UNTOLD TALES FROM THE LIBERALIZED PLAINS: THE VIOLENT LIVES OF RURAL PEOPLES IN IGUSA, TANZANIA

By

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To my mother Haegum Chung and to my wife Shoko Kurata
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Lastly, I would like to acknowledge the limits of this dissertation. While I strove to capture the complexities involved in the current Igusa political economic situation, it must be recognized that this effort can only convey slices of experience. In addition to being limited by the inexperience of my youth, it is simply not possible to write about, much less understand all the vastly different and changing ideas surrounding Igusa
histories as they exist within many ethnic groups. My hope then is that this dissertation is understood as a beginning for further study.
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This study investigates violent conflicts between farmers and herders and their ramifications on the daily livelihood of rural peoples of Igusa in Morogoro, Tanzania. Contrary to suggestions that farmer-herder violent conflicts are one-time incidents, ethnically motivated while competing over diminishing natural resources, ethnographic data reveals that there is a high possibility that these violent conflicts are the part of the prolonged violent condition of rural livelihood, orchestrated and perpetuated by powerful violent actors in the area. The conflicts between farmers and herders in Igusa are one example. The violent actors in the area are export crop plantation owners and large-scale herders, whose economic motivations have been intensified by the recent privatization process. These communities perpetuate the prolonged violent conditions in favor of their economic interests and goals. The principal ramification upon the rural livelihoods of Igusa peoples has been the intensification of livelihood strategies, which are destructive not only to the security of daily livelihood but also to the surrounding natural environment on which their livelihoods are based. Recently failed movements of civil society have been the unexpected but predictable byproduct of these violent
conditions. The case of the Igusa peoples’ struggles not only reveals the hitherto hidden aspects of violent conflict, but also illustrates the need to reassess a dualistic approach to understanding of farmer-herder conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa.
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Ex Africa semper aliquid novi

–Pliny the Elder (AD23-79), Historia Naturalis

Historically, Africa provides so many natural wonders, so that Pliny states: “Africa will always bring something new” (Frazier 2007:3). This short, provocative maxim has motivated untold numbers of people to go to Africa to look for their version of something new. What most of the followers of this maxim have in common is that “something new” has usually been materialistic. For Pliny it meant various flora and fauna from African nature. For a pre-colonial slave caravan it would be an endless supply of slaves, plus exotic animals and their body parts to decorate a house thousands of miles from the place of origin. For colonial whites and their opportunistic investors, they were the economic possibilities offered by vast tracts of land or natural resources, and more recently oil, diamonds, and rare metals. The truth is that the harder they looked for something new, the more disrupted the continent became.

This dissertation is about the people of a rural town in Africa whose lives have been caught in the violent pathways of these material quests. The Igusa region had been one of major plantations of once flourishing sisal industry in Tanzania. As the sisal industry fell apart, the people of Igusa have had to deal with the ups and downs of volatile economic changes that often disrupted their daily lives. It is alleged that the privatization of the sisal industry is the most recent change that has often put local farmers and herders on a head on collision course (Butler and Gates 2010:10). An example of these volatile conditions was the violent incident in 2000 between farmers and herders in which 31 farmers perished in a “genocidal” massacre (BBC 2001). Since
then, numerous small-scale violent confrontations have occurred, and Igusa has become one of many rural villages in Africa that are living under the influence of everyday violence more than ever before (Fratkin and Mearns 2003).

The purpose of this research is to understand the lived experiences of pastoralists in Tanzania, and to gauge how everyday violence, due to external pressures, is impacting the lives of the Igusa people. Rather than accepting that pastoralists are culturally, or in terms of survival driven to be violent, this dissertation argues that Igusa pastoralists have strategically chosen to be violent. To reveal this, several comprehensive questions that related to the pastoral violence, from structurally-, environmentally-, and politically-relevant perspectives were examined. In the complex context of formulating pastoral violence in Africa, this research focuses particularly on everyday violence and seeks to gauge how routinized violence, due to the consequences of structural pressures of political economy, are impacting the trajectories of daily lives of the Igusa people. The principal questions this dissertation aspires to answer are: 1) Why have the Igusa pastoralists become violent and how have the structural conditions of political economy influenced their decisions and methods for applying physical force? 2) What are the major challenges that the Igusa people face in their societies as everyday violence prevails? 3) What are the principal causes of everyday violence in Igusa; and, are the major causes of violent context related at the regional and national levels (Tanzania) compared to perceptions at the Igusa level? 4) How has the existence of everyday violence influenced environmental condition in the Igusa region over time and space? 5) Who are the majority of actors in Igusa region that contribute to the conditions of everyday violence in the Igusa region? 6) Does the
recent civil society movement pose any unique opportunities for the Igusa people, or do their experiences parallel those of other regions where such movements have failed?

This research applies the contextual perspectives of political ecology to the understanding of pastoral violence in order to overcome the shortcomings of conventional approaches. Several conventional views have prevailed in understanding pastoral violence. Proponents of these conventional views often show a tendency to focus on finding a major factor leading to excessive and endless violent confrontations (Turner 2004:864). Those factors are ethnic antagonism, framed as the barbaric culture of violence of African pastoralists- which surprisingly and unfortunately has become the dominant argument among the general public. Even though these factors are indeed related to the violent conflicts of the Igusa region in one way or another, these explanations are far too simplistic to explain the complexity and dynamics of the issue in the area (Turner 2004:864).

What the approaches of political ecology provide is quite appealing. Firstly, one of the crucial approaches is historical in nature. While the continent has experienced a legacy of colonialism, botched development projects in the post colonial area, and the recent wave of neoliberal privatization, these series of historical events of a political economic nature often provide the crucial clues to understand the trajectories of violent conflicts and the nature of pastoral violence. Second, scholars of this approach accept more expansive definitions of violence. While most dominant approaches have seen violence as spontaneous, impulsive, one time actions, recent development in the study of violence presents much significant meaning by expanding the concept of violence onto a broader level (Peluso and Watts 2001). Finally, such approaches recognize the
normalization of violence and pay adequate attention to the dismantled lives of people under protracted violence. Most conventional views do not pay attention to the fact that the lives of people are still ongoing despite the acute conditions of violence.

This dissertation adds to the discussion of political ecology through situating pastoral violence in the historical context of regional political economy. Based on a broader concept of violence, the action oriented contextual and processual approach to pastoral violence in the Igusa region will make it possible to see people’s actions on the ground. Eventually, the Igusa research shows that in fact pastoral violence is of a processional nature, existing in the interactions with various forms of violence, maintained and orchestrated by local actors with their own goals and interests.

**Entering Igusa**

In retrospect, the town of Igusa is a place of contact where seemingly totally different existences meet and coexist. First, it is the scene of a past and present which coexist awkwardly side-by-side. The scenery of the town is still filled with dilapidated buildings and facilities built in the heyday of the colonial period. What is also striking is the contrasting nature of the surrounding natural environment. The town is located at the bottom of a mountain where the geographically famous great Mpaka Plains end. Third, the presence of peoples with contrasting way of lives in the area is striking. Farmers with modernized life styles live side by side with herders following traditional ways of life.

On one hand, Igusa provides the perfect backdrop for bouts of imperialistic nostalgia (Rosaldo 1989). The area has a checkered colonial history of suffering, but it is also a popular tourist attraction for visitors who want to examine the colonial past. The spectacular scenery and the geographic wonders of the “Mpaka” Plains ensure that
it is a popular destination for many nature enthusiasts. Travelers visiting the historical caravan routes of the old slave and ivory trades easily find exotic peoples and their cultures who provide fertile ground for tourists to indulge their curiosity and interests. Visitors also find the rustic facilities of sisal plantations dotted around the landscape, a sign of a once prosperous colonial economy (Kimambo and Temu 1969).

There is always something going on to make Igusa people feel mentally and physically occupied. For example, Igusa is becoming increasingly connected with the outside world. Despite its remote location in the middle of the plains, this town is well connected with other areas. In fact, as one of major towns in Wassamu district, Igusa is a hub town functioning as an economic, political, and administrative center for several small villages in the northern Mpaka Plains. The Igusa town and these villages are connected with surprisingly reliable transportation services running from Morogoro to Wassamu. Weekly train service passing through the town in the wee hours regularly connects the area between Mwanza and Dar es Salaam. The most up to date addition to this connectivity is the recent installation of a cell phone tower in the center of the market place that enables many to stay electronically connected with the outside world.

All kinds of daily occurrences make the otherwise quiet and boring rural town lively. The happenings can come from the daily sounds from various sources such as the calls to prayer from the three mosques in town, ear-splitting honking horns from passing buses connecting from Wassamu to Morogoro, and finally, from the loud music emanating from the radio repair shop, playing all genres from Tanzanian hip-hop to American pop. The livelihood activities at the market contribute to the liveliness too. The Igusa market is filled with small shops and merchants who are willing to do their best to
satisfy the various wishes of the residents and passers-by. Everyday grocery items, such as maize flour, meat, fish, and poultry, or local vegetables are available all day long, including tropical fruits such as mango, stafeli, papaya, and bunches of small bananas. There are also restaurants serving local dishes: For people who just want a cup of tea or coffee, one side of the market serves fried dumplings called samosa, donuts, grilled beef, boiled eggs, and Tanzanian chapatis.

Finally, it can be interesting people engaging in small activities of their own that make this place unique and stimulating. They could be an aged farmer pouring his cup of tea into the saucer. This is a local way of cooling down the hot tea before drinking it. Or it could be a legendary Parakuyo Maasai male herder fully wrapped in his traditional costume. Parakuyo Maasai Women are less demonstratively decorative. Most of them tie lengths of cotton cloth around their shoulders as capes (shukas) or around their waists as a skirt. They prefer this purple cloth to have an embroidered logo saying “Mifugo Ni Mali” (A herd is wealth).
Igusa town is the meeting point between two physiogeographic units, which also constitute different agro-ecological zones (Mung’ong’o and Mwamfupe 2003:13). The town of Igusa is located at the end of the Plateau, a zone characterized by dissected hills with moderately fertile and well-drained soil (Mung’ong’o and Mwamfupe 2003:13). Plantation estates for the growing of sisal have heavily cultivated most of the area. The rest of the land along the river valley has been also intensively utilized by local villagers for growing vegetables. The flood plain is a zone characterized by low-level vegetation with thorny acacia trees. The area is primarily occupied by nomadic herders living in makeshift villages due to the poor soil quality and lack of water. Two different seasons affect the scenery of the area. In the rainy season from March to May, the rainfall easily
reaches 2000 mm. And the Wami River seasonally floods the plains (Hyera 2009: 2), making the roads impassable. The dry season from June to February is the reverse. The long dry spell often dries up the entire plain, turning the place into a large dusty area.

Finally, Igusa has been the contesting point for the peoples living in contrasting political, economic, cultural, spatial, and ethnic backgrounds. The area used to be divided into many politically unstable groups, each potentially at odds with its neighbor (Beidelman 1961). The Maasai Parakuyo, Hehe, Kaguru, Nguu, and Arabicized coastal Africans all raided each other, some for livestock, others for slaves. In these unstable periods, many of the Kaguru retreated to the ridges and mountain areas where they could defend themselves and their livestock against attack (Beidelman 1961). Most of the fertile river valleys of the plateau were only sparsely cultivated. The plateau zone was dominated by Parakuyo Maasai and other tribes who raided their weaker neighbors and who frequently attacked each other for control of grazing areas and water sources.

Colonial government, started by the Germans and then taken over by the British, brought political stability and a new economic system based on markets and cash. This period meant an expansion for Kaguru people (Beidelman 1961). With the advent of peace at the close of the last century the Kaguru descended from the mountains, which they regarded as too cold, damp, and uncultivable for desirable habitation. They again occupied the more fertile river valleys, and some even resumed herding. For Kaguru herds were no longer easily raided, and the lands available for Kaguru cultivation vastly increased. Conversely, Parakuyo Maasai seemed to have retreated (Beidelman 1961). Land previously free for the pasture of their herds were converted to Kaguru fields or
were contested by Kaguru farmers. Furthermore, Parakuyo were no longer able to augment their herds by raiding their neighbors (Beidelman 1961).

Currently, multi-ethnic sedentary groups reside in and around the town. Many of them, especially people residing in the town are past migrant sisal workers and their siblings from neighboring regions and countries. They settled down in the Igusa region after the demise of the sisal industry in the area (Benjaminsen 2009: 428). Some sedentary people are still working on the sisal estates as day laborers or running small shops at the market. Most of them are currently subsistence farmers working on small plots around the town growing maize, sorghum millet, beans, and potatoes. People residing in the villages are indigenous Kaguru or Sagara who are living in hilly or river valleys area cultivating their agricultural fields (Beidelman 1960: 245). Their main crops are maize, millet, sorghum, beans, and potatoes. Small but important crops of tobacco and sugarcane are also grown.

The contrasting group is a group of nomadic pastoralists who reside mostly in the plains. Locals call them by various ethnic terms. They are often called Maasai, Ilparakuyo (Rigby 1992) or Baragugu (Beidelman 1960: 246) which literally means “People very well off in terms of livestock.” Parakuyo Maasai live in small, widely dispersed kraal-camps containing one to five extended families, i.e., approximately 10 to 30 people. These camps are located in the wooded land roughly seven km from Igusa town. None of the Parakuyo Maasai I interviewed farmed, since these people despise cultivation and their one time agricultural trials were ended up complete failure due to the lack of agricultural experience. Only small sizes of home gardens managed by Parakuyo women were scattered around their huts. Parakuyo Maasai herders in Igusa
distinguish themselves from Kaguru and Sagara farmers by their firm adherence to their ethnic heritage. They pride themselves on their rejection of all Western dress and ornaments and although they speak some of the languages of their neighbors, they do so only when absolutely necessary. Normally, they speak their language, a Parakuuyu or related Maasai dialect.

Demographically speaking, sedentary people are the majority group with a population of 10,000 while herders are approximately less than 2,000 (Population and Housing Census 2002). There are two questions regarding this population table. One is that the table does not show the drastic population increase from 1988 to 2002. The total population in Tanzania has increased by 11.3 million or 49.1 percent during this period (UN-HABITAT 2009). There has been a notable wave of young people migrating into urban areas for small business ventures (Morogoro Report 2007: 6). Secondly, despite the continuous national census, there is a high probability that the population size of pastoralists in the area has been discounted or simply ignored. Due to the nomadic life style of pastoralists, it is hard for the census surveyors to collect accurate data on them. In fact, the 1988 census does not show the population of Parakuyo at all. Historians point out that pastoralists from northern Tanzania have migrated into the plains looking for better pastures (Beidelman 1960; Jennings 2007; Morogoro Report 2007: 32). Therefore, it is possible that the actual size of the pastoral populations in the region could reach twice as large as has been reported.
Table 1-1. Population of 1988 by age group and sex in Igusa area

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Table 1-2. Population of 2002 by age group and sex in Igusa area

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There are also considerable differences in social organization. People living in the town of Igusa and neighboring villages are loosely organized ethnically or religiously. They are divided into matrilineal clans. Certain rights to land and political power are still held by various clans. The Kaguru and Sagara often show ethnic unity by performing initiation rituals, and membership enabled them to form Sungusungu, a self-vigilance group, but it seems these ethnic cultures are overwhelmed by various religious activities in the town. On the other hand, people living in the town show a diminished sense of ethnicity since they are mostly coming from different regions or countries. Instead, rather than being organized around the ethnic membership, the people of the town are more interested in religious activities. One Catholic Church, three mosques, and four evangelical churches are dotted around the market, providing access to daily religious activities.

Parakuyo Maasai are organized into patrilineal clans, and maintain socio-political units called age-groups, who help regulate their society. Beidelman has demonstrated
that each age group has a local leader taking charge of persons within areas somewhat larger than the governmental districts (Beidelman 1960: 247). The unity among groups is provided by a ritual leader living in another district that regulates ritual and age-group activities for all Parakuyo Maasai in northern Tanzania. His control often operates over an area of 7000 to 100,000 square miles, and there is continuous contact between Parakuyo Maasai in much of this area (Beidelman 1960: 248). The Parakuyo Maasai also have several headmen who are appointed by the local government administration. These individuals have little power within the traditional age-group system, and are seen as rather communication representatives of government for forwarding complaints concerning various government policies.

Finally, there is the economic difference. The Igusa market is the best place to observe this difference. While most farmers eke out a living in subsistence-level farming, herders are seen as being well-to-do with a tendency for being conspicuous consumers. The recent addition of a new discotheque in the town has intensified this proclivity. The ceiling is decorated with sparkling lights and the loudspeakers pump out loud music all night long while herders relax after long hours working on the plains.

Unlike any other region in Tanzania, Igusa pastoralists are quite well to do. Due to the high demand for meat from the urban area, pastoralists have become rich. The richest are those few large-scale herd owners who own more than 1000 or more cattle. At least five large-scale herd owners frequent the town of Igusa. They do not live in town. While they have houses in different places, they are often frequently travelling, checking their cattle. They are the ones who hire daily herdsmen through their kinship networks. They often show up at night in the town drinking beer with local government
officials or even local judges to talk with them about ongoing negotiations on various issues they or their herd managers might have in the area. This category of herders operates as benefactors to the herding community. Attending their ethnic meetings at local auctions they often donate their money for the purpose of improving their communities. Since they donate their money to the causes of their ethnic community, they have a strong voice on many issues.

The second richest herders own from 100 to 300 cattle. These groups are the backbone of the local herding communities. Although the size of herds was modest by Parakuyo Maasai standards, they were still relatively secure among village households, and formed the medium status group among the herders residing in the village. Their herd size was large enough to feed and support their families relatively well by local standards. They are the ones who mostly tend to stay near Igusa and actively participate in various herders’ community activities. They often hire local farmers to fix or rebuild their huts for new wives. Bicycle taxi drivers in the town mostly carry these herders and their families from herder’s village to Igusa town. The heads of these households do not themselves engage in herding activities. The herd managers are mostly their young sons so that they can spend the whole day at the market chatting and sipping tea or coffee with other elders of herding villages.

The poorest group in Igusa consists of the hired herders. Those in this category own few or no cattle. They are mostly relatives of herd owners hired to guard herds. Hired herders account for a significant proportion of the pastoral labor force and form the lowest ranked group in the village status hierarchy. If a household owns more than 200 head and does not have enough children, they often hire these herders. The
number of hired herders varies between seasons. They hire in a greater number during the rainy season when household members are engaged in different duties such as schooling, or dealing legal matters at the local court. In general, large herd owners employ salaried herders more often than small herd owners. Hired herders are paid either in cash or in kind, depending on their stated preference when hired. Some work to build their own herds and receive a two or three-year-old male animal every six months. They also have access to lactating cows and receive clothing, bedding material and occasionally food from their employers. Those working for money earn anywhere between 30,000-40,000Tsh (equivalent of $25-30) a month plus clothes and milk. The payment tends to be minimal and it was often insufficient to support a family. Despite their economic conditions, however, they still enjoy a certain margin of security against hard times by virtue of the traditional system of mutual obligations between owners and herders.

**Contextualizing Igusa Violence**

Due to my personal fondness for the rustic and socially diverse atmosphere of African rural towns and their peoples, in the beginning of my fieldwork, the town of Igusa did seem to be a promising location for fieldwork. Even though I was aware that there were serious violent conflicts occurring between herders and farmers in the region, I thought that violent conflicts in Igusa could represent but a drop in and ocean of violence: “the most warring region on the planet” (Van Tongeren 1999:11; Jackson 2000: 210). I knew the relatively stable security condition of Tanzania as well. Tanzania is known as “an oasis of peace” in the troubled continent of Africa (Hoefmeier 1997). The country had not experienced civil wars, religious conflicts, ethnicity nor coups since independence (Rubanza 2001).
In fact, Tanzania is an exceptionally peaceful country in a continent accustomed to experiencing a much greater rate of increase in the number of conflicts than other regions: in 2004 half of African states were in conflict, affecting 20 per cent of the population of the continent (Kuna 2004). In mid-2003, there were serious internal conflicts in Western Sahara, Sudan, Chad, Somalia, Sierra Leone, Senegal, Liberia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, and Angola. Many other African states face instability, high levels of domestic political violence, or burgeoning secessionist or rebel movements (Kuna 2004). Contrary to other African countries, widely known violent conflicts in Tanzania were few. Al Qaeda attacked the U.S. embassy in Dar es Salaam in 1998, but the presence of terrorist operatives in Tanzania does not necessarily attract high levels of support from the population (Kessler 2006). Tanzania’s semi-autonomous islands of Zanzibar are the only example of ongoing conflict in the country (Kessler 2006). However, the secessionist movement was mainly a war of words, rarely escalating into armed action. It is not known how much popular support the secession movement gained either (Kessler 2006). Lastly, occasional clashes between supporters of opposing political parties or opposition supporters and the police and military have occurred since the reestablishment of multiparty politics in 1995 (Kessler 2006). In sum, although Tanzania has experienced these kinds of internal problems, in comparison to its neighbors, it has been remarkably stable, unified, and nonviolent.

Despite its image of a place of relative peace in a war torn continent, my reasons for studying violence in the Igusa region of Tanzania is that Tanzania is not a completely society free of violence anymore. There are growing signs of violent activities that are
hard to be noticed by external observers who have been accustomed to large-scale African instabilities. The hidden but more serious kind of violence is occurring mostly in rural area, where violent struggles over access and control over natural resources have become serious threats to everyday life and the stable image of the country (Moser et al: 2006:13). One example is northern Tanzania where the Kuria of Tanzania are involved in ongoing inter-clan conflicts (Fleisher 2002). Stock raiding among these groups is a perennial part of the local scene, sometimes escalating into wars, as raiding intensifies prompting ever more extreme retaliation (Heald 2000:101) in Tarime in the Mara Region, they have on several occasions fought over cattle rustling and land disputes with deaths and loss of homes and other property being a common consequence, becoming the most difficult to administer in the whole of Tanzania (Heald 2005).

Struggles over natural resource such as forests are also a major source of violent conflict in rural areas (Sunseri 2005). Tanzanian forest policy has produced an agenda of biodiversity preservation coupled with privatization that calls for the expansion of state oversight over forests and woodlands. This agenda has become a heavy crack down on peasant intrusion into forest reserves to make charcoal for the urban market and to expand fields for agriculture. Recent violent evictions of peasants from forest reserves, and ongoing tensions between villagers, the state and conservationists, are the direct result of this policy to protect forest reserves and to expand forest conservation into previously freely accessed forests and woodlands (Sunseri 2005: 609).

In the similar vein, the growing tourism industry of Tanzania also provides fields for on-going violence. Wildlife is the subject of long-standing conservation efforts and is
the basis of a tourism industry valued at around 10% of Tanzania's national GDP (World Bank/MIGA 2002). However, the interaction between wildlife management on the one hand, and rural land tenure, on the other, has become violent one (Newmann 1998). The establishment of state protected areas for wildlife and tourism has been a major cause of local land loss and alienation in northern Tanzania during the past fifty years (Parkipuny 1991; Neumann 1998; Igoe and Brockington 1999; Nelson 2005). Much of the wildlife in northern Tanzania remains widely dispersed across the region's rangelands because of the traditional coexistence of pastoralist land use practices with wildlife (Boone and Coughenour 2001). Today the tensions between wildlife management and village land tenure continue, albeit with new nuances, legal issues, and contesting parties over access to lands and resources (Nelson 2005).

Land conflicts between farmers and herder are occurring almost everywhere in Tanzania. Among the major conflicts in Tanzania which involves pastoralists are land conflicts in Hanang, Loliondo, Kilosa and Mvomero in Morogoro and Mbarali in Mbeya (Mangwangi 2011). It was further stated that the major roots of conflict are shortage of grazing land led by establishment of game reserves and government institutions which alienate great parcels of grazing lands that left the pastoralist landless (Mangwangi 2011). Also encroachment of pastoral land for development of farming has been mentioned as one of the factor for emergence of pastoralist-farmers conflict in Tanzania for many years. There still exists the negative perception that the land that belongs to pastoralists is no man's land, so it can be expropriated to anybody such as a private investor or put to any use by the government as it is not seen as being in possession of anybody for productive work (Mung’ong’o and Mwamfupe 2003). Because of this
perception, many traditional livestock keepers have lost vast tracts of their land this way, the never-ending conflicts have not only claimed lives of people and their herds but led to disruption of their lives through forced evictions and resettlement.

Even though the external image of Tanzania has been peaceful due to its recent economic growth and stable political system, it has to be considered that the mass media and strong government intervention played a crucial role together in hiding the seriousness of these kinds of violent conflicts in rural areas. Tanzania has been known for its extraordinary success in utilizing the mass media as effective tools in the formation of national cohesion. The national integration process was supported by the media through classical propaganda techniques, such as the creation of system-endangering enemies, the reverence for political leaders, and the propagation of the national language, Swahili (Sturmer 1998:316). This effectiveness does not mean that the mass media system represents the reality. One example is that the commercial orientation of the independent mass media causes a further widening of the information gap between the urban centers and the rural areas. Private media owners are subject to market tendencies, and, thus, they cannot afford to invest in media ventures in the countryside (Sturmer 1998:316). On the other hand, the government stepped up its pressure on the independent media by warning editors against publishing material which in its opinion - instigated religious, tribal and rural conflicts. The government let the Tanzanian media professionals know that stern measures would be taken against such newspapers (Sturmer 1998:183).

**Violence in Igusa Region**

Unfortunately, Igusa has been one of many rural towns engulfed with one of the problems. Historically, herders have been blamed for violent behavior. Before colonial
rule, Wassamu was the scene of frequent intertribal raiding (Beidelman 1960: 535). Prior to this time the lowland zone was unsafe for habitation except where traders or Arab-supported Africans had established rather large settlements. The plateau was dominated by herders and other groups who raided their weaker neighbors and occasionally contested with control of grazing areas and water points (Beidelman 1960: 249). The mountain zone was occupied by separate clusters of Kaguru settlements, each defensively situated in its own series of ridges and each separated from most of the others by intervening valleys and plateaus often unsafe for settlement (Beidelman 1960: 245). Ethnic conflict decreased significantly after German, and then British colonial powers took over this area in 1910 (Beidelman 1960: 248). However, Mtwale (2002) notes that between 1945 and 1960 there were several skirmishes between Kaguru farmers and Parakuyo Maasai herders in the Wassamu District, The first serious encounter between the two groups took place in 1967 when swords, spears, and machetes were used, and many people were killed (Benjaminsen et al. 2009:430).

There seems to have been another type of skirmish between the two groups in the late 70s. Villagization in Tanzania (or Ujamaa) has indelibly altered settlement patterns and exasperated farmer-herder conflict (Benjaminsen et al. 2009). Villagization was designed to end the nomadic life of the Maasai and other nomadic peoples, underlying a broader narrative of “modernizing” agriculture. More particularly, In Wassamu, the Parakuyo Maasai have been forced to settle in a pastoral village, Twatwatwa, with range lands located not too far outside a farmer village (Butler and Gates 2010: 9). Despite the designation of special pastoral villages associated with special pastoral lands farmer-herder conflicts persisted, primarily because the land areas allocated to
the pastoralists were not large enough, leading herders to move their cattle outside the pastoral village areas in search of pasture and water. Maasai livestock kept encroached on farming areas destroying the farmers’ crops (Butlers and Gates 2010: 9).

The violent incident of 2000 was one of the most recent and largest confrontations in a long local history of farmer-herder rivalry. According to the news coverage at that time, the confrontation between farmers and herders lasted several days. The level of violence in the incident was so gruesome that some newspapers had described it as a “genocidal” massacre (BBC 2000). The attackers were the herding population who mostly resided in Parakuyo. The victims were mostly local farmers who resided near the herders’ villages. Thirty-one people from farmer’s villages perished during this violent period, making this area one of the most dangerous places in Tanzania (ECAPAP 2005: 3). Detailed news coverage revealed that the immediate cause of the conflict was a planned act of revenge by Parakuyo Maasai, after the farmers’ battery on two Maasai women on December 6. 2000. It is alleged that the two Maasai women were sexually assaulted (Komba 2000 cited in Maganga et al 2007) and that the men that attacked the women were members of a Sungusungu or farmers’ vigilante group (Benjaminsen et al 2009). The women suffered serious injuries and had to be transported to the Wassamu District Hospital where they stayed for several days receiving treatment (Maganga et al 2007: 202).

As a result of this violent event, the Wassamu District Commissioner was dismissed and the Police Commander of the District was demoted and left town. A number of Parakuyo Maasai warriors and elders were also arrested. Some were kept in prison for up to one and a half years and one Parakuyo Maasai died in prison. However,
none of Parakuyo Maasai were tried in court. The Prime Minister’s Office initiated a committee to investigate the violence. Among its key suggestions was that the government and the ruling party CCM should “educate pastoralists in the country to stop their nomadic life” (The Guardian 2000).

Nothing like the full-blown physical confrontations of 2000 has happened again, yet, there is a lingering atmosphere that similar incidents can take place anytime and anywhere, herders being solely blamed for the on-going tension in Igusa. Victims often accuse herders of mismanaging their cattle. The catalyst for violent confrontation is often the cattle that invade the farmers’ fields. Farmers think that herders’ aggressive and careless herding practices are the main reasons behind violent confrontation. Sometimes it seems that it is the size of the cattle herds that triggers fights as herders are perceived to destroy farmers’ gardens intentionally while passing through the area. Two or three hundred cattle are the usual size of a herd for two herders. The age of the herders is getting lower so they have less experience with moving cattle. The low age of herders is mostly due to the fact that cattle owners prefer their own siblings as herd managers to hired ones. The cattle often stray into a farmers’ field, which often escalates into conflicts, as inexperienced but fierce herders attack farmers who interfere with the cattle.

It takes only a minute or two for these invasions to escalate into a full-blown physical confrontation. Hungry and thirsty cattle cannot tell the difference between grass and agricultural crops and do not sense the desperation of the farmers. The crops they have eaten might be the food supply for a half-year for the family of the farmer. Desperate farmers attack cattle with their long pointed spears or sticks to block them
from entering the field. The cattle’s bellowing from spear wounds triggers a violent reaction from herders. Two or three dagger-wielding herders can surround a solitary farmer with a spear in one hand, a machete in the other. Violence breaks out as their verbal arguments, filled with swearing and insults escalate into physical confrontation.

Even though physical violent confrontations hardly ever occur in the Igusa market, the tension between these groups was hard to ignore. Even in the eyes of outsiders, the Igusa market, run by town folk, is a location where the tension is easily detected. I observed that this tension reveals itself as the herding group demarcates its territory, keeping a spatial distance, and avoiding farmers physically. In terms of using the market space, there is a certain place where herders tend to assemble while waiting to go back to their villages. It is mostly in front of a white Nissan pickup truck that is parked under the Pratanas tree outside the “Florida” barbershop. Parakuyo women would sit there quietly. In terms of physical interaction, it is rare to find herders and farmers mingling with each other. Both groups just look the other way, avoiding eye contact.

Even though many farmers interviewed during fieldwork consider herders to live rather bestial lifestyles, they do not express their views of cultural superiority over herders directly. For example, public transportation facilities are the most common places to observe farmers revealing these kinds of superior attitudes toward herders. Most farmers would not share seats with herders because farmers think herders smell bad because they live with their animals. Most herders know this and they tend to stand or take a seat in the back of the bus. Sexual harassment is commonly observed in buses between male Tanzanians and female Maasai. Men often ask female herders why they wear these decorations, touching their bodies or asking where they are living.
Women just remain seated, ignoring such harassment. For many “educated farmers,” herders with their cattle walking through the plains represent an unsightly blot on a picture of a modernizing Tanzania, seeing such things as an obstacle to development. To the eyes of “modernized” farmers, the existence of herders is a disgrace to their country (Lane 1990).

From the herders’ point of view, they think that farmers’ aggressive farming practices are the main reason behind violent confrontations. Herders argue that it is not herders but farmers who invade the area and that farmers’ establishing their fields far away from their villages is the main reason behind all the tension. Herders do not like agricultural activities such as setting up traditional irrigation dams that block water flow into the Plains and water sources for the cattle. Herders also suspect that farmers are practicing the irrigation activities intentionally in the cattle passage in order to set up confrontations and then seek compensation from the herders.

Herders have their way of expressing their frustrations toward farmers or ordinary Tanzanians, often displayed this emotion in the form of disobedience (Bodley 2011). Passive resistance is also common. For example, refusing to take part in central or local politics and eschewing education are the most common ways of showing this kind of attitude. For example, they will not take any kind of order or instruction except from their elders. They also refuse to give information about villages, ignore instructions from the local government, and have no dialogue with neighboring farming -village councils. These kinds of behavior often extended to daily life, disobeying any kind of instructions from bus conductors, school teachers, policeman, and the like. Indifference of herders to state business is also a common form of disobedience (Tignor 1972).
Conclusion

In this tense, volatile situation, it is easy to assume that pastoralists are the only party to be blamed for the disorder in the region. In fact, most local and national level media put the blame on the pastoral population (The Guardian 2000). The following chapters in this dissertation, however, try to depict a somewhat different picture about the state of disorder. Rather than blaming the Igusa pastoralists for the violent tension, I describe the structural reasons why Igusa pastoralists have become involved in violent activities. Committing violence is not an irrational act. By analyzing characteristics of violence in the area this research shows how and why these violent tensions occur. The following chapters are organized sequentially to document and understand the nature of the pastoral violence in Igusa. The rest of this chapter devotes itself to the introduction of Igusa area as a contact zone between various different peoples, cultures, economies, and natures. Ethnographic discussions on the recent development of violent conflicts are also discussed. Chapter 2 reviews the theoretical developments of understanding pastoral violence in African contexts. The phenomenon has been attracting attention from various academic disciplines and has inspired influential theoretical perspectives. While critically reviewing these perspectives, I present a political ecological approach and its concepts as the main theoretical perspective in this research.

Chapter 3 presents the research methodology I applied when conducting my ethnographic fieldwork. As many others who have done their ethnographic research in conflict areas, mine was also filled with many successes and failures. By sharing these experiences, I show the advantages and disadvantages of undertaking ethnographic fieldwork in violent contexts.
Chapter 4 describes the history of changes in access to natural resources and sources of resource control in the area. Natural resource scarcity has been blamed for excessive pastoral violence in the area (Ndaskoi 2009). This chapter criticizes this position and illustrates that the changing conditions of access to and control over existing natural resources has been the main reason behind these violent conflicts in the region.

Chapter 5 delves into the nature of violent environments. The lack of coordination of any process of control and access to natural resources ignites continuous violence throughout the area. While analyzing various forms of violence, the chapter describes why Igusa people resort to physical force perpetuating violent environments.

