REBUILDING A NEW EUROPEAN CAPITAL: AN EXAMINATION OF THE EFFECTS OF BERLIN’S PLANWERK INNENSTADT ON INNER CITY DEVELOPMENT

By

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To Mimi and the Palast.
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## TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF TABLES</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF FIGURES</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND DEFINITIONS</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHRONOLOGY</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 AN OVERVIEW OF URBAN PLANNING IN BERLIN</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berlin before November 9, 1989</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Political and Economic Context of Urban Development after 1989</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Life</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German federal system</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local government within the federal system</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berlin’s Bezirke and urban development</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centralized City Planning</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-Socialist Planning</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative restructuring</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Privatizing the economy – the Treuhandanstalt</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restitution</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic and Fiscal Crisis</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic restructuring since unification</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiscal crisis</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Additional Actors and Their Roles</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real Estate Development</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public policy and demand</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developers and the state</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experts, Architects, and the Built Environment</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The architects’ debate</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competitions</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Planning, Memory, and Cultural Inclusion</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural Identity</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politics of Space</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Historic preservation</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural inclusion in the planning process</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# LIST OF TABLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4-1. Inventory of housing typologies. [Gathered with data from the Berlin Senate Department for Urban Development. 2008.]</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-2. Effectiveness of the Planwerk Innenstadt’s ten objectives</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# LIST OF FIGURES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-1.</td>
<td>Berlin in Europe. [Courtesy of Google Earth. 2008]</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-2.</td>
<td>Map of Mitte within the Berlin metropolitan area. [Courtesy of Wikimedia Commons. 2008]</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-3.</td>
<td>An aerial view of Berlin’s Mitte district. [Courtesy of Google Earth. 2008]</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-1.</td>
<td>The Berlin Wall’s place in Berlin. [Reprinted with permission from Palgrave Macmillan. 2008]</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-2.</td>
<td>High rises near the Wall. Bottom photograph is of a GDR model currently housed at the Senate for Urban Development. [Photographs taken by author. 2007.]</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-4.</td>
<td>Drawings of future plan for Alexanderplatz. [Reprinted with permission from Regina Poly. 2008.]</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-1.</td>
<td>Figure-ground maps: Berlin in the 20th century. Top: Berlin, circa 1943; Bottom: Berlin, circa 1984. [Reprinted with permission from Palgrave Macmillan. 2008]</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-1.</td>
<td>The Planwerk Innenstadt Berlin, 2002 update. [Reprinted with permission from the Berlin Senate Department for Urban Development. 2008.]</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-2.</td>
<td>3-D models of the Planwerk Innenstadt Berlin. The wooden structures represent post-1989 construction [Photographs taken by author. 2007.]</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-3.</td>
<td>Examples of rehabilitated <em>Plattenbauten</em>. [Photographs taken by author.]</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-4.</td>
<td>Examples of contemporary high-density urban development [Photographs taken by author.]</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-6.</td>
<td>Transportation corridors in central Mitte</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-7.</td>
<td>Public transportation connectivity in Mitte.</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-8.</td>
<td>Railway stations. Top: Ostbahnhof; Middle: Hauptbahnhof; Bottom: Unter den Linden. [Photographs taken by author]</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4-9. An example of a “green artery” running through Mitte. [Reprinted with permission from the Berlin Senate Department for Urban Development. 2008.]

5-1. Projected view of Mitte by 2010. [Reprinted with permission from Palgrave Macmillan. 2008.]
## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND DEFINITIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>East Germany</td>
<td>Common name for the German Democratic Republic (GDR), established in 1949 in the Soviet zone of Allied occupation. After reunification, this area is referred to as eastern Germany.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Berlin</td>
<td>The Eastern part of the German capital city of Berlin. East Berlin fell within the Soviet section of the Berlin after World War II. In united Germany, this area is referred to as eastern Berlin.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Berlin</td>
<td>The Western part of the German capital city of Berlin; the West Berlin was the aggregate of the American, British, and French sections of the city. After reunification, this area is referred to as western Berlin.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mitte</td>
<td>Translates as “Middle.” Berlin’s historic city center dating to the early 13th century. It fell on the western edge of East Berlin during the Cold War, surrounded by the Wall on two and a half sides.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>The German initials of the Social Democratic Party, which headed the Weimar Republic. After World War II, the Party was reformed in the West and remains one of Germany’s major parties.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSDAP</td>
<td>The German initials of the National Socialist German Workers’ Party; commonly known as the National Socialist or Nazi Party. NSDAP ruled Germany from 1933-1945 under the leadership of Adolf Hitler.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SED</td>
<td>The German initials of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany. Formed in 1946, the Party ruled East Germany for 40 years. For</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDS</td>
<td>The initials of the Party of Democratic Socialism, the successor of the SED in post-unification German politics.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plattenbau</td>
<td>High-rise buildings made of prefabricated concrete slabs. Plural is Plattenbauten.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bezirk</td>
<td>The German word for district. The plural is Bezirke.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communism</td>
<td>The popular term for the political and economic system employed by the Soviet Union and its satellite states between 1917-1989.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ostalgie</td>
<td>A combination of the German word for east, Ost, and nostalgia. Translates to nostalgia for the East, i.e. the GDR.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Definition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S-Bahn</td>
<td>Abbreviation for <em>Stadtschnellbahn</em> (translation: fast city train). Berlin’s circular light-rail system serving metropolitan and regional populations; opened in 1924.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U-Bahn</td>
<td>Abbreviation for <em>Untergrundbahn</em> (translation: underground train). Berlin’s underground subway system opened in 1902.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Currency Note:</td>
<td>All currencies are expressed in U.S. dollars at the current exchange rate as of November 2007. Eastern marks have not been converted because there is no existing equivalent value for this defunct currency.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHRONOLOGY

1237  First documents mentioning Cölln.
1244  Earliest documents mentioning Berlin.
1307  Berlin and Cölln consolidate, forming a joint government under Berlin.
1442  The first Hohenzollern palace is built for Elector Friedrich I of Brandenburg.
1538-40 A new expanded Palace is built for Elector Johann.
1647  Friedrich Wilhelm (Friedrich the Great) establishes Unter den Linden, linking the Palace to the Tiergarten.
1871  Consolidation of the German Empire under Kaiser Wilhelm I; Berlin becomes the Imperial capital.
1918  World War I ends. German Communist Party founded; Weimar Republic founded.
1933  NSDAP comes to power, led by Adolf Hitler.
1936  Olympic Games held in Berlin; Hitler has a stadium built especially for the Games.
1938  Hitler’s state architect, Albert Speer, develops a transformative master plan for Berlin, entitled Germania, inspired by Classic architecture.
1939  Germany attacks Poland, igniting World War II.
1940-45 British and American bombing campaigns destroy most of the city.
1945  End of World War II.
1948  Westmark introduced into the three Western sectors of Berlin; Berlin airlift.
1949  Western region becomes the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) and West Berlin, respectively; they establish Bonn as their capital. Eastern region becomes German Democratic Republic (East Germany) and East Berlin. Blockade and airlift ends. East Germany declares Berlin its capital.
1950  Ruins of the former Hohenzollern Palace in East Berlin are demolished.
1953  GDR workers revolt while building housing units on Stalinallee, demanding political and economic reforms.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>Hallstein Doctrine introduced by West Germany.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>Khrushchev and the “Free City;” Western powers reject idea.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>East Germany begins building the Berlin Wall.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>The Palace of the Republic, the East German parliament building, is built on the land formerly occupied by the Hohenzollern Palace.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>Willy Brandt ends Hallstein Doctrine.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>Fall of the Berlin Wall.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>First East German democratic election; reunification.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>The Bundestag moves Germany’s capital from Bonn to Berlin.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Beginning of “Critical Reconstruction” period; first drafts of the Planwerk Innenstadt presented to the public.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>The Planwerk Innenstadt is passed by the Senate and City Parliament.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Demolition work on the Palace of the Republic begins.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Since the end of World War II, Berlin’s urban development has been characterized by exceptional political circumstances resulting from the city’s Four-Power status and its subsequent division, the construction of the Wall, and reunification. Almost two decades after the fall of the Wall, city officials, planners, and residents remain charged with the task of positioning Berlin in relation to other major European metropolises. This paper examines the effectiveness of Berlin’s Planwerk Innenstadt in reshaping the city in order to create a modern, dynamic iconic European capital. This is done by analyzing four elements of the plan: housing, community development, transportation, and sustainability. The case study of Mitte in Berlin, Germany, provides a context to examine post-conflict urban development in divided cities by looking at the discrepancies between the city plans and their execution resulting from existing tensions.

Located in the center of Berlin, the historic Mitte district has been indelibly shaped by past planning efforts—including Frederick the Great’s cosmopolitan capital, modernist planning during the Bauhaus era, Adolf Hitler’s plans for a massive neo-Classical capital city, and forty years of division. The paradigm of critical reconstruction provides a theoretical tool for
analyzing how to deal with the multiple layers of history present in the inner-city area. A methodology was formulated to rate the current plan’s success in creating a cohesive European capital city based on how well it conforms to basic patterns present in other historic cities, such as London, Paris, Rome, and Prague.

The Planwerk Innenstadt rated exceptionally well in transportation and sustainability measures, areas where Berlin is seen as an international leader. Various programs to improve energy production and consumption, as well vehicular traffic reduction, have all contributed to the amelioration of living standards in the inner city. Some of Berlin’s sustainability initiatives are in fact used as models in other Central and Eastern European countries. Unfortunately, due to Berlin’s lackluster economy, housing presents a peculiar situation, where there is significantly more supply than demand. This housing surplus is correlated to the preservation of historical housing typologies; in fact, historic buildings are more likely to be at full capacity. Overall, these findings demonstrate that the Planwerk Innenstadt has been an effective tool in uniting the city in its future-oriented endeavors.

While the Planwerk Innenstadt’s principles have thus far been useful and successful in creating a cohesive plan for a modern European capital, its success and strength are heavily dependent on civic participation, communicative planning, and most importantly, access to sufficient funding. By making community participation a requirement throughout the planning process, the Planwerk is allowing for intra-district diversity—a major characteristic of other historic areas. Although Berlin’s plans have been infamously overwritten and forgotten, the Planwerk has innumerable future potential: in a little over a decade, it has already become a prototype for the modern, future-oriented European city.
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

“Berlin’s centre is condemned to always becoming and never to be” (Scheffler, 1989, p. 219).

A city’s built environment and urban fabric matters. As Brian Ladd (1997) eloquently explains,

Buildings matter. So do statutes, ruins, and even stretches of vacant land. Buildings provide shelter for human activities, but it is the activities, not the shelter, that make structures and spaces important to human beings trying to define their place on this earth. Buildings and monuments are also the visible remnants of the past: they often outlast the human beings who created them. How these structures are seen, treated, and remembered sheds light on a collective identity that is more felt than articulated. (p. 2)

What kind of development properly acknowledges and respects tradition? Whose tradition is it acknowledging and respecting?

This paper argues that the urban planning measures to recreate Berlin as a modern European capital have resulted in a myriad of conflicting issues. Consequently, these issues have put the city plan at risk of obsolescence. How can, for example, the city government encourage developers’ investments when many of their buildings remain unoccupied? Many of the historical buildings and urban patterns preserved by the GDR are being surveyed for “revitalization” by the city government, in an attempt to capture Berlin’s European character by looking to the past. Furthermore, the comprehensive plan proposes the privatization of publicly-held land for housing, as planners believe that this will encourage people to move back into the city center. Eastern residents have met this plan with significant opposition. By using Berlin and several elements of the Planwerk Innenstadt as case studies of a fragmented urban space struggling with a new comprehensive plan,

After Unification in 1989, Berlin’s planners set out to repair the urban fabric’s fragmentation by issuing strict guidelines for the historical city center (Mitte) intended to restore
the density and diversity that World War II and the Cold War destroyed. Their efforts coincided with the Eastern Berliner Ostalgie (nostalgia for the East) movement. This embracing of GDR planning and architecture by East Germans (and some West Germans too) may be seen as indicative of greater problems that have arisen from integration and Western planning schemes. There is a sense of alienation for Easterners, however, resulting from reunification. The designs of iconic structures like the Palast der Republik and the Plattenbauten fostered a sense of community and togetherness post-1989; this feeling was spurred because of the lack of economic growth and opportunities in the East.

The Berlin Wall left many scars, transcending politics, economics, and culture. As Joseph Rykwert (2000) explains, “The city was so shaken, its institutions so transformed, that it was unable to reshape itself for some time, while a mistrust of planning, perhaps all too understandable given the megalomania of the past, has meant that its government was not able to promulgate, much less embody, a plan for reconfiguring all Berlin” (p. 240). Until very recently, Rykwert’s assessment of urban planning in Berlin was indeed accurate. In the past decade, city officials have made monumental progress in creating a unified city plan, the Planwerk Innenstadt, based on the principles of smart growth and communicative planning. Furthermore, traditional elements of the “European capital city” are being summoned as guides pointing to what Berlin once was, as well as what it should be in the future. Figure 1 illustrates Berlin’s central position not only in Germany, but also within greater Europe (See Figure 1).

The Planwerk Innenstadt, produced by the Berlin Ministry of Urban Development and Environmental Protection, “proposes to use design to suture together both parts of the previously divided city through the invocation of a history common to both west and east” (Neill, 2000, p. 12). Specifically, the Planwerk references city plans from 1916 as their base templates. This has
created significant opposition, particularly in east Berlin, as this calls for a redesign of existing streets, city blocks, and buildings. The Ministry of Urban Development and Environmental Protection, however, regards the plan as an opportunity for the German capital “in urban design terms, [to] return to the architectural principles and urban ground plan of Berlin as a European city in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries” (Neill, 2000, p. 12). Subsequently, this is the underlying philosophy associated with Critical Reconstruction.

Though people may be exaggerating when referring to the new Plan as a “declaration of war,” this statement offers valid and relevant insight into how the city administrators and planners have provoked internal conflicts between East and West Berliners. While developers and those interested in economic development in the historic center promote initiatives like the privatizing of public lands and introducing other commercial initiatives, they are often overlooking the infrastructure and architecture already in place—and often well-suited for the job—in those areas. Furthermore, the professional prejudice and conflicts between West and East Berlin planners further aggravates the situation.

In order to go beyond Berlin as “the city at the edge of the Iron Curtain,” planners must, ironically, be willing to accept the fact that division still exists, and it is not wrong to acknowledge or even celebrate this separation, all the while looking to the future. City image becomes an important facet to keep in mind, as it has the potential to stimulate the economy by bringing in tourists. By preserving various physical elements of Berlin’s extensive history, the city stops being the nucleus of the Cold War, and can instead become a multi-dimensional urban area. As Bernard Schneider (2001) explains, Berlin has a second chance. World-renown architects have discovered this and built projects in major plazas; it is time that residents and planners realize the same, and look to the future while still remembering the past.
Western planners presume that they can demolish important structures and engage in Critical Reconstruction in order to restore the lost character of Berlin’s urban environment.¹ But who gets to decide what this character is? For many East Berliners, no matter how economically or aesthetically prudent these “revitalization” initiatives are, they also convey a belief the GDR’s history is “erasable.” Thus, Germany now finds itself at a crossroads; it can destroy this history, or find something else to do with it. Some critics, like architect Daniel Libeskind and Dolores Hayden, believe that these forms are the texture of living memory.

As György Konrád (2000) writes, “socially speaking, the historical city seemed to be much more dynamic than the new, outlying districts even though the latter were the product of conscious, meticulous planning” (p. 39). Mitte was chosen as this project’s study area because of its dynamic and historically layered location within the city (See Figure 1-2, Figure 1-3).

Following the opening of the Berlin Wall, “one of the most interesting shifts in thinking was the rediscovery of the huge creative potential of the historical city,” what for forty years was a veritable “no man’s land” (Konrád, 2000, p. 39).

This paper examines the multiple claims competing for the city center, Mitte. Chapter 2 reviews the literature on the context of Berlin’s political and economic urban development after 1989. To better understand all of the forces at work in building the new city, this chapter gives an overview of the German federal system, various models of city planning employed between 1945-1996, and real estate development. Finally, the chapter closes with a discussion on the relationships between urban planning, memory, and cultural inclusion.

¹ Western planners are defined as urban or city planners that received their planning education and training in any country in the Western bloc during the Cold War (i.e. West Germany, Great Britain, the United States, etc.).
Chapter 3 provides information on the materials and methodology used in this project. The reasoning for focus area is discussed, as are the paradigms and criteria employed to guide this study. Furthermore, research limitations are enumerated. There has been considerable difficulty pursuing a project whose real-life situation is continuously in flux. However, the criteria and focus areas offer somewhat stable glimpses in post-conflict planning in Berlin.

In chapter 4, I present my findings and analyses of four elements of the Planwerk Innenstadt: housing, community development, transportation, and sustainability. The paper concludes in Chapter 5, with a brief discussion on the ephemeral quality of city planning in Berlin, as well as the present disconnect between planning and process in Berlin.
Figure 1-1. Berlin in Europe. [Courtesy of Google Earth. 2008].
Figure 1-2. Map of Mitte within the Berlin metropolitan area. [Courtesy of Wikimedia Commons. 2008].
Figure 1-3. An aerial view of Berlin’s Mitte district. [Courtesy of Google Earth. 2008].
CHAPTER 2
AN OVERVIEW OF URBAN PLANNING IN BERLIN

“That we use transparent building materials does not necessarily mean that we have a transparent open democracy. That depends on the people.” – Barbara Jakubeit, Berlin Building Director, 1995 (as quoted in Neill, 2000, p. 4).

