THE CHALLENGE OF THE SLUMS:
LOOKING FOR DEMOCRATIC INCLUSION IN THE SQUATTER SETTLEMENTS OF RIO
DE JANEIRO, BRAZIL

By

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by

Bryan C. Williams
To all of the good people who shared their lives with me and made my work possible.
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Our aim was to describe the mechanisms that drive this difference in success among groups of urban squatters in the city of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. The purpose is to find how space for democracy may be created at the bottom of the socio-economic pyramid in the context of great social, political, and economic inequality. Exposing the avenues and methods of successful demand making of the poorest of Rio’s citizens contributes to a deeper understanding of how democracy develops, deepens, and functions—particularly under unfavorable conditions. Moreover, understanding how and why the poor choose to access or avoid the government when they do is an important first step in trying to build a relationship between the state and the slums. Developing this relationship is imperative in order to turn the current unsustainable drain of uncontrolled urbanization by poor migrants who choose to avoid the state’s purview, into a positive contribution to state and society. How to bring in those with an exit option to participate in the state is the real challenge of the slums.

A new model of social and political movements is presented here that captures a heretofore unobservable phenomenon: that of binding, or temporary, cooperative relationships between individuals in a community that form groups; between these temporary groups and influential institutions outside of the community; and de facto, asynchronous cooperation between the
institutions on behalf of the community. The presence of these Binding Action Networks is empirically tested, as well as the results for communities where the Binding Action Networks are relatively stronger or weaker. In the final analysis, this dissertation develops a new view of social movements among the worst off in society, and consequently captures an element of democracy and democratization that has been overlooked until now. In the final analysis, social capital, both within the community and bridging outside of the community plays an instrumental role in the political voice and the material well being of those pushed to the political and economic margins of society.
CHAPTER 1
LOOKING FOR DEMOCRACY IN THE SLUMS OF RIO DE JANEIRO

This study does not attempt to travel the well-worn path of looking for obstacles to egalitarian results from a Latin American democracy where the voice of the majority—the poor—has been unsuccessful in wringing meaningful reforms from the government. Authors from Plutarch to Dahl have noted the causal link between economic and political inequality; the political tools and access points available to the wealthy are not in the same arena as those of the poor. Instead, this study compares equivalent groups of poor individuals whose main point of difference is that some groups were politically successful in that they received governmental development funds, services, or projects, while the others did not.

The puzzle that is confronted in this work is to discover the mechanisms that drive this difference in success among these groups of urban squatters (favelados) in the city of Rio de Janeiro (Rio), and in so doing, to find how space for democracy may be created at the bottom of the socio-economic pyramid\(^1\). Exposing the avenues and methods of the demand making of, and the subsequent government response to the poorest of Rio’s citizens contributes to a deeper understanding of how democracy develops, deepens, and functions—particularly under unfavorable conditions\(^2\). Moreover, understanding how and why the poor choose to access the government when they do is an important first step in trying to build a relationship between the state and the slums. Developing this relationship is imperative in order to turn the current

---

1 For example, see Charles Tilly’s Popular Contention in Great Britain: 1758-1834
2 According to Freedom House’s Freedom in the World Country Ratings 1972-2000, Brazil political climate has been rated as “partially free” for all but seven years (1985-1992) of their data when it was rated as “free” in response to the newly overturned military dictatorship (1984), and creation of an extraordinarily liberal constitution (1988). The failure of the government to make good on the promises of the civilian constitution, exacerbated by violent treatment of the poor and homeless led to a decline in Brazil’s rating to “partly free” again in 1993 and remains so until today.
unmanageable drain into a positive force for state and society. How to bring in those with an exit option to participate in the state is the real challenge of the slums. This challenge is the global issue for the foreseeable future because it is the slums in and around the already crowded major cities in developing countries that are to be home to a vast majority of the additional three billion people the world is to bear by the middle of this century. A rise from the current population of approximately six billion to nine billion individuals on earth is daunting for a number of reasons, particularly with most large cities in the developing world already bursting at the seams with too many immigrants chasing the unrealized dream of employment and a better life. City growth has surpassed industrial growth in and around those cities more than ten-fold, and it has happened with Malthusian speed. Using a conservative, physical-and-legal-characteristics-only, easily-empiricized definition for slum, a 2002-2005 UN study predicted more than one billion residents of slums in 2005—fully 17% of the population of the world and 31.6% of the world’s urban population.

Aside from the more individual problems of feeding and housing the growing population of slum dwellers, negative spillovers such as pollution, disease, crime, and urban congestion promise to make urban habitation a society-wide problem. Unchecked, this problem in countries like Brazil—the country with the third largest population of slum dwellers in the world—will consume state resources and stall economic advances after the past decade of profitable industrialization. This is the root of the main political and economic problems for new democracies like Brazil and its Latin American neighbors: how to capture these burgeoning

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3 Slums are the result of two increasing factors: urbanization and the urbanization of poverty. Slums are the locus of the worst shelter, physical and environmental conditions (United Nations Human Settlements Programme., 2003).

4 These characteristics are defined as inadequate access to safe water; inadequate access to sanitation and other infrastructure; poor structural quality of housing; overcrowding; and insecure tenure (ibid, p. 12) as opposed to a definition based on social conditions such as the locus of discontent or political disruptiveness.

5 China has 37.8% or 193.8 million of its urban population living in slums; India has 55.5% of its urban population, or 158.4 million individuals, in similar conditions; and Brazil has 36.6% of its urban population, or 51.7 million individuals, in slum communities commonly called favelas (Davis, 2006, p. 34).
populations of the poor into the state so as to use them as productive resources, and to more efficiently meet their needs while forestalling the most negative effects of their uncontrolled immigration.

This dissertation, then, is about democracy in the City of Rio de Janeiro (Rio) in the years (1988-2000) after the dictatorship, with data focusing primarily on 1995-2000. The findings of this study could be seen as disagreeing with the current trend in the literature, which prefers clientelism to describe the primary relationship of the poor with the state, and the cause for their marginalization in the stalled democracies (ditaduras) of Latin America. But rather than contradict, this study adds a different perspective and deepens the understanding of citizen-state relations at the bottom. While authors such as Diniz (1982) have put extensive work into describing the extent and methods of the clientelist machine in Brazil, others, such as Gay (1999), Paley (2001), and Stokes (1995) have attempted to capture the undercurrent of desire for and action towards real, inclusive democracy among the traditionally excluded classes in Brazil, Peru, and Mexico. In so doing, they point to how the poor build relationships with the state on their own terms. To these authors of the social movement school, it is useful to add studies and theory from research on social capital in order to move away from the phenomenological case-based approach and towards a more general framework for comparing the more-than-fifty communities in this dissertation.

The research for this manuscript follows a theme similar to Gay, Paley, and Stokes and focuses on the democratic, political actions of groups of urban squatters (favelados) in pursuit of collective benefits from governmental resources. And, while clientelism certainly persists in Rio, years of unfulfilled promises and incomplete projects⁶ have led to yesterday’s clients

⁶ See most recently the now infamous debacle for the Garotinho political dynasty of Rio de Janeiro where the “10,000 Obras (public works)” campaign with a budget of just over R$1 million was investigated to reveal the
becoming savvier and seeking new ways of approaching and negotiating with the government. The results of this research bring to light these countercurrents in Rio’s political arena, which would otherwise be overlooked against a background of ‘typical’ elite-centered, top-down analyses of politics.

**Global Problem**

What is revealed in Table 1-1 shows that there is a squatter population of over one million in Rio de Janeiro, or almost one-fifth of the total population of the city\(^7\). Moreover, the growth of the *favelas* has far outstripped the overall growth of the city for all but ten years between 1950 and 2000. Also, it is important to note that these figures provide a low estimate based on a fungible definition of ‘*favela*’ that has changed over time and across applications. In addition to those who live in communities officially designated as *favelas*; there is a group of equal size or larger who live in irregular settlements that were not the result of illegal occupation or invasion.

The living conditions in these *lotamentos irregulares* is often worse than in the *favelas*, and combined the two types of slums account for around 40% of the urban population of the city, a conservative number which is consistent across the largest cities of Brazil.

Table 1-2 shows the uneven distribution of *favela* population and growth by zone of the city. The concentration of the *favelas* is highest in the North, industrial zone housing more than half of all *favela* residents and nearly half of the communities. The North Zone was the destination of the first wave of slum removal projects that cleared the city center and the South Zone between 1907 and 1930. The West Zone experienced it’s *favela* boom between 1980 and 1991 with the population of residents more than doubling to around 200,000. The wealthier South Zone has avoided most of the sprawl during until shortly after the end of the military extent of publicity for the campaign (R$11 million) alongside the thousands of projects that had either not been started or had not been completed (Menezes, 2006).

\(^7\) The proportions are approximately the same for the state of Rio de Janeiro
dictatorship. From 1991 to 1997, the number of favelas nearly doubled and the population of these illegal communities increased by more than 50%. Poverty continues to increase across all of Rio de Janeiro’s areas. Slums sprawl across the face of the West Zone where there is little infrastructure and plenty of unwanted land. And in the fashionable South Zone, largely because of access to jobs or tourists, those favelas that managed to escape the destruction of the military dictatorship are growing upwards and developing population densities that rival Tokyo and Osaka.

**Economic Drain**

With over 80% of the country already urbanized and a predicted 90% urbanization by 2020, that means that more than one-third of all Brazilians will be living in crowded, unorganized, unhealthy urban conditions by the end of the next decade. In the past two decades, 72 of every 100 new households established in Brazil have been located in favelas (Todaro, 1997, pp. pp. 6-7). The residents of these slums are plagued by problems of transportation to work, finding jobs, dangerous housing, lack of clean water and sewage facilities, concomitant ill health, social discrimination, political marginalization, and continual fear of removal for lack of legal tenure. Surrounding neighborhoods complain of spillovers from these unsanitary conditions and high crime, as well as property devaluation due to the proximity of such squalor.

Governmental policies regarding favelas have varied as wildly as their growth rate (Table 1-2) depending on the interests of the state, the implementation of repressive measures, and the ability of the favela residents to mobilize politically. The current policy practiced in Rio de Janeiro is to allow slum dwellers to exist on the periphery of the state, acting as a drain on resources. Their presence and growth can largely be attributed to the need for cheap labor in the city’s industrial areas, as well as to a century of populist policies.
The principle source of resource drain results from the general increase in welfare policies in every administration since José Sarney became the first civilian president in 1985 after over twenty years of military dictatorship. This culminated in the 2002 election and 2006 reelection of Ignacio “Lula” da Silva from the liberal Partido dos Trabalhdores, who dramatically increased the monetary amount and number of state benefits for the poor. The form of aid provided is non-productive and is not compensated by returns of a more competitive and economically participative population.

Also, vast informal\textsuperscript{8} economic networks exist in the urban areas under discussion, which deprive the state of needed resources in terms of exportable production, taxes, and other contributions to the state. And since the end of the military dictatorship in the 1980s, there has been a rapid acceleration in the use of Rio’s slums as a haven for drug gangs that require more and more state resources in the attempt to contain them.

\textbf{Informality versus the State}

The estimates of two different studies put the informal economy of Brazil around 33% of its GNP (Portes and Sassen-Koob, 1987; Schneider and Enste, 2000)—that is one-third of the taxable base that is not being captured. And means-tested aid is likely being misallocated to those who do not merit it according to program guidelines. From 1995 to 2002, unemployment among Brazil’s youths has skyrocketed with the rate for 15-17 year olds increasing threefold (11.0\% to 34.5\%) and that for young adults aged 18-24 more than doubling (9.3\% to 21.4\%) (UNDP, 2005, p. 124). And total urban unemployment there in the same period rose from 4.3\% to 7.1\%. These are individuals who either choose to or are forced to enter the informal economy in order to survive. Furthermore, those that participate in the informal economy as their primary

\textsuperscript{8} The informal sector or ‘shadow economy’ can be thought of as the aggregate of income-earning activities, save those that are legally registered or regulated. In general, criminal activity is excluded from this definition (Portes and Sassen-Koob, 1987; Schneider and Enste, 2000).
mode of transaction are choosing an “exit option” to the “voice option⁹” of democratic participation, thus robbing the state of legitimacy of almost one-third of its citizens. Also, there is a further drain on the formal economy through attracting consumers and able workers from the formal sector to the informal who would rather not suffer the extra expense of taxation and governmental monitoring (Schneider and Enste, 2000).

Informal sector workers may be there because of lack of education, a dislike for authority, a traditional adherence to local work options, or exclusion from the formal sector by social discrimination. Similarly, there are those urbanites who remain in the peasant mode of production as a type of proto-proletariat who engage only in self-employed production and trade (Wilson, 1998). Göran Hyden (1983) points to the dire prospects for economic development of countries that have large, uncaptured productive groups¹⁰. The limitations of the state to oversee production and labor in the slums means that the workers can escape the system, even though they do not own their own means of production¹¹.

Marx and Engels envisaged a state created by the capitalist means of production that had the primary purpose of supporting that economic system. However, the limits put upon Brazil’s government by the social and political backlash against the military regime, a decade of ruinous economic policy, and the ambiguous historical position of the squatters has led to refuges in the squatter settlements in which small to medium enterprises exist with their own army of street-

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⁹ Albert Hirschman (1970) proposed that individuals in a state have several choices in reacting to state policy: support the policy, voice their discontent, or exit the state to avoid the effects of the policy. The exit option undermines the legitimacy of the state in denying the power of the state over all individuals within its political borders. Repeated use of the exit option by broad sections of society will lead either to a praetorian state or a crisis of government. The voice option indicates a continued relationship with the state and a de facto acceptance of the rules of the game.

¹⁰ Although Hyden’s work centers on peasants in Africa, there are many similarities between the subjects of his work and the urban squatters in terms of alternative economic activities, social characteristics, and political reasoning.

¹¹ Although there is an important informal sector provision of services in the slums, such as coiffeurs and mechanics, the vast majority of individuals and most of the income in the informal economic sector are merely retail agents.
level retailers. Moreover, the complex and costly processes of legitimizing a business in Brazil, added to the potential liabilities of ultra-liberal labor laws, plus the corruption of government fiscal agents results in a combination of factors guaranteed to keep fledgling businesses unregistered. So, like the peasants, the productive and reproductive needs of the poor are not tied to the upper classes. That is to say that the relationships between them and the rulers are not based in the production system. Outside of police repression, then, the state has very little control over these working poor, and squatter settlements can exist like a “society without a state (Hyden, 1983, p. 7).” As such, those in the lower classes see requirements of extractive public policy as unwelcome foreign intervention to be avoided as much as possible.

**A Crisis of Democracy and A Crisis of State Authority**

The following statistics indicate a crisis of democracy in Brazil, and further explain the inability of the government to capture Rio’s poor. Embedding the poor of Rio de Janeiro into the economic and political society is a task necessary for progress and growth of Brazil, or at least the state of Rio de Janeiro. However, the economic incentives to remain outside of the state’s sphere of influence are great, while the economic incentives the state offers in the way of transfer payments is negligible and insufficient to live on. At the same time, distrust of the government is at an all-time high with almost two thirds (64.7%) of the respondents in a 2002 Latinobarometer survey indicated that political officials don’t keep their promises because they never intended to—they lied in order to be elected (UNDP, 2005, p. 51). In 1999 through 2002, Transparency International (2002) polling results listed Brazil as 4.0 on an eleven-point scale with lower numbers corresponding to higher political corruption (ranked 45th least corrupt country out of 141 countries). By 2006 that estimation had fallen to 3.3/11 (70th least corrupt country out of 141 countries) (Infoplease, 2007). And the same Latinobarometer survey mentioned above revealed that 56.7% of all respondents, and 44.7% of those who claim to prefer
democracy to any other system of government, would prefer to live under authoritarian rule if it meant improved economic progress.

Compounding the problem of a large population with little reason to reach up to the state, the extensive slums are often the homes to criminal gangs who set up small fiefdoms that form a significant barrier to the entry and function of the legitimate state\textsuperscript{12}. And more than just one more obstacle in constructing a relationship between the poor and the state, this criminal activity creates a serious drain on state resources in terms of policing and control. Consequently, because of the inability to enter poor communities to treat the source of pollution and disease, spillovers must continually be dealt with downstream where it is more difficult and costly to treat. This problem is particularly visible in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo in Brazil where drug gangs are so powerful that they have closed these cities down for a week at a time (Oliveira, 2006), and fire fights between police, the national army and the drug gangs involving modern weapons of war (bazookas and antiaircraft machine guns are the latest that have been seized) regularly flash across the city’s skies.

Clearly, some incentives need to be created to encourage slum dwellers to invest themselves in the greater society. But strong, functioning informal networks coupled with the common wisdom that politics are corrupt and politicians are unaccountable provide opportunities and justification to remain outside of state control. Even with mandatory voting for citizens aged 18-65 that penalizes non-voters by withholding governmental benefits such as welfare payments, public jobs, and public education, around a quarter of Rio’s one million favela dwellers opt out and either refuse to vote or fail to register with the government for any type of identification (PCBR, 1998).

\textsuperscript{12} See, for explanation, (Leeds, 1996; Amorim, 2004; Mir, 2004; Arias, 2006)
By existing outside of government purview, individuals avoid the hassle of the formidable bureaucracy; the potential of being removed to a government housing project far from family, friends, and work; and possible trouble with a justice system that is patently distrusted by the poor. Furthermore, because of the stigma of residing in a slum, residents experience social prejudice that precludes many legitimate job opportunities and negates the value of having an officially registered job (*Carteira de Trabalho assinada*). In contrast, operating in the informal economy, individuals can often make more than minimum wage either as a micro-entrepreneur, or by selling their services off book and thus saving employers both paperwork, social insurance payments, and the growing possibility of lawsuits from disgruntled employees.

Even with this avoidance of the government at all levels, it is clear that the poor, at least in Rio de Janeiro where they occupy the very visible sides of tall hills throughout the city, do have access to and influence over the government to some extent. After all, these hillside communities started out as squatter settlements with no rights or legal claims for government help. Even in the 1970s under the military dictatorship, the most active period for removing these squatter settlements, some were left standing on what should be the most expensive property of the elite South Zone. Since that time, the process of upgrading and integrating *favelas* into the city has been just as selective as the earlier removals, gracing some with projects, others with the promise of projects and token starts, and still others left out entirely.

**Political Climate of Rio**

As seen in most Latin American nations, 20th century transitions to democracy have tended to privilege those elite groups who brokered the transitions. The result has been the creation of “delegative democracies” characterized by “low-intensity citizenship” (Peterson et al., 2001, pp. 11, 106) wherein voting is the only form of democratic participation for the poor, and access to government services and fair treatment is limited. That is, excluded groups (the majority) have
little real power to influence policy, and few choices when they are able to exercise their right to vote. There is a cumulative, mutually reinforcing effect between economic inequality, social inequality, and political inequality where wealth determines social position and access, wealth and social access lead to political power, and political power allows the protection and enhancement of wealth and social position.

From this perspective, the democracy of Brazil, and particularly of Rio de Janeiro, must be seen as inherently unstable. The status quo is unviable, and the future possibilities appear as polar opposites: a return to dictatorship and hegemony, or riotous demand making by the lower classes (or most likely: riotous demand making leading to a return to dictatorship). A third option completes the triangle of future possibilities: movement towards inclusive democracy at all levels of society. Realizing this deepening of democracy, however, would require the cooperation of large networks of entrenched, vested interests in the country’s government (the rich who benefit from the status quo) as well as political interest and participation from the poor.

Robert Dahl (1971) suggests that a country like Brazil that has a system of public contestation trammeled by extreme inequality is on the path to return to authoritarian rule. So, the possibility of deepening\textsuperscript{13} democracy in Brazil is unlikely because of the vulnerability of systems when they attempt to include such disparate interests of the extremely wealthy and the very poor in the contest of ideas that is politics. What has been the norm for social policy in Brazil echoes Dahl’s (1971) prediction of consistent, stopgap measures to delay general rebellion among the disenfranchised (maintain the system) due to resentment and frustration at perceived inequality that has eroded their allegiance to the regime. An appropriate metaphor is that of a king giving his ring in order to save his finger from being bitten off by the hungry

\textsuperscript{13} By deepening of democracy, I refer to an increase in top-down inclusion of the polity into democratic institutions and practices, as well as an increase in commitment to democratic norms, voting, and campaign activism at the grassroots. See particularly (Oxhorn, 1995; Booth and Richard, 1998)
peasants. But even in this hostile atmosphere, has there been the development of a civil society accompanied by a democratic culture and accompanying repertoire of democratic actions among the poor?

Since Brazil’s 1985 return to civilian democracy from a twenty-one-year military dictatorship, and the 1988 passage of an extraordinarily liberal constitution, the level of political, social, and economic inclusion has not significantly advanced, leaving the poor as de facto non-citizens to a large extent. This is especially true of those who live in the illegal squatter communities known as favelas where, in Rio, less than one-third of those who work either full time or part time are officially registered\(^\text{14}\) (PCBR, 1998). And although procedural democratic practices may have returned for the middle classes, nothing inherent in the transition to democracy guarantees either procedural or substantive democracy for the lower classes (O'Donnell, 1992; Fox, 1994a). “Longstanding exclusionary practices [do] not disappear because of the signing of decrees or the transfer of the sash of power in national capitals” (Fox, 1994b, p. 106).

The question remains, however, of why is it and how is it that some groups of poor citizens, moreover squatters or illegal inhabitants of public and private land, succeed in capturing governmental responsiveness in the form of material resources and public services, while other nearly identical groups are left to fend for themselves? It is even more difficult to explain the success of squatters in capturing governmental resources over other, needier groups who own title to their land such as those in irregular housing arrangements\(^\text{15}\).

\(^{14}\) Registered workers (Carteira de Trabalho assinada) receive governmental protection and guarantees as well as qualify for unemployment insurance as well as an enhanced pension after reaching retirement age.

\(^{15}\) Favela is both a socially constructed and a legal term with the two definitions often conflating in practice. Communities that are categorized as favelas often receive special attention in the news and in the government, while equally poor or even poorer communities that did not start as squatter occupations are ignored. These “invisible communities” are generally legally-owned land that has been subdivided into very small plots and sold or rented by
Democracy or Clientelism?

The research presented in this dissertation shows that a democratic space has indeed opened in Rio that benefits certain groups over others in relation to the various democratic actions these groups pursue. Only a careful study of attitudes, resources, and actions at the grassroots level can reveal this trend, as typical institutions of aggregating political will such as political parties or ballot-box returns are not appropriate measures of democracy in Rio. As voting in elections is mandatory, with rather severe penalties for shirking, this participation alone cannot be interpreted as political will. Further, electoral laws in Brazil and much of Latin America have rendered political parties to be poor representative containers, as politicians habitually jump from one party to another within a single term. There is, therefore, no accountability to uphold a party’s platform, and voter expectations must be based mainly on the campaign material of each individual candidate. At the same time, electoral laws provide equal access to television advertising of parties, not candidates, a perverse combination that serves to misinform the electorate, or at best, leave the electorate uninformed about their choices.

This setup has been the perfect recipe to continue clientelistic relationships between politicians and their electoral base. As only individual politicians can really be held accountable at the ballot box, savvy voters prefer personalistic relationships over supporting a party that has no real ability to mount a united front to implement its platform. Further, years of populist rule of Rio de Janeiro under Brazilian President Getúlio Vargas (1930-1945 & 1951-1954), his protégé, João Goulart (1961-1964), and later Governor Leonel Brizola (1983-87, 1991-94), created a historical expectation of governmental assistance in return for electoral support so that, the landowner for the construction of multiple houses. It is the responsibility of the residents to continue water, electricity, and sewage infrastructure into their ‘irregular lots’ (*lotamentos irregulares*)

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16 Clientelism here refers to the trading of votes for the promise of post-election returns in the form of government resources. See particularly (Diniz, 1982; Gay, 1990a)
to this day, even the current generation of favela residents gratefully calls Vargas the “father of the poor” without irony, and community schools as “brizolas.”

The roots of clientelism can be seen as far back as Brazil’s independence in 1822 where a fracturing of the central state devolved into an almost feudal system of coronelismo, known as caudillismo in Spanish America (Campos, 2004). Later, modern clientelistic networks were firmly established during the twenty years of the military dictatorship (Diniz, 1982), yet clientelism does not define the limits of grassroots political participation in the post-dictatorship years (Gay, 1990b). Philip Williams (1994, p. 171) conceptualizes democracy at two levels: one is formal-institutional and deals with competitive elections and regime accountability; the other involves “expanding the space available for autonomous social organization and mobilization” so that “[…] typically marginalized groups are granted greater opportunities to express their interests in a collective fashion.” So, should the formal level of democratic participation be blocked by clientelistic obstacles, the lower level of social mobilization still remains, with a broad repertoire of democratic actions including petitions, public demonstrations, and lawsuits against the government. This dissertation shows that clientelism at the formal level doesn’t preclude democratic activism at the grassroots.

What Is Meant by Democracy

Defining and breaking democracy into its composite parts is necessary at this stage to create an understanding not only of how democracy should work, but also to provide a framework for analyzing the Brazilian case of Rio de Janeiro. Presented in Table 1-3, political landmarks point towards Brazil’s nominal achievement of democracy on paper. But the success on paper has not led to political equality or any semblance of real democracy for Brazilians. Yet rather than rehash the case against democracy in Brazil that many authors have already presented
in even more volumes\textsuperscript{17}, the purpose here is to describe the formal and informal democratic institutions and processes in order to later connect them to the grassroots organizations and actions of the poorest Brazilians.

As the focus of this research is to reveal the extent of democratic content of urban squatters’ political participation, it is important to understand what is meant by this overtaxed word. Democracy is not a bimodal condition that a state may either have or not have. Democracy is better conceived as processes and structures that are implemented in fits and starts with varying success and inclusion over time. In Brazil, elections with full suffrage, a legislature, and a detailed and socially liberal constitution exist, but the “civil component of citizenship is ineffective [so that] the vast majority cannot rely on the institutions of the state—particularly the courts and the police—to respect or guarantee their individual rights, arbitrate their conflicts justly, or stem escalating violence legally” (Holston and Caldeira, 1999, p. 719). Further, neoliberal reforms have created a disconnect between governmental institutions and social actors—a distance that is not easily bridged by any but the economic elite.

Munck and Verkulien (2002) indicate that conceptualizing democracy ultimately derives from whatever theory informs each particular research program. Therefore, “there is no point arguing about what a ‘correct’ definition is” (Gutmann, 2002, p. 8). The preliminary task of any study of democracy, then, is to delineate the necessary attributes of such a system. Robert Dahl (1971, p. 16), positioning democracy as an unreachable ideal, suggests that “meaningful public contestation and participation in governmental decision-making characterize those imperfect institutions that most closely approximate democracies.” These two broad strokes capture a

\textsuperscript{17} (cf. Gay, 1990b; Mainwaring et al., 1992; Cohen, 1994; Stepan, 1994; Leeds, 1996; Weyland, 1996a, 1996b; Marx, 1998; Smith and Messari, 1998; Gay, 1999; Levine and Crocitti, 1999; Samuels, 2001; Goirand, 2003)
multitude of nuances that allow Dahl to measure the degree to which polyarchies approach the theoretical ideal of democracy.

Elements of Democracy

Sylvia Chan (2002) describes democracy as the rules for popular decision-making. These rules define the mechanisms used to aggregate the public will. Like Dahl, Chan requires depth of participation and contestation in these rules in order to approach ‘true’ democracy. She adds a historical element to the definition, breaking democratization into three stages: transition, consolidation, and maintenance. Western liberal democracies, in the maintenance stage, may be backsliding, as exclusionary political parties and public apathy distort these mechanisms, and Latin American democracies have never progressed to full consolidation.

At the same time, participation cannot be taken on its own. Dahl (1971), among others, reminds that many authoritarian regimes require a kind of rubberstamp voting that indicates a high level of participation in government while no meaningful alternatives are presented. Structure does not exist without process. Each element interacts with all others in the framework for analyzing the degree to which a country is democratic. No single part is sufficient, and each interacts with the other, providing democratic meaning to abstracted aspects.

In this case, a strictly structural or procedural study of the governing system of any country will not reveal the true extent that it approaches democracy. That is to say that socio-economic structures and civic and state institutions are important, however, the processes that they engender are not equally influential. In all, it is important to look at the foreground players (individuals’ capacity, values, and attitudes for democratic participation) in the context of background democratic processes and structures (the rules and institutions for popular decision-making). The shared ideas and beliefs that constitute civic structures, as well as those that undergird governmental structures are also important to consider. Finally, evolution of historical
paths and conditions must be considered in evaluating the democratic nature of any system (Tilly, 1984). Both Dahl (1971) and Chan (2002) Agree that there are historical, material, and socioeconomic conditions that converge in order to pass a system through the stages of democracy: transition, consolidation, and maintenance.

**Democratic Structures**

Authors in the Modernization school of democracy, such as Lipset (1959) and Rostow (1960) see technological modernization occurring alongside economic modernization, which creates private spaces and common interests through the liberation of the market to all, access to private property rights, and increased education and communication. It is these factors that allow democratization of a society. Lipset emphasizes that democratization requires broad legitimacy of the state within society, and he criticizes France and Italy for having had too many unincorporated groups during their stumbling attempts at democracy. He suggests that the creation of political institutions that are available to the “lower strata” are necessary in order to show effective benefits at this level and thus win buy-in and loyalty to the system.

Taking the idea of private space and common interests out of modernization avoids the paradox of democratic transition in eighteenth-century America where educated, white freeholders in a *pre-industrial* society began to form democratic institutions and practices. With the relative ubiquity of cheap mass media to create intra-class communication and coherence, urbanization and industrialization were not necessary to create the weakening of the bourgeoisie or landed gentry that made space for broader political inclusion in Europe and later, in Spanish America (Dahl, 1971; Rueschemeyer et al., 1992). This space for civil society is the important structure that resulted from modernization in other post-industrial societies. And the change in the relationship between the working class and the bourgeoisie is the resulting process.
The capacity to participate and carry out civic duties must exist among the polity. For Putnam, associationalism is linked to civic capacity because clubs, teams, and groups are “schools for democracy (2000, p. 339)” where debate, leadership, and participation are learned. In addition to these civic skills, norms of reciprocity and trust are engendered through interaction in the civil sphere; these provide a base that facilitates government function, and even replace government function in some cases (North, 1990b; Ostrom, 1990; Putnam et al., 1993). Moreover, civil society is the space and mechanism for information sharing, so necessary for democratic decision-making (Dahl, 1971; Putnam, 2000; Chan, 2002). And for Dryzek (1990), this sharing of information can lead to an exchange of political opinions among the polity which nears his ideal of discursive democracy where there is a general, highly informed, public debate about policy issues. Actual participation in elections or politics is not a sufficient measure of the political capacity of society (Munck and Verkuilen, 2002; Moraski, 2003); for the participation to be meaningful, citizens must be informed and allowed to derive their own opinions regarding political choices.

In addition to a space for civil society, in a democracy the most important structure is that which aggregates the public will. Barrington Moore (1966) posits that a state must evolve sufficient institutions to absorb popular voice, or riot and praetorian society will result. External challenges to the system itself can lead away from democracy by reducing state autonomy necessary to enforce the aggregate will of the polity, or may force a praetorian intervention on the part of the state. Severe external challenges to an already democratic system (consolidating, or maintaining) are most likely to occur in the form of hegemonic coups, rather than those in the forms of groups demanding greater democracy.
One of these aggregating structures is political parties, which work in conjunction with another structure, the electoral system, to attempt to create an approximation of the collective will. In the large, complex systems of modern, industrialized nations, parties and representative democracy is the norm. The broader or more inclusive these structures are (to a point), the more likely they are to engage in democratic decision-making processes that contribute to a democratic political culture and build the repertoire of democratic participatory actions in society. On the other hand, highly factionalized parties, like those in Brazil, in societies with multiple socio-economic cleavages, again like Brazil, are likely to evolve exclusionary structures with inflexible, exclusionary processes (Dahl, 1971, pp. 221-5). The eventual outcome of an election held with either factionalized or broad-based parties may end quite similarly, however as a democratic structure, the more inclusive the parties, the better for democracy.

**Democratic Processes**

Democratic processes work in conjunction with democratic structures. And while the formal institutional rules and structures mark out the limits of democracy of the system, it is these rules in practice, or structures in use (processes), that really show the degree of democracy in the system. For example, it is possible to have a political party structure that is deeply inclusive in theory, but privileges a segment of the population in practice—all theoretically may participate, but only a small minority is able to. The same is true with public debate of political issues: all may contribute, but some few voices are heard much louder than others in practice. Thus we are cautioned by Dahl (1971) that complete suffrage and high participation in elections meant very little for democracy in the Soviet Union.

Dankwart Rustow (1970) takes the processes of conflict and reconciliation to build a minimal definition of democracy. The heart of democracy, for Rustow, is the aggregation of the public will in the decision-making phase, and the subsequent “habituation” or acceptance of that
decision by the polity. Through a participatory (discursive) process, the state derives a “transformative aggregation” of the public will. The creation or acceptance of this process is usually achieved by pact-making among the elite who believe that losing under a democratic regime is preferable to winning under the alternative (Przeworski, 1991). The outcomes from a truly consensual process will likely be “second-best to all major parties involved (Rustow, 1970, p. 357).” But once made, however sub-optimal to the leaders and the polity, the decision must be implemented. This requires a degree of state autonomy in order that the policy not be captured or distorted in implementation.

The historical process of democratization is also important, in terms of stage (transition, consolidation, or maintenance), and whether it was imposed from external sources, created from the grassroots, or created from the middle (Rueschemeyer et al., 1992). The impetus for, and process of democratization will impact the path to habituation of shared democratic values. And, although each step towards democracy is fragile and reversible, in general, the longer a country has been on the path, the more deeply imbedded democratic values and capacities are in the polity (Dahl, 1971; Chan, 2002). For Rustow (1970), it is shared values of national unity, whatever the regime, that provides the necessary precondition for democratization.

**State Autonomy**

Clearly, state autonomy from foreign intervention is necessary to any definition of democracy as the people that govern must also be those that *are* governed. What is less clear is why state autonomy from its own polity is important. O’Donnell (1978) provides an important justification, suggesting that a state with limited resources must shield itself from demand making or risk losing legitimacy through its inability to even partially meet those demands. This is the paradox that Chan (2002) mentions: a strong state is necessary to protect liberties and carry out the “second-best” general consensus, but the strong state may also be less responsive to the
polity and more invasive. Moreover, should the state mechanisms be too strong or unresponsive, especially in the face of concerted objection, protests against the system itself (rather than about the issue) are likely to ensue (Moore, 1966; Kitschelt, 1986; Skocpol, 1992). A balance between strength (autonomy) and openness is needed.

This question of balance is related to the nature of the non-elected administrative bodies of the bureaucracy. Chan’s paradox remains, if government outputs are relatively open, does this reduce the democratic nature of society due to risk of capture by minority factions? Or does it increase democratic nature because of expanded access to the policy process for the general populace? The answer links openness to equality of access, which is naturally linked to socioeconomic equality. If different groups are able to express their collective will at these different points in governmental action, such “weakness” in the state leads to greater democracy. On the other hand, if the same minority factions have disproportionate access to both inputs and outputs of the government, then it is clear that having a non-elected bureaucracy only increases the hegemonic nature of the state.

The same must be true with the judiciary—often proclaimed to be a pre-requisite for true democracy. Some measure of security from the state is necessary for the polity (and between groups and individuals within the polity). Yet a non-elected judiciary that broadly interprets laws made through an elected legislature dilutes the democratic nature of the state. This may be particularly true in the case of a common versus civil law tradition, as common law is based on precedents and interpretation, whereas civil law is anchored in the rule of law above all else. A counterargument could insist that common law practices adapt laws made in previous historical contexts to fit contemporary public sentiment, lest the past be our unquestioned master. It is
from this ideal that the US Supreme Court draws their idea of “ripeness.” That is, the Court will usually only hear a case if the issue has made multiple appearances in courts around the country.

Most consistent with the definition of democracy being developed in this paper, laws and their implementation should be the aggregated consent of the popular will through democratic processes. Judicial or bureaucratic adjustments to this will, coming from un-democratic institutions, must be considered as dilutions to democracy. But openness to a degree of influence from the polity may increase the democratic potential of a state if access is equal at all points, or roughly equal with tradeoffs between groups and policy stages.

These aspects of democracy will be taken up again in the third and fourth chapter of this dissertation. There, using a social-capital-based lens, the political resources of favela residents and the available access points to the government will be addressed. Social capital is a useful tool to describe the actions and interactions of these residents in order to examine each of the communities in this study through the common framework provided in Table 1-3, which summarizes the political history of Rio according to the lens provided in the preceding pages.

Methodology

This study is based on field research conducted in Rio de Janeiro between January, 2005 and June, 2007. While in Rio, I received both theoretical and practical help from Dr. José Cláudio Souza Alves, a Dean at the Universidade Federal Rural do Rio de Janeiro. His help and friendship were invaluable in formulating my conception of the favelas and gaining introductions to key informants in several communities. I also received generous funding from the Fulbright Commission for the fourteen months of January, 2005 to May, 2006.
I employed a variety of research methodologies during the data-collection phase of my dissertation. Living in four different communities for at least a month each allowed me to conduct participant observation of household daily life, community social interactions, and community political actions. During this time, I attended political rallies and participated in community-works projects. At the same time, I conducted semi-structured interviews with the residents regarding their view on government, society, and their living situation. This immersion in the language and culture gave me a profound appreciation for the urban squatters who are the subject of my study. And, although I had to give up on one community because of drug-gang-related violence, I have never felt more welcome nor safer in Rio de Janeiro than when on the streets or at home with my hosts in these poor communities.

During this stage of my research, I realized that the news stories that emphasize the violence in Rio are not reflective of the day-to-day lives of the residents of favelas. I was always looking for signs of fear, desperation, or at least dread, but even the most violent favelas I visited had consistent movement on the streets—something that is not the case after dark in the neighborhoods surrounding them. The popular conception of the favelas as anarchic and wild-west like was not born out in reality. This was confirmed for me by a census of more than 250,000 favela residents who failed to list violence as one of the top-ten problems that they were concerned about. Rather, the residents were more concerned with quality schools, access to transportation, and availability of jobs. And the cases of violence that they did cite were divided 50-50 between police brutality and shootings, and drug wars.

Furthermore, the portrayal of residents’ protests as being violent affairs where they use stones and burning tires to close highways and threaten motorists was only telling one side of the

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18 I was unable to secure housing in Rocinha, a very large community in the South Zone of Rio. Instead, I bussed in each morning, and returned to a share-house in Copacabana at night (between 5PM and 4AM depending).
story: the sensational side. I found favela residents to be extremely politicized, to use Marxist language when talking about their situation, and for small groups of community leaders to be tied in to a city-wide network of political activists. In short, the months that I spent living in the favelas were, without question, necessary for me to ground my more quantitative findings.

In addition to these more anthropological research methods, I conducted archival research in the Rio de Janeiro edition of O Globo, the most widely distributed newspaper in Brazil, and immersed myself in the databases of the Regional Electoral Tribunal (TRE), the State Tribunal of Accounts (TCE), Instituto de Estudos do Trabalho e Sociedade (IETS) Pesquisa das Comunidades de Baixa Renda (PCBR), and the Instituto de Pereira Passos do Rio de Janeiro (IPP), a clearinghouse for government-sponsored research on urbanization. From the newspaper, I pulled all instances of the mention of fifty one favelas\(^\text{19}\) found from 1995-2005, and evaluated them with the help of a research assistant according to their content, storing the results in a database and then exporting cleaned and sorted data to the SPSS statistical program. The electoral and budget information will be discussed in later chapters.

Furthermore, I administered a survey to the officers of the residents’ associations of twenty randomly selected favelas, including some of the same fifty one favelas mentioned above. I also conducted unstructured interviews with employees of local development organizations (NGOs), and with municipal politicians.

**Framework for This manuscript**

The following chapters attempt to make a coherent argument that brings social capital into the center of the debate on democratization in Rio de Janeiro in order to refine the concept, as

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\(^{19}\) These fifty one favelas are the same as those in the PCBR census that will be described later. The census chose a representative sample of favelas in terms of size and location around the city of Rio de Janeiro.
well as to show how social capital works to provide space for civil-society interactions, embed individuals in the state, and facilitate democratic action.

The first chapter lays out the historical context of the *favelas* relationship to the state, and to the society of Rio de Janeiro. The absence of the state is prevalent throughout this history, and when legal authority does take note of the *favela* communities, it does so through repressive measures meant to dislocate the squatter settlements to the far outskirts of the city. In this chapter, social capital plays the role of creating an ‘exit option’ to make up for the enforced isolation of the *favelas*. As expressed above, a democratic state cannot survive without legitimacy given by its citizens, so the presence of *favelas* can be seen as a political crisis in this new democracy.

Chapter two investigates literature relevant to the study and operationalization of the concept of social capital. The theoretical study here distills social capital into two major components, individual- and group-level social resources, and then carries on to analyze data on individual-level social capital at work in the *favelas* between 1995-2000. The data show that social capital can be a resource that allows individuals to avoid the government—the exit option. At the same time, recognizing that social capital may bond and blind homogenous groups or bridge and bind heterogeneous groups, the preference for networking outside of the community leads to individuals with this kind of social capital choosing to embed themselves in the state. As much as it is a threat to democracy, it may also be a solution for the state.

Chapter three looks at the group-level benefits of social capital, first locating the processes and mechanisms through which it works by examining three key points in the history of group action in *favelas*. From this background, group-level social capital is described in two forms: creating and maintaining group identity and group norms, as well as creating (or facilitating) the
ability for collective action among the favela residents. In the search for what differentiates favelas’ political success, chapter three concentrates on the second form, the capacity to concert. The second part of the chapter addresses evidence of this capacity to concert during the time of this study, and then turns to evidence of the connection between group-level social capital and collective resources.

Chapter four completes the social-capital-based explanation that drives this dissertation and details how wide, loose, complex, binding social networks, herein termed ‘binding action networks,’ are responsible for connecting the favelas to the government. That is, social actors including reporters and media, ONGs, inter-favela associations, and the residents themselves act sporadically around the same issue, occasionally coming into contact and working together directly. The demand making of all of the actors is synergistic, creating much more of an effect than each actor working alone, and allowing the demand to remain in the social discourse for much longer than any one of the actor’s temporary attention to the demand would allow.

The concluding chapter points to the implications of this research, both in the literature and in application, as well as a future research agenda based on the inevitable shortcomings of this current project. In general, using the unpacked version of the concept of social capital allows for a more exact or transparent examination of how social resources are created and used at the individual and group level, and of the connection between social and political resources. Furthermore, the concept of social capital as presented here gives great purchase into an understudied area of democratization literature and helps bring the people back in. Finally, using these findings to create a more focused study, particularly among the poorest communities, can then help design governmental attempts to reach down and incorporate the economically, socially, and politically disenfranchised.
Table 1-1 Population and growth of Rio de Janeiro and the *favelas* of Rio by decade

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>(a) Population of favelas</th>
<th>(b) Total population of rio</th>
<th>% favela growth by decade</th>
<th>% population growth of rio by decade</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>169,305</td>
<td>2,337,451</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>41.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>337,412</td>
<td>3,307,163</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>28.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>563,970</td>
<td>4,251,918</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>29.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>628,170</td>
<td>5,093,232</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>19.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>882,483</td>
<td>5,480,768</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>1,001,336</td>
<td>5,857,879</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

_Favela_ is a term that will be discussed later; in short it is a slum area that started as a squatter settlement.

As noted in an earlier footnote, counts of *favelas* and their residents vary for the same time period depending on the source due to disagreement about the exact definition of ‘favela,’ and the inconsistency of application of a given definition even within the same office at any given time, and especially over time.

