

EMPOWERMENT OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLE IN THE REGULARIZATION,  
SURVEILLANCE, AND PROTECTION OF INDIGENOUS LANDS IN THE BRAZILIAN  
AMAZON

By

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AIKK	Associação Indígena Kawaip Kayabi (Kawaip Kayabi Indigenous Association)
CIMI	Conselho Indigenista Missionário (Missionary Indigenist Council)
CIVAJA	Conselho Indígena do Vale do Javari (Indigenous Council of the Vale do Javari)
CLTEMTA	Comissão de Linhas Telegráficas Estratégicas de Mato Grosso ao Amazonas (Strategic Telegraph Commission of Mato Grosso to the Amazon)
COIAB	Coordenação das Organizações Indígenas da Amazônia Brasileira (Coordination of the Indigenous Organizations of the Brazilian Amazon)
DAF	Diretoria de Assuntos Fundiários (FUNAI's Land Department)
DFID	Departamento de Desenvolvimento Internacional (International Development Department)
FUNAI	Fundação Nacional do Índio (National Indian Foundation)
G7	Group of Seven
GIS	Geographical Information System
GPS	Global Positioning System
GTZ	Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (German Technical Corporation within the FUNAI)
IBAMA	Instituto Brasileiro do Meio Ambiente e dos Recursos Naturais Renováveis (Brazilian Institute of Environment and Renewable Natural Resources)
INCRA	Instituto Nacional de Colonização e Reforma Agrária (National Institute of Colonization and Agrarian Reform)
MSF	Médicos sem Fronteiras (Doctors without Borders).
PPG7	Programa Piloto para a Proteção das Florestas Tropicais do Brasil (Pilot Program to Conserve the Brazilian Rain Forest)
PPTAL	Projeto Integrado de Proteção às Populações e Terras Indígenas da Amazônia Legal (Integrated Project for the Protection of the Indigenous Population and Land of the Legal Amazon)
SETEC	Secretaria Técnica (Technical Secretary of the PPTAL)

SPI	Serviço de Proteção aos Índios (Indian Protection Service)
SUDAM	Superintendência de Desenvolvimento da Amazônia (Superintendency of Development for the Amazon)

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The regularization and protection of indigenous lands is essential for the continued physical and cultural existence of indigenous people in Brazil. The Projeto Integrado de Proteção às Populações e Terras Indígenas da Amazônia Legal (PPTAL – Integrated Project for the Protection of the Indigenous Population and Land of the Legal Amazon), has significantly increased the rate at which the Fundação Nacional do Índio (FUNAI – National Indian Foundation), carries out the land regularization process for indigenous territories.

This thesis examines the ways in which the PPTAL empowered indigenous people in both the land regularization process of the FUNAI as well as in the surveillance and protection of their territories. It also discusses the ways in which the PPTAL transformed the technical standards of the FUNAI. It includes a comparison of two case studies: the Kayabi indigenous territory, located in the Brazilian states of Mato Grosso and Pará, and the Vale do Javari indigenous territory, located in the Brazilian state of Amazonas.

As a result of the innovations introduced by the PPTAL, the land regularization process is more streamlined, less expensive, more flexible, and more accurate. Indigenous people are more aware of the land regularization process and the boundaries of their own lands, and they enjoy

greater autonomy in the actions needed to protect indigenous territories. Indigenous communities are also more integrated with Brazilian national society, due to improved communication, and they are better equipped to protect their own lands from invasion and environmental degradation.

## CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

I first became interested in indigenous people in Brazil over three years before I began my research. I was living in Goiânia, Goiás, Brazil, and I traveled with a friend to his parents' house in Ji-Paraná, Rondônia, Brazil in December of 2004. His father worked for the Fundação Nacional do Índio (FUNAI – National Indian Foundation) and invited us to stay the night at a government post in the municipality of Chupinguaia in the state of Rondônia. We drove for two days until we reached the government post out in the wilderness near the border of Bolivia. There were three indigenous people, who had lost all of the other members of their group, living at the government post. My friend's father explained to me that most likely farmers murdered the members of their group to take the land where they lived. We stayed one night at the government post, and, the following day, we walked out to the Akuntsu indigenous group, a formerly isolated group with just six people remaining.

At the time, I had never heard of the FUNAI, I did not know that it was the subject of hot debate, and I had certainly never come into contact with formerly isolated indigenous people in Brazil. Little did I know that I was standing on such controversial ground. Two years later, while meeting my classmate, Raissa Guerra, for coffee, she suggested that I study the effect of the PPTAL on the land regularization policy of the FUNAI. Raissa, as well as many other colleagues and professors at the University of Florida, helped me establish contacts at the headquarters of the FUNAI, and that is how my research began.

This thesis is about the ways in which the Projeto Integrado de Proteção às Populações e Terras Indígenas da Amazônia Legal (PPTAL – Integrated Project for the Protection of the Indigenous Population and Land of the Legal Amazon) empowered indigenous people and improved technical standards in the land regularization process of the FUNAI and in the

surveillance and protection of indigenous lands. It also seeks to identify the local, national, and international actors that either facilitate or obstruct these processes. It builds on existing literature through the examination of two case studies: the Kayabi indigenous territory and the Vale do Javari indigenous territory.

### **Significance**

In 1500, when Pedro Álvares Cabral first landed in Brazil, there were at least 3.5 million indigenous people. In 1953, twelve years before the establishment of the new Indian foundation, Darcy Ribeiro and Eduardo Galvão, two prominent anthropologists, estimated that only 150,000 of Brazil's tribal Indians remained. In 1972, during the time of the military dictatorship, two individual FUNAI documents listed the indigenous population at 150,000 and 180,000 (Hemming 2003). The presence of non-indigenous groups brings diseases to which the indigenous population has no immunity. The indigenous population suffers devastating losses as a result of these diseases as well as violent interactions with non-indigenous people.

In more recent years, the indigenous population in Brazil reached approximately 600,000 (ISA 2009b). This increase can partially be attributed to better medical and health care provided by the FUNAI to the indigenous population (Hemming 2003). Hemming points out that "The improvement also has a social explanation: security of land tenure and cultural revival have produced a strong birth rate and improved life-expectancy" (Hemming 2003:637). The very survival of the indigenous peoples of Brazil as well as the preservation of their culture is directly linked with the policies of the FUNAI and the implementation of these policies. While indigenous people face many challenges, the regularization of their territory is undoubtedly essential for their continued existence.

The Brazilian government's policies as well as its approach to indigenous affairs have changed drastically since the formation of the first indigenous agency. Cândido Mariano da

Silva Rondon, the first director of the Serviço de Proteção aos Índios (SPI – Indian Protection Service), believed that, although indigenous people had a right to their own lands, they should also eventually be integrated into the national society of Brazil (Diacon 2004; Gomes 2000). When the military dictatorship came to power in 1964, not long before the Brazilian government dismantled the SPI and formed the FUNAI, the development of Brazil took precedence over the protection of indigenous people and their lands (Garfield 1999; Urban and Sherzer 1991).

Although the land on which the indigenous population resides has been contested since the founding of Brazil, the competition for land in the Brazilian Amazon increased significantly in the 1970s and 1980s. Brazil's military government implemented a National Integration Plan in the early 1970s with the goal of populating Amazonia, making use of its natural resources, and modernizing the region. The military regime replaced the National Integration Plan with a National Development Plan in the 1980s. The National Development Plan supported large-scale capitalist ventures with the intention of bringing technological innovations to the region. Large-scale migration brought on by these plans resulted in increased competition for land as well as violent conflict visited upon indigenous people who were trying to hold onto their traditional way of life. During this time period, the military government favored developmentalist policies and made few attempts to protect indigenous lands (Schmink and Wood 1992).

In the 1970s, the Conselho Indigenista Missionário (CIMI – Missionary Indigenist Council) took an innovative approach in an effort to protect indigenous rights. While the missionary council agreed that indigenous people had a right to their own lands, it went further to declare that indigenous cultures and customs also deserved respect. CIMI succeeded in bringing awareness to indigenous issues via campaigns (Hemming 2003). As a result of increased awareness, international entities began to form alliances with indigenous people in the

quest to defend indigenous territories as well as the natural resources located within these territories (Schmink and Wood 1992). The PPTAL is an example of an international project designed to protect the land rights of indigenous people. A study of how indigenous lands are regulated is one avenue for understanding the broader processes that influence the fate of indigenous people in Brazil.

This research is significant not only for indigenous people, but also for the preservation of the natural environment in Brazil. “Under traditional resource management regimes, indigenous people have relatively low negative impact on the environment” (World Bank 2007b:8). In the case of the Kayabi indigenous group, the regularization of their territory would not only ensure their continued physical and cultural existence, but also prevent further deforestation and aid in the conservation of the forested areas in the basins of the Teles Pires, São Benedito, and Cururu Rivers located in this indigenous territory (Mundurukú n.d.).

### **Research**

The Tinker Travel Grant funded my travel from the United States to Brazil as well as other activities related to my research. I carried out my research in Brasília, Distrito Federal, Brazil and in Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.

#### **Brasília, Distrito Federal, Brazil**

I arrived in Brasília on May 30, 2008 and conducted research in this city until June 26, 2008. The vast majority of my research took place at the headquarters of the FUNAI where the main office of the PPTAL is also located. The president of the FUNAI, Márcio Meira, granted me permission to conduct research in the FUNAI including the archives of the FUNAI located at the headquarters. I gathered mostly information pertaining to the two case studies, the Vale do Javari and the Kayabi indigenous territories, in the archives.

Sondra Wentzel, an employee of the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ – German Technical Corporation within the FUNAI) and also an alumna of the University of Florida, acted as an unofficial advisor while I conducted research in Brasília. She provided the annual reports of the PPTAL as well as secondary sources related to the effect of the PPTAL on the land regularization policy of the FUNAI.

