LANGUAGE REVITALIZATION AND IDENTITY POLITICS: AN EXAMINATION OF SIRAYA RECLAMATION IN TAIWAN

By

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To my Siraya family and friends, and my grandparents
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Abstract of Dissertation Presented to the Graduate School of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

LANGUAGE REVITALIZATION AND IDENTITY POLITICS: AN EXAMINATION OF SIRAYA RECLAMATION IN TAIWAN

By

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Chair: M. J. Hardman
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In this inter-disciplinary research, I combine anthropology, linguistics, and political science in search for a comprehensive understanding of the relationship between language and identity politics. With a triangulation approach, I examine the historical development of language policy and planning in Taiwan, the contemporary discourse of Chinese as well as Taiwanese nationalism, and the identity narratives I collected from several persons of the country. I also conduct a detailed analysis of the linguistic structure of Mandarin and as a result develop an emic analysis of its discourse of national identity. Then I apply the approach and the analysis to the evaluation of the Siraya Continuation program led by Tainan Pepo Siraya Culture Association, in which I have personally participated. The result shows that language, culture, and identity are truly intertwined and they mutually influence one another. In addition, I analyze how the different languages and cultures surrounding the modern Siraya people, i.e., Siraya, Southern Min Taiwanese, and Mandarin Chinese, affect the native activists’ effort to reclaim their indigenous mother tongue and native identity. I point out some problematic areas that demand
special attention. In the end, I offer ways for the Siraya people to redirect their effort in the future.
CHAPTER 1
LANGUAGE ECOLOGY OF TAIWAN

Introduction

Several decades ago, linguist Einar Haugen observed that “most language descriptions are preaced by a brief and perfunctory statement concerning the number and location of its speakers and something of their history. ….linguists have generally been too eager to get on with the phonology, grammar, and lexicon…” (Haugen, 1972: 325). This treatment, he worried, does not do justice to the languages, and more importantly, to the speakers, for a language is not a living organism that functions independently of its users, and “the true environment of a language is the society that uses it as one of its codes” (ibid: 325). Hence, he proposed the “ecology of language,” which is a linguistic approach to the interrelation between the speakers of a given speech community and the larger environment that incorporates insights from anthropology, sociology, political science, and psychology. In particular, Haugen encouraged the undertakers of such an approach to perceive the problems from the native community’s perspective. He further suggested that, as such, language ecology should go beyond descriptive science and see its applicability to social movements (ibid: 329). Today, Haugen’s observation remains true: most linguists still pay minimal attention to the sociopolitical environment that affects the livelihood of a speech community they study. However, as will be reviewed in Chapter 2, some have also taken his suggestion and moved on to what Florey et al. (2009) call “language activism.”

In this research, I examine the languages of Taiwan and the environment surrounding them, with a special focus on the interrelation between language and identity. Therefore, this research as a whole is about the ecology of language. In particular, I dedicate the main parts of my work to the people called Siraya, an indigenous group to which I personally belong, whose
ancestral language has been dormant, or sleeping, for over a century. However, the language is awakening, as the people are becoming more aware of the uniqueness of their own heritage. My main goal is hence to investigate how this newfound self-awareness has motivated, shaped, and affected the outcomes of Siraya language reclamation.

Chapter 1 serves as background information for the readers. I provide a concise summary of the history of Taiwan, the languages, and the number and location of their speakers. But I also supplement the inorganic cold facts and numbers with exciting sociopolitical events that have real impact on the peoples, their lives, and their languages. In Chapter 2, I review the literature from several academic disciplines and sub-disciplines that all contribute to the study of the relation between language and identity, and to language ecology, in different ways. Chapter 3 discusses the research methods I have employed for this study, which mainly include critical discourse analysis (CDA), anthropological linguistics, and ethnography. Chapter 4, THE CO-CONSTRUCTION OF NATIONAL IDENTITY IN TAIWAN, is where I analyze both the top-down and bottom-up identity discourses within a CDA framework. I hope it to broaden as well as deepen the background information in Chapter 1 such that it would prepare the readers for the appreciation of Chapter 5. Chapter 5 is the focal point of this dissertation where I discuss various aspects of the present day Siraya movement that concern language revitalization and identity reclamation. I also detail my personal involvement in this movement, such as the roles and tasks assigned to me by my people, and their expectations of me as a “heritage linguist” (Crippen, 2009). The main body of Chapter 5 is my attempt to braid the identity discourse of Taiwan and the Siraya experience together. Finally, I conclude in Chapter 6, showing how the Siraya identity is awakened via the realization of linguistic activities.
First of all, I would like to clarify that in most parts of this dissertation, when I write about Taiwan I speak of it as a place where the lives of ordinary people take place. This place of living differs from the legal organization whose definition and operation are controlled only by the powerful individuals who adhere to the ideology of nationalism. Hence, when necessary, I would follow the convention in political science, distinguishing “country,” as a place, from “nation-state,” as an artificial political entity (e.g., Koenigsberg, 2008; Smith, 1995). Also, as a consequence, the account I am presenting below does not accord with the national history given by the government of today’s Taiwan, that is, Republic of China. The latter is history in the textbook that starts with a mythical Chinese origin 5,000 years ago in Mainland China, which then moves on to include Zheng, Qing, among other imperial dynasties, and ROC, but excludes the indigenous Austronesian Taiwan, Dutch Taiwan, and Japanese Taiwan. Until the late 1990s, it also excluded historical events that could impair the image of the ruling Chinese Nationalist Party KMT, such as the 228 Incident that took place in 1947. My account, on the other hand, is local-centric. It not only begins with the Austronesian origin but also locates the indigenous peoples in different periods of time. In this way, I believe, the complexity and diversity of Taiwan the place would be better represented.

Taiwan Prehistory

Taiwan Island as a place was already inhabited by human beings as early as 6,300 years ago. Archeological evidence derived from comparing numerous sites in Asia suggests that the predecessors of this first group of Taiwanese people came from South China. Historical linguistics, on the other hand, while agreeing with archeology that these people belong to the

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1 Based on Neolithic artifacts found in Da-Beng-Keng.
cultural-ethnic group Austronesia, is unable to identify any Austronesian root on the Asian Mainland. In fact, linguistic findings suggest that Taiwan is the original homeland of the Austronesian peoples, who now reside in the vast region of Pacific Ocean\(^2\) (Blust, 1988). Many words and phrases just presented in this paragraph have generated strong political connotations and are used in the *nationalistic* debate concerning the Taiwanese identity vis-à-vis the Chinese identity, as discussed in Adelaar (2005) and Ku (2005). Later in Chapter 4 I will come back to this debate. It suffices now to conclude that Taiwan is originally an Austronesian place and any account of its history and/or cultural composition should always address the Austronesian indigenes first.

**The Dutch Period (1623-1661)**

The written history of Taiwan begins in the 17\(^{th}\) century, left by the employees and Calvinist missionaries of the Dutch East India Company (*Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie*, or VOC). They named the island Formosa, after a Portuguese sailor exclaimed *Illa Formosa* ("beautiful island") when he spotted the island from the sea. The crew landed on Tayouan in 1623, an inlet that is now part of the Tainan City located on the southwest coastal plain, home of the Siraya people. Back then, Taiwan was still mainly an Austronesian place\(^3\); only a few people on the west side of the island had contact experiences with the traders and/or fishermen from China, Japan, Malaysia, and the Philippines. According to Brown (2004), the initial intention that VOC seized Taiwan was for its geographically strategic location: the Dutch hoped to utilize Taiwan as a middle point for them to compete against the Han Chinese from Fujian of Southeast

\(^2\) I will provide further explanation of the Taiwan-as-Austronesian-origin hypothesis in the next section.

\(^3\) Brown (2004: 37-39) estimates that the indigenous population of Taiwan in the 1650s was somewhere between 64,000 and 68,000 and the immigrant Han population around 15,000.
China, the Japanese, and the Portuguese who then controlled Indonesia. But soon they realized that Taiwan was a lucrative land, and hence they established Fort Zeelandia in Tainan as an administrative center for controlling (the western part of) the island. The Dutch were pleased with the deer skins they acquired from trading with the indigenous Siraya people, but they deplored the “nonproductive” indigenous agricultural practice, which today may be praised for sustainability\(^4\). After some futile attempts to persuade the indigenes into mass agricultural production, around the 1630s the Dutch started inviting Han male farmers from Southeast China to the island to cultivate rice and sugarcane. The Dutch also applied various taxes on the indigenes and the Han (Brown, 2004: 38-40). Because the Han participated more in cash economy, they might have felt the taxes to be particularly heavy, which in some way led to the East India Company’s losing Taiwan to Zhen Cheng-gong in 1662.

Also, the historical archives of this period document the first language contact experience between the Dutch and the Siraya indigenes, which, unsurprisingly, shows a mixture of negative and positive evaluations. For example, in a 1623 VOC document, an anonymous author wrote, “Their language sounds pleasant, modest, measured, and extraordinarily graceful, so that judging them in this respect you would not think them to be savage but to be outstandingly wise men [sic], filled to the brim with modesty and virtue.” (Blussé et al., 1999: 18); but the Dagregister Batavia reported in February 1624, “It is a broken and mixed language” (Blussé et al., 1999: 30). Later, in 1625, a request was made by Missive Governor Martinus Sonck in Taiwan to Governor-General Pieter de Carpentier in Holland to ask him send ministers to Taiwan, “so that

\[^4\] General Missive, 1626: “They [the Siraya] are a disorderly…, lazy, and greedy people” (Blussé et al., 1999: 47). Discourse by the Reverend Georgius Candidius, 27 December, 1628: “Although they possess [sic] plenty of good, rich, and fertile soil, nevertheless they do not cultivate or sow more than the need themselves for their daily subsistence.” (Blussé et al., 1999: 114)
the name of the Lord will be spread in these parts and the barbaric [sic] inhabitants of the island may be numbered among the Christians” (Blussé et al., 1999: 40). These missionaries then learned the Taiwanese indigenous languages Siraya and Favorlang for missionary purposes. Moreover, Reverend Daniel Gravius developed a Siraya writing system based on Roman letters and published The Gospal of St. Matthew in 1661 (Campbell, 1996 [1888]). According to Adelaar (2005) and Macapili (2008), until the early 19th century the Siraya people were still literate in this Roman writing system.

The Zheng Period (1662-1683)

Zheng Chenggong (1624-1662) defeated the Dutch and took over Taiwan in 1662. Chenggong was born in Japan as the first son of an Okinawan mother and a Southern Min5 Han father. Her name is seldom mentioned in history, and her native culture and ethnic identity are never thought to be important to Zheng Chenggong. Until today, Zheng Chenggong is considered solely as a Han person.

Chenggong’s father, Zheng Zhilong, was at the beginning a pirate leader in South China Sea. He surrendered to Ming Dynasty (1368-1644), an empire established by the Han people in Mainland China, and served as a navy commander. Despite the fact that in 1646 Zhilong defected to Qing, a Manchurian people that overthrew Ming and founded a 300-year-old Qing Dynasty (1616-1911) in China, Chenggong remained loyal to the Han Ming (Brown, 2004: 41). Even after Ming had lost most of its Chinese territory to Qing in 1644, Chenggong still

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5 Southern Min, a label for the group of Han people originally from southern Fujian of China and their language, is also known as Hokklo. In a personal communication, Oliver Streiter told me that both labels were given to the people by Northern Han, who are considered the authentic Han Chinese, with derogative connotation. But for lack of more politically correct alternative, and also for the fact that the derogative meanings of these two terms mainly come from the Chinese characters used to write them, I will maintain the term Southern Min in this dissertation.
supported the son of the last Ming emperor and established a military base in the Fujian area. In 1645, the last Ming King rewarded Chenggong for his loyalty, giving him the royal name, Zhu, and hence Zhu Chenggong. The Southern Min people hence see Chenggong as a hero and refer to him as Koxinga, which in the Southern Min language means “(the honorable) Sir National-last-name.”

In 1661, Qing finally removed Zheng Chenggong from Mainland China, and so he fled to Taiwan. Soon after Chenggong evicted the Dutch in 1662 and took over Fort Zeelandia, which he renamed Chengtian Fu (“the Sky=Empire-bearing Palace”), he died. But the military force he brought, along with the support from the early Han immigrants in Taiwan, had proven to be strong enough for the Zheng family to seize control over (the west side of) the island. Taiwan remained under Zheng rule until Chenggong’s grandson was conquered by Qing in 1683.

The Zheng regime is mostly known for “exploring the wasteland of Taiwan,” not unlike European colonists exploring the North American Wild West. While the Dutch influence on Taiwan was mainly limited to the central to southwest plains, Zheng expanded its control over the whole west side of the island and also to the flat land on the northeast corner. All these areas were traditionally resided by the low-land indigenes. However, Zheng, through what Brown (2004: 41-42) calls “military colonization,” utilized its army force to “reclaim” and “open” land for the new Han immigrants to cultivate. Jiang (1960 [1704]: 244, cited in Brown, 2004: 40) estimated that Zheng brought around 100,000 Han people over to Taiwan within the first four years of its ruling. This number, even without adding the 15,000 Han population in the 1650s under the Dutch, is greater than that of the indigenous population, around 60,000 at the time. In sum, in the 17th century alone, Taiwan changed terms four times (Austronesian → Dutch → Zheng → Qing). While for the most part the indigenous peoples managed to keep their
traditional cultures from outside influence, the demographic composition and social structure of Taiwan had changed dramatically. Since then, Taiwan has never gone back to being a predominantly Austronesian country. Also note that these earliest Han immigrants were Southern Min and Hakka. Although from (the southeast parts of) Mainland China, their languages and cultures are quite different from what is known today as “Chinese,” which typically refers to the Mandarin language and the northern Han culture. This historical fact has led to the modern identity debate in Taiwan-China nationalistic discourse, a topic to be discussed in Chapter 4.

The Qing Period (1684-1895)

Despite the development by the Dutch and Zheng, initially the Manchurian Qing did not consider Taiwan a land of much importance. In late 1683, when Qing had gained the upper hand over Zheng, Emperor Kangxi hesitated to take over the island; he said, “Taiwan is but a tiny piece of land; getting it would add no benefit [to the empire], and not getting it would do no harm.” Still, Taiwan was officially incorporated into Qing territory in April 1984, as a prefecture of Fujian Province, after General Shilang successfully persuaded the emperor to do so.

Because of the concern with potential ethnic conflict between the majority Han immigrants in Taiwan and the Qing Manchurian ruling class, Qing’s governance policy in Taiwan followed two basic principles: (1) let the Han (employed by Qing) manage the Han, and (2) (in case of Taiwanese Han insurgency) let the indigenes fight the Han. Hence, instead of assigning Manchurian officials to Taiwan, Qing sent Han men, most of who were Southern Min and had served as provincial administrators in China, over to Taiwan as local governors. Brown (2004: 43-53) divides the Qing history in Taiwan into three periods, the early Qing (1683-1730s), the

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6 Guo Hong-Bin, The History of Taiwan by Taiwanese People, at http://www.taiwanus.net/history/media.htm
Accessed 1.09.09.
middle Qing (1730s through 1860s), and the late Qing (1860s through 1895), based on the changes in Han-Austronesian relation. She summarizes, “in broad terms, the early and middle Qing periods were characterized by ethnic tensions among the Han [that is, between the Hakka and the Southern Min] and between Han and Aborigines (ibid: 43).” However, as the Han population increased and the deer population decreased, the indigenes were no longer considered as important by late Qing.

Moreover, as Brown (2004: 43-53) observes, the role of the low-land indigenes is of great significance for Qing’s ruling. In the early period, the low-land indigenes were treated relatively well by Qing, thanks to their contribution in Qing military to suppressing several cases of Han insurrection. However, during the middle period, Qing encountered a few instances of rebellion by the low-land indigenes, because they were bullied by the Han officials, and became suspicious. Consequently, in the late period, Qing no longer trusted the low-land indigenes to control the Han, albeit it would use the low-land to fight against the mountain indigenes. As a result, after a tax reform in the 1880s, “[Qing removed] the last possible benefits to an Aborigne identity [and made] them completely subordinate to Han socially, economically, and politically (Brown, 2004: 43, my italics). The reference to the term “identity” here is particularly meaningful and revealing. Since Brown (2004) has given a detailed and comprehensive account of the changes in, and of, the Taiwanese low-land indigenous identity, especially in political-economic terms, I would save space here. Basically, what she describes is to a great extent similar to the history of ethnic policy in the US, where the notorious “one drop rule” was applied to the African American because they are in the bottom of the socio-economic ladder (see Satris, 1995), and strict identification measures were applied to the First Nation peoples because of the value of their native land (see Jaimes, 1995). In the case of Qing Taiwan, the acquisition of an
indigenous identity was at first easy (e.g., people of mixed indigenous and Han bloods were categorized into indigenous) because its usefulness in military recruit. However, it turned hard when Qing realized that Han, with their skills of producing agricultural surplus, could pay more tax. In the early 1730s, intermarriage between the Han and the indigenes was banned.

In the social spheres outside of economics, the low-land indigenous peoples of Taiwan under Qing rule experienced a cultural shift to the Han as well as a language shift to the Southern Min language. This is not only attributed to the increase of Han population, which had become dominant, but also to the fact that Qing founded schools in low-land villages to teach the indigenes Chinese writing and reading. Yu (1959 [1697]), a businessman who traveled in Taiwan in the late 17th century, noticed the presence of interpreters in an (unspecified) low-land village he visited. This account suggests that around that time (at least some of) the low-land languages were still quite vital. However, the popular belief today is that by the late 19th century, the Siraya people had been “completely sinicized, or Hanized,” and their language, which served as lingua franca for several low-land peoples in the southwest plains, had become “extinct,” “lost,” or “dead”7. This account cannot be true, for as a person of both Siraya and Southern Min heritages I can well identify the differences between these two cultures, even in the 21st century. Also, although no one today speaks Siraya natively, the variety of Southern Min I and my Siraya family and friends speak employs several Austronesian linguistic features that are not found in the Standard Southern Min8. Therefore, “complete sinicized and extinct” is an overstatement, and the substrate resistance has been overlooked. Nevertheless, the Qing period does seem to be

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7 This popular belief is informed, and perpetuated, by a few famous linguistic figures in Taiwan and/or working on (not with) the Formosan Austronesian languages, whose names I would not mention here, for courtesy as well as for silent protest.

8 I will give some examples in Chapter 5.
a critical historical point when many low-land peoples had to change their cultural and linguistic behaviors for social survival.

On the other hand, the indigenes who resided in the mountains and east coast were able to keep their languages and traditional ways of living relatively intact throughout the Qing period. As Hsueh et al. (2005; 133) point out, the Qing government did not have all of Taiwan under its hands; its control over the indigenous peoples was limited to those who dwelled on the (mostly western) plains. Qing made an ad hoc distinction between those who they labeled “raw savage” (sheng fan 生番) and “acculturated savage” (hua fan 化番). The acculturated (from a Han perspective) low-land peoples paid taxes and their villages were under Qing administration; the raw peoples did not, as they lived in the mountains and/or the east coast, far away from Qing and Han influences. In fact, during my fieldtrip in the summer of 2008, I met a group of Siraya people whose ancestors migrated from southwest to the east during the Qing period. Hence the alignment of hua fan with Taiwanese low-land indigenes and sheng fan with mountain indigenes is not definitely precise. Worth mentioning now is that the different historical experiences of these two major divisions of indigenous peoples have led them to different alliances in today’s identity politics of Taiwan, a matter I will discuss later.

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9 Sheng fan is translated as “unassimilated barbarians” and hua fan “assimilated barbarians” in Hsueh et al. (2005). In a personal communication, Mr. Jason Pana, a low-land activist from the Bazai tribe, tells me that he prefers the English translations “unfamiliar savage” and “familiar savage.” I understand that their choices of English words come from the concern with political correctness. However, I would stick to the most literal, that is, truest to the original sense, translations for these derogative labels because (1) I mean to let the readers figure out the original connotations of these terms, and (2), simply, this is a linguistic study.
The Japanese Period (1895-1945)

After losing the First Sino-Japan War in 1894, Qing on April 17, 1895, signed the Treaty of Shimonoseki and gave Taiwan to imperial Japan\textsuperscript{10}. The description in this section and the next would be concise. Further details of the historical facts and sociopolitical implications related to language policy and planning are discussed later in Chapter 4.

Considering Taiwan as land of the enemy, at the initial stage (1895-1919) of its ruling, Japan exercised high-handed governance. The Japanese governors to Taiwan at the time all came from a military background, and they brought army with them. The army was not only used to control the majority Han and the low-land indigenes, whose ethnic label was changed from “acculturated” to “ripe savage,” but its main function was to conquer the villages of the formerly isolated indigenes, that is, the “raw savage.” And, as with Qing, many low-land peoples were incorporated into the Japanese army to serving as the vanguard, or frontline force, in the fights against the mountain tribes. A few cases of Han insurgence also took place, and hence immigration from China was also banned.

After having gained control, the Japanese government started focusing on economic development and cultural assimilation. Japanese governors to Taiwan at this second stage (1916-1937) were of civil service background. They built railroads and sugarcane factories all over the island. East Taiwan and mountain areas formerly unaffected by outside forces now saw Japanese officials and (Taiwan-internal) Han migration. The Japanese government also built public schools, teaching the National Language Japanese, which served as the medium of instruction. Han Literature classes were offered as a subject, mainly instructed in Southern Min by the local

\textsuperscript{10}The war is also known as the Jiawu and the treaty Maguan in the 5,000-year-old Chinese nationalistic history as a “national shame” (for references, one only needs to look at any National History textbook in Taiwan or in China).
teachers. Still, wary of potential ethnic conflict, schools for the Japanese people, for the Han (including the low-land peoples who lived among the Han), and for the indigenes, were separate.

Assimilation turned into total Japanization in the third and last period (1937-1945), as Japan decided to invade China and then entered World War II. It needed more man force for the military and hence a national campaign called Kominka Movement was effective “to make people [in Taiwan] subjects of the Japanese Emperor, Tenno.” Women were not spared; many of them were brought to the military brothels as ianfu, “comfort women.” Also affected by the Japanization policy were the local languages. Except Japanese, all other languages were banned in public domain. Once again, identity change here has a sociopolitical motivation behind and leads to complicated cultural, linguistic, and psychological consequences.

The Republic of China Period (1945-Today)

The Chinese Nationalist Party, or KMT (Kuomintan), overthrew Qing and established a modern nation-state Republic of China in China (henceforth ROC) Mainland in 1912. When Japan lost World War II in 1945, ROC took over Taiwan. Whether there is a legal basis for ROC’s occupation of Taiwan remains debatable (cf. Hsueh et al., 2005; Rubinstein, 1999). A population of around 1.5 million “Mainlanders” composed of KMT military and governmental staff, and some of their families, then moved to Taiwan in 1949, after they lost China to the Chinese Communists.

Mainly due to cultural and linguistic differences, the early ROC-KMT years were characterized by conflicts between the Mainlander newcomers and the native residents of Taiwan. The Mainlanders spoke Mandarin Chinese, a language unknown to the locals. The ethnic conflicts exploded into the infamous 228 Incident on February 28, 1947, when a KMT
policeman hit the head of a Southern Min woman, Lin Jian-mai\textsuperscript{11}, with the handle of his pistol on a street in Taipei. In the ensuing months, several cases of local people attacking the Mainlanders took place around the island, which became the onset of an over 40 year long Era of White Terror, as the government declared Martial Law in Taiwan, and tens of thousands locals were charged as political criminals, put in jail, executed, or simply disappeared by KMT. The whole island turned silenced (for KMT’s justification, cf. Ma, 2007).

In 1987, the Martial Law was lifted by President Chiang Chin-kuo. As the society became more stable, Taiwan’s economy grew rapidly, from agricultural to industrial, and then to international commercial. “Made in Taiwan” thus transformed into “Miracle in Taiwan.” At the same time, people were able to enjoy more political freedom, and in particular, the freedom of expression. The Southern-Min-led Taiwanese nationalistic Democratic Progressive Party (henceforth DPP) was formed underground in 1986 and became legal in 1987. The permitted legality allowed DPP to participate in several elections ranging from regional to congressional (Legislature Yuan). Significantly, although DPP lost the first presidential election in Taiwan history in 1996, the elected president KMT, Li Teng-hui, a Southern Min who went through full Japanese education, was the first Taiwan-born ROC president. DPP-nominated Chen Shui-bian, also a Southern Min, then won the next two presidential elections in 2000 and 2004. The current president of ROC, Ma Ying-jeou, a Hong Kong native KMT politician who claims to be Hakka, won the election in 2008. Both Chen and Ma were born after the 228 Incident. And hence many comment that ethnic conflict is no longer in Taiwan. Later on throughout this dissertation I will show that this comment is only superficial.

\textsuperscript{11} Lin was a 40-year-old widow selling contraband cigarettes on the street.
On the linguistic front, ROC Taiwan has been captured by Mandarin Chinese dominance. At the very beginning, KMT made Mandarin the one and only official, and national, language. Although later with the political change some Taiwan local languages became audible and visible in public media, the decades of Mandarin-only policy has made its high status unchallengeable. For example, in the last term of Chen’s presidency, DPP made an effort to legalize all languages in Taiwan as national languages, but today people in Taiwan still use guoyu, that is, “National Language,” as a synonymous term to Mandarin Chinese. As a result, all non-Mandarin languages in Taiwan are threatened.

The Languages and Speech Communities in Today’s Taiwan

In this section I introduce the languages that are, or have been, spoken in Taiwan, with their linguistic typology, locations, estimated numbers of speakers, social and vitality status, and other related information. Note that the relation between (the labels of) a language and a speech community is rarely one-to-one. Many speech communities, especially if the social status of their native language is low, are multilingual.

The Austronesian Languages

While previously referred to as “savage” by the colonial governments and still today by the Southern Min Han in their casual speech, the indigenous peoples in Taiwan are now generally called yuanzhumin, “the original residents” (Figure 1-1). When a yuanzhumin person from X tribe refers to her heritage language, she would normally use the phrase “X language,” or simply zuyu, “tribal language.” Currently there are 14 indigenous peoples, and hence languages, officially recognized by the ROC government of Taiwan. They are Amis (177,909), Bunun (50,132), Kavalan (1,169), Paiwan (85,617), Puyuma (11,670), Rukai (11,348), Saisiyat (5,696), Sakizaya (340), Sediq (?), Tayal (81,545), Thao (647), Tsou (6,580), Truku (24,514), and
Yami/Tao (2,510). The numbers in parentheses indicate tribal population registered in, and published by, Taiwan’s Council of Indigenous Peoples in 2008; they do not indicate the numbers of speakers. The official indigenous population 494,107 makes up to only about 2% of the total population of Taiwan (23,040,000). Except for Kavalan, who obtained official status in 2002, all these registered peoples were formerly categorized as “raw savage” under Qing and Japan. However, there are still at least 11 low-land peoples, who have never physically disappeared, without recognition and hidden, as far as official statistics is concerned, among the Han. They are Babuza, Hoanya, Hoho, Kahavo, Ketagalan, Makota, Papora, Pazeh, Siraya, Taivoan, and Taokas.

All these indigenous peoples and languages of Taiwan belong to the cultural-linguistic group Austronesia. Also, although generally referred to as “Formosan languages” in academic literature, they actually belong to various branches in the Austronesian typological tree. More specifically, the languages of Taiwan (except Yami, which locates outside of the main Taiwan Island) take up all but one (Malayo-Polynesian) of the branches, in spite of the fact that linguists have not reached an agreement on the exact numbers and ways of Formosan branching (e.g., Adelaar, 2005; Lyovin, 1997). In other words, among the places in the vast Austronesian region ranging from Taiwan (north) to New Zealand (south) and from Madagascar (west) to East Island (east), Taiwan enjoys the greatest diversity. Of course, the diversity is enjoyable only if the languages are “vital,” but the fact is that all indigenous languages in Taiwan are threatened due to their low social status. Among the languages that are still spoken, the rate of trans-generational learning is very low and the shift to the dominant Han language(s) is prevalent. Every indigenous person is hence necessarily multilingual; most likely she speaks Mandarin.

\[12\] For the definition of and a thorough discussion on “linguistic vitality,” see Hinton & Hale (2001).
Chinese, and besides that she may also speak the neighboring Hakka or Southern Min. Still, the typological evidence has led linguists to hypothesize that Taiwan is the original Austronesian homeland (Figure 1-2). The idea is that, within the region of a language family, the area of the greatest linguistically genetic diversity is most probably the root of dispersal, or migration (originally proposed by Sapir, 1968, and elaborated for Austronesian in Blust, 1988).

Today, even though there is an increasing interest in the indigenous cultures of Taiwan, the government’s attitude towards them is marked by tokenism and the general academic attitude condescending paternalism. During my 2008 fieldtrip to Taiwan, a former linguistic student told me their personal story below. I will not name names.

Student X was about to visit a village for fieldwork. The supervising Professor Y, who was associated to an indigenous research project funded by the government, told Student X, “people there will complain to you about their problems and want you to help them. Do not listen to them. You should just ignore them. You only need the data. Get the data and leave.” (Personal communication with Student X)

The political implication of Professor Y’s statement cannot be overlooked, for people with such a prestigious academic status are often considered experts by the government. They are invited to various official meetings that decide how the resources of the nation-state are to be appropriated to the indigenous communities. Given the circumstances, many feel that the success of cultural preservation and/or revitalization relies on indigenous initiation and participation. A relatively successful effort is the Paiwan of the Lalaulan community, and the Siraya Movement to be discussed in chapter 5 is an attempt to emulate the success.

**The Han Languages**

Three major Han languages are spoken in Taiwan: Hakka, Mandarin, and Southern Min. While Hakka and Southern Min are also the names of the ethnic groups associated with the languages, Mandarin is not. As mentioned earlier, Mandarin was first introduced to Taiwan in
the late 1940s and early 1950s as the lingua franca of the “Mainlander” group. While the general public perceives the Mainlanders as a homogenous group, they are not. The Mainlanders originally came from different areas in central and northern China such as Zhejiang, Henan, Hebei, and Shandong that all have their own regional linguistic varieties. However, many second and third generation Mainlanders today have indeed become monolingual in Mandarin; the social and ideological reasons behind will be discussed later. Also note that I refer to Hakka, Southern Min, and Mandarin as three distinct languages of the same language family, instead of following the folk belief that treats the first two as “regional dialects” of the Chinese language, Mandarin. My choice is based on the principles of spoken-precedes-written and mutual intelligibility: although the three Han language varieties arguably use the same writing system, the linguistic difference among them is so great that they are unintelligible to one another when spoken.

Hakka

As with the Austronesian case, while general demographic statistics indicates that Hakka makes up approximately 12% of Taiwan’s total population, it does not tell the number of native speakers\(^\text{13}\). From my personal estimation, I am convinced that the native speakers of Hakka are much fewer than ethnic Hakka. The Hakka ancestors mostly immigrated to Taiwan in the early 18\(^{th}\) century, only a few years later than the Southern Min. Both groups became “natives” (different from “indigenes”) of Taiwan when the KMT-ROC arrived in the late 1940s; the government then carried out a strict Mandarin-only policy for several decades. I was born in 1978, and many Southern Min people in my generation can still speak their native language, but none of my Hakka friends speaks Hakka – they know nothing more than a few Hakka native

\(^{13}\) The statistical number also does not explain how the descendents of interracial marriage, which is common in Taiwan, are taken into account, if at all.
words. Yet besides Mandarin, some of the Hakka people do speak Southern Min as well, for Southern Min enjoys a slightly higher social status than Hakka due to its dominantly larger population. Also, several low-land indigenous peoples who have lived around or mingled with the Hakka people have adopted Hakka as their first home language after their heritage languages went unused. On the other hand, Hakka stereotypes have crept into the public perception, which marks their ethnic uniqueness: Hakka people are known for “hard-necked spirit,” which is characterized by superb perseverance and stinginess.

The term Hakka, as so pronounced in the language, can be morphologically construed as hak-ka, “guest-family.” Or according to Hashimoto’s (1973) analysis, hak bears some negative connotation that means “stranger,” and, ka is an “agent suffix.” It is used by Hakka and non-Hakka people alike for the designated cultural ethnic group. In either analysis, Hakka is in contrast with the local, or native, people. Hence, it is reasonable to suspect that this ethnic label is not Hakka people’s own creation. After all, why would a people see themselves as guests or strangers?

The late Sinologist Hashimoto Mantaro (1973) proposed that the Hakka ancestors adopted the term Hakka from Cantonese because it could help separate them from the “southern natives” and maintain their proud identification with Central Plains, which in Chinese nationalistic history is believed to be the birthplace of Han. Although without a specific historical linguistic analysis, Hashimoto’s hypothesis was supported by several anonymous Hakka people he consulted, along with the history of Hakka migration that shows a very close contact relation between the Hakka and the Cantonese. Hashimoto identified five major waves of Hakka migration: (1) Between 4th and 9th century, due to the “Five Northern Barbarian Invasion,” the Hakka were forced out of their homeland in Zhongyuan, “Central Plains,” in north-central Mainland and moved south to
lower-central China. (2) From the end of 9th century to early 12th century, considering the barbarian rule of the Five Dynasties unbearable, a group of Hakka moved further south to as far as northeast Canton, the native land of the Cantonese. (3) From 12th century through 17th century, more Hakka people immigrated to Canton because of the Tartar and Mongolian invasion. (4) From the mid 17th century to the mid 19th century, the remaining Hakka in central China migrated to Canton, and some off to Taiwan, because of the Manchurian expansion (which led to the Qing Dynasty). (5) Finally, because of ethnic conflict with the Cantonese, some Hakka moved to deeper into southwest China or further south to Southeast Asia.

Today, like other Han groups, the Hakka people can be found in virtually every part of Taiwan, especially when there is promising business opportunity. Still, four areas are traditionally regarded as Hakka places: Taoyuan, Xinzhu, and Miaoli in central northwest Taiwan, and Pingdong Meinon in the southeast. The Hakka villages in these places are generally located between the Southern Min villages on the plain side and the indigenous villages on the mountain side, for when the early Hakka came to Taiwan the more fertile agricultural lands were already taken by the Southern Min. Because of such a history of opportunistic settlement, these Hakka groups did not share much communication among one another. The Hakka language in Taiwan has developed at least five linguistic varieties, which the Hakka call “accents”: the Sixian Accent, the Hailu Accent, the Dapu Accent, the Raoping Accent, and the Shao-an Accent. Also, the fact that Hakka is the close-to-second biggest ethnic group in Taiwan14 makes the Hakka identity a political commodity of special interest. As my Hakka consultants told me during a 2004 interview, when it comes to election time, many politicians would suddenly show

14 According to a 1998 census in Chen (2001: 95), Southern Min takes up to about 72% of the total population of Taiwan, Mainlanders (which is not really a homogenous group) 14%, Hakka 12%, and Austroneisan 2%.
up in the Hakka villages and even publicly claim that they have Hakka heritage, including the former president Chen, a Taiwanese nationalist, and the current president Ma, a Chinese nationalist. While my consultants generally consider the politicians’ claims of the Hakka identity and promises to invest in Hakka preservation as mere lip service, it is a fact that in the last 15 years or so the government has paid more attention to the Hakka culture and language. The non-commercial Hakka TV was founded in 2002 and started broadcasting in 2003, Hakka language classes are offered in elementary schools as an elective Mother Tongue Class, and one consultant told me that in Xinzhu there is a sign inside every bus that reads, “Please Speak Hakka to Children.” Nevertheless, the social status of the Hakka language remains low. For instance, Hakka-accented Mandarin phrases such as [fən-haw] ([hən-haw] in Standard Mandarin, “very good”) and [lyu] ([lyo], “slippery”) are common jokes in public media.

**Mandarin and the Mainlanders**

“Mainlander” is a term used to refer to the people, mostly soldiers and governmental staff, who were brought to Taiwan by KMT in the late 1940s and early 1950s. It is originally wai-shen-ren in Mandarin, meaning “outside-province-people.” This is after the fact that according to the ROC constitution, the nation-state still owns the territory over all Mainland China that also includes Mongolia and Taiwan. And Taiwan is but a province of the nation-state.

Mandarin was at first a Han language native to Beijing, the capital of Qing, pre-Taiwan ROC, and today’s People’s Republic of China (PRC). During the Manchurian Qing Dynasty, it was used as an official language for communication between the Manchurian ruling class and the Han officials. KMT overthrew Qing and founded ROC in 1912. In 1913, Mandarin was declared the National Language. Therefore, before settling down in Taiwan, the Mainlanders had already spoken Mandarin to one another for some decades in their work domains, i.e., military and
governmental offices. After arriving at Taiwan, because many were from different regions in Mainland China, the Mainlanders had to rely on Mandarin for communication and hence extended its use to several lower sociolinguistic domains. Although in the first decade or so after ROC’s retreat to Taiwan, the government built *juan-cun*, “military-family-villages,” for the soldiers and families according to their regional origins and therefore their heritage languages thrived for a while in home domain, the relocation and rearrangement of *juan-cun* in late 1950s and 1960s have mixed all Mainlanders together.

While regionally cultural and linguistic difference was ignored in the composition of these *juan-cun*, they were organized along the military ranks and the amount of governmental stipend. Homes for the generals received the highest address numbers and best living quality, those for the lieutenants were of second rate, then those for the sergeants, and the living condition for the petty soldiers, who were the majority, was dire. This observation indicates that a pure socio-economic explanation of the ethnic conflict during early ROC period in Taiwan is insufficient. Many Taiwanese nationalists argue that when KMT first occupied Taiwan, the Mainlanders took all the good jobs from the Taiwanese natives and hence the latter were bullied by the former. This may be true when applied to the better-off Mainlanders (and not all of them), but to accuse *all* Mainlanders as perpetrators is just unfair and hasty. I believe that linguistic disparity must have had played a significant role: at that time, Mandarin was all new to Taiwan. There was no shared language between the Mainlanders and other groups of peoples.

Many early Mainlanders then became the primary Mandarin teachers in school after their retirement from the military and/or government. Therefore, Taiwanese people who grew up in the 1950s and 1960s often recount having teachers whose Mandarin is “heavily accented.” But still an ideal of Standard Mandarin close to the Beijing variety was heard on radio and television.
It was against this ideal that the many “accented Mandarin” varieties, no matter it was due to the influence of the students’ native languages or inadequate teaching, received negative evaluation.

Today, after 60 years, a variety of Standard Mandarin has been developed naturally in Taiwan that is different from both the early KMT ideal and the Standard Mandarin in China. However, the prestige of Standard Mandarin (and the Mandarin language) remains. The stereotypes of the Austronesian-accented Mandarin, the Hakka-accented Mandarin, and the Southern-Min-accented Mandarin are a main source of jokes targeting the people with such accents, who are perceived as lazy, uneducated, and/or plain stupid.

In addition to the socio-historical reasons such as the relocation and reorganization of juan-cun, many second and third generation Mainlanders today do become monolingual Mandarin speakers also for ideological reasons. Whether or not affected by their families’ historical connection to Mainland China and/or initial loyalty to the nation-state Republic of China, the Mainlanders are among the most fervent supporters of Chinese nationalism. As a consequence, it is logical that they identify with Mandarin, that is, the Chinese language.

**Southern Min**

The Southern Min people came to Taiwan in the late 17th and early 18th century. Their original homeland in Fujian, also known as Min, Mainland China, is approximately 80 kilometers, or 48 miles northwest to Taiwan across the Taiwan Strait. The Southern Min is now the largest ethnic group in Taiwan (about 72%), but it is not the largest linguistic group. Mandarin has to be the most dominant language today. Almost everyone speaks Mandarin as (one of) their first language(s). Some in the younger generations of ethnic Southern Min do not speak the mother tongue at all, and among those who do, many speak it with less fluency than their parents or grandparents. On the other hand, several low-land indigenous peoples such as the
Siraya, whose heritage languages are currently in a dormant state, now speak Southern Min as their first language at home. Also, as the language of the dominant ethnic group, Southern Min is a preferred choice of second language besides Mandarin and/or English. It is a very useful business language indeed. When hiring people, many Taiwanese companies would require at least minimum communicative skills in Southern Min. Hence, it is hard to tell if the Taiwanese variety of Southern Min is really a threatened language or not. Its lack of a standardized and popularly accepted writing system makes trans-generational learning as well as permeating into higher social domains difficult, but still it is a quite popular spoken language.

Although like other non-Mandarin languages, Southern Min had been oppressed for about four decades until the lift of Martial Law in 1987, it has been imbued with high political values since. As the Southern Min natives in Taiwan are self-designated “Taiwanese people,” the Southern Min language is now commonly known as the Taiwanese language, which in the national identity discourse is raised against the Chinese language Mandarin. The prototype of such a discourse with regard to language can be summarized as such: if you love, or identify with, Taiwan, you speak Southern Min, and if you speak Mandarin, it means you identify with things and values associated with Chineseness. As such, not only the Taiwanese nationalists use Southern Min as their default language of expression, but some Chinese nationalists today would also occasionally speak Southern Min to counter the accusation of them betraying Taiwan. This is probably why the government does not seem to be concerned with funding a specialized public TV station, like Hakka TV (in 2002) and Indigenous TV (in 2005), for Southern Min. There are already a couple of Southern-Min-speaking, broadcast as well as cable, commercial TV stations (under the Formosa TV Corporation), in addition to plenty of Southern Min shows elsewhere.
Still, I think that it is unjustified that some radical Chinese nationalists today use a reversed racism argument against Southern Min Taiwanese. They may to some extend admit that the Taiwanese people (Southern Min as default) have been treated unjustly by the Chinese people (Mainlanders as default) in the early ROC history, but then they go on to say that in today’s Taiwan it is the Taiwanese people oppressing the Chinese people. Quite often they would mention the popularity of Southern Min as an example. But if one takes the constitutional structure of the ROC nation-state as well as the international popularity of Chinese into consideration, they will soon realize that the status of Mandarin and the pertaining Chineseness is just too dominant to be challenged.

Other languages

Other languages of certain importance in contemporary Taiwan include English, Japanese, and several Southeast Asian languages such as Thai, Filipino, and Vietnamese. English, needless to say, is considered the global language. It is the only required foreign language taught in the school system. In fact, more hours are allotted to English than to the Mother Tongue Class, making it the second most important language in school after Mandarin. The government often regards the ranking of Taiwanese students’ English performance vis-à-vis other Asian countries with great importance. Japanese is still one of the first languages for the non-Mainlander people who are now in their 70s and/or above. Although it was banned for several years by KMT after 1945, the Japanese linguistic and cultural heritage has left a discernable mark in Taiwan. Many sociolinguistic behaviors such as other-oriented politeness and pragmatics driven by “collective face” would serve as examples (see Huang, 2004). Today, because of the popularity of Japanese pop culture in East Asia and its relatively healthy economy, many young people in Taiwan have a strong preference to Japanese as the most important foreign language next to English. The
Southeast Asian languages, on the contrary, do not attract people much and are often overlooked. Their significance, however, continues to grow, as the number of contract workers (as construction workers, home helpers, and personal caretakers, etc.) from these countries increases every year. Moreover, some women, many of whom mail-order brides, have married Taiwanese men and given birth to the children who are inappropriately called “New Taiwan Sons” by the media. Unfortunately, the society in general has not paid much attention to the welfare of these Southeast Asian people, let along their linguistic needs. As far as I know, only one radio station, International Community Radio Taipei, has dedicated a few hours a week to the Southeast Asian audience, playing music from their countries and welcoming call-ins, but the programs are actually broadcasted in English.

For Diversity and a Healthy Environment

This chapter has provided a rather concise description of Taiwan’s cultural-linguistic diversity, which I consider covert, or recessive. It is not overt because the general perception of Taiwan is still quite singular and homogenous. Despite the growing Taiwanese nationalism, Taiwan remains in public belief as a Chinese place. As reflected in the sentence “Is Taiwan Chinese?” used in the book titles of both Brown (2004) and Hsueh et al. (2005), it seems as if the assertion of being Taiwanese must predicate being Chinese. I do not think so, for Chineseness is only an iota of the whole cultural diversity in Taiwan. I further contend that both Chinese nationalism and Taiwanese nationalism are false choices for the peoples on this island. Both of them are Han enterprise, and hence both lead to a root in Mainland China, however defined. It is not that the Chinese root is insignificant, but that it has morphed into the Han linguistic postulates that limit the nationalists’ imagination of the nation

I will provide the definitions for “linguistic postulate” and “imagination of nation” in Chapter 2.
peoples in *Formosa* to truly appreciate diversity, we need to first assert the ownership of the Austronesian indigenes. Recognizing the Austronesian root, we can then embrace the beauty of difference that is essentially local. When conceiving of the future for the language ecologists, Haugen (1972: 329) states, “one may even venture to suggest that ecology is not just the name of a descriptive science, but in its application has become the banner of a movement for environmental sanitation.” I interpret his “environmental sanitation” as a healthy environment that does not discriminate. Hence, my work here is an attempt to look for ideal supplements to such health. In the next chapter, I begin the search by reviewing literature that provides meaningful clues.
Figure 1-1. Indigenous languages of Taiwan
Figure 1-2. Austronesian dispersal (Source: http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v405/n6790/images/4051052aa.2.jpg Last accessed 10.5.09. Figure 1. In Gray D. and Jordan F. M. (2000) Language trees support the express-train sequence of Austronesian expansion. Nature, 405, 1052-1055.)
CHAPTER 2  
LITERATURE REVIEW

Nationalism and Political Discourse

The Hegemony of Nationalism

Many linguists concerned with diversity warn against the popular myth of “one nation, one
language” (e.g., Heller, 1999; Pavlenko, 2002; Shohamy, 2006). Such a myth, as they point out,
not only often leads to language planning and policy that privilege one dominant linguistic
variety in a society, but it also generates a xenophobic and patriotic discourse that reinforces
ethnic or racial inequality. However, in my opinion, linguists have not dealt enough with the
fundamental problem, that is, the ideology of nationalism, which carries implications beyond the
state boundary, beyond socialism and capitalism, and beyond left and right.

Political scientists, on the other hand, have long realized that it is nationalism that shapes
today’s world politics. Domestically or internationally, politics is usually perceived as “game”
played by the “logical men” who seek absolute order and dominant control (Tickner, 1992;
Waltz, 1959 [1954]). These men, and the women who play their game, have created the modern
nation-state that affects the life of all. Anderson (1983) argues that this nation-state, however, is
not real, in the sense of being absolutely essential and inherent; rather, it is imagined. Or, in the
terminology of critical discourse analysts, it is discursively constructed (Chilton & Schäffner,
2002). The nation-state has to be supported by an elaborate discourse because it is a by-product
of colonialism, in the first place for the colonialists to justify their expansion, and later for the
post-colonial states to reassert their existence. Therefore, the next question is how such a
discursive construct is conceived. In Smith’s (1995: 133-135) analysis, a nation, or national
identity, is composed of (1) a collective name, (2) a myth of common origin, (3) a shared ethno-
history, (4) cultural characteristics that serve to demarcate members from non-members, (5) an
association with historic territory, or homeland, (6) a sense of solidarity, (7) a definite territory or homeland, (8) a common economy, (9) a shared public, mass education-based culture, and (10) common legal rights and duties for all members. These components indicate an obvious tendency towards homogeneity: all is one and the same. If you do not comply, you do not deserve to be treated equally like everyone else. In other words, in a modern nation-state, there is little space for difference. This is why I consider nationalism as the primary obstacle to cultural and linguistic diversity.

Still, since nationalism is created, or imagined, by human beings, there should be other conceivable ways of organizing human social life. In fact, in as early as 1873, the late Russian philosopher and activist Mikhail Bakunin presented the political model of anarchism, which is a governmental system that does not function hierarchically and does not discriminate along class or ethnic distinction (Bakunin, 1991 [1873]). Also absent in Bakunin’s original thesis is the association with violence and chaos that prevails in today’s common perception of the term anarchism. Furthermore, anthropologist Barclay (1990) convincingly shows that anarchy as an actual practice has indeed already existed in the traditional societies of the Pygmies, Eskimos, Makhno, and Durruti where no one single authority can push judgment on and make decision for all the people. Unfortunately, the anarchic alternative is often not taken seriously by grass root activists today who strive for equal rights for the minority and/or indigenous groups. Probably because nationalism is so dominant and universal, many activists take it as the default route. The following is an example given to me by Heather Souter, a native activist from the multilingual Métis community in Canada, in a personal communication: “Our own Métis political leaders have privileged one of our own traditional languages over others! This is causing problems for our own people! This has been done for nation building purposes. Somehow the leaders of our
Métis National Council have bought into the misguided idea of ‘one language, one nation!’” A similar situation is taking place in the Siraya Movement, which I discuss in detail in Chapter 5.

**Analyzing Political Discourse**

The discipline of linguistics actually offers a solid approach to studying the discursive means employed by the nation-state to normalize its control over the general public. This approach is known as critical discourse analysis, or CDA. Because of the awareness of as well as concern with the pervasiveness of political ideology in language, CDA analysts are among the first in linguistics to openly question the Western ideal of *scientific objectivity*, which in turn often leads to indifference of politics. Fairclough (2001: 4) argues that “the scientific investigation of social matters is perfectly compatible with committed and ‘opinionated’ investigators (there are no others!), and being committed does not excuse you from arguing rationally or producing evidence for your statements.” And the CDA analysts set as their goal to imbue *linguistic consciousness* to the general public such that the latter can move towards *emancipation* from the sociopolitically powerful, or “members of ‘symbolic’ elites such as politicians, journalists, scholars, writers, teachers and so on” (Van Dijk, 2006: 362).

CDA mainly follows a post-structuralist framework when approaching the *power structure* of modern society. Three sets of relations thus form the core of CDA: (1) on the theoretical level, the relation between Agent and Structure, (2) on the analytical level, micro- vs. macro- analyses, and (3) on the empirical level, local interactions vs. global discourse.

**Agent and structure**

The question with respect to the relation between Agent and Structure is not simply a concern for the critical theorists; it has concerned Western scientists in general for centuries. At the beginning of the Agent-Structure question was the difference between Plato’s and Aristotle’s
conceptions of the relation between the mind and the world. For Plato, the human mind is independent of the natural world that is *out there*; human beings have the ability to observe and analyze the world *objectively* against the ideal world that only exists in their minds. For Aristotle, however, the knowledge in human minds is never devoid of human experience in the world; hence, knowledge is a *subjective*, rather than an objective, product. The difference is hence ontological as well as epistemological.

The Platonian tradition has led to *scientific positivism*, which presumes that we as human beings can construct knowledge about the world through the formation of theories and the testing of such theories in the one, singular, *real* world out there. Such knowledge, the positivists argue, is *objective* in that it is a product of rationality that is unaffected by *subjective* motivations and emotions. Positivism has dominated Western science for centuries, but recently it has attracted scrutiny from social science and natural science alike. Political scientist Onuf (1989: 38) notices a “linguistic turn” in social science in the early 20th century as a critical reflection upon positivism. Informed by Saussure’s structural linguistics, these scientists challenge the positivist ontology and epistemology and propose a *linguistically-constructed* reality instead. They argue that human beings only know, or conceptualize, the world *through language*. Hence the Platonian dichotomy between Self/Agent and Reality/World and its assumption of an absolute world-reality are, as Onuf’s (ibid: 39) puts it, only “with perverse plausibility.” With the linguistic turn came the critical theories, the central thesis of which is an undividable construct of Agent and Structure intertwined together. In other words, the Agent and the Structure “co-construct” or “mutually constitute” each other and form the reality in perception of knowledge

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1 In this section, I only discuss the reflection on positivism in the social science. For reflection on positivism in natural science, see Keller (1996).
(e.g., Onuf, 1989; Hopf, 1998). It is from here the fundamental assumption of CDA, that is, the (social) world is discursively constructed, arises.

While sharing the epistemological convictions that the world/reality is co-constructed by Agent and Structure through intersubjectivity, the CDA analysts disagree in terms of how the relation between Agent and Structure is established. As Erickson (2004: 161) observes, in many critical theorists’ conceptualization, the Agent, or the (local) individual social actors, is mostly affected by the existing social Structure passively. Other critical theorists, such as Erickson himself, choose to hold on to the middle point in the Agent-Structure relation. For this latter group, the middle ground between local individual actions and global social discourse is the construction site of social reality. According to my understanding, such a divide is derived from two different theoretical paths. On the one hand, CDA analysts such as Fairclough and Van Dijk formulate their theories on the basis of Antonio Gramsci’s ideological hegemony (Howson & Smith, 2008), Michel Foucault’s (1995 [1977]) theory of power, and Pierre Bourdieu’s (1990) analyses of habitus and field. On the other hand, Frederick Erickson corresponds to Giddens’s theory of structuration, which gained original insights from Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language. In the space below, I will examine these two paths and their implications. For simplicity in reference, I refer to the Foucault-to-Fairclough path as Path 1, and the Wittgenstein-to-Erickson path as Path 2.

The influence of Foucault on Path 1 CDA is not only explicitly pointed out in Wodak et al. (1999), but it is a recurrent theme in Fairclough’s and Van Dijk’s writings (e.g. Fairclough, 2001, 2003; Van Dijk, 1996, 2006). In particular, the Foucauldian theorization of the order of discourse shapes the basic understanding of the Agent-Structure relation for the Path 1 analysts. For example, according to Fairclough (2003: 200), although empirically speaking there are many
different ways to order different elements in a text, or local discourse, the practical choice of the order in such a discourse is actually limited, for they are “socially structured.” In other words, the freedom for the Agent to construct a local discourse is constrained by the larger, more general, social discourse. This view accords with Bourdieu’s thesis of social practice, which is developed around the concept of habitus: “a system of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures” (Bourdieu, 1990, in Swartz, 1997: 100, my italics). Habitus functions in several socially structured fields and conventionalizes human social practices. Put differently, individual Agents act in social fields following the normative force of habitus, which is for the most part predetermined by the social Structure. Hence, Bourdieu sometimes also referred to habitus as mental habits. However, if one looks closely, they would see that habitus is more than merely normative; it is also regulative, for it is defined as “generative principle of regulated improvisations” (Swartz, 1997: 101).

Moreover, Swartz (1997: 63) points out the Marxist influence on Bourdieu such that “the [social] relations he construct[ed] are invariably competitive rather than cooperative, unconscious rather than conscious, and hierarchical rather than egalitarian.” And Bourdieu’s analysis of power relations is predominantly, if not always, class-based. These traits are also apparent in Fairclough’s and Van Dijk’s CDA works. Terms and concepts such as power struggle, control, manipulation, dominance, and ideological hegemony are in almost every page of their theoretical writings as well as analyses of empirical data. As such, their discourse does not differ much from the symbolic elite. It hence seems ironic to me that the Path 1 CDA analysts may be reproducing the very ideology they criticize, as they themselves are engaged in the same meta-discourse using the metaphors of hierarchy and violence. Violence in hierarchy creates victims, as exemplified in Van Dijk’s (2006: 375): “[the common people are] recipients
of manipulation – as a form of power abuse – [and hence] may be defined as victims.” As such, the individual human Agents are, in Erickson (2004) terminology, passivized. In sum, despite Path 1 CDA analysts’ commitment to individual agency in meaning-making, they nevertheless depict a scenario where Agent succumbs to Structure, which is monopolized by the powerful and/or the dominant\(^2\).

Unlike Path 1 scholars who often treat Structure pivotal for the Agent-Structure relation, the Path 2 scholars are committed to the middle point between Agent and Structure. For them, this is the main construction site of discourse and hence demands attention. As Onuf (1989) points out, constructivism, which serves as the foundation for Path 2 CDA, is for the most part informed by Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language and Giddens’ structuration theory\(^3\). He explains Wittgenstein’s philosophical position as such: “In the beginning was the deed. I call this position constructivism. In simplest terms, people and societies construct, or constitute, each other” (ibid: 36, original italics). In other words, (local/individual) Agent and (global/social) Structure co-construct or mutually constitute each other into a reality (e.g., Hopf, 1998; Onuf, 1989). Or as Erickson (2004: 186) puts it, “the processes that we call ‘structure’ and those that we call ‘action’ taken by particular persons … are both parts of a time/space whole.” Note that the “deed” in Wittgenstein’s account and the “action” in Erickson’s explanation are not just any type of human activity; they crucially refer to the linguistic activity. British sociologist Anthony

\(^2\) The powerful and the dominant, as conceptualized in Path 1 CDA, do not refer to ordinary individuals. For example, Van Dijk (2006) explicitly refers to the “symbolic elites” as powerful social groups and institutions that control the manipulative resources. They are more than Agent in that only they are privileged to define/construct the Structure.

\(^3\) I shall note here that in his later work, Fairclough (2003) also acknowledge the contribution of Giddens. However, what Fairclough gains from Giddens is primarily the analysis of globalization and new capitalism, which is very different from the epistemological theory of structuration discussed here.
Giddens’ theory of structuration resonates with Wittgenstein: “The basic domain of study of the social sciences, according to the theory of structuration, is neither the experience of the individual actor, nor the existence of any form of social totality, but social practices ordered across space and time” (Giddens, 1984, cited in Onuf, 1989: 58). According to this view, neither the individual Agent nor the social Structure receives primacy, and a purely subjectivist approach is as insufficient as a purely objectivist one. It also follows the conviction that the social structure is only manifested through being expressed by the individual agents as social actors. “In and through their activities agents reproduce the [social-structural] conditions that make these activities possible” (ibid: same page).

Hence, in conclusion, the difference between Path 1 and Path 2 is beyond directionality. While Path 1 conceives of a Structure → Agent direction of social influence, Path 2 does not present an Agent → Structure antithesis. Rather, Path 2 perceives Agent/Structure as an inseparable whole (or, Agent ↔ Structure). Moreover, while Path 1 is predisposed to a global → local, or top-down, macro-analysis, Path 2 does not presuppose any direction on the analytical level.

**Micro- and macro- analysis**

Fairclough (2001) is one of the most influential CDA works. It presents many central ideas for Path 1 that have significant analytical implications. Therefore, I start the analytical level discussion by reviewing the ideas in this book.

First of all, Fairclough defines discourse as “language as social practice *determined by social structures*” (Fairclough, 2001: 14, italics mine). This definition clearly reflects the influence of (post-)structuralism, which is further manifested in Fairclough’s definitions of *orders of discourse*: “Actual discourse is determined by socially constituted orders of
discourse….Orders of discourse are ideologically shaped by power relations in social institutions and in society as a whole” (ibid: 14). While Fairclough does point out that discourse does have the potential to affect social structures and hence initiate social change, his core definition of discourse nevertheless indicates a deterministic view on social structure. The social structure, however, does not exist in a vacancy where human beings are excluded. It is maintained by human beings as groups, for agency in Path 1 is defined collectively in terms of power. According to Fairclough, every discourse is a realm of “unequal encounter” with “the powerful participants controlling and constraining the contributions of non-powerful participants” (ibid: 38-39, original emphasis). And the conceptual divide between “the powerful” and “the non-powerful” implies that one (group) of the participants in a social encounter is predominantly active and the other passive⁴. The powerful groups, that is, the symbolic elites, control not only the discursive resources but also the access, and they keep these resources away from the non-powerful general public.

With discourse and power relations thus defined, Path 1 CDA analysts tend to emphasize the manipulative effect of the big discourse controlled by the powerful for sustaining the status quo. As explicitly put in Van Dijk (2006: 362), “social conditions of manipulative control hence need to be formulated – at least at the macro level of analysis – in terms of groups memberships, institutional position, material or symbolic resources …that define the power of groups and their members” (my italics). Therefore, when doing analysis, the Path 1 CDA scholars primarily focus on the structural factors in and above the discourse, rather than the individually initiated subversive factors that start from the bottom. This can be seen in the texts they choose to

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⁴ There is a delicate difference in defining the discursively abused as “the non-powerful” and as “the less powerful.” The former passively wait for a savior, but the latter may actively work their way towards empowerment.
analyze: most of the examples are public texts administrated by the mass media and/or political figures, for example, advertising and Thacherism in Fairclough (2001) and Tony Blair’s speech for supporting Bush’s War on Terror in Fairclough (2003) as well as Van Dijk (2006). The Path 1 analysts hence are more apt to carry on macro-analysis that examines the top-down influence of discourse than the other way around.

Now, compare Erickson’s (2004) book title “Talk and Social Theory” with those of Path 1: “Language and Power” (Fairclough, 2001), “Discourse and Manipulation” (Van Dijk, 2006), and “Discourse of Silence” (Wodak, 2003). They indicate, if only implicitly, that while Path 1 focuses on the top-down structural dominance, Path 2’s Erickson focuses on the “talk” or linguistic interaction. This observation also holds as one examines the actual examples used by these two groups of scholars for analysis. Two cases studied in Erickson (2004) are: (1) a dinner table conversation in a working class family, and (2) a college student visiting his academic advisor to discuss the registration issue. Different from Path’s 1 big examples of politicians’ speech or news reports, Erickson’s examples are rather small. Style-wise, case (1) is casual and case (2) semi-formal (for the advisor is also the student’s family friend); topic-wise, case (1) is about home economy (short of money), and case (2) is personal career choice. The details of these interactions are well documented and analyzed by Erickson, with the supplement of small contextual information such as personal and family background or interactional history. Still the big issues are not overlooked. They are actually incorporated in the analyses as the larger, socio-

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5 Ruth Wodak, or the Vienna School, is also considered as one of the leaders of CDA research, which I present here as Path 1. However, Wodak’s work does not show as clear an influence of Foucault and Bourdieu as Fairclough’s and Van Dijk’s do. Moreover, scholars from the Vienna School do carry out some “local” or “micro-” analyses, through the methods of ethnography, for example. I hence consider Vienna School as capable of offering some solutions to the local → global problem. These solutions will be discussed later.
historical context. For example, the family’s financial problem is related to the Oil Crisis in 1973, and the advisor’s academic suggestion to the student is related to him trying to help the student avoid military draft to the Vietnam War. Throughout his analysis, Erickson makes a clear distinction between personal interactional history and the formal, big, History with a capital “H” (Erickson, 2004: 82).

Furthermore, Erickson’s analysis indicates that the individual Agents are not passively constrained by the social Structural conditions. These individuals may be less powerful than those who have direct access to the big discourse and hence better life choices, but they are not completely impotent, or non-powerful. They participated actively in the undercurrent that eventually changed the big discourse and the Structure, as exemplified in the economic revival of US and the withdrawal from Vietnam War. Therefore, in Path 2 analysis, the Agent is surfaced and stands alongside the Structure, i.e., Agent/Structure.

For the fact that while using History as a background context Erickson does not include big talks such as the president’s speech and the media reports in his analysis, one may tend to categorize his analysis as a micro-level analysis that pays attention to only the bottom-up social influence. However, as pointed out earlier, in the analytical details, influences from both the top-down and bottom-up directions are exposed. Therefore, although micro in appearance, the analytical flow of Path 2 is actually bidirectional, including both top-down and bottom-up, and therefore holistic.

**Local and global**

At the center of the pair local and global is a contrast between the small linguistic interactions that take place at a particular moment with immediately identifiable individuals participating and the big social discourse that is above and beyond the immediate observable
social interactions. The small is the local, and the big the global. In general, local refers to the action of the readily-recognizable Agent, and global the prevalent Structure that provides conditions for the local action. But still there are three variations of the expanded interpretation of local-vs.-global, as illustrated below.

(1) Local text vs. global discourse. Fairclough (2003: 3) defines text rather generously; it could be “written and printed texts such as shopping lists and newspaper articles…, [but also] transcripts of (spoken) conversations and interviews, as well as television programmes and webpages.” Hence, “any actual instance of language in use is a ‘text’” (ibid: 3). Different texts that address the same issue but carry competing ideologies comprise a discourse. Also, a discourse in fact often precedes a text, with the former normalizing orders (based on power relations) for the latter. Therefore, the immediate text is local, but the general discourse is global. For Fairclough, while text is indispensable in a discourse analysis, the focal point has to be the discourse and its orders. This is so because the ideologies and/or hidden agendas can only be revealed through looking at the orders of the discourse, but not the texts alone. Such a distinction between text and discourse should be understood as Fairclough’s response to other sub-disciplines of Discourse Analysis, especially Conversational Analysis (CA), which is criticized by the CDA analysts for focusing only narrowly on the description of linguistics proper (e.g., back-channeling, code-switching, etc.) in local texts but ignoring the larger social factors. Following this line, CDA defines context differently from CA. Context in CA refers to the interconnection in and between linguistic texts only; but in CDA it is an intermediate stage between text and discourse that provides the general social conditions. Context mediates between text and discourse via interpretation (Fairclough, 2001: 21). Thus defined, context in CDA becomes more social than textual, and another concept, intertextuality, is introduced for
describing the interconnection at the textual level. Then, a logical consequence is that interconnection also takes place at the level of discourses, which, in the CDA terminology (Fairclough, 2003: 35), is called interdiscursivity. In sum, at the local level are texts, as units, and intertextuality, as relations; at the global level are discourses and interdiscursivity. And linking these two levels is the context. Still, I shall point out that the distinction between text and discourse along the line of local-vs.-global is more readily received by Path 1 CDA than by Path 2. I will show later that Path 2 analysts such as Erickson actually talk about local discourses sometimes.

(2) The local-and-global-co-construction of discourse. Erickson uses the notions of local and global quite frequently in his work. He defines local social actions as the cases where “the topics of talk were of immediate concern and each and every comment was addressed in a particular moment to a particular… audience;” and global social actions are those “entailed in social processes on broader time scales than that of the moment at hand” (Erickson, 2004: 102). While this definition overlaps to some extent with the definition of text and discourse in Path 1, it has broader applicability. Remember that the focus for Path 2 scholars is the nexus between local and global discursive actions, which they consider as the construction site of the discourse as a whole. As Erickson puts it, “talk is both a local process and a global one” in that the local elements and the global elements mutually constitute each other (ibid: 107). He further correctly points out that Path 1 scholars such as Bordieu, Fairclough, and Foucault would not be able explain how oftentimes the local discourse practices do make history. This question can only be answered if co-construction, rather than global-to-local-dominance, is recognized as the normal process.
(3) Local politics vs. global politics. Another interpretation of local-vs.-global is illustrated in the analysis of the discourse of globalization (Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 1999; Fairclough, 2003). Local here refers to the regional space-time, or Europe, and global refers to the globalization discourse and the space-time it covers. While here the terms local and global follow their most general definitions, Fairclough also reveals his top-down thinking by stating that “the relationship between the ‘global’ space-time and the ‘European’ space-time is that the latter is framed by the former.” (ibid: 154, italics mine). As such, Fairclough actually betrays his subscription to Giddens’ theory of globalization, for Giddens insists upon “the nation-state as a constitutive element of modernity…that the emergence of the nation-state as a form goes in tandem with the emergence of a world system of nation-state” (Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 1999: 79, italics mine). Notice that in Giddens’ account here his theory of structuration, that is, co-construction in my terminology, prevails. According to him, the nation-state, or local/domestic politics, and the world system, or global/international politics, mutually constitute each other, a fundamental assumption overlooked by Fairclough.

In addition, I would like to point out that the disparity between Giddens and Fairclough corresponds to the Third Debate in the discipline of International Relations (IR). Traditionally, the academic field of IR is dominated by Realism, which treats states as autonomous rational actors participating in a competitive world system. Since the 1980s, however, there have been three debates within IR: the first regards Realism vs. Idealism, the second Realism vs. Behaviorism, and the third Constructivism vs. Structural Realism and Positivism. What is relevant to my discussion here is the third debate between the IR constructivists, who are informed by the Path 2 critical theorists Wittgenstein and Giddens, and the structural realists. The structural realists argue that war and conflict are inevitable because the individual states
would always seek dominance, for they are constrained by the world system that is defined by competition. On the other hand, the constructivists argue that war is not inevitable because the local agents (including states and NGOs) can alter the make-up of the current international relations by defying (parts of) the existing system and acting out new orders. Fairclough, who portrays a state-Agent whose (discursive) actions are passively framed by the global Structure, implicitly supports the Realist thesis and goes against the constructivist Giddens. Last but not least, as well-documented in IR literature, Realism is criticized for “normalizing” and sometimes even “justifying” aggressive state behaviors such as Bush’s War on Terror. This position is, ironically, one that Fairclough criticizes constantly.

Discussion

Today CDA is often criticized for not being able to handle the bottom-up analysis, or the local-to-global influence. Below are some responses to such criticism. First of all, since Bourdieu argued that everyone acts according to habitus, which includes thought habits, defined by the pre-existing power relations in Structure, he faced the dilemma of how the social scientists may refrain themselves from abusing power in their own production of knowledge. He responded to the dilemma with a call for “reflexive practice of sociology” (Swartz, 1997: 270). This means that social scientists need to reflect upon their own practices, including the socio-historical conditions that have made the science into existence. I have applied this reflexive practice to CDA and pointed out that many CDA scholars, especially those on Path 1, risk reproducing the ideology of dominance by evoking metaphors of violence and hierarchy. They also risk victimizing the individual social actors they promise to emancipate. As such, they imply that only they know what the lay people do not know. I call this the intellectuals’ burden. This

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burden is unfavorable because it denies the ability of the mass social individuals to act, and it also prevents the intellectuals from learning others’ real-life experiences. Indeed, it overlaps with the White man’s burden. This is not just because these famous CDA scholars and the philosophers that have inspired them are White males, but that their conceptualization of the world-reality is based upon the experience of an adult White man. The White men rationalize, they compete, and they feel obliged to protect the weak. They have in general overlooked the female experience, that is, the experience of the other half of humanity as well as the other half of their own existence.

Furthermore, to facilitate the reflexive practice, many CDA scholars call for an interdisciplinary approach. This is often understood as triangulation (Van Dijk, 2006; Wodak et al., 2003), or transdisciplinary dialogue (Fairclough, 2003). However, this call for interdisciplinary perspective is interpreted slightly differently by different CDA scholars. For Fairclough and Van Dijk, the major concern is theoretical depth. For example, in the series preface of Wodak et al. (2003: viii), Fairclough writes, “the development of CDA has raised a number of theoretical problem, some of which need more sustained attention than they have so far received….we hope the series will encourage…the exciting possibility for working across disciplines” (my italics). On the other hand, Wodak interprets triangulation and Erickson interdisciplinary in a broader sense, incorporating not only theoretical or analytical construction but also methodological implementation. When studying the discursive construction of national identity, Wodak et al. (2003) not only ground their theoretical framework with theories from linguistics, sociology, and psychology, they also incorporate different research methods, including attitudinal questionnaires, discourse analysis of public texts, biographical narrative interviews, and ethnographic notes acquired from participant observation. Ethnographic
participant observation is also included in Erickson (2004) in addition to some CA transcription. This disparity, I believe, also emerges from the difference in the fundamental assumption of the Agent-Structure relation. For Fairclough and Van Dijk, Structure receives primacy, and hence to implement their CDA work the focus has to rest upon implementing the (theoretical) understanding of Structure. But for Erickson and Wodak, who commit to the inseparability of Agent/Structure, various methods are required in order to approach the Agent-in-Structure.