Source: _IBGE_ (Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics), 2000

Table 1-2 Growth rate of number and population of *favelas* by zone, 1980-1997

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Geographic Zone</th>
<th>Number of favelas</th>
<th>Population of favelas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>25 26 4%</td>
<td>50 92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>86 195 127%</td>
<td>219 12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>194 270 39%</td>
<td>272 1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBD&amp; Port</td>
<td>45 57 27%</td>
<td>60 5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>350 548 57%</td>
<td>601 10%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>65,596 79,651 21%</td>
<td>124,446 56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>94,002 195,546 108%</td>
<td>226,158 16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>416,307 532,340 28%</td>
<td>529,199 -1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBD&amp; Port</td>
<td>92,119 99,488 8%</td>
<td>98,224 -1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>668,024 907,025 36%</td>
<td>978,027 8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: table assembled from various sources including (O'Hare and Barke, 2002; Perlman, 2006)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Democratizing mechanism</th>
<th>Process</th>
<th>Historical event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Creation of space for civil society</td>
<td>Social and economic liberalism is necessary for individuals to have the space necessary to make independent, meaningful decisions without government intrusion.</td>
<td>1860-1930 implementation and growth of economic liberalism 1888 abolition of slavery 1945 return to economic and (some) social liberalism after Vargas is deposed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creation of civil society</td>
<td>Space for political debate and information sharing necessary for meaningful participation in elections; also leadership training among all levels of society.</td>
<td>1945 rise of unions among urban-industrial poor 1954 suicide of Vargas allowed a move from corporatist, populist policies to a more open democracy under Kubitschek 1964 Liberation Theology and the Pastoral das Favelas encourages collectivization among the poor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creation of structures to aggregate common will</td>
<td>Elections are meaningless without known choices for leaders who embody the spectrum of the polity's desires. Political parties, unions, and social movements are examples of this type of structure.</td>
<td>1930 Vargas breaks the hold of the Café com Leite oligarchy 1945 Vargas is removed from power for the first time, opening space for more political inclusion 1954 Vargas’ suicide demonstrates his political isolation—new and old power seekers rise on the political scene, creating new political parties 1974 Military regime opens electoral competition under tight control 1988 First open election with free participation from any parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State autonomy</td>
<td>Can implement second best decision to suit all somewhat.</td>
<td>1933 Getúlio Vargas’ Coup breaks Café-com-Leite oligarchy that was beholden to agrarian interests of only two states. Also, implements authoritarian regime 1964-84 military dictatorship 1964- strong, layered bureaucracy ensures continuation of autonomy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State openness</td>
<td>Allows more direct access at various points of policy for more actors to have input (may lead to capture).</td>
<td>1984 return to civilian democracy 1988 liberal, socially progressive constitution is ratified</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 1-3, continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Necessary to judge if laws are being applied consistently and to judge if laws are being created in accordance with the overall, predetermined limits (usually a constitution).</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Judiciary      | 1891 creation of STF (like US Supreme Court)  
1932 creation of TSE (Superior Court of Elections) to prevent fraud and manipulation  
1946 creation of TFR (Federal Court of Appeals) & TST (Superior Labor Court)  
1988 TFR → STJ (Superior Court of Justice)  
1995 creation of JEC (Small Claims Court) following the 1988 constitutional mandate for a judicial instrument available to the common citizen |
| Bureaucracy    | 1964 military coup created a rationalized state and implemented the strong bureaucracy that exists today |
| Correcting inequality | Necessary to create the conditions of social and economic inclusion that lead to buying into the system and preferring to ‘lose’ with the current system than try to bring about a different system altogether. |
|                | 1965 free access for parties to broadcast campaign material by radio and television  
1988 there is almost unlimited basis for standing in the Supreme Federal Tribunal (STF) and unlimited appeal up to the STF |
| Incorporating polity into the government’s purview | Increases potential pool of individuals connected to the government through participation and demand making as opposed to connections going in the opposite direction government registration and enforcement. |
|                | 1891 Republican Constitution expands direct popular participation under limited suffrage (approx. 2.2% of pop.)  
1931 women’s suffrage and 18-year limit of majority for voting (approx. 5.7% of pop.)  
1945 voting made mandatory and men and women registered as employed were automatically registered  
1988 universal suffrage with no restrictions (property, wealth, literacy requirements)  
1989 first direct presidential election |

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a. O horário eleitoral gratuito or horário político provides time for political commercials to all parties passing a minimum threshold of adherents and allocates this time proportionally based on party size; b, c. (Engerman and Sokoloff, 2001); d. The Constitution of 1946 continued to limit voting to the literate—more than ½ of the population was ineligible
CHAPTER 2
ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF FAVELAS IN RIO DE JANEIRO

Introduction

The historical interaction between *favelas*, the government of Brazil, the state of Guanabara, and the city of Rio de Janeiro\(^{20}\) is both tragic and complex, and needs to be understood at some level in order to appreciate the contemporary relations between *favelas*, or “illegal squatter communities”\(^{21}\) and the public sector. It has been the cyclic repetition over one hundred years of a few general policies towards the *favelas* that has ingrained a unique social logic in their residents. This logic provides a basis for rationality in the *morros* (hills) that differs from that on the *asfalto* (lit. asphalt, or urbanized area). Excluded by social discrimination from many options of formal participation in production, the *favelados*’ existence is determined by very local, informal production and exchange networks that have little or no connection to government or society at large\(^{22}\). What follows, in short, is the history that justifies this stance from the *favelados* point of view, as well as the mechanisms and processes that have been a part of their repertoire of political action.

From the onset, *favelas* have been a resource to be exploited by politicians, entrepreneurs, and the church. For the politicians, *favelas* were a rallying point that demonstrated all that was bad and wrong in the city and could be corrected with the appropriate vote. On the other hand, the same politicians saw the *favelados* as a potential constituency with a cheap price tag. The

\(^{20}\) Rio de Janeiro became the national capital of Brazil in 1763, the capital of the Portuguese Empire in 1808, and the federal capital in 1822 after independence. Rio de Janeiro grew to take on the geographical boundaries of the state of Guanabara in 1965 when Brazil’s capital was moved to Brasília.

\(^{21}\) The legality and tenure of many of these communities categorized as *favelas* is a topic in need of clarification as, particularly since 1988, parts of communities that started as squatter settlements have been legalized on a lot-by-lot basis, and more generally, the largest single *favela*, Rocinha, is officially a *bairro* (neighborhood). At the same time, many of the government housing projects that started legally have been *favelizado*, or made into a *favela* because of irregular building over the years.

\(^{22}\) Here I borrow from Göran Hyden’s work on the uncaptured peasantry of Africa (Hyden, 1980, 1983). See the introductory chapter of this dissertation for the logic of likening the traditional or peasant mode of production to understand the *favela* mode of production.
entrepreneurs saw favelados as a cheap source of ready local labor until their makeshift housing projects interfered either with the construction of new factories, transportation of produced goods to the ports, or spoiled the view from the elegant homes of the nouveau rich. Favelados, for the church, inhabited an equally paradoxical position. On one hand, they were poor souls that needed to be saved and therefore required the transfer of great resources from Rome. Further, they gave concrete reasons for the Church to become politically involved and led to the foundation of semi-statal religious organizations like Fundação Leão III, thus increasing the Church’s power in Brazil. At the same time, these poor communities were the focal point for the liberation theology movement that threatened central control of the Catholic religion and led to a rift within the Church and between the Church and the state throughout Latin America.\(^{23}\)

The tenuous position that favelas have always had has been made worse by the game of political “hot potato” in which the problem of the slums has been passed around between city, state, and national levels of government, allowing the favelas to grow through “benign neglect” without real benefits in terms of social-structural changes, social services or infrastructure. For the most part, this relationship with the government has been concentrated at the sub-national level, except for the sixteen years between 1964 and 1980 when the military government implemented policies of removal in a conservative attempt to forestall growing social spending. It was the state government that has been mostly responsible for housing policy in the city of Rio de Janeiro from the beginning (1889) until the implementation of municipal decentralization from the 1988 constitution. This reformation of government structure gave broad taxing and

\(^{23}\) In 1952, Bishop Dom Helder Câmara and other progressive Brazilian bishops organized the creation of the National Council of Brazilian Bishops (Conselho Nacional dos Bispos Brasileiros—CNBB), one of the principal goals of which was to encourage the Church’s leadership to take an active role in social change. To accomplish this, the CNBB faced an internal political struggle in the Church that they waged through, among other methods, converting moderate bishops during Cursos de Atualização de Bispos (a type of professional development workshop); their position in the Latin American Council of Bishops (Conselho Episcopal Latino-Americano—CELAM); and the founding of the Center for Religious Statistics and Social Investigations (Neuhouser, 1989).
spending powers to Brazil’s cities, which has been supplemented to a great extent by the use of constitutionally-guaranteed block grants for federal funding of municipalities.

The major factors that have historically dictated the treatment of *favelas* are: 1) the architectural modernization of Rio de Janeiro; 2) the health and sanitation of the city; 3) the creation of a land speculation market via absolute right to property laws; 4) concentration of transportation infrastructure in the port area, the city center, and the rich South Zone; 5) the utility of a reserve army of labor nearby a quickly growing metropolis. The priority given to any one of the above was often in conflict between the levels of government enacting programs at any one time, often resulting from political battles between the parties in control at each level. And riding herd over all of these debates was a very active press, and a few very active citizens’ organizations such as the Rotary club who firmly embraced the philosophy of Social Darwinism.

The resulting policies have been a chaotic mélange of neglect, urbanization, eradication, relocation, moral and civil education, and responsibilitization. In the final analysis, while the residents of *favelas* have reaped some short-term benefits from their ambiguous position of tolerated illegality (*illegal e dai*), the long-term consequences include their exclusion from needed resources, a profound prejudice within society, and a lack of political voice through formal channels.

The particular historical path of the interaction between the various levels of the state and the *favelas* of Rio de Janeiro has had four interconnected results. First, the residents of *favelas* and the poor in general in Rio have developed a dependency on the state because of repeated populist policies over time, their political orientation by the liberation theology movement, and the social liberalism of the 1988 constitution. Second, although clientelism still exists in Rio, the historical patterns of politicians failing to deliver on their promises has led to a more savvy
constituency who have sought different means to make demands on the government. And third, governmental corruption, the growth in power of drug gangs, misguided removal and public housing projects, and rapid population growth of *favelas* from in-migration have resulted in a deterioration of social capital within *favelas*. At the same time, the absence of bonding capital within the *favela* has incentivized the development of bridging social capital to connections outside of the *favela*, some of which may help in attracting political champions for community. And fourth, the major form of political participation from the *favelas* is group demonstration. These demonstrations may be petitions, peaceful gatherings, or aggressive protests that generally seek to interrupt the regular flow of the city.

The dependency on the government, seen from the top down, looks similar to the idea of development embraced by the modernization school—that the government is best equipped to enact policies that will result in increases of the macro-economic and social indicators. From the grassroots, acceptance of *assistencialismo*\(^\text{24}\) may be counter-intuitively justified by involvement of the *favela* residents in liberation theology. The fundamental goal of the ecclesiastically-based communities (CEBs) is to bring small groups of Christians together, united by the common desire to study in their faith, in order to help them focus on improving their well being. But the remnants of this ideology uncovered in the course of this study suggest that the idea of rights for the poor has been emphasized while the self-help impetus has been lost. Additionally, there was a radical backlash to the elitism and human rights abuses of the military dictatorship that resulted in the 1988 constitution with guarantees for minimum standards of living and social use of property.

\(^{24}\) Assistentialism is the government policy of giving direct aid instead of indirect, capacity building opportunities with few or no expectations in return from the beneficiaries.
These two events provide the philosophical basis for the poor to understand the populism and clientelism that they experienced from 1930 on. This has created an expectation that it is the government’s duty to improve the favelas and the lives of the residents to the point that it actually inhibits action in civil society. That is, many residents of favelas are unwilling to invest their own time, effort, and resources in self-help community work because, in principle, it is owed to them by the government. Certainly, there are core groups of actors within communities that organize and carry out improvement projects, but participation in most favelas is small. In communities that have some kind of mechanism to enforce shared responsibility, residents would prefer to buy their way out of the community effort by purchasing a bag of cement or five meters of PVC pipe in lieu of participating. From the fifty communities included in this research, there was only one that consciously eschewed any government support—but they have the support of a teacher’s union that has provided many of the resources used for community improvement, including sharing in the labor.

The ubiquitous use of clientelism in the favelas, especially from Vargas through the military dictatorship, played in to the expectations of assistentialism. However, fifty years of experience with unrealized campaign promises and incompletely executed public projects has led to a favela constituency that is no longer willing to consolidate their vote in return for the promise of specific benefits. The belief in the right to government assistance still exists, but the belief in the promises of candidates has been tempered with experience. This personal experience with governmental corruption, constant repression by the police, and frequent political scandals revealed in the public media have resulted in an attitude of antipathy towards the government. The cost and confusing bureaucracy of the sluggish court system, even after the implementation of the local Special Courts (Juíza Especial), blocks the only other alternative to
democratic participation through the institutions of the government. Individual politicians cannot be trusted; the ground-level instruments of policy implementation are as likely to exploit the residents as help them; and the option of approaching the courts is either out of reach or unhelpful. The relationship between the state and the favelas has been reinforced as such for more than one hundred years. And the result is a politicized population who must make demands outside of the formal channels.

Unfortunately, the ability of the communities to carry out successful demand-making campaigns is hindered by the lack of cohesion of identity or shared condition among the community residents. One of the central features of the Favela-Bairro program was the creation of common spaces for meeting or recreation. In many of the communities that aren’t beneficiaries of that program, it is still a clear priority to have such a community space—at the very least, for a place where residents can hold celebrations (sala de festa). Nevertheless, there has been a drastic reduction in the amount of social contact between residents, and a consequent lack of trust and reciprocity. The qualitative data collected for this research revealed a conscious and clearly stated desire that many of the residents simply don’t want to know their neighbors, which is a drastic reversal from earlier findings (Perlman, 1976; Leeds and Leeds, 1978).

There are many additive reasons for the severe reduction in social capital in the favelas. At one level, interviewees implied that they did not want the obligation to share their meager resources that social connections bring, which suggests a lack of expectation of norms of reciprocity and trust. Also, they indicated that they would prefer to get to know people outside of the community, perhaps because of the potential opportunities that such contacts might bring.

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25 The sala de festa is present in all condominums of the middle and upper classes and serves the purpose of bringing large families together for birthdays, anniversaries, and holidays. Where the sala de festa is not available, there is always a casa de festa (lit. party house) nearby that exists only to rent space for these gatherings.
Furthermore, they would prefer not to be associated with the favela because of the social stigma that inhibits employment and dating.

Another aspect that has reduced the social capital in the favelas is the history of removals and subsequent mixing of families and social groups, often randomly, into either new government settlements or new areas wherever space could be found to try to reconstruct a home. Combined with this, the explosion of favela populations with thousands of new residents emigrating every day from surrounding states requires some integrative factor that is apparently not present. One such factor used to be an acceptance of the favela as the future family community; however most residents now express the plans or desires to move out and into a ‘respectable’ neighborhood—usually because of the potential for violence. Investing resources in constructing strong social networks, therefore, doesn’t make sense as the focus is on constructing a life outside of the community.

The role of drug gangs in the organizational structure of the favelas cannot be ignored in the decline of social capital and access to formal, institutional access to the government. While strong gangs enforce safety and order in their hillside strongholds, they do so with violence. Also, the presence of a drug gang is a magnet for battles with other gangs or the police where stray bullets cut through the hollow bricks of the favela houses and often leave dead bodies behind. This provides the incentive to move and the disincentive to develop strong ties to the violent place. It also affects the way that police view the residents because, just as in a guerilla war, it is impossible to know exactly who the enemy is. This mentality explains some of the worst violations of human rights by the police in the 1990s and the resulting distrust of police by the residents.
So, with a belief in their entitlement to government resources and support, yet finding formal avenues to make demands on the government blocked, the remaining actions have to do with popular protest. The deterioration of their patronage relationships opened the door for this kind of social action as they were no longer subordinated to the patron’s needs and desires (Brockett, 1991). Unfortunately, the lack of social capital means that sustained action is unlikely as there is little mutual reinforcement to facilitate it. So the residents’ demand making appears sporadically and occasionally violently. Petitions are common, but fairly ineffective unless they are accompanied by a visible event like a group demonstration. The most effective method of complaint, then, is to infringe on the normal function of the city through methods like blocking traffic with their bodies, or closing the roads entirely with rocks and burning tires. Drug gangs incite *favela* residents to hinder public transportation, and gang members symbolically burn commuter buses as their voice to the government.

NGOs have aided political action by providing a form and incentive for organization, occasionally providing economic support, adding legitimacy to the complaints by making them class-bridging issues, and increasing visibility through media and other contacts. With the help of *Viva-Rio*, a South-Zone based NGO, more peaceful protests that involve people from the middle class have been carried out—one such famous, yearly action is a march of primarily middle class citizens, all dressed in white, along the beach road of Copacabana. It is a show of solidarity that is ridiculed to some extent in the *favelas*, but it does keep the issue in the paper, and consequently on the agendas of policy makers.

**Pre-1900 At the Birth of the Nation Comes the Birth of Favelas**

As Rio de Janeiro developed as *the* urban-industrial and shipping center of Brazil in the early 19th Century, more and more freed slaves and immigrants from other parts of the country were welcomed by the barons of nascent industry and construction. At the same time, these
labor inputs for economic development were viewed with suspicion and reticence by the government and the aristocracy over concerns of the housing of these large groups of poor. Slums made up of flophouses, makeshift shacks, and overcrowded apartments began to proliferate in the city center.

The Inspector of Public Hygiene and the Academy of Medicine denounced the *cortiços*\(^2^6\) (slums) as insalubrious breeding grounds for epidemic disease prompting political solutions to the housing problems of the burgeoning city. The government’s principal concern was to keep the city’s ports open and functioning amidst paralyzing plagues occurring in other port cities in the Northeast and congestion in the city center and port area as workers and hopefuls established *casabres* (shacks) close to the jobs. In response, as early as 1882, the government began to implement incentives for industrialists to create housing for their workers. In a decree (12/09/1882), the state government lifted customs duties for those businesses that created appropriate housing centers (*vilas operárias*) for their employees. Six years later, as population pressure among the lower classes in city increased, the incentives were raised to include the ceding of public land and 100% tax relief on imported construction materials used for the purpose of housing workers (08/02/1888)\(^2^7\). The law allowed for the *vilas* to be constructed nearby the factories following a pre-approved and standardized design meant to maximize number housed and minimize the possibility for disease and epidemics. Unfortunately, this policy did not encourage housing starts to meet the needs of the army of unemployed nor those employed outside of the industrial sector, which left the growing problem of the homeless. Nor was the government’s architectural plan particularly healthful as it did not provide for indoor

\(^2^6\) Lit. ‘beehive’

\(^2^7\) One rich industrialist, Arthur Sauer, was given land for the construction of five workers’ villages, many of which still exist today. (Centro: Vila Rui Barbosa; Jardim Botânico: Vila Arthur Sauer; Sampaio: Vila Sampaio; Vila Isabel: Vila Maxwell e Vila Senador Soares) (Mendes de Pinho Via, 2001, p3)
ventilation, and fresh water, cooking, and toilet facilities were all communal for groups up to 500 residents.

At the same time that the government was encouraging private industry to address the problem of the slums in Rio, concurrent national policies led to a worsening of the housing shortage there. The progressive end to slavery in 1850 (end to importation of new slaves), 1871 (slaves’ children are born freed), and 1885 (emancipation of senior citizens) leading to the complete abolition of slavery in 1888 created a new class of citizens without resources, jobs, or homes. The difference in the cost of slave labor versus salaried labor led many plantation owners to unceremoniously expel a majority of their freed slaves from their former, modest housing. The Inspector of Public Hygiene at the time estimated that the slum population at least doubled between 1888 and 1890 as a result of emancipation without concurrent support\(^{28}\).

Even as affordable housing demand was soaring, the state government implemented a policy of razing the slums, starting in 1893 following the recommendations of the 1875 “First Report of Improvements for the city of Rio de Janeiro.” Under the administration of Mayor Pereira Passos (1902-1906) such remoções (removals) were increasingly common as a variety of both formal, such as a literacy requirement, and informal policies, such as de facto social segregation, denied the poor a political voice to challenge the process. The purpose behind this wholesale relocation of the urban poor was the re-ordering of the city center for the benefit (aesthetic, social, and economic) of the urban aristocracy. Those left without shelter after the demolition of more than 3,000\(^{29}\) homes during the reformas Passos (1903-1906) sorted through the rubble and carried what they could up onto the hills that populate Rio de Janeiro—only a very few were relocated to the suburbs. They rebuilt a more precarious and insalubrious version

\(^{28}\) Abreu, 1994, p36
\(^{29}\) Soares and Soares, 2005, p. 1
of their former homes on the steep sides of the morros (hills), and thus began the favelazation of the city. The initial relationship between those who created these squatter settlements and the government was that of pests who could be ignored as long as they didn’t stand in the way of modernization and urbanization.\textsuperscript{30}

The government, in the guise of military generals, created a formal relationship with these hillside communities by billeting their soldiers on this unused land in the period between 1897 and 1900. As troops and relocated dissidents poured into the nation’s capital, their housing and provisioning became the primary concern of the military, having finally won a long and costly campaign of national consolidation in the Northeast.\textsuperscript{31} The first favela, for which all that followed are named, was the Morro da Providência (providence hill), called Morro da Favella (favella hill) after a flowering plant that is plentiful in the Northeast. Other communities were formed by the previous inhabitants of the city’s slums. Regardless of their origin, these hillside neighborhoods were ignored by the government, completely lacking in basic infrastructure and susceptible to landslides during the rainy season that could carry away one or all shacks from a community in an instant. And, by 1900, there were seven favelas that shared these common characteristics.

At this time, the relationship between favela and government was very different from that of non-favela slums and the government. Whereas the government was clear about its objectives to remove the slums (particularly from the city center), the favelas, located mostly on the hillsides that populate the city, benefited from benign neglect. From the point of view of the government, not dealing with the favelas allowed a necessary evil, providing the pool of

\textsuperscript{30} The first three communities constructed were Quinta do Caju, Mangueira (not THE Mangueira), and Serra Morena around 1881. These had begun on the bottom of hillside slopes in the downtown district (O’Hare and Barke, 2002). These may not have been invasions, but were settlements by Portuguese, Italian, and Spanish immigrants.

\textsuperscript{31} For more information, see Euclides da Cunha’s Os Sertões along with more contemporary treatments of the War of Canudos.
available labor that was necessary for the modernization plans of the capital city. Moreover, it was an evil that could easily be ignored as the favelas remained more or less discrete and out of public view.

The poor, on the other hand, did not. From the foundation of the first republic to 1902, there were a number of protests against the poor living conditions in the city: lack of water, poor food distribution resulting in high prices, and a lack of affordable housing, education, and health care. In 1890, there was an organized protest of hundreds of working-class marchers representing a collection of suburbs to demand something be done about the high price of food. By 1893, the poor were joined by many ‘respectable people’ from the middle class and created a multi-day event resulting in battles with the police, and vandalism and threats on food markets. But the norm for collective action among the poor was spontaneous outbreaks or riots that grew from a single incident or specific complaint (Meade, 1989).

**1900-1930 The Period of Rapid Urbanization**

The following period was not nearly as friendly for the favelas. Mayor Pereira Passos (1902-1906) left an indelible stamp on the geography of Rio de Janeiro through his future-looking plans that privileged huge plazas and wide avenues that would be packed with cariocas as the “Marvelous City” swelled. The improvements that the mayor implemented gave Rio a very European look and feel and facilitated exports (particularly of coffee, wood, and precious metals and stones) in return for manufactured goods from Europe. Also important to Mayor Passos was modernization, which meant removing the stigma of yellow fever and squalor from the face of the city. The mayor’s program resulted in competing forces: the need for plentiful manual labor to carry out huge urbanization projects, while at the same time, the reduction of

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32 Carioca is the local word for residents of Rio de Janeiro.
33 Rio de Janeiro, at that time, was infamous for rampant epidemics and was avoided as much as possible by all shipping companies.
affordable housing opportunities within the city (and within easy commute to their worksites). Pereira Passos’ term coincided with a population and housing crisis, largely because of his modernization plans. While prior to the construction projects, Rio de Janeiro grew at an annual rate of just less than three percent (2.84%), it leapt to almost three-and-a-half percent (3.40%) with housing starts only growing by one percent (1.00%). This unequal growth rate resulted in a marked increase in housing density, from 7.3 to 9.8 people per dwelling (Valladares, 2000).

The common conception of favelas at this time is exemplified in a 1900 Jornal do Brasil (national newspaper of Brazil) article that vilifies the hills as “infested with vagabonds and criminals who are the dread of families” (in Valladares, 2002, p 8). This view is echoed by police officer of the time: “it’s good that there aren’t any families in that designated place, it’s impossible to police that area that is filled with deserters, thieves, and army garrisons, there are no streets, the shacks are made of wood and covered with zinc, and there isn’t even a single gas pipe on the entire hill” (in Valladares, 2002, p8). These stereotypes of the collective poor were only reinforced by the typical interaction between them and the state: riots.

In October of 1904, Oswaldo Cruz, the Director General of Public Health, attacking epidemics like yellow fever and variola, ordered the mandatory, forcible vaccination of the city’s population—for Mayor Passos, this would have the additional benefit of allowing him to condemn and remove much of the unhealthy congestion in the port area. Accompanied by police, public health teams broke down doors, destroyed many shacks, and gave variola shots to the bared asses of willing and unwilling alike. With no political recourse, the poor began peaceful demonstrations that eventually coalesced into a city-wide riot known as the revolta da vacina\(^34\) (vaccination revolt) that lasted for five days. The government’s action stopped after just

\(^{34}\) Under the Lei de Vacina Obrigatória, Octobro 4, 1904, the riot lasted from Oct. 10-16.
two days…only to be restarted after the riots died down a short time later. However, the anti-
government aspect of the protests went much further than the vaccination program.

Much of the beautification works that took the place of the eradicated slums lay in ruins
along with symbols of modernization such as streetlights, streetcar tracks and the streetcars that ran along them. Unseen was the unification of disparate groups of the working class including
an ideological wing of the military, the Positivists, who reacted by launching an aborted coup
against the national government (Meade, 1989). In all cases of popular demonstration, severe
repression was the only remedy carried out by an increasingly well-armed and violent police who
habitually escalated peaceful demonstrations into riots and thereby alienated the demonstrators
from potential, less than radical allies.

Cruz’s crusade, with full support of the government, exemplifies the attitude of the
‘respectable people’ towards *favelas*: a public nuisance to be fumigated like so much of a termite
mound. Three years later, his shack busting focused on eradicating the community on Morro da
Favella. The portrait painted of *favela* residents in Seabra’s report ultimately did not have a
significant impact on the government’s actions.

The illegal communities that were springing up on the unusable hills of the city were
officially tolerated. The 1903 Official Decree 391 stated that 1) shacks and other irregular
housing was not allowed in Rio de Janeiro but that 2) “rough shacks” were to be tolerated on
those hills that were currently uninhabited. In the context of this solution for the housing
problem of Rio, it makes sense that the government demolition of two to three thousand housing
units for the poor was countered by the construction of only 120 *casas populares* (public housing
for the poor) by the *Reformas Perreira Passos* policy (Passos’ Reforms).
Further formal recognition of favelas occurred in 1905 when the Minister of Justice and Domestic Affairs, Dr. J.J. Seabra, created a commission for the sole purpose of analyzing the problem of favelas and “other forms of popular housing.” One year earlier, although evidence suggests a very heterogeneous composition of the ‘Revolt Against Vaccination,” Dr. Seabra scapegoated “foreigners, vagabonds, and prostitutes [as well as] foreign anarchists” who were preying on otherwise innocent citizens (Meade, 1989, p. 251). Seabra’s 1905 findings argued the hygienic importance of removing not only the shacks necessary to widen the streets, but also the favelas as dangerous sources of disease. Interestingly, Seabra’s report, which included observations of the favelas from site visits of his staff, challenged the popular conception of who the residents are:

“It is not only ruffians and gangsters who live there [in the favelas] like the legend [...] shows; diligent workers also live there who, lacking basic rooms, reach for these high places where they spend relatively little for a kind change [in luck] that they continually improve, sweetening the bitterness of the habitation.” (in Valladares, 2000, p. 13)

Yet this view within the report was no match for the continuing social dialog in the newspapers of the time, generally blaming the favelas for all of the city’s ills. In particular, regardless of who lived in the communities, they were seen as impediments to the modernization and reputation of Rio de Janeiro, which was meant to be the “Paris of the New World.”

Allowing slums and favelas to continue was counter to the economic interests of the wealthy homeowners and, increasingly, of the growing middle class. Removal, eradication35, and repression campaigns by the government were consistently driving a geographical wedge between the interests and connections of the poor and the rest of society (Meade, 1989). This marginalization of the poor led to alienation from the city services enjoyed in the city center and the South Zone, yet that were completely absent in the Northern and Western suburbs, which

35 The first official removal was in 1910 against the Morro de São Antonio. In the following nine years, the residents were expelled three more times, the second by a fire of mysterious origins.
lacked schools, clinics, streetlights, storm water systems, reliable garbage collection, policing, and public health programs such as mosquito control.

By 1913, according to a report from the Director of Public Health, there were a total of 669 shacks with a population of more than 5,000 people (avg. 7.47 people per shack) in the two largest *favelas* (Morro da *Favela* and Morro do Santo Antônio). On the flatland, life was a bit more comfortable with a population density of 5.30 people per shack, and easier access to food, water, transportation, and jobs. In the seven urban districts of the city there were still 2,564 shacks housing around 13,600 people. A majority of the remaining slums were in the suburban districts. The most contested of these was the *Zona Sul* (South Zone) where Copacabana, Ipanema, and Leblon are now located. At that time *Zona Sul* was rapidly growing in value and popularity among the wealthy coinciding with government terraforming and infrastructure projects. Increasing transportation costs and increasing distance of the suburbs made even a day-trip to the beach of Copacabana or Leme for a family of four out of reach for any in the working class\(^36\), which left only the few *favelas* remaining in the South Zone and their residents as eyesores for the ‘respectable people.’ And with the assertion of absolute rights to private property in the Civil Code of 1916, there began an unchecked land speculation that constantly uprooted informal settlements. The homeless and landless were driven further and further into the periphery, far from employment and any urban infrastructure such as transportation, water, and sewage.

The year 1913 also marked another large-scale collective action of the poor who, after a decade of sporadic riots following the *revolta da vacina*, hadn’t resolved any of their demands

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\(^36\) According to the *Jornal do Brasil* in 1905 the round-trip cost of the streetcar from a suburb to the city center was around 10% of the monthly wage of the working class. The cost of streetcar and movie for four was one entire monthly salary. And the cost of streetcar and drink for four in Copacabana or Leme was at least two full monthly salaries (Meade, 1989, p. 255). Prices continued to rise thereafter resulting in the 1913 Cost-of-Living Riots.
and, at the same time, inflation continued to drive even a minimum standard of living further from their grasp. Under the organization of the anarcho-syndicalist group FORJ (*Federação Operária do Rio de Janeiro*—Workers Federation of RJ), a two-month Campaign Against the High Cost of Living was conducted, uniting disperse groups and interests among the poor, workers, homeless, and *favelados*. Although the Campaign was successfully repressed in the end, 1913 marked a year of increasingly organized collective action by the lower classes. This was of enough concern to the government that they turned their police loose to ferret out the organizers so as to better bring the groups under control—either through cooptation, or through an escalation of individualistic repression that had not been possible or necessary when demonstrations and riots were local, spontaneous, and specific. In the end, however, the interests of the lower classes in general had been fused with those of trade unions who saw a gain for one as a gain for society.

Although FORJ-initiated general strikes in 1917 might have enlightened the governing elite that the urban problems of Rio de Janeiro were neither simple nor solvable through police action, under the administration of Mayor Carlos Sampaio (1920-1922), many more of these slums were demolished in order to improve the aesthetics and hygiene of the wealthiest areas. The 1920s was an era characterized by the celebration of the values of capitalism exemplified in Social Darwinism. The ‘grow or die’ mentality of the firm was firmly entrenched in society, and those riding on the cusp of progress felt completely entitled and morally justified to pave over those who couldn’t, or in their eyes wouldn’t, keep up. In a single action, many thousands who had weathered the grandiose *Reforma Pereira Passos* were made homeless when the *favela* *Morro do Castelo* (Castle Hill) along with the poor neighborhood at its foot, *Bairro da*

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37 The best exemplar of these motives is the 1920 removal of the *favela* Morro Dois Irmãos, which has a commanding view of Gávea, Ipanema, and Leblon in the South Zone, in preparation for the visit of the King of Belgium.
*Misericórdia* (lit. neighborhood of mercy), were demolished. No alternative housing was offered nor created, nor did the government offer infrastructure in the suburbs where the poor were forced to relocate: no transportation for jobs, no water, and no government services—none of the urban conveniences. According to Social Darwinism, only the strong survive, and culling the herd of those who couldn’t find a way to earn a decent wage and make a different life was not the problem of those who could.

In 1926, working through the politically influential Rotary Club in combination with the press and local politicians, Dr. Mattos Pimenta began to change the social discourse around *favelas* from that of simply a hygienic problem or one of crime to one of an impediment to progress and aesthetics. Pimenta used inflammatory language to characterize the *favelas* as irredeemable, calling them “leprosy” on the beautiful face of Rio de Janeiro. Moreover, he relegated the *favelados* (residents of *favelas*) to the status of non-citizens due to their existence outside of the government. He proclaimed to defend Rio de Janeiro’s “health, beauty, and social order” and campaigned heavily in his role as Rotarian, physician, and journalist:

“The *favelas* – a genuine Carioca creation not to be found in any other cities, even in Brazil – are not purely a ruthless crime against aesthetics. They are a particularly serious and permanent threat to public tranquility and health. Built in opposition to all precepts of hygiene (no water, no sewage, not the least bit of cleanliness, no garbage removal) they are like large filthy latrines covered with excrement and other waste of human existence, heaps of dirt and rottenness that feed clouds of flies and attract all kinds of diseases and impurities into the city streets. Devoid of any type of policing, freely built out of cans and scrap in lands of the National Patrimony, freed from the need to pay any taxes, alien to all fiscal actions, they are an excellent stimulus to indolence, an attractive appeal to tramps, a stronghold of loafers, a nest of thieves bringing insecurity and restlessness to all corners of the city by multiplying robbery and larceny.”

(Quoted from the speech “To remodel Rio de Janeiro,” delivered by the physician cum journalist João Augusto Mattos Pimenta, one of the inventors of the “*favela* problem,” at the Rotary Club in October 1926 (in Ribeiro and Lago, 2001, p. 39)).

Mattos Pimenta’s proposed solution was to create six-storey apartment buildings with 20 apartments on each floor: a monument to modernization, hygiene, and maximization of space.
His plan was to replace all slums and *favelas* within 15 years, financing his project through rent, justifying that even the most humble of shacks in the worst slum was rented in some way (Valladares, 2000). In an ironic twist in *favela* policy, he put the responsibility of the financial burden completely on the shoulders of the *favelados* by tying the construction and eradication budget to the rental or purchase income from the housing projects. At the same time Pimenta’s plan still held the *favelados* responsible for the common problems of the rest of society. Further, all of this discussion and planning was carried out at the highest levels of society that had no personal knowledge of the problem, excluding those who would be directly affected. According to Valladares (2000), Mattos Pimenta must be given credit for planting the seed for the major policies and perceptions of *favelas* for the next 50 years.

Mayor Prado Júnior followed Mattos Pimenta’s suggestions closely and implemented *Plano Agache* (named for his advisor Alfred Agache) that meant to remake the face of Rio de Janeiro into a monumental city. This plan, supported by the dominant economic class, was restricted to the city center and the South Zone, and found the *favelas* particularly aesthetically noisome, reiterating the term “leprosy,” as they were interrupting the beautiful views from the richest neighborhoods. Agache characterized the *favelados* as proto-citizens, quasi-nomadic and without any rule of hygiene whatsoever (in Valladares, 2000, p. 17). *Plano Agache* formalized the idea of economic and social stratification, designating suburban areas for public housing projects to house the poor (who, he rationally admitted, would only return to the hills once expelled without this alternative) far from the rich. The decade ended with an estimated *favela* population of 200,000.

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38 Specifically: Plano Agache, Codigo das Obras 1937, and the BNH (1964)
On October 24, 1930, Getúlio Vargas ascended to the presidency of Brazil in a bloodless coup that marked the end of agrarian, Café com Leite elite rule. His populist platform promised to put the country into the hands of “the people” as he ended a de facto oligarchy by reforming the military, ending coronelismo (rule by colonels, military bosses and political patrons of their almost feudal districts), and promoting industrial interests over the prior primacy of coffee and dairy farmers. For this, Vargas is credited for laying the foundation for the modern state of Brazil and the transition from an underdeveloped agrarian “sleeping giant” to the industrial powerhouse of the southern cone through his dictatorial program of the Estado Novo (lit. New State). For the poor in the nation’s capital, Rio de Janeiro, Vargas created a schizophrenic complex of policies: on one hand demanding a social use for land in his constitution, implementing a minimum wage, mandating workers’ rights, and favoring unions (later to be wed to his corporatist syndicates); while on the other, denying suffrage for illiterates, attempting to roll back Rio’s poor population through forced out-migration, and supporting the destruction of the few favelas that remained in the rich South Zone and the city center. He further complicated the lives of the poor residents of the Federal District of Rio de Janeiro by introducing land-use planning and zoning, and regulating land sales as preventative tools to the growth and establishment of favelas.

The dual character of the favelados in this era is well-characterized by Leeds and Sanjek: who suggest that the government sees them as voters and workers who need to be mobilized, but as a potential source of strikes and disorder, they need to be contained or actively controlled (1994, p. 228). Vargas’ answer to this was to privilege registered workers (those with

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39 The Café com Leite politics of Brazil involved a negotiated peace between the large states of São Paulo and Minas Gerais where the presidency of the country would switch back and forth to give power to a candidate from each region every other term.
governmental work cards tying them to the Institute of Retired Persons and Pensions (IAP) and inhibit the participation of the unregistered poor. His 1933 policy that made loans accessible to the poor for housing through the *Caixa Econômica Federal* (National Bank), and his 1941 policy of creating housing projects for factory workers (*parques proletários*) were available only for the salaried poor (Burgos, 1998). Even so, very few benefitted with space for only around 4,000 created by 1941. He ignored the needs of the great majority of *favelados* whose participation in the formal economy was sporadic, when it occurred at all, due to the growing societal hostility towards the more than 200,000 illegal residents of the hillside communities. Those that he did acknowledge, he treated as pre-citizens as his parques proletários were compounds for “civilizing” the residents in terms of hygiene and correct thinking (Burgos, 1998). Furthermore, regardless of Vargas’ populist rhetoric, he did nothing to open government to the voices of the poor, therefore political action on the part of the *favelados* remained unorganized, intermittent, and ineffective.

The 1937 City Building Code (*Código das Obras da Cidade*) defined “*favela*” as a group of two or more shacks made from improvised materials in contradiction to the Code, and mandated that such habitations would “absolutely not be permitted,” and further still, no improvements could be made in the existing *favelas*. By making *favelas* illegal as well as improvements *in situ*, the government effectively absolved itself of any responsibility for improving the habitation for a growing number of urban workforce. But instead of outright eradication, continuing the general historical trend of viewing *favelas* as a source of pollution and disease, the treatment of *favelas* was taken over by the Secretary General of Health of the Federal District who assigned the duty to Vítor T. Moura, the director of the Good Will Hostel.

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40 Although in 1933 shacks (casebres) were added as an official census category, the 1937 building code is the first official recognition of the *favelas* as a distinct feature in Rio’s geography.
Moura’s plan was to first control immigration into Rio de Janeiro of people of ‘poor social condition’; second, to return individuals of this condition to their states of origin; third, to fiercely apply the law forbidding construction or repair of irregular housing; registering individuals currently living in halfway houses (*instituições de amparo*); and fourth, to conduct an impassioned reeducation campaign for the *favelados* to correct personal habits and incentivize choices for ‘better living’ (*melhor moradia*) (Burgos, 1998).

Political recognition of the *favelas* was twofold: first the physical location was legally registered for the first time with the building code of 1937; and second, the residents became central to the ambitions of politicians from the president to the mayor who saw them as a possible electoral base. Vargas, still widely revered among the residents of today’s *favelas* in Rio, gained his popularity through a selective policy of benign neglect along with rhetoric of removal—threatening with one hand while winking conspiratorially to let the residents know that he would never bring about their end. This policy dissonance created a *de facto* formalization of many of the contemporary *favelas*. Vargas further facilitated the *de jure* formalization of *favelas* by buying into the popularization of Samba, a musical product of the urban hills. For political ends, he hosted several shows at or near his proletarian parks.

The progression of Samba from the hills to the pavement was quickly advanced when the poetry of a *favelado*, Cartola, was mixed with the music of a well-known, middle-class musician, Noel Rosa. And increasing mainstream acceptance of this musical “discovery” resulted in the celebrated decision of Rio’s Mayor Pedro Ernesto to make the samba school (*Escola da Samba*), or costumed parade band, an official part of the Carnival celebrations (Burgos, 1998). And it was around Samba that the first homegrown political organization of the *favelas* began with the publication of “*Voz do Morro*” (*lit.* Voice of the Hill) which carried news about the *Estação*
Primeira da Mangueira samba school, and also other news and calls to meetings relevant to the poor (Silva and Barbosa, 2005).

The government support of *favela* culture led to embedding these illegal settlements into the official framework of Rio de Janeiro as the competition between samba schools, all from the hillside communities, was increasingly institutionalized and anticipated by Rio’s residents. Nor did it hurt that these samba schools were concurrently financed by the large, organized network of criminal activity that centered on the *jogo do bicho*—an illegal, private lottery that started while Brazil was still an empire. The *bicheiros*, or dons of the game, were very rich and very well connected politically as they financed election campaigns and samba schools alike to buy legitimacy amongst their fellow citizens where they could not achieve it in the law books.

The official tolerance, and moreover support, of the samba schools exemplifies the relationship between the *favelados* and the rest of Rio, which remained one of exploitation and containment: like a child’s doll that is taken out only at playtime, *favelados* were expected to bring the entertainment to Carnaval, vote as ordered, and then retreat to their community and try not to bother decent society. Similar to the situation of Black Americans around the same time, the mostly black *favelados*41, composed largely of families of the first generation of freed slaves, were celebrated for their music, samba like its counterpart jazz in the US, and segregated (but not by law) from other white collar occupations. Blacks at this time in Brazil had only recently won a place on a professional soccer team (Vasco de Gama in 1923), but not through government action. Because there were no laws mandating racial segregation, it was social restrictions reinforced by the elites of the day that created the impassable divide (Marx, 1998). Thus, at this

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41 Non-whites made up around 43% of the total population of Rio at this time and around 75% of *favela* residents, although some of the communities were either all white (for example those starting with Portuguese immigrants) or all black (for example Jacarezinho).
time, *favelados* were caught under the triple yoke of social, economic and political discrimination.

According to the government, as demonstrated by Mauro’s policy above, the *favelados* were seen as pre-citizens needing moral education and soul saving as much or more than literacy. But even instruction in morality was expected to be the problem of the surrounding states to which the poor were slated to return. Yet instead of a proactive policy to create opportunities in the Northeast (the source of most of the migration), or to create opportunities for freed slaves and first generation freemen, Vargas and his cronies courted the vote of those poor who could pass a literacy test with populist fish fries, samba shows, and a failure to destroy *favelas* (the absence of the negative making a positive in the minds of current residents of Rio’s *favelas*).

At the same time, around 1935, the Municipal Guard of Rio De Janeiro took over the security of the capital of the Republic from the military police. By 1937 this paramilitary corps had been turned into a disciplined, uniformed, and very public armed force. In their role of preserving urban order and providing security for special occasions, they began bumping heads with *favelas* and *favelados*. They played a major role in the removal of the *favela Hípica* in 1945, and in the creation of the largest soccer stadium in the world, *Maracanã*, in 1950, which required the removal of urban slums (Musumeci, 2000, p138). The policy dissonance of Vargas’ populist rule was in many ways an extension of the eradication policies of Perreira Passos and Oswaldo Cruz from the turn of the century, with just enough acceptance offered as needed to win the popular vote.

Following this trend of recognizing the *favelas* (or at least the threat of *favelas*), the first Census of *Favelas* was carried out by the mayor Ângelo Mendes de Morais in 1947-48. Morais’ overall plan, following that of the state Secretary General of Health Moura, was to map and
count the communities and their residents in preparation to plow under the shacks and return the immigrants to their home states as a part of his ‘repress and eradicate’ doctrine. And although Morais was supported by local press who made a propaganda campaign about the “Battle for Rio,” writing that the city existed in a state of civil war, and of the need to do away with the poor invaders. The mayor eventually blamed the failure of his plan on the lack of support from the other Brazilian states who refused to participate in the reverse migration scheme (Leeds and Leeds, 1978).