She also helped me set up interviews with Márcio Meira; Slowacki de Assis, the Director of Assistance in the FUNAI; Artur Nobre Mendes, an anthropologist in the FUNAI; and Francisco Apurinã, the coordinator for the Coordenação das Organizações Indígenas da Amazônia Brasileira (COIAB – Coordination of the Indigenous Organizations of the Brazilian Amazon). Raissa Guerra, a former employee of the Programa Piloto para a Proteção das Florestas Tropicais do Brasil (PPG7 – Pilot Program to Conserve the Brazilian Rain Forest) and a current student at the University of Florida, helped me set up an interview with Nazaré Lima Soares, the coordinator of the PPG7.

### **Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil**

I carried out my research in Rio de Janeiro from August 11, 2008 to August 21, 2008. I originally intended to conduct research at both the Museu do Índio (Indian Museum) and the Museu Nacional (National Museum) in Rio de Janeiro. However, the library of the National Museum was under construction, and, therefore, I could not access the archives. Also, my two contacts, Antonio Carlos Lima and João Pacheco de Oliveira Filho, from the National Museum, were both out of the office during this time period. I accessed the archives at the Indian Museum and also conducted a confidential interview with an employee of this museum who had previously studied the GTZ.

## **Interviews**

I selected people to interview with whom I had already made contact via professors and students at the University of Florida in Gainesville, Florida. After I arrived in Brasília, Sonda Wentzel suggested people to interview who she believed to be knowledgeable about the PPTAL. At the time that I conducted the interviews in Brasília and Rio de Janeiro, I had not yet narrowed my research topic. My objective in conducting these interviews, at the time, was to determine the impact of the PPTAL on the land regularization process of the FUNAI. I also wanted to determine if the increase in the number of indigenous territories regulated was due to the influence of the PPTAL. I asked those I interviewed the following general questions:

- What was your role in the land regularization process for this project?
- What do you believe are the contributions of the PPTAL to the implementation of the policy of the FUNAI regarding land regularization?
- Why do you believe that the number of indigenous territories regulated by the FUNAI increased during the time of the PPTAL?

Although I later narrowed my research topic to address the ways in which the PPTAL empowered indigenous people and transformed technical standards in the land regularization process of the FUNAI and in the surveillance and protection of indigenous territories, I was unable to return to Brazil to ask more specific questions. However, I used some of the information that I gathered from these interviews to address my revised research question.

## **Conceptual Framework**

This thesis is not simply a list of innovations implemented by the PPTAL in the land regularization process of the FUNAI and in the surveillance and protection of indigenous lands. It focuses on these particular events and sets out to identify the factors that help and hinder these processes. Along the way, it has identified factors that operate locally, such as farmers who

inhabit indigenous territories; factors that operate nationally, such as the Brazilian government and the FUNAI; and factors that operate internationally, such as the PPTAL. Therefore, through the study of innovations implemented by the PPTAL, we can see the net results of the interactions of these various factors operating at different levels of socio-political organization.

### **Structure of this Thesis**

Chapter 2 gives a short history of Brazilian indigenous policy from the time of the first Brazilian agency to the present. Chapter 3 details the land regularization process and defines empowerment. It offers a short history of the PPTAL and the PPG7 which is the umbrella program under which the PPTAL was formed. It also lists the innovations implemented by the PPTAL in the land regularization process of the FUNAI and in the surveillance and protection of indigenous territories. It describes how these innovations arose and the effect that these innovations have had on these processes. Chapter 4 illustrates how these innovations played out in two case studies: the Kayabi indigenous territory, located in the Brazilian states of Mato Grosso and Pará, and the Vale do Javari indigenous territory, located in the Brazilian state of Amazonas. Chapter 5 concludes with a discussion of additional questions and issues that this study inevitably raises.

In order to understand the current issues that surround the land regularization process and the surveillance and protection of indigenous lands in Brazil, it is important to understand the history of indigenous policy in Brazil. We now turn to a short history of Brazilian indigenous policy beginning with Brazil's first indigenous agency.

## CHAPTER 2 HISTORY OF INDIGENOUS POLICY IN BRAZIL

### **Serviço de Proteção aos Índios (SPI – Indian Protection Service)**

Cândido Mariano da Silva Rondon, the first director of the SPI, was born in the Brazilian state of Mato Grosso in 1865 (Diacon 2004). Although he attributed his compassion for the indigenous peoples of Brazil to Positivism,<sup>1</sup> it may have also stemmed from his own indigenous lineage. His maternal great-grandmother was from the Bororo indigenous group, and his mother, in addition to her Bororo extraction, had ancestors from the Terena indigenous group. Rondon spoke both Portuguese and the Bororo language which would later become useful in the course of his interactions with the Bororo people in Mato Grosso (Hemming 2003).

In 1890, Rondon graduated from the Military Academy and the Superior War College where he studied military engineering. He later became a Brazilian army officer and led the Comissão de Linhas Telegráficas Estratégicas de Mato Grosso ao Amazonas (CLTEMTA – Strategic Telegraph Commission of Mato Grosso to the Amazon) which began operating in 1907. The objective of the commission was to build telegraph lines connecting the Amazon basin with the coastal region; however, Rondon also intended to carry out his Positivist ideals via the construction of the telegraph lines. Adherents of Positivism supported the industrialization and modernization of Brazil, and Rondon believed that indigenous people would eventually be integrated into the national Brazilian society (Diacon 2004). He also thought that indigenous

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<sup>1</sup> Positivism, based on the ideas of French philosopher Auguste Comte, began gaining extensive popularity, especially in military and law schools in Brazil, in the early 1880s. Comte believed that man passed through three stages while attempting to explain his relationship with nature. The first stage is theological, the second stage is metaphysical, and the last, and also most complete stage, is positivistic. Adherents to positivism supported industrial progress which they believed could be achieved while maintaining social harmony (Nachman 1977). In fact, one can find the positivist motto, “order and progress,” written on the Brazilian flag (Nachman 1977: 6). Rondon first learned of Positivism at the Military Academy in Rio de Janeiro in 1885 (Diacon 2004).

people “were not racially inferior but merely living in a different (earlier) state of social evolution” (Diacon 2004:104).

Rodolfo Nogueira da Rocha Miranda, the Minister of Agriculture, offered Rondon the directorship of Brazil’s first indigenous agency, and, on September 7, 1910, the Brazilian government established the SPI. Indigenous people in the Brazilian Amazon suffered as a result of discrimination on all levels of society as well as brutal attacks, including the rape of indigenous women, perpetrated by rubber-tappers (Hemming 2003). Through the SPI, Rondon hoped to defend indigenous people from attacks, grant them titles to the lands that they occupied, and reinstate lands seized by non-indigenous people (Diacon 2004). Famous for the quote, “Morrer, se for preciso. Matar nunca” (“Die if you must, but never kill”) (Urban and Sherzer 1991:221), Rondon believed that the civilization of indigenous people should happen peacefully and without force (Diacon 2004).

Rondon used a technique called pacification, now referred to as “attraction,” to establish relationships with indigenous people (Hemming 2003). Pacification entailed leaving gifts on trails for indigenous people and then waiting, sometimes for extended periods of time, to make contact (Urban and Sherzer 1991). Despite Rondon’s intentions, pacifications often led to widespread deaths brought on by diseases to which indigenous people had no immunity as well as invasions by non-indigenous people in indigenous lands (Hemming 2003). Although Rondon’s philosophies concerning indigenous people were forward-thinking at the turn of the century, the SPI regarded indigenous people as wards of the state under Brazilian law, making them the responsibility of the Brazilian government.

In 1915, after only five years, Rondon stepped down from the directorship; however, the Indian agency continued to operate successfully for several more decades (Diacon 2004). In

1953, the SPI established the Indian Museum in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. During this same year, Rondon delivered a letter to President Vargas from Darcy Ribeiro and Eduardo Galvão, two nationally-known anthropologists and indigenists, which requested the creation of the Xingu Indian Park. The idea of an indigenous park functioned not only as a vehicle for the protection of indigenous cultures, but also as an instrument with which to protect the natural environment. The Indian foundation also established 106 posts in indigenous lands by 1955 (Gomes 2000).

Unfortunately, the SPI lacked the resources to fully realize the goals Rondon had envisioned for indigenous people in Brazil (Garfield 1999). Over time, the failure of the indigenous agency was also worsened by abuse. In 1967, “evidence had been found not only of massive corruption, landgrabbing, and labor exploitation, but of massacres, enslavement, rape, torture, and biological warfare against Indians” (Garfield 1999:269). The Brazilian government charged numerous SPI employees of crimes which resulted in the removal of thirty-three employees and the suspension of seventeen. In December of 1967, the SPI ceased to exist, and, in its place, the Brazilian government formed a new agency called the FUNAI (Garfield 1999).

### **Fundação Nacional do Índio (FUNAI – National Indian Foundation)**

Rondon continued to influence governmental policies regarding indigenous people through the philosophies he established during his short time as director for at least forty years after the founding of the SPI (Diacon 2004). The original Indian foundation was responsible for the idea that indigenous people have a right to inhabit their own lands in Brazil (Gomes 2000). Orlando Villas Boas, who worked as an advocate for indigenous people in Brazil, described Rondon as “One of the greatest humanists we have ever had, Rondon was a beacon. Before him, Indians were regarded as beasts. If an Indian was encountered in the forest, he was killed like a pig. It was Rondon who gave a conscience to our laws and turned Indians into respected figures”

(Hemming 2003:136). Because Rondon recognized “Indians as a symbol of Brazilianness,” he remains a prominent figure in the history of indigenous policy in Brazil (Diacon 2004:160).