In conclusion, the solution to the local-to-global problem lies on a reflexive inspection on CDA itself and an interdisciplinary approach that includes not only the theoretical but also the methodological. A mere reflection on social science is not enough and too general, for it may still lead to a lack of self-consciousness on one’s own discourse. A mere focus on theoretical implementation is insufficient, for it gains little with respect to approaching the local Agent. Furthermore, researchers who share the conviction that all linguistic practices are sociopolitical actions can learn with the individual social actors through acknowledging the legitimacy of these individuals’ acts. In other words, they should see themselves as simultaneously informing and informed by the individuals. Only through this can the researchers stand on the Agent’s local position and experience how an active individual enacts global structural changes. Last but not least, as Chilton & Schäffner (2002: 8) point out, “The actual language in which the analyzed texts are written should not be neglected. Analysts of political discourse cannot afford to assume an anglo-centric attitude to political discourse, and ignore the potential… implications of Whorf’s hypothesis.” It seems to me that the majority of CDA research is Western. Not only is the informing philosophy Western, as reviewed earlier, but the analytical details such as the manipulation of inclusivity in the first person plural pronoun, such as English “we,” are European. Many non-European languages make a grammatical distinction between inclusive we
and exclusive we and hence the pronoun would function differently in the discourses in these languages. In the next section, I will review the framework of linguistic postulates developed by M. J. Hardman in the hope to expand CDA to account for the non-Western discourses.

**Language and Worldsense**

*Linguistic postulate* is a linguistic anthropological concept developed by Hardman (1993, 1004, 1996) that takes Lee-Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis⁷, or Linguistic Relativity, as its theoretical foundation. It is defined as “a theme or motif that can be found in almost all the sentences of a language, a feature that is used repeatedly by [the speakers of] the language to organize the universe” (Hardman, 1996: 25). When approaching a discourse, the analysts hence look for the common rather than the specific. In other words, instead of (or, before) identifying the specifics that allow the powerful to manipulate and those which enable the less powerful to resist, the analysts research the linguistic features shared by and available to all those in the speech community. In this way, an access to the native *emic* sense of a particular linguistic community is permitted, for only through grammar can the actual categories in a people’s life be truthfully presented. Therefore, this approach not only precludes the danger of imposing Western notions on non-Western contexts, but it also helps account for the local, agent-oriented, processes.

Because Linguistic Relativity is often overlooked by academia, in what follows I will discuss its fundamentals in detail while reviewing Hardman’s thesis of linguistic postulate. I do

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⁷ Many in linguistics distinguish between a strong Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis and a weak one (e.g., Cipollone et al., 1998), where the strong is interpreted as language determines, and hence constrains, human thinking. However, this position is never proposed by Dorothy Lee, Edward Sapir, and/or Benjamin Lee Whorf (see Lee, 1987, for an original account, and Elgin, 2000: 49 -71, for a thorough discussion on Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis). Hence, here I use Lee-Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis with its original sense, rather than the deterministic version conjured up by some others.
so by examining some basic linguistic constructs and supplying them with cultural-linguistic examples.

**Phonology**

There are many physical sounds in the natural world; only some of them are *detectable* by human ears because of our biological constraints. Among the sounds human ears can detect, only some are used in human languages. They are the linguistic sounds. Phonology (and phonetics) is the academic area devoted to the study of the linguistic sounds.

Among all linguistic sounds, only some are *perceivable* by an individual human being. For example, by making the tongue tip slightly touching the alveolar ridge in the mouth and loosening the vocal folds, we can produce two physically different consonantal sounds that may be represented as [tʰ] and [t], the former with an airflow coming out of the mouth but the latter without it. If we follow the articulatory mechanism described above, and then constrict our vocal folds, we would produce yet another physical sound represented as [d]. However, if we present these three physically different sounds to a monolingual English native speaker that has never received any linguistic training, she may most possibly only *perceive*, or hear, two distinct sounds. The English speaker would *perceive* [tʰ] and [t] as one sound and [d] the other. On the other hand, a monolingual Mandarin Chinese speaker would have no problem perceiving [tʰ] and [t] as two distinct sounds, while she cannot distinguish [t] from [d]. This is so because [tʰ] and [t] do not *contrast meaning* in English as they do in Mandarin Chinese, and [t] and [d] only contrast meaning in English but not in Chinese.

Linguists hence make a distinction between *phonemes* and *phones*. The phonemes of a language are those perceivable for the speakers of that language. In other words, they are not (physical) sounds but *mental representations* of sounds (Hardman, 2000: 30). Put differently, a
phoneme represents a *bunch of sounds* that contrast meaning with other bunches in a language stored in a human mind/brain. The discovery of phonemes is significant in that it shows that human beings do not interact with the natural world directly. Human beings interact with the World *through language*. Moreover, the fact that phonemes are represented in human minds according to the function of contrasting meaning indicates that a language is *systematically structured*. As a consequence, we as human beings perceive the world as a structure. Last but not least, because there are many different human languages, there are many different representations of the World out there. In other words, there are many different world-realities structured in different languages by and for different groups of people. These different world-realities, we call *culture*. Notice that while there is, theoretically speaking, an outside World, there is no “Reality” *out there* because all realities are constructs in our minds. A straightforward example is *onomatopoeia*: “words that are imitative of natural sounds or have meanings that are associated with such sounds in nature” (Cipollone et al., 1998: 15). In a sense, onomatopoeic words are such words in a language that are closest to the World. However, even these words show variation across languages. For example, the sound a dog makes is bow-wow in English but [wang-wang] in Mandarin Chinese, and a rooster sounds like cock-a-doodle-doo for English speakers but [ku-ku-ku] for Mandarin Chinese speakers. Still, while these examples indicate that the sign-sound relation in human language is arbitrary, it does not mean that human perception is arbitrary. Human perception is *conventionalized*, or structured, by language. A Mandarin Chinese native speaker would not just arbitrarily accept the English perception; she would find it difficult to perceive, for example, [l] in the sound a rooster makes.
Morphology

Phonemes then form morphemes, which are the minimal meaningful units in a language. Like phonemes, morphemes are not objective meaningful units in the World. There is actually nothing meaningful in the World, for the World itself does not tell. Meaning only exists in language, and hence in human minds. As different languages use different sets of phonemes to contrast meaning, they also have different sets of morphemes for categorizing and understanding the things in the World out there. In this way, speakers of different languages construct different worldsenses\(^8\) in their respective cultures.

With morphemes words are formed. Since the number of phonemes and morphemes in a language is limited and their relations structured, words and the ideas they represent are limited and structured as well. These ideas guide the speakers to act in a limited and structured way. It is very important to know that without these ideas we as human beings would not be able to act, and therefore language not only confines us but also empowers us.

Take English for example, Hardman identifies three linguistic postulates: (1) sex-based gender, (2) number, or singular vs. plural, and (3) comparative ranking. Their respective morphological manifestations are, for example, (1) wo/man, s/he, (2) a dog vs. two dog-s, and (3) -er and -est. English grammatical genders are based upon biological sex, in which the morphological base, or the norm, is male (man, he) and fe/male (wo/man, s/he) is derived. As such, we find that not only in the language but also in the culture, “the feminine is dependent … on the masculine” (Hardman, 1993: 252). In other words, females are marked, as deviant\(^9\). This

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\(^8\) I borrow the word “worldsense” from Oyèwùmí (1997) in place of “worldview” for the reason that not all cultures perceive the world through viewing. I will explicate this point later.

\(^9\) I am aware of the fact that the English word “woman” is not morphologically derived from “man” and also that etymologically speaking “female” is unrelated to “male” and “she” unrelated to “he.” But the derivational relations
is also evident in the generic use of the pronoun “he” and the noun “man” (or “mankind”) for all human beings. Grammatical number is another linguistic postulate pervasive in English. Every English sentence is marked either as singular or plural. The grammatical marker lies on both the nouns and the verbs. For example, “a dog is barking” and “two dogs are barking.” As shown in “dog-s”, “singular is unmarked and primary, plural derived” (Hardman, 1993: 252). The third English postulate refers to comparative and superlative, which take the suffixes -er and -est, respectively. According to Hardman (1993), while comparative may not seem as overt as sex-based gender and number, it is as prevalent and gives rise to constant hierarchy in the culture. All the things that are compared cannot be just different or the same; they have to be ranked against one another. A recent example is sports news on ESPN, December 19th, 2006: the famous professional basketball player Allen Iverson is transferred (by the team owners) from the Philadelphia Seven Sixers to Denver Nuggets, which has a franchise player Carmelon Anthony. On the day the deal was just made, ESPN asked “who will be the best player for Denver Nuggets, A.I. or Carmelon?” A.I. and Carmelon had not even played together once yet! If we again apply Bourdieu’s reflexive practice, we can find English comparative ranking in our own linguistic discipline. One only needs to take a look at the Chomskyan generative grammar to find all sorts of theories and analyses based upon hierarchy (cf. Junker, 1992).

While each of these postulates carries certain cultural implications on its own, it is their interplay that contributes to the more general thought patterns of a people. As Hardman (1996: 26) puts it, “while grammatical items can be analyzed singly, they do not occur singly, which is why they also act as mutual reinforcers – they are all part of a pattern… in the human

of wo/man, fe/male, and s/he are what most English speakers perceive as true. It is the native speakers’ perception that counts, for it affects people’s action.
community.” Through examining the interplay of English linguistic postulates, Hardman calls attention to the *derivational thinking* that fortresses sexism and racism in the culture: singular is the norm from which plural is derived, wo/men are derived from men, and since all things have to be ranked, only one (type of) man can be the best. This man is the White man, who holds the social power of definition. Hence, the answer to Hardman’s question in the title of her 1993 article, “Why is equality so difficult?” is: sexism and racism are conventionalized and structured via the English language in people’s everyday thinking and action, and so they cannot be easily rid of even after some improvement has been made in legislation to address the right issues of women and minorities.

The organization of *word class*, or *lexical category*, serves as a morpho-syntactic example that illustrates the linking between language and worldsense. A class of words is defined as the words that share the same morphological and syntactic properties. English has the word classes *noun*, *verb*, *adjective*, and *adverb*, for example. Among them, the noun class is conceptually the most important. English children learn nouns first, and they perceive the world-reality through (naming) things. In Navajo, on the other hand, the verb class is the most crucial. When Navajo children learn the language, they learn verbs first, and hence they perceive the world through actions and events. As Navajo people construct the world through action, they perceive themselves as *within* the world. English speakers, however, consider the world as *outside* of the essential human existence; they define things in the world so as to *control* them (for naming implies controlling). When something unfortunate happens, or as in the Navajo sense, some unfortunate happening takes place in the individual person, Navajo people take it as it happens, but English speakers would look for something in the world to blame. For example, the Navajo people do not perceive death as a *thing*; they talk about the natural *process* of “death taking place.
(with somebody).” For English speakers, death is dreadful because it is an unknown thing that is separate from and uncontrollable by human beings.

Another lesson we learn from morphology is that if a language does not have a word, it does not necessarily mean that the people of that language/culture do not have what may be referred to by the word. Lee (1987 [1959]) pointed out that the Dakota language do not have the word for “free/freedom.” She explained that we should not conclude that Dakota people do not have freedom: in fact, Dakota people do not need the concept of freedom because “imposition” is also absent in the language. Not only is the word “imposition” not found in Dakota language, but the concept of it is also absent in the Dakota worldsense. Dakota grammar does not generate phrases such as “me and the people” or “me and the world,” but the Dakota speakers say, approximately translated in English, “I am the people” and “I am the world.” Everybody is part of everybody, and hence nobody can command another person. On the contrary, while English speakers talk about freedom all the time, they also talk about “I have to” or “I gotta” all the time. For Lee (1987 [1959]: 53), this indicates that the feeling of an urgent need for freedom in the English speakers is due to the fact that they are constantly obliged to do something. The word “freedom” they have, but freedom they may not have. The observation again indicates that language/culture is a system of structured relations: what is (represented) there is not just there; it is there in relation to something else also present there.

**Syntax**

So far I have only discussed the English linguistic postulates in morphological terms. However, in Hardman’s original thesis, linguistic postulates do not merely exist in one aspect of language; rather, they permeate through all linguistic and cultural aspects. As I have shown, according to English derivational thinking, masculine singular sits at the top of the
conceptualization of hierarchy. We can find correspondence in the organization of English syntax. Since the standard word order of English is SVO (Subject-Verb-Object), the thematic subject often overlaps with the grammatical subject that occupies the leading position in a sentence. In the real world reference, this subject is usually kept for a man while the lower, or conceptually less important, object position, is kept for a woman. When occasionally a woman referent does take the grammatical subject position, she is often a victim. Specifically, when a woman-as-victim takes the subject position, the sentence is most likely manifested in the passive form, and the male perpetrator is often absent, that is, the “by X” part is omitted. For example, as Taylor and Hardman (2004: 12) point out, in English news concerning domestic violence we would more frequently observe sentences such as “a woman was beaten” than “a woman was beaten by her husband,” and even less frequently is “a man beat his wife.” This type of construction functions to exempt the perpetrator of responsibility and hence is called passive exonerative.

Also serving to exonerate the perpetrator is nominalization. As Fairclough (2003: 13) points out, “one common consequence of nominalization is that the agents of processes, people who initiate processes or act upon other people or objects, are absent from the texts.” His uses as an example Tony Blair’s statement, “the modern world is swept by change.” In the discourse it generates, the multinational corporations that collaborate with governments in changing the world to cater to their parochial interests (in dispense of the well-being of the public) are freed from scrutiny. In addition, nominalization can, and often does, work together with passive voice

\[10\] Cf. Tagalog, a VSO language, where the thematic subject is often manifested as a verbal suffix and the grammatical subject position is left empty. It appears to me that the Siraya syntax also functions in a similar way.

\[11\] The term “passive exonerative” was invented by Geoffrey S. Nathan and first published in Elgin (2000: 107).
to obfuscate agency and responsibility. Take for example the passive phrase ubiquitous in newspaper titles: “Bombing in Iraq.” The human victims disappear, often because even the revelation of the damage to the victim itself would cause too much scrutiny for the hidden perpetrator – the powerful nation-states.

Besides passive voice, Taylor and Hardman (2001) point out that the English functional verb to be also contributes to the obfuscation of agency. “It does so by locating the functions of perceiving (existence) and of naming (identity) outside the perceiver and namer, making the language user less likely to remain aware of the perceiver and a namer.” For example, “the apple is sweet”; although the speaker tastes it as sweet, another person may not taste the same. Also for example, a person growing up in Alaska may consider a 40 degree Fahrenheit temperature as warm and pleasant, but another person growing up in Florida may feel it cold or freezing. When one says, “it is hot,” the other may say, “it is cold.” Or, as Taylor and Hardman observe, when one says, “it is hot,” the other who disagrees would tend to retort by saying, “no, it is not hot.” Between “it is” and “it is not,” the valuing processes evaporate. But valuing processes in comparison may help people share their different experiences, which may contribute to mutual appreciation, yet the tyranny of IS keeps the sharing and appreciation from happening. Taylor and Hardman (2001) also observe the prevalence of IS and passive construction in the language of science, which many people believe represents “truth.” They urge us to question the claimed objectivity of it: Who forms the hypotheses? Who designs the measures? What (assumptions and implications) do the hypotheses and/or measures carry with them?

As we can see, the syntactic examples examined here all have repercussions in thought patterns. In turn, the thought patterns yield observable behavioral patterns. For example, as we observe passive women in English sentences, we also find women victims in an English-
speaking society. It is also not surprising that many women suffering domestic violence would blame themselves instead of their spouses, for they have internalized the passive exonerative into their thinking. People who support War on Terror have a hard time perceiving that many other innocent people are suffering because only “bombing” but not “people dying” takes place\textsuperscript{12}. Similarly, those who could not find a job still cheer for the “change of the world” because they perceive changing as inevitable and often promising. Finally, if an absolutely indisputable objective truth existed (in science and/or religion), why would so many people fight against each other for the truth? In fact, these people are fighting for “is” and “is not” in the (English) language. Therefore, people virtually behave in language (the language-constructed reality), in addition to through language (e.g., “speech act” – using language to do things, such as “request” and “guarantee”).

Semantics and Pragmatics

A language system is composed of linguistic signs that combine a linguistic form perceivable by human beings and some meaning associated with it (Cipollone, 1998: 478). We can hence understand a linguistic sign as a coin with form on the one side and meaning on the other. Or we can formulate the relation as “linguistic sign = form/meaning.” Such a relation, as mentioned earlier, is arbitrary, and yet the arbitrariness is conventionalized. By analogy, we can formulate the semantic relation as “linguistic meaning = linguistic sign/reference.” A word bears certain linguistic meaning because it is a linguistic sign that refers to an entity (as an object, action, concept, etc.) in the World. The referencing process is also arbitrary as well as conventional, for meaning is only for humans and their cultures. Thus, in a sense, as Suzuki

\begin{footnotesize}
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\textsuperscript{12} For a detailed account of how the language of war and weapon desensitizes people’s perception of other human beings, see Cohn (1987) and also Collins & Glover (2002).
\end{footnotesize}
(1978: 32) puts it, “words create things”: “we recognize fragments of the universe as objects or properties only through words, and… without words we could not even distinguish dogs from cats.” In addition, the meaning a word contains is often multiple. Such multiplicity is attributed to the senses mediating in between the linguistic sign and the reference. For example, the proper name George W. Bush refers to an identifiable person in the World, but that person alone does not make the full meaning of the word because the associated sense in the mind of individual users of the term may range from “an honorable man,” “an ignorant person,” to “a bloody killer,” and so on. It is hence apparent that linguistic meaning would not exist if no one makes sense of it. Therefore, meaning is indeed pragmatic, rather than semantic.

As language is a societal property rather than a personal one and human society a structure based on relations, the linguistic meanings generated by a language reflect (and also guide) the relations in the society. Take English for example, the words referring to female beings, when applied to men, usually connote senses that are derogative and insulting, for example, “a girly man” or “a sissy boy.” Also observable is that a word referring to a type of woman may connote a neutral meaning initially but after a while it becomes imbued with negative senses (for example, “spinster”). By extension, two words in two different languages may refer to the same entity in the World but they could have very different meanings because the peoples of the two cultures make different senses out of it. For example, the English word “dog” and the Spanish word “perro,” albeit referring to approximately the same canine animal in the World, do not mean the same. In English, the word for a female dog connotes an insulting sense towards

13 On the other hand, “a manly woman” and “a boyish girl” are not always as negative, although they can also connote insult due to the prescribed gender roles.
women and motherhood, but such a sense is not found in Spanish “perro.” Also, Suzuki (1978) points out that a Japanese pet-owner sometimes abandons her dog when she finds herself unable to take care of the dog properly. Even if the dog is extremely sick, the Japanese pet owner would not kill it. She would take the dog out and leave it somewhere, hoping “that [the dog] might be lucky enough to be picked up by someone” (ibid: 93). While observing that many English-speaking people accuse such a Japanese practice as cruel, Suzuki points out that the Japanese people would also consider the English practice of “mercy killing” unbearable. Both English and Japanese have the words for “dog” and “cruelty,” but their meanings differ, because the senses made by the speakers of the respective languages differ.

Lee (1987 [1959]) made a similar point through examining the different meanings of the word “free” in Japanese and English. As mentioned earlier, Lee pointed out that English-speaking people are constantly propelled to do something and hence they long for freedom all the time. However, even when they do have free time, they still feel obliged to engage themselves in some sort of activity, and hence the English expression, “time to kill/fill.” Lee (1987 [1959]: 55) thus summarized English senses of space and time: “space is empty and to be occupied with matter; time is empty and to be filled with activity”. On the other hand, for (some) Oriental cultures such as Indian and Japanese, “free space and time have being and integrity” and this “conception of nothingness as somethingness” enabled the Indian philosophers and the Japanese Zen masters “to perceive the integrity of non-being” (ibid: 55, Lee’s emphasis). She further pointed out that the ability to perceive emptiness might contribute to Indian philosopher’s naming “zero.” Also, Lee observed that a Japanese person would often do nothing in free time

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14 Source: Multiculturalism and Linguistic, a guest lecture given by Addie Sayers in a Language and Violence class of Hardman in the Spring term, 2006, at University of Florida.
while *making full use* of it by enjoying its essence. This again shows that the meaning of a word is not only multiple and conventionalized through human beings’ sense-making, but this process of sense-making is itself embedded in a multiplicity of structured relations. The meaning of “free” does not stand alone; it makes sense to us because it makes sense *in relation to* other words (“time,” “space,” “empty,” etc.) in the linguistic system in which we live.

Lastly, a reflexive note: In this section I follow Oyèwùmí’s (1997) use of the term *worldsense* in place of *worldview* because not all human languages-cultures privilege seeing as the dominant sense of perceiving. As Elgin (1990: 122-124) points out, sight is the preferred sensory mode for English-speakers, which explains their obsession of visualization. The English expression “I see” often means “I understand.” However, to indicate understanding, the Aymara speakers would say, in approximate English translation, “I *hear* (you)” (Hardman, 2000: 97). Speakers of different languages make different senses of the world, and hence “worldsense.”

**Discourse and Other Language Practices**

We have seen that words do not stand alone. They work with each other in a system to create senses and meanings. We have also seen that meaning-making is carried out by human beings through action. Therefore, we can understand language as *social practice* (Fairclough, 2001). Such a practice goes beyond the mere utterance of words or sentences; it involves the (re)production of discourse. For example, through a comprehensive analysis of the media coverage of Private Jessica Lynch’s escape from being a POW in the US-Iraq war, Howard III & Prividera (2004) are able to show how the American public discourse perpetuates the stereotypical gender roles. Besides pointing out media’s choice of words and the pertaining connotations, they identify several linguistic formations such as passive exononervative that also functioned to sexualize and victimize Ms Lynch and deprive her of the soldier-warrior identity.
Importantly, the large body of collected data help illustrate that it is not one or two blatantly sexist comments but the *recurrence* and *pervasiveness* of the implicitly sexist linguistic constructions that allow the public discourse to reinforce people’s habitual perception of gender.

On the other hand, Russ (1983) approaches English sexism by examining the writing about English literature. Her data consist of various texts including literary works, notes by individual female writers, comments from literary critics, anthology, and syllabi used in English literature courses. She identifies the following ways used by the society to suppress women writers (or, to *keep women in their place*): Denial of Agency, Pollution of Agency, the Double Standard of Content, False Categorization, Isolation, and Anomalousness. Each of these categories corresponds to an actual discursive practice, and all of them together reinforce the English discourse of sexism. For example, “Margaret Cavendish… was accused of hiring a male scholar to write her works” (Russ, 1983: 20). The speech act of accusation practices the social function of denying Margaret Cavendish’s agency: “she didn’t write it; he did” (ibid: 21). In sum, language is a structured social practice; through repeated practicing, the speakers/users of the language internalize the structure into their thinking and action.

**The discursive use of “we”**

As mentioned earlier, language confines us and at the same time empowers us. Language empowers us because we conceptualize through it; language confines us because it leads us to think in a structured way. In addition, (human) language has the characteristic of *reflexivity*, that is, we can use language to talk about, or reflect on, language itself. As a consequence, a language user is not always passive. She could make conscious decisions with regard to how she wants to

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15 See Hardman & Taylor (forthcoming) for a five-way categorization – Simple Denial, Pollution, False Categorization, Isolation, and Anomalousness – and further clarification.
use the language. Some people utilize language in a way that only fits their own parochial interests. They manipulate language through its vagueness\textsuperscript{16}. Such vagueness exists because although all languages enable their speakers to express every possible thought, each of them nevertheless requires explicitness only in certain areas that are crucial to the respective cultures. One example of the manipulation of vagueness is the discursive use of “we.” The pronoun “we” is generally understood as the plural form of the first person pronoun “I.” However, as Wodak et al. (1999) point out, it permits more than one logically possible interpretation. Two common examples are the addresssee-inclusive we and the addressee-exclusive we. The former incorporates the speaker with the addressee(s) but the latter excludes the addressee(s). Many languages of collectivistic cultures lexicalize both, but the languages of individualistic cultures, such as the Indo-European languages, often have only one word, and as such its interpretation becomes vague. Hence, many politicians of the latter group manipulate the vagueness of “we” to create a bonding feeling among Us through evoking a sense of uniformity and also conjuring up an unfavorable Other/Them. Wodak et al. (1999) give examples of how such manipulation is done by the Austrian nationalists, and Breuer (2004) that by the German nationalists. Fariclough (2003), on the other hand, shows that British Prime Minister Tony Blair has used English “we” to create a sentiment of Us-vs.-Them-enemy in his discourse adjoining Bush’s War on Terror.

**Naming**

Generally speaking, when we define a thing or an action in the World through language, we are naming and thus creating. But here I would discuss naming as it specifically applies to

\textsuperscript{16} Here I use manipulative/manipulation according to Van Dijk’s (2006) definition: manipulation is understood not only for its instrumental sense but also for it being an illegitimate form of power abuse. Illegitimate is defined as “all forms of interaction, communication or other social practices that are only in the interests of one party, and against the best interests of the recipients” (ibid: 363).
persons. As mentioned before, the derivational thinking pattern that emerges from the English postulates becomes part and parcel of the English cultural thinking. Based on the conviction that language is a social practice, we would expect to find manifestations of derivational thinking in every domain of social life, and personal names are no exception. Since English gender roles are based on biological sex and women derived from men, women are considered in the culture as passive and trivial. As a consequence, in English given names for women, we can find elements that convey properties and qualities that are weak (Gracie), trivial (Candy, Flora), little (Kat-y), and that are dependent on men and men’s names (Paul-a). As far as last names are concerned, the patronymic practice not only makes a woman take her father’s (but not mother’s) name as her family name, but it also asks her to replace this family name with her husband’s when she marries. Before marriage, she depends on her father; after marriage, she depends on her husband. She never stands on her own and has little chance to self-define. Hence, Boxer and Gritsenko (2005) conclude that this patriarchal naming practice not only perpetuates the inequitable sex-based power relations in the society but also affects a woman’s identity.

Also through examining the patronymic practice, Hardman (1994) explores the issue of imported sexism as a consequence of the introduction of Spanish to the Jaqi community in the Andes. She points out that not only has colonialism brought sexism to the Jaqi community through the import of the colonial language and its practices, but the current developmental efforts or international aids also add to the effect. In traditional Jaqi practice, a woman and her husband never shared the same last name; in fact, surnames did not exist. Hence, for Jaqi people, “the only possible explanation for the two sharing a name [as in the European way] ...was they were blood kin, therefore: incest” (Hardman, 1994: 153). Also in traditional Jaqi culture, the

\[17\] For an examination of the imported European sexism in the Yoruba community, see Oyewumi (1997).
name of the owner of a land was the name of the land. In other words, before colonialism, a Jaqi woman had her own land/property and her husband his own. The woman (and her property) was not a property of her husband. However, today the Spanish language has become spoken by many Jaqi people and the Spanish patronymic practice imposed on them. Consequently, the modern Jaqi women are gradually losing their names as well as their lands. Without their own properties, they also become dependent on the men.

**Conclusion: Cultural Emes**

In this section I have demonstrated that language is a structure with which, and in which, human beings construct the world. People live and act in a world thus constructed, not the World out there. In short, language is culture. Since human beings act according to the senses of their linguistic making, they act via the cultural emes. We should hence always keep in mind Pike’s (1954) *emic approach*. “It is an attempt to discover and to describe the pattern of [a] particular language or culture in reference to the way in which the various elements of that culture are related to each other in the functioning of that particular pattern, rather than an attempt to describe them in reference to a generalized classification derived in advance of the study of that particular culture” (ibid: 8). Only through this approach can we, to some extent, avoid imposing our native sense-making to a cultural phenomenon unfamiliar to us. Ideally, with patience, when different peoples meet, they should be able to interact in a way that allows them to learn from one another. However, due to various socio-historical circumstances, peoples have acquired unequal power and influence. Therefore, when different peoples are brought into contact, those with larger or wider influence may prevail while others are subordinated or even eliminated. In the next section I will review the literature of Language Policy and Planning that explores the unequal relations among peoples and their languages.
Language Policy and Planning

Traditionally, sociolinguists consider nation-state as the main arena of Language Policy and Planning (LP) and the government the main actor. This perspective is reflected in Holmes’ (2001: 95) juxtaposing national language (NL) with LP in her introduction to sociolinguistics. The sociolinguists also make a distinction between a national language and an official language. While “a national language is the language of a political, cultural and social unit,” “an official language … is simply a language which may be used for government business” (Holmes, 2001: 97). However, as Shohamy (2006: 161) points out, “for governments, language is a political issue and it will always be so.” Therefore, in reality the governments, who hold the power of definition, often disregard the academic distinction and use the two terms in ways that suit their political agenda.

Furthermore, Holmes (2001) emphasizes a language’s affective value over social function in serving, or being chosen, as a symbol for national identity. For example, in Paraguay the colonial language Spanish functions in most high social domains such as administration, education, and business, and it is believed to be the language of social appropriateness. On the other hand, the indigenous language Guaraní fulfills low social functions in family and/or talk between friends, and it is often associated with negative evaluations such as lack of education. However, despite the fact that both Spanish and Guaraní are legalized as the national languages, it is the Low language Guaraní that is considered by most Paraguayans as the actual national language because of its affective value of solidarity (Holmes 2001: 95). Many over-sea Paraguayans choose to use Guaraní, rather than Spanish, with one another, for it symbolizes the

18 And also in some other cases, “official language” refers to a language that is officially recognized by the government but is not necessarily used for governmental functions. Such a language has an official status but is not used officially.
Paraguayan identity. Hence, Fasold (1984: 259) accurately points out that language planning is usually also identity planning. However, while Fasold (1984: 259) recognizes a “definite relationship between use of language and willingness to claim a particular identity” (my italics), Shohamy (2006) warns against jumping into the conclusion that this relationship is absolutely dominant. She points out that other social factors such as religion and history may affect identity choice as well. “The use of language as the primary markers [of identities] … are very strict and narrow as well as imposing, especially in multilingual societies … where clear divisions among the different languages do not exist” (Shohamy, 2006: 143). Take People’s Republic of China for example. While different groups of people speak different vernaculars, many of which are mutually unintelligible Han-Chinese varieties, they generally recognize only one Chinese language, that is, the NL Mandarin, and one shared national identity. Holmes (2001: 101) thus speaks of NL’s “symbolic unifying function.”

Still, in some other cases, the NL may be divisive rather than unifying. This is often because the pertinent process is considered unfair by some. For example, although it may seem logical for a government to choose the language of most speakers as its NL, this is not always the case. While an NL often corresponds to the most dominant language in the nation-state, this dominance does not have to be defined quantitatively (as number of speakers), but it could be defined qualitatively as sociopolitical power. In the Philippines, Tagalog is the NL, but other native languages such as Cebuano and Ilocano also have a considerably dominant number of speakers in their respective regions. Tagalog being chosen as the sole NL of the Philippines “reflected the political and economic power of its speakers who were concentrated in the area which included the capital, Manila” (Holmes, 2000: 101). Agcaoili (2009), a linguist, a native speaker of Cebuano, and an advocate of Cebuano for Filipino NL, hence speaks vehemently of
“Tagalogism being accorded with an army and a navy.” Others with a more sympathetic attitude towards the modern history of the Philippines struggling for post-colonial political autonomy, such as Rafael (2006), would recognize Tagalog as the language of the sociopolitical elites of the time when the nation-state was founded; the common language of the nationalista then became the NL. This last observation leads to my next point: language planning as identity planning is also political planning for nationalism.

As Holmes (2001) points out, underlying nationalism is the myth of one nation = one people = one language. Holmes argues that this conception of linguistic nationalism was not observed before the modern nations emerged in Europe between the 16th and the 19th century (ibid: 101). Similar point of view can be found in Edwards (1994) as well. However, the Chinese nationalism may have a longer history than (and hence a different origin from) its European counterparts, as Qin, the first dynasty that conquered Mainland, had already administrated a language policy that lead to the standardization and unification of Chinese writing system in 3 BC. Such Chinese nationalism had generated ideologies very similar to Holmes’ linguistic nationalism, as discussed later in the LP cases of modern China (PRC), Singapore, and Taiwan (ROC). Regardless of origin, the ideology of “one nation, one language” has led to the violation of minority groups’ linguistic rights, which are legally defined as basic human rights in many international regulations and/or laws. Many scholars have devoted themselves to the linguistic

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19 See, for example, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities (both from UN), Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and Universal Declaration of Linguistic Rights (from European Parliament), and Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimensions (from OSCE – Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe).
rights issues and advocated for a more politically sensitive approach to LP studies (e.g., Heller, 1999; Pavlenko, 2002; Zhou, 2004).

While Edwards (1994) and Holmes (2001) associate nationalism to a state government, I believe that a distinction between nation and state is in need for a finer understanding of the various issues concerning LP. If the state was the only actor of nationalism, then LP should simply be a monotonic state order. However, in actual practice, LP is often expressed in and functions as a discourse, where the state and non-state actors simultaneously participate. Albeit relatively less influential, the non-state actors could often find room to express their own LP ideals. Hence I follow Smith’s (1995: 137) definition: “whereas the state is a political-legal organization … nations are social and cultural communities.” Following this vein, a state may consist of more than one nation/nationalism, as exemplified in the co-existing French nationalism and English nationalism in the state of Canada. Later in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, I will also show that, in the state of Taiwan-ROC, the competition between Chinese nationalism and Taiwanese nationalism has led to fervent discussions and debates concerning LP. Still, keep in mind that multiple nations in a state do not guarantee multiple expressions in cultural-linguistic diversity, especially when the thriving nations take for granted the ideology of ONEness = SAMEness in modern nationalism. In Francophone Canada, the Native Americans are as marginalized as in the Anglophone Canada; in Taiwanese Nationalist Taiwan, the Austronesian indigenes are as overlooked as in the Chinese Nationalist Taiwan. In addition, notice that a nation or an expression of nationalism may cross the state border as well. An obvious example would be the international Hebrew nationalism. Also, the people called the Ivatans in the Philippines and the Taos in Taiwan are actually one ethno-linguistic group divided
into citizens of two modern states. They dwell on a geographically related chain of islands, in the middle of which the Taiwan-Philippines border is marked.

Last but not least, I would end this section with a reflexive discussion on the linguists’ role in LP. Haugen (1996) identifies four steps in language policy and planning: selection (of norm), codification (of form), acceptance (by the community), and elaboration (of function). He defines the second and fourth steps as linguistic, whereas the first and third social: The social steps concern social actors such as politicians, but not linguists, and the linguistic steps concern only the linguists. Accordingly, LP is understood as a linear process where the politicians first choose a specific language, the linguists then codify/standardize its linguistic features and then elaborate/develop them so as to allow the language to, for example, express new concepts in modern technology, and finally the politicians make the public use this language and accept the established standards. In my opinion, this view is not only naïve but also dangerous. The motivations and power relations behind language selection and LP administration (to make accept) are overlooked, and the linguists are falsely portrayed as non-social and non-political beings, or single-minded craftspeople, that are rid of the social responsibilities for the things they do. It also reinforces the erroneous assumption of scientific objectivity that treats language as a politically neutral matter outside of human conscience. Heller (2006: 166), on the other hand, points out that language is “a set of resources socially distributed, but not necessarily evenly.” In Heller (1999), she takes French LP in Canada as an example and shows that many linguists are indeed engaged in political action and associated with certain political agenda when they embark on LP. Hence, I believe that we as linguists should at least bear some political awareness of our own action. While LP is particularly sensitive because it usually concerns laws and regulations, this applies to the minutest linguistic research as well. Since language is a necessary condition of
human existence, what we do and how we express our ideas all have certain resonances in the society.

In what follows, I will review in detail the French case in Canada and the Mandarin Chinese planning in Singapore. The French Canadian case helps reveal that even an identity that has received one singular label still has multiple expressions, and these expressions often in turn affect the LP decisions. The Singaporean case, on the other hand, would facilitate deeper reflection upon the one nation = one people = one language ideology. I intend to show that the Singaporean government’s self-proclaimed multiculturalism is in effect overruled by the obsession with ONEness in Chinese nationalism.

**French LP in Canada**

First, an examination of the historical development of the French linguistic ideology is necessary before assessing the relevant LP issues. Bourhis (1997 [1982]) notes that the Standard French today is derived from a sequence of events that privileged the *Ile de France* variety in the past. This variety, originally spoken by the political elites in Paris, was incorporated into modern French nationalism through LP. Before the 16th century, France was a multilingual country, but since 1539 when French was declared the only official language of the France nation-state, “nation building … was facilitated by language legislation promoting French unilingualism” (Bourhis, 1997 [1982]: 308). In 1793, Abbé Grégoire conducted a national survey in France with funding from the Parisian bourgeoisie in the National Convention. “In his report, Grégoire aligned patriotism with the speaking of French while non-French speakers were viewed as potential traitors to the Revolution and a threat to the political unity of the emerging French Republics” (ibid: 309). The nationalist “one France, one French language” discourse was introduced to schools and military with the aid of sets of policies favoring Ile de France, the
status of which was further secured by planned standardization and codification. Since the French Revolution in 1789, no other languages and/or French varieties was taught. As a consequence, other languages and French linguistic varieties withered away, and the prestige of Ile de France continues today. Its influence also goes beyond France thanks to the colonial expansion in the 19th century.

On the other hand, Bourhis (1997 [1982]) points out that despite the prestige of Ile de France, the loyal speakers of other nonstandard varieties have also found ways to express themselves. This is often done through the discourse of cultural/regional nationalism and the practice of ethnic revival movement. These movements resulted in the passing of a law called Loi Deixonne in 1951 that allowed teaching some regional linguistic varieties as second languages. “However, the ‘Loi Deixonnee’ is seen by many as too limited since these second language classes are only optional, often scheduled at inconvenient times and are assigned to teachers who lack proper second language training skills” (Bourhis, 1997 [1982]: 313). As a result, regional nationalism and revival movements remain in today’s France.

The situation in modern-day Canada is quite complex, for it involves the state of Canada that is predominantly English-speaking, a dominant version of French nationalism in Quebec, and other versions of French nationalism representing the French speakers outside of Quebec. Since Lord Durham’s Reports in 1839 asserted full assimilation of the Francophones to the English culture as the goal of Canadian government, English has become the dominant language in the state. Nonetheless due to geographical separation and difference in religious affiliation, French nationalism emerged in Quebec. This version of French nationalism was originally, as Heller’s (1999) puts it, “spiritual,” but it turned “territorial” or “political” after the declination of Church and the emergence of new socio-economic elites in the 1950s. The fact that this so-called
Quiet Revolution is an elite-initiated top-down process has led to what Heller (1999: 145) calls *linguistic purism*: the Quebecois elites monopolize the selection and standardization aspects in LP and are in favor of French monolingualism. As Bourhis (1997 [1982]: 317) points out, although because of 200 years of separation from France the Quebecois have developed a linguistic variety different from Ile de France, Ile de France is still considered as the Standard French and imbued with positive social values. As a result, Quebec has since the 1960s introduced various LP plans that cater to Standard French and denigrate the Quebecois variety.

On the other hand, since the 1970s more new immigrants have come to Quebec. This has contributed to the expansion of English because English has overall socioeconomic advantage over French not only in Canada but also in the world. As a consequence, a series of laws are enacted by the Quebec localist government aiming to secure the status of French in Quebec. Before the immigration wave, Quebec had two parallel government-financed education systems serving both the French majority and the English minority, but since the immigration wave and as a reaction to the growing English dominance, the government has passed Bill 22 that restricts new immigrants’ choice to French education only (Bourhis, 1997 [1982]: 319). This implementation of such a LP, however, was not successful in reducing the use of English. Hence, in 1977 the Quebecois government passed Bill 101 that decreed French as the official language, making it the language of work. However, as Heller (1999) points out, the success of this bill in solidifying French monolingualism is not simply due to the granted official status. It is also because of the fact that French was made into a *linguistic capital* that promises economic mobility. Besides, in the preface of Bill 101, Heller (1999: 155) observes an identity expression informed by nationalism: “the French language allows the Quebecois people to express its [sic]
identity.” Hence, the effectiveness of the bill should also be attributed to its reinstating the affective values of the language.

As far as the Federal Government of Canada is concerned, the Quebec-based French nationalism and the related LP pose a threat. As mentioned earlier, in its inception the Canadian state was imagined as unified English-speaking territory. When responding to the French nationalism, however, the government does not argue straightforwardly for English monolingualism. Rather, it argues for multilingualism in the hope to counteract French monolingualism. The government has advanced several LP proposals that seemingly follow the multilingual principle, but they have incurred suspicions: “Francophones tend to fear that it [the LP proposed by the Canadian government] ignores disparities of power between French and English, putting too much weight on helping English-speakers learn French, thereby helping them to retain their advantage in the marketplace” (Heller, 1999: 158). In other words, the Francophones discern that multilingualism is utilized by the federal government more as a discursive means than a genuine ideal. However, they often find themselves in disadvantage because the argument of multilingualism is supported and reinforced by a grander and quite popular discourse, one that which re-imagines the contemporary Canada as a cultural mosaic. Again, the observation here shows that LP does not function alone as legal matters, but it is integrated into the more general discourse.

Heller (1999: 156) points out that the Quebecois version of French nationalism challenges the legitimacy and identity of the one million Canadian Francophones outside of Quebec as well. These minority Francophones find their linguistic and cultural varieties delegated to a lower status than Standard French as well as the Quebecois. In addition, they also worry that the federal government’s LP would not represent their interests. Thus, as Bourhis (1997 [1982]: 316) points
out, one can now observe a newly formed Francophone identity in Ontario and also a French-speaking Acadian revival movement in New Brunswick, both of which dissociate themselves from the Quebeois as well as the English Canadians. In sum, the relation between LP and identity discourse has come full circle. Not only could identity discourse guide LP decisions, as exemplified in the Quebeois case, but LP could also influence identity choice, as in the case of the emerging minority Francophone identities. The minority Francophone case also indicates that identity has multiple expressions. *French Canadian* is more than one singular label for one group of people; its definition and ownership are rather fluid.

Heller also examines the linguist’s role in LP. She points out that “the politicians justify their positions on the basis of ‘expert’ knowledge about language” (Heller, 1999: 159), and “much of the work on language [by the linguists] in Canada [are] motivated by political interests” as well (ibid: 162) For example, the generative linguists’ view that language is an apolitical entity is taken by the Canadian federal government to justify their disregarding the Francophones’ concern with historical justice and social equity. On the other hand, the variationist view helps the minority Francophones assert that the local varieties are indeed distinct from Standard French and Quebeois. It also contributes to the legitimization of the localist movements and results in actual LP such as the curriculum planning in Franco-Ontario schools funded by Ontario Ministry of Education (Heller, 1999: 163). These instances show that language matters are truly political, and they have been political for a long time. As Bourhis (1997 [1982]: 314) points out, in the very beginning a Belgian linguist named Goosse had endowed prestige to Ile le France, advocating the “necessity of maintaining the Ile de France… as the universal standard for French.”
Mandarin LP in Singapore

Like Canada, Singapore also prides itself for being a multilingual and multicultural state. However, the multicultural discourse of Singapore is “more about homogeneity within each ethnic community rather than heterogeneity within the nation[[-state]]” (Bokhorst-Heng, 1999: 235). For example, the Singapore government identifies three major ethnic groups in the state, the Chinese, the Malay, and the Indian, and for each of them, the government prescribes *one and only one* language: Mandarin for the Chinese, Malay for the Malays, and Tamil for the Indians. This prescription then becomes the guideline for its language and ethnic policies. Below, I will use Mandarin Chinese as an example to show how the “one people, one language” ideology suffocates cultural diversity.

In 1979, the then Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew launched the first of a series of annual Speaking Mandarin Campaign. According to Bokhorst-Heng’s (1999) analysis, this campaign was at first advanced as a reaction to the dominance of English. While some saw English as an important resource for Singapore’s economic development and hence vital for nation-building, many considered it as a threat to the Asian values crucial to Singapore’s national identity. Later, in the form of an “English vs. mother tongues” debate, English was associated with negative values such as individualism and materialism while the local native languages were assigned positive values such as solidarity and family-oriented morality. Eventually, Lee Kuan Yew concluded in a newspaper interview that the mother tongues represented “a whole philosophy of life” and hence were irreplaceable by English; the statement also reflected the government’s evaluation of English as “culture-less” (Bokhorst-Heng, 1999: 240). The Speaking Mandarin Campaign (SMC) was conceived of by the government as a necessary means to restore the Chinese identity and traditional values. But ironically, *none* in the so-labeled Chinese
Singaporean community spoke Mandarin as their heritage language: 39.8% Min Hokkien, 22.6% Teowchew, 20% Cantonese, 6.8% Hainanese, 6.1% Hakka, and 4.7% others (1957 Singapore national census). The selection of Mandarin as the Chinese language for the Chinese people hence appeared *ad hoc* in nature and aroused uncomfortable feelings. In its own defense, the government presented three arguments: (1) cultural argument – Mandarin would provide the Chinese Singaporeans a “cultural ballast” that unifies them against the threat of English, (2) educational argument – the use of Chinese “dialects” [sic] at home would add burden to the children who are required to learn English and Mandarin at school, and (3) communicative argument – “Chinese Singaporeans needed a lingua franca other than English” (Bokhorst-Heng, 1999: 243). It is clear that none of the arguments actually explains why Mandarin has to be the language, except for the fact that the equation of Mandarin to Chinese is taken for granted in modern time20. Nevertheless, they all appeal to the “one (Chinese) nation, one language” ideology. The reiteration of this ideology was deemed sufficient by the Singapore government to justify their decision.

SMC is implemented in both the public and the private social domains. In the public domain, the Singapore government enforces a bilingual education program at school that uses the mother tongue of the Chinese ethnic group, i.e., Mandarin, as the medium language and English the second language. In the private domain, the resistance to Mandarin is greeted by slogans such as “no dialect, more Mandarin” and “from now on, speak Mandarin, please.” Bokhorst-Heng (1999: 251-252) further identifies several discursive themes used by the politicians to privilege Mandarin against other Chinese languages, which are denigrated as dialects: (1) “Dialects are vulgar [and] polluting; Mandarin is refined.” (2) “Dialects are divisive [and] fragmentary;

20 More discussion on the history that made Mandarin the Chinese language will come in Chapter 4.
Mandarin is the language of unity.” (3) “Dialects are burden to the youth, forcing them to learn two languages when they go to school; Mandarin facilitates academic success.” (4) “Dialects have no value, neither culturally nor economically; Mandarin is linked to a 5000-year old history [and] rich in culture.” (5) “Dialects represent the past and are primitive; Mandarin is the future.” Many of them are apparently paradoxical and self-contradictory. For example, Mandarin embodies history and represents the future, while the dialects do not promise future because they represent the past! Still, as I have pointed out earlier when discussing linguistic meaning, in real-life situations the effect of language does not have much to do with logic. Bokhorst-Heng (1999) shows that in a couple of decades SMC, as an LP as well as a top-down discourse, has indeed successfully made Mandarin the mother-tongue of many Chinese Singaporeans. Today, in many Chinese Singaporean families, the older generation and the younger generation have difficulty communicating with each other. In sum, through Chinese nationalism, Mandarin has been prescribed to the (imagined) Chinese community in Singapore, and as a result the non-Mandarin varieties, that is, all Chinese languages originally spoken there, and the distinct cultures encoded in them are diminishing.

Additionally, in the context of the Singapore state, SMC is often perceived as a threat by the minority ethnic groups. As internal diversity is overruled by singular labeling, Singapore sees only three ethnic groups: Chinese is the largest (77.5%), and Malay (14.2%) and Indian (7.1%) are the minorities. SMC, although focusing on the Chinese, has been carried out as a national campaign administrated by the Prime Minister’s Office. The two prime ministers since 1979, Lee Kwon Yew and Goh Chok Tong, are both ethnically Chinese. Bokhorst-Heng (1999) points out that many Malays and Indians hence have doubts on the claimed multiculturalism by the state government, which is accompanied by the phrase “unity in diversity.” They fear that SMC would
strengthen the already disproportionate power of the Chinese. Instead of directly addressing such fear and suspicion, the Singapore government utilized the ambiguity of “we” in its identity discourse to blur the issue. For example, as in Bokhorst-Heng’s analysis (1999: 257), it is not clear if “we” refers to all the Singaporeans or the Chinese community only when Prime Minister Goh spoke of the necessity of making SMC a national policy: “It gives us our bearing and makes us understand what we are today.” The discussion here shows that a careful examination of discourse and the sociopolitical context would help shed light on a linguistic issue, even as specific as one LP project.

As far as the linguists are concerned, most of them took the role of silent perpetrators in SMC. As I have revealed above, the discourse behind SMC is full of what anyone with basic linguistic training would consider common non-sense. However, except Bokhorst-Heng, I have not heard any other linguist speak out against it. For example, on July 11th, 1980, Senior Minister of State Rabim Ishak, when articulating the argument “(Chinese) dialects are vulgar, and Mandarin is refined,” commented: “Although [I do] not speak Chinese… [I have] learnt some of the swear words in Cantonese, Hokkein, Teochew and Hainanese. In Mandarin, the swear words are less common…” (Bokhorst-Heng, 1999: 250). The fact that no linguist stood up against the falsehood of this comment might be taken by the general public as implicit endorsement. Even worse, by keeping silent, the linguists helped pollute the agency of the Cantonese, Hokkein, Teochew, and Hainanese speakers (see Russ, 1983: 25-38 for “pollution of agency”). In other words, the non-doing does not make the apathetic linguists politically neutral; at best, it makes them seem irresponsible and unconvincing.
Threatened Indigenous Languages and Language Activism

Now I would shift focus from the linguistic concerns of (minority) immigrants to indigenous languages, especially those that are threatened due to colonialism, nationalism, and improper LP. I substitute the term “threatened” for the more common term in linguistics, “endangered,” because the latter is often embedded in a set of biological metaphors that many now consider inappropriate (e.g., Grenoble & Whaley, 2006; Harrison, 2007; Leonard, 2008). Also in this section I will introduce a new concept called language activism proposed by Florey et al. (2009) that prompts the linguists to address the language-related sociopolitical issues and to actively participate in movements that would better indigenous rights.

Endangered Languages? Extinct Languages?

People who care for the continuation of less spoken indigenous languages often speak of language endangerment, or endangered language conservation (e.g., Fishman, 1982; Hale, 1992; Wurm, 1991). They are academically trained linguists and/or self-taught language leaders who have at least some field experiences, meaning that they have either visited or stayed in an indigenous community for some time to learn the language from the locals. Besides being a convenient rhetorical strategy that can be easily used to approach the general public, the biological metaphor that analogizes the decline of speakers with the erosion of natural resources has certain additional merits. Today, the indigenous peoples usually live in colonial or post-colonial states where they are forced to adopt the mainstream society’s way of life, due to either political oppression or socio-economic pressure. They lose not only their languages and traditional cultural values, but also their land and the biological diversity that comes with it. Skutnabb-Kangas (2000) observes a correlation between linguistic diversity and biological diversity, and she suggests that the relationship may indeed be causal: “linguistic and cultural
diversity may be decisive mediating variables in sustaining biodiversity itself, and vice versa, *as long as humans are on the earth*” (ibid: 91, my emphasis). The presence of human beings is crucial. Simply imagine a scenario where a hundred dictionaries of different languages are dropped on an uninhibited land; the number of animals and plants should not increase as a result. It is the peoples who speak the languages and acquire the encoded knowledge about the natural environment that have an impact on biodiversity. An example would be what Harrison (2007) calls *folksonomy*, or *folk taxonomy*, which is the natural classification system in a language that differs from (Western) science. The Mongolian language identifies various species of what the Western science labels as one species of “horse.” Or, put differently, the Mongolians perceive many different animals that are all categorized as one animal by the western scientists. For the scientists, as long as *some* individual horses survive, the horse species survives. But for the Mongolian natives, it is important that *all* of these animals (or horses) survive because each of them has a specific place, and use, in the Mongolian life. Indeed, the Mongolian speciation (of what is known as “horse” in English) is itself more diverse than Western science, and as a consequence, the *species* gain(s) a better chance of survival.

Moreover, natural linguistic knowledge provides alternatives to Western science. It is a simple fact that science does not always work. How many times has a *scientific solution* failed to clear the problem it is purported to solve, or create even more problems? The more languages we human beings have, the more options we have when we need them. As Harrison (2007: 51) points out, “knowledge is fragile and may be lost in translation.” Also, as I have demonstrated in the Language and Worldsense section, the linguistic meanings are systematic and interrelated. Hence, it is unlikely that we could bring the Mongolian knowledge of horses to English by

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21 But of course, Western science is also (the result of) a folk taxonomy.
simply translating the horse terms; we have to know the Mongolian language to access the whole set of system. Therefore, the loss of a language is the erosion of human knowledge and may cause the survival of entire humanity (see also Evans, 2010; Harrison, 2007).

The analogy of languages in peril with endangered species, however, leads to several undesirable implications. For one thing, language loss is happening in a much faster rate than the disappearance of animals and plants. Krauss (1992: 7) estimates that, if nothing corrective is done, 90% of human languages will no longer be spoken by the end of this century, while only about 10% of mammals and 5% of birds are facing extinction. In other words, the biological metaphor fails to pinpoint the dire situation many languages face. While it may grab the public’s attention, it does not prompt them to act. Still, what is seriously dangerous about the biological metaphor is its connotation that language is an organic being independent of human beings. In a way, the discourse of language extinction, or language death, may actually be a self-fulfilling prophecy. This is because when people speak of threatened languages as endangered animals or plants, they think of them as such. As a result, there are many language documentation projects where a linguist goes to an indigenous community to collect linguistic data, analyzes them, and then publishes articles or books to be stored in libraries, not unlike a biologist collecting samples for the museums. The problem is that while many museum exhibitions are open to the public, the academic writings in the libraries are often inaccessible to the indigenous people. The people do not learn the language, and as a result it remains largely unspoken and unused. An unused language, even if its sounds are recorded and words written, does not mean much (except for its symbolic value for the people who embrace it as their heritage). It is hence not very convincing

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22 The statistics in Harrison (2007) is slightly different: 40+% of languages, 5% of fish, 8% of plants, 11% of birds, and 18% of mammals. But it nevertheless shows that human language is disappearing faster.
to claim that a language has been “preserved” or “maintained” merely because it is made into archives.

Informed by a panel of linguists, UNESCO has published a Red Book of Languages in Danger of Disappearing (Table 2-1) that categorizes world languages based on the degree of endangerment. It defines extinct languages as languages “other than the ancient ones” (UNESCO). However, as Harrison (2007: 5) points out: “Languages do not literally ‘die’ or go ‘extinct,’ since they are not living organisms. Rather, they are crowded out by bigger languages… [and] abandoned by their speakers, who stop using them in favor of a more dominant, more prestigious, or more widely known tongue.” Some linguists are aware of the absence of human beings in the UNESCO definition, and so they redefine extinction as follows: “an extinct language is one with no remaining speakers” (Grenoble & Whaley, 2006: 18, my emphasis). Unfortunately, this point is often overlooked by the general public. Probably because the biological metaphor is too powerful and also because the categories in UNESCO Red Book are very similar to those in the IUCN Red List of endangered species (Table 2-2), the public habitually equate language extinction to the extinction of a people. For example, my people, the Siraya who still live healthily in Taiwan with a population of around 5,000, were once referred to as “completely disappeared” in an earlier Wikipedia entry. Also in the entry, the language was said to be “extinct for a century,” while in fact some Siraya people today do speak Siraya, although not natively, as a result of a language reclamation effort that I introduce in Chapter 5.

Wesley Y. Leonard (2008), a native to the Oklahoma Tribe of Miami and a linguist, hence proposes language dormancy, or sleeping languages, in place of “language extinction.” The Miami case is quite comparable with Siraya: The Miami language has not been spoken natively for a generation or two, but the decedents still live well and are devoted to bringing their native
tongue back through a “Miami awakening” project (cf. “language revitalization”) that teaches the language to the younger generations. Leonard makes it clear that his choice of metaphor is a political one, for “different metaphors have different social effects and also… they differ in their level of accessibility to the wide range of audiences that one might need to speak to” (Leonard, 2008: 32). The metaphor of extinction has caused ignorance on the one hand and paradox on the other. The government and the public think that the language is gone and the people are dead, and so they are not worth of any attention, or, it is too late to do anything about them. The burden hence solely lies on the indigenous people who “have to experience the paradox of communicating and fostering an identity through an extinct language” (Leonard, 2008: 32). It is my hope that, through rephrasing the language-in-peril situation as sleeping, the Miami people, the Siraya people, and many others who share a similar experience, could receive just treatment and gain confidence in their uninterrupted continuous survival.

Language Activism

Relabeling, or re-conceptualizing, the issues regarding threatened languages is but a step towards language activism, a proposal recently spelled out by Florey et al. (2009) that advocates positive sociopolitical involvement with the native community by the linguists. In fact, language activism is not a new idea, nor is it a new practice. The linguistic works of M. J. Hardman, Leanne Hinton, and Wesley Leonard, for example, all fulfill certain social responsibilities for the native communities in various ways. However, as Florey et al. (2009) point out, there remains in today’s mainstream linguistics an ideological dichotomy that separates “linguists” from “community activists” and distinguishes “linguistic work,” which is supposed to be purely scientific objective and hence apolitical, from “community language project,” which aims to bring the threatened native tongue back to a community. According to this view, the linguists are
only responsible for the “language proper”\(^\text{23}\), and the burden of sustaining or reclaiming a language (through teaching, learning, and real-life usage) lies solely on the native people. Some may argue that such dichotomy is derived from a cautious reflection on some White-man’s-burden-like sentiment: the linguists are “outsiders” and they better stay away from meddling with the native affairs. I disagree. What matters should be attitude, not group affiliation. With a disrespectful attitude, a linguist can do just as much harm to a native community even if they “step aside.” For example, as I mentioned in Chapter 1, a famous linguist in Taiwan told his student who was leaving for fieldwork: “[The local] people there will complain to you about their problems and want you to help them. Do not listen to them. You should just ignore them. You only need the data. Get the data and leave.” With this attitude, linguistic documentation is not just unhelpful, but it could be detrimental to the community involved.

Florey et al. (2009: 4) define a language activist as “a person who focuses energetic action towards preserving and promoting linguistic diversity/supporting language rights,” and they emphasize that this definition “clearly incorporates both language documentation and conservation efforts.” Hence, the line between (outside) linguists and community activists is erased. If a linguist is to study the language of a people, she must get involved in all aspects of the people’s culture and social life. As such, language activism does not permit just any linguist the right to speak for the indigenous people. If the linguist does not take her involvement with the people’s life seriously, she simply would not be accepted by the locals as a member and hence has no right to speak. On the other hand, out of the academic conscience, many still find it imperative to distinguish the linguists from outside and the local indigenous people on the inside. For example, in Resource Network Linguistic Diversity, an online mailing list that welcomes

\(^{23}\) Again, this is to falsely assume that language exists independent of human beings.
people to discuss anthropological linguistic issues, many linguists have posted comments on Florey et al.’s (2009) proposal of language activism and questioned that the enthusiasm to help may risk being intrusive. Ironically, the linguists who share such worry tend to be those who actually care; those who do not are just apathetic. And I believe that the answer lies on a correct understanding of the relationship between language and culture. As I explicated earlier, language is culture. Hence, if a linguist has learnt an indigenous language well, she would be able to act in a way appropriate to that culture and not impose her own cultural emes to the local worldsense. This, I am convinced, is the true value of language activism.

Moreover, as Crippen (2009) points out, a fact often overlooked is that many linguists are they themselves indigenous. This statement may not be true in the past because higher education used to be monopolized by the social group with higher socio-economic status, and such a group generally did not include the indigenous minority. However, today, especially in countries that are economically better off such as Taiwan and U.S., many indigenous people do receive solid academic training. Many of them are linguists devoted to both the academic aspects and the community aspects of work pertaining to their heritage languages. My involvement with Siraya serves as one example, and Leonard’s Miami project serves as another. These indigenous activists are commonly perceived as inherent insiders by their respective native communities, despite the fact that they do not necessarily speak their heritage languages with native fluency since most indigenous languages are threatened today. Hence, as Crippen (2009), who is a native Tlingit person and a linguist, points out, the insider status of the heritage linguists\(^{24}\) could

\(^{24}\) Crippen gives a more detailed distinction between “indigenous linguists” and “heritage linguists” than my use of the two terms here, which follows English commonsense for its practicality in my discussion. For Crippen, an indigenous linguist is “one who studies the language(s) of their native culture” (2009: 7) and a heritage linguist does “linguistics with the language that [she] grew up hearing but [does not] speak” (ibid: 9). In this definition, there is no
simultaneously be a blessing and a burden for them. On the positive side, the insider status allows the heritage linguists short or no adaptation time to adjust to the indigenous community and its culture. After all, as Crippen (2009:11) puts it, a “fieldwork” is for the heritage linguists their “homework” and hence most aspects of the culture are already familiar to them. In addition, being an insider, or an inherent community member, also allows the heritage linguists relatively easy access to specific events and knowledge, such as those that are regarded as sacred and ought to be kept from the outsiders. However, the insider status also causes certain difficulties because (1) preexisting social relationships may interfere with the research, (2) the heritage linguists may experience lower tolerance level from the consultant(s), (3) they often face the temptation to prescribe older speech forms as the standard, and (4) their researcher’s role may socially distance them from their friends and families (Crippen, 2009: 13-14). Moreover, in many cultures the insider status also translates to tremendous communal responsibilities: (5) the heritage linguists may be expected to be “a political proxy,” (6) they may be blamed for LP failures, and (7) the community may ask them to teach other than just to research (ibid: 15). Indeed, the heritage linguists are all different individuals and hence they may not all consider the abovementioned burdens and difficulties as undesirable. I, for one, do enjoy my political role and teacher’s role with the Siraya. Chapter 5 has a section that shows how Crippen’s observations apply to my experience. It suffices to conclude here that heritage linguistics is a sensitive topic, and as it is becoming more common, it deserves more serious attention from the linguistic discipline.

While individual efforts are important, the continuation of a threatened language relies on the participation of the whole community. However, not all the so-called community projects are

place for those indigenous linguists whose heritage languages are sleeping and hence have not been spoken by anyone for a long time. In reality, however, this third group shares many experiences with the two groups of linguists identified by Crippen. It is their shared experiences that concern me.
truly community-based or community-oriented. For example, it is becoming popular for the linguists to build dictionaries for the language they work with, but many of them simply take the Western model for granted such that they impose the Western categories (for worldsenses as well as word classes) on a non-Western language. As a result, the end products either become unintelligible, i.e., do not make sense, to the native people, or they create an undesirable break between the linguistic artifact and the native culture\textsuperscript{25}. Hence, Cash Cash (2009) envisions Endangered Language Management (ELM), which I rename as Language Continuation Management (LCM), to be a holistic program that holds the language/culture inseparability as its central thesis and evaluates the “culturally organized communicative behaviors” as most crucial for language sustainability. It is not that the individual linguistic practices are trivial, but that the communal practices often bring several cultural aspects together and hence help reveal the interrelatedness of meanings. For example, when documenting data, Cash Cash does not, like most field linguists do, sit down with a consultant and record her or his speech. Rather, he puts a camera recorder in the background (so as not to be too intrusive) of community activities such as a traditional Nes Perce ritual and documents the whole event that includes gestures, positioning, material artifacts, music, and language(s). The data thus documented also include code-switching, an authentic, natural, linguistic phenomenon (and hence culturally important) that is often bypassed by the infamous “data elicitation” method that focuses on eliciting, or extracting, only certain linguistic artifacts from one focal language\textsuperscript{26}.

\textsuperscript{25} Cf. Aymara on the Internet at \url{http://test.aymara.ufl.edu} for an online language-teaching-and-learning project that truly reflects the native senses, or Mosel (2009) for a dictionary project that is candidly informed by the native people and designed to fit their practical needs.

\textsuperscript{26} See Newman (2009) for justification of and defense on “eliciting” data.
Besides documentation for preservation, successful language continuation programs need the passing of the languages and traditions onto the next generations. This often requires good political skills to negotiate for better language and ethnic policies, which would ideally lead to better, and more, funding opportunities. But still, even with sufficient monetary support and the determination from within the native community, as Hinton (2009) points out, most language continuation projects concentrate on issues such as literacy, classes at school, and master-apprentice programs, while ignoring the fact that language sustainability crucially depends upon intergenerational transmission. After all, a language continues only if it is spoken natively. Otherwise, it falls asleep. Therefore, as Hinton (2009) suggests, the indigenous communities need to show willingness to use their languages in the domestic domain, even though these languages usually do not carry as much socio-economic value as the dominant languages do. The linguists, heritage or not, can lend a hand by developing programs useful and feasible at home. The same applies to those peoples whose heritage languages have been sleeping. They can still be awakened as long as they are spoken again. For instance, Hinton (2009) gives an example of a young Miami father speaking the mother tongue reclaimed from the Maimi Awakening project to his child while playing games at home. Such is another good example of language activism.

**Identity Study**

In all the topics reviewed so far, identity bears significant implications. As Ager (2001) points out, identity is one of the main motivations behind the language planning (LP) associated with nationalism. Accompanying such LP is the nationalistic discourse that prescribes a homogenous people who speak one standardized language and share one common culture. Yet,

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27 This episode can be viewed in the Myaamiaki Eemamwiciki: Miami Awakening DVD published by Miami Tribe of Oklahoma in 2008.
as any sensible mind would observe, the natural state of human societies is multilingual. Therefore, the identity-based LP often meets resistance from the minority and/or indigenous peoples. These peoples cherish their traditions and refuse to see them denied. The traditions, and hence cultures, are encoded in their languages, which in turn constitute a sense of identity for the peoples. As such, the struggle against nationalism and nationalistic LP is also the struggle of an identity. This explains why even though most of the minority and/or indigenous languages do not carry as much economic value as the dominant languages, many of the peoples who inherit such languages still desire to bring their native tongues back.

Reviewing Western classical literature such as the Bible, the Hebrew history, and the Greek mythology, British sociologist Anthony Smith states, “There is nothing peculiarly modern about the problem of identity; It is almost as old as recorded history” (Smith, 1995: 129). In particular, he refers to the “who am I?” and “what am I?” questions that serve as the common themes. While I cannot find the exact equivalents of these I-related questions in the classics of the East and the Oceanic, where cultures are often directed towards collectivity, the concern of identity is still prevalent in the myths of origin that define a people or classify different peoples. However, because it is so common and essential, (the question of) identity has long been overlooked by modern academia, which tends to treat identity as a biological given. It is not until quite recently that the issue of identity has gained attention from some in social science, who begin to realize that the definition and positioning of a person and those of a people are mostly cultural, fluid, and multiple. In what follows, I will review the young academic discussions on identity in education and LP, in nationalistic discourse, and in narratives. I hope to find proper

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28 Le Page & Tabouret-Keller (1985) is often considered as the first research where the identity-related issues are examined sociologically and linguistically.
theorization as well as methodology that would lead to a comprehensive understanding of identity.

**Learning Identity**

Modern nation-states are with no exception of an originally multilingual and multicultural composition. But they usually have one variety of language stand out as the standard and socially prestigious, due to the ideology of nationalism, socio-historical context, and inequitable power relations. Many immigrant and indigenous minorities are pressured to learn the prestigious linguistic variety, which often represents the colonial remnant, in order to gain socio-economic success. However, when they acquire/learn this socially-preferable second language, they often also acquire a new identity. It is hence no surprise that a major field of identity study is Second Language Acquisition, or SLA.

The traditional approach to SLA, as Norton (1997, 2000) and Norton Peirce (1995) point out, often takes a code-based view where the (target) language is set in the foreground. That is, the focus tends to be “how effective language learning is” rather than “how language learning affects the students.” Following this assumption, the students’ (gender, ethnic, etc.) identities are coded as independent variables in correlation to their “learner strategies” or “motivations” (McKay & Wong, 1996). Therefore, if a student fails to acquire the target language, she is blamed for adopting the wrong strategies or lacking motivations.

Influenced by Hornberger’s (2003) *Linguistic Anthropology in Education*, Norton (1997, 2000) points out that SLA is often situated in and reflects the inequitable power relations in the society. When learning the dominant language, the immigrant students do not merely *learn to*

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29 I borrow Wortham’s (2006) book title and apply it here to show that the negotiation of identity does not take place only in language learning. Rather, it takes place in the acquisition of knowledge in general.
become the target culture, but they also face the challenge to as well as redefinition of their original culture. Norton (1995: 14-16) hence treats identity as a “site of struggle.” Since struggling involves agency, the individual learners are re-conceptualized as active participants rather than objects passively defined. Moreover, Norton (2000: 10) replaces “motivation” with “investment” by borrowing Bourdieu’s concept of cultural capitals. Languages are the carriers of these intangible cultural capitals. As a result, Norton (2000: 10-12) finds learners actively invest in the languages as well as the pertinent identities through evaluation and negotiation. Thus, identity should not be viewed as a constant trait that is biologically given; it is fluid, mobile, and always changing across time and space. While Norton Peirce’s original definition (1995) of “investment” focuses on the opportunities to speak, McKay & Wong (1996) expand it to include listening, reading, and also writing. Still, the assumption remains the same: SLA “must be regarded as constituting the very fabric of students’ lives and as determining their investment in learning the target language” (McKay & Wong, 1996: 603, my emphasis). McKay & Wong refer to this new insight in SLA as “contextualist perspective” that shifts focus from the effectiveness of teaching and learning onto the discourse and power relations in the acquisition environment.

Also noting the importance of sociopolitical context and seeing knowledge as a form of cultural capital, Wortham (2006) expands the scope of “learning identity” from language to all other subjects taught at school. He uses a one-academic-year empirical study of a ninth grade English history class as an example to show that the acquisition of knowledge in school is indeed inextricable from the construction of social identity. By distinguishing different timescales of identification, Wortham’s method allows the researchers to examine the interaction of the pre-established (hence often stereotypical) cultural-historical identity with the local socialization
process that takes place in the immediate classroom events. He reveals that underlying the seemingly academic learning is social identification based upon the established power relations in the society: two students were identified, socialized, or fit into the stereotypes of a “loud Black girl” and a “resistant Black male,” respectively, by their teacher and the peers.

Furthermore, Pavlenko (2004a) extends the scope of identity acquisition from the classroom to the general public domain. Similar to Norton, Pavlenko starts out criticizing the traditional view that prescribes a one-to-one indexical correlation between the language used by the individuals and their identity. Instead, she advocates approaching identity as a discursive process that permits multiplicity. In other words, an individual is associated with more than one identity, and this constellation of identities and the meanings within are fluid. Since meanings change in different contexts (time, place, the speaker, etc.), one’s identities change as her interaction with the social context changes. While Norton conceptualizes identity as a site of struggle, Pavlenko (2004a: 20-22) observes the process of “negotiation of identities” where three types of identities interact: the “imposed identities” (non-negotiable), the “assumed identities” (non-negotiated or non-contested because generally-accepted), and the “negotiable identities.” Crucially, she reminds the researchers to always look into the socio-historical background that would help explain why a certain identity may be negotiable at a certain time but non-negotiable at another. In addition, Pavlenko proposes the concepts of audibility and visibility as indicators of identity negotiation: audibility concerns whether the voice of a person/people can be heard, and visibility concerns whether the person/people is included in the imagination of a certain identity (Pavlenko, 2004a: 24-25). These two concepts are closely related to the poststructuralist theorization of the imagination of nation, which I discuss in the next section. Below, I will first
review another linguistic issue pertaining to the socialization of identity, that is, language ideology.