The year after the publication of the municipal census, the first national “Census of the Favelas and Demographic Census of the Municipality of the Federal District [of Rio de Janeiro]” was taken in 1950. Together, these two official counts of the communities and their residents were able to challenge the common yet erroneous wisdom that was propagated in the press of the day. Even so, the two counts differed dramatically. The estimated number of communities was cut from 119 to 105 and then to 58 by the federal census (Preteceille and Valladares, 2000; O’Hare and Barke, 2002). The estimated number of residents was cut in half, from 400-600 thousand to 280 thousand, and finally settled at between 134-169 thousand who lived in around 35 thousand shacks with only about four people per habitation (Valladares, 2000; O’Hare and Barke, 2002). Importantly, even this reduced population count already amounted to almost ten percent of the population of the Federal District.

There were several other formal institutions designed specifically to treat favelas during the Vargas years, although not many by his administration, as housing in Rio de Janeiro was more of a state issue than a national one. In 1937, the Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro (PUC-RJ) created the Instituto Social (today PUC’s Departamento de Serviço Social)

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42 Carlos Lacerda, contemporary journalist and later politician and governor of the State of Guanabara from 1960-1964 led this propaganda campaign having recently changed his allegiance and ideology from communist to anti-communist.
whose social assistants became the right hand of the municipality in the administration over the poor offering social protection on one hand, and facilitating governmental control over the poor at the same time (Preteceille and Valladares, 2000). Ten years later, the Fundação Leão XIII (Fundação), a church organization with strong ties to the government (eventually becoming a governmental agency in 1963), was created as an alternative to the populist pedagogy of the time. In the eyes of some (Soares and Soares, 2005), the Fundação gave a special legitimacy to the existence of favelas as it provided them with access to at least some public goods and services, with the dignity of recognition, and with the voice of an advocate in the government—although still not their own voice. On the other hand, as the Fundação was created with the mission to “recover the favelas” that were lost to the city and to provide appropriate “orientation” for the favelados “for their own good,” it is clear that the public perception of favelas and their residents had not improved (Leeds and Leeds, 1978, p. 199). Orientation in this case meant re-educating the illiterate, disease-ridden thieves, layabouts, and prostitutes. More than plans for urbanization and orientation, there was a political motivation behind the good works of the Fundação: they found it “necessary to go up into the hills before communists [came] down (Leeds and Leeds, 1978, p. 199).”

From the 1920s, the Brazilian Communist Party (PCB) was a lurking threat both to the economic elite and, seen as an internationalist organization, to the nationalism that was still nascent in Brazil. In 1947, the year the Fundação was created, the PCB had around 200,000 members in Brazil—a majority of those in Rio—and had gone through a bumpy history of cyclic banishment and illegality, and reintroduction to Brazilian politics. In 1945, the PCB had once again been allowed to participate but in 1948 was driven underground again. Because the communist platform and message resonated best with the urban poor, there was a very rational
fear that *favelados* would swell the Party’s ranks and give them a political advantage. This had been demonstrated by the 1945 collaboration between the socially progressive wing of the Church, the PCB, and *Comissões de Moradores* (residents’ commissions), which were successful in securing city water for several *favelas*, and governmental guarantees that the *favelas* would not be removed for the creation of parques proletários.

The residents’ commissions continued into the 1960s and were joined in 1953 by the *União dos Trabalhadores das Favelas* (UTF—Union of Workers from Favelas). The UTF was an organization of leaders from various *favelas* supported by the progressive leadership of the Church in Brazil and the PCB. By 1957, many more *favelas* were integrally connected through their own political organizations such as the *Coligação dos Trabalhadores Favelados do Distrito Federal* (Federal District [of Rio de Janeiro] Alliance of *Favela* Workers)\(^43\) (Silva and Leite, 2004). As the state was not improving its relationship with the poor communities, the communities were organizing to change their relationship from the bottom up by connecting politically with the state, and not limiting their political participation to mass demonstrations in reaction to government action. The *favelados* were finding that they could have agency and work proactively to make a better life out of their hard existence.

In terms of changing the social discourse around *favelas*, the official "home of the poor," the *Fundação*, was meant to Christianize the masses and offer persuasion instead of coercion in the spirit of Democratic responsibility. Instead of political conflict, the *Fundação* promised dialogue and understanding; instead of the fight for public goods, they promised assistance; instead of mere criticism and resignation they planned the development of traditional leaders

\(^{43}\) This was later either joined or replaced by the following, similar organizations: Federação de *Favelas* do Estado da Guanabara (Fafeg), a Federação de *Favelas* do Rio de Janeiro (Fafber), a Federação de Associações de *Favelas* do Rio de Janeiro (FafRio) e a Pastoral de *Favelas*. In 2005, this study determined that the proliferation of organizations of *favela* leaders actually inhibits coordination as there are too many competing parties claiming to represent the needs and ideas of the *favelados*—some are actually the creation of politicians.
(Burgos, 1998). These social activities of the Church that concentrated on the poor were consistent with the “preferential option for the poor” under the liberation theology movement that gained a formal presence in Brazil after the 1969 publication of Gustav Gutierrez’s *A Theology of Religion*.

Projects by the Fundação were a radical departure from the previous treatment of the *favelas* in that this organization actively worked to upgrade and integrate the marginal areas into the social fabric without removal. Furthermore, these projects were, for the most part, participatory with more help for community group projects than execution of projects from the top down. Between 1947 and 1954, the Fundação had implemented projects for basic services (light, water, and sewer) in thirty-four different *favelas* (Burgos, 1999, 29). And the *Cruzada São Sebastião*, created by the Church in 1955 to facilitate basic service projects in twelve more *favelas*, quickly expanded its role, moving into the political arena as intermediary between governmental removal policies and the *favelas*. By 1962, these two church-based organizations had become state-funded service providers for the poor communities and became part of the waft and weave of the government, which could now exercise some control over them. Although it may be coincidental, 1962 coincides with opening of the Second Vatican Council where Pope Paul VI vociferously criticized the liberation theology movement as being inappropriately political, and for sullying the traditions of the Church by popularizing the religion.

In the first real reformation between the state and poor communities, the municipal government created The Special Service for the Recuperation of *Favelas* and Unsanitary Habitation (*SERFHA*) in 1956, the first governmental organization designed specifically to urbanize and improve *favelas* (Silva, 2005). The Ministry of Agriculture’s published the results of its 1950 federal census of the *favelas* in 1957, which revealed the working class nature of the
residents, and debunked the myth of favelados as crooks and whores. In this same vein, the Undersecretary of Social Services at the time undertook progressive policies that treated the poor residents as capable and intelligent individuals instead of the pre-citizens of Vargas’ estimation or the subhumans of Cruz and Passos. The Undersecretary was particularly interested in creating the incentive for political organization within the favelas for streamlined contact with the government, and self-help actions with governmental support. This resulted in the creation of most of the residents’ associations that are in existence today (Portes, 1979). Unfortunately, SERFHA was short-lived as Governor Lacerda44, the same man who, as a journalist, had led the “Battle for Rio” campaign some years before, found the demand making too much. He pushed to reduce the formal structures that existed to connect the state and favelas. By 1967, Decree no 870 along with 3.330 in 1969 limited each favela one residents’ association, and the flow of demand making was reversed—by these decrees, the leaders of the residents’ associations were to attend the demands of the state. Predictably, the first requirement was to register all of the residents and prohibit new construction. The implementation of this law eviscerated the organizations’ ability to contest the government, and left the residents with a vacuum of leadership and a necessity to develop a new repertoire for demand making on the government.

At the same time SERFHA was reaching out to serve the poor citizens, the city increased its eradication efforts in a seemingly contradictory policy, on one hand, attempting to urbanize, regularize, and legitimize the informal settlements, while on the other attempting to bulldoze them from the sides of the hills where they perched. In 1960, the state government jumped into providing housing and services for the poor through COHAB (Companhia de Habitação Popular). That same year, the federal government joined the effort with the Federal Council on

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44 In 1960, the national capital was moved to Brasília and the municipality of Rio de Janeiro was left under the governance of the State of Guanabara. As of 1975, the Guanabara state no longer exists, and the city of Rio de Janeiro now includes all of its former territory.
Housing (CFH—Conselho Federal de Habitação), which brought housing for the poor into the national spotlight for the first time (Soares and Soares, 2005). COHAB’s first job was to study Rio’s housing problem, and then it was tasked to do something to solve it. Between 1962-1965, COHAB built a total of 9,500 dwellings in government housing projects in return for the eradication of 5,345 dwellings in the three largest favelas, and twenty-four smaller ones for a total of 41,958 removed individuals in the South Zone, and in the North-central Tijuca-Mier area. The stated purpose was to make way for improved roadways and a state university (Portes, 1979). Despite organized protest, these relocations removed the residents to the city’s periphery in the West Zone where they did not have easy access to public transportation, jobs, or commercial services such as markets. Lacerda lost the next election due to the participation and preference of the working poor and favelados, clearly demonstrating their growing political power and growing organization (Perlman, 1976).

At the municipal level, the Sociedade de Análises Gráficas e Mecanográficas Aplicadas aos Complexos Sociais (SAGMACS—Society for the Graphic and Mecano-graphic Analysis of Complex Society) was created in 1960 to, among other things, carry out a comprehensive study of Rio’s favelas. Also, a kind of triage area stop-gap measure was implemented primarily to help those residents made homeless by favela eradication: the Centro de Habitação Provisória (CHP—Provisional Housing Center). These centers, created by the Fundação, were intended to count, register, house and feed the newly homeless as they migrated back to their home state, or at least to the city suburbs and into a government housing project. The lack of coordination between eradication and construction, however, resulted in the temporary inhabitants of these provisional centers squatting, refusing to move, and the centers eventually turning into favelas.

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45 Conjunto Habitacional de Vila Aliança (2,181) e Vila Kennedy (4,751).
46 Favela Esqueleto (3,931); Morrod do Pasmado (911); Maria Angu (503) affecting 41,958 individuals.
In 1963 the Legislative Assembly of Rio, for the first time, guaranteed the allocation of 3% of its state budget for public works to improve favelas in situ. Although the Military dictatorship would reverse this city-level trend in 1964, in situ improvements became and remain the norm for the treatment of favelas since 1988.

**1964-1984 The Military Dictatorship Decides to Clean House**

As demand making increased and the government at the various levels was unable, or politically unwilling, to increase investments in services for the poor, new steps were taken to bring the favelas more firmly under control. The policy can be generally seen as drowning these nascent political bodies in red tape through co-opting them by legally recognizing them, then binding them with crippling bureaucracy, and offering conditional funding based largely on the adherence to strict censorship policies (Soares and Soares, 2005). The first step was to make the Fundação into an official state agency in 1963 so as not to have the principal-agent disconnect from when policy in the Fundação was dictated by the Church.

As the government was turning away from the favelas, 1967 saw the first private collaboration on a large scale with the favelas. Ação Comunitária do Brasil (ACB—Community Action of Brazil). This registered Federal Public Utility was funded by a group of businessmen with the objective of creating the spirit of self-help while building the capacity in the favela of Maré so the residents can solve their own problems without relying on a reluctant government. This domestic non-governmental organization (NGO) represents the birth of what has become the contemporary hope for most favelas in the Twenty-first Century. At the same time, for a variety of reasons, the organization has a spotty record of negotiating between the government and the community.

The new federal government continued to use COHAB as its major policy arm for the housing of the poor; however it was clear that it had lost its will to spend. For example, in the
period 1966-1968, COHAB built fewer dwellings than it had in 1964\textsuperscript{47} alone. Further, all of those new starts were in the same remote project (\textit{Cidade de Deus}) and was merely completing a chapter of the public budget that had already been committed prior to the military take-over in 1964; yet it oversaw more removals than it had in all prior years combined\textsuperscript{48} (Portes, 1979). At the same time, the new regime creatd the Banco Nacional de Habitação\textsuperscript{49} (BNH) (National Housing Bank) to replace the Conselho Federal de Habituação for the unrealized purpose of facilitating the construction and purchase of personal housing for the poor.

The state government chose to reform its relationship with the poor by creating CODESCO (Companhia de Desenvolvimento de Comunidades—Community Development Company), in 1967, which was quickly subsumed by the federal CHISAM (Coordenação da Habitação de Interesse Social da Área Metropolitana do Grande Rio—Greater Metropolitan Rio Habitat Coordination for Social Interest) in 1968. CODESCO was tasked to deal with the problem of housing and urban decline in Rio de Janeiro, however it quickly became the locus for the general contest between governmental levels as the Governor Negrão de Lima’s populist policies returned to the supportive structures of SERFHA and thus were working in direct opposition to the national government’s removal plans. CODESCO began planning the improvement of specific favela, but before any of its projects could meaningfully get underway, the federal CHISAM “consolidated” all 110 housing agencies and existing housing initiatives from all levels of government under its umbrella policy of eradication.

This rivalry between the national and sub-national governments played itself out in the conflicting policies regarding welfare and housing of the poor, among other areas, and were

\textsuperscript{47} In a 1964 survey Rio de Janeiro’s land tenure, CHISAM registered favela occupation of 23% of federal land, 27% of state land, and 44% of private land.
\textsuperscript{48} From 1963-1966, they removed 6,875 homes.
\textsuperscript{49} Law 4380 of 21 Aug, 1964
gradually resolved through a number of institutional acts between 1965 and 1974 that eliminated
election of the president, then of state governors, then of city mayors, thus consolidating the
federal will at all levels of the state. Opposition was violently oppressed through the use of
imprisonment, torture, and ‘disappearances,’ which effectively put an end to popular protest for
that decade.

The federal intervention in what had been the arena of state policy put the *favelados* in the
crossfire of battling politicians with the best option for them the benign neglect of the state-level
populists. In 1972, the state-level government was appointed by the military regime rather than
elected. This removed the governmental infighting, but worsened the plight of the *favelados*.
*

*Favela* organizations were of little help as the elimination of the large number of access points to
the government had left them with a single closed door. It was truly best at this time to avoid the
notice of the government if at all possible as their bulldozers seemed anxious to get to work in
new areas. And in terms of the social discourse, after almost twenty years of building a societal
perception of *favelados* as honest, church-going citizens with families and a variety of “normal”
occupations, the federal government’s policies required a return to perceiving the *favelas* as
insalubrious dens of criminality, dangerous blights on the city. And the removal of an
autonomous state government and the dismantling of CODESOC in 1972 removed the issue
from public debate.

Thus, the small gains made by formalizing relationships between city, state, and federal
government and the *favelas* were reversed by the military dictatorship that was all but
inaccessible by the poor. This opened the door to clientelistic politics in the *favelas* where
politicians would dip into the well of support that the *favelas* represented and leave behind token
efforts of help, always careful not to meet all of the needs of the community so that the need to trade for favors would not dry up (Diniz, 1982).

In seven years (1968-75), more than 100,000 individuals from between fifty and sixty *favelas* were destroyed without providing alternative housing—the vast majority of these removals were from the trendy South Zone (Table 2-2 and 2-3) where the majority of supporters of the dictatorship lived (Portes, 1979). *CHISAM*’s main policy had two primary motivations: first, to reorganize urban space for the modernization and beautification of the city—also maximization of land values by allowing middle- and upper-class homes to take the place of slums; and second, to create employment and grow businesses through construction starts at all economic levels. In 1972, coinciding with the appointment of Rio’s state government and the dismantling of *CODESCO*, *CHISAM* was also virtually deactivated in the historical context of a job well done having fulfilled its purpose.

In a return to Mattos Pimenta’s 1926 housing solution, removals through *CHISAM* were complicated for the residents as the plans placed an untenable economic burden on *favelados* who were to buy their space in newly constructed housing projects and pay for utilities and condo fees. Of particular interest in this policy is the inherent recognition of *favelados* as income-earning and capable enough to finance their own removal and, thus, the progress of the entire city, while at the same time justifying their removal by identifying them as incapable, quasi-human, non-citizens. Families who pinned their hope on regularized land title found their loan indexed for inflation that consistently ran ahead of salary adjustment leading to average default rate of 74-77% that ended up with middle class buyers usurping the formers’ position so the poor got some cash but no housing help (Perlman, 1976). Worse, the housing projects moved *favelados* far from job opportunities which increased the economic burden of time and
transportation. And by collecting large groups of unemployed, untrained and therefore similarly
skilled individuals far from wealthier regions, the opportunity for odd jobs (biscate) was lost.
Finally, the safety net of the poor, family and social networks, were torn apart as relocations
were necessarily hurried and without the luxury of many options.

In the favor of the favelados was that, in the early 1960s in the first years of the military
dictatorship, the favela became a locus of investigation for university research (Valladares, 2000;
Lustosa, 2006). This link between universities, which are much more closely tied to social
action than those in the United States, and favelas remains strong today and it is often teachers’
unions and other labor unions associated with universities that are the biggest advocates for
favelas in the government and in society. The strength of popular movements and protest, and
the growing networks of AMs in the mid 1970s and early 80s brought about a radical change in
favela policy at all levels. First, with the deactivation of CHISAM, eradication programs were all
but stopped. Second, COHAB was reformed as CEHAB (Companhia Estadual de Habitação—
State Housing Company) and its mission changed from being primarily a construction company
to administering BNH policies and returning to individual-level loans rather than attempting
mass projects. This was more of benign neglect than anything and resulted in a virtual standstill
of new housing starts for the poor financed by the government. Whether the result of popular
movements in the 1970s (Valladares, 2000) or due to poor funding structures (Portes, 1979), the
results were the same: a return to Vargas era particularistic relationships with favelas designed
more to develop dependency on the state through individual politicians than to actually improve
living conditions.

The extent of this neglect can be seen through the loans of the BNH. From 1964-1975, the
Bank identified only about one-tenth (9%) of all money loaned as fulfilling its raison d’être:
facilitating construction and acquisition of housing for the poor (Table 2-1). Much of the one-third of its resources it officially allocated for low-income housing actually went to finance military mortgages. And almost half of the Bank’s resources (47.6%) were used to finance middle- to upper-class housing (Portes, 1979). And of the housing for the poor, the president of the Favela Residents’ Association (FAFEGH) reported that “the majority of favelados removed to CEHAB housing returned to live in favelas, near their places of work, building new shacks with the sale money from their apartments (Portes, 1979, p. 23).”

In 1979 Rio’s Mayor Klabin, with the help of his Secretary of Social Development, emphasized the problems of the favelas, and used the issue as a strong criticism of the military government. Moreover, Klabin used his position to condemn all earlier legislation and treatment of favelas and their residents as inept. One of his first priorities was helping sanitize the communities by providing free trash collection with the formation of COMLURB/FEEMA under the Secretary of Public Works. In addition to putting twelve trucks and three hundred sanitation workers on the streets, he sent education campaigns in the communities to help residents understand the compounding problems of trash and pollution. (Valla, 1985)

By 1980, the military government was keenly aware that they had lost the support of all classes of society and were then trying to negotiate a controlled transfer of power. In 1979, the literacy criteria for voting was abolished, removing a formal obstacle from the largely illiterate poor for having their voices heard in government—and consequently making favelas even more desirable to politicians. At the same time, as a sop to the middle class, the government set up Promorar, the last housing program of the military regime, under the National Housing Bank (BNH). Specifically this program would work with basic sanitation in favelas that proved significant public health risks to the rest of the city as flooding threatened to pollute municipal
water supplies with *favela* sewage, and the ever-present threat of dengue fever loomed large in areas that were not easily accessed by the government. According to the Minister of the Interior, the program would urbanize where possible and eradicate when the area was a “lost cause (Valla, 1985).” This program immediately became mired in its methodology of participative planning when the residents began to agitate for ownership of land title. The municipal government continued in Klabin’s footsteps and implemented *Projeto Mutirão* (Project Self help) as one of several unambitious attempts to improve around fifteen *favelas*. *Proface*, in 1983, was the state annex to *Projeto Mutirão* that dealt specifically with water and sewage infrastructure, and at the same time, the state government initiated a regularization of land title program called *Cada Familia Um Lote* (A Lot for Every Family).

The movement of the government reaching out towards the *favelas* from 1979-1982 was nothing compared to the ‘golden age of social action’ under Governor Brizola (1982) whose return to Vargas-like populism won him a landslide victory, largely on the votes of the newly incorporated poor. Having been the Secretary of Public Works for the municipality had served him well in building a constituency prior to his election. Brizola incentivized a renewal of *favela*-level organizations and opened up formal channels of communication with residents’ associations. His political platform was creating opportunities for equal access to governmental resources from electricity to police security. In the end, he used his political institutions to coopt *favela* leadership and support his administration. The infrastructure of *favelas* in general certainly improved during this time, and his trademark Integrated Center for Public Education (CIEP) was implemented in 137 locations around the city that could educate as many as 30,000 students per day. Furthermore, he addressed the age-old problem of public transportation by renovating the fleet of public busses. But Brizola satisfied the population of the *favelas* with
short-term improvements, such as creating the Sambadromo for the yearly Carnaval, and made no move to incorporate them into political or economic society.

**1984-Present The More Things Change, the More They Stay the Same**

The 2000 census by IBGE defines *favelas* as: Below Normal Agglomerations (*favelas* and the like) in a group of at least fifty-one habitable units occupying or having occupied until recently usurped land (public or private), generally disorderly and densely constructed, mostly lacking in essential public services. But, according to their own data, defining *favelas* in terms of what they lack (title to land, and public services) is no longer accurate. The three largest *favelas*, Rocinha, Complexo Alemão, and Maré actually rank above the city-wide average for the provision of water, sewage, and trash collection. Almost all of these ‘civilizing’ improvements were made after return to democracy.

The post-military regime era in Rio de Janeiro was a confusing one for municipal policy regarding *favelas*. Not only did the 1988 constitution create broad legal space for illegal settlements, workers’ rights, and a minimum standard of living for all citizens; but the nature of city-state-nation relationships as outlined in the *Lei Organica* created a bottleneck in that municipalities were given unprecedented autonomy, which allowed clashes in policy coordination between local governments in areas such as transportation, environmental stewardship, and urban infrastructure integration. In 1993, a new populist mayor, César Maia, created an administrative mechanism to try to bring order out of the chaos that was provoking many spontaneous popular demonstrations (Acioly, 2001). The principal aim of this new mechanism was to bring particularistic populist spending practices that created great inequality among the poorest areas, and equalize expenditures for general improvement of informal communities and public spaces. Transparency was brought to the municipal budget, and the
Instituto Perreira Passos (IPP), formerly IPLANRIO, was created to research and record a huge variety of urban and budget indicators (Soares and Soares, 2005).

The 1991 census reported the existence of 412 separate favelas, a number which was quickly increased to 570 after an IPLANRIO census of favelas two years later. The 1993 census estimated around 1.3 million inhabitants of favelas that represented more than twenty percent of the city’s population. The positive side of the benign neglect favelas had suffered was evident in the change in building materials: shacks were no longer precarious dwellings made of wood and salvaged scrap, but were now overwhelmingly made of concrete and brick. The negative side of the neglect was equally obvious in the near total lack of municipal services save for those that had been integrated into the community through improvised connections (gatos).

One important step in reforming the relationship between the city and the poor was the dismantling of an “execution infrastructure” of control that had evolved out of the clientelistic networks that were encouraged during the military regime (Alves, 2003). In order to continue party control after opposition was allowed in 1984, the state was divided into many regions that were under the control of one or two strongmen each. This execution infrastructure was a continuation of earlier policy that used summary impeachment of opposition members to maintain political control or to solve political problems. The increase in force from impeachment to execution was seen as necessary to control not only politicians, but also a population that had already shown itself to be capable of rebellion in the mass demonstrations that finally brought down the military regime. In addition to using selective elite assassinations and mass drive-by shootings in communities to instill fear of defecting, these political groups also created loyal constituencies to provide token services to as positive incentives as the carrot accompanying the stick of violence (Alves, 2003). The result for residents of poor communities
was to alienate them from any decision-making process and keep them cowed for fear of reprisal against voicing any political opinion.

Over the past 30 years, the political and criminal spheres have overlapped and drug gangs that control favelas have replaced their execution infrastructure predecessor, severely complicating the relationship between favelados and the government (Arias, 2006). And at the same time, the state has proven to be poorly coordinated and controlled, with various groups of police and firemen taking justice into their own hands either in reprisal for violence done to them and their friends; for personal financial interest working as mercenaries for one drug faction; or as privateers carrying out unauthorized raids in order to fill their own pockets. For example, in 1993 during Brizola’s second term as governor, a group of around fifty well-armed, masked men invaded the favela Vigário Geral and killed twenty one men, women, and children in what is known as the Vigário Geral Massacre (A Chacina do Vigário Geral). In the final analysis, thirty three civil and military police officers were arraigned for the crime, although the appeals continue and many have been absolved. The example above points to but fails to fully capture the climate of distrust of the state and fear of the police by the favela residents who often choose the ‘devil that you know,’ the drug gangs, when they appeal for justice or aid.

Yet at the same time that drug gangs serve as political fixers for state and municipal politicians, positive steps to reforming the city’s relationship with the informal communities have been carried out. The common feature of these recent policies is they were to be carried out in situ. One such step was the 1994 creation of the Secretariat of Municipal Housing (SMH) that was tasked with providing sustainable solutions to the multitude of housing problems being revealed by IPP studies. The SMH set about to re-create the national housing finance system that was active from 1964-1985, and to retake control over public housing projects in order to
address their inadequacies. The elimination of the Banco Nacional de Habitação in 1981, as ineffective as it was, coupled with the dire economic situation for the next two decades resulted in an explosion in the populations of favelas as the poor had no other options than to move in to the periphery of an illegal settlement where their illegal presence would be tolerated (Preteceille and Valladares, 2000; Ribeiro and Lago, 2001).

The Favela-Bairro Program, begun in 1993, was the most comprehensive of SMH projects, undertaking the ambitious mission of integrating informal communities into the surrounding neighborhoods socially, spatially, and economically (Conde and Magalhães, 2004). The partial and arguable success of the program aside, it is without a doubt that the government has carried out the first steps of Favela-Bairro and held participatory planning meetings with residents of over 145 favelas and their surrounding neighborhoods. Although the program necessitates standardized architecture that does not always adapt to the local conditions, most of these favelas are now more spatially integrated into the city. At least on the periphery of the favelas, public services may now flow: police, ambulance, mail, sewage, and light.

Outside of the meetings for Favela-Bairro the formal communication structure between state and favela has become strained. Part of the reason is the rise of the drug gangs who serve as impediments to favela organization, not wanting to call attention nor the anger of the government down on their place of business. Further, the drug gangs are integrally involved with the leadership of the residents’ associations. Government projects to improve the infrastructure often meet resident resistance in proxy for the objections of the drug gangs who benefit from labyrinthine streets and alleys that make access to the favela difficult. Further, the increase in violence in the favelas, among other reasons, has led to a decrease in social networks within the communities—a necessary ingredient for the common collective protests of previous
eras. As evidence of the specificity of the violence, a study by the Legislative Assembly of Rio de Janeiro revealed that in the ten years between 1992-2002, more than one hundred community leaders were assassinated by drug dealers; another three hundred were literally banished from their community; and four hundred were working in the employ of drug dealers (Silva and Leite, 2004).

Conclusion

Through the historical process over the past century, Rio de Janeiro and the city’s favelas have created a complicated and unique relationship that is not shared by all of Rio’s poor. The social construction of what a favela is and what it is to be a favelado has defined the options for social, economic, and political interaction for that specific group that makes up almost one fifth of the population. Although there has been some progress in the social conscience of Rio’s middle-class society, largely due to governmental excesses against the favelados, criminalizing, scapegoating, and threatening the elimination of favelas remain part of the social discourse. The favela residents’ general preference for material gains versus political or social gains must be understood in this context—the former is concrete and has been won from time to time while the latter two are abstract and progress is without visible reward within a single generation. Favela residents’ attitude, that the government should provide for them, has part of its basis in reaction to this exclusion, and another part based in their historic exploitation at the hands of industrialists, politicians, and clergy. They make up a politicized body that is aware that the city was built by their families and yet they can’t access it.

While such an attitude is an excellent core around which to build a cohesive group identity, there are several intervening factors that have fractured the solidarity of favela residents. United groups did exist at one time in many of the favelas; however favela removals, particularly vicious during the military dictatorship, broke up tight networks and families. The increased
immigration to Rio and the associated growth of the favelas led to further dilution of their social networks. Further, the benefits of united action began to dwindle by the 1960s as populist politics were replaced with neo-liberal reforms and the clientelistic promises of campaigning politicians rang hollow year after year. At the same time, repression by the police, drug gangs, and the militias increased the risk of making waves and being noticed.

There is little left of the relationship between favelados and the state except half-hearted attempts from both sides to improve communication and cooperation. While the Favela-Bairro program has painted the visible, road-side row of houses in 145 favelas and filled a few potholes, favela residents continue to tap illegally into the electricity, cable, and water lines that run nearby. Police, ambulance, and mail service refuse to climb the hills, and fully one third of the city’s economy is off-book and untaxed. In some few communities, there seems to be healthy and successful exchanges with the government, and it is exactly the element that makes those communities successful that this dissertation aims to reveal. It is important for all parts of society: the favela residents, the government, and the middle-class neighbors that surround and are surrounded by the dysfunctional communities on the hills of Rio.
### Table 2-1 Government housing starts in Rio de Janeiro by year, 1962-1975

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Houses built</th>
<th>Apartments built</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>499</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>499</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>4,115</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4,115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>3,815</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3,815</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>1,101</td>
<td>1,221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>1,560</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,560</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>1,014</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>767</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>767</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>2,566</td>
<td>3,237</td>
<td>5,803</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>673</td>
<td>22,252</td>
<td>22,925</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>366</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>8,366</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>1,057</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,057</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>1,446</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>2,246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>479</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>2,288</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>2,432</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>20,385</strong></td>
<td><strong>35,914</strong></td>
<td><strong>56,299</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Compiled from Portes, 1979

### Table 2-2 Favela homes destroyed per zone after the creation of CHISAM, 1968-1972

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>South zone</th>
<th>North zone</th>
<th>Outer central zone</th>
<th>Inner-central zone</th>
<th>Northern and western periphery</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>9,789</td>
<td>2,646</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>902</td>
<td>3,130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>54.5</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Compiled from Portes, 1979, p. 14
Table 2-3: Removals in the largest *favelas* of Rio by zone, 1963-1966 & 1968

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Favela name</th>
<th>Zone</th>
<th>Date of removal attempt(s)</th>
<th>Homes removed</th>
<th>Zone subtotal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alvaro Ramos</td>
<td>South</td>
<td>1963-1966</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Getulio Vargas</td>
<td>South</td>
<td>1963-1966</td>
<td>113</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedo Sobrinho</td>
<td>South</td>
<td>1963-1966</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marques de São Vicente</td>
<td>South</td>
<td>1963-1966</td>
<td>111</td>
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<td>1963-1966</td>
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<td>South</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1963-1966</td>
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<td>1963-1966</td>
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Compiled from data in (Portes, 1979)
CHAPTER 3
SOCIAL CAPITAL AND THE SLUM

Introduction

The last chapter ended with a fairly pessimistic view of social capital and collective action in the *favelas* of Rio de Janeiro, suggesting that the limited capacity to act in concert came from a lack of social networks within the communities or attachment to the community as an identity. The simple definition of social capital as used in this dissertation is, at the individual level, the amount and intensity of actual and potential cooperation an individual receives when interacting with another; and similarly, at the society level, it is the aggregate potential and actual cooperation that society gains from all members. This definition will become clearer as it is applied throughout this chapter to investigate the extent to which social capital in the *favelas* provides an exit option for the residents; the extent to which it facilitates demand making on the state; and the extent to which it may help embed the residents in the state-society structure.

In the first case, social capital must be understood at the individual level as a productive resource and survival strategy that takes the place of the state in the lives of *favela* residents. In the second case, social capital must be understood as a community resource that creates the capacity to act in concert and make demands on the government. And in the final case, social capital must be understood at both the individual and community levels in terms of how aggregate linkages within society lead to greater or lesser connection to the state. Understanding the mechanism of social capital formation and differentiation into type and intensity will provide an efficient lens through which to examine the social, economic, and political strategies of *favela* residents.
What Is Social Capital

Before discussing social capital in the *favelas* of Rio de Janeiro, the concept will be operationalized here. Current literature on social capital acknowledges both its positive and negative potential. On the one hand, social capital may ease inter-ethnic conflict (Varshney, 2002) or provide a foundation for enhanced function of institutions (North, 1990b; Putnam et al., 1993). It may also be an instrumental individual resource, providing a leg up for immigrants (Portes, 1995), and reinforcement of culture and community in minority groups (Gold, 1995).

On the other hand, it may restrict individual choice (Portes and Sensenbrenner, 1993), compel harmful behavior (Fernandez Kelly, 1995), and lead to narrow pursuit of interests (Varshney, 2002). Transporting social capital to a development context, Naryan and Pritchett (1997) discovered a positive correlation between social capital and household income in rural Tanzania, giving empirical evidence of social capital as a resource to enhance survival strategies and options. The many differences above can best be understood in terms of the unit of study (individual, community, or society); whether social capital is causal (exogenous) of social behaviors, or the result of interactional behavior (endogenous); the variable utility of social capital; and the extent to which social capital can be measured, created, stored, and destroyed.

The term “social capital” has been used over the past century to capture the idea that individuals’ social networks contribute to making better or more productive lives. First appearing in the work of L.J. Hanifan, a Progressive Era reformer, social capital was the “good will, fellowship, sympathy and social intercourse,” which could lead to the “substantial improvement of living conditions in the whole community” (1916, p. 130). The term then lay dormant until the 1950s, where it was used to describe the associations of immigrant suburbanites in Canada. The idea of social bonds and norms being bankable, or as an available resource to be put to use for personal betterment was first identified by Jacobs (1961) in terms of
neighborhood networks and the ability to borrow a cup of sugar during hard times. James Coleman provided a theoretical framework (1988, 1990) which was later adopted and narrowed by Robert Putnam (1993; 2000, 2002) in terms of norms for interpersonal relations, particularly trust, that facilitate productive, group activities. Economists such as Douglass North (1990b; 1990a) and Elinor Ostrom (Ostrom, 1998; Alt et al., 1999) have developed models of the instrumental value of trust and norms of reciprocity in terms of lowering transaction costs in free-market exchanges. However, these theories have not been empirically tested.

In all of the cases above, the measures of social capital have been conflated with the definition of social capital. Cooperation, and particularly the potential to cooperate, is very difficult to empiricize and measure. Norms of reciprocity and feelings of trust, the general basis for measuring social capital across most authors, are but two manifestations of actual and potential cooperation. In order to understand the mechanism of social capital, however, these manifestations alone do not suffice. In the case of Putnam’s definition, “features of social organization, such as networks, norms, and trust, that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit (1993, p. 36),” it is actually backwards. Rather, the accumulation of individual-level cooperation in the historical discourse of a given society leads to stronger social networks, generalized trust and reciprocity, and shared norms and values.

Social Capital at the Individual Level

Social capital, at the individual level, can be conceived as a complementary form of the traditionally acknowledged forms of human, physical and economic capital, and the more recent cultural and political capital. Human capital is the knowledge and skills that individuals possess that enable them to work. Physical capital refers to the resources used in production such as tools, land, and raw inputs. Economic capital is simply access to economic resources (cash assets). Cultural capital is the forms of knowledge, skill, and education which allow individuals
to achieve a higher status in society. Political capital is an individual’s position in the leadership hierarchy and ability to command action (power). And in broad terms that capture the individualist side of social capital as described above, it is possession or access to resources which are linked to a network of relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition (Bourdieu, 1986). Similarly, it is the extent to which an individual can harvest others’ cooperation or collaboration for their own benefit. As a factor of production, it can be used in the production of other goods, or as a multiplier for the other types of capital, and is as particularistic as an individual’s labor. Also, it is a distinctly human product like tools and wealth, as opposed to naturally occurring resources such as land. And, like a tool or machine, it is not necessarily used up when employed in production.

As a factor of production, social capital is an additional resource to be employed to achieve individual goals. Importantly, social capital is specific to its context of creation, for example it is not reasonable to expect that a social network created around fine dining would be the best resource to recruit help to build a barn. Social capital can exist between two individuals in the form of goodwill, non-monetary expectations and obligations, or non-monetary debts that can be traded or called in when resources are needed. These obligations occur through norms of reciprocity or through cultural traditions, such as familial obligations between a mother and her son. It can also exist between an individual and a group in terms of gaining access to group benefits, resources, and information.

Norms of reciprocity, as conceived by Robert Putnam, are a public good that results from active social capital at large—particularistic norms of trust and reciprocity generalize to the society in general and may be enjoyed by strangers within the society or even newcomers to the society. Note that Putnam focuses on the norms that exist as path dependent cultural outcomes made durable through tradition of historical processes. It is more useful, however, to envision the norms in terms of an iterated game where each decision outcome affects the probable choices of the players in the next round. These norms certainly enter into societal discourse, as well as the signifiers that leads one to expect (or not) that a new individual, location, or situation will adhere to those norms. However, they are not indefinitely durable and do not survive nearly the same levels of defection that a good friend might tolerate in a series of games.
It is at the individual level that Granovetter’s\(^{51}\) (1973) and Coleman’s (1988) work begin and give purchase on the actual mechanism of social capital. Granovetter envisioned relationships in terms of dyads that had either no relationship\(^{52}\) whatever (absence of relationship); a weak relationship (weak tie) such as that created between individuals who work in the same office or attend the same school but only share conversation around the water cooler; or a strong relationship (strong tie) that can only be built over time after numerous positive interactions and shared interests such as with good friends or family members.

Coleman extends this idea of intensity of dyadic relationships to social networks in order to consider the notion of open and closed groups of individuals (see Figure 3-1). In an open group (Figure 3-1B), because there is no interconnection between terminal ends (x & z), an individual in either branch (w,x or y,z) may behave badly (defect) and suffer no social consequences from the other branch because of the lack of direct connection for information flow between z and x. In a closed group (Figure 3-1A), however, information may be transmitted from one branch to the other, either by person A, or by the C←D connection. The closed group, therefore, is more effective at generating generalized trust and norms of reciprocity because reports on group members and the quality of their interactions can be easily passed throughout the entire network without relying on a single bridge, thus the only way to avoid sanctions is to leave the group entirely—a potentially costly decision. Also, in the terminology of Granovetter, because each dyad is connected, that is they spend time together to develop a relationship, it is more likely in the closed group than in the open one that separation in the

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\(^{51}\) Although Granovetter doesn’t use the term ‘social capital,’ his work is directly applicable in understanding the mechanism that underlies social networks, which are its basis.

\(^{52}\) It would be interesting to treat the ‘nodding’ relationship that may exist between individuals who regularly pass each other on the street or ride the same bus without talking, however this would complicate the research without adding much benefit. As such, like Granovetter, I do not treat this weaker form of weak ties. Certainly favela residents may experience a decrease in discriminatory treatment on an individual level due to nodding relationships, and may parlay some of these into weak ties, but it is probably sufficient to incorporate such acquaintances into the absence of relationship category. Additionally, negative ties are not treated here.
relationship chain (e.g. A is not directly connected to C) will not prevent members of the group from knowing each other nor from having spent time with one another. Reasonable expectations of behavior then develop because of confidence in the social cooperation to enact sanctions shown by historical experience.

This idea of banking on cooperation goes beyond the idea of rationality however, even when rational choice is expanded to include iterated games. That is, individuals within a group base their choices on embedded, historical trends, and learned expectations and behaviors outside of dyadic interactions. As such, the individuals create their choices based not only on the likelihood that their transaction partner will defect or cooperate, but based on the likelihood of community sanctions in the face of defection given the historical actions of the community; the chance to enhance their reputation outside of the dyad even in the case of no real transactional gain; and based on the cultural signifiers that their partner presents, indicating that they are either group adherent (cooperators) or group defiant (defectors). Individuals’ particularistic experiences become generalized to encompass others who are not personally known, but appear to belong to the same group. This is a weaker version of Putnam’s path dependence to generalized or society-wide social capital in Italy where the North and the South are divided primarily because of their different historical experience with the hierarchy of the Catholic Church (1993).

In the case of the favela residents, the continuity of historical precedent and subsequent ability to predict fellow residents’ behavior was damaged by forced relocations and the eradications (see chapter 1 for this discussion). Further, stable expectations continue to be hindered by the great influx of new immigrants who keep the community group open rather than closed, and therefore without reasonable hope of sanctions in the case of malfeasant behavior.
Trust and norms of reciprocity in this case do not develop even though they existed in the same place only thirty years prior (Perlman, 2000). The generalization of social capital from successful dyadic (individual-level) relationships to reasonable expectations of enforced reciprocity found within closed groups (group-level) fails to occur because of the prevalence of an open-group community (see Figure 3-2).

Nevertheless, individuals find it worthwhile to invest time in cultivating social relationships and obligations (individual-level social capital) because of the direct utility they derive from it. Portes (1995) examines the process of immigrants’ construction of social capital both before and after their arrival in their new residence. Immigrants provide an excellent case study in the creation of social capital, as they have the potential to arrive in a new locale with no contacts, no understanding of the culture of their new surroundings, and only the shirt on their back. Their ability to survive requires that they quickly create a social network to gain the cultural capital that will facilitate their navigation of their new society, and thus their accumulation of economic resources. Even with limited options for these groups of immigrants in the new culture due to language or discrimination, it is possible to tap into the resources of their cultural group rather quickly because it is virtually closed—the degrees of separation between a group in one city and a group of the same makeup in another tend to be few, so reputation and sanctions can easily follow. In the favelas of Rio, on the other hand, immigrants do not face the same limiting obstacles to navigating the new culture such as the lack of a work visa or the ability to speak the language. Nor do they stand out as notably different and thus identifiable as some immigrant communities in the US do. For example, note the relative homogeneity of the origin of Rio’s favela population in Table 3-1. This couples with the post-1975 trend of outward migration from favelas rather than maintaining and improving a
generational home there (Perlman, 2004). Groups, therefore, remain open, so the possibility to defect and run with no repercussions is great.

Also helpful to explain the apparent lack of social capital resulting in collective action in the favelas, still looking at the individual level, is that connections or relationships outside of the favela are preferred to those within. One way of conceiving of this preference is through Granovetter’s (1973) idea of “the strength of weak ties,” which suggests that, in terms of access to information and resources, weak ties are more valuable than strong ties. Weak ties are those dyadic relationships that require little time and few resources to maintain, but result in a connection somewhat more profound than that of nodding acquaintances. Strong ties, on the other hand, are like those between good friends or close family members, which require a substantial investment of time and energy and allow high predictability of the actions of the others in the group.

To create strong ties, individuals must be in each other’s presence for a good deal of time—this is the main difference between strong and weak ties. Therefore, if A has strong ties to B, and B has strong ties to C, it follows that A and C are likely in each other’s presence some of the time—certainly enough to develop at least a weak tie based on the common interest that B is a friend to both. In a group predominated by strong ties, the chances that everyone in the group spends some time together in either a primary relationship or secondary relationship is high. This group is automatically closed because everybody knows one another, and it is unlikely that there are significant relationships that are not somehow included in the group by virtue of the shared time (Figure 3-1). Much of the information that the individuals in this group possess is likely to be common and available for the asking. Also, each member of the group may have

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53 Tie strength is mostly determined by the combination of the amount of time, emotional intensity, mutual confiding, and reciprocity that describe the relationship (Granovetter, 1973). Note that these relationships can be negative, and are most likely always asymmetrical to some extent.
access to the aggregate of the group’s resources in addition to their own; however the resources available at any one time are capped at the limit of the group’s total resources\(^{54}\). Strong ties that form a closed group can be termed “bonding” social capital (Figure 3-1) as per Putnam (1993) and typically unites people with similar characteristics and interests.

A group composed primarily of weak ties (see 3-1), on the other hand, almost guarantees that a great percentage of the members don’t know one another, and furthermore, have friends (closely tied groups) that are unknown to the other members in the weakly-tied group because each pair (v-w, w-x, v-y, y-z) does not spend sufficient time together to know many of the other’s friends. In this case, the weak tie between v-w and v-y does not imply a transitive association (i.e. v-w & w-x : v-x) between v-x and v-z, similarly there is no tie between x-z. The practical benefit of this is that it is possible to maintain numerous weak ties as they do not require much time, effort, or resources. As such, each individual in such a network has access to many other networks that they don’t personally know.