In 1964, shortly before the formation of the new Indian foundation, the military took power in Brazil (Garfield 1999). At first, government officials consented to an extension of the Xingu National Park as well as the creation of several new indigenous reserves (Davis 1977). The FUNAI established a set of policies including the stipulation that indigenous people had the right to continue to occupy the lands that they originally inhabited when the Portuguese first arrived in Brazil in 1500, and they also had the right to use the natural resources within those lands. The concept behind this stipulation was the physical and cultural preservation of indigenous communities. Paradoxically, the new Indian foundation also carried forward Rondon’s original idea that indigenous people should be integrated into the national society of Brazil at their own pace rather than by force (Hemming 2003).

However, it soon became clear that the military dictatorship was more interested in the rapid development of Brazil than in the protection of indigenous people and their rights (Urban and Sherzer 1991). The FUNAI adopted a developmental model of Indian policy in which indigenous people would be quickly integrated into both the national Brazilian society as well as into the regional economy. This model contradicted the protectionist model, established by the Indian activist brothers, Orlando, Cláudio, and Leonardo Villas Boas, in which indigenous people would live in protected territories and slowly integrate into the national Brazilian society.

Originally attempted by the SPI during the period of its decline in the 1950s and 1960s, Bandeira de Mello reinstated a policy called “renda indígena” (Davis 1977). The FUNAI intended, through this policy, to make its organization financially independent from the government by leasing indigenous lands and by profiting from the sale of natural resources on

these lands (Gomes 2000). According to David Maybury-Lewis in the book, *Nation-States and Indians in Latin America*, “the government did encourage development at all costs and took no measures to protect the Indians from the predictable effects of frontier expansion” (Urban and Sherzer 1991:222).

In 1970, the new president of the FUNAI, General Oscar Jerônimo Bandeira de Mello, made it known that the National Integration Plan to build highways and colonize the less populated rural areas of Brazil would take precedence over the policies established to protect indigenous people. A series of events led up to the voluntary resignation of one of the FUNAI’s most devoted employees in 1972, Antonio Cotrim Soares. There was an influenza outbreak among the members of the Parakanân group after the FUNAI made contact with them in 1970. There were also accusations that agents from the FUNAI sexually assaulted women from this group (Davis 1977). Soares stated when he resigned, “I do not intend to contribute to enrichment of economic groups at the cost of the extinction of primitive cultures” (Davis 1977:68). The FUNAI’s focus was now on rapid development, evident from Soares’ statements regarding the FUNAI’s policies (Davis 1977).

In the pamphlet, *O que é a FUNAI* (What is the FUNAI), published in August 1972, the organization summarizes its official policies more diplomatically (FUNAI 1972). For example, the FUNAI states that it exists to “protect the biological equilibrium and the cultural standards of the Indian in his contact with regional society, taking him and integrating him slowly, without sudden changes” (FUNAI 1972:1).<sup>2</sup> In addition to development and integration, the FUNAI provided health care, granted agricultural assistance to indigenous groups already integrated into

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<sup>2</sup> All translations were made by the author unless otherwise stated.

the national society of Brazil, sold craftwork of the indigenous people, and planned to offer a course to those interested in working for the FUNAI (FUNAI 1972).

On December 19, 1973, the FUNAI passed a new law called the *Indian Statute* (Gomes 2000). The *Indian Statute* provided further confirmation of the FUNAI's commitment to respect and preserve the culture of the indigenous people. Paradoxically, it also stated that the FUNAI would provide means for the development and assimilation of the indigenous peoples. The statute gave Indians the right to remain on the land they inhabited permanently, and made it illegal for those outside of the group to use the land for such purposes as hunting, fishing, agriculture, pastoral, or extractive activities (FUNAI 1974). The FUNAI, however, reserved the right to either restrain the Indians or remove them (temporarily or permanently) for the following reasons (FUNAI 1974:7):

- “To put an end to fighting between tribal groups.”
- “To combat serious outbreaks of epidemics that may lead to extermination of the native community or any disease that may endanger the integrity of the forest-dwellers or tribal group.”
- “For the sake of national security.”
- “To carry out public works of interest for national development.”
- “To repress widespread disorder or deforcement.”
- “To work valuable subsoil deposits of outstanding interest for national security and development.”

The *Indian Statute* also stated that indigenous peoples fell under the authority of the FUNAI, which required the non-integrated native peoples to work through the FUNAI in dealing with others outside of their own groups (Gomes 2000). Indigenous people were considered wards of the state and held the same status, “minor,” as people under the age of eighteen in

Brazil (Ramos 1984). The intention of this provision was to protect the native peoples from exploitation.

The Brazilian government devised an Indian Emancipation Project under the presidency of General Ernesto Geisel. With their emancipation, indigenous people would become Brazilian citizens with a full set of rights; however, the true intention of this proposal was to dissolve the protective barrier between Indians and others. It would allow non-indigenous people direct access to indigenous lands and the natural resources located on those lands (Gomes 2000). Not only would indigenous people lose the guardianship and protection of the FUNAI, they would also no longer be allowed to practice some of their own traditions which conflicted with Brazilian law (Ramos 1984). Some examples of illegal cultural practices under Brazilian law are “nudity, polygamy, infanticide, and use of hallucinogens” (Ramos 1984:95). Fortunately for indigenous groups, there was much protest in the international community against this project, and the military regime never carried out this scheme (Gomes 2000).

In the early 1970s, the Brazilian military government devised a National Integration Plan with the objective of populating and modernizing Amazonia. The construction of the Transamazon highway as well as tax and credit programs offered by the Superintendência de Desenvolvimento da Amazônia (SUDAM – Superintendency of Development for the Amazon) encouraged investors to buy large plots of land which they often converted into pastures. Large-scale migration resulted in competition for land, and those native to the region often suffered violent conflict while trying to defend their traditional way of living (Schmink and Wood 1992).

In the 1980s, the debt crisis in Brazil along with a growing number of poor people in rural areas prompted the Brazilian government to create a National Development Plan (Urban and Sherzer 1991). The new focus became large-scale capitalist development in the Amazon

region. The National Development Plan resulted in violent conflict among those competing for land and natural resources, and the effect of this plan on indigenous people was devastating (Schmink and Wood 1992). Contact with non-indigenous people resulted in deaths due to diseases to which indigenous people had no immunity. The traditional way of life of groups that were formerly isolated gave way to prostitution and begging when they came into contact with civilization (Ramos 1984). The military regime and the FUNAI viewed natives as an impediment to the development of Brazil (Schmink and Wood 1992).

The CIMI, a radical missionary council founded by the Catholic Church, began defending indigenous rights in the 1970s. Influenced by liberation theology, the CIMI held the belief that indigenous people had a right to inhabit their lands and also that indigenous culture and customs should be respected. The CIMI also launched a campaign to bring about awareness of the issues faced by indigenous people (Hemming 2003). At the end of the 1980s, indigenous people had developed international political relationships in their pursuit to defend the right to their native lands and natural resources (Schmink and Wood 1992). In 1985, the end of the military dictatorship in Brazil brought radical changes in favor of indigenous people.

The new 1988 Federal Constitution outlines two concepts that differ drastically from the Indian policy of the past (Hemming 2003). First, the constitution eliminated the clause that called for the assimilation of indigenous people into the national Brazilian society, “because that implied that Indians were a transient social class ultimately doomed to disappear” (Hemming 2003:350). Interestingly, Rondon had also come to the conclusion later in his life that his earlier view of Indians, as people who were not fully evolved, was incorrect.<sup>3</sup> He eventually realized

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<sup>3</sup> During the 1940s, ideas regarding indigenous people began to change. Although the Getúlio Vargas administration secretly believed the “white” race to be superior, denunciation of racial intolerance was en vogue during this time period. The Brazilian national society began to focus on the positive role that indigenous people had played in the formation of the country. The changes taking place in society prompted Rondon to reexamine his

that he preferred the native way of life as opposed to the destructive nature of the advance of colonization. This new stipulation in the constitution ensured that indigenous people were free to practice their native customs and practices without interference from non-indigenous people. Indigenous people now hold the same rights as ordinary Brazilian citizens, but they also continue to enjoy the protection of the Brazilian government, at least in theory.

The 1988 Constitution also granted indigenous people the right to inhabit their native lands and prohibited non-indigenous people from occupying indigenous territories and from exploiting the natural resources located in these lands. Although the Brazilian government remains the official owner of indigenous territories, the FUNAI set a deadline specifying the delimitation of all of the indigenous territories listed in the 1988 Constitution by 1993 (Hemming 2003).

In January of 1996, around the time of the initiation of the PPTAL, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, the President of Brazil, enacted Decree 1775 which would allow “state governments and commercial interests to challenge the demarcation of indigenous lands, including those lands whose demarcation processes have already been initiated” (Moore and Lemos 1999:445). The “Genocide Decree,” as many often referred to it, triggered fear and anger, both nationally and internationally, among those who supported indigenous rights. Many feared that those who had economic interests in the exploitation of indigenous lands would now have the opportunity to challenge demarcations. If those who challenge the demarcation are successful, this could also lead to the exploitation of natural resources and the destruction of indigenous lands.

The Brazilian government, however, claims that Decree 1775 actually protects indigenous territories from perpetual challenges once the Brazilian government denies or settles

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own ideas concerning indigenous people (Hemming 2003). Rondon readily joined this campaign and later gave a speech regarding “Indians’ contribution to the greatness of Brazil” (Hemming 2003:215).

initial disputes. In the case of the Raposa/Serra do Sol indigenous territory, the enactment of Decree 1775 opened the way for numerous appeals which contested a staggering ninety-nine percent of this territory (Moore and Lemos 1999). Aside from this extreme case, the Brazilian government has rejected most attempts to challenge indigenous territories already established (Lisansky 2005).