Chapter 6 analyzes how the Igusa people manage their livelihoods in an environment of continual violence and argues that the extreme conditions generate extreme measures. In this chapter, I focus on the intensification of economic activities and describe how excessive economic activities harm the natural environment, threatening the environmental sustainability of the area.

Chapter 7 describes the response of external organizations and their interventions for mediating the violent conditions. One aspect of violence in Africa is attracting attention and intervention of external actors such as governments or international aid groups. In case of Igusa, It had been various types of humanitarian intervention aiming at resolving conflict. The implanting civil society was one of them. I describe how these energetic movements of civil society in the area have played out in terms of resolving violent conflict between Igusa farmers and Parakuyo Maasai herders.
Finally, in Chapter 8 sums up and discuss this research, presenting the lessons learned through the dissertation. I argue that a seemingly “primitive” and on-off event of pastoral violence is, in fact, part of a sophisticated long-term strategic behavior of a processual nature, consisting of various characteristics. Perceiving pastoral violence with multiple characteristics opens several new windows in terms of reevaluating, researching, understanding, and resolving the issue of violence in contemporary Africa.
Despite the long history of scholarly interest in the issue of pastoral violence, current analyses of pastoral violence in Africa do not seem to represent the depth of the previous academic achievements on the issue. Despite the significant ramifications to the daily lives of many Africans in rural areas, analyses of the issue have been shallow. One reason for this shallowness comes from the narrow scope of the mainstream theoretical perspectives of farmer-herder conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa (Hussein et al. 1999). Most questions focus on finding a main determinant for these conflicts. The determinants that are identified are often repetitions of old theories. For example, commonly cited cause of violence is that Africans are barbaric and so have engaged in such violent conflicts since time immemorial (Zeleza 2008:15). Others blame African herders’ lack of discipline in terms of managing their abundant natural resources (Harding 1968). A recent explanation blames the greed of African farmers and herders for fighting over diminishing natural resources (Homer-Dixon 1994). Overcoming the simplicity of these discourses on farmer-herder conflicts in Africa, scholars of various disciplinary backgrounds have emerged from anthropology, history, politics, whose interests are not only in finding the main factors behind conflict, but also in contextualizing those conflicts from a historical perspective (Peluso and Watts 2001; Turner 2004; Moritz 2010).

The goal of this chapter is two-fold. First, I analyze anthropological contributions to the understanding of farmer-herder conflicts in Africa. The complex nature of farmer-herder conflicts has attracted the attention of many anthropologists since the birth of the discipline. I argue that observations from these scholars contribute significantly to the
perception of the nature of farmer-herder conflicts in the past and present (Turner 2004). I also discuss the recent theoretical confluence among scholars of history, geography, and anthropology, geared toward analyzing the more violent and protracted patterns of contemporary farmer-herder conflicts on the continent. After critically reviewing the theoretical spectrum on farmer-herder conflict, I argue that a more contextualized approach is necessary to understand the complex nature of farmer-herder conflicts across the continent.

**Pastoral Violence in Human History**

How do African pastoralists become violent? To some, this question has seemed easy. The perception of violent African pastoralists is present historically, and still appears in the present as televised images of violent conflicts among pastoral groups (BBC 2011). Some theories appear to support these images with their simplistic arguments (Richards 2005). Historically, pastoralists have been characterized as war-prone group (Tigor 1972). For example, the Bible has scripture where pastoral Cain kills the sedentary Abel out of jealousy (Genesis 4: 2). Herodotus, writing in the Fourth Century B.C. in Greece described the devastation wrought by Scythian nomads (Herodotus 1972[4th C. B.C.]). Ancient Chinese emperors built the famous Great Wall to protect themselves from fierce attacks from Mongol pastoralists (Blench et al 2003:1). Endless struggles between nomadic Bedouin and fellahin (peasants) in Arab societies punctuated the historic record of the Mideast (Smith 1969).

The second source is the biased Western media coverage on violent conflicts of pastoralists. Today in the Sahel, in Kenya, Tanzania, and Sudan, as well as Mali, Niger, and the Ivory Coast, violent low-intensity conflicts occur with regularity (Turner 2004: 868). Militaristic pastoral groups are one of major violent actors portrayed as often
brutally attacking neighbors with overpowering weapons. Western mass media keep providing eye catching images of raw violence, which then easily become headline stories.

Thirdly, it is the pseudo theoretical arguments about the causes of rampant pastoral violent activities in the area. Based on historical records and unbalanced media coverage of pastoral violence, three simple but persuasive explanations have provided simple answers for the complex nature of the frequent violent activities of pastoral group, explaining the causes of excessive and irrational behavior through their low levels of cultural development, irrational natural resource management systems, or the natural resource scarcity of their surrounding environment (Turner 2004; Richards 2005; Whitehead 2007: 40).

From a scholarly perspective, the most common and enduring argument is the primordial approach. Scholars of this perspective see primordial elements as the main triggers for excessive violence in pastoral violence (Turner 2004). These primordial elements can be traditional family structure, spirit power, sexual urges, “wild zone mentality,” or primitive warlike instincts (Dalby 1996). These elements are allegedly explosive since their roots are seen to have biological or even genetic foundations specific to the individual and related to primordial human needs for security and, more importantly, survival (Richards 2005). Deeply rooted in human nature, pastoral people involved in destructive behavior are often considered to be trapped within destructive spirals of kin-based warfare and feuding, "regularly battling one another into a state of anarchy" (Gregory 1992: 34). Easily available hostile images of pastoralists often become a perfect example for this kind of approach.
Robert Kaplan is a firm believer in this stance. In his 1994 Atlantic Monthly article, Kaplan uses Sierra Leone as an example for his generalizations about the violence plagued with primordial elements throughout the postcolonial world (Kaplan 1994). Even though he did not pinpoint African pastoralists, the image of violent pastoralists perfectly match with existence living in a premodern formless states, similar to pre-premodern Europe, becoming, as Graham Greene once observed, a "blank" and "unexplored" dark continent (Dunn 2004: 493). Gun wielding pastoralists in remote rural area are the perfect image to support this kind of description of the continent.

For another group of scholars, pastoral violence is a byproduct of irrational systems of natural resource management by local populations, especially that of indigenous African herders. A key example of this, the argument of “The Tragedy of the Commons”, was elaborated by Hardin (1968), Ehrlich (1968), and Ophuls (1977). Their arguments were based on the premise that African peoples, especially herders, are irrational maximizers of self-interest that eventually leads to a spiral of violence. In the eyes of scholars of the Tragedy of Commons School, their self-interest is often manifested in their insatiable quest for bigger herds without consideration of or knowledge of proper natural resource management systems. Indigenous African herders tend to overgraze their natural resources since there is no incentive to manage the range in a collective or sustainable way. The consequences of uncontrolled overgrazing are the destruction of the natural environment, deterioration of regional security since herders cannot or will not regulate competition and conflict over access to those resources.
The rampant violence was justification for development regimens of central governments and Western donors. The violent conditions have been used as a good excuse to initiate these projects to bring peace into conflict zones. Herders living in and exploiting arid areas were seen as disruptors of the eco system and regional security rather than as a long-term part of the same larger ecosystem (Little 1994) and limiting or dismantling common property systems was seen as a key solution consequent violence (Lamprey 1983). The solution has almost invariably been development projects characterized by authoritarian governance systems led by a class of “ecological mandarins” (Ophuls 1977:163) backed by strong powers of coercion (Hardin 1968:1247) and emphasizing privatized land ownership.

On the other hand, the perspective perceiving pastoral violence as a consequence of natural resource scarcity is gaining in popularity among both scholars and the general public. Scholars of this circle (Homer-Dixon 1999; Homer-Dixon & Blitt 1998) have linked increasingly violent conflicts, occurring coincidently at the end of the Cold War, to natural resource scarcity. Their argument is quite straightforward: natural resource scarcity causes violence. Homer-Dixon (1999), one of pioneers of this position, writes that natural resource scarcity (by which he means scarcity of renewable resources) has three causal forms, namely degradation (supply induced), increased demand (demand induced), or unequal resource distribution. The presence of any of these “can contribute to civil violence” through “resource capture” (generally by “elites”) and/or “ecological marginalization” of vulnerable or disenfranchise people (Homer-Dixon 1999: 177). As pastoral violence has taken place over natural resources, this kind of argument gained
its popularity among many scholars and general public, forming as a theoretical basis on many excessive violent conflicts among pastoral groups on the continent.

**The Anthropology of Pastoral Violence**

While these explanations have become dominant arguments on explaining the rampant pastoral violence in the region, there are a number of skeptical scholars who argue that the question over pastoralists becoming violent is not a simple phenomenon to be answered as acts of survivalist impulses over decreasing natural resources (Hussein 1999; Turner 2005). An anthropologist may be one type of scholar who can challenge these simplistic approaches. Since they were the first group of outsiders who observed and recorded the violent behavior of various human groups, especially in the economically and politically marginal regions, the very area where anthropologists are often active, violence becomes a forceful, if not inevitable, form of affirmation and expression of identity in the face of a loss of tradition and a dislocation of ethnicity. Violence is often engendered through the regional and sub-regional disputes which have their origins in the complexities of local political history and cultural practices (Whitehead 2004:1). Properly understanding the historical importance of colonialism and neocolonialism in establishing certain codes of violent practice, anthropology has now moved to understand why it occurs in the ways it does. This involves recognition that violence is as much a part of meaningful and constructive human living as it is a consequence of the absence and destruction of all cultural and social orders (Whitehead 2007:40).

In fact, early anthropologists had already rejected the instinctive theory of aggression, and have argued against the biological hypothesis of the causes of violent culture (Turner 2004:864). It would be Evans-Pritchard who first experienced and
documented the violence of African pastoralists as an academic issue in his analysis of the role of violence in the political system of African societies. According to Evans-Pritchard's characterization of Nuer violence, the behaviors displayed by the Nuer conform to their culture, their social organization, and their character (1940:134). The violent behaviors started from early age among the Nuer. Nuer children are encouraged to settle disputes through fighting, and as adults they regard courage as the highest virtue. Dignity and shame are also sources of violence: homicides are rarely left unavenged (Evans-Pritchard 1940:164). This violent culture of the Nuer is effectively utilized in their relationship with neighboring groups as well. Every Nuer group raided the Dinka at least every two or three years, and some part of Dinka and had probably raided annually. As Evans-Pritchard has argued, “Their political structure depended for its form and persistence on balanced antagonisms that could only be expressed in warfare against their neighbors if the structure were to be maintained (Evans-Pritchard 1940).

The approach of balanced antagonism of structural functionalism has become a weak argument. Understanding this as regular violent activities is not enough to achieve a balanced view and the simplistic nature of political structures of African pastoralists, their ways of lives have been under consistent challenge from many directions, making the task of maintaining their political structure only through violent acts almost impossible. Despite the fact that these arguments are out of date, positioning violence in analyzing the social structure of African pastoralists, however, were meaningful in that early anthropologists had already started paying scholarly attention to the irrational and barbarous acts of African pastoralists. This attention
eventually led to the understanding of pastoral lives, in turn drawing out which more reasonable understandings in terms of ecological and economic adaptation to surrounding natures and groups.

**Symbiosis**

While this kind of early ethnographic description of pastoral violence had been mostly misused to generate the mystic image of violent and irrational pastoralists, what the followers of structural functionalism started realizing and seeing was a quite non-violent and ecologically sound aspect of pastoral lives. During the 1960s and 1970s the juxtaposition of anthropologists’ ecological interests with existing data sets on “simpler societies” created an intellectual space for ecological adaptive cultural practice by using concepts like territoriality, carrying capacity, resource scarcity, regulation, and feedback loops. Unlike irrational images of tribal peoples, the perspectives of human and cultural ecology have shown that most of their livelihood systems fit into and were adapted to local natural systems, and that such natural systems were managed and transformed by local communities (Rappaport 1968; Vayda 1969).

This tradition continues to reveal the ecological wisdoms of indigenous peoples. In terms of understanding pastoral ecology, in his book titled “Pastoralism in Africa”, Andrew B. Smith gives a historical account of the development and adaptation of pastoralists to grassland areas in Africa (1993). He analyzes a series of key concepts associated with the resilient nature of pastoralism: transhumance, seasonality, and procurement strategies, as well as pastoral psychology, decision making, and a sense of place. Smith demonstrates that pastoralists throughout the continent have deep, variegated, instructive histories (1993). Specifically, he underscores the adaptive
strategies in response to ecological change deployed by the Fulani, the Jie, the Karamojong, the Khoi, the Maasai (1993).

Research on symbiotic relations with their neighboring groups was an academic area influenced by the academic tradition stemming from the functionalistic and ecological tradition. During the 1970s, anthropological and other studies of African pastoral systems have found the importance of interaction systems among farmers and herders whose relationship were thought to be only filled with animosity (Barth 1969; Dyson-Hudson and Dyson-Hudson 1980; Simon 1981). Examples of symbiosis are ample throughout the continent. In Eastern Africa, Elam also notes (1973: 4) the economic symbiosis in his research of Hima and their interaction with agriculturalists. Although the Hima shun agriculture and concentrate almost exclusively on cattle husbandry, when milk is scarce or unavailable, crops may be purchased from cultivators. The fact that, despite Hima aversion to agriculture, beer made from finger millet is bought and consumed in large quantities, and “forms not only an essential part of their diet, but also their recreational and ceremonial experiences” suggests that these exchanges are not recent development. According to Bernsten (1975), the Maasai tended to engage in warfare and raiding with those agricultural groups which kept large herds of cattle, but generally had peaceful relations and exchanges of livestock and their products for tobacco, maize meal, millet, and bananas with those agricultural groups who had many goats and sheep but few cattle. Some of these systems of exchange apparently are long-standing ones. He traces interactions between the nomadic pastoral Maasai and the agricultural Sonjo back to the seventeenth century.
In Western Africa, Bassett shows how Fulani herders have only been able to move south into northern areas of the Ivory Coast due to the presence of settled farming communities, which has reduced tsetse infestation (1988:458). Hussein remarked that in Mali herders have traditionally depended on farmers to secure their year–round food supply, given that grains make up a large part of their diet and they often cannot produce sufficient grains themselves (Hussein 1999:17). Bovin (1990) points to a seasonal dimension. Relations between these groups are symbiotic in the dry season (fields grazed upon are manured. Kamuri buy milk from and employ herders; Fulani buy millet and other agricultural products) but conflict with farmers occurs in the wet season due to crop damage by herders. Pelissier has argued that farmer-herder conflict is becoming less likely due to this economic cooperation. For Pelissier, increased economic symbiosis between farming and herding production systems is likely to reduce conflicts between farmers and herders (1977: 80).

Outlining a processual approach of anthropology to peace and conflict between West African farmers and herder, Moritz provides ample examples of coexistence in the region. He emphasizes the importance of host-client relations in the coexistence that integrates West African pastoralists into agricultural societies in preventing and resolving herder-farmer conflicts across West Africa (Moritz 2010). He explains that many communities of farmers and herders in West Africa have built interdependent relationships with one another through emergent processes of exchange. Such interdependence has often been based on host-client or host-stranger relationships with one another (Bassett 1986; de Haan et al 1990; Tonah 2006). A good example of a host client relation is that between Mbororo herders and Gbaya farmers in the Adamawa
Province of Cameroon (Burnham 1980). The basis of this long-term symbiotic relationship is reciprocity, which either party may initiate with small gifts, for example, kola nuts and later exchange more substantive gifts and commodities (Moritz 2010:139).

Conflict

In addition to its important theoretical contribution to the revelations of pastoral lives of interactive and symbiotic system, what anthropologists contributed was to raise questions about the demise of the tradition of symbiosis. Important questions are: why have their once harmonious lives been disappearing and why they have given up on harmonious way of living, generating conflicting relations and degrading the natural environment. Anthropologists were prepared to answer these questions since they were in the field documenting “anthropological subjects at the intersections of global and local histories” (Roseberry 1988:173), trying to understand behavior, institutions, and beliefs in the context of this wider and historically changing context (Ferguson and Whitehead 1992: 28). It was in the period that many anthropological researchers started dealing with the colonial economy and its ruthless policies, post-colonial states, and their development projects which have been especially relevant to the discussion of the increase of pastoral violence in African contexts.

The Colonial Economy and Pastoral Displacement

Even though many current scholars do not show any interests in investigating the historical roots of contemporary violent conflicts, anthropologists assert that the contemporary conflicts of most indigenous pastoral people have originated from the colonial political economic order (Mahmoud 2011:166). During the colonial period, when the colonial powers integrated Africans into the expanding world economic system (Ferguson and Whitehead 1992), the lives of pastoralists were dismantled as they were
expelled from their ancestor’s land, causing them to lose their indigenous ownership over sedentary farmers. Historians of colonialism trace back to the beginning of this ordeal of pastoralists particularly after the Berlin Conference of 1884 (When the European powers partitioned Africa into “sphere of influence”). At that time, the industrial revolution generated unprecedented demand for crops such as palm, sisal, cotton, coffee, tea, cocoa, and sugar (Young 1994: 84-85). To ensure adequate production of these crops, colonial powers instituted a process that entailed the restructuring of the prevailing precapitalist modes of production and their subordination to international capitalism through the operations of the world market. The main purpose was to gain control of the surplus produce extracted from these earlier modes (Stichter 1982).

Draconian economic policies were designed to force indigenous populations to stay aside according to the need of colonial powers, displacement from their ancestor’s lands was one of common social phenomena during the colonial period. Herders are often the major target of draconian displacement policies as the groups occupy enormous land. In British Tanganyika, native reserves policy was a tactic used to confiscate vast tracts of land from the indigenous population, especially from herders such as the Maasai. British colonial administrators, soon after they took over Tanganyika from the Germans in 1916, forcefully consolidated all Maasai herders into an ethnic reserve to control the movements of livestock and people and to protect them from outside influences. Colonial administrators thought that herders like the Maasai would be more easily governable if they changed from exclusive pastoralism to horticulture and this could be best be achieved by allowing non-cattle herders to come
in and deplete the cattle-herding resources. The Maasai Reserve became “an ethnological and economic sanctuary; rigidly closed to outside influence and to trade (Fratkin et al 1994).

This abrupt displacement was the beginning of dismantling pastoral interaction with neighboring groups. Displaced populations often found their ancestral lands were occupied by farmers who were treated favorably for their cooperation with colonial governments and these kinds of problems lead to the causes of permanent struggles over the ownership of land which have been a vital resource for maintaining their way of life.

Post Colonial Development and Militarization

The disrupted relations with neighboring groups, especially sedentary farmers, were unable to recover as the degree of pastoral violence has increased significantly during the post colonial period. The newly independent countries took the course of developmentalism that not only continued the policies of displacement, but also allowed the disgruntled pastoralists to militarize themselves through easily available weaponry.

Building the nation-state by transforming a multi-ethnic society into a national society through the instrumentality of the state and using the influx of privatized international development aid¹ was their main blueprint for action. Post-colonial development designed to overcome colonial legacies had become a root of many problems and contemporary issues. The problems started as the planners of these

¹ Large-scale assistance was provided by the World Bank and bilateral agencies as fixed-term interventions, usually of highly capitalized infrastructural inputs including roads, slaughter houses, railway transport, mechanized bore holes, dipping facilities, and feed lots, planned by outside technical experts for implementation by national government officers. These projects also supported privatization of common lands (Galaty 1992).
developmentalist projects treated rural people as the main source of the needed capital. The efficient extraction from peasant agriculture has always been of concern to central government to extract the surplus required for capital investment for development projects (Bryceson 1982: 547). The process has been crueler to pastoral groups as pastoralism has been marginalized and often regarded as outright counter-productive. While pastoralists were forced to destock, because of limited land resources, land was always being made attainable for agricultural expansion. Thus whenever there was a need for more land for cultivation, it was readily made available, eventually by expropriating pastoral communities. For example, in implementing villagization, the authorities in Bagamoyo district of Tanzania decided to put the farmers and the herders in separate village settlements but made sure that the cultivators were given all the land they thought they needed, mainly by expropriating that of the pastoralists. On the other hand, the official livestock policy has consistently and insistently used to force the pastoralist to destock further (Hussein 1999).

A project known as the Tanzania-Canada Wheat Project (TCWP) is another good example. As early as 1968, a Canadian mission spotted the Basotu plains in what is now Hanang District as suitable for mechanized farming. By then the growing demand for wheat in Tanzania already far exceeded supply. An agreement in 1970 between the governments of Canada and Tanzania provided for a wheat-farming scheme, “based on a technological package based on the green revolution, with mono-cropping of hybrid varieties of wheat using extensive mechanical equipment along the lines of prairie wheat farming in Canada (Mwaikusa 1993:154). For herders, over 100,000 acres of prime grazing land has been given up to facilitate a large-scale wheat farming project
undertaken by the government, through a parastatal corporation (NAFC), with financial support from Canada. This encroachment weakened traditional management systems, and undermined pastoral livelihoods. As a result, Barabaig protested against the large-scale wheat farms and Iraqw farmers who had been allocated land, leading to confrontation with the State through court cases, arrests for the continued use of the pasture lands near state-supported farms, and occasional violence, with loss of stock and human life (Lane 1990).

In a similar vein, in his thesis on the economy and ecology of the pastoral Fulbe in the Inland Niger Delta region of Mali, Turner (1992) documents that the state’s desire to increase crop production helped aggravate resource conflicts (see also Moorehead 1991). Vedeld (1992: 4) also claims that conflict has increased due to government policies to expand agriculture in the West African Sahel leading to farmers encroaching on grazing lands. With regards to Eritrea, Woldemichael (1995) asserts that increased conflicts over grazing areas and water-points have limited the movements of herders to justify a policy of promoting the sedentarization of pastoralists.

**Militarized Pastoral Violence**

An unavoidable consequence of post colonial period of developmentalism favoring sedentary groups has become a destructive violent spiral as already disrupted relations escalated into extreme violence through easily available weaponry. Adams and Bradbury (1995:14-15) assert that the introduction of modern weaponry in Africa was one of the main legacies of colonialism, resulting in more destructive relations between certain ethnic groups. Easy access to such weaponry precipitated the collapse of ancient principles of balanced reciprocity in the practice of warfare between ethnic groups, and thereby warfare changed from being a means to adapt to new
circumstances to an agent for the outright destruction of other groups (1995:21). In his important book on understanding Turkana violence in Kenya, McCabe raises the issue of the role of automatic weapons in interethnic fighting, a scourge to so many societies in northeast Africa. Describing how environmental factors including drought, patchy vegetation, and scarce water resources affect pastoral production and mobility, his explanation focuses on how warfare with extreme violence among ethnic groups shape the existential direction of Turkana herding populations. For him, the Turkana situation is a classic example of excessive weaponry, (both in number and type), and famine are intertwined among East African pastoral peoples (McCabe 2004).

**The Political Ecology of Pastoral Violence**

Even though anthropologists have contributed a great deal in understanding African pastoral violence and its historical sources, it seems that individual anthropological research itself is hardly sufficient by itself. It has become clear that issues of pastoral violence have become a complex issue, happening in a volatile context of political economy (Bassett 1988). This is why anthropological research into pastoral violence has oriented towards a confluent and contextual theoretical framework (Moritz 2006) of political ecology. A contextual approach means placing pastoral violence in the broad historical spectrum of political economy while not losing sight of the individual actors. In doing so, it is expected that the motivations and dynamics behind pastoral violence can be analyzed (Moritz 2006).

Under the name of political ecology scholars from various disciplinary backgrounds have formulated a theoretical confluence as a major alternative response

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2 The intellectual origins of the term political ecology trace back to the 1970s, when a variety of rather different experts, along with anthropologist Eric Wolf, journalist Alexander Cockburn, and environmental
to the apolitical perspective that influenced natural resource discourses (Rogers 2002).

Common elements of the stream of political ecology as summarized by Bassett (1988: 454) are (1) the contextual analyses of human-environmental relationships at different scales of inquiry, (2) an historical approach emphasizing the transformation of indigenous systems of resource management in the process of incorporation into the global economy, (3) an emphasis on the influence of state intervention in rural economies on land-use patterns, (4) a focus at the local level on differential responses of decision-making units to changing social relations of production and exchange, and, (5) a sensitivity to regional variability.

What scholars of political ecology focus upon is the conflicting nature of the issue of pastoral violence. Pastoralists are one of major interests of this discipline as their lives are dismantled as they are engaged in natural resource related conflicts, the cause of these conflicts have been historically originated as most of their land has been occupied and those land are still occupied by the forces of the global economy or state governments whose priorities are often decided under the pressure of international financial institutes. Despite all these pressures, it is often the creativity of these populations that have generated unexpected responses and strategies in the midst of conflicting situations.

**Violent Environments**

Ironically, it is the theorists of natural scarcity that propelled the scholars of political ecology into taking up the topic of violence as a topic of research. Even to many

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scientist Grahame Beakhurst, originated it as a way of conceptualizing the relations between political economy and ecology in the circumstance of a growing environmental movement (Keil and Faucett 1998).
scholars of political ecology, violence is often regarded as an automatic consequence of these kinds of conflict ridden societies. Based on applying a broad concept of violence, scholars of the political ecology of violence begin by looking into how societies or human groups cope with the increasing occurrence of violence in their daily lives, analyzing violence as a catalyst in important socio-political change.

Among various analytical contributions from political ecology, the concept of the violent environment has been especially relevant to understand the complexity of African pastoral violence. Developed from the analysis of violent conflicts over natural resources, the concept of the violent environment provides scholars not only with theoretical frameworks to understand the complex nature of pastoral violence in African contexts, but this concept of violent environments challenged the narrow scope of the definition of violence. This conceptual expansion allows academic inquiries into various topics such as political and economic lives under protracted violence, and the relations between violence and natural environments (Peluso and Watts 2001: 5).

The concept of violent environments, elaborated by Peluso and Watts (2001), are states of protracted violence resulting from conflicts over entitlements in times of natural change. Violent environments initiate as transformations and instabilities in the conditions and characteristics of nature, environment, or natural resources, causing a shifting of the positions of resource users. In these moment of transformation, resource users, who can be indigenous peoples, workers, the state, or powerful transnational

3 Therefore, Peluso and Watts (2001: 26) suggest focusing on four dimensions of environmental transformations and instabilities: environmental degradation (associated with non-renewable resource extraction); environmental change (human transformation of renewable resources); environmental enclosure (associated with living space and territory); and environmental rehabilitation, conservation, and preservation. These dimensions have significant implications for existing entitlement relations and the transformation of resource-based livelihoods.
cooperations, are involved in fierce contests, ranging from discursive struggles to mass violence, over entitlements in which conflicts and claims over property, assets, labor, and the politics of recognition are demonstrated (Peluso and Watts 2001: 25). As this condition of fierce struggle continues, violence becomes an everyday phenomenon, the everyday nature of violence often causes consequences and impacts upon every aspect of peoples' lives on the ground.

As a first major concept of the political ecology on violence, especially in terms of struggles over natural resources, the concept of the violent environment clearly helps us understand pastoral violence and its complexity in the era of transformation. Pastoral violence is often regarded as committed solely by pastoralists. However, the concept of the violent environment reveals that the conditions are much more complex processes with various actors with their own goals and interests. These actors are bureaucratic states with economic policies, private actors who are rapidly become the new owners of natural resources whose financial and political powers often drive pastoralists into taking violence. The interactions between these actors are violently charged as these struggles are mostly over natural resources, its entitlements have always been ambiguous and contestable. It seems political ecology promises this by focusing on the violent nature of interactions between various actors such as bureaucratic states, while including private actors who are applying violent activities without consulting the government, sometimes, under their acknowledgement to protect their private properties from unruly pastoralists. These struggles are not only violent. In many cases, as mentioned above, there is the politics of recognition which is a major form of struggle.
as many pastoral organizations and their activities are highly productive especially in terms of their networking at the international level.

Categorizing Violence

In analyzing the complex nature of violent environments, expanding the meaning of violence is a main interest of scholars of violent environments. Political ecologists think that the conventional definition of violence is too narrow to extract the socio-cultural aspects of violence, while ignoring its various forms (Peluso and Watts 2001: 26). Thus, in the account of violent environments, they assert that violence in violent environments should be a more encompassing, inclusive sense of violence and nonviolence (Peluso and Watts 2001: 26). More encompassing because scholars of violent environments shift the definition away from collective brutal acts to “disorganized,” random, or isolated physical harm, to violence within the nonphysical realm, and to “the destruction of home and humanity, of hope and future, of valued traditions and the integrity of community” (Nordstrom 1997:123). They argue that the conceptual expansion allows scholars to look into the contextual aspects of violence. Therefore, scholars of violent environments distinguish themselves from others in that they pay attention to the “more ineffable nature of violence that sometimes puts non-physical violence at its center” (Lutz and Nonini 1999:74). As a result, in their analysis of violence, scholars of political ecology take on extensive definitions of violence.

Scholars of violence generally categorize violence in violent environments as:

- Structural violence, e.g., chronic, historical political-economic oppression, or social inequality. This can stem from national as well as international factors such as terms of trade, local working conditions, structural adjustment programs, and the like (Galtung 1990).
Symbolic (Cultural) violence refers to the ways that communities and individuals internalize humiliation and racial, class, and sexual inequalities, including how they act to recognize or “misrecognize” such violence (Bourgeois 2004).

Direct violence, e.g., targeted physical violence implemented by official armies, police, and other state apparatus as well as unofficial non-state entities and parties in opposition (Lautze and Raven-Roberts 2003).

Everyday violence, e.g., interpersonal, domestic, delinquent, with a primary focus on how these daily expressions of violence become routine daily acts of terror with which communities have to constantly live (Nordstrom 1997).

In fact, the violent environment of pastoral violence consists of many kinds of violence. The main point is that pastoralists are also victims of violence. Pastoralists are often victims of socio-economic marginalization, which has been accomplished historically. They are often exposed consistently to symbolic violence whose cultural traditions are often mocked as a disgrace in an age of modernization. This structural and symbolic violence become physical and routine as marginalized and harassed pastoralists resist and fight back.

Despite the usefulness of categorizing violence, one thing that should be kept in mind is that violence is ambiguous concepts that are hard to distinguish. For example, structural violence is hard to notice, as this kind of violence is not considered blatant violence. This is why despite the detailed categorization of violence in the context of violent environments and its usefulness in analyzing the violent environment, not all scholars like the usefulness of expanded definition of violence. Nordstrom & Martin argue that expanded definitions of violence have been useful in giving a voice to systems of violence no less powerful by virtue of their intangibility. However, they warn that the expansion of the definitions of violence can also play into the hands of repressive regimes who justify widespread repression by claiming to “see” violence (read “opposition”) throughout the population (Nordstrom and Martin 1992).
The “Everydayness” of Pastoral Violence

One kind of violence that has not been covered as extensively as other forms of violence is everyday violence (Peluso and Watts 2001: 9). While most types of violence have been well researched, the “everydayness”-ordinariness as a consequence of being frequent and commonplace- of pastoral violence has rarely been dealt with. One reason is that even among scholars of political ecology, pastoral violence is often still considered as one-off incidents committed by unruly violent actors without socio-political implications. It is only recently that seemingly simple violent outbreaks of pastoralists have seen to be often connected with the dynamic events of political economy, in which the protracted acts of violence are orchestrated and maintained by powerful violent actors with their own interests and goals (Bohle and Fünfgeld 2007). It is in the middle of the continuation of violence that often affects the daily lives of people economically, socially, politically, and even environmentally (Bohle and Fünfgeld 2007).

In theorizing on the everydayness of violence, Nancy Scheper-Hughes, Buorgeois, and Basaglia have most thoroughly conceptualized this form of violence, focusing attention on a more phenomenological level on the “peace-time crimes,” the “small wars and invisible genocides” that afflict the poor around the world. She draws on the psychiatrist Franco Basaglia’s phrase “peace-time crimes” (Basaglia et al. 1987) in order to reveal the institutionalized brutalities that are accepted and rendered invisible because of their routine preponderance (see also Scheper-Hughes and Bourgeois 2004). She explores how the phenomenon of sociopolitical violence as experienced by average citizens, to examine how violence is displayed in the larger contexts of the actual lives and life of civilians who find themselves on the frontlines of today’s “dirty wars”, wars they did not initiate and cannot control. In her fieldwork in Sri Lanka and
Mozambique, she explores how dirty war strategies can be used by actors to accumulate power. Emerging evidence points to more and more violent conflicts that have become easily routinized. More often than not, the routinization is often the consequence of orchestrated efforts by violent actors.

The concept of everyday violence is rarely used in understanding pastoral violence. The terms are mostly used in politically driven violence in Europe or Latin America. The concept of everyday violence is flexible enough to apply to various areas and issues, pastoral violence in an African context. It is mostly because of the fact that the existing violent actors are often economically driven due to new opportunities. They are the new owners of vast tracts of land rapidly privatized through the acknowledgement of state governments. What they share with the actors of everyday violence is their degree of preponderance. The repercussions of their acts of violence are as strong as previous actors as their actions and motivations are often hidden in the middle of media reporting.

**Politcized Livelihoods Under Violence**

Life under everyday violence has been difficult to understand, due mostly to the lack of conceptual tools to analyze the topic. Applying the concept of livelihood is an experiment in overcoming this obstacle. Scholars interested in daily lives under protracted violence find that the concept of livelihood has been effective in understanding the condition of these lives (Bohle and Fünfgeld 2007). Livelihoods are comprehended as collections or structures of activities through which people (individuals or groups) attempt to make a living. These include assets (both material and social resources) and capabilities, and are mediated by economic, political, and institutional contexts (Chambers and Conway 1992; Slater 2001). A livelihood contains income, both cash and kind, as well as the social organizations (kin, family, compound,
village and so on), gender relations, and property rights needed to maintain a certain level of standard of living. Social and kinship networks are important for materializing and maintaining various income sources (Berry 1989; 1993; Hart 1995; Bryceson 1996). A livelihood also means access to, and benefits derived from, social and public services provided by the state, such as health service, education, road constructions, and the like (Lipton and van der Gaag 1993; Blackwood and Lynch 1994).

The livelihood perspective enables researchers to study change from below, emphasizing actor diversity. Due to its actor-oriented focus, the perspective of livelihoods has been effective in such studies as coping in arid and semiarid environments (Reitsma et al 1992; Davies 1996), studies emphasizing income diversification in rural communities (Preston 1992; Reardon 1997; Ellis 1998; Bryceson 1999), and poverty and environmental degradation (Reardon and Vosti 1995; Murton 1997; Scoones 1998). More sophisticated and detailed concepts of livelihood perspectives have been articulated by many international aid agencies such as The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and the British Department for International Development (DFID) (Carney 1998; see also Bryceson 1999). Collinson (2003), Korf (2003), and Lautze and Raven-Roberts (2006) have offered adaptations of the DFID framework for complex crisis, including protracted conflicts. These adaptations add political assets into the framework and underline the effect of vulnerabilities upon all aspects of the framework.