In other words, an individual must invest much time and energy to maintain a close group of friends who, by the nature of common interests attracting, will likely have limited types and quantity of additional accessible resources, and won’t have extra contacts outside of the group to enrich it. On the other hand, the comparatively inexpensive weak ties are much more likely to pay off with their expanded access to previously unavailable information and other resources.

To put this in real terms, \textit{favela} residents tend to save their time and energy and the potential of accruing time-robbing obligations within their communities, and instead develop as many ties outside of the \textit{favela} as possible. The research for this dissertation revealed a common, conscious preference for ties outside the community because 1) residents see these ties

\(^{54}\) Social connections and introductions are resources that are usually available because they cost little to share. However, resources here can also mean physical labor, tools, money, or other productive resources.
a potential way out of the *favela*; and 2) (particularly younger <35 years old) individuals seem to have internalized the discrimination against *favelas* and consequently steer clear of even their own (Figure 3-2). This was evident to researchers in the early 1960s (Mangin, 1967) just as it is today in the form of consistent advice to avoid other *favelas* because they are dangerous and the people there can’t be trusted. In the end, whether these associational choices are consciously strategic or not, weaker, outside ties are beneficial to the *favela* residents because it is those multiple weak ties that are most likely to be rewarding in terms of information, employment, educational opportunities, or loans. Of course residents in *favelas* do form strong ties, but these tend to be within their extended families, and take up a majority of their free time, leaving little room for more strong ties outside of their house. From the outside, the relationship structures within *favelas* can look like the amoral familism described by Banfield (1967) in ‘Montegrano’, Italy where families were reported to see other families as competitors in a zero-sum game, and therefore unlikely to interact or help one another.

Another way of looking at this phenomenon is to think of it in terms of the fragmentation of society into cliques with few ties between to act as bridges (Figure 3-3). Rather than mean-spirited competition among clans, the strongly connected families in Banfield’s study simply didn’t have time for one another, and therefore didn’t interact. For a community to form bridging, weak ties between closed groups, individuals must interact in a variety of contexts to develop them (Granovetter, 1973). Trust can only be developed through a reasonable assumption that an individual can predict others’ behavior and affect their actions, which only occurs after repeated interactions or repeatedly hearing of others through acquaintances. But the benefit of a rich network of these bridging ties between individuals or between closed groups is increased sharing of information, resources, and mutual understanding. Without these bridges,
each group will not have access to information and innovation from other parts of society, resources that have a very practical, economic utility in terms of finding jobs, purchasing quality products, and investing wisely.

**Social Capital at the Community Level**

Social capital at the community level is manifested in several forms: generalized rather than strictly particular trust; a capacity to act in concert for common goals; and informal but very real community sanctions for those who deviate from the norms. Just as social capital works to enhance or multiply an individual’s stock of other types of capital, it does the same for a community or society; yet all social capital originally derives from dyadic interactions and was likened above to an iterated prisoners’ dilemma game played on the thick carpet of culture, religion, and morality of the specific societal context. The actual capital in individual case is the individual’s reputation coupled with social norms which either facilitates or hinders interactions and transactions. The manifestation of the social capital is the appearance of trust, reciprocity, goodwill (or distrust and bad will) that exists within the dyad.

To project this upwards, a community or society’s social capital is the potential and actual cooperation and collaboration that each of its members provides to the rest of the group as a whole. This exists in two parts: one part is composed of the social norms that facilitate dyadic interactions (a tendency to cooperate that reduces transaction costs); and the other part is composed of the aggregate potential for group members to cooperate for the good of the society as a whole—cooperation itself being a public good. The manifestation of social capital at this level is trust, reciprocity, and civil production of public goods. Individuals’ cooperation with the community at large requires both facilitating community action as well as social enforcement of community norms (usually a type of ostracism) that extends beyond mere financial punishment into the possibility of robbing a defector of their way of life.
For example, in a society with little or even negative social capital, individuals are not likely to produce any public goods whatever, and may even actively destroy what public goods there are because of their antagonistic relationship with the greater group. This seems like a typically adolescent or immature attitude, to spitefully damage public property as an act of rebellion against a system that is perceived as oppressive. The behavior is immature because it is self-destructive: the young rebels don’t realize or don’t care that they are hurting everyone in the group—their self as well. Further, the behavior is tolerated de facto because there is no collective consequence. On the other hand, altruistic behavior such as the type promoted by Boy and Girl Scouts looks to acknowledge every individual’s value to society, and consequently honors anonymous help to strangers. However generalized or community-oriented such altruism may be, there is still an expectation that such behavior will be rewarded, perhaps with the intangible, reputation-enhancing respect at the individual level. And at the community level, the reward may be a continuation of good works by others that makes society a better place for all.

Just as patents and private property are thought to be necessary prerequisites for scientific and economic innovation, generalized social capital is necessary for a society to function smoothly. In the case of Putnam’s study of northern and southern Italy (1993), he found that cooperative behaviors in the North tended to fill in the gaps that were not completely spelled out by the government, allowing state functions to be carried out more quickly and efficiently. In the South however, the lack of such cooperation meant that the government bureaucracy had to invest extra time and resources to carry out the same policies. There is another natural experiment to understand social capital in the form of work slow-downs or ‘work-the-rule’ strikes where employees demonstrate the value of their good will to their employer by withholding cooperation. Even in the engineered transactions of an assembly line, there are
many unwritten norms and actions that allow it to work smoothly, and without valuing the group as a whole and the output as a whole piece, the aggregate of each individual’s letter-perfect work will end up in disaster.

One way of thinking of the society-level social capital is, as Putnam described, that it is habituated patterns of interacting predicated on governmental and religious history. The South of Italy lacks cooperation because they were habituated for hundreds of years in vertical or strict, hierarchical organization. Conversely, the North was more liberal and citizens interacted in more horizontal or non-hierarchical organizations from town government to local churches. But this macro-lens is not sufficient, because it suggests that changes in society-wide social capital can only occur through generations of habituation. Dyadic interactions generate immediate consequences and, although the consequences may be tempered by habits and common repertoires of social action, it is these tangible costs and benefits that result from interacting that, in the end, drive good will and cooperation.

Fukuyama (2001) looks at this pairing of social norms and individual will in terms of a ‘radius of trust.’ This radius is developed through iterated interactions with individuals and outcomes of cooperating with society to determine the extent to which the particularistic trust for one other person or for immediate family is generalized or extended to others who are less well known, more distantly related, or even unknown. Coleman’s closed group is a clear example of a short radius of trust that may not extend beyond those well-known members. And certainly, strong ties that form in a closed group provide ample time to evaluate the trustworthiness of all members so that nothing need be taken on faith. And although weak ties and an open group mean that defection and free riding may increase without consequence to those who do so, the radius of trust may be extended based on strong social norms of civic values; effective
monitoring for defectors and free riders by civic organizations or the government; the visible, positive result of cooperation in iterated interactions.

Fukuyama (1995) identifies the shortcomings of particularistic trust—a visible measure of social capital. In comparing the United States and Japan with Italy and China, he finds that the culture in the latter two countries includes very short trust radii that do not extend beyond family, once removed. Thus businesses must rely on nepotistic hiring practices for management because they don’t trust anyone they don’t have personal knowledge of. Businesses in the US and Japan, that do have generalized trust, have been able to generate huge mega-corporations, benefitting from innovation and expertise from around the world. Italy and China have not because their businesses have a tendency to fail when the family member with business acumen dies. At best, these businesses fail to expand because sufficient expertise doesn’t exist within the family network.

Lacking in the Italian and Chinese cases is the power of reputation, or social censure/acceptance of an individual based on the known record of their behaviors and beliefs. Reputation is a concept that bridges individual-level and society-wide units of analysis. Reputation is a quantifiable measure of an individual’s social capital, and a society replete with citizens of good reputation may generate more public-good cooperation. The power and quantifiable value of an individual’s reputation can be seen in the online auction sites of e-Bay in the US and Mercado Livre in Brazil. Sellers on e-Bay, and buyers and sellers on Mercado Livre, are rated after every transaction as either having performed positively, negatively, or having failed to distinguish themselves for good or bad and gaining a neutral evaluation. If one party defects and either fails to pay or sends a disappointing product, even if the ‘government’ of the site is unable to bring about a satisfactory outcome, the e-Bay/Mercado Livre society will punish
the defector by refusing to do business with them. Even though these online sites are very open groups with mostly weak ties connecting members (strengthened through social networking options such as chat and on-site e-mail), it is costly to deactivate an identity (leave the group) and come back under another identity because a new identity is almost as bad as a negative reputation. T

The trading of information about the sellers is a social act, as are the various product reviews, wish lists, “best of” lists, and the host of other forums that e-Bay and Mercado Livre have created to draw more and more time from more and more individuals—to make their site a virtual “hang out” spot. And because e-Bay and Mercado Livre members take the time to participate, submit reputations, and read comments so they can sanction defectors, these sites have become the two biggest in their markets and attract thousands of new members (strangers) each day who are willing to risk their money or treasures based on the sites’ reputations—individual cooperation created a stronger, more efficient, and ultimately more reliable society.

A benefit of a long trust radius is that confidence spans groups, and these bridging ties help integrate society and mitigate friction between competing groups. The trust radius likely lengthens only in response to repeated interactions with individuals from other groups, which is a society-wide benefit of weak ties. Those who can exist within several groups or within one group and at the periphery of others not only accrue the individual benefit of access to information and resources, but provide experience for both groups with others. Varshney’s (2001, 2002) study of ethnic violence in India suggests that it was exactly these kinds of social or civil interactions in a variety of contexts between Hindus and Muslims that resulted in a diffusion of tolerance throughout the region’s culture. In contrast are the periodic riots along
religious lines in other regions of India that lacked the types of organizations that facilitated a mixing of Hindus and Muslims.

**Bonding, Bridging, Blinding, and Binding Social Capital**

Whether at the individual or community/society level, social capital can be thought of in terms of the types of connections that compose it: either bonding or bridging social capital (see Figure 3-4). Bonding social capital, in the terminology of Robert Putnam (Putnam, 2000), is made up of the strong ties that form within groups after multiple interactions where norms of behavior and expectations of reciprocity are developed. Bonding social capital tends to form among individuals who share many common characteristics, that is they have many common points whereby to connect, which facilitates the interactions within multiple contexts where a rich set of norms and expectations that may be generalized to other, unknown contexts may be practiced. Because of the shared characteristics of individuals within such a group, when bonding social capital is very strong, it may be exclusionary towards outsiders and consequently eliminate opportunities for ideas from outside of the group.

Hyden (2006) calls bonding social capital in the extreme ‘blinding’ (Figure 3-4) because it results in a group that is not self-reflective and only mutually reinforces ideas already in the group’s discourse. This is a serious barrier to innovation on one hand, and is a clear cause for friction between such groups and the rest of society. From a positive point of view, Putnam (2000) describes bonding social capital as good for “getting along” in life; the more of it that exists, the better individuals are able to relate to one another within the group, communicate, interact, and forgive when limits are surpassed. It is the glue that helps keep community together in solidarity. In the extreme, blinding social capital is most evident in the *favelas* among the drug gangs or the factions within the state-wide drug gangs. Because of the high risk of betrayal by police or rival spies, or even individual greed, drug gangs are necessarily closed for protection.
from the outside as well as for effective monitoring and sanctioning of all members. This causes a favela-wide problem when the drug gang can be said to “own the hill.” Then, the blinding social capital is extended, by virtue of the watchful eyes (olheiros) of the gang, to all residents of the community, which limits the possibility for rewarding bridges (Figure 3-4) outside of the community or to other communities.

Blinding social capital can also be seen as inhibiting broad-based collective action where resources are scarce. Like the “amoral familism” described by Banfield (1967) in “Montegrano, Italy,” small groups or families are strongly tied together to the exclusion of all other groups or families in the community. Banfield saw this resulting in a zero-sum-game approach to life in the city that made collective approaches to community problems impossible. Similarly, in many favelas in Rio, families or geographic blocks of neighbors will work together to improve their constrained area at the expense of, or at least to the exclusion of, non-group members and areas of the larger community despite the potential for greater rewards from generalized community action. Blinding social capital, in this case, increases expectations of free-riding from non-group individuals, but more importantly prevents the casual social interactions that could facilitate even a modicum of trust that could ‘grease the wheel’ of cooperation at the most basic level even outside of the question of sharing resources. Whereas bonding social capital may be transferrable to a general trust of strangers, blinding social capital is not.

Bridging social capital (Figure 3-4) is composed of weaker connections between individuals who do not share many common characteristics, and are separated by group affiliation or identification such as religion, race, or political ideology. Strong ties are almost exclusively bonds, and can rarely be bridges. Only if neither party in the dyad has other strong ties can a strong tie between them be a bridge (see Figure 3-3). Weak ties, on the other hand, are
nearly always bridges. As above, bridging social capital is generated through multiple interactions over time and grows stronger with the increased variety of contexts for these interactions. Norms and expectations between individuals are created and may eventually be generalized to entire groups of populations so that using the signifiers that indicate belonging to one group is sufficient to be imbued with the social capital attributed to the group in general. And because bridging social capital puts individuals in touch with information, connections, and resources that may not exist within their primary group, it can be thought of it as good for “getting ahead” for individuals whose base of accessible resources is expanded with each new group they can include in their network.

While the favela residents don’t put it in those blunt terms, it is clear that their preference is to focus on bridging rather than bonding social capital. They tend to make social contacts that may be of value to them either by increasing the options of current survival strategies, or as an investment in the future should some crisis occur in their lives. This type of social capital is not only good for individuals, but at the society level, it is the “grease” that keeps the machine of society working without having to renegotiate social, economic, and political transactions every time a person interacts with someone who is not from their known community (if the social capital is positive). At this level, both bonding and bridging social capital are equivalent to generalized trust between individuals and members who appear to be from their group, or between individuals and other groups that have been included into the lexicon of trustworthy associates through the creation of norms and expectations.

Binding social capital (Figure 3-4), on the other hand, is more of a temporary truce or shift in the cost-benefit analysis of working with others for common goals. Hyden (2006) describes it as short-lived connections between individuals who may only share a few common contexts of
interaction. In his examples, binding social capital requires some external stimulus to catalyze formation, such as a problem or enemy that threatens groups across social cleavages. Although it facilitates cooperation between individuals who may have had little or no contact, it is cannot be generalized like bridging and bonding social capital above. Instead, it is limited trust extended to others who are working towards the same ends that will usually result in personal benefit from the collective gain, such as Sun Tzu’s maxim that “the enemy of my enemy is my friend.” And rather than resulting in a collective orientation to problem solving as strong bridging or bonding social capital may, the collective orientation applies to a single problem or issue at a time. This results in a final distinguishing characteristic of binding social capital, which is its transient nature. Whereas bridging, bonding, and blinding social capital are reasonably durable, applicable to a large set of different types of interactions and purposes even if they are not able to be maintained in the face of defection, binding social capital provides the ‘grease’ to facilitate cooperation around one, limited problem or issue and then deactivates. When binding social capital is next seen, it is likely to connect some of the individuals from the previous action to a different set of temporary allies.

Binding social capital is likely the most common type within favelas, and has even been able to bridge strong, blinding ties. At one extreme are the temporary agreements between two of the three state-wide drug gangs made in order to eliminate the third, or even the agreements between battalions of police and a drug gang that may allow non-drug related police action in the community, provide weapons to the gangs against another gang, or even enlist the service of

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55 The possibility also exists that binding social capital may result in a more durable form, but will not be applied to the entire group as the interests of all individuals in the group likely only intersect at one or few issues.
police in a drug war\textsuperscript{56}. Usually such cooperation is less extreme and occurs in forms such as the collective effort to maintain claim on land against police or unhappy neighbors; cooperating for a one-off infrastructure project such as sewage, stairs or streets; or in reaction to police violence within the community that may spark spontaneous and immediate protest to bring public attention.

Social Capital in the \textit{Favelas of Rio de Janeiro}

As early as 1967, Mangin reported that, counter-intuitively from a Marxian frame that predicts durable community once individuals see each other as linked by their common situation and not as competitors in a zero-sum game of life, squatter residents may involve themselves in the single collective effort of securing their land in the initial invasion from opposition, which has been labeled as active binding social capital above. The expectation of the press and most researchers, who treat \textit{favelas} and their residents as interchangeable (Preteceille and Valladares, 2000), has been for some sort of class consciousness or fraternity to evolve among those ‘reduced’ to invading land and living in \textit{favelas}. However, as evident from examples above, all types of social capital actively exist in the \textit{favelas} at all levels.

The rest of this chapter considers social capital in the \textit{favelas} of Rio de Janeiro, first at the individual level, and then at the community level. The focus of the empirical evidence below is on bonding social capital within the \textit{favela}, and bridging social capital from the \textit{favela} to professional organizations (either unions or smaller, more local groups), particularly the relationships between social capital and individual and community well-being. However, binding and blinding social capital are also evident, but are more appropriately considered in the context of the \textit{favela} residents’ capacity to act in concert in the following chapter.

\textsuperscript{56} In the extreme, in the drug war of April, 2004 between Terceiro Comand and Comando Vermelho, two different battalions were seen firing at each other in Rocinha (documentation from a personal interview with a local journalist).
For a general picture of social capital in fifty one favelas of the fifty five included in this study, Table 3-2 shows five measures for collective action and associationalism. The evidence there suggests a greater instance of cooperation and collective orientation than Mangin found above. With no large survey data available reporting norms of reciprocity and trust, group membership and participation in favela events is a satisfactory proxy for measuring the civic space and social ties that are parts of the concept of social capital.

According to Table 3-2 below, there is great variation in the tendency to join an organization across the fifty one favelas in the data set. The greatest tendency is to join an orgão de classe (ultra-local work-related or professional organization) with an average of 11.58% of the favelas’ populations members of this bridging association. The second greatest is to membership in a neighborhood organization, such as a residents’ association, either for the greater neighborhood (bairro) or the favela (average membership of 9.54% per favela). Nevertheless, with only a maximum of one-quarter and average of one-tenth of the favela residents belonging to their residents’ association—the formal connection to the government that is provided for by law in every favela—is still quite low.

Low participation can be explained by avoidance of monthly dues (usually between R$3 and R$10 or US$2.00-5.00, which was 3-7% of a monthly minimum salary at the time, perception of corruption in even the most local of governments, and the ineffectiveness of such organizations. While the 1980s saw a proliferation of grassroots organizations and activity in favelas, the movement of NGO funding from project- or favela-specific to more universal causes, such as hunger and poverty in general, has led to dissolution or fragmentation of such

57 Social capital can be measured as it manifests: potential and actual cooperation and collaboration between an individual and others, and between society and members. For this study, data regarding associational membership, community attitudes, and personal resources from a 1998 census of fifty one favelas, is used to approximate the concept of social capital empirically.
groups. The other, local options, such as membership in a sports team, religious or philanthropic organization, parent-teacher association, or cultural group (column b in Table 3-2, other local social organizations), are not well exercised, which points to the preference for ties to outside the community mentioned above.

**Social Capital as an Individual Resource**

As an individual resource, social capital may increase the number of survival strategies and amplify those already in practice. New or expanded possibilities when linked to social capital include borrowing from the group to ease crises in a person’s or family’s economic cycle—the metaphorical ‘cup of sugar’ that is borrowed with the tacit understanding that it will be repaid when the neighbor is in need. Access to knowledge about work opportunities or better paying opportunities, and the ever-important personal introduction has also been noted as a benefit to social capital (Granovetter, 1983). There is a play on words in Brazil that emphasizes exactly that: the *QI* (*quociente de inteligência*—intelligence quotient or IQ) is slang for *quem indica* (who introduced you) indicating that who you know is often more important than what you know.

The value of acquiring or maintaining social capital can be seen in the numbers of formal memberships that *favela* residents hold, where an average of one in ten are members of their residents’ association and the ‘professional’ association of their workplace (Table 3-2). More still either moved to or remain in the same *favela* because of their friends (see Error! Reference source not found. below). Table 3-3 provides evidence of people’s reasoning and actions—what they say they think, and what they say they have done. But with the data available from a survey of fifty one *favelas* in 1998, it is possible to quantify the value to individuals of these connections by looking at the correlations between various measures for social capital and tangible, individual assets.
These measures are methods of empiricizing the presence or absence of the concept of social capital. For this, it is necessary to find trust, and norms of reciprocity that are socially enforced through the presence of interconnecting social networks at the community level. At the individual level, it is enough to find the extent to which each person in a community is socially connected. Membership in their residents’ association, participating in community events, and membership in a workplace professional organization or union are all good measures of this. From the survey, there are three more measures that help expose the extent to which the generalization of social capital is perceived as existing in the community: if the resident reported that life is better in the community because of residents’ efforts versus governmental, philanthropic, or religious organizations; whether the respondent’s water connection was made by themselves, made through a group project (multirão), or made by the government; and if friends were the main reason for living in the favela.

One test of the construct validity of the measures of social capital to be used in this chapter is looking for strong, statistically significant bivariate correlations between them. Table 3-4 shows correlations between the seven measures of social capital: five at the individual level, and two at the community level. Each of these measures alone has a high face validity—that is, on its face, it appears to get at the idea of social networks, trust, and group orientation towards problem solving. If these different measures are correlated, it is reasonable to assume that they are measuring different aspects of the same thing, as there is no reason to believe a causal relationship between any of the seven variables. The concept of social capital is quite complex, so the seven measures above are only proxies for some of its components. It is for this reason that data from hundreds of hours of personal interviews and participant observation are included in this section to reinforce the validity of the quantitative data available.
Table 3 shows that there are at least weak correlations (r<.15, p<.01) between all of the measures except between membership in a work-related organization and reporting that household connections to piped water were made by group effort (*multirão*) as opposed to government or individual effort. The latter measure also has an unexpected, negative relationship with friends being the main reason to move to or remain in the *favela*, but may be explained by ready-made social ties leading to blinding social capital within the community along with the preference for building bridges outside of the community. The four most strongly correlated measures are membership in the residents’ association, union, or work-related organization (*orgão de classe*), and reported participation in community events.

The weaker correlations between friends being the main reason for living in the community and the other measures could be due, in part, to the insensitivity of the variable in determining if the friends live inside or outside of the community. Another significant reason for weaker correlations between the variable above, reporting life improving in the community because of the residents, and water connections made by group effort is that these three variables attempt to capture an informal measure of social capital at the community level. Whereas membership in formal groups is individual, clearly either present or not present, and unlikely to change back and forth over time, daily connections to friends and daily sentiments about neighbors are likely to change rapidly and radically. And although Leeds (1978) saw the occupation and building process of informal settlements as contributing to the strengthening of social networks through residents’ collaborating against eviction and installing basic urban infrastructure, the measure of group-work water connections are likely to result in “what have you done for me lately” attitudes. Like the solidarity over the initial invasion, putting in local connections to a nearby water supply may be a one-off activity. These connections suggest that
the capacity to act in concert existed at one time, but doesn’t capture the current atmosphere nearly as well as current membership in the residents’ association or participating in local events. Nevertheless, these three variables are clearly related to the concept of social capital, and thus make good cross-checking points for triangulation on the other four measures.

**Social Capital as an Exit Option**

Thinking of social capital as creating an exit option from the state for *favela* residents goes directly against the logic of Robert Putnam (1993) who, conceptualizing social capital as a generalized cultural climate of trust and norms of reciprocity, reports how it functions to embed government in society and society in government. For Putnam, social capital fills in the gaps that governmental institutions leave. Similar to a firm grinding along inefficiently during a ‘work-the-rule’ strike when the internal, informal institutions are shut down, a government depends on all of the informal pathways that are generated by robust social networks to help disseminate information, facilitate access to services, and enhance enforcement of rules.

His research in Italy suggests that in the atomized South, characterized by weak ties and a subsequent lack of generalized trust, state governments were very inefficient and ineffective. However, in the North, characterized by high levels of generalized norms of reciprocity\(^{58}\) and trust, the government was very efficient and effective. The difference is attributed to the integration of the government institutions into the existing social networks that reduced the cost of transactions between the government and its constituents and *vice versa*

It is easy to imagine the opposite as well, that is strong social capital being an impediment to the function of government when the social networks are opposed to its rule. Underground resistance movements during WWII, and student movements in China immediately come to

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\(^{58}\) Individuals acting for the benefit of unknown others, or society at large and not in a dyadic relationship of reciprocity.
mind. For social capital to be instrumental in creating an exit option for the favela residents it must allow them to avoid relying on the state so as not to be monitored by it. Social capital, then, must substitute for several public goods: economic security, physical security (policing), health, education, and living conditions. A negative perception of government may also drive individuals to seek an exit as opposed to a voice option.

Figure 3-5 shows a disturbing picture of the favela residents’ perception of the Brazilian government in their lives in 2000. Residents, whether correct in their idea or not, believe that the government at all levels has harmed them in some way. This data from Janet Perlman’s longitudinal study is supported by the data from the 1998 census of fifty one favelas (Table 3-10) that reveals a minimum of 12%, a maximum of 67%, and an average of 42% of the population of these communities believe that their lives have been made worse because of the government. So avoidance of the government’s negative effects, or actively seeking an exit option, is an obvious choice for at least 1/6th of the residents. This attitude is echoed in historical research at the beginning of the military dictatorship where available data reports almost 50% of favela residents holding the attitude that “there is nothing to be gained by political action,” and less than 20% had had “a heated political discussion in the past six months” despite report a decline in the quality of life over the previous five years (Mangin, 1967, p. 83).

Economically, the choice is fairly easy as the voice option does not garner enough to live on, even when there are no costs for habitation. Because of a decline in the number of jobs requiring unskilled labor, uneducated residents of the favelas cannot demand minimum wage or a formal job with guaranteed benefits (the signed work card). The same is true for the number of residents who work as housekeepers, gardeners, and nannies so they all must make their own

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59 During Lula’s second mandate, a variety of conditional cash transfer programs were consolidated and streamlined, yet the average payment for a family of four is less than R$150 (about US$75) per month, while the minimum salary has been raised in steps from R$120 in 2002 to R$450 in 2007.
According to Table 3-9, for the decade between 1991 and 2002, the informal workforce of Rio de Janeiro grew from 36% of the total to 43% of the total workforce, which was a rational move as the monetary difference between working on- or off-book consistently declined at the same time. Although a part of this change can be attributed to a 1.8% increase in unemployment over the same time, most of the movement can be attributed to the increased benefit of avoiding government monitoring and taxes as the post-dictatorship bureaucracy found its footing. Somehow, in the decade after the civilian government was reinstated in Brazil, it became easier and more profitable to enter the informal economic sector.

Goirand (2003) uses the term “new citizenship” when looking at “citizenship from below” and grassroots movements of the urban poor. The citizenship is “new” because it paradoxically applies more to self reliance than embeddedness. Whether the *favela* residents are thought of as either marginalized, and existing at the periphery of state, society, and economy, or actually repressed and excluded by the system, they are substituting the state through social movements and participation in local community organizations, having learned to distrust the inaccessible and corrupt state.

Data in the first column of Table 3-12 shows the correlation between the responses of two different questions: what the main problem in the *favela* is; and, if life in the *favela* has gotten worse, what the main cause for that is. The strong, highly statistically significant correlation between these unrelated questions that appear in different parts of the questionnaire suggest that there is, more than face validity, also construct validity for the concept of violence. The following columns show that all measures of social capital, except for union membership, are inversely related to violence in the community. Although the correlations are weak (r < 0.10),
they are highly statistically significant (p < 0.01) and point in the expected direction that would be explained by group cooperation and social sanctions against acts of violence within the favela.

Table below provides confirmatory evidence to this idea, that social capital may substitute the state, at least in some capacities. Data in the first column suggest that safety is better in those favelas that have higher measures of social capital than those that don’t, and further, that government action has not helped alleviate the problem of violence. It is not fair to say that government involvement in the community makes violence worse, but it is clearly not associated with making it better. Similarly, the second column should be understood to indicate that residents are not as effective at improving the infrastructure as the government does.

From the evidence above, it is clear that social capital provides enhanced economic opportunities as well as physical security, and thus is a credible exit option to some extent. The other public services that the government can use to capture the favela residents include healthcare, education, and living conditions. In Brazil, however, the Sistema Único de Saúde (SUS) equity principle makes it so public healthcare is free to all, and public hospitals and clinics cannot require identification. Providing healthcare, then, may improve residents’ perceptions of the government, but does not help the government in registering them so they can be counted, taxed, included, etc… Furthermore, the relationship between improved health and wellbeing and social capital has been widely explored by public health researchers. Like the association between social capital and safety, those with higher levels of social capital tend to be healthier, live longer, and require fewer medical interventions in their lives. Moreover, these same individuals perception of their wellbeing—a measure of mental and physical health combined

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60 Note that there is an inverse relationship between government and residents improving the community that was created by the survey question’s mutual exclusivity from being allowed only one choice.
with their prospects in life—is significantly improved relative to the amount of social capital they have\textsuperscript{61}.

In terms of improved quality of life, Table 3-9 provides the correlations between measures of social capital and measures of work stability and income, and Error! Not a valid bookmark self-reference. Error! Not a valid bookmark self-reference. provides the correlations between measures of social capital and physical living conditions. With very few anomalies, the correlations support the hypothesis that social capital, or access to cooperation and collaboration of others, is instrumental in improving the physical conditions of life. Cashing in on these social connections could be through information networks, personal introductions, receipt of donations and hand-me-downs, and receiving help in constructing or improving a home. But at the same time that access or possession of social capital enhances the viability of the exit option, the act of collaborating and cooperating, of being a part of a group, may also have the opposite effect. The following section looks at how social capital may actually embed favela residents in the government and society.

\textbf{Social Capital Embedding Favela Residents in Government and Society}

The history of favela residents is one of purposeful marginalization, repression, and expulsion that kept them from becoming a part of the social body and the body politic for most of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century. As seen in the previous chapter, even through the populist Vargas administration and into the 1950s, favela residents were considered ‘unfit’ to be a part of modern society. They were proto-citizens who needed to be broken of their deviance and immorality—the underlying reason for the creation of Parques Proletários and Fundção Leo XIII. An interesting mystique existed around the famous ‘malandros’ (malanderers) from the hills that

\textsuperscript{61} For recent literature on this subject, see (Kawachi et al., 1997; Leeder and Dominello, 1999; Raphael et al., 2001; Helliwell, 2003; Lochner et al., 2003; Lauder et al., 2006; Miller et al., 2006; Poortinga, 2006; Carpiano, 2007)
differentiated *favelado* mentality from that of the traditional orientation of peasant migrants to the city. There was no question of these deviants being embedded in government and society because their perceived *raison d’être* was to subvert and leech off the system so carefully being constructed by the *gente* (lit. people).

Yet from a Marxian point of view, the poor were completely integrated into the system, only much to their disadvantage, and always at the margin. The construction and modernization of Rio de Janeiro benefitted greatly from the huge reserve army of labor that could be pushed out of the way as the city expanded to conveniently exist away from the city streets at the beck and call of industry. Even more conveniently, because their poverty and filthy conditions were perceived as the result of their own low morals, because they were to blame for their station in life, the government did not have the obligation to care for them. But instead of blaming the victim, *favela* residents can be seen not as marginalized but as repressed, stigmatized and excluded by the system (Perlman, 1976).

Another perspective takes a more positive approach to the embeddedness of *favela* residents that is brought about by their apparent preference for weak ties outside of the *favela*, which enhances their linkages to, at least, the social body of Rio de Janeiro. The extended ‘aunt’ and ‘uncle’ relationships that Brazilians of all classes have with friends, and families of friends, are a culturally-based method of crossing class lines. The more formal choice of godparents is often strategically planned to hopefully provide a better future for the godchildren. Furthermore, membership in regional and voluntary associations tends to tie individuals to the greater society instead of creating a closed, rural or traditional community within the city (Mangin, 1967).

Proud statistics from Brazil’s national census demonstrate the change from 1980 to 2000 in economic inclusion of *favela* residents in terms of possession of durable goods such as
refrigerators and televisions, and access to public services such as water and electricity. These figures approach 99%, but fail to reveal the full picture, such as the frequency of water delivery and the type of connection to the city system (legal or makeshift/stolen), or the nests of improvised electrical taps into public transformers. The government, for the most part, accepts these *gatos* (illegal water and electrical taps) as a necessary evil—a part of the benign-neglect plan for social services. So the individuals practicing Goirand’s “new citizenship” in the *favelas* are not indebted to the government and so not embedded in the state.

Social capital, in this case, does not lead to more embeddedness in the government, but rather makes public resources available through social networks who benefit from the obligations they incur through sharing. The same distribution of resources through social networks occurs from some *favelas* to the ‘legal’ neighborhood outside. There are an increasing number of middle-class residents near *favelas* who tap into their social connections on the hill in order to tap into the illegal connections (*gatos*) for power, water, and cable television. This decreases the embeddedness on both sides as middle-class residents become leeches on the system, and *favela* residents can benefit from their extended network outside. This may help explain why government attempts to legalize land tenure and access to public services are often rejected because of the perceived cost-to-benefit ratio of becoming embedded in this way—being mapped and counted means being subject to taxation.

On the other hand, social capital is strongly correlated with other measures of embeddedness in the state, which include the possession of government-issued identification, registration being a primary requirement of citizenship. In this case, a 1998 study (see Table 3-12) revealed that, on average, less than three-quarters of the eligible population of fifty one *favelas* had a voter registration card despite voting being mandatory and non-voting carrying the
penalty of being denied federal aid and access to federal jobs. The same is true for the CPF (equivalent to a US Social Security number). And while around 60% of the eligible population has a work card and state-issued ID, less than one-third of those with work cards have had it registered (assinada) by their employer, which entitles them to governmental protection and benefits. In this case, the work card represents either the hope of a better future, or merely the necessity of a second ID to do anything in the complex public and private bureaucracy. Yet, according to the correlations in Table 3-15, measures of social capital are strongly and significantly positively related to measures of embeddedness in the state.

These measures may be changing since 2002 when President Lula carried out Cardoso’s plan to centralize conditional social aid and increase access through the provision of a debit card (cartão unica) with automated, monthly deposits by the federal government. Whereas the bureaucracy of the previous system required individuals to visit various offices to collect various, specific types of aid, each with their specific requirements and proof, there is now a single office with streamlined procedures. This has made it easier for the government to register and track the poor, and also to ensure that the conditions for receiving aid, such as school attendance and vaccinations of all children in a family, are met. It has also made counterfeiting and fraud more difficult, thus eliminating an exit option. By decreasing the costs to the favela residents, the government has succeeded in capturing a greater number.

In terms of the effect of social capital on state embeddedness, Table 3-13 shows a strong, positive correlation between measures of social capital and measures of individual embeddedness in the state from a survey of fifty one favelas completed in 1998. Membership in a community organization of any kind\textsuperscript{62} is a strong predictor of possession of some form of state organization.

\textsuperscript{62} residents’ association, parent teacher association, sports team or club, religious group, cultural group, philanthropic group, or ‘other’
connection and registration⁶³. Such membership has a stronger correlation with the measures of state embeddedness than the more formal membership of work-related associations (orgãos de classe) or workers’ unions (sindicatos), and even more than those who reported participating in community (local) events such as parties and self-help work groups (mutirãos).

This begs the question of causality: does social capital lead to embeddedness, or vice versa? Given that residents’ associations exist as the formal bridge between the favela and the government, it is reasonable to assume that those more closely connected to the association will have more opportunities to learn about and be guided through the bureaucratic process necessary to be registered. In other words, individuals who ‘own’ more cooperation are more likely to get the information than those who don’t; and communities who ‘own’ more cooperation of their residents are more likely to be able to share information with them than communities who are not so attached. The counter-hypothesis, that having a government ID of some sort exposes residents to more opportunities to learn about or join the associations, on the other hand, is not credible. No government office at any level has information on the residents’ associations or their activities. Furthermore, identification is not a requirement to belong to or participate in the association. The same argument holds true for the directionality of participating in community events and having identification and registration.

These same arguments do not necessarily hold for the work-related organizations or unions. Work-related organizations (orgãos de classe) are ultra-local associations that pertain to one firm, franchise, or limited geographical region. They are not national professional organizations as understood in the United States, such as the APSA, the AMA, or the Bar Association. In Brazil, these associations include groups of bakers or apartment-building doormen in a neighborhood or in the city; groups of tire-repair businesses on a certain street; all

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of the restaurant help from the two Sheraton Hotels in Rio, and other, similar types of work-related groups. Membership does not require a formal ID or work card, whereas union membership does. Although the argument for social capital within work-related organizations leading to state embeddedness is not as strong as with the measures above because many of these organizations represent professionals (nurses or dental hygienists for example) that have state licensure as a pre-requisite, many more of them don’t (bakers, mechanics, doormen). The combined data of these two types of membership in the work-related organizations, inseparable because of the survey instrument, don’t cancel each other out; that is, it still produces a highly significant, positive correlation with the measures of state embeddedness. It is likely that the direction of causality would run from organization to state embeddedness, at least in those cases where state ID was not a prerequisite.

Union membership, on the other hand, has state registration and identification as a prerequisite, but as above, it does not make sense that ownership of identification would lead to union membership. What makes more sense is that the desire to join a union for its various benefits would lead to procuring legal identification and work registration.

Carrying the discussion about the difference resulting from the characteristics of the four measures of social capital above, Seligson (1999) points out that the type of organization is at least as important as strength of association to the organization for turning social capital into a practical resource, such as creating the civic space for political discussions. For example, she speculates that members of a bird-watching group are less likely to politicize than those of a environmental advocacy group. Along these lines, the lower correlation of union membership to measures of state embeddedness compared to the other measures of social capital can be explained by a) union control of public transport and trucking, and b) the higher average wage that union members earn that may allow for the purchase of a car.
explained by the indirect involvement of the workers in collective bargaining and in interacting with the state, as it is primarily union leaders who carry out these discussions behind closed doors with management. In Putnam’s terms (1993), unions engender vertical relationships, such as the strong, hierarchical traditions of the Catholic Church in southern Italy. Vertical relationships do not promote generalized trust and norms of reciprocity as horizontal, everybody-is-more-or-less-equal relationships do.

Workers’ unions function more like “membership list organizations” that Putnam (2000, p. 51) describes as having taken over the civic organization scene in the United States over the past three decades—investment of money, but no time or social commitment. Belonging to a modern union is essentially the same, in terms of social capital, as membership the American Association for Retired Persons (AARP), where only ten percent of the members are also members of their local chapter, and therefore come into face-to-face contact with one another. Following Granovetter above, it is this personal contact and spending time in the presence of one another that determines the type and intensity of the social tie. It is reasonable to expect more direct participation from the more local, work-related organizations (orgão de classe)\textsuperscript{65}, and as such, should lead to stronger ties in direct relationship to the time invested. The more intense social capital relates to a higher rate of embeddedness in the state.

The residents’ associations’ primary purpose, from the government’s point of view, is to be a connection between the favela and the government. From the point of view of the residents, it is to perform parastatal functions in the absence of actual state presence. It is therefore reasonable to hypothesize that the higher the membership in the residents’ association, the higher the embeddedness in the state of the favela as a whole, and therefore of the residents as

\textsuperscript{65} According to Ivo (2001), there has been a steady erosion of the local orgãos de classe in favor of the sector-wide unions (sindicatos) since the mid-1980s, which must have the effect of reducing face-to-face contact and concurrently reducing the social capital engendered by them.
individuals. Table 3-15 supports this idea demonstrating strong correlations between population percentages of the four available measures of social capital and possession of some form of state registration. There is no statistically significant correlation between the aggregated population measures of social capital and the population percentage in possession of a driver’s license or a work card, but at the individual level, there is (Table 3-15). The first case is most likely explained by the low numbers of individuals who possess driver’s licenses, thereby diluting their effect on the population and making such an aggregate measure inappropriate. The second case is not correlated because of the homogeneous distribution of population percentages of work card holders (mean=.784, S.E.=.004, Std. Dev.=.026).

Turning to another data source, attitudes are another good measure of social capital and embeddedness. In a longitudinal study covering the same population in 1969 and 2000, Perlman (2004) noted an understanding among the favela residents in her sample of the importance of group approaches to government problems. As suggested by the strong, positive correlation between measures of social capital and measures of embeddedness, above, being pulled into the state is more likely when individuals attach themselves to a group. This is echoed by the sentiment of 60% of the study group in 2000 (vs. 40% in 1969) who believe that the government will only respond to organized demand making. This group orientation is correlated to the doubling from one-third to two-thirds of the population who now believe that it is important to participate in political life rather than allow policymaking to remain in the hands of the politicians, and a tripling (from 11% to 30%) in those who now believe that they can influence government decisions through their participation. Even more promising is the 67% (vs. 30% in 1969) who have approached a government agency for help. But this optimism in the system must be tempered by the increase from 36% in 1969 to 51% who do not believe that Brazilians
are able to choose their candidates, and the 67% (vs. 26% in 1969) who believe that government officials do not try to understand the problems of the poor.

**Conclusion**

The most important aspect of this chapter has been the disaggregation of several components of social capital, which is often ambiguously used in political science literature. Putnam’s model divided social capital into bonding and bridging, which Hyden refined to include blinding and binding. Here, social capital retains the categorization of the types of horizontal networks, and then disaggregates further into individual-level and group-level social network resources. At the individual level, social capital exists as an extension of personal wealth and a complement to survival strategies. That *favela* residents prefer bridging outside of their community indicates that social capital varies in value to the individual, and social capital within the community does not increase an individual’s personal resources very much and may come with high costs of obligation that end up actually draining resources. Also, because social capital at the individual level depends on the maintenance of relationships and reputation, the mechanism for the creation or destruction of it becomes apparent.

This chapter also outlined how individual-level social capital can be transformed into group-level social capital, particularly through interconnected networks that allow reasonable expectations of others’ behavior given reputation and expected social sanctions in the case of defection in a transaction. At some point these norms and patterns of behavior become part of the social fabric and new entrants and children will fall into the same patterns without thinking⁶⁶.

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⁶⁶ In *Blink* (2005), Malcom Gladwell describes an experiment with chimpanzees wherein all of the chimps receive a shock if any one of them attempts to grab a banana. Of course, the chimps don’t tolerate the shocks and there are severe penalties for individuals who even approach the banana. One by one, these chimps are traded out for others that have no experience with the group under observation. Even after several generations of these trades, with no chimp ever having been shocked or meeting a chimp who had met a chimp who had been shocked, the norm of allowing the banana to hang by its wire was enforced. While humans are not chimpanzees, this experiment goes a long way to confirming the power of societal enforcement of unwritten rules and social etiquette.
Table 3-1 Origin of *favela* residents by region by *favela*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>North</th>
<th>Northeast</th>
<th>South</th>
<th>Southeast</th>
<th>Central west</th>
<th>Other country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Min</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>3.54%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>55.84%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Max</td>
<td>1.01%</td>
<td>43.20%</td>
<td>0.66%</td>
<td>96.13%</td>
<td>0.51%</td>
<td>1.66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avg</td>
<td>0.31%</td>
<td>18.07%</td>
<td>0.20%</td>
<td>81.06%</td>
<td>0.17%</td>
<td>0.19%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Southeast includes Rio de Janeiro, which accounts for a majority of the *favela* residents from that region.

