boomerang pattern. According to Wu (2005), double mobilization happens in cases where the state is assumed to be repressive and isolated from international agencies (e.g., China). In this model, the external advocacy actors make contact with domestic social groups to assist them in persuading the state to change its behavior toward the campaign issue. Thus, while forming solidarity with the domestic NGOs, external actors also engage the state to change its position and start
connecting with domestic NGOs. The external actors thus mobilize both the domestic NGOs and the state.

Wu’s (2005) framework in a way is similar to what I discovered from the analysis of the present case in terms of the involvement of external advocacy actors in organizing both the state and the domestic NGOs to collaborate more effectively on an issue. What differs in my case is the collaborative engagement between the domestic and foreign NGOs in dealing with the targeted states, which consist of both domestic and foreign states, and in reaching out to the affected community (see Figure 5-1). In Wu’s framework, the emphasis is on the triangular connections between the state actors and the domestic and the external non-state actors (NSAs). Wu emphasizes how the state and domestic NSAs eventually work together to resolve the issue area once the state becomes familiar with the innovations promoted by the external advocate actors.

What I define as “theory of engaged collaboration,” on the other hand, emphasizes an alternative route to Keck and Sikkink’s (1998) Boomerang pattern and a corollary to Wu’s (2005) Double mobilization model. I theorize that the nature of relationships among partner-organizations within TANs can evolve from mere information sharing into a more engaged collaboration. In this case study, there are three prominent dimensions of engaged collaboration: the technical/legal, the ethical and the ethnic. The emphasis lies on how the domestic NGO (i.e., PTFBC) organizes a TAN so that the external advocate (i.e., FACES) becomes involved in the lives of the community of victims and their families. Engaged collaboration enriches the frameworks of both Keck and Sikkink (1998) and Wu (2005) because it takes into account how the external NGO deepens its
involvement in domestic affairs not only with their partner NGOs and/or the targeted states, but more importantly with the community of victims

**Definitions**

I use the term “engaged collaboration” to denote the recursive process through which the TAN between PTFBC and FACES operated to achieve shared goals and strategies. In this case study, engaged collaboration across borders is defined by three dimensions, namely, the technical/legal, ethical and ethnic aspects of activism. These dimensions are interrelated; they intertwine like threads in a fabric of the lived experiences of the activists in this campaign.

The technical/legal dimension comprises the strategic decisions pertaining to information sharing, policy advocacy, research and education, and litigation aspects of activism. These strategic decisions provided the foundation for the campaign’s claims-making. The ethical dimension, one the other hand, covers the moral and affective aspects of the campaign. It interrogates the social rectitude of the claims based on what is right, beyond that which was set by the law (in this case, the MBA). The victimization frame provided a solid ground for ethical considerations. Finally, the ethnic dimension caters to the collective identity put forth by the campaign, as articulated among Filipinos and Filipino Americans along with their American supporters. This collective identity is anchored on the Filipino nationalist identity and the underlying colonial past that created it.

Analyzing these dimensions provides a deeper understanding of the process by which the campaign transformed from being local to becoming transnational, and from sharing of information to engaged collaboration that amounted to sharing an identity. Hereafter, I analyze how these different dimensions inform the transnationalization of
the campaign. I argue that each dimension has enabled the activists to move beyond information sharing to more fully engaged collaboration between PTFBC and FACES in a TAN. In particular, I argue that it is the element of ethnic identity that solidified the engaged collaboration of the TAN.

The common identification among the members of the network with the Filipino identity was possible through ethnic identity and/or familial association. Most of the members of both PTFBC and FACES identify themselves as “Filipinos” or “Americans of Filipino descent” or “Filipino Americans.” Others who were not obviously of Filipino ethnicity were in one way or another familiar with the Filipino culture or have relationships with Filipinos. Two respondents were married to Filipinos and spent a significant number of years living in the Philippines; thus, they gained such familiarity and familial connection with Filipino identity. Of the Americans among the respondents, two were first-generation immigrants who came to the US when they were school age, and three were second-generation immigrants; one was biracial.

**Technical/Legal Dimension**

At the outset, the cleanup campaign depended largely on the technical expertise of the USWG scientists and other experts who volunteered their services to the Filipino activists. Such technical and scientific information propelled the campaign forward by accessing the international system. This in turn permitted advocacy against the indifference of the Philippine and US governments over the issue of toxic contamination in the former US military bases in the Philippines. In the next five years, the struggle was fundamentally to establish the authenticity of the claims of the PTFBC, that is, whether there was indeed toxic contamination in the former US bases.
The technical dimension of the collaboration expanded the reach of PTFBC and allowed it to link itself to other NGOs across the world that had similar agendas concerning toxic contamination in US military bases in their countries. Such linkages culminated in the First International Forum on US Military Toxics and Bases Cleanup, held in Manila in November 1996. This conference was attended by representatives from NGOs in countries such as US, Japan, South Korea, Panama, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines. In the Final Declaration forged by the participants, the forum collectively underscored above all else the following points:

Whereas, the US Government has managed to establish military bases through unequal and unjust treaties and agreements; . . . . Whereas, the presence of these bases had caused various and unlimited environmental degradation, health impacts and social costs to the local inhabitants; Whereas, the US Department of Defense has failed to properly address these negligent and irresponsible acts. … (see Appendix E for full text)

Technical dimensions of the campaign also yielded projects that were beneficial to the affected communities. Aside from working on the international and national levels, the TAN was able to solicit commitments from private individuals and organizations to finance the design of community projects in order to initiate implementation. This move pushed the TAN toward engaged collaboration rather than just initiating collaborations and writing declarations. Through the community projects, the TAN pursued a deeper and more meaningful involvement in hopes of actually improving the situations of communities affected by toxic contamination. For example, there was a plan to design and construct a deep well for the community of Sapang Bato, a community near the CAB.

Most recently in April 2002, negotiations between Arc Ecology’s Executive Director, International Campaign Coordinator, the Program Coordinator of the Philippine-based People’s Task Force For Base Cleanup, and Philippine Senator Serge Osmeña led to a commitment of $1.5 million Philippine
pesos to tap a new water supply with an engineering design to be created by Arc Ecology’s staff (pro-bono) for the community of Sapang Bato. (DD-45)

**Ethical Dimension**

The ethical dimension of the engaged collaboration between PTFBC and FACES involved righteous condemnation of the US for contaminating its former military bases in the Philippines. To add insult to injury, the US had consistently denied any responsibility to clean up these toxic contaminants from the bases, and had delayed dissemination of information on the major contamination sites. The righteous condemnation is best summed up by Greenpeace toxics campaigner Von Hernandez in his personal statement on the matter:

> It’s a shame that a rich country like the United States has chosen to ignore responsibilities in the Philippines despite the fact that contamination at former US bases is already poisoning the environment and the people. (DD-35)

This statement corroborates the Final Declaration of the First International Forum on US Military Toxics and Bases Cleanup, which called for the US to be accountable for its overseas bases. This ethical dimension of the engaged collaboration between the PTFBC and FACES also invoked the environmental standards being followed in the US.

The ethical standards on environmental protection and remediation to which the campaign referred were adopted from the Superfund Act, which served as the main reference legislation for the entire campaign. In the context of Superfund, which putatively applied to US states and territories, the PTFBC used information exchange to identify similarities among military bases in the mainland US and the Philippines in terms of toxic contamination:

> With the help of our friends in the United States like Arc Ecology and FACES, we began to uncover the similarities between Superfund level
bases in America and those military bases that the US had abandoned in the Philippines. (DD-44)

Convinced that they had sufficient information to sue the Philippine and US government and force them to address these negligent and irresponsible acts over toxic contamination in the Philippines, the PTFBC and FACES filed lawsuits against both governments. PTFBC filed its lawsuit on behalf of the victim-families at the Angeles City Regional Trial Court through a pro-bono prosecutor. Meanwhile, FACES filed a similar lawsuit at the San Jose federal court.

**Ethnic Dimension**

The ethnic dimension of this engaged collaboration provided the foundation for the formation of FACES. The pioneer members of FACES, especially second-generation Filipino Americans, were able to identify themselves as belonging to an ethnic collectivity (i.e., Filipinos), and thereby engaged the victims and their families in the advocacy work. Thus, similar to the USWG scientists who were equally dedicated to providing assistance to the campaign, these Filipino Americans nurtured commitments in an affective way.

Social movement scholars have explored the role of emotions in social movements not only in evoking empathy but, more importantly in moving people to act on certain issues that become personal to them (e.g., Jasper 1998). Moreover, this unique connection among activists can also be explained by the concept of “rooted cosmopolitans” as another way of classifying more engaged collaboration at the transnational level. According to Tarrow and Della Porta (2005:237), “rooted cosmopolitans” refer to
people and groups who are rooted in specific national contexts, but who engage in regular activities that require their involvement in transnational networks of contacts and conflicts.

Moreover, according to Tarrow and Della Porta (2005:238), these “rooted cosmopolitans” also include immigrant activists, labor activists from the South, and members of TANs. They regularly participate in political activities concerning their home countries, forge linkages with unions in the North, participate in international NGOs, or in transnational protest campaigns. In this study, second-generation Filipino Americans can also be seen as “rooted cosmopolitans” who were able to commit not only their knowledge and financial capabilities to the cleanup campaign but more importantly, through the campaign, they were also able to strengthen their ethnic identity, which is salient in their existence in American society as immigrants or children of immigrants.

Shared ethnicity and experience in both the US and the Philippines contributed significantly in pushing the TAN’s key players toward a more engaged collaboration not only with the participating organizations but more importantly with the individual victims. When PTFBC allowed second-generation Filipino Americans to have first-hand experience of living in Madapdap Resettlement Center where most of the families of the victims were relocated, the Filipino Americans were transformed by their experience of being with families whose lives were directly affected by the toxic contamination in the former US bases.

For example, notably two second-generation Filipino Americans became interns in PTFBC. Both were exposed to the severity of the problems in the community as interns in PTFBC’s community office in Madapdap Resettlement Center. After their field immersion, they returned to the US and participated in speaking tours with USWG experts. Interns presented to colleges and universities across the US and shared
information on the conditions of the victims and their families, and their experiences as volunteer interns in PTFBC. As noted earlier, the speaking tour resulted in establishment of small groups of activists that in turn were formalized under the coordination of FACES. Thus, immersion in Filipino communities by Filipino Americans led to mobilization in the US around the cleanup issue, and in turn was crucial in constituting the TAN.

The cleanup campaign in the US attempted to connect with Filipino Americans across the US, whose number totaled almost 5 million in the 1990s, plus other Americans who might be sympathetic to the cleanup campaign. Filipino-American identification with the cleanup campaign proceeded in large measure due to ethnic identification with the victims, something that the PTFBC and FACES were in an ideal position to foster via a TAN with multiple dimensions of engaged collaboration.

Local chapters in the US conducted various activities in their own states, for example:

The Washington, DC chapter of the Filipino/American Coalition for Environmental Solutions (FACES) has launched a Green Ribbon campaign aimed to bring attention to the medical urgency and environmental tragedy of contamination at the former US bases. (DD-36)

Through their ethnic identification, the transnational network between PTFBC and FACES started off as mere information dissemination and evolved into technical partnership and then to ethical motivation. Crucial to the process of transnationalization was the simultaneous engagement of victims in the contaminated sites, and Filipino Americans who would bring their experiences from the Philippines to the US, where they also had direct contacts via ethnic identification. Thus, transnational actors became
engaged in the local, not only in terms of the advocacy agenda of the transnational network, but also in terms of assisting in the daily living conditions among the victims.

**Chapter Conclusion**

In this chapter, I discussed the process by which a local environmental campaign that was initiated in a Third World setting transformed into a TAN. I argued that at the outset, the PTFBC’s clean-up campaign was already to some extent transnational, since the issues it raised concerned both the Philippines and the US. Thus, the goal of forging a TAN was to a great degree to gain access to information and resources via actors operating in the international arena.

In the first part of the chapter, I discussed how the campaign developed a tactical repertoire to promote awareness and invoke international support. This repertoire included networking, information sharing, participatory and direct action, legal engagement, and engaged collaboration. This plan of action was designed to persuade both the Philippine and US governments to establish bilateral cooperation to expedite the cleanup of the toxic contamination in the former US military bases in the Philippines.

The second part involved a theorizing of how the TAN evolved toward a more engaged collaboration among partners. I defined engaged collaboration as a recursive process through which TAN partners operated to achieve shared goals and strategies beyond mere information sharing. I discussed three relevant dimensions of engaged collaboration, namely 1) technical/legal, 2) ethical, and 3) ethnic. Technical/legal dimension involved the exchange of information between PTFBC and FACES on the toxic contamination in the former US military bases in the Philippines, and taking concrete actions by filing lawsuits against the Philippine and US governments. Through these technical and legal exchanges, both NGOs were able to put forth their demands.
through the legal systems of two different countries. Accessing the state legal apparatus, however, can have a profound effect on a TAN, which will be discussed in Chapter 6.

The ethical dimension of engaged collaboration highlighted the affective and moral aspect of the partnership between PTFBC and FACES. By invoking ethical arguments about the clean-up campaign, both PTFBC and FACES were able to capture the attention of the international and domestic media, which followed up the stories of victimization among the afflicted individuals as well as the lived experiences among the advocates. These stories, which were disseminated in print, broadcast and electronic media, begged for a moral condemnation of US refusal to acknowledge the toxic contamination in its former military bases in the Philippines. The ethical aspect of such transnational activism solidified the TAN, as the external opponent (i.e., the US government) was clearly delineated and characterized.

The third dimension involved the ethnic dimension, which underscored how the Filipino American members of FACES were able to identify with the ethnic collectivity that is anchored in Filipino national identity when FACES visitors were exposed to the material conditions of the local community of victims. This ethnic identification was critical in pushing the TAN to evolve into a more engaged collaboration with the community of victims. Another way of depicting this process of engaged collaboration is through the concept of “rooted cosmopolitans” which captures the transnational activities of Filipino Americans in FACES (see Tarrow and Della Porta 2005).

Engaged collaboration differs from Wu’s (2005) double-mobilization framework, insofar as engaged collaboration focuses on grassroots organizing. While the double-
mobilization framework highlights the role of external advocacy actors in mobilizing both the state and non-state actors to reach a collaborative effort toward the issue at hand, engaged collaboration emphasizes the role of grassroots organizing by both domestic and external NGOs in a TAN in making sure that the community of victims, whom these NGOs represent as constituents, participate in the advocacy work. Finally, the theory offers an alternative route to Keck and Sikkink’s (1998) Boomerang pattern wherein both the domestic and external NGOs deepen their involvement with the community they represent via engaged collaboration while persuading or protesting both domestic and foreign states to achieve bilateral cooperation.

In the next chapter, I will highlight how engaged collaboration can also lead to tensions and conflicts within a TAN. This raises questions about whether it is worthwhile for domestic NGOs to reach out and initiate TANs when the resulting partnership can complicate and possibly damage the campaign itself.
Figure 5-1. Transnationalism as Strategy. Process A involves Nongovernmental Organization (NGO) A forming a network with NGO B to share information and persuade both States A and B to form a bilateral cooperation with one another. NGOs A and B conduct protest and persuasive actions to influence both States A and B, respectively, toward the said goal. At the same time, in Process B, NGOs A and B strengthen their connection with the local community they represent as constituent through participation. In the process, both NGOs A and B transform the nature of their relationship from mere information sharing to a more engaged collaboration.
CHAPTER 6
A RIFT IN THE CAMPAIGN

The previous chapter focused on the transformation of a local environmental advocacy into a transnational advocacy network (TAN) for the clean-up campaign in former US military bases in the Philippines. I discussed the goals, strategies and tactics employed by the TAN in order to gain acknowledgment by the Philippine government of the toxic contamination left by the US military. This chapter addresses the third research question, on how the TAN in question entered a period of decline. Why do seemingly successful TANs decline? What are the contributing factors that lead to their demise?

Decline in TANs

Decline in TANs can be understood as by-product of the complex interactions among various external factors (i.e., changes in the larger societal context) and internal factors (i.e., micro-organizational dynamics). Internal factors may include schisms within the TAN among partner organizations (e.g., Rootes 2005; also for theoretical discussion see Zald and Ash 1966), and inequalities in the capabilities and resources available to the partner organizations, which then can lead to tensions within the TAN (e.g., Mendelson 2002; also Rootes 2005), and loss of mass support (e.g., Messinger 1955). External factors may include the success of the TAN (e.g. Schrad 2010), institutionalization of the social movement in mainstream politics, shifts in public attention from a TAN’s focal issue (e.g., Joppke 1991), and changing political and social dynamics surrounding TANs (e.g., McAdam 1999).

In this case study, the most important factors that caused the toxic cleanup campaign to decline include: (a) the defeat of the lawsuits filed against the Philippine government and the US military; (b) a rift among partner organizations of the cleanup
campaign; (c) the lack of sustained community support in the US; and (d) the effect of the 9-11 incident on the willingness of people to be identified with the cleanup campaign. I analyze these factors by looking at how they impacted the overall strategy and repertoire of protest used by the campaign, emphasizing the ramifications for engaged collaboration that constituted the TAN.

**Overview of the Chapter**

I argue that the rift in the TAN between PTFBC and FACES happened in three ways. First, an internal rift emerged within the PTFBC when simultaneous crises in leadership and financial accountability occurred. These resulted in distrust among the leaders involved. The second rift opened among members of the affected community, as a reflection of the rift within the PTFBC. The victims’ parents became divided in their loyalties among the two factions in PTFBC and consequently community members also began “in-fighting.” The third and final rift occurred between PTFBC and the pioneer members of FACES and was a result of the first rift, within PTFBC. While FACES tried not to be affected by the PTFBC rift, FACES nonetheless struggled to manage relationships with splintered groups while continuing its campaign in the Philippines.