CHAPTER 3  
LAND REGULARIZATION AND THE PROJETO INTEGRADO DE PROTEÇÃO ÀS  
POPULAÇÕES E TERRAS INDÍGENAS DA AMAZÔNIA LEGAL (PPTAL – INTEGRATED  
PROJECT FOR THE PROTECTION OF THE INDIGENOUS POPULATION AND LAND OF  
THE LEGAL AMAZON)

In order to understand the role of the PPTAL in the land regularization process of the FUNAI, it is first necessary to describe the steps involved in this process. According to the FUNAI, the process of land regularization is composed of the following steps (FUNAI 2009a).

**Process of Land Regularization**

- I. Identification and delimitation: a technical work group, comprised of experts from the FUNAI, the Instituto Nacional de Colonização e Reforma Agrária (INCRA – National Institute of Colonization and Agrarian Reform) and the state secretary of the region where the indigenous territory in question is located, carries out historical and anthropological studies as well as field surveys in order to prepare a comprehensive report on which all other steps of the land regularization process will be based. The indigenous community also plays a part in all of the sub-phases of both the identification and delimitation. The report is then published in the official gazette of the state where the indigenous territory is located. Non-indigenous people who wish to challenge the identification and delimitation must do so within a ninety-day period from the date that the report is published.
- II. Declaration: the Ministry of Justice reviews the report submitted by the technical work group and also any complaints lodged by those contesting the demarcation of the land. If there are no issues regarding the report, the Ministry of Justice issues a declaration of the indigenous territory which specifies the area, perimeters, and limits to be used in the physical demarcation.
- III. Demarcation: the physical demarcation takes place in the field. This step of the process includes an estimation of the cost of the demarcation, a selection of the type of demarcation to be used, the execution of the demarcation, and a receipt of the services carried out.
- IV. Compensation and Resettlement: The technical work group conducts surveys regarding non-indigenous people located in the proposed indigenous territory during the identification and delimitation. A special commission analyzes these surveys, and, if it is determined that the non-indigenous people that occupy the indigenous territory do so in good faith, they receive a payment as well as priority for resettlement by the INCRA.
- V. Homologation and Registration: The President of Brazil issues a decree which officially recognizes the proposed indigenous territory. The registration is also published at the state and municipal levels.

It is also important to understand the origins of the PPTAL: who created this project and how the idea for this project arose. The following section on the history of the PPTAL will also define empowerment in the sense that it is used to describe the ways in which the PPTAL brought indigenous people into the land regularization process of the FUNAI and also into the process of the surveillance and protection of their own lands.

### **History: PPTAL**

#### **Programa Piloto para a Proteção das Florestas Tropicais do Brasil (PPG7 – Pilot Program to Conserve the Brazilian Rain Forest)**

The PPTAL is part of an umbrella program called the PPG7. The Group of Seven (G7) industrialized countries (the United States, Canada, Germany, France, Italy, the United Kingdom, and Japan) first initiated discussions regarding the formation of the PPG7 during a meeting in Houston, Texas in 1990 (FUNAI 2009b). Two years later, in 1992, the PPG7 began operating with the goal of maximizing “the environmental benefits of rain forests through the implementation of pioneering projects that contribute to the ongoing reduction of the deforestation rate in Brazil” (World Bank 2009).

#### **PPTAL**

The PPG7 formed the PPTAL in 1994 shortly after the FUNAI failed to reach its goal for the regularization of the indigenous territories listed in the 1988 Constitution; however, the Project did not begin operating until 1996. The initial objective of the PPTAL was to assist the FUNAI in the regularization of the indigenous lands in the Brazilian Amazon as well as in the protection of indigenous lands already regulated. Through the regularization and protection of indigenous lands, the PPTAL hoped to improve the lives of indigenous people (World Bank 2007a). Although the PPTAL is part of the FUNAI, the German government provided the main source of funding for the Project (FUNAI 2008).

It is important to note that the Brazilian government originally viewed indigenous issues as a “matter of national security and thus off limits to international actors' influence” (Rodrigues 2002:491). During the rule of the military dictatorship, policies regarding indigenous people were crafted with developmentalist objectives in mind. For instance, in the early 1980s, the Brazilian government was hesitant to discuss the protection of indigenous people with the World Bank during the Polonoroeste highway development project (Rodrigues 2002). Due to the sensitivity towards indigenous issues in Brazil, it is surprising that the Brazilian government allowed an international project, such as the PPTAL, to make radical changes in the procedures of the FUNAI.

As mentioned earlier, organizations, such as CIMI, began to bring international awareness to indigenous issues in the 1970s (Hemming 2003). During the 1980s, indigenous people enjoyed a growing alliance with international environmental and human rights groups (Rodrigues 2002). At the time, the World Bank administered the PPG7 and had established a set of policies advocating “respect for cultural diversity and self-determination by indigenous groups, with considerable attention to land tenure and natural resource issues, indigenous rights and participation” (Lisansky 2005:175). The Brazilian government recognized that the demarcation of the indigenous territories remaining in the Amazon was urgent especially considering the rapid development taking place in the region. The financial support that the Brazilian government could obtain via this international project prompted it to reconsider its position regarding this issue.

The funds allocated to the PPTAL, during the development stage of the project, an estimated US\$20.9 million, financed four main components (World Bank 2007b). The first component, “Regularization of Indigenous Lands,” consisted of a budget of US\$16.6 million to

assist in the regularization process of a set list of indigenous lands in the Legal Amazon (World Bank 2007b:10). The second component, “Surveillance and Protection of Indigenous Areas,” provided US\$1.6 million to establish activities in indigenous communities with the purpose of training indigenous people in the defense of their own lands while preserving natural resources necessary for their survival (World Bank 2007b:11). The third component, “Capacity-Building and Studies,” also provided US\$1.6 million “to strengthen the protection of indigenous populations and regularization and improved conditions for the management of indigenous lands by means of training and studies” (World Bank 2007b:11). The fourth component, “Support for Project Management,” “supported project management, monitoring and evaluation, and the project advisory commission” with a budget of US\$1.1 million (World Bank 2007b:11).

In conjunction with the PPTAL and the PPG7, the FUNAI published a report which contained the total number of indigenous territories as well as the total area in hectares that the PPTAL assisted in identifying and demarcating as of May 2008. Of the 114 indigenous territories that the PPTAL identified with a total area of 12,769,048 hectares, the Brazilian government issued a Presidential Decree for 76 indigenous territories with a total area of 11,756,526 hectares. The PPTAL also demarcated 173 territories with a total area of 47,042,559 hectares of which the Brazilian government issued a Presidential Decree for 99 indigenous territories with a total area of 38,000,000 hectares (FUNAI 2008).

### **Empowerment**

In order to demonstrate that the PPTAL empowered indigenous people, we must first define empowerment. Jo Rowland, co-director of Manantial Women’s International Link, states “In the context of the conventional definition, empowerment must be about bringing people who are outside the decision-making process into it” (1995:102). This, however, is only one element of empowerment. Rowland also offers a more comprehensive definition of empowerment that

contains three dimensions: personal, close relationships, and collective (Rowland 1995).

“Personal ... empowerment is about developing a sense of self and individual confidence and capacity, and undoing the effects of internalized oppression” (Rowland 1995:103). In a broader sense, empowerment also requires “developing the ability to negotiate and influence the nature of the relationship and decisions made within it” (Rowland 1995:103). Collective empowerment occurs when “individuals work together to achieve a more extensive impact than each could have had alone” (Rowland 1995:103).

The indigenous groups that inhabit the Vale do Javari indigenous territory mobilized themselves and formed their own indigenous organization in 1991. The purpose of the Conselho Indígena do Vale do Javari (CIVAJA – Indigenous Council of the Vale do Javari), is to unite indigenous peoples and communities in a common struggle for land, improved education and healthcare as well as other benefits (Gusmão 2002b). This is evidence that, at least three years *before* the beginning of the PPTAL, Indians from the Vale do Javari indigenous group felt a sense of personal empowerment and mobilized collectively in order to influence policies which directly affected their interests.

Katrina Brown and Sérgio Rosendo define two types of empowerment: economic and political (2000). Empowering in the economic sense “implies finding means to facilitate and assist the efforts of resource-poor groups to meet their needs, either through their own organization or through pressure on the State and other groups to make them act in their interests” (Brown and Rosendo 2000:202). Political empowerment takes place when indigenous people have “access to the political structures and formal decision making necessary, for example, to enable people to gain control over land and resources” (Brown and Rosendo 2000:203).

The FUNAI, rather than the PPTAL, named the indigenous territories to be regulated in the 1988 Constitution (Hemming 2003). However, Márcio Meira, the president of the FUNAI, acknowledged, in an interview conducted on June 24, 2008, that “The PPTAL was important and even fundamental in the case of Amazonia, because it was an instrument.”<sup>4</sup> Nonetheless, he also stated that “the principal cause of the increase in the demarcations of indigenous lands in Brazil in the 1990s was not the PPTAL, it was the constitution.”<sup>5</sup> Moreover, although the PPTAL contributed human and financial resources to carry out the regularization of the indigenous territories, this project worked with the FUNAI to ensure the continued physical and cultural survival of indigenous groups rather than pressuring the Indian Foundation to change its policies regarding indigenous people and the regularization of their land. In an interview conducted on June 24, 2008, Artur Nobre Mendes, an anthropologist of the FUNAI, stated that, “Every revision of the demarcation procedures was made (by the PPTAL) without needing to alter the Brazilian legislation.”<sup>6</sup>

Still, while the PPTAL worked within a structure established by the Brazilian constitution and promoted by the FUNAI, there is no question it made a significant difference and that it did so precisely through indigenous empowerment. The conventional definition of empowerment, in which people who formerly could not make decisions are enabled to make them in order to influence their own future, best fits the effect of the PPTAL on indigenous people, and this article will refer to this dimension of empowerment. While the 1988 Constitution empowered indigenous people politically, the PPTAL made that more effective, and thus assisted the FUNAI in carrying out its own policy. This is not to suggest that indigenous people have no agency

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<sup>4</sup> Márcio Meira, interview by author, Brasília, DF, Brazil, June 24, 2008.