To understand how East and West Berlin came to be and remain different from one another, one must understand the roots and fall of the GDR. Furthermore, it is any discussion on urban planning’s role throughout the course of Berlin’s development requires background on the relevant issues and stakeholders

**Berlin before November 9, 1989**

The earliest documents mentioning Berlin date back to the early thirteenth century, and in fact, refer to two smaller towns. Cölln and Berlin were two adjacent towns, granted charters in the late twelfth century by the Holy Roman Emperor. Divided by the River Spree, Cölln was the island on the river, while Berlin inhabited the mainland to the East. The two towns remained allied throughout the thirteenth century, and eventually Berlin, the name of the larger town, came to represent both. As the Prussia and House of Hohenzollern grew more powerful, Berlin expanded in its role as capital. When the Hohenzollerns built their castle on the city’s western edge, it was done as a symbol of their interest in strategically expanding the city, both physically and politically. Scholars have argued that it was precisely this western interest that influenced Berlin’s development from then on (Zappe, 2002). For example, the succeeding line of Hohenzollern rulers mandated that their citizens settle west of the castle. This development pattern led to neglect of the oldest medieval parts of the city, as expansion was focused towards the west in a symbolic political maneuver.

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, Berlin underwent one of its most important expansions, represented by the Friedrichstadt plan. This plan first introduced the strict pattern of
blocks and streets still present in Mitte. As Prussia accumulated power during the nineteenth century, the city’s form took on grander and more militaristic qualities. Berlin became Germany’s capital in 1871 as a result of the Second German Empire’s consolidation under Prussian rule. As Zaffe (2002) explains, during this period “the emperors remained where the kings and the Elector already resided, but the representatives of the people moved westwards to the outskirts in front of the city gate, the Brandenburg Gate” (p. 171). Consequently, the German Empire’s Parliament building, the Reichstag, was built one block west of the Brandenburg Gate, on the northern edge of the Tiergarten, the ruler’s hunting grounds. At this time, the Tiergarten lay at the city’s western borders; state representatives, then, began to move away from the city center, creating neighborhoods adjacent to the Reichstag and Tiergarten.

The democratic Weimar Republic was established after World War I. Because of the problems affecting German politics and economics as a result of the First World War, the Weimar period did little to further affect urban form or planning. It is important to note, however, that it was under this era that the renowned Bauhaus architecture school explored the concept of the modern city, in attempt to apply new ideas to a devastated Europe. The Weimar Republic ruled from the Reichstag until 1933, when Adolf Hitler’s Third Reich assumed power.

Adolf Hitler wanted to completely change the city, as he demanded for Berlin to be second to no other city in Europe. According to Hitler’s plans, Unter den Linden, the historic east-west axis connecting the Palace to the Reichstag needed a complementary north-south axis. This north-south axis was to be five times wider than the east-west axis (Zappe, 2002). Along with architect Albert Speer, Hitler designed Germania, a plan that called for the demolition of much of Berlin’s center, replacing it with a monumental Classical city. By 1942, when the Allied
bombed campaigns began, the National Socialists had already begun demolishing parts of the city to make way for the north-south axis and the new chancellery.

The bombing campaigns did indeed clear significant sections of the city. By the end of the Second World War, “about 2 million tons of bombs dropped by the British and US Air Forces had hit their targets;” Berlin was attacked 29 times (Schildt, 2002, p. 141). Aerial maps as late as 1953, show a myriad of empty lots. Topographical maps from the same era offer a glimpse into the unbelievable level of destruction; Berlin now had hills where none had previously existed, as mountains of rubble were simply covered with land. In the 1950s and 1960s, the city remained a veritable no man’s land on both administrative sides, with few rebuilding or construction projects.

The East German and West Berlin governments established their administrative centers early in the city’s post-war division. The German Democratic Republic (GDR) established their city center on Berlin’s original medieval site; their parliamentary building was constructed on the site of the Hohenzollern Palace. Since West Berlin did not serve as the capital of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), it had no need to establish a strong administrative district.

The most historic areas of the city fell within the GDR’s jurisdiction (See Figure 2-1). While many of the buildings irreparably destroyed during the War were demolished, several cultural buildings (e.g. the museums on Museuminsel (formerly Cölln), the State Opera House, and the Rat Haus) were saved. In keeping with a socialist planning tradition, large areas for public rallies were created, particularly near the Lustgarten. Much of the surviving baroque and classical architecture between the Palace and the Tiergarten was neglected, as this became a buffer zone between East and West. Similarly, on the Western half, Potsdamer Platz—previously one of the most vibrant parts of the city, became a no man’s land; it experienced the double
misfortune of having been leveled during the War, and standing on West Berlin’s eastern edge after the War. In 1961, the GDR erected the Wall to serve as an “antifascist protective rampart” against the West (Ladd, 1997, p. 19). The Wall ran through the city, becoming the physical symbol (the Iron Curtain) of the omnipresent East-West divide during the Cold War and the consequence of a country’s blind faith in their supposed historical destiny. The Reichstag lay on the West Berlin’s Eastern periphery, with the Wall running behind it, perhaps symbolically keeping with the Prussian vision of a western-looking state.

The Political and Economic Context of Urban Development after 1989

Political Life

Creating and enacting policies, including urban planning and development policies, necessarily involve going through a political process. This section’s goal is to provide an overview of the political system, parties, and institutional structures under which urban planning decisions are made in Germany, but more specifically in Berlin.

German federal system

In 1989, two options were presented during unification discussions. German unification could be enacted based on either Article 146 or Article 23 of the West German Basic Law (Kocka, 1994, p. 175). Article 146 called for the creation of a new constitution, to be negotiated and voted on by all Germans. Article 23, on the other hand, allowed the “accession of the GDR to the Federal Republic, whose constitution would remain unchanged,” and therefore applied to Germany as a whole (Kocka, 1994, p. 175). In other words, Article 146 would have led to drawn-out negotiations and dialogues as to what the “new” Germany should be and look like, whereas Article 23’s implementation was a quick way to unite the country, despite its colonialist undertones. East Germany was therefore “completely assimilated by West Germany and in
return not only received the Deutschmark but also a fine-meshed network of rules and regulations” (Venhuizen, 2004, p. 92).

Along with general unification, the federal government had to incorporate the new Länder into the existing intergovernmental system, including the city-state of Berlin. As Elizabeth Strom (2001) explains, “in this system, the state government is, in principle, the most important level of government for making and implementing domestic policy” (p. 19). While the federal government is responsible for foreign affairs, currency, trade, and defense, it is the state government that is in charge of everyday services, ranging from education, police, and cultural affairs to health. Moreover, the state governments are responsible for urban economic development, including infrastructure and municipal services. The city of Berlin falls within the jurisdiction of the state of Berlin, which includes smaller cities like Potsdam and Oranienburg.

Intergovernmental cooperation can be traced back to a series of constitutional amendments (Paragraphs 91a and b, Paragraph 104a) passed in 1969 which outlined the scope of intergovernmental responsibilities (Gemeinschaftsaufgaben) (Strom, 2001). With unification, the new east German states were structured as to be included in the Gemeinschaftsaufgaben. Although certain tasks are officially delegated to the state governments, these amendments made all major policy initiatives (transportation, regional development, planning, agriculture, etc.) joint tasks; local governments were responsible for planning and execution, with both the state and federal government sharing funding responsibilities. Furthermore, intergovernmental cooperation is perennially present due to voluntary cooperation between state governments to establish some sort of uniform policies (Strom, 2001). This cooperation to ensure policy uniformity is not required by law, leading social scientist Peter Katzenstein to proclaim that Germany has a “decentralized state, [and] centralized society” (Katzenstein, 1987, p. 15).
Although the federal government is not directly responsible for urban planning and development *qua* urban planning, they can opt to pass legislation to equalize living conditions throughout the country. Article 72 of the Basic Law (1949) states that,

The Federation shall have the right to legislate on these matters if and to the extent that the establishment of equal living conditions throughout the federal territory or the maintenance of legal or economic unity renders federal regulation necessary in the national interest.

Because of this requirement, the federal government issued a spatial development law to create equal living conditions. Although these laws of course apply equally throughout the country, their intent is to decrease physical inequalities (as well as social and economic inequalities) between west and east Germany. Paragraph 1 of the federal spatial development law states that the total area of the Federal Republic of Germany “has to be developed, organized, or secured according to special regional development policies or plans and through the coordination of every plan or development which has a spatial impact” (Eltges and Strubelt, 2007, p. 60).

According to the spatial development law, regional planning policy has the duty to create and formulate physical planning goals as the basis for other policies. In Berlin’s case, it is the city-state’s duty to design and carry out such plans accordingly.

**Local government within the federal system**

Unlike American and British cities, Article 28 of the Basic Law grants German cities and municipalities local autonomy; that is, the cities are allowed to undertake any activities not regulated elsewhere. After reunification, Eastern states were paired up with a Western “sister” state and adopted their governmental model (e.g. strong mayoral system or strong city council) (Strom, 2001). The three eastern city-states, Berlin, Bremen, and Hamburg, however, did not follow this model.

The governmental structures of the three city-states have more in common with other state governments than with city governments. They are run by a parliament and a series of cabinets.
(called Senats), which are “coordinated by a mayor whose power often derives more from his position as head of the ruling party than as ‘first among equals’ on the Senat” (Strom, 2001, p. 21). The city-states are then divided into districts (Bezirke). In 1920, Berlin was divided into twenty districts; the districts’ boundaries remained almost identical to the original ones until 2001, when the Senat reduced the number of districts to twelve. After World War II, the four main Allied powers maintained the district boundaries, apportioning districts based on prescribed military occupation zones. The Soviets got eight districts, the Americans six, the British received four, and the French two; this distribution would mirror the physical distribution of districts that would lie on either side of the Wall during the Cold War. Although the historical center, Mitte, lay in the Soviet sector, “after 1961, it bordered the Wall on its southern, western, and most of its northern side” (Ladd, 1997, p. 13).

The districts carry out local functions—such as planning—usually reserved for municipal governments. As the districts are not granted autonomy, they principally act as commanded by the city government.

**Berlin’s Bezirke and urban development**

As noted above, the lowest layer of city government is the Bezirk, or district. With the reduced number of districts, the city is expected to annually save approximately $80 million (Strom, 2001, p. 31). Although the individual districts do not have any significant autonomy, they have been granted the authority to make their own spending decisions (Jetzt, 1994).

Berlin’s Constitution gives the central administration power over affairs affecting more than one district or requiring uniform administration; all other local decision-making is left up to the Bezirk (Strom, 2001). The district, then, is responsible for decisions regarding street names, administering homeless shelters, day care facilities, and senior citizens centers; most importantly, though, the Bezirk is responsible for actively participating in the policy area of urban planning.
District officials act as the official representatives of local interests, “a concept that has significance given the quasi-corporatist nature of certain policy-making processes” (Strom, 2001, p. 31). The approval of city plans or amendments to existing plans require consultation with the district officials as representatives of local public interests, even though the officials are not actually responsible. Local Bezirk officials are equally involved as jurists in architectural competitions. This cooperative system, however, has created some problems with new developments, particularly in the eastern districts.

Because of the grassroots power exercised in the districts, Berlin’s eastern districts (particularly the focus of this study, Mitte, the site of intense development pressures), have become prolific players in unification politics and planning. Since unification, Mitte’s Bezirk has been led by individuals with strong feelings about preserving facets of GDR architecture and planning—or at least not neglecting their value. In the early 1990s, Mitte’s first elected building director, Dorothee Dubrau, attempted to block several development projects, claiming that she was simply asserting her constituents interests in the face of capitalist investment, development, and planners (Strom, 2001). Her successor, Karin Baumert, attempted to prevent the inauguration of a building in Leipziger Platz, as the developer had built a structure with three more storeys than permitted; the building was to be American Jewish Congress, and any opposition would be questionable, at best (Strom, 2001, p. 33).

The Bezirk will play a pivotal role in this examination of Berlin’s newest city plan in Mitte. Emotions and beliefs about acknowledging, if not preserving, East Germany’s legacy are still strong in many east Berliners. The Bezirk is the place where they let their voices be heard.

Centralized City Planning

Berlin’s urban landscape is uniquely politicized because of the numerous layers of history present in the city. It is a difficult task for academics, let alone city planners, to decide what the
German *Stunde Null* ("zero hour"), where the present breaks from the past, is. The question of the *Stunde Null* became extremely relevant during dialogues on how to plan the city after the fall of the Wall; what plan or era should present day planners look to as the last “true” city plan from which to build upon? In the twentieth century, one could look at the city’s form before World War I, after the establishment of the Weimar Republic, during the National Socialist regime, during the forty years of division, or after the reunification of the 1990s; each of these offers a different urban form.

It is post-unification planners’ job to treat the city’s streets, buildings, and real estate in a way that is not only respectful, but cognizant of the needs of a growing, vibrant city. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the old city center was expected to return to its role within the urban landscape. The main problem, though, is that much of that center had either become a no-man’s land, or had been destroyed during the War and rebuilt according to socialist planning principles. This section looks at some issues present in Berlin’s contemporary city planning. Rather than discussing problems arising from the immediate post-war years (1945-49), this paper concentrates on the post-1949 era.

**Cold War City Planning**

On May 19, 1945, eleven days after Germany’s surrender, architect Hans Scharoun was named head of the (still-united) city’s Housing and Construction Division by the Soviet occupation forces, and given the task of creating a new city plan. Berlin had not yet been decisively partitioned, nor had its future as a capital city been decided. The Allied bombing campaigns had destroyed much of the city, though not all. Scharoun and his design team, however, saw this opportunity to treat the city as a *tabula rasa* (blank slate). The resulting “Collective Plan” was that of a prototypical modernist city, with glass skyscrapers, wide plazas,
and long stretches of highway (Berlin Ministry of Urban Development, 1994). Scharoun’s “Collective Plan” was never realized due to the city’s division in 1949.

Throughout the late 1940s, newly appointed building and planning officials found themselves entrenched in bureaucracy and discussions about the city’s future form. Meanwhile, the renowned *Trümmerfrauen* (“rubble women”) worked endlessly to clear rubble and war debris. In essence, it was these women that adopted the supposed roles of the planning and construction divisions: to clean up and rebuild as soon as possible.

After the War, the historic city center lay within East Berlin, making the GDR’s capital physically easier to establish. In 1950, the SED leadership developed the “Sixteen Principles of City Building,” in response to need for reconstruction, especially in the housing sector (German Institute for Economic Research, 1989). The document stressed the city as the “economically and culturally richest settlement form for the collective existence of men,” and prescribed polycentric, multifunctional city centers as the best strategy to create meeting places for citizens throughout the urban landscape (Flierl, 1991, p. 51). Traditional suburbs and garden cities were all but prohibited, as leading Soviet architects and planners thought that these would subvert man’s role as a worker and political entity.

Throughout most of the GDR’s existence, East Berlin’s built environment, as a socialist capital, was dedicated to being on the frontline against the capitalist west. Consequently, the city built massive high-rise buildings on the edges, near the Wall (See Figure 2-2); these structures were meant to symbolically further insulate the East from any Western decadence or influence. Furthermore, the GDR erected a giant television tower at Alexanderplatz that could be seen from anywhere in the city—East or West.
Keeping with socialist planning and design, East Berlin has wide boulevards and plazas that served as stages for political ceremonies. The most important two were the Marx-Engels Platz across from the Palace of the Republic, the Lustgarten space in front of the Altesmuseum. This area effectively became the city’s governmental center (See Figure 2-3). Since the Reichstag did not fall within the GDR, administrative and parliamentary functions had to be moved further east. The GDR’s new parliamentary building, the Palace of the Republic, was built on the land previously occupied by the Hohenzollern Palace. Further discussion about this action’s symbolism and ramifications will be discussed below.

Unlike East Berlin, West Berlin did not inherit an obvious city center. The Tiergarten and the Reichstag belonged to West Berlin, albeit on its Eastern edge. The government, however, did not want to build a new city center further west because they saw this as a suggestion that the city’s division would be permanent. To solve this problem, Western city planners continued the tradition begun by the House of Hohenzollern centuries before: orient the city towards the west, without abandoning the East.

The area around the Tiergarten’s western edge, Zoologische Garten—the same area government representatives migrated to during the early years of the Second Empire—became West Berlin’s downtown. In the 1980s, as perestroika and glasnost gained momentum, planning officials began to reconsider revitalizing the Reichstag and surrounding areas. The last attempt at rebuilding this area took place in 1957-58 during a Senate-sponsored architectural competition entitled “Capital City Berlin” (Strom, 2001). The overall goal of this competition was to rebuild the city center in such a way that could be amenable to a “greater Berlin” come reunification.

The competition did not result in an effective plan for the city center. Instead, Hans Scharoun, formerly the East Berlin’s Housing and Construction Division Director, designed what
would be known as the *Kulturforum*, a district of cultural facilities along the Spree, to the southwest of Potsdamer Platz. Still following a modernist aesthetic, Scharoun designed a series of massive, disconnected buildings to house the new national gallery and the Berlin Philharmonic Orchestra. This cultural district is arguably the West’s most enduring planning legacy from the Cold War period.

**Post-Socialist Planning**

The initial breaching of the Berlin Wall may be regarded as fairly anti-climactic considering the monumental consequences of the event. Within a year of the initial breach, November 9, 1989, East Germans had voted in favor of accession. By July 1, 1990, the Ostmark was replaced by West German currency; on October 1, 1990, the Federal Republic’s Basic Law became the official legal document a reunited Germany.

Although East Germany’s political and economic legacy could be preliminarily evaluated in the months following reunification, it would prove much harder to determine the effects that the socialist morphology imposed upon the city and its historic center would have on unification planning. Furthermore, the events of 1990 quickly thrust East German citizens into new political and economic systems. Along with GDR’s political and economic transformation into the FRG, Berliners on both sides were forced to consider what to do with the restructuring not only of the historical landmarks, but of the city as a whole.

