To @ubrey
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Delivery@Machines: Toward a Rhetoric and Decomposition of New Media

By

Sean W. Morey

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Delivery@Machines theorizes a new media practice (that is, electrate practice) for the rhetorical canon of delivery. Delivery, in both orality and literacy, has traditionally been undertheorized by scholars of rhetoric, beginning with Aristotle’s reticence for the practice of delivery as a whole. This makes sense, given that Aristotle was trying to invent delivery practices pertinent to the technology of alphabetic print, and not rely upon the technologies of the body. Our present situation is analogous to Aristotle’s: a new language apparatus, electracy (as developed by Gregory L. Ulmer—the skill set necessary to use all the communicative technologies of new media) is emerging, and new practices, or at least theories, should also emerge to make use of new media technologies. While many scholars in rhetoric and composition studies, or even writing studies in general, attempt to fit new media technologies into the existing logic of literacy, Ulmer notes that each language technology works within a unique language apparatus, and so many scholars of “media literacy” are looking in the wrong places, trying to retrofit the logics developed specifically for alphabetic print to work for a technology that uses print, image, and sound, coupled with the digital internet. Thus, scholars of rhetoric, finding the same problem as Aristotle, try to theorize delivery at the
dead end of literacy; that is, they look to understand how the visual aspects of writing become aspects of delivery rather than ask what new kinds of delivery does electracy make possible. Delivery@Machines, then, does not attempt to recover the canon of delivery as it was before literacy, but to invent delivery practices specifically for the developing communication apparatus of electracy as understood through the lens of grammatology.
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Toward Electracy

Delivery keeps reaching dead ends. That is, whenever scholars take up a study of delivery, its intended usefulness is almost surely limited by its potential elsewhere. Aristotle struggled with this when he tried to reconcile the canon of delivery into his treatise on rhetoric; he found that even though delivery proved useful in an oral context, he developed little taste for delivery’s use since it often allowed those with weaker arguments and faulty logic to win the approval of the audience. Thus, Aristotle never did invent literate practices for delivery as he did for invention.\(^1\) Subsequently, the technology of literacy provided a different kind of application for delivery, mostly developing it into what Collin Gifford Brooke might call a transitive mode of delivery.\(^2\) While scholars and teachers of rhetoric other than Aristotle did develop practices and pedagogies for delivery, most notably Cicero, Quintilian, and the elocution movement of the nineteenth century, these practices, again, focused on an oral delivery of speeches, which, although using literacy in their development, did not use a literate-specific mode of delivery. It could be that Aristotle’s student Theophrastes developed adequate techniques, but remnants of his work are few and his treatise on delivery is lost. One might argue that in addition to providing a prosthesis for memory, writing can deliver on its own, without the writer/speaker present. The book, for instance, provides a literate

\(^1\) While it may be debatable whether Socrates, Plato, or Aristotle “invented” literate practices as the way I discuss them, disciplines such as Rhetoric, Composition, and Media Studies have come to understand and converse about rhetorical concepts while using these three individuals as certain “celebrities” of the fields. Thus, I write of figures like Aristotle as becoming categorical for any and all of the rhetoricians that influenced the developing use of alphabetic technologies at the time. Thus, my use of “Aristotle” is more iconic than historically accurate.

form of an artificial memory aid as well as a delivery machine that can function when disconnected from the author, one of writing’s most important features. However, this kind of delivery usually presumes writing as delivering a transitive meaning or content with writing itself as the delivery mechanism (writing in its representational mode), no matter what dissemination technology (scroll, book, Web page) that writing appears in. This perspective of writing as being itself a delivery might prove true, but if so, this writing is usually seen as a literate writing, which can only deliver a certain kind of “information,” a literate information, not an information of the body.

Our present situation is analogous to Aristotle’s: a new language apparatus, electracy (the skill set necessary to use all the communicative technologies of new media), is emerging, and new practices, or at least theories, should also emerge to make use of the technology. While many scholars in rhetoric and composition studies, or even writing studies in general, attempt to fit new media technologies into the existing logic of literacy, Gregory L. Ulmer notes that each language technology works within a unique language apparatus, and so many scholars of “media literacy” are looking in the wrong places, trying to retrofit the logics developed specifically for alphabetic print to work for a technology that uses print, image, and sound, coupled with the digital internet. Thus, scholars of rhetoric, finding the same problem as Aristotle, try to theorize delivery at the dead end of literacy; that is, they look to understand how the

3 While the alphabet as a technology existed well before Aristotle, and while literate practices took millennia to develop into those we have today, Martin Heidegger and Eric Havelock, amongst others, point to classical Greece as the tipping point or paradigmatic example that pushed practices of alphabetic writing to develop toward particular trajectories. While electrate technologies have existed only recently (primarily with the invention of photography in the nineteenth century), the analogy of the transition from orality into literacy provides a point of reference to think through the transition from literacy into electracy. This is not to say that only a few Greeks “invented” literacy, but that they provide a way of understanding our current situation, even if in a reductive way.
visual aspects of writing become aspects of delivery rather than ask what new kind of delivery does electracy make possible. For instance, Robert Connors tries to equate only the final written product as the being of delivery (again, what Brooke would call transitive delivery), and organizational devices such as the use of headers and typeface as tools of delivery. While he is correct in saying that “Contemporary actio is concerned with learning to use effectively the instruments that are being put into our hands,” his conception of “instruments,” and perhaps even “hands,” needs broadening. And while John Trimbur makes a cogent argument that understands delivery under the Marxist idea of circulation, this “tool” use and circulation operate mainly under literate practices developed out of the invention of the printing press, not the digital internet.

Delivery, within the context of an orator speaking before an assembly, makes several assumptions about how the technology of speech (and by extension, writing), functions. It often assumes a privileged speaker that has control of both the words and meaning of those words, and again, that those words have a representational element, that the speaker can transmit meaning through language. However, delivery extends and augments this control of meaning by relying on accidental traits of communication that occur in face(s) to face(s) utterance. The words themselves are influenced by the body: how the body performs their production, but also the visual aspects that surround the performance of the words themselves, which deliver multiple tracks of “information.” This kind of information, one that deals with an image-based information of the body, becomes unavailable when the words in a speech become abstract through their appearance on a page, devoid of the speaker’s body, for such a body provides accidental traits of a performative language that the technology and logic of literacy
alone cannot accommodate, and thus, provided Aristotle with difficulty when trying to develop a literate rhetoric for delivery.

What delivery delivers, then, and this seems to be common to delivery in all modes, is not always an information of literate logic, but affect. Delivery provides an interface for the accidental to occur in a particular kind of communication designed to solve problems. Should we attack Phillip of Macedonia? Should Socrates be put to death? How should we commemorate the 9/11 attacks? What should we do about global warming? These questions all revolve around desires: the desire for city-state protection; the desire to "protect our youths"; the desire to reinvent national values in the aftermath of a disaster; the desires around the metaphysics of physics. Of course, these are only a few desires, and are contested desires. However, delivery, especially in the Greek term *hypokrisis*, deals with uncovering these desires, with revealing the subconscious moods that affect rhetoric. Delivery as a process makes knowledge, but it needs to go deeper, and deliver self-knowledge. Delivery here is also communal. It is never just a speaker delivering a speech, but the total system of judgment that occurs in the situation, whether it is a trial, a theatrical performance, or the court of public opinion. Demosthenes shouted against the waves as an exercise, but he delivered to an audience. Delivery needs an audience, even if imagined, even if to the self, so that it can help solve/create problems (practical reason). In other words, delivery concerns communal, situational problem solving; the problems delivery tries to solve are situational, not abstract. They involve particular people in particular situations, not hypotheticals. And these situations involve individual and communal desires, desires that must be delivered. The speaker must deliver his own desire into the audience, to
persuade the listeners to take his prescribed course of action. In doing so, a group
invention occurs.4

But our groups rarely gather within an assembly, but through online assemblages via a variety of online platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, Second Life, Wikipedia, blogs, chatrooms, and any other myriad ways to join together online. Do to so, we form machinic assemblages and become digital cyborgs as Donna Harraway suggests, amongst others. As cognitive scientist Anthony Chemero explains, “The person and the various parts of their brain and the mouse and the monitor are so tightly intertwined that they’re just one thing. . . . The tool isn’t separate from you. It’s part of you.”5 Thus, if we are to deliver online, via the pathways of the Internet and in digital forms, we need to understand how to construct delivery-machines that will allow us to do so and to take advantage of what this technology has to offer. If the tool is a part of us, we might find ways to let it think, or delivery, for us. While many such machines might be constructed and I hope many more offer their own formations of delivery-machines, I offer one, the Monkey’s T@il, as an example at the end of the project.

One of my own desires in this work is to offer a practice for delivery within the framework of electracy—a new media delivery that can account for and extend new identity and institutional formations that develop around the emerging language technologies of the image and Internet. And although text has become hyper, our logic (at least for delivery) must become hypo. Desire works at the level of taste: a craving.

4 With new media delivery, audiences do not include just humans, but also digital codes, usually in the form of algorithms and web robots, often referred to as search engine spiders. The presence of this audience may be asynchronous with the speaker, as with writing, and may be invisible to the speaker as well.

Yet, desire often becomes blind to such cravings. It is not always clear what we want, or if what we want is in our best interest—yet this unconscious knowledge can help make decisions. Part of Ulmer’s work in electracy tries to create a new kind of public policy formation, one that deals not only with expert opinions, but also with the state-of-mind of both the individual and collective societies making political choices. If we are to overcome the possible general accident that Paul Verilio claims is inevitable, and if we are to maintain a democracy within a society of the spectacle, then we must develop practices for electracy that allow citizens to make decisions that are in their best interest. Since delivery, in myriad manifestations (at least, so it seems), plays such a large part in this spectacle (the medium, what some reduce delivery to, is the message), then an electrate delivery becomes a crucial practice that must be developed. The question this project takes up, then, is to ask what practices of delivery might be invented or useful for electracy, taking up a different path that hopefully does not end before it begins. This project does not necessarily attempt to answer that question, to take up the task of creating a series of practices, but to ask questions and theorize possibilities that might be useful for others on that path.

**Methodology and Chapter Outline**

Toward an electrate delivery, *Delivery@Machines* focuses on three main aspects of delivery: the deliverer, the audience, and the technology used to interface between the two and foster group invention. To generate a new practice, this work employs Ulmer’s heuretic method of the CATTt (Contrast, Analogy, Theory, Target, tale). Chapter 1, “Remixing *Hypokrisis* . . . Picking Up Where Theophrastes Left Off” establishes the “Contrast” by looking at the Greek term for delivery, *hypokrisis*, as well as the pedagogical advice of the Roman orators Cicero and Quintilian. Aristotle
theorizes the transitional moment for delivery as it changes with the shift from orality to literacy. This is not to say that the oral mode of delivery disappears, for orators make use of its techniques into the present; nor, as Ulmer shows, does one language apparatus erase the previous one, but rather supplements it with new practices for new language technologies. However, the very detachment of the speaker from his voice through writing, as lamented by Plato, is also a detachment of the orator from his body. Book 3 of *On Rhetoric* provides a brief account of *hypokrisis* that Aristotle equates to “acting,” having also looked at the term according to its artistic uses in the *Poetics*. Aristotle writes that “when delivery comes to be considered it will function in the same way as acting, and some have tried to say a little about it, for example, Thrasymachus in his Emotional Appeals” (1404a). Thus, for Aristotle, *hypokrisis* borrows its techniques from the theater, and these techniques are not intrinsic to rhetoric as a practice. He goes on to say that “acting is a matter of natural talent and largely not reducible to artistic rule, but insofar as it involves how things are said [lexis], it has an artistic element” (1404a). Acting, and by extension *hypokrisis*, is not teachable, although certain stylistic elements can be taught to aid in the delivery of a speech, although not substitute for natural talent. However, no matter how well one crafts the other parts of rhetoric, *hypokrisis* usually wins the argument, and those with the most “natural” skill at this canon have the upper hand: “As a result, prizes go to those who are skilled at it, just as they do to orators on the basis of their delivery; for written speeches [when orally recited] have greater effect through expression [lexis] than through thought” (1404a). Through a grammatological reading, chapter 1 theorizes the metaphor at play in the Greek term *hypokrisis*, and let those meanings play further to reveal what it can teach
us, which is much different than what Aristotle’s metaphysics allowed him to understand. Thus, part of chapter 1 looks at the originary moment of literacy in general, particularly through Martin Heidegger’s *Introduction to Metaphysics*, in order to understand Aristotle’s purpose in treating *hypokrisis* as he does. And since *hypokrisis* works on the unconscious—its delivery occurs “under the skin”—then a new theory of delivery would need to contend with examining a logic of the unconscious applicable to the electrate technologies and identities in which it would be used.

Chapter 2, “Delivery-Machines,” provides the “Theory” for an electrate context of delivery through the works of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, specifically their theories of schizophrenia in *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, and particularly the schizophrenic's logic of coupling desiring-machines (assemblages) to the body without organs. Ulmer, in *Electronic Monuments*, argues that we are collectively dumb (*ATH*), and need to explore this dumbness so that we can make decisions in our best interest. Throughout much of his work, Ulmer relies upon French poststructuralist theory and psychoanalysis as a way to explain this dumbness and out to invent/create our way out of it. However, if psychoanalysis provides a method for invention in electracy, then schizophrenia provides an analogy for a method of delivery, for the body is as dumb as the rest of us. Some of the symptoms of schizophrenics include affected movement, flat affect, and word salad, all which effect body mechanisms needed for the aspects of delivery that Cicero and Quintilian require; thus, schizophrenics are “delivery-dumb” from their disorder. Delivery makes connections between desiring-machines to reveal such dumbness; and delivery is about delivering desire, creating intensities in the Body without Organs—making people develop the
organs they need to feel what the “speaker” is thinking/feeling. Delivery-machines, cyborg relationships, all create new ways of “enframing” necessary for an electrate body to deliver. The schizophrenic logic provides a relay for how a deliverer in new media might create her or his own desiring-machines in order to reach the level of unconscious native to delivery. If the schizophrenic's goal though assemblages is to create desire, then a Digital Demosthenes (as was actually the case with an oral Demosthenes), must also produce desire as well. But besides Demosthenes, another public figure that we can look towards is that of the shaman, who takes a similar role in the community to that of an orator, and offers another practice of hypokrisis more applicable to electracy.

Chapter 3, “Becoming Shaman,” offers the “Analogy,” and argues that the “society of spectacle” that we inhabit actually inhabits us, and this environment is analogous to the spirit-world that the shaman must navigate. The shaman serves as an intermediary between multiple worlds, providing his or her community with practical reason. This is not unlike the classical notion of the deliverer, who must become an intermediary between possible, deliberative worlds, and the current contingent world in which he or she makes their argument, in the process striving toward practical solutions to problems. Moreover, the shaman, like the schizophrenic, joins with machines in order to produce their respective delivery-systems; the shaman constructs delivery-machines. The shamanic metaphysics provides a relay for an image-based society because images have similar characteristics to the spirits that shamans had to befriend, confront, attack, and make use of. One of the first steps toward becoming a deliverer in new media is becoming shaman. But besides his use of machines and connection to
an invisible world, the shaman also teaches us that delivery requires the audience to participate in the spectacle of delivery.

Chapter 4, “Audience Analysis,” looks at the “Target” of this theory in multiple ways while also extending the analogy in chapter 3. The chapter first examines the target as new media, or, the institution-plus-technology toward which the heuretic method is applied. For this first concept of target, the chapter examines artists who serve shamanic roles (thus extending the analogy), providing an interface between the conscious and the unconscious, and how artists use desiring-machines to accomplish this; some of these artists include The Edge from U2, who couples with multiple machines, creating his own desire, but extending that desire to others who share in it and cluster about via his live shows. In addition, multimedia bio artists like Eduardo Kac use new media installations to integrate the invisible spirits with which he experiences, and an audience who is “dumb” to such forces. Thus Kac serves as a medium between the two realms. But as the deliverer is different, so is the audience, and so chapter 4 also considers the audience as the “target” of the deliverer. While the classical idea of delivery involves an orator addressing a crowd, usually arranged in a structure made for such gatherings, an electrate delivery requires not only the audience to gather around the deliverer, but also the deliverer to gather around the audience. The assemblage of the deliverer does not just stop with his or her integration with new media, but extends to the audience as well within/throughout a rhizomatic structure. Moreover, new media delivery requires not just a performance of the deliverer, but it requires the audience to perform as well and take a role in the delivery process. Web 2.0 technologies allow the Internet user to participate in online environments in more accessible ways, and so such
technologies can be used, like the shaman’s tools, in a rhetorical way that functions as a delivery-machine.

Finally, Chapter 5, “The Monkey’s T@il,” applies these theories within a “tale” (and tail) to create a form in which the new delivery practice might assume. Specifically, this chapter examines the t@il constructed by cyclist Lance Armstrong as a way to deliver his message, the mood of “hope,” and apply it toward the policy debates of cancer. While he, as a professional cyclist, lives visibly and openly as a machinic assemblage, he also uses such logic to create digital machines, delivery@machines, in order to create a t@il for his avatar, or online persona, which consists of an assemblage of social media platforms including Facebook, Twitter, Flickr, Web sites, blogs, etc. Through this method, Armstrong constructs a digital prosthesis that functions toward delivery, for his t@il not only attempts to sting, to place “hope” under the skin of his audience, but requires an audience participation for this injection to occur. While most social networking sites function toward entertainment rather than pedagogic_democratic purposes, Armstrong makes use of these technologies toward solving the problem of cancer, and becomes a shamanic figure mediating between the affective problems of cancer and the larger community. Instead of accepting the entertainment uses of such social networking sites at face value, Armstrong taps into their underlying technical and psychological codes and provides a model for how an electrate identity might use them toward an electrate delivery method. My own “hope” is that the practices and principles that make up Armstrong’s particular t@il might be used for anyone to construct their own toward their own purposes.
Aristotle, in the beginning of *On Rhetoric*, recognizes that people argue because they have some lack that must be filled, and so always argue from a mood of desire. While all of rhetoric seeks to create persuasive measures in order to fulfill these lacks, delivery deals directly with the body on which such desire works and, through the body as a rhetorical device, can affect that desire in others. Delivery delivers desire. This is a personal desire, the “what do I want” that is delivered, but also a situational desire: I am in a situation, what does the situation desire that I do—what is in my best interests? More generally, this project tries to look at how certain tools of new media might be used under an electrate logic of delivery to make use of the canon for rhetorical purposes, to discover how it may be used to deliver that lack/desire back into the writer, to make them unblind to the desires from which they argue.
CHAPTER 2
REMIXING HYPOKRISIS . . . PICKING UP WHERE THEOPHRASTES LEFT OFF

The voice is thus directly linked to the psychê. This understanding lies behind Theophrastes’ statement that mastery of hypokrisis involved harmonizing the movement of the body with the tonos (tone) of the psychê.

—David Wiles, The Masks of Menander

Classical theorists of delivery, mainly Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian, provide the contrast against which an electrate delivery might be developed. However, the contrast that they provide contains elements of delivery that have been abandoned or neglected and which might be useful for a new delivery, useful gaps that might be remixed to provide the invention of a delivery suited for an electrate apparatus. When considered amongst the contrasts of oral, literate, and electrate language apparatuses, Aristotle’s theories of delivery leave clues for how a delivery might work when contextualized within a new media environment supported by the digital internet.6

Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian offer possibilities in their prescriptions. Aristotle, trying to exclude the accident from rhetoric, acknowledges the role of delivery only with great hesitation. Cicero notes its importance, and goes further by extending categories of delivery practices glossed over by Aristotle. Quintilian provides even more guidance, offering pedagogical practices and head-to-toe instructions for how to deliver well. However, they all provide a kind of delivery that suits either an oral context, or an oral-literate, almost pre-electrate hybrid. That is, Aristotle acknowledges delivery only so that he may advise against its use (ideologically speaking, but not practically), while Cicero and Quintilian make use of the voice and image of the speaker (the poetic

6 I use the concept of language apparatus as derived from media studies. In this context, a language technology functions within a social machine that includes a matrix of technology, institutions that determine practices for that technology, and the individual and collective identities that evolve and develop within their interaction.
aspects), when delivering rhetoric. However, in the gaps between their techniques, or in asking the question, “what is that for us?” we can find practices in this classical contrast that might be useful toward a delivery that uses not only the literate technology of the book (as most current scholars in rhetoric and composition understand a “new” delivery), but one that uses image technologies combined with the digital internet (in short, new media) in addition to the identity and institutional formations that coevolve with the language technology.

These three classical thinkers, then, provide a distinction for what a delivery-for-us does not want to do while at the same time, through a grammatological reading, perform exactly those aspects which can be adapted for an electracy language apparatus. In one sense, Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian have delivery all wrong at the same time that they (collectively) have it all right. They all point out that delivery is the most important aspect of rhetoric, but they all examine different aspects of delivery that were most appropriate for their situations. The program for an electracy delivery circulates among all of these theorists, but is suppressed by the need to use it according to either an oral scenario or for the written word, where Aristotle tried to incorporate it but failed. However, Aristotle’s student, Theophrastes, is said to have developed a more comprehensive theory of delivery than his teacher.7 But just as the voice disappears on the air, so has Theophrastes’s works on delivery, and all we know of them come from classical references to his supposed treatise. Here, then, I will not attempt to recreate Theophrastes’s work, but to extrapolate what delivery might be for electracy: to do for electracy what Theophrastes tried to do for an emerging literacy. In

7 Given that Theophrastes’s name translates into something like “sweet voiced,” his attraction to delivery should not be surprising if considered in a mystorical context.
other words, my point in teasing out some of the following classical elements of delivery is not to take them literally (that is exactly the opposite of what I want to do), but to look at how they might provide an analogy or relay for practices that an electrate delivery should inhabit.

My methodology does not consist of an archival categorization of the different practices of delivery taught or recommended by these classical teachers and orators, although I do provide a somewhat detailed examination of their advice. Rather, my method is grammatological, letting the metaphors and terminology do the work for me. This methodology in looking for these gaps comes from Ulmer’s work in *Applied Grammatology*. Ulmer advocates that one needs to examine “every manner of inscription, circulating in the universe of discourse as an interruption, a disturbance that excites (incites, not insights), generating ‘information’” (314). Toward this, Ulmer says we should explore the “metaphors (verbal images) lining every discourse, in order to decompose or unfold and redirect the possibilities of meaning inherent in the material” (314). Although we have no actual classical bodies to study (only texts that tell us how such bodies should speak, gesture, move, dress, etc.), the descriptions can still provide information, and we can bootstrap the literate archive to find out what it knows. I begin this work by looking at the metaphors within classical conceptions of delivery and ask where those metaphors lead for a system of delivery more useful for a rhetorician that requires not only her own body for delivering, but the prosthesis of new media, a cyborg body that functions differently from the classical orator. Because Aristotle provides the chief icon (along with Socrates and Plato) of literacy—or if you will, literacy’s celebrity—I
begin with him in order to establish the contrast against which and electrate delivery might be constructed.

**Aristotle and Hypokrisis (Getting Under His Skin)**

“It is interesting that Aristotle, who rarely holds back from being the first to investigate a subject or to formulate the art of practice, dismisses this one as too vulgar to be worthy of his attention” (397). According to Don Bialostosky, hypokrisis posed a difficult problem for Aristotle, who never quite developed its theory as he did the other rhetorical parts: “It is rare to see him take as many conflicting turns of evaluation as he does in the brief section in which he takes up the topic” (396). In the Poetics, Aristotle writes a more straightforward account of hypokrisis, where “his deprecation of its importance for poetics is accomplished in a dismissive rhetorical question, while his referral of the topic elsewhere is relatively neutral” (396-397). In chapter 19 of the Poetics, Aristotle dismisses delivery as rhetorical by classifying its elements, such as diction, and “Modes of Utterance,” under a separate poetic delivery category: “But this province of knowledge belongs to the art of Delivery and to the masters of that science.” The poet who writes the lines must not be responsible for whether a poetic line is a “command, a prayer, a statement, a threat, a question, an answer, and so forth. To know or not to know these things involves no serious censure upon the poet’s art.” The actors of such poems must know how to deliver the lines, not the poet, and, Aristotle argues, “we may, therefore, pass this over as an inquiry that belongs to another art, not to poetry” (395). As Bialostosky points out, Aristotle refers this mode of speaking “to an ‘art of Delivery’ that belongs in neither poetics nor rhetoric” (396). Hypokrisis belongs to the actors, not to the poets: let them deal with it.
Aristotle cannot decide whether to classify delivery as either an art or a science, and this indecision reveals his crisis with hypokrisis. This terminological untidiness might simply be due to carelessness by Aristotle, or such categorical confusion might be a slip that shows his uncertainty and difficulty in developing a theory and practice for hypokrisis. George Kennedy, in his translation of On Rhetoric, notes that Aristotle’s “negative attitude toward delivery probably also derives from Plato,” specifically, Plato’s view that “political oratory under democracy had become a form of flattery and that it offered entertainment to the mob” (195 n.7) rather than a reasoned debate based in logos. Aristotle contends with hypokrisis in more detail in On Rhetoric then in the Poetics, but, as Bialostosky describes, “his tone vacillates” as Aristotle acknowledges hypokrisis’s role in rhetoric, but simultaneously laments its necessity. Hypokrisis “has the greatest force” but its effectiveness in oration is due to “the sad state of governments.” However, while hypokrisis “seems a vulgar matter when rightly understood . . . one should pay attention to delivery, not because it is right but because it is necessary, since true justice seeks nothing more in a speech than neither to offend nor to entertain.” Aristotle would prefer a rhetoric that could rely upon logos alone ("for to contend by means of facts themselves is just"), since the rest of rhetoric is merely ornament, extraneous to the pure argument ("everything except demonstration is incidental"). Yet, “because of the corruption of the audience," hypokrisis “has great power” (1404a).

Aristotle perceives hypokrisis with a hue of deceit (one that stays with us in the word’s English derivative “hypocrite”), and his analysis of hypokrisis supports this: “Even in regard to tragedy and rhapsody, delivery was late in coming to be considered; for
originally the poets themselves acted their tragedies. Clearly there is something like this rhetoric, as in poetics” (1404a). When performed by the author of a play, hypokrisis seems more authentic, and does not require a developed skill set. Aristotle considered that an author speaking one’s own texts was not much different than just merely speaking, and as Kennedy notes, “Thus there was no need to consider the oral interpretation of a play separately from the presentation of it by the author. With occasional exceptions, plays were only performed once, but written copies were available to the reading public” (195 n.4). Kennedy also confirms that “the prevailing meaning of hypokrisis in Greek is ‘acting’ and the regular word for an actor is hypokrites” (195 n.2). According to this vernacular meaning, then, the delivery of a speech becomes complicit with delivering lines in theater, and thus the rhetorical canon of delivery (as we understand this canon within the context of modern rhetorical studies) becomes synonymous with acting, which would not necessarily be “deceitful” except that during his time logographers wrote speeches for others who would then have to “act” those speeches, and some orators took acting lessons from both tragedians and comedians, thus concealing their “true” essence. Hypokrisis becomes an acting of the logos, a performance of the word, words that are not one’s own, sometimes using a “body” that is not one’s own. And such “deceit” itself is not necessarily negative or positive, but rather a form of othering as a rhetorical strategy distinguished as negative or positive through context and use. That is, one becomes something other than an “authentic” self to foster hypokrisis, and so we should read “deceit” as the rhetorical attempt to create this alterity rather than assume that it must carry negative baggage.
But Aristotle does view *hypokrisis* with a negative understanding of deceit, and Kennedy further illustrates Aristotle’s disposition toward *hypokrisis*, which shifts from an “authentic” acting to a deceitful kind: “Aristotle has remarked in 2.8.14-15 on gestures used by people in affliction, which were probably sometimes acted in court” (195 n.2). Aristotle notices a schism between truth and appearance when such speakers distort their ethos in order to win sympathy (which resembles techniques that Aristotle advocates in Book 2 of *On Rhetoric*, techniques that explain how to affect the emotions of the audience). In Book 3, as it pertains to *hypokrisis*, Aristotle provides only a brief summary of the techniques involved in acting:

> It is a matter of how the voice should be used in expressing each emotion, sometimes loud and sometimes soft or intermediate, and how the pitch accents [*tonoi*] should be entoned, whether as acute, grave, or circumflex, and what rhythms should be expressed in each case; for [those who study delivery] consider three things, and these are volume, change of pitch [*harmonia*], and rhythm. (1403b)

Aristotle mentions here only the auditory aspects of delivery, those concerned with how a speaker orally performs the speech and sounds to an audience. However, he neglects to mention anything about the gestures used to act out a speech. Alan Lindley Boegehold points out that in large spaces, the audience probably could not readily see such delivery aspects such as facial features: “The shadows and nuances of facial expression, effective as they are in close quarters, are lost when much of the audience sits too far away to see the expression on the orator’s face” (6). However, large spaces such as the *ekklesia* thus require that other visual performances of the body, such as gesture, become more important in such venues: “Speakers accordingly had to move...
their heads and hands and bodies to be fully effective” (Boegehold 6). Through his attention to speech, neglecting the other aspects of the body visible to the audience, Aristotle reveals his bias for the word, and his own anxiety for what he feels are extrinsic properties not proper to rhetoric. His omission of gestures forces us to consider the absence of the visible, which requires more attention in a shift from book to screen culture.

Aristotle would prefer only to consider the logical essence of an argument. However, the accidental traits of rhetoric haunt him. When in the form of writing alone, speeches can appeal more to reason. But when orally recited, “written speeches have greater effect through expression than through thought” (1404a). His unease with hypokrisis appears again when he considers pedagogy: “The subject of lexis, however, has some small necessary place in all teaching; for to speak in one way rather than another does make some difference in regard to clarity, though not a great difference; but all these things are forms of outward show and intended to affect the audience. As a result, nobody teaches geometry this way” (1404a). Geometry, a logical construct, does not require pedagogical ornament in the classroom. However, by arguing in the section on hypokrisis that “outward show” and “affect” are undesirable, Aristotle undercuts his own argument on rhetoric that he developed earlier in his text. Again, Bialostosky:

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8 Boegehold also points to Aeschines 1.25, who “implies that orators addressing the assembly should keep their hands to themselves.” To illustrate his point, Aeschines references “a statue of Solon standing in the Agora on Salamis as having been fashioned after the living Solon. This misstep opens him up to ridicule from Demosthenes in due course . . . and a lessons to be drawn from the exchange is that by the fourth century, orators were not constrained to keep their right hand under their cloak” (6 n.3).

9 And if the gesture must be used in larger spaces, how much must the body move in infinite spaces, such as those online?
Applying the standard first to forensic rhetoric, then of teaching, then of geometry teaching to all rhetoric, these gestures would retract not just attention to delivery but to everything beyond arguments from logos in the *Rhetoric*; indeed, the turn to geometry would retract all the probabilistic arguments that Aristotle has carefully developed for the kinds of questions rhetoric ordinarily addresses. He seems to be struggling here to name a rational discourse of sufficient power and purity to dismiss definitively the inescapable but apparently scandalous irrational force of delivery, which seems even more troubling in the province of rhetoric than in that of poetics. (397)

Aristotle, based on Bialostosky’s reading, wants to exclude the accidental traits of rhetoric to arrive at a purer, more “literate” form of rhetoric, a rhetoric of pure reason that involves just “the facts themselves” and can “dismiss” the irrationality of delivery. This irrational force of delivery threatens this pure reason, but if he excludes it in total he dismantles much of his argument that other rhetorical aspects, predominantly those that affect an audience’s emotions, should be available to the speaker.

These emotional appeals primarily appear in Book 2 of *On Rhetoric*. Aristotle’s stance toward *hypokrisis*, then, as it pertains to emotions, seems antithetical to this earlier argument where he lists propositions for the definition and causes of various emotions and how to address them in rhetoric.

The emotions [*pathe*] are those things through which, by undergoing change, people come to differ in their judgments and which are accompanied by pain and pleasure, for example, anger, pity, fear, and other such things and their opposites. There is need to divide the discussion of each into three headings. I mean, for example, in speaking of anger, what is their state of mind when people are angry and against whom are they usually angry and for what sort of reasons; for if we understood one or two of these but not all, it would be impossible to create anger. And similarly, in speaking on the subjects discussed in other emotions. (1378a)

While Aristotle disapproves of delivery as *hypokrisis*, that is, as an acting equivalent to defrauding, he sees the value of understanding emotion to the extent that a rhetor may either elicit or at least take account of mood (“state of mind”) when inventing a speech.
However, the way that Aristotle accounts for emotions with *heuresis* is quite different from how he approaches them in *hypokrisis*. It seems that as long as the argument is contained to the writing, the word of the speech, then emotions are necessary. However, when other factors such as pitch, rhythm, or tone are introduced, these non-graphic elements have too much power over logos in persuading an audience. This emotional element (*pathos*) of rhetoric, especially as it manifests through the image of the body, provides an abandoned thread that can benefit electrate delivery.

Aristotle’s anxiety coincides with an originary moment for literacy. Martin Heidegger analyzes this moment in *Introduction to Metaphysics* when the Greeks chose a metaphysics based on logos rather than *phusis*. For Heidegger, literate logic provides only one kind of metaphysics, one way to understand the world; literacy allows for more efficient practices of pure (abstract) thinking; but other ways of thinking also exist not as suitable to literate methods, most notably, practical reason. Literate logic and thinking are usually considered synonymous; this is not necessarily so. Heidegger notes that metaphysics might have developed along two main paths, but ultimately followed a literate logic developed by Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. Literacy creates the possibilities for essences (which Plato explored through his definition of *dike*) and it provides the necessary traits of a thing in the world, the conditions for a “thing” to exist. 10 Thus, the Greeks began to think in terms of things, and developed the category

10 While classical Greeks had the technology of writing, they still had to invent practices for its use. Part of this process involves “bootstrapping” the familiar practices (orality) in order to do this. Thus, although Socrates may not have been able to read or write, he was able to use (via Plato) the familiar form of the dialogue in order to explore what literate practices might entail. More generally, Rosalind Thomas explains that “at first glance, ancient Greeks seems self-evidently a society which relied extensively on the written word, which included a very large number of literates among its population, and which, in short, could be considered ‘a literate society.’ After all, it is these literate achievements of Greek civilization which Western society has inherited. Yet ancient Greece was in many ways an oral society in which the written word took second place to the spoken. Far more was heard or spoken, rather than
as a way to differentiate things. This thinking in thingness created a metaphysics based on a category system of essences, which excluded the accident as a condition for Being. Literacy as a metaphysics necessarily eclipses this other way of knowing, which includes the non-essential, or the accidental, that which is contingent: the poetic. Heidegger wished to go back to this inceptive moment, when the Greeks chose the essential over the poetic, and find a path to a logic of practical reason, something literacy does not support.11

Why did the Greeks need to develop a metaphysics? Within their environment, the most pressing problem they confronted was their “natural” environment. That is, nature was all around them, and it overwhelmed them. But literacy gave them a tool to understand it, and eventually, to master it in ways that an oral metaphysics based on mythology could not. At first, the Greeks understood nature as “phusis,” or the “emerging-abiding sway.” That is, as nature appeared to them, they took notice of particular aspects: some things stood out and emerged, and some things remained hidden, and what appeared could oscillate between these two states. What emerged became, and this is what was possible to be. Thus, “phusis” was the “Being of beings.” The Greeks, with the recording device of alphabetic writing, could then, as Walter Ong notes, study, and notice new aspects of being that were before hidden. Alphabetic writing, as a prosthetic tool, allowed them to experience phusis: “It was not in natural

written and read, than we can easily envisage” (3). Thus, the classical Greece that Heidegger discusses is only the “originary moment,” still steeped in a primarily oral culture, in which literate practices begin to emerge. Toward this analogy, then, while electracy is currently emerging, we are still a culture immersed in print and oral practices and traditions.

11 Although extremely reductive, for expediency I use “the Greeks” while discussing Heidegger as he does in Introduction to Metaphysics. While “the Greeks” compose much more diverse groups of people/cultures that what such a term can capture, the scope of this dissertation is too small to explore such differences here.
processes that the Greeks first experienced what *phusis* is, but the other way around: on the basis of a fundamental experience of Being in poetry and thought, what they had to call *phusis* disclosed itself to them. Only on the basis of this disclosure could they then take a look at nature in the narrower sense” (Heidegger 15-16). This noticing becomes the apprehension of being. In noticing something, the Greeks grasp some part of that emerging-abiding sway of *phusis*. However, just as they did not apprehend all of *phusis* with a metaphysics based in orality, neither did a literate metaphysics allow them to apprehend all of nature; some aspects still went unseen. But because literacy allowed them to notice things they could not without the technology of alphabetic writing, they were able to break the world apart into essences and define the things in the world. Thus, we now understand *phusis* as physics: the absolute essential laws of nature. 12 But again, using literacy to create categories allows only one kind of being to emerge. Heidegger sees this as a problem for contemporary society: he believes we need a logic of practical reason to confront the problems of an advanced technocratic society.

Specifically, the feature of literacy that the Greeks used to confront *phusis* was logos, which becomes reduced to “word” or “language.” However, Heidegger tells us that logos originally meant “gathering.” That is, the Greeks gathered things that they saw and put them into relationships with each other based upon categories. Category systems, however, can differ. Once the Greeks had the recording device of alphabetic language, and the logic of literacy, they began to gather according to words and

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12 Heidegger comes to translate *phusis* in both its narrow and broader senses of “what naturally is” as well as “Being”: “When one asks about *phusis* in general, that is, what beings as such are, then it is above all *ta phusei onta* that provide the foothold, although in such a way that from the start, the questioning is not allowed to dwell on this or that domain of nature—inaanimate bodies, plants, animals—but must go beyond *ta phusika*” (18).
essences, and categories became literate. At this point, logos-as-gathering and logos-as-word collapsed into a single meaning, the latter eclipsing the former: “Logos, in the sense of saying and asserting, now becomes the domain and place where decisions are made about truth—that is, originally, about the unconcealment of beings and thus about the Being of beings. In the inception, logos as gathering is the happening of unconcealment; logos is grounded in unconcealment and is in service to it. But now, logos as assertion becomes the locus of truth in the sense of correctness” (Heidegger 198-199). The literate way to connect things in the world (and thus gather them) was through the copula, which Heidegger identifies as the verb “is,” and which creates essences through this linking. The “is” places things into categories, into fixed states of being. This linking excludes the accident as an important element of being, one that Heidegger tells us to rescue. One of the most important features of the poetic is doxa, for this is what the poet works with, what we notice, the already known. The doxa gathers accidents, and is an accident itself. If Heidegger is not after literate essence, then one must look for the accidental, the opinion, the view of something other than the necessary. Like logos, hypokrisis the term collapses into the essence of “acting,” cutting off other ways of being that hypokrisis reveals.

Aristotle’s dilemma, his tracing and erasure of hypokrisis (rooted in this new metaphysics of essences), mimics a dance, or more accurately, a two-step. In Applied Grammatology, Gregory L. Ulmer makes a creative case for the way that Derrida often evokes dance metaphors to create a dancing effect in his texts, especially when Derrida analyzes other texts such as those of Mallarme, and this “reversal of the analogy between syntax and dancing helps to decipher what is taking place” (182). In looking at
Derrida’s “Pas,” as step that is not a step, Ulmer notices how Derrida structures his syntax to create a shuttling effect (which he identifies earlier as a pattern important to Derrida).

A phrase like “pas d’au-dela” (undecidable between a “step beyond” and “no beyond”) perfectly states the simulacrum of movement in the space of writing (the taking place of the place itself, which goes nowhere). The “step” that does not walk, in the syntax explored in “Pas,” recalls the language of choreography and suggests that what is involved here might be easier to dance than to explain or describe. . . . But a glance through a grammar of dance verifies that much of Derrida’s terminology used to discuss syntactical movement also carries choreographic meanings (as he himself suggests in *Of Grammatology* when he extends writing to include all manner of inscription). As one classic text on this topic notes, French is the international language of dance terminology, so the choreographic associations with pas require no Rosetta stone. (182)

Aristotle as well creates a shuttling effect, dancing around *hypokrisis* (which is itself, in its bodily aspect, concerned with movement as well), weaving back and forth, toward and away from it, flirting with it at times but ultimately rejecting it as an undesirable component of rhetoric—yet accepting it as necessary, given the “sad state of governments.” Thus, *hypokrisis* is an accidently necessary dance partner, or perhaps a necessary accident, but one that Aristotle would rather pass off and forget altogether.

Because of this, *hypokrisis*, even though in the international language of theory, does require a Rosetta stone, or at least an application of grammatology.

If Aristotle dances around *hypokrisis*, snubbing it, what can the jilted term itself tell us that he will not? If we return to this transformational moment for *hypokrisis*, what paths might it take other than “acting”? Starting etymologically, the prefix, *hypo-* translates from Greek into several meanings: under, beneath, down, from below; underhand, secretly; in a subordinate degree, slightly. “*Krisis*” derives from the verb *krinein*: to decide, determine, judge. The sense in which the term comes to mean
“acting,” then, would seem to be something like “to undercut one’s judgment,” in that acting has the ability to fool, to represent as truth what is false, to swindle. The English derivative “hypocrisy” has this meaning—dissembling: “To alter or disguise the semblance of (one’s character, a feeling, design, or action) so as to conceal, or deceive as to, its real nature; to give a false or feigned semblance to; to cloak or disguise by a feigned appearance” (“Dissemble, v.1”). Hypokrisis makes what seems seem something else. It operates below doxa, or transforms what would seem into another seeming. Hypokrisis adds accidents to accidents, which may be why Aristotle found it so troubling.

Turning to the English derivative, hypokrisis (as hypocrisy) denotes this dissembling. To where does dissembling lead? At first, it suggests the kind of hypocrisy common in the current vernacular: one who says one thing but does another. In this way, one disguises one’s true nature. One “acts” a way different from her/his essence: they are uncanny, out of their being. But one can also merely “appear” different, which becomes an act of representation, of resemblance. But when one “sembles,” (the obsolete root of dissemble) one already appears: “To be like, resemble; to seem, appear” (“Semble, v.2”). Why, then, does hypokrisis dissemble? Why the “dis”? Dissemble suggests a double appearance, or an undoing of appearance, a return from appearance. It also suggests an undoing of appearance. However, this is not a turn to the “truth,” but rather a means of a non-representational writing; hypokrisis is a writing without a clear inscription, a clear trace, for the trace disappears on the air even as it becomes affect. Hypokrisis, as it dissembles, disses the appearance that
passes for truth. It is to resemble not ("Dissemble, v.\textsuperscript{3}"). But if hypokrisis is a writing of disappearances, can we make it appear and turn it into a writing practice?

“Semble” also means “to bring together” ("Semble, v.\textsuperscript{1}"). A dissembling disburses what has been gathered. Within the rhetorical canons, hypokrisis, literally, delivers what was invented, arranged, styled, and memorized. It disperses this work of the author/speaker to an audience. This, it seems, is at the heart of hypokrisis as delivery. Of course, writing alone becomes its own deliverer. A shopping list can deliver; the author and the audience, in this case, is the same. So why hypokrisis at all? Aristotle seems to be correct in wanting to dismiss it from rhetoric, especially as it pertains to literacy. However, although literacy does not support hypokrisis, hypokrisis supports affect, and thus still finds a place within the oral applications of literacy. But “dis” does not just convey an undoing, but also a “twiceness.” That is, hypokrisis disseminates, it disburses what was gathered, but it also gathers again. An orator gathers his audience as they hang on his words. He tries to gather their opinions into his own. He tries disseminate his own feelings while collecting theirs, a process that flows back and forth as an audience affects the speaker and the speaker affects them in turn.

But back to hypokrisis. If krisis derives from krinein (to decide, determine, judge), then hypokrisis not only operates on the surface, on the seems (seams) of the speaker’s voice and appearance, but also below, or under, judgment. Moreover, the form of krinein within hypokrisis is that of the middle voice, and connotes “crisis” ("hypocrisy"). That is, hypokrisis names the level at which it works—it operates on the level of the unconscious, underneath those faculties that we use to judge, determine, and decide. Hypokrisis does not deal with logos because it operates at the level of
hypologos, beneath the “truth” at the same time it operates at the surface of the truth. Thus, there is no getting under what seems in order to get to the bottom of things, for under the bottom is the unconscious. Going back to dissembling, the judgment of hypokrisis comes from Dis, the realm of the underworld, and becomes exploited in the commercialization of unconscious desires through the fantasy worlds of entertainment institutions like Disney (DIS, the NYSE symbol for the Walt Disney Company).

Hypokrisis is a judgment that operates “from below.” Instead of the head, hypokrisis operates on the visceral, the lower, abject faculties of reason. Moreover, hypokrisis through dissemble also represses this unconscious: “To pretend not to see or notice; to pass over, neglect, ignore; To shut one’s eyes to the fact.” Hypokrisis deals with blindness (ATH), with the dumbness of the unconscious that we know is there, but that we pretend does not exist: denial.

How does one deliver from below? An electrate delivery should not perpetuate such blindness, but deliver these “semblances” and make them visible to the audience. An electrate deliverer does not just gesture in the air within hypokrisis, but writes with the gesture—she uses the tools of new media to write the unconscious and make the invisible appear. An electrate delivery provides another hypokrisis that would allow a delivery of desire, to desuppress the faculties of thinking that literacy does not support.

Toward this decomposition of hypokrisis, what would a hypo-hypokrisis tell us? That is, what is the unconscious of the word that can point toward forming a new hypokrisis? For starters, Ionic meanings of hypokrisis do not immediately include “acting” as such: “In Ionic . . . the word and its correlative verb hypokrinomai have the dialogically central sense of ‘reply’ or ‘answer,’” and the root krisis “carries the rhetorically central senses of
choice, decision, judgment, and the related senses of trial or dispute and the issue of trials and disputes.” *Hypokrisis* provides the interface for a communal practical reason. “The verb *krino* can mean ‘to question,’ as *hypokrinomai* can mean ‘to answer,’ making such paradigmatic dialogic interchange available along with the paradigmatic situation of rhetorical debate and decision in the same word history” (Bialostosky 394-395).

*Hypokrisis* answers the call of the unconscious, and tries to question and answer the various desires at play when confronting a situation; it interrogates mood. But this interrogation is not categorical—it does not attempt to eliminate “irrelevant” moods. Thus, distinguishing or separating (*krino*) in this case relates to the space of chora rather than the place of topos. *Hypokrisis* does not suggest the analytical separation available through literacy, but a decision based upon the gathering of pathos in addition to logos, a gathering where all moods contribute to a decision, fostering group decision-making at the level of affect.