<sup>5</sup> Meira 2008.

<sup>6</sup> Artur Nobre Mendes, interview by author, Brasília, Distrito Federal, Brazil, June 24, 2008.

themselves, indeed, as noted earlier, in the case of the Vale do Javari, any internal transformations that took place in the broad sense of empowerment occurred before the time of the PPTAL.

### **Issues Encountered by the FUNAI**

The PPTAL developed the four components mentioned in the previous section in response to some of the issues that the FUNAI faced in the land regularization process and in the surveillance and protection of indigenous lands. While the PPTAL introduced several new innovations within these components in an attempt to resolve the multiple issues the Project encountered, this thesis focuses on the issues related to the innovations that empowered indigenous people as well as the technical innovations that the German government supported through the GTZ. It will also compare and contrast the two specific case studies, the Vale do Javari indigenous territory and the Kayabi indigenous territory, which contained the same set of PPTAL innovations yet resulted in two very different outcomes.

The PPTAL empowered indigenous people through four main mechanisms. First, the Project involved indigenous organizations in the “Identification” and “Demarcation” steps of the process of land regularization of the FUNAI. After the regularization of the indigenous territory had taken place, the PPTAL instructed indigenous people in the protection of their own lands. The Project further empowered indigenous people through capacity building, training, and technical assistance. Finally, the PPTAL brought indigenous people into the decision-making process for proposed PPTAL projects.

The PPTAL also introduced several technical innovations, some of which, as we will see, the Project used as instruments with which to empower indigenous people. These technical innovations include: the installation of networks of radio-phones, the implementation of video

and photography in the land regularization process, the use of global positioning systems (GPS), and the creation of geographical information systems (GIS).

The PPTAL allowed indigenous organizations to participate in the “Identification” and “Demarcation” steps of the process of land regularization of the FUNAI in order to better understand where the borders of the indigenous territories lie and also to better understand the relationship between the indigenous people and their environment. Before the time of the PPTAL, the President declared indigenous territories with very little input from indigenous people or their organizations (Lisansky 2005). Artur Nobre Mendes also pointed out that, in the past, indigenous participation “existed, but it was not systematized. The Indians participated only in so far as they were able to mobilize themselves and to influence the demarcation.”<sup>7</sup>

Before the initiation of the PPTAL, the FUNAI experimented on rare occasions with a participatory self-demarcation method. This method differed from the conventional method in that the FUNAI contracted individuals, rather than companies, to assist indigenous people with the demarcation. The indigenous people who completed the physical tasks of the demarcation enjoyed a sense of ownership of the process. Unfortunately, this method was also time-consuming and, therefore, not realistic for meeting the deadline set by the FUNAI for the demarcation of all of the indigenous territories listed in the 1988 Constitution.

Therefore, when the Project began, it set out to develop a demarcation method that was both participatory and practical. The PPTAL developed four demarcation methods during the life of the Project, each one progressively more participatory. The minimal participation method, used mainly between 1996 and 1998, allowed indigenous people to monitor the work of

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<sup>7</sup> Mendes 2008.

contracted companies during the demarcation. The PPTAL employed this demarcation method when there was no indigenous group that could take on a more active role (Abers 2001).

The second method is institutional networking where a local indigenous group receives support from an external organization, such as “indigenous organizations that operate at the level of ethnicity,” regional indigenous organizations, and indigenist organizations, that are familiar with the indigenous territory and have worked with the local indigenous group in the past (Abers 2001:69). The third method, anthropological facilitation and support, seeks the input of local indigenous organizations during the planning of the demarcation. The plan that the indigenous organization develops will later be used by the anthropologists and other specialists in the work group to carry out the demarcation. The PPTAL has used this method since 1999.

The last method, direct partnerships, involves the same type of input from indigenous organizations in the planning of the demarcation as the previous method. However, this method also allows indigenous organizations to participate in the physical demarcation and support the work of the anthropologist in some instances. This is the method to which I will refer, and it is also the method used in the case of the Vale do Javari indigenous territory. Ideally, the indigenous organization that takes part in the physical demarcation should represent all of the ethnic groups in the indigenous territory being demarcated (Abers 2001).

The inclusion of indigenous organizations in the “Identification” and “Demarcation” steps arose from a need for environmental diagnostics which had previously not been a part of the land regularization process. Identification teams were not always fully aware of the ways in which indigenous people utilized the resources in their lands. In some instances, indigenous people themselves were unaware of the official boundaries of their lands due to an absence of indigenous participation in the land regularization process.

The geo-referenced database is one method that the PPTAL used to identify and monitor the environmental conditions in indigenous lands, especially during the identification step of the land regularization process. The PPTAL also used this database to carry out ethno-ecological surveys to aid in the management, surveillance, and monitoring of indigenous territories that have already been regulated. The implementation of the GIS called for the development of manuals of cartography, maps of indigenous territories, and a data bank (Lisansky 2005).

In 2002, the PPTAL partnered with the Diretoria de Assuntos Fundiários (DAF – FUNAI’s Land Department) to create a geo-referenced database (GIS) of indigenous territories on the level of the PPTAL rather than on the level of the FUNAI (Viergever 2005). “A geographic information system (GIS) integrates hardware, software, and data for capturing, managing, analyzing, and displaying all forms of geographically referenced information” (GIS 2009). A GIS application can be used as a database, a mapping instrument, a modeling tool, or a combination of these three functions. The geographical information can also be derived from multiple sources (ESRI 2008).

The PPTAL utilized GPS receivers to gather geographical information for the geo-referenced database. “The GPS is made up of three parts: satellites orbiting the Earth; control and monitoring stations on Earth; and the GPS receivers owned by users” (GPS 2009). GPS receivers receive signals from these satellites and produce accurate data, including the latitude, longitude, and altitude, for the position where the receiver is located. It also supplies navigation services and the time. The GPS is based in the United States and available without charge to civilians and governmental agencies (GPS 2009).

The result of the implementation of this technological innovation is that work groups carry out the identification and demarcation steps of the land regularization process in a more

accurate and efficient manner. The improved efficiency and simplification also reduces the cost of the process (Viergever 2005). Judith Lisansky points out that “such a system will be an essential tool for the improved protection of indigenous lands and perhaps someday, improved ethno-ecological management plans for natural resources” (2005:182). The current geo-referenced database operates on the level of the PPTAL and has not yet been integrated into every department within the FUNAI. However, the FUNAI intends to expand the GIS to include all indigenous lands in the future.

Along with the implementation of the GIS, the inclusion of indigenous people in the “Identification” and “Demarcation” steps of the land regularization process resulted in more accurate boundaries and more frequent mobilization of indigenous groups in the land regularization process. The PPTAL and the FUNAI also benefited from a better understanding of indigenous lands and the resources contained within these lands, while indigenous people became better informed of the new boundaries and the process of land regularization (Lisansky 2005). It is also possible that the simplification of demarcations not only made the process more cost efficient but also more sustainable. However, long-term evaluations of the effect that more participatory demarcations have had on the conservation of natural resources have not yet been performed (Viergever 2005).

Unfortunately, a participatory demarcation method is not ideal for all indigenous territories. There are instances where indigenous people within an indigenous group differ greatly in terms of culture and lack cohesiveness to participate in the demarcation as a team. Some indigenous groups have political structures that conflict with a participatory demarcation model. As a result, the PPTAL encountered many indigenous territories that lacked an indigenous organization that could participate in the demarcation. It should also be noted that

representatives of indigenous organizations may not necessarily share the same ideas as the indigenous community as a whole; and, therefore, the presence of indigenous people in the demarcation does not necessarily suggest that their participation benefits the entire community.

When the PPTAL managed to incorporate indigenous organizations into the demarcation process, the Project met with other challenges. Time constraints sometimes limited the ability of indigenous groups to supervise the work groups responsible for the physical demarcations. There were instances of a lack of communication between the headquarters of the FUNAI, the companies contracted to carry out the demarcation, and the indigenous organizations. As a result, indigenous organizations were sometimes unprepared to participate when the work groups arrived without notice. Indigenous organizations were also unable to participate in some cases when the FUNAI could not provide funding in a timely manner. Finally, if an anthropologist was not present, indigenous organizations ran into difficulties communicating with other members of the work groups (Abers 2001).

Secondly, the PPTAL empowered indigenous people to protect their own lands after the completion of the land regularization process through such methods as installation of radio systems in indigenous territories (Lisansky 2005). Providing indigenous people with vehicles is another means to support surveillance of an indigenous territory (Pohl and Viergever 2007). Other innovations include reorganization of occupied areas in a territory to strengthen the land against invasions (Viergever 2005).

In partnership with indigenous organizations and the non-governmental organization, Amigos da Terra (Friends of the Earth), the PPTAL installed radio systems in villages and also within indigenous organizations (Lisansky 2005). The installation of radio-phones arose from a need to provide better communication between indigenous groups. It also allowed indigenous

groups to communicate with governmental and non-governmental organizations. This innovation is especially important for indigenous communities located in remote areas without easy access to a nearby city (FUNAI 2008).

The PPTAL also developed this innovation in response to invasions by non-indigenous people in indigenous territories. As a consequence of competition for land and natural resources, issues such as mining, deforestation, fishing, hunting, extraction of non-forest products, and tourism threatened to disturb the environments in which indigenous people lived. Drug-trafficking in indigenous territories also became a concern. Government organizations such as INCRA sometimes encroached on indigenous territories, as was the case in the Kayabi indigenous territory (Pohl and Viergever 2007).

The result of this technical innovation was an improvement in the communication among indigenous communities as well as between indigenous communities and outside organizations (Lisansky 2005). Indigenous people use the radio-phones to arrange meetings, plan parties, and keep in touch with relatives living in other indigenous communities. The radio-phones can be used in case of an emergency such as an illness or death. Radio-phones also greatly reduce the need to travel to other indigenous territories and to cities which results in saved time and oil that would normally be used to travel by motor vehicle (Gusmão 2002a).