Language ideology is where the social meaning(s) and role(s) of a language are negotiated. In turn, it affects people’s decisions concerning language use and how they identify with the language in question. In many cases, language ideology is intertwined with the nationalism-informed LP issues. For example, to study the construction of the ideology that asserts English as the one and only language for the American national identity, Pavlenko (2002) looks at the change of language ideology in the US and shows that the general tolerance of multilingualism in the 18th and 19th centuries has been replaced by English monolingualism since World War I, mostly due to the anti-German sentiment. She points out two major discourses that have contributed to this transformation: (1) the Superiority of English, and (2) the de-legitimizing of non-English languages, which was (and still is) often manifested in debates concerning bilingual education. As a matter of fact, today the ideology has been materialized into the educational and immigration policies in many states, as English is defined as the only proper language to be taught to immigrant and indigenous children. On the other hand, Heller’s (1999) study on the French LP in Canada, which I have reviewed earlier, shows that the debate around language is truly identity-sensitive. The French ideology in Quebec is inseparable from the Quebecois nationalistic identity, which envisions a monolingual French territory. The Federal Government of Canada counters with policies that are seemingly in favor of bilingualism and multiculturalism, while they actually fortress the English dominance and prevent the recognition of the existing unequal power relations among different ethno-linguistic groups. And the Minority French, located in-between as well as outside of the ideologies represented by the Quebecois nationalists and the Federal Government, find their own identity and speech variety
unrepresented, and so they have to strive for audibility and visibility. All in all, by revealing the ideologies behind the negotiation of ethno-linguistic identity, Heller shows that the identifications of “being French,” “being Canadian,” and “being French Canadian” all bear multiple meanings.

Last but not least, some policies may not seem as straightforwardly concerned with language as LP in education, but they could also complicate the identity issues. For example, Shohamy (2006: 112-114) shows that policies of road signs, toponyms, and names of organizations affect the linguistic landscape (LL) in the public space, and the outcome would further affect the identities of the people(s) who reside in the area. She examines the LL in Israel and finds that much of the political-linguistic ideology is reflected in not only which language is used (Arabic, English, or Hebrew) but also in the semantic contents of the signs and labels. The linguistic landscape hence turns into the mental landscape in the individuals’ minds and affects their sense of location and positioning, and thus their identity. On the other hand, manifested in the private space, personal naming certainly affect a person’s (and/or a people’s) identity. As discussed earlier, Boxer & Gritsenko (2005) and also Hardman (1994) show that personal names are often beyond personal choices (assuming free will) and/or normative practices (assuming cultural tradition). The (change of) naming practice may be an indirect result of colonialism or cultural hegemony, as the indigenes or the minority immigrants accept the dominant culture of the nation-state in order to fit in. However, quite often a government would dictate its peoples how to name themselves. For example, some countries such as China, Japan, and Taiwan still have laws that suggest a woman take her husband’s family name after marriage. Also for

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30 I use the word “suggest” here because what make the women use their husbands’ names in these countries are not laws that directly states that they should do so. These laws are not under the policy of naming. Rather, they take the form of, for example, inheritance regulations: if a woman does not take her husband’s name, she may not inherit his
example, for over fifty years in Taiwan, there have been laws prescribing Mandarin Chinese names to the Austronesian indigenes. It is only until recently that the government has replaced the old policy with a new one that allows the Austronesian to register names in their native languages. But for many indigenes, their sense of the Austronesian identity has already been altered due to the imported Chinese culture that comes with the names. I will come back to this last case later in Chapter 4 when I examine Taiwan in detail.

National Identity

My research primarily focuses on a specific type of identity, namely, *national identity*, for it is what concerns most people in Taiwan. It lies in the center of Taiwan’s “identity crisis,” a favorite topic in the mainstream discourse. At the same time, I do not preclude the possibility of other identities (such as gender, age and ethnicity) factoring in the formation of these people’s identification process. Hence, in this section, I examine the conceptual and social significance of national identity in relation to other varieties of identities.

Smith (1995: 130) first defines two essential questions of identity: “Who am I?” and “What am I?” The who-question asserts continuity through genealogy and residence, but the what-question asserts distinctiveness through culture and community. He asserts that national identity belongs to the what-question rather than the who-question. However, according to the conviction that all identity-related issues are *discursively* constructed, one would assume that the distinction between the who-question and the what-question is only superficial. For example, genealogy and residence are expressed as well as interpreted in human languages, and hence they do not connote absolutely indisputable values. Etymologically speaking, the word “genealogy” is
derived from the Greek root *genos*, meaning race-family. And contemporary DNA technology has shown that race as it is generally understood is quite different from what is coded genetically. As Zach (1995) points out, most of the so-called Black people in the US have Caucasian blood (because of the One-drop Rule) and many in the White/Caucasian race have Native American blood. Also, as will be shown later in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, even the “family history,” or history of lineage, could be forged by the government, and it has been prescribed to the Austronesian indigenes in Taiwan. The concept of lineage is hence also blurred. Therefore, in real-world application, the who-question has actually been made into the what-question, and the two are virtually inseparable. That is how the nationalists often associate blood and lineage with a nation’s people.

Secondly, Smith (1995) distinguishes two levels of identity analysis: the “individual” and the “collective.” While identity often operates in both levels, confusing the levels of analysis may contribute to the confusion in discussion and explanation. For instance, as Smith (1995: 130) points out, “while collective identities are composed of individual members, they are not reducible to an aggregate of individuals sharing a particular cultural trait.” Or in light of CDA, one might consider collective identities as constructs in the global discourse, from which the individuals draw discursive resources to construct their own identities. Collective identification and individual identification are hence not one and the same. National identity operates mainly on the collective level. It is defined as “a complex of similar conceptions and perceptual schemata, of similar emotional dispositions and attitudes, and of similar behavioral conventions, which bearers of this ‘national identity’ share collectively and which they have internalized through socialization” (Wodak et al., 1999: 4). In addition, because of its direct relation to the nation-state, national identity exerts a special power over other collective identities, such as
religious identity, which may exert power only implicitly through the interest groups (Smith, 1995: 131). Still, this last observation needs to be put in doubt when Taiwan is concerned, for it assumes a monotonic expression and hence one unchallengeable version of national identity. In the context of Taiwan, the major political parties and interest groups are divided into “Chinese nationalism” and “Taiwanese nationalism.” Thus, even the identity of the nation-state itself cannot be defined singularly. Besides, the expression of national identity co-exists with but does not overshadow other identity expressions. Take gender for a simplified example: the Chinese nationalist-feminists tend to attribute the observed sexism to earlier Japanese colonialism, but the Taiwanese nationalist-feminists often attribute it to the Chinese colonialism. The attitude of the former is in accordance with the Chinese nationalists’ general hatred towards the Japanese invasion of China, and the latter corresponds to the Taiwanese nationalists’ grudge towards the Chinese intrusion into Taiwan.

Smith (1995: 131) further points out that, generally speaking, the collective identity is expressed through being “embodied in various cultural elements – the symbols, values, myths, memories, and traditions of the community, and the artifacts that express them.” As should be obvious by now, all these cultural elements are embodied in language and discourse. In discourse, a collective national identity often expresses the following themes: (1) a collective name, (2) a myth of common origin, (3) a shared ethno-history, (4) cultural characteristics that serve to demarcate members from non-members, (5) an association with historic territory, or homeland, (6) a sense of solidarity, (7) a definite territory or homeland (other than through historical association), (8) a common economy, (9) a shared public, mass education-based culture, and (10) common legal rights and duties for all members (Smith, 1995: 133-135). Later I will introduce the manifestation of these themes in the identity politics of Taiwan, but now I
would just focus on two most well-studied, i.e., the myth of common origin and the Self-Other distinction.

Given the ideology of “one nation, one people,” the myth of common origin is crucial to the nationalists who aim to prescribe one same language and culture to their target members. For example, as Wodak et al. (1999) point out, German is the primary language in which the original Austrian nationalism was expressed. This historical fact turned into a profound problem for the Austrian founding members who sought to create an Austrian people that were distinct from their German enemies. Therefore, they selectively resorted to some historical archives in order to create a common and distinct Austrian origin. One of the selected documents is Ostarrichi where “Austria” was first used as the name of the nation in 996 AD by the Romans (Wodak et al., 1999: 2). This (myth of) common origin, however, is not enough: a mere name/label for the Austrian people does not make them so different from the German. Distinctiveness needs to be built upon an elaborated separation system. Wodak et al. observe several sub-discourses or discursive themes in Austrian national identity that served the purpose of severing the German connection. First there is a “victim thesis,” which states that Austria was the first victim of the German Nazi occupation, and then there is a “perpetrator thesis,” which further defines (Nazi) German as the one to blame (Wodak et al., 1999: 5). Consequently, the German-Other is (depicted as) the only one responsible for the Nazi crime, and the Austrian-Self is rid of the guilt of having participated and facilitated in much of the crime. A characteristic of such a “Self-Other distinction” is that the history is often re-written, or selectively presented, to allow Self to be exonerated from the wrong-doings and/or to put all blame on Other. This discursive means can serve any designated Self. The Self does not have to be Austrian, and the Other does not have to be German. For example, Breuer (2004) explicates how a positive German-Self is constructed
against the negative French-Other in the German nationalistic discourse. Here the German are the brave and honorable, and the French are feminized as incompetent sissies. Note that this example again shows that gender could be incorporated into the discourse of national identity.

In sum, a national identity, and hence a nation, is often founded in and through language. Without the linguistic sense-making such as a myth of common origin and the discursive characterization such as the Self-Other demarcation, a nation cannot be defined. Therefore, Anderson (1983: 15) concludes that nation is an “imagined community”: nations as communities differ from one another “not by their authenticity but by the way in which they are imagined.”

**Narrative Identity**

While national identity is often constructed in the global discourse and connotes collectivity, it is also expressed in the local discourse and morphs into each person’s individual identity. A comprehensive identity study hence needs to combine the collective aspect with the individual aspect by integrating different methodologies. For example, in Pavlenko’s (2004b) study of the linguistic identity of English, which is related to the American national identity, she combines a macro-analysis of the historical development of LP and a micro-analysis of the memoirs of individual immigrants. For the latter, the method of *narrative study* was applied along with *ethnographic interview* (cf. Cortazzi, 2001).

Narrative study as a methodology consists of various perspectives (Benwell & Stokoe, 2006). These perspectives often share terminology, but many terms are defined differently by different scholars to fit their respective research purposes. For example, both scholars with Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) and Conversational Analysis (CA) backgrounds study narratives, and both of the two groups use the terms “global” and “local” in their analyses. However, while the CDA analysts take the sociopolitical and socio-historical implications into
consideration when they address the global issues, the CA analysts’ global concern takes a narrower scope. For instance, when the CA analyst Shiffrin (1996) mentions the “global” aspect of the construction of gender identity, she refers to the “mother role” and simply takes it as it is generally understood in the mainstream culture, without dwelling on the social meanings of such a role and questioning the reason why it is assigned to women. Neither is she concerned with the social effects this role-assignment may have on women’s identity. The questions Shiffrin does not address, on the other hand, are often taken seriously by the critical analysts. For example, even though the major focus is not gender in Pavlenko (2004b), Pavlenko nevertheless devotes parts of her discussion to the (re)negotiation and (re)imagination of gender in the formation of an individual’s overall identity.

A theory directly developed from narrative study that shares the critical concern of power relations is the positioning theory. In its original version, the subject position in a narrative is said to be determined by the larger social forces from outside. In other words, the subject is positioned by the structure and the narrator is completely vulnerable to the top-down social influence. However, Bamberg (2004) later re-conceptualizes narrative as a “self-making performance” instead of a mere text of personal story, and accordingly he develops an agentive notion of subject that acknowledges the subject’s (and/or the narrator’s) ability to position herself. Through “the creative act of story-telling and the construction of story content,” the story-teller constructs her own identity (Bamberg, 2004: 135). While the narrative resources (e.g., time sequence, social role, genre, etc.) available to the story-teller may be pre-defined in the social structure, she does take an active role in making creative use of them. By extension, De Fina (2003) distinguishes “identity” as an element in the content from “identification” as a process, both of which are observable in an identity narrative. As a consequence, this latest
version of positioning theory enables the analysts to incorporate both the top-down and bottom-up processes of identification. Or as Pavlenko (2004a: 20) puts it, it “allows [the analysts] to bring together the views of identities as located in [global] discourse and as situated in [local] narratives.”

Last but not least, albeit acknowledging the potential use of personal narratives in the examination of national identity, Wodak et al. (1999: 26) argue that “national identity cannot be reduced to narrative identity.” This stance resonates with Smith’s (1995: 130) observation that “collective identities are not reducible to an aggregate of individuals sharing a particular cultural trait.” Hence, in their study of the Austrian identity, Wodak et al. (1999) pay attention only to the global discourse but spend no discussion on any individual narrative. I consider this as an unfavorable result misled by the Path 1 CDA, for a solely top-down account of identity would overlook its complicated nature. On the contrary, because the distinction between “identity” and “identification” is made, De Fina (2003) is able to recognize identity narrative as a story-telling process that engages individuals as well as groups. Hence, it encompasses both individuality and collectivity. “At one level, identity can be related to narrators’ adherence to cultural ways of telling” (individual; Structure → Agent orientation); “at another level, identity can be related to the [narrator’s] negotiation of social roles” (individual; Agent → Structure orientation); “Yet at another level, identity can be related to the expression, discussion, and negotiation of membership into communities” (collective; Agent ↔ Structure) (De Fina, 2003: 19). Once again, it comes down to the Agent-Structure relationship, and just like any linguistic and socio-cultural activity, the two co-construct each other.
Conclusion

I have shown that a comprehensive study of the relations between identity, language, and society needs to take into account the public discourse, the official policy and planning, the local discourse that includes personal narratives, and the reflexivity of the researcher. The terms and linguistic strategies used in the discourses need to be carefully examined without losing the complexity of meaning. The inspection of policy and planning needs to include the public domain as well as the private. And, crucially, all examinations and analyses must adhere to the native people’s common sense-making, for only this would help unfold the essential cultural and linguistic elements that braid together the different directionalities, or flows, of social influences and interactions. When all these aspects are taken care of, a truly holistic research project would become possible. Such a project shall be able to include both the macro-level and the micro-level of the overall ecology and hence address both individuality and collectivity. In the next chapter I will introduce the methods I have employed in the quest for my research questions: What are the factors in the relation between identity and language? And how do they interact? I hope that the findings would eventually lead to the establishment of a healthy social environment where diversity is appreciated, rather than feared and/or oppressed.
Table 2-1. United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization Red Books definitions of language endangerment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Definitions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(i) Extinct languages</td>
<td>Other than the ancient ones</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ii) Possibly extinct languages</td>
<td>Without reliable information of remaining speakers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(iii) Nearly extinct languages</td>
<td>With maximally tens of speakers, all elderly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(iv) Seriously endangered languages</td>
<td>With a more substantial number of speakers but practically without children among them</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(v) Endangered languages</td>
<td>With some children speakers at least in part of their range but decreasingly so</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(vi) Potentially endangered languages</td>
<td>With a large number of children speakers but without an official or prestigious status</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(vii) Not endangered languages</td>
<td>With safe transmission of language to next generations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Categories</td>
<td>Definitions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(i) Extinct</td>
<td>When there is no reasonable doubt that the last individual has died</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ii) Extinct in the wild</td>
<td>When it is known only to survive in cultivation, in captivity or as a naturalized population well outside the past range</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(iii) Critically endangered</td>
<td>When it is facing an extremely high risk of extinction in the wild in the immediate future</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(iv) Endangered</td>
<td>When it is not critically endangered but is facing a very high risk of extinction in the wild in the immediate future</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(v) Vulnerable</td>
<td>When it is not critically endangered or endangered but is facing a high risk of extinction in the wild in the medium-term future</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(vi) Lower risk</td>
<td>When it has been evaluated, does not satisfy the criteria for any of the categories critically endangered, endangered, or vulnerable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(vii) Data deficient</td>
<td>When there is inadequate information to make a direct, or indirect, assessment of its risk of extinction based on its distribution and/or population status</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(viii) Not evaluated</td>
<td>When it has not yet been assessed against the criteria</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER 3
TRIANGULATION: A METHODOLOGY

Triangulation is a concept originally proposed by the CDA scholars of the Vienna School to describe an approach in which the “discursive phenomena are approached from a variety of methodological and theoretical perspectives taken from various disciplines” (Wodak et al., 2003: 9). While I borrow insights from theories in different academic fields, here I use triangulation to refer to a concrete methodology for this particular research that accommodates three major areas of a linguistic inquiry into identity: the big discourse generated collectively in a larger society, the small discourse by individuals and/or small communities, and cultural activism. The big discourse represents social control. It is prescriptivism in that it defines the peoples and regulates their linguistic behaviors as well as cultural thinking. The small discourse is not as audible or visible as the big discourse, but it reflects the individual minds and how they cope with the central control. Note that the labels I use, “big” and “small,” do not imply that one of the discourse types is intrinsically more significant or more important than the other; they are equally meaningful to social members. The differentiation is made only for the convenience of discussion, as it follows Gee’s (1996) distinction between the socially constructed “Discourse” and the locally constructed “discourse” as well as Erickson’s (2004) distinction between the collective “History” and individual “history.” The third element, cultural activism, on the other hand, exhibits social mobility. It embodies local agency, its resistance and perseverance, and an opportunity to move to the main, or central, stage of social influence. Triangulation thus means that it is my intention to integrate these three areas into one academic investigation. In the following sections, I will explain the kind of data needed for examining each of the three areas, how I collected them, and how I am to analyze them.
The Big Discourse and Critical Discourse Analysis

The Data

The “big talks” such as the speeches or comments by the politicians, and their renditions as well as interpretations by the media, constitute the main body of what I call “big discourse.” The big discourse also consists of laws and policies for which these politicians provide explanations and about which they debate. The language- and identity-related laws and policies also crucially affect the speech behaviors and identity choices of the politicians just like they affect everyone else in the nation. In addition, the talks given by other symbolic elites such as the expert consultants and/or interest group leaders, and, sometimes, the media reports on relevant topics that do not reference any specific individual or group, are of great relevance. The source, such as the name of the newspaper or TV station, is included in the data as well because it may indicate the bias of a certain media company and how the company “frames” the discourse (cf. Lakoff, in Powell, 2003). Journalism is never really “objective” or “neutral,” as most mass-communication corporations have an implicit political affiliation due to ideological preference or business connection.

For the purpose of this research, my collection of media data focuses on issues pertaining to the identity politics of Taiwan. However, the data come from more areas than just Realpolitik; they also include news articles in the Culture & Education column, for example, and/or Entertainment. In the highly identity-sensitive context of Taiwan, a seemingly trivial issue such as the name of a sport team representative of the country may carry certain ideological implications as well. For instance, the same baseball team representing the nation is often referred to as Team Chinese Taipei or Team Zhonghua by the Chinese nationalist media but as Team Taiwan by the Taiwanese nationalist media. Background understanding of these issues, on
the other hand, is implemented by the collection of the (language, education, and ethnic) policy data. While the media data are contemporary and their analysis mostly synchronic, the policy data are examined diachronically so as to show the historical development of top-down identity construction. Below, I explain the method I have employed to collect these data and its limitations.

**The Method**

Because I do not currently live in Taiwan, I rely on World Wide Web as my news source. I check the main news page everyday in Yahoo Taiwan, read through the news entries, and save the ones useful for this research in Microsoft Word files. The downfall of this method is that the internet news entries tend to be shorter than their original published version in newspapers or on TV, due to space limitation and rapid renewal. However, the method enjoys the advantage of multiple news sources and cross referencing. For example, through Yahoo News one can access news from all three major newspaper publishers in Taiwan, including the two Chinese nationalist newspapers China Times and United Daily News, and the Taiwanese nationalist newspaper Liberty Times. It also publishes the text version of news from major TV networks such as TVBS (which belongs to the ERA Group, a Chinese nationalist cooperation) and Formosa TV (Taiwanese nationalist) in addition to radio sources such as Chinese Radio Network (Chinese nationalist). Besides, news entries from non-mainstream sources are often available as well. Hakka TV and Taiwan Indigenous TV, both under the commercial-free Taiwan Public Television Service, provide different angles from the oftentimes highly opinionated commercial networks.

The time span for my collection is between January 2005 and the present. It witnesses one of the most significant political transitions in the history of democratic Taiwan-ROC. Between
2004 and May 2008 was the second term of President Chen Shui-bien, a political leader of the Taiwanese nationalist Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). And Ma Ying-jeou, the star of KMT (Kuomintang, also known as the Chinese Nationalist Party), has served the presidential position since May 20th, 2008. This transition has received tremendous attention because it marked KMT’s return to central political power since 2000. Before 2000, Taiwan had been under KMT’s exclusive control for 50 years. Therefore, identity politics was particularly heated in the presidential election in March 2008 and the time around it. During the campaigns, the two competing nationalistic ideologies had generated a vast body of identity discourse, which takes up much room in my data.

All of my news data are originally printed in Chinese characters and they predominantly correspond to spoken Mandarin, although occasionally a journalist might use the characters to write Hakka or Southern Min, both of which are Han languages, in a non-standardized way that is nevertheless understandable to the native speakers. In Yahoo News Taiwan, the news entries are pre-classified into 15 categories in the following order: Headline, (Domestic) Politics, Society (general), Local, International, Finance and Economics, Science and Technology, Sports, Health, Education, Arts and Literature, Entertainment, Travel, Life, and Reader’s Opinions. As mentioned earlier, because identity prevails over all aspects of social life, I do not limit my focus on a certain news category. Although most of my data were originally under Headline, Politics, and International (especially its subcategory China-Hong Kong-Macao), many others were retrieved from the Education, Arts and Literature, Entertainment, and Sports categories.

The policy data, on the other hand, mainly come from academic publications. There is a healthy literature devoted to the study of Chinese LP (mostly, but not all, about spoken Mandarin) and other related policies, and its scope of examination ranges over China, Taiwan,
and also other nations with a Chinese(-speaking) population such as Singapore. These publications often include references to the original policies and policy statements published by the respective governments, to which I am free to add my own interpretations. When there is a new policy or change of the old policy in contemporary Taiwan, I would then go to the websites of the responsible governmental agencies to look for official statements. I also visited the governmental websites to attain policy data concerning other languages and/or identities in Taiwan, which are relatively less documented by the academics. Still, given the long colonial history of Taiwan and the fact that not all the previous and current colonists use the same language, my own linguistic ability becomes a limitation. While I have no problem reading Modern Chinese as well as Classical Chinese and hence can assess the historical development of the Han-rulled Taiwan, I cannot read Japanese. Therefore, for the policies carried out in the Japanese era of Taiwan, I have to solely rely on other scholars’ translation, a secondary source which in itself is already a re-interpretation. Even worse, the literature dealing with this particular era is surprisingly little, and so my overall policy data are left with imperfection and await future implementation.

All the “big discourse” data are to be analyzed from a CDA perspective (in Chapter 4). I refer to CDA as a perspective because I do not want to confuse it with any particular analytical method. I share the CDA perspective that all discourse bears sociopolitical implications and all sociopolitical contexts channel meanings into the discourse. Thus, my data consist of policies

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1 As far as policy is concerned, the other two non-Han periods of Taiwan, i.e., the pre-Dutch indigenous Austronesian Taiwan and the Dutch era between 1623 and 1661, are of little relevance. The Austronesian Taiwan was a natural anarchy, and hence there were no laws or regulations to which the modern standard of policy can apply. Dutch Taiwan was a property of the East India Company, a business-oriented agency. There was exploitation of the native peoples and resources, but there was no full-fledged policy.
and my analytical attention is paid to the policies themselves in addition to the news. However, as discussed above in the review of CDA, many of the analytical concepts used by the contemporary CDA scholars reflect a Eurocentric viewpoint and hence are unsuitable for analyzing non-European discourses. Therefore, while I may still use some of such concepts in my analysis when the current Taiwan politics obviously mirrors the Western model, the majority of my analysis reflects Taiwan’s native thinking. For this, I have discovered a set of Mandarin Chinese postulates (since Taiwan’s big discourse is predominantly in Mandarin) based on Hardman’s (1993, 1994, 1996) framework of linguistic postulates as analytical tools, which I introduce in Chapter 4.

The Small Discourse and Ethnographic Interview

Definition and Method

A small talk is only “small” because it is personal and hence not as audible or visible as those talks in the big discourse. Nonetheless, a person can still talk about “big” issues such as politics and national identity. Moreover, anything a person reveals bears meanings to her life. Hence, no matter how small, or short, the talks seem, they are still significant. To be able to truthfully assess the meanings of such significant talks, I follow the guideline of Ethnography of Communication (EC), which was originally developed by Dell Hymes and is summarized by Boxer (2002: 13) as such: “[EC] is concerned with community members’ perceptions and representations of their own culture; therefore, it must be able to describe everyday, ordinary use of speech in addition to such phenomena as patterns of dialect and language use and ritualized speech events.” The key phrase is “of their own culture.” EC envisions a data collection method that emerges from the emic senses of the studied, rather than imposing the researcher’s judgments and values on them. The method I employed is ethnographic interview, “[which]
requires intensive and thorough knowledge of a community and its values and expectations in order to attempt to learn what the speech community under examination already intrinsically knows” (Linfoot, 2007: 205). Granted, as a Taiwanese native, my familiarity with the general background of the society has provided me with certain advantages. However, as I have pointed out at the very beginning and intend to show through this research, Taiwan is far more diverse than it is generally perceived to be. Hence, I still needed to make a great effort to be able to “hear” my interviewees well.

In the summer of 2007, I went on a fieldtrip to Taiwan with a digital recorder, a note book, and a pen, to interview 11 individuals from various (age, ethno-linguistic, gender, education, residence, etc.) backgrounds with open-ended questions. Except for some identity-related and language-related themes that I asked all interviewees to explore, I encouraged them to talk about anything they would like to address. The identity-related questions include “what is your name? what does it mean to you?” and “what people(s) do you perceive yourself as? and why?”, and the language-related questions include “what do you think of as your ‘native language(s)’? how do you feel about it/them?” and “please talk about your experience of learning language(s) in and outside of the school.” I also encouraged them to use the language(s) with which they felt comfortable (when talking to me) since no one is monolingual. As a result, eight of the interviews were conducted mainly in Mandarin Chinese (Han) and two in Southern Min Taiwanese (Han), while other languages such as Amis (Austronesian), Sakizaya (Austronesian), Siraya (Austronesian), Hakka (Han), English, and Japanese occurred occasionally. Some of these languages and/or expressions I did not understand, but my interviewees were all willing to explain them to me with tremendous patience. Although due to technical problems and my inaptitude as a researcher not all 11 interviews went on to be included in my data, through this
ethnographic method I have been able to attain several identity narratives with good quantity as well as quality. The average length of each interview is about an hour and 30 minutes long. But it is the stories and the people who told them that really fascinate me. All of these people and their experiences are unique, and hence none of them should be treated as a sample of the “typical Taiwanese” (or “indigene,” or “Chinese”). What I have gained from them is beyond the often narrow definition of “data.” Besides providing information, they have revealed their truest emotions and feelings while they bore those of mine. They have given me undeserved trust and shared some very private stories. I have learnt a lot. No proper words can really express my appreciation to these people. Hence, instead of “coding” them in a chart, I devote the next section to introducing (my encounter with) each and everyone of them in honor of their individuality.

The Individuals Who Share Their Stories

In the summer of 2007 I visited the following individuals. Although categorizing individual human beings is not to my personal liking, I include some background information after their names for the readers who are accustomed to social scientific writing and also for the convenience of indexing. The demographic categories include age, gender, ethno-linguistic background, education, and residence. Age shows the historical periods through which the person has lived. Gender may indicate different sensibilities that come out of the social expectations towards different sexes. Ethno-linguistic background helps situate the person into their native culture(s). Different education backgrounds often correspond to the different discursive strategies these individuals use to negotiate their identities against the big discourse. And residence is of special interest in Taiwan’s identity politics: in general, the society perceives those who (originally) live in the North(west) part of Taiwan to be Mandarin-speaking KMT
(Chinese nationalism) supporters and those who live in the South(west) to be Southern-Min-speaking DPP (Taiwanese nationalism) supporters. In this picture, the East, an area densely populated by the Austronesian indigenes, is often overlooked. I hope that my analysis of these individual narratives in the next chapter will help in some way test, or evaluate, the validity of such categories and the perceptions along them. But for now, the generalized categories are not my main concern; the uniqueness of these individuals is.

**Jian Yu-min (簡玉閔):** 29 years old; female; bilingual in Mandarin and Southern Min, with Southern Min Han heritage; master’s degree in landscape ecology; from Nantou County (Central Taiwan). Jian is the first person I interviewed. I met her in late May 2007 through her older brother Jian Guo-xian, who is a good friend of mine from high school. Her hometown is in Nantou County located in Central Taiwan. But when I met her, she just finished a 3-year master’s study in Hualian County on the East Coast, home of several indigenous peoples such as the Amis and the Sakizaya. Later she introduced me to a Sakizaya family whose father I interviewed. My conversation with Jian was very pleasant. She appeared to be calm, open-minded and quite impartial. She did not lay much judgment on the issues we discussed, including her personal language experiences and some general topics about the government’s current language policies. Unfortunately, my digital recorder (which I had just acquired a week before the interview) was not set up well and as a result nothing was recorded. (The interview was in Mandarin).

**Qiu Hao-zhi (邱皓之):** 21 years old; male; with Southern Min and Hakka heritages but identifying with “Chinese,” bilingual in English and Mandarin and also speaks Hakka as a third language; college junior, double major in English and law; born and grew up in Taiwan but had lived in the US from 1 to 7 years old. For me, Hao-zhi was an interesting contrast to Jian. He was
passionate, outspoken, and very opinionated. He never hesitated to reveal what he liked and what he hated. Among the people I met, he adhered to the “big discourse” the most. He spoke eloquently and fervently in favor of Chinese nationalism, using the arguments and rhetoric commonly used by politicians and/or celebrity experts. Even though during all these interviews I mostly took the role of a good listener, I must have revealed to Hao-zhi in some way that I am not particularly fond of Chinese nationalism. Our conversation was indeed quite exciting (yet, still friendly). I interviewed Hao-zhi on June 3, 2007. He was introduced to me by his older sister, Qiu Hao-xi, who went to the same college as my younger sister. (The interview was in Mandarin, with some English input).

**Huang Guan-zhong (黃冠中)**: 24 years old; male; Hakka Han heritage, bilingual in Hakka and Mandarin; pursuing master’s degree in botany; born and grew up in a Hakka community in Xinzhu (Northwest Taiwan). Guan-zhong is a good friend of my sister and also Qiu Hao-xi, the next person I was to interview. He is known among his friends as a jokester. When I listened to him during the interview on June 4, 2007, I indeed found him very funny and charming. His lighthearted attitude made coping with animosity seem easy. First of all, as Hakka is a threatened language in Taiwan, it is not very common for a person in his generation to be able to speak it fluently. However, Guan-zhong not only speaks (two different varieties of) Hakka natively, but he also has tremendous knowledge about the linguistic and cultural meanings of his heritage. And he made it clear to me that he was proud. While the popular media have constructed and continued feeding on a negative and stereotypical Hakka image through, for example, making fun of the “Hakka-accented Mandarin,” Guan-zhong recounted his personal experiences of encountering such racial and linguistic prejudices with nothing but amusement.
Even now, when I think of Guan-zhong, a young, thriving, Hakka culture often comes to mind. (The interview was in Mandarin, with some Hakka input).

**Qiu Hao-xi (邱皓兮):** 24 years old; female; Hakka and Southern Min Heritage, bilingual in Mandarin and English, and also knows some Japanese and Spanish; college graduate with double degrees in biology and English; born and grew up in Taiwan but had lived in the US for 7 years since age 3. My interview with Hao-xi took place on June 12, 2007. Like her brother Hao-zhi, Hao-xi is very eloquent and polite. She attributed their eloquence to the home education by their mother, who used to be a journalist. In fact, Hao-xi revealed her not-so-pleasant relationship with her mother, whom she respects but also fears. I truly appreciate her sharing with me such private feelings. According to Hao-xi, her mother is a “language police” of Mandarin Chinese. She not only asked Hao-xi to attend extracurricular “pronunciation rectification” classes and is picky about her Mandarin grammar, but she would also “correct” the Mandarin of her friends. I asked to meet her mother, but she was not in an ideal health condition at the time. I wish that she had been well. (The interview was in Mandarin).

**Huang Hong-sen (黃鴻森):** 51 years old; male; Hakka heritage, bilingual in Hakka and Mandarin, and also speaks Southern Min fluently as a second language speaker; college degree in engineering; from a native Hakka community in Xinzhu County (Northwest Taiwan). I interviewed Hong-sen on June 16, 2007, when he visited his son Guan-zhong. As a high school teacher, Hong-sen was very knowledgeable and his opinions on social issues tended to be analytical and impartial. Even when he talked about his own experiences, he gave a lot of “background information” in an objective manner. At times it seemed that the stories were general, rather than personal. Hong-sen’s interview was literally quite “educational.” Besides his occupation, this might also have to do with the fact that I am junior to him by about 20 years. In
the next chapter, I will show that the Mandarin Chinese Han postulate of “seniority” requires that the senior give advice and that the junior listen obediently. Still, Hong-sen was very kind to me and to my questions. He was certainly an admirable senior. (The interview was in Mandarin, with some Hakka as well as Southern Min input).

Ng Bi-su (阮 美姝): 80 years old; female; Southern Min Han heritage, bilingual in Southern Min and Japanese, with some knowledge of Mandarin Chinese but consciously chooses to reject the language; high school degree; originally from Pingtung County (Southwest Taiwan), but has resided in Taipei City (Northwest) for most of her life. Ng Bi-su is a grandaunt of mine that I had never met but occasionally seen on TV or in newspapers. Accompanied by my maternal grandmother, I visited Grandaunt’s Taipei residence on June 27, 2007. Grandma and Grandaunt chatted for a while, exchanging news about other family members, and then Grandma left me with Grandaunt Bi-su for the interview. As mentioned, Ng Bi-su has been somewhat of a public figure in Taiwan. Her father (and hence my great granduncle), Ng Tiau-jit (阮朝日), like many other Taiwan natives in his generation who had received higher Japanese education, was “disappeared” and executed by the Chinese Nationalist KMT during the White Terror period following the 228 Incident in 1947 (see “The Republic of China Period” section in Chapter 1). And so partly because of her will to “speak out” and partly because of tokenism, Ng Bi-su has become a “spokesperson for the victims” in the media. However, she had not dared to take this role until the late 1990s when she felt that the political climate in Taiwan had turned relatively safe. Even in today’s Taiwan, her act demands tremendous courage. The media image of Ng Bi-

\[2\] While everyone in Taiwan has a name printed in Chinese characters, not all wish them to be pronounced in Mandarin Chinese, which is the modern default spoken language for the characters. Ng bi-su wants her name to be pronounced in Southern Min Taiwanese, and therefore “Ng bi-su” here instead of the Mandarin “Ruan Mei-shu.”
su is often sad and angry, and sometimes “radical,” for in the big discourse she is often associated with extreme Taiwanese nationalism that denounces everything Chinese. When I faced her in person, I did feel many heavy emotions like sorrow and anger, but above all I saw a strong and perseverant woman. When Ng was 20, she witnessed her father being taken away by the police, who gave no explanation of why and where they were taking him. For the next thirty some years, she tried many different ways just to “find an answer,” as she put it. She snuck into the governmental archives, she smuggled reports about incidents in the White Terror period from abroad (mostly Japan and some US), and she had visited several other families who shared similar experiences. Not all these other victims were willing to talk to her. And she said that she understood; she was sympathetic. In the end, she found a piece of official document saying that her father was executed because he had committed treason. Treason, she refused to believe. Ng Tiau-jit was just an editor for a newspaper for the Taiwanese people to read (Taiwan Daily). How would he betray his people? As if she needed to justify him, Ng Bi-su told me many stories of her father having helped other “Taiwanese people,” and in fact, she has set up an Ng Tiau-jit Fund to support students from underprivileged families. In the end, Ng Bi-su rationalized that the accusation of treason could only apply to the “Chinese” (as opposed to “Taiwanese”) nation, that is, Republic of China, a nation that she has denounced. She has identified herself only as a Taiwanese, and she has refused to speak Mandarin, the Chinese language. And yes, both in the image depicted by the media and in my interview, Ng Bi-su has made many generalizations about “Chinese” being bad and “Taiwanese,” and also “Japanese,” being good. However, while the big discourse reveals only these generalizations, from the small discourse, or small talk, I have learnt the significant meanings behind them. A few months before the interview, Ng Bi-su closed down the Ng Tiau-jit Museum she had established to commemorate her father because, as
she said, “I am old, and tired.” I have not met Grandaunt since. I wish her well. (The interview
was in Southern Min, generally referred to as the Taiwanese language, with some Japanese
input).

Uma Talavan (Siraya), or Ban Siok-koan (萬淑娟, pronounced in Southern Min): 43
years old; female; Siraya heritage, bilingual in Mandarin and Southern Min, attempting to
awaken Siraya; theology degree; from Tainan (Southwest Taiwan). After visiting my maternal
grandaunt Ng Bi-su, I went down south to Tainan County to visit my Siraya (paternal) side of
family. Other than my original hometown Jiali Township (佳里鎮), I also visited another Siraya
community in Sinhua Township (新化鎮), where I found this flyer of a Musuhapa Siraya
Summer Camp, in which I enrolled. By then I had already known that I have Siraya heritage and
self-studied some published academic materials about the language some linguists had
announced “dead,” but I had no idea that there was this group of people in the Tainan Pepo
Siraya Culture Association (TPSCA) who had worked on awakening the dormant native tongue
for a decade. Hence, I was pleasantly surprised by the language lessons and music and dance in
the Siraya form when I participated in the summer camp in early July. Then I met Uma, the chair
of TPSCA and organizer of the camp. She treated me like a brother of her own and recruited me
to join TPSCA’s cause. I happily obliged. On July 20, 2007, I sat down with Uma. With honesty
and sincerity, Uma told me her stories. By not being afraid to reveal that she, like many others in
our generations, had only realized her Siraya heritage lately and learnt to embrace it, Uma also
let me know I was not alone. In the two-hour long interview, I was deeply affected by her
passion. More on Uma’s stories, TPSCA and its language and culture awakening missions,
including the summer camp, and the reflection on my own discovery of my Siraya heritage,
comes in Chapter 5. (The interview was in Southern Min and Mandarin).
**Padaw Ngayaw (Sakizaya), or Lin Bing-hong (林炳宏):** 61 years old; male; Sakizaya heritage, bilingual in Amis and Sakizaya and speaks Mandarin as a second language; elementary school degree; from Hualian County (East Taiwan). I stayed one night with the Ngayaw family in Hualian on August 3, 2007. The youngest daughter, Dome, is friend of my first interviewee, Jian. The generosity they offered me is deeply appreciated. The Ngayaw family belongs to an indigenous people of an approximately 10,000 population called Sakizaya, who had just been officially recognized by the central government in early 2007. Before 2007, the Sakizaya were mis-classified as the Amis people, as a historical consequence of the early Sakizaya seeking sanctuary inside the Amis during the Japanese oppression. Not all in the Ngayaw family shared the same affection towards the Sakizaya identity. While the parents identified with Sakizaya strongly, the three children did not care much about being Amis or being Sakizaya. They did embrace the “indigenous” identity, though. The father Padaw Ngayaw accepted my interview invitation. We sat down together on August 4. Padaw was very humble and shy at first, about his only having received elementary school education and his occupation of being a contract worker in Hualian Harbor. He said he did not have many interesting stories to tell. I believe that this shyness had to do with the fact that the interview was conducted in Mandarin, the only language we shared in which Padaw was not very fluent. I apologized for my lack of proper linguistic skills. Still, with my encouragement Padaw opened up and told me many fascinating stories about his life experience, the history of the Ngayaw family, the history of Sakizaya vis-à-vis Amis, and the church’s role in maintaining Sakizaya as well as Amis. I am also grateful that Padaw taught me several native Sakizaya place names in the Hualian area, which are only known to the general public in their Mandarin Chinese names. Due to an earlier typhoon, the Ngayaw family had been forced to leave their traditional home in the mountain to the suburban area of
Hualian City. I wish that they have recovered their native land. (The interview was in Mandarin, with some Sakizaya input).

**Xu Jin-huan (徐錦煥):** 72 years old; male; Hakka heritage, trilingual in Hakka, Southern Min, and Japanese, and also speaks Mandarin as a second language; high school degree; originally from Pingtung County (Southwest Taiwan), now residing in Taitung County (Southeast Taiwan). I met Xu Jin-huan by chance on August 4, 2007, when I took a southbound train to leave Hualian. I was going to Taitung County to meet the indigenous Paiwan writer/activist Sakinu, and Xu sat next to me. It turned out I did not meet Sakinu as originally planned; he had other obligations. Instead, I had a pleasant encounter with Xu on the trip. Xu initiated the conversation in (very fluent) Southern Min, but later I found out he was Hakka. Like some of the other Hakka people I had met, Xu told me what being Hakka had meant to him. His experience was as unique as the other Hakkas. Their difference might mainly be attributed to the fact that they came from different regions as well as generations. Because I had not originally planned for an interview, the speech setting was more of a “natural conversation.” Besides some identity and/or language related topics, Xu also talked a lot about his business, for example. I did not record the conversation, but I did take notes afterwards. (The conversation was in Southern Min).

**Chen Jun-hong (陳俊宏):** 43 years old; male; with Bunun (Austronesian) and Southern Min (Han) heritages, trilingual in Bunun, Southern Min, and Mandarin; high school degree; from Pingtung County (Southwest Taiwan). Chen is a folk artist mastering the Bunun craft of wood

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3 I did get to meet Sakinu in his hometown Lalauran the next year, when I accompanied Uma and two others from the Siraya Association to visit several indigenous communities on the East Coast so as to learn from their experiences of native cultural maintenance. I will recount this field experience later.
carving and malat (Bunun word for an indigenous hunting knife) making. In August, 2007, he had an exhibition in the Civil Cultural Center of Taichung City, my home base in Taiwan. My mother worked as a volunteer in the center, and hence through her help I was able to make an appointment with Chen on August 9, 2007. The day was also the opening ceremony for Chen’s exhibition, and so he was in a very good mood. But he was not prepared to talk much about himself, except for his art. Besides, a group of his friends, all of whom indigenous, was there to congratulate him and to celebrate. Hence, the interview did not take the traditional one-on-one, face-to-face, format. Instead, I was cordially invited by Chen to join him and his friends to a banquet in a restaurant, and they agreed to let me put a recorder on the big round table. The food was excellent and the conversation must have been interesting. Unfortunately, because the restaurant was noisy, the recording quality turned out poor. Also we drank a lot, and so afterwards I could not write down any orderly notes. And Chen had to tour the island for his other exhibitions. So I could not make another appointment with him before returning to the US. Still, I thank his generosity and I truly admire his art as well as what he has done for his culture through the art. (In the table conversation, there was Mandarin, Southern Min, Bunun, and probably two other Austronesian indigenous languages, which I am unable to identify).

**Xu Ling-mei (徐玲媚):** 53 years old; female; a “Mainlander” with Zhejiang heritage, bilingual in Zhejiang and Mandarin, and also speaks Cantonese, Hakka, Shanhaiese, and Southern Min as a second language; high school degree; born in Penghu Island (a small island off the west coast of Taiwan island) in a military camp and grew up in several military settlement villages scattered around the Taiwan island. Xu Ling-mei was the last person I interviewed. We sat down in her office on August 16, 2007. Her amazing multilingual ability alone shreds the image of a homogenous “Mainlander” group that speaks only one “Chinese language” (that is,
Mandarin), as portrayed in the big discourse. Yet, this multilingual ability does come from a shared Mainlander experience, that is, continuous migration. Probably because of her profession as a family psychotherapist/consultant, Xu was not afraid to reveal her feelings and the deepest emotions that many would keep private. She told me in great detail about her personal life history as well as the history of her family, who came originally from the Zhejiang province in Mainland China. Xu’s parents, like many other so-called “first generation Mainlanders,” were rather young when they were drafted into the KMT military. They traveled many places in Mainland China to fight the Chinese Communists. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, they were gradually removed from the Mainland to Taiwan as KMT admitted defeat. Then the migration continued in Taiwan, as the KMT government would relocate these soldiers and their families several times to different “settlement villages” due to different “development projects.” In these villages, peoples from different Mainland origins live together. As Xu told me, in general these peoples have developed a solid friendship and a shared identity that reflects their shared experiences. This explains why Xu has learnt so many different “Chinese dialects,” which are in fact mutually unintelligible “languages.” And neighboring the villages are often some native Taiwanese Han communities, which could be Hakka or Southern Min. Not all (from the) Mainlander communities get along with (those from) the native Han, but Xu has learnt to speak both Hakka and Southern Min when she was doing business in Taiwan. Eventually, she married a native Southern Min man, against her parents’ will to find her a Zhejiang, or at least a Mainlander, husband. In a quick summary, Xu described her identity as “rootless” . Neither Taiwan nor China as they currently are (which Xu has visited several times) has provided her a secured sense of belonging. I would not be surprised if other Mainlanders share a similar sentiment. And that may explain why Chinese nationalism does seem to have certain appeal
particularly to the Mainlanders: The imagined, historical China is a homeland, and an origin, of which these people(s) may still dream. (The interview was in Mandarin, with some Zhejiang input).

In sum, all these people I have met have specific stories that only come from their own individual experiences. On the other hand, they also share certain larger, or more general, experiences with one another. Hence, the individual identification and the collective identification interplay. Also, the descriptions I have provided in this section are rather incomplete. The identification processes as revealed in these people’s narratives are far more complex than those which the short paragraphs here could cover. For example, gender actually plays a significant role in Xu’s stories and it has also contributed to her “rootless” feeling. In Chapter 4, more pieces will come along when I bring the big discourse and the small discourse together under close examination.

**Siraya Activism and Participatory Observation**

One way to examine an interwoven pattern is through following the string. Siraya activism is the string I follow to get a closer look at the intricate pattern of identification in Taiwan. I choose Siraya activism because it is simultaneously “big” and “small,” social and local, and collective and individual. The contemporary Siraya Movement is as much a cultural event as it is political. Through several cultural reclamation activities such as language awakening and the reinterpretation/reinvention of music, it aims to attain official acknowledgment of the people. Started a decade ago by Uma Talavan’s father Ban Cheng-hiong (萬 正雄), the then Chair of TPSCA, the Siraya Movement was at first “grassroots,” only limited within the Sinhua Tavocan Tribe, home of TPSCA, and it represented a small local discourse collectively formed by the voices of the individuals involved. It had not gained much attention from the mainstream society.
A little more than ten years later, more people from other Siraya tribes, such as I myself, have joined the TPSCA’s team, which is now involved in several cross-/inter-tribal projects. Many of its activities are now reported in Regional News, and some in National News, of the mainstream media. In other words, the name Siraya and its people have gradually moved into the big discourse, although they have not yet been granted an official status by the central government. On May 2, 2009, the Siraya joined several other unrecognized Lowland peoples of Taiwan in a street demonstration in front of the Presidential House, an event that has made the people even more audible and visible.

**My Homework**

The Siraya movement is also personal to me, as Siraya constitutes part of my own heritage and identity. As mentioned earlier, I met Uma and was recruited into TPSCA in the summer of 2007. Since then, I have served several positions in the association, from Special Assistant to the Chair, Linguistic Consultant, to Head of the Siraya School Project, and I have participated in several programs. Most, but not all, of them are language-related. I have helped the language-awakening team in compiling a modern Siraya-Chinese-English dictionary that was published in November, 2008 (Macapili, 2008), I have helped develop some language-teaching materials, and I have taught several language and language-related courses in the 2008 Musuhapa Siraya Summer Camp. Also in the summer of 2008, the Siraya aspect of my research was funded by Foundation for Endangered Languages and Taiwanese-American Foundation of Boston, which allowed me to go back to Taiwan again and spend three full months in close vicinity to TPSCA and the Siraya people. Here, I would like to thank the two foundations for their generous support.

When all is in consideration, I, the researcher, have indeed received the status of a “heritage linguist,” and my participation in the Siraya Movement has become more than a single
“fieldwork” event; it is my “homework” (cf. Crippen, 2009). Even though Tavocan is not my native tribe, when Uma introduced me into Tavocan she did explicitly point out my Siraya heritage to the locals such that I could easily “blend in.” The Tavocan people have embraced me as a family member, as I have so embraced them. As Crippen (2009) observes, the “insider status” that comes with being a heritage researcher brings blessings and as well as burdens. From the academic standpoint, there must be certain specific issues that the researcher wants to explore. In my case, at least in the beginning, I was particularly interested in the political aspects of the Siraya Movement. I wanted to look deep into the political discourse and to get more first-hand information about how the individuals construct their identity. My insider status has helped a lot, as Uma would reveal to me details about the external as well as internal politics, which she would normally hesitate to share with an “outsider.” And she has brought me along to several political meetings, including some inter-tribal meetings where I met and talked to the local activists from other Siraya tribes. On the other hand, while I do sometimes wish to maintain more of a neutral, or “objective observer,” position, I have been given many tasks that required active involvement. For example, I have edited and also drafted a few political statements for the association, and, if not for financial difficulty, I would have been physically present in the abovementioned street demonstration earlier this year. In addition, as summarized above, I have been asked to work much on the language proper, which I did not initially expect to do. Originally, I intended the research more as a sociolinguistic project than an anthropological linguistic one. But then I recognized my responsibility for the people and the culture for whom I care. Being the only academically trained native Siraya linguist, I have little choice but to help awaken our ancestral language because many Siraya people wish to hear it spoken again. In fact, I wish for the same.
As a result, my involvement with the Siraya does not completely overlap with the research presented in this dissertation. Many issues, such as a detailed analysis of Siraya phonology or a discussion on the proper language-teaching method for teaching a heritage language as a second language, are left out. It is in spite of the fact that much of what I have gained from working on the language proper has helped me explore the Siraya identity discourse. For example, from the little Siraya language I have reconstructed with TPSCA, I have been able to perceive the native Siraya worldsense better. But, after all, this research is mainly about identity and the sociopolitical role of language. Still, I am committed to the Siraya for a longer term than this current research project. I will keep doing my “homework” as long as I am needed. I hope that in the future some of the material that is not included here will be published and shared in academia, and some shall be made available in other forms useful to the natives’ practical needs.

In sum, through participatory observing Siraya activism as a developing social, cultural, and linguistic movement, I have gained insights regarding the relation between language and identity, the interplay of top-down influence and bottom-up resistance, and the co-construction of identity in general. Chapter 5 is devoted to (these aspects of) Siraya and more details are presented there.
CHAPTER 4
THE CO-CONSTRUCTION OF NATIONAL IDENTITY IN TAIWAN

In Taiwan, identity, especially national identity, has been the most influential factor in people’s life for decades. Taiwan’s sociopolitical context is so peculiar that everything eventually comes down to identity. In sports, shall the national team be called “Team Chinese (Taipei)” or “Team Taiwan?” In business, does signing a pact with China equate to “selling Taiwan out”? In literature, how many “Taiwanese” and “Chinese Mainlander” authors should be included for the anthology to be considered fair? The discussion on identity hence prevails over all sorts of discourse, from family, classroom, to Realpolitik. Even when taking an inner city trip in a taxi, one may find it hard to avoid being engaged in a conversation about identity politics, as the stereotype of a taxi driver is one who listens to political radios all the time. Such an obsession with identity is often attributed by the media and popular opinion leaders to the long colonial history of Taiwan, which, they argue, has created an “identity crisis” in the country. However, in my opinion, the perceived crisis has not yet been dealt with carefully enough. For example, it is quite common to see scholars (or ming2 zui3, “famous mouths,” in the local terminology) in the ever-present political talk shows on TV¹, arguing passionately about identity against one another. The debates are often extremely heated but the opinions are rarely situated in professional knowledge. In other words, identity in Taiwan remains for the most part a subject of opinionated moral debates. As a result, it becomes more of a cause of the social problems and

¹ According to my rough estimation, there are at least four or five such TV political talk shows broadcasted in Taiwan everyday from Monday to Friday. They are all aired around the same time (around 9 or 10pm) and have a solid fan base. Each of these TV stations has a known political bias and the fans tend to stick to the shows that confirm their own preferred political ideologies. All the shows accept call-ins and encourage antagonistic comments. Therefore, instead of offering the audience a platform for reasonable discussions, the shows are, in a twisted sense, popular entertainment.
conflicts than a problem itself that needs treatment. Given this observation, I find it important to have a discussion on Taiwan’s identity issues that is theoretically and empirically grounded. This chapter provides a close look at the construction of identity through language in the general society of Taiwan. My discussion focuses on the two competing national identities, namely, the Chinese identity and the Taiwanese identity. In the discussion the underlying nationalistic ideologies will be revealed. At the same time, I point out how other identities, such as ethno-linguistic identity, gender, and age, have featured in the overall discourse.

The chapter is divided into three sections. First, it starts with a detailed examination of the linguistic background of Taiwan’s political discourse. In particular, I investigate the linguistic postulates of Mandarin Chinese, which is the language of high social functions and hence affects people’s general political thinking. Such an examination, I hope, will provide the readers with a preliminary understanding of the native society’s sense-making. In other words, it is for setting up an emic perspective from which one can approach Taiwan’s identity issues. Then, I review the nation’s language policy in order to examine the development and formation of people’s linguistic behaviors. Discussions on other policies, especially those concerning ethnicity and naming, are also included so as to show how they may interplay with the language policy in selecting, or limiting, people’s identity choices. In the last section, I provide both a top-down and a bottom-up analyses of Taiwan’s identity discourse. In the end, I suggest several possible ways in which the big discourse and the small discourse mutually influence, or co-construct, each other.

**Linguistic Background**

Since the Chinese Nationalist Party KMT brought Republic of China to Taiwan in 1945, Mandarin Chinese has been the sole national and also official language of the nation-state.
Despite the comment by former president Chen, from DPP, that “every mother tongue of every [ethno-linguistic] group is Taiwan’s national language” (President Chen, 2005), the law-protected status of Mandarin remains the same. This prestigious status, and the policy and planning that foster it, have made Mandarin the dominant language in all higher social domains. It is the language of education, commerce, media, law, and politics. Indeed, it is the language of Taiwan’s big discourse. Even in small discourse, an individual would often resort to Mandarin when engaged in “serious topics” such as identity because they cannot find sufficient vocabulary and/or expressions in other languages. Therefore, I devote this section to the examination of the linguistic postulates of Mandarin Chinese in the hope that it will prepare the readers with a native sense of Taiwan’s identity talks. In addition, I also provide a summary of the recurrent key words in such talks so as to familiarize the readers with them.

The Linguistic Postulates of Mandarin Chinese

Following Hardman’s (1993, 1996) anthropological linguistic approach and informed by Mandarin Chinese, I have identified four linguistic postulates of Mandarin: ONEness, comparative ranking, centrisn, and seniority. In what follows, I give their definitions, explain the cultural connotations, and provide examples that illustrate such connotations.

ONEness and singularity

ONEness in Mandarin Chinese is prevalent. It is encoded in the morphology of singularity and also in the commonly used words composed of the morpheme yi (“one”). Consequently it underlies the essential cultural values in various domains such as domestic organization, political discourse, and language ideology, etc.

First, take the morphological numbers for example. Although generally perceived as a morphology-less language because its syntax is rather analytical, grammatical numbers are not
completely absent in Mandarin Chinese. Specifically, there is a derivational suffix -men (們) capable of rendering any singular NP that denotes an animate being plural. The distinction between singular and plural is mandatory in personal pronouns: the singular forms are default, and the plural derived with the suffixation of -men. For example, wo3 (我) means “I” and wo3-men (我們) means “we;” ni3 (妳/你) denotes “second person, singular;” and ni3-men (妳們/你們) “second person, plural;” ta1 (她/他) is “third person, singular;” and ta1-men (她們/他們)“ third person, plural.” The same suffixation applies to other NPs that denote an (actual or imaginary) animate being, although in this case the use of -men is not mandatory because the unmarked singular form is so strong that it suffices to provide the same NP a plural interpretation with the support of a quantifier phrase. For example, xiao3-hai2 (小孩) means “child” and san1-ge xiao3-hai2 (三個小孩) suffices to denote “three children,” with san1 referring to the number “three” and ge classifying the NP. However, if the quantifier phrase is absent, with suffixation xiao3-hai2-men would entail plurality. In sum, singular is the underlying default form in Mandarin Chinese and plural the derived. However, unlike in English where such a default-derived relation is carried over to the general cultural perception and hence singularity is taken as the norm, in Mandarin the plural interpretation is often unmarked and more common. For example, when coming across the NP xue2xiao4 li3 de xiao3-hai2 (學校裡的小孩), or “xiao3-hai2 in school,” the Mandarin intuition is to interpret the NP as an unspecified plural rather than a singular. Such a tendency may use the cultural stereotype of “Han-Chinese collectivism” as a simplistic explanation. But later I will show that it is actually intertwined with the postulate of centrism that organizes the basic social relations based on sets.

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2 See the discussion of English derivational thinking in Chapter 3.
Other than grammatical numbers, the Mandarin postulate of ONEness can also be observed in the lexicalization associated with the free morpheme “one,” that is, \textit{yi1 (一)}. Many Mandarin words and phrases are formed with \textit{yi1} and they usually connote constancy, absoluteness, and precision. For example, the APs \textit{yi1-zhi2 (一直)} and \textit{yi1-xiang4 (一向)} both mean “always.” \textit{Yi1-zhi2}, “one-straight,” modifies constant action in a period of time, and \textit{yi1-xiang4 “one-towards”} connotes habitualness. Through such morphological derivation, Mandarin Chinese associates constant activities with single-mindedness and undeviating directionality: \textit{one way} is the \textit{normal way}. The AP \textit{yi1-guan4 (一贯, “one-through”),} which means “constant,” sums up this mentality. The idiom \textit{qian2 hou4 yi1-guan4 (前後一贯, “before after one-through”) yields a positive evaluation of someone whose mind never waivers. Such appreciation of the constancy of singularity also leads to the association of “one” with consistency. If someone is \textit{yan2 xing2 yi1-zhi4 (言行一致)}, her \textit{xing2} (“action,” “behavior,” or “deed”) is consistent with her \textit{yan2 (“speech”)}). Even if this person’s speech-deed is not noble, she is at least considered honest and may be exempted from additional moral scrutiny. After all, once a decision is made, one is expected to stick to it. Flip-flopping and/or nonconformity are not appreciated. The Mandarin word for “must” is \textit{yi1-ding4 (一定): ding4 means “to stop” or “to settle.” “To stick to (what is decided upon in) one speech,” yi1 yan2 wei2 ding4 (一言為定), hence means to keep a promise.

Given the meanings of constancy and consistency, Mandarin ONEness also connotes wholeness, collectivity, or totality. The word \textit{yi1 cie4 (一切)} means “all” or “whole”: \textit{cie4} is “to cut” and \textit{yi1 cie4} hence literally means “to cut with one stroke.” The metaphor employed here in “one-cut” is not such that the completeness is cut in half. Rather, what is cut off is the complexity that interferes with the ideal wholeness: once the complexity is gotten rid of,
completeness is achieved. This Mandarin wholeness-in-ONEness is manifested in many common NPs. For example, while Mandarin does have a quantifier *quan* (全) that refers to “all” or “whole,” it can often be replaced by *yi*. For example, *quan* *guo* (全) and *quan* *tian* (全天) mean “the whole nation” and “the whole day,” respectively; but *yi* *guo* (一) and *yi* *tian* (一天) are capable of connoting the same meanings. Also, while with the classifier *ge* (個), *yi*-ge *jia* (一個家) would necessarily single out “one family/home,” without the classifier, *yi* *jia* (一家) would mean “the whole family.” Hence, although the mother is the “main married-woman,” *zhu* *fu* (主婦), of a household, the father’s dominant role is unquestionable because he is the real *yi* *jia* *zhi* *zhu* (一家之主), “the main boss of the whole family.”

Now that the connotation of constancy and totality in Mandarin ONEness is understood, it should not be a surprise that *yi* also connotes “sameness.” *Yi* *yang* (一樣), “one appearance,” is the word for “same/alike.” The Han-Chinese founding fathers hence felt natural to prescribe *wu* *zu* *yi* *jia* (五族一家), “five peoples, same family.” And the Chinese nationalists of Republic of China (i.e., Taiwan) point to the phrase *yi* *xin* *yi* *de* (一心一德) in the lyrics of its national anthem to demand all citizens share “the same mind (xin)” and “the same virtue

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3 The Mandarin metaphor of “cutting off the complexity to make clear a situation” is also exemplified in the idioms that describe the (in)ability (to) end of the relation between two people. For example, *yi* *dao* *liang* *duan* (一刀兩斷) literally means to cut (a line) into two separate segments and metaphorically it means “to end a relation decisively.” On the contrary, *jian* *bu* *duan* *li* *hai* *luan* (剪不斷理還亂) and *ou* *duan* *si* *lian* (藕斷絲連) both conjure the image of something that is messily cut and as a result there are still “strings attached,” referring to a situation where the breaking up is unsuccessful.

4 The Mandarin word *zhu* has an adverbial meaning of “main” or “major,” and it also has a nominal meaning that refers to “the boss,” or “the chief manager.”

5 In fact, there are more than five identifiable ethnically, culturally, and linguistically different peoples in China.
(de2)” for the love of the nation. In fact, sameness is also embedded in the Mandarin word for collective identity, ren4 tong2 (認同), which literally means “recognized sameness.” Therefore, under the influence of this ONE = SAMEness postulate, any call for the attention to the internal conflicts due to real-world cultural diversity in the Chinese nation(s) is easily ridiculed as a separatist attempt. In other words, Mandarin, the sole national language in the two existent Chinese nations, ROC and PRC, has provided modern Chinese nationalism with a solid foundation.

**Comparative ranking**

Like in English, to compare in Mandarin Chinese necessarily entails ranking. That is, if two or more things are compared, one must be better, more, the best, or the most. In comparison, things (that are not categorized into ONE) cannot just be alike or different. However, Mandarin comparison differs from English comparison in that inflectional morphology is never used. While for most adjectival roots English uses the inflectional suffixes -er and -est to render them comparative and superlative, Mandarin Chinese uses the isolated comparative morphemes “more” (bi3 jiao4, 比較) and superlative morpheme “most” (zui4, 最) to supplement all adjectival roots. For example, the Mandarin word for “tall” is gao1 (高); its comparative form is bi3 jiao4 gao1, “more tall,” and the superlative form is zui4 gao1, “most tall.”

Mandarin comparison is manifested throughout different layers of grammar: morphology, syntax, and semantics. It is encoded in the VP bi3 jiao4/bi3 (比較/比, “to compare”) and the

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6 While ren4 tong2 refers to the collective identity, the other word, shen1 fen4 (身份, lit. “body portion”) refers to the individual identity. Ren4 tong2 is hence the word more commonly used in the discourse of national identity, although shen2 fen4 may also appear, especially when the nation-state is humanized through metaphorical expressions. For example, the Taiwanese nationalists may say, “a national ren4 tong2 is very important because Taiwan has not yet found a distinct shen1 fen4.”
comparative morpheme (also bi3 jiao4) and superlative morpheme (zui4) introduced earlier.

Notice that the “to compare” VP and the comparative morpheme are exactly the same. Hence, probably for economic reasons, when the VP is used, the comparative morpheme is absent, as shown in examples (1) and (2) below.

(1) Wang2mei3mei3 bi3 Li3ying1xong2 (jiao4) gao1
Female name to compare male name (jiao4) tall.
Wang Meimei is taller than Li Yingxong.

(2) *Wang2mei3mei3 bi3 Li3ying1xong2 (jiao4) bi3jiao4 gao1.
Female name to compare male name (jiao4) *comparative tall
And the following examples show that in Mandarin Chinese it is ungrammatical to compare without ranking.

(3) *Wang2mei3mei3 bi3 Li3ying1xong2
Female name compare Male name
*Wang Meimei compares to Li Yingxong.

(4) *Wang2mei3mei3 bi3 Li3ying1xong2 yi1yang4/bu4 yi1yang4
Female name compare male name same/not same
*Wang Meimei compares to Li Yingxong the same/different.
Example (3) clearly shows that it is impossible to compare two things (in this case, people) without ranking them, or the traits or properties they carry. And (4) is ungrammatical because of the use of “same” and “different,” even though “same” and “different” are APs. Significant in this observation is that what makes (4) ungrammatical is not syntax. If “same” and “different” are replaced by any other AP, then (4) becomes grammatical. In other words, (4) is ungrammatical purely for semantic reasons: things compared just cannot be the same or different.

Now, following the contextual information in (1), a Mandarin speaker can reach the conclusion in (5), using the comparative morpheme bi3jiao4.
(5) Wang2mei3mei3 bi3jiao4 gao1
Female name comparative tall
_Wang Meimei is taller._
Note that the postulate of comparative ranking is so strong that even without any given context
(5) would still make sense. When uttered alone as a single sentence, that is, isolated from any
informational background, (5) would mean that Wang Meimei is “relatively taller” (than average
human beings).

Another example that reveals comparative thinking in Mandarin Chinese would be the use
of _bu4ru2_ (不如). _Bu4ru2_ is derived from the combination of the negation _bu4_ and the
morpheme “similar” _ru2_. However, it does not mean “unlike;” it means “less than.” _X (is)
bu4ru2 Y_ does not mean “X is unlike Y;” rather, it means “X is _lesser than_ Y.” Therefore, the
overall cognitive structure of comparative ranking in Mandarin Chinese can be summarized as
such: if someone or something is unlike, or different from, other people or things, then this
person or thing is lesser than the rest. This observation corresponds to the well-known
collectivist culture of Han-Chinese. Also, to specify that X is lesser than Y in a certain respect,
one only needs to add an AP that is _neither “same” nor “different,”_ as in (6).

(6) Li3ying1xong2 bu4ru2 Wang2mei3mei3 gao1
Male name unlike female name tall
_Li Yingxong is not as tall as Wang Meimei._
In addition, _bu4ru2_ also has a metaphorical function. Let me use a common scenario for
example: if a person complains about the food offered to her, the cook could reproach the diner
by saying, “if the food is truly so bad, you _bu4ru2_ not eat it.” The second clause translates to
“you might as well not eat it.” Again, this use of _bu4ru2_ connotes lesser in degree.

Finally, I would like to point out that it is still possible to state that two things are alike or
different in Mandarin Chinese. Just like in English, all one needs to do is use the simple
conjunction “and” (he2/han4, 和) to connect the people or things in question: “X and Y (are) the same/different.” In other words, Mandarin Chinese speakers do have the option to look at things without ranking them. Also note that the Mandarin word for “the same,” yi1 yang4 (一樣), literally means “one appearance.” Hence, the ONEness postulate is also effective here: to have things the same is to first make them ONE. However, the option of seeing things simply as alike or different is often ignored because compare-to-rank is entrenched in Mandarin speakers’ mentality. The comparative construction discussed in this section is among the first sentence patterns taught in school, it is ubiquitous in media discourse, and it is prevalent in people’s daily speech. In other words, for Mandarin speakers, comparative ranking has become habitual thinking.

Centrism

As shown in the previous section, any trait or quality except being the same or different can be ranked in Mandarin Chinese. However, certain qualities are deemed more important than others in Chinese culture. The two qualities in question are centrism and seniority distinction, and their importance is indicated through the validation in grammar.

What I refer to as centrism is such that the center is the core of the universe and hence people’s perception; and it is always positively valued. The word for “center” in Mandarin Chinese is zhong1 (中). With zhong1 the Han-Chinese people position, and identify, themselves. They call their country zhong1 guo2 (中國) and themselves zhong1 guo2 ren2 (中國人). Zhong1 guo2, “central/middle nation,” denotes the land known as China, and it is often translated in English as the Middle Kingdom. This sexist connotation in this translation is not wrong, for

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7 And the Mandarin word for “different” is formed by adding the negation morpheme bu4 (不) to yi1 yang4.
Confucius, arguably the most influential ideologist in Han-Chinese history, did prescribe male sex to the leader’s role of the country. However, such a simple translation from one language to another obscures the linguistic development of the original native concept. Again, zhong1 guo2 literally means only “central country,” or “the country that is in the center of the world;” the “kingdom” part in the accepted translation is derived from Confucius’s teaching and the interwoven relation between centrism and other postulates that assign male dominance. Besides, zhong1 guo2 being an unifying term for all those involved in the land of China and or its nationalistic history has occurred rather recently. In the so-called 5,000 years of Chinese history, there have been many nations, or dynasties, each with a different name for itself and oftentimes ruled by a different people. None of the dynasties was named zhong1 guo2, which was only first incorporated into a national name in 1912 by Sun Yet-sen, a native Cantonese speaker, when he founded Republic of China, or zhong1 hua2 min2 guo2. Later, ROC and PRC (People’s Republic of China, or zhong1 hua2 ren2 min2 gong4 he2 guo2) split in 1949; both of them have decided upon Mandarin as the sole national language (hence the Chinese language), both have claimed to be the authentic zhong1 guo2, and the fight over central authenticity has continued until today.

For the Chinese nationalists in ROC and PRC alike, there can be ONE and only ONE central nation. However, when it comes to peoples, cultures, languages, and versions of history, these Chinese nationalists tend to ignore the diversity and they would conjure up an imaginary CHINESEness that is unquestionably singular: there is only ONE Chinese race that speaks ONE Chinese language and shares ONE common history. It may seem ironic that in the history of the expansion of Chinese territory, peoples that lived outside of the territory of (what is prescribed in the imaginary Chinese history as) Middle Kingdom were all referred to as barbarians and/or
savages. But once they are in, that is, being conquered, they become the same “Chinese people.”

Recall the ONEness postulates that also encodes ALL and WHOLENESS.