Those who have applied the livelihood approach in actual violent environments were a group of scholars, whose case studies focused on the political ecology of violence in the Batticaloa District, located in the Eastern Province of Sri Lanka. In
Batticaloa all three forms of violence, as defined above, coincide, causing continuous political and social crisis. What they found in Batticaloa was that the protracted conflict caused the entire fabric of entitlement relations — by which the fishing communities gain and lose access to environmental goods and services — to become overpowered by the logic and dynamics of violence (Bohle and Fünfgeld 2007: 673). As a consequence of restrictions on movement and mobility, violent displacements, and limited access to resources, markets, and social networks, the environment became an arena of contested entitlements, where claims over resources were never a simple process. The entitlements were continually negotiated and struggled over as access to and control over “livelihood assets” become a matter of shifting power relations, with physical destruction of assets, on the one hand, and transfers of assets from the powerless to the more powerful actors, on the other (Le Billon 2000: 4). The prevailing social, economic, political, and institutional environment through which livelihood assets gain their meaning and value is subordinated to the logic of power (Bohle and Fünfgeld 2007: 670).

Arid and dry areas are quite an unusual place to observe livelihood strategies. Such areas are often described as barren areas with degraded environments due to the excessive exploitation of careless resource users. Even during serious violent conflicts, however, the lives are filled with meaningful activities of livelihood negotiations and struggles that need to be evaluated. It is too early to conclude that the entire socio, economic, political, and institutional environment is subordinated to the logic of power (Nordstrom 1997). This logic is often challenged and moderated. The recent civil society movement is a good example of such a process. In sum, the livelihood approach is
important not only in that it reveals the nature of lives under violence, but also in the way that it shows how structural aspects of political economy affect actors on the ground.

**Environmental Consequences**

While concerned with the vulnerability\(^4\) of rural families to livelihood collapse in the face of violent logic and dynamic, another aspect is the impact of violence on the natural environment. Violent activities often lead already marginalized people into taking extremely destructive measures against those who restrict their access. Internal conflicts among marginalized people are also part of reason that exceeds the environmental degradation. Distribution of natural resource under violent conditions are easily corrupt and unfair, those people who feel unjust treatment from the distribution of natural resources often take destructive and vengeful measures, while limiting the possibility of negotiation and coexistence with other marginal groups.

Based on the explanation of Blaikie and Brookfield’s marginalization process, violence and its social consequences can have direct or indirect destructive impacts on environmental resources and their livelihood resourcefulness (Peluso and Watts 2001). Politically and socially marginal (disempowered) people alienated into ecologically marginal areas and economically marginal social status groups tend to make increasing demands on the marginal productivity of ecosystems, the result is a degraded landscape that returns less and less to an increasingly impoverished and desperate community.

\(^4\) Vulnerability is defined in this context as a high degree of exposure to risk, shocks, and stress, all associated- with food insecurity (Chambers 1989; Davies 1996).
Case studies indicate that environmental change can occur as a consequence of violence, specifically through violent action that may not be triggered by environmental concerns (Bohle and Fünfgeld 2007). Examples include various agricultural intensification activities under protracted violence, such as irrigation schemes and vengeful bush burning. Fire is commonly used in African savannas to remove long, dry, low-nutrient grass to generate fresh grass, both for livestock and wildlife. Fire has now become a tool used by powerless individuals or groups against those they perceive to be powerful (Scott 1985; Kuhlken 1999; Kull 2002). In the wake of commercial agriculture, the rise of export-driven plantation space-economies, and postcolonial modernization of the locals, rural fire-setting persists as a political-ecological tactic operating in defiance of those who seek to extract labor, food, taxes, rents, and interest from them (Scott 1985: 29).

**Chances and Opportunities**

Contrary to common sense and indicative of a lack of interest, most conflict-related research does not pay attention to the aftermath of violent conflict. Paying attention to the aftermath of violent conflicts is important due to the fact that violence is not only the key element of an often long process of conflict but also meaningful cultural expression, whatever its apparent senselessness and destructive potential (Whitehead 2007: 41). This does not mean that violence has some magical power to generate these opportunities and chances automatically. The focus should be on how people mobilize these opportunities and chances. Unlike common sense, people with marginal social status are not necessarily culturally or even politically disempowered. They often take a leading role in creating opportunities and chances in the middle of crises.
Nordstrom (1995) explores not only how violence deconstructs societies, but also how those caught in its grip employ tremendous creativity to survive it against all odds. In the same vein, scholars of political ecology notice that a violent environment is not a place in which only negative events happen. There exist unexpected opportunities and chances. A violent environment is a place where formative and transformative events, such as initiations into new life ways, entanglement in events of “social effervescence” (such as a political campaign, a cause celebre for public agitation, and the like) take place (Nordstrom 1995). It is in this lull of violence that most people are looking for a chance to promote their objectives.

**Civil Society Construction**

The opportunistic nature of indigenous civil society movements in Africa provides a good example of the nature of social effervescence. The lessons from the research of asymmetrical power connections at different levels is that it is vulnerable groups that often produce unpredictable results (Little 1996; Brosius 1997; Fisher 1997). The massive and sudden nature of land alienation and the apparent failure of state-based economic management policies have created a sense of urgency for people and international communities. One of the most significant changes in effort has been the empowered voice of indigenous peoples. Encouraged by the emphasis on NGO activities by international communities in the early 1990s5, many indigenous groups have successfully organized civil society organizations. International NGOs often make

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5 Because of the accessing development and economic crisis of the 1980s on the continent, international institutions such as the World Bank launched the search for new political cultures and ideas (Rogers 2002:62). They had come to recognize that economic recovery would not be possible without government accountability (World Bank 1989:60-61). Since Africa’s economic woes were aggravated by authoritarian governments where there were no counterbalancing forces of political power to restrain the state, “civil organizations,” “intergovernmental institutions were given a much larger role (World Bank 1995: 4-5).
a partnership with these organizations, letting them play a central role in various projects focusing on long-term and community–level civil society-building activities to improve their livelihoods. Networking at the international level gave many indigenous activists a new high-profile identity which transcended national boundaries (Neumann 1995:377). The transnational networks have also allowed indigenous groups to ‘scale up’ their political voices, while simultaneously consolidating the local communities that serve as spatial and institutional bases of both political power and cultural reproduction (Igoe 2001). A good example of such a movement is the mobilization of marginalized peoples such as pastoral peoples to advocate for land rights and cultural autonomy. Areas with violent conflicts are often chosen for civil society intervention. While providing humanitarian assistance to violent affected area, peace can be restored through rebuilding through various non-material assistances.

Unfortunately, these civil society projects do not guarantee the best results. The root of ethnic culture in African politics is too deep to ignore. This geographical and ethnical separation eventually encouraged Africans to think ethnically (Berman 1998:324), making ethnic culture based on tribalism as a main political ideology among ethnic groups. The unexpected consequence of the institutionalization of ethnicity is that it creates internal and external dimensions that John Lonsdale has called moral ethnicity and political tribalism (Berman 1998:324). According to Lonsdale’s argument, internal dimension, moral ethnicity, was the discursive and political arena within which ethnicity identities emerged out of the renegotiation of the bounds of political community and authority, the social rights and obligations of moral economy and the rights of access to land and property. The dialectically related external dimension, political tribalism,
emerged out of the diverse consequences of colonialism for different African communities, especially with regard to access to the resources of modernity and economy accumulation. Political tribalism did not involve a search for a moral community of rights and obligations, but rather collective political organization and action across the boundaries of communities defined by moral ethnicity, first against the alien power of the colonial state and then, increasingly, against the competing interest of other emerging rival ethnicities for access to the state and control of its natural resources.\textsuperscript{6} It is the existence of the duality of African political culture that was often reproduced and blamed for the collapses of early efforts of economic modernization efforts of African countries and made it difficult for indigenous farmers and herders to coexist harmoniously.

The strong existence of the duality of African political culture in civil society organizations is the reason why the remarkable success of the new movement does not impress scholars of African politics. Criticisms mostly focus on persistent patron-client networks in civil society organizations. Many believe that patron-client networks, which account for the personalistic, materialistic and opportunistic character of African politics, penetrate institutions of civil society as well. The lack of appropriate norms in African politics allows a civil society that is a "disorganized duality of mutually exclusive projects that are not necessarily democratic" (Fatton 1995:75). What is missing in civil society in

\textsuperscript{6} Ekeh named the duality primordial public and civil public. According to Ekeh, the two levels play an important logic in terms of understanding the political culture of African countries. In the level of moral ethnicity is the public realm in which primordial groupings, ties, and sentiments influence and determine the individual’s public behavior, which is closely identified with primordial groupings, sentiments, and activities. The primordial public is moral and operates on the same moral imperatives as the private realm. On the other hand, the civic pubic, which is amoral and lacks the generalized moral imperatives, is a public realm which is historically associated with the colonial administration and which has become identified with popular politics in post-colonial Africa (Ekeh 1975).
Africa is “the development of trans-ethnic public arena founded in universalistic norms and civic trust governing both political and economic transitions” (Berman 1998:19).

Critics agree that the most serious problem comes from civil society’s strategic involvement in ethnic identity politics in local and national level. Many indigenous groups are organizing around the identity claims of “being indigenous” challenging civil society’ championing of the individual rights and responsibilities of “citizens” (Muehlebach 2001). Many fear that such ethnic mobilization could foster ethnic tensions between those who are indigenous enough and those who are not (Neumann 1995). Some of the most marginalized groups tend to live in ethnically mixed communities and are essentially invisible to donor organizations. Ironically, these groups are marginalized in part because they are unable to lay claims to indigenous status, which means that only certain members of a community—whether because of their ethnicity or primary livelihood—are singled out for representation and resources, while the needs of other community members are ignored. As a result, in some areas, as Jim Igoe (2001) has documented, the formation of NGOs has catalyzed ethnic tensions over the new resource of international attention.

Heavy dependency on international material support has been raised as another main concern to the development of the civil society. This often causes an immature culture of civil society organizations. Lack of resources and severe economic crisis on the world’s poorest continent make all the organizations of African civil society weak and usually dependent on the state or foreign donors (Igoe 2001). This dependence often leads them to a lack of a clearly defined vision, including short-and long-term objectives; poor leadership qualities, especially a lack of commitment or spirit of
voluntarism; a lack of transparency in communication in relations with community members (Hodgson 2002).

Despite all these negative aspects of current civil society movement in the area, the civil society movement is meaningful since civil society often generates different kinds of motivations. Even though the version of African civil society is quite different from the European version of civil society, the civil society movement is generating new kind of chances and opportunities. These chances and opportunities are often evolving into a political resource which can generate alternative versions of a civil society. Academic attention therefore should be focusing on what kinds of civil societies are being created in their interactions with European versions of civil society.

**Conclusion**

This literature review reveals that pastoral violence is not a single isolated physical event, but a processual phenomenon with political, social or even environmental ramifications. It is not isolated event as the most contemporary pastoral violence occurs as a consequence of interactions with different types of violence. That often leads to the normalization of violence in the rigid structural context of political economy. The lives of people trapped in the process are consistently required to find ways to deal with unusual circumstances, generating chances for unexpected outcomes.

In the complex context of pastoral violence in Africa, this research is particularly interested in everyday violence and seeks to gauge how everyday violence, due to consequences of structural pressures of political economy, are impacting the trajectories of daily lives of the Igusa people. The principal questions this dissertation aspires to answer are: 1) Why have the Igusa pastoralists become violent and how have the structural conditions of political economy influenced their decisions and methods for
applying violence 2) What are the major challenges that the Igusa people face in their societies as everyday violence prevails? 3) What are the principal causes of everyday violence in Igusa; and, are the major causes of violence related at the regional and national levels (Tanzania) compared to perceptions at the Igusa level? 4) How has everyday violence influenced environmental condition in the Igusa region over time and space? 5) Who are the majority of violent actors in the Igusa region that contribute to the conditions of everyday violence in the Igusa region? 6) Does the recent civil society movement pose any unique opportunities for the Igusa people, or do their experiences parallel those of other regions whose movements have failed? The next chapter discusses how the information needed to answer these multiple research questions was obtained.
Ethnographic Research in the Field of Violence

Ethnographic methods do not guarantee the success of research activities in the zones of violence. This was mainly due to the fact that applying traditional methods of ethnographic research can be impossible in a violent conflict zone. Traditional ethnographic research assumes ideal field circumstances for interacting with informants (i.e., stability, trust, quietude, security, freedom from fear) and presupposes the ethnographer’s position of control (Kovats-Bernat 2002: 210). In violent areas, these conditions rarely exist, making basic research activities difficult or impossible.

Despite all these difficulties of conducting ethnographic research, the reason to apply qualitative research on violent situations in the Igusa region is that the anthropological definition of violence and ethnographic approach is inseparable. It is often argued that every act of violence is embedded in a complex material, structural and cultural reality, there exist larger causes and consequences of violence (Kovats-Bernat 2005:12). As part of a dialectical movement, violence also stimulates creativity in rebuilding devastated social worlds (Kovats-Bernat 2005:13). In my opinion, violence as a social process of a dialectical nature makes the ethnographic approach suitable as the research process requires long time of study to deal with specific regions, peoples and issues. The ethnographic approach of long engagement identifies and records the sites, acts, agents, and artifacts of the violence itself, and then contextualizes those elements in relation to the conflict as a whole, extracting some degree of cultural meaning from the community torn apart and reconstituting itself throughout and after the crisis (Kovats-Bernat 2006:121).
Applying the process nature of the ethnographic approach, what I used in the field was the livelihoods approach as I was particularly focusing on the livelihood activities of Igusa people under the circumstances of everyday violence. The livelihood approach is a relatively practical methodology in violent zones since livelihoods analysis has the ability to go beyond an overt focus on ‘the conflict’ to consider a longer historical trajectory of change and present a differentiated understanding of the impacts of and responses to conflict (e.g. for different groups of actors; according to spatial patterns; and at international, national, regional and local levels) that incorporates political, economic and social factors (Longley & Maxwell 2003: 2).

A livelihoods approach is underpinned by a number of principles. Livelihoods approaches are: people-centered; responsive and participatory; multi-level; conducted in partnership with both public and private sector; sustainable; dynamic; and holistic (Schafer 2002). According to Koen (2006:196), the main interest of a livelihoods approach is actual people seeking different strategies to achieve the outcomes they seek. Therefore, apart from the physical aspects of livelihood survival, major analytic interest is focused on the politico-economic nature of livelihood opportunities, which involve the essential elements of both entitlement and access to labor and resources. So, rather than starting from the perspective of a grand economic theory, a livelihood approach looks at what the needs and interests of the subjects are, and it contextualizes the strategies they use within the broader political and economic framework to achieve their desired needs and interests. The analysis of these livelihoods thus requires a differentiated and multi-level research that examines the
historical changes in political economy over time to explain the social, economic and political elements relating to poverty and vulnerability (Longley and Maxwell 2003: 2).

According to Sarah Collinson, the livelihoods approach to analysis can be applied to understand both the political and the economic aspects of conflict, and how these combine to affect the trajectories of lives under conflicts (2003). Just like any political economy analysis, it is concerned with the interaction of political and economic processes in a society, which include the distribution of power and wealth between different groups and individuals, and the processes that create, sustain and transform these patterns of the distributions over time. For example, in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, Koen came to the conclusion that ethnic trust is a vital aspect in enabling people’s access to resources: claiming ethnic belonging often is used to set up private commercial opportunities, to facilitate economic transactions and to guarantee the necessary trust in commercial relations in general. In sum, the livelihoods approach made it easier to analyze how the combination of a certain social asset (ethnic kinship) with a certain livelihood strategy (using ethnic network) has had a detrimental effect on inter-communal solidarity as a whole (2006:196).

In my research of Igusa conflicts and the lives of the Igusa people, the same principles of the livelihoods approach are applied. First, in understanding three historical developments of political economy in the area-colonial, post colonial, and neoliberal period, which is vital to understand the origins of violent conflicts in the area, I look into how these historical developments of political economy affect the distribution patterns of vital natural resources in Igusa, especially land, by analyzing the ramifications of the expansion of sisal industry and development projects on the access of the local
population. While looking into the actual people and their livelihood activities under violent conflicts, I also analyze political and economic livelihoods activities and strategies that make the lives of Igusa people possible in the context of protracted everyday violence in the area. What I was particularly interested in was the seemingly casual livelihoods activities such as irrigation schemes and herding practices, social networking and trying to show how these activities are intensified under the constant everyday violence in the region. I also look into the burgeoning activities of civil society movements as a way of enabling livelihood activities to be strategically facilitated, since these political activities offer valuable economic and political opportunities for the Igusa population.

**Research Process**

A combination of ethnographical and livelihood approaches was adopted during the three stages of the research activities. First, in order to look into the historical aspects of the conflicts, I did a historical data collections of the political economic development in the area. Studying past events and processes through direct and incidental references in archival (local and regional) data were mostly used. Second, I did a livelihood data collections that allowed me to have contextual perspectives of rural lives of the Igusa people. In order to understand the current livelihood status of key farming and herding groups, I conducted interviews with farmers focusing on farming and basic livelihood strategies with detailed information on cropping strategies, yields, issues of land tenure, and land transactions. I also conducted interviews with herders, focusing especially on herding practices, income sources, as well as herding strategies. Third, I analyzed natural resource distribution patterns in the area of frequent conflict zones and analyzed how conflict events affect distribution patterns of natural resources such as land and
water. Fourthly, I inquired into recent civil society activities. Recent civil society activities were observed by conducting participatory observations and interviews with civil society leaders, and civil society members. I also worked as a volunteer at a civil society associations’ office in Igusa town to engage in more close up participant observations.

First Stage: Entering the Field Site

Entering the field is often the hardest part of anthropological field work. Mine was no exception in that I was supposed to enter a place where a serious violent conflict had taken place several years ago. The reason for the extensive period of entry was because entering a conflict zone requires special precautions. In an area polarized by a long history of violent conflicts, I thought that small mistakes in the beginning could jeopardize the entire research activities to come. The extended duration was allocated to entry to obtain accurate information to find the right places and persons to facilitate the fieldwork. The weather was also another reason for the delay. From Mid-March to the end of May was the beginning of the major rainy season of the year (masika). It rains heavily almost every day so most unpaved roads in the Mpaka Plains were impassable, making fieldwork activities in the plains impossible.

As a combination of these two reasons, I ended up allocating three months to entering the field. The introductory period consisted of various basic ethnographic research activities, such as gathering up-to-date information on the conflict situation in the area, setting up a field site, and looking for key informants in the area while doing spontaneous ethnographic participant observations. During the first month of the one-year field trip of 2004, I allocated the time to gather basic information on the fieldwork site and overcome tension and suspicion with locals. This was mostly due to the fact that the information I had gathered previously was not sufficient to pinpoint a neutral
zone, a physical location that does not show any sign of affiliation to any party in the conflict. I thought that as a researcher of a two-party conflict, positioning myself in a neutral zone would be wise for the research and also for personal safety. To locate the exact neutral zone in the conflict area, I stayed at the Sokoine University of Agriculture in Morogoro, located approximately 80 miles from the fieldwork site, which was helpful for this purpose. Through library research at the university, I was able to gather up-to-date information, especially on the situation of the area where I intended to do fieldwork. Information included local area maps and various research done by local scholars on the area, and local newspapers, which had not been available in U.S. libraries. While staying in the guesthouse of the college, I was able to establish connections with Tanzanian scholars who were experts on the issue of farmer-herder conflicts in the Igusa region.

After the library research at the local college and several field trips to the prospective fieldwork site, I concluded that Igusa town would be the best base for the fieldwork. The town is a popular gathering center for herders and farmers and residents of the town had a good relationship with both groups since most of them were their customers. This cautious entry into the field, however, did not eliminate the tension of fear and suspicion. I sensed tension between me and the Igusa people from the beginning. The tension affected my research activities. In the beginning, I think this fear came from the lack of trust between the local people and myself as a stranger. The people had a great deal of suspicion of me and the nature of my work in the town. It was mostly due to the fact that the issues of violent conflicts in the area were ongoing situation, making the existence of outside researchers problematic. I also had my own
suspicions as well. In the beginning, I could not tell whether people approaching me were sincere or not.

The tension gradually resolved itself as I found key informants in the fieldwork area. The assistance of two informants was crucial. The first person was my landlord who also ran a small mom-and-pop store in the Igusa market. His good reputation in the town helped clear up the suspicion that surrounded me. He was an Arab Tanzanian who had been born and raised in the town. Since he was a native, he knew almost everyone and everything about the town. My landlord always went out for a cup of coffee at night to chat with a variety of people who were often local policemen, his school friends, and the like. While drinking coffee with him at night people suspicious of me asked him what I was doing in the town and his positive reflections about me often eased their suspicions. His extensive connections and local knowledge were also a tremendous help in terms of choosing the right people to study with for the research. As I expected, he had many farmer and herder customers with whom I was able to do interviews later on. Owing to his advice, I was able to stay away from a group of people working for the government security agency who were curious about my activities in the town. Thanks to all of these, I was able to avoid many problems. The only shortcoming of staying at his place was the noise from the surrounding elementary school, evangelical churches, and the mosque.

In terms of starting the research activities, one local elder’s assistance was extremely helpful. He was a retired local government politician and an intellectual who was a columnist for regional newspapers. He was running an NGO called the Human Development Association from his own house. Once I arrived in town, he showed a
The first research associate, who was a farmer himself and came from one of the villages with a long history of violence with herders, was especially helpful in finding interviewees from farmers' villages for intensive interviews regarding farmer-herder conflicts. I was able to pinpoint many farmers who experienced such incidents first hand. The second research associate was a retired teacher. Due to his professional background and age, he was especially helpful to me in my work with herders who show respect toward a teacher (mwalimu), making up for not having a research associate from the herding population. The reason of not having had research associates from the herding population was that any member of the herding population was prohibited from entering farmers' villages. After the violent conflict of 2001, farmers' village councils maintain a policy of no entry so as not to agitate villagers. Despite his assistance, the implications of the absence of a herder research associate can be significant, especially in terms of the neutrality of research data regarding the herding population. Crosschecking the authenticity of data with friends from the herding population was helpful.

Having noticed a possible problem, I made extra efforts to maintain the neutrality of the research data especially regarding the herding population. One is the friendliness
of the herding population that allowed me unlimited access to the herder’s village.

While farmers were conservative in their views towards an outside researcher, herding members of Igusa were extremely cooperative. These cooperative relationships were helpful in accessing herders without any assistance of a research associate. The other was the existence of cooperative persons. My research activities were possible due to a friendship I developed with a herder who was a regular customer of my landlord’s shop. Through his recommendation, I was able to gain access to the herding population without any significant problems. Additionally, key informant from the herding population in Igusa also acted as a research associate, especially in researching the civil society movement as he were a volunteer coordinator of a pastoral civil society association.

Owing to these connections, I was able to carry out surveys to collect data on the various professions, and the ethnic or political background in order to describe and analyze the area and its population. According to the results of this census, I divided the fieldwork into three sections. I chose Igusa as a place to stay due to its neutral position in the area. It was the center of the area. Most amenities such as hospitals and schools, churches were located in the town and its market attracted herders and farmers around the area. Three small farmer’s villages around Igusa were selected to do in-depth livelihood research on farming activities, especially irrigation schemes and also experience of violence conflicts. I visited at least 20 households in each farmer’s village to collect data through semi-structured interviews. Most residents of these villages were at odds with the herding population. For research activities with the herding population, the towns of Mbwade and Parakuyo were selected. Mbwade was the closest town from Igusa; Parakuyo was reachable by bus. For most research activities, I visited Mbwade
on a daily basis. For researching the civil society movements of the herding population, I visited Parakuyo every Wednesday to meet interviewees and attend cattle auctions which were also occasions for meetings of the herder communities in the area.

**Second Stage: Dynamics in a Violent Environment**

As the dry season approached, there were more reports of physical confrontations between farmers and herders. The entire town was buzzing about increasing low intensity violent incidents farmers had experienced in the field. Increased violent activities were, however, not an automatic process that occurred as the dry season came. During the four months of the dry season, most research activities focused on collecting ethnographic data on how the logic and dynamics of violence in the area affected the access to natural resources and eventually degraded the environment.

First, I looked into the history of violent rivalry between the two groups. Historical data of the conflictive past often revealed not only a chronicle of inter-community violent incidents at a local level between farmers and herders, but hints of who the active participants in those incidents were, their motivations, and their real interests. Most needed data were gathered through semi-structured interviews. I was able to conduct interviews with 19 elderly men from farmer’s villages and 15 elderly men from herder’s villages. Elderly men of farmers’ villages were selected through recommendations from the key informants and research associates. Interview questions were focused on the elders’ experiences and memories of past violent conflicts that happened in the region between farmers and herders. Many parts of these interviews were focused on the 2000 violent confrontation between farmers and herders. In addition to interviews with these elders, I was able to interview a score of victims from the incident and also was able to contact the managers of national (government owned) farms and private sisal farms.
who, it turns out, orchestrated the whole incident of 2000 (see page 87). I also visited regularly local government offices, local courts, village council offices, and civil society offices to collect any data regarding the history of violent conflicts in the area.

Knowing the place where violent confrontations occur is important. The place is often strategically chosen by the masterminds of intentional violent incidents, so it tends to reveal the true motivations of these violent acts. It also shows the area in which most productive activities were limited or restricted, showing the gravity of the impact of routinized violence on the livelihoods of local people. In order to do participant mapping of the area of violent confrontations, visiting these areas was necessary. First of all, I used interview data and people’s advice to pinpoint the area of violent confrontations. To corroborate this verbal information, I did participant observation in the field where violent confrontations took place in regular basis. To access these occasions, I had to follow several routes of herding practice. I was able to observe low intensity violent confrontations at least once a week during the dry season.

More often than not, these sites of violent confrontations were chosen carefully by the aggressors. Understanding the motivations and logic of them in terms of choosing these sites can reveal many aspects of their true nature. I was able to find some major participants of the violent incident of 2000 during the interviews. I did not ask questions about their participation and experience in the incident directly, but it did not take long since most of interviewees wanted to identify major violent actors while criticizing their immoral behavior. Based on the information from these interviews and observations, I was able to arrange interviews with some of the people who were allegedly central figures in major violent activities and their use of violence in those confrontations.
Another major interest in the second stage was how these violent activities affected the livelihoods of local populations. Components of livelihoods are often controlled and limited under the circumstance of protracted and routinized violence. In the case of the Igusa area, the basic and most important aspect of making a living is access to natural resources, such as land and water. I also investigated the various livelihood strategies people took in the midst of the limitations on natural resource access due to these violent activities. Three farmers and one herder’s villages were selected to conduct interviews on their efforts to increase their material incomes. I organized focus groups to discuss with farmers and herders how the recent outbreak of violence in the agricultural field affected their economic strategies. One undeniable fact was that this increased intensification of economic activities often directly influenced the conditions of the environment. Excessive irrigation schemes and bushfires are good examples (see page 129). I investigated the conditions of environmental degradation in the region by visiting local agricultural research centers.

**Third Stage: Locating Civil Society Activities**

As the fieldwork went on, it became clear that violence and destruction were not the only scenarios in the area. There also were scenes filled with unusual opportunities and creativity. As violent incidents between farmers and herders attracted national and international attention, there had been a series of international assistance interventions in the region to promote local civil society movements.

I had a strategic reason to study the civil society movement in the fieldwork site. It was to facilitate the research of violent conflicts. The topic of civil society played the role of an ice-breaker. Violent conflicts are emotionally charged issues in any cultural zone and Igusa was no exception. There were many people who felt uncomfortable being
interviewed about their experiences or roles in violent conflicts. Most of them were friends or relatives of the victims or attackers in the incident. In some cases, they themselves were the victims or attackers themselves. Therefore, it could be quite difficult for me to broach the main topic of the interview. I needed a lighter topic to start the interview with and issues concerning the local civil society movement were one topic most people could casually respond to.

For researching civil society movements on the issue of violent environments, I looked into the characteristics of civil society movements in the region. Three civil society organizations, two representing farmers and one, herders, were chosen because they were active and sufficiently well organized to find interviewees through their leader in the villages from which most interviewees came. I interviewed civil society association members to listen about the motivations for their participation. I also participated in meetings in order to observe their contributions to their local societies. Through my key informants in the field, I was able to meet a person who was knowledgeable on the entire process and much valuable data came from interviews with him. Those data consist of the details of the construction project such as the purposes, the amount of financial investments, parties involved in the project. In order to validate the data from him, I accessed agencies’ websites and obtained project report documents reporting the consequence of these building projects after their completion.

**Research Limitations in the Field of Violence**

Traditional ethnographic research methodologies have strong advantages for doing research in unusual places. It does not mean, however, that it is a perfect way of conducting this kind of research. There were some important issues I encountered while engaging in the fieldwork. The constant recurrence of violence often was a major
obstacle in the research. Due to the tensions in the field, some traditional ethnographic research methodologies had to be adjusted.

**Violence in the Field**

Physical confrontations between farmers and herders were common in the field, especially during the dry season. These frequent violent incidents affected many aspects of fieldwork. Despite these precautionary measures, I experienced first-handedly several occasions of violence in the field while doing participant observations of herding practices. On one occasion, the confrontation was at very close range since the confrontation broke up with the herders I accompanied for field observation. Fortunately, that confrontation did not escalate into full violence between each party, but it was an eye-opening experience for me to finally understand the seriousness of routinized violence in the field. In most cases, this incident did not affect me physically, but there was always a chance of being caught in the middle. In some cases, just my presence as an outsider observer prevented these situations from escalating into full blown confrontation. The best way to deal with on-going violence in the field was not to get too close to the scene. When violent confrontations were rampant in the field, I often adjusted my research schedule. For example, rather than visiting the fields when tensions ran high, I would conduct more interviews with elders from each side, who usually stayed at home during daytime.

**Ethnographic Documentations**

In conflict zones it is often impossible to use traditional ethnographic research methods, such as note-taking or recording. The main reason usually is the harsh reaction by the locals. People in the conflict zone often are highly suspicious of recording since their contents could be and had been used to violate their security. The
recorder also elicited a great deal of curiosity among people who were working for the government secret police. Some managers and government people openly asked me to show them my notes, and took my refusal as a challenge to their authority. With herders, taking pictures was extremely difficult. They especially expressed aggressive reactions in the beginning when I took pictures of their cattle without their permission. There is a taboo against taking photos of their cattle. As a result, I had to refrain from many photographic and recording activities due to these extreme responses. I often wrote lengthy field notes after the end of a day so as not to forget the details. After having learned of the herders’ sensitivity to photography, I asked their permission every time I wanted to take photos of them and their animals. In the beginning, mostly they refused. However, as friendships developed, they did not mind me taking pictures of them and their herds.

**Ethical Issues**

While seeking interviewees, they questioned me about the main purpose of doing the research. In many cases, I hesitated to give them direct answers, since the topic of conflicts become a self-fulfilling prophecy and can stimulate people involved in the conflicts. Instead I circumvented their question by giving them general, neutral answers. I was living in a small village and I did not want to be categorized as a person who was intensely interested only in their past violent history. Even though I did not reveal the full scope of my research, by telling them I wished to study local civil society (which I had to explain) past violent confrontations were brought up spontaneously. Most interviews eventually touched on the topic of conflict anyway since it was a main problem in the area, so there was no need to tell them I was interested specifically on conflict. One major concern during the field work was to protect the identity of informants from any
possible threat, especially from state informants or the police. One more finding during many interviews was that most people preferred to be interviewed at home rather than in a public space. Interviews done in their home usually generated much more information and took more time than those done outside or in public spaces. At home, people usually were more cooperative and allowed me to take notes of the conversation or to use my recording device. Since they secretly monitored my movements in the village, I expected them to ask me to show what I had found. One creative way I prepared for this challenge was to write down sensitive field notes and other information in Korean. If I had been asked, I would have told them it was an entry into my personal diary. Fortunately, nobody asked me.

The Lack of Representation of Women

The lack of representation of women is the main limitation of this research. Despite their meaningful position in every aspect of livelihood of rural Africa, this research has not been able to describe the role of woman as much as it should have. One of the reasons was the fact that there was a lack of access to the female population. As a male ethnographer, I was discouraged from seeking access to woman interviewees. Interviewing women was seen as problematic or even provocative to the people of Igusa. Foreigners are considered predatory regarding African woman, which could create unpleasant encounters with locals who could have been offended by these research activities. This jeopardizes the reputation of researchers, but also the women. This is especially true in areas of strong Muslim influence where at least four Mosques and their religious leaders kept watching the activities of this strange East Asian male in their town, uneasy in this time of harsh confrontation between the U.S. and the Muslim world.
The other reason was safety. While conducting research whilst worrying about my own safety, accompanying a female research assistant would have meant increasing the safety issues for both. Especially when the main means of transportation was bicycle, the vulnerability of the means of transportation would not provide enough security. Bicycling is also hard for female research assistants. While worrying about my own safety, exposing a female research assistant to possible harassment would be irresponsible.

Even though the role of women was not fully explored, there was also a strong possibility that women possess an important knowledge of the violent context in the area. First, they are the most common victims of the insecurity. Women are the main targets of both groups. Attacks on women have often been used to justify the use of violent force in time of conflict. Unseen in this research does not mean that they were not in the area. Women are the ones who are very energetically participating in various areas of livelihood by taking most of the hard work of male farmers or herders.

They are also energetic opportunity takers as well. While political activities have been known as only man’s business, civil society movements in the country have been providing opportunities to women. The waves of civil society movements have reached the town as well. Thanks to the many gender sensitive NGOs, there was at least one civil society movement run by a women’s group in the area, which promotes the rights of vulnerable populations. Women have been the main target for receiving this assistance. Some groups of women have been energetically seeking these opportunities.
Other Challenges in the Field

I also had difficulty obtaining government cooperation. It usually took too much time to go through the byzantine administrative processes involved in asking for certain information in government files. This red tape often discouraged any impulse by me to spend time with government officials, especially, the police department in the region. One other limitation to my research was a lack of information about the international agencies. When the research was conducted, there were no international assistance agencies present in the region, so I had to rely on the accounts from people on the ground, which may have caused some limitations in the research. If NGOs had been there, there would be more descriptions and documents or interviews from the perspectives of these international NGOs. I have found much complementary information through the internet after having conducted the fieldwork. Due to recent developments in information technology, many government documents from Tanzania have been available on-line. The lack of information about international agencies was also partially remedied by accessing valuable reports on their projects in the region.
CHAPTER 4
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IGUSA SISAL INDUSTRY

We have, for instance, specific zones for crops like cotton, coffee, tobacco and sisal but nothing like that for livestock keeping. We even have special areas for zebras (national parks) but livestock keepers are hanging.