**Administrative restructuring**

Massive unemployment was but one adverse effect felt by Easterners following unification. The Federal Republic’s government could not accommodate the over two million people (approximately 12 percent of a total population of 17 million) employed by the German Democratic Republic (Strom, 2001; German Institute for Economic Research, 1989). One of the most important tasks, then, became “weeding out” those who held government positions in the
GDR due to Party allegiance rather than technical expertise, or those who were unwilling to learn
the laws of the new political system.

Unlike other Eastern districts, East Berlin experienced relatively little administrative
upheaval, as it was incorporated into West Berlin’s existing government structure. As Elizabeth
Strom (2001) explains, “there was no movement to draw up a new state constitution, establishing
a new government apparatus, or even build new party organizations; those of West Berlin simply
became all-inclusive” (p. 58). Indeed some former GDR employees found positions in the new
government; others were purged due to lack of skill or imprudent political allegiance. Many
more, still, were forced to retire.

The local Bezirke served as positive career options for many east Berliners, possibly to the
chagrin of western planning officials. The Bezirke served an important purpose in the early years
of unification. Since Berlin’s Bezirke maintained virtually the same boundaries they had during
the city’s division, disenfranchised easterners became involved in something that seemed
familiar amidst all the West German novelty (Berlin Ministry of Urban Development, 1994).

Despite renewed involvement in the Bezirke, Bezirk administration was having a difficult
time finding qualified personnel, particularly in Mitte and Prenzlauer Berg, “where property
values increased most rapidly, district planning officials were inundated with building
applications, creating pressures that would be daunting to even the most experienced bureaucrat”
(Strom, 2001, p. 60). In these districts it was particularly difficult to find administrative workers
with sufficient familiarity with the new laws and the private real estate market system. As late as
1997, only two building department administrators processed over 2,500 building approvals in
Mitte (Strom, 2001, p. 60).
Such adjustment problems yielded problems for Mitte’s Bezirk. Berlin’s construction Senator tried to gain some control over the Bezirk, claiming that they lacked efficiency and an adequate level of expertise to deal with some of the most desired real estate in the city. Furthermore, by gaining control over the Bezirk, the construction Senator would be able to dilute some of the development obstacles posed by local citizen groups active in the Bezirk. In the spirit of allowing Bezirke to remain autonomous, the city refused the Senator’s proposals. The city believed that the best way to indeed develop Mitte was to engage residents, addressing their concerns before pursuing any further development projects.¹

**Privatizing the economy – the Treuhandanstalt**

The introduction of a free market economy with a common currency was one of the most dramatic changes experienced by East Germans. Privatization in united Germany occurred much faster than in other post-socialist countries, due to its incorporation of the existing Federal system, rather than having to start anew. The Treuhandanstalt (THA), a “public, government controlled, but highly autonomous and controversial corporation,” was founded in March 1990 with the purpose of “taking over and privatizing state-owned and collectivized enterprises of the GDR” (Kocka, 1994, p. 178). By 1993, the Treuhand had sold about 78 percent and liquidated 17 percent of approximately sixteen thousand property units, encompassing a total of 8,500 businesses employing 4.1 million people (Kocka, 1994; Strom, 2001). The majority of these properties were sold or taken over by West German investors, entrepreneurs, and managers. Arguably, the most controversial aspect of the THA was the fact that public money was used by investors to restructure the newly acquired properties.

By 1994, the THA had succeeded in privatizing fourteen thousand businesses, while preserving only about a quarter of the original workforce (Strom, 2001). In East Berlin, the greatest effects were felt in industrial sector jobs. The enormous industrial infrastructure only became evident after unification; it was the THA’s job to dismantle it, as most was obsolete compared to the same industries in the west. Those companies that were not closed were instead restructured, retaining only about half of the original workforce (Strom, 2001).

Because the THA’s principal objective was to sell unneeded state-owned property to bring in capital needed to reinvest in ameliorating conditions in the east, some of the real property holdings were sold at significantly reduced rates. The THA quickly realized that selling all the surplus real estate at once would “result in depressed property markets and provide incentive to speculate” (Strom, 2001, p. 63). To solve this problem, in 1991, the THA created a real estate subsidiary organization, the Treuhand Liegenschaftsgesellschaft (TLG). The TLG acted as a brokerage company for land and property held by the THA (Kocka, 1994). Furthermore, the senate and Bezirk officials created the Berliner Modell (Berlin Model), where they would meet monthly to determine what properties should be offered for sale and when (Strom, 2001). This administrative structure gave affected locals increased input as to the fate their neighborhood’s character. Despite the Berliner Modell, however, much of the available property in Mitte has been sold without significant Bezirk consultation; real estate transactions around Alexanderplatz are but one example.

Restitution

In Germany, and specifically in Berlin, property restitution has become a complicated legal process with a wide array of actors. On the eve of unification, a majority of real property in East Germany was publically owned (German Institute for Public Research, 1989). This is not to say that private ownership did not exist. Individuals owned homes and multi-family apartment
buildings; a select few even had commercial holding, although it was discouraged. Most property came under state ownership during the 1940s, when the Soviet authorities confiscated property belonging to “Nazis and War Criminals;” later on, the state seized properties abandoned by families fleeing to the West, as well as properties which owners were unable to maintain (Strom, 2001, p. 64). As it would be impractical for the GDR’s government to administer all of these properties, this duty was delegated to the state or local government.

The 1990 Unification Contract granted former owners of property in GDR restitution rights, arguing for compensation only in cases where restitution was impossible (Strom, 2001). This proved to be more complicated than anyone could have predicted, and is filled with exceptions to the rule. First, unified German government agreed that property confiscated by Soviet authorities during 1945-49, before the creation of the GDR, would be ineligible for restitution. Second, with the declaration that former owners of East German property would be allowed restitution, many residents living in possibly contested properties quickly bought their property, in order to obtain deeds supporting their ownership. This was made possible because the FRG would uphold the owner’s property rights if the transaction was legally completed before formal unification. Previous owners, then, would only be allowed compensation in these instances (Kocka, 1994, p. 178). Berlin’s Landesamt zur Regelung offener Vermögensfragen (LAROV, the State Office for the Resolution of Open Property), “maintains that of the 70,000 East Berlin residents who have claimed to be legal owners of their homes, only two hundred had been shown to have acquired title under suspicious circumstances” (Strom, 2001, p. 66).

Property restitution and compensation becomes more complicated, as West German law allows for claims dating back to property held in 1933 (with the aforementioned exception of the period of Soviet occupation). Although anyone with legitimate property claims dating to 1933
can file, this law is primarily for former Jewish owners. Commonly, heirs living abroad or the Jewish Claims Conference (for Holocaust victims without heirs) file a property claim, with the implicit knowledge that they will receive compensation (Berlin Ministry of Urban Development, 1994). The Jewish Claims Conference contributes whatever property compensation they receive towards a fund to help Holocaust survivors. In some cases, however, owners/heirs are granted restitution. Elizabeth Strom (2001) explains that “restored Jewish property has thus been part of the first wave of privatized commercial and residential buildings sold to property developers and is therefore at the vanguard of postunification property speculation” (p. 66).

Property rights issues are central to development in Berlin, particularly in Mitte. Berlin has seen approximately 300,000 applications for restitution; 170,000 applications were for real estate, with 30,000 applications for property expropriated during the National Socialist regime. In Mitte, “90 percent of all property is subject to property claims… not many claimants, however, actually get their properties back” (Strom, 2001, p. 67). As of 2001, out of 17,460 property claims in Mitte, only 3,300 were deemed legitimate; out of those, 1,100 received compensation instead of restitution (Strom, 2001).

**Economic and Fiscal Crisis**

The City of Berlin is presently bankrupt.\(^2\) Integrating the Eastern half of the city has come at a great cost, including little growth and high unemployment rates. This section will look at Berlin’s economic and fiscal situation since unification, and the ramifications it has for urban development.

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\(^2\) As of late 2007, all data demonstrates that the city of Berlin is running a deficit.
Economic restructuring since unification

Although the German economy immediately benefitted from unification, by 1993 economic growth had become stagnant and unemployment had risen (Eltges and Strubelt, 2007). By 1997, Berlin’s unemployment rate was over 17 percent (Strom, 2001, p. 83). These dramatic job losses were directly related to the city’s deindustrialization programs, specifically those administered by the THA. Further restructuring in the manufacturing sector leading to job losses is forecast up to 2010 (Eltges and Strubelt, 2007). The fact that the reduction in industry and manufacturing has transpired in a matter of years rather than decades has made it difficult for the economy to adapt.

The city is also lacking long-term economic stability due to its lack of company headquarters. Many larger companies retained their headquarters elsewhere, providing Berlin with only a satellite office. By not hosting corporate headquarters, there are less employment opportunities for high-skilled professionals often sought to work in higher levels (e.g. legal, accounting, and consulting specialists).

To offset this problem, the city government hoped to capitalize on its geography and on the city’s new capital role. Berlin was once considered to be the bridge between Eastern and Western Europe. Technological improvements and globalization, however, have made it so that companies situated in Paris, London, or Frankfurt have little cause or incentive to move their main operations to Berlin. If the city relies too heavily on strategic positioning to attract business, then little growth can be expected. Economic leaders, though, maintain that geography will be a major draw in the future (Eltges and Strubelt, 2007).

Fiscal crisis

The deterioration of Berlin’s economic well-being is linked to the city’s fiscal problems. In 2004, the European Union (EU), along with intergovernmental cooperation with federal and state
governments, allocated Germany €30 billion in European structural funds “aimed at reducing disparities between levels of development within various regions and the backwardness of disadvantaged regions or islands, including rural areas” (European Commission, 2004). Berlin has received funding based on objective 2 of paragraph 158 of the European Union Contract.³ The purpose of these funds is to help create equal living conditions between the two halves of the country (and in turn, the city), both of which are plagued by unemployment and high rents (Eltges and Strubelt, 2007, p. 70).

The roots of Berlin’s fiscal problems lie in the Germany’s national recession in the mid 1990s and in the reduction of federal subsidies which had supported West Berlin during the Cold War, soon after unification. The latter’s has arguably been the largest contributor to the city’s fiscal problems. During the Cold War, federal subsidies had underwritten a large portion of West Berlin’s budget. Between 1993 and 1994, Berlin’s subsidies were abruptly reduced by 30 percent, a cut from which the city has still not yet recovered (Eltges and Strubelt, 2007). Although the city still receives some support, it is nowhere near pre-unification levels; in 1998, “federal subsidies and inter-state transfer payments account[ed] for 30 percent of the city’s income” (Strom, 2001, p. 87).

The city’s expenses, however, have been hard to control, as they have increased much faster than revenues. Consequently, the city runs extremely large deficits. The majority of government spending here goes to the large number of public employees. The city employs 90.6 civil servants for every 1,000 residents, significantly more than the average 23.3 per 1,000 residents for other German territorial states, including 66.8 for Hamburg (Strom, 2001, p. 87). Furthermore, Berlin has to deal with unique operating and maintenance costs, as they have two

³ Objective 2 offers “Support for those regions which have economic and social problems, e.g. old industrial or rural areas, problematic urban areas and coastal regions” (European Commission, 2004).
opera houses, two state libraries, and three public universities, all a result of the city’s division. Finally, the city’s budget is further strained by the demands of fixing neglected infrastructure inherited from the eastern sector. The remaining federal subsidies and EU structural funds are barely able to keep up with the city’s expenditures for basic operations and maintenance. This has led to Berlin’s essentially being bankrupt.

**Additional Actors and Their Roles**

There are a wide array of actors within Berlin’s urban planning and development network. In addition to actors in the federal, city-state and Bezirke levels, this section briefly describes the role of real estate developers and architects in the reunified city.

**Real Estate Development**

As discussed above, real estate development in Berlin can be a complicated task because of issues surrounding property rights. The introduction of a global real estate market immediately after unification helped the city’s economy and global profile. Although Berlin’s real estate market is currently oversaturated due to the large number of projects completed in the late 1990s, the city still attracts investors. These investors, in turn, create much needed employment opportunities. Although the city no longer offers the generous subsidy packages of the early 1990s, development and redevelopment projects are still predicted to continue, most notably Hans Kollhoff’s redevelopment of Alexanderplatz (See Figure 2-4). This project will create a series of high-rises near the historic center that will redefine the city’s skyline. Although Berlin has downtown outflow patterns similar to those found in the United States, much of this new development is aimed at drawing families in from the suburbs. As long as developable lots exist throughout the city, real estate development will remain a ubiquitous actor in Berlin’s urban planning discussions.
Public policy and demand

In Berlin, as in the United States, public policy decisions and real estate markets are inherently intertwined. Soon after unification, in an attempt to increase investment in East Berlin, the federal government began offering generous subsidies to real estate investors. The most significant subsidy called for a “50 percent tax write-off over five years for investment costs on any commercial or residential development” (Strom, 2001, p. 121). As a result of this subsidy, approximately $9.5 billion worth of real estate development took place throughout Eastern Germany between 1992 and 1994 (Eltges and Strubelt, 2007).

This building boom led to the construction of a myriad of new projects in Berlin in anticipation of the move of the government from Bonn; early estimates expected the creation of approximately 100,000 new office jobs (Strom, 2001). This figure, though, was severely inflated, as the move only created 36,000 new office jobs. As a result, Berlin now has significantly more office space than it can fill; many of the buildings in Potsdamer Platz, for example, are largely vacant. Although the government helped subsidize the building projects, so far it has done little to ensure that the buildings do indeed have occupants.

Developers and the state

A city’s economic development—regardless of location—is intrinsically tied to real estate. After unification, international developers flocked to Berlin, where they saw ample opportunities for significant development projects. These newcomers were unfamiliar with the traditional public-private partnerships fostered during the early reunification years, like the importance of a developer’s relationship with a Bezrike. In the historic city center, however, the dizzying pace of development followed traditional real estate logic (Eltges and Strubelt, 2007). As Strom (2001) explains, here,
the pace and scale of building have been set by property developers from around the world, eager to gain access to a hot, new location. These international players have bid up the price for certain central locations, and in the process produced more office space than the city can really use for the next decade or longer. (p. 131)

International advertisements for these projects are not based on “just” selling a building. Instead, they focus on selling culturally significant images. It is no surprise then, that many office projects have been developed proximate to old east-west border crossings, most notably Checkpoint Charlie. Others are developed on strips of land previously occupied by the Berlin Wall. Although many buildings have been erected on these plots, many of them remain partially vacant. As discussed above, companies have little incentive to move operations to Berlin. Situating one’s development historically significant land alone is seldom sufficient allure for prospective investors.

**Experts, Architects, and the Built Environment**

The task of reuniting two halves of a city has attracted armies of social scientists, critics, developers, planners, and architects, each of whom claims to have the ultimate solution. But as Ladd (1997) notes, in Berlin “they cannot avoid the simultaneous identity crises of architecture, cities, and the nation. Amid the city’s fragile and contested urban traditions, the prospect of so much that is new raises fear of losing whatever historical identity remains” (p. 226). In the wake of unification, east Berlin’s center (i.e. Alexanderplatz and surrounding areas) needs to undergo major renovations. Instead of working with a tabula rasa, however, architects and planners are faced with complicated laws and regulations. The city has found that the simplest way to solve this quagmire is to go back an age-old architectural tradition: “competitive charrettes.”

**The architects’ debate**

Architectural historian Dieter Hoffmann-Axthelm, writes that “in spite of all destruction Berlin is an extant city, shaped by history. We do not need to invent a new city, certainly not the
metropolis of the third millennium” (in Ladd, 1997, p. 231). The challenge presented to those interested in the built environment, then, lies in understanding and physically restoring Berlin’s identity, and in finding its essence amidst a century of war and division.

While working on the design for Potsdamer Platz, British architect Richard Rogers noted that Berlin’s planning and design process was “much too bound” to the past; the past in this case, refers to the period 1900-1910 (in Ladd, 1997, p. 233). This period is regarded as a dynamic and modern period in the city’s history, before World War I, Weimar, and the National Socialists. Between these years, architects were transforming the city from a Wilhelmine capital to sleek and streamlined modern one. Furthermore, this early modern era is regarded as the last time that a common, pure German tradition was being pursued in the built environment. Consequently, conceptual inspiration for the latest city plan, the Planwerk Innenstadt, draws heavily from the city’s morphology during this period (See Figure 2-5). Architects attempt to incorporate the corresponding early modern style to their projects in homage to architecture lost during the National Socialist regime and the Second World War. Consequently, Richard Rogers suggests that a break similar to the one cited in the Stunde Null be applied to architecture and urban development; the city should separate itself from its past and start anew (Ladd, 1997).

Some architects, like Rogers, believe that Berlin’s preoccupation with the past prohibits it from moving forward. Vittorio Magnago Lampugnani, director of the German Architecture Museum in Frankfurt believes that “the fear of the past has condemned German architecture to disorder by banishing all convention and tradition” (in Ladd, 1997, p. 234). His belief stems from the taboo of preserving or incorporating fascist architectural elements into contemporary projects. But like many Germans, Lampugnani believes in acknowledging and accepting the past, for better or worse. A city is made up of what Dolores Hayden (1995) calls layers of
history. Even if one chooses to ignore the layers, they are still present throughout the city, from the streets to the buildings, to the trees. Architects who believe in acknowledging and accepting the past attempt to preserve existing buildings, despite what period they come from. Furthermore, these architects and planners often incorporate historical detailing into their projects, in a post-modern homage to Berlin’s “organic” architecture.