Other than the unifying power in organizing the universe and the nation, the concept of “center” (zhong1) is also considered suitable for managing human life. Confucianism teaches the Chinese leaders to “manage” (guan3 li3) or “control” (tong3 zhi4) the people with zhong1 dao4 (中道), or the “middle way,” namely, not to the extreme. It conceptualizes human life and social organization around five concentric circles (Figure 4-1). From center outwards they are the relation between the king and the ruled (jun1 and chen2, 君臣), the father and the son (fu4 and zi3, 父子), the husband and the wife (fu1 and fu4, 夫婦), the older brother and the younger brother (xong1 and di4, 兄弟), the friends (peng2 you3, 朋友). The concentricity is interpreted as such: the innermost circle is the most important human relation, and in each pair of relation the first nominated individual is ranked higher than the second nominated. Hence, the relation between the male ruler and the ruled is more important than that between the father and the son, which is more important than that between husband and wife, and so on. The male ruler dominates the ruled, the father dominates his son, the husband dominates his wife, the older brother dominates his younger. Also notice the trivial role of women here: the ruler is male, the relation between the mother and her daughter is ignored, the husband leads the wife, and the relation between female siblings is unworthy of consideration.

Also through the metaphor of circle, centrism generates the distinction between in-group and out-group. Again, following the philosophy of concentricity, the in-group is valued more highly than the out-group. Such notion is inseparable from the Han-Chinese appraisal of “family/home” (fia1, 家): those who are in my family are zi4ji3 ren3 (自已人), or “self/own people,” and those who are not are wai4 ren2 (外人), or “outside people/outsiders.” One should
always stand by the side of her family members, even if they have done something wrong or
dreadful. As the saying jia1-chou3 bu4 wai4 yang2 (家醜不外揚) goes, one should never reveal
the ugliness of their family to the outsiders.

(7) Jia1-chou3 bu4 wai4 yang2
Family-ugliness NEG outside reveal

Never reveal the ugly secrets of (your) family to an outsider.
Or approximately, don’t wash your dirty linen in public.

Now recall that a Han-Chinese family is organized around its male members, and one human
relation that features importantly in the organization of human life is that between father and son.
Hence, as observed in another Mandarin saying, a woman is born an outsider in her own family,
jia4 chu1qu4 de nu3er2 shi4 puo1 chu1qu4 de shui3 (嫁出去的女兒是潑出去的水), “a
daughter married out is like water splashed out.” Chu1qu4 (出去) is the directional phrase that
means “going outwards.” That a woman is an outsider of her birth family is also manifested in
the Mandarin terminology for marriage, which encodes gender-specific usage. The male term for
“to marry” is qu3 (娶). It is derived from the word “to take,” which has exactly the same
phonological and morphological realization. Therefore, one can claim that the derivation is
purely semantic. Or one may consider that the male term “to marry” qu3 is derived from “to take
and own” qu3 on the level of writing: the character for “to take and own” is 取, and that for
“(male) to marry” is 娶, formed by adding a female charactereme (i.e., emic character element)
女 to 取. Both analyses work fine. They exemplify the male aspect of the Han-Chinese marriage
mechanism. When a man marries a woman, “he takes and owns her.”

8 Some may argue that the Mandarin word qu3 (取) only means “to take” and does not entail “to own.” This analysis
may work on the surface level, but if one examines the semantic context, she would observe that qu3 (取) is opposed
to she3 (捨), which connotes “to give up” or “to discard.” To discard something, one has to own it first.
The female term for “to marry” is jia4 (嫁), which is derived from the word “home,” jia1 (家), through changing the tone and adding the female charactereme 女. In other words, it is only when a woman marries does she finally go home. In this home/family, she is trivial and lesser than her husband.

The question is: after a woman marries, or goes home to her husband’s, does she immediately become a member of his in-group? Probably not, for a typical “family feud” in Han-Chinese culture is expressed as po2 xi2 bu4 he2 (婆媳不和), or “the conflict between the husband’s mother (po2, 婆) and her daughter-in-law (xi2, 媳).” While common folk analysis often attributes such conflict to “two women fighting for the love of the man” and a critical analyst may explain it in terms of “power struggle,” I suggest that the fundamental source of the conflict resides on the women’s striving for in-group membership. An investigation on Mandarin kinship terms first would help achieve this understanding. In the core of the kinship terms is the opposition of nei4 (内), which means “inside,” and wai4 (外), which means “outside.” “Paternal grandfather” is gong1 (公) or nei4 gong1 (内公), and “maternal grandfather” is wai4 gong1 (外公); paternal grandmother is po2 (婆), and maternal grandmother is wai4 po2 (外婆). A married woman calls her mother-in-law po2 po2 (婆婆), as she is expected to treat her husband’s mother as her own (paternal) grandmother. Moreover, once she bears children, she calls her own birth

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9 What about the women who never marry? Do they feel, or are they perceived by others as, “homeless,” and hence never “belong” all their lives?

10 The reason why the wife refers to her mother-in-law as “grandmother” rather than simply “mother” may be ascribed to the Chinese postulate of seniority. By moving one age group higher, the wife is expected to pay greater respect. I will provide detailed discussion of seniority distinction later. For now, also note that her husband still calls his mother (and his mother-in-law as well) “mother”. Consequently, he is one age group higher than his wife.
mother wai4 po2 (外婆), and everyone else in her husband’s family would do the same, for it is Han-Chinese convention that parents use kinship terms from their children’s perspective. The same analysis applies to the relation between a married woman and her father-in-law and that between her and her birth father as well. As a result, a married woman is constantly reminded of her dubious status: she seems to be in, but at the same time she is nevertheless out. And what better serves the woman’s need to secure the in-group status than to establish the status of po2 po2, that is, to become the grandmother as well as the mother-in-law of the family? Such is the psycholinguistic analysis of Han-Chinese family feud.

The observable gender inequality goes beyond family as an institution built upon marriage. Through metaphors, Mandarin Chinese speakers also talk about the school, a sports team, and a company or cooperation as a family. The school principal, the team coach, and the boss of the company are all referred to as the father of the family. Moreover, the concept of jia1 “family” is so essential that it is also encoded in the morphology of “nation” and “race/ethnicity.” The word for nation, nation-state, or country, is guo2-jia1 (國家). And the word for “race/ethnicity” is zhong3 zu2 (種族) or min2 zu2 (民族), derived from (jia1) zu2, which means “extended family.” Therefore, the society as a whole is a family, and hence the previous analysis of marriage and family reveals only the tip of an iceberg of Han-Chinese sexism. In the society, women’s group categorization remains ambiguous. For example, the Mandarin linguistic convention instructs a child to address any non-kin stranger using kinship terms. When meeting a non-kin female adult, the child has to call her yi2 (姨), “maternal aunt.” But a non-kin male adult is referred to as bo2 (伯), “paternal uncle who is older than the father,” or shu2 (叔), “paternal uncle younger than the father.” Now recall that the maternal family is conceived as out-group and the paternal family in-group. Hence, in general, a Han-Chinese woman is always an outsider to the society. She may
reach a more solid in-group member status only when she becomes obviously old. A female adult that is (or, looks) old does get to be called by a non-kin person *po2 po2* ("grandmother") sometimes. In the next section I will introduce a more complete set of Chinese kinship terms when examining the postulate of seniority.

Before moving on, I would like to point out that, in addition to sexism, Mandarin Chinese centrism also leads to racial inequality. China (*zhong1 guo2*, 中國), be it ROC or PRC, literally means “central nation,” or “nation in the center (of the universe).” Since the “nation” (*guo2-jia1*, 國家) is perceived as a family and no clear distinction between nationality and ethnicity is made, the NP *zhong1 guo2 ren2* (中國人), or “Chinese people,” is often vaguely interpreted as to include all those who live in the Chinese nation’s territory. All these people are referred to as *tong2 bao1* (同胞), literally meaning “from the same placenta.” That is to say, all peoples in the Chinese national family are siblings. And they are not just any siblings; they are all *identical* twins, or N-lets\(^\text{11}\). Ideally speaking, if these different racial/ethnic groups are truly twins of the same parents, they should receive equal treatment. However, the term *zhong1 guo2 ren2*, “Chinese people,” also has a strong interpretation that encompasses only the ethnically Han people, or *han4 zu2* (漢族). The Han-Chinese people (allegedly) share the same, ONE, language that other peoples do not, including the writing system *zhong1 wen2* (中文) and the Han language *han4 yu3* (漢語), *which today is often synonymous as Mandarin Chinese*. Hence, fundamentally, the Han people, especially those male individuals who natively speak the Mandarin variety, sit in the center of the Chinese nation conceived upon concentricity. In the

\(^\text{11}\) Notice how the ONEness postulate is also at display here.
outer circle there are the Han who speak other Chinese varieties, and further out are the non-Han peoples and the women (Figure 4-2).

**Seniority**

Probably associated with the focus on family, *age* is another crucial Han-Chinese social institution. In particular, aspects of human social life are organized around the distinction of seniority. On the positive side, such age-based ranking encourages the younger to respect the older. However, in many cases, it also provides the conservative, who tend of be older in age, culturally legitimate reasons to oppress those younger than them.

Seniority distinction as a linguistic postulate is first and foremost presented in the distinction between the words for “old” and “young.” The Mandarin Chinese word for “old” is *lao3* (老) and that for “young” is *shao4* (少). Terms for certain social positions are derived from the morpheme *lao3*. For example, “teacher” is *lao3 shi1* (老師), and “boss (of a company)” or “owner (of a business)” is *lao3 ban3* (老闆). The Chinese culture reprimands people who retort upon those older than them. Therefore, the students are expected to “listen to the words of” (*ting1 hua4*, 聽話) the teacher, and the employees to the employer. Also remember that it is language, rather than some abstract ideas detached from it (if such ideas really exist), that truly guides people to conceptualize the world and behave accordingly. Therefore, it is quite common that a Chinese student or employee fears confronting the teacher or employer, *even when they are older than the teacher or employer in actual age.*

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12 Many observe that compared to a Western classroom, a Chinese classroom is utterly quiet. It is a one-way lecturing where the teacher dominates all the talk and the students just listen. The students tend not to raise questions. Some social psychologists take Chinese collectivism as a cultural explanation and argue that the collectivist culture discourages independent thinking because anyone who “sticks out” would risk damaging the “group harmony.” Here, I provide a linguistic reason that directly explains the phenomenon.
Seniority distinction is also encoded in the delicate Chinese kinship system alongside sex division and the in-group vs. out-group distinction. The core area age distinction operates is the sibling terminology. One distinguishes "older sister," jie³ (姊), from "younger sister," mei⁴ (妹), and "older brother," ge¹ (哥), from "younger brother," di⁴ (弟). In addition, one also distinguishes "father’s older brother," or "senior paternal uncle," bo² (伯), from "father’s younger brother," or "junior paternal uncle," shu² (叔). However, one does not make an age distinction among "father’s female siblings," who are all gu¹ (姑), nor does one distinguish among mother’s siblings. "Mother’s sisters," regardless of their ages relative to the mother, are all yi² (姨); and "mother’s brothers" are all jiu⁴ (舅).

Still, one may have several siblings, aunts, or uncles, who belong to the same seniority grouping but differ in age ranking. For example, a person may have three "older sisters," jie³. In this case, the words "big" (da⁴, 大) and "small" (xiao³, 小), and those designating numerical order, are used. The oldest older sister is da⁴ jie³, the middle older sister is er⁴ jie³ ("two/second sister"), and the youngest older sister is xiao³ jie³(-jie), or san¹ jie³ ("three/third sister"). The application of the terms "big" and "small" goes deeper than simple seniority distinction; it also marks (conceptual) importance even when seniority distinction is unnecessary. As mentioned

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13 Some wonder how the "one child policy" in PRC has affected Chinese sibling terms. While a more accurate analysis still awaits further observation, I believe that at least for now nothing much has changed because, as mentioned earlier, Chinese kinship terms are broadly applied to all (non-kin) social relations anyway. When a single child meets another single child, they still address each other according to the sibling terms.

14 This word, "mother’s sister" or "maternal aunt," yi² (姨), may be related to the word yi² (夷), which, with the same pronunciation but without the female charactereme, is defined in Chinese dictionary as "(non-Han Chinese) people from the East who lack culture." It corresponds to the Chinese kinship system that sees women, and those in the mother’s birth family, as outsiders.
earlier, mother’s parents are categorized into the out-group family with the mark of *wai4*.

“Maternal grandmother” is *wai4 po2*, derived from “paternal grandmother” *po2*; “maternal grandfather” is *wai4 gong1*, derived from “paternal grandfather” *gong1*. Guided by the postulate of centrism, the out-group members are considered less important than the in-group members. And hence in colloquial Mandarin Chinese, one can also refer to the maternal grandparents as *small* grandparents, as opposed to the *big* paternal grandparents.

That “big” (*da4*) and “small” (*xiao3*) extend the seniority distinction to psychological importance is also observable in their direct morphological application to the term “human being,” *ren2* (人). The NP *da4 ren2* (大人), or “big person,” generically refers to “an adult human being,” but it has a second meaning referring to “someone in a high social position.” On the contrary, a *xiao3 ren2* (小人) is not a person before reaching adulthood; rather, it refers to “a person who commits some despicable moral crime,” such as snitching or back-stabbing. Such association of size with value (often intertwined with seniority) is also revealed in the racial-nationalistic slurs. Radical Chinese nationalists, while holding the “big China” (*da4 zhong1guo2*, 大中國) position, constantly refer to Japan and the Japanese people as “small Japan” (*xiao3 ri4ben3*, 小日本).

Following all the above discussions, it should be clear now that the linguistic postulates rarely operate alone. Instead, they *mutually reinforce* one another via natural language usage. Han-Chinese women’s low social status is not a simple result of the in-group vs. out-group distinction, nor is it the sole function of seniority distinction. Rather, it is the result of them intertwined with each other. Also, since Chinese kinship terms are applied beyond the actual family domain, its effect is pan-social. This is how the postulate of centrism and that of seniority distinction really work together to oppress women. For example, the word for “husband” is *xian1*
sheng1 (先生), which literally means “born first.” Even if a woman is in fact older than her husband, the language still requires her to treat him as someone senior to her, and hence she should respect him and does not retort. Moreover, the term xian1 sheng1 is also the honorific title for (married as well as unmarried) men in general. The equivalent to English “Mr. Smith” is Smith xian1 sheng1. Thus, Mandarin prescribes that any man is an important senior. Also for example, the generic term for “child” is hai2 zi (孩子). “Female child” is nu3 hai2 zi (女孩子) and “male child” nan2 hai2 zi (男孩子). But only nu3 hai2 zi can also be used to refer to “an adult woman that is available for dating;” the same semantic extension generally does not apply to a male adult. A woman is, and remains, junior in the Chinese society; a junior always obeys, or listens (to the senior-man).

Summary: the discursive frame of Chinese national identity

Now, with a rudimentary understanding of the four Mandarin Chinese postulates, their functions, and the ways they may interact, I would summarize with a general introduction to the realization of these postulates in the discourse of contemporary Chinese nationalism, especially with regard to the construction of national identity.

A national identity, as Anderson’s (1983) theorizes it, is imagined by the nationalists and imposed upon the mass. However, I believe, for it to be normalized and taken for granted, such an identity must appeal to the common perception of the people, and such a perception must be shared. In other words, a received national identity must hold strongly in the common sense of the nationals, who, in the modern context, often share a common language. In the case of contemporary Chinese nationalism, the common sense shared by the Mandarin speakers is that China, the country called zhong1 guo2 in the language, is the center (zhong1 means “center”), and that there can only be one center. From this seemingly simple belief comes the guideline
called “One China Principle.” One China Principle is the English translation of the Mandarin phrase *yi1 ge zhong1 guo2 yuan2 ze2* (一個中國原則), often shortened as *yi1 zhong1 yuan2 ze2*, or “one center (nation) principle”. Upon this principle two modern Chinese nations were founded, Republic of China (Taiwan) and People’s Republic of China (China), and both constitutionalize that there is only one China nation and Taiwan is part of it. As a consequence, since their split in 1949, ROC and PRC have refused to acknowledge the autonomous status of each other (while each claiming the ownership of the territory of the other). Yet such tension has been mitigated since the 1990s, as the voice of the localist Taiwanese nationalists became hard to ignore and the claim for a political Taiwan Independence began to gain more support. The Chinese Nationalists in Taiwan have realized that they in fact share more in common with the Communists in China as far as nationhood and national identity are concerned, than with the localists in Taiwan, who are often labeled as “separatists”. In the last two decades, several versions and (re-)interpretations of the One China Principle have been proposed by the Chinese nationalists across the Taiwan Strait, as shown below.

The first semi-official face-to-face meeting between PRC-China and ROC-Taiwan since 1949 took place in November 1992, in Hong Kong (then under British rule). Representing PRC was Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS), and representing ROC, Strait Exchange Foundation (SEF). Originally, the meeting was set because the two representative governments hoped to find practical solutions to handle the problems arising from the growing

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15 Here I use “Chinese Nationalists” to refer to those in Taiwan who belong to, or support the principles of, the Chinese Nationalist Party, also known as Kuomintang/KMT, which founded ROC in 1912 and fled from Mainland China to Taiwan in 1949. And “Chinese Communists” refer to those who subscribe to the principles of the Communist Party in China, which founded PRC in Mainland China in 1949. Because Chinese Nationalists and Chinese Communists share the same ideal of Chinese nationhood and Chinese national identity, I will refer to both of them as “Chinese nationalists.” It is the discourse constructed by the Chinese nationalist that is examined here.
commerce between Mainland China and Taiwan. After the meeting, however, debates on political ideology, in particular concerning national identity, took the front seat. The then ROC government, led by the Chinese Nationalist Party KMT, took the meeting as confirmation that a consensus of “one China, different interpretations (of Chinese nationhood)” (yi1 zhong1 ge4 biao3, 一中各表) was accepted by both PRC and ROC. The Taiwanese nationalists disagreed, who pointed out that for PRC and many of the leading world powers such as the United States, “one China” is unquestionably defined as the Mainland China, to which PRC lays official claim. PRC, on the other hand, has since then utilized this conflict to aggravate the so-called identity crisis in Taiwan to fit its own political goal of seizing Taiwan.\(^\text{16}\)

For example, in April 2004, after the Taiwanese nationalist Chen Shui-bian won the ROC presidential election and claimed that “the mainstream Taiwanese opinion is to protect Taiwan against China,” the PRC spokesman Li Wei-yi condemned Chen for “refusing to accept the One China Principle” and reiterated that “PRC has never wavered in its determination to see the reunification of (Chinese) motherland” (Post-election statement, 2004). On March 14, 2005, an Anti-secession Law, or literally in Mandarin, “Anti-separating-the-nation Law” (fan3 fen1-lie4 guo2-jia1 fa3, 反分裂國家法), was passed by the third conference of the 10\(^{th}\) National People’s Congress of PRC, which formally grants PRC the use of “non-peaceful means,” i.e., military force, against the “Taiwanese separatist attempt” in the event of a declaration of Taiwan independence. Item Two of this law spells out the One China Principle.

There is only one China in the world. Mainland and Taiwan belong to the same [one] China. No division of the sovereignty and territory of China would be allowed. It is the duty of all Chinese people, including the Taiwanese compatriots

\(^{16}\) See the news article, Is there a 92 Consensus? (2008), for a debate between DPP’s Chen and KMT’s Ma on the interpretation of One China Principle.
[literally, “of same placenta”], to observe the wholeness of such sovereignty and territory. Taiwan is part of China. The nation would never allow the Taiwanese Independence separatist attempt to separate Taiwan from China by any means. (People’s Republic of China, 2005a)

At display here are two Mandarin linguistic postulates, ONEness and centrism. There is only one China, namely, zhong1 guo2 the Central Nation. As examined earlier, the ONEness postulate entails wholeness. The wholeness of the nation in turn is associated with the metaphor of family. Remember, the Mandarin word for “nation” (guo2-jia1) is morphologically composed of “family” (jia1), and the word for “compatriot,” tong2 bao1, in its native sense means “(those who share) same placenta.” Any attempt to split such wholeness is unacceptable. Hence, the only thing that should be rid off is the separatist attempt that has caused complexity within the perfect ONE-wholeness.

The strong version of PRC’s Chinese national identity discourse as examined above may sound jarring to those who sympathize with Taiwan Independence. However, its core motifs do seem to be shared by the Chinese Nationalists in Taiwan. In fact, PRC has often provided a weaker version of its national discourse so as to appeal to the (non-separatist) “Taiwanese compatriots.” In this version, the threat of military solution is edited out and PRC’s position on the unchallengeable definition of “One China” is toned down. Replacing them is a more emphatic use of the family metaphor to reinforce the sense that people in Taiwan and people in China are all compatriot-kins. In early November, 2008, the vice president of ARATS, Chen Yun-lin visited Taiwan for the first time. During an interview, he phrased the conflict between Chinese nationalism and Taiwanese nationalism as such: “There seems to be some problems and conflicts among the people across the [Taiwan] Strait. We need to resolve them with patience.
…the compatriots on the two sides of the Strait were all from the same placenta, and hence we should care for each other (Chen yun-lin, 2008, my italics).”

The national identity discourse generated by ROC’s Chinese Nationalists resonates with that of PRC. Take Ma Ying-jeou, the current president of Taiwan, for example. While having once confessed in an interview published by Newsweek in December 2005 that Taiwan’s (re)unification with China is the ultimate goal of the Chinese Nationalist Party, Ma frequently tries to convince the people in Taiwan that he is in favor of the idea that Taiwan’s (political) future should be determined by its people. The question is: how are these “people” identified? In 2007, as part of his campaign for ROC’s presidential election, Ma published a book titled “Spirits of the original homeland: the model stories of Taiwan” (Ma, 2007). In the book, Ma’s attempt to co-opt Taiwanese localism into the grand discourse of Chinese nationalism is apparent. Not only does he replace his habitual use of the term “Chinese people” with “Taiwanese people” in various texts, but he also presents several attractive stories of the Taiwanese personalities and links them to the “Chinese root” and “Chinese history,” while selectively ignoring much of Taiwan’s indigenous history of the Austronesian aborigines and the resistance of many Southern Min and Hakka immigrants against the sociopolitical control of the Chinese Mainlanders. In addition, Ma and the Chinese Nationalists in Taiwan have labeled Taiwanese nationalists’ intent to localize national issues such as language policy and education policy as “de-Chinese-ization,” and they accuse the localists of “forgetting the root” (wang4 ben3, 忘本). In accusation like this, Chinese culture being the root culture of Taiwan is assumed and taken for granted. The fact that Ma was eventually elected as the President of ROC indicates the successful appeal of such rhetoric. The success, I believe, can be attributed to Ma’s resorting to the (imagined) Chinese national history, in which the Mandarin postulates seniority and
comparative ranking take effect. After all, in the alleged five thousand years of Chinese history, Taiwan features about only a few hundred years of time. In this view, Taiwan’s past is but marginal and trivial. Functioning through metaphor, a longer history is perceived to be more senior in age. Therefore, a recurrent argumentative theme employed by the anomalous Chinese nationalist who hold an antagonist view towards Taiwan Independence is: China has a long, grand, history, and Taiwan does not; hence, there is no way that the small Taiwan can compare to the big China. Here, “small” and “big” refer to both seniority defined by the length of (Chinese) history and geographic size.

Also observable in Taiwan’s discourse of Chinese national identity is the concept of imagined homeland frequently discussed in the analysis of modern nationalism (e.g., Anderson, 1983; Smith, 1995; Wodak et al., 1999). As mentioned above, it is often constructed through evoking a commonly accepted account of history and then decorated with the metaphor of “root” to arouse a sense of belonging. In what follows, I will use my 2007 interview with Xu Ling-mei as an example17. In the story, Xu’s subscription to the constructed Chinese nationalism is revealed in her sentiments towards the Chinese homeland. However, it is also apparent that her acceptance of the Chinese root is partial: while she does consider China “home,” she does not truly feel that she belongs. The interview was conducted in Mandarin, and I have translated it as literally as possible in English so as to maintain a native sense. Below is an excerpt in which Xu recounted her experience of “returning to” her “home” in Zhejiang Province, Mainland China. In the excerpt, P refers to the participant Xu and R refers to me, the researcher. My emphases are underlined.

17 See (10) in the “The Individuals who Shared Their Stories” section in Chapter 3 for a summary of Xu’s background.
P: In these two years I… very much… miss, my hometown in Zhejiang [Note: P was not born there].

R: um

P: I have returned there about… ten times [since 1987].

R: um

P: The second year after my mother passed away, I returned to Zhejiang+ and when leaving Zhejiang [for Taiwan] we needed to first take a ferry.

R: oh

P: As soon as I boarded the ferry I started crying. Oh no, I started crying as soon as I walked out of the door of my home [i.e., the family’s old house in Zhejiang].

R: um

P: crying… when I boarded the ferry, suddenly I felt that my mother’s homesick had transferred onto me.

……

P: Our life experience [as Mainlanders in Taiwan] actually isn’t much different from those people living on the Mainland.

R: hum…

P: We make our own food and drinks [i.e., different from the food and drinks common in Taiwan].

R: So is it like… the old hometown provides you a sense of belonging?

P: Yes it does.

……

P: One day our trainer [of a psychotherapy session] asked us to write a life story… “how do you think you would die in the future… and where will you die?”
R: oh oh

P: I… what I envisioned was… I would… uh… “wander around the world,” and “die as a guest at an alien place” [These two phrases were given in the form of traditional Mandarin four-word idioms].

R: uh huh huh

P: and become a “guiding corpse” [in Chinese belief, a guiding corpse would guide those who die in a foreign place to find their way home.]

R: hmm

P: So it’s like dying at an alien place and then becoming a guiding corpse, that kind of wandering-around-the-world feeling.

R: uh…mm… so that means Taiwan does not let you feel [home].

P: It doesn’t matter where.

R: What if returning to your… returning to… [Zhejiang, China]?

P: That’s still like a guest dying at an alien place, no?

R: oh…

P: because for me [no matter where I die] it is extremely embarrassing/awkward.

R: hum hum… hum

P: And that hurts my feelings the most.

This excerpt shows that while Xu regards Mainland China, instead of Taiwan where she was born and grew up, as her home(land), she does not always confidently project her sense of belonging to the land. In fact, she finds herself alien to both China and Taiwan. The politicians who design the “big” Chinese national identity discourse, such as Ma, fail to address such a feeling of alienation because they are often too obsessed with the grand motif of one singular China homeland. Informed by the Mandarin postulate of ONEness that connotes consistency and
constancy, these politicians have imagined a China (its history and its territory) with perfect wholeness that is never changing. The Chinese homeland thus defined hence becomes such that nobody can get away from it. However, Xu’s narrative indicates that the complexity of an individual’s real-life experiences may disagree with such constant wholeness. It also shows that while the big discourse does exercise some top-down influence, its effect is not all-encompassing. From an individual perspective, there is always room for alternative interpretations from bottom-up, even if such interpretations may not readily be defined as “resistance.”

Finally, I would like to point out that, in Taiwan, Chinese nationalism is not the only discourse of identity that is operative. There also exists the discourse of Taiwanese nationalism which is no less influential. Much in my analysis of the Mandarin linguistic postulates and Chinese nationalism should apply to the Taiwanese national identity discourse as well\(^\text{18}\), for the Taiwanese nationalists also use Mandarin as a major linguistic vehicle to appeal to the general public despite the fact that they strongly identify with “the Taiwanese language,” namely, Southern Min. After all, Mandarin is the most dominant language in Taiwan and functions as the only true lingua franca among different peoples. In my opinion, it is the competition between the Chinese and Taiwanese identity discourses in and over the Mandarin language, rather than some superficial explanation based on “historical facts,” that truly accounts for the “identity crisis” Xu

\(^{18}\) Basically, ONEness, comparative ranking, and seniority all actively function in the Taiwanese national identity discourse, although sometimes in different ways from how they function in Chinese national identity. Centrism, on the other hand, poses a problem for the Taiwanese nationalists because it is inseparable from Chineseness. Given the fact that Mandarin is the major linguistic arena where Taiwanese nationalism confronts Chinese nationalism, I assume a (linguistically) predetermined disadvantage on the Taiwanese nationalist side.
and many others in Taiwan have experienced. Later in the chapter I provide more examples to support my conviction.

**Interconnection of Terms**

Before moving on to examine the identity discourse of Taiwan, I would first provide definitions for some key words and phrases. These terms represent the central concepts in the discourse and are recurrent in people’s discussions on identity. For each term, I present the Mandarin origin alongside its English translation and my definition would accord with the Taiwanese context. It will become clear that the connotation in the native language is often more complex than that in the commonly accepted English translation. Understanding the native connotation will also help illuminate the semantic-pragmatic interconnection of these terms and concepts (Table 4-1). And seeing such interconnection is a crucial step to perceiving the complication of the whole issue from an emic point of view. Still, the readers should keep in mind that all that which is presented/defined by me does not correspond to the whole truthfulness of the situation in Taiwan. What I provide is just shared common understanding, but the individual groups and persons in Taiwan would also have their own take on each of the specific issues. The individual variations can only be assessed later when the overall discourse is studied.

**Peoples**

(1) The Chinese people. Generally speaking, the following three terms all refer to “the Chinese” or “Chinese people.” But each of them came from a different origin, and this difference can only be discerned through the Mandarin semantics. In the following space, the relation among terms is indicated through references to the indexical alphabets.

(A.) *Zhong1guo2 ren2* (中國人). *Zhong-guo* means “center-country” literally (see E); *ren* means person/people. *Zhongguo ren* hence means “the people of the center-country.” In the
current identity discourse, *Zhongguo ren* is interpreted differently by different agents. For supporters of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in China (see I) and the Chinese Nationalist Party KMT in Taiwan (see K), the term covers all the citizens in China and in Taiwan *and their overseas descendants*; for supporters of the Taiwanese nationalist Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) (see J), nowadays it usually refers to the citizens in the modern nation of China-PRC (see F) only, but sometimes it is expanded to cover the Mainlander group in Taiwan who, or whose ancestors, came to the island with the defeated KMT in 1945. This latter meaning was socio-pragmatically innocent before the 228 Incident that took place 60 years ago, but after 228, it has been loaded with indignation, or hatred, emerging from the 228 victims towards the KMT Chinese oppressors. The last interpretation is extremely confrontational: it sees the conflict between “the Chinese” and “the Taiwanese” (see D) as insoluble. Some other hate words used in this sub-discourse include *wai-sheng zhu* (out-province pig, i.e., “Chinese pigs”) and *tu tai-ke* (dirty Taiwanese-Hakka, i.e., “vulgar/barbaric Taiwanese folks” or “Taiwanese rednecks”).

(B.) *Hua2 ren2 (華人).* *Hua ren* refers to the people with Chinese or Han (see C) heritage in general. The origin of the term is unclear, but its usage can be observed in historical texts from as early as 300 AD in expressions such as *wu hu luan hua* (five barbarians “to-make-chaotic” *hua*), referring to the five surrounding non-Han countries raising war against the central Chinese country. A common usage of the word *hua ren* includes the Chinese immigrants all over the world, as in *hai-nei-wai hua ren* (sea-in-and-out Chinese, “local-and-oversea Chinese”). This term, when used, often includes Cantonese, Hakka, Southern Min, Northern Min peoples, etc. However, despite the fact that many of the DPP (see J) or Taiwan Independence (see L) supporters do acknowledge their Chinese or Han origin, they tend not to use this term *hua ren* to refer to their heritage but prefer another term, *Han ren* (see C). There may be a morphological
reason behind this tendency: the Chinese compound words for the proper names of the two modern Chinese nations PRC (see F) and ROC (see G), both of which potentially prevent the political Taiwan Independence, have hua as one of the components.

(C.) Han4 ren2 (漢 人). The word Han was first used as a proper name for the Han Dynasty (202 BC – 8 AD) in Mainland China. It then became a generic term of “the people with the Han heritage,” who are considered as the real Chinese. The biological or genetic connotation is prevalent in today’s usage of the term Han ren. And it is this biological connotation that distinguishes Han ren from Zhongguo ren (see A). Remember, a broad meaning of Zhongguo ren covers all the people living in the territory of China. However, not all the people living in China are with Han heritage. For example, the Manchurian/Qing people (who established the Qing Dynasty, from which came the English word “Chinese”) are not Han, and Mongolians and Tibetans are not considered as Han, either. The use of Han as a biological term is unanimously taken by the supporters of one United China (see M) as well as those of Taiwan Independence (see L).

(2) The Taiwanese people.

(D.) Tai2wan1 ren2 (台灣 人). Taiwan ren literally means “Taiwanese people.” It first existed in the Taiwanese Southern Min vocabulary as Taiwan¹⁹ lang, with the word Taiwan (see H) itself borrowed from the indigenous Siraya language. Originally, the term was only used by the Han to distinguish themselves from the Austronesian indigenes. It referred to the Han (see C) immigrants (mostly Hakka and Southern Min) who had settled down in Taiwan since the mid 1600s. Since 1895, the first Han immigrants have used the term to separate “the native” from the

¹⁹ The first consonant in the Mandarin word Taiwan is aspirated [tʰ], but the first consonant in the Southern Min word Taiwan is unaspirated.
Japanese and Mainlander newcomers. Therefore, the term *Taiwan lang* or *Taiwan ren* has reserved an essential reading exclusively for the mid-1600s Han immigrants as well as a broader reading that includes the Austronesian indigenes. Still, the distinction between these two readings is not always clear today. Out of political correctness, the politicians now tend to use the term ultra-inclusively, i.e., *everybody in Taiwan is Taiwan ren*. But they also often use an additional term *yuan-zhu min* ("original-residents") to refer to the Austronesian specifically.

As mentioned, the politically correct use of the term *Taiwan ren* today is to call whoever that live in Taiwan *Taiwan ren*, regardless of their origins. In other words, even the Mainlanders should be considered as part of the Taiwanese people. This not only reflects the "awaking Taiwanese consciousness" in Taiwan politics since the late 1990s, but it also seems to suggest that the Taiwanese-vs.-Chinese confrontation has decreased. However, the reality is that such confrontation remains observable in the undercurrents of the politically correct speeches. For example, it is not uncommon that the KMT politicians add in their message "all Taiwanese (*Tawan ren*) are Chinese (*Zhonggua ren*)," while the DPP politicians make it clear that "Taiwanese are Taiwanese; Chinese are Chinese." On the other hand, this term and its use is not acceptable from the perspective of China-PRC government because in Mandarin when the word *ren* is compounded with other words, the created lexical item implies a racially and culturally homogenous people. To call the people in Taiwan *Taiwan ren* contradicts China government’s strong position that all the people in Taiwan must be Chinese. Hence, when necessary, China government uses other NPs to refer to the people in Taiwan: *Taiwan de renmin* (Taiwan POSSESSIVE people) or *Taiwan tongbao* (Taiwan compatriots/“same placenta”). But more commonly a China spokesperson would address “all the *Chinese people* in China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan.”
Nations and/or regions

(3) China

(E.) Zhong1 guo2 (中 國). Zhong means “center” or “middle,” guo means “country,” and hence zhongguo refers to “the counter in the center” or “central country”\textsuperscript{20}. It is taken for granted that the direct translation of Zhongguo in English is “China.” However, as I mentioned earlier, the English word translation came from the western contact with the Qing Dynasty in the late 19\textsuperscript{th} century, but the meaning of Zhongguo goes far beyond Qing. In contemporary Mandarin, Zhongguo refers to the mainland China geographically and historically. School children in Taiwan learn every geographical area of the mainland in Zhongguo Geography Class, and in Zhongguo History Class they learn “the 5,000 years of history of Zhongguo.” Taiwan geography and history used to be included in these two courses; it is until recently that an independent Taiwan Geography and a Taiwan History courses are offered. What is interesting is that none of the dynasties, countries, or regimes in the 5,000 years of history was named Zhongguo. Indeed, the Zhongguo history is composed of the Qin history, the Han history, the Tang history, the Yuan history, the Song history, the Ming history, and the Qing history, etc, each of which was written by a different historian as a different book. One trace of this word is the Confucian usage of guo zhong zhi ren (country center/inside possessive people) to refer to the people in the center-country, as opposed to the surrounding “barbarians.” Thus, it seems that the use of Zhongguo as a superordinate term of everything Chinese is quite recent. Also, as will be shown below, Sun Yet-Sen first formed the Chinese Nationalist Party, as Zhongguo Kuomin Dang (also known as KMT, see K), and the party overthrew Qing Dynasty to form ROC (see G), whose Mandarin name was Zhonghua Min guo. Therefore, Zhongguo seems to have its origin in the

\textsuperscript{20} See the discussion on the Mandarin postulate of centrism for more details.
KMT terminology and is carried over to Taiwan and applied into daily use through education and policies. This term was adopted by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, see I) as well, known as *Zhongguo Gongchan Dang* in Mandarin, which formed PRC, or *Zhonghua Renmin Gonghe guo*.

The term *Zhongguo* has another narrow reading and a specific denotation, that is, the political body of China-PRC (see F), for *guo* in modern context also connotes the western concept of nation-state. Popularly known as China, PRC as a nation has its official Chinese name *Zhonghua Renmin Gonghe Guo* abridged as *Zhong-guo*. This being the case, careful readers may have already noticed that the official Mandarin name of the nation of ROC-Taiwan, *Zhonghua Min Guo*, can also be abridged as *Zhong-guo*. So the question is: do Mandarin speakers use the word *Zhongguo* to refer to both PRC and ROC? And if so, do they confuse the two nations? The answer is: yes and no. For some of the United China (see M) supporters, this abridging potential can be taken *as an argument* in favor of their political position. But normally the referent of *Zhongguo* is limited to PRC, and the official Chinese name of ROC remains the unabridged *Zhonghua Min Guo*. More discussion on this specific issue can be found in H, M and N.

(F.) PRC: People’s Republic of China, or *Zhong1hua2 Ren2min2 Gong4he2 Guo2* (中華 人民 共和 國). PRC was formed on October 1st, 1949, by the Chinese Communist Party (see I). Mao Zetong was the Chair of CCP and the first president of PRC. In Mandarin, PRC is *Zhonghua* (see B for *hua*) *Renmin Gonghe Guo*, which literally means “Chinese People’s Republic Country.” PRC is also known as China or *Zhongguo* (see E). Despite the functioning of a non-communist government in Taiwan, PRC spokesperson claims that Taiwan is part of the PRC territory and includes Taiwan in its constitution as a province.
(4) China-Taiwan.

(G.) ROC: Republic of China, or Zhonghua Min Guo (中華民國). ROC was formed on January 1\textsuperscript{st}, 1911, by an alliance of five political parties that overthrew the Qing Dynasty. These parties later formed the KMT party (see K), led by Sun Yet-Sen, who became the first president. The official Chinese name of ROC is Zhonghua (see B for hua) Min Guo, which literally means “Chinese People’s Country.” Note that although KMT claims that they formed “the first democratic republic nation in Asia,” the word “republic” (gonghe) is not used in the national name of ROC but is used in the communist nation PRC.

ROC had been synonymous to mainland China from 1911 to 1949, and Taiwan has been included in its territory since 1945 when Japan lost World War II. After 1949 when KMT lost its war to the Chinese Communist Party (see I) and retreated to Taiwan, Taiwan has become the sole geographic area under ROC’s actual ruling. However, even in the latest version of ROC Constitution, ROC’s territory remains thus defined: “The ROC territory includes the regions of its inherence, and it cannot be changed without the decision of Guomin Daihui [i.e., National Assembly]\textsuperscript{21}.” Ironically, the National Assembly (similar to the upper house in the British system) has ceased to exist since 2005. Hence, the constitution guarantees ROC continuous and constant rights over the regions of not only Taiwan and PRC’s mainland China (which includes the independence-seeking Tibet and East Turkistan and parts that overlap with India and Japan), but also the autonomous nation of Mongolia. In short, the territory of ROC is at best an imagined existence.

\textsuperscript{21} Number 4, Chapter 1, ROC Constitution, original text 中華民國領土，依其固有之疆域，非經國民大會之決議，不得變更之 translated into English by me.
Taiwan.

Taiwan.

In the general perception of the non-Chinese and non-Taiwanese, Taiwan refers to not only the physical island but also a political entity. But officially only ROC (see G) is the legal name of the nation. This linguistic inconsistency has generated confusion in Taiwan-ROC citizens’ psychology and also caused practical inconvenience and discrimination. For example, on the cover of my passport, it is printed “Republic of China.” On my U.S. visa, my nationality is identified as “Taiwan.” But when I entered the U.S., the custom would stamp “China” on the entry form. Oftentimes, the way I was treated in the custom (e.g., politely or not) would depend upon the immigration officer’s perception and/or bias towards China and/or Taiwan and how they identified me. Stressing on such confusion and inconvenience, the Taiwan Independence (see L) supporters and the Taiwanese nationalist DPP party (see J) have started a political movement towards changing the national name to Taiwan officially. Such a movement is known as zheng ming (正名), which literally means “to rectify the name(s),” and it has now developed into a full-fledged discourse that concerns not only changing the name of the nation to Taiwan but also eliminating any other institutional names in Taiwan that have a “Chinese” connotation. More details about zheng ming and its manifestation in actual policies are discussed later.

Political parties

The three political parties introduced below can be seen as the main characters in the big discourse. They are responsible for defining the peoples in modern China and Taiwan either through discursive means or through policy and planning.

property,” means communism and is only used in the political context. *Dang* means political party. But what is crucial to the identity discourse is the first word, *Zhongguo*. As shown in (E), *Zhongguo* is interpreted by most Mandarin speakers as the superordinate term of a vast geographical as well as historical body of China, and this interpretation also related to the broad reading of *Zhongguo ren* (see A) that refers to a homogenous “Chinese people.” As will be shown below, between the two main political parties in Taiwan, DPP and KMT, one has the word *Zhongguo* and the other does not. This (lack of) appearance of the word corresponds to their political-identity ideologies.

(J.) DPP: Democratic Progressive Party, or *Min2zhu3 Jin4bu4 Dang3* (民主 進步 黨). Democratic Progressive Party is a literal translation of *Minzhu Jinbu Dang*, formed in 1986. Before the Martial Law was lifted in 1987 and the people in Taiwan were legally allowed to form political parties, KMT (see K) was the sole party in power and controlled all sectors of the ROC government. For being sympathetic to the victims of the 228 Incident and starting the Taiwan Independence Movement (see L) under KMT dictatorship, many of the original DPP members had been (defined as) political criminals and kept in jail by the KMT-ROC government. Many of them also came from a higher middle-class background because they, or their families, had cooperated with the previous Japanese government in Taiwan. Hence, some label the initial Taiwan Independence cause as a native *elitist* movement. Today, Taiwan’s mainstream media align DPP to the middle-left of the political spectrum and KMT the middle-right\(^2\). In addition, the popular terminology in Taiwan also defines DPP and the pro-Taiwan-

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\(^2\) In Taiwan’s mainstream political terminology, Taiwan Independence is “left” and United China is “right.” There are some smaller and more radical parties besides DPP and KMT that occupy the far-left and far-right positions. This use of “left” and “right” in Taiwan as political terminology is very different from the western political tradition.
Independence as the *Pan-Green* group, and KMT to the pro-United-China *Pan-Blue* group. Green and blue are the iconic colors of DPP and KMT respectively, and so DPP and KMT are taken as the indices or reference points for the competing political ideologies.

The first major political statement of DPP was made in 1987 that “People (in Taiwan) have the right to advocate Taiwan Independence.” DPP’s party constitution stated that the ultimate goal is to establish “an independent and autonomous republic nation of Taiwan,” but it also insists that “the establishment of an independent Taiwan Country should be decided by all the people living in Taiwan through referendum (Democratic Progressive Party, 1995).” See KMT in (K) for a contrast in terms of how Taiwan’s political future should be decided. Also significant in the DPP’s party constitution is that the only word used to refer to Taiwan Island as a political entity is “Taiwan;” the official national name of the nation, ROC (see G), is absent throughout.

Between 2000 and 2008, DPP took the position in the central government of Taiwan-ROC. Its member Chen Shui-bian won the 2000 and 2004 presidential elections and has been a hero for Taiwan Independence for a long time, but he has since retirement under trial for corruption.

(K.) KMT: Chinese Nationalist Party, or *Zhongguo Kuomin Dang* (中國 國民 黨). *Zhongguo Kuomin Dang* (used to be spelled as Kuomintang, and hence KMT) means “China Nationals’ Party.” It started out as *Xing-Zhong Hui* (Revive Zhongguo [China] Society) in 1894, formed by Sun Yat-sen, and overthrew the Qing Dynasty and formed ROC (see G) in the mainland China in 1912. The China-period ROC then went through WWII and a civil war against the Chinese Communist Party. In 1949, KMT lost the mainland to CCP and retreated to,

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that uses “left” for (some variation of) socialism and “right” for capitalism. Both the left and the right in Taiwan are essentially liberal capitalist-nationalist.

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or “reclaimed” in KMT’s discourse, Taiwan. The war between China-PRC and Taiwan-ROC continued for a few years after until 1958, in the form of a bombing competition.

In its early Taiwan-period, KMT had set as its goal the restoring of mainland. But with CCP gradually gaining control over mainland China, KMT realized that its original goal was impossible to achieve and hence turned its focus on developing economy in Taiwan. The economic development had been fruitful and made Taiwan into part of the “Asian (economic) Miracle.”

Since losing its sole political control in Taiwan to DPP (see J) in 2000, KMT has seen the Taiwan Independence Movement (L), or Taiwanese nationalism, as an even larger threat than China-PRC. Today, KMT seems to consider China-PRC as a potential friend rather than an enemy, as revealed in its discourse, non-linguistic action, and the policy and/or plans it proposes. On April 1st, 2005, Lian Zhan, former ROC president and KMT chair, became the first Taiwan’s political leader to visit China-PRC. There he visited his ancestral tomb as well as his elementary school alma mater, and he discussed with the PRC leaders on several issues such as open trade and direct flight between China and Taiwan. After the meeting, the PRC leader promised to give a couple of pandas as “gifts to our compatriots in Taiwan.” While KMT described this move as a big achievement that symbolized the improved relation between China-PRC and Taiwan-ROC, DPP warned against the “political motivation” behind. DPP and the pro-Taiwan-Independence camp have since referred to the two animals as “political pandas.” In December 2008, the two pandas finally arrived at Taiwan, and they were named by China-PRC as Tuan-tuan and Yuan-yuan. Tuan-yuan in Mandarin means “reunite.” Again, any seemingly trivial matter can be highly sensitive to identity politics in the context of Taiwan.
Despite its claim of democracy and its loss of regime to DPP, KMT openly claims on its official website that “KMT and ROC is one and the same (Kuomintang, 2009).” And while no longer mentioning “restoring the mainland China,” KMT Chair (and current ROC President) Ma Ying-jeou still claims that “the ultimate goal of KMT is one united China (CNN, 2007).” This claim worried many people in Taiwan who were sympathetic to Taiwan Independence (see L), and so Ma reassured them by stating that Taiwan Independence is also a potential option for Taiwan’s future. This latter statement then worried the supporters of KMT and/or United China since KMT had before been insisted that Taiwan Independence was not an option at all. Therefore, the KMT politicians later provided an oxymoronic version on Taiwan’s future: “Taiwan Independence is an option for Taiwan’s people, although it is not an option for KMT (KMT: Taiwan Independence, 2006).” On the other hand, in KMT’s party constitution there is no mention of who have the right and how to decide Taiwan’s future (cf. DPP: “the establishment of an independent Taiwan Country should be decided by all the people living in Taiwan through referendum.”).

**Main political issues**

The political issues discussed below prevail over the life of people in Taiwan. They are not only concerned with the politicians but are talked about by virtually every individual. In a sense, life in Taiwan does not have a clear “political dimension.” This is evident in the fact that one of the most popular forms of entertainment is the various political talk shows on TV

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23 Contrary to many of the political shows in the U.S. that utilize humor as the main appeal, Taiwan’s political talk shows are not “funny.” In Mandarin pragmatics, humorous tropes such as verbal irony and sarcasm, although perceivable when occasionally used, are normally considered as too offensive and impolite and hence are avoided. For a comparative study on the social function of verbal irony between English and Mandarin, see Huang (2004).
Taiwan Independence, or *Taiwan du4lin4* (台灣 獨立), often shortened as *tai2 du2* (台獨). The expression “Taiwan Independence” may appear paradoxical to those who consider Taiwan as a virtually or practically independent political entity. And since the Taiwanese nationalists seldom use any other word than “Taiwan” to refer to the country, their cry for Taiwan Independence seems contradictory to their practice. Adding to the confusion is the fact that the Taiwanese nationalists, although rejecting “Republic of China” as a legitimate name of the nation, nevertheless function within the political institution of ROC. They participate in ROC’s elections and have never suggested revolution or other politically subversive acts. They basically observe the ROC Constitution, except that their goal is to revise the constitution such that it would allow changing the name and the territory of the nation to Taiwan and Taiwan only. In sum, Taiwan Independence is essentially politics of *naming*, and thus politics of identity.

The semantic value of the term “Taiwan Independence” depends on its users. For the Taiwanese nationalists, Taiwan Independence is a just call and hence its meaning is necessarily positive. But for the Chinese nationalists (in China as well as in Taiwan), the meaning of Taiwan Independence must be negative because it would sever the tie between Taiwan and China. More specifically, the existence of a Taiwanese *identity* threatens ONE China, whose perfect wholeness presumes the inclusion of the former. Such binary opposition is further elaborated, magnified, and polarized in the big discourse by the symbolic elites from both camps. For example, in the discourses composed by China’s CCP and Taiwan’s KMT, Taiwan Independence is directly related to danger, threat, and war, and hence contradictory to peace, and the Taiwanese nationalists are hence “trouble makers.” In DPP’s discourse, however, Taiwan Independence is associated with dignity, historical justice, and self-respect. DPP also assures that Taiwan Independence would not necessarily lead to war as long as Taiwan maintains a good
relation with nations such as the U.S. and Japan, who would help Taiwan resist the “belligerent” Chinese nationalists.

(M.) Unification of China, or Zhong1guo2 tong3yi1 (中國 統一). Logically speaking, a united China need not contradict an independent Taiwan: there could co-exist a China and a Taiwan. In real life, however, United China and Taiwan Independence (see L) are pragmatically contradictory because United China has been defined as a huge Chinese nation that includes Taiwan. Morphologically speaking, the Mandarin term for “unification,” tong-yi, means “all-[as]-one,” which had led to the politically defined One China Policy (see N).

Still, while both China-PRC and KMT seek ONE United China, it is not always clear to what extent their ideas of the Chinese nation converge. For China-PRC, the United China is a communist nation that has Taiwan in its territory. But for KMT, the semantic value of “communism” is often quite negative. Nevertheless, the eagerness of the present day KMT leaders to open talk and trade to China-PRC has been taken by the Taiwan Independence supporters as suggesting that, at this time being, uniting China seems to be of greater priority than maintaining a democratic nation for KMT.

(N.) One China Policy, or Yi1ge Zhong1guo2 Zheng4ce4 (一個 中國 政策). China-PRC advanced One China Policy as a prerequisite of a potential “peace talk” between the PRC and Taiwan-ROC governments. Its gist is summarized in a political statement known as One China Principle that “there is only one China in the world, and Taiwan is an inseparable part of it (People’s Republic of China, 2005b).” This stance is reiterated in China-PRC President Hu Jintao’s Four Opinions: “the welfare/happiness of our compatriots in Taiwan is our welfare, and hence we would only take war as the last resort in the face of any radical move towards Taiwan Independence,” and “our leaders are always ready to talk to the Taiwan leaders as long as they
observe the One China Policy (Hu’s four opinions, 2005).” Hu’s pragmatic use of “as long as” (zhi3yao4) is understood by many as a formal semantic condition “if and only if” (zhi3you3). His proposition hence sounds especially cacophonous to the Taiwanese nationalists, who interpret the One China Policy as to prescribe that peace between Taiwan and China is only talkable or negotiable if Taiwan first gives up being. It is unimaginable for the Taiwanese nationalists to conceive a situation where one who does not exist can talk. As a result, the ROC government under DPP during 2000 and 2008 had refused any kind of government-to-government communication with China-PRC. In addition, China-PRC passed an “Anti-secession Law” in March, 2005 that solidified the One China Policy by legitimizing the use of military power against Taiwan Independence.

Today, many in Taiwan stack their hope for a less confrontational China-Taiwan relation on KMT’s return to ROC government. They believe that KMT has a better chance than DPP to negotiate with China because the ideology of one China is not much of a problem for the former.

Representative teams and delegations

The name of the team (dui4, 隊) and/or delegation (tuan2, 團) that represent (dai4 biao3, 代表) Taiwan-ROC is a highly sensitive issue. Towards outside, the government in Taiwan often does not have much choice because China-PRC is far more acknowledged as a true political entity and has a say in determining the title Taiwan-ROC is to use (on the basis that China does not block Taiwan out of the event all together). But even internally, Taiwan’s Chinese nationalists and the Taiwanese nationalists often disagree upon how the representatives should be addressed.

(O.) Team Taiwan, or Tai2wan1 dui4 (台灣 隊). Team Taiwan is the preferable name for the Taiwanese nationalists. However, it is rarely used in actual events not only because China-
PRC would not allow it but also because ROC, the official name of the nation, is a legally more correct choice. Nevertheless, in news published for the domestic audience, one would occasionally observe the use of “Team Taiwan” by the media that sympathize with Taiwanese nationalism.

(P.) Team ROC, or Zhong1hua2 dui4 (中華 隊). Team ROC or Zhonghua dui has been used from the beginning when KMT brought ROC to Taiwan and hence is the habitual choice for most people in Taiwan. But since the word Zhonghua (see A and B) is used, the name of the team tends to be translated as “Chinese Team” in other languages and hence creates confusion between the Taiwan-ROC team and the China-PRC team (see R). The confusion may be one of the reasons why China-PRC has consistently protested against Taiwan’s use of this name in addition to “Team Taiwan” in occasions where both China-PRC and Taiwan-ROC participate. As a result, the term “Team ROC/Zhonghua dui” is also limited in domestic usage.

(Q.) Team Chinese Taipei, or Zhong1hua2 Tai2bei3 dui4 (中華 台北 隊). Due to China-PRC’s protests and its stronger political power, “Team Chinese Taipei” is the name most often registered for Taiwan-ROC in international events. From China-PRC’s perspective, this name is ideal because it avoids the abovementioned confusion in translation and also puts Taiwan in a provincial or regional status relative to China. For example, in 2004 Olympic Games and 2006 Doha Asian Games, there were a Team China representing PRC, a Team Chinese Hong Kong representing the Hong Kong region of PRC, and a Team Chinese Taipei. From Taiwan-ROC’s perspective, the name “Team Chinese Taipei” also puts down the players and/or representatives that came from regions outside of Taipei. Adding to the complication is that, within Taiwan-ROC, there has already existed a political-ideological conflict between “the Southerners” and “the Taipei people,” with the former feeling indignant about the latter always receiving central
attention. Therefore, the politics of naming here can be seen as an example of “Denial of Agency” through “False Categorization” (Russ, 1983).

(R.) Team China, or Zong1guo2 dui4 (中國 隊). In practice, Team China unmistakably refers to the representatives of China-PRC. It nevertheless creates a problem for Taiwan’s media and their audience. When writing/reporting sports news, the journalists tend to use abridged phrases. Now that Zhonghua dui (Team ROC) and Zhongguo dui (Team China-PRC) both have the component Zhong (“center” in center-country), a news report titled zhong-mei da zhan (ZHONG-America/USA big war\(^{24}\)) can refer either to a competition between Taiwan-ROC and USA or that between China-PRC and USA. The audience needs to wait for more contextual information in the news content in order to solve the referential ambiguity.

**Additional discussion on the overseas**

So far I have introduced several terms related to “Chinese” and “ Taiwanese” and showed that they bear multiple meanings, which in turn often evoke different (sets of) identities and ideologies that are mutually incompatible. I have focused on three groups of people: the Chinese nationalists in China-PRC, the Chinese nationalists in Taiwan-ROC, and the Taiwanese nationalists. But there are still some people left, namely, those immigrants from Taiwan who now live overseas. Regardless of their legally defined nationalities, they often express their opinions on issues concerning the China-Taiwan-related identity politics. In other words, they are also real actors/agents in the identity discourse. How do the terms and concepts examined here concern them?

Indeed, these people overseas do not all belong to one group. Take the immigrants in the U.S. for example. For the immigrants from Taiwan and their second and third generations, there

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\(^{24}\) Like in English, the “war metaphor” is commonly used for sport events in Mandarin discourse.
is an “Oversea Hua-ren Organization,” attended by the immigrants who identify themselves as Chinese; and there is the other “Oversea Taiwan-ren (Taiwanese) Organization,” attended by those who consider themselves Taiwanese. The “Taiwanese” group consists of many families that only speak Southern Min ("the Taiwanese language"), but not Mandarin Chinese, besides English. They are politically pro-Taiwan-Independence and hence are often offended by the racial category “Chinese American.” The “Chinese” group may willingly accept the label “Chinese American,” but they nevertheless draw a clear distinction between themselves and the Chinese immigrants from China. The Oversea Hua-ren Organization is only for the self-identified Chinese people from Taiwan, while there is still another Oversea Zhongguo-ren Organization for the people from China. Also for example, in Gainesville, Florida, there are two (Mandarin) Chinese weekend language schools, one for the immigrant children from China and the other for those from Taiwan. Hence, the cover-all identity category “Chinese American” may cause confusion in these people’s identification process as well.

The label “Chinese American” as pre-defined by the mainstream society in the U.S. has also confused the researchers. In McKay and Wong (1996), the terms “Chinese American” and “Chinese immigrants” are used conterminously as “Chinese-speaking children 25,” while the term “Taiwanese immigrants” is never used. However, in the four cases studied, three participants are originally from Taiwan and only one from Mainland China. Among the three immigrant adolescents of a Taiwan origin, one insisted on reporting his nationality as “Taiwanese”; one hesitated among “Taiwan,” “Chinese,” and “Taiwanese”; and the third one could not decide between “ROC” and “Taiwanese” (ibid: 590-591). These self-determined identity choices are

25 In their use, sometimes the term Chinese-speaking is synonymous to Mandarin-speaking, but sometimes it also refers to Cantonese, Hakka, Taiwanese Southern Min, and other languages. This shows that the authors take for granted the popular notion of “one Chinese language, several Chinese dialects.”
overlooked by the researchers, who conclude that “the students’ intricate articulations of ‘being Chinese’ were directed towards fellow Chinese” and “a strong Chinese cultural identification and a strong investment in learning English and American ways [are] mutually exclusive” (ibid: 592, my emphasis). In my opinion, such an analysis is not only potentially offensive to those whom it purports to address, but it also runs the risk of giving rise to inaccurate interpretation. The two researchers of the study are both citizens of China-PRC and speak Mandarin. I suspect that they might have projected their own readily-received “ONE Chinese” ideology onto the individuals they worked with. And I hope that future researchers on similar topics could take into serious consideration Bourdieu’s proposal of “reflexive practice” (Swartz, 1997: 270).

Language Policy and Planning in Taiwan

Overview

Indeed, before the modern colonial nation-states set foot in Taiwan, there must have been numerous factors that have changed the language ecology of Taiwan and the linguistic behaviors of its peoples, during the 17th-century Dutch and Zheng periods and the 18th-to-19th-century Qing period. These factors may include Dutch imperialism’s association with Christianity, the mass Southern Min and Hakka immigration due to Zheng’s (agricultural) land development, and Qing’s sending Southern-Min-speaking officials over Taiwan to rule the locals. However, as reviewed earlier, none of the three abovementioned colonial forces was able to seize control of the whole island and the execution of their policies and plans was mostly partial. Also, since they did not function in the way modern nation-states do, the documentation of official policies is scarce. Hence, although not ideal, my discussion on LP in Taiwan excludes these historical periods. Still, I recommend Blussé et al. (1999) for those interested in the interaction between the
Dutch and the low-land indigenes in the 17th century, and Brown (2004) for those who would like to know more about Taiwan under Zheng and Qing.

The Japanese period (1895 – 1945), on the other hand, is a different story. The Japanese colonial government did function much like a modern nation-state. It had developed a sophisticated multi-layer governmental system to rule over the whole Taiwan Island, with full-fledged policies and plans under central control. Some of the policies and plans certainly concerned language and identity. The lack of a comprehensive examination of the LP from the Japanese period in this research is hence all due to my own inability. I do not read Japanese and hence cannot access the Japanese archives, and I have not found good sources in the languages I know that deal with the relevant LP issues. But, basically, the Japanese government decreed (the Kyushu variety of) Japanese as the national language. Japanese was the language in public social domains and the medium of instruction in school, while the schools also offered a Han Literature course instructed in Southern Min that taught Chinese writing26. As a result, in today’s Taiwan there is still a generation of people who grew up in the end of the Japanese era that speak Japanese as one of their first languages.

In this section, I first focus on the LP pertaining to Mandarin. I intend to answer the two following questions. Why, in today’s general perception, Mandarin has become synonymous to Chinese? Who, and what, made Mandarin the Chinese language? I start with a discussion on KMT’s LP history in China, for much of KMT’s LP in Taiwan has been a continuation from that period. Then, later in the section, I introduce DPP’s LP that is informed by Taiwanese nationalism, examine how it differs from KMT’s, and discuss the controversies it has generated.

26 I do not know if Hakka was also used to teach Han Literature in the Hakka areas. Nor do I know about the Japanese government’s attitude towards the indigenous languages, except for the fact that it had funded many anthropological projects to document them.
In addition to the general language policy and planning, in the next section I include a discussion on “LP for naming.” I will show that name planning, while often categorized as a sub-field of LP, is in fact a rather direct form of identity planning and hence deserves full attention.

KMT’s LP in China: 1912 – 1949

Many who study LP in Taiwan consider it necessary to examine (the history of) KMT’s LP in China because most of the early LP in Taiwan was direct application of the former (e.g., Kaplan & Baldauf Jr., 2003; Tsao, 2000). In such investigations, the central issue often surrounds the policies and planning that made Mandarin Chinese the National Language of ROC.

Not unlike Qin Dynasty’s effort of standardizing and unifying the Chinese writing system in 200 BC, the KMT government, soon after it founded ROC in China in 1912, administrated a LP plan that aimed to define a “supradialectal” language that could unify the speeches of all ROC citizens (Tsao, 2000: 49). KMT differed from Qin, however, in that its goal was not only to elevate the rate of literacy through a uniformed writing system but also to standardize the oral form of “the Chinese language.” To meet this goal, on July 10th, 1912, a meeting on national education was held at the Minister of Education (MOE) in the capital Beijing, the mission of which was to establish a Committee for the Unification of Pronunciation (CUP) (Kaplan & Baldauf Jr., 2003: 49). The CUP committee of 45 members was officially formed on February 15th, 1913, whose first task was to choose one one of the five major Han-Chinese language varieties as the National Language. The five varieties are: Mandarin 73%, Wu 9% (Shanghaiese), Min 4.5% (Hokkien/Northern Min, and Souther Min), Yue 5% (Cantonese), and Hakka 4% (Coulmas 1999: 400). Linguistically speaking, they are all mutually unintelligible, despite the fact that they are generally referred to as “Chinese dialects.” The CUP committee in 1913 took two of them into serious consideration: one is Cantonese, because it was the native language of
Sun Yet-Sen, the founding father of ROC, and many early KMT members; the other was Mandarin because it had the largest number of native speakers, it covered a large geographical area, and it originated from Beijing, the historical cultural center of the Han race. Mandarin eventually won out as the National Language (NL). Since then, in ROC, “national language” (guo2 yu3, 國語) has been a synonym of “Mandarin.” In 1932, the “Pronunciation Dictionary of the National Language” was published, authorized by MOE with the recommendation of CUP. This dictionary and the LP for pronunciation was facilitated by a set of National Phonetic Symbols (注音符號) designed by the Committee for the Preparation of a Unified National Language (CPUNL) formed in April, 1919, because the Chinese characters are incapable of transcribing (phonetic and phonological) sounds. However, the National Phonetic Symbols, which themselves were designed based on parts of the characters, still need to be learnt and memorized as any other writing system. For example, ㄅ represented [pə], and ㄆ represented [pʰə]. Therefore, another main task of CPUNL was to train teachers that were later sent to schools to teach NL-Mandarin. At first, Mandarin was taught only to the first two grades in elementary school in the “Chinese Literature (zhong1 wen2, 中文)” class. Later, MOE replaced “Chinese Literature” with “National Literature (guo2 wen2, 國文)”, which was required for all six grades. Recall that “China/Chinese” in Mandarin is zhong1 guo2, that is, “center country.” Thus, even during such an initial stage when Mandarin had not yet been popularized and normalized, its postulates of ONEness and centrism were already effective in guiding the thinking of the Chinese nationalists.

27 ROC’s primary education system is as such: 6 years of elementary school, 3 years of middle school, and 3 years of high school. Currently in Taiwan, all these 12 years of schooling are mandatory. But in the earliest stage of ROC, only the first 6 years were required by the government.
KMT’s LP in Taiwan: 1945 – 2000

KMT-ROC retreated to Taiwan in 1949 as it lost the war against Communist Party of China (CCP). But the NL-Mandarin LP had already been carried out in Taiwan since 1945, when KMT-ROC took over the island from Japan after World War II.

Chen Yi, a KMT general, was assigned the Administrative Head of Taiwan in 1945. When he arrived at Taiwan, he seemed to be unaware of the fact that Taiwan was inhabited by native speakers of Austronesian languages, Hakka, and Southern Min, many of whom had received Japanese education. According to Tsao (2000: 71), Chen’s lack of linguistic awareness and preparation was evident in his boasting in an interview that “with his experience in the propagation of the national language in Fujian Province [the Southern-Min-speaking region of mainland China], he should be able to make great headway [in achieving NL-Mandarin proficiency in Taiwan] in four years” (my italics). As a result, Chen implemented the NL-Mandarin LP in Taiwan with strict measures. Such strict measures in forcing people to change their linguistic behaviors, along with Chen’s iron wrist ruling, were identified as the main source of the 228 Incident in 1947. Soon after the 228 tragedy, “Chen was deposed and was eventually executed [by KMT] on the grounds of conspiring with the Communist Chinese against the government” (Tsao, 2000:72, my italics). The White Terror period that ensued, during which time many Taiwan natives were executed or “disappeared,” was not unrelated to language and the NL-Mandarin LP either, for many of those who were persecuted had been editors or teachers of the native languages (mainly Taiwanese Southern Min).28

As far as implementation is concerned, the NL-Mandarin planning was administered in Taiwan by the Committee for the Promotion and Propagation of the National Language of

28 See the story of Ng Tiau-jit, narrated by Ng Bi-su, for an example.
Taiwan Province (CPPNL of TW), established in April 1946. Under CPPNL of TW were Mandarin Promotion Centers (MPC) in Taichung, Taitung, Hsinchu, Kaosiung, Changhua, Chiayi, and Pingtung (Tsao, 2003:72-73). The staffs of the MPC offices were recruited from the mainland and they operated in cooperation with the local school systems as well as city governments (Fang 1965: 133). Before the standardized textbooks were complied, the “National Literature” course was taught by the teachers who had been brought from mainland to Taiwan by KMT. Many of them were not native speakers of Mandarin, but they consulted the Standard Pronunciation Dictionary as the standard and use the National Phonetic Symbols to teach pronunciation. Later, more Mandarin-based teacher-training sections were offered by the KMT government to elementary and secondary school teachers in Taiwan, and spelling bees, pronunciation competitions, and National Language Speech Contests occupied the students’ school life (Tsao, 2003: 74-75). Students who spoke their non-Mandarin mother tongues at school would either be physically punished or fined, and sometimes both. Many of them were also forced to sew a black buckle on their school uniforms as a symbol of shame, a scene often shown in the Taiwan New Wave movies made in the 1990s.

NL-Mandarin was also the only language allowed in the military. At first it was simply a lingua franca for the Mainlander soldiers who moved to Taiwan, but since military service was (and still is) compulsory, or mandatory, for all men in Taiwan, NL-Mandarin was also taught and prescribed to Taiwan’s native men who were beyond school ages. In addition, CPPNL used mass media, mostly radio and newspapers with the National Phonetic Symbols printed on the sides of Chinese characters, as a means to spread NL-Mandarin. For the native villages and communities of each region, the MPC offices would also select a few National Language Promotion Families who had learnt Mandarin well to serve as models.
On the discourse level, the whole NL-Mandarin LP was carried out and covered under the name National Language Movement, which was itself part and parcel of the Chinese Cultural Restoration Movement (中华文化復興運動) initiated by President Chiang Kai-Shek in the 1960s and continued to the 1970s. Through discursive means in KMT’s propaganda, restoring Chinese culture was made into the mission and duty of the peoples in Taiwan. Through being given the prestigious status of National Language and implemented in all major social domains, Mandarin was made into the first language of most people in the nation. And, gradually, through collective psychology, (the imagined homogenous) Chinese culture was made into the native culture of Taiwan. As a result, in today’s Taiwan, many younger generations of the Austronesian, Hakka, and Southern Min can only speak Mandarin, but not their heritage languages, with native fluency. All of the factors listed above may have contributed to the fact that, today, many supporters of the Chinese nationalists’ identity discourse in Taiwan do not actually have a direct Mainland background, but they nevertheless subscribe to the “we are all Chinese” myth. This observation shows that, indeed, identity is not so much of a biological given. It is for the most part sociopolitically constructed.

The“(all) Taiwan people = Chinese people” myth created by the Chinese nationalists of KMT, which is again associated with the Mandarin postulates of centrisn and ONEness, can also be found in academic works written by the scholars from Taiwan as well as those who are not. For example, in the “historical background” sections of Kaplan & Baldauf Jr. (2003) and Tsao (2000), the pirate leader Zheng (spelled as “Cheng” in the articles) who occupied Taiwan in the 17th century is depicted as a “Chinese general who saved Taiwan people from the Dutch,” and KMT’s taking over Taiwan from Japan is described as “colonial Japan returning Taiwan to
China.” Also for example, in the literature of International Relations, Taiwan is often described as “the other China” (Edmonds, 1971).

**DPP’s LP in Taiwan: 2000 – 2008**

For most of the time under KMT’s rule before 2000, LP in Taiwan could be thought of as a direct result of the central government’s will29. However, the same does not apply to today’s Taiwan, for Taiwan since the 1990’s has gradually grown into a modern democracy. Crucially, the DPP government between 2000 and 2008 did not always have full control over legislation. A brief sociopolitical background is provided below.