J.K. Nyerere
Morogoro, August 1981

Introduction

Without understanding the historical development of the political economy of sisal industry in the Igusa region, the nature of contemporary pastoral violence is difficult to understand. The process has been violent and the local people have experienced this violence directly, especially the Parakuyo Maasai in that their lives have always been ones of constant sufferings. For Galtung, this condition is a typical characteristic of structural violence. Structural violence is a form of violence that is embedded in ubiquitous social structures, normalized by stable institutions and regular experience (Winter and Leighton 2001). He originally framed the term “structural violence” to mean any constraint on human potential caused by economic and political structures (Galtung 1969). Constraints are unequal access to resources, to political power, to education, to health care (Winter and Leighton 2001). Structured constraints produce suffering and death as often as direct violence does, through the damage is slower, more subtle, more common, and more difficult to repair (Winter and Leighton 2001:1).

All these constraints and sufferings did not happen automatically. These are the consequences of actors with human agency. Paul Farmer, a medical anthropologist and physician, further elaborates on the side of human agency in the formulation of structural violence (Farmer 2005: 40). Farmer asserts that structural violence is not the
result of accidents or events. They are the consequence, direct or indirect, of human agency interacting with structures (Farmer 2005: 40). Unfortunately, the nature of structure is exploitation based on an unequal distribution of power (Galtung 1995:169). Farmer contends that examples of suffering like that endured by the Parakuyo Maasai is structured by historically given (and often economically driven) processes and forces that conspire to constrain agency (Farmer 2005: 40). Like people in Igusa, those who are victims of structural violence often do not see the systematic ways in which their plight is choreographed by unequal and unfair distribution of society’s resources. Such is the insidiousness of structural violence.

In analyzing structural violence orchestrated by human agency, this chapter firstly analyzes the nature of historical events of political economy in the Igusa region. This chapter goes further by illustrating the historical changes of natural resource access and control in the area. By beginning with a story of an encounter with a local businessman and uncovering the real background of the 2000 incidents in the area, I focus on three major historical events that have transformed the mode of natural resource access. These three historical events are: the introduction of sisal plantations in the colonial period, the nationalization of the sisal industry in the post-colonial period, and the privatization of the sisal industry in the neoliberal era. Each event is crucial in terms of understanding of the contemporary pastoral violence as these transformations are closely related with current violent confrontations. The understanding of the historical context of political economy in the Igusa region will contribute to an accurate understanding of the context that Igusa pastoralists apply violence in their quest over diminishing access to natural resources.
Encountering the Reality

Crossing the Mpaka Plains, I first saw the spiky leaved plant called sisal along the bumpy road. They looked like overgrown pineapple plants or some kind of stiff tropical succulent thriving successfully in the dry and hot weather of the plains. As the scale of the field increased, I thought that it would be a field of pineapple, teasing me with the endless prospect of juicy pineapple in such a remote and dry area. This dream did not materialize once I discovered the real identity of the plant. A local villager tying up the bundle of the plant told me that it was not pineapple, but sisal. He kindly continued to explain to me the uses of the plant as a raw material for making industrial brushes to cleaning oil residue in industrial machinery, and for making rope or carpeting.

This seemingly uninteresting plant proved to be the main key to understand the highly politicized violent incident of 2000 in the Igusa region. The information on the connection between the incident and this exotic plant came from a middle aged businessman with a Kaiser mustache I had met at the beginning of my fieldwork. His name is Amuri, an agricultural businessman from Dodoma. I came across him when I was staying in the town of Wassamau before going into the town of Igusa. I was having my new Chinese-built roadster bicycle assembled at a local bicycle shop, when he approached and struck up a conversation with me. He was a good talker. According to him, he lives in Dodoma, the capital of Tanzania, but is now working in Igusa where he is in the business of renting agricultural tractors with a hired driver. He has temporarily appropriated a plot from the sisal farms in Igusa since all the fertile land in the area belongs to the sisal estates.

Since Amuri was quite knowledgeable about the area where I was going to do fieldwork, I was interested in what he knew about Igusa, telling him of the purpose of my
stay while drinking beer at a local pub. As the conversation over my research went on, he gave me a surprising version of the violent conflicts in 2000. After having been asked several questions on the conflicts in the region, what he told me that night was totally different from what I had known before from the international and local newspapers. First of all, according to this particular informant, the incident was not only a conflict between local farmers and herders. Even though most of victims came from farmers’ villages and the attackers were herders, the crucial role had been played by the owner of the sisal farm management in the Igusa area. As herders’ cattle grazed in the boundary of the sisal farm, the owner ordered his guards to confiscate all the cattle on his property. On this sudden confiscation, the herders retreated at first and called for ethnic meetings of their group and decided to dispatch warriors to rescue their cattle. The consequence of the rescue operation agreed with the version of the reportage of newspapers on the incident. Thirty one farmers perished because they stood in the way of herders attacking the sisal farm.

The critical role played by the sisal estate owner is not that surprising when taking into account his economic power in the area. In fact, there is the high likelihood that the entire sisal field of Igusa belongs to a person named Amer. He was one of many large scale agro businessmen who benefited from the privatization of government property. As of 2004, as a part of sisal plantation privatization policy of Tanzanian government, most of the 263 formerly state-owned companies which were privatized have been taken over by foreign investors’ (The Guardian 2000). Igusa sisal estates was one of many sold off state-owned estates and factories. Amer was the owner of a company called Katani Limited, a consortium of European and local investors’ (The Daily News
1998). Consequently the sisal estates in Igusa have been putting the majority of the arable land and water resources under his tight control. This means landless Igusa town people have to apply every cultivating season for a plot or two to grow maize or sorghum for their own consumption. The sisal owner decides when and where he rents out plots based on his own business plans. Pastoralists are strictly prohibited from coming on his sisal property and his security guards patrol regularly to make sure that pastoralists stay out of the sisal estate boundary.

The Political Economy of the Sisal Industry

The privatization of the sisal estates in Igusa are the recent culmination of three historical events of political economy in the area: colonization, nationalization, privatization processes filled with sacrifices and sufferings of local populations. The introduction of sisal by the colonial powers transformed Igusa into a sisal plantation town filled with migrant sisal cutters from different regions and neighboring countries while destroying the way of life of the indigenous populations. The second incident was Post-colonial nationalization of the sisal industry with ill-fated development projects. Once white settler owned sisal estates were nationalized by the central government, development projects such as villagization dismantled the living patterns and disturbed the lives of people in the Igusa region, cornering farmers and herders into designated areas with limited access to natural resources. The third incident was the process of privatization in the neoliberal era. All government controlled properties of sisal estates in the Igusa area were handed over to an agricultural business companies from outside, causing issues of access.
The Colonization Process of the Sisal Industry

Few would believe that a century ago, the Mpaka Plains were an almost unpopulated area. Before colonial rule, Igusa was the scene of frequent intertribal raiding. It was the introduction of the colonial powers that made the Mpaka Plains a sought-after place to live in. As a group of colonial explorers and administrators reached the area, a series of significant changes swiftly transformed the once sparsely settled nature of the Mpaka Plains into basically an export crop producing factory or colonial ranch. Privileged sisal estates had access to, or control of, important resources that allowed them to enrich themselves at the expense of local populations. This prosperity was often maintained and upheld through the use of repressive displacement policies that violated the basic human rights of those already living in the plains. Colonized populations had to fight against these policies so as not to lose their lands, resources, cultural identities, and sometimes even their lives (Sabea 2001).

The transformation to sisal plantation town began as German rule began in the 1890s under a chartered company, the Deutsche-Ostafrikanische Geselleschaft (DOAG), or German East Africa Company (Iliffe 1979). The company sought to control extractive exports, particularly ivory and rubber, and encouraged the production of agricultural exports. German policy gradually encouraged European capital and settlers to seek new crops, such as sisal and cotton, providing basic infrastructural and legal investment into the Plains (Maddox 2006: 442). The German colonial government at that time saw the possibility of setting up agricultural plantations for cotton, but sisal eventually became the top export crop for the plains as it more easily adapted to the drier environment of the Plains (Maddox 2006: 442).
Sisal cultivation not only meant planting sisal on a vast scale, it also curtailed a meticulous process of installing a rigid legal and infrastructural system. The main purpose was to transform an unknown small rural village into a cosmopolitan township with direct connections to the global economy (Iliffe 1979). Firstly, the ownership of once free land was institutionalized, making those residing there without legal ownership legally non-existent. Infrastructural investments, such as a railroad, were installed to transport sisal products to global markets and new facilities were built to accommodate a population with various ethnic and national backgrounds (Sabea 2008: 413).

In order to guarantee the property rights of white settlers, colonial land regulation and ordinances were swiftly prepared to legalize their control over most of the Plains (Sabea 2008: 413). Two land regulations were especially important in terms of facilitating the control of the Plains by the two subsequent colonial governments, the Germans, then the British, in the region. The German Imperial Decree of November 26, 1895 was declared to facilitate the acquisition of lands in general in German East Africa (Iliffe 1979). All land in German East Africa was to be considered unowned. Ownership of such land was transferred to the Empire. After World War I, when Germany ceded its holdings to Britain, the British colony introduced the 1923 Crown Land Ordinance. It made it clear that all of the lands of the territory, whether occupied or unoccupied on the date of the beginning of the ordinance, became public lands, provided that the validity of any title to land or any interest therein lawfully acquired before the commencement of the Ordinance was not affected (Land Ordinance 1923). By this ordinance, therefore, the governor of the territory was permitted to alienate public land by grant of right of
occupancy for a term not exceeding ninety-nine years (Ngeregere 2008). As a result, by the end of the British colonial period, three types of agricultural land tenure had been created in the plains: Freehold arising out of German alienation, rights of occupancy arising out of African customary law, and rights of occupancy by grant (Iliffe 1979).

Installation of a railroad was one of the major infrastructure investments undertaken by the colonial powers. By 1907, colonial policy makers saw the rail line as essential for making German East Africa into a source of peasant cash crops for the German metropolis (Bryceson 1982). From 1905 to 1914, the German rulers of Tanzania opened up the Plains by constructing the Central Railway from the Indian Ocean port of Dar es Salaam to Kigoma on Lake Tanganyika (Gillman 1942; Hill 1957). Paralleling the main nineteenth-century caravan route from Zanzibar to the interior, the railhead reached Morogoro in 1907, Tabora in 1912, and the terminus of Kigoma in 1914 (Iliffe 1979). The Plains became more connected to the global economy by the completion of the Central Line railroad system by the German colonial government.

The consequence of this infrastructural investment and legalization was the installation of a sisal industry and cattle breeding ranch in the most arable part of the Mpaka Plains. Of the 15,300 hectares of land in the North Mpaka Plains, approximately 12,000 hectares were transformed into sisal estates, clustering around the intersection of the Wassamu-Turiani and Morogoro-Mvomero roads (Pitblado 1981). On the whole, these were heavily capitalized farming enterprises. A number of large-scale farms were held by government leaseholds in the North Mpaka Plains. The sisal estate owners, mostly Greek sisal planters, owned or shared heavy agricultural machinery such as tractors and combine harvesters and marketed their produce through co-operatives.
based in Morogoro and Mvomero (Shabea 2001). The once free grazing field for Parakuyo herders became a national cattle ranch. The NDC Cattle Ranch, located along the Central Railway Line in the south central portion of the North Mpaka Plains, was started in 1948 by the Tanganyika Veterinary Department with the aim of keeping and developing breeding stock for the rest of Tanganyika (Old name of Tanzania).

Creating a sisal plantation town meant a population living with a permanent status of marginalization. Indigenous populations of Igusa such as Kaguru were not happy about the creation of sisal plantations in the region. The prosperity of the sisal economy was won at the sacrifice of the interests of them (Graham 1970). Most indigenous groups did not take part in the sisal economy since the booming sisal economy meant a constant threat to their way of lives. Indigenous farmers on the plains were not enthusiastic about the sisal economy from the beginning for two reasons (Graham 1970). Despite their distance from the colonial economy, their land and labor were constantly encroached upon by sisal farm owners who wanted to expand their farms into the indigenous farming areas (Graham 1970). Local lands were easily absorbed into the sisal estates through illegal purchase or occupation by the sisal farm owners. Their labor was also sought as the plantations were in desperate need of labor to serve the booming sisal demand from the world market. Working at sisal farms was, however, not a popular job for indigenous farmers. The nature of cutting sisal is dangerous and harsh. They had to report to the plantation in the early morning and work long hours without sufficient rest. The plantation paid late and less compared to other daily jobs such as rail construction workers (Graham 1970).
While most indigenous farmers juggled their status with the sisal plantations, indigenous herders had confrontations with the colonial management when it came to ownership or access to the natural resources of the plains. The motivation behind this resistance was their strong willingness to protect their traditional ways of life from colonial influence (Beidelman 1960). For the colonial government, herders’ attitude was just stubbornly arrogant, challenging directly the colonial natural resource management plan for the plains. The authorities thought that the size of the land herders appropriated on the plains was excessive for such a small group of people, while their ways of managing their cattle looked irrational and inefficient (Jennings 2005). Displacing these groups into the Maasai Reserve in northern Tanzania was thought to be an ideal solution (Jennings 2005).

This idea of a reserve was originally designed for Maasai herders in the northern Tanganyika. By the time that Britain began to set up an administrative apparatus in the area it controlled in 1916, the Maasai were scattered across much of northern Tanganyika (Jennings 2005). This disorderly way of life did not sit well with officers attempting to sort out unclear units of ethnic affiliation and political control (Jennings 2005). In order to control their movement, the colonial government forced all herding populations into the region called the Reserve zone (Iliffe 1979). Since Parakuyo herders were not differentiated from the unruly Maasai herders, British administrators enacted a policy of forcing Parakuyo pastoralists to settle within the boundaries of the Maasai Reserve (Jennings 2005).

The Parakuyo in the Mpaka Plains did their best to escape from the Reserve zone as living in the Maasai Reserve posed remarkably difficult problems for Parakuyo
individuals and the society as a whole (Jennings 2005). There can be little doubt that
the policy was intended to eliminate Parakuyo distinctiveness altogether, by subsuming
their vague “Kwavi” ethnic designation into other tribal units, especially Maasai
(Jennings 2005). Consequently, by the end of 1926, every one of the more than three
thousand Parakuyo pastoralists who had been moved into the reserve elected to move
away from it. Large groups moved east to Handeni and south to Wassamu and
Morogoro (Jennings 2005). By the end of 1929, officials had conceded that the
Parakuyo would elect their own headmen, and had even conceded to a degree that the
Parakuyo could move from one area to another as they wished (Koponen 1994).

The Post-Colonial Nationalization Process

While colonial forces had dissected the plain according to their economic goals,
holding tight control over natural resources, the post-colonial state control over natural
resources gradually dissolved as the combination of government policy failure with the
collapse of the international markets for the sisal industry. The newly independent
country tried to outdo its colonial predecessor with fewer resources. The grand plan,
however, was short-lived due to the sudden collapse of the international sisal market
and the failure of national development schemes such as villagization. Ironically, the
lack of government control in the area created a physical space for Igusa farmers and
herders to live side by side, while herders took advantage of this lack of control of
disserted sisal fields, strolling with their cattle on the deserted sisal estates.

The main national message of the 1960s in Tanzania meant reconfiguring the
socio-economic complex of the national industries through encouraging export crops
and development projects. Igusa found itself on the frontline for the modernization
project of Tanzania as a place which could provide natural resources to accomplish this
goal. Sisal estates and ranch land had become targets for these developmental experiments. The sisal farm had become a major subject of intensive investments by the government as the Igusa sisal estates were nationalized and a public corporation (the Tanzania Sisal Corporation, later the Tanzania Sisal Authority) was formed to run the nationalized estates and control international marketing. As a result, by 1970-71, approximately 29,500 hectares of land in the North Mpaka Plains could be mapped as sisal estates (Westcott 1984).

The infamous villagization program (Operation Vijiji) was implemented in this area as well. Its aim was the modernization of traditional agriculture through the resettlement of the rural population in concentrated Ujamaa villages (Hodgson 2001). Igusa herders had become the major target of this development project in the region. Villagization programs had been designed to end the nomadic life of the Igusa Maasai Parakuyo herders and other nomadic peoples by modernizing their traditional pastoralism. Permanently settling all pastoral people of the plain near to the town was the main concept of the project. As a result, the Parakuyo Maasai have been settled in a pastoral village, Twatwatwa, with range lands located not too far outside a further village (Rudewa Mbuyuni), which was registered as an independent village in 1977 (Butler and Gates 2010: 9). In 1968, a ranch project began with financing from the World Bank. The main aims of these newly opened ranches on the plains were to increase the national production of beef, and “to demonstrate and disseminate modern ranching techniques to traditional herders” (Benjaminsen 2009).

Most of these ambitious experiments by the newly independent government, however, did not materialize. Two factors worked together to cause the failure of the
nationalization of the sisal industry. The external cause was the collapse of the international sisal market. Failure to respond in a timely way to the growing competition in the global marketplace both from other sisal producing countries and alternative fibers like synthetic substitutes (polypropylene) which took more than 55 per cent of market share, gave way to a dramatic drop in the contribution of the sisal industry to the local economy (Shabea 2001). Low priced synthetic spinning from large petrochemical companies with newer technology made it easier for them to gain market share at the expense of sisal products (Tanzania Sisal Authority 1996:2). The internal cause that led to the demise of the sisal industry was the inefficiency of overly centralized and political governance. Government Imposition of unfriendly business policy instruments like export taxes, the lack of accountability of staff at all levels, high turnover in senior management and over employment lead to a dramatic drop in sisal production and a rise in corporate losses. The lack of investment capital, organizational development, and research and development further undermined the situation (Shabea 2001).

Villagization projects also turned out to be a failure with more significant implications for contemporary violent conflicts. While villagization projects attracted the nomadic Parakuyo Maasai to the outskirt of Igusa town, this coexistence often led to violent conflicts among Igusa farmers and herders. It came mostly from the proximity that farmers and herders lived in. Farmers and herders are known for maintaining space between each other in order not to conflict with each other’s way of life (Hussein 1999). However, during the villagization period, the traditional space between two groups was often disrupted and ignored by government project practitioners who only sought to further attract herders near to the town. As deserted sisal fields started to become
covered in weeds, especially those sisal fields along the river where seasonal flooding inundated the sisal farms and deposited soil, the sisal farms became good grazing fields for herders. The location was perfect for them because nearby water sources made their lives easier. They could also use the services from the town while their siblings grazed and watered their beloved cattle in the former sisal estate property.

Therefore, in some sense, it is not surprising to hear that many herders remember this period as the most peaceful time in the area. It was mostly due to their easy access to deserted sisal estate properties for grazing and watering. Farmers without any hope of generating income sources from the once prosperous sisal industry uncomfortably accepted the reality of living side by side with unruly herders, selling their agricultural products and services to the neighboring herding population. Agricultural products such as maize, vegetables, and even local beers were in high demand. Farmers provided casual labors to dig holes or build mud houses for neighboring herders who do not like to do manual works themselves. As the economic interdependency deepened, more and more herders started building their houses nearer to town, forming their own villages.

**The Neoliberal Privatization Process**

The symbiotic relationships based on relaxed control over natural resources in the area did not last long. The sisal estates came under the control of a private Arabian Tanzanian owner. This transfer of ownership has been the direct consequence of a new economic order implemented by the pressure of international financial agencies in 1990s. Government owned lands were allocated for large scale sales for external investors. New land owners did their best to prevent local people from entering their
properties by enclosing them and through the application of both legal and physical force.

Since the 1980s many countries in Africa have been under pressure from international financial agencies to reform their economic and political systems. Led by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, international banks and donor governments launched a concerted campaign to bring African governments' debts under control, stabilize their economies, and lay the groundwork for long-term democracy (Berry 2002: 652). Sweeping programs of fiscal austerity were implemented rapidly, and the process of dismantling market controls and state owned enterprises began across the continent. African states were pressured to cut state budgets and payrolls, privatize public assets and services, and open their doors to international investors (Berry 2002: 652).

Land policy reform was at the top of the economic policy agenda of the international financial institutes. The prescription of financial institutes was to replace customary systems with titling and private property rights, which were posited as necessary preconditions for modernization and development. In accordance with these guidelines, in 1999, the Tanzanian government implemented a dramatic change of land laws. The Land Ordinance of 1923, the principal governing land law was replaced by two pieces of legislation, the Land Act of 1999 and the Village Land Act of 1999, which divided land into three categories: General Land, Reserve Land, and Village Land (Lugoe 2008). General Land is governed by the Land Act directly under the Commissioner for Lands. Reserve Land is managed under bodies set up for these areas; and Village Land is
governed by the Village Land Act and is under the administration of village councils (Wily 2003).

In rural parts of Tanzania, the implementation of new land laws meant an exacerbating deepened division between the rich and poor. As the bodies, village councils, commissioners were often occupied by local or national elites, who have in many cases used their privileged access to money, information and power, and their better mastery of the complexities of new national land law, securing large areas for personal gain has become rampant (Shviji 1998). On the other hand, poor people have typically been unable to purchase title; holders of secondary rights have become increasingly vulnerable, such as women and pastoralists, whom the colonial and post-colonial system generally excluded from land ownership (Talle 1988; Hodgson 2000).
Figure 4-3. Website land advertisement of Igusa area
(Source: www.realestate.classifieds1000.com/Tanzana/Morogoro)

The change of land laws in Igusa region means that, increasingly, many private interests weigh in against local natural resource-based livelihoods. As the laws took hold, trading of land has been in full swing in the plains. Over the last decade state lands have increasingly been made available for private purchase. Privatization of sisal estates originally controlled by parastatals pastoralists’ and the upsurge in real estate development and speculation has provided rich opportunities for further alienation to
outsiders under the guise of supposedly “joint” ventures for ranching or cash crops (Shivji 1998). The land grab which took in the Igusa region was one of the examples demonstrating how the land use systems of mobile pastoralists became frequently marginalized in the process of such events (Lane 1998; Galaty 1993). Settled people have an advantage in claiming tenure over mobile groups, and are better represented both in official administrations and in processes of consultation (Hesse and Trench 2000). During my fieldwork, as of May 2003, a very rough estimate is that tens of thousands of hectares of land have been granted in such concessions or ‘sold’ to private commercial enterprises. The privatization of Mpaka ranch demonstrates the characteristics of this process. A little less than half of the total area of 61,528 hectares was divided into seven blocks of about 4,000 hectares each and leased for 33 years to individuals at 200 Tsh per acre. Except for three blocks of a total of 12,240 hectares allocated to the Parakuyo Maasai community, 19,446 hectares were kept by National Ranch Company as a demonstration farm and as sales stock for external investors from urban areas.

Conclusion

This chapter covers mostly the structural process diminishing the access to natural resources in the Igusa region and its impact on the lives of the Igusa people. The chapter argues that despite the abundant existence of natural resources such as land and water, the introduction of the sisal industry has caused a status of natural resource scarcity by restricting access to vital natural resources. It is often argued that the lack of natural resources has been the major reason behind violent conflicts in farmer-herder violent conflicts in the Africa. This chapter, however, indicates that it is not the diminishing natural resources themselves, but the diminished access to those natural
resources that cause possible conflicts among various resource users with different interests and goals. The process of diminished access to natural resources coincided with the development of the political economy of the sisal industry which has positioned the rural Igusa area in the context of the global economic system. Those who have controlled the access have been colonial white settlers, national governments, private agricultural business groups; and those who have been restricted were the indigenous farmers and herders whose daily basic needs are heavily dependent on these restricted natural resources. While describing the historical changes in modes of access and control of sisal estates from the colonial period to the present neoliberal era, I have focused on how the plain and the lives of the Igusa peoples have been dissected by these external forces, threatening the basic rights of the Igusa population to access to their natural resources on their own lands.
CHAPTER 5
THE ORIGINS OF A VIOLENT ENVIRONMENT IN IGUSA

Introduction

While the repressive nature of structural conditions of political economy continues, the scope of pastoral violence has become destructively violent as a result of the easy availability of weaponry in sub-Saharan regions (Turner et al 2005: 5). Analyzing pastoral violence has been mostly focused on the physical nature of the phenomenon. This is due to the fact that researchers of pastoral study focus on the phenomenal aspect of pastoral violence. One weak point of this kind of focus on the physical aspect of pastoral violence, however, is that this emphasis often ignores the existence of different types of violence which are as damaging and destructive as physical violence of pastoralists. The attention to the physical nature of violence mainly focuses on pastoralists, effectively ignoring the existence of non-pastoral violent actors who orchestrate the physical violence.

In terms of detecting these various characteristics of violence, the contributions of political ecologists are exceptionally noticeable as they not only identify the strong linkage between the structural condition of political economy and pastoral violence but also expand our understanding of different kinds of violence in daily lives under the umbrella of structural violence. By accepting a more expansive definition of violence, scholars of political ecology look into “its more ineffable nature of violence (Lutz and Nonini 1999:74), they look into the existence of everyday or normalized violence which is more often than not ignored or regarded as non-violence.

This unique perspective of political ecology on violence comes from the theoretical contributions of many scholars with different academic backgrounds. Bourdieu’s theory
of violence is one example of this. By including the everyday violence hidden in the minutiae of normal social practices— in gender relations, in communal work— Bourdieu argues for reconsidering the broader meanings and status of violence, especially the links between the violence of everyday life and explicit political terror and state repression (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992:162-173). Similarly, Basaglia’s notion of peacetime crimes provides a concept of everyday violence as well (1987). Peacetime crimes suggest the possibility that everyday violence includes routinized forms of violence inherent, in particular, social, economic, and political formations. These kinds of violence are normalized and becoming invisible because of their routineness (Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois 2004).

The everyday and invisible nature of violence is not an unfamiliar academic field in anthropology either. Most of this kind of research focuses primarily on Latin America in the 1980s and 1990s (Bourgois 1997; Taussig 1987; Scheper-Hughes 1992, 1996). One of the famous study is Taussig’s essay on the cruelty of violence engaged by international rubber barons in the Colombian Amazon (1987). In the context of these dirty wars, governments turn in fury against their own citizens suspected of harboring the seeds of subversion, the terror operates quietly and secretly, making daily lives filled with hidden violence. The medical anthropologist Nancy Scheper-Hughes also began using the term everyday violence in order to counter psychological-reductionist and individualistic understanding of social pathologies that blame victims for their self-destructive behaviors. She refers to everyday violence as the “small wars and invisible genocides” that plague the socially vulnerable and cause them to suffer inordinately (Scheper-Hughes 1996).
In this chapter, while analyzing the logic of pastoral violence, I also focus on the invisible and indirect violence and its participants in the Igusa region. While most of pastoral violence has been well researched due to the notorious pastoralists and their violent acts in the area, the subtle and hidden nature of this kind of violence and violent actors has never been analyzed. It is mostly the fact that these kinds of violence are invisible, physically non-violent and not that spectacular comparing to pastoral violence. The masterminds in this violence are also hidden intentionally in order to put most of the blame from the consequence of violence on pastoralists for the disorder and destruction caused. Despite the lack of attention to this kind of violence and its actors, the consequences of it are more often than not as destructive and damaging as physical violence, initiating, in turn, more physical violence in the area.

**Locating Everyday Violent Zones in Igusa**

After the 2000 incident, there were several measures taken by various levels of government to restore peace in the Igusa area. Most of these measures targeted the herding populations that were accused of orchestrating the violent events. First of all, a large scale herder named Frankie, who organized the herders' attacks from behind the scenes through financial and military support, was evicted from the area for good. He was one of the richest herders in the area and took part in the incident to rescue his own cattle by mobilizing his fellow ethnic tribesmen. He ended up living in Nairobi, Kenya. Despite his frequent visits to the nearby downtown of Morogoro, his visitations were heavily monitored by the local security agents in order not to allow him to enter the area. On the other hand, most of the other participants from the herders' villages are still in jail. Those who did not participate in the incident were also heavily affected as well. Herding populations living near the farmers' villages were relocated to a place called
Mbwade where the evicted herders had to build a new village from scratch. They were also not allowed to enter farmers’ villages where most victims perished. A police station was opened in the herders’ new town to prevent additional farmer-herder’s deadly confrontations from occurring.

Most people in the Igusa area did not think that the series of measures have brought peace into the area, because there was still much violence in their daily lives. These violent activities are just hard to detect as most of them happen inside the area. Most of this sporadic violence occurs in the area where Igusa farmers and herders undertake their subsistence activities. Located approximately 2 kms away from the center of the township, the area teems with farmers and herders with their cattle engaging in their farming or grazing. For farmers, it is the benefits of the year-round availability of river water and fertile land that often makes this area the breadbasket of the region. For herders, it is the river water that comes from the mountains directly. In particular, this area is the only water source for their animals in the dry season.

Since daily violence occurs frequently, it was not difficult to detect the existence of daily violence. Even in the beginning of the fieldwork, I recognized the sparks of the violent reality in the area. The existence of everyday violence came to my notice as I was doing interviews with victims of the 2000 incident. After having heard from Amuri, who gave me the information about the local background of the 2000 incident, I was doing interviews at the village where the most destruction and casualties of the incident took place. That village was most affected by the incident because it was located between sisal farms and herders’ villages. In the middle of the interviews, I heard a woman screaming from the entrance to the village. There was a group of people
surrounding a person lying on the ground. A man bleeding from the head was being placed on the back seat of a bicycle. He had been attacked by a herder with a club in the field. We never learned what precipitated the attack. His head was covered with a blood-soaked white towel. He was being taken to the town clinic in Igusa. The scene was so disturbing that we had to pause the interviews for a while.

In fact, the reality of everyday violence in Igusa was gruesome. A local civil society office has filed many incident reports of everyday violence in the area. Run by a local elder, Mr. Fumie was one of few intellectuals who were well informed on the local violence between farmers and herders. His NGO office filed relatively detailed records on the issue of violent confrontations between farmers and herders in the area. The files he gave me for references were quite revealing, consisting of many cases with graphic photographs of wounds caused mostly by herder’s daggers and wooden clubs. When their requests for investigation were turned down by the police, they started filing their complaints with the office of Mr. Fumie. Approximately, thirty more files were in the cabinet of the civil society association. Most of them were not resolved as other cases of last year had had the same fate.

Case #1

Name: Mr. Amuri  Occupation: farmer  Residence: Igusa B  Place and Time: 2002. June.2.2pm near Mbwade

I refused to allow herders’ cattle to enter my maize field. They wanted to graze on the maize residue. I did not like them because their cattle pounded the soil of my field and made it hard. I did not have money to hire a tractor to dig. All I have is this hoe. And I even did not know where they came from. When I told them not to come inside my maize field, their cattle were already inside…I hit one of cattle with a stick and fighting started from there and lost conscious until my family members found me several hours later. I was almost beaten to death. I had to spend lots of money to pay for medical treatment.
Case #2

Name: Mr. Cholacho  Occupation: farmer  Residence: Igusa A   Place and Time: 2002. July. 3. 1pm at the village of Mbuuni

Two boy herders were stealing sweet potatoes from my field. I knew they were eating their lunch there, but that was our dinner, too. I caught them red handed and slapped them on the cheek and asked them to bring their parents to compensate me for the sweet potato they stole while holding one of their cattle to negotiate the compensation. Their parents with other herders found me and started beating me with their clubs.

Case #3

Name: Mr. Asama  Occupation: farmer  Residence: Igusa B   Place and Time: 2001. May. 4. 12:30 pm

While attending my garden, two cows approached. I tried to block them by wielding a stick. All of sudden two herders surrounded me and shouted at me. They were young. They started charging on me with their daggers. I just ran from the field in fear for my safety. I knew I would have died if I hadn’t.

Table 5-3. Number of farmer-herder conflicts in Wassamu district

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Cases reported to the police</th>
<th>Cases forwarded</th>
<th>Number of cases to court</th>
<th>Number of convictions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Not available</td>
<td>Not available</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Not available</td>
<td>Not available</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Not available</td>
<td>Not available</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>57</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<td>45</td>
<td>15</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Benjaminsen 2010)

(Source: Wassamu Police and the District Magistrate’s Office (Benjaminsen 2010))

In fact, the frequent occurrence of violent confrontations is the main reason that one of my research assistants did not want to go with me to certain areas. John, who lived in a farmer’s village, was one of two people who helped me with my fieldwork...
activities. He was a local farmer with good connections with local elders. Owing to the fact that he was acting as secretary to the village council, his knowledge of local affairs and his connections with villagers were extremely useful for conducting such interviews, especially with farmers who had been suffering from their violent encounters with herders. Despite his significant contributions to my fieldwork, he refused to go beyond the town boundary where the grazing activities of the local herders took place. For the purposes of balance in the research, my going there to observe these practices was inevitable, but John had very harsh feelings toward herders as a result of many traumatic experiences of his fellow village members. He also mentioned that nobody would venture outside without proper safety measures. He told me that the place was only for those most desperate to who had to go to make ends meet. It is fertile, but not a safe place for agricultural activities. Despite his highly qualified assistance, I had to give up trying to persuade him to do research activities with herders.

Witnessing the violence in the field was the quickest way to understand the reality of everyday violence in the area. The chance to observe the reality of another world came unexpectedly as I was invited to join the grazing activities of a local herder. After parting with John, I wanted to go on a fieldtrip to the herders’ village and was able to arrange one through a connection of a herder named Muchini. He was one of the regular customers of my landlord’s grocery shop at the market. He often visited the store and we used to talk to each other, mostly about the number of his cattle and wives. According to him, he had about 300 cattle and three different wives. He invited me to his village as I showed my interest in their daily herding practices and herding areas. I gratefully accepted his invitation without hesitation. The village they lived in
was located approximately 5 kms away from Igusa town. This was the place where they were forced to relocate as a consequence of the 2000 incident. His household was one of the 35 households in the village. There was no electricity; most houses were built with mud bricks. His cattle were kept safe in the small area surrounded by three houses, each occupied by one of his wives.

To my surprise, grazing was not his job anymore. Instead, Muchini had most of these tiresome activities performed by his teen age sons and a relative hired to work for him to assist the son. The son was just 16 year old, one of his many sons. For working one year, the relative was promised that he could have one full grown bull from the owner. For that reason, he especially took great care of a bull he was promised to be given, providing it with all kinds of care and attention. They accompanied me to the grazing field to show me their daily activities and grazing strategies.