I also argue that the rifts among collaborators in the TAN, as well as premature deradicalization of the movement, help explain the decline in the cleanup campaign. In addition to the complications resulting from the three rifts described above, the leaders of the cleanup campaign bought into the “success” of the PTFBC in persuading the Philippine government to acknowledge the problem. However, they failed to ensure that acknowledgement would be translated into action, particularly the bilateral cooperation by the US (cf. Figure 5-1). As a result, movement leaders began working with the state through its judicial system. While this move might have been the best option at that
time, operating through the channels of the state deradicalized the movement and yielded judicial decisions that did not suffice movement goals. Deradicalization was viewed by some as subordination to the state and betraying the promise of the cleanup campaign.

In view of these themes, I subdivide this chapter into four parts. I devote one section each to examining the three rifts, first the one within the PTFBC, then the rift among victims and their families, and finally the PTFBC-FACES rift, in order to analyze the processes by which the rifts emerged. In the fourth and final section, I discuss the issue of the premature deradicalization of the cleanup campaign as another factor that led to the decline of the TAN.

**PTFBC: Crisis and Distrust**

There were two main crises that constituted the rift within PTFBC. These crises were: (a) a crisis in leadership; and (b) a crisis in financial accountability. The leadership crisis involved the quintessential question in organizational management: “Who is best equipped to lead the organization?” Was it the Board of Directors (BOD), whose job was to oversee the general operations of the campaign organization, or was it the local staff, whose work involved daily contact with the community? In the specific context of the PTFBC, the crisis of leadership became a question of who could best represent the campaign and the community of victims.

The crisis of leadership illuminates key issues concerning the internal dynamics of NGOs in the Philippines in particular, and collaborative networks in general. It is worth recalling that the PTFBC itself constituted a key node in a network of local organizations in the Philippines that were pushing for the cleanup of former US bases. The PTFBC thus had to manage relationships with many other social actors, often via specific
personnel in the PTFBC. I assert that in coalitions or networks where there is inequality among individuals or partners, based on education (learned vs. untrained), or geographical location (local vs. national), conflicts are bound to happen as the situation mirrors the same inequalities that movement coalitions are often trying to challenge in the first place. In the case of the PTFBC, inequalities among its Directors and staff were directly tied to their network ties to other local cleanup coalition partners. Inequalities within the PTFBC thus mapped onto the coalition of local partners.

Another problem that adversely affected the cleanup campaign was the alleged lack of financial accountability wherein accusations of misuse of funds abounded. These accusations escalated into the filing of a lawsuit against the local staff of PTFBC in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. While the case was dismissed in 2008, the damage had already been done against the accused in particular, and the cleanup campaign in general.

**Crisis in Leadership**

The root cause of the problem within the PTFBC was the crisis in leadership. When PTFBC was formalized as an independent NGO from the Nuclear-Free Philippines Coalition (NFPC) in 1997 (DD-82), the organizational structure of the PTFBC consisted of the BOD as the highest policy-making body, and a National Director. PTFBC was based in Quezon City, making it a national NGO rather than a local NGO.

Recognizing the need for local satellite offices in provinces where there were communities affected by former US military bases, PTFBC through its National Director invested in community organizing as a strategy to gain local participation, by hiring
community organizers. A PTFBC staff described how helpless the “unattached” victims in CAB felt when describing their situations:

When the media asked them [victims], they could not answer properly. They would just cry. So I stepped back and examined the campaign. I told myself, this campaign would not work if it remains a single-level campaign [i.e., only at the supra-level]. We should strengthen the grassroots participation [in the campaign]. (Interviewee 20)

This quote presents a justification for the community organizing activities initiated by PTFBC. Community organizing ensured not only the participation of the community of victims in PTFBC, but also training in personal and organizational skills toward self-empowerment. Such efforts directly resulted in the creation of local organizations, which became known as “the people’s organizations” because they consisted mainly of local families of recognized victims of the toxic contamination. The two people’s organizations were established in the Metro Clark and the Metro Subic Bay areas.

At this point, PTFBC re-structured its organizational setup to cater to the emergence of the two satellite offices. The leadership in PTFBC was divided into two components: the BOD, with executive decision-making power in the national office in Quezon City; and the local leadership, with mass-based support via direct contacts between local staff and community organizers, and led by the Executive Director or ED (formerly the National Director). The BOD consisted of volunteer individuals who were also active in their respective NGOs, offices, or academic positions, while the staff and community organizers were full-time paid personnel of PTFBC. The organizations where these BODs were also affiliated included Greenpeace International, NFPC, local governments, and the University of the Philippines, among others. The local leadership, on the other hand, was headed by the ED whose task was to oversee the daily
operations of PTFBC in its local offices. The ED and local staff planned and implemented community organizing and other activities in the communities of victims.

**The 2000 General Assembly.** Prior to the 2000 PTFBC General Assembly, which proved to be a momentous event, a respondent recalled that there were already conversations going on behind the scenes within PTFBC, wherein the BOD members were becoming suspicious of the ED and her plans “to take over” the entire organization (Interview with the ED). At this point, the cleanup campaign was in full swing as it gained international recognition after the landmark 1996 First International Forum on US Military Toxics held in Manila, organized mainly by PTFBC. It was also during this period that questions came up regarding the leadership of the local staff and how they were managing the activities and funds of the cleanup campaign.

These tensions escalated during the 2000 PTFBC General Assembly meeting which was held jointly with the national conference on the cleanup campaign and its future. This General Assembly was supposed to be held in the afternoon after the culmination of the conference. There was a huge audience, with numerous participants from local communities brought in by the local staff from Clark and Subic. In hindsight, a respondent called the huge turnout “hakot” (which roughly translates as “mob”), referring to the large number of attendees in the meeting to enforce the majority rule.

During the General Assembly meeting, debates ensued on several points related to the election of members of the BOD. First, how would the votes of the participants be counted? Would it be one vote per attendee or one vote per delegation? If it was the former, the local staff and the “mob” would win anything they pursued, since their numbers exceeded those of the BOD. If it was the latter, then all the people who
travelled long hours to attend the assembly would only get two votes as representatives for the Clark and Subic groups.

The debate on the manner of voting had not yet been resolved when another matter was brought to the floor by one of the BOD members. As one attendee recalled, there were hundreds of attendees, including the victims and the Board members. That’s when the problem arose. How are they going to elect the Board of Directors? On one hand, one group wanted to do such election among themselves. On the other hand, another group wanted to involve themselves in the election. These groups parted ways without resolving the issue of who should elect the BOD. (Interviewee 1)

Addressing the general assembly, which had already been in a heated discussion on the first topic, a BOD member declared that this assembly was not only about the elections but more importantly about certain matters concerning the financial status of PTFBC. The BOD then raised questions regarding the financial accountability of the ED and her partner, by pointing out that the ED was conducting financial and other transactions not sanctioned by the BOD. Another eyewitness recalled this event during the General Assembly meeting:

> When the election was about to start, they [BOD] started saying “the purpose of this general assembly is not for election. This is to audit Mr. Z and Ms. Y because they corrupted the budget [financial].” (Interviewee 20)

These issues further complicated the already heated discussion. Emotions ran high and the ordinary participants watched the angry exchanges between the local staff and the BOD. The local staff, through the leadership of a community organizer, clarified that their concern with voting rights and representation was related to demands that the BOD should not consist only of individuals who were based in Metro Manila. Rather, staff proposed that the BOD should include representatives from both Clark and Subic,
and make a position for the ED to sit on the BOD to facilitate communication between the BOD and the local staff.

The BOD members responded by asserting that they were unpaid volunteers, and that if ever the ED joined the BOD, then the ED could not be paid staff anymore. The leader of the local staff disagreed strongly with this proposition and insisted that the ED retain the salary because of the duality of the ED’s functions (Interviewee 18). In short, the local staff wanted representation on the seemingly powerful BOD so that, according to a respondent, the local staff members would have their voices heard during BOD meetings.

The inclusion of representatives from the local communities in Clark and Subic served the same purpose. When asked why these seats were necessary, respondents emphasized that the ED and the two local community representatives understood the situations in the communities better than the BOD members who represented them during BOD meetings. Thus, local staff and some community members wanted access to the power held by the BOD.

Despite the nobility of purpose of these requests for inclusion (i.e., of the ED and community representatives) in the BOD, the conduct of BOD in PTFBC as a non-profit organization is subject to the current policy framework that governs non-profit organizations (including NGOs) in the Philippines, that is the Batasan Pambasa Blg. 68 (1980), otherwise known as “The Corporation Code of the Philippines.” Unfortunately, the Philippines does not have special laws for NGOs. Thus, under the Corporation Code, the compensation of the BOD or Trustees is limited as follows:
In the absence of any provision in the by-laws fixing their compensation, the directors shall not receive any compensation, as such directors, except for reasonable per diems. (Title III, Section 30)

**National versus local leaders.** The struggle for power to make decisions regarding the campaign was manifested clearly in the leadership crisis. Many respondents (13/31) underscored that there was a great divide between the “national” and “local” leaders. In this case, the “national” leadership pertained to the BOD members who “seldom frequented the local communities” (3/31) and “were never around” (2/31) because they lived in Metro Manila, about two and half hours away from the communities. The “local” leadership referred to the staff members, including the community organizers, whose job entailed being immersed in the communities, and who were thus “always around the people” (2/31) whenever they were needed.

The debate over the “national” vs. “local” reflects not only the geographical proximity of these leaders to the communities of victims, but more importantly, the perceived power relationships between these two groups of leaders. Specifically, there were perceptions of an unfair distribution of power and knowledge. Whereas the BOD held final decision-making power, the staff held the knowledge they felt necessary to make decisions. Staff in particular thus felt that power was very unequally distributed, to the detriment of the cleanup campaign. While the campaign had transformed itself to become transnational, the internal dynamics of the Philippine organization that supported the campaign had not overcome local/national hierarchies of power and proximity, which in turn reflected class inequalities. The following quote presents the version of a local leader on how this power struggle ultimately played out during the General Assembly:

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It was BOD X who stood on top of the table as she was campaigning to amend the by-laws. She said, “There should be no paid staff in the board.” I spoke about this with other active organizations and leaders. What’s happening here? What is the correct position here? I asked… You know what they said? The non-profit organization in the Philippines is on a level that community organizers can have a seat in the board. Look at those community members. You are just training them. Who will be on their side? So then the body [General Assembly] did not allow that amendment. Then [the BOD] said, “This is a mob”!

This quote exposes another layer on the issue of the leadership crisis, which involves the question of “who represents the best interest of the local community?” This issue of representation is also tied to the question of “who spent the most time in the community?” These issues had profound impact on the credibility of the TAN itself in whether or not it is authentic and adequate enough in representing the community it claims as constituent. The Corporation Code does not specify any qualification for trustees or BOD in non-profit organizations except that such BOD member is a bona fide member of the concerned organization.

While transnational exchanges fostered information flows across national boundaries, the cleanup campaign ironically became entangled in domestic contestations of power, which involved conflicts along multiple dualities that nonetheless were aligned, including the national vs. local, city vs. community, and academic elites vs. masses. Contention within the PTFBC was demoralizing, not only among the leaders and the victims and their families, but also for the partners of PTFBC, especially FACES. In fact, one of the pioneer members of FACES was an eyewitness to the havoc at the General Assembly, and he said that it was disheartening to watch the event as it unfolded.

Two PTFBCs. At the General Assembly, the local staff pursued the elections for BOD members, with all individuals voting as is over the protest of the BOD members.
Not surprisingly, the outcome resulted in an entirely different composition than the previous BOD. The newly-elected BOD comprised a mix of community organizers and community leaders (particularly the parents of victims), along with the ED. Further, the ED retained her paid position and at the same time sat as an interim BOD member.

**Financial Accountability**

The second cause of the rift within PTFBC was the accusation against the ED of mismanagement of funds. This allegation was openly stated to the ED during the fateful 2000 General Assembly. The BOD proposed to the General Assembly that an official audit should be done on the ED and the staff in order to clarify unofficial and unauthorized financial transactions by the ED and the staff. These transactions were being executed through a separate bank account that was opened by the ED and one of the staff members.

One eyewitness to the accusations made by the BOD of the ED during the 2000 General Assembly claimed that he overheard conversations confirming that indeed the ED maintained a separate account for some transactions related to the cleanup campaign by PTFBC. When asked about this matter, the former ED did not deny the existence of this account. She said that the use of this other account was limited to facilitating the timely implementation and completion of PTFBC projects. She asserted that had the staff waited for the actions of the BOD pertaining to the daily activities of the PTFBC, projects would have been delayed since the BOD met only once a month. Furthermore, the BOD members resided in the Metro Manila area and did not visit the communities regularly.

The original BOD formally filed its charges against the ED and staff in the Quezon City Regional Trial Court (RTC) in November 2002. The lawsuit included two important
points, namely: (a) that the breakaway group of PTFBC had illegally formed a new set of BOD (in the official complaint, the breakaway group was called Board of Trustees) and had appointed a new Executive Director; and (b) that the unauthorized personnel were claiming the name of PTFBC in their financial transactions. The BOD plaintiffs were represented by the same attorney who had drafted the lawsuit filed against the Philippine government on behalf of the victims and their families. The plaintiff requested that the breakaway group not be allowed to represent the PTFBC in whatever transactions and activities, monetary or otherwise.

The leadership rift was formalized in two steps. The first was when the “old” BOD filed the lawsuit against the “new” BOD after the PTFBC’s 2000 General Assembly. The second step occurred when the local staff and community organizers decided to register their “new” organization at the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) under the name, “Alliance for Bases Cleanup, Inc.” (ABC). But in the press, the organization used the name, “PTFBC-ABC,” to denote the linkage between ABC and PTFBC. The registration was finalized in 2001, thus legitimizing ABC’s existence and authority (DD-14). The old BOD still continued to own the name PTFBC (DD-5). The BOD fired the ED and replaced her with another former local staff member who sided with the national leaders.

The old BOD’s lawsuit was eventually dismissed by the RTC in 2008 due to lack of evidence presented by the plaintiffs. Even though the formal court did not find merits in the case, the damage had been done against the individual staff and the PTFBC in particular, and the cleanup campaign in general. The rift within PTFBC had eroded the
relations of mutual trust not only among members of PTFBC but, more importantly, among the network partners.

**Community: Double-Victimization**

Concurrent to the lawsuit between factions of PTFBC was the rift among the victim-families who identified with one leadership faction or another. The rift within the PTFBC over leadership and financial accountability thus also divided communities of victims and their families. In this section I therefore discuss three themes that were generated from the respondents who were asked, “What is happening to PTFBC now?”

The first theme reflects the fact that most of the community respondents (14/18) were uninformed of what actually transpired between the factions and how this affected the outcome of the campaign. For example, when asked such question, one respondent replied:

I do not know why they [PTFBC] split up. They might not agree [on something]. You know them, they have other agendas. (Interviewee 12)

The second theme shows the division in the community along two lines of loyalty – loyalty to either the old or new BOD members, and loyalty to the new NGOs helping them and the children-victims. The third and final theme focuses on how the respondents view the implications of the struggle within the PTFBC for what they want to get out of PTFBC.

**A Divided Community**

The victims and their families can be characterized as having survived multiple forms of victimization. First, they survived the natural disasters brought about by the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo. Their livelihoods had been destroyed by the ash fall that covered their homes and fields. Second, they survived being uprooted from their
homelands because of the torrential flows of lahar (lava) that destroyed their homes and drove them to resettlement centers. Third, many survived the harsh conditions involving toxic exposures at Clark Air Force Base (CAB) as their resettlement area for the next five years. And fourth, when things were about to get better through work with PTFBC to lobby for the compensation for damages, the rift occurred in the leadership of PTFBC. I argue that this split and its consequences delivered a final blow to the victims.

PTFBC or ABC? The victims and their families were caught in the crossfire between the two factions in PTFBC. Those who came to the General Assembly, especially those who participated in electing the new set of the BOD in PTFBC, were identified with the breakaway group headed by the ED and her community organizers. In the next few years, the new BOD would not even be recognized by the old BOD members because of the pending case at the Quezon City Regional Trial Court.

Despite the authorized usage of the PTFBC label, the old BOD members were not as “hands-on” in terms of community organizing as the ABC BOD. This strained relations between families of victims and the two BODs. A handful of the respondents, especially those who were not present at the 2000 incident, indicated their loyalty to the old BOD. They articulated that the original BOD was the only legitimate PTFBC in their community. One respondent expressed passionately her loyalty to the old BOD:

Until now I am with the PTFBC, the original PTFBC. The Alliance (ABC) departed because of Mr. Z. … I am with PTFBC still to this day even if they do not come [here] anymore since the ED (replacement) got sick. (Interviewee 15)

Another respondent described what remained after the conflict in PTFBC:

There were 12 leaders, [who] volunteered with the task force [after the conflict]. … we used to accompany patients to their medical appointments. But now, it is the other side which is active. They are the ones who have
[activities]. I don’t know where [the ED] is getting funds because the money [of PTFBC] is currently frozen in the bank. (Interviewee 12)

After a while, the satellite offices in both communities ceased to function in both Clark and Subic areas due to the freezing of the account of PTFBC ordered by the court, in view of the ongoing lawsuit between the two factions. Although in one interview, a former PTFBC community organizer claimed that ABC still maintained offices in both communities, I did not find any office when I visited the area. I asked local respondents if the PTFBC continued to operate within the communities, and I received negative responses.

PTFBC or Other Organizations? The old and new BOD division was further aggravated with the entry of new programs, such as the Philippine Scholars and the Virlanie Foundation. Victim families thus had to repeatedly make decisions not only regarding their loyalties to factions of the PTFBC, but also to decide whether to work with the PTFBC or other organizations, which had limited capacity to provide assistance. This compounded the confusion over loyalties of the victim families, for divisions arose not only between factions of the PTFBC but also between the PTFBC and other organizations. Each had its own list of identified victims, and being on one faction or organization’s list sometimes implied not being on the list of other support providers.

Philippine Scholars (www.philippinescholars.org) is a US-based NGO which is supported by FACES through recruitment of sponsors. The organization gives educational opportunities for poor but deserving students in the Philippines. It started this project in Cebu, and eventually opened up some slots for the victims or their siblings in major cities in the Philippines, including the Madapdap Resettlement Center.
When I visited the community in 2009, the Philippine Scholars in Sitio Madapdap had already produced one college graduate whose degree was in Secondary Education. He already had a job offer and was about to begin work in June 2009. As of now, there are 18 victim-families who are being served by the Philippine Scholars in Sitio Madapdap Resettlement Center.