Although mostly associated with Taiwanese nationalism, since established in 1986, DPP’s political agenda has also included some general human rights issues. The initial DPP members consisted of the victims of 228 Incident, human rights lawyers and/or “political criminals,” feminists, environmentalists, and Marxists. They worked together as a political force because they all shared dissatisfaction towards the early KMT government led by Chiang Kai-shek. As mentioned earlier, the National Assembly of ROC in Taiwan, a legislative institution that had the sole rights to elect the president and revise the Constitution, was disproportionately represented by the Mainlanders. Since most of its members were Chiang’s people, Chiang was granted all the political power. He declared Martial Law in Taiwan such that no political congregation among the natives was allowed, and he also revised the original Constitution compiled in the Sun Yat-sen period such that there was no limit to the terms of a presidency. As a result, Chiang served five terms and 31 years as the president of ROC in Taiwan (1945-1953, 1954-1959, 1960-1965, 1966-1971, 1972 to his death in 1975). All the major NL-Mandarin LP discussed before was

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29 Between 1945 and 1989 when the Martial Law was lifted, KMT was virtually the only legal political party in Taiwan-ROC.
originated from him. Chiang Kai-shek’s son, Chiang Ching-kuo was then elected as the president by the National Assembly and served two terms until his death in 1988. While still authoritarian, Chiang Ching-kuo declared the end of Martial Law in 1987 and hence allowed different political voices to be heard. That was when DPP became legal and could nominate candidates in elections. After having won some legislator elections and mayor elections over the years, DPP’s candidate Chen Shui-bian finally won two presidential elections in 2000 and 2004, and DPP has since established true political power that can match KMT’s.

The present political system Taiwan-ROC is as such. Every citizen above the age of 20 can vote (for local legislators, local mayors, national legislators, and president and vice president). The president may propose a policy, but the policy is designed and planned in the Executive Yuan (nominated by the president). The policy proposal is then sent to the Legislature Yuan, and the legislators would vote to decide if the policy and its budget are to be passed. Then the Executive Yuan could either revise-and-resubmit the proposal, or it could execute the plan. Between 2000 and 2008, the president and the Executive Yuan belonged to DPP and represented the Taiwanese nationalists’ agendas, while in the Legislature Yuan KMT occupied over half of the seats. Therefore, during DPP’s eight years of ruling, most policies had to go through intense debates before they were passed and executed.

The DPP government had more success in having those LPs concerning cultural diversity passed by the Legislature Yuan, for KMT today also considers general human rights as universally indisputable. Two major cases are the LP for media and the offering of non-NL-Mandarin “mother tongue” classes at school.

KMT has a long history of banning non-Mandarin languages in media. As early as in 1936, when KMT was still in China, it decreed a law that banned Cantonese movie-making. During
most of its regime in Taiwan before 2000, there were only three TV stations, all of which were
broadcasted in Mandarin, and all were directly or indirectly associated with KMT. In 1994,
however, due to pressure from the Taiwanese nationalists, the Government Information Office,
under the Executive Yuan, announced one additional opening for the fourth broadcast TV
station. On June 16th, 1995, the Southern Min TV station, Formosa TV, officially aired for the
first time. Formosa TV was predominantly funded by the DPP party, and hence its news angle is
often in favor of Taiwanese nationalism and the related identity discourse (while the other three
broadcast TV stations are in favor of KMT’s Chinese nationalism). Following the Southern-Min-
speaking Formosa TV was Hakka TV, broadcasted since July 1st, 2003. The establishment of
Hakka TV was achieved by the Government Information Office under DPP. And it has been a
public non-commercial station operated by the non-profit organization Taiwan (Public)
Broadcasting System (TBS). Following the same route, Indigenous TV opened on July 1st, 2005.
While Formosa TV and Hakka TV are both devoted to only one language, Indigenous TV has to
allot different sessions to various Austronesian languages. This partially reflects Han-centrism:
while Southern Min and Hakka in Taiwan now have gained linguistic identities independent of
Mandarin, Yuan2-zhu4min2 (原住民, “original residents,” or “indigenes”) is still a superordinate
label that covers all indigenous Austronesian languages and peoples in Taiwan. On the other
hand, it reflects the sociolinguistic fact that the indigenous languages face greater danger of
extinction, and hence they do not have as many speakers as the Han languages. Simply put, it is
much easier to find a fluent Mandarin, Southern Min, or Hakka broadcaster than a broadcaster
who can speak any of the Austronesian languages at ease. The sociolinguistic disadvantage
against the Austronesian indigenes is also reflected in the implementation of the media policy. In
August 2006, a Han person (who does have experiences working with the indigenes), Yu Kan-
ping, was assigned by the government-funded TBS as the Executive Chair of Indigenous TV. On August 31st, a group of indigenes protested against the decision; they asked for an Austronesian executive for the Austronesian TV station. Within a month, Yu resigned, and a new electing process finally selected Mashao Aji, a Tayal indigene, as the new Executive.

In the domain of education, the MOE (Ministry of Education) under DPP added “mother tongue education” into the “national languages” syllabus in 2001. While the only official National Language is still Mandarin, this policy has granted some legal status to the other non-Mandarin languages. However, in actual practice, the “Mother Language Course” (Mu3-yu3 ke4, 母語課) is only offered in elementary school one hour per week. The hours allotted to the National Language (i.e., Mandarin) course have basically remained the same, and the time allotted to the English course in mandatory education has even increased. Moreover, in many schools, Southern Min is the only language offered in the Mother Language classes. The DPP’s LP requires the Mother Language education for all, but not everyone in Taiwan speaks Southern Min as their native language. Hence, many, especially the supporters of Chinese nationalism, criticize DPP for creating a new Southern Min hegemony. While this controversy, on the one hand, again reveals the practical problem that many minority languages lack capable teachers, it also corresponds to the observation that the so-called “localist movement” (and the related policies) in Taiwan can often be a token for the Southern-Min-dominated Taiwanese nationalists to co-opt other non-Mainlander groups.

As a result, the DPP government’s ideal goal of multilingualism and multiculturalism was often diverted to a heated debate between the “Taiwanese Southern Min identity” and the “Chinese Mainlander identity,” both claiming that they represent all of the people in Taiwan. With regard to LP, the debate often surrounds the “Taiwanese language” Southern Min and the
“national language” Mandarin. As mentioned earlier, in practice, the time allotted to the Mother Language class is only one hour per week and the hours allotted to the NL-Mandarin class have remained the same. Such time-arrangement was not what the DPP government originally intended: the DPP government in fact proposed more hours in school for Mother Language by taking time away from NL-Mandarin. The proposal caused strong resistance from KMT and the Chinese nationalists in general, who dominate the Legislature Yuan, and hence it was not passed. The Chinese nationalists have labeled DPP’s attempt to reduce NL-Mandarin education as “de-Chinese-ization” (去中國化). They further argue that “de-Chinese-ization” is equivalent to “de-Taiwanization” because, as framed in their discourse, people in Taiwan all have a Chinese root.

Another controversy concerns what Romanized phonetic system should Taiwan use for Mandarin, as summarized in Her (2005). While still using the National Phonetic Symbols in addition to the Chinese characters, the government considers a Romanized system for annotating Mandarin necessary to cater to the need of the international audience. There are two such Romanized systems available, Pinyin and Tongyong. Since the Pinyin system has been used internationally for teaching Mandarin to foreign L2 learners, the choice seems to be simple. However, the issue has only been complicated by the Taiwan-China identity politics. Crucially, the Pinyin system was designed by the Chinese Communist Party to substitute (KMT’s) National Phonetic Symbols, and it has been used to teach Mandarin to the nationals of China-PRC. Hence, the Taiwanese nationalists see it as a “Chinese” system and unsuitable for Taiwan. The DPP government thus in 2002 decided to use Tongyong instead, for translating all its official documents. On the other hand, the then Taipei Mayor Ma Ying-jeou, a KMT member who is currently President of Taiwan-ROC, decided against the central government and used Pinyin in Taipei City. He went on to justify his choice by arguing that Pinyin would be a more practical
choice for connecting with the international society. Ma’s decision then agitated DPP and the Taiwanese nationalists, who argued against Ma and KMT by presenting expert endorsement that Tongyong is better than Pingyin because Tongyong represents the (Mandarin) sounds more accurately. The validity of such an argument, of course, does not hold on linguistic ground. After all, all writing systems are just as good as one another, and as limited, because they are all (sets of) signs that need to be learnt and memorized; no writing system bears a direct relation to the physical sounds it intends to transcribe. However, because DPP’s argument was endorsed by some so-called “language experts,” most of whom are college professors, it might indeed affect people’s perception about writing and its ability to represent oral language. Moreover, some fundamental, or radical, Taiwanese nationalists even accused Ma and KMT of treason: conspiring with the Chinese Communists. Remember, the exact same accusation had been used by the KMT government against the Taiwanese nationalists during the White Terror period. The absurdity of it can only be appreciated against the “Self vs. Other” theme in the discourse of nationalism (cf. Smith, 1995).

**LP for Naming**

Many who study LP have pointed out the inseparability between language decisions and the “[language-] external factors” (e.g. Edwards, 1994; Fasold, 1984). Merely showing this inseparability, however, is not enough, because naming entails power. Therefore, I propose a critical approach to LP for naming that incorporates broad sociopolitical context and a concern with political discourse and power relations. In what follows, I first review the theories concerning the politics of naming, names and culture, and critical methodology in LP research. Then I discuss LP for naming in Taiwan by examining its implications in the public social domains as well as the private domains.
The Politics of Naming

Researchers of names in general recognize two basic functions of names: one is “informational” or “informative,” and the other is “symbolic” or “affective” (e.g. Bourhis, 1992; Helleland, 2002; Landry & Bourhis, 1997). The former is derived from the Saussurean structural linguistic dichotomy of “signifier” and “signified” where a name refers to an entity (a person or a place) in the objective world. The latter, on the other hand, alludes to the socio-psychological sense a name means for its referent: a name connotes traits, characteristics, and identity with respect to the entity it refers to.

However, the French postmodernist philosopher, Derrida, criticized the philosophy of dichotomy prevalent in the Western academic tradition. To him, this binary thinking perpetuated the violent practices in Western hierarchy (Derrida, 1967). Derrida referred to the flux of meanings in modern society as a result of the embarking of mass media, and he contended that the distinction between the signifier and the signified did not make sense. Oftentimes names are hard to define: they seem to refer to something, but the referents exist not as much in the objective world as in personal perception and feelings. Hence, Derrida proposed “commemoration” as the fundamental function of (proper) names instead: “we resort to [names] to remember and commemorate, [and] to recall those no longer with us but still close to us in ways that more often than not defy immediate comprehension” (Moraru, 2000: 52). Thus defined, a proper name is no longer merely a label that provides information about an individual (or a thing). It is a property of a group of people. Through a name, the people commemorate their long-gone friend, her existence, deeds, and legends. Therefore, to give a person a name is to befriend her, or in ’s terminology to “embrace” her, and the politics of names is hence conceived of as the “politics of friendship” (Derrida, 1997).
Modern politics of names, however, appears to be not so benign as the term “politics of friendship” may suggest. The LP for proper names often involves a cultural-politically dominant group depriving a minority people of their native names, and sometimes imposing on them non-native names. For example, Moraru (2000: 50) observes that thousands of Albanians had their names “ripped off” at the Yogoslav border in 2000 where the Serb troops violently took away their IDs and driving licenses. He further quotes Baudrillard (1996: 112) “where your driver license goes, so goes your identity” and asserts that “names constitute, [and] ultimately are identities” (Moraru, 2000: 50, original emphasis). Similarly, in Taiwan, the Austronesian indigenes have been denied their native names by the government and received Chinese names that bear no connection to their culture(s). Derrida (1997: 73) attributed name oppression as such to the nationalist dichotomy between Self and Other and indicated that “in the act of naming… I get closer to this ‘other’ yet without forcing (my)self upon his or her identities.” And if true friendship is observed, “[the enemy] will respect my own name. He [sic] will hear what my name should, even if it does not, properly name” (ibid: 72). The emphasis on respect towards Other extends to the labels, and hence names, given to a people, which may in turn be used in other social domains. For example, Bright (2000) points out that the respect to different peoples has made some ethnically offensive terms such as “nigger,” “Jap,” and “squaw” undesirable in the US place-name practice, and that policies have been revised several times to accommodate such social demand. In sum, the study of names necessarily involves the examination of human social relations: the issue of name planning concerns who gets the power and the rights to name, and how difference is perceived and dealt with.
Names as Cultural Heritage

Derrida’s conception of “commemoration” as the fundamental function of names anticipated the currently popular notion of names as cultural heritage because proper names are not just name tags on individual persons or entities, but they also encode the culture of a whole people. Moraru (2000: 55) elaborates: “as such, the name becomes a badge of *re-noun* and thereby an instrument of public memory … [as] an essential way of reconstituting a tradition, of organizing and preserving a culture” (original emphasis). By extension, through deliberate planning or not, a change of name practice may lead to a change of culture. For example, in “‘And if we lose our names, then what about our land?’, or, what price development?” Hardman (1994) explores the way the colonial Spanish culture imported sexism to the South American Jaqi culture through the introduction of patronymic practice. Hardman (1994:153) explains that according to traditional Jaqi practice, a woman does not take her husband’s name as her family name upon marriage and the name of a land is the name of its owner. That is, in the past a Jaqi woman had her own land/property before and after marriage, and her husband his own. She (and her property) was not a property of him; she need not depend on him. However, today’s Jaqi women are concerned that with the import of Spanish patronymic practice they will lose their lands as they lose their names. This observation in part explains why now many consider the rights to names as general human rights.

In Europe since the 1970s “Place-name care” has become one of the main concerns in LP. It has been the main topic of the annual event European Heritage Days and several articles are devoted to the LP-related aspects of this issue (e.g., Helleland, 2002; Paikkala, 2000). Helleland (2002: 325) explains that “the protection of names as part of the cultural heritage… [requires] good place-name practice.” And Paikkala (2000: 145) cites the objectives and aims published by
European Concil, pointing out that taking care of place-names would “improve the knowledge of our heritage and that of others… know each other better;” “protect the cultural heritage, which is threatened,” “[facilitate] our search for identity and… our collective memory,” and “also [provide] a vision towards the future.” While both review the general principles and attitudes, Paikkala’s article examines the case in Finland and Helleland’s discussion covers other Nordic nations in addition to Finland. All the cases share the conviction that native place-names should be treated as important immaterial cultural heritage because they are crucial to people’s understanding of history and identity. The conviction also constitutes the premise under which the policy-makers and language planners in these regions work towards the establishment of a “good” naming practice. In addition, Landry and Bourhis (1997) point out that LP for naming in the public domain often result in a certain “linguistic landscape,” which in turn has a substantial effect on people’s perception of “ethno-linguistic vitality.” This perception has a “carryover effect” to actual linguistic behaviors and hence LP for naming may also contribute to the domination, diminishing, or demise of a language (ibid: 29-35).

**Critical Approach to LP for Naming**

The above discussion implies that one need not consider LP for naming in particular and LP in general as a sub-area of “applied linguistics,” in the sense that the established theories are applied simply as an instrument to explain real world observations. On the contrary, one could think of LP as part of “contextual linguistics” where theories are advanced and/or developed through contextualization in the real world. Derrida’s example has shown that the issue of names and naming itself demands theorization; and many researchers stress on the importance of taking social context into account when addressing LP issues. Shohamy (2006: xvi) states that “the

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[30] I would like to thank Dr. Hardman for introducing this term to me in a personal communication.
study of LP should not be limited to formal, declared and official policies but rather to the study of the powerful mechanisms that are used in most societies nowadays to create and perpetuate ‘de facto’ language policies and practices.” This critical view of LP is concerned with “inequitable power relation” (Heller, 1999). It takes into consideration broad sociopolitical context and investigates the “ideology, myths, propaganda, and coercion” behind formal policies (Shohamy, 2006: xvii). In addition, while history is an indispensable part of the critical contextualization, the formal written history should not be taken as all that counts. As Pavlenko (2002; 2004a) points out, not all people have gained “visibility” and “audibility” in formal history. By examining the history of the less powerful, the minority, or her-story, one may attain a more comprehensive picture of LP and reveal its significance beyond the nation-state.

Below, I apply this critical approach to the LP for naming in Taiwan along two types of social domains: the public domain and the private domain. In the public domain, I review the change of linguistic landscape across time as a consequence of policy change. In the private domain, I focus on the policy that affects personal names. Historical background and sociopolitical context information are also included in my discussion as part of the “contextualization” process.

**Public Domain**

Oftentimes, LP for naming molds the “linguistic landscape” (LL) of a community, which includes “road signs, names of the sites, streets, names of buildings, places and institutions, advertising billboards, commercials and personal visiting cards as well as labels, instructions and public forms, names of shops and public signs” (Shohamy, 2006:112). Landry and Bourhis (1997) point out that LL is arguably the most visible or apparent of name policies. Their research in French Canada shows that LL, through operating at the socio-psychological level, results in
different “vitality beliefs” with respect to the “ethno-linguistic identity” in the people’s perception of the language(s) in question (ibid: 29-35). In other words, the visual landscape in the outside world becomes the “mental landscape” in an individual mind through linguistic function, and this internalization affects the individual’s broader beliefs concerning language, identity, and culture. Indeed, in and through the public names, people *commemorate* a heritage. As a consequence, if public names change so drastically that the new names resemble little to the old ones, the history and identity of a people may face the danger of being forgotten or lost.

Having experienced several waves of immigration and endures various colonial regimes, multilingual Taiwan’s LL is characterized by constant name change and discontinuity between the present and the past, as will be shown below.

**Naming the island**

One encounters a landscape when visiting a site. For example, people talk about enjoying the beautiful landscape of Mount Alps. Therefore, before moving on to examine the linguistic landscape in Taiwan, it is necessary to first examine how the island itself has been named.

When the Portuguese crew of a Dutch ship first spotted the island from the sea in the early 17th century, they exclaimed *Ilha Formosa*: “a beautiful island.” *Formosa* was hence taken as the name of the island by the Portuguese, the Dutch, and the Spanish, who explored the island from 1624 to 1662. The first wave of Han immigrants came short after, most of whom were Southern Min and Hakka. These immigrants came from the southeast coast of the mainland China and landed on the southwest plain of the island, where they encountered the Austronesian indigenes of Siraya. They inquired of the Siraya people about the place, and the Siraya gave them the word *Tayovan* (sometimes also spelled as *Tavicon*), meaning “land of woods and hills.” The Han immigrants borrowed *Tayovan* into their lexicon and spread it to other places as they explored
more suitable lands for agriculture. They pronounced the Siraya word as *Taiwan* (same pronunciation in Southern Min, Hakka, and Mandarin, with different tones), and eventually this word became the Han name of the island.

The island could also be found on the maps drawn by the Chinese Ming Dynasty (1368 - 1644) around the same period of time. On those maps, the island was labeled as either *Big Lioqio*, *Small Lioqio*, or *Lioqio Country*. But as Wang & Hu (1992: 65) point out, these three names could also refer to the island(s) known as Okinawa today. In other words, for the 17th century Han Chinese, Taiwan and Okinawa were rather interchangeable, while today in Mandarin Chinese the word *Liuqio* only refers to the Japanese islands of Okinawa. Wang & Wu also suggest that the interchangeability of names implies that Qing, at least at the beginning, did not care much for these tiny lands. However, in the late 17th century, more Han immigrants came to Taiwan when the island was under Zheng’s rule. They learned the Han-appropriated term *Taiwan* as the name of the island from the earlier immigrants. This name was later adopted by the Manchurian Qing Dynasty that defeated Zheng in 1684 and became official, as Qing named the local government it established on the island *Taiwan Fu* (Taiwan Government). Before taking over Taiwan from Qing, the Japanese referred to the island as *High Mountains* (Zhang, 1996: 127). But in 1895 when they established the first local office on the island, they followed the Qing convention and named it *Taiwan Government* also. Since then, *Taiwan* as the name of the island has been commonly accepted around the world.

**Linguistic Landscape before 1945**

Because the Austronesian languages in Taiwan had no writing systems before they encountered the Dutch missionaries and modern anthropological linguists, there is little documentation of the aboriginal toponyms. In the early 17th century, the Dutch first named two
places in the southwest of Taiwan Zeelandia and Provintia; and the Spanish, who occupied the
north part of Taiwan, named the northeast San Diego and the northwest San Domingo. The Han
immigrants, on the other hand, had their own name for the cities occupied by the Europeans. For
example, San Domingo was known to the Han people as the Red Hair City (Hong-mao-cheng, 紅
毛城), or City of the Red-haired (Cai et al., 1993: 19).

After Zheng evicted the Europeans in 1662, he renamed Provintia as Cheng Tian (承天). Cheng
means “to support,” and Tian means “sky,” which symbolizes the emperor. Other names
Zheng gave to the places located in the southwest region of Taiwan included Wan-nian (萬
年, “million years,” symbolizing long-life for the emperor), An-fu (安撫, “to pacify” and/or “to
civilize”), and Tian-xing (天興, “prosperity under the sky”, i.e., the emperor’s blessing). These
names followed two patterns: one was to “civilize” the Austronesian indigenes and the other was
to honor the empire of Ming, whose king granted Zheng’s father the royal family name Zheng as
a prize for his service in the navy. In fact, at that time in the mainland China the Chinese Ming
had already been conquered and replaced by the Manchurian Qing Dynasty. Therefore, the
Zheng Taiwan was deemed an enemy by Qing.

After defeated Zheng in 1684 and took over Taiwan, Qing basically inherited the emperor-
honoring place-names from Zheng, but the emperor receiving the honor became the Qing
emperor(s). The only Zheng place-names that were demolished or renamed by Qing were the
military bases. During two hundred years of ruling in Taiwan, Qing had explored a far greater
area than Zheng had before. As a consequence, the Qing officials encountered more native
names and were confronted with more naming problems. Cai et al. (1993: 22-23) identified three
patterns of Qing’s naming policies. (1) “Beautify” the “uncivilized” native place-names. For
example, changing Cow Shit to High Officer, or Ghost to The Honorable. In such cases the
substituting names are phonologically close to the replaced names in Han languages. (2) Replace the original vulgar names with phonologically similar names whose connotation is considered less vulgar, without necessarily beautifying them semantically. For example, a village in the middle-west coast was originally Tu-ku, meaning “mud-smeared pants,” after the natural fact that whenever it rained, the roads were all muddy and people could not keep their pants clean. This name was replaced by Tu-ku, supposedly pronounced with the same phonemes with different tones but written in different characters, which would mean “the bank/storage of soil.” (3) While the first two name policies targeted towards the places named by the early Han Chinese immigrants, the third pattern applied to the indigenous Austronesian names only. Basically, all the Austronesian place-names composed of more than two syllables were reduced to two syllables, such that the new names would fit the phonology of Chinese languages better. For example, the Austronesian place-name Ma.lo.u.yan was turned into Wu.yang and Ta.ta.yu became Ta.you. This observation reflects the historical fact that a few generations after the first wave, the Han Chinese immigrants and their languages had enjoyed greater sociopolitical power than the indigenous Austronesian. According to Landry and Bouhis’s (1997) findings as discussed earlier, the de-Austronesianized LL may have contributed to the low belief of the Austronesian towards the ethno-linguistic vitality of their native languages, which in turn results in the loss of over ten indigenous Austronesian languages in Taiwan since then.

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31 I am unable to provide (the transcription of) the original Han pronunciations of the replaced names here. Neither can I specify if each of these names was of Southern Min or Hakka origin. This is because my source, Cai et al. (1993), is published in Chinese print. As mentioned earlier, Chinese writing does not represent pronunciation well. And because its assumption of “One Chinese language; various dialects,” it does not specify which Han-Chinese language variety is represented at a specific point.
The major toponymic reform by the Japanese regime took place in 1920. With new
demarcation of administration districts, the Japanese name policy in 1920 affected over 100
places that had been identified and named by the Qing government. Cai et al. (1993: 26-29)
identified three patterns. (1) Resurrect the old Zheng names. These include the former Zheng
military bases that had been demolished by Qing, and the places that, after Zheng left and before
Qing officials arrived, were taken back by the Austronesians. In 1920, the Japanese government
decided to establish new military-based governance in these areas and the Zheng names fit its
purpose. (2) Replace the Chinese characters with Japanese Kanji. Although Japanese Kanji is
influenced by Chinese writing, not all Chinese characters are pronounceable in Japanese. On the
other hand, among those pronounceable Chinese characters, much of the Japanese pronunciation
is dramatically different from the Chinese pronunciation. The Japanese officials decided to
adhere to the criterion of “similarity in pronunciation,” that is, they would replace the original
Chinese characters with Japanese Kanji that sounded similar to the Chinese pronunciation when
pronounced in Japanese (for example, 阿公店 in Chinese characters became 岡山 in Japanese
Kanji). The result of this policy is that many of the new place-names in Japanese Kanji bear little
semantic sense to the local natives who were literate in Chinese writing. (3) Reduce all tri-
syllabic names (including Chinese and Austronesian names) to bi-syllabic, make them
pronounceable in Japanese, and at the same time also “beautify” the meanings according to the
Japanese sense. One example in Cai et al. (1993: 28) is a Hakka village name that was written as
咸菜硼. 咸菜 refers to the cabbage pickles that Hakka was good at making. When 咸菜硼 is
pronounced in Hakka, it is tri-syllabic. The Japanese renamed the place by rewriting 咸菜硼
into 關西 in Kanji. The Japanese pronunciation of 關西 is similar to the Hakka pronunciation of
咸菜硼, but it does not refer to the smelly (to Japanese noses) pickles. In addition, Zhang (1996:
115) recognizes one more pattern of Japanese naming policy: transplanting domestic Japanese toponyms into Taiwan soil. This practice primarily applied to the places in east Taiwan. The west and east sides of Taiwan are geographically separated by a group of high mountains in the middle across the island from the northern tip to the southern tip. There was no traffic between these two sides; the European, the Han immigrants, Zheng, and Qing had only explored the west side because it was the side of their initial landing. The east had remained unaffected and only been populated by several Austronesian peoples until 1910 when the Japanese government started building a railroad system there. The transplantation of domestic names may reflect the Japanese ideology that these newly developed lands were “authentic” Japanese properties.

**LL in the KMT era: 1945 – 2000**

In this subsection I review the LP for naming of the KMT government in Taiwan between 1945 and 2000. Notice that although DPP took central power between 2000 and 2008, it had not changed or removed all the KMT names. Therefore, the LL in today’s Taiwan remains predominantly the result of the policies discussed here.

Cai et al. (1993: 32) point out that the new toponyms given by KMT since 1945 lack any relation to the old ones they have replaced, in terms of semantics, phonology, and/or written form. In other words, the LL constructed by KMT is manifested by a discontinuity of history. Most of the patterns underlying KMT’s LP, including the naming policies, however, are consistent in reflecting a Chinese nationalist ideology. Essentially, this ideology and the LP it prescribes function to build a nationalistic “collective identity” for all the people in Taiwan such that the legitimacy of KMT as the government of the nation could be solidified. Or in Anderson’s (1983) terminology, a new nation as a unity could be “imagined.” Smith (1995: 133-135) observes that the discourse of collective national identity often expresses the following
themes: (1) a collective name, (2) a myth of common origin, (3) a shared ethno-history, (4) cultural characteristics that serve to demarcate members from non-members, (5) an association with historic territory, or homeland, (6) a sense of solidarity, (7) a definite territory or homeland other than through historical association, (8) a common economy, (9) a shared public, mass-education-based, culture, and (10) common legal rights and duties for all members. Many of these themes are manifested in the LL KMT has constructed in Taiwan.

Cai et al. (1993: 32-33) identify three public-naming patterns of KMT: names that reflect the Confucian philosophy to symbolize Taiwan as a place that sustains the traditional Chinese culture, names that honor the political philosophy of Sun Yet-sen, the founding father of KMT, and names that pray for prosperity in Taiwan. After examining the LL in Taiwan, I extend the number of categories to six as follows. (1) Names that reflect Confucian morality embodied in the prototypical “traditional Chinese culture”. Confucianism is generally taken as coterminous to Chinese culture, despite the fact that there had been several other schools of thoughts, such as Taoism and Chinese Zen that stressed very different moral values. Its eight central moral values are “zhong” (忠, loyalty), “xiao” (孝, filial piety), “ren” (仁, benevolence), “ai” (愛, love towards fellow people), “xin” (信, credibility/honesty), “yi” (義, justice/righteousness), “he” (和, harmony) and “ping” (平, peace). They are prevalent in Taiwan’s LL, usually appearing in pairs as “zhong-xiao”, “ren-ai,” “xin-yi,” and “he-ping.” Nowadays, virtually every town and city in Taiwan has at least a Zhong-Xiao Road, Ren-Ai Road, Xin-Yi Road, or He-Ping Road. These moralities are ideal types and they mostly apply to the perceived/imagined Han Chinese only. Behind them is the center-based hierarchy of Confucianism that considers the peoples outside of China (Central Country), that is, the non-Chinese or non-Han peoples, as barbaric savages. The story of the Confucian politician Guan Zhong in 7 BC reveals that in the Chinese minds it is not
only moral but also righteous to raise a war against the barbaric, for the Chinese would “educate and civilize” (jiao hua, 教化) them. Today, many of the underprivileged Austroneisan indigenes in Taiwan, who were/are seen by the Han Chinese immigrants as uneducated, live in Village of Benevolent Love (Ren-Ai Zun) or Village of Honesty and Justice (Xin-Yi Zun). These villages of concrete houses were built and named by KMT on the sites where the traditional tribal communities used to be. This pattern of Chinese culture in LP worked in tandem with the Chinese Cultural Restoration Movement initiated by Chiang Kai-shek and later implemented by KMT as a national policy in the 1960s. The name of this general cultural policy served two discursive purposes: in the domestic discourse, it legitimized and mythified Chinese culture as the common origin of the collective identity of the people in the nation, and in the international discourse, it served to counter the Cultural Revolution in the communist China.

(2) Names that honor Sun Yat-Sen’s political philosophy. Sun Yet-Sen and his disciples in KMT built the nation of Republic of China, now ROC-in-Taiwan, based on his political philosophy San-Min Zhuyi (“three-MIN principle,” also known as the Three Principles Concerning the People). They are “min-zu” (民族), Government of the People, “min-quan” (民權), Government by the People, and “min-sheng” (民生), Government for the People. These three major concepts have also been turned into road names in virtually every town and city in Taiwan. They serve to create an illusion for the people in Taiwan that they have a “people’s government.” However, the meaning of the word “people” is not necessarily inclusive and representative once one inspects the actual practices of the early KMT government. For example, the representatives who served in the National Assembly brought to Taiwan by KMT, which enjoyed the rights to vote for the president and revise the constitution, were mostly not natively
born in Taiwan. In other words, despite the fact that in the LL the people in Taiwan are always referenced, for decades they were under-represented in the actual political system.

(3) Names that honor Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek. Just like Zheng and Qing who used toponyms to honor their emperors, KMT uses toponyms to honor its leaders. Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek are better known in Chinese languages as Sun Zhong-Shan and Jiang Zhong-Zheng, respectively. Zong-Shan and Zhong-Zheng have also been turned into road names in every town and city in Taiwan. In addition, most towns, cities, and also schools have a Zong-Shan and/or Zhong-Zhen Hall. This “myth of national heroes” is not discussed in Smith (1995), but it is certainly related to the creation of the myth of common origin.

(4) Names that reflect KMT’s hope to regain Mainland China. The early KMT government nicknamed Taiwan as the “(Military) Base for Regaining China.” “To regain” in Mandarin is “fu-xìng” (復興) or “guāng-fú” (光復). There are now not only many Fu-xìng Guān-fú roads in Taiwan but also schools and villages as well. Many of the Guān-Fu schools was originally built by the Japanese and used to bear a different name, but KMT has assigned them the duty to regain mainland China. As for the villages, some were constructed by KMT for the Mainlander soldiers they brought to Taiwan, and some were indigenous Austronesian tribes. The soldiers lost the war because they were on the losing side. Many of them were forced to leave their families in the mainland to come to Taiwan. Now in their new homes in Taiwan they are still constantly reminded of the war. Besides the not-so-glorious reminder, a second-generation Mainlander who grew up in one of these military settlements adds that the variations of the Guān-fú names also imply ranking and different living conditions. On the other hand, the Austronesian indigenes do

not even have a historical connection to the mainland, but they are reminded of the “imagined homeland-China” as well.

(5) Directly transplanting Chinese toponyms to Taiwan. The KMT government has transplanted several mainland toponyms into Taiwan soil, most of which were turned into road names. There was no logical criterion behind the selection of a certain mainland name for a certain place in Taiwan. For example, in Taichung city, a humid plain on the west side of Taiwan by the sea, there is a road named Gansu (甘肅), which is originally a desert area in Mainland China. Naming policy as such served to create an “imagined homeland” for the Chinese nationalists. In addition, it has led to not only a confusing linguistic landscape in the local Taiwan places but also a confusing mental landscape in the minds of the people. Take for example the personal experience of Xu Wen-Yi, a pediatrician working in Taitung City on the east side of Taiwan: “One day, a young mother brought her child to my clinic. The child had some respiratory problem. [I suggested that the child] should not be exposed to the strong wind blowing from the sea. The mother said, ‘well, but our home is right next to the seashore.’ I was suddenly stunned and thought, ‘Oh, yes, Cheng-Du Road [the patient’s address] is right by the sea. But how would Cheng-Du be by the sea? Isn’t it ridiculous?’ (Yu, 2005)” Cheng-Du is originally the name of the capital of Si-Chuan Province in China, which is an inland rainforest.

(6) Names that connote the hope for prosperity. This group of toponyms contains Mandarin words connoting wealth and prosperity, such as “feng” (豐), “fu” (富), “gui” (貴), “tai” (泰), among others. Many of the referents (roads and or villages) are places that have few know that [the names of] Juan-cun imply ranking. If the name is Ju-guan (莒光), the luxurious village is for the generals and above; and the broken bamboo fences only exist in the villages for the low-ranked.”
directly benefited from KMT’s Ten Year National Construction Plan between 1973 and 1980. They also reflect Taiwan’s participation in the East Asian Miracle in the 1970s and 1980s.

**LL change by DPP: 2000 – 2008**

Before taking central government in 2000, DPP had set zheng ming (正名, “name-rectifying”) as one of its main political goals. During its regime between 2000 and 2008, the DPP government’s LP for naming was mainly designed to pursue this goal. Name-rectifying implies DPP and the Taiwanese nationalists’ ideology that the existing Chinese names (mostly pronounced in Mandarin) given by KMT are “incorrect.” While the ultimate goal of Taiwanese nationalism is to change the name of the nation from Republic of China to Taiwan, name-rectifying is also concerned with the general LL, including toponyms, names of organizations, public signs, and personal names.

With regard to road names, the first instance of name-rectifying took place in 1996 and was initiated by the then Taipei Mayor Chen Shui-bian, a DPP member who was then elected as the president of ROC in 2000 and 2008. The road in front of the President House, which is in Taipei City, was named as Jie-Shou Road (介壽路) in 1947 to celebrate the then KMT president Chiang Kai-shek’s birthday. Jie is the Mandarin pronunciation of Cantonese Kai in Chiang’s name, and Shou means long life. In 1996, the Taipei Congress received Chen’s order and renamed the road as Katagalan Boulevard. The word “Katagalan” came from the language of the indigenous Katagalan people who used to dwell in Taipei Basin and it means “(a) plain submerged in water.” By doing so, Chen attempted to incorporate Austronesian-ness into the discourse of the Taiwanese (nationalistic) identity, the subscribers of which had before been mostly the Southern Min and Hakka immigrants. Such an attempt has been partially successful.
While some indigenes consider Chen’s gesture as genuine recognition of the Austronesian root of Taiwan, some others consider that it was mostly symbolic or even tokenistic.

In December 2004, President Chen Shui-bian ordered the Executive Yuan/Department to “rectify’ the names of several government-funded organizations in Taiwan that contained the word China. He justified this order by claiming that changing “China” to “Taiwan” would help relieve the confusion in the international society. Chen set a two-year deadline and announced that the changes would first apply to only the nation-owned industries. Unsurprisingly, Chen’s announcement aroused major dissent from KMT and the Chinese nationalists, who contended that the nation is Republic of China and referred to the DPP government’s “name-rectifying” policy as a “de-Chineseness,” or qu4 Zhong1guo2 hua4 (去中國化)33. Thus, DPP’s LP for naming became a “site of negotiation” between the Chinese and the Taiwanese nationalistic identity discourses. Because of the dissent, Chen’s two-year deadline was not met. By 2007, only two name-changing cases had been carried out: “China Petroleum” (Zhong1guo2 shi2 you2, 中國石油) was changed to “Taiwan Petroleum” (Tai2-wan1 shi2 you2, 台灣石油), and “Republic of China Postal Service” (Zhong1-hua2 you2 zheng4, 中華郵政) became “Taiwan Postal Service” (Tai2-wan1 you2 zheng4, 台灣郵政). The LL also changed as a result, for all the signs on the properties owned by the two companies such as gas stations, gasoline-transporting trucks, post offices, and post service vehicles, and stamps, needed to be re-designed and re-printed. The estimate cost of making all these changes amounted to billions of dollars. KMT hence added an economic argument into its dissident discourse, which can be summarized as “the DPP

33 The term qu4 Zhong1guo2 hua4 is supposed to be semantically negative according to the Chinese nationalists’ ideology and values.
government has unnecessarily wasted our tax-payers’ money.” KMT’s Chair Ma Ying-jeou, who later won the presidential election in 2008, commented on DPP’s name-changing: “When KMT successfully returns to the center in 2008, we will change these [Taiwan-related] names back [to China-related names]” (Name-rectifying controversy, 2007). To endorse Ma’s comment, KMT then announced a “Second Time Name-rectifying Plan.” KMT’s choice of adopting DPP’s terminology into its discourse is a rather interesting case. As far as I know, the direct adaptation of an opponent’s rhetoric has not been found in other nation’s political discourse. Moreover, after reviewing the Democratic Party’s rhetorical failure against the Republic Party during the Bush Administration, Lakoff suggests that using a completely different discursive frame, instead of working within the opponent’s frame, may be a more successful strategy (Powell, 2003). However, KMT’s success in regaining popularity in Taiwan indicates that Lakoff’s suggestion does not have universal applicability.

Besides the direct confrontation between KMT and DPP, there was also a voice represented by the mainstream media, asking: “we have been used to these (KMT) names for years; why bother now?” From a critical point of view, “being used to something” often results from something being naturalized and/or normalized by those in the power position. According to Shohamy (2006), this is achieved through policy-making and the “manipulative mechanisms” in the discourse that help sustain the status quo. In other words, the mainstream opinion could be taken as a manifestation of the previous KMT government’s LP and its manipulative discourse, an opinion that is often expressed by DPP and the Taiwanese nationalists. While I believe that such criticism bears some validity, I also think that it is not totally justifiable. After all, since

34 Ironically, in 2008, the KMT government changed the names of the two companies back. Doing so, it also spent a considerable amount of money.
2000 DPP has arguably enjoyed as much sociopolitical power as, if not greater than, KMT. To thoroughly understand how the two competing contemporary nationalisms and their LPs affect the people in Taiwan, it is necessary to examine how they have functioned in the private domain.

Private Domain

LP for naming in the private domain first and foremost concerns the names of people, that is, personal proper names. As understanding (the history of) the name of the island is prerequisite to understanding the present-day LL in Taiwan, here I start the discussion of LP for personal names by examining the name-labels given to the ethnic group most affected by it, that is, the Austronesian indigenes. The Austronesian population in Taiwan consists of about 20 to 30 different groups of peoples, all speaking a different language. However, currently only 12 languages and peoples are officially acknowledged by the government. The culture within these groups is diverse, but they share certain characteristics that are disparate from the dominant Han (Hakka, Southern Min, and Mandarin) culture. However, as early as since Qing’s ruling (1684-1985) the Han Chinese have from their perspective divided the Austronesian into two groups by labels. Sheng-fan (生番), or “raw-barbarians,” referred to the indigenes that dwelled in the mountains or on the east side, about whom the Han had little knowledge. Shu-fan (熟番), “cooked-barbarians” or “ripe-barbarians,” referred to those in the lowland areas on the west, with whom the Han immigrants had extensive social contact. The Japanese (1895-1945) then renamed the former group Mountain Tribes, while in effect not all those so labeled resided in the mountains, and the latter group remained being called as “ripe savages.” On the other hand, the Han immigrants also referred to the low-land peoples as Pepo in Southern Min, or ping2-pu3 zu2 (平埔族) in Mandarin, meaning Lowland Tribes. Pepo was later adopted by the low-land peoples and is used by them as a self-designated name-label today. In the fifty years of KMT’s ruling, the
lowland Austronesian were not recognized by the government at all, and individuals from the Mountain Tribes were called “mountain folks,” or *shan1 di4 ren2* (山地人) in Mandarin Chinese.

The connotation of barbarism or uncivilness is carried over to the label “mountain folks” in the pragmatics of the Han languages. Today many Han people still refer to the Austronesian as *fwan-a* in Southern Min or *fan* in Mandarin, that is, “savages,” in casual speech. In 1994, DPP pressured the National Assembly to revise the Constitution and “rectify” (or re-appropriate) the name-label of the Austronesian people and replace it with the more politically correct term *yuan2-zhu4-min2* (“original-resident”), similar to the concept of “First Nation” in the United States. However, in Taiwan’s identity-political discourse, *yuan-zhumin* is not absolutely equivalent to “native Taiwanese.” As examined earlier in the Interconnection of Terms Section, “native Taiwanese” often implicitly refers only to the descendents of first Han immigrants, namely, the Southern Min and Hakka, and excludes the Mainlanders. In such discourse, *yuan-zhumin* is also semantically contrastive to *xin1-zhu4-min2* (“new-residents”), which is a recently-coined name-label referring to the alien employees and mail order brides from Southeast Asia (mostly the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam), and their Taiwan-born children. In fact, the *yuan-zhumin* and the *xin-zhumin*, especially those with an Austronesian background (such as the Filipinos), share more ethno-linguistic traits with each other than they share with the Han Chinese.

The early KMT government not only re-labeled the indigenous Austronesian people, but it also re-named the individual Austronesian persons. This is where LP for naming penetrates into the private domain of social life. First, the KMT regional officials were ordered to give each of the Austronesian individuals in the region a Chinese name. The policy had no specific criterion,
and hence the Chinese-name-giving process was sheer random. As a result, many indigenous individuals found out that the Chinese last/family names given to them are different from those given to their family members. On the other hand, the prescribed Chinese first names often reflect the racial bias of the regional KMT officials: That, Little Bird, Gas, and Passerby are just some examples. No Han person would actually bear such derogatory names. Such is Derrida’s (1997) “politics of friendship:” in the act of naming, the KMT colonizers superficially “embrace” the indigenes, but their insincerity is revealed in the fact that they did not “properly name” them. Or, taking into consideration of the Mandarin postulates (since the Chinese names are most commonly pronounced in Mandarin) and their function in the Chinese nationalistic discourse, through naming the indigenes have been imperfectly framed into ONE = SAMEness because of the underlying Han-Chinese centrism.

In 1995, the Taiwan-ROC legislators revised the Bill of Rights to Names (henceforth Bill) to grant the Austronesian indigenes legal rights to resume their native names. However, according to the statistics from Taiwan’s Minister of Domestic Affairs, by the end of 2005 only about 850 individuals had applied to resume their indigenous names and 50 among them had later asked to change the names back to Chinese. The reasons behind include both the policy and its implementation. First of all, in the Bill the Austronesian name-resuming is categorized under general name-changing. According to the laws, name-changing requests involve complicated procedure: various forms have to be filled in and documents to be presented to “prove” its necessity. As mentioned earlier, only 12 out of the 20-30 Austronesian ethnies are currently acknowledged by the government. The Bill is hence invalid for the indigenes without an official ethnic status, for they can by no means provide any document for proof. Second, the resumed Austronesian names have no better choice than to be put in Chinese print even though the Bill
allows Roman spelling, for Chinese writing system is the only official writing system in Taiwan and hence practically useful. This limits the phonological applicability of name-resuming, for Chinese characters are only pronounceable in Chinese languages, from which the Austronesian languages differ dramatically. Third, on the ID card there are only and exactly five grids, that is, the ID cards permits only five Chinese characters. Moreover, the undertakers (predominantly Han) of the name-resuming requests in the regional offices are not all patient and understanding. For example, a Tayal Austronesian woman walked into a regional office to ask for resuming her Tayal name Bi.si.wei.zi. • Yo and she specifically asked for a dot in between zi and yao because Yo is her family name. But the undertaker insistently told her that there could be only five grids (i.e., five Chinese characters) and that she had to accept either Bi.si.wei.zi.yo or Bi.si.wei. • Zi. After a long fight, the Tayal woman forced the undertaker to hand-write Yo in Chinese character outside of the five grids (Lin, 2005).

Despite its impracticality, many Austronesian indigenes in Taiwan consider the Roman letters an ideal writing system for their name-resuming for the following reasons. Before the Han Chinese came, the European missionaries had designed writing systems for some of the indigenous languages and today several peoples still read Bible printed in these Roman systems. Also, from a linguistic point of view, Roman letters seem to be more flexible than Chinese characters in phonological transcription. For example, the letter “r” can be pronounced as an alveolar trill, flap, or approximate, or as retroflex. But in Mandarin, the default language today for pronouncing Chinese characters, only the retroflex is a phoneme. However, even if disregarding the practicality in real life, this ideal still faces the problem that on the Taiwan-ROC ID cards there are only five grids. If such restriction on space is not first removed, transcribing
names in Roman letters would never work because five Roman letters normally allow even fewer pronounceable syllables than five Chinese characters. 

Another name policy that affects the private life of the Austronesian indigenes concerns the Chinese patronymic practice. As officially stated in the Kinship Chapter in Taiwan-ROC’s Civic Law (民法親屬篇), a child has to bear the father’s name as the family name. Regulation 1095 further specifies that “Children shall take father’s name, but if the mother has no brothers and the parents agree for the children to bear mother’s name, then follow the agreement” (my emphasis). The problem is that some of the Austronesian cultures in Taiwan, such as Siraya, were traditionally matrilineal, or “matri-focal” (Shepherd, 1995), and/or did not use a “family name” at all. Since language is not merely an element of but also a guide to life, the Chinese patronymic practice enforced by LP for naming may hence import Chinese sexism to the abovementioned Austronesian cultures (cf. Hardman, 1994 and Oyèwùmí, 1997 for imported sexism through language contact). In addition, since names are inseparable from a “cultural heritage” (cf. Helleland, 2002; Paikkala, 2000), LP for naming in the private domain also affects a person’s (collective as well as individual) identity. Note that Taiwan-ROC’s patronymic policy is forensically unrelated to the name-changing/name-resuming policy. Therefore, it still applies even after the Austronesian indigenes have resumed their name in their native languages. It is hence problematic if the individuals want to take back their foremother’s last name. On the other hand, the Explanations in the name-changing/name-resuming policy lists four conditions for

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35 Each Chinese character is a monosyllabic word of the (C)V(C) construction. On the other hand, it usually requires two to three Roman letters representing consonants and vowels to spell out just one syllable. In other words, with Chinese writing, one grid on the ID card would allow one syllable and five grids five syllables; but with Roman writing, five grids would normally permit two to three syllables at most. And most Austronesian names exceed three syllables.
changing the last name, none of which takes into account the possibility that an individual may simply want to discard the last name without replacing it. Hence, it leaves one to wonder how, for example, the Siraya could truly “resume” their traditional first-name-only practice.

Discussion

Through this section and the last, I suggest that LP in general and LP for naming in particular demands interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary effort. A simple description of the government(s), persons, and institutions involved does not suffice in providing full understanding of the social situation behind the planning and policy. Policy researchers can borrow insights from linguistics to assess the details of policy implementation, as I have demonstrated in the discussion of the controversy concerning Chinese and Roman writing systems for resuming Austronesian names. With respect to the issue of names in particular, theorization such as that of Derrida’s (1967; 1997) provides LP researchers with a different perspective. LP researchers can in turn “contextualize,” rather than simply “apply,” the theory. Socio-psychological theory as that of Landry and Bourhis (1997) allows LP researchers to evaluate the effects of the policies on people’s perception of the language(s) involved. In addition, sociopolitical theories such as that of Anderson (1983) and Smith (1995) help LP researchers explain the political milieu and the motivations behind. Take Taiwan for example, knowledge about nationalism and (post-)colonialism is a prerequisite for understanding the changes in LP, as the political system changes frequently. From before the KMT era, LP in Taiwan can be understood as directly emerging from the colonial governments’ will to define and control the natives. But under modern democracy, such as in today’s Taiwan, a policy proposal often undergoes intense public debates against different political ideologies and hence is involved in complicated negotiation processes. Given the prevalence of debates and
negotiations, one need also examine the *discourse* in order to fully assess the various issues pertaining to language and identity, including, but not limited to, the parts that address LP directly. In the rest of this chapter, I explore Taiwan’s identity discourses in a broader scope.

**The Big Discourse**

As mentioned earlier, between 1949 and 1987, Taiwan-ROC was under a Martial Law declared by the KMT government. People not only had no freedom of speech, but they were also prohibited from organizing any political party outside of KMT. Since the law was lifted in 1987, however, more new parties, and thus multiple expressions, have emerged. As a consequence, Taiwan has witnessed dynamic changes concerning national identity, as documented in the “Identity surveys,” or “identity polls,” conducted by the media and some academic institutions.

In 1989, a survey by United Times showed that 52% of the interviewees considered themselves as “Chinese people,” 26% “Chinese as well as Taiwanese,” and only 16% self-identified as “Taiwanese.” However, merely 14 years later, in 2003, a survey by China Times (in Taiwan) showed that only 7% considered themselves as “Chinese,” 41% “Chinese as well as Taiwanese,” while 44% identified with “Taiwanese.” In 2004, another survey indicated that the ratio of the self-identified “Taiwanese” jumped up to 57%.

Granted, the designs of such surveys are self-limiting: by giving only three options, they precluded other possible identifications by the individuals. In fact, as I will show later when introducing the small discourse, many individuals disagree with the *trichotomy* of “Chinese,” “Chinese as well as Taiwanese,” and “Taiwanese.” They may prefer to identify themselves first as “Hakka,” “Zhejiang people,” or “Sakizaya,” etc.

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Therefore, the survey agencies also participated in identity formation. They did not just ask the interviewed individuals to identity, but they also taught them how to identify.

Nevertheless, the results of the identity surveys to some extent truthfully reflect the changes of political milieu and LP in Taiwan. Specifically, they suggest that with the emerging DPP and Taiwanese nationalism, Chinese nationalism (and the contingent “Chinese” identity) represented by KMT is no longer the default choice. What the surveys did not show, however, is how these identity categories are defined, or constructed, in the nationalistic discourse. In this section, I explore the top-down construction of national identity in Taiwan by examining the language of the politicians. I divide the sub-sections by agent: first I examine KMT’s Chinese nationalistic discourse, and then I investigate DPP’s discourse of Taiwanese nationalism. In each of the two sub-sections, I point out the discursive themes and/or rhetorical strategies that have been employed. The subject language is Mandarin, and so my analysis is mainly based upon the Mandarin linguistic postulates I developed earlier, with additional help from CDA and the political theories of nationalism. In the end, I show that the linguistic factors must be fundamental: despite the significant difference in political ideology, and hence content, the discourse of Chinese nationalism and that of Taiwanese nationalism share great similarity in linguistic instrumentals. They both invoke the ONE = SAMEness postulate so as to homogenize, while at the same time they also manipulate centrism and summon up comparative ranking in order to justify the Self and exclude the disagreeing Other.

**KMT: We Are All Chinese, But…**

The core concept of KMT’s nationalistic discourse has always been consistent: “we,” that is, all citizens of ROC, are all Chinese. As pointed out earlier, this idea is not necessarily a product of modern, Western, nationalism; it is rooted in the culture and history of the Han people
who originated from central-north Mainland China. As the Han expanded (through conquering other peoples), the ideology of a “Chinese nation” and the definition of a “Chinese identity” expanded. KMT inherited such an ideology when it founded Republic of China in 1912 and brought it to Taiwan in 1945. Between 1945 and the lifting of Martial Law in 1987, KMT’s Chinese nationalism was rather secured and unchallenged. Indeed there were the 228 Incident (see The Republic of China Period in Chapter 1) and the short uproar afterwards, but at that time a complete thesis of Taiwanese nationalism had not been formed. Hence, basically, during the 40-or-so years, the general public in Taiwan, including the Mainlanders, was silenced, as KMT monopolized the right to expression. However, since the 1990s, as DPP has become politically active and its Taiwanese nationalism gained more support, KMT has recognized a need to change its discursive strategies. Today, the ideology of “one Chinese identity for all” harbors several variations, and hence “we are all Chinese, but….” Below, I examine these variations from three different angles: identification vis-à-vis China, identification towards Taiwan, and the chasm in-between. I will show that, for KMT, even though Taiwanese nationalism poses a serious internal, or domestic, challenge, it is the definition towards outside that creates the biggest problem for it to sustain a coherent (discourse of) Chinese identity.

**Identification vis-à-vis China**

As revealed in the field of identity studies, no identification is truly *self*-identification. An individual may have several “*self* expressions” of identity, but they must induce an image of Other against which Self is projected or defined. In other words, any identification faces outwards. This is true for an individual person as well as an individual nation. As Smith (1995) points out, “Self vs. Other” is a prevalent theme in any modern nationalism. Today, KMT’s
expression of Chinese identity is primarily defined against two “significant Others:” one is the
Taiwanese identity of DPP and the other is the Chinese identity of China-PRC.

When facing China, the main problem for KMT is: how to maintain an autonomous
identity that is also unique. The communist China, or PRC, also claims that “we are all Chinese.”
How does KMT differ? In earlier time, when the legitimacy of ROC was endorsed by
international powers such as the U.S., the choice was easy. KMT only needed to insist that, “our
nation-state,” that is, ROC, “is the authentic Chinese nation” and imply that “we represent the
real Chinese people.” But in 1971, the United Nations voted to grant PRC official membership,
and as a result Chiang Kai-shek withdrew ROC from UN to protest. Since then, the argument by
authenticity has lost ground. Nowadays everyone in the world regards PRC as the China. Thus,
KMT needs to find new ways to assure its existence, which include compromise. For example,
although when addressing the people in Taiwan, the KMT politicians always use the term “Team
ROC” (zhong1-hua2 dui4, 中華隊) to refer to the sports teams and/or political delegations that
are participating in international events, they resort to another term, “Team Chinese Taipei”
(zhong1-hua2 tai2bei3 dui4, 中華台北隊) when addressing an international audience or when
they themselves are in the delegation. This is because China-PRC would boycott an international
event if Taiwan is allowed to use its national name. China accepts “Team Chinese Taipei”
because it is a geographical term and implies that Taiwan is part of (the territory of) China.
KMT accepts “Team Chinese Taipei” because, according to them, although it is not ideal, it
allows Taiwan-ROC an opportunity to be represented. After all, KMT reasons, no international
host would like to lose China’s participation because of Taiwan. Such reasoning is in direct
opposition to that of DPP, who insists that, under all circumstances, “Team Taiwan” (tai2wan1
dui4, 台灣隊) is “Team Taiwan,” and it does not matter to us-Taiwan whether China is going to boycott the event or not.

Another of KMT’s common word choice is tong2 bao1 (同胞). As introduced earlier, tong2 bao1 literally means “from the same placenta,” but in the modern context, its direct interpretation is “compatriots,” or “people of the same nation.” It hence makes sense for both KMT in Taiwan and Chinese Communist Party in China to use the term to refer to everyone in these two countries since they claim each other’s territory. The discourse of tong2 bao1 could thus also be seen as a political compromise between KMT and China-PRC: instead of using the national terms to distinguish two citizens (that is, “ROC citizens” vs. “PRC citizens”), a set of geographical terms hinged upon tong2 bao1 is in place. The people in Taiwan are addressed as “Taiwan compatriots” (tai2wan1 tong2 bao1), and the people in China are addressed as “Mainland compatriots” (da4-lu4 tong2 bao1). It is crucial to see that the pair is “Taiwan-Mainland,” not “Taiwan-China.” In the Chinese nationalist’s mind, “Taiwan” is no doubt a place, but “China” is more than that. “China” is also a nation, whose place is “Mainland,” da4 lu4 (大陸). However, the tricky part is that da4-lu4 literally means “big-land.” Recall that, besides size, “big” in the Mandarin language also summons up the postulates of Seniority and Comparative Ranking. Therefore, the paired terms could imply that the people in Taiwan are smaller, younger, less experienced, and hence less important than the people in China, and they also suggest that “Taiwan” is subordinate to “China.” In 2003 and 2005, some Taiwan-born KMT members proposed to the party changing the official title of KMT from “Zhongguo Kuomintang,” that is, “China KMT,” to “Taiwan Kuomintang,” to no avail.

Still, some KMT politicians seem to prefer using the all-encompassing term “compatriots from both sides of the [Taiwan] Strait” (liang3-an4 tong2 bao1, 兩岸同胞) instead. For example,
Wu Poh-hsiung, former KMT Chair and one of the first high-rank KMT people that have talked to the Chinese Communist leaders in person since the Chinese Civil War, commented after his visit to China-PRC: “We [Wu and the China leaders] have reached several consensuses [on the Taiwan-China issues] and they reflect the ardent expectations of the compatriots from both sides of the Strait” (Resuming talk, 2008). Also revealed here is that Smith’s (1995:137) distinction between “state,” a modern political entity, and “nation,” a cultural entity, is helpful. In the exchange between KMT and Chinese Communist Party, the two states ROC and PRC have disappeared; only a vaguely defined Chinese Nation remains. In fact, when talking to China’s leaders, Wu also avoided referring to Taiwan-ROC’s president Ma Ying-jeou as “President Ma.” He referred to his own president as “Mr. Ma” (Wu calls Ma “Mr. Ma” in Mainland, 2008).

Also helping KMT circumvent the issue of statehood is the Mandarin metaphor of “family.”37 The fact that the Mandarin NP for nation as well as state, guo2-jia1 (國家), is composed of “nation/country” (guo2) and “family” (jia1) allows KMT to avoid mentioning the state by simply conjuring up the second part of the compound. For example, businessman Cao Xing-cheng, when campaigning for Ma Ying-jeou’s run for ROC President in 2007, commented: “The Taiwan-Strait issue is basically analogous to ‘family affair’ and ‘domestic violence.’ Foreigners [the international society] would generally stay away from our family affair, but if China raises war against Taiwan, then it becomes domestic violence and will provoke the international society to react” (Cao Xing-cheng, 2007). Basically, Cao was arguing that DPP’s Taiwanese nationalism would lead to war and chaos, and only KMT could assure peace. Another

37 Indeed, the term for “compatriot,” tong2 bao1 (“from same placenta”), is also part of the family metaphor.
example is that, in 2008, when attending the Boao Forum for Asia\textsuperscript{38}, ROC’s Vice President Vincent Siew (KMT) endorsed PRC’s Minister of Commerce Chen De-ming’s statement “We have discussed the possibility of normalizing cross-strait [i.e. Taiwan-China] business. And the biggest foundation for such a possibility is that \textit{we are a family}” by co-signing a press release with him (One China consensus in Boao, 2008, my emphasis).

It should be clear by now that KMT’s discourse of Chinese identity defined vis-à-vis China relies upon an “imagined common origin” (cf. Anderson, 1983; Smith, 1995), and Mandarin helps because this shared Chineseness is but taken-for-granted commonsense for the speakers of the language, that is, all people in China and in Taiwan. \textit{Tong2 bao1} and the family metaphor are ordinary Mandarin; they are by no means political jargon. Moreover, “language” itself is incorporated into the discourse of Chinese nationalism. As Liu (2003) points out, the Chinese nationalists frequently refer to the conventional Mandarin phrase \textit{tong2 wen2 tong2 zhong4} (同文同種) to argue that the people in China and the people in Taiwan are the same. The phrase can further be parsed into two parts: \textit{tong2 wen2} means “same language,” and \textit{tong2 zhong4} means “same species.” The \textit{tong2 wen2} part has a diachronic aspect as well as a synchronic one. Examined diachronically, \textit{tong2 wen2}, with \textit{wen2} originally meaning “writing/literature,” reflects the historical fact that a unified and standardized Chinese writing system has long been set since the Qin Dynasty\textsuperscript{39}. But \textit{tong2 wen2} is more often argued in a

\begin{footnotesize}
\footnote{Boao Forum for Asia was formed in 2001 by China-PRC and has since then held annual meetings for “leaders in government, business and academia in Asia.” Its stated goal is “promoting regional economic integration and bringing Asian countries even closer to their development goals.” BFA, on WWW at \url{http://www.boaoforum.org/Html/adoutjs-en.asp} Accessed 11.9.09.}

\footnote{Qin’s writing unification has led to the Chinese “literacy bias,” and so now “same writing” is generally taken to mean “same language.”}
\end{footnotesize}
synchronic sense, which simply points to the reality that, today, all people in China and in Taiwan speak the same language, Mandarin. As examined earlier, Mandarin being the Chinese language of today is a result of modern nationalistic LPs. To use tong2 wen2 to speak in favor of “common origin” is hence post hoc and unsound. However, such an argument nevertheless pleases those who are sympathetic to Chinese nationalism because, as most linguists would agree, logic has little place in natural language (or at least in the languages of, say, politics and religion). Tong2 zhong4, on the other hand, literally means “same seed.” Its diachronic interpretation is thus apparent.

In sum, KMT’s identification in relation to China mainly appeals to sameness. To what extent should KMT emphasize such sameness is a problem. Oftentimes, KMT’s identity discourse appears all too similar to that of China. Consequently, its ability to represent Taiwan is susceptible to DPP’s challenge of Taiwanese nationalism. In particular, DPP questions KMT on the ground of consistency: a few decades ago, KMT was still fighting the Chinese Communists and calling them demons; how could it now agree with them and accept their claims?

Identification towards Taiwan

Other than indirectly responding to DPP’s criticism of inconsistency by claiming that the Chinese Communists have changed and become “democratic,” KMT has adopted DPP’s discursive theme, or catch phrase, when addressing the audience in Taiwan with regard to identity. Nowadays, in its domestic discourse, KMT also states, “we are all Taiwanese.” “We are all Taiwanese” was first used by the Taiwanese nationalists of DPP in the 1980s and has served as their guiding ideology since. Its effectiveness in appealing to people’s affection towards their local land is evident in the identity polls that show that more and more people would now consider themselves as “Taiwanese.” KMT has recognized such a trend towards local
identification in the last decade and hence its acceptance of DPP’s identity claim. However, the acceptance, or the adaptation of DPP’s catch phrase, is only partial, for KMT has also realized that claiming “we are all Taiwanese” does not necessarily contradict its central ideology “we are all Chinese.” Basically, what KMT says now is: Yes, we are all Taiwanese, but all Taiwanese are Chinese.

To link Taiwan to China, the Chinese nationalists of KMT have employed two strategies. One is to emphasize that KMT’s affection towards the local Taiwanese land is second to none. And the other is, again, to resort to “the myth of common origin” (Smith, 1995: 133): all Taiwanese people are Chinese because all of us (and/or our ancestors) were originally from China. The first strategy is manifested in Ma Ying-jeou’s speech on 5 April, 2007, during his run for the 2008 presidential election: “I have lived here [Taiwan] for 50 years. I love this land. And so let me emphasize that I AM TAIWANESE. I am Taiwanese. Who can argue that I am not Taiwanese [in Hakka]? Who can argue that I am not Taiwanese [in Southern Min]? ” (Presidential election 2008, 2007, my italics). Ma is perceived as a “Mainlander” because he was born in Hong Kong and brought to Taiwan by his parents, who were both KMT members, in 1951. Since DPP’s version of “Taiwanese identity,” as many interpret it, excludes the Mainlanders and categorizes them into “Chinese,” Ma felt it compulsory to assert his Taiwaneseness. Also note that Ma was at first speaking Mandarin, his native language, but he then switched to Hakka and Southern Min when he questioned “Who can argue that I am not Taiwanese?” According to Aristotle’s philosophy of rhetoric (see Lunsford & Ruszkiewicz, 2007), in as short as five simple sentences, Ma incorporated both pathos, the appeal to emotions (affection in this case), and ethos, the appeal to the author-speaker’s credibility (through using
local languages). No wonder Ma is generally considered one of the best public speakers among
the politicians in Taiwan.

The second strategy then comes into play alongside the first strategy in Ma’s (2007) book,
*Spirits of the Original Homeland: the Model Stories of Taiwan.* It was published a few months
before the 2008 election and served as a venue for Ma to elaborate his, and KMT’s, discourse of
Chinese nationalism. In the book, Ma as a presidential candidate does not mention any policy
proposal; he only focuses on identity. To show that KMT truly loves Taiwan, Ma first gives a
few examples of the demised KMT icons such as Hu Shi and Chiang Ching-kuo having done
good for the people in Taiwan (e.g., brining higher education and developing economy). Also, he
utilizes Yang Du’s preface to accuse DPP of fabricating a malicious “love Taiwan vs. betray
Taiwan” dichotomy to “sever the shared, unified, love” of the Taiwanese people, and he
ultimately claims that KMT is no less local/localism than DPP (Ma, 2007: 30-36). But Ma’s
major thesis is to argue that the well-known “Taiwanese icons,” that is, the historical figures
hailed by DPP as Taiwanese national heroes, were all indeed “Chinese.” For example, Ma
provides a list of Taiwanese (Southern Min and Hakka) intellectuals such as Lin Xian-tang, Lian
Ya-tang, and Jian Wei-shui, etc., who fought against Japan during the Japanese occupation, and
then he mentions that KMT’s Republic of China also fought against Japanese colonialism in
Mainland around the same time and eventually concludes that the Taiwanese icons were hence
unquestionably loyal to the Chinese nation (ibid: 149-151). He also conveniently points out that
these “early Taiwanese people” were all (Southern Min and Hakka) “immigrants” (ibid: 196). In
other words, they were all from Mainland China anyway. Later, in April, 2009, Ma, who is now
the elected president, leads his staff to face the direction of China and hold a memorial ceremony

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for Huang Di, the fictional god-like figure who is believed to be the original Han-Chinese forefather\textsuperscript{40}. This is a symbolism to assert that, once again, indeed we are all Chinese.

In conclusion, KMT’s contemporary discourse of identification towards Taiwan is built upon concepts borrowed from DPP’s Taiwanese nationalism, although with a twist. It has proven to be a successful strategy. After all, Ma did win the election by significant margin. This result indicates that Lakoff’s proposal (Powell, 2003), which suggests that using a completely different discursive frame from one’s political opponent is more effective, does not apply to the context of Taiwan.

**The chasm**

The KMT and DPP politicians accuse each other of creating a “chasm” among the people(s) in Taiwan. The popular media feed off this belligerent sentiment by selectively quoting and reporting their partial views. Hence, in my opinion, the chasm is really caused by all these parties in the big discourse. Ordinary people normally get along with one another; they get fired up at times when the big discourse turns outright antagonistic and violent. Moreover, the chasm not only exists between the competing discourses of Chinese nationalism and Taiwanese nationalism, but it often also results from the incoherence internal to each of the discourses.

An infamous case took place in March, 2009, when some DPP legislators found out that Guo Guan-ying, an employee of Taiwan-ROC’s Government Information Office (GIO) stationed in Canada, had published many outrageous comments about Taiwan (note: not about “Republic

\textsuperscript{40} Note that while the myth of Huang Di leads to a patriarchal Han-Chinese origin, people in Taiwan also know of another myth of Han origin that depicts a Goddess Nu-wa who created all human beings. A discussion on how such incoherence may be attributed to the bottom-up influence of the native Taiwan cultures is presented in my manuscript “On the Representation of Persons in Taiwan’s Variety of Mandarin Chinese: A Gender and Linguistic Study.”
of China”) and Taiwanese people on the internet with the pseudonym Fan Lan-qin. Guo’s comments include (1) referring to “Taiwanese people” as tai2 ba1-zi (台巴子, “Taiwanese hicks/rednecks”) and wo1 ko4 (倭寇, “short bandits,” a negative term formerly used by the Chinese patriots to refer to the colonial Japanese), (2) calling Taiwan Island gui3 dao4 (鬼岛, “ghost island”), (3) justifying early KMT’s massacre after the 228 Incident by saying that “Chinese people’s blood was shed, and so [KMT] must beat up these wo1 ko4 [i.e., Taiwan natives] without mercy” and “declaring Martial Law was virtuous,” (4) “Stand up! Use our [supposedly the Mainlanders] flesh and blood to build a new Great Wall,” and (5) “Remember, we Mainlanders are high-class” (GIO employee in Canada published articles insulting Taiwan, 2009). The revelation made big news, and the KMT government was forced to respond. Within a month, Guo was fired on the ground of not having reported to the government on time.

While Taiwan society’s general concern with this incident focused on the issues of political correctness and the boundary of freedom of speech, I think that Guo’s comments actually reveal, and reflect, a chasm in KMT’s identity discourse. Apparently, Guo and his supporters do not buy into KMT’s superficial claim that “we are all Taiwanese.” They still align the Mainlanders with “the Chinese people,” who are presumably superior to “the Taiwanese.” They also somehow associate the Taiwanese people with, or equated them to, the Japanese evil-doers, and hence betray Ma’s attempt to use “fighting against Japanese colonialism” as a common ground to render the Taiwanese nationalistic icons “Chinese patriots.” In other words, Guo represents a group of radical Chinese nationalists who have taken KMT’s identification vis-à-vis China to the extreme and used it against KMT’s identification towards Taiwan. And, in my opinion, this is where the so-called “Taiwan’s identity crisis” lies. The bottom line is, for these people, “Taiwan” is not, and should never be, a nation, and “Taiwanese,” a national identity. As
Li Au, a famous Chinese nationalist writer who is thought to be instructive to Guo’s writing, points out: “As a governmental employee, Guo did not make any comment that is inappropriate to his appointment. [And] as a [ROC] citizen, Guo did not say anything unpatriotic. What do you mean that he has insulted Taiwan? Taiwan is not a nation” (Li Au was behind all these, 2009). Guo’s case also explains why, today, many Mainlanders, especially those who subscribe to the fundamentalist Chinese nationalism, feel that they suffer “reverse racism” as Taiwanese nationalism becomes more and more popular.

**DPP: We Are All Taiwanese, But…**

DPP has come from a very different path from KMT. While KMT originated from China and has brought ROC and the Mainlanders to Taiwan, DPP was born in Taiwan and most of its leaders are Southern Min natives. Crucially, DPP started when Taiwan was already known as “Taiwan” (cf. the section on Linguistic Landscape, or LL). Therefore, its identity discourse has been simple and straightforward: “we are all Taiwanese.” However, while such an identity does not actively seek for “China” and “Chinese,” it often needs to react to them in order to assert itself, given the sociopolitical context and the “national history” KMT has laid out for, and imposed on, all people in modern Taiwan-ROC. DPP’s main problem hence concerns how “China” and/or “the Chinese people” should be identified, or portrayed. The task is easier when facing outwards: “China” refers only to the nation-state of PRC, a hostile Other threatening the Taiwan nation. But when facing inwards, DPP wavers with regard to the definition of “Mainlanders.” In the old time, when DPP’s was still a small opposition party, it used to align all the Mainlanders with the “Chinese evil-doers,” assuming that they all approved KMT’s oppressive rule. However, since DPP has now gained equal popularity to KMT, especially when taking the central government during 2000 to 2008, it cannot risk excluding any of the nation’s
citizens, including the Mainlanders. As a result, the old definition and the new definition do not connect perfectly, and just like KMT’s case with Guo, there have been slips.