In turn, better communication led to greater integration between indigenous groups (FUNAI 2008). Luciene Pohl and Marcel Viergever point out that “the mobilization (of indigenous people) also depends on the cohesion of the population and/or the institutional capacity of the indigenous association or of the indigenist organization involved in the implementation of the project, to mold that cohesion” (Pohl and Viergever 2007:89). Indigenous people are better able to protect their own territories if the indigenous groups located within a

territory have good relationships as well as open lines of communication. Studies carried out by the PPTAL indicate that invasions into indigenous territories declined as a result of surveillance performed by indigenous people (Pohl and Viergever 2007).

Therefore, radio-phones promote indigenous participation and cohesiveness in the protection and surveillance of their territories which leads to the prevention of invasions by timber merchants, fishers, and hunters. The FUNAI lacks the human and financial resources to adequately protect indigenous territories, and other organizations, such as the forest police, many times neglect to perform this role sufficiently. The PPTAL's earlier attempts to strengthen police protection in indigenous lands had also failed, and, for that reason, the PPTAL opted for projects, such as the installation of radio-phones, to mobilize indigenous people in the protection and surveillance of their own lands (Gusmão 2002a). However, the question remains as to whether indigenous people will be able to maintain the surveillance of their own lands without the support of the PPTAL. A small number of indigenous groups were able to generate the funds necessary through economic activities, but most were not able to offset the costs of protecting their own lands (Pohl and Viergever 2007).

Thirdly, the PPTAL empowered indigenous people through capacity-building, training, and technical assistance (Lisansky 2005). Capacity-building is comprised of two themes: "Indigenous Rights and the Process of Regularization" and "Monitoring of Demarcation, Protection Actions, and Surveillance" (Viergever 2005:26). In the first theme, the PPTAL provides training for indigenous people with regard to indigenous land rights, the process of land regularization, indigenous land and environmental legislation, and the protection of the indigenous land, surveillance, and territorial management. In the second theme, the PPTAL offers education on the subject of cartography and GPS, photography and video, radio-phones,

maintenance of engines, management of resources for the protection of indigenous lands, and administrative management of projects (Viergever 2005).

The PPTAL implemented capacity-building activities in response to a request from indigenous representatives for training (Lisansky 2005). These innovations also arose from a need to demonstrate how the land regularization process is carried out (PPTAL n.d.). In some instances, indigenous people themselves were unaware of the boundaries of their own territories. GPS receivers enabled indigenous people to identify their locations within the indigenous territory, and training in cartography gave indigenous people the ability to create maps of their own lands. Indigenous people can also utilize GPS receivers to pinpoint the areas where invasions occur (Lisansky 2005). Similar to the radio-phones, video and photography of the land regularization process disseminates information to both the local and international community (PPTAL n.d.).

The result of this innovation is a greater understanding of the boundaries of the indigenous territory by the indigenous people. Indigenous people were able to report more accurately the locations where invasions occurred to the appropriate governmental agencies (Postigo 2002). Indigenous people also acquired a better understanding of the processes that take place and the methods used in the land regularization process and in the surveillance and protection of indigenous lands (Lisansky 2005). Not only have indigenous people become increasingly aware of the steps required to carry out the land regularization process and to protect indigenous territories, video and photography enable the FUNAI and the PPTAL to distribute this information to foreign countries (PPTAL n.d.).

Finally, the PPTAL deliberately requested the input of indigenous people into proposed PPTAL projects. A committee that included indigenous representatives first offered consultative

support to the PPTAL, and in 2001, acquired the authority to make decisions regarding the PPTAL's projects. Indigenous people, who were once considered incapable of making decisions that determined their own fate, now directly influenced policies within the indigenous organization (Lisansky 2005). Marcel Viergever, coordinator of the technical cooperation of the Departamento de Desenvolvimento Internacional (DFID – International Development Department) of the PPG7 projects, observes that “the FUNAI, at least on the level of the headquarters, is today more open, more transparent, more organized, and less paternalistic with respect to the Indians than when the PPTAL began” (2005:48).

## CHAPTER 4 CASE STUDIES

Now we turn to the case studies, Vale do Javari and Kayabi, in order to examine how these innovations related to the empowerment of indigenous people played out in two separate circumstances. The following section includes an outline of the background of each indigenous group, a description of the circumstances of each case study before the establishment of the PPTAL, an evaluation of the innovations implemented by the PPTAL in each circumstance, and a comparison of the results.

### **Kayabi**

The Kayabi people include three indigenous groups: the Apiaká/Koyabi, the Kayabi, and the Munduruku with a total population of 297 Indians. Situated in the Brazilian states of Mato Grosso and Pará in the municipalities of Apiacás and Jacareacanga, the territory encompasses 1,053,000 hectares.<sup>1</sup> The language of these indigenous groups is Kayabi, which is of the Tupi-Guarani linguistic family. The Kayabi suffered considerable population loss due to conflict with rubber-tappers during the rubber boom at the end of the nineteenth century (Lasmar 2003). Originally inhabitants of Mato Grosso, the Kayabi were forced to move north to Pará (Perez 1982).

Brazil experienced a revival of the rubber industry during the Second World War (Hemming 2003). By the 1950s, the Kayabi formed a dependency on the sale of rubber after becoming involved in the rubber market due to the influence of the SPI. In this same time period, this area experienced the effects of the expansion as a result of the development plans of the government and the construction of the national highways, Cuiabá – Santarém and BR – 080.

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<sup>1</sup> FUNAI/DAF – Sistema de Terras Indígenas – Cayabi (database located in the headquarters of the Fundação Nacional do Índio in Brasília, DF, Brazil on June 9, 2008).

In more recent years, prospectors in search of gold and other minerals have exploited this indigenous territory (Lasmar 2003). The Kayabi indigenous territory was originally demarcated in 1982 with an area of around 140,000 hectares situated in the state of Pará (Cavalleiro 2004). In 1988, the INCRA failed to consult the FUNAI before allocating a piece of the Kayabi indigenous territory to the Brazilian Army (Lasmar 2003). The Ministry of the Army expressed its intention to resolve this issue in 1992, and, in 1993, the area was identified and delimited (FUNAI 1995; Perez 1982).

The PPTAL initially intended to carry out a land survey of the Kayabi indigenous territory in 2000 (PPTAL 2004). The plan for an Indigenous Accompaniment Project would allow the Associação Indígena Kawaip Kayabi (AIKK – Kawaip Kayabi Indigenous Association), to oversee the work of the company contracted by the FUNAI to complete the demarcation of the Kayabi indigenous territory. This project would also enable the younger generation of the Kayabi indigenous group to become better acquainted with the boundaries of their own lands. The Indigenous Accompaniment Project would have two stages: the preparation, publication, and planning with the Kayabi indigenous community; and the accompaniment and completion of the physical demarcation. After the completion of the land regularization, there would also be plans for a Surveillance Project (de Assis 2004).

The Indigenous Accompaniment Project and the Surveillance Project would be comprised of the following activities (de Assis 2004: 3):

- “Formation and installation of the operational coordination, consisting of a general coordinator and an administrative assistant.”
- “Preparatory meeting with the communities for the logistic planning of the work.”
- “Formation of two teams, consisting of twenty four people (twelve on each team), for the accompaniment of the demarcation.”
- “Acquisition and distribution of the consumer materials.”

- “Internal and external publication, including production of printed material and utilization of radios and local televisions.”
- “Construction of two help stations.”
- “Capacity-Building of the two teams in GPS, mechanics, administration/secretarial work and accounting.”
- “Preparation of minutes of the proposal for the Surveillance Project.”
- “Realization of a commemorative event for the demarcation of the indigenous territory, including traditional festivals and a soccer tournament.”

Unfortunately, in 2000, there was an issue regarding the boundaries of the Kayabi indigenous territory adjacent to the neighboring Campo de Provas Brigadeiro Veloso. The PPTAL decided to move forward with the Indigenous Accompaniment Project despite the boundary conflict; however, the Secretaria Técnica (SETEC – Technical Secretary of the PPTAL) was informed that the Declaration made by the Ministry of Justice (the second step of the land regularization process) was suspended. The land survey would also need to wait until the boundary conflict was resolved.

In 2003, there were two more complaints, one made by the municipality of Apicás, Mato Grosso and the other by a non-indigenous person occupying the same territory, which once again suspended the Declaration. The Kayabi indigenous group enjoyed a small victory on June 26, 2003, when the Superior Court of Justice temporary lifted the ban on the demarcation of the Kayabi indigenous territory. This brief opening allowed the PPTAL to complete the preliminary field work albeit only in the area located in the state of Pará (PPTAL 2004). The PPTAL carried out the land survey with the use of a GPS in order to have a geographical reference for the areas where indigenous people resided. The work group identified the boundaries of the indigenous territory utilizing the GPS system. The land survey also included the collection of personal data

from each occupant as well as information used to create a map of each occupied area (Freitas and Andrada 2004).

The Project planned to begin the demarcation in August 2004; however, the Federal Tribunal of Mato Grosso, motivated by complaints made by local farmers, issued a preliminary verdict to suspend the demarcation (Mundurukú n.d.). The PPTAL responded to this set-back with the Projeto Emergencial de Mobilização para a Proteção da Terra Indígena Kayabi (Emergency Mobilization Project for the Protection of the Kayabi Indigenous Territory) in 2005, with a budget of R\$62,200 (Sellani 2008). This idea arose from the necessity to connect the three ethnic groups to mobilize collectively in order to protect the area in which they live. Since the Kayabi indigenous territory had not been officially regulated, it was more vulnerable to deforestation and other forces that threatened the preservation of the environment. The Emergency Project also intended to train indigenous people to participate in the demarcation of the Kayabi indigenous territory when the Federal Tribunal of Mato Grosso lifted the suspension of the demarcation.