The Virlanie Foundation (www.virlanie.org) is a Makati City-based NGO whose main purpose is to serve the poor and homeless children in major cities in the Philippines. One of its main contributors is the Amade Mondiale headed by the Princess of Monaco. According to respondents, when she visited the Philippines, the Princess immediately asked to see the victims of the toxic contamination in CAB whose photographs she had seen on the internet. The Princess was shown the children and she was moved by their plight. As a result, the Virlanie Foundation extended its medical assistance to some of the children. At present, there are about 10 children being served by Virlanie in Sitio Madapdap Resettlement Center (Interviewee 15).

No matter how well-intended these new organizations were in their hopes of helping the children and their families, they could not afford to be as inclusive as the PTFBC because of limited funds and personnel. Both organizations had to make lists of the victims and families to be served. Thus, the nagging question among families when interviewed was: “Are you on the list?” A more complicated question was, “Whose list are you on?”

Some community respondents (4/18) believed that they were removed from the PTFBC list because they were included on the Philippine Scholars list, which was being identified as a FACES project in the community. They accused PTFBC of dropping
them from the list because their children had been included as either Philippine Scholars’ or Virlanie Foundation’s beneficiaries. One respondent exclaimed that:

They [ABC] removed us [from the list] because they want the assistance [from Philippine Scholars] to pass through them. They want to alternate [the distribution of benefits among other members of ABC]. We thought our children will hardly finish their schooling if it [the distribution of benefits] is alternate. The remittance of the money [from sponsors of Philippine Scholars] does not come monthly, only quarterly. (Interviewee 3)

This dilemma mainly resulted from the fact that the new organizations had limited capacity to support the toxic contamination victims. Thus, their lists are more exclusive and selective, which further placed the victim families in difficult situations regarding loyalties and information in order to gain assistance.

Some residents (6/18) were confused as to the question of with whom FACES was aligned. Among beneficiaries who chose a former PTFBC community organizer to be their site coordinator, a few respondents (3/18) thought that FACES was aligned with the new BOD. However, when asked about this “alignment,” a pioneer member of FACES claimed that FACES had never aligned itself to any factions. As a result, when the Virlanie Foundation came into the community and chose another community leader, who identified herself as a community organizer of the original BOD, other respondents claimed that they were not included in the list because they were already identified with FACES and Philippine Scholars.

This confusion created tensions among the members of the community, specifically those on the Philippine Scholars’ list and those on the Virlanie Foundation’s list. In fact, during interviews, the respondents usually introduced themselves as being beneficiaries of either program. However, I soon found out that a handful of them (5/18) were beneficiaries of both Philippine Scholars and Virlanie Foundation. This means that
one of the siblings, if not the victims themselves, received educational funds and medical assistance from both the Philippine Scholars and Virlanie Foundation, respectively.

Navigating through the Mess

During data gathering, I encountered inconsistent claims among community respondents about what actually transpired with the PTFBC. I received a wide range of responses, from frustration to defeat, from indifference to overindulgence. One of the responses by victim-parents was that they did not know anything about any conflict. They thought that there were other reasons that halted the operations of PTFBC in their area. However, some respondents (8/18) knew what actually transpired in the 2000 General Assembly because they knew of someone who attended, or were present during the fateful election of the new BOD. Some of these attendees (3/8) disseminated information by way of offering their own account of what happened.

From the community interviews, I learned that very few respondents (2/18) were aware of the financial troubles in PTFBC. One respondent even told me that she was personally called in by one BOD member who asked her if she was the one who signed for a particular voucher for her allowance as community organizer. The respondent was stunned when shown the amount, which was much larger than what she actually received during her work as community organizer. This angered her, because she said she thought that the PTFBC had paid her enough for her allowance as community organizer (Php 500) and not as salary, as it appeared on the document (Php 3,000). This confused her, and made her resentful of the ED to this day. She also said that because of this information, she only recognized the old BOD as the true PTFBC.
Other respondents had some hints as to why PTFBC ceased to operate. Some (3/18) labeled it as “inggitan” or jealousy. Others (2/18) saw it as just “lying low” but not abolishing the campaign. Still others (4/18) believed that the inactivity of PTFBC in their area was brought about by the defeats of the lawsuits that the PTFBC filed against the Philippine and the US governments. Finally, some others (3/18) elaborated further, pointing out that the legal defeats had broken the spirit of the community of victims. Thus, for various reasons, after the rift in PTFBC, the families of victims felt much less unified as a “community” with the PTFBC.

**FACES: From Engaged to Entangled Collaboration**

Beyond the communities, the rift within the PTFBC generated other consequences for collaborating organizations, particularly FACES. As a result of PTFBC’s rift, FACES severed ties with PTFBC, thus breaking a key link in the TAN for cleanup. In this subsection, I present two important factors that affected FACES in deciding to sever its ties from PTFBC. These involve the manner of the rift within the PTFBC itself, and the overwhelming concerns about “homeland security” after the 9-11 incident. These factors compelled FACES to reposition itself with regard to its collaborations. In turn I examine how FACES’ decision to walk away from PTFBC had repercussions for the fate of the cleanup campaign.

**Walking away from PTFBC, not from Victims**

FACES stayed on the sidelines during the conflicts within PTFBC. A FACES member, who witnessed what has transpired in PTFBC’s 2000 General Assembly, described it as follows:

It was going so well, and we had press conference, a lot of media questions, all very good. Then came the afternoon, and the afternoon was an absolute mess. So what happened is that the organization split into two;
so all of a sudden there were two task forces. I spent one whole day with one side, another whole day with the other side, trying to figure out what's what. And coming from my experience, I came to a number of conclusions – one, on the one side, the side of the directors, let's put it that way, the criticism that the board was made up of all this national [and] international people and have no community, that was very damaging, although I felt they were also going on the right direction to address it. But, on the other side, there were questions of financial mishandling and the ideas of a lawsuit. That's the other side. And so when I came back after that disaster, I suggest that I would continue to work with both but would be very careful not to provide financial backing to the [ED's] side. I felt I have reasons to believe, because of the things I heard that were spoken in Tagalog, which I understood. I was talking to an American volunteer, but my ear was actually listening to the whispers which confirmed to me that in fact it was true that there was a separate bank account and all. I was very disturbed.

Despite its resolve to stay out of the PTFBC conflict, FACES nonetheless became entangled in the conflicts being the most significant partner of PTFBC. This created additional dilemmas for FACES, which still wanted to support the victim families. The desire of FACES to maintain a meaningful connection with the communities in Clark and Subic influenced its decision to walk away from the conflict while retaining its link to the communities through small projects. These joint decisions nonetheless resulted in entanglements for FACES. One area of entanglement was the fact that some FACES members had already promised some of the victim-families to provide educational support to victims or at least their siblings.

However, the implementation of community-level projects was affected by the rift and FACES had to make decisions on what to do with those projects. These projects were designed to be small and thereby keep PTFBC's involvement minimal. This provided leeway for FACES to conduct small projects while staying away from the conflict within PTFBC. These projects included the construction of a deepwell in Sapang Bato, and work with the Philippine Scholars; which I discuss both below.
**Sapang Bato Deepwell Project.** The Sapang Bato Deepwell Project was conducted in coordination with other partners both in the US and the Philippines. FACES, together with Arc Ecology, who designed this pro-bono project, was able to secure a hefty 1.3 million-peso grant from the Philippine Government through the help of a Senator who was one of the most ardent supporters of the cleanup cause in the Philippine Senate (DD-41). By 2001, the project was underway. Initial construction such as breaking ground and digging had already proceeded when the conflict in PTFBC arose. Since this project required PTFBC cooperation, FACES and Arc Ecology found it hard to coordinate the project with the ED, who was at the middle of the internal dispute.

Sensing that FACES had abandoned the PTFBC or at least had sided with the national leaders (i.e., the old BOD) the local staff of PTFBC decided to stop the deepwell project. To FACES and Arc Ecology’s dismay, ABC decided to cancel activities on the deepwell project. The hole which was already excavated remained open and abandoned for quite some time. This decision to abandon the project cut the connection between the ED and FACES for a long time (Interviewee 26).

Although this disagreement was limited to the core leaders of ABC and FACES, the decision to stop the deepwell project halted the cleanup campaign in both the Philippines and the US. In an interview, a respondent who was central to the decision-making expressed disbelief over ABC’s decision to close down the deepwell project without making an effort to cover the hole itself. He said that this hole would further accelerate the seepage of the toxins to the potential water source. The following quote captures this respondent’s view of the tension between FACES and ABC regarding this matter:
But the result of that split was much devastating. One of our projects was building a deep well and that deep well was to ensure that the people have safe drinking water instead of contaminated water, usually [found in] the shallow wells. What happened is, because of the split, the driller stopped and said “you know I should remind you that I’m going to be paid for this so I stopped drilling.” As a scientist, it’s very dangerous thing to never finish a well. … in that score, I was very disappointed in the [ED’s] side because I spent hundreds of dollars on telephone calls trying to negotiate on both sides [PTFBC and ABC] and finally, when we thought everything was already ok. … The [old] board agreed with me that it needed to be capped but the other side [ABC], for some reason, in the end backed out. I think it’s partly because they had no understanding of the danger. For example, [Mr. Z] said, “Ow, that dug well is not an issue. . . “. I think they were trying, thinking of fund-raising, thinking particularly of the well and [how] they can charge people to make some money out of it. And I said, “No, you know this is contaminated well. You don’t have any experience on this.” Here in the US, if you leave a contaminated well open for like a week’s time, you could be thrown in jail. (Interviewee 27)

He further expressed his frustrations over how this in-fighting had affected the cleanup campaign because once the international scene knew of the in-fighting, sponsors and benefactors started withdrawing or suspending support until the conflict was resolved.

While the conflict escalated to a legal venue, the financial assistance to projects such as these began to wane and eventually stopped. Since the campaign was very dependent on external funding, it was not able to survive despite the dedication of its staff and leaders. The overhead costs of activism were so expensive that without external philanthropic contributions, the campaign did not endure.

**Philippine Scholars.** The Philippine Scholars provided another way of reaching out to the needs of the community in Sitio Madapdap. While FACES did not officially initiate this endeavor, a number of FACES members were pioneer contributors or sponsors of this program. Some of the founders of Philippine Scholars were also very active during the campaign against the Marcos dictatorship and the anti-US intervention movement. They eventually extended education benefits to the toxic victims. In 2005, a
key Philippine Scholars member became the chair of FACES during its transition from supporting the cleanup campaign in the Philippines to becoming a full-blown environmental justice organization in the US.

The Philippine Scholars worked in Sitio Madapdap Resettlement Center with toxic victims or their siblings. A former community organizer became the Philippine Scholar site coordinator because he was personally chosen by the family recipients. He described this program as:

We also had problems at the start because the PTFBC [ABC] also tried to block the [entry of] Philippine Scholars because they also wanted to handle the scholarship funds. But our US coordinator said no. They [Philippine Scholars] have their own policy. Because [the ABC] wanted [to add] a policy, say for example, you must first become a member in the organization before you become a scholar. They [ABC] wanted to be the ones to choose the scholars, and require them to attend regular meetings, which is outside the scholarship. Why do you need to impose [these proposed policies] on the mothers and parents when it is the child who is the beneficiary? Then the Philippine Scholars also have their own criteria. (Interviewee 1)

In the end, the Philippine Scholars also offered his child to be included among the beneficiaries as a way of rewarding his hard work in assisting and “fighting for” the families even if his child is not one of the victims. The community organizer gladly accepted the offer.

However, the inclusion of the child of this former community organizer-turned-coordinator of Philippine Scholars also created intrigues among families who were not included in the list. One respondent said that she knew “the truth about Philippine Scholars” (Interviewee 15), alluding to the fact that not all the victims were included among the scholars and not all scholars were actually victims. Another respondent also claimed that “they wanted all the benefits for themselves” (Interviewee 8), alluding to the fact that some of those benefitted by Philippine Scholars also received monetary
assistance from other programs available to the community such as the Virlanie Foundation.

A handful of community members (4/18) cast doubts on the authenticity of some claims of victimhood due to their inclusion in lucrative scholarships. Jealousies also appeared over the benefits of Philippine Scholars, which sends the beneficiaries to school from elementary through college. One student even received extra funds to buy a personal computer for his schoolwork during college. Another instance was when the money that was supposed to cover the tuition fee was spent for a family emergency. One respondent regarded this as “over exploitation” of the donors; others saw it as “excessive” (2/18) and “taking advantage” (1/18).

Confronting Homeland Issues

Aside from entanglements due to rifts in the Philippines, FACES had to confront another constraint in the US. This constraint was the 9-11 incident in 2001. After 9-11, international travel and assistance became more difficult in general, which posed challenges for FACES since they were operating via a TAN. In addition, FACES members found it harder than before to challenge the US military, for two reasons. First, FACES members felt that it was difficult to get support, especially financial support, for its advocacy that dealt with the wrongdoings of the US military when the US declared a “war on terror” that relied on military action as a means of protecting US citizens. For example, a FACES member explained the impact of 9-11 as follows:

What I am aware of, as I understand history is that, after 9-11, there was a very dramatic shift in the U.S. So, while there has been years of work and there has been allies in Congress who were really standing as allies around the bases issue, this shifted dramatically after 9-11. And that makes working, organizing, and advocating around anything involving U.S. bases, militarism … a very difficult topic to talk about. …You know, to my
understanding we lost American allies in the Congress [due to] like partisanship issue. (Interviewee 25)

Second, Filipino supporters cautioned FACES that it was difficult for them to provide material support of FACES’ agenda against the military at the height of patriotism in the US after the 9-11 attack. The 9-11 incident thus made it harder to provide foreign assistance, especially in the name of holding the US military accountable, at a moment when the US military was seen as the main agent for protecting US civilians against terrorism. A respondent explained these events as follows:

It was a couple of things that were just kind of what happened. … the atmosphere … like being able to bring issue against the military. There was, you know, overwhelming cry in the military in response to what happened in the World Trade Center. So, you know, we lost support in Congress on the issue and we lost some of the [financial] support and at the same time the funding would be coming less available for the support work [to the campaign] that we were doing. We also knew that the US was really creating agenda of the war up here, and the Philippines became one of the battlegrounds for the US. That was really very challenging for us to even… So, yeah, there was a lot of different things all coming together with 9-11 and the aftermath. (Interviewee26)

Consequently, the toxic cleanup campaign in former US military bases in the Philippines fell prey to the political consequences of the 9-11 terrorist attack in the US. Like other activism that was curtailed after the 9-11 incident, even environmental activism around cleaning up toxins with documented health impacts was not spared from the fear of being labeled “anti-US.” This was a turning point for FACES members when they sat down to review their position on the cleanup campaign in 2004. Once the members realized that “there was no movement in the campaign since FACES’ formation,” they decided to change FACES’ name from “Filipino/American Coalition for Environmental Solutions” to “Filipino American Coalition for Environmental Solidarity.”
The change of name reflected a strategic change in FACES. For one thing, FACES repositioned itself vis-à-vis PTFBC to highlight its continued solidarity with the Philippines while also acknowledging that quick solutions were not rapidly forthcoming post-9-11. For another, FACES’ new name reflected its shift from being a mere supporter of PTFBC’s campaign in the Philippines to its reinvention as a fully-fledged transnational environmental justice organization based in the US.

**A Case of Premature Deradicalization**

Whereas 9-11 made radical mobilization more difficult for FACES in the US, I also argue that in the Philippines, the cleanup campaign suffered ultimately from what I call “premature deradicalization” of its agenda. I borrow the term “deradicalization” from the work of Tucker (1976: 236):

The phrase “coming to terms with the existing order” best indicates what deradicalization means. In the stage of deradicalization, the movement loses its revolutionary otherworldliness, the alienation from existing conditions arising out of its commitment to a future perfect order, and makes an accommodation to the world as it stands.

Although Tucker (1976) used this concept in his evaluation of Marxist movements, I found his assertions applicable in this case study. For one, he asserted that the principal manifestations of deradicalization involved the “action-pattern of the movement, its relations to its ideological goals, the development of its strategy and tactics, and, finally, its inner conflicts”. The emergence of a reformist movement is a big leap from a revolutionary pattern of action. In his analysis, the reformist movement in Marxist movements divorced itself from the “upheaval foretold in the Marxist ideology and concentrated itself in what was called the Gegenwartrarbeit, or ‘everyday work of the party’”. He identified, above all else, two key factors leading to deradicalization, namely, leadership change and worldly success (Tucker 1976:238; 236). The most
important take-home point from Tucker’s analysis of the transition of the Marxist
movements from revolutionary to reformist action was his differentiation between the
“minimum program” and the “maximum program” of actions. He asserted:

What had come to be called the “minimum program” of the movement, embracing lesser goals attainable without revolutionizing the existing order, was emphasized at the expense of the truly revolutionary “maximum program,” but on the official assumption that every step in fulfillment of the movement’s minimal program would likewise bring closer the realization of the maximal program. (Tucker 1976:241)

By premature deradicalization, I refer to the unnecessarily early termination of the “revolutionary” vision of the bases cleanup campaign to persuade the Philippine and US governments to form a bilateral initiative for remediation of the toxic contamination in the former US bases in the Philippines. I argue that while this vision seems like a reformist stance that aspires to work with the state institutions, the campaign was far from being reformist in the sense that it utilized alternative avenues, strategies and ideology, apart from the institutional mechanism available in government agencies.

The “revolutionary” vision of the bases cleanup campaign involved a belief in people’s power to influence the workings of the state, both within and across national boundaries. Using social mobilization as an avenue for protest, and adopting a transnational approach to cooperation, the cleanup campaign aspired to overrule the seemingly monolithic influence of the US in the Philippines in the neocolonial era. The deradicalization process of the cleanup campaign occurred prematurely due to two factors. First, deradicalization of the movement happened in 1999 at the height of the cleanup campaign, before the onset of concrete action by the Philippine and US governments. Second, deradicalization was reinforced when the cleanup campaign
decided to pursue established institutional channels by suing the Philippine and US governments.