**Identification against China**

For those unfamiliar with identity politics, the triangular relation among the state PRC, the KMT party, and the DPP party, seems incomprehensible. This is so because they do not understand that politics is about language (and vice versa). Indeed, no matter what its official name is, ROC, or Taiwan, is virtually an autonomous state independent of China-PRC. It has its own constitution, its own government, which is elected by its own citizens. And, although not many, its official status is acknowledged by a number of states. It hence appears inexplicable that China-PRC would vehemently oppose DPP while conditionally tolerate KMT. What is the difference? To add to the puzzle is that KMT had actually fought the Chinese Communists of PRC in a war between the 1920s and the 1970s. But today it is between China-PRC and KMT where a friendly relationship is established, a friendship that DPP has never been able to establish with either of them.

Now, to solve the puzzle, one only needs to examine the language closely. The names, or terms, used by the above-mentioned political bodies are self-explanatory. DPP’s goal is to establish a “Taiwan nation,” and its discourse is all derived from this premise. KMT, on the other hand, wants to sustain a (supposedly 5,000-year-old) “Chinese nation,” and so does China-PRC. Even though KMT’s state name, Republic of China, is distinct from People’s Republic of China, they both look for “one united China” in the end. Hence, KMT and PRC find room for negotiation (and “negotiation” is a linguistic activity), but DPP remains an untamable “separatist.” As a result, not only does China-PRC identify DPP as an Other, but KMT, which shares the same land as DPP, also alienates it as an Other. DPP does the same the other way.
around. Besides viewing China-PRC as an evil Other, it also labels KMT, which has stayed in Taiwan for over 60 years, as a “foreign/invasive regime” (wai4 lai2 zheng4 quan2, 外來政權).

DPP’s identification against “China” is thus against both PRC and KMT. And while most discourses of definition (in Mandarin and in English) involve IS and IS NOT, this one is particularly so. The main Mandarin copula is shi4 (是) and its negation bu2 shi4 (不是); they function much in the same way as the English copula. In March, 2007, PRC passed Anti-cession Law, which officially defines Taiwan as part of China and allows China to use “non-peaceful means” against Taiwan if Taiwan declares independence (Anti-cession Law, 2005). The original Mandarin name for the law is fan3 fen1lie4 guo2jia1 fa3 (反分裂國家法), which can be parsed into “against separation [of] nation law.” It hence simply presumes that Taiwan is part of the nation of China. The passing of this law generated zealous debate over the One China Principle introduced in the beginning of this chapter. PRC claimed, and still claims, that Taiwan is part of China, or more accurately reflecting the Mandarin sense, “Taiwan is China’s” (tai2wan1 shi4 zhong1guo2 de, 台灣是中國的), with possession and ownership. And DPP contended, and still contends, “No, Taiwan is not (bu2 shi4) China’s.” PRC would reference the written, nationalistic, Chinese history, to back up its claim. DPP would write its own “history of Taiwan” (see Hsueh et al., 2005) to back up its. At the time, DPP still controlled Taiwan’s central government (Chen Shui-bian was the president), and it almost pushed through an “Anti-anti-cession Law.” IS and IS NOT, “anti-” and “anti-anti-,” and that is pretty much all about it. No compromise has been made on either side. No negotiation is possible.

In controversies like this, KMT would present itself as an “arbitrator,” or a voice of reason. It does not need to, and in fact could not, directly argue for PRC. Laws arise in the state level, and KMT still represents a state different from PRC. Nevertheless, it would try to reason by
offering “facts and evidence.” One such fact is the 92 Consensus. Accordingly to KMT (and also PRC), the consensus was signed in 1992 (under ROC President Li Teng-hui\textsuperscript{41}) between Taiwan’s Straits Exchange Foundation and China’s Association for Relations Across Taiwan Straits, which permits “one China, (two) separate expressions/interpretations by each side” (\textit{yi4 zhong1 ge4 biao3}, 一中各表). Note that this statement essentially subscribes to the ideology of “one China (nation)” and Taiwanese nationalism is not counted as one of the “separate expressions.” Hence, not everyone believes that KMT-the-arbitrator is impartial. While some consider KMT as the “bridge of communication” (\textit{gou1 tong1 qiao2 liang2}, 溝通橋樑) between Taiwan and China, some others consider it as China’s sidekick, or “hitting hand” (\textit{da3 shou3}, 打手).

Moreover, since the two participants that signed the statement in 1992 are, by definition, non-governmental organizations, DPP insists that the 92 Consensus is not legal (as far as state is concerned) and therefore does not exist. In the end, it is still about IS and IS NOT: KMT, “there is a 92 Consensus;” DPP, “there is no 92 Consensus.” And this is about as much as the so-called “facts and evidence” can do in an argumentative discourse. The ordinary people, who are truly affected by the potential war, are left with nothing substantial. Human life takes a back seat to the predetermined ideologies.

\textbf{Identification towards Taiwan}

When facing outwards against China, a physical existence, DPP takes a strong, unwavering, stance. However, when facing inwards towards Taiwan, DPP’s discourse turns

\textsuperscript{41} Li, a Taiwan-born Southern Min who received Japanese education, was then a KMT member, but many of his policies were thought to be moving towards Taiwanese nationalism. After he had served his term, he left KMT and founded a new political party called Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU). TSU now takes over a small population of voters in Taiwan who are even more radical towards Taiwanese nationalism than the DPP supporters. Li himself \textit{denies} that there was ever a 92 Consensus.
inconsistent. This is mainly because DPP could not make a clear distinction among Taiwan the place, Taiwan nation the ideal, and ROC the state reality. Or, the Mandarin language does not allow DPP to do so. Again, Mandarin has only one word, *guo2-jia1*, for “country,” a place, “nation,” an ideal cultural entity, and “state,” a legal institution. As a result, when DPP mentions “Taiwan” in its domestic discourse, the reference and connotation of the term are often ambiguous. This is despite the fact that DPP’s identity premise remains the same: “we are all Taiwanese.”

Therefore, the question then is: who are *we*? The modern variety of Mandarin in Taiwan only uses one 1st person plural pronoun, *wo3-men* (我們), which is, like English “we,” semantically ambiguous between “inclusive” and “exclusive.”\(^{42}\) For instance, if person A brings a friend C with her and then tells person B, “let *wo3-men* go see a movie,” they would probably all see the movie together. But A could also point out, “oh, I meant *wo3-men*, but not you, will go see the movie.” Such an ambiguity of “we” and its role in political discourse have been studied extensively by the CDA scholars (e.g., Fairclough, 2001; Wodak et al., 1999). Most of the cases examined are European or in the U.S. In these cases, “we” usually refers to either “all citizens of the state” or “the government, but not the people.” And according to the analyses, the Western politicians all seem pretty skillful; they seem to be able to manipulate the vagueness of “we” deliberately. However, as far as Taiwan is concerned, not only are the politicians usually unaware of the fact that *wo3-men* is ambiguous, but the meanings of *wo3-men* go beyond “the government” and “the people.” In Taiwan’s nationalistic discourse, *wo3-men*, or “we,” could

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\(^{42}\) The older variety of Mandarin did distinguish an “inclusive we” (*za2-men*, 咱們) from an “exclusive we”(*我們*). But *za2-men* has now become obsolete in Taiwan.
refer to “the government,” “all the citizens of the state,” “all the people on this land,” or “all the people who subscribe to my\textsuperscript{43} nation/nationalism, but not those who do not.”

Take for example the excerpt below from former president Chen Shui-bian’s (DPP) New Year’s Day speech in 2006.

It does not matter where [you] originally come from. Today, no one considers this place [Taiwan island] as a foreign land, and no one thinks of themselves as merely a passing traveler. This is because our children and grandchildren will all live here together. Taiwan is [our] homeland. Everyone is the host/owner of this land.

As the \textit{Taiwan-first awareness} becomes a trend… \textit{identification towards guo2-jia1} has become a serious topic every [ethno-linguistic] group of people must face.

If we ourselves cannot assert our own identity, [and] if we cannot reach a consensus on national identity, then Taiwanese people will forever lack confidence, and [we] will never be able to unite together facing the outside world. We will not be able to find a solid footing on the international stage.

[Today,] we are unable to pronounce the name of our \textit{guo2-jia1}. What a pity that is. How sad, and how embarrassing! Without a [shared] national identity, we cannot defend our \textit{guo2-jia1}. And that is why we must insist on the \textit{Taiwan-first awareness}. So [I] sincerely plead all the political parties: no matter [you are] in office or in opposition, [we] must surpass United-China-or-Taiwan-Independence, and we must surpass different ethnic groups. Together, [we] must consolidate a national identity for the Taiwanese people.

(Chen, 2006, my italics. See Appendix A for the original text.)

First of all, this passage is self-contradictory: Chen pleads for a consensus on the “Taiwanese identity,” or “Taiwan-first awareness,” while he generally assumes that such a consensus has

\textsuperscript{43} The Mandarin 1\textsuperscript{st} person plural pronoun, \textit{wo3-men}, is indeed derived from the 1\textsuperscript{st} person singular, \textit{wo3}. Also, \textit{wo3}, as well as all other Mandarin pronouns, is the same form for nominative (English “I”), accusative (English “me”), and possesive (English “my”).
already existed. “Taiwan-first awareness” is originally zhu3-ti3 yi4-shi4 (主體意識) in Mandarin, literally “subject/agent consciousness.” It is set against Chinese nationalism and means that Taiwan should be the subject, rather than an object defined by, or derived from, China and Chineseness. Asserting that everyone, no matter where they came from, now sees Taiwan as their homeland, Chen ignores (or overlooks) the reality that KMT and many Mainlanders disagree with him. In this message, “we” includes everyone who now resides in Taiwan, the place, the land. But then, through repeating the word guo2-jia1 and associating it with “Taiwan,” Chen’s “we” also refers to “everyone in the Taiwan nation.” This also exemplifies how instrumental the concept of “original homeland” is for nationalism. However, given his law-defined status as the president of ROC, Chen’s “we” is also interpreted as to include “all citizens of the state.” As a matter of fact, not every ROC citizen finds the Taiwan nation desirable. Therefore, in the end, Chen’s attempt to include failed. The media reports on the next day indicated that many actually considered Chen’s speech divisive; they felt excluded.

The problem with guo2-jia1, or the problem of nation-or-state, is prevalent in DPP’s discourse. When addressing the Taiwan-internal issues, most DPP politicians, like Chen, refuse to mention ROC. When they think of guo2-jia1, they think of Taiwan. However, when China-PRC is in the picture and KMT compromises, the DPP politicians would suddenly come out to defend the ROC state. In July 2007, an Asian volleyball tournament involving Taiwan, China, Japan, and South Korea, was held in Jiayi, Taiwan. Because it was hosted by the International Olympic Committee to which China-PRC is an important member, the team from Taiwan was forced to use the name “Team Chinese Taipei.” China-PRC also insisted that the ROC flag must be absent in any of the individual events. KMT said nothing, but DPP protested. The DPP politicians argued, “this event is held in our guo2-jia1, and so the people have the right to bring
in our *guo2-qi2* [國旗, “national flag”]” (Asian volleyball game, 2007). The incident reveals that DPP has been trapped in the Mandarin word, and thus concept, of *guo2-jia1*: if the *guo2-jia1* is Taiwan, then whatever happens to ROC (and its symbols) should not matter. In addition, DPP’s own identity also prevents it from confronting ROC directly. DPP is a legal political party in the state of ROC. It has decided to take the “route within the system” (*ti3-zhi4 nei4 lu4-xian4*, 體制內路線) since the very beginning: it observes the state-defined laws and never seeks revolution to overthrow ROC. As discussed earlier in *zheng4 ming2*, or “name rectification,” DPP’s political goal has been to win the majority seats in Legislature Yuan so as to revise the constitution in order to change the name of the *state* to “Taiwan.” So, besides linguistics, the problem for DPP now could as well be that many of its members have not realized that “Taiwan Nation,” as a state, is still an ideal, not a reality.

The Taiwan Nation ideal is constructed in a discourse of somewhere between colonialism and post-colonialism. On the one hand, DPP portrays KMT as a “foreign regime” (*wai4 lai2 zheng quan2*, 外來政權) colonizing Taiwan; On the other, as mentioned earlier, it does comply with the state system founded by this regime. What is really troublesome is that DPP habitually puts all the Mainlanders into the same category as the KMT colonizers/enemies. In the Taiwanese nationalistic discourse, DPP constantly reminds “the Taiwanese people” of the past crimes committed by the KMT party, in particular the 228 Incident and White Terror, so as evoke a “shared ethno-history” (Smith, 1995: 133) for nation-building purposes. But the DPP fundamentalists also often hold *all* the Mainlanders responsible for these crimes, and therefore they may in fact, as DPP’s modern opponents criticize, magnify and deepen the chasm between “the Mainlanders” and “the Taiwanese.” In folk terminology, the Mainlanders are also known as “people from outside the province” (*wai4-sheng3 ren2*, 外省人) and the Taiwanese natives.
mostly referring to the Hakka and Southern Min, “people from within the province” (ben3-sheng3 ren2, 本省人), two terms coming to use when Taiwan was still considered as a province of ROC. KMT hence accuses DPP of having manipulated the “province-affiliation complex” (sheng3-ji2 qing2-jie2, 省籍情結). Eventually, the blowback against DPP came on 21 March, 2008, one day before the presidential election. KMT candidate Ma Ying-jeou commented that DPP has been a “perpetrator,” not a “victim” (Ma pushing for votes in Taichung, 2008). Ma meant that DPP, not KMT, was the real cause of the conflict and division among different groups of peoples in Taiwan. 24 hours later, Ma won back the ROC presidency for KMT, which had been held by DPP in the 8 previous years.

Indeed, the so-called Mainlanders are those who or whose ancestors came to Taiwan with KMT as ROC citizens. But it is untrue that all of them support KMT and/or what KMT has done. Some DPP politicians seem aware of this fact: recall that in the New Year’s Day speech by DPP’s Chen (2006), he asserts that “it does not matter where [you] originally came from… everyone is the host/owner of Taiwan.” Later in the same year, he specifically assures the Mainlanders that they do belong by quoting the lyrics of Taipei, the New Homeland: “Arriving early, arriving late, all the same; [we are all] new generation of Taiwanese people.” He insists that “there is absolutely no province-affiliation problem [i.e., problem between the Mainlanders and the Taiwanese]; there is only the problem concerning national identity” (Taiwan has no province-affiliation problem, 2006). While statements as such are still illusory because nationalism is essentially forging ONE-SAMEness out of differences, they at least show some respect to the people(s) addressed. But the more fundamentalist, or radical, Taiwanese nationalists, who often become TV talk show celebrities, have not endorsed Chen’s sentiment. In the most irrational situations, they would even call the Mainlanders “Chinese pigs” (zhong1guo2
A friend of mine, who is a third-generation Mainlander and a supporter of KMT, once asked me: “What do they [the radical Taiwanese nationalists] want us [Mainlanders] to do? We do not really have a home in Mainland anymore. Should I just jump into the Taiwan Strait and drown in the ocean?” Note that the group I label as “radical” Taiwanese nationalists here can be seen as a mirror image of the radical Chinese nationalists such as Guo, whom I have introduced. They hate each other, but their use of derogatory identity labels and violent discourse is the same. Ironically, they have the potential to become “best friends forever,” for neither of them would exist without the other.

Last but not least, I would like to point out that it is equally untrue to assume that all KMT, or Chinese nationalism, supporters are Mainlanders, and for that matter, all DPP, or Taiwanese nationalism, supporters are Southern Min (and vice versa). For one thing, the KMT members today are from many ethno-linguistic backgrounds, including a lot of Southern Min people, and DPP also has Mainlander members. And after all, while the Mainlanders take up about 14% and the Southern Min 70% of Taiwan’s population, the identity polls and the election results from recent years clearly show that the ratio of KMT to DPP voters is about fifty-fifty. Therefore, if the politicians in Taiwan-ROC truly believe that “national identity” is a serious issue we all must face, they should be more truthful and mindful when addressing it.

Discussion

Before leaving the big discourse, I must address three issues: (1) the politician’s claims about their own ethno-linguistic identity, (2) the role of media, and (3) a question, where are the indigenous peoples? First, although the KMT politicians claim a “Chinese” identity and the DPP ones a “ Taiwanese” identity, they all also make claims about other ethno-linguistic identities in
Taiwan so as to relate to a certain group of people, or “voters.” As manifested in the Mandarin word zu2 (族), “ethnicity” in Han culture connotes “extended family” or “shared ancestry.” Since the concept of family is central to all social relations, one is expected to help, or support, people from the same zu2. Hence, for the politicians who desperately need votes, the more ethno-identities they could claim, the merrier. And what might be more effective in claiming one’s ethno-linguistic affiliation than to speak the language? For KMT’s Ma Ying-jeuo, who came from Mainland China and speaks Mandarin as his first language, the Mainlander identity is a given. But he also needs another identity that is local to Taiwan such that his statement that he considers himself also as a Taiwanese would be more convincing. The ethno-identity he chooses is Hakka. Note that Ma’s zu3-ji2 (祖籍), or “ancestral home,” is in Hunan, China, which is not known as a Hakka area. But Ma himself was born in Hong Kong, where many Hakka live. And so Ma has been able to use Hong Kong as a reference point to claim his Hakka identity. In addition, he has learnt the Hakka language and achieved certain fluency, and in recent years he would openly speak for Hakka language maintenance. Ma’s claiming Hakka is so successful that in 2009, the people of the Ma Village in Miaoli, Taiwan, have decided to enshrine Ma’s family ancestors there. DPP’s Chen Shui-bian, on the other hand, has claimed almost every ethno-identity local to Taiwan. For him, Southern Min is a given. He speaks Southern Min as his first language, and his ancestors were the 17th century immigrants from Fujian, China, which is the Southern Min homeland. Because Fujian also has a significant Hakka population, Chen has hence once claimed that he was Hakka as well, but later he decided to disclaim it and stick with Southern Min. In Taiwan, Chen’s family has lived in Tainan for generations, and since Tainan is

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44 As far as I know, all Han languages in Taiwan share the concept of zu, although they pronounce the word slightly differently.
the homeland of the Siraya indigenes, Chen has also claimed that he is Austronesian. When Ma and Chen, and other politicians as well, cannot really claim an ethno-identity, they would incorporate the associated language into their Mandarin-dominant speech so as to appeal to some sort of solidarity with the group of people. For example, Ma has learnt a little Southern Min, and Chen has learnt a little Hakka. This is tokenism indeed, but the public, or at least the media, like it. Whenever a politician speaks a little bit of a non-Mandarin language, the media would point it out as if it was a likable novelty. And yes some politicians would occasionally pronounce one or two sentences in “the indigenous language,” such as “how are you” and “thank you,” a true novelty. I do not know exactly what language(s) that is because the media really only refer to it as “the indigenous language.” For the media (and probably for many others), there are only four “languages,” and “peoples,” in Taiwan: Mandarin and the Mainlander, Hakka, Southern Min, and “the indigenous.”

The mainstream media in Taiwan, i.e., the TV channels, newspapers, and radio stations that are actually popular, are not only untruthful (or ignorant), but they are plainly unfair. The unfairness or bias in media is so apparent that it does not take, say, a professor in mass communication, to figure it out. Most people could point out the political preference of a media company with ease. The companies are sorted in colors: there are the “blue” media, and there are the “green” media. Blue is the color of KMT, and so the “blue” media refer to those TV stations and newspapers that privilege the Chinese nationalist politicians. Green is the color of DPP, and the “green” media are biased towards Taiwanese nationalism. Oftentimes, the true color of the media companies is revealed in their own outward-showing identities; it is in their names and/or in their investors. The well-known blue media include the newspapers China Times (Mandarin name: zhong1guo2 shi2bao4) and United Times (lian2he2 bao4), the TV companies China TV
Groups (zhong1 shi4 and zhong1 tian1) and TVBS (funded by Chinese investors in Hong Kong), and the radio stations Broadcast Corporation of China (zhong1 guo2 guang3 bo1). The green media are Liberty Times (zi4 you2 shi2 bao4, which is founded by DPP’s Chai Trong-rong) and Formosa TV (min2 shi4). I tend to think that the blue media (and thus the Chinese nationalistic discourse) have an advantage over the green media because of sheer number. But some may disagree. As my friend Li Lu-feng, who is a Ph.D. candidate in advertising at Taiwan’s NCCU, points out, “generally speaking, the viewers tend to choose the media with which they share the same political preference anyway” (personal communication). If Li’s observation is true, then the majority of Taiwan society is color-blind. Almost everything the KMT, or “blue,” politicians do is framed positively by the blue media, everything the DPP, or “green,” politicians do is framed negatively by them, and the reverse relations apply to the green media. Once in a while, the politicians may do or say something outright inappropriate; then the media that support them would just ignore it and not report. In other words, ignoring, or not mentioning, is also part of the media framing.

An example of the “outright inappropriate” speeches is “Ma comments: I will treat you as human beings” (2007), reported by Formosa TV. This leads to the last topic I want to discuss: where are the indigenes in the big discourse? The context of Ma Ying-jeou’s comment is that the Taipei City Government, to which he served as mayor, decided to relocate, and thus first abolish, the Amis community in Xizhou, Taipei, but the locals protested and refused to move. In a public hearing, Ma told the locals: “There is no problem in the genes of the indigenous people; the problem is [socio-economic] opportunity. I will treat you as [if you were] human beings. I will treat you as [Taipei] citizens. I will educate you well and provide you opportunities.” The sentence structure Ma used in his comment, “I will treat you as human beings,” demands
particular analytical attention. Note that the underlying, or default, Mandarin word order is S(subject) V(erb) O(bject). But instead of it, Ma used the functional word, BA3, to *topicalize* the Object: S BA3-O V. That is, instead of the natural order “wo3 kan4 ni3” (“I see/treat you”), Ma actually said, “wo3 BA3-ni3... kan4” (“I BA-you [as human beings] see/treat”), or “I *take* ‘you,’ a thing, and see/treat it.” In other words, the indigenous Amis people, as “you” here, are *objectified* double-fold: syntactically and also semantically. By using the BA3 structure, Ma was not just saying, “I will treat you as human beings,” but he implied that he had never really thought of the indigenous people as human beings. Thus, I translated the sentence as “I will treat you *as if* you were human beings,” which I believe is more accurate. More importantly, such an analysis explains why the Formosan indigenes are almost always absent in KMT’s identity discourse: they are not human, they are unimportant, and so they can simply be ignored.

DPP’s attitude towards the indigenes, on the other hand, is “co-option.” Basically, in recent years, DPP has realized that it is not enough to designate only the Southern Min as the *true/authentic* Taiwanese because (1) it is hard to compete with KMT’s new discourse that first recognizes Southern Min as Taiwanese and then connects them to a Mainland China origin, for such a geo-historical connection is a fact, and (2) compared to the Southern Min, the indigenes are even more *local* and hence more *Taiwanese*. As a consequence, (the radical) DPP has now started a new discourse claiming that all Taiwanese *natives*, i.e., Southern Min and Hakka, must have *indigenous* Austronesian blood, and so, unlike the Chinese/Mainlanders, these are the *real* Taiwanese people. This claim is based on the saying in Taiwan’s variety of Southern Min that “[we] have fathers from Mainland, but no Mainland mothers” (ū tông-soaⁿ kong, mô tông-soaⁿ má, 有唐山公，無唐山媽). It refers to the probable historical fact that there had been many inter-marriages between the indigenes and the early Southern Min (and Hakka) immigrants. Such
a claim seems to appeal to the *Pepo*, or low-land indigenes, in particular (but not the mountain indigenes), because many *Pepo* today do speak Southern Min, the “Taiwanese language,” as their first language and identify more with Taiwanese nationalism than Chinese nationalism\(^45\). Furthermore, to complete its discourse of co-option, DPP also refers to the modern academic studies that hypothesize Taiwan as the original Austronesian homeland (e.g., Adelaar, 2005; Blust, 1988; Diamond, 2000; Ku, 2005). By referencing these studies, DPP *implies* that the indigenes, and thus all the non-mainlander “Taiwanese natives,” really have no Chinese root. Although KMT has not yet reacted to this new discourse of DPP, probably because most of the *Pepo* peoples have not acquired the official indigenous status, I predict that it will soon.

**The Small Discourse**

My previous discussion has shown that the big discourse is not as “controlled” and/or “unified” as it is generally thought to be. Internal conflict and inconsistency are prevalent. In this section, I turn to the small discourse, that is, the stories told by the individuals who are not involved with any powerful sociopolitical institution. I will show that the diverse personal experiences may be a source, or even cause, of the inconsistency in the big discourse, in addition to being simply affected by it. In other words, the dynamics between the big discourse and the small discourse is indeed mutual.

\(^{45}\) *Pepo* (平埔) is itself a Southern Min word meaning “flat/low-land.” In Mandarin, it would be *ping2-pu3*. According to my personal experience, the low-land peoples prefer the Southern Min word over the Mandarin word. This may also serve as to indicate that they have what might be called “Southern Min complex,” a topic I will discuss later.
The examples and narratives below are all from the ethnographic interviews I conducted in the summer of 2007. When a narrative is examined, I will provide concise information of the narrator that is relevant to the discussed topic. But the readers should refer to “The Individuals who Shared Their Stories” in Chapter 3 for detailed information concerning each of the unique persons.

In the actual interview process, I started all conversations asking the interviewees to talk about their personal names, and then I asked them to talk about their language(-learning) experiences in general. Next, I asked them to talk about their identity experiences in any way they wished. Interestingly, while I did not always specify the kind of identity about which they should talk, they always focused on the ethnic and national identities, rather than other social identities such as age, gender, and sexual orientation, etc. This indicates that identity politics is a general concern for the people in Taiwan and that language is an indispensable part of it.

In what followings, I first examine the talks that reflect on language policy and planning (LP), and then I examine those that reflect on the national identity discourse. Finally, I present some examples that link these people’s language experiences to their identity experiences.

**Reflection on LP**

Because of the continuous colonial history in Taiwan, several linguistic generation gaps have been created by the changing LP. The older generation, who had passed school age when KMT brought ROC and Mandarin to Taiwan in 1945, used to attend Japanese schools and


47 I was interested in personal names because, as I reviewed earlier, names are often related to identity formation. However, while I have indeed collected several interesting stories about personal names, their relevance to the thesis of this research, that is, “national identity,” is not obvious. Therefore, I would not discuss them here.
learned Japanese, the then national language, there. Today’s middle-agers, on the other hand, learned Mandarin, a different national language, as their first language in school, and Mandarin was also the only language they could speak in school. The younger generations, who are in their twenties now, went to school to learn Mandarin if they have not already spoken it, but they are also encouraged to speak their non-Mandarin mother tongues, as some of them may have also received some Mother Language Class education. Such gaps have not only created some communication problems among people from different generations and affected the continuation of a certain language, but they have also evoked various emotions in the individuals.

Take Ng Bi-su for example. Ng was born in 1928 in a native Southern Min family that was doing well socio-economically. Probably because of the high socio-economic status, such families tended to use Japanese, instead of their native language(s), at home. However, many people from these families would prefer speaking Southern Min today because of their terrible experience with KMT, which they associate with Mandarin. Ng’s story below documents such a transition. In the excerpt, P refers to Ng, the Participant, and R refers to me, the Researcher. Also, all italicized phrases and sentences in the following excerpts were emphasized in the original conversations.

Excerpt 1: Ng Bi-su’s language experience

R: Um…so your parents both spoke Japanese at home?


R: How about Taiwanese [Southern Min]?

P: Not at all.

R: You didn’t speak Taiwanese at all [at home]?

P: Not at all. So when I got married, I didn’t know Taiwanese.
R: Oh.

P: I couldn’t communicate with my father in law. I needed an interpreter.

R: When did you start speaking Taiwanese?

P: I learned gradually… after marriage.

R: And do you speak Chinese language[i.e., Mandarin]?

P: Yes, as for Chinese…

R: Huh

P: Uh…restoration, ey…[if I] say “restoration” I’d be scolded by others [Taiwanese nationalists].

R: (laugh)

P: If I use the word “restoration,” I’d be scolded by others. Yes [Mandarin] I did learn.

R: Uh

P: Ah, but since my father was taken away [by KMT’s ROC police], I stop going [to Mandarin classes].

R: Uh

P: So I studied [Mandarin] for not one day/less than a day [figuratively speaking].

R: Hm

P: I did want to learn Mandarin [at first]

R: Um

P: [because, as] I told my father, I wanted to find a job.

Ng’s father, Ng Tiau-jit, was the chief editor of a Southern Min newspaper called Taiwan Daily when KMT took over Taiwan. One day in 1947, he was taken away by a group of KMT’s ROC
policemen, and he never returned. The reason behind Tiau-Jit’s disappearance had never been explained to Bi-su until she found it out herself thirty years later. He was accused of treason, “conspiring with the Chinese Communists,” an explanation unacceptable to Bi-su. Today, Bi-su has become an icon of Taiwanese nationalism. She hosts a few radical underground Taiwanese nationalist radio shows and she speaks the “Taiwanese language,” that is, Southern Min, only. She also writes books documenting the 228 Incident in honor of her father. As she told me, when she thinks, and hence writes, she thinks in Japanese. She would write drafts in Japanese first and then ask someone to translate them into Mandarin for the contemporary readers in Taiwan.

Those in their fifties and sixties today had a different experience. They had to speak Mandarin in school because, if they did not, they would be punished. While the Mandarin-only policy was universal, the means of punishment was not unified. The punishment took many different forms, all dependant on the schools and/or individual teachers. They might be physical, psychological, or financial (as fines). The excerpt below from Huang Hong-sen details a type of psychological punishment that seeks humiliation. Huang was born in 1956 and he is a Hakka native.

Excerpt 2: Huang Hong-sen’s language experience

P: Mother tongue [use] started being restricted when I went to elementary school. I remember the most severe restriction took place when I was… 4th grade [10 yrs old].

R: oh…

P: So it should have been… 1968… 1967… 1966

R: uh huh, 4th, 5th, and 6th grades

P: Yes so it was probably from 1965 to 1969.

R: uh
P: That period was… the era that [KMT] *fiercely* promoted the so-called National Language [NL = Mandarin].

R: the… Beijing speech [Mandarin] NL

P: Yes yes the Beijing speech NL. [It was] a very fierce/powerful era. I was refrained from… speaking regional dialect.

R: Oh… can you *explain* a bit more in detail?

P: It’s just… one must speak NL.

R: huh

P: *We… my classmates were all Hakka people,* you see. Quite naturally we just spoke Hakka. And… the LP for promoting NL back then was to hang a piece of board [when] one, one didn’t speak… one didn’t speak NL. so at that time [the KMT government] was carrying out… the so-called National Language Policy. So the local governments used… very strict measures.

R: They, hung a board on you, written on it…

P: Yes, yes. The teacher would hang it on us.

R: And what was written on it… was it “[I] have spoken regional dialect”?

P: Yes yes yes “have spoken regional dialect”

R: oh…

P: So that’s what the DPP… has been… severely *criticizing*.

R: oh um…

P: It was complete… *suppress*… *mother tongue*, you know.

R: So, besides the hanging of board was there any other means of punishment when one spoke regional dialect?

P: Different teachers would have different ways.
R: *Each teacher* had a different means.

P: Yes in terms of implementation there were differences. Some might have used [physical] punishment. As for our teacher, it’s like a warning.

R: So how could one take the board off?

P: Pass it to others, you know.

R: Pass it to others.

P: It’s like, I heard you speak [Hakka] to others, so I could pass this board onto you.

R: oh… so you had to snitch.

P: Yes yes yes.

R: oh oh

P: Yes so… (a bitter laugh) this kind of method was somewhat… abnormal. to do it in this way.

R: Did you, did you remember, wearing the board often?

P: quite often

R: quite often (laugh)

P: quite often

R: oh

P: But… after I wore it… most of the time it all ended when [the board] was passed to me.

R: uh uh uh

P: You know, we had content classes in the morning, and in the afternoon… about… 3pm to 4pm, I was in the school’s [basketball] varsity team.

R: uh huh
P: So I needed to go to the practice and I would take off the board and put it in my drawers. When it went into the drawers it disappeared (laugh). [i.e., P didn’t pass it on to others].

Huang Hong-sen’s account here is invaluable in that it describes not only the oppression but also the resistance. He knew that the punishment of humiliation was, in his words, “abnormal.” And as a ten-year-old, he made a decision not to pass the humiliation to other children. What is not shown in Huang’s account, however, is gender difference. In my interviews as well as in my personal daily encounters, most women from the generation say that they were never, or rarely, punished because they always observed “Mandarin only,” but most men, like Huang, confess that they had been punished frequently for speaking vernaculars. This observation corresponds to Labov’s (1990) findings that associate “overt prestige” with the female gender and “covert prestige” with the male gender. In sociological terms, overt prestige is derived from the conforming to the general social expectations or the mainstream values, and covert prestige comes out of loyalty to the small, local, group with which one identifies. In linguistic terms, overt prestige leads to one’s adherence to the socially dominant language, and covert prestige makes one proud of, and willing to use, their vernacular. While Labov’s generalization is based upon American English, my analysis of the Mandarin postulate of centrism (see also Figure 4-1 and Figure 4-2) has shown that the Mandarin-speaking Han culture does also demand women to obey men, who are by default the rulers in the society. Thus, it seems reasonable to hypothesize that more women than men in Huang Hong-sen’s generation, that is, people who are now in their 40s and 50s, have grown up speaking mostly Mandarin. But more sociolinguistic research needs to be done to test this hypothesis.

The linguistic generation gap caused by the change of regime and that of LP may make one suspect a discontinuation of native tongues. However, interestingly, in the two families
introduced above, the home language has in fact been passed on to the next generation from within the domestic domain. In Ng Bi-su’s case, although she herself only learned her heritage language Southern Min as a second language, she now speaks only Southern Min at home with her children and grandchildren. In addition, she requests all her children to take Japanese classes, and so she has also passed on the socially prestigious language in her generation. While Ng’s language decision is motivated by a conscious political choice, the language continuation in the Huang family is simply benefited by its natural linguistic environment. The Huang family has for six generations lived in the same area that has been a Hakka settlement since the 17th century. Although the past LPs have changed its linguistic landscape (LL), the locals of the village have not changed their language behavior. According to Huang Hong-sen, the place used to have a name written in Chinese characters as 穷林, meaning “poor woods.” It reflected the historical fact that when the first Hakka immigrants came to Taiwan, they were economically deprived. But later, in the 1940s, the KMT government replaced the old name, because the government considered its connotation vulgar, with the new name 芎林, which refers to the tree species in the area, lagerstroemia subcostata kochne. The two characters 穷 and 芎 are pronounced the same in Mandarin as qiong2, but their pronunciations differ in Hakka. The knowledge about the history of the place is hence lost to many of the locals. However, despite the Japanese and KMT occupations and their anti-vernacular LPs, the local Hakka villagers have always continued speaking their native tongue at home and in public. Therefore, Huang Hong-sen’s 27-year-old son, Huang Guan-zhong, whom I also interviewed, speaks Hakka natively with confidence and pride, unlike many contemporary young Hakkas who grew up in other regions. For example, Huang Guan-zhong’s schoolmate, Qiu Hao-xi, another of my interviewees, does not know a single Hakka word even though her father is Hakka. Qiu’s mother is half Southern Min and half
Yangzhou Mainlander, but Qiu does not speak these two languages, either. In the Qiu family, only Mandarin is spoken. In addition, Huang Guan-zhong pointed out that the LL in his native village went through yet another change in the early 2000s when DPP took the central government and implemented a Mother Language policy. Huang Guan-zhong recounted that, when he was in high school, he would see this sign saying, “please speak Hakka to your children,” inside every public bus in the area. He thought that was funny: “we [he and his high school friends] all speak Hakka already anyway.”

Still, as Hinton (2009) points out, the transgenerational language learning at home is particularly crucial to the continuation of indigenous languages. This is because the indigenous languages are often most threatened in a nation-state: they do not have many native speakers left, and hence they cannot offer a very supportive public language-learning environment. As far as Taiwan is concerned, even if a family has given up Hakka and/or Southern Min to Mandarin, its younger generations can still learn their mother tongue(s) outside of home because Hakka and Southern Min still have a large population of speakers today. The same does not apply to the indigenous Austronesian families. Once an Austroneisan language is no longer spoken at home, it is hard for the youngsters to learn it elsewhere. In Excerpt 3 below, the Sakizaya indigene Padaw Ngayaw showed remorse over the fact that he had not taught his mother tongue to his daughters when they were little. Note that the Sakizaya people have only been officially recognized by the (DPP) government since 2007. Before that they had sought sanctuary under the Amis people for over a century because of the Japanese invasion. Therefore, when Ngayaw spoke of his “mother tongue,” it could refer to either the Amis language or Sakizaya. Also, when Ngaway was talking to me, his youngest daughter, Dome, was also present, and she would
Excerpt 3: Padaw Ngayaw’s reflection on language continuation

R: Amis and Sakilaya, which one is…which one do you feel is your mother tongue?

P: Usually…I speak, Amis, more often.

R: You speak Amis more often.

P: um um

R: Oh…and Sakilaya. did you speak it when you were little?

P: yes, yes, yes. [Sakilaya is my] father and mother’s language… normal days we spoke it.

R: oh

P: It was the language I heard when I was little. I could also write a bit.

R: You could also write.

P: um hum

R: use that…Roman letters?

P: yes.

R: hum, where did you learn to write [Sakilaya]?

P: father When my father was still alive.

R: Oh you learned to write from your father.

P: from…father [and] mother.

R: Oh…then, why, why don’t they [the two daughters] know [Sakizaya]?
P: That that that is our [probably P and his wife] fault. When they were little, [we] didn’t teach them.

R: Oh…why…[is it because you] didn’t want to teach them… or they didn’t want to learn?

D: (make a face)

R: (laugh)

D: [They] didn’t… didn’t seriously teach us anything.

P: (laugh)

R: (laugh)

D: We didn’t… my parents both talked National Language [i.e., Mandarin] to us.

P: That, thinking about it now, I, of course, would feel regretful. I didn’t teach them well. Of course I would think (sigh) [it’d be nice had I taught them].

D: My older sister would understand [listening comprehension]… my sister would understand [Sakilaya]. She can’t speak. But she is better than me.

R: (turning to P) you said you would regret?

P: Yes.

R: Then when they [the daughters] have children…

D: (laugh) He will teach [them].

P: Yes…yes…I think they [the daughters] will not have time [taking care of their kids]. It’s likely I will take care of …I, I, will definitely teach my grandchildren, teach them Amis.

R: Teach them Amis. [You will] teach grandchildren Amis.

P: I will not speak NL [Mandarin], I will speak… our own… language.

R: huh.
P: [I will] teach them well.

When speaking of languages, Ngaway attached to them strong affective values: Sakizaya is “father and mother’s language,” Amis is “our language,” and when he expressed his regret over not teaching her children these two languages, he said, “I didn’t teach them well.” As Holmes (2001) and Ager (2001) point out, people’s affection towards a language may sometimes motivate a government to design, or facilitate, LP in favor of its continuation. I sincerely hope that Ngayaw’s, and many other indigenous people’s as well, love for their languages and regret over losing them can one day be heard clearly by Taiwan’s government and prompt it to carry out some positive actions. I also wish that more indigenous families will, like the Ngayaw family, make a new decision and start speaking their native tongues at home again.

Last but not least, I would like to discuss people’s reaction to the latest LP in Taiwan that requests schools to offer Mother Language Class. As mentioned earlier in my review of Taiwan’s LP development, the Mother Language Class is a rather recent policy that was first introduced by the DPP government (2000-2008) and is now continued by the KMT government. In spite of its initially benign intention, the policy has generated much controversy because it has made some Chinese nationalists feel threatened. For these people, to offer school hours to the Mother Language Class means to sacrifice the hours originally given to the National Language Class, that is, the Mandarin class. They hence think that this policy is in fact a malicious attempt by the Taiwanese nationalistic DPP government to “de-Chinese-ize” Taiwan. In other words, LP and the big identity discourse merge here. As a result, most arguments surrounding the controversy is not advanced from a strictly policy, or administrative, standpoint; rather, they bring heat to the discourse of identity. In particular, the arguments focus on definitions: What is our “mother language”? Is the National Language, i.e., Mandarin Chinese, also our mother
language? Below, Qiu Hao-zhi, brother of Qiu Hao-xi, argued against the Mother Language LP from a Chinese nationalistic perspective.

Excerpt 4: Qiu Hao-zhi on DPP’s Mother Language LP

P: Isn’t it true that the [DPP] government… [as a] government policy, every elementary school must offer mother language classes now?

R: yes…yes

P: They [the government] deny that NL [Mandarin] is a mother language… they think that only Southern Min… Hakka… and that…(indigenous people)

R: (but it is because) NL has its own NL classes. And NL still has more…more hours.

P: Many of the hours have been cut down. And, the point is, the schools would ask you, “what is your mother language?”

R: Mm

P: And then… [the schools would] divide [the children and send them] to Southern Min classes and Hakka classes. But… isn’t it true that this is in another way saying that… NL cannot be your mother language?

R: Why is it so?

P: Because you… mother language… because it [the government]… you, your mother language… [the DPP government] now divides the whole nation-state as such: your mother tongue is either Southern Min or Hakka… or the indigenous speech, but I… I feel that for many kids, their mother language is NL. And the government forces them to [study the non-Mandarin languages].

R: Must they choose one?

P: [They] must choose, they must choose a mother language to learn, but… and then… you must choose either Southern Min or Hakka as your mother language.

R: So… in other words… you fear that these mother language classes would edge out NL, no?
P: [The policy] would actually aggravate the loss of Hakka language… and Hakka people… let me tell you why. Because… nation-wide… the number of schools that offer Hakka classes are way lower than the actual Hakka population.

R: uh… well but in the past [the early KMT era], they [the Hakka people] had no Hakka class to go to even if they wanted to learn.

P: But now [the children] have to learn Southern Min as an extra… and they need to take tests.

R: um

P: So isn’t it that… now, in school, you have to learn NL you have to learn Southern Min and you also have to learn English. As such… would you still want to learn Hakka?

Logic aside, I am sympathetic to Qiu Hao-zhi’s strong affection and identification towards Mandarin. Even though Mandarin is not actually any of his heritage languages (Hakka, Southern Min, and Yangzhou are), I can understand his passion for it. After all, Mandarin has been the only language spoken in the Qiu family. Moreover, as his sister Qiu Hao-xi revealed to me, their mother could be considered as some kind of “NL-Mandarin language police:” she would scold the children if they do not speak the most Standard Mandarin, and she would even scold their friends whose Mandarin variety does not fit her ideal. Probably as a result, both Qiu Hao-xi and Qiu Hao-zhi are strong KMT supporters, like their parents. They despise DPP, its Taiwanese nationalism, and anything associated with it. Moreover, if Qiu Hao-zhi’s description of DPP’s Mother Language policy was true, that everyone must learn Southern Min no matter what their heritage language really is, then the LP would be truly unfair. However, his description seems rather like a duplication of KMT’s big discourse argument, which often frames a preconception that everything DPP does must be Southern-Min-biased. As a matter of fact, Qiu himself never received Mother Language education when he was in elementary school, nor has he ever been a
teacher for any Mother Language class. On the contrary, two of my other interviewees, Jian Yun-min and Uma Talavan, have indeed taught some Mother Language classes, and they both appreciated the diversity the policy offered. Jian is a 30-year-old Southern Min native speaker. She has substituted some Southern Min classes when she was a graduate student in Hualian, the hometown of Amis and Sakizaya. She told me that the school children could freely choose among Amis, Sakizaya, Hakka, and Southern Min as a subject for their Mother Language classes. Uma Talavan also speaks Southern Min fluently, but she identifies with Siraya. Uma is also the chair of the Tainan Pepo Siraya Culture Association, an NGO that has worked on reclaiming the dormant Siraya language for over ten years. A few years ago, she used to be a Mother Language teacher in a local school in her home village of Tavocan. At first she taught Southern Min. But later she asked the school to let her teach Siraya, and the school agreed. Since Uma is in fact a musician by training, the school also let her teach some Siraya songs in the music classes.

**Reflection on Identity Discourse**

When reflecting upon the identity discourse, some people’s narratives correspond to the big discourse more, and some less. Within a person’s narrative, some accounts repeat the big discourse, and some do not. These should be natural, as they indicate that the big discourse does not control all of people’s sense-making.

Among my interviews, Ng Bi-su’s and Qiu Hao-zhi’s narratives correspond to the big identity discourse most directly. For example, Ng tended to identify KMT, the Mainlanders, and the Chinese people as one and the same, and when she recounted something bad KMT had done to her family, she commented (in Southern Min Taiwanese), “this shows the evil quality [ò chit, 惡質] the Chinese people possess.” But note that even when a personal account indeed mirrors
the big discourse, it does not necessarily mean that the narrator is completely under a top-down influence. Correspondence, or correlation, does not entail (any direction of) causal relation. The personal account may in fact have informed the big discourse from bottom-up. Or there may be an independent factor outside of this person and the big discourse that has caused the correlation. In the 80-year-old Ng’s case, she might have actually helped shape the Taiwanese nationalists’ big discourse from bottom-up since she grew up in the first generation when DPP had just started. She has personally lived through the 228 Incident and KMT’s White Terror (see The Republic of Chinese Period in Chapter 1), both of which are main themes in DPP’s national identity discourse. But even Ng concurred on one occasion that “There are indeed some people in KMT who really love Taiwan.” She referred to those individuals who had provided her historical documents explaining the reason behind her father’s death. On the contrary, Qiu Haozhi’s narrative does suggest that he was copying the big discourse of Chinese nationalism. As mentioned earlier, in spite of his multi-ethnic background, Qiu is a strong KMT supporter and a self-identified Mainlander. Without presenting much personal real-life experience to support his claims, the 24-year-old Qiu portrayed Taiwan as young, small, and “lack of culture,” compared to China (and United States). He also revealed that he considers Hakka culture as a mere “branch” of the Chinese culture, treating the latter as the center. And he depicted the Southern Min people as hicks, or “low level” (mei2 shui3-zhun3, 没水準). In other words, it seems to me that Qiu has received many stereotypes concerning Taiwan and the Southern Min people created in the discourse of Chinese nationalism.

Besides the Southern Min Taiwanese nationalist Ng and the Mainlander Chinese nationalist Qiu, my Sakizaya friends Dome Ngayay and Padaw Ngayaw also gave accounts that reflect some social stereotypes. For example, while Dome does not speak any indigenous
language, she identifies herself as an indigene. But this identification follows the tokenistic view of the mainstream society. She said, “yes indeed [as generally known] we indigenes love to sing, dance, and drink” in a tone of passivism: “we are who we are; we cannot help it.” That is, Dome’s self-image seems to be mostly derived from other’s imagination of her (and her people). Dome’s father, Padaw, on the other hand, shows a clearer appreciation of his (and his people’s) own uniqueness. While he also identifies himself as an “indigene,” he told stories that differentiate the Amis culture and the Sakizaya. But when he recounted his experience of working in a hospital as a volunteer alongside many foreign care-givers from the Austronesian regions such as the Philippines and Indonesia, he commented, “so I told them that I am [just like] an Indonesian in Taiwan.” Such an account reveals that Padaw is more or less aware of the fact that his people, who are now labeled by the mainstream Taiwan as “original residents” (yuan2 zhu4-min2, 原住民) due to a modern sense of political correctness, are really perceived as foreigners in their native land.

Between the two national identities, that is, Chinese and Taiwanese, prescribed by the big discourse, and the four smaller, taken for granted, ethnic identities, e.g., Indigene, Hakka, Mainlander, and Southern Min, there are numerous possible combinations and hence identity choices one could make. For instance, while Ng Bi-su often disregards the ethnic label Southern Min and sticks only to the nationalistic label Taiwanese, Qiu Hao-zhi does identify with Mainlander and occasionally Hakka, although he ultimately identifies with Chinese. Uma Talavan, Chair of the Tainan Pepo Siraya Culture Association, believes strongly in the Taiwanese identity; but she does not see a necessary link between Taiwanese and Southern Min, for she believes that her Siraya identity is indigenous and thus authentic enough to let her claim Taiwanese. Then there are people like the Ngayaws who do not choose either of the big national
identities; they only identify with Indigene. The same applies to Huang Guan-zhong and his father Huang Hong-sen, who only see themselves as Hakka.

In fact, when asked about their national identification, Huang Hong-sen and also Xu Ling-mei specifically spoke against the binary distinction in the big discourse between Chinese and Taiwanese. In the next two excerpts, they pointed out that such a binary distinction is not only unhelpful in terms of solving the identity conflicts in Taiwan, but it could be rather ridiculous.

Excerpt 5: Huang Hong-sen on the binary opposition between Chinese and Taiwanese

P: You asked me who I think I am. Well, I *am* Hakka. … I think there should be multiple options, and I am pretty sure I am a Hakka person.

R: um, you meant in identity choice

P: multiple, multiple

R: So multiple options in identity choice.

P: Yes, multiple options, but not binary/dichotomy.

R: hm

P: You see, it is very convenient to do surveys [identity polls] with binary options, and therefore they [the politicians] often talk about “are you Chinese or Taiwanese?” Garbage! [lit. waste/junk speech]

R: (laugh)

P: That’s junk speech/garbage.

R: (laugh)

P: Imagine someone asks “Are you China’s Hakka or Taiwan’s Hakka? or ‘China’s Taiwan’s Hakka’?”

R: (laugh)

P: This is junk speech/garbage.
R: (laugh) oh yes.

P: And that’s how I see it (laugh).

While Huang Hong-sen spoke against the binary choice in national identity in a relatively casual tone of voice, Xu Ling-mei spoke with certain indignation. In fact, when I asked her about Chinese-or-Taiwanese, she appeared offended by the question because, as will be shown in the beginning of the excerpt, people often simply assume that she must be “blue,” that is, pro-KMT and pro-Chinese-nationalism, given her Mainlander background. And she thought that this assumption is unfair.

Excerpt 6: Xu Ling-mei on the binary opposition between Chinese and Taiwanese

P: I don’t see things this way [i.e., Chinese and Taiwanese must be incompatible]… [because] if I did, I would not go against [my parents’ will]… refuse to marry a Mainlander… refuse to marry a Zhejiang man. [Note: Xu’s husband is Southern Min.]

R: um… hm… hm…

P: People wouldn’t ask me [about identity politics]. They…simply assume that I am blue.

R: What, what if one day you get a phone call from the identity polls… a phone call that asks you to choose?

P: Oh it doesn’t matter, does it? I would say, as a matter of fact, I have not made up my mind.

R: uh

P: I have not made up my mind… I would tell [the caller] as such.

R: oh

P: And I… perhaps… perhaps… I, I could also lie to them… play with them, so to speak.
R: um…

P: depending on my mood that day.

R: But if they call and ask you, you are, are you Taiwanese or Chinese or Taiwanese as well as Chinese?

P: *No sensible person would ask such a question, would they?*

R: Well but identity polls as such are on newspapers all the time, no?

P: *Of course I am Taiwanese.*

R: oh

P: Of course I am Taiwanese. You ask me… you could only ask me… you would not ask me if I am Taiwanese or Chinese. *If you must ask this,* I would not answer you [because] obviously *you are antagonistic* [and] you are just testing me. You could only ask me, “Do you… agree on the pursuit of Taiwan independence?” *That is a discussable topic.*

R: oh

P: Of course I am Taiwanese (angry voice).

R: But let’s see, those identity polls *on newspapers,* don’t they always talk about… this percentage of people think they are Taiwanese, this percentage of people think they are Taiwanese as well as Chinese, and… this percentage of people think they are Chinese?

P: Ok… *if you must force me to answer this question,* I would… I think I am Taiwanese as well as Chinese.

R: oh, huh huh huh huh

P: But this thing [i.e., the prescribed identities], no matter what I say, [it] does not interfere with my identification towards the nation.

R: huh uh uh uh

P: I am Taiwanese as well as Chinese but I can still support Taiwán independence.
R: um

P: [That is] if the Chinese communists do not threaten to raise a war against us.

In sum, Huang Hong-sen and Xu Ling-mei show that resistance against the big discourse’s top-down influence is possible. For decades, the politicians/nationalists in Taiwan have given people only two choices of national identity, but until today there are still people who refuse to subscribe to them. These people discern how futile such binary opposition is to solve the ethnic conflict within the nation-state and to alleviate the threat posed by China-PRC. They also demonstrate that people need not accept the nationalistic manipulation: like Huang, one could laugh at it, or like Xu, one could “play with” it. In addition, they raise the point that people could make a better effort to accept, or at least to understand, one another’s differences, for only through such understanding can everyone sit down to discuss the practical questions such as if changing the name of the state is necessary and if pursuing Taiwan independence is beneficial. Last but not least, I believe that a bottom-up influence from individuals such as Huang and Xu has indeed already taken place, as evident in the transition in the big discourse where both the (non-radical) Chinese nationalists and Taiwanese nationalists are trying to redefine “we” to make it less discriminatory.

Connection between Language and Identity

In the narratives I collected, a connection between language and identity is always there, although it was not always told to me directly. Sometimes this is because it need not be told: Huang Hong-sen has a strong identity towards Hakka, as he always lives in a Hakka community, he speaks the Hakka language naturally and proudly, and he feels it “abnormal” that children were punished for speaking it.
Some other times, however, the connection is unveiled by the minor inconsistencies or contradictions in what the narrator did tell. Qiu Hao-xi openly claims a pro-KMT, Chinese, identity. She not only recounted how Standard Mandarin was reinforced at home by her mother, but she also said that she is proud of her being able to speak such a variety. She gave several examples of the “bad” and “illogical” Mandarin, including pronunciation and expressions, most of which were influences or borrowings from Southern Min Taiwanese. However, during the interview, her own speech actually carried many of the linguistic features she denounced, such as the reduction, or palatalization, of Mandarin retroflexes, and the grammatical extension of you3 (有, “to have”) from simple possessive to perfect aspect. The use of you3 for perfect aspect is only observed in the Southern-Min-affected Mandarin variety; the Standard Mandarin uses le (了) instead. For example, “I have eaten” would be “I eat LE” in Standard Mandarin but “I YOU3 eat” in the other variety. It is true that Qiu Hao-xi’s non-standard speech might have been due to my, the interviewer’s, influence; I normally do not speak Standard Mandarin. However, this is unlikely because given “linguistic reflexivity” (Matthews, 1997: 314)\(^48\), one should be more aware of her own speech performance when discussing language, rather than less. Therefore, I suspect that Qiu Hao-xi’s unawareness of the inconsistency is caused by her identity: she believes that, as a Chinese, she speaks the Standard Mandarin, and such belief may prevent her from perceiving otherwise.

Uma Talavan, on the other hand, demonstrated how a Taiwanese national identity may affect one’s language attitude. As introduced earlier, Uma is pro-DPP and strongly supportive of

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\(^{48}\) Linguistic reflexivity is thought to be a human-only faculty that allows the speaker to reflect upon, or to talk about, language itself. For example, some primates demonstrate communicative skills very similar to human language, but they cannot describe their own communicative performance. Linguistics as a human science is also an obvious example of linguistic reflexivity.
Taiwanese nationalism; she is also a Siraya indigene and has devoted more than 10 years of her life to reclaiming the sleeping Siraya language, culture, and identity. She places the national identity Taiwanese above the ethnic identity Siraya; she identifies herself first as a Taiwanese and then as a Siraya person. But in some parts of the interview, she would question the definition of Taiwanese (identity and language), to which Southern Min is generally considered as the default representative. For example, she said, “in recent years, I have become less attached to the attitude that ‘Taiwanese people must know how to speak the Taiwanese language [Southern Min]’ [because] now that we have developed [i.e., reclaimed] our own Siraya… [I start to ask:] what is my ‘Taiwanese language’?” However, in other parts, she still revealed a strong sentiment towards the Taiwanese-Southern-Minness, as she referenced a Taiwanese nationalist scholar’s opinion and said, “let’s not talk about reclaiming Siraya [because] you see… even Southern Min may not be kept. [If the government does not do something to help maintain Southern Min,] in the end we Taiwan will have only Chinese left” (my italics). Note that for Uma, as well as for the majority of modern-day Siraya people, Southern Min, i.e., the Taiwanese language, is indeed her first language; she speaks it with her parents, and she speaks it with her children. In other words, Southern Min may have imbued in Uma a certain “affective value” (see Holmes, 2001) for the Taiwanese identity with which it is associated. And this is all in spite of the fact that Uma also recounted how, as children, she and her Siraya friends would be bullied and discriminated against by the neighboring Southern Min children. All in all, Uma’s example shows that the relation between language and identity can be extremely complicated and it is really hard to discern, or to predict, a certain directionality of the causal effect. One may think that because Uma speaks Southern Min natively, she has developed a strong Taiwanese identity; such nationalistic-localist awareness may have prompted her to rediscover her Siraya identity in the
first place, but now it may lead to the co-option of Siraya into Southern Min Taiwanese nationalism. On the other hand, one may predict that the new-found pride in Siraya (identity and language) would eventually lead Uma to develop a new identity that does not conform to either of the national identities prescribed in the big discourse.

The examples above indicate two places where the not-so-direct connection between language and identity can be found: one is between a person’s narrative and her linguistic performance, and the other is among the contents within one narrative. A third, more subtle, place would be between the claims made in a narrative and the labeling, especially with regard to the two ethno-linguistic groups Mainlander/Mandarin and Southern Min. For example, the relatively politically neutral Huang Hong-sen would refer to Mandarin as “the so-called National Language” or “the Beijing Speech,” the Chinese nationalist Qiu Hao-zhi would refer to it as “National Language,” and the Taiwanese nationalist Ng Bi-su would call it “China’s Language.” Huang Hong-sen and Qiu Hao-zhi would both refer to the Southern Min language as “Southern Min,” but Ng Bi-su would always call it “the Taiwanese Language.” Labeling is nevertheless not a strong indicator because quite often the most commonly used ethnic and linguistic labels are simply taken for granted. Also, many people think of the (several co-existing) labels as just labels and use them interchangeably. Take the Taiwanese nationalist Uma Talavan for example. In her full narrative, which was 132 minutes long, two different labels were used to refer to the Mandarin language: “Chinese Language” (zhong1 wen2⁴⁹ in Mandarin) appeared 17 times and “National Language” (guo2 yu3 in Mandarin) 5 times. Four different labels were given to the Southern Min language: “Taiwanese Language” (tai2 yu3 in Mandarin and tâi ĝî in Southern

⁴⁹ Note that zhong1 wen2 literally means “Chinese literature/writing.” But given the “literacy bias,” that is, the false belief that writing precedes oral speech as the default linguistic form, zhong1 wen2 is commonly interpreted as to refer to the Mandarin language itself.
Min) appeared 11 times, “Taiwanese Speech” (tai2 wan1 hua4 in Mandarin) twice, “Southern Min Language” (min3 nan2 yu3 in Mandarin) three times, and “Holo Speech” (holo òe in Southern Min) 6 times. Note that the information I provided in the parentheses also shows that, for a multilingual individual, certain labels may go with certain languages more comfortably. My conversation with Uma was carried out bilingually in Mandarin and Southern Min, but somehow she would only speak Mandarin when referring to the Mandarin language with either of the two different labels, which actually can be pronounced in Southern Min as well without any linguistically technical difficulty. Uma’s choices of labels vis-à-vis languages for the Southern Min language are even more complicated. Since I am unable to clearly identify all the possible minute motivations behind these choices, I will just leave the discussion here.

While labeling as discussed above can be considered as a form of naming, it was through telling about personal names that Uma explicitly pointed out a connection between her identity attitude and language choice. Uma has a registered Han name, Bân Siôk-koan in Southern Min or Wan4 Shu2-juan1 in Mandarin, and since the Siraya language had not been spoken for almost a century until quite recently, I asked her where the name Uma came from. She said that she named herself Uma several years back when she became deeply involved in awakening the Siraya language and culture; the name was also symbolism for reclaiming her native identity.

Excerpt 7: Uma talking about personal naming

R: So you said you… you were always known as “akoan,” or “Wan4 Shu2-juan1,” and “Uma” is… did you name yourself “Uma”?

P: Yes.

R: Oh.

P: I didn’t ask for my father’s agreement.
R: Why?

P: Well “Uma” is a Siraya word, you see. Uma is from the Siraya language.\(^{50}\)

R: uh, huh huh

P: So… we [Tainan Pepo Siraya Culture Association] have also decided to let all the [Musuhapa Siraya language & culture] summer camp participants choose a [Siraya] name for themselves because, at least… say, we give you a name and hence an identity.

R: hm hm…

P: What it [i.e., Siraya naming] means to me is a beginning of symbolism.

R: hm hm hm

P: Besides, if every [camper] would pick a different [word for their] name, then we can all memorize more, more words.

R: Yes yes yes (laugh). So did you name yourself just this year?

P: Me? No, I have got mine for quite a while.

[Then R asked P how she selected the potential Siraya words/names.]

P: Well, I have tried looking into the Family Registry Booklets\(^{51}\)… to find the old names of our ancestors.

R: um um

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\(^{50}\) Uma’s father, Bân Chéng–hiông actually founded the Tainan Pepo Siraya Culture Association and served as the first chair, before Uma. Until today he has been very involved in Siraya reclamation, but he does not participate much in the linguistic aspect. So I think what Uma meant here is not that she was afraid that her father would disapprove her self-naming; she probably simply meant that her father would not understand the Siraya language.

\(^{51}\) an official document required by the Japanese and the ROC governments for all its citizens for the purposes of demographic census, in Japanese Kanji and Chinese characters.
P: But… anyway, from [the things found] there one wouldn’t really know how the naming was done. And also if you look into the Savage Contracts, you would only find a handful of names… we [the modern-day Siraya] can’t all just use this few names, right?

R: Yes, yeah yeah

P: So I thought… maybe we could use those [relearnt Siraya] words that refers to things in the nature.

R: um

P: This [choice of nature-related terms] is also inspired by today’s concepts of, say, environmental awareness, or conservation of the nature.

R: hm hm hm hm

P: So, for example, you take a name from a plant, a Siraya word… the whole thing may seem unfamiliar to you at first

R: um

P: but when you wear it on your own body [i.e., apply it to yourself], it would interact with you and create a relation.

R: hm hm hm

P: And through such a relation, you, yes, you would grow a love/affection towards it [i.e., the name, the identity, and the culture].

Although Uma gave plant names as an example for the modern-day Siraya name choice, the word uma actually means “land” in Siraya. Other name/word categories provided by the Siraya Association to the summer campers include inanimate entities in the nature (e.g., “sun,” “mountain,” “ocean”), natural phenomena (e.g., “cloud,” “rain”), animal names, human/artificial

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52 a collection of land contracts signed by the 18th and 19th centuries Siraya people and the Han farmers of Qing Dynasty, in Chinese characters.
objects (e.g., “candle,” “window”), and human qualities (e.g., “beautiful,” “gentle,” “honest”). I will talk more about the naming activity in the Musuhapa Siraya summer camps later in Chapter 5. For the discussion here, it suffices to know the reasoning behind Uma’s decision on self-naming: it is for reclaiming a lost identity, and it is for continuing the language use. From a CDA point of view, the Siraya re-naming initiated by Uma could also be thought of as a bottom-up resistance through self-assertion. Until today, the Siraya have not been officially recognized by the central government as a people because the government insists that all Siraya people have been “completely Han-ized.” Now that more and more Siraya people have replaced their Han names with a Siraya name, even if just as “symbolism,” they feel more confident about their own identity and uniqueness. In addition, I also asked Uma how she named her three children. She told me that all her children has three names, a Siraya name, an European name, and a Han name. The oldest, a daughter, is Uging (“candle”)/Euphony/Wan Ying-lu. The second daughter is Ulan (“rain”)/Eucharis/Wan Ying-sui. The youngest, a son, is Dilig (“truth”)/Eurico/Wan Ying-en. The Siraya name is for their Siraya identity, the European name is for their Filipino identity (their father, Edgar Macapili, is from the Philippines), and the Han name, as Uma explained, is necessary because “without a Han name, how do they survive school in Taiwan?” Indeed, identity does not need to be singular.

Last but not least, I would like to use Qiu Hao-zhi, brother of Qiu Hao-xi, as an example to show another explicitly articulated connection between language choice and identity choice. Like Qiu Hao-xi, Qiu Hao-zhi is also a supporter of KMT/Chinese nationalism. But unlike Qiu Hao-xi who only speaks Mandarin (and English), Qiu Hao-zhi also speaks Hakka, their father’s native tongue, as a second language. Because I was introduced to Qiu Hao-zhi by Qiu Hao-xi, who told me that her brother could speak Hakka pretty well, the earlier part of my interview with him was
directed towards Hakka. But halfway through the interview, I started to realize that Qiu Hao-zhi’s speaking Hakka and speaking of the Hakka identity were a means for him to assert his Chinese identity. In his narrative, many interactions between the top-down and the bottom-up discourse influences took place. It seems to me that he has received much top-down influence from KMT’s discourse of Chinese nationalism, and then, through his own personal expressions of Hakka and Chineseness, he went back to the big discourse from bottom-up to counter DPP’s discourse of Taiwanese nationalism, which he designated as Southern-Min-biased. For example, when speaking against the then DPP government’s proposal of developing a character-based writing system for Southern Min, Qiu Hao-zhi said, “this [writing Southern Min in characters] is just ridiculous; you [i.e., DPP] kept plagiarizing the Mandarin language’s writing and so how could you tell us that [Southern Min] is [Taiwan’s] own language?” (my italics). In fact, the Chinese writing system bears no direct association with any (oral) language; in its thousands of years of existence, it has been used to write many different Han languages as well as non-Han languages such as Japanese and Korean. Qiu Hao-zhi’s comment hence reveals that he has accepted the myth of common origin in Chinese nationalism, which is reinforced by the Mandarin postulate of centrism. I also asked him what had made him learn Hakka in the first place. He explained as follows.

Excerpt 8: Qiu Hao-zhi’s explanation of learning Hakka

P: Well, when I went to high school, I once had this geography test. And one of the questions in the test was like… how can I put it… well there was this question that asked “what does this mean?” and the an-answer was in Southern Min. Can you believe it?

R: Ge-geography?
P: Yes, it was like, you must know Southern Min or you would not know the answer. So I felt... I questioned the teacher: how dare you give a question like this? I cannot speak [Southern Min].

R: Were you saying that Southern Min was in the question or in the answers [multiple choice]?

P: It was... in the answers. So to reach the correct answer you must be able to pronounce it in Southern Min... and so I felt that was ridiculous and then I challenged the teacher: why don’t you use Hakka to test us?

R: Mm

P: Or why don’t you use English to test us?

R: Mm

P: Ugh... yes. So I felt... the teacher didn’t say anything after I scolded [her/him] because [she/he] probably didn’t know what to say. [She/he] probably knew that arguing against me wouldn’t do any good.

R: Mm mm mm

P: But at the time I also realized that oh well if [she/he] really did incorporate Hakka into the test, I would still fail because I didn’t really know Hakka.

R: Mm

P: So that was one of the major motivations that made me think that I should probably learn Hakka. [If I did,] I would have more/stronger... ground to shut other people up. The other motivation was that I saw Chen Shui-bien [DPP’s presidential candidate in the 2000 election] speaking on an occasion, claiming that he was also Hakka. How absurd! At that time he... he was just trying to trick people into voting for him. He was running for president. Two months prior to the election day he suddenly, out of nowhere, claimed that “hey, I am also Hakka!” Yes. But then the Hakka he spoke was extremely broken... and [I] could tell that he was just squeezing it out.

R: So at that time you yourself had not been able to speak Hakka yet?
P: Yes.

R: But you could tell whether a person’s Hakka speech was standard or not?

P: Yes. It [i.e., Chen’s case] was extremely obvious… because he was holding a [speech] draft and reading off it… I had no idea what the heck he was reading…you [i.e., Chen] only came out to claim Hakka for the votes, so snobbish. Then I felt that I must speak Hakka better than you [Chen.]

R: Mm

P: Yes, for me to ridicule you [Chen, and probably Taiwanese nationalists in general], I must be able to speak better than you.

I wanted to know if Qiu Hao-zhi was learning Hakka for Hakka’s sake or he was mainly using Hakka as a way to rebut the discourse of Taiwanese nationalism, and so I asked him how he felt about the fact that Hakka had been losing its speakers. He said, “mm… I think… [people] can try to preserve it, but… I feel that [the loss of Hakka language] is very natural.” Then, since he argued that DPP’s Mother Language LP was designed to help Southern Min “eliminate” Mandarin, I pointed out to him that some think that DPP’s Mother Language LP might actually help raise both Hakka and Southern Min to the status of official language and hence increase their chance of survival. But he disagreed: “oh no, making Southern Min and Hakka official would actually speed up the rate of Hakka loss… because… official language… how can you have four [he added English] official languages? Which country has four official languages?”

His favoring the dominant Mandarin (and English) and his sentiment against multilingualism, both echoing the grand discourse of Chinese nationalism, became even more obvious when I asked him if he would teach his future children Hakka. He said for sure he would teach them “National Language,” that is, Mandarin, and probably also English. But he would not teach them Hakka because, as he said, “well let us first assume that in the future all of us are forced to learn
So how is it possible to teach four languages? It is rather difficult, isn’t it? … who has the energy to teach four languages? So I think I will sacrifice Hakka.” After all, Qiu Hao-zhi concluded that Hakka for him is just “a branch of Chinese culture” and “Hakka… is just… Chinese… tradition. It [Chinese] is our cultural thinking. Hakka is just another speech to express this [same] concept.” In sum, for Qiu Hao-zhi, the identity is Chinese and the language is Mandarin, and their centrality and dominance should never be changed. Indeed, in his narrative one finds not only the influence of the big Chinese nationalist discourse but also the effect of Mandarin postulates, especially centris-and comparative ranking. He truly embodied the inseparability of (the Chinese) identity and (the Mandarin) language.