The grazing practice started as they took their cattle into the area of the Mpaka Plains. Unlike my expectation that most grazing is usually done in the center of the Mpaka Plains, the two took their cattle in the direction of the Igusa town. Perplexed by this move, I asked why they were going in the direction of the town. They answered that there was lots of water and grazing field around the town area. The route to the center of the Plains was too far even for the herders and there was no guarantee of water in the dry season. After two hours of walking in the bush, they finally reached an area covered with maize residue. Passing through various obstacles such as thorny acacia trees, two brooks, even a railroad, the grazing field was a maize field where the remains of maize were still scattered around the area. There was a farmer sitting there looking at
us. Without much exchange of greetings, they started a conversation while the cattle started peacefully grazing on the maize residue.

Herder: Mzee (sir), how are you doing today? Have you already harvested your maize? Then, we would like to graze here today.

Farmer: I am fine with that, as long as you do not go in that direction, I planted some potatoes down there. Other than that, your cattle can graze. I warn you, do not go there.

Herder: No problem, Mzee, we will be careful. Thank you for letting us graze here.

Even in this kind of peaceful moment of conversation, physical fights can happen without notice. A violent incident happened as the cattle moved along the river and entered the river bank. Ten minutes of slow walking from the previous grazing field to the riverside for watering cattle, sounds from the cattle came from the front of the herd. Several cattle at the front crossed over the fence of another farmer's maize field. The owner of the field had just attacked those cattle with his spear. The two experienced warriors had immediately drawn their daggers and charged at the farmer. The farmer, with a machete in one hand, spear in the other, was not enough for two intrepid herders. Surrounded by the farmers with their daggers pointed at him, they circled around him, exchanging harsh words. The herders tried to snatch away the farmer's spear a couple of times in vain. A few minutes of exchanging harsh words and the farmer gave up. They started talking and the farmer just dropped his weapons on the ground and went back to his field to check the damage. Despite the stress of the moment, he did not forget to greet me with a big smile as if to demonstrate that this had been nothing serious.

The farmer was lucky. Others often end up in exchanging physically fierce blows with these herders. There are two sources through which we can see the consequences
of everyday violence in the area. The first place to see is the local hospital that treats
victims of violent incidents. Their treatment records usually describe the nature of
wounds. Usually, this kind of treatment dramatically increases as the area enters dry
season. The nature of treatment is mostly for cuts and bruises coming from the herders’
favorite weaponry: wooden clubs and daggers. One the other hand, the police station in
Igusa is also a good place where some forms of statistical record keeping can be found.
In the case of this research, I was not able to get through the red tape. I was asked to
get the permission from the district level police station. This meant a lengthy time of
waiting for the clearance and possible bribery to expedite the clearance process.
Fortunately, few years later after the fieldwork, I was able to find related statistical
record from an academic article on the conflict situation in the region (Benjaminsen
2010).

The Dynamics of a Violent Environment

In fact, the unexpected encounter with violence in the field showed a small slice of
the reality of everyday violence in the area. The area is part of a major volatile zone
where everyday violence happens at any moment. Farmers and herders in this case
were the main actors of violence as it is almost inevitable that they would clash.
Farmers unfortunately were not knowledgeable about the symbolic importance of cattle
to herders. It turns out that they had to cultivate in the area as a last resort to manage
their livelihoods.
Figure 5-4. Map of the violent zone (hatched area) in the Mpaka plains, adapted from Google Map: Morogoro, Tanzania (Source: Google Earth 2005)

This place is one of the most dangerous zones in the area where the most physical violence breaks out. Locals know exactly where confrontations easily occur from their own or shared experiences as they exchange this information constantly. According to the information from local interviews, this area, legally owned by a local sisal estate, is located 2 to 3 kms away from the town of Igusa mostly within a 20 minute bicycle ride. Violent confrontations take place constantly as the area since it is one of the most sought-after areas in terms of the rural agricultural activities of farmers and herders in Igusa. It is the fertile soils with a reliable supply of river water from the mountain that makes this area so attractive and dangerous. Frequent flood activities and lack of a road make this area inaccessible to outsiders, so only experienced local people enter this area for their various agricultural activities.
**Violent Actors in Igusa Region**

Every man living in the Igusa area has a high chance of becoming involved in violent scenes as more and more people are forced to enter this area to make a living. The only people who can avoid this fate of committing violence are those who have enough income sources from other economic activities such as shop keeping at the market. The only difference was in the nature of violence they were practicing. Without doubt, herders are not the only violent actor in the area. Farmers also contribute to the violence through their symbolic attacks on herder's cattle. Several influential economic figures such as sisal estate managers, national farm directors, and owners of large scale cattle operations in the area contribute to the existence of daily violent tension in the area as they are prone to take forceful measures intentionally as major tactic to maximize their economic gains and interests.

**Actors of Direct Violence**

It is an undeniable fact that male herders are the main contributors in the category of direct violence. Their militaristic ethnic culture, feelings of resistance, feelings of superiority to farmers, and finally harsh working conditions all contribute to their tendency to commit physical violence. Breaking rules is their way of showing their resistance. In fact, it is an open secret that many herders know the owner of the field as their cattle sweep through an agricultural field. As many farmers and herders have worked together in the same area for a long time, herders often use their cattle as a form of power in order to exact revenge on a farmer or group of farmers who have made humiliating remarks about them in the town. Conversely, farmers mostly know the owners of the cattle by the brands on the bodies of their cattle. However, all they can do to stop cattle from trampling their fields is to poke them with a spear, which often
escalates into a bloody confrontation. A farmer told me that this was why farmers often tried to stay away from trouble with herders as their revenge could cost them the entire harvest of one season.

The center of this attack is the warrior group called Moran. Almost similar to the organization of Maasai Moran, they are the group of people whose responsibility in their community is to protect their people, village property, and their beloved cattle in a time of danger (Tignor 1972). The first qualification of membership in the Moran group is to not to hesitate in using physical force on those occasions. Due to their tactics of applying violence without hesitation, small incidents often easily escalate into full blown violent confrontations. Farmers try their best not to fight with them. One farmer with whom I did interviews at the Igusa courtyard told me:

If your counterpart is Moran, don’t agitate them. If you talk to them, they will raise their daggers in answer. Did you see what they have done to their hair? They are using cow oil to make it all shiny around their head, I don’t even know what they are using to make their head so crazy like that. We do not deal with them. I would not suggest you to come closer to them. They are all animals.

The patrol guards of Sisal estates are also direct violent actors in the area. Mostly, under the supervision of sisal estates managers, one of their major duties is patrolling the sisal estates in order to protect it from herders and their cattle. They are often out patrolling on trucks with shotguns to chase away herders or confiscate their cattle. They are the ones who legally confiscate cattle as a way to negotiate compensation. It was this type of violence that triggered directly the incident of 2000.

Herders fear guards from sisal estate farms most because of the guard’s ruthlessness and willingness to use physical and legal force. Unlike farmers, guards would not hesitate to take extreme action to stop herders from encroaching on land they
are guarding. Despite their few numbers, they are threatening as they are armed with shotguns, they often patrol the area of sisal farms in their pickup trucks looking for invading herders and their cattle. Violence is not their only option. Interestingly, they do not harm herders physically, even though they have the capability. Instead, they confiscate their cattle on the spot, waiting for family members or the owner of the cattle to show up to pay the compensation. The business of taking these cattle is so lucrative that some guards started doing this to make their own pocket money. One herder I spoke with was especially upset with these guards as he had had to pay. In his case, instead of reporting their capture to the police or the sisal owners, he pays a much smaller amount of money to the guards who kidnapped his cattle.

I do not want to have trouble with them. They have guns and trucks so that they can find us and our cattle. They come to us and confiscate our cattle in broad daylight. They would not care whether they shoot and kill one of us with their shotgun. It is because the law [is] on their side.

**Actors of Symbolic Violence**

Are you interested in marrying a Maasai woman?

What! Am I crazy? They are living like an animal. How can I think of having a Maasai woman for my wife?

The question I asked the son of Mr. Fumie indicates the deep prejudices against herders. This way of thinking often is the basis of different kind of violence, also known as symbolic violence against herders. For many reasons, farmers cannot engage in direct physical violence. First of all, this is due to the solitary nature of farming in the field. Igusa farmers, in particular, working for sisal estates, have to do their farming alone as their allocated fields are usually located far from the town. They also do not have a tradition of organized militarism either. The ethnically highly polarized town hampers the farmers living in the town from organizing these kinds of militaristic
associations. Many militaristic organizations in rural Africa are heavily dependent on ethnic connection with hierarchical chain of command in time of threat against their communities. Igusa town, consisting of people from neighboring countries and regions are hard to form this kind of tight ethnic organizations. The diverse ethnic backgrounds among Igusa town people do not generate the strong hierarchical chains of command and systematic coordination, which is necessary to operate militaristic assaults against the Parakuyo herders.

One consequence the lack of ethnic coherence is the impossibility of organizing Sungusung. In additions to a restriction by the local government openly banning them from organizing any form of Sungusungu (war), a vigilante group activity, especially popular in Tanzanian rural areas to maintain order and security in time of disorder (Fleisher 2000), is technically impossible among Igusa farmers.

Rather Igusa people are more interested in religious activities. The religious activities do give Igusa town people to deal with their current issues more peacefully. The estimates even point to increasing involvement in religious activities in the Igusa town most affected by violence. While communal violence has an overall negative effect on every aspect of lives at the local level, the presence of ethnic polarization hence seems to spark participation in religious activities, even during conflict.

This does not mean that all farmers in the Igusa region are non-violent, especially when it comes to their reactions against violent herders. A farmer’s practice of violence has to be subtle, which remind of passive resistance of James Scott, which is less visible, every-day forms of resistance such as ‘foot-dragging, evasion, false compliance, pilfering, feigned ignorance, slander and sabotage’ (Scott 1987). First of all, they are the
people who engage in most of the verbal abuse against herders in public spaces.

Criticizing the crassness of herder culture is one way of doing this. There are many subjects for them to talk about. The herders’ low educational levels, their practice of polygamy, their living with their cattle in the bush are all common topics that are used to criticize them. Farmers think that these customs are backwards, an obstacle to the development of Tanzanian society. While in conversation with a community organizer in the town, a farmer lamented that the area is underdeveloped because of the heavy presence of herders. He told me that he knew of an incident that touring members of a foreign development agency passed by the area without stopping because there were too many herders standing in the market. He thought the foreigners felt awkward and were intimidated by the herders’ appearance. This kind of verbal abuse can still become dangerous. As one farmer put it:

Maasai is a disgrace to Tanzanian society. We are not a developed country because people like Maasai are living with us. They do not get educated; they do not speak Swahili correctly; they have wives with lots of animals. What would the people from outside think if they saw a bunch of them in our town? They would just pass by without even stepping outside of their car. You know why, they were so terrified by them and ran away. I understand what they told me.

These acts of symbolic violence can become as dangerous as physical acts.

Farmers often attack the animals of herders at times of confrontation as a way of blocking cattle from entering their gardens. Usually, they poke the large body of the animal with their spears. For farmers, cattle are just animals, but for herders, they are considered the same as members of their own family. They consider an attack on their cattle to be the same as an attack on themselves.
Actors of Indirect Violence

Behind various types of violent exchanges, there is a group of people whose role is hard to ignore, but their acts of violence are invisible. They are the employers of these direct violent actors mentioned above. They are the ones who instruct them to use violence as their main tool to maximize their economic gains. Through this influence, they often control the wave of violence according to their business interests, the map of violence can be shifted back and forth. Not only have they masterminded many violent incidents in the area, they are also the main reason behind the routinization of violence.

The top indirect violent actors in this category of violence were the sisal estate owner, Amer and his management staff. Amer has one chief manager and seven sub managers working for him in the estate manager’s office. As mentioned in the previous chapter, he recently bought ownership of the sisal estate from the government. To manage this vast sisal farm, he comes to Igusa town once every month to get a report from the chief manager of the sisal farm. Most villagers know his name, but few recognize his face. When his shiny Land Cruiser or Benz zipped down the main road, people notice that he had come to town.

The second actor was the chief manager of the national research farm. His influence has become somewhat reduced as the size of that farm has dwindled due to the recent purchase by the private owner. Located in the northern part of the Plains, the research farm conducts research on crops. Despite its smaller size, the research farm occupied the most fertile land. Moreover, the water source is available year round, which makes this area an attractive spot for herders to get water during extended periods of the dry season.
Lastly were the large-scale herders. There were two herders in this category. One of them was Frankie who currently resides in Nairobi, Kenya. Another was a large-scale herder from northern Tanzania, Amen, a man in his 50s. He is totally new to the area, but has been able to graze his cattle in the Plains because he recently bought the portion of land from the old Mpaka ranch. He has 4000 cows and plans to establish his own ranch in the purchased area.

In terms of the economic stakes and interests of these violent actors, these people have clear goals. Sisal estate managers and national farm managers want pastoralists out of their sight as the existence of herders roaming around their property directly affects their commercial opportunities. Those who rent agricultural plots from their estates do not like the existence of herders in their prospective agricultural fields. They also have a plan to reclaim the area which used to belong to the sisal estates. Due to the heavy flooding activities and lack of management at least one quarter of their sisal estate legally owned by them has not been utilized. The consequences have been an open space for herders to roam around the area threatening even the sisal estate fields. On the other hand, the large scale cattle owners like Frankie keep their gigantic number of cattle watered and grazed without stopping. The area has been inundated with new herders and their cattle coming from northern areas looking for grazing fields in the Mpaka plain. Especially during the peak dry season, getting access to these natural resources gets harder as most water sources dry up in the middle of the plains. The only year round water spot is the area near the river valley.

**Orchestrating Everyday Violence**

Even though these persons did not commit violence directly, they designed and oversaw various violent acts through instructions to their subordinates from their farms.
or ranches. Their business interests often determine where and when the violent activities occur most. In the case of sisal farm owners, the easiest subject they controlled were the absolutely desperate farmers who did not own any land themselves. Most Igusa residents rent the land for farming from the sisal farm every season as they do not own any land in the area. This is the only way for them to produce their own crops for their own food supply. Since the landlord knows the desperation of the Igusa residents, the sisal farm uses this feeling of desperation meticulously to manage their farm. Farmers who are most desperate are often allocated uncleared areas. The purpose of this allocation is to clear the land by the manpower of farmers and to chase away herders from the area. An old farmer lamented on this in an interview:

> You know, we do not have any choice when it comes to feeding our children. We want to farm more. But there are too many people who want to do farming as they do not own their own field. Their only way to get access to extra fields is to ask the manager of the area. It is dangerous. Nobody wants to go there, but, there are still some people out there doing this risky business. Some people want to cultivate more crops, especially rice as this can be very lucrative. But they do not know what they are risking, their own life.

These kinds of economic power used by these sisal estate managers often determine the location and frequency of violent activities. The area of violence is usually decided by their business plans for the season. The areas where the human barriers were heavily used are places so remote and seasonally flooded that the sisal estate patrol vehicles cannot reach it as often as they wanted to. This area is, however, popular among rice growing farmers as the price of rice is soaring. On the other hand, for sisal estate managers, it is one of the most difficult places to guard as the area is remote and easily flooded by the activities of the Wami River. Therefore, they willingly distribute plots within the area to groups of people who are interested in growing rice.
While leasing this land to make extra cash, they also admitted that they were acting as a kind of human barrier against the herders who want to enter the area for grazing and watering for their cattle.

Herders know this fact so well that the first thing they do in the morning is ascertain the location of the guards in the area. This kind of information is especially disseminated to inexperienced herders, as they are often easily distracted and go into the area where these guards are waiting to take their cattle hostage.

Local herders, especially large-scale herders, see these encroachments by farmers as a threat to their customary rights of using the grazing field no matter whether the area is legally owned by the sisal farm or not. What they are doing is to send herders purposefully into the area even though they are not allowed to let the cattle graze there. Unlike the sisal estate owners, they do not have to order their hired herders to go there, because it is the only place for herders to get water, especially in the dry season. Herders, hired or not, have no choice but to go to the area if they do not want to see their cattle die of thirst or hunger. It is the herder’s duty to find water or grazing fields for the cattle. The only thing he has to keep in mind is to avoid trampling farmers’ fields or irrigation installations. The possibility of head-on confrontations shoot up when the herders decide to ignore any kind of installation of farming activities related systems, such as irrigation equipment, canals, and the like.

**Routinizing Violence**

The contribution of sisal estate managers and ranch owners to the violent environment is the routinization of violence. This routinization happens as the process is directly related to their economic interests. For sisal estate managers, the routinized violence works as a virtual fence, preventing encroaching herders from entering the
sisal estates. They use the potential for violence as a barrier to protect their properties. Sisal estate managers knew that actual fencing around the estate farms or ranch would be the best solution to protect it from outside intruders. It is, however, an unrealistic measure as the cost of fencing around their vast property would be very expensive. There is a problem of theft as well. The fence materials could tempt many rural villagers to steal them for personal use or to sell as a source of income.

Therefore, instead of fencing around their estates or ranches, they were tempted to avoid this cost by finding cheaper methods. Sisal managers and ranch owners seem to have found a cost effective alternative. The sisal farm and national research farm use violent tactics to protect their assets. Sisal estate owners or other herders never admitted that they were using physical force. Local farmers and herders are their soldiers when it comes to generating violence, doing so as their proxies and on behalf of their interests. Consequently, they already know and fully expect that the season could be as violent as ever according to the location of their fields for cultivation or grazing. They went where they were instructed to go. The area where the violence occurs was used as a natural barrier in several places in the Igusa area. They were there wherever the sisal owners would not tolerate the existence of herders in a location. Alternatively, it could take the form of pushing their cattle into those areas where the possibility of causing skirmish was already high.

There would be no routinization of violence if there were no invaders. Herders were those who tried all they could to break the rules. The large-scale herders urged their caretakers to invade the areas just in order to make it impossible for sisal estate managers and farmers to install permanent facilities such as irrigation dams or canals.
(Schmink 1982). They knew that an increase in such facilities meant more farmers would come to the area and this in turn would decrease grazing field land available for herders. To stop this from happening, they threatened farmers and told them not to come to this area for any kind of activity. Destroying farmers’ facilities came first and then without hesitation, they used physical threats to send their message. When it comes to acting on these kinds of threats, the large-scale herder dispatches to the designated place the most experienced and brave herders, that is, the Moran.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has described the conditions of everyday violence that have been generated in the political economy of Igusa. My main interest has been to show how different forms of violence have played out in the Igusa context. In sum, the Igusa area turns out to be an intersection where various manifestations of violence are played out by various actors with different goals, agendas and interests. The major finding is the existence of manipulative orchestrations of invisible controllers such as sisal estate management and large scale herders, who control the most violent activities, eventually transforming the Igusa region into a protracted everyday violent zone. They are usually hard to recognize as their act of involvement are not noticeable ones and more often than not, these often exempt them from being categorized within the topography of violence types mentioned in the chapter. It is also harder to pinpoint the nature of the violence of their activities. In most cases, they are often acting according to their economic or political agendas and interests. It is the indirectness of their actions that often hide them most successfully.

Despite this ambiguity of involvement, the sisal estate managers and ranch owners in Igusa are still actual contributors to the violent environment. This is because
they are the masterminds of most violent activities of farmers and herders in the area. Their economic and political gains often encourage Igusa farmers and herders to engage in violent activities through pressuring subsistence farmers and hired herders into taking extreme measures against each other. As a member of each group, they also participated in violent activities indirectly. They often organize actual violent attacks through providing instructions, masterminding actual violent activities, and providing weaponry to their subordinate farmers and herders.

Revealing the identities of these hidden contributors is meaningful in terms of the fact that making it clear enables us to understand the multidimensional nature of pastoral violence. There is a tendency to simplify the nature of pastoral violence by perceiving it as acts of pastoralists or farmers over natural resource scarcity. It is these groups that are often blamed for the excessive and primitive nature of the violence. Uncovering these invisible violent actors reveals the fact that these occasions of violence occurring in remote rural areas, are, in fact, the consequence of the political economy, which is tightly interrelated with the material requirements and demands of developed industrial countries.
CHAPTER 6
ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION IN IGUSA

Introduction

Thirty years ago, anthropologist Andrew Vayda, summarizing a decade or more of work on so-called “primitive violence” by ecological anthropologists, concluded that “Warfare [plays a key role] in the maintenance of man/resource balance” (Vayda 1976: 4). The logic of balance maintenance has been useful as a main argument in explaining the causes of “irrational violence tendency (Homer-Dixon 1994: 31). Resource scarcity played a key role in explanations of increasing warfare especially among pastoralists in African continent (Peluso and Watts 2001). What these scholars continue to argue is that, “as the global population continues to rise, and the demand for resources continues to grow, there is a significant potential for conflicts over natural resources to intensify” (UNEP 2009). The proponents of this view argue that resource scarcity may be an underlying cause of violence.

What recent scholars of new ecological perspectives think is quite different. Violence itself can be the main factor that leads to natural resource scarcity (Peluso and Watts 2001; Bohle and Füngfeld 2007). The occurrence of protracted violence not only harms the population and their lives but also degrades the conditions of the natural environment. In explaining this process of environmental degradation, Blaikie and Brookfield (1987) offered up arguments as to how marginalized populations can destroy the surrounding environment by exploitation. Based on the concept of marginalization from neo-classical economics, ecology, and political economy and linking them together, Blaikies and Brookfield show how the process of marginalization has led to simultaneous and increasing impoverishment and environmental degradation.
Politically and socially marginal (disempowered) people are pushed into ecologically marginal spaces and economically marginal social positions, resulting in their increasing demands on the marginal productivity of ecosystems. Bohle and Fünfgeld discovered that in Sri Lanka, the consequences of violent marginalization where the impact of violence in resource and livelihood systems have direct or indirectly adverse impacts on environmental resources as well as livelihood functions and services (Bohle and Fünfgeld 2007).

This chapter describes the unexpected implications of everyday violence on the natural environment of the Igusa region. While analyzing trajectories of livelihood strategies taken by the Igusa people, living as they do within the violent context of Igusa, I show how these livelihood strategies contribute to the condition of the surrounding natural environment. Two strategies have emerged as the main sources for the environmental degradation in the area.

**Environmental Degradation in Igusa**

When my fieldwork was coming to an end, one of the serious issues, except for the ever present violent situation that I realized in the field were evident and increasing signs of environmental degradation in the area. The barren look of the Igusa plains is but one of these signs. Grazing fields are often left burned, agricultural fields were often left unoccupied and with barren. Those lands were unoccupied as agricultural activities were stopped due to the lack of nutrients in the soil. Cattle under the scorching sun seemed to contribute to the soil erosion as thousands of them strolled around the area and almost every second flattening an already dusty and compacted area.

The consequences of this environmental degradation were realized as the massive floods hit the Wassamu area. The Wami river, which flows through the
lowlands was the source of the December 2009 floods in Wassamu district. This was caused by excessive downpours in Dodoma in December which recorded 107 mm of rain over 24 hours in the December before the Wassamu floods (TMA 2009). The Kilosa floods were accelerated by environmental degradation due to steep mountain slope cultivation (done through terracing farming techniques), shifting cultivation, sand and mining on rivers banks, deforestation due to logging for fuel-wood, and inappropriate irrigation schemes (TMA 2009). This situation led to soil degradation which left the soil devoid of surface vegetation and thus floods swept the area easily. As a result, a total of 207 km of the road network in Wassamu district was rendered impassable while sections of the Central Railway Line from Kilosa to Dar es Salaam and from Kilosa to Dodoma were destroyed, and this led to the suspension of train services. In addition, a total of 100 electricity poles were affected by the floods. Lack of clean and safe water for residents and destruction of the water supply network has led to the increase of water bone diseases like diarrhea and cholera. More than 300 acres of precious paddy and maize farm were flooded, covered with sand and mud and can no longer be used for future farming.

In fact, this kind of environmental degradation has been predicted of and warned about by the local agricultural research center. The local agricultural research center in the Wassamu district monitors the environmental consequences of agricultural activities and had already pointed out at least three problems, two of them are directly related to the floods (Mung’ong’o and Mwamfupe 2003). Soil erosion is one of most serious problems in the area, causing the continuous problems of flooding in the area. Nutritionally speaking, soil erosion generates less nutrition in the soil for growing crops.
or vegetables. The last stage of soil erosion is desertification. Lack of nutritional value causes soil to lose its stickiness and turn into sand, becoming barren in the end. Local agricultural administrators monitoring the area pointed out that the area suffering from soil erosion is expanding, which means agricultural fields have been deserted without maintenance for many years.

A byproduct of intensive irrigation is deforestation (Bassett et al 2003:9). Deforestation is taking place at an alarming speed, destroying vegetation in the fields. Each year, more than 50 ha of vegetation is lost, and the causes are man-made (Kibuga and Samweli 2010:3). While charcoal making and pole gathering activities are one of the primary income generating activities in the area contributing to the deforestation, there is a high degree of concern about the intentional setting of bushfires that are aimed to clear off the once rich forests in the area (Kibuga and Samweli 2010:5). The main drivers of deforestation are bushfires set by farmers and herders for clearing more fields for cultivation or grazing (Kibuga and Samweli 2010:4). Many environmental destruction results from bushfires as these fires are set without proper supervision, they are often difficult to control and eventually spread to other farms and even villages, causing much damage to the surrounding ecosystem. Thus, in places like Igusa, the effects may be devastating with acres of burned grazing fields or barren fields with no trace of living vegetation (Ako 2001:4). As these fields belong to nobody, and these areas become useless as the result of passing herds of cattle, the area can become unusable for years. Consequently, the effects of bushfires results in the loss of native flora and fauna which may take many years to regenerate (Ako 2001:8).
The direct cause of soil erosion and deforestation is excessive grazing and agricultural activities. Excessive livestock in the area causes the soil to become compacted and compacted soil is easy to dry up during a prolonged drought. Dried and compacted soil is getting worse, as other livestock trample on the already compacted area, making the area’s soil erosion a more serious problem. Farmers are also blamed for the consequences of soil erosion. Their very activities of irrigation are, in fact, contributing to the soil erosion in the area. The main culprit is the contained water and the soil without air contributes to the quality of soil, causing soil to compact further.

Four men whom I met from the area have unwittingly participated in and experienced the process of gradual environmental degradation without knowing that their involvement contributed to the degradation of the surrounding environment. They are Bahame, Gosai, Viana, and Hechei. Bahame and Gosai, both in their forties, are farmers whose parents used to be sisal workers. They are neighbors living in Igusa A. They engage in subsistence farming, planting maize, rice, cabbages, and onions in different agricultural fields in the area for a living. They rent the land they need from the sisal estate. Bahame has three children, while Gosai has four. All of them attend nearby primary schools in town. Each is married to one wife. On the other hand, Viana and Hechei are herders living in Mbwade village. They are medium scale herders, each owning only three hundred head of cattle. Viana has five children from three different wives, while Hechei has four from two wives.

What the four men have in common was that they are suffering from skyrocketing living expenditures recently due to the changing conditions of privatization, they are becoming a part of environmental degradation as they work their best to do extra jobs to
earn or produce enough to make ends meet while dealing with unstable conditions in the fields. Most of them did not know whether the privatization process had anything to do with the environmental destruction they are witnessing, but all of them agreed that their livelihoods had been affected by the process. What the farmers have experienced is their households’ increasing needs for larger amounts and more regular supplies of cash. Bahame’s household itself reflects on only a part of his expenditures. Bahame complains about the cost of education. Since privatization started, he has been busy keeping up with paying bills from the primary school his children are attending. The expenses for school uniforms, textbooks, and school fees were almost free before privatization, but that is no longer the case. New items have been added every school semester, taking more cash from their pockets. On top of this, he has to pay more for their agricultural activities as well. He pays tractor rent to clear his new field leased from the sisal farm. He recalled the old days when the government-run sisal farm used to bulldoze if there were too many weeds or rocks in the field, but when the new owner took over the sisal estate, clearing is no longer free. Since he does not always have money for the service, he often has to clear it himself by hoe. Gosai talks of the fertilizers they have to buy to cultivate tomatoes and onions in his garden. He knows it is necessary to use these agricultural products to increase the quantity of the harvest, but the problem is that the prices of these products keep increasing.

In the case of the herders, it is their newly found consumer culture in the middle of the plains that threatens to overwhelm them. Even though most herders are in better financial shape than farmers, herders have their own problems with living expenditures. While they are spending the same amount of money to lease land that farmers do, they
also have developed a consumer culture. A good example can be found in a recently opened open-air market held every Wednesday. The major customers of these makeshift markets are herders in need of various goods. Hechei tells the story of why he likes to go to the Wednesday market each week. The open-air market is flooded with cheap but eye-catching new goods from China that often tempt many Igusa people, especially herders, a villager told me that herders are especially regular customers for these goods. Cell phones, recently introduced in the area, are another luxury item. For managers of large cattle herds in the Mpaka Plains, the cell phone is the technology that the herding population has been long waiting for. By using cell phones, they can disseminate critical information, such as locations of good grazing, water, possible acts of cattle theft, the location of sisal estate guards, etc. However, the cost of maintaining the telephone sometimes gets out of control as many bored herders in the field often use it for casual conversations.

**Limited Economic Activities in Fields of Violence**

Despite their fierce engagement with their economic activities, it seems almost impossible for Igusa people to meet the increased cash requirements of living in the Igusa area, the major obstacle is the violence in the field that has impeded them from furthering their income-generating activities. For farmers, their limited mobility reduces the possibility of diversifying vital livelihood activities, significantly reducing their chances to make extra cash for their increased expenditures. For farmers, everyday violence in the area has hampered them from more agricultural diversification, a common way of dealing with the economic hardships of a rural livelihood. Growing various agricultural produce in multiple places was one of the common methods in rural Tanzania. This method spreads the risk of the possibility of crisis to reduce the damage
to as little as possible. These diversification activities are, however, almost impossible due to the high level of violence in the fields. A good example is Gosai. He used to grow rice in the flooded area. Growing rice, however, became more dangerous as this area overlapped with the passage of herders and their cattle. Irrigation systems for rice cultivation are often destroyed by the cattle who unknowingly invade the rice area for grazing. Similar incidents happened to his cash crop gardens as well. He used to grow tomatoes, onions, and cabbages to sell to the market in Morogoro, but this area has become overrun by herders as well.

Their main source of cash is the extra money they earn selling vegetables from their irrigated fields. Some people found jobs at the sisal farm as temporary workers. It is hard work with long hours cutting sisal or processing sisal fiber. The wages are rarely more than 1,500 Tsh (equivalent to $1) a day and work are not always guaranteed. Another way of making money is growing rice or other cash crops such as cotton. Due to such initial investments as rent, fertilizer, and pesticides, growing cotton in the area is limited to certain groups of people who own a store or have other occupations. In the case of rice, it is more lucrative than growing cotton, but it is highly risky due to the fact that the places they use are inevitably invaded by herders in search of water.

For herders, it is getting difficult for them to secure enough grazing fields as the cost of grazing is increasing in the context of the violent environment. They have observed that their grazing areas are being reduced every year, while the cost of grazing has dramatically increased due to their tense relationship with local farmers. There are a growing number of farmers asking for money before allowing grazing in theirs or the village’s fields. Viana and Hechei have to deal with this problem daily. They
used to graze their herds around the Igusa town area, especially during the dry season, as they could find the harvest residue and water easily at the same time. It used to be possible due to their good relationships with the villagers living along the river. After the 2000 incident, the relationship has soured and herders and their cattle have been prohibited by villagers due to their involvement in violent incidents. The anger toward herders is so deep that the residents of these villages publicly announced that seeing one herder in their area would be considered another violent confrontation between village farmers and herders. This kind of hatred from the farmers’ side has caused great difficulties for herders’ grazing activities, especially during the dry season. Since herders were not welcome near farmers’ villages, they have had to find alternative water sources and grazing field. Finding these places in time is not guaranteed and can take hours of walking through the plains which may jeopardize their weakened animals.

Compensation costs for damaged crops have become another thorny issue for herders. There are seemingly endless claims from farmers for compensation. However, money for compensation is not the only problem. The compensation process often requires herders to deal with long lawsuits at the court without any clear judgment. Most herders have to attend these court hearings every time the court holds hearings. If they do not appear, the verdict is almost always unfavorable to the herders. Due to the slowness of the court process, it usually takes a month for a case to hold an appeal. As time and labor are precious for herders’ activities, these kinds of lawsuits and compensation processes are not only costly, but also prevent them from engaging with their proper livelihood activities in the region.
**Destructive Livelihood Strategies**

The process of environmental degradation is complicated in Igusa. In order to take advantage of the small windows of economic opportunities under the violent circumstances of living in Igusa, two kinds of livelihood strategies have been evidently identified: heavy dependence on social networking and excessive agricultural intensification schemes. From the observer’s viewpoint, all these activities are related with the obvious signs of environmental degradation in the area. The social networking activities of herders are often directly intertwined with the destruction of the natural environment in two ways. Favored treatment often causes environmental destruction as those decisions are mostly made without consideration of the effect on the surrounding natural environment. The economic disparity facilitated by favored treatment leads to destructive agricultural activities of frustrated farmers which in turn contribute to environmental degradation in such forms as soil erosion, deforestation through excessive bush burning and irrigation activities.

**Social Networking**

Like any other place in rural Africa, social networking in Igusa is the backbone of a rural livelihood. There are ample reasons behind the intensification of social networking. The monopolization of natural resources by the sisal estates makes increased social networking inevitable. The social networking activities are concentrated on sisal estate management personnel. As people prefer non-violent areas for agricultural activities there have been high levels of competition among farmers for renting land in those areas. Sisal estate management personnel are those who decide the location of land for each farmer. Gosai has engaged in this activity, and has experienced every season the struggle of getting access to fields from the sisal farm.
He goes to church every Sunday to meet people from the sisal estate, yet for him, sharing the same religious affiliation does not guarantee favorable treatment. It only allows him to have the possibility of negotiating with them. Negotiations are all about the location and terms of renting favorable fields. The process often takes place at a local bar at night. It is not illegal to meet these people, but they want to avoid observation by neighboring farmers. The farmer usually buys sodas or beers for the management while negotiating terms. In most case, the official price for renting a piece of land from the sisal farm is 5000 Tanzanian shillings. If the farmer wants more favorable places in a safe area without the possibility of violence, it means he has to pay more to these managers. The most favorable places are mostly those with sufficient water and without the presence of herders and their cattle. The going price of the payment was 10% of the harvest, which is a significant burden for the farmer because he has many other demands on his income.