Even more telling, modern day uses of *hypo* provide clues to the spirit of a new *hypokrisis*. I mention them now to circulate their uses in this context, but will return to them later. An obsolete example of hypo appears as a synonym for melancholy: “Morbid depression of spirits” (“Hypo, n.†”). This term sometimes relates to the idea of “hypochondria,” but suggests a psychological depressive state more akin to our current notion of depression (the gloomy underworld of Hades). While perhaps less severe than depression, Ulmer notes a similar condition which appears as the dominant mood of Japan in the term wabi-sabi: “Wabi-sabi is the cultural mood of Japan, its default aesthetic, developed over centuries, being to that civilization what the Classical Greek principles of harmony, proportion, and the like are to the West” (*Internet Invention* 52).
In recent American culture, Ulmer identifies a similar aesthetic emerging as “the blues” which comes from jazz: the experience of feeling happy to feel sad. We also see here, in this originary moment for a Western rhetoric, how Aristotle sought to suppress the emotional aspects of rhetoric, or at least those most unlikely to be controlled by logos (such as style), in favor of another aesthetic. However, these latent forms of hypo still exist, or emerged in later formations. Thus, hypo in this sense connects the term back to emotion, the primary faculty upon which Aristotle believes delivery works.

Hypo also plays an important role in the development (delivery?) of images in film and photography. “Hypo” is a slang term for sodium hyposulfite, a photographic fixer used to develop photographs, and invented by John Herschel, also the inventor of the term “photography” (as well as “negative” and “positive” as they relate to photographic film) (“Hypo, n.2”). The fixing process, which Herschel helped to improve, is used in all common modes of photography that use film, and is used as the final step of developing a photograph, the same step that most have viewed delivery as having in rhetoric. Without “hypo” or hypokrisis, neither image nor speech would come to view. Hypo also shows how the objective senses, in this case sight, are dependent upon the chemical, or at least, in this case, a chemical process that is required to bring an image into being, or in other terms, transform a latent image into a visible image, in essence, delivering the visible aspect.

A third meaning of hypo is its slang use as a hypodermic needle, which is a delivery method for medication or other substances into the body (under the skin) (“Hypo, n.3”). Hypokrisis, in theory, delivers “information” rather than substances, be it the message composed by the other rhetorical canons, or more unpalatable to Aristotle,
the accidental traits of a message. Or rather, it uses accidental traits to deliver the essential. *Hypokrisis* uses emotion as its point (Barthes' punctum), its needle, to deliver emotion, to “get under one’s skin” and cause an emotional disturbance and release the chemicals in the body that influence emotion.

However, the hypodermic needle is not just used to deliver a drug, but for the “rapid delivery of a drug,” and ties into one necessary aspect of an electrate delivery. If one needs to reason at the speed of light, Ulmer’s *reasoneon*, or flash reason, then delivery must also work at a comparable speed, and needs a rapid delivery system in order to help society to collectively reason at such velocities. The hypodermic needle as metaphor, within the auspices of new media, was also conceptualized in the 1940s and 1950s as a strategy for delivering information. Known as the Hypodermic needle model (also the magic bullet perspective), the strategy held that the intended message sent out by mass media is directly received and wholly accepted by the viewer. This theory became debunked as research determined that mass media is more selective on individuals, and that a predetermined response cannot be produced. But, is not this the same for pharmaceuticals injected into the body as well? Drugs sometimes have selective effects on patients, and one drug does not work for all. But the mediascape delivers information ubiquitously, and creates a virtual panacea to immunity by saturating the infosphere with many kinds of “drugs” (creating compassion fatigue). As an antidote, electracy needs to develop its own practice of delivery that would be as effective at detoxifying the collective body. An electrate delivery needs to be as much anti-delivery as pro-delivery; or, delivery must be self-injected.
Hypokrisis puts judgment under the skin, just not the kind of judgment that Aristotle had in mind. But the needle can also extract. It can take fluids from the body, and use them elsewhere. Can hypokrisis extract, and if so, what? Does a speaker not extract sighs, cheers, laughter, boos, and gasps from an audience, and then adjust the delivery accordingly? A new hypokrisis should extract affect and show it before the viewer. Again, it should get under the skin and discover what was (placed) there originally. Ulmer has created a method of invention (the mystory) that allows for an individual to do just this. The epiphany, the ah-ha!, or even the “huh?” is the response from such an extraction. How, then, does an individual do this for a larger audience, or does that group do it for itself? How does an individual extract group desire, a collective unconscious that is dumb, and dissemble the semblance? At stake here, as well, is a kind of metaphysics for the unconscious, gathering a particular aspect of phusis and unconcealing it. If Ulmer shows how we can invent from the unconscious, how can we deliver from it? How can we deliver to it? Delivery occurs at the level of desire, and we must deliver desire.

The Rhetorica ad Herennium and Cicero’s Flute

Another detailed account of hypokrisis (now through the terms actio and pronuntiatio) appears in the Latin text Rhetorica ad Herennium (RaH), which defines delivery as “the graceful regulation of voice, countenance, and gesture” (I.1.10) and breaks these elements further into the aspects of “Voice Quality and Physical Movement” (III.11.19). Voice Quality has three aspects, “volume, stability, and

13 Although the Rhetorica ad Herennium was originally thought to be written by Cicero, many Classicsists now believe that another author wrote it. Rather than an author’s name, then, I will refer to the text itself, in the form of RaH, to identify the author of its citations.
flexibility” (III.11.20); the first comes primarily from “nature” alone, but the other two may be developed by declamatory exercises, or by hiring “those skilled in this art.” Vocal flexibility is perhaps the most malleable, and the one that RaH devotes the most attention to, breaking it into eight subparts: the dignified conversational tone, explicative conversational tone, narrative conversational tone, facetious conversational tone, sustained tone of debate, broken tone of debate, hortatory tone of amplification, and the pathetic tone of amplification.

However, besides voice, the RaH provides more detail on the physical aspects of delivery than does Aristotle, and states that physical movement “consists in a certain control of gesture and mien which renders what is delivered more plausible” (III.15.26). The physical aspects of delivery, then, should provide the words with credibility, perhaps imparting ethos to the speaker. The speaker must act the part that s/he plays, becoming believable when speaking, making the audience believe that the speaker believes what s/he says. RaH’s prescription on this kind of physicality, this kind of “acting,” is more nuanced than Aristotle’s, who saw the necessity in developing delivery, but found it rather distasteful. RaH, on the other hand, fully prescribes techniques for delivery, but notes that one must disguise them when performing, so not to look like one is performing: “the gestures should not be conspicuous for either elegance or grossness, lest we give the impression that we are either actors or day labourers.” Here, the concern lies less with a falsity of the argument, a distortion with the truth, than with being seen as a lower class of citizen. In Ancient Rome, actors were an abject class of citizens, among the ranks of prostitutes, so that hypokrisis here is not just a
swindling or dissembling of the audience, but a kind of decision making that happens from the abject class, from the bottom up rather than the top down.

_RaH_ posits that delivery is more complicated than “acting,” or at least describes this complexity in more sophisticated ways than Aristotle was able to, breaking down various techniques of voice and movement, and then synthesizing them. For example, _RaH_ gives this advice on how to combine voice with gesture for one of the voice tones:

> It seems, then, that the rules regulating bodily movement ought to correspond to the several divisions of tone comprising voice. To illustrate: (1) For the Dignified Conversational Tone, the speaker must stay in position when he speaks, lightly moving his right hand, his countenance expressing an emotion corresponding to the sentiments of the subject—gaiety or sadness or an emotion intermediate. (III.15.26)

Delivery, in this case the combination of sound and movement, becomes a kind of song and dance. And while Aristotle has his own hesitations at theorizing _hypokrisis_, _RaH_ also finds difficulty in trying to describe proper delivery techniques through words: “I am not unaware how great a task I have undertaken in trying to express physical movements in words and portray vocal intonations in writing. True, I was not confident that it was possible to treat these matters adequately in writing” (III.15.27). _RaH_ has the same problem when trying to explain how changes in delivery can augment the reiteration of earlier points for emphasis: “This cannot be described with complete effectiveness, and yet it is clear enough. Hence there is no need of illustration” (IV.42.54). However, _RaH_ can point the way toward methods or practices that will help develop an electrate delivery: “Yet neither did I suppose that, if such a treatment were impossible, it would follow that what I have done here would be useless, for it has been my purpose to suggest what ought to be done. The rest I shall leave to practice” (III.15.27). Studying does not improve delivery, but active practice does. To learn _actio_,
one must be active. The constant performance of performance makes one a better orator, in both voice and movement. The pedagogy that RaH prescribes cannot use writing alone: actio must be shown.

After this advice, RaH proclaims one important maxim for those who wish to achieve effective delivery: “This, nevertheless, one must remember: good delivery ensures that what the orator is saying seems to come from his heart” (III.15.27). Ultimately, again, delivery comes down to acting, and not just “half-hearted” acting, but fully committed, “good” acting. Unlike Aristotle, who dislikes the accident of delivery, but views it as only a temporary necessity as long as men are corrupt, RaH makes the claim that delivery only needs the appearance of essence, it only needs to “seem” as if the orator “speaks from the heart.” Effective delivery, then, depends upon a seam that seems, and this seeming depends upon the doxa, opinion—what constitutes believability to the audience. What seems to seem, then, is not the authenticity of an argument, but the authenticity of emotion.

Augmenting the advice given in the RaH, Cicero provides his most detailed account of delivery in De Oratore. Cicero makes very clear in the section he devotes to delivery (as well as throughout the work) of his thoughts about this part of rhetoric: “Delivery, I am telling you, is the one dominant factor in oratory. Without it, even the best orator cannot be of any account at all, while an average speaker equipped with this skill can often outdo the best orators” (III.213). While invention, as a canon, gathers materials into topics, themselves categories, on which an orator should speak, delivery is a canon of gathering people. That is, delivery’s purpose is to collect the listeners, not only to listen, but to agree. But the way that delivery gathers is not through logos, but
through pathos, emotion. While we might disagree whether a certain delivery is “natural” compared to another, it is easy to understand the following argument by Cicero: “Now all the elements of delivery possess a certain force that has been bestowed by nature. That is why delivery strongly affects even the inexperienced, the common crowd, and also foreigners. After all, words only affect those who are joined to the speaker by the bond of a shared language, and clever thoughts often escape the understanding of people who are not so clever” (III.223). In Cicero’s time, delivery was still required because of, as Aristotle complained of his own time, “the sad state of governments and people.” Not all citizens may be as intelligent as Cicero, “But delivery, which displays the feelings of the soul, affects everyone, because everyone's soul is stirred by the same feelings, and it is through the same signs that people recognize them in others and reveal them in themselves” (III.223). Pathos, via delivery, provides the unconcealment of the poetic in Heidegger’s emerging-abiding sway; pathos uncovers what logos concealed. This is not to say that logos is lost or irrelevant or unnecessary, but that it is not suited for gathering “souls” the way that it gathers other kinds of information. Rather than gathering “nature,” delivery requires a trip to the domain of the underworld (the unconscious) to gather the “human nature” of souls.

In Book 3 of *De Oratore*, Antonius, countering Crassus, argues about the merit of knowing civil law, and whether it behooves the orator to memorize this topic before going into court. “I cannot deny the benefit of any knowledge, especially for one whose eloquence ought to be adorned with a rich supply of subjects” (I.250). However, Antonius notes that the orator already has so many aspects of his craft to consider, that he must be judicious in how he allocates his time, for “the essential qualifications of the
orator are already considerable, numerous, and difficult to come by, so that I would rather not have him divide his energies among too many pursuits” (I.250). However, Antonius would have the orator study voice and gesture, even to the detriment of the knowledge of civil law. Among these, Antonius vacillates on which should be studied more: “Who would deny that an orator, in his movement and bearing, needs the graceful gestures of Roscius?,” though due to time constraints in an orator’s studies, “no one would advise the young men who aspire to be orators to toil over learning gesture in the way that actors do.” He goes on to ask, “What is so essential to the orator as his voice?” Yet, he recommends that “no aspiring orator to become a slave to his voice, like the Greek tragic actors,” who practice every day for several years, and before performances practice voice exercises that condemn “those whom we represent in court . . . before we had chanted our paean or another hymn the prescribed number of times” (I.251). Voice and gesture requires so much time for training that civil law has no time left, for “if we shouldn’t toil over our gestures, which are of great help to an orator, and our voice, a thing which above all else makes our eloquence attractive and sustains it,” then “how much less should we fall into a preoccupation with thoroughly learning civil law?” Unlike voice and gesture, “civil law can be acquired in broad outline without instruction.” And unlike civil law, or other kinds of law, “voice and gesture cannot be picked up all at once or drawn from somewhere else, whereas the legal matters that are important for each case can be taken, instantly if you like, either from experts or from books” (I.252). Delivery, then, becomes a technique, a skill set, a kind of knowledge that an orator must practice to gain proficiency.
Antonius elevates the importance of delivery because legal books can do the other kind of thinking for the orator, or, in other words, the prosthesis of literacy can do the legal thinking, and so mastering this kind of knowledge is not as important for the orator as the physical aspects of “being” that he extends in the court room. In addition to excellent delivery, he needs only an excellent ability to navigate the database which, although slower than contemporary searching, can be perused “instantly if you like” (I.252). And the database of civil law need not be done by the orator, but can be done by legal aids: “Greeks, when handling their cases, have assistants who are experts in the law, whereas they themselves are quite ignorant in this respect” (I.252). Rome’s orators are more knowledgeable about the law than the Greeks, according to Antonius, but even this knowledge is superfluous, for “it would certainly have occurred to the Greeks, if they had thought this was necessary, to educate the orator himself in the civil law, instead of providing him with a legal aid as an assistant” (I.253). Such an idea conjures images of our own celebrity lawyers who provide not legal expertise to their celebrity clients, but notoriety, often being celebrities themselves. Antonius shows us that literate knowledge itself is not as necessary for argument as delivery is, which most likely would irk Aristotle, for the orator need not even have her/his own best argument (this is not new to legal cases, of course, for logographers in Ancient Greece often wrote speeches for clients). But delivery in this case is not one based in a pure orality, but one more fully supplemented by the prosthesis of literacy. Delivery now needs its own non-literate prosthesis.

This dialogue between Antonius and Crassus also stresses an aspect relevant to a general writing relevant to new media. In *Applied Grammatology*, Ulmer describes
Derrida’s attempt to write, within the technology of the book (*Glas*), multiple tracks that play simultaneously, and the implications that such writing has for new media forms of writing.

*Glas* (especially if one includes as its post card the “Chimère” graft) stated and de monstrated a model for verbal-visual writing of the kind that is required in intermedia situations such as the classroom or television. The double column text that is conventional for video (film) scripts—one column for verbal discourse, one for the visual (figural) track—is simulated by *Glas*, miming a “machine” (apparatus) that “can not be managed like a pen”—“the machine adapts itself to all the progress of Western technology (bellows, acoustics, electronics)” (Glas, 250). In book form, the two tracks of *Glas* are spatially distributed, allowing only analytic access to the two scenes (“one must pass from one signature to the other, it is not possible to put a hand or tongue on both at once” (285). In intermedia productions, of course, the two tracks or bands play at once. In this context the point of Derrida’s insistence on the separation and the independence of the frame and the example (accompanying one another without touching) may be recognized as a formula for the relation of the audio and the video tracks. (147-148)

Delivery, then, which is explained by its dual terms in Latin (*pronuntiatio* and *actio*), is performed in two tracks: the verbal and the visual. If the script provides multiple tracks and directions for a film’s production, then delivery performs those multiple tracks within an aural/visual context. Cicero explains that neither voice, gesture, nor expert knowledge is enough to persuade an audience, but that all must “play” at the same time for delivery to be successful. Thus, delivery requires a narrative track (expert knowledge), a sound track (voice), and a visual track (gesture) in order to achieve maximum effectiveness.

The *RaH*, of course, describes these different tracks and how to combine them. The one “track” that Cicero adds is that of the face: “But everything depends on the face; and this, in turn, is entirely dominated by the eyes. . . . For delivery is wholly a matter of the soul, and the face is an image of the soul, while the eyes reflect it”
This idea that the eyes project an image of an inner soul was not new, but Cicero’s explication on how to use this “image” is more detailed than any other account: “The face is the only part of the body that can produce as many varying signs as there are feelings in the soul; and there is surely no one who could produce these same effects with his eyes closed.” The eyes become the signature, a sign with a floating signified, which can be used repeatedly to deliver different affects.

Consequently, it is quite important to regulate the expression of the eyes. We should not alter the appearance of the face itself too much, so as to avoid distorting it or acting like a fool. It is the eyes that should be used to signify our feelings in a way suited to the actual type of our speech, by an intense or relaxed, or a fixed or cheerful look. Delivery is, so to speak, the language of the body, which makes it all the more essential that it should correspond to what we intend to say; and nature has actually given us eyes, as it has given the horse and the lion their manes, tails, and ears for indicating our feelings. So the most effective element in our delivery, next to the voice, is the expression on our face; and this is controlled by our eyes. (III.221-223)

While voice produces the soundtrack, the face, directed by the signifying eyes (though with a floating signified), becomes the image track. The face projects the unconscious, what lies beneath (the soul). Malcolm Gladwell, in *Blink*, uses Paul Elkman’s work on facial expressions and emotion to explain that the face tells the truth when we consciously lie, and that only the best actors can control these involuntary (unconscious) motor reflexes. Again, acting, *hypokrisis*, tries not only to produce the unconscious, but sometimes cover it up. While delivery produces the accidental traits, it tries to clean it up as well, making it unknown to even the speaker. Thus, the speaker produces his own blind spot.

Cicero’s analysis of the voice track breaks down the different kinds of sounds into discreet categories that might be combined depending on the desired emotion. His general categories include: “smooth and rough, restrained and wide ranging, sustained
and staccato, hoarse and cracked, and with crescendo and diminuendo and a changing of pitch" (III.216). Each emotion depends on the right composition of sound effects. Anger requires “high and sharp, excited, breaking off repeatedly,” while “lamentation and grief require another kind of voice, wavering in pitch, sonorous, halting, and tearful" (III.217). Fear uses a voice “subdued, hesitating, and downcast,” while happiness is a tone that is “unrestrained and tender, cheerful and relaxed” (III.219). He goes on to list the tonal requirements for energy, distress, and others in addition to these. Again, looking at the voice as one part of a multi-track delivery system, the voice provides information based on affect, not unlike how a film can use a single image but conjure up different emotions depending on the background music. What Cicero describes, then, is a category system for mood based upon sounds, which he likens to music: “The voice is stretched taut like the strings of an instrument, to respond to each and every touch, to sound high, low, fast, slow, loud, and soft,” and earlier, “The entire body of the human being, all facial expressions and all the utterances of the voice, like the strings on a lyre, 'sound' exactly in the way they are struck by each emotion” (III.216). However, Cicero’s chief metaphor in developing each category is not music, but painting: “The employment of each of these kinds falls under the regulation of art. They are at our disposal to be varied at will in delivery, just as colors are in painting” (III.217). The musical qualities of voice require a layering effect, just as paints on a canvas; so does all the elements of delivery in general. Delivery requires a layering of different verbal and visual elements that literacy has difficulty (even in Glass) reproducing.

Cicero leaves the section on delivery with an interesting anecdote. Crassus speaks on the proper use of voice, and how to use it in a manner that preserves and
cares for it. During this discussion, he tells the story of Gaius Gracchus, and his use of a flute to aid him in delivery: “When he was addressing a public meeting, he always had someone standing inconspicuously behind him with a little ivory flute, a skillful man who would sound a quick note that would either rouse him when he voice had dropped, or call him back when he was speaking in a strained voice” (III.225). The man with flute, then, serves as a delivery aide, a prosthetic that provides a bio-cybernetic feedback loop to help Gracchus regulate his delivery. Of course, the flute itself is not the whole of the feedback system, but also the “skillful” someone who operates the flute, and who gauges if and when Gracchus strays in voice. And all three—Gracchus, the flute, and the flute player—operate according to an established network with certain parameters and behavioral codes. Delivery, therefore, is not just communal in the sense of a gathering around an orator, but that gathering, illustrated by this extreme example of the flute player, provides feedback to the orator who delivers according to a specifically designed system, where delivery is also delivered to the orator (of which I will have more to say later). An electrate delivery would not just make the “subject” responsible for delivery, but make the audience responsible as well. That is, the audience should all be flute players.

Delivery depends upon an attunement with the audience, but this audience must be skillful. The story of the flute seemed important enough to Cicero that he not only explains its use, but calls attention to it through Caesar’s pleading: “Please, please, Crassus . . . stop talking about that and return to Gracchus’ flute. I still don’t clearly understand how that worked” (III.226). Crassus responds:

There is . . . a middle range in every voice (though this is different in every individual case). Raising the voice gradually from this level is useful as well as
pleasing, since shouting right from the start is a coarse thing to do, and this gradual approach is at the same time salutary, as it will strengthen the voice. Moreover, there is a certain limit to raising the voice (which is still below the level of shouting at the highest pitch). Beyond this the flute will not allow you to go, while it will also call you back when you are actually reaching this limit. Likewise, at the other end of the scale, when you are dropping your voice there is also a lowest sound, and this you reach step by step, descending from pitch to pitch. By this variation, and by thus running through all the pitches, the voice will both preserve itself and make the delivering pleasing. And while you will leave the man with his flute at home, you will bring with you to the forum a feeling for these things, derived from practice. (III.227)

In *Applied Grammatology*, Ulmer points out that electracy (though he introduces the term in later writings) writes in the middle voice. That is, it is an auto-communication (an action done to oneself), a writing of oneself and one’s particular situation. The flute, then, is a prosthetic device for finding the middle voice (in this case, literally), and provides practical reason for the best delivery decisions. An electrate delivery, as well, would be a delivery in the “middle,” whether that middle voice occurs on the individual or collective level. It is conceivable, then, that delivery can occur between one’s selves. But besides just being in the middle voice, it is clear that delivery has to do with taste, with aesthetics, what is “pleasing.” And while Cicero advises one not to bring the flute player along, and instead “leave the man with his flute at home” once an orator has sufficiently mastered the practice, an electrate delivery would do the opposite: do not leave the prosthesis at home, but let the prosthesis leave home without you.

**Quintilian’s Body Language**

Quintilian further demonstrates the extent to which the “language of body,” studied under the topic of “gesture,” becomes suppressed and subordinated to speech in delivery. Gesture, “conforms to the voice and joins it in obeying the mind.” And while this view is consistent throughout most of Quintilian’s writing, in his section on gesture the suppressed aspect of the visual slips out: “The importance of Gesture for an orator
is evident from the simple fact that it can often convey meaning even without the help of words” (XI.3.65). And, like Cicero, Quintilian defines gestures as extending beyond just the hand: “Not only hands but nods show our intentions; for the dumb, indeed, these take the place of language.” But beyond just nods, “A dance too is often understood and emotionally effective without the voice; mental attitudes can be inferred from the face or the walk; and even dumb animals reveal their anger, joy, or wish to please by their eyes or some other bodily signal” (XI.3.66) The body in delivery, then, can offer a way to express a state of mind, or mood (emotion/mental attitude). “Nor is it surprising that these things, which do after all involve some movement, should have such power over the mind, when a picture, a silent work of art in an unvarying attitude, can penetrate our innermost feelings to such an extent that it seems sometimes to be more powerful than speech itself” (XI.3.67). Quintilian offers a point of departure for electrate delivery, for in his expansion into nonhuman forms of visual expression, or extra bodily forms such as art and, we might assume, sculpture, he ventures into some of the (comparatively) more recent theories of the image, such as Barthes’s punctum, which stings very much the way that Quintilian describes how art “can penetrate our innermost feelings to such an extent that it seems sometimes to be more powerful than speech itself” (XI.3.67).

And if Cicero’s contribution to gesture is to focus on the face, then Quintilian extends this theory by analyzing gesture according to a whole body, moving from the head down to the feet. The head “occupies the chief place in Delivery (as it does the body itself)” (XI.3.68). Quintilian describes how the head should and should not be used in accordance with voice and other gestures, “keeping time with the Gesture, and
following the movement of hands and sides,” and that it “conveys meaning in many
different ways” (XI.3.69-70). However, as teachers of actors explain, “it is wrong to use
nothing but the head for gesturing. Nodding the head frequently is also a fault: tossing it
about and shaking out the hair is for fanatics” (XI.3.71).

If the head is primary, the “face is sovereign” (XI.3.72) The face “makes us
humble, threatening, flattering, sad, cheerful, proud, or submissive; men hang on this;
men fix their gaze on this; this is watched even before we start to speak; this makes us
love some people and hate others; this makes us understand many things; this often
replaces words altogether” (XI.3.72). While Cicero speaks much already on the face,
Quintilian adds the “ancillary service provide by the eyelids and the cheeks,” as well as
the eyebrows, because they “shape the eyes and command the forehead” but then
moves to a brief discussion of the blood, which controls the forehead when it “blushes
when it finds the skin sensitive to shame” and “disappears altogether in an icy pallor
when fear puts it to flight” (XI.3.77-78). To control the image produced by such facial
elements, one aspect of theatre that Quintilian mentions in this section is the mask.
While others who write about delivery disparage the use of the mask by actors,
Quintilian notes how it may be used by actors, like Gracchus’s flute, as an aide for
delivery, and in this case, emotion: “in plays composed for the stage, artists in delivery
borrow extra emotion from masks . . . actors regularly turn towards the audience that
side of the mask which suits the particular part they are playing” (XI.3.73-74). The mask
provides a prosthesis for emotion—it does the work of delivering emotion for the actor,
so that he may focus on other aspects of performance, just as the flute aids the orator in
controlling his voice.
Quintilian moves from the head/face complex into the neck, shoulders, and arms (where he mostly describes posture and exercises to keep good posture), into the hands, “without which Delivery would be crippled and enfeebled.” They possess infinite movements, “for these almost match the entire stock of words. Other parts of the body assist the speaker: the hands, I might almost say, speak for themselves.” While languages differ among peoples of different nations, he writes that the hands seem “the common language of the human race” (XI.3.85-87). Of course, hand gestures are not the same across different cultures, but the important point here is that Quintilian sees a nonverbal system of communication operating within delivery, not just as another track, but one that can be understood by itself, without the accompaniment of a soundtrack.

And like Cicero, Quintilian advises against miming or mimicry: “For example, you can suggest a sick man by imitation a doctor feeling the pulse, or a lyre-player by shaping your hands as if you were striking the strings. You should refrain from such things in pleading” (XI.3.88-90). Instead, an orator should be “very different from a dancer; he must adapt his Gesture to his sense more than to his words . . . I do not approve of his miming attitudes and making a visual display of whatever he says.” In other words, the sign produced by hand gestures (of which Quintilian describes at least twenty-three different kinds) should not try to illustrate the words, but add value to them. They should not represent or signify the words, which themselves represent, but add another dimension to delivery. “This caution applies not only to the hands, but to the whole range of Gesture and voice” (XI.3.88-90). Turning again to the question of prosthetics, how can new media augment the hand so that such delivery can be extended to the digital internet? A simple answer seems to be the computer mouse and
the pointer/hand it controls, but we might also ask how can the hand (literally, the digits) be amputated and sent off along with the flute to deliver without the speaker (digital digits)?

Quintilian’s advice for hand gestures ultimately seems less like signs than advice on how to move the hands. What does such movement produce, though? “A slower hand movement expresses promise or agreement, a quicker one is for exhortation or sometimes for praise” (XI.3.102). “The hand may also be drawn towards the body, with the fingers pointing down a little more freely, and then opened more widely to face the opposite way, so that it seems to be somehow delivering our actual words” (XI.3.97).

What are the hands moving? “Again, if the top joint of this finger is gripped lightly on both sides, and the two last fingers are slightly curved (the little finger rather less so), the Gesture is appropriate in arguing a point” (XI.3.95). What are the hands holding? “If the first finger touches the middle of the right-hand edge of the thumbnail with its tip, the other fingers are being relaxed, we have a Gesture wholly appropriate to approval or narrative or marking a distinction” (XI.3.101). The fingers, the hands, mark. They mark the air with finger tips the way that brush tips mark a canvas. Earlier, Quintilian compares the modulation and change of voice to painting, as did Cicero: “Artists who painted in a single colour nevertheless made some things stand out more than others, since otherwise they could not even have given proper outlines to the limbs of their fingers”( XI.3.46). Gestures, besides marking, outline, and they gather aspects of phusis. Quintililian provides instructions for painting an image track that disappears along with the words, but nonetheless provides a kind of writing. “It is best for the hand to begin its movement on the left and end it on the right, but in such a way that it seems
to be putting something down gently, not striking a blow” (XI.3.106). Quintilian

describes how to make a brushstroke. “Sometimes however it is lowered at the end,
but only to go back quickly; and sometimes it springs back, to express either denial or
surprise” (XI.3.106). This kind of painting does not produce a trace like that of a more
permanent inscription, but one of constant performance, so that it does not draw letters
or a landscape, but draws out emotion.

Quintilian even provides the dimensions of the canvas on which the orator paints
with his gestures: “The experts also tell us never to raise our hand above eye-level, or
lower it below the chest; so it is indeed wrong to have to pull your hand down from
above your head, or to lower it to the bottom of your belly! It may be moved to the left
as far as the shoulder; anything beyond that is unseemly” (XI.3.112-113). Unseemly
because these dimensions create an aesthetic, a doxa of beauty, and anything outside
of this aesthetic does not “seem” the same way when delivered within the “canvas.”
Again, we are not dealing with the realm of literate logic that Aristotle tried to codify
within rhetoric (thus he found delivery difficult to account for), but one of aesthetics
(which is one reason that, especially after the printing press, delivery becomes almost
completely lost as a canon until the elocutionary movement of the nineteenth century).
And while some hand gestures can “speak for themselves” (XI.3.85-86), they
nonetheless always speak, in this classical context, along with speech, and thus show.
Not unlike W. J. T. Mitchell’s imagetext, gestures produce their own kind of
gesturespeech. A show and tell. However, like an imagetext, the two cannot replace
each other, but work together to elicit different faculties. While delivery does literally
“tell,” its most significant contribution to rhetoric is “showing.”
Two smaller contributions that Quintilian makes, without really making much contribution at all (at least it seems), are in his analysis of the nose and the lips. His remarks demonstrate more how not to use them in order to avoid a negative effect rather than for any positive gain. For instance: “As for the nose and lips, there is hardly anything that we can decently display by their means, though derision, contempt, and disgust are the feelings they usually signify.” One should not “wrinkle the nostrils” nor wipe one’s nose. “As for the lips,” he writes, “pushing them forward, half-opening them, pursing them, opening them wide, baring the teeth, stretching the lips sideways and almost as far as the ear, curling them in scorn . . . all of these are bad.” The lips should mostly go unnoticed and do not help the speaker, even when speaking: “Licking or biting them is also an ugly habit, because they ought not to move very much even when forming words. We should speak with the mouth rather than with the lips” (XI.3.80-81). However, the nose and the lips provide yet another departure towards an electrate delivery, one that would attempt to make use of the chemical senses that Ulmer finds Derrida wanting: “Derrida’s project to displace the dialectic includes an attempt to isolate the specific features of those senses that have not been conceptualized—taste in particular, and smell—and to pose them as an alternative, as models of thinking and writing, to the distancing, idealizing notions based on sight and hearing” (Applied Grammatology 34). Quintilian (as does Cicero) judges delivery by taste: a good voice is often described as “sweet,” and unlike acting, oratory has a “different flavour: it does not wish to be highly spiced” (XI.3.182). The nose and the lips, then, become the organs by which to judge a good delivery, and if an orator is not to make use of these when performing, how will he know whether he “stinks” or not? An electrate delivery needs to
make use of the chemical senses, whether those chemicals are registered by the nose and mouth, or just the ones that we register with emotion (serotonin, dopamine, endorphins). The tendency to describe delivery in terms of taste, yet deny those organs needed to judge it (including Quintilian’s exclusion of eating and drinking itself during delivery), again shows the tension begun with Aristotle in trying to account for delivery within literacy, or at least an oral performance of a literate logic.

Quintilian often analogizes delivery to music, and often a musical instrument in particular: “The voice is indeed like the strings of an instrument: the slacker it is, the deeper and fuller it is; the tighter it is, the thinner and shriller it is,” and “Delivery is ‘ornate’ when it is supported by a voice which is fluent, strong, rich, flexible, firm, sweet, durable . . . having of course all the necessary inflexions and tensions, and being equipped, as they say, with ‘all the stops’” (XI.3.40). Jeffrey Henderson notes that this last phrase most likely refers to a hydraulic organ, an instrument Quintilian would have knowledge of. And just as music moves emotions according to tempo, “Some passages are better suited to a quick Delivery, some by a restrained one. We use the former to pass rapidly over things, to pile up details, and to hurry on; the latter to insist, to emphasize, and to drive points home” (XI.3.111). But if the voice is an instrument, it needs a player to pluck at its strings or play its keys. Or, it needs a conductor (in the sense of an orchestra conductor, but also, as discussed later, in the sense of a chora conductor, such as Ulmer’s fourth inference of “conduction”). If the movement of the hands represents a painting, they might simultaneously direct, or rather conduct, the musical track as well. The orator not only paints, but conducts the music of his voice. Quintilian finds the same problem as Cicero in analogizing delivery into music or
painting: it seems to be both. The conductor may conduct with the hand using the baton, making use of the other hand only in an ancillary way; such is the case with delivery: “The left hand never rightly makes a Gesture on its own, but it often lends support to the right” (XI.3.114). The musical terms used for the purpose of conduction (beat and tempo, dynamics, articulations) correspond to those aspects that an orator should have in making sure his speech is well articulated, that his voice raises or lowers for the correct occasion, or that he stresses the correct words for emphasis. Quintilian finds that using gestures to help “conduct” oneself is an error for delivery: “There is another mistake too . . . language possesses certain hidden stresses, one might say metrical feet, and the Gestures of many speakers coincide with these” (XI.3.108). Instead, orators should adapt gestures to the units of speech so that one may take a breath. However, gestures do correspond to aspects of Delivery, whether or not they follow or lead, for “when the temperature goes up, Gesture too will become more frequent as the Delivery becomes faster” (XI.3.111). And lead gestures do, for again, although Quintilian finds it a fault, delivery even delivers ideas to the orator, for sometimes during invention, “when students are writing something and articulating their thoughts by rehearsing the Gestures, they tend to compose their sentences to fit the way in which the hand is to fall” (XI.3.109). So unlike a conductor that directs an orchestra or a choir, the orator conducts himself, both in the composing of a speech and its delivery. While the gestures might be visible to the audience, and might elicit that which is inexpressible through language, the orator also directs his performance, even if he means for his gestures to follow his words. Thus, feedback occurs between speech and gesture, both influencing each other, making it difficult to tell which is really
controlling the other. However, the outcome, the signal that indicates the system is working correctly, is not a result of “understanding,” but an infusion of pleasure. Within this system the orator must maintain a middleness (Cicero’s flute): “The first rule of correct Delivery is evenness. Speech must not be jerky.” At the same time, “The second requirement is variety” (XI.3.43). The key to Delivery, then, is a proper aesthetics that is balanced, sung in the middle range. Through these aesthetics, the output of the system does not just provide pleasure to the audience, but also to the speaker, and “revives” him by “giving him a change of work” (XI.3.44). The speaker’s outputs become his inputs.

However, while an orator’s rhythm and sweet voice may sound like music, Quintilian advises against actually speaking in song. Other “faults are tolerable compared with the sing-song manner which is the chief problem in every Cause and every school nowadays—and whether it is more useless than disgusting I do not know!” (XI.3.57). His aversion toward this style of delivery stems from Aristotle’s fear—*hypokrisis’s* roots in acting. “What is less becoming of an orator than a theatrical recitation which sometimes sounds like the excesses of a drunken orgy or a riotous party?” (XI.3.57). Or, perhaps what is worse, musical theatre: “What can be more counterproductive in emotional appeals than if, when what is called for is sorrow, anger, outrage, or pity, the speaker not only distances himself from these emotions (which he should be implanting in the judge’s mind), but destroys the very dignity of the court by a sort of naughty song and dance act?” (XI.3.58). From the head to the feet, song possesses the ability to transform the speaker from a controlled orator to one controlled
Quintilian advocates a balanced oratory that is musical, but without singing. “Cicero said that those ‘Lycian and Carian rhetors almost sang in their epilogues’—but we have gone beyond the limits of any reasonably restrained style of singing!” In fact, most often some singing does occur in delivery: “Does anyone who has to deal—I will not say with homicide or sacrilege or parricide, but with figures and accounts, in a word with any case at law—<not> sing?” Orators do this because the feedback they receive from such practice is pleasurable: “Yet we do it readily enough, because no one dislikes the sound of his own singing, and singing is less hard work than making a proper speech.” If one sings too much, one becomes addicted: “There are some people, too, who, as well as the other vices of their life, are slaves to the pleasure of listening to sounds that soothe their ears wherever they are” (XI.3.58-60). Delivery delivers pleasure.

Quintilian dislikes marking time (rhythm) with the body, as did Cicero: “No twiddling of the fingers, no marking the rhythm with the finger joint; he controls himself more by the pose of his whole body and the manly flexing of the side” (XI.3.122). Both a pose and a static flexing, the orator should appear more like a statue. However, as already seen, when the music starts, dancing soon follows. Thus, we arrive at the bottom of the orator, his feet. “As to the feet, both stance and walk require attention. It is unsightly to stand with the right foot in front, and to put the same hand and foot forward together. It may be sometimes acceptable to put the weight on the right foot, but only if you hold your chest level; even so, this is a Gesture of comedy rather than of
oratory” (XI.3.124-125). At first, Quintilian wants to separate oratory from the theater, and so footwork appropriate to the stage would not be appropriate in court. However, as he goes on, it is clear that besides merely providing instructions on how not to step, delivery has its own moves: “Again, when you put your weight on the left foot, it is bad to raise the right, or keep it poised on tiptoe. Holding the feet too far apart is unsightly if you are standing still, and almost indecent if combined with movement. A step forward is quite in order, so long as it is opportune, short, and well controlled” (XI.3.125). Quintilian emphasizes control of movement as becoming of an orator, and proper etiquette. “I know we are also advised not to turn our backs on the judges as we walk, but to move at an angle and keep our eyes on the panel. This is impossible in private trials, but the distances are less there, and we do not have to turn our backs for long.” Thus, specific moves become necessary to maneuver throughout the court. “Sometimes however it is permissible to step back gradually.” However, “Some people jump back: this is simply ridiculous.” Slow and controlled: thus is the advice that Quintilian provides to keep the orator from looking “ridiculous.” “Stamping the foot can be opportune on occasion, as Cicero says, at the beginning or end of a passage or aggressive argument, but if it is done often it shows the speaker to be a fool, and ceases to attract the judge’s attention. Swaying from right to left and shifting the weight from one foot to another is another indecorous performance. Above all, one should avoid effeminate movements, such as Cicero ascribes to Titius—which is how a type of dance came to be called a Titius” (XI.3.127-128). A slow, methodical movement by the feet prevents one from stamping the foot too much, or marking time through too much rhythmic movement and delivering oneself into song and dance.
If Quintilian’s discussion of the hands seems to resemble a kind of conducting, his detailed suggestions on an orator’s footwork seem like choreography, or anti/counter-choreography. What Quintilian really despises, and again, what Aristotle (via Plato) wanted to eliminate from delivery, is any aspect of noise in rhetoric. While Aristotle saw acting and emotion as an uncontrolled element of rhetoric, and hence a noise, Cicero and Quintilian seem to think that they can control it and turn it into music, music that is not noise. Quintilian dislikes the sing-song style of delivery because it can devolve into this kind of noise, where the orator no longer controls the delivery, but the delivery controls the orator. As Henderson notes in his translation, “Whether ludus talarius [the place where the naughty song and dance act takes place] is a gambling house or a place where long-skirted dancers perform, it is evidently a noisy place, and that is Quintilian’s point” (114 n.39). When singing and dancing take place, the spectacle becomes unbecoming, more of a Bacchic performance, and the delivery becomes noisy. And while the orator may feel the rhythm and understand the unexpressible, the danger is not that the audience will not understand, but that they will: “Fronto makes it clear that its castanets and cymbals were a public nuisance: a censor closes the places down, because he cannot help dancing to the beat himself as he passes by” (114 n.39). In advocating a sweet voice and fluent gestures, then, Quintilian (and to some extent Cicero) flirts with moving from literacy into something else entirely: the pure aesthetic. This, as it pertains to rhetoric, was Aristotle’s ultimate anxiety.

Finally, in addition to song and dance, Quintilian gives advice on the element of a performer that is especially relevant to an electrate delivery: the look. Ulmer theorizes that “the look” is the category of individual identify formation that occurs in electracy, just
as the spirit was to orality and the self to literacy. Quintilian often teaches against appearing “unsightly” (deforme) to others, and goes on to provide specific advice about several aspects of an orator’s “look” beyond voice and gesture. “As for dress, there is no special form for the orator, but his is noticed more. As with all men of standing, it should be distinguished and masculine.” Dress need not be special, but particular styles can improve the orator’s effectiveness: “Toga, shoes, and hair invite criticism both for too much care and for not enough.” And like all aspects of rhetoric, the orator must adapt dress to the rhetorical situation: “There are some features of dress which have themselves changed somewhat with the changing times” (XI.3.137). Quintilian’s look has to do with fashion, and not just fashion for fashion’s sake, but how it will improve or detract for oratory. “I should like the toga itself to be round, and well cut to fit; otherwise there are many ways in which it will be unshapely” (XI.3.139). The speaker must find, just like his tone and movement, a middle-ground that appears fashionable but not “over-made” (it “must be neither too tight nor too loose”), or else the audience will attend too much to gossip about “what he is wearing” rather then the substantive quality of his speech. The speaker should also not wear too much jewelry: “The hand should not be loaded with rings, especially any which do not go over the middle joint” (XI.3.142). And some garments must be avoided altogether: “The short cloak, like leg-bandages, scarves, and ear-protectors, is only excusable by illness” (XI.3.144). The orator must properly hide the body beneath the toga. However, once the initial “look” is given, the orator can disrobe during the actual delivery (first impressions really are the most important): “This close attention to dress applies only at the beginning of a speech. As it proceeds, almost by the beginning of the Narrative, it is quite proper for the fold to slip,
apparently accidentally, off the shoulder.” As the speech continues into the Arguments and Commonplaces, “it is quite proper to throw the toga back from the left shoulder, and even to let the fold down, if it tends to stay up. You can pull the toga away from the throat and the upper chest with the left hand, for everything is not hotting up” (XI.3.144-145). The initial dress advice Quintilian gives makes the orator look more like a celebrity on the red carpet, complete with advice on hair, jewelry, and dress, than a rhetorician. “And when the great part of the speech is over, at least if fortune smiles upon us, almost anything goes—sweat, fatigue, disordered clothing, toga loose and falling off all round” (XI.3.147-148). No wonder Demosthenes practiced declaiming while running; as Quintilian describes it, oratory is an athletic endeavor. While Quintilian denounces the orator whose movements devolve into dancing, he finds no problem in moving towards nudity in the court. This is an exaggeration of course, but like Aristotle, again, Quintilian finds himself in his own crisis when trying to account for what elements of the body should be used in delivery. And again, these accidents are all necessary, because of their affect. Unlike Pliny, who advises not to “disturb the hair” when wiping sweat with a towel, Quintilian thinks that “dishevelled hair has some emotional impact, and wins approval just because trouble seems to have been forgotten. However, if the toga falls down early in the speech, or after only a little while, failure to rearrange it is a sign of carelessness, laziness, or ignorance of how clothes should be worn” (XI.3.148-149). Quintilian does not provide the essentials of delivery, but the accidental traits, and more specifically, his own aesthetics for what makes a good deliverer. For us, his orator equates to our celebrity, from A list to D. The
question for an electrate delivery, then, is how do we each bring out our own “celebrity” in order to better deliver in new media?

Delivery, ultimately, is this incarnation, not necessarily into celebrity, but the incarnation of being into a body, and then out of a body. Aristotle wanted the logic of literacy, what he saw as pure being, an essence of an argument, to incarnate into a body and come forth from an orator, just as a logical argument can be read from a book. However, the human body is full of accidents: it never exists only as Plato's “featherless biped” (famously debunked by Diogenes). Even the current scientific essence of a body, DNA, is full of necessary accidents in order for being to strive within the body (Heidegger's Dasein or Spinoza's conatus). This very striving occurs when an orator tries to deliver a speech; it is never just an act, but a struggle, an attempt to incarnate a “soul” into being, a soul that incarnates the speaker, which the speaker tries to incarnate into the audience. The orator is trying to deliver, to birth, a new being. Literately, ironically enough, it is impossible for delivery to be without accidents as long as a human being delivers it. However, delivery needs these accidents, for it interfaces with other humans, who are designed to respond to such accidents. This delivery depends not just on the speaker, but the audience as well, so that delivery needs multiple bodies in order for this incarnation to occur. Thus, Delivery’s Necessary Accidents, DNA, is necessary in rhetoric too for these accidental births to occur. Within new media, the image disrupts the essence of literate logic in print so that a “logical” delivery-machine like the book cannot deliver accident-free. We need to look at the site of the body and what it can tell us about how the accidents of an electrate apparatus can be used to deliver being. However, this being-becoming-body is not the incarnation into a human
body of an oral delivery, but a posthuman body of a digital delivery-machine, a cyborg body connected in multiple ways to the society of the spectacle and the Internet. Bodies such as these become integrated into desiring-machines, and require a new logic for their operation. By turning to Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari and their theories of the desiring-machine and schizoanalysis, the next chapter offers an example of such a logic for a new media delivery-machine.
Gracchus’ flute provides a point of departure for thinking about new media forms of delivery. Cicero’s anecdote to Caesar in his *De Oratore* displays the ways that various technologies are implicated with skills and techniques of delivery, as much as various technologies are implicated with different types of writing. Given that current writing practices and technologies have evolved since the first marks were made with a writing tool and substrate, so delivery technologies have evolved alongside. We should not forget that some of the first delivery-machines included the very spaces in which delivery took place. The Ancient Greek *pynx* provided acoustic amplification to the speaker so that his voice reached the back row. Equivalent modern spaces are equipped with microphones, speakers, teleprompters, cameras, internet connections, so that the speaker may be viewed and heard ubiquitously. However, this is only one setting that mimes the traditional image of an orator delivering a speech in front of a crowd (even if the crowd remains unseen and elsewhere). The technology borrows from the same logic of an oral apparatus, and requires the ability to reach the stage in the first place, a particular kind of power. New media offers many different forms of delivery than just this model, and changes the power structure of who is able to speak/show/deliver. The one similarity between this model, and nearly all models of delivery, is the reliance upon prosthetic machines to aid in the delivery. Before Gracchus had his flute, however, an even more famous orator relied upon machines at various stages of the delivery process: Demosthenes.