Why did these two events effect a premature deradicalization on the bases cleanup campaign? At the height of the bases cleanup campaign in 1999, the Philippine government had acknowledged the presence of toxic substances in former US military bases. After almost a decade of denial, the Philippine government finally issued a statement recognizing the blunders done by the US military on Philippine soil. Consequently, the Philippine government, through the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), instructed the DFA to design a plan of action. The plan would be proposed to the US government on how the two governments could organize a bilateral cooperation initiative leading to the remediation of toxic contamination in the former US bases.

This event was a major achievement for the cleanup campaign as it fulfilled half of its strategic vision (see Figure 5-1). What was critical at that moment, however, was the ability of the campaign to follow up with tactics to ensure the materialization of a bilateral plan of action. Unfortunately, the bilateral plan did not materialize, partly due to the lack of US response, but also because the campaign itself began expending more energy on the internal workings of its institutional operations, ranging from daily logistics to conflicts over leadership, mass participation, and financial accountability. Rather than capturing the momentary vulnerability of the Philippine government and leveraging it to further the “maximum plan” of the cleanup campaign to continue to push for remediation, the campaign in effect reverted to a “minimum plan,” having won the
acknowledgement of the Philippine government, and then becoming focused on the TAN’s domestic crises.

I argue that the PTFBC-FACES TAN missed an opportunity through deradicalization at this crucial moment. There was a good window of opportunity for the TAN to keep pressuring the Philippine government, for the government to push a stronger agenda on the US government. That is because at the time, the Philippine and US governments were engaged in negotiations over the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). The US-Philippine VFA is another avenue by which the US military could return to Philippine soil and use its land and water resources as practice fields. This might have presented an excellent opportunity for the cleanup campaign to pressure the Philippine government to require the US military to cleanup former US bases as a condition for returning to the Philippines. Distractions in the cleanup campaign, however, led to deradicalization insofar as the campaign failed to bring such pressure on the governments. Instead, the most contentious issues in negotiating the VFA proved to include civil and criminal jurisdictions on VFA; nonetheless, these discussions proved useful in the case filed against the four US servicemen who raped a Filipina in 2005.

Because of the lack of response by the US and due to other contentious factors, I would not blame the campaign for the failure of the Philippine government to include in its negotiation agenda for the VFA the concerns on toxic contamination in the former US military bases. However, I argue that the campaign was responsible for its actions leading to its premature deradicalization, which in turn were instrumental to its ensuing decline.
Once the Philippine government chose to wait for the US government to respond to its request for bilateral cooperation, the campaign further deradicalized, by changing tactics. Rather than continue to protest and pressure the Philippine government, the campaign accessed a key avenue that establishes state legitimacy – that is, the judicial system. Thus, the second factor that led the campaign to its premature deradicalization was the shift in tactics from direct action to the use of the legal system in seeking remediation action from the Philippine and US governments.

By filing lawsuits against governments, PTFBC and FACES succumbed to state authority and power, instead of demanding that state power act on their demands (see Figure 5-1). Indeed, the lawsuit was not only immediately dismissed by the presiding judge, it was dismissed on the grounds that the Philippine state cannot be sued without its consent (according to the 1987 Philippine Constitution, Art. XVI, Sec. 3). The legal counsel for the campaign attempted to appeal this decision, but by then, PTFBC was already split into factions and the original signatories either could not be located or refused to sign the appeal. Thus, the counsel could not pursue the case further. In the meantime, FACES also filed its lawsuit against the US military through a federal court in San Jose in 2002. However, the case there was also immediately dismissed on the grounds that FACES could not sue on behalf of plaintiffs in foreign territories. Since the Philippine bases were no longer under US jurisdiction, Superfund was rendered irrelevant.

These dismissals not only had a profound effect on the supporters of the campaign. They also served to demobilize and demoralize the families of the victims in the communities of Clark and Subic. The élan of the campaign, which was at its peak
prior to adoption of legal tactics, was suddenly lost. No amount of convincing could save the soul of the campaign.

This was not new to social movements in the Philippines. As I have already laid out in Chapter 4, there were different precursors to the social movements in the Philippines that suffered the same deradicalization or defeat because of internal problems. From overzealous leaders to opportunist demagogues, uninspired members to blind followers, and opposing ideologies and visions, the Philippine social movements experience was nothing but full of examples.

Chapter Conclusion

This chapter evaluated internal and external factors to explain the decline of the toxic cleanup campaign in the former US military bases in the Philippines. The internal factors centered mainly on the organizational discord brought about by the rift among partners of the TAN and the defeat of the lawsuits filed against the Philippine government and the US military. The external factors consisted of the lack of popular support of the campaign in the US, and the impact of the 9-11 incident on people’s willingness to participate in the clean-up campaign for fear of being perceived as anti-American. These factors ultimately caused what I refer to as the “premature deradicalization” of the campaign, which I regard as the direct cause of the TAN’s decline.

I subdivided this chapter into four parts. The first three corresponded to different rifts within the TAN. First, I discussed the root cause of the rift, which was the internal conflict within the PTFBC involving the BOD against the alliance between the ED and the local staff. This rift emerged due to the simultaneous crises in leadership and financial accountability. The rift in leadership led to the decline of the TAN due to the
inability of both the formal leaders (i.e., BOD) and the “bridge” leaders (i.e., ED and the local staff), who by definition mediate between the top leaders and the mass base of the TAN; (see Goldstone 2001:158) to creatively reach a compromise on power-sharing strategies within the organization.

The leadership conflict was not new to TANs, nor was it insurmountable. However, the crisis of financial accountability compounded the difficulties of the leadership crisis, which spiraled into a legal battle between the two factions. As a result, the corrosive impact of distrust among the leaders had profound consequences on the outcome of TAN. While trust is a concept that is usually explored in studying transnational networks among immigrants, kinship, religious, and ethnic groups (e.g., Tilly 2007), it is also an emotive aspect of the values that propel effective communication that is necessary to support TANs. Without trust, there can be no networks of activists and advocates, especially across borders.

Second, I discussed the rift that appeared within the community of victims who were divided along loyalty lines between the two factions within the PTFBC. There was widespread confusion and disorientation among the community of victims and their families because they were inadequately informed about the events surrounding the split within the PTFBC. It is ironic that while the TAN prospered by sharing accurate information on the toxic contamination in the former US military bases through open and efficient communication across borders, the same TAN only provided its mass base with partial accounts of its internal conflicts.

PTFBC’s failure to communicate effectively regarding the split caused not only the loss of trust, but also the loss of hope among community members. Further, the
disappointment on the defeat of the two lawsuits filed by PTFBC and FACES against
the Philippine government and US military multiplied the frustrations among community
members. Looking ahead, the community did not have the material resources,
connections, networks, and skills to reorganize themselves to continue the agenda of
the cleanup campaign. All they had was a willingness to articulate and embody the
advocacy frame of being victims that they absorbed through community organizing by
the TAN. Having been used to assistance coming from PTFBC and FACES, the
community of victims welcomed the entry of the Philippine Scholars and the Virlanie
Foundation reaching out to assist communities. Although limited in their ability to
provide for all members, these organizations nonetheless have been instrumental in
absorbing the remaining core activists among the community members as they await
the much-hoped-for renewal of the campaign.

Third, I examined the rift that occurred between the PTFBC and FACES. To avoid
entanglement in the conflicts within the PTFBC, FACES severed its ties, at least with
the ED and the local staff. FACES assumed that by maintaining small projects in the
local communities, it would still be able to conduct meaningful relations with the
community of victims. However, the implementation of these small projects also
complicated the standing of FACES at the grassroots level. The “questionable” position
of FACES in the community emanated from the inadequacy of information provided to
the community about the split of PTFBC.

At the same time, FACES confronted shifting public attention in the US to focus on
American patriotism after the 9-11 bombing. This event had great effect on American
contentious politics and social movements in general in challenging state authority and
legitimacy (see Castro-Rea 2009). FACES also felt those effects, as many potential participants were apprehensive to be identified with FACES advocacy against the US military. FACES therefore resolved to re-structure its organization and the direction of its advocacy.

The last part of this chapter discussed the notion of premature deradicalization as a final factor leading to the decline of the TAN. Building on Tucker’s (1973) notion of deradicalization, I argued that the TAN between PTFBC and FACES had undergone an unnecessarily early termination of its “revolutionary” vision to contest the postcolonial influence of the US in the Philippines. Such a revolutionary vision entails a belief in the power of people to influence the workings of the state both at the domestic and international levels, using social mobilization as a venue for protest, and a transnational approach to cooperation. However, the deradicalization of the cleanup campaign materialized prematurely, that is, before the campaign could gain enough leverage to achieve its vision.

Both the PTFBC and FACES missed key political opportunities. First, the campaign failed to follow through and build up much pressure during a momentary vulnerability of the Philippine government. When it appeared to be yielding to the persuasion of the campaign by acknowledging the claims on toxic contamination, and was negotiating the VFA terms with the US government, the clean-up campaign failed to ensure that the governments would agree to act on the toxic contamination as a condition for continued collaboration. Second, the campaign failed to avoid dismissals of its legal cases against both the Philippine and US governments. Deradicalization thus failed to yield successes, which left the TAN demoralized. These factors, combined with
the ongoing domestic disputes in PTFBC and the political climate after the 9-11 incident, resulted in the decline of the clean-up campaign.

While the decline of TAN was marked by the relative inactivity of organizational partners and the community of victims, the campaign has not entirely dissipated. This raises questions concerning the responses to former partners to the break-up of the TAN. In the succeeding chapter, I argue that the former partners of the TAN have continued certain advocacy activities, though the specifics of their strategies and impacts differ substantially.
CHAPTER 7
A MOVEMENT IN ABEYANCE

The previous chapter analyzed the rift within the transnational advocacy network (TAN) between the People’s Task Force for Bases Cleanup (PTFBC) and the Filipino American Coalition for Environmental Solidarity (FACES). This chapter aims to respond to the fourth and final research question on how partners adjust to the decline of the TAN by adjusting their goals and tactics. I specifically explore how the PTFBC, community of victims and FACES proceeded after the decline of the TAN.

Defining Abeyance in Social Movements

The notion of “abeyance” has been applied to social problems (e.g. homelessness, see Hopper and Baumohl 1994), public policy (e.g. Sawyers and Meyer 1999) and social movements (e.g. specifically on feminist movements, see Bagguley 2002; also Taylor 1997). The common thread amongst these applications lies in how the terminology was borrowed from the works of Mizruchi (1983). Mizruchi used this concept in the field of social order and control to denote the gap between the available status positions in the society and the number of possible claimants to those positions. As a result, abeyance organizations are created as mechanisms to absorb and control surplus and marginal populations to defuse any disruptions they may cause in the larger society (Mizruchi 1983).

Extending Mizruchi’s thesis to social movements, Taylor (1997:762) proposes that abeyance organizations provide “a measure of continuity” to social movements that challenge the status quo, and thereby contribute to social change. The notion of abeyance, however, connotes the occurrence of “decline, failure and demobilization” of social movement, which is not usually the case (Bagguley 2002:170). In fact, generally,
a movement in abeyance foreshadows further mobilization in the future. A social movement may enter into a period of abeyance when the political and social climates are too hostile and non-receptive to its agenda. One good indicator of such hostility is the increasing difficulty in recruiting new members into the social movement. In order to persist in this type of setting, social movements usually adopt abeyance structures (Taylor 1997).

Abeyance structures are typically formalized social movement organizations (SMOs) which sustain the collective identity of the movement and “retain activists between waves of mobilization” (Bagguley 2002:171). The main goal of these abeyance structures is to refocus the challenge set forth by social movements toward the targeted state, and instead concentrate energy in “preserving enduring values and identity” within their organizations for future mobilization (Sawyers and Meyer 1999:761). Movements in abeyance must be able to maintain their culture and organization rather than transform the larger society (Taylor and Whittier 1997: 557). Movements in abeyance are concerned with reproducing themselves and maintaining their networks; thus, instead of confronting the state, mobilization is unobtrusive (Bagguley 2002:174). The continuity of social movements depends on several dimensions of social movement abeyance structures, namely: 1) temporality, or the length of time that an SMO is able to retain individual members; 2) their commitment to maintain the organization regardless of personal cost; 3) the impact of exclusivity and homogeneity of membership in providing stability to the movement despite minimal activity; 4) centralization to ensure a relatively advanced level of specialized skills among core activists; and 5) maintenance
of a rich political culture that promotes continued involvement in the movement (Taylor 1997:765-769).

For the purpose of this research, I extend the abeyance thesis to the TANs. I define abeyance structures as consisting of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) which have absorbed the spillover of activists from the former TAN between the PTFBC and FACES. Abeyance structures also include new NGOs which assisted the local community of victims in Sitio Madapdap Resettlement Center. Since there is limited literature on abeyance structures for TANs, I seek to contribute by analyzing how former partners in TANs continue their activism after the fragmentation of a TAN, and examine how they seek to revive the clean-up campaign.

**Overview of the Chapter**

Almost a decade has already passed since the rift in the TAN. Judging by the low visibility of the cleanup campaign in the Philippines and the US, and the small number of new recruits, the campaign seems to have been abandoned by the TAN between the PTFBC and FACES. However, a closer inspection of the ongoing occupations and affiliations of former activists of the defunct TAN can show the potential, although limited, for mobilization around the former campaign.

The remainder of this chapter proceeds in four main sections, one each for the routes taken by PTFBC, the community of victims, and FACES in response to the rift in the clean-up campaign. Extending the abeyance thesis to the case of this TAN, I first discuss what was left of the PTFBC after the campaign went into decline. I focus on how its former members, from the Board of Directors (BOD) to the Executive Director (ED) and the local staff were dispersed after the decline.
I highlight three routes by which the core activists of PTFBC disbanded and were re-absorbed by other NGOs working on similar or parallel advocacies. The first route led some activists back to the previous affiliations they had maintained while they were working with PTFBC. The second route led some to find new NGOs with advocacies related to the clean-up campaign. The third route led most of the breakaway group, led by the former ED, to stay with the clean-up campaign while finding new partners to help them revive the campaign.

Second, I examine how the community of victims coped with the decline of the campaign. Based on their responses, the community members welcomed the entry of new NGOs which offered assistance to the victims and their families in terms of medical, financial and educational benefits. These NGOs function mainly as abeyance structures by providing alternative venues for the community members to seek help after PTFBC.

Finally, I analyze how FACES took a different route and re-directed its activism from a mere supporting role to the cleanup campaign in the Philippines to becoming a bona fide transnational environmental justice (TEJ) organization in the US. FACES restructured its organization by adopting the environmental justice (EJ) framework. However, its repertoire of protest resembles the original set of strategies and tactics used in the TAN it shared with PTFBC.

My analysis will show that after the decline of the TAN, FACES showed a greater degree of resilience in continuing to pursue its goals. I argue that FACES was able to recover from the decline because of its position as an organization based in the US. FACES proved more effective at reorganizing following the decline of the cleanup
campaign than PTFBC or the affected communities. This is because FACES secured access to financial and social support in the US to perpetuate its activism, which continued in the Philippines. In so doing, FACES left the TAN but continued to pursue issues relevant to the cleanup campaign in the Philippines.

**Route 1: Return to Previous Affiliations**

After the rift in the PTFBC, the cleanup campaign declined. Virtually all sponsors withdrew their financial support to the campaign because of its lack of organization. The defeat of the two lawsuits filed against the US military and the Philippine government also demoralized the campaign. Moreover, the former BOD of PTFBC filed a lawsuit against the breakaway group. The rift further trickled down in the local community, dividing it according to loyalty among the parties in the intra-PTFBC lawsuit. Due to the lawsuit, the existing funds at the time (around one million pesos or roughly $20,000) had been frozen by the Quezon City Regional Trial Court. Without money, both factions were unable to pursue activities of the PTFBC.

Thus, most of the BOD members and other staff opted to return to their original affiliations, while maintaining their positions in the PTFBC. These original affiliations included posts in the University of the Philippines, Greenpeace International, Nuclear Free Philippines Coalition (NFPC), local governments, grassroots NGOs, and law practice. Two of these NGOs (i.e., Greenpeace and NFPC) were also affiliated with the network of support for the PTFBC. In other words, the BOD members also acted as *de facto* representatives of their original organizations while serving in the BOD of the PTFBC. These NGOs were also allowed to participate and co-sponsor undertakings with the PTFBC (e.g. the Rainbow Warrior of Greenpeace was coordinated with
PTFBC). When asked if his organizational affiliation had persisted with the campaign after he left PTFBC, one respondent shook his head and said:

After I left, [name of organization] cut off its ties with PTFBC and the campaign. Besides, there was no funding to justify the involvement of [the organization] with PTFBC. (Interviewee 31)

As far as the abeyance thesis is applicable in the case of the BOD, these positions are part of the abeyance structures that provided organizational homes for the former activists of the campaign. With these positions, activists were officially "re-absorbed" into the mainstream channels of the larger society, without losing their status.

**Route 2: Moving Forward with New Organizations**

Other former members of PTFBC sought to be employed in new organizations, usually NGOs or government agencies. These new organizations usually had similar or parallel mandates involving advocacy. A former local staff member of PTFBC now works full-time in a government position on disaster coordination. According to him, the nature of his work is similar to his previous occupation in PTFBC as a community organizer, except that the new post is an "8-to-5" job. His post is at a municipality close to Sitio Madapdap, where he also maintains a position as the local coordinator of the NGO, Philippine Scholars. When asked why he continues to stay close to the community, he said

Kasi gusto ko rin titingnan-tingnan. Kasi nga naawa na ako sa biktima, nagagamit sila. (Because I'd like to look after [them]. I feel sorry for the victims, they are being used). (Interviewee 1)

Thus, through his new affiliation with Philippine Scholars, he can still maintain his concern over the community of victims (at least the families affiliated with Philippine Scholars). In a way, moving forward after the decline for him means becoming more personal in his dealings with the victims than through official routes.
Other BOD members moved forward by joining other transnational NGOs with similar or parallel advocacy as the former TAN. One BOD member now works in Health Care without Harm (HCWH). HCWH, which was organized in 1996 in Bolinas, California, is an international coalition of hospitals systems, medical professionals, community groups, and other health-affected constituencies such as labor unions, environmental-health organizations and religious groups located in 52 countries. Its mission is “to implement ecologically sound and health alternatives to health care practices that pollute the environment and contribute to disease” (see http://noharm.org). Based on the website, she holds one of the key positions in the Southeast Asian branch of HCWH.