**Competitions**

Berlin’s architecture competitions have attracted so-called “superstar” architects like Frank Gehry, Renzo Piano, Hans Hollein, and Hans Kollhoff. These architects’ projects have revitalized interest in rebuilding the capital city. Before any major development project is begun, it must go through an architectural competition; most recently, Hans Kollhoff was granted the commission for the redevelopment of Alexanderplatz, and in 2008, a competition will be held to determine the future design of the Humboldt Center.

The tradition of competitive design goes back to the Internationale Bauaustellung (International Building Exhibition, or IBA), held in West Germany. The IBA changed urban development policies in the districts adjacent to the Wall. A heavily subsidized, multi-year urban redevelopment project, the IBA competitions “brought prominent architects to Berlin to design new apartment buildings that complemented their nineteenth century neighborhoods;” Frank Gehry, for example, built a high-rise apartment building through the IBA (Ladd, 1997, p. 228). The IBA helped city planners and architects rediscover how to understand and preserve an existing and functioning city. One of the most important contributions that the IBA had towards urban planning was shifting the focus from modern car-oriented development patterns to mixed-use forms, inspired by traditional nineteenth century German neighborhoods.
These competitions followed precedent established in the early in the century. As Rykwert (2000) explains, “previous efforts at rebuilding—two ‘exhibitions,’ which were in fact large-scale construction programs—harnessed public enterprise to private investments (p. 239).

Urban Planning, Memory, and Cultural Inclusion

Cultural Identity

Culture is an ever-present force, influencing most—if not all—planning decisions. It is important to consider cultural identity when discussing post-unification development in Berlin, as it is a reoccurring point of contention. William J.V. Neill (2000) warns against using the term “cultural” identity because of the difficulty in defining culture. The issue of presenting individual versus collective identity also looms large. According to Castells (1997), individual identity is “a customized college of collective identifications” (p. 6-7). Collective identities, on the other hand, are constructed within the context of power relationships, “us[ing] building material from history, from geography, from biology, from productive and reproductive institutions, from collective memory and from personal fantasies, from power apparatuses and religious revelations” (Castells, 1997, p. 7). Cultural identities, then, can be seen as “particularly meaningful collective identities of overarching common significance to people who may be otherwise socially diversified in terms of experience” (Neill, 2000, p. 5).

When studying urban planning in Berlin after 1989, it is important to note the cultural identities that resulted from the city’s division. Although East and West Berliners have had over 15 years to forge new identities as simply “Berliners,” it is not uncommon to see allegiances to one part of the city. Forty years of living under competing systems—with all that entails—has left an indelible mark on the city’s residents. This idea is reinforced by the German word for being alive, Dasein, which literally translates to “being there.” As Neill (2000) explains, “identity has always been related to a physical space… experience, ‘being there’ in the city,
provides many opportunities and spaces for individual and collective identity formation and affirmation” (p. 6). Therefore, it is far more common to see long-time city residents as vocal community activists, based on long-term formed identities.

**Politics of Space**

During the Cold War, “official Eastern parlance knew no ‘East Berlin,’ only a remote and infrequently mentioned ‘Westberlin,’ which appeared as a blank space on the GDR’s city maps. On Western maps, by contrast, it was the Wall that was often inconspicuous, indicated only by a stripe barely distinguishable from those dividing the districts within East or West Berlin” (Ladd, 1997, p. 28). Since unification transpired under the stipulations written in Article 23 of the Basic Law, West Germany can be seen as the ultimate political winners. This dichotomy of winners and losers is still present in the minds of Berliners; nowhere does it become more evident than in discussions on the urban environment and how to rearrange the cityscape.

**Historic preservation**

The fall of the Wall restored Berlin as a political and cultural capital. The historical center, however, remained void of shops, homes, and corporate headquarters, as this was the area most directly affected by the Wall. This physical void had to be filled. Citizens and the government looked to common points of orientation to create a sense of fraternity and wholeness. Few people anticipated the problems that would arise throughout discussions of common points and historicized places. The last time the city had been one was under the National Socialist regime. Since both sides regarded themselves as the sole legitimate anti-fascist government, it was all but impossible (and undesirable) to seek commonalities rooted in the National Socialist period. The search for shared experiences and identities would have to look farther into the past.

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4 Historicized places are historic valuable places/structures, with contentious histories. Their worth is derived from their role in a particular era, or what they have come to symbolize in the aftermath.
The Nikolai Quarter is the best preserved medieval district in Berlin. Named after St. Nikolai, city’s oldest medieval church, it was the center of medieval Berlin, after unification with Cölln. Here, tourists and locals find cafes and shops typical of a German Altstadt, or old city center. During the Cold War, the Nikolai Quarter lay in East Berlin; West Berlin had no comparable Altstadt, with the exception of a distant suburb, Spandau (Ladd, 1997, p. 44). The most interesting fact about the Nikolai Quarter, though, is that it is almost entirely brand new, as it was rebuilt by the GDR using historic plans and drawings.

In 1979, all that stood in the Nikolai Quarter was rubble, ruins of the St. Nikolai Church, and some scattered buildings. East German planners authorized a plan by architect Günter Strahn to rebuild the neighborhood; this included rebuilding the church and carefully recreating rows of houses that had previously lined the narrow streets (Ladd, 1997, p. 45). Most of the housing structures, however, were not medieval; they were instead typical merchant homes dating from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In 1987, after meticulous restorative design and construction, the historically accurate Nikolai Quarter was completed, in time for Berlin’s 750th anniversary.

Towing a Party line, any GDR-sponsored project, the Nikolai Quarter restoration was officially regarded as commemorating a neighborhood of merchants, i.e. the proletarian. Ladd (1997) explains that the merchants that lived in the homes in the Quarter,

tested to the vigor of the new middle class at the end of the Middle Ages, rising to power in a feudal society and thus illustrating (in the most basic Marxist theory) the bourgeois revolution that was the prerequisite for the proletarian revolution that the Red Army brought to Germany in 1945.” (p. 46)

The GDR did not mean for the Nikolai Quarter restoration to only commemorate the International Worker’s struggle (May Day); they did it to also revitalize the derelict inner city. In addition to serving as a tourist destination for the city’s visitors and residents, the Nikolai
Quarter’s new buildings provided housing for over two thousand residents in a previously uninhabitable area of the city (Ladd, 1997). These buildings, unlike the East’s iconic pre-fabricated high-rises, maintained a “medieval” scale, with mass and form oriented towards the street. The architects’ attention to detail makes the buildings indistinguishable from authentic structures to all but the most astute architectural historian.

Why, then, did this small district receive criticism after reunification? Although it gave West Berliners a long awaited *Altstadt*, many saw it as inauthentic kitsch. The use of concrete was regarded as tasteless, and the re-creations were thought to be offensive to so-called “authentic” historic preservation (Ladd, 1997). The district became even more politicized in the mid-1990s, as the government attempted to deal with restitutions and other property claims. Furthermore, business privatization and the setting of rent prices led to some conflict between business owners and residents.

Many intellectuals regard this *Altstadt*, like others created out of war rubble, as inauthentic and kitschy; tour guides explain that Berliners avoid the Nikolai Quarter whenever they can, as only tourists go there. Despite the wide array of criticisms, the Nikolai Quarter has become one of the most vibrant areas in Mitte. Although its authenticity is sometimes challenged, medieval Germany is far enough in the past to not be hotly debated. Indeed, of all the GDR’s urban projects, the Quarter has experienced one of the smoothest transitions into the capitalist system. Furthermore, unlike the majority of GDR urban projects, the Nikolai Quarter will be indefinitely preserved, as it is seen to honor a distant past.

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5 *Altstadt* translates to Old City.
Cultural inclusion in the planning process

After Unification in 1989, Berlin’s planners set out to repair the urban fabric’s fragmentation by issuing strict guidelines for Mitte intended to restore the density and diversity destroyed by World War II and the Cold War. Their efforts coincided with the Eastern Berliner Ostalgie (nostalgia for the East) movement. This embracing of GDR planning and architecture by East Germans (and some West Germans too) is reflective of the aforementioned greater problems that have arisen from integration and Western planning schemes. There is a sense of alienation for Easterners resulting from reunification because of the difficulty some have faced in integrating into the free-market economy. The designs of iconic structures like the Palace of the Republic and the Plattenbauten fostered a sense of community and togetherness post-1989; this feeling was spurred because of the lack of economic growth and opportunities in the East.

Urban planners are confronted with issues of cultural exclusion every day in Berlin. In formulating a comprehensive plan for the reunified capital, the government has been loyal to what Iris Marion Young (2003) refers to as an outdated ideal of community: “the ideal of community exemplifies the logic of identity…This ideal expresses a desire for the fusion of subjects with one another which in practice operates to exclude those with whom the group does not identify” (p. 337). In Berlin, Young’s statement can apply to planners planning for reunification, but alienating minority populations. The Planwerk Innenstadt, for all its pretenses at community building, has in fact galvanized city residents (most of whom are living in Berlin’s eastern and central historic neighborhoods) (Süchting and Weiss, 2001). Moreover, though public forums intended to boost civic participation were introduced early in the planning process, these exercises in communicative planning left many eastern and Muslim Berlin residents dissatisfied with planners’ future visions for the city.
While Simone Hain (2001) may be exaggerating when referring to the new Plan as a “declaration of war,” she offers valid and relevant insight into how the city administrators and planners have provoked internal conflicts between East and West Berliners (p. 69). While developers and those interested in economic development in the historic center promote initiatives like the privatizing of public lands and introducing other commercial initiatives, they are often overlooking the infrastructure and architecture already in place—and often well-suited for the job—in those areas. Furthermore, the professional prejudice and conflicts between West and East Berlin planners further aggravates the situation. Berlin’s Building Director, Hans Stimmann, believes that urban planning and architecture should wait a generation before finding talented professionals from the East, as “there is no longer anyone who understands what commissioning a building means” (as cited in Hain, 2001, p. 77). Accordingly, during the Planwerk Innenstadt’s creation, no planners or architects from East Berlin were included, only those from the West. Both government officials and planners must realize that the first step in creating a wholly inclusive urban plan necessitates the inclusion of professionals from all sides which one is bringing together. Until officials in Berlin understand this, it will be impossible to begin an effective physical and economic reunification; until then, it will just be what Hain (2001) calls “a colonization by new settlers” (p. 72).

In order to go beyond Berlin as “the city at the edge of the Iron Curtain,” planners must be willing to accept the fact that division still exists, and it is not wrong to acknowledge this separation, all the while looking to the future. City image becomes an important facet to keep in mind, as it has the potential to stimulate the economy by bringing in tourists. By preserving various physical elements of Berlin’s extensive history, the city stops being the nucleus of the Cold War, and can instead become a multi-dimensional urban area. As Bernard Schneider (2001)
explains, Berlin has a second chance (p. 165). World-renown architects have discovered this and built projects in major plazas; it is time that residents and planners realize the same, and look to the future while still remembering the past.

Western planners presume that they can demolish important structures and engage in Critical Reconstruction in order to restore the lost character of Berlin’s urban environment. Who decides what this character is? For many East Berliners, no matter how economically or aesthetically prudent these “revitalization” initiatives are, they also convey a belief the GDR’s history is “erasable.” Thus, Germany now finds itself at a crossroads; it can destroy this history, or find something else to do with it.

One of the most politicized and polarizing plots of land in the city lies on Museuminsel, in the area previously known as Cölln. After the Second World War, much of the Hohenzollern Palace had been reduced to rubble; unlike many surrounding buildings, its foundation and first two storeys remained mostly intact. The East German government, in attempt to realize Karl Marx’s stages of history, destroyed the Palace’s remains, replacing them with the Palace of the Republic, East Germany’s parliamentary building.6

The Palace of the Republic was commissioned to architects Heinz Graffunder and Karl-Ernst Swora by the Honecker-led GDR government in 1973. The main goal of the Palace was to build an environment that would bring together Volk and Regierung. The Palace was meant as a “people’s house,” rather than an official “government house,” important principles in the social democratic tradition.

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6 Karl Marx outlines the stages of history in *The German Ideology*. They are primitive communism, slave society, feudalism, and communism. In *The State and Revolution*, Vladimir Lenin divided the last stage into socialism and communism; communism is the final stage, when the last vestiges of capitalism have disappeared.
The site the leaders of the GDR had chosen for the Palace is arguably one of the most historically important locations in Berlin (Ladd, 2002, p. 92). According to Ladd, “It was above all their desire to create a vast square for mass demonstrations that prompted them to demolish the badly damaged palace [Stadtschloss] in 1950” (Ladd, 2002, p. 92). In the years following the demolition, plans were made for a central government Stalinist skyscraper. In 1953, as Khrushchev denounced Stalin, new plans were made for a modernist building made of glass and marble to occupy the space.

The Palace embodies its political context as a “people’s palace.” As Ladd explains, it was “only secondarily a government building. It housed the insignificant national parliament as well as official gatherings such as party congresses, but mainly it was used for popular entertainment: concerts in its main hall, plus a theatre, bowling alley and several restaurants and bars, all affordable and open to the public” (Ladd, 2002, p.93). The incorporation of such recreational spaces also went along with Erich Honecker’s new perception of the citizen as consumer. The Palace was built using a special type of construction that allowed the alteration of its form, function, and aesthetics by pressing a few buttons (Palast, 2006, p.1). This allowed for a dynamic space that could be used for a myriad of functions, political or otherwise.

What had once been Berlin’s historic focal point became home to the GDR’s most popular attraction. The attraction was replete with political symbolism at work here; the masses were being drawn into the supposed hub of East Germany. A testament to the effectiveness of the design of the Palace can be seen with the preservation movement rooted in what was East Berlin. East Berliners hold fond memories of the Palace as a public and recreation space, rather than the seat of government. As such, orders from the current government to demolish the Palace passed
in 2002 have remained largely ignored; it was not until February 2006, amid various protests and petitions that cranes began to dismantle the Palace.

Memory

In the late 19th century, Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche wrote about his fellow Germans’ overdeveloped sense and feverish consumption of history. According to Nietzsche (1983),

A man who wanted to feel historically through and through would be like one forcibly deprived of sleep, or an animal that had to live only by rumination and ever repeated rumination. Thus: it is possible to live almost without memory and to live happily moreover, as the animal demonstrates; but is altogether impossible to live at all without forgetting. (p. 62)

Although Nietzsche acknowledged the importance of memory, he was also acutely aware of Germany’s propensity to self-flagellate while embracing the idea of German strength and destiny. Thus, he believed that balances between “the unhistorical and the historical are necessary in equal measure for the health of an individual, of a people, and of a culture” (Nietzsche, 1983, p. 63). Nietzsche was opposed to Germans’ Hegelian confidence after the creation of German Empire, and France’s defeat in the Franco-Prussian War.

Germany has a unique legacy within the specter of the twentieth century. Discussions of politics, memory, and the built environment will always be complicated by recollections of the two dictatorships (i.e. National Socialism and the SED system) that left doubly burdensome scars on the national landscape (Jarausch, 2002).

The Wall is recurring in discussions of memory because it is a starkly vivid symbol of the city’s division, and a physical manifestation of many of the memory and development issues Berliners are faced with. As Brian Ladd explains, “After 1989, the ‘wall inside our heads’ became the way Germans described post-Wall problems of German national identity—specifically the growing sense of difference between Easterners and Westerners (‘Ossis’ and ‘Wessis’)” (Ladd, 1997, p. 33). One of the Senate for Urban Development’s principal tasks is to
ease the sense of difference between Easterners and Westerners by creating a physical joint post-
war German history. Konrad Jarausch writes that “the very fact of their reunification raises the
question of whether and how to continue a national narrative after the end of division. It might
seem relatively simple to have two previously parallel lines once again intersect, but such a plot
line could turn out to be politically dangerous...” (Jarausch, 2002, p. 110). By imposing the
history of the victors (i.e. West Germany) on reunited Germany, the GDR ends up being treated
like a footnote in the greater scope of German history. Moreover, painting the GDR as a failed
experiment or a dark horse trivializes the experience of millions of Germans who lived in the
East. Berlin planners, then, must remain conscious of this debate, as they are responsible for
rebuilding the city that was once at the edge of two worlds.