Demosthenes embodies a desire of delivery as much as a delivery of desire. Many anecdotes abound about his devotion and dedication to overcoming his natural
impairments that would make him an otherwise poor speaker. Cicero advises orators to “press forward night and day” in their vocation, and

do as the famous Athenian Demosthenes did, whose preeminence in oratory is unhesitatingly admitted, and whose zeal and exertions are said to have been such that at the very outset he surmounted natural drawbacks by diligent perseverance: and though at first stuttering so badly as to be unable to pronounce the initial R. of the name of the art of his devotion, by practice he made himself accounted as distinct a speaker as anyone; later on, though his breath was rather short, he succeeded so far in making his breath hold during a speech, that a single oratorical period—as his writings prove—covered two risings and two fallings of tone; moreover—as the tale goes—it was his habit to slip pebbles into his mouth, and then declaim a number of verses at the top of his voice and without drawing a breath, and this not only as he stood still, but while walking about, or going up a steep slope. (On the Ideal Orator 193)

These pebbles become a kind of machine, for as Deleuze and Guattari write of stones: “on being confronted with a complete machine made up of six stones in the right-hand pocket of my coat (the pocket that serves as the source of the stones), five stones in the right-hand pocket of my trousers, and five in the left-hand pocket (transmission pockets), with the remaining pocket of my coat receiving the stones that have already been handled, as each of the stones moves forward one pocket, how can we determine the effect on this circuit of distribution in which the mouth, too, plays a role as a stone-sucking machine?” (Anti-Oedipus 3). Demosthenes sucks his stones, not for the pleasure of sucking on stones, but for the pleasure of the process, the process of becoming his desire, which for him, is becoming orator.

If one were ever to make an action-movie based upon Demosthenes’s life, one would surely include these elements in a Rocky-like montage, quickly covering his training. In practicing his gestures, to be “seemly,” Quintilian tells us that Demosthenes made use of a mirror: “This is why Demosthenes used to plan his performance in front of a big mirror; despite the fact that the bright surface reverses the image, he had
complete trust in his own eyes’ ability to tell him what effect he was making” (*The Orator’s Education* 121). Also, since “Moving the shoulders about is another fault,” Demosthenes “cured himself of this by standing to speak on a narrow platform, with a spear suspended above his shoulder, so that if in the heat of his speech he forgot to avoid this, he would be warned by a prick from the spear” (*The Orator’s Education* 153). And in order to study, to break off with the world, Demosthenes made use of a primitive sense-deprivation chamber: “he used to hide away in a place where no sound could be heard and no prospect seen, for fear that his eye might force his eye to wander” (*The Orator’s Education* 347-349). But Demosthenes also overloaded his senses, in perhaps one of the best known scenes of his training. Although a “great lover of seclusion,” he “used to rehearse his speeches on the beach, against the crash of the waves, to accustom himself not to be frightened by the roar of the assembly” (*The Orator’s Education* 351).

To face the assembly, Demosthenes relied upon assemblages of different kinds, and although not schizophrenic in a clinical sense, practiced a kind of schizophrenic production. “What the schizophrenic experiences, both as an individual and as a member of the human species, is not at all any one specific aspect of nature, but nature as a process of production” (*Anti-Oedipus* 3). Demosthenes relied upon coupling with the various machines he either finds or devises in order to enact a process that will eventually produce another process. To be sure, the earthen elements that Demosthenes used constitute as much of a machine as a flute or a computer. As Deleuze and Guattari explain, nature is itself a process of production, and by process they refer to the interaction of “nature” and “industry”: “It is probable that at a certain
level nature and industry are two separate and distinct things: from one point of view, industry is the opposite of nature; from another, it returns its refuse to nature; and so on. Even within society, this characteristic man-nature, industry-nature, society-nature relationship is responsible for the distinction of relatively autonomous spheres that are called production, distribution, consumption” (Anti-Oedipus ##).

The goal of delivery and of the schizophrenic are the same: they both seek to produce desire. The orator in classical Athens sought to persuade an audience based upon the speaker’s desire, and to do this, the desire must be extended to this audience. The very desire to speak was also indicated and questioned by the presiding officer of the Ancient Greek assembly, who asks “Τίς ἄγορεύειν βούλεται;” (“Who wishes to speak?”). Once delivering, Quintilian says that the orator must make himself believe in what he says, in order to convince his audience that they should feel it to. Such false desire is nonetheless still desire. This orator, desiring an outcome, seeks to persuade the listeners to share in this outcome, to also desire it, thus, the output of desire becomes an input, and the process perpetuates. This is no less true for any of the three species of rhetoric. For instance, a deliberative speech shares the same desire for a particular solution to a problem. Socrates is negatively influencing our youth. What should be done about it? One speaks, “I desire him to be put to death,” and desire becomes delivered. For epideictic rhetoric, one desires to praise Pericles for feats in battle: an agreement over such feats must begin and end with the desire to also praise him. Forensic discussions deal with the desire to find the truth about past events. The orator must convince the audience that finding the truth is important, that it is desirable, before anyone would agree to look for it. Logical arguments have little effect at this
level of discourse. Simply informing an audience of the facts, even if credible, is not enough. They must be made to believe—they must desire such knowledge, and so such desire much be delivered.

When Ulmer looks at the modern disaster in *Electronic Monuments*, he observes that with the news of a disaster, the media fail to deliver desire, and creates its own kind of schizophrenic, with the split coming between knowledge and belief: “The immense amount of knowledge about disaster is supplied to us by our media in a way that is unreceivable at the level of belief. . . . Such is the scission of our time—the disjunct between knowledge and experience, between collective history and individual existence” (xxx). The media creates what Ulmer refers to as compassion fatigue. Knowledge persists about a whole host of problems, but few enough have the desire to do anything about the problems. If rhetoric exists at all as a tool for democratic institutions, to find solutions to collective problem solving that are in the best interests of the people, then rhetoric must attend to belief, and the beliefs that we hold are often tied directly to our individual desires. The trick, rhetorically, is to tie the other problems of the world with the beliefs people have, or, to their desires that influence what they believe. But such beliefs and desires do not always appear at conscious level of debate, for literacy since Plato has attempted to suppress such desires within argumentative engagements. Thus, rhetoric, needs to attend to the unconscious.

This is what delivery has always done. And as delivery has delivered the unconscious, it has always been theorized not in terms of a whole body, but as an assemblage of body parts—as a delivery-machine. This break-up may be from the whole of rhetoric itself (a contradiction?), which is used precisely to break wholes of
language/argument into parts for criticism and pedagogy. The five canons of rhetoric are an exemplar of rhetoric’s aims. Thus, Cicero and Quintilian’s pedagogical breakdown of how the body should deliver never rests upon an organic whole, but proceeds through the different sub-machines and how each of them functions. The voice, the head, the face, the arms, the hands, the eyebrows, the eyes, the feet—and then the nonhuman prostheses such as clothing and flutes. The deliverer draws upon whichever machine is necessary to enact the feeling desired in his audience. Aristotle’s body without organs writhes because it wants to be organless, but rhetoric has sensations and requires that organs develop. And the Latin usage of actio to describe the action of delivery informs thinking about delivery as primarily a process, a production made by such machines.

To be sure, delivery-machines have the ability to augment the physical capabilities of the body. The amphitheatre, the microphone, the webcam: all of these help the speaker connect with the perceptive hardware of a desired listener. They all amplify sound, zoom the image, or teleport presence. However, what is the software that determines how these machines become connected? If delivery operates at the level of the unconscious, what is the unconscious logic that might guide how delivery machines become joined? If delivery delivers desire, the unconscious, both uncovering what lies beneath, as well as injecting it and placing it there, then any logic at which these machines work must deal with the unconscious. Deleuze and Guattari, specifically in their work *Anti-Oedipus*, provide a theory of desire and assemblages of machines that can complement the work with unconscious writing and psychoanalysis already done by Ulmer with what they call schizoanalysis. If invention operates at the individual level,
and psychoanalysis can inform the invention process for the individual, allowing them to write the unconscious, the linking of multiple individuals into groups—the effect of delivery—requires an addition to psychoanalysis so that the group subject might write a larger group unconscious. Such writing certainly requires the techniques put forth by Ulmer for invention, but delivery also requires a new logic aimed at the machines used to make such connections. Deleuze and Guattari’s theories of how desiring-machines operate become an important relay for the logic of delivery-machines.

**Schizophrenia**

The schizophrenic and schizophrenia are not necessarily the same. The former defines the creator of flows of desire, while the latter defines a clinical condition of the person who is stopped from her desiring production. It is this latter definition that often conditions the way we understand the schizophrenic. And while Deleuze and Guattari’s revised understanding of schizophrenia’s causes provide our initial relay into understanding what the schizophrenic can teach us about delivery, the clinical understanding of the schizophrenic’s “symptoms” also provides a way to understand how clinical schizophrenia informs classical delivery, and why it has become more or less useless for the body attempting to deliver within a new media environment.

Traditional characteristics of schizophrenics reveal several aspects of an individual who would not be able to deliver very well, at least according to Cicero and Quintilian’s methods. Schizophrenics have no voice. They cannot pronounce that which they think, because what they think is inaccessible to their body, and their body is inaccessible to what they think. They cannot think through feeling. If they try to declaim their words, it is possible that that “word salad” comes forth (Freud might say word diarrhea) rather than the musical intonations of a classically trained orator. The schizo has not the
smooth starts and stops, the carefully raised and lowered tones of a well-trained
mouth/ear complex, but the fits and starts, breaks and flows of one who cannot
enunciate the desired words. What follows is a breakdown of the schizo’s breakdowns,
and how they might be indicative of or relayed towards an electrate delivery.

Positive Symptoms

Delusions. False beliefs strongly held in spite of invalidating evidence, especially as a
symptom of mental illness: for example,¹⁴

1. Paranoïd delusions, or delusions of persecution. For example believing that

   people are “out to get” you, or the thought that people are doing things when
   there is no external evidence that such things are taking place.

Living now not only in the society of the spectacle, but also the society of
surveillance, such belief is not necessarily false, generally speaking. However, the
condition of a general paranoia does not preclude others from still seeing such a
condition as a positive symptom of schizophrenia in others. A collective paranoia
might include those engaged in classic conspiracy theories (JFK assassination,
UFOs, 9/11), but also the celebrity’s condition of constant gossip about
themselves. A famous example Ulmer mentions about Mariah Carey reveals not
only the line-of-flight that the image attempts to make, but also the need for one to
be paranoid about one’s own image. Celebrity gossip creates the appearance that
“people are doing things,” even if there is no evidence. For better or worse, this
appearance, and the corresponding belief in it (rightly or wrongly), must be
accounted for in a logic of electrate delivery.

¹⁴ In this section, passages in italics are quoted directly from the DSM-IV.
2. **DELUSIONS OF REFERENCE.** *When things in the environment seem to be directly related to you even though they are not. For example it may seem as if people are talking about you or special personal messages are being communicated to you through the TV, radio, or other media.*

It should come as no surprise that one would believe this in a new media environment. Messages everywhere constantly clamor, not for the attention of the person next to me, but for MY attention. The schizo might be more aware of this than most, but this is no reason for institutionalization. But besides an understated enthymatic attempt to influence one’s desire to buy in the advertisement, journalism often directly asks viewers to respond to prompts, send in citizen videos of both news and opinions, and to blog or twitter their thoughts. The media, while trying to be both immediate and effaced, collapses that space by direct appeal to the viewer, not just as consumer, but as producer (or perhaps the newly coined term, “prosumer”). New media knows how to tap into the schizophrenic’s need to create desiring-machines, and territorializes the flows by seeming to deterritorialize them at the same time.

3. **SOMATIC DELUSIONS.** *False beliefs about your body - for example that a terrible physical illness exists or that something foreign is inside or passing through your body.*

Somatic delusions do not just happen to the individual body, but also the socius, the collective body. Not only does media shift back and forth on whether the latest drug or diet are good or bad for the individual, but also about what is good for the socius. However, the beliefs are false only in that their frame of reference, how
they ask the question, creates a serious blind spot, a spot that Ulmer details extensively in *Electronic Monuments* which I’ll return to in a later chapter.

4. **DELUSIONS OF GRANDEUR.** For example when you believe that you are very special or have special powers or abilities. An example of a grandiouse delusion is thinking you are a famous rock star.

The culture of celebrity, of not just the idea that everyone has 15 minutes of fame, but that such fame can become extended through new media, relies on the idea that anyone can become an instant celebrity in a moment. In fact, the celebrity (as Ulmer notes), the look, is one of the chief identity formations within electracy. One of the chief ways to generate celebrity, for both the already-celebrity as well as the wannabe, involves the hoax or the gag (about which I’ll demonstrate later). Youtube, through a viral method that mimics Jim Ridolfo and Danielle Nicole DeVoss’s concept of rhetorical velocity, provides the vehicle for this gag to deliver and promote such delusions.

**Hallucinations.** Hallucinations can take a number of different forms - they can be:

1. Visual (seeing things that are not there or that other people cannot see)
2. Auditory (hearing voices that other people cannot hear)
3. Tactile (feeling things that other people do not feel or something touching your skin that is not there)
4. Olfactory (smelling things that other people cannot smell, or not smelling the same thing that other people do smell)
5. Gustatory experiences (tasting things that is not there)
It would make sense that the schizophrenic would be able to sense things beyond what other people cannot. Not only does the schizophrenic have the advantage of being able to connect to her/his desiring-machines, creating other experiences unavailable to those whom the socius territorialize, but they also have a metaphysics based less on literate logic and more on that of the poetic (how else could they create their machinic assemblages?). The schizophrenic is not hermeneutic, but heuretic, constantly making things, things other people cannot see, hear, touch, smell, or taste. The task would be to take such practices and to make these “hallucinations” appear for the group unconscious, using them to create a practice for delivery that would create mass hallucinations, not for control, but to investigate the idea of collective/cultural hallucination and lead toward practical reason.

**Disorganized Speech.** *(Frequent derailment or incoherence)* - *these are also called “word salads”. Ongoing disjointed or rambling monologues - in which a person seems to talking to himself/herself or imagined people or voices.*

Again, the apparent disorganization results not from the point of view of the schizophrenic, who requires multiple lines of flight to make machine assemblages, but from the blind spot of the observer, from this description, the clinician, whose bias toward a literate understanding of the behavior produces the appearance of disorganization. And it is not that such behavior is not disorganized, for it most certainly is in the sense that the schizophrenic must disorganize the body without organs, the organization of organs without becoming an organism. Thus, when undergoing treatment by an analyst, as Deleuze and Guattari explain in *Anti-Oedipus*, what seems like disorganized word salad cannot be used in the
psychoanalytic formula of daddy-mommy-me (although this perhaps still has merit because we believe that it does), and the analyst cannot look for Freudian slips. The schizo does not have Freudian slips; he or she cannot engage in wordplay. Instead, speech itself is nothing but wordplay, all slippage, all flows, and so the play aspect disappears and turns into serious business, a business of desire—she puts play to work. For the clinician evaluating the schizo, the logic of the pun inherent to the schizophrenic voice becomes unnoticeable and suppressed.

Contrasted with “word salad” is cognitive slippage, “where categories and lists become overly broad as concepts unrelated at first glance become related through tangential connections”:

“List some types of cars.”

“Let's see, there's Ford, Chevrolet, Toyota, Japan, Rising Sun, Hiroshima, Atomic Bomb, Enola Gay, oh and Miata.”

The problem is not the slippage, for a logic indeed operates within cognition that produces this speech. Rather, the problem is the blind spot produced by the logic of category systems: literacy. Science, one of the byproducts of literacy, is too invested in the logic to see that the response to “List some type of cars” is not categorical but poetic (categorical still, but of a different kind). It is nothing more sophisticated than a stream of consciousness, or perhaps, stream of unconsciousness. It is this unconsciousness that delivery must deliver, and the apparent disorganization used by the schizo can become a strength of delivery rather than a weakness.
**Grossly Disorganized or Catatonic Behavior.** *(An abnormal condition variously characterized by stupor/innactivity, mania, and either rigidity or extreme flexibility of the limbs).*

A seemingly paradoxical symptom of schizophrenia, where the behaviors appear more to fall in line with bipolar disorders. However, such behavior can be thought of in two ways. The first has to do with the general dumbness of society, what Ulmer identifies as *ATH*, the condition of a blindness showcased in Greek tragedy. Our current *ATH* manifests because we are unaware of how our actions mismatch our supposed values, or the fact that we overlook abject values and fail to recognize our behaviors that, in a disorganized way, contradict those values. An example Ulmer gives is traffic accidents, which he says should be memorialized to officially commemorate those who’ve sacrificed their lives so that we may drive as freely as we do. The catatonia symptom appears in the “compassion fatigue” that sets in due to the presence of a 24-hour news cycle that wears out any motivation to act. We are presented with so many disasters and problems that must be dealt with that it stifles any call to action—where to start?—thus effectively putting society into a stupor. Instead, our mania centers around entertainment and the stir started with the hip of Elvis and moving toward wardrobe malfunctions and whatever Perez Hilton blogs about.

**Negative Symptoms**

*These symptoms are the lack of important abilities. Some of these include:*

**ALOGIA.** Poverty of speech, is the lessening of speech fluency and productivity, thought to reflect slowing or blocked thoughts, and often manifested as short, empty replies to questions.
Literally, without speech, how is the schizo to speak before the assembly? Are not there many ways to speak? It is assumed that one without speech, without logos, is also one without logic, without content, without anything to say. However, nothing could be further from the truth. Alogia is not alogical, but for the schizophrenic, operates under its own logic. The flows of words dry up, but the flows appear elsewhere in other ways of speaking. While oral speech may decrease, productivity as a whole does not, unless, of course, the desiring-production of the schizo is blocked and she is reduced to an “autistic rag.” Although this may seem antithetical to the concept of delivery, it is not necessarily up to the deliverer to make the message appear to the audience, but make the audience responsible for the delivery as well. The whole system of deliverer-audience needs a shared metaphysics. This metaphysics would not be alogical, but a logic apart from logos. For, if the schizo seeks to deliver desire, as delivery itself has always strived for, then the literate content contained in words is only secondary to the machinic function it serves, and words, if thought of as containers or vehicles, might not be the best way to deliver such “information.”

**AFFECTIVE FLATTENING.** The reduction in the range and intensity of emotional expression, including facial expression, voice tone, eye contact (person seems to stare, does not maintain eye contact in a normal process), and is not able to interpret body language nor use appropriate body language.

The fact that affect and its expression are tied to some of the most important bodily parts of delivery (the face, voice, and eyes) indicates that delivery indeed expresses accidental traits rather than literate essences. The question, again, is
how does a schizophrenic, given her/his dearth of ability to deliver like a
Demosthenes because of the failure of the face, voice, eyes, and other bodily
movements, provide us as a model for how to deliver? If a schizophrenic is bodily
dumb and affectively dumb (a redundancy), then why study one for a new media
form of delivery? As Deleuze and Guattari show us, machines are meant to wear
out, but it is the breaking of desiring-machines that serves as the key for creating
flows of desire. The schizo, methodically, knows how to break the flows, breaking
the machinic assemblages in favor of others. Because the schizo’s bodies is, for
lack of a better term, broken, he is familiar with how to break, and also because of
his brokenness, finds it necessary to create desiring-machines to augment his
body and create conditions for affect to occur. This is necessary for society as a
whole given its general condition of schizophrenia, and the affect flattening that
appears most notably in the condition of compassion fatigue discussed earlier.

AVOLITION. The reduction, difficulty, or inability to initiate and persist in goal-directed
behavior; it is often mistaken for apparent disinterest. (examples of avolition include: no
longer interested in going out and meeting with friends, no longer interested in activities
that the person used to show enthusiasm for, no longer interested in much of anything,
sitting in the house for many hours a day doing nothing.)

Ulmer provides the following characteristic of compassion fatigue: “We know more
about worldwide catastrophes than ever before, and care less. Or rather, we are
unable to conjoin our intellectual understanding and our emotions, and this
disjunction of discursive and pathic knowledge is systematic, structural, and
seemingly irreducible” (Electronic Monuments 61). What Ulmer describes here is
analogous to the reduction of affect in the schizophrenic, the lack of will to do anything, even if the knowledge about what and how is present. This problem at large plagues social activists about a host of issues. For example, consider Al Gore’s quest to convince Americans that the threat of global warming is real. If one watches his documentary *An Inconvenient Truth*, one can “know” that the phenomenon is occurring, but be too emotionally dumb to do anything about the problem (emotional dumbness = avolition). What avolition is for the individual, compassion fatigue is for the collective, but with the individual still important and a key for such delivery of affect. What delivery must do (which ties into the larger invention of electracy as a whole) is to deliver that affect to both the individual and the collective. As Ulmer notes, part of the problem is the emotional reduction that takes place within literacy: “Part of the paradox marking the difficulty of the transition from literacy to electracy is that the very pathetic sentimental emotional ‘fallacies’ of propaganda against which critical reason constructed an entire logical defense become in electracy a point of departure for a new mode of reason (the categorical image)” (*Electronic Monuments* 62). Delivery’s function becomes delivering the desire back into such debates, so that the clinical condition of avolition, which occurs not as symptom of schizophrenia per se, but due to the schizophrenic’s blockage from her desiring-machines, may be overcome.

**Cognitive Symptoms**

*Cognitive symptoms refer to the difficulties with concentration and memory. These can include*

1. disorganized thinking
2. slow thinking
3. difficulty understanding
Besides the symptoms associated with the body, we often associate schizophrenia with the cognitive symptoms that the schizo possesses or lacks. Again, such cognitive problems are only symptoms if we identify them from the perspectives of literacy or orality. Thinking that appears to be disorganized under a literate apparatus has its own organization under an apparatus of electracy. Moreover, a poor memory, as was Plato’s concern when alphabetic writing came into prominence, has always been associated with literacy, and within orality, is particularly damaging, especially for one trying to deliver a speech. However, perhaps the last item is where the true schism occurs from the standpoint of trying to solve problems of public policy, and the place of delivery. As Ulmer writes, collectively we have difficulty when attempting to “conjoin our intellectual understanding and our emotions,” (Electronic Monuments 61), thus revealing our collective schizophrenia. We cannot systematically connect information with emotion, integrating what we know with what we feel, and then create new behaviors based on this integration. While literate rhetoric has, for the most part, jettisoned delivery via the body in favor of delivery via the book, feelings have mostly been jettisoned along the way because literacy was never an adequate substitute for the body. However, new media affords the opportunity not to replace the body, but to offer new kinds of machines for which the schizo may attach and reinvent the methods of delivery while still striving toward this same goal of a mind/body/function integration.
Schizophasia, as one of the symptoms of formal thought disorder within the schizophrenic, is understood as a disorder when language is taken for its representational mode. A famous question is posed to a schizophrenic: “Why do people believe in God?” Some replies:

- “Because He makes a twirl in life, my box is broken help me blue elephant. Isn't lettuce brave? I like electrons, hello.”
- “Tissues without a triangular head lice be it with controller is the noodle man of ice pops and radio yes thanks.”
- “So even with I but he river flow amber rod with it.”
- “You know bear mama said just keep boxing bitches.”
- “Where is narwhal pretty rhombus with monocle kitty”
- “Has anyone really been far even as decided to use even go want to do look more like?” (Andreasen 1315)

But why should language be understood in this representational way, a way that causes the clinician to find fault with such answers for being “illogical”? Cannot a delivery exist that does not deliver “meaning”? What does the voice of schizophrenics deliver at the same time it fails to deliver? If the voice of a schizo fails to deliver, it is only that it fails to deliver a literate logic. This is not to say it does not fail to deliver other kinds of logics as well. However, would we recognize such logics, probably more poetic logics, if we heard them? If not, how can we design delivery-machines that can aide both the audience and the speaker so that what is noticeable (the breakdown of literate logic) becomes hidden so that the unnoticeable (a nonliterate logic) might emerge? In other words, how can we create a prosthesis that puts such statements in an other-context so
that the “meaning” that one derives from them the intended state of mind, or mood—the accidental remainder that delivery offers?

**Schizoanalysis/Desiring-Machines**

Given these symptoms, it would seem that the schizo is the least capable of society to deliver according to the classical pedagogy we’ve encountered through Cicero and Quintillian. The physical limitations alone would prevent them from clear voice, pronunciation, gesture, etc. However, the point is not to take the schizophrenic’s condition at face value, but to learn how she compensates through her processes, and more than compensate, develops a different logic. The point Deleuze and Guattari make throughout *Anti-Oedipus*, and in other writings, is that the body for all of society is dumb: we do not have a logic of feeling generally. While the logic of literacy has hypertrophied the left brain, the right brain has been killed: death to desire. The schizophrenic, according to Deleuze and Guattari, has a logic to find the desire again, to deliver it to herself, and to put it into action through her desiring-machines. Collectively, then, we need to develop such desiring-machines and put them to the service of delivering desire not only individually, but also collectively, the vector that delivery has traditionally taken.

Although some of the clinical symptoms of schizophrenia appear above as one way to consider the “disorder,” as Brian Massumi points out, “the ‘schizophrenia’ Deleuze and Guattari embrace is not a pathological condition” (1). Neither should my use of schizophrenia be construed as pathological in nature; instead, the schizophrenic can teach us about delivery, how she is able to connect with the outside world despite the apparent inability to enact the necessary bodily processes as understood within a literate selfhood: “For [Deleuze and Guattari], the clinical schizophrenic’s debilitating
detachment from the world is a quelled attempt to engage it in unimagined ways. Schizophrenia as a positive is inventive connection, expansion rather than withdrawal” (Massumi 1). In the schizophrenic’s attempt to expand, to connect, we can find instructions for how to deliver in a digital environment where identity and thinking is as much within cyberspace as it is outside of and beyond the body. The schizophrenic, through desiring-machines, provides a relay for how a body connected to multiple prostheses might create multiple vectors toward delivery.

Moreover, the kind of schizophrenia discussed by Deleuze and Guattari is simultaneously an invention and a delivery, and both canons often occur simultaneously. However, delivery pushes invention to the final step, just as the schizophrenic process does with the idea. The experimental nature of the schizophrenic, her “relay in ideas is only effectively expansive if at every step it is also a relay away from ideas into action” (Massumi 1). The schizophrenic process is pragmatic. This, in many ways, is also true of delivery, or at least the desired outcome of delivery, which is rhetorical at the level of affect. Layered onto logos, delivery attempts the pragmatics of a logic of sensation, to help (or manipulate) an audience to feel a particular sensation about the question of debate, persuading them toward one or another contingent outcome. Delivery, like the schizophrenic, relies upon a process that must be enacted (thus not just hypokrisis, although this is where such thinking occurs, but also “pronuntiatio” and “actio,” which is why, perhaps, delivery has taken so many different terms throughout its history).

And while Deleuze and Guattari take schizophrenia non-pathologically, they take the machine non-metaphorically. “In what respect are desiring-machines really
machines, in anything more than a metaphorical sense?” (*Anti-Oedipus* 36). They are very clear to explain that desiring-machines are, in fact, real machines. “A machine may be defined as a system of interruptions or breaks. These breaks should in no way be considered as a separation from reality; rather, they operate along lines that vary according to whatever aspect of them we are considering” (36). The machines we are considering here are those that may be used to deliver, but it is complicated, if not impossible, to extract these kinds of machines from any other kind of machine, for they are really one in the same. That is, desiring-machines are always delivering-machines. The question becomes, how can these machines be put to use so that, in conjunction with the literate forms of persuasion already available to us, we can use them within a new domain of electrate reason.

**Machining the Code**

Deleuze and Guattari explain that every machine already has codes built into them. “The code is inseparable not only from the way in which it is recorded and transmitted to each of the different regions of the body, but also from the way in which the relations of each of the regions with all the others are recorded” (*Anti-Oedipus* 38). Such machines do not merely stand as signs, but as relationships, and relationships denote not a thing, but a process. “An organ may have connections that associate it with several different flows; it may waver between several functions, and even take on the regime of another organ—the anorectic mouth, for instance” (*Anti-Oedipus* 38). One can use a gesture just as well as the voice, the hand or the mouth, to deliver a message—actio can happen in many ways. The pedagogical question becomes the functional question, and “All sorts of functional questions thus arise: What flow to break? Where to interrupt it? How and by what means? What place should be left for other
producers or antiproducers (the place of one’s little brother, for instance)? Should one, or should one not, suffocate from what one eats, swallow air, shit with one’s mouth?” (Anti-Oedipus 38).

Perhaps one of the most important characteristics of desiring-machines is that they work not according to a stringent code, a program that controls their operation, but that their processes and functions require a large network that takes advantage of chance (the accident, the contingent). One of the advantages of DNA is that it is seventy-five percent redundant, which allows for it to have a glut of information that is not responsible for any processes at a particular time. This, we might say, “surplus value,” allows its “microscopic cybernetics” to be ready and available for environmental conditions should they arise. If the organism (in this case) had only the single code available, it could not be as selective, and would be selected against. Deleuze and Guattari make this point looking at allosteric protein. The function of its interactions “permits a complete freedom in the ‘choice’ of controls,” which, “having no chemical requirements to answer to, will be the more responsive to physiological requirements, and will accordingly be selected for the extent to which they confer heightened coherence and efficiency upon the cell or organism” (Anti-Oedipus 288). Thus, per DNA, “the very gratuitousness of these systems, giving molecular evolution a practically limitless field for exploration and experiment, enabled it to elaborate the huge network of cybernetic inter-connections” (Anti-Oedipus 288-289). This collection of “veritable lottery drawings, creating switching points as lines of selection or evolution,” is characteristic of all the stages from molecular to molar, and appears in all machines. The codes in these machines, if they are termed “signifying chains,” are really
“nonsignifying elements that have a meaning or an effect of signification only in the large aggregates that they constitute through a linked drawing of elements, partial dependence, and a superposition of relays” (*Anti-Oedipus* 290). The signification of these codes can only occur when coupled and interlinked with the rest of the system. DNA requires the redundancy in order to function. Likewise, the social machines and organic machines participate in the desiring-machines. “At man’s most basic stratum, the Id: the schizophrenic cell, the schizo molecules, their chains and their jargons” (*Anti-Oedipus* 290).

The important feature of such code is not its “information” purpose, but its functional purpose, specifically these “extra features” it might enact based on its redundancy. Deleuze and Guattari describe code’s surplus value as a different kind of surplus value beyond its term in Marxist economics. Rhetorically, the surplus value is what delivery adds, specifically to uncover the surplus, in each of us. This is what is left over when logos is exhausted. While the sur- signifies super-, it really denotes sub-, the values hidden at the subconscious level.

The disjunctions characteristic of these chains still do not involve any exclusion, however, since exclusions can arise only as a function of inhibitors and repressors that eventually determine the support and firmly define a specific personal subject. No chain is homogeneous; all of them resemble, rather, a succession of characters from different alphabets in which an ideogram, a pictogram, a tiny image of an elephant passing by, or a rising sun may suddenly make its appearance. In a chain that mixes together phonemes, morphemes, etc., without combining them, papa’s mustache, mama’s upraised arm, a ribbon, a little girl, a cop, a shoe suddenly turn up. Each chain captures fragments of other chains from which it ‘extracts’ a surplus value, just as the orchid code ‘attracts’ the figure of a wasp: both phenomena demonstrate the tracks, and of selections by lot, that bring about partially dependent, aleatory phenomena bearing a close resemblance to a Markov chain. (*Anti-Oedipus* 39)
While Deleuze and Guattari offer a series of signifiers via alphabetic text to represent this chain, we can represent such a chain just as easily through the metaphysics of science via a DNA sequence or a string of binary code. The latter becomes the digital code with which a new kind of delivery occurs. The example of a Markov chain is also telling, because the selection process can only be determined by whatever is present at the time . . . there is no code from the past . . . although such code can lead one back into the past.15

The schizo is not concerned with an inscription on the surface, but these codes that lie underneath, even when such codes within the chain appear to be analogical. These codes appear in Deleuze and Guattari’s chains, which “are the locus of continual detachments—schizzes on every hand that are valuable in and of themselves and above all must not be filled in” (Anti-Oedipus 39). These chains rely on gaps, the schizzes that form, schizzes that must not be filled in with new desires, but allow spaces for the rearrangement of codes. “Schizzes have to do with segments or mobile stocks resembling building blocks or flying bricks. We must conceive of each brick as having been launched from a distance and as being composed of heterogeneous elements” (Anti-Oedipus 39-40). The schizzo as engineer does not place blocks where she desires them, but must launch them, throwing different blocks together over distances. The blocks are not so much placed as delivered, for delivery inheres this distance, this schiz that must be crossed but not filled. And as Deleuze and Guattari note, each brick is not homogeneous, “containing within it not only an inscription with signs from different alphabets, but also various figures, plus one or several straws, and perhaps a corpse”

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15 Google’s algorithm for Page Rank is a Markov chain.
Each brick contains a heterogeneous mixture not unlike the mixture of elements found in new media, which itself contains a multitudinous array of material. Moreover, the bricks, and their assemblage, also resemble digital technologies rather than analog: “This is the second characteristic of the machine: breaks that are a detachment, which must not be confused with breaks that are a slicing off” (Anti-Oedipus 39). Machines are made of digital pieces, digital chains that can be combined and recombined. Even if analogical in appearance, the analog functions as a digital component.

Thus, if this schizo is an engineer, she is a digital engineer, a d-engineer (one that de-engineers the digital), and a d-engineer of codes. How does the schizo go about this de/re/coding? At first, such a recoding seems improbable: “How could part of a flow be drawn off without a fragmentary detachment taking place within the code that comes to inform the flow?” (Anti-Oedipus 40). Deleuze and Guatarri explain:

When we noted a moment ago that the schizo is at the very limit of the decoded flows of desire, we meant that he was at the very limit of the social codes, where a despotic Signifier destroys all the chains, linearizes them, biunivocalizes them, and uses the bricks as so many immobile units for the construction of an imperial Great Wall of China. But the schizo continually detaches them, continually works them loose and carries them off in every direction in order to create a new polyvocity that is the code of desire. (Anti-Oedipus 40)

The schizo, as a coder, is a writer, a rewriter, and she rewrites using the method of cut-and-paste, taking parts of would-be analog productions and creating a digital collage. The schizo uses machines to write with, to decode and recode, to inscribe. “Every composition, and also every decomposition, uses mobile bricks as the basic unit” (Anti-Oedipus 40). In terms of new media, the brick is the byte, and as Ulmer might see it though Derrida: “The first step of decomposition is the bite” (Applied Grammatology 57).
This is the first step of the schizo in her recording process, and also, as Ulmer explains, one of the salient features of Derrida’s writing and his theory of iterability. “To understand the rationale for all of the interpolations, citations, definitions used in *Glas*, Derrida says one must realize that ‘the object of the present work, its style too, is the ‘morceau’ [bit, piece, morsel, fragment; musical composition; snack, mouthful]. Which is always detached, as its name indicates and so you do not forget it, with the teeth” (*Applied Grammatology* 57-58). The mechanism for those working in alphabetic text, the “teeth” for writers like Derrida, “refer to quotation marks, brackets, parentheses: when language is cited (put between quotation marks), the effect is that of releasing the grasp or hold of a controlling context” (*Applied Grammatology* 58). These bites are Deleuze and Guattari’s bricks, which the schizo takes apart at the edges, and perhaps center, of the “imperial Great Wall of China.” The schizo is a citing-machine (and thus a biting-machine), and takes those pieces away to make other kinds of machines. And lest we forget that what Derrida describes is a kind of machine, we should remember his image in *Glas*: “I see rather (but it is perhaps still a matrix or a grammar) a kind of dredging machine. From the hidden, small, enclosed cabin of a crane I manipulate levers from afar. I saw it at Saint-Maries-de-la-Mer at Easter. I plunge a steel mouth into the water. And I rake the bottom, and pick up rocks and seaweed which I carry back to dump on the land while the water rapidly falls back out of the mouth” (*Glas* 229). Derrida uses some of the same pieces as Demosthenes: rocks and parts from the sea.

So while Cicero’s mouth declaims and enunciates, one of the important features for delivering desire to the schizo is this bite. They bite the bricks, or bytes, in order to decompose and then recompose their machine, all the time using other machines to do
the biting. And to be sure, this effect concerns not just the schizo in her local element, but has a delivery effect over distance. “Diaschisis and diaspasis, as Monakow put it: either a lesion spreads along fibers that link it to other regions and thus gives rise at a distance to phenomena that are incomprehensible from a purely mechanistic (but not a machinic) point of view; or else a humoral disturbance brings on a shift in nervous energy and creates broken, fragmented paths within the sphere of instincts” (Anti-Oedipus 40). Given our present metaphysics of network, this can easily be read as how the digital schizo (as if there is any other kind) creates links in networked environment. Although the machines seem to only have immediate connections, the spans of these connections actually have global potential. Beyond network, a more appropriate metaphor might be the felt, as discussed by Deleuze and Guattari: “Felt is a supple solid product that proceeds altogether differently, as an anti-fabric. It implies no separation of threads, no intertwining, only an entanglement of fibers obtained by fulling (for example, by rolling the blocks of fibers back and forth). What becomes entangled are the microscales of the fibers. An aggregate of intrication of this kind is in no way homogenous: it is nevertheless smooth, and contrasts point by point with the space of fabric” (A Thousand Plateaus 475). This concept is more fully theorized by Ulmer, and he provides a way to construct “felts” and put them to use toward an image logic: a felt “coheres as a tangle of interlocking ‘hooks and eyes’ produced in fibers such as hair, fur, wool, when rubbed in conditions of heat and moisture. The mattered fibers of felt may be pressed into any shape. The term carries the overtones of emotions, of feeling (I felt the punctum)” (Electronic Monuments 166-167). Ulmer, in his initial use of felts, relies on them for purposes of invention, for fulling out the biographical/historical
constellation of one’s mystery to reveal what the unconscious has otherwise hidden. The “hook and eye” of the fibers provide the place where the machines may connect, and these interstices need not be physical in the sense of Velcro, but graphic traces that hook the eye. In this way, machines tap into the codes of other machines (such as the posthuman machine) and break and create flows. Insofar as breaking these flows constitutes an inscription process, as Deleuze and Guattari claim, the schizo writes as she breaks: “These bricks or blocks are the essential parts of desiring-machines from the point of view of the recording process” (Anti-Oedipus 40). And what the schizo is trying to write though her machines is the unconscious and the codes that surround it. Just as the individual can construct a felt that fulls the unconscious layers onto other graphic traces, the group can create felts filled out with a group unconscious. Writing felts, then, is a process of delivery when it occurs at the group level.

The bite is not always, if ever, swallowed—it is always vomited and reused toward the schizo’s purpose. The brick, bite, byte (mark), because of its iterability once detached, “may also continue to function in the absence of its context” (Applied Grammatology 58). This bite that occurs in the decomposition of the social code has everything to do with the decomposition that Ulmer finds in Derrida. In addition, as it is technically regurgitated once bitten (although one could argue that it is digested in thought and excreted), the morsel becomes vomit. As Ulmer explains, reading Kant, “The split between all opposed values passes through the mouth, whether sensible or ideal, judging the good and the bad. . . . Against Kant’s ‘exemplorality’ (exemplary orality) concerning taste in the ideal sense, having to do with singing and hearing, without consumption, Derrida raises the question of ‘distaste,’ or rather, disgust
As we know, the mouth is one of the main conduits of the oral deliverer (although not necessarily the most important), not just because the content that comes out, but the articulation of that content (how as opposed to what). For Ulmer, the question of the mouth’s content, the question of taste, “has to do with the relation of Kant’s ‘exemplorality’ to the structure of the gustus—the relations among the palate, lips, tongue, teeth, throat—in short, the articulators,” the very structure that an orator like Demosthenes depended upon. “The point of Derrida’s interrogation is to find out, with regard to exemplorality [the goal of a Demosthenes or Cicero?], ‘what is excluded from it, and from what exclusion, gives it form, limit and contour? And what of this excess with regard to what is called the mouth?’ Derrida’s response is an inverted duplication of the question. If taste orders a system of pleasure of assimilation, the excluded will be that which cannot be digested, represented, spoken. What cannot be swallowed is what ‘makes one vomit’” (Applied Grammatology 56).

Does the deliverer vomit? Can the articulators do nothing more than to provide an excess through the articulators that is nothing more than the vomi? For Aristotle, the answer to this question might be yes. Other than thought alone, which would be preferred, all else is but extraneous material best vomited and never assimilated, just as if the nutritious parts of modern processed food might be assimilated into the body, and all of the preservatives and nonessential chemicals could be regurgitated and left out of the body. Of course, how would any of that taste? As Ulmer writes, “The vomi explicitly engages not the ‘objective’ senses of hearing and sight, not even touch, which Kant describes as ‘mechanical,’ all three of which involve perception of or at surfaces, but the
‘subjective’ or ‘chemical’ senses of taste and smell” (Applied Grammatology 57). Ulmer shows how Derrida offers the chemical senses as a way to breakdown the object within a new philosopheme of decomposition. “The organ of this new philosopheme is the mouth, the mouth that bites, chews, tastes: the organs of speech in the mouth and the throat are examined now for their metaphoric potential in terms of their other function—not to exclude speaking in the way that the orthodox philosopheme of the voice-ear circuit excludes eating, but to ‘think’ their ‘surplus’” (Applied Grammatology 57). The vomit provides that surplus, the surplus that leaves a sweet or bitter taste in the mouths of the audience that determine whether or not they “like” what they hear. Demosthenes, to Aristotle’s chagrin, could sugarcoat and make the medicine go down. However, although the words may go down the ear part of the circuit, if done well, the unconscious, the vomit, is what comes up. When Deleuze and Guattari ask—"Should one, or should one not, suffocate from what one eats, swallow air, shit with one’s mouth?"—the answer should be yes, we should deliver the shit, the vomit, all of what’s underneath, and add this to the track of “clean” literate logic.

This vomiting occurs at both ends of the sender-receiver circuit, as the vomit and shit flow from each. But in terms of the schizo as deliverer, to ask that she bite is to ask too much. Instead of the bite, the schizo can only nibble, only sampling what is available. From these nibbles, these tastings, the schizo can construct larger bites, but such is not necessary. Working within the digital, the schizo works with the bit, the 1 or the 0, not the full byte, the full string of numbers within a code. Instead, the schizo strings together her own series of bits making her own bytes. And just as the schizo-deliverer nibbles when inventing, so too does she vomit just a nibble. It is not that this is
all she is capable of, for she could expel the full assortment of nibbles, and does in a very scattered way. However, to be effective, any one particular line of flight is best delivered via the nibble. It is not in the schizo’s interest to deliver a full speech, the way that Demosthenes might have. It is not even in the schizo’s interest to deliver the out-of-context soundbyte, which on its own seems small enough to work at a molecular level. No—the schizo delivers at the micromolecular level, a level so small that it goes straight to the unconscious, straight to the viscera bypassing the audience’s ears and mouth altogether: a mouth-stomach machine. Instead of the soundbyte, the schizo delivers the soundbit, picking up on a single word and riffing it into a new design, and delivering the one-word micromolecule directly to the gut. The trick for delivery is not delivering a speech, but a single word, a microspeech.

**Machining the Unconscious**

Deleuze and Guattari make it clear that their use of physics is not just a metaphor to describe the unconscious. “[I]n reality the unconscious belongs to the realm of physics; the body without organs and its intensities are not metaphors, but matter itself” (*Anti-Oedipus* 283). Thus, when they describe the machines that affect the unconscious, the machines themselves are more than metaphysical: “In the unconscious there are only populations, groups, and machines” (*Anti-Oedipus* 283). They go on in more detail to explain how such machines can be physical and affect desire, and how they might function to do so: “But how can we speak of machines in this microphysical or micropsychic region, there where there is desire—that is to say, not only its functioning, but formation and autoproduction? A machine works according to the previous intercommunications of its structure and the positioning of its parts, but does not set itself into place any more than it forms or reproduces itself” (*Anti-Oedipus*
A machine itself requires someone to build and operate it, or at least provide the programming that allows it to auto-function. Then how could a machine produce desire? “This is even the point around which the usual polemic between vitalism and mechanism revolves: the machine’s ability to account for its formations. From machines, mechanism abstracts a structural unity in terms of which it explains the functioning of the organism. Vitalism invokes an individual and specific unity of the living, which every machine presupposes insofar as it is subordinate to organic continuance, and insofar as it extends the latter’s autonomous formations on the outside” (Anti-Oedipus 284). Machines use humans as a prosthesis to gain their own vitality. But desire is always external to the machine, “either because desire appears as an effect determined by a system of mechanical causes, or because the machine is itself a system of means in terms of the aims of desire. The link between the two remains secondary and indirect, both in the new means appropriated by desire and in the derived desires produced by the machines” (Anti-Oedipus 284). Desire can deliver machines, and machines can deliver desires, but never in a primary relationship. They depend upon a third intermediary. Or, rather, desire always exists; machines just let us notice it. They help, literally, to deliver the unconscious.

At least, so it would seem. As an example, Deleuze and Guattari point toward Samuel Butler’s text “The Book of Machines.” Butler’s argument appears to contrast the machinic and vitalist arguments, but eventually pushes them to a point of “dispersion.” For Deleuze and Guattari, Butler provides a way of thinking about machines that extends their argument of desiring-machines: “For one thing, Butler is not content to say that machines extend the organism, but asserts that they are really limbs and organs
lying on the body without organs of society, which men will appropriate according to
their power and their wealth, and whose poverty deprives them as if they were mutilated
organisms" (Anti-Oedipus 284). We can already see the ethics of desiring-machines
taking shape. Likewise for organisms, Butler cannot see them as simply machines, “but
asserts that they contain such an abundance of parts that they must be compared to
very different parts of distinct machines, each relating to the others, engineered in
combination with the others” (Anti-Oedipus 284). Butler’s double movement eventually-pushes Deleuze and Guattari’s main point about machines:

It is said that machines do not reproduce themselves, or that they only reproduce
themselves through the intermediary of man, but ‘does any one say that the red
clover has no reproductive system because the bumble bee (and the bumble bee
only) must aid and abet it before it can reproduce? No one. The bumble bee is
part of the reproductive system of the clover. Each one of ourselves has sprung
from minute animalcules whose entity was entirely distinct from our own. . . .
These creatures are part of our reproductive system; then why not we part of that
of the machines? . . . We are misled by considering any complicated machine as
a single thing; in truth it is a city or a society, each member of which was bred
truly after its kind. We see a machine as a whole, we call it by a name and
individualize it; we look at our own limbs, and know that the combinations forms
an individual which springs from a single centre of reproductive action; we
therefore assume that there can be no reproductive action which does not arise
from a single center; but this assumption is unscientific, and the bare fact that no
vapour-engine was ever made entirely by another, or two others, of its own kind,
is not sufficient to warrant us in saying that vapour-engines have no reproductive
system. The truth is that each part of every vapour-engine is bred by its own
special breeders, whose function is to breed that part, and that only, while the
combination of the parts into a whole forms another department of the
mechanical reproductive system.’ (Anti-Oedipus 285)

This passage also informs the rhizome which Deleuze and Guattari will develop,
especially the image of the wasp and the orchid, where a surplus value of code is
captured by one machine into itself; “the red clover and the bumble bee; or the orchid
and the male wasp that it attracts and intercepts by carrying on its flower the image and
odor of the female wasp” (Anti-Oedipus 285). So far, the point for delivery has to do
with the machines it uses: Gracchus’ flute is a simple machine that depends on humans
for reproduction, but together entwined produce something that is external to both:
sound. The sound, the tone, depends upon the breath that goes forth, and the
pleasantness of that sound is dependant upon the human playing it. However, within
the flute’s physical properties—which determine a range for its limit and use—is also the
knowledge of scale and pitch, which is not immediate to the deliverer looking for the
right range, and so has a built in aesthetic constraint of desire, passing on that same
scale of desire to the deliverer, creating the expectation of a certain kind of deliverable.
These physical properties themselves are also affected by context, such as altitude,
pressure, temperature, or humidity. Something else appears if the instrument goes out
of tune.