Another BOD member has expanded her affiliations by becoming involved in Focus on Global South (http://www.focusweb.org). Focus on Global South (Focus) is “an NGO working in Thailand, the Philippines and India.” Focus was initiated in 1995 in Bangkok, and is now connected with the Chulalongkorn University Social Research Institute. Its main goal centers on the use of a combination of “policy research, advocacy, activism and grassroots capacity building in order to generate critical analysis on national and international policies.” In so doing, Focus hopes to transform the global economy to cater to the needs of communities and nations, and strengthen the capacity of local and national economies. Focus has a similar tactical repertoire to the previous TAN, with a fundamental parallel in its activist stance on state-society relationships.

Most of the community members in Madapdap Resettlement Center became clients of Philippine Scholars (www.philippinescholar.org) and/or the Virlanie Foundation (www.virlanie.org). Details of these affiliations have already been discussed in Chapters
4 and 5. In light of the abeyance of the cleanup campaign, the respondents from the affected communities have two demands. First, they all (18/18) want to get some form of compensation or subsidy from the US government to cover medical expenses and health maintenance for their victim-children. Second, most respondents (16/18) want to directly receive monetary assistance donated to the victim-children, without passing through any NGOs. Most of them wanted this arrangement for two reasons. First, they already had a bad experience with the PTFBC which they alleged to have misused the funds that were raised on behalf of their victim-children. One respondent even exclaimed that,

[p]inanghahanapbuhay ang anak ko (my child was being used for fund-raising (direct translation is “livelihood” or “employment”). (Interviewee 3)

This suggests that the respondent thought that most of the funds that were raised by the campaign through PTFBC were because of the pictures of their victim-children circulated by the media. Second, they wanted to get the maximum amount of assistance for their children’s medical expenses. In fact, one of the issues that continued to haunt the community is how to subdivide the benefits that were coming for the victim-children. This goes back to the question of “who belongs on the list?” If the benefits are directly sent to the families of the victim-children, then there is no need to “be on the list” of anyone. Community members in Sitio Madapdap Resettlement Center still wait for the success of the campaign they once supported. As of this writing, they have become more desperate in their struggle to manage the medical needs of their victim-children. Their last hope relies on the renewal of the cleanup campaign.
Route 3: Road to Renewal of the Campaign

The third route was taken by the breakaway group in hopes of gathering a mass base of allies for the renewal of the campaign. The mass base and other allies may not necessarily be coming from the same individuals and NGOs as in the previous TAN. Using the name PTFBC-Alliance for Bases Cleanup International (or referred to in this dissertation as ABC; hence the official acronym, PTFBC-ABC), this small group still maintains a physical office in Quezon City, and sporadically releases press statements on the campaign. Its latest press release in the Philippine Daily Inquirer, dated January 21, 2009, emphasized the new hope for the campaign with the election of Sen. Barrack Obama as the 44th US President. As the former ED said,

We’re seeing there is more openness and more like us having access to his [Obama] office because there are a lot of allies [who] have supported him during his campaign and have gone to his conventions. [They are] Filipino-Americans who have been working on this issue to get the US to clean up.

(DD-74)

This quote specifically gives at least three facts about the road taken by ABC. First, it stresses ongoing groundwork by ABC to renew the cleanup campaign. Second, it shows that the ED has already relocated the groundwork for the renewal of the campaign to the US, and left the groundwork in the Philippines to the rest of the ABC staff. And third, the repertoire that this US-based groundwork has taken appears more conservative as to what is expected of the bases cleanup campaign, as opposed to protest activism against the US government.

Thus, when the abeyance thesis is applied in this case, the abeyance structure which “absorbed” the breakaway group is defined by a variety of career positions as well as immigrant status. The career positions were mostly created by the breakaway group when they opted to organize ABC. Their new career positions gave them enough
work to do while the campaign is in abeyance. The ED also transformed herself by immigrating to the US and traveling regularly by virtue of her US immigrant status as a Green cardholder (see the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, http://www.uscis.gov). Through this status, the ED herself has become transnational and is thereby able to access Filipino American communities in the US, which used to be exclusively the domain of FACES. In turn, the abeyance structure for ABC has expanded across borders when a new status slot was created for the ED to become an immigrant. With this new access to an international audience of potential supporters and allies, the ED endeavored for months to find new partners in the US.

To summarize this argument on the abeyance structure as far as the third route is concerned, I quote a member of ABC describing the business of the ED in the US as:

We have a desk in Chicago. We [ABC] were absorbed by the Christian Peacemaker. (Interviewee 18)

I therefore analyze how the ED sought to revive the campaign for the bases cleanup. Her transnational activities to reawaken an abandoned cause are enlightening in that they are accomplished by negotiating her immigrant status in the US and the Philippines. I argue that through these transnational activities, the campaign which was started from a Third World country and became transnational via a partnership with a First World organization has been currently uprooted from the Philippines and transported to the US in order to revive it. This moment of the campaign is a unique case of a transnational social movement.

The ED therefore opted to emigrate from the Philippines to the US, hoping that her move would open new doors for the cleanup campaign. In 2008, she flew to the US and stayed in Chicago where the Mennonite Central Committee (http://mcc.org), specifically
the Christian Peacemaker Teams, offered her a campaign desk for PTFBC-ABC. She thereby found a venue to continue her advocacy by courting possible partners from prior work. She even visited the office of then-Senator Barack Obama in hopes of lobbying for the opening up of the case of the toxic contamination in the former US bases in the Philippines. After eight months of working in the campaign desk, she came back to the Philippines to work on the campaign.

What is instructive in these border-crossing activities is the impact an individual can have on the transformation of a collective campaign. From a humble beginning as a small campaign desk at a national NGO in the Philippines, the PTFBC grew into a TAN supported by various sectors including the “church, environmental, peace and justice groups, students, scientists, professionals, and other concerned citizens” (DD-53). After the TAN broke up, the ED sought to reinvigorate the cleanup campaign through the same means by which the PTFBC originated, by finding an organizational niche in the form of a campaign desk managed by another organization.

The ED therefore sought assistance from other philanthropic and activist organizations in the US. She found a new ally in the Bayanihan Foundation Worldwide (http://fdnbayanihan.org/). The Bayanihan Foundation Worldwide is a TAN which works specifically at “developing new partnerships among Filipino diaspora donors, organizations, businesses, government and other stakeholders” and also acts like a coalition as it attempts at “matching funds to encourage 20 partnerships in health and education in 20 Filipino communities for the long-term until 2020.” For 2011, the foundation has already lined up an advocacy program specifically for the bases cleanup
campaign. Such advocacy project aims “to rectify the ill effects they [US military bases] left behind and restore the long-term sustainability of the residents.”

At this point, the ED may have taken the second route as she sought partnership with a new organization, but all of this was done in the spirit of renewing the campaign. From her words,

Well, to tell you the truth, my going here to the U.S., was really for the cleanup of the bases. Partly it was also coupled with survival needs. But I crafted my stay here so as to continue the campaign here [US]. So, in the three years that I’m here, it was very hard.” (Interview with ED)

For the meantime, the ED now works full-time with the Foundation which has embraced the campaign for the bases cleanup as its own.

**Route 4: Redefining the Mission**

After the rift in PTFBC, FACES decided to restructure its organization. Such restructuring re-focused the priorities of the members of FACES. While there had been some dropouts in the membership for a variety of reasons, FACES was able to “absorb” its own members who were demoralized by the rift in the cleanup campaign. In a way, the newly restructured FACES acted as pseudo-abeyance organization by reconnecting its people back into their membership status with the organization.

In 2005, FACES reviewed its status following the breakdown of the TAN it shared with PTFBC. The general assembly assessed what had become of the cleanup campaign and how FACES wanted to proceed going forward. After thorough deliberations, FACES members decided to forego the campaign and move forward with their own environmental campaign.

FACES identified new projects that were focused on EJ issues. For example, it collaborated with different EJ organizations around the San Francisco Bay area, such
as the Asia-Pacific Environmental Network (APEN) in its work with Laotian communities in Richmond, California. Moreover, FACES has also connected with various organizations whose advocacy is consistent with FACES’ new thrust for environmental and social justice. These organizations include but are not limited to Amazon Watch (amazonwatch.org), Filipinos for Affirmative Action now Filipinos Advocates for Justice (www.filipinos4action.org), and RESIST (www.resistinc.org), among others.

Most recently, FACES has taken up protests against the multinational corporation Chevron. FACES coordinated Filipino lobbying against Chevron’s oil depot in Pandacan, Manila. This is a heavily populated neighborhood that is at potential risk of exposure in the event of an environmental accident. FACES has also been active in working with other groups in nations where Chevron operates. Finally, FACES has taken on various issues involving environmental and identity politics in order to carve out its own niche as a transnational EJ (TEJ) organization.

In analyzing the road that FACES took after the decline of the campaign, I highlight three important aspects of the restructuring effort of FACES. First, FACES restructured the cultural aspect of its organization by rooting itself in its ethnic identity as its organizational and collective identity. In doing so, FACES strategically became an ethnic-based organization in the US. Second, FACES highlighted its transnational aspect owing it to its adoption of the TEJ as its working framework, and backing it up with concrete solidarity action with local communities in the Philippines, US, and other countries where Chevron operates. Third, FACES articulated the “solidarity” nature of its advocacy to mix different issue areas that they can work with, such as women’s movements, toxic waste issues, oil spills, to name a few.
Hereafter, I subdivide the analysis into three areas corresponding to the abovementioned restructuring. A lengthier discussion is devoted to FACES in this chapter to drive the argument that FACES as an organization was able to move from the decline in TAN to its new status because of its access to resources (both material and symbolic), networks, and connections, without discounting its status as an organization in a developed country which together facilitated its smooth transitioning. Compared to its former partner-organization, the PTFBC, and the local communities, FACES successfully restructured itself on its own.

**Embracing Filipino American Identity**

This theme takes on the ethnic identity of FACES. In general, ethnic identification among Filipino Americans is salient in their identity formation in the US context. FACES therefore strengthened its ethnic identity by embracing its Filipino roots. One step FACES took was to change its name from “Filipino/American Coalition” to “Filipino American Coalition.” The removal of the “/” in its name marked its recognition of its ethnic identity in the US. No longer does “FACES” signify a coalition between two nationalities, “Filipino” and “American,” but as an ethnic group legitimately acknowledged in the US society as citizens.

I focus on three aspects of how FACES constitutes its definition of Filipino ethnicity as an organization. The first aspect involves how FACES traces back its Filipino roots through new projects. Here, I highlight Face2Face, an ecological tourism (hereafter eco-tour) project that annually brings a group of Filipino Americans back to the Philippines. Through the Face2Face program, FACES is able to expose second- and third-generation Filipino Americans to the conditions of the Philippines through the communities where FACES has connections in terms of advocacy and activism.
The second aspect involves how FACES uses Filipino culture in its advocacy. FACES, as an ethnic-based organization, consciously utilizes unique features of Filipino culture to elaborate on its mission, vision and goals. I argue that both by embracing the Filipino identity and utilizing Filipino culture in pursuing its own brand of activism, FACES is able to distinguish itself from the rest of the EJ organizations not only in the Bay area but across the US. Filipino ethnicity situates the organization in a unique position in the terrain of contestation not only in terms of environmental issues but also of ethnic identity politics. Finally, the third aspect discusses the use of specific symbolism in FACES’ activities. FACES engages in meaning-making by using symbols to mark its organization as distinctively Filipino and at the same time as a TEJ organization.

**Tracing back their Filipino roots.** FACES traces back its Filipino ethnic roots by creating avenues for its members to explore their ethnic identities. These avenues usually come in the form of exposure trips, educational lectures, and sharing sessions among the members of FACES. One of the most prominent programs that FACES pursued post-PTFBC was the Face2Face Tour.

Face2Face, as an eco-tour, brings a small group of second- and third-generation Filipino Americans to the Philippines to visit specific communities with which FACES has connections via activism and advocacy. One of the places that the tour visited frequently was the Madapdap Resettlement Center, wherein the tour group talked with the victims and their families. Another favorite site to visit was the Pandacan community in Manila which hosts one of the largest oil depots of Chevron. The anti-Chevron agenda of FACES is also evident in the CARENow! Program that FACES initiated in
response to the issues surrounding Chevron’s oil depot in the Pandacan area. These
tours were conducted from 2005 to 2009.

After the trips, the eco-tour participants were treated to debriefing sessions with
the rest of the FACES members. During these sessions, participants shared their
experiences and insights with other FACES members. One of the most memorable
comments that I have encountered in the documents was the following excerpt:

As I approached my F2F experience in the Philippines, I was aware that
many Fil/Ams [Filipino/Americans] visit the islands and are overwhelmed by
family connections and commitments. (DD-54)

This excerpt was written by a participant during the 2005 Face2Face eco-tour in the
Philippines, and was subsequently published in the newsletter, Facing Justice. This
illustrates the first characteristic of how Filipino American members of FACES traced
back their Filipino roots – by tracing back their family lineage to find people who are still
living in the islands of the Philippines.

Such family connections, as this participant expressed, are deep and oftentimes
overwhelming to Filipino Americans who are used to nuclear families rather than
extended families. The expectations of these Filipino relatives are also oftentimes
overwhelming to young Filipino Americans who were brought up in the American culture
of independence and individualism. While Filipino American participants look at the
Face2Face eco-tour as a way to reconnect to their roots for personal gain, the relatives
and communities they visited have a different set of expectations. These expectations
may range from verbal expressions of appreciation to receiving material assistance from
Filipino Americans who are perceived to have the financial means to help.

The debriefing in 2005 was entitled “Balikbayan,” which roughly translates to
“returnees” but more appropriately “homecoming.” The use of the term “balikbayan” is
normally attributed to Filipinos abroad coming back to the Philippines. But homecoming in this sense did not pertain to homecoming to the Philippines (which they already did when they visited the Philippines) but was used in reference to Filipino Americans coming back to their homeland, which is the United States:

The Balikbayan (which translates to “homecoming”) event was put together by the 2005 Face2Face trip participants to share the stories and reflections of last year’s trip. The Balikbayan event focused on recognizing the complicated layers of our identity and culture as Filipino/Americans, and how as Americans living in the United States, with all its luxury and abundance, is due to the exploitation of entire nations. It was a way to reclaim and develop our kamalayan, our consciousness, around our own identity and to ask questions of ourselves and our society. (DD-49)

This gives a vivid illustration that while it was necessary for these young Filipino Americans to trace back their roots, their identity is very much tied to their homeland in the US. This is very true among second- and third-generation immigrants who want to re-connect to an imagined community with the original homeland so that their insights and experiences would give more meaning to their own personal journey in their host country (see Espiritu 2003).

The eco-tours raised awareness among the participants as they made first-hand connections between their lives in the US and the conditions in the Philippines. The “awakening of consciousness,” which Filipino Americans referred to as “kamalayan,” enables participants to further question the privileges they have as Americans and their position in the US as ethnic minorities. Another participant described this experience as a “self-reflective journey of heritage and global injustices” (DD-54), which was the intention of FACES in designing these tours. The constant re-examination of Filipino American identity is facilitated by the conscious effort of FACES to educate its members regarding activism among Filipinos in the US.
The “balikbayan” sessions enabled the participants to discover the political, cultural, and environmental issues in the Philippines (DD-48). Such understanding deepens the connections of Filipino Americans to Philippine society. By design, “balikbayan” events allowed the Face2Face eco-tour participants to share their own stories and reflections. These reflections in turn helped constitute a fabric of a collective memory of FACES about its Filipino identity, and further nourished its identity as a Filipino American organization.

Creating a space to partake in a collective narration of what it is to be and become Filipino is critical to the establishment of the organizational identity of FACES. Constituting this organizational identity in a way that can withstand scrutiny of both American and Filipino societies is very important for FACES and its presentation of itself as a TEJ organization. Being transnational and severing ties to PTFBC meant that FACES must work on a cultural level to remain grounded in both the US and the Philippines. Without a solid cultural grounding as via awareness-raising activities, FACES cannot claim a transnational existence, which would ultimately destroy its credibility. Thus, continuing these eco-tours for “balikbayans” is strategically crucial, not only for the personal journeys of the participants themselves, but more importantly in proving cultural authenticity of the organizational claims of FACES as a transnational Filipino American organization.

Engaging culture and arts in advocacy. Another significant change in FACES after the rift involved the amplification of the role of culture and arts in its advocacy. While culture and arts had informed the activism of FACES while working with PTFBC, the use of these as tools for advocacy became more important after the breakup. In
moving on, FACES utilizes the Filipino culture and arts in communicating its message and in sharing experiences with the larger Filipino community in the Bay area. For example, FACES had participated in the "Parolan," an annual Christmas lantern festival which is a longstanding religious tradition in the Philippines and in some Filipino communities in the US:

On December 9, 2006, FACES participated in the 3rd Annual Parol Lantern Festival in San Francisco for the first time. Members of FACES worked on an organizational parol weeks leading up to the event. The parol was covered in green and yellow tissue papers to symbolize the environment. To symbolize solidarity and the interconnectedness of people and the environment, the outer circle was connected to the star lantern by cutouts of people holding hands. FACES was excited to be part of a great tradition with other community groups and looks forward to participating again next year. FACES members created this parol for the annual festival. (DD-52)

Being an integral part of this celebration is both an expression of FACES' desire to make its mark in the Bay area without competing with other existing Filipino groups, and also a manifestation of its purpose to embrace its Filipino identity as an organization. Furthermore, its participation in community activities such as this lantern festival in San Francisco opened new venues to use culture and arts to convey its activism not only among Filipino communities but also among other ethnic groups in San Francisco. FACES put up a "parol" (i.e., five-pointed star-shaped paper lantern) whose design communicates two things, namely: 1) a summary of its advocacy in terms of solidarity of people across borders with regard to environmental issues; and 2) its commitment to support traditions of Filipino communities across the globe.