Table 3-2 Individuals’ associations min, max, and avg percent by *favela* (not aggregate)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Neighbrhd org (a)</th>
<th>Other local, social orgs (b)</th>
<th>(a) + (b) by <em>favela</em></th>
<th>Work-related orgs</th>
<th>Workers union</th>
<th>Sum of all assns</th>
<th>Particip. in comm events</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Min</td>
<td>0.66%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>1.07%</td>
<td>0.84%</td>
<td>1.46%</td>
<td>4.55%</td>
<td>1.12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Max</td>
<td>26.41%</td>
<td>3.96%</td>
<td>28.36%</td>
<td>34.03%</td>
<td>11.58%</td>
<td>74.09%</td>
<td>28.77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avg</td>
<td>9.94%</td>
<td>0.59%</td>
<td>10.54%</td>
<td>10.67%</td>
<td>4.37%</td>
<td>28.68%</td>
<td>8.67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City Avg</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>9.00%</td>
<td>1.80%</td>
<td>12.00%</td>
<td>22.80%</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source PCBR data and *City Average is from IBGE Monthly Survey of Jobs, Rio de Janeiro – April 1996*

Table 3-3 Reason for currently living in *favela*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Dependent</th>
<th>Cost</th>
<th>Friends</th>
<th>Locale</th>
<th>Work</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Creche</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Min</td>
<td>41.54%</td>
<td>11.98%</td>
<td>7.63%</td>
<td>0.69%</td>
<td>0.54%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
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<td>Max</td>
<td>67.22%</td>
<td>29.80%</td>
<td>33.96%</td>
<td>11.98%</td>
<td>4.40%</td>
<td>1.71%</td>
<td>0.06%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>54.03%</td>
<td>22.85%</td>
<td>16.91%</td>
<td>3.93%</td>
<td>1.73%</td>
<td>0.53%</td>
<td>0.01%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Living in favela b/c of friends</td>
<td>Res. assn</td>
<td>Participate in events</td>
<td>Union</td>
<td>Work-related org</td>
<td>Life better b/c residents</td>
<td>Water conn. by group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Living in favela b/c of friends</td>
<td>r = 1</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n</td>
<td>29931</td>
<td>29931</td>
<td>23404</td>
<td>23404</td>
<td>23397</td>
<td>15644</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Member of residents’ association</td>
<td>r = 0.08</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>0.05</td>
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<td>0.00</td>
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<td>65234</td>
<td>65234</td>
<td>65223</td>
<td>15685</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Participate in events</td>
<td>r = 0.04</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.05</td>
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<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
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<td>65234</td>
<td>65232</td>
<td>65221</td>
<td>12351</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Workers’ union</td>
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<td>65232</td>
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<td>65221</td>
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<td>65223</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Life better b/c residents</td>
<td>r = 0.06</td>
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<td>0.03</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
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<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
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<td>n</td>
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<td>15685</td>
<td>12351</td>
<td>12349</td>
<td>12348</td>
<td>15685</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Water conn. by group</td>
<td>r = -0.04</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>p</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
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<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n</td>
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<td>19476</td>
<td>15095</td>
<td>15095</td>
<td>15089</td>
<td>11234</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: PCBR data
Table 3-5 Correlation matrix of measures of social capital and individual resources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Signed work card</th>
<th>Work outside comm.</th>
<th>Salary</th>
<th>Unemp. benefit</th>
<th>Retire benefit</th>
<th>Social sec. benefit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>Member of residents’ association</td>
<td>r = 0.06</td>
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<td>0.09</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.04</td>
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<tr>
<td>p</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.06</td>
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<tr>
<td>n</td>
<td>28152</td>
<td>33656</td>
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<td>304</td>
<td>4058</td>
<td>2880</td>
</tr>
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<td>Participate in events</td>
<td>r = 0.05</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p</td>
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<td>0.89</td>
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<td>p</td>
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<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
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<td>33649</td>
<td>29858</td>
<td>304</td>
<td>4058</td>
<td>2878</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work-related org</td>
<td>r = 0.05</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p</td>
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<td>304</td>
<td>4058</td>
<td>2878</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Better b/c of residents</td>
<td>r = 0.03</td>
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<td>0.05</td>
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<td>-0.02</td>
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<td>58</td>
<td>768</td>
<td>544</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connected to favela by group effort</td>
<td>r = -0.01</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>-0.10</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p</td>
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<td>1486</td>
<td>1031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Better walls</td>
<td>Better roof</td>
<td>Better floor</td>
<td>Own home</td>
<td>Bi-level fridge</td>
<td>Freezer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Member res. Assn.</strong></td>
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<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.04</td>
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<td>81831</td>
<td>81836</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Better b/c residents</strong></td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.04</td>
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<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.00</td>
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<td>0.02</td>
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<td>0.03</td>
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<td><strong>Workers’ union</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Live in favela b/c of friends</strong></td>
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<td>-0.02</td>
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Table 3-7 Reason for conditions improving in *favela* in percent

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<th>Religious orgs</th>
<th>Businesses</th>
<th>Other</th>
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<tr>
<td>Max</td>
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<td>90.92</td>
<td>5.39</td>
<td>2.04</td>
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<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>53.52</td>
<td>43.83</td>
<td>1.30</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>1.10</td>
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Table 3-8 Reasons for conditions worsening in *favela* in percent

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>Residents</th>
<th>Violence</th>
<th>Government</th>
<th>Other</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Min</td>
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<td>12.50</td>
<td>0.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>Max</td>
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<td>71.43</td>
<td>66.67</td>
<td>34.38</td>
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<td>Average</td>
<td>19.11</td>
<td>29.13</td>
<td>42.61</td>
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Table 3-9 Informal sector as percent of metropolitan rio workforce, and salary difference

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<th></th>
<th>% self-employed workers of total</th>
<th>% workers w/o work card of total</th>
<th>% salary difference btw workers w/ and w/o card</th>
<th>% salary difference btw workers w/ card and self employed</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>109.9</td>
<td>38.5</td>
</tr>
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<td>1992</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>121.7</td>
<td>50.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>114.1</td>
<td>59.8</td>
</tr>
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<td>1994</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>116.5</td>
<td>42.5</td>
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<td>1995</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>88.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>1996</td>
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<td>1997</td>
<td>24.9</td>
<td>16.5</td>
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<td>16.2</td>
<td>93.1</td>
<td>21.5</td>
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<td>1999</td>
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<td>2000</td>
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Data from IETS, 2002
Table 3-10 Correlation between favelas' major problem and source of improvement

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<th>Main problem is infrastructure</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Better b/c of residents</td>
<td>r = -0.09</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>p 0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n 15677</td>
<td>15677</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Better b/c of government</td>
<td>r = 0.09</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>p 0.00</td>
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Table 3-11 Correlation between violence in each favela and measures of social capital

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Worse b/c violence</th>
<th>Comm. org</th>
<th>Participate</th>
<th>Union</th>
<th>Work-related org</th>
<th>Better b/c residents</th>
<th>Water conn. by group</th>
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<tr>
<td>Main Problem Violence</td>
<td>r = 0.26</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
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<td>-0.02</td>
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<td>-0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>p 0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
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<td>23426</td>
<td>23419</td>
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<td>19469</td>
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</table>

Table 3-12 Min, max, and mean percent of population of 51 favelas with state-issued identification

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Voter reg. Card</th>
<th>Social security card</th>
<th>Driver's license</th>
<th>Work card</th>
<th>Signed work card</th>
<th>ID card</th>
<th>Birth certificate</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Min</td>
<td>63.70</td>
<td>63.33</td>
<td>4.07</td>
<td>70.79</td>
<td>21.74</td>
<td>71.05</td>
<td>97.47</td>
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<tr>
<td>Max</td>
<td>82.40</td>
<td>84.36</td>
<td>22.73</td>
<td>84.08</td>
<td>42.02</td>
<td>87.15</td>
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<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>72.59</td>
<td>72.51</td>
<td>9.92</td>
<td>78.43</td>
<td>30.64</td>
<td>79.29</td>
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Table 3-13 Bivariate correlations between measures of social capital and measures of state embeddedness of individual residents of *favelas*

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Work card</th>
<th>Signed work card</th>
<th>State ID</th>
<th>Driver's license</th>
<th>CPF (social security)</th>
<th>Voter's reg.</th>
<th>Proof of military service</th>
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<td>Community org</td>
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<td>0.000</td>
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Data from (PCBR, 1998)
Table 3-14 Correlation between measures of social capital and public resources

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Source (PCBR, 1998)
Figure 3-1 Relations between individuals in closed vs. open groups. A) closed, B) open

Figure 3-2 Change in community strength from 1969 to 2001 in selected favelas

Figure 3-3 Ties among groups

*strong tie A-v is unlikely as v has no connection to other members in A’s close group despite the time A&v appear to share to maintain their close tie.
Figure 3-4 Conceptualization of four types of social capital by group openness and strength of ties within the group

Figure 3-5 *Favela* Residents' Opinion on Governmental Impact by Level\(^{67}\)

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\(^{67}\) Source (Perlman, 2004)
CHAPTER 4
SOCIAL CAPITAL AND THE CAPACITY TO ACT IN CONCERT

Introduction

In the previous chapter, the concept of social capital was discussed as existing at both the individual-level and group-level, and went on to consider the individual benefits that can be derived from stocks of social capital. Putnam’s (1993; 2000) idea of the horizontal bonds of social capital creating a fertile ground for the development and growth of vertical bonds to the government was contrasted with social capital creating an ‘exit option’. The exit/embeddedness aspect of social capital is important to understand in regards to the growing challenge of state legitimacy and authority as informal economies and parallel systems of authority are created in Rio’s favelas. In this way, social capital can actually be seen as a threat to democracy as opposed to a facilitator. In addition to this double-sided, individual facet, social capital can become generalized to the community or society at large, fostering cooperation and collaboration to overcome the collective action problem so individuals can work together towards a common, social goal. In this case, it is the glue that brings disparate individuals together; it facilitates collective action and is the real focus of most social capital literature where this aspect is analyzed in terms of its bonding, blinding, bridging and binding tendency.

This was the aspect of American culture that so impressed de Tocqueville in the 19th century: the transcendence from mere individualism to community- or civic-mindedness. By his definition, the culture of individualism leads to the kind of small, closed groups that Banfield (in 1967) noticed in Italy, and is a drag on progress and quality of life.

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68 This group-level aspect of social capital also has an opposite side when blinding occurs and prevents cooperation between individuals in one group and the rest of the community or society.
69 In Putnam’s work (Putnam et al., 1993; Putnam, 2000), the transformation of horizontal to vertical connections is rather taken for granted.
“I see an innumerable multitude of men, alike and equal, constantly circling around in pursuit of the petty and banal pleasures with which they glut their souls. Each of them, withdrawn into himself, is almost unaware of the fate of the rest. Mankind, for him, consists in his children and his personal friends. As for the rest of his fellow citizens, they are near enough, but he does not notice them. He touches them but feels nothing. He exists in and for himself, and though he still may have a family, one can at least say that he has not got a fatherland [emphasis added] (Tocqueville, 1969, p. 692).”

Although he describes Americans as individualistic, Tocqueville attributes their capacity to act together to the “immense number of different types of associations […] not only commercial and industrial associations in which all take part, but others of a thousand different types -- religious, moral, serious, futile, very general and very limited, immensely large and very minute (p. 513).” The socially-constructed capacity to work together is vital to the life of the democratic state, and a lack of collective capacity puts not only the state, but also civilization at risk. Thus, “knowledge of how to combine is the mother of all other forms of knowledge; on its progress depends that of all the others (p. 517).” Combining, for Tocqueville, is “the reciprocal action of men, one upon another” that leads to innovation through renewal of ideas and feelings, and the creation of shared understandings (p. 515). The benefits are such that, when investment in communal rather than individual efforts is correctly understood, collective action is actually value-maximizing rational action at the individual level. He states that “it gives [participants] pleasure to point out how an enlightened self-love continually leads them to help one another and disposes them freely to give part of their time and wealth for the good of the state [emphasis added] (p. 526).”

Put in terms of a collective-action problem, social capital lowers the cost of exchange because improved cooperation within social networks leads to societal enforcement of unwritten contractual expectations, and thus the terms of exchange do not have to be renegotiated at every transaction. Furthermore, networks composed even of weak ties increase the cost of “defecting,” and allow expectations of reciprocity for contributions towards common goals—first, through the
ability to limit the benefits to a closed group, and second through the understood future benefit of investing in reputation (Olson, 1965; Olson and Kähkönen, 2000). Further, there should be a reduction in private actions with negative, public spillovers because of the greater ability to monitor community actions and apply sanctions when a densely interconnected group is present. These aspects of social capital have been identified in terms of relations of trust; reciprocity in exchange; common rules, norms, and sanctions; and connectedness through networks and within groups (North, 1990b; Ostrom, 1999; Putnam, 2000, 2002).

Most contemporary measures of social capital center around self-reported feelings of general trust towards others (within or between groups); norms of reciprocity; group membership; and participation in bonding rather than isolating activities (picnics or bowling versus watching television alone)\(^70\). Daubon and Saunders (2002) go a step further towards measuring the instrumental potential of social capital, suggesting that social capital can be operationalized as the “capacity to concert,” or following Coleman it is norms of interpersonal relations that “facilitate productive group activities (1988, pp. 100-1).”

In the favelas, it is difficult to measure the extent to which group activities are facilitated through the social construction of the ability to work in concert for common goals. As binding social capital is the most common type of social capital at work in the poor communities of Rio, the participants and defectors are constantly changing. The evidence for this is the lack of durable groups in these communities, and the few incidents where individuals risk the investment of time, resources, or personal security to collectivize in order to confront a problem. This is particularly the case since the 1990s when ONGs began to work more at the national level than

\(^70\) (Coleman, 1988; Seligson, 1999; Dasgupta and Serageldin, 2000; Putnam, 2000; Fukuyama, 2001; Varshney, 2001; Krishna, 2002)
at the local level. From that time there has been a dearth of centers of ready-made benefits around which to organize.

This reduction in voluntary associations and collective action is as true with community-level literacy courses as it is with *comunidades eclesiais de base* (CEBs – Ecclesiastically-based Communities). In the first case, the change in focus of the ONGs from local to global causes diminished the field of available resources to individual favelas; and in the second case, it has been the continual decline in Catholic adherents in favor of the growth of Protestant, Evangelical faiths. This is all to say that whereas bonding and bridging social capital may have existed in their more durable forms in the favelas of the past (Perlman, 1976; Leeds and Leeds, 1978), there has been a process of change since the end of the military regime in Rio de Janeiro that clearly favors the “cheaper” and less durable version: binding social capital.

**Social Capital and the Capacity to Concert**

The capacity to concert is directly linked to the collective action problem proposed by Mancur Olson in 1965. Using a rational choice frame of reference, Olson proposed that, when there is no accountability or risk for not participating in an attempt to gain a group reward, it is rational not to participate in the work, but to be the first in line to collect the reward—in other words, to be a free rider. Further, with the very real prospect of free riders in any attempt to gain generalized rewards, the incentive for anybody to participate in the effort is close to zero. Consequently, projects that will have generalized benefits and have no negative implications for not participating rarely, if ever, get off the ground.

Olson’s suggested remedy for this collective action problem is, although stated in different words, to create bonding social capital. Olson’s suggestion is to create closed groups that are capable first of monitoring participation of all members, and second in restricting the rewards to the members of that group; this fits the model of bonding social capital based on Granovetter’s
(Granovetter, 1973, 1983) closed groups. Taking a step outside of Olson’s frame, bridging or
binding social capital can provide the incentive for rational participation in group projects with
generalized benefits as long as generalized trust and norms of reciprocation are sufficiently
strong to allow a reasonable expectation of a future return on an individual’s investment. This is
the idea of paying an obligation ‘forward’ instead of paying it back. That is, the repayment of a
good turn by a stranger is not directly to that stranger, but rather to another stranger who is in
need of a good turn. A strict rational choice view of individuals makes this second possibility
unlikely because each unmonitored interaction with a stranger is, essentially, a non-iterated game
with a rational winning strategy of defection in every case.

However, authors such as Douglass North (1990b) and Elinor Ostrom (1990), among
others, have noted that reciprocity and trust can become institutionalized within a heterogeneous
society to the point that even experiencing several defections from anonymous interactions will
not eliminate an individual’s faith in the system. In terms of social capital, the society needs
sufficient bonding social capital to bring about norms of reciprocity within groups and
particularized trust, as well as sufficient bridging or binding social capital to generalize both. It
is the bridging or binding social capital then that is the key to the capacity to concert.

Shifting lenses, literature on social movements has taken on the difficult task of explaining
collective action to achieve generalized benefits in the presence of the great possibility of free
riders. The New Social Movements (NSM) model of social movements is useful to explain the
group work projects and protests of the favelas of Rio de Janeiro in the context of social capital.
For Melucci (1985) and Habermas (1996), the formal, institutionalized catalyst for collective
action, the social movement organizations (SMOs), are not as important as the hidden networks
of interpersonal relationships that only become visible temporarily when activated by some
catalyzing event. Collective action seen through this lens is not coordinated group action, but rather individuals united by loose identification to a cause who assert the movement’s goals through their personal life and actions. This approach focuses on the symbolic function of movements, the struggle to produce new meaning within society and to change the meta-discourse that defines it (Melucci, 1985).

Snow and Benford’s (1988) work on framing suggests that the messages that compete for prominence in the meta-discourse that drive societal values are created through purposive framing of these movement messages. This theme will be taken up later in the context of Liberation Theology in the favelas that provided a common frame of reference for adherents around which collective action was possible. Later, evidence is presented of purposive attempts to change how favela residents are framed in order to gain recognition and importance in the social discourse. Research using a database of protests and legal action demonstrates that the residents activate spontaneously (81.7% of the time), and mostly without the contributing support of any formal SMO (69.5% of the studied occurrences).

New Social Movement theory provides approaches to Olson’s challenge and provides a vision of collective action where the cost of joining a movement approaches zero. Since movements, as seen through this lens, are primarily constructed of networks of everyday personal relationships, there is no added cost of ‘belonging.’ Also, the only ‘benefit’ the movement needs to provide is a symbol upon which adherents may build their identity.

Mobilization, although more problematic within this model, can largely be seen in terms of

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71 Although Snow and Benford (1988) contribute directly to Sidney Tarrow’s Political Process Model, their concept is helpful shorthand to conceptualize the power of social discourse or narrative. The use and power of language, stereotypes, and problem definition in public discussion produce a limited set of frames that constrain approaches to and outcomes of public issues. See also Cress and Snow’s (2000) article on social movements of the homeless in the United States. Similar work in the field of public policy also illuminates the power of discourse and symbols in attracting support to pressure policy makers in government (Fischer and Forester, 1993; Roe, 1994).

72 (Vanier and Acselrad, 2007)
individuals exercising their new identity as a lifestyle. In this way, NSMs are counter-cultural expressions that do not directly assault the political system, but can certainly make demands upon it. In terms of social capital, mobilization can be seen as fleeting moments of intense bridging around a single event or symbol that is the trigger for binding social capital to manifest among individuals who may have few ties or commonalities in daily life. Furthermore, this event or symbol need not be the most important part of movement adherents identity—it merely rises temporarily in prominence for some individuals and may fade into unimportance just as quickly.

Binding social capital in the favelas often manifests as collective action and protest after the perceived unjustness of a residents’ death. Interviews with residents and officials of residents’ associations, confirmed by the contents of hundreds of newspaper articles, reveal that grief and anger were the common triggers that catalyzed spontaneous community protest (68.28%\textsuperscript{73}). Initially, these protests may be started by one or several aggrieved individuals whose voices are spontaneously joined by community members—ironically, the same neighbors who were found in the previous chapter not to work together in community improvement projects. Spontaneous protests like this are mostly the result of police violence in the community (63.4%) or the roadway death of a community youth crossing the nearby highway (4.88%)\textsuperscript{74}.

The work of Charles Tilly (1995, 2003, 2004) has highlighted the effectiveness of disruptive group action in order to make political change. Similarly, other authors have reported the importance of such behavior, particularly to social movements where the base has few resources or where inequality and repression make formal organization dangerous, as was the case particularly during the military dictatorship. The resulting social movement relies on

\textsuperscript{73} Ibid
\textsuperscript{74} Ibid
“shadowy” (Piven and Cloward, 1977), “submerged” (Melucci, 1989), or “hidden” (Scott, 1990) forms of resistance.

There are two main purposes behind the residents taking to the streets. The first is a demand on the government clearly articulated by the residents to control the police or install an overpass crosswalk. There is a clear second message that is an affirmation of their own value as human beings and a call to be noticed and treated as fellows. These actions are very much an attempt to alter the meta-discourse of society about who the favelados are: somebody! Their protests include tactics such as holding rallies in the surrounding middle-class neighborhoods or public plazas; assembling outside of the governor’s palace (Palácio da Guanabara); or closing down streets or major thoroughfares around their favela for hours at a time, using everything from their bodies, to blocks of wood and burning tires.

Repeated instances of police violence in the favelas have led to increased levels of bonding social capital by repeatedly reactivating the binding connections between the same individuals. This process is particularly visible in the creation of groups of mothers who maintain the focus and action of the movement long after the binding social capital has faded (Alvito, 2001; Nobre, 2005). These groups of mothers are then available to quickly mobilize either to prevent or protest further police actions. Over time, these groups have created bridging ties between favelas that have blossomed into permanent social movement organizations such as the Mães de Acari, and the Network Against Violence (Rede Contra Violência), which is most visible for its “may I identify myself [before you shoot me]?” (Posso Me Identificar?) campaign.

An initial protest from a favela community is often followed by a secondary protest of a larger and more organized nature that is better analyzed through the Political Opportunity Structure approach to social movements. In the second phase, an institutionalized social
movement organization (SMO) uses the catalyzing event to recruit the (temporary) support of the protesters and channel their energy into demand-making efforts that the SMO has in its repertoire. That these secondary protests are also examples of binding rather than bonding social capital is evidenced by how provisional support for the SMO is, and how quickly adherents disappear after the initial moment has passed.

At the same time, the larger SMOs that work with favelas in Rio de Janeiro, such as IBASE and Viva Rio, have enough contacts with political entrepreneurs that they are able, from time to time, to coordinate city-wide protests that include groups from all socio-economic levels and various primary interests around an issue that has common pull to all involved. The death of young children caused by the stray bullet of a police officer, or a massacre (chacina) of several teens in one night were the causes for such large-scale secondary protests in the time period covered in this study (Vanier and Acselrad, 2007, as well as original research). The issue of police violence has been a sensitive issue since the end of the military dictatorship in the mid-eighties, culminating in harsh popular reaction to police “cleaning” the South Zone of youths sleeping on the streets by executing them and stacking their bodies on street corners to be collected the following day.

While the New Social Movement literature predicts moments of binding social capital as the key to a kind of organic political organization, there is also evidence of more durable, bonding social capital at play among Rio’s least privileged. Table 3-2 in the previous chapter reveals that in a sample of fifty favelas, there is a range between 1.46% and 11.58% of the residents belong to workers’ unions—a source of bonding social capital. In a city-wide survey of

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75 All the same, there are many politicized individuals in the favelas who see organizations such as VivaRio (Long Live Rio!) and Reage Rio (React, Rio!) as middle-class movements that are more about pacifying the South Zone than meaningfully addressing the underlying problems of poverty, and economic and social exclusion. [interviews, Cláudio, and O Dia 29 Nov 1995, 13 & 20.]

76 1996 news articles “reigning in police”
non-professional unions (blue-collar workers, janitors…) 33.0% joined for legal assistance, and another 11.2% of these members joined primarily for political activity (see Table 4-1). This indicates a potential group of political entrepreneurs and activists in the favelas\(^{77}\) with the resources of an SMO to call on.

**Capacity to Concert in Favelas**

The capacity to concert may be exhibited in various forms among favela residents. The two principal cases are demand-making actions such as petitioning and demonstrating, and collective work projects such as a group-work day to install or repair sewage pipes. Other less observable forms of concerted action include group enforcement of social norms, and generation and maintenance of group identity. These latter two are rarely observed at the group level, but rather as individual decisions and disconnected actions that, in the aggregate, compose the group culture.\(^{78}\) This capacity to concert has a number of qualities including the quantity of participants in a group for a specific event, the unity of purpose, and the degree of self-organization. The number of group events within a community, and the diversity of attendance from one event to another are two other possible measure, whereas the successful achievement of the group’s goal is not as it is an indirect measure of the concept and has many possible intervening variables. In the terms of McCarthy and Zald (1977) the “set of opinions and beliefs in a population which represents preferences for changing some elements of the social structure and/or reward distribution of a society (1217)” must be distinguished from the “formal

\(^{77}\) It is reasonable to accept this survey data in Error! Reference source not found. as approximately correct for favelas even though it is from a city-wide sample because the vast majority of the formally employed in the favelas work in non-professional jobs, and union participation in the favelas is very close to the city average.

\(^{78}\) I have witnessed group enforcement of norms in several cases including expelling a resident thief as well as intervention in episodes of domestic violence. The community involved in these cases was either small or represented a neighborhood within the larger community. In terms of creating and maintaining a group identity at the group level, the best examples are community celebrations, barbeques, dances, and games (such as a favela-league soccer match, which involves players and fans).
organization that […] attempts to implement these goals (1218).” In terms of social capital, it’s the extent of mobilization or participation within the community rather than the number of organizations working to motivate change.

**Vaccine Revolt**

The history of struggle of the poor in Rio is filled with examples of binding social capital turned into political action. Such alliances tend to fall apart quickly after the collective goal is reached, often leading to great conflict between the former allies as each group begins to struggle to control what they could not have won alone. The Vaccine Revolt (*Revolta da Vacina*) of 1904 mentioned in Chapter One is one such example on a large scale where tens of thousands of individuals, each bolstered by the participation of the next, collectivized and directed their anger and actions against the state rather than randomly, or at each other. In this case, riots began spontaneously and quickly included several, clearly differentiated groups, each with their own purpose.

These groups included the poor from the *cortiços* who wanted to halt the process of slum burning and removal; the poor from the nascent *favelas* on the hills who resented the repressive intrusion of the police battalions who were aiding the doctors in the vaccination process; labor unions who were agitating for a seat in government; and even middle-class roughnecks who were protesting the increasing costs of everything from food to the price of a streetcar ride. The unions were particularly useful as they provided the daily impetus that kept the protest active for a week, and they also turned anarchic, violent destruction of state property and symbols to more focused and purposive marches and rallies. In the end, the unions were the biggest winners. By

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79 Charles Tilly’s (Tilly, 1978, 1995) work helps understand how *favela*-level action can be understood in the social movement framework limiting SMs to groups that lack formal, institutionalized access into government decision-making processes and thus must find other methods of demand making.

80 See the chapter above on the history of *favelas*. 
jumping in front of the already-moving parade, they were able to convince the government of their growing mass appeal and their ability to call upon it. As for the others, prices continued to rise, cortiços continued to be destroyed, and after a five day lull the vaccinations were taken up again in the same aggressive manner.

Notable in this case is that no one person or group had sufficient strength to stop the vaccination campaign, and both the risk and penalty of trying were high while there was absolutely no risk for not participating. Disorderly fights cannot be counted as examples of binding social capital, but in this case, it was riotous mobs who confronted police battalions and focused their violence specifically on the government, which demonstrates commonality of purpose. The length of the anti-vaccine campaign also points to a high level of spontaneous cooperation that was maintained despite the involvement of a spectrum of socio-economic groups and heterogeneous individuals. The unions certainly acted as an organizing force, but the power of the common thread they were able to use to weave the variety together remains a puzzle—at some point in the young republic, Brazilians had gained the capacity to concert.

Machado da Silva (2002) suggests that, in the first half of the 20th Century, social action from the favelas was almost non-existent. What social action did occur was “amorphous [and] based solely on the force of numbers.” That is, just existing, refusing to move from the hills, yet entering the asphalt society for work or diversion was a kind of protest—a manifestation of existence without concomitant political demands on the system for resources or for formal recognition\(^81\). The benign neglect of Vargas’ “Estado Novo\(^82\)” demanded little and returned less,

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\(^81\) While NSMs are reportedly contemporary phenomena that required a certain level of modernization and technology for the diffusion of common symbols and connectedness, as well as a progression away from SMO-led protesting, it seems a useful model to apply to the favelados in the first half of the 20th Century.

\(^82\) 1937-1945
but with increased police repression and no catalyzing event or institution, the *favelados* turned inwards whatever social capital they had into community improvement projects.

**Escolas da Samba**

The first voluntary associations that gained public recognition and thus some state reward were the *escolas da samba* (samba schools\(^\text{83}\)) that have now become so central to Brazil’s carnaval culture. Through 1930s, *favelas* were mostly black, and carnaval was a yearly expression of emblems of African culture: *samba* (dance), *candomblé* (African spiritualism hidden under Catholic symbols), *capoeira* (a kind of martial-art dance), and *malandragem* (laziness and mischief). These ‘schools’ were organized community parties and the locus for dance, song, and beauty competitions—also the beginning of the space for civil society interactions among the poor. *Carnaval*, also known as *Mardi Gras* or Fat Tuesday, being a permitted time of excess, became the opportunity for communities to display their pride in competitions in the public spaces of Rio de Janeiro. This was the impetus for the creation of community identity, and a focus for collective action throughout the year to practice the community song and dance, and to make beautiful outfits to rival the other schools. Bonding or binding social capital was built around these competitions as team or community loyalty became a center of commonality. For the contestants, their yearly cycle of practice and performance created a durable bond. For the fans from the communities and from the asphalt, *Carnaval* was a two-week period of the year where their attachment to a particular school might outweigh all of their other attachments.

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\(^{83}\) Originating prior to emancipation, samba schools were more euphemistic than anything. Blacks in Brazil were not allowed to gather in number except for educational purposes. Calling their neighborhood parties “schools” satisfied the government’s requirement. This practice can also be seen in the dance-like martial art of *capoeira* that was nominally not a martial art, and the use of Catholic saint’s names and icons to represent the pantheon of African deities in *Macumba*, *Umbanda* and *Candomblé*.
It should be said that the *escolas de samba* gained monetary support from the owners (*donos*) of the lottery-like *jogo do bicho* (lit. animal game), so social capital created around them allowed access to tangible resources. Formal organization in the *favelas* led to Getúlio Vargas’ recognition and support of *escolas de samba* and *samba* shows, particularly for his *parques proletários*. Without such organization, the *favelas* would have been worthless in Vargas’ populist calculus, as finding the key to the communities’ votes would have been difficult. The *donos* of the *jogo do bicho* were perfect for the role as they had ties and respect among the poor. Even when *jogo do bicho* was outlawed in 1947 and *carnaval* became tied to illegality and anti-state movements, populist politicians still reached for the hills through their fixers to engage in clientelist politics also known as *políticos do bico d’água* (lit. ‘water faucet politics’, or ‘pothole filling’ in American parlance because of the paltry promises and results thereof). In the final analysis, resources from the *escolas de samba* were directed towards *carnaval* and not towards infrastructure, political recognition, or any long-standing contribution to the physical conditions in the *favelas*. Nevertheless, spreading the symbol of *favelas* to the streets of Rio was the first real step in gaining acceptance among general society as well as creating a stronger identity among the *favela* residents.

**Political Development of the Favelas**

From 1947 until the military dictatorship of 1964, there were a number of structural changes in the Rio de Janeiro government that led to sources of durable social capital concurrent with the political activation of the ever increasing *favela* population. Fundação Leão XIII (*Fundação*) was the first attempt to reach into the *favelas* to give help and organization, and
consequently a voice in government\(^{84}\). Unions (*sindicatos*) were the next to think to use the political strength of the poor in order to avoid a second administration of the anti-labor President Dutra. Labor unions brought about various Unions of *Favela* Workers (*Uniões dos Trabalhadores Favelados*) that quickly mobilized to halt the removals of several *favelas* that stood in the way of urban expansion. Their tactics were peaceful, marches and rallies, but they were also determined and went so far as to invade the seat of government (*Câmara*) in 1955 (Lima, 1989). Alone, these unions did not gain the serious attention from the government, but when they began to support the Communist Party in Brazil (PCB), the Church and the government scrambled to bring an end to the possible growth of communism.

The *Fundação* quickly spawned a specialized unit (*A Cruzada São Sebastião* – Saint Sebastian’s Cross) to keep their flock out of the hands of the atheistic communists. *Cruzada’s* scope was, in the end, not very large, but it did arrange some immediate tangible benefits for those poor who associated themselves with the Church. The government created their own agency to deal with the threat of the new-found power of the poor in Rio: the Special Service for the Recuperation of *Favelas* and Unhygienic Housing (*SERFHA*). The main goal of these two new organizations was to monitor the *favelas* and either control or out-compete any other efforts therein—especially the PCB and the PTB (Worker’s Party of Brazil). SERFHA coordinated the creation of *Favela* Residents’ Associations (*associações de moradores* or AMs) in seventy-five different communities. These became the direct ties from *favelas* to the government that promised to bring a better standard of living. And for two years (1962-1964) SERFHA did distribute infrastructure and housing resources to many communities that contributed a weekly quota of man hours (*cota multirão*). While the promise remains unfulfilled until today, the

\(^{84}\) While it is not technically correct to call *Fundação* part of the structural changes in the government, it was commonly seen as such and, in 196, it was finally, formally adopted into the Federal District’s organization chart. See Chapter One of this text for a discussion of the dual nature of the *Fundação*: social programs or social control.
creation of the Residents’ Associations has been an important institution in transforming local
social capital into active cooperation.

**Liberation Theology Creating the Capacity to Concert**

Binding social capital best describes the prevalent form of community-wide cooperation in
the *favelas* in this study. While there may be small pockets of non-family groups that display the
more durable bonding social capital, joined by common norms, values, and contacts, even in the
smallest communities in this study, these patterns do not extend to all, or even most of the
residents. Although not addressed in these terms, the durable social networks discussed in the
recent literature on *favelas* (cf. Leeds, 1996; Venkatesh, 1997; Arias, 2006) tend to focus on drug
gangs. Certainly the rules mandated by the gangs and enforced by a small number of individuals
who make up the formal institution of the gang, along with the informally affiliated residents,
are strong boundaries for certain activities. Also, in populist style, gangs may try to win favor
of communities by sponsoring dance parties (*bailes*), sponsoring infrastructural improvement,
and providing stolen cable or telephone time. Celebrated by the presidents of the residents’
associations, it is clear that, for some types of collective action, the gangs provide the capacity to
concert. However the cooperation is self-serving: encouraging the residents to protest police
raids; providing a safe hiding place during a police or rival gang invasion; maintaining a
collective silence; and maintaining order in the community through self-policing.

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85 Drug gangs (*traficantes*) may be considered a formal institution in that they have a regulated hierarchy of
command and control of the organization, associate for a common purpose, and are bound by intra-institutional norms
and rules. This formal core, even in the largest *favela*, is typically relatively small (10-50 members). However, the
drug gangs are strengthened by using informal associations with community residents who are not part of the
hierarchy, are not invested in the purpose, and are not bound by the rules and norms of the gang. These informal
affiliations are best seen through the lens of patron-client ties, with the same weaknesses thereof.

86 While drug gangs are often the court where community problems are resolved, it is not their purpose nor in their
interest to be involved in more than avoiding giving the police any reason to enter. A notable exception follows the
code enforced in Brazilian prisons that does not tolerate rapists or abusers of children—drug gangs may involve
themselves in these issues in the communities. If the issue is not one that directly involves a gang member, doesn’t
involve property theft or destruction, and doesn’t disturb the general peace, the court is closed.
Linking Liberation Theology to Social Capital

An earlier source of durable, bonding social capital in Rio’s *favelas* was the ecclesiastically-based communities (CEBs) formed under the guidance of priests of Liberation Theology (LT) of the Catholic Church. LT’s “preferential option for the poor” clarified (or transformed, depending on your view) the Catholic message to apply heavenly principals to Earth, such as human rights, dignity, and charity. Because LT considers the poor as a class group and encourages recognition of this commonality, it has been termed Marxist. This stigma, along with its intertwining of social reality with religious doctrine, led to a removal of Papal support that, along with the growth of Pentecostalism and other competing religions in Rio has gradually siphoned off adherents. Nevertheless LT led to a transformation among adherents that has also been absorbed into the competing religions, and must be considered as a source of social capital lending to the capacity to concert (Vásquez, 1998).

CEBs are groups of about ten to sixty people who assemble to study the bible and discuss its relationship to their daily lives under lay leadership—that is, with Catholic clergy providing mostly organizing support. The activities of CEBs can be enumerated in terms of education and fellowship (reflection and discussion, and political consciousness raising), community action (aiding in provision of basic services such as health, education, and housing), organizational or leadership functions (creating functional subgroups, providing representation to the community network, lay ministers), and of course, religious activities (prayer meetings, bible study, festival preparation). It is the religious activities that are the principal social bond that buttress each of the other functions and create relational networks between adherents. Aside from the Catholic doctrine, CEB membership provides exactly the kind of preparation for productive participation in a democracy that Putnam (Putnam, 2000) exhorts. Not only is commonality reinforced, but the introduction of social issues and problems is the political component of civil society that can
be connected to the state through the nascent leaders and the community network, if not through the Church.

Reflection and discussion sessions that apply the teachings of the Bible to the daily experience of the poor have been instrumental in facilitating individual transformations. Perhaps most importantly, has been the growth of rights consciousness among the members of CEBs. Participants in the movement have internalized a belief that they are entitled to a better life than they have. At the same time, the feeling of empowerment that participants gain by acting on their own behalf has led to increased action outside of the community. Local examples of such action include petitioning the city for running water and electricity (Vasquez, 1997; Russell, 2001). In this way, CEBs have been a training ground, source of support, and springboard for activism.

Liberationists tend to conceive of the CEBs as a spontaneous democratic collectivization—a true grassroots movement. While others have documented the elite character of community formation, their impetus derived from the CNBB (Conferência Nacional de Bispos do Brasil) Joint Pastoral Plan, and most in evidence where the local bishop approves them (Bruneau, 1982; Hewitt, 1990). Both characterizations may have merit, as CNBB support nurtured a pre-existing trend of small-scale collectivization (Vásquez, 1998). But, at least in the case of Brazil, CEBs would not be nearly as prevalent in the absence of church support (Hewitt, 1986; Rother, 2007).

While it is easiest to observe the organization of the movement elites, and the cohesiveness of resisting forces within the church, more important to understanding collective action among the poor requires investigation at the level of organization within each CEB that has dictated the majority of individual benefits. So, although these communities only flourished under the sanction of the church, their diffusion and internal strength is related to leadership, organization,
and resource issues particular to each community (Bruneau, 1980; Hewitt, 1990). Vasquez concentrates on these “micro-environments” as the locus of change. These micro-environments “provide the horizons within which social actors construct, maintain, and transform the social order (1998, p. 10).” Individuals must strive to carve these new spaces out of the macro-society, even in the face of limited resources such as knowledge and power.

The variety of housing, education, medical, and nutrition services that these small groups are able to produce to help themselves and their neighbors is the capacity to concert in action providing tangible rewards (Hewitt, 1990). But the attraction to this collective action is not to procure such membership benefits, particularly as the CEBs are ideologically committed to sharing with all in need. Since movements are primarily constructed of networks of everyday, personal relationships, there is no added cost of belonging. The original attraction to bond to the social network is the symbol upon which adherents may build their identity—in this case, the theology of liberation and god as a god of the poor. This is consistent with Swindler’s (1986) concept of culture as a “tool kit” of symbols, stories, rituals and world-views, which provides the basis for approaching different kinds of problems. Religion, as one of the central components of culture, can provide a repertoire of social action, which, combined with available resources, defines the parameters of possible strategies for mobilization. Here, mobilization can be seen in terms of individuals exercising their new identity as a lifestyle.

The impetus for this transformation comes from “conscientização,” or consciousness-raising, which consists of bridging the ‘reality’ expressed by LT to the individual’s own experience of day-to-day reality. From this bridge, a new vision of reality and the forces at work in society, results from the sharing of individual experiences. The strength of the movement lies in such individual level transformation. The poor and oppressed, validated and
valued often for their first time, is empowering and life-changing (Hurley, 1991; Smith, 1991; McCann, 1994).

**Evidence from the Field**

Around the year 2000, there were approximately 75,000 CEBs in Brazil, with more than half estimated to participate in some type of social activism (Cousineau, 1997; Russell, 2001). Furthermore, the solidarity of purpose and unity of effort has been reported to provide the strength necessary to bear violent retaliation against their demand making (Cousineau, 1997; Vasquez, 1997). Unlike much of the rest of Brazil, although Rio de Janeiro did evolve a great number of CEBs, the community groups could not be as visibly active as elsewhere. Although the basic tenets of LT, such as encouraging lay group interpretation of the Bible to deepen the personal experience with Catholicism, were in action in the late 1950s, it was not a coordinated effort by regional bishops until the Medellín conference of 1968. By that time, the repressive force of the military dictatorship was at the height of its power and reacted harshly to any hints of communist social action, particularly in Rio as the national capital transitioned to Brasilía.

After twenty years of authoritarianism, the archbishop of the state of Rio de Janeiro (1971-2001), Cardinal Eugênio Sales, proscribed the social and political aspects of liberation theology following Pope John Paul II and Cardinal Ratzinger’s strong disapproval after the pope’s ascension in 1981. Nevertheless, one researcher in the field (Madeleine Cousineau) commented that she was surprised to find “resilient communities which, now that there’s a new archbishop in Rio, are beginning to come out of the shadows.” Whereas in São Paulo, CEBs received the Church’s approval and support, leaders of the “clandestine CEBs” were not allowed to attend national or regional meetings so as not to flaunt their existence and draw the anger of the Cardinal (Fraser and Jeffrey, 2004).
Burdick (1996) and Vasquez (1997; 1998), among others⁸⁷, have commented on the
decrease in Catholicism, and particularly CEBs in Brazil since the end of the military regime.
The common explanation starts with an increase in the popularity of Pentecostal, evangelical
religions that siphoned adherents to the more modern, musical and moving services. With a base
of 6.6% of Brazil’s population in 1980, Protestant religions grew to 15.4% in 2000 with three-
quarters of those identifying themselves as Pentecostals, while the Catholic Church exhibited the
opposite trend, reducing to only about 75% of the population by 2000 (IBGE, 1980 & 2000).
That, along with the economic crisis in Brazil in the 1990s, which necessitated CEB participants
and activists to invest more of their time working and procuring family sustenance, have reduced
the number of CEBs to a level that Daniel Levine (in Burdick, 1996, p. 4) to suggest that
continued academic research in CEBs “is not for the numbers they attract.”

Despite the contemporary absence of visible CEBs in Rio, they remain important for their
contributions to the favela residents’ capacity to concert. Levine’s 1988 prediction was that even
as CEBs began to lose visibility, particularly in politics, they will still

“play a long-term role by eliciting and promoting new sources and styles of leadership,
making them normal and legitimate. The groups as such may leave center stage, but the
leaders they develop should diffuse throughout society. This is probably the most critical
long-term impact of liberation theology (p. 260).”

And in the absence of economic justice and social equality, the themes, messages, and symbols
of LT remain in the political discourse of the poor shaping their perceptions of and approach to
their daily struggles. The important contribution of LT to contemporary favela life is this
common discourse that creates a base of commonality around which binding social capital is
easily formed and can be activated and politicized with the right catalyst.

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⁸⁷ (Levine, 1988; Hewitt, 1990; Cousineau, 1997; Alves, 2002; Souza, 2007)
Hewitt (1990) helps to explain the invisibility of CEB impact on election outcomes in Rio de Janeiro through a study that shows that the small size of each CEB, and the dispersion throughout the city dilute their measurable effect. Furthermore, studies by Bruneau (1982) and Hewitt (1986, 1987) have shown that CEBs are very heterogeneous in terms of their organization and purpose. As a super-local community organization, regardless that they are connected through a common religion, they were never meant to have an external, measurable impact. Additionally, the favela residents must naturally concentrate more on sustenance before investing ‘surplus’ time in collective or even individual spiritual efforts so that when collective actions do occur, they cannot be sustained for long periods and thus fail to catch public attention. And finally, Hewitt (1990) finds evidence for Levine’s (1988) prediction in his longitudinal study of eleven CEBs in São Paulo.

He reports a general shift in focus from political activism towards devotional activities in the CEBs of the poorest communities, but includes an observation that the activists simply moved into other organizations such as unions. Nevertheless, like the change in the political discourse among the favela residents, the early successes of the CEBs in organizing to gain basic infrastructure, halt police abuse, and avoid removal remains in the local history and repertoire (Levine, 1988; Cousineau, 1997; Vasquez, 1997). The fact is that there must be some model of success on which the residents base their protests, because the risks of protesting are high and the rewards are never achieved quickly.

Residents’ Associations and other SMOs

History

In Rio de Janeiro, there is a long list of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) at work in the favelas as meta-organizations that house or unite the community efforts that may catalyze group action—that is they tap into a group’s capacity to act in concert. However, the outside
resources that NGOs often have access to may be seen as rewards that are actual goal of participants. Collective action around guaranteed benefits may help create common bonds, but is more akin to a campus fraternity party with a political spin. Residents’ Associations (Associações de Moradores—AMs), on the other hand, receive few or no external resources to offer to the residents who choose to work alongside of their official community coordinator. The rewards are in this case are either generated from the community from individuals’ monthly contributions to the association, or they are the goal of group action\textsuperscript{88}. The following section explores the role of AMs in facilitating, generating, or representing the capacity to concert of the community.