Summary

The desire to forget—whether it be Hitler or Honecker—constantly struggles with a
determination to remember, creating a complicated environment for planners given the task of
blurring the lines of division, while somehow simultaneously acknowledging the existence of
said division, and everything that preceded it. This division, though, is precisely what makes
Berlin strikingly unique within the European urban development context. Fiscal, political, and
cultural tensions also strain planning and redevelopment efforts. The Planwerk Innenstadt, which
will be explored in chapter 4, attempts to mitigate some of the issues discussed above.
Figure 2-1. The Berlin Wall’s place in Berlin. [Reprinted with permission from Palgrave Macmillan. 2008].
Figure 2-2. High rises near the Wall. Bottom photograph is of a GDR model currently housed at the Senate for Urban Development. [Photographs taken by author. 2007.].
Figure 2-3. Marx-Engels Forum, East Berlin’s Central Government District. Top: Position within the city; Middle: GDR model looking westward from Alexanderplatz; Bottom: Marx-Engels Forum in 2007. [Photographs taken by author. 2007.].
Figure 2-4. Drawings of future plan for Alexanderplatz. [Reprinted with permission from Regina Poly. 2008.].
Figure 2-5. The evolution of Berlin – District Mitte (Overlay of maps from 1658-1700, 1915, and 2000). [Reprinted with permission from the Berlin Senate Department for Urban Development. 2008].
CHAPTER 3
MATERIALS AND METHODOLOGY

Characteristics

This paper examines the multiple claims competing in the city center to create a “European” capital. These claims involve the housing, community development, transportation, and sustainability elements of the Planwerk Innenstadt in Mitte, Berlin’s historic downtown district. This site was selected because it was the area most immediately affected by post-unification planning, as it straddled both sides of the Berlin Wall. Many of Berlin’s most iconic landmarks (and prolific projects) lie in this district, including Pariser Platz, Alexanderplatz, and Potsdamer Platz. Rykwert (2000) reiterates the importance of these sites,

If the city was to weld together, something had to be done about the derelict areas adjoining it, the Pariser Platz with its Brandenburg Triumphant Gate opening into the Tiergarten, the Reichstag and its forecourt to the north, as well as the Potsdamer and the Leipziger Plätze with their nexus of roadways to the south… Pariser Platz, which links the old city through its main avenue, Unter den Linden, and the adjoining streets… (p. 239-40)

In this study, physical unification is regarded as equally important to economic and political unification. Planners are charged with designing an overall urban structure meant to create a common identity, therefore uniting the city. The resulting Planwerk Innenstadt “is designed to re-create and strengthen relationships between these two city-centers, re-expose a common history and future, and assist the further development of these city center identities” (Süchting and Weiss, 2000, p. 57). As the Senate for Urban Development explains, development in Mitte “decisively influences the development in the entire metropolitan region. The city centre is the locomotive that propels Berlin and the region into the future” (Senatsverwaltung, 2007b, p. 28). By selecting the city center as this study’s focus area, the power of inner city to revitalize a region from the core outwards is affirmed.
Advanced capitalist cities, as explained by Mollenkopf and Castells (1992), are marked by high levels of class polarization, the coexistence of affluent, luxury residences and places of consumption alongside derelict slums. Berlin is arguably on that path. The Senate for Urban Development and many Bezirke have too noticed this trend, particularly those located in the city’s central districts (e.g. Mitte and Prenzlauer Berg). They believe that mistakes in city planning in the past fifty years have led to this gentrification, and accordingly planners and architects should take the lead in retarding (or even reversing) Berlin’s supposedly inevitable fate as a “typical” advanced capitalist city.

Many theorists argue that Berlin’s essence can be found in “the eighteenth-century block structures in Friedrichstadt and the dense pattern of five-story courtyard buildings that covered those and newer blocks at the end of the nineteenth century” (Ladd, 1997, p. 231). Furthermore, they hold that this “essential” structure had remained intact after 1945; neither Speer nor bombings destroyed, but postwar reconstruction did. The massive projects, in both the capitalist West and the socialist East cleared most of these structures; many of which may have been salvageable. Rather than preserving the urban form resulting from forty years of division, architecture and planning are charged with capturing a so-called lost character and charm, as long as those characteristics come from pre-1914 neighborhoods.

Residents of the city center still experience the consequences of the war’s destruction, a frequently city-destructive reconstruction, as well as the separation of the two city centers. The Planwerk Innenstadt was chosen for this project because it aims to overcome the actual and invisible boundaries of the city divided and create a holistic center out of the historical center and the town center west, all the while implementing communicative planning strategies. Ideally, the plan hopes to curb urban sprawl and discourage commuter traffic; other resources and cost-
intensive new infrastructure are not needed, since sufficient capacities are available in the city center.

**Methodology**

Though no two European capitals are exactly alike, most share common features. They are made a highly dense urban fabric, sprinkled with historic architecture. Most are located on rivers; a few are on the major bodies of water. All have highly diverse demographics (when compared to surrounding areas). Berlin is no exception to any of these rules. To judge the Planwerk Innenstadt’s effectiveness in creating a “European” capital, we look to these criteria. More importantly, however, it is necessary to look at Berlin’s historic development patterns.

Prior to the city’s division, Berlin’s development trends were characterized by “specifically European public qualities and a separation of public and private spaces; mixtures of residential, commercial, service, and cultural activities and functions; and special local identities that were manifested in historic physical structures, streetscapes, and ground plans” (See Figure 3-1) (Schwedler, 2000, p. 33). The incorporation of these characteristics will be the basic framework for gauging the effectiveness of the Planwerk Innenstadt.

Critical Reconstruction is the most widely applied urban planning paradigm in unified Berlin. Popularized between 1991 and 1996 by Social Democratic planner and city building director, Hans Stimmann, critical reconstruction aimed to undo the planning errors of the previous past century (Ladd, 1997). During his tenure, Stimmann issued strict guidelines to restore the city center based on the outlines of old streets, squares, and blocks. He also introduced height limits, “seventy-two feet for the eaves, a hundred feet for the set-back peak of a roof,” that followed nineteenth century building codes (Ladd, 1997, p. 232). Indeed, if one overlays city plans from 1915 and 2007, buildings, streets, and blocks almost always overlap; the same could not be said if juxtaposing the 1953 or 1984 plans to the 2007 city plan.
Critical Reconstruction was the product of the 1987 International Building Exhibition in West Berlin. The theory is based on a rejection on modernist planning principles, where “streets, squares, parks, blocks and buildings were no longer seen as compositional urban building elements that worked together to create built environments” (Süchting and Weiss, 2000, p. 67). Critical Reconstruction embraces traditional European city design, resulting in a high density, somewhat polycentric urban core.

This study uses Critical Reconstruction and the criteria outlined above to analyze the Planwerk Innenstadt. The latest incarnation of the Planwerk seeks to dramatically rebuild Alexanderplatz, revitalize socialist high-rises, and redevelop the area along the Spree. Similar to the redevelopment of Potsdamer Platz, it is already apparent (based on Hans Kolhoff’s plans) that Alexanderplatz will not reclaim its early twentieth century form. What makes this space special? What are the economic ramifications for the Bezirk? By using the inner city neighborhood as a model, this paper analyzes housing conditions, transportation patterns, and sustainability initiatives to determine if the proposed projects in Mitte will affect those already living there.

Furthermore, this project studies the effects of Mitte’s critical reconstruction on eastern cultural identity. As discussed above, the Mitte Bezirk often makes it difficult for building plans to get approval because of a concern that development will erase traces of their experiences living in the GDR. The Senate for Urban Development has already pledged to preserve the Soviet-era high-rises built along Karl-Marx Allee; is this enough to satisfy alienated easterners?

This study principally relies on the analysis of primary and secondary sources. Sources include newspaper articles, polls, published articles, and data from the Senate of Urban Development. Furthermore, maps, photographs, and relevant interviews conducted by the author
in Berlin in September 2007 will be used as primary sources. Although this is no substitute for surveys or traditional fieldwork, it offers a well-rounded view of how urban planning decisions are directly affecting citizens—economically, socially, and culturally.

**Limitations**

The greatest limitation faced while conducting research was the inaccessibility to traditional data collecting methods (e.g. attending community meetings, conducting surveys, etc.) due to physical distance. It is always difficult to write about a topic that is still in flux; the Palast, for example, had not been demolished when I began my research. Consequently, some of the contemporary information contained in this document may be less relevant in the future.

**Summary**

This project focuses on Mitte, Berlin’s historic inner-city district, in order to examine various elements of the Planwerk Innenstadt. Mitte was selected as the study area because it was the area most immediately affected by post-unification planning, as it straddled both sides of the Berlin Wall. Four elements of the Planwerk Innenstadt will be analyzed within a “European capital” framework by looking at the division between public and private spaces, incidences of mixed-use developments, a highly dense urban fabric, and strong transportation connectivity. Furthermore, the investigation is guided by the principle of critical reconstruction, whereby planners, city officials, and community members engage in dialogues about the direction of the city’s development. Critical reconstruction discussions are, then, akin to the American urban planning paradigms of “visioning” and “communicative planning.” By employing the “European city” criteria and critical reconstruction, it is possible to determine whether the Planwerk Innenstadt is an effective planning tool to accomplish the task of recreating Berlin as a historically mindful, strong, open, modern European capital.
Figure 3-1. Figure-ground maps: Berlin in the 20th century. Top: Berlin, circa 1943; Bottom: Berlin, circa 1984. [Reprinted with permission from Palgrave Macmillan. 2008].
“In good and in evil, Berlin is the trustee of German history, which has left its scars here as nowhere else” – Richard von Weizsäcker, 1983 (quoted in Rürup, 1987, p. 205)

“There is a general awareness that social, demographic and economic tendencies are hard to predict and that it usually does not take long before planning and construction based on such predictions are hopelessly outdated and out of tune with the reality ‘on the ground’. Despite this, planning still assumes that developments can be precisely predicted and steered and therefore, ultimately, designed” – Marc Neelen and Ana Dzokic, 2004 (Neelen and Dzokic, 2004, p. 84)

“The ‘Planwerk’ that has been adopted is a classic example of consensus democracy. The plan is without either teeth or authority, and it is implicitly acknowledged that critics will eventually reduce what is there to an absolute nothing... One does not have to be a prophet to predict that his ‘Planwerk’ will find a quiet resting place in the overflowing archived of Berlin urban development plans.” (B. Schulz, 1999, as quoted in Schwedler, 2000, p. 31).

Throughout the 1990s, Berlin’s historical center (Mitte) was the hub of city’s urban development. This was the area that had straddled the Wall and stretched to the east of Alexanderplatz. With reunification, the city center lost its previous function as capital of the GDR. As a result, it had to react to and accommodate the pressures of new market forces, all the while representing “New Berlin” to Germany and to the world. As a European city, however, with its flexible structures, Berlin was naturally considered to be well suited to “adapt to the needs of the post-industrial economy and society” (Senatverwaltung, 2007b, p. 8). The existing cityscape and building stock were seen as valuable capital, to be utilized as soon as possible. Investors were anxious to create new forms and functions for living and working in densely built areas as well as conversion sites. The city, though politically united, did not have a unified physical plan for how to proceed with such development. Mitte was seen as a particularly lucrative district as it offered potentially flexible areas for the creation of a sustainable, post-industrial city, characterized by compact, mixed-use, socially diverse developments. The Planwerk Innenstadt became the planning document that would attempt to create a new, modern, unified central district.
This chapter examines four elements of the Planwerk Innenstadt to gauge the effectiveness and preciseness of the plan versus process of molding a modern European capital. The knowledge gleaned from studying the plan will inform a discussion on the progress that the city has made over two decades of post-conflict development. The chapter begins with a brief introduction to the Planwerk Innenstadt and its goals. This is followed by a closer examination of the housing, community development, transportation, and sustainability elements of the Planwerk, as these allow the reader to gather a well-rounded glimpse into the city’s projected trajectory. Finally, the chapter closes with a summary of the most salient points related to the creation of a contemporary European capital.

An Introduction to the Planwerk Innenstadt

The Planwerk Innenstadt was the Berlin’s first comprehensive plan since Albert Speer’s monumental plan for Germania. Encompassing approximately 11.5 square miles and 300,000 people, the Planwerk includes about one-third of the land within the S-Bahn ring; this is an area comparable to the inner city of Paris, yet with roughly half the population (Süchting and Weiss, 2000; Senatverwaltung, 2007b). First drafted in 1996, the plan has continued to evolve, as the Senate for Urban Development receives feedback and criticism from various citizen groups. Intensive communication and interaction with a wide spectrum of residents is required for the approval of major projects. Consequently, the Planwerk Innenstadt looks much different today compared to its original version due to constant plan updates resulting from this “communicative planning.” Many of the principal redevelopment and urban infill projects have now been formalized; the 2010 city plan includes models of future projects (See Figure 4-1, 4-2).

Furthermore, the Planwerk Innenstadt uses a number of classical urban planning tools to help guide the city’s development. Among these are land development plans, an urban
development plan, infrastructure upgrades, and the Regional Development Plan for the Berlin-
Brandenburg area (Senatsverwaltung, 2003a). The plan’s essential objectives are,

1. Appropriation of the city through civic dialogue to reformulate Berlin’s identity
2. Advocate for sustainable urban development
3. Enhancement of public terrain through reurbanization
4. Creating new typologies for inner-city homes and jobs
5. Creating new forms of land management and investment
6. Creating links between urban planning and urban management
7. Replacing the car-oriented city with a choice-oriented city
8. Enhance the historical center’s urban texture through dialogues on design elements
9. Enhance the western downtown’s urban fabric by reinforcing nodes
10. Advocate ‘modernity with tradition’ to replace the paradigms of Modernist urban
design (Senatsverwaltung, 2006a)

These goals are all employed with the intent of reaching the overarching goal of creating a
vibrant, sustainable, densely populated, historically layered city. It is this paper’s aim to
investigate if and how well these goals have been realized.

Mitte had “encompassed the central institutions of government, finance, and culture for
successive Prussian and German regimes, including the German Democratic Republic” (Ladd,
1997, p. 43). Like New York, in the early twentieth century, Berlin was unconcerned with
preserving the past, preferring to look into the future. Many narrow streets and medieval homes
yielded to massive modern structures for built for government and business. Ladd (1997)
explains that, “After 1945, once the rubble had been cleared, the heart of East Berlin was a
windswept district of vacant spaces, which were only slowly covered with new buildings” (p.
43). Figuring out what to do with those empty spaces (previously used as “modernist” plazas) is one of many of the issues facing planners attempting to redevelop the city. A fundamental principle of the Planwerk, however, is to respect what is already in place, keeping history intelligible. This keeps buildings in East Berlin safe from demolition, as long as they adhere to the principles of zoning, mixed use, clear separation of public and private space, and of public and private maintenance and responsibility.

The Planwerk principal aim is to suture the physical/urban wounds left in Mitte by the Wall. Since this district has been the city’s historical center, the Planwerk attempts to reconcile the various “histories” present while still creating a capital city capable of future development and evolution. The Senate for Urban Development and city planners realize that this is indeed a very precarious undertaking. Communicative planning has taken an important part in the post-unification urban planning discourse because of the city’s mindfulness in including all facets of society in creating a new image and direction for the district. It is important to note that Mitte receives the most tourists of any Berlin district, as it contains major landmarks like the Reichstag, the Brandenburg Gate, Alexanderplatz, the Monument to the Murdered Jews of Europe, and the Museuminsel, among others. It is therefore necessary to redefine this space not only for residents, but also because it defines Berlin internationally.

All in all, it is necessary to reiterate Berlin’s financial problems. The city is deeply in debt. Therefore, anyone who wants to make any planning changes must show that the necessary funds are in place. According to ex-Senator of Urban Development, Hans Stimmann (2000), “for this reason, every changed line in the Planwerk is at the same time covered by identification of building land and justification of the ideas about use, including the necessary sectoral planning
for transport, ecological elements, use and watertight viability in terms of city finances and the necessary basis in building law” (p. 30).

Housing: Space for New Ideas

“No one understands that the city is simply reflecting historical reality. Nor does anyone want to understand this because the historical reality is naturally not that of the middle-class dwelling that has now been proclaimed the urban planning ideal” (van Rossem, 2004, p. 37). Housing, both general and affordable, is a challenge facing urban development in Berlin. Since the end of the nineteenth century, Berlin’s housing market has been characterized by severe lack of supply in accommodation. After the opening of the Wall, many expected a dramatic population increase in the region, inducing massive new building construction projects (Mauruszat, 2000, p. 106). These projections, however, were incorrect, creating the novel situation of housing surplus; the middle-class migration to the periphery for newer housing (the so-called Speckgürtel around Berlin) also added to the housing surplus.\(^1\) The most desirable accommodations have become restored pre-fabricated structures (Plattenbau) built by the GDR. The opening of the Wall also led to a population decrease. Although the federal government’s relocation created an initial demand for housing, it did not live up to landlords’ expectations. Furthermore, private and public trust developers have invested in urban renewal projects throughout the Eastern sector—including refurbishing the Plattenbauten. They expected to finance these projects through future increases in land value, which have not occurred. This has led to continued high vacancy rates and protests for the affordable housing of yore. For the first time in over a century, landlords must compete for tenants.

\(^1\) Speckgürtel translates to “fat belt,” referring to the area characterized by new single-family residential developments.
To understand the complicated issue of housing in Berlin, it is necessary to take inventory of common inner-city housing developments, beginning with the nineteenth century Mietskaserne (See Table 4-1). This background knowledge informs the discussion on post-unification housing policy and planning.

The Mietskaserne

On the eve of the twentieth century, Berlin was a city of tenement housing, the infamous Mietskaserne. In 1930, Walter Benjamin reviewed Das Sterne Berlin, by Werner Hegemann, a Berlin architectural critic. The book criticized living conditions in the Mietskaserne. While Benjamin agreed that they offered miserable living conditions, he asked readers to consider the community bonds and shared experiences that the buildings offered. As van Rossem explains, “In Benjamin’s view, it was sheer impertinence to brush aside the historical reality of life in the tenements with architectural criticism… [we] should be curious about the true relation between the life of the city dweller and the built environment” (van Rossem, 2004, p. 37).

Built between 1870-1918, the Mietskaserne is characterized as being a closed or almost closed, five to six-storey building (Senatsverwaltung, 2007a, p. 1). Individual properties units were put on all sides of the building, even if the building abutted another one, leaving no room for windows, or other types of natural ventilation. Small courtyards were included in the design, sometimes with tree in the center; otherwise they were paved with concrete, asphalt, or stone. This open-space structure is characterized by crooked block interiors, made up of entirely or largely enclosed, narrow courtyards, sometimes arranged in a row, and connected by court passages (Ladd, 1997). Much like the tenements in the late nineteenth century in New York City,

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2 London, England and New York, New York also experienced similar living conditions in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries; Mietskaserne translates to tenement house.
the *Mietskaserne* were a haven for impoverished families, creating environments filled with high-crime rates and poverty.