Another example of FACES' use of culture and arts in its advocacy was its Human Resilience project. This started during the 2006 Face2Face eco-tour wherein the participants facilitated an art activity with the Pandacan community, especially the children, by "creating the space for them to address international communities through
art‖ (DD-51). This creative space in turn gave FACES’ environmental advocacy a human face, and at the same time enabled local communities to connect to international audiences:

Using art and imagination as a tool, participants will answer questions such as: Draw your environment. What does your ideal world look like? If you had three wishes what would they be? If you were an animal what would you be and why? This project will enable participants to recognize their artistic capabilities as a way to construct hope and communicate to a larger audience. The intention of this activity is to help communities build connections to the world around them, foster a sense of hope, and amplify their voices internationally. (DD-51)

This art project illustrated the environmental contamination in the water, soil, and air brought about by Chevron’s “irresponsible practices” (DD-51). This exhibit was held at the Manilatown Center in San Francisco, which offered widespread public viewing (DD-52). A short film on the Pandacan depot’s threat to the surrounding community was also used by FACES to emphasize the problems represented in these drawings. The images were also used in press conferences and other functions related to FACES’ activism against Chevron in order to show how the community members in Pandacan, Manila confront Chevron’s presence in their area.

**Using Filipino symbolism.** In articulating its identity as a Filipino American organization, FACES deliberately uses symbolism that is meaningful to Filipino culture in the US context. For one, it uses venues around San Francisco that are historically connected to Philippines-US relations. San Francisco City is replete with Filipino cultural symbols, being a place which carries a long history of Filipino immigration and survival. Examples of these symbols include Union Square where the Dewey Statue is located, and the Manilatown Heritage Center where the International Hotel can be found.
The Dewey Statue was built to celebrate the victory of Commodore George Dewey in 1898 over the Spanish fleet stationed at the Manila Bay. The event marked the defeat of Spain and the beginning of US occupation of the Philippine Islands as the first US colony. The Dewey monument was dedicated by President Theodore Roosevelt in March 1901, and has become an important landmark in the central shopping district of San Francisco.

FACES, together with the Filipino community in San Francisco, has used this area as a site for demonstrations. FACES used the area to protest against the six US marines who raped a Filipina in the former Subic Naval Base in the Philippines while being stationed for military exercises under the Visiting Forces Agreement military (VFA) in 2005. Notably, FACES used the location strategically, not only to show outrage over the rape incident, but also to stress its indignation over the monument that symbolizes the beginning of ongoing US intervention in the Philippines. As described in the newsletter:

The site of the demonstration, the Dewey Statue, was chosen because it inaccurately commemorates Admiral Dewey’s success in “liberating” the Filipinos during the Spanish American War, which set the stage for US entry into the Philippines in the 1800s and the ongoing oppression and violation that the US military presence continues to perpetuate. (DD-50)

Moreover, the date of the rally was chosen to coincide with the 14th anniversary of the US pullout from the Philippines (DD-22).

Another important venue for FACES demonstrations is the Manilatown Heritage Foundation, a place where the old International Hotel was located. The International Hotel is politically significant for Filipinos in San Francisco because of the eviction of the manongs (elderly males) from the hotel as part of the gentrification of the area. This site was chosen by FACES to hold the book launching of Benjamin Pimentel’s U.G. This
book was about the life story of Edgar Jopson, a Filipino activist who was killed in the Philippines. FACES chose the hotel as a historical and political site to connect symbolically the life story of Edgar Jopson, who was a distant figure, to young Filipino American activists who fought against the evictions from the hotel. This event was narrated by FACES in this manner:

FACES sponsored this book launching and signing with the Manilatown Heritage Foundation at the site of the old International Hotel—a flashpoint during the late 1970s as a site where young Filipino American activists (Edjop’s generation) defended the forced eviction of manongs, elderly Filipinos who once farmed California’s fields. (DD-52)

FACES thus emphasizes that to be a part of that event held in that historic place was a huge honor and blessing for the organization because it was able to partake in a “history of struggle and perseverance” among the Filipino American elders (DD-50).

**Invoking an Environmental Justice Framework**

Given the many experiences of FACES in various environmental and social issues surrounding Filipino communities in the US and the Philippines, FACES reinvented itself as a TEJ organization (see History of FACES at [http://www.facesolidarity.org](http://www.facesolidarity.org)). In this section, I discuss how FACES invoked the TEJ as framework for action. For one thing, the TEJ frame is in line with the concept of solidarity, as FACES members continue to connect themselves to the Philippines from the United States. For another, FACES redefined its organizational identity as Filipino American as a manifestation of the need for the FACES members to invoke its ethnic collectivity (otherwise, why label it ‘Filipino American’) and at the same time uphold its environmentalist stance, a status slot (borrowing from abeyance thesis) that only FACES can suffice:

Through Kamalayan, FACES members will engage in a series of discussions and activities around the meaning of transnational environmental justice and solidarity in relation to our work. We hope that
raising our levels of consciousness will ultimately sharpen our work as a US-based environmental justice organization, working with communities and struggles both here in the U.S. and in the Philippines. (DD-61)

Through Face2Face activities, FACES exposed its members to various organizations and communities that were struggling with issues surrounding EJ. As illustrated by the following quote, Face2Face is:

a national, all-inclusive program to educate and deepen the understanding of the magnitude of Philippine and US Environmental Justice issues, with the intention of establishing meaningful and mutually beneficial relationships between communities in the Philippines & US by coordinating and facilitating educational trips. (DD-60)

FACES eco-tours expose participants to the “effects of militarism, globalization, and capitalism on local communities and their resources” (DD-54). The tours also enable FACES to provide a “hands-on service learning curriculum” for its members and engage them in direct action with organizational partners in the Philippines (DD-54).

In the process, FACES used its EJ activities to develop strong relationships among tour participants and the FACES leadership. These connections helped FACES avoid disconnects between members and leaders, such as had transpired within the PTFBC. In summary, FACES contributes to the definition of TEJ by embracing its Filipino American identity and tracing back its roots to Filipino culture. At the same time, FACES transformed its mission, vision and goals using the EJ frame well-known in the US and appropriated it to interpret the experiences of communities exposed to environmental hazards in the Philippines. Through this repositioning, FACES has evolved from being a partner in a TAN to becoming a fully-fledged TEJ organization, operating both for Filipinos in the Philippines and Filipino Americans in the US using the same issue frame.
As a TEJ organization, FACES is actively fulfilling its mission on TEJ by forging links with Philippine-based organizations such as the Advocates for Environmental and Social Justice (AESJ) with which FACES joins in demonstrations and awareness campaigns on the dangers of Chevron oil depots in Pandacan, Manila. FACES established its partnership with Metro Subic Network (MSN), another NGO formerly identified with PTFBC. When it was reviewing its organizational mission in 2005, FACES learned that MSN had reoriented itself to local community members “to assure them that it is independent of the PTFBC” (DD-54) and so FACES decided to re-connect with MSN. Clearly, FACES continues to be cautious in aligning itself with the remnants of PTFBC. Most recently, as part of its TEJ-related activities, FACES has joined with the True Cost of Chevron Coalition, bringing together the stories and fight of fenceline communities from across California and the US, Nigeria, Ecuador, Burma, Kazakhstan, Iraq, and more. (www.facessolidarity.org)

Building Solidarity

Durkheim ([1893] 1997) originated the sociological concept of solidarity, which pertains to the type of social cohesion among individuals in different contexts. In his theory on the division of labor in society, Durkheim proposed that there are two types of solidarity, mechanical and organic. Mechanical solidarity refers to the social cohesion characteristic of traditional societies wherein integration and cohesion among individual members emanates from the homogeneity of the society. Organic solidarity, on the other hand, refers to the social cohesion characteristic of more advanced and industrial societies wherein integration and cohesion emanates from the interdependence among different groups.
I discuss briefly this notion of solidarity as a theme that emerged from an in vivo code, “building solidarity” (8). This code was prevalent in the newsletters of FACES, as well as in interviews with FACES members. As its name bears this concept, I deem it important to understand how “solidarity” is practiced by FACES as a reflection of how it learned its hard-earned lessons in relating with other organizations, especially across borders. Thus, in the succeeding text, I analyze the different aspects of solidarity based on the practice of FACES. These aspects include “building solidarity” as: a) working together; b) building community; and, c) taking a stand.

Building solidarity as working together. First, building solidarity means working together with individuals or groups toward achieving a goal. For example, the following is an excerpt from FACES’ newsletter, “Facing Justice”:

Solidarity Work—On December 16th, we collaborated with author Benjamin Pimentel to launch his book, U.G. (DD 52)

Benjamin Pimentel is a California-based Filipino American who was one of the producers/directors of “Toxic Sunset,” the first documentary on toxic contamination in the former US bases in the Philippines. The film depicts the discovery of the toxins inside the Clark Air Base in Pampanga, and in Subic Naval Base in Zambales. Pimentel also wrote U.G.: An Underground Tale (The Journey of Edgar Jopson and the First Quarter Storm Generation), which is described in the FACES newsletter as about “the life of a student leader activist who was killed by the Philippine military, grounding us in our history as being a part of a larger continuum of the social justice movement.”

The book launching of U.G. is framed as “building solidarity” with a Filipino American author who may not be directly contributing to the activities of FACES but whose work reminds FACES members of their Filipino roots. Thus, it is important for
FACES to show solidarity by welcoming Filipino individuals and/or groups who are also working toward bettering the well-being of the Filipino communities in the US, not only in terms of physical but also on cultural and collective growth. This aspect of solidarity is consistent with FACES’ notion of ethnic collectivity as well as its newly designed Mission-Vision-Goal statement.

**Building solidarity by building community.** When FACES conducted a debriefing on its annual Face2Face eco-tour as a testimonial event to reflect on the experiences of the participants with the trip, the event was described in FACES’ newsletter as “truly a night of solidarity and community building” (DD 52). This quote sums up how FACES members ought to feel whenever FACES gathers as a collective. A deep sense of community must first be built among the members of FACES in order for them to cater to other communities and groups to which FACES advocacy may lead. These debriefings, and other FACES events, are filled with testimonies, storytelling, sharing, and even food sharing. The conduct of events such as these are normal among Filipino communities all throughout the US because oftentimes it is through these parties and similar events held by Filipino associations and organizations that the Filipinos, especially second- and even third-generations, can perform and experience the essence of their ethnic identity (see Espiritu 2003). These events truly give them a sense of community.

**Building solidarity by taking a stand.** In one of the issues of FACES’ newsletter was an article entitled, “A Demonstration in Solidarity with Philippine Partners” (DD 52). This article was written on the demonstration to support Nicole, a rape victim of six US
Marines assigned in Subic during the VFA exercises in 2005. The demonstration touched upon issues of Nicole’s rape and the call to prosecute the six US Marines.

Solidarity here refers to taking a stand on issues. Taking a stand is consistent with the idea of solidarity because it entails action, an essential element in building solidarity with communities that need their support. In this case, FACES took a stand through partnership with other NGOs involved in the protest, such as Women for Genuine Security, a US-based NGO (http://genuinesecurity.org/), and Gabriela Network, a Filipino women’s group. As FACES noted, the coordinated action amplified the stand of these NGOs in showing their solidarity with the Philippines, especially the women’s sector:

Over 300 people witnessed the demonstration of the solidarity event with several signing a solidarity statement that will be sent to the Philippines.

(DD 49)

The involvement of FACES in demonstrations such as this confirms my assertion that in adopting a TEJ as framework for mobilization, FACES opened up many geographies of protest (i.e., in this case, the US and the Philippines). In addition to that, by emphasizing its notion of solidarity, FACES broadens its list of issue areas to work with as it cultivates its advocacy. This multi-faceted collective identity is owed by FACES to its dual organizational identity of being both an ethnic-based and a TEJ organization.

Chapter Conclusion

In this chapter, I outlined four routes which the former partners and community involved in the TAN between PTFBC and FACES took after the decline of the bases cleanup campaign in the Philippines. In order to frame the discussion, I presented a brief literature review focusing on the concept of abeyance as applied to social movements. In this chapter, I attempted to extend the concept of abeyance to TANs in

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order to see how former partners adapt via various abeyance structures. I defined abeyance structures as various organizational arrangements that absorbed the spillover of activists from former TAN after its breakup.

Next, I defined the four routes that these former partners took with the abeyance structure as background. In Route 1, some former BOD members and PTFBC’s local staff were absorbed by their original affiliations which had maintained their posts while they were active in the PTFBC. In Route 2, other former BOD members sought new affiliations with other transnational NGOs and coalitions with similar or parallel advocacy as the previous TAN. Similarly, most of the community members in Sitio Madapdap Resettlement Center became clients of new NGOs working in the Philippines, which catered to the well-being of the children-victims after the rift in PTFBC. In Route 3, the breakaway group remained in the spirit of the campaign in hopes of renewing it someday. ABC currently endeavors to build a mass base via a transnational network apart from the former TAN. ABC seeks to accomplish this through the ED, whose change of immigrant status has allowed her to become a transnational being as well, crossing borders of US and Philippines to work on the renewal project. Route 4 was taken by FACES, which restructured itself by adopting the TEJ as framework of action, and by cultivating an organizational culture geared toward promoting its ethnic identity as its collective identity, and the notion of solidarity as its principled organizational norm. All of these were reflected by FACES on its new name, “Filipino American Coalition for Environmental Solidarity.”

The discussion on FACES and Route 4 was longer is for two reasons. First, I wanted to illustrate how FACES capitalized on the ethnic dimension of engaged
collaboration in order to redefine its collective identity in a way recognizable to Filipino Americans as well as victim communities in the Philippines. The strength of the ethnic dimension of the collective identity of FACES fits their need for ethnic identifiability in both the US and Philippine contexts.

Second, I wanted to show how the transitioning of FACES after the decline was facilitated by their grasp of both material and symbolic resources, as well as the maintenance of their own networks and connections and the skills to forge new linkages. Indeed, as the best-resourced partner, FACES had greater success in moving forward after the decline of the cleanup campaign. This was possible thanks to the ability of FACES to hone the cultural aspect of its organization, maintain its vision, and restructure itself and its networks. The fragments of the PTFBC pursued various routes without clear signs of success to date. The least-resourced partner, the local community, resorted to being absorbed by other assisting NGOs providing for their welfare. In this regard, at least in the short term following the breakup of the TAN for the cleanup campaign, former partners have followed different routes and achieved varying degrees of success in pursuing their goals. To a great extent, the degree of success is tied to their initial resources in terms of material support as well as cultural and symbolic legitimacy in the US and the Philippines. This suggests that stronger partners in a TAN also fare better after the breakup of a TAN; and that in turn raises questions about the ability of networking in TANs to truly overcome inequalities among TAN partners.
CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSION

In this concluding chapter, I divide the discussion into three sections. First, I provide a summary of the dissertation. Second, I discuss some insights on transnational advocacy networks (TANs). Finally, I underscore the implications of this dissertation for future research surrounding TANs.

Summary

In a nutshell, this dissertation evaluated the case of a TAN that emerged as an offshoot of a longstanding social movement against US intervention in the Philippines. The transformation from an environmental campaign based in a local organization into a TAN proceeded through processes involving partnership formation, issue framing emphasizing victimization, and designing a tactical repertoire that featured collaboration with non-state actors across national borders. The TAN’s goal was to access the resources and opportunities available in the international system in order to pressure state actors in the US and the Philippines to establish a bilateral initiative to take up the environmental and health problems arising from the toxic contamination in the former US military bases in the Philippines. However, the TAN was plagued with internal discords that resulted in the rift within the TAN. These internal factors were further complicated by the shifting political and social contexts surrounding the TAN. Together, these factors led to the premature deradicalization, and eventually the decline of the TAN. Moving forward, the core activists from the failed TAN were absorbed by different organizations in both domestic and transnational levels until such time when these activists and other succeeding new recruits are ready to pick up where the previous TAN left off.
Research Problem

This dissertation aimed to develop an in-depth case study on a TAN surrounding a toxic contamination cleanup campaign in the former US military bases in the Philippines. The main research problem of this dissertation focused on how a TAN that was initiated in a Third World setting became divided and went into decline. What are the factors that influence the emergence as well as decline of TANs? To capture the dynamics of a TAN, I asked four research questions: (a) how does a local advocacy network on environmental issues emerge; (b) how does a local advocacy network become transnational; (c) how does a TAN enter a period of decline and what are the factors that lead to such decline; and (d) how do TAN partners respond to the decline of the TAN?

Theoretical Approach

To address these research questions, I pursued a qualitative research methodology, as a means to analyze and piece together the lived experiences articulated by TAN partners, notably the People’s Task Force for Bases Cleanup (PTFBC), the Filipino American Coalition for Environmental Solidarity (FACES), and the local community of victims. Using a constructionist perspective, I focused on how meanings are produced and practiced through social interactions in the context of TAN. More specifically, I highlighted the processes involved in the emergence and decline of the TAN surrounding the cleanup campaign. I viewed the reality surrounding this cleanup campaign as a locus of claims, contestations and compromise over conditions surrounding the TAN, without prejudice to the truthfulness of these claims.
Methods

I use a case study design to organize the data collection and analysis. Data sources included 31 semi-structured interviews, which I conducted face-to-face (27) and via telephone (3) and internet (1). I combined the interviews with secondary information from various archival documents. The use of in-depth interviews complemented the extensive archival research using the internet and secondary documents from partner nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). I combined interview and archival data in order to address the research questions.

As a case study, this research aimed to (a) provide a contextual description of the case; (b) analyze the emerging themes and issues using grounded theory as a tool for analysis; and (c) report the insights generated from the case study. Throughout this dissertation, I analyzed emergent concepts and themes to address questions about relationships among TAN partners as well as relationships of the TAN to the targeted states. This analytic focus highlighted the interactions among partners in the TAN as they created and negotiated subjective meanings concerning their transnational activism.