The Emergency Project planned to establish a group responsible for performing activities such as periodic meetings between the villages and monthly expeditions to monitor the activity of timber merchants and farmers as well as inform the FUNAI, Instituto Brasileiro do Meio Ambiente e dos Recursos Naturais Renováveis (IBAMA – Brazilian Institute of Environment and Renewable Natural Resources), and the Federal Public Ministry of the deforestation taking place in the area. It also intended to organize trips with indigenous leaders to Cuiabá in order to establish contact with the Public Ministry, the FUNAI, and the IBAMA. This training would also include a GPS workshop held at the headquarters of the AIKK in the city of Alta Floresta, Mato Grosso (Mundurukú n.d.).

The FUNAI attempted to raise the ban on the demarcation three more times in 2006, 2007, and 2008. Despite the efforts of the indigenous organization, the Federal Tribunal of Mato Grosso upheld the preliminary verdict against the demarcation of the Kayabi indigenous territory. The Kayabi indigenous people have yet to be able to put into practice the training they received from the PPTAL, including the GPS knowledge that they acquired. The PPTAL has not been able to carry out the demarcation, and the indigenous territory remains unregulated to this day (Sellani 2008).

### **Vale do Javari**

The Kanamari, Kulina, Pano, Matis, Matsés, Korubo, Tsohom Djapá and Marubo indigenous groups inhabit the Vale do Javari indigenous territory. There are also isolated groups located near the Jandiatuba, Alto Jutaí, Quixito, and São José Rivers. In total, there are an approximate 3,645 indigenous people in the Vale do Javari indigenous territory (ISA 2009a). Located in the municipalities, Atalaia do Norte, Benjamin Constante, Jutaí, and São Paulo de Olivença, in the Brazilian state of Amazonas, the Vale do Javari indigenous land spans 8,544,482 hectares.<sup>2</sup> The indigenous groups in the region speak a diverse number of languages as well as possess cultural differences, including the degree of isolation they maintain from mainstream society. The major economic activities of this group include agriculture, hunting, fishing, gathering, and small-scale commercialization of agricultural and forest products (Coutinho Jr. 2000).

In 1971, the FUNAI established an Ajudância (Help Station) in the Brazilian city of Atalaya do Norte in order to support the indigenous groups in this region; however, due to lack of resources, the FUNAI could not properly maintain the Help Station, and the Indian

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<sup>2</sup> FUNAI/DAF – Sistema de Terras Indígenas – Vale do Javari (database located in the headquarters of the Fundação Nacional do Índio in Brasília, DF, Brazil on June 9, 2008).

Foundation failed to satisfy the demands of the indigenous people (FUNAI 1980). Similar to the Kayabi indigenous territory, the Vale do Javari experienced the effects of the government development plan, principally due to activities related to timber extraction, commercial fishing, and hunting to a lesser degree (Coutinho Jr. 2000). The failure of the FUNAI to regulate this territory resulted in invasions by timber companies, rubber merchants, and the Brazilian oil company, Petrobrás, which was the most detrimental to indigenous populations in this region (FUNAI 1980).

At the beginning of the 1980s, the FUNAI completed the identification and delimitation survey of the Vale do Javari area; however, the Indian Foundation did not move past this point for the next seventeen years. Once again, the FUNAI lacked the resources necessary to carry out a comprehensive land survey. In December 1990, several leaders from the indigenous groups of the Vale do Javari region decided to collectively mobilize. They formed the CIVAJA after attending the “First Meeting of the Indigenous Peoples of the Vale do Javari” that took place in the city of Atalaia do Norte.

In 1996, the PPTAL partnered with the CIVAJA and the non-governmental organization, Friends of the Earth, to install a network of sixteen radio-phones that linked the city of Atalaia do Norte with the principle municipalities of the region. The installation of the radio-phones served as a means of communication both within the indigenous territory and also as a connection to the outside world. The indigenous people who formed the CIVAJA were better able to organize the movement as a result of more direct communication (FUNAI 1998). The radio-phones allowed the work group to keep the indigenous community informed as to the progress of the demarcation with a radio show called “The Voice of the Indian” (PPTAL n.d.).

The indigenous people of the Vale do Javari were also able to communicate with the Dutch organization, Médicos sem Fronteiras (MSF – Doctors without Borders). This strengthened the Health Project in the community, since indigenous people were able to ask medical questions via the radio-phones rather than traveling to the nearest MSF post. The only major complaint from the coordinator of the CIVAJA was the high cost of the taxes which the indigenous community was required to pay for the radio-phone frequency.

Indigenous people also used the radio-phones to discuss which strategic points in the Vale do Javari indigenous territory to protect in order to minimize the opportunity for those outside to invade the area. The surveillance and protection of the indigenous territory improved as a result of the greater cohesiveness of the indigenous population (FUNAI 1998). However, over time, most of the remaining radios were located in the interior of the territory rather than at the strategic points along the border, and, therefore, did little to assist indigenous people in the surveillance and protection of their lands (PPTAL n.d.).

The report of the “Meeting of the Allies” in Manaus, Amazonas, Brazil, attended by the CIVAJA, the PPTAL and other organizations in 1998 states that the PPTAL proposed that indigenous communities play a part in the identification and demarcation steps of the land regularization process of the Vale do Javari indigenous territory. The PPTAL intended that the participation of indigenous communities would ensure more accurate limits in indigenous territories, bring about a better understanding of the current situation in each area, and help indigenous people themselves to become acquainted with the limits of their own lands. Participation in the process of land regularization would include the supervision by indigenous people of the work teams hired by the FUNAI. The indigenous groups would also receive appropriate training and their own budget (PPTAL 1998).

This same year, the GTZ gathered information pertaining to the environmental situation in the Vale do Javari indigenous territory with the help of the indigenous people. The GTZ input this information into a GIS to create a report which would later aid in the physical demarcation of the indigenous territory (PPTAL 1999).

In 1999, the PPTAL began the “Implementation and Monitoring” phase of the project at the CIVAJA headquarters in Atalaia do Norte. Indigenous people had the opportunity to take courses in GPS, filming, and photography at the headquarters of the CIVAJA in the city of Atalaia do Norte, Amazonas. Due to limited time and difficulty understanding the Portuguese of the Nicaraguan instructor, the first GPS course was not very effective. Although the same instructor taught the second GPS course, there was more time, which helped the participants to understand better to some extent. Unfortunately, it was not enough. During the physical demarcation, indigenous people lacked the skills to operate the GPS effectively.

However, all was not lost. The PPTAL chose ten indigenous people to record the progress of the demarcation utilizing the video and photography skills they obtained during the training courses. The team that carried out the demarcation detailed the process through video and photography to celebrate Indian Day. There was special attention given to the images which captured indigenous participation in the process. The PPTAL even showed the video of the demarcation at the EXPO 2000 in Germany. These two technical innovations introduced by the PPTAL brought greater awareness of the process of demarcation to indigenous people as well as to an international audience.

During the process of demarcation, fishers, hunters, and timber merchants began to invade the area more frequently. Aware of the increased susceptibility of the area to environmental degradation and violence, the PPTAL proposed a “Protection and Monitoring”

phase of the project planned for a three-year period. Until adequate resources for a “Surveillance Project” for the region became available, the PPTAL created a subproject in 2000 which would provide the essentials such as equipment maintenance and funds to continue activities already in progress (PPTAL n.d.). The PPTAL offered another series of cartography and GPS courses from November 22 to 26, 2002 as part of this subproject (PPTAL 2003).

The GPS course taught indigenous people how to use a compass, to take simple measurements, and to create basic maps. Indigenous people also learned GPS lingo in order to understand the meaning of the buttons located on GPS receivers. The course enabled indigenous people to geographically pinpoint the location of invasions, and, in turn better protect the borders of the territory. They also gained a more comprehensive understanding of the limits of their own lands. The ability to defend their own lands led to the greater autonomy of the indigenous people and the decentralization of actions needed to protect the territory (Postigo 2002).

The CIVAJA accepted the task of placing plaques along the natural limits of the Curuçá, Javari, and Jaquirana Rivers. The communities that participated in the placement of plaques were situated close to the limits of the indigenous territory. Although some problems, such as inadequate knowledge of GPS and bureaucracy required by the PPTAL, delayed the process of the demarcation, overall the project was successful (PPTAL n.d.). The regularization of the Vale do Javari indigenous territory was completed in the year 2002.<sup>3</sup>

The expenditures of the PPTAL totaled R\$254,388.56 for the projects carried out on the Vale do Javari indigenous territory. In 2006, three years after the funding of the PPTAL for the “Project of Surveillance” came to an end, the indigenous people only partially maintained the infrastructure of the projects due to lack of resources. Some of the radios installed by the

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<sup>3</sup> FUNAI/DAF – Sistema de Terras Indígenas – Cayabi (database located in the headquarters of the Fundação Nacional do Índio in Brasília, DF, Brazil on June 9, 2008).

PPTAL still functioned mainly to answer questions related to the health of indigenous people; however, these radios are situated in the interior of the territory, and therefore do not offer protection for the indigenous territory. Timber merchants destroyed some of the support houses built near the border of indigenous territories, and invaders also damaged plaques used to mark the limits of the territory (PPTAL n.d.).

Although the PPTAL approached the demarcation of both the Kayabi and the Vale do Javari indigenous territories with the same set of innovations, the regularization of the Vale do Javari indigenous territory has been successfully completed whereas the Kayabi indigenous territory still has not passed the declaration stage of the land regularization process due to the intervention of the Federal Tribunal of Mato Grosso. This demonstrates the limitations the PPTAL has in the land regularization process, because it must operate within the constraints of Brazilian legal and political realities.