While farmers like Gosai were focusing on their dealings with sisal farm management, the herders are dealing with high-ranking local politicians or government officials who have more power and authority. Surprisingly, herders are experts at dealing with them. Despite herders’ long history of bad relationships with the local government, they have been effective in dealing with these people in high positions. It is their ready access to cash that often easily buys influence. Their connections are especially useful when a herder has problems with neighboring farmers. Those problems are usually regarding the damage caused by careless herders or disputes over access to local grazing fields belonging to the local government. According to the experience of Viana, policemen, judges, and local government officials stationed in the
area are the targets of their social networking. Policemen often write up a favorable report for the herders, reducing the damage or even persuading local farmers not to file a claim for their losses. A common way of discouraging farmers is to refer to the high court fees or the bureaucratic red tape. Local judges can become involved if the damage is grave, so personal connections often mean that the judges give verdicts in favor of herders. He also had an encounter with a local politician as well. In that case, the politician gave Viana the benefit of allowing his cattle to enter a government-owned field. So Viana has not had any problems with local farmers over permission to graze.

**Consequences of Herders’ Social Networking**

Corrupt government officials or politicians often grant favors without consideration for any environmental repercussions (Ebiede 2011:139). There are two examples of these kinds of transactions. One example was a herder’s opening his own ranch in the middle of the town. Mosobico, a friend of Hechei, was having difficulty finding enough grazing land for his cattle, so he decided to buy a plot near the town of Igusa to open his own ranch. Legally speaking this was entirely possible as the government is selling government property to the highest bidders, but the people living around the plot complained of possible problems with their new neighbor with his hundreds of head of cattle. So Mosobico had to ask a favor from one of the high ranking officials in the local government to get permission. The deal was sealed when he promised to install a fence along his new property. It turned out that it was an empty promise. Since then, his cattle have become a constant threat to the neighboring farming community whose vegetable gardens were mostly concentrated in those areas. Due to excessive grazing of the herd, the land has become barren. A farmer living near the ranch lamented:
Can you see the area? These cattle walk around the area all the time. There is no grass in the area anymore. They just keep eating whatever looks green. I am telling you, these cattle are destroying not only our gardens but also the entire area. I just regret that I trusted in his promise that they will install fence around his ranch. It is just too late now because they have the land title. The only thing we can do here is to blame the local government for not supervising these activities.

The environmental damage can become more serious as the size of the corrupt transaction gets bigger. The process of auctioning off the Mpaka ranch was a famous story among the Igusa residents. The Mpaka ranch in the middle of the Plains has been in the process of privatization. Many farmers in the area also applied for a block or two, planning cooperative farms since the area is relatively near a branch of the Wami River and the products from these farms can be transported to urban areas such as Dar es Saalam and Morogoro through the nearby Mpaka railroad station. At the end of the application process, the final winners turned out to be a retiring local politician who was finishing his term as a member of the Tanzanian national parliament. Most Igusa people accepted this result as he was quite a powerful figure. What puzzled many was the second winner, a Mr. Mogomo, who was completely new to the area. He came from the northern area to build his own ranch on the Mpaka ranch. Nobody, however, believes in his plan because the area is not suitable for a ranch. There is a lack of water, especially in the dry season and insufficient grazing fields for 5,000 cattle that he claimed were going to be brought in. Instead, Igusa people who had participated in the application process were suspicious of his connections with a retiring prominent local politician who was involved in the process. Coincidentally, the political also took a chunk of land from the Mpaka ranch as part of his retirement plan to open his own large-scale farm.
Farmers’ Agricultural Intensification Activities

The real environmental damage starts as farmers take these corrupt transactions through their own intensified agricultural activities. One of the social consequences of this economic disparity is widespread anger and frustration among farmers. Emotional frustration propels them to engage in excessive agricultural activities without consideration for either herders or the surrounding natural environment. This charged emotion is often expressed by a group of farmers who argue that herders’ wealth comes from farmers’ sufferings. Gosai is one of many who share this opinion. He argues that there is unfairness in the wealth of herders. He is especially upset about the fact that the wealthy lifestyle they are enjoying in the town is the result of damage done to farmers’ agricultural fields. It seems they then avenge themselves through what they do best. These activities are irrigation schemes and bush burning by Igusa farmers, which on the face of it are seemingly ordinary agricultural activities of rural Africans, but they become effective weapons for frustrated farmers to cause trouble for aggressive herders. Angered by the growing wealth of the herders and frustrated by the lack of local government intervention, they blocked upstream water and burnt fields for crop preparation, which is the major part of irrigation scheme activities, these actions made things difficult for herders in the downstream area. Numerous irrigation schemes that block upstream river water meant that there would be a lack of water downstream. As most herders were technically prohibited to enter the upstream area, the water downstream was significantly reduced at the peak of the dry season. Applying these activities at an intensive level not only makes trouble for the herding population, but also destroys the surrounding natural environment.
Looking for alternative fields far removed from the violence-prone areas, farmers are building irrigation systems. Irrigation not only allows previously uncultivable plots to grow agricultural crops, but also makes it possible for many cash strapped farmers to grow crops year round. These small scale irrigation schemes often redirect water from the Wami River, making it possible for farmers to water their plants year round. The practice, in general, manages to produce enough agricultural products to meet certain livelihood goals. Almost every farmer I interviewed was involved with an irrigation scheme year round to increase their agricultural incomes.

According to Bahame, a farmer, usually the participants of irrigation schemes are members of the local Kaguru or Sagara ethnic groups who have close ties to the local village councils so that they can easily get permission from the village leaders. Building irrigation scheme is a labor intensive activity. To control the flow of the river, a makeshift dam is also built to change the water way using wooden sticks. To deliver the water to their fields, they have to dig a narrow and shallow but lengthy canal from the river stream to their field. According to the local government, there were more than forty irrigation scheme groups active at the same time. Farmers do not acknowledge they irrigate, although, the irrigation scheme is one agricultural recommendation from the local government to increase the food output in the area where arable land is in short supply due to the increased farming population. There is even an irrigation scheme class that was organized by a civil society association to improve the technological aspects of the scheme.

Bush burning is a major element of irrigation schemes. Perhaps the most common use of fire in rural Africa is bush burning, practiced to manage natural
resources to meet certain livelihood goals (Kull 2002). Most bush burnings are conducted to clear land either for cultivation or to build houses. This often is the case where the soils are dry and desiccation is rapid, because fire is the least expensive means available for clearing slash and felled trees from fields to create a larger planting area for crops. Locals also burn grass to eradicate ticks. Those who burn to control ticks do so during the winter months (June to August) before the young ticks attach themselves to their hosts (livestock). There are also local reports that people burn paths to drive away snakes. Local respondents tell of cases where desperate women burn woodland, in order to speed up the drying process of the wood they wish to collect for fuel in the future.

For the people of Igusa, burning the fields has one more benefit. It is also used as a technique to chase away herders. Bush burning has become a nightmare for herders because it blocks them from grazing their stock in the area and deprives them of residues of various crops left behind after the harvest that has been the main food source for hungry cattle. As they could not use the residue from the harvested fields, they have to take more time, often long hours or even days to look for alternative sources of grazing. Meanwhile, farmers clean their fields before sowing the next crop by burning the agricultural residue that has been left in place after the harvest. This residue is mainly stalks of different crops: millet, sorghum and corn. Burning fields in late August and early September has traditionally been associated with preparing for the next crop, but herders require that residue for grazing.

One problem is that the bush burning is hard to control because the fires are not regulated by the local government or village councils. There is no authority to control the
bush burning practice as most of land belongs to the sisal estates, so after the initial field is burned, the bush-burning can become a wildfire, spreading into the Plains area where most of the herders are grazing. Burning during August and September creates further problems in the area, as the wind and the intensity of the bushfires often mean the fires jump over firebreaks. The dried vegetation at that time of year is easily ignited and the fires and the exposed nature of the soil in the fields make that soil barren for several years.

These intensive irrigation schemes become a thorny issue for most herders who are using the downstream water for watering their cattle. The water usually coming down to the lower Plains has been significantly diminished as more farmers engage in irrigation schemes. Mostly the complaints came from the herders who feel the difference before, and after the irrigation scheme practice is instituted in the area. Hechei has been going through this ordeal every dry season. It has become a life or death issue for him as he loses at least 10 heads of cattle every year for lack of water in the dry season.

The Irrigation scheme thing is killing us and our cattle. They just keep building these small wooden dams everywhere upstream so that they plant whatever they want year around. Because of all these wooden dams, we do not have water in the plains. All the water goes sideways to water their plants. Where do we get the water for our cattle in the middle of dry season? They should know the fact that as long as they keep using the river water for themselves, we will do whatever we want to get the water for our cattle. We do not want war with them, but we do not want to see our cattle die because of these hideous irrigation schemes.

The herders even believe that irrigation schemes are not for agricultural activities, but for diverting the river water. Most herders take these as acts of sabotage to divert water intentionally from the plains so that herders downstream suffer from the lack of water during the dry season.
These guys are evil. They know that we are suffering in the dry season for the lack of water. That is why they do not break the unused dams in the river to block the water anyway to make sure that we do not get the water. They would think that we would not come here because there is no water in the area. No way, we will go inside all the way to get that water.

The consequence of bush burning is the premature loss of grazing fields. It is believed that the emphasis on late dry-season burning has increasingly been associated locally with very intense fires that contribute to woodland degradation. Bush burning by farmers, like irrigation schemes, is done without any consideration of herders' interests. Thus, herders often find themselves in difficulties as the fine grazing field of yesterday turns into a charcoaled field in an instant without notice. An agitated herder looking over the charcoaled grazing field near the town boundary lamented.

They do not have land title here. We do not have title to the land either. Both of us are the same status. Then, why do they have the right to burn the field without telling us? We have also lived as long as they have lived in this area. The only difference is that we have our cattle. This is why we attack their crops instead of looking for new grazing fields. As long as they are playing tricks with us like this, we will attack their fields.

Conclusion

This chapter describes the process in which intensified livelihood activities degrade the surrounding natural environment in the Igusa region. While most arguments are often dominated by the perspective that violence is the consequence of natural resource scarcity, the case of this chapter tells a different story. In the case of Igusa, it seems the various intensified livelihood activities under contained and protracted violent activities of local people degrade the surrounding natural environment. The degree of degradation is overwhelmingly excessive as the violent conditions in the region have accelerated the degradation process. What this chapter did not provide is, despite the high possibility of this causation between violence and
degradation, more scientific data on these relationships. The reason that I did not collect these data was largely because of the difficulties of measuring erosion and the other components of soil life, and because of the highly spatially and temporarily variable natural environment of the area (Warren et al 2001). Measurement is also subject to financial constraints - insufficient funds to enable procurement of equipment and materials required for monitoring system instrumentation and data analysis.

Environmental degradation is a scientific area that requires specialized knowledge in the area of soil, water, forest eco-systems that require years of a relevant research background. The physical processes of erosion are very difficult to measure, a point repeatedly emphasized by scientists involved (Roose and Sarraih 1990; Stocking 1995). Most soil erosion takes place in short, intense events, during which there is rapid and complex interaction between the eroding rain and wind, and the resisting soil. Too few or too many of these events may be included in a short period of measurement, introducing uncertainty into the data obtained. Without longer periods of measurement, these errors are impossible to evaluate, especially in a climate which is as variable as that of the Mpaka plains.

While ethnographic data still can be collected on the scale of environmental degradation through interviews and observations on the conditions of the natural environment, a more scientific approach to the local ecology can contribute much. To reveal the seriousness of environmental degradation, it is often necessary to have much more data to prove the existence of such processes. The perspective of political ecology is needed to provide a more contextual understanding of the relationships. In order to advance this reverse argument, scholars of political ecology need to develop a
more persuasive methodology to pinpoint the implications of violence on the natural environment.
CHAPTER 7
THE CIVIL SOCIETY MOVEMENT

Introduction

Violence destroys lives, property, even the natural environment. The nature of these destructive consequences often pushes outside observers to focus their attention on the most easily seen consequences of destructive violence. Destruction is, however, not the only picture that emerges here. Even under severe and extremely violent circumstances, social lives continue to exist despite violent hardships. Anthropologists are among those few who especially attempt to pay attention to social lives being led in the context of various violent situations. While reporting the destructive nature of violence, their observations often consist of the creative responses of local people under conditions of severe violence (Nordstrom 1997). Unexpected opportunities and chances often make social lives even more dramatically eventful, pushing members of society into displaying exceptional creativity in utilizing these windows of opportunities (Nordstrom 1997). Anthropologists point out the liminal nature of social space during or after violent conflicts as the main driving force in unusual expressions of creativity by people under distressful conditions. Liminal space, which is generated by the relaxation of the morals and rules of the everyday social structure (Davidheiser 2006), is formed by a series of innovative events orchestrated by pioneering groups or individuals. Applying the liminal elements of van Gennep’s approach to conflict processes, Max Gluckman (1971) and Victor Turner (1969) noted how ritual events were also prominent in conflict processes. Carolyn Nordstrom (1997), in her book, A Different Kind of War Story, offers fascinating accounts of grassroots resistance to the efforts of both
RENAMO and FRELIMO forces. Religious figures played a key role in rural residents’ resistance to war and violence.

This chapter is about socio-political lives being led in the context of violence. Despite the continuation of violent conditions, there have been many opportunities and chances for overcoming the consequences of violent conflict between farmer and herder since the end of the violent conflict of 2000. A driving force behind these efforts has been a religious international agency having tried to implement civil society building programs, making the discourses and activities of civil society a part of the major socio-political scene in the Igusa region. The main focus of this chapter is an analysis of the complex consequences of the civil society activities. Igusa civil society movements have been designed to promote peace between farmers and herders, but the process does not seem to fulfill this goal. This chapter looks into the obstacles that prevent farmers and herders from accomplishing the original goals of civil society movements. While analyzing the nature of the activities of civil society movements initiated by farmers and herders, I present how an external civil society movement intervention has become a source of mixed consequences.

Civil Society Igusa

There are many number of attention grabbing events and places encountered while riding a bus from Morogoro town to Igusa, like the dance of the Parakuyo Maasai kids to the raucous sounds of buses honking. Whenever a bus passed by the Parakuyo Maasai herder’s town, Parakuyo Maasai kids wave their hands at the bus and the driver would send a series of honks to the kids. The high-pitched honks of passing buses somehow worked as dance music on them. With their eyes half closed, they danced up and down emitting high-pitched trills as if they were ready to enter a deep trance. There
is one other thing. In the center of Parakuyo Maasai village, the main village of herders, there is an oval-shaped concrete structure on a concrete pillar tower. Due to the eccentric paint color and shape it stood out like it was a UFO landing on the ground. Locals informed us that it was a water tank for the village residents. Travelers of the Mpaka Plains use the oval concrete structure as a landmark, since it is the only building between Morogoro and Igusa. As the dome became visible in the distance, for them it meant that the bumpy journey through the Mpaka Plains was almost over. Whenever I passed by the oval dome, I could not stop thinking that its sheer size and eccentric color scheme made it something completely out of place on an African Plain.

Civil society in Africa resembles the oval water tank in terms of the fact that it seems equally alien to this situation. My analogy was influenced by readings on the recent development of civil society movements in sub-Saharan Africa, which had been critical about the nature of the movement (Young 2004; Igoe 2000; Rogers 2002). Civil society refers to those organizations that arise out of voluntary association within a society (Thompson 1997:6), often defined as a complex welter of intermediate institutions, including businesses, voluntary organizations, educational institutions, clubs, unions, media, charities and churches (Fukuyama 1993:4), existing outside the state and exercising restraint on the state (Labuschagne 2003: 3).

Much of the criticism was based on the fact that the civil society movement of Igusa region was not voluntarily motivated. Western donors orchestrate most civil society groups or associations both financially and ideologically. Despite all the over-publicized achievements of recent civil society movements on the continent, critics insist that as long as civil society movements in the region are still tightly entangled with the enduring
ethnic culture and heavy dependent on Western support, building a sound civil society in African is a pipe dream (Thompson 1997: 5).

Despite all these negatives, civil society is a topic hard to ignore in the Igusa region. The reason for this is its ubiquity. Everybody in the villages used to be a member of at least one civil society association out of the many that came and went. There have been many civil society associations in the small villages, with new ones appearing at least every three months. Accordingly, many people knew a lot about the movement and loved to talk about the new political culture. Their knowledge covered everything from the number of each type of association to the inner and interpolitics of them. Talking about these trivial things concerning these associations became a good topic for casual conversation. As the length of the interviews on civil society grew, I started wondering why they had so much to say about the civil society movement that seemed to have nothing to do with their everyday lives. Finally, I became overwhelmingly curious about the cause of this passion and the knowledge they shared about civil society movement.

As far as the level of accessibility to civil society associations was concerned, Igusa is already full blown civil society country (see the appendix). Civil society associations are actually easy to find in the area because many of them have their offices on the main street of the town and most of their offices have eye-catching signboards. Upon arrival, I was able to recognize several signboards having familiar civil society names. Most of these had skillfully executed calligraphed signboards. The names of these associations used the up to date wording of civil society circles, such as rebuilding, community, community-based, empowerment, and the like. Additionally, as
in many other places, they had a recognizable office with basic furniture and staffed by at least one well-mannered person with fluent English. These people are usually extremely friendly and approachable for foreigners (mzungu) as long as you have a legitimate reason to be in the town. As I introduced myself and my research interest, showing legitimate paper work, I was able to establish useful relationships with several leaders of these associations. Among them, three people were especially helpful in many ways, becoming the main informants for understanding the development of civil society activities in the area. Information came from casual conversations, and daily visits to their offices.

“What are you doing here?”

“I am here to study civil society movements in the area.”

“Well then, you are lucky, I have one.”

This is the first conversation I had with Mr. Fumie in front of his office door. In his mid-60s, he was a retired politician whose highest position had been the mayor in the Wassamu district. Born in Igusa of sisal worker parents, he acquired a university education and turned to local politics. After retiring from public service, he said that he wanted to use his experience and knowledge to help the people of his hometown since their livelihoods had been turned upside down after the 2000 incident. At first, he opened a counseling office, giving advice on various issues. It seemed his services were well appreciated by locals because his office was always filled with them. A few years ago, he also founded his own civil society association called the Human Development Association. Now with more than 30 active members, the reason he founded it was to promote economic prosperity at a time when everything was getting scarce. However, the activities have been reduced significantly due to a lack of financial
support from Western NGOs. One recent project is focusing on running a class to disseminate irrigation scheme information to improve the quantity of the harvests. In his rare free time, he puts his good writing skills to work on articles and columns for local newspapers on various issues, such as national park development and violent conflicts in his hometown area.

In many ways Mr. Moroboko was quite opposite to Mr. Fumie. He is a new, young leader in the league of civil society associations. He lives in the neighboring Igusa B village. In his late 30s, he would often show up in the market dressed in an impeccably tailored suit. He was also a son of sisal workers. After graduating from high school in Igusa, he went to Dar es Salaam to attend college. There he encountered a new political movement. After several years of working for major urban civil society organizations and accumulating enough experience and connections, he decided to start his own from his hometown. The timing was right as he noticed that his hometown was in full swing, new changes occurring every few months due to the intervention of a Western NGO in the area. His youth was compensated by his strong speaking skills and approachability. His youth was actually a resource, attracting young members to his association. For his age, he also has a good reputation among local politicians whom he often invited to various events of his organization.
Lastly, there was Peter, who was not a leader, but a volunteer worker for a pastoral civil society association based in Parakuyo. In his 50s with a white beard, he introduced himself as a volunteer for the association. He is not a noticeable figure due to his modest appearance, but he was quite knowledgeable and passionate about what he was doing for the organization. He would bicycle through the Mpaka Plains to organize committees while checking on various chores related to his association. He served the association well through his good command of English. This language skill made him a valuable asset to his association as nobody else in the association spoke English. Understandably, he took charge of all communications with external sources.

These three leaders had experienced the whole process of the civil society movement. After the crisis of 2000, there were unexpected interventions by an international NGO that eventually introduced the civil society movement to the area as a
part of a peace restoration project. It was unexpected, but that did not discourage the local people from jumping into the new opportunities with high expectations. With international support, the area had become a laboratory for the new social and political experiment called civil society. These three leaders mentioned above were some of the few who had played a pivotal role in introducing the concept of civil society into the area. They were well qualified for this role through their familiarity and passion for civil society culture, their personal connections, and strong educational backgrounds. These were vital qualifications to bridge the wide gap of different expectations between the Western NGO and the local people.

**A Short History of Civil Society Movement in Igusa**

The district capital of Wassamu became the original center of the civil society movement when, in the late 90s, an Irish NGO was based for a couple of years there. It was a new concept even for the Irish NGO, so they started funding small-scale projects. They encouraged local people to organize their own associations. Among those organized at that time were associations for vulnerable people, the disabled, an agricultural skill improvement study group, and women’s empowerment association in the capital and surrounding towns and villages like Igusa. They received a monetary allowance through the bank account of the association. Due to the budget limits and the organization’s short stay, the organization did not make an impressive impact on the local scene, but at least people learned that ordinary local people could access Western NGO financial support and attention. In order to get this assistance they learned that they needed to set up an eligible bank account.
The first impression lasted a long time. Those people who were involved with the Irish NGO were not bad but few in number. An Igusa B ward official told me of his encounter with the NGO.

They came to Igusa B Office with their Land Cruiser and asked us to assemble as many villagers as possible. They came here at the wrong time. Every man was in the field busy doing their work. Anyway, those who came to the meeting were lucky. They got paid for signing in their names, mostly women and elders since they were free at that time. It was some kind of project to improve many things in the village. Some people got paid because they had to go to Wassamu on foot. I did not know what they did there, but they went there several times.

Herders’ Civil Society Association

The 2000 conflict was the catalyst for the expansion of the scale of civil society movements in the area. The violent conflict between farmers and herders immediately garnered national and international attention. Outside intervention poured into the area. International humanitarian agencies such as Lutheran World Relief and its partner NGO in Nairobi, Kenya, the Community–based Livestock Initiatives Programme (CLIP) was one of those interested in the violent situation in the area. According to the annual report of one of several intervention organizations, the government initially felt the need to intervene and sought help from CLIP (Community-Based Livestock Initiatives Programme) which was able to mobilize resources from several partners such as LWR (Lutheran World Relief), Irish Aid and the communities affected. The project aimed at restoring peace through improved natural resource management, capacity building of the community and local institutions, to manage the peace thus established. The project has been implemented for two years (CLIP 2003).

Building water canals and tanks in the herders’ villages was one large project after the incident. Consequently, two water tanks of 6,400m³ and 7,380m³ were completed by
the end of 2002 and are full of water. A community-managed drug store is operational and has been providing services to the Parakuyo community. Five peace committees assisted in resolving 22 conflict cases and were actively involved in conflict management during the last two years. There were voluntary civil society movements organized by charismatic local community leaders with connections or working experience with international agencies. As a result, it is claimed that since the commencement of the project, no serious conflicts have emerged even during droughts that have always precipitated conflict due to the scarcity of pastures and water for the livestock. All the conflicts that emerged, however, were resolved by the peace committees whose capacity had been developed to be able to handle conflict peacefully (CLIP 2003).

First of all, they organized seminars and conferences to understand the causes of the conflicts in the region and provide opportunities for dialogue. After that they encouraged local people to organize conflict resolution committees. Coming to the conclusion that the main reason behind the conflicts were water shortages, they identified which areas had scarce natural resources and started construction of water tanks, reservoirs, and canals. What differentiated this intervention from past actions was that all these projects would be done with the cooperation of the local people. That was why they bypassed the local government and contacted the local community leaders for their cooperation with these projects. Here is an interview with a local leader of the herder village:

I received a call out of the blue early in the morning. The caller told me that he was working with a NGO in Kenya supporting the human rights of pastoralists in East Africa. They wanted to help us to restore peace in the area. It looked like he got our information through the local government.
What they wanted us to form [was] our own association so that they could work together with us. I thought that this was a prank, but a few days later he was here with local government officials. He gave lots of instructions to form an organization for the projects. I insisted that we had one already but it seemed he did not like our associations. So we made another one.

Due to the strong incentive of financial support from the international NGO, various civil society organizations formed in the area. The most energetic associations were formed in the herders’ village. Based in the village of Parakuyo, they have the most support and assistance from the international agency. In fact, a pastoral civil society association was the main target for their program in the area. The reason of this support came from their understanding that pastoral groups were living under severe pressure for survival. The Western NGO wanted to help them establish a sustainable and secure way of life while maintaining their traditional identity as livestock keepers in the area. The Western NGO thought a strong grassroots institution was necessary to empower them to advocate for policies that supported community–based livestock initiatives.

**Farmers’ Civil Society Associations**

Stimulated by the energetic activities of the pastoral association, farmers also started their own associations. Unlike the pastoral associations that were founded there was no direct support from the international NGOs. Community leaders in the area founded at least two associations. The first one, previously referred to, was called the Human Development Association. As indicated by the title, it was organized to promote development issues in the region. Most of the members were residents of Igusa with various occupational backgrounds. The purpose of the association was to promote economic opportunities by sharing expertise and information among members. Smaller but more focused associations also sprang up in the same area. Most represented
previous sisal workers laid off from the state sisal farm. The association focused especially on the issue of economic security through the fair distribution of land.

Despite the existence of disparities between farmers and herders, the local response to this influx of civil society movements was strong and positive. Many thought that the new political experiment could bring more opportunities to this area with its many problems. For some, especially those who became future leaders of various civil society associations, it was an eye opening experience since they were always looking for new possibilities. In a country with a one party system and in a rural area, it was hard for them to find these kinds of opportunities to mobilize people to deal with the various problems and issues they have. Most people, including leaders of these associations, paid more attention to the realistic side of this opportunity. Their interests were focused on how the new political movement might possibly provide them with various opportunities. Many still had the impression that a Western NGO might have the economic means strong enough for them to obtain some assistance to alleviate their already poverty stricken rural livelihood.

“I had never seen that many people coming to this small town. Since the sisal farm was out of business, there was nobody who wanted to come to visit this place. Look at the gas station; look at the beautiful hotel in front of the station. Do you think you can find this kind of things in the middle of rural villages? You know, this road used to be asphalt paved. These civil society things would bring us into another boom business here. I was not sure about what the meaning of civil society was, but as long as they keep coming, I thought anything would be possible.”

The Reality of the Igusa Civil Society Movement

Over time, my interviews with these civil society leaders were reduced significantly as I found discrepancies between what they said in their interviews and reality. Despite their rosy descriptions of civil society, the reality was very different. There was clearly a
low level of participation in civil society activities, so low that it was literally hard to 
observe people doing anything associated with the goals of the civil society association. 
For example, I asked a local civil society leader when the next meeting was. He told me 
that it would be next week. The next week the meeting was usually postponed due to 
reasons unknown. Sometimes the excuses were heavy rain or an unexpected funeral 
ceremony in the villages, it was after several postponements of the meeting that I finally 
realized that there was not going to be a meeting. After a few more similar frustrating 
interactions with the leader, he finally admitted that there was a low level of 
participation. In fact, there were few meetings even in the beginning and after that most 
expenses were paid by him. He was especially frustrated by the fact that young people 
never spent their time with these association activities.

These days, it is hard to recruit young members from this village. I know 
lots of youngsters moved out of this villages looking for jobs in the urban 
areas. But they are just part of many youngsters living in the town. I 
approached them in the market to recruit them but they would not pay 
attention to what I said. They just want to make money. They do not move 
without payment. That is so frustrating!

The low level of participation was the same story in the pastoralist’s association as 
well. This group was maintained by Peter, the volunteer worker. It did not mean that he 
was doing a bad job. It meant that he was the only one who was engaging in any civil 
society-related activities. I had the impression that it was he who did most of the work. 
He started his day alone on his bicycle visiting members of the conflict resolution 
committee. After spending the morning discussing issues with those involved in 
committee activities, he bicycled back to his Parakuyo villages to supervise a drugstore 
opened through the financial assistance of a Western NGO. Reporting the up-to-date 
situation in the Igusa area to a high level NGO through email was his job as well. He
had to bicycle 30 km to send this report from a local internet café in the town of Wassamau. His report usually started by stating the fact that everything was okay and people were living peacefully. He never missed asking the question when the next project would be coming to town. He would end this report by saying that the people in Igusa were waiting for the NGO to come back.

This lack of participation rendered pointless many potentially vital activities of the civil society associations. The section on peace restoration projects was one of many casualties. Monitoring peace was the main promise that the civil society association made in the beginning of its activities. The formation of conflict resolution committees for each village was one example. The committees were designed to reduce unnecessary confrontations by providing advice to parties in conflict. Civil society associations were funded to run these committees. The problem was that few people used this conflict resolution committee in times of conflicts. One of the reasons was that the herders’ civil society associations paid no attention to the activities of those conflict resolution committees. Representatives of herders’ association blamed the lack of financial resources for managing those committees as committee members asked for compensation for their services. As support from the association faded away, local interest dwindled and committees dissolved.

Peter was not a saint. He also was frustrated with the lack of participation by the association. He was especially upset with the leadership.

You know, these guys, the association leaders, they are all thieves. They collected money from the NGO and then spent all of them to buy new things. Did you see the motorcycle there? He got it from the NGO. He is a rich man. He is not living here. He has a house in Morogoro downtown. This is so funny. He is the head of this village, and, at the same time, he is
the head of the association. This is why people do not know about the association. There is no difference. This is so wrong.

As interviews went on, leaders admitted that the low level of participation was the most serious problem in their attempts to maintain the civil society associations. In fact, their immediate goal was not to run the association, but to run the office. For now, the office was the association itself. In order to look for the reasons behind the collapse of civil society associations in the area, I had to ask the leaders to introduce me to their members, who might have more candid opinions about the civil society movement in the area. After having interviewed more than thirty members from the associations in the area, it emerged that various factors contributed to the early failure of the civil society association project.

**Lingering Everyday Violence**

Among many reasons behind the failure of the civil society movement in the area, one commonly named factor was the violent conditions that hampered the physical movement of members of a civil society association from participating in association activities. Without freedom of movement, it was almost impossible to spend time on civil society association activities. The sisal farm as a political and economic powerhouse in the area was a major obstacle. The sisal farm owner was not happy with the strong civil society associations in Igusa. The sisal farm did not want to see civil society strengthen its influence in the area as civil society association members often organized protest at the entrance to the sisal farm. Intensified ethnic culture liable to violence was another factor. The culture of violence was behind the intensification. The last blow was the fact that there would be no more external assistance from the Western NGO in the near future, which was the most discouraging fact to most of the people in the region.
One characteristic of the violent environment was the reduced predictability in every aspect of life. Unpredictable conditions made it difficult for many to take part in civil society activities. In case of Igusa, people used to meet at least once a week to do various activities, such as preparing for events or meetings. The increasing violence in the field, however, discouraged people from participating in those civil society-related events or meetings. It was not that they did not like to perform their duties as members, but it was literally impossible for them to spare the time, due to the increasing unpredictability in the field. This can be observed more easily among farmers who had to monitor the movement of the herding population. On top of working many hours in the fields they had to spend significant amounts of extra time monitoring whether the cattle were threatening their crops.

Mr. Morokobo was a prime example of this dilemma. He used to be known for his energetic participation in civil society activities. He joined the civil society association by invitation from his close friend, who happened to be the organizer of the association. He liked the atmosphere in which there was much conversation about how to improve the living conditions of the area. He also enjoyed the company of others who shared similar opinions. However, his activities could not be continued. His new rice field was assigned in a zone where pastoralists very often come and go. Plus he had another field in a less dangerous area where he planted onions and cabbages. He used income from this vegetable field to pay for living expenses and school fees and uniform fees for his children. This meant that he put more hours into growing vegetables and worked continuously in the field throughout the year. He woke up early to get to his field before the herders did. He usually went on his bicycle, crossing a small brook. On his arrival,
he immediately monitored the movement of the herders and their cattle. He would shout and whistle toward the cattle if they approached too close to his field. No cattle in the area do not mean that he could come home. After tending this field he had to go to another area where he grows vegetables. There is no weekend since herders and their cattle have no weekend. He simply could not find enough time for extra activities with the civil society association and slowly lost interest in their activities.

**Uncooperative Sisal Farms**

Mr. Morokobo might have had a problem with the sisal farm because he had been a member of the civil society association. If he had not, he likely would have his field in a safer area out of the danger zone of the cattle route. In fact, it was a simple but effective tactic for the sisal farm to give civil society members a hard time. The sisal farm had a very negative view of the movement because they believed people who became members of the groups would become more demanding. Their requests included distributing land in as timely a manner as possible in order to take advantage of planting and growing during the rainy season on more accessible fields. Furthermore, they requested a more transparent process of land distribution. More often than not, these members organized protests at the entrance to the sisal farm. All these issues are considered a nuisance by the sisal farm. For this reason, the sisal farm did not want to see civil society strengthen its influence in the area. They wanted to control the movement.

These tactics involved discouraging local people, especially farmers, from becoming involved in the movement. Favorable land usually goes to people who do not have any relationship with any type of civil society association. One member from Igusa A described why he had to quit civil society activities.
First of all, if you are a member of a civil society association, they would be suspicious of your motivations. Even though the association I participated was not that radical, they asked me several times about the nature of our activities in the associations. I knew what they wanted to hear so I told a lie. That year I had no problem getting land not far from the village. But, they knew that my association was planning something with village people so they decided to do something with me. I was not that involved at that time, not a leader or anything. So I told them that I quit the association a long time ago. I had to give them a document to show the termination of membership. They knew what they were doing.

Due to these kinds of activities by the sisal farm, most civil society activities in Igusa do not address the issues related to sisal farms, giving up on involving themselves in protests and demonstrations.

**Disappearing Western Assistance**

The fatal blow to the civil society movement was the fact that local people learned that there would not be any more Western assistance with the civil society activities. Aid was discontinued as the irrigation canal and water tank constructions were completed. In fact, civil society associations advertised their activities by promoting their strong connection to external sources. This was the case of the Igusa association. Most of members initially were attracted to the group by the aura of rosy expectations. As the wave of development projects has come and gone most local people have lost interest in the activities of civil society. The leaders of these associations have failed to provide alternative reasons to promote their associations. An interview with the leader of association shows this clearly.

We are just sitting in the office waiting for another round of projects. I know this is not good situation but there is nothing we can do. I am pretty sure that they will come back if there is good news. The problem is that I do not know when it will come. But, I am sure they will come back. I am working on it pretty hard. Do you know any organization in America? You should give us your email, so we can contact you to arrange another NGO to come here.
Growing Identity Politics

Despite the obvious failure of the civil society experiment in real life terms, it seems clear that in the aftermath, the experiment still reverberates in the area. The knowledge and experience of the civil society movement from the past have become an important resource for local politics in the present. Different memories of the civil society movement have become a nexus for engaging in the politics of culture, (explain your use of this term) an arena where members of certain social groups with the shared experiences of injustice assert ways of understanding their distinctiveness that challenge dominant oppressive characterizations, with the goal of greater self-determination (Heyes 2009). Indigenous peoples such as Parakuyo Maasai now increasingly advance their struggles through a discourse that links their cultural identity with rights to territory, autonomy, and peoplehood rights that run parallel to those of the nation state itself (Albo 1991; Bonfil and Batalla 1981; Conklin and Graham 1995; Jackson 1995; Sherzer and Urban 1991; Stavenhagen 1992).