Residents’ Associations are voluntary organizations based on community relations and common interests around the community in general. Since 1969\textsuperscript{89}, their purview has been delimited in statutes charging the AMs with the defense of certain rights of favela residents, particularly in negotiating their relationship with the state and the providence of basic urban services. From the point of view of the government, AMs would register and monitor the residents and dwellings and be charged with carrying the law from the asphalt to the hill. For the residents, they hoped the AMs would continue to negotiate the details of the concessions they had won through popular protest and ensure the delivery of water, electricity and sewage to provide a minimum standard of healthful living in the poor communities.

The earliest documented AM in a favela was founded in 1947. Nearly 8\% of the AMs in favelas that existed in 1981 were founded in 1966, the year after the federal government requirement for each favela to have such an official organization. The next big surge was in

\textsuperscript{88} This in no way is to deny possible spiritual or social benefits such as the benefit of the sense of belonging, and the satisfaction of being a part of something that is bigger than oneself.

\textsuperscript{89} Decree No 3.330/1968 limited favelas (and bairros) to one Residents’ Association each, which were purposed to be the official contact between the government and the community.
1979, where around 15% of the 1981 total was instituted. SERFHA (Serviço Especial de Recuperação das Favelas e Habitação Anti-Higiénicas—Special Service for the Recuperation of Favelas and Unsanitary Habitation), tasked with improving the general living conditions in the favelas, was formed in 1956, and by 1961 this governmental organization was providing incentives for the residents to organize formally for their own benefit, such as offering construction material for weekly group-work quotas. Shortly thereafter, however, SERFHA’s budget was gutted and what was left was better fit for registering and monitoring the favelas than to support self-help projects and favela organization. Predictably, many of the nascent AMs disappeared and others became inactive with only symbolic leadership. Some few maintained their momentum and worked effectively as the mechanism to carry the voice of their residents to the states (Diniz, 1981).

Under the Lacerda administration (1960-1965), the deactivation of SERFHA took on new meaning as the governor rolled out urban remodeling plans that required removing the poor communities. Lacerda’s successor, Negrão de Lima (1965-1970) took a stronger stance against the favelas and was supported by the federal government’s CODESCO. The growing threat, first in political rhetoric, then with the first removals in 1963, can help explain the foundation of 42% of the AMs existing in 1981 between 1960 and 1967 (Diniz, 1981). Replacing the positive incentives of SERFHA with the threat of removal created a strong motivation for the favela residents to organize.

Contemporary Scene

Today, all favelas in Rio, at least nominally, have an RA, yet the leaders of the previous generations lament that the new associations are nothing like they were when residents worked together to force the government to recognize their political power and their needs (Pandolfi and Grynszpan, 2003; Silva and Barbosa, 2005). All of the association presidents included in this
study cited a lack of resources from the government and a lack of solidarity or interest from the residents for the current downturn in AM activity. The decrease in the importance or activity has come to the point in some of the *favelas* in this study that the AM is nothing more than a building used to house a community phone and message board, and as the point of collection and distribution for mail.

The main tasks performed by AMs today, aside from being the communications hub of the community, include monitoring and passing payment for the community sanitation workers and electrical repairmen, who are paid and trained by the city sanitation and disposal company, COMLURB, and the city electric company, LIGHT or *Rio Luz*. The AM is also the official contact for CEDAE, the state water company. And it is the official distribution point for mail to the community, particularly the state “Medicine at Home” packages that the postal service will not deliver directly a lack of official addresses or maps, as well as potential danger due to gangs. Although not all communities have sanitation, electricity, and water projects, the problem of moderating disagreements over the illegal electric and water taps (*gatos* or *gatinhos*) usually falls to the association.

For example, Rocinha, famed for being the largest slum in Latin America as well as having the highest standard of living among Rio’s *favelas*, is technically a *bairro* (official, legally incorporated neighborhood) but has thousands of *gatos* bristling from electric transformers and water pipes. It is thin (1/2” – 1”) PVC pipes that carry the water from the broad piping of CEDAE to the constantly growing number of apartments, houses layered one upon the next. When these pipes are broken they affect all residents downstream, so the AM speaks with the community’s voice to have either the vandal (intentional or not) or the victim repair them. The AM is also involved as the point of contact when an overloaded transformer explodes or catches
alight. Once LIGHT restores the network to working condition, the AM will coordinate the reconnection of the homes based on seniority. In the name of public safety, it may also limit the number or type of appliances that families try to connect.

The AM also functions as a notary, registering important documents in a semi-official capacity. Because of the fees that can be charged, this single role makes administering the AM a highly contested position in *favelas* with a vibrant real estate market where the transfer of title, although not legal in the eyes of the Brazilian government, costs 10% of the sales price\(^{90}\). All births in hospitals are automatically registered at no cost to the parents, but on the infrequent occasion that there is a birth in the community the AM may give semi-official testament. And, as many residents do not have official connections to electricity, they have no legal address of residence, which denies them access to jobs and credit as current, official proof of residence is a basic requirement. In this case, the AM may charge a small fee for such a document.

The major issues that confront the *favelas* today (see Table 4-2) are infrastructure problems\(^{91}\) like drainage and sewage (see Table 4-3), regular access to potable water (see Table 4-4), regular access to electricity, and trash collection, as well as adequate commerce close enough for employment and shopping without the added expense of buses. Infrastructure concerns are the concentration of the AMs daily business, but the daily concern with violence in the *favelas*, particularly police violence, is the issue that brings more people and organizations to action (see Table 4-5).

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\(^{90}\) This may vary across *favelas*, but the 25 presidents of AMs who reported this as one of the services they provide, they all reported that the charge is 10%. The price of a two-bedroom dwelling ranges between around R$1,000 and R$25,000, with Rocinha and Vidigal as outliers with prices above R$40,000.

\(^{91}\) Statistics from the Brazilian government proudly tout that from 1980-2000 *favelas* went from below 50% connected to electricity, sewage, and water to 99%. Site visits, however, suggest that the number is somewhere closer to 70-80% as there are entire communities whose collective sewage is piped directly into the bordering river, whose intermittent access to water may leave them dry for days at a time, and whose intermittent access to electricity is no better.
Little Support for AMs at the End of the Century

By 1998, almost none of the AMs (4%) receive meaningful support or legitimacy from their residents as evidenced by fall in participation from 1981 (see Table 4-6). The reasons given include that “the previous administration(s)” were corrupt and ruined the institution’s image; that “the previous administrations” were not interested in being a community organization and didn’t act on residents’ requests and suggestions; that the election of association officers was extremely heated and divided the community, or the community differed greatly from the association’s plans; that the residents just didn’t have interest or time; or that some external force such as the police or drug gangs had pressured either the association or the residents into halting their participation. The major problems that keep the association leaders from being effective are a lack of resources (financial, material, and human); insufficient support from the government; poor relations with the community at large; general lack of support from both the community and the government.

Another possibility for the low participation is the lack of relevance of AM work to what is considered the real problem of the favelas: social discrimination leading to economic inequality and inhuman treatment at the hands of the government. In this database of conflicts in Rio (Vanier and Acselrad, 2007), public safety refers to police violence in the context of the favela, while in the conflicts that originate from a different locale, public safety usually means criminal violence but may also refer to pollution or unsafe building practices. From 1993-2000, there are 818 conflicts included, with 164 originating from favelas—that is 23.3% of the total, which closely corresponds to the favela residents’ share of the population. Amazingly, over 80% of these group conflicts originated from the grassroots within the favelas. Most of the cases (74.4%) are about police violence, but the residents mobilized over many different issues. Table 4-5 shows that public safety in the favelas also brings in the most diverse external support with
only the judiciary and state legislators choosing not to become involved in that cause, regardless that it is usually the federal police (Polícia Militar) who are the cause of the threat to public safety.

**Obstacles to Relevancy for Residents**

Associações de Moradores, as a potential center for bonding or binding social capital, must find relevance to the lives of the residents. Almost two-thirds of the AMs work in isolation, without any ties to other groups, and thus must have some intrinsic value to residents in order to be of use. Almost a quarter are involved in supporting or organizing Blocos de Carnaval or Escolas da Samba, and around one-tenth support or coordinate sports groups. This certainly aids in creating the space for civil society, and so gives the residents more potential to develop the capacity to work well together. On the other hand, although women’s and mother’s groups are the best organized local interests, only one association leader reported working together to support their activities. In fact, only around a third of the leaders even mentioned what might be termed “women’s issues” in their list of the top problems of their community.

The AMs are, nominally, the official pipeline to the government on behalf of the residents, and *vice versa*. However, when asked about their relationship with politicians, the leaders were very cynical in their response, which must temper their ability to carry out their function as a mediator. Fully one quarter of them will have nothing to do with politicians, and 10% of the sample refuses to even let the politicians enter their community for campaigning. Around one-third of the leaders surveyed commented that they meet with politicians and negotiate with them in pure clientelistic fashion, yet they now demand at least a part of the promise to be delivered before the election (Avritzer, 2000). Interviews for this research revealed that the association leader need secure only around 30% of the residents’ vote for a single politician in order to have

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92 Mainly issues dealing with the health and education of children.
a trading chit. For those association leaders who are willing, this is a great test to their personal social capital—whether or not they can command or cajole a third of their residents to support a candidate in exchange for the promise of payola.

The 1986 creation of a new budgeting system that gives legislators the ability to propose up to twenty amendments on the yearly federal budget destined for public works, so they capitalize on the monetary value and size of the projects they promise to bring back to their home district. However, this portion of the budget is pre-set by the Ministry of Planning and there is never anywhere near enough money to pay for even half of the projects, so each legislator finances their twenty pet projects over decades and allocate a small percentage of the necessary resources. Then, when it is time to decide on the next year’s budget, each legislator has twenty new amendments to propose with no rule requiring them to support their ongoing projects. In 1996, there were 2,214 public works projects worth a total of $15 billion that went unfunded because the $600 million was already committed to mostly new projects that would also never be completed (Avritzer, 2000).

The perverse incentives in the budgeting process encourage clientelism and broken promises. Furthermore, it is up to the executive branch to release the funds, which they do only quid pro quo for legislators’ support of this branch’s own pet projects. Social groups lose out because they are easily confused by a process that is hard to track and, ultimately, disastrously wasteful of governmental resources. In this atmosphere it seems that the residents seeking change would naturally turn to the closest and most accountable political body available, the Residents’ Association. After all, the two major functions of the AM are to coordinate demand making to the government, and to organize internal community activities. Yet
above shows that, even in 1981 at the height of social activism in the context of the waning military dictatorship and before the 1986 budgeting changes, almost one-third of the AMs indicated that fewer than 20% of their residents participated in any AM assembly, and almost 60% of the RA’s saw participation rates below 40%. By 1998, 100% of the associations in this study reported participation from less than 40% of their residents, and 96% reported participation from less than 20%.

**Political Activity of the AMs and the Residents**

Table 4-8 gives more evidence of the lack of the political activity of AMs. In 164 conflicts involving *favelas* from 1993-2000, AMs were the primary agent of complaint twice. This compares poorly with the sample of conflicts involving non-*favela* neighborhoods where 31 or 6.3% of the 489 complaints were championed by the AM. On the other hand, the AMs from *favelas* supported the residents in their protest in 19 other cases, or 11.6% of the time (Table below), whereas in the other neighborhoods, AMs lent their support only 33 times, or 6.7% of the time. So in regards to the whether or not AMs are instrumental in building the capacity to concert amongst *favela* residents, there is strong evidence as their participation is correlated with 21 of the 164 *favela*-driven conflicts, or 12.8%. This is essentially equal to the 13.3% participation of the AMs in non-*favela* neighborhood actions.

Leaving aside the issue of leadership or support by the AMs, Table 4-5 reveals that 81.7% of *favela*-related conflicts were championed by the residents themselves—clear evidence of the capacity to concert amongst the *favela* populations. And it is important to note that these cases represent more than 79 different *favelas* as the principal actor in the conflict, which indicates that this capacity is widespread, and approximately one-eighth of these communities

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93 The 164 cases from the database on conflicts that include *favelas* as the principal actors, 119 different *favela* names are included but many have been grouped into the larger complexes to which they belong, such as Maré, Complexo Alemão, and the various linked *favelas* of Catumbi.
engaged in demand making that was public enough to be picked up by the news sources included in the study. Looking again at Table Table 4-5, it appears that the principal actor (AM or resident group) specializes in the objective they choose to pursue. The two issues the AMs of the favelas chose to tackle dealt with living conditions in one form or another, while the residents primarily demanded improvements in public safety (an end to police violence in 101 cases) and the safety of children (four cases protesting inadequate medical treatment for children and six cases of protesting children’s deaths on the highways that define the limits of the favelas).

Error! Reference source not found. Table 4-8 shows the repertoire of demand-making actions from the various plaintiffs on behalf of favela residents’ causes. These data reveal that the residents’ capacity to concert is not limited to spontaneous reactions of rage and destruction. Only 9.7% of residents mobilization resulted in the destruction of property, such as the burning of commuter buses—an immediate reaction to a grievous event in all cases, perhaps suggested or supported by drug gangs in some. While the blocking of streets (60.0% of the residents’ repertoire) is also often a spontaneous reaction, it may also be a planned event. Almost one-quarter (21.6%) of the residents’ demand making has been in the form of planned rallies in public squares. Appropriately, it was the AM filed the one complaint with a government officer reported in the database, acting as the representative of the residents in this case. An AM was also the organizer in one of the forty five public rallies that were held during the period of this study.

Of the approximately 600 favelas that existed between 1993 and 2000, no less than 79 (13.2%) were involved in bringing a conflict to the public sphere at a rate of about 23 cases per year, or two cases per month. This is hard evidence of the residents’ capacity to concert, which can only be assessed in action. Participation numbers were available for 80 of the 165 reports of
*favela*-originated conflict detailing the smallest participation of 30 individuals, and the largest of 20,000 individuals who took part in a city-wide remembrance march of a 1993 police massacre of 21 residents of Vigário Geral. The median of participation among these cases is 225 individuals, indicating that half of the conflicts involved more than 225 people working together in some form or another (mean = 1,651.4, mode = 200).

**Benefits From the Capacity to Concert**

Although the outcome of those specific actions is unknown, some generalizations can be drawn from complementary data. From the various measures of social capital and capacity-to-concert-in-action\(^94\), there are consistent results that point to *favela* residents organizing and activating in order to solve community-level problems. Table 4-9 shows the correlation matrix for six measures of social capital and eight group-level resources. Membership in an AM or other community organization, and moving to a *favela* where a social group already exists are measures of potential social capital in its passive form as the organizations provide a commonality around which bonding or binding social capital may form.

The next three measures are similar in that they measure reported social capital in action through participation in the AMs activities, working as a group to install water pipes to neighborhood houses, and the more general report that life in the *favela* has improved (*melhorou*) because of the residents. Table 4-9 clearly demonstrates the strong relationship between these six measure. The highly significant correlations suggest that an individual who is involved with one of these aspects of social bonding or networking is also involved with at least one more. The only relationship that is not statistically significant is that between the group work and being a member of the AM. Group work also has an inverse relationship that what was

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\(^94\) From the PCBR 1998 study of 51 *favelas*, the following variables are used: a) member of the AM, b) member of other community organization, c) water piping installed by community group, d) reason for moving to *favela* was to be with friends, and e) life in the *favela* has improved because of the residents.
expected with having moved to the favela because of friends. This is not particularly troubling, however, as the two variables are capture different aspects of social capital, active and potential, and can thus disagree without threat to the concept validity of the measures.

The group-level benefits of social capital can be seen in Table 4-10. There is an interesting difference between the two groups of variables that seem fit the following explanation: social capital is more likely to be activated around perceived needs, while potential social capital in the form of group membership, size and expected solidarity is likely to remain after the group has met with success in achieving its goals. This fits the model of how social capital works as discussed above in the context of historical residents’ movements as well as the mechanisms of LT and AM as facilitators of social capital. That is, that CEBs and LT provided a central belief system around which otherwise unrelated individuals were able to bind in order to achieve collective success. Also, the creation of a group and the expectations of solidarity make it less costly, in terms of risk analysis, to make claims to the government or to venture personal effort amid the possibility of free riders.

The positive correlations between potential social capital and group-level resources are most likely the result of earlier instances of group solidarity, either in demand making, or in selling a block of votes for clientelist booty95. The negative correlations found on the other side of the table with the active social capital variables are consistent with the relative deprivation model of social movements. This can be understood in terms of the perceived deficiency in the community becoming the common center around which the residents bond and activate.

95 Following the 20 interviews with AM presidents, both of these possibilities are equally plausible as, although only around 33% reported that their AM had participated in selling a block of votes, they all said that “probably all” or all of the other favela associations did. Furthermore, more than 60% of the interviewees recalled group demand making on the government, particularly for infrastructure and healthcare facilities.
Unfortunately, this census data only provides a snapshot of the residents’ reports, so it is only through the follow-up interviews some 7 to 10 years later that confirmation of sorts is available.

The case of garbage and sanitation is also noteworthy as it is positively correlated with all six variables. COMLURB, the city sanitation company, began community sanitation projects starting in 1989 in just six favelas. By 2000, the project has expanded to include 60 communities and complexes of communities. The *gari comunitário* (community street sweeper) employs between 4 and 100 favela residents for daily or semi-weekly trash gathering and removal.

COMLURB benefits greatly from this program as it helps to ensure that the trash doesn’t end up in other neighborhoods or over the edge of a cliff onto underlying highways. They do require the assistance of the AM in order to monitor, supply, and remunerate the workers, and so they have targeted communities that have the ability to maintain a consistent sanitation program. The *gari comunitário* fits under both active and potential social capital because, once gained for the community, it requires daily cooperation to maintain it.

Interviews with 20 presidents of *favela associações de moradores* confirm the quantitative findings above. More than 75% of those interviewed reported that their community had been politically active during the time covered by this study, and every one mentioned some community protest against police violence. The other reason consistently mentioned by 50% of the respondents was lack of infrastructure (electricity, water, or sewage). A third reason for community action was against stalled governmental projects, particularly when the press visited for a photo opportunity with the ‘hero’ of the hour. In addition to group rallies, 60% of the AM presidents were aware of court cases that the AM had filed for various reasons—mostly on behalf of a resident in order to legalize their plot, but also in legal complaint against police violence. One small community in the middle of a middle-class suburb in the West Zone was
successful in using judicial power to halt daily harassment by the police who were trying to oust the fledgling community before it became a permanent favela. In terms of the role of the AM, around 80% of the presidents declared that the AM’s purpose is to support rather than to lead, so that group protests had to start with the residents before the AM would consider taking action.

Although only about 10% of the interviewees admitted to having been pressured by drug gangs in the role of the AM, a 2002 report from the municipal legislature (ALERJ) identified around 400 community leaders who were associated with the criminal syndicates between 1992 and 2001. The same report found another 400 community leaders who had been assassinated (100-150) or expelled (250-300) during the same time (Schmidt, 2002). After the interview, once out of the AM office, other presidents admitted that they too had been or were under pressure to follow gang directives. When asked how that relationship affects their ability to work in the interests of the community, the similar replies indicated that, although the AM was often burdened by an extra sinecure or two, the AM could operate normally as long as the actions didn’t bring police interference or reprisal. At the same time, the shadow of the gang “probably makes” residents hesitant to seek out help so as not to bring undue notice upon themselves. On the other hand, it is “possible” that “in other communities,” gangs operate through the AM to encourage protests against the police—a perverse use of social capital. On the other hand, as gang leaders infiltrate the city and state government, their relationship with any given favela can be beneficial as they gain new bargaining power to funnel resources to their ‘home district (Garcia, 2002b, 2002a; Alves, 2003).”

**Conclusion**

The point of this chapter was to outline a second aspect of social capital, that of providing the capacity to concert, the “knowledge of how to combine [that] is the mother of all other forms of knowledge; on its progress depends that of all the others (Tocqueville, 1969, p. 517).” By
focusing on the case of *favela* residents in Rio de Janeiro, it has been possible to elaborate the process through which social capital of this type develops. The examples of the Vaccine Revolt, samba schools, Liberation Theology, and *associações de moradores* all point to the same important components: a central focus to provide commonality around which bonding, bridging or binding is possible, and group solidarity that provides the reasonable expectation that individual risk taking will have shared consequences. The transient nature of *favela* resident collective action points to how the central focus need not be each individual’s identity or *raison d’être*. Like the short-term activation of samba school loyalty during *Carnaval*, or team loyalty during soccer playoffs, groups come together briefly and then quickly return to anonymity with no durable bonds. The example of the *Mães de Acari*, however, demonstrated that durable bonds are not out of the question, and that the more often a group activates around the same central idea or cause, the more likely durable bonds will occur.

Although this chapter ended with evidence that generalized or group-level social capital is highly correlated with government resources, the question of why some *favelas* have access to more governmental resources has yet to be satisfactorily addressed. The following chapter will present a model, introduced above, that considers complex open networks of social actors that revolve around the various communities and become visible only when each actor mobilizes, however briefly. These purposeful networks appear over time consistent with Sidney Tarrow’s Political Opportunity Structure approach to social movements as they are “a delicate balance between formal organization and autonomy—one that can only be bridged by strong, informal, nonhierarchical connective structures […] operating within and between formal movement organizations (Tarrow, 1998, p. 137).” At the same time, Tarrow’s picture of social movements, however fluctuating he imagines them, still prioritizes formal structures and durable ties. What
is termed Binding Action Networks (BANs) in the following chapter have very much the quality of NSMs in the very temporary connections that characterize even the core of the movement. Importantly, BANs have expanded the strategies of *favela* residents in making demands on the state, away from the clientelistic options that dominated the scene through the 1980s.

In terms of democracy, the previous chapter demonstrated how social capital can work to provide an exit option for *favela* residents to avoid participating in the state economically and politically. At the same time, the evidence showed that individual-level social capital was positively correlated with state embeddedness, which leaves the power of these networks as a double-edged sword *vis à vis* the government. This chapter expanded the discussion on social capital and democracy showing how the creation of group-level social capital is equivalent to creating space for civil society—an essential building block for democratic governance. The chapter that follows explains how the horizontal bonds of civil society connect vertically to the state through the focused attention of diverse social actors in a loose, binding network.
Table 4-1 Individuals in Rio, 18+ years, reasons for joining unions for non-professionals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason for Joining</th>
<th>Sample n</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Medical assistance</td>
<td>129,253</td>
<td>24.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal assistance</td>
<td>173,876</td>
<td>33.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leisure, sports, or culture</td>
<td>56,933</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political activity</td>
<td>58,985</td>
<td>11.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>254,916</td>
<td>48.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td>5,642</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 4-2 Main problems of 18 favelas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main Problem</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>n=</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure</td>
<td>49.1%</td>
<td>14720</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence</td>
<td>19.5%</td>
<td>5840</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No problem</td>
<td>15.9%</td>
<td>4774</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More commerce for jobs / markets</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
<td>1650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
<td>2998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>29982</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source (PCBR, 1998)

Table 4-3 Sewage connections of 50 favelas by type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of sewage system</th>
<th>% of sample</th>
<th>n=</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General network</td>
<td>78.3%</td>
<td>62817</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Septic tank</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
<td>5338</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Septic runoff / open pit</td>
<td>8.2%</td>
<td>6571</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Directly to river</td>
<td>6.8%</td>
<td>5433</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>80180</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source (PCBR, 1998)
## Table 4-4 Water delivery and connection by frequency (50 favelas) and origin (18 favelas)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Water Delivery</th>
<th>% of sample</th>
<th>n=</th>
<th>Connection made by</th>
<th>% of sample</th>
<th>n=</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>every day</td>
<td>70.0%</td>
<td>50769</td>
<td>private, individ</td>
<td>46.0%</td>
<td>8950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>every other day</td>
<td>12.6%</td>
<td>9147</td>
<td>private, group</td>
<td>16.2%</td>
<td>3151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2x / week</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
<td>3837</td>
<td>CEDAE</td>
<td>28.3%</td>
<td>5502</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>irregular</td>
<td>9.4%</td>
<td>6821</td>
<td>Favela</td>
<td>8.8%</td>
<td>1718</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>every day, at least</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>1956</td>
<td>other</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>don't know</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>19476</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total</td>
<td></td>
<td>72530</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source (PCBR, 1998)

## Table 4-5 Group mobilized by conflict objective

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Wtr and Sewr</th>
<th>Aesthetics</th>
<th>Ownership and land use</th>
<th>Living cond.</th>
<th>Health</th>
<th>Public safety</th>
<th>Transpt and traffic</th>
<th>Conflict method totals</th>
<th>Percent of all conflicts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Residents’ assn</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental org</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parents and friends</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residents or neighbors</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>81.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homeless movements (MST)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Related professionals</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unions or Prof. Assn</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict objective totals</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of all conflicts</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>74.4</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source (Vanier and Acselrad, 2007)
Table 4-6 Percentage of *favelas* with participation at given levels in residents’ assn. projects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Levels of Participation</th>
<th>1981</th>
<th>1998</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-20%</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21-40%</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41-60%</td>
<td>23</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61-80%</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81%+</td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>(n=97)</td>
<td>(n=50)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source (Diniz, 1981; PCBR, 1998)

Table 4-7 Organization providing support for *favela* in conflict vs. objective of conflict

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflict objective totals</th>
<th>Water and sewer</th>
<th>Aesthetic</th>
<th>Ownership and land use</th>
<th>Living cond.</th>
<th>Health</th>
<th>Public safety</th>
<th>Transport and traffic</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Residents’ assn</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional assn</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human rights org</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious groups</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social movement</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judiciary</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>Political party</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State legislator</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City legislator</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support Totals</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unsupported conflicts</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source (Vanier and Acselrad, 2007)
### Table 4-8 Form of conflict by mobilized group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Form of Conflict</th>
<th>Res. assn.</th>
<th>Envr. org</th>
<th>Parents and friends</th>
<th>Res. or neighbor</th>
<th>Hmless mvmt (MST)</th>
<th>NGO</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Related professionals</th>
<th>Unions or prof. assn</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Percent of all</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Petitions, letters, visits</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicular procession (bike, car...)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct confrontation with police/army</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public complaint to gov officer</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destruction of property</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>14</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blocking streets</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>76</td>
<td>46.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appeal to the judiciary</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rally in public plaza</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>27.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seizing buildings or land</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strike or slow down</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Total</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source (Vanier and Acselrad, 2007)
Table 4-9 Correlation matrix of six measures of social capital

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Res. assn (AM)</th>
<th>Member in any other comm. org.</th>
<th>Moved to <em>favela</em> b/c of friends</th>
<th>Particip. in assn.</th>
<th>Water piping installed by group work</th>
<th><em>Favela</em> is better b/c of residents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Res. assn (AM)</em></td>
<td><em>r</em> = 1.00</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>p</em></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.259</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>n</em></td>
<td>65223</td>
<td>65223</td>
<td>23397</td>
<td>65221</td>
<td>15089</td>
<td>12348</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Member in any. other comm. org</em></td>
<td><em>r</em> = 0.88</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>p</em></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>n</em></td>
<td>65223</td>
<td>81882</td>
<td>29931</td>
<td>65234</td>
<td>19476</td>
<td>15685</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Moved to Favela b/c of friends</em></td>
<td><em>r</em> = 0.04</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>p</em></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>n</em></td>
<td>23397</td>
<td>29931</td>
<td>29931</td>
<td>23404</td>
<td>19434</td>
<td>15644</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Particip. in assn.</em></td>
<td><em>r</em> = 0.58</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>p</em></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>n</em></td>
<td>65221</td>
<td>65234</td>
<td>23404</td>
<td>65234</td>
<td>15095</td>
<td>12351</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Water piping installed by group work</em></td>
<td><em>r</em> = -0.01</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>p</em></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.259</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>n</em></td>
<td>15089</td>
<td>19476</td>
<td>19434</td>
<td>15095</td>
<td>19476</td>
<td>11234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Favela is better b/c of residents</em></td>
<td><em>r</em> = 0.03</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>p</em></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>n</em></td>
<td>12348</td>
<td>15685</td>
<td>15644</td>
<td>12351</td>
<td>11234</td>
<td>15685</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source (PCBR, 1998)
Table 4-10 Correlations between measures of social capital and group-level resources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Res. assn (AM)</th>
<th>Member in any comm. org.</th>
<th>Moved to favela b/c of friends</th>
<th>Particp. in assn.</th>
<th>Water piping installed by group work</th>
<th>Favela is better b/c of residents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public safety</td>
<td>r = 0.04</td>
<td>p = 0.000</td>
<td>n = 23390</td>
<td>29945</td>
<td>29868</td>
<td>23397</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.355</td>
<td>0.000</td>
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Source: (PCBR, 1998)
The story above has shown that the government is not predisposed to aid the favelas, that the aid that has been provided has been incomplete, and that there is no single answer for favela improvement and development. Neither NGO, AM, CEB, or government agency has been able to create a large-scale, cross-favela plan that has made significant improvement, regardless of the billions of dollars that continue to be spent in the Favela Bairro projects of Rio de Janeiro. This chapter explores the complex open networks that are composed of combinations of the internal and external actors around favela issues that allow the transfer of necessary local information and demands to influence general public opinion and consequently decision makers in the government and other development agencies.

In the highly politicized grassroots environment of favela residents and activists, many believe that only ‘the people’ (o povo) are capable of bringing about meaningful reform, which leads some to reject outside solutions because they don’t originate from ‘the movement’ (o movimento). A century of experience has shown that external actors operate on their own agenda, and connections of favela residents to external actors are too often cheaply co-opted for the benefit of only a few. The problem is that while local change can only be affected by locals at the local level, favelas are woven into the fabric of society and so the residents cannot simply turn their back on the rest of the world. To pursue their community goals in the social and political milieu, they must cultivate external links to help them remove the constraints, created externally, that define the possibilities of the locale. These limitations include the stigmatized public perception of favelas and their residents, police repression of contentious activities outside of the favelas, and the labyrinthine nature of the government bureaucratic apparatus that is poorly disposed to attend favela representatives.
Desmond Arias (2006) made an ethnographic study of two\textsuperscript{96} external networks, built from favela-level organization, that ultimately succeeded in drawing government response to their demands. Importantly, he found that state action only came about much later after the original event and subsequent protests, which indicates that the original message was somehow maintained in the social and political discourse until it was addressed. The success that Arias reports for one community, Vigário Geral, was based on the ability of a group of active residents, fronted by a college-educated community leader, who used external contacts with politicians and international funding agencies to finance local-action NGOs.

External financing motivated the local NGOs to formalize and persevere, and the prestige of the international element, broadcast by the local, national, and world-wide press, resulted in government help to end violence in the favela by installing an occupational force of police… after three years. Unfortunately, this was a short-lived solution and Vigário Geral remains one of the most violent favelas in Rio. In the long term, international financing and support helped create and maintain a local alternative for youth recreation, Afro Reggae. This local NGO now has branches in several other favelas, and makes international tours in an attempt to lure kids away from the drug business and to raise awareness about the problem of violence in the favelas of Rio (Junior, 2006).

The failure to address the underlying problem of Vigário Geral exemplifies the biggest limitation of the temporary nature of binding social capital as an agent of political change in the face of the complexity of the government, bureaucracy, and judiciary. It allows opposing interests to ‘wait it out,’ safe in the knowledge that popular contention rarely holds together for long and will likely dissipate before any political changes are necessary. This is especially true

\textsuperscript{96} Three case studies are included in his research, but one community failed to make external connections because of limitations placed by the drug gang, working in collaboration with the AM president.
among the poor residents who get no quick reward for their investment in trying to influence the system, and so they must turn their attention to more immediate concerns. The media is not a reliable ally in their struggle as the press needs fresh news every day. With even the ongoing war in Iraq and Afghanistan turning stale, how can the comparatively small problems of small, unwelcome groups hope to keep the public eye throughout their campaign?

**Binding Action Networks**

Binding action networks (BANs) refer to a specific type of social movement that is particularly applicable to groups that lack social, economic, and political resources to engage in ‘normal’ interest group politics. The simple definition, as developed here, is that they are loose collections of groups and institutions, like AMs inside the *favela* and the media operating outside the *favela*, that operate independently and asynchronously as part of a process over time, yet have similar reasons to connect a *favela* to the state in a bid for resources. The creation of binding social capital with institutions outside of the *favela* is absolutely necessary for the creation of resilient action networks that distinguish successful cases from those that fail to gain governmental resources.

Note that the difference between a durable network constructed from bridging social capital, and a resilient network created from binding social capital makes the latter more difficult to empiricize because each branch of the network may only be activated for a short time, potentially never visible in action at the same time as any other branch. This collection of on-again, off-again ties distinguishes itself by always activating around the same cause or idea, even though it may not be a central concern for most, or even any, of the actors. The various actors or elements in the network can temporarily ‘store’ the movement to reactivate it later, or can step in at key points to keep it going—all without formal coordination.
The lack of central organization means that the momentum of the movement may fade away forever, or fade away temporarily only to be re-lit later by a new actor who just discovered the cause, or by a previous actor whose priorities finally shifted to give the movement attention again. This is the same basic picture that New Social Movement (NSM) theory creates for modern movements, that they are constructed of identity-driven adherents whose tenuous support consists of punctuated activity over time. The difference with the BAN, particularly in the context of democratization, is that BANs must involve at least two sets of actors, demand makers originating from the favelas, and the government—BANs examine a strictly political phenomenon. Residents and organizations of poor communities approach intervening actors that help to solidify the link between favelas and the government. Consequently, the study of BANs requires an understanding of the public policy process as well as the mechanisms of social movements, which are described here through the lens of social capital. Because of the temporary and fungible nature of the network, literature on interest groups, lobbyists, and other formal political institutions is not an appropriate framework for understanding BANs.

**BANs and the Political Opportunity Structure of Social Movements**

Sidney Tarrow’s (1998) Political Opportunity Structure (POS) provides the most promising existing framework in social movements literature to understand the success in demand making of favela residents in Rio. This model, constructed to create a unified theory of social movements, is flexible enough to allow the struggle in Rio to be described, but in trying to be all-encompassing, it obscures the central character of the movement there, the strength of which comes from binding rather than bridging, weaker rather than stronger ties, from being resilient rather than durable.

The POS model, applied to favela movements, requires consideration of their dual focus 1) as a competing frame in societal discourse, and 2) as a political force competing for power in the
state system. The latter concentrates on elite-level politics where decisions are ultimately made, and the former looks first for the consensus formation of the movement frame, and then for consensus mobilization wherein there are “deliberate attempts to spread the views of a social actor among parts of the population (Tarrow, 1998, p. 113).” Unlike the case in Rio, however, the POS model discusses the mass base as important in terms of political leverage to be used by “allies” and “third parties (p. 105),” at times of changing opportunities for political access or reductions in repression that “lower the costs of collection action, reveal potential allies, show where elites and authorities are most vulnerable, and trigger social networks and collective identities around common themes (p. 20).” If this were the case in Rio, it would make sense that the larger the favela, the more political leverage would exist and could be used to gain resources. The data on the favelas in this study, however, did not find correlation between favela size and resources, even when controlling for other variables. What is useful from the POS model is the idea that movements are both a political force as well as a cultural one through their influence on the societal discourse.

A third effect of social movements is how they change lives at the individual, personal level. This is not as much about how they shape the way daily lives are lived, as was discussed in the context of Liberation Theology in the previous chapter. Instead, POS emphasizes how individual life changes may substitute formal movement organization through the creation and adoption of new identities among adherents that can facilitate action, interaction, and alliances according to the common norms, values, and accepted life-style repertoire of the created community. In order to do this, the new identity must clearly identify movement members as different from the rest of society, particularly distinguishing the militants97 (p. 119). Identity, in

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97 Tarrow uses the example of the solidarity movement in Poland to show how it was not a movement of Catholic industrial workers, but rather industrial workers using the symbols of Catholicism to create a common language and
terms of the BAN model that recognizes the transient nature of associations, can be thought of as priority put upon a cause or idea, out of the field of causes that vie for personal investment within an individual’s ego, that creates enough commonality around a catalyzing event to bring individuals together in demand making—under this model, collaborative action does not have to occur at the same time (i.e. it can be asynchronous). Unlike the biographical influence imagined in the POS model, the BAN model emphasizes temporary prominence of identity parts. Similar to the POS, it is the consistent concurrence of actors’ identities over time that takes the place of a formal movement organization, or formal organization within the movement.

In addition to group identity and movement frame, the POS looks at organization as a third resource to be used politically. Organization is described along three axes: a) hierarchical leadership, b) group cohesiveness when “confronting the enemy,” and c) “connective structures that link leaders and followers, center and periphery, and different parts of a movement sector, permitting coordination and aggregation between movement organizations and allowing movements to persist even when formal organization is lacking (pp. 123-24).” Similarly, the BAN model uses social capital to explain both intra-group cohesiveness and inter-group commonalities for action, but rejects the necessity of hierarchical leadership. This vertical component is unrealistic in the context of favelas in light of the evolution of favela movement tactics and ideologies that were strengthened over the long term as corrupt or co-opted movement leaders lost support, as eventually vertical leadership did. As described in the previous chapters, movement cells with strong hierarchical structure that were either rendered powerless once accepted into the government structure or succumbed to corruption dissipated.

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98 This is not empirically tautological in the sense that the commonality exists if collaboration occurs, and collaboration occurs when commonality exists. The commonality is visible, even when the actors are not collaborating as will be demonstrated below.
leaving the rest of the movement temporarily weakened, but sturdier in the end. Now, movement adherents, disenchanted with such leaders, openly express suspicion of even the most well-meaning organizers.

Tarrow’s (1998) conception of cycles of contention is particularly well suited to account for the ebb and flow of the favela movement over the past four decades. The chapter above dealing with the history of favelas detailed the changing field of political opportunities involving the porousness of the state administration in contrast to its repressive capacity, as well as the availability and sincerity of potential institutional allies. Unions of favela workers, for example, were one of the results of the turn-of-the-century vaccine revolt. However, in the context of economic liberalism and later anti-communism, they were not able to win any substantive gains. The Church was the only institution ostensibly placed to continually pursue social justice but it worked more as an arm of the state monitoring and controlling favela movements until the 1970s when state-sponsored torture and repression led to a change of heart among the church leadership. Regrettably, by that time, its ability to make overt challenges was effectively subdued. The Church’s more compelling action was, by necessity and by nature, different from political interference, and had its biggest impact through the development of Liberation Theology and ecclesiastically based communities (CEBs) that changed the societal discourse around the poor across the socio-economic spectrum, as well as catalyzing individual transformations among the poor.

Describing the tension among the various forces and actors in politics is an appropriate use for POS in analyzing the favela movement. However, one of the most important changes that occurred through unionizing and liberation theology was a change in the nature of the individual

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99 See the discussion in the previous chapter on the role of Liberation Theology in building the capacity to concert among favela residents.
self worth of the poor. The political struggle for solidarity and power against industrialists and neo-liberal policies is clearly captured by the POS conception of social movements. The path for personal metamorphosis and the cybernetic\textsuperscript{100} nature of identity and resistance, on the other hand, is not. This is a fundamental mechanism in the process of demand making that is lost in the POS model.

As good of a job as the POS does at describing movement cycles in terms of external opportunities and restraints, it is not designed to capture the social and economic reality that defines internal relationships at the grassroots. For example, the post-dictatorship economic crisis in Brazil increased the need of poor households to ‘self-exploit,’ leaving less time and energy for community participation remains outside of the view of the POS lens. Also affecting the cycle of favela movements is the rise of Pentecostalism that has substantially changed the focus away from the earthbound reality of the poor towards the heavenly possibilities that may exist for them in the afterlife—away from political action to correct temporal problems towards prayer and service that promise the exchange of suffering on Earth for an eternity in heaven. Finally, the para-statal drug gangs create a non-political obstacle for organization and contention. None of these informal factors fit into the POS model that was designed around more traditional interest-group politics. They are, however, central considerations in the BAN model.

Actors and groups of actors tend to appear and fade away quickly making networks difficult to discern. This tendency, from the nature of binding social capital, has to do with the multiple identities each individual carries based on the host of relationships that constitute the person. Over time, each identity gains prominence in its appropriate context for each individual, which may not occur at the same time as other individuals. This can make groups virtually

\textsuperscript{100} Cybernetic refers to Bateson’s (1987) concept of mutually reinforcing or balancing systems where a change in one element brings about a consistent reaction in another.
hidden networks in the short term. Although the entire network may not be visible at one time, it is possible to assemble the threads of the action web in order to get a good idea of how the connections work by using the BAN model. It is this empirical nature of the this model that separates it from similar social movement approaches such as New Social Movements (cf. Melucci, 1985; Snow and Benford, 1988; Habermas, 1996; Giugni et al., 1999) and Tilly's polity model (1978).

POS provides a model for the context of the *favela* movement, and BANs help to explain the actual mechanisms. For *favela* movements, network actors include residents, AMs, other neighborhood organizations, the press, NGOs, religious groups, and governmental offices, but no one group or individual is responsible for mobilization or progress. Also, further removing *favela* movements from the more formal and political conception of POS, competition for resources isn’t as much a competition against opposing groups with clashing agendas around the same issue, but rather an effort to attract sustained policy attention[^101].

Figure 5-1 portrays the important limitations in interest sharing both between residents in the *favelas* and between the residents and other, external institutions. The separation of the external institutions indicates that each may have a different interest in the *favela*, and so will only activate on its behalf under separate circumstances when that interest is stoked. The areas of the circles representing *favela* residents that do not intersect with the circles representing other residents signifies the life that an individual doesn’t share with other residents, perhaps sharing only with their family, in a blinding group within the *favela*, earning income, or bridging outside of the *favela*. The small area of intersection of the three circles representing each *favela* resident

[^101]: Admittedly, funding is a zero-sum game by virtue of the limited nature of resources versus unlimited demands, but there is a big difference between competition between two plans or frames of the same issue and the competition between different issues for government budgeting and funding. Moreover, the absurd difference between budgeting and actual allocation of funds mentioned in the previous chapter further reduces the likelihood of a *favela* proposal being challenged in the budgeting phase.
indicates the difficulty in finding common interests amongst all of the other demands or opportunities for an individual’s time.

**The Communities Speak: Data from the Study**

The BAN model explains the difficult-to-visualize political action of social movements of traditionally excluded groups. The model is tested here by considering differential success in demands on the government by *favela* residents who, although strongly politicized by the language of Liberation Theology that still dominates the assessment by the poor of their condition and position in Brazil, lack political, economic, and social resources necessary to participate as equals in claim making on the state. Further, the stark separation between *asfalto* and *morro* has maintained the conception of class in their movement, not based on proletarian solidarity (attraction or pull-based commonality), but based on discrimination and exclusion from the rest of society (isolation or push-based commonality).

These two contextual conditions contribute to the clear, purposeful targeting of the government by the *favela* movements. Additionally, without a doubt, there is a constant subtext to *favela* movements intended to change the social discourse about their communities and residents. Affecting society’s perception is important as the core of spontaneous but short-lived demonstrations by residents—the primary or unitary reason for involvement in the movement for many. Still, such riotous protests do not constitute a social movement and are included as an important part of the BAN.

The evidence presented below comes from three sources: 1) the media’s perception of 50 *favela* communities between 1993 and 2000, 2) the residents own reports of their living conditions from a 1998 census of the same communities, and 3) original research including participant observation and unstructured interviews in four *favelas* as well as semi-structured interviews with the presidents of the AMs of 15 others.
Two sources were used to ascertain the media’s perception. The first is a database the Brazilian national, daily newspaper, O Globo, which I constructed for this study by searching in the newspaper’s electronic archive for all references to each *favela* between the years 1995 and 2000, and then collating, cleaning and coding thousands of articles. This labor-intensive process has an advantage over the next data source, a database of conflicts gathered from the news, in that my selection criteria were much more inclusive—the articles merely had to mention the name of the *favela* rather than only selecting news with conflict-related information, and then looking for *favela* names. This allowed the creation of a more complete picture of the public perception of the *favelas*, including secondary and tertiary mentions rather than only focusing on articles where the named *favela* was the main topic.

The most obvious limitation of this database is that it depends on only one source: the O Globo daily newspaper, which has a reputation of collaborating with the national government and, with its headquarters in Rio, may also be susceptible to influence from the state or city level. However, by 1980, O Globo played an active role in watching over the government, and seems to have maintained that position, even if it remains economically conservative. Another limitation is that, due to cost constraints, I was only able to assess the article title plus the 150 words surrounding the *favela* name.