Example—Botany of Desire: Michael Pollan makes a similar argument in his
book *Botany of Desire* where he explores the coevolutionary relationship of humans and
four plants: apples, tulips, marijuana, and potatoes, which he links to four basic desires
of humans: sweetness, beauty, intoxication, and control. Humans manipulate these
species to best deliver these desires, constructing an interlinked organism like Butler
describes. In fact, Pollan refers to man as a “human bumblebee,” using the example of
Johnny Appleseed who spreads the seeds of apple trees about the countryside, so that
these trees in turn provide the fruits of his desire. Besides merely disseminating these
species, man also manipulates them at the genetic level, at the level of coding, so that
the desire that each plant represents is fully manifest. It is not just a baseline level of
sweetness, beauty, intoxication, or control that Johnny is after, but he is striving for the
plant to embody such feelings to the essence of each. Such an exchange is not one-
sided, for the plants also benefit from such an exchange, and use humans as much as 
humans use plants. From the apple’s perspective, although its fruit is harvested, it was 
able to reproduce in places that it would not have otherwise had access to without the 
help of Johnny, thereby adding to its reproductive success and constructing a 
reproductive rhizome in the mold of Butler’s bee analogy, or Deleuze and Guattari’s 
orchid/wasp. Through this relationship, which is worked out at both the molar and 
molecular (and micromolecular) levels, the desire of both organisms is attained (at least, 
to a certain degree), and delivery flows two-ways.

Deleuze and Guattari claim that it matters not if machine are organs or organs 
are machines: “The two definitions are exact equivalents” (Anti-Oedipus 285). Butler’s 
passage is most important for what it “blossoms into,” which is showing the true 
relationship between desire and machines: “Once the structural unity of the machine 
has been undone, once the personal and specific unity of the living has been laid to 
rest, a direct link is perceived between the machine and desire, the machine passes to 
the heart of desire, the machine is desiring and desire, machined. Desire is not in the 
subject, but the machine in desire—with the residual subject off of to the side, alongside 
the machine, around the entire periphery, a parasite of machines, an accessory of 
vertebro-machinate desire. In a word, the real difference is not between the living and 
the machine, vitalism and mechanism, but between two states of the machine that are 
two states of the living as well” (Anti-Oedipus 285-286). Machines and the living are 
both “mass phenomenon or molar aggregates” in one state, and as such exist in a state 
of extrinsic existence. However, they also exist in a state of interconnection, 
“interpenetration and direct communication” between the “small machines scattered in
every machine, and the small formations dispersed in every organism” (*Anti-Oedipus* 286).

As opposed to the molar machines (social, technical, organic), desiring-machines are molecular. “Desiring-machines are the following: formative machines, whose very misfirings are functional, and whose functioning is indiscernible from their formation” (*Anti-Oedipus* 286). One of the salient features of desiring-machines is not the fact that they work, but their breakdown, the misfirings that are functional. The breakdown here is analogous to the accident, and the accident is a necessary condition of delivery, at least a delivery that occurs at the level of the unconscious. Desiring-machines are also “chronogeneous machines engaged in their own assembly (montage), operating by nonlocalizable intercommunications and dispersed localizations, bringing into play processes of temporalization, fragmented formations, and detached parts, with a surplus value of code, and where the whole is itself produced alongside the parts, as a part apart . . . that fits the whole over the other parts” (*Anti-Oedipus* 287). These are all “machines in the strict sense” because they operate by “breaks and flows, associated waves and particles, associative flows and partial objects” and they induce, “always at a distance,” “transverse connections, inclusive disjunctions, and polyvocal conjunctions, thereby producing selections, detachments, and remainders, with a transference of individuality, in a generalized schizogenesis whose elements are the schizzes-flows” (*Anti-Oedipus* 287).

However, machines can also appear to be unified, and when these machines “become unified at the structural level of techniques and institutions that give them an existence as visible as a plate of steel” then “desire does not need to project itself into
these forms that have become opaque” because these forms “are immediately molar manifestations, statistical determinations of desire and of its own machines” (Anti-Oedipus 287). “They are the same machines,” no matter if the machines are social, organic, technical, these machines are all “apprehended in their mass phenomenon, to which they become subordinated; there, as desiring-machines apprehended in their submicroscopic singularities that subordinate the mass phenomena” (Anti-Oedipus 287). Desiring-machines apprehend—gather—other machines to place them in the service of desire, and can subordinate the mass phenomenon, creating realities. “This is why from the start we have rejected the idea that desiring-machines belong to the domain of dreams or the Imaginary, and that they stand in for the other machines. There is only desire and environments, fields, forms of herd instinct” (Anti-Oedipus 287).

The problem occurs when these machines, which are the same machines, enter determinant conditions, which are “those statistical forms into which the machines enter as so many stable forms, unifying, structuring, and proceeding by means of large heavy aggregates; the selective pressures that group the parts retain some of them and exclude others, organizing the crowds” (Anti-Oedipus 287-288). When machines aggregate into these larger molar uses, something becomes lost, because these machines, which are the same, are no longer in the “same regime, the same relationships of magnitude, or the same uses of synthesis” (Anti-Oedipus 288). These machines cease to function as desiring-machines: “It is only at the submicroscopic level of desiring-machines that there exists a functionalism—machine arrangements, an engineering of desire; for it is only there that functioning and formation, use and assembly, product and production merge” (Anti-Oedipus 288). Because of this,
because desiring-machines function in the same way that they are produced, unlike the molar, desiring-machines “represent nothing, signify nothing, mean nothing, and are exactly what one makes of them, what is made with them, what they make in themselves” (*Anti-Oedipus* 288).

The molar aggregates, like the molars in the mouth, are incapable of taking bites, making selections to taste. While molars may make bikes more digestible, and while they may release taste by crushing a food’s casing or increasing its surface area (turning a bit into a morsel), they are not as precise as the incisors, mix tastes together, and grind and homogenize the food before sending it to the gut. At this point in the gastro-intestinal track, the sampling is over, for the journey across the tongue has ended. There is nothing left to do but to swallow. This molar mashing, this unifying, is abhorrent to the schizo, who delights in the tasting of many things. If she were to become full, then the desire to taste would end. The schizo must continue to nibble and nibble, bite after bite. These bites, these nibbles, are a salient feature of a digital delivery. For the digital desiring-machines deliver not by molar aggregates of gigabytes, and not even by the individual lines of bytes, but by the bit that the mouth nibbles away. A 1 here, a 0 there. Perhaps maybe something as large as 0010, or 10100, but nothing much longer. The schizo does not want to organize the crowds the way that the fascist would, but smaller groups, according to whatever desire the group fancies, and this only secondary to what the individual schizo wants to deliver to herself: desire.

**Body Without Organs**

To bite in the first place, to nibble and taste, the schizo needs a body to which the teeth attach, a mouth of some sort which contains the tongue. This “body” is not that of an organism but a “body without organs” (BwO). What exactly is a “BwO?”
Brian Massumi writes that a “body” is an “endless weaving together of singular states, each of which is an integration of one or more impulses” (70). For example, different stimuli create different vibratory regions which pick up these stimulating vibrations, creating different “zones of intensities.” Next, “Look at the zone of intensity from the point of view of the actions it produces” (Anti-Oedipus 70): this perspective gives us an “organ.” “Look at it again from the point of view of the organ’s favorite action, and call it an ‘erogenous zone’” (70). If the body is still, suspended, taking no action, then intensity = 0, and you have a BwO, a body that ceases to maintain any essential functions, one instead that is “outside any determinate state, poised for any action in its repertory; this is the body from the point of view of its potential, or virtuality” (70).

However, the BwO does not want an assembly with desiring-machines. “Every coupling of machines, every production of a machine, every sound of a machine running, becomes unbearable to the body without organs” (Anti-Oedipus 9). The BwO would rather remain at intensity = 0 rather than become organized. To resist, it “presents its smooth, slippery, opaque, taut surface as a barrier. In order to resist linked, connected, and interrupted flows, it sets up a counterflow of amorphous, undifferentiated fluid” (Anti-Oedipus 9). Deleuze and Guattari see “primary repression” as this initial attempt of the BwO to resist organization, the “repulsion of desiring-machines by the body without organs” (Anti-Oedipus 9). It is the person who does not answer the door for the deliveryman, afraid of what he brings. The BwO wishes to stay at intensity = 0 while the desiring-machine wants to add its bit of desire = 1 to form a code. Thus, an “apparent conflict arises between desiring-machines and the body without organs” (Anti-Oedipus 9). To bypass this apparent block, the BwO “falls back
on (se rabat sur) desiring-production, attracts it, and appropriates it for its own” (*Anti-Oedipus* 11). But if desiring-machines continue to constantly disturb the BwO, it will make the best of it, so that the “organ-machines now cling to the body without organs as though it were a fencer’s padded jacket, or as though these organ-machines were medals pinned onto the jersey of a wrestler who makes them jingle as he starts toward his opponent” (*Anti-Oedipus* 11). While the BwO began by being repulsed by the desiring-machines, an “attraction-machine now takes the place, or may take the place, of a repulsion-machine: a miraculating-machine succeeding the paranoiac machine” (*Anti-Oedipus* 11). The net effect of this interaction is that the BwO, the “unproductive, the unconsumable, serves as a surface for the recording of the entire process of production of desire, so that desiring-machines seem to emanate from it in the apparent objective movement that establishes a relationship between the machines and the body without organs” (*Anti-Oedipus* 11).

An important note about the process of production, however, is that it differs in how that production becomes recorded, and this difference occurs because of the features of the BwO. “The law governing the [production process] was connective synthesis or coupling. But when the connections pass from machines to the body without organs (as from labor to capital), it would seem that they then come under another law that expresses a distribution in relation to the nonproductive element” (*Anti-Oedipus* 12), in this case, the BwO. “Machines attach themselves to the body without organs as so many points of disjunction, between which an entire network of new syntheses is now woven, marking the surface off into co-ordinates, like a grid” (*Anti-Oedipus* 12). The grid creates a layout not of the linear “and then,” but allows for the
schizophrenic “either . . . or . . . or”: “no matter what two organs are involved, the way in which they are attached to the body without organs must be such that all the disjunctive syntheses between the two amount to the same on the slippery surface” (Anti-Oedipus 12). Such a recording process allows for decision-making to be slippery as well, for although “the ‘either/or’ claims to mark decisive choices between immutable terms (the alternative: either this or that), the schizophrenic ‘either . . . or . . . or’ refers to the system of possible permutations between differences that always amount to the same as they shift and slide about” (Anti-Oedipus 12).

The ‘either . . . or . . . or’ system resembles a digital code, and it is important for the schizophrenic, and thereby the deliverer, to be able to operate at this sublevel. Because not only must the schizo be able to recognize the existing social codes, but also develop his own. The first part of the schizo’s strategy is to be able to play the same games as the psychoanalyst, when he “goes along with the whole game and even invents a few tricks of his own, introducing his own reference points in the model put before him and undermining it from within,” but in little “bits” he will “reimpregnate’ the series of young girls with all talking birds, his father with the superior God, and his brother with the inferior God, all of them divine forms that become complicated, or rather ‘desimplified’” (Anti-Oedipus 14). Ultimately, though, such is merely play, for the schizo “has his own system of co-ordinates for situation himself at his disposal, because, first of all, he has at his disposal his very own recording code, which does not coincide with the social code, or coincides with it only in order to parody it” (Anti-Oedipus 15). The schizo takes the ready-made codes available and transforms them into his own, again, taking a bit here and a bit there, and making a new code. “The code of delirium or of
desire proves to have an extraordinary fluidity. It might be said that the schizophrenic passes from one code to the other, that he deliberately scrambles all the codes, by quickly shifting from one to another, according to the questions asked him, never giving the same explanation from one day to the next, never invoking the same genealogy, never recording the same event in the same way” (Anti-Oedipus 15). While the coding method of the schizo might seem counterintuitive for a deliverer, constantly switching back and forth, this variation is actually beneficial (Quintilian tells us that variety is the “second requirement” of correct delivery), not only in a new media environment that constantly changes, but to reach diverse audiences that were never before reachable all at once. Of course an electrate deliverer would need to have a variety of codes available, be able to make use of them all at once, constantly creating new microstrands of codes for diverse groups of not just humans and posthumans, but nonhumans as well.

Because the act of production is simultaneously a recording process, the inside becomes the outside, and is folded back onto the body of the schizo so that the output also becomes an input, and delivery is always a self-delivery. In order for this to occur, a deliverer needs to be a BwO, but at the same time make use of desiring-machines so that this production/recording process occurs in such a way that creates the very possibility for the slipperiness and fluidity of the coding process, which gives the schizo, and thus the deliverer, such flexibility. “Although the organ-machines attach themselves to the body without organs, the latter continues nonetheless to be without organs and does not become an organism in the ordinary sense of the word. It remains fluid and slippery” (Anti-Oedipus 15). While the deliverer’s body is always connected to
Moreover, Cicero and Quintilian suggest that a speaker’s own emotions are secondary to the emotions required by the situation. The deliverer must make themselves feel the same emotion they want the audience to feel, whether or not they do so intrinsically. “In fact,” writes Cicero, “it is impossible for the hearer to grieve, to hate, to envy, to become frightened at anything, to be driven to tears and pity, unless the self-same emotions the orator wants to apply to the juror seem to be imprinted and branded onto the orator himself” (On the Ideal Orator 173). These emotions, again, exist at two levels—a coded level of the unconscious (the imprint), and an external image of the emotion (the brand). If these emotions do not exist for the orator, he must arouse them in himself just as much as in the audience: “Now if, for instance, the grief that we must assume would somehow be unreal and pretended, and if this mode of speaking would involve nothing but deception and imitation and feigning, then we would probably require some quite powerful art . . . every time I have ever wanted to arouse grief or pity or envy or hate in the hearts of jurors through my oratory, I was invariably, while working to stir the jurors, thoroughly stirred myself by the same feelings to which I was trying to lead them” (On the Ideal Orator 173). Not only must the deliverer make the audience develop the necessary organs needed to feel, but herself as well. And although the techniques by which the orator comes to feel these emotions may seem artful and “artificial,” the actual feelings themselves are not, for they are sensations that are as real as any other. The orator’s body, then, must be a BwO through which she can be artful, and arouse the emotion not just extrinsically, but intrinsically as well.
Such practice is incumbent upon an electrate delivery, for it is not the internal that must be delivered to the external to ward off combat compassion fatigue, but making the external internal, rousing the self.

Finally, the key to selecting and producing these emotions lies in philosophy, specifically the philosophy that lies around the human heart and mind, psychology. “Can speech be applied to kindle the emotions or to quench them again—precisely the thing most essential for an orator—without having investigated with the utmost care all the theories that the philosophers have developed about human character and behavior?” (On the Ideal Orator 72). Cicero’s answer, which he repeats throughout his dialogue, is “no,” and he stresses how important it is for the orator to understand the role emotions play in driving people to act: “For everyone knows that the power of an orator is most manifest in dealing with people’s feelings, when he is stirring them to anger or to hatred and resentment, or is calling them back from these same emotions to mildness and compassion. And this will only be accomplished by someone who has gained a thorough understanding of the human character and the whole range of human nature, and the causes by which feelings are stirred or calmed” (On the Ideal Orator 70). The orator must understand not only the conscious workings of the mind, but the unconscious as well. It is not only at the surface of the soul, the “logical” arguments that he must make, but he must dig deep. Cicero, through Antonius, cites three procedures to his own method of oratory: “one is to win people over, the second, to instruct them, the third, to stir their feelings” (On the Ideal Orator 157). Why stir? Why arouse? Because those feelings often lie at the bottom, in the unconscious, and this domain, rhetorically speaking, is that of delivery, hypokrisis. While Cicero’s orator,
then, must be well versed in philosophy, if not a philosopher as well, a deliverer based upon a BwO must also be an engineer, and know how the assemblage of various parts will stir emotions and make them appear so that desire can flow. An electrate delivery, to what we now know more precisely as psychoanalysis, adds Deleuze and Guattari’s schizoanalysis as necessary fields about which the rhetor should attend. However, this rhetor, this deliverer, is a complicated entity, and exists in at least as many parts as there are members of his audience. Delivery requires the assembly of a particular kind of “subject” that does the delivering, which I take up in the next chapter.
Demosthenes’s success in delivery depended upon his ability to tap into the emotions of his audience, to understand the pathic potential in a given rhetorical situation—to be empathic, sympathetic, pathetic. For his situation, delivering before a present and collected audience, Demosthenes’s body was enough to fill the space with his presence. However, the body requires machinic-assemblages to become present again over the vast distances across which it must now deliver. What the body did for orality, and what the technology of alphabetic print did for literacy (the page, of course, arranged as a “body”), we must now do for electracy. Moreover, because of the distance across which we must now deliver, the schizophrenic in us has become apathetic, suffering from compassion fatigue. Thus, this distance does not just include physical space, but the psychic spaces that exist within these physical spaces. In addition, space exists with time, and we not only need the ability to flashforward—to allow for a deliberative rhetoric—but also the ability to join different states of psychic time (memory) and apply them within an instant (Ulmer’s flash reason). Thus, in addition to the other pathic attributes, what we now need is to be telepathic—we need to deliver affect across space(s).

Demosthenes often stands as the deliverer-par-excellence, if not for actual, acclaimed ability at oration then at least for the celebrity status that such acclaim has endowed him with. Yet, Demosthenes—and the whole Western tradition of delivery coming from Demosthenes, Cicero, Quintilian, and others—does not serve as the best

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16 Of course, Demosthenes made use of machines prior to his performance, and also during his performance through the space of the assembly, which becomes enmeshed into the larger machine by which he delivers and thus becomes a machine, a prosthesis, itself.
model to deliver telepathos within a society of the spectacle. While their oral tradition most certainly made use of visual elements, a better model for an electrate-deliverer appears in the figure of the shaman, a deliverer that provides a relay for how to straddle both the oral and literate apparatus and move forward into an electrate logic. Thus, the shaman provides an apt analogy for this CATTt because of his association (accurately or inaccurately) with several aspects of our own situation. First, shamans provide a service to their community, much like the public speaker, that allows the community to solve problems collectively. Shamans also, by serving as an intermediary between physical and psychic worlds, explore the unconscious states of both individuals and communities (which, in effect and affect, are the same). But in this capacity as intermediary, shamans perhaps provide their most important relay function by showing how to enter into and navigate alternate worlds that affect the common physical world that we normally experience: they have telepathic powers. This spirit world that the shaman must navigate is analogous to our society of the spectacle, and the shaman’s logic can offer us instructions helpful to delivering in (and through, across, around—underneath) an electrate apparatus.

Shamanism has parallels in many cultures, even those without strong evidence of shamanistic origins. For the Ancient Greeks, the closest analogous figure would seem to be the oracles. Many similarities exist in the oracle of Delphi and what we know about shamanism: the trance-like state that the priest or priestess undergoes, the sometimes use of hallucinogenic agents to create such a state, and the use of divination and shamanism toward practical reason. However, another parallel is that of the deliverer, both of whom must create a powerful enough performance in order to be
successful: “The shaman’s activities depend closely on the ability to sweep the audience along with the power of his or her performance, which must have its effect both on the audience and on the shaman” (Vitebsky 52).

While shamanism is a broad (perhaps too broad) concept that incorporates many cultures and most continents, my borrowing of the practice(s) is more comprehensive than specific, and while I provide some specific examples from specific cultures, these examples are not meant to be representative of every mode of shamanism. Rather, they represent those best practices that can help us with an electrate-delivery system. In general, for shamanistic cultures, the universe is comprised of not just the physical world, but a cosmos composed of many layers of worlds, or layers of reality. The shaman is a figure that can travel to and from these other layers through a variety of techniques, and thus serve as an intermediary between their community in the (for lack of better phrasing) immediate, physical world, and these other “spirit” worlds.

“Shamanic logic starts from the idea that the soul can leave the body. This happens to everyone at death, but the experience of dreaming is taken to show that the soul can also wander independently and return without causing death” (Vitebsky 14). While the term “shaman” is often used “interchangeably with ‘medicine-man/woman’, ‘sorcerer’, ‘magician’ and ‘witch-doctor’, particularly where these figures have operated outside the mainstream of institutionalized religions” (6), the shaman performs his or her specific function unlike many of these other cultural figures. As Mihály Hoppál explains, the shaman’s role is to understand and preserve the complex codes of his or her community, and to help the community navigate those codes depending upon a given situation (15). Thus, we might say that the shaman, for his or her community, serves
the same function as our modern-day humanities departments: knowing, teaching, and using the human-text interface. Thus, in one of its contested translations, “shaman” means “one who knows,” for the shaman knows better than anyone else (for this is his or her profession) how to master these codes. As a profession and practice, shamanism is always practical, attempting to solve problems.

The shaman does not choose his or her profession, but it chooses them. Shamanism is a calling, often resisted by the one called into service. This resistance often causes the would-be-shaman significant distress, both mentally and bodily, until he finally accepts the role that he must take. One reason for this resistance is the dangerous initiation that the shaman must undertake to become shaman, which is a rather gruesome affair. Below is the recalling of the Siberian shaman Dyukhade’s initiation:

The husband of the Mistress of the Water, “the Great Underground Master,” told me that I would have to travel the path of every illness. He gave me a stoat and a mouse as my guides and together with them I continued my journey further into the underworld. My companions led me to a high place where there stood seven tents. “The people inside these tents are cannibals,” the mouse and stoat warned me. Nevertheless I went into the middle tent, and went crazy on the spot. These were the Smallpox People. They cut out my heart and threw it into a cauldron to boil. Inside this tent I found the Master of my Madness, in another tent I saw the Master of Confusion, in another the Master of Stupidity. I went around all these tents and became acquainted with the paths of various human diseases.

After this I came to a wide, endless sea. The shore had sparsely growing trees and short grass. There I saw seven flat cliffs. When I went up to one of them it opened wide. Inside there appeared the teeth like bear’s teeth and a cavern like a box. “I am the stone that weighs down the earth,” announced the rock, “with my weight I hold down the turf of the earth so that the wind does not lift it up.” The second cliff opened wide, saying, “Let all people, both baptized and unbaptized, take the stone from me and let them use it to smelt iron.” Then one after another all the other cliffs opened wide and each one of them said how it could be used by humanity. For seven days I was held spellbound by these cliffs. It was really they who gave me my instruction.
Then I went through an opening in another rock. A naked man was sitting there fanning the fire with bellows. Above the fire hung an enormous cauldron as big as half the earth. When he saw me the naked man brought out a pair of tongs the size of a tent and took hold of me. He took my head and cut it off, and then sliced my body into little pieces and put them in the cauldron. There he boiled my body for three years. Then he placed me on an anvil and struck my head with a hammer and dipped it into ice-cold water to temper it. He took the big cauldron my body had been boiled in off the fire and poured its contents into another container. Now all my muscles had been separated from the bones. Here I am now, I’m talking to you in an ordinary state of mind and I can’t say how many pieces there are in my body. But we shamans have several extra bones and muscles. I turned out to have three such parts, two muscles and one bone. When all my bones had been separated from my flesh, the blacksmith said to me, “Your marrow has turned into a river,” and inside the hut I really did see a river with my bones floating on it. “Look, there are your bones floating away!” said the blacksmith, and started to pull them out of the water with his tongs. When all my bones had been pulled out on to the shore the blacksmith put them together, they became covered with flesh and my body took on its previous appearance. The only thing that was still left unattached was my head. It just looked like a bare skull. The blacksmith covered my skull with flesh and joined it on to my torso. I took on my previous human form. Before he let me go the blacksmith pulled out my eyes and put in new ones. He pierced my ears with his iron finger and told me, “You will be able to hear and understand the speech of plants.” After this I found myself on a mountain and soon woke up in my own tent. Near me sat my worried father and mother. (qtd.in Vitebskey 60-61).

The shaman becomes nothing but a skeleton, completely devoid of a body, until the spirits teach him his craft and rebuild his body into one that can mediate between worlds. In the process of becoming a shaman, a deliverer for his people, the shaman undergoes a deliverance from the body, and in the end is re-delivered in the delivery metaphor of rebirth. Here, the skeleton becomes code-like, giving form to the context; indeed, in adults, blood cells are produced within the bone marrow and serve as the paradigmatic source of DNA (though any cell contains DNA). Maureen B. Roberts places the shaman’s initiation and his/her wounding within a larger mythic context: “it’s worth bearing in mind, for instance, that Osiris and Dionysus were dismembered, that Psyche had to journey to the Underworld, that Prometheus had his liver repeatedly torn
out by Zeus’s eagle, and that Medusa was beheaded” (“Embrace”). The body is continually stripped down in the process of the “psyche’s ultimate goal of attaining wholeness, centredness and integration, fragmentation is a blow to the hubris of the stable ego, which must relinquish its sense of a fixed identity and must eventually step aside in order to allow the paradoxical Self to displace it as the centre of consciousness” (“Embrace”). In order to become whole, the body must undergo trauma, for in this wounding the body learns how to join with its machines to find true deliverance. This trauma allows the shaman to have his power. “The shaman’s mental strength comes from an expanded experience of mental disturbance. The initiation is a controlled disintegration which is always followed by a reintegration into someone more powerful and more whole” (Vitebsky 139).

This kind of shamanic initiation, this becoming shaman, presents an important parallel between the shaman and Deleuze and Guattari’s Body without Organs. Furthermore, the stripping away of organs, making it necessary to learn to attach new ones, provides the shaman with a form of schizophrenic logic, knowing when/how to attach machines to the body and create new organs for specific situations. Because of their experience of a Body without Organs, the shaman shows us a praxis of schizophrenia, especially mirroring the schizo-logic espoused by Deleuze and Guattari as discussed in the previous chapter. While Deleuze and Guattari observe the advantages of schizophrenic logic for a capitalistic society and theorize a method in schizoanalysis by which such a logic might be developed, the shaman as schizo exhibited a schizo-logic for his own spaces, but given a mode of capitalism linked with images, shamanism can offer a mode of schizoanalysis, a method of attaching
machines and creating assemblages, that provides a point of connection for our own machines. In this analogy, of course, I am not attempting to celebrate or romanticize either schizophrenia or shamanism (of which there are many kinds/degrees of both), but to learn from their logics toward a new mode of new media delivery. It is unimportant if shamans were truly schizophrenic: what matters is the logic they provide under analogous conditions.

The schizophrenic nature of the shaman’s performances and way of interacting with the world has historically linked the celebrity of shamanism with schizophrenia and mental disorder, so it should come as no surprise that the shaman can offer us something toward a schizo-logic, the logic that Deleuze and Guattari notice in our modern, clinically-diagnosed schizophrenics. As Vitebsky writes, “Perhaps the closest parallel to shamanic ‘madness’ is in the clinical condition of schizophrenia. A schizophrenic episode can plunge a person into terrors comparable to the Siberian shaman’s initiation vision, as his or her personality disintegrates in the same way.” However, unlike the idea of the schizophrenic that Deleuze and Guattari argue against (even if indirectly), for example, the schizo that is diseased and without a logic, the shaman has a very specific method for inducing and controlling her schizophrenic states: “Where the shaman’s concentration is increased, that of the schizophrenic is scattered; where the shaman retains a far-reaching control of his or her own state of mind, schizophrenia entails a loss of this control; and where the shaman’s experience is always brought back to society and shared for society’s benefit, the schizophrenic is trapped inside a private experience, almost to the point of autism” (138). Vitebsky’s analysis about the current notion of the schizophrenic seems right, but only given that
these individuals are denied access to their desiring-machines, that they are denied access to their means of connecting with the world(s).

The shaman, on the other hand, is honored rather than ostracized because of her ability to enter into a schizo state on demand. Socially, the shaman and the schizophrenic occupy much different positions: “The shamanic personality is moulded by the culture, and shamans are ‘mad’ courtesy of the culture and on the terms of that culture. It is ultimately society which distinguishes between the behaviour of the shaman and that of the schizophrenic or psychotic. One becomes a hero, the other a hospital patient. The shaman lives on the brink of the abyss but has the means to avoid falling in” (Vitebsky 139). This position of hero, the shaman becoming local celebrity, puts her in another position that allows her to become the chief deliverer of knowledge for her community. And this is not just any knowledge, but practical reason, what an individual or the whole community should do given a particular situation. The shaman is not only one who knows, but one who knows what to do, and in turn gets others to do.

Thus, the shaman represents the schizophrenic that is not feared or clinically treated, but revered, even though the shaman also lives a very normal life, often only becoming shaman when a problem arises and the community needs help. The community then turns to their schizophrenic, who in his shamanistic role delves completely into his inward self, to find the problem’s desire within the unconscious. Joseph Cornell describes this role of the schizo: “The shaman is the person, male or female, who . . . has an overwhelming psychological experience that turns him totally inward. It’s a kind of schizophrenic crack-up. The whole unconscious opens up, and the shaman falls into it. This shaman experience has been described many, many times. It
occurs all the way from Siberia right through the Americas down to Tierra del Fuego.”

How that psychological experience happens differs from culture to culture. The point for delivering desire is that we turn it into a method for rhetoric, to use such practices for communal problem solving. One of these practices includes approaching a problem from the unconscious as well as conscious aspects of thinking, providing a point of view not just from the physical world, but the metaphysical world.

The shaman, then, possesses these unique powers which make them useful to study toward an electrate delivery within the society of the spectacle. What follows is a more in-depth analysis of where the shaman delivers (his spirit world which is analogous to our infosphere) as well as how the shaman delivers (using a logic that is analogous to Deleuze and Guattari’s schizoanalysis, a combination of the Body without Organs with desiring-machines to form assemblages, which is how one must deliver with/in new media environments).

**The Spirit World**

The shaman does not operate in the physical world alone, but also other “spirit” worlds. These worlds act upon each other in daily existence, and shamanic cultures needed to find a way to coexist with these other worlds and the spirits that reside in them. For shamanic cultures, spirit becomes a being’s *Being*, as well as a kind of consciousness, and “creatures, trees, rocks and tools can have their own consciousness similar to our own human consciousness” (Vitebsky 12). With this consciousness, spirits can “deliberately act upon humans and cause events in our lives.” Moreover, spirits “can love humans, and so nourish us and feel compassion. They can also have needs and emotions, such as hunger, jealousy and pride, and so can attack us and eat us or drive us mad” (Vitebsky 12). Although such a metaphysics
might seem too vitalistic for our purposes, it provided the shaman “a means for acting upon the world” that acted upon his society: “Shamanism is a practical and pragmatic religion, never only a mystical one” (Vitebsky 12).

The quality of a creature or object’s spirit depends upon this practicality: “Bear spirits are big and fierce while mouse spirits are timid but can usefully enter narrow crevices. The spirit of a knife cuts while that of a pot contains” (Vitebsky 13). And while useful at times, the properties of these spirits still “may overwhelm us.” Thus, shamanic metaphysics, like preliterate Ancient Greeks, developed a category system for contending with nature. And just as the Olympian deities had emotions that stirred the seas, lands, and skies, so forces that affected shamanic cultures “had properties of the environment itself in which animals, landscape and weather may either nourish or destroy us, according to their mood of the moment” (Vitebsky 13). These worlds, thus, interact and often join, for an individual “consciousness of spirits can merge into human consciousness” (Vitebsky 13). What the shaman provided, then, was a human figure that could become an intermediary in both the human and spirit worlds.

For us, this spirit world no longer exists, and became closed with the invention of literacy. The possibility of a world(s) depends on one’s metaphysics, what is possible to be noticed. This claim is, essentially, the argument that Heidegger makes in *Introduction to Metaphysics*. When I state that the spirit becomes a being’s *Being*, Heidegger would argue that the spirit is what a shamanic metaphysics makes possible to become, for the spirit is their chief category system. With literacy, spirit becomes replaced with the essence of a thing (a redundancy). Thus, when Vitebsky writes that a “‘spirit’ sometimes seems better translated as the ‘essence’ of a phenomenon—it is
what makes an animal an animal, a tool a tool” (12) for shamanic thinking, his logic works only by a strained analogy, for the identity formations of spirit and essence are only possible from their different language apparatuses of orality and literacy.

In *Internet Invention*, Ulmer tells that Wallace, an Oglala medicine man, narrates to Black Elk (a shaman in his own right), his experience of the white man’s sense of identity (self) as being without spirit: “I went inside this communication (English Language) to study the white man. It was like walking up to the Statue of Liberty. You go inside everywhere. I went into the heart. I went into the head and even looked out through his eyes to see what he sees, how he observes things. What I learned was that the white man has a real keen sense of eyes. They see values, so I give them credit for that. But what they don’t see is the spirit” (202). As Ulmer explains of this account, we “don’t see the ‘spirit’ in Wallace’s sense any more than he sees the ‘self’ in our sense, in that these terms refer to the identity formations of distinct apparatuses. Spirit and self are mutually exclusive possibilities in this sense” (202). But also within Wallace’s description is an experience of a Body without Organs. From a shamanic point of view, the organism is useless and less important than the individual organs. Rather than group the organs together as an organism, they instead compose a spirit, a spirit that becomes altered depending upon the composition of those organs. In the English language, Wallace experiences organs, but no organism, no spirit. The eyes he experiences are keen, they are sharp and can cut, analyze, but they do not see visions.

When a language apparatus comes into dominance, these identity formations spread to nonhuman beings. If, as Ulmer writes, what “remains the ‘spirit’ for us, due to the nature of our apparatus, is the ‘concept,’ ” (202) then we can see that our
relationship becomes one of concepts of things (another redundancy) rather than things having spirits. An animal becomes classified by a concept such as morphological traits or genetic differentiation rather than the spirit by which an oral civilization might identify it. We do not give corporations spirits, but they have legal “selfhoods” even though they are not, technically, human. However, from corporations—and many other institutions—spring forth new kinds of spirits, exactly the “exchange between literate and oral societies into literacy” (203) that Ulmer is attempting to theorize. While our conceptions of spirits are not the same as spirits in oral cultures (precisely because they are concepts), they nonetheless behave in a similar way to the spirits that shamanic cultures had to contend with on a daily basis.

The spirit world is not static. Shamans had to adapt their practices to changing environments over time or place (one only has to research the many kinds of shamanistic practices that have developed over the world), for with changes in the physical world come changes in the spirit worlds, which change with the physical conditions. This is true of the society of the spectacle as well, in which the spirit world has reopened and we need to contend with spirits once again. The spirit world for the shaman, this other world to which the shaman journeys, is analogous to the image spectacle in which we find ourselves. While the images themselves may be apparent to us, the actual affect they produce remains within the invisible (or unconscious) world. It makes no difference if spirits are “real” or not—it only matters that spirits are real for the shamanistic cultures that believe in them and have to find practical solutions for dealing with them everyday. Thus, it makes no difference if images are “spirits” or not: what
matters is that they have effects/affects that are analogous to spirits in shamanic cultures.

Toward this analogy, the spaces in which both spirits/images live mimic each other. Although the shaman may be capable of accessing other worlds, this often occurs within the same geographic space. The shamanic cosmos is built in layers, with one on top of another. “If we see spirits as the essence of the things around us, then this realm is not geographically removed. Rather, it occupies the same space as we do but is accessible to only some of us some of the time” (Vitebsky 15). The shaman has specific practices that allow him to make this invisible world visible, to merge different layers of reality. “Space is a way of expressing difference and separation, but the shaman’s journey expresses the possibility of coming together again” (Vitebsky 15). Such spaces can be thought of as our current concepts of the conscious and unconscious, two ways of being in the world that exist in one physical location (the brain/body). “The gulf in space represents firstly a difference in being. Spirits, whether of dead people whom we have known or forces of nature, exist not here but somewhere else. This gulf can also sometimes reflect the moral inferiority of humans as they live a degraded existence in a state of separation from the divine” (Vitebsky 15). If delivery, in a modern context, consists of moving objects from one place to another, then the shaman transports from one space to another. However, the shaman delivers in the same sense that classical delivery does: it delivers from the unconscious world to the conscious. Shamanic thinking holds that “the dimension of the spirits is permanently present, although it is largely hidden. It is hidden because it expresses not the surface appearance of things but their inner nature. Thus to a shamanic culture there is more to
reality, especially to its conscious aspect, than that which meets the eye and the other ordinary senses” (Vitebsky 18). At its best, delivery reconciles the conscious and unconscious, making the invisible visible, and allowing another mode of decision making to exist alongside pure, literate reason. However, at its worst, delivery unleashes spirits from the unconscious that we cannot see nor do anything about, causing us to act against our own best interests.

People’s attitudes toward images in many ways mirrors the way they react to the idea of spiritual phenomenon. Shamanic cultures treat spirits as having very real and physical relationships with the immediate visible world in which those cultures find themselves, even if most of the people cannot see the spirits. The society of the spectacle is a bit opposite, but still analogous. We see images everywhere, and are affected by them, but are blind (ATH) in the sense that we do not know what to do about them. In other words, we still need a mediator to discern what these image/spirits want. W. J. T. Mitchell, in his book *What Do Pictures Want?*, addresses this question from the viewpoint that images have both lives and desires, and examines “the varieties of animation or vitality that are attributed to images, the agency, motivation, autonomy, aura, fecundity, or other symptoms that make pictures into ‘vital signs,’” by which he means that pictures are “not merely signs for living things but signs as living things. If the question, what do pictures want? makes any sense at all, it must be because we assume that pictures are something like life-forms, driven by desires and appetites” (6).

Mitchell asks “Why do [people] behave as if pictures were alive, as if works of art had minds of their own, as if images have a power to influence human beings, demanding things from us, persuading, seducing, and leading us astray?” (7). Images
have all the capabilities and agency of the spirits of shamanic cultures. However, while those seeking the shaman do so because they believe in the powers of spirits, with images the perception is akin to how modern societies view spirits rather than shamanic cultures: “Even more puzzling, why is it that the very people who express these attitudes and engage in this behavior will, when questioned, assure us that they know very well that pictures are not alive, that works of art do not have minds of their own, and that images are really quite powerless to do anything without the cooperation of their beholders” (7). For the most part, we might replace “pictures” with “spirits” and reflect the same modern attitude about the latter. The final question Mitchell poses is how do we “maintain a ‘double consciousness’ toward images, pictures, and representations in a variety of media, vacillating between magical beliefs and skeptical doubts, naïve animism and hardheaded materialism, mystical and critical attitudes” (7). What we have lost is the ability to recognize that it does not matter if images/pictures/spirits are alive in the biological sense, but that they still affect us and require not simply a logical dismissal, but a way to accept them and deal with them on the affectual level on which they operate.

The answer that Mitchell gives provides further justification for my use of shamanism as an analogy toward a logic of new media delivery. “The usual way of sorting out this kind of double consciousness is to attribute one side of it (generally the naïve, magical, superstitious side) to someone else, and to claim the hardheaded, critical, and skeptical position as one’s own” (7). We see this behavior happen often, as when some strange phenomenon, such as alien sightings, happens to someone with no belief and the non-believer becomes a convert, if not totally obsessed. The spirits have
possessed them. This person then becomes an easy target for another skeptic. But there are “many candidates for the ‘someone else’ who believes that images are alive and want things: primitives, children, the masses, the illiterate, the uncritical, the illogical, the ‘Other.’ Anthropologists have traditionally attributed these beliefs to the ‘savage mind,’ art historians to the non-Western or premodern mind, psychologists to the neurotic or infantile mind, sociologists to the popular mind” (8). However, “every anthropologist and art historian who has made this attribution has hesitated over it” (8). Thus, the justification: “Claude Levi-Strauss makes it clear that the savage mind, whatever that is, has much to teach us about modern minds” (8). Many regard shamanistic cultures (and the schizophrenic) as falling within the category of those with “savage minds,” but their situation with spirits (not to mention the many images of spirits that they create) parallels our dealings with modern spirit-images. As Mitchell surmises, “magical attitudes toward images are just as powerful in the modern world as they were in so-called ages of faith,” and that “ages of faith were a bit more skeptical than we give them credit for. . . . the double consciousness about images is a deep and abiding feature of human responses to representation. It is not something we ‘get over’ when we grow up, become modern, or acquire critical consciousness” (8).

It is not that Mitchell actually believes that images want things, but that “we cannot ignore that human beings (including myself) insist on talking and behaving as if they did believe it, and that is what I mean by the ‘double consciousness’ surrounding images” (11). The same situation manifests in shamanic cultures: it does not matter whether or not any particular member of the shamanic community actually believes in spirits, in the spirit world(s), or not. The important features of such communities are that
they behave as if the spirits really do exist, and their survival as a culture depends upon this behavior. Do people in shamanic cultures really suffer because malicious spirits hurl poisonous darts at them? No. Or Maybe? However, the shaman is still able to provide relief to the suffering patient. Even if we do not believe that images actually want anything from us, or that they lack means to do us harm, they still affect us, and we need a practice to deal with them in the practical way that the shaman does. But if we replace the spirit with the image, this suggests that we can use practices similar to dealing with spirits to contend with images. Images have the ability to deliver, just as spirits do; the trick, like the shaman’s tricks, is to figure out how to make the images work for us, to become picture helpers, rather than benign but useless, or worse, malicious images that, as Mitchell argues, want something from us.

Rather than destroy images, though, as the shaman might attempt to destroy either rival spirits or shamans—stripping them down to their own bones so they can no longer reconstruct themselves and thus stealing the soul away from the body—we must use images and new media technologies as if they were our own spirit helpers. As Deleuze and Guattari instruct, if we want to deliver the unconscious then we must connect with our desiring-machines to produce delivery-machines. Marshall McLuhan also noted the machinic interaction with media: “by continuously embracing technologies, we relate ourselves to them as servomechanisms. That is why we must, to use them at all, serve these objects, these extensions of ourselves, as gods or minor religions. An Indian is the servo-mechanism of his canoe, as the cowboy of his horse, or the executive of his clock,” (26) or of the shaman and his spirits. To deliver the unconscious, the desire of an individual or group, we must also understand the desires
of those machines to which we attach. Shamans understand this when negotiating with their spirits. Mitchell, then, suggests that rather than destroy images we should attune to them, to "play upon them as if they were musical instruments" (26). We must, just as Cicero and Quintilian recommend, produce a sweet sound.

Back to Aristotle, Mitchell notes that he recognized the poetic nature of the image: “Pictures are themselves products of poetry, and a poetics of pictures addresses itself to them, as Aristotle proposed, as if they were living beings, a second nature that human beings have created around themselves” (xv). Whether images are actually “living” or not does not matter, for they still have what Mitchell calls “lives.” The question we need to ask about such images is not the rhetorical or hermeneutic, not how they work or what they mean, but what do they want, “what claim they make upon us, and how we respond” (xv). While part of my question here partially asks how they work (or how we can work with them), this question depends on the poetic question, because an image’s desire influences the situation and helps determine the rhetorical response.

But pictures, like people, do not always know what they want, and have trouble expressing it when they do: “What pictures want is not the same as the message they communicate or the effect they produce; it’s not even the same as what they say they want" (Mitchell 46). Just like people, “they have to be helped to recollect it through a dialogue with others.” Not only just like people, but along with people. Images and people form assemblages that can deliver not only the unconscious for the viewer, but for the image as well—for the image, in the “real” world, has its own unconscious as does the viewer in the spirit world. The desiring-machine complex that the two form help to deliver (or at this point, perhaps, invent) what each wants/lacks.
The picture’s lack is the insertion point for the desiring-machine to connect. The image does not always sting us (although this is another point of conduction); sometimes the image beckons us as though pulling us with a thread. Here the question is not one of representation, the image is not a carrier of some literate kind of information, but a spirit that desires, that wants. Mitchell offers a different approach to image investigation, which is not one of hermeneutics, but one where we should “question pictures about their desires instead of looking at them as vehicles of meaning or instruments of power” (36). Mitchell offers by investigation the U.S. Army recruiting poster designed by James Montgomery Flagg that displays the mythic “Uncle Sam.” Uncle Sam is the spirit of patriotism calling not the realm of logos, but that of the unconscious, looking to pluck upon the values instilled by the dominant culture. In order to deliver, the spirit of Uncle Sam must resonate with the same spirit region within the viewer. Whether or not this spirit is malicious can only be determined by how well the viewer is attuned with his or her own unconscious, and whether they have the flash reason to determine if such a decision is prudent.

To play Mitchell’s game, “What do pictures want?,” is to engage in a game of practical reason—attempting to solve a problem towards some potentially beneficial outcome. This game, then, is one of the shaman, and the motivation behind the game is the shaman’s motivation as well: “The idea is to make pictures less scrutable, less transparent; also to turn analysis of pictures toward questions of process, affect, and to put in question the spectator position: what does the picture want from me or from ‘us’ or from ‘them’ or from whomever?” (49). We can easily substitute the keywords in this sentence and complete the analogy: “The idea is to make spirits less scrutable, less
transparent; also to turn analysis of spirits toward questions of process, affect, and put into relation the spectator position: what does the spirit want?” Both attempt to make the invisible visible through either a game or a shamanistic practice. Of course, Mitchell is only one of the more recent image theorists to suggest that the society of the spectacle has effects on us. No doubt that we can find many parallels between a shamanic worldview and the descriptions of our current image society. For example, according to Roland Barthes, the affect that images have we feel as a sting, a *punctum*. Shamans often had to fight off evil spirits who slung arrows or barbs that also produced stings. However, unlike us, shamans were able to use their own arrows to fight back against these spirits. We need our own means of arming ourselves, which is to say, to provide practical solutions to think with/against images. As Mitchell writes: “Every advertising executive knows that some images, to use the trade jargon, ‘have legs’—that is, they seem to have a surprising capacity to generate new directions and surprising twists in an ad campaign, as if they had an intelligence and purposiveness of their own” (31). Images do not just have legs, but wings, beaks, claws, tails, and teeth. Becoming a shaman, then, we must use them to become our own wings and claws, and when necessary (using the logic of the schizo), bite them back.

**The Shaman’s Machines**

We have already looked at the various machines that a Demosthenes makes use of in order to deliver. His machines, although not always present at the scene of his speech’s delivery, are present at his own delivery, his own deliverance. Contrasted to Deleuze’s loss of speech later in life, Demosthenes reportedly had an absence of clear voice early in life, as Plutarch reports his habit of stuttering. To free him from his own body’s affliction, he devised to use the earth, from surf to stones, as machines that
would deliver desire to him if he would practice with them enough. But such desire is not inherent in the machines themselves; rather, it becomes a byproduct of an interaction. Demosthenes did not desire the stones, but the process that would become of them, the becoming-orator that they offered. Such a relationship is not one (only) of fetish, the desire for the object, but the interaction-into-being that such a relationship promised—the relationship itself.

However, Demosthenes’ relationship with his tools (or we might call them training aids, although they are much more) extends beyond his own body once he steps before the assembly and begins to speak. At such a point, his being becomes assembled with the audience into a true assemblage, for all the traces of his desiring-machines are with him and become true delivering-machines. Through his machines, he has attuned himself with his body so that the sound he produces has the highest potential of resonating with the audience, to teleport his desire from his own body into others through the sound of his voice and the sight of his gestures. He becomes machine, and his machine is a descending-machine that posits his own desires into others. When successful, the group no longer acts as individuals, but makes a collective decision. As Aristotle laments, this is not always based on literate reason, but often on feeling: Demosthenes attempts to become desiring-machine so that he can create desire in others, create the desire for others to join Demosthenes-as-desiring-machine into a larger assembl(age)y with a single desire, even if, as so many desires are, that desire is conflicted with itself. Demosthenes then succeeds at becoming a delivery-machine.