**Conclusion**

Throughout this long chapter I have depicted but a general picture of Taiwan. I could not tell what Taiwan is, for Taiwan are many different things. Although Mandarin is the most dominant language and cultural thinking today, others have not disappeared. History does not progress in such a way that the new events completely replace the old; rather, the remanents of the old continue and co-exist with the new. As I have shown, although KMT has executed its Mandarin-only and Chinese-centric LP for decades, in contemporary Taiwan there are still old people like Ng Bi-su who speak and think Japanese first; although Hakka and Souther Min have lost their previous prevelance, there are still many people, like Huang Hong-sen and Huang Guan-zhong, who speak and think in their native ways, and a Mother Language LP is in place trying to restore mainly these two languages and cultures; although the indigenous Austronesian cultures have long been ignored, there are still people like Padaw Ngayaw and Uma Talavan who still remember their roots and are making an effort to continue them. With regard to discourse, although Mandarin guides most areas, it does not dictate or engulf all of them. Otherwise, the
politicians would not bother to speak a little of other languages so as to co-opt other identities, and the individual without obvious political power would not show any bottom-up resistance. In other words, even though the Mandarin postulates may have indeed influenced everyone, they must have also received people’s feedback. In fact, even Mandarin has a lot of variations in Taiwan. What Qiu Hao-xi referred to as “Southern-Min-accented” Mandarin is actually, as I have explained, a Taiwan’s variety of Mandarin that has borrowed not only pronunciation but also other aspects of grammar from Southern Min. There are also well-known stereotypes of the Hakka-accented Mandarin and the indigenous-language-accented Mandarin (which is, of course, false categorization) that are often made fun of by the mainstream media; them being stereotypes means that, in reality, there must be more. After all, despite the fact that many of my interviewees chose to speak Mandarin to me, the interviews and the thoughts expressed in them are all very different. Therefore, by way of demonstrating the mutual influence of top-down and bottom-up, what I really intend to show is that there is not because “we,” the favorable pronoun of the (two camps of) nationalists, are plural and different. In the next chapter, I follow the Siraya’s footprint to more specifically explicate the importance of recognizing such plurality. I choose Siraya because it is my heritage culture and also because I have talked a lot about the Han but not enough about any of the indigenous experiences. The Siraya experience can serve as one example, but again, it should not be generalized to represent all.
Figure 4-1. Han-Chinese philosophy of social organization.
Figure 4-2. Concentric conceptualization of Han-Chinese nation.
Table 4-1. Interconnections of terms

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CHAPTER 5
THE SIRAYA EXPERIENCE

I see the Siraya experience as a compass that guides one through the convoluted and interwoven paths tredded by the interaction between societal and personal discourses and that between language and identity. This chapter starts with a narrative of my own, and then it examines the historical changes of the Siraya since the Dutch time in the 17th century and continues to the modern Siraya movement of cultural continuation and identity reclamation. It ends with a discussion on the diversity within the Siraya and the struggle of such diversity against the prevalent discourse of nationalism.

My Personal Journey

These days, if someone asks me who I am, I say that I am a Siraya, or at least that I am an Austronesian indigene from the island of Formosa. For convenience of reference, I may add that I am a Taiwanese, but I would never say that I am a Chinese. However, the fact is that I have not known that I am a Siraya, let alone identified with it, since until four years ago. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, I had actually for a few years identified with Chinese, for it was the only option in my country at the time, and I was proud of it. I remember that, as young as a kindergarten child, I was very pleased to find out that I share the same name as the creator of the Chinese Nation, Huang Di. By age 9 or 10, I was already aware of such a human activity called politics, and I would watch political news and elections with my family, which portrayed the DPP members as trouble-makers: they were always protesting something on the street, and those elected DPP legislators would jump onto the podium in the Legislature Yuan, pushing the KMT legislators, shouting in their face, and throwing water at them. I remember disliking and fearing DPP that was labeled by the media as a “violent party.”
However, when I became a teenager, I started questioning authority. I did not hate everything in school, but I could not stand the National Geography and National History classes. I was particularly disgusted by the fact that the things taught in these two classes had nothing to do with the land where I grew up. My classmates and I had to, literally, *memorize* the names of all the mountains, rivers, and provinces in Mainland China, the natural resources in each of the provinces, the names of all the kings and wars in the supposedly 5,000-year-long continuation of Chinese history, and all the modern treaties signed by Qing and ROC with the nation-states that had “invaded” China. But I still did not know the name of the creek I used to go catching crabs with friends and that of the hill behind my house where I could see fireflies. And so I started to seek non-textbook reading materials, many of which are written by the DPP Taiwanese nationalists. Eventually, in high school and later in college, I turned into a strong DPP supporter and a rather radical Taiwanese nationalist. I not only participated in several street protests, but I had also organized a couple with my friend, Monkey, who is now a law consultant. Monkey and I also semi-joked that we would run for president one day so as to change the education system; our ideal education system would not stress tests and memorization, and it would focus more on Taiwan.

I never really hated the National Language (i.e., Mandarin) class, however, because I have always been interested in language. I was good at English as well. In fact, because I tested very well in NL and English, I was able to obtain a high overall score in the National College Entrance Exam despite my poor performances in geography and history. I was admitted to the undergraduate program of my “number one choice” (*di4 yi1 zhi4 yuan4*, 第一志願) at the time, that is, Advertising at the National Chengchi University (NCCU). I had thought that advertising would be a perfect place for the freedom of expression and individual creativity, but I was
wrong. What I learned at NCCU is that advertising always needs to compromise to the pop, or mainstream, demand, a compromise so serious that all creativity must yield to the most widely accepted ideologies. In other words, advertising is always under top-down influence and can never be subversive. Still, I finished my B.A. degree in advertising, for it was (and maybe still is) really hard in Taiwan’s college system to change major. But I also chose to take courses offered by other departments, including political science, comparative literature, and linguistics. My favorite was linguistics. I was lucky to have a good professor who not only showed me how very fascinating languages could be, but also let me know that linguistics can indeed help illuminate sociopolitical problems. Therefore, after having graduated from college and fulfilled two years of mandatory military service, I came to the U.S. to study linguistics in graduate school. It is during these years in the U.S. that I have been able to really hear different voices and to understand that every voice, no matter how tiny it may be, does have a legitimate point. It is also in these years that I have started questioning the singular discourse of nationalism and the singular choice of identity, be it Chinese or Taiwanese.

I spent two and a half years at Michigan State University where I studied formal semantics and theoretical pragmatics. I enjoyed the academic days in Michigan; the professors were really nice and helpful. However, the concern was that I could not find an ideal way to apply what I had learnt to what really interested me, that is, the sociopolitical issues. So after acquiring a master’s degree, I transferred to the linguistic program at the University of Florida where there was a larger and more diverse faculty. Since the very beginning of my days in Florida, I have known that I wanted to research some social issue in Taiwan, and so my academic track has been mainly with sociolinguistics. But I also took several anthropological linguistic courses with Dr. M. J. Hardman, starting with field methods, and I realized that anthropological linguistics is what
really interests me. Not only can it implement the sociolinguistic inquiries, but it can on its own reveal many cultural, and thus sociopolitical, problems deeply rooted in language. Still, in 2004, I had not decided on my research topic yet. I thought about working on the conflict between the Taiwanese nationalistic discourse and the Chinese nationalistic discourse. But I was afraid that my research result would be too biased, in spite of the fact that by then I was confident that I could hear different voices well. What I feared was my own cultural and political grid: even though I could, at that point, appreciate some parts of KMT’s Chinese nationalistic discourse, I was still more sympathetic to Taiwanese nationalism. And even though I could relate to some personal stories I heard from my Mainlander friends, I still thought of myself as a truer Taiwanese than them. I believed that I was Southern Min and that Southern Min, the (generally accepted) Taiwanese Language, was more Taiwanese than Mandarin, which is the Chinese Language. In other words, I sensed that I, the researcher, was still under much top-down influence of nationalism, and that was not good if I wanted to make nationalism my subject.

Here, please allow me to digress a little bit to talking about my language-learning experiences. My first language is actually Mandarin. Despite the fact that my parents both speak Southern Min natively, they only spoke Mandarin to me when I was little probably because they believed that Mandarin was the only language that could guarantee social success. Them speaking only Mandarin to me might have also been due to the fact that, before I was ten, my family lived in Taipei City, the capital of ROC-Taiwan, where most people spoke (and still speak) Mandarin. My family then moved south to Taichung when I was ten. In the first semester in Taichung, my teacher openly praised me in class for speaking “perfect” Mandarin while I was just speaking the Taipei variety that was (and still is) considered standard in Taiwan. Speaking Standard Mandarin made me a class representative for a few Chinese/Mandarin speech contests,
but it did not bring me friends. My classmates in Taichung spoke Southern Min outside of class; they would not be punished like Huang Hong-sen’s generation because the Chinese/Mandarin-only policy was then removed. So I learned Southern Min from them and gradually earned their friendship. Today I speak Southern Min with near native fluency, although I do not have the command to use it to address issues in high social domains such as academics and politics. For three full academic years from 2005 to 2008, I had taught Mandarin in the Chinese Program at the University of Florida as a teaching assistant/instructor and received financial support from them. I truly enjoyed being a teacher in the Chinese Program; the staff there was all very nice to me and the students were great. However, I did not enjoy the China-centric, or indeed PRC-centric, ideology much. For example, I had received some materials from the program that I was supposed to teach to my students. One of such materials was a set of vocabulary cards published by the PRC-owned People’s Education Publishers of China, with each card showing a Mandarin word on one side and a picture on the other. On the card of the word zhong1 guo2 (“China”), the picture is a China map including Taiwan. On another card that shows only a picture of Taiwan, the word is tai2 wan1 sheng3 (“Taiwan Province”). As far as English is concerned, I have been able to speak it since an early age because my mother had been a college English teacher and my father had done international commerce with American partners for over 20 years before both of them retired. I now also speak a little bit of Siraya, which I consider my heritage language. I have only started learning Siraya since about four years ago. The whole experience is quite unique and I will detail it below.

I was in Taiwan in the summer of 2005 just for the break. My parents, my sister, and I visited an indigenous museum where there was a special exhibition called “The Siraya Plain Indigenes.” In addition to some short texts explaining where the Siraya reside, that is, the
southwest plain ranging from Tainan to Pingtung, there were pictures depicting the activities such as fishing and farming, and there were a few pieces of actual domestic tools. There were also some photos of a pot-worshiping religious ceremony. My father’s first reaction was: “hey, that is how I used to fish when I was little, and those tools, we still have them in the old home in Tainan.” He asked me, “the cradles, you used to sleep in one of those; do you remember?” Then he remembered the religious pot. He said that when he was little, his mother, my grandmother, used to take him to worship a big pot like the ones in the pictures, and her mother called the deity “Alid,” same as noted in the explanatory text next to the picture. My father was rather confused. Like me, he, 54 years old at the time, had always thought of himself as a Southern Min Taiwanese, just like other Taiwanese people. He later remembered having wondered why his home religion was different from his childhood Southern Min friends. So we decided to call my senior uncle, the eldest member of the family, and check if he knew something we did not. My uncle’s reaction was quite plain; after listening to our explanation, he said straightforwardly on the other side of the phone, in a calm voice, in Southern Min, “yes, we are fwan-a [‘savage’]; don’t you know that?” My father said of course he did not know; his parents, my grandparents, had never told him. He then asked, “but on our parents’ tombs it is inscribed, ‘Huang family, from Longxi, China.’ Isn’t that true?” Longxi is an area in the Fujian Province, from which many of the early Southern Min people had came to Taiwan. My uncle explained, again, in a calm voice, “oh, that; that was put there by the government.” That was when I finally knew that I was a Siraya and a Formosan indigene. Indeed, my mother’s side may still be Southern Min. But that does not make me less Siraya, or less Southern Min for that matter. I share the same sentiment

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1 First of all, it is now generally believed that there have been many inter-marriage between the early Southern Min immigrants and the indigenous people. Second, my mother has been “mistaken” as an indigene numerous times in her life, not only by the Han, but also by many indigenes. She “looks” Austronesian.
with many authors in *American Mixed Race* (Zack, 1995) that being mixed does not mean being incomplete. I am 100% Siraya and I am 100% Southern Min, not half-and-half.

After the discovery, or revelation, of my indigenous identity, I felt ready to pursue the research on Taiwan’s identity politics and its discourse. It is not that this new label, indigenous, automatically granted me any legitimate status of an impartial researcher. It is that the new-found identity, especially the journey through which I acquired it, allowed me to appreciate diversity more. Gradually, I became able to perceive that there are indeed many different kinds of Taiwanese peoples and some of them do think of themselves as Chinese; and no one is less *authentic* than another. I started by reflecting upon the variety of Southern Min I myself and my paternal family speak; I compared this variety to the standard Southern Min and noticed many differences that I had never considered before. I also found a few academic linguistic publications about the Siraya language and learned that it has been “extinct” for a century. But from the few findings I gathered via comparing the Siraya variety of Southern Min with the non-Siraya one(s), I knew that the Siraya language has not “completely died out:” pieces of it have persisted in a modified form in Southern Min. I personally really wanted to continue the Siraya language, and so I tried to learn it from the publications I found. However, they are just not very helpful. For one thing, there is simply not that many of them; for another, following the academic convention, these publications all focus on only one or two grammatical aspects of the language, and their main concerns are either generative grammar or typology. Simply put, these academic publications are not ideal language-learning materials. Nevertheless, I still tried to *pronounce* the few Siraya phrases I gathered. But I had to wait for two more years, until I met Uma and Edgar from the Tainan Pepo Siraya Culture Association (TPSCA), to find a group of people with whom I could really learn the language together.
In the summer of 2007 I embarked on my first academic field trip to Taiwan. I traveled around the island meeting individuals of various backgrounds and documenting their stories in search for some patterns in the small discourse of identification. The results I have presented in Chapter 4. At first I did not really consider incorporating Siraya into my research, for I had not known any Siraya person or activity outside of my family and relatives in the village of Saⁿgòkäh in Jiali Township, Tainan, and really besides the Alid religion and the variety of Southern Min spoken there, Saⁿgòkäh does not show many cultural features different from the Southern Min Han culture (or I have not yet been able to discern them). But I did take some personal detours, as I had thought of them as such, in some areas in Tainan the literature indicates as traditionally Siraya. So there I was, in a place called Green Valley in Kauchannia in Sinhua Township. Green Valley is the home of Ban Cheng-hiong, who has reinvented parts of his house into a local Siraya museum: there were photos and articles about Siraya and also several music instruments made of bamboo his family has recreated. I was talking to him as I noticed a flyer on the table about an upcoming event, Musuhapa Siraya Language and Culture Summer Camp. The flyer really intrigued me. I thought, “how amazing, Siraya language, really?” And so I inquired Ban Cheng-hiong for details about the event. He told me that his daughter, Ban Siok-koan, that is, Uma, and her husband, Edgar Macapili, have spent about a decade relearning the language and now they would like to teach it to more people. He also said that I should check out the summer camp. And so I did. On the 4th of July, 2007, I arrived at Hothaupi Reservoir in Sinhua, where the summer camp was held. As soon as the event took off, I was in complete awe. A group of teenagers and children first took the stage and performed a few welcome songs. The songs were in Siraya! And a girl (later I knew the girl to be Uma’s second child, Ulan) then took the microphone and gave a speech, again, in Siraya! So I finally realized
that I was not the only person in the world that has been trying to continue the language. A few hours later, Uma found me. She said that she had been expecting me since she had received my registration form (the flyer) because I noted on the form that I am Siraya myself and I am a linguist. She was very pleased with both facts. She called me “brother” (and since that day she has really treated me as her own brother) and asked, “we [the association, TPSCA] really need a linguist; would you like to work with us?” How could I refuse? As a result, since July, 2007, I have become an official member. My title would be Linguistic Consultant, but really I have just been learning the language; we have all been learning the language together.

Besides the narrowly defined cultural activities such as language and music, TPSCA has always been deeply involved in politics. For one thing, language awakening itself is contingent to the association’s political goal of reclaiming by attaining a Siraya identity recognized by the central government. For another, the association would not just sit around when other indigenous peoples have been ignored or underrepresented. It has formed a Siraya Alliance with several other similar Siraya cultural organizations (none of these other Siraya groups works on language, however), and this alliance belongs to yet a bigger one that represents all the unrecognized low-land peoples, including the Bazai in Nantou County, the Papula in Taichung County, the Taokas in Miaoli County, etc. Either as an organization of its own or as a member of the allies, TPSCA has been present on numerous political occasions, including the domestic and the international. On some occasions, the association was invited, such as a few public hearings held by the Council of Indigenous Peoples under the ROC-Taiwan government and the Asia Indigenous People’s Preparatory Meeting on UN Mechanisms held in Nepal in February, 2008. Some other occasions were initiated by the association and/or its allies, such as a street protest requesting official recognition of the low-land indigenes that took place in May, 2009. Partly because of all
these and partly because of my “insider status” (Crippen, 2009) that has granted me access to the details behind all the political events, I have found a place for Siraya in the research presented here. What TPSCA has been doing, and hence what I have been doing, is simultaneously cultural and political: It is an indigenous rights movement from bottom-up, and it concerns not only the Siraya identity but also the overall identity politics in Taiwan. Indeed, this is “language activism” (cf. Florey et al., 2009).

**Summer Trip 2008**

My next field trip to Taiwan took place in the summer of 2008. While spending a lot of time analyzing linguistic data and teaching the Siraya language, I also participated in meetings with activists and politicians and was actively involved\(^2\). Therefore, it is appropriate to say that linguistic activism was the theme of this expedition. In the space below, I detail the work I had done during the three busy, yet fulfilling, months.

(1) *Computer-based work center.* I left Florida, US, on 8 May, 2008, and landed on Taiwan the next evening. The weather was nice, still early before the notorious typhoon season would arrive. From the airport I went directly back to my parents in Taichung City and rested for two days for my jet lag to cease. The next day was a Monday. I received a telephone call from Uma, who asked me to go to Tainan to meet her and others in TPSCA. “Let’s get ready to work,” Uma said. By “work” she referred to the preparation for this year’s Musuhapa (“burgeoning”) Siraya summer camp.

The next afternoon I was sitting inside the Chimei Building at National Cheng Kung University with Uma, Edgar, and Agoan, a volunteer of the association and a personal friend. We

\(^2\) I received generous financial supports from the Foundation for Endangered Languages and Taiwanese-American Foundation of Boston for the field trip. I would like to take this opportunity here to thank them.
were all happy to see one another again and Uma was particularly pleased with my new hair style – long, untied, and scattered on the shoulders. “You wear your hair like a true Siraya son,” Uma commented with a big smile on her face. But we all knew that we ought to start preparing for the summer camp, which was only but two months away; everyone carried a sense of urgency and anxiety in their tone of voice while talking. So Uma pulled out a note book that was filled with schedules of meetings (with government officials, other Siraya leaders, and TPSCA staff) and began explaining to me the schedule of the summer camp and my duties.

This year the association planned to host about 150 participants. They may not all be of Siraya descent. Uma explained: “We want to welcome interested individuals from the general public so that they can learn about our culture and maybe in the future speak for us. Also we do not want to set any restriction on age: we will teach our language and culture to all who are willing to learn. But still, based on last year’s experience, we will divide this year’s participants into two groups, the student group and the adult group, each having its own syllabus.

3 While all participants will attend the language and music classes, the student group will participate in more hands-on activities such as arts and crafts and the adult group will attend more academic seminars and lectures. And Chun, you and Edgar will be the leaders of our TPSCA linguistic team. You two need to collaborate in designing and teaching language lessons, training the volunteers to be assistants for group exercises, and in addition you two will co-lecture a class for the adult group that addresses the issue of 17th Century language contact between Siraya and Dutch.” That night I stayed at Uma and Edgar’s home. I had a long discussion with Edgar on Siraya linguistics until early next morning. Eventually both of us turned physically exhausted.

3 In 2007’s Musuhapa summer camp, all participants attend the same classes and activities regardless of their age. Among the classes some were academic lectures given by invited scholars from research institutions. And on the feedback forms some younger participants reflected that these lectures were too difficult for them to appreciate.
but we were pleased that we could catch up with each other and learn from each other’s findings regarding the Siraya language. After having stayed at Uma and Edgar’s for one night, I took a two-hour bus back to Taichung. In the next few days, I communicated with Uma and Edgar via phone and email, and whenever they needed to see me in person, I would take another two-hour bus ride back to Tainan.

This mode of working lasted for about two weeks, not long before we all realized that it was not ideal. It was not ideal not only for economic reasons but also because of the intricate nature of language: there was much adjustment we needed to make constantly in our language materials. So we all agreed that it would be better if we could work together while in physical vicinity. In addition, in an official TPSCA meeting Uma had officially assigned me the position of Special Assistant. Hence, I also had the obligation to accompany her to attend numerous political meetings. Since most of these meetings took place in Tainan, it would be easier if I could stay there. Fortunately, in the first week of June we finally found an apartment studio in Tainan that was just 20 minutes away on a scooter motorbike from the headquarter of TPSCA. So I moved in immediately stayed there until the end of July.

Besides the issue of commuting, there had been a more serious problem that affected the quality of our language work: Edgar did not have a solid computer that was capable of dealing with the linguistic data. While I did have an up-to-date computer with acceptable speed of data processing that allowed me to carry on my linguistic research, the only two computers the association possessed were old models donated by individuals sympathetic to the Siraya movement. As our language data grew bigger, the association’s computers would slow down dramatically and sometimes refuse to work. So to solve the problem Edgar borrowed a laptop computer from his music student (Edgar teaches music as a regular job). This computer was a
tremendous help in May such that it allowed me and Edgar to work on the language materials separately after each of our meetings; it saved us a lot of time and energy.

Finally, by early June we had raised enough money from within TPSCA to purchase a MacBook laptop. And we were also able to acquire several needed language and music processing software programs. With the MacBook and programs at hand, we had built a legitimate computer-based work center in TPSCA. The work center allowed us to work on our summer camp materials (linguistic as well as non-linguistic) efficiently and it can also be used for other Siraya linguistic research and music composition projects in the future.

(2) 2008 Musuhapa Siraya language and culture summer camp. Throughout the month of June, while still working with Edgar on the language materials for the Musuhapa summer camp, I accompanied Uma and Agoan to several meetings. Some of the meetings were within the Siraya groups: we represented Sinhua’s Tavocan Village to meet with the Siraya activists from other communities such as Gabaswa, Soulang (that is, Jiali, my actual hometown), Liuxi, etc. In these meetings we discussed various Siraya cultural projects that included the Musuhapa summer camp and other events such as maintaining the traditional Alid religion. But the major concern in everyone’s mind was to regain pride towards the Siraya identity within the Siraya communities, to make the Siraya voice heard more publicly, and eventually to attain official recognition of the Siraya people by the central government. Many were especially worried that the newly elected KMT government might not be willing to lend as much support on issues concerning indigenous rights as the recently resigned DPP government, whose ideology of Taiwanese nationalism was thought to be more sympathetic to localism in general.

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4 We had to raise money on our own because the funds to which I had applied would not arrive until I finished the trip and wrote a report.
The other meetings we attended involved negotiating with governmental officials to request for funding for the summer camp. In this case we were facing not the central government but the Tainan County Government, which was (and still is) led by DPP. Tainan County is the home of Siraya people, and Magistrate Su Huan-chih has been quite supportive of the Siraya movement. As a matter of fact, since 2006 Tainan County had acknowledged the official status of the Siraya people. However, a supportive/sympathetic magistrate does not guarantee generosity with regard to money. At first the Tainan County Government promised a 20,000 NTD (about 6,000 USD) fund to the summer camp, but in the end the fund was reduced to 10,000 NTD (about 3,000 USD); the government even requested to be entitled as the host of the summer camp and TPSCA, the true organizer of all things, could only be the undertaker. This 10,000 NTD would later be spent on accommodating the summer campers, especially for food and lodging\(^5\).

By the end of June, one week before the Musuhapa summer camp, the preparatory work was about ready: TPSCA had completed designing and editing the language and music materials, the registration for the participants had been ended, the guest lecturers had submitted their notes to be included to the summer camp textbook/manual, and the textbook had been sent to print. On July 3, one day before the summer camp officially started, the TPSCA staff moved in to the summer camp base at Hothaupi Reservoir, with all needed equipments and tools including computers, projectors, textbooks, musical instruments, and bamboos and rocks for arts and

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5 The TPSCA had designed the recruiting flyer for the summer camp during the period when the amount of 20,000 NTD was promised, and hence it decided to announce free-for-all participation. Later, when the Tainan County Government notified the association of the reduction of fund, it was already too late for the association to change the flyer and ask the participants for money. Hence, in the end, the summer camp was still free for all, but TPSCA had to raise money through donations during the event to compensate its expenses.
crafts. That night Edgar and I convened all the language assistants for our last Siraya language training section. We checked their pronunciation and made sure that everyone understood the content of the lessons. Then all of us decorated the activity center with arts before we went to bed until past midnight.

Around 8am on July 4, the summer campers had started to arrive. I sat in front of the welcome center with a list of Siraya words that denote natural substances (animals, plants, and rocks) and human properties (traits such as “tender,” “intelligent,” “beautiful,” etc.) to assist the campers to pick a Siraya name that would accompany them at least in the next three days; as soon as a person picked a name, I would then teach them how it is pronounced. In the next hour the participants would talk to each other and introduce themselves by their newly-acquired Siraya names, and through such socializing experience they had started learning a few Siraya words even before the first language lesson started.

From 10am to 11am we taught the summer campers a Southern Min song composed by TPSCA, the content of which is about Siraya awakening. Then before and after lunch there were a couple of talks serving as an introduction to Siraya culture and history. These talks were of a non-academic nature and were offered to both the student and adult groups. Later in the afternoon I gave a more serious lecture with Edgar titled <Siraya language, culture, and Gravius> that addressed the issue of language contact. In the lecture Edgar and I led the adult summer campers to imagine the cultural shock that 17th Century Siraya folks and Dutch missionaries might have experienced when they encountered each other, and we also provided as

6 Daniel Gravius was assigned by the Dutch East India Company to come to Taiwan for missionary purposes and encountered the Siraya people in the early 17th Century. He learned the native language and was the first person to design a Siraya writing system based on Roman letters; he translated the biblical text of St. Matthew from Dutch to Siraya.
examples linguistic borrowing and word coinage that came out of the encounter. We also raised some open-ended questions in the hope to inspire our audience to think what kind of cultural export and/or import might have emerged from such a contact situation and what kind of influence they might have on the native people. Through and after the lecture, Edgar and I received much positive feedback from the participants. In their questions and comments, it was evident to me that they had started to empathize with the Siraya perspective. After dinner, Edgar had to leave the camp for some personal business, and hence I alone taught the first Siraya language lesson to all summer campers. Lesson 1 was <Greetings and making friends>. I introduced some basic phrases for self-introduction and greetings, and then the students were given about 40 minutes of time to practice these phrases with one another in group drills.

The second day of the summer camp was long: it began at 7am and ended at around 10pm. At 9am Edgar and I co-taught the second Siraya language lesson <What do you do and where do you go?>. In the <Where do you go?> part, we incorporated phrases related to the native environment such as “mountain” and “tree.” Then we taught a Siraya song: “Ka mu-nonang ko ki da-rang tu vu-kin; ni ki-taan ta sasat ki ayam,” which could be roughly translated as “I walked on a trail in the mountain and saw a bird.” The language lesson and the song anticipated the next lecture by Uma’s brother Ban Chun-beng, who was knowledgeable of and talked about the indigenous bird species and their inhabitant environment. After lunch, we had our third language lesson <What is this? What is that?> and we introduced more terms related to animals, flowers, and other things in nature. Then at 3:30pm, Uma’s father Ban Cheng-hiong told several stories of hunting that were either told to him by his parents or out of his own experience. He also brought several traditional Siraya equipments for hunting and fishing purposes, and he demonstrated how they are used. Both Ban Chun-bing and Ban Cheng-hiong’s talks were given in Southern Min.
After Ban Cheng-hiong’s story-telling, we divided the summer campers into several smaller groups (of 15 to 20 individuals). We took these groups out of Hothaupi Reservoir and embarked on several small expeditions, treading the local Tavocan trails that had traditionally been Siraya land for centuries. Some parts of the trails are now the property of ROC, and so TPSCA had to ask permission for entry. Each group was guided by a couple of Tavocan natives who were familiar with the environment, hence to avoid danger and also to offer the participants insights to indigenous wisdom. The expeditions took about two hours, and by 6pm we all reached Green Valley where TPSCA had prepared a Siraya party. We danced and sang together, and then we had traditional Siraya dishes for dinner that included squirrels and snails. Tainan Magistrate Su came to join us for the dinner and gave a short speech. After dinner, Uma engaged me and a local teenage athlete, Tong Bai-sheng, for a Siraya foot-race. Both of us enjoyed the race, and the crowd had fun as they were cheering for both of us and laughing. Our goal was not to compete against each other; rather, we simply wanted to show the summer campers how the Siraya people would have fun. More importantly, through such an activity we were also telling a story: the Siraya people have always been known to other Formosan indigenes as “the runners,” or “the deer-chasers,” because of our ability to run fast; but this reputation had led a King of Qing Dynasty in the 19th Century to send a delegate to Taiwan to fetch a Siraya man to Beijing so that he could entertain himself with a “savage exhibition” involving the Siraya man racing against the fastest horse in China. After the party at Green Valley we all took a bus back to Hothaupi Reservoir. Before we called it a day Uma sat down with all the participants and talked about the Siraya women, their life stories, and the Siraya matri-focal culture (in Southern Min and Mandarin). This gentle talk had a fitting title: <Siraya, our grandmothers>. Through the
story-telling and experience-sharing, Uma reminded all of us that the true strength of Siraya resides in women.

The last day of the summer camp Edgar and I taught one last language lesson, which concerns numbers. In the lesson we not only taught the participants how to count in Siraya but also how to apply Siraya counting to modern context, such as talking about human age. As documented in historical archives, the Siraya ancestors in the earlier times had not actually counted age. But besides modernizing the Siraya language, the cultural goal of this lesson was to bring up an important Siraya concept: respect to seniority. But the tricky part is that seniority is a postulate in Mandarin and most Han cultures as well. However, Han seniority and Siraya seniority do not mean the same. As I have explained earlier in Chapter 4, Mandarin seniority encodes ranking and absolute obedience. But Siraya seniority does not; it is accompanied by other social orders such as the belief that everyone should be equal in rights and hence there should be no human hierarchy at all. It is hard to explain such differences clearly in a short language lesson in a summer camp. Thus, to avoid resorting to the Han way, we the TPSCA staff demonstrated the differences by way of physical practice: when a Han person meets a senior, she would bow; but when a Siraya person meets a senior, she would turn to her back so as to let the senior pass undisturbed.

Then, after a guest lecture by Duan Hong-kun from the Gabasua Village of Siraya, who shared with the adult participants traditional Gabasua stories, and a couple of arts sections for the student participants, the 2008 Musuhapa Siraya summer camp came close to an end. In the afternoon we had a two-hour farewell section. The participants took the stage as groups and performed several skits they had come up with in the past three days; each of the skits told a story related to one or a few Siraya experiences such as encountering the Dutch people, the
marriage proposal, the singing and dancing, and/or the hunting scene. Then, thanks to the assistance of TPSCA volunteer Shi Chao-kai, who is currently a linguistic student at Kaohsiung Normal University, two adult participants and two student participants were able to give a few of short speeches in Siraya. Last but not least, several summer campers volunteered to speak to all, sharing with everyone what they had experienced and/or felt during the event. Some student participants wrote poems (in Southern Min and/or Mandarin Chinese, with a few Siraya phrases) to express their loving feelings towards Siraya. As they were reading the poems, I saw tears in Uma’s eyes. According to my observation, for many Siraya activists it is these touching moments that have encouraged them to keep going. In fact, these moments have kept me going, too. After saying goodbye to all the summer campers, Uma asked me, “A-Chun, are we [TPSCA] going to do this again next year? What have I got myself into?” Her tone of voice sounded of exhaustion. But I knew that she would, for the simple fact that she had asked me the same question several times before.

(3) The Siraya dictionary project and a fieldtrip to eastern Taiwan. The TPSCA has started the project of compiling a trilingual Siraya-Chinese-English dictionary since 2002. I joined the project in 2007 as a linguistic consultant and co-editor to help with language data analysis and English translation. The major source of our language data is the 17th Century Siraya documents left by the Dutch missionaries written in Roman letters. In early 2008, the main body of the dictionary was completed; we had in the dictionary a collection of over 4,000 Siraya words, each provided with a Chinese definition, an English definition, and an example sentence. By May 2008 what was still lacking was a description of the grammar (phonology, morphology, and syntax) and an explanatory note on how to use the dictionary. It was TPSCA’s hope that with the
addition of the grammar and explanatory sections the dictionary would be helpful for those who wish to learn the language and put it in actual use after its publication.

In the end of 2007, the Council of Indigenous Peoples under the DPP government offered a promising fund to indigenous language projects. The dictionary team of TPSCA hence set as our goal the publication of the dictionary by August 2008. Therefore, besides the establishment of a computer-based research center and assisting in the summer camp, another major task for me during this summer trip was to work intensively with Edgar to polish and finish up the dictionary. Unfortunately, with the change of power from DPP to KMT, much of Taiwan’s indigenous policy has been affected. By mid July, TPSCA had realized that the aforementioned fund promise was canceled, and as a result we were unable to publish the dictionary by the previously set deadline. Still, TPSCA had not quit on the dictionary project. In what follows, I will detail my involvement in the dictionary-related tasks during my summer stay.

In May and June, while preparing the summer camp materials, Edgar and I also had numerous informal meetings discussing the dictionary-related issues. For the most part, we focused on revising the writing system that we had earlier developed. We proof-read the dictionary drafts to check the spelling for each word and phrase; and by the end of June we were able to make the writing system more consistent with the Siraya phonology and morphology, while also being accessible to our Southern Min speaking Siraya readers who are familiar with the Roman writing system known as *Peh-oe-ji* (白話字). In editing and revising the drafts, we were also able to identify our previously made mistakes in grammar and definition. We redressed

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7 The complete dictionary was eventually published in November, 2008, by TPSCA with funding from the Tainan County Government.
these mistakes and used the knowledge acquired through such editing-and-revising experience to draft the grammar section.

In July, TPSCA realized that it was impossible to publish the dictionary before the summer ended due to lack of funding. Uma decided that instead of mourning over the unsuccessful publication plan, we could seize the opportunity of additional time to polish the dictionary and make it more comprehensive. Consequently, the language team of TPSCA started researching into the Siraya language data we had previously been unable to incorporate into the dictionary that included some documents and collections of Siraya words, phrases, and/or texts written in Chinese characters, and Siraya word lists spelled out in Roman letters in research reports by researchers who are not linguists. We had previously left out these sources for the following reasons. First, the Chinese writing system has been fixed for thousands of years and it is not phonologically driven. That is, Chinese language change is not encoded in the characters. While one may automatically assign Mandarin pronunciation to a Chinese text written today, they would not know how a Chinese text written hundreds or thousands of years ago had actually been pronounced. Hence, for example, when we have at hand a list of Siraya words in Chinese characters written a hundred years ago, there is no way we could be sure how these characters were actually pronounced. Also, since the Chinese writing system is not as phonologically flexible as the Roman system, even if we have a Siraya word list in Chinese characters written rather recently, we still cannot take the Mandarin pronunciation as the Siraya pronunciation. Chinese writing system only prescribes pronunciation to the standard Chinese language at its time. For example, the Siraya word for “god,” as we find in 17th century Roman texts, is alid, but in Chinese characters, the word would look like 阿立 and be pronounced as a1-lij in Mandarin, with tones, fitting the modern Mandarin phonology that recognizes only two consonants, /n/and
/ng/, at the end of a syllable. In other words, had we taken the Chinese-written data as our main source of Siraya language revitalization, many native syllable-ending consonants would have been lost. Second, we had disregarded other small word lists collected by modern non-linguist researchers albeit they are spelled out in Roman letters simply for the reason of consistency in data. These researchers are often historians and/or folk ethnographers. They may include in their publications (often in an appendix) a small list of Siraya words and/or phrases they heard during their fieldtrips. But these researchers’ goal is not language documentation, and so they put the words down in Roman letters according to their own intuition, which is often limited by the native language(s) they themselves speak. As the language team of TPSCA has found, spellings in such word lists are usually inconsistent, across authors and sometimes within one author’s own writing.

Still, now that we in TPSCA were more confident in our knowledge of the Siraya language because of intensive research, we figured that these additional language data might be of some help. Therefore, we investigated these documents, deciphered the Chinese characters as much as we could, resolved the inconsistency in the Roman spellings, and then added to our dictionary a Supplementary Vocabulary section as an appendix. We reasoned that some of our potential readers might find such supplementary material interesting, or useful, for their own purposes. In addition, since we were already on the direction of expanding the dictionary, Uma thought it might be a good idea if we could conduct a little ethno-linguistic fieldwork of our own. Edgar, I, and the rest of TPSCA language team agreed, for we know that the Siraya language is not “completely extinct” as some linguists have declared: many of our grandparents and/or parents would still incorporate a Siraya word or two in their speeches. Still, it would be ideal if we could
find someone who knows a relatively large vocabulary, a *rememberer*. And we found him, 70-year-old Mr. Pan Wan-jin, in Dongli Village, Hualian County (花蓮東里村).

Hualian County is located on the central east coast of Taiwan, far away from the Siraya homeland on the southwest (including today’s Tainan, Kaohsiung, and Pingtung counties). A group of Siraya people, however, had moved to the east in early 19th Century. As Mr. Pan later told us, his great-grand parents were among this migrating group and the decision to move had been made for the reason that their native farming lands were taken away by the Han immigrants and the folks were oppressed by the Qing Dynasty officials. Eventually, they settled in what is now known as the Dongli Village. Note that due to the geographical division, or protection, by the high mountains stretching from northern to southern Taiwan in the central axis of the island, the indigenous peoples who resided in the east experienced contact with outsiders later than other indigenous groups. For this reason, the eastern indigenes have been able to maintain the traditional Austronesian culture relatively better than others. In the Siraya case, the Dongli people today still observe the traditional Alid religion and hold a stronger sense of Siraya identity than some other native communities on the west coast. Still, the dominance of Han cultures and languages prevails in every part of Taiwan. I hence do not want to mislead my readers to think that the Siraya language is still widely spoken in the Dongli Village. Before having met Pan, we in TPSCA had already known that he was not a fluent speaker of Siraya; it is just that, according to the scarce media reports on Dongli Village, Pan seems to be able to recall more native Siraya words and oral histories than most other Siraya invididuals could.

The Musuhapa summer camp ended on July 6. Then, after having talked to Senior Uncle Wan-jin (Mr. Pan encourages us to call him as such) on the phone and received his warm welcome of our visit, Uma, Edgar, TPSCA volunteer Puecin Li, and I, started to plan our
eastbound fieldtrip. The planning alone was not an easy task. First, July is the typhoon season in Taiwan and the weather broadcast had just predicted three consecutive typhoon visits on all the rest of the weekends in July. I had already booked my flight ticket back to the US on August 5. And Uma could not leave on most weekdays due to her busy schedule of meetings. Finally, we decided on the last weekend of July and the following Monday and Tuesday for our field trip. Besides Dongli Village, we would also visit several communities of two other indigenous peoples, Amis and Paiwan, whom anthropologists and historical linguists have identified as closely related to Siraya in terms of language and culture.

The morning of July 27 the four of us hopped on a train in Tainan despite the typhoon warning, and five hours later we arrived at the Taimali Station in Taitung County (south of Hualian). We visited the Paiwan tribe of Lalauran and were welcomed by the local activists Sakinu brothers, who are devoted to the preservation of Paiwan culture. We had long talk with both of them and learned a lot from their experiences such as getting funding from the government, negotiating with the governmental officials, and organizing cultural events. We were also invited to participate in their ongoing harvest festival. That night we stayed in Lalauran. Also that night, the typhoon had arrived; it was hovering above the whole island, but we slept in peace feeling content at heart. The next day we were introduced to Vuvu, the chief of Lalauran, and her family and friends, all of whom we called vuvu (“grandparents- ancestors” in Paiwan language; mumu in Siraya). The vuvus treated us well: a feast was on the table, and betel nuts and traditional millet rice wine were offered. The vuvus sang us several Paiwan songs, and in return I sang a Siraya song for them. In the songs we were able to recognize some linguistic similarities between the two languages, and such recognition bound us even more. That evening when Uma, Edgar, Puecin, and I had to move on in our trip and the chief Vuvu gave each of us a
big hug, we realized that the friendship between the Lalauran Paiwan people and the Siraya people of TPSCA had been established.

We spend the night of July 28 in Taitung City. The next morning we rented a car and drove 3 hours to Hulian. A little past noon we arrived at Senior Uncle Wan-jin’s house. Senior Uncle Wan-jin is tall and soft-spoken. When he first met us, he appeared to be happy but was very shy. He asked, “so what would you like to hear? I am old and with little education. I am afraid that I am of no help for you.” But as soon as we showed him that we were genuinely interested in everything about his life, he started giving us fascinating stories one after another. It was amazing to me how much Senior Uncle Wan-jin could recall: the events, the names, and even the years, he all recounted with great details. As Senior Uncle Wan-jin said, those were stories told by his parents and grandparents and hence he would never forget: The Dongli group of Siraya left its original homeland in Liouguei, Kaohsiung County, in 1829, due to the oppression by Han and the Machurian Qing. The Dongli ancestors first moved to today’s Taitung City and stayed there for 7 years, but in Taitung they were not welcome by the native Puyuma people, many conflicts ensued, and hence they decided to move again. In 1836 they reached the border between Taitung and Hualian but soon they realized that they were caught in the conflicts between the Paiwan people, the Amis people, and the officials of Qing. The Siraya people were first cooed by the Qing to fight the native Amis, but soon they realized that the Qing officials were not trustworthy. In 1944 they finally reached a peace pact with the Amis in Hualian and settled down in Dongli Village.

Beyond the story-telling, Senior Uncle Wan-jin also provided us many native Siraya words that he could recall from his childhood memories. In the end of our four-hour long conversation with him, we had recorded a list of 55 Siraya words, including names of plants and animals,
fishing terms, farming terms, cooking terms, and religious terms, etc. This list of words is now included in our dictionary. Moreover, Senior Uncle Wan-jin gave a box of cassette tapes of Siraya religious songs to us. The types are now safely stored in TPSCA.

For the rest of our trip, we visited an Amis community in Hualian called Tabalang. There we did not have a contact person, and hence we just walked around and talked to random people who were preparing for the Amis harvest festival that was to take place in three days. They were building a high bamboo structure that looks like a Siraya watch tower called *kuva*. We asked them what the structure was for and its Amis name. They told us that it is also called *kuva* and it would serve as a temporary watch tower during the festival. We were encouraged by this small observation; it to some extent supports the historical linguistic finding that Amis and Siraya are related. The Tabalang people we talked to actually invited us to stay for the festival. Unfortunately we did not have room for change in our schedule. We left for home on July 31.

(4) *The end of summer.* I left Taiwan on August 5, 2008, and was back to Florida the same day, brining with me full appreciation of my Siraya friends in TPSCA, their devotion to the continuation of our native culture and language, and their perseverance through hard times. I have not been back to Taiwan since, but I have always kept in touch with TPSCA and the Siraya movement. With the efforts of Uma, Edgar, Agaon, Puecin, Chao-kai, and others, Siraya awakening and reclamation have carried on. They would send me newly drafted language lessons and ask for my opinion, and they would also send me notices of new events such as study group gatherings, political protests, and festival invitations. There have been good news and really bad news. On the positive side, the Siraya people in Tainan now can officially register for an “indigenous” status *in the county* as individuals even though we are still not recognized by the central government, and Tainan County government has also agreed to let the TPSCA-trained
teachers teach some Mother Language classes in an elementary school in the Liuxi Village. However, in August 2009, Typhoon Morakot brought flood to TPSCA headquarter and damaged many materials and equipments; it also caused a mud slide that completely wiped out the Siraya village of Xiaolin in Kaohsiung County and took away the lives of hundreds of people. All I can say is: the survivors persevere. In summer 2009, after the typhoon stroke, TPSCA has not only hosted a third Musuhapa summer camp for the general public but also another camp designed specifically for training future language teachers. I cannot predict what will happen in the future, but I know that my people still have hope and with hope we can go a long way. I am looking forward to joining them again in person soon.

Background and Traditions

As I have reiterated several times, the modern Siraya people, including myself, do not consider the Siraya language and culture as “extinct;” we believe that it is just “sleeping.” Leonard (2008: 31) explains the significance of such a change of metaphor: “different metaphors have different social effects and also how they differ in their levels of accessibility to the wide range of audiences that one might need to speak to;” the problem with the biological metaphors of extinction and death is that “such ‘final’ terms… [become] the only known option” and they block the possibility for people to consider other choices. He also provides an operational definition of “sleeping languages” as “those that are not currently known but that are documented, claimed as part of one’s heritage, and thus may be used again” (ibid: 23). Siraya indeed fulfills all the criteria in this definition. There is at least one complete text, and hence documentation, of the Siraya language spelled out in Roman letters, *The Gospel of St. Matthew in Formosan*, by the 17th century Dutch missionary Daniel Gravius (Campbell, 1996 [1888]). This text has further generated several academic and non-academic publications concerning the
language that allow TPSCA and other native organizations, who claim Siraya as their heritage, to relearn it for future use. In addition, there are non-linguistic documentations as well. These are documents and/or reports written between 1623 and 1662, in Dutch, by the Christican missionaries and employees of the East India Company that describe the Siraya people and their lives at the time; some also include a few native words. They have been translated into English and published as three huge volumes of *The Formosan Encounter* by Shung Ye Museum of Formosan Aborigines (Blussé et al., 1999; Blussé & Everts, 2000; Blussé & Everts, 2006). Hence, Siraya, as Leonard (2009) points out for the sleeping languages and cultures, is “not irretrievably lost.”

In the rest of this section, I (re)introduce the Siraya language and culture. I first give a concise description of the linguistic structure of Siraya. I then review and summarize the 17th century Siraya traditions as documented in *The Formosan Encounter*. Finally, I provide my personal observation of the Siraya traditions that have emerged after the 17th century contact with the Dutch and continued until today.

**Linguistic Background**

As mentioned earlier, there are not many academic publications about Siraya linguistics. As for October, 2009, one would find exactly ten articles searching “Siraya” in the database Linguistics and Language Behavior Abstracts, only four of which appear in peer-reviewed journals. While the quantity is low, I do not intend to imply that the quality of these publications is poor. In fact, most of them are products of rigid research method and careful examination. Most of them use the same material/data TPSCA uses to compose a dictionary and numerous teaching materials, that is, Gravius’s version of Gospel of St. Matthew (Campbell, 1996 [1888]). And all of them refer to Siraya as an extinct language that is no longer spoken, ignoring the fact
that, with TPSCA’s decade-long effort, some, albeit little, Siraya language is spoken today in Tainan, Taiwan. Such ignorance, or some may say academic arrogance, carries certain negative political effects. For example, some of the academic authors are invited by Taiwan’s government to serve in the expert panels that evaluate Siraya people’s application, or petition, to official status. If they denounce the effort of TPSCA and claim that the Siraya language is irretrievable (and some have done exactly so), then the government is unlikely to acknowledge the people’s legal status. But to their own defense, they would say that linguistics, or academia in general, has nothing to do with politics, or the welfare of a people and their culture for that matter.

My purpose here in this subsection, however, is not to discuss whether any type of linguistics or any academic discipline can be truly apolitical. I simply want to point out that, because the people in TPSCA (myself included) have not done a complete and comprehensive research into our own language, my description of the Siraya grammar below will focus on the structural outlook and may appear somewhat void of cultural implications, as it references the abovementioned publications. Also, I will dwell more on morphology (structure of words and phrases) and syntax (structure of sentences) than phonology (structure of sounds) because the original data all come from centuries-old written texts and hence no one really knows how the language used to sound. In addition, since not all published versions of Siraya grammar agree

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8 I must point out that, although he still refers to the Siraya language as “extinct,” Professor Karl Alexander Adelaar of the University of Melbourne has in fact acknowledged the effort of TPSCA in Adelaar (2005). Moreover, Edgar Macapili, who has conversed with Professor Adelaar personally, told me that he is very sincere and supportive of Siraya continuation. Hence, any implication I make on “the academia” or “the experts,” should it be perceived as negative, does not involve Adelaar.

9 This is despite the fact that with the comparative method in historical or typological linguistics, that is, through systematically comparing the sound systems of contemporary Austronesian languages, some historical sounds can be suggested.
with one another, I will adhere to the one written by TPSCA’s volunteer Chaokai Shi (2008) when dispute occurs, for this is the version upon which the current effort of Siraya awakening is based\textsuperscript{10}. In other words, Shi’s is the version that affects the most native people. Last but not least, because these people, who are not academically trained, are my intended audience, my writing below will be brief and concise and I will avoid linguistic jargon. I hope this grammar presented here to be practical such that it can implement actual language-learning. Those readers who are interested in detailed linguistic analyses should refer to Adelaar (1997) and Shi (2008).

**Suggested sound system**

The problem with reconstructing the Siraya sound system as it was used by the people in the 17\textsuperscript{th} century is two-fold. First, the primary source, Gravius’s version of St. Matthew, is only written (that is, there is no recording) and it was all based upon Gravius’s personal intuition. Hence, for example, when seeing a letter “r,” the modern linguists would not know for sure how it was actually pronounced: Was it pronounced in Old Dutch? Was it a flap like in Modern Southern Min, a retroflex like in modern Mandarin, an approximate like in modern English, or a trill in modern Spanish? Could it be something else? Also, for example, Gravius used another letter “c.” Was it a palatal affricate in Old Dutch as Adelaar (1997) suggests? Or could it be pronounced more like the velar plosive [k], as suggested by Edgar Macapili? Second, Gravius’s spelling was not always consistent. For example, he used “au” and “aw” and also “ei” and “ey” in many words/phrases that seem to convey the same meanings. Were they always

\textsuperscript{10}I did mention in the last section that I had several long discussions with Edgar Macapili on Siraya grammar and the Siraya dictionary project in the summer of 2008. However, in the end it was Shi Chaokai who wrote up “An Overview of Siraya Grammar” published along with the dictionary (Macapili, 2008) because Edgar and I both had other obligations. Chaokai is a devoted volunteer for TPSCA and he receives rigorous linguistic training at the National Kaohsiung Normal University in Taiwan. Here I would like to express my appreciation to Chaokai’s help and his excellent work.
interchangeable and hence just free variations in pronunciation and/or spelling, or could they imply some structural constraints? Because of the limited amount of data, the room for modern researchers to systematically compare the appearances of these inconsistent spellings is limited. Hence, there is not yet a consensus.

TPSCA, however, must find, or define, a consistent sound system of Siraya now so that it could start teaching the language to the natives before no one wants to learn. Two rules of thumb for resolving the abovementioned problems have been in effect. First, when the pronunciation of a letter, or a spelling, is unclear, reference the sister languages, that is, the modern Austronesian languages that are still spoken. Second, when a modern Austronesian sound appears to be too difficult for the modern-day Siraya learners, accept the Southern Min equivalents because Southern Min is the first language for most Siraya people today. According to these rules, TPSCA has hence decided that the letter “r” should ideally be pronounced as a trill, for this is how it is pronounced in many modern Austronesian languages, especially those in the Philippines. But since the Filipino languages may have actually acquired the trill from Spanish and also trill poses a big problem for many Siraya learners, the letter “r” can also be pronounced in the Southern Min way as a flap. The palatal affricate [c], although it is used in Southern Min, is universally replaced by the velar plosive [k] because [c] is uncommon in Austronesian languages. As far as the vowel-vowel combination is concerned, TPSCA has chosen to render them all diphthongs, that is, a vowel-and-approximate-consonant combination, again, for the convenience for the Southern-Min-influenced learners. Please see Table 5-1 for the Siraya consonants and Table 5-2 for the vowels, both suggested by TPSCA. Note that all the representations there are subject to change, either due to future research findings or natural evolution of actual use.
Word and sentence structures

(1) Word order. The basic word order in Siraya is Verb Object Subject (VOS). What is “I love you” in English would be KA VAGANGO, IMHU-AN, TA YAW (“love you I”). However, if the subject is a pronoun, it can also take another form and attach to the end of the verb. For example, the 1st Person Pronoun can appear as –KO and gives the sentence KA VAGANGO, KO, IMHU-AN, also meaning “I love you.” In addition, if the subject refers to the speaker, it can be dropped: KA VAGANGO, IMHU-AN would still mean the same. In a sentence where there is no verb phrase, the adjectival phrase precedes the subject. For example, “Uma is beautiful” would be MAMUTIRAG adj TA TI UMA. Other typological examples that support Siraya’s status of a VO language include: Noun goes before the Adjective that modifies it, Noun before Possessive, Noun before Relative Clause, and Preposition.

(2) Verbal affixes. Adelaar (1997) identifies two sets of verbal affixes in Siraya. One is syntactic, or functional, and the other is semantic. The affixes in the first set mark tense, aspect, and thematic role. For example, the prefix NI- indicates past tense, the suffix –ATO indicates perfect aspect (that is, some action has been done or completed), and the infix –M– indicates that the verb phrase is oriented towards the actor. Those in the second set, however, bear substantial meanings, and they are all prefixes. For example, MU- indicates “moving towards”; when attached to the root RUBO, which means “inside,” it results in MU-RBO, which means “go inside.” But there is another prefix, SA-, which specifically means “moving towards a narrow place.” Thus, for instance, to speak of “to enter into the mouth (MUTUS),” one must use SA- instead of MU-, as in SA-RA-RBO KI MUTUS. Still, my personal favorite are MAKI- and PAA-TUKUL. MAKI- is a prefix that indicates “collective action” or “collaboration.” In the fall of 2007, when I was just back to Florida after becoming acquainted with Edgar and Uma during my
first field trip in Taiwan, Edgar would send me a lot of emails, in English, and he would end the letters with a Siraya sentence using MAKI-. Those Siraya sentences spoke to me in terms of intimacy more than the English sentences “Let’s study Siraya together” or “Let’s work together for our people” could ever do. PAA-TUKUL, on the other hand, is a verb phrase that may be roughly translated into English as “to do wrong.” But its original sense is more specific: PAA-conveys “giving” and TUKUL “inequality,” and so PAA-TUKUL actually means “to give inequality.” PAA-TUKUL, a term that has slept for a century, is now awakened just in time to empower its people by helping them describe the social plight they must endure: the government of ROC-Taiwan has not treated its peoples equally; it has indeed done something seriously wrong.

(3) Verbs and nouns. Most Siraya roots, that is, the basic lexical elements, show a verbal tendency. They need to be attached to the functional verbal affixes to perform grammatical functions, and they are often attached to the semantic verbal prefixes to express full meanings. In other words, verb, while not taken for granted, should be considered as the default category in Siraya lexicon. With the exception of a few nominal roots, these verbal stems further yield nouns, which are defined by Adelaar (1997: 382) as those words that may be introduced by prepositions. These nouns are derived from the verbs via affixation, either with the circumfix KA- -AN, or the suffix –AN.

(4) Relational markers. There are three free morphemes, or independent lexical elements, that mark grammatical relations in Siraya. TA marks the topic of a sentence; TU marks locations

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11 This definition, however, is only “tentative,” as Adelaar (1997: 382) suggests, because the definition of Siraya preposition itself is unclear. The elements that are currently categorized as prepositions by Adelaar (1997) and case by Shi (2008), TU and KI, basically function to introduce a (syntactic and semantic) relation, such as location.
and/or directions, including metaphorical places in time; and $KI$ is the default marker for everything else.

(5) Pronoun system. Siraya has the following pronouns: 1$^{st}$ Person Singular, 1$^{st}$ Person Plural that is Inclusive (including the addressee), 1$^{st}$ Person Plural Exclusive (excluding the addressee), 2$^{nd}$ Person Singular, 2$^{nd}$ Person Plural that can also function as the honorific form of 2$^{nd}$ Person Singular, 3$^{rd}$ Person Singular, and 3$^{rd}$ Person Plural. All these pronouns have a free form, that is, they can appear independently in a sentence without attaching to another word, and a bound form. In addition, Shi (2008) observes three cases for each form: nominal, genitive/possessive, and oblique/default. The pronouns do not distinguish biological sexes or grammatical genders; they do not seem to demarcate human and non-human features either, although Shi (2008: 1144) suggests that the distinction of humaneness can be made by some other case markers. For a complete list of the Siraya pronouns, see Table 5-3.

(6) Numbers. Siraya numbers observe a decimal system. The numbers higher than ten that were already documented in the 17$^{th}$ century text include 12, 14, 30, 60, 70, 99, 100, 4,000, 5,000, and 10,000 (Adelaar, 1997: 382). When counting, the morphology of reduplication takes effect. If the number is bigger than one, the first syllable of the number and the first or second syllable of the counted object must be repeated. For example, “one child” is $SAAT KI ALAK$, “two children” is $RURUHA KI ALALAK$, and “three children” is $TUTURU KI ALALAK$. TPSCA taught this system of counting in its 2007 summer camp, but in 2008 Uma simplified it to only reduplicate the objects but not the numbers because she thought that reduplication is “too long and too complicated” for the learners, who are used to the monosyllabic number in Southern Min and Mandarin. Edgar and I did not fully agree with her, but we decided to trust her intuition.
Ordinal numbers are mostly derived from cardinal numbers with the prefix KA-, except for the number “one;” cardinal one is SAAT, and ordinal one is NAWNAMU.

**Siraya Traditions as of 17th Century**

The Dutch of East India Company landed on the island of Formosa (Taiwan) in September, 1623, by way of Malaysia. They entered the southwest plain and established Fort Zeelandia in what is today’s Tainan, which served not only as an administration center for them to deal with the locals but also as a military stronghold against the Spaniards, who occupied the Philippines at the time. The locals, whom the Dutch generally referred as “Formosans,” were the ancestors of Siraya. An anonymous author thus described their first encounter with the Siraya people:

“Their language sounds pleasant, modest, measured, and extraordinarily graceful, so that judging them in this respect you would not think them to be savage but to be outstandingly wise men [sic], filled to the brim with modesty and virtue” (Blussé et al., 1999: 18). They traded with the locals mostly for deer skin by giving them war favors (the local tribes used to fight against one another). They shipped most deer skin home to the Netherlands, while keeping some for trading with the Han and Japanese merchants for salt and rice. They would also get angry with the locals and threaten to withdraw military help if they saw them in touch with the Han. In general, as documented in the archives, the Dutch preferred the Siraya over the Han, whom they considered selfish and untrustworthy. For example, confounded when noticing that the natives would trade with the Han for salt despite the fact that the local sea-side land was ideal for salt making, the anonymous author asked the Han for a reason. And they replied that they never extracted salt on

It is in the missionary Daniel Gravius’s writings that the word “Sideia,” “Sireya,” or “Siraya,” first appeared and it was used to refer to the locals. The exact meaning of the word is unclear. According to Macapili’s (2008: xxxiv-xxxvi) analysis, it could mean “peaceful people” or “people of the East.” SI- is a prefix that connotes “to be” or “of the quality,” and RAYA means “peace” while REIA means “east.”
the land because they did not want the locals to learn the skill and hence hamper their profitable trade.

In spite of their positive impressions of the locals, the Dutch concluded that the 17th century Siraya were uncivilized savages on the following grounds: They walked around naked, they committed relatively free sex, they practiced mandatory abortion, and, most importantly, they were not Christians, as Missive Pieter Nuyts and Pieter Muyser reported, “they are simple, ignorant people who do not know good or evil as it were” (Blussé et al., 1999: 63). In 1625, Missive Governor Martinus Sonck wrote to the Governor-General Pieter de Carpentier in the Netherlands and asked him to send “two or three ministers… so that the name of the Lord will be spread in these parts and the barbaric [sic] inhabitants of the island may be numbered among the Christians” (Blussé et al., 1999: 40). The first missionary that came to the island was Reverend Georgius Candidius, who learned the Siraya language and converted 120 natives to Christianity as of December, 1628 (Blussé et al., 1999: 133). Then, in the late 1640s early 1650s, the Protestant Pastor Daniel Gravius came. He translated and published The Gospel of of St. Matthew in the Sinkan variety of Siraya in 1661. This publication and the archives of East India Company, albeit failing to reflect the authentic, unaffected, and unfiltered, early Siraya traditions, have become the most complete texts based on which the modern Siraya people relearn their linguistic and cultural heritage.

In what follows, I will review the 17th century Siraya practices and traditions as documented by the East Asian Company employees and collected in Formosan Encounter (Blussé et al., 1999; Blussé & Everts, 2000; Blussé & Everts, 2006). I will also re-organize some of the often male-centric Dutch accounts when possible so that they would fit the Siraya worldsense better. Still, keep in mind that the descriptions below should not be taken as a
comprehensive representation of the Siraya culture, for the \textit{functionality} of social rituals was utterly unobserved by the Dutch reporters\textsuperscript{13}.

\textbf{Matri-focality overview}

Shepherd (1995) describes the 17\textsuperscript{th} century Siraya culture as “matri-focal.” It differs from matriarchal in that the social organization is egalitarian: there was no ruler and ruled, and there was no hierarchy. As encoded in the word \textit{PAA-TUKUL}, to give, or to bring about, inequality upon people is to commit something wrong. The observation of egalitarian organization was made by many Dutch individuals and documented in various places in the East India Company archives as well. Here I list just two accounts as examples: “All and sundry without distinction are equally free and unfree. One person is in no way more master than another, because they keep no slaves, servants, or subjects for selling or lending purposes. Nor do they have any say in other people’s business or way of life” (Blussé et al., 1999: 20-21); “We were not able to find out if they have leaders among them… the highest is no higher than the lowest” (ibid: 30). Such a condition, however, posed a serious problem to the Dutch men accustomed to the hierarchical order. Reverend Georgius Candidius, in his 1628 report, referred to the Siraya equality as an “impediment” to the success of Dutch rule: “The third impediment so far has been the fact that there is no certain leader among this nation, which whom I would be able to speak on behalf of the entire people. …the third impediment, that is disorder and no commendation” (ibid: 87).

However, there were certainly ways for the natives to resolve disputes and maintain social order. In the case of theft or murder, the individuals would take justice in their own hands. When something concerning the welfare of the whole village came up, the people would hold meetings.

\textsuperscript{13} In other words, the Dutch reporters might have not only overlooked certain significant Siraya behaviors, but they might have misinterpreted the meanings of those they did observe and hence given some misleading descriptions.
[In such meetings,] they raise the matter for discussion, talk about the pros and cons for half an hour continuously, depending on the matter. If someone tires or has finished, someone else replaces him [sic] and by this they try to persuade the people using many arguments until the matter is approved. They keep good order in this, because when someone is speaking, the others will all be silent and listen, even though they are there in their thousands. (Blussé et al., 1999: 121)

These meetings usually took place in front of a large temple, and all women and men participated. In fact, it was often the words given by the female priests, or Inibs, that received high regard, and hence the other revelation of matri-focality.

The Siraya did observe distinct gender roles: the women farmed, fished, gathered, cooked, and cleaned the house; the men hunted and raised war. The women stayed with their natal family all their lives, but the boys had to leave home in an early age and live in the male house organized according to age groups. After marriage, a man must cut off all connections with his birth family, move into his wife’s family, and treat her parents as his own. About 12 of the older men in a given village were elected into a “council” and served for no longer than two years. They were consulted for warfare and smaller social disputes, but their main function was to carry out the orders given by the religious Inibs, who were all older females. The Inibs also monitored and performed the practice of mandatory abortion. No women before middle age were allowed to give birth; if they were pregnant, they must ask an Inib to the house to conduct abortion via a massage method. This practice appalled the Christian Dutch men; they thought of it as “horrific” and “irrational.” Shepherd (1995), on the other hand, reasons that it was a natural and necessary means for the Siraya to maintain their social structure. But his explanation still seems male-centric: the mandatory abortion was called for because the men had to fulfill their duties in warfare and must not retire until they reached their 40s; besides, there was “the mythical incompatibility of headhunting and childbearing” (Shepherd, 1995: 66). However, to me, the
reasons behind Siraya abortion seem obvious: because it was the women’s duties to farm the land and they had to spend so much energy in the field, they simply would not want to bear children in a relatively young age. In other words, I believe that it is mainly the social expectation of female productivity that required the women to be temporarily, biologically unproductive. “The women… cultivate the field and perform the heaviest tasks” (Blussé et al., 1999: 114), and every task was performed manually: there was no horse or oxen but only the women’s hands, a mattock for sowing, and a knife for reaping. In addition, the 17th century Siraya agriculture was truly sustainable. The natives “do not cultivate or sow more than they need themselves for their daily subsistence, indeed they even run short of supplies now and then” (Blussé et al., 1999: 114). When preparing food (mainly rice), they took “no more than they need for one single day” (ibid.: 114). Such practice of frugality, or sustainability, may also explain the need of mandatory abortion for some sort of population control. The children, particular the daughters, were indeed cherished by the parents once they were born:

They raised their children in a tough and ruthless way and love the girls more than the boys. This clearly is shown by the jewelry with which they prefer to deck the girls, rather than the boys…. Moreover, [the girls] are more often carried on the arm and the shoulders, whereas the boys run around without any heed being paid to them. (Blussé et al., 1999: 17)

Considering the fact that the women farmed the land, were highly regarded in religion, and defined the family, such a preference for daughters should be no surprise.

In the subsections below, I will examine in detail the practices in three 17th century Siraya social institutions: marriage, religion, and warfare. Here I just want to conclude that had the Dutch men also learnt the Siraya ways, that is, had they been patient enough to let the Siraya people speak and listen to them, while they learned the language, the people today would probably have different ideas of democracy, equality, and justice. But the reality is that the Dutch
only wanted to change and convert the Siraya. And they did so by affecting mostly the Siraya men and thus eroding the egalitarian matri-focal system. It is true that they introduced artifacts such as guns and bullets to the Siraya men in exchange for deer skin. But what they really introduced was 
greed, the desire for more; kill more deer so as to gain more war power and more control over others. Greed in turn brought about lack and inequality. When the Dutch first arrived, there were plenty of deer on the island. But in as short as 39 years (1623 - 1662), the deer population decreased dramatically because the Siraya men wanted from the Dutch; they hunted more than they needed. Today, there are virtually no wild deer in the southwest plain of Taiwan. While the Siraya women maintained sustainable agriculture, the men abandoned sustainable hunting. Also when the Dutch first encountered the Siraya, they documented eight tribes that were somewhat equal in terms of military power, even though the tribes were different in size/population. However, in the following years, they gave the groups unequal war favors, depending on whether the native men collaborated with them or not, and hence destroyed the inter-tribal balance. For example, the men from the tribe of Soulang gradually lost the Dutch’s trust because they intended to maintained equal relations with the Han, the Japanese, and the Dutch. The Dutch, however, wanted monopoly of Soulang deer skin, and when the Soulang men did not grant them the monopoly of rights, they labeled all the Soulang people as “liars” and “thieves.” They then turned to the men in Sinkan and made them the strongest. Sinkan also had the most people converted to Christianity, while Soulang has maintained the native religion until today\textsuperscript{14}. The Dutch furthermore introduced inequality within the individual tribes. Remember that Candidius viewed the Siraya egalitarian system as an “impediment.” As a solution, the

\textsuperscript{14} Ironically, the Sinkan tribe is no longer in today’s Taiwan. All the Sinkan lands are now Tainan Science Park, a government-funded project that hosts many big high-tech companies. All that is left in the place that is associated with Sriaya is just a symbolic Siraya Boulevard and a Siraya museum built in the style of a Han temple.
Dutch later assigned certain Siraya *men* to be the administrative heads of the tribes. These men received orders only from the Dutch; they not only disregarded the elderly in the Siraya male council, but they did not respect the Inib women anymore. In other words, the Dutch also introduced, or *imported*, sexism to the Siraya, not unlike what the Spaniards did to the Jaqi people (see Hardman, 1994). Granting unjust power and giving inequality, are these not the definition of “wrong-doing” – *PAA-TUKUL*?

**Marriage**

First of all, the length of hair indicated whether a man was suitable for marriage (or probably sexual relations) or not. This restriction did not apply to women, who kept their hair growing since birth without ever having a haircut. But the men must keep their hair shorter than above the ears until age 16 or 17\(^\text{16}\). Once reaching the age, they tended to let their hair grow as long as possible, showing that they were eligible.

When courting, a man needed to send gifts, or dowry, to the mother, female siblings, and/or female friends of the woman he fancied. The gifts varied, but they often included some garments, bangles and bracelets made of bamboo, and finger rings made of deer-horns and decorated with dog hair. The man must not present the gifts himself; he had to ask his female relatives or friends to visit the woman’s family on his behalf. If the gifts were accepted, he would

\(^{15}\) Even though, as I briefly mentioned earlier, the 17\(^{\text{th}}\) century Siraya organized marriage around the wife’s family, I cannot avoid giving some male-first descriptions here because all the documents/archives were written from a male perspective.

\(^{16}\) Despite having a counting system in the language, the 17\(^{\text{th}}\) century Siraya did not actually count age in the numerical way. All the age numbers provided here are merely estimations by the Dutch observers. However, the Siraya did make age/seniority distinction. People born around the same time belonged to the same “age group,” or *CASSIUWANG*. Members of the same *CASSIUWANG* often functioned together, for they had the same obligations and rights.
then be allowed to sleep with his wife the next night. As such, the marriage was done; there was no wedding ceremony. Given that all marriage arrangements and decisions were made by the women, I suspect that they could also take initiatives. That is, a woman might also be able to court a man. But no documents of female courting were ever made by the Dutch observers.

After marriage, the wife stayed living with her natal family. But the husband, if he had not reached the age of retirement, must stay in the “male house,” living with his cohorts and fulfilling the male responsibilities for the community. He might visit her at night, but he must enter her house discreetly; he must not disturb other people (mostly women) there. He had to be quiet and lie down on her bed immediately. He could not touch anything. If he needed something, he might make a feeble sound, such as by coughing. If his wife heard him, she would bring the things for which he asked. And then she returned to her folks again. She would sleep with him after she had tended all her business.

Before dawn next morning, the husband would leave the wife’s house, again, without making a sound that might disturb others. In general, he was not allowed to enter her house in the daytime. But if he must talk with her and if she was at home alone but not in the field, he could go standing outside of her house and send someone to ask for permission of entry. She was not obliged to give the permission, however. Also, if the married couple came across each other in public under daylight, they would not talk to each other.

The couple could not have children until they (or maybe the wife only) reached their late 30s because of the above-mentioned mandatory abortion. And the husband would eventually move into his wife’s house in his 50s. That is when he had fulfilled his male duties and retired from the male house. From this point on, the couple would cultivate her farm/field together. They might also build a separate, smaller, house in the field and sleep there sometimes.
The 17th century Siraya observed monogamy. But both the wife and the husband could divorce their spouse. If one of them did not want to stay with the other anymore, they were free to marry someone else. Providing good reasons such as adultery and/or domestic violence, the divorcee might keep the dowry. But if no good reason was provided, they might ask the dowry back.

Religion

The native Siraya religion used to be a strictly female domain: not only did the priests, or Inibs, have to be female, but in ceremonies only women sang and danced. The men could only watch. Religion was also the center of social life. While the senior male councillors did make some communal decisions (which were not absolute orders and could be declined), they were only responsible for secular affairs. An important duty of the male council was to execute the demands of the Inibs, which mostly concerned taboos.

The Dutch noted numerous Siraya deities, most of whom represent a direction but they documented in detail only four or five of them. The goddess of east is Tekarukpada, and her husband is Tamagisangach, the god of south. Tamagisangach makes people beautiful and he also has the power of rain. But he is lazy. So people pray to Tekarukpada, who makes thunder, to scold her husband and demand that he send rains. Then there is Sariasang of the north, the deity

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17 Interestingly, while recounting from an overall male-centric perspective (for example, detailing how the husband could divorce his wife throughout the paragraph and only in the end mentioning that the wife enjoyed the same rights), the Dutch gave examples of the wife flirting with other men or beating her husband.