The reason for maintaining this source despite its potentially severe limitations is that, being the only newspaper with a searchable database that covers the years of interest in this dissertation, it was the only option to capture five years of any mention of the *favelas* of interest. Additionally, to compensate for the lack of the full article, I achieved more than 97% congruence in coding trials between O Globo articles where the full text was available (current week 2005-

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102 Although I originally employed a research assistant to help with the coding, in the end I went back and checked or recoded every article personally. I do wish to give thanks to the efforts of my assistant, Juliana Cardoso.
2006) and the remnant available in their archive, which suggests that the title plus 150 words of context was sufficient to capture the essence of the reference (average of 595.5 words with standard deviation of 191.5).

The database of conflicts in the Rio de Janeiro metropolitan area is a collection of thousands of articles culled by a team of university-affiliated researchers from five different media sources, and then sorted by motive for the conflict, location of the conflict, participants in the conflict, and type of conflict action (court case, demonstration…). From their data that spans from 1990-2008, those occurring between 1995 and 2000 were selected for use in this study. This source was instrumental in picking which *favelas* had made the news for either initiating or being the cause of some type of civil or legal conflict. Happily, it includes all manner of protests and is consequently sensitive to the most common type of *favela*-level action. Coming from five different news sources is also beneficial because it casts its net wider than relying on a single source and can build a more complete profile of the conflict with collaborating or conflicting reports.

The main drawback to this source is that it has a tendency to, when summarizing the reporting on a *favela*-level conflict, leave out associated communities, focusing instead on the one or two that were directly involved and not those who may have lent support. On the other hand, this data does include supporting organizations like NGOs or religious institutions.

Special census data giving extra details of 50 *favelas* comes from the PCBR and PCEBR studies carried out for the state of Rio de Janeiro by IETS, an NGO specializing in statistical description and analysis of economic indicators and employment data. These two data sets were compiled from individual structured interviews in 50 different *favelas* with questions pertaining
to the residents’ perceptions of their home, family, and the favela around them, as well as their reports of possessions, income, education, and occupation and migration history.

The biggest benefit of this data is the large number of respondents (82,358 individuals from 21,704 households), and the roughly proportionate distribution of surveys by favela population per city zone (North, South, Central, and West). More than one-third of the 254,618 estimated population of the favelas in the study directly responded in person to this census, and represent around one-quarter of the entire favela population of Rio at the time. The biggest limitation of this data, however, is that all of the favelas in the study were selected for prefeitural, in situ upgrading projects (Favela Bairro or Favela Barrinho), which means that neither the smallest nor the largest communities are included in the data set.

This is not to suggest, however, that the programs had been implemented in all of these favelas nor that residents knew that their community was on the list for upgrade by 1996-1998, the years of the survey. Many of these same communities from the first round of the implementation of these world-renowned projects are still waiting for the promised upgrades to anything more substantial than aesthetic improvements to those areas viewable by the passing public. Unfortunately, without a follow up study, the survey remains a snapshot of personal evaluations of their community at a single point in time.

In order to make up for this limitation of previously collected data, as well as to be able to contextualize the findings from this study, I lived\textsuperscript{103} a month each in four different favelas from 2005-2007 and maintain several friendships from that time, and conducted interviews with the presidents of residents’ associations of 15 favelas in 2008. Living in the communities and

\textsuperscript{103} In two of these cases, I did not find an apartment nor a family to stay with. Nevertheless, I visited daily for a minimum of eight hours, sometimes managing to sleep on couches for days. I feel that this arrangement was better in many ways than being bound to a single family and their extended group of friends because it allowed me to cover more ground, particularly in Rocinha, which has more than 100 named mini-neighborhoods.
participating in the daily lives and landmark events was irreplaceable for gaining an understanding of the reality behind quantitative evaluations of the communities, as well as the thoughts and actions of the residents.

The interviews of the AM presidents provided information to understand what relationships exist and how the relationships function between media, politicians, NGOs and religious institutions and the *favela* residents and *favela* government. If it had not been for these qualitative interviews, enriched by my experience I would not have had the knowledge and information necessary to have developed the BAN model of political action around a *favela*. And despite the comparatively limited exposure to the 50 *favelas* that I have the most data for, I believe that I was able to create generalizable understandings that have borne out under quantitative testing.

As described in the previous two chapters, there is a high correlation between related terms in the various data sets, which gives great confidence in the construct validity of social capital as used in this research, and confirms my coding for the 164 conflicts from the conflict database, the PCBR and the PCEBR surveys, and my original content analysis of more than 2,600 articles about the communities in the study. The major benefit of using such a variety of sources, each with its particular data-collection methodology, is the ability to triangulate close to the ‘actual’ value of a variable by looking for congruence between the various sources. In the reverse of the idea of triangulation in navigation at sea, which uses the angle of sighting from the ship to three known, mapped points in order to estimate its position, this study uses a definition of each concept as the central, known point and evaluates the data from variables that are hypothetically related to each definition. When these data demonstrate the expected pattern or correlations around each conceptual definition, it suggests that the data is indeed a measure of the concept.
because it is related in the expected way to the concept as well as to the other independently-measured data points.

**Hypothesis:**

The evidence from these various sources is used below to test the following hypothesis:

BANs are responsible for the success in those favelas that gain government resources, and the lack of BANs results in failure in the residents’ search for resources. Empirically, favelas related to external institutions such as the media, religious organizations, and NGOs, along with internal associations and groups will have higher quality infrastructure, health, and education services.

This is broken down into the following empirically measurable hypotheses:

1) External actors are attracted to favelas where there is internal self-organization visible through the presence of local groups of any type, membership in the AM, and religious organizations. (measures of passive social capital)

2) External actors are attracted to favelas where there is active group participation in community events. This can be seen in participation in AM events and group production of collective resources. (measures of active social capital)

3) External actors are positively associated with the quality of infrastructure of the favela.

4) Internal organization is positively associated with the quality of infrastructure of the favela.

5) The connections between internal groups, between external groups, and between internal and external groups is not formal but is based upon temporary overlaps in their focus of attention to the similar purpose of improving the favela.

6) External actors are positively correlated with the presence of government-led development.

**Independent variables.** The independent variables in this study include both internal and external actors that influence the outcome of the favela-quality dependent variables. The external actors are made up of the following groups or institutions:

- The media variables represent the total number of articles, average words per, average articles per author, article frame (the frames are measured as the proportion of articles from all the articles about a particular favela that are about a certain topic like needy-ness, police violence, social capital… These were coded, trimming a stack of 10,000
articles to 5,000 about 50 favelas and end up with 2,600 articles about 39 favelas in the study.

- The variables regarding the involvement of religious institutions are reports that the favela had been made better by religious institutions (survey of 80,000+ residents called PCBR elsewhere), news reports that include religious institutions in the favela (but not the action)

- The presence of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) was determined from the news articles mentioned above that mention specific NGOs by name or description in the favela (again, action is not coded, but whether it is a positive or negative frame is)

- The unions and orgões de classe variables are derived from the PCBR census, calculated as the percentage of residents who reported they belonged either to a labor union or orgão de classe (work-related organization described in chapter three).

Internal actors are broken down into measures of passive social capital and active social capital. Passive social capital refers to those variables that indicate the presence or high probability of close networks that facilitate the creation of social capital such as:

- Residents’ association (associação de moradores or AM) membership is the proportion of residents who reported membership in the AM—usually requires a monthly subscription cost of R$2-5.

- Any favela organization is the proportion of residents who reported membership in any other organization within the favela (soccer team, bible study group…).

- The ‘friends’ variable indicates the proportion of residents who reported that the reason they had moved to a particular favela was because they already had friends living there.

- The ‘clients’ variable is the proportion of businesses inside the favela (barbers, stylists, repair shops, convenience stores… mostly run out of private homes and not dedicated storefronts) that report that a majority of their customers are from the favela.

Variables representing other potential actors within the communities look at social networks in action where social capital is being used (and most likely generated) through physically contributing to some group activity. These variables include:

- The proportion of residents who reported that they participated in AM organized events (not including elections).
The proportion of houses where the head of household reported that the water piping from the source was made by group work.

The proportion of residents who reported that the *favela* had improved over the time of the study because of residents’ actions.

The proportion of articles about each *favela* that contained a mention of some group-building event or collective resource production (excluding protests).

**Dependent variables.** The process of the movements’ demands on policy output of local, state, and federal politics requires variables quite different from those above. But a focus on the process outputs is often more important than one on the process itself, even more so when considering the convoluted practices of the Brazilian legislation system which is as rife with unrelated amendments and riders as that of the US. As outputs, the evidence is clear which *favelas* have benefitted from governmental development policies and which have not. Unfortunately, governmental budgets and spending reports to quantify investment per *favela* were not accessible.

The information that was available was the type of governmental programs at work in the sample of *favelas* from 1995-2000, newspaper articles rating program progress for some of these cases, and resident and news reports on the various types of infrastructure that is commonly part of government upgrade projects. This information from non-governmental sources is actually a better indicator in the end because of errors in tracking the all-too-common diversions of allocated funds, unscheduled delays, and years where budget items get no allocation. The data indicate a strong and highly significant correlation between government projects and

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104 I worked for three years trying to uncover the detailed governmental budget that would list the resources that were invested in each *favela* in this study to no avail. There appears to be a purposive effort to obscure the final destination for funding related to urban development in Rio de Janeiro, regardless the origin. Pursuing the trail, I was advised three times, once by an AM president, once by a office assistant in the SMH, and once by a lawyer friend that “if you do end up finding out, you’ll never return home to see your family.”
infrastructure quality, which supports the belief that government resources are at least partially responsible for the quality of infrastructure, health, education, and sanitation in the favelas.

Census results were all 5-point Likert-scale items transformed into proportions of residents reporting that the infrastructure items listed below were very bad, bad, regular, good, or very good. The variables for quality of the community include:

- Quality of streets
- Quality of sports facilities (soccer field, basketball court, dedicated “Olympic village”)
- Quality of recreation facilities (skate ramp, tables and benches, lighting)
- Quality of trash pickup
- Quality of crèche
- Quality of clinic
- Sewage destination (city connection, septic tank, open septic field, river, lake, or sea)
- Water sources (government created, group-installed, installed by individual, no water in home)

Similarly, the data from the O Globo dataset are all percentages of articles about the favela. The quality-related variable from this set include:

- Infrastructure rated as good
- Infrastructure rated as bad
- Environmental problems (separate for water, trash, deforestation, erosion, combination)
- Public health (mention of hospital, clinic, health team, or epidemic)
- Data Analysis

**Overarching Hypothesis.** With a reasonable expectation that government resources are at least partially responsible for the quality of infrastructure, health, education, and sanitation in the favelas, the independent variables and their effects can be evaluated. The definition of BANs, as developed in this study, leads to the following overarching hypothesis for empirical testing:

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105 This chapter relies on six different data sources (see appendix A for complete descriptions): two are from a single census of 50 favelas of Rio de Janeiro, PCBR and PCEBR, the third is a database of more than 2,600 articles from O Globo directly related to the same 50 favelas, the fourth is a database of conflicts reported in the news from 1993-2000, the fifth is a series of 15 semi-structured interviews conducted with presidents of favela residents’ associations, and the sixth is from a municipal database of favelas (IPP). It makes for awkward reading and writing in this chapter to continually report the data in the exact terms that the data sources allow (‘the relationship between a higher percentage of articles about social capital and portion of the favela population made of longer-term residents’ for example). In order to make this more readable but take nothing away from the transparency of the science behind the writing, each statistic is marked by a superscript letter indicating its origin: A = PCBR, B = PCEBR, C = O Globo Articles, D = Conflict Articles, E = Interviews, and F = IPP.
BANs are responsible for the successes of those favelas that gain government resources, and the lack of BANs results in failure of the residents’ search for resources. Empirically, favelas related to external institutions such as the media, religious organizations, and NGOs, along with internal associations and groups will have higher quality infrastructure, health, and education services. The individual relationships described in this hypothesis are examined below in terms of bivariate correlations using the computer statistics package SPSS 15.0. The results of these correlations\(^\text{106}\) are reported in parentheses as a convenient manner of providing quantitative evidence with associated claims as attempting to provide a table to capture the various relationships would be unwieldy and confusing.

I examined dependent variables and experimented with eliminating cases with radical outliers, but was dissatisfied because, in every case, the outliers existed for a reason that I felt needed to be captured if the study were to be at all generalizable. I performed factor analysis on the independent and dependent variables in order to create a more concise list of important factors, and at the same time, eliminate problems of multicollinearity while maintaining internal, construct validity. From these results, I created composite measures of active and passive social capital from the simple algebraic sum of individual variable values. Additionally, factor patterns allowed me to avoid variables with outliers in favor of those without outliers, but with a similar factor load (see Appendix A). In this way, I was able to maximize the number of valid cases while ensuring construct validity.

I performed partial correlations to try to identify potential intervening variables that were leading to extreme results; this is particularly the case for reported violence in the favelas. There is a high potential for violence by drug gangs or police to affect survey responses by reducing

\(^{106}\) These are reported in terms of Pearson’s ‘r’, accompanied by the probability ‘p’ that such a correlation could occur randomly, along with the number ‘n’ of observations valid for use in running the equation.
interviewee’s subjective valorization of their community, which would diminish the measures of quality per *favela* used in this study. Moreover there is a well-known difficulty in carrying out development projects in communities where gang presence is particularly strong, which must reduce the actual, objective quality of each affected *favela*. Yet, whereas gangs are detrimental to *favela* quality and reports of *favela* quality, strong gangs tend to be located in those *favelas* in the most populated and wealthy parts of the city—two variables hypothesized to be positively correlated with government aid (see ‘Counter Hypotheses’ below). In order to control for the effect of violence on quality, I used first-order partial correlations in the affected hypotheses below. These are clearly indicated with a superscript ‘1’ after each statistic (ex. $r^1$, $p^1$, $n^1$).

**Hypothesis 1 (H1)** states that external actors are attracted to *favelas* where there is **internal self-organization visible through the presence of local groups of any type.** Support for H1, or rejecting the null hypothesis, requires highly significant correlations between measures of passive social capital$^{A,B,C}$ listed above and indicators for religious organizations$^{A,C}$, the media$^C$, and NGOs$^{C,F}$ associated with each *favela*. Levels of passive social capital can be approximated from the data in this study including membership in the AM$^A$, membership in any other group within the *favela*$^A$, the proportion of residents who moved to the *favela* to be with friends$^A$, the proportion of businesses whose clients are mostly from the *favela*$^B$, an index of length of residence$^A$, and the visibility of group cohesion in the news$^C$. These are considered to be indicators of passive social capital because they don’t reveal any group action, simply the presence of visible groupings, excepting drug gangs, or the probability of grouping because of reported friendship groups or longer residence that provides the context for the repeated interactions that can create social capital. Variables representing external groups are residents’ reports and news articles indicating the presence of religious institutions and NGOs, repeated
connections with the media measured by number of articles and average length of the articles, as well as outside businesses or ‘other’ groups having improved the *favela*.

The data shows that the hypothesized relationships between group organization and external groups do exist as expected. The presence of NGOs\textsuperscript{C} is highly positively correlated to scale of passive social capital\textsuperscript{107} (r = .635, p = .066, n = 9), as are news reports of social capital\textsuperscript{C} (r = .398, p = .013, n = 38). The correlation between these two sources from the O Globo database is noteworthy in that there is little overlap (3.07\%) between articles that include both social capital and NGOs. In other words, the communities were evaluated in different articles as having newsworthy instances of social capital in some, and NGOs in others.

Further confirmation of H1 is that religious institutions\textsuperscript{C} are also associated with measures of passive social capital. A similar scale\textsuperscript{108} of passive social capital is positively related to the presence of religious institutions (r = .688, p = .131, n = 4). The media, too, is associated with measures of passive social capital. Controlling for violence in first-order partial correlations, the two scales\textsuperscript{109} mentioned in this section are strongly correlated with higher numbers of articles about the *favelas* (r = .877, p = .022, n = 4 & r = .854, p = .030, n = 4) as are the individual component parts of each scale. Finally, 5-1 shows how unions and *orgões de classe* are related to passive social capital.

**Hypothesis 2 (H2) states that external actors are attracted to favelas where there is active group participation in community events that can be seen in participation in AM events and group production of collective resources.** External organizations are even more strongly associated with measures of active social capital than passive. NGOs\textsuperscript{C} have strong,\textsuperscript{107}

\textsuperscript{107} AM membership\textsuperscript{A} + other *favela* org membership\textsuperscript{A} + moved b/c friends\textsuperscript{A}

\textsuperscript{108} AM membership\textsuperscript{A} + other *favela* org membership\textsuperscript{A} + moved b/c friends\textsuperscript{A} + clients\textsuperscript{B} + social capital articles\textsuperscript{C};

\textsuperscript{109} 1) AM membership\textsuperscript{A} + other *favela* org membership\textsuperscript{A} + moved b/c friends\textsuperscript{A} + clients\textsuperscript{B} + social capital articles\textsuperscript{C}; 2) AM membership + other *favela* org membership + moved b/c friends
positive relationships with three indices\textsuperscript{110} of group action in the favelas ($r = 1.721, 2.723, 3.635$, $p = .019, .018, .066, n = 10, 10, 9$). At the same time, one of these indices\textsuperscript{111} is also highly correlated with the number ($r = .662, p = .037, n = 10$), average length ($r = .628, p = .052, n = 10$)\textsuperscript{112}, and positive frame ($r = .316, p = .050, n = 39$) of O Globo\textsuperscript{C} articles during the time of this study. And, removing the suppressing effect of violence through a first-order partial correlation, political action in protests and legal cases is shown to be strongly related to articles per author\textsuperscript{C} about a particular favela ($r = .905, p = .013, n = 4$ & $r = .963, p = .002, n = 4$). Also, removing the effect of violence reveals the strong association between participation in the AM\textsuperscript{A} and the length of articles. Finally, considering another category of possible external actors in a BAN, unions and orgões de classe are highly correlated with participation in the AM and with reports that the favela improved because of the residents (see Table 5-2).

**Hypothesis 3 (H3) states that external actors are positively associated with the quality of infrastructure of the favela.** The link between NGOs and favelas may exist for the simple reason that NGOs budgets are paid by the government and international aid, so they go to the poor communities in order to attract money that is then turned into salaries for the NGO employees, and potentially not much else. Interviews with numerous individuals in the larger favelas in Rio confirm that this type of exploitation of misery is not unusual. They even have a name for the large NGOs (organização não-governamental, ONG) that are known to receive lots of input but produce little to no output—“King kONGs (king-ee kong-ees).” At the same time, there are many small NGOs that do meaningful work in the favelas and mid-sized NGOs that

\textsuperscript{110} 1) AM participation\textsuperscript{A}, better b/c residents\textsuperscript{A}, water by group\textsuperscript{A}, and protests\textsuperscript{C}, 2) AM participation, better b/c residents, water by group, and 3) AM participation, better b/c residents, protests

\textsuperscript{111} AM participation, better b/c residents, water by group

\textsuperscript{112} There is no significant correlation ($r = .064, p = .698, n = 39$) between number of articles and average length of the articles, which strengthens the argument that it is the intervening variable of active social capital that is responsible for the high correlation above.
specialize in demand making on the favelas behalf. One example is Justícia Global, which is a grassroots police watchdog organization in Rio that bears witness and files actions on behalf of the favelas they are involved with. But with over 800 favelas in the city of Rio de Janeiro, it is impossible for this, or any other organization, to work with them all.

Fulano de Tal\textsuperscript{113}, the president of a South Zone AM, admits that both international and local NGOs have helped improve the quality of life there, however he complained that they are more interested in publicity and news coverage than actually helping. The NGOs apparently control the contact with the media\textsuperscript{114}, even preventing reporters from talking with residents and community leaders so that the NGO does not get associated with just one community. As the methodology for gathering these O Globo articles was to search by community name, the NGOs included in this study are not of that type to any large extent.

Linking NGOs (domestic\textsuperscript{C} and international\textsuperscript{C}) to measures of infrastructure and service quality\textsuperscript{A} in the favelas demonstrates the highly significant contribution they make to the communities in providing, securing, or helping to secure infrastructural resources (see Table 5-3). A reading of the articles that include international NGOs reveals that they include the Inter-American Development Bank (Banco Inter-Americano do Desenvolvimento, BID) that co-financed the largest in situ favela urbanization project in Rio de Janeiro, Favela-Bairro, that had been implemented to some degree or another in 155 favelas by 2000. Other international NGOs made the news during the time of this study for opening art schools in poor communities, providing language classes, contributing to Escolas de Samba, and even coordinating the visit of Prime Minister Tony Blair of England.

\textsuperscript{113} As promised in the pre-interview IRB consent form, names have been changed and locations are not exact to prevent identification of sources.

\textsuperscript{114} When controlling for violence in a first-order partial correlation,
In addition to NGOs, Unions, or *sindicatos*, and *orgões de classe* are predicted to be positively associated with *favelas* with stronger or more plentiful groups. These organizations were discussed in the third chapter of this dissertation as an individual-level source of social capital. As spaces for civil society interaction and debate, leadership opportunities, and links to other external organizations, they should also be considered here. Data analysis reveals that *favelas* with higher percentages of members of these groups also have better infrastructure and services associated with governmental resources. *Orgões de classe* is positively correlated with the index of all infrastructural resources and services ($r = .483, p = .042, n = 18$) and, in partial correlations controlling for violence, with better water ($r = .545, p = .054, r = 11$), sewage connection ($r = .420, p = .153, n = 11$), streets ($r = .059, p = .076, n = 11$), and trash pickup ($r = .593, p = .033, n = 11$).

Unions, on the other hand, do not share the association with quality infrastructure, and are actually related to some negative indicators. The explanation for this is likely the strong correlation between union membership and the poorly developed West Zone ($r = .296, p = .035, n = 51$), which is where the majority of industry is located. Additionally, unions are large sector-level organizations that don’t require much in the way of participation, so they are not expected to be as interested or effective in *favela*-level affairs. Conversely, membership in the smaller and more local *orgões de classe* is unrelated to location and is more likely to be based on participation instead of simply paying dues.

Religious institutions make up another important potential set of external actors. The previous chapter examined the role of Catholic base communities (CEBs) in fostering the capacity for *favela* residents to work together, and additionally carrying their voice to the

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115 At some point, a discussion should be taken up as to how authentic Liberation Theology represents the people’s voice. From a rational choice frame, because it is a “preferential option for the poor,” it certainly makes sense that
government through the developed institution of the Church and its longstanding involvement with the government\textsuperscript{116}. This is one example of an external link that can bring about real change, not only in the government, but also in the social discourse. However, as Catholicism has given way to Evangelicals whose focus is more heavenward than to present conditions on Earth, the Church’s power has diminished as a movement leader.

That religious institutions have taken a step back from politics does not affect their position as a social actor in a BAN for any given \textit{favela}. The historic relationship between churches and the \textit{favelas}, coupled with the religiosity of the Brazilian culture, has created a generalized trust around them. Additionally, the evangelical services that popularize their religion through music and socializing create space for civil discourse within a bonding context. The role of the churches in the \textit{favela} movement is to foster the creation, strengthening and maintenance of social capital. The leadership of the church can also be a link outside of the \textit{favela}, providing the resource of contacts and, potentially, influence.

The data about religious institutions is contradictory in terms of effect on quality of \textit{favela} infrastructure in a way that suggests the two measures are not capturing the same phenomenon. Controlling for violence in first-order partial correlations, the proportion of articles referring to religious institutions in the \textit{favelas} is associated with positive attributes such as an index of infrastructure ($r = .464$, $p = .110$, $n = 11$) and better clinics ($r = .494$, $p = .086$, $n = 11$). Conversely, the proportion of residents reporting that the \textit{favela} improved because of religious institutions is significantly negatively associated with almost every measure of \textit{favela} infrastructure that is what the poor would support. At the same time, for millennia around the globe, religions have been successful at keeping the poor quiescent to the will of the rich drawing Marx to call religion the “opiate of the masses.” I mention this here only to indicate that, in the discussion about the authenticity of the voice of the people, neither Liberation Theology nor Evangelical’s message has been questioned in the public arena.

\textsuperscript{116} Although the Church supported the military regime at the start, a decade of violent repression, particularly against the poor, drove it to take up the cause of defending them in the early 1970s.
infrastructure from sewage (r = -.593, p = .033, n = 11), streets (r = -.634, p = .020, n = 11),
sports (r = -.641, p = .018, n = 11), and recreation (r = -.542, p = .056, n = 11) to crèches (r = -.581, p = .037, n = 11) and clinics (r = -.557, p = .048, n = 11). The two measures of religious
institutions themselves have no significant relationship (r = -.078, p = .782, n = 15), which points
to the presence of institutions being unrelated to having improved the favela.

Although it is not possible to return to the census respondents to clarify this difference, the
likely explanation for saying that the reason for community improvement was because of
‗religious motives' (motivo pelo condições melhores na comunidade é religioso) is that this
declaration is a personal statement rather than one that applies to the condition of the community.
That is, as mentioned above, religion has the power to change people’s perception, and social
and spiritual opportunities to the point that they feel more individually satisfied. In the context
of appearing in newspaper articles, however, the institution represents either an actor or scene of
the story. In the second case, merely appearing in the paper indicates institutional participation
in social or political action. In the first case, however, turning eyes upward and focusing on the
next life is a protective reaction that acts as a substitute for political demand making.

With their own motives, both print and broadcast media have great potential for
influencing the flow of public goods, and are examined here as a final external actor. The media,
as captured by the O Globo database, has a strong tendency to frame favelas in a negative light.
More words are written about favelas where the trash pickup is ‘bad’ (r = .438, p = .103, n = 15)
or ‘very bad’ (r = .506, p = .055, n = 15), and where residents mention infrastructure as the main
problem in the community (r = .054, p = .056, n = 15). More articles overall are written about
favelas where violence is the major concern (r = .491, p = .063, n = 15) and where residents cite
violence as the major cause for conditions getting worse (r = .857, p = .000, n = 15). Article
topics focus on police violence (r = .469, p = .003, n = 39) and traficantes (r = .328, p = .041, n = 39), whereas communities that receive positive coverage in the press even once receive less coverage overall (r = -.268, p = .099, n = 39). That the media accentuates the negative in favelas runs counter to the expectations of H3 above. However, these findings have two explanations, both of which fit into the model of BANs.

First, the actors in the binding networks are known to have their own motivations for associating with the cause of the favelas. The only requirement under this model is that their participation be purposeful in furthering the movement, but clearly this has to be accomplished alongside their other competing interests. The tendency to exaggerate the violent aspect of the favelas is consistent with the commercial interests of O Globo in that this particular frame is very popular with the O Globo readership and it would seem overly liberal to present favelas in positive frame or as deserving of attention. Additionally, reading about cops and robbers is evocative and entertaining, much more so than reporting that a group worked over weekends to dig and install a sewage system. In this way, the media becomes its own victim, it can’t sell another version of favela stories and so it is stuck with the pattern of drugs and violence.

Also, and this is not to deny the real danger that can exist for strangers asking questions in favelas, reporters are nervous to enter and end up getting most of their information from the police (Arias, 2004), so they don’t know the other side of the story—the side that reflects 99% of the daily life in the community¹¹⁷. The corollary is that, because of this fear, the media doesn’t develop relationships with the AMs or small, local NGOs who could use the public voice to speak to the government. This is one of the reasons that so much of the political action of favela residents must take place on the streets outside of the community. It is the only place where they

¹¹⁷ In a 1984 study, more than 13% of favela residents reported that police were discriminatory while only 3.65% of people outside of favelas felt the same way (Pedrosa et al., 1990, p. 27). In 2004, 52% of the favela residents interviewed reported similar feelings of discrimination by the police (Perlman, 2004, p. 32).
will be noticed and have their story heard. Across the interviews with AM presidents in this study, they were consistent about the difficulty of ‘going through channels’ and waiting in the lobbies of the public ministries, secretariats, and politicians.

The media, then, appears to be hindering the secondary goal of the favela movement, that of changing the societal discourse around favelas and their residents. But that doesn’t mean that, in their own way, the press isn’t purposefully helping create a vertical connection between the favela and the government in their bid for resources. One indication that reporters may be using the power of the press to amplify the voice of favela residents is demonstrated in the data for H2, that reporters tend to develop relationships, measured in number of articles per author by favela, with favelas that have high levels active groups. Also, articles demonstrating the community’s need are longer, on the average, than about any other subject (r = .559, p = .059, n = 10). Table 5-4 illustrates, consistent with H3, the favelas that have built a relationship with an author tend to have better infrastructure and services. Moreover, when removing the suppressing effect of violence from the correlations, more and longer articles portray the poor conditions of favelas that can be seen as a constant pressure on the government to address their unmet needs.

**Hypothesis 4 (H4) states that internal organization is positively associated with the quality of infrastructure of the favela.** Similar to H4 above, measures of active social capital were analyzed to determine their correlation with favela quality. Counter-intuitively, active social capital was not found to be related to higher quality infrastructure and services in the favelas—if anything, they are related to poorer quality. Measures of passive or potential social capital, in contrast, are significantly and strongly associated with improved communities as demonstrated in Table 5-5. An element of passive social capital is the proportion of favela commerce with a majority of clients from the favela. Higher proportions of local clients per
business suggests either 1) an isolated *favela* with few options for purchasing goods and services in the surrounding areas, 2) a very large *favela* like Complexo Alemão or Maré where walking to the *morro/asfalto* border can take as much as an hour, or 3) a *favela* with well-developed commerce such as Rocinha or Nova Holanda. The causal mechanism to explain the importance of the clients residing in the *favela* is that there are more opportunities for interaction as the residents are not exiting the *favela* as much as in other communities. Increased interaction leads to stronger social ties and the development of commonalities around which they might unite and act.

Front porch markets to storefronts in the *favelas* tend to charge a premium for the convenience, and most individuals would prefer to shop in larger discount stores. However, shopping outside of the community requires the investment of time, round-trip bus transportation, and moto-taxi transport on the return if loaded with purchases. Furthermore, one of the limitations of poverty in the informal economy is that food must often be purchased daily, or only as often as money comes in, which makes such forays outside of the *favela* impractical, and the savings of buying in bulk unattainable. In any case, apart from the possibility of good commercial development, the other two possibilities point to poor *favelas* that would not commonly be thought of as being developed. It is fitting that ‘local clients,’ as a measure of potential social capital, would have the weakest correlations of the three reported in Table 5-5.

The unexpected negative correlation between active social capital and resources actually fits the BAN model well as it turns out that the worse the conditions in the *favela*, the more likely there is to be social capital in action. This makes sense in that the BAN model’s purpose is to explain *how* the differentiation in resources occurs, and suggests that *favela* groups, and links between *favela* groups and external actors facilitate demand making on the government. Without
the motivation derived from discontent with *favela* conditions, the groups do not become active, and are therefore invisible to researchers using external sources. The opposite relationships of passive or potential social capital being associated with more resources, and active social capital being associated with fewer is evidence that government is moved to invest in *favelas* with strong (albeit passive) social capital. However, *favelas* only develop active social capital when these needs aren’t well met.

Hereby, H4 becomes the most important in terms of looking for democracy at the grassroots. How internal organization turns into claim making on the government is a picture of political participation where official avenues are closed or unreachable. Focusing exclusively on the links to external support organizations diminishes the amount of agency that the *favela* residents regularly display, particularly in terms of protests and legal action in the courts. External links are essential, but it is important to remember that the demands are first articulated by the aggrieved, not by others on their behalf in a paternalistic manner. A history of *favela* protests[^1] (*manifestações*) is associated (r = .229, p = .160, n = 39) with unhealthy living conditions[^2], supporting Gurr’s notion (1970) of relative deprivation driving contentious action. Protests are also linked to an index[^3] of active social capital (r = .571, p = .085, n = 10) (see Table 5-6).

Another indication of residents’ political action is their tendency to take cases to court. While this was captured to some extent in the conflicts database[^4], it can be tied directly to the communities through the database of O Globo articles[^5]. These articles include suits for regularized title to occupied land (*usucapião*), wrongful death suits against the police, and requests for resources based on comparative inequality. The correlations here are consistent with

[^1]: Percent of residents who participate in AM events + percentage of residents with water connections made by group self-help work + percentage of residents who reported that the community improved because of other residents
these motives, with a justifiable complaint about access to water \((r = -0.284, p = 0.086, n = 39)\) and trash collection \((r = -0.722, p = 0.003, n = 15)\) (see Table 5-6).

Sports and recreation, a big problem in these tightly packed communities, are often developed through government construction of basketball/soccer courts and skate ramps as well as through large, off-site recreation centers known as *Vilas Olímpicas*. In some communities, the city pays for youth sports training. On site sports projects tend to be cheap tokens to give to a floundering community. Nevertheless, the sports \((r = -0.451, p = 0.089, n = 15)\) and recreation \((r = -0.453, p = 0.093, n = 15)\) facilities reported by the residents in communities with articles about legal cases by residents tend to be poor.

But because legal cases from *favelas* concern three main reasons, abusive police, lack of infrastructure, or land title, and *favelas* with both shorter- and longer-term residents suffer equally from these problems, a natural hypothesis is that these two variables would not correlate significantly. Contrary to intuition, legal cases are positively related to higher percentages of newer residents (under 10 years) \((r = -0.349, p = 0.043, n = 34)\). There is a two-part explanation for this phenomenon that starts with the AM being the primary source of origination of legal cases, and ends with the reluctance of longer-term residents to interact with it, as mentioned above.

**Hypothesis 5 (H5) states that the connections between internal groups, between external groups, and between internal and external groups is not formal but is based upon temporary overlaps in their focus of attention to the similar purpose of improving the favela.** Looking first at NGOs and AMs, first-order partial correlations controlling for the presence of NGOs helped to clarify the picture of where they fit in to community organization. The results of relating the social capital measures to measures of *favela* quality reveal that
without NGOs there is less organization$^{119}$ around the problem of sewage ($r = .393$, $r_{1st} = .395$; $p = .004$, $p_{1st} = .381$; $n = 51$, $n_{1st} = 5$) and recreation ($r = .574$, $r_{1st} = .727$; $p = .013$, $p_{1st} = .064$; $n = 18$, $n_{1st} = 5$). In other words, NGOs have an augmentative effect on the organization in favelas that have problems with sewage and recreation. However, because the data on infrastructure is not longitudinal, it is not possible to know what the results of this organizing effect are. On the other hand, the links between both active and passive social capital and the quality of life in the favela have already been demonstrated, so it is fair to suggest that the organizing effect of the NGOs on favelas will eventually produce positive outcomes.

The presence of NGOs has a suppressing effect on the association between AM membership and trash collection, at least where the collection is good. That is, there is a higher correlation between trash collection rated ‘good’ and AM membership ($r = .508$, $r_{1st} = .846$; $p = .031$, $p_{1st} = .016$; $n = 18$, $n_{1st} = 5$) and participation ($r = .407$, $r_{1st} = .795$; $p = .094$, $p_{1st} = .032$; $n = 18$, $n_{1st} = 5$), as well as with participation in other favela organizations ($r = .490$, $r_{1st} = .832$; $p = .039$, $p_{1st} = .020$; $n = 18$, $n_{1st} = 5$) when controlling for the presence of NGOs. In this case, NGOs reduce both the size of the correlation as well as the probability that the relationship between the variables is not by chance. Trash collection, however, is a special case among the government services to favelas as COMLURB has been proactive in trying to prevent urban pollution from the favelas since 1989 when they implemented and funded the gari communitário program.

For most (66%) of the AM presidents interviewed for this study, the monthly stipend for the local garis is the only money they receive, and for 100% of them, it is the only state money they receive. The result has been symbiotic in that the program solves the access problem that was plaguing COMLURB, improved the health of the favelas and the surrounding neighborhoods, and strengthened the AMs by giving them authority, albeit limited, in the

$^{119}$ AM membership, AM participation, any other bairro association.
community and a *raison d’être*. As such, NGOs are not necessary and apparently don’t interfere where there is no need. The suppressing effect of NGOs in this case is due to NGOs associating with *favelas* where the trash collection isn’t good. That suggests that NGOs play an important part in *favela* BANs, working and drawing resources to where there is necessity rather than wherever is easiest.

The same can be said for *favelas* in which the water delivery is clean and constant: there is a suppressing effect of NGOs on the correlation of AMs that have already been successful with this resource. A second-order partial correlation with AMs, controlling for both NGOs and age of the *favela* shows that age also affects the delivery of water ($r = -0.097$, $r^2 = 0.860$; $p = 0.498$, $p^2 = 0.028$; $n = 18$, $n^2 = 4$). In other words, AMs have a strong positive correlation on their own that becomes obscured when considering the age and presence of NGOs in the *favelas*.

Moving on to other actors, of the four categories of external organizations analyzed in this study, unions and *orgões de classe* is the only one that does not have any direct connection to the *favela*. Whereas NGOs enter the *favelas* to implement projects or create headquarters and community centers, religious organizations either convert homes or build places of worship, and the media reports what happens inside of *favelas*, the two work-related organizations require residents to leave the *favela* to interact with them. The unions of *favela* workers that were created in the 1920s and 1930s were effectively dismantled by the military regime and have not been reincarnated. Similarly, the organizations of *favelas* discussed in the previous chapter, are poorly attended and anyway only involve the community leaders. The major role for these organizations in the BANs is to provide leadership training and space for civil debate and exchange of information. Nevertheless, *favelas* with larger percentages of union or *orgão de classe* members do have correlations to NGOs, the media, and religious institutions.
The NGO Viva Rio, although considered by many to be a South Zone organization, has a positive correlation with orgãos de classe even controlling for zone \((r = .307, p = .057, n = 39)\). On the other hand, union membership has a negative correlation with NGOs in general, again controlling for zone \((r = -.269, p = .098, n = 39)\). Union membership has a potentially important link with total articles per favela \((r = .296, p = .068, n = 39)\). The connection is not likely direct as in unions contacting the press on the behalf of the favela, but rather union members acting as a bridge to facilitate the adoption of a technique from the professional demand makers into their community’s repertoire. Unions are also linked to religious institutions, the correlation suffering no significant effect with zone \((r = .246, p = .131, n = 39)\), which again has no logical, causal connection. This type of association, however, fits the BAN model and speaks to H5. External organizations need not interact with the other external organizations on behalf of the favela, the expectation is only that the more external support the favela has, the more likely it is to be successful in getting its demands met by the government. Confirmatory evidence of this, following the other hypotheses, is that if external organizations are all attracted to favelas with high levels of internal organization, then these organizations should also be associated at the favela level.

Religious institutions were found to have a significant impact on community visibility in the media. Analysis revealed a strong correlation between favela residents reporting that their community was improved by religious organizations and the number of articles produced about that community \((r = .617, p = .014, n = 15)\) suggesting a potential network connection between the church or church groups and catching the attention of the press. It appears that the variable representing favela improvement by religious organizations suppresses the relationship between protests and articles about religion. In a partial correlation controlling for “better
because of religion, a strong relationship appears \((r^{1st} = .821, p^{1st} = .000, n^{1st} = 12)\) that did not exist in the multiple regression \((r = .177, p = .231, n = 39)\).

The lack of correlation \((r = .140, p = .396, n = 39)\) between the total number of articles and the number of articles linking religion and *favelas* indicates that the former relationship is not a side product of reporting on a church in the *favela* and picking up on another story. Still controlling for religion, communities with more articles about religion are associated with environmental problems \((r = .711, p = .004, n = 12)\), threats of removal \((r = .759, p = .002, n = 12)\), legal cases \((r = .495, p = .072, n = 12)\). This fits H5, that churches play a part in getting *favela* residents’ collective voice out, not directly in this case, but by creating the civil space for bonding, organizing, and reaching out.

Thinking of a BAN as a series of branches or links between other networks, the high correlation \((r = .693, p = .038, n = 9)\) between religious organizations and the index of passive social capital described above suggests that the complete mechanism starts with the residents, passes through the AM and local churches to the press. To complete the process, the press would have to attract governmental attention, which is the topic of the next section.

**Hypothesis 6 (H6) states that external actors will be positively correlated with the presence of government-led development.** As mentioned above, transparent budgeting and allocation data was not available to confirm H5. The O Globo database does contain many articles that mention the largest contemporary projects in the *favelas*. During the time of this study, the government had recently implemented *Favela Bairro*, *Favela Bairrinho*, and Grande *Favela in situ* upgrading programs. The result was that the smaller projects and unassociated government expenditures were eclipsed and did not receive media coverage except when residents protested against the government for stalling implementation or completion of a
promised project. The proxy for government development, as described in H3, is the quality of infrastructure-level resources and services such as roads, sewage, water, clinics, and crèches. This is an imperfect proxy as these resources and services may have been produced locally or with the support of an NGO, without benefitting from the government. Interviews with AM presidents, however, confirms that the major development projects were performed by the government or under government grant to a private construction company.

Still, the findings presented in the discussion of H3 can be improved using the gross measures available. Because of the newspaper priority on reporting violence, a partial correlation removing its effect reversed what was a negative correlation and revealed that favelas with more press coverage overall are likely to have some government program \( r^{1st} = .451, p^{1st} = .122, n^{1st} = 11 \). And controlling for the number of articles on the three major favela-upgrade programs, where there are more articles per author, there is likely to be a government project (indicated by a zero-one dummy variable) \( r^{1st} = .272, p^{1st} = .098, n^{1st} = 36 \), as there are when controlling for active social capital\(^{120} \) \( r^{1st} = .611, p^{1st} = .081, n^{1st} = 7 \).

Likewise, when removing the effect of this same active social capital index, the presence of religious institutions is strongly tied to the Favela Bairrinho program \( r = .931, p = .000, n = 7 \). The strong correlation between active social capital and government programs hides or suppresses the relationship between religious institutions and the Bairrinho program. Not unexpectedly, there is not a very strong relationship between unions or orgões de classe and governmental resources as these organizations have no real role in the favelas. All the same, unions have a weak positive association with the favela Bairrinho program \( r = .255, p = .117, n = 39 \).

\(^{120}\) AM participation, better b/c residents, water by group
Competing Hypotheses

This section considers alternative explanations for differentiated success among favelas in securing government resources. The alternatives are more traditional in terms of literature about favelas and about relations between the government and the poor—they do not acknowledge the agency of the favela residents, and they do not consider the possibility of democratic participation from the poor. Nevertheless, they have face validity and should be evaluated instead of simply relying on the null hypothesis, that BANs do not determine which favelas receive resources, as the rather vague competition to the proposal presented here.

Clientelism. The 1982 release of Voting and the Political Machine: Patronage and Clientelism in Rio de Janeiro (Diniz) presented a detailed picture of how prevalent the anti-democratic practice was, how it worked, and why it existed so openly. While the military regime has been transformed into a nominal democracy, evidence of political perfidy is presented daily in the news. The question is not whether clientelism exists in the favelas, but rather if clientelism is responsible for the government resource flow that has improved some favelas and left others in the cold. At the same time, Robert Gay’s (1990b, 1990a, 1999) excellent study contrasts two of Rio’s favelas whose political practices point to a growing awareness among favela residents that the benefits of clientelism are not particularly grand, and that remaining in the grasp of patronage politics is actually betraying their future. That is to say that it is not a foregone conclusion that clientelism holds sway in all or even most of the favelas of Rio.

Some evidence that points to patronage politics from the data in this study is found in the difference between the Favela Bairro and Favela Bairrinho programs. Bairrinho, similar to Favela Bairro, was designed to upgrade and urbanize smaller and less populous favelas with

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121 Marketing Democracy (Paley, 2001) is another interesting study with the same general findings of post-dictatorship dichotomies among the poor who are separated by their dedication to meaningful democracy or still caught in clientelistic webs.
basically all of the same architectural and infrastructural improvements. Interestingly, while residents in communities that were upgraded by Favela Bairro by 1998 reported that the government had improved their community, those in Favela Bairrinho communities reported that they had improved due to ‘other’ \( r = .624, n = 013, p = 15 \), not the government, not residents, and not religious organizations. There are many public complaints regarding the top-down style of implementation in the larger Bairro program even though the design called for including residents in the planning and construction phase in each favela. These same complaints are not as typical for the smaller program, perhaps because it was easier to include and employ a representative sample of residents in the smaller community for the group opinion to be satisfied.

On the other hand, the Bairrinho project has a significant association to the articles mentioning clientelistic practices in the favelas \( r = .700, p = .000, n = 39 \). This supports the speculation that the Bairrinho program was begun in communities with an understanding that they were the beneficiaries of a single politician’s good will. Further support of the possibility of clientelism affecting favela residents’ perception is the 36.4% of the AM presidents (100% response rate) reported that their community had received resources from the government in exchange for votes \( E \) during the period of this study. The actual percentage is likely higher than reported as the same respondents indicated that between 50% and 100% (average 85%, 75% response rate) of the neighboring favelas were involved in the practice. Furthermore, when interviews with these respondents continued outside of the office, or had to be broken into different parts over some days, the response often changed from denying to admitting that vote buying occurs in their community.