The shaman uses her or his machines in much the same way. The shaman seeks to reach the unconscious spirits within herself so that she can interact with
invisible spirits in present and alternate realities or worlds. This variety of present worlds mirrors the future contingent worlds that an orator wishes to enact. A shaman also deals with future, contingent worlds, but interacts with present alternate realities to help create practical reason regarding those contingencies. Of course, whether or not shamans “actually” accomplish this linking with alternate dimensions/universes depends on one’s metaphysics. Even if we take the physicist Hugh Everett’s theory of many words, what he calls his “relative state” formulation, seriously, a literate metaphysics would view the shaman’s experience of relative states with skepticism, judging any possible correspondences between her visions and future events as mere coincidence—a lucky prediction—or an accidental alignment. But still, the shaman becomes-spirit, becomes something more when joining with his or her many tools to become, like Demosthenes, a desiring-machine that seeks to deliver a message from the spirit world. “Without the necessary accessories the shaman could not enter the underworld” (Stutley 39).

**Drum**

One of the chief musical tools of many shamanic cultures is the drum. “There is a powerful connection between trance and the rhythmic regularity of percussion instruments. In virtually every region where shamanism is found, the drum is the shamanic instrument par excellence” (Vitebsky 78-79). As Roger Finch writes, “The question arises, then, whether it is possible for the shaman to enter a state of trance without the aid of drumming. Instances reviewed where genuine trance was attested all involved music: drumming, drumming and singing or, in the absence of a drum, at least rhythmic choral singing” (100). The shaman’s drum is not just a musical instrument, but also a portal or gateway to the spirit world: “the most important object is the drum which
symbolizes the universe as well as countless other things. Its symbolism is of great complexity as well as including many archaic elements” (Stutley 39). Of instrument classification, the drum is a membranophone, and produces its sound through a skin that vibrates when struck. This membrane separates an inner world from an outer one, and through proper rhythm, allows the shaman to transport his spirit from this world to another.

The material of the drum’s membrane is specific to the shaman. Most drums are made by stretching the hide of an animal over a shell or structure. Most shamans can narrate how their drum came into being. An Altaic shaman can give “the details of the animal’s birth (whose hide makes the drum), its parents and its life until it was hunted down, so both the shell and the skin of the drum contain magico-religious elements which enable the visionary to undertake his ecstatic journey” (Stutley 40). The historiography inscribed in the drum provides a knowledge necessary for the shaman, and this “drum animal is the shaman’s chief spirit or alter-ego” which becomes his or her spirit-helper in the spirit world.

Of course a drum must be made from an animal, for the ability to drum is one that humans have either lost, or never developed, so that they must recreate this ability with a musical prosthesis. Certain fish, such as red and black drum are able to produce a drumming sound, and some primates have special organs used to achieve this effect. For instance, the howling monkey has a hollow hyoid bone which it uses to produce a bass-like sound. It can drum from its interior to exterior, the opposite way in which a shaman works. The monkey, as we shall see later, has many built-in tools and appendages which the human must adopt.
The shaman uses the drum to help tell a narrative. It creates a rhythm “as an aid in developing the state of mind necessary for the trance on the part of the shaman or for hypnotic influence on the patient” (Rogers 36). The drum affects both the shaman and his audience. “The rhythm of the drum excites the shaman, as well as controlling the psychic state of the audience” (Stutley 39). However, the drum itself may also tell a story. The drum is often embellished with artistic representations, like Achilles’s shield which both plays a part in current events (protection) but also contains wisdom in its telling of histories. “The Asian shaman’s drum is often decorated with symbols on the head and with objects suspended from it. With the Tungus people, representations of birds and snakes, as well as human-like figures, are used as embellishments” (Rogers 36). However, such embellishments (accidents) are important in the shaman’s delivery system, for the visual texts that accompany the drum’s sound provides a metaphysical context for the shaman’s work. In Siberia, “the drum and its features may have a complex mythological significance. It may be a representation of the cosmos: the sky, earth, and underworld” (Rogers 36). By itself, the drum provides a multimedia text; but when coupled with the shaman as a prosthesis, it becomes a more complex delivery-machine used to reach the spirit world.

However, the drum’s waves do not affect the ear alone, but transport the whole body. The human-drum-machine produces a delivery mechanism that transports one to another world. This is one reason why many shamans correlate drums with the transportation features associated with their materials or shape. For instance, “In the north of Siberia, the drum may represent the wild reindeer from whose skin it was made and the shaman will use it to ride to other worlds” (Vitebsky 79). If not a wild animal, the
Drum may represent a domesticated, or saddle, animal. As a gathering device, the drum “may also be used as a boat or as a container to scoop up spirits, and may be decorated with drawings of animals and of the shaman’s family so that they should multiply and be healthy.” The drum provides a tele-machine that, like our current electronic tele-machines, performs dual functions in how it reduces space and transports across worlds; the drum both allows the user to travel to new places, and bring beings from other places: it both travels and hosts.

It is music itself, however, that opens up the space between the physical and the spiritual, what a Western metaphysics might call life and death. Music provides the vibrations needed to trigger the death themes necessary for the shaman to enter the other worlds. Music offers a kind of becoming, a becoming-music that Deleuze and Guattari find facilitates a line-of-flight: “What does music deal with, what is the content indissociable from sound expression? It is hard to say, but it is something: a child dies, a child plays, a woman is born, a woman dies, a bird arrives, a bird flies off. We wish to say that these are not accidental themes in music . . . they are something essential” (A Thousand Plateaus 299). For the shaman, these are often the problems they must deal with: the death of a child; the mourning mother; the assemblage with a spirit-animal, such as a bird, to fly off, become the child, and communicate as the child with the mother. “Why a child, a woman, a bird? It is because musical expression is inseparable from a becoming-woman, a becoming-child, a becoming-animal that constitute its content. Why does the child die, or the bird fall as though pierced by an arrow? Because of the ‘danger’ inherent in any line that escapes, in any line of flight or creative deterritorialization,” and this is why the shaman faces danger whenever she or
he attempts to visit the spirit world on behalf of her community, “the danger of veering toward destruction, toward abolition” (*A Thousand Plateaus* 299). But when the woman cries because of the lost child, and the shaman brings her the child’s spirit, the music “is never tragic, music is joy” (*A Thousand Plateaus* 299). The shaman’s use of music “necessarily gives us the taste for death; not so much happiness as dying happily, being extinguished,” which is one of the shaman’s functions as psychopomp, making sure that the spirits are now content, and that the living are content with their loved one’s transition. Thus, music does not function toward that “death instinct it allegedly awakens in us, but of a dimension proper to its sound assemblage, to its sound machine, the moment that must be confronted, the moment the transversal turns into a line of abolition” (*A Thousand Plateaus* 299).

The drum works by creating an altered state of consciousness for the shaman, an event somewhat scientifically supported by psychological experiments which demonstrate that “drumming harmonizes neural activity in the brain with the vibrational frequency of the sound” (Vitebsky 81). “The shamans say that they use this shamanic drumming (which, in the majority of cases, consists of a steady, monotonous beat of 3 to 4 1/2 beats per second) to enter into an altered state of consciousness and to travel to other realms and realities, thereby interacting with the spirit world for the benefit of their community” (Maxfield). And while neurophysiologists might contend that the drumming produced by the shamanic-drum machine produces an altered state of consciousness by which the shaman slips into a trance, we might also say that the drum allows the BwO to develop a deterritorializing organ that allows an escape from the body. The power of the drum can have fascist effects, to be sure: “Music seems to
have a much stronger deterritorializing force [than painting], at once more intense and much more collective, and the voice seems to have a much greater power of deterritorialization. Perhaps this trait explains the collective fascination exerted by music, and even the potentiality of the ‘fascist’ danger we mentioned a little earlier: music (drums, trumpets) draws people and armies into a race that can go all the way to the abyss” (*A Thousand Plateaus* 302). However, music can be used to free one’s own soul from the body itself. “Music dispatches molecular flows” (*A Thousand Plateaus* 309). Rather than rely on the body’s own drum, the heart, which might produce a rhythm up to 200bpm given strenuous exercise, the shaman relies on the prosthesis of the drum in order to achieve a greater, superhuman rhythm of up to 270bpm while at rest. The shaman, using the drum, can create another organ that allows her or him to transcend the limits of her own body and temporarily (though sometimes accidently permanently) escape it. The drum aids in deterritorializing the body’s own biological codes.

The shaman does not join with the animal-via-drum in order to imitate it, nor is the drum, covered in the animal’s skin, meant to imitate or represent the animal: “One does not imitate; one constitutes a block of becoming. Imitation enters in only as an adjustment of the block, like a finishing touch, a wing, a signature” (*A Thousand Plateaus* 305). Deleuze and Guattari offer the example of Alexis the Trotter, who “ran ‘like’ a horse at extraordinary speed, whipped himself with a short switch, whinnied, reared, kicked, knelt, lay down on the ground in the manner of a horse, competed against them in races, and against bicycles and trains” (*A Thousand Plateaus* 305). However, “he had a deeper zone of proximation or indiscernability” than what these
external imitative indexes might suggest. “Sources tell us that he was never as much of a horse as when he played the harmonica: precisely because he no longer needed a regulating or secondary imitation. It is said that he called his harmonica his ‘chops-destroyer’ and played the instrument twice as fast as anyone else, doubled the beat, imposed a nonhuman tempo” (*A Thousand Plateaus* 305). Instead of moving like a horse, music provides the human-horse-attunement necessary to sync the spirits of the human-harmonica-horse-machine that allowed Alexis to become-animal, and which allowed him to take on the human activity of playing a harmonica at a nonhuman, or superhuman, rhythm. “Alexis became all the more horse when the horse’s bit became a harmonica, and the horse’s trot went into double time” (*A Thousand Plateaus* 305).

In this altered state of coding, a rearranging of DNA, the altered state of consciousness develops (a phenotypic display). And what the shaman becomes through music more than the child, more than the woman, is her or his animal, and often specifically, her or his helper-animal. “Music takes as its content a becoming-animal; but in that becoming-animal the horse, for example,” or in our case, a reindeer, whale, etc., “takes as its expression soft kettledrum beats, winged like hooves from heaven or hell; and the birds find expression in gruppeti, appoggiaturas, staccato notes that transform them into so many souls,” (*A Thousand Plateaus* 304) which is how the shaman is able to gather other souls around his spirit-helper. “It is the accents that form the diagonal in Mozart, the accents above all. If one does not follow the accents, if one does not observe them, one falls back into a relatively impoverished punctual system” (*A Thousand Plateaus* 304). The shaman must be cautious as the music changes him, or else he risks leaving his body forever. However, the helper-animal also becomes
shaman, and the drum, the permeable membrane of the animal skin on which the shaman beats provides the linkage. However, this linkage occurs only when activated by the vibrations it puts forth. “The human musician is deterritorialized in the bird, but it is a bird that is itself deterritorialized, ‘transfigured,’ a celestial bird that has just as much of a becoming as that which becomes with it” (A Thousand Plateaus 304). The musician does not “imitate the animal,” she or he “become-animal at the same time as the animal becomes what they willed, at the deepest level of their concord with Nature. Becoming is always double, that which one becomes becomes no less than the one that becomes—block is formed, essentially mobile, never in equilibrium” (A Thousand Plateaus 305). The spirit-helper has a much greater danger than the shaman: it risks becoming territorialized back into a body and losing the freedom it had died to achieve.

The drum itself is also digital, and not just because it is made of the bite, the skin torn from an animal. The drum, when combined with its operating system of the player, sends out digital signals. While the individual vibrations produced by a drum may technically be considered as continuous and thus analogue, the drum only fulfills its function as a rhythm-machine by producing many discontinuous beats to create the rhythm; the experience that these beats are so close together as to seem continuous does not make them less digital. These beats become the bits through which the drum reaches its audience, and although a single beat/bit might permeate the air, rhythm is not produced until another beat/bit is transmitted, and then another, and another. The drum makes use of discrete beats, sounds that are not sustained by the player, as might be found in a woodwind instrument. Once stricken, the beat lasts only as long as the skin continues to vibrate, and then must be struck again, another bite by the player’s
digits to produce another beat (bit). Continuously pressing on the drum’s skin will not sustain the vibration—the skin must be torn into again. Rather than operating by one’s and zero’s, an accidental construction developed by humans, the drum operates ac-
co(r)ding to beats per second. The shaman’s drumming code is roughly 3.5-4 bps.

And it is no wonder that we need these kinds of musical augmentation. “Of course, as Messiaen says, music is not the privilege of human beings: the universe, the cosmos, is made of refrains; the question in music is that of a power of deterritorialization permeating nature, animals, the elements, and deserts as much as human beings” (A Thousand Plateaus 309). Humans may be able to codify music, develop category systems for it, but this does not make us innately musical: “human being are hardly at an advantage, except in the means of overcoding, of making punctual systems,” which is “even the opposite of having an advantage; through becomings-woman, -child, -animal, or –molecular, nature opposes its power, and the power of music, to the machines of human beings, the roar of factories and bombers” (A Thousand Plateaus 309). While the shaman uses her drum to harmonize with the environment, Deleuze and Guattari’s humans have mechanized music in order to destroy and exploit it. They require the poetic, as Heidegger does with language, in order to avoid what Heidegger saw as the threat of technology represented by “the great pincers between Russia on the one side and America on the other” (40). For Deleuze and Guattari, “it is necessary for the nonmusical sound of the human being to form a block with the becoming-music of sound, for them to confront and embrace each other like two wrestlers who can no longer break free from each other’s grasp, and slide down a sloping line” (309). To do so, we need to couple the technology of non-music
with music’s sound logic in order to capacitiate humans with the ability to deterritorialize their own flows and attune with the cosmos.

Finally, the drum is both a writing instrument and substrate. The word membrane derives from the Greek word *membranos*, which translates to parchment. The drum’s membrane does not only produce sound, but provides a surface on which to produce marks. Such marks include the picto- and ideographic mythologies for sure, but also bear the trauma performed on the originary animal, and the reverberating, disappearing marks of vibration that reappear elsewhere within the body of the shaman and/or audience as psychic marks, the marks necessary to provide a digital code that transports the shaman elsewhere and allows him or her to interacting with otherworldly spirits. As much as the shamanistic experience is a performative one, it is very much invested in writing, and the drum provides one of the many surfaces which become this delivery-machine’s textual substrate. However, these texts on the shaman’s drum do more than add ornamentation. “Colors, silhouettes, and animal refrains are indexes of becoming-conjugal or becoming-social that also imply components of deterritorialization. A quality functions only as a line of deterritorialization of an assemblage, or in going from one assemblage to another” (*A Thousand Plateaus* 306).

The drum, through both its visual and acoustic effects, provides points-of-attachment which further provide points-of-departure. These marks provide memories, which are not for remembering per se but to create openings to the spirit world, and these openings appear because of the larger delivery-machine made possible by the attachment points that the marks provide. “This is why an animal-block is something other than a phylogenetic memory, and a childhood block something other than a
childhood memory. In Kafka, a quality never functions for itself or as a memory, but rather rectifies an assemblage in which it is deterritorialized, and, conversely, for which it provides a line of deterritorialization” (*A Thousand Plateaus* 309). For the shaman, the key to delivering oneself to the spirit world, and thus ultimately delivering a solution to the community, depends upon memory.

**Costume**

For Quintilian, the dress of the orator provided important clues to the speaker’s ethos, and one had to take care in one’s appearance: “Again, decent and impressive apparel lends men authority, as the Greek verse bears witness, but a womanish and luxurious dress, instead of adorning the body, exposes the mind within” ([VIII prooem](http://example.com)). The habit of delivery may offer credibility, yet it may also provide a glimpse through to an interiority that may be a speaker’s undoing. Like the drum, the clothing, or costume, that a speaker chooses to wear becomes a permeable membrane through which the spirit, or in this case, the mind, may pass. However, Quintilian’s actual advice on what to wear is rather brief but specific, as we’ve already seen, and consists of general rules for toga etiquette such as “it should be distinguished and masculine,” or, “it is not difficult to make purple stripes hang properly; carelessness in this sometimes attracts criticism. The rule for wearers of the Broad Stripe is that it should be a little lower than the girt tunic would be” ([XI.3.138](http://example.com)).

But Quintilian’s conservative approach to dress is a bit disingenuous, for its decorative use only pertains to the orator’s start: “This close attention to dress applies only at the beginning of the speech,” for as the speech proceeds, “almost by the beginning of the Narrative, it is quite proper for the fold to slip, apparently accidentally, off the shoulder” ([XI.3.144](http://example.com)). The orator works himself into such a frenzy at times that
the garment necessarily (accidentally) falls away: “And when the great part of the speech is over, at least if fortune smiles upon us, almost anything goes—sweat, fatigue, disordered clothing, toga loose and falling off all round” (XI.3.147-148). Such a description sounds more like the shaman in his or her frenzied chant than the controlled orator, master of delivery. Instead, the toga appears to aid in heating the orator, in raising the temperature of the body so that the body itself can warm up and better deliver, much like an athlete must warm up prior to an event. The toga becomes an aid to body temperature regulation, itself a second skin that may be removed (to a point) when necessary.

For the Roman and Greek orator, the body is inescapable, and the classical garments worn highlight this fact. And while the toga, in Quintilian’s case, does offer some short-term benefit to the orator, as described above, it eventually becomes a hindrance and shows off the body as the orator finds it a nuisance and tries to contend with it while still being in control of the rest of his delivery. This is not to say that the goal of delivery should be a transcendence of the body, which would please Aristotle, but instead the use of the body to deliver the unconscious rather than exhibiting the conscious attention to contend with it.

In contrast, the shaman never fights with her own costume, but becomes with it a delivery-machine. In fact, the costume becomes a sacred space for the shaman’s work, so that while Demosthenes might enter the assembly space, the shaman becomes the assembly space by donning her elaborate costume. The costume itself might be made up of few or many materials. To be sure, some shamans use so little worn paraphernalia that a simple piece of headwear such as a scarf can hardly be said to
constitute a costume. However, for many shamanic traditions, the costume encompasses the whole world. Most Siberian shamans perform in “some ritual costume or equipment which distinguished them form other people on sight,” visually marking their profession. Toward this, Shirokogoroff writes that “there is no shamanism without paraphernalia,” and Mihály Hoppál comments that “symbols make a shaman” (qtd. in Hutton 78). Such garb might include “a gown or kaftan . . . ornamented with embroidery, tassels or metal pendants, and a headpiece decorated with hangings, ironworks, feathers or fur” (qtd. in Hutton 79).

And while such costumes could be heavy—“The most ornate clothing and headgear could combine all of these forms of decoration, so that the most lavishly embellished of all the Evenk garments weighed forty kilogrammes” (Hutton 79)—the clothing, for the purposes of delivery, weighs less to the shaman than does the comparatively light-weight toga for the Roman. Much of this weight hangs in the form of metal: “A good shaman’s garment is decorated with forty to forty-five pounds of iron; these metallic ornaments are said to resist rust and each possesses a soul” (Stutley 76). Many of the metallic elements consist of metal disk “mirrors” which, depending on the shaman, serve a variety of purposes. The mirror may be used to “see wandering spirits and to hold helpful spirits (Maginnis 59), or to “drive off evil spirits who fear their own reflection, or are used like armor to protect the navel or heart from attack by hostile spirits” (Maginnis 59). For our own spirit world, the most immediate analogy that presents itself is that of computer virus protection against computer malware. However, such defenses only project one part of the human-computer interface. The images themselves, to the extent that they become a kind of spirit that wants something from
us, still have the opportunity to affect us. Since delivery, as always, is so dangerous, what must we develop to protect and electrate deliverer from new risks they might face?

The costume differs from shaman to shaman, as they all have unique needs to fulfill their function in the community. The costume “constitutes a religious microcosm indicating a sacred presence and symbolizing the shamanic worldview” (Stutley 71). The costume provides a “sitemap” of sorts that detail the metaphysics of the community. At the same time, the costume is “an independently existing object possessing its own magical power because of its in-dwelling spirits.” When the shaman dons her costume, she literally invests herself with spirits. “By means of the costume the shaman is transformed into a superhuman being before the assembled people; thus the shaman becomes that which one displays.” The shaman becomes a focal point, an image or icon for the community. She becomes celebrity.

As Caroline Humphrey describes, the objects that make up the costume have a specific “construction which was a conscious appropriation of powers. It had its own space (the back-pad), time (the twelve year straps, the days of the year, shells), roads (the cart-track straps and the rainbow streamers), and vehicle (the drum)” (208). The costume itself becomes a world for not only the shaman to inhabit (again, quite literally), but also for the audience to view and help share in the experience. The costume provides the background narrative by incorporating “the idea of the renewal (the antlers . . .) and mysterious metamorphosis-birth (the cuckoo-chick which emerged in the nest of a different species),” as well establishing the shaman as a location in space-time or “as a socio-political arena, the armed citadel . . . the shaman’s plaques, arrowhead, etc. were a comment on time, since the ancient objects were fixed to a gown representing
years and months” (71). If the shaman is actually going into another world, then he and his costume become a sort of monitor for viewing from the outside.

Nganasan shamans have reported using the disks to “break the ice” when going to the “Lower World of the dead” (Maginnis 59), but they also say that the disks are there “for beauty” (Maginnis 59). So in addition to its functional purpose, the costume does have an aesthetic dimension. Tara Maginnis likens the shaman’s costume to that of the actor’s, extending the performative action of the shaman’s delivery, not unlike the mask used by the actors of Ancient Greece. The costume is powerful in its own right, “capable of assisting the shaman to complete a total internal and external transformation,” and thus the “relationship between the shaman and these specialized garments is closest to that which an actor in performance has with the expressive and transforming dress of theatrical costume,” through which the performer “assumes another personality or acquires other personal attributes by the process of donning the costume and expressing the character of the being the costume represents” (Maginnis 57). As delivery is concerned, Aristotle had it all wrong again. He should not have pushed delivery away from acting, but towards it, using the methods of acting, including costume, in order to achieve a greater performative effect (or affect). Hypokrisis, as identified with acting, is indeed an apt name after all for delivery. To what extent, then, can this analogy be played out with the actor/celebrity of today, where donning the identity of actors themselves rather than becoming-actor for oneself is the proper mode of transformation? In other words, is it enough to mirror oneself on those who are actors already, or must one become an actor oneself rather than let others act for us?
The shaman, during his or her initiation, becomes nothing but a skeleton, the Body without Organs par excellence. While this de-organizing removes his or her own organs, it provides a blank slate for attaching other organs, many of which his original body was already without and so the de-organizing caused no ill-effects. And with the stripping away the flesh, the shaman becomes a blank slate, a canvas on which to arrange the parts of the costume. More specifically, the shaman’s costume becomes a choral space, a cut-and-paste text, and resembles many pieces by avant-garde collagists of the twentieth-century. Joseph Cornell, especially, was able to make desiring-machines that functioned in the way of the shaman’s costume. Like the shaman and his tools, Cornell used his collage boxes to search, both for “what the world looks like, how far man can see . . . man’s attempt to understand and then represent the universe” as well as the invisible, “to what cannot be seen, to what lies beneath the surface” (Blair 189). Just as the shaman’s costume provides a metaphysical map of the outer and inner worlds, Cornell’s Soap Bubble Sets were “concerned with the heavens, seas and earth—the ‘created Universe’” (Blair 191) as well as his own relationship to it. Cornell created these sets as maps (many of which contained pieces of actual maps) by combining different created and found objects such as “wine-glasses . . . sea-shells, cork balls or stoppers, glass marbles, natural sea-sponge, driftwood and wooden cylinders,” with pipes “flanking either side of a central map” (Blair 192). Shamans also made use of found materials, and attached these objects to their costumes as well as those specifically developed for particular purposes. Such objects include “old horse brasses, or, in another case, an old brass Soviet army button, added to the mix of metal amulets” (Maginnis 59) and “small copper wheels taken from watches” (Stutley 79).
These found objects, although perhaps not having the same meaning for a shaman’s culture as the culture from which they came, provide a variety of associations and open up possibilities for lines of flight for travel. Cornell chose not to disguise what many of objects were for this reason: “A map drawn by a cartographer is precise in its rendering, it has been used by travelers or explorers through time and it displays a known and specific way of depicting the world.” However, “An object like a cotton reel or a piece of driftwood allow, by being more everyday, the possibility of a different range of associations entering into the assemblage” (Blair 202). Although the shaman needs to know how to navigate the spirit world, she also needs to be able to explore new visions.

Like Cornell’s boxes, no two costumes of the Siberian shaman’s are exactly alike, or even closely alike, for each were constructed specifically by each shaman according to his or her history and experiences with various spirits. When Johann-Gottlieb Georgi tried to sketch the dress of Russian inhabitants in 1776, “he had to illustrate eight completely different styles of shaman’s costumes to show what he had seen in just a few regions” (Maginnis 58). Likewise, Shirokogoroff writes of southern Evenks that “there are no two absolutely similar cases of paraphernalia observed in the individual cases of shamans, even within the same ethnical unit” (qtd. in Hutton 80). Thus, while “certain symbols and attachments . . . reoccur on many different costumes from a broad range of locations,” the “meanings and powers ascribed to them vary considerably, not only from location to location, but from shaman to shaman” (Maginnis 58). As Cornell constantly reworked many of his boxes, often asking to have boxes back once given away so that he might append them, the shaman often makes and remakes his costume, which “is also a continuing work throughout the shaman’s life”
(Maginnis 59). Indeed, Cornell’s boxes, like the shaman’s costume, “are clearly part of a process; they exude stillness, timelessness, yet are manifestly stages in a voyage” (Blair 204). The costume becomes revisable, and becomes more powerful as the shaman gains increased experience. While shamans initially learn how to begin their costume from traditional knowledge, they “also seek for ideas directly from the spirits who help them, and many costume features are intended to physically represent attributes of animals that the shaman has been allowed by his animal spirits to acquire for use in the other words” (Maginnis 59). The shaman and his costume mimic the narrative of the hero and his journey, who acquires more power as he defeats adversaries, and gains important items such as “magic tools.” “Shamans in these cultures are said to gain power through the process of making and wearing the costume” (Maginnis 59). And to illustrate how important the costume is as a prosthesis, the shaman may also lose powers without the costume: “There is a recorded incident in the eighteenth century of a Tungus shaman who lost all his powers after a group of professors from the West stole his costume” (Maginnis 59). Thus, “A shaman’s equipment is an extension not only of the shaman’s person but in particular of his or her capacity to act. The carved, weasel-like Alaskan kikituk, like the reindeer and the birds on a Siberian shaman’s costume, summarizes the certain powers in its owner’s mind and communicates these to the audience” (Vitebsky 82). The costume, like the drum, provides a prosthesis to the shaman that allows him or her to have nonhuman powers. “Such objects also allow the shaman to perform an associated action. A kikituk enabled the Alaskan shaman Asatchaq to heal patients by biting the disease spirit inside them,
or to bite an enemy to death,” and the “reindeer on his costume acted as the mount of a Siberian shaman when he wished to ride the sky” (Vitebsky 82).

What is most important for us about the shaman’s costume, however, is not only the assemblage-makings that it can teach us, but this use of assemblages to “go before” the shaman, allowing the assemblages to perform actions on the user’s behalf, doing things and going places the shaman cannot. Rocks, crystals, plants, and animals are all important because “Like helper spirits, they endow the shaman with something of their own properties, and may perform actions on the shaman’s behalf” (Vitebsky 82).

Secondly, the costume provides not only a cosmology for the viewer, but also a map for his own use so that he can navigate the other worlds. The costume becomes a map, but one enriched with myth and narrative, as well as the shaman’s own history and relationship to the cosmos. Thus, in some ways the costume-as-map is mystorical, documenting the shaman’s relationship to his oral language apparatus, and using it as a compass to make decisions to help his community. We each need to map our own cosmos, our own pathways through the society of the spectacle, and create a costume that can help us leave the body and deliver in other worlds.

**Fringe**

Besides the larger pieces such as the drum and headgear, an element of fringe, such as the iron disks, make up much of the rest of the costume. As already demonstrated to an extent with the metal disks, this fringe provides the organs that attach to the costume’s BwO, which is necessary because the shaman’s own body has been reduced to a skeleton. The fringe provides the points of attachment for the shaman-machine to connect with the different worlds and spirits to make up the larger delivery-machine.
This fringe manifests in many kinds of materials: “Siberian shamans also have many soft attachments to their garments, the most common being fringes made of fur, leather, fabric, or even beads. Fringe, though it is the broad term most used to describe these dangling pieces, conveys an overly generalized meaning; in fact they are usually individually sewn on strings, tassels, or bundles of strings” (Maginnis 59). This fringe appears across the costume, including the headgear, where often “these fringes are attached to the headpiece and used to cover the face, which for the protection of the shaman must be concealed in the world of the dead” (Maginnis 59). The shaman’s headgear is one of the more important elements of shaman’s costume, “for it contains a great deal of the shaman’s power” (Stutley 60). Many shamanic cultures believe the chakra located near or above the head provides a connection to the center of the universe, and thus a gateway for the soul to leave the body. Thus, the headgear “closes up the hole at the top of the head through which the soul may escape” (Stutley 60). Soul loss is particularly dangerous for the shaman, whose spirit might be captured by hostile spirits while on a spirit journey. Thus, it is important to make sure the head/face area is protected. This particular feature is interesting when relayed to our current situation, where the seeming anonymity of cyberspace, in which our face often remains hidden, provides a different subjectivity for behavior. Of course, as with the shaman, different identity signatures appear, such as the avatar, and become a new face for inhabiting electronic environments.

Fringe appears on the body garment “in great profusion” (Maginnis 60). Fringe provides the lines of flight for the shaman’s travels, allowing great opportunity to journey to different realms. Like so many feathers on a bird, which must exist as a critical mass
for them to achieve their physical lift, fringe appears especially in the case of shamans whose main animal spirit is a bird” (Maginnis 60). The shaman’s fringe helps him connect with his animal spirit, so that “the fringes on the arms of the garment allow the wearer to fly to the other world with the aid of the animal spirit” (Maginnis 60). And Tuvan shamans use fringe “strings of leather or fabric . . . to represent snake spirits . . . and may include tiny carefully sewn bead eyes on each individual snake of the fringe” (Maginnis 60). Many other animals might be attached as well, for a variety of purposes. When displayed properly, the costume signals to the spirit helper that the shaman is friendly, and the spirit comes to help.

Perhaps the most iconic fringe though—that is, the one that seems most representational within a single object—is the amulet. These amulets, made of many kinds of materials, “may be in abstract shapes or stylized forms representing boats, faces, fish, animals, snakes, breasts, six-fingered hands, or humans” (Maginnis 59). As the shaman’s costume grows throughout his career, the shaman may also add or remove these amulets depending on the particular function that he needs to carry out. For instance, a shaman among the Alaskan Eskimo might make use of “an effigy of an animal such as an ermine or weasel as a power-object” which was “carved out of wood or ivory” and kept “in his parka or inside his body.” He would need such an amulet to “heal patients by using it to bite the spirits attacking them” or to “sent it to kill an enemy by burrowing into his body to the heart” (Vitebsky 83). These amulets, like all elements of the shaman’s costume, have a very practical use: “increase the efficacy of natural forces along lines they would or might move on anyway, as in farming, gambling, or love magic” (Rasmussen 162). Amulets may also be used for protection against evil spirits.
“A more modern amulet reflects the political violence of the recent armed separatist conflict between the Tuareg and the central government: One child was seen wearing a bullet as an amulet, made for the purpose of protecting him from his father’s tragic fate of being shot to death” (Rasmussen 162).

Literally, what is an “amulet”? From the Latin *amulētum*, it would seem that an amulet can be “any object—a stone, a plant, an artificial production, or a piece of writing—which was suspended from the neck, or tied to any part of the body” for “counteracting poison, curing or preventing disease, warding off the evil eye, aiding women in childbirth, or obviating calamities and securing advantages of any kind” (Yates 91). A possible Arabic cognate, “hamalet,” defines such objects as “that which is suspended” and generally means any kind of object which is “a carrier, bearer” (“amulet”). The amulet, like all pieces used by the shaman, provides an external organ through which he can function in a way unavailable to him without its aid. The amulets literally suspend from the body, not unlike Deleuze and Guattari’s description of a stone-machine, or the “organ-machines” that “cling to the body without organs as though it were a fencer’s padded jacket, or as though these organ-machines were medals pinned onto the jersey of a wrestler who makes them jingle as he starts toward his opponent” (*Anti-Oedipus* 11). They provide nodes with which to network with other parts of the environment that remind hidden without their use. Like a metaphor, they carry the shaman across to an affective state she or he could not otherwise arrive at.

It is this function, more so than its use as an apotrophaic device, which informs the amulet’s potential as a totemic augmentation. The totemic objects are “primarily objects of individual and collective identification” which may be “a personal tutelary spirit
or a clan emblem, the thing that gives a person or tribe its proper name. The naming of the object is also the naming of an individual or collective subject, as in the figure of the team mascot” (Mitchell 122). The totem as emblem often appears in amulet form on the shaman’s costume, not necessarily to provide himself with a proper name, but to give a proper name to his spirit-helpers and help to bring those spirits into the larger community as kin. While the amulet wards off evil, it also attracts friendly spirits as well as cultural knowledge to the group who witnesses the shaman’s performance. As already described in the shaman’s costume description, “totems are generally inferior things in the hierarchy of beings: animal, vegetable, or mineral, rarely human, they are things which are adopted as counterparts to people, a kind of society of things we can use to think through what a human society is” (Mitchell 122). As Mitchell explains, the totem derives from “familiar, everyday items, usually found from the nature world, that have been found” (122). These found objects provide identify formation when they become totems. Mitchell further identifies friendship (within which he includes kinship), with totemism “the image practice that signifies the clan, tribe, or family, and the word means, literally, ‘he is a relative of mine’” (75). The amulet hails, and like the corporate brand or logo, provides a recognizable icon for gathering. The amulet, as a totemic carrier, collects friends.

The amulet-totem provides an image-artifact for creating complex group desiring-machines because it avoids the Oedipal tangle often found with the fetish object. An image is fetishistic “when it is the object of fixation, compulsive repetition, the gap between articulated demand and brute need, forever teasing with its fort-da of lack and plenitude, its crossing of drive and desire” (Mitchell 75). As an example, Mitchell
applies classical fetishism to the images offered after 9/11, with the “flag-waving and profiling and endless hagiography of the victims,” which is “all conducted with a kind of bellicose dogmatism, bordering on idolatry. It’s as if we are being dared to disrespect the national fetishes, or (what is the same thing) forced to venerate them or pay for the consequences” (75). In contrast, the totem is not longed-for by the individual, or even the “national individual” that creates national fetishism, but a different kind of group desire. As Claude Lévi-Strauss quotes Andrew McLennan, “fetishism is totemism minus exogamy and matrilineal descent,” or, “In short, the fetish is the totem, a part object, often a body part, and isolated individual severed from the collective” (99).

While the fetish object, the partial body part, may sound more applicable to the construction of the desiring-machine, it is only so to the extent that the fetish helps to understand (invent) which parts might go together; the fetish does not provide a means for linking those objects. Totemism, more than fetishism, relates to the situation of the schizo and the shaman, both of whom use these objects not because they long for the object, but because they provide points of transition from one desire to the next. This is not to say that fetishism and traditional psychoanalytic techniques do not offer means of invention, for Derrida and Ulmer have certainly shown that they do, especially within electracy. However, for terms of delivery, the totem offers much more potential than the fetish, precisely because it offers a way to reconnect the individual to the group so that a collective decision might be made (delivery).

Totemism links by creating what René Girard calls “mimetic desire”—wanting something because others want it. This kind of practice is analogous to a modern company’s logo, which certainly wants to be wanted, to be purchased, but the logo itself
attempts firstly to provide a point of familial attachment, it wants to be your friend and establish a relationship. The modern logo creates a kinship system based on this mimetic desire rather than a longing for, although the one can certainly become the other. But “the totem is, above all, an image, a collective representation in graphic or sculptural form” and “is the ideological image par excellence, because it is the instrument by which cultures and societies naturalize themselves” (Mitchell 101). In a society of the spectacle, where the nation state falls away toward another kind of institution, the logo provides a different way for kinships systems to form, ones based not on DNA (which Mitchell says is the fetish object of our time, most likely because it is a last attempt to hold onto the traditional social formations of orality and literacy), but on a different kind of desire. So while the “nation becomes ‘natal,’ genetic, genealogical, and (of course) racial . . . rooted in a soil, a land, like a vegetative entity or a territorial animal,” an electrate collective identity becomes attached to a node, one from which the individual or group may break free to join with other nodes, and multiple nodes, creating multiple lines of flight and not rooted to a particular place.

Consider Nike’s emblem for their Air Jordan line of basketball sneakers. It consists of the silhouette of an iconic photograph of Michael Jordan, mid-air, legs spread-eagle, soaring toward the basket with a single arm raised, ball in hand, preparing to come back down to the ground and dunk the ball. The ball and his two shoes create a triangle, within which becomes a vehicle for the body to inhabit and leave the earth. Nike has used this logo to brand other clothing besides shoes, but the shoes become invested with the spirit of Michael Jordan. Beyond this, though, the logo creates not just a brand identity for Jordan (who is not a “business man, but a business,
man”), but also a collective brand identity for those who see themselves as “friends” of Jordan, or who accept the offer from Jordan, through his brand, to “be a friend of mine.” Thus, not only does the brand create an entire community around this logo, but also includes other features of totemism such as ancestor worship. While Jordan retired (again) many years ago, and while many professional players who display Jordan’s acrobatic athleticism were not even born when Jordan started his career, the mythology of Jordan is so strong that they become attracted to the brand and desire to be friends, if not family, as do many non-professionals on the playground courts. Although Jordan himself is not dead, he has already developed a spirit, and continues to haunt—although a better word may simply be visit—the basketball court of public opinion. In 2009, his son Marcus Jordan insisted on wearing his father’s Air Jordan brand and refused to wear the brand of shoes contracted with his University’s team. This caused the university to lose a “$3 million exclusive contract with adidas after basketball player Marcus Jordan's insisted on wearing his father, Michael's, Nike Air Jordans for the school's opening basketball game” (“Michael Jordan's Son”). Adidas spokeswoman Andrea Corso stated that Jordan’s university had “chosen not to deliver on their contractual commitment to adidas. As a result we have chosen not to continue our relationship with them moving forward.” It seems that image really is everything, even above lucrative contracts. The ancestor worship, for Marcus Jordan, was an important statement to deliver, associating him with his father’s brand and displaying their mark of kinship. “It’s a level of importance with the Jordan brand and my family. It’s no disrespect to adidas . . . but I’m going to be wearing Jordan shoes. I’m wearing the
adidas uniform, and all my other UCF gear is adidas, but the shoes are going to be Jordan brand” (Limon).

These shoes, like the shaman’s costume, are meant to give the wearer special powers because of the presence of the Jordan logo, which calls forth the spirit of Michael Jordan to lift the player to new heights. While some ancestor worship is involved (and again, the shoes themselves can be worshipped as a fetish object), totemism is more “on the level,” like basketball, “as a game between friends and relatives, not as a hierarchy in which the image must be adored or reviled, worshipped or smashed” (Mitchell 106). In his or her performance, the shaman is not revered the way a king or deity is, but is another player (although an important player) in a communal gathering that attempts to play out a problem using the shaman’s various tools/techniques and his relationship to his audience. “Totemism allows the image to assume a social, conversational, and dialectical relationship with the beholder, the way a doll or a stuffed animal does with children,” both items which commonly appear attached to the shaman’s costume as amulets. Mitchell offers that “We adults could learn something from their example, and perhaps apply it to our relationships with the images that seem, for often mysterious reasons, to matter so much to us” (106). An electrate delivery needs to make use of the features of totemism to create these “friendly” collective formations that allow delivery to take place.

While the totem offers a conversational piece for the community to form around, the shaman’s amulets and overall costume also serve as a totem for the spirits. The shaman uses his amulets to tell the spirits that he is a friend of theirs, and asks for their assistance. His totems provide an interface through which to connect with the invisible,
and use totems as a prosthesis that go before him into the spirit world, for their powers “take flight” before he is able to alter his consciousness and enter into a trance. For although the shaman makes a totem, or finds one and adds it to his family of totems, “they take on an independent life. They seem to create themselves, and to create the social formations that they signify” (Mitchell 105). This feature of the totem, its ability to deliver before the deliverer, is a salient feature needed for an electrate delivery. “The Israelites, and specifically Aaron, crate the calf, but they create it to ‘go before them’ as leader, predecessor, and ancestor that has begotten them as a people” (Mitchell 105). As I offered when discussing Crassus’s flute, the deliverer needs to make use of tools that can deliver without him. The literate form of this is the letter, even when in electronic form. However, a letter does not address that spirit world that is the society of the spectacle. Although writings are important to imagetext formations, written documents may become amulets, and spirits might be able to read, they are not literate, at least not functionally so.

How to find or create totems in electracy? For the most part, Ulmer’s mystery and electronic monuments provide invention methods for seeking the totems used to create collaged emblems made of found “objects.” Such invention methods correspond with those of the shaman and other “rituals of searching for the totem (the vision quest) which, like Rauschenberg’s tour around the block to find junk to put in his combines, may seem to focused and willful and deliberate, lacking the contingency we want from the truly found object” (Mitchell 124). Although the mystery and Memorial are deliberate (that’s the point), what they really offer is something like the “‘happy accident’ . . . that artists have always prepared themselves to recognize” (Mitchell 124). Once we find the
totem, though, the next task is not only to compose with them, but then to deliver such compositions back to the community so that collective decision making can occur. The closest deliberate practice toward accomplishing this is Ulmer’s Electronic Monument, but other practices must be developed as well, which I’ll return to in the last chapter.

Being Shaman

In the previous chapter, I discussed the role of the vomi; for the shaman, the stomach and the vomi it contains serves an important role in his or her delivery. As Vitebsky writes of the peoples in the Peruvian upper Amazon, “a shaman keeps one aspect of his power as a thick white phlegm in the upper part of his stomach, which is the most vital part of the body. The phlegm contains spirit helpers which the shaman calls upon for healing, as well as magical darts which he fires into victims to harm them” (24). While we often associated a white phlegm as sperm, coming from the most vital part of the body for a Freudian psychoanalysis, for this particular shaman it is the gut and the juices it contains. While other organs, especially the heart and brain, are given prominence in the knowledge they impart to the person, for the shaman it is this gut, intuition, a kind of knowledge passed off as less important within a literate metaphysics: “The shaman’s phlegm is called yackay, which is derived from a verb meaning ‘to know’” (Vitebsky 24). The phlegm, the yackay, is yucky, not only in its physical form, but also in the kind of knowledge it contains, a deeper knowledge of the unconscious. However, the yackay “therefore also represents power as knowledge. The magical substance, the helping spirits and the darts are just three aspects of the same shamanic power, which in turn consists of knowing how the world really is and how to manipulate its processes” (Vitebsky 24). The shaman relies on helpers to deliver his knowledge, prostheses that do some of the work for him, all in order to manifest the power he is
able to summon. And this yackay is not just practical for the shaman operating on a communal problem, but is also pedagogical: “The shaman is able to regurgitate some of this phlegm and give it to a pupil to drink, in order to pass on this knowledge and power” (Vitebsky 24). The phlegm, like many of the tools of the shaman, can both help or hurt, depending on how it is used.

We often make such claims of modern deliverers. These vehicles for information, whether it is a politician or a media outlet, can either harm or help their audiences, depending on the level and aims of the propaganda they use to persuade. Again, this returns us to Aristotle’s main complaint about delivery: orators did not rely on their arguments alone, but used the body (in multiple ways) to add value to their content, to tap into the unconscious of the audience and persuade them toward a course of action that might not be in their best interest. Delivery, then, is about regulating behavior, which is often performed at the individual level through psychotherapy toward the literate self in one-on-one sessions, or mass produced and delivered to us like a pizza, as though we were individuals first and foremost. But unlike psychotherapy, which is chiefly concerned with healing the psyche (cold soul) of the individual, the work of the shaman functions within a group context and the soul of the collective. “The shaman’s techniques as such are morally neutral, but within the community much shamanic activity is concerned with morality, and many areas of social behaviour may be regulated and arbitrated through the shaman. In this respect the shaman is not so much a psychotherapist as a sociotherapist” (Vitebsky 112). The shaman attends to the values of the society, and delivers/reifies those values through his prescriptions: “When the vegetalista’s patient was wrenched from his mermaid lover,
restored to his family and forbidden ever to go fishing again, the diagnosis and
treatment were a reminder of a man’s duty to stay with his family” (112). Like orators
deliberating over a proper course of action, the shaman must deliver the proper course
of human actions in order to keep balance in the society, and attending to one member
attends to the whole: “Thus a sick person is a sign of a fault in the cosmos, so that both
tend to be healed together” (Vitebsky 114). And such sicknesses and acts toward
healing affect not just this reality, but all realities, for “a wrong action in one realm may
have a bad consequence in another” (Vitebsky 114).

The shaman’s tools provide not only a means of attachment, but also a means of
attunement, of tuning the resonance of the unconscious with that of the drum, so that
the healer becomes the feeler. Through Heidegger, Ulmer has written extensively on
the need for attunement within the society of the spectacle, and how one of electracy’s
chief logics is one of attunement of one’s state of mind. As Heidegger writes,

The three essential determinations of Stimmung—Dasein’s thrownness or
facticity, the disclosure of its being-in-the-world as a whole, and the fact that
something can “matter” to it—constitute existentially Dasein’s openness to the
world. In Stimmung, in the attunement of a state-of-mind, Dasein, which
experiences itself always already factically (knowingly or not), is shown to be
capable of being “affected” by the world and of directing itself toward things in a
world that in every case as already been disclosed to it. Dasein’s being-attuned
in a state-of-mind is the existential a priori of all possible linkage, connecting, or
relationship. (qtd. in Gasche 116)

Ulmer might say that the shaman becomes a bachelor machine, “possessed by and
articulating the collective multiplicities passing through ‘me’” (Electronic Monuments
154). Or as Deleuze and Guattari write, “When a statement is produced by a bachelor
or an artistic singularity it occurs necessarily as a function of national, political, and
social community, even if the objective conditions of this community are not yet given to
the moment except in literary enunciation” (Kafka 83-84). To create this attunement, this Stimmung, one must calibrate the vibrations of ones machines so that they resonate the “sweet sound” of delivery. Of course, what is sweet is a matter of opinion, in both quality and quantity. Moreover, this vibration is not just a singular vibration but also a rhythm of vibrations. But the point is to create a vibration in “me” that also affects others, attuning one’s own mood to the audience, and vice versa.