18 This is another reason why I think that a woman might also be able to take initiatives in courtship.

19 I use past tense in my accounts here except for those regarding the deities, who are supposed to be eternal, because the native religion today, even though more or less maintained in many villages, has changed tremendously. I will explain the changes later.
of undoing. While Tamagisangach makes people pretty, Sariasang makes them ugly again. Two other gods, Tacafulu and Tupaliap, take care of the men. They help with warfare.

Other than monitoring taboos and performing abortion, the Inibs had the power of summon these deities, usually in a state of being possessed. The Inibs could thus tell fortunes, bless an unholy place, exorcize the demons, and ask for rain or good weather. On important dates, public worhiping would take place. The Inibs and the participating women would drink millet rice wine and chew betel nut, which is a mood-altering palm fruit. Both millet rice wine and betel nuts are still enjoyed by many Austronesian peoples in and outside of Taiwan today. Once the Inibs were possessed, they would climb to the roof tops and remove their loincloth to appear completely naked. They chanted and tapped their genitals; they washed their whole body with water and send the water down to the blessed. Abortion, drinking, nakedness, the Christian Dutch men unsurprisingly abhorred the Siraya Inibs. Reverend Georgius Candidius even referred to the Inibs as “liers” and the Siraya beliefs as “irrational” and “pathetic” (Blussé et al., 1999). Requested by the Christian missionaries, the East India Company captured many Inibs and sent them to a concentration camp in today’s Jiayi County, north of the Siraya homeland. What happened to the Inibs in the camp and whether they were able to return home after the Dutch left in 1662 remain unknown; no document is found.

**Warfare**

The Dutch described the Siraya men as strong, fast, and skilled fighters. But my intention is not to magnify the testosterone-filled “worrior culture,” which has in many cases been used to stereotype or tokenize the Austronesian culture (cf. “the Hawaiian worriors,” “the Maori worriors,” and “the Bunun worriors in Taiwan”). I just want to talk about the Siraya conduct of war: its principles, code of honor, and definitions of honesty and fairness.
Because the Siraya men would decapitate their enemies, they were called “head-hunters.” The image of head-hunting made the Dutch, and the ensuing Han, think of the Siraya as a people that were “cruel” and “barbaric.” But really, is taking the enemies’ head with one stroke essentially crueler than hurting them with bullets (like the Dutch did) or spears and arrows (like the Han did), leaving them on the battle field, and letting them die suffering? In fact, “head-hunting” is an overstatement, for it was merely a sufficient condition, not a necessary condition. The Siraya men did not thirst for heads; rather, they would declare victory and leave the battle field as long as they had collected some body parts of the enemies, such as hands, feet, or just a tuft of hair. They would bring these parts back to the village, carefully preserve them, and then keep them in their house. The Dutch considered such a practice as some form of trophy display, as they observed that the bigger collection a Siraya man had in his room, the more he was honored by others. However, I suggest that the practice of displaying the enemies’ bodies at home is a way to show respect towards the deceased because it is in many ways similar to the Siraya rite of natural death, which is as follows. When a family member had died, music, mostly drum-beating, would be played outside of the house and the women would dance around so that the passersby would know that the house was mourning. The naked body was then washed with water once a day for 9 days; it was also smoked to be preserved. Finally, the body would be moved back inside the house: Some records show that it would be buried underground, and some say that it would just lie in open sight. The Balinese, another Austronesian people, has maintained a similar rite until today. They would clean and preserve the corpse and keep it home on the bed where the deceased used to sleep.

The Dutch also noted that an inter-tribal war between two Siraya villages was often caused by “betrayal,” or when one side had failed to fulfill its promise to the other. To seek justice, the
betrayed would then send a messenger to the other camp to discuss a date and place for the fight. The soldiers, usually fewer than 30 men, were all volunteers; they could not be forced to participate in the war. And the battle normally took place in an open field at night. Occasionally it could be taken to the village, but in that case the invaders would first raise alarm, so that the willing opponents would come to fight them. As mentioned before, a fight might end without any casualty; a tuft of hair would do. More often, the fight ended as soon as one person died, “for they [took] the death of one of their people as seriously as we [i.e., the Dutch] the defeat or rout of an entire army” (Blussé et al., 1999: 118).

Despite how the Siraya warfare was conducted and how few casualties were actually involved, the Dutch decided that the Siraya were belligerent and commented that “the Formosan villages knew no mutual peace” (Blussé et al., 1999: 52). Below, Missive Commander Gerrit Fredericksz recounted how his troop had “brought peace” to the Sinkan village. In fact, the Dutch were seeking favor from the Sinkandians, who were at war against the peoples from Mattau and Baccaluan.

Our people… [have decided] to put an end to the war and to tell the enemy [i.e., the Mattau and Baccaluan peoples] that if they wished to make peace, they should do this immediately unless we should ourselves take the field. This, they said, they were willing to face. When our men quickly showed themselves, they took to flight immediately, unable to stand the whine of the bullets. They stood amazed when they saw that one of them remained lying without seeing what had caused this. …Here we have warned and charged them that they should maintain friendship with the Sinkandians… or we shall punish such harassment and its perpetrators. Thereupon they swore in their way that they should obey us. (Blussé et al., 1999: 53)

Notice the difference in the Dutch war conduct. There was no prolonged and honest pre-warning: they provoked the natives to fight, and then they immediately shot bullets. There was no precise ending: they shot one man and left him lying on the ground, without ending his pain. And most
importantly, the Dutch had no justifiable initiatives: what exactly had the Mattau and Baccaluan men done that betrayed their trust? Therefore, it should be no surprise that six days after the Mattau men “swore in their way that they should obey us” (Blussé et al., 1999: 53, my emphasis), they went back to Sinkan and beheaded a man in the field.

Continuations and Changes

What was the Siraya culture like before the Dutch arrived? What has happened to the Siraya people after the Dutch left in 1662? How has their culture changed and/or evolved into what it is like today? And what was the Siraya contact with other non-Dutch peoples and cultures like? These are the questions lingering in the minds of some contemporary scholars and those Siraya natives who are interested in their heritage. But the answers to these questions are not easy to be found because other peoples that have visited Taiwan, particularly the Han and the Japanese, did not leave many documents as descriptive and as detailed as the Dutch. A Han official of the Ming Dynasty, Chen Di, wrote a one-page note (in Chinese characters) on the Siraya lifestyle in 1602 when he came to Taiwan with the Ming Navy to fight the Japanese; the article was entitled Eastern Savages (Chen, 1955 [1602]). The Zheng regime, who evicted the Dutch in 1662 and stayed in Taiwan until 1683, left virtually no document about the indigenes. During the Qing Dynasty, there were Baihai Travel Log written by Han merchant Yu (1955 [1697]) and Six Chapters of the Savage Customs by Qing official Huang (1961[1722]), in both of which only a few paragraphs are about the Siraya. The Japanese documents in the late 19th century and early 20th century are mostly measurements (of the size of forehead, the length of

And this may be due to the cultural difference in the way the historians work. The “Chinese” (including the Han and the Manchurian) historical writings, for example, do not focus much on the descriptive details of the conquered. The Chinese visual documents (i.e., paintings) of the indigenous people also differ from the European ones. While the latter follow the principle of “accentuated difference,” the former draw Han features on every human being.
fingers, etc.) done by the anthropologists at the time. Last, the KMT, or the ROC government, simply does not acknowledge the Siraya people (and many other low-land peoples) at all. Therefore, the modern researchers who are interested in studying the continuations and changes of Siraya traditions must extend their research into the small, or non-official, historical documents, such as the land contracts signed between individual Han families and Siraya families in the Qing era and the (texts on) tombstones. Most of these research projects are still underway and have not published much. Hence, in the following space I will just provide some simple descriptions of the non- and post-Dutch-period Siraya traditions. My main sources include Chen (1954 [1602]), Yu (1955 [1697]), Huang (1961 [1722]), my personal experiences, and my field observations.

First of all, when the Dutch still occupied Tainan, they noticed that the Siraya natives had already established some trade relations with the Han and the Japanese, and they also found a man from today’s Philippines who resided in a Siraya village and a few Malay and Southern Min loan words in the Soulang variety of Siraya. But there was not yet mass immigration from Mainland China, which only started after the Dutch left and continued until the early Qing period. The Han literature, albeit little, adds some details to the Siraya lifestyle in the 17\textsuperscript{th} and 18\textsuperscript{th} centuries. The Han writers noticed that the Siraya people always showed much respect to their elderly, for the natives believed that if they did not respect the seniors, they would be punished by the deities. The Siraya men were married into their wife’s family and the husband

\footnote{I am planning to embark on a collaborative project with Dr. Oliver Streiter from the National Kaohsiung University (in Taiwan) beginning summer 2010. The project will use a Geographical Information System technology to locate and document the Siraya tombstones (in both Christian and Han styles) and the texts inscribed on them. Dr. Streiter and I hope to find explanations of Taiwan-internal migration and possibly Han-Siraya intermarriage.}
must serve the wife’s parents until they passed away. The inheritance was only given to the daughters; nothing was left for the sons. And so the Siraya people preferred daughters. The women farmed rice, and they used the method of fire/flame cultivation, which produced much less than the Han method of irrigation. The men participated in warfare; they collected the heads of their enemy, and they openly displayed these heads on the entrance of their house. The Siraya of the time still did not build tombs; when someone had passed away, they buried the body vertically underground inside the house.

Today, however, the Siraya build tombs, either in the Han or in the Christian style, and the Siraya farmers, including women and men, irrigate their fields just like the Han do. According to Brown (2004), the Qing officials in the late 18th century were responsible for the change of agriculture: they lured the Siraya farmers (or actually the low-land people in general) to adopt the Han irrigation method by promising tax reduction. The Qing, and later the Japanese, also used tax and other promises (such as “rewarding” with a Han or Japanese name) to lure the Siraya (and low-land) men to join their army against the mountain indigenes. Such manipulation in turn caused many conflicts between the Siraya and other indigenous peoples, as documented in Senior Uncle Wan-jin’s story, which I recounted earlier in the Summer Trip 2008 section. So just like the Dutch, the Qing and the Japanese had also “given inequality” to the Siraya people; they PAA-TUKULed (or NI-PAA-TUKUL). The feeling of shame among the Siraya has probably hence emerged. Many people today do not acknowledge their Siraya heritage; they do not like to

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22 The change from fire to irrigation agriculture, while increasing short-term productivity, has actually had a negative impact on the environment. Today, many coastal areas around Tainan, where the Siraya tribes of Sinkan and Soulang used to farm, have become too salty to farm because of the rising sea level. Also, several tombs are now sunk in water and abandoned, as documented in Streiter & Huang (2010).
mention that they are indigenes, or “savages” (cf. Chapter 4, LP for Naming). Some do not even know. As previously mentioned, my father was not told that he is Siraya until he was 54 years old and I 27 years old. But our experience is by no means an exception: Uma, who is probably the most prominent Siraya activist now, did not know of her Siraya heritage until some 10-plus years ago.

Not unrelated to the academic dismissal of a still vibrant Siraya culture, the mainstream Taiwanese society until quite recently opines that the Siraya people have all “disappeared,” or they have been completely “Han-ized” (han4-hua4 in Mandarin). The Siraya activists, however, reject such a concept; they say that not only have the Siraya not been completely Han-ized, but the Han people and their culture might have as well been “Siraya-ized.” A linguistic example of the Siraya influence in Taiwan’s Han culture is the Southern Min word khan-chhíu, which refers to “spouse” and literally means “holding hands.” This word is now commonly used in Taiwan’s variety of Southern Min regardless of the speaker’s ethnic background; but in China’s variety and in Standard Southern Min there is a distinction between “wife” and “husband,” with “wife” associated with lesser values (as ke-āu, “behind the house,” or bó, “somebody/nobody”). The Siraya do not make such a distinction, for the spouses are perceived as equal. And Huang (1961 [1722]) also noted that in the 18th century the Siraya had indeed already referred to their spouse as “the person with whom I hold hands.” Thus, khan-chhíu must be a semantic borrowing from Siraya. In addition, it has in turn affected Taiwan’s Mandarin: khan-chhíu can be written in Chinese characters as 牽手 and pronounced in Mandarin as qian1-shou3, which most Mandarin speakers in Taiwan would understand as “spouse,” even though they do not use it in daily speech.

23 It does not help, either, that the current government does not grant the Siraya people an official status.
In addition, the activists have also adopted a modern slogan, originally created by Mr. Duan Hong-kun from the Gabaswa Village, to counter the discourse of Hanization. It is accompanied by a print of Duan’s hand, and the four characters between the fingers, 甘願作番, read kam-gòan-chòe-fwan in Southern Min or gan1-yuan2-uo4-fan1 in Mandarin, meaning “[we would] rather be savages” (Figure 5-1). As Duan once explained to me, the whole design is to tell the Han colonizers: “It is fine that you call us ‘savages’; you call every people unlike you ‘savages’ anyway. We are not you; we do not want to be you.” Duan also said that he was originally inspired by the African American rights movement in the U.S., which made a strong identity claim through the expression “Black is beautiful.”

Still, the factor that holds many modern-day Siraya together is religion. In many villages that have not been (completely) converted to Christianity or Han religion(s), there are many public altars that host a clay pot, in which the deity known as Alid lives. On the ground or a table next to the pot, people would offer millet rice wine and betel nuts. There would also be a pestle and a mortar so that the worshipers could grind the betel nuts for Alid. This practice is uniquely Siraya, and the Siraya people are hence also known as “the pot-worshipping people.” The shape of the pot is round, and in it there must always be water and some green leaves. These items together appear to symbolize fertility, or productivity, in accordance with other aspects of the Siraya religious tradition such as being a female domain and the request for rain and harvest. The story below from my own family serves as an example of how the female-centric religion has been gradually lost as the senior women passed away. Everyone in my father’s generation, that is, my aunts and uncles, remember having been taken by my grandmother to an altar near our ancestral home to give offerings to a pot. It had to be my grandmother; my grandfather did

\[\text{24} \text{“Alid” in the Siraya language is actually a generic term for “deity.”}\]
not participate. In my generation, however, only my oldest cousin has had the same experience because my grandmother died relatively young. Since she passed away, the family has stopped visiting the altar and gone to a nearby Southern Min Han temple instead (because “everyone” goes there). In the summer of 2007, I revisited the place. See Figure 5-2 for a photo of the altar, Figure 5-3 for a photo of the pot, and Figure 5-4 for a photo of the betel nut pestle and mortar (photo courtesy of my sister, Ping Huang).

This native religion, however, has indeed received some Han influences. For example, the originally polytheistic system has now become monotheistic, reflecting the Mandarin ONEness postulate. While in the 17th century the Siraya people worshipped many deities, most of whom represent a direction as well as a natural phenomenon, today there is only one omnipresent and omnipotent Alid. Also, in villages where the Siraya religion and the Han religion are apparently mixed, Alid is considered the highest deity, reflecting the Mandarin postulate of comparative ranking. Alid is either equal to or higher than the highest Han deity, Tai4-shang4 Lao3-jun1, which means “the old man on the top.” In addition, in these places, the pots that host Alid are often removed from the native altars and relocated into a Han-style temple, resting in the darkest and inner-most room behind Lao3-jun1, a position that seems to reflect the shame many Siraya people have felt. Moreover, I have personally heard a story from one of such villages that even depicts a Chinese origin of Siraya: the Siraya ancestors were brought by Alid to Taiwan from Mainland. It shows that the discourse of Chinese nationalism has permeated into the domain of Siraya religion as well.

Nevertheless, all these villages with a native Sriaya religion recognize that Alid must be a woman, that in ceremonies only the women are to sing and dance, and that the priest, Ang-yi (meaning unknown; formerly as “Inib”), should ideally be a woman as well, thus continuing the
female-centric belief system. Unfortunately, today there are only a couple of female priests left, and all others are men, who have learnt chants and rituals from the last true Ang-yi, Li Ren-ji from the Gabaswa Village, who passed away in 2003\textsuperscript{25}. The chants memorized by the priests are now pronounced in a language yet to be deciphered: it is quite different from the 17\textsuperscript{th} century Siraya variety used in Gravius’s Gospel of St. Matthew; it sounds Southern Min phonology but its carries no obvious Southern Min meaning. And the rituals have preserved the tradition of directionality: the main element is called hiòng-chūi in Southern Min or xiang4-shui3 in Mandarin, meaning “directional water,” and the priests would first hold the water in their mouths and then spit it out towards a certain direction to ask for and also to give blessings.

The present Siraya religion hence manifests both assimilation (i.e., with some Han elements) and perseverance (i.e., maintaining certain 17\textsuperscript{th} century features). For example, a few months ago, on 8 August, 2009, Typhoon Morakot struck Taiwan, causing a mudslide that wiped out the Siraya village of Xiaolin. About 400 people disappeared overnight. Three months later, on 31 October, 2009, it was a religious festival, and the survivors, although not many left, decided to carry it on in the shelter center. A person explained the decision in Southern Min when interviewed on TV: “we will continue this practice, just like it has always been done… [we must] continue the culture and revive our tradition\textsuperscript{26}.”

Last but not least, I must point out that even in a Christianized village such as Kauchannia, home of TPSCA, religion still plays a crucial role in the villagers’ identification towards Siraya. It is because the people there have Gravius’s Gospel of St. Matthew with which they can identify

\textsuperscript{25} Li was considered a true or authentic Ang-yi because she did not choose to be a priest. As the story goes, Alid came to her dream and made her an Ang-yi.

\textsuperscript{26} Formosa TV, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OXK07fvpvtI Accessed 1.11.09.
as uniquely their own. It is also because of this Christian text that they are hopeful to relearn and reclaim their heritage. Today, the Christian Siraya call their god Meyrang Alid, that is, “Master/Lord Alid.” Meyrang Alid has inspired the formation of TPSCA and guided its core members through hard times. In the next section I will document their journey and the significant works they have achieved.

**Tainan Pepo Siraya Culture Association and Its Efforts**

As mentioned, Tainan Pepo Siraya Culture Association (TPSCA) is not the only local, native, NGO that is devoted to the continuation of Siraya culture and identity. There are also Gabaswa Culture and History Studio, Tainan Soulang Pokthauiong Association, and several other “village committees” in individual Siraya communities around Tainan and Kaohsiung counties. However, while all these other organizations focus on maintaining the native Alid religion through the Han language, TPSCA is the only one associated with the (Presbyterian) Christian religion and concerned with re-constructing and re-learning the Siraya mother tongue.27

I joined TPSCA in the summer of 2007. But TPSCA had started long before my involvement, beginning in 1997, when about 100 members of the Kaupi Church organized and performed a musical called “Another Window of/to the Low-land People” in Sinhua High School. In 1998, with the help of Kaupi Church, TPSCA was officially founded, and Mr. Ban Cheng-hiong was elected as the first chairperson. Then, around 2000, Mr. Ban passed his responsibilities to his daughter Uma Talavan, who has led TPSCA until today.

Under Uma’s leadership, TPSCA started working on the Siraya language and the incorporation of language education into music. This direction also has a lot to do with Uma’s

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27 And if one must consider the officially registered “chair” as the singular leader of an organization, TPSCA is the only one currently led by a woman, namely, Uma Talavan.
husband, Edgar Macapili, a Bisayan native from the Philippines whom Uma met in Manila when she went there to study music at Asian Institute for Liturgy and Music. Edgar is not only a professional composer and an ethno-musicologist, but he is also multilingual in several Austronesian and non-Austronesian languages with remarkable instinct in linguistics. When he was “married into” Uma’s family in Taiwan, as he and Uma would jokingly comment on their marriage, and became a member of the Kauchannia-Kaupi community, he noticed a copy of Gravius’s St. Matthew (Campbell, 1996 [1888]) written in Siraya. To the villagers’ surprise, he could read it and made some sense out of it! Uma was encouraged, thinking that recovering her lost mother tongue might no longer be a dream, and so she prompted Edgar to engage in further linguistic research. They started little by little, learning a few words first, putting them into sensible sentences, composing simple, catchy, songs according to the Austronesian musicology, and teaching them to the children in the church.

At first, TPSCA was only involved with the local community, but then, with the success of several activities, it became more famous and its story was covered by some in the mainstream media. In 2003, a journalist reported that the Sriaya people in TPSCA had embarked on “resurrecting their dead mother tongue.” A few days later, Uma received a phone call from a famous linguistic professor from a prestigious institution in Taiwan, who ridiculed TPSCA’s efforts. According to Uma, the man’s tone of voice was rather condescending, as he told her: “Who do you think you are to revive a dead language? Are you not aware that around the world, there is only one successful case of language resurrection, that is, the Hebrew\textsuperscript{28}… those fanatic religious radicals [sic]? Have you heard the Siraya language spoken? Is there anyone in your village who can still speak it? [No.] So how are you going to revive the language?” So Uma

\textsuperscript{28} This statement is not true, of course. Besides Hebrew, there are also Miami and Manx Gaelic, just to name a few.
explained to him that the people in TPSCA had never been so arrogant to claim that they could “completely revive” the Siraya language; they merely attempted to “remove the seal that has been put on the so-called dead language.” She also explained to him how Edgar could comprehend some of the old text by comparing Siraya to the modern Austronesian languages he speaks. But the said linguist was uninterested, and he further commented, “Oh come on. You cannot do it this way. It would never work.” Adding to the man’s negative comments is the fact that he would later serve in several government-organized committees that decided that the Siraya people should not receive an official status because they do not have a language of their own. Hence, until today, Uma still feels offended by the man. But she and others in TPSCA have not been discouraged. They have continued their own linguistic research and they have organized more activities, bigger, with a wider range of participation, and more successful. Then there came more words, more sentence structures, more songs, and more people who are willing to learn. The rest is history. The TPSCA experience as a whole also shows that social influence does come from both the top and the bottom. The locally initiated effort had initially gone “under the radar,” but then it permeated into the top and incurred some feedback, which has in turn induced more efforts from the bottom.

In the rest of this section, I document the major efforts and achievements by TPSCA in the last decade. My presentation follows two lines, Linguistic Activities and Political Activities, only for the convenience of writing. In reality, as Uma’s encounter with the abovementioned linguist has indicated, the linguistic activities and those concerning politics are often intertwined. Hence, my discussions below must bring the two aspects together.
Linguistic Activities

The Onini band

The musical performance group Onini (plural form of ONI, “sound,” in Siraya) is the soul of TPSCA. This is not because Onini is one of the most popular and loved groups that promote the Siraya culture to the general public, but because the majority of its members are children and teenagers. In other words, Onini is where the hope of cultural continuation lies.

The group Onini was formed in the very beginning of TPSCA. Its 43 members all go to the Kaupi Church and, except for Edgar, all are local Siraya natives. Significantly, as many as 35 of them are from the younger generations, ranging from 4 years old to 19-20 years old. While a few of the programs performed by them are in Southern Min and/or Mandarin, most of the Onini performances are Siraya songs written by Edgar and Uma. The Onini youth are hence always the first Siraya individuals who learn their awakened mother tongue. The older ones have done so for over 10 years. And they have also learnt to play several traditional Siraya instruments, such as the nose flute, the mouth harp, and percussions, all made of bamboo. Although it would be an exaggeration to say that these Onini youth are “fluent” Siraya speakers, most of them do have a rather sufficient knowledge about the language such that they would serve as language and music teaching assistants in the Musuhapa summer camp, which I will introduce next.

Since 1997, Onini has performed over 40 shows around Taiwan and received much publicity and praise. Most performances were in a cultural venue, e.g., in a music festival or a Civic Night kind of meeting. But sometimes Onini would open for a political venue as well, e.g., a public hearing to discuss the official recognition of Siraya and other low-land peoples or even a street protest. In the excerpt below, I asked Uma if she has had any memorable experience
related to Onini’s public performances. The interview was conducted in 2007; R refers to me and P refers to Uma.

P: ugh… recently, in a meeting concerning official recognition, many professors and scholars from Academic Sinica29 came to Tainan. In the meeting they [the Onini] had a performance, and afterwards some professors told me that they were really astonished.

R: What did they mean?

P: Well [the professors said that it was] unbelievable/incredible to see a group of children… singing in a language that has been defined as a dead language and jumping around all over the place [i.e., dancing].

R: oh…

P: And not only did they sing and dance, but they appeared to be so happy.

R: So…

P: So [Onini] embody vitality, and that is why they [the professors] were stunned. [They said,] “how come you still have songs to sing!?”.  

R: um

P: And my daughter also gave a short speech in Siraya.

Uma’s words show that besides being a true manifestation of cultural continuation, Onini is also a metaphor in itself. Over the years, Onini has become a significant discursive element for TPSCA and other Siraya people to counter, or to resist, the top-down discourse that dictates

29 “Academia Sinica, the most preeminent academic institution in the Republic of China, was founded in 1928 to promote and undertake scholarly research in sciences and humanities. After the government moved to Taiwan in 1949, Academia Sinica was re-established in Taipei.” Academic Sinica, on WWW at http://home.sinica.edu.tw/en/about/history_and_mission.html Accessed 9.11.09.
Siraya extinction. Onini, the “sounds” of Siraya, are alive; they represent a voice that cannot be denied.

**Siraya language and culture camps**

In the beginning section of this chapter, I have detailed my involvement in the 2007 and 2008 Musuhapa Siraya Summer Camps and I mentioned that a third Musuhapa camp was held in August 2009. Here I just want to review the development, or evolution, of all the language and culture camps hosted by TPSCA and their significance.

While the children of Onini had always met regularly and maintained an intimate relationship among one another, in 2005 Uma thought of organizing a summer camp in a “natural” local environment that would allow them to spend days living together and learning from one another. That led to the first Siraya cultural camp called Tatalag, meaning “welcome” (*TALAG* actually means “home/house” in Siraya and *TA-TALAG* “to the home.”) The camp was hosted in Hothaupi, a former reservoir for irrigation purpose built in 1846 (Qing period) whose function now is tourism. It has a lake, woods, trails, and camping sites. Most importantly, it is located in the Kauchannia-Kaupi area and so all the natural resources are local. During the camp, the children took a few Siraya language lessons, studied some Siraya history, and learned to build some traditional structures, such as *KUVA* the watch tower, with bamboo. And they also received their first Siraya name (see Excerpt 7 in Chapter 4). The camp was a success. Many students wanted more. And so in the summer of 2006 the second Tatalag was held. This time, it even attracted the Tainan County Government’s attention. Tainan Magistrate Su came and gave a speech that acknowledged TPSCA’s efforts. Along with Su came the media, and TPSCA became more widely known soon after.
With the experiences with Tatalag, in 2007 Uma decided to “go public,” that is, she decided to open the camp to those in the general public who are interested in learning (about) the Siraya language and culture. Thus, the camp-goers were no longer all Siraya natives from the Kauchannia-Kaupi community, and they included children as well as adults. The camp was also meant to be a publicity event that could help spread the name of Siraya. Uma renamed the camp MUSU-HAPA, which means “to bud-leaves” or “budding.” Musuhapa is hence yet another metaphor besides Onini that serves to counter the big discourse of Siraya death and/or extinction. It is to show the public that even though the Siraya culture has been dormant for a period of time, it has budded again. It turned out that the 2007 Musuhapa enjoyed even greater publicity success than the 2006 Tatalag. Uma was encouraged. And hence she organized TPSCA to host Musuhapa again in 2008, and again in 2009. Uma’s name and that of TPSCA are now well-known to the public. Today, no longer would a Taiwanese press refer to the Siraya culture as extinct or its people as “disappeared.”

A problem with going public, however, is that the local children and teens now seem to stop progressing. This is despite the fact that they still more or less learn something, as they would help in the Musuhapa camps as team leaders, staff, and/or teaching assistants. But they have not received new linguistic input for a while, and some have even forgotten the old things they learned. For example, in 2008’s Musuhapa, I was one of the main language teachers alongside Edgar and Shi Chaokai. We taught a few language lessons and after the lectures we would ask the campers to do some conversation exercises as groups. In each of these groups, an Onini teenager would serve as a teaching assistant. To my surprise, a couple of the TAs, who have actually started learning the Siraya language years before me, found the need to come to me and ask for explanations concerning pronunciation and/or sentence structures. That experience
made me worried, and so I finally persuaded Uma to organize a different camp in 2009, in addition to 2009’s Musuhapa, that was aimed for language teacher training purposes. Uma now agrees with me that TPSCA needs more capable language teachers and we must try to bring Siraya lessons to the public schools in the native areas.

Still, Musuhapa is mostly encouraging. During the 2008 camp, A-sin, an Onini member, composed the first Siraya song that is not written by Edgar and/or Uma. And several other young campers also wrote poems to express their appreciation of the camp and the Siraya identity and culture. Even though these poems are written in Mandarin and/or Southern Min, with only a couple of Siraya words, they indicate that the awareness of (the importance of) Siraya continuation is growing. Below is a titleless poem by 15-year-old Ramag (“light”) Ge Hong-ying, who is a Sriaya native from Kauchannia-Kaupi. The poem was originally written in Chinese characters (Appendix B) and is translated into English by me. I am not much of a poet myself and my English ability is limited, but I hope that my translation suffices to show Ramag’s use of metaphors that epitomizes the TPSCA-Siraya experience beautifully.

Colors of the wayward sky, awakened somewhere dormant for long, now bound to recover.
Music has laid a path, that defies time and space.
From the sky, a forgotten voice will burgeon again, on every inch of the earth.

The blaze of musuhapa, Meyrang Alid, have you seen us?
Our loud voices, our cheering, Meyrang Alid, have you heard us?
The passion of Siraya, Meyrang Alid, have you felt us?

Old stories must continue to be told.
All ears are waiting, all eyes are watching, for us, ourselves, to launch a vessel that traverses history.
**The Siraya dictionary**

As I mentioned earlier, TPSCA published a Siraya dictionary (Macapili, 2008) in November, 2008, mainly thanks to Edgar’s 7 years of research into Gravius’s Gospel of St. Matthew (Campbell, 1996 [1888]). The 1175-page long trilingual dictionary consists of over 3,000 Siraya lexical entries, each with a Mandarin definition, an English definition, and an example sentence or phrase. It also includes an introduction/methodology written by Edgar and an appendix of grammar notes by Shi Chaokai. In addition, there are five prefaces written by Tainan Magistrate Su, Academic Sinica historian Ang Ka-im, another Academic Sinica historian Chen Qiu-kun, Uma, and Edgar, respectively. Each of them contains some encouraging words that acknowledge the importance of Siraya language, culture, and identity. For the most part, the dictionary is written in an easy-to-understand, ordinary, language, for it is TPSCA’s hope that the dictionary can be truly accessible to an non-academic audience. There is only some linguistic jargon in the grammar appendix.

Nevertheless, the dictionary is far from ideal. For one thing, it is too cumbersome to be really practical. It is about 6-inch long, 12-inch wide, 1.6 inch thick, and it weighs 4 kilograms (or 8.8 pounds). For another, the dictionary still utilizes several *preconceived* grammatical categories to explain the language. These categories, such as Case, Noun, and Preposition, may fit some European languages well (and hence are often taken for granted by the “mainstream” linguists), but they do not seem to reflect the *emic* sense of Siraya, as they hardly explain how the Siraya language constructs the world. Therefore, in my opinion, the people in TPSCA must not be too complacent about this edition; they/we must realize that further research and revisions are needed. Edgar agrees with me, and so we do not consider the current publication as an end product. Until today, we talk about Siraya dictionary as an *ongoing* project.
Still, one may ask: “If you in TPSCA did not consider this edition as ideal, why did you publish it? Was the decision not too hastily made?” An easy answer would be: “No, it was all out of necessity. We do not have much time. The Siraya language is just being awakened, and so we must keep the momentum going.” However, an honest answer must consider politics. Note that, as I previously pointed out, the publication of this dictionary had at first been promised funding by Taiwan’s central government under DPP, who later lost the presidential election to KMT in May, 2008. As soon as KMT took over, the promise was broken. Therefore, in the summer of 2008, TPSCA was worried that the dictionary project would not continue. But then, in September, 2009, Uma received a call from Tainan Magistrate Su, a rising star in the DPP party, who offered to fund the publication. Su’s motivation was not completely out of altruism, though, for his current term as Tainan Magistrate is in fact his last and adding something like sponsoring the Siraya dictionary to his resume would help with his future political career. So Su set “end of 2008” as the deadline for TPSCA to publish the dictionary. And that is why the dictionary was indeed, in a sense, “hastily” published. Moreover, the political explanation does not just end on the local, county, level, or on the level of Su’s (possible) personal calculation. It must also take into account the overall discourse of nationalism in Taiwan-ROC. Remember, while KMT’s policy towards the indigenes, especially the low-land peoples, is total ignorance (“The Austronesians are not really human beings because they are not ‘Chinese’”), DPP’s is co-option (“We are all Austronesian, the ‘authentic’ Taiwanese.”). Hence, by sponsoring Siraya, DPP is able to appeal to those who identify with “Taiwan/Taiwanese” and potentially regain its popularity. The following are some words taken from the prefaces in the dictionary that exemplify such a co-option of Siraya into Taiwanese-ness (original English text).
(1) “[The dictionary effort is] to seek to find the mother land [of] Austronesian languages that is called Taiwan” (by Su, in Macapili, 2008: xxv).

(2) “As a county magistrate, I wish you luck – God bless Taiwan! God bless Siraya!” (by Su, in Macapili, 2008: xxv).

(3) “Taiwan National Fish (Oncorhynchus Masu) for example was on the verge of extinction [but it was brought back]. Recreation and reinvention of culture, be it in the past or present, is not a new idea” (by Ang, in Macapili, 2008: xxviii).

(4) “For many years [Uma and Edgar] [have] been dedicated to… teaching the tribal youth and children their language in an attempt to celebrate their pride as the master of Taiwan’s history” (by Chen, in Macapili, 2008: xxix-xxx).

The Siraya School project

Siraya School is a rather recent project proposed by Uma in a TPSCA-internal meeting in January, 2009, and I was nominated as the head of the project. A dreamer as she has always been, Uma states the long-term goal of Siraya School as “to found a complete school that teaches ‘everything Siraya,’ from language, music, to all other cultural aspects, to students of all ages.”

The proposal and my nomination were unanimously passed by the TPSCA committee, for we all recognize that it is Uma’s “dreams” that have awakened Siraya and kept us going. The long-term goal does not have a strict deadline. Uma says that she would be pleased if she can witness a bilingual Siraya school sometime in the 2020s.

Siraya School also has a short-term goal that seems more practical, or reachable, that is, to bring Siraya language lessons to the public schools in the native areas. And TPSCA has already been moving steadily towards this goal. The teacher-training camp in 2008, although taking place before the school project was officially announced, is often considered the first step.
TPSCA needs more capable teachers who can explain the language (including what we do know and what we do not know) to others. Besides teachers, TPSCA also needs additional language lessons. Before 2009, TPSCA had only four fully developed lessons, including <Greetings and making friends>, <What do you do? Where do you go?>, <What is this? What is that?>, and <Numbers and counting>. These lessons had been implemented in the past cultural camps and proved to be effective. However, the camps are only three to four days long; more lessons are needed in order to develop a complete syllabus for school. With continuing efforts by the TPSCA language committee, as of September 2009 the following have been added: <Where do you live?>, <What are there in your community/village?>, <Who are the people in your family?>, <I am…> (self-introduction composition), <How old are you?>, <How many people are there in your family?>, <How much is it?>, <What do you like (to do)?>, <What did you do?>, <Do you have X?>.

Moreover, these lessons are now actually being taught in one elementary school, in the Liuxi community. With the agreement of Tainan government and the Liuxi committee, TPSCA has since the fall semester of 2009 sent teachers to Liuxi Elementary to teach Siraya four hours a week as part of the Mother Language Class. This is a significant achievement not only because the plan is in effect implemented, but also because this is the first time TPSCA is able to bring Siraya language lessons out of the Christian Kauchannia-Kaupi community. Liuxi is one of the Siraya communities that maintain the native Alid religion, and as I mentioned earlier, these communities, although working as partners of TPSCA on the political front, have in general ignored the language aspect. But now, finally, (some) children in these communities are given the opportunity to familiarize themselves with their heritage language. According to Li Puecin, one of the volunteer teachers, the classes have been very enjoyable; the children find learning
Siraya fun and interesting. The TPSCA staff are encouraged, and now they are drafting proposals to seek possibilities to bring Siraya language to other schools/communities next year.

The next concern, of course, is keeping the students motivated. This will not be an easy task because, under the current sociolinguistic circumstances of Taiwan, learning Siraya does not bring any socio-economic promise. This is despite the fact that Taiwan-ROC does have an Affirmative-Action-like education policy that grants extra credits, or points, to indigenous students. The central government also offers a Tribal Language Certificate to the indigenous individuals who are tested with certain proficiency in their heritage languages, and this certificate yields some career benefits. The problem is, obviously, that the Siraya are NOT an official people, and so neither of the abovementioned policies applies. As a consequence, even some parents of the Onini members have told their children to quit Onini because, as Uma once recounted the parents’ words to me, “what are you learning the Siraya language and those songs for?” Thus, all boils down to politics again: without recognition of identity by the Taiwan-ROC government, Siraya continuation will remain difficult.

**Political Activities**

Achieving official recognition has been the main political goal since the very beginning of not only TPSCA and the Siraya Movement but also the overall Low-land Peoples Movement. A number of local, native, NGOs like TPSCA have worked together as the Low-land Peoples Alliance in negotiating with the government for at least 10 years. During the course, while always being a very active member, TPSCA’s role has shifted from a participant-observer to somewhat of a leader-organizer. This is because Uma does have a keen interest in politics and tremendous past experience in the Taiwan Independence Movement (see Chapter 4), and it is also because TPSCA is always open-minded and willing to learn from its own as well as others’
mistakes. One of the things TPSCA has learnt is the importance of language. As Uma recalled, in earlier days she observed that relying on religion alone, be it Alid, Meyrang Alid (i.e., Sriaya Christianity), or others, could only take the movement so far as to consolidate a community-internal identification. But it does not suffice to convince the government that these people do have a unique identity of their own. As a matter of fact, one law-defined condition for the Taiwan-ROC government to recognize a people is that they share, and speak, a common language that is different from those of other groups. In addition, the religion-oriented native NGOs often find themselves repeating similar activities year after year because, after all, their goal is culture *preservation*. While there is nothing wrong about preserving a tradition and such an effort is truly important, the inability to *bring something new to the table* affects the government’s evaluation of the vitality of a culture/people, regardless of how misleading this criterion is. Hence, while focusing on the linguistic aspects, TPSCA has maintained a close alliance relation in particular with the Gabaswa Culture and History Studio, another Siraya NGO led by Mr. Duan Hong-kun that is devoted to the continuation of Alid religion, so that the Siraya groups, together, would always have something to present. In 2006, the Siraya Alliance was formed, and in the same year, it successfully persuaded Tainan County Government (DPP) to register Siraya as a “county indigenous people.” This move on the county level was not only beneficial to the Siraya people but also to the Taiwanese nationalist DPP party for the reasons I have explained earlier. Below, I will use a street protest in 2009 as an example to show how the Siraya and the Low-land Peoples Alliances work.

Shortly after KMT regained its position in Taiwan-ROC central government in May, 2008, the low-land peoples felt betrayed by the nation-state because the new head of Center for Indigenous Peoples (CIP), Zhang Ren-xiang, announced the cancelation, or abolishing, of the
Preparatory Committee for the Recognition of Low-land Peoples, which had just been founded by DPP’s CIP a year earlier. So the low-land groups soon held several meetings to discuss negotiation strategies. At first, they sought to appeal to logic and reason. They organized several academic conferences, inviting (mostly forensics, history, and political science) scholars sympathetic to the low-land peoples’ predicament to give speeches that explained how unlawful and/or unjust the government’s act was. And then they presented the results to CIP, hoping that the government would re-evaluate its decision. In the meantime, the Siraya Alliance also found support in Tainan Magistrate Su (DPP), who would, starting sometime around December, 2008, publicly speak for the Siraya and the low-land peoples in general. This strategy lasted for months until a public hearing in February, 2009, when the Low-land Peoples Alliance finally realized that the KMT government had been unaffected; the government denied every historical evidence the Alliance presented and blamed the non-recognition on low-land individuals having failed to register themselves five or six decades ago. In other words, the government not only showed no interest in redressing its past mistakes but it outright denied that such mistakes were ever committed by itself. So the Alliance members decided to turn to what is known in Mandarin as the “outside of the system” (ti3-zhi4 wai4, 體制外) means, namely, protest. They first decided on the date of the protest, the 2nd of May, which would be a few weeks prior to President Ma’s (KMT) 1-year commencement celebration. Then, each of the Alliance members/organizations was given a quota of mobilizing a certain number of protesters, and they were also asked to come up with some unique activities. As far as the Siraya are concerned, the Gabaswa Studio, together with Tainan Soulang Pokthauiong Association, offered to organize an event called Flying Savage Delivery, and TPSCA offered to prepare a petition, a theme song, some slogans, and a speech. The Flying Savage Delivery was a reenactment of the Siraya tradition of using fast-running
young athletes, or *Bata*, to deliver important messages/documents. This time, the “important document” is a petition drafted by TPSCA\(^3\). And while in the past the Batas relied on their legs, the modern-day Batas ride bicycles. They took off from Tainan the day before the protest and joined the 3,000 or so protesters in front of the Presidential House in Taipei the next day after biking 400 kilometers (or 250 miles). When the Batas arrived, they would also hear a speech given by Ulan, the 10-year-old daughter of Uma and Edgar, in Siraya. Ulan’s speech was short but affectionate. Basically, she said, “I am a Siraya person. I grew up in a Siraya village. I love my village because it is very beautiful and the people there are all very nice.”

It is hard (and probably meaningless) to judge whether the protest was successful or not, for everyone has a different definition of “success.” What I know is that it has attracted much media attention. It made headlines in several newspapers and was reported on TV. And despite some misrepresentation such as referring to all the low-land peoples as a “tribe,” the media now at least make it clear that the low-land peoples have not “disappeared” or been “completely Han-ized.” Some viewers must also have seen Ulan on TV and hence learnt for themselves that the Siraya language is not “dead” or “extinct.” Yet the KMT government remains unmoved until today: It has not even met the rather simple request in the petition, namely, deposing CIP chair Zhang Ren-xiang, let alone restoring the Preparatory Committee for the Recognition of Low-land Peoples. However, Tainan County Government (DPP) has, in addition to recognizing the *collective* Siraya identity, granted the Siraya people the right to register *individually* as indigenous persons. As of October, 2009, 1,191 individuals have been registered. Also, in July,

\(^3\) In March, 2009, right after TPSCA had drafted a Mandarin petition, I drafted an English version and posted it online to seek international supports (see Appendix C).
2009, Taiwan Presbyterian Church, a long-time political supporter of DPP and Taiwanese nationalism, also officially announced that it now acknowledges the Siraya as a people.

Still, politics, and its effects on those who participate in it, are way more complex than what I have presented so far. For example, the Siraya and the low-land activists, while fashioning a counter-discourse from bottom up against that of the state, have also acquired some bad habits from the grand discourse of nationalism, such as overlooking internal differences (or microdiversity) and over-generalizing them into ONE-SAMEness. How such an adaptation of the Mandarin nationalistic discourse may affect the future of the Siraya is explored in the next section.

**Conclusion: Towards a Discourse of Diversity**

**Mutual Influence between Nation-State and the Indigenes**

Throughout this chapter, I have shown that, from the viewpoint of discursive interaction, TPSCA’s activities or projects are all parts of the (low-land) indigenous peoples’ response to the nation-state. When the nation-state forges a “discourse of silence” (see Wodak, 2003), the indigenous peoples would find ways to make sounds (e.g., ONINI) to assert their existence. This is despite the fact that the nation-state has employed various techniques of silencing, from denying the peoples’ access to language and other legal rights, denying its own socio-historical responsibilities, to the complete denial of low-land cultures. And the academics, if not heeding the consequences of their deeds, may also become co-culprits. For example, when the many linguists insist that Siraya is “extinct” and ignore TPSCA’s linguistic achievements, they are giving the government an warrant to state that “Oh, yeah, it may be true that I have heard something [from TPSCA], but this ‘something’ is definitely not Siraya” (see “denial of agency” in Russ, 1983).
In addition, the nation-state of Taiwan-ROC itself is denied in the international discourse. The non-existence of a state affiliation has also led to the denial of all Formosan indigenes on a global scale. The following is an excerpt from Hsieh (2006). Her interviewee Yahani Uuskakavut recounted his encounter with the United Nation officials as a Taiwan delegate in a 1996 UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations meeting.

Chairperson Ms. Erica-Irene Daes, who ruled the WGIP from 1984 to 2001, called him [Mr. Yahani Uuskakavut] to the platform, but first walked down from her seat and requested that Yahani delete the first section of the speech [which was about asserting Taiwan’s status as a nation-state]. Yahani refused. Yet, when he spoke, the UN’s official interpreter stopped translating the speech from [Mandarin] Chinese language to other UN official languages. That same day a Chinese government UN representative spoke publicly and asserted that Taiwan’s statement was not related in any way to indigenous rights, and that the statement was based on the “evil” and incorrect ideal of separatism. China’s representative further stated that “Taiwan is a province of China, a fact that is widely accepted.” (Hsieh, 2006: 48)

However, while until today the Taiwan-ROC government, be it led by DPP or KMT, has not yet been capable of making any significant “noise” on the international stage, the Formosan indigenes have, by their own effort, made themselves heard. For example, in February, 2008, Uma, a person of the domestically unrecognized Siraya, was invited to the Asia Indigenous People’s Preparatory Meeting on UN Mechanisms in Nepal as a member of the Taiwan delegation. She not only performed some Siraya music there but also gave a speech. Hence, I disagree with those contemporary indigenous activists who believe that a national identity, or an affiliation with the nation-state, is absolutely necessary. I doubt if (the identification towards) any kind of nationalism is really relevant to the advancement of indigenous rights.

Back to the domestic domain, the Siraya and the low-land peoples have not only made themselves better heard (e.g., the media report on the 2009 protest), but their bottom-up
movement has also changed the outlook of the big discourse. As I pointed out, until not long ago the big discourse in Taiwan towards the indigenes was still just a singular expression of total ignorance/denial. But today, the DPP at least is attempting to co-opt the low-land identity into its general scheme of Taiwanese nationalism. To co-opt entails to first recognize: one simply cannot co-opt the non-existent. Thus, I see *co-option as an opportunity of negotiation* for the low-land peoples. Some successful examples include the Tainan County Government and the Taiwan Presbyterian Church’s support of TPSCA and acknowledgment of the Siraya identity, as introduced earlier. In other words, the small and big discourses are indeed intertwined, and the bottom-up and top-down *co*-construction of identity is surely fluid and constantly changing:

What is going to happen to the Siraya reclamation in the future must depend on what is said and done today.

**The Discourse of ONE**

Even though the Siraya and other indigenous activists/leaders have resisted the big discourse of the Taiwan-ROC nation-state to some extent, they have not yet been able to resist adopting its language. In fact, they have no choice but to speak and write Mandarin, a language the KMT and DPP politicians have used so masterfully for decades, when engaging themselves in the identity discourse, for Mandarin is the only speech in Taiwan’s high politics. Adopting the Mandarin language means also acquiring its postulates, and thus its thinking patterns. This is so not because linguistic postulates are omnipotent and the speakers must always be vulnerable to their influence, but because people normally do not reflect upon their language behaviors much. They do not analyze the underlying effects, but they just follow the habitual, or conventional, ways. As a result, many of the indigenous leaders today also speak of ONE=SAMEness and are creating a myth of one Formosan people that is not unlike the nationalistic myth of *one Chinese*
and that of one Taiwanese. In addition, they distinguish Self from Other (centrism) and rank different peoples (comparative ranking), suggesting that those who do not identify or agree with them are necessarily inferior and hostile. That is, today, many indigenous leaders in Taiwan in fact speak the *language of inequality* as much as the Han nationalists do.

When used, the discourse of ONE is often selective and layered. The low-land activists tend to align all the low-land peoples with all the officially recognized mountain peoples and invoke an unified sentiment of the indigenous people against the Han, despite the fact that the low-land and the mountain have very different socio-cultural and historical experiences and hence different needs. In fact, some mountain peoples, to whom the low-land activists refer as “our sisters and brothers,” do not welcome the low-land peoples to enjoy the same official status they have enjoyed because sharing the status would mean sharing the resources (such as governmental funding), which are quite limited.

The individual low-land groups also tend to speak of one another as a cohesive and unified whole, falling into the popular myth of one low-land tribe, while they should know that they are not all the same and they do have many internal conflicts. For example, soon after TPSCA published the Siraya dictionary, a non-Siraya person suddenly showed up in an online platform that grants access only to the Low-land Alliance members and accused TPSCA’s work of being “redundant and inappropriate.” Similarly, members of the Siraya Alliance, while always asserting a common Siraya-ness, do not actually always share the same concerns. They reside in different villages, have gone through different circumstances, and believe in different religions. Hence, albeit under the umbrella of Siraya-ness, they do have different identities. And they also

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31 Uma was much bothered by this episode and convinced that the person made the untruthful accusation out of jealousy.
need to share the limited resources: In many cases, members from different villages would work through the Siraya Alliance to request financial support from Tainan County Government, and then they would discuss how to distribute, and often fight for, the money. But conflicts as such are usually kept within and not revealed to the public.

In addition, creeping in along with the adopted Mandarin-Han mentality is the concept of singular leadership and hierarchy, which in turn often provokes jealousy (of power and control). Who is the leader of the Indigenous Movement? Who is the leader of the Low-land Peoples Movement? Who is the leader of the Siraya Movement? My two-year involvement with indigenous politics has revealed to me that such questions do exist in the minds of many activists. In other words, their relationship with one another is not as harmonious as the discourse of ONE suggests; the reality is that they do not always trust one another.

Still, my concern with the discourse of ONE is not that it obfuscates the reality. I do understand that a sentiment of common cause would help with the collective effort my people and my indigenous friends so dearly need. I also understand that sometimes internal conflicts should not be revealed to the outsiders because doing so may affect the morale of the alliances. However, I am worried that such a discourse, which is all too similar to the one the nation-state has used to separate us and to deny us, would do no good in the long run. If we ourselves cannot embrace our internal differences, or the diversity within, with true sincerity, who will appreciate our cause that essentially demands the rights to multiple expressions? To end this section, I will quote a poem by Jolan Hsieh, a Siraya native and a professor of the Department of Indigenous Culture at the National Dong Hwa University (Taiwan), and I will leave its interpretation to my readers. In the poem, originally written in English, “PingPu” is the Mandarin term for “low-land peoples.”
To The PingPu Indigenous Peoples

Our cultural heritage has been taken away
Our traditional lands have been taken away
Our native languages have been taken away
Most important of all
Our indigenous identity has been taken away
But our spirit and soul can never be taken away
United together
We seek self-determination
United together
We peoples reclaim identity
United together
We support all indigenous peoples in the struggle
United together
We are PingPu indigenous peoples

(Hsieh, 2006: v)

Towards Multiple Expressions

Let me reiterate: although language *shapes* people’s perception of the world, it does not completely *control* us. In other words, as proven by examples around the world such as the feminist movement in American English, change (of linguistic behaviors and thinking modes) is possible. Hence, my suggestion to my Formosan low-land friends is that we can still speak Mandarin when discussing/negotiating politics, but we do not need to speak it in the singular and nationalistic way; we can speak it in ways that reflect our native worldsenses. As for how to do it, I offer advices only to the Siraya, for they are the only low-land people I know well.

First of all, we must listen, and by “listen” I mean to understand where each of us comes from and sympathize with one another. So far I have only seen the Siraya activists gathering in meetings and conventions, but I have not seen them visiting one another’s villages and talking to the local people there. As such, the views they receive about one another are often partial and
incomplete; they cannot fully appreciate the concerns of the villages other than their own. So I suggest that the Siraya Alliance organizes some kind of village tour or even homestay that would allow members of different villages/tribes to visit others and learn about their customs and histories.

Second, we should share with one another what we have learnt about Siraya. In the last three Musuhapa camps, there have been some non-TPSCA, or non-Kauchannia-Kaupi, leaders who came to give a speech or lecture, but only few stayed and participated in the full event. I encourage more participation, for if these leaders take all the Musuhapa lessons, they will not only learn some Siraya language and a few songs but also see in the campers’ responses how learning the language does strengthen the identity. For example, in Musuhapa 2008, two people from the Liuxi Village Committee enrolled and were very impressed in the end; the next year Liuxi (Liuxi Elementary) became the first place outside of Kauchannia-Kaupi where TPSCA was given a chance to teach the Siraya language. In the same vein, TPSCA should also encourage its members to participate in the activities hosted by other organizations. Doing so will not only help TPSCA be aware of the aspects of Siraya culture it has previously overlooked, but it may provide new ideas for developing further Siraya language teaching materials or for song-writing.

Third, although sensitive, members of the Siraya Alliance should understand that religion does not necessarily divide us. I said so because even though until now religion, or religious difference, remains more or less a taboo in the Alliance’s meetings, I have observed that for most of the members the shared Sriaya identity actually overrides religion. I will provide an episode here as an example. In 2008, a group of fundamentalists from the Taiwan Church visited the Kaupi Church and learned about TPSCA’s efforts towards Siraya continuation. They questioned Uma of her faith. They asked her, “if, one day, just like in your Siraya superstition [sic], an Inib
comes to your dream and demands you to succeed her, what would you do?” Uma felt offended and was really angry but did not know how to answer. Then Edgar retorted, “What question was that? Uma is our Inib!” In other words, syncretism with Han or with Christianity, it does not matter; “Alid” is still our Siraya Alid. She may have taken up different images in different villages, but she blesses us all. Such is the true spirit of diversity within.

Last but not least, I must point out that our own Siraya past in fact provides us clues towards a collective yet non-singular way of collaboration. Remember, as mentioned earlier, when the 17th-century Siraya people gathered in a meeting, they were all given time to fully elaborate their ideas while others listened attentively. Everyone, no matter their age, gender, or family affiliation, received equal chance of expression. In this way the meetings proceeded: there was no timeline, no schedule, and no rushed decision. Consequently, unlike today’s majority-rule type of democracy, which often translates to the-powerful-rule and, by creating “losers,” leads to jealousy and indignation, the traditional Siraya democracy, that is, the consensus democracy, left no one feeling ignored, mistreated, or silenced. I see no reason why we cannot reenact this egalitarian system in our contemporary meetings and embody its spirits into our discourse.

So I share a sentence Edgar wrote to me in a 2007 email: MAKI-pa-kuting Siraya imita (“COLLECTIVE-to-learn Siraya we”).
Table 5-1. Suggested Siraya consonants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Labial</th>
<th>Labio-dental</th>
<th>Dental</th>
<th>Alveolar</th>
<th>Palatal</th>
<th>Velar</th>
<th>Glottal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Plosive</td>
<td>p, b</td>
<td></td>
<td>t, d</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>k, g</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fricative</td>
<td>f, v</td>
<td></td>
<td>s, z</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>h</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nasal</td>
<td>m</td>
<td>n</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ng</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Lateral</td>
<td></td>
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<td>l</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Trill</td>
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<td>r</td>
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<tr>
<td>Glide</td>
<td>w</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>y</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Table 5-2. Suggested Siraya vowels

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Front</th>
<th>Mid</th>
<th>Back</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>i</td>
<td></td>
<td>u, o</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mid</td>
<td>e</td>
<td>(schwa)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Diphthongs
- aw, ay
- ey
- uy
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FREE</th>
<th></th>
<th>BOUND</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NOM</td>
<td>OBL</td>
<td>NOM</td>
<td>GEN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1S</td>
<td>yaw</td>
<td>yaw-an</td>
<td>-ko</td>
<td>(m)aw</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1P</td>
<td>Inclusive</td>
<td>imita</td>
<td>imita-an</td>
<td>-mita</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Exclusive</td>
<td>imian</td>
<td>imian-an</td>
<td>-kame</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2S</td>
<td>imhu</td>
<td>imhu-an</td>
<td>-kaw</td>
<td>(m)uhu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2P (2S Honorific)</td>
<td>imumi</td>
<td>imumi-an</td>
<td>-kamu</td>
<td>(m)umi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3S</td>
<td>tini</td>
<td>tini-an</td>
<td></td>
<td>tini</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3P</td>
<td>naini</td>
<td>naini-an</td>
<td></td>
<td>nain</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 5-1. Rather be savages
Figure 5-2. An altar of the Siraya religion\textsuperscript{32}

\textsuperscript{32} There is no pot or offerings in it because they have been relocated to a modernized temple nearby.
Figure 5-3. A pot of the Siraya religion
Figure 5-4. A pestle and a mortar for betel nut offering of the Siraya religion
CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION

Throughout this dissertation, I have demonstrated that a research project must be holistic with its approach and as encompassing as possible in its scope to provide a truly comprehensive understanding of the relationship between language and identity and the interaction of the various social influences that factor in the formation of such a relationship. With language and identity both being dynamic and constantly changing, there are many factors to be accounted for. Leaving any of them out would not only yield incomplete research results but also make the research(er) seem partial or even skewed. Crucially, the researcher would want to avoid skewing the data because the issues pertaining to language and identity are highly politically sensitive and hence any claim made about them would create consequences in real-life situations and affect people’s well-being.

This research has revealed that the various factors and social influences behind language and identity are indeed intertwined. They co-construct one another. In addition, as I have shown, all these factors are equally important, despite the fact that I use terms such as “big” and “small” (discourses), and “top-down” and “bottom-up” (influences). The big discourse and policies produced by the (politicians in the) nation-state, while oftentimes giving only limited choices, do not completely dominate or control the individuals they address. The individuals do carry out their free will and/or resistance in the small, personal discourse, in their daily lives, that provides sufficient feedback to the nation-state and motivates it to change. The Siraya Movement serves an example: The Siraya people have been put down, overlooked, ignored, and co-opted during the last four centuries, but they have also maintained faith in their collective identity such that they are now able to move steadily towards reclaiming it by negotiating with the nation-state. Such perseverance is what I admire and to which I wish to pay tribute through this research. In
addition, as a member of the linguistics community and the Siraya people (and the larger indigenous community as well), I have conducted this research hoping to bring changes to the academic and social environments.

**Theoretical and Practical Implications**

Today, many people in linguistics speak of linguistics as a medley of several sub-fields. According to their idea, the “core” linguistics *only* studies the underlying grammar of human language and seeks to find a universal explanation to human linguistic faculty; anthropological linguistics *only* describes and documents the structures of those often understudied languages and focuses on their idiosyncratic uniqueness; sociolinguistics *only* studies the various social factors that affect human languages and linguistic behaviors; and, sometimes, discourse analysis is separated from sociolinguistics in that its main concern is thought to be only with language on the discourse level. There is also a distinction between the “theoretical” and the “applied” kinds of linguistics, implying that the former is somehow superior intellectually to the latter.

Such demarcation, or specialization, in the academic field of linguistics, in my opinion, should not be encouraged. For one thing, it often leads to the misconception that a person in one sub-field *should not* meddle with the affairs of a person in another. For example, an anthropological linguist or a sociolinguist is often expected not to show interest in or have knowledge about how language affects human cognition, which is supposed to be the monopoly of a so-called “core” (and “theoretical”) linguist. However, if the anthropological linguist or sociolinguist does not study the effect of language on human perception, how do they account for the cultural uniqueness and/or social impact that must be inseparable from the linguistic input of the community? So a related question is: Why would some linguists, who are often self-labeled as “theoretical linguists,” denigrate their colleagues in other sub-fields, whose work bears no less
theoretical implications, as “only” doing documentation or application jobs? To assess the intricate politics within the discipline, Bourdieu’s (1990) suggestion of “reflexive practice” must be taken seriously; some discourse analysis needs to be carried out to examine the discourse of linguistics itself.

For another, the discourse of specialization also prescribes and hence limits one’s concern. For instance, a “core” linguist, because she focuses on analyzing the structure of language, is often told not to care about the speakers and their social conditions. Such prescription is unrealistic because, pardon my repetition, there is no way that language, or a language, can be understood without knowing its speakers. It could also generate unwelcomed outcome in a speech community, such as making the people feel that their existence is unimportant and thus their language unworthy of being spoken. But if the language is gone like that, what is left for the linguists to study?

Therefore, I propose a holistic kind of linguistic research that incorporates all sub-fields and bears all their concerns. In the research presented, I started out looking not at a particular language but at a community, namely, Taiwan, where various languages are spoken. In other words, this research is set to be human-centered. I was able to examine each ethno-linguistic group, their development since the earlier days, and their interaction with one another in the modern-day context. That is, I studied them diachronically as well as synchronically so as to understand the sociolinguistic ecology of Taiwan the place. Then I moved on to Taiwan the nation-state and, again, investigated it diachronically as well as synchronically. I studied how the colonial governments, including the present one, have exercised their power through administrating different policies to regulate the people’s linguistic behavior and identity choice. I also looked into detail the political discourse of nationalism. That was when I examined the
grammatical structure of a specific language, i.e., Mandarin Chinese, which is the main language of the discourse. The effort has enabled me to reveal the top-down influence of nation-state from an emic perspective. Then I presented the voices of several individuals, and in their stories I have found resistance from bottom-up. In the end, I combined all the approaches and applied them to the study of Siraya and the Siraya Movement. By doing so, I was able to braid all social and linguistic factors together and show that they are indeed interwoven. Finally, I stepped out of the academic discourse and in to the real world concern and presented a proposal for the Siraya people to move forward towards true diversity and equality with dignity.

Last but not least, such type of research not only travels across linguistic sub-fields, but it also must be inter-disciplinary. To account for nationalism and colonialism, it has to bring up theories of political science that address both domestic politics and international relations (IR). It also needs to consider “culture” in a broader sense than language per se (even though most, if not all, cultural aspects are linguistically constructed) and embrace general anthropology so as to open up the discussions on religion, social structure, and gender composition, for example. In sum, to study humanity, all disciplines and fields in the academic area of “humanities” must share insights and collaborate with one another.

**Limitations and Future Research**

For this research, “time is the limit” is not an overstatement. As I mentioned earlier and as the research has shown, history (and the changes in it) is continuation, not one period replacing another. Many of the policies, discourses, and identity choices I have examined are susceptible to change. And the change may happen any time. Thus, my work here should never be taken as a closure. It only lays out a foundation for follow-ups in the future.
Second, even though this dissertation is heavy in volume, there are still plenty of data left unused. Because my main concern here is the identification process in the nation-state vis-à-vis language, I have focused on the ethno-linguistic and national identities. I have also incorporated age as a factor to show how the colonial history of Taiwan has created very different experiences for people of different generations. However, in the many personal narratives I collected, there are accounts related to other types of identity such as gender, educational background, region of residence, etc. All of them may have also affected the people’s perception of who they are as well as how the world functions. Further research that pays attention to these other factors is hence necessary.

Third, in all honesty, I believe that this research should have a Mandarin version. As stated earlier, one of my practical goals is to induce social change, or change in real life. But the people in Taiwan, whom the content of this research affects the most, do not really read much in English. So eventually I will have to translate (with inevitable rewriting) the research into Mandarin for them. It is my hope that the Mandarin version will not only interest the scholars but also the lay people and the politicians. And I wish that it could bring them towards sympathy and appreciation of one another. After all, it is not to me to whom I wish that the people in Taiwan would listen; it is their own different voices that I hope can be heard.

Fourth, to my Siraya family and friends: We must study our mother tongue more thoroughly and more carefully. As I have shown, language is not just a constellation of sounds and sentences, nor does it merely serve as a symbol of identity. Rather, language is the whole of cultural meaning, and hence the Siraya language should be an indispensible part of our Siraya identity. In this research, I was only able to examine in great detail the fundamental structure of Mandarin and how it has affected our thinking and doing. But I was not capable of doing as
much with Siraya because we do not know enough about it. Yet, if we believe as we do that our Siraya heritage, the culture and the language, has never left us, then we must understand that much of how we think and what we do now is essentially Siraya. To be able to perceive the cultural patterns that make us different from others, we must learn the language as it is first, for if we do not do so, we will risk letting our heritage disappear or yield to the dominant cultures surrounding us (e.g., Mandarin and Southern Min). Still, I am not being a prescriptivist here. All I am saying is that when we re-learn the language spoken by our foremothers, we must also learn, with utmost sincerity, how they used to think and behave. And when we teach the re-learnt mother tongue to our children, we must not treat it so casually that we use it to translate, or imitate, the Mandarin or Southern Min thoughts just because we are so used to them. Learning about oneself is not easy: if we want to do it well, we have to endure the uncomfortable.

Last but not least, the teaching and learning of Siraya we must continue even if one day the nation-state does officially return us our name. This is because all the government can do in terms of redressing its past mistakes is only on the legal level: It may revise the language policy to provide an environment in school that encourages all our children to learn our mother tongue, it may grant our children extra points for being the “original residents” (i.e., “indigenes”) of Formosa, and it may fund our further “cultural activities.” But the identity it gives us, as it has named us so, will be Cil-la1-ya4 (西拉雅), in Mandarin, not “Siraya.” To continue the “Siraya” heritage, we must pass it down to our future generations, like our foremothers have passed it down to us. And we must do it ourselves, in our way, and with our own effort.

1 A language prescriptivist tells other people, even if they are native speakers, how a language should be spoken to be “correct” or “grammatical.” A language prescriptivist believes that only she herself is right and is ignorant to the fact that there are natural variations and changes in a language.
不管過去從什麼地方來，沒有人再把這裡當做異鄉、把自己當做過客，因為我們的代代子孫都將在此安身立命，台灣就是故鄉，每一個人都是主人。

在「台灣主體意識」的發揚以及人民渴望當家做主的民主浪潮之下，國家認同已然成為不分族群、無可迴避的嚴肅課題。

如果連我們都無法確認自己的身分，不能夠凝聚國人對於國家認同的共識，台灣人民將永遠缺乏應有的自信，也無法團結對外、立足於世界的舞台。

但是，很遺憾的，我們無法清楚的說出自己國家的名字—這是多麼令人感傷而難堪的處境！如果沒有國家認同，就無法保衛國家安全，也無從捍衛國家利益！這就是為什麼我們必須堅持「台灣主體意識」，並且誠摯呼籲朝野政黨能夠超越統獨與族群，共同凝聚台灣人民對於國家認同的基本共識。
APPENDIX B
RAMAG’S SIRAYA POEM

異天的色彩，在某處被喚醒，

沉睡已久，此刻正要再生。

用音符開路，穿越時空的屏障，

那一片天，有著被遺忘的聲音，

將在未來發芽，深植在每一片土。

Musuhaba 在燃燒，Meirang Alid 祢看到了嗎?

我們要高聲呼喊，Meirang Alid 祢聽見了嗎?

Siraya 的熱情正活躍著，Meirang Alid 祢感受到了嗎?

古老的故事要繼續轉述，

全世界的耳朵都在等，全世界的眼睛都在看，

等我們親自開動穿梭歷史的大船。
SIRAYA PETITION 2009

Siraya Supports Pingpu (low-land) Peoples in Taiwan for Official Recognition of Collective and Individual Identities

**Statement: Please give us back our names**

For us, it is too long a time that the Pingpu (low-land) indigenous peoples have been forgotten in the modern history of Taiwan. Structural violence in the government’s policy has emptied the phrase “life of Pingpu” and made it a historical term that only awaits condolence. Such policy and history ignore the fact that we are still living strong. For generations, we reside on this beautiful island of Formosa, surviving and reproducing, but we remain unrecognized and our names lost. Today, the Ping-pu peoples have become orphans in our own country. We are absent, with blank names.

Based on (1) the acknowledgment of self-determination as one of indigenous peoples’ basic human rights, (2) the recognition of Siraya people’s own claim to indigenous identity and justice in history, (3) and reassuring the collective will of the indigenous peoples, since the beginning of 2009 Tainan County Government has responded to the Siraya individuals, whose families were registered as “ripe (savage)” during the Japanese occupation of Taiwan, by re-registering them officially as “low-land indigenes.” Such an act has its legal basis: Taiwan Government’s Province Regulation, Item 128663 (1/22/1957), and Civil Regulation, Item 01957 (3/11/1957), clearly state that the individuals registered as “ripe” under Japanese rule should be recognized and re-registered as “low-land indigenes.”

Unfortunately, the Council for Indigenous Peoples under Taiwan’s central government has still not yet responded to the Pingpu peoples’ claim and request. Therefore, Tainan Pingpu Siraya
Culture Association has taken the initiative to start this petition. Also, on May 2nd, 2009, the Siraya people and our friends will gather on Katagalan Blvd. in Taipei for a street protest in front of the central government, to express our voices and seek support from all sectors of the society and governmental institutions. For our children, for the Pingpu group, for the basic human rights, and for justice in the history, we demand the government return the accurate identity and deserved dignity to the Pingpu peoples, who have never disappeared.

Our claims are as follows

1. Council for Indigenous Peoples (CIP) should admit that it is the government’s mistake and its improper laws that have deprived the indigenous identity of the Pingpu peoples. We request CIP redress such mistakes by directing the local governments on the city and county levels, via official administrative orders, that they recognize and return the “indigenous” identity to the Pingpu individuals whose families were formerly registered as “ripe (savage)” under the Japanese rule.

2. CIP should also recognize that there are Pingpu individuals who and/or whose families were not able to be registered as “ripe” under the former governments. Hence, we demand CIP re-examine Item #8 of the Regulation Concerning Indigenous Identity and adhere to the two principles in common legal practice, “analogy” and “applicability,” to provide these individuals a proper legal basis for attaining the official indigenous identity.

3. It is a simple fact that the Pingpu peoples’ concern with attaining official indigenous status is completely constitutional, legal, rational, and humane. Hence, CIP should also seek consensual resolutions for the related issues such as human rights, policies, and their implementations, by having honest conversations with the Pingpu peoples. CIP should never put inadequate political considerations above the basic rights of the Pingpu peoples.
Link to in-depth discussion of Pingpu’s identity issues:

http://www.wretch.cc/blog/Musuhapa/21596834 (only available in Chinese print)

Official blog of the May 2nd event: http://www.wretch.cc/blog/Musuhapa (articles only in Chinese print, but there are related photos)
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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Chun (Jimmy) Huang was born and raised in Formosa/Taiwan. He received a bachelor’s degree in advertising from the National Chengchi University in 2000. In 2002, he moved to the United States to study linguistics at the Michigan State University. He graduated from MSU with a master’s thesis titled *On the Function of Ironic Criticism* in 2004 and then transferred to the linguistics program at the University of Florida for his doctoral research. Huang was awarded his Doctor of Philosophy degree in May, 2010, and is now pursuing an academic career in linguistics and anthropology while he continues working on the reclamation of Siraya language, identity, and culture.