Keeping in the nineteenth century tradition, the *Mietskaserne* was in fact a mixed-use building. The street-level housed businesses; merchants lived in the stories immediately above. As explored higher and deeper within the building block, one would find worsening living conditions. Consequently, these units became synonymous with poor planning and “Old World” injustice during the early twentieth century. As such, many were razed prior to World War I and during the Weimar Republic to accommodate new modern housing estates. Further razing occurred under the National Socialist government to make room for Hitler’s new capital city.

Because the historic center of the city was to the east of the Tiergarten, there was a greater prevalence of remaining *Mietskaserne* in the GDR after World War II. As part of the preservation-oriented reconstruction at the end of the 1970s and throughout the 1980s, new buildings were erected on formerly vacant lots, and old *Mietskaserne* buildings were renovated (Senatsverwaltung, 2007a). Demolition was carried out in isolated cases. The rehabilitated sites required large-scale demolition of rear buildings to create a healthier living environment. This allowed for the consolidation of courtyards, following the socialist tradition of creating communal gathering places.

**Postwar High-Rise Development**

In Berlin, urban development and housing construction were seen as initial post-war panaceas. As Taverne explains, “Urban development and housing constructions were spearheads of a centrally planned economy” (Taverne, 2004, p. 117). Not only would constructions create new jobs, but it would also result in the production of desperately needed housing structures. However, since foreign architects and planners were assigned to rebuilding efforts, the resulting plans were not “typically German.” Instead, they reflected the victorious side’s agenda, upheld
by SED leadership: “architecture and urbanism has a strong political programme function as the physical evidence of the construction, triumph and above all superiority of the socialist system” (Taverne, 2004, p. 117). Although post-war high-rise development is often accredited to East Berlin, West Berlin developed this housing typology.

In December 1949, one of the most prominent boulevards in East Berlin was renamed Stalinallee, in honor of Joseph Stalin’s birthday. Only four years after the end of the War, “this road, still a giant heap of rubble…became a demonstration object of socialist architecture and socialist town planning” (Düwel, 2004, p. 53). The Stalinallee was a veritable showroom for socialist architecture, erecting “residential palaces” for workers, many of which still stand.

Reconstruction negotiations for Mitte began as early as mid-1946. Keeping with Swiss architect Le Corbusier’s Charter of Athens, architects and city planners created plans for the “construction of multi-storey blocks mainly for single people and childless couples” (Düwel, 2004, p. 53). According to the Berlin Senate for Urban Development, post-war high-rise developments include tall row houses and single houses with varying storeys (Senatsverwaltung, 2007a). In order for a building to be considered a high-rise in West Berlin, it had to have at least eight floors; in East Berlin, the number was six. Of the pre-fabricated concrete buildings laid out in East Berlin as large-scale developments, half were built in semi-open styles (with courtyards), with the rest being mixed with row development. High-rise development in West Berlin in the 1960s and 1970s commonly arose in lots formerly occupied by the Mietskaserne (Senatsverwaltung, 2007a). East Berlin developed the high-rise Plattenbau during the late 1970s to accommodate housing demand. These are the structures that are the most contentious in post-unification housing planning.
The word *Plattenbauten* translates roughly to “flat building.” The East German high-rises acquired this name because they were made of pre-fabricated concrete slabs. Building a *Plattenbau* building became so streamlined that it became possible to erect a 100 unit building in a matter of weeks (Ladd, 1997). Architectural historians and architects praise the *Plattenbauten* as “The extreme architectural simplicity of Plattenbau, in combination with the radical character of the urban design plan for the vast housing estates, resulted in a form of public housing purged of all formal ambition” (vam Rossem, 2004 p. 37). The buildings were therefore effective in conveying the SED’s message of workers’ equality and solidarity.

Although *Plattenbauten* range in shape and size, one can point to a distinct building typology. The Berlin Senate for Urban Development characterizes them,

The open-space structure of the developments in East Berlin in semi-open block-edge displays a relatively large block interior, which is partly broken up by building rows in the block interior. For the type “unplanned reconstruction,” undeveloped areas are used relatively sparingly, mostly as parking lots; the remaining open areas are green edge-strips. The share of the non-built-up areas is relatively large for the type "high-rise." Half of the area is paved by large access driveways and parking lots, the other half is landscaped as ornamental green space, geometrically designed with trees and shrubs. (Senatesverwaltung, 2007a, p. 1)

Although regarded as a commodity enjoyed only by top Party members during the city’s division, the *Plattenbauten* lost their prestige after the opening of the Wall. Their small square footage, as well as a desire for Western amenities drew many residents away. The *Plattenbauten*, then, became youth-oriented housing, as it was relatively affordably priced. As reunification slowed down and the economy experienced a recession, many of the new inhabitants left the city. The debate as to what to do with the *Plattenbauten* began. Investors, both foreign and domestic, began to purchase units—if not entire buildings—for retrofits (See Figure 4-3). Since 1993, 60,000 *Plattenbauten* have been refurbished with public funding assistance (Senatsverwaltung, 2006s). Currently, the *Plattenbauten* are being marketed to young families.
and urban professionals that would otherwise live in the city’s outskirts. City officials and investors both hope that the Ostalgie fad will contribute in the city’s renaissance. The city has created targets within the Urban-Rebuilding East program to aid this process.3

Immediately after unification, two housing typologies arose: compact, high-density urban developments and low-density urban developments. These differ considerably from the large pre-fabricated housing developments common in East Berlin. First, they include a wide span of city structures (e.g. block-edge development, row development, row-house development, villa development, etc.) (Senatsverwaltung, 2007a). The principal (and most obvious) difference between the GDR developments and the newer developments is building height; height differences also exist between low and high-density post-unification developments. Newer developments have fewer storeys, as the building permit department did not want to significantly alter the city’s skyline (see Figure 4-4).

Post unification compact, high-density development commonly consists of units (often row-houses) with more than four floors. These units have either closed yards or half closed yards within the row development. In a continuation of Berlin’s utility structure, post-unification units are built with common infrastructure installations (energy supply, waste disposal facilities etc); this is done to promote reduced energy expenditures and sustainability. Furthermore, these projects include green building strategies, like rainwater collection, green roofs, green walls, and small terrace gardens.

To contrast, low-density urban development consists of duplexes and single-family houses with less than four floors, built mainly at the outskirts of the city. Similar to the garden houses of

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3 Program examples include assisting the housing industry in the deconstruction of superfluous apartment buildings, as well as deconstructing empty schools and nurseries that cause undue environmental burdens (Senatsverwaltung, 2006a).
the early twentieth century, these structures include carports and private gardens within the owner’s lot. Accordingly, the share of publicly usable open spaces is low. Although this project does not look at these low-density urban developments, as they do not occur within Mitte, it is worthwhile to note their existence as evidence of a continuum of an early-twentieth century building tradition.

**Housing in the Planwerk Innenstadt**

After reunification, large amounts of money were invested in east Germany’s “hopelessly out-of-date economy, infrastructure and housing stock” (Venhuizen, 2004, p. 92). In many East European cities, “spatial planning still relies heavily on worn-out government patterns of thinking which, because of their use of one-dimensional forces that determine the real spatial order and which are consequently overtaking traditional planning on all sides” (Sanders, 2004, p. 103). In eastern Germany—including east Berlin—development initiatives come from large-scale Western commercial organizations, making it difficult for private self-initiative. This problem is compounded due to the area’s economic stagnation, and the housing market’s oversaturation.

Unlike other capitals that have undergone so-called “urban renewal,” Berlin has been able to preserve a considerable amount of inner city housing. One of the Planwerk Innenstadt’s principal development goals has been to maintain the inner city as a place where significant amounts of people live. This has allowed housing in Mitte to remain open to the city’s diverse wealthy, creative, and immigrant populations. Increased rents in some rehabilitated buildings, however, are making living in those structures less affordable than during the 1990s.

The Berlin Senate for Urban Development reported in 2007 that “altogether, approximately 181,000 apartments were built again in Berlin between 1990 and 2005, [raising] the total number of apartments from 1.7 million to 1.88 million” (Senatesverwaltung, 2007a, p.
Moreover, about 60 percent of all reconstructions were, in fact, small additions made to existing structures. Unfinished high-rise projects in the east were finished; the last “typically Eastern” project was completed in 1992 (Ladd, 1997). No significant developments were neither planned nor erected in west Berlin during this same period. Upon unification, city officials were hesitant to approve any projects due to the amalgamation of the two cities. Furthermore, major investors waited until the initial unification fervor subsided before speculating on possible ventures; the dust had to settle before the city could start healing its wounds.

Between 1993-1997, development was characterized by the building of new suburbs in the outskirts, creating a so-called “fat belt” around the city. Much of the inner city’s population migrated elsewhere—including the suburbs. The suburbs created a “fat belt,” as they became the buffer between city and country, though to a much lesser extent than in other European capitals. Housing construction in the metropolitan area slowed between 1997-2002, due to the economic recession plaguing Germany. Between 1995-2002, only 103,000 housing units were built in Berlin. Of these, 61 percent were subsidized, and 39 percent were privately financed (Senatsverwaltung, 2006a). In 2000, for example, new construction was at 1991 levels because of a reduction of financial supports/incentives, existing building vacancies, increased demands for single-family construction, and additional traffic facilities (Senatsverwaltung, 2007a). This was particularly debilitating for development in east Berlin, where parts of the city had been revitalized with government aid programs; most notably, federal programs were responsible for rehabilitating approximately 80 percent of the *Plattenbauten* housing stock (Senatsverwaltung, 2007a).

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4 During the 1993-2002 there were various high-profile projects completed, including the new Potsdamer Platz, the addition of a glass dome on the Reichstag, and the unveiling of the new government center across the River Spree.
The large amount of available housing has led to Berlin’s reputation as a city of tenants; only 13 percent of residents are homeowners (Senatsverwaltung, 2007b). Although remaining low, homeownership rates have been steadily increasing since 1990. During the late 1990s, occupancy rates of rental units, on the other hand, drastically fell. Between the years of 1994 and 1998, rental occupancy rates fell by over 12,000 units (Senatsverwaltung, 2003b). This can be explained by the economic recession going on during the same time period. By the end of 2002, 1.65 million apartments (88.5 percent of the total housing stock) were rented; the remaining 216,000 (11.5 percent) were owner occupied (Senatsverwaltung, 2006a).

The relatively affordable inner city housing market has recently attracted the “urban middle class” as well as the “creative class.” The main issue for these demographics is the city’s poor economy; Berlin is often a temporary stop en route to opportunities in another city. As stated above, there is no housing shortage, but rather tenant shortage. In 2002, for example, the city stopped subsidizing rental apartment construction because of the market’s oversaturation of available housing options. To attract a more permanent population of homeowners, it is crucial to adapt the existing housing stock to the needs of different user groups. The urban development department is already responding to this criticism by enacting policies encouraging the creation of family-friendly housing in the inner city. By working with the private sector, the city hopes to replicate some of the success it has had creating family-friendly housing in Prenzlauer Berg, an adjacent district. There, they entered public-private partnerships to produce high-quality housing, green spaces, retail infrastructure, and nearby childcare facilities in accordance with the Inner-

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5 Homeownership in comparable German cities is much higher. 23 percent of both Hamburg and Munich’s housing stock is owned.
City Zoning Plan (See Appendix A) (Senatsverwaltung, 2007b). The city hopes that this and similar programs will bind new and old neighborhood groups, thus stabilizing the districts.

Small-scale housing options—similar to American cooperatives or “co-ops”—are in high demand. Since 2000, Berlin has promoted “cooperative” housing purchases from the existing stock. In 2006, 6,400 units fell under this “co-op” classification (Senatsverwaltung, 2006a). These structures are already integrated into the existing urban structure and contribute to image formation and stabilization. Some are retrofitted Mietskaserne, while others are new constructions built on vacant building lots in the inner city to repair fractured urban fabric. The main obstacles facing these housing types are related to organizational structure, legality, and clarifications of financial questions. Although some building groups’ joint building ventures have pursued this housing type, there is little legal definition or protection within the city’s current system.

Unforeseen developments, like social and physical segregation, site clearances, apartment vacancies, and decreased financial resources, all demand new strategies on how to plan for the city. The Senate for Urban Development (2007a) projects negative growth for the city until about 2010, as reflected in the housing urban development plan (See Figure 4-5). This projection considers a stagnating rate of inhabitants and jobs, 45,000 additional apartments, half-mile of new commercial areas, and 48.4 million ft² and 4.3 million ft² additional office and retail space, respectively (Table 4-2). In anticipation, the Senate has been working on Stadtkonzept Berlin 2020, a conceptual document on the future of Berlin’s urban development.7

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6 Since 1994, the Senate for Urban Development has promoted low-energy housing projects. In 2007, there were approximately 800 apartment units in compliance with low-energy standards. Other sustainable strategies include domestic rain and gray water treatment used to conserve water.

7 Stadtentwicklungskonzept translates to Town Development Concept.
Community Development: “The Social City”

Berlin is mired with problems of social segregation, gentrification, and gender inequality. On the eve of the opening of the Wall, East Berlin was a fairly homogenous city, composed of life-long residents or migrants from the countryside. West Berlin, on the other hand, was heterogeneous, made up of a variety of nationalities and religions. While initial tensions and anxieties have subsided, the legacy of division is still acutely present. Although the developments of the past two decades have increased social diversity, they have also yielded social division. One of the Planwerk Innenstadt’s goals is to alleviate social divisions and tensions, while still acknowledging and respecting respective cultures and ethnicities. European cities are, after all, the conglomeration of a multitude of ethnicities and cultural quarters. It is therefore necessary to find a balance between fostering cultural traditions and strongly encouraging involvement in civic life and the economy. Planners believe that the Planwerk is but one vehicle to achieve these goals.

Berlin is characterized by its various districts and neighborhoods. Accordingly, the Bezirke play an indelible part in the city’s development. Cooperation between the Bezirke and the municipal Senate Administration has proven to be extremely inefficient “in the implementation of the visions and goals for the city as a whole” (Senatsverwaltung, 2007b).

Historically, Berlin’s neighborhoods have developed based on cultural and ethnic boundaries; the same is true today. Approximately 460,000 foreign nationals live in Berlin—roughly 14 percent of the population—the largest of any German city; this includes 118,000 Turkish, 39,000 Polish, and 14,000 Russian residents (Senatsverwaltung, 2007b). As the ethnic communities become larger and more concentrated, there has been evidence that feeling of responsibility for the larger community dissipates. These problems are further aggravated by language barriers, health problems, lack of education, and feelings of fear and insecurity.
(Senatsverwaltung, 2006a). There is a higher prevalence of these complaints in east Berlin’s older neighborhoods, as well as in neglected (and affordable) *Plattenbauten*.

Berlin’s community development vision relies on openness and communication to achieve its goals. This is based on the idea that “a European city does not dismiss any of its population,” and of course, Berlin is a European city (Senatsverwaltung, 2007b, p. 45). According to the Senate for Urban Development the so-called Social City is “a city in which citizens not only comprehend the development of their city but also where they feel at home, where they can influence development by engaging in a discourse about the design of their city and for their city” (Senatsverwaltung, 2007b, p. 49). An effective interaction between various actors—and cooperative understanding of policy and planning—is thus crucial for this process’ success. The city wants its neighborhoods to be socially stable, with citizens being content and secure about their surroundings. To achieve these goals, Berlin has established a series of “quality” and “action goals,” to be overseen by the Neighborhood Management Program. Quality goals address improving residents’ quality of life by suggesting that,

> Equitable living conditions should be offered to all Berlin inhabitants, regardless of social or ethnic origins. Stable community structures should be supported or developed in all neighborhoods. Housing and apartments or various types and sizes are available in all parts of the city, appropriate for people with varying cultural backgrounds, needs and interests. (Senatsverwaltung, 2006a, p. 39)

Other quality goals focus on preventative health care and education, immigrants’ rights, and reducing incidences of public violence. Furthermore, the city lacks a traditional elite, one of the consequences of mass emigration throughout the twentieth century. Politicians, embassy workers, journalists, and others associated with the “New Capital” seldom establish themselves permanently in the city.

**Education**

To meet the quality goals, Berlin has created a series of corresponding action goals.
Creating equal opportunities—for immigrants and natives—is of utmost priority. To accomplish this, Berlin would like to reduce the citywide poverty rate to 10%; at the most it “should not exceed 20% in any statistical cell of the social data map for Berlin, with the percentage of households with extreme debt problems being reduced to 5%” (Senatsverwaltung, 2006a, p. 39). Nowhere in its plans, however, does the city identify specific strategies to meet these targets; rather, it proposes a nebulous series of measures. Possible programs would improve the available supply of renovated apartments and local housing options for senior citizens and multigenerational families; affordable housing is to be maintained with the municipal housing corporations with an even distribution throughout the area (Senatsverwaltung, 2007b). Furthermore, individual Bezirke may enact policies strengthening renters’ rights and participation in local governance. The Senate for Urban Development also plans to increase the number of community centers offered. By doing this, the city expects to strengthen citizens’ identity as Berliners, rather than as members of their ethnic and cultural groups. Finally, the Neighborhood Management Program will upgrade public spaces, thereby making the spaces more attractive for Bezirke appropriation. This plan, then, makes the Bezirke responsible for managing and maintaining these green spaces.