The total ensemble of the shaman and his delivery-machines exists not as some sort of organic whole; it does not exist as an organism, but of a collection of molecules that make a machinic hole through which the shaman may enter the spirit world. Nothing is fluid with the shaman; everything is out-of-place while still being in-place and belonging. Becoming-music, which is becoming-shaman that leads into becoming-animal, is also a “becoming-molecular in which the voice itself is instrumentalized” (A Thousand Plateaus 308). The voice is no longer whole, but another molecule connected to a larger ensemble. While the bird is an important animal for the shaman, representing the flight from the body, Deleuze and Guattari suggest that another animal might better represent our situation: “birds are still just as important, yet the reign of birds seems to have been replaced by the age of insects, with its much more molecular vibrations, chirring, rustling, buzzing, clicking, scratching, and scraping. Birds are vocal, but insects are instrumental: drums and violins, guitars and cymbals” (A Thousand Plateaus 308). A shaman uses many instruments to become-animal with her spirit-helper, and creates an orchestra. How do we make our own orchestra? “A becoming-insect has replaced becoming-bird, or forms a block with it. The insect is closer, better able to make audible the truth that all becomings are molecular (cf. Martenot’s waves,
If our spirit-animal is the insect, how do we summon it? What is our drum that links us with it? Such a union is necessary, for the insect helps us to bear witness, to deliver the invisible, providing a perspective we cannot see without its compound eyes. “The molecular has the capacity to make the elementary communicate with the cosmic: precisely because it effects a dissolution of form that connects the most diverse longitudes and latitudes, the most varied speeds and slownesses, which guarantees a continuum by stretching variation far beyond its formal limits” (308). Insects, those that bite both us and those that bite the bits in our computers, become, if only in metaphor, the new spirit-animals.

Or, is this a deterministic reading, and the bird is still available to us? Is the phrase, “ants marching,” which refers to the mindlessness of humans deterritorialized by capitalism so that we march through daily routines, unthinking and unfeeling, a true description of postmodern societies in the “rat race”? Or, correspondingly, does the “hive mind” of other insect colonies adequately describe the current situation where we collectively follow orders, many of which may not be in our best interests, both collectively and individually? Does the “web” provide the home where we are either caught to be consumed by other insects, if we are not ourselves the spider? The point for cyberspace and new media environments is that these worlds are filled with spirits (and apparently, insect-spirits), no less real (in fact, more so) nor less dangerous than those spirits that the shaman encounters when he or she enters a trance and leaves the body. For shamanistic cultures, all beings have a soul that gives them Being, just as all objects have a literate essence within literacy. Even web robots have Being, and we have to attune with these spirits and try to make them friend rather than foe.
To be sure, shamanism has not entirely left us, and the practical reason that it provided is still sorely needed. But shamanism—as we find it in hunting and oral societies—is also outdated and nonfunctional; for the language apparatus we find ourselves in, literacy giving way to electracy, has a different set of problems and thus requires different kinds of solutions. However, as Vitebsky points out, “Shamanism may be a particularly appropriate religion for a classless hunting society, but shamans also function under the most diverse social and political systems.” Shamanism, because of its adaptability to a diverse range of cultures and climates, still persists, albeit in muted forms: “As the importance of hunting declines, other forms of religion, divination and healing begin to appear and the shamanic element which remains in them becomes increasingly ambiguous and hard to pinpoint. The shaman as a single central figure is joined or replaced by a range of complimentary and parallel specialists.” We still have our shamans, although they exist in different forms. “This process is linked with the growth of the nation state, which can hardly arise on the basis of a pure hunting economy. In societies with a more complex social organization, natural human anxieties about chance and misfortune shift from hunting to floods and crop failure, passports and permits, and passing exams or finding a job” (33). What shamanism offers to us is not trying to bring back the shaman of preliterate cultures, but the logic that Deleuze and Guattari notice in the schizophrenic, which shamanism has turned into a fully developed system of delivering what is invisible. The next chapter examines contemporary shamans, and explores how these figures perform their shamanistic functions and facilitate new modes of delivery.
CHAPTER 5
BECOMING AUDIENCE

As the “final” step in the rhetorical process, delivery necessarily relies upon the other parts of rhetoric before (and sometimes during) the act of dissemination. The shaman, to be sure, has his analogous parts of “rhetoric” as well. The vision quest, for example, could be considered an act of invention toward the final communal problem-solving that occurs with delivery. Because of this introverted part of the process, many consider the shaman as a figure of solitude. “But being a shaman is ultimately a public role and the shaman’s inner experience reaches its culmination and its full significance only as part of public performance” (Vitebsky 120). Without delivery, there is no rhetoric. And without his performance, the shaman could not deliver what the community needs, for the shaman, in “acting” his part, bridges more than just his own being and the spirit world; he also taps into the inner world of his audience, into their unconscious. The shaman’s “acting” is truly hypokrisis, creating a knowing from underneath the audience. The shaman’s role requires that he “act” in his community, at times to save the community, and this importance of “acting” undercuts Aristotle’s argument against a rhetorical canon that became synonymous with this term. “To say that the shamanic action is sometimes highly theatrical is not to imply that the shaman is ‘only acting’, as though this were something false. Rather, the performance transforms the inner reality or consciousness of a whole range of people who are involved in a number of different ways. It is this which makes the question of trickery irrelevant” (Vitebsky 120). The shaman’s machines, aiding his performances, are not just “theatrical props, but . . . genuine expressions or extensions of the shaman’s persona” (Vitebsky 120).
Delivery as “acting,” then, should not merely connote a sense of deception, but becoming. “Is a shaman who wears a mask or speaks with the voice of a god or an ancestor a true incarnation or a mere dramatist?” (Vitebsky 120). Neither. Instead, the shaman, through his assemblage of delivery-machines, becomes a self/other hybrid that is at once both. “A shaman who impersonates someone else is simultaneously both him- or herself—that is, an ordinary mortal—and a spiritually empowered being” (Vitebsky 120). And this becoming into a new being does not rely on the claim by the shaman of her transformation; instead, the audience must validate the shaman's performance through recognition—they better recognize: “When this shaman engages the audience, they are called upon to respond to a figure who resembles someone they know whose consciousness has been transformed through a powerful association with spirits” (Vitebsky 120-121). And the audience, depending on the circumstances of the performance, can “test this paradox, as when they put a Sora shaman’s baby to her breast while she is incarnating a male ancestor” (Vitebsky 121). In response to this test, the “spirit inside her broke off its speech for a moment and said, ‘No, I’m a male spirit, wait until a female one arrives after me’” (Vitebsky 65).

As I’ve argued about classical delivery, the shaman’s performance is not meant to appeal to logos, but pathos—not to knowledge, but belief and the community’s values. While Demosthenes exhibited a highly-crafted, honed delivery, so the shamanic performance is “a highly skilled activity in which the delicate collective mood is vulnerable to collapse, resulting in the failure of the purpose of the ritual. In this light, healing power is a form of artistry” (Vitebsky 121). It is not just a matter of knowing the right incantations or drum beats, but linking them into an overall experience. I can recite
dialogue from a screenplay as readily as Robert Deniro, yet I will not be nearly as skilled or entertaining. If Aristotle had attempted to orate one of Demosthenes’ speeches, surely he would not have moved a crowd like Demosthenes. Likewise, “Some Sora laypersons know all the words of shamans’ songs but are simply unable to act them out and make them work as performance” (Vitebsky 121). The shaman does not only know the physical requirements, but the codes, the theories, that integrate all the components into an overall aesthetic experience, one that entertains, but one that also establishes and sustains the proper mood necessary for supporting the values of the community embedded in the rituals’ purpose. This performance, then, becomes a form of pedagogy—reteaching the community those aspects that gather its individuals into a collective. This performance also exhibits the extent to which the shaman is a valued profession in his community, a consultant or public intellectual giving advice and labor toward solving the community’s problems.

The shaman, like the schizo and sometimes as the schizo, becomes an engineer within the community. If the shaman is the “one who knows” within his society, what he knows are the many codes that circulate amongst the community. And this community is not just the visible members, but also the invisible spirits as well. The shaman is the network technician and administrator amongst his people, one of the first IT specialists. The shaman has to operate on multiple audiences that compose the larger network, and attunes them through his performance, in which “the shaman interacts with the spirits, the immediate patient, and also with the wider audience, which amounts in some sense to society itself” (Vitebsky 122).
However, the shaman never works alone, but always alongside multiple audiences that serve as aids. As Vitebsky explains, “There are important levels on which the roles of the shaman, patient and audience cannot be sharply distinguished. A rite to heal one sick person is also a rite to ensure the continued good health of the group” (123). Any glitch in the code affects the whole of the network, and a sickness in any individual extends to a much larger population. “The mutual involvement of persons in shamanic societies often ties their perceptions and their fates very closely together. When a group of Sora crowd around a shaman to argue with an attacking spirit and defend their sick relative, they also know that if the patient dies, he or she will become an aggressive spirit which will pass on its own terminal sickness to those who remain alive” (Vitebsky 123). The audience, then, necessarily participates in the shaman’s performance because they understand that they are contributing to their own healing. The shamanic audience takes responsibility for their own delivery.

This interaction between performer and audience is not unlike various forms of avant-garde and performance art (to which I’ll return to later). The shaman’s rites and performances resemble “post-modern theatre, in which the performance is not a finished product but a continuing process of self-expression” (Vitebsky 122-123). This process is continuous due to the regular changing of community situations, requiring a problem solving approach. To the extent that the shaman self-expresses, he is also group-expressing, working out the problem at hand through an inner-outer complex composed of himself, the spirit world, and the multiple audiences mentioned above. Rather than typical anthropological approaches which “imply that ritual performance acts out some hidden cultural script,” the shaman instead uses these performances to
tweak the code, and create new scripts when necessary, so that “the culture itself is constantly being formed and reformed through these performances. The narrative force of the shamans’ accounts of their initiations, journeys and battles, the initial uncertainty and step-by-step detection work of divinations and confessions, all make it clear that something vital is being created on the spot by a collective consensus as the performance proceeds” (Vitebsky 123). The shaman’s performance becomes a simultaneous act of both invention and delivery, for as he delivers through performance he invents, and as he invents, he adjusts his delivery. This invention does not wholly occur before the performance, but happens in a flash, “on the spot.” Shamans practice flash reason, and invention and delivery occur together in this flash.

The audience, then, becomes part of the delivery-machine, so that in addition to the delivery-machine developed between the shaman and his tools, as well as the interaction between the shaman and his spirits, a “second sort of support came from the audience at performances” (Hutton 92). The shaman relies on the audience. The shaman is a “relational being” (Humphrey, Hutton 92) who “worked before others, and required a response from them” (Hutton 92). This kind of interaction is not unlike that described by public performers such as musicians and comedians who claim to “feed off” the energy and reactions of the crowd. This relationship creates a kind of delivery-complex that creates a feedback system between the two, so that the outputs of one become the inputs of the other, and vice versa.¹⁷ “This is true of most performing

¹⁷ This kind of system is termed a “second-order” cybernetic system, for the participant and/or viewer become aware that they influence the system, and so a metacybernetics occurs. The paradigmatic example of this is when some person such as a scientist researches the brain, and so the brain becomes aware that it is observing itself and must account for this observation. As Heinz Von Foerster writes: “a brain is required to write a theory of a brain. From this follows that a theory of the brain, that has any aspirations for completeness, has to account for the writing of this theory. And even more fascinating, the writer of this theory has to account for her or himself. Translated into the domain of cybernetics; the
artists, but often more literally so of Siberian shamans, because the onlookers were expected to contribute directly to their performances by chanting or singing refrains. This feature of performances is very obvious in the selection of them reported earlier, from that witnessed by Richard Johnson in the sixteenth century on. Shirokogoroff felt that the sense of bonding between Evenk shamans and their audiences, expressed obviously when the latter functioned as a chorus, was vital to the success of shamanizing" (qtd. in Hutton 92-93). The shaman and audience create a system that, in terms of systems theory, might be described as an autopoietic system, specifically one that operates according to second-order cybernetics. In an autopoietic system, the system as a whole creates itself—it does not create other systems, nor do other systems create it; rather, such a system operates in the middle voice, creating itself as a system. As the shaman performs, the audience responds, and each use each other's actions as an impulse for future actions. However, the overall goal of the performance is not merely one of stimulus/response, but maintaining a homeostasis of the system (for instance, healing the community). Even though the actions inside the community may change, such actions are merely a procedure of self-regulation to ensure that the whole community survives. While the shaman performs with his many machines, the audience uses the refrain as a way to provide feedback back to itself, which is to say, an autopoietic system is created by the shaman/audience.

One of the methods by which the audience and shaman interact is through the refrain. Deleuze and Guattari theorize that the refrain provides a “means of preventing music, warding it off, or forgoing it” (A Thousand Plateaus 300). Thus, it would seem
that rather than promote the shaman’s becoming, which is fostered through the beating of his drum, the refrain might actually hinder the teleportation that the drum allows, interfering with the digital rhythm produced by this delivery-machine. However, instead, the refrain actually allows the music to exist in the first place, “because music takes up the refrain, lays hold of it as a content in a form of expression, because it forms a block with it in order to take it somewhere else” (A Thousand Plateaus 300). Although a refrain is literally restrictive, it can be layered onto music to form this block, adding to the music of the shaman’s drum, while the rhythm gives more freedom to the refrain than it would otherwise have. “The child’s refrain, which is not music, forms a block with the becoming-child of music: once again, this asymmetrical composition is necessary” (A Thousand Plateaus 300, emphasis in original). The refrain is the local, domesticated knowledge of the whole community—the doxa—that music alters by creating a block: “Music submits the refrain to this very special treatment of the diagonal or transversal, it uproots the refrain from its territoriality. Music is a creative, active operation that consists in deterritorializing the refrain” (A Thousand Plateaus 300). The music created by the shaman’s own delivery-machine, coupled with an even larger machinic-complex of the audience, lifts the refrain and offers new possibilities, new lines of flight. The shaman, with the community, performs an action of delivery that simultaneously invents, producing creative thinking.

To use a symbolic animal important to the practice of shamanism, the bird can be musical or nonmusical. However, “Is the bird’s refrain necessarily territorial, or is it not already used for very subtle deterritorializations, for selective lines of flight?” (A Thousand Plateaus 301-302). The distinction for whether the bird is musical is the
“labor of the refrain: Does it remain territorial and territorializing, or is it carried away in a moving block that draws a transversal across all coordinates-and all the intermediaries between the two?” (A Thousand Plateaus 302). When musical, the bird is able to swoop down, take its bite out of the refrain, and escape with it to do what it pleases, rather than being refrained by the refrain, trapped in its original block. This is the logic of cut and paste. It is also the logic of the bite. The rhythm of the shaman’s drum, like the bird, picks up the refrain and moves it along toward another trajectory, just as the shaman’s costume/dance does for the visual elements of his performance. “Music is precisely the adventure of the refrain: the way music lapses back into a refrain (in our head, in Swann’s head, in the pseudo-probe-heads on TV and radio, the music of the great musician used as a signature tune or ditty); the way it lays hold of the refrain, makes it more and more sober, reduced to a few notes, then takes it down a creative line that is so much richer, no origin or end of which is in sight . . .” (A Thousand Plateaus 302).

What the refrain creates is an additional rhythm layered onto that created by the drum. While the latter helps the shaman slip into his trance, the refrain becomes an integration of the audience into the performance. The audience gets to play a part during the performer’s delivery, rather than after he has spoken in the form of a verdict or vote. But even within a Greco-Roman pedagogy of delivery, rhythm has always been fundamental to an effective performance. As Quintilian advises, one has to account for the delivery of a speech while composing its rhythm, and the place of performance also plays a part (and again, delivery affects invention, style, arrangement, and comes before them):
Finally, to sum it all up, our Composition must generally correspond to our Delivery. Are we not, as a rule, subdued in the Prooemium (unless we need to stir up the judge in a prosecution, or fill him with indignation about something); full and explicit in the Narrative; quick in the Arguments, and rapid even in our body movements; expansive and fluent in Commonplaces and Descriptions; downcast and submissive for the most part in the Epilogue? Yet the movement of the body also has its own time units, and the musical principle of Rhythm is used to mark out feet in dancing no less than in melody. Again, are not voice and gesture accommodated to the nature of the actual things of which we are speaking? There is therefore all the less reason to feel surprised to find these features in the feet we use in oratory; our sublime passages need a stately walk, our smooth ones a slow progress; vigorous argument entails moving at the double, delicacy calls for a sinuous flow. (IX.4.138-140)

As described in chapter 1, what Quintilian calls for is a dance—that the orator thinks with the body while delivering a speech. The orator should mark time through the foot-mouth machine and literally put one’s foot in his mouth. If the orator is to appear credible, again, he must believe what he says, and moreover, feel it. So as the orator, to paraphrase Ulmer, does his duty and shakes his booty, how would an audience—how should an audience—respond to such movement? They should get on the dance floor and join in. Within the shamanic performance, the audience does join in and become part of a delivery dance. For the shamanic audience, who has more at stake in the shaman’s performance than the shaman himself, dancing is not just optional, but necessary: they have a duty to dance and shake as well. But how are we to dance, or to make others dance, so that a new model of delivery might emerge? Ding-dong.

Answer the door.

It’s Not Delivery. It’s DiGiorno.

Really. A television spot: a man in his underwear, salivating over the thick cheese from his pizza . . . not only on the pizza, but also in the crust, a hidden, gooey goodness underneath and within the crust. This pizza offers him what he desires. In celebration, not even taking a single bite, he rejoices with a slice of pizza rather than
consuming it by taking the pizza as his partner into a multi-genre dance. He holds a slice in his arms, sways rhythmically from side to side before starting the robot . . . moving then onto the moonwalk, sliding backwards with the pizza, eventually grabbing his ankle with his free hand and launching into the crazy knee. This pizza-lover, or perhaps more specifically, cheese-lover, for he compliments the slice of pizza on its preponderance of cheese, jumps from dance to dance move with a schizo’s logic, pushing his desire further and further until his wife walks in, catching him in his affair: “Don’t tell me the pizza delivery guy saw you like that,” she says—to which he replies, surprised, “it’s not delivery,” but then with a defiant smile, holding up the box, “it’s DiGiorno.” After the voiceover—which states “so much cheese in the crust, it’s hard to believe it’s not delivery, it’s DiGiorno”—the man takes his pizza and continues to dance, letting out a euphoric “Whooo!” and ignoring his wife who stands by dumbfounded.

This commercial, titled “Boxer Boogie,” is indicative of many of the commercials in DiGiorno’s advertising campaign, which on the whole suggests that their pizza, bought in a supermarket and cooked at home, is just as good as what you would get from a pizza delivery establishment. But what makes delivery pizza so good to begin with? Certainly the ingredients: they are usually fresher, sometimes less processed, and more flexible, since you can customize your order rather than accept what comes out of the box. Not that you could not customize a frozen pizza yourself, but that gets to exactly the point that DiGiorno would have its audience sidestep: convenience. DiGiorno knows the customer would rather relax and telephone, outsource the responsibility of meal preparation to someone else in addition to having a pizza that tastes better. Until the late 2000s “economic crisis,” when scrimping increased its value
as a value, the suppressed premise in such ads is that DiGiorno costs less than delivery (or carryout) while tasting just as good, if not better, and so these ads deliver the value of frugality and domesticity, preparing meals at home and avoiding any middle-class guilt of eating out too much (even when the food is delivered in). The ads also, in the way that Barthes describes of the Panzani advertisement in “Rhetoric of the Image,” use connotative visual cues to suggest a feel of Italianicity, from displaying fresh toppings to the name itself, DiGiorno, which translates to “of the day,” further suggesting at the pizza’s freshness.18

However, depending on the delivery company (local rather than chain restaurants), DiGiorno is not necessarily less expensive, nor does it taste “of the day”: it still tastes like a frozen pizza (they have merely increased our expectations for what a frozen pizza should taste like . . . no longer cardboard, but now something more akin to foam rubber). What DiGiorno delivers is not the pizza, certainly, and not even the taste of delivery. Instead, they deliver the decision itself of what to purchase, like most advertisements. In *Internet Invention*, Ulmer notes the difference between how art and advertising solve problems. Art fosters creative thinking, which opens up the possibilities of a question rather than sealing them off with a solution, which is the role that advertising attempts to take: “The effect of advertising is exemplary of the effect of myth in the spectacle in general: to introduce the actual problems of life, but then to invoke the psychic defense mechanism of fetishism and conduction, by displacing the threatening, anxiety-producing possibilities of the problem toward a sense of well-being, reassurance, safety” (258). The problem?: an exigency that requires a pizza, most often

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18 My thanks to Kyle Hall for providing me the Italian translations.
a desire or craving rather than an actual need, which becomes compounded because of cost or other values that conflict with satisfying the desire. DiGiorno tricks the consumer into thinking this problem is solved due to the pizza’s cost-savings and taste. These commercials also promote the idea, even if this is not their intention, that the consumer becomes more self-sufficient, empowered, and seemingly more responsible for their own delivery. Instead, delivery involves making decisions, and thus DiGiorno is, in fact, an antidelivery. It maintains the confusion of a literate delivery of a material form rather than the unconscious aspects which are sorely needed. The commercials shut down any further thought, the refrain without the music, the art, to move it into new directions. The fact that many viral YouTube videos create spoofs on DiGiorno’s commercials, that they take a byte from the tagline, only suggests the extent to which the spirit (brand) of DiGiorno has become free to affect at will. DiGiorno has created a brand and motto that takes the place of the shaman’s costume and drum and sends out spirits in order to attract the audience.

And DiGiorno has been quite successful in this attraction. One of the key ingredients to their implicit argument (that their pizza tastes better than delivery) lies not on the surface, not in the toppings, but underneath, the crust hidden below all that cheese that the boxer boogier delights over. As Tim Straus explains, “Professionals in the ‘pizza business’ understand that ‘pizza is all about the crust.’” Kraft [the parent company of DiGiorno] understood that frozen pizzas, while immensely popular were known for their ‘cardboard crusts.’ Any substitute for a restaurant/pizzeria pizza would have to have a superior crust, no matter the toppings. The crust would make or break their success” (22). The real taste lies not on the surface, but hidden below in the
pizza’s doughy unconscious. To create a better-tasting crust, Kraft developed a “self-rising” crust, thus bringing this underlying-taste to the surface for the consumer (again, providing another level of convenience), delivering the taste from underneath. At the same time, the DiGiorno advertisements crate an appetite for the DiGiorno brand by appealing to the audience’s unconscious: “While consumers like the pizza, they also have an appetite for DiGiorno ads. In this week’s USA TODAY exclusive consumer Ad Track survey, 20% of respondents say they like the ads ‘a lot’ vs. the Ad Track average of 22%. Women liked the ads slightly better than men did. About 22% of women vs. 17% of men liked the ads ‘a lot’” (Howard).

How the commercial delivers, besides its traditional enthymatic quality, is through the surprise, the joke, the gag, played not on the consumer directly but experienced through the unsuspecting victim of the commercial, tricked into believing not that a frozen pizza is delivery, but that it is not. For the commercial mentioned above, the wife becomes the unsuspecting party, unbelieving that her husband could become seduced by a pizza that was not delivery. But consider another DiGiorno television advertisement featuring college football coaches Steve Spurrier and Ty Willingham. In a pre-game press conference, Spurrier and Willingham address the media while sharing a pizza.

Spurrier: First I want to thank my rival coach here for getting my favorite pizza delivered—that was a class act, thanks coach.
Willingham: (Smiling and shaking his head) It’s not delivery.
Spurrier: (Surprised) What?! Hey, if this isn’t delivery, well play the entire game in dr— (“Steve Spurrier Digiorno Commercial”)

Spurrier’s last word is cut off, and the director uses a word/image match cut to show Spurrier’s football team emerge from the stadium tunnel wearing football helmets and
dresses—surely not the clothing that Quintilian would suggest for an effective delivery, but highly effective in this context. DiGiorno hopes, of course, to persuade the audience that their pizza tastes so much like delivery pizza that even Steve Spurrier would be fooled, and be foolish enough to place a wager on his beliefs. However, the main operating feature is not the argument’s logos, but its pathos, how it makes the audience feel, which in this case is one of surprise, a pleasant eureka moment, an ah-ha, the mystique that one’s perception is wrong. DiGiorno, literally of the day and sunshine, brings forth an illumination. The commercial initiates the audience into the collective of those who know, using Spurrier as the unsuspecting butt of the inside joke. The commercial delivers a secret, what everyone else knows except the one eating. It offers not only a fresh-baked crust, but a fresh idea on what is possible, even if that possibility extends only toward pizza. So even though the commercial itself has already decided for the audience which is the better tasting pizza, enfolding them into a collective wisdom, its use of the surprise, the well-delivered joke, gives the illusion that a new possibility has emerged, and at the level of the unconscious, DiGiorno is well-delivered as well.

Instead of letting television advertisements decide for us, to deliver not only this decision but also the emotional reaction we should have towards its content, we need to develop a delivery-system that is based on pedagogical rather than commercial purposes. That is, we need auto-delivery systems that help us learn not what some corporation wants us to feel (the media as hypodermic needle) but feelings that we can extract for ourselves. Such delivery systems not only create individual learning (invention) but also help establish learning at the group level (delivery). While the
commercial takes on all responsibility for trying to create the feeling, individuals and groups must become responsible for their own delivery, just as the shaman’s audience must participate in the shaman’s performance. The deliverer and audience form a delivery-complex, with different ratios of responsibility for the action of delivery. An electrate delivery requires that this ratio balance out, decreasing responsibility for the deliverer (although this responsibility still remains extremely high) and increasing responsibility for the audience. The following examples in film (*The Soloist*), music (U2’s lead guitarist, The Edge), and new media art (Eduardo Kac) offer a spectrum moving from individual delivery that spreads to a group delivery, and provides possibilities for a combined auto/allo delivery system.

*The Soloist*

Since effective delivery depends upon delivering desire, the unconscious, then the deliverer must reveal that desire in others. However, as Quintilian advises, the deliverer must also make the audience believe that he contains that desire as well, that he actually believes (and feels) what he espouses. Thus just as important as delivering the unconscious to others is delivering that to oneself. The individuals who best excel at this kind of auto-delivery are those that can practice a schizophrenic logic, ones who know how to connect with various external machines in order to bring forth and express desire. In the film *The Soloist*, we see the character of Nathaniel Ayers (Jamie Foxx) exhibit just such a logic. Based on the newspaper columns of the journalist Steve Lopez (Robert Downey Jr.), *The Soloist* explores the relationship between Lopez and Ayers, a schizophrenic musician, once-matriculated at Julliard before his mental disorder got the better of him. Ayers wound up homeless in the streets of Los Angeles
where he was eventually encountered by Lopez, who became friends with Ayers and wrote about him for the Los Angeles Times.

Some of the back-story concerns of the movie are quite telling toward our transition from literacy into electracy. While the first shot is of Lopez riding his bicycle in the early morning hours (I'll return to the bicycle later), the next demonstrates one of literacy’s culminating practices of delivery before the digital revolution: the newspaper delivery. A pickup truck (or, in this case, a dropoff truck) cruises along with a deliverer in the back tossing newspapers on the front lawns of subscribers, more consistent and reliable than even pizza delivery. The next scene: the printing press of the LA Times, with spools of imagetexts blurring by at a hundred miles per hour (the film itself is an imagetext of imagetext). The constant rhythm—thump-thump-thump-thump-thump—beats at a tempo that goes even beyond the shaman’s 3-4.5bpm. Back to the truck, to Lopez-bicycle, to the press, to the truck, to Lopez-bicycle, and back to the press, the delivery-machine that unifies the nation state in literacy. And then, the crash: the Lopez-bicycle machine his a pothole, and the writer skids along the asphalt. What is his situation?

Lopez becomes attached to more machines: the ambulance, and the western-medicine-machine of life-support, lung-machines pumping in oxygen, just like poor Deleuze toward the end. Lopez then goes into the CAT-scan-machine, which supposedly can analyze his “inner” state. The next shot: his CAT scan, and the outline of his skin, skull, brain, morphing as the scan goes deeper from one side of his head to the other (“I’m not entirely comfortable with this”). But no matter how deep the scan reaches, it can never reach the spirits that affect him in the unconscious. Back at home,
he goes in and finds that another delivery-machine, the phone-messaging machine, as
no new messages for him from other parts of the world (has he lost touch with his
spirits, so that they no longer send him messages?). Back to the printing press, and
inside the LA Times building: “Life Has a Mind of Its Own” printed on the front page, by
Steve Lopez. From the press to the mail room—more delivery. The editor speaks of
the canon of arrangement, the layout of the newspaper’s page. The LA Times finds
itself in trouble due to the rise of Internet journalism, and the decreasing number of
people who read newspapers. One of the writers complains how people care more
about Lindsey Lohan and Lopez’s column than his stories about how corporate America
is profiting from the Iraq war. Literacy is both failing, and dying.

External shot: Lopez sits alone in a local courtyard, back facing the camera. He
hears someone playing a violin, and turns his half-eaten, one-eyed face to the camera
to search out its source. He finds what appears to be a homeless man, Ayers, playing a
violin that only has two strings and sitting under a statue of Beethoven, who looks down
upon him quite ominously. Like the shaman, Ayers too has his costume, his machines.
His headdress consists of a yellow sun-visor with the name “Mr. Stevie Wonder” written
across it in red marker, along with “Mr. Walt Disney,” “Tchaikovsky,” and “Donald
Duck”—perhaps all of his spirit helpers: certainly Stevie Wonder, whose name also
appears on his violin. In fact, like the shaman’s drum, he has decorated his violin with
several markings. He wears a hi-vis yellow road vest as well, over a camouflaged coat.
Around his neck hangs a Hawaiian lei. His costume will change throughout the movie,
and he will don a mardi gras mask, a presidential jacket and Uncle Sam top hat for
Independence Day, a bank robber’s ski mask, white-face, and on and on. He also
pushes a shopping cart, full of totems, lined with fringe: a milk-crate bungeed to the front and filled with papers, a hubcap, satchel, a wooden board with again the name “Tchaikovsky” written on it. The basket also carries a broom, 5-gallon bucket filled with some sort of cloth with a baby-doll sitting on top, an empty golf-club bag, blankets, pillows, a stuffed-dog customized by paint, rugs, a table leg, water pistol—many of the items a homeless man might try to gather, for sure, but with an aesthetic element, albeit a schizophrenic one. The items are at once useful and decorative.

Lopez walks up to Ayers: “Stevie Wonder fan?” In Ayers’s response, we hear that an oral delivery would seem nearly impossible for him: Oh, my cherie more the sunshine of my life (Lopez: Signed, Sealed, Delivered) but you really shouldn’t write on a violin like that because you have to treat a violin like a child you have to protect it (Lopez: You only got two strings) . . . all I wanna do is play music and here’s the problem that I’m having right here this one’s gone this one’s gone this little one’s out of commission but you get that in Cleveland public schools a lot of military statues in Cleveland (Lopez: Is that where you’re from?) very military-oriented city and I’ve got to get musicians on parade there you’ve got severance hall there you’ve got the music settlement Ohio State University where in Los Angeles you have Los Angeles PD you have LA Times you have Los Angeles Lakers those are armies too military regimentation experimentation Roman Gabriel Roman Catholicism Colonel Sanders this guy right here (Lopez: Colonel Sanders) is from the orchestra and the cello this guy the same moves but the cello can’t be kind a certain master he leads out Yitzhak Perlman, Jascha Heifetz you can’t play music in the winter in Cleveland because of the ice and the snow that’s why I prefer Los Angeles Beethoven’s city because it never rains in
southern California and if it does all I have to do is go in the tunnel I can play to my heart’s content I’m flabbergasted about the statue aren’t you flabbergasted?  (Lopez: Anyway, nice to meet you.)  Do you have any idea how it got here?  (Lopez: No.)  Maybe they dropped it off at night it’s just astonishing that it sits here for hours and just just gaze at it (Lopez: No idea.) it really blows me away that someone as great as Beethoven is the leader of Los Angeles.  Ayers, as he says later, is “crazy for Beethoven.”  Of course.  Who else but the master of the “Beet.”

As Lopez looks around the scene, he sees that Ayers has also decorated his surroundings as well, writing “Mr. Stevie Wonder” again on the stone block that supports the statue of Beethoven.  The writing, essentially graffiti, spills around the block and extends outward, even onto a palm tree a few feet away.  Lopez notices the scrawl: “Who were Nancy, Paul, and Craig?”  Ayers: “Those were my classmates at Julliard.”  This writing goes beyond the margins of Ayers’s costume canvas and become fringe that hangs off the margin, it reaches out and delivers to Lopez the situation that Ayers finds himself in, and the logos and celebrities with which Ayers seems to identify.  Moreover, this graffiti, these scratches, provide the incisions necessary for grafts, allowing other fringe to inhabit and grab hold.  They provide a point of reference for Lopez to make his calls to Julliard and inquire more about Ayers.  He eventually finds out that Ayers attended Julliard for two years but dropped out.  Lopez has a story.  How does he continue to invent once he decides to write?  He dances about his dwelling to Mr. Bojangles as covered by Neil Diamond, a song that calls forth the ghost of the famous tap dancer.
This fringe will proliferate throughout the movie. Several scenes later, back in the LA Times: POV shot from the mailman’s perspective as he pushes his cart about the office. Dominating the shot is the human silhouette created by a cello case, taking a ride to the desk of Lopez. An elderly lady, stricken with arthritis (failure of the hand-cello interface) gifts the cello to Ayers, via Lopez, because she was moved by Ayers story, again, via Lopez. As Ayers takes on the cello as a prosthesis, developing a relationship with it, his fringe slowly attaches and grows to the cello, appearing as graffiti on the case, a few scarves tied on the handle, and eventually to the cello itself. In one scene, we see that Ayers has placed a brazier on the instrument. And while a psychoanalytical reading might argue that the cello has become the fetish instrument par excellence, it makes more sense, in this case, to say that like the rest of his body, Ayers has simply extended his fringe to his newest organ, to make sure that it has become fully integrated with the rest of him.

Lopez, falling back into a psychoanalytic mode rather than schizoanalytic, bribes Ayers to enter the LAMP rehabilitation community along Skid Row. Ayers would rather not live inside, in a structure or an apartment (because “you can’t hold down angels”), or anywhere else but out in the air. For him, music has always been a method of freedom—his mechanical relationship with an instrument provides delivery via deliverance. As his mother tells him in a flashback: “You’ve got somethin’ special here baby, a way out. There is a whole world waitin’ for you.” If one attunes with one’s desiring-machines, and one can become the intermediary of the shaman, then the invisible can become visible, and one can deliver oneself from a particular situation. His mother kisses him and leaves him to sleep, but rather than close his eyes for slumber,
he reveals his right forearm, on which he has inked the four strings of a cello, and he practices himself to sleep. He transforms the organ of his arm into something more consistent with his Being: a cello. He has turned his arm into a machine. When Ayers finally does give in to his desire to integrate with the cello, the writing “Mr. Stevie Wonder” becomes replaced with “Lopez” (eventually, Ayers will claim that Steve Lopez is his god, perhaps because Lopez has given him the cello).

The relationship between Ayers and Lopez is very complicated, and it is unclear who is delivering knowledge to whom. Lopez will receive “grace” from Ayers, and Ayers will call Lopez his god, but also a ballerina and an airplane pilot, for Ayers thinks that Mr. Steve Lopez is flying the plane in the sky. Ayers, when tied to his desiring-machines, becomes the shaman who links the unconscious and conscious worlds, always immersed in both, but through music aware of how the two interrelate—this is not always the case when he’s without his instrument. Like Gracchus’s flute, the cello allows him to regulate how he auto-delivers affect between these two states. Without a musical prosthesis, he becomes paranoid, hears voices, and feels the affects of a psychiatry that treats his desire as a disease. Lopez is himself a form of medium, for he writes media for a newspaper, becomes the interface between citizens who must make democratic decisions, and those problems that might cause democracy to collapse. Of course, as we have seen in the beginning, this kind of power is failing (even though Lopez wins a media award). Lopez tries to combat his own compassion fatigue, to deliver something to Ayers himself, to touch at least one life with his journalism, but he has not the powers of Ayers. However, Ayers eventually gives in to living in an apartment, and to living a life off the street, and Lopez adopts, in a form, the techniques
of the shaman, reaching out to Ayers via his totem, a miniature bust of Beethoven (“I can’t believe Mr. Beethoven himself is in my own apartment”). What the two accomplish is becoming a medium for delivery rather than an agent. One must be a conductor (Lopez: “To be there with him like that, to see the way that he’s transported, he surrenders”). The two become intermediaries through whom each man sees himself, or a different version of himself, and each discovers his respective situation. Through Ayers’s playing we see a man whose outputs become his inputs, whose passion for music creates a music of passion, a perpetual motion machine of rhythm and vibrations: a feedback loop. Like fringe on the shaman’s costume, these vibrations scatter and deliver Ayers’s unconscious, not only to himself, but to others, who then experience themselves within it. Auto-delivery, then, which may be called invention, has the ability to reach out toward other audiences so long as that auto-delivery carries a feeling of believability.

Many other scenes in the movie reflect the overall emblematic signature already present in this treatise so far. We learn that the violin and the cello are not the only instruments that Ayers can play; he can also play the bass, piano, guitar, trumpet, French horn, drums, and harmonica. After playing the gifted cello under the overpass for the first time, pigeons fly toward the sky, “applauding” with their wings, and lifting Ayers spirits toward the air, for Ayers conducts in his eponymous medium. The bird is as important to Ayers as it is to any shaman. The camera boom rises with the birds, and follows them—at first underneath them, seeing only their shadows on the ground, but eventually rising above the birds, looking down upon them as in the shaman’s journey, the teleportation that a proper rhythm provides. When Lopez arranges Ayers a
private audience at the LA Philharmonic’s rehearsal, he cannot go without his cart (as a shaman cannot be without his costume). Here, he wears a “skeleton” t-shirt, showing—even if unaware—that his body has been stripped away and rebuilt by the spirits that haunt him. He taps out the rhythm of the music against the chair’s arm, and we see the visual representation of rhythm in the conductor’s baton. The orchestra has conducted the spirit of Beethoven into the room. Ayers: He’s in the room. Lopez: Who is? Ayers: Beethoven. The delivery-machine of the orchestra has delivered Beethoven to the room. After the rehearsal scene, Lopez describes the experience to his ex-wife, Mary: “I’m tellin’ you it was such an unbelievable experience. The whole thing. The whole day. And if you had seen him, if you could have felt him . . . I mean it’s the same awe, we’re listening to the same god-damn music but, but no, you see him it’s one thing but you feel him, I’m watching him he’s watching the music and while they’re playing I say my god there is something higher out there . . . something higher out there and he lives it and he’s with it . . . I’ve never even experienced it, but I can tell, I don’t even know what you fuckin’ call it.” Ayers becomes the intermediary that delivers this “higher” something to Lopez, and extends his desire to a larger group: “Points West, by Steve Lopez. A year ago I met a man who was down on his luck and thought I might be able to help him. I don’t know that I have. Yes, my friend Mr. Ayers now sleeps inside, he has a key, he has a bed, but his mental state and well-being are as precarious now as they were the day we met. There are people who have told me I’ve helped him. Mental health experts who say that the simple act of being someone’s friend can change his brain chemistry, improve his functioning in the world. I can’t speak for Mr. Ayers in that regard. Maybe our friendship has helped him but maybe not. I can, however, speak for
myself. I can tell you that by witnessing Mr. Ayers’s courage, his humility, his faith in the power of his art, I’ve learned the dignity of being loyal to something you believe in, holding onto it, and above all else believing, without question, that it will carry you home.”

And during the credits, we see scenes from of the LAMP community, dancing in celebration rather than wallowing in their despair, their collective joy expressed in the rhythm of their feet. Ayers music frees them in the spirit of one of the many meanings of delivery: deliverance. Ayers as shaman, with his costume and tools, can solve some of the problems of the LAMP community, mainly those that cannot be addressed by literate, scientific understanding. As one LAMP resident earlier states: “I’m just tired it’s like they can’t find the medication that’s right for me, you know, you know what I’m trying to say . . . when they put me on lithium it was like a portion of my brain was fully functional, you know what I mean, because it’s like when I take the lithium and everything, it totally eliminates the voices in my mind, when they first start risin’ up, you know, and it stops them right there. I don’t like that because then it just stops them because you see sometimes those voices comfort me, and when they comfort me, if they give me all this lithium then I no longer have the voices to comfort me—you understand what I’m saying, do you feel what I’m sayin’ to you?” Deleuze and Guattari would no doubt sympathize with the woman in this scene and feel what she’s saying. A shaman would also sympathize with her, for she is losing her ability to communicate with her spirits. However, the universal that her particular case fills is that we are all losing our ability to “feel” our spirits. The feature relevant to Ayers delivery is not in his
ability, but in his passion, the desire that his desiring-machine produces, which becomes infectious toward others and garners a response.

In the last scene of the movie, the camera zooms out from a tight focus on Ayers, his sister, Lopez, and his wife, so that the whole audience is revealed, a collective completely focused on the orchestra, a delivery that is at once truly fascist, but like the doves which clap when Ayers plays in the streets, liberating at the same time. The zoom pulls back, revealing the conductor’s gestures, how he delivers the motions of the body to synchronize the musical collective, all operating on an aesthetic logic, all following not a conduction of sound, but conduction through the image. Music, despite its differences with the visual arts, can itself be guided by sight, and the conductor can paint a song for the musicians to play. And the key to this painting? Rhythm. Like the shaman’s technique, a tap-tap-tap to begin with, and varying motions from there. And at the end of the zoom, now in the foreground, the timpanist, keeping all on a steady beat.

Delayed Delivery: The Edge

At first consideration, we might say that U2’s lead singer, Bono (short for Bono Vox, “good voice”), might be the best representative for analyzing a “pop” delivery. Not only does he sing, but he runs about the stage, letting the music carry away his body, dancing about to the band’s music. In a very conscious way, Bono sees himself as having an intermediary role between god and the people, and literally serves as an intermediary as the ambassador for DATA (Debt, AIDS, and Trade for Africa). In terms of songwriting, Bono “was able to reach deep within himself and find lyrics that expressed what his peers were feeling” (Stockman 10), bridging the gap between the conscious and unconscious. Bono also notes the hypokritic function of a song, and how
it can affect others, stating that the songs they play are not about them, but about the audience: “It’s unexplainable what a song means to you, because remember that songs, it’s not like a movie you’ve seen once or twice, a song, it . . . gets under your skin and that’s why we abandon ourselves to it. It has a sense of . . . uplift, getting airborne” (“U2 Special”). However, as Steve Stockman explains, the U2 cannot be limited to Bono, but relies on the whole band to play a group role. And the band, as a group, becomes responsible for delivering information between god and mankind: “U2 inhabits that dangerous and exhilarating space that connects spiritual and physical, mortal and divine. The band’s music stretches every sinew of our imaginations in a most courageous attempt to take us as far as a rock ‘n’ roll band can” (5), and as Steve Beard writes, “For more than twenty years, U2 has done their part to puncture the power of nihilism and hopelessness by pointing listeners to a transcendent reality of heaven, hell, angels, demons, deliverance, redemption, grace and peace. Their lyrics unfold a world beyond the things that can be merely seen and rationally grasped” (v-vi).

But it is not the lyrics (only) that provide this deliverance, but the whole ensemble of the band, the music that carries the refrain. On the other hand—the right hand—of Bono it is The Edge who provides the shamanic function of the band, interfacing between Bono’s political lyrics—his refrains—by laying down the beat. While one may point out that Larry Mullen, Jr. is the actual “drummer” of U2, it is The Edge who provides the function of the shaman’s drum. As his name implies, he stands on the edge of himself, the audience, and the unconscious, the intermediary position between one plane and the next. And he also stands at the edge of Bono. While Bono might be an intermediary for a god above and without, The Edge provides an intermediary for
that within, aiding the total delivery of the band, and very much understanding his role as a bigger part of the band as an assemblage: “I think there are the sort of the gunslinger guitarists whose . . . it’s sort of the . . . fastest draw in the west mentality . . . and then there’s the sideman . . . who are really about supporting the singer and playing the songs and try to make the whole thing mesh together and I really think of myself as more of that sideman kind of guitar player . . . it’s about the entire” (“U2’s The Edge”). And like the shaman who can recite the etiological story of his drum, The Edge offers the origins of his first guitar: “We built a guitar, when my brother was 16, I was 14 . . . literally hand wound the magnets to make the pickups, every little component, got wood from Mary O’Connell’s parent’s place, hand carved neck, hand carved the body, sawed the grooves, put the fret wire in, every, every aspect, and put it together.” And the first guitar that he used to record with U2 was, aptly enough, an Explorer: “this instrument was just there, calling out to me, this Explorer.”

In the documentary It Might Get Loud, one of our first glimpses shows The Edge performing a more traditional form of inner-exploration through a yoga-like stretching. However, The Edge loves his machines, and loves creating hybrids, and while he stretches, bends, folds, he also interacts with his BlackBerry. His first interview, then, rightly starts, “I’m very interested in what hardware can do to an electric guitar sound. I love effects units. They’ve always pushed music forward” (It Might Get Loud). The Edge uses as many as 23 guitars for a set, and as many, or more, effects pedals to create unique sounds for each song. All guitars are precisely tuned to work with the effects unit for particular purposes. Like the shaman, The Edge has multiple tools, multiple helpers to give him the right sound for the situation—artistic, aesthetic, yes, but
also rhetorical. And the schizophrenic effect is no less present than these various machines: “I drive everyone crazy, I drive myself totally crazy trying to get the sound I can hear in my head to come out of the speakers. It’s my voice, that is my voice, what’s coming out of the speaker” (*It Might Get Loud*). The Edge has a voice inside him that he tries to get out, and that he tries to make audible via his desiring-machines. He truly wants to deliver the sound, to give it birth, and invents the sound in the process. However, his auto-delivery, because of its technological interface with amplifiers, becomes a public delivery as well; he crafts his voice, like Demosthenes shouting against the surf, so that he can find the perfect, sweet sound. And what The Edge tries to express through his voice is a feeling, an affect through effects: “It’s the music that tells us the direction a song should go. As writers we start with the feeling and everything follows from that” (*It Might Get Loud*).

What is perhaps more interesting is how The Edge relates his performance, his delivery, back to memory, and his first effects unit was, fittingly enough, “a cheap Memory Man echo unit” (Stockman 10). “When you start to treat the sound you start to invoke location. As I’m working I’m often thinking about where is this? Where is this location?” (*It Might Get Loud*). We next see The Edge’s old school and classroom spaces where U2 had some of its early experiences, as well as video from one of their first songs, which they could hardly play: “The thrill was just being able to do it, even if you did it badly” (*It Might Get Loud*). We can relate The Edge’s phenomenon to Greek mnemonics used to remember speeches, such as the construct of the memory palace. However, it is not The Edge’s memories that are used to aid delivery, but delivery that aids memory. As The Edge plays, and his mind moves off the stage, where he is
watched by thousands and thousands in the audience, his consciousness becomes transported into other places of space and time. Like the shaman, the music he produces becomes an output that recirculates as an input, and his spirit leaves the body. And this attunement occurs not only because of a given pitch, or sound, but also timing. In a previous scene we witness The Edge listening to old four-track recordings of his initial song writing, and he explains the difficulty in playing “Where the Streets Have No Name,” moving between different time signatures in various parts of the song: “Bono is actually calling out the timing—that’s funny . . . four, five, six . . . ‘cause the first section is in a different time signature so a little bit of a head trip to go between the two . . . you can count in different ways . . . one two thee four five six . . . or you can go one two three one two three . . . it’s like a waltz” (It Might Get Loud). The beat of the shaman’s drum, or the rhythm of The Edge’s guitar, needs to find a particular rhythm to reach the proper attunement, otherwise a “head trip” results. However, the ultimate result produces the affective feeling of a dance, acting on the body and making one move to the beat.