Parakuyo Maasai do not claim to be "first people" as such, since their migration approximately three centuries ago from northern Tanzania. Nonetheless, they believe that they share similar struggles with "first peoples" to protect their distinct cultural identity and their economic and political rights (Murumbi 1994). Like other pastoralist-identified groups in Tanzania such as the Maasai and Barabaig, and hunter-gatherer groups such as Ndorobo and Hadzabe, Parakuyo Maasai have been subject to repeated efforts by the colonial and then postcolonial state to alienate their land for more "productive" enterprises (such as commercial agriculture), to isolate and exclude them from state-sponsored development (such as schools and health facilities), and, more recently, to promote and project them as "primitive savages" in order to
market them in the lucrative, expanding tourist industry. Their marginalization has been at once material and discursive; efforts by elites to disenfranchise Maasai and label them as "second-class citizens" have been buttressed by disparaging stereotypes of "the Maasai," and pastoralists and hunter-gatherers in general, as backwards, "traditional," and culturally conservative (Hodgson 2001). Despite the obvious failure of the civil society experiment in real life terms, it seems clear that in the aftermath, the experiment still reverberates in the area. The knowledge and experience of the civil society movement from the past have become an important resource for local politics in the present. Different memories of the civil society movement have become a nexus for engaging in the politics of culture, an arena where members of certain social groups with the shared experiences of injustice assert ways of understanding their distinctiveness that challenge dominant oppressive characterizations, with the goal of greater self-determination (Heyes 2009).

The politics of culture was nothing new. Farmers and herders have been known for their rivalry in every aspect of their livelihoods. The long traditional rivalry has formulated cultural biases against each other. For most farmers, herders are shameful symbols of backwardness. In the farmers’ view, they live in the bush with many wives. They have no electricity or running water. Their dress is ridiculed. They usually do not educate themselves. They do not speak perfect Swahili, which is the national language in Tanzania. Most of them are neither Christian nor Muslim. All they care about is cows and money. Farmers regarded all these features as evidence of cultural backwardness.

Despite all the economic power herders have enjoyed, it has been they who have been perceived as the underdogs in the area. Their resistance often keeps them at a
distance. They do not send their children to the public education system. They have survived only on their cattle. They have their own ethnic organization, which has been respected by the government, but they do not have any voice in central politics. This lack of a voice affects every aspect of their livelihood since most important decisions have been made without notice or consultation with them. This has discouraged them from participating in politics or even education. Some herders I interviewed also acknowledged that their way of life is backward.

You know, if you live here, there is nothing you can do. Life is so boring. This is why I always go to the town. I don’t know. I have nothing to do but whenever I have nothing to do in the village, I would go to the town. I just love to see buses coming and going. I just listen to all kinds of funny sounds which we don’t have here in the bush. I have to go to the town everyday anyway to charge my cell phone. This thing costs me a fortune.

The introduction of civil society activities in the area, however, flipped this ladder of socio-cultural status upside down completely. All of a sudden, on many occasions, the herders looked like sophisticated presenters of their traditional culture. They had the opportunity to express their opinions to total strangers. They were interviewed and researched by reporters and scholars. Some eloquent local herders were favored for their well-balanced opinion toward the problems in the area. They also took part in many conferences and seminars in which they expressed their own accounts of incidents. Those who could not attend had their say in their own way. Many town meetings were held before a major conference to collect grass roots information. The conference participants were often required to hold this kind of meeting to assess local people’s opinions. They also accumulated knowledge and experience. It became a process of building collective memory.
What precipitated all these events was the excessive attention by Western NGOs who favored the herders. Pastoralists were viewed as real traditionalists. Whenever the NGOs visited the area their delegates toured the remote herders’ village, attending ceremonies and collecting gifts, such as handmade water bottles or wooden clubs. Their visitations were regularly recorded by photographers and even made into documentaries for their staff stationed in their home country. Herders were treated as minority groups in danger, their struggles to protect their way of life respected. Understandably, there was a strong consensus that their way of livelihood should be protected. On the other hand, farmers were viewed as conformists. Compared to herders, they were less colorful and interesting. They lived in rural villages without wearing ethnic attire or performing any kind of traditional rituals. Few people would think that their life styles were in grave danger. They were perceived and treated differently.

Therefore, for herders, civil society has been remembered as a triumph. There had been so many material changes in herders’ villages where no electricity or running water existed. These conditions changed as the Western donors poured money into the area as part of their civil society projects. Electricity came into the area and a huge concrete water tank was built in the middle of the town. A water canal was another addition.

“from now on, I do not have to go to Igusa every morning to charge my cell phone battery. I can do it here. That is one of most important things, to have electricity. And as you see we have that beautiful water tank in our town. Yes, our town, I can call this place a town. Since we have a bigger water tank than Igusa does. It is clean inside and looks shiny outside. I know some people in Igusa already get jealous of our tank because of its size and color. You know, the only thing I want from now on is a cell phone antenna.”
The perfect example of boosted ethnic identities and culture is the drive to build their own high school in their villages because education has become an important issue even for herders. They started sending their children and younger siblings to secondary school. The problem has been that the high school they enrolled in was too far from their villages. Parents were worried that their children would forget their cultural heritage while mingling with farmers’ children and the fact that the schools often hurt herders’ children by attacking the “backwardness” of the herder culture. Influenced by teacher and student ridicule, some students returning from the school often confronted their parents or friends. As these incidents happen often, the ethnic organization finally decided to build its own high school with a dormitory. The surprising thing is that they collected all the money necessary by themselves.

The unexpected turn of boosting ethnic identity is that this prosperity from Western assistance is the justification for violent activities. It can be seen to be the result of the debate surrounding the achievements of the civil society association. The main issue was who contributed most to this achievement. It can be traced back to the 2000 event of violent conflict. A group of people, especially the Moran, requested permission from Parakuyo elders in Wassamu district to use violence to rescue their cattle, while most elders opposed the plan due to the excessive use of violent force. The advice of the elders was ignored. Moran invaded the villages. As a result, many herders went to jail, while several important figures were permanently exiled from the area. For a while, people who participated in the violet assaults on farmers’ villages were criticized by their own people for ignoring elders’ advice. It was, however, the sudden involvement of a Western NGO that provided massive assistance to the area that got many starting to
think that their violent activities attracted the attention of these outsiders and justified the logic of violence, which they then thought would make more profit than peace would.

This history of success in attracting external assistance became a useful material for reproducing warrior identity more strongly. Some of them used this occasion to justify the violence they used in rescuing cattle from the sisal farm. It was the groups of herder civil society leaders who are most energetically glorifying this unpredicted achievement. They preached that it was the superiority of their way of life that attracted all the international attention and assistance, emphasizing the Moran warriors’ courage. They believed that it was the Moran’s violent tactics that eventually resulted in the subsequent success for Parakuyo community. They argued that even though there was strong opposition to the use of violence by elders, young warrior herdsmen were right in the long run. All these experiences have been used to bolster the perceived greatness of their ethnic identity and culture.

External assistance induced by the warriors’ violent activities of 2000 meant that the Moran were able to inhibit social change through violent action, causing a great chasm between the two groups. It is historically known that Maasai elders and Moran warriors respond differently in many ways (Tignor 1972). Many of the elders try to negotiate, to make small but timely concessions while preserving their traditions. Elders would benefit handsomely from government support. More significantly, the military organization of the Parakuyo Moran had become a serious liability to the elders. Not only were the defensive and military aspects of the system unnecessary in the contemporary era, but the illegal Moran raids were bringing heavy government punishments with fines that the whole community had to pay. Since the elders were
obviously the wealthier element, they were subject to the heaviest burden of repayment. Their economic interest asked co-operation with the Tanzanian government. Contrarily, the Moran warriors have been known for their acting impulsively, emotionally, and often violently (Tignor 1972). Living in their own order, Moran enjoyed a degree of independence, and their structure of leadership also permitted a great variety of views and the quick carrying into operation of hostile sentiments. In fact, the Moran’s capacity for eruptive action is being turned against the elders at times, and so helped to limit the control of the latter over the warriors (Tignor 1972). Organizing a cattle raid against an elder or group of elders who seemed especially oppressive to them has not been rare thing.

It was evident that Parakuyo elders were losing their power over Moran warriors. Elders enjoyed having the final say in important matters of their communities, handling all disputes between Parakuyo members. Disobedience to the elders’ instructions and orders meant risking severe punishment because elders would instruct the community to cut off all contact with them (Tignor 1972). However, a recurring theme in elders’ complaints in recent days is their frustration over their limited power today as compared to the past. For example, in Mbwade, the elders used to go to a few houses to request a goat for rituals, urging the necessity of hold rituals to prevent bad luck from happening to their cattle and Parakuyo people. Whenever they visited these houses, elders tried to select a small number of unmarried youths who had no physical scars or disabilities, and who carried no ritual impurity, to perform specific duties of the rituals. They were also required to obey the elders’ instructions and carry out the hard task of running with the 'medicine' around and within the community borders.
The chance of being turned away has increased, however. Elders voiced the most frustration over the unhelpful attitude of youngsters towards the preparation and performance of rituals. Elders’ selection process is growing increasingly difficult as a significant proportion of the youth are attending schools and do not want to be associated with black magic, which they are taught is a backward tradition by their school teachers in town. Elders complained that especially those youngsters who attend a high school at Wassamu town either refused outright to volunteer to prepare various rituals. In fact, in a meeting in Parakuyo village, the youths who had been asked about participating rituals expressed great reluctance to participate. They demanded that the elders should provide them with monetary compensations in exchange for their performing the ritual. The reluctance on the part of the youths as well as their demands to the elders represent the ongoing social change in Parakuyo Maasai communities in Igusa region. The outright display of resistance designed to emphasize their importance to the elders reflected that their own authority as a decision group might not carry much weight anymore.

For farmers, who were alienated from all this civil society assistance, the civil society movement was a nightmarish experiment. Farmers use this to criticize their leaders for a lack of leadership ability at a point of crisis. Compared to the benefits herders enjoyed, farmers received nothing from this wave of assistance. Most of the farmers thought that they were the victims of the incident, since all the casualties were farmers. The compensation they received from the government was sacks of maize powder and only several pieces of tin roof sheeting to replace the burned down houses. This inequitable and inadequate compensation angered many farmers.
Cynicism was rampant on the farmers’ side. The poor performance of civil society leaders was also a main target of their criticism. While most assistance went to the pastoralists, farmers also organized several associations on their own. Most of the new leaders advertised their connections with these Western NGO and brought some level of assistance from them. It has turned out, however, that most of the leaders’ promises did not materialize or was exaggerated. The final blow came from the corrupt style of management. Membership dwindled over time.

Farmers try to ignore the sudden fame the herders have been enjoying. In addition, they try to ignore the existence of the herding population. They ignore the existence of the group by reducing the chance of any kind of contact in their daily lives. One extreme case was an elderly man who lost one of his relatives in the violent conflicts. He told me:

I hardly go to the town, because I do not want to see those animals. They are animals. They killed my friends. If I go there I would not look at them in the eye.

Planting Western style civil society in the area has failed. The political economic conditions have been too harsh for the new political experiment to take root. For local people, it appeared that it was not a matter of failure or success. In many aspects of their lives the remains of civil society was still there even though it was not to the degree that would satisfy the critical observation of outsiders. A good example of the influence of civil society movement was the fundraising activities by pastoral people. Even though their organization was totally ethnically controlled, the activities were the same as ordinary Western civil society activities. However, some farmers are still working hard to organize real civil society associations. At least three new associations were organized during my stay. I do not know the exact purpose of these associations, since they did
not have any meetings or offices in town, but these groups are in the district office and await the right time to be called up for a new influx of civil society intervention. As one herder remarked;

“You know, this is like a cell phone antenna at the market. Nobody knows who calls you and when. If you have this association ready, you may get a call someday.”

**Conclusion**

This chapter discussed the recent development of the civil society movement in the Igusa region. The chapter showed an unusual side to violent environments. Even under the constant threat of violence, daily livelihoods continue and the seemingly monotonous daily lives are often filled with chances and opportunities. Recent civil society movements introduced by international NGOs are one example of such chances, among many consequences of these external interventions, one of the significant consequences of the changing nature of farmer-herder conflicts. While farmer-herder conflicts have been known to be motivated by access to natural resources or ethnic tensions in the past, the circumstance of protracted violent conflicts in the area often add one more aspect to the already complex nature of conflicts. While herders are the major economic actors in the region, the interventions of civil society organizations with various assistance packages often worsen the socio-economic gap between farmers and herders in the region, igniting jealousy and frustration among relatively underprivileged farmers in the process. It is this moment that ethnic or natural resource motivated conflicts become a conflict of class as poor farmers use their position of controlling natural resources as a tool to take revenge on herder’s excessive economic gains by taking advantage of a lack of government regulation.
In this kind of situation, civil society in this area is an impossible task to achieve and it is possible and in fact temptingly easy to blame farmers and herders or violence. It is too early, however, to say whether or not civil society is an impossible dream in this area. Instead, despite all the aforementioned negative impacts of civil society intervention, what should not be discounted is the fact that the violent fields are often filled with all these opportunities and efforts to use them. People living in this unusual condition often are actively involved in making these scarce opportunities in favor of their benefits. This positivity which resides in the midst of a violent context means that even though in the middle of serious violent activities, a number of things may be possible. If there is appropriate coordination among interest groups, a possible breakthrough movement is possible and these kinds of opportunities could one day possibly contribute to peace reconstruction through the participation of the process of distribution of material assistance and external attention. In turn, this may lead to an eventual and successful introduction of a culture of civil society to the Igusa region. Therefore, finding out the way to coordinate this external intervention is a serious task that needs to be examined very carefully before any intervention occurs on the ground.

This dissertation shows that a seemingly primitive and one-off event of pastoral violence is, in fact, a form of sophisticated long-term strategic behavior of an essentially catalytic nature, originating from interaction with other kinds of violence in Igusa region. The complicated natures of pastoral violence contribute to the making of different kinds of pastoral violence. The physicality of pastoral violence is one of the consequences of struggles against structural violence caused by the remaining colonial economic legacy in the Igusa region. Violence is the best weapon against the omnipotent existence of
never-ending structure. The long term nature of this is derived the status of everyday violence, formulated as it is by new violent actors, necessitating the existence of pastoral violence in a longitudinal and continuing form. The strategic nature of the violence mostly comes from the instrumentality of violence as pastoralists apply violence as a calculated way of dealing with the unsustainable and intensified livelihood strategies of other actors. The sophistication of pastoral violence is based on the nature of catalyticity, as the act of pastoral violence often attracts chances and opportunities that turn apolitical circumstance into unknown future circumstances, filled with possibilities.
While violence is clearly mediated through local cultural norms, it is equally occurred in the logic of globalized capital. Privatization of sisal industry has been imposed by market-oriented government reform policies, rather than recognizing the local variations of economies or distinct histories. Consequently, the basis of the rural lives of Igusa has been violently dismantled, daily lives completely fell under the influence of violent activities, limiting the present political and economic potentialities. Exasperated Igusa population follows their scripted roles and resorts to extreme means in their attempts to cope with the poverty and mounting injustice. In sum, local experiences of violence that seemingly occur in isolation from the wider matrix of space are in fact tied to the ‘global’, which renders violence somewhat ‘everyday’ (Springer 2009).

This dissertation shows that a seemingly “primitive” and on-off event of pastoral violence in Igusa region is, in fact, one of the multiple types of violence that is perpetuated by various actors with different strategic goals and interests (Bohle and Fünfgeld 2007). For many subsistence levels Igusa pastoralists, who are often regarded as sole contributor to the violent situation in the region, administering violence is a form of strategic resistance against the omnipotent structures of privatized sisal political economy and encroaching farmers with intensified agricultural activities. For sisal estate management and large-scale herd owners, whose prosperity are heavily dependent on the rigid political economy structure in the region, masterminding violence is one of the lucrative form of business strategies that is geared at maximizing their economic gains. They contribute to making Igusa violence as normalized as possible in a degree to
reach the status of everyday violence. For Igusa farmers, who have been regarded as the major victim of pastoral violence, are also contributing to the violent scene through their subtle and indirect way of performing violence. Resorting to symbolic violence is as formidable and destructive as physical force because these kinds of indirect agitations often instigate pastoralists into committing direct violence in large scale.

Perceiving the multiple types of violence in Igusa region opens several new windows in terms of reevaluating, researching, understanding, and resolving the issue of normalized violence in rural Africa. Firstly, while this research shed light on the long term and destructive nature of African rural violence, it also reaffirms the violent aspect of the neo-liberalization process imposed on the Igusa region and its people, which has been structurally and physically violent. Liberalization, through the implementation of Structural Adjustment Programs, forces poor African countries to open their markets to foreign products, currency speculation from abroad, removing regulatory agencies and regulatory laws, allowing foreign corporations free reign to operate with fewer public safeguards (Makwana 2006). Agricultural land, water sources, and previously government subsidized basic services are now increasingly controlled and supplied by corporations for profit (Makwana 2006). The present study contributes to understanding the violent aspect of liberalization process by conceptualizing the liberalization process as operating on a continuum from the physical to the structural and symbolic (Lockhart 2008:96). Like Farmer, this research situates violence in a political economy, particularly by linking it to the impacts of neoliberalism and widespread privatization policies in East Africa.
Theoretically speaking, this research focuses on the political impacts of the diminishing access to environmental resources based on a contextual understanding of political economy. While analyzing the sisal industry as the primary structural condition, this research looks into how the structural factors of the sisal industry have become involved in the environmental degradation. It is a process in which powerful and violent actors with connections to the global economy push subsistence farmers and herders into accepting diminished access to natural resources, and as a result, their daily livelihood activities eventually degrade the surrounding natural environment. By revealing the politics of the process of natural resource scarcity, this research provides vivid counter-narratives to the widely influential and popular yet deeply flawed and unapologetic neo-Malthusian claims such as Robert Kaplan’s (1994) “The Coming Anarchy” and Jared Diamond’s (2005) “Collapse”.

In addition, it avoids the mechanical nature associated with the term structural violence by focusing on the everydayness of violence at the local level (Peluso and Watts 2001). Schepers-Hughes’s term everyday violence is used here because it more effectively frames this local complexity and lived experience of individuals while remaining attentive to the political economy of severe conditions of rural Africa (Lockhart 2008). While most scholarly studies of violent conflict in academic disciplines have a tendency to focus on large scale violent conflicts or urban violence which are well publicized, this research focused on sporadic and communal rural violence which often goes unnoticed, and is thus under analyzed. Through the revelation of everyday violence, this research provides ethnographic data for the nature of real lives of rural people in Tanzania whose sufferings under everyday violence are often unnoticed in the
movement of grand economic transformations. In the case of Igusa, it was the previously sisal workers who are dependent on the privatized sisal estates and the herders whose lives are always under threat due to the privatization in the plain. The revelation of everyday violence necessitates a more thorough understanding of the seriousness of low intensity violent conflicts in rural Africa (Elbadawi and Sambanis 2000).

This research also shed light on the study of pastoralism in Africa, especially on the complex nature of interaction between nomadic pastoralists and sedentary farmers. In describing the conflicts between farmer and herder in Africa, what the contemporary relationships are turning into is the more complex nature of farmer-herder conflict (Turner 2004; Moritz 2010). One of complexities is the diverse characteristics of participants in this type of conflicts. As shown in the analysis of violent conflicts in Igusa, the nature of Igusa farmer-herder conflicts was, in fact, conflicts among subsistence farmers, herders, sisal workers, large-scale herders, sisal estate managements, and even state governments. By elucidating various participants of Igusa conflicts, it shows that describing these conflicts as farmer-herder conflicts, often makes the complexity disappear and unnoticeable, making analysis impossible.

This research also contributes to the field of conflict resolution through providing a more nuanced and contextual understanding of pastoral violence and the importance of local initiatives. Conflict resolution programs are often destined to fail as most of their programs and suggestions are implemented without considering the complex nature of the violent conflicts and their contexts. This research demonstrates that conflicts should be viewed as events which cannot be isolated from their social contexts. Vital
contextual information such as historical background or detailed understanding of participants of violent acts are important in understanding the social context. The research describes the activities of local initiatives to promote peace. As indicated in the research, the process and consequences of violence are not always filled with negative phenomena. In the midst of destructive and on-going violence, there are always activities of anti-violence. Anti-violent activities consist of peace restoration, conflict resolution, and negotiation. The external process sponsored by multilateral institutions tend to hide the importance of internally-driven processes for peace. This research shows that a peace process is thus more sustainable when local actors define the contents and procedures.

There are several limitations in the research. Firstly, the research did not cover the issue of biophysical process in the Igusa region fully. Consequently, research on the causal relations between the condition of natural environment of Igusa and violence has been insufficient. Sufficient research on the relation might have helped to explain a highly causal relationship between recent flooding disaster and environmental degradation under Igusa conditions of everyday violence. The researcher clearly was not prepared for analyzing the biophysical process, while focusing most research activities on the political and economic aspects of the region and its violent conditions. This research did not or could not cover this complex topic completely, and therefore, many of these issues can be the basis of a future study in the area.

In fact, there has been a theoretical debate over whether scholars of political ecology put too much emphasis on the political aspects while hardly mentioning the biophysical aspects of issues (Walker 2005:73). It seems the debate has emerged
partly because some researchers have seen further work in biophysical explanation to be unnecessary in essential social-science applications. For example, in a book entitled, The International Politics of the Environment (Hurrell and Kingsbury 1992), List and Rittberger (1992) argued that social-scientific approaches to environment should not get embroiled in the difficulties of biophysical science.

Vayda and Walters (1999) criticize that some political ecologists do not even deal with the influence of politics in effecting environmental change but rather deal only with politics. However, acknowledging the importance of biophysical aspect has been the long tradition in major work of political ecology. Significant research in political ecology has shown concerns of ecology (Blaikie and Brookfield 1987:17) as a defining question of their research. For example, Blaikie and Brookfield’s (1987) foundational text emphasizes the role of the biological/biochemical and physical characteristics of particular environments in creating a variable management task for land users within the context of broader social and political economic conditions. In his landmark study of the environmental degradation in West Africa, Michael Watts (1985) applies paleoclimatic data and local-level ecological analysis to critique then-prevailing theories of population- and drought-driven desertification, concluding that ‘a form of economic disequilibrium in the socio-economic system is transmitted as a form of ecological disequilibrium.

Focusing only on political economic aspects does not mean that this research undervalues the importance of biophysical aspect of political ecology. Avoiding the simplistic separation of science and politics, should be the major task for the future research of political ecology. What this research can contribute to is to ponder the possibility of integrating politics and biophysical context in the research of political
ecology. One potential way is that biophysical contexts and politics may be integrated through adopting a more politically aware understanding of the contexts within which environmental explanations of biophysical phenomena emerge, and are seen to be relevant. By analyzing the drawing of social boundaries and social networks around the analysis of complex biophysical processes, the result of the integrating analysis can be a biophysically grounded form of transparent and accountable explanation, which is socially relevant to the places where such biophysical explanation is applied (Forsyth 2003).

Secondly, the study of international interventions was mostly conducted after the actual projects were finished. Therefore, most of the research has been carried out based on documentation from the international agencies and testimonies of the local populations. While paying extra attention to the issue of the credibility of interviews of local people on this issue, there is a chance that some information regarding the nature of activities of international agencies is biased and unbalanced. In order to reduce the possibilities of these biases exerting undue influence on understanding this situation, I tried to increase the validity of this information by not heavily depending on a certain group of people while crosschecking the content of interviews with various people with different political and economic interests.

Finally, as mentioned in the methodology section, the role of women in the pastoral violence has not been described in depth. This was because studying women in a traditionally Muslim area faces significant limitations. Moreover, it was because the research was carried out after the events of 9.11 and the terror attack on the US embassy in Tanzania, being a foreign researcher on a sensitive topic such as violent
conflicts between farmers and herders often required extra precautions in terms of accessing local populations. Despite a lack of the information on the role of women in the violent circumstances of the Igusa region, their ordeals and contributions are significant and the nature of these issues should receive due attention in future research.
### APPENDIX A

**FARMING ACTIVITY CALENDAR**

#### Seasonal calendar Chekereni

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activities</th>
<th>Jan</th>
<th>Feb</th>
<th>March</th>
<th>April</th>
<th>May</th>
<th>June</th>
<th>July</th>
<th>Aug</th>
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<th>Oct</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Seasonality</td>
<td>Drought</td>
<td>Late February to early March</td>
<td>Very low, farmers are clearing the bush and preparing land</td>
<td>Very low, few farmers are ploughing and sowing paddy</td>
<td>Very low, farmers are ploughing and sowing paddy</td>
<td>Very low, farmers are ploughing and sowing paddy</td>
<td>Most of the farmers are busy harvesting maize</td>
<td>Very low, farmers are ploughing and sowing paddy</td>
<td>Most of the farmers are busy harvesting paddy</td>
<td>Very low, farmers are ploughing and sowing paddy</td>
<td>Very low, farmers are ploughing and sowing paddy</td>
<td>Very low, farmers are ploughing and sowing paddy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bush clearing &amp; Ploughing (Paddy)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ploughing (Maize)</td>
<td>Intensive, most of the farmers are busy ploughing their farms</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planting (Paddy)</td>
<td>Intensive, few farmers are sowing</td>
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<td>Planting (Maize)</td>
<td>Intensive, few farmers are sowing</td>
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<td>Weeding (Paddy)</td>
<td>Very few farmers are weeding their farms</td>
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<td>Weeding (Maize)</td>
<td>Very few farmers are weeding maize</td>
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<td>Harvesting (Paddy)</td>
<td>Very few are harvesting paddy</td>
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<td>Harvesting (Maize)</td>
<td>Very few are harvesting maize</td>
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<tr>
<td>Harvesting (Coconut)</td>
<td>A larger amount of coconut is harvested mainly from December to April</td>
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192
Third Farmers Forum
for the Southern Highlands Zone on

Relations Between
Farmers and Pastoralists

Held at the Don Bosco Youth Center, Songea

26 – 29 November 2001

The Forum was organized by
The Implementation Team of the Project

Food Security and Household Income for
Smallholder Farmers in Tanzania:
Applied Research with Emphasis on Women

under the Tanzania Agricultural Research Project Phase Two,
Sokoine University of Agriculture
(TARP II – SUA Project)
ANNEX 3D: Morogoro Rural and Kilosa Group

Participants
1. Emmanuel Ibahim
2. Huseni Mejja
3. Martin Lupata
4. O.S. Mitu
5. K. Kambu
6. Bilali Msabaka
Greetings to dear Mpoke and Joker. And I'm also sending this to Bill, so
greetings to you too. I just got an email from Joker telling me about
the dedication of the Lutheran church at Parakuyo. It was so great to hear
from you.
Joker. We did arrive back in Seattle safely. And since then, just
about every
day, I've been looking at our videotapes and reliving our trip. It was a
great time. I have a summary of the script below. I realize you might not get
to
your email for many days, but when you get this it would be great to hear
your reaction to the script summary. Please realize it is just a
summary and
leaves out a lot of material that will be in the final script, such as
interviews
from Maasai and farmers that I will include. Please correct any of my
factual mistakes, and I would appreciate your adding any of your
personal
opinions
and reactions too...this helps me with the script. It's good to hear
what you
think is important to draw out. Many thanks, Mary

First a few questions:
1) In the early incident, how many cattle did the farmers confiscate
from
the Maasai. This was the incident that lead to the Maasai then
recapturing their
cattle, and the farmers retaliating by burning the Maasai houses. In
the
tape interview with Maasai elder Mkunduge, it has 6,000 cattle
confiscated. That
sounds high. Perhaps he meant to say 60 cattle?
2) How long ago was the Twatwatwa dam built? And when did the rains
come that
filled that dam?
3) Dr. Mpoke -- when you pronounce your first name, is the last "a" pronounced?

Stand With Africa &© Peace video
Script notes from Mary Peterson, 206-365-7726

Summary: As Maasai fight with neighbors for survival, our Stand With
Africa
project is there to help build peace.

A. Atlanta Youth Gathering
Excitement at youth gathering. Heidi Nagstrom, director for gathering
program, says, &©The quarter idea actually came from God, I think. I actually
woke
up one morning with the idea in my head.&© Heidi tells about the
response. We
see a cascade of quarters. One of the many groups excited to collect
quarters is
from Tulsa, Oklahoma. A teenage girl from Tulsa says, &quot;Something like
a quarter is so small, but together, with all of these quarters -- we can do
something.&quot;}

Pouring, spinning quarters dissolve into pouring water in Tanzania.
What can
those quarters do in Africa? More than you can imagine.

B. Africa story: Kilosa, Tanzania

1. Maasai with herd at lake. Wild animals. Maasai lived for centuries
roaming
with their cattle on the plains of East Africa. They learned from their
elders how to survive. But Maasai are now encountering a force that
might do
them
in. The modern world is encroaching on Maasai territory and their
grazing land
is being taken away. Dr. Mpoke of CLIF says, &quot;There are things that
we really
fear. If they happen so fast and so badly, it will just mean the Maasai
will
be wiped out of this earth.&quot; Completely.

2. Maasai used to graze freely around Kilosa, Tanzania. They came here
when
other grazing land dried up. But now as they search for grazing in the
dry
season, they find new neighbors taking up the land -- farmers who are
themselves
struggling to survive.

3. The Massai culture is changing rapidly. The government is telling
Maasai
to settle in one spot. We see them sell cattle at a livestock market
something they never would have done in the past. Cattle mean wealth to
them.
But as
Maasai settle, they now need cash to pay for food and other things.
Being in
the cash economy and settling near towns has proven dangerous for
Maasai youth:
they're getting involved with drinking, drugs, and are being exposed
to AIDS.
At the livestock market we also meet another voice telling Maasai to
leave
their culture -- an itinerant evangelist. He preaches to them: Change
your
ways; stop wearing beads; dress Western if you want to be a good
Christian.

Mpoke is
a gentle man, but he speaks with the evangelist. Mpoke is saddened when Maasai
a gentle man, but he speaks with the evangelist. Mpoke is saddened when Maasai culture is put down, and even more so when he's saddened when scripture is misused. Mpoke is our Stand With Africa connection here, and we'll see how his presence has been a saving grace for the Maasai of Kilosa.

4. Others are also here to support the Maasai in their struggle. A Lutheran missionary is serving 14 Maasai churches. He preaches this Sunday on how many times you should forgive someone. He says, "Forgiveness is one of the essentials of Christianity." The Maasai take this message to heart as drought proves more and more severe, neighbor has turned on neighbor.

5. The missionary tells us how cattle have been crossing into the gardens of farmers as there is nowhere else to go for food. The farmers confiscate the cattle. Then Maasai take out bows and arrows to get their cattle back, and the farmers take our guns.

6. An incident happened three years ago. Cattle wandered onto farmland, and farmers confiscated then. The Maasai then took back their cattle. Then farmers came after the Maasai &c; burning their village and killing a man and a child. The Maasai warriors declared war. They attacked a village of farmers &c; burning 56 houses, killing 32 people. The police failed to catch the warriors and instead picked up 30 Maasai, as if they were wild animals, say the Maasai. They were jailed for three months then released without charge.

7. Mpoke reads us the newspaper account. The nation was shocked. Mpoke explains that people found it hard to understand how neighbor could turn on neighbor. At this point, IWR/CIFF was asked to come help. Mpoke saw the solution was to touch people's hearts &c; people had to face the truth and only then could their community heal.

8. The project began by meeting physical needs to lessen the tension. Maasai were trained in animal care so their animals would produce more milk &c; the staple of the Maasai diet. Maasai communities also worked together to build an earthen water catchment dam, so they would have their own water when the rains return.

9. But the next step was an even greater challenge: how to heal the broken relationships. The process began when Maasai and farmers admitted their prejudices against each other. This was the start of healing. They then formed a peace committee to solve their community problems. This was a revival of Maasai traditions &c; a council of elders would decide the compensation for a transgression, but they would go beyond compensation to mend the broken relationship.

10. They built on the Maasai tradition of swapping belts with your enemy to develop empathy and understand the others' point of view. A Maasai elder says, &"The big lesson we have learned is there is not much difference between us and our neighbors." Today, farmers are appreciating the Maasai, realizing that to help cattle survive is important for their own survival: they need the meat. And Maasai have a new appreciation for farmers: they need the crops for their own diet now. Peace has returned.

11. The Maasai people celebrate another pond they built through this project. This pond has saved the water from the rains a long time ago. Children sing, &"Water is life." The women from the village of Hwade-Kenyan church women -- sing that the still waters of the pond remind them of peace.

Gifts from Lutherans are helping make all this possible. Those little offerings have turned into a priceless gift. The people have peace.

12. There's another Maasai tradition of the peace tree. You give your enemy a bracelet from its bark, with words promising peace. As the people have peace and start working together again, they are now free to work on their other problems of finding food security and prosperity. A farmer sits down with his Maasai neighbor. The farmer invites the Maasai to use some of his land for grazing, just stay inside the boundaries. We again hear the women singing, &"Let us make peace. Let us make peace. Let us make peace. Let us make peace. Let us make peace."

....getmsg?currmbox=F0000000001&a=eb882482e2330227ca98a727e95e75032&msg=MSG106435109/03
CONSTITUTION
OF
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES ASSOCIATION

PART ONE

1.0 PREAMBLE/ STATUS/NAME/ADDRESS

1.1. PREAMBLE:
Whereas, the Government Policy insists on self help, participatory planning, Community collaborative Efforts, exchange of experience for sustainable Economic and social Development: We the Residents of Kilosa District on General meeting held at Kimamba on 26th June 2001 have seriously considered and agreed to form Human Development Strategies Association (HDSA) so as to cater for the development need of the area. HDSA shall carry out and Manage its affairs in accordance with this Constitution

1.2. STATUS: The Association shall be a Non Profit and Non Governmental, Deriving its functions and operations from the will of its members

1.3. NAME: Human Development Strategies Association (HDSA)

1.4. ADDRESS: The main Office of Association shall be in Kimamba, Kilosa District, its Postal Address shall be Human Development Strategies Association

P. O. BOX 20,
Kimamba,
Kilosa District
Morogoro Region
TANZANIA

2. AREAS OF OPERATION
The Association shall operate its functions in Kilosa District.
PART TWO

3.0. OBJECTIVES

3.1. The main objectives of the Association is to foster Social – Economic development of the people of Kilosa District by having a Central Organization, which will act as a focal point for co-ordinating development activities, carried out in the District by the member of the Association.