Consequently, the city government is also a proponent of ensuring that all of its citizens speak fluent German, as this increases economic opportunities. In 2007, the city’s unemployment rate was at approximately 19 percent; about 36,000 of these were under the age of 25 (Senatsverwaltung, 2007b). One of the quality goals states that, “immigrants should enjoy the same full rights and responsibilities, and the same opportunities for education and work, as all others” (Senatsverwaltung, 2006a, p. 39). The easiest way to fulfill this goal is to enforce language education, so that immigrants are given the same opportunities as native speakers to
prosper. However, this program is difficult to enforce outside of a formal educational structure. The language action goal requires that all children speak German fluently enough to pass acceptance tests and participate in the classroom by the time they begin school (Senatsverwaltung, 2006a). Percentages of immigrant children receiving equivalents to American high school diplomas, then, should correspond to those of native German children. An additional measure promoting language education is the offering of language courses to all age levels. Getting interested parties to attend may be problematic, as the government does not offer them free of charge, nor do they guarantee any kind of subsidy; enrollment is based on time, cost, and interest. The City Parliament has recently proposed that schools with higher percentages of immigrants receive extra support (Senatsverwaltung, 2007a). Moreover, immigrants should be sought out to teach language courses. They would be offered special training opportunities that would allow them to obtain employment within the German school system. Therefore, the language education component meets its goals of integrating immigrants as well as boosting the economy.

**Preventative Healthcare**

To meet preventative healthcare goals, the city supports developing a State health program, which not only supports preventative care, but would also offer support for recreational sports, and infrastructural support for youth activities (i.e. maintaining playgrounds and other recreation sites). Berlin’s specific goals are to ensure that at least 90% of children receive annual preventative check-ups, to reduce deaths caused by heart and circulatory diseases by 30%, and reduce work-related diseases/injuries by 75% (Senatsverwaltung, 2006a, p. 39). The city also encourages that public food services follow the principles of “organic agriculture” and provide residents with fresh regional produce. Similar to the program measures discussed above, neither the Senate for Urban Development nor the City Parliament identifies funding for these programs.
Public Safety

Another critical component of community development is ensuring that residents feel safe in private and public spaces. Violence prevention campaigns would disseminate informational pamphlets on anti-violence measures. Additionally, the city proposes the development of self-defense programs in schools, as well for women and senior citizens (Senatsverwaltung, 2006a, p. 40). Other crime or violence prevention programs would be organized around various types of crimes, such as burglary or assault. The City Parliament hopes that by 2015, recognized crimes are reduced by 30 percent and violent crimes by 50 percent; the percentage of people who feel insecure or unsafe in the city should be reduced by 30 percent (Senatsverwaltung, 2006a, p. 40). The main problem with the crime mitigation programs is that they do not attempt to reduce crime, but rather teach people how to avoid being a victim. It is assumed, however, that if the other community development initiatives are successful, then crime rates will decrease. Societal elements that were previously susceptible to committing violent acts would no longer do so because of improved economic and educational opportunities.

As mentioned above, incorporating public spaces as well as affordable housing throughout the city are integral community development elements in the Planwerk. High-quality, accessible public spaces are designed to attract diverse groups of residents. The Neighborhood Management Program has created “Social Urban Development Monitoring” to improve the opportunities of residents living in disadvantaged neighborhoods (Senatsverwaltung, 2007b). The citywide Social Urban Development Monitoring aims to advance the city’s integration, education, and employment agenda in impoverished neighborhoods and ethnic enclaves. Simultaneously, construction projects continue upgrading “problem” areas. The city’s Social Urban Development Monitoring program depends on physical development, investment, and continuous local involvement in the development process. As such, the city encourages projects
initiated and supported by local residents, as well as local management projects emphasizing intervention and prevention. Such local civic responsibility will be reinforced by the presence of strong community partners, like housing corporations, community centers, and local businesses, each with a strong interest or stake in promoting the community’s overall success.

Unfortunately, Berlin has extremely limited financial resources to fund all of their proposed initiatives. One aim of the Neighborhood Management Program, then, is to use public and private resources more efficiently and effectively. The key in achieving this is recruiting new project stakeholders, as well as garnering widespread actor support, creating what the city calls a “synergy” (Senatsverwaltung, 2007b). Scarce resources, like money, must be concentrated and used in the targeted manner, rather than having funds “slip through the cracks.” The previous mechanism of adjusting budgets across the Bezirke no longer corresponds to the differentiated socio-physical situation in the city, as each district has distinct problems and needs.

Transportation Networks: “The Mobile City”

Permeability in major European cities is based on historic urban patterns, which include small, dense blocks, and relatively narrow roads. In Berlin, however, post-war destruction allowed for the rebuilding of roads and infrastructure to accommodate for the age of the automobile. Mitte, however, is an exception to this pattern. Although many individual buildings were destroyed, block patterns remained largely intact. In East Berlin, principal arteries were widened in accordance with socialist planning principles. Vehicular traffic remained low throughout the city’s division, increasing only after unification. Consequently, the Planwerk’s traffic element recommends a “reduction model” for the inner-city, “whereby through traffic would be hindered by applying a variety of traffic controlling and speed reducing measures…reducing single-person vehicle trips to about 20 percent of the total volume, to the
advantage of public transport” (Süchting and Weiss, 2000, p. 65). In addition to reducing vehicular congestion, this strategy also aims to reduce environmental pollution.

The Wall severed established transportation paths of inner-city circulation (Ladd, 1997, p. 13). Central Berlin was devoid of both pedestrians and automobiles. Often, streets would seemingly lead to the edge of the world, otherwise known as a ubiquitous ten-foot cement wall. This led to the overwhelming neglect of roads, bridges, and other structures, as one got exponentially closer to the Wall, especially in West Berlin. In East Berlin, the Wall was to be ignored, except on national holidays (Ladd, 1997). Residents were discouraged from approaching or visiting the structure. Therefore by 1989, the inner city consisted of fragments of different concepts of transportation planning. As Hans Stimmann (2000) explains, “there were green spaces reserved for raised urban motorways, tunnels, broad trunk roads which suddenly ended in buildings, oversized crossroad structures, gaps which had lost their meaning, etc.” (p. 103). Transportation routes, almost more than any other single dimension, were placed in the position of simultaneously bringing traffic under control, keeping historical continuity, and redefining public spaces.

One of the Planwerk’s main goals was to reduce the width of the main transportation routes, restoring the small plot structure conducive to inner city development, as this is more amenable to mixed urban land use (See Figure 4-5). The city’s polycentric structure and low degree of suburbanization create ideal conditions for sustainable mobility. By revising the land use plan to encourage less traffic in the areas around large developments, and reusing vacant land in areas with access to existing services and infrastructure, suburban growth patterns will be moderated. The existing public railway system offers substantial connectivity throughout the city.

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8 It is worth noting that almost 45 percent of the trips made in Berlin are less than 1.8 miles (Senatsverwaltung, 2006a).
(See Figure 4-6) Additional transportation improvements include minor roadway, sidewalk, and bicycle lane reorientation to accommodate new development projects (Senatsverwaltung, 2007c).

During Berlin’s division, many intercity rail stations became useless and were consequently abandoned. Subway lines connecting East and West were blocked by underground cement walls, mirroring the Wall above ground. Two subway lines, however, “connected northern and southern parts of West Berlin by passing under central East Berlin, gliding through ghostly stations where no train had stopped since 1961” (Ladd, 1997, p. 19). After unification, all of these stations were made operable. Although the trains have been modernized, additional facilities are often lacking in central district stations. The city’s two main stations, Hauptbahnhof and Ostbahnhof, have undergone significant improvements at the expense of smaller stations (See Figure 4-7). Maintenance problems are aggravated by the lack of enforcement of rail passes. Payment for rail U-Bahn or S-Bahn passes goes unmonitored. One can easily board a train without a pass; police seldom conduct searches. Buying tickets has no incentive for the casual user, particularly as increased fares have raised barriers for some people to use mass transit. A proposed solution is to make mass transit tickets more affordable for the poor, as well as offering alternative mobility courses. This solution, however, does not address the immense strain put on the economy by not enforcing ticket payment.

Like any capital city, Berlin has traffic problems. The strong Green Party, however, has led efforts in reinforcing the railway systems (the U-Bahn and S-Bahn) rather than the freeways (Rykwert, 2000, p. 240). Berlin’s sustainable mobility policy emphasizes three dimensions: economic, social, and ecological. One of the city’s principal aims is to minimize health burdens and the consumption of natural resources related to transportation (Senatsverwaltung, 2006a). The three dimensions will be discussed under the sustainability heading.
As noted above, Berlin’s population has stabilized at 3.39 million since 2000, following a slight decrease. In 2004, significant population growth was recorded in the inner city (within the S-Bahn ring) for the first time since prior to World War II (Senatsverwaltung, 2007a). Despite little change in the overall population, the number of single-person households has, however, continued to grow. Consequently, the number of commuters in the city has recently increased. In comparison with other major cities in western Germany, however, total commuter numbers remain low (Senatsverwaltung, 2007a).

Furthermore, when compared to other German cities, Berlin has a low level of motorization. The Senate for Urban Development has found that motorization levels have “stagnated at an average of less than 330 passenger cars per 1000 inhabitants since 1994, and since 2002 has even begun to fall slightly” (Senatsverwaltung, 2006a, p. 43). The City Parliament encourages the use of non-motorized, environmentally friendly transportation. To this end, the city has already instituted a highly successful bicycle-sharing program.

As with the community development element, the city has created a series of plan-related action goals and corresponding measures for transportation. First, it has set a target goal of reducing the traffic-related accidents by 20 percent, with traffic-related injuries and deaths being reduced by at least 40 percent by 2015 (Senatsverwaltung, 2006a, p. 44). To accomplish this action goal, the city will

[Use] speed limits, city-wide creation of new bike lanes, reducing the surface area of streets, improving connections and transfers among mass transit systems, adjusting traffic lights, expanding on areas with parking meters, publicity campaign and expansion of public transit, and building of the BBi Single-Airport combined with the closure of the Templehof and Tegel Airports. (Senatsverwaltung, 2006a, p. 44).

These measures also allow lead to a reduction of transportation-related noise pollution in residential areas, improving living conditions. Moreover, consuming land for new housing and
transportation endeavors is also discouraged, as these two elements are directly related.

Other ambitious action goals include increasing the percentage of public and environmentally friendly transportation in the inner city to 80 percent by 2015 (Senatsverwaltung, 2006a). This figure includes the stabilization of non-motorized transportation at 33 percent of all transportation. The Senate for Urban Development also expects an increase in bicycle transportation to 5 percent by 2015, and 15 percent by 2030. Berlin does not expect to impose any restrictions on motorized transportation in the inner city.9 Transportation is an excellent field to extract financial resources. By imposing greater taxes or user fees (in addition to monitoring public transportation tickets), the city would be able to alleviate some of its debt while still creating a compact, dense urban environment.

**Sustainability: “The Green City”**

Maintaining high-density is a prerequisite not only for the success of the Planwerk Innenstadt, but also for the establishment of Berlin as a “typical” European capital—a compact, spatially complex city. Berlin’s sustainability program is based on the Brundtland Commission’s definition of sustainability, whence the one must find methods of handling the resources of an indebted city when planning and managing with a view to future generations (Senatsverwaltung, 2003a). To accomplish this, the Berlin Parliament as mobilized the Bezirke to be ecologically aware self-organized forces; in addition to reporting economic and social complaints, they are now given the responsibility of airing their district’s ecological grievances as well.

This section looks at Berlin’s sustainability plan, particularly Local Agenda 21, sustainable transportation, and sustainable construction. These elements will then be analyzed in the proceeding section to determine how this fits into the image of a strong European capital city.

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9 Other European cities like London and Amsterdam have recently created legislation charging cars going into the downtown district.
Local Agenda 21

Berlin has made substantial progress since 1991. East Germany’s only domestic source of energy and the main fuel for home heating and industry was coal (Ladd, 1997). Coal and the car exhaust produced by the Trabants turned the sky brown in the winter; in East Berlin’s older residential areas, most apartments that survived the War were still heated with coal-burning tile ovens (Ladd, 1997, p. 13). In less than twenty years, Berlin has been able to enact stringent legislation and standards to clean substantial amounts of air pollution. Berlin’s Local Agenda 21 is one of the city’s most recent tools to not only improve the city’s environment, but to also improve citizens’ quality of life in a sustainable way.

The Local Agenda 21 was adopted by the City Parliament on June 8, 2006 (Senatsverwaltung, 2006a). This document is supposed to act as a guiding tool for overall future city decision-making, as well as for individual Bezirk. According to the Berlin Parliament’s sustainability statement,

The sustainable city is a social city with growing economic potential, a green city and a city of integrated uses having an inner city that is attractive for housing… Sustainable development strives for a fair distribution of resources among current and future generations but also for global, ecological, economic, and socio-cultural standards that are within the carrying limits of nature.” (Senatsverwaltung, 2006a, p. 32-33).

The city is also concerned with the growing number of elderly residents and the influx of members of the “creative class.” One of Local Agenda 21’s efforts is to create programs that will simultaneously cater to these two groups. Long-term visioning is a critical component for Local Agenda 21’s success, since the Brundtland definition emphasizes long-term sustainability.

One of the principal obstacles facing the Local Agenda 21 program is the city’s unstable financial situation. Until Berlin’s budget can be ameliorated, additional public funding will only be drawn to projects where it can contribute as a long-term investment, thus improving the fiscal crisis. This seems somewhat contradictory, as Berlin’s sustainability statement declares
sustainability as a necessary investment for the future. Indeed, the global Agenda 21 has shown that many sustainable development strategies can lead to reduced societal costs in the long-term. Most of the mobilization recommended by the Local Agenda 21 committee depends on a commitment on the behalf of civil society. Although the government cannot offer financial incentives to participate, they can encourage civil society’s engagement to advance Local Agenda 21.

It is too soon to conclusively report on Local Agenda 21’s effectiveness, as it was adopted less than two years ago. The Senate for Urban Development will produce five-year reports on Local Agenda 21’s progress, with the first report scheduled for June 30, 2009 (Senatsverwaltung, 2006a).

**Climate Change and Energy Production**

Climate change caused by human activity is arguably the largest contributor to global warming and other deleterious environmental phenomenon. Oil production and consumption, coal production and consumption, and gasoline consumption are worldwide behaviors that have been factors in worsening environmental conditions. Germany, as a highly industrialized country, is as susceptible to blame as any of its international industrial contemporaries. As previously mentioned, Berlin was in a unique position throughout the middle of the twentieth century in that though the Western government was attempting to reduce environmental hazards, airborne pollutants from the East could easily traverse the Wall as they pleased.

In 2000, Berlin emitted 7.5 tons of CO$_2$ gas per capita, a decrease from the 1990 emission level of 9.6 tons; the global system (supporting a population of approximately six billion people) can only absorb about 2 tons per capita (Senatsverwaltung, 2006a; Senatsverwaltung, 2003a). Projection studies have found that if the city (and the greater Brandenburg region) continues on this trajectory, it could face increased droughts, along with dramatic increases in energy prices
leading to substantial financial burdens for households and businesses. Berlin’s sustainability plan has found that the main contributors to energy waste are the usual culprits: inadequate building insulation, inefficient vehicles, and inefficient appliances (Senatsverwaltung, 2003a). By promoting certification programs like Blauer Engel\textsuperscript{10} and increasing public/shared transportation programs, Berlin has been able to reduce its CO\textsubscript{2} emissions by approximately 14 percent (Senatsverwaltung, 2006a).\textsuperscript{11}

Keeping with the principles laid out in Local Agenda 21, Berlin’s energy plans focus on long-term energy production and consumption capabilities. By investing in long-term plans to reduce CO\textsubscript{2} emissions, Berlin hopes to revitalize its economy by producing in related research and technology development. Rising energy costs (environmental and economic) would therefore be inherently reduced due to energy savings and increased efficiency. If one further analyzes the city’s energy policy, one finds that another aim is to reduce dependency on oil exporting states. This endeavor, however, requires commitment on behalf of the federal government more so than on the part of the city-state.

Similar to the actions goals specified above for housing, community development, and transportation, the city has developed three action goals for the climate change and energy section. These goals are based on the principle of “locally produced, intelligently applied, [and] conservingly used” energy (Senatsverwaltung, 2006a, p. 48). The first action goal sets a minimum 50 percent CO\textsubscript{2} emissions reduction by the year 2050, with the target being set at 80 percent. Furthermore, the city aims to increase the percentage of electricity produced by

\textsuperscript{10} The Blauer Engel (trans. Blue Angel) program is a German eco-labeling program. The Blue Angel program includes a wide range of products, from construction materials to household appliances and goods.

\textsuperscript{11} Although CO\textsubscript{2} reductions in Berlin may seem like impressive gains made in a relatively short period of time, the city is still below the national average of 18.5 percent (Senatsverwaltung, 2006a). This can be attributed to limited available local funding in support of more radical programs. Berlin’s accomplishment, however, is still significantly better than many other cities of comparable size.
renewable resources (i.e. photovoltaic panels, solar generation plants, etc.) by 35 percent.\footnote{In 1998, the Berlin metropolitan area had approximately 300 solar power generation plants, creating up to 1,200 kilowatts per hour (Senatsverwaltung, 2003b).} Finally, the percentage of co-generation local and district heating of the total market should be increased from 25 percent in 2003 to 40 percent in 2020 (Senatsverwaltung, 2006a, p. 49). The last two action goals are inherently related, as with increased installation of renewable resource technology, it becomes easier for local power generation.

Similar to the action goals previously examined, the most daunting obstacle is securing funding for the programs’ success. Berlin’s Senate for Urban Development affirms that by influencing national laws and regulations to promote similar energy plans, then the city will be able to secure sufficient long-term funding. Unfortunately, if the federal government adopts similarly ambitious goals and passes them on to the states, then Berlin is again left competing for financial assistance; ecological restructuring of public funding systems (by placing a value on natural capital) is a potential alternative. Possible positive national options include introducing passive energy building standards for new construction and minimum energy standards for all buildings, heating laws requiring additional building technologies or systems for heat production using renewable energy systems, and introducing air traffic taxes to reduce CO$_2$ emissions, among others.