During a scene with The Edge portraying the roll of Demosthenes, standing on the beach and playing his guitar with the amplifier pointed into the surf, he explains in more detail the feedback loop created by him, his guitar, and his effects pedal and machine: “I got the second unit and I brought it back to rehearsal. I just got totally into playing but listening to the return echo filling in notes that I’m not playing, like two guitar players rather than one: the exact same thing, but a little off to one side. I could see ways to use it that had never been used. Suddenly, everything changed.” The director asks, “You come out and bring your amp out here all the time?” “Oh yeah, yeah, it’s my
thing, I like to get out here in the elements and, rock out, yeah yeah with, with the islands, I always find very inspiring for those long echoed delayed sounds" (It Might Get Loud). The Edge’s connection to his machines, like Demosthenes’s to his, is not meant for his own inspiration, his own invention alone, but to be delivered to the surf, the islands, the masses. The Edge’s feedback, this auto-delivery by which he feeds his desire with his desiring-machines, also feeds another desire: delivering his feeling to other people. “The biggest thrill is creating something that had the power to really connect with people. That’s why I took up the guitar in the first place” (It Might Get Loud).

In another scene, The Edge tours the camera crew through his old Dublin high school and points out the bulletin board where Larry Mullin, Jr. first posted the flyer recruiting members for a band: “Now exactly where this note was I have no memory, but this is where it was put. I loved this whole idea, you know, of getting a band together. So I was definitely going to do something . . .” (It Might Get Loud). The literate delivery of one kind of note produced the proliferation of another kind of note, moving from literacy into electracy. And The Edge is well aware of the serendipity of delivery: “But if Larry had not put the message up I would have been in some other band, I don’t know what . . . it wouldn’t have been U2. God knows who it would have been, and would I be doing what I am now, probably not. I mean I could be doing anything. I’d be, I dunno, working in a bank somewhere or something” (It Might Get Loud).

And music, for The Edge, did deliver for him just as he delivered through his machines. Like Ayers in Cleveland, music provided The Edge and the rest of U2 a way out of an economically-depressed Dublin: “Dublin in the mid-70s was really
economically very challenged. The economy was in the toilet. We just didn’t believe that anything could change. There has to be more than this, this is not the only thing that is on offer here” (*It Might Get Loud*). Music, via a complex of desiring-machines, becomes a delivery-machine that offers not just a delivering of affect, but a deliverance out of a situation. Delivery for The Edge means a freeing, the freedom that the shaman has to move in-between states of consciousness, the freedom represented by the bird. As The Edge moves from his pedal to his foot buttons to change effects, he performs his delivery, he performs a freedom dance as he gestures across the strings of his guitar. And as his performance affects the audience, and as he performs the collective act of shamanism, this performance becomes a sort of speech act echoing the band’s name: U2 have a part in this show, and U2 play a part in the performance. While Ulmer’s motto for invention acknowledges “Problems-Be-Us,” delivery also considers that “Problems-Be-U2.”

**Teleporting an Unknown State: Invisible Subjects, Invisible Audiences**

Eduardo Kac literalizes, in a more obvious way, the construct of a delivery-machine. In *Time Capsule* (1997) he was the first human to implant a microchip into his own body, literally putting information under his skin. The location, however, is meant to put affect (another kind of information) into others, for Kac chose to implant the chip into his left ankle, an area of the body where slaves were typically branded. Kac, in more ways than one, has created his own digital brand, a branding reminiscent of his Jewish ancestry and the tattoo serialization and processing by the Nazis. After implanting the chip, Kac entered himself into the animal surveillance database (the typical use for such microchips) and recorded his tracking information, listing himself as both animal and
owner. However, the implantation of memory has other implications for both digital
delivery and digital memory:

I felt that in 1997 we were starting to see something different, because
throughout the 90s we went through the digital revolution. We saw the rise of cell
phones, we saw the popularization of the digital networks, but I felt that
something was changing by 1997, and I felt that we’re moving into a post-digital
paradigm. And in that paradigm there’s also a cultural shift that takes place in
relation to memory. So I wanted to make a piece—an artwork—that would deal
with memory as we inherited from the past, but also projected it into the future.
So what did I do exactly? In front of a series of sepia tone photographs from my,
from the past, my family, in the 30s. . . . I implanted live on television and live on
the internet a digital microchip. So what’s the relationship between these two
elements? One is the memory of the past that gets externalized and through a
slow process of identity formation, cultural debate, you internalize those
memories. On the other hand, and quite literally, on the hand, I had the
microchip. In a few seconds, with no historical context, with no tradition, with no
identity formation, with nothing, with just a gesture of injection, in a few seconds,
dramatically, and traumatically as well—boom, the microchip goes into the body.
It’s a memory microchip, it’s a microchip that stores memories, digital
information. So, what’s the relationship between the complex, subjective,
processural, internalization of those photographs and the abrupt internalization
of digital memory? And the body, in this case my body, becomes the interface
where these two questions come together. (“One on One”)

Simply, the microchip contains digital information and serves as a prosthetic for
memory. However, Kac and his body play a shamanic role in how the questions raised
by this prosthesis rise to the surface as the memory chip becomes implanted beneath.
From the perspective of grammatology in general and electracy in particular, Kac
expresses the need for the practices, identities, and institutions to circulate around the
technology and effects of new media. Through the integration of a machine, Kac
combines digital and biological codes, and can now use both to store information. And
in this case, memory, as an idea, helps to facilitate Kac’s delivery, but delivery is also
used to deliver, quite literally, memory. Kac engages directly in hypokrisis, for he puts a
kind of knowing underneath the skin using a hypodermic syringe. Of course, Kac
cannot access that memory directly, but must use another machine, a scanning device, to read its digital codes.

By integrating these various codes, Kac has developed an aesthetic logic of the bite within new media. He tears away the genes of one animal and puts them in another, or takes a bit(e) from one digital code and implants it into himself. He becomes a new media shaman that does for digital codes what the traditional shaman did for her own community. He often mixes the codes that drive various bodies. If Kac had a totem animal, it would have to be from his most famous bioartwork, *GFP Bunny* (aka *Alba*), a rabbit whose DNA he crossed with a bioluminescent jellyfish. Under a black light, Alba glows in a fluorescent green, and is the first larger mammalian animal to undergo transgenic modification. In almost a literal cut-and-paste way, Kac combined different genes, different bits of information, to form a new creature. In many ways, Kac outshamans the shamans, by taking certain “spirits” from other animals (the spirit that gives the jellyfish the power to glow) and gives it to another. In doing so, Kac makes the invisible spirit visible within a different context. But while he delivers one bit of code into another body, himself the medium that facilitates that exchange, he also unconceals the cultural and psychological anxieties that this kind of practice often induces, with fears of mutants and monsters run amuck. In a very real way, Kac delivers the unconscious, an unconscious that glows in the dark, but is otherwise invisible within the “illuminated” light of consciousness.

Kac also shows us one way in which we might perform the delivery technique of the gesture through new media. He often describes his art works and practices as a form of gesture, and while his metaphor derives from painting, the tele-nature of his
works, that they can themselves gesture, offers broader possibilities (if the artistic
gesture were not enough). In answering a question about his creation of new life, of
making the chimeras of legends become life, Kac responds and shows that the gesture
opens questions rather than closing off possibilities: “In the twenty-first century we have
a significant cultural transformation. So ‘what happens when we cross that bridge?’ was
the first question I wanted to ask, the first gesture that I wanted to do. And I say gesture
like a painter would make a gesture on a canvas that expresses an idea. In my case it’s
a physical as well as a psychological gesture” (“One on One”). While advertisements
gesture to close decision making, offering a pre-made solution, Kac’s art (as art does in
general) gestures to open it again, not only at the level of the individual, but also as a
collective. In other words, rather than being persuasive toward a particular outcome,
Kac attempts to provide more options, to deliver a kind of creativity in order to foster
creative delivery.

But no matter how Kac “gestures,” he does so to facilitate delivery as rhetoricians
might understand it, and which he understands as communication. This might seem to
be a statement so vague that it is worthless. However, Kac’s notion of communication
does not simply revolve around a one-way communication—the way that mass media
typically operates, and the direction of a spirit-human relationship without the powers of
a shaman—but is always dialogic. Kac also reveals that his interest in networked art,
art that can communicate, is mystical:

My Grandmother, if I actually had to do something specific, she would sit down
and explain to me why is it that I had to do that, so that I had the opportunity to
understand what is it that was going on. And if I had a different opinion, she
would listen and she would talk to me. Which means that also at a very early
age I understood that there were two ways to go about in the world. One is
blindly—it is this way, just because. End of story. And the other was through
dialogue. And that I picked up from my grandmother. And that’s something that later on through reading, through studying, through philosophy I became interested in Bouber and Bakhtin and other philosophers who also dealt with philosophy of dialogue. And, many years later, without thinking about it—of course, only, you know, looking back one can see that—but many years later I started to work with communication as the core aesthetic element of my work. (“One on One”) And this dialogue, this communication, is not meant to persuade someone of one’s own point of view (necessarily) but to understand the other’s point of view, to, as Kac says, transport one into another’s mind.

I always talked to [my grandmother] because I was always in dialogue with her and I was able to, in a sense, look at the world from her perspective. And just that alone was also extremely rich, to be able to transport myself to another space, to another time, and in spite of the generation gap, to be able to enter that world and have different feelings, to connect with another space and time, because of course Rio de Janeiro Copacabana Beach is far removed from the Warsaw of 1939. So, to develop empathy, to have respect, not purely and simply because somebody told me so. (“One on One”) The shaman’s spirit leaves his body and travels to other realms, to gain knowledge of other’s situations, and thus one’s own—and one’s community’s—situation. Again, this kind of content delivery becomes an auto-delivery, but, ideally, for both (all) parties involved. It is not just a question of making something appear to the eye, but to create the “feeling” that exists between the gaps of space and time. The shaman’s spirits exist in the same time, and the same place, yet are invisible. Kac’s grandmother experienced events in a different space and time, but yet can be felt by Kac because of the empathy, or more specifically, the telepathos, that he was able to create. What Kac attempts to do is to create a system, a practice for making that telepathos function as a logic system. And what Kac tries to deliver via this logic are those spirits that lie within our unconscious: “More than making visible the invisible, art needs to raise our
awareness of what firmly remains beyond our visual reach but, nonetheless, affects us directly” (236).

Kac’s work achieves this through its digital coding, but not in a computational mode. Rather, the coding Kac uses enacts a feedback loop, a dialogue, between the artwork and the audience, so that the coding of the audience becomes a coding of the artwork, and vice versa. Cary Wolfe points out that “Wieczorak finds a precursor to [Kac’s work] regarding the parallels between art and scientific theory in minimalism, with its ‘potentially endless sequence of repeated shapes,’” (144) as well as minimalism interaction with the viewer which creates “ever-shifting viewpoints over time, though a kind of feedback loop,” (144) which Wolfe notes resembles “a similar emphasis in cybernetics on what Humberto Maturana and Francesco Varela call the ‘autopoiesis’... of the observing system” (144) which Wolfe claims “Kac's work insists on again and again, most obviously in his inclusion in the work itself of remote, Internet-based observer/participants” (144). Rather than become a regressive reflexivity, which is Wieczorak’s perspective, Wolfe thinks of this observer/participant interaction as “recursive—it uses its own outputs as inputs, as Luhmann defines it. . . . And it is only on the basis of that recursivity—a dynamic process that takes time—that reflexivity becomes productive and not an endlessly repeating, proverbial ‘hall of mirrors’ associated with the most clichéd aspects of postmodernity” (144). It is this process, this repetition that provides a salient aspect of delivery, and it has already been established once by the shaman’s drum. This dialogue, communication, feedback loop—however you name it—all require a rhythm, a regular—but discontinuous—beat which provides the loop along which feedback may travel, so that the byte taken may be regurgitated
and fedforward down the line: communication is a biting together, sharing a meal. In some ways, this trajectory resembles Jim Ridolfo and Dânielle Nicole DeVoss’s concept of rhetorical velocity. However, this velocity requires rhythm, not to become the “hall of mirrors,” but to become recursive, revisable, and eventually deliverable. The only snag, as Wolfe says, is that this often “takes time.” Delivery, also, takes time, sometimes up to 30 minutes (or else it’s free). This is time that Ulmer, through his admonition against the general accident of the internet, has already made clear we do not have. While velocity is simply speed with direction, we need to make sure that the speed is that of a flash, Ulmer’s reasoneon, and that an electrate delivery is an instant one.

Kac’s work bypasses the delay in traditional delivery by harnessing the speed and ubiquity of the digital internet, and creating conversations that could not occur across space otherwise. In his work Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1994), Kac uses a simple phone line to link a canary and plant six-hundred miles apart, showing “our own longing for interaction, our desire to reach out and stay in touch” (Kac 219). By observing the plant or the bird, the audience changes each species’ behavior and thus the conversation. However, Kac’s web-based installations afford the audience even more direct participation. In Teleporting an Unknown State (1994-1996), Kac “combined biological growth with (remote) Internet activity” (Kac 221) by placing a seed and substrate in a dark room and making the audience responsible for giving the seed light for development: “Remote individuals responded to email announcements and sent light via the Internet to enable this seed to photosynthesize and grow in total darkness. The installation created the experience of the Internet as a life-supporting system” (Kac
By pointing their digital cameras to the sky, these remote individuals caused light to shine down from a projector onto the plant. As feedback, the “slow process of growth of the plant was transmitted live to the world via the Internet as long as the exhibition was up. All participants were able to see the process of growth via the Internet” (Kac 223). This piece reverses, in many ways, the typically direction of delivery, or if not reverse, at least recycles. Instead of the artist/installation delivering a message, it requires the audience to make the delivery instead. Or, rather, the artwork demonstrates the larger circulation, the larger ecology necessary for delivery, but in doing so, focuses on the audience’s responsibility in the process. For if the audience does not answer the call, does not participate, then the plant dies and all delivery stops.

According to Kac, “The poetics of this piece’s network topology operated a dramatic reversal of the regulated unidirectional model imposed by broadcasting standards and the communications industry. Rather than transmitting a specific message from one point to many passive receivers, Teleporting an Unknown State created a new situation in which several individuals in remote countries transmitted light to a single point in the Contemporary Art Center, in New Orleans. The ethics of Internet ecology and network community were made evident in a distributed and collaborative effort” (Kac 223-224). Demosthenes could not deliver in the mode of broadcasting, but relied upon his own kind of ecology of the assembly, and required his audience’s participation. However, he was still responsible for delivering his argument and making his audience aware. Kac shows us that while the author might set up a delivery-machine, the audience must, at least in some part, become responsible for the rest of delivery. The trick of the author, then, is to deliver the desire that makes the audience willing and wanting. The unknown
state that becomes teleported is not the state of the seed, but the unknown state of unconsciousness that influences participation.

Kac’s *Genesis* project (1998-1999) extends this audience participation through a work that not only becomes networked, but also incorporates his interest in transgenic art. Kac’s creation of the installation shows how the Internet becomes a thinking prosthesis and an aide for making art. Kac took a Biblical verse from the book of *Genesis* (“Let man have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over every living thing that moves upon the earth”) and converted it into Morse Code. Since he did not own a Bible, he copied the text from an edition on the internet, integrating hypertext from the start of the project. Kac also “used a Web site to create the Morse translation” (Kac 251). Kac created his own conversion from Morse to DNA [DASH (-) = T; DOT (.) = C; WORD SPACE = A; LETTER SPACE = G] and sent his DNA sequence to a company that synthesizes DNA. Once he received the DNA, Kac inserted the gene into its context: “The context of the gene is the body of an organism, and the context of the organism is its environment. In the case of my *Genesis*, the organisms are bacteria . . . and their environment is at once their dish, the gallery, and the Internet” (Kac 251). To network the bacteria, Kac places a microvideo camera and a UV lightbox above the Petri dish which houses the bacteria. As the bacteria grow and reproduce, “Remote participants on the Web interfere with the process by turning the UV light on . . . The energy impact of the UV light on the bacteria is such that it disrupts the *Genesis* DNA sequence, accelerating the mutation rate” (Kac 251). The Web participants directly change the content of the exhibit, and participate in how the art delivers. Kac, again, describes this process as a gesture: “In the context of the work,
the ability to change the sentence is a symbolic gesture: it means that we do not accept its meaning in the form we inherited it and that new meanings emerge as we seek to change it” (Kac 251-252). The audience participates in the art work by performing a gesture that creates mutation, and this gesture is “the smallest gesture of the on-line world—the click” (Kac 252). In a feedback loop, the interaction between installation and audience demonstrates an attitude by the audience to the meaning of the Biblical scripture: “To click or not to click is not only an ethical decision but also a symbolic one. If the participant does not click, he allows the Biblical sentence to remain intact, preserving its meaning of dominion. If he clicks, he changes the sentence and its meaning but does not know what new versions might emerge. In either case, the participant faces an ethical dilemma and is implicated in the process” (Kac 252).

Mitchell finds caution regarding this kind of participation, and writes of Kac's work that “Perhaps the most disturbing and provocative sort of biocybernetic art, however, is work that does not attempt to represent the genetic revolution but instead participates in it” (327). This participation, which can seem unethical and grotesque to some, is precisely the kind of delivery necessary for an audience which cannot always be seen. And the major point is not that the artist participates in debate, and creates art that participates in the debate (Kac makes his own spirits), but that the art installations require the audience to participate, making them, in part, responsible for delivery.

W. J. T. Mitchell points out a potential problem with a delivery method based on Kac's works: “Kac’s work dramatizes the difficulty biocybernetic art has in making its object or model visible. In looking at the Genesis installation or hearing about the synthetic rabbit, one is basically taking it on faith that the work exists and is doing what
it is reported to be doing. There is, in a very real sense, nothing to see in the work but
documents, gadgets, black boxes, and rumors of mutations and monsters” (328). But
this, of course, is no different than a classical notion of delivery, or any kind of cognitive
research of writing, where the “mind” of the audience cannot be represented as
anything other than a black box, and measurements can only come from later actions
(be it responses or writing practices). That is, even though medical instruments afford
us to see what regions of the brain might be at work when writing/reading/listening/
communicating, this still does not tell us exactly what happens in the mind when one
engages in these activities. The body as a black box, that the deliverer cannot know
what his audience is feeling or experiencing during delivery, only shows to what extent
an audience’s body is a BwO, a blank surface on which the deliverer must attach, or
depending on the method, provide machines that the audience attaches to themselves.
This uncertainly of effect/affect has always been a part of rhetoric at all levels, which is
why rhetoric is an art. And, as Mitchell goes on, “Perhaps this is the point, and Kac’s
work is best viewed in the context of conceptual art, which often renounces visual
payoff. The object of mimesis here is really the invisibility of the genetic revolution, its
inaccessibility to representation. The real subject matter, then, becomes the idea of the
work and the critical debate that surrounds it as much as its material realization. In
response to the predictable objection that the work is a kind of irresponsible ‘playing’
with genetic technologies, Kac’s equally predictable response is that purposeless play is
at the heart of the aesthetic gesture as such” (329-330). Kac’s work allows the invisible

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19 The black box also becomes a metaphor for memory, specifically “accurate” and “truthful” memory such
as that which comes from the “black box” of an airplane. This information records the memory of a crash
or other incident that in turn becomes a post-traumatic delivery-machine.
to become visible, and to allow debate about problems that did not exist. Kac’s work delivers both the problem, as well as a way for the audience to participate in the debate about the problem. In other words, Kac’s works spur invention at the group level, which is nothing other than delivery.

Kac’s work takes on another meaning of delivery, that of giving birth to new species that have become genetically modified. Such mixing of codes provides new kinds of beings, new ways of becoming that did not exist before. Rhetorically, the act of delivery offered the same potential to the Greeks, for as an orator made his case, and mixed affect with logos in different quantities, the collective experience of the speaker/audience birthed a response to a choice—they chose one solution among many to solve a particular problem. They chose a particular way of being in the world. Delivery becomes becoming, and leads toward this being. How a mixing of codes might occur, how a combination of digital media might promote a delivery as becoming, is offered in the next chapter.
I wish to return, for a moment, to the refrain. In the last chapter we see how the doxa of the refrain layers with music, so that the commonplace becomes teleported via the music and invention occurs. Within the context of the shaman’s performance, this happens within a collective experience that fosters group invention, aka, delivery. The shaman becomes an intermediary between the physical and spirit worlds through his use of the drum-machine to create a superhuman rhythm and enter an unconscious trance. The operational feature and variable of this process is the rhythm at which the drum beats. However, I am not interested in replicating the shaman’s rhythm to put ourselves into some hypokritic state, but rather discover what kinds of rhythms new media writing technologies offer that can produce an analogous effect—rhythms that not only operate on the ear, but on the rest of the body as well.

They shaman’s body becomes the rhythm, becomes rhythmic and links the two milieus of the visible and invisible. Kac’s artwork, his gesture, produces a rhythm that links the invisible spirits that haunt his work with the participants that take part in his installations and start to experience those spirits for themselves. However, there are many other possibilities for what mechanisms exist that might foster a delivery within the Internet generally (not just installations produced by artists). Deleuze and Guattari, again, provide a point of departure. In A Thousand Plateaus, the chapter “1837: Of the Refrain,” begins with a plate of a painting by Paul Klee entitled Twittering Machine. In the painting, four birds (an important symbol for the shaman and a logo for Twitter) perch on a handcrank while also chained to it. Birds sing for many reasons, such as to mark their territory, or to express their desire for a mate. These birds, in particular, have
become territorialized and make up a twittering machine with the instrument on which they’ve become attached; and they do not sing, they twitter. Tweet tweet. But what exactly is a twitter? Of a bird, to twitter is an intransitive verb that means “to utter a succession of light tremulous notes; to chirp continuously with a tremulous effect” (“Twitter, v.1”). It also means “to spin or twist unevenly, to make ‘twitty’” (“Twitter, v.2”). As a noun, a twitter is implicated with desire, and so twittering delivers a performance of desire: “a condition of twittering or tremulous excitement (from eager desire, fear, etc.)” (“Twitter, n.1”). However, a twitter is also “an entanglement; a complication” (“Twitter, n.3.c”). And so, like the birds in Klee’s painting, one cannot twitter without also becoming ensnared.

The microblogging site Twitter contains all of these aspects of the definitions for twitter. The service prompts for spontaneous updates of excitement; the @ (which serves as a method of making responses to others public) and hyperlinks create a twitty, and even the nature of the short (140 characters or less), regular posts mimic the short, repeated “tweet tweet” of a bird’s song or the shaman’s drum. And this rhythm is carried across by the @. Deleuze and Guattari indicate that the formal feature of language that best represents the way that desiring-machines connect is the “and.” The “and” provides a method toward linking machines together, to move from break to break in various flows. However, as an image this “and” is best presented by the character @. In the digital internet, the @ provides one of the many points of connection for making delivery-machines. It is not just that the @ serves as the link between sender-

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20 From here on, I will thus refer to delivery-machines as delivery@machines, since the @ provides the signifying connector at both the level of image and code that unifies the deliver, machine, and audience.
receiver, between the recipient and the conduits (email address domains) making such a connection possible, but that it provides the conductor of desire itself, as if it were the indefinite article: “‘A’ stomach, ‘an’ eye, ‘a’ mouth: the indefinite article does not lack anything; it is not indeterminate or undifferentiated, but expresses the pure determination of intensity, intensive difference. The indefinite article is the conductor of desire” (Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus 164).

This kind of linking, with the “at” as an “an” and as an “and,” not only provides a way of connecting, but also one with a vector, projecting a line of flight (in more traditional delivery vehicles, the “arrow” wedged between the “E” and “X” in the FEDEX logo, or the “up” in UPS). We might say the @ gives direction with purpose, if purpose can be taken to mean the striving toward a particular desire. Lacan tells us that the desire expressed by the objet petit a, from where the @ ultimately derives, can never be reached. However, the @ also derives from accounting, and means “at the rate of.” This origin, of course, refers to money, and so fits nicely with Deleuze and Guattari’s theories of how capitalism affects the schizophrenic. But we can also use the @ to indicate the rate at which the machines work, which, as Ulmer suggests as a speed for thinking within electracy, needs to be the speed of light. Thus, delivery needs to occur instantaneously. Ulmer’s flash reason becomes fl@sh reason, for in that flash is direction as well as time, sp@ce time, noting the unique kind of dual space in which delivery now operates (“real” and virtual).

For the Portuguese, the @ historically stood as a symbol for a unit of specific weight (15kg), as in the weight of goods contained in an arroba, a kind of jar. This

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21 Rui Coelho and Joana Fernandez de Carvalho, Portuguese ichthyologists at the Florida Museum of Natural History, state that the term arroba now refers to the @ in Portuguese vernacular.
usage lends credence to the potential of the @ image to serve as an image category for a means of connection, a way of gathering. While typically only two kinds of categories cluster about the current use of @—as the sender/receiver signifier and a signal of presence in the form of a domain address—is it possible that the @ could cluster many other machines around it as well, becoming a kind of BwO clustering different paths of desire, serving as a gathering place. Ulmer’s chora might be thought of as chor@, where @ is the non-place, a space that allows a gathering to occur. The @, then, becomes a point of departure (or arrival) for thinking about how to construct a delivery@machine, not in the limited sense that such a symbol is used to send emails or link usernames on Twitter, but as an important linking component that might be expanded.

Ulmer theorizes the @ as the objet petit a for electracy, which might potentially foster group identity formation: “The object @, joining letter and signifier, preserving a piece of the Real in the Symbolic (discourse). The implication for individual and collective identity formation, in the context of the apparatus, is profound. The electrate category emerges at the opposite pole of the literate one. It is not universal, but is a sinthome, a non-sense letter sported by a particular body” (“Letter l’etre”). The @ is, like delivery, performed, and as a non-sense letter is a remainder that requires a body to which it desires, or creates desire, for the assemblage with a body. Toward this, it is the hole of the unconscious, a black hole that spirals into the singularity. The @ works toward creating a hypokritic form of delivery to unify desire/body/machine. And while not universal for every body, the @ is also Lacan’s empty universal joined to particular bodies and filled with particular desires; the @ has become quite ubiquitous, much as
the invisible spirits of an image society, and serves as a way to trace these spirits (in us): “the @ marks the object (a), the expressible standing in for the inexpressible” (Ulmer, “Corridor Window @ Shands Hospital”).

The T@il

If the @ becomes the expressible image for the inexpressible which is the unconscious (hole), the @ provides a hole, a point of attachment, in which to insert a new machine, a prosthesis for something lost. In the womb, we all have tails. The human embryo continues to grow its tail until about the fourth or fifth week, but around the seventh week of development the tail begins to disappear. The tail is never something that any animal gains, but a body part that humans in particular lose. The human embryo grows out of a tail, which disappears as the embryo continues to develop. However, although we lose most of its physical aspects, except for the few vertebrae that compose the coccyx, do we lose all of the psychological ones? What parts of our tail remain? Do we still try to use our latent tails? For those animals which still have tails, what functions do they allow for that becomes missing for us? We are all conceived with tails, but what kind of conceiving would tails allow?

Besides humans, other animals have found many uses for their tails. Fish use tails for hydrodynamic propulsion, and the thresher shark also uses its tail to stun prey; likewise, alligators and crocodiles use their tails in similar ways. A lizard can use its tail to deceive, fooling a predator into attacking their detachable appendage so that it may escape. The rubber boa also deceives with its tail, using “short, blunt tails that look

22 To see how inexpressive the @ is, as well as the unconscious knowledge it contains, conduct a Google search for “@.” As of this writing, Google cannot find any results for it (nor can Yahoo!, Altavista, or image search results).
almost identical to the head. When threatened by a predator, this snake arranges its
body in such a manner that the tail is exposed while the head is hidden safely beneath
the snake” (Gibbons). Birds may use their tails as a rudder, but also ostentatiously to
attract, such as the elaborate tail displays of peacocks. Squirrels use their tails for
balance as they prance around trees limbs, to help regulate and store body heat, and,
like the bird, as a rudder when jumping. Horses and cows swat flies away from their
rears; the hippopotamus swats dung. Larger tails store fat in addition to their other
functions. One of the main points to take from the tail, then, is that they most often have
multiple uses. And besides providing attunement for balance, motion, temperature, and
hunting, tails also provide a means of telling—tails often become tales. Such tales are
most commonly observed in the dog or the cat.

While the cat can use its tail to communicate commands/requests, like
hypokrisis, what the tail delivers is primarily mood. The cat tail is rhetorical and
becomes a means to deliver, through a visible signal, what the animal cannot express
audibly. The cat’s tail gestures, and what it gestures is a state of mind. If, as I’ve
argued in the previous chapter, we need to lead with our rear and enter cyberspace
backwards, a tail would be useful to deliver the affect necessary for an electrate
hypokrisis. One of the chief kinds of delivery@machines that we might construct is this
tail which can account for affect and deliver a state of mind, and perhaps, like a
scorpion’s tail, inject this state of mind into others. Images can do this already with their
punctums. We need the ability to construct our own prosthetic tails to give us this
power. We need to re-tail ourselves.

23 In the sense that “cybernetics” derives from the Greek word for “steersman,” the tail provides a literal
cybernetic function.
One of the tails that we might incorporate is the @. Besides a jar, an accounting symbol, or its other uses, the @ is also called the monkey's tail in various vernaculars, where the tail section is that which wraps around the indefinite article. The German term, Klammeraffe, refers specifically to the spider monkey and its prehensile use of its tale in its New World arboreal habitat. The spider monkey, like many monkeys, uses its tail as another hand with which to grasp branches or other objects as it moves about the rainforest. As @ refers to Ulmer's theory of the object @, the tail of the @ grasps the unconscious hole in the middle, providing a shield to hide the hole in the “a,” but also to offer a secret point of entry, a cyclical maze or crypt-like structure that opens the possibility for discovery. The process of attaching a prosthetic t@il does not involve starting at the hole, but with the t@il itself, working toward the unexpressible. One familiar with prosthetics, using the body to deliver, and who has been able to construct a prototype for the t@il model is the cyclist/anti-cancer advocate Lance Armstrong.

Lance T@il(str)ong

Lance Armstrong was delivered like most of us, in the usual way, with only a modest array of medical cyborg assemblage, and without a tail. Some vaccinations, a doctor monitoring him with various scanners, and the regular series of vaccinations was probably Armstrong’s only venture into becoming (more) posthuman. And, as the suburban cliché often goes, his next major transition toward cyborgification came via the form of bicycle, which he received at age seven and reportedly rode from Plano, Texas, to the Oklahoma border, having to then call his mother to pick him up after having ridden too far. Since these initial deliveries, however, Armstrong has constantly attached himself to other machines to form more complicated assemblages. In fact,
one might say that Armstrong has become nothing but machine ever since receiving his first bicycle.

While true for most professional athletes, cyclists live as cyborgs in very conscious and sophisticated ways. More than a runner, swimmer, or ballplayer (broadly construed), a cyclist and his relationship to his bicycle might only be historically outcyborged by athletes who perform by operating more complex forms of machines, such as cars.\(^{24}\) However, the integration of body/machine in cycling is more intimate. As Ted M. Butryn and Matthew A. Masucci write, “Bicycle racing has a long history of embracing technology in the pursuit of results. As much as any sport, in fact, cycling has been at the forefront of technological innovation. The sport of cycling has seamlessly integrated many of the technological advancements that have developed over the past 30 years, including the utilization of composite aerospace materials, temperature-adjusting clothing, and sophisticated electronic communication devices” (128). The power for the bicycle derives from the body, and the body becomes one with machine through an elegant connection at the pedal system, where the cyclist clips-in his shoe cleats and locks into the body/bicycle machine. The cyclist makes use of a heart rate monitor as well as a power meter to provide cybernetic feedback in the mode of second-order cybernetics. Always an endurance sport, the cyclist must not push too hard too early or for too long, so readings from internal monitors, regarding power output in the body via the heart, or external readings from the power output within the wheels’ torque, allow the cyclist to monitor his outputs which become inputs, helping the

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\(^{24}\) Now, nearly every sport has taken increased advantaged in technology to increase performance. For example, Michael Phelps has adopted a swim suit made with NASA developed technology that decreases his hydrodynamic drag. My point is not that no other sports use technology, but that cycling has a more proactive, visible history of doing so.
cyclist regulate his or her effort. The cyclist also has other smaller machines: lactate meters to monitor the rate at which he produces lactic acid; oxygen deprivation tents to simulate atmospheric conditions at high altitudes; VO2 max testing equipment that determine the maximum rate that the lungs deliver oxygen to the blood; wind-tunnel testing to perfect aerodynamic positioning; global position navigation devices; two-way radios to communicate with other cyclists and personnel in the team cars that follow the riders (“team directors, while looking at the live television feed on a laptop computer, can communicate with their riders through tiny transmitters called ‘earbuds’ and direct tactics from several miles away” (Butryn and Masucci 128), creating another pathway of cybernetic feedback; the usual array of safety equipment such as helmets, gloves, sunglasses, high-tech clothing (that can wick sweat away from the body and bend the wind to one’s advantage); and, of course, like many athletes who participate in team sports, cyclists have a larger assemblage of team mates, coaches, mechanics, doctors, and financial sponsors. And since “Project ’96,” a program to move technology in cycling to a new level of sophistication, “the dominant ethos of the sport became tied with technological progress, and although individual athletes still claimed ownership of authentic ‘natural’ selves, the collective identification was anything but natural” (Butryn and Masucci 129).

Butryn and Masucci trace Armstrong’s particular relationships with technology and identity formation, and offer that from “a top bicycle racer, to a patient, to a survivor, to a father, to a multiple Tour de France champion,” Armstrong’s cyborgification through technology “is infused in his self-narrative and the ways that Armstrong relates to his own physiological identity through technological means” (125). Butryn and Masucci
notice that beyond the bike and the technology that integrates him into a larger machine, Armstrong focuses back into his body itself. As Armstrong writes in his autobiography, “I did computer calculations that balanced my body weight and my equipment weight with the potential velocity of the bike in various stages, trying to find the equation that would get me to the finish line faster than anybody else. I kept careful computer graphs of my training rides, calibrating the distances, wattages, and thresholds. Even eating became mathematical” (224). Armstrong became notorious for weighing his food, making sure that his caloric intake was even or below his expenditures: “I measured my food intake. I kept a small scale in the kitchen and weighed the portions of pasta and bread” (224). As Armstrong earlier writes of cyclists, computers, and biofeedback: “Cyclists are computer slaves, we hover over precise calculations of cadence, efficiency, force, and wattage. I was constantly sitting on a stationary bike with electrodes all over my body, looking for different positions on a bike that might gain mere seconds or a piece of equipment that might be a little bit more aerodynamic” (65).

More analogous to NASCAR than sports such as football, basketball, or baseball (the holy trinity of American sports), cyclists peddle/pedal their wares as their chief job, displaying them openly, constantly (not only in off-field endorsements), and at (relatively) high speeds. Covered with logos, cyclists become a literal delivery@machine, caught up in the flows of both the peloton and capitalism, showing off the brands of multiple corporations who provide the sponsorship for the cyclist’s desire to race and compete (which are themselves symptoms of a capitalist system). Cyclists use their body/machine to display and deliver desire in others—and if someone
famous like Armstrong, they use their celebrity—creating a hypokrisis that is the
fundamental feature of marketing/advertising. Cyclists, by design, become image
categories on mobile billboards that travel tens of thousands of miles every year across
six continents. And like a triptych billboard that can rotate advertisements, or animated
banners on website that can cycle among different products, the peloton of
moving/shifting cyclists becomes a rotating cycle of commercials. As the cranks and
wheels turn, as different cyclists take turns drafting and rotating through the pacelines,
the images rotate as well. The peloton literally becomes a delivery@machine.

“Ironically, though not surprisingly considering, among other things, the increasing
corporatization of professional cycling, the contemporary professional cyclist has
become but one cog in the wheel of successful performance” (Butryn and Masucci 129).

The capitalist logic of the schizophrenic imbues the cyclist’s logic of breaks and
flows, for cycling tactics include schizzing off from the peloton and “breaking away,” or
later rejoining the group to “go with the flow” and save energy. Cyclists integrate their
BwO into other machines, using these machines as prosthetics for movement, for
hearing, for seeing, for sweating. And while they may perceive that they race for
themselves, or for teammates, for a paycheck, or even for their team, they instead race
for the sake of integrating with the system, to deliver desire via machine: “A violence
without purpose, a joy, a pure joy in feeling oneself a wheel in the machine, traversed
by flows, broken by schizzes” (Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus 346). Or, as
Armstrong writes: “It would be easy to see the Tour de France as a monumentally
inconsequential undertaking: 200 riders cycling the entire circumference of France,
mountains included, over three weeks in the heat of the summer. There is no reason to
attempt such a feat of idiocy, other than the fact that some people, which is to say some people like me, have a need to search the depths of their stamina for self-definition. . . . It’s a contest in purposeless suffering” (220). But of course, their racing does have purpose, for it supports capitalism in general, which seizes the cyclists’ desire, delivers it back to him in its own form, and perpetuates itself: “Oh, to be sure, it is not for himself or his children that the capitalist works, but for the immortality of the system” (Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus* 346). July becomes almost a national holiday for France, and besides the riders’ sponsors, the Tour itself requires sponsors and becomes a sporting spectacle in the most Debordian sense of the term. The fact that the Tour de France occurs on open roads and is free to the public (anyone can stand along the racing route and watch the riders whiz by) only illustrates how deterritorialized capitalism has constructed the sport.

Despite his claims of being anti-conformist, Armstrong, as a cyclist, participates in this spectacle. He wears the brand of his title sponsors and appears in commercials for the pharmaceutical companies that produced drugs used to save his life. Moreover, he sometimes seeks out these sponsors, trying to craft more intimate relationships with them, for their delivery of desire—in his case—was fully successful. Of his association with his long-time sponsor Nike, Armstrong writes: “My relationship with Nike went back to when I was a high-school runner and a triathlete, and thought their progressive messages were cool and their athletes the most hip. But I never figured I’d be a Nike guy, because I didn’t play in Dodger Stadium, or Soldiers Field, or Roland Garros—instead I played on the roads of France, Belgium, and Spain. Still, when my career took off, I asked Bill Stapleton [his lawyer/agent] to see if he could get me a Nike deal
because I yearned to belong to their company” (127). Nike did offer Armstrong an endorsement contract, right before his cancer diagnosis. Armstrong called Scott MacEachern, his Nike representative, expecting that many of his sponsors would desert him after hearing about the illness. But the flows of capitalism never quit, perhaps playing the bet that if Armstrong could survive, their combined brand would have even greater appeal: “Well, don’t worry about us . . . We’re with you” (Armstrong 127), since, as Butryn and Masucci conjecture, “Armstrong’s survivorship has enhanced both his hero status and his worth as a commodity to be consumed by the masses” (141). Armstrong’s main sponsors, Nike, Giro, and Oakley all paid out their contracts to him, and Armstrong’s lawyer arranged for Oakley to cover his health insurance, which was callously dropped by his new-would-be team Cofidis, a French team whose sponsor, ironically, provides money-lending services. Armstrong was/is fully integrated into the flows of capitalism, which would finance his reconstruction. “So don’t talk to me about the cold world of business . . . I’ll be an Oakley, Nike, and Giro athlete for as long as I live” (Armstrong 128).

After calling his sponsors, Armstrong used the spectacle of the press conference as the delivery vehicle to announce his cancer. On October 2, 1996 (which Armstrong has begun to turn into a brand: “10/2”), Armstrong discovered his he had cancer, and a few days later announced that he had stage 4 testicular cancer that had spread to his lungs and brain. Given less than a 40% chance of survival, Armstrong underwent a series of surgeries (removal of testicle, removal of brain tumor) and chemotherapy. Although Armstrong kept a rigorous surveil(lance) of his own body, he did not realize that he had cancer until very late. Why did he miss it? How, despite the fact that his left
testicle swelled to the size of an orange, did he not consider that he had an evil spirit inside of him? Where was his self-knowledge? Butryn and Masucci notice this incongruity: “Of course, the cruelest irony of elite athletes’ self-surveillance and their policing by doping agencies is that, regardless of the intimate relationship with their internal physiology, they are still able to deny the most obvious signs that something might be wrong with their own body” (132), which is often the case because of a cyclist’s tolerance of— and sometimes desire for—pain. “In Armstrong’s case, one of the reasons for the late detection of his cancer was his own failure to recognize that the swelling in his testicles needed immediate attention. This, too, relates to his sense of traditional and rigid conceptions of masculinity that prohibit open displays of vulnerability and that often prompt men to resist seeking medical treatment” (132-133). As Armstrong explains, “What makes a great endurance athlete is the ability to absorb potential embarrassment, and to suffer without complaint. . . . If it was a suffer-fest, I was good at it” (24). And as Butryn and Masucci continue, “Armstrong paints himself as a glutton for punishment and as someone so hardy that in any contest of attrition, on a bike or on a hospital bed, he could be the only survivor” (134). But this relationship to pain comes with a price. As Andrew C. Sparkes writes,

In dissociating from itself, the disciplined body also ceases to feel pain as its own. For example, in considering the various ways in which male athletes respond to pain and injury in sport, White, Young, and McTeer (1995) highlight how they employ particular ways of thinking and speaking about pain that depersonalize this experience and objectify the body. With regard to the latter, attention is focused on a local anatomical part and not on the body as a whole. Thus, the knee or the shoulder is injured, but this injured body part is not explicitly acknowledged by the athlete as his or her own. (400)

The pain from the tumor, he felt, was just another obstacle to overcome, just another discomfort to try and bear along with road rash, saddle sores, fatigue, etc. Such foreign
bodies were not Armstrong’s and did not affect him-as-whole. And this is precisely why Armstrong did not notice the tumor. His cycling metaphysics knows pain exists, but tries to avoid feeling it.

Of course I SHOULD HAVE KNOWN THAT SOMETHING was wrong with me. But athletes, especially cyclists are in the business of denial. You deny all the aches and pains because you have to in order to finish the race. It’s a sport of self-abuse. You’re on your bike for the whole day, six and seven hours, in all kinds of weather and conditions . . . and you do not give in to pain. Everything hurts. . . . So no, I didn’t pay attention to the fact that I didn’t feel well in 1996. When my testicle became slightly swollen that winter, I told myself to live with it. (5, emphasis in original)

Armstrong tried to become blind to pain, and thus became foolish to pain (ATH). He could no longer incorporate its signals into his account of self-knowledge. His focus, what he noticed, where the physiological effects of his body on and off the bike, but he did not notice the affect of training, both the emotional and physical trauma that caused a hole in his whole. Armstrong’s Being ignored this aspect of the world to foster becoming cyclist.

However, once Armstrong had to contend with the cancer, his attention to physiological details transferred to his treatment: “Before cancer, he kept track of his VO2max and hematocrit level in a highly organized effort to improve performance. During his chemotherapy treatment, however, his self-surveillance efforts were aimed at merely surviving” (Butryn and Masucci 131). And, as Armstrong writes: “When Latrice [his nurse] came in to give me the chemo, no matter how sick I was, I would sit up and be as attentive as I could. ‘What are you putting in me?’ I’d ask. . . . By now I could read a chest X ray as well as any doctor could, and I knew all the terms and anti-nausea dosages” (136). However, rather than seeing Armstrong’s attention to every physiological detail as a symptom of a Western suppression of the body—an attempt to
master and control it—we might view his fixation differently. Armstrong instead uses the tools of Western science and medicine to perfect his ability to “play” with his body: “Armstrong views his body as a playground for manipulation and his internal physiological markers as variables to be monitored” (Butryn and Masucci 130). While this kind of control gave Armstrong the organization and analysis necessary to survive cancer, it also becomes an art. Armstrong becomes a master at writing (on) his own body, adding and tweaking elements in a second-order cybernetic fashion to meet his own (performative) aesthetic desires. While Eduardo Kac implanted a microchip into his own body, Armstrong was delivering other elements, to tweak his body and deliver his desire to perform better and win, even if that desire is embedded within a capitalist ethos. Armstrong traces the “markers” that trace within his body in order to refine his “canvas.” “For Armstrong, tweaking is an art form, and on his cyborg body-as-canvas, his multiple lines of identity intersect with his engagements with various technologies to construct a sense of self that, unlike many sport heroes who seem to view themselves as monoliths of modernity, is overtly fractured and postmodern” (Butryn and Masucci 139). And like Kac’s work with *Time Capsule* and *GFP Bunny*, while some of the traces that Armstrong composes are visible and can be accurately calculated or measured through secondary prosthetics such as scanners, lactate meters, or simply a clock to indicate race results, other marks that he writes, such as neuromuscular facilitation (muscle memory), stay invisible underneath the skin.

Cancer marred the original work Armstrong thought he was creating/performing. By surgeons, he became marked via the scar at both his genitals and head. His body was written on by others, externally and internally via doctors, disease, and the harsh
metal cocktail of chemotherapy. Armstrong’s body, as he understood it, was no longer autobiographical (if it ever was), but instead biographical, a situation he laments: “One thing they don’t tell you about hospitals is how they violate you. It’s like your body is no longer your own, it belongs to the nurses and the doctors, and they are free to prod you and force things into your veins and various openings” (125). Of course, as a professional athlete, Armstrong’s body was never his own since he is paid for its input/output. But like Kac’s more communicative works, Armstrong’s body becomes an intermediary between certain problems facing the medical and cycling communities, such as those surrounding cancer treatment, patient treatment (in all the ways that “treatment” might be understood), use of pharmaceuticals, doping, uses of technologies on the body, etc. All of these issues, in one form or another, become marked on Armstrong’s body. And while the brain and muscle memory offers one site of invisible marks, the blood provides another site in which a more visible language occurs: “There was an odd commonality in the language of cancer and the language of cycling. They were both about blood. In cycling, one way of cheating is to take a drug that boosts your blood cell count. In fighting cancer, if my hemoglobin fell below a certain level, the doctors would give me the very same drug, Epogen” (Armstrong 92). While delivery often involves placing or tapping judgment underneath—doctors, anti-doping officials, and Armstrong himself retrieve the knowledge contained in blood via hypodermic needles and create hyperkritical possibilities.