Despite the numerous failed attempts to demarcate the Kayabi indigenous territory, the PPTAL offered training and equipment to facilitate indigenous people of both the Kayabi and Vale do Javari in the monitoring and protection of their own lands. While this initiative helped in the prevention of invasions in the two indigenous territories, only three years after the end of the funding provided by the PPTAL for the “Project of Surveillance” of the Vale do Javari indigenous territory, the indigenous organization lacked the resources to maintain the infrastructure of the project and the equipment. This resulted in continued destruction of natural resources within indigenous territories and violence perpetrated by invaders on indigenous people.

## CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSION

This study is a glimpse into the complexity of indigenous issues and policies in the Brazilian Amazon. By focusing on the innovations that the PPTAL has made in the land regularization process of the FUNAI and in the protection and surveillance of indigenous territories, this study reveals local, national, and international factors that have either helped or hindered these processes, and, in some cases, had a mixed effect.

### **PPTAL**

Clearly, the PPTAL, which is an international project, has promoted the land regularization process of the FUNAI, and, to some extent, has aided in the protection and surveillance of indigenous territories through the empowerment of indigenous people and through the implementation of technological advances.

### **Lack of Human and Financial Resources**

Lack of human and financial resources on both national and local levels is a factor that continues to impede the regularization, surveillance, and protection of indigenous lands. Before the time of the PPTAL, the FUNAI, an agency of the Brazilian national government, lacked the human and financial resources to carry out the regularization of indigenous lands established in the 1988 Constitution by a deadline the agency itself had set. Once the Project ends and takes with it the human and financial resources that have made many of these technological innovations possible, the question that inevitably remains is whether the FUNAI will be able to effectively incorporate these technological advances into its own organization and if the indigenous people will be able to maintain these innovations in the long run.

One employee of the Indian Museum, in an interview conducted on August 19, 2008, described the PPTAL as “a certain island of fantasy inside of the [FUNAI].”<sup>1</sup> The employee went on to explain that, “The FUNAI already was, and today continues in a very poor situation. It is vulnerable as an institution, without personnel [and] without technical resources.”<sup>2</sup> As was the case in the Vale do Javari indigenous territory, few indigenous communities and organizations, operating on a local level, were able to generate the funds necessary to maintain the innovations implemented by the PPTAL without outside assistance. A deficiency in the number of forest police, which is a branch of the Brazilian national government responsible for the protection of indigenous lands, also prevents this agency from adequately assisting indigenous people (Pohl and Viergever 2007).

### **The Brazilian National Government and the FUNAI**

The 1988 Constitution, ratified by the Brazilian national government, made possible the regularization of indigenous territories and also prohibited non-indigenous people from invading indigenous lands in order to exploit natural resources. The FUNAI set the deadline for the regularization of indigenous lands in the 1988 Constitution, and, although lack of resources prevented the FUNAI from meeting this deadline, the constitution legally permitted the PPTAL to carry out the regularization of indigenous territories. Therefore, the Brazilian national government and the FUNAI are two actors, operating on a national level, that assisted in the regularization and protection of indigenous lands by simply making these processes legal.

Some would argue that Decree 1775, approved under the presidency of Fernando Henrique Cardoso, actually stood in the way of the regularization of indigenous lands since it

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<sup>1</sup> Confidential interview by author, Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, August 19, 2008.

<sup>2</sup> Confidential interview by author, Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, August 19, 2008.

gave non-indigenous people inhabiting indigenous territories the right to contest the demarcation and bring the land regularization process to a halt. However, once a complaint lodged by non-indigenous people has been addressed and dismissed, the regularization of an indigenous territory cannot be contested again. Therefore, it can also be argued that Decree 1775 actually supports the long-term sustainability of the demarcation. Ratification of Decree 1775 by the Brazilian national government can thus be viewed as both a help and a hindrance to the land regularization process.

### **The Case of the Kayabi Indigenous Territory**

In the case of the Kayabi indigenous territory, a local complaint issued by the Campo de Provas Brigadeiro Veloso initially brought the land regularization process to a standstill. Despite several other attempts made by the PPTAL to follow through with the regularization of the Kayabi indigenous territory, the Federal Tribunal of Mato Grosso, a local governmental agency, suspended the demarcation with a preliminary verdict as a result of complaints lodged by the Municipality of Apiacás in the state of Mato Grosso, local farmers, and another local non-indigenous person. This is an example of just how vulnerable the process of regularization can be. In this case, several local actors successfully thwarted the regularization of this territory. Local timber merchants and farmers also continue to hamper efforts to protect these unregulated lands.

### **The Case of the Vale do Javari Indigenous Territory**

Although the PPTAL managed to successfully regulate the Vale do Javari indigenous territory, fishers, hunters, and timber merchants, operating on a local level, continue to invade this territory. This is an example of local actors hampering the efforts of indigenous people in the protection of their lands.

## Development Policy

Throughout the history of indigenous policy in Brazil, those in authoritative positions in the government have shared a common thread that development in Brazil is not only important but also essential. In *Contested Frontiers in Amazonia*, Marianne Schmink and Charles H. Wood describe “belief in the virtues of advanced technology” in Brazil as “quasi-religious” (1992: 347). In the case of Cândido Mariano da Silva Rondon, the first director of the SPI, his ideas regarding the industrialization and modernization of Brazil and the integration of indigenous people in the Brazilian national society stemmed from his Positivist religious convictions (Diacon 2004). The Brazilian government promoted the National Integration plan in the 1970s and then the National Development plan in the 1980s.

Unfortunately, the poorest and most vulnerable people, especially Indians, suffer the most as a result of industrialization, technological advancement, and modernization in Brazil (Schmink and Wood 1992). The Brazilian government has also been guilty of “subordinating Amazonia to the needs of the national economy and to the will of technocrats in Brasilia” (Schmink and Wood 1992: 346). Preservation of the natural environment and of indigenous people themselves has been sacrificed in the past in exchange for the “general welfare” that the Brazilian government believed development would bring (Schmink and Wood 1992: 347). Although Rondon believed that development could be achieved without disrupting social harmony, the military dictatorship feared that indigenous people would hinder progress in Brazil.

In the 1980s, the political environment in Brazil and specifically in Amazonia began to change. Indigenous people started to form international alliances, and, surprisingly, grassroots organizations were able to influence policy in Brazil. Changes in policy were met with resistance by ranchers and investors as well as others who stood to gain from development in the Amazon (Schmink and Wood 1992). Schmink and Wood point out that “A survey of events

during the latter half of the 1980s indicated that despite everything that had taken place over the last two decades – the change in regime from military to civilian rule; the mobilization of peasants, Indians, rubber tappers, and miners; and the fundamental change in the content of the development discourse – the main thrust of Amazonian policy continued to invoke the precepts of developmentalism” (Schmink and Wood 1992: 353).

If the Brazilian government’s slant towards development in its policy-making regarding the Amazon region and indigenous people in the past is any indicator of the future, the advance of industrialization and modernization in Amazonia will continue to threaten the land and natural resources on which indigenous people subsist.

### **Challenges Ahead**

The FUNAI undoubtedly still has many challenges ahead in the regularization of the indigenous territories that remain unregulated and in the continued protection and surveillance of all indigenous territories. Lack of resources, political controversy surrounding indigenous issues, and trouble coordinating with other governmental agencies are all problems that continue to hinder the efforts of the indigenous organization (World Bank 2007b). Local disagreements, difficulties hiring qualified people to take part in identifications, issues dispatching teams on time, and bureaucracy both within the FUNAI and in other governmental organizations also contribute to the struggles the indigenous organization will face in the future.

Indigenous communities not only have to be concerned about protecting indigenous lands from invasion and environmental degradation perpetrated by non-indigenous people, but they must also develop techniques to sustainably manage natural resources contained within their own indigenous territories. The regularization of indigenous territories is not enough to conserve the forested areas and natural resources in the Brazilian Amazon (Lisansky 2005).

Early in my research, while eating lunch at the Pátio Brasil shopping center located in Brasília near the headquarters of the FUNAI, I noticed three indigenous men, dressed in shorts and t-shirts with face paint and traditional headdresses, watching a program on a flat-screen television on display. This curious event is symbolic of the effect that technology, development, and industrialization has had on indigenous culture in Brazil. Cultural changes in indigenous communities due to contact with the national society of Brazil may also change the way that indigenous people interact with the environment, and it cannot be assumed that indigenous people will “remain frozen in time” and continue to live “in relative harmony with their natural environments” the same way that they have in the past (Lisansky 2005:185).

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## BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Noelle Katherine Nuebler was born in Indianapolis, Indiana. She grew up in Indianapolis and graduated from Lutheran High School in 1995. She attended Ball State University in Muncie, Indiana, where she earned a B.S. in actuarial science in 1999. Following graduation, Noelle worked as a Senior Research Analyst for four years in the actuarial department of Consec Life Insurance Company in Carmel, Indiana. In 2004, she took time off to travel and volunteer for a humanitarian-aid organization in both Kabul, Afghanistan and Manaus, Amazonas, Brazil. In addition to her humanitarian-aid work in Manaus, Noelle has traveled extensively throughout Brazil and the world. After returning from Brazil in early 2005, she began working as a Senior Financial Analyst in the finance department of Wellpoint in Indianapolis until 2007.

The University of Florida, in Gainesville, offered Noelle the Foreign Language and Areas Studies (FLAS) Fellowship for the academic years 2007/2008 and 2008/2009 as well as for the summer of 2008. This fellowship for the study of the Brazilian Portuguese language offered her the opportunity to earn an M.A. in Latin American Studies with a specialization in Brazilian Studies. She also participated in the University of Florida's language and culture program in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil in the summer of 2008. Upon the completion of the coursework required for the master's program, Noelle began working as a Project Manager at US Biomedical Information Systems, Inc. in Gainesville.