Berlin does in fact have effective energy programs in place. For example, public roof surfaces (when not used as green roofs) are used for photovoltaic systems. Furthermore, the city can continue to exclude nuclear energy in the Berlin-Brandenburg Region. The Senate for Urban Development (2006a) describes that an additional program,

\[\text{Is to be established for systematically increasing energy efficiency and for establishing renewable energy: comprehensive renovation and insulation of Berlin’s buildings (public and private) through energy partnerships, requiring City}\]


Housing Authorities to carry out energy studies of their buildings and to introduce benchmarking; consistent ecological purchasing for all public institutions… (p. 50)

As long as these programs are able to continue, then additional energy efficiency gains will be seen, though perhaps not as dramatic as the city aimed for in its long-term goals.

**Sustainable Mobility**

In addition to reducing dependence on vehicular transportation, the Senate for Urban Development has introduced additional measures to promote sustainable mobility. Among these are innovative concepts like “green arteries,” as well as more conventional plans to enforce nighttime speed reductions through residential areas, and car and bicycle sharing programs.

The “green artery” plan was introduced in 2004 as a part of Berlin’s Local Agenda 21. Cutting through Mitte, the land abutting the River Spree is slated to become one of twenty “green arteries” within the city (See Figure 4-8). Where the Tiergarten is the Berlin’s “lung,” the ten mile “green artery” running from Charlottenburg Castle to Rummelsburger Bucht is supposed to scenically connect the two halves of the city. Furthermore, the Spree green artery is planned in a way that it is within a few blocks’ distance from over fifty smaller city parks, which act as green recreational spaces (Senatsverwaltung, 2007d). The green arteries therefore not only encourage pedestrian activity, but also offer new intra-city linkages. Additionally, by planting native species along the river, the city is creating a scenic route for the enjoyment of tourists and residents alike.

The “Speed 30” initiative was introduced in April 2007 to reduce traffic and noise pollution in residential neighborhoods at night. The program is based on the assumption that noise pollution and air pollution caused by vehicular traffic can cause illness (e.g. insomnia, asthma, etc.). The Senate for Urban Development saw it as their obligation to citizens to create
“Speed 30” zones; the majority of Bezirke approved the measure (Senatsverwaltung, 2007d). Like any traffic zone with a speed limit, compliance is monitored by local police enforcement.

Though car sharing is not a novel idea, government sponsored programs are indeed rare. Begun in 1995, car sharing is regarded as a sustainable means of transportation. The Senate for Urban Development has found that car sharing users not only “change over to a more sustainable means of transport, but tend to generally reduce their transportation needs” (Senatsverwaltung, 2006a, p. 44). The city’s bicycle sharing program, Call-a-Bike, has provided bicycles in Mitte without restrictions on pick-up/return locations, since 2002. The bicycles are remotely released by cellular phone. It is not unusual to see a preponderance of bicycles within the inner city with the large red “DB” (Deutsche Bahn) logo. These two traffic measures have been effective in reducing traffic in the inner city, though not to the government’s target levels.

Summary

The Planwerk Innenstadt’s various elements have helped the inner city quickly rebuild its identity as a modern European capital. Given the city’s fiscal and political constraints, it is impressive that such dramatic and ambitious changes have been accomplished in less than two decades. As the findings show, the largest problems faced in meeting the action goals involve citizen participation, alleviating environmental hazards, and providing subsidies for program success (Table 4-2). The Planwerk Innenstadt considers these weaknesses, however, and has provided mechanisms to mitigate them. The main issue facing the Planwerk, then, is the discrepancy between the plan’s goals and the city’s ability to execute them.
Table 4-1. Inventory of housing typologies. [Gathered with data from the Berlin Senate Department for Urban Development. 2008.]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structure Type</th>
<th>Area Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Structure Types with Predominantly Residential Use</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) Late 19th-century block development with wings and rear buildings</td>
<td>(1) Closed courtyard</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2) Courtyard</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(5) Preservation-oriented reconstruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Late 19th-century block-edge development with few wings / rear buildings</td>
<td>(3) Decorative and garden court</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(6) Shed court</td>
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<tr>
<td>(3) Late 19th-century block-edge development with major changes</td>
<td>(7) Postwar block-edge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4) Reconstruction by de-coring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) Twenties and thirties block-edge and row development</td>
<td>(10) Large court and twenties and thirties row (in east-Berlin only large court)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(72) Twenties and thirties row</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) Fifties and later row development</td>
<td>(11) Fifties and later row</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6) Postwar high-rise development</td>
<td>(8) Unplanned reconstruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(9) High-rise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(7) Eighties and nineties block-edge or row development</td>
<td>(71) Eighties and nineties pre-fab high-rise,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(8) compact high urban living development of the nineties</td>
<td>(73) Settlement area of the nineties compact, &gt;= 4 floors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(9) urban living development of the nineties with low density</td>
<td>(74) Settlement area (row, single and double houses) of the nineties with low density, &lt; 4 floors</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4-2. Effectiveness of the Planwerk Innenstadt’s ten objectives.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objectives</th>
<th>+</th>
<th>-</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Appropriate the city through civic dialogue to reformulate Berlin’s identity</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advocate for sustainable urban development</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Enhance of public terrain through reurbanization</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Create new typologies for inner-city homes and jobs</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Create new forms of land management and investment</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Create links between urban planning and urban management</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Replacing the car-oriented city with a choice-oriented city</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enhance the historical center’s urban texture through dialogues on design elements</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enhance the western downtown’s urban fabric by reinforcing nodes</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advocate ‘modernity with tradition’ to replace the paradigms of Modernist urban design</td>
<td>+</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Figure 4-1. The Planwerk Innenstadt Berlin, 2002 update. [Reprinted with permission from the Berlin Senate Department for Urban Development. 2008.].
Figure 4-2. 3-D models of the Planwerk Innenstadt Berlin. The wooden structures represent post-1989 construction [Photographs taken by author. 2007.].
Figure 4-3. Examples of rehabilitated *Plattenbauten*. [Photographs taken by author.].
Figure 4-4. Examples of contemporary high-density urban development [Photographs taken by author.].
Figure 4-6. Transportation corridors in central Mitte.
Figure 4-7. Public transportation connectivity in Mitte.
Figure 4-8. Railway stations. Top: Ostbahnhof; Middle: Hauptbahnhof; Bottom: Unter den Linden. [Photographs taken by author].
Figure 4-9. An example of a “green artery” running through Mitte. [Reprinted with permission from the Berlin Senate Department for Urban Development. 2008.]
CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION: A EUROPEAN METROPOLIS

“Time is stronger than planning. The new parts of the city will be devoured by the new layers. Everything is a phase, just an episode. The city speaks for itself, as a person. The city is a very strong individual, capable of absorbing all the wounds that are inflicted on it” (Konrád, 2004, p. 43).

This chapter introduces the implications of the findings presented in Chapter 4. Gyorgy Konrád’s *The City Builder*, “tells the story of a town planner who discovers the city as a treasury of clever solutions to well-defined problems, and as an expression of what people think, what they do, what they aspire to. As soon as he starts to realize what the city is really like, he becomes aware of the shortcomings of modern town planning” (Konrád, 2004, p. 40). In the past decade, Berlin has arisen as a modern interpretation of the European capital city. The city shares many of the same problems as other capitals: stagnant growth, unaffordable housing, congested traffic, heightened ecological awareness, and socio-economic tensions. Berlin, however, has been given the opportunity to forge its own development by seeking out the city’s historical structures and interpreting them in new ways. This makes the Planwerk an effective plan—theoretically. Its execution, however, is limited due to extraneous circumstances (i.e. lack of funding), thus compromising the Planwerk’s ability to substantially affect change. The physical decisions made there directly affect the well-being of citizens and serve to mitigate the problems discussed above. The effects of the Planwerk Innenstadt are examined under three themes: (1) the European capital, (2) the unified city, and (3) the historical city. Finally, as the Planwerk Innenstadt is a constantly evolving plan, this chapter provides a glimpse into opportunities for further research.

**Measuring Up to the Definition of a European Capital**

This project is based on evaluating the certainty of the Planwerk Innenstadt’s claims that it is, in fact, (re)creating a modern European capital out of the divided city. To do this, several
unifying characteristics of successful capital cities were listed, including: proximity to a body of water, highly dense urban fabric, clear historic district, reliance on public transportation, and a commitment to promoting sustainable lifestyles. These characteristics were then juxtaposed with four elements of the Planwerk Innenstadt: housing, community development, transportation, and sustainability. By applying the criteria of the European city to the plan elements, it was possible to determine that the Planwerk is indeed accomplishing its goal—with unexpected results.

The Senate for Urban Development wishes to blur the lines that once divided the city by looking to the characteristics shared by great European cities and then highlighting those in central Berlin. During this process, they did not realize that they were, in fact, creating a new post-industrial city, principally because of the new issues and variables that they confronted. Mitte is experiencing a housing surplus, at the same time as it is experiencing massive financial deficits. Furthermore, various immigrant groups have created enclaves within the city. Finally, Berlin also had to adhere to federal sustainability measures to improve quality of life for all residents. After combining these variables, the Senate for Urban Development had to create new programs for city, some of which were explored above.

By creating programs and initiatives to resolve Berlin’s local problems, the Senate for Urban Development unknowingly created vanguard programs that have been recreated throughout Europe. The city’s sustainability initiatives are but one example, as other cities have developed similar green building guidelines. Furthermore, many ex-Soviet capitals are embracing their stock of Plattenbauten in the same manner as Berlin, as these too have proven to be highly attractive housing options. This paper found, then, that although Berlin wanted to capture a certain “lost” European character by emulating other cities, it has instead become a vanguard in creating the image of the ultra-modern, citizen-centered, sustainable city.
The Unified City: From Modern to Post-Modern

One of the unique characteristics of urban planning in Mitte is the preoccupation with acknowledging the various layers of history present in the streets and buildings. The Planwerk Innenstadt attempts to recreate historic block patterns and facades with the excuse of restoring Berlin its last “authentic” incarnation in history—the pre-World War I city.

Prior to 1914, Berlin was undergoing rapid transformation whilst becoming Europe’s modern Bauhaus-styled city. Current city planners wish to adopt planning principles present during this time period. However, this practice overlooks over six decades of the city’s history. By attempting to arbitrarily recreate the past, the city is at risk of falling into a post-modern slump—that is, recreating historic patterns without need. Furthermore, pre- World War I Berlin does not have the same demographics, cultural diversity, and financial woes as present-day Berlin. It would be counterintuitive to the Planwerk’s action goals to ignore these variables.

Continued community participation and involvement is needed to “shape our cities and to make them communicative,” in addition to maintaining a “checks and balances” system on development proposals (Rykwert, 2000, p. 246). Governing bodies, however, have overlooked this idea. In Berlin, the Bezirke facilitate community participation and have made city planning a more democratic process—at least in the neighborhoods with active community groups. It is pivotal that involved actors understand the city as a dynamic and three-dimensional figure, capable of self-generation, requiring understanding its layers of history, as well as an understanding “of how built forms are transformed into image by experience” (Rykwert, 2000, p. 246). Mitte residents already have obtained a reputation for understanding the city as an organic, growing creature, which needs to evolve and update itself; the uneasy tension exists in cases where emotional bonds to buildings and streets overshadow this understanding.
**The Influence of the Past**

Berlin’s form has been shaped by more than 700 years of history. Countless ideas, thoughts and speculations, planned and unplanned decisions, and constructive, as well as destructive events have left their physical mark. As Unger (1999) proclaims, “The city is a perfect textbook recording all the traces left behind by what has passed” (p. 93). Most other European capital cities embrace their history, with each period showing its distinct mark in the urban landscape. For Berlin, it is difficult to embrace history. Painting the GDR as a failed experiment or a dark horse trivializes the experience of millions of Germans who lived in the East. Berlin planners, then, must remain conscious of this debate, as they are responsible for rebuilding the city that was once at the edge of two worlds.

No one has to remind a Berliner about how much history there is in a city. Time has indeed proven to be stronger than any sort of urban planning planning. Anything having to do with building and planning, as the paper has demonstrated, is inevitably political. Planners (and builders), then, must be held publicly accountable for their actions. The Planwerk is an attempt to overcome Modernist planning without falling to pre-Modern planning practices, or giving up serious city planning altogether. It has been described as falling “somewhere between a general zoning plan and a special development plan” (Stimmnann, 2000, p. 31).

In matters involving contentious historical reflection, the Planwerk gets mired in self-aware debate. The city (and its planners, citizens, etc.) is continuously engaged in a dialectical process, where each statement is contradicted, and made relative by an opposing, or counter, statement. It is difficult to find a “third” or “new” direction for the city because the city is essentially a collection of fragments, ranging from the late 13th century until today. By attempting to rudimentarily heal wounds in search of a new identity, past planning endeavors have seldom worked out: a decade later the plans are accused of being un-German.
Beyond Berlin: Opportunities for Further Research

A city never stops growing and evolving—possibly to the chagrin of many planners and residents. Given the Planwerk Innenstadt’s collaborative nature, it is inherently a continuously evolving creature. It would be worthwhile to study the plan’s long-term results to see if the city indeed meets all of the action and objective goals detailed in Chapter Four and shown in Figure 5-1. Further research is also needed to thoroughly examine all of the issues present in the politics of space and memory in Berlin, and how well prepared urban planning is to deal with these. As Gyorgy Konrad espoused, plans and people are impermanent; regardless, planners must engage citizens to create the healthiest and most successful living space possible—if only for one’s own lifetime.

By using Berlin and the Planwerk as a case study of a fragmented urban space struggling with a new comprehensive plan, it is possible to apply some of these findings to future research on other fragmented cities, including Nicosia, Cyprus and Belfast, Ireland. Both of these cities are dealing with similar issues as Berlin regarding cultural inclusion, future visioning, and contested histories. By using Berlin as the prototypical divided city, it is possible to gather relevant information on the aforementioned cities to see how successful their paths to unification may be.
Figure 5-1. Projected view of Mitte by 2010. [Reprinted with permission from Palgrave Macmillan. 2008].
Housing Urban Development Plan (1999)– District Mitte. [Reprinted with permission from the Berlin Senate Department for Urban Development. 2008.].
Legend

Priority areas and locations

Development areas

Priority city development areas Inner City, West, South East and Northeast

Urban Development Schemes (§ 165 ff. BauGB)

Priority locations (MFH/>=250 AU, OFH/>=50 AU) OFH - Detached house for one family ("one family house") MFH - Detached house for two or more families ("more families house") AU - Apartment ("Apartment units")

Priority areas to complement the existing city structure

Existence of areas in priority development spaces (filling in of construction gaps in the city, in the western and south-eastern part of the city as well as in open design areas in the north-east of Berlin)

Securing and development of high-quality areas

Increase the urban density of areas, but in an open design form

Priority locations

Location development in respect to their marketability

Locations

Lower priority areas and locations Perspective areas (after 2010)

The space used for living as well as its other uses are to be clarified within the framework of further plans

Lower priority locations to be developed (after 2010)

Areas well down the list to be claimed for example domestic architectural areas or housing in mixed construction areas

Single measures

Guiding - projects for urban living

Current land use plan - alteration procedures

Possible land use plan - alteration fields Reduction / increase of domestic architectural areas, mixed construction areas
**Development of existing areas**

**Priority areas; Year of construction predominately up to 1948**

- Intense urban renewal (Redevelopment areas of the 9th RVO to 11th RVO)
- The finishing of the city renewal (Redevelopment areas of the 1st, 4th, 6th, 7th RVO)
- Old inner city building quarters
- Areas with special development needs (neighbourhood management)

**Year of construction predominately after 1948**

- Settlements (large housing estates and social housing complexes)
- Areas with special development need (neighbourhood management)
- Guiding-projects of urbanisation in the inner city

**Links / restrictions**

- City-Structural Contract Area (§ 11 BauGB / city-structural contracts under preparation)
- Formal defined redevelopment areas (§ 136 ff. BauGB) (§§ 136 ff. BauGB)
- Aircraft noise protection-, planning zones, settlement limitation zone / water protection area
- Residential areas and mixed construction areas of the land use plan, state October 1998
- High expenditure for external development of potential areas together with city-technical infrastructure >500 AU

**Other descriptions**

- Water
- Subway, commuter railroad, regional railroad / small railroad (according to the land use plan)
- Highways (according to the land use plan)
- District boundaries / county border
The basic map for the surrounding area

- Motorways in the surrounding area / a and b roads (federal highways) in the surrounding area
- Railway constructions in the surrounding area
- Municipality boundaries / district boundaries
- Built up areas in the surrounding area
LIST OF REFERENCES


BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Alexandra Cristina Montealegre was born on June 29, 1984, in Miami, Florida, to Nicaraguan parents. Growing up in both Nicaragua and the United States, Alexandra was exposed to differing political systems and development patterns at an early age. She graduated from Dr. Michael M. Krop Senior High School in Miami in 2002, going to the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign to study political science. Alexandra transferred to the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in 2003 to study political science and history. Within political science, she focused on Latin American politics; in history, her studies were concentrated on modern Europe, particularly Germany. Through her electives in anthropology, German studies, and dual enrollment at Duke University’s art history program, she began to explore the connections between culture, politics, and the built environment. Although Alexandra first considered pursuing graduate work in material anthropology, she instead chose urban planning, as it was a more pragmatic field in which to pursue her research interests.

She earned a bachelor’s degree in political science with a second major in modern European history from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in 2006. Later that year, Alexandra enrolled in the graduate program in urban and regional Planning at the University of Florida on a U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development Community Development Scholarship. She is interested in post-conflict development, sustainable design, infrastructure and modernization in the Global South, and historic preservation.