3.2. The association will concern itself with the following activities:

3.2.1. Improvement of Agriculture Production through better knowledge/understanding and improved techniques.

3.2.2. Design and launch programmes for Environmental protection for example tree planting etc.

3.2.3. Improve the position and status of Youth in the Society major measures should be to find ways on how to improve their economic position.

3.2.4. Improve the position and status of Children – major measures should be to fight against child labour.

3.2.5. Improve the position and statuses of old people.

3.2.6. Improve Primary School Education through increased and systematic strengthening of physical and personnel resources and through creating a more positive attitude towards education among the Residents.

3.2.7. Improve health care through strengthening of physical and personnel resources for preventing as well as curative public health.

3.2.8. To act as an intelligence centre in both social and economic of the members.

3.2.9. To organize meeting, seminars, workshops, exchange visits and study tours aimed at fostering aims and objective of the association.

3.2.10. To print publish and broadcast through the media inclusive of its own journals, books, magazines and the like.

3.2.11. To liaison, co-operate and work together with other associations both in Tanzania and elsewhere having more or less similar aims and objectives to those of the Association.
3.2.12. To mobilize, disburse and supervise the use of funds of the
Community felt needs.
3.2.13. To procure funds in support to community Projects. In order to attain
this the Association shall impose Member’s fees and Annual
contribution. It may as well receive donations, grants, loans from
government bodies, Parastal Organizations, Non Governmental
organizations Private individuals or other whether based in Tanzania
or elsewhere.

PART THREE

4.0. Membership

4.1. The membership is strictly voluntary and open to all adults
who are mentally fit
4.2. Any interested individual who fullfills the conditions of section
one of this article will have to apply in writing for membership.
4.3. The council has the authority to accept or reject any
membership application.
4.4. Membership may cease through death, mental cases,
suspension or resignation.
4.5. Each individual member of the Association shall on enrolment
pay an admission fees of 10,000/= (ten thousands) or as
otherwise determined by the Association from time to time
4.6. Each individual member of the Association shall pay Shs
20,000/= (Twenty thousands) every year as membership fees or
otherwise as determined by the Association from time to time.
4.7. Any Individual member shall be eligible for election as a
member of the Council and a Board as established under
Constitution.
4.8. Every member shall have the right to speak to general meetings
of the Association on any matter on the Agenda.
4.9. Association membership is open to existing Institutions of
Kilosla District as may be determined by the Council and
subject to the confirmation by the Annual General meeting.
4.10 RESIGNATION AND SUSPENSION:

4.10.1. The resignation in writing of a member from the association shall take effect from the moment the letter of resignation is delivered to the office.

4.10.2. A member who has resigned will not be entitled to refund of any subscription however paid.

4.10.3. The council may suspend an Association member for Gross Misconduct after having given such member a fair and reasonable opportunity to answer the allegation(s), or charges against the member.

4.11.0 RIGHTS OF MEMBERS:

A member shall have the following rights:-

4.11.1. To participate in all activities and Programmes of the association

4.11.2. To participate and/or attend meeting os the Association at the level she/he is entitled.

4.11.3. Content any post/position in the association and elect his/her leaders in accordance with the laid down procedure, provided that such a member is not in arrears of annual fees.

4.12.0 DUTIES OF MEMBERS. All member shall:-

4.12.1. Endeavour to work for the Association with all the dedication without fear, hatred or favours.

4.12.2. Work for the Eradication of Poverty, ignorance and diseases, cooperate with others for the betterment of the Association.

4.12.3. Be honest, trustful and good member of the association

4.12.4. Pay fees and subscription when due.
PART FOUR

5.0 FUNDS AND PROPERTIES

The funds and properties of the Association shall include;
5.1 Entrance fees
5.2 Annual subscription
5.3 Grants from individuals and Associations within and outside Tanzania
5.4 Assets acquired in ordinary course of business
5.5 The Financial year of the Association shall be the calender year.
5.6 The Association shall establish rules governing the collections, keeping and expenditure of finance.

5.7.0 AUDITORS.

5.7.1 All the Association accounts, records and documents shall be open to the inspection of the Auditors at any time.
5.7.2 The auditors shall be paid such honorarium for their duties as may be approved by the Board.
5.7.3 The Auditors shall not be the Association Official or members of any committee of the Association.

6.0 ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT

For the proper and Effective execution of its functions the Association shall have the General meetings, the Council and The Board.

6.1.1 The supreme Authority of the Association shall rest in the Annual General meeting.
6.1.2 The Annual General meeting shall be held within three months after the closure of the Financial year.
6.1.3 Duties of the Annual General meeting among others things shall be
   (a) To approve minutes of previous Annual General meeting
   (b) Approval of Annual Reports of the Association
   (c) Approval of audited accounts of the Association.
(d) Election of chairperson and members of the council when due.
(c) Approval of short and long term plans.
(f) Admission of new members
(g) Do any other relevant business,

6.1.4 The call for General Meeting shall be circulated to members, giving a one month’s notice and shall specify the date, place and agenda for the meeting.

6.1.5 The board on written request of not less than three members shall call a special meeting. The call shall be circulated to members giving fourteen days and shall specify the date, place and agenda for the meeting.

6.1.6 The decisions at the meeting shall be majority votes.

6.1.7 The council may call an extra – ordinary meeting when deemed necessary.

6.2.0 THE COUNCIL

6.2.1 The Council shall consist of:
(a) The chair Person
(b) The vice Chair Person
(c) The Executive Secretary
(d) Three women members
(e) Other Elected members not exceeding ten (10)

6.2.3 The General meeting by Secret Ballot under the laid down procedure shall elect all these Officials.

6.2.4 The period of holding office is three years. A retiring member of Council may be re-appointed for another term of three years. No member of council may hold office for a period exceeding nine consecutive years.

6.2.5 The council shall have the following duties:
(a) Carry out objectives of the Association.
(b) Prepare and Recommend short and long term Plans of the Association to annual General meeting.
(c) Give effect to all Resolutions of the Annual and Extra Ordinary General meetings
(d) Manage funds and assets of the Association ensuring that such funds are utilized for the sole purpose of achieving the objective of the Association.
(e) Recommend entrance fees and Annual subscription.
(f) Ensure that accounts of the Association are audited in time.
(g) Hire and fire staff of the Association
(h) Election of members of the Board when due.
(i) Do any relevant business.

6.3.0 THE BOARD

6.3.1 The council shall establish a board comprising five (5) members from among members of the council at least one of these shall be a woman. The board is the technical committee of the council. The chairperson of the council shall also be the chairperson of the board. The board may co-operate technicians without voting rights and when required.

6.3.2 Functions of the Board shall be the following:-

(a) Supervision of the day to day duties of the Association.
(b) Prepare short and long term Development Plans for the Association.
(c) Prepare and Review Association implementation Plans and budgets.
(d) Implement decisions and recommendations made by the Annual General meeting and of the Council
(e) Preparation of General meeting agenda.
(f) To interview and recommend to the council a suitable candidate for employment to the Association.
(g) Pursue any other business relevant to the Association objectives.
(h) Networking with other NGO’s, Donor Agencies and Government Institutions.

6.4.0 QUORUM

6.4.1 At the General meeting at least 50% of the members should be present
6.4.2 At the Council meetings at least 50% of the members should be present
6.4.3 At the Board Meeting three members of the Board shall constitute a quorum

6.5.0 DUTIES:

6.5.1 Duties of the chairperson.
(a) The chairpersons shall be the spokesperson of the Association.
(b) The chairperson shall preside all the meetings of the board and the Association. In his absence a Vice-chairperson shall preside or any member of the council or board shall be elected to chair the meeting.
(c) The chairperson shall not vote at any meeting saves where there is a tie of vote then he/she shall have deciding vote. The passage of any resolution of the Association shall as far as possible be by a consensus amongst the members.
(d) The chairpersons shall affix his/her signature to the documents/certificates that belong to the Association.

6.5.2 THE SECRETARY

(a) Shall be the chief, Executive officer of the Association and responsible to the board and council.
(b) Shall implement decisions made by the Council and the Board.
(c) Shall record minutes of the meetings and shall maintain proper records.
(d) Shall prepare Annual Plans and Budgets.
(e) Shall compile an annual report and financial position of the Association for presentation at the Annual General meetings
(f) In consultation with the chairperson shall convene meetings and ensure that notices, agendas circulars etc. are supplied to members prior to such meetings.
(g) Shall maintain the seal of the Association.
(h) Shall carry out any other duties assigned to him/her by the Board and the Council.
PART SIX

7.0 MISCELLANEOUS PROVISION

7.1 The official language for the Association shall be Kiswahili and English.

7.2 Any amendments to this constitution shall be made with the consent of at least two thirds (2/3) of members of the Association present and voting at a General meeting.

7.3 In the event of there being any doubt regarding the interpretation of any part of this constitution, the decision of the council thereon shall remain valid unless such a decision is overruled by the General meeting.

7.4 A motion for the dissolution of the Association may be made at the General meeting specifically convened for the purpose. To affect the dissolution at least three quarters of the members actually present and voting shall vote in such dissolution.

7.5 In an event of the Association being dissolved the members present at the meeting shall decide on all liabilities and assets of the Association. Priority shall be given to the interests of the employees and creditors of the Association.

7.6 Any remaining excesses of the assets over liabilities shall be given to charitable bodies having similar Objectives to those of the Association.
8.0. DECLARATION:

We, the several persons whose names are listed below have seriously considered and agreed to form Human Development Strategies Association.

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<th>SIGNATURE</th>
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<td>Antony Simon Fuime</td>
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<td>2.</td>
<td>Martin Lusinga</td>
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<td>Leonard Mapunda</td>
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<td>4.</td>
<td>Eliena Semwenda</td>
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<td>5.</td>
<td>Stephan Maurus</td>
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<td>6.</td>
<td>Anton Kigoda</td>
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<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Ameir Nahdi</td>
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<td>11.</td>
<td>Philipo Mbena</td>
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<td>15.</td>
<td>Rashid Saburi</td>
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<tr>
<td>17.</td>
<td>Anna Antony</td>
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CONSTITUTIONS

KIMAMBA FARMERS ASSOCIATIONS.

THE KIAMBA FARMERS ASSOCIATION
P.O. BOX 20
KIMAMBA

2004
PHASE I

I. NAME: KIMAMBA FARMERS ASSOCIATION
II. ADDRESS: P.O. Box 29 – KIMAMBA
   Tel. (023)2620168 – 0748 70503, 0748 943400
   EMAIL: KIMASSOCIATION@yahoo.co.tz

III. HEAD OFFICE: KIMAMBA IN KILOSA DISTRICT

PHASE II

(i) OBJECTIVE
   (a) To construct and build ability of economic in the food and business feed.
   (b) Search for market
   (c) To find for object of labour
   (d) To make sure object of labour getting at a time.
   (e) To build warehousing
   (f) And soon.

PHASE III

(ii) Membership
   - Any peasant/farmers who leave and farming at Kimamba area.
   (a) Mentality
   (b) Age from 18 and soon
   (c) Should be paying membership fees.
   (d) Agreed the

PHASE IV

(iii) End of the membership:
   (a) Death
   (b) To go beyond the construction
   (c) If you are not leave and farming at the Kimamba area.
(d) Mental defect
(c) To isolation (resining)

(iv) For every member should be paid a share under two member and given them a
Identity card.

Member should be buying 10 share and every share have worth of 500/= and these money will not refundable.

PHASE V
(v) Financially:
(a) Share, constribution from the members.
(b) Loan from the various Institution
(c) Saving from the project
(d) Grants from doners
(vi) The money should be resumed to any Bank.
(vii) Profit should be divided to the member accordingly to the share.

PHASE VII
(viii) MANAGEMENT:
- Every member have a equal vote in the meeting together with selection of the leader.

(ix) (a) After every 3 (three months) should be a meeting of the members.
(b) The following will be discussed.
   (i) Read the previous minutes.
   (ii) To reserve and discussed the notes of
   (iii) To recure and discussed reverence and expenditure of the org.
   (iv) To make objectivity of.
   (v) To discuss the profit
   (vi) To make the selection of the leader if the...
   (vii) To make clear for the member who disobey the Rule and Regulation
(viii) The Chairman should be the head of the meeting and if the Chairman are absent, the Vice-Chairman will under control the meeting and if the Vice-Chairman was absent the member will select in within to the chairperson in order to control them.

(ix) Every three years will be the meeting for selection of the Management.

(x) Top Management will be under (10) people (member)
Chairman, Vice-Chairman, Secretary,, Vice Secretary, Chief-cashier and Vice together with (Four members)

(xi) For Every 3 (three months) should be a meeting of the to management every if the top management especially Chairman have ability to make a meeting

(xii) Top management have of controlling directing, Organising in order to go with objectivity.

(xiii) Chairman have the ability of controlling direcivity, organizing the meeting and others according to worthiness which have selected.

PHASE VII

(xiv) For every member should be selected and amend to the management of organization for and but have ability to change others.

(xv) For every member have a write to check the Book if

(xvi) The Organisation kshould be the sign which shows, and sign should be used in the various books.

(xvii) Take Secretary and Chairman should be signed all of the documents.

(xviii) All the document should be signed by the Secretary under Authority of the organization.
THE FOLLOWING WHO SIGNED THE CONSTITUTION OF KIMAMBA FARMERS ASSOCIATION.

1. CHAIRMAN OF THE ORGANIZATION
REV. AUGUSTINE LUBAGULA

2. CASHIER OF THE ORGANIZATION
MR. YONDU D. NNA

3. SECRETARY OF THE ORGANIZATION
MR. SALUM S. KILONJI

4. MP. CENTRAL KILOSA
MHE/ ALHAJI ABDALLAH SHAWEI

5. OWARD KIMAMBA "A"
JOHN JOSEPHAT MUSHI
PART ONE

NAME OF THE ORGANIZATION:
PARAKUYO COMMUNITY BASED ORGANIZATION (PCBO)

ADDRESS OF THE ORGANIZATION:
P. O. Box 63,  
Kimamba,  
Kilosa District,  
MOROGORO REGION.

Phone:  0748 549175  
E-mail: parakuyo-community@hotmail.com

PART TWO

ORGANIZATION’S VISION / MISSION  
To undertake the process of ascertaining provision of good and sustainable livelihoods to indigenous pastoral community.

PART THREE

DEFINITION:
Words used in this constitution should be understood / taken in the sense as follows:
The “CONSTITUTION” means a modus operandi of the way how things should operate when fulfilling any duty / activity of the organization and this should be adhered to, by all “PCBO” members in order to accomplish their goals.
“PARAKUYO COMMUNITY BASED ORGANIZATION” (in short PCBO)  
“Executive Officers” shall mean and include Chairman, Executive Secretary and Treasurer.  
“Executive Committee” shall mean and include of nine (9) elected members plus the Executive Officers.

PART FOUR

TARGET / AIM:  
“AN ORGANIZATION FOR DEVELOPMENT INDIGENOUS PASTORALISTS”.  
This organization has been formed by indigenous pastoralists residing in the village of Parakuyo Kilosa District Morogoro Region.
OBJECTIVES:

A) To make health facilities accessible and nearer to pastoralist community residential areas by construction of a dispensary within the village.

B) Mobilization coupled with starting of small scale / micro projects and businesses directed at provision of employment / livelihoods to women and youth, with an intention of minimizing or even reducing poverty.

C) To complete construction of Parakuyo Primary School; in addition to increasing kindergarten classrooms so that the exercise of enrolling pupils can be successful, hence provision of primary education can be guaranteed.

D) To improve and strengthen water service projects for human and livestock

E) Environmental and wildlife conservation, going hand in hand with promotion of tourism, at the same time carrying out economic harvesting of wild life natural resource.

F) To improve production of indigenous livestock, thus increasing productivity.

G) To educate and sensitize the community of indigenous pastoralists on the existence of HIV / AIDS and its catastrophic effects and impact.

H) To provide education to the indigenous pastoral community on the negative effects of female circumcision.

I) To stand / advocate on gender equality.

J) To improve and extend / spread social and veterinary services to the community and livestock.

K) PCB to cooperate with the Government and other institutions within and outside our country and development issues.

L) To resolve / solve disputes between indigenous pastoralists and farmers.

M) To supervise and facilitate good management / usage of land resource in pastoralists areas.

N) To own boarding primary and secondary schools in Parakuyo Pastoralists Community.

PART FIVE

SOURCES OF INCOME / MONIES

1. Money / Income of the organization shall be acquired as follows:
   a) Remittances from membership fees and annual subscriptions.
   b) Aids: grants and any other acceptable gifts from within and outside Tanzania.
   c) Any acceptable investments made in our country.
   d) Loans and advances from banks and any other financial institutions.
   e) Money from charity and any other self-help activities.

2. All organization’s incomes / money shall be collected on availability. The money shall be used in accordance with the organization’s Targets as specified (or laid down) in PART III (three) of this constitution.

3. members of the Executive Committee shall have the authority / mandate to open and manage the organization’s account in any bank for all monetary transactions.
PART SIX

MEMBERSHIP (ELIGIBILITY OF BEING A MEMBER)

1. Should be an indigenous pastoralist of the age of 18.
2. Should be a resident of Parakuyo pastoral village
3. Should be totally self-committed to bringing community advancement
4. Should be prepared to remit Tshs. 10,000.00 (ten thousands Tanzania Shillings) as an entry fee.
5. He / She will have to pay an annual subscription fee of Tshs. 15,000.00 (fifteen thousands Tanzania Shillings) per annum.

PART SEVEN

CESSATION OF MEMBERSHIP
   a) Death
   b) Insanity / madness
   c) Self – resignation by any member through his own will, without any question of the organization being indebted to him / her but he / she will have to give out a written notice to that effect.
   d) Immigration from the village of Parakuyo
   e) Expulsion due to misconduct.

PART EIGHT

MEETINGS:
   A) General Meeting:

   1. a) The general meeting shall be held after six (6) months and it will include all members of the organization and it should be convened / held in the months of June and December. The meeting shall be required to have not less than 50% of all the members of the organization. Therefore such a QUORUM shall legalize the meeting to proceed.
   
   The following things are to be taken into consideration:

   i) Election of the organizations’ Chairperson who shall hold office for a period of two (2) years only; after expiry of this period he / she shall be obliged to be elected again. He / she shall chair / lead all General meetings, as well as Executive meetings.
   ii) Election of the Executive Committee members
   iii) Appointment or termination of the Executive Secretary and Treasurer for or from their positions / duties.
iv) To receive a report of all targets / objectives presented before the General Meeting for acceptance / adoption or rejection.

v) To authorize agreements with other organizations.

vi) To fix targets / aims and strategies for all organization’s activities and projects by giving them special preference.

2. Notice to call a General Meeting shall be given / communicated to each member fourteen (14) days before the date of the actual General Meeting, specifying the date, place / venue and the agenda to be tabled.

3. Extra ordinary general meeting:
The Executive Committee shall be obliged to call an extra ordinary general meeting at an opportune time for dealing / executing any affair / matter that has occurred / transpired by giving out a seven (7) days notice before the actual date of the said extra ordinary general meeting, specifying reasons compelling the extra ordinary general meeting to take place and the venue where the meeting shall be held.

4. Hold important decisions in such a meeting shall be undertaken by vote aggregate.

B) EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE:

1) The Executive Committee shall comprise of not less than nine (9) members or not more than twelve (12); including the executive officers, for execution of the organization’s activities. The executive committee shall be obliged to appoint additional members who should not be more than half (½) of the elected members.

2) The Executive committee shall be obliged to hold four (4) meetings per annum.

3) The executive committee shall adhere to the following, when executing it’s duty:

i) To formulate procedures and policy to be followed when executing duties of the organization, even activities of the elected committees and authorized by the executive committee.

ii) To receive reports from elected committees.

iii) To evaluate and authorize plans / projects intended for the community or groups within

iv) To employ and suspend the Executive Secretary and Treasurer for or from employment

v) To appoint auditors / inspectors.
vi) To receive operational / financial reports regarding the organization’s activities.

4. Any executive committee member who shall not attend three (3) consecutive meetings of the Executive Committee shall be considered to have removed himself / herself from membership of the Executive Committee unless he / she has been allowed by the executive committee through a vote of seven (7) votes of the members and this should be with an acceptable / sound reason.

5. Executive officers shall attend executive committee meeting and to each elected committees in accordance with their official status. And they shall not have a right to cast their votes but they shall be obliged to present any clarification or information if they shall be required to do so.

PART NINE

ORGANIZATIONS’ ASSETS:
Assets of the organization shall be under custody of the registered authority under the trust sheep of PARAKUYO COMMUNITY BASED ORGANIZATION (PCBO)

Accumulations / expenditure and dissemination of all assets regarding income and expenditure of the organization’s cash shall be under the executive committee as shall be explained later.

PART TEN

TRUSTSHIP

1. Trustship (committee of Trustees) shall comprise of two (2) eminent persons in the village (of Parakuyo) who are not members or members of the village government.

2. a) Trustees shall occupy their positions for a period of three (3) years.
   b) Trustship shall cease on the event of death, medically proved insanity, resignation or any other reason proved for that purpose.
   
   c) In the event of the Trustship vacancy falling vacant; the executive committee shall appoint another trustee who shall occupy the vacant position and he/she shall stay to conclude the remaining period.

3. The organization shall have a RUBBER STAP which shall be under custody of the executive secretary and shall be affixed / stamped on all correspondence required; in the presence of two (2) trustees and the authority conferred on to the executive secretary to sign all documents duly stamped with the said rubber stamp.
PARTY ELEVEN

BANKRUPTCY / INSOLVENCY

"PARAKUYO OF COMMUNITY BASED ORGANIZATION" If the decision to
dissolve the organization shall be reached by a consensus of three quarters (¾) of the
members of the Executive Committee and be upheld / accepted later by an
extraordinary general meeting which shall be held in a period not less than one
month (1) after being passed by two thirds (⅔) of all members of the organization.

The committee shall fulfill as directed in accordance with the decision of the
declaration and it will be obliged to settle all debts of the organization. The
remaining assets shall be transferred to the custody of the 2 (two) trustees of the
organization.

PART TWELVE

ELABORATION / CLARIFICATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMMENDMENT:

1. The executive committee shall be the only authority / organ with a mandate
to give out an explanation / clarification of the organization’s constitution by
laws and procedures which shall be instituted as the need arises from time to
time. And any decisions by the executive committee on any matter
pertaining clarification shall be final and binding on the organization.

2. Amendments / changes to the constitution shall not be made unless by the
organization’s General Meeting. Notice in writing on recommendations for
amendment of the constitution shall be given out in a period of not less than
three (3) months before the actual date of holding the said general meeting
by the executive secretary as secretary of the committee. He / she will have to
inform every member of the organization on the recommendations of making
constititutional amendments not less than one (1) months before the date of
holding the actual extra – ordinary general meeting.
Any changes / amendments involving / regarding this constitution shall be
authorized by two thirds (⅔) of the members in attendance.

OFFICIAL OF THE ORGANIZATION

Are as follows:
a) Chairman / Chairperson
b) Executive Secretary
c) Treasurer

Members of the Executive Committee except officials of the organization are not
allowed / entitled to any payment except they will be reimbursed for costs and
expenses incurred during execution of the organizations duties / activities as
underlined or specified according they by laws and “procedures” of the
organization.
KIMAMBA FARMERS ASSOCIATION,
BOX 29,
KIMAMBA,
TEL.023 260168,
Email: Kimfaassociation@yahoo.com

18th October 2004

District Commissioner,
Box 8,
KILOSA.

RE: REGISTRATION OF KIMAMBA FARMERS ASSOCIATION.

Please heading above,
We are peasant of Kimamba in the Kilosa District in Morogoro Region; we need to register our Organization. Together with Government in war against poverty by using farming. We know that the farming was the Back Bones of the nation; we need registration because we are in the goal of technological cultivation because unity is the power

We are sincerely,

KIMAMBA FARMER ASSOCIATION.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>GENDER</th>
<th>FEES</th>
<th>TITLE</th>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Salum S. Kilongi</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>Secretary</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Yondu D. Niaa</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>Cashier</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Rev. A. Lubagula</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>Chairman</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Ahmad Ngallawa</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>Vice – Chairperson</td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Maria P. Shetuli</td>
<td>Female</td>
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<td>Vice – Cashier</td>
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<td>6</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>Hassan Rajabu</td>
<td>Male</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>Zainabu Napilla</td>
<td>Female</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Ramadhani Miogwa</td>
<td>Male</td>
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<td>Member</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>Musa Surenzi</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>Member</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Abdallah Omari</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>Member</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Zainabu Mshamu</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>Member</td>
<td></td>
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<td>13</td>
<td>Abdul Msoopo</td>
<td>Male</td>
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<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Omari Hussein</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>Member</td>
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<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Adam Chambira</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>Member</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
AIM OF THE ORGANIZATION
1. To create power of the farmers in the bringing of unity in the freedom.
2. To be free on what happen of the farmers to the Mass media.
3. To be free on financial institution on Loans also easy for the Government providing fund even a Land.

EXPECTATIONS.
1. To reduce the Total of Rural to urban
2. To help peasant from hand cultivation to Technological cultivations.
3. To build warehousing which will be used on keeping cash and food crops with the aim of waiting of price.
4. To keep environment by reducing wood charcoal instead of cultivation also reducing the total number of cutting trees abraphilly.
5. To create employment for various people by farming or irrigation
6. The aim of Tanzania government of Reducing Poverty by cultivation.

PROJECT:
HELPING PEASANT FROM HAND CULTIVATION TO TECHNOLOGICAL.
The following issues will be started:-
1. To provide seminar for the members
2. To create unity of the members
3. To build office or to rent office for a year
4. To have the office tensile (furniture office)
5. To have object of Labour means of labour together other facilities like motorbike about bicycles.
6. To have modern means of labour in order to make easy development
7. To build warehouse with the aim keeping cash crops.

THE KINANSA FARMERS ASSOCIATION
P. O. Box 20
KINANSA
PART ONE

NAME OF THE ORGANIZATION:
PARAKUYO COMMUNITY BASED ORGANIZATION (PCBO)

ADDRESS OF THE ORGANIZATION:
P. O. Box 63,
Kinamba,
Kilosa District,
MOROGORO REGION.

Phone: 0748 549175
E-mail: parakuyo-community@hotmail.com

PART TWO

ORGANIZATION’S VISION / MISSION
To undertake the process of ascertaining provision of good and sustainable livelihoods to indigenous pastoral community.

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A) To make health facilities accessible and nearer to pastoralist community residential areas by construction of a dispensary within the village.
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b) Insanity / madness
c) Self – resignation by any member through his own will, without any question of the organization being indebted to him / her but he / she will have to give out a written notice to that effect.
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MEETINGS:

A) General Meeting:

1. a) The general meeting shall be held after six (6) months and it will include all members of the organization and it should be convened / held in the months of June and December. The meeting shall be required to have not less than 50% of all the members of the organization. Therefore such a QUORUM shall legalize the meeting to proceed.

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i) Election of the organizations’ Chairperson who shall hold office for a period of two (2) years only; after expiry of this period he / she shall be obliged to be elected again. He / she shall chair / lead all General meetings, as well as Executive meetings.

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PART NINE

ORGANIZATIONS' ASSETS:
Assets of the organization shall be under custody of the registered authority under the trust sheep of PARAKUYO COMMUNITY BASED ORGANIZATION (PCBO)

Accumulations / expenditure and dissemination of all assets regarding income and expenditure of the organization's cash shall be under the executive committee as shall be explained later.

PART TEN

TRUSTSHIP

1. Trustship (committee of Trustees) shall comprise of two (2) eminent persons in the village (of Parakuyo) who are not members or members of the village government.

2. a) Trustees shall occupy their positions for a period of three (3) years.
   b) Trustship shall cease on the event of death; medically proved insanity, resignation or any other reason proved for that purpose.
   c) In the event of the Trustship vacancy falling vacant; the executive committee shall appoint another trustee who shall occupy the vacant position and he/she shall stay to conclude the remaining period.

3. The organization shall have a RUBBER STAP which shall be under custody of the executive secretary and shall be affixed / stamped on all correspondence required; in the presence of two (2) trustees and the authority conferred on to the executive secretary to sign all documents duly stamped with the said rubber stamp.
PARTY ELEVEN

BANKRUPTCY / INSOLVENCY

"PARAKUYO OF COMMUNITY BASED ORGANIZATION" If the decision to dissolve the organization shall be reached by a concensus of three quarters (¾) of the members of the Executive Committee and be upheld / accepted later by an extraordinary general meeting which shall be held in a period not less than one month (1) after being passed by two thirds (⅔) of all members of the organization.

The committee shall fulfill as directed in accordance with the decision of the declaration and it will be obliged to settle all debts of the organization. The remaining assets shall be transferred to the custody of the 2 (two) trustees of the organization.

PART TWELVE

ELABORATION / CLARIFICATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMMENDMENT:

1. The executive committee shall be the only authority / organ with a mandate to give out an explanation / clarification of the organization’s constitution by laws and procedures which shall be instituted as the need arises from time to time. And any decisions by the executive committee on any matter pertaining clarification shall be final and binding on to the organization.

2. Amendments / changes to the constitution shall not be made unless by the organization’s General Meeting. Notice in writing on recommendations for amendment of the constitution shall be given out in a period of not less than three (3) months before the actual date of holding the said general meeting by the executive secretary as secretary of the committee. He / she will have to inform every member of the organization on the recommendations of making constitutional amendments not less than one (1) months before the date of holding the actual extra-ordinary general meeting.

Any changes / amendments involving / regarding this constitution shall be authorized by two thirds (⅔) of the members in attendance.

OFFICIAL OF THE ORGANIZATION

Are as follows:

a) Chairman / Chairperson
b) Executive Secretary
c) Treasurer

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APPENDIX D
MEDIA REPORTS AND LEGAL DOCUMENTS

Kilosa pastoralists, farmers heading for violent conflict

2992-06-01 11:12:08
By Correspondent Zephania Utwein, Morogoro

Kilosa district in Morogoro region is on the brink of another violent conflict between pastoralists and crop cultivators over limited land and diminishing resources.

Researchers from the Sukole University of Agriculture (SUA) have warned that the 14,245 square kilometre district has more livestock herds than its rangeland carrying capacity.

Prof. Martin Shem of the Animal Science and Production Department says although livestock is a dependable economic asset in the district, it has little prospects because of scarce pastures on limited land.

"Let me be frank on this. Unless modern rangeland management services are introduced, the future of old type pastoralism is in doubt not only in Kilosa but elsewhere in the country as well," he said. He said in an interview here that the district currently had between 100,000 and 150,000 cattle and herds of thousands of goats and sheep amid continued influx of cattle keepers from other parts of the country running away from drought.

He said he was worried that more conflicts between the livestock keepers and crop cultivators would erupt over water and rangeland resources unless an effective conflict resolution mechanism was put in place.

In December 2000, a dispute between Maasai pastoralists and farmers in Ruwete-Mibuyuni villages in the district left at least 31 people dead and scores injured.

In a move to minimize violent conflicts between the two parties, the district authorities earmarked some villages including Malawagere, Kibuli, Lonza, Tovwetwa, Mikia and Kwanbe as pastoral villages.

However, Prof. Shem, who is a livestock systems researcher, warned that despite the "separation" of pastoralists and farmers, reports of cases of conflicts in the area still abound. The district also has a big potential for commercial farming.

He said the recurring fights between farmers and cattle herders were manifestations of the shortcomings in the local and national institutions governing land resource tenure, conflict management and existing livestock policy.

He was emphatic that there would be no peace where cattle keepers were driving and grazing their large herds in the farms and at the time farmers were encroaching the pastoralists' rangeland, sometimes cutting them off water sources. Until a few years ago, Kilosa was not even considered a cattle-keeping zone. But since the 1980s, the district has seen a big influx of the Maasai, Pwakuya, Sukuma and Baragwe with their large herds of cattle in search of greener pastures. The influx has not only made the district one of the leading districts in livestock population overnight, but has also increased the human population now estimated to be about 550,000.

Other researchers say conflicts over land and water resources between pastoralists and crop farmers have worsened in areas where local leaders do not understand or appreciate pastoral livestock systems.

A team of SUA dons are currently visiting villages, particularly those inhabited by the pastoralists in the district, to identify sources of resource conflicts and suggest appropriate technical and policy interventions.

* SOURCE: GUARDIAN
THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA
JUDICIARY.
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF KILOSA
AT KILOSA.

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 16/2004
ORIGINAL CRIMINAL CASE NO. 134/2004
FROM KIMANJA PRIMARY COURT

ALLY S/O MOHAMEDI PACICHCHA ....APPELLANT
VRS.

PROOSO S/O LEMARIOO ............RESPONDENT.

Before A.J. Napunda - Hon/Mag
Both parties present

JUDGEMENT.

The appellant Ally s/o Pacicha wasn't satisfied with the
Kimana primary court decision which acquitted the accused who
was charged with the offence of malicious damage to property
C/s 326 (1) cap 16. Respondent's farm was destroyed or blocked the
ditch which was used irrigate his shamba and made the water to
diverge from normal course. The evidence on record wasn't watertight.
to register a conviction. I dismiss this appeal.
The appellant is advised to open a civil suit.

sgd: A.J. Napunda - Hon/Mag

Court: - App/Rights explained.

sgd: A.J. Napunda - Hon/Mag

HEREBY CERTIFY THIS TO THE
TRUE COPY OF THE ORIGINAL

RESIDENT/DISTRICT MAGISTRATE
APPENDIX E
FIELDWORK PHOTOGRAPHS

Igusa Marketplace

Mangati herders
Road to Igusa

Office of Human Development Association

Bus station at the Igusa marketplace

Maasai children
Maasai butchering a cow

Grazing Activity Participant Observation

A Young Maasai herder
Maasai herders in Mbwade village

Interviewing a Maasai woman at Mwade village
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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Sungwon Jin was born and raised in Jeonju, South Korea. After graduating from Dongam High School in 1989, Sungwon attended the Hanyang University at Ansan where he earned his Bachelor of Art in cultural anthropology in February of 1996. Following graduation, Sungwon went to Kigali, Rwanda to work as a volunteer worker for a South Korean non governmental organization. In August of 1997, he entered the University of Florida’s graduate program in anthropology where he concentrated his studies in applied anthropology and African Studies. During his graduate studies, Sungwon conducted two fieldworks in East African countries. For master’s research, he did six month fieldwork in a Sudanese refugee camp in Northern Uganda. For doctorate research, he went to Eastern Tanzania to study farmer-herder conflicts in the region. He received his Ph.D. from the University of Florida in the spring of 2012 and continues teaching and researching careers in Korea, Japan, and African countries.