Besides the mechanical machines, Armstrong also embraces the technology of the narrative. In his autobiography, It’s Not About the Bike: My Journey Back to Life, Armstrong recounts his childhood, pre-cancer professional career, contending with
cancer, and then his post-cancer comeback to win the Tour de France. This autobiography contains some of the standard elements of the hero’s quest: Armstrong experiences a tough upbringing as the son of a single, 17-year-old mother; he experiences hardship through an abusive (to himself and his mother) step-father, whom he challenges in oedipal fashion; he receives a gift (the bike) and discovers his talent at using it; he faces setback and almost loses everything once cancer attacks him; during the cancer treatment, he journeys to the underworld and conquers death (as evidenced in the subtitle, “My Journey Back to Life”); once healthy, Armstrong must make a choice whether he will return to cycling or not, and becomes a reluctant hero; he gains the magic tool (one could choose for many, some would say doping, but he identifies this as cancer, which gave him a new threshold for suffering); with the help of a wise sage (his coach Chris Carmichael), he learns new techniques and skills; he takes on a sidekick/mentor in his director Johan Bruyneel, and together they venture to a far land and win the battle. Sometimes Armstrong frames the enemy as cancer, but in general, Armstrong uses a version of the classic hero’s tale to understand and present his experiences, a tale that resonates widely: “Armstrong’s story has been inspirational on a number of different levels, and he is often branded as ‘heroic,’ not only for overcoming cancer despite grim odds but also for helping to temporarily restore the dignity of the disgraced sport of cycling through his improbable victory in the Tour de France” (Butryn and Masucci 137). But this narrative is just another part of his larger delivery@machine: it is the cybernetic element that helps to program and deliver another element of judgment underneath the skin in addition to the regular flow of chemicals associated with racing a bike. Thus, the story Armstrong presents is not
about the bike (although it is about/around the bike)—it’s about the machine of narrative that integrates another layer onto the already complex assemblage he engages in for his profession.

If Armstrong’s subject is about this machine of narrative, the object falls back to his body and the traces it contains: “the body is recognized as a site of autobiographical knowledge, as well as a textual surface on which a person’s life is inscribed . . . the body is a site of autobiographical knowledge because memory itself is embodied” (Sparkes 398). Similarly, in The Wounded Storyteller, Arthur Frank (also a cancer survivor) explains that the body leads the narrator toward a particular story of its trauma: “People certainly talk about their bodies in illness stories; what is harder to hear in the story is the body creating the person” (27). Armstrong does not develop his body—his body develops the stories he is able to tell: it starts to grow him a tail. Considering this, Sparkes writes that “the story told reflects strong cultural and personal preferences, and different kinds of bodies seem to be drawn to, or propelled toward, stories of a particular kind” (402). In Stephen Spielberg’s Jaws, the scene on the Orca between Hooper and Quint (with Brody as observer) illustrates this point. The autobiography of the body and its traces (scars from shark bites) influences how Hooper and Quint read their marks and how they in turn craft their narrative. As Frank writes, “different bodies have ‘elective affinities’ to different illness narratives. These elective affinities are not deterministic. Bodies are realized—not just represented but created—in the stories they tell” (52). Armstrong has many stories from his many crashes, but the ones his bodies focus him on are those surrounding cancer: his missing testicle; his chemically burned
establishes this focus of body on the second page of his autobiography:

If you saw my body underneath my racing jersey, you’d know what I’m talking about. I’ve got marbled scars on both arms and discoloured marks up and down my legs, which I keep clean-shaven. . . . Cancer was like that. It was like being run off the road by a truck and I’ve got the scars to prove it. There’s a puckered wound in my upper chest just above my heart, which is where the catheter was implanted. A surgical line runs from the right side of my groin into my upper thigh, where they cut out my testicle. But the real prizes are two deep halfmoons in my scalp. . . . Those are the leftovers from brain surgery. (2)

While Armstrong begins with some typical scars from road rash on his arms and legs, he mentions them only to provide a triangulating reference for moving to his scars from cancer. These wounds, in turn, summon Armstrong to create a narrative based on their particular problem, cancer, which becomes a larger ecological problem when we consider a body that extends beyond its “natural” limits, a body that extends through its assemblages, yes, but also its connection to other organisms via ecology as well as social connections. Armstrong’s body mirrors the way that Kac consciously creates stories with self-inflicted trauma in order to expose some of these questions that Armstrong was summoned toward against his will (as is the case for most shamans). As Eduardo Kac states about his body’s role in *Time Capsule*, the body becomes an intermediary, an interface, to raise and address those questions and solutions that remain hidden from view. For Armstrong, his body becomes shamanistic, or in rhetorical terms, hypokritic, providing the means for addressing and resolving problems.

As part of this process, as part of the judgment that comes from his *hypokrisis*, Armstrong calls upon his scars to testify. Sparkes describes this as one of Armstrong’s chief narrative strategies: “The truth Armstrong seeks to construct with this early reference to the scars on his body signals a tactic he calls on frequently throughout his
autobiography. This tactic involves calling on the body’s testimony as an act of witness” (405). The witness speaks with the experience of having been on the scene, and typically relies on the sense of sight (the eyewitness). However, to testify at the level of the body typically requires not the sense of sight, and not of telling, but a sense of being: “the illness witness also speaks from having been there, but his testimony is less of seeing and more of being. . . . Illness stories are told by bodies that are themselves the living testimony; the proof of this testimony is that the witnesses are what they testify” (Frank 140). Armstrong’s narrative fully integrates with his body, so that the two essentially become one. Rather than simply recount a narrative, Armstrong—again like the shaman—must perform the story through his Being. His being must be shown as a recreation of his becoming. Luckily for his ethos, he has the scars to prove it.

Arthur Frank identifies three narrative strategies that generally surround narratives of illness. One, the restitution narrative, is “the most prominent and culturally preferred narrative in Western cultures” (Sparkes 403). The basic plotline: I was healthy, now I’m sick, but tomorrow my health will become restored. In general, failure is never an option in this narrative, for its strategy “outdistance[s] mortality by rendering illness transitory” (Sparkes 403). This kind of narrative creates the body as primarily physiological in nature, or, as Sparkes writes, like a machine: “Within the story, the body tends to be viewed as a machine in need of fixing. The temporarily broken-down body becomes an it to be fixed, and the self is dissociated from the body” (403, emphasis in original). In practice, this narrative is also that of the shaman’s community: The society was well, but a spirit has made it sick; however, the shaman will help us find an answer and help us restore it back to normal. Western cultures prefer this narrative because it
reaffirms that we can fix any of our multiple assemblages: “the purpose that restitution narratives aim toward is twofold. For the individual teller, the ending is to return to just before the beginning: ‘good as new’ or status quo ante. For the culture that prefers restitution stories, this narrative affirms that breakdowns can be fixed” (90).

In contrast, the chaos narrative never assumes the positive outcome of the restitution narrative, and always acknowledges the contingency that events can go very badly: “Often, the ill person telling chaos stories defines himself or herself as being swept along, without control, by life’s fundamental contingency. Efforts have been made to reassert the predictability of the former body-self, but these efforts have failed, and each failure has had its costs. Therefore, although contingency is not exactly accepted, it is taken as inevitable” (Sparkes 403). Thus, while the shamanic community generally wants the narrative to become restitutive, the fact that they require a shaman often belies their expectations, for the community turns to a figure that can often seem (given their sometimes reported schizophrenic behavior) a bit chaotic himself: “Thus, the characteristics of chaos stories are disorder, distortion, fragmentation, threat, anguish, and uncontrollability” (Sparkes 403).

Alternatively, the quest narrative integrates elements of both of these plots, working for a solution amid contingent problems. This is the story of the hero, as already described in Armstrong’s particular case. As Frank explains, “quest stories meet suffering head on; they accept illness and seek to use it. Illness is the occasion for a journey that becomes a quest. What is quested for may never be wholly clear, but the quest is defined by the ill person’s belief that something is to be gained from the experience” (115). We know what Armstrong believed he gained, but the listener—as
he or she hears the gears turning in the narrative machine—gains something as well: “It is important that quest stories are about being transformed and the teller being given something by the experience of illness that is then passed on to others in the telling” (Sparkes 404). Whatever Armstrong gained, he passes on some small part of that to others through telling his narrative. He delivers a magic tool to the listener that in some way aides them in their own endeavors, just as the shaman delivers critical information (a tool) that helps his community.

In this narrative, not only does Armstrong undergo the hero’s journey, but he also suffers the classic initiation experience of the shaman. To recall, during their initiation a shaman’s body becomes disassembled and rebuilt in a very gruesome process that reduces him or her all the way down to the skeleton. Armstrong’s doctors removed his evil spirits (the tumors), dug below the skeleton into the brain, and sent their own spirit helpers (chemotherapy) to help cure and rebuild him. As Armstrong tells us, “I left my house on October 2, 1996, as one person and came home another. . . . I returned a different person. In a way the old me did die, and I was given a second chance. . . . Even my body is different, because during the chemotherapy I lost all the muscle I had ever built up, and even when I recovered it, it didn’t come back in the same way” (4). And like many shamanic stories of initiation, the process was painful: “To race and suffer, that’s hard. But it’s not being laid out in a hospital bed with a catheter hanging out of your chest, platinum burning in your veins, throwing up for 24 hours straight, five days a week” (Armstrong 243). This process lasted for weeks-to-months, and had drastic effects on his body that, while temporarily leaving him ill, ultimately made him better as a cyclist: “There was one unforeseen benefit of cancer: it had completely
reshaped my body. I now had a much sparer build. In old pictures, I looked like a football player with my thick neck and big upper body, which had contributed to my bullishness on the bike. But paradoxically, my strength had held me back in the mountains, because it took so much work to haul that weight uphill. Now I was almost gaunt, and the result was a lightness I’d never felt on the bike before. I was leaner in body and more balanced in spirit. . . . I became very good in the mountains” (Armstrong 224). Cyclists often excel in the mountains when they achieve a high strength-to-weight ratio. After treatment, Armstrong retained most of his strength, but lost several kilograms of upper body muscle, sculpting him from his previous career as a triathlete (with bigger shoulders and arms for swimming) into a leaner, more efficient cyclist. Philosophically, Armstrong came to understand his cancer as something beneficial: “So if there is a purpose to the suffering that is cancer, I think it must be this: it’s meant to improve us” (273). Armstrong’s shamanic initiation experience left him with the greater ability to perform what all shamans must: the ability to ascend, to fly. Armstrong was becoming Legstrong, and he could now soar. But he was also losing his blindness, his $ATH$, and learning to listen to his body as it made these transformations. Thus, Armstrong became attuned, and wished to spread this kind of attunement to others.

Armstrong also serves as an intermediary for how we might understand our own being-cyborg. Butryn and Masucci offer that “an alternative read of Armstrong’s story positions him as a cyborg figure who signifies important notions of postmodern identity, eschewing any conception of core self throughout his book, and who articulates simultaneous and often competing lines of identification: cancer patient, professional athlete, father, quasi-scientist, and even self-as-formula, all of which are thoroughly
infused with various cyborg processes” (138). If this is the identity formation of a cyborg, it is also that of the schizophrenic: a switching back and forth between various flows. And while Armstrong’s book “is not” about the bike, the bicycle functions as Armstrong’s drum—the bike opens a portal that grants Armstrong a means of entering into a shamanic state, entering another world. As a cyborg, the bike simply becomes a machine of desire; but as a shaman, the bike provides a delivery@machine that, like the drum, Armstrong beats against to produce a superhuman rhythm. As stated earlier, the shaman must usually strike his drum @ 3.5-4 beats per second, or 210-240 beats per minute. How does Armstrong produce such a rhythm with his bike? One of the technique improvements Armstrong made after cancer was to increase his pedaling cadence, the rate at which he spins the crankset to which the pedals attach. He now spins the crank at a specific 110 rotations per minute (controlled, cybernetically, through a cadence sensor), well below the shaman’s rate. However, we should not look at the crankset itself, but at the individual strikes, which are made by two feet, so that the actual rhythm of Armstrong’s feet is closer to 220 pedal strikes per minute. But Armstrong has a secondary rhythm, a secondary beat: the heart beat. At its maximum, Armstrong’s heart can beat at over 200 bpm. While his bike might not transfer its effects through his ear, it does produce a rhythm in the body when used, transferring its effects via other organs. The beat Armstrong produces as he stamps on the pedals of his bike-body delivery@machine returns as hypokrisis: Armstrong auto-delivers. And like the shaman’s machines, Armstrong’s bike facilitates an altered state of consciousness when played at its maximum rhythm: “Cycling is so hard, the suffering is so intense, that it’s absolutely cleansing. You can go out there with the weight of the
world on your shoulders, and after a six-hour ride at a high pain threshold, you feel at peace. The pain is so deep and strong that a curtain descends over your brain. At least for a while you have a kind of hall pass, and don’t have to brood on your problems; you can shut everything else out, because the effort and subsequent fatigue are absolute” (88). While Armstrong initially shut out pain, to his own detriment, he has learned to listen to it, to let it in—to notice it. Like the pain he discovered from his shamanic initiation via cancer, Armstrong returns to pain, receives the signals of the body and instead shuts out the brain. Armstrong learns to think below the neck, so to speak. He learns to feel, but his preferred feeling is one of pain. Thus: “Once, someone asked me what pleasure I took in riding for so long. ‘Pleasure?’ I said. ‘I don’t understand the question.’ I didn’t do it for pleasure. I did it for pain” (88). Armstrong’s pleasure is pain, and his pain is pleasure; this interplay allows him to bypass his brain and think with his body. Armstrong uses his machine to rev up his body and propel it into this altered state, a state that offers him emotional clarity. By tapping on the pedals, Armstrong taps into another affective element of his Being that he cannot access otherwise.

As Armstrong becomes a shamanic figure, Cycling itself has always served as a medium of some sort, and the origins of the Tour de France trace back to the newspaper L’Auto, which, to help increase the sales of its newspapers, held the race as a form of marketing. The maillot jaune, which is the yellow jersey worn by the overall race leader, was yellow to represent the yellow-tinted newsprint of L’Auto (similarly, in Italy’s grand tour the Giro d’Italia, the race leader’s jersey, the maglia rosa, is pink to signify the pink newsprint of La Gazzetta dello Sport). In this same vein, Armstrong has
primarily competed on teams sponsored by some sort of communications technology. Armstrong began his professional career on the team Motorola, sponsored by the well-known telecommunications company. After cancer, he joined the United States Postal Service cycling team, an organization immediately implicit with the ways we typically understand delivery (not to mention the suburban cliché of the bicycle paper route). After the USPS cut sponsorship, Armstrong secured funding from the Discovery Channel network, moving from mass mailing back into mass communications via TV. And currently, Armstrong has rebuilt a team sponsored by the omnipresent electronics store RadioShack, which has turned its business model from hobbyists of ham radio in the ‘20s to the booming market of smart phones today. From print (L’Auto) to electracy, cycling and Armstrong demonstrate the trajectory toward new media and their preoccupation with the latest technologies.

In the midst of this larger cycling mediation of images, brands, and sponsorship, Armstrong becomes another conduit, another flow, a communicator that operates through the medium of the bicycle that gives him access to using the society of the spectacle that he would not be able to otherwise. And the key to entering the spectacle is not only his image(s), but also the narrative of his hero’s quest. To return to Armstrong’s question about how he was saved (via himself, science, or spirit), he responds “I don’t have the answer to that question. Other people look to me for the answer, I know. But if I could answer it, we would have the cure for cancer, and what’s more, we would fathom the true meaning of our existences” (271). Armstrong understands that he becomes a resource for people needing answers, just as the shaman provided a problem-solving resource within his or her culture. As Frank
explains, “the quest narrative tells self-consciously of being transformed; undergoing transformation is a significant dimension of the storyteller’s responsibility. . . . Quest stories of illness imply that the teller has been given something by the experience, usually some insight that must be passed on to others” (118). This passing on is telepathic, and occurs via hypokrisis: Armstrong certainly offers advice on how to advocate for oneself during cancer, but his ultimate message comes at the level of affect, helping others to adjust their state of mind and feel that the restitutive and quest narratives can come into being, a being that becomes learned through “acts of extrospection” (Sparkes 414) in which the “unfinished project is a new vision of oneself in a previously unimagined relation to others” (Frank 170). This passing on is also rhetorical. Armstrong has certain information (broadly construed) to convey to an audience to help them make a decision, just as a speaker like Demosthenes might offer a new way of understanding a problem in the community (this is why we should attack Philip of Macedonia). Armstrong’s passing on is delivery, hypokrisis. He is a shaman that occupies a particular liminal space and can see (feel) into two realms. Moreover, just as the shaman is often reluctant to serve in this role (the shaman is always called to service, for the painful initiation alone puts many off), so Armstrong shows some hesitancy at trying to serve in this capacity. However, Armstrong very much understands his role as that of a deliverer: “I can deliver motivation, inspiration, hope, courage, and counsel, but I can’t answer the unknowable” (271). Armstrong does not have to answer the unknowable, just deliver the invisible and help the larger community address the @.
As Sparkes argues, Armstrong adopts a variety of these narrative strategies at different stages of his life, and he also shifts through how he identifies with and understands his body. These ideal body types are utilized to solve various problems, and each one carries its own problems as well. A Frank posits, “being a body always involves certain problems, and each body problem is a problem of action” (Sparkes 399). Pre-cancer (pre-shaman), Armstrong adopts two body types. One is the disciplined body, for which the “medium is regimentation, and the model is the rationalization of the monastic order. This kind of body seeks to make its performances predictable though following specific regimes” (Sparkes 399). The problem for this body is that of control, and Armstrong becomes disciplined by controlling his body through a specific training regimen as well as utilizing his tools of cyborgic self-surveillance to enforce this control. Moreover, as we have already seen concerning Armstrong’s blindness to pain, “With regard to desire, the disciplined body is lacking, in that it only comes to know itself in the practice of the regimen” (Sparkes 400). Finally, while he integrates technologies with this own body, Armstrong becomes mostly detached from other bodies: “This body becomes isolated in its own performance, even if, as in many sports, the body performs among others. The disciplined body, therefore, may be among others but is not with them” (Sparkes 400).

Armstrong also employs the dominating body, for which “the medium is force, and the model is war” (Sparkes 400). Obviously, in any competitive sport, domination is required, and Armstrong thoroughly enjoyed dominating. Because this body remains alert for dangers and unfamiliar situations which threaten its dominance, it is “constantly aware of its own contingency” (Sparkes 400). An athlete, unless stricken with severe
hubris, always has the fear of defeat; they always know that the probability of defeat largely outweighs their chance of victory, and so they must rigorously train to improve the chances for a winning outcome. In a sport such as cycling, where instead of 1-on-1 or team-on-team, a cyclist faces 1-on-200, the odds dramatically decrease. Thus, this body focuses more on others than the disciplined body, but this focus is mostly one of suspicion and aggression, so that “it is against others rather than for others” (Sparkes 400). Like the disciplined body, the dominating body is also detached from itself, which makes inflicting pain onto others, as well as onto the self, more tolerable.

The mirroring body constructs itself at the surface, but creates that surface by examining others, so that the chief step in this process is consumption: production occurs via consumption. As the individual finds something that they like, they try to recreate their own image in such fashion. “Ultimately, via consumption, the mirroring body attempts to recreate the body of the individual in the image of other bodies. The primary sense is visual. This kind of body sees an image, idealizes it, and then seeks to become that image” (Sparkes 401). Such a body is perhaps more electrate than the other two bodies above, creating an identity more associated with the brand or logo rather than control and domination. Although Armstrong certainly uses the disciplined and dominating bodies as an ideal type, he also utilizes the mirroring body, and his cycling kit is adorned with icons and logos for others to consume as well, perpetuating the mirroring image cycle (any and all puns intended). Such a body is much more interrelational than the disciplined and dominating, although conversation occurs not (just) in words, but at the level of the image.
Finally, throughout his narrative Armstrong shifts toward a communicative body, one of the messenger. As Sparkes explains, the communicative body is “a body in process, creating itself through constructive interaction with others. It is important that its contingency is not a problem but a possibility. In terms of desire, the communicative body is producing, and this is expressed in terms of other-relatedness in the form of dyadic sharing” (402). The communicative body is one of assemblages, of networks, and of producing, coupling with and joining with desiring@machines. Before receiving the magic tool from his donor/doctor, Armstrong first received a condition placed upon the oncologist’s gift to him: “He wanted to talk with me about the larger implications of cancer. He wanted to talk about the ‘obligation of the cured.’” It was a subject I had become deeply immersed in. I had said to Nichols [his oncologist] and LaTrice [his nurse] many times over the last months, ‘People need to know about this.’ As I went through therapy, I felt increasing companionship with my fellow patients” (154). Armstrong realizes that his own body must become a conduit, a gateway to delivering this news to others. While at first reluctant to the initiation, he becomes obsessive in his desire to stop the disease (it gets under his skin), a desire he needs to spread to others. Armstrong begins this practice while still in the hospital by visiting children facing the disease, sharing his own bout with the disease, or inquiring into other patients’ treatments, trying to offer advice. “This sharing signals the emergence of a communicative body acting for others and connecting in a dyadic fashion with them rather than acting against others” (Sparkes 415).

It seemed to help them to know that an athlete was fighting the fight alongside them. One afternoon LaTrice pointed out that I was still asking her questions, but the nature of them had changed. At first, the questions I had asked were strictly about myself, my own treatments, my doses, my particular problems. Now I
asked about other people. I was startled to read that eight million Americans were living with some form of cancer; how could I possibly feel like mine was an isolated problem? “Can you believe how many people have this?” I asked LaTrice.

“You’ve changed,” she said, approvingly. “You’re going global.” (155)

Armstrong begins to identify with a larger collective, a collective that might be, as he was, dumb to their own bodies’ signals. Armstrong was going global, thinking beyond the limits of his own cancer, his own body, to those of others. He had fully felt the call that summons the shaman to serve. Armstrong’s next task was to devise a way to network with those cancer patients so that he could deliver to them what he knew, as well as those without cancer, so he could deliver to them what he felt.

Moreover, as Armstrong begins to train after cancer and “as Armstrong becomes increasingly involved in competitive sport,” and again “develops the characteristics associated with a highly disciplined and dominating body” (Sparkes 420), these bodies never fully replace the communicative body he had developed. In fact, Armstrong’s racing becomes subordinate to his goals of delivering his knowledge about cancer. One of the first ways Armstrong sought to network himself toward this delivery was through a bicycle charity event called “Ride of the Roses.” He also launched the Lance Armstrong Foundation [LAF], a charitable organization that donates money to cancer research, outreach, and direct care, and has since involved itself with every aspect of cancer treatment. During his post-cancer workouts, Armstrong was significantly out of shape, and even after regaining much fitness was unsure of his desire to return to professional cycling. Armstrong had to be “called” back to this profession by his management team (to get their own flow$ going again as well), who “called on aspects of his communicative body-self and its need to be for others by raising money for his cancer
foundation to motivate Armstrong to race again in the second Ride of the Roses. Their appeal also focuses on the exterior, or mirroring aspect, of Armstrong’s body that both looks and is unfit, thereby acting as a source of embarrassment to his foundation” (Sparkes 417-418). While Armstrong would rediscover a desire of winning, his principle driving force involved becoming a messenger about cancer. As his friends sought to embarrass him regarding his current body image, Armstrong realized that he needed to craft that image if he were to maximize his outreach. And the only way to craft that image, to reestablish an assemblage with those who could help him deliver (mainly his corporate sponsors), was to return to the professional cycling peloton.

This image and narrative that Armstrong created gave him access to a significant number of media/entertainment outlets, ones that he (as if they were his spirit helpers) repeatedly called on. Thus, to aid in his delivery, Armstrong relied on the traditional alliances between celebrities and the media. As reflected in the list of his team sponsors, Armstrong has always been conscious of the media’s role in both his sport and in constructing his celebrity. Whenever possible, he has used the media to advance his own agenda, whether to fight doping allegations (whenever a story argues or suggest that he has doped, Armstrong calls a press conference or appears on television) or promote LAF. When his image spread to the coveted Wheaties box, Armstrong “asked if we could hold the press conference in the children’s cancer ward at the same hospital where my son was born” (272) using his celebrity and the surrounding media attention to provide another flow towards his own goals. Not only does Armstrong adjust the breaks/flows of his internal and external composition,
decomposing and recomposing himself toward his cycling profession, but he has also
developed a schizo’s logic for how to bite back at the media to further his own desires.

Furthermore, Armstrong fostered relationships with other celebrities, other
images, so that their joint assemblage might offer more possibilities. But rather than
working with and reaching out to celebrities who are actors, musicians, or politicians,
which as a cyclist he might rarely come into contact with, Armstrong brings the
celebrities to him, becoming hypercelebrity, a shaman-figure for celebrities, despite his
hypocelebrity status. While an act like U2 draws in their audience, Armstrong also
draws in his audience, including U2: “Armstrong’s popularity reaches far past the cancer
community, and numerous celebrities have publicly praised his accomplishments. Of
the more notable examples, comedian Robin Williams incorporated Armstrong into his
latest HBO standup production, and Bono, the lead singer of U2, stated that Armstrong
‘awakens in America the idea of the impossible made possible’” (Butryn and Masucci
142 n.5). Armstrong summons others necessarily because of a shared experience of
battling cancer, but also by delivering a universal signifier that anyone can fill with their
own particulars. Armstrong does not just make the impossible seem possible, he
makes the invisible visible through an image category, a brand, that signifies a state of
mind. Instead of a brand (image category) that goes on a t-shirt (although it shows up
there too), Armstrong placed his on yellow rubber wristbands (or, wristbands) under
the LAF’s alias LIVESTRONG. Nearly ubiquitous, Armstrong created this campaign to
raise money for his eponymous foundation, and the campaign was/is so successful that
LIVESTRONG became the new pseudonym, the new identity, for LAF. And this
branding is literally de-livery. At the end of every Tour de France stage, jerseys (yellow,
green, polka-dot, etc.) are awarded for different race classification categories (overall, sprinting, mountains, etc.). Behind the jersey presentation façade, a worker makes use of a machine to press the sponsor’s brand of the rider’s team onto the jersey for the jersey presentation that happens after the stage has finished. Such a machine is sometimes referred to as a livery machine, and literally becomes a delivery@machine, pressing the livery down (“de”) onto the jersey. A definition of livery is “something assumed or bestowed as a distinguishing feature; a characteristic garb or covering; a distinctive guise, marking, or outward appearance” (“Livery, n.1”), and can also be a “distinctive colour scheme and design on a vehicle, product, etc., indicating its owner or manufacturer; (also) an emblem or device having the same function” (“Livery, n.2.d”). The team kits worn by cyclists have liveries and are liveries, and while the backstage machine de-livers, so do the riders as they download their sponsor’s brand through various electronic interfaces.25

But more than just marketing, Armstrong’s livery, his b®and, has become totemic. From all walks of life, the wristb®and identifies one as someone who “is a friend of mine,” because they are a fellow cancer patient/survivor/family member/supporter/etc. These wristbands obviously sport the message to “live strong,” but also become tied with a singular message that Armstrong’s narrative eventually promotes: Hope [hOpe].26 At one point in his narrative, Armstrong describes his survival as itself of a cyborg nature, consisting of part human, part, machine, but also

25 To the extent that new media offer a possibility for hypokrisis, a judgment below, I propose reversing the standard use of “download” and “upload” when discussing transfer or electronic files. We download into the collective unconscious of cyberspace, and we upload (retrieve) its information from down below.

26 In instances where “hope” is written as “hOpe,” the “O” signifies the contour of the wristbands and the interlinkages contained between the image/concept.
part something else: “The question that lingers is, how much was I a factor in my own survival, and how much was science, and how much miracle?” (Armstrong 271).
Armstrong brings in the divine, or more appropriate here, spirit, as part of the reason for his survival. He and his doctors were not the only ones working on his body, but as on the shaman, spirits were at work as well. And what did the spirits leave when they were finished? What new identity did Armstrong possess that he did not before? “Maybe, as my friend Phil Knight says, I am hope” (Armstrong 265). The spirits left Armstrong’s body ravaged from his initiation, but left him, like Pandora’s jar, with hOpe. Armstrong became a container, a category, for the emotional state of hOping which was placed under his skin. To place hOpe under the skin of others, Armstrong uses his brand identity not only to promote literate messages, but affective ones as well. While the LIVESTRONG manifesto advocates the “practical” aspects of cancer, such as “Planning for surviving. Banking your sperm. Preserving your fertility. Organizing your finances. Dealing with hospitals, specialists, insurance companies and employers” (“The Manifesto”), it focuses in greater measure on mood: “Attitude is everything. . . . We help you accept the tears. Acknowledge the rage” (Livestrong.org). Armstrong’s wristb®ands deliver a state of mind around which he collects/organizes a group. And like the @, the O (the shape of the band, the “O” in hOpe) provides telelinks that create a larger delivery@machine, and also becomes the hole of the unconscious that past approaches to cancer failed to account for.

However, what exactly is hOpe? Hope is sometimes expressed as a “faith” that something will happen, but also a “wish” for something to happen. Hope is “Expectation of something desired; desire combined with expectation” (“Hope, n.1”). The state of
mind that Armstrong delivers is implicated in desire, so that his delivery@machine floods with desire and is already a desiring-machine. Armstrong injects hOpe (hypokrisis), he downloads hOpe, but also taps into the hOpe already in his audience, so that they can upload it and make use of it toward their particular purposes. This latter method is much more efficient because, like the enthymeme which relies on shared cultural knowledge that the audience already has, it relies on shared emotions, shared pathetic knowledge that gathers the audience; Armstrong uses Guattari’s pathetic logic, “which is the sort operating in group subjects” (Ulmer, Electronic Monuments 16), to cluster an audience and think through/with the pathetic elements of the “cancer” problem. Thus, as Rick Reilly wrote of Armstrong in 2002 when Sports Illustrated named him the “Sportsman of the Year,” Armstrong has become a “hope machine” (71).

Armstrong’s hOpe@machine runs most efficiently through his avatar. As Ulmer explains, the term avatar was “adapted to cyberspace to name one’s online persona” from the original Sanskrit avatara, for which the “original usage referred to the incarnation or human appearance of a deity, particularly Vishnu, in Hindu mythology” (“Avatar”). The avatar does not represent any single element of the online persona, but “has come to include every aspect of one’s online representation, from the icon on a blog, or an email signature to the figure one plays in Second Life. ‘Avatar,’ then, is a practical point of entry for theorizing the emergence of the new identity experience of electracy, that is supplementing and displacing ‘selfhood,’ the identity formation of literacy” (“Avatar”). Armstrong constructs a @tail and online presence to construct a brand identity becoming avatar, which is at the core of his delivery. As Ulmer further explains, the etymology of avatara includes “ava, down + tarati, he crosses over.” The
avatar = delivery: both involve a crossing down, a movement into the @. And, punningly enough, the ava (down) in Sanskrit and the ává (rate) in Greek can both be expressed by the @, which, through the avatar also links the individual with the collective through the process of identity formation: “The third dimension of a language apparatus (after technology and institutional practices) is identity formation, individual and collective. The term covering the site of new identity experience in electracy is avatar” (“Avatar”). Armstrong’s avatar joins the individual and collective toward a group invention (delivery).

Moreover, cancer becomes Armstrong’s nemesis that incorporates into his avatar, a foreign spirit that crossed down and incarnated his body, such as the spirits in shamanic cultures that possess its members. As Ulmer relates, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Von Schelling defines nemesis, one of the five “personal deities accompanying each individual at birth” as when “something hidden that should have remained secret is brought to light.” In addition to Daimon, Anake, Eros, and Tyche, “The fifth personal spirit was Nemesis, Retribution (righteous indignation), representing a principle of measure in the cosmos: nothing in excess” (“Unheimlich”). For Armstrong, his cancer was in excess, out of measure with his computations, and would not remain hidden—no matter how much he tried to ignore it—and grew, metastasized, and became a problem that he had to solve. In terms of rhythm, Armstrong’s cancer changed his measure. Armstrong grew to hate cancer generally (cancer in all forms), and his cause is one of retribution, as he frames his conflict in terms of a fight. Moreover, especially as relates to Armstrong’s chief state of mind that he aims to deliver, Nemesis becomes replaced with hope:
Goethe translated “Daimon” as “Limit” (Grenze), as part of the updating of this cohort of forces or powers, and replaced Nemesis with Elpis (Hope). The rationale for this switch perhaps was to clarify that Nemesis as a personal spirit promised through retribution the possibility of redemption. The drive of Nemesis as measure is to expose whatever violates measure. Its own disproportion is that the retribution is triggered automatically and without the possibility of negotiation or consideration of mitigating circumstances. (Ulmer, “Unheimlich”)

For Armstrong, any cancer is bad cancer, creating this automatic response indicative of Nemesis. Hope, then, becomes Nemesis as understood by Goethe, for to Hope is to have a state of mind in the mode of Nemesis, to expose the cancer that violates the body’s measure. Thus, the fifth personal spirit drives the desire to perform the fifth canon of rhetoric.

The avatar, to the extent that it contains all the components of one’s online persona, might be better stated here as @v@t@r, since unlike the t@il in Twitter or Facebook alone, the @v@t@r necessarily contains many t@ils. The @v@t@r contains multiple t@ils, multiple lines of flight to facilitate hypokrisis. However, each t@il of the @v@t@r, or the total number of t@ils it contains can be long or short, many or few. In The Long Tail, Chris Anderson describes a new and developing business model for internet retail sales which entails selling less of any particular good and instead offering more types of products. As Anderson differentiates between “old” media and new media, the former “can bring one show to millions of people with unmatched efficiency. But it can’t do the opposite—bring a million shows to one person each. Yet that is exactly what the internet can do so well” (5). The internet can deliver the “everything else,” the non-hits that typical broadcast media and brick-and-mortar stores cannot because of economics: “The simple picture of the few hits that mattered

27 If we use the full Sanskrit version, avatara, then the tail letter becomes another t@il: @v@t@r@.
and the everything else that didn’t is now becoming a confusing mosaic of a million mini-markets and micro-stars. Increasingly, the mass market is turning into a mass of niches” (5). Micromolarities are becoming the norm. And these micromolarities cluster together to form what Anderson calls the “Long Tail,” which, although they do not sell as many quantities as the “hits” that make up the head, in aggregate they can potentially add up to a greater mass: “The onesies and twosies were still only selling in small numbers, but there were so many of them that in aggregate they added up to a big business” (9). The Long Tail, by adding the prosthesis to the head, allows a way to make the invisible visible: “Many of these kinds of products have always been there, just not visible or easy to find. They are the movies that didn’t make it to your local theater, the music not played on the local rock radio station, the sports equipment not sold at Wal-Mart. Now they’re available, via Netflix, iTunes, Amazon, or just some random place Google turned up. The invisible market has turned visible” (6). The Long Tail aggregates, for it is an aggregate, and in doing so makes the formerly microscopic noticeable.

Connecting to the market/economic implications of the Long Tail, the form of “tail” in words such as “detail” and “retail” refers to its meaning of “cut,” specifically to cut up into pieces. In contrast to wholesale, mass produced goods become cut up and distributed to smaller retail outlets. Armstrong, like the schizo/shaman, cuts off pieces from their flows, he schizizes them and assembles those cut pieces into his delivery@machine forming his t@il. Armstrong delivers himself in small quantities, he re-tails himself, not (always) as a whole body, but as organs, as micromolarities of the whole. Implicated in this schizophrenic logic of the cut, of biting off bits and reattaching
them, is desire. Our missing tail that we lose in the womb becomes the fetish object which, in a group, becomes totemic. The Long Tail is also the long(ed for) tail. And this tail can be long: “What’s truly amazing about the Long Tail is the sheer size of it. Again, if you combine enough of the non-hits, you’ve actually established a market that rivals the hits” (Anderson 22-23). So long, in fact, that it extends to infinity. As mentioned earlier, Klammeraffe derives from the German name for a spider monkey; its scientific genus, ateles, translates to “without end.”

Linking various social network sites, logos, email signatures, brands, etc. all add up and create a long tail(s) for the @v@t@r, which, in terms of delivery, makes distributing that persona more efficient. To deliver his @v@t@r, Armstrong assembles it in the form of a long tail. In addition to the macrocomponents of media conglomerates and celebrity bodies that he brings into his assemblage, Armstrong adds the microcomponents as well. While part of this microaspect of his Being consists of Armstrong’s concentration of his chemical/physiological makeup, Armstrong has also assembled himself digitally. Thus, Armstrong has recently focused on complementing the traditional press with new media networks. As Josh Catone writes, “In their endeavor to create that network of cancer support and awareness, LAF has also thoroughly embraced social media tools. Armstrong himself is one of the top Twitter users, with over a million followers, but the Foundation also maintains an active social media presence. From a regularly updated blog, to MySpace, Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter accounts, LAF is all over the social media map” (Catone). Armstrong creates an assemblage that resembles Anderson’s Long Tail, whereby Armstrong spreads his @v@t@r across a broad array of cyberspaces, networking them into a
intricate rhizome so that “in addition to merely having a presence on top social networks, the Lance Armstrong Foundation is actually putting these tools to use in innovative ways that allow them to run the organization’s web community more efficiently and emphasize organizational goals” (Catone). As an example, Catone notes that a “clever way that the foundation uses social media to streamline their operations is their use of social bookmarking site Delicious,” which “also powers their news feed on the main page of their site” (Catone). Brooke McMillan, the “Online Community Evangelist” for LAF, “scans the headlines for cancer-related news, which she adds to the account. That feed is then syndicated to the news section of the foundation’s web site” (Catone). Armstrong’s foundation, through its ability to adapt the digital codes to its purposes, provides a better shamanic function and becomes a medium for cancer patients and their problems. Armstrong, through the LAF component of his @v@t@r, becomes a collective shamanic identity, and toward integrating with those patients, “probably spends most of its attention on its Facebook and Twitter communities, which serve as an extension of the organization’s mission of creating an atmosphere of support for those affected by cancer” (Catone). Again, although LAF offers practical information at the level of logos, it also attempts to provide a pathic approach to a patient’s situation. “The organization uses its Facebook fan page as a way to directly connect with cancer survivors on a personal basis, and encourages them to share stories on the discussion boards. According to McMillan, people on the site have come together and organically formed a support group” (Catone). Armstrong’s @v@t@r provides a way for him to become a new media sh@m@n.
But for an even faster, more efficient delivery system, LAF has relied on Twitter for a more rapid rhythm “to spread news and awareness, and by following search topics, reach out to people facing cancer treatment” (Catone). Twitter has not only allowed quick distribution to others, but from others as well, creating more participation from Twitter followers and then appropriating and spreading those causes as if their own: “LAF has used its social media presence to help spread awareness for other worthy causes. For example, earlier this year when blogger and social media guru Drew Olanoff was diagnosed with cancer, he started the Blame Drew’s Cancer campaign” (Catone). The Olanoff’s campaign benefits “the American Cancer Society and the Make A Wish Foundation, but it raises cancer awareness as well, so LAF helped promote it via their Twitter account. That gesture illustrates that the Lance Armstrong Foundation really understands the collaborative nature of social media” (Catone). Armstrong’s delivery requires this audience participation, and like Kac’s work, the Internet allows for delivery to occur at an increased rate, a faster rhythm. And again, delivery as hypokrisis makes use of the narrative: “For the Lance Armstrong Foundation, social media tools have provided an amazing new platform for connecting with people, and helping to empower cancer survivors to tell their stories and connect with one another” (Catone). Through his reading of Barthes’s study of discourse, Colin Gifford Brooke supports my assertion that delivery, especially new media forms (although probably including most instances of delivery), require this audience participation:

The instance of discourse . . . not only includes the reader, but assigns to the reader a great deal more responsibility than criticism of the time presumed. To put it another way, the model against which Barthes is writing is one where an Author delivers ‘reality’ to a passively consuming reader through the medium of
language. Much of his subsequent work helps to demonstrate that ‘reality,’ as portrayed by even the most ‘realist’ of French authors, is indeed performed in the instance of discourse, and that performance relies heavily on the readers’ faculties. (177)

The performance of delivery, then, mandates audience participation. Even the mundane examples offered earlier require someone to answer the door for the delivery driver, or to pick up the newspaper off the front lawn. Armstrong’s model also requires delivery participation, and he uses this requirement to his advantage. For most of Armstrong’s audience, this participation happens without their noticing (it happens unconsciously), and the audience empties the signifier Armstrong presents, “hOpe,” and fills it with their own particular. Thus, in a capitalist/schizophrenic move, flows of signification become deterritorialized and can be appropriated by anyone in a spot of difficulty, not just those with cancer. Armstrong attracts those with many other kinds of illnesses, as well as the families of those with illnesses, or simply those compelled by Armstrong’s restorative and quest narratives. Armstrong constructs an image-text that not only images himself, but allows others to imag(in)e themselves as well. If the audience of Armstrong’s t@il participates in the mirroring ideal body type described by Sparkes and Frank, then that mirror becomes two-ways, so that the audience’s participation also occurs in the middle voice, for they, latching onto Armstrong’s t@il, begin to write themselves.

And the audience participates in Armstrong’s t@il in other concrete and performative ways than just initial act of—to augment the term middle-voice—middle-sight. One method whereby LAF connects with its audience is to establish and sponsor sporting events around the world, such as cycling rides, running races, triathlons, etc. However, rather than offer much in the way of logistical support, LAF mostly offers its
Local members of the communities, instead, take responsibility for promoting and directing the events, and so LAF can have multiple events occur simultaneously, networking in ways that would be impossible for a single foundation to do alone. LAF then provides feedback to those participants by using new media to incorporate them into its brand, letting them assemble and connect with Armstrong's flows. “For example, LAF uses its Flickr account as a way to pull in photos from supporters at various events. When they held a contest asking people to show off the coolest place they’d taken their iconic yellow Livestrong wrist band, they used Flickr to collect entries, and received 400 in just 3 days. By asking entrants to tag their photos in a special way, [McMillan] was able to easily bring all the entries together on the organization’s Supporter's page” (Catone). One might say that such a practice establishes a hegemony on who gets to create the conversations on cancer (LAF), but Armstrong offers a possible practice for establishing larger collectives all focused on solving a particular problem (which, after all, is the goal of delivery). As Ulmer writes of hegemony in an electrate age:

Hegemony is revised for poststructural theory by Ernesto Laclau, whose description of the empty universal and its isotopy with Lacan’s object @ and the commodity sign show the point of application of flash reason in contemporary society. Avatar shifts the role of Prince and Party to the distributed sage, whose witness and decision are correlated in the KaChing database interface. Contemporary emancipatory politics proposes that it is possible to sustain democracy in the absence of a “people” (a unified body politic), through the transformation of the crowd into a multitude. (“Hegemony”)

Using a logic of capitalism/deterritorialization and tapping into their audience's desires for “hope,” Armstrong creates this multitude, a distributed sage, by creating the conditions whereby the audience can easily participate in and “mirror” all aspects of his narrative, whether this participation includes the unfortunate diagnosis of cancer, or
coming back from disease/hardship/suffering to take on greater challenges than one thought possible pre-cancer. Armstrong’s tail stretches long, allowing as many people as possible to wear his livery for themselves and make it their own.

Ultimately, in order to deliver, Armstrong must perform—not only on the bike, but also as image. Rather than the mundane ways we have come to understand “delivery,” such as those of newspapers and pizzas, Brooke argues for the intransitive use of delivery in new media as a performance rather than the delivery of an object, a thing [although, as he qualifies, on the Internet “there are plenty of examples of each kind of delivery” (171)]. For Brooke, “a model of delivery restricted to the physical distribution of commodities is insufficient for an understanding of new media,” since the things, or as Richard Lanham terms “stuff” and “fluff,” require considerably more performance to create, often now as a prosumer using Web 2.0 applications, the same platforms used by Armstrong to perform his avatar. For Armstrong, his performance is always intransitive. If he “delivers” with a win, he delivers no stuff, only intangible relationships, associations, and contingent concepts. But regarding his Livestrong project, Armstrong’s success at delivery is not giving something, but getting it: money to support his foundation’s goals—redirecting the flows into his organization. What he does deliver, this hope, is itself not a thing; but even if we think of hope as fulfilling a transactional function, the hope that he constructs is so empty as a signifier—it has such a big hole—that it is essentially based in performance only. Armstrong injects hope by performing hope, leading to hypokrisis. This performance occurs, like for the shaman, in the middle voice. Brooke examines Roland Barthes’s essay “To Write: An
Intransitive Verb?” to point out the way that a writer constructs him or herself in the act of writing, and so the act of writing is done to oneself:

The meaning or goal of this effort is to substitute the instance of discourse for the instance of reality (or of the referent), which has been, and still is, a mythical “alibi” dominating the idea of literature. The field of the writer is nothing but writing itself, not as the pure “form” conceived by an aesthetic of art for art’s sake, but much more radically, as the only area for the one who writes. (144)

As I offered in the previous chapters, delivery also works in this middle voice, for the act of delivering to the community must always be a delivery to oneself, in varying degrees (whether its Ayers’s or The Edge’s music, or Kac’s new media installations). For Armstrong, he becomes written as he performs on the bicycle. Or, we might say that Armstrong becomes im@ged as he rides, and further imag(in)es himself as he constructs his @v@t@r, becoming @rmstrong. Thus, the @v@t@r can be delivered transitively, but best works—individually and collectively—intransitively: “Playing one’s avatar is to electracy what writing an essay is to literacy. The point addressed by the theory is that an avatar is not merely the appearance of one’s representation, since through interactivity and even telepresence, I am t/here with my image” (Ulmer, “Avatar”). This performance takes us back to the dancing that Quintilian warns against when delivering, or the shaman/audience dances used without such reservations; such performance/dance applies to a delivery based on affect. In his performativity, in the process of delivery, Armstrong “dances on the pedals” to the song of his own name, “LA LA LA LA LA LA.” His heart beats @ 201bpm, his cadence spins @ 180rpms, and while his bike moves forward, his t@il extends backwards. He not only dances, but he d@nces: pl@ying with his body and his @v@t@r, all a delivery@machine. He LAFs as he attempts to destroy his Nemisis c@ncer, a hole thoroughly embedded in his
unconscious. A mole’s tail allows it to find its way backwards into its tunnel as fast as it can move forward, and so Armstrong’s tail allows him to move back into his own hole in the center of @. He enters cyberspace with his posterior, and does his duty.

Armstrong provides a model, a tale, which like his universal Hope, we can empty and fill with our own particulars. We need to develop a practice (which might more or less exact than the way Armstrong has) of re-tailing ourselves and learning to think with the tail, not only to think with the unconscious, but to do so on a collective level, and thus establish a new practice of delivery.
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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Sean Morey was born in Okinawa, Japan, and grew up in the Florida Keys. He received his Bachelor of Arts from the University of Florida in English (2002) and classical studies (2003), and a Master of Arts in English (2005). He received his Ph.D. from the University of Florida in the summer of 2010. He has published on the interplay between environmental and visual rhetorics in *Ecosee: Image, Rhetoric, Nature* (co-edited with Sidney I. Dobrin, SUNY P 2009), and is currently working on a visual rhetoric textbook for Fountainhead Press. He also designs and maintains the Ichthyology Division’s Web site at the Florida Museum of Natural History, including the Web site for the International Shark Attack File and various other shark conservation organizations. As an update to the last time he has written a biographical sketch, Sean plans to continue working on theories of electracy and ecossee, has caught his elusive grand slam (July 2005), and will train for the Leadville 100 and Badwater 135 instead of the Tour de France.