Key Findings

Building on the pioneering work of Keck and Sikkink (1998) on TANs, this research generated findings that elaborated some of the major concepts and processes in social movements and TAN literatures. These concepts, which emerged from the data, were discussed in four analytic chapters in this dissertation. In this section, I highlight the major findings of each chapter.

Chapter 4. This chapter outlined three key conditions for the emergence of protest over toxic contamination on US military bases in the Philippines. First, a nationalist
backdrop inspired the mobilizations among Filipinos to strengthen their claim of a collective identity against American colonial rule. Second, by recognizing that the issues surrounding US military bases were not only about sovereignty but also encompassed environmental issues, some nationalist activists were able to recognize new political opportunities. These opportunities led to 1) the rejection of the Military Bases Agreement by the Philippine Senate which forced the US military to withdraw its troops from the Philippines; 2) the coming of US delegations of technical and policy experts to evaluate and initiate research on the former US military bases; and 3) the relocation of the newly organized cleanup campaign from a local NGO to a national NGO, enabling the budding campaign to capture larger audiences through mass media attention. And third, by framing the experience of toxic contamination in terms of victimization, the local environmental campaign of PTFBC highlighted the continuing damage of US foreign policies to the Filipino people.

Chapter 5. This chapter focused on the transformation of a local/domestic campaign into a TAN. Two main findings were generated in the analysis of transnationalization. First, the clean-up campaign became transnational by developing a tactical repertoire to promote awareness and invoke international support. This repertoire included networking, information sharing, participatory and direct action, legal engagement, and engaged collaboration. Second, the campaign became transnational by opening up domestic constituencies (i.e., the community of victims) to collaboration with international partners. This transformed the activities of the TAN from mere information exchange to a more engaged collaboration, which was achieved in three dimensions, namely the technical/legal, ethical and ethnic. The technical/legal
dimension involves exchanging information between TAN partners on the scientific aspects surrounding the toxic contamination issues, and sharing strategies such as filing lawsuits against the Philippine and US governments. The ethical dimension entails the use of the affective and moral aspect of the engaged collaboration between PTFBC and FACES in order to effect behavioral change in the general public for support, and in the targeted states for remediation. Lastly, the ethnic dimension underscores the ethnic collectivity among the activists that is anchored in Filipino national identity. Ethnic self-identification solidified the TAN and advanced it into a more engaged collaboration with the community of victims through grassroots organizing and community participation in advocacy works. These processes were captured in the concept of engaged collaboration as an alternative route to Keck and Sikkink’s (1998) Boomerang pattern.

**Chapter 6.** This chapter analyzed the internal and external factors that explain the break-up of the TAN and the decline of the cleanup campaign. The internal factors centered mainly on the organizational discord brought about by crises in leadership and financial accountability, and the defeat of the lawsuits filed against the Philippine government and the US military. The external factors consisted of the lack of popular support for the campaign in the US, and the impact of the 9-11 incident on people’s willingness to participate in the clean-up campaign for fear of being perceived as anti-American. These factors ultimately caused the premature deradicalization of the campaign before it could achieve significant results from its mobilization. The TAN, and thus the PTFBC and FACES, thus missed key political opportunities. For one thing, the campaign failed to sustain pressure on Philippine government when it appeared to be
prepared to yield to the demands of the campaign. For another, the campaign failed to avoid dismissals of its legal cases against both the Philippine and US governments.

Chapter 7. This chapter assessed the responses of former TAN partners to the breakup of the TAN, and the decline of the clean-up campaign. The analysis highlighted 1) the different routes by which activists from the TAN were absorbed by NGOs, which in effect acted as abeyance organizations; and 2) the different outcomes of restructuring undertaken by the former partners of the TAN. A key finding of this chapter was that the better-resourced partner (i.e., FACES) had greater success in moving forward after the decline, due to cultivation of the cultural identity of its organization, adjusting its vision, and restructuring its networks. The least-resourced partner (i.e., local community) resorted to relying on assistance from new but smaller NGOs.

This dissertation contributes to knowledge about TANs in three key respects. First, by systematically tracing the socio-historical background of the emergence of a local environmental campaign, this dissertation highlighted key concepts in the social movements literature such as political opportunity structures, issue framing, and collective identity, as they apply to the life course of a TAN. Whereas the TAN in question emerged due to e.g. political opportunities, it also incurred difficulties that later hampered its ability to seize political opportunities. Second, by adopting a social constructionist perspective, this dissertation focused on key concepts grounded in the experiences of diverse participants in the TAN, which permitted the refinement of concepts such as engaged collaboration, collective victimization, and solidarity work. Notably, the analysis evaluates these processes across the emergence and decline of a TAN, showing their potential as well as difficulties for supporting and sustaining
mobilization. Lastly, this dissertation contributed to the ongoing discussion on social movements by focusing on the concept of abeyance. As this subject matter is not explored extensively in the social movements literature, this dissertation attempted to extend the abeyance thesis in the context of TANs. The last two analytical chapters in particular showed how the advantages of TANs for supporting a campaign, from information exchange to engaged collaboration, also help explain the risks of TANs in terms of potential conflicts and abeyance.

**Insights on TANs**

This dissertation generated three important insights to add to the ongoing discussion of the processes involving TANs. I subdivide this section into three to highlight the following: (a) the complex processes involved in the emergence and development of a local environmental advocacy campaign in a Third World setting to becoming transnational; (b) the fragmentation of a TAN brought about by internal and external factors; and, (c) the analysis of the abeyance structures that absorbed the core activists from weakened TANs.

**Emergence and Transnationalization**

This dissertation unpacks the complex processes by which local movements and advocacy campaigns become transnational by identifying some core factors. The emergence of TANs depends partly on the political opportunity structures as well as the capacity of the core activists in the TANs to mobilize the available resources, both material and symbolic. The key is to be keen in recognizing and taking advantage of these opportunities when they present themselves (i.e., to be able to recognize when state authorities are most vulnerable to change). Misrecognition of these political opportunity structures, on the other hand, can delay or even jeopardize a TAN
campaign since political opportunity structures are usually constricted by states. In addition, the findings resonate with Tarrow’s (1998) notion of the cycle of contention. TANs need to recognize the shifting consistency in the political climate. Such shifts are important, as they affect the prospects for TANs. In particular, external factors influence the incentives by which people participate in social movements, the dynamics of recruitment, and the participation and retention of members and partners.

Another key issue that arises from this dissertation concerns the relations of TANs with states. How well TANs influence state actors depends on how well TANs can frame issues that resonate with the values of the state, articulate a shared identity, concoct an effective repertoire of protest, and capitalize on the available material and symbolic resources at their disposal. Such arguments highlight TAN engagement with states, though this engagement may be contentious or collaborative. The degree of independence and contention of TANs and states have, however, both been topics of debate. The importance of the state in relations with TANs has been challenged by the world civic politics perspective, in which transnational political change is theorized to be independent of the state (e.g., Wapner 1995). This dissertation showed that in at least one case, a TAN provided an avenue to represent marginalized sectors of society to negotiate with, persuade and protest against state actors and their policies. Hence, engagement, particularly via contention, can be crucial to the goals of TANs.

That said, for some, there has nonetheless been an overemphasis on contentious politics as the primary avenue for TANs. Wu (2005) asserts that TANs can be an avenue for sustained collaboration and negotiation with state actors, rather than only combative. In a way, being loosely connected, TANs can perhaps have more leeway in
dealing with state actors even amidst contentious politics than transnational coalitions or transnational social movements, which are more formal in terms of operations.

The relationship between the emerging TANs and domestic and foreign states is also relevant to the outcomes of TAN campaigns. According to Risse-Kappen (1995), domestic structures determine whether or not the TAN becomes successful in accessing the international system to link with other NSAs. This dissertation showed the importance of ties among TANs and domestic states and communities; I also showed how such ties can be sources of internal contention that help explain the decline of TAN campaigns.

Finally, this dissertation speaks to the broader literature on the question of the functions and activities of TANs by highlighting the importance of engaged collaboration across borders. Prior research typically emphasizes that the main activity of TANs is usually to share information (Khagram et al. 2002: 7). However, as this dissertation showed, TANs sometimes venture into more engaged collaboration between domestic and foreign partner-organizations. As a result, local organizations become enmeshed in national and international networks. However, this dissertation also showed that the results of such engaged collaboration may vary among the partners within the same TAN. Indeed, whereas the successes of one partner may support others within the TAN, the travails of one partner may affect the fortunes of the others. In the Philippine case study, the engaged collaboration between a domestic NGO (PTFBC) and a local community facilitated the emergence of another partner NGO (i.e., FACES); but later, internal conflicts of the domestic partner created problems of entanglements for the
foreign partner as well as the community. More research should be done to explore the problematic dilemmas as well as advantages of collaborative engagement in TANs.

Decline and Fragmentation

This dissertation documented the processes of fragmentation of a TAN by highlighting the challenges that TANs confront in terms of managing and sustaining networks. Partners may start on an unequal footing in terms of the social capital they bring to the table, and while complementarities among collaborators may provide support to weaker partners, such asymmetries may also translate into internal tensions within a TAN. Further, structural problems external to the network may also cause rifts within TANs, causing their decline.

Any discussion on decline of TANs has to consider two basic aspects: (1) the factors that lead to such decline; and (2) the fate of the networked partners. This dissertation included an analysis of both, which permits insights into how decline affects responses, and the ensuing outcomes. Focusing on the factors of decline not only allows for an examination of the micro-macro dynamics of the interactions and experiences within TANs, it also affords an evaluation of how those dynamics influence subsequent strategic options for former partners. Indeed, the notion of decline in TANs should not read as implying termination or dissolution but rather as a moment of crisis, beyond which a campaign may enter a period of abeyance, but former partners may nonetheless pursue various strategies and actions on other but related fronts. Thus, a key research question in this dissertation, and one that should inform future research, concerns the responses of former partner organizations as well as the activities of individual activists who may move among organizations. Both may serve as possible
“abeyance structures” created or made available as a means of reallocating and refashioning networks of activists affected by the decline of the TANs.

In the context of tensions and breakups in TANs, trust becomes a key issue. TANs are supposed to be venues for information exchange and shared values. The case study in this dissertation illustrated the salience of trust as a crucial value that must be shared among partners in order to maintain the integrity of TANs. Trust is an important element in creating social capital in organizations and networks, as well as in ensuring the successful integration and survival of new immigrants in their host countries (see Tilly 2007).

TANs can be viewed as trust networks in terms of sharing information that is often sensitive. Indeed, such information sharing embodies trust necessary to maintain confidence among partners to contribute to the success of a TAN. Trust is key to offsetting inequalities among partners. This dissertation showed that when there is a breach in trust among participants in a TAN, conflicts can multiply through the network, causing a TAN collapse. This dissertation thus documented the risks of TANs, in that their great strength – building trust as via information sharing – can also be the source of their tensions, conflicts and decline. Without accurate information being smoothly shared among the partners in TANs, miscommunication may arise and the resulting perceptions of hiding information can cause rifts.

**Abeyance Structures**

Lastly, this dissertation contributes to the analysis of TANs in abeyance by examining the differential experiences among TAN partners after decline. The abeyance thesis as conceptualized by Mizruchi (1983) has seldom, if at all, been used in the analysis of the fates of TANs. In most cases, the notion of abeyance has been extended
to social movements to explain how abeyance structures are created or devised to absorb the failed movements. This idea complements Tarrow’s (1998) assertion that when social movements decline, they leave residues of their protest, which in turn accumulates over long periods and can lead to a new cycle of protest. The thesis on abeyance can thus provide an explanation as to the fate of the network partners after the decline of TANs. Whether or not the former partners seek to reconstitute the same TAN again or join a new TAN, the idea of networked partners being absorbed by abeyance organizations offers an avenue for understanding the life cycle of TANs.

This dissertation attempted to extend the abeyance thesis via an analysis of the disproportionate social capital of TAN partners as it affects their fortunes after TAN breakup. A key insight from this dissertation is that after TANs decline, better-off partners (i.e., partners with greater social capital) do better in terms of reorganization or continuance of their advocacy work. Least-privileged partners (with less previous networks and connections) expectedly fare the worst. This leaves us another fundamental question, that is, whether forging TANs among unequally endowed partners only increases disparities further among partners, when the partnership fails to work out. These variations depended largely on two factors: (a) how durable the networks and connections were that partners had at their disposal; and (b) how influential the resources (i.e., social capital) were that activists had at the time of abeyance.

**Implications for Future Research**

Based on the insights from this dissertation, I have identified some areas that need to be explored further in future research. First, TANs do not only act as channels for sharing information and diffusing principled ideas and norms. TANs also perform
political roles not only in negotiating with targeted states but also in micro-managing interactions among network partners. Thus, for future research, I suggest that there should be more empirical investigation to analyze the political role of TANs. Using qualitative research, possible research questions may focus on how TANs simultaneously embody aspects of agency and structure in performing their political role in both contentious and non-contentious venues.

Second, there should be more comparative research on TANs initiated in developing countries. These comparative studies can be framed to see how grassroots organizations from developing countries can access resources and information in the international system by forming or joining TANs. In what circumstances do TAN partners based in developing countries gain resources from the international system via TANs?

Third, more cases need to be examined on how research on ethnic-based TANs can further articulate the notion of engaged collaboration. Is ethnic identity salient in fostering more engaged collaboration with targeted communities? Does undertaking engaged collaboration at the grassroots or mass base of any social movement lead to its decline? In what forms of engagement other than information sharing can TANs participate, without endangering their ability to act efficiently at supra-level dealings with partners and state actors?

Finally, more research should be done to understand TANs in abeyance, in order to refine ideas on recruitment, re-emergence, decline, and restructuring of TANs. The thesis of abeyance should be extended to understanding of TANs. Doing so will also
help us better understand the lifespan of TANs and the possibility of reconnecting, and thereby renewing a TAN after it declines.
## APPENDIX A
### LIST OF ARCHIVAL DOCUMENTS USED IN THE RESEARCH

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<th>DD</th>
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<td>List of Past/Present Supporters in US Congress</td>
<td>File copy from Greenpeace (photocopy)</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>Time Line of Events surrounding Bases Cleanup Campaign</td>
<td>File copy from Arc Ecology (photocopy)</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>List of Medical Provisions from Virlanie Foundation</td>
<td>File copy from a community member (photocopy)</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>List of Toxic Waste Victims in Clark Air Base and surrounding areas (as of June 2000)</td>
<td>File copy from a community member (photocopy)</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>Lawsuit filed by the People’s Task Force for Bases Cleanup (PTFBC) against individual members of the newly created Alliance for Bases Cleanup, Inc.(October 20, 2002)</td>
<td>File copy from Quezon City Regional Trial Court (photocopy)</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>PTFBC’s Commemorative Program for the First Death Anniversary of Crizel Valencia (February 21, 2001)</td>
<td>File copy from PTFBC (photocopy)</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>Hazardous Waste Contamination in Clark</td>
<td>Prepared by the Environmental Planning and Development Department, Clark Development Corporation, n. d. (photocopy)</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>Health for all: A study of the Health of People Living in or near to the former US Clark Air Force Base, 1996-1998</td>
<td>International Institute of Concern for Public Health and the PTFBC</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>Bantay Ka! Kalikasan, Kaligtasan, Kalusugan, Katarungan: Publication of Advocates for Environmental and Social Justice (UFO-OD)</td>
<td>File copy from Alliance for Environmental and Social Justice (AESJ)</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>Lawsuit by AESJ against individual polluters (April 1, 2009)</td>
<td>File copy from the Office of the Ombudsman, Quezon City, Philippines (photocopy)</td>
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<td>12</td>
<td>History of Mabalacat, Pampanga</td>
<td>File copy from the Regional Trial Court (photocopy)</td>
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<td>13</td>
<td>Lawsuit filed against US and the Philippine governments at the Regional Trial Court in Pampanga</td>
<td>File copy from the Regional Trial Court (photocopy)</td>
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<td>14</td>
<td>Certificate of Incorporation of the Alliance for Bases Cleanup, Inc.</td>
<td>File from the Securities and Exchange Commission, Philippines under SEC Registration Number A200103525 (photocopy)</td>
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<td>&quot;The Sunbeam&quot;: a Monthly Publication of Virlanie (March 2008)</td>
<td>Published by Virlanie Foundation, Inc., Barangay Singkamas, Makati City, Philippines</td>
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<td>25</td>
<td>Filipino/American Coalition for Environmental Solutions June Update (June 12, 2001)</td>
<td>Retrieved 5/14/2009 (<a href="http://groups.yahoo.com/group/FYP-DC/post?postID=V4Zllmb7soEE3CpqZXHIU58FyITOM">http://groups.yahoo.com/group/FYP-DC/post?postID=V4Zllmb7soEE3CpqZXHIU58FyITOM</a> ghH4aQoklNHb5k4_bbwd9bHN- 8ltSDTwAkawdAukHmimCmkYM-4jTg)</td>
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<td>Filipinos: U.S. has 'obligation' to clean up</td>
<td>Retrieved 5/15/2009 (<a href="http://www.stripes.com/01/may01/ed052801b.html">http://www.stripes.com/01/may01/ed052801b.html</a>)</td>
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| 55 | FACES Contact Information | Retrieved 5/17/2009 (http://www.facessolidarity.org) |

| 57 | FACES Stands in Solidarity with Global Fenceline Communities for Accountability from Chevron at Shareholder's Meeting | Retrieved 5/17/2009 (http://www.facessolidarity.org) |
| 58 | FACES Bases Cleanup: Background and Directions and Goals | Retrieved 5/17/2009 (http://www.facessolidarity.org) |