Clientelism tends to create particularistic rather than general benefits as the patrons, although they like to be seen in favelas around election time, prefer to deal with a broker who
usually includes his own fee on top of what he must promise the community. Clientelistic relationships could be counted as a logical aspect of BANs as the vote buying requires a certain amount of solidarity on the part of the residents\textsuperscript{122}. For the purposes of this study, which describes democratic participation from the grassroots, clientelism must be considered as a non-democratic subset of external connections.

**Age and Size and Location as Determinants.** The ages of the *favelas* in this study were determined by either their official history maintained by the AM that reports the year of occupation\textsuperscript{E,F}, or by an official entry in the municipal registry that was opened in 1981\textsuperscript{F}, or the first year of legalization of tenure of at least one parcel in the *favela*\textsuperscript{F}. In most cases in this study, all three dates were obtained. The age of the *favela* as measured from the date of founding\textsuperscript{F} definitely plays a role in the types of problems that the *favelas* confront. For example, the older *favelas* are inversely related to reports of infrastructure problems\textsuperscript{C} ($r = -.330$, $p = .046$, $n = 37$), that is to say that the older the *favela*, the fewer problems it has with infrastructure. This relationship between age and quality of infrastructure may be explained by the lack of governmental projects\textsuperscript{C} in the younger *favelas*\textsuperscript{F} ($r = .291$, $p = .085$, $n = 36$). Newer *favelas* also have to worry more about being targets for removal\textsuperscript{E,F} ($r = -.437$, $p = .007$, $n = 37$), and the perception in the news trends away from positive framing\textsuperscript{C} ($r = .429$, $p = .009$, $n = 36$), which suggests they should receive less sympathy from society at large.

Controlling for *favela* age alone, reveals the suppressing effect of the year of occupation on the relationship between AMs and the quality of trash pickup ($r = .508$, $r^{1st} = .894$; $p = .031$, $p^{1st} = .007$; $n = 18$, $n^{1st} = 5$). Removing AMs, on the other hand, shows that older *favelas* tend to have worse trash pickup ($r^{1st} = -.817$, $p^{1st} = .025$, $n^{1st} = 5$), worse sewage ($r^{1st} = -.792$, $p^{1st} = .034$, $n^{1st} = 5$). Interview participants explained\textsuperscript{F} that between a 33-50% block of votes had to be arranged as the going rate for these brokered exchanges.
5), and worse streets \( (r^{1st} = -0.698, p^{1st} = 0.081, n^{1st} = 5) \). Favelas with more AM membership, then, are a mitigating factor in the quality of group-level infrastructure, and therefore an important element of the BAN.

In terms of size, there is a direct relationship between the area occupied by the favela\(^F\) and the population\(^A\) \( (r = 0.639, p = 0.000, n = 49)\), which is only surprising in the face of the vertical growth and increasing population density in the older and more urban favelas. The large population creates a profitable market base for drug gangs, and the large area makes hiding from police raids easier, consequently police violence\(^C\) is higher \( (r = 0.39, p = 0.016, n = 38) \), and is confirmed by the residents\(^A\) \( (r = 0.874, p = 0.000, n = 17) \). As sex and violence make for good entertainment, which is enough of a reason that the more violent favelas get more coverage. Larger favelas are not only more violent, they are also more likely to be visible from the street and known by name. This familiarity to the media’s audience is another reason that there are more articles written about the more populous favelas \( (r = 0.90, p = 0.000, n = 38) \).

The chapter on the history of favelas described the growth pattern of the communities as moving from the center of the city and port area to the South Zone and then populating the North Zone as jobs drew workers in that direction. The favela removals in the 1960s and 1970s started the move into the West Zone and eradicated most of the South Zone and some of the central favelas. There is currently a patchwork of founding dates across the map of Rio, so the statistical relationship between the year of founding of the community and geographic zone are not significant.

\(^1\) The relationships of all of the following correlations provided parenthetically are reported consistently with age, population, size, and percent all having the same directionality. I have tried to use a more natural language to describe the relationships such as reporting that newer favelas tend to be smaller, which is an inverse relationship between size and age and the r-value is presented as a negative number.
The main geographic pattern of favela quality shows that South Zone and city-center communities don’t have as many infrastructure problems as those in the North and West \( (r = -0.422, p = 0.007, n = 39) \). This geographic measure of inequality is particularly vivid in light of the relative freedom these two ‘fashionable’ areas have from raw sewage in the aquifer \( (r = -0.391, p = 0.005, n = 51) \).

**Long-Term versus Short-Term Residents.** The time of residence in a community is important for many reasons, and the collection of the benefits and drawbacks due to the distribution of individuals’ time in residence help shape the character of the community. The percentage of residents who have lived in the same favela for 1 to 3, 3 to 5, 5 to 10, and more than 10 years is directly linked to its age and population \( (r = 0.275, p = 0.064, n = 46) \). Probably due to this, the more residents in a community with long periods of residence live with less fear of removal \( (r = -0.381, p = 0.026, n = 34) \), better water delivery \( (r = 0.279, p = 0.060, n = 46) \), and better conditions overall \( (r = -0.347, p = 0.021, n = 34) \). The common sense explanation, that older favelas have had more opportunity to be developed bears out under statistical investigation.

Newer favelas tend to have shorter term residents \( (r = -0.394, p = 0.007, r = 46) \) whereas the longer term residents (10 years or more) can just as distinctly be found in the older ones \( (r = 0.384, p = 0.008, r = 46) \). This becomes important when social capital is introduced to this explanation as the natural expectation is that in communities with longer-term residents would have more social capital built through the repeated interactions of daily life \( (r = 0.264, p = 0.076, n = 46) \), more time to be picked up by the news and turned into a household name (total articles: \( r = 0.306, p = 0.078, n = 34 \)), and more chances for institutionalized external relationships. Of course, there are some confounding circumstances such as the larger population, area, and
violence\textsuperscript{A,C} associated with longer-term residents, as well as clientelism\textsuperscript{C} associated with governmental projects\textsuperscript{C} \((r = .745, p = .000, n = 39)\). These variables should detract from social capital.

All the same, the larger the percentage of long-term residents\textsuperscript{A} in a\textit{favela}, the higher the correlation with measures of social capital\textsuperscript{A,C}, which makes sense given the discussion on how social capital is formed in the preceding chapter. More iterated interactions between individuals means greater predictability of future interactional outcomes at the very least. It also allows time for individuals with similar interests to find each other and create friendships or familiarities. Turning to the individual-level data, there is a strong, positive relationship between the amount of time an individual resides in a\textit{favela}\textsuperscript{A} and belonging to some community organization\textsuperscript{A} other than the AM \((r = .363, p = .000, n = 13131)\). No significant correlation was found between AM membership and length of residence in the\textit{favela}, although from qualitative interviews, longer-term residents expressed a marked lack of sympathy for the “games” of the AM.

\textbf{Conclusion}

Social and political phenomena are remarkably complex. In order to create a model with any applicability outside of a single case, some tolerance is allowable regarding its expectations and requirements. The competing hypotheses clearly explain a part, albeit small, of the differentiation in \textit{favela} success. One component of the limited size of their effect is the simplicity of the single-variable explanations that, aside from clientelism, don’t approach the causal mechanism. In the final example above, that of length of residence in the community, finding the intervening variable of social capital begins to give explanatory power to the otherwise context-less correlation.

The BAN model, with its six hypotheses, provides context for the power of each of its elements and links them in a coherent chain starting with the causes of resident binding at the
lowest level and then bonding into *favela*-level organizations. The model carries through to the logical conclusion of external actors, associated with a given *favela*, also associated with government projects and resources in that *favela*. At each step, the evidence confirmed the hypotheses, and anomalies were explainable under the system that was described at the outset—no patchwork exceptions akin to ‘covering laws’ were necessary for the model to hang together.

The following chapter, the last in this dissertation, will examine the success of this new model of social movements and its use of a clarified definition of social capital in terms of how it contributes to the current literature in political science.
Table 5-1: Correlations between passive social capital, *orgões de classe* and unions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>AM membership</th>
<th>Move b/c friend</th>
<th>Clients in the favela</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Orgão de Classe</strong></td>
<td>r = 0.949</td>
<td>0.114</td>
<td>0.453</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>p = 0.000</td>
<td>0.651</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n = 51</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>r = 0.420</td>
<td>0.481</td>
<td>-0.052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Union</strong></td>
<td>p = 0.002</td>
<td>0.043</td>
<td>0.739</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n = 51</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5-2: Correlations between active social capital, *orgões de classe* and unions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>AM participation</th>
<th>Favela better b/c residents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Orgão de classe</strong></td>
<td>r = 0.704</td>
<td>0.285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>p = 0.000</td>
<td>0.252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n = 51</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>r = 0.380</td>
<td>0.492</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Union</strong></td>
<td>p = 0.006</td>
<td>0.038</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n = 51</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5-3: Correlations between quality of infrastructure and services to NGOs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Streets</th>
<th>Sports</th>
<th>Recreation</th>
<th>Trash</th>
<th>Crèche</th>
<th>Clinic</th>
<th>Sewage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Local NGO</strong></td>
<td>r = 0.957</td>
<td>0.969</td>
<td>0.966</td>
<td>0.892</td>
<td>0.986</td>
<td>0.981</td>
<td>0.746</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>p = 0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n = 15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>All NGOs</strong></td>
<td>r = 0.762</td>
<td>0.781</td>
<td>0.765</td>
<td>0.634</td>
<td>0.798</td>
<td>0.802</td>
<td>0.417</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>p = 0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n = 15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5-4: First-order partial correlations between measures of media and infrastructural quality controlling for violence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Trash</th>
<th>Sewer</th>
<th>Streets</th>
<th>Sports</th>
<th>Recreation</th>
<th>Crèches</th>
<th>Clinics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Article total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(-r)</td>
<td>-0.346</td>
<td>-0.583</td>
<td>-0.591</td>
<td>-0.511</td>
<td>-0.498</td>
<td>-0.588</td>
<td>-0.566</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(p)</td>
<td>0.270</td>
<td>0.036</td>
<td>0.033</td>
<td>0.075</td>
<td>0.083</td>
<td>0.034</td>
<td>0.044</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(n)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average words</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(-r)</td>
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<td>-0.606</td>
<td>-0.533</td>
<td>-0.331</td>
<td>-0.276</td>
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</tr>
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<td>(p)</td>
<td>0.293</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>0.294</td>
<td>0.385</td>
<td>0.082</td>
<td>0.067</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(n)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Articles per author</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(-r)</td>
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<td>0.446</td>
<td>0.376</td>
<td>0.499</td>
<td>0.462</td>
<td>0.465</td>
<td>0.456</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(p)</td>
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<td>0.146</td>
<td>0.229</td>
<td>0.099</td>
<td>0.130</td>
<td>0.128</td>
<td>0.136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(n)</td>
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<td>10</td>
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Table 5-5: Bi-variate correlations between measures of internal organization and infrastructure quality controlling for violence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>sewer, water, streets, trash, sports, recreation, clinic and crèche</th>
<th>streets, trash, sewer, and water</th>
<th>clinic and crèche</th>
<th>sports and recreation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Majority clients from favela</td>
<td>(r = ) 0.446 0.770 0.425 0.487</td>
<td>(p = ) 0.169 0.006 0.192 0.129</td>
<td>(n = ) 11 11 11 11</td>
<td>(r = ) 0.923 0.680 0.928 0.908</td>
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<td>Social capital in the news</td>
<td>(p = ) 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.000</td>
<td>(n = ) 15 15 15 15</td>
<td>(r = ) 0.896 0.738 0.878 0.864</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>AM and other favela organization membership</td>
<td>(p = ) 0.001 0.023 0.002 0.003</td>
<td>(n = ) 9 9 9 9</td>
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Table 5-6: Explaining motivation and capacity for protests and legal action: zero- and first-order correlations between active social capital, media measures, and residents' visible demand making

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>AM participation, better b/c residents, water by group</th>
<th>Articles per author</th>
<th>Article highlights necessity</th>
<th>Discussion about removing favela</th>
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<tr>
<td>Protests</td>
<td>r= 0.571</td>
<td>0.123</td>
<td>0.229</td>
<td>0.531</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>p= 0.085</td>
<td>0.457</td>
<td>0.160</td>
<td>0.001</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n= 39</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>r'= -0.363</td>
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<td>-0.205</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>p'= 0.548</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.860</td>
<td>0.740</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n'= 3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ctrl violence</td>
<td>r= -0.280</td>
<td>-0.024</td>
<td>0.448</td>
<td>-0.085</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residents' legal action</td>
<td>p= 0.434</td>
<td>0.882</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.608</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>n= 39</td>
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<tr>
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<td>r'= -0.492</td>
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<td>ctrl violence</td>
<td>n'= 3</td>
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Figure 5-1: Internal and external linkages around *favela* issues
CHAPTER 6
WHAT DOES THIS ALL MEAN?

Implications for the Current Conversations in Political Science

The findings of the study reported in this dissertation directly address one form of democratic inclusion is generally overlooked in contemporary political science literature. This concluding chapter points to the implications of this research, both to various disciplines of political science, as well as to practical, policy-oriented application. A future research agenda is then presented, which applies the methodology developed here to cases outside of the favelas of Rio de Janeiro, as well as laying out plans to improve upon the inevitable shortcomings of this current project. The answer to the question that drove this study is that the model: Binding Action Networks seems to go a long way in determining the differential success between favelas that receive, receive little, or do not receive government resources.

In general terms, this study has approached the idea of consolidation of democracies from the grassroots rather than the common top-down approach. The central issue underlying each chapter is ‘where do these socio-economic disadvantaged fit into a still consolidating democracy?’ More simply, the question asks whether or not the poor, who occupy an ambiguous position on some of the best land of Rio and who have been habitually repressed from using their political voice, have influence in the politics there. The answer is: yes, they do.

Upon finding that favela residents’ demands are met from time to time, the study becomes more complex as it approaches how this process works. This requires a two-stage evaluation. First, the horizontal connections that perform the function of the formal aggregating institutions like political parties have to be located, and then the vertical connections between such non-traditional or informal groupings and the government must be identified. The academic discourse about social capital is the point of departure for understanding the creation, and nature,
of the networks of favela residents. Social movements literature is the entrance to the vertical connection.

First, an unpacked version of the concept of social capital is developed and then applied to determine how demands are aggregated among those in the lowest socio-economic strata. The detailed description of the different axes or spectra for considering the various qualities and intensities of social capital turn, what was before a black box, into a transparent process. This use of social capital provides an insight into the formation of groups from individuals, and the attachments between these groups and formal institutions and in so doing, it fills an important lacunae in the social movement literature. Once the picture of favela-level actors is clarified, social movement theories are considered as the means for analyzing the vertical connections that transform horizontally-formed demands into claims on the government. In doing so, current conversations on social movements are found inappropriate to explain the resources and interactions that occur in the favelas of Rio de Janeiro.

**Democracy and Democratization**

Unlike the vast majority of the literature on democracy, this study looks from the ground up, which is appropriate when looking for the influence of a heterogeneous group that has no organized lobby or political party to collect its voice and carry it to the debate inside the government. Whereas these formal aggregating institutions are generally sufficient to involve the middle and upper strata of society, they do not democratically represent large parts of the citizenry in countries with great economic inequality. In other words, primacy for quality of, and inclusion in, democracy is put on individual agency instead of structural access points into government.
Civil society

One major theme in democratization literature is that of the creation and action of civil society as a precursor for democratic participation. There is a paternalistic argument among many in Brazil that *favela* residents cannot take care of themselves and that transfer payments to the poor in general are misspent on drugs and alcohol instead of childcare and education. This line of thinking portrays *favelas* as an anarchic wilderness, not unlike the England that Thomas Hobbes saw when he looked out of his window in 1651. To the contrary, this study has shown that there is a robust civil society in the *favelas* of Rio.

Because most literature on democratization looks at top-down structures, civil society is usually considered as a binary condition: it either exists or it doesn’t. Using the lens of social capital, this study details the mechanism for self-organization, as well as how the process of organizing creates the space for exchanging ideas and interacting within civil society—a spectrum of possibilities rather than a condition that either exists or doesn’t. The product of the relationships formed in this space has been the creation of groups of residents who are informed by what looks like Tocqueville’s (1969) “enlightened self interest,” that brings individuals together to work in cooperation in spite of the general disincentives of the collective action problem. These voluntary associations are the schools for democracy that Putnam (2000) describes, teaching thoughtful decision making, valuing the whole group rather than just parts of that group, and working alongside one another to realize goals—that is understanding, taking responsibility for, and valuing that each individual has a role within a non-family system, the goal of which is self-perpetuation.

Unlike other works that contribute to an understanding of civil society, this examination of Rio’s *favelas* describes the potential negative side, from the government’s point of view, of civil society. The para-statal organizations and informal economic associations found in *favelas*
cannot simply be written off as ‘uncivil.’ Looking at the role of bridging social capital and open versus closed groups, the author demonstrates how civil society exists in *favelas* and may lead to variable embeddedness of *favela* residents, or to avoidance of the government.

**State and society: Embeddeness and democratization**

Almond and Verba (1963) speculate that democracy can only thrive in a society where there are some leaders, some followers, and some who just don’t care. In a democracy, these leaders must be representative of the entire society, or it must be prepared to use repression to exclude and pacify the losers in the system when they begin to care and are no longer content to follow. Creating the culture of solving problems through dialogue and interaction *with* the system is the key to maintaining governmental stability. This is why everything from the legal filings to the aggressive but ultimately controllable street-level protests are so important for the Brazilian state—because the *favelas* are ultimately working within the constraints of the state to affect decisions made by the state rather than trying to overturn the system. The actual mechanism for working ‘with’ the state is complex, and has been described here as ‘binding action networks’ that fulfill the role of demand aggregator and presenter to the government, satisfying the plaintiffs enough that they remain ‘content’ to lose under the current system.

The voluntary associations among *favela* residents can cut both ways for the government, however. Evidence presented in the second chapter elaborates how social capital can work to provide *favela* residents an ‘exit option’ from state control and taxation, creating an unproductive drain on state resources in the form of aid, security, and health costs as well as uncaptured taxes and theft of governmental resources. The group that intentionally chooses disenfranchisement is a constant threat to the sovereignty of the state. In Rio de Janeiro, it is drug gangs and independent militias that carve out neighborhoods where their own law exists and the legal government may not interfere. The government walks a fine line as a democracy whose
consensus decisions are not accepted and consequently not obeyed in areas within its borders. Accepting the status quo will lead to the eventual dissolution of the democratic system; there cannot be two sovereigns in one state. Repression is a slippery slope for a democratic government, particularly for Brazil where the government has already slid down that path before into dictatorship.

The remaining choice is re-negotiating the consensus so that it is minimally acceptable to the excluded groups. How this process might be carried out cannot even be imagined via current images of democracy and democratization because the tools and elements in this literature are not fine enough or do not reach far enough into the population to approach how they might be reached. The democratization discussion needs to consider the informal web of binding networks that the *favela* residents seem to favor over the more enduring bridging or bonding connections. It is the BANs described in the previous chapter that could reveal those who could easily become isolated, and work towards embedding them in the state. After absorbing the uncaptured population, the quality of democratic participation must be improved, whether it is reflected by only previously uncaptured citizens’ *pro forma* participation in elections, or whether there is demonstrated acceptance of the government’s authority. Again, this is practiced in the voluntary associations among the *favela* residents and is not a habit that can be forced.

**Social Capital**

The conversation around social capital provides inroads into the actual processes and methods of voluntary association. While most authors of social capital literature are content to view networks as a useful resource equivalent to a hammer or a dollar, whether the subject is an

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124 Of course, the Soviet model of the Young Pioneers (a kind of communist Boy and Girl Scouts) and the Chinese model of collective exercise and attendance-mandatory educational presentations that substituted entertainment during the Maoist era show that it is possible to inculcate habits, particularly over generations, but that is well outside of the scope of democratic governance.
individual or a regional government, they avoid describing the means to create, store, modify, and destroy it just as any physical resource can be manipulated. This is generally taken for granted and it is much easier and less messy to work with associations that are visible and measurable, and whose purposes are generally known. But in the context of the *favelas* where the procurement of daily sustenance and shelter may occupy much of the residents time, these associations may not be consistently visible, which could give the incorrect impression of some kind of amoral familialism at work.

One of the important clarifications on social capital made by this study is that, just as authors have already illustrated the different qualities of bonding, blinding, bridging, and binding, the concept must be explicitly separated into individual-level capital and group-level, recognizing that these are the products of the same basic network structure. The building blocks of social networks are described in chapter three using Granovetter’s (1973) idea of strong and weak ties, and Coleman’s idea (1988) of open and closed groups. The method of generalizing group capital to society uses the rational choice language of iterated games and explains the benefits quantitatively in terms of reduced transaction costs as discussed by North (1990a) and Zerbe and McCurdy (1999). These three factors together create a new, clear vision of what social capital is that has not been brought together as a coherent depiction of the concept in previous contributions to the literature.

**At the individual level**

Viewing social capital at the individual level, as presented by authors such as Coleman (Coleman, 1988), Portes (1995) and Hardin (1999) gives theoretical purchase on how social resources can replace the functions of government, and thus allows the individual an exit option from the state. That is, social capital can be a bankable, spendable resource with specific application (many willing friends who can use a hammer or can loan a hammer) or more general
application (many willing friends with different skills, knowledge and lendable possessions). In the absence of the state to provide individual access to infrastructure (water, sewage, electricity) or services (child care, education, health care, security), individuals can employ their social capital to make up for this lack. In this way, communities of individuals can focus on being self-sufficient as a group, and may decide to avoid connections to the state because of the potential costs.

Individual-level explorations of social capital, however, have not considered the opposite possibility that is the cornerstone of society-wide social capital studies in political science—that individual social capital may also work to foster embeddedness in the government, or may help the state capture its citizens. Here, social networks are conduits for the spread of innovation to individuals distant from the state. Knowledge of state benefits and legal rights moves between open groups and may draw upon each other to negotiate the convoluted bureaucracy of the Brazilian government. Similarly, the government may tap into these connective threads to reach an underserved population as they do with their PSF (Plano de Saude Familiar or Family Health) agents who use a kind of snowball method to search out the most needy and least accessible patients in the poor communities and bring the medical team directly to them.

However, limiting the discussion of social capital to individual utility misses the cumulative effect of many such binary connections and many overlapping networks operating in society that allow generalization of these trust networks125.

Still, whether exit option or cause for embeddedness, these views consider social networks simply as an extension of an individual’s resources, similar to a community shed or workshop

125 Generalization of trust is a rational response to the decreased risk of catastrophic betrayal in a society with strong particularistic social capital (except in the exclusive presence of blinding networks) because generalizing trust reduces transaction costs of negotiating and monitoring every exchange. As long as expected benefits outweigh expected losses in the absence of monitoring, the scarce resource of time is better allocated in increasing the number of contacts in a network.
that stores objects to be borrowed, or as a community bulletin board for accessing information.

Few of these authors consider social networks’ contributions to and reinforcement of individual identity and self-valorization that has been so important among *favela* residents, creating or reinforcing their identity as deserving citizens with the confidence to make demands. Such biographical effects have been noted to a very limited extent in terms of social movements (McAdam, 1999), and to a somewhat limited extent in regards to immigrant groups (Gold, 1995; Portes and Landolt, 2000). In Brazil, the importance of Liberation Theology to social and religious discourse in the 1960s and 1970s was a particularly influential case in the history of *favelas* (Levine, 1988), and highlights this personal role of active social relationships, revealing a new outcome of social capital that should be investigated in future research.

Bringing attention to the idea of the role of personal identity in social capital (and *vice versa*) allows access to the mechanism responsible for the fluctuating nature of associations. The necessary variance in priority given to each in the multitude of relationships by which we define ourselves explains why social networks both in and out of *favelas* may appear to completely disintegrate only to reform stronger at some much later time. This is only understandable by acknowledging the basic structures of social capital, the open and closed groups, and weak and strong times that individuals develop. Allowing for association disintegration and reintegration makes the concept more realistic, reduces the number of necessary assumptions needed to apply it (such as that the connection either exists or it doesn’t, which doesn’t take into account that the connection has only been temporarily subsumed), and provides a new lens to assess community organization and potential for political action.

**At the group level**

Group identity is another important product of social capital, and has been described in this context of variable attention given to the relationships that are the threads in the weave of our
personalities. But again, without clarifying the elements that make group identity out of social capital, it is an untouchable concept that is perceived as having different intensities and qualities from group to group. The process of creation, differentiation, intensification cannot be understood without bringing in the idea of open groups versus closed groups and their effect on innovation or changes in group culture. Occasionally, models from medical epidemiology are used to describe the spread of ideas, however this model overlooks the human element, imagining ideas as transmissible with $x\%$ contagion rate. A detailed model of social capital as presented in this study can explain the rate of transmission not in terms of contact, but through the idea of group openness.

Whereas individuals in either open or closed groups may be exposed to new ideas on a daily basis, differentiation in adoption is explained by the reinforcement and reiteration, or resistance that is met within the group. Members of open groups will hear more ideas directly from other members, whereas members of closed groups will hear more ideas from non-group members and will be valued less. Because in the open group there is guaranteed competition between ideas, new ideas have the possibility of entering the group discourse. Closed groups are likely to have no competition among major beliefs, so contradictory opinions will meet united resistance and be rejected. In the case of favelas, it is useful to know about the residents’ limited opportunities for travel and exchange both with people on the asfalto and with people in other morros, as well as the degree of control of the community by drug gangs. With this information, more accurate predictions of any given favela’s receptiveness to change is possible.

Social capital is also important to understand how favela residents manage to overcome the disincentives to collective action and work to maintain norms of civility, to produce group benefits, and to make collective demands. Separating this aspect of the capacity to concert from
the other facets of social capital maintains the concept’s analytical function in its more visible or active phase. The main feature of social networks, in this regard, is that they reduce the cost of participating in group work through networks’ ability to effectively monitor future beneficiaries and compel participation. The fewer free riders on any project proportionally reduces the investment of time, energy, or material goods each individual must contribute and makes the benefits more selective.

Similarly the cost of making demands on the government, which include those above plus risks to personal safety, are reduced with increased participation. Just like preferring to swim in the ocean around groups because of decreased odds in being chosen by a passing shark, the probability of being directly affected by any violence that may occur during a protest or rally dwindles as the number of participant rises. Even more, the probability of violence occurring is inversely related to the number of protest participants as the possible costs of any single act of violence rise.

The capacity to concert includes both the quality (group solidarity) and the intensity (proportion of group involved) of social capital. It is the lack of intensity that social networks in favelas tend to demonstrate that leads to this final addition to the conversation about social capital. First, intensity is quite different from durability of social connections. Durability describes the longevity and possibility to withstand adversity, whereas intensity describes commitment to or importance of the connections to any one individual, and may be evaluated at the group level by the proportion of active participants at any one time. Putnam touches on this difference when he contrasts AARP with the Audubon Society, the first has a huge member list but the main activity is writing checks to support lobbyists in DC whereas the second has a much
smaller list but serves as a center of naturalism and conservation activities every week. Putnam (2000) uses this distinction as an important part of the decline of social capital in the US.

Here, the intensity of social capital is addressed in terms of the competing relationship networks that provide a multitude of allegiances and demands to consider at any single moment. Mother, daughter, son, father of a family group; student, teacher, athlete, alumni of an academic group; player, coach, fan of a sports team… all of these are possible competing identities that may assume priority at one time or another. These may be eternally enduring relationships, as in the case of family, or ephemeral, as in the case of a summer job working for a public interest research group. But with the number of relationships vying for primacy, it is certain that some will suffer less intense commitment from adherents over time.

Binding social capital is characterized by those relationships around a cause or idea that benefit from the temporary priority of many individuals. Unlike bridging social capital, the impetus for the relationships in binding social capital quickly declines in importance to group members after succeeding or failing in the group mission. In bridging social capital, the central commonality that connects the members persists with enough importance for members to continue to relate. In binding social capital however, other relationships overwhelmingly extinguish attention paid to the binding core, and previous allies may find themselves as enemies as they don their new identity. This doesn’t, however, preclude the re-ignition of an alliance around the same core in the future.

Given the daily reality of poverty in Rio’s favelas where, for a large number of the residents, water, food, and shelter are daily struggles, the importance of relationships not related to sustenance must often take a back seat. Groups within the favela may appear only once a year to commemorate a relevant date, whereas others may congregate daily or weekly with varied
attendance. Measuring the capacity to concert at any one time is difficult in itself, and any snapshot is bound to produce a distorted view of the ebb and flow of the intensity of social capital. Nevertheless, it may be the shortest-lived of relationships, particularly relationships that bridge outside of the *favela*, that are the most politically important.

Binding action networks are a concept introduced in this study and held to be the answer to the question of political success of different *favelas*. Using the definition of binding social capital above, these networks involve groups and institutions within the *favelas* connected to those outside of the community. These groups are bound together by the central idea that a certain *favela* should receive governmental resources, and although they may never directly work together, they remain important to that *favela*. The lack of strong, permanent connections can even work in favor of the *favela* for while the connections may not be intense, they may be durable as they require little investment. Permanence is one of the most important qualities of demand making pressure on the government to secure positive results in the end as there is a world of difference between being allocated resources in the budget and actually receiving them\(^{126}\).

The principal groups in *favela* issues were identified as the *associações de moradores* of the community, the press, NGOs, and religious organizations. Each may play a different role in the residents’ organization and demand making at different times. The binding network can act as storage for a *favela* movement with residents reactivating after a long run of apparent disinterest when costs of group participation are lowered by the AM, a local church, or NGO. The residents may also activate politically when the benefits or chances for benefits are increased such as when they are in the media spotlight, or when international attention is on them in the

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\(^{126}\) Senator John Dingell famously indicated in the choice between control of policy content and policy process, he would prefer the process every time.
form of NGO outreach. These brief contacts between individuals temporarily forming groups, and groups interacting with external institutions may create stronger ties of higher intensity over repeated interactions. Even in the absence of strong bonds, the occasional contact with outside institutions can put the *favela* in the periphery of multiple influential social networks, the confluence of these networks eventually pushing that particular *favela* to the center of attention and temporary importance.

**Social Movements**

**The BAN model emphasizes informality in movements**

Binding action networks (BANs) refer to a specific type of social movement that is particularly applicable to the *favelas* of Rio because of their lack of social, economic, and political resources. The simple definition as developed here is that they are loose collections of groups and institutions that operate independently and asynchronously, yet are similarly purposed to connect a *favela* to the state in a bid for resources. This is in contrast to the Resource Mobilization (RM) approach to social movements that prioritizes the social movement organization (SMO) as the driving force for movement progress and looks at demand-making as a competition between various formal organizations. The Political Opportunity Structure (POS) revision reduces the focus on the SMO, but still emphasizes formal organization within the movement; collective expectation of success among the mass base; and the cohesiveness of insiders that structures the political opportunities of challenger groups. These are not requirements for the BAN model, which acknowledges the multi-faceted identities of individuals that allows for strong but temporary attachments that facilitate effective collective without future expectations or obligations to the group.
The informality of organization embodied in the BAN model creates a moving target that avoids direct, organized competition. That is, no one group is responsible for mobilization or progress, and competition for resources isn’t as much a competition against competing groups with opposite agendas, but rather an effort to attract sustained policy attention\textsuperscript{127}. The RM and POS approaches to social movements see the field of social movements as filled with opposing players. Even New Social Movement (NSM) literature looks at purposeful framing and counter-framing of issues that doesn’t hold the same weight with BANs. When BANs contest public frames, it is an attempt to alter a century of prejudice and discrimination that is not produced nor reinforced by an organized opposition. BANs do work to alter social discourse, but not on a field of players that moves in opposition to the BANs efforts.

Unlike the conception of movements by RM or POS, effort need not be coordinated or planned to qualify as a movement, spontaneous and violent reactions in these two models are generally considered as ‘riots’ rather than part of a movement. In the BAN model however, \textit{favela} residents’ use of reactive, spontaneous destruction is seen as collectivization around a method of claim making pulled from a repertoire determined by the particular historical path of governmental repression and response. The duration of the movement around a particular \textit{favela} is based on the continuation of unmet need perceived by the BAN actors rather than political strategizing. This should be understood more formally than the unlimited breadth of actions recognized by NSM literature that holds that creating a life in reference to a movement symbol qualifies as movement action. Under the BAN model, effort and action does need to be purposeful and goal-oriented.

\textsuperscript{127} While every funding policy is a zero-sum game, there is a great difference between competition between two plans or frames of the same issue and the competition between different issues for government budgeting and funding. Moreover, the absurd difference between budgeting and allocation of funds mentioned in the previous chapter further reduces the likelihood of a \textit{favela} proposal being challenged in the budgeting phase.
The BAN model was developed out of a combination of NSM literature and the Political Opportunity approach as neither are perfectly suited to capture the phenomenon. Much of the previous literature on social movements, when considering movement outcomes, has focused only on the “official” agendas espoused by the official movement organizations rather than a general struggle for government resources. The widely accepted model of movement “success” in terms of political acceptance and new advantages concentrates only on those advantages explicitly sought by the movement organization. This narrow definition ignores the organic composition of BANs that, by the nature of uncoordinated actors, may have several complementary agendas.

**Temporary and Changing: Movement Cycles, Performance Clusters, and Action Systems**

Sidney Tarrow’s (1998) idea about “movement cycles” added nuance to social movements as a process, emphasizing the tendency to grow in momentum, peak, and then ebb. The BAN model takes this idea and builds on it to include the reiterative nature of such cycles, as well as their recursive nature. At least in the field of *favela* movements in Rio de Janeiro, the informality of the networks allows ‘cheap’ participation by occasional adherents and doesn’t lead to movement exhaustion or burnout. Because the BAN model incorporates the reality of divided attention among actors, it can explain the longevity of a movement in terms of episodic affiliation/disaffiliation and activation/deactivation of movement networks without looking for exposition, rising action, climax, falling action, and denouement. Furthermore, each repetition of the cycle feeds back on the movement itself modifying the relationship threads between individuals and groups.

Tilly progresses toward a useful model to describe *favela* movements by supplanting the mistaken idea that movements are solidaristic and coherent with a model of movements comprised by “multiple, changing actors” who activate in “clusters of performances (1999, p.
This is the result of the variety of identities each individual holds that compete for precedence depending on the immediate context. Although he rejects NSM ideology because of his specific focus on the formal and organized competition in electoral campaigns and interest group politics, his idea about multiple identities seems to resonate with the NSM concept of participants activating sporadically with no fixed loyalty to one specific group. At the same time, his explanation of clusters of action implies some coordination and synchronization of various groups’ actions, a requirement that the BAN model specifically avoids.

NSM locates “action systems” in a “systemic field of possibilities and limits (Melucci, 1985, p. 792),” which aligns well with the external determinants of movements as described by Political Opportunity Structure (POS). These actors or movement adherents in this field of constraints are composed of both hidden networks as well as visible organizations engage in limited political behavior in response to opportunities produced by variations in the system. The BAN model, which requires an explanation of the highly variable nature of pro-favela support, especially from the residents themselves, adopts a similar view but focuses on the relationship threads, viewed as resilient, although only occasionally active. The benefit of privileging the connection rather than the individual is, particularly in the relatively small population of each favela, that it explains how movements strengthen or weaken and groups form or dissolve depending on the frequency of activation of each relationship strand. The BAN model goes further to suggest that the “hidden networks” are visible over time, but may not be visible at any given moment—in this sense, it is more empirically oriented than the NSM image.

**BANs: A Model to Fit Bureaucratized Government and Continuing Class Divisions**

Tilly and Melucci’s evolution away from organized SMOs, as well as BANs’ outright rejection of their necessity organizations, was necessary because of the bureaucratization of government that has led to a decline of representative democracy, and has consequently changed
the landscape of social movements (Touraine 1992, p130-131). Brazil’s legacy from the military dictatorship is a bureaucratic-authoritarian state that continues to protect the socio-economic system of inequality through a façade of democracy, which Melucci and Tilly predict leads to a reduction of direct political action of social movements in favor of competition for social resources to influence the meta-cultural discourse that, purposefully or not, redefines society. In this vision, the proletariat has been transformed into a class of consumers with varied and distant relations to business so that class mobilization is no longer a useful lens for understanding the targeting and actions of social movements.

BANs specifically apply to the case of favela residents who were strongly politicized by the language of Liberation Theology that still dominates their claim making. Further, the stark separation between asfalto and morro maintains the conception of class in the movement, not based on proletarian solidarity, but based on exclusion from the rest of society. These two contextual conditions contribute to the clear, purposeful targeting of the government by the favela movements. Without a doubt, there is a constant subtext to favela movements intended to change the social discourse around their community and residents, particularly those protesting children being run over on the bordering streets and highways. These expressions of grief are meant to reach the government, but they also must be understood as a call for recognition by society at large. Most favela movement action, however, involves direct political demands on the state for resources. In this way, Tilly’s polity model is relevant to BANs with the idea that social movements represent the competition between members of the polity and challengers who seek to enter the polity so must compete for social resources in order to increase their share of power and public resources.
In sum, social movement theory needs to be combined with social capital in order to explain how horizontal networks reach upwards, making demands on the government. Unfortunately, the extant visions of collective political action are not wholly appropriate for a population as bereft of social, economic, and political resources as the favela residents. McAdam, Tilly, and Tarrow’s versions of Political Opportunity Structures, emphasizing formal organizations with explicit goals as they do, are most useful for analyzing the context in which favela movements operate—particularly the political obstacles and opportunities that they might find external to their community. And while Tilly’s conception of “clusters of performances,” similar to Melucci’s action systems, describe a loose network of actors, the former is too organization-oriented and should be constantly visible, and the latter allows for purposeless action, which is too amorphous and does not lend itself to empirical study. In the previous chapter, one description of participation in a favela ‘movement’ included lifestyle changes based on movement tenets. In the case of Liberation Theology, these changes were patterned on a politicized religious vision, and led to adherents automatically becoming challengers to the contemporary members of the system in pursuit of their preferential option. The BAN model was created to correct the application of these broad ideas to the case of Rio’s favelas.

Applications for These Findings

Government attempts to extend the rule of law into the ever-growing favelas of Rio, must make every effort to capture the residents into the system if they are to meet any success at all. Already the problem of para-statal organizations claiming sovereignty to small but populous areas of the city is a challenge to the authority of the state, as well as a constant drain on its resources. From the point of view of a consolidating democracy, they create a dilemma that ultimately destabilizes the regime and has already resulted in limiting civil rights for the residents of many favelas there. But as long as these areas exist, they provide a sanctuary for the
robust informal economy that is a further drain on the state’s coffers as well as an obstacle to
greater economic productivity as around one third of the workforce of Rio is involved in
unskilled or low-skilled off-book jobs that, with more resources diverted to education and job
training, could improve the value of Rio and Brazil’s production and increase the country’s
standing in the world economy.

Searching for a solution, however, leads to the paradox that, as long as the favela residents
remain without political voice, there is little direct incentive for the government to improve their
situation. The small advances that the government has made towards the favelas to date have
potentially done more harm to the relationship between the two than good as projects go
unfinished for years, promises made at the highest level are broken shortly after they are made,
and the main token from the government, legalization of land tenure, is not necessary or wanted
by many. One practical finding from this study is that, opposing De Soto’s (2000) vision that
has been adopted by the World Bank and USAID, there is already an active real estate market in
all of the favelas, and borrowing against a house there happens all the time, just not from a bank.
In this, the favela activists are correct when they say that the solution to favelas must come from
within the favelas.

However, as traditional avenues of political contestation, aside from voting, are either
blocked or unfeasible for favela residents, their only alternative becomes rallies, protests, and
destructive violence to call attention to their cause, the last of which only distances them further
from incorporation. This behavior has certainly given many on the asfalto the idea that the
residents are not capable of being part of their democratic society. To the contrary, this study
shows that there is a vibrant civil society within the favelas that has prepared them for
democratic inclusion, so should the proper approach be made, inclusion is culturally feasible.
However, to date, the government’s idea of gaining cooperation and involving the residents in the upgrade projects has been lip service and post-facto meetings that have had little or no impact on project implementation. Moreover, the state must acknowledge that their official connection, the AM, is not the solution to inclusion as it is often poorly subscribed and even more poorly supported by action. Understanding how residents already interact with their socio-political surroundings, that is through BAN, can help sensitize government efforts in this direction.

If nothing else, this study points to the need to begin inclusionary efforts, and the sooner the better as the current trend in disordered urbanization is only growing.Preparing the ground, so to speak, for the inevitable increase in urban squatters in the next twenty to thirty years is something that will be more difficult and more expensive with each passing year.

In short:

1) Social movement adherents and groups may exist even in their apparent absence

2) The government cannot expect need to propel the poor into its purview, the poor can and do survive and even thrive using social capital as an exit option.

3) Proper understanding of transmission of ideas and resources through social networks can facilitate government ‘capture’ of its citizens. Improper understanding leads to a waste of resources and further alienation of those they are trying to reach.

4) Political groups and demands from the poor look different from demands from those with more economic, social, and political resources.
   a. These demands occur more based on crisis then based on external opportunity and constraint.
   b. Demand making is less organized, and more organic and flowing with potentially strong relationships that appear to flicker on and off.

5) Individuals in favelas are politicized and do practice democratic organization in the vibrant space for civil society that exists there, despite the popular perception of these communities created principally from reports from outsiders about residents’ actions away from the morro.

6) Action by favela residents is important to their cause, regardless that there is rarely immediate response to their demands—the nature of the favela movements is to use asynchronous pressure from various sources making for an exceptionally resilient process that is independent of any one organization for support or future expectations of success.
LIST OF REFERENCES


BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Bryan Williams’ adult life has been centered on becoming a knowledgeable and critical thinker about world affairs, a goal that he has pursued for more than twenty years through teaching, travel, and formal study. In the middle of his BA studies at the University of Florida (in political science, Latin American politics, and education), he took a year-long break to travel the US, occasionally funding his trek by selling t-shirts, pancakes, and burritos at Grateful Dead concerts. Two years after gaining his first degree, Bryan graduated from the UF College of Education with an MEd in secondary social studies instruction and curriculum, and a license to teach. His plan at this time was to make the world better, one student at a time.

He made the most of his long summer vacations, one of the benefits of being a teacher, by traveling extensively throughout Mexico and Guatemala, making many friends along the way. Eventually, his peripatetic lifestyle found him on another sabbatical, this time travelling around the world to gain a better understanding of those places he knew only as blotches on maps. After a year and a half, Bryan washed up on the shore of Japan and returned to his career as a teacher, eventually designing curriculum, implementing a teacher training program, and managing a franchise of a national chain of English schools. Invaluable as a personal learning experience, his stay in the Far East lasted four and a half years before the pull of more formal education brought him back, once again, to his family home in Gainesville and the ivied halls of UF.

Bryan’s first days in his doctoral program in political science coincided with the tragic attack on New York’s World Trade Center. This event, which shaped the lives of so many all around the world, pushed him to develop a deeper and better understanding of conflict and cooperation through comparative politics and public administration of developing countries. Encouraged by the diverse faculty in Anderson Hall, Bryan studied Africa, India, and Latin
America; and eventually went to work in microfinance in Kazakhstan as part of the Coca Cola World Citizenship Program at UF.

Finally settling on the topic of social movements, the collective action problem, and how groups work to solve their own problems in Brazil, Bryan gained fluency in Portuguese and a Fulbright research scholarship in order to study in the poor communities of Rio de Janeiro. Certainly, sharing the lives of the generous and open residents of these so-called *favelas* was the most important aspect of his work in Rio. But equally important in shaping and developing his thinking about group cooperation was his preparation for teaching history at a local American school. With students as a sounding board for his ideas, and historical content to fuel his intellectual fire, Bryan developed a significant addition to political science theory in the form of Binding Action Networks. The BAN model seeks to describe how the poor gain a political voice in a society that blocks them at every turn because of social, economic, and political inequality.

After receiving his PhD, Bryan intends to return to the classroom as a university professor in order to keep developing his understanding of the world, which is much more easily done when creating a shared understanding with a group. And finally, having found his own voice through this two-decade-long process, he would like to write in order to share his ideas with the world, participating in the very slow conversation in political science that can be seen evolving in the various journals and publications of new books—rather more ambitious than making the world better one student at a time.