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<td>63</td>
<td>A Vigil For The Filipino Children Of Clark And Subic, an event sponsored by the Filipino/American Coalition for Environmental Solutions (Washington, DC Chapter); Asia Pacific Center for Justice and Peace; and, National Federation of Filipino American Associations</td>
<td>File copy from the Filipino/American Coalition for Environmental Solutions ([<a href="http://www.faces">http://www.faces</a> solutions.net](<a href="http://www.faces">http://www.faces</a> solutions.net), unavailable)</td>
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<td>66</td>
<td>Virlanie Foundation Inc. License to Operate (Specialization: Residential Care Services for Street Children)</td>
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<td>67</td>
<td>PTFBC Primer</td>
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<td>68</td>
<td>PTFBC Backgrounder on The U.S. Toxic Legacy in Subic</td>
<td>File from PTFBC (photocopy)</td>
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<td>PTFBC Workplan for the Period October 1997 to December 1998</td>
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<td>70</td>
<td>PTFBC Statement on the Asia-Star Weston Environmental Baseline Study (September 25, 1997)</td>
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Appendix A.  Continued

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<td>Resolution urging President Fidel V. Ramos to call upon the United States of America Government to fulfill its responsibility of investigation and cleaning up wastes left behind by the American troops, in the light of alarming cases of hazards and illnesses experienced by some residents in the said communities</td>
<td>Tenth Congress of the Republic of the Philippines First Regular Session, House of Representatives H.R. No. 395 (January 3, 1996) (photocopy)</td>
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<td>Joint Meeting of the Committees on Ecology and Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>Tenth Congress of the Republic of the Philippines House of Representatives (December 17, 1997) (photocopy)</td>
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<td>Joint US and Philippine Campaign Calls on Presidents to Acknowledge Contamination and Take Action on Bases Cleanup (November 24, 1996)</td>
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<td>79</td>
<td>An Urgent Message to President Clinton: Support Philippine Democracy and the Peace Dividend: Cancel ACSA (Friends of the Filipino People)</td>
<td>File copy from Arc Ecology (photocopy)</td>
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<td>Proposed Long-Term Strategy of the USWG</td>
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<td>Solidarity Message of Sen. Wigberto Tañada to PTFBC on the Launching Forum of the PTFBC (August 1, 1997)</td>
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<td>PTFBC: First Metro Clark Forum on Base Cleanup</td>
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<td>84</td>
<td>An Assessment of the Woodward-Clyde Report Submitted to the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (October 23, 1997)</td>
<td>File copy from Arc Ecology (photocopy)</td>
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<td>USWG Internal Communication on the Meeting with Ambassador Tom Hubbard, US Ambassador to the Philippines</td>
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<td>86</td>
<td>Philippine and US NGO Briefing Paper for President Fidel Ramos on &quot;Issues and Agenda for Action for the Proposed Bilateral Talks on Philippine Base Toxic Contamination&quot; (November 23, 1996)</td>
<td>File copy from Arc Ecology (photocopy)</td>
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<td>87</td>
<td>“More Publicity than Progress: The Troubling Path of Economic Conversation in the Philippines” by Saul Bloom</td>
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<td>89</td>
<td>The Official Minutes of the September 10th Phone Conference of the USWG (September 17, 1997)</td>
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<td>90</td>
<td>Final Report on August Philippine Tour and Related Matters (September 9, 1997)</td>
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<td>NFPC’s List of Visiting Foreign Military Ships After the Final Withdrawal of the US Facilities</td>
<td>File copy from Arc Ecology (photocopy)</td>
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<td>93</td>
<td>List of Available Reports on the Contamination at Clark Air Base and Subic Naval Facility</td>
<td>Retrieved 5/14/2009 (<a href="http://www.facessolutions.net/default2.html">http://www.facessolutions.net/default2.html</a>)</td>
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<td>94</td>
<td>Professor Roland Simbulan Discusses America’s New Strategy for the Philippines (March 24, 1997)</td>
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<td>Inheritors of the Earth: The Human Face of US Military Contamination at Clark Air Base, Pampanga, Philippines</td>
<td>Kasama 14(3)/July-August-September 2000 Solidarity Philippines Australia Network</td>
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APPENDIX B
APPROVED INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD PROTOCOL

INFORMED CONSENT
The US Bases Cleanup Campaign in the Philippines, 2010-2011

I am asking you to participate in this research because I would like to hear in your own words about your experiences and views on issues regarding the former US military bases cleanup campaign in the Philippines, which started in early 1990s and geared towards the safe removal of toxic wastes and substances from these former US bases. I would like you to participate in an interview that would last not more than 2 hours. Your identity will be kept confidential to the extent provided by law, and will not be revealed in any work published from this research. I will systematically remove any identifiers during the transcription, and the recording will be erased afterwards. However, if you wish to reveal your name in any publications that will come out of this research, please indicate by signing below. There are no anticipated risks, compensation, or other direct benefits to you as a participant in this interview. There will be no material or topic that will be discussed in the interview that may cause you any legal or personal harm, nor will we discuss classified information that may put you at risk with the US government.

If you have questions, please feel free to contact me.

Principal Investigator: Larissa Gata, Graduate Student, Department of Sociology and Criminology & Law, 3219 Turlington Hall, P.O. Box 117330, email: deapgate@ufl.edu, phone: (352) 846-5530

Supervisor: Dr. Stephen G. Perz, Associate Professor, Department of Sociology and Criminology & Law, 3113 Turlington, P.O. Box 117330, email: sperz@soc.ufl.edu, phone: (352) 392-0265 ext: 234

Questions or concerns about your rights as a research participant may be directed to the IRB Office, Box 112250, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL 32611-2250; phone 392-0433.

If you agree to participate in this interview, please sign and return this copy of the letter to me. A second copy is provided for your records. By signing this letter, you give me permission to confidentially report your responses in any manuscript written for possible publication.

I have read the procedure described above. I voluntarily agree to participate in the procedure and have received a copy of this description.

Participant’s signature: ___________________________ Date: ____________

Principal investigator: ___________________________ Date: ____________

I wish to have my name published in any work or publication that will come out of this research.

Participant’s signature: ___________________________ Date: ____________

Approved by
University of Florida
Institutional Review Board 02
Protocol # 2010-U-0221
For Use Through 03-15-2011

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APPENDIX C
INTERVIEW GUIDE QUESTIONS

General Questions
1. Please tell me about yourself.
2. Please tell me about your experiences before, during, and after the US military bases cleanup campaign.
   a. How were you recruited in the campaign? Or how did you become involved in the campaign?
   b. What were the most significant events that you can remember that happened during and after the US military bases cleanup campaign in your area/locality?
   c. What were the issues/problems (if ever) that you knew existed during those times? How were they resolved (if ever)?
   d. How do you want to resolve these issues (if there are)?
3. How do you assess the campaign now?
   a. If it is still on-going, what is your present involvement in the campaign organization?
   b. If not, please tell me what happened. Is there a chance to revive it? How?

Specific Questions (used especially during theoretical sampling)
1. To start, please tell me about yourself. [Especially your history with activism in the Philippines and/or in the US]
2. What is your connection to the bases cleanup campaign?
3. Can you please tell about the organization with which you were affiliated (as far as the bases cleanup campaign is concerned)? [Follow-up questions: When was this first organized? Who initiated this organization? For what purpose?]
4. In what capacity had you been involved in this organization?
5. What was the connection of your organization to the bases cleanup campaign?
6. In your recollection, what were the main issues/struggles that your organization experienced?
7. Specific to FACES: FACES had decided to part with its initial goal in pursuing the bases cleanup campaign. Instead, it focused on the Chevron campaign. How do you assess this decision?
   a. In your opinion, what were the main factors leading to this decision?
   b. At present, how do you assess FACES? (in terms of its activities, mission, and goal, and other parameters that you deem important)
   c. One of the FACES newsletter emphasized the need to learn/talk about the history of the Philippine Left Movement in order to understand the context of the environmental issues. What is your thought about this matter?
   d. Why is there a need to emphasize the role of the Philippine Left in FACES advocacy?
8. Finally, how do you see the future of the bases cleanup campaign? How should this campaign move on, if ever?
APPENDIX D
CODEBOOK

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- Undefined environmental policies 10
- Poverty 10
- Lack of technology 6
- Inaction 4
- Military codes 3
- Lack of monitoring 3
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- Loopholes in contract 1
- Natural disasters 1

**Adopting a victim frame**

**Defining who the victims are**

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**Proving victimhood**

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<td>• Insisting that FACES has “no local partner”</td>
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<td>Victims and Parents</td>
<td>Dealing with Dilemmas</td>
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<td>• Leaving the organization because of lack of communication</td>
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<td>• Leaving the organization “for the sake of the children”</td>
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<td>Desiring to Control Donations Directed to them</td>
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<td>• Wanting to get support directly</td>
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<td>• Emphasizing financial support for victims</td>
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<td>• Attempting to control direct assistance to victims</td>
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<td>• Emphasizing the need for financial support</td>
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<td>Being Forced to Choose Loyalty</td>
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<td>• Not being involved because of being Philippine Scholars</td>
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<td>• Sticking to PTFBC as “utang na loob”</td>
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<td>Continuing to Prove/Disprove “Victims” Claim or Claims as Victims</td>
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<td>• “Sikat sa ibang bansa”</td>
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<td>• Still using the cases of the victims</td>
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<td>• “Ipinapanglimos sina Abe”</td>
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<td>• Being excluded from the “list”</td>
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<td>Redefining Transnational Advocacy through Environmental Justice Lens</td>
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<td>• Becoming transnational environmental justice (TEJ)</td>
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<td>• Comparing toxicity across nations</td>
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<td>• Focusing on US EJ problem</td>
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<td>• Presenting new approach to TEJ</td>
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<td>• Filling a niche in Philippine TEJ movement</td>
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<td>Paralleling NIMBY with NION</td>
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<td>Changing FACES strategies</td>
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<td>Working locally and globally to raise awareness and fight for corporate responsibility</td>
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<td>Understanding magnitude of Philippines and US EJ issue</td>
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<td>Building environmental justice</td>
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<td>Broadening the vision and mission of FACES</td>
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<td>Representing the Victims</td>
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<td>Representing the Philippine victims</td>
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<td>Representing rape victim</td>
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<td>Redefining the Issues</td>
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<td>Protesting against rape by US Marines</td>
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<td>Emphasizing American colonization</td>
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<td>Connecting back to toxic contamination</td>
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<td>Invoking corporate social responsibility from Chevron</td>
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<td>Comparing with US conditions</td>
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<td>Advocating international campaign</td>
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<td>Putting up playground to “entertain” residents</td>
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<td>Making the issue an international concern</td>
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<td>Narrating history of oil and colonialism in the Philippines</td>
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<td>Redefining Solidarity</td>
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<td>Describing Pandacan community</td>
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<td>Expressing solidarity with women’s organizations</td>
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<td>Doing actions against oil companies</td>
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<td>Counting Chevron’s offenses</td>
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<td>Characterizing Pandacan oil depot</td>
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<td>• Maintaining ties in the Philippines 5 &lt;br&gt; o United Front to Oust the Oil Depots (UFO-OD) 6 &lt;br&gt; o Metro Subic Network for Bases Cleanup 5 &lt;br&gt; • Connecting with new US collaborators 4 &lt;br&gt; o APEN 2 &lt;br&gt; o RESIST 2 &lt;br&gt; o UCSB 2 &lt;br&gt; o UCSC 2 &lt;br&gt; o Filipinos for Affirmative Action 2 &lt;br&gt; o AGAPE 2 &lt;br&gt; o Amazon Watch 2</td>
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<td>• Emphasizing Filipino Roots and Experiences in US 12 &lt;br&gt; • Using Filipino terms 12 &lt;br&gt; • Speaking about racism 11 &lt;br&gt; • Illustrating “intergenerational” aspect of FACES 9 &lt;br&gt; • Sharing experiences as immigrants 7 &lt;br&gt; • Underscoring racial and ethnic relations 6 &lt;br&gt; • Discovering Filipino roots 6 &lt;br&gt; • Highlighting growing Filipino activism 4 &lt;br&gt; • Unpacking Filipino American identity 3 &lt;br&gt; • Involving Filipino student organizations 2 &lt;br&gt; • Noting the change in name 2 &lt;br&gt; • Emphasizing intergenerational aspect of the organization 1</td>
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<td>• Using Culture and Arts in Advocacy 16 &lt;br&gt; • Using culture and arts in advocacy 16 &lt;br&gt; • Using symbolism 15 &lt;br&gt; • Combining advocacy with entertainment 8 &lt;br&gt; • Using photography to document and analyze issues 8 &lt;br&gt; • Using official holidays to conduct activities 5 &lt;br&gt; • Using Filipino performances in advocacy 1</td>
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<td>• Conducting New and Diverse Projects 26 &lt;br&gt; • Conducting Face2Face 26 &lt;br&gt; • Fund-raising 19 &lt;br&gt; • Conducting new/additional projects 14 &lt;br&gt; • Doing CARE Now! 12</td>
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<td>• Conducting Kamalayan discussion</td>
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<td>• Depending on the support from members and supporters</td>
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<td>• Hosting house parties “Feasting for FACES”</td>
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<td>• Launching PACES2FACES (walkathon)</td>
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APPENDIX E
FINAL DECLARATION FROM THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL FORUM ON US MILITARY TOXICS AND BASES CLEANUP

We, the participants of the “First National Forum on U.S. Military Toxics and Bases Clean-up,” on behalf of the past, present, and future victims of toxic substances and wastes from military bases in the U.S. mainland, colonial territories, and “host” countries, do hereby declare the following premises and principles:

WHEREAS, the U.S. government has managed to establish military bases through unequal and unjust treaties and agreements;

WHEREAS, the continued presence of these bases is deemed to be an affront to the sovereignty of host nations;

WHEREAS, the reckless and negligent operations of U.S. bases have resulted in the significant toxic contamination of the air, water, and land at its foreign bases;

WHEREAS, the presence of these bases had caused various and unlimited environmental degradation, health impacts and social costs to local inhabitants;

WHEREAS, the U.S. Department of Defense has failed to properly address these negligent and irresponsible acts.

NOW, THEREFORE:

Resolved, as it is hereby resolved by the “First International Forum on U.S. Military Toxics and Bases Clean-Up,” that the U.S. Government adopt the following principles:

1. That the U.S. should close and remove its military bases from foreign soil;

2. That the U.S. should assume full responsibility for the thorough and complete cleanup of the contamination in its foreign bases;

3. That the U.S. respect the right of all peoples and host governments to environmental information, including the right to request and receive information regarding chemicals and other hazardous substances used, held in storage, transported and disposed at military bases abroad;

4. That the U.S. assure transparency and meaningful involvement of all peoples and host governments, including international oversight boards for all environmental programs at said bases;

5. That the U.S. should utilize principles of economic justice and equity with the involvement and approval of local communities in the clean-up of the bases; and,

6. That the U.S. should perform a comprehensive and thorough search for all potential waste sites, then assure of the highest level of standards in the clean-up of said sites at overseas bases;

7. That the U.S. respect the right of the host country to complete access to these bases;
8. That the U.S. respect the rights and culture of indigenous people affected by the presence of these bases;

9. That the U.S. apologize and compensate for damages to local lives, health and property, including crimes such as murder, rape and robbery, on-base as well as off-base;

10. That the U.S. assure fair labor practices inside these bases;

11. That the effects of militarism and military toxic substances and wastes on women and children born and unborn be analyzed and acted upon;

12. That the U.S. and the host country rectify Status of Forces Agreements and abrogate unequal and unjust treaties and agreements.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we the participants of the said international forum do hereby affix our signatures on this 26th day of November 1996, in Manila, Republic of the Philippines.
LIST OF REFERENCES


Skopcol, Theda. 1979. States and Social Revolutions. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.


BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Immediately after finishing her baccalaureate degree in Forestry (*magna cum laude*) from the University of the Philippines Los Baños in 1994, Larissa Gata was hired by the Department of Social Forestry and Forest Governance as an Instructor to teach undergraduate students specifically on courses such as *Forest Conservation* and *Community Organizing*. In the same year, she was also recognized as one of the Ten Outstanding Students of the Philippines, besting around 300 candidates from all state colleges and universities across the country. She also served as one of the Ambassadors of Goodwill in the 22nd Ship for Southeast Asian Youth Program in 1995, touring ASEAN-member countries and Japan.

While teaching at the university, Larissa rose from the ranks and secured a permanent position as Assistant Professor in the same department by 1999 after completing her masteral degree in Forestry (major in Social Forestry and minor in Rural Sociology) under the auspices of the Southeast Asian Regional Center for Graduate Study and Research in Agriculture (SEARCA) from 1995 to 1997. During her tenure at the university, Larissa participated in a number of local and international trainings and conferences including the Training for Sustainable Forestry which was sponsored by the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) in 2004.

In 2005, Larissa was accepted in the graduate program of the Department of Sociology at the University of Florida. She pursued a doctoral degree in Sociology, major in Environmental Sociology and minor in Race and Ethnicity. She was mentored specifically by Dr. Hernan Vera on Race and Ethnicity, Sociology of Knowledge and Sociology of Culture. On the other hand, she took classes on Environmental Sociology under Dr. Stephen G. Perz, her Supervisory Committee Chair, Dr. Christine Overdevest
(on Environmental Governance and Corporate Social Responsibility), and Dr. Brian Mayer (on Environmental Inequality and Justice). She is the first graduate of the Environmental and Resource Sociology specialization in the Department of Sociology and Criminology & Law at the University of Florida.

Her graduate study was mainly supported by the University of the Philippines Doctoral Fellowship for three years from 2005 to 2008. She also worked as a research assistant to Dr. Stephen Perz, and teaching assistant to Dr. Christine Overdevest (University of Florida) and Dr. Rohald Meneses (now in University of North Carolina) before she was given the opportunity to teach her own classes at the University of Florida. She taught classes in Principles of Sociology and Minorities in American Society. In Fall 2010, she designed and implemented a course on Race, Class and the Environment, which was chosen by the Center of Race and Race Relations in the Levin College of Law at the University of Florida as one of its inaugural recipients for the Course Development Grant in Sociology.

Upon return to her country, she resumes her position as Assistant Professor at the University of the Philippines Los Baños which has given her a six-year study leave. She plans to institute new courses on Environmental Sociology and Environmental Justice, reflecting her training at the graduate school. She also plans to mentor graduate and undergraduate students as a way of giving back to the academic community which has cultivated and supported